Populist Voting Demographics in Australia and New Zealand

An Aggregate Level Analysis

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Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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Abstract

Do populist supporters in Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) share commonalities or does each country possess its own unique form of populist supporter? To consider this question this study uses aggregate level data to create a quantitative analysis of populist support in ANZ and is divided into five sections. Section 1 establishes what populism is in a theoretical context and Section 2 addresses the factors that cause and sustain populism. Section 3 applies these principles to four political parties deemed to be populist in ANZ; Pauline Hanson's One Nation, United Australia Party, Association of Consumers and Taxpayers and New Zealand First. Section 4 uses simple linear regression to compare vote share from the 2019 Australian Federal election and the 2020 New Zealand General election to the most recent census data in each country determining demographic support. Multiple regression models then present the strongest demographic variables supporting each party. Section 5 discusses two significant findings. First, there is no single variable determining populist support across ANZ but there are commonalities within the variable categories of education and employment type. Second, two distinct types of populism are present in New Zealand compared to a single competing populist presence in Australia.

Introduction

Populism's influence has been profound since the mid-1990s, featuring prominently in elections, media coverage and academic writings. Populism is often derided as a threat to modern democracies and used solely as a pejorative. Yet, despite the increased focus, populism remains an elusive term to satisfactorily define and categorise. Populism as a political theory is widely debated in academia, as are the specific causes of why voters reject mainstream political parties and support actors who many decry as divisive and racist demagogues. Populism exists in a variety of political systems such as the electoral college in the United States (US), the first past the post system in the United Kingdom (UK) and proportional representation systems used across Europe, indicating populism is not limited to a specific country or electoral system. In order to understand populism, it is important to examine commonalities from successful populist movements.

The *Front national*, founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, promoted anti-immigration policies, advocating significant cuts to legal immigration and protection of French identity. In 2012, Jean-Marie Le Pen's daughter, Marine Le Pen, was elected by the party as their new leader. Marine Le Pen has moderated the *Front national* and has sought to distance it from the extreme right, by censuring the party's more controversial figures, including her own father who she expelled in 2015. In the 2017 presidential election, Le Pen surpassed all of her father's previous achievements by finishing second in the first round with 21.30%, albeit still losing to Emanuele Macron, in the second round achieving 33.90% of the vote. In 2018, Le Pen officially changed the name of the party from *Front national* to *Rassemblement national* and softened its Eurosceptic positions. *Rassemblement national* now advocate to remain in the European Union's (EU) Schengen area and to keep the Euro as the main currency

of France.[1] In the 2022 presidential election Le Pen improved her 2018 result by finishing second with 23.15% of the vote in the first round and then 41.45% in the run off. Despite losing to Marcon again, Le Pen has made populism mainstream in France.

In the liberal Nordic countries, populism still exerts political influence. *Fremskrittspartiet* of Norway, described as moderately right-wing populist,[2] had its first major victory in 1997 achieving 15.3% vote share and entered into a confidence and supply role with the coalition of *Kristelig Folkeparti*, *Venstre* and *Senterpartiet*. Although the coalition ended in 2005, *Fremskrittspartiet* received a vote share of 22.1%, becoming the second largest party in parliament and the official opposition. Their election results have deteriorated slightly in the 2021 election receiving 15.2% of the vote and 27 seats, however, they remain the third largest party in the Norwegian parliament. In Denmark, *Dansk Folkeparti* (DDP) founded in 1995, first entered parliament in 2001 on 12% vote share. Since then, the DPP have increased their vote share in every election and in 2015 won 21.1% of the vote and 37 seats in the parliament, making them the second largest political party in the country. Like their Norwegian counterparts, their electoral success has waned slightly, in 2019, they achieved 8.7% of the vote entitling them to 16 seats, a net loss of 21; however, they remain the third largest party in Denmark.

Two of the most impactful instances of populism came within months of each other in 2016. The so-called Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States of America. In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU in a public referendum by a margin of 51.9% leave and 48.1% remain. With 72% turnout and over

[1] Barbière, "Le Pen's Rassemblement National Revises Stance towards EU and the Euro."

[2] Bergmann, *Nordic Nationalism and Right-Wing Populist Politics*, 199.

33 million votes cast, Brexit is the largest democratic process in the UK's history. The vote was split along education, age and geography. Leave voters tended to be older, low skilled, non-university educated, jaded by more socially liberal cultural changes imposed by a media and political class.[3] An important precursor to Brexit was the political ascension of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Formed in 1991, UKIP was a single-issue party with the sole aim of taking the UK out of the EU. The party had little electoral success until Nigel Farage became leader. Farage expanded UKIP's policy platform, focusing on concerns over increased immigration into the UK. UKIP won two seats in the House of Commons through by-elections in 2014 and in the 2015 general election they secured 12.6% of the popular vote. Due to the first past the post system in the UK, this resulted in only one seat in the House of Commons, but it made UKIP the third most voted for party in the UK. Preceding the 2015 election then Prime Minister, David Cameron, vowed to hold a referendum on EU membership to appease not only Eurosceptics within his Conservative Party but also voters who were seen as defecting to UKIP. Farage resigned shortly after the Brexit referendum and UKIP has struggled to retain political momentum, achieving 0.07% of the total vote in the 2019 UK general election. However, UKIP's impact on British and European politics have had a profound and lasting effect.

Brexit represented one of the most decisive victories for populists in Europe, six months later American populists would celebrate their own victory. In November 2016, the US presidential election was won by businessman and media personality, Donald Trump. Trump, running as the Republican nominee, who had no previous political experience, beat veteran Democrat

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[3] Goodwin and Heath, "The 2016 Referendum," 330.

politician Hillary Clinton, in the Electoral College 304 to 227.[4] Trump possessed an anti-immigrant nativist nationalism,[5] expressed by targeting minorities such as Mexicans and Muslims in crude and debatably racist rhetoric. Accused of appealing to the worst aspects of the electorate, pundits cited his chances of winning as low as 1.7%,[6] to a comparatively high 28.6%.[7] Yet, Trump defied expectations in what is considered to be one of the most shocking election upsets in American political history.[8] Reasons for Trump's victory include his rejection of political correctness, working-class apathy towards an elitist Democrat Party and Clinton's immense unpopularity with the American electorate.[9] In 2020, Trump lost the presidential race to Democrat Joe Biden, but increased his overall vote to 74.21 million, making Trump the most voted for Republican nominee in American history. Despite numerous controversies, including two impeachments, Trump remains a strong candidate amongst conservatives for the 2024 Republican nomination.[10]

The previous examples offer insight into how populism has affected electoral competition within the past two decades. Le Pen is highly successful, others such as *Fremskrittspartiet* and the DDP see their success eb and flow, while others such as UKIP are verging on irrelevancy despite the legacy they have left. However, *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* of Austria, *Alternative für Deutschland* of Germany, *Partij voor de Vrijheid* of the Netherlands, *Vox* of Spain, *Chega* of Portugal and *Movimento 5 Stelle* of Italy all represent the increasing influence

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[4] National Archives, "2016 Electoral College Results."

[5] Goodheart, "Trump's Cultural Populism," 22.

[6] Scheller, "2016 President Forecast."

[7] Silver, "2016 Election Forecast."

[8] Goldmacher and Schreckinger, "Trump Pulls off Biggest Upset in U.S. History."

[9] Agnew and Shin, *Mapping Populism*, 77.

[10] Ulmer, "Trump Wins CPAC Conservative Meeting's 2024 Presidential Straw Poll."

populist movements have on modern democracies. Even Canada, a western democracy purportedly void of national populism, has experienced a populist movement concentrated within the francophone population, *Coalition Avenir Québec*.[11] Much has been written about the reasons why populism has received this level of success. A populist narrative has formed amongst parts of the media and academia; that populist support emanates from old, angry, white men, aggrieved by neo-liberal policies resulting in financial crises.[12] Yet, a counter narrative has emerged within academia rejecting the economic narrative and arguing that increased immigration and a rejection of cosmopolitan liberal ideals offer a better argument for populist support. See Margalit,[13] Eatwell and Goodwin,[14] and Inglehart and Norris.[15]

This study addresses populist support on a quantitative level within Australia and New Zealand (ANZ). Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON), United Australia Party (UAP), Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) and New Zealand First (NZF) are ideologically distinct yet all considered populist. To determine demographic predictors for populist support within ANZ, aggregate level analysis is conducted upon election data and census information. At time of writing, the Australian 2022 federal election is yet to be held and the results from the Australian 2021 census are unavailable.[16] The most recent data obtainable is the primary vote from the 2019 Australian federal election, which is compared to the 2016 Australian census. The general electorate vote and list seat vote from the 2020 New Zealand general

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[11] Kaufmann, *Whiteshift*, 284.

[12] Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, "Resolving Debt Overhang," 1-28.

[13] Margalit, "Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered," 152-170.

[14] Eatwell and Goodwin, *National Populism*.

[15] Inglehart and Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism," 1-52.

[16] The Australian 2022 Federal election was held on May 21st 2022 resulting in a Labor victory. The results for 2021 Australian census will be available in late June 2022.

election is compared to the 2018 New Zealand census. In addition to census data, results for the 2017 Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey and the New Zealand 2020 Cannabis and Euthanasia referendums are also examined.

Using linear regression on populist party vote share against the demographic composition of electorates, demographic variables that indicate support for populist parties are determined. These variables indicate if economic factors, cultural factors or a combination of the two provide explanations for populist support and determine commonalities between populist parties in ANZ. Economics and culture cannot be so cleanly separated as to isolate a specific determinate for populism. Immigration is a variable related to both economics, perception of increased employment competition, and culture, natives adapting to foreign ideas and customs. Therefore, as an explanator for populist support, economics and culture should be viewed as varying predictors rather than a mutually exclusive proposition.

The study is divided into five sections. Section 1 addresses the question of what populism is, how the term populism is used and how it manifests as a political philosophy. Drawing on theories established in the literature, key arguments such as 'the people' versus 'the elite', the importance of a populist leader and the tensions between globalisation and nationalism are addressed. Section 2 examines the causes of populist success outlined in this introduction. Cultural and economic factors are evaluated, specifically the cultural role of immigration and resistance to what is termed as left-modernism. After establishing what populism is and identifying its predominant causes, Section 3 details populism specifically within ANZ. The electoral success and differences between the Australian and New Zealand populist parties are evaluated. Section 4 details the methodology used in aggregate level analysis and results from simple linear regression are examined. Models for each party identifying the

demographic variables that indicate support are presented through multiple linear regression. Section 5 draws conclusions from the results and determine what similarities, if any, are present between the four populist parties and presents possible future research opportunities based on this study.

Section 1: What Is Populism

To conduct a study into populism, it is necessary to establish a theoretical framework of what populism is. Consistent inquiry into populism demonstrates the obtuse nature of the term, scholars and those outside the academy provide conflicting and varied definitions of populism.

1.1 The Left-Right Dynamic

Mainstream politics encompasses the political ideology of the economic left-right cleavage established in the aftermath of the French Revolution, yet populism does not conform to conventional political philosophies such as liberalism or socialism. Populism exists across the left-right political spectrum and its proponents are found in traditional socialist, liberal, conservative and other political ideologies. Evidence of populism's political diversity is documented in The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 5.[17] Political parties are ranked on a traditional left-right cleavage and also a one to ten scale of how populist they are by electoral experts in their respective countries, one equals "not populist at all" and ten equals "extremely populist". *Kommounistiko Komma Ellados* of Greece is considered to be the most left-wing party in the 2015 election, yet it is amongst three other parties considered to be the most populist, each scoring eight. *Movimento 5 Stelle* of Italy is recorded as the most populist party, receiving a ten, in the 2018 election but was rated centrist in the left-right cleavage. As the name would suggest, *Partido Comunista Português* of Portugal is a communist party and has the highest left-wing rating of the 2019 election. However, it scored a seven on the populist scale behind only *Chega* which scored ten.

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[17] Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, "CSES Module 5."

Populism exists on the right side of the traditional political divide but is not the exclusive product of right-wing politics. Upon their emergence to the political stage in the early 1980s, the Green parties of Europe were considered populist.[18] Focusing on a single issue, the environment, they presented as an antithesis to conventional political thought and process. Only in recent years have Green parties expanded beyond single issue politics and embraced a wider ranging political ideology.

Confusion over the left-right dynamic leads to misuse of the term populism, commonly reduced to a pejorative ascribed to one's political opponents. As demonstrated by Bale, Van Kessel and Taggart, print media in the United Kingdom (UK) applied the term 'populist' to political actors such as Barack Obama, John McCain and David Cameron. Little justification of why the term populist was used and the aforementioned actor's establishment credentials were ignored.[19] It was concluded the term populist was employed as a negative adjective, most likely used to smear a right-wing politician the left leaning press did not approve of.[20]

Traditionally, political entities will display their left-right allegiance predominantly and use it to differentiate from other parties. Labour, or Labor, is synonymous with traditional centre left politics, organised around unions and lower socio-economic workers, referred to as working-class. Centre right parties extol the virtues of free market capitalism and reduced government regulation in the private sector. However, populists rarely label themselves in such an identifiable manner.[21] The Chapel Hill Expert Survey reviewed European political

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[18] Taggart, *The New Populism and the New Politics*, 25.

[19] Bale, Van Kessel, and Taggart, "Thrown around with Abandon," 119.

[20] Bale, Van Kessel and Taggart, 126.

[21] Worsley, "The Concept of Populism," 218.

parties between 1999 and 2019. Academics and political experts identified 50 parties as populist, yet none of these parties described themselves as populist.[22] The closest identifier was the word popular used twice, *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (Popular Republican Movement) of France and *Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós* (Popular Orthodox Rally) of Greece. This inconsistent placement on the left-right cleavage and lack of self-identification contribute to competing academic and journalistic arguments as to how populism is defined.

1.2 The People

The most widely accepted phrase defining populism is 'the people' versus 'the elite'. This phrase is best articulated by Cass Mudde, who states populism is "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people."[23] The phrase contains three key identifiers of populism: 'the people', 'the elite' and the conflict between them. Arguably the hardest of these identifiers to accurately define is 'the people'. This study demonstrates quantitatively, at an aggregate level, who 'the people' are within Australia and New Zealand. Representing a literal form of 'the people' in a specific context, the results may not necessarily represent populist support in other countries and at other time periods. Therefore, a greater interrogation of the term 'the people' is required in order to understand how it exists within the framework of populism.

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[22] Jolly et al., "Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2019."

[23] Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," 543.

Scholars argue that 'the people' only refer to a specific class segment, typically the working-class that have been abused by the rich and powerful.[24] However, this argument refers to 'the people' as viewed by left-wing political groups and is couched in the traditional left-right cleavage; as demonstrated, populism exists across this spectrum. 'The people' are also conflated with the uniquely American context of 'we the people' from the United States Constitution. Similar to the class-based definition, 'we the people' refers to a specific group of individuals who reside within the United States and who are subject to the protections of the Constitution. 'The people' of populist context exist within and outside the parameters of class and constitutional definitions. Rather than isolate a specific group, 'the people' should be thought of as a rhetorical tool, an abstract idea that contains the emotion felt by certain citizens towards societal elite. To emphasise the nature of this abstract, Paul Taggart uses the term 'Heartland' as an alternative to 'the people'. The 'Heartland' is a place "in which, in the populist imagination, a virtuous and unified population resides."[25] The 'Heartland' helps to emphasise that 'the people' in populist rhetoric are neither real nor all-inclusive, but are in fact a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population. Taggart also emphasises the uniformity of the 'Heartland' as set in the past, leading to a sense of forgotten glories. This past encapsulates a time of moral purity and cultural dominance. The evocation of the past contributes to the illusionary nature of 'the people', presenting a fabled reality rather than authenticity.[26]

Taggart's 'Heartland' encapsulates 'the people' not as a specific group but of a feeling, an emotional appeal to the electorate. As such, 'the people' are best defined as: A simplistic and

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[24] Di Tella, "Populism into the Twenty-First Century," 190.

