SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE
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INTERNATIONAL STUDENT MOBILITY AND THE QUEST FOR POLICY INTEGRATION: *A LONG TERM QUALITATIVE CROSS SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIA AND ITALY*

Ph.D Candidate
Eleonora Erittu

External Supervisor: Prof. Giliberto Capano

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2WW	Second World War
3Cs	Communication Collaboration Coordination
5SM	Five Stars Movement
AACUPI	Association of American Colleges and University Program in Italy
AAUCS	Australian Asian Universities' Cooperation Schemes
AANZTA	ASEAN Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreements
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACA	Academic Cooperation Association
ACT	Australian Capital Territory
ACTU	Australian Council of Trade Unions
ADAA	Australian Development Assistance Agency
ADM	Australian Diplomatic Mission
AEC	Australian Education Centre
AFAM	Alta Formazione Artistica e Musicale (Artistic and Music High Learning)
AICS	Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (Italian Agency for Development Cooperation)
AIE	Australian International Education
AIEF	Australian International Education Foundation
AIEPB	Affiliation of the International Education Peak Bodies
AIMA	Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs
ALP	Australian Labor Party
AM	Academic Mobility
AMAC	Australian Multicultural Advisory Council
AMEP	Adult Migrant Education Program
ANCI	Associazione Nazionale dei Comuni Italiani (National Association of Italian Municipalities)
ANS	Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti
ANVUR	Agenzia Nazionale Valutazione Università e Ricerca
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States
APEC	Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
APS	Australian Public Service
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ASQA	Australia Skills Quality Authority
AUDIF	Australian Universities International Director Forum
AUI	Australian Universities International
AUQA	Australian University Quality Agency
AVCC	Australian-Vice-Chancellors Committee
BIMPR	Bureau of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Population Research
BP	Bologna Process
CAE	Centres of Advanced Education
CBD	Central Business District
CEE-ACP	Convenzione di Lomé - Comunità economica europea – Africa, Caraibi, Pacifico (Lomé Convention – European Economic Community – Africa, Caribbean, Pacific countries)
CGS	Commonwealth Grant Scheme

CICS	Centro Interministeriale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (Inter-ministerial Committee for Development Cooperation)
CIRPS	Centro Interuniversitario di Ricerca per lo Sviluppo Sostenibile (Center Inter-universitary for Sustainable Research and Development)
CISA	Council of International Students Australia
CIMEA	Consorzio Interuniversitario per il Calcolo Automatico dell'Italia Nord Orientale
CINECA	Consorzio Interuniversitario per il Calcolo Automatico dell'Italia Nord Orientale (Inter-University Consortium for Authomatic Calculus of North-East Italy)
CIPE	Centro Interministeriale per la Pianificazione Economica (Inter-ministerial Committee for the Economic planning)
CNSU	Consiglio Nazionale (National Committee for the Evaluation of the University System)
COAG	Council Of Australian Government
CONICS	Consorzio delle Università Italiane Impegnate in Accordi di Cooperazione con le Università dei Paesi in via di Sviluppo (Consortium of Italian Universities engaged in Cooperation Agreement with developing countries' Universities)
CPI	Climate Integrated Policy
CQAHE	Committee for Quality Assurance in Higher Education
CRE	Conferenza dei Rettori Europei (General Assembly of the European Rectors)
CRICOS	Commonwealth Register
CRUI	Conferenza dei Rettori Italiani (Italian Board of Rectors)
CTEC	Commonwealth Tertiary Education Committee
CTP	Centri di Permanenza Temporanei
CUIA	Consorzio interuniversitario Italiano per l'Argentina (Inter-university Italian Consortium for Argentina)
CUN	Consiglio Universitario Nazionale (National Academic Council)
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
DC	Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
DGSP	Direzione Generale per la promozione del Sistema Paese (General Directorate for the promotion of the Country System)
DEA	Department of External Affairs
DET	Department of Education and Training
DEE-HELP	Department of Education and Employment – Higher Education Loan Program
DEET	Department of Education, Employment and Training
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DGSP	Direzione Generale per la promozione del Sistema Paese (Directorate for the Promotion of the Country System)
DIAC	Department of Immigration and Citizenship
DIEA	Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
DIMA	Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
DPCM	Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (Decree of Prime Minister)

DPR	Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica (Decree of the President of the Italian Republic)
DSU	Diritto allo Studio Universitario (right to study)
EAIE	European Association for International Education
ECTS	European Transfer Credit System
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
ELICOS	English Language Intensive Courses for Overseas Students
EMSS	Equity and Merit Scholarship Scheme
ENIT	Agenzia Nazionale del Turismo (National Agency for Tourism)
EOI	Expression of Interests
EPI	Environmental Policy Integration
ESOS Act	Education Services for Overseas Students Act
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
EUREC	European Union Research Ethics Committees
EVCC	Education Visa Consultative Committee
FFO	Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario (National Fund for Higher Education)
FFPOS	Full-Fee Paying Oversea Student
FLEX	Flexible Labor Exchange Service
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GAS	Global Alumni Strategy
GAES	Global Alumni Engagement Strategy
GD	General Directorate
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSM	Generally Skilled Migration
GTIP	Global Talent Independent Program
HE	Higher Education
HEI	Higher Education Institution
HEREOC	Human Right and Equal Opportunity Commission
HESC-HELP	Higher Education Student Contribution – Higher Education Loan Program
ICP	Inter-university Cooperation Programs
IDC	Inter-Departmental Committee
IDOS	Centro Studi e Ricerche (Studies and Research Center)
IDP	International Development Program
IEAA	International Education Association of Australia
IIC	Italian Institute of Culture
IIE	Institute of International Education
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Inter-university Cooperation Project
IPISM	Integrated Policy on International Student Mobility
IPRS	International Post-Graduate Research Scholarship
IRR	Immigration Risk Rating
ISANA	International Education Association
ISM	International Student Mobility
ISSA	International Student Strategy for Australia

ISTAT	Istituto nazionale di Statistica (Italian National Centre of Statistic)
IYTI	Invest Your Talent in Italy
LSIA	Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia
JSA	Job Service Australia
JSP	Joint Study Program
JUG	Joined-Up Government
MAE	Ministero Affari Esteri (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MAF	Multi-Annual Framework
MAECI	Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation)
MOA	Military Operation Abroad
MODL	Migration Occupation Demand List
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MISE	Ministero per lo Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development)
MIUR	Ministero dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca (Italian Ministry of Education)
MURST	Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica (Ministry of University and of Scientific and Technologic Research)
NADIO	National Association of Directors of International Offices
NAFSA	National Association of Foreign Student Advisers [Currently: NAFSA - Association of International Educators]
NBEET	National Board for Education, Employment and Training
NCP	New Colombo Plan
NESB	Non-English Speaking Backgrounds
NFRC	National Federation Reform Council
NFOM	National Forum of Outbound Mobility
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMAC	National Multicultural Advisory Council
NPM	New Public Management
NSIE	National Strategy for International Education
NSW	New South Wales
NUHEP	Non-University Higher Education Provider
OCSE	Organizzazione per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo Economico (OECD)
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMA	Office for Multicultural Affairs
OLM	Opinion Leader Model
OME	Overseas Mobility Experience
OPA	Old Public Administration
OPRS	Overseas Postgraduates Research Scholarship
OSAN	Overseas Students Advisers' Network
OSC	Overseas Student Charge
OS-HELP	Overseas-Students-Higher Education Loan Program
OSO	Overseas Student Office
OSTAL	Overseas Student Tuition Assurance Levy
PACER	Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
PCI	Italian Communist Party

PI	Policy Integration
PM	Permanent Migration
POSP	Private Overseas Student Program
PR	Permanent Residency
PRISMS	Provider Registration and International Management System
SACE	Sezione Speciale [dell'INA] (Ina Special Division)
SOL	Skilled Occupations List
SPC	Special Premiers' Conferences
SSVF	Simplified Student Visa Framework
STEM	Science Technology Engineering Mathematics
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TAR	Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (Regional Administrative Court)
TEQSA	Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency
TFHR	Task Force for Human Resources
TIME	Top Industrial Managers for Europe Program
TSS	Temporary Skills Shortage
TU	Testo Unico (Unified Text)
UEO	UNESCO Eurostat OCED
UCSEI	Ufficio Centrale Studenti Esteri in Italia (Central Office for Foreign Students in Italy)
UCTS	UMAP Credit Transfer System
UMAP	University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific
UNIADRION	Association of Universities of the Adriatic-Ionic Region
UNIBO	University of Bologna
UNIMED	Union of Mediterranean Universities
UNISTRASI	Università per gli Stranieri di Siena
UNS	Unified National System
VET	Vocational Educational Training
VIDC	Victoria International Directors' Council
VLT	Visto a Validità Territoriale Limitata (Visa with limited territorial validity)
VN	Visto Nazionale (National Visa)
WAP	White Australia Policy
WOG	Whole of Government
WRT	German Conference of Universities

To all of those who still wish to spend our spare time together, regardless of my four-years-long reply 'I must write the thesis'.

To whom did felt guilty while working, when working was the unique solution available.

A tutti coloro che, con grande pazienza e apprezzabile perseveranza, hanno continuato imperterriti a chiedermi di passare assieme il nostro tempo libero, nonostante le innumerevoli volte in cui ho risposto 'No, devo scrivere la tesi'.

A chi si è sentito in colpa mentre lavorava, quando lavorare era l'unica opzione possibile.

INTRODUCTION

'An Italian student who was tortured and murdered in Egypt had been detained by police and then transferred to a compound run by Homeland Security the day he vanished, intelligence and police sources say'.
Reuters, April 21th 2016
about Giulio Regeni, an Italian Cambridge PhD student killed while doing fieldwork in Egypt

'In the aftermath of the Trump administration's executive order temporarily banning immigration from a number of Muslim-majority countries to the United States, universities and scholars across the country are grappling with what the restrictions mean for their students—and for scholarship more broadly.
The Atlantic, January 30, 2017

'UK students' lost Erasmus membership in Brexit deal'
The Guardian, 24th December 2020

'One of the biggest problems will be the drop in revenue from international students. Australian universities, which rely heavily on tuition fees paid by students from China, expect to lose Aus\$3 billion to \$5 billion (US\$2 billion to \$3 billion),
Nature, June 1th, 2020th , about the coronavirus impact for Australia

     While international student mobility (ISM) is often at the top of the news and of the political agenda of many governments, its wide implications at the level of national public policies are largely underestimated and unknown. In this dissertation, I approach ISM as transversal issue and take it as a case study to investigate the process of Policy Integration (PI), contributing to advance our understanding of this concept and providing comparative evidence about ISM national policies, a stream of literature yet at an embryonal stage.

Transversal issues such ISM spans across traditional thematic boundaries according to which national departments or ministries are organized, and they pose salient challenges in each phase of the policy making cycle. The main aim of the research is the one to advance the understanding of the processual development of policy integration, where a general theory is yet missing. Two main research questions drive the analysis, and notably, '*to which extent did Australia and Italy developed and implemented an integrated policy on international student mobility in 2020?*' and '*why and how did the process of policy integration occur and develop in Australia and Italy in relation to the international mobility of students, since the eighties onward?*'.

     The worldwide huge economic revenue resulting from student mobility on the one side, and the more general phenomenon of internationalization of Higher Education (HE) systems – where it is often interlocked, occupy for the large part the academic debate, especially on the background of the so called global knowledge economy. ISM

has been also extensively investigated in light of its soft power potential and as a new stream of skilled migration. Unfortunately, these and other streams of literature evolved within watertight 'compartments', following parallel path harming the cumulative process of knowledge creation. Moreover, research concentrated on the individual, institutional and regional/international level of analysis: as a result, there is still very partial and fragmented comparable evidence around ISM implementation at the national level, to the extent that Riano et al (2018) argued they remain 'a black box'.

This fragmentation can be explained in light of the fact ISM has never been approached as a transversal issue which poses a puzzle of policy integration. Eventually, ISM related national policies' formulation and implementation poses questions that have been at the center of organizational and public policy studies ever since. Its promotion and implementation spans across a number of policy domains, ranging from HE to trade, foreign policy and tourism to name a few of them. ISM involves a very wide constellation of actors, from central governments to universities, stakeholders of different nature and a relevant number of ministerial departments, beyond a range of academic stakeholders. Moreover, mobility implementation turn and twist other issues, such as the *mercification* of HE, convergence among them, and the contextual pressure to attract high skilled migrants in a context of worldwide stiffening migration regulations. How do domestic actors cope with such complexity? How is mobility framed across actors' subsystem, and how does the process of integration develop within the cross-sectoral, multi-level and multi-actor governance system it involves? Does the development of integration interfere with core values of some actors subsystems, and if yes, how do domestic actors cope with these kind of policy challenges? Is political commitment a relevant driver for policy integration? Does the domestic context alter or foster PI development, and in which ways? and how do turbulent events affect it?

As a comprehensive framework able to explain PI development is yet missing in policy literature, I engage in the effort of providing a parsimonious yet comprehensive framework thanks to which expand the current knowledge on the dynamics behind its development.

A first core argument of this dissertation relies in the processual understanding of PI. The analytical framework developed shows its development occur in different dimensions, and that PI process is asynchronous beyond being multi-dimensional, meaning it does not follow a linear or logical development by definition. High levels of PI may also not be a 'best possible scenario', and even lead to unexpected and/or un-wanted outcomes. The framework also shows that PI process of development should be observed looking to several dimensions ranging from PI in political commitment and subsystems' actors relations, passing by policy goal, frames and instruments. Contextually, it allows to observe PI in more traditional axes of analysis, such as its vertical and horizonal tiers. It also fully included the role of turbulent event in relation to PI, providing preliminary empirical evidence of their role, and it takes into full account the role of the domestic context. So far, in many discussed the implications of a country form of state on PI process, while other scholars focused on implications of wider multi-level dynamics. This framework expanded the common understanding of the domestic policy context usually found in these literature strands, and provide evidence on how a wider understanding of the institutional and policy context help to better grasp a domestic environment formal and informal characteristic's and idiosyncrasies may foster or alter PI development.

The research follows an historical comparative approach and it is based for the large part in qualitative data. Four policy domains are included by the analysis: those of immigration, foreign policy, trade and the labor market, beyond the obvious one of HE. Beyond academic literature, expert interviews constitute the core of the empirical evidence collected, for a total of 22 interviews held in Australia and 18 in Italy. Documents have been another crucial source, including grey literature, institutional documents, media release, archive material, newspaper articles, many types of legislative and executive pieces. Statistical data have been used to undertake a descriptive analysis for both case studies, allowing sources triangulation. Triangulation is meant in this research not as a way to confirm previous finding obtained, but rather as a mixture of different data to better grasp the object of analysis. More in detail, I use quantitative statistics to show trends in the two countries analyzed and provide a more robust evidence base reconstruction of ISM cross-sectoral development. This work is also precious as it constitutes in itself evidence about the capacity of data collection of a country and consequently it says a lot on the stages of policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the process under analysis.

The research follows a most different design, and it takes two 'outlier' countries in relation to the ISM. Despite they had a very similar panorama in the early eighties, the paths of development of student mobility took very different rails over the time and while Australia is currently a frontrunner, Italy compare bad at the global and European levels. This case selection also allows to take an English speaking country and one which is not, as well as it includes two countries with a different tradition of HE systems which include education within General Agreement for and Trade Service (GATS) agreements and one within the Bologna framework.

The dissertation is organized as follow. The first chapter introduces the boundaries of the concept of policy integration and it provides an overview of similar concepts emerged in policy literature in the first section. Section two draws the global panorama on ISM, highlighting its worldwide salience and the one it holds in policy studies. Section three motivate more extensively the choice of ISM as a case study for the analysis of PI, while the last section of the chapter presents the main argument of the dissertation. The second chapter provides the review of the literature more strictly around the concept of policy integration. The second section introduce the analytical framework developed, more carefully explained in section three, where also its operationalization is discussed. The last section of the chapter present instead the research design.

Chapter three and chapter four present respectively the evidence collected for the Australian and Italian cases. Each chapter begins with an country introduction of their institutional policy domestic context. Section two provides the cross sectoral policy reconstruction from the early eighties until today: the phases of development are presented by periods interrupted by 'turbulent events'. The sub-sections discusses more in detail the various phases identified, and the final one wrap up the entire period basing on descriptive statistics. Section three of each chapter provides a preliminary analysis of ISM and PI development within each policy field considered.

Chapter five presents the comparative analysis carried out in four different sections. The first one provides a summary of PI development within each of the four field analyzed in both countries, while the second section illustrate the core of the analysis, focusing on the process of development of PI as per the six dimensions identified.

Section three of chapter five provide instead the result of the analysis of PI in output, intended as a caesura of time in PI process rather than a fixed point to which the PI

process should tend to. The last section of the chapter presents the main findings of the research, and discusses how the evidence does support the theoretical propositions of the analytical framework developed and tested in this research.

A final discussion on the research, about its main contributions and constrains, is provided in the conclusion, where also paths of further research and unexplored themes have been addressed.

1. Chapter I | International Student Mobility and the Quest for Policy Integration

1.1 Introduction

PI has been defined as a sort of contemporary reframe of the issue of policy coordination (Peters, 2018). Peters (1998, 295) even referred to policy coordination as the 'Holy Grail of Administrative Studies', and pointed out how complaints among organization related to lack of information exchange and the redundancy and contradictions among programs exits 'from the time at which governing structures began to be differentiated into departments and ministries (Peters 1998,1)'. Candel (2019, 2) also referred to PI as 'the 'Philosopher's Stone' or '*the* eternal problem of public governance (Perri six et al. 2002, Peters 2015, Candel 2017)'. For policy makers, the dream has always been the one to understand the right receipt to solve nots of coordination, cooperation, collaboration and integration in national policy making. Conversely, for analyst, the eternal problem was and still is how to assess policy integration, not to say the differences among its many similar concepts (Dupont 2013).

As largely know, the 'public policy' definition has attracted the attention of scholars for a long time. The same could be said in relation to the concept policy integration, especially when understood in its broadest declination. If we came to have a shared definition of a policy, what is in fact an integrated policy, and how do we define policy integration?

For Briassoulis, since a policy is not a 'single, discrete, unitary, disembodied phenomenon, but a series of decisions (Briassoulis, 2004, 9)', policy integration can be defined as 'a process either of coordinating and blending policies into a whole, or of incorporating concerns of one policy into another (Briassoulis, 2004, 10)'. Howlett et al. (2017) explained instead policy integration as the process of reconciliation between policy goals and instruments, while Meijers and Stead (2004) sees in PI the highest grade to be reached following policy coordination and policy cooperation. Underdal (1980, 163), in its pioneer effort, considered an integrated policy one that meet three basic requirements: comprehensiveness, aggregation and consistency. He argued that 'at least some efforts should be made to achieve them [the three requirement]', although he stressed PI is more an ideal than something which can be fully implemented. For Braun (2008), PI is the second to last point to which public policy should tend to reach strategic coordination.

As better discussed below, the current state of art around the concept of integration is strongly fragmented, as a plethora of different approaches emerged and developed around this and similar concepts (Candel and Biesbroek 2019). Consequently, a shared

definition of policy integration is missing, and a general theory to explain it has not been developed.

The next two sections set the boundaries of the discussion around the concept of policy integration, a long standing debate which lately acquired increasing salience, and briefly discusses its very close concepts, such as coordination and cooperation, which must be inevitably considered when discussing policy integration. As we shall see, while grounded in the literature developed around policy integration, the analytical framework proposed take into fully account also contribution emerged by literature developed around the similar concepts presented below.

1.1.1. *Policy integration and its cousin concepts*

Using Stead and Geerlings (2005, 445) words, 'a number of better known and more or less synonymous concepts of policy integration can be found in the literature'. They range from coherent policy making to cross-cutting policy-making, policy co-ordination, holistic government and joined-up policy, joined up government and whole of government approach. Howlett et al (2017) note that theoretical and empirical works developed around these different concepts in parallel strand of research, and the cumulative process of knowledge creation has been harmed by this development. We shall briefly discuss these 'cousins' of the policy integration concepts to highlight the overlaps among these literature and the need to bridge them.

Policy coherence has been coined by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the context of the Development Assistance Committee in 1991, and, it focuses on the creation of links between aid and non-aid policies and the Millennium Development Goals (Tosun and Lang 2017). Holistic government, always following the OECD (1996, 29 in (Meijers and Stead, 2004, 3), refers instead to an idea of government with an understanding 'greater than the mere piecing together of the partial perspectives', as it does also the Joined-Up Government (JUG) approach developed within the UK. The latter replaced the concept of holistic government in the UK, and was embraced by a number of countries, such as Norway (Tosun and Lang 2017). The Whole of Government (WOG) approaches gained instead attention in Australia and New Zeeland, and, according to Kickbusch (2010,12) refers to 'public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and the integrated government response to particular issue'.

Policy coordination is instead often 'seen as an umbrella concept for a number of other terms related to integrated policy making, such as *policy consistency* and *policy coherence* (Meijers and Stead, 2004, 3)'. Policy integration is a concept developed 'out of a top-down notion of policy-making (Tosun and Lang 2017, 4)' and more strictly refers to policy makings where the goals of one sector are incorporated by other sectors. The concept of PI itself has been introduced in the nineties by international organization, and more specifically by the International Labor Organization (ILO), which created the Policy Integration Department to 'support national governments in adopting policy portfolios with coherent cross-sectional policy instruments and goals (Rodrigues-Pose 2002; Kohler 2011 in Tosun and Lang 2017, 2)'.

Only very recently, few studies engaged in the effort of reviewing these literatures enlightening their common grounds. One of these studies is a systematic literature review provided by Trein, Meyer and Maggetti (2018) where they shed light on the interlinkages among these research streams. As relevant differences among these bodies of research

emerge, they suggest a division according to issues and countries analyzed. For example, they note that studies embracing the concept of PI often focus on environmental and clime policy issues and they are commonly tested on continental Europe country-cases. JUG/WOG approaches, by contrast, seem to span within the fields of social, educational, research and health policies, and to be tested in Anglo-Saxon and Southern-Europe context.

Looking to these bodies of research, Tosun and Lang (2017) and Trein, Meyer and Maggetti (2018) also observed a governance-oriented lenses approach at the base of the concepts of integration and policy coordination, and a more government-oriented approach on which the scholarship on JUG and WOG draw on.

Also in light of this knowledge, I strongly draw by previous studies evolved around the concept of policy integration scholarship, while I simultaneously do engage to let these streams bridge, building on the many strand of literatures emerged around policy integration. Chapter two will more carefully present the state of art developed strictly around the concept of policy integration, while the section below illustrates the increasing salience that policy integration acquired in the past decades and specifically its salience in policy research.

1.1.2   *The perennial quest for policy integration*

Tosun and Lang (2017) write that, despite governments traditionally respond to policy problems with specialized 'policy measures', this way of approaching policies have important constrains, to the point that Howlett and Ramesh (2014) noted it could even bring to policy failure. Already in the early nineties, Rhodes (1991, in Candel and Biesbroek 2016) referred as 'policy messes' the act of addressing cross-sectoral problems within the boundaries of sectoral subsystems. The necessity of overcoming the excessive *siloisation* in the provision of public services emerged to be one of the leading motivation to the search and promotion of policy integration. Governments and a number of organizations engaged over the time in a number of initiatives to foster the integration of policies across sectors, such as the with JUG and WOG initiatives.

Peters (2018) notes that while problems of coordination poses challenges ever since at the national level of policy making, this matters became of crucial importance during the eighties, following to the spreading of New Public Management (NPM) ideas. Tosun and Lang (2017) also show that the development of scholar literature on PI and related concepts constitutes a response NPM set of ideas. The latter, in fact, placed crucial salience on the need of further specialization among public bodies so to increase the efficiency of the state, fostering however dis-integration rather than integration in the provision of public services. Ling (2002, 616), who focused on the concept of JUG in UK, also stressed the increased awareness that some policy goals cannot be addressed by separate entities nor super-ministries, as they require 'to align the activity of formally separate organization towards particular goals of public policy'.

This was part of the so called 'Third Way' claim, evolving around those Clarke and Stewart (1997) had called 'wicked issue', too complex to be solved with already known public strategies. Also 6 et al (1999), the Social Exclusion Unit, and Rhodes, agreed that there has been 'the emergence of a class of problems whose cause are so complex, and whose solution are so multi-factorial, that they require a multi-agency response (Ling 2002, 622)'.

Climate change, to make an example, constitutes one of this new class of problems which requires coherent and coordinated efforts in a number of policy domains such as transports, agriculture, economy, energy, and a whole body of policy research developed around this issue. Environmental Policy Integration (EPI), emerged to be a salient issue since the late eighties, in front of the need to address 'the incompatible goals of economic competitiveness, social development and environmental protection, and hence to ensure sustainable development (Jordan and Lenschow 2010,1)'. As we shall see, an important part of scholars' contributions around the concept of PI has been exactly derived by the analysis of this issue.

As Candel and Biesbroek (2016) put it, as a number of crucial issues are 'crosscutting the boundaries of established jurisdictions, governance levels and policy domains (Candel and Biesbroek, 2016, 2)', the pressure to address transversal issue grew. This happens since 'issues are becoming increasingly 'cross-cutting, and do not fit the ministerial boxes into which governments, and policy analysists, tend to place policies (Peters 1988, 296)'. Berger and Steurer (2009, 4) also note this is true 'not only [in] the competencies of ministries within a particular government, but also [in] the vertical tiers of different jurisdictions, from supranational institutions […] to city halls'. Candel (2019) also found that research on the topic 'steadily increased', passing by the five per cent of peer-reviewed publication in 2000 to the 63 in 2018.
In sum, PI discussion has always been on the table, but it acquired a special relevance in the few past decades due to the increasing complexity that national government must tackle.

Peters (2018) identified seven different motivations leading to the search of policy coordination, which in turn should lead to better integrated policy. They are the necessity to avoid duplications, contradictions and displacement, but also to emphasize vertical management, to address the changing of demands, cross-cutting problems and simple tidiness, meaning government would aim to better coordination so to increase their capabilities in front of the public. Coherently, Tosun and Lang (2017) highlights that the development of integration may follow 'external demands, coming also from the public (see Bogdanor 2005)'. Candel (2019) writes that policy integration appears as the best way to approach crosscutting problem, as highlighted by (Briassoulis, 2004), and to 'reduce many of the inefficiencies in public policymaking (PAGE)'. Candel (2019, 4) also stress how integration could 'serve an important political function'. Meijers and Stead (2004) note that both policy coordination and inter-organizational collaboration provide benefits, and basing on Alter and Hage (1993) and the Cabinet Office (2000), they highlight how such process provides opportunities to learn and adapt, sharing costs and risks, increasing mutual support and harmonious relations – leading to have a 'big picture' over the transversal issue and an increase in the quality and the provision of services.

Candel (2019) also note that it should be further proven that integrated approaches are more effective than other less-integrated one. Basing on Underdal (1980) and Peters (2018), he also stresses the way integration may 'conflict with other political values, such as decentralization, broader participation, privacy and citizens' civil liberties Candel (2019, 5)', as well as could lead to a normative undesirability of 'specialization'.
Meijers and Stead (2004) underline costs of practices related to integration, such as loss of autonomy, resources, conflicts over responsibilities, delays in time due to coordination. Approaching coordination beyond normative assumptions, Peters (1998) also explain it could not be an optimum solution. Costs of policy integration could be

specialization itself, that we saw lays at the bottom of integration necessity, but also power, performance management, turf, belief and ideology, politics and accountability. He concludes that excessive coordination could result in too-low-specialization, and that '*redundancy*' could be eventually necessary to deliver important services, as in defense. Moreover, he also notes too much coordination could lead to failure in the case of science and arts, disciplines requiring higher grade of freedom, and it could lead to loss of privacy and civil liberties for the population.

As we shall see in the next chapter, an initial stream of literature developed however basing on the assumption that integration and coordination were something to which public policy should tend to. For example, EPI has been approached as a 'policy making principle without reflecting too much on its meaning (Jordan and Lenschow 2010, 148)', or 'as a guiding model that requires primarily the integration of environmental considerations in others policy fields (Berger and Steurer 2009, 2)'. They based on the assumption according to which the higher level of integration the better it was. As Candel and Biesbroek (2016) and Jordan and Lenschow (2010) noted, new research approaches overcame such approach and proposed processual understanding of PI, as chapter two will present in detail, a perspective on which the analytical framework proposed relies.

1.2   International student mobility: a state of the art

This section provides a brief overview on the salience of the phenomenon of international student mobility in tertiary education. It offers an overview of its origins and development, highlights in the first place its massive worldwide growth and the way it is intertwined with a number of other contemporary global trends and issues. It then provides a short overview of the theoretical and analytical approach developed around ISM, which, as in the case of policy integration literature, developed in a plethora of parallel strand of research (within, between and across policy fields, levels of analysis, theoretical assumptions and contemporary academic debates, geographical and geopolitical analysis, methodologies). Section three finally discusses more in detail the reason why ISM should be approached as a transversal issue which pose a salient puzzle of policy making.

1.2.1   The 'race for global talents' in the global arena

Although often considered as a recent phenomenon, mobility laid the foundation of the modern university. Its origin date back even earlier, to the point that Guruz (2008) identifies in Pythagoras a pioneer of the practice of mobility within academia in its magisterial reconstruction of this *phenomenon*. He carefully retraces the story of mobility ever since, and shows how the emergence of the modern form of nation-state enclosed HE under the control of singular entities, affirming education as fundamental tool in the nation-building process among the population (Guruz 2008). Already before the establishment of the medieval university, mobility was considered the core of idea circulation, an inherent character of education within the Greek, Roman and Muslim worlds. In medieval times of '*peregrinatio academica*' people 'on exchange' even enjoyed a peculiar status according to which their belonging country offered a sort of 'diplomatic immunity' while abroad (Guruz 2008). ISM then strongly suffered the emergence and establishment of national states touching its minimum values in this period, as according to available estimates (Guruz 2008).

It has been the end of the Second World War (2WW) to make of student mobility again a relevant phenomenon, when following the atrocity committed during the war, student exchanges became to be thought as a suitable instrument to promote peace and mutual understanding between countries. As Meadows (2011,55) put it, 'educational exchanges were in the air in the heady days of international organization'. The establishment of the Fulbright program by the USA with a number of western countries, the Colombo Plan across South-East Asia by Australia, and the Joint Study Program launch in Europe (later Erasmus) provide eloquent examples. Mobility in education was implemented as a tool to enhance mutual understanding, but it also reflected the bipolar international relation panorama and had an implicit component of foreign policy.

Since then, ISM experienced a dramatic growth until 2020, when the Covid-19 pandemic begun. The massive growth of ISM sheds light on its salience well beyond its intrinsic socio-cultural and educational aspects, largely recognized by public and research organizations. If its salience in foreign policy was clear already since the early post war years, the following ISM development enlightening a far wider scope interlinked also to the domains of migration, trade, labor market, research and development. Few crucial moments are worth to be mentioned within this timeframe, as they help to grasp the several paths ISM took across periods, geographical and geopolitical areas.

In the first place, following 1989, with the fall of the communist regime and the fast spreading of capitalism across the world, ISM begun to grow beyond Europe and North America, especially in Easter Europe and South East Asia, with the consequent emergence of crucial players such as China. In 1987, the European Community also launched the Erasmus program, that had a far larger scope in objectives and numbers of exchange than its predecessor, and set the stones to the dramatic growth of credit mobility within the European continent.

Moreover, in the early eighties, a number of countries, beginning with the UK, in the wake of NPM ideas, introduced a full fee policy for foreign students enrolling in the domestic higher education system, opening a new global market within higher education. In 1995, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) entered in force, a treaty which consists in a set of rules as according to which signature countries regulate the provision of commercial services including education. The GATS are relevant to this discussion as the third mode of supply of the four agreed – commercial presence – foreseen the provision of education services to a person who had to cross a border to receive that service. While Anglo Saxon countries included education within GATS commitment, European countries did not do so, as education is largely seen as a public good.

Beginning by 1999, the European discussion on ISM has been instead framed within the lenses of the Bologna Process (BP). Launched in continental Europe by Italy, France, Germany and the UK in 1999, BP had the aim to enhance the comparability of their HE system and of their academic qualification within the continent, and it marked a mile stone of ISM development as it identified in mobility in academia its 'overarching aim'. The latter expanded beyond Europe, as the signature of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan among the others testifies. As large scholar literature shown, at the time, the biggest European countries had to tackle underperforming higher education systems which did not addressed the changing necessity of the labor market nor of European society, and increased cooperation in higher education was seen as a powerful tool to revitalize those labor markets. In that years, moreover, the entire South East Asian basin

was experiencing a decisive economic growth, and strongly increased their commitment on student mobility.

The rise of international terrorism, and more specifically the attacks of 9/11 also impacted ISM development, given the stiffening of international relations panorama and increased concerns on domestic security and migration flows. Surprisingly, the number of exchange students continued to growth, albeit the simultaneous growth of nationalist rhetoric and the alleged 'cultural threats' linked to the coexistence of different groups in the same territory (Citrin and Sides 2008).

Chen and Barnett (2000) estimated the number of mobile students to be about in 238,000 in 1960, a number which the OCED (2010) reported to be of 3.3 million in 2008. Forecasts suggest that the number of mobile students is expected to reach 7.2 million students in 2025, a value about 1.2 million in the 2000 (Knight, 2012). Murphy-Lejeune (2008) reports a 41% rate of growth of student mobility between 1991 and 2004, while (Kim, 2009) highlights an increase of the 50% between 2000 and 2005, a thin span of time of about five years. In absolute terms, King and Raghuram (2012) report for example how Malaysia and Check Republic hosted respectively 3508 and 4583 international students in 1999, turned to be 57,824 and 30,624 in 2009. Since the late eighties, student mobility grew beyond specific areas: it has been global, within and across geographical regions, and it represents a real migration flow.

Scholars largely pointed out the emergence of a 'global brain race' to select and 'import' bright international students (Sà and Sabzalieva 2017), where both traditional European and Anglo-Saxon players are challenged by competition from developing countries such as Russia, China, Singapore and Malaysia (de Wit, Ferencz and Rumbley, 2013). As Chan (2012), put it, traditional patterns where student mobility scene was dominated by western countries took its path to sunset. The DAAD and British Council (2014) mention a number of non-western countries engaging in the promotion of mobility, and examples come from Mexico, India, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt.

Two third of international students studying in OECD countries come from non-OECD countries, with their top origins being China, India, Morocco, Malaysia and Hong Kong (Kim, 2009). More than the half of 2.7 millions of international students esteemed by OCED in 2004 had Asian origin, and 14.4 % of them were Chinese (UNESCO 2019). Ziguras and Mc Burnie (2011) reveal that the Asia-Pacific region has taken in this sense 'an increase [of the] 5% global market share between 1999 and 2007 at the expense of Western Europe and North America (Ziguras and Mc Burnie 2011, 128)'. Nowadays, Asian countries 'are the biggest providers of international students, and counts for the 55% of international students worldwide (Chan 2012, 213)'. The 2014 Going Global Report also reveals that the Chinese government grant about 11.000 scholarship per years to its students to study abroad, a value that makes up only around the 10% of Chinese international students, and the Malaysian one also set the ambitious target to host one million of international students per year (Ziguras and Mc Burnie 2011). Graphs 1.1 and 1.2 shows the increase of mobility to more carefully enlighten its growth patterns.

Graph 1.1 - Worldwide outbound internationally mobile tertiary students studying abroad

1998-2018

Graph 1.1- Worldwide outbound internationally mobile tertiary students studying abroad

Graph 1.2 - Outbound mobile tertiary students, by region of origin
1998-2018

arab states — Central and Eastern Europe
Central Asia — East Asia and the Pacific

Graph 1.2 - Outbound mobile tertiary students, by region of origin

Across continental Europe, the Erasmus program has become the flagship program of the European Union (EU), with growing economic support granted by the EU despite the last severe financial crisis of 2008, and it counts already over three million *alumni* (European Commission, 2014). The BP lead to the establishment of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) in 2010, at least formally a space of mutual recognition and comparability of degrees. The introduction of the common three cycle system, of the European Transfer Credit System (ECTS) and the signature of the Lisbon Convention set the stones that lead to the EHEA within this intergovernmental process, which put the basic technologies to implement credit mobility within the continent.

Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the relevance of HE across the EU increased even more. European institutions begun to place more importance also to ISM development, and also increased funds allocated. The European Commission also recently called for the implementation of an European Education Area by 2025, where

students, scholars and staff shall have full opportunity to study, research, train, teach and work across the EU, within a legal framework which overcome the 'timid' intergovernmental approach until now followed with Bologna. Following the Goteborg Summit in 2017, the first European Universities Alliances, currently loose network of European universities have also been established, as pioneers of real European universities and building blocks of a new European Education Area (EEA). Within this new framework, financed by the new European Multi Annual Framework (MAF), the EC currently approach ISM as a powerful instrument to increase synergies among policy sectors, higher education and research and development in the first place, innovation and technological transfer among the others.

Within Anglo-Saxon countries, instead, together with the number of international students worldwide, their economic salience strongly increased over the time to the point that they became a true source of revenue for HE institutions. Reinberg and Rumbley (2014) vividly state this point when they report how the US Department of Commerce 'estimated the value of the worldwide market for international students and their financial assets […] as a critical source of revenue for universities (Reinberg and Rumbley, 2014, 123)'. Choudaha and Chang, (2012) report that the single University of Berkeley, California, gained $18 millions by international fees for the year 2011/12, with international freshmen making an increase of 50% of the enrollment rate.
Fees coming from international students often fund consistent amount of domestic research, as it happens in Australia (Norton 2018), and many pointed out how the increase of international students has been concurrent to decreasing public funding to higher education. Already in 2003, the minister of Trade and Industry of Singapore estimated a $ 2.2 trillion market for the education sectors (Knight, 2012). The text highlights the economic relevance of mobility also across the South East Asia basin, which became a new crucial geographical area altering a long standing path of vertical mobility (when the movement is done by poor/developing country to a developed one).

Regardless of geographical and geopolitical patterns in the promotion of mobility, the salience of ISM also increased given the establishment of the so called new global knowledge economy, which requires highly formed human capital able to tackle the fast technological development and the fast changing needs of the labor market and society, aspect at the base of the new EU approach to mobility: International students are a subset of highly skilled migrants very much appreciated by governments occupied to secure their countries trained and specialized work force. ISM flows may result in brain circulation as much as in brain drain and brain gain, meaning their relevance overcome the net (already huge) revenue resulting from fees payed to institutions. For the single year of 2016, UNESCO estimated for example a $ 1229 million volume of official development flows for scholarship (UNDESA 2018), as mobility still constitutes one of the most powerful tool to boost the development of HE systems of underdeveloped countries. Dassin, Marsh and Mawe (2018) engaged in a review of international scholarships to this end, and revealed a very range of countries implementing such programs, by way of example Vietnam, Japan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, China, Australia[1].

In 2014, over one-hundred governments around the world were already sponsoring and funding student exchange programs (DAAD and British Council 2014), and there are currently over 5.3 millions of international students in the world (UNESCO

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[1] Among the programs mentioned: Project 2020 and Victorian Doctoral Scholarship (India), DIKTI Scholarship (Indonesia), King Abdullah Scholarship Program (Saudi Arabia), ABD Japan Scholarship Program (Japan), Schwarzman Scholar Program (China), Australian Awards (Australia) (Dassin, Marsh and Mawer 2018).

2019). National government promotes mobility as according a wide set of policy rationales and instruments, ranging from more cultural to more economical or political ones, which the OCED (2004) attempted to synthetize in a number of different approaches to mobility, and notably: mutual understanding, soft power, national development, human capital approach, revenue generation and skilled migration. The next section provides an overview of the theoretical approaches to mobility in scholar literature, developed for the large part around the OCED approaches just aforementioned.

1.2.1   Approaches to the study of international student mobility

This section provides an overview on the theoretical approaches so far developed in academia to explain and investigate ISM, and it then more carefully discuss the most salient ones for what that regard this dissertation.
ISM begun to achieve relevance within scholar literature around the sixties, especially between political scientists, sociologist, educational and international relation studies. These are the disciplines which attempted to study mobility in the first place, investigating its impact at the individual and societal levels. As the phenomenon grew, so the attention of scholars in other fields increased - but these literatures never 'talked to each other'.

In its very synthetic attempt to summarize the theoretical efforts available to frame ISM, (Güçlü, no date) enlightens a first set of theories that follows an historical path, others including equilibrium approaches - as human capital and modernization theories, pull push models and the screening hypothesis--, and a third stream where he includes conflict and critical perspectives. Fifteen years later, (Shields, 2014) also identified 'three broad theoretical perspectives' in his article on the interplay between Globalization and ISM: competition, neoliberalism and critical theories, e.g. neo-Marxist theories; world system analysis and post-structuralism; a large framework where he refers to world culture theories and new institutionalist perspectives. Also Kim (2016) summarizes theoretical approaches so far developed according to historical perspectives, a large stream of research drawing on the concept of spatial mobility, and a further approach within geography studies. Riano and Piguet (Oxford University Press 2016-) identified instead four main theoretical approaches to explain ISM beyond the micro level. They are i) those which brings 'supply and demand side theories together', explaining mobility as a complex mix of interests of UK institutions and the ones of private students and family (see (Findlay, 2011); ii) a set of theories which point out ISM is nothing else than a process reproducing class inequalities in a different scale (i.e. (Findlay *et al.*, 2012) (to which Guglu referred as critical theories); iii) another set of theories that see instead mobile students as active agents, building on global knowledge theory (Raghuram, 2013), (King, Raghuram and Keynes, 2013) and (Madge, Raghuram and Noxolo, 2015); plus, iv) another set brought to light by Murphy Lejeune (2002) which sees them as a 'new migratory elite'.
The ones mentioned above constitute the most comprehensive attempts retrieved in scholar literature to order the way scholar research developed around this issue. While they are not fully able to grasp the enormous research effort which developed around student mobility, these overviews enlighten the several disciplines and research streams which engaged with this topic. The paragraphs which follow present more carefully relevant research efforts developed around the aforementioned OECD approaches, as they cross normative and disciplines boundaries, before turning to their constrains.

The first approach, so called 'mutual understanding', constitutes the origins of policy rationales at the domestic policy level in the aftermath of the atrocity discovered after the second world war. It means that a country focuses on the socio-cultural facet of mobility, stressing its values in building peaceful relations. This approach emerged linked to colonial ties (Rivza and Teichler, 2007), and to a regional imprinting of student exchange across Europe, in Latin American and among Arab-speaking countries (Rivza and Teichler, 2007). Altbach and Knight (2007) identify in the mutual understanding approach an 'European' and 'traditional' approach to mobility. The ERASMUS Program, flagship program of the EC, constitutes a common case study to analyze ISM in this sense: research shed light on a 'civic' policy rationales linked to the eradication of nationalisms, racism and the promotion of peaceful relations between cultures (Papatsiba 2006). Rizvi (2008) highlights how also the Australian Colombo Plan, developed to increase knowledge diffusion in Asia and lighten the general distress at the end of the 2WW, may be read according to a socio-cultural rationale.

The scholar literature developed around the mutual understanding approach strongly enlightens the role of cultural and historical national factors in shaping policies in relation to student mobility. It places high emphasis on its human value and socio-cultural traits, and has provided extensive empirical evidence about the high value of mobility at the individual level and consequently for society. It discovered that mobility foster personal growth and independence, critical thinking and increased intercultural understanding, cosmopolitan belonging, foreign language competence, increased chance of employability and international carriers (King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Kehm, 2005, Bennet 2008,). ISM has been even correlated to increased knowledge production (Paige *et al.*, 2009). Coherently, Raghuram (2013), King, Raghuram and Keynes (2013) and (Madge, Raghuram and Noxolo, 2015) used global knowledge theory and understand international students as key agents for the transformation and constitution of new global spaces of academic knowledge (Madge, Raghuram and Noxolo, 2015)'[2], while Tarrant (2010) claimed that student mobility is even creating 'global citizens'.

In line with Ljiparth (1964), one of the first author to engage in the study of the political impact of mobility in the sixties, Murphy-Lejune (2002) suggests further that international students should be understood as a new migratory elite (University of Oxford International Strategy Office, 2015) (Oxford University Press 2016)', mixing in this way foreign policy with migration studies while keeping a strongly cultural emphasis. A consequential development of the mutual understanding approach resulted in fact in the 'cultural diplomacy'/'soft power' approach. Within this framework, scholars studied ISM with the lenses of democratization, on the background of Inglehart's modernization theory, according to which IMS would constitutes a powerful indicator of increasing cooperation between states through international organizations (See (Spilimbergo, 2009). Campbell (2005) argued that these exchanges are able to turn nations into people, in this way contributing to more human international relations. Atkinson (2010) claimed ISM foster increased respect towards 'basic right of freedom of movement, speech, religion, political participation and workers' right', in line with evidence provided by Han and Zweig (2010). Beyond studies conducted by European institutions, also scholars claimed that mobility fostered both global and regional sense of belonging (Marcu 2014, Bennet 2009, ECPR 2015), with Mitchelle (2015) providing evidence on the role of Erasmus in

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[2] The concepts of 'transnational social fields' and more generally of 'transnationalism' appear of specific relevance within this literature (See Schiller 2005, Bhabba 1994, Appadurai 1996, Urry 2000, Marginson and Sawir 2005, in turn interlinked to post-colonial studies and the multicultural/intercultural debates (Benhabib 2006, Parek 2005, Appiah 2007, Hall 2006).

increasing European belonging. Findlay (2006, 1), also argued that ISM may be 'a mechanism by which the intellectually most vital elements of a country's future elite form heterolocal social network that will be part of the ongoing de-coupling of residence and citizenship'.

In sum, the promotion of mobility adds to the layer of socio-cultural rationales of the mutual understanding approach key concerns in the realm of domestic foreign policy. Scholars identified this approach in the US (Atkinson 2010, Bean 2015), in the European and Arab context (Papatsiba 2006, Van Damme 2009) and also in Australia (Marginson 2005). While the concept of soft power and cultural diplomacy has been developed later in time, this approach to mobility developed mostly immediately after the 2WW. Intuitively, it has been the ground of a body of research that highlights a more strategic approach where national governments use international student mobility as a diplomatic policy instruments. In this light, for example, the Erasmus program has been read as a tool to increase regional integration within European member states, elevating the 'civic rationales' mentioned by Papatsiba to a true instrument of foreign policy. On a similar track, the Australian New Colombo plan has been interpreted as a way to increase Australian influence within the Indo-Pacific region, and as a tool to boost Australian foreign policy in Asia, something that will become manifest with the New Colombo Plan launched half a century later.

The fil rouge of this literature goes from Gramsci trough Wendte to reach Nye (2004) concept of soft power (Wilson 2014), on which for example Scott-Smith (2008) drawn extensively to develop his Opinion Leader Model (OLM), with which he argues educational exchange results in long term diplomatic benefits for countries supporting exchanges. The model is an example among those belonging to the set of theories building on Ljiparth (1964) stream of research, that enlightened the political saliences of social and cultural ISM outcomes and impact, and hence the link between the micro and macro levels of policy making (see Deutsch 1954, Allport (1955), Amir 1966, Gaertner (1993)). Wilson (2014), however, argued that solid empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such tools remains vague and he concluded that the implementation of mobility in the UK as according to foreign priorities has been due to windows of opportunities, in which the government found in mobility a 'solution' to contingent policy problems.

Following the last wave of globalization, more precisely since the nineties, a number of additional approaches to mobility emerged as strongly linked to the aftermath of a deeply globalized world based on the background of the worldwide capitalist economy, joined so far by China and the entire South-East Asia basin.

In the first place emerged the 'capacity building approach', that add to the heritage of the mutual understanding approach aspects linked to both national capacity and development, and it is spread within developing countries (DAAD and British Council 2014). Here mobility is framed as a tool to provide high-quality learning opportunity to professionals that will later serve their state or differently be obliged to return home (at least on paper), mostly in Science Technology Engineering Mathematics (STEM) disciplines not available at home. A report from the DAAD and the British Council (2014) also reveals a more general national development approach by healthier countries, apparently basing on the potential of ISM to enhance their economy basing on an 'human capital approach'(Wells 2004, Dassin Marsh and Mewer 2018). Capacity building approach also points out to ISM as a strategic tool to boost organizational reforms of HE sector and increase its modernization. Pull-push models have been largely used to explain direction flows of international students and the patterns of ISM management, focusing on pull

factors such as high quality higher education infrastructures or push factors such as high rate of unemployment (See Kim 2009, Rivzi 2009). To sum up, the literature evolved around this approach focuses on ISM as a challenge-opportunity for both developing and developed countries: within developing countries it resulted in a race to national development, modernization, internationalization, in the developed world ISM became to be seen as a matter of competition and educational related exports (see Mosneaga and Agergaard 2012).

Given the massive economic salience of ISM worldwide, a very large body of research focused indeed on the 'revenue generation' approach. According to the latter, international students are seen as a profitable substitute of funding to HE, in light of constant decreasing of public funding. A modification relies in the 'skilled migration' approach, where governments undertake a strategic selection of international students according to *criteria* that goes beyond mere revenue, and relies in the attraction specific migrant target groups that may become long term ad hoc skilled migrant (OECD, 2004). The approaches have been the focus of several vividly debates within the framework of policy literature, which developed around many of the deep transformations HE systems knew since the last wave of globalization. This body of research largely focused on the underlying differences of HE systems crucial in relation to ISM, where education is seen as a public good on the one side and as a tradable commodity on the other. Moreover, it also focused on the shift in modes of governance in HE system, which have their roots in the early years of strong growth of ISM, the late eighties.

Teichler (2007) distinguished four scholar debate interlinked to this matters within this wide stream of literature. Notably, what has been called the HE commodification (or *mercification*) - the GATS debate, the one of Quality Assurance, to which he adds the more continental debates around Bologna Process and the Erasmus.

Especially in the context of the Bologna and Erasmus debates, mobility has been largely linked to structural convergence among higher education systems. Van Damme (2009) shows 'a process of more structural convergence […] [started with the Bologna Process in the EU in 1999, after a] series of pioneering and voluntary forms of cooperation (Van Damme 2009, 39)', such us the Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo and Tempus programmes ((Papatsiba, 2006). Convergence has been defined by Kerr 'at root […] as the tendency of societies to grow more alike', to 'develop similarities in structures, process and performance ((Bennett, 1991 p. 215)' and policy convergence lenses have been hence used to assess the extent of Bologna Process stimulus among signatories' countries (see for example Vögtle and Martens (2014)), in light of the fact that in such constellation 'common educational and normative backgrounds typically facilitate joint development of common policy models (Di Maggio and Powell (1991) in (Holzinger and Knill, 2005 pp. 784)' (Vögtle et al 2010).

Veiga and Neave (2015) underlined instead how Bologna Process' inputs are often incorporated within national policy designs and strategies, and provide 'windows of opportunity' in order to pursue national goals (Witte, 2008). Papatsiba writes that despite what 'many scholars contend that during the last two decades, converging HE policies have reinforced disparity among European systems instead of leading to more harmonized systems within Europe (Musselin (2005) in Papatsiba, 2006, pp 1))'. A number of scholars also pointed out that the links between increased competition in higher education and stimulation or facilitation of student mobility is not as clear as sweeping political statements suggest (cf. van Vught/van der Wende/Westerheijden 2002; OECD 2004; Teichler 2004; Knight 2006) (Teichler 2007, 4)' (Heinze and Knill, 2008)).

Vice versa, as according to another interpretation, increasing worldwide competition would have fostered convergence via competitive pressure, driving countries to approach international students as a profitable investment for their economies. Consequently, another very large body of the literature looked international students as a key part of migration industry in light of 'the competitive edge they offer in a global knowledge economy (King, Raghuram and Keynes, 2013 in Riano et al 2018 pp 283)'.

The strong relevance of ISM within global market is quite visible in scholar literature, to the extent that Adriensen et al (2004) wrote that, when it comes to HE, neo-liberalism is 'a structuring force'. Bandhari and Blumenthal (2011) point out to the crucial salience that high skilled migrants – a vast part of present and former international students – reached within the national governments, that see them as a crucial resource to tackle for the knowledge economy. Kim (2016) pinpoints that academic mobility happens in the aftermath of the 'Mercentilization of Knowledge' (Lyotard, 1984) and the global establishment of academic capitalism (see Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Münch and Hoch, 2013). He concludes its analysis arguing that 'the internationalization of the UK HE tends to have been led by economic interest for cash-strapped HE institutions rather than 'intercultural strategies (Kim 2009, 87)''. Marginson and Mc Burnie (2004) saw in student mobility both a cause, a symptom of globalization, while Knight (2002) use the 'trade creep' to refer to the increasing importance of trade in HE.

The role of great innovation and technology brought in place by the last wave of globalization has been also largely taken into account. Guruz (2008, 2011) argues that the stage of development of a national innovation systems explain ISM patterns across countries. He arrived to consider international students as a 'cause, product and consequence' of globalization, pointing out to the role of external stimulus as driver of national responses to the new economic world paradigm, from the individual to the international level of analysis. The spread shifts in higher education sectors that changed dramatically HE systems in the last decades (See among the others Capano (2009), Capano, Rayner and Zito (2012), Guruz (2008), Shattok (2017)) are, to put it shortly, strongly interlinked to mobility development.

In conclusion, scholars largely enlightened the role that established domestic institutional, historical and cultural factors have in ISM promotion, pointing out by way of instance to links between ex colonies and the motherland, or the domestic systems of higher education. At the same time, they also enlightened how political and economic factors became always more relevant, linking HE to contemporary issues such as new skilled migration flows, the knowledge economy, capitalism, globalization and technological innovation.

The literature provided an overall big pictures of three crucial setting in which ISM takes place: a first one, shaped by the exchange concept, mostly oriented to balanced and horizontal mobility, with Bologna Process as keyword; and a second one, mostly the one in Anglo-Saxon countries, where ISM has been investigated for focusing on the attraction of full-fee paying incoming degree mobility students. The aforementioned four scholarly debates identified by Teichler (2007) are of special relevance here, since they enlightens an 'European' response to globalization (Bologna debate) - leading to a strong increase of structural convergence to increase its global competitiveness in the knowledge economy era - in parallel to an 'Anglo-Saxon' one (GATS debate), mold instead by increasing global and capitalist competition, where international students are no other than an alternative source of funding for universities. The third setting, the 'youngest' one, is the entire basin of Asia and more specifically South East Asia, overcoming its

limited role of source of international students, currently attracting and retaining foreign students.

While fallacious in their theory building effort, this research provides large empirical evidence which translate in a rich playground to bridge different bodies of literature, allowing to focus on the linkages among policy domains and policy levels involved in the promotion and implementation of ISM, and therefore approach it as a puzzle of PI.

1.2.1   *International student mobility as a puzzle of policy integration*

In 1991, Bennet (1991, 217) wrote that 'for practical reason, the comparative policy literature is cast mainly within the traditional, but atheoretical, set of sectoral policy categories (education, health, environmental, social, etc.). Yet, […] it is necessary to break away such artificial sectoral boundaries'. Coherently, Teichler (2015) wrote that while exchanges are high within governmental political priorities, a clear theoretical approach according to which approach ISM is not available in scholar literature. The section above showed that also within the boundaries of policy studies, ISM has been approached mainly within single policy fields, and mostly in the ones of higher education, immigration, foreign policy, trade and the labor market.

I argue that, since previous theoretical effort around mobility result above all within sectorial boundaries of different nature, their scope of analysis is limited to investigate ISM, as it only allow partial analysis of it. I unpack instead the policy process that ISM implies at the national level of policy-making, looking contextually to different policy domains and their connections. In light of previous knowledge, a cross-sectoral policy approach unbounded by artificial boundaries appear to be in fact the most solid available analytical approach to fully grasp the dynamics of ISM development. As introduced, I understand ISM as a transversal issue, as the latter cannot be developed unless a process of integration begun across levels and sectors (and we shall we, also in a number of additional dimensions).

There are many reason which support this approach to ISM. In the first place, either a government approaches ISM according to a more economic or a more political/social driven-approach, mobility raises questions of policy coherence and practical co-ordination to be smooth and effective. Scholarly literature largely revealed that ISM requires highly structured national policy and a regulatory architecture in higher education, such as compatible/comparable degree structures and mutual recognition of qualifications, solid quality assurance procedures, regulated entry requirements, provision for fees, charges and welfare.

Beyond HE, ISM also implies adequate visa laws, settings and implementation, together with the management of temporary migration flows, often interlinked to more general issues such domestic labor market (i.e. labor force needs or unemployment) and population dynamics (i.e. fertility rate and aging population). As the previous section shown, educational exchanges also plays a role in diplomatic relations, and a large body of research enlightened how governments take into account their foreign policy when engaging in the promotion of student mobility, and it is also clear how ISM twists and turns with trade. Table 1.1 provides a schematic overview that highlight also the way(s) many additional policy sectors are relevant for the mobility of students beyond the most obvious ones mentioned above. This highlights in the first place the complex exercise of policy integration that ISM implies nationally.

Mobility also requires a solid national transmission belt from the higher to the lower level of policy making, as technology and funds to implement policies developed. It involves many policy making actors, requiring the facto a complex multi-level and multi-actor governance systems to be handled. It implies a total of at least six levels of policy making, notably the international, supranational, national and state ones. There is than an institutional level represented by the national higher education system, the sub-level of the single institution and finally, the single individual who experience student mobility – which also means that families are involved in the process (and they in fact strongly contribute to its funding). Moreover, the steering of student mobility involves scholars, departments and universities, regions and governments, several ministries and various public bodies, as well as a number of intergovernmental organizations, beyond many stakeholders (i.e. students' organizations, rectors' associations, academic guilds, a whole new administrative staff focused on mobility, and also business union and other private actors, industries in the first place).

The involvement of several institutional bodies also raises important issues alone. Beyond the obvious relevance of the HE ministry, also the one of the interiors and of foreign affairs are directly involved by the implementation of student mobility, as well as those of trade and labor, the treasure, skills, science and potentially many others. These should be summed to a number of other bodies of different natures, such as public agencies or implementator entities of different kinds. Moreover, as introduced above, several levels of policy making, from the ministerial level to street level office are substantially involved by mobility implementation. Past research in policy integration largely enlightened the implications that this may have for domestic actors, which may have very different problems' perception according to their sectorial belonging. As Candel and Biesbroek (2016, 212) put it, 'these integration challenges emerge particularly when complex societal issue are confronted with traditional forms of subsystem policymaking […] [where] (sub-)sectoral policy is made by relatively stable actor configurations, each of which is characterized by specific sets of associated interests, belief systems, and problem perceptions'. The implementation of mobility pose therefore important questions on the way such a large constellation of domestic actors subsystem perceive and problematize this *phenomenon*, which also includes a number of other stakeholders, universities in the first place.

By way of example, ISM may be perceived as just a type of migration flows within the interior ministry, while seen as a pillar of a wider strategy of the higher education system internationalization at the ministry of education and research. Similarly, a government could see in ISM a solution to solve problems of resource scarcity or to boost national development, while academic guilds could see it as a treat to the national academia. Further, ISM could be seen as an effective instrument of soft power by the ministry of foreign affairs and the government, while contextually perceived as a treat to the HE by the ministry of education and/or universities. The list of examples could be far longer, also in light of the many issues to which ISM is related. This aspect acquires increased salience in light of the many aforementioned additional issues to which ISM is interlinked with.