[25] Taggart, *Populism*, 95.

[26] Tuan, "Space and Place: Humanistic Perspective," 194.

guttural discourse, an emotional statement claiming loss, a past that was morally purer and a condemnation of the societal elite who has bettered themselves through corruption and betrayal of ordinary citizens. This definition of 'the people', communicating on an emotional level, serves populists in two fundamental ways. As 'the people' is an emotional appeal, empirical evidence is not required, populist supporters simply know it to be true. It is not to assert that populists do not use empirical evidence, but the core message is an emotional one, as demonstrated by the Brexit referendum. The 'Leave' campaign focused on the emotional resonance of an independent UK; the empirical evidence used was in service of an idealised version of the UK that would be regained by leaving the European Union (EU). Conversely, the 'Remain' campaign focused on empirical negatives if the UK were to leave the EU. In doing so, the 'Leave' campaign engaged the electorate on an emotional level while the 'Remain' campaign relied on negative empiricism and failed to convey a broader message of positivity associated with the EU.[27]

Populists will denounce organisations and individuals, typically 'the elite', with claims of oppression or betrayal of 'the people'. Understanding 'the people' as an abstract provides populists with a useful tool in which to target their opponents. Countering populist rhetoric incurs an insult against 'the people', a denial of the sense of loss and a repudiation of voters' feelings. However, this interpretation of 'the people' cannot always represent a feeling of loss. As previously stated, Green parties of the early 1980s were also considered populist. How does 'the people' of modern populism differentiate from 'the people' of the 1980s Greens without resorting to the left-right cleavage? In order for these different philosophies to both co-exist as populism, they must be considered different *types* of populism, national

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[27] Agnew and Shin, *Mapping Populism*, 65.

populism and green populism. There are philosophical commonalities between national populism and green populism, although these are not strictly the only two variations. Rather, when discussing populism, greater specificity is required. The central difference between national populism and green populism is a concern for the future compared to a focus on the past, proactive compared to reactive. Green populism used the phrase 'the people' to envisage an educated, engaged and progressive electorate, one that was concerned and took action to preserve the future.[28] 'The people' of national populism represents a rebellion of the silent majority. The aggrieved, law-abiding citizen, who has had society of the past changed irrevocably by progressive ideology, in which they no longer matter.

1.3 The Elite

While 'the people' exist as an abstract and is difficult to fully articulate, 'the elite' are far more specific. Mainstream politicians, media elites, bankers and universities would all qualify as 'the elite' within populist framing.[29] Bankers who have profited from financial collapses, most notably the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), are seen to be in collusion with corrupt politicians, typically of the centre right, securing the financial stability of wealthy elites at the direct expense of ordinary citizens. Media outlets and universities that promote values of diversity and equity over established traditions and have these values re-enforced by politicians, typically of the centre left, are seen to be either patronising or directly disparaging 'the people'.

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[28] Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," 557.

[29] Greven, "The Rise of Rightwing Populism in Europe and the United States," 3.

Populists will focus attention on groups and individuals at the lower end of the socio-economic strata such as new immigrants, asylum seekers, indigenous peoples and other minorities. Populism is regularly cast as an aggressor to minorities,[30] but successful populists' true ire is directed at the social elite that facilitates an ever greater liberal and cosmopolitan value shift upon 'the people'. An outline of how distinct populism is from traditional politics is found within Paul Taggart's 'unpolitics' and the tropes of war, conspiracy, and religion. Taggart's war trope is actualised with the suspension of rights.[31] Populists frame 'the people' and 'the elite' as engaged in an ideological war. Within this war, as with actual wars, rights are suspended in the service of a greater outcome. Populism suspends rights of minorities in a form of 'collateral damage' by breaking social taboos in order to attack 'the elite'. Populists who focus entirely on minorities tend not to be as electorally successful as populists who break social taboos surrounding minorities to target elites. For example, Marie Le Pen's 'softened' stance on minorities in comparison to her father has proved electorally very successful in France.

Another example of populism criticising minorities, but ultimately blaming societal elites is Pauline Hanson's maiden speech to the Australian parliament.[32] Given in 1996, Hanson was an independent, having been disavowed by the Liberals, but her speech set the tone employed by the party she would go on to form less than a year later, One Nation. In the speech Hanson targets Aboriginals for receiving greater monetary and governmental benefits compared to non-Aboriginal citizens. She explicitly blames the government at the time and its bureaucrats for the disparity in welfare payments and wasted money. Whilst commenting

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[30] Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers," 35-49.

[31] Taggart, "Populism and the Crisis of Democracy," 82.

[32] The Sydney Morning Herald, "Pauline Hanson's 1996 Maiden Speech to Parliament."

on the amount spent on payments to Aboriginals, she states "$40 million spent so far in native title has gone into the pockets of grateful lawyers and consultants." Hanson even offers a form of reconciliation towards the indigenous peoples of Australia by implying they are the victims of government mismanagement, "the majority of Aboriginals do not want handouts because they realise that welfare is killing them." Hanson also makes her infamous "swamped by Asians" comment in the same speech in relation to what she viewed as an increasingly open and abused immigration system. The violation of taboos involving Aboriginal people is ethically questionable, but whether Hanson's comments are factually accurate is irrelevant to populist rhetoric. National populism represents a tension between genuine discrimination of minorities and attacks on societal elite's deference to modern values over 'the people', with the latter being more electorally successful.

Taggart's second trope of 'unpolitics' is conspiracy and stems from the propensity to see the elected, corporate, social and academic elite as corrupt and unrepresentative of the wider population. Populism maintains the assumption that 'the elite' and the institutions they represent are not just working against 'the people,' but that they are designed to.[33] Conspiracy also simplifies complexity, resorting to unsophisticated explanations for difficult and multifaceted situations. Complex political situations constricted to simplistic rhetoric are demonstrated through the premise of the 'Cartel Party' by Katz and Mair.[34] The emergence of the 'Cartel Party' is a result of mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties moving closer to the political centre in order to maximise their potential vote. As a result, the policies each party present become increasingly similar with only marginal differences to avoid

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[33] Taggart, "Populism and the Crisis of Democracy," 84.

[34] Katz and Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy," 5-28.

disrupting norms established within the country. This cartelisation of policy is compounded by the necessity of governments to form coalitions in order to govern. Countries that operate a proportional representation voting system, where a single party rarely achieves more than 50% of the vote, are particularly reliant on coalitions to form a functioning government. In certain circumstances centre-left and centre-right parties may work together to form a grand coalition with the explicit intention of isolating what they consider extreme parties, such as national or green populists. This allows the populist party to target political elites as conspiring against 'the people', simplifying the intricacies of policy and ignoring electoral realities.

Examples from Austria and the Netherlands present direct instances of political cartelisation, exacerbating the populist trope of conspiracy. Austria's centre left *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs* (SPO), orchestrated a series of grand coalitions with the centre right *Österreichische Volkspartei* (ÖVP) in the early 1990s with the explicit goal of isolating the national populist party *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPO). This strategy did little to counter FPO claims of a "stitch-up of state and society"[35] by the two larger parties. The isolation tactic ultimately failed as concern over increased immigration, dismissed by the grand coalition and addressed predominantly by the FPO, became too salient an issue amongst the electorate to ignore. As a result, in 1999 the OVP had to form a coalition with the FPO. Given the FPO's direct hostility towards open immigration and its leader Jörg Haider cast as a xenophobe and racist, the coalition was met with protest in Austria and even a threat of sanctions from the EU.[36] However, the coalition held and the FPO continue to attract high levels of support.

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[35] Luther, "Austria," 428.

[36] Nohlen, *Elections in Europe*, 179.

Major parties in the Netherlands went to extreme measures to isolate the Gert Wilders led *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV). In 2017, the PVV became the Netherlands second biggest party with 13.06% of the vote. However, nearly all other parties had ruled out forming a coalition with the PVV as Wilders had become one of Europe's leading critics of mass immigration, specifically Muslim immigration, and had taken a distinctly anti-Islam stance in PVV policy. Forming a coalition became increasingly difficult as multiple parties had to compromise on a wide range of policy stances in order to numerically form an effective government without PVV collaboration. Eventually, a four-party coalition comprising of the *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, *Christen-Democratisch Appèl*, the liberal *Democraten 66* and the conservative *ChristenUnie* was formed 225 days after the election. In order to prevent the PVV from taking office, other political parties set a record for the longest cabinet formation in Dutch political history.[37]

1.4 Conflict

Conflict between 'the people' and 'the elite' is the third identifier of populism, rejecting traditional political norms of disagreement and compromise. To serve as an effective government, compromises on legislation and election promises are negotiated between the government, dissenters within the government and the opposition. Political norms rely on establishing compromise, populism rejects political norms[38] and the conflict between 'the people' and 'the elite' allows for no such concessions. Established institutions that question

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[37] Kroet, "Dutch Coalition Partners Agree on Government Deal, Seek Party Backing."

[38] Taggart, "Populism and the Crisis of Democracy," 85.

or hinder the progress of 'the people' face more than just criticism, they are denounced as evil, corrupt and an enemy of 'the people'.

Cass Mudde states, populism requires that "opponents are not just people with different priorities and values, they are evil."[39] Compromise with pure evil will only lead to the corruption of the good and cannot be permitted. Populism requires its opponents and critics to be the very antithesis to 'the people', this approach to morality and conflict is decidedly Manichean. A religious system from third century Iran focusing on the dualistic nature of the universe, Manichaeism is a principle of good versus evil[40] in which middle ground and compromise is not permitted, a system of absolutes. Manichaeism disavows compromise and frames conflict as a struggle between the pure and the corrupt. Political norms of western democracy rely on a tension of disagreement and compromise. Too much disagreement and politics is considered to have descended into pure conflict and to have failed. Too much compromise results in a perception of governments and oppositions as colluding and lacking conviction and differentiation. Populism does not require total revolution, its proponents are not anarchists, but it does embrace a form of moral conflict. Populism sets the emotional yearning of 'the people' as a moral purity that cannot be questioned and objections to that yearning are labeled corrupt and evil. Populism tries to exist within political systems but apart from politics, aiming to return a direct sovereignty to it supporters. Further details on this are examined in Section 2.1.

Stark differences between the strategic approach of traditional politics and populism are demonstrated by comparing US Republicans Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump. During their

[39] Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," 544.

[40] Leeming, "Manichaeism."

respective presidential campaigns each addressed supporters in regards to their political opponents. Reagan, representing established political norms, remarked in October 1980, "The important issues of the day have fallen into the hands of people whose motives are certainly not in question but whose fundamental understanding of how to lead America is woefully inadequate."[41] Reagan acknowledges the intentions of the incumbent Democrat administration, led by Jimmy Carter, as well intentioned but inept at delivering meaningful results.

Trump represents a populist abandonment of political norms and employs a Manichean notion that his opponents are evil and their intentions are nefarious. Speaking in 2016 at a rally in Montana, Trump stated, "radical Democrats, they want to raise your taxes, they want to impose socialism on our incredible nation, make it Venezuela…. They would rather devastate American communities than defend America's borders…. The Democrats have truly turned into an angry mob, bent on destroying anything or anyone in their path."[42] Disparities between Reagan's chastising of an opponent for failing to deliver success and Trump's Manichean approach of depicting his opponent as intentionally immoral are clear. The Manichean approach to purity and corruption, in which no compromise is made, emphasises the stark polarity in which populism frames opponents of 'the people'.

Populism's Manichean philosophy is directly related to Taggart's trope of war, placing emphasis on an enduring ideological war rather than individual battles that are won or lost.[43] Losing an individual battle, such as an election or debate, can be reframed within the context

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41 Memoryretro, *Reagan Campaign Event. 31 October 1980*.

42 Eapen, "Remarks at a 'Make America Great Again' Rally in Missoula, Montana."

43 Taggart, "Populism and the Crisis of Democracy," 82.

of war as a mobilising force for populism. Evoking a sense of oppression upon 'the people', populist actors can claim the superior resources or corruption of 'the elite' as a reason for failure. A clear example of this would be Donald Trump's refusal to accept the 2020 US presidential election result, in which he lost to Democrat Joe Biden. In the so called 'stop the steal' campaign, Trump falsely blamed his loss on voter fraud perpetrated by Dominion voting machines and the subsequent lack of investigation on "radical left democrats" in conjunction with "fake news media."[44] By denying the election result, Trump was able to galvanise a section of his supporters into believing that societal elites were oppressing their vote, leading in part, to the January 6th attack on the US Capitol building in an attempt to prevent the formalisation of the election result.

1.5 The Leader

Taggart's third 'unpolitics' trope is religion. Early instances of populism are grounded in religious movements, the American Know Nothings of the 1800s were founded on Protestant rebellion towards Catholic immigration.[45] However, the trope of religion does not denote a single faith but a comparison of religious action and rhetoric that populists employ. 'The people' is a faith-based concept, not something that is empirically proven but something that is felt. This can result in the tendency to proselytise on a moral basis rather than a factual one, the emotional appeal of 'the people' opposed to the rationale of 'the elite'. Yet, the most striking way populism mimics religion is in the concept of the charismatic leader.[46] This does not refer to merely a personable or charming form of leadership but the Weberian idea of

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[44] Olson, "Trump's Latest Voter Fraud Claims about Dominion Aren't Just False, They're a Bit Ironic."

[45] Billington, *The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860*.

[46] Taggart, "Populism and the Crisis of Democracy," 83.

charisma, implying touched by God. This form of leadership means that the authority attaches, not to an office or tradition, but to the individual alone.

Considered one of the founders of modern political science, Max Weber describes three types of legitimate rule: Legal, traditional and charismatic.[47] Legal refers to elected officials, viewed by populism as 'the elite', and traditional comprises of hereditary recipients, such as monarchs. Similar to religious figureheads, the charismatic leader possesses supernatural, superhuman, or exceptional powers or qualities,[48] setting them apart from the citizenship. Populism requires the charismatic leader to encapsulate 'the people' and prioritise faith and enthusiasm over experience as no other leader could. This reverence for the leader is articulated in an excerpt from Arlie Hochschild's book, *Strangers in Their Own Land*. On attending a Donald Trump rally, she writes:

> The day before the Louisiana Republican primary in March 2016, I watched Donald Trump's Boeing 757 descend from the sky at the Lakefront Airport in New Orleans. Inside the crowded hangar, Elton John's 'Rocket Man' was playing. Red, white, and blue strobe lights roved sideways and up. Cell phones snapped photos of the blond-haired candidate as he stood before thousands waving and shaking signs that read MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN. A small, wiry man bearing this sign with both hands, eyes afire, called out within earshot, "To be in the presence of such a man! To be in the presence of such a man." There seemed to be in this man's call… a note of reverence, even ecstasy.[49]

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[47] Weber, *The Three Types of Legitimate Rule*.

[48] Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 10.

[49] Hochschild, *Strangers in Their Own Land*, 683.

As populism deviates from the established norms of politics, so does Weber's charismatic leader. The charismatic leader "lacks all orientation to rules and regulations whether enacted or traditional. … irrational decisions are characteristic of charismatic authority."[50] The violation of norms presents two distinct advantages for populist leaders, excitement and opposition. The rebellious nature of the charismatic leader is suited to represent the inherent emotional nature of 'the people' and solidifies the leader as distinctly separate from 'the elite' and their bureaucratic institutions.

The leader centric nature of populism possesses the strengths of an appeal to emotion, relies on faith over empiricism and does not require established political ideology to achieve its goals. However, these advantages are outweighed by an observation contained within Weber's appraisal of the charismatic leader. Charismatic leadership is unstable by nature, relying on an individual to encompass 'the people' possesses the inherent risk of momentum subsiding once the leader is uninvolved. Populist supporters are inherently disinterested in politics, viewing it as dominated by 'the elite' and therefore irredeemably corrupt and require a leader to reflect 'the people' on a moral level.[51] This support is generated relative to a crisis that is neither imagined nor created by the leader, but exemplifies the feelings of loss and betrayal of 'the people'.[52] The embodiment of 'the people' through the populist leader allows populist supporters to enact their moral world view upon what they perceive as a corrupt process. However, once populism loses its charismatic leader 'the people' are not so easily personified and the sense of urgent reaction against the crises fades. Examples of populist movements failing without their leaders include the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* of the Netherlands and

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[50] Weber, *The Three Types of Legitimate Rule*, 6.

[51] Taggart, "Populism and the Crisis of Democracy," 81.

[52] Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," 548.

UKIP of the UK. Both parties encountered dramatically poorer election results without the specific dynamic that Pim Fortuyn and Nigel Farage brought respectively.

In order to survive once the charismatic leader is removed, populism must engage in what Weber describes as "routinization".[53] This involves standardising the movement and providing an organisational structure based on the ideas and policy put forward by the now absent charismatic leader. Ironically, to achieve longevity, populist movements must transition into an organisation akin to 'the elite', establishing political norms originally derided by populist supporters. Weber's 'routinization' allows for continuation of the leader's legacy, a direct descendant such as the leader's child may carry the mantel of the original leader whilst evoking change that 'routinization' requires. Marine Le Pen is an example of this but direct descendants are uncommon and the successful new organisation has to be built upon the ideas and legacy of the original leader, albeit without requiring their unique encapsulation of 'the people'. However, if the organisation relies solely on the appeal to emotion without an authentic avatar for 'the people' it is perceived as ersatz and will ultimately fail.

In Australia, One Nation has performed poorly in the absence of its founding member Pauline Hanson, having its most successful primary vote in a federal election in 1998 with 8.43% and in 2001 with 4.34%. Hanson left the party in 2002 which resulted in drastically poorer election results, averaging a primary vote share of only 0.46% between 2004 and 2013. These results changed once Hanson was reinstated as leader in 2014, refer to section 3.1 for details. The United Australia Party (UAP) relies on its leader but unlike One Nation the concentration of power is deliberate. Founded in 2013 and originally called Clive Palmer's United Australia

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[53] Weber, *The Three Types of Legitimate Rule*, 8.

Party and then Palmer United Party (PUP), the six-person executive committee comprised entirely of founder Clive Palmer's immediate family with Palmer as chairman. PUP showed little interest in establishing party structures or developing active membership outside of the election cycle and its own federal candidates believed PUP would not continue without its leader. When asked if the party could continue in Palmer's absence, 15 out of 20 candidates expressed either doubt or stated it definitely would not. Any attempt to develop a party structure beyond the executive committee and Palmer's direct control was actively discouraged.[54]

Weber's charismatic leader within Taggart's trope of religion requires a uniquely talented individual in the leader role as a prerequisite. Charismatic leadership is prone to authoritarianism, as the leader is placed in the unique position of knowing what is truly best for the population and should not be questioned. However, populism requires a leader to encapsulate 'the people', not to dictate specific positions to their supporters. Populism instigates a 'populist feedback loop' in which leaders espouse sentiments to potential supporters that are a priori. Acknowledging their concerns have been vocalised, supporters lend greater authority to the leader to represent 'the people' at a larger scale. The populist message then reaches a wider audience, some of whom identify with the leader as truly representing them on a moral level and the cycle continues. Populist leaders do not tell their followers what to think, they tell them what they already know. Due to this cyclical relationship, when attacking populist leaders or movements, opponents are framed as belittling supporters, as the leader has been uniquely appointed to represent 'the people'. This also provides explanation as to why specific populist movements are short lived-in

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[54] Kefford and McDonnell, "Ballots and Billions," 187.

comparison to established political ideologies. Unless 'routinization' manifests when the leader leaves, the emotional connection with the movement's supporters is severed and it cannot continue.

1.6 Globalisation Versus Nationalism

Populism has been described in the context of 'the people' versus 'the elite' and the tropes of war, conspiracy and religion. A third framing in which national populism is addressed is globalisation versus nationalism. A key aspect of globalisation is erosion of the importance of national sovereignty in favour of integration with different countries and cultures.[55] Globalisation is presented by populism as a forced progressive value set embraced by cosmopolitan elites with disregard to 'the people'. The nation, embodying cultural traditions in which populist supporters are aligned with, are rejected in preference for either the supra-national, conglomerates such as the EU, or the infra-national, powers within the nation such as cosmopolitan cities.[56] Established traditions are either classified as old and no longer relevant to the modern world or deemed exclusionary as they celebrate a monoculture.

As depicted by Sassen, the infra-national cosmopolitan city supports the supra-national conglomerate as an anchor or node in which globalism fully operates.[57] 'Global Cities' create a homogeneous network and share more in common with each other than the nations that they are situated in. Cosmopolitan cities develop their own sense of identity and represent a progressive vanguard to the ideals of modernisation.[58] Within this vanguard of progressive

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[55] Hopkins, *Globalization in World History*, 17.

[56] Hopkins, 25.

[57] Sassen, "The Global City," 32.

[58] Canovan, "Populism for Political Theorists," 245.

ideology cultural shifts are facilitated as are economic ones. Culturally, positive views towards gender roles, sexuality and minority inclusivity are celebrated. Economically, global cities can generate more wealth than the rest of the nation they are located in.

For populism, the nation represents a culture, a way of life, memories and the process of how individuals identify themselves. The nation surpasses philosophies of patriotism and presents an experiential way of life, a resident's way of being would be irrevocably changed if not for the characteristics of the nation. Supported by Tuan's view of 'homeland', the attachment to the nation is so intense that it becomes the centre of many people's world.[59] National populism asserts the nation should not be defined by a governing authority or political ideology but by a set of values developed through experience of the nation, these values form part of 'the people'. The conflict between national and global provides an important distinction between national populism and, for example, green populism. As previously established, green populism envisaged a tolerant and educated citizenship that embraced globalism. Green populism would not just tolerate immigrant and world cultures but actively celebrate them. However, this new form of modernism would not exist alongside the cultural traditions of the nation, but would eventually replace them. It is this philosophy of denigrating one's own national traditions in preference of immigrant and global culture, a process Eric Kaufmann terms asymmetrical multiculturism,[60] that national populism stands so firmly against. The origins of asymmetrical multiculturism and its effects on populism are detailed in Section 2.6.

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[59] Tuan, "Space and Place: Humanistic Perspective," 146.

[60] Kaufmann, *Whiteshift*, 53.

Section 1 establishes definitions for populism and addresses the need for differentiating between different types of populism. National populism is summarised as the thin centred ideology of 'the people' versus 'the elite'. The 'people' exist as an abstract, an idea encompassing the felt values and traditions of national sovereignty combined with a sense of loss derived from a value shift driven by cosmopolitan modernism and an erasure of established cultural homogeneity. Populist leaders are essential to the movement as they have a direct emotional connection with supporters and are best suited to channel 'the people' against 'the elite'. Section 2 addresses causal factors for national populism examining economics, immigration, positions of centre left parties and left-modernism.

Section 2: What Causes National Populism

Unlike Section 1 that applies a theoretical framework defining what populism is, Section 2 examines the specific circumstances in which the creation and success of national populism occurs. The focus of this study relates to national populism in Australia and New Zealand (ANZ), both of which are described as western democracies. As such, Section 2 focuses on causal factors occurring within the complex social processes of similar democracies in Europe and North America. Causal factors for populism in other regions, South America for example, are subject to separate analysis and will not be addressed in this study.

2.1 Is National Populism a Threat to Democracy

National populism is argued to be a danger to democracy and 'threat' theories demonstrate the risk. 'Threat' theories include a form of anti-democratic governance through exclusive representation of 'the people',[61] anti-pluralism targeted at minorities not elites[62] and populism acting upon rather than within democracy fundamentally changing it in a negative way.[63] Yet, national populism is also referred to as an 'operational' by-product of an open democracy and seeks to use a simplistic majoritarian form of democracy rather than do away with the concept altogether, see Inglehart and Norris,[64] and Mudde.[65] It is possible to reconcile the competing 'threat' and 'operational' theories whilst simultaneously providing an explanation for how national populism manifests in a political space.

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[61] Tormey, "Populism," 264.

[62] Müller, *What Is Populism?*, 39.

[63] Bang and Marsh, "Populism: A Major Threat to Democracy?," 354.

[64] Inglehart and Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism," 7.

[65] Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist," 558.

Political theorist Margret Canovan presents two characteristics, or faces, of democracy, pragmatic and redemptive.[66] Pragmatic relates to real world situations and establishes institutions and processes in order to maintain functional governance. Redemptive concerns itself with ideology and promotes citizens as the real source of power. Purely pragmatic systems induce apathy within the population and purely redemptive systems lack the functional mechanism to accommodate its idealistic vision. National populism inhabits political space that is too pragmatic, that foregoes its connection to ordinary citizens and prioritises the bureaucratic nature of governance. Canovan describes populism as short sighted, yet democracy cannot function on pragmatism alone, requiring a renewal of ideas and a grander vision to inspire the general populace.[67]

The faces of pragmatic and redemptive serve as a rejection of total 'threat' theory and places national populism within a context of partial threat. Populism favours direct democracy, utilising referendums to restore sovereign power towards citizens and away from 'the elite' and this preference exists across the populist spectrum. In Australia, Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON) supporters were found to have the most favourable attitudes towards referendums and a distrust in political establishments. However, the second largest group to share these anti-establishment views were The Australian Greens supporters.[68] Consideration of these arguments leads to the conclusion that national populism is not a threat to democracy per se with two important caveats. First, when describing national populism as a threat to democracy, an emphasis should be placed on the incompatibility with the liberal aspect of modern democracies rather than dismissing the movement as entirely anti-

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[66] Canovan, "Populism for Political Theorists?," 9.

[67] Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," 14.

[68] Kefford, Moffitt, and Werner, "Populist Attitudes," 14.

democratic. Second, populism flourishes in political spaces deemed in need of renewal as they are failing to represent the needs of ordinary citizens.

Renewal is of particular relevance to the United Australia Party (UAP) as the party exists primarily as a protest vote. UAP policy expands government programs such as retention of national assets while simultaneously promising to abolish various taxes. The incoherent ideological position is deliberately used to attract disillusioned voters of the traditional left and right demanding a redemptive face of politics. Describing its generous policies, a high level UAP party figure commented, "rather than presenting policy, you found opportunities to take more of a populist approach to policies that were controversial and presented by the government. So you're effectively harvesting the protest vote."[69] UAP embraces protest of the pragmatic by promising an arguably unachievable platform of renewal. Section 2 examines what intersecting factors contribute to electorally successful national populists in an overly pragmatic political space.

2.2 Economics

Economic arguments for the rise and success of national populism centre around industrial shifts, financial crises and immigration. Industrial shifts relate to changes within the manufacturing industry, primarily automation of manual labour and proliferation of predominantly Chinese manufactured imports. In the east of Germany, automation and increased Chinese imports create a significant impact on growing unemployment within the manufacturing industry and working-class communities. The incumbent government's perceived complicity over these job losses led directly to greater support for national populist

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[69] Kefford and McDonnell, "Ballots and Billions," 186.

parties.[70] Frey, Berger and Chen estimate the adverse effect of unemployment due to automation and foreign imports in the US were sizable enough to swing several states to Republican Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election.[71] Had these effects on unemployment been half, the margin in favour of Trump in Pennsylvania would have shrunk by 1.7%, and Democrat Hillary Clinton would have won the state by 0.5%. Likewise, the simulation indicates that Clinton would have won the states of Wisconsin by 2.2% and Michigan by 1.8%. The combined value of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan in the Electoral College was 46 votes, had Clinton won these states she would have won the Electoral College 273 to Trump's 258.

Financial crises are also cited as providing populist movements with success, in particular the (GFC) of 2007-2008. Algan et al argues that a lack of financial market regulation and subsequent monetary aid provided to banks responsible for the GFC, led to mainstream political parties being held as partially responsible or complicit in the crisis and its aftermath by voters. Banks responsible for the GFC were kept solvent by government bailouts while unemployment rose steadily, leading to an increase in national populist voting across Europe.[72] Immigration is synonymous with national populism and many parties are founded on the promise of reducing immigration. National populism argues increased competition posed by foreign workers, typically in low skilled and manual labour markets, result in lower wages and job losses for native born workers. Combined with claims of increased pressure on

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[70] Dippel et al., "Instrumental Variables and Causal Mechanisms," 33.

[71] Frey, Berger, and Chen, "Political Machinery," 24.

[72] Algan et al., "The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism," 316.

public services and welfare systems, rising immigration levels are directly linked to an increase in support for national populism in France.[73]

2.2.1 Economics Rebuttal

Economics as an explanatory factor for the emergence and support of national populism is highly contested. Political scientists Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin suggest that left-wing academics and journalists favour economic reasoning for national populist success as it supports their negative view of neo-liberalism and means they do not have to engage with national populism's ideals of tradition and nationhood.[74] Economist Yotam Margalit suggests that the economic rationale is overstated as the outcome does not necessarily equate to explanatory significance. Addressing Frey et al in relation to the 2016 US presidential election, Margalit acknowledges swings of 2% in specific states affected the outcome, but the explanatory significance of economic impact is minor compared to the overall result. Economics make a difference at the margins, but do not explain the base support of a candidate as contentious as Donald Trump. Partisan affiliation provides a more comprehensive explanation for Trump's support as Americans overwhelmingly voted for the same party in 2016 as they did in 2012. Of Americans who voted either Republican or Democrat in 2012, 92% who voted for Barack Obama in 2012 voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016.[75] Cumulatively, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan, were worth 46 points in the Electoral College, but Florida and Ohio combined were worth 47. Both Florida and Ohio voted

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[73] Edo et al., "Immigration and Electoral Support for the Far-Left and the Far-Right," 115.

[74] Eatwell and Goodwin, *National Populism*, 24.

[75] Margalit, "Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered," 156.

for Obama in 2008 and 2012 but flipped to Trump in 2016, yet the impact of imports and concerns over manufacturing automation were not a significant factor in these states.

A strong counter argument to financial crises, particularly the GFC, is the formation and success of populist parties before 2007. Three of the four parties in this study were formed and had electoral success considerably earlier than 2007, detailed in Section 3. The formation and success of national populist parties continues outside of ANZ. Stockemer shows that 17 European democracies experienced the majority of national populism growth before 2008 and that the subsequent economic hardship did not increase electoral support for these populist parties.[76] None of the previous statistics negate the overall impact of the GFC or other financial crises, however, they show that other variables are more prominent in explaining national populism's formation and success.