Table 1.1 - Policy Fields intertwined to ISM

Table 1.1 | Policy Fields intertwined to ISM

HE Institutional	Educational	Immigration	Foreign Policy	Trade and Labour-Market	Research, Development & Industrial Policy	Social Protection	Promotion/Marketing	Tourism
Recognition of Previous Learning and Degree Recognition	Joints/Double programmes	Visa Regulation for Admission	Country Competitiveness	Funds For Mobility	Innovation Policies	Health Care	Awareness Campaign	Attraction of additional tourists
Admission Criteria and Comparability of Workloads	Non-native languages taught Program	Visa Regulation for Studying	International Cooperation	Grants for Mobility	Research and Development	Housing Services	Data Collection and Analysis	Special visas
Quality Assurance Frameworks and Procedures	Space in Curricula / Mobility Windows	Visa Regulation for Working while Studying	Soft Power-Cultural Influence	Portability of Grants and Loans	Brain gain	Tutoring - Orientation	Creation of ad hoc Bodies	related exports
Creation of ad hoc Bodies	Off-Shore Curricula	Recognition of previous Learning for Working Purposes	Regional Integration			Integration	Off-line and Online Campaign	
International Research	Stimulation of Student Participation	Visa Regulation for Prolonged or Permanent Residences	Selection and Recruitment	Tuition Fees		Families Policies	Recruitment	
Institutional Cooperation	Stimulation of International Network Domestically			Recognition of previous Learning for Working Purposes		Stimulation of Stakeholder participation		
Data Collection and Analysis	Social and Cultural Spill over			International Ranks		Protection of International Students		
Internationalization of the HE Sector				Public and Private Expenditure per Student				
Reforming / Modernization of the HE Sectors								
Selection and Recruitment								

Source: Elaboration of the author building on Erittu (2019)

As the past sections introduced, mobility flows are a core pillar of the discussion around the mercification of higher education systems and on the shift of governance in higher education, as well as of the large debate on structural policy convergence in continental Europe. Second, ISM is also related to a number of other policy challenges currently common to a number of developed democracies, such as their aging population and low fertility rate, national labor-force shortages and/or rising youth unemployment. Third, ISM has been clearly directly connected to the necessity of high skilled human capital, in the aftermath of a knowledge economy oriented to fast innovation within a new digital *paradigma*, as international students seems to have the right credentials to cope in the new contemporary highly competitive job global market (Bratch et al 2006). Fourth, ISM also highlights the tension between the necessity of boosting the process of opening national educational system to an unprecedent extent and the necessity of government to keep their grip on national systems, assessing their quality and controlling the release of qualifications and the recognition of degrees for studying and working. Fifth and finally, the imperative to foster mobility flows hidden the clear contradiction between the begin of the massive growth of mobility worldwide in the early 2000 contextually to the stiffening of international relations following 9/11, consequent events and trends, the closure of domestic borders in the first place. The mobility of students has also been linked to the espionage world, with concerns about fake students belonging to foreign army serving their own country while abroad.

The next sections will present more extensively the research puzzle of this research and the main argument of this dissertation, while figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 below conclude the section with a graphical overview of the transversal character of international student mobility to wrap up this section.

Figure 1.1

Figure 1.1 – Policy domains of relevance for ISM

Figure 1.2

Student/Family (target)

International level

HEI level

POLICY MAKING LEVELS CONCERNED

ISM

Regional level

HEI institutional Level

Bi-Multi National Level

State/Regional Level

National Level

Figure 1.2 – Policy making levels engaged with ISM promotion/implementation

Figure 1.3

Ministry of Education

Universities

Ministry of Interior/Immigration

INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS ENGAGED

ISM

National Agencies

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic net Abroad

Domestic regular bodies

Ministries of treasure, trade, economic development, finance

Ministries of Labor, Skills, economy

Figure 1.3 – Key Institutional Actors involved by ISM promotion

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Figure 1.4

Internationalization of Higher Education

Mercification of
Higher Education

Intercultural Exchanges

CONTEMPORARY ISSUE INTERLINKED

ISM

GATS
and BP

Shift in governance &
Policy Convergence

Science Diplomacy

Global knowledge Economy

Skilled Migration
Brain Drain/Grain/Circulation

Figure 1.4 – Contemporary global issues related to ISM

1.3 Research puzzle

The main research puzzle that this dissertation aims to solve relies in how to put into a single system the several factors emerged by previous studies as having an effect on PI. As introduced, while a general theory nor a comprehensive analytical framework to assess PI is available in scholar literature, important overlapping in the way scholars addressed integration are present.

So far, the literature reveled the necessity to address the complexity of domestic actors' subsystem relations when addressing transversal policy problems, reason why many authors focused on the concepts of coordination, cooperation and collaboration among domestic actors, and many others on the role that governmental commitment and action may have in fostering or preventing PI.

Further, it also pointed out to the role of policy goals and policy frames, that eventually drive and/or depend by actors' preferences, interests and ideas. Literature largely shed light on the role of the institutional domestic context, of a country's institutional architecture and policy 'software', on its cultural and historical peculiarities, as well as on the role of resource. A number of authors also recently shed light on the process of development of integration in policy instruments, shedding light on the vertical tier of policy integration. Few authors also set the research ground to approach policy integration as a multi-dimensional and asynchronous process rather than a normative goal, or a linear process which proceed following a logical sequence by definition.

As chapter II will show more in detail, these research efforts offer however a partial analytical approach to the study of policy integration, as they focus on just one or few of the factors mentioned above which emerged across the various literatures interrelated to the study of integration. How does the overall process of policy integration develop over the time? Are there hierarchies among dimensions of policy integration? When and why does the process of integration increase or decrease? How do several

domestic sectorial subsystem come together to address a transversal issue? What kind of events are able to foster or alter the integration development? Are there optimum levels of policy integration?

I make a step forward and provide an analytical model according to which it is possible to look at the development of policy integration contextually in a number of factors – which I call axes and dimensions where PI manifest itself, and provide evidence to respond to such questions. Those questions driving the analysis can be summarized by the two main research questions of this study, and notably '*To which extent did Australia and Italy developed and implemented an integrated policy on international student mobility in 2020?*' and '*Why and how did the process of policy integration occur and develop in Australia and Italy in relation to the international mobility of students, since the eighties onward?*.

As introduced, I take the development of national policies around ISM as a case study to investigate PI. Although large research has been conducted on this topic, the phenomenon has never been approached as a PI puzzle, and as discussed above I argue it provides a privileged angle for PI analysis.

More importantly, although in light of the massive growth of ISM worldwide and its huge economic relevance, it could be fair to expect that governments developed a well-equipped technology to tackle it, the preliminary evidence available suggest another state of things. Above all, two paradoxes emerged by the review of the literature partly presented above. The first is that it is not yet possible to define an international student, a matter which raises important methodological concerns. In fact, while many scholars provide analysis basing on quantitative data, many other suggest that solid comparable statistical data are still missing. Teichler (2015) even argues the state of research is 'deplorable', since partial and incomparable statistic data harms comparable policy research. UEO rely on national dataset where different definition of international students are embraced and includes different 'types' of mobile students, in some case also those following online distance education (Guruz, 20082)[3] or second and third generation of immigrants.

The second and biggest paradox relies in the fact that we do not know much about national policies that shape student exchanges. In a sharper fashion, Riano, Van Mol and Raghuram (2018, PAGE) argued that 'policies [around exchanges] remain an unknown black-box'. As shown, a large part of the knowledge we have on national policies on student mobility derives by larger assessments on higher education internationalization policies, or other sectorial analysis focused say on high skilled migration flows, trade and labor market dynamics among the many.

Very little in instead known on the complex multi-level and multi-actors dynamics between these policy fields and their actors when developing and implementing student mobility. Moreover, the few studies that more carefully addressed mobility with a more cross-sectoral approach suggest that national policies around mobility seems to be far less developed than the extent that could be forecasted in light of its political salience. Perri (2004) noted that 'achieving policy coordination is after all the perennial quest of all political systems', and 'overcoming attitudinal and bureaucratic barriers to policy coordination and integration should not be underestimated, even when there is adequate

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[3] The Bologna Follow Up Group on Internationalization (2010) also suggests that the current embraced definition of international student by international organizations (i.e. OECD) not result adequate because of the complexity in distinguishing those students who strictly moved to the purpose of receiving higher education and the ones who were previously living in the latter for reasons other than studying, but have no taken nationality on the meantime. Furthermore, regulation for gaining the citizenship change according to the country, and this interfere with the identification of international students. Figure X and X in the annex shows these aspects more in detail.

political will'. Coherently, the UNESCO (2013, 50) notes that national policies for ISM 'even when given a high priority, tend not to be complete in the way that may be expected'. Teichler (2015) also suggested caution in interpreting the enormous growth in revenue from international students as a consequence of strategic national policies. Sa and Sabzalieva (2017) tested such hypothesis in global leaders such as Australia and USA, and found no evidence of such relation of causality. In contrast, they enlighten a poor policy design in policies concerning student mobility among global giants. (Teichler, Ferencz and Wächter, 2011) also reported a 'the more the better approach' rather than developed policies on ISM around the world. As Papatsiba (2005, 1) argued time ago, researches should concentrates beyond the 'apparent acceptance [behind the] further promotion of student mobility' (van der Wende 2001, in Papatsiba 2005), being it because of political, economic or socio-cultural rationales, since 'it is important to investigate the extent to which mobility outcomes […] reflect the perceptions and fulfil the expectation of political actors […] [as well as] to tackle the 'legitimating ideas' or 'rationales' that accompanied the institutionalization of student mobility by political actors since these are likely to mark future promotion of mobility (Papatsiba 2005,1)'. In light of these observations, I hence bridge the literature on international student mobility with policy strands of literature drawing on the concepts of policy integration, and engage in a qualitative comparative study of the process of policy integration in relation to ISM.

1.4 Main argument in brief

This dissertation aims to contribute at the theoretical, descriptive and practical levels. Using the concept of PI to investigate ISM at the national level of policy making holds in fact a three-fold relevance: in the first place, it allows to test policy integration's theoretical tool-kit within a broader space of research, as research on PI suffers its concentration within few policy domains. Second, it provides a missing cross-sectoral design according to which describe, analyze and compare ISM policies in different jurisdictions. Third, it finally provide a practical policy tool kit which may be of interest of policy makers involved in ISM, or other transversal issues.

The main ground on which this research has been undertook relies in the proposition according to which the few analytical framework which attempted to explain ISM at the national level of policy making have important structural constrains, as they address ISM within sectorial boundaries which strongly limits the understanding of both ISM as a phenomenon and of the national policies dynamics it implies. I therefore engage in a study of policy integration and offer my contribution to the ongoing academic debate on the assessment of this concept, basing on a processual understanding of PI across fields, levels and a number of additional dimensions. I bridge scholar literatures developed around this concept and its most similar ones, and refuse a normative assumption of mere positive effects of PI. I place strong attention to the cross-sectoral, multi-level and multi-actor governance system PI requires, going beyond the mere role of governments in addressing transversal issues, also building on studies which explained PI with a more linear approach.

I propose an analytical framework to explain PI based on a processual understanding. Building especially on the work of Briassoulis (2004), Candel and Biesbroek (2016, 2017), Candel and Pereira (2017), Candel (2019), Crosby and Bryson (2010), Dupont (2013), Jordan and Lenschow (2010), Howlett and Saguin (2018), Howlett et al (2019), Howlett and Rayner (2009), policy integration is approached as a multidimensional and

asynchronous process of policy change that may be activated both by an endogenous or exogenous turbulent event, and implies the emergence of a cross-sectoral multi-level and multi-governance system where many actors must contextually frame and address a cross-sectoral policy problem.

This research confirms previous work which shed light on the need to approach its study with a processual understanding, looking to its development by a number of different angles of analysis. Evidence provides in the first place fresh elements which advance the current knowledge on the role that an institutional policy context have in shaping PI development, suggesting that a wider understanding of the former help to grasp its connections with PI. Second, it shed light on the role of turbulent events that emerged to play both as a stimulus and break to PI development, opening a path of further research which may more carefully investigate the impact of different kind of these events. A key finding emerged by this dissertation is then the crucial role played by the presence or dearth of PI in the dimension of political commitment and in the one of policy goal and frames. Coherently, the evidence emerged shed light on the salience of PI in the dimension of subsystem' actors relations, as graphically visible in figure 1.5 below, which also enlighten the complexity of PI in policy instrument for the overall PI development. As clearly shown by the figure, the processual understanding at the base of this analytical framework sees in the output of PI only a product of a *caesura* of time of the wider process, which turn to be a new input for PI overall development. These output, described and analyzed both in the case of Australia and Italy, revealed the extent to which PI strongly developed in the first case and it barely did so in the latter, but also allowed to grasp further analytical insights. As introduced, this dissertation revealed that turbulent events may have a disruptive impact on integrated policy, especially in the case corrective and shock-related strategies have not been properly developed. Building on this work, further research may investigate which may be optimum levels of PI overall and in different dimensions, basing on the evidence that full level of PI are not desirable by definition. In conclusion, it shall be underlined the biggest contribution provided by this research, notably the development of a comprehensive framework which enable to explain the overall process of PI and its outputs, putting into a single system the mentioned factors that previous research identified as crucial for its analysis.

Figure 1.5 – A processual framework to analyze Policy Integration

2. Chapter II | Towards a comprehensive framework to study policy integration

2.1. A Brief Review Of The Current State Of Arts: From A Normative Aim To A Processual Understanding To Pi

In a pioneer paper of PI, Underdal (1980) notes that 'to integrate' means 'to unify, to put parts together into a whole (Underdal 1980, 1)' and he suggests an integrated policy should meet three basic requirements, each of which refer to a specific policy making stage. The first one is comprehensiveness – the input stage, the second aggregation – the processing of inputs, and finally consistency - output consistency. Underdal (1980, 163) argues that 'at least some efforts should be made to achieve them', although he himself stress the way full policy integration is more an ideal, what Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) defined as 'synoptic decision making'.

As introduced above, a vast amount of research around the concept of integration and similar ones developed following watertight approaches, although joints effort would have favored the cumulative process of knowledge creation (Trein et al 2018). The next section provides an overview of the policy literature which specifically developed around the PI concept and its 'closest' one of policy coordination, and it set the ground of the analytical framework developed. It introduces in the first place streams of literature which explained PI developing scales and concentrating on hierarchies among the concepts of coordination, collaboration and integration. It then focus on different strands of literature sharing a processual understanding of PI, shedding light on many additional dimensions of PI and on its multi-dimensional and asynchronous evolution over time, setting the ground of the analytical framework tested within this research. For the sake of clarity, the review will briefly introduced these works, while annex I of this chapter provides a detailed panorama of the graphical representation drafted by mentioned authors in their effort to address the concept of PI.

2.1..1. Scales, Hierarchies and Policy Integration

Lindblom (1965, 154) provided what become a standard definition of policy coordination, arguing that 'a set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in it such that the adverse consequence of any one decision for other decisions in the set are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or outweighed'. In the words of (Peters, 2018, 2), this means that 'coordination occurs when decisions made in one program or organization consider those made in others and attempt to avoid conflict', what Scharpf (1993, in Zingerli, Bisang and Zimmermann, 2004) has

called *negative coordination*, as shown by figure 2.1 at the end of the section. While in its negative form policy coordination it is thought as steered by one single actor in charge of coordinate the others, positive coordination implies the development of a series of relations across various actors, as there is no a single actor in charge of controlling the process. Peters (2018) distinguishes between negative and positive coordination (where more is done than a mere avoiding of conflicts), and even adds *strategic coordination*, the one occurring 'around broad strategic goals of government'. Differently by Sharp, however, Peters approaches policy coordination according to its degree of development.

In an article that constitute another pioneer paper for this discussion, Metcalfe (1994), see in 'government strategy' the higher level of a scale whose steps follow a logical sequence. The author developed a Guttmann scale shown below by figure 2.2, ranging from level zero to nine, a path of development ranging from 'independent decision-making by ministries' to a 'government strategy', respectively throughout communication, consultation, the avoiding of divergences and the search for agreement among ministries, to reach arbitration, limits on ministries and the establishment of central priorities. According to him, the scale constitutes a theoretical base to develop reform strategies, as well as a 'tool of measurement or diagnosis' in light of its capacity to locate the 'underlying source of co-ordination problems'. Metcalfe investigated this issue in light the necessity 'to cope with increasing international interdependence', and drawn on a study of coordination across EU Member States, with the underlying assumption that higher level of coordination would be positive for the EU.

Braun (2008) proposed a simplified Guttmann scale to describe the path to PI ranging from no coordination to negative and then positive integration, followed by strategic coordination. He also distinguishes among administrative and policy coordination, with the first one preceding during the path to policy integration. Pelkonen, Teräväinen and Waltari (2008) rely on a very similar Guttmann scale adapted, but while the former has been developed to investigate relations among ministries, they 'apply it also to the horizontal relationships between agencies (Pelkonen, Teräväinen and Waltari 2008, 242-3)', focusing in the domains of HE, science and technology in Finland.

According to Stead and Meijer (2007), instead, policy co-operation constitutes the lower level of integration, since 'it simply implies dialogue and information', while policy co-ordination, 'plus policy coherence' and 'transparency' attempts to avoid conflicts in situation where policy goals differs among sectors. PI includes both policy co-operation and co-ordination, plus the existence of shared goals to formulate policies. Figure 2.3 at the end of the section graphically represents these hierarchy among concepts. Here, PI constitutes a 'synonymous to concept of holistic government, joined up government or cross-cutting policy making (Stead and Meijers 2004,6)', where cooperation and coordination are necessary but not sufficient conditions for integration, as it 'is more demanding for the stakeholders involved in the process (Stead and Meijers 2004, 6)'. As the triangular representation enlightens, the authors stress the analytical difference between the concept of co-operation and coordination. They make the argument that co-ordination increase interdependency and may reduce autonomy more than cooperation, as 'in the case of cooperation two organizations work together to accomplish their goals, while in the case of co-ordination, the joint decision and/or actions result in joint outcomes that may be quite different from their initial account (Stead and Meijers 2004,5)'. PI should be therefore distinguished by coordination because of the level of interaction it implies among actors and their output. Other than being more demanding, PI aims to result in one joint policy across fields, while

coordination rather aims to adjust specific single-field policy to become 'mutually enforcing and consistent'. Perri (2004) also fully distinguishes between policy coordination and integration. The author defines coordination as the development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of planning, and making decisions'.

Zingerli, Bisang and Zimmermann (2004) suggest instead that policy coordination can be thought as a process and that it 'is just a part of the overarching concept of policy integration', and approach it as a 'degree of integration'. They adapted Metcalfe's scale to assess it basing also on OECD, and they argue it constitutes a helpful tool to describe levels of both policy coordination and policy integration. This scale is eventually more defined than the previous ones mentioned, as provides clear *criteria* for its stage of development.

Before turning to the shortcomings of these approaches, it is worth to underline their contribution offered investigating the role of information exchange between actors and their willingness to share information, consultation among them and their commitment to boost the process of PI development. These authors also took their analytical effort further, revealing the necessity to observe the wider panorama of actors and the different networks present, or weather ad hoc bodies have been established.

As Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) in (Fine 2001 in 2007, 12) note, however, 'the three 'Cs (Cooperation, Coordination, Collaboration)' should be still 'fully 'unpacked' in order to provide a more detailed understanding on the different elements comprising each of the integration terms'. Moreover, approaches that see 'overarching strategies' preceded by a logical sequence of reaching cooperation, coordination, and only after collaboration, assume that PI development follow a linear trend (Candel and Biesbroek, 2016). This sequence does not take into account the chance of partial cooperation, coordination, collaboration occurring – horizontally and vertically - in a very high number of possible different combinations, nor their evolution in time. What happens if after reaching positive coordination a shock of any kind disrupt information exchange, base of the entire process?

Eventually, a large body of research based on the assumption that PI and coordination were something to which public policy should tend to reach. For example, Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) has been approached as a 'policy making principle without reflecting too much on its meaning ((Jordan and Lenschow, 2010) 148)', or 'as a guiding model that requires primarily the integration of environmental considerations in others policy fields (Berger and Steurer 2009, 2)'. Another problem of such approach consists moreover in the dearth of shared *criteria* according to which assess them, resulting in a multitude of different scales of integration/coordination and a consequent dearth of comparable evidence, as this section and its Annex show. Further, both strand of literatures mostly focused on the horizontal level of policy integration, placing the most of their attention to the occurrence of PI between fields, leaving therefore aside any investigation its vertical tier, as also noted by Tosun and Lang (2017).

In conclusion, many authors focused on and refined Metcalfe's (1994) scale, while another stream of literature approached this research puzzle in terms of hierarchies. While the analytical framework presented in this research does not share the grounds of these approach of PI, these literature deserve attention in light of its extensive focus on the dynamics among actors. Albeit limited, moreover, some of these authors also shed partial light on the necessity of a processual understanding of PI, enlightening the complexity of conflating it into a single line of measurement (Trein et al 2018, Braun

2008). Other scholars suggests however different ways to conceptualize this research puzzle, as discussed in the next section.

Figure 1: Ideal-type negative and positive coordination (after Scharpf, 1993).

Figure 2.1 – Sharpf (1993), Difference between positive and negative policy coordination

Metcalfe: *International policy co-ordination*   281

FIGURE 1
Policy co-ordination scale

9. Government strategy
8. Establishing central priorities
7. Setting limits on ministerial action
6. Arbitration of policy differences
5. Search for agreement among ministries
4. Avoiding divergences among ministries
3. Consultation with other ministries (feedback)
2. Communication to other ministries (information exchange)
1. Independent decision-making by ministries

Figure 2.2 – Metcalfe (1999) scale of policy coordination

Figure 1. Integrated policy-making, policy co-ordination and co-operation.

Figure 2.3 – Stead and Meijers (2007) – Hierarchies among cooperation, coordination and integration

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2.1..2 Tiers, levels, dimensions and objectives of PI: toward a more
processual understanding

Within the vast literature of this topic, a number of selected studies constitute the main playground of the analytical framework tested by this dissertation, since they were the key to identify the building blocks of the framework built. These research expand our understanding of the necessity of a multi-dimensional processual understanding beyond any normative assumption, including contextually a number of more specific aspects ranging from actors' relations to their goals and policy frames, passing by political commitment and policy instruments. This section briefly review this literature.

As Underdal (1980, 162) already noted, the vertical tier of PI implies additional complexity, as the actors involved 'often constitutes two different political arenas, involving different actors and different configurations of policy preferences. This makes it harder for principles to penetrate 'downwards''. Jordan and Lenschow (2010) note past research reveal federal jurisdictions emerged to be more exposed to fragmentation, in which PI process develops with more difficulties, such as in Germany, Australia and the USA but also the EU, where they pin point by way of example that EPI implementation encountered more institutional constrains. Lafferty and Hovden (2003, 12) talks instead of Vertical Environmental Policy Integration (VEPI) to refer 'to the extent to which a particular government has adopted and sought to implement environmental objectives as central in the portfolio of objectives that the governmental body continuously pursue'. Their attention is more focused on the dynamics within the vertical tier of ministerial departments, shifting their research attention away from the discussion around PI and form of state. Braun (2008) noted that federal countries have an additional horizontal level to be coordinated, and he distinguishing by the level of the government and the cabinets, the sectorial ministerial level and the one of agencies, executing bodies. He also takes into account the 'software', meaning the governance mode in place 'that bind the different institutional levels of the machinery of government together (Braun 2008, 232)'. As Russel and Jordan (2008, 2009 in Jordan and Lenschow (2010)) demonstrate, 'a favorable institutional framework is a necessary but insufficient condition for stronger EPI (Jordan and Lenschow 2010, 151)'.

Briassoulis (2004) argues the output of PI shall be approached as an 'integrated policy system aiming to achieve multiples complementarities and synergies among policies'. As we shall discuss below, she looked to PI identifying a number of different objective to investigate to fully grasp the entire concept – the relationship among actors, goals, policy structures and procedures. Against the shortcoming of approaching policy coordination only according to its horizontal tier, she place attention on this tier of PI, since 'both approaches should be merged through appropriate procedures for complete and effective PI (Briassoulis 2004, 12)'. She also place strong attention on policy instruments, distinguishing between relationship among policy instruments of the same type and of different types by integrative instrument. She also underlines the extent to which policy instrument should be coherent with goals, as we shall better discuss in the next few lines. .

PI by means of instruments is one of the aspect left uncovered by the 3C' hierarchy (Candel and Biesbroek 2016), and it is strictly connected to the discussion on the institutional context given its role in the stage of policy implementation. Howlett and Saguin (2018) make this point quite clear when they argue that PI is no other than the process of reconciliation among policy goals and policy instruments, and provide a

typology to explain different outputs that may result by the different combinations of consistent and inconsistent policy goals and frames (notably policy institutionalization, mainstreaming, harmonization and coordination, as shown by Annex II).

Basing also on Briassoulis (2004) work, Howlett et al. (2017, 70) understand instead PI 'as the smooth coexistence of different elements of policy, including goals, policies and government levels involved in the policy mix design and creation, so that conflicts are minimized and, if possible, synergies and complementarities are promoted'. Since some policy problems to be solved are 'more complex than others' – they argue - they require complex policy mixes. They explain 'policy mixes' as a 'bundles' of policy instruments, tools and techniques embraced by governments and bridge this concept with the one of policy integration. They stress 'a temporal dimension of complexity', meaning additional complexity deriving from layers of former instruments and tool already implemented, that, in turn, result in further inconsistency and incongruences. They hence derive a 'spectrum of tool mix complexity', which range from 'simple' to 'complex', shown by Annex II and concluding their analysis arguing that 'attaining policy integration involves adopting policy tools capable of overcoming or avoiding conflicts in a policy mix (Howlett at al. 2017, 74)'. Reversing this reasoning, this add further evidence on the need to focus on both formal and informal aspects to fully grasp the institutional domestic context: the ability and capacity to steer each level of the policy making process is in fact fundamental for the stage of implementation. Steurer and Berger (2009) also enlightened a diagonal dimension of PI resulting from the mixing of horizontal and vertical tiers of integration. In a similar fashion, Magro et al (nd), while focusing on coordination 'to explore its implication for Science, Technology and Innovation (STI)', provides a more-developed graphical representation, including some of what Briassoulis (2004) called dimensions of integration - a political, administrative and operational layer.

A number of other authors focused on many additional aspects, facets and objects of PI which of relevance to this regard. Authors highlighted for instance that a fair division of role and responsibility and the presence of 'joint teams' favor the development of PI (Stead and Geerlings, 2005), as an higher extent of institutional capacity (Roman et al 2012, Howlett and Saguin 2019, Wu et al (2015), but also the role administrative culture (Jordan and Lenschow 2010), an aspect that, together to tradition, also Briassoulis (2004) has taken into consideration. Braun (2008) recognized the institutional complexity, and also looked to the agency level in his analysis, enlightening the vertical tier of PI. Perri 6 (2004) provides a detailed overview of authors who focuses on the role of 'national cultures', while Dupont (2013) also argue that the institutional and policy context may be more or less favorable to the development of the PI, looking several variables to assess it (the legal basis of the proposed policy, the procedures for consultation, stakeholders' involvement and impact assessment, the past policy framework and the negotiation of related policy instrument.

Moving beyond the institutional policy context, a range of other aspects have been analyzed in the effort to fully grasp and explain policy integration.

In light of the shortfalls to approach integration according hierarchies between cooperation, coordination and integration, Candel and Biesbroek (2016) proposed a processual definition of PI. They define integration as 'an agency driven process of asynchronous and multidimensional policy and institutional change within an existing or newly formed governance system, that shapes the system's and its subsystems' ability address a cross-cutting policy problem in a more or less holistic manner'. They place strong focus on its process dimension, and more specifically enlightens four dimensions

- policy frame and goals, subsystems involvement and policy instruments, according to which assess integration. Basing on a range of qualitative scale, they manage therefore to un-pack the concept of PI and carefully address four of its dimensions. This work marks a clear cut in respect to approaches that thought integration as the end point of a linear process, and it shed extensive light of the extent to which different dimension of PI may result to have reached a different grade of PI. Moreover, they also show the extent to which approaching PI as a linear process would strongly reduce the explanatory capacity any framework based on such premises. The aforementioned works of Briassoulis (2004), Howlett et al (2017), Howlett and Saguin (2018) and Jordan and Lenschow (2010) also shed light in this sense, as they identifying a range of aspects at least oversimplified by the research discussed in the previous section.

Additional evidence in this sense is present. Among the vast research partially introduced by chapter one, another strand of literature approached for example this research puzzle embracing the lenses of governance and policy networks, seen as facilitators of integration (Torfin 2012), following research focused on bureaucracy before and new public management afterword (Borzel 1998). For example, Kickers et al (1997,6) refers to policy networks as 'more or less stable patterns of social relationships between independent actors, which take shapes around policy problems and/or policy programmes'. This body of literature enlightened the crucial role that nets of actors plays during the process of integration policies, as well as the several different coalitions of actors that may emerges around a transversal issue as a way of example by level and fields of policy making. As we shall see below, Bolleyer (2011) investigated for example the extent to which parties' ties across departments and level may favor PI development. These work shed lights therefore on the same aspects of literatures around Metcalfe scales and the 3Cs, despite being grounded in very different theoretical premises. This literature is salient to our discussion and governances analytical lenses are solid ones to observe and assess the evolution of PI between domestic actors: as discussed in the previous chapter, in fact, a wide cross-sectoral and multi-level governance system is required to tackle transversal issues in their complexity.

As partially already shown, many actors engaged with the study of PI focused on actors dynamics. Dupont (2013) even distinguishes between internal and external stakeholders relation to assess the functional interrelations dimension of PI. She approaches PI as a process on its horizontal dimension. Building on Lafferty and Hovden (2003) 'strong standard' for climate policy, she argues in this way she can analyze the PI process and output, but also 'the full spectrum from strong to weak Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) (Dupont 2013, 64)'. In her work, she develops a pioneer model to assess integration, where functional interrelations, political commitment, institutional and policy context plus the process dimension itself explain the reached output of policy integration. In doing so, While still focusing uniquely on the horizontal tier of PI, Dupont (2013) provides a finer design to assess the occurrence of PI, bridging past knowledge in a simple and solid framework. Beyond this aspects, this model constitutes an important playground for the framework presented also in light of its extensive attention to the role played by stakeholders engaged in the process and their relationship with institutional bodies.

Within domestic actors, past research also more carefully concentrated on the role governments have in PI development.
Howlett and Saguin (2018) note how governments need to hold capacity to 'manipulate the design space […] that moves the integration projects towards higher level of

integration (Jordan and Matt 2014 in Howlett and Saguin 2018, 10)'. They approach government capacity according to a broader governance oriented definition, in contrast to the notion of 'state' capacity'. Wu, Ramesh and Howlett (2015) previously highlighted that 'governance capacity' has three dimension, notably the analytical, operational and political.

Candel (2019) brings together the work by Howlett, Ramesh, Saguin and Wu and the study of Howlett and Saguin (2018) to develops a typology of policy integration, shown below. He notes how 'leadership scholars have coined the term of *integrative* leadership to refer to the type of leadership that is necessary for governing cross-cutting problems (Candel 2019, 8)', and built also on Crosby and Bryson's (2010, 2014) work on integrative leadership to develop a typology of policy integration potential, where he identifies four possible outcome of policy integration - limited, symbolic, administrative or full, each of them according to a matrix mixing integrative capacity and integrative leadership, as shown by annex II.

The latter authors define integrative leadership as 'the work of integrating people, resources, and organization across various boundaries to tackle complex public problems and achieve the common goods (Crosby and Bryson 2014, 57)', and identified nine different practice of integrative leadership, falling in the three categories of diagnosis context, practices related to structure and process, outcomes and accountabilities.

These work largely shed light on the importance of focusing, beyond the wide cross-sectoral governance system a transversal issue requires, on the specific role of the government within this mentioned system.

A final aspect which emerged by these work around PI, which is for the large part also very recent in time, is related to actors' preferences, interests, values and goals. This aspects had been only partially considered also by the 3C' and Metcalfe's strand of literature. More in detail, the salience of both policy goals and policy frames has been underlined by these research.

Briassoulis (2004) explains that congruent and compatible goals 'among two or more policies are favorable, necessary but not sufficient, pre-conditions for their integration (Briassoulis 2004, 16)'. Having in mind Briassoulis case study, this means that the environment should be framed positively in each field (and among the correspondent actors' system) to make the PI process possible. Meijers and Stead (2004) note, they may act both as facilitators of 'organizational co-ordination' as well as 'inhibitors', depending on the fact the former are shared or no among domestic actors involved. As aforementioned, Candel identified in policy goals and policy frames two crucial dimensions of the overall process of PI development, as well as Howlett and Saguin (2018) consider goals as one of the elements that explain policy integration in their typology.

Between the mentioned actors, Candel works are those who more extensively focus on the dimension of policy frames beyond the one of policy goals. Policy frames is an expression that has been used in policy studies since long time to describe how specific problems are approached in the public debate, or the way competing definitions contextually approach them. Zito (2011) defines policy framing as a concept used 'to explain the process by which actors seeks to understand and act on complex situations (Zito 2011, 2731)', and refuses the basic assumption according to which individuals will *necessarily* arrive to the same conclusion when observing the same natural or social phenomenon. Bocquillon (2018), who focused on the close concept to policy integration of policy coherence, and summarizes efficaciously that 'policy frames act as policy

glue—or organizing idea—binding issues and actors together. […] They also contribute to the promotion of new objectives and instruments that escape traditional classifications. (Bocquillon 2018, 341)'. He also notes the role of policy frames in the construction of 'cohesive policy constituencies', that are able to shape debates around the issue discussed. Nilson (2004), who focused on the larger process of learning trough policy frames, identified three main energy policy frames, notably energy 'as infrastructure', energy 'as risk' and energy 'as market', 'by analyzing problem perceptions, objectives, and principles, and policy prescriptions over time as they are expressed in governmental bills, committee reports, and other public documentation (Nilson 2004, 211)'.

In conclusion, the studies discussed in this section strongly enhanced our understanding of PI overcoming the approach of integration as merely creating interdependency between policy, and open the path to a more comprehensive and systematic evidence based research on PI. Being their precious contribution acknowledged, this section shows however that each of them leave aside one or more crucial factor emerged to be relevant for PI development by past research, although it shall be stressed their contribution in providing solid tools to analyze specific aspects of PI. Further, some of the typologies proposed are mostly theoretical-based and scarce empirical evidence is currently available. Basing on these playground, the next section illustrates the way selected items were identified and put into a single *systematic* system to explain and assess PI process in the two countries under analysis.

2.2 Framework for Analysis

2.2.1 A Processual understanding of policy integration

The focus of this dissertation is to study PI process of development taking as a case study ISM related policies. The research aims to answer to two leading research questions, notably the extent to which two developed western countries implemented an integrated policy on international student mobility, and the way in which the process of integration occurred. The framework of analysis engages in the effort of gluing together the crucial factors linked to policy integration emerged by decades of research on PI. In detail, the two research questions of the dissertation are i) *'to which extent did Australia and Italy developed and implemented an integrated policy on student mobility in 2018?'* and ii) *why and how did the process of policy integration occur and develop in Australia and Italy in relation to the international mobility of students, since the eighties onward?'*.

I approach PI as a multi-sectoral and multi-level challenge that arise because of formal and informal structures are organized in specialized sectoral agencies (Jordan and Lenschow 2010), and hence demand actions to answer comprehensively, in particular to transversal problems. Policy integration is then seen as happening in a number of every-day formal and informal 'organizational routines', refusing the approach to PI as a 'transient political objectives' (Jordan and Lenschow 2010). I therefore understand policy integration as a process which develop over the time according to a non-linear process in a number of different axes and dimensions, rather than as an overarching principle.

The framework of analysis is grounded in institutional theory, and it most specifically embraces an institutional actor centered approach. This allows to fully take into account the role of institutions in shaping political and policy action while conceiving the state as a not-unitary and non-rational actor. The state is rather considered

as a 'multi-composed entity', made up by many facets building up its entire architecture - such as bureaucracies, governments, and single departments - (Leviatino 2018). It encompasses more than legislation and formal structures, including policy discourse and policy ideas that travel across constellation of actors and departments, within and outside state bureaucracy (see Schmidt 2006). The theory provides a solid ground to investigate the PI development also thanks to its extensive focus on actors' relation within the larger domestic and institutional and policy context. As March and Olsen (1989) put it, the best way to understand institutions 'is through the values that shape the behaviors of their members (Peters (1998, 298)'. In other words, this theoretical ground allows to overcome the conflation of policy integration into a single linear unite that attempt to measure a degree of coordination and integration among domestic actors (see Trein et al 2018, 345), opening the path to a more comprehensive framework.

To define policy integration, I strongly draw on the definition provided of Candel and Biesbroek (2016), to the best of my knowledge, the most comprehensive definition currently available in scholar literature. Building on this works, I define policy integration as 'an agency or *event* driven processes of asynchronous and multidimensional *policy* change within a newly formed cross-sectoral governance system, in the larger framework of the domestic institutional and policy context, that shapes the system's and its subsystems' ability *to frame and* address a cross-cutting policy problem in a more or less holistic manner, *horizontally and vertically*'.

I bridges few contributions belonging both to public policy studies and international student mobility literature to derive the ideal definition of an Integrated Policy on International Student Mobility (IPISM), as more extensively discussed in the research design section of this chapter.

In its contribution, Underdal (1980) defined a policy as integrated as according to 'the extent that it recognizes its consequences as decision premises, aggregates them into an overall evaluation, and penetrates all policy levels and all government agencies involved in its execution (Underdal 1980, 162)'. According to him, a 'perfectly integrated policy' is a policy 'where all decisions and significant consequences of that same policy are recognized in decision premises, and policy options are evaluated on the basis of their effects on some aggregate measure of utility, and where the different policy elements are consistent with each other (Underdal 1980, 162). Briassoulis (2004), building and expanding Underdal's work, defined an integrated policy as the result of both the vertical and intra-sectoral integration process, and argued that an integrated policy is one where a policy system 'aims to achieve multiple complementarities and synergies among policies (Briassoulis 2004, 13)'. Rayner and Howlett (2009) defined an integrated policy as one with 'a design in which, first, multiple policy goals can be coherently pursued at the same time, and, second, policy instrument mixes are consistent, in the sense of being mutually supportive in the pursuit of policy goals Rayner and Howlett (2009, 100)'.

Building on these research, I define an Integrated Policy on International Student Mobility as 'a policy holding the incorporation of compatible and shared policy objectives and instruments for the promotion of ISM in fields different than higher education, and at least in immigration, foreign policy and the trade/labor market, where integration is effective in every stage of policy making, also thanks to ad hoc resource and technology for its implementation (i.e. policy instruments). Such policy requires the development of shared frames and a transversal policy goal in relation to the mobility of students across actors' subsystems involved within and between levels and fields'.

To put it in more theoretical-oriented terms, an integrated policy on international student mobility constitutes the results of a multitudes of elements, as the structural domestic historical and cultural traits of the many bureaucracies involved in ISM, summed to a number of more peculiar and temporary policy dynamics between the government and the several actors' subsystems involved within and across different policy domains and levels, including both institutions and stakeholders. Such process is strongly shaped by the processes of bargaining among different institutional departments and among wider constellation of key player, their values and interests.

Basing on these premises, I develop and empirically test a framework of analysis for the assessment of the PI, engaging in the effort of putting together into a single system the few factors emerged as strongly connected to PI development, extensively discussed in the previous section. Despite a general theory of policy integration has never been developed, available scholar literature allows in fact to engage in an exercise of synthesis thanks to which identify a limited number of factors that constantly emerged within the literature presented, as shown below by table 2.1: they constitute the pillars of the framework developed. Trein, Meyer and Maggetti (2018) already shed light on the presence of shared conceptual core in the vast literature presented by the previous section, and note how these studies always 'refers to institutional aspects, actor-level, and politics-related elements, the question of policy implementation and policy capacity (Trein, Meyer and Maggetti 2018, 344)'. Meijers and Stead (2004), basing on the reviews of Halpert (1982) and Challis et al (1998), identified seven different sets of factors as facilitators and inhibitors of policy co-ordination: organizational, behavioral, cultural and personal; political, economic or financial factors, plus process or instrumental and contextual factors, plus others specifically related to the issue involved. Similarly, Stead and Geerlings (2007) highlighted the influence of institutional and political factors, such as i) the division of roles and responsibilities, ii) the nature of inter-departmental and inter-agency relationships, iii) the diversity of professional skills and education, iv) the role of political and public support. As shown by table 2.1, a more systematic approach to the literature enables in fact to highlight few crucial factors, on which this dissertation will concentrates.

TABLE 2.1 | Review of the literature in relation to the six factors identified

FACTOR IDENTIFIED	CORRESPONDENT AUTHORS
Institutional context	Perri 6 (2004), Bolleyer (2011), Pelkonen et al (2008), Magro et al (2018), Jordan and Lenschow (2010), Braun (2008), Dupont (2013), Briassoulis (2004) [traditions and administrative culture], Stead and Geerlings (2007) [division of roles and responsibilities, nature of relationship], Roman et al (2012) [Institional Capacity], Howlett and Saguin (2008) - Candel (2016) - Wu et al (2015) - Hughes et al (2015) [governance/policy capacity]
actors' relations	Ross and Dover (2008) [preferences and strategies], Candel and Biesbroek (2016), Briassoulis (2004), Peters (1998) [interdependence], Dupont (2013), Peters (2018), Steurer (2007) [lack of information exchange], Sharpf (1992,3) - Metcalfe (1994) - Pelkonen (2008) - Bolleyer (2011) - Magro et al (nd) - Peters (1998,2018), Braun (2008) [information exchanges, coordination, cooperation and collaboration]
political committment	Crosby and Bryson (2010), Boyeller (2011), Stead and Meyers (2007), Briassoulis (2004), Dupont (2013), Howlett and Saguin (2008) [political capacity], Candel (2019) [integrative leadership], Steurer (2007), Peters (2015)
policy frames and goals	Nilsson and Nilsson (2005) [policy frames], Howlett and Saguin (2018), Candel and Biesbroek (2016), Perri 6 (2004, 2005), Bogdanor (2005), Briassoulis [policy objectives], Underdal (1980), Stead and Geerlings (2007), Stead and Meijers (2007)
policy instruments	Howlett and Saguin (2018), Howlett and Rayner (2007), Rayner et Howlett (2009), Peters (1998, 2018), Underdal (1980), Briassoulis (2004), Candel and Biesbroek (2016)
Turbulent events	Dupont (2013), Howlett and Saguin (2018), Candel (2017, 2019), Jordan and Lenschow (2010), Briassoulis (2004), Crosby and Bryson (2010)

Source: author's elaboration

Table 2.1 – Key factors past research linked to Policy Integration process of development

2.2.2 Analytical framework and expectations

The first building block of the framework developed is the domestic institutional policy-context, on which scholars extensively discussed. As illustrated in the previous section and summarized by table 2.1 above, a number of authors investigated the domestic institutional architecture, discussing patterns of integration development in federal systems and different unitary countries, given the presence of an additional level of policy making in the former ones (or vice versa)(See Stead and Meijers (2004), Stead and Geerlings (2007), Boyeller (2011), Perri 6 (nd) and Peters (1998)). Further, some authors focused on the division of responsibilities and competences among institutional actors, as Stead and Geerlings (2004). Others brought the analysis to a more meso level, pointing out to the role of administration and its predominant culture, while some others discussed instead the role of governance capacity, generally referring to the capacity of implementation of formulated policies. The previous section introduced the attention reserved by Briassoulis (2004), Braun (2008), Trein et Maggetti (2017), Howlett and Saguin (2018), Wu et al (2015) on administrative cultures, and the role that a country public service characteristics may have in the development of an integrated policy.

In light of these contribution, the 'institutional-policy context' is intended in a broad sense within this framework, encompassing a number of elements discussed by the presented literature. This approach allows to look beyond structural characteristics and focus more comprehensively on the overall domestic context in which the process of developing a date integrated policy occurs, and it grasps both formal and informal factors. This building block sets the domestic boundaries of the process of integration, taking into account its peculiarities and idiosyncrasies, resulting by a mix of formal and more informal factors, which can translate in a fertile or very harsh context for the development of integration. I derive from these grounds the first expectation of the framework, according to which:

- (E1a) a wider understanding of the domestic institutional context, rather than the patterns of a single domestic factor, enables to better grasp the overall environment where the process of integration develops.

To better assess the vertical level of PI, I also build on scholars which focused on the analysis of policy instruments in relation to PI. Instruments constitute another building block of the framework, enabling to include within the analysis an advanced stage of the policy integration process, notably implementation, what Underdal (1980) has called the output stage of PI. Figure 1.5 showed the complexity of policy instruments necessary to substantially implement an integrated policy, as both vertical intra-sectorial instruments and cross-sectoral ones are needed to substantially implement such policy. As shown, policy instruments can encompass two or more policy fields. Disruption on the vertical axes of policy instruments, may, as a consequence, undermine other horizontal transversal instruments. Policy instruments are moreover strongly linked to the dimension of PI of actors' subsystem. As discussed in the first chapter, ISM may be perceived very differently by domestic actors, which may consequently prefer very different or event contrasting instrument to steer ISM.

Another building block of the framework are turbulent events. As shown by figure 1.5, both external and internal turbulent events to the domestic institutional context can occur. These can be possible activators of the entire PI process or lead to the disruption

of an already integrated policy. External shocks, as discussed by Jordan and Lenschow (2010), can occur in the form of a response to external pressure, or emerge as a policy learning process. Briassoulis (2004) also noted that some events may alter the course of integration development, and both Crosby and Bryson (2010) and Candel (2019) pointed out to the fundamental necessity of developing a response to them. The former argue that shocks *will occur* 'in collaboration', and it is necessary to prevent them. The latter note instead that 'a certain degree of redundancy is hypothesized to strengthen the government ability to signal and manage risks and shocks (Candel 2019, 5)'.

This building block of the framework enable to provide evidence on wheatear the process of integration begun in the early eighties around ISM can be seen as a response to an external shocks of this kind, as already hypothesized by several strands of literature discussed in the previous section of this chapter. For example, in the case of Bologna signatures countries, it has been hypothesized that the fact mobility is the overarching aim of the entire process is the result of an external shock which drove countries to engage in the integration of different policies. A large body of literature also pointed out to the expanding international student market as the ground of national international education/mobility strategies development in Anglo-Saxon contexts.

Although the scarce information available, we already know that also endogenous shocks may occur. The framework representation shows how turbulent events may either push and speed up the PI process acting as input for integration, or by contrast cause a disruption of the process until further input arrive, leading to a situation of impasse. Figure 1.5 shows that endogenous shocks may occur in different dimension of PI evolution discussed and included by this framework, notably in political commitment, actors' subsystem relations, policy goal and frames. From these conceptual premises, I operationalize therefore two expectations, according to which:

- (E2a) turbulent events can act both as activators or breaks to policy integration development, depending on the ability of the institutional policy context and the newly governance system emerged around the transversal issue to tackle them. They may act as policy windows of opportunities to reframe the process of PI leading to the inclusion (or exclusion) of different policy field(s).

- Furthermore, (E3) too high level of integration are not desirable in itself, since full levels of integration – a too tighten integrated policy – is not an optimum solution, given its excessive exposition to disruptive domino effects that may be activated by turbulent events.

Within the boundaries of the framework – the domestic institutional policy context, figure 1.5 shows the wide newly governance system that should occur among actors subsystem around ISM. Actors' relations have been investigated looking at different parts of this puzzle, such as preferences and strategies of actors (Ross and Dover 2008), their interdependences (Peters 1998), the lack of information exchange, and the role of cooperation, coordination, collaboration (Metcalfe 1994, Meijers and Stead 2004, Braun 2008), the importance of joint teams, shared responsibilities, budgets and goals (Stead and Geerlings 2004). Peters (1998, 2018) focused his attention on the role of networks, which would act as true mechanism for coordination, while pointing out that policy integration may cause also a disruption across networks.

The graphical description effectively illustrates the complexity behind the wide cross-sectoral actors constellation involved by the steering of a transversal issue. This networks is composed of institutional actors, such as ministries, departments, unites, agencies, belonging to several levels of policy making, plus the government and several stakeholders, within policy domain involved which taken together makes up a newly governance system. The figure highlights both actors relations and instruments, that can have both a sectorial and a cross-sectorial nature. It is visible the process that may occur following a turbulent event in actors' relations, also within a single policy domain: it may have in fact the potential to disrupt the overall process of integration, given its relevance for the wider transversal actors' relations system, blocking the policy process. This cross-sectoral and multi-level governance system, that emerge around a process of policy integration, constitutes another building block of the framework developed, and it will be investigated looking to the dimension of policy integration in actors' subsystem relations.

Two additional building block of the framework are indicated in figure 1.5, notably transversal political commitment and policy goal and frames.
Political commitment has been considered by many a core factor for the overall development of PI (see especially Bolleyer 2011, Braun (2008), Briassoulis (2004), Dupont (2013), Steurer 2007). Dupont (2013) writes that political commitment is a crucial dimension to explain Climate Integrated Policy, and Steurer (2007) argues that a lack of political commitment may undermine the entire PI process. Meijers and Stead (2004) claim that political commitment is a precondition to reach integration. The framework proposed, building on these insights, coherently consider these factors.

Transversal policy goal and frames are the fifth building block of the framework, and they stand between political commitment and actors relations. This dimension of integration is shaped, as largely introduced, by the government as well as by the entire aforementioned cross-sectoral and multi-level governance system. Policy integration within actors' relations implies in fact the existence of compatible policy objectives aiming to a wider transversal goal and to a shared frame of the transversal issue in subsystem engaged.

In this research, a transversal policy goal is defined as one developed around the transversal issue, common to and pursued by actors in different policy domains. Such policy goal must be shared across levels and fields by definition. By contrast, policy objectives refers to single policy domains, and sectorial objectives may differs among them and yet be complementary to the wider transversal goal, or in the worst case scenario, be incompatible and contrasting among each other. As discussed in the previous section, policy frames are another factor which has been investigated in relation to PI, strongly interconnected with policy goals, and definitely necessary for its assessment.
I derive another expectation from these further theoretical premises on political commitment and policy frames and goals:

> (E4) the occurrence of PI in the dimension of political commitment and the presence of at least compatible and/or of shared policy frame and of a transversal policy goal among domestic actors across levels of policy making and policy domains constitute preconditions for the development of the process of PI, avoiding a situation of general impasse. Therefore, I expect a substantial development of PI in both countries and over time in periods marked by higher political commitment and the presence of

compatible and shared policy frame and goal in relation to ISM, while a situation of stalemate in moments with an opposite situation.

In conclusion, the analytical framework acknowledges a more realistic combinations that may occur in practice during the development of an integrated policy, allowing to grasp different extent of PI in its many dimensions and axes at the same time. As shown already by Candel and Biesbroek (2016), that focused on the shortfall of approaching integration according to a linear understanding tending to a fixed end point, it may be the case that vertical integration across actors is strong within fields, but horizontal integration is very weak across fields. Otherwise, higher level of integration may occur across subsystems' horizontally, but shared top-down policy goals may be undermined by lower levels of policy making. Finally, the framework shows how integration may also develops differently in the several dimension in which it occur.

The framework grasps that the process of integration is not linear and has instead no endpoint: the output box at the right of the framework, if reached, bring back to the beginning of the process. This is a core assumption of this framework: the outputs of the process of integration are intended as short and medium term objectives to pursue during the integration development, caesuras in time of a wider process. There is not end point in the PI process, given that wheatear an integrated policy should be implemented, the process would keep forward to maintain the levels of integration acquired in any of its dimension and axes, as well as it would have to adjust to the transversal issue's development, or indeed respond to shocks of different natures and scope. To use other words, the output of the PI process in a date moment constitutes a new input to correct the level of policy integration reached, adjust or correct and maintain it. To sum up, the framework acknowledge therefore the processual multi-dimensional manifestation of the process of integration. Basing on this theoretical premises, I derive the fifth expectation of this research which attempt to confirm results obtained by Candel and Biesbroek (2016), and notably:

> (E5) PI is an asynchronous and multi-dimensional process, and dimensions of policy integration do not necessarily move in a concerted manner, but mutual dependency exist and occur among them. I hence expect this hypothesis to hold among the two case under the analysis during the entire process of development.

2.2.3 Framework operationalization

To test the validity of the analytical framework and to confirm expectations derived. A qualitative ideal-type of an Integrated Policy on International Student Mobility has been developed as it allows to compare the degree of integration reached in output by the two countries at the end of the timeframe under analysis against a third point of reference.

To analyze policy integration in process, instead, six dimension of integration have been derived by the analytical framework: PI in institutional policy context, shocks to PI dimension, PI in actors' relations, PI in transversal political commitment, PI in policy frames and goal, and PI in instruments, as discussed more extensively below before turning to the IPISM operationalization.

Policy integration in process

As introduced, the institutional policy context is intended in a wider sense if compared to previous research. To assess the extent of PI in the institutional and policy context dimension, I control for the domestic form of state and its administrative traditions, the type of higher education system, plus its mode of governance in force. Last but not least, I place strong attention to wider domestic vertical multi-level dynamics, and to the extent of competence division among domestic bodies.

Turbulent events are defined in this framework as events able to change ISM path of development, regardless of their endogenous or exogenous nature. The two chapters that illustrate the evidence collected for Australia and Italy provides an overview of the these moments during ISM development for each country. Each chapter present moreover ISM cross-sectoral policy development between moments of turbulent events, illustrating periods by moment of incremental change, in some cases following critical junctures. I however more generally focus my attention on the role of turbulent events to provide preliminary empirical evidence about turbulent events, including junctures, as well as less confined turning points and shocks.

To analyze political commitment, policy frames and policy goals, and policy instruments, I built four qualitative scales ranging from 0 (absent IP) to 5 (fully developed IP).

Several authors attempted to operationalize PI in political commitment. Dupont (2013) by way of example, operationalized it building on Council and European Commission conclusions, communications and statement, while Briassoulis (2004) provided a number of qualitative indicators to assess it. Crosby and Bryson (2010) developed the 'integrative public leadership' typology as a tool to assess the extent of integration, as leaders 'must lead across sectors boundaries to foster the requisite relationships and resources flows needed to produce desirable outcomes', especially given that governments are not anymore the unique crucial domestic actor. Also Candel (2019), developed a integrative leadership typology, that mixing capacity and commitment works as a tool to assess a country situation. As shown by table 2.2 below, the scale built on this insights bridges the insights provided by these several scholars into a single synthetic but solid tool that allows to comparatively investigate the process of integration in political commitment.

A qualitative scale also provides the operationalization of the actors' subsystems relation dimension of PI. This dimension is made complex by the many different kind of relations in places within the cross-sectoral wide constellation of actors. As the chapter shown, relations among actors may and have been investigated across field, level, concerning more specifically institutional actors relations among each other and also their relations with stakeholders. Dupont (2013) developed a typology, a matrix that attempt to explain 'functional relations'. Candel (2019) provided a qualitative continuum according to which assess policy integration in 'subsystem involvement' (See Annex II for the graphical representations). I also developed a scale, building also Dupont (2013) and on the strand of literatures discussed in the previous section that focused on horizontal PI. As a result, actors' relations are assessed vertically and horizontally, between institutional bodies and between the latter and stakeholders. Moreover, the role of the government in gluing the cross-sectoral governance system is carefully taken into account.

A single qualitative scale has been developed to assess the policy goal and frames dimension of the process of integration. The scale has been built most specifically drawing on the work of Candel and Biesbroek (2016, 2017, 2019), and, in light of extended evidence pointing out that policy frames and goals are strictly connected, a single dimension of policy integration which includes both policy frames and goals has been developed. The five-level scale enlightens the process throughout which both frames and goals develop during a process of PI: in the case of absence, both policy goals and frames are narrowly oriented, and they become fully integrated only when the transversal goal has been jointly developed and a single policy frames is predominant and shared among domestic actors, who jointly work to improve IP performance.

Two additional observations are worth to be done in relation to the operationalization of this dimension. Concerning policy frames, three main frames of ISM (treat, opportunity and necessity) have been identified as introduced: the scale consider therefore whether domestic actors shares a common frame of IMS or if domestic actors hold different contrasting frames of this transversal issue, by levels and fields. Figure 2.4 below graphically shows plausible current frames of ISM, building on the effective synthesis of discourses around ISM provided by Riano et al (2018, 4). According to the authors, in fact, 'five different types of discourses on international students used by political elites to legitimize their policy', notably i) as economic agents, ii) source of income, iii) as temporary subjects, iv) as doubtful migrants and v) as part soft power. I also built on Nilson (2014) who identified three different frames around energy policy, as we shall see below.

Moreover, the goal component is intended as cross-sectoral transversal goal, jointly developed by domestic actors, while sectorial policy objectives are more narrowly oriented in their aims: they may or not be compatible, complementary or contrasting to other sectorial objectives. This distinction follow the work of Howlett (2009, 4), that defines policy goals as a the most general 'macro-level statement of government aims and ambitions in specific policy area', and he distinguishes them from policy objectives, which are meso-level objectives, and policy targets, both of which instruments serving to reach a date policy goal. Also Briassoulis (2004) considers, beyond the political commitment and leadership for PI that 'common, shared, congruent, compatible and/or complementary policy goals and objectives' and 'the stipulation of quantitative, measurable, indicator-based targets and timetables for PI', should be taken into account to assess this policy dimension of PI. As shown by the scale below, this insights have been considered for the development of this qualitative scale.

I finally follow Candel and Biesbroek (2016, 2017, 2019) for the qualitative scale measuring integration in policy instrument, always ranging from low to high. The scale developed is however simpler than the provided from the authors aforementioned, which distinguished among the 'range of subsystems' policies that contain policy instruments' from 'procedural instruments at system level' and 'consistency'. At the same time, it bridges the insights of the mentioned contributions above and some belonging to other stream of research discussed in this chapter. It emerges a more synthetic and comprehensive qualitative scale thanks to which analyze the development of policy integration in instruments.

TABLE 2.2 | Scale of integration

	absent	low	medium	high	full
Political commitment	The issue need yet to enter the agenda as a transversal issue. No commitment in institutional documents and neither in political discourse	The issue is formally framed as a transversal issue, but commitment only emerges sporadically in political discourse or policy documents, and/or the process of integration is confined to only two policy domains. There is any clear official vision or medium-term strategy to pursue.	The issue is framed as transversal, and it is linked both to a short and medium timeframe. Commitment is bipartisan and emerges both from time to time in institutional documents, political discourse and developed policies/instrument embraced. At least some transversal policy instrument has been developed. Cross-sectoral commitment encompass additional policy domains.	The transversal issue is among the priorities of the government and follow at least a medium term vision, while a long term strategy is under development. Commitment is evident in institutional documents political discourse, in different policy domains, and in new instruments developed and/or implemented. There is bipartisan agreement on the core of the transversal policy developed.	The transversal issue is a top priority of the government, and follows a medium and long-term vision. Commitment is evident in institutional documents, political discourse, and in the set of policy instrument embraced to implement developed integrated policies. There is bipartisan agreement on the core of the transversal policy developed.

Table 2.2 – A qualitative scale to assess PI in Political Commitment

Figure 2.4 – Policy Frames around ISM

TABLE 2.3 | Scale of integration

	absent	low	medium	high	full
actors' subsystem relations	Subsystems have no relations among each other, exception made for formal ones. There is one dominant subsystem, while others are indirectly involved. There is no information exchange between actors' subsystems. Each subsystem has different goals and frames of the transversal issue.	Beyond formal relations, actors' subsystems have sporadic relations among each other at the horizontal level. There may be one dominant subsystem but the indirect involvement of other subsystems is recognized. Information exchange is sporadic. Actors' subsystems have different policy goals and frame and they perceive consequent shortfalls, but act to preserve their own	Different actors' subsystems have formal and informal relations both at the horizontal and vertical level. Information exchange is constant. Actors' subsystems engage in adjusting their policy goals and frame to be coherent among different subsystems. There is clear division of roles, and the government push the system towards to reach cross-sectoral goal, including stakeholders. Ad hoc bodies have been established.	Different actors' subsystems have fruitful relations both at the vertical and horizontal level. Formally, there is no a dominant subsystem as the process of integration resulted in a new actors' subsystem which include all relevant players, including stakeholders. Information exchange is formal and informal, as well as cooperation, collaboration and coordination both horizontally and vertically. Shared goals and policy frame develop across different coalitions. Clear division of roles and responsibilities and ad hoc bodies works	All relevant actors' subsystems are involved in the ongoing process of integration both formally and informally, and each subsystem is aware of its own role. Clear division of roles and responsibilities both formally and informally. There is full information exchange, cooperation, collaboration and coordination among different subsystem both vertically and horizontally. They share policy goals in relation to the cross-cutting issue and frame it the same way.