Immigration has two competing, although not mutually exclusive, arguments as a cause for national populist support. Individuals with tertiary level education are more likely to view immigration positively, while for low-skilled workers the inverse is true.[77] The economic interpretation is that low-skilled workers are concerned by rising competition within the labour market and form a negative opinion on immigration. However, a secondary argument for this negative relationship concerns the erasure of cultural homogeneity. In European and North American countries cultural homogeneity typically refers to white Christians speaking the parent language. As the preference for cultural homogeneity violates social taboos surrounding multiculturism, economics is overreported as a justification for an anti-immigration stance. Alexander Janus found that views on immigration are markedly different

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[76] Stockemer, "Structural Data on Immigration or Immigration Perceptions?," 1009.

[77] Scheve and Slaughter, "Labor Market Competition," 133-145.

depending on if a respondent's answers are concealed or not. When asking if immigration should be reduced to zero, Janus found that 60% of white Americans were in favour when their answers were concealed, compared to 39% when their answers were public.[78] This does not axiomatically promote cultural homogeneity concerns over economic concerns relating to national populist support. However, it does show that a greater interrogation of societally taboo attitudes is required in order to fully assess negativity towards immigration.

2.3 Immigration

Anti-immigration has been central to national populism for a significant period of time. The United States experienced a form of anti-immigration populism in the 1850s through the Know Nothings, so called due to their oath of secrecy. The Know Nothings originated the term 'nativist', short for Anglo American Ethnic Nationalist, in response to increased Catholic immigration into a predominantly Protestant United States. As a plurality of Catholics settled in north eastern cities, the perceived change in a country that was previously 95% Protestant was acute. Based on anti-Catholic immigration policies, The Know Nothings' ascendancy was fast, in 1854 all but of one of the 337 state representatives of Massachusetts were Know Nothings.[79] The movement was abruptly halted in 1860 when northern and southern divisions of the Know Nothings were split by the American civil war. The northern Know Nothings softened their stance on Catholic, German and Irish immigration to recruit soldiers in their efforts to defeat the south.

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[78] Janus, "The Influence of Social Desirability Pressures on Expressed Immigration Attitudes," 938.

[79] Billington, *The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860*, 387.

The attitudes of 'the elite' compared to citizens opposed to immigration creates ample opportunities for national populism to flourish. In Britain, a form of 'proto-populism' is observed in Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' Speech from 1968. The speech encapsulates Powell's lament over the dilution of British culture and ethnicity due to increasing levels of immigration. Powell, a Cambridge educated classics scholar and an MBE, frames his argument in the guise of protecting the working-class citizen.

> For reasons which they could not comprehend, and in pursuance of a decision by default, on which they were never consulted, they found themselves made strangers in their own country. They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition, their plans and prospects for the future defeated; at work they found that employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker; they began to hear, as time went by, more and more voices which told them that they were now the unwanted.[80]

The full speech focuses on an ethnic component making it undoubtably racist, but the above passage is largely indistinguishable from modern national populist rhetoric. At the time, most people in the United Kingdom (UK) voted for one of two major parties, the Conservatives or Labour, and political elites were held in high regard. The working-class had secure employment and there was little objection to an increasing level of immigration on economic grounds. With high government trust and employment concerns low, the disparity in reaction

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[80] Enoch Powell: Life and Views, "Speech at Birmingham 20th April, 1968."

to the speech between elites and citizens is notable. Powell, fired by Conservative leader Ted Heath, was decried as racist by members of parliament, but had huge support among citizens. Approximately one thousand people protested his firing in Westminster and one survey at the time suggested 74% of Britain supported him while 15% did not.[81]

Political elites in America have largely supported legal immigration from the 1960s to the mid-1990s. Democrats were pro-immigration and Republicans viewed cheap labour as benefitting business and the increase in the religious cohort of the electorate benefiting themselves. Yet, concerns over immigration within a conservative element of the population remained latent without an elite channel to express their concerns.[82] Without the emergence of a populist leader to channel 'the people', the societally taboo subject of reducing immigration remained largely unheard until 1994. Under pressure from labour unions and their concerns regarding a large influx of unskilled Mexican workers, the California government held a public vote on proposition 187, which passed 59% to 41%. California could not restrict immigration as it was a federal issue, but proposition 187 was designed to deny public services such as non-emergency health care and public education to illegal immigrants. Proposition 187 was the subject of multiple law suits brought by a broad coalition of elite opponents and in 1997 was officially struck down by a federal court citing it as unconstitutional. Studies have suggested that while couched in the economic denial of services, motivation behind voting in favour of proposition 187 was founded in concerns over cultural disruption.[83] The galvanizing of political and cultural elites against a democratically voted for bill is an example of 'the people'

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[81] Kaufmann, *Whiteshift,* 144.

[82] Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America*, 281.

[83] Hainmueller and Hopkins, "Public Attitudes Toward Immigration," 231.

versus 'the elite'. Richard Day, chief counsel to the Senate, described the situation as "Washington Groups' against the American people."[84]

Both Powell and Proposition 187 provide clear examples of public attitudes towards immigration being incongruent with the ruling elites at the time. In both instances the framing of 'the people' versus 'the elite' are observed as cultural priorities overriding economic arguments regarding immigration. Yet, as discussed in section 1.4, outright hostility towards minorities is not electorally successful. National populism deliberately breaks social taboos regarding immigration, but must take care in how and to what extent it breaks these taboos in order to present politically palatable arguments against immigration.

2.4 Reputational Shields

Unless the electorate has positive connotations of national populism, the perception of xenophobia or racism is a deterrent to most voters. A proven electoral tool for breaking societal taboos and protecting national populists from negative accusations is what political scientist Elisabeth Ivarsflaten terms a reputational shield. Ivarsflaten states due to "widespread social norms of racial equality and abidance to democratic institutions, most voters do not want to support parties seen to be racist or extremist."[85] It is reasonable to state that most European countries, the United States and ANZ employ a social norm of intolerance towards racism and xenophobia. As such, national populism requires a prerequisite position on economic, regional or occupational policy in order to successfully promote restrictive immigration policies to a wider audience.[86] As well as deflecting accusations of racism and

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[84] Joppke, "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration," 187.

[85] Ivarsflaten, "Reputational Shields," 6.

[86] Ivarsflaten, 15.

xenophobia, reputational shields re-enforce public voting decisions externally and internally. Externally, voters are not ashamed to publicly support populists as accusations of social maleficence are diminished. Internally, voters justify to themselves their electoral decisions are not motivated by racism or other exclusionary considerations.

A reputational shield contrasts the success between the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP). At their most successful UKIP held two seats in the British House of Commons, received the third biggest vote share in the 2015 UK election and were widely regarded as instigators of the Brexit referendum. Conversely, the BNP had limited electoral success. At its height in the late 2000s the BNP achieved fifty local government seats, one London Assembly seat and two European Parliament seats. However, BNP electoral success waned quickly, achieving less than 26,000 votes nationally in the 2012 local elections, down from 240,000 votes in 2008. By 2014, the electoral presence of the BNP was virtually non-existent.[87] UKIP and BNP campaigns prioritised immigration reform and a preference of native British culture over multiculturalism, yet UKIP was a more electorally acceptable proposition amongst the British public.

Formed in 1982 on a distinctly neo-Nazi basis, a central BNP policy was the compulsory expulsion of non-whites from Britain. It also formed Combat 18 as a stewarding group to protect BNP events from anti-fascist protestors. Combat 18 took its name from the initials of the Nazi Germany leader, Adolf Hitler, A and H are the first and eighth letters of the alphabet. In 1999, under the leadership of Nick Griffin, the BNP distanced themselves from Combat 18 and toned down the ethnic segregation aspects of their campaigning. However, due to a

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[87] Goodwin, "Forever a False Dawn?," 888.

targeted campaign against Muslim immigration, increased public scrutiny and an inability to fully disassociate itself from a highly controversial past, it became difficult for the BNP to expand and attract more voters.[88] Contrariwise, UKIP were formed on the basis of a Euro Sceptic party couched in the reputational shield of free market economics. Immigration restrictions and abolition of free movement were merely a by-product of leaving the EU. UKIP was formed by middle class Conservatives who had been vocal in their opposition to the much more working-class BNP. UKIP were also far better at moderating the fringe elements of their party, quick to expel members whose views veered into racism, UKIP maintained their anti-immigration stance by removing the ethnically hostile components of their argument.[89] UKIP's reputational shield of free market economics, middle class origins and lack of ethnic hostility made anti-immigration arguments far more acceptable to the British public than the overtly racist BNP.

2.5 Left-Wing Positions on Immigration

National populism siphons off working-class votes that otherwise would go to centre left parties through appeals of nationalism and the left side of the state–market dimension.[90] This observation is made when comparing vote share and voter demographics between Australian national populist parties and the Australian Labor Party (ALP). In the 2019 federal election, PHON and UAP increased their vote share in the state of Queensland by 3.34% and 3.51% respectively, conversely the ALP vote share dropped by 4.23%.[91] It is unrealistic to state that the PHON and UAP increase was entirely due to the ALP loss. However, as all other party gains

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[88] Goodwin, "Forever a False Dawn?," 901.

[89] Kaufmann, *Whiteshift*, 176.

[90] Bale et al., "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them?," 412.

[91] Australian Electoral Commission, "Election Results - Tally Room Archive."

were relatively minor, it is reasonable to determine that national populism was the principal beneficiary of the reduced ALP primary vote. Demographically, political scientists have noted the similarities between rural ALP voters and PHON voters since 1998. In contrast to the perception of national populism attracting the fringes of the centre right, PHON voters were described as having "a list of characteristics which comes close to defining the archetypal Labor voter … [The evidence] suggests that it is Labor-style voters in rural areas – rather than the much more predominantly urban Labor voter – who are chiefly attracted to One Nation."[92]

A compelling case of how divisive immigration is to centre left coalitions and how it benefits national populism is the 2001 Netherlands election. Rapid influx of Islamic immigration became a wedge issue between the pro-immigration centre left *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA) and their coalition partner and increasingly anti-immigration centre right *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD). The PvdA tried to re-affirm concerns amongst the electorate in the traditional socio-economic frame, focusing on an increase in labour market access for natives and additional funds for education. But the VVD and populist Pym Fortuyn reorientated the debate around cultural aspects citing language, religion and social behaviour as failures for foreign integration. Due to the economic reputational shield possessed by the VVD and the intellectual arguments of Fortuyn, avoiding ethnically charged rhetoric, anti-immigration arguments were received positively by the Dutch public. As a result, fierce divisions within the PvdA emerged, one faction arguing that the PvdA must abandon 'political correctness' and a leadership faction insisting on support among ethnic minority voters was required for electoral success.[93] Unable to satisfy older, more nationalistic voters on cultural

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92 McAllister and Bean, "Voting Behaviour," 181.

93 Bale et al., "If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them?," 422.

issues, the PvdA lost support to the VVD and Pym Fortuyn. However, younger more cosmopolitan voters, perceiving the VVD and Fortuyn's rhetoric as racist and Islamophobic, were unsatisfied with the PvdA's 'middle ground' position and defected to the left-wing *GroenLinks* and the *Socialistische Partij*. This cohort of younger, mainly educated, metropolitan dwelling voters provides a resistance to national populism both electorally and culturally. Section 2.6 examines how strident resistance to socially conservative political attitudes actually furthers national populism.

2.6 Left Modernism

Left modernism has various synonyms including the new left, extreme political correctness and the colloquial term 'woke'. Professor of politics Matthew Goodwin defines 'woke' on Twitter as "a pseudo-religious belief system which is organised around the sacralization of racial, sexual & gender minorities and which prioritises subjectivity & lived experience over objectivity and empirical evidence."[94] Elite cultural and educational institutions are dominated by a left-liberal ideology that views subaltern racial and sexual minorities as sacred. Those who would violate the protected taboos and question liberal cosmopolitan values are considered deviant.[95] Superficially, left modernism is viewed as societally accepted practices, but the definitions on how taboos are broken and the resulting consequences vary dramatically from previously accepted views. Left modernism considers an ethnic majority's attachment to their ethnicity or national identity as inherently racist.[96] Therefore, as most European descended countries' ethnic majority is white, any attachment to being white or

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[94] Matt Goodwin [@GoodwinMJ], "A Useful Definition of 'Woke'".

[95] Kaufmann, *Whiteshift*, 298.

[96] Kaufmann, 298.

pride in a predominately white nation is castigated as deviant. This runs contrary to many older working-class citizens' view of their own nation, many of whom are attached to their national traditions. The increased derision from cultural and educational elites has resulted in a fierce ideological backlash which manifests in increased support for national populism.

2.6.1 The Philosophy of Left Modernism

The strict economic definition of left-wing does not pertain to the support of minority groups, although the modern association with this characteristic is undeniable. Left modernism stems from left-wing ideology but is distinct from it, as summarised in Isaiah Berlin's positive and negative liberty. Negative liberty encompasses 'freedom from', that an individual's will should be free from any extraneous forms of coercion. "Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act."[97] 'Freedom from' encapsulates a liberal left-wing promotion of tolerance. Though one may object to an individual due to race, sexual orientation, gender or religion they must tolerate and refrain from impediment based purely on that difference. Positive liberty encompasses 'freedom to', that an individual may use an authority to coerce others for their own good, as the authority is bestowing greater liberty, it cannot be viewed as coercive. Left modernism embraces positive liberty and the capacity to enforce a progressive, inclusive and utopian culture through authority. Resistance inevitably occurs when individuals who do not share this progressive mindset object to the mandated nature of the utopian vision. As Berlin writes, "to threaten a man with persecution unless he submits to a life in which he exercises no choices of his goals; to block before him every door but one no matter how noble the prospect upon

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[97] Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," 16.

which it opens, or how benevolent the motives of those who arrange this, is to sin against the truth that he is a man, a being with his own life to live."[98]

Diversity coexisting equally with national traditions and norms is insufficient for left modernism, it actively seeks to diminish majority tradition in favour of minority culture. Genesis of this approach is traced to Randolph Bourne, prominent writer and part of the bohemian Young Intellectuals movement of the early 1900s New York. Bourne came to national attention in an essay he wrote for *Atlantic Monthly* magazine in 1916 called 'Trans National America'. Bourne argues for a cosmopolitan America comprised of an amalgamation of various superior immigrant cultures that should supplant the existing, inherently inferior, white Anglo Saxon culture. Of an American youth attending university and meeting immigrants Bourne writes:

> In them he finds the cosmopolitan note. In these youths, foreign-born or the children of foreign-born parents, he is likely to find many of his old inbred morbid problems washed away. These friends are oblivious to the repressions of that tight little society in which he so provincially grew up. He has a pleasurable sense of liberation from the stale and familiar attitudes of those whose ingrowing culture has scarcely created anything vital for his America of to-day. He breathes a larger air. In his new enthusiasms for continental literature, for unplumbed Russian depths, for French clarity of thought, for Teuton philosophies of power, he feels himself citizen of a larger world.[99]

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[98] Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", 20.

[99] Bourne, *War and the Intellectuals*, 133.

Bourne acknowledges the need for a traditional America in his essay, but only as a vessel in which cosmopolitanism may occur. In his promotion of foreign culture and simultaneous denigration of native culture, Bourne creates the asymmetrical multiculturism described in Section 1.6. Bourne championed the foreign but did not actively address how the cosmopolitan may argue against native resistance to his asymmetrical proposition.

Utilising Berlin's positive liberty to the fullest extent, repression of dissent to left modernism is articulated in Herbert Marcuse's 'Repressive Tolerance'. Marcuse believed that systems in which left-wing and right-wing proponents were compelled to tolerate each other was unjust, as right-wing advocates were inherently hostile to minorities and responsible for most tragedies in human history. According to Marcuse a system of tolerance, perpetrated by right-wing governments and complicit media elites, was to run a premediated risk of atrocity. As such, tolerating dissent from left-wing views only lead to harm and therefore is not tolerant at all. Marcuse writes:

> The whole post-fascist period is one of clear and present danger. Consequently, true pacification requires the withdrawal of tolerance before the deed, at the stage of communication in word, print, and picture. Such extreme suspension of the right of free speech and free assembly is indeed justified only if the whole of society is in extreme danger. I maintain that our society is in such an emergency situation, and that it has become the normal state of affairs.[100]

In Marcuse's permanent state of emergency, minorities and disadvantage groups are always at risk. Therefore, dissent may potentially cause harm and is justifiably silenced or labelled

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[100] Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance." 120.

as sexist, homophobic, Islamophobic, transphobic and a variety of other pejoratives. Positive liberty coercing the will of the individual for the betterment of society. Asymmetrical multiculturism combined with Marcuse's argument of silencing dissent actively represses older and conservative citizens opinions on immigration, multiculturism, sexual orientation and other taboo issues.

2.6.2 Applications of Left Modernism

Left modernism is observed at the highest levels of government and more broadly across western cultures. Legal immigration in the UK under Tony Blair increased significantly, from 55,000 per annum prior to 1997 to 82,000 in 1998 and then to 156,000 in 2004. When objections to the increasing numbers were raised, most notably by UKIP, pro-immigration policy advisor Barbra Roche advised Blair to "rub the right's nose in diversity and render their arguments out of date."[101] Left modernism employs the silencing of dissenters to unusual extremes, even against minorities who do not adhere to its political philosophy. Author Douglas Murray states that to show any deference towards a political ideology other than progressivism is to risk ostracisation from social circles.[102] Peter Theil, a gay man, speaking at the 2016 Republican National Convention (RNC) in support of presidential candidate Donald Trump demonstrates left modernism's propensity for ostracisation. A gay man given such a prominent role at the politically conservative RNC demonstrates how dramatically the acceptance of homosexuality within the US has changed. Yet, rather than acknowledging this positive change, Theil was ridiculed throughout the LGBTQ

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[101] West, *The Diversity Illusion*, 14.

[102] Murray, *The Madness of Crowds*, 44.

media in his support for Trump. Prominent gay magazine *Advocate* made the contentious statement "Thiel is an example of a man who has sex with other men, but not a gay man. Because he does not embrace the struggle of people to embrace their distinctive identity."[103]

The description of left modernism as a pseudo-religious belief system is supported by American linguist John McWhorter who describes practitioners of left modernism as 'The Elect' and that this religion is replete with its own blasphemy laws. Left modernism shares populism's Manichean struggle of good versus evil and attempts to silence those who would trespass against its religion. In the wake of the George Floyd murder McWhorter notes that dissenting views, such as Floyd's murder was a result of bad policing and not racially motivated, were not just questioned but that left modernism demanded they be quashed and removed from any platform of discussion.[104] As debate on taboo subjects in universities, legacy media (with the exception of affirmatively right-wing press) or cultural institutions is restricted, national populism attracts voters as the only political entity visibly breaking taboos and rejecting asymmetrical multiculturism.

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[103] Downs, "Peter Thiel Shows Us There's a Difference Between Gay Sex and Gay."

[104] McWhorter, *Woke Racism*, 47.

2.6.3 Resistance to Left Modernism

Left modernism's oppression actually precludes those it seeks to protect when a competing minority is prioritised. Gay and lesbian support for Marine Le Pen in the French presidential election of 2017 reached 35%[105] and in the subsequent regional elections 40% of gay married men voted for the *Rassemblement National*.[106] These figures represent a smaller proportion of the LGBTQ community, but it is remarkable that they are that high considering Le Pen herself has spoken out against gay marriage. The increased support is due to perceptions that mainstream politicians and media outlets were indifferent to increased Muslim immigration and had made the subject taboo. Le Pen was the most prominent public figure actively addressing concerns of illiberal attitudes that strict adherents of Islam have towards gay people.

Resistance against left modernism has manifested in ANZ over concerns for free speech and critiques of multiculturism. In the 2019 Australia Talks survey, 54,000 Australians were interviewed on various subjects including political correctness and the ability to speak freely. When asked if political correctness had gone too far, 98% of PHON voters agreed compared to 88% of Liberal-National voters and 52% of ALP voters. When determining if people should be free to say what they want even if it offends others, 78% of PHON voters agreed, compared to 58% of Liberal-National voters and only 28% of ALP voters.[107] A direct approach to combating the repression of speech was taken by the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) of New

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[105] Duina and Carson, "Not so Right after All?," 5.

[106] Buet, "This Is How France's Nationalist Party Is Winning Gay Support."

[107] Banks, Liddy and van der Linden, *Australia Talks National Survey*.

Zealand in 2019. ACT's leader David Seymour proposed to repeal parts of the Human Rights Act which make insulting and offensive speech unlawful, specify that the Harmful Digital Communications Act only applies to complainants under the age of 18 and to abolish the Human Rights Commission as it had become anathema on the importance of free speech. An absolutist approach to free speech is aligned with ACT's libertarian ethos, but Seymour made specific reference to left-wing political entities pursuing restrictions on speech and that media outlets were complicit in the pursuit of those restrictions. "Freedom of expression … is under attack. The Government, urged on by the Greens, is planning to further restrict what New Zealanders are lawfully allowed to say through tougher hate speech laws. The Human Rights Commission has completely failed to defend our most basic human right and has even supported extending restrictions on speech. The media and other parts of the establishment have been silent."[108] New Zealand First has always campaigned against mass immigration and its leader Winston Peters has been vociferous in his condemnation of multiculturism. Speaking to a radio show in July 2018, Peters commented "There is one cultural thing we want developed in this country and that's the New Zealand culture… it's not a multitude of cultures and a plethora rising up like mushrooms in this country."[109] In the same interview, Peters separated ethnicity from culture but insisted upon the preservation of a New Zealand monoculture and that immigrants be receptive to it.

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[108] ACT. "New Bill Will Protect Freedom of Expression."

[109] Bracewell-Worrall, "Winston Peters Compares Multiculturalism to 'Rising up Mushrooms.'"

Economics, immigration, positions of centre-left political parties and left modernism act as contributing factors to the creation and success of national populism. Section 3 discusses how these factors apply to the electoral success of populist parties in ANZ. An overview of each party is given and comparisons between the two countries are assessed.

Section 3: National Populism in Australia and New Zealand

Section 3 examines the electoral success of populist parties in Australia and New Zealand (ANZ). Electoral data for Australian elections pre 2001 is obtained from the Australian Federal Parliamentary Library,[110] Australian elections post 2001 is taken from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)[111] and all data for New Zealand is derived from the New Zealand Electoral Commission.[112] The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 5 populist score is given for context, parties included in this study received the two highest populist scores in their respective countries.

3.1 Pauline Hanson's One Nation

Originally called One Nation and founded in 1997, Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON) scored seven on the CSES populist scale and represents an archetype for national populism. Hanson's combative political style, dubbed Hansonism, channels 'the people' more so than any other leader in Australia due to her working-class background, anti-elite positions and admiration for pre 1960s Australia.[113] Despite success in the 1998 Queensland (QLD) state election winning 11 legislative seats and the second largest primary vote of 22.7%, at a federal level PHON are comparatively weak. Hanson won the seat of Oxley at the 1996 federal election, although she was listed as a Liberal on the ballot. Originally a Liberal candidate, negative comments regarding Aboriginals prior to the election resulted in Hanson being dis-endorsed by Liberal party leader John Howard, but as the AEC deadline to change electoral

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[110] Parliament of Australia, "Research Papers Index Page."

[111] Australian Electoral Commission, "Election Results - Tally Room Archive."

[112] New Zealand Electoral Commission, "Historical Events."

[113] DeAngelis, "Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party," 16.

ballots had passed, Hanson was listed as a Liberal on election day. Hanson sat as an independent before co-founding One Nation in 1997. In the 1998 federal election, despite One Nation's 8.43% national primary vote, Hanson lost the seat of Oxley meaning no One Nation or PHON member has been directly elected to the House of Representatives. Hanson left the party in 2002 and after a number of endeavours including a reality television dancing show, re-joined the party in 2013. By July 2015 One Nation was renamed Pauline Hanson's One Nation. The PHON federal primary vote increased to 1.29% in 2016 and 3.08% in 2019 but still lags behind the 1998 and 2001 result. PHON has had greater federal success in the Senate, winning a seat in 1998 with 14.9% of the QLD state vote and 8.99% nationally. In the 2016 double dissolution federal election, Senate quotas were lower allowing PHON to win four Senate seats with a national vote of 4.28%. This represented the biggest national swing in the Senate of 3.75% to PHON and the biggest net gain of Senate seats, from zero to four.

3.2 United Australia Party

United Australia Party (UAP) formed in 2013 by mining magnate Clive Palmer scored nine on the CSES populist scale. UAP shares its name, although is unaffiliated with, United Australia formed in 1931 and subsequently folded into the Liberal party in 1945. UAP runs a deliberately minor policy platform, focusing on reduction of mining taxes and reduced government reliance on taxation as a source of revenue.[114] Established in section 2.1, UAP represents an anti-elite protest vote against the two mainstream parties, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal-National coalition (LNP). UAP ran candidates in all 150 divisions of the 2013 federal election, a strategy never attempted before by a debut party at a federal election. Palmer narrowly won the seat of Fairfax on a primary vote of 26% and a two-party

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[114] United Australia Party, "National Policy."

preferred of 50.03%, a margin of 53 votes. In the same election UAP won two Senate seats, one in QLD and one in Tasmania, with 4.91% of the national vote and a further Senate seat in Western Australia via the special election of April 2014. In terms of seats won, UAP produced the most successful federal election debut since 1977. UAP increased its presence at the state and territory level through defections, gaining two members of the Queensland Legislative Assembly in June 2013 and three members of the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly in April 2014. Due to Palmer's ill health, infighting and defections from the party, UAP had almost no electoral presence at the 2016 federal election, gaining 315 primary votes in the single division of Herbert, a national vote share of 0.002%. Officially de-registered with the AEC in April 2017, Palmer and ex PHON Senator Brian Burston re-registered the UAP in December 2018 to participate in the 2019 Federal election. All 151 divisions were contested and UAP achieved a national primary vote share of 3.43% and a Senate vote share of 2.6%. A notable element of the 2019 UAP campaign was the $89 million[115] spent on advertising and campaign materials, double the amount spent by the ALP and LNP combined. Despite the monetary advantage, UAP failed to win any seats.

3.3 Association for Consumers and Taxpayers

Formed in 1993 by ex-Labour minister Roger Douglas and ex National Party minister Derek Quigley, the Association for Consumers and Taxpayer (ACT) became an official political party for the 1996 New Zealand general election. Winning 6.10% of the party vote entitling ACT to eight list seats, they have obtained at least one seat in every general election since. ACT are the most traditionally right-wing party in New Zealand, favouring libertarian and free market policies and scoring seven on the CSES populist scale. Early electoral success for ACT was

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[115] Australian Electoral Commission, "AEC Transparency Register - Political Party Returns."

under leader Richard Prebble from 1996 to 2002 achieving an average party vote of 6.76% over three elections. Despite a party vote decline to 3.65% in 2008, ACT formed a government alongside United Future and the Māori Party in a confidence and supply agreement with the National Party. The ACT party vote continued to recede in the 2011 and 2014 general elections, 1.07% and 0.69% respectively, but due to their retention of the Epsom electorate ACT maintained the confidence and supply arrangement with the National Party. In the 2017 general election, ACT received their worst ever result with only 0.5% of the party vote and the single electorate of Epsom and were forced into opposition by the Labour-New Zealand First coalition. ACT has witnessed an electoral revival since, securing their highest party vote of 7.58% in the 2020 general election and combined with the Epsom electorate have ten seats in the New Zealand parliament. The increase in vote share has been attributed to dissatisfaction with the National Party, approximately 37% of new ACT support in 2020 came from the Nationals. A smaller but significant portion came from New Zealand First (NZF), with 12.9% of 2017 NZF voters issuing their vote to ACT in 2020.[116]

3.4 New Zealand First

Formed in 1993 by former National MP Winston Peters, NZF have contested every election since their formation. Arguably the most successful populist party in ANZ, NZF scored eight on the CSES populist scale. The 1996 general election represents NZF's most electorally successful result to date. Achieving one general electorate, all five Māori electorates and 13.35% of the party vote, NZF gained a total of 17 seats in a 120-seat parliament. Forming a coalition with the centre right National Party, Peters became Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer. Since 1999 NZF has achieved between 4.09% and 10.38% of the party vote and in

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[116] Newshub, "Newshub-Reid Research Poll."

2005 entered a supply and confidence agreement with the centre left Labour Party and Peters was made Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Racing. In 2017, despite a 1.46% decline in party vote and losing two list seats, NZF were instrumental in determining who formed government, as neither Labour on 46 seats or the National Party on 56 seats could reach a majority without NZF's nine seats. NZF entered a formal coalition with Jacinda Ardern's Labour Party forming government, alongside the Green Party in a confidence and supply arrangement. Peters was made Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for State Owned Enterprises and Minister for Racing. NZF achieved its worst electoral result in 2020 with only 2.6% of the party vote, down from 7.2% in 2017. With no electorates and failing to qualify for the 5% party vote threshold, NZF found itself outside of parliament for the second time since 2008. Objections to restrictive Covid 19 measures when a majority of New Zealand citizens supported them is attributed to the NZF vote collapse and that Peter's anti-establishment populist rhetoric lacked authenticity when espoused from the position of Deputy Prime Minister.[117]

3.5 Australia and New Zealand Immigration

NZF and ACT of New Zealand are electorally more successful than PHON and UAP of Australia. PHON and NZF run on anti-immigration platforms with NZF having a level of electoral success that PHON has not, yet public attitudes towards immigration in ANZ are very similar. Between 2004 and 2016 the percentage of people wanting to reduce immigration either a little or a lot was on average 42.6% in Australia and 45.4% in New Zealand. A relatively low percentage compared to the United Kingdom (UK), whose average in the same period was 75.5%,[118]

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[117] Graham-McLay, "Kingmaker No More."

[118] Vowles and Curtin, *A Populist Exception?*, 150.

demonstrating that immigration reduction is important within ANZ but has yet to break majority consensus. Australia and New Zealand have high but consistent levels of immigration. Australia's foreign-born population is 29.8%[119] and New Zealand's is 27.4%,[120] however the majority of foreign intake has been from either country or the UK, resulting in little ethnic or cultural change.[121] Rates of immigration changed in 2006 with significant increases in Chinese, Indian and Filipino immigrants. By 2017 UK immigrants made up 4% of the monthly inflow to Australia while Chinese and Indian immigrants comprised nearly 33%.[122] In New Zealand immigration has increased from 10,000 arrivals in 2013 to 69,000 in 2016, with arrivals from China and India five times larger than arrivals from the UK.[123]

As discussed in section 2.5, the position of left-wing parties on immigration provide space in which national populism can grow. However, in ANZ the centre left has been consistently analogous with their centre right counterparts on immigration, leaving little room for a populist uprising. There is little to separate the Australian LNP and ALP in terms of immigration policy. Although initially opposing the LNP's Operation Sovereign Borders and its boat turnback policy as an effective measure for curbing illegal immigration, as defined under the Migration Act 1958, the ALP adopted it as official policy in 2015. In New Zealand, Labour's Jacinda Ardern was one of the few western leaders to actively reduce legal immigration. In

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[119] Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Migration, Australia, 2019-20 Financial Year."