Table 2.3 - A qualitative scale to assess PI in Actors' Subsystem relations

TABLE 2.4 | Scale of integration

	absent	low	medium	high	full
Policy goals and frames	Goals and frames are narrowly-oriented and refer to specific policy sectors, and they may conflict among each other. Actors belonging to one subsystem are not aware of such differences among goals and frames of different coalitions. Goals and frames also differs by level of policy making. Actors act to preserve their own frames and goals.	Goals and frames are narrowly oriented and refer to specific policy sectors, and they may conflict among each other also by level of policy making. Actors belonging to one subsystem do not share goals and frame by of other subsystems, and act to preserve their own, while they are aware of such differences.	A transversal goal is under development, but frames are still narrowly oriented, both between levels and policy domains. Different frames are present. However, actors belonging to one subsystems still act to preserve their own frame of the issue, while they are aware of negative externalities which block the process.	A transversal goal is present and it jointly developed across N policy sectors. A dominant shared frame is Shared Different actors' subsystems (horizontally and vertically). Opposite new contrasting frame may however emerge.	A transversal long term goal has been developed in light of the N policy sectors involved by the transversal issue, and actors share a dominant policy frame of the issue. Different actors' subsystems share them and jointly works to strengthen performance.

Table 2.4 - A qualitative scale to assess PI in Policy Goals and Frames

TABLE 2.5 | Scale of integration					
	absent	**low**	**medium**	**high**	**full**
Policy Instrument	Policy instruments are merely sectoral and they conflict among each other. The set of instruments derives by layering. Policy instruments have different and contrasting policy objectives.	Policy instruments are merely sectoral and they may conflict among each other, having different policy objectives. Basic cross-sectoral instrument have been developed	Some cross-sectoral sets of instrument are developed, and they take into account both multiple goals, policies and level of policy making. However, some instruments are sectoral-oriented and may contradict each other.	The set of instruments developed is cross-sectoral and allow to meet cross-sectoral goals. Policy instruments are coherent to multiple goals and levels, but relevant negative externalities are still in place	The set of instruments developed is cross-sectoral and allow to meet cross-sectoral goals. Policy instruments are coherent to multiple goals, policies and level of policy-making. Minor or desirable negative externalities may be present

Table 2.5- A qualitative scale to assess PI in Policy Instruments

Policy integration in in output

While previous scholar research does not offer many examples of empirical testing of PI in the field of higher education, and more specifically on HE internationalization or national policies related to ISM, some pioneer work left some guidelines. It is of relevance Pelkonen and al (2008) study of policy coordination capacity: they focused on vertical, horizontal and additional coordination channels, and looked at the role played by two national ministries, the one of education and the ministry of trade and industry, plus their several departments involved, and a number of other bodies such as the ministry of finance and the Finnish innovation Fund SITRA. This approach, unbound by specific field of policy, allowed them to address the domestic 'knowledge space', looking simultaneously to the dynamics in place in the three fields of higher education, science and technology.

Another crucial contribution is the first effort in the definition of how a 'fully fledge academic mobility policy' should look like, developed within the framework of the monitoring of Bologna Process, by Academic Cooperation Association (ACA) in 2012. These scholars argue that a 'fully-fledged' national policy/strategy on academic mobility should (i) clearly identify targets and types of mobility, diploma and degree mobility, funding schemes, (ii) levels of education and it should have regional targets, (iii) quantitative and qualitative targets/policy aims, rationales, linkages to other policy areas or national development, (iv) and name instruments and means.

Building on these studies, and more generally bridging contributions on policy literature (especially Underdal (1980), Briassoulis (2004) and Rayner and Howlett (2009) and on the international mobility of students (specifically the works by Ferencz and Watcher (2012), UNESCO (2013), and Colucci (2013)), I therefore identified four pillars that an integrated policy on international student mobility should include, and developed an ideal type of an IPISM shown by table 2.6. Each pillar can be qualitatively assessed thanks to a number of qualitative indicators, as shown also by table 2.7. Such tool allows an in-deep comparison within countries in different moments of time, as well as across different jurisdictions, and it also constitutes a self-assessment tool for policy makers.

TABLE 2.6 | IPISM Ideal-type

Pillars	Qualitative Indicators
Presence of clear and transversal policy goal and political commitment to it	ISM is transversally framed across sectors, and it is a national priority. ISM is transversally mentioned in political discourse and policy documents coherently to its cross cross-sectoral policy goal.
Establishment of ad hoc bodies and clear appointments of tasks to providers of ISM related services	An ad-hoc national body (or more) have been established to manage ISM. Competences have been clearly assigned to actors of ISM involved in ISM management. Actors involved engages in joint actions to promote ISM
Establishment of ad hoc transversal policy framework, technology and resources transversal to field involved	There is a shared definition of international student mobility which encompass its many declinations (for study, research, training, short and long term, by level of study); There is a clear cross sectoral policy framework for ISM, and of optimum levels of funding to promote the integrated policy. Full technology to map and assess the new policy is implemented There are several cross-sectoral initiative to promote ISM are in force.
Presence of coherence between ISM transversal goal and sectorial objectives, frames and instruments across policy levels and fields	ISM had been developed and implemented according to a jointly cross-sectorial policy goal, common across levels and fields. Success of the integrated policy do not harm specific policy domains Important negative externalities are identified and tackled

Table 2.6 – An idealtype of Integrated Policy on International Student Mobility (IPISM)

	Absence of IPISM	Developing IPISM	Developed IPISM
Presence of clear and transversal policy goals and political commitment to these goals	ISM is not framed transversally, and it is not a priority; Ism is not mentioned in political discourse, and emerged only in one policy sectors in policy documents	ISM is framed transversally in at least two policy field, but it is still not a country priority; Ism is sporadically mentioned in political discourse and policy documents in relation to the field involved. ISM may still have dominant goal and frame belonging to a single policy field but new transversal goals are being developed	ISM is transversally framed across sectors, and it is a national priority. ISM is transversally mentioned in political discourse and policy documents, and it has a clear cross-sectoral policy goals.
Presence of coherence in goals, frames and instruments across policy levels and fields	There is no coherence in different policy sectors and fields around ISM, and actors may have different and/or contrasting goals and frames of ISM; Policy instruments are sectoral oriented and the may harm each other	Coherence among goals and frames is present in the sense that both goals and frames are compatible and do not contracting each other's, but important differences in actors' frames remain relevant across both policy making levels and fields. Some new cross-sectoral instruments are developed, but substantial contradictions between sectoral oriented instruments around ISM are present.	ISM had been developed and implemented according to jointly cross-sectorial policy goals, common across levels and fields. Success of the integrated policy do not harm specific policy domains, and important negative externalities of the integrated policy, which have been identified and tackled by domestic actors.
Establishment of ad hoc transversal regulation, technology and resources transversal to field involved	The policy framework around ISM is the result of a number of sectorial oriented policies and normative, and they may also be in contradiction among each other. There is important lack of resource to develop ISM and the basic technology to map and assess the phenomenon is missing	Cross-sectoral legislation around ISM is being developed for its promotion and implementation; Additional resources are allocated to ISM in the field involved, and adequate technology to map and assess the phenomenon is under development. Also a definition of international student mobility which encompass its many declinations is under development.	There is a clear cross sectoral policy framework for ISM, and of optimum levels of funding to promote the integrated policy. Full technology to map and assess the new policy is implemented, and there are several cross-sectoral initiative to promote ISM are in force.
Establishment of ad hoc bodies/providers of mobility and fruitful relations among actors by level and fields	There is no ad hoc body established to tackle ISM promotion and development; domestic actors do not cooperate and they have different of contrasting frames of the issue. They may also pursue different goals around ISM.	At least an ad hoc body to promote ISM had been established. Actors' engage in a common effort to coordinate, collaborate ad cooperate among each other's, both by field and levels, but important problems to reach fruitful relations are in place.	Different ad-hoc bodies have been established or appointed to foster the development, promotion of ISM and related research. Actor's shares policy goals and frames and engage in a fruitful and efficacious joint efforts to strengthen the performance of the integrated policy.
Source: elaboration of the author			

Table 2.7 - IPISM framework for assessment

2.3. Research design: from theory to empirical analysis

2.3.1 Method

The framework is tested following an historical comparative analysis and it is based on documents, expert interviews and descriptive statistics. The principal method of analysis has been document analysis. The qualitative method chosen to test this framework has been obliged in a way by the many shortcoming of data collection around the ISM phenomena, of which the dearth of standard quantitative definition of international students is only the most eloquent example. This is however only one of the reasons why the research design of this dissertation has been developed embracing a qualitative approach. In fact, the latter allows to grasp in-deep underlying dynamics of the policy making domestic process, and it appears the most solid one to test a preliminary analytical framework which engage in the effort to systematize our understanding and explanatory capacity about PI. As it will be discussed in the last pages of this research, this also appear as a necessary step which may pose the playground to further quantitative research on PI, which is currently very rare.

In order to respond to the two research questions driving the research effort, PI is assessed in three different way. In the first place, the evidence collected is presented by Chapters III and IV, focused respectively on Australia and Italy. Both chapters provide an introductory overview of the country domestic context, and a cross-sectoral policy reconstruction of ISM development of the timeframe under analysis. Moreover, they extensively discussed policy development in each of the policy domains taken into account, and the way this can be linked to ISM specific policy development. Chapter V presents the analysis, beginning with a preliminary assessment of integration within policy field, and conclude with a direct comparison of the extent of PI reached in time one in the two countries. At the core of the chapter, the process of policy integration is then assessed comparatively as according to the six dimensions of policy integration illustrated above, setting the ground for the validation of the expectations of the framework.

2.3.2 Small N Case Selection and Timeframe under analysis

I test my framework thanks to a comparative analysis of Australia and Italy. The selection of cases followed several stage, as the focus of the thesis implied to follow clear criteria also concerning the phenomenon of ISM. Ankar (2020) points out that a researcher does not have to 'be necessarily confronted with the choice of applying' a most similar or a most different system design, given that combinations of the two methods have been developed over the time and these strategies can be combined'. For what regard this dissertation, for example, the two countries have been selected basing on the differences only in output of the dependent variable, notably policy integration in process and output, so to allow the investigation of the reasons why such differences occurred.

This meant the universe of possible case to be selected coincided with all those cases having a different process and output of PI in relation to ISM national policies at time one of the analysis, which translated in a very wide sample of countries. I therefore decided to select two countries which differ not only with strict reference to the dependent variable, but also with regards to the development of ISM at the country level during time 1. I then excluded non-democratic regimes from the analysis, given the inclusion of sensible policy fields such as immigration and foreign policy and the necessity to reach high level policy experts. Second, I selected countries comparable at the level of national policies, and therefore excluded federal ones such as Germany, where the state level holds important powers in the domain of higher education. Third, so to control differences in output which may be biased by intrinsic ISM character, I looked for a front-runner and a laggard country. Given that both mobility and integration literature suffer by geographical bias, these countries had to belong to two different geographical areas and not to be both signature countries of the Bologna Process or the GATS agreements. Consequently, I selected Australia and Italy, since they constitute to 'extreme' countries, being respectively a laggard and a frontrunner countries of western developed countries.

After a first common phase where cooperation and foreign aid were at the center of the discourse about ISM in both countries, Australia began to approach student mobility as a profitable source of revenue to fund its higher education, moving 'from aid to trade'. The country become a global front-runner and international education became its third larger export sector, after iron ore and coal (ABS 2019). Italy, where mobility is strongly interlinked to the European cooperation efforts ongoing in the region since the late sixties, lost instead its attractiveness to foreign students and it currently suffers to send abroad its own (OCED 2012), becoming a laggard in the international panorama. Put it differently, Italy was a frontrunner in student mobility in the early eighties, when Australia was still a strongly protected and in-ward looking countries, a situation currently reversed.

On a more theoretical note, the choice of the case study selected also help to bridge the policy strand developed around the concepts of policy integration and the very close ones discussed at the beginning of the chapter, following the call suggested by Trein et al (2018) to let these literature to 'tack among each other'. As introduced, Italy is in fact usually an European cases selected to explore the concept of policy integration, while Australia has been the focus of research exploring the whole of government approach.

A span of about forty years, from the early eighties until the Covid-19 outbreak, is the timeframe considered by this analysis. The span of time selected overcome of large range the minimum amount necessary to provide valid policy analysis, and it is motivated by a number of reasons. In the first place, for both countries, the eighties have been selected as starting point of a transformation, which taken both countries to approach mobility in a different way than in the period following the end of the second world war. Those years are indeed widely remembered as the cradle of the many and profound changes higher education experience worldwide, which marked the beginning of cooperation in higher education between national government, in the wake of a more globalized and more interconnected world. International education largely gained the agenda of policy makers beyond the national level, and cooperation within the field of education reached extent barely unthinkable until the aftermath of the third wave of globalization. The eighties have also been the cradle of the NPM ideas, which, as discussed in the previous section, brought to excessive specialization, to which policy integration aim to respond to. It is in this background environment that the phenomenon of student mobility began to grow worldwide - massively and constantly, reaching very high rate of growth, to the extent of becoming – in some countries – a necessary and crucial source of income for the higher education institutions.

2.3.3 *Choice of transversal issue and of policy fields analyzed*

As introduced by the former chapter, the study of PI in public policy has been confined around environmental policies, and only more recently also in fields such as innovation and research and development policies. Only few authors addressed the field of HE, and these efforts approached the research puzzle with different concepts as discussed at the beginning of the chapter.

The previous chapter discussed the extent to which, despite the worldwide salience of ISM in political discourse, public policies that promote and manage student mobility has not been assessed in policy studies, where the discussion has been focused on more general issue such as the shift in governance of higher education. Further, ISM has never been approached as a puzzle of policy integration, despite public policies regulating it must be cross-sectoral by definition.

Apart for the obvious higher education domain, the other selected (immigration, foreign policy and trade & labor market) domains emerged as discussed by chapter I the fundamental sectors that an ISM policy should cut across (despite additional domains could be added, such as welfare policies, research and development, and tourism to name some of them). There may be no integrated policies on ISM if the national policies are not aligned between the fields of higher education and immigration at least. The inclusion of the trade and labor policy domains relies instead in its salience just aforementioned and the evidence emerged by the literature linking ISM to the labor market domain. This choice is justified also in light of the fact that governments (of western countries) experience simultaneously

the necessity of keeping their grip on their national education system while increasing its international outlook and its attractiveness. Moreover, given the precarious equilibrium of international affairs, they also experience the necessity to tighten control on visa regulations. Further, they also experience skilled labor force shortages, or unemployment, and it is largely known the extent to which developed countries suffer aging population and low fertility rate, factors that the literature directly linked to the international mobility of students in higher education. Therefore, it is clear why these policy sectors should be included in the study of the integration process. As discussed in chapter one, the policy domains selected are also those implied by the several approaches to ISM illustrated by the OECD.

Some may argue that the framework developed could have be tested taking the case study of Academic Mobility (AM) rather than the more confined phenomenon of international student mobility. Few observation motivate this choice. In the first place, ISM salience is also due to their relevance in economic terms. Analyzing the PI process around ISM allows therefore to investigate more carefully the relations among higher education and educational export in the first place, whose importance has been already stressed by chapter I. At the same time, testing the developed framework on the issue of AM would have implied to include also the research and development and innovation policy domains, expanding therefore the scope of this research beyond its feasibility. In conclusion, the choice of ISM as transversal issue on which test the developed framework appears the most solid choice to test the analytical framework developed.

There is currently any available qualitative or quantitative worldwide shared definition of who is an international mobile students. International organization follow definitions not shared by the large majority of states, which developed a wide range of definition spanning from the inclusion of second and third generation of immigrants to students attending virtual degrees offshore. In this thesis, I rely in the definition provided by the OCED, who specify an international students is a students who is not resident in the country of studying and received its prior education in another country.

With its focus on ISM, this dissertation also includes outgoing mobile students, meaning the comparative analysis of national policy around ISM concentrates transversally on inbound and outbound students. Notably, those who left Australia and Italy and those who arrived in these countries are considered by the analysis. This choice is motivated in the very first place in light of the focus on policy integration of this manuscript, which is investigated looking to a transversal issue such as ISM. While this choice surely add complexity to the research, it appeared coherent to includes both flows that together makes up the transversal phenomenon taken as a puzzle of policy integration. Further, this choice also add insights to more ISM-focused literature, given that available research focus either on one or the other flow, rather than on the overall phenomenon.

2.3.4 *Sources*

Scholar and grey literature, institutional policy documents, experts' interviews and descriptive statistics constitute the kind of sources on which this research has been drawn. This paragraph sheds lights on the method that have been used to define the set of data collected and on which the analysis is based.

The phase of gathering data followed a multi-stage process. A first selective review of high quality scholar literature and key documents related to the evolution of domestic policies related to ISM for each country has been retrieved in the first place. Following relevant quotations included within bibliographies, the sample has been integrated until the criterion of saturation has been reach, consistently expanding the bibliography during fieldwork.

A first and provisional sample of expert to be interviews in the two countries has been constructed basing on this material, selecting the members of key committees/involved by international student mobility in the past, often also recurring to web archives, to which current members of key national bodies and organization involved by ISM have been then included in the sample. This provisional sample has been constructed taking care of balancing according to periods

of involvement of experts, their belonging to governmental bodies and stakeholders' organizations, the position held within their organization, plus the policy domain of main interest. The final sample includes 38 experts and two international students, with 22 interview held in Australia and 18 in Italy. Annex II bis report the list of interviewed included and their role, unless where the interview has been agreed (semi) anonymously.

The expert sample has been expanded as according the snowball effect until the criterion of saturation has been met during fieldwork. Interviews constitutes primary source of evidence and have been extensively used to reconstruct each case study for the entire period of time covered by the research. In light of the dearth of literature focusing transversally on student mobility, interviews have been the key to fully understand the different ongoing process of development both within and across policy domains. With specific regards to the Italian case, policy literature on mobility development is very scarce, at least beyond the specific framework of the BP and the Erasmus. This is also true concerning Australia outbound mobility, where material interview has been a precondition to re-construct the overall policy development. More generally, this is especially true for dynamics ongoing in the very early period (1980-2000) and the most recent ones (after 2012). Interview material has been further coded as according to the operationalization illustrated to test the framework for a number of dimensions of policy integration in process, and notably the ones of policy frames and goals, of actors' relations, on the institutional context and in political commitment.

Statistical data have been retrieve mostly thanks to open source datasets, as well as drawing on secondary source where primary were not available. Archive material has been also collected during fieldwork in different places[4], and it has been crucial to the reconstruction of the case study in the pre-digital period, notably the span of time between 1980 and 1999. Such material is mostly of governmental and institutional nature, and includes bills, laws, reports, telegrams and other type of printed correspondence by a range number of bodies, as well as material from milestone federal commissions of salience for the policies under analysis for the Australian case, while Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) media content constitute the majority of this material in Italy. Additional unpublished material has been collected during fieldwork. Interviewed experts also suggested a relevant number of additional policy documents, reports, institutional and-non media release, books, discourses and a range of additional policy literature.

The final set of data used and analyzed is therefore composed by grey literature, audiovisual material, media releases, newspapers and journals articles, archive material, descriptive statistics, and above all by scholar literature, policy documents and expert interviews.

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[4] In particular, the Australian National Archives, the Australian National Library, the National Australian University, the National Library in Florence.

3. Chapter III | Case study: Australia

3 Introduction

The Commonwealth of Australia is a federal country located in the southern hemisphere 'at the edge of the world', in between the Pacific, Indian and Artic oceans. It covers an area of 7.7 million square kilometres, which is inhabited just by slightly more than 25 million people (ABS 2019 online). To have a point of reference, Australia has twice the territory of the European Union while its population is about the same of those of Romania and Slovakia combined (EP 2020). The 67% of Australian inhabitants live moreover in its coastline, and more precisely in the cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, Adelaide, Perth, Brisbane and Darwin. Slightly less than one million out of those 25 are international students enrolled at an Australian post-secondary education provider: to put it differently, one out of 25 person in Australia is an international student.

Australia is located very near to the 'new' centre global of economic growth, and it shares its time zone with large part of the South East Asia, close by to a number of the most populous countries of the world such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and above all China and India. Currently, Australia is a truly multicultural country, with about one third of its population born overseas, and a high proportion of those born in China and India (ABSb 2017). Over 300 languages are spoken into Australia, and about one fifth of Australians spoke a language other than English at home. About the half of the population was born overseas, or has at least a parent born outside Australia (ABSb 2017).

As we shall see throughout the entire chapter, its European and Anglo-Saxon heritage and its geographical collocation close to Asia decisively affected the history of Australia. Since the late seventies, when the White Australia Policy (WAP) was abolished, connections to the region begun to grow, and they lie at the bottom of the extraordinary economic performance of Australia in the last thirty years, altered only very recently by the Covid-19 outbreak. After the 2008 financial crisis, noting the explosion of China's steel production, Coleman (2016, 17) even asked himself: 'had the lucky country' ever got luckier?'. Yet, and especially in geo-political terms, Australia currently holds a peculiar position interrelated with both the western world and South East Asia, where a contradictory line divides its military and economic interests. The federation has been found in 1901 by the six states and two territories once colonies of the British empire. The country is equipped with a functioning constitutional monarchy, a strong economy and it is among the wealthier countries of the world, with the Human Right Watch (2020) Report stating that Australia has 'a vibrant multicultural democracy with robust institutions'.

3.1 Setting the context: Australia

3.1.1 Institutional policy-context

Wanna and Woods (2016, 1) state clear that 'Australia can vaunt a 'long history of inventive' public policies, since when 'Australasian colonies were 'social incubators' and wellsprings of

pioneering 'state experiments''. The influence of the motherland is still evident, in the first place in light of the country belonging to the Commonwealth and to the Commonwealth realms, a group of fifth teen countries which recognise Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II as their Head of State (EP 2020, PEO nd). Formally, the Constitution states that the Queen has the executive power in her hands, but as suggested by the Australian Department of Parliamentary Service (nd a), a more realistic approach to understand the political Australian system enlighten how the executive power is in fact in the hands of the Australian Prime minister and of the cabinet.

Australia has a mixed system of government, being a representative democracy and a constitutional monarchy (PEO nd b). Australian Constitution foresees three main powers – the legislative, the executive and the judiciary (PEO b)). It is an example of representative democracy, and voting is compulsory, beside for certain states (EP 2020). The separation of powers is not complete, as both the cabinets, the prime minister and the governor-general, are part of the parliament and of the executive powers, and as such the government is accountable and responsible to the parliament (EP 2020). As a consequence, the Australian federalism currently miss 'one of the pivotal veto points of the American System (Castles and Uhr 2005, 73)'.

The Australian Constitution foresees different levels of government (PEO nd). The federal parliament is located in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, and each state and territory of the Commonwealth has its own parliament and Constitution. Australian Constitutions does not mention however the over 500 local Australian councils (PEO 2021), which are located in regionals or rural areas for about the 60% of cases (EP 2020). There is wide variety in their organization as they follow different normative framework set up by states, which have the power to overrule local council decisions (EP 2020). Over the 70% of policy areas involves both the federal and the state governments, while only the 13% of areas are exclusive competences of the Commonwealth (EP 2020). The federal government is competent for monetary policy, defence, immigration and communication, while state governments are in charge of transports, housing policies, and hospitals (PEO 2021).

When the Commonwealth was established, it has been given a specific list of power, while all those remaining were to rest to Australian states, in the effort to mitigate the Federation influence (Wanna and Woods 2016). As reported by the DPS (2006), Australian Founders attempted to protect as much as possible state powers, as the establishment of the Senate with a fixed number of seats testify in the first place. Although so, it is clear that the federation acquired more power over the time, expanding its scope of actions. Moreover, article 109 of the Australian constitution, states that 'when a law of a state is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of inconsistency, be invalid'. While issues may be solved cooperatively 'far more typically, resolution is a matter of Commonwealth prevailing in the argument, irrespective of the views of any particular state (DPS 2006, 8)'. Further, the Australian Constitution foreseen that the Commonwealth has the power to make laws concerning the 'execution of any power' as per section 51 xxiiiA (DPS 2000, Jackson 2003). It is the so called 'matter accidental', on which the government also relied for the profound change within the HE domain, as we shall in section 3.3.1. The DPS (2006, 4) summarizes as 'the High Court's treatment of the words 'with respect to' has broadened each of the powers fractionally 'by attaching an 'incidental' power to them to do anything that it is necessary to make the main power fully effective'. Moreover, it shall be noted that despite in the Senate there is a fixed number of twelve seats for each state (EP 2020), the role of the Australian Senate has been one of a party 'house' rather than a 'state' house, with political parties responding more to political than territorial logic (Castles and Uhr 2005).

Castles and Uhr (2005) underline that, among the imperatives that brought Australian colonies to go for federation instead of unity, the peculiarities of the Australian context should be taken into account, as in great contrast with other federation, Australian colonies had a quite homogeneous population which shared both religion, language and culture. The authors retrace the motivations in geographical reasons, institutional and economic ones, also naming an 'institutional inertia' rather than ideological driven motivations. Bruges (2006) also raises this point, highlighting the relation between the enormous size of the country and the small one of its population, remarking

how the theme of isolation is something that concerned Australian population in its entirety. Bruges (2006, 86) reminds also Holmes and Sharman reference to this aspect as the ''historical residues' of Australian federalism. Autonomy was important as it recognized the idiosyncratic differences of the many settlements in the late nineteenth century, but the need of a central administration was made necessary given the harsh conditions of inland Australia and the uncertainty of economic development due to their geographical isolation. According to Burges (2006, 87), in conclusion, these two authors demonstrate that 'Australia's geography and economic development, […] effectively paved the way for 'a federal rather than a unitary national political system'. In sum, while the federation has never been a concept which 'conquered' the southern colonies' population, it appeared to be the most feasible option for independence.

Downey and Myers (2020,1) wrote that 'for simplicity', federalism may be thought as a system of government where preference for some joint actions at the national level are balances with preferences for action at lower level of 'self-government of constituent unites for other purposes'. Fenna (2007) distinguishes the American, Canadian and Australian federalism from other case such as Germany, as the division of powers follow a legislative rather than an administrative approach. In contrast with Germany, in fact, in Australia the division of powers are divided by areas of competences, rather than a framework where the federal government set the main framework which will be then implemented and administered by states. This happened, according to the author, 'on the presumption that the national government could be restricted to areas of a specifically 'national' character (Fenna 2007, 7)'. Currently, however 'it might be argued that Australian federalism has metamorphosed into something akin to the German model in the way powers are divided […]. Australia has lost the defining qualities of the legislative model but not acquired of the administrative model (Fenna 2007, 7)'.

Colino (2013 in Capano 2014), in its typology mixing the two dimension of formal framework and federal relations, considered instead Australia as a case of 'balanced federalism', since characterized by a disintegrated formal framework and centripetal federal relations. Using Painter's word, Australia could be defined as embracing 'a mixed system [of federalism] where co-ordinate parliamentary governments share overlapping functions, and are forced to co-operate while seeking to preserve an arm's length existence (Painter 2000, 132)'. The author recognize however that the federal government is the main actor in the Australian system, especially since the Commonwealth is in charge of taxation, both for sale, corporations and income (Painter 2000). Downey and Meyers (2020,1) focused on this 'distorted vertical fiscal imbalance', and argued instead this model resemble 'very much' executive federalism, as the Commonwealth dominance grew acquired 'control over taxation and spending […] out of [the] broad interpretation of key enumerated powers' the federal government theoretically have. Fenna (2007) also reminds that vertical imbalance has been a key characteristics since the very early days of the federation, a matter which became 'overwhelming' following a 1942 court sentences which denied states to charge a tax on local sales. Currently, he notes, states are dependent on the Commonwealth for more than the half of their needs.

For Painter (2000), the third way of 'collaborative co-ordination' emerged in the Australian federal system since when the country begun to experience pressure due to both globalization and technological development. Beginning with Hawke initiative of 'co-operative federalism' for a 'new partnership', this process brought to the establishment of the Council of Australian Government (COAG) and of a series of Special Premiers' Conferences (SPC). Wanna and Woods (2016,2) argue instead that a form of executive federalism is in place although 'unsupported by any constitutional authority', and note how this approach 'evolved into an institution – the GOAG'. Also Castles and Uhr (2005) note that the COAG emerged in response to the 'national government's virtual monopoly of direct taxation revenues (Castles and Uhr 2005, 102)', and it represented as such an attempt to lock the increasing powers of the federal government into a new framework of federal dynamics. GOAG decisions, however, required unanimity, and, as according to Painter (2000), state government

preferred a number of times to avoid impasse and look forward compromises, or to put it more sharply, 'to fight another day'.

The COAG has been the most important body of intergovernmental cooperation until very recently, with the competence of handle issues of national relevance and those requiring particular coordinated action (EU2 2020), supported by a number of inter-jurisdictional and ministerial level councils which constituted the COAG Council System (COAG 2021) . These council were in charge to develop policy reforms and policy advice, but it main objective was the one to facilitate vertical connections between the federal and the states level of policy making rather than being an intergovernmental forum providing 'a horizontal basis to states to coordinate and communicate their own priorities (Downey and Meyers 2020,6)'. Fenna (2007), to this regard, noted that GOAG is more something which occur rather than exist, an institution where states does not eventually have any kind of veto power. In 2020, the GOAG was suppressed and a newly formed National Federation Reform Council (NFRC) was created: the latter should meet annually, and it is a part of the coordinated response the Australian government developed around the Covid-19 crisis (DPMC 2020). Downey and Meyers (2020) note however that its reform is 'simply a rebranding of the GOAG', given that the main difference among the two bodies is the fact the newest does not include the President of the Australian Local Government Association.

Painter (200) concludes its analysis on the evolution of Australian federal dynamics pointing out to 'a positive sum outcomes for the collectivist of executives. Even if in the process a particular government has lost exclusive possession of a slide of turf, the result is that the field on which they all play is enlarged (Painter 2000, 139)'. More sharply, Coleman (2016, 2) list 'a façade federalism, where an appearance of a federal structure belies the reality of a unitary state' as one of the most salient characteristics of Australian exceptionalism. Fenna (2007) concludes instead that 'there is general agreement among commentators that Australia is one of the most, if not the most, centralized of all the established federations (Fenna 2004, 298)', and continues that 'federalists – by which I mean those individuals who champion the cause of federalism, and, in this context, the role of the states – point to the revival federalism has enjoyed around the world in recent years with its sorry state in Australia (Fenna 2004, 299)'. Fenna (2007) note also the paradox according to which unitary states seems to follow a path to increasing decentralization, federal states are not: we shall see in the next chapter how the institutional domestic context in Italy eventually shows opposite trends.

Another issue of concerns in relations to Australian vertical multi-level governance dynamics regards Australian local governments, which, as introduced are not mentioned by Australian Constitution.The most common kind of local governments are city councils in both metropolitan and rural areas, and they 'have a great deal of autonomy', while they depend upon their state legislation according to which they also may be abolished (Megarrity 2007).

Their role has been barely neglectable until the end of the second world war, when the scope of their action begun to increase and the Whitlam government got convinced to achieve some policy goals with local governments, the so called 'regional focus' (Megarrity 2007). The following right government dismantled this policy, but the path of financial funding became sort of institutionalized and also raised the profile of such governments, which in fact found constitutional recognition by Australian states and Territory during the seventies and the eighties (Megarrity 2010). The Hawke government also proposed another referendum proposing again –after 1974 –to constitutionally recognize local governments, but the attempt failed one more time. Support to this issue continued during the Howard decade, to became more salient following the Queensland reduction of its local council of more than a half without public consultation (Megarrity 1974). With the Rudd government, a new phase of relationship with local government begun (Grand and Drew 2017), in the first place given the establishment of the Australian Council of Local Government (ACLG), which included representative from each of them, looking to establish a 'genuine dialogue' (Grand and Dew 2017). However, soon after the Abbot government distanced itself by local governments, and it also worked to white papers about the reform of the federation, in turn abandoned however by the Turnbull Government in 2016 (Grand and Drew 2017).

Policy problems to which they must respond become however more complex, ranging from water services to growing pressure for rails and housing infrastructure, as an higher density of population requires, a matter that the DPS (2006) point out as one of the few weaknesses of the Australian system. Megarrity (2007) also point out to the increasing dissatisfaction emerged around Australian local government, despite a relevant attachment of residence to local areas. As briefly shown above, Grant and Drew (2017) explain the way the 'great game' of federalism has been always played at the expenses of local governments, which are in between the federal government as well as the local level, and despite the many attempt to be solved, it currently rest in a situation of impasse.

Wanna and Woods (2016) focused on the many different channels of coordination within and between governments in Australia. Beyond the GOAG, discussed above, inter-departmental committee (IDC) occupy surely a very important place among these channels, as they represent the venue where different departments can provide inputs and feedbacks on matter of common interests (Wanna and Woods 2016): their role may range by being consultative forum to 'implementation liaison coordinators', with some of them also working as 'turf protection mechanisms'. The Productivity Commission, for example, is a 'specialist public policy inquiry organization', created in 1998 and with a parliamentary act, and it is independent by the government (Wanna and Woods 2016). Wanna and Woods (2016) also focus writes that among the features of the 'Australian landscape for public policy decision-making', its long history of review is worth to be discussed. Commission reviews may have different degrees of independence among them, which includes various bodies such as committees, review panels, working groups (Regan 2014). The latter may also be temporary or permanent, and they do cover a very range of issues. In its review of reviews, Regan (2014) distinguishes mainly between internal and external governmental reviews and external non-governmental reviews. Among the first categories can be places by way of example green and white papers, while, in the second ones permanent advisory bodies (such as the Productivity Commission). The latter, instead, are usually run by research institute or private consultancies. Wanna and Woods (2016) also highlights that their work may vary a lot both in scope and in the depth of analysis undertaken, and their impact on the public policy process may also vary from being neglectable to be substantial.

3.1.2 Bureaucracy

Another important aspect to be taken into consideration when addressing the institutional context of Australia is bureaucracy. Dunleavy and Evans (2019) note that the Australian Public Service system has developed as a 'generalist model', strongly influenced by the British experience: 'it follow the lower-profile 'professional bureaucracy' path that Silberman argues characterizes the British and American types of civil service system (Dunleavy and Evans 2019, 3). As the author underlines, the APS workforce socialization happened mostly thought university education, and the system also 'evolved as a generalist-dominated set-up-closely responsive to ministerial and political directions (Dunleavy and Evans 2019,3)'. Davies (1964 in Walter 1999, 2), in its account of the sixties, argued that Australia 'have a characteristic talent for bureaucracy'. Nerchecote (2016) reminds how a visitor from France in 1800s observed a 'socialisme sans doctrine' in Australia, and Hancock revealing phrase according to which Australian saw the state as a 'vast public utility'. Nerchecote (2016) highlights the properties of bureaucracy, interrelated both with uniformity and standardization, and he even referred to the Australian experience as one of administrative Federalism.
The Australian Parliamentary Department (2010) provides a very extensive overview of the process of evolution of Australian Public Service (APS) since the-mid seventies. Until then, Australian bureaucracy was marked by an emphasis of process and inputs, on male domination, security of employment, central control and about a monopoly around policy advise. As the department shows, things begun to change in the seventies, when a number of issues begun to make manifest the constrains of the Australian Public Services (APD 2010). A crucial moment for the Australian Public

Services has been the Royal Commission established in 1974 by the Prime Minister, to be led by Coobs, which will bring to major changes to the APS already since the following year (APD 2010). Following such review, intervention to Australian reform brought to create toward more flexible processes a to a stronger emphasis on efficiency, to a more diverse workforce and type of contract embraced, as well as to a more control on bureaucracy by politics (APD 2010). The decline in the number of personnel employed was a part of the restructuration of the public service to increase its efficiency, and its went on through the entire eighties and nineties (APS 2010). The main theme was at the time the one 'to let the managers manage' (Demircioglu 2019). After that period, the overall number begun to grow again to reach its peak in 2012, as we shall see below.

Even after the implementation of the major reform to the APS, the issue of Australian bureaucracy was high in the political agenda. In the 1999, the Minister for Industrial Relation argued that employees at the APS should have been free to innovate, and that hierarchies and had to be replaced by far more flexible framework (Demircioglu 2019). The Public Service Act and the Parliamentary Service Act entered in force and sanctioned the separation of parliamentary departments from those of the public service ones. Moreover, these act also foreseen a number of innovations such as codes of conduct, employment equity, the prohibition of patronage, equity and both collective and individual employment contracts (APD 2010).

Currently, APS (2020) counts slightly less than 148,000 employee, rising almost of the three per cent if compared to 2019. The APS reached its peak of employee in 2012, and have fallen since then by 11.1 percentage points. Over the half of workers in Australian public administration have a age between 30 and 49 years old, a percentage which overcomes the sixty per cent if summed to workers of 30 years or younger. Almost the sixty per cent of employees are female, over the twenty per cent was born overseas, and slight less than one in six workers are employed part time. The Australian public service is strongly concentrated in the Australian Capital Territory (almost the 40%), and more generally within the in New South Wales and Victoria (these three hosts the 72.8% of the total APS workforce). The norther territory, instead, host the 1,2%, and Western Australia the 4,6.

Australian Public Service has been often said to be characterized by feature promoting innovation as noted by Demircioglu (2019,1), that writes how 'Australian public, politicians and bureaucrats have long perceived innovation as important'. The author notes that the country's very large size and its collocation lies at the bottom of the early realization that Australian dependency on primary goods was not an optimum solution for the country, and, as a consequences, Australian governments have identified the need to diversify making of innovation a crucial aspect of domestic health (Demircioglu 2019).
Coleman (2016) wrote that public servant in Australia holds a public profile and prestige that in many other countries only central bankers may hope to have, and he also notes that only in Australia the post war period saw the 'Seven Dwarfs'. Dunleavy and Evans (2020) found that innovation – especially in the form of digital changes- have been driver of change for the Australian APS, as for every aspect of domestic governance. The authors however note that, while the it is currently clear that the implementation agenda is currently set by the government, the political impetus and impact on Australian APS may also drive APS departments and agencies to move toward short terms goals, to even be too reactive.

3.1.3 Political System and Political Culture(s)

Australia never knew a moment in which Australians were determined to change (Marginson et al 2010)', and the biggest cleavage to be highlight in Australia is surely the one between the Australia 'immigrants' and indigenous populations (see EP 2020).

Kane (nd) notes that Australian democracy appear to be of a very high quality if assessed with the five procedural dimension identified by Diamond and Morlino (2005 in Kane (nd). He also noted that the Australian party system has been 'remarkable' stable since its very early foundations, despite turbulence occurred, and it provides civil and political freedom as well as it combine political

equity with 'a traditional emphasis on social and economic equality (Kane nd, 2). Paul Reynolds (2007) highlights to main factors from which the Australian party system has profited, notably, the facts that vote in Australia is compulsory and the public funding system which guarantee more room for action for those that could do otherwise.

As introduced, Hancock wrote in 1930 that Australian democracy has since ever looked to the State as a 'vast public utility', whose aim is the one to provide the maximum of possible happiness, a sort of instrumental view of government having a paternalistic role. Colins, in 1985, underlined the importance of positivism in Australian political culture, together to legalism and utilitarianism (Bean 1993). As Bean shows, Hancock attempted to reconcile the two conflicting 'reputations' of Australians, notably individualism and collectivism, as its sentence 'to the Australians, the State means collective power at the service of individualists rights (Hancock 1930 in Bean 1993, 4)' testifies. Others important features historically recognized in Australian political cultures are the one around 'its authoritarian or conformist nature, and concerns around conservatism and radicalism (Bean 1993). Altman (1988) argued that individualism grew in Australian political culture at the expenses of other traditional values such as class, family and religion (in Zappala 1988). Kane (nd) writes that many noted the superficial attachment of Australians to democracy, despite its very early constituency and hallmarks such as the universal franchise: its left party was also one of the first one to drop socialism out, embracing a quite positive approach to competition with Keating (Kane nd).

Coherently to the discussion presented above about the Australian institutional domestic context, it shall no surprise the emergence ever since of a discussion around the two faces of regionalism, between cities and the country as well as the one between the federal and the state levels (Beans 1993). Other accounts of Australian political cultures also takes into account the massive immigration flows that permeated Australia since several decades, especially the one of NESB immigrants (See Zappala 1998), highlighting also the wide concept of 'political culture' and the way more political culture*s* may co-exists.

Australian party system has been ever since characterized by a stable two party system, lately showing the 'Coalition' on the one side and the labor party on the other. To the sake of precision, the system could it actually be considered as a two-and-an-half party system, as the National Country Party, widely known as 'the National' has never be relevant at the federal level where it governs together to the Liberal Party (Kane nd). The latter has been funded in 1909, while the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was established back in 1891 (Kane nd). As she note, the party system has been therefore characterized by the traditional cleavage around capital and workers as it happened in most of Europe (Kane nd). However, 'more important than any strong attachment to ideology, whether of Left of Right, was the goal of development (Kane nd, 6)'. Over the time, and especially since the Keating mandate, the boundaries of among the two Australian main parties blurred, as they eventually embraced an economic policy very similar to each other and they became catch all parties. A relevant recent important moment for Australian party system was 1999, when the One Nation Party risen at the elections. According to Kane (nd), however, this episode only shows the strengths of Australian system, which indeed kept resisted the rise of One Nation.

Coleman (2016) count 'it's essential complete bipartisan support' in the list of Australian exceptionalism, quoting Collins (1985) when he noted that competitors offered mostly different receipts made by the same ideological ingredients. Also Reynolds (2007) notes the durability of the Australian party system, pointing however out a the consequent question: Pragmatism for what?. In conclusion, Wanna and Woods (2016) note that despite the common sense of Australian success story, in the last decades a sense of institution failing at governing is spreading. The authors note that many argued that political parties are always more concerned with opinion pools, media opinion and about 'the reactions of any looser from policy change'. To cut a story long short, they highlights that also the Australian system suffer by the short electoral cycles and the pressure of consensus, pointing out to sub-optimal (Wanna and Woods 2016).

3.2 Cross-sectoral policy development

3.2.1 Early years of mobility and consequent phases of policy development

The phases of development identified by the cross-sectoral reconstruction of Australian policy development around ISM matches to a certain extent the ones presented by Gallagher (2011), who distinguishes seven distinct phases the Australian international education history since the Federation until around 2010: a detached phase, soft power, drift, trade, two step migration, exposed and corrective. Gallagher (2001) focused however of the more general development of Australia international education, while we shall focus on this chapter on the more restricted space of international student mobility related policy. As he argued, we shall see how each of the phase identified in the policy development around ISM sheds light of the increasing number of domestic departments and their interest in different moment of times, 'reflecting the growing multitude of overlapping (and sometimes competing) government different policy foci Gallagher (2011, 115)'.

As introduced by chapter II, this chapter's section presents policy development historically, within and across policy domains, more carefully analysing each of the phases presented in this introductory overview. Five main phases of development have been identified, and notably i) the introduction of the market in HE, ii) a phase of flows containment and policy adjustments following the China crisis of 1989, iii) the period of direct linkage of ISM to permanent migration in the country, and finally iv) the recent phase of ISM framed as a core of Australian diplomatic strategy. Table 3.1 provides additional insights highlighting the several turning points of this story, setting the grounds for the analysis illustrated by chapter five.

The milestone of this Australian history is the introduction of the full fee policy for overseas students by the Labor government in the mid-eighties. Until then, ISM had meant 'Colombo Plan', a matter of aid in international cooperation in foreign policy, seen also as a tool to combat communism in the Asian basin. As the new full fee overseas student policy was implemented, incoming flows acquired a new meaning as source of revenue for domestic institutions, contributing to the transformation of Australian economy from industry to service, from a closed to an open economy. Migration legislation was adjusted, and new bodies established or appointed to manage related issue (i.e. the Overseas Student Office, the Australian Educational Centres).

A first turning point happened soon after in 1989, with the so-called 'China crisis', and it brought to a stiffening of immigration regulations in light of the many bogus students and fake providers which concerned for the large part Chinese flows, contextually to Tiananmen events of 1989. Problems of coordination and coherence between HE, trade and immigration begun to be manifest, and a number of correctives were implemented, beginning with the ESOS Act and the risk assessment system. The policy has been slowly refined during the entire nineties, when evidence of an appreciable performance in the labor market of former international students emerged.

In 1999, the Howard government directly linked Permanent Migration (PM) to inbound mobility granting additional points to foreigners holding an Australian tertiary qualification. Numbers steadily grew, despite additional consequences of the federal policy begun to emerge. They did so until 2008, when the so called 'perfect storm' hit Australia, beginning with the attack of an Indian student in Melbourne. The 2008 shock leads in that already tense context to the abolition of the direct link among tertiary education and PM, and to an increase of awareness of the relevance of ISM in foreign policy, especially in India and China: it also sanctioned the passage to the 'third phase' of international education, more focused on quality than on quantity.

Those years are the playground of the whole of government approach, passing by the 2011 International Student Strategy of Australia released by the COAG to the release of the 2025 National Strategy for International Education in 2016, when the International Education Council, a ministerial body which includes seven different ministries and a number of stakeholders, was also established in the effort to further coordinate and integrate policy action around ISM.

A new frame of ISM also emerged since the Australian 2020 Summit held in 2008, which will however reveal very soon its core contradictions. ISM begun to be framed within the larger Australian Indo Pacific foreign policy strategy, as testified by the launch of the New Colombo Plan in 2013 and the Global Alumni Strategy of Australia of 2016. Numbers grew even more than in the period prior to 2008, despite concerns on the over exposure of Australian universities particularly from China. Very recently, the Covid-19 outbreak that strongly impacted Australia in light of the large majority of Chinese students both in terms of students' numbers and of institutional revenue flows, transforming a nightmare into reality fortnight.

To wrap up, Australia experience a real process of policy integration in its national public policy around ISM, which developed across fields, levels and dimensions, including additional policy domains over the time and expanding therefore the constellation of actors involved. However, the full fee policy over expose the domestic HE system to Chinese markets and also raise concerns around its quality. In addition, it appear in clear contradiction with the developed rationale behind policies around outbound flows, framed within the Indo-Pacific strategy thought to contain China expansion.

Before presenting the identified phases of ISM development in Australia in the next sections of the chapter, the rest of the present section provides an overview of the panorama at time zero of the analysis, of the period between the end of the war and the introduction of the market in higher education.

For a long time since the second world war, ISM in Australia was conceived as foreign aid and, especially after the 2WW, it mostly meant Colombo Plan, moment in which the Australian government manifested its interest in the 'aid potential' of the program, as reported in the Goldring Report[i] of 1984. Foreign students were however present at Australian institutions since many decades, with the first admitted into Australian in 1904 (Goldring 1984, Meadows 2011). As Meadows (2011) reports, Australian universities were yet 'in their infancy', and, as the most of Asia countries were colonized, the large majority of Asian students enrolling in tertiary education were by far doing so at institutions of the colonising countries such as France and the UK. The policy to welcome students was however liberal, and since already 1937 a common entry policy for those students coming from Asia was established: they were eligible to study in Australia, granted they had enrolled to a domestic institution, as full time students, had enough financial support to pay fees and maintain themselves as well as kept good results during their carrier (Australia, Committee of Review of POSP 1984). Main rationales were the one of fostering cultural exchange and trade with specific countries, reason why until 1937 policies depended upon the country selected in the aid basin (Australia, Committee of Review of POSP 1984). Meadows (2011) reports there were 225 foreign students in Australia in 1940, including schools and universities, and despite the liberal approach students were carefully controlled as there were fears they could use education as a backdoor for illegal immigration. In 1950, a conference in Melbourne held after the request of the ministry for immigration, other departments and the University met to remark the policy of welcoming should be 'as liberal as possible, but […] be safeguard to ensure educational institution were not swamped by overseas students (Australia, Committee of Review of POSP 1984, 2.4)'.

It was but the Colombo plan[5] to mark a landmark of international student development into Australia. The program has been established following the Colombo meeting of 1950, called to discuss communism, the role of China and security in the Area in the aftermath of the end of colonization (Meadows 2011). The historical context is the one of the first years following the war and of the creation of the United Nations, when 'educational exchanges were in the air in the heady days of

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[5] The Colombo plan was not however the only program driving foreign students to enrol at Australian universities. Among the others, were active the Australia Papua Guinea Education and Training Scheme, the Australia International Awards Scheme, the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan and the Commonwealth Cooperation Schemes (Meadows 2011). The Australian Asian Universities' Cooperation Schemes (AAUCS) is reported by the author as the most important one, resulted by discussion among the Australian Ministry of Education, the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta and the Australian-Vice-Chancellors Committee (AVCC) which sent three agricultural professor to Indonesia to create 'an inter-universities body to foster 'the scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects of food production (Meadows 2011, 59)'.

international organization (Meadows 2011, 55)'. Beyond the Colombo Plan and other programs, foreign students arrived into Australia at the time with the so called Private Overseas Student Program (POSP). As Fraser (nd) note, any student which was not sponsored directly by the Australian government was considered to be 'private', despite the fact many were sponsored by foreign governments.

| TABLE 3.1 | ISM phases of development in Australia and related turning points		
1985	Implementing the recommendation of the Jackson committee, the government implements the full-fee paying foreign student policy (FFPOS), allows then university to entirely retain such revenues and decrease public funding to higher education institutions. High number of Asians students began to arrive to Australia and change the Australian student body, an unthinkable development until ten years before.	**Jackson and Goldring Committees** **New Overseas Policy** Begin of foreign incoming flows Salience in trade and education
1989	The full fee policy begun to revels a number of constrains related to contrasting provision of services in a number of fields, especially higher education and immigration. Moreover, competences were not effectively distributed and the implementation of the policy showed a number of constrains.	**The 'China Crisis'** Development of the Risk Assessment System ESOS Act Enactment C.R.I.C.O.S. Register introduced
1999	Tightening of immigration policy but for foreigners holding Australian qualification, for which a pathway was reserved. According to Howard government, there were too many Asian immigrants. But records about foreign student labour impact reveals their positive effects in a time of labour shortages and predicted decreasing fertility pressed the ministry to shift the focus of the migration program to skills instead of closing it.	**Shift in Skilled Migration Policy** Foreign Students policy becomes part of the migration skilled stream The numbers of foreign students grew dramatically
2008	The attack of the Indian student in Melbourne brings the worse part of Australian dramatic growth in foreign students. Rumours about racial episodes, isolation and exploitation of international students were neglected too far in time by the government and institutions. The crisis becomes diplomatic, and lead to a dramatic tighten up of visa regulations.	**Indian attack in Melbourne** **Bradley Review** Australia experience 'the perfect storm' Tighten visa regulation Introduction of the demand driven system
2016	The process leading to the so called 'all of government approach' reaches a crucial point with the creation of a National Council for International Education, which includes six different ministries and a number of peak bodies. The government launched also the NSIE, the AIE Roadmap to 2025 and the GAS. Moreover, the launch of the New Colombo Plan in 2013 also matched the inclusion of foreign policy within the space of international education policies.	**Establishment of the Council of International Education** International Strategy for International Education (NSIE) Launch of International Education 2025 RoadMap (AIE2025) Launch of the Australian Global Alumni Strategy (GAS)
2020	The COVID-19 outbreak disrupted in the very early 2020 beginning. While its consequence have been dramatic worldwide, the health emergency had enormous consequence on Australian higher education sector, as it begun just before the beginning of the Sothern hemisphere academic year and in a moment in which a large part of Chinese international students were at home due to the Chinese new year celebrations.	**COVID-19 outbreak**

Table 3.1 - ISM phases of development in Australia and related turning points

The ministry for foreign affairs, Richard Casey, breaking down prejudice, was sure that engaging in educating Asia elites would have bring benefits on the long term, and when in 1956, a former student of the Colombo Plan became a cabinet minister in Malaysia (Meadows 2011), the approach consolidated. The program was not however free by concerns of providing a back-door for migration purposes for prospective students, in a period when the White Australia policy was still in place and basically forbidden the possibility to migrate to Asian citizens. Between 1956 and 1966 further provisions were taken to this regard in occasion of the first review of the overseas student policy, and the government made it clear that students had to go back to their own country following the completion of their study and pass a standardized English test following 1966.

In 1972, a change in the government resulted in the introduction of a cap of 10,000 as total number of private students, and it discarded the 'aid' and 'development assistance' policy objectives linked to the POSP following the 1973 review (Australia, Committee of Review of POSP 1984). The new policy had the aim to anticipate the rising number of Asian students which could be granted permission to study in the country, as well as to protect the availability of places for domestic students. Conditions to enter Australia were made stricter. Foreign students could enrol to Australian institutions only if the degree was not available in their home country, beyond the other requirements such as the prove of being a genuine students not looking for permanent residence in Australia (Committee of Review of POSP 1984). Soon later, the Whitlam government abolished fees in higher education to foster enrolment, and exempted by fees foreign students with the abolition of the Overseas Student Charge (OSC) for. Contextually, the government had also repealed the Immigration Restriction Act sanctioning the end of the white Australian policy, and Ali Grassby given its speech 'A multicultural Society for the Future' (DPS 2010). The years between 1973 and 1979 were marked by discussion between the different departments involved by the issue, in the first place the one of immigration and that of foreign affairs (Committee of Review of POSP 1984). Gallagher (2011) report the Fraser government had to deal with the outcome of the policy shift of the Whitlam government, and two different external inquire turned to be ineffective (the Butcher and Williams of 1977 and 1979).

The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA), was of the idea that the student policy was no other than a back door for migration (Committee of Review of POSP 1984). Each department agreed such a door had to be closed, but especially the foreign affair department was of the idea that to consider the student policy just a 'temporary migration' scheme was 'unacceptable', as they believed the policy had 'valuable foreign policy and aid objective'. An inter-departmental working group in 1977, with the aim of reconcile the various position of the several department involvement lead to relevant change (Gallagher 2011). Since 1979, the new policy had the main goals of advancing Australian interests in Papua Nuova Guinea, South Pacific and the middle east, so to improve communication, sympathy and promote cultural exchange (Australia, Committee of Review of POSP 1984). The policy re-introduced the 10000 cap to overseas student enrollment and the OSC, ranging between 1500 and 2500 AUS dollars per year, and it foreseen the students had to go back to their home countries or by the way leave Australia after graduation - resulting in a loss of foreign students granted permanent residence from 75% in the seventies to 10% in the eighties (Australia, Committee of Review of POSP 1984). A number of problems characterized however the policy developed. A clear definition of courses 'not available' in the student home country was missing, often students just changed their course after arrival, and best foreign students which wanted to study subject present at home could not apply to Australia. On the OSC, the inter-departmental discussion was even more complicated, as the DIEA wanted to recover costs from the program, while the Prime Minister Cabinet and the one of Finance agreed to its introduction at a level that would not prevent students to enroll.

By that time, the issue of foreign students had already reached national newspapers and the public, and there were allegations that the program was displacing domestic students, also since many foreign students were admitted at the secondary school level.

Graph 3.1 | N. overseas students in Australia 1959-1983*
*as 1969 was missing, data of 1968 was inserted to plot the graphic

Graph 3.1- | N. overseas students in Australia 1959-1983. Source: Goldring Report, Australian National Library

In 1984, henceforth, the Australian government announced a new cap on the number of foreign students, only 1500 for higher education, further increased the OSC and called for a new review, run by the Goldring Committee, officially Committee for the Review of the Private Overseas Student Program (POSP). Burden from the management of overseas students, especially in administrative terms were pressing the cabinet, also since the number of students did not decrease following the introduction of the OSC. As Fraser (1983, 1) report, flows were growing and mostly involving students from south Asia and hence involved also issue of 'sensitive socio-cultural, racial-ethnic' factors, beyond those related to development, education, and these factors contributed to the policy dilemma on how to handle policies around overseas students. Graph 3.1 below provides an overview of the flows since the early fifties until the introduction of the full fee policy.

To sum up, while Australia has been familiar with international education since the early years of the past century, political commitment to the issue emerged mostly following the establishment of the Colombo Plan, after the second world war and the process of de-colonization. Number of these students growth steadily within and outside sponsored scheme, and already during the seventies a number of domestic departments and actors were involved by the issue and had developed clear policy objectives to pursue (and to be bargained with other departments). Fraser (1983) notes already that Australia was not equipped with a non-governmental body that permanently looked at this student population, that at the time already accounted for the 7% of the total, and neither of a professional organization such as NAFSA or the IIE in the USA. Moreover, these years were also marked by a high degree of uncoordinated actions among governmental department. Despite the different policy goals linked to the issue, and the many intervention that characterized the twenty years before the introduction of the full fee policy, domestic actors were already conscious of the many implications that policies related to ISM had, and engaged in the attempt to establish venues for cooperation, such as with inter-departmental working group of 1977. Moreover, the crucial and discussed role of Asia is already evident, as well as the double rhetoric of foreigners as an opportunity and a treat.

3.2.2 The Establishment of the market in higher education

As introduced, departments in Canberra were discussing utility and efficiency of the Overseas Student Program already in 1979. The Goldring Committee was launched in this context, and it soon later released a number of recommendations. Contextually, another interdepartmental Committee was established with the aim to review the Australian aid policy (the Jackson Committee). While they had different object of analysis, both committees begun to work on the overseas student program, which was eventually an important core of the domestic aid policy of the time. Table 3.2 below provides a concise overview of the policy view and objectives of these

committee, highlighting the extent to which they released opposite recommendations on the same matter. The latter shed light on the 'foreign aid' component hidden by the OSP and proposed to establish launch a market in higher education, while the former one suggested to preserve education from the influence of trade continuing with a carefully calculated OSC.

As a matter of fact, two schools of thought emerged within the country, one arguing Australia could and should have left isolation and protectionism behind and open up to the world, keeping a very alert eye on the deep transformation undergoing in Asia (and to the Asian market potentiality for Australia, as there where many prospective overseas students). According to this view, Australia could compete with economic giants from Europe and the Atlantic. Economic globalization was positive for Australia, that was a not a country to be protected as a 'weak player' within the international checkboard. For those of whom agreed, this was also a great cultural opportunity to deepen relations with Asia. The other side, instead, wanted to protect Australia from market deregulation, in line with the Whitlam government's operate. The Goldring Committee also underlined trade in education could look like as a racist white Australian policy (Fraser, nd,), as Australia had left behind its own white Australia policy only in the seventies. While the new government was run by the Labour, elected with Hawke as prime minister in 1983, it had a progressive orientation, and it ended up to launch the most profound shift of Australian higher education embracing the view of the Jackson committee and it established a market, despite it kept the subsidize program for students coming by developing countries.