[120] Stats NZ, "2018 Census Data Allows Users to Dive Deep into New Zealand's Diversity."

[121] Kaufmann, *Whiteshift*, 265.

[122] Hunt, "Barely Half of Population Born in Australia to Australian-Born Parents."

[123] Emigration New Zealand, "New Zealand Migrants – Moving to New Zealand."

2017 Ardern wanted to cut immigration by 30,000 per annum and stabilise migrant intake to 40,000 per annum, resulting in media outlets comparing her to Donald Trump.[124]

 Commonalities between ANZ populist parties include distrust of political elites, a noted trait within supporters of populism across western democracies. Voters who are not anti-immigration or for whom immigration is not a salient issue will still consider voting for a populist party as a form of protest against mainstream political entities.[125] This explains support for UAP and to a lesser extent ACT, as immigration reform is not a priority for either party. An increase in ethnically and culturally diverse immigrants has the potential for national populist expansion in ANZ. However, the acceptance of current immigration levels among the ANZ populace and the consistent positions held by centre left parties on immigration demonstrates there are other reasons for disparity in electoral success between Australian and New Zealand populists.

3.6 Populist Success in New Zealand Relative to Australia

Immigration, positions of left-wing parties and objections to left modernism (demonstrated in section 2.6.3) are comparable between ANZ and fail to explain populist electoral success in New Zealand relative to Australia. The following sections examine electoral systems, reputational shields and 'routinization' as explanations for the electoral discrepancies.

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[124] Vowles and Curtin, *A Populist Exception?*, 145.

[125] Jiang and Ma, "Political Distrust and Right-Wing Populist Party Voting in Australia," 373.

3.6.1 Electoral Systems

New Zealand's mixed member proportional (MMP) system in a unicameral legislature allows smaller parties to compete against larger mainstream parties.[126] Providing a 5% party vote threshold is reached, political parties are entitled to parliamentary seats without winning a general or Māori electorate which are typically dominated by Labour and the National Party. MMP allows smaller parties to obtain power sharing positions. In 2014 the United Future entered into a confidence and supply agreement with the National Party with one general electorate and 0.22% of the party vote. Introduced in 1996, MMP has required every government to consist of coalitions or at least confidence and supply agreements with the exception of the 2020 Labour victory. MMP benefits populist parties, 86% of all NZF and 85% of all ACT parliamentary seats have been won through list seat voting.

The bicameral Australian system makes it difficult for smaller parties to obtain seats in the lower house via the party preference system. Accepting the LNP as a single party either they or the ALP have formed a majority government in every election since 1922, with one exception in 2010, Julia Gillard's ALP had to form a coalition with one Green member and three Independents. The Australian Senate operates a form of proportional representation resulting in greater success for smaller parties. Since their formation, PHON's ratio of winning federal Senate to House of Representative seats is 8:0 and UAP's is 3:1. UAP have held a total of four federal Senate seats, the fourth obtained through a defection in June 2018 from former PHON Senator Brian Burston.

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[126] MacDonald, "Between Populism and Pluralism," 229.

3.6.2 Reputational Shields

ACT and NZF demonstrate an effective use of reputational shields making them electorally acceptable compared to PHON and UAP. Pauline Hanson's comments regarding immigration have been documented in section 1.4, although her vitriol was directed at the political elite her comments were viewed as distinctly 'anti-Asian' and racist. She made efforts in subsequent speeches to move away from ethnicity and focus on unemployment,[127] but could not distance herself from charges of racism. Winston Peters identifies as Māori and David Seymour (current ACT leader) is of Māori descent so charges of white superiority have less credibility. Winston Peters criticises immigration but his comments prove far less of a hindrance to electoral success. Peters frames his immigration arguments in terms of globalization disproportionally affecting Māori citizens as they are less affluent than non-Māori and increased job competition and pressure on public services would exacerbate this. Framing his critique in traditional left-wing values and de-emphasising the ethnic nature of immigration, Peters is able to simultaneously promote Māori interests and garner support from older, white voters with nationalistic tendencies.[128] Peters' reputational shield of economics and promotion of indigenous interests have allowed NZF a firm stance against increased immigration whilst being electorally viable.

ACT maintain that citizenship and permanent residency are subject to applicants affirming New Zealand's values,[129] a form of acute assimilation for immigrants. However, ACT benefit from an economic shield of libertarianism and do not actively oppose immigration. UAP's

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[127] Goot, "Pauline Hanson's One Nation," 106.

[128] MacDonald, "Between Populism and Pluralism," 238.

[129] ACT, "Principles."

position on immigration is inconsistent and a low priority for the party. The UAP candidate manual 2013 made a pledge to give refugees opportunities in Australia for a better future and lifestyle,[130] while five years later a statement made by Senator Brian Burston called for a reduction and then dispersal of immigration to regional Australia.[131] UAP suffer from stigmas other than racism. Palmer has accumulated negative press about diverting $15 million from his company Queensland Nickle to fund political campaigns. Queensland Nickle was liquidated in April 2016 due to large debts leaving 800 workers redundant.[132] Given UAP policy on reducing mining taxes, Palmer's connections to the mining industry and apparent mismanagement, UAP has little defence against claims of self-interest.

3.6.3 Routinization

'Routinization' refers to how a movement may transition from a charismatic leader into a stable political entity, detailed in section 1.5. ACT has had five leaders since its conception and always maintained at least one seat in the New Zealand parliament since 1996. Free market policy independent of a single leader and shrewd political manoeuvring in the seat of Epsom has allowed ACT to sustain a continued political presence. NZF are more reliant on their leader Winston Peters than ACT is on theirs, Peters has led the party since its formation in 1993. Peters is brash and combative in his rhetoric, particularly against David Seymour.[133] Nevertheless, Peters has also gained a reputation for being reliable to work with, earning praise from ex-Prime Minister Helen Clarke. "He was my minister of foreign affairs for three years. I can say that on no occasion did NZ First let us down. In the business of government,

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[130] Kefford and McDonnell, "Ballots and Billions," 184.

[131] United Australia Party, "Burston: It's Time to Curb Immigration and Ease Population Pressure."

[132] ABC News, "Creditors Vote to Liquidate Queensland Nickel."

[133] Sowman-Lund, "Fight for Life."

we had a very functional and good working relationship."[134] Peters has the ability to channel 'the people' particularly towards his enemies when in opposition and simultaneously develop a good working relationship with those he partners with in government.

Conversely, PHON are completely reliant on Pauline Hanson and demonstrate notably poorer election results detailed in section 1.5 without her. Hanson outperformed One Nation when she stood against them in the QLD Senate ballot in the 2007 federal election under the party name Pauline Hanson's United Australia. Despite not winning the seat she attained 101,461 first preference votes and a state wide vote share of 4.2%. Comparatively Brian Burston stood as the official One Nation Senate candidate for QLD and only received 39,807 first preference votes or just under 1% of the state wide vote share. This demonstrates that Hanson is talismanic in the fortunes of her party and without its charismatic leader it struggles to achieve meaningful election results. UAP have clear problems with candidate retention due to a party structure that discourages devolved decision making, detailed in section 1.5. At their most successful, April 2014, UAP had nine representatives across federal, state and territory parliaments, a significant accomplishment for a party just over a year old. However, by March 2015 less than a year later, all but two UAP representatives resigned citing either clashes with Palmer[135] or party mismanagement.[136] Palmer's attempt to placate voters across the left-right cleavage reducing UAP to a protest vote is unlikely to attract the support required to increase UAP's current vote share. UAP demonstrates little in party structure that would see it survive the removal of Palmer's financial and public involvement.

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[134] MacDonald, "Between Populism and Pluralism," 239.

[135] The Sydney Morning Herald, "Glenn Lazarus Quits Palmer United Party."

[136] Agius, "PUP Qld Leader Quits amid Claims of 'Jobs for the Boys.'"

Assessing each party's electoral results and positions within respective parliaments demonstrate that while causal factors of national populism exist in ANZ they are constrained to a greater extent than in Europe and North America. Immigration and positions of left-wing parties are not as prominent in ANZ populist success, while reputational shields, effective routinization and the diversification from a charismatic leader are. Section 4 assesses quantitative data and determines the most likely socio-economic variables that contribute to national populism in ANZ.

Section 4: Aggregate Level Analysis

Section 4 uses aggregate level analysis to assess economic and social variables reporting the demographic composition of electorate support for national populism in Australia and New Zealand (ANZ).

4.1 Methodology

Aggregate level analysis has been used to evaluate the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom,[137] the 2017 Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey[138] and the One Nation vote from the 1998 Australian federal election.[139] The most recently available election vote share is compared to demographic census information. At time of writing the Australian 2022 election data and 2021 census data are unavailable. The primary vote from the 2019 Australian federal election[140] is compared to the 2016 Australian census.[141] The Commonwealth Electoral Divisions (CED) 2018 boundary redistribution[142] for census data is included to provide accurate representation for the 2019 federal election. The general electorate vote[143] and list seat vote[144] from the 2020 New Zealand general election is compared to the 2018 New Zealand census.[145] In addition to census data, results for the Australian Marriage Law Postal

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[137] Goodwin and Heath, "The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind," 323-332.

[138] Gravelle and Carson, "Explaining the Australian Marriage Equality Vote," 186-201.

[139] Gibson, McAllister, and Swenson, "The Politics of Race and Immigration in Australia," 823-844.

[140] Australian Electoral Commission, "House of Representatives Downloads."

[141] Australian Bureau of Statistics, "TableBuilder | Australian Bureau of Statistics."

[142] Australian Bureau of Statistics, "1270.0.55.003 - Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS)."

[143] New Zealand Electoral Commission, "Votes Recorded at Each Voting Place."

[144] New Zealand Electoral Commission, "Statistics - Enrolment and Voting Statistics."

[145] The New Zealand Parliament, "Electorate Profiles 2020 - New Zealand Parliament."

Survey[146] and the New Zealand Cannabis and Euthanasia referendums[147] are included. New Zealand census data for Māori electorates is deemed too broad an area to be statistically relevant and double counts electorates on the general roll in aggregate level analysis. Therefore, Māori electorates are not included in this study. Arcsine transformation is performed to normalise the dependent variable of vote share percentage to ensure a normative distribution[148] for linear regression analysis. Using simple linear regression, an R^2 value denoting positive, negative or not statistically significant association between vote share in an electorate and a single census demographic variable is produced. The full range of demographic variables tested is listed in the appendix, A-1 for Australia and A-2 for New Zealand. Statistically significant factors are tested in multiple regression analysis producing models indicating which demographic factors determine support for each populist party in ANZ. Variance inflation factor (VIF) testing is performed to compensate for multicollinearity within the models and conflicting independent variables are removed. In total, 558 regression tests are performed encompassing 17,431 individual points of data.

4.2 Pauline Hanson's One Nation

Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON) vote in the 2019 federal election was primarily focused in Queensland (QLD). All QLD seats except Kennedy were contested meaning of the 59 federal divisions that PHON ran in, 29 were located in QLD. PHON contested 16 divisions in Western Australia but received its biggest primary vote of 21.59% in the division of Hunter located in New South Wales. PHON are an archetype for populism and strong positive regressions with

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[146] Australian Bureau of Statistics, "1800.0 - Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey, 2017."

[147] New Zealand Electoral Commission, "Statistics - Enrolment and Voting Statistics."

[148] Garson, Testing Statistical Assumptions, 28.

older, lower income, less educated, religious and ethnic majority electorates is expected. The strongest variable for age is a negative association for 18–49-year-olds (R^2 -0.29). However, the inverse is different as ages 50 and over have a positive but weaker association (R^2 0.08) compared to 50–64-year-olds (R^2 0.13). This suggests that PHON support stems from older electorates rather than the oldest and is lower in younger electorates.


Figure 1: Aged 18-49 and support for PHON

Figure 2: Aged 50-64 and 50+ and support for PHON

PHON support is consistent with strong positive associations in lower income electorates and negative associations in higher income electorates. The strongest positive association is with individual income between \$15,600 – \$25,999 per annum (R^2 0.36) and the strongest negative

association is with $156,000 plus per annum ($R^2$ -0.33). Figure 3 shows that as income across

electorates increases, support for PHON decreases. Analysis suggests that lower income

earning areas are more likely to vote for PHON, but when controlling for other variables

individual income is less significant. PHON's anti-Immigration stance would predict

electorates with higher PHON support have a lower foreign-born population. Figure 4

demonstrates this to be accurate, however, the R^2 value of foreign born (-0.416) and migrants

arriving between 2006 and 2016 (-0.412) are very similar, suggesting that migrants are not

settling in the rural and regional areas where PHON support is strongest. All religious

denominations excluding Christianity have a slight to moderate negative association with

PHON support ranging from the weakest negative association of Islam (R^2 -0.07) to the

strongest negative association of Hinduism (R^2 -0.30). Christianity is the only religion to have

a positive association (R^2 0.45) indicating that the electorates with practicing Christians offer

stronger support to PHON than other religious variables. Religious and foreign-born variables

demonstrate PHON has greater electoral successful in less multicultural electorates.

*Figure 3: Individual income distribution per annum and support for PHON*

*Figure 4: Foreign born population and support for PHON*

Figure 5: Christianity and support for PHON

Employment status provides the strongest associations in PHON testing, Professionals (R^2 -0.59) and Machinery Operators and Drivers combined with Labourers (R^2 0.64). Of the five electorates that have the highest PHON primary vote two are classed as rural and three are classified as provincial by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The five electorates with the lowest primary vote are classified as either 'Inner Metropolitan' or 'Outer Metropolitan', demonstrating that electorates with more working-class professions lead to stronger support for PHON and the inverse is true for more white-collar electorates. Education provides strong negative associations with Bachelor's Degree or Higher (R^2 -0.64) and positive associations with vocational qualifications, Certificate level I-IV (R^2 0.57).

Figure 7: Employment and support for PHON

Figure 6: Education and support for PHON

Table 1: Pauline Hanson's One Nation Analysis, Multiple Regression

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Certificate - I - IV	0.57**	0.22
Machinery Operators and Drivers + Labourers	0.88***	0.13
Christianity	0.56***	0.09
Constant	-0.27***	0.04
N	59	
Adjusted R Squared	0.83	

Notes: *** denotes p<0.005; ** denotes p<0 .05; * denotes p<0.10.

Table 1 shows the multiple regression model for PHON electorates. Education and employment type are undoubtedly related, however, multiple regression and VIF shows that these two variables are to be viewed independently. Income provides a weak association

when modelling against other variables and is deemed not statistically significant. The results show there is strong PHON support in electorates that have increased skill and trade-based education, a high employment in traditional trade work and high levels of practicing Christians. Individually Overseas Born and Recent Migrants show strong negative associations with PHON support, but are not statistically significant in the model. This is reflective of the rural locations PHON run in rather than direct associations with lack of support. The PHON model fulfils expectations of working-class professions, lower education levels and adherence to traditional European religious practices.

4.2 United Australia Party

The United Australia Party (UAP) ran in all 151 divisions of the 2019 Australian federal election. UAP was most successful in Victoria, with eight seats in the state achieving more than 5% primary vote share. The two highest primary votes were in NSW, the division of Riverina achieved 10.71% and Whitlam achieved 8.84%. One of the stronger results for UAP was from electorates with single parent families. This is an unexpected result as there is no specific UAP policy that was prominently aimed at single parents.