The Overseas Student Policy entered into force in 1985, allowing the enrolment of full-paying students beyond subsidized places (Megarrity, 2007, 43), with the first student admitted to Australia in 1986 (David and Mackintosh 2011). In the same year, the government set up an Overseas Student Office (OSO) within the Department of Education and Youth Affairs: the office had the task of administering the program and provide assistance in policy formulation and developments to assess the new-born policy, and engage in data collection (Megarrity 2007, Meadows 2011). Institutions aiming to offer courses to overseas students had to register to the OSO and to Commonwealth Tertiary Education Committee (CTEC), revealing the ambiguity around OSO's role (Meadows 2011): each course had to be approved by the CTEC itself to guarantee there was no subsidy payed by the Commonwealth. Students from developing countries were still paying the OSC, with the government paying back the difference with full cost to higher education institutions (Meadows 2011). The government also organized a number of trade missions performed by officials from the Education and Trade departments to visit Asian countries to collect information about services abroad, develop a screening procedure to admit students, and to focus on visas. The missions resulted in a *Report on Potential Export of Education Servic*e (Gallagher 2011), and revealed initial CTEC guidelines had to be updated (Gallagher 2011). Gallagher (2011) also reveals that interdepartmental cleavages undermined a coordinated approach to the trade mission. Soon later, In 1986, minister Ryan announced a policy with streamlines procedures for foreign students, allowed to work for 20 hours per week (Meadows 2011). Additional DEET offices were established abroad since 1987, beginning with those in Beijing, Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur, so to assist in administrative procedures (Gallagher 2011). Few years after OSC abolition the government launched a number of exchange schemes via DEET to guarantee the chance of studying to Australia to students facing financial problems and to bright international students, such as the Equity and Merit Scholarship Scheme (EMSS)[6], a funding contribution for bright and disadvantaged foreign

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[6] Within this scheme, the AVCC also lunched the Overseas Postgraduates Research Scholarship (OPRS) (DEET 1991), together with AusAid (until soon before AIDAB) (DIISR[6] 2010). Soon after, also other special funds for postgraduate mobility were granted, and since 1993 all foreign citizens but New Zeeland could apply; in the same year, the management of the scheme was transferred to the DEET, and the program continued until 1999 when it would become the IPRS under the *Backing Australia Future* framework (DIIRS 2010). The scheme was initially established also to address criticism abroad about its too market oriented approach, as the Kuala Lumpur High Commissioner warned (Meadows 2011), and guaranteed about 150 students scholarships.

students. John Dawkin, which substituted minister Ryan in Education in 1987, encouraged university to profit from the new chance of enrolling full fee paying students as a way to restore the balance of payments (Gallagher 2011). The new regulation allowed a deregulation of Australian HE system that grew much faster than the Jackson committee foreseen (DEET, 1991), and plans to dismiss the subsidize program since 1990 emerged every soon.

The novel policy was a huge break with the past for the HE system, 'a controversial approach in the international scene and among Australian institutions and even within the government itself (Gallagher 2011, 123)', as we shall better explore in section 3.1. In many resisted the change implemented by the government, on a number of different grounds. Also students' movement tried in vain to push the government to abandon the new policy, but they manage to establish a National Liaison Committee for International Students (Sebastian 2009). At the time, Australian HEIs were in charge of organizing basically everything related to overseas students, until then not even distinguished by domestic students, ranging from marketing and recruitment abroad to relations with Australian Diplomatic Mission (ADM) embraced abroad, or to students' welfare of these students.

Between 1987 and 1888 the green paper *Higher Education: A policy Discussion Paper* and the consequent *Higher Education: A policy statement – Dawkins White Paper* introduced other dramatic change.

Table 3.2: Comparison of view and Recommendation of the Committee

	Goldring Committee	**Jackson Committee**
View and policy objective	The Goldring Committee shared the view that the overseas students policy was important for Australia, as it contribute to the social and economic development of developing countries, to increase the quality of Australia's educational resource as well as to improve Australia's understanding abroad and its communication with foreign countries. Moreover, that it should have been development after consulting relevant foreign governments before implementing any change.	The Committee stated that education is critical for the development of human resources, and while Australia already had some strength in the sector, a more efficient approach. Education of overseas students has important return for Australia, and the absence of fees is considered as an hidden subsidy with a value of about AUS\$ 70 million. According to the Committee, difficult procedures to entry Australia for education, especially at PhD level, were harming Australia's foreign relations, it was depriving cultural contacts and of a potential export earnings.
Recom - mendations	The Committee suggested that the government should have continued with the overseas student policy, as the costs of educating foreign students had a return for Australia. Moreover, it recommend to establish an Australian Council for Overseas Students to advise the government on the number of students, to set up a uniform OSC at the undergraduate level, and to exempt students enrolled to degrees focused on research by the OSC. Moreover, to invest a quota similar to the revenue from the OSC to support overseas students able to certify financial restrictions. Overseas students had to be an integral part of the HE population, and between 5 and 10% in CAEs and maximum the 25% in universities.	a) To explicate the hidden subsidy to developing countries' students (absence of fees) and count it as official development assistance b) To increase the OSC until reach full cost of education c) To establish further merit scholarships to balance the introduction of full cost for educations, and keep the government-to-government schemes in place, adding other special schemes for targeted groups such as women. d) To foster 'development oriented' education to students coming from developing countries.

Source: Compiled by the author basing on the Jackson and Goldring Commission reports.

Table 3.2 - : Comparison of view and Recommendation of the Committee

The HE reform introduced the Unified National Systems (UNS) in 1989 (DEET 2015), eliminating differences between universities and Centres of Advanced Education (CAEs), rationalizing the number of HEIs while contextually increasing the student body (Jackson 2003). UNS introduction aimed to reach more flexibility at the university institutional level thanks to greater institutional control over resources (Megarrity 2007), and to alleviate the fiscal burden coming from HE. Since then, the government was to provide funding to higher education on a triennial basis as according to the Higher Education Funding Act of 1988, a base of the systems until 2003 (DEET 2015), and the commonwealth acquired the funding prerogative from Australian states. Further, institutions could directly kept the revenue resulting from the enrolment of overseas students. In sum, within 5 years, the Australian HE landscape was transformed.

A number of problems emerged in the initial implementation phase, according to many given the market inability to regulate the sector, as indeed suggested by the Industry Assistance Commission Report of 1989 (Megarrity 2007). also the High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur warned about criticism emerging abroad around the new market approach, beyond underlining the need to coordinate this marketing facets within the more general tourism industry (Meadows 2011). IDP reported the need of 'a provider of information and services' abroad (Davis and Mackintosh 2010). IDP was a crucial and quasi-governmental body, that helped Australian universities to enter Asian market together with AUStrade since the beginning of the reform. ADMs also begun to experience pressure given the high number of application to be processed, and the overstay rate begun to increase, adding burden to ADMs which had to pay even more attention on the real intention of students applying to the program Meadows (2011). The increase in applications was also a consequence of AUStrade's success the recruitment of foreign students. DEET had appointed therefore additional staff in Beijing, Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur, but while the move took of some pressure, additional measure were needed.

The question of who had to take care of all the procedure needed to recruit students, such as information and counselling, procedures for enrolment and visa procedures, 'not to mention the bona fides of applicants (Meadows 2011, 72)', was getting always more salient. As a result, the government launched a task force to find a solution, which suggested to create single one-stop-show called Australian Education Centres (AECs) abroad to 'give comprehensive services outside ADMs (Meadows 2011, 72)'. In conclusion, a call for tender was done and a consortium of IDP and Qantas begin to manage the AEC with a pilot program in Jakarta. By 1990, IDP was operating with AECs in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Seoul, Singapore, Taipei and Suva (Meadows 2011)[7]. Given the market advantages that IDP had compared to other private actors, the call for tender to run them was without public funding, but to make them financially sustainable, IDP was included all key actors (Meadows 2011). However, while the government did not want to engage financially to the AEC, it was soon clear this was not possible (Megarrity 2007). Another problem emerged in the immediate years following the introduction of the new policy related to consumer protection. As a result, IDP and the Australian Vice Chancellor Committee developed *The First Code Of Conduct For The Overseas Marketing Of Australian Education Service* in 1989, to which the government later added the *First Code of Ethical Practice In The Provision Of Full Fee Courses To Overseas Students By Australian Institutions* to respond to criticism about the lack of regulatory framework in the field of student mobility (Gallagher 2011). In those years there were also attempts to establish a National Association of Directors of International Offices (NADIO) were in place, as the one-day retirement at the Gold Cost testifies (Murray 2002). The purpose of the association was to strengthen the advocacy position of universities in the matter of international education, but there was a sense among international directors that AVCC did not wanted such body,

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[7] The author also report how at the time constant reference was made in relation to the British Council examples. However, the idea of launching a central bodies following the British Council was not appreciated by the government, even if the AVCC and a number of officials liked it. Therefore, the AVCC used its arm, IDP, to address the problem of organizing Australian presence abroad.

keeping therefore a privileged bargaining position in front of the federal government (Murray nd)

3.2.3 The 'China Crisis'

Expert interviews strongly claimed how the new overseas student policy resulted on a very fast opening up to new migration flows that anyone was at the time expecting, and how a number of constrains soon emerged in the immediate phase after the introduction of the new policy. A turning moment was however reached in 1989, after a series of events which will be remembered as the 'China crisis'. In 1989, over 45% of overstaying students in ELICOS were Chinese, and about 40% of them were overstaying their visa (Ellinsen 1989, Gan 1994, Industry Commission 1991). They were Chinese also the majority of those refunded by the government following involved by a crack of ELICOS bogus providers (Gallagher 2011, Meadows 2011). Following a protest of Chinese students in front of the Australian Embassy, the government even arrived to refund about AUS$ 70 millions so to avoid further shame at the international level (Ellinsen 1989, Gan 1994, Industry Commission 1991). Moreover, because of Tiananmen affairs, it conceded over 20,000 visas to Chinese students on humanitarian grounds (Ellinsen 1989 and Gan 1994).

This 'China crisis' had at least three major consequence in the development of the international education sector in Australia. In the first place, the government lost its faith of the capability of the market to regulated the sector. Also the Industry Commission, in the aforementioned report of 1991, argued that too many change occurred into the industry in a very short time and with insufficient consultation, and the government passed by a very loose regulation, with important consequences in terms of bogus students and incorrect behaviour by some Australian institution (Industry Commission 1991). Second, it lead to the release of the ESOS Act, as the necessity of protecting students' fees became evidence following the just mentioned institutional incorrect behaviour. Third, it drove a rationalization in foreign students number (Don Smart 1989), resulting in over 30% of application from China being refused in the following period; finally, to import the introduction of visas assessment by the Overseas Student Office (Megarrity 2007) according to countries' specific risk (Gallagher 2011).

The issue of migration and its consequence in Australian policy were at the time also at the centre of the public debate. This is clear looking to the focus on multiculturalism considered as something of great benefits t Australia by the Hawke and Keating governments. Hawke government published a *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* to address the loud debate on multiculturalism, which attempted to accompanying the rights to cultural identity to a unifying commitment to Australia. As we shall better discuss in section 3.2, Australian become somehow consciousness during the eighties of its new geographical and geopolitical collocation in South East Asia: a real turning point has been the Garnaut Report of 1989, that argued the extent to which Australia could gain from its geographical proximity with 'the historic shift in the centre of gravity of economic production and power towards North East Asia.' Eventually, although the Gulf war and the consequent global financial crisis of the 1991-1992, Australia would enter in the early nineties in its longest era of economic growth, strongly connected to the entire Indo-Pacific basin.

3.2.4 Shift in Skilled Migration Policy

By 1991, the growth in enrolments revealed how the target in numbers of the full fee paying student policy was reached 10 years in advance (DEET 1991). The government state the program turned to be 'from primarily an aid activity fostering education interchange and promoting cultural ties into a significant export industry (Meadows 2002, 124)'. In 1992, Beazley, minister at DEET, introduced for the first time the words 'international' and 'internationalization' in relation to the mobility of students as a 'corrective to the domestic and international criticism of the program as overly commercial (Meadows 1992,78)'. A mobility scheme called University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific (UMAP) was also launched by Australian universities in 1993, involving countries of the

region from Africa to the Middle East, Asia e Pacific islands (Day and Backer 2010, Olsen 2005), to increase international understanding between them. The government established the Australian Postgraduate Awards, and it increased programs for development assistance (Gallagher 2011, 123). The ESOS Act reform also entered in force in 1991, and introduced a register called CRICOS where institutions providing education to foreign students had since then had to be registered, providing they satisfied necessary requirement (Megarrity 2007, Meek and Wood 1997). The act also introduced the OSTAL, Overseas Student Tuition Assurance Levy, further responding to the necessity of consumer protection.

The promotion of Australian higher education abroad was however still fragmented by a number of bodies at the time. Following the AECs creation, an overlap between IDP, AECs and ADM emerged and undermined the innovative concept of one-time step. We shall see more carefully in section 3.3.1 the process leading to the establishment of the AIEF in 1994, with the purpose of assisting in policy formulation and policy implementation (Meadows 2011), a first attempt to rationalize the governance around ISM. International education was at this point recognised as a major export sector, yet mostly linked to the domains of education and trade in the middle of the nineties. In this period, an important shift on immigration policy occurred, as Australia begun to approach the temporary and permanent streams of migration as two path of the same framework. Moreover, in 1996, the Bureau on Immigration, Multiculturalism and Population Research sponsored a study on the impact of providing international student the right to work, which will strongly contribute to the next shift in Australian international student policy. These are the years in which the evidence about the good performances of international students in the Australian labour market begun to emerge. The Howard government arrived to cabinet in 1996 and he strongly opposed the process of opening up to Asia undertaken by the labour government, especially its position on multiculturalism. Pauline Hanson, after being expelled by the Coalition, was elected in Queensland as an independent with over 19% of votes at federal elections, and soon declared that 'Australia have been swamped by Asians' (Hanson 1996). The event has its own relevance for Australian migration history, and even records of AIEF carefully controlling Asian markets those days in the fear or repercussions in the field of students are present (Gallagher 2011). Howard repudiate Keating multicultural policy, which he considered indeed as a Asia-first Australian foreign policy. In 1997, his government published '*In The National Interest'*, setting the milestone of a part of its policy discourse, relaxing however its migration policy to Chinese students. Albeit its political discourse, Howard decreased public funding to universities making them relying even more to international students (Davis and Mackintosh 2010), mostly of which were Asians, and also introduced fees for Australian students. This was because 'for too long Australians graduates have been denied the same opportunities as overseas students to purchase a place at an Australian institution (The Australian, 1996)'. The key part of this shift of Australian immigration policy relies however in his government's decision of granting higher points for permanent migration to foreigners who held an Australian tertiary degree (DPS 2016). This policy shift has been often defined as a 'highway' to long term migration and sometimes also to citizenship for international students.

The process of developing of such policy was however particular, and worth to be extensively discussed[8]. As introduced, Howard governments' was very critical in respect to migration and against a multicultural Australia. The government intended to close down the possibility of migration, but the Australian industry community, intended in its wider sense, was of the opposite idea: Australia needed even more migrants, given its important labour shortages, given the contribution they gave to the education sectors and more generally to the national balance of payments. 'How to convince the government to do an U turn in its migration policy?', asked an expert interview to introduce its own perspective of this story. To cut a long story short, and more

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[8] While largely discussed by previous academic literature, which also constitute precious sources for this section, the latter has been drafted basing on material interviews, which devoted large space to this issue and highlighted the events behind the scenes of those intense months leading to major policy change.

precisely three intense years, the government decided a third path, the one to carefully target the migration intake: recruit only migrants Australia needed the most: high skilled people. In this way, was possible to guarantee to the labour market the necessary intake of migrants without made the prime minister looking 'silly, doing a U turn out of the blue'. The ball was then passed to the immigration department, which had 'the challenge […] to find them.

TABLE 3.3: Overview of policy change in the immigration sector between 1999 and 2002

DATE	POLICY CHANGE
August 27th, 1998	The General Skill Migration (GSM) system is modified, and former overseas students are granted additional points in their application. Changes will be effective since July 1th 1999
March 9th. , 1999	A Migrant Occupation in Demand List (MODL) is established. The point based skilled migration system foreseen additional points to applicants who had studied in Australia and engages in jobs in national shortages, included in the MODL. Moreover, former overseas students can apply for a working visa without leaving Australia
April 29th. , 2000	The Skilled Migration program is increased to comprise the 50% of the entire Migration program, for a total of 35,000 places. 5000 places are also introduced in a 'contingency reserve' in the Skilled Migrant Program.
March 3th. , 2000	The Ministry of immigration declares that the MODL introduction had been a success. MODL will be reviewed annually, as according to existing and emerging national shortages identified by the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business.
August 3th. , 2000	The Ministry of Immigration announces additional 5000 places under the Skilled Migration Program, thanks to a new point system which grants additional points to applicants with strong English proficiency. The Australian government is expanding domestic ability to attract long term temporary migrants, which passed by the 29% in 1995-96 to the 50% in 2000 of the entire migration program to Australia. Officially, 'to attract a highly mobile and lucrative workforce' to Australia, thanks to 'a critical shift' which gives Australia a competitive advantage in comparison to other countries.
March 31th, 2001	International students graduated in disciplines among the most needed for Australian labour markets are seen as a 'ideal migrants'. For this reason, former overseas students in this position are allows to apply and get permanent residence status without leaving the country, in an effort to attract further overseas students to degrees leading to critical occupations.
July 1th , 2001	Visa application are made more transparent. The government announce a new strategy to assess applicants on the base of their country of origin and the sector in which they would like to enrol to education, so to determine their chance of success prior to migration and 'place Australia at the forefront of student visa processing arrangements in this highly competitive and growing industry'.
July 18th, 2001	Exceptional number of visas granted to Chinese students: absolute numbers passing by 1934 in the a.y. 1996-97 to 8,886 in the a.y. 2000-2001, an increase of the 360%. (DIMA release)
January 7th, 2002	The Ministry of Immigration declares publicly that the explicit link between the overseas student program and the permanent migration scheme is working well and attracting migrants trained as according to Australian standards.
May 7th, 2002	The government announce its looking to increase the stream of foreign students, which are seen as Australian 'ideal migrants'.
November 11th, 2002	The government launch the E-Visa program, thanks to which procedures for application are to be done online.
March 13th, 2003	Additional points are granted to those who finish an Australian PhD course, and to those able to complete an Australian upper Class Honours. At least a period of two years of degrees in Australia are however necessary to qualify to the program.
November 29th, 2003	The ministry for immigration announce that Australia is by then an international leader in international education, and further change will strengthen its position, such as greater flexibility on both financial and English requirements. Moreover, a new student guardian visa will be available for relatives to care about migrant students.
September 1th, 2004	The MODL includes so far 28 occupation (they were 14 in February 2003), and skilled migration applicants must have an occupation on the new Skilled Occupations List (SOL).

Source: Elaboration of the author, based especially on DPS (2016)

Table 3.3 - Overview of policy change in the immigration sector between 1999 and 2002

'How to find them without lowering the criteria? We had just increased', one a high level official of the department at time summarized. International students ended up to be in this way the subject of the policy shift. They offered a good compromise: they were highly skilled, had high English proficiency and were already used to Australian customs. Moreover, they were young, which helped to contrast the ageing Australia trend, and they constitute an additional source of revenue given their domestic consumption. As a result, he government introduced the Migration Occupation Demand List (MODL) in 1999, according to which it recruited migrants as according to Australian national labour shortages. The Generally Skilled Migration (GSM) was effectively transformed to favour those holding an Australian qualifications, and it was to comprise the half of the entire domestic Australian program. For the sake of clarity, it is reported in table 3.3 a detailed timeline of migration adjustment happened between 1999 and 2002, and successive arrangement implemented in 2003 and 2004.

Change were in the air also within the higher education sector more broadly. Following the launch of the online visa, AIE (former AIEF) launched the Study in Australia portal, and it was by then active in Hanoi, in the UEA, Pakistan and also in Europe together with AUStrade, at that point became a frontrunner in marketing (Gallagher 2011). The 1998 West Review was supposed to brought deep change into Australian HE introducing a demand driven system, but the government never answered to the Review, and followed its recommendation partially with no structural action (DEET 2015). Moreover, with the ESOS reform Act of 2000, coordination between DEET and DIMA was made formal, with both departments able to access the Provider Registration and International Management System (PRISM), a database to control the huge flows of foreign students. The Nelson review, announced in 2002, developed with a series of discussion and issues papers[9] (DET 2015). *Our Universities: Backing Australian Ability* outlined the governmental response and introduced a review of Australian HE basing on quality, sustainability, equity and diversity. The reform introduced a system of calculating institutional rate of funding according to student load by disciplines, and it introduced loans for domestic and full-fee paying students with the FEE-HELP and HESC-HELP (DET 2015). With *Engaging the World through Education* of 2003, the government also outlines the international education framework for the years to come. Brendan Nelson, then minister of Education, Science and Training, identified again outbound mobility as relevant for Australia almost about a decade.

Apart for the timid salience that UMAP acquired over the years, this is the first time that outbound mobility is mentioned in the official discourse in Australia following Beazley of the early nineties. Daly and Barker (2005 in 2010) report that between 1996 and 2001 only the 0.41% of Australian students were engaging in academic experiences abroad, a percentage that will grow to 5.8% in 2007 (Olsen 2008 in Daly and Barker 2010).
The government launched the Endeavour Scholarship by Minister Nelson with a ministerial statement (Davis and Mackintosh 2010), targeting both students and fellows (Barker 2019). As Barker shows, the program served to redistribute the growing amount of economic benefits resulting from the steep increase of enrolment of foreign students. Nelson announced the program[10] to 'boost the profile of Australian's Education sectors in overseas markets (Nelson 2003 in Barker 2019). Gallagher (2011) reports that it was focused on migration, cultural strategic and commercial main rationales in the mind of the government, and it also serve to alleviate the concerns by Australian Vice-Chancellor worries about the perception of Australia in international education was 'all take no give' (Barker 2019).
The government also developed the OS-HELP scheme, which granted students the possibility to apply for a loan to fund their mobility experience. The scheme was interest free, but the government

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[9] *See* Higher Education at the Crossroads, Setting Firm Foundations, University Resourcing: Australian in an International context
[10] The program was to cover many country of the world and to attract bright students into Australia beyond the usual countries within programs in the framework of aid (Barker 2019). The aforementioned OPRS scheme, later renamed (E)IPRS, were englobed by the Endeavour Program[10].

charge an upfront 20% loan fees to students so to guarantee the sustainability of the program (taken into account the foreseen rate of non-repayments) (Parliamentary Services Department 2018). Already the firsts year after its introduction, around 2000 students per years obtained the loans. We shall see how the outbound mobility of Australian program will since this moment constantly grow, beginning with a National Forum of Outbound Mobility (NFOM) in 2006 (Maliki 2006, AUDIF 2002, IIEA 2004).

3.2.5 Disruption of the link between ISM and permanent residency

So far, the link between immigration and international education was explicit, and a number of documents claimed the efficacy of the policy shift happened in late 1999 (Davis and Mackintosh 2010). Since 2006, the definition[11] itself of migrants was also revised so to grasp a more precise flows picture (McDonald nd). Since 2000, however, domestic media started to report concerns about ghettoes of international students, related racism episodes, about their exploitation and poor living conditions. Concerns were also present due to the concentrations of international students in some type of courses and degrees, with courses having disproportionated numbers of international students enrolled. Former representative of an Australian peak body revealed someone attempt to alert universities to slow done the increase in the number of students, which was too fast and left no time to institutions and the government to adjust and refine their policies. The pros of the policy were too many, and flows kept to grow while the government kept to lower visa requirements (DPS 2016).

As a result, in 2008, when Australian media reported the aggression of an Indian overseas students in Melbourne, 'the atmosphere was already such that it just took off like lightening a fire'. On the background of many previous smaller episodes, the issue gained large attention within and beyond Australia and it even became a diplomatic governmental crisis (Davis 2010), after Indian media outlets begun to constantly report about the precarious conditions of international students in Australia, which begun a 'free fall', as shown by graph 3.2 below.

The wider background context of this period was the global financial crisis, during which the Australian dollar stronger than the usual, making therefore degrees more expensive in Australia, resulted in the decrease in numbers, and important consequences for the reputation and prestige of Australian higher education sector. The episode marked a juncture, a wake-up call around many issues linked to ISM until then latent, among which transport, safety and even more the quality of degrees, making manifest the fragility of the governance framework until then developed. Among the many limits emerged of the policy settings about ISM, an important realization was that the lack of involvement of Australian states local governments, eventually those that more closely experienced the impressive growth in flows, had been a major mistake.

The response to the crisis was however promptly and determined at the time. The Minister of Immigration announced an official visit to India in 2009 to reassure the Indian government of the well-being of Indians student choosing Australia as a studying destination. A Task force on Crimes Against International Students, under the leadership of the National Security Advisor, was launched to coordinate actions across all level of governments, and the Deputy Prime Minister illustrated the project of establishing a student hotline for raising concerns (DPS 2016). The DIAC offices undertook a severe hunt to (fake) provides that were providing fake documents to students in Melbourne (DPS 2016), the integrity measures of migration requirements were tightened up and higher requirements established. The MODL was revoked, and a visa for studying was 'just that: a visa to study' (DPS 2016), said the Minister of the time sanctioning the end of the two-step migration approach that linked for almost ten years international mobility with permanent migration to Australia. The Knight Review, which was appointed for reviewing the system, released 41 recommendations in principle all acknowledged by the government. Shift in the migration program introduced higher English

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[11] Calculating within Australian population those who stayed in Australia for at least 12 out of 16 months, hence overcoming limits of the former definition of Australia Migration intake who excluded international students, as they usually did not spend one years without interruption in the country.

requirements, abolished automatic cancellations of visas for foreign students, set the creation of a new advisory body and established an Education Visa Consultative Committee (EVCC)[12]. Moreover, the GOAG begun to work on a national strategy, which resulted in the International Student Strategy for Australia (ISSA).

Under the ISSA, the government assumed the responsibility for a range of aspects related to ISM Walters (2011). The strategy focused on four areas of priority, notably the wellbeing of international student, the quality of higher education, consumer protection and better communication (Walters 201). In 2011 it was established the Council of International Students Australia (CISA), a peak international representative body for international students (Colin Walters 2011). As we shall see below, however, while the involvement of international students grew, the scope of the strategy built around the students was insufficient to handle the complexity of designing a coherent and comprehensive policy framework.

In the background of Melbourne events, a more decisive focus on outbound mobility also become a way to demonstrate the value Australia attached to 'internationalization' and 'cultural exchanges', providing a ground to overcome the post-Melbourne narration of Australia using international students as 'cash cows'. As Daly and Barker (2010) pointed out, moreover, already during the 2008 Australian 2020 summit emerged a political priority for a 'campaign to develop regional literacy in Australia (Australia' 2020 Summit, 378)', an issue particularly relevant for Australian labour market. In 2008, education minister Julia Gillard stated that 'People connections [gained through outbound mobility] are vital to the future prosperity of our country, constituting part of what's known as the ''global supply chain'' and ensuring that Australia is truly ''globally connected'' going into the future (Byrne and Hall 2013, 429)'. The 2008 Bradley review concluded the Australian higher education system was solid but it required crucial decision in light of the emerging treats. It welcomed the growth of international students in Australian HE, but also highlighted it made institutions too vulnerable to geo-political developments (DET 2015). Further, it called for the abolition of the OS-HELP fees, opening the path for a more substantial growth of outbound flow. Finally, following the Baird Review, a review of the ESOS Act was performed introducing more support and stronger protection to international students. These years, cradle of the so called 'third phase', brought Australia beyond a mere commercial approach to ISM, and also set the ground for a new phase of development of mobility and international education in the country. Table 3.4 below summarizes the key events, from Melbourne attack to Covid-19, following the 2016 establishment of the Council of international education.

Graph 3.2 | Historical trend of inbound students from India in Australia

Graph 3.2 - Trend of inbound students from India in Australia, 2002-2018

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[12] The Committee is run by DIBP, it meet every quarter, and it had the task to provide inputs and feedbacks on policy matter involving student visa, discuss emerging trends, and to share information and operational initiatives.

Table 3.4 | A cross-sectoral policy chronology of events from 2007 to Covid-19 outbreak

2008 *(Rudd Government, ALP)*	Critical Skill List introduced
	Melbourne attack to Indian Student
2009	Australia Summit 2008
	Bradley Review
	Australian Senate Inquiry into International Student Welfare
	Diverse Australia Program released
	Deputy Prime Minister convenes an International Student Roundtable in Canberra
	Establishment of a Task Force on Crimes against International Students
	The Ministry of Immigration announce he will travel to India following concerns about international students
	Reform of the Skilled Migration Program announced
	Education Services Overseas Students Amendment Act
2010 *(Gillard government, ALP)*	Abolition of the OS-HELP up-front loan fee
	MODL Revoked and SOL Introduction – disruption of the link ISM and PM
	Amendment of the Migration Act and introduction of student visa integrity measures, new points tests for independent skilled migrants
	AIE competences transferred from AIE to DFAT (Aus-AID, Aus-TRADE)
	Launch of the *International Student Strategy for Australia* (ISSA)
	Minister Evans visits China
	Baird Report on Review of review of the *Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) Act 2000*
2011	Establishment of the Council of International Students Australia (CISA)
	Knight Review and governmental response
	Lomax-Smith HE Base funding for higher education review
	Overseas students' ombudsman commences
	Establishment of the International Education Advisory Council (IEAC)
	Establishment of the Education Visa Consultative Committee (EVCC)
2012	Introduction of the Demand Driven System
	Introduction of the Tuition Protection scheme introduced for international students
	Australian in the Asian Century paper released
2013 *(Rudd Government, ALP)*	Launch of the New Colombo Plan
	Launch of AsiaBound
(Abbot Government)	Release of *Australian Educating Globally* report (Chaney Report)
2014	Kemp Norton Review of the Demand Driven System
2015	Release of the draft national strategy for consultation
2016 *(Turnbull Government)*	*National Strategy for International Education* (NSIE)
	Establishment of the Council for International Education (CIE)
	Launch of *International Education 2025 RoadMap* (AIE2025)
	Launch of the Australian *Global Alumni Strategy* (GAS)
	Migration 'target' of 2016-2017 transformed into a ceiling
	Simplified Visa Migration framework enters in force
2017	Australian Foreign Policy white paper released
	Department of immigration adsorbed by home affairs department
	Demand driven system frozen
2018	Establishment of the Endeavour Leadership Program (ELP)
2019 **(Morrison Government)**	Launch of Destination Australia
	Abolition of the ELP
2020	Covid-19 outbreak

Table 3.4 - A cross-sectoral policy chronology of events from 2007 to Covid-19 outbreak

3.2.6 The Indo-Pacific Decade

Following 2008, flows of international students begun to grow again, and since about 2013 international education was able to fully recover. Universities begun to welcome even more international students than before, and the government introduced the Demand Driven System in 2012, uncapping the number of students.

The most salient part of this period relates with increasing salience of international education in foreign policy, with a number of events 'open[ing] up [Australia] public diplomacy potential (Byrne and Hall 2013, 422)'. Byrne and Hall (2013) identifies them in the 2009 Baird Review ESOS review, the 2010 Review of student visa, together with the establishment of the International Education Advisory Council (Byrne and Hall 2013), and underline the way in which Melbourne attacks and the collapse of fake providers in the VET raised up attention on the important interlinkages of international education with Australian foreign policy.

Following the release of the International Student Strategy for Australia (ISSA) in 2011 and the several action focused on inbound students, this period has been mark the attachment of an unprecedent salience to outbound mobility by the Australian government. In 2012, the published *Australian in the Asian Century* white paper also explicit linked ISM to Australian foreign policy. OS-HELP contribution was also increased for students involved in exchange in the Asian region the same here (Department of Social Services 2018). Already by 2012, the percentage of students who went to Asia increased arriving to count for one-third of the total (Nerlich 2015). AUDIF reveals that short-terms program made alone the 66% of the total in the same here, the 68% of which were carried out only in China (Nerlich 2015). Following Minister Evans formal visa to the country in 2010, the government also launched the AddChina Undergraduate Toolkit. Nerlich (2013, 393) underlines the governmental effort aiming to raise the profile of exchange to china, as 'the toolkit leads with the statement 'it's no longer mostly art students consider an international study experience in China. From mathematicians and scientist to engineers… students of all disciplines can… get ahead in the Asian Century (Australia government 2012 in Nerlich 2013)'. AIE saw its competences around ISM decreased as a range of them transitioned to DFAT, and more specifically under AusAid and AUStrade (Byrne and Hall 2013): as we shall explore more in detail in section 3.3, the role of this department will become predominant since this moment.

In 2013, the Coalition won the general elections and arrived into cabinet after three different government of the Australian labour party. The new Abbot government did not alter the strong focus places on ISM so far since the Australia Summit of 2008. By contrast, it is in the years of the previous government that Bishop, shadow minister, developed the program that would became New Colombo Plan, finally launched in 2013. NCP sanction a milestone of outbound mobility in Australia, as it constitute a 'reversed' Colombo plan bringing Australians into the Asian Pacific region. It permits to engage in long and short term mobility for studying and training, individually and in group, and it is largely supported by Australian companies. NCP constitutes an high level and privileged instrument of people-to-people diplomacy coherently to the 2012 Asian Century white papers: it helps 'Australians need to build Asia relevant capabilities' and 'to participate and contribute to the Asian century' (Asian Century 2). The program is unsurprising under the management of the DFAT. As one official declared during fieldwork 'We need NCP because Australian graduates are not good at doing business with Asian countries. We need to increase our familiarity with the region. We need every Australian to have basic Asia capability'.

The introduction of the NCP and the increase in salience of ISM within the space of foreign policy domains has been however only a part of this period of ISM development in Australia. Few years later the launch of the ISSA, criticized as having narrow focus on students, the National Strategy for International Education (NSIE) was launched by the federal government in 2016.
The year of 2016 is a crucial year for policy development, as a number of initiative which were under development since the initial years of the NCP entered into force. More specifically, the government also released the new Australia International Education 2025 RoadMap (AIE2025) and the Australian Global Alumni Engagement Strategy (GAS) (Laifer and Kitchen 2017). They are managed by DET (NSIE), AUStrade (AIE2015), and DFAT, which manages both the GAS and NCP (Laifer and Kitchen 2017). Further, also the Council of International Education (CIE) has been established in 2016. De facto, it institutionalized coordination, cooperation and collaboration between a number of departments. Beyond the Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, Migration and Trade, Immigration,

Employment and Industry, it also includes representatives of stakeholders and peak bodies, such as English Australia, Study Adelaide, the Council of International Students Australia. The Council immediately engaged with research and information about the issues, particularly focusing on the implementation of the National strategy.

In conclusion, also the Simplified Student Visa Framework entered into force in 2016, with simplified procedures aiming to favour even greater flows of international students, supporting the international education sectors (DPS 2016). As according to the SSVF appraisal, it also constitutes an improvement if compared to previous methodology, together with the newly immigration risk framework[13] which foreseen restrictive requirements for high risk countries but open up to flows with low risk rates.

As we shall more carefully explore in chapter five, this year emerged as characterized by a high level of PI in several dimensions, among which the one of political commitment, actors' subsystem relations, policy goal and frames, as we as in policy instruments. The very last years of the analysis reveal however that this panorama deteriorated.

In the first place, the political instability resulted in six different government in office in the last nine years, after decades of stable government since the era of Howard and Keating even before. If political commitment remained stable and yet increased around the promotion of outbound flows, the political discussion around incoming flows begun politicized and framed within the larger discussion of immigration in Australia. Second, the country is currently experiencing the long term consequences of ten years of Australian temporary migration policy (of which international students were a key pillar), a discussion which span from the integration of foreigners to Australian multi-level governance dynamics, passing by the interests and preferences of the education industry. Third, the Turnbull government abolished the department of immigration and transformed the migration intake into a ceiling, releasing contradictory declarations about the future intake of skilled migrants and international students. Fourth, the whole discussion evolved into a very complicated issue as the dependence of higher education institutions from Chinese flows became an overdependence, neglecting any possible risk assessment judgment (see Annex III for descriptive statistical empirical evidence to this regard). This is a clear reflection of Australian wider contradictions in foreign policy that will be better explored by section 3.3, with outbound flows embraced as a way to promote Australian effort of containment of China and inbound flows a crucial component of Australian economy instead dependent by that same country. Five, another layer of complexity is due to the extreme concentration of Chines flows into few programs, mostly master level in ITC and business, that raised important concerns around the quality of programs, often accused to have been customized to this market segment needs at the expenses of Australian students. And finally, six, as Chinese students have been found to spy among each other. Needless to say, the Covid-19 puzzled even more this complex policy environment.

3.2.7 The Covid-19 outbreak

On January 23th, the Chinese government, after weeks of under-estimation of a new respiratory syndrome very similar to SARS, admitted an epidemy was spreading in its national soil, and it took unprecedent measures to tackle it. Among them, there were about 157,000 Chinese international students enrolled to Australian universities – about two thirds of the total – that could not arrive in time for the beginning of the Australian academic year, which was about to begin as usual in the southern hemisphere (Rossi 2020), as on February 1th, the Australian governments closed its borders to anyone who was, or had been, in China in the previous fourteen days. What many Australian experts forecasted during fieldwork, and many scholars were writing since years, became reality: the most relevant single source of revenue for Australian university collapsed overnight.

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[13] The system foreseen that under the SSVF, students' financial and English evidence are combined to the immigration risk outcome of the education provider to which they are enrolled, together with their citizenship: the system is meant to disincentive provides to recruit bogus students by providers and push them to search for genuine students

Three days later of the ban introduction, the Australian Government engaged in negotiation with Chinese authorities a relaxation of Chinese internet firewall as to give students enrolled at Australian universities the opportunity to follow online teaching (Patty 2020), and ministries of Education and Trade called for an immediate meeting of the Council of International Education taskforce. The latter was established as 'to monitor and advise the government and AUS$39 billion industry on the impact of the virus and bushfires (Patty 2020)'.

The ministry of education claimed that the government offered the most flexibility via TESQA and ASQA, and established a telephone hotline dedicated to international students, with daily updated on the Study in Australia website, and launched a dedicated care package established for Chinese students obliged to quarantine in Australia (Patty 2020). On March 13, the Australian Minister for Immigration announced that international students were to be eligible to increase their working hours, beyond the usual cap of hours per week (Coleman 2020), if working in supermarkets, nursing and aged care. This came as a response to the need of Australian major supermarkets to keep up with the increasing demand, as well to help international students to maintain them during the emergency.

However, on April 3th, Australian Prime minister Morrison argued that 'if they[international students]'re not in a position to support themselves, then there is the alternative for them to return to their home countries (Ross 2020b)', a move which caused strong criticism by the entire industry while supported by the government as temporary visa workers demonstrated they were able to sustain themselves for at least their first 12 months in Australia when applying for a visa (Coleman 2020b). However, as statistics of the own Australian government testifies, more than 40% of these students claimed wages was their most important income during their stay in Australia, and the majority of them are enrolled since more than 12 months to Australian universities (Norton 2020). Less than 10 days after, on April 12th, the Australian government released the Higher Education Relief Package, with the aim to address the enormous consequences of the pandemic. It claimed that funding for universities would have not decrease in 2020 despite a fall in the number of students, and HE providers would benefits from exemptions for six months under the FEE-HELP and VET Student Loans. About AUS18$ have been guaranteed to universities under the Commonwealth Grant Scheme (CGS) and HELP schemes, including also performance-based funding amounts for public university. The measure added about 100 million back to Australian education and training business to address the emergency (Tehan 2020 b).

The government also launched the JobKeeper scheme, which left outside temporary visa holders, the large majority of international students, and excluded universities. At the time of writing, UA pointed out that despite each of the 39 universities members established support for students on temporary visas, this effort will not be sustained for long time. Australian states engaged to support universities and students, in an effort to cover the loss of help arriving by the Australian government. The former earmarked additional AUS$ 6 million to help charities helping temporary residents, in addition to another AUS$2020 already guaranteed for accommodation for international students in need (Rossi 2020).

3.2.8 Conclusive remarks

This final part of this section provides a summary of the policy cross-sectoral reconstruction undertaken based on descriptive statistics, using numbers to wrap up what discussed until now, enlightening the extent of ISM growth, the salience of Asia, and its relevance in economic terms.

ISM in Australia knew a dramatic expansion of inbound flows following the eighties and even more following 1999, when a policy shift directly linked temporary permits for education with permanent resident permits. Australia currently host the 10% of worldwide international students, with greater percentages in comparison also to UK and USA, even if these countries perform better in terms of absolute numbers (OCED 2019). This 10% of international students counts for the 21% of total enrolment into Australia, with OCED average of about 6%.

Graph 3.3 shows the late expansion of outbound student mobility flows in the country: the percentage of Australian students who experience ISM is low and still neglectable if compared to outbound students. The graph shows two lines of outbound mobility: as Nerlich (2013) report, UNESCO data refers to degree mobility only, leaving aside credit mobility flows. The latter are not comprehensively available, but statistics on the OS-HELP loan scheme, together with AUDIF reports, reveals that also in this case the value of outbound mobility is lower than inbound, while it knew a decisive and salient growth after 2010. Graph 3.4 shows instead a more detailed overview of international students composition by enrolment and provenience. It is possible to see that a relevant part of these students are not enrolled in higher education institutions, but in English courses (ELICOS), professional courses (VET) and other non-award degrees. Of about 900,000 foreign students, around the half engaged in tertiary education in Australia: it shall be noted that since 2012 the fastest growth happened within higher education, one of the better performing Australian export (at least until the Covid-19 outbreak). Graph 3.4 provide further evidence on the increasing importance of the Asian Pacific basin for Australia, showing the extent to which students from North America and Western Europe constitute a minority which is almost neglectable. It makes manifest the relevance for Australia of these Asian flows, especially China and India. By the graph emerges also that, among Anglo-European students, the majority are enrolled outside the higher education system.

Graph 3.3 | Historical trends of (HE) Inbound and Outbound flows

Graph 3.3 – Australia - Historical trends of (HE) Inbound and Outbound flows

Graph 3.4 | Trend of inbound flows by geographical belonging and type of education 2002-2020

Graph 3.4 - Trend of inbound flows by geographical belonging and type of education 2002-2020

Graph 3.5 | Growth of revenue - full fees payed by students

Graph 3.5 - Growth of revenue - full fees payed by students

Graph 3.6 | Trend of Australian main export, millions of Australian dollars

Graph 3.6 - Trend of Australian main export, millions of Australian dollars

Another way to show ISM development in Australia relates, as largely discussed, to its economic salience. Graph 3.5 above shows fees payed by foreign students, providing further evidence on the way they became a crucial source of revenue for Australian institutions. As graph 3.6 shows, education related exports are the current third larger Australian export, after iron & ore, coal and natural gas.

There is no doubts, as we shall better see throughout the entire chapter, that Australian governments and universities have been successful in the creation and consolidation of international education in the country. Especially Australian universities, in fact, have been very efficient in securing themselves alternative revenues to public funding.

Graph 3.7: Fall in (HE) student visas lodged following Covid-19 outbreak
Source: Home Affairs Department (2020)

Graph 3.7 - Fall in (HE) student visas lodged following Covid-19 outbreak

The sector demonstrated to be very integrated, to success in coordinating various level of governments (most importantly the federal and institutional one), and various policy domains. There is however another side of the coin, which was well known well before the Covid-19 outbreak made it even more manifest: the (over) dependency of Australian universities on international student fees, and, to make a more general argument, the over-reliance of Australia by China, as section 3.3 will extensively discuss below. Graph 3.7 provides a graphical overview of the fall of student visas lodged following the outbreak, so to show the extent of this recent exogenous shock.

3.3 Preliminary Sectorial Analysis

3.3.1 Higher Education

Australia's higher education system counts nowadays a total number of 199 HEIs, of which 40 are Universities (including the Australian National University, one specialist University and one overseas university) while the rest (127) are Non-University Higher Education Providers (NUHEPs). 'University' is a legal defined term, and institutions need to pursue research in at least three main fields of study to be accredited as such, and number of other criteria set up by TEQSA, the competent Commonwealth agency. As introduced in the previous section, Australian HEI system knew a dramatic evolution from the early 2000, while its transformation sees its roots in early eighties. Until 1946, no doctoral degrees were granted all over the federation. Currently, instead, Australia produces a consistent amount of global research output, and it has a number of its Universities competing in the research global league. In 2016, four institutions appeared in the Shanghai Jiao Tong ranking among the top 100 worldwide universities, while twenty in were in the top 500. The number of annual publication per academic more than doubled from 1999 to 2014 (Norton 2016), when Australian publications 'were 33 per cent more likely to be cited internationally than publications in their discipline and year from other countries (Norton 2016, 71)', a percentage of 7% in 2000.
About the 51% of 25-34 year-olds people in Australia has a tertiary degree, with an increase of the 9% since 2008 (OCED 2019), despite disparities are present according to gender (59% of women and 44% of men). Australian students also take more than then set period foreseen to graduate, and only the 34% do so in time; this percentage reach the 70% after three additional years of studying. The Australian system of education is organized in 10 different level of education, with tertiary education starting at level 7. Levels 5 and 6 may also be university education, but in practice at this level students are enrolled in vocational education for the large majority (Grattan Institute 2018). A

severe peculiarity of the Australian HE system states that a student with a qualification of level 8, meaning a Bachelor with Honours (or a Graduate Certificate or Diploma) has access to PhD degrees, resulting in unconformity with the Bologna system.

Tertiary education in Australia is funded by private and public money, with the first one strongly increasing their relevance since the Dawkins' reform. Public contribution by the Commonwealth comes in the form of research and teaching grants directly to HEIs, plus an important share of student loans and income support payment (Norton 2018). According to OECD (2019) Australia spend 5.8% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to fund education (from primary to tertiary), and its annual expenditure per students is on average with other OECD countries. Conversely, Australia share of private sources for tertiary education is about the double of OECD countries, with this segment constituting the 60% of the total funding for higher education (OCED 2019). Funding of higher education works according to (past) performances, resulting in newer universities having more troubles to set up a virtuous circle to pursue high quality research. Public to private fund transfers constitute a consistent share of tertiary education, with about 22% in the form of financial support to students coming from the Commonwealth (OCED 2019). Fees coming to international students constituted in 2018 the biggest single source of revenue for Australian Universities (Norton 2019). As largely introduced, the growth of overseas students in Australian system has been dramatic: the Australian Bureau of statistics (2007) reports how there were 30.000 of them in 1985, a number which grew to 137.000 in 1995 and reached 375.000 in 2005. In 2017, the 22.8% of the Australian HE student population were international students, with an average of 6% among OECD countries. The most of them are studying at the master and doctoral level, and Chinese and Indian students constitute by far the large majority.

How did Australia to transform its poor efficient HE system from a remote one with loose connection to the rest of the world to become a worldwide frontrunner in international education? Section 3.2 told the historical policy evolution in relation to ISM with a cross-sectoral perspective. This section dive deeper within HE developments, highlighting in the first place the governmental re-active approach, the surprisingly adaptivity and efficiency of Australian universities and of the entire ISM stakeholders constellation of actors. The section also discusses the high level of PI reached in this domain, highlighting both positive and negative implications. Last but not least, the paragraph discusses the process with led outbound student mobility into the governmental agenda.

Policy development

To maintain the autonomy states had prior to the federation, the Australian Constitution states the provision of education services is responsibility of the state governments (Social Policy Group 2000, Jackson 2003). The Commonwealth has however the power to provide 'benefits for students', as according to a 1946 amendment inserted to assure the chance to provide welfare to students (section no. 51 of the Constitution). Moreover, the Commonwealth has the power to make laws concerning the 'execution of any power' - the so called 'matter accidental[14]', and to legislate in the field of 'trading and financial corporation', i.e. universities. Further, it can provide help and grant financial assistance to its states, an activity which started back in 1951 in the case of the universities and in 1964 for schools[15] (Jackson 2003). As Jackson (2003) put is, these elements constitute the ground according to which the federal level exercises its power within the HE sector.

In sum, an important feature of Australian system relies in the fact that over the time, the Commonwealth got more involved in the HE domain at the expenses of Australian states, to the extent it arrived to directly fund HEIs with no formal change to the constitution[16]. Since the late eighties, in

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[14] As per section 51 xxiiiA of Australian Constitution

[15] As specified by section 96 of the Constitution

[16] The social policy group of Australian parliament notes how the constitutionality of such arrangement have not been passed by court judgment 'although it would presumably be justified on the basis of the Commonwealths' appropriations power (s.81) Social Policy group (2006)'

fact, Australian states kept their HE legislative responsibility, but the financial responsibility passed to the Commonwealth, resulting in a substantial change in the management of tertiary education[17]. The Australian Department of Education[18], which known several restructuration over the time according to the inclusion/exclusion of a number of areas (i.e. training, work) has been founded only in the sixties. Until then, matters of education and tertiary education were administered by the prime minister cabinet, as this was indeed primarily a matter of state responsibility (Norton 2018). Following the amendment of 1946, a new path lead to the creation of the department in 1966. Section 3.2 provided already an overview of the Australian political and policy panorama before the eighties in this domain. Free education introduced by Whitlam was no confirmed by the following government, and soon after the Hawke labour government introduced strongly reformed of HE system: we shall dive here more extensively on the dynamics of this policy domain to better grasp ISM evolution.

The introduction of the market has been a completely watershed for the Australian HE, until then heavily subsidized with public money. Also the ministry of education had opposed Jackson's recommendations, but Hawke was convinced of the benefits of liberalization. As one of its former member said 'Hawke and Hayden took this to Cabinet, the education minister opposed it. And the prime minister said 'look I don't care we're going ahead with this''. Annex III provides an overview of declarations of policy experts interviewed to shed additional light on the mood across the country following this policy shift. The full fee policy was a small change in regulations whose enormous implications will slowly emerge in the following years, but the government also implemented a substantial reform of the system. Following the Dawkins White Paper *Higher Education: A policy statement*, the Unified National System entered into force in 1989 (DEET 2015), eliminating differences between universities and Centres of Advanced Education (CAEs), rationalizing the HEIs number (from 75 to 36) while increasing their student body (Jackson 2003). HR funding was at this point happening through direct negotiation between the federal government and universities, that were since 1988 allowed to retain the whole revenue coming from international students. The government was to provide funding to HEIs on a triennial basis, as according to the Higher Education Funding Act of 1988, base of the Australian systems until 2003 (DEET 2015). As introduced, while the Act formally left legislative prerogative to states and territories, it excluded them from the core process of bargaining. The policy objective was to reach more flexibility at the institutional level, thanks to a greater institutional control over resources (Megarrity 2007), and to alleviate the fiscal burden higher education was for the government. Universities income was therefore constituted by federal funding, revenue from overseas students, the OSC (from overseas students), and the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HESC), fees that could be charged to domestic students only in some post-graduate courses. Direct grants to Universities commenced in 1993, until when conditional grants to states where the main 'constitutional vehicle' to fund higher education.

Despite the strong input for competition, institutional staff was cooperating given the complete lack of know-how on ISM at the institutional level (Davis and Mackintosh 2010). 'No education institutions in the public sector had dedicated international student office […] and [they] had to be established from the ground up (Murray and Leask 2011, 831)', and they missed both infrastructure and workforce to respond to the transformation. Institutions appointed existing staff, with a large majority of people previously engaged by the Adult Migrant Education Program (AMEP) (Murray and Leask 2011) mentioned in section 3.2. IDP organized a workshop in Canberra already in 1987, *Overseas students: New Approaches and Practice,* to brought together 'managers, marketers, student support staff and governmental officials for the first time (Murray and Leask 2011, 372)'. The organization gained the sector's leadership, also given its established network in Asia (Murray and Leask 2011), and it became crucial for the AVCC to manage markets of the region, especially in relation to marketing (Gallagher 2011)'. Two years later it was also launched the Overseas Students'

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[17] Already with the Whitlam government, for example, the Commonwealth implemented a (very short in life) reform providing free education at the tertiary level, abolishing fees in 1973, without any change in the constitutional architecture of Australian federation.

[18] For the sake of clarity, the department will be named this way or its complete name as per correspondent periods.

Advisers' Network[19] (OSAN), a network providing opportunities for staff working in the field. Section 3.2 already described the unclear competence repartition and actors involved in these early years. Beyond the DET, as we saw, bodies involved were the OSO, the Australian Education Centres abroad and ADMs, plus IDP.

As discussed in section 3.2, moreover, the necessity to correct the negative externalities of the HE market begun salient, as concerns and problems related to fake students and fake providers became evident. Two different code of conduct were then developed, and already in 1991 the government promulged the ESOS Act in 1991, a consumer protection framework to protect students' fees in the event of providers collapse. Contextually, the risk assessment system begun to be developed to protect providers from bogus students as well as alleviate the burden of foreign applicants selections. We shall see this pattern of development for the entire period under analysis, with the Australian government setting up new frameworks in the first place, to then calibrate and adjust them as problems arose, also following input coming from stakeholders.

As it happened immediately after the launch of the new policy, when the OSO was created, the division of competences in this realm became a salient issue in the early nineties. The number of students grew as fast as anyone had predicted, contextually to the necessity of a body in charge of coordinating the industry In many thought to the English model of the British Council, especially the AVCC, while this idea was not in the mind of the government. The issue was made more complex given the fact that IDP had already a special role, and it was also a very experienced body. Following a tumultuous process, the government established the Australian International Education Foundation (AIEF) in 1994 as a coordinating body, and IDP was asked to cede it the management of the AECs entire network (Meadows 2011) in exchange of running seven AECs under financial compensation. AIEF was established as a government-industry partnership, which operated 'as a business program managed by the newly established International Education Promotion and Marketing Branch in DEET (Gallagher 2011, 128)'. It had three main tasks: the one of promote the benefits on international education abroad, and specifically in the Asian Pacific region, to facilitate national cooperation and to promote global understanding of Australian education community (Gallagher 2011). Stakeholders such as AVCC, initially supporting the creation of a governmental body, remained however dissatisfied (Meadows 2011), as they had in mind something on the British Council model. AIEF was instead more an advisor body (Meadows 2011), and the fact that IDP acted as an agent while running AECs in seven countries raised conflict of interest concerns (Meadows 2011). Further, AIEF had been thought to be a formal council of the NBEET including representatives from the wider industry rather than an advisory body. As we shall see below, AEIF did not lasted for long, also in light of its incapability to efficiently offer its services, a matter that turned into an advantage for IDP.

As partially saw in section 3.2, HE stakeholders begun in this period to organize themselves. While the most of the outcomes of this process will be far more evident during the new millennium, it is worth to observe more carefully the development of key actors' panorama during the nineties. The Super seven met in 1993, and later resulted in the establishment of the Group of Eight (Go8). The idea was to form a first-league players able to bargain directly with the federal level in relation to the deep change HEIs were undergoing, as eventually happened in 1996 (see Meek and Wood 1997). Consortia to promote institutions, as the CANDIP were created from the university international director in NSW and ACT (Davis and Macintosh 2010). The Affiliation of the International Peak Body (AIEPB) was also established as a forum to discuss matter of international education development. Moreover, the 'future' IIEA association was present across the country with state groups, very active during 1993 (Murray 2002), and a draft charter was under development. There was however a certain grade of immaturity. For example, attempts to constitutes an Australian Universities International (AUI) body failed (Murray and Leask 2011, 378), as the creation of a body grouping HEIs international responsible 1989, when the directors of Australian universities'

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[19] later ISANA: International Education Association

international offices tried to establish a National Association of Directors of International Offices (NADIO) to strengthen their advocacy position with the government (Murray 2002). However, it was soon clear that Vice-Chancellor and more generally the AVCC opposed the creation of such a body, probably to preserve their privileged position in front of the government (Murray 2002). By the mid-nineties, further concerns were risen in relation to IDP, which still had a predominant role. Sources highlight the universities did not like its very good job abroad, since it mostly focused on private providers offering non formal courses. Universities had also signalled the malfunctioning of AIEF, the reduction of venues for consultation with peak bodies (Gallagher 2011), and the inefficiency of AECs, especially in comparison to IDP services. Consequently, the government replaced AIEF with AIE, created this time within the DEET portfolio while keeping AIEF original aim of assisting governments in policy development, in connection with the foreign office and Australian government trade missions (Meek and Wood 1997). AIE received fair public funding (Megarrity 2007), and AUStrade interrupted its work abroad. The government also adopted a National Protocol for Higher Education Approval Process in an effort to stop fake and low quality educational institution in the wake of the Greenwich University affair, further correcting distortions of the market.

The success of the government reform was however clear at this point clear. The industry commission (1991) reported its benefits in the early nineties, with universities capitalizing on the new opportunities - while yet being for a large extent formally against the continuous reduction of public funds to universities.

Table 3.5 below reports the number of universities offering courses for international students from the beginning of the new policy and 1990. The most common interpretation emerged sees these years as the beginning of a cycle according to which the better universities performed in raising funds by overseas students, the more the government kept to decrease public contribution, henceforth pushing universities to so. In many saw (and see) the cycle as a virtuous one, which on the long run transformed Australian universities from being heavy subsidized entities into successful public enterprise, sometimes able to compete worldwide. By contrast, another interpretation sees a vicious cycle, prelude of unwanted consequences for HE quality, which transformed Australian universities in entities strongly reliant on foreigners' fees. It is here worth to underline the extent to which the Australian system begun a systematic transformation shaped both by the government and stakeholders, which immediately begun to organize themselves. The shift changed the core feature of approaching education as a public good, but already in the mid-nineties was clear the process of change had been substantial and became irreversible.

With the new Howard government, moreover, the message that universities will have received less funds was set in stone, and the second main phase of development of the system begun. Howard launched in 1996 the *Higher Education Budget Statement of 1996*, that reduced the number of grants for HEIs, increased the HECS rate and he lowered threshold repayment rate (DEET 2015). Most importantly, it abolished the cap on the number of Australian students paying full-fees beyond Commonwealth places (Jackson 2002-3). The Australian Ministry of Education, Vanstone, said that 'universities and their leaders should be leading the change in society, but they 'don't have a map, […] feel helpless and totally dependent on government in seeking to cope with the changes facing their own institutions (The Australian, 1996)', causing strong criticism by some Vice-Chancellors, that reacted saying how the only rationales the government showed has been the one of national deficit (Meek and Wood, 1997).

In 1999, moreover, the Howard government established the direct connection between international higher education and migration to Australia, pushing further Asian international students to enrol and universities to enrol them, and definitely transforming the Australia HE sector into a market, discussed in the previous section. As anticipated, despite the general opposition to the new policy of the governments, the sector was not passively taking notes of development.

TABLE 3.5 | Numbers of Australian HEIs offering courses to overseas students				
1986	**1987**	**1988**	**1989**	**1990**
22	51	60	63	130

SOURCE: Industry Commission (1991)

Table 3.5 - Numbers of Australian HEIs offering courses to overseas students

In 2002, it was established the Australian Universities International Director Forum[20] (AUDIF) to support advocacy and promote other activities. Murray (2002) report International directors thought they were an under-utilized resource for the sector. VIDC agreed and started to prepare the AVCC called meeting for the following year, when AUDIF was officially established. In 2003, moreover, during the annual jointly managed by AIE and IDP Conference– was also proposed that 'the international education profession in Australia begin a cross-sectoral consultation with a view to establish an Australian International Education Association within the foreseeable future (Murray 2002)'.

The example of the NAFSA in the USA and EAIE in Europe were since a while within the discussion of practitioners, that lead the creation of aforementioned state groups in the nineties as discussed above. While a number of actors were sceptical about the idea as they feared an overlap of tasks with other official bodies, the Association was set up in 2004 (Murray 2002). NIEA, the Network of International Education Association was launched soon later in 2007. In contrast, the AIEPB, created as the government industry stakeholder, did not result productive.

The active role of Australian stakeholders, tertiary institutions in the first place, became even more manifest as soon as they begun to capitalize on the 1999 policy linking degree mobility to permanent migration, since when inbound flows of students dramatically increased. In contrast to the late eighties, however, this time flows were far bigger. Experts interviewed revealed how Australian universities enjoyed the consistent increase in revenue, as well as they were aware of the many problems linked to the new policy. Issues such as the decrease in quality of a number of degrees, the emergence of new 'fake' degrees, dubious institutions and migrant agents, entered the public debate far before the 2008 event in Melbourne. However, as summarized by a former president of the AVCC, anyone at the time would have acted to alter such huge flows of students and revenues. The entire system was at this point highly integrated, and it fueled universities to enroll more foreign students, a key objective of the governmental agenda in the domains of education, migration, trade and labor-market. Consequently, the Melbourne event acted as a domino effect and had consequence for several years in Australia. Universities experienced for more than five years a steep decrease of enrollments of Indian students, a matters that highlighted another negative externality of such an integrated system: the constant increase of reliance Australian universities had by international students' fees.

As a result, in the immediate period following the events, the whole community of international education peak bodies begun to call for a national strategy for international education which could truly respond to the complexity of the industry. The sector had felt the consequences in the middle of the global financial crisis, with a stronger Australian dollar and global uncertainty to be summed to the stricter visa implemented to tackle the emergency phase (IEAC 2013). Already in 2009, former president of the IIEA Adams declared for example that the government should have set up 'a minister or at minimum a Parliamentary Secretary, with responsibility for international education […]. The Government should also partner with industry to develop a comprehensive national strategy on international education […] [and] support for the industry should be lifted to levels commensurate with the support already provided by government to Australia's other major export industries (Vista

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[20] Everything started in 2001, when Bob Goddard, at the time head of the International Division of the AVCC attended a meeting of the International Vice Chancellor Directors and revealed that the AVCC was planning to set up a meeting which could include those figures in early 2002 (Murray nd), during a dinner held in Sydney on the side of the 2001 Australian International Education Conference.

2009, 372)'. IIEA (2013, 2013 b, nd, nd b) also called for the development of a national policy on international education, more engagement between government and peak bodies, improved coordination across governmental agencies and better alignment of policies supporting the industry, awareness policies to increase Australian community understanding of international education, beyond the appointment of a formal position to handle international education at the political level (Vista 2009, 372). In 2011, it also published a position paper that called for a detailed definition of international education, commitment to quality and ethics, evidence-based policy, investments and effective consultation among stakeholders and the government, in the background of political support (IIEA 2011).

Contextually to the abolition of the MODL and the clear abolition of the link between ISM and permanent migration, the government established an International Education Advisory Council and developed an International Students Strategy for Australia in collaboration with State and Territory trough the COAG. It aimed to 'support a high quality experience for international students, in order to ensure a sustainable future for quality international education in Australia (ISSA 2011, 2)'. The strategy covered the 2010-2014 period, and focused on student wellbeing, quality and consumer protection, coherently to the 2010 ESOC ACT review.

As the former section illustrated, however, the attack of the Indian students was just the event that risen attention to the many additional problems behind the policy in force since about one decade, and it had marked consequences in terms of loss of reputation for the entire HE system (although providers cracks and others illegal affairs affected for the large part only the VET sector). Consequently, stakeholders, such as IIEA, did no welcomed the ISSA, given the framing that was reducing a large industry into a student strategy (Vista 2009, 372).

Starting with the West review of 1998, the Howard government had also set the ground for the introduction of a demand driven system, then introduced in 2012 (DEET 2015). McCawley (2008), former member of the 1983 Jackson committee drawn a parallel between the Bradley review results and the situation the Hawke government faced back in the early eighties, when the two discussed schools of thought, protectionist and internationalist, emerged across Australia. According to the author, the introduction of the Demand Driven System was in fact need to fully exploit the continuous emergence of the Asian market, while others pointed out to the constrains of further liberalization. The changes ended up to profoundly modify the HE governance, with the main aim of increasing the number of Australian graduates attending tertiary education. Following the reform, HEIs don't bargain anymore the number of places with the central government anymore and funding from the federal government is based on triennial mills. The reform also increased public contribution to HEIs, and accepted the introductory and participation and equity targets (DET 2015). The introduction of the demand driven system was a crucial moment in Australian higher education system as it fundamentally removed the cap on students number, making institutions much more autonomous[21]. The strong focus on quality and on increasing students belonging to low socio-economic background of the 2009 reform appear also coherent with the pressing issue of reputation, for the Australian higher education system following the 2008 perfect storm. Gillard, yet Prime Minister, declared that 'This is a transformation of our university system so that it can lead this nation in the knowledge economy of tomorrow for the jobs of tomorrow, whilst we deliver on providing support for Australian jobs today (Gillar J. 2009)'.

The Government had indeed accepted the recommendation of abolishing the OS-HELP upfront fee of the 20%, resulting in a rapid increase of ISM outbound flows, a trend which acquired salience in the Australian effort of demonstrate that international education was not 'all take no give', and that also Australia sent its students abroad.

As Maliki (2006, 1) wrote, 'outbound mobility has also been slowly gathering momentum in Australia' starting with the 2004 National Forum on Outbound Mobility (NFOM) and a National

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[21] In the course of a radio program, former Chief Executive of Universities Australia declared to this regard that 'we [the higher education system] don't like the micro-regulation, don't like the Government telling us exactly how many students to take and what areas. We like to be able to be flexible to adjust on that basis and deliver performance that the Government can judge (Withers G 2009)'.

Roundtable on Outbound Mobility which followed in 2006, within the framework of the AEI International Education Forum. NFOM has been developed as there was no national strategy to achieve what minister Nelson had identified in 2003. The forum had to raise the profile of outbound mobility experience, to push those numbers, and to increase coordination between institutions and the national level of government. It also had to provide 'a first class professional development activity for practitioners of international education'[22]. In 2004 the Australian Exchange Fair Circuit was also launched under the management of the ISANA's Study Abroad and Exchange group (Maliki 2006), helping to achieve the goal of increasing outbound mobility (universities were to use their previous connections with international partners to raise participation in exchange programs). In the conclusion of the final report of the 2006 Roundtable, Maliki (2006) points out that an organization to manage outbound mobility would have ensured a better management of programs nationwide, such as issue relating to quality assurance and accreditation, branding, promoting and marketing, fundraising and one-stop shop, possibly given the organization would be able to maintain itself.

The abolishing of the OS-HELP upfront fee in 2010 resulted soon in a rapid increase of students engaged with the scheme. The adjustment of the policy came after a national lobby campaign. In the words of an campaign leader, the fee was 'quite a blunt instrument, because most of the students who take out study overseas and we know students study overseas are more likely to complete their degrees… and therefore will pay it back. So it's a really unfair mechanism for them to be paying the 20 per cent for people who you know don't repay their tax'. Evidence suggests the government received suddenly a very high number of submissions and experts calling for a most decisive development of outbound flows. Fees of the DEE-HELP was also increased to the 25% (Parliamentary Service Department 2018), and data reveals how the number of loans given after the abolition of the OS-HELP fees almost doubled immediately, and more than tripled by 2013. As section 3.2 revealed already, however, outbound mobility acquired salience also in light of other reasons. The Australian 2020 Summit held in 2008 gave large attention to the role of education for the Asian century that had come (Australian 2020 Summit Final Report).

Ap art for the OS-HELP scheme, the government funded other programs, such as the International Student Exchange Program, UMAP and the Endeavour (both Endeavour student Exchange Program and Endeavour Cheung Kong Student Exchange Program), for a total of five and an half millions per year. Daly and Barker (2010) report that students within the UMAP scheme received 5000 dollars each as a subsidize to support the exchange programs, resulting in a contribution by the Australian government of about 2.9 millions of funding in the financial year 2008. This scheme attracted however a number of criticism because of its excessive bureaucracy, and it lacked prestige (Daly and Barker 2010). Maliki (2006) even argued how students who receive the scholarship 'are not even aware of where their grants has come from', and that the attempt to create an UCTS (UMAP Credit Transfer System) under the ECTS model failed to reach any outcome. This aspect more generally emerged by fieldwork, with a number of experts underlying the lack of relevance of outbound flows. It was also clear, that beyond flows also technology was strongly imbalanced in favour of inbound flows: Australia was not even capable to map the number of Australian students engaged with ISM.

An AUDIF (2007) study found that only the 6% of students undertaken a mobility experience abroad in 2007 among undergraduate students, a percentage esteemed to be of the 4.8% in 2005. Jones et al (2016) reports this percentages at a value of 13,1% already in 2012: in about ten years the esteem passed by a 0.41 of the 1996-2001 period to exceed the 10% following 2010[23]. Olsen (2005) also

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[22] The roundtable of 2006 concluded i) that the governmental priority was concentrated in the Asian-Pacific, ii) that UMAP funding would have increased from 1.4 to 1.6 millions of dollars and the number of Cheung Kong Scholarships double to 200 per year, iii) that a loan scheme that could assist in funding outbound mobility was to be developed. Moreover, it highlighted gaps in data collection and stated the IEAA would have begun to carry out research on the issue, and a taskforce on data collection would have been established with AUDIF and other relevant stakeholders, as well as issues related to institutions reporting of exchange programs. It was also the occasion to call for the development of additional funding scheme, to exchange relevant material across practitioners and to gain media attention on outbound mobility.

[23] Olsen (2005) report that in 2006 experiences abroad of at least a semester where the 'key types' of mobilities for the Australian government in its main project of increasing outbound mobility, and they represented the 47% of experiences, with yearly based

report that until then the majority of Australian students went to Europe (42%). As more precisely showed by Annex III, as also revealed by the AUDIF survey of 2015, outbound mobility strongly grew in the last decade; the report found out that in some institutions about one quarter of students took part in outbound mobility (UA 2016). Pasfield et al 2010 also report the extent to which 'Australian universities are developing new opportunities for students […], these include partnerships expansions, varied study options and increased communications (Pasfield et al 2010,2)'. Also institutional university support for increased, with the majority of universities allocating funds for student participation (UA 2016).

The fast development of outbound mobility sheds further light on the capability and efficiency of Australian universities to adapt and response to change, to set up a plan and move to achieve it. It also highlight the extent to which stakeholder at least influence the governmental agenda. According to UA (2016, 4) this has been possible thanks to a 'combination of factors, including an increased focus on university and government policy makers and practitioners to making learning abroad more academically accessible, more affordable and less complicated'. Pasfield et al (nd, 1), noted that the benefits of international experience for students have been acknowledged since long in Australia, and recently this 'acknowledgement has been matched by a substantial will by the Australian government, institutions and the education sector in general to increase the mobility of Australian students'. The launch of the New Colombo Plan, and its high profile framing, has been the cherry of the story: outbound mobility meaning went beyond their salience due to prestige and reputation of the system abroad, and it became a pillar of Australian public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region. Its rapid growth is illustrated more in detail by annex III.

To summarize, the HE sector was fully able to recover following 2008 events and begun to grow to an yet unprecedent rate, enrolling even more students than before. This hold both for domestic and international students. Norton (2019) notes that since the introduction of the demand system (from 2008 until 2017) the increase in bachelor students was of 45%, meaning about one quarter of a million. Universities Australia (nd) report the enrolment of undergraduate student from regional and remote areas increased of the 50%, and for low socio-economic backgrounds of the 66%, while participation by indigenous increased of the 105%, and even more of the 123% the one for students with disability. The Grattan (2018) institute also showed that in 2016 one quarter of machinery operators, drivers and labourers' kids had a degree or were at universities, up for the 9% by the previous decade. Moreover, that, as according to Bradley's aim, courses expanded in areas of skills shortage. The very last development in Australian HE reveal however a less solid system, and a number of emerging problems in the government-stakeholders dynamics.

The demand driven system was frozen by the Coalition in 2017, under explanation of excessive burden in terms of costs. The act was done by means of a fiscal emergency provision hence force not requiring parliamentary approval and revealing how the Coalition approach may change overnight with any discussion. The immediate implications will be mitigated by the current *plateau* in demand, but the 'Costello-era baby boom generation is due to arrive at university and it could easily add 20,000 to the number of people applying for higher education (Norton 2017)'.

Inconsistent declarations about future policy around international students have been made, ranging from uncertainty about the number of students to be welcomed to the one of sending international students only to the bush. More generally, as discussed in the previous section, the political discourse became more volatile. Further, concerns party emerged already in the years of Melbourne events emerged again, this time particularly concerning Chinese students. Their dramatic concentrations in few degrees rise important quality concerns, and more generally a number of other issues arisen. Some also claimed evidence of Chinese students enrolled in master degree with very poor or any English knowledge were able to pass exams. The over-dependency of Australian institution by this specific stream of revenue is also at the centre of the debate (it constitute around the 40% of the total

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counting for the 16%, and only about one third (36%) were short term types. We shall see how instead the latter group will strongly increase while long term mobility will timidly grow.

international student body), as despite problems are manifest the alternatives are currently missing. Data reveals that in some of the biggest institutions, fees of international students to count for around the 40% of the total revenue. The response to the Covid-19 crisis of the Coalition, both towards universities and international students, as we saw in section 3.2.6 add insight on deteriorating relations between the government and the HE sector (annex III provides a series of statistical data to this regards). Universities Australia (2020) writes that 'the government has repeatedly sought to craft legislative instruments specifically to exclude universities from the scheme, while publicly maintaining that universities would be eligible on the same terms as other business or not-for-profit organization (Universities Australia 2020, 15)'.

Recent empirical evidence is also raising problems related to academic freedom and other biggest issues, such as the integration of these students (especially, once more, for Chinese students). Chinese students seems not to live an international experience, but rather to live together to a group of other mainland Chinese students for the entire period of the degree; several episodes of students receiving complaints by Chinese authority following a specific discussion held in class reported also shed light of the presence of Chinese military personnel into Australian institution (we shall discuss this issue in the foreign policy section (See Varghese 2018, SMEE 2020).

3.3.2 Immigration

As section 3.2 introduced, ISM development in Australia has been deeply connected since the early beginning to the domestic policy on immigration, with the Colombo marking a milestone of Asian migration to Australia. Australia passed by being a monocultural and monolingual country with clear British and European origin to become a truly multicultural society where about one every ten Australian has been born overseas, and more importantly, often in Asia. The demographic evolution of Australian population is surely one of the biggest and profound change happened during the last decades. The increase of Asians, before cut off by the Australian White Policy, and the decreasing role of European migration is clearly visible in table 3.6 below. The growing relevance of Asians in migration is also observable in the demographic composition of international students, as shown by table 3.7 below and partially discussed by the previous section. McDonald (2019) also notes how data from the Census 1961 reveal that only the 0,3% of Australian population had Asian origins, while in 2016 the 26% of all birth in Australia had a least a parent born in Asia. Button and Rivzi (2018) add that

> 'more than 3.6 million migrants – one in seven in the country – have arrived in the past twenty years. Nearly one in four Melbourne residents arrived in the past decade. Today, one in ten Australians is born in Asia, and for the first time in the nations' history, a greater proportion of people born overseas are from Asia rather than Europe. More than one in three residents of Melbourn's CBD speaks Mandarin or Cantonese at home, while Sydney has sixty-seven suburbs in which at least half of the population does not speak English at home (Button and Rivzi 2018, 1).

This section retraces the domestic policy development of immigration and multiculturalism policy frameworks until the current days, to shed further light on the marked linkages between ISM and immigration in the country.

Policy development

Koleth (2010) note how since the establishment of the department of Immigration in 1945, the governmental and public discourse on migration and cultural diversity has fluctuated, with periods focused on assimilation, others on integration and yet others on multiculturalism. Assimilation was the main policy objective in the immediate period following the war, including the granting them Australian citizenship in the effort to avoid the emergence of a temporary population.

Migration from Asia was however not welcomed for the most of the time since British settlement in the country (McDonald 2019). The White Australian Policy was also one of the first act holding bipartisan support of the Australian federation (while basing on different motivations – related to inferiority for the right and on fear of labour market competition by the left) (McDonald 2019). It was effectively a 'founding and defining law of the new Australian Commonwealth (Button 2018)', according to which non Europeans could not migrate to the country as well as 'any idiot or insane person (Button 2018)'. The country had hence mostly no immigrants coming from Asia.

Its first minister for immigration, Artur Calwell, was convinced that Australia could become a real heterogenous society that mixed Italians, Greeks, Dutch or any others (Button 2018). He spelt out the crucial role that immigration had for the country announcing the post war migration program to the nation (Button 2018): the ministry had yet in mind however a society based on European origins, with no place to Asia.

At that point, Australia was anyway experiencing some incoming flows from Asia: overseas students participants of the Colombo Plan, who reached the number of about 5.500 between 1951 and 1964, counting alone for the 16% of the total flows of the program (Oakman 2002). Oakman (2002 stress that students were already highly educated and spoke fluent English, and therefore they de facto helped to 'debunk[…] the myth of Asian intellectual inferiority or backwardness (Oakman 2002, 95)'. Although the number of Asian was small, 'their presence marked something of a watershed in Australia's cultural development, and their appearance […] provided a direct – if subtle – challenge to Australian insularity (Oakman 2002, 89).

The official rhetoric had already shifted towards the term 'integration' during the sixties, and soon after also the 'multiculturalism' would have entered in the Australian public debate (DPS 2010). The attitude to migrants was about to shift, with the idea is was possible that immigrants kept their cultural identity after arriving (DPS 2010). The process of decolonization brought the country to focus on Asia as never before, and hence force the White Australian policy was becoming a source of diplomatic embarrassment in Australia neighbourhood (McDonald 2019). Foreign newspapers in India, for example, argued that Colombo plan was a 'kind of blood-money paid by the Australian to silence his guilty conscient toward Asians and Africans (Times of Indonesia 1958 in Oakman 2002). In 1966, Prime Ministry Holt called for a review of migration approach in pointing out to Asian students and to the growth of trade with Asian countries. Al Grassby mentioned the term 'multiculturalism' for the first time during its speech '*A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future*' in 1973 (Parliament Service 2010). In 1974, the White Australian Policy was abolished and the Immigration Restriction Act repealed (Parliamentary Service 2010). Multiculturalism was at that point an issue on which there was bipartisan support, a state of thing which will last until the development of Howard's One Australia policy in 1989 (Parliamentary Service 2010). By 1977, Australia had a more defined approach of multiculturalism, 'cultural pluralism', since 'Australia should [have] work[ed] towards not a oneness, but a unity, not a similarity, but a composite, not a melting pot but a voluntary bond of dissimilar people sharing a common political and institutional structure (Parliament Services 2010, 2)'. Few years later, in 1982, the Australian Council on Population and Ethic Affairs also published a report to tackle the spreading uncertainty of the domestic public around multiculturalism, and defined it far more broadly (Parliamentary Services 2010): the report called for 'equal responsibility for, commitment and participation in society (Parliamentary Services 2010, 8)'.

Table 3.6 - Top 10 Countries of Birth for the overseas-born population

1981- 2016

	1981		1986		1991		1996		2001		2006		2011		2016	
	Country	share	Country	share	Country	share	Country	share	Country	share	Country	share	Country	share	Country	share
1	UK	36.5	UK	33.5	UK	30.0	UK	27.5	UK	25.4	UK	23.6	UK	20.8	UK	17.7
2	ITA	9.3	ITA	8.6	ITA	7.2	NZ	7.5	NZ	8.8	NZ	8.8	NZ	9.1	NZ	8.4
3	NZ	5.4	NZ	6.3	NZ	6.9	ITA	6.1	ITA	5.4	China	4.7	Chi	6.0	Chi	8.3
4	YUG	5.0	YUG	4.7	YUG	4.4	Vietnam	3.9	Vietnam	3.8	Italy	4.5	India	5.6	India	7.4
5	Greece	4.9	Greece	4.3	Greece	3.7	Greece	3.2	China	3.5	Vietnam	3.6	Italy	3.5	Philippines	3.8
6	GER	3.7	GER	3.6	Vietnam	3.3	China	2.8	Greece	2.9	India	3.3	Vietnam	3.5	Vietnam	3.6
7	NL	3.2	NL	3.0	GER	3.0	GER	2.8	Germany	2.7	Philippines	2.7	Philippines	3.2	Italy	2.8
8	POLAND	3.7	Vietnam	2.6	NL	2.6	Phil	2.4	Philippines	2.6	Greece	2.5	South Africa	2.8	South Africa	2.6
9	MALTA	1.9	Poland	2.1	CHI	2.1	NL	2.2	India	2.3	Germany	2.4	Malaysia	2.2	Malaysia	2.2
10	Lebanon	1.7	Malta	1.8	Phil	2.0	India	2.0	NL	2.1	SA	2.4	Germany	2.0	Sri Lanka	1.8
tot		73.7	tot	69.9		65.5		39.5		59.4		58.6		58.9		58.7
other		26.7		30.1		34.5		60.5		40.6		41.4		41.1		41.3
% of pop		20.3	% of pop	20.6		22.0		22.0		21.7		22.2		24.6		26.3

Source: Elaboration of the Author, Data of the Australian Bureau of Statistics

TABLE 3.7 - Share of International student by country of Origin –
only higher education/all international students

	2002		2008		2013		2018	
	only he	all	only he	all	only he	all	only he	all
Bangladesh	1,8	1,1	0,8	1,0	1,5	0,8	1,5	0,8
Brazil	0,4	1,9	0,4	3,5	0,4	4,4	0,4	4,4
Canada	1,4	1,0	2,0	0,9	1,1	0,7	1,1	0,7
Chile	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,5	0,2	0,5
China	**17,1**	**19,8**	**32,8**	**23,7**	**37,8**	**24,3**	**37,8**	**24,3**
France	0,4	0,9	0,8	0,8	0,6	0,8	0,6	0,8
Germany	0,8	1,3	0,8	1,4	0,5	1,1	0,5	1,1
Hong Kong	7,7	7,3	2,5	1,6	3,0	2,1	3,0	2,1
India	**7,2**	**3,4**	**14,1**	**18,3**	**9,7**	**8,8**	**9,7**	**8,8**
Indonesia	8,8	6,1	4,1	2,6	3,4	2,9	3,4	2,9
Ita	0,1	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,3	1,3	0,3	1,3
Japan	2,2	7,1	1,3	2,4	0,7	2,6	0,7	2,6
Nepal	**0,6**	**0,4**	**2,1**	**3,7**	**3,8**	**2,5**	**3,8**	**2,5**
Pakistan	**0,9**	**0,5**	**1,3**	**1,1**	**3,0**	**2,4**	**3,0**	**2,4**
Philip	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,5	1,3	1,9	1,3	1,9
Saudi-Arabia	0,0	0,1	1,3	1,8	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,7
Singapore	7,8	3,5	3,4	1,2	2,8	1,1	2,8	1,1
Spain	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,1	1,1	0,1	1,1
Sri Lanka	1,5	0,8	1,9	1,4	1,5	0,9	1,5	0,9
Taiwan	3,0	3,6	1,8	1,6	1,0	1,7	1,0	1,7
Thailand	**4,4**	**6,2**	**2,0**	**4,2**	**1,3**	**4,6**	**1,3**	**4,6**
UK	1,3	1,2	0,9	0,8	0,6	1,1	0,6	1,1
Usa	2,3	6,0	1,3	3,0	1,0	2,5	1,0	2,5
Vietnam	**1,5**	**1,2**	**3,0**	**3,2**	**4,6**	**5,0**	**4,6**	**5,0**
Tot	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: Elaboration of the Author | AIE Data

Table 3.7 - Share of International student by country of Origin

Contextually to the Australian approach to multiculturalism, a new approach to immigration was also developed in the early eighties, overcoming a migration model based from on family reasons and asylum seekers to one on skilled migration. The country overcame its old assisted passage scheme, markedly focused on aid (Betts 2003), and four new main channels of migration were established: independent migrants, family reunions, humanitarians' migrants and the neo-Zealanders. In 1983, to increase the efficiency of migration flows, the Australian

government launched the BUSINESS Migration Program and the ELICOS schemes, soon before the introduction of streamlined procedures for student visas (Betts 2003).

However, many migrants previously arrived in Australia in the previous years begun to qualify for on-shore migration application, and, as a result, many migrants were getting visas yet on humanitarian grounds (Betts 2003). A new occupational category also emerged: migration agents. As Betts (2003) report, while the most of them were 'reputable', such industry begun to work clandestinely and helped in some cases smugglers and people traffickers. This was also the case among overseas student whose number were swiftly increasing. The Labour government, while keen to promote skilled migration, had a different agenda in regard to asylum seekers. As Button (2018) pointed out in its article, prime minister Hawke, one year after

> 'tearfully decreeing that 20.000 (later 42,000) Chinese students could remain in Australia after the Tiananmen Square massacre, said upon the arrival of one boat containing 25 Cambodians and one Vietnamese: 'We have an orderly migration program. We're not going to allow people just to just the queue by saying we'll jump into a boat… lob here, and Bob's your uncle. Bob is not your uncle on this issue'.

In those years, 'a close association' between migration and racism had developed, and the management of immigration had turned to be difficult (Betts 2003). In 1984, a prominent Australian historian pointed out that the influx of Asian was 'threatening the social fabric', giving a degree of respectability to this viewpoint (McDonald 2019, 90)'. In 1988, while in opposition, Coalition leader John Howard developed the One Australia Policy and begun to question that 'the proportion [of migrants] coming from Asia was higher than the majority of the public preferred (Betts 2003, 171).', consequently breaking the bipartisan consensus until then in force in Australia in relation to both its migration program and its approach to multiculturalism.

The FitzGerald commission criticized the still excessive focus of Australian immigration policy on family reunion, suggesting a greater intake from skilled migrants (Betts 2003). The Committee suggested that an immigration reform was needed, and it pointed out multiculturalism was not really understood by Australian population. It suggested to stress Australian identity along multiculturalism, as to shift the core of the migration program toward economy. Betts also report contrariety on migration was growing as multiculturalism 'had helped make immigration unpopular (Betts 2003, 175)'.

Due to a recession, the Hawke government cut a number of government programs in the mid-eighties (Parliamentary Services 2010), among which some of the migration program. It also abolished the AIMA, but established the Human Right and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) and the Office for Multicultural Affairs (OMA). In 1989, it released the *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia* in the effort to respond to growing discontent, setting outs rights and obligation for Australians (right to cultural identity, social justice and economy efficiency, an unifying commitment to Australia) (Parliamentary Services 2010). Moreover, it established the National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition and expanded the support for English language teaching – a program that will become the largest worldwide. It was also established the Bureau of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Population Research (BIMPR), and the National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC) in 1994. The NMAC released immediately after *Multicultural Australia: the next steps*, to which the Keating government reacted with a *Multicultural Compact*. In 1992 the government had also launched its Productive Diversity Policy, with the aim of highlighting the positive impact that increasing rate of employment among non-English Speaking Backgrounds (NESB) migrants could have on the Australian trade sector (Hawthorne 2005), a move according to the author more visionary than data based. Hawthorne how the period between 1992 and 1996 was marked by the need to retrieve secure data on employment outcomes by migrants' origin, and this was one of the main migration research area receiving continuous federal support.

In 1995, there was an important change in immigration policy. A selection points system was introduced for those applying to permanent residency - depending on English qualification, age, qualification and work experience, and a more robust temporary migration program was developed in the wake of the increasing necessity of skilled labour force (McDonald 2019). This move followed data which pointed out to lower grade of employability of Backgrounds NESB migrants. Also the National Agenda of 1988 affirmed the way in which labour performances of these migrants were inferior than English speaking migrants and Australians, and the discrimination migrants faced. A first major issue emerged therefore around English competences, to which the government swiftly responded (we saw before the AMEP). English speaking migrants, by contrasts, emerged by a number of studies to outperform both NESB migrants and Australian in their performances (Hawthorne 2005). By that time, the number of migrants in the Australian labour force was already relevant. Almost 49% of mechanical engineering were born overseas, as the 40% of doctors, the 43% of skilled workers in computing jobs (Hawthorne 2005).

As largely introduced in section 3.2, while the Hawke government had a positive approach to multiculturalism, the following Howard government had an opposite approach. Betts (2003) also report at that time the 71% of public declared that there were too many migrants in Australia, and the debate was by far politicized. The government was determined in its action against multiculturalism: it abolished the OMA, the BIMPR, restricted the AMEP program, and reduced funding for migration programs (Parliamentary Services 2010). Pauline Hanson famously declared that Australia was 'in danger of being swamped by Asians' (McDonald 2019). While the Howard government had been explicit in its different approach to migration and multiculturalism developed by the previous Labour governments, a number of exponent of the Coalition revealed their opposition to the One Australian Policy. Before Howard's election, Hawke managed to approve a motion according to which the Australian parliament refused 'the use of race to select immigrants (McDonald 2019, 90)' which was voted for example by a number of exponents of the liberal party. McDonald (2019) notes that until 1996, opposition to Asian migration was based mostly on socially based concern. During the first years while he was in cabinet, the government however increased the number of skilled migrants, foreign students, and Holiday Makers visas - commonly called backpackers (Parliamentary Service 2020), which numbers markedly grew. The Parliamentary Service (2016) reports that while 417 visas released in 1982-1983, they were 50,000 in the year 1996-1997. The program, once targeting UK, Ireland and Canada, expanded to a number of Asian country among which Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and a number of European nation (Parliamentary service 2016). The program gives youth foreigners between 18 and 30 years of travelling around Australia with short fixed term jobs, and taken together international students and skilled migrants made up already relevant extent of the total temporary population in Australia already in the mid-nineties[24]. In 1999, the NMAC called for a leadership to defend multiculturalism, increasing funds and advocacy. However, the Howard government did not implement its recommendation while it launched of a new policy statement (Parliamentary Service 2010).

In the years between 1999 and 2001, migration of Asylum seekers gained attention. An unprecedent number of migrants attempted to reach Australia by boat, coming mostly from the middle east, a situation culminated with the Tampa crisis in August 2001 (Parliamentary Service 2010), when the M/N Tampa was prevented to reach Australian coastlines. Howard publicly defended the decision. Summed to the 9/11 attacks, the issue of migration and of international terrorism were by then important the key discussions on the table, and 'brought many latent

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[24] Following the first decade, main concerns for the program shifted to the plausible impact of the program on the Australian labour market, as visa holders were entitled to work in the country to sustain their holiday time (Commonwealth of Australia 1997[24]). While the program policy rationales were based on cultural exchange grounds, we shall see already the salience of this stream in terms of labour-market, something that will continue and indeed strengthen over the time. The program will strongly contribute to the growth of the temporary population into the country.

anxieties about multiculturalism to a head (Parliamentary Services 2010, 31)'. Intuitively, the war in Iraq, the 2002 Bali bombing as all as the 2005 London ones contributed to a stiffening of public discourse to immigration. Already in 2003, the Howard government published a new agenda pointing to national cohesion as the best way to protect Australia. Following 2005 Cronulla Riots, moreover, the Coalition government openly begun to argue 'multiculturalism' was an obsolete term, and suggested to shift toward assimilation or integration (Parliamentary Services 2010). In contrast with this picture, the DPS (2010, 34) report that two different studies of 2002 and 2006 found 'there was an overwhelming positive response to Australia's cultural diversity among a majority of the participants'. In sum, the discourse of immigration did not calm down in the early 2000 and the Howard government kept its sharp attitude to migration, while the migration intake kept to increase in the meantime.

As section 3.2 extensively discussed, the government opened however an 'highway to international students' for permanent migration in Australia in 1999, with Howard becoming 'the biggest migration Prime Minister in history of the country', as argued by a former high level policy advisor, although keeping a very sharp public attitude towards immigration. As discussed, it was not by chance: Birrel and Hawthorne (1999) had found that former international students had very good performances in the labour marked, outperforming also those of domestic students and regardless of their nationality, for example also among Vietnamese and Filipinos, usually NESB migrants characterized by poor performances. They advocated to remove the three years ban for permanent migration within the larger 'lobby case' discussed in section 3.2, also in light of the general acceptability employers demonstrated in their regards (Hawthorne 2005).

In other words, the government directly linked the two stream of migration to Australia, the temporary and the permanent ones. A new approach to migration into Australia, often called as Two-Step migration was established. Among the other things, in 1999 the government abolished the three year ban that prevented international students to apply for PM, and in 2002 it also granted them the chance to apply onshore (Hawthorne 2010). The result of this new policy have been astonishing: 'by 2007, two-third [of skilled migrants] were former international students recruited in Australia rather than off-shore applicants (Hawthorne 2010, 5-6), and more generally, continues Hawthorne (2010), 'the majority of skilled independent category migrants […] [were] […] sourced in Australia rather than off-shore'. Overall, Hawthorne argues how the shift in policy following 1995 strongly helped to reduce the intake of migrants with poor labour market outcomes, with unemployment passing by 23,4% in 1995 to 12,4% in 2005 (Hawthorne 2005)'.

As section 3.2 revealed, the bridging of temporary and permanent migration has been concurrent with the exponential grow of the international education industry, the rising numbers of international students and the increasing reliance of education providers on their full fees, given the decreasing support in real terms of the government to public education. By 2006, international students had the 99% of chance of being selected, with a 66% of Indian students and around 38% of Chinese transferring to permanent migration. A guardian visa was also established so that international student could bring their parents in Australia, something that drove entire foreign families to relocate in the country. This is especially true in the case of Chinese students, as because of the one child Chinese policy their parents qualify for this visa (McDonald 2019). In the words of Hawthorne (2010, 13), 'the export education sector was an immediate beneficiary of Australia's shift to student migration [and] strong expectations developed for these students as skilled migrants'.

Interview material enlighten that such transformation has been possible also in light of a changing attitude towards the subset of international students at the department of immigration. Until the turn of millennium, following the troubles emerged in the late eighties/late nineties related to bogus students, the rise of migrant agents and of fake providers, overseas students were seen as a treat from the immigration department. Experts reported how the Treasure, the Immigration and Education department, the Productivity Commission and the Reserve Bank

begun instead to work in a coordinated matter, they 'had been one mind on this for a long time' until 'consensus broke in 2017' – overcoming the period in which the approach to overseas students by the DIAC was definitely more negative. One expert, former high level public officials at the department made this point:

> And interestingly through the 90s the philosophical view of the Immigration Department was that transition was bad. So the view was that transition was a bad thing. And we should stop that. From 2001 we decided 'no that's a good thing'. So we completely turned on this. Most immigration departed from that 2001 period because there was a number of changes made after all, the really significant day is July 1th, 2001'.

As discussed in section 3.2, this was not a neglectable issue. We shall come back to this point at the end of the section, and turn now to the consequences of the dramatic shift in Australian migration starting in 1999.

The intake of migrants begun to grow with unprecedent speed, among skilled migrants and international students, in the stream of working holiday makers and family reason (given that a number of migrants arrived in the previous years were beginning to relocate and brought their spouses and children in Australia). It is in the period after 2006, in fact, that the first consequences of such a swift increase in migration intake let emerged its unintended consequences as it led to a very rapid expansion of the temporary population in Australia, for the first time in history.

Already in the mid-2000, media reported the emergence of ghettoes in Melbourne and Sydney mostly made up by international students. Hawthorne (2010) report that in 2006, following the largest ever government commissioned review for migration policy, a number of additional constrains came out.

In the first place, performances of skilled migrants recruited onshore were lower than those recruited offshore; overseas students performances were then lower of those of Australians born, especially in English performances, given the prior lift of the English test requirements. Moreover, the straight connection between vocational training and permanent migration also drove the emergence of 'wily entrepreneurial players existing solely to funnel international students into skilled migration […]. Dramatic growth in student demand also occurred for hairdressing and hospitality courses, in a context where these could secure equivalent migration bonus point as six-year medical degrees. […] (Hawthorne 2010, 18)'. The attack to the Indian student in Melbourne in 2008 overcome the red line and only then, after about nine years, major policy shift to the program occurred, sanctioning the end of the direct link between education and permanent residency. The following government led by Rudd also modified the skilled stream making skilled immigration strongly linked to sponsorship. But the consequence of the Indian attack in Melbourne were major, and they even awaken a discussion about Multiculturalism which was not in the headlines of governmental agenda since 2003. Despite the abolishment of the direct linkages between holding Australian qualification and permanent migration, a new temporary graduate visas was introduced, allowing international students to remain in Australia after their studies between two and four years. Further, the stream of holiday makers kept to grow, reaching its peak number in 2012-2013 (DPS 2016).

The last Howard government also changed the name of the DIMA, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which became the Department of Immigration and Citizenship in 2007, removing the word 'multiculturalism' after ten year from its creation and operating not substantial change in its organization. But as introduced, multiculturalism came back in the discussion with the newly elected Labour government. Particularly PM Gillard re-established a multiculturalism portfolio, established the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council (AMAC) to advise government on issue related to racism, social cohesion and intolerance (DPS 2010).

A new process for the selection of skilled migrants in Australia was also established, and it marked the end of any possible rational calculation to gain permanent residency. The system

consist in an online database which collect application called 'Expression of Interests' (EOI), and applicants may or may not be invited to formally proceed. Bourcher and Davidson 2019 explain the rationales lies behind the change, notably velocity, the absence of claims to question the decision, the necessity of a pre-match between applicants and sponsors. They conclude the system 'further changed the nature of permanent skilled migration selection in Australia' strongly decreasing the predictability of an application.

In 2013, the Coalition again in cabinet made some change a the departmental level. More sharply, in the words of Button (2018), in 2013, Abbot 'began gutting the department': it moved the AMEC program to the Department of Industry, shifted the responsibility for multicultural policy and settlement services to the Department of Social Services (Button 2018), and re-named the department as Department of Immigration and Border Control. The following year the Australian Border Force was created, and the head of the Department, Pezzullo, declared that 'the department of immigration of our collective memory and imagination will be no more (Button 2018, 2)'. Finally in 2017, the department was also absorbed by the Department of Home Affairs, a move that 'changed the way we think about immigration from nation building and economic benefits to security and law enforcement, the attitude changed', as declared by a former high level official at the (yet) Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Abbot had suggested to substantially cut the permanent immigration program, passing by 190,000 to 110,000 per year (Button and Rivzi 2018). Button (2018) report that Pezzullo declared that Australia was entering its third revolution in managing migration, finally targeting high skilled temporary migration, as they would secure a strong economy. Already in 2016-2017, Button and Rivzi (2018) noted the target for temporary migration was transformed in a ceiling, and in 2016-2017 the intake has been lower the foreseen. In sum, following the return in power of the Coalition, the approach to immigration in Australia stiffened. As the aforementioned former public official at the DIMA put it, consensus on the issue had broken among domestic actors and the immigration department has now a different attitude towards immigration.

At the eve of 2020, twenty-five years after the migration revolution begun in the mid-nineties, Australia finds itself a deeply transformed country. The enormous intake of migrants means unprecedent numbers of international students, working holiday visa holders, and skilled migrants. The number of Asian migrants makes up more than the half of total migrants in Australia, with peaks of 67% in the Skilled Stream and 88% for the off-shore humanitarian Stream (McDonald 2019). Australia found itself with a very large temporary population, which stays in Australia for a relevant number of years before leaving Australia or applying for permanent residence: an international students, by way of example, may arrive in Australia at 18 years old, be granted two studying visas for BA and MA, plus a temporary graduate one, and then further apply via the independent stream, for a total of years between 5 and 10 years. The discourse on migration has been even more politicised in the last decade. The Department of Immigration does not anymore even exist, and how discussed above, the approach to immigration shifted to a more security-driven approach. On top of this, the Covid-19 outbreak impacted on Australian migration policy, sanctioning a moment in which implications of having such a wide part of Australian population in the country on a temporary bases, as illustrated in section 3.2. Moreover, a silent demographic revolution remains to be explained to the Australian public. McDonald and Withers (2008) noted already at the end of the 2000s Australia has absorbed already a large number of migrants and attitudes towards immigrants even became positive, also in light of the fact that the economic oriented selection of migrants has meant a fast integration in the Australian labour market and social life of the country for migrants, as well as the fact they were strongly covering positions among those at labour shortage. The authors of *Population and Australia's Future Labour Force*, conclude their analysis recommending to increase the migrant intake 'unless the public can be reassured that all best-practice efforts are being adopted (McDonald and Withers 2008 4)'. Also the Australian government (2015) risen concerns related to the fact that linking

international education to a huge market could have unintended consequences in Asian markets, and provided recommendation on the way according to which communicate such contents. However, despite in many raised up the necessity to carefully communicate to the wider Australian public the great demographic transformation Australia begun in the eighties, whose impact begun to be felt particularly after the mid-2000, this issue remained latent for the most of the time. Blakely and Hu (2019) revealed how Australian huge exports of education are concentrated in Australian cities, which 'have housed the bulk of Australia's population, including many of the quarter of a million or more migrants arriving each year since the 1960'. If some discussion about governance-related problems begun, such as an increased coordination among federal, state and local governments on the aforementioned issues such as congestion, the same does not hold for public awareness. A high level former public official to the immigration department revealed about this discussion that

> At the transport level we bowed Yeah. We failed on accommodation, we failed on transport. We failed on infrastructure and we failed on basic communication to or certainly in recent years basic communication to society, to people. […] The worst thing we did at the Commonwealth level was we stopped communicating what was going to happen from a population perspective across Australia. We failed to adequately communicate that to the Australian public at large. We should have been communicating to everybody that this is going to happen. Get ready. It's gonna be a surge of overseas students get ready. […] This is a failure at the federal level to adequately communicate the surge that was coming. And when the surge came everyone demands it 'how did this happen?' No one told us! Well actually … it was pretty obvious. […] You have to communicate. You've got to better communicate and we're not we're not communicating because I don't think the government is sure from a political perspective what to communicate'.

Lowe (2018), President of the Australian Reserve Bank, confirmed such problems in its speech of 2018, enlightening however the way corrective action have been taken into this regard:

> "The effects of faster population growth on our economy and society are complex and they are widely debated. As a number of commentators have noted, population growth has put pressure on our infrastructure. As a country, we were slow to increase investment in infrastructure to meet the needs of our more rapidly growing population. Investment in this area has now picked up, particularly in transport, which, in time, will help alleviate some of the pressures. We were also slow to increase the rate of home building in response to the faster population growth. Indeed, it took the better part of a decade for this adjustment to take place".

3.3.3 Foreign Policy

The geographical collocation of Australia, very proximate to Asia, differs by the historical geo-political collocation of the country, which belong to the English Commonwealth and has later became a key allies of the United States of America. Australia shares its time zone with very-fast evolving South East Asia countries, and it has as neighbour six of the most populous countries of the word, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Japan beyond China and India (Marginson et al. 2010). Chapman (2017), in its review of the last Australian defence papers, note how

> 'the incorporation of these interests [the USA alliance and growing economic interest in Asia] and the demographic, economic, and political limitations into defence white papers is a perennial challenge for Australian policy makers which is exacerbated by it being an island continent heavily dependent on sea-based trading and lines of communication (Chapman 2017, 17)'.

As Chapman (2017) notes, incorporating its alliance with the US in Australia immediate region has old roots and many implications. Beeson and Hameiri (2017) note how, although the enormous challenges that Australian foreign policy had to tackle following the end of the 2WW and of the cold war, contemporary changes appear even bigger, with the complication that 'Australian foreign policy makers' lost the sense of 'ontological security': the knowledge of what to expect in a rapidly changing world (Besson and Hameiri 2017, 1)'. Within the section, we shall dive more extensively

on the evolution of Australian foreign policy in its complexity, shedding further light i) on the role of international education in fostering Australian links with Asia, ii) on the process that lead outbound mobility to be a pillar of the current Australian Indo-Pacific strategy, iii) the current precarious equilibrium of Australian geo-political collocation between the USA and China, iv) made even more complex due to the Covid-19 outbreak.

Policy development

For a long time, Australian foreign policy has been largely aligned with the one of the UK. Albeit it geographical proximity with Asia, Australia was mostly looking to its Commonwealth and Western belonging. Moreover, until 1942, Australia had legally a minister of external relation rather than a own foreign policy minister (Gyngell 2017). As so far largely introduced, an exception in the period after the war to this panorama was the Colombo Plan. The report by the Goldring Committee, discussed already, shed light on the increasing interest in the government in the program that was bringing Asian students to Australia, in particular in light of the high aid potential of student programs highlighted years before by the Indian High Commissioner.

The Colombo plan resulted by a meeting in Colombo where a number of British countries belonging to the Commonwealth 'mapped out a plan of technical and education cooperation and assistance for a number of developing countries' following which the interest of Australian government in the matter 'stepped up considerably (Australia, Committee of Review of POSP 1984, 2.5)'. The program was administered by the Department of External Affairs (DEA), serving to promote international understanding and the provision to developing countries of training their workforce. For Australia, the process leading to its involvement was particular, as the idea came to the first High Commissioner of Australia serving in India in 1944 but initially did not took off in Canberra (Meadows 2011). The Labour party believed that cooperation in aid could foster trade, and it approached the plan as a solid way to avoid the creation of fertile grounds to communist revolutions. While the Liberal party was against this open-minded internationalist approach, its leader Spencer went to the Colombo meeting 'armed with Burton's briefing' (Meadows 2011). 'Incidentally', reports Oakman, also Tange – at the time Secretary of the DEA – was convinced that Colombo Plan had a double policy objective: on the one side helping close by countries of Australia, and fostering prestige for Australia among the participating foreign students. McDonald (2019), Oakman (2002) stress the preoccupation of the time because of the White Australian Policy in establishing friendly relations with Australian neighbouring countries, and how the Colombo Plan was used as a way to demonstrate there was no racial discrimination in Australian foreign policy. It remains that the presence of Asian students made belt some alarms, most specifically of alleged communist propaganda. Authors depicting overseas students as spies are already visible in Australian newspapers since 1953 (Oakman 2002). Their presence was anyway always more salient due to their role in Australian foreign policy objective of transmitting them the Australian way of life. Problems arisen in the early years also brought the DEA to establish the first international house in Melbourne in 1957 (Oakman 2002). Evidence reveals that the enthusiasm domestically did grew to a certain extent, while reports by abroad were encouraging and stressing the impact of this action yet questioned at home. Already by the end of the decade, more than 2650 students participated.

As according to Gallagher (2011), the phase from the end of the world to the early sixties, can be considered as a 'soft power' phase in the history of Australian international education history. A 'silent revolution' started to add Asia to Australia's focuses, soon followed by the abandonment of the White Australian policy in the wake of better neighbouring relation necessity in the new international environment. Foreign policy rationales were clearly spell out in the case of the Colombo plan, but after the market introduction the development of ISM and of international

education played a marginal role mostly confined to the one of fixing problem arisen such as during the Chinas crisis of 1989 or due to the practical work of the ADMs. We shall see below the extent to which Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, will once more gain relevance following 2010, not restrictively in terms of inbound flows but with a larger approach of people-to-people diplomacy which should let Australians familiarise with the Indo-Pacific region.

Let's go with order. During the eighties, Australian foreign policy become somehow consciousness of its own need to address many concern that went beyond the ones of both the UK and the USA, and increased cooperation with its South East Asian allies (Firth 2005). The Labour government elected in 1983 kept continuity in foreign policy, stressing its alliance with the USA as the core of the country foreign policy. Contextually, however, the engagement with Asia grew, and Australian foreign policy was centred on multilateral action and activity, as the establishment of the Cairns Group of Agricultural Fair Traders and of the APEC testify (Frost nd). To strengthen relations with Southeast Asia in particular was a main concern for the Hawke government (Frost nd).

Between the others, a turning point has been the introduced Garnaut Report of 1989, that argued Australia could gain from its geographical proximity given the shift towards North East Asia of the economic production and power centre.' The paper is a milestone for Australia (Patience 2018), that realized it had to re-position itself following the collapse of the cold world. During the Hawke government, moreover, 'Australia's objective of broadening its connection with China meshed with China's new foreign policy, enunciated in 1982, which gave greater weight to economic relationships (Parliamentary Service 1997, 6)'. Australia and China begun hence a special relationship, and China swiftly became a major Australian power. The relation was strongly disrupted by the Tiananmen events of 1989, although the economic cooperation not even questioned.

In the late eighties, the fall of the iron curtain also provided a new international fluid international panorama. The engagement with ASEAN had increased, and also thanks to the evolution of events in Cambodia Australia was able to impact in its immediate regional arena (Frost nd). Moreover, the increasing protectionist moves in Europe and in the US resulted in increasing insecurity for Australian economy. Frost (nd) note that also the prospect of a tariff war between Europe and the USA suggested that more cooperation in Asia-Pacific was needed, as Hawke explained in 1989 calling for a Asia-Pacific economic cooperation organization.

Australia was able to promote the discussion, even modifying its approach as according to regional sensitivity and reactions. It was also held the Asian Regional Forum, which would serve to reach the Australian's main objective […] to ensure an Asia-Pacific dialogue around security (Frost nd). 'The diplomatic interactions in this period carried cooperation between Australia and ASEAN to a new level and made this multilateral relationship one of the most important in Australia's foreign relations (Frost nd 106)'. In sum, the beginning of nineties have been characterized by an explicit focus on Asia within Australian foreign policy. In the words of Ministry Keating 'Australia security was to be found 'in and not from Asia' (Gyngell 2017). Within the new global order, the focus of Australian foreign policy shifted from being mostly military to be far more economic, and the fast developing far east countries gave Australia a huge opportunity to developed an independent foreign policy. These developments are also linked to a number of events happened around the region during the nineties, from the issue of Timor-Leste, the management of Australia's colony, to the echoes of Tiananmen squares.

The silent revolution before introduced was ongoing at very high levels of policy making. In Australian society, instead, the revolution which brought Asia 'to Australia' was instead mostly made within the education system, by full fee paying overseas students. It was neither exempted by problems, also in this policy domain. Following changes in higher education, foreign affairs have been in fact marginally concerned by ISM, for example monitoring foreign responses to Australian policy setting changes, as it happened during the 'China crisis' of the late eighties. Those events, however, brought to tighten visa regulation and assessment, but did not shake

enough the Australian agenda to become prominent, as it will instead happen following the incident with India of 2008. Beyond the full fee paying students, we also saw in section 3.2 that Australia was also providing channels from student of the region to study in Australia. Moreover, drawing on the European ERASMUS format, also the UMAP (University Mobility Asia Pacific scheme) had been developed, as to foster exchanges wider in the society.

The election of Howard in 1996 marked a sort of a shift in Australian foreign policy. In fact, while its government had emphasised the importance of multilateral cooperation and of ASEAN, his policies has been mostly oriented to bilateralism relations. Frost (nd) report that by the end of the nineties relations with ASEAN had diminished considerably in intensity. However, following the attack of 9/11 in the USA and the 2002 Bali Bombing, also in light of the previous Asian financial Criss, an increasing engagement to the region occurred and brought Australia to sign the ASEAN and Australian and New Zealand trade agreement and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), pre-condition to join the East Asian summit, a long discussed issue across Australia. The Howard government also stressed the strong alliance with the US, and Australia and New Zealand also signed the ANZUS treaty (Frost nd).

Moreover, the Coalition government stressed the role of China and Japan, with the latter also pursuing the trilateral dialogue with the US. Frost (nd) report that the Asian financial crisis had 'a significant influence' on Howard approach to relation with Asia. The author highlights that with the bilateral approach the government embraced to respond to the crisis 'Australia had underscored the importance of relationships with Southeast Asia (Frost nd 114)'. Hence forth, while the views of the coalition and labour were different, with the second pointing out the limited potential of multilateralism and a huge focus on bilateral relations, both governments put attention on the role of Asia for Australia.

Following the cooling of Australian-Sino relation after 1989, relationship enjoyed a stable pattern until 1996, when other core differences between the two countries came to light. The Parliamentary Service (1997) identifies a juncture of relations in 1996, contextually with Australia's criticism of Taiwan China policy, in some way questioning the One China policy, an issue apparently promptly solved by Prime minister Howard in occasion of the APEC summit of the same year (Parliamentary Service 1997). Australian-Sino relations have been strongly influenced by the USA since the end of the cold war. Frost (nd) note, to this regard, that already in the early 2000 an Australia as a 'deputy sheriff to the US' was attracting attention and criticism. The increasing role of China was largely under scrutiny within ASEAN countries, as they welcomed its pros but were aware of the increased competition China expansion meant (Frost nd). It is also against this background that the playground for an economic cooperation between ASEAN, Australian and New Zealand further emerged. However, in the meantime, while Australia was formally not modifying its positions, it is was evident how the discourse in relation to China changed, for example avoiding criticisms of human right violations. In the words of Tubilewicz (2010), 'by late 2007 […] Australia enjoyed a 'unique' partnership with the United States (Ayson 2006, 34) and a 'strategic economic partnership' with China, then Australian's largest trading partner and second-biggest export market (Tubilewicz 2010, 3)'.

By the early years of the new millennium, beyond high level engagement of Australia with Asia, the exposition to Asia within Australian society had grew a lot. Frost (nd) report how over 700,000 Australians visited Southeast Asia in 2003, about the double of the previous decades. Moreover, in the mid 2000 the salience of inbound flows of international students had become prominent for Australia according to many dimensions, it was but a silent revolution. The 2008 student attack in Melbourne immediately became a national priority at the Australian foreign ministry, since it raised core concerns about Australian international reputation, quality of students' life, security, particularly across its closer regional context, from which the large majority of international students came from. As discussed in section 3.2, it even lead to the set-up of an official delegation to India, and the first official visits to India of a Australian ministry.

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In 2008, for the first time, with ALP victory after two mandates of Howard coalition, Australia found itself with a prime minister fluent in Mandarin and having strong ties of different nature with China, the only non-US allies of Australia key partners in the region. Australia also signed the ASEAN Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreements (AANZTA), which further strengthen cooperation in the region. The Australian 2020 Summit, held in 2008 further testify the strong importance placed on Asia and the wider Asia Pacific region by the Australian government. Ministry Gillard referred in that occasion also to Asia-pacific literacy.

It is worth to discuss more extensively the increasing salience of China across the area in this period (Beeson and Hameiri 2017). China had begun to work at the artificial island in the South China Sea in 2013, arriving to cover an esteem of 800 land hectares (Frost nd). The move caused strong criticism, and during in 2015 ASEAN Summit an indirect critic was done. Bishop declared that Australia pushed for stability and the halt of reclamation work (Frost 2015).

With *Australia in the Asian Century* 2012 white papers, Gillard eventually outlined the increasing importance of Asia-Pacific region for the country. The document developed around the two-fold aim of linking Australian prosperity in its immediate region and supporting China participation, but at the same time re-assuring about the strong Australia-USA ties, which were to continue in the future. The document also referred to India, whose role across the region was also strategic for Australia (Chapman 2017). Across the entire area, the rise of China stimulated policy responses, which for Australian meant reinforcing the existing alliances with USA and Japan, later participating to the Obama 'Pivot to Asia' 2017-2018 program, after signing a further agreement in Japan in 2014 on top of those discussed already since 2007 (Beeson and Hameiri 2017). The increasing society-to-society relations with China had also deepen the complexity of managing such relation, and this will be the 'litmus test of policy efficacy' for any government which would follow, as the handling of China may affect Australian capacity to exercise its 'middle power diplomacy' (Beeson and Hameiri 2017), Discourse on foreign policy had become prominent also in the domestic discussion, and it taken a 'populist' tone (Beeson and Hameiri 2017), making harder the handling of these issues.

What is of special importance to observe is the shifting focus from the more confined region of Asia to the 'Indo-Pacific Area' area, ranging from the east African costs to reach the smallest insular states in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and the US. The landmark was 2013, when the Australian Defence White Paper released by Labor Gillard government signed 'a categorical shift, spelling out 'Australia's region of strategic interests as something called the Indo-Pacific (Medcalf 2014, 1)'. Medcalf (2014) highlights the strengthens of such concept for Australia, which finally found a definition of Asia which could include its continent by definition. Boundaries of the Indo-Pacific are also fluid, while its key actors well known, with China, India, USA, Japan and South Korea in the 'premier league'.

Especially following Gillard took office, the concept has been refined (Frost nd). Further, the shift from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific matches with the realization of the necessity to innovate Australian foreign policy public diplomacy, also due to the 2008 perfect storm which strongly impacted the Australian reputation in this region. Already in 2007, the Senate Inquiry on Australian public diplomacy identified in international education as an important resource and 'in many forms as a key plank of Australian public diplomacy (Byrne and Hall 2013). At the time, the department of education highlighted already the broader benefits of international education, although at the time the inquiry did not impacted the national debated.

Outbound mobility begun therefore to be strongly relevant at the beginning of the last decade. As noted by Laifer and Kitchen (2017) a soft power approach to international education emerged, and the 'Australia's attempt to operationalize soft power troughs policy making' reveals

> 'the design of Australian's international education policy was driven by core soft power considerations around relationship for Australia: although previous policies have had clearly identified soft power benefits, those had not been the explicit intent of policy. Today Australia believe

it can extract those benefits thought policy design, and it is explicitly prioritizing soft power in international education (Laifer and Kitchen 2017, 815).

The New Colombo Plan, a reversed version of the original program, is eloquent about the different assumption on which built relationship in the Indo-Pacific region (Laifer and Kitchen 2017), as it brings Australians to the region instead of the opposite. New Colombo Plan became *de facto* flagship program of the Coalition Government, and key outbound mobility program in Australia. Interview materials strongly stressed the high prestige and salience attached to the program, and the way the latter has been far more relevant than previously established outbound mobility programs. It enjoys generous support, with 100 million granted over a period of 5 years. 'It is a high profile, high stakes initiative, upon which the government pins considerable hopes on enhancing people-to-people connections between Australia and the Indo-Pacific, providing ballast to relationships and strategic pockets of engagement beyond officialdom in relation to policy objectives (Lowe 2015, 450)'. The plan to send more young Australians overseas to study is unfolding in the context of an overarching government priority of economic diplomacy aimed at developing greater prosperity in Australia, its region and the world, to deepen Australian engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, promote a rules-based approach to international co-operation, and highlight Australia's commitment to development and Australia's international reputation as a democratic, open and diverse nation (DFAT 2014). Already the year after its launch, over 3100 students were undertaking a program in one of the 38 destination countries across the Indo-Pacific areas (UA 2016), with the 'ultimate goal of the program [..] to establish learning experience in the Indo-Pacific region as a 'rite of passage' for Australian undergraduate students (UA 2016, 9)'.

The salience of outbound mobility grew beyond the New Colombo Plan. The aforementioned EPITOME concluded Overseas Mobility Experiences (OMEs) role within the larger Asian century framework should have received more attention and information, and boost awareness around their professional component rather than the social-holiday one. Dall'Alba and Sidu (2015) highlights the connection between outbound mobility and soft power, and the way OME currently respond to a national imperative, starting back with the Garnaut report of 1989.
In 2013 the Abbott government declared its aim to reach a 40% of Australians studying foreign languages, with a clear suggestion to go for Asian literacy (Jones et al 2016). In its paper *Australian Resources in the Asian Century,* Garnaut (2014) stressed out the importance of cultural differences and its communication, and the 'importance of intense interactions with Asia that has come from our large non-discriminatory immigration program and the presence of so many international students in our education institutions (Garnaut 2014, 312).
The swift shift toward a foreign policy driven approach to ISM also respond to wider perceived necessity of bringing Australian public to familiarize as much as possible with Australian region, in the realization of the missed communication to the population discussed in the end of section 3.2. According to Wesley, ANU academic, Australia did not have a foreign affairs minister [Bishop] so 'attentive' to Australian international reputation since decades. Further, the development of this new approach 'required a repudiation of three decades of treating education purely as an export commodity, a rebranding that explains the language of the Colombo Plan (Laifer and Kitchen 2017, 824)'.

In (2013), Byrne and Hall wrote that 'DFAT may appropriately build its public diplomacy leadership role in international education' as 'the Asian Century White papers presents DFAT with a political opportunity to claim and build leadership capacity in key areas such as international education (Byrne and Hall 2013, 434)'. Few years later, Barker (2019) note how DFAT currently manages all the Australian international education programs exception made for Destination Australia (following the abolishment of the Endeavour Program), and this 'represent a shift by the

government of core responsibilities for international education from the education portfolio to the foreign affairs portfolio (Barker 2019, 9). As a policy expert declared:

> 'this space was mostly about individual student focus, from a policy perspective. So… it was run by the Department of Education. So this was still this was being run by Prime Minister and Cabinet reshuffle the same and this was being run by the Department of Education and this is being run by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade with assistance from the Department of Education... So you can see that transition when it was all about individuals whose department of education when it started to change its a mix between the Prime Minister's Office and Department of Education. And then once it morphs into the stage we get now it's led by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade'

This discussion is also markedly connected to a more defined core discussion of Australia foreign policy, introduced above: Sino-Australian bilateral relations. The New Colombo Plan, in fact, has also been explained as a way to contain China expansion in the area. China had increasingly become a key strategic partner for Australia, a role once occupied by Japan. In 2015, the China Australia Free Trade Agreements was singed (Blaxland 2017), and already in 2014, they established the Australia-China High-Level Dialogue, a common forum for increasing mutual understanding (DFAT 2020). China became a major partner also in education, since, as discussed, about a quarter of international students in Australia are Chinese. To put it differently, Australia pushed contextually its ties with in the Indo-Pacific area also in the effort to contain China expansion in the region (pushing outbound flows), while it de facto increased its ties with the country (welcoming unprecedent numbers of Chinese students from which its HEIs now depends). This over-dependency of Australian educational related export by China is part of a wider discussion on its wide foreign policy: according to many, in fact, Australia should keep its strategic relations with the USA, an approach that many others reduce Australia's room of manoeuvre with China and more generally in the Asia-Pacific zone. To be sure, the Covid-19 outbreak made thing worst, while the precarious equilibrium of Sino-Australian relations is known at least since the late eighties.