Figure 8: One Parent Family and support for UAP

UAP demonstrates a strong relationship with income and support. Electorates with a higher percentage of individuals earning more than $65,000 per annum have a negative association with UAP (R^2 -0.48) and electorates with an individual income of less than $65,000 per annum showed strong positive association (R^2 0.50). The strongest positive association is in electorates with an individual income of between $26,000 - $41,599 ($R^2$ 0.43). This is a clear indicator that less affluent electorates are more likely to support UAP.

Figure 9: Individual income and support for UAP

UAP demonstrated similar results to PHON in employment and education. Employment status produced strong negative associations with Professionals (R^2 -0.45) and positive associations with Labourers (R^2 0.44), shown in figure 10. Electorates with the highest level of education as Secondary Education - 9 Years and Below showed greater support (R^2 0.46), while electorates with Bachelor Degree or Higher held a strong negative association (R^2 -0.45), shown in figure 11.

*Figure 11: Employment and support for UAP*

Figure 10: Education and support for UAP

Born Overseas had negative but weak association with UAP support (R^2 -0.14). UAP lack a specific anti-immigration policy and the results indicate this is not an important issue for their supporters.


Figure 12: Born Overseas and support for UAP

Table 2: United Australia Party Analysis, Multiple Regression

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Tradies, Machinery operators and Labourers	0.07	0.04
One parent family	0.29**	0.13
$26,000 - $41,599	0.37**	0.15
Secondary Education - Years 9 and below	0.62***	0.17
Constant	0.01	0.02
N	151	
Adjusted R Squared	0.55	

Notes: *** denotes $p<0.005$; ** denotes $p<0.05$; * denotes $p<0.10$.

The UAP model is weaker than PHON with an adjusted R^2 of 0.55. This is reflective of the indiscriminate approach by Palmer in targeting every electorate in an attempt to win the protest vote. However, even taking this into account there are still clear demographic identifiers. UAP shows similarities with PHON but Christianity, or any other religion, is not a determinate factor in support for Clive Palmer's party. UAP shares populist commonalities, showing greater support in areas with lower levels of education and where working-class employment is predominant. The Labourers variable had the single strongest positive association for UAP, but only when combining the three different variables of Technicians and Trades Workers, Machinery Operators and Drivers, and Labourers did the result become statistically significant within the model. Labourers placed individually in the model resulted in a p value in excess of 0.66. Income, education and job type are obviously related, but VIF modelling suggests that these should be treated as three separate variables demonstrating little multicollinearity. The UAP model differs from PHON in there are clear indicators that lower income electorates are attracted to the UAP. One Parent Family does not directly infer those single parents are voting for UAP, just that the electorates with higher levels of single

parents are. One Parent Family has a strong negative association with Median House Hold Weekly Income (R^2 -0.44) and Median Weekly Rent (R^2 -0.60), showing that electorates with higher income or rent are less likely to have single parents live there. One Parent Family could indicate a dissatisfaction with the mainstream political approach to child care and support for single parents, but could also act as another yet separate indicator for lower income electorates supporting UAP.

4.3 Association of Consumers and Taxpayers

The Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) electorate regression provides the overall weakest result in this study due to the vote share being concentrated within the seat of Epsom. Epsom received a vote share of 47.53%, the second highest seat Kaipara ki Mahurangi won 6.67%. Concentration of the vote within Epsom is a result of a deal struck between the National Party and ACT in which the National Party directs support to the ACT candidate standing in Epsom. Epsom is a very wealthy electorate in Auckland, which explains results such as a positive association with houses being held in a family trust (R^2 0.31). ACT's emphasis on reduced government involvement results in a positive but weak association with business owners (R^2 0.10) and actually increases (R^2 0.18) when the Epsom electorate is removed. Other significant differences when Epsom is removed are detailed in figure 13. While association is weak, the results suggest that electorates outside of Epsom are less educated, work outside of white-collar jobs and are more opposed to cannabis legalisation suggesting a more conservative opinion on recreational cannabinoid use.

Figure 13: Comparison of ACT electorates with and without the seat of Epsom

Multiple regression for ACT electorates, including Epsom, provides a particularly weak model with an adjusted R^2 of 0.34 and a Constant p value of 0.46, and is rejected as it is not statistically significant. A reason for the overall weakness of the model would be the concentration of vote share within the single electorate of Epsom and the inherent differences it has with other electorates in which ACT ran.

Table 3: Association of Consumers and Taxpayers Analysis - Electorates, Multiple Regression

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Bachelor degree and higher	0.31*	0.17
Dwelling held in a family trust	1.62***	0.36
Interest, dividends, rent, other investments	-0.98**	0.4
50 to 64 years old	0.87	0.75
Constant	-0.10	0.13
N	57	
Adjusted R Squared	0.34	

Notes: *** denotes $p<0.005$; ** denotes $p<0.05$; * denotes $p<0.10$.

List seat votes for ACT are more evenly distributed than the electorates and produce a stronger model. The most successful list result for ACT was in Southland with 12.70% vote share and the key electorate of Epsom is its 12th most successful list seat with a vote share of 10.41%. Similar to PHON in Australia, ACT list attracts older but not the oldest electorates. Strong positive association is found in electorates that have a higher percentage of 50-64-year-old voters (R^2 0.45) compared to 80 years and over (R^2 0.25). Conversely, there is a strong negative association with younger electorates aged 0-49 (R^2 -0.41). The strongest association in income is earning $5,000 or less ($R^2$ -0.36), all other income divisions are statistically weak, suggesting that personal income is not a significant factor in voting for ACT list. A commonality between ACT list and ACT electorate is income source, the strongest positive association in each being Self-employment or Business I Own and Work in. The strongest negative association in income source was Government Assistance (R^2 -0.39), which is a composite of various government funded support programs. Combining these programs gives a much stronger result than any individual variable. Income source demonstrates that support for

ACT list is derived from business owners and that electorates requiring larger amounts of government aid reject the right-wing economic policies of ACT.

Electorates with higher use of government assistance and their lack of ACT list support is also reflected in household tenure type. Dwelling Held in a Family Trust has strong positive association (R^2 0.50) and Of Renting - Housing New Zealand Corporation has strong negative association (R^2 -0.54). Further evidence for affluent voters' support of ACT list is the comparison between unemployed (R^2 -0.51) and those holding managerial positions (R^2 0.69). ACT list performs strongly in electorates with majority European descent and where the main language spoken is English. The level of Māori in an electorate is not statistically significant when determining ACT list support.

*Government Assistance derived from combining Jobseeker Support, Sole Parent Support, Supported Living Payment, Student Allowance, Other Government Benefits, Government Income Support Payments, War Pensions and Paid Parental Leave.

*Figure 14: Income source and support for ACT list*

Figure 15: Ethnicity, language and support for ACT list

Unlike PHON, where Christianity is highly relevant, or UAP where religion is not statistically relevant in determining support, the variable of No Religion has a strong positive association for ACT List support (R^2 0.46). The strongest negative association in the religion variable is Islam (R^2 -0.49), which is related to the negative association of Non-European shown in figure 15. The strong positive association with No Religion is counter to arguments that populist support is derived from a religious ethnic majority,[149] regarding ACT list this is only partially correct.

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[149] Inglehart and Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism," 1-52.

Figure 16: Religion and support for ACT list

Another contrast with ACT list and traditional populist support is education level. There is a very weak negative association for Bachelor Degree or Higher (R^2 -0.03), but there is a much stronger positive association for Level 6 Diploma (R^2 0.40) which is one level lower than a bachelor degree.

Figure 17: Education and support for ACT list

This contrasts with support for PHON, UAP and as will be demonstrated New Zealand First (NZF), as these show positive associations with electorates that have lower levels of education. New Zealand's referendum on assisted dying was a direct result of ACT's leader David Seymour bringing forward the private member's End of Life Choice Bill. As a result, electorates with a high percentage of Yes for assisted dying have a strong positive association

(R² 0.44) with ACT list support. This aligns with the libertarian ethos of reduced government interference with an individual's personal circumstances. However, like ACT electorate analysis, the Yes variable for legalised cannabis has a weak but negative association with ACT list.

Figure 18: Referendum on End-of-life Choice and Cannabis and support for ACT list

Table 4: Association of Consumers and Taxpayers Analysis - List Seats, Multiple Regression

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Language other than English spoken at home	-0.14***	0.03
Managers	0.73***	0.09
OF RENTING - Housing New Zealand Corporation	-0.08*	0.04
Level 6 diploma	1.17**	0.45
Constant	0.13***	0.03
N	65	
Adjusted R Squared	0.85	

Notes: *** denotes p<0.005; ** denotes p<0 .05; * denotes p<0.10.

ACT list seats present a stronger model than ACT electorates with an overall high R² adjusted figure and statistically significant findings. The model presents a generally wealthier electorate that while not necessarily university educated has higher education levels than supporters of other populist parties in ANZ. The negative association with the Housing of New Zealand Corporation suggest that ACT supporters are from wealthier electorates and

individual regressions confirm this. ACT presents an anomaly within populist support in that electorate association with bachelor degrees is negative but weak and that wealthier electorates with white-collar employees support ACT. ACT is supported by electorates with ethnic majorities but otherwise present a unique instance of a populist party in ANZ.

4.4 New Zealand First

NZF contested 27 electorates in the 2020 New Zealand general election, the fewest number of any party in this study. The highest vote share was in the seat of Northland at 11.43% but NZF's average vote across electorates was 2.67% and in 13 electorates out of 27, they failed to achieve more than two percent of the vote. Low vote share combined with limited observations produce weak individual regressions for NZF electorates. However, there are some notable exceptions in income, how wages are paid and ethnicity. The individual income variable of $10,000 - $20,000 provides strong positive association (R^2 0.44) indicating that less wealthy electorates are more likely to support NZF. This assertion is supported by how income is received. Income received from an employer has a strong negative association (R^2 -0.53) compared to income received through work accident insurers (R^2 0.33) and pensions (R^2 0.26). This suggests retirees on pensions or people receiving a form of government benefit are likely to support NZF in the electorates they ran in.

Figure 19: Individual income plus income source and electorate support for NZF

Table 5: New Zealand First Analysis - Electorates, Multiple Regression

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Regular payments from ACC or a private work accident insurer	12.00**	4.60
Bachelor degree and Level 7 qualification	1.66**	0.74
Recent migrants (arrived 2009-2018)	-0.19*	0.10
Māori religions, beliefs and philosophies	2.52**	0.74
Not in the Labour Force	0.45	0.31
No qualification	0.69	0.44
Constant	-0.51*	0.25
N	27	
Adjusted R Squared	0.61	

Notes: *** denotes p<0.005; ** denotes p<0 .05; * denotes p<0.10.

Multiple regression produces a strong adjusted R^2 value of 0.61, however, there are significant problems with the model. The model shows a positive association with more educated electorates when the individual analysis shows the opposite to be true. There is also high microcolinearity with No Qualification and Bachelor Degree and Level 7 Qualification. When either of these variables are removed, p values for other variables are significantly increased up to 0.77, demonstrating the statistical weakness of the dependent variable. As a percentage NZF ran in 42% of seats compared to PHON which ran in 39% of Australian seats but the actual number is significantly lower, 27 compared to 59. Despite having a strong R^2 adjusted, the limited number of observations, statistical errors and low significance mean the NZF electorate model is rejected.

NZF list seats, like ACT, provide a stronger model for demographic factors than its electorate counterpart. Vote share ranges from 1.12% in Wellington Central to 5.83% in Northland, and though the average of 2.48% is slightly lower than the electorates, the 65 observations provide a stronger individual regression. Age variables share similarities to PHON in Australia. The negative association with ages 20-49 (R^2 -0.31) and positive association with ages 50 and above (R^2 0.16) show NZF is more likely to lose support from younger electorates than it is to gain support from older ones.


Figure 20: Age and list support for NZF list

Figure 21: Individual income plus income source and support for NZF list

Electorate and list testing show similar outcomes in income and how the income is received.

There is a strong positive association with the \$10,000 -\$20,000 income variable (R^2 0.52) and

negative association with the highest income variable of \$50,000 and above (R^2 -0.36). Income

received through jobseeker support or work accident compensation schemes have a strong

positive association (R^2 0.47) and income from an employer displays a negative association

(R^2 -0.34). Income and how it is received variables show that less affluent electorates are more

likely to support NZF compared to wealthier electorates.

A trend for populist support is the negative association with higher levels of education. NZF

has a negative association in electorates with higher levels of bachelor degree attainment (R^2

-0.44) and very similar positive association in electorates that have higher levels of no formal

qualification (R^2 0.44). However, there is a positive association with electorates that have

higher instances of Certificate 1 - Diploma 6 (R^2 0.42), indicating that electorates with more

vocational qualifications support NZF over electorates with more academic qualifications. NZF

list educational association should be separated from ACT list as it is relevant across a range

of vocational qualifications whereas ACT list shows strong association with Diploma 6 only.

Figure 22: Educational comparison and support for NZF list

NZF electorates report a strong positive association with Māori population (R^2 0.41) and list

seats increase this association (R^2 0.55). This positive association could be reported as unusual

because populists tend to be antagonistic towards indigenous peoples, refer to Pauline

Hanson. The data shows that electorates with high Māori populations vote for NZF, not

necessarily Māori communities. Cultural or ethnic backlash against perceived grievances with

Māori from white populations exacerbated by living in the same electorates could also explain

this. However, cultural backlash seems unlikely as NZF has proven to be popular with Māori

voters. In 1996 NZF won all five Māori electorates in which only Māori or Māori descendants

vote. Between 2002 and 2017, NZF are the third most consistently voted for party in Māori

electorates ahead of the Greens, the National Party and the Mana Party. Winston Peters also experiences high likeability ratings amongst Māori, actually proving to be more popular amongst Māori than non-Māori voters.[150] Favourability ratings combined with the data presented indicate that the indigenous Māori support NZF. The anti-immigration stance that NZF takes does not extend to a broader perception of hostility towards non-white individuals in the same way that Pauline Hanson's rhetoric extends to Aboriginals in Australia. This enhances NZF's reputational shield, despite the party's official policy of abolishing Māori electorates.

Figure 23: Māori and support for NZF list

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[150] Vowles and Curtin, *A Populist Exception?*, 121.

Table 6: New Zealand First Analysis - List, Multiple Regression

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Regular payments from ACC or a private work accident insurer + Jobseeker Support	0.25**	0.11
Wages, salary, commissions, bonuses etc paid by my employer	-0.14***	0.04
Māori	0.06*	0.04
Certificate 1-Diploma 6	0.07**	0.03
Constant	0.18***	0.03
N	65	
Adjusted R Squared	0.68	

Notes: *** denotes $p<0.005$; ** denotes $p<0.05$; * denotes $p<0.10$.

NZF list analysis presents a far stronger model than its electorate version. An adjusted R^2 of 0.68 and statistically significant results indicates a model not dissimilar to UAP, indicating less affluent electorates with lower levels of education and a focus on vocational skills support NZF. The obvious exception to the UAP comparison is support from indigenous peoples, showing that electorates with higher Māori populations are more likely to support NZF. The support from indigenous peoples separates NZF from the typical populist model and combined with ACT New Zealand presents two unique populist movements in western democracies.

The final section of this study compares the four accepted models of populist support and examines commonalities and differences between. Proposals for further research in identifying the motivation behind populist support are also given.

Section 5: Conclusions

Section 5 analyses components within the accepted models, shown in Table 7. No single consistent variable is present but the variable categories of education, employment type and income distribution indicate a demographic trend in support for three of the four populist parties. However, the variation within New Zealand suggests there are two types of national populism present compared to a single competing populist vote in Australia. New Zealand populist support also demonstrates deviation from populist norms found in Europe as established by Inglehart and Norris.[151]

5.1 Education

Bachelor Degree or Higher did not feature in the models as a single variable, however, with the exception of the Association of Taxpayer and Consumers (ACT) the strong negative associations with tertiary level education are shown in Figure 23. Electorates with university level education are less likely to support Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON), United Australia Party (UAP) or New Zealand First (NZF). Conversely, intermediate and vocational qualifications indicate a strong positive association in support of populist parties. Figure 24 shows electorates with various post high school qualifications ranked lower than a bachelor degree and in all four examples there is mild to strong positive association with populist support.

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[151] Inglehart and Norris, "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism," 1-52.

Table 7: Comparison of Accepted Models, Multiple Regression

Notes: *** denotes p<0.005; ** denotes p<0 .05; * denotes p<0.10.

Pauline Hanson's One Nation

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Certificate - I - IV	0.57**	0.22
Machinery Operators and Drivers + Labourers	0.88***	0.13
Christianity	0.56***	0.09
Constant	-0.27***	0.04
N	59	
Adjusted R Squared	0.83	

United Australia Party

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Tradies, Machinery operators and Labourers	0.07	0.04
One parent family	0.29**	0.13
$26,000 - $41,599	0.37**	0.15
Secondary Education - Years 9 and below	0.62***	0.17
Constant	0.01	0.02
N	151	
Adjusted R Squared	0.55	

Association of Consumers and Taxpayers – List Seats

	Coefficients	Standard Error
Language other than English spoken at home	-0.14***	0.03
Managers	0.73***	0.09
OF RENTING - Housing New Zealand Corporation	-0.08*	0.04
Level 6 diploma	1.17**	0.45
Constant	0.13***	0.03
N	65	
Adjusted R Squared	0.85	

New Zealand First – List Seats

|	Coefficients	Standard Error
Regular payments from ACC or a private work accident insurer + Jobseeker Support	0.25**	0.11
Wages, salary, commissions, bonuses etc paid by my employer	-0.14***	0.04
Māori	0.06*	0.04
Certificate 1-Diploma 6	0.07**	0.03
Constant	0.18***	0.03
N	65	
Adjusted R Squared	0.68	

Figure 25: Bachelor Degree or Higher and support ANZ populist parties


Figure 24: Intermediate and vocational qualifications and support for ANZ populist parties

Each party presents a different range of post high school qualifications that, with the exception of UAP, demonstrate stronger positive associations with populist support than high school completion as the highest level of education in an electorate. Even with UAP, where Secondary Education - Years 9 and Below is a component of its model, clear positive association with additional qualifications is observed. Further research is required to determine the specific qualifications attained, but it is reasonable to state electorates that support populist parties in Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) are not 'uneducated' but elect for a different type of education to that on offer at university. When referring to electorates with higher populist support, the phrase 'uneducated' lacks specificity and should either be reconsidered or reserved explicitly for not having a university bachelor's degree or higher.

5.2 Employment Type

Unlike education, employment type observes a clear division between the two countries. Australia presents a significant positive association with employment type by combining the three variables of Trade Workers and Technicians, Machinery Operators and Drivers, and Labourers, defined in Figure 25 as Working Class. Positive association with Working Class is far weaker for NZF and is not statistically significant for ACT. The employment type trend is re-enforced by a strong negative association with White Collar employment, achieved by combining the variables of Professionals and Managers, shown in Figure 26. Australian parties have an even stronger negative association with White Collar than their positive association with Working Class. NZF have a weaker negative association and ACT have a slight positive but not statistically significant association with White Collar. Employment type is featured in three of the four models with NZF being the exception. The negative association with Wages Paid

by an Employer indicates that electorates supporting NZF are less likely to have participants in the work force.

Figure 26: Working Class employment type and support for ANZ populist parties

Work type variable indicates that support for Australian populists come from electorates that have less White Collar and more Working Class employment. This finding reflects the trend established by Inglehart and Norris, but does not apply so uniformly to New Zealand. The ACT model disassociates from this trend showing a positive association with the employment variable of Manager. Positive association between White Collar and ACT support is weaker than Manager alone, but analysis indicates that ACT receives support from more elite forms

of employment, inferring a wealthier electorate. This claim is reinforced by examining the income distribution of electorates in each country.

Figure 27: White Collar employment type and support for ANZ populist parties

5.3 Income Distribution

Figure 27 demonstrates the similar relationship PHON and UAP have with support and income. Level of income association follows a trend of positive support in lower income electorates and negative support in higher income electorates. The association is more pronounced for UAP, but PHON follows the trend closely and the two often overlap. The PHON model demonstrates income is less relevant for support, but from an income perspective PHON and UAP receive support from similar electorates and compete with each other in divisions that PHON contested. PHON and UAP may be cannibalising the other's vote given the similarities in support they receive in income distribution, education levels and employment type. The parties competed against each other federally in 2013, but the 2019 election represents the

first time a fully Hanson rejuvenated PHON contested seats against UAP. The combined primary vote share of PHON and UAP was 6.51%, making the national populist vote the fourth biggest behind the Greens in third with 10.40%, Australian Labor Party in second with 33.34% and the Liberal-National Coalition in first with 41.44%.[152] Section 3.6 demonstrates why Australian national populism is electorally weak compared to the New Zealand equivilent. An additional factor is PHON and UAP are competing for the same electorates and fragmenting the populist vote.

In stark contrast with Australia, Figure 28 demonstrates on a measure of income ACT and NZF have little in common and in some instances have oppositional associations. No income variables were relevant for the New Zealand populist models, however, other economic indicators such as how wages were paid and employment type were. Combined with the income distribution analysis, the conclusion is that wealthier electorates support ACT and less affluent electorates support NZF. There is very little overlap between the two parties and in most income divisions the parties have a weak but inverse relationship to each other, indicating that ACT and NZF compete for separate votes.

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[152] Australian Electoral Commission, "Election Results - Tally Room Archive."

Figure 28: Individual income distribution and support for Australian populist parties

Figure 29: Individual income distribution and support for New Zealand populist parties

5.4 Summary

Aggregate level analysis presents a commonality between three of the four parties with education and employment type clearly offering the strongest signifiers in populist support for PHON, UAP and NZF. As previously stated, reframing of the terms 'educated' and 'uneducated' is required to represent support for populist parties. Bachelor Degrees or Higher may represent a negative association, but there is a clear preference for education and training outside an academic structure. Employment type is also a strong signifier with a negative association in managerial and professional occupations and positive association with more manual labour and trade professions. Employment type is linked to education, forming a base of traditional working-class support. Income distribution is also similar in that lower income electorates are more likely to vote for PHON, UAP or NZF and support decreases in higher earning electorates. Combined with the individual variables featured in the models, similarities in three of the four populist parties in ANZ are concurrent with the observations made in Europe by Inglehart and Norris. PHON matches the populist archetype with older, working-class, non-university educated and religious electorates supporting them and UAP features a similar pattern, albeit with a greater economic focus. NZF has similarities but differs from the populist archetype due to the support received from the indigenous Māori population. The personal popularity of Winston Peters certainly contributes to this support, but the party as a whole is viewed favourably by Māori.

The true outlier of this study is ACT, while they attract an ethnic majority electorate, variables such as employment and education are distinct. ACT electorates share little in common with PHON, UAP or NZF and even in the one area of similarity, intermediate and vocational qualifications, there is a clear difference. The New Zealand Diploma 6 is the highest level of

education outside of academic qualifications such as a bachelor degree. Other parties required a range of lower-level qualification to form a positive association with education, indicating a general acceptance of vocational awards, but ACT required the specific, higher-level qualification. Bachelor Degree or Higher had strong negative associations with PHON, UAP and NZF but was statistically unimportant for ACT. Electorates which support ACT may have tertiary level education, but this is not a determining factor in ACT support. Combined with employment type and income distribution it is clear that wealthier electorates are more likely to support ACT, which deviates from the populist archetype. It can be argued that ACT should not be considered populist and that their classification should be reviewed. However, reclassifying ACT still leaves NZF as the predominant populist party in New Zealand and while they share economic commonalities with populists in Europe, their support of and popularity within the indigenous Māori separate NZF from populist norms.

Rather than reclassify ACT as not being sufficiently populist, an alternative approach would be to reconsider terms that are applied to populism. Much is written about the rise of right-wing populism, but the most traditionally right-wing party in this study, ACT, has the least in common with the populist archetype. Culturally, Pauline Hanson is ostensibly conservative yet she promotes government ownership of natural resources and is supported by electorates who are less wealthy and work in vocations heavily associated with unionisation. From an economic perspective Hanson is essentially left-wing. The same principles apply to Winston Peters and Clive Palmer is indeterminate, promising large government programs whilst simultaneously promising tax reduction. Economically, the only right-wing party studied is ACT. The left-right cleavage is challenged by populism and consideration should be given to a party's economic policies as well as their support base before such labels are applied. National

populism is a more accurate term to describe these political entities but even within this term there are clear differentiations. ACT and NZF cannot easily be classified using the same term and it is necessary to further distinguish different types of national populism to fully reflect those who support them. ACT and NZF have enjoyed electoral success comparative to PHON and UAP by appealing to economically different electorates. A cultural message of either anti-immigration or strict assimilation unites ACT and NZF, as does their resistance to left modernism allowing them to target specific but separate voters for electoral success. PHON and UAP are economically competing for the same voters and Hanson's association with ethnic vilification limits her wider appeal, as does Palmer's questionable management of and links to the mining industry, detailed in section 3.6.2. An increase in ethnically and culturally diverse immigration could present an opportunity for a successful national populist party within Australia, even with a less pluralistic electoral system than New Zealand. However, the current volatility of leadership in PHON and UAP and their competition for the same economic vote means they are unlikely to replicate the electoral success of either ACT or NZF.

5.5 Future Research

Longitudinal research can be conducted to study how populist support changes over time. At the time of writing the 2022 Australian federal election has concluded with PHON contesting 149 electorates and UAP contesting 151. Regression tests could be repeated on a larger sample size to ascertain if the results change or stay the same in a wider field of electorates. The Australian 2021 census results are due to be released in late June 2022 and can be compared to the 2019 or the 2022 federal elections. The most recent Australian census data available for this study was 2016 and more recent demographic data would be valuable. The next New Zealand census will take place in 2023 and can be compared to the next New Zealand

election due to take place no later than 13th January 2024. This study determines the demographic makeup of electorates that support populist candidates and from that infers the type of people that are voting for populist parties. Aggregate level analysis cannot determine specific motivation in voting for populist parties and this would require analysis of election surveys or individual level interviews. Combined with this study, election surveys and individual level interviews would present a more accurate model of populist support in ANZ. This analysis can be used to compare populist demographic support in other countries to determine if the demographic characteristics are uniquely antipodean or if they share a greater commonality with other western democracies.

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Appendix

A-1 Independent Variables Tested – Australia

Variable Category	Variables
Age	0 to 17 years old 18 to 34 years old 35 to 49 years old 50 to 64 years old 65 to 79 years old 80 years old and over 18-49 Year Old 50 + year Old 50 - 79 Year Old
Family	Couple family with children One parent family Other family Couple family without children
Individual income	$15,599 or less $15,600 - $25,999 $26,000 - $41,599 $41,600 - $64,999 $65,000 - $90,999 $100,000 - $155,999 $156,000 Plus Less than $65k $65k Plus
Culture	Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander peoples Born overseas Recent migrants (arrived 2006-2016 Language other than English spoken at home
Religion	Buddhism Christianity Hinduism Islam Judaism Other Religions Secular Beliefs and Other Spiritual Beliefs and No Religious Affiliation Inadequately described Not stated
Employment	Clerical and Administrative Workers Community and Personal Service Workers Labourers Machinery Operators and Drivers Managers Professionals Sales Workers Technicians and Trades Workers Inadequately described Not stated Machinery Operators and Drivers + Labourers Technicians and Trades Workers, Machinery Operators and Drivers and Labourers (Working Class) Managers and Professionals (White Collar)
Same Sex marriage	Yes No

Education	Postgraduate Degree Level Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate Level Bachelor Degree Level Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level Certificate III & IV Level Secondary Education - Years 10 and above Certificate I & II Level Secondary Education - Years 9 and below Bachelor Degree or higher Certificate - I - IV
Tenure Payment	Median weekly rent ($) Median monthly mortgage repayments ($)
Tenure Type	Owned outright Owned with a mortgage Rented Other tenure type Tenure type not stated

A-2 Independent Variables Tested - New Zealand

Variable Category	Variables
Age	0 to 19 years old 20 to 34 years old 35 to 49 years old 50 to 64 years old 65 to 79 years old 80 years old and over 0 - 49 Years Old 20 to 49 years Old 50 -79 years Old 50 Years plus 65 + years old
Family	Couple without children Couple with child(ren) One parent with child(ren)
Individual Income	$5000 or less $5,001-$10,000 $10,001-$20,000 $20,001-$30,000 $30,001-$50,000 $50,001-$70,000 $70,001 or more $10k - $50k $0 - $50,000 $50k +

Income Source	No source of income during that time Wages, salary, commissions, bonuses etc paid by my employer Self-employment or business I own and work in Interest, dividends, rent, other investments Regular payments from ACC or a private work accident insurer Other superannuation, pensions, or annuities (other than NZ Superannuation, Veteran's Pension or war pensions) Jobseeker Support Sole Parent Support Student Allowance Other government benefits, government income support payments, war pensions or paid parental leave Other sources of income, including support payments from people who do not live in my household All Government Support Pensions Regular payments from ACC or a private work accident insurer + Jobseeker Support Regular payments from ACC or a private work accident insurer + Jobseeker Support + Sole Parent Support
Household type	Dwelling owned or partly owned Dwelling held in a family trust Dwelling not owned and not held in a family trust OF RENTING - Private person, trust, or business OF RENTING - Housing New Zealand Corporation
Ethnicity	European Māori Pacific Peoples Asian Middle Eastern/Latin American/African Other Ethnicity New Zealander Other Ethnicity nec Non European combined
Cultural	Māori NZ born Overseas born Recent migrants (arrived 2009-2018) Migrants less than one year Language other than English spoken at home
Labour force status	Employed Full-time Employed Part-time Unemployed Not in the Labour Force
Employment Type	Managers Professionals Technicians and Trades Workers Community and Personal Service Workers Clerical and Administrative Workers Clerical and Administrative Workers Sales Workers Machinery Operators and Drivers Labourers Technicians and Trades Workers, Machinery Operators and Drivers and Labourers (Working Class) Managers and Professionals (White Collar)

Religion	No religion Christian Islam Māori religions, beliefs and philosophies Judaism Buddhism Hinduism Spiritualism and New Age religions Other religions, beliefs and philosophies Object to answering All Other Religions
Education	No qualification Level 1 certificate Level 2 certificate Level 3 certificate Level 4 certificate Level 5 Diploma Level 6 Diploma Bachelor degree and Level 7 qualification Post-graduate and honours degrees Master degree Doctorate degree Overseas secondary school qualification Bachelor degree or higher Certificate 4 - Diploma 6 Certificate 1- Diploma 6
End of Life Referendum	Yes No
Legalise Cannabis referendum	Yes No