As section 3.3.1 introduced, the outbreak clashed on Australian universities, and the Australian government's act of closing borders at the beginning of the pandemic was not welcomed in Beijing. Yet bigger where the implications of joining the international request for an independent assessment of the virus origin, since when the Chinese government slowed Australian export with a range of different reasons. Kung and Jun (2020) efficiently summarized the China response, of which the pandemic WHO investigation is just a recent discussion which follows its Huawei ban, the issues risen by China in Hong Kong and in South China Sea.

For example, Chinese imports of Australian coal dropped significantly, and in November China signed an agreement for coal with Indonesia, a move 'seen as China's first step in replacing coal imports from Australia (Kung and Jun 2020, 1)'. The cooling of Sino-Australian relations does not seems to evolve in a reassuring ways, and the move of the Chinese government to disincentive students from studying into Australia does not signal a distension in these countries' diplomatic relations.

3.3.4 Economy and the labor market

Until the Covid-19 outbreak, Australian economy has been strong, and 2019 has been the 28th consecutive year of economic growth (AUStrade 2019). The country did not felt the global 2008 economic crisis, and gained indeed the world record in 2017 as the country with the longest time with no recession (SMH 2017). As previous sections shown, this Australian economic success story is strongly linked to Asia and 'Australia's strong ties to the Asian region supported a positive medium and long-term growth outlook (AUStrade 2019, 9)'. Min and Falvey (2018) even provided evidence showing that international study 'is an important determinant of bilateral trade between Australia and the student's home country', and it 'implied greater integration of bilateral goods

markets in the future' (Min and Falvey 2018, 886)'. According to Garnaut (2014), it has been the establishment of modern economic growth in the three main populous developing countries to 'set the scene for the Asian Century (Garnaut 2014, 303)', also given that Asian economies 'are more closely complementary to Australia in their resource endowments and patterns of trade than any other parts of the world economy (Garnaut 2014, 304)'.

Australia is the thirteenth biggest economy of the world (world bank 2020). In 2017, it had a GDP of 1433 trillions of US Dollars in 2018 (WOLRD BANK 2020b), and it experienced an annual grow of 2.9% points (WORLDBANK 2020). Health and Education, mining, finance, construction and manufacturing constitute key sectors of Australian economy as of 2021(Reserve Bank of Australia 2021). Exports of goods and services constituted the 22% of GDP in 2019), while imports of good accounted for the 21% (WORLDBANK 2020). Main Australian commercial partners for export are China, (34%), Japan (12%), the EU (85%), Korea (6%), US (5%) and India (4%); by type, exports are resources (63%), Services (15%), Rural (9%) and Manufactured (9%) (Reserve Bank of Australia 2021). Main partners in imports are instead China (24,50%), US (10,47%), Japan (7,37), Germany (4,94), and Thailand (4,89), and by type Consumer goods, Capital Goods, Intermediate goods and raw materials (World bank 2021).
Australia unemployment rate stood at 5,26% in 2018 (World bank 2021). According to the OCED (2018), it compares better than the OECD average score in 2017, exception made for two indicators. The Department of Employment, Skills, Small and Family Business (DESSFB nd), note that employment increase by 66.9 per cent in the thirty years period between May 1989 and May 2019, and it did so in 16 over the 19 broad Australian industries. Sectors in which employment grew more are health care and Social Assistance industry (4,7 % over 30 years, industry share of employment), in Professional Scientific and Technical Services (4,3%), Construction (1.3%) and Education and Training (1.6%) (DESSFB nd).

The previous paragraphs introduced to a certain extent the dramatic salience of international education for Australian economy and labour market. The following pages will focus their attention on four crucial aspects, and notably i) the overall contribution of higher education, ii) the way migrants arrived to constitute a key stream for the provision of human capital to Australia, and how this happened given their assessed labour-market performances emerged in the nineties, following which former international students became the most desiderated migrants. Moreover, iii) on the relevance of Asia and specifically of China as a key trade partner and key source of international students. The paragraph will conclude with a reference to Covid-19. These aspects will be discussed as they raise up, following a concise overview of Australian economy and labour market since the eighties until the present day, which began by providing a brief comparison of the economic benefits of the industry under analysis in the early years and the very last period.

Policy development

Table 3.8 below reports students expenditure on goods and services showing already a rapid grow between 1986 and 1900. The Industry Commission (1991) underlined already the several declinations of the contribution of international students, ranging from fees to goods and service consumptions, providing valuable data that clearly show the market growth.
The report reveals esteems of the time suggest that only the 10% of what international students spent was earn into Australia (which meant most of the money spent was coming from offshore), that students' contribution of in goods and services overcame the one of fees, and that one of the less named non-tangible benefits occurred when students go back home, as it forecasted brand loyalties among students and Australian brands. The report also shed light on how the education of foreign students could strengthen Australia as it also implied better services for the Australian community, and it made 'familiarising young Australians with their East Asian environment

(Garnaut 1989, 255)'. The most salient contribution of foreign students perceived at this point was however constituted by fees, or 'the net addition to institutional funds which can be applied to domestic students (Industry Commission 1991, 169)'.

By 2011, expenditure of international students in Australia generated jobs for just over 130,000 full time equivalent workers (DAE 2013 in Productivity Commission 2015). According to a study by Deloitte Access International (Australian Government 2015) in 2014-15, higher education also 'was the single largest contributing sector to Australia, with total value added equal to $11.1 billion. About two months earlier than the Covid-19 outbreak disrupted international education statistics, Minister Tehan declared that 'international education has experienced its fifth year of consecutive double digit growth, highlighting the strength of Australia's higher education system', it constituted Australia's 'largest service-based export and supported 240.000 jobs, business opportunities and economic growth'. The 37,6 AUS dollars in 2019 declared by Australian Minister for Education also means 'an increase of 5 billion increase since 2018, or the 15% (Tehan 2019)'.

Few reports constitutes key sources that allow to provide a detailed picture of the current contribution of the higher education sector to Australia. *The Value of international education in Australia* has been commissioned by the DET 'to assess the value of international education to the Australian community, encompassing the sector's contribution to the Australian economy and its broader economic and social impact on communities, tourism, and Australia's stock of human capital (Australian Government 2015, 0)'. The report provides evidence quantifying the 'value of services and operations that are not captured in ABS data', the output in economic contribution for the Australian tourism sectors and the contribution to the country skilled labor force. It allows to decouple the contribution of higher education sector from the larger one of international education: higher education has been the singles largest contribution 'as measured by economic contribution, with total value equal to AUS$ 11.1 billion (Australian Government 2015, 21)', and it counted alone for the 70% of contribution mode two (see table 3.9 below).

Data on the contribution of offshore campus (in the year considered, 2014, with 800 degrees given offshore at that time), revealed that foreign campuses are in some case not expected to provide positive margin, and they serve as a way to increase enrollment at the on-site Australian university. Deloitte Economics (2015) also estimates that tourist to Australia stating the trip has been motivated also due to a visit to an international student contributed for an overall 222 millions of AUS dollars in value added to the Australian economy, and supported over 2300 full time employments (with 124,029 visitor saying visiting an international student was a main reason for their trip to Australia). The survey also reports Pyke et al (2013) study who found out that 64% of Chinese students travelled back to Australia, with a majority of them doing so two or more time in five years.

TABLE 3.8 | Students' expenditure on goods and services 1985-1986/1989-1989-90				
	Sponsored	**subsidized**	**Full fees**	**Total**
1985-1986	31	105	19	155
1986-1987	24	117	48	188
1987-1988	21	107	128	256
1988-1989	17	101	192	311
1989-1990	20	79	194	293
SOURCE: Industry Commission (1991) Values i AUD				

Table 3.8 - Students' expenditure on goods and services

Table 3.9 - Four different modes of delivering

Mode 1	Cross border supply of education services, including their students' expenditure, distance education and royalties
Mode 2	Onshore consumption by international students, including fees and good and services
Mode 3	Offshore provision of international education
Mode 4	Includes Australian educators overseas beyond the 12 months, guest lectures and fly-in quality assurance checks

Source: Elaboration of DET (2015)

Table 3.9 - Four different modes of delivering

According to the report, International education also resulted in an increase of about 0.5% of Australian GDP per capita, or 8.7 AUS millions of dollar for 2014.

The Productivity Commission (2015) report that 'around 30% of the total value generated by the attainment of a bachelor degree qualification by international student graduates who migrate to Australia can be attributed to the specific value added by the fact that they obtained this bachelor degree in Australia, rather than overseas (Australian Government 2015, 46)'. It also stresses additional contribution in terms of unique cultural and language skills for the Australian labor market, supporting more integrated bilateral economy. The Go8 (2014) summarizes similar finding highlighting that international students are crucial for Australian economy beyond their contribution of the 16% in university revenue (2012), highlighting their contribution in job creation: for every ten international students enrolled 2,9 jobs follow, and for every ten students 5 additional people would come to Australia, and as in five will gain permanent residence, addressing therefore Australia's skill shortages.

The Universities Australia commissioned Deloitte Access Economics (2015) report also reached similar conclusions. It also shed light on the way the increase in people with tertiary qualification drove higher wage also among less skilled people, and a further estimated a value of 160 millions generated by university research. It highlights 'investments in university research has grown, in real terms, by $ 9 million over the past 30 years, at an average growth rate of 6% a year (Deloitte 2015, viii)'. Blakely and Hu (2019) further note that the immigration inflow of students has created a new value chain, which range from English lesson to housing to industry services, to count up the 8% in 2017 GDP.

Let's put all of this in historical perspective. Until 1986, in Australia there was not even a market within the HE sector and university taxes had been re-established since a couple of years. While until 1983, immigration in Australia had no focus to skills, in the mid 2000s' skilled migrants were an established crucial stream of migration. 'In 1988, 31 overseas students were awarded a PhD. By 2009, 1,375 or almost one-quarter of all PhDs were awarded to overseas students (Dobson 2012, 97)'. McLean (2017) notes that Australians in the seventies and in the eighties were not feeling to experience as good economic times as the previous generations. However, the author also note how domestic 'features' of the Australian system operated to protect the country from a 'deteriorating global environment' due to the two oil shocks and the collapse of the Bretton system. In fact, as discussed, the shift in trading partner of Australia begun in the previous decades, with a much reduced reliance by way of example from the UK. Further, the oil price increase had stimulated the energy sector, where Australian had an advantage. During the seventies, however, the employment rate of expansion was low, and it begin to grow only following in the eighties (IMF 1998), also due also to the collapse of the mining sector and an overall poor management by the Whitlam administration.

The new-elected Hawke government soon engaged in a series of reforms, among which it was able to reach the Accord (IMF 1998). Conversely to the Whitlam government, the new government developed a framework agreement which was welcomed by unions, business and

government, aimed at pursuing long term run outcomes. The accord was implemented soon after the elections (Mclean 2017): the first phase was marked by 'micro-economics' reforms, including the privatization of a number of public companies. These are the years in which the government also reviewed the migration program and launched the two interdepartmental commission to review the overseas students policy and Australian Aid overseas. The second one, (1987-1996) by contrast, was mostly looking toward 'opening' or 'internationalizing', coherently indeed to discussed developments in HE. The path to open Australian economy was signed.

The nineties begun with the recession 'that Australian had to have', but the country recovered somehow quickly (Borland 2011). In 1993, the Industrial Relations Amendment Act and the Industrial Relations Reform Act of 1993 also encouraged enterprise bargaining, with Awards established to create 'safety nets' (Borland 2011). In 1994, the government had also introduced relevant policy change in labour market programs, implementing a series of reform following the Working Nation Statement released in 1994 (IMF 1998). The government introduced the Job Compact to address long term unemployment, a case management strategy to help disadvantage job seekers, the Youth Training Initiative and a traineeship system.

In 1996, the Howard government in cabinet implemented a further reform of the labour market, legislated with the *Workplace Relations Act of 1996*, centred around transferring wage negotiation at the firm level (IMF 1998). The Act implemented two different certified agreements, one with employees and another also involving unions, both of them however subject to a global disadvantage tests. Centre-link, a service delivery agency, was introduced as a one stop shop to provide assistance to those looking for employment or income support.

Australia entered at this point the record period with no recession that will last until 2019 as introduced. McLean (2017, 228) note how since this moment

> 'Australian economy experienced another sustained period of growth and prosperity characterized by rising population and living standards, declining levels of unemployment and inflation and only minor fluctuation in economic activities', referring to the beginning of the 'third golden age' in the country economic history', fuelled by 'continuing economic development of Asia. [...] The key attribute of those Asian economies experiencing rapid growth was that their factor endowments were complementary to those of Australia's'.

Data about both labour market were emerging, and researchers noted already the productivity of migrants, and especially of English speaking ones. Already in 1985, the Bureau of Labour Market Research (1985 in Stromback 2012) had revealed that skilled migrants performed as good as Australian born people after a phase of adjustment. Junankar, Pope and Withers (1998, 23) also reported that the Centre for International Economic had found out that the 'most important contributions to average real income growth come not from the quantity of labour but from the quality of the labour force' in 1988. The authors stressed that importing skills for Australia did have substantial pay off, and while on averages migrants had higher rate of unemployment, some non-English speaking groups performed even better then Australian born people. Stromback (2012) also noted how

> 'change in immigration policy may have led to increased human capital endowments that in turn resulted in higher participation rates and reduced unemployment (Cobb-Clarke 2003 in Stromback 2012).'

The evaluation of the Australian migrant intake performances in the labour market was relevant to Australia also in light of its reliance on foreign labour force, a longstanding issue for the country. To make this point, Stromback (2012 IOM 2012), quoted the discourse a Commissioner in New South Wales in 1912, which already pointed out the need for Australia of 'the introduction from abroad of trained and competent workers (Parliament of New South Wales 1912 p. vi in Stromback (2012, 1)'. The author also notes that while Australia recruited migrants to populate its vast

continent since the 2WW, there has been a shift 'towards giving immigration a shaper economic focus' after the eighties.

In the early nineties, studies risen concerns about 'discrimination' against foreign labour force, especially among NESB migrants. Hawthorne (2005) report migrants coming from Asia and Oceania were the most exposed to unemployment, part-time work and overeducation.

At the time, the labour government was placing strong attention on multiculturalism on skilled migration, with the Productive Diversity the area who received more support (Hawthorne 2005). Keating underlined several times the direct connection between the employment rate of NESB migrant and the country trade potential, with the Productive Diversity policy developed to 'sell the benefits of skilled NESB employees to Australian employers in them on enlightened interest (Hawthorne 2005, 669)'. According to the author, the policy 'was visionary rather than empirically based (Hawthorne 2005, 670): 'a distinctively optimistic and ingenious Australian idea, born of an irreducibly diverse society of immigrants and indigenous people and an economy that must be export oriented (Cope and Kalantzis 1997, in Hawthorne 2005, 670)', however completely detached from the Australian reality of that time.

The crucial role of Asia for Australian prosperity further emerges with a labour-market and trade perspective. In the words of Blakely and Hu (2019, 33), 'Australia was lucky' be to in proximity of the worlds' new economic boom area, as well as able to profit from the occasion.

Gruen and Stevens (2000) the impressive macroeconomic performance of the country during the nineties, with increasing living standards, and unemployment that 'had declined by the end of the 1999 by more than many would have dared hope six or seven years earlier (Green and Stevens 2000, 68)'. The IMF (1998) also noted that the greater flexibilities introduced in the previous years contributed to increasing economic performances in the nineties. It is in this period, indeed, that Australia begun to see, beyond rising foreign demand for natural products (Mclean 2017), also a relevant amount of service exports such as tourism and educational services (Industry Commission 1991), a success directly linked to the Asian basin.

In the early nineties it was also introduced the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) (Cobb-Clark 2001), which provided several data about their working performances, beyond shedding light of the department of immigration to improve the 'understanding of the immigrant settlement process (Cobb-Clark 2001, 6)'. Cobb-Clark (2001) found i) that skilled migrants found the process into the labour market much easier than family or humanitarian migrants, ii) that (selected) skilled migrants had higher employment rate and lower unemployment rate, iii) and that English knowledge was a crucial determinant for success. The reviews of the general migration program held in those years added detailed evidence. In fact, it is in this period that labour market performances of former overseas students came to light. Birrel and Hawthorne (1999) had in fact found out that '54% of overseas-born professionals with Australian degrees has secured professional employment by 1996 (Hawthorne 2005, 686)' against the 52% of Australian-born professionals, and this was to be the case also for migrants belonging to groups usually subjected to disadvantages, such as Vietnamese and Filipinos overseas students.

These data referred therefore to the nineties, when flows of inbound students were growing but they had been adjusted following the crisis of 1989. The third LSIA, focused instead of migrants arrived in Australia following the 1999 shift, when requirements to obtain a student visa had been already relaxed. The performance of overseas students somehow decreased comparison to the previous wave. English emerged to be a major issue of the post 1999 policy, with students from Vietnam, Thailand, Korea and China had unsatisfactory language skills, even scoring 5 (instead of at least the 6 required) at IELTS test after having completed an Australian degree (Hawthorne 2010).

The LSIA third survey included an high proportion of overseas students, and it also revealed only the 60% of jobs of former overseas students were in skilled occupation, while the average was of 80% for offshore independent applicants and 90% in the business stream (Commonwealth of

Australia 2007). Moreover, former overseas students declared that there was some racism in Australia. Also the general review of the skilled program of 2006 found out that migrants selected offshore enjoyed superior work outcomes than those onshore, and hence former students. The latter subgroup had inferior salary, lower weekly average earning and job satisfaction, and used formal qualification at work left often than migrants selected offshore (Hawthorne 2010).

According to Hawthorne (2010), data of the mid-2000s reveals unrealistic government assumption related to 'the immediate contribution' former overseas student had to give to Australian economy. However, the author note how students were yet a 'significant Australian resource', as unsatisfactory data emerged to be mostly linked to shorter program below the two years of education and in overcrowded degrees; overall they had comparable labour market participation rate to offshore migrants and stronger early employment rates.

The interlinkages among higher education policy, immigration and labour market & trade of the late nineties are in sum further clarified by with a labour market/trade perspective. On the one side, in fact, it is clear that the market of foreign student was a strong pillar of the wider transition of Australian economy toward a more structural predominance of service sectors. Moreover, this part adds evidence to the 'lobby case' discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3.2 which contributed to the shift of 1999 opening the highway for international student. In fact, the reconstruction provided of the data which have been at the base of such shift confirm the evidence-based Australian interest on welcoming higher number of skilled migrants due to their labor performances, to be added to the advantages resulting also in the domains of shortage of (skilled) labor, an ageing population, a decreasing fertility rate and a relevant export crucial for higher education institution and the construction industry. At the same time, data also revealed how the huge increase of intake of former students combined with the exemption of English tests, a high number of MODL occupation, and a direct connection to permanent migration path were at the base of lower performances of these students during the first decade of the new millennium – an issue which also emerged in relation to quality as we saw in the higher education part.

Let's now go back to the more general picture of Australian economy and labour market following the nineties. As Borland (2011) put it, the 2000s have been 'the quite decade', despite important trends are relevant to be tackled, with a GDP average growth of the 3.1%. During the 2000s, the Australian economy definitely shifted away from both agriculture and manufacturing, towards higher share in GDP becoming mining, construction, professional scientific & technical services, health care & social assistance. Australian population growth rate grew about 1.8 per cent annum, also caused by the expansion of immigration programs, as Australian citizenry was aging Borland (2011). The author also note the chance of Australia to manage a recession at the end of the decades, given its minor exposition to US and European economies (Borland 2011).

The beginning of this paragraph already highlighted the extent to which international students contribute to Australian labor market and trade development since this period onward. Migration of students has become a pillar of the immigration stream in Australia, whose general contribution in the last period has been huge. We shall dive a bit deeper into the more general contribution of the Australian migrant intake, and especially that of skilled migrants with more recent data.

The Migration Council[25] state that 'for too long the economic contribution of migration to Australia has been significantly undervalued (Migration Council nd, 6)'. An important introduced

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[25] The report focuses on a comparison of two *scenario*, one in which Australia keeps its current migrant intake and another one in which it goes to zero. It provides projections to 2050. It is esteemed that by that time migration will have added 15.7 per cent t workforce participation rate, the 21% after tax real wages for low skilled workers, and the 5.9% per cent in GDP per capita growth. Moreover, that migrants in 2050 will contribute to Australian economy 10% more than Australians on average, and further that Australia population was projected by 2050 to be 24 million with no migration and 38 million with the current intake. It is also stressed how migrants are young, are relatively highly educated and contribute to raising employment rate, therefore ensuring a skilled Australia. The report also refer directly to students, a subset which strongly contribute to Australian prosperity as they fund their own education, pay full taxes beyond contributing as other skilled and non-migrants.

aspect where migration provided and currently provides additional advantage to Australia is the direct contribution it gives to population growth. Lowe (2018), Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia, explores in detail this aspect in a recent speech, where he clearly decouple the linkages among migration, population dynamics and fertility rate. He underlined that the population annual growth of 1.5% of Australia in the last decade has been largely due to the country migration intake. The Governor also directly referred to international students, at this point over 500,000, highlighting their skilled competences and the added value of overseas connections. As the majority of migrants in Australia, the Governor underlined they are also young, further contributing to decrease the Australian median age, which stood at 37 years old (far lower than other developed countries). In sum 'the movement to Australia of large numbers of young people over the past decade has changed our demographic profile in a positive way' and this 'remind us that demographic trends are not set in stone (Lowe 2018)'.

As section 3.2 presented, since the late 2000 and especially the launch of the New Colombo Plan, benefits of mobility to the Australian labor market also emerged also regarding outbound flows. While the most spread form was the year or semester abroad within an university exchange, short mobilities of Australian students which combined studying and traineeship increased over the last decade, as well as the involvement of foreign firms. 'Asian literacy' among Australian labor force had been a core message already at the Australian 2020 Summit of 2008, a sort of precondition to fully exploit the benefits of trade with Indo Pacific countries.

Following 2010, the change in Australian main commercial partners is evident. DFAT (2020) makes this point clear stating that 'until the 1960s, Britain and the United States were Australia's main trading partners. Today the emphasis of Australia's trade has shifted to Asia, with four out of five of Australia's top trading partners located there. China, Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea are now Australia's largest trading partners (DFAT 2020, 1)'. The 73% of Australian trade is currently happening with countries belonging to the APEC group DFAT (2020). That same report also underlines the fifteen trade agreements (FTAs) entered in force with 26 different countries, among which the bilateral ones with Indonesia and Hong Kong in 2020, and the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus agreement signed together to New Zealand with several Pacific Island; two-way trade in Australia is also happening for the 70% with countries belonging to one FTA (basing on 2018 data), and Australia's two-way goods and services trade in Asia accounted for the 60% in the mid 2010s. Until 1963, UK was Australia largest merchandise export destination, and it stayed so until 1966-67, when Japan took its place and remained Australian leading merchandise export destination until 2009-10, when China took its place (DFAT 2014). By 2013-14, export to Asia counted for the 83% of total merchandise exports – while it was the 32.8% in 1963-64. Also merchandise imports transitioned from Europe and North America to Asia, with China the most significant important source (DFAT 2014).

Within Asia, the specific case of China is crucial relevance. We already explored in detail in section 3.3.1 the strong weight that Chinese international students acquired for domestic HEIs. This is however only a part of a much wider discussion concerning Australia's economic over-reliance on China. The reserve bank of Australia (2020) provides an eloquent snapshot of Sino-Australian economic relations, at the eve of the Covid-19 crisis. An average of 28,000 visitors arrived for tourism in 2019 every day, and they spent about 56 billions of dollars in goods and services, or the 3% of GDP or 13% of exports. Australian' inbound air capacity doubled in nine years, and fourfold increase happened in the capacity of direct Australia-China flights. Education exports amounted 40 billions of dollars in 2019, of which seventeen in fees and 23 on living expenses, with China alone making one third of the total in export figures. Exports in tourism were at 23 billions in 2019 (Reserve bank of Australia 2020). According to the report, the outbreak caused a decline in education and tourism exports that costed about 1.5 percentage point of GDP only during its first phase of 2020. Numbers are not forecasted to improve in 2021 (Reserve bank of Australia 2020), and concerns about a difficult response to Covid-19 are currently present.

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Graph 3.8: Australia permanent migration outcome by streams,
1984-85/2019-2020

Graph 3.8 - Australia permanent migration outcome by streams

4. Chapter IV | Case Study, Italy

4. Introduction

The Italian Republic extends for the entire Italian peninsula and beyond within the Mediterranean sea, in the middle of west and east Europe and between the European and African continents. Its geographical collocation turns and twists with its development since the creation of the Italian state. Italy is a key member state of the European union, a NATO member, and it also has historically close relations with Balkans and African countries, whose influence is strongly evident throughout the southern part of the country, in clear contrast to the European influence receipted by norther regions. Gisborg (1995) wrote it stands in between 'the Christian countries of the northern sea-bord, and the Islamic ones of the South, [in between] a northern African population explosion and a southern European vertical decline in fertility (1995, 4)'. In relation to an approach of Italy 'as a Mediterranean country', he sanctioned:

> 'the peninsula is not only the thin divider of the two basins of the Mediterranean, but also the recipient of different and contrasting cultures. To the west Italy looks to the Iberian peninsula, to the north to France, Austria and Germany; to the east to the Balkans, to the south to Africa. This is an extraordinary and heterogeneous combination, full of conflicts and contradictions […] Gisborg (1995, 4)'.

Italy has currently a population of 60,391000 (ISTAT 2020), of which 8,2% are foreign nationals (data of 2014). Italian population is between the oldest of the world, with over 21.9 % of people over 65%, and only the 13,8 % under fifteen years old (data of 2017). Migration helps to balance the ageing of Italian population (OCED 2019), but as we shall see throughout the chapter it is not approached as an opportunity but rather a treat for the country wellbeing.

Italy is a unitary country, but the central government devolved a number of competences to Italian regions following the constitutional reform of 2001, a move that increased the un-clarity of competences among policy making levels, a process Levi's (2009, 6), summarized as 'Italy's zigzag path to federalism'. As we shall see in the chapter, the lack of clear division of competences among levels of government is not the only constrains of the Italian institutional policy context, which is characterized by a weak central power with weak capacity to steer its system across levels, as the failure of implementing a number of reforms in several domains in the last forty years testify. In 2017, Italy had a GDP of € 1726 billions of Euros (OECD 2019) and it was however the eighth larger economy of the world and it is also one of the largest economies of the European Union.

4.1 Setting the context: Italy

4.1,1 Institutional context

Italy is a parliamentary republic, considered as having a unitary form of state according to the tripartite classification among confederal, federal and unitary states (Bretton and Fraschini 2016). While distinctions among federal and unitary countries are largely shared within academic literature, territorial responsibilities and the division of powers in federal and unitary countries are not clear-cut. There may be in fact unitary countries with great autonomy at territorial level and highly centralized federal countries (Terlizzi 2019, Braun 2000), as discussed indeed in the previous chapter for Australia. More specifically since 2001 reform, Italy has been studied to understand whether it could be considered as a federal or quasi-federal state ((Breton and Fraschini, 2016), (Bolgherini, Di Giulio and Lippi, 2018): Woelk (2007), by way of instance, wrote to this regard that Italy could be considered as a 'devolutionary asymmetric federal system' in the middle of its transformation process.

The Italian state developed as unitary, following the French Napoleonic Model, an asset which survived the second war world and it is still formally in place (Bolgherini et al 2018). The system foreseen, at the time, only province and municipalities, while the regions were introduced in the seventies, when 15 of them were established with ordinary status and five of them which special ones (plus autonomous provinces). In the following decades, the State has been in charge of local affairs together with local administration, which have been strengthen since the introduction of direct elections of majors and regional president, in 1993 and 1999 respectively (Bolgherini et al 2008).

Currently, regions and the State coordinate their activities throughout a number of bodies, notably the Permanent State-Region Conference, the State-Cities conference, and the *Conferenza Unificata*, a body which brings together the latter with the two aforementioned bodies. The conference between the State and the Region was instituted in 1983, after an inquiry of the Parliamentary commission on regional affairs, and it provides mandatory consultation to the parliament for any kind of issue since 1997 (Bretton and Fraschini 2016). The authors note however the conference works differently in practice, pointing out to differences according to the government in cabinet, to a basic lack of symmetry, a lack of periodicity in meeting, and the fact that 'political meetings' have often higher impact than the Conference itself. As introduced, a crucial reform of Italian State institutional asset was undertook in 2001. The reform devolved power and competence in a number of sectors to regions, such as in energy, transportation and health. Frosini (2009) argues that the 2001 reform marked the way to the transformation into a federal country, something that has been observed also in the case of Spain (Ahmad and Brosio 2006). Regions also acquired a number of increasing powers in foreign policy. Law 131/2003, La Loggia has been a first attempt to better regulate Italian regions power, but it did not overcome problems of multi-level governance emerged by the reform. This necessity lead to another attempt in 2004, which however failed. Only in 2008, the government and the regions reached an agreement adopted by the State Regions Conference of the same year (GU 2009). It aimed to increase coordination between the regional and the national levels in all the matter of relevance, and it even called for the institutionalization of a permanent commission on the international activities of regions.

The constitutional reform is of peculiar relevance to this discussion as a regions acquired power in external trade and more generally in foreign policy, impacting the mobility of students: the dearth of clear repartition of competences between the two tiers and the consequent overlapping of responsibilities further fragmented the governance of Italian foreign policy. In 2015, a new declaration of intent was signed by the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministry, the MAECI and the National Association of Italian Municipalies (ANCI), the lower tier of policy making which has however a relevant grade of competence in this domain: they can run partnerships with

foreign cities, protocols of intents and other action within the humanitarian domain or throughout projects and missions abroad (DAR 2015)[26].

Noting the way the legal framework evolved after the 2001 reform, Bretton and Fraschini (2016) conclude their article 'Is Italy a quasi-federal state?' answering that it is not, being less decentralized as one may think in light of its formal asset. Following 2010, in fact, a window of opportunities due to the financial 2008 crisis occurred to strengthen the role of central state, as lower budged have been passed from the state to regions (Bretton and Fraschini 2016). In 2014, moreover, with Delrio Law (56/2014), there has been a weakening and reduction of the provinces and the establishment of the metropolitan cities. The new design was however harmed by the popular refusal of the referendum held in 2016, which attempted to change Italian constitutional architecture. It remains that, although Italy may not satisfies requirements to be classified as a federal country, it is currently characterized by a high grade of autonomies by lower levels of policy making, and its multi-level governance system currently emerge as fragmented. Darnis (2011, 200) argue for example that to understand foreign policy 'we must consider several interlocking spheres of this 'Italian system' in order to describe the actors and the decision-making dynamics behind the country foreign policy'.

4.1.2 *Bureaucracy*

A further layer to be taken into account when discussing the institutional domestic context is bureaucracy. The principle of hierarchy is crucial in Italian public administration (PA), it led to a relevant extent of rigidity and pushed the system toward immobility on the one side and fragmentation on the other (Capano 2006). As (Galanti, 2011) 26) put it,

> 'what can be still considered exceptional in the Italian case is the resistance of the legalistic and formalistic administrative culture: it has been capable of absorbing the shock of reforms and of slowing down the pace of change. Conservative pressure have been present in all the cases, but in Italy the power of veto in favour of the 'bureaucratic status quo' has been amplified by the weakness of the political principals'.

A first recent season of reform begun in 1993 with ministry Cassese. The reform increased control by senior officials in a number of domains (Bassanini nd), the crucial separation between administrative and political levels, and also a paradigmatic change: administrators could be removed by their position due to poor performance (Castellani nd). Another major reform, remembered as the Bassanini Law, was introduced in 1998. It aimed to rationalize the system and make it more flexible, to create a public administration that 'serve the citizens-user' to be realized 'by means of a 'cultural revolution' based in 'the quality of the service provided and on customer satisfaction', with a form of control 'of performance […] more efficient [and] less invasive' (Bassanini nd, 15, Bassanini 2000/12/03). A study of Capano and Vassallo (2003) revealed soon after a large majority of administrative personnel to which they refer as a 'constant bureaucrat' type: civil servants which long tenured contracts, high seniority, no mobility, lack of training, mistrusts towards politicians.

Further reforms shaped Italian administration, i.e. law 145/2002 (later on declared unconstitutional) by government Berlusconi, whose III government also implemented the Brunetta reforms. The latter also aimed to 'bring the quality of public goods and services into line with international standards' and 'reward merit and punish incompetence', 'replacing the bureaucratic culture with the culture of results and evaluation' (Bassanini nd, 387). However, also this reform,

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[26] A Circular of the President of the Council of Ministry of November 2016[26], of the Department for regional affairs stress this aspect and reveals that actions of the lower level of policy making even undermine the main core of national policy, by way of example with local authorities signing partnership with foreign territories not recognized by the Italian central government.

introduced on the background of the financial crisis, was not able to change the Italian bureaucracy at the paradigmatic level. In contrast, the crisis strongly impacted the administrative body with caps to turnover and a consequent marked downsizing of its size and increase of the average age.

Recent scholarly research pinpoint old logics are currently in force. Tomo (2018) undertook another analysis to investigate the extent of relevance of the 'old bureaucracy type' into Italian public administration. Not surprisingly, he found employers in PA are yet strongly engaged in 'defending the status quo that allows 'having more by doing less''. They work within 'context in which anarchy is the most recurring organizational model, with no clear attribution of roles and responsibilities, and no employee involvement (Tomo 2018, 12)', (the 27% of his sample indicated that there is not clear attribution of roles and responsibilities). A study of the Tuscany region of 2015 – yet one among the most developed ones in the country – also reveals elements of the Old Public Administration (OPA) are still prevailing than those of New Public Management (NPM), and 'the post NPM reform wave […] have become a complex sedimentation or layering of structural and cultural features (Iacovino et al. 2015, 78)'.

The importance of hierarchy, the opposition to change at the status quo, the anarchy and/or lack of clear division of competences, the discretion in implementation of policies – idiosyncrasies of the Italian administrative systems yet shaped by obsolete logic – constantly and extensively emerged in the analysis of student mobility related policies, both within and across policy field.

4.1.3 Italian Political System and Political culture(s)

Italy is a constitutional republic established in 1946. Powers are distributed in legislative, in the hands of the parliament, executive – the government, and judiciary. Italy has a Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic; the President of the Council of Ministries is appointed by the President of the Republic, elected by the parliament.
The Italian party system, ever since characterized by instability, has been for a long phase under the control of the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) party, contraposed by the Communist Party always at the opposition. In the eighties, a major change occurred with the emergence of the so called 'pentapartito 27', which sanction the end Christian democrats lead governments.

In 1992, the Italian party system collapsed following the 'clean hands' judicial scandal, which dramatically eroded existing parties and marked the entrance in politics of Italian business-man Silvio Berlusconi, main character of Italian politics for the following twenty years. Italy's very first centre-left government entered in office in 1992, establishing a two-party system which will last for about 15 years. In 2013, finally, he 5SM emerged by the general elections as the larger Italian party, sanctioning the end of the two-party system.
Since then, and in timeframe of about 7 years, the Italian republic changed six different governments. The nineties marked profound transformation of Italian politics. In his article 'The Disappearance of Political Culture in Italy', Pasquino (2018) makes the argument that up until 1992 the party system showed a good degree of 'constitutional patriotism', which assured a functioning democracy even during the hard times of domestic terrorism, something that was not the case after 1992. Valbruzzi (2015), found out for example that *trasformismo*, 'a traditional Italian disease', dramatically spread since 1992 (he shows as a handful of parliamentarians left a party to joint another one between 1948-1992, while about one third of them did so between 2006-2018).

Pasquino (2018) 134) considers political culture to be 'a set of elements [...] shared by party leaders, activists, and members, that had shaped their vision of politics, inspired their fundamental choices, and connected them to millions of voters providing political identities'. Following the new-born Italian republic, three main political subcultures developed across the Italian party system, notably the Christian democrats, the Socialists and the Communists. On the

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[27] A government that included five different parties.

one side, the DC supported the state and was very close to the church, the PCI clearly defended the supremacy of the state over the market and defended the working class, while the socialist, 'did not success in overcoming their communist heritage and their attempt to 'shape' a reformist, quasi-social-democrats political culture, [and] remained for a long time weak and vague (Pasquino 2018, 135)'.

Since the second republic onward, following the in vain attempt to reform political culture from the extreme right to the extreme left, the Italian political class was no able to came up with a new political culture, a situation which left space to populism and anti-politics new or (re-newed) political forces (Pasquino 2018), such personal and catch up parties.

4.2 Cross-Sectoral Policy Development

4.2.1 Early years of mobility and consequent phases of policy development

As for the Australian case study, this section presents policy development historically, within and across the policy sectors on which this research focuses. The development of student mobility in Italy is reported as according to its main five period of development, each of which with a peculiar background context and different subsystem involved. Briefly introduced below, these phases correspond to i) the origin of European intra-mobility, ii) a moment of domestic and exogenous substantial changes, which also impacted mobility, iii) the early years of the Bologna process, iv) the following period of loss of relevance, and v) the period from the reform of Farnesina to the publication of the first National Strategy for the promotion of HE system abroad.

In its magisterial historical reconstruction of ISM since the middle age to present time, (Guruz, 20082) reports Italy as a forerunner country during the eighties, at least if compared by hosted number of foreign students, as shown by table 4.1. As introduced, this primate will not last many years, and the country acquired otherwise a strong delay in relation to ISM and more generally when it comes to its higher education system' internationalisation.

Until the late eighties, mobility in Italy was framed in terms of aid, something which substantially changed following the introduction of the Erasmus program and the begin of intra-European flows, since when HE became the most impacted policy domains. However, although Italian university did soon engage with Erasmus, especially after Ruberti law, mobility did not became a salient issue within academia nor outside it.

Another phase of interest on ISM begun with the Bologna declaration, whose overarching aim was the promotion of student mobility, years in which a number of binational universities were also established with France, Germany and China. Timid attempt to integrate efforts in HE with those on foreign policy also emerged between the late nineties and early 2000s, particularly in aid cooperation.

Table 4.1 | Top 10 hosting countries of foreign students

1968	1980	1985	2004
USA	USA	USA	USA
France	France	France	UK
Germany	URSS	Germany	Germany
Lebanon	Germany	UK	Australia
Canada	UK	**Italy**	France
UK	Lebanon	Canada	Japan
URSS	Canada	Lebanon	China
Egypt	**Italy**	Belgium	Russia
Argentina	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Canada
Italy	Romania	Australia	Spain

Source: Cunnings (1991) and Guruz (2008)

Table 4.1 - Top 10 hosting countries of foreign in various years

The Italian legislation on migration had been reformed three times in the meantime, in 1986, 1990 and 1998, but important constrains in relation to mobility flows reported in the eighties were not overcame. Instead, beginning with the 2002 Bossi Fini law and culminating with Salvini's 2018 '*security decrees - decreti sicurezza'*, migrants are approached within the framework of public security. International students are therefore treated almost as any other stream of migrants, and they are scrutinized in fear of illegal immigration or activities such as terrorism by a relevant part of the interior street level offices and of the Italian diplomatic network abroad.

Since 2008, strong cuts to the Italian HE sector have been done, leading to a steep decreases of administrative staff and scholars, and the lack of funds, ever since emerged as an obstacle to mobility, became an institutionalized problem. Moreover, despite a new reform of HE was accomplished in 2010, the capacity of the HE ministry to steer the system is still very low, with the presence of a strong academic guilt which defend the status quo, as we shall better see in the next section. It is worth to notice that since around 2012 ISM briefly come back at the top of the public discourse, and a number of actions have been done at the ministerial level. Eventually, MIUR engagement grew contextually to the one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI).

The MAECI undertook a reorganization in 2010 leading to the establishment of the General Direction for the Country System (DGPS), which has among its tasks the one of Italy internationalization, including the one of the HE system. The DGPS involvement around ISM pushed the development of new flows, particularly but not only with China, but it also resulted in a clear clash of competences with MIUR. Following the establishment of the Sino-Italian University in 2006, two programs of mobility – Marco Polo and Turandot – were also launched, and soon after the Uni-Italia organization was established jointly with MIUR, MAECI and the Interiors. Currently, also mobility programs directly sponsored by MAECI via Uni-Italia clash with immigration legislation, only recently partially soften thanks to the enforcement of a number of European directives. Summarizing, the process of integration between policy fields and dimensions, as well as among policy levels did not develop to a relevant extent, and disintegration appear to be predominant in a number of dimensions. ISM is yet approached following sectorial policy objectives and domestic actors do not coordinate their action neither have stable substantial relations, we shall extensively discuss in the various parts of this chapter. Before discussing more

in detail each of this phase, the remaining part of this section provides an overview of the ground of departure of ISM development until the early eighties, time zero of this analysis.

Apart for the so-called free movers, which moved around Europe since many centuries, international students were friendly called '*studenti d'oltremare*' - overseas students –, and they arrived to Italy mostly throughout governmental agreements between the Italian and foreign governments, particularly from developing countries. While the Italian ministry of foreign affairs officially operates in the field of education since the 1971 - when the first law on technical cooperation with foreign countries was promulgated (law 1222/1971) - the ministry had the power to provide scholarship since 1955, as according to law 288 of the same year. The ministry, between the fifties and sixties, also established welcome centres in Rome, Siena, Pavia and Naples, and an inter-ministerial committee to manage the issue (UCSEI 2004). The aforementioned law also established a service for foreign countries – *Servizio per i rapporti con i PVS* - operating within the general direction for cultural cooperation (*Direzione generale per la Cooperazione Culturale, Tecnica e Scientifica*) (UCSEI 2004). These schemes developed during the post war period and aimed to promote peace and cooperation among countries, and students from Latin America, Africa and Asia were positively perceived within the framework of international aid. For the academic year 1955-1956, ISTAT reports a number of 2828 foreign students enrolled in Italian universities, which will turn to be 6130 after ten years and reach 14.357 in 1970-1971 (Colucci 2018).

As one former president of the Board of Rectors of Italian Universities (CRUI) interviewed argued, the interests in cooperation of the foreign affairs ministry is a clear reflection of the Italian multilateral approach in foreign policy. Among the agreements signed in this period, it should be highlighted the Fulbright program, following the birth of the Italo-American Fulbright Commission, still currently in force to promote high level exchanges of students between the two countries. Beyond this single and elite program, the huge number of Americans students coming to Italy also brought to the institution of the Association of American Colleges and University Program in Italy (AACUPI) in the late seventies. Such flow will however always remain parallel to flows of international students in Italy, as these students enrol only in American universities mostly in the cities of Florence, Rome and Bologna (AACUPI 2017).

Mirror of foreign policy of the time is also the formal agreement between Italy and Greece after the second world war, which lead to the consolidation of a significant flow of Greek students (Pelliccia, 2014), which reached its peak during the years of the military dictatorship in Greece. If in 1955 about 1386 Greek students were present in the country (Papoutsis 1997, 68, in Pelliccia 2014), they were 16,593 in the year 1976-77, accounting for about 54% of foreign students in Italy during the decade and the 59.4% during that academic year (Pelliccia 2014). This flow will decrease starting from the early 80's, but Greek students will account for about the 54% of foreign students in Italy during the eighties, and still counted for a 24% of the entire body of foreign students in Italy in the a.y. 2003-2004 (Pelliccia 2014). Its roots are lively, as showed by Pelliccia (2014), who reports how many Greek students studying in an Italian university have at least one parent who obtained its tertiary degree in Italy.

The strong influence of the catholic world is one of the many Italian peculiarity and it is clearly visible also discussing ISM. Crucial to our discussion is the *Ufficio Centrale Studenti Esteri in Italia (*UCSEI[28]), a catholic very active player in the field of mobility. It begun its activity in 1960 in Rome, and it organized over 40 national conferences and about 80 regional meetings linked to the issue of right to study, international cooperation and cultural exchanges between 1962 and 2002 (Redattore Sociale 2020). UCSEI's objective was the one to help foreign students coming from developing countries. Already 1970 it opened a centre hosting foreign students free of charge, which it will become an association in 1981, Centro Giovanni XXIII. UCSEI also founded

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[28]UCSEI stands for Foreign Students Central Office of Italy

AMICIZIA-STUDENTI ESTERI (Friendship: foreign students) in 1964, a magazine which devoted extensive space to student exchange in academia. UCSEI was engaged in collecting data about the presence of foreign students, also together with the Italian Ministry of Education (MIUR) and the national statistic Italian centre, ISTAT[29]. Material by the UCSEI and the collection of *Amicizia* constitute a precious sources to discover, beyond the extent and composition of the *phenomenon*, also the political and policy development of the time, the roles and actions of domestic institutional actors. More specifically, this material has been used to describe the dramatic shift in handling foreign students happened in Italy between the seventies and the eighties, which altered a path in place since more than twenty years: graph 4.1 below shows foreign students flows grew with no exception until the sixties, to follow an up-and-down trend until the early eighties and hence begun to increase again after the Erasmus introduction[30] (see annex IV for additional evidence). In particular, the UCSEI (2004) reports that since the early seventies the Italian foreign minister shifted to a different approach to the mobility of students, being more inclined to help students to study in their own countries for a believed-to-be-better approach to cooperation.

ISTAT data |Foreign students enrolled at Italian universities 1995-2013
Elaboration of the author

Graph 4.1 - Foreign students enrolled at Italian universities 1995-2013

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29 See, by way of example, http://briguglio.asgi.it/immigrazione-e-asilo/2006/giugno/ucsei-statist-studenti.html and
    http://briguglio.asgi.it/immigrazione-e-asilo/2004/dicembre/ricerca-ucsei-studenti.html
30 As introduced in the first section and it will be more extensively discussed in the next paragraphs, the sharp increase since the early 2000 is a reflection of the increase of migrants of second/third generation at Italian universities rather than a decisive increase of student flows. ISTAT data do not consider Erasmus mobilities.

TABLE 4.2 | PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIOL STUDENT MOBILITY IN ITALY	TURNING POINTS
The rise of intra-European student mobility: 1978 - 1987 Following the developments at the communitarian development in education, the JSP and the ERASMUS, Italy engage as a driver country of intra EU mobility. The relevance of mobility decrease in cooperation in aid. **Institutional autonomy granted to universities. They can develop inter-university agreements with foreign institutions, within and beyond the ERASMUS program.**	**1987** Erasmus Program
Major international changes and domestic reforms: 1987-1999 New laws to regulate immigration, with more restrictive Martelli Law for foreign students. Reform of Italian international cooperation, which does not mention universities. Intra-EU ISM flows rise, extra EU decrease, but structural problems within HE twist with slow development also in EU flows. Collapse of the bipolar war. Lira crisis and collapse of the Italian party system.	
The Bologna Process: 1999- 2003 Promulgation of 509/1999, which reformed the Italian HE into the three tier degree as according to Bologna Process, for which student mobility constitutes an 'overarching aim'. Three ministerial plans for internationalization launched, 4 bi-national universities and a national fund for mobility established. **International cooperation programs launched in strategic areas of foreign policy with MAE involved, leading to the *2004 Declaration of Intents*.**	**1999** The 509/1999 enters in force BOLOGNA DECLARATION
The loss of Relevance: 2003-2009 9/11, Emergence of terrorism and stiffening of immigration regulations across the western world and Italy (Bossi-Fini law). With the launch of the Erasmus Mundus, EU programs begin to twist with visa/immigration regulations. The ministry of interior get involved by student mobility. 509/1999 implementation slow and patchy, failed implementation of basic technology to support student mobility. Loss of salience across MIUR and at the political level. Cultural heritage in the HE system undermines ISM: the latter disincentives credit out-going mobility, it does not attract foreign students, always more Italian leave the country for degree mobility	
From the reform of Farnesina to the National Strategy: 2009-present Gelmini Reform, strong cuts to HEIs budget. Lack of funds became another major obstacle to student mobility in the country, together with the increasing re-centralization of the HE system who strong decreased institutional room to innovate (especially internationally) **Reform of the MAE in 2010, institution the Directorate of the Internationalization of the Italian country system. Launch of ad hoc programs of mobility within the new framework and establishment of Uni-Italia. Reform of cooperation in 2014, institution of the MAECI, universities are considered actors of international cooperation. CRUI and MAECI sign a new cooperation path. CRUI manifesto 2016** Attempt to a tri-partite games according to a shared strategy according to which ISM constitutes a foreign policy instrument, as per the 2017 National Strategy for promoting HE system abroad. ISM gain salience again MIUR, which attempt to increasingly steer the phenomenon. Mostly formal than substantial changes	**2010** MAECI Re-organization
SOURCE: Elaboration of the author	

Table 4.2 - Phases Of Development Of international Student Mobility In Italy

Developing countries were begun to be seen as able to offer tertiary education domestically, and different channel of aid were activated (i.e. sending abroad Italian teachers, equipment and books) (UCSEI 2004). Already in 1973, a foreign affairs circular established tighten criteria for the admission of foreigners to tertiary education (requiring a minimum of 80/100 in grades of secondary education, the fulfilment of each activity required each year to have a confirmed visa, with police allowed to check students' achievement in education) (UCSEI 2004). While the Circular was later cancelled and substituted with a new one by the ministry of education changing a number of such provisions (after mobilisation of actors such as the UCSEI), this issue anticipated the changing course of events and a clash of competences and of coordination between the ministry of university and the one in charge of foreign affairs. Universities opposed the 1973 provision, and pointed out to the dearth of a policy towards foreign students in governmental action in a conference held in Perugia in 1978, where by the others were present both Antonio Ruberti and Luigi Berlinguer, at the time rectors of Sapienza and Siena Universities (UCSEI 2004). When the ministry of foreign affairs blocked the inflow of students in 1977 for the next two years, the dearth of political commitment to solve the issue by legislation became clear UCSEI (2004).

Despite the loss of salience of the issue, law 38/1979 established the Department for International Cooperation for Development' within the foreign affairs ministry, and the former division for scholarship was transformed in a structured office, which directly managed scholarships and grants (UCSEI 2004). However, foreign students were at the time considered as tourists by the ministry of interior, within the 'educational exchange' by foreigner affairs ministry, while the ministry of education was not yet considering them if not explicitly involved (**UCSEI (2004)**. Already in 1976, the organization gave voice to such problems, pointing also out norms – mostly immigration ones – beyond becoming far restrictive, were differently implemented by offices across the country, and any student could be sure to be really legal in the country.

4.2.2 The Rise of European Mobility

If the interest in hosting foreign students from developing countries was vanishing, a new approach to the mobility of students, deeply European, was about to begin.
Following the Rome Treaty, the education sector – left out by the treaty – begin in fact to scale up the European debate particularly following the student protest able to shake HE systems in both side of the Atlantic. It is worth to mention to this regard the General Assembly of the European Rectors (CRE) held in Geneva in 1968, whose focus was on the institutional autonomy of universities (Corradi and Costa, 2015). Following the CRE conferences, in fact, a delegation of Italian Universities (now CRUI) had a meeting with a German delegation of WRT (the German conference of universities) (Corradi 2015), the first one of a series culminating with the establishment of the Italian-German University in the early 2000s. The meeting had the aim to to identify equivalences between some courses of study in German and Italian universities, as reported in a letter of the Italian Ministry of Public Education (Corradi 2015, 34). Meetings among the Italian and German Rectors conference continued, with another one in 1970 in Rome, in 1971 in Bonn, and also during the eighties, as the text will show below. Soon after the first Italo-German meeting, also a delegation from France arrived in Pisa, Italy, with the aim of 'preparing a study of course equivalences between French and Italian universities in some subject' (Corradi 2015), another moment of departure which will see its climax about 30 years later with the establishment of the Italo-French University. In 1969, law 910/1969 had introduced the possibility for students to complete part of their degree abroad, granted a faculty council's preventive agreement. The issue had reach local and national newspaper such as *Il Messaggero* and *Il Corriere della Sera*, which testify the enthusiasm in place around European student exchanges at the time (Corradi 2015). These events shed light on Italian universities engagement to promotion of ISM since the early seventies, even before a series of crucial events at the European level which brought to the

establishment of the Erasmus project, briefly mentioned below as to better understand concurrent and future Italian policy development in relation to ISM.

In 1971, the Ministers of European Community had meet and released a report entitled *For a Community Policy on Education*', de facto opening a discussion at the communitarian level (Corbett 2003, Corradi 2015). EUREC, a group of expert in the field made by the Belgian, German, French and Italian Rector Conferences was also created in 1973, year of the second European Ministry of Education Meeting. Altiero Spinelli, Italian, at the time Commissioner for Industry and Technology and deeply in favour of such initiative, also established two groups within the Commission that had to organize cooperation and carry out related research (Corbett 2003). As the author note, he did not achieve his main aim of extending the commission role, but these events were crucial to the launch of the Joint Study Program (Erasmus' predecessor) in 1977 (Corbett 2003). Since 1973, there was even a new Commissioner title for Research, Science and Education (Corbett 2003). The first Commissioner, Dahrendorf, 'had been horrified by the mention of harmonization (Corbett 2003, 9)' of European HE system. Coherently, the Dahrendorf report called for cooperation between HEIs and for academic recognition of study period abroad (Corradi 2015), as it did the Act following the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Helsinki, that had an entire section to 'Cooperation and Exchange in the field of Education'. In 1974, the ministries of education meet again and further defined cooperation in education to reach closer relations between educational systems in Europe while yet respecting traditions and culture of each country. It is worth to notice how meetings between the Italian and German rectors' conference were happening mostly on the side of these European meetings. Finally, in 1975, with the Masclet report, the idea of intra-European mobility for the purposes of study formally emerged with the study '*the Intra-European Mobility of Students*'. The Joint Study Program (JSP) was launched following European Resolution of February 9th, 1976 (Corradi 2015, Corbett 2003). Italy has been a key participant of the program of the program: it participated in 79 out of the 409 JSP financed by the European Commission, for about 1/5 of the total share (CIMEA 2002) in the period between 1976-1984.

Meetings among the Italian and German rector conferences during the eighties, and the two rectors' conferences engaged in drafting a 'model for cooperation' between Italian and German universities basing on the first experience of the late sixties. It is of 1982 the request of the former rector conference Romanzi to collect information about Italo-German relationship of Italian HEIs in place (Corradi 2015). The model has been later diffused in 1983 by the Italian organization (Corradi 2015), but in 1989, when it was held another Italo-German meeting in relation to the new Erasmus program, complaints about very difficult procedure for recognition were to emerge (Corradi 2015). The European Council of Ministry of June 2th, 1983, also declared that 'the promotion of mobility in higher education [was] one of the most important objectives for cooperation in the field of higher education […] [and it aimed to] intensif[y] and extending mobility in the field of higher education (Corradi 2015)'. The year before, in Strasburg, it was also agreed the 5% goals of foreign students as percentage of the overall academic student population (Corradi 2015). The Italian legislation, however, was already following a system of quotas relying on HEIs availability to determine the places available to foreign students, and did not consider such provision (UCSEI 2004 228), despite its strong involvement in these European developments.

A number of other relevant events also happened at the communitarian level, among which are crucial to our discussion the Grevier sentence, the launch of the Erasmus and the Andonnino report. In 1985, one French student enrolling to a Belgian institution was in fact requested to pay a four-times-increased fee rate due to her non-Belgian citizenship (De Rita and Buldriesi 2006). The student appealed to the European Court of Justice, which ruled how Belgian universities could not ask different tertiary fees due to European Community treaties, as the per sentence of Feb 13th, 1985. Grevier, the student who applied to the court, obtained that each students belonging to a member states could enrol in professional education in another member state following the same

provision of domestic students. The judgment embraced an extended interpretation of article 128 of the Rome Treaty, considering any form of training preparing to work as education, regardless of the level of study and the age of students (De Rita and Buldriesi 2006), and it provided a solid ground to foster cooperation in education across Europe, in those year of positive commitment for ISM and the Erasmus program discussion already on the table. Despite the positive general framing about mobility, the establishment of Erasmus at the European level has not been a linear process and the program was established in 1987 instead of 1985 because of (harsh) discussion of financial nature

It was also published the Adonnino report, that foreseen support to foster a Europe of citizens, the creation of European symbols such as a flag, an anthem, a passport, and actions to promote knowledge of at least two European languages among European languages. Within this framework, the mobility of students in HE was to constitute a key instruments. Lenarduzzi (2006) notes how it is after the adoption of the Adonnino Report that the Commission truly engaged in launching programs such as the Erasmus, Comett, Lingua, Europa dei Giovani and Petra between 1986 and 1989, and it has been published under the Italian presidency of the European Community. Erasmus activities were to be part of the SOCRATES program and under the Task Force for Human Resources of the European Commission (TFHR). Activities were grouped in five areas, the one of Inter-university Cooperation Programs (ICP), visit grants for staff, grants for student mobility, recognition of studies abroad and foreign qualification (EC 2019). Erasmus was also to be a pilot test in 145 HEIs for the implementation of 'a European Community Course Credit Transfer System (ECTS), that should have allowed an easier and more efficient tool across different systems of higher education (EC 2019 Erasmus 87)'. Inter-university cooperation programs were 'cooperative networks of HEIs, which took commitment to implement programs fostering student and teaching staff mobility, to be fully recognized as part of the study/work activity in Italy (EC 2019 Erasmus 87)'. Before the Erasmus, the Top Industrial Managers for Europe (TIME) program was also implemented within the framework of a IPC, with a clear orientation toward Industry, as the name explain itself. In 2002, Cimea (2002) reported already 165 TIME graduates received their diploma by Milan and Turin Polytechnics, beyond the growth of the index of cooperation agreements (from 100 in 1985 to 674 in 1994, with an absolute number of programs beginning by 239 to reach 1612). The salience of this ISM European driven development in Italy is also clear also looking to some additional project launched, among which is worth to mention UNIMED. The Union of Mediterranean Universities, established at Sapienza University in 1989, was an association of 73 HEIs within the EURO-Mediterranean basin: the result of a new formula to cooperate at the European level, called as the Renewed Mediterranean Policy. UNIMED was financed for only three academic years, but it lead to the establishment of MEDCAMPUS three years later, in turn evolved into TEMPUS MEDA in 2001, and it also set the playground for the ERASMUS MUNDUS project (CIRPS 2004).

Expert interviews described this period in Italy as enthusiastic, a moment to experiment new programs and actions given the slim normative framework under which first agreements were signed. In 1986, it was also established the CIMEA, a national body designed by the Education Ministry as the Italian centre belonging to the National Academic Recognition Information Centres (NARICs) and to the European National Information Centres (ENICs) of the European Council. Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 shows statistics revealing the extent of Italian engagement of them time.

The decade had begun with a symbolic year, 1980, which marks both the peak number of foreign students since the fifties, around 30.000 units, and the first normative ground to promote international cooperation among universities. The Article 91 of the Presidential decree 382/1980 (Reorganization of University Teaching, Relative Training Band and Organizational and Teaching Experiment), stated in fact that Italian universities could engage in common activities within foreigner universities, including the mobility of students ('CIMEA 2003). Moreover, law 905/1980 granted the free circulation of nurses within the European Community, and it stated that only in case of serious doubts in relation to tertiary qualification authenticity, the country could have

applied to another member states for further confirmation (Corradi 2015). As according to ministerial circular 82/1981, however, Italian universities could not yet however give validity to foreign joint academic qualification (CIMEA 2003).

TABLE 4.3 | ERASMUS PROJECT | N. of Study Visit - Italy

	incoming	outgoing	total
1987/88	nd	nd	245
1988/89	155	93	248
1989/90	nd	nd	nd
1990/91	53	53	106
1991/92	nd	nd	nd
1992/93	nd	nd	nd
1993/94	7799	8675	16474
1994/95	9364	10562	19926
Elaboration of the author of data from Erasmus Annual Reports 1987-1995			

Table 4.3 - ERASMUS PROJECT | N. of Study Visit - Italy

TABLE 4.4 | ERASMUS PROJECT | N. of Inter-University Cooperation Programs, Italy

	n. HEIs involved	%	n. of HEIs coordinators	%
1988/89	489		211	
1989/90	589	26.5	252	**11.3**
1990/91	875	31.8	353	**12.8**
1991/92	925	10.6	195	**10.9**
1992/93	1081	9.8	180	**9.4**
1993/94	1381	9.4	194	**9.6**
1994/95	1622	9.6	203	**8.9**
Elaboration of the author of data from Erasmus Annual Reports 1987-1995				

Table 4.4 - ERASMUS PROJECT | N. of Inter-University Cooperation Programs, Italy

TABLE 4.5 | ERASMUS PROJECT | N. of HEIS eligible for Erasmus

	ITA	GER	FR	ES	UK
1988/89	43	83	150	**37**	**106**
1989/90	59	126	247	**42**	**148**
1990/91	59	132	268	**42**	**157**
1991/92	65	176	300	**47**	**172**
1992/93	72	186	369	**55**	**197**
1993/94	77	205	405	**60**	**212**
1994/95	85	217	411	**63**	**220**
Elaboration of the author of data from Erasmus Annual Reports 1987-1995					

Table 4.5 - ERASMUS PROJECT | N. of HEIS eligible for Erasmus

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Soon after the introduction of the Erasmus, Minister Ruberti, strong supporter of the program and more generally of European ongoing developments, implemented a reform which deeply marked the higher education sector. Remembered as the '*quadrifoglio'*, it was made by four different laws each of which concentrated in a specific aspect of the higher education system (Capano and Turri 2017). The reform has been a watershed for the university system, since it granted autonomy to universities, and it simplified the normative framework to engage in European cooperation in the field of tertiary education.

Until then, the Italian system was yet characterized by strong control by the state over universities, and a substantial power held by academic guilts. While centralized, universities had in fact a good degree of autonomy, however mostly within the hands of full professors (many of which strongly refuse the option to recognise students' work done abroad). The idea of giving autonomy to HEIs systems was maturing across entire Europe at the time. Autonomy is crucial to our discussion, as it meant universities were to be autonomous in establishing inter institutional agreements with foreign institutions, beyond the framework of formal governmental agreement, a path only partially opened already by D.P.R. 382/1980. One expert, at the time working for the MURST and following the Erasmus in its very first years, clearly summarize the link between autonomy and student mobility:

> 'in those years internationalization processes related to the chance to promote international university agreements were beginning. So, let's say the first experiments if we want also of institutional autonomy in international agreements... everything was to be... a scenario to be invented, to be delineated, to be built'.

Another expert, former CRUI president, in relation to 168/1989 argued that

> 'in this story [autonomy], there is also the desire of making it possible for students to move across universities, hence to look for the best institution at which to better develop their attitude, their aspiration, and also, if you want... to know other parts of the European word'.

Generally, experts argued this was a very enthusiastic period which transversally involved the ministry, universities and single professors, within the context 'of a very closed system' which was in clear contrast to the foresight of the reform promoter, Minister Ruberti –explaining in this way the contrasts two souls of the same system, one frontrunner also at the European level, and another one which attempt – and eventually succeed – in maintain the status quo.

In 1992 the Italian and French government signed a framework of agreement on university cooperation, and as CIMEA (2006) writes, it is important 'historically since it formally established for the first time the awarding of a double degree'. The agreement foreseen that students enrolled in these programs could finish their preparation in the hosting institution and be granted both the Italian Laurea and the French Maîtres, and followed the one of 1985 between Turin and Savoy Universities (CRUI 1996).

While the normative framework to enable and promote mobility was slowly developing – in contrast to those related to immigration regulation - deep cultural heritage were however undermining the reform, which shacked only Italian HEIs 'which wanted to be shaken'. Experts further noted that while the Erasmus became a flagship program of the European Union, it did not had the mass effects among Italian universities expected in the very first years, and its introduction revealed soon many aspects of rigidity of the Italian HE system (as teaching activities organized as according to rigid ministerial regulation). Despite the general enthusiasm of the period, only 'some university took off in Italy, while others lagged behind', to quote one very concise summary made by one expert interviewed. The Erasmus program, however, while with limited scope, constitutes yet currently a program which cover the large majority of opportunity to go abroad in the country.

According to Lenarduzzi, at the time, the large majority of European states were against the idea of the Commission engaging in the field of HE because of fear of harmonization of academic programs. He states 'we had not only to face the dearth of legal basis, but mostly with the sense of sovranity of member states, which were afraid of the Commission interference on this matter' (INDIRE 2012). As we shall see in the next paragraphs, the fear of harmonization from above will strongly emerge in the ISM Italian development. Such fear, that will be evident following Bologna Declaration, has its roots in these years, when a large part of Italian academic guilt refused the implications of the new mobility schemes.

4.2.3 Years of change in several policy domains

In the mid-eighties, the country did not have a law of immigration - rules in force was the one developed at the end of the second war world - neither one on international cooperation. The years between 1986 and 1989 have been marked therefore by four different reforms. In 1989, moreover, the Soviet Union collapsed, and in 1992 Italy experienced the collapse of its party system and a Lira crisis.

The first law of the series is the immigration Foschi law of 1986, which however – given the many problems encountered during its creation – ended up to completely miss its mark of regulate the immigration phenomenon, and will be replaced by Martelli law only four years later.

The second one is the reform of international cooperation, law 49/1987, that disciplined international cooperation within the framework of Italian foreign policy, and pursued the Italian interests of promoting solidarity among countries and human rights in the background of UN principles and the CEE-ACP conventions. This law will be the legal base for cooperation in the country until 2014, and it also established, together with article 18 of the Presidential Decree 177/1987, the General Direction for Cooperation of Development (Ufficio IX DGCS 2004 – UCSEI 2004). The law, as stated by art. 2, foreseen the 'promotion of educational programs on development matters, including the ones in education, and the intensification of cultural exchanges between Italy and developing countries, particularly concerning those involving youth (Law 49/1987)'. The activities promoted mostly relied in granting scholarships to individuals and funds for Italian HEIs activities abroad (trough '*borse di studio a gestione diretta*' – directly managed scholarships by foreign countries and the Italian diplomatic network abroad, plus funds to courses and programs training). However, the law did not mention universities as actors of Italian cooperation, and it sanctioned a different approach to cooperation with developing countries, focusing on the establishment of programs and course in developing countries rather than welcoming students in Italy (Piva A., 1987), a trend denounced and criticized by the UCSEI since already 25 years. According to the organization, moreover, the law worsen the conditions of foreign third country nationals students in Italy, and requirement for obtaining a visa to study in Italy were becoming stricter. Cammelli (1990) reports how in 1989 foreign students were required to have a minimum of 800.000 Lire per months and a 'good conduct' certificated released by students' responsible domestic authority. These students were in a sort of grey area (UCSEI 2004), and had to face a complex and unclear normative framework composed by a mix falling on the sectors of international cooperation and immigration. For this reason, the UCSEI, that was became in the meantime a suitable no profit organization for the purposes of development cooperation (CENTRO GIOVANNI XXIII nd a), organized and held a conference in 1989 on the issue to bargain better conditions with the government. In that occasion, Giulio Andreotti, at the time Italian foreign ministry, admitted UCSEI raised relevant points, and took his personal commitment 'to improve the grievous condition of foreign students within cooperation schemes (AMICIZIA 1988)' – an eloquent sentence to describe the ISM panorama UCSEI had until then denounced.

It is also in light of this panorama that, when the immigration discourse exploded across the country following the failed attempt to be regulated by the Foschi law, foreign students came

together with other immigrants group during the first national strike of foreign nationals in Rome of 1989, which asked major reform and an improved law on immigration. Being the better educated, they held a crucial role in the protest, lead local committees and acted as leaders of the whole and the many communities of immigrants (Colucci 2018). A delegation of foreign students even meet Iotti, at the time president of the Italian Chamber, and give her the request resulting from the rally (EMN 2012), asking easier procedure to enrol at universities, more scholarships, and the cancellation of restrictions introduced in the eighties (**Sacchi et al 2017**, Colucci 2018). In these years, there has also been an attempt to draft a law focused on foreign students, with the UCSEI strongly involved in the discussion.

Immigration became by then a crucial public and political debate, to the extent that in 1990 was held the first National Conference on Immigration organized by the Italian government together with OCSE (Colucci 2018), with the aim to raise consciousness among Italian population about the issue of immigration and better promote international cooperation (so to intervene at the base of those push factors alimenting immigration in Europe, coherently to the disposition of the recent law of 1987 on international cooperation mentioned above for students (Colucci 2018)).
A new law on immigration was promulgated in 1990, and it established clearer rights and freedom of foreign citizens living in Italy. However, given a number of amendments by republicans, it lost part of its potential impact (Paoli 2013 in Colucci 2018) and everyone was against the law, given it was to flexible for those against immigration and too restrictive for the others. The so-called Martelli law focused on students with two crucial provision. In the first place, they were since then allowed to transform their permit to a working permit. Crucially, the law sanctioned they would lose their permit if they failed to graduate within a two-year timeframe beyond the normal cycle of study (UCSEI 2004). As a result, the law forced a number of students to transform their permit in a working-one, resulting in a obligated path of drop-out among foreign enrolled (spread, as large research proved, also among nationals students).

At the turn of the decade, in conclusion, the normative framework developed confirmed a loss of interest and salience on exchange within the framework of cooperation, and the immigration regulation to this regard was not really reformed. In 1992 another crucial law, 91/1992, disciplined the granting of Italian citizenship. Tintori (2009a in Colucci 2018) argues this law was even harsher than the one promulged in 1912, as mostly focused on the right of citizenship to expatriated Italians, in a very generous ways - i.e. granting it to many distant generations of Italians emigrated abroad, while strongly reducing the margin of obtaining it by immigrants - newborns by foreign parents in Italy could only gain citizenship after reaching the legal age of 18, and they must certified the lived in Italy for their entire life (Colucci 2018). This disposition, apparently non related to the issues of international student mobility, will instead lead to a paradox in the following decades, given that it currently obliges to considers Italians students who have never been in Italy but have Italian parents or grandparents, while it consider foreigners students second and third generation that were born and lived in Italy their entire life. This law was more over the last of the so called '*prima repubblica*' (Colucci 2018), before the events that shacked the course of Italian politics in the following years, with *Mani Pulite*.
The year before law 390/1991, had instead stated the right to study for non-Italian nationals as according to the country constitutional provision (art. 34 of Italian constitution). The law also gave competences in HE to the Italian state to address and coordinate policies, by means of regional study agencies (*Aziende Regionali per il Diritto allo Studio*). Article 16, comma 4 of the same law also established an ad hoc fund to integrate resources of region and autonomous provinces in matters linked to educational aid. The law was the first of its kind in the history of the Italian republic (Capano and Turri 2017), and it also set that the general criteria for matters in relation to funding students for their right to tertiary education were to be disciplined by a decree of the prime minister (D.P.C.M.), promulgated every three years, while this was not always the case (EMN 2012). Italy also receipted the European Directive 89/48/CEE, with DL 115/1992, which implied

to recognize member state's foreign qualification of post-secondary education within Italian labour market.

As anticipated, the new course of cooperation had changed dramatically, and resources were decreasing. From 1991 to 1996, funds went from 15 billions of Lire to 13,5 and the number of scholarships the MAE dropped from 1920 to 976 (Forcesi 2004, 246). *Mani Pulite* had a direct impact into Italian foreign cooperation system, further explaining the decreasing trend of scholarship within the framework of aid. Calzolari, at the time Rector of the Bologna University, wrote that during the Venice Brainstorming of 1996 at the European-Asia Forum on University Relations 'a series of statistical data' presented were astonishing, since they revealed that 'among Asian youth studying at universities, every six five would go to the USA, while the 6th was to come in Europe, mostly to Germany, French and UK'. He concluded saying: 'I leave you to imagine the extent to which the percentage of those coming to Italy was irrelevant' (CRUI 1996). Coherently, Forcesi reports Di Francia, a professor at the University of Bologna, released a study proving the reduction of foreign students in Italy was in clear contrast with international development, and this came from a tendency to underestimate their value. Moreover, the study point out how quotas decided by the ministries as according to HEIs availability represented a clear break to foster mobility (UCSEI 2004, 246).

Given the clear loss of salience of extra-European students at the national level, UCSEI held a number of conferences[31] addressing and discussing the normative context and the real conditions of foreign nationals studying in Italy. At this point also CRUI acknowledged and focused on their decreasing numbers, pointing out to have discussed a new partnership with the foreign affairs minister to anticipate the granting of scholarship as according to the academic year calendar, and actions for students' accommodation that were however never be implemented. In 1994, a civil servant of the Interior ministry admitted the very low number of foreign students in Italy as non-comparable with other European countries, and he identified in entry procedures the biggest obstacle to attract students (UCSEI 2004).

Since then, in order to obtain visas to study in Italy, foreign students had also to participate to an interview at the Italian diplomatic offices abroad, that hold the power to decline the visa request even when the students had proven his/her enrolment to an Italian university, if they had a grounds to suspect there were other motives at the base of such request (such as illegal activities or migration). Diplomatic seats did not had to justify any refusal (UCSEI 2004). The interview to be done at a diplomatic seats was a truly restrictive requirements, as the majority of students in developing country often had no means to travel to the closest Italian consular seat. The MAE ministerial circular of 1994, also further defined attitudes in the field of cooperation (UCSEI 2004) and stressed how the ministry was in charge of relation with other government and countries, and therefore policies in this realm, including education, had to be concerted and in line with the development of foreign countries (UCSEI 2004 261, Amicizia).

CONICS, the *Consorzio delle Università Italiane Impegnate in Accordi di Cooperazione con le Università dei Paesi in Via di Sviluppo*, a new born body in 1992 which grouped Italian universities engaging in cooperation, published in that year a document which shed light on the missing coordination among the different governmental bodies involved, and the mix of instruments embraced. CONICS was a consortium which operated under the ministry to promote internationalization of involved universities, as to strengthen relations with emerging countries and Eastern Europe. It has also been the national contact point for the TEMPUS aforementioned program (POLITO 2002). Don Musaragno, founder and President of the UCSEI, use the following words in the document to describe the situation:

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[31] Between 1991 and 1994, five of them were organized and testify the mood on this matter with their titles '(1990) *Requiem per gli studenti stranieri?*, (1991) *Per una legge giusta sugli student stranieri*, (1993) *Studenti Esteri: da extra-comunitari a soggetti del diritto allo studio*, (1994) *Gli studenti esteri e il diritto Internazionale allo studio*.

'Since ten years they have been trying to make a law but it did not work out. Different ministries are involved at the same time: of foreign affairs, of interior, of labor, everyone in the sector of its own competence, and at the end of the day anything which works for everyone is done. In the meantime, their number [of students] decrease (since then years); but nothing gets done, exception made to condone them as workers and increasing places at the universities (Don Musaragno, Amicizia 1992 n 6 p 1, Forcesi 2004)'

In 1994, also Ruberti, still Minister at MURST, declared that 'few things have been done and Italy is on late' ('*In effetti molti passi Avanti non sono stati fatti', 'siamo in grave ritardo'*) at a three day reunion of foreign students in Rome in the same year. The minister took his commitment to approve the draft of the law proposed by the former government about foreign students, and to better coordinate its ministry and the one in charge of foreign affair actions (UCSEI 2004), but the law was never promulged. Already in 1988, Ruberti had pointed out at the conference *Università e gli Studenti Stranieri: situazione e prospettive,* that there was a political issue to be solved, as there was not the interest in engaging with developing countries (Melica 1988). In the editorial of an AMICIZIA number of 1987, Don Musaragno underlined the large extent to which the phenomenon was driven by ministerial circular delegating to other public authorities decisions on foreign students, also biased by the spread negative framing (ie. 'before a problem of numbers for the system', 'then linked to terrorism or because students are likely to engage in illegal behaviours if not enough privileged in their economic situation (Don Musaragno 1987)'.

In the meantime, also the Italian HE system ability to resist change also became evident. Material interviews revealed that a changing 'mood' within the ministry of university begun exactly in this period, since it was also loosing valuable professionals and it was not investing in their formation for new strategic tasks, such as internationalization. They also stressed the end of a 'period of enthusiasm' and 'period of growth'. According to one expert, it is also in light of this consideration that Lenarduzzi organized in 1994 a general meeting 'the European Responsibility of Universities' in Pisa, as to stress the crucial role that institutional autonomy had to play in universities within the European context, and how ISM constituted a strategic instruments to this purpose. While, in 1996, with the introduction of the new budget law, a step towards a steering at distance mode in HE was achieved, the process of transformation of the system was coming to a stake.

In 1996, the country found itself at the eve of the entering in force of the Schengen agreement, with the first centre left government of the history of the Italian Republic in cabinet. The government, Pro-European, made a number of adjustment needed to fully join the European integration process: it is of relevance to our discussion the new law on immigration, the first one since when, with the symbolic arrive in Italy of Vlora from Albania in the early nineties, the country had realized its new identity of immigration country. The Turco-Napolitano was introduced in 1989 with the aim of finally implement a resonated approach to immigration, building on the awareness that immigration had become a structural phenomenon in Italy.
The law established the Unified Text on Immigration, still the main text of reference also for foreign students in the country. Article 37 was dedicated to enrolment in HE, stating same rights to foreigners and Italians citizens. The law considered the European provision of keeping around the 5% the share of foreign students enrolled in the Italian tertiary education system, allowing them to work while studying and to convert permits from working to studying and vice versa, granting also the chance of higher education to foreigners already living in Italy (UCSEI 2004). However, it did not change the norm on the quotas in place to admit foreign nationals based on Italian universities availability, which was away to reach the 5% of total enrolment, resulting in contradiction with European agreements took in Strasbourg. Forcesi (UCSEI 2004) defined the annual circular following the new law by the ministry of 98-99 'the last 15 minutes of sufferance' for foreign students, and that – for the thin part in which it was more 'friendly' for foreign students, lot of work should have been done so that established restrictive practice within the minister and its administration would come in line to new legislative provision (UCSEI 2004).

The Bologna Declaration signs the begin of a voluntary process according to which signatures countries would engage in a reform of the tertiary education system with the introduction of a three-tier cycle structure – Bachelor, Master and PhD - as well as the introduction of a common framework enabling the comparability of degrees thanks to tools such as the European Transfer Credit System (ECTS). As a full reform of the HE sector appeared impossible to happen in Italy, the ministry turned to his European peers which tackled similar problems: high level of student drop outs, long periods to gain tertiary diplomas, and universities not responding to societal change (Capano 2002). Eventually, Italy turned to be a very early implementer of the Bologna reforms, where student mobility was seen as the 'overarching aim' of the process. However, as Capano (2018) note, while years between 1996 and 2002 were marked by 'considerable belief in autonomy', the years since 2002 revealed instead a loss of capacity of steer the reform implementation, both by the ministry and by Italian universities.

Italy implemented the new related reform of the tertiary education system a couple of months following the Bologna declaration, as according to law 509 of 1999, introducing the mentioned two tier system and the ECTS. The Berlinguer reform gave effective autonomy to HEIs also in the field of teaching, and generally in academic activities. Coherently, Law 508 of 1999, regulation no. 509, granted institutional autonomy on the curriculum as to foster international cooperation internationalization (De Rita & Buldriesi 2006). Despite the many debates begun on the impact of the Bologna Process in Italy, many of which question its effectiveness, during the immediate period following the declaration Italy engaged in a decisive series of actions and measures to support the internationalization of its HE system and ISM.

The Ministry of university and research adopted the first plan for internationalization in 1999, launching an open call to HEIs to submit proposals as per DM 21 May 1999. Funds were allocated to promote programs involving foreign professors, mutual recognition of study period abroad and of qualifications, as well as for the development and granting of double-degrees (De Rita and Buldriesi 2006, Crui 2003). Almost every Italian HEIs proposed at least one project, for a total of 477 projects submitted to the Ministry, and a total amount of funds three times higher than the 20 million foreseen (CIMEA 2002) (MASIA 1991). Another three year plan was implemented for the period 2001-2003 (about € 13) (De Rita and Buldriesi 2006). A third action of internationalization will be also promoted for the period between 2004-06, of about 10 millions of Euros, aiming to foster and promote network and bilateral cooperation within the Mediterranean area and Latin America.

In 2001, a Presidential decree of the council of minister also stated that foreign students will be granted financial help as according to the same indicator for Italian students (ISEE), and they will be considered as '*studenti fuori-sede*', meaning Italian students enrolled in HEIs beyond their region of belonging (UCSEI 2004). Moreover, it stated each students eligible of a grants in Italy would have been granted an additional top up when abroad, with the unique conditions the mobility granted credits to the students. The Decree also devoted € 12 millions per year per HEIs to integrate ISM, mostly used to top up the Erasmus grant. A ministerial decree also established the National Student Database, *Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti,* on May 30th. The database is however not able to offer a clear picture about many issues of the Italian academic system at the time of writing, and ISM makes no exception.

Moreover, Italy recognized in 2002 the 1997 Lisbon Declaration, with law 189/2002. Consequently, HEIs gained formal competence for the purposes of recognition of foreign titles for accessing and continuing tertiary education in light of their institutional autonomy, in conformity with Italian legislation - exception made other bilateral agreements (EMN 2012). The disposition, while soon receipted, was not implemented homogeneously across the countries, and empirical evidence shows its partial implementation even nowadays. Law 170/2003, in conclusion,

established the National Fund for Mobility to provide additional grants to be summed to Erasmus scholarship. The fund is basically distributed to HEIs as according to their quota of resource received by the national agency, then distributed among students depending by institutions criteria, defined according the DM 198/2003. As we shall see in the next section, such approach already reveals the aforementioned effort by the MIUR to improve mobility within the framework of the Erasmus program rather than launching programs beyond it.

Parallel to the Italian engagement in EU inter-governmental programs, a focus on China also emerged. In 2004, the at-the-time President of the Italian Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, pointed out to the necessity to increase the number of Chinese students in Italy, during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister in Rome at Quirinale on May 7th (Cammelli 2004 UCSEI), whose number – as Calzolari pointed out one decade before – were very low. A joint governmental committee Italy-China was also established, and it produced a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the sector of education (EMN 2012). Soon later, following the will and direct suggestion of the Italian Presidency of the Republic (EMN 2012), the Marco Polo program has been launched to foster Chinese students enrolment into Italian universities, signed also by CRUI (2004). In 2006, the Sino-Italian University was established, further fostering Chinese students to come to Italy for their tertiary studies. The university has been established among the Italian Polytechnics of Turin and Milan, LUISS and Bocconi Universities, plus the Chinese Tonji and Sudan Universities of Shanghai, and it involved, only in the first four years about 800 students studying engineering and economy (Lombardinilo, no date). The goal of the project was to train high level Chinese students which will occupy strategic position in Italian companies operating in China, as well in Chinese companies interested in trading with Italy (Lombardinilo nd). MIUR funded about 12 millions of Euros for the first four year period, a part of which was coming from private partners (Uni-Italia 2017, Lombardinilo nd). Moreover, the Invest Your Talent in Italy mobility program was launched (MAECI 2016). CRUI and MAE also launched the MAE-CRUI internship, which granted the opportunity to do a training mobility abroad at diplomatic seats network abroad (MAE/CRUI 2004).

The Sino-Italian university is chronologically the third bi-national university established by the Italian republic since the Bologna Declaration. The aforementioned Italo-French summit in Florence lead to the creation of the Italo-French University (Cimea 2006) four years before, formally with Law 161/2000 (CRUI 2003). Having its headquarters in Grenoble and Turin, this is a virtual university which aim to coordinate cooperation among HEIs of the two countries, with two website in French and Italian (CIMEA 2002). In the same year Italian and French rectors' conference also signed an agreement for a program of co-supervised themes, on the bases of the convention already signed by the two countries (CIMEA 2002), culminating the cooperation begun in the sixties. Following the scheme implemented to establish the Italo-French University, with law 171/2001, the Italian and German Rectors' Conference also established, with DAAD and the University of Trento, the Italo-German university, so to enhance cooperation between the two countries. The agreement had the main aim of new joint programs, both at the bachelor and master levels, and the co-supervision of doctoral dissertations. Moreover, following a meeting among Italian and Turkey authorities of 2008, also the Italo Turkish university has been established, offering courses in the subject of engineering, science, economy and literature. While Turkish authorities will fund infrastructure and management costs, the Italian government is in charge of funding the teaching staff of the university (Lombardinilo nd). Any additional source have been however retrieved during the period of data collection in relation to this bi-national university.

The Italian effort on international university cooperation had also developed in a series of multilateral activities. The 2000 is a key year, as among the others, were signed the Ancona, the Paris, and the Catania declarations (see table 4.6 and 4.7 below). A number of additional events of relevance to this discussion also happened. Between the others, material retrieved pointed out to the Inter-ministerial Conference held in Milan in 2003, the Inter-ministerial Conference in San Patrignano, the meeting of the General Directors of MAE in Venice, as well as additional

programs, such as the Scuola Superiore di Catania and the Mediterranean School of Advanced Study in Science and Technology of Media in Tunisi, funded by the MAE (De Rita and Buldriesi 2005). These efforts concentrates on university international cooperation with the involvement of the ministry of foreign affairs.

Italy had still in force law 40/1987 to regulate international cooperation, a law thought even before the end of the cold war. Perhaps also in light of such obsolete normative framework, in 2004 was signed a declaration of intents between Italian universities and MAE as a way to find common objectives to launch a solid cooperation path during the 'Days for Cooperation' of 2004, within the framework of the conventions managed by the CIRPS (*Centro Interuniversitario di Ricerca per lo Sviluppo Sostenibile*). The document defined the guidelines for university cooperation, and enriched the traditional concept of 'academic collaboration' with a new strategy of 'academic development and peace cooperation'. The 'Days for Cooperation' (Giornate per la Cooperazione Italiana 2005) were organized by DGCS, MAE department for cooperation, and resulted in over 70 initiative which brought together public and private organization engaged in international cooperation (MAE 2004). Del Gaizo, public officer of the Ministry for regional affairs, stressed at the *Conference of Italian University on International Cooperation* the obsolescence of Italian law on cooperation, which excluded universities as key player for cooperation (CIRPS 2004). Serafini, General Director of the MAE General Directorate for international cooperation, highlighted that a new conception on university cooperation emerged, where the many actors involved in these activities should get together and working on the same axe on the background of the local territory, which act as a 'unificator' (CIRPS 2004). A public officer from the MAE stressed indeed during the way in which the Ministry could not be seen as a mere funding partner, as it had the capacity to actively participate in the discussion on academic cooperation, taking for granted the autonomy of universities (CIRPS 2004). However, as graph 4.2 shows below, the number of scholarships granted by the MAE kept to decrease.

TABLE 4.6 | COOPERATION IN THE EARLY 2000

UNI-ADRION	The Ancona Declaration, signed in May 2020, establish cooperation across the Macro Adriatic Ionic Region, and launch the UNIADRION project, which brings together universities across the region to cooperate and launch a Virtual University of the region. UNIADRION has been a Calzolari idea, and it has been constituted during the constitutive conference held in Ravenna, following the Ancona declaration. As material interview testify, the original idea was to establish a net across the universities of the area, but the MAE support - huge during the first phase - declined. Currently, UNIADRION is an association constituted by rectors of the involved universities, which foster mobility across the association.
TEMPUS-MEDA	As Masia wrote, TEMPUS-MEDA has been one of the key action of the Italian Presidency to strengthen the academic offer within the Mediterranean Area, 'following the spirit of the Barcelona declaration signed in 1995, it has been launched an initiative which brought together the European ministries of the Tempus-Meda Area in Catania, held in Catania on November 2000. (CRUI 2003).
CUIA	In 2002, coherently with the growing interest in Latin America, Unibo opened its branch in Argentina, in Bueno Aires, which aims to foster participation of Argentinean students to Italian universities. The action is in fact supported by ministry of foreign affairs, in the form of scholarships to students (EMN 2012). The UNIBO seats in Argentina is fully within the local framework, of which it release diplomas (EMN 2012). Also the University of Bari signed in the same year an agreement with Argentinian institutions, which lead to the granting of double qualification to enrolled students thanks to a formal agreement (CIMEA 2002)
Carta di Caserta	35 Ministers of Industry/Trade or the European Parternariate, which, having the bases on the Barcelona declaration of 1995, constitutes one of the few shared commitment of these countries to foster exchange in the euro-Mediterranean basin, with the partnership of companies beyond the one of Universities, which - despite not even mentioned by the chart - 'may constitute a transversal pillar for this action (Adrippina Alessandra, Atti della Conferenza delle università Italiane, 2004)

Source: Elaboration of the author, based on CIRSPS 2004, De Rita and Buldriesi 2006

Table 4.6 – Cooperation projects in the early 2000

TABLE 4.7 | PROGRAMS TO FOSTER MOBILITY BEYOND THE ERASMUS

CRUI-MAECI INTERSHIP	CRUI established an agreement with the MAE which enables students and graduates to spend a period of traineeship at Italian diplomatic seats and IIC abroad. The program, which also involves universities, is run by CRUI.
MARCO POLO PROGRAM	Marco Polo program has been launched by MAE within a framework of internationalization and partnership among companies and universities, within the framework of internationalization policies aiming to strengthen the internationalization of the country system. Until 2005, about 32 he is participated to initial edition of the programs, a number which will strongly grow in the following decade. As section 1.1, 4.3.3 and 4.4.4 discuss more in detail, the program is currently managed by Uni-Italia together with the additional Turandot program. These programs foresee ad hoc provisions for the international mobility of Chinese students for the purposes of study in Italy, both at universities and AFAM institutions and have been launched following the agreement signed by Italian Republic and the Chinese Popular Republic in 2004.
IYTI 2009	The program was born by the collaboration of MAE, MISE, ICE, Unioncamere and 19 Italian universities (SENATO 2015), in an effort to internationalize Italian enterprises. The program offers scholarships for degrees in engineering and technologies, economy, management and social science plus architecture and design, and involves crucial partners of economic diplomacy, namely Colombia, Sud Africa, India, Turkey and Brazil (EMN 2012).

Source: Elaboration of the author

Table 4.7 - Programs To Foster Mobility Beyond The Erasmus

Graph 4.2 - Comparison of trends of MAECI scholarships and cooperation agreements

In these years there were also the first attempt to link the academic word to the one of business, with the first 2001 agreement between the ministry of foreign commerce, ICE, and CRUI. As we shall see below, while the following 10 years were characterized by a dramatic loss of relevance of ISM across the country, a new approach to ISM beyond cooperation and European action was maturing. Moreover, the 2001 constitutional reform granting extensive power to regions in foreign policy occurred. As we shall see in the next two sections, in fact, after a phase of general loss of relevance of ISM, the mobility of students was to become salient instrument of foreign policy, this time in the realm of economic diplomacy. Such switch point will be appreciable however only at the end of the decade, after a period of complete loss of interest on ISM, as discussed below.

4.2.5 Loss of Student Mobility relevance: 2003

Not even two years after the Bologna Declaration, there have been the 9/11 attacks, and international terrorism reached the top of public debate in a period of peculiar alliance between Italy and the USA, respectively under the Berlusconi and Bush leaderships. Berlusconi had won the general elections of 2001, and begun his term in office together with two key ally, Bossi and Fini, of Northern lega and National Alliance, that were strongly anti-immigration. It is only three days after the tragic events of 9/11 that the new Italian government presented its draft of a bill on immigration (Colucci 2018), which will became a law, 397/2002, commonly known as the Bossi-Fini law. The latter was strongly restrictive in comparison to Martelli law, and among the other things, it establish a single office for immigration issues (*Sportello Unico per l'immigrazione*) and a the biggest regularization of immigrants of the history of the Italian Republic (Colucci 2018). Third national country begun to be approach as a 'potential treat' for the country, as something related to public security.

In those years Italy held the presidency of the European Union, and committed itself to the development of human capital (CRUI 2003). Letizia Moratti was the minister for HE, and already during her first declaration to the Parliament showed commitment to incentive the internationalization of the education system (CRUI 2003). It is with Minister Moratti that Vivian Reding, former European Commissioner, launched the Erasmus Mundus program to give a global dimension to the Rome treaty (CRUI 2003).

Based on the Erasmus logic, it meant to enhance cooperation with non-European countries in the field of HE, and to sustain joint masters active in foreign countries by means of generous scholarship (UCSEI 2004). Italian universities resulted immediately involved in this process, with 19 masters financed in this framework (Italy was at the time the second country for number of projects coordinated after Germany (UCSEI 2004)). We largely discussed both the legislative framework and the conditions which third national students faced in Italy since the eighties, in a constant-perceived fear of not being legal across the country due to high discretion in policy implementation and very strict law requirements. Until then, however, the European driven mobility of students – mainly an intro-European affair within the borders of the recent established Schengen area – has remained un-touched by the problems to which the UCSEI gave voice during the previous decades. As European developments of student mobility stretched their borders and start looking to extra European countries and students, problems related to visas and resident permits begin to turn and twist also with these flows, resulting also in an increased involvement of the Italian ministry of interior. A former Bologna Experts, to this regard, argued how

> 'there has been a stiffening by the interior ministry because of fear of terroristic infiltrations etc.
> etc., and this conversation about visas became to be more problematic, while it was never been...
> there was no reason to be before, because there was not this big flows extra....'.

Eventually, a number of experts confirmed evidence according to which the period between the promulgation of the new immigration reform and the launch of Erasmus Mundus constitutes a clear moment in which ISM became a 'complex' issue to be managed in terms of immigration, visas and more generally foreign policy. Italy was soon on late in the reception of European directives regulating the right of access for third national students, begun a priority at the European level given the global scope of the new program. With legislative decree n. 154 of 2007, it was hence granted the right to third countries students, who had been granted a visa by another member state to study, to come to Italy without requiring another visa to Italian authorities (EMN2012). Evidence collected revealed that, given the difficulties or the impossibility of obtaining a visa from Italian authorities, the 'shortcut' of asking a visa to another member states and then transfer their carrier in Italy was not a spare phenomenon.

The implementation of Bologna driven reforms, moreover, was not proceeding as its best. Experts pointed out how the reform impacted the system differently, with universities which wanted to be engaged by the new processes and others apart. Breaks to the implementation of the reform harmed the mobility of students, mostly importantly as many professors kept its own normal activity and many other did not accepted the idea to recognize students' credits earn abroad. As one former Bologna expert summarized:

> 'because the problem was how to overcome free will, the recognition process was in the hands of the academic guilt, and it had to be because of institutional autonomy and so on, but the problem is… how do you overcome free will with autoregulation?
> 'So we began the path toward institutional autonomy, in which you would say for example 'let's leave here a mobility window, let's leave a free semester to students to decide', there were choices to be made, options, optional things…. And then we got in this rigid system, obsequious, conformist, in which the room left to autonomy…there was not.'

Another expert even argued that Bologna signed the end of a period rather the a new beginning. Instead of favouring BP overarching aim, ISM, the implementation of the reform in Italy ended up eventually to disincentive student mobility, as students i) feared to ought seat exams done abroad again in their home institutions, ii) perceived it was likely to postpone their graduation in time, iii) they did not have enough funds, and iv) as BP national reports states, because of dearth of information and awareness on these programs. Degrees were not really organized to receipt credits earnt abroad, and, most importantly, everything could change from university to university, from degrees to degree, and from professor to professor, as we already saw in the case of immigration and visas regulations. As a result, as it happened in the early eighties to mobility within the framework of aid, also intra-European mobility was to enter in crisis. And, while the system was losing its enthusiasm to this regard, outbound degree mobility began to grow.

In 2003, the National Committee for the Evaluation of the University System (CNSU) published a report focusing on the years 1998-2001 (CNSU 2003). The committee noted the strong necessity of a national database of students, so to be able to collect and analyse data in a faster and more efficient way. It identified a positive trend in the participation of Erasmus students in Italy and increasing expenses by Italian universities for ISM, stressing already the imbalance between the number of outgoing and incoming students, the former more consistent than the latter. The predominance of outgoing mobility is visible by the few data available for these years, as reported more carefully by graph 4.3 below.

Graph 4.3 | International mobility flows in Italy from late eighties ti mid 2000

Graph 4.3 - International mobility flows in Italy from late eighties until mid 2000

It should be underlined how increase of foreign students enrolled visible in the graph since 2001 should be read remembering the growing number of migrants of second generation across Italy (see also Brandi C., 2012). This can be confirmed looking to data of the national student database, that in 2004 – first year of data collection – report that out of 33,647 foreign students enrolled at Italian universities, only slightly over 9,000 hold Italian foreign diplomas (data below by ISTAT includes instead second generations students).

It is of 2004 also the Realacci motion on the Erasmus program (CAMERA 2005a), presented and approved to the parliament, which had the aim to denounce the loss of the interests even on the Erasmus program, and further stressed ISM underdevelopment in Italy. With the motion, the Italian Chamber of deputies took its commitment to further promote the program and to recognize the importance of a long term strategy at the national level, that was until then never discussed (CAMERA 2005b). In 2004, moreover, law 240, commonly known as Moratti reform, added a new layer to the yet-to-be-implemented reform of the 1999. Most importantly, the Moratti reform, in words pro internationalization and student mobility, re-introduced in the system a higher grade of administrative control reducing university autonomy, harming the chance to innovate and to do so internationally. Beyond Moratti reform, also the ANVUR, the new evaluation agency established in 2006, further contributed to transform internationalization and student mobility more as duties related to national regulation rather than an overall objective to be reached by the higher education system.

It is in this period that domestic actors begin to be seriously aware of the enormous delays of Italy, and of their watertight approach to the phenomenon in front of the dearth of a clear and shared strategy. The several bodies involved by in the steering of mobility attempt therefore to cooperate, as we saw in the cycle of meetings focused on cooperation between the MAE and Italian universities.

It was becoming clear that Italy missed a 'control room' in charge of mapping, coordinating and steering the phenomenon. In contrast to the experience of basically other major European country, Italy did not in fact developed a central agency, and the competence for the issue were to be shared by the ministries of university and research, foreign affairs and interior, plus CRUI, the Bologna Experts, the CIMEA, the Erasmus National Agency (the new-born agency for the managing of ERASMUS program), plus universities and regional bodies for the right to study. Between the period between the reform and the forthcoming economic crisis, a series of actions, schemes and additional agreements were eventually implemented, eloquent in describing first timid attempts to cooperate by domestic actors, as shown in the two tables above. However, evidence suggest the majority of these actions are the result of personal commitment of key public servants, be they university rectors or public officers rather than the result of a more coherent structural approach.

4.2.6 First attempts to structural cooperation

In 2008, the new government run by Berlusconi, after a short centre-left experience, transformed the 'political and cultural horizon of the *binomium* immigration-security into a real normative framework (Colucci 2018, 153)'. One of its first law provision strictly modified in fact in terms of securization the presence of foreigners in Italy (Colucci 2018). This *binomium* lead to the framing of also incoming third-national international students in terms of national security among those more involved in the issues, often putting universities and their staff in complex situation, for example when they have to guarantee that a foreign student (or professor) is a genuine guest which does not have intention to engage in illegal behaviours. A spread attitude that ISM constituted a route for illegal immigration emerged as relevant across administrative staff of both the ministries of foreign affairs and of the interior. For this reason the European Migration Network Italy, together with IDOS and the University of Venice, even organized *'The Student Route*

Conference Venice 2013', 'as a way to sanction the term 'route'', and to raise the awareness on the issue in the Italian public discourse, argued one of it organizer.

During its last legislation, Berlusconi government also implemented another reform of the HE system, so called Gelmini reform, despite the system still had not fully receipted both 509/99 and 270/2004. This happened during years of strong cuts of public funds to education, and after a long period in which ISM salience at MIUR strongly decreased, as discussed above. Gelmini reform, together with the Tremonti law, also transformed the lack of funds in a structural obstacle to mobility implementation.

In the meantime, a new domestic approach to ISM was about to emerge. A high level exponent of the Ministry of University, already in a preface to a 2008 book[32] wrote that 'Italy should recover the noble tradition of the past and be once again considered as the selected venue for students and scholars from all over the word'.

In 2009 it was held the national conference *Strategies to Sustain Internationalization of University Italian System*, jointly by the MAE, the MIUR and CRUI. The conference suggested a view to frame the internationalization of Italian academy as a whole in terms of foreign policy, and to base it on joint ventures with public and private bodies (MAE 2009, EMN 2012). In the same year it was also established a joint group of members of MIUR, MAE, and CRUI to work on the internationalization of Italian HE, which held a mandate to monitor HEIs international activities, with the involvement of CUN, the Ministry of Economic Development, the National Institute of Foreign Trade, the National Agency of Tourism, Chambers of Commerce, Italian regions and cities seats of HEIs (EMN 2012).

Law 122/2010 established then the Uni-Italia organization and Uni-Italia centres abroad. These centres operates within Italian embassies and they have the task to promote the Italian tertiary systems and to attract foreign students, offering them support for pre-enrolment procedures and legal papers, as well as to foreign institution aiming to cooperate with Italian institutions (MAE2009b). In the same year it was launched the TURANDOT program, with AFAM students as a target, along the lines of the MARCO POLO program. As according to MIUR note no. 1360 28/10/2011, currently UNI-ITALIA manage the two programs, even if the association always took care of managing them since their very beginning (UNITALIA 2016). Uni-Italia has rapidly become the crucial actor in the attraction of foreign Chinese students, which passed by slightly more than one-hundred during the 2000 to be several thousand after the launch of the Marco Polo program in 2006 (MAECI 2017). The organization works in strict contact with the Italian foreign ministry, and it constitutes a priority in the new vision of the ministry of ISM as a profitable diplomatic instrument.

Fieldwork revealed that this effort developed in a parallel way to the so far established path of mobility in Italy, framed around the Erasmus Program and on the background of the Bologna Process. Moreover, that domestic actors have very different perceptions of the new organization. Curiously, however, expert interviews also revealed since the launch of Uni-Italia MIUR, MAECI, the INTERIOR, CRUI and universities begun to cooperate, and engaged in attempts to solve problems mentioned in the previous sections, or, to be less optimistic, at least 'to sit around the same table' to discuss problems and concerns.

Until 2010, MAE was involved by student mobility via few channels that we already discussed, notably by cooperation projects and the few scholarship granted on a yearly base, plus visa releasing. Following the 2009 ministerial reorganization of the MAE, it was established the introduced Directorate for the Promotion of the Country System (DGSP), which soon became engaged by ISM promotion. Core task of the DGSP is in fact the promotion of each aspect of the country system as according to the country foreign policy priorities, be it in terms of trade, culture, science and technology. The DGSP, as we shall better see in the next section, is a crucial actor for the new developed approach to ISM.

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[32] *University: The Challenge of Changing*

In October 2011, former state secretary of MAE, in the context of a senate hearing, stressed the relevance of foreign students for a comprehensive internationalization system of the country, the so-called 'country system' (SENATO 2011, EMN 2012), but pointed out to problems in place, three in particular: i) insufficient recognition of foreign qualification, ii) strong obstacles in issuing visas and residency permits, and iii) the dearth of English taught degrees. The secretary stressed the aforementioned working group MIUR-MAE-CRUI launched soon before should have had worked on these issues (EMN 2012, SENATO 2011). The severe problems in implementation of dispositions related to foreigners, particularly third-country nationals - that the UCSEI raised up decades before - were at this point evident and of a structural nature.

To this regard, however, interview material strongly stressed a dramatic extent of directionality still in place among MAE/MAECI net abroad, contextually to a great disparity of implementation of immigration regulations in releasing residence permit by the interior offices. According to the evidence collected, in the majority of the case, relations of universities with *Questura* and *Prefettura* emerged to be problematic. There is large variation in the country: cases of universities which host (multi-lingual) public officials from the *Questura* to help foreign students tackle with compulsory obligations emerged as (far more common) cases in which students received already expired residence permits (being consequently confined in Italy for months, worth losing the chance to re-enter the country in the meantime without asking a new visa).

Is only because of regulation CE 810/2009 (EMN 2012), that consular delegations have currently to motivate the refuse of issuing a visa since September 2010, granting the right to appeal their decision to students. Until then, diplomatic seats could in fact refuse applications with no explanation because of security reason, with any possibility to appeal the decision. Although the introduction of legislative decree 104/2013, that set the validity of the visa to last for the entire duration of a study-program, permits procedure are based on a yearly base also at the time of writing. In particular, it should be mentioned the debate held at the 'MoviMenti[33]' conference between public officials of MIUR, MAECI and INTERIOR, where each of them discovered (in real time) that the ministries had different information on the procedure to be followed in relation to such disposition.

High discretion emerged to be still in place also in relation to degree recognition. CRUI (nd), for example, stressed how the new normative framework which was to discipline the recognition of foreign titles did not impact institutional practice. This emerged to be the case also in the case of the credits acquired abroad, mostly during the Erasmus program. Coherently with such panorama, on 19 February 2013, just before the new general election, the president of the CRUI, rector of UNISTRASI, declared that 'if there was to be a Maastricht of Universities we would be out of Europe. There is the necessity to shake the system to bring up education and research among the most important priorities in the next government agenda (EMN 2012)'.

Other constrains to a real development of mobility were also becoming manifest. For example, the use of degree mobility also emerged as a shortcut to obtain degrees which foreseen strict admission examination, such as for medicine and odontology abroad, as in the case of the thousands of Italian students enrolled at orthodontia degrees at Rumanian university in 2012 (EMN 2012). The issue reached national press, i.e. with Adnkronos (2012) and il DENTALE (2012) covering the issue (in EMN (2012). One year later, also the Republic, one of the main Italian newspaper, published an article on this matter, *La laurea romena*, interpreting the phenomenon as a consequence of the introduction of controlled access and quotas for the enrolment to a number of degrees. In February 2013, outbound student mobility also reached the public opinion agenda as the DPR 226/2012, setting norm for voting abroad to 2013 general elections, did not include about 25,000 Italian students at the time abroad with the Erasmus project (EMN 2012). The issue

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[33] See at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrAso4XFcXs&t=9977s, min: 02:37.

brought up once more the discussion on the obsolesce of Italian legislative frameworks, who after 26 years of Erasmus program had never tackled the issue.

Starting by 2012, however, an increased interest in ISM by the MIUR, a novelty since the early years of Bologna. Mobility entered the ministerial agenda with ministry Profumo, former rector of Turin Polytechnic, who expressed his own view on the need to launch a 'country project' to modernize Italian tertiary education in an interview to the financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore (2012). Responding to a question on legal obstacles because of immigration legislation, he stressed the enormous abundance of legislation developed and implemented in the past decades, and he clearly pointed out that foreign students should be able to work after their studies in Italian companies. In the course of a Senate audition, he also replied about his departmental programmatic guidelines: launch of a single information online portal on Italian tertiary education, an improved involvement of the diplomatic network abroad, the recognition of the Cambridge Assessment and an improved system to provide foreign students in-campus support and service when talking legal papers to stay in Italy (EMN (2012) SENATO (2012)). It is possible to see the first, substantial, cross-sectorial attempt to approach the international mobility of students.

Universitaly.it was launched soon later, as per legislative decree n. 5/2012. It is a double language portal targeting both Italian and foreign students about to approach tertiary education in Italy. The website was built and it is managed directly by CINECA under MIUR mandate. According to the decree, it was also to be completed by a more-timely promotion throughout social networks, a real novelty for the country, and equipped with an update platform thanks to which official papers of prospective foreign students are shared by diplomatic seats abroad and the competent ministerial office (SENATO 2016).

Profumo has been involved in first person in this issue, as the tool should have served to invert the trend of very low rate of graduates among Italian universities (Corriere della Sera, 2012). In a note of CRUI, its president, Mancini, stressed the many implication of this portal, which should have had rationalized the way information are provided within the country - 'no more too many confusing websites' (CRUI 2012). The issue even attracted the attention of foreign newspaper, such as the New York Times (2012), which stressed the attempt of the Italian government in office to shake an obsolete and yet in-ward looking system, were international students were 'a rare bread, about 1/3 of OECD average'. Currently, however, it seems the portal missed its aim, as the information it contains about degrees are not comparable, sometimes in English, sometimes not. Also in this case, expert interviews stressed the limits of universitaly.it, together with many problems arisen to create a national catalogue of academic degrees supply throughout the country.

In 2014, international student mobility came back in the agenda of the government following the Milan Polytechnic judicial affairs, for having developed English-taught Bachelor program[34]. A protest was organized to express contrariety around the spreading of English taught degrees, a matter often seen as going against to Italian students – whose English proficiency is well below European standards. The institution, together with MIUR appealed to the State Council, which confirmed internationalization should not put Italian in second-position but this was not the case (as other close-by universities offered the same programs in Italian). The ministry had even to respond for this affair in parliament, confirming it had fully normative grounds[35] (EMN 2012), but a spread interpretation according to which English taught degrees harm the right to study to Italians and Italians remained, adding evidence to the aforementioned cultural resistance spread across the country. EMN (2012, 26) reports however English courses grew over the time. Also a study undertaken by CRUI (2012) revealed that in 2011/2012 about the 70% of Italian universities

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[34] The institution was to offer in English both second-cycle degrees and PhD, as according to law 240/2010, art. 2 comma 2 letter 1. However, a group of professors appealed to the TAR, the regional court, which cancelled the provision from the school since it subordinated the Italian languages to English (EMN 2013). A number of scholars explicitly expressed a negative view on the issue, and De Mauro, a well-known Italian linguist, suggested English taught courses should be given for specific subjects and in some degrees only, as reported by Il Sole 24 Ore (2014) (explicitly in favour of addressing Italian students to English taught studies).

[35] To see the entire session at parliament see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yLEWLTspybg

offered at least an English taught course, with a large majority (59%) in post-bachelor degrees and only the 3% in BA. Since 2014, as according to ministerial decree 104/2012, non-Italian taught degrees even follow different *criteria* of quality assurance, such as reduction of necessary professors to institute a degrees, in a ministerial effort to their.

In the years since 2009, to sum up, also a more pro-active role of the MIUR emerged. With the *Programmazione Triennale 2013-2015*, Italy also set as a target of 20% of students that undertook a mobility programs to be reach by 2020 in line to Bologna agreements, and it promoted a series of ministerial circular to steer a better implementation of dispositions. Already in 2009 a D.P.C.M. also increased to 500€ the grant for students engaging with ISM, and MIUR established an additional fund for mobility reserved to bright students, with ministerial decree 755 of 4th sept 2013. The ministry had however to face a number of problems beyond the contrast to the spreading of English taught degrees. For example, many universities were reporting relevant number of exams held abroad by their students, but the majority of them were not recognised. Consequently, in 2014 the ministry promulged a ministerial decree stating that, for the purposes of the quote of the FFO based on internationalization performance, only the number of recognised credit obtained abroad was to be considered. In other worlds, for the first time MIUR linked directly ISM to the performance base funding quota, and it tried to sanction the practice of universities (and in turn of professors) of not recognizing credits earn abroad. MIUR emerged also as a frontrunner, together with other countries, in the promotion of the project European Passport for Refugees, which enabled refugees from Syria and other foreigners in similar situation to enrol at the university and continue their degree even with no formal qualification, given the exceptionality of the circumstances. Even more recently, in 2017, Italy took on the Goteborg mandate, sponsored the new European University Alliance project, and it took the presidency of Bologna Process Secretary in 2018 (Cinquepalmi 2018, Cinquepalmi 2018b).

Another novelty of ISM recent development has been the very-much awaited new law of cooperation, n. 125/2014, which finally recognized explicitly university as 'subjects of the development cooperation system'. The law also established a new ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affair and International Cooperation (MAECI). The following three year planning of Italian international cooperation also extensively mentioned universities as key actors for the pursuing of Italian cooperation goals, declined in light of foreign policies priorities (MAECI 2017 b). In 2014, CRUI and MAECI also established a new collaboration model, which sees universities as key actor for Italian cooperation (CAMERA 2018, CRUI nd). Together with the MIUR, the Interior and CRUI, MAECI also released the 2017 National strategy for International Education, for an integrated promotion of the higher education system (MAECI 2019c). The strategy takes into account the lack of a key actor responsible for the promotion of mobility for the first time, and the example of Britain and Germany with the British Council and DAAD are pointed out as best practices to be followed. The strategy is financed as according to a D.P.C.M. of July 2017, with the fund for the improvement of Italian culture and language abroad, which was instituted by law 232/2016 (EMN 2019), despite it appeared as untied from development related to internationalization and the mobility of students until the national strategy.

The same year, the President of the Republic, Mattarella, also launched in China at the Shangai Fudan university a 'knowledge silk road' from China to Italy, were universities should be motors of knowledge (Mattarella 2017?). The path of cooperation in HE between Rome and Begin appears to have become an institutionalized one, and received high attention by very high level public officials since its very beginning in 2004. The necessity of increasing the attractiveness of the Italian HE system has been stressed also by the former ministries for foreign affairs, current European commissioner (Gentiloni (2016), Uni-Italia 2016b), during the European networks and Agencies for Internationalization conference on student visa in Europe of 2016.

This final part provides a summary of the policy cross-sectoral reconstruction undertaken based on descriptive statistics, only in part introduced above, using numbers to wrap up what discussed until now. As discussed, ISM developed in Italy to a small extent in comparison to other big European countries and other western democracies, as table 4.8 below testifies. Currently, the Ministry of University and Research (MUR) declares about 90.000 incoming foreign students in Italy (ANS 2020), and the OECD (2020) esteems slightly less than 75.000 out-going Italian students enrolled abroad[36]. Almalaurea, a consortium of universities who represent more than the 90% of Italian student body, reports that an average of 12% of Italian students undertake a mobility experience abroad. Almalaurea data refers to credit mobility within the framework of Italian degrees (ALMALAUREA 2020), mostly via the Erasmus, while aforementioned OCED data refer to outgoing degree mobility. A closer look to statistical available data reveals however a far complex situation, the result of a discussed fragmented development which resulted in a multi-facets phenomenon and a number of parallel flows of ISM. Among the about 90.000 foreign students officially declared, almost the half of them are migrants of second or third generation with foreign nationality rather than international students. For the academic year 2018-2019, the *Anagrafe Nazionale Studenti*, reports only 42.174 students with a foreign diploma out of 90.843 with a foreign passport (ANS 2020) (See also EMN 2012/2013 and Brandi C. (2012)). The ANS also does not keep trace of other relevant international students flows[37], as foreign PhDs students, mobility flows within the framework of the Erasmus and Uni-Italia mobility programs, nor students enrolling at *Alta Formazione Artistica e Musicale* (AFAM) institutions[38].

TABLE 4.8 | Percentage of all foreign tertiary students enrolled, by destination

	2000	**2012**
United States[1]	22,76	16,35
United Kingdom[1]	10,68	12,56
Germany	8,96	6,35
France	6,57	5,99
Australia	5,07	5,51
Canada	4,52	4,89
Russian Federation	1,97	3,86
Japan	3,19	3,33
Spain	1,95	2,16
China	1,74	1,97
Italy	**1,19**	**1,72**
Austria	1,46	1,69
New Zealand	0,39	1,62
South Africa	2,17	1,56
Switzerland	1,25	1,42
Netherlands	0,67	1,38
Korea	0,16	1,31
Belgium	1,86	1,23

Source: OECD. Table C4.7, available online. (*www.oecd.org/edu/eag.htm*).

Table 4.8 - Trends in international education market shares (2000, 2012)

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[36] any national database is currently able to track students enrolled at foreign institutions after secondary school diploma

[37] Foreign students enrolling at foreign institution miss from ANS data collection

[38] AFAM are higher education institutions distinguished by universities and includes academies, conservatories, (…).

As graphically showed by graph 4.4, it is possible to esteem the total number of incoming international students in slightly more than 87.000[39] in 2018, in line with past research (SEE EMN, 2013). Curiously, it is about the same data officially declared that we saw above: MIUR declares about 90.000 foreign students excluding Erasmus and Uni-Italia, AFAM and PhD students flows, but including indeed migrants of second/third generations. Taking off foreign students in AFAM institutions, the esteem would be of about 74.000 foreign students present at Italian universities in the last academic year. Graph 4.5 presents instead a graphical historical reconstruction of mobility flows in the country since its very beginning, highlighting crucial moments of its development and including all the mentioned ISM flows (See EMN 2012, EMN 2013, CRUI 2018 and Netz and Orr (nd) for overviews on ISM flows in Italy).

Statistical data of the Italian case study underline the extent to which Italy did not developed the basic technology to develop and implement mobility: the *phenomenon* has never been statistically mapped beyond the Erasmus framework. To draft this section, data have been consulted by two different databases of the MIUR, the ANS, ISTAT and ALMALAUREA, plus single national reports of the ERASMUS and UNI-ITALIA programs, as well as the ones of OPEN DOORS (nd) for the number of incoming American students. While data retrieved are partial and only allows for esteems rather than punctual quantitative descriptions, they summarize the lack of a strategic approach to ISM, and even more, the dearth of commitment to this issue. Italy reached the 5% of foreign students among its student population in 2018-19, a target which was agreed in Strasburg in 1982 (Corradi 2015). Moreover, that although the 20% targets of MIUR triennial plan 2013-2015 graduates having experienced a mobility abroad by 2020 (MIUR 2013), Almalaurea (2020) aforementioned data revealed that only about the 13% of Italian students did so.

Graph 4.5 helps also to identify the main traits of student mobility in Italy discussed in previous section, as i) the salience of degree outbound flows - clear reflection of the wider issue of brain drain, ii) the strong role of the Erasmus Program in driving mobility within the country, and iii) the low level of foreign students which complete their degree in Italy. It also sheds light iv) on the potential attractiveness of the country as a destination for international students, contextually to the low attractiveness' capacity of its HE system, as evident in the case of American students: so far beyond the 30.000 of them enrol to American universities in Italy each academic years (AACUPI 2017 MAECI nd), while the number of American students enrolled in Italian university is negligible (they were 722 in the a.y. 2018-2019 (ANS 2020)).

Graph 4.5 further helps to see how ISM developed in Italy within the framework of one single policy field according to the period under analysis, to become (officially) framed in a transversal way only in very recently time. ISM was related to foreign policy - and more specifically to international cooperation – until the mid-eighties and it has also been a priority after the second world war for the Italian foreign ministry (we can see the growing trend by ISTAT data until the eighties), to then be framed in terms of higher education until the mid 2000s in light of the fast evolving European integration process – before with the Erasmus (Erasmus flows begin) and after with Bologna Process (see ANS flows). While not visible by these data, ISM knew at that point a strong loss of salience until the 2008 financial crisis, period since when interest to ISM in terms of foreign policy emerged again, this time declined in terms of economic diplomacy. In this last period emerged also the firsts, not easy, structural attempts to develop an integrated cross-sectoral approach, including also the fields of immigration and of labour market/international trade (as the begin of Uni-Italia driven flows testifies). We shall more extensively identify and discussed the dynamics which drove this output in each of the policy domains considered in the next section of this chapter.

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[39] It should be noted however that it is not possible to filter foreign students who hold double citizenship, and those with also an Italian passport are always considered as Italian. This is the relevant, as according to MIUR and CIMEA declarations within the framework of this research, for students of Albanian and Brazilian citizenship in the first place.

Graph 4.4 | Esteem of total inbound mobility in Italy

Graph 4.4 - Esteem of total inbound mobility in Italy

Graph 4.5 | ISM flows overview 1999-2019

Graph 4.5 - ISM flows overview 1999-2019

4.3 Preliminary Analysis

4.3.1 Higher Education

The Italian academic path follow the three tier BP system, comprising a bachelor (*Laurea*) and a master (*Laurea Magistrale*). There are also a number of other university' courses, such as the Master of I and II level, not to be confused with the Laurea Magistrale, the only one granting access to PhD, or post-lauream track for specialization (i.e. in medicine or law) (CIMEA 2010). The Italian HE system follows a sharp distinction between universities and non-universities tertiary education providers (AFAM - Alta Formazione Artistica e Musicale – Artistic and Music High Learning), and it counts 97 state universities and 17 private providers, 11 online universities and 6 higher schools (*Instituti superiori a ordinamento speciale*), plus 44 Academy of Fine Arts and a number of additional AFAM institutions, which follow however different legislation (and are not included by this analysis, while the text refers time to time also to these students as one of the programs managed by Uni-Italia relates with AFAM institutions) (CIMEA 2010). The country is characterized by the relevant presence of (public and privates) universities related to the catholic church (EMN 2012), mostly collocated in Rome area, and it also host a relevant number of foreign universities. Italian universities can be grouped according to a number of criteria, among which age and size (small, medium and large), plus their geographical collocation (north, centre, south and insular Italy) and their degree of specialization (general or specialized institutions) (Reale and Potì, 2009). They also perform very differently in terms of teaching and research output, both qualitative and quantitative speaking, as well as in their third mission activities and their degree of innovation. The OCED/UE (2019) also reports there is large variation due to their geographical collocation, with some in highly productive and innovative contexts and other embedded within far less industrialized areas.

Despite so, universities follow the same normative regulation and they are organized in the same way. They have a Rector plus two different governing bodies, the *Consiglio di Amministrazione* and the *Senato,* whose composition is a mix of different component of the university (professors, students, administrative and technical staff, external stakeholders) (Reale and Potì 2009). Following the Gelmini reform, universities are organized in departments, which in turn organize academic degrees, groups full and associated professors, researchers and students, and carry out research.

In Italy, tertiary education is not very diffused, and 19% of working population has an academic degree (OCED 2019a). Italian universities are characterized by long time to graduation and high drop out of their students (Gitto, Minervini and Monaco 2011, Zotti 2015, MIUR 2011, ANVUR 2018). They are run by old professor and administrative staff, whose number strongly decreased in the last decade (the average age is over 50 years old (Rizzica 2020, ANVUR 2010)). They are also heavily dependent by public funds, despite their financial autonomy. Eventually, they are underfunded, with Italy spending only the 3.6 % of its GDP in education (OCED 2017). Despite so, the Italian HE system has a fair research output when compared to other European countries, with even better performance of other European countries (Nascia and Pianta 2018). The FFO, in its performance base quota, has been dramatically unbalanced to favour research over teaching since 2008 (Banfi and Viesti 2016).

The system internationalization is weak and the system does not attract foreign scientist and professors, nor, as we already saw, students. Great disparities appear in this regards. If generally the foreign student population stays below the 1%, some universities, mostly in the Norther part of the country it is possible to observe values above 10% (it is the case of Pisa and Siena Universities, the two Polytechnic of Milan and Turin, plus Bologna University) (OECD/UE 2019). However, only the 3.7% of academic staff in the country is foreign (3240 foreign professors) and 'several institutions present[…] figures around 1% (OECD/EU, 113)'. Despite a 'general

commitment' to internationalization, the majority of Italian universities also have an 'insufficient developed structure in this area (OECD/EU, 114)' due to lack of funding and the plethora of domestic actors involved.

The roots of this panorama date back to several decades ago. Capano and Turri (2017) consider both the 189/89 and the 509/1999 reforms, which in vain tried to substantially innovate the system, two policy windows which attempt to alter a long-standing status quo pattern, also thanks to the two ministers' foresight. Ruberti and Berlinguer were both strongly pro-Europeans, and they directly contributed from the seeds, at the domestic and European level, to the designing of student mobility playground, respectively with the Erasmus Program and the Bologna Process, yet the main drivers of student mobility in Italy. This paragraph provides the evidence to explain why those seeds did not grow, enlightening the origins of the scarce ISM (and internationalization) development in HE.

Policy development

Since the sixties, Italian universities were growing and constantly reaching an increasing number of Italian and also foreigners students, as Italy was perceived as a prestigious venue for academic studies. In front of the huge expansion of students' cohorts, which brought the number from 268.000 in 1960 to over 1 million in 1980, the Italian government undertook a series of measures mostly related to foster recruitment, but no process of transformation took off as in other European countries (Reale and Potì 2009). Moreover, while universities had been democratized with the introduction of councils and departments (Sacchi et al 2017), collegiality and democracy were rather 'rhetorical device (Capano 2008, 483)'. Barons, full professor in charge, were autonomous in organizing their work, and they were even called to mediate among different academic groups, even if they had no institutional power to do so (Capano 2008).

As according to the Clark triangle (1983), the Italian HE system constitutes a continental model, with its main elements of academic corporations and governmental bureaucracy, plus a weak role of universities as institutions and a fair power of the academic guilt. It could originally be considered one 'specific variation of the classic oligarchic model [as] the combination of power between academic guilts and the State bureaucracy was of an asymmetric nature: the former exercised much greater influence than the latter (Capano, 2008) 483)'. This heritages is yet visible despite the several reforms occurred. The system, in fact, 'showed a great ability to avoid change and maintain its key features (Reale and Potì 2009, 82)', even decades after the paradigmatic transformation the HE system undertook due to the transition from an elitist to mass university, and later on with the introduction of institutional autonomy.

First real change in the HE system occurred in the late eighties, when it was implemented law 189/89. While the implementation of Ruberti law and its long term impact on the Italian HE system has been at the centre of the academic debate, it remains one of the most comprehensive reform of the system, as it receipted the constitutional provision according to which Italian universities were to be autonomous institutions. It established the Ministry for University and Scientific and Technical Research', which would have had a portfolio, and it marked the beginning of a policy inspired to the new ideas of a model of HE with the State serving as a 'supervisor' of the system, 'a process of innovative national legislation which continued right up until the present day (Capano 2008)'. This was crucial for the development of ISM within European driven process, as it provided the room of manoeuvre for the very first experiments of inter-university cooperation projects (IPCs) with foreign institutions, which were a pillar of the new European action in the filed together with students exchange. As we already saw, the Erasmus had a profound impact in the system and it still counts for a very relevant part of ISM flows in Italy: it marked a paradigmatic approach to international cooperation in HE before unthinkable across Europe. Evidence also reveals these years of European development in relation to the mobility resulted an Italian driven process to a relevant extent – starting from Spinelli to Andonnino, and then to Lenarduzzi and

Ruberti, as shown emerged also by interview material (see annex IV). More in detail, experts pointed out to Lenarduzzi as the technical father of the Erasmus process, while to Ruberti as the 'political father', together with Sofia Corradi - professor at the Rome University La Sapienza (where Ruberti was rector before becoming Ministry). Domenico Lenarduzzi, Italian, was the European Commissioner in the DG responsible for occupation and social affairs.

Few years after the Ruberti reform, however, it was clear that process of reform came to a standstill. The reform started 'a centralized-decentralization', a 'radical break' quite difficult to be implemented, reason why the following real steps toward autonomy happened in 1994 with the introduction of the Budgetary Act in 1996 – called FFO - (Capano and Turri 2017), following law 573/1994 and 549/1995. Only few universities embraced however an autonomous statute (Capano 2018), and one of the law which was to complete the overall reform was not approved by the parliament. The FFO - originally an instrument to shake and incentive the system – begun to be calculated basing on an historical and equalization components plus a 'reward' quoted linked to specific governmental objectives (Capano and Turri 2017). The ministerial capacity to steer the system was weak, and it continued to vanish over the time, with a large majority of institutions initially did not profit of the granted autonomy as in the mind of policy makers. As a result, difference across the system, instead of vanishing, begun to get structural.

Italian tertiary system was hence not performing particularly well in the mid-nineties, contextually however to other big European countries facing a number of problems related to university un-efficiency. As introduced by section 4.2, they were high drop-outs rates, increasing time to graduation, and an enormous public burden coming from tertiary system: notably the premises of the Bologna Process. As a reform of the system, clearly necessary in the mind of domestic actors appeared impossible to be implemented, Italy driven such process from the early beginning gaining a true windows of opportunity in a very pro-European period.

However, despite this time Italy was an earlier implementor of the reform, already in 1999, the same story of a foresight minister setting the ground for substantial change followed by a lost occasion occurred. The reform found (once more) universities and the academic community 'totally surprised (Capano 2008, 491)', and was not 'culturally' accepted as it shacked the system in its foundations. The crucial discussion remains the one about a blocked transformation from a centralized model. By way of example, the first degree cycle designing was done with any information on second cycles (Capano 2008), resulting in universities designing a plethora of degrees and courses with very high course loads so to involve the biggest quota of professor as possible. Degrees arrived to be over 5500 in the a.y. 2005/2006. The two different reactions by the central government of 2002 and 2006 may be read as steps backwards in relation to institutional autonomy, while they tried to correct institutional behaviours, establishing for example structural requirements for the creation of degrees and a limit to exams number both in BA and MA courses (Capano 2008). In sum, following the 509, the ministry 'found it increasingly difficult to steer the ongoing process which were driven by the large scale activism of the universities (Capano 2018, 88)', and once again the reform ended up to fragment the system and 'acerbated internal divisions and conflicts (Capano 2018, 88)'.

It is worth to stress the failed substantial implementation of 509/1999, which dramatically reduced institutions' room of manoeuvre to internationalize and implement ISM. As we saw above, the ministry already had little capacity of steering the system following the Ruberti reform. Bologna constituted a window of opportunity to regain a grip on the system, to push them toward internationalization, but a recentralization process, contextually to an increased fragmentation of the system instead begun. The first experiments of Bologna Stocktaking exercise revealed the many constrains in place when it came to degree recognition of credits gained/internships done abroad, and the large differences within the system. The implementation of mobility implied a relevant grade of cooperation and coordination among the many domestic actors in charge of a 'small' part of the large process, but material interviews pointed to actors' lack of cooperation and

coordination as one of the biggest obstacle yet to be solved. The attempt to implement mobility 'as according Bologna', in sum, further highlighted the necessity of 'technologies' to steer the system at distance, such as an agency to coordinate internationalization and mobility, as well as mapping of the system (i.e. a national course catalogue, a databases of international programs, a national register for international students), which the system was not able to develop, (and yet not in place thirty years later). Beyond the increasing inability of the ministry to steer the process, moreover, the years following Bologna have been marked by a loss of ISM interest and enthusiasm in the first place among the ministry of HE bureaucracy, and above all in political commitment, as largely underlined by interviews (commitment of the ministry to ISM has been reported as strongly dependent upon public officials in charge for the entire period under analysis). It is in this context that the largely mentioned 'cultural resistance' found a fertile ground to spread, and it resulted in a consolidated characteristic of the system, other than in brain drain.

As introduced in section II and it will be better discussed in the next paragraph, ISM came instead to be again a relevant issue for the ministry of foreign affairs. In these years immediately following Bologna declaration, both ministries pursue the goal of inter-university cooperation, as projects testify (see section 4.2). A closer look to the FFO distribution for this years also enlighten that until 2005 the only (vague) reference to internationalization was an article which granted additional resources to hire foreign professors or incentive Italians experts working abroad: by 2005, instead, ISM appeared on the FFO to promote international inter-university cooperation and the attraction of foreign students, as shows by annex IV.

Since the early 2000, ISM development faced however the stiffening of regulations for visas and residence permits, beyond MIUR competence but of serious relevance for universities. Interview material largely testified how the ministries of foreign affairs and of the interior become more concerned about illegal immigration and terroristic risks. Those are the years following 9/11 and the introduction of the Bossi law discussed above. As a result, when the season of strong cuts to education arrived as soon the III Berlusconi governments took office - together with an even stricter immigration regulation and the Gelmini reform, mobility had been already relegated on the one side since a number of year in the domain of HE, and it already overlapped to a relevant extent to the single Erasmus program.

Sacchi et al (2017, 207) identify three main period in the development of the system: a first one focused on 'autonomy and market (1990)', the years of Ruberti reform and the introduction of the FFO, followed by a period of 'reforming the teaching organization and academic staff, (1996-2005')', and finally a season characterized by the cutting of public funds (2006-present). Following 2006, in fact, and even more the financial crisis of 2008, the core of this discussion became the dramatic decrease of public funding. These cuts constituted a real earthquake for Italian universities, and worsen the conditions of an already inefficient system. A former CRUI president summarized this way the consequences these developments had for Erasmus:

> 'just after the subprime crisis begin… 2008, the economic crisis, let's say overwhelming that it is still in place, and this issue begin to be the last of problems, you can imagine Erasmus, is something that… if professors decrease of about 15%, if there is a contraction of organics, of employees, of labor force… of the 15% in public administrations…you can imagine if the problem can be the Erasmus organization'.

Starting with law 133/2008 or Tremonti law, cuts to tertiary education became constant and got institutionalized. The FFO was strongly and constantly reduced, and it provoked serious unbalance on the repartition of fund (Banfi and Viesti 2016). Gelmini law gave increasing power to university governing bodies, further disintegrating the system, cancelled the figure of researchers, and also faculties - making of departments the central units of universities. It also reformed entirely the FFO, until then divided in three main parts, one depending by the number of enrolled students, one on the outcomes of education process, and a final one on research outcomes. FFO was to be then calculated basing on a standard cost for students, a provision who should have

overcame the historical expenses quota system, plus a standard quota and a performance-based component. *Criteria* for allocation of funds are published at the end of the ongoing year, they favour universities of the northern part of the country and punish southern and insular ones (Banfi and Vesti 2016). Moreover, there is a strong imbalance of research weight over teaching activities, and many indicators are biased by external factors. The performance of universities is assessed by ANVUR, the national evaluation agency, which further centralized the system creating an over-regulated environment, in turn further vanishing of ministerial capacity to steer the system (Banfi and Viesti 2016). This dearth is clearly visible looking the FFO evolution since 2008: until 2015, 23 different indicators have been used to evaluate universities, adding evidence to the lack of any strategic approach.

(Capano and Turri, 2017), in their extensive analysis on the HE Italian system, discuss whether the Italian system should be currently considered an anomalous of paradigmatic case. (Degli Esposti and Geraci, 2010) use the Vico's *ricorso* image to summarize the Italian HE system development. In the XVIII century, with *ricorso,* Vico refereed to an historical circle implying an ending point that match with the starting one. Therefore, the authors uses this metaphor to describe the system, stressing it finally reverted 'back to a situation analogous to that of the pre-1980s' following the 2010 last reform. Reale and Polì (2009), instead, read these developments as a failed transformation to a steering-at-distance mode of governance, as the process begun in the background of the NPM narrative of the eighties was not accomplished. They interpret the Italian system as an 'in between configuration' model, characterized by a central weak authority and a high extent of procedural control over institutions. According to them, autonomy in this contexts did not stimulate competition nor institutional differentiation, but 'reinforced the tendency of professors to view the autonomy of universities as the freedom of individuals from schemes, rules, results and restraints (Simone 1995) (Reale and Potì 2009, 101)'. Reale and Potì's (2009) analysis summarize perfectly the aforementioned consequences that the HE development had for student mobility, whose implementation ended up to be in the hands of single professor or institutional decision makers.

Only after 2012, as introduced, attempts by MIUR to steer the internationalization of universities emerged. Already in 2009, exception in the season of public cuts, the grant for mobility was increased to 500€ per month and the portability of some grants introduced, as according to a D.P.C.M. of 2009 (9th of April). It is however with Minister Profumo student mobility acquired again salience at the ministry of university and research. In 2012 the FFO article funding international cooperation agreements disappeared while in 2014 ISM became the single indicator according to which universities were allocated the performance funding quota for didactic activities (which accounted for 10%, the remaining 90% was research-related). Table 4.9 and 4.10 below shows the weight of the allocation to ISM in relation to the total FFO. While up until 2016 FFO directly linked it to the performance funding quota, this may appear as just one of so far over 23 aforementioned indicators used in the last decades than a real way to promote a strategy of internationalization. It should be noted, however, that with this provision the ministry obliged universities to recognizes students' credits earnt abroad, rather than registering them additionally to student carriers, until then a diffused practice. Moreover, a real increasing involvement of MAE/MAECI emerged in these years: the establishment of Uni-Italia has been in 2009, the aforementioned ministerial MAE reorganization establishing the DGSP in 2010, and in 2014 also the new law on international cooperation entered in force. MIUR behaviour in the very last years under analysis may be hence read as an attempt to regain a grip on the steering of ISM and to softly push universities to develop both student mobility and internationalization, as well as an attempt to balance and possible shape the room of manoeuvre of other national players.
It is interesting to note that MIUR actions in the very last period under analysis reveals the presence of ISM framing in European terms, with the Erasmus occupying a 'special' role. As the General Director of MIUR office for internationalization declared at the Erasmus+ Contact Seminar 2017,

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Italy emerges committed to promote ISM as cohesion instrument for the UE, and the Erasmus constitute the greatest instrument ever implemented within the EHEA to contribute to European integration and freedom of circulation (Cinquepalmi 2018). Italy (MIUR) also took the secretariat of the Bologna Process 2018-2020, marking the twenty year anniversary since its foundations, and it has been truly engaged in the promotion of the European Qualification Passport for Refugees, enabling mostly Syrian students refugees with no official papers to continue their academic carrier at Italian universities. Moreover, it has also supported the European Universities Alliance project, launched as a pilot project under the EC Horizon 2020 project and core action of the forthcoming Horizon Europe.

It also engaged in common action with other ministries, as emerged by the 2017 national strategy for the promotion of the higher education sector abroad. While experts interviews pointed out to the lack of substantial coordination and cooperation among these actors, it is relevant to stress that for their large majority an improvement in institutional cross-sectoral relations took place. However, while within the framework of European driven mobility programs the MIUR emerged as the coordinating body – with all the discussed limits of the case, in the case of the National Strategy (and in the steering of Uni-Italia programs), the body of reference emerged to be the MAECI with the DGSP. This findings are coherent with claims of the OCED/EU (2019), that identified a surprisingly major governmental commitment of the MAECI rather than the MIUR in matters related to internationalization and ISM.

Fieldwork revealed that there are two differently approaches to unlock ISM development in the country. Section two revealed as the large majority of efforts to promote mobility were linked to the Erasmus and to Bologna process, and how MIUR effort has been concentrated on enabling as many students as possible to take part in the Erasmus projects. The new strategy, by contrast, identify new context of crucial interest, with China in the forefront followed by India, Brazil, Egypt (MAECI /MIUR 2017), and here MAECI appear to be the dominant actor. A quality-quantity in force dilemma also suggests that policy objectives of this very recent frame of ISM contrast the aforementioned frame within the framework of the Erasmus and the Bologna Process, and it also enlighten clash in strategic priorities and policy goals. For example, within the framework of the Uni-Italia governmental programs, Italy welcomed Chinese students for a number of years with a GAO KAO score that would have prevent them to enrol to Chinese universities. As Uni-Italia reports testifies (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019), criteria have been strengthen over the years, but the quality of Chinese students still remains not comparable to those enrolling in German universities, by way of example as pointed out by former General Director of the DGSP (de Luca 2018).

In conclusion, the lack of substantial institutional autonomy of Italian universities, the cultural opposition from the academic guild, and the lack of technology to implement ISM summed to the decreasing funds to education, resulted in a very hostile panorama for the development of ISM. To this, an increased involvement of both MAECI and the interior in the background of terrorism since the early 2000 complicated the pictures. Following 2009 and the development of a frame of ISM as a foreign policy instruments, cross-sectorial dynamics further intricated the steering of ISM. Currently, a lack of clear competence between MIUR and MAECI is also evident and it appear to reduce MIUR scope of action.

A final, positive note for the higher education system relates instead in the presence in the system of a number of best practices, spread in a small but significant numbers of Italian universities where mobility developed since the very beginning and it is currently a structural part of the student body, as we saw above the 10% in some cases (see OCED/UE 2019). As Reale and Potì (2009) noted in their paper, some universities have been in fact able to escape domestic conditions and constrains, and in this case successful in creating an international community where mobility is on the agenda.

TABLE 4.9 | Weight of PERFORMANCE BASE FFO quota funding ISM

YEAR	% of FFO performance base quota	% of total of the FFO	Amount in €
2014	10	1,73	121.500.000
2015	7	1,40	96.950.000
2016	7	1,43	99.155.000

Source: CRUI (2019) L'internazionalizzazione della formazione superiore in Italia

Table 4.9 - Weight of PERFORMANCE BASE FFO quota funding ISM

TABLE 4.10 | Weight of support to ISM and Internationalization on FFO total

YEAR	% OUT OF FFO TOTAL	AMOUNT
2014	0,70	926.000
2015	0,66	930.000
2016	0,64	986.000

Source: CRUI (2019) L'internazionalizzazione della formazione superiore in Italia

Table 4.10 - Weight of support to ISM and Internationalization on FFO

4.3.2 Immigration

Italy is commonly recognised as a new immigration country, as it experienced immigration flows recently in comparison to other countries such as Germany, the USA or Australia. While Italy experienced some migration flows linked to its colonial past, with Eritrean and Somalian migrants (Collinson 1994), it is in fact during the eighties and most importantly following the Albanian and Balkans disorders that immigration really entered the domestic agenda (Bretagna and Maccari Clyton 2013). They signed the begun of a relevant flow to the country, with additional flows from Romanians and Kurd migrants coming from Iraq and Turkey (Bretagna and Maccari Clyton 2013). Flows from Europe has been predominant during the nineties, while north African flows during the 2000s (Collinson 1994, Thomassen 2010).

According to ISTAT (2019), in 2019 there were about 5,3 millions of foreigners in the country, accounting for about the 8.7 of the total population, with the 80.2% of them concentrated in the norther part of the country. Migration helps to balance Italian ageing population, and the foreign born components of its population reached 9.6% in 2017 (OCED 2019b). Among foreigners, Romanians and Moroccan still account between the biggest foreigners group, together with Brazilians, Albanians and Nigerians. Also the number of Chinese migrants increased over time. Foreigners are on average younger than Italians, and the expansion in the foreign population is also due to the increasing number of second and third generations, which, for effect of the 1992 immigration law are considered foreigners. Among the reason for migration, about half migrated for family reasons, followed by about one quarter seeking humanitarian protection. Currently, foreigners have a similar employability rate to Italians, 64.4% against 63.35%, while they shows higher rate of unemployment (13,8 against 9,5%) – while they inactivity rate is lower than that of Italians, 29.1% and 34,9% (**OECD 2019**). They contribute to Italian economic growth, but are not approached as an opportunity while far more depicted as a treat from which seek protection.

Despite the constant increase in the number of migrants and several attempts to regulate the phenomenon, Italy has never developed an immigration model, in contrast to other countries such as France, Germany or Sweden (Thomassen 2010). The Italian legislation has been mostly been characterized by massive regularizations of immigrants, as Collinson (1994) already argued in

1994. Immigration became a salient and divisive issue among Italian parties, especially since the early 2000s, because of the anti-immigration attitudes of extreme-right parties. As Urso (2018) reports, the media coverage of the immigration phenomenon increased since the early 2000, and it peaked between 2005 to 2009, a period of large coverage of asylum seekers arriving by boats to which the centre-right government responded with an harsh policy. Since then, immigration has been constantly approached as an 'emergency', as an 'imminent treat' (Colucci 2018). Currently, immigration across the country follow a complex normative framework, known for its high extent of policy discretion. We shall see international students have never been a relevant subset of migrants, while this legislation has been relevant for ISM development in Italy.

Policy development

Until the first law on immigration during the eighties, Italian legislation was based on Testo Unico di Pubblica Sicurezza of 1931, and even if already Rome Treaty guaranteed some freedom to the labor force at least in member countries, the disposition was particularly problematic and complex (Colucci 2018).
Eloquent for this discussion, is the way the central Italian government begun to approach the issue. In 1976 it established the Inter-ministerial Committee for Emigration, which meet the first time in 1978 to face the issue of immigration (Colucci 2018). The ministry of interior, one of the most involved by the issue, was left outside given the original nature of the committee, which included instead the President of Italian Council of Ministers, the MAE, treasure, education, industry, agriculture and the budget ministries (Einaudi 2007 in Colucci 2018).
Colucci (2018) reports the years between 1978 and 1986 have been marked by a strong 'confused and contradictory' legislative framework, and he stresses foreign nationals could never be sure to legally be in the country, most importantly due to the high level of maneuver held by public officials when implementing norms, as we saw in the case of foreign students in section 4.2. Italy had apparently an open door policy, with borders easy to pass even legally, and only after a 'legal and administrative labyrinth' mostly incomprehensible to foreigners (Colucci 2018). It is in this year that the commitment of a number of civil society organizations around the issue of immigration emerged, as discussed for UCSEI.
Foschi law was approved in 1986 following a vividly debate in parliament and across parliamentary commission of the IX legislation (1983-1987) (Einaudi 2017 in Colucci 2018). It has been the first one to approach family related migration, and it included a number of provisions such as the creation of a consult. The law also foreseen an amnesty which legalized about 116,000 foreigners (Colucci 2018). As argued by Chiaromonte (2013,107 in Colucci 2018), however, it gave a 'form' to the many disposition rather than being a true new law. Consequently, the public debate on immigration did not calm down in the country and strong opposition against immigrants kept to emerge. The Martelli law, promulged in 1990, established clearer rights and freedom of foreign citizens living in Italy. However, given a number of amendments by republicans, it also lost part of its potential impact (Paoli 2013 in Colucci 2018).
Whichever judgment may be given to it, it represents the first law with which became clear that Italy had to take on the managing of migration flows, not anymore a negligible phenomenon but rather a crucial one (Colucci 2018). Having promulgated Martelli law, Italy was ready to join the Schengen area. It is also in this year that Italy sign the Dublin convention, which will become a crucial debate points in the following decades. However, as neither this law was enough to manage immigration, the first Italian center-left government approved in 1998 a third law, the so called Turco-Napolitano. Once again, law 40 had the aim to implement a model of resonated integration, and aimed to a better regulation of migration for work and repatriation, as well as to implement new rights and social provision for integration. It was regulated by quotas on yearly bases, key instrument of the policy (UCSEI 2004). The law was focused on the need to control immigration flows, manage integration processes, and to simplify expulsion (Colucci 2018). In clear continuity

with former laws, even the Turco Napolitano foreseen an amnesty for foreigners, which legalized about 217.000 foreigners (Colucci 2018).

While law 40/1998 still constitutes the base of the normative framework in relation to immigration, a number of additional legislative intervention altered Italian immigration policies in the past twenty years.

Berlusconi won the general in 2001, and among his allies there was the Northern Lega, an extreme right party who strongly opposed immigration. Until then, extra-Eu immigration flows were mostly coming from the old migration channels linked to East Europe, the Balkans in the first place, while since the 2000 relevant flows begin to arrive from north Africa. In this years, the relevance of immigration among the public strongly grew, and it also polarized the political debate. In 2002, the II Berlusconi government promulgated the Bossi-Fini law, a clear and sharp message of a new approach to immigration. The law established immigrants could enter Italy only if holding a signed working contract, it extended period of 30 days of maximum time in Centri di Permanenza Temporanei (CTP – Temporary stays centers), restricted the number of relatives could benefits for family benefits, and that a permit would ends its validity if migrants were to lose his/her job, other than simplifying expulsion (Colucci 2018). At the same time, the law is also remembered as the 'big amnesty', which brought to regularize the position of over 643.738 foreigners in the country (Colucci 2018).

The third Berlusconi government also promulged another law, the 'security package', on the background of always more relevant flows of illegal migrants reaching Italian soil by boat. As Italy had signed the Dublin convention, these migrants had to be welcomed, identified, registered and supervised in submitting application for staying in Europe, an effort which was for the large part left to Italy and other Southern bordering countries by the UE. Law 94/2009, titled *Disposition in matters of public security*, according to Colucci (2018) well explain the way in which the *binomium* of public security-immigration becomes – beyond a cultural and political approach – a normative instrument, as in the case of the agreement in Libya of 2008 (art. 19), or the following decree Minniti-Orlando. As large research proved, there has been a disconnection between the reality of the phenomenon and its public perception (Colucci 2018). Following the collapse of the third Berlusconi government, there has also been an attempt to upgrade the citizen laws, which should have enabled second and third generations to have Italian citizenry, but the center left government, which supported initially the proposal, fall apart. Very recently, moreover, Italian framework has been further tighten in 2018, when prime minister Salvini, from a re-born Northern League, released the 'security decrees'.

In decades of tortuous Italian policy immigration development, four different phases may be identified. A first one, the attempt to regulate it between the seventies and the eighties. The second and third ones, characterized by European and North-African flows, during which further attempts to develop an organic approach to immigration followed, especially for those already in the country, with no tangible results. And the last one which last until today, characterized instead by the introduction of harsh laws within a 'securization' context of the immigration phenomenon, resulted in a spread public perception of immigration as largely illegal and unnecessary.

In any of these phase the segment of international students have been central with the evolution of Italian immigration legislation. The lack of strategic policy approach around the issue of mobility is reflected in flows composition of third country students, largely shaped by historical linkages. Also Durazzi (nd) notes how foreign students in Italy are representative of the 'main migratory flows, mostly entailing the Balkans (e.g. Albania), Eastern Europe (e.g. Romania), Norther Africa (Morocco) and Asia (e.g. China)'. Crui (2019) provides a comparison of flows between a.a. 2005-2006 that highlights how Albanian and Romanian still account yet for the large majority of foreigners studying in Italy, while the third foreigners larger group, once Greek, is currently the one of Chinese students. Despite the salience that skilled migration gained among other western developed countries, in Italy this migrant subset has never been considered as a

relevant flow and the framework around them evolved by layering, with any domestic intervention leading to a reform aimed at retaining foreign students.

The immigration regulation for foreign students, mostly impacting third country nationals, relies still in the article 39 of the unified text of immigration instituted by legislative decree 286/1998 and by article 4 and 4bis of D.P.R. 394/1999, the inter-ministerial decree of 9 July 2008 and from the a circular of the health ministry of 19 July 2006. As according to the circular of the foreign affair ministry of 23 August 2010, each third country nationals residing in Italy longer than 90 days (outside the country list with no visa requests for short visits) must ask a permit within eight days by entrance to Italy. The procedure to ask for permit is often explained only in Italian, it is very complex, long and also assume a number of qualifying conditions for students. The system is still based on the system quota, as it happens since the early years of student exchanges. However, an article the aforementioned decree foreseen the possibility to grant visas and permits beyond the annual quota. Ad-hoc programs developed by institutional actors happens outside the yearly '*contingente*', the quota decided for a data year, as it happens for exchanges within the framework of the Uni-Italia managed programs. Permits regulations constitutes an obstacles for the development of mobility even within governmental programs such as the ones run by Uni-Italia, as the reports of the last conferences testify (Uni-Italia 2016, Uni-Italia 2018b, Uni-Italia 2019).

In Italy, moreover, legislation foreseen that students can convert their permit from studying to working as according to the availability of the quota foreseen by the an yearly decree (Decreto Flussi), which is published by the interior ministry. It is within the quota for non-seasonal work that is included the share of availability for converting a visa (EMN 2013)[40].

EMN (2017) reveals that out of the five type of incentive to retain students, Italy only implemented the simplification of procedures to stay (the remaining are the lowering of salary requirements, the full access to the labor market, the chance of staying to set up a business, additional incentives). We shall come back to this point in section 4.3.4, when discussing ISM and the labor market.

The permit for studying is not the only type of permits which could be granted to a third national student: seven other type of residency permits may (and are) granted for a number of additional reason. As table 4.11 show more in detail, the may be for 'traineeship', work in special cases, for scientific research/study, for scientific research (3 sub-categories). Table 4.13 shows instead the historical series of students' permits released for any visa that may be granted. Beyond making the picture far complex, these additional type of permits increase the margin of discretion during implementation. Visas and permits for studying and research have been distinguished only in 2013, and the boundaries among the two emerges as unclear, especially in the case of PhD students.

The biggest obstacle to mobility in Italy ever since emerged to be the high level of discretion in normative implementation. Fieldwork and interview material strongly pointed out to very different approaches in the releasing of permits as according to territorial offices of the ministry and public officials in charge of the process, as discussed in section II. The normative framework around international students has been also influenced by the EU intervention, an intervention attempted to create a more friendly normative for incoming student mobility flows (see table 4.12 below), but it also added a layer of complexity in the managing of permits. Despite the reception of these EU directive, empirical evidence still point out to enforced old practices.

Another relevant problem emerged has been the necessary time to obtain permits, which often even overcome their timeframe of validity. Moreover, as reported by De Feo in 2010, Deputy at the Italian Chamber in the course of an audition with the chief in charge of the interior department

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[40] The share is not stable: 46 practices where concluded in 2010, but the granted quota for 2010 was of 4500 (1500+3000) thousand. EMN (2017) report that in 2015 less then 10 students were retained (for any reason), while in 2018 8000 of them stayed in Italy for working purposes (it was not possible to retrieve data explaining such an incremental trend). See Annex V to observe allocated quota for transformation of studying permit into working one. It should be noted however that to high skilled migrants, and therefore former international students after their graduation, are also granted permits beyond this quota.

responsible – which also admitted such situation, after foreign students submit their application, and until they receipt their permit, they cannot travel, in Italy nor abroad (CAMERA 2010), and 'this is one of the most important causes to determine a so law extra European students at our universities (CAMERA 2010, pp 13)'. We also discussed already the lack of implementation of the Inter-ministerial circular released every year by MIUR (MAECI and the INTERIO, plus LABOR ministry) according to which permits should be granted for the entire period of degrees (DM 104/2014), as the debate of the aforementioned *MoviMenti* conference testifies.

This findings confirm former studies on the phase of implementation of immigration regulation in Italy. Triandafyllidou (2003), for example, reports a relevant grade of informal discretion and favoritism in local officers' daily implementation of law 48/1998. The article, which is the result of a European comparative assessment of local administration implementation of immigration regulations, suggest that the vertical organization of the ministry, together with informal relations among officers of the same ranks translates in significant room of discretion when implementing regulations. Moreover, the author shows how behaviors of informal discretionary practices reflect the general 'more traditional current in the Foreign Office's organizational culture, which privileged a clientelist pattern of relations between public servants and clients Triandafyllidou (2003, 292)', and that street level bureaucrats discretion is also due the development of 'copying strategies', 'which helped the FO agents to manage their workloads (Triandafyllidou 2003, 292)'.

Eventually, also experts interviewed for this research revealed that in many cities the permits for students had become a relevant burden from territorial offices, also given the fact that flows are usually concentrated during a period of the year (as per legislative framework). Informal relations among university and territorial offices' leadership also emerged to play a crucial role for effective coordination among institutions and the foreign offices. On the contrary, harsh relations among universities, and especially the offices managing mobility at administrative level, have been often reported with the office in charge of releasing permits. Not surprisingly, fieldwork revealed a very variegated picture, as shown by section II, with universities even having officials in-campus and other unable to establish valuable basic exchange of information.

Fieldwork and material interviews also revealed that third national students are often approached by the interior ministry administration in light of 'securitarian' arguments, related to the control of immigration flows against the background of terroristic infiltration risks, or more generally as an easy route for entering the UE borders for purposes different than studying at Italian universities. Urso (2018) distinguishes three frame of immigration that the author identifies by media coverage while investigating left and right parties approaches – securitarian arguments, solidarity and human rights, cultural frames, and pragmatic justification. This categorization reflects to some extent those until now emerged across key institutional players, respectively for the interior, MIUR and MAECI, in this case with the securitarian argument. To conclude, despite foreign students have never been at the center of Italian discussion of immigration, they face structural problems of Italian legislation and most importantly its major constrains related to implementation. In addition, the framing of the foreigners as a potential treat for the country holds also for international students, as lamented from the UCSEI even before the eighties.

TABLE 4.11 | Additional residence permits that may be granted to foreign students

traineeship	Third national students coming within the framework of a traineeship within a degree may be granted this permit
work in special cases, TU, Art. 27 L. 40/1998, art. 25 L. 943/1986, art. 14, cc 2 e 4	Foreign students may fall in this permits as they are included by article r, who include 'people in Italy within the framework of: research activity within youth exchange programs'
for scientific research/study (entrance and stays for research) Ex. Art 2ter dl 286/1998	Foreign students enrolling a PhD degrees in Italy have the requirements for this permit, as it can be granted to a person who has 'a title which grants access to a PhD in his own country'
for scientific research (entrance and stays for research) (autonomous work) Ex. Art 2ter dl 286/1998	Foreign students enrolling a PhD degrees in Italy have the requirements for this permit, as it can be granted to a person who has 'a title which grants access to a PhD in his own country'
for scientific research (entrance and stays for research) (dependent)Ex.Art2terdl286/1998	Foreign students enrolling a PhD degrees in Italy have the requirements for this permit, as it can be granted to a person who has 'a title which grants access to a PhD in his own country'
Job seeking Ex Blue card, Art. 27quater, c 17 TUI	Reserved to high skilled migrants, it may have a validity of two years for permanent jobs and of three additional months to the length of the contract if it has temporary validity. If the foreign nationals is already in Italy, it should not request another visa.

Source: Elaboration of the author of primary sources

Table 4.11 - Additional residence permits that may be granted to foreign students

TABLE 4.12 | European Directives and Regulations receipted in relation to immigration for studying/research

EU DIRECTIVE 2004/114/CE *Decreto legislativo* 154/2007	The decree sanctions that a foreign national student holding a valid residence permit for studying purposes released by another UE Member state does are allowed to stay in another member state for periods longer of three months, as to continue his/her study or to integrate them, and they should not ask an additional visa.
EU Directive of 2005/771/EC Decreto legislative 17/2008	The decree updates dispositions for the entrance of researchers in Italy, and it insert art. 27ter to the TU (286/1999) which enable to welcome researchers beyond the annual quota if the researches meet requirements to enroll in a PhD in his country.
CE Regulation n. 810/2009 *Inter-ministerial decree* 11/05/2011	Introduction of Schengen Uniform Visa and of National Visas (VN), including type those with limited territorial validity (VLT). Nationals of other member states should not apply for visa for period shorted than 90 days (but they do need a temporary permit).
EU Directive 2009/50/CE Decreto legislative 108/2012	The decree introduced to the TU (286/1998) articles 9ter and 27quater (see below), which grants the change to high skilled workers (i.e. graduated foreign students) to enter Italy for working beyond annual quotas. The permits is called EU Blue Card
EU DIRECTIVE 2016/801 con *Legge Delega* 163/2017, *Decreto Attuativo* 11/04/2018 n. 71	International students and researchers can stay at least for nine months and max for 12 following their study/research to complete their studying for working purposes. They can also travel within the EU in the meantime.

Source: Elaboration of the author of primary sources

Table 4.12 - European Directives and Regulations receipted in relation to immigration for studying/research

TABLE 4.13 | ADDITIONAL TYPE OF PERMITS FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS

	Total	Studying	Traineeship	Work, special cases ex art. 27	Scientific research/study (ex art 27ter DL VO 286/98)	Scientific Research	Scientific research (independent work 27ter DL VO 286/98)	Scientific research (dependent work 27ter DL VO 286/98)	blue card
2004	948.327	31.840	73	-	-	-	-	-	-
2005	2.271.680	47.531	205	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	2.039.151	34.767	95	5	-	-	-	-	-
2007	1.889.490	17.874	78	-	-	13	-	-	-
2008	1.553.229	16.398	8	806	-	12	-	-	-
2009	2.084.256	26.601	80	2468	-	63	-	-	-
2010	2.497.294	30.173	108	3745	91	71	98	24	-
2011	2.906.109	49.431	238	5911	187	157	199	39	-
2012	2.956.007	50.859	324	5528	241	221	197	53	-
2013	?	31.659	396	5002	335	243	255	53	-
2014	3.117.482	53.133	227	4750	325	288	277	72	6
2015		50.814	168	4538	302	280	236	58	-
2016	3.247.129	46.353	134	442	282	270	179	78	2
2017		42.601	109	408	253	205	166	83	12

Source: Elaboration of the author of the Annual Reports of the ministry of interior

Table 4.13 - Additional Type Of Permits For International Students

4.3.3 Foreign Policy

Italy enjoys a peculiar geographical and geopolitical position in the world, which deeply influenced its history, culture and development. It is a key member state of the European Union and a NATO member, and it also has close relations with both the Balkans and African norther countries, whose influence is strongly evident throughout the southern part of the country and contrast to the norther European influence receipted by norther regions. Gisborg (1995, 4) notes that Italy is the only Mediterranean country to be a founder country of the European Union, and define such peculiarity an 'enduring specificity of a Catholic and Mediterranean country'.

In 1991, in relation to the Italian international standing, Santoro (1991) wrote that Italian status could be ascribed to the 'least of the great powers' or the 'largest of the small power'. More recently, Bonvicini et al. (2011) stress vulnerability and insecurity, uncertainty about Italy international standing, asymmetric alliances and deficits of methods, plus disinterest towards foreign affairs as 'historical constants', since they can be observed in every phase of Italian foreign policy. While discussions on weather Italy gained a status of middle power spread in academic literature, Romero (2016) provides a very much sharper summary writing Italy is 'smaller, weaker, less influential than 25, 50 or even 100 years ago (Romero 2016, 1)'. He continues that the country:

> 'largely missed the key innovative dynamics of the cycle of globalization [...]. It regressed in terms of research, skills and technological prowess. Its financial solidity and credibility was substantially degraded. Its voice in the international arena [...] is little more than a well-meaning [...] whisper. [...] 'Italy foreign policy remained shackled to a state-centred notion of diplomatic actorness, while all the other engines of international influence were sputtering, and the country was rapidly losing ground. Even before the great recession painfully brought the message home, Italy had clearly become a laggard in almost all dimensions of international competitiveness (Romero 2016, 9).

Policy development

Let's begin by Italian foreign policy foundations. As (Spinelli, 2015)(1967) wrote, 'the fundamental decision which have had a determining influence [...][for Italian foreign policy] were made during the forties and fifties to incorporate the nations' reconstruction in the two Atlantic and European multinational establishment', unique pillars until the fall or the iron curtain. Global and internal transformations resulted in a far complex overall picture of Italian foreign policy, but did not change the Italian fundamental choice made after the war. Italian foreign policy has been marked by 'Atlantic, European and Mediterranean ones [circles], which gradually allowed for the construction of a generalized consensus in which Italy close relationship with the USA was tamed by its equally strong relations with European partners, and, increasingly, with Arab countries (Andreatta 2008, 3).

A first crucial point to raise is the relevance of the European integration process, within which the Erasmus program has been framed, developed and slowly implemented. The entire dimension of intra-European mobility, perfectly coherent with Italian foreign policy, emerged however as de-connected by the interest and action of the ministry of foreign affairs. This may be explained by the fact that intra-European mobility, following the Schengen agreements, has been implemented for the large part outside legislation for visas.

Also the relevance of the Atlantic pact for Italian foreign policy, and more specifically of the USA as key Italian ally, can be seen since the very beginning in ISM development. In fact, already in the pre-eighties context a large number of American universities have been established in Italy. As section one shown, the trend of Americans students studying at American university in Italy follows a positive trend since then, and American students in Italy so far account for over 30.000 units (while Italy register a total of about 42.000 foreign students enrolled in its higher education system). Also the Italo-American

Fulbright commission, established in the early years after the second war world, testify the relevance of the Italian Atlantic belonging, it is still active and promotes very high level exchange among students of both countries. To sum up, the very early commitment in foreign policy taken by Italy after the 2WW are still visible in relation to the international mobility of students, while as we saw, they constitute different ways of promoting and implementing mobility (respectively mostly credit mobility and mobility outside the Italian HE system).

Until the nineties, Italian security concerns were mostly related to the Soviet treat, to which both United States and NATO were ready to respond. Following the end of cold war, Italy had to begin to look after its own security concerns (Walston, 2007). Many medium size countries had to understand which and where were their own priorities within the new international chessboard (Walston 2007). For Italy, this *caesurae* has been the events following the break of Yugoslavia (Fassino 1998). The author points out it is with Kosovo operation that becomes clear that 'Italy [was] no longer just a consumer of security, it create[d] security too (Fassino 1998, 31 in Walston 2007)'. Italy found in fact itself with a much closer to home treat (Walston 2007), and it had to tackle the new scenario in the middle of a complex period (the Lira crisis of 1992 and the collapse of its party system). Multilateralism was to become a peculiarity of Italian foreign policy, especially in areas of crucial interest for the country. Crucial areas were the Mediterranean and Latin America, as the aforementioned project TEMPUS-MEDA by way of example testify. Also the Italian engagement in Yugoslavia and Albania is reflected in student mobility development. As shown, Albanian foreign students played a relevant role being the largest foreign group for a long time and yet one of the larger (Durazzi nd, CRUI 2019). The Balkans have also been the setting of the aforementioned UNIADRION project, aimed to increasing student mobility and internationalization of HE system across countries time. In 2002, the Ancona declaration involved all the countries of the Adriatic-ionic basin and established UNIADRION under the coordination and funding of Italy, with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs granting financial support for about € 390.000 (in De Rita and Buldriesi 2006). Launched under D'Alema government, it lead to the establishment of a diplomatic seat in Ancona.

In the late nineties, despite 10 years were gone following the Cold War end, cooperation was yet managed by law 49/1987 plus article 18 of the Presidential Decree 177/1987 that disciplined international cooperation within the framework of Italian foreign policy. It pursued Italian interests of promoting solidarity among countries and human rights in the background of principles of the United Nations and the CEE-ACP conventions. As introduced, the law did not considered universities as key actors for international cooperation, and the many project launched also begun to face limits due to constant decreasing funds in cooperation. In 2004, the MAE attempted to overcome the obsolescence of this law signing the *Declaration of Intent* with Italian universities (MAE 2004). However, the salience of cooperation projects largely decreased, as a new instrument of foreign policy emerged.

As Coticchia and Giacomello (2011) point out, already since the nineties Italy begun in fact to guarantee its participation (in multilateral actions) engaging to Military Operation Abroad (MOAs) with its military forces, a turning point of Italian foreign policy. These operations may be in fact read in light of multilateralism as they were always under UN mandate, with the only exception of Iraq 2003 (Coticchia and Giacomello (2001). In sum, until this moment, reading ISM development with the lenses of foreign policy reveals a limited commitment by the MAE, also due to a more political decrease of salience of international cooperation. Moreover, while stable and structural cooperation with the USA remained relevant and flows of American students grew, they were detached by ISM national development which happened mostly within the Erasmus program, not among the priority of the foreign affairs department, some exception made (i.e. the relevance of Greek and Albanian students).

In the new millennium, a part for the shocks of the 9/11, which had (in)famously known worldwide consequences (and discussed above in relation to the stiffening of immigration flows management), the emergence of new global player shaped Italian foreign policy. In 2004, for example, it was signed the 2004 Memorandum of Understanding with China, which lead to the establishment of

two ad hoc mobility programs under the coordination of Uni-Italia. We shall see more carefully in the next session as the international relation panorama also shaped foreign policy in relation to international trade, the increased salience on different emerging countries, and a new ministerial approach to ISM.

Another juncture in this period has been the constitutional reform of 2001, which substantially increased Italian regions' powers in matters of foreign affairs. As according to art. 117, they acquired competence in foreign trade and in their relations with European Union and at the international level. This reform left in fact open the practice (and discussion) on the overlap of state and regional competences in this matter.

The very wide range of geo-strategic collocation of Italian regions across Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean shaped in very different ways the engagement of regions. Darnis (2011) mentions for example the different regional policy developed by Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Sicily, the first one clearly oriented to Adriatic and the Balkans in comparison to Sicily, strongly oriented to the Mediterranean and to USA in light of relevant communities abroad. For Darnis (2011, 201), the Italian foreign policy follow a mixed model 'which entails both public and private actors at both the regional and national levels': regional policies are currently systematized by central offices in a developed 'country system', and Italian foreign policy should be currently thought the way it is perceived by its decision makers and implementors: 'the internationalization of the country system', (Darnis 2011).

We shall focus at this point on the ministerial organization evolution of the MAE, as it also tells a lot about Italian foreign policy interlinkages with ISM development.

A never-ending debate on reforming *Farnesina* started in Italy already in the late seventies, following the so called Fornari Commission (Diodato and Niglia 2019) but a first relevant re-organization of the ministry was undertaken only in 2000. Under the key figure of Umberto Vattani, state secretary, a number of geographical directorates absorbed thematic issues – the way traditionally the MAE approached its tasks*,* as per D.P.R. n. 276/1999, and the ministerial decree 029/3466 of the same year. Despite the novel organization of the MAE in geographical unites, the thematic ones never disappeared; for example, it is during this first re-organization that a General directorate for the EU was established, sanctioning once more the relevance of European integration process in foreign Italian policy (Baldi in Baldi and Nesi 2017).

Soon after, during Berlusconi second mandate, especially in the years in which he also served as foreign ministry of the Italian Republic, his idea was that Italian diplomats had to become ambassadors of Italian economy, and 'open the business highways', as he declared during the annual conference of diplomats of 2001 (Diodato and Niglia 2019). While its third government already left the office when the reform was truly implemented, the authors note that Berlusconi had a role in transforming at least the mindset of Italian diplomats, despite not transformed in 'agents of Italian business'. The long standing attempt of reorganizing Farnesina was relevant also not only for the center-right, and exponents of the left as Prodi and D'Alema 'operated to achieve the same goal (Diodato and Niglia 2019, 87)', as the necessity of making Farnesina more efficient was evident across the country.

The reform of our interest was hence adopted only in 2010, with a Decree of the President of the Italian Republic, n. 95/2010, basing on the legislative decree 112/2008 converted by law 133/2008 - while the internal organization of the ministry happened through a series of internal regulations (Diodato and Niglia 2019, 87). It lead to a closer coordination between the MAE and the ministry of economic development, and it also lead to the assignment of a diplomatic advisor to each ministry. Moreover, the ministerial organization lead to a rationalization of its structure, which resulted again in an organization in thematic rather than geographical units (Gulotta 2014). The reform had the main aim to respond to the changing international panorama, but it also aimed to 'restore the country's budget to balance (Gulotta 2014,1)'. As the MAE (nd b) reports, the reform reflects the more general change on the role that Italian foreign policy plays for the country development in a new worldwide scenario, and the novel organization of the ministry structures also reflects its update priorities.

Of specific relevance is the creation of the General Directorate for the Country's Promotion (DGSP), which replaced the former GD for Cultural Promotion. This General Directorate has a special importance as it sanction the begin of an integrated promotion of Italian culture, economy and research, since then part of the wider but single and organic system of the *Sistema Italia* (Gulotta 2014,1). Rationales behind its constitution were in the first place the necessity of overcoming a fragmented approach to the country promotion in light of the increasing international competition environment MAE (nd b). The new general directorate has the task of managing the cultural, financial and scientific Italian promotion, basing on the recognized link between culture and economy, together with other general directorate of the ministry and the MAE network abroad, as well as with other Italian Institutions involved (MAE nd). The DGPS is divided in two different central directorate, one in charge of the internationalization of the country system (both for of the economy system and for territorial autonomies – as we saw above relevant institutional actors) and another one in charge of the promotion of the Italian cultural and language abroad, including interuniversity cooperation and scholarships, and in the steering of Italian Institutes of Culture (IIC). Moreover, there is an unite in charge of scientific and technological cooperation to support the General directorate.

As a results, economic and cultural diplomacy became a crucial assets according to which promote the entire country. One of the major strength of the new approach relies in its capacity of coordination among the rich network involved in these activities in the field of entrepreneurship, of university and research, other ministries as additional actors and stakeholders as according to a new public/private partnership (Mae nd b). The body in charge of coordinating the several activities linked to internationalization is the *Cabina di Regia per l'Italia Internazionale*. This cabin is the control room for a number of activities ranging from coordination between the government and territorial autonomies (regions and province), the promotion of foreign investments - public and private, the attraction of touristic flows, the valorization of the university system abroad, of human capital and innovation, sports, events, and the net of the Italian cultural Institutes abroad (MAE nd b).

The program Invest Your Talent in Italy, introduced in section 4.2, has been developed within this new approach. As the MAE (nd) reports, the DGSP, together with MiSE, ICE, Universities, Italians and foreigners Chambers of Commerce and firms sponsor it. The program is meant to incentive the attraction of foreign talents throughout academic and companies training programs, coherently to other actions looking to Asia and the middle East (MAECI 2016b, MAECI 2018d, MAECI 2019b, MAECI 2019d). During the chamber audition discussed in section 4.2, former MAE state secretary Scotti mentioned the relevance of strengthening relations with emerging countries such as a India and Turkey as a reason why the program has been developed (SENATO 2011). The section also discussed the establishment of Uni-Italia, who manages the Marco Polo and Turandot, and it aims to the attraction of foreign bright student from Asia and especially from China (MAECI 2017, MAECI 2018e).

The Association has been established within the MAE and it enjoy the support of consular and diplomatic Italian network, basing on the new strategic public/private partnership approach in force. Uni-Italia is also in charge of the promotion of the Italian university system abroad, as its participation to international road-shows and international fairs in a number of destinations, as India, China and the United States testifies. Marco Polo program has been defined as an added value to Italian foreign policy as 'it is one of those manifestation of interests and presence of a system (Massolo 2009)', fostering Italian relations with China thanks to the training of Uni-Italia Chinese students, that will become the future Chinese managerial class (Romiti 2009). Always at Uni-Italian launch conference, the former Director of the Promotion of Italian Cultural and language abroad stressed the priority interest of the Ministry toward such programs, also in light of its structure that bring together several actors, i.e. MAECI, MIUR, CRUI and Italian universities (Riccardo 2009). Also former MAE State Secretary Scotti underlined the relevance of this program, which brought the number of Chinese students by less than 400 hundreds in 2004-2005 (when the MoU with China was signed) to over 5.500 in that a.y. 2010-11. The crucial role of Uni-Italia programs been also further stressed by Schifani, former president of

Italian Senate, which explained the necessity of fostering Italian-Chinese relations (SENATO 2012. More recently, also MAECI underlined the doubling of Chinese students numbers via Uni-Italia programs (MAECI 2017, Uni-Italia 2018, Uni-Italia 2019). It should be noted that CRUI signed the agreement for the Marco Polo in 2004, and that Uni-Italia currently manage both programs as per MIUR mandate (as per ministerial note n. 1360 of Oct 28th 2011). The former section already shedder light on the limited scope these actions will have in the following years; while we shall more carefully focus on this point below and in the next paragraph, it is worth to stress the 'small' revolution happened in about two years, which resulted in two additional (and soon crucial) actors for ISM development.

In the years following the 2008 economic crisis and the 2009 ministerial re-organization, in sum, the MAE appeared to be committed in the promotion of ISM in terms of economic diplomacy. This was not the case in the field of cooperation, however, as we shall sew below. Already in 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge, G. Terzi di Sant'Agata, stressed the added value of cultural and university exchange underlining the need to increase cultural exchange across the Mediterranean with program such as Erasmus, that to deepen Italian relations in north Africa, and especially in Egypt and Tunisia (Camera 2012). The Minister also pointed out cooperation with governments of those countries and with the European commission may result in an improved steering of immigration flows, with students legally entering European borders for studying purposes (Camera 2012). This point was stressed by Scotti, who highlighted instead the action of the MAE in relations to north Africa and specifically Libya, to which scholarships are granted in light of the 2008 Treaty of Friendships (SENATO 2011).

However, as the number of granted scholarship to Libyan students – about 89 in 2011-2012 testify (see annex IV for statistical evidence), these Italian efforts remained strongly limited and locked within a very obsolete normative framework, law of 1987, as the aforementioned *Declaration On Intent* of 2004 testifies. At the time, universities were not yet explicitly mentioned by the law in force on cooperation of 1987, and the 2010 reform did not focus on cooperation development. Law 125/2014, strongly waited within the country, established the MAECI and an inter-ministerial committee for development cooperation (CICS), the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), and stated that cooperation is a part of Italian foreign policy (CAMERA 2018). It constituted a clear cut from the previous law in a number of ways (Bottiglieri, 2016) nd), for example since it never refer to donor or receiving countries, but only of partners. Most importantly, the law finally recognises explicitly Italian universities as key actors for international cooperation. Venturi (2019,1) note however that while the reform improved the sector, historically characterized by 'lack of transparency, accountability and effectiveness', Italy is still 'a long way to go' when compared to international standards.

In 2014 CRUI and the DGCS, the new Directorate established in charge of cooperation, also engaged in a redefinition of collaboration mechanism between universities and MAECI (MAE 2004). As the report explain, CRUI acquired 'once more' a function of coordination as to have a single actor thanks to which coordinate actions with the ministry of foreign affairs. Three working joint group were also launched to address most salient aspect, notably planning, policy making and evaluation. The report claims that cooperation in aid should be framed in terms of internationalization of HE, with the overall aim of supporting human and economic development in partner countries. It proposes the launch of a new course of 'innovation for development', where scientific research became an instrument for cooperation. The documents pin points the several opportunities that may follow a more direct involvement of the academic word also during the designing phase of the Ministry projects, thanks to their expertise (i.e. around the issue of international cooperation), and also given the contribution they may offer in the evaluation of projects.

Beyond the relevance of this attempt of increasing cooperation across sectors testified by these initiative, the CRUI document together with the *Manifesto 2016 The Italian cooperation system and Universities* also confirms the many obstacles in place to translate such proposal in effective action. The document yet call for the establishment of a focus group between MAECI and CRUI with a calendarized meeting,

the creation of an advisory committee, as well as a database of ongoing projects and the creation of an observatory, providing evidence of the missing basic technology for ISM development.

A further layer of complexity of MAECI engagement in ISM is given by the fact that it is also in charge of releasing visa to third national students seeking to study in Italy, more specifically with the visa office (*Ufficio VI*). As we saw, the issue of visa emerged as problematic since the early eighties, but even more since the early 2000. Flows also acquired – while yet limited – a more substantial weight, and legislation over visas begun to conflict with objectives of both HE internationalization and of the promotion of the country system. Conversely to the development in the field of country promotion and cooperation, the legislation follow for the large part the legislative framework developed between 1998 and 2004 as discussed in relation to permits legislation (EMN 2013). On the base of the annual quota assigned and declared by the annual circular for foreign students, diplomatic seats can release visas permits. The procedure to obtain visas, as for permits, is neither easy nor fast, and also characterized by a high grade of discretion[41].The 41bis article of DPR 334 is of specific relevant as it foreseen the possibility to grant access for third national beyond the annual quota established, when students are selected within specific cultural programs of agreements between Italy and other countries.

The type of visa is regulated by the aforementioned legislative intervention plus the inter-ministerial decree of May 16th 2011, plus European directives mentioned already in relations to residency permits. The introduction the European Regulations on Schengen visas (Reg. CE n. 810/2009) marked the crucial distinction for periods within and beyond 90 days. As a results, students may be eligible for a Uniform Schengen Visa or should apply to a National Visa or a type D visa, which gran access for longer periods and has multiple entrance, if staying more than 90 days. It should be noted that while annual reports show a single category for studying visas, an overview of the MAECI affairs website reveals the ministry also distinguish among visas for studying, vocational studying, traineeship while studying, studying within an exchange program, plus the visa for research[42]. Annex V provides an overview of visas for studying, traineeship and research granted since the first year of available data. Also in the case of visas an high level of discretion emerged across MAECI vast diplomatic seats abroad, whose practice strongly differing also as according to the officers in charge. Fieldwork and experts strongly pointed out to the complexity of obtaining a visa by certain diplomatic seats, and reported of many students selected which did not obtained a visa. Vertical integration emerged strongly harmed by street level officials interpretation of the normative, even within country where high level officials of the ministry are promoting ISM. The most common situation emerged by interviews is the one of Italian ambassador strongly committed to the development of international mobility flows, but consular seats of that country apply legislation in a very harsh way. The '*insindacabile giudizio del console*', notably the exclusive decision making power of the authority granting the visa, was mentioned several times by experts as an enormous obstacle for ISM. This is the case also in countries considered strategic by the 2017 national strategy. Moreover, as introduced in the case of permits, visas procedures emerged to be an obstacle for the development of mobility also in the case of programs directly promoted by the MAECI, i.e. Uni-Italia managed programs.

As introduced, the emerging 'integrated' approach of the ministry towards economic diplomacy and the attempt to align Italian cultural and scientific cooperation toward Italian trade, clearly visible in the 2017 National Strategy, has been commented as 'cosmetic' by a number of expert

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[41] Normally, foreign students must submit their application after the publication of the annual circular to diplomatic seats, so to compile pre-enrollment application. Diplomatic seats are the only authority to have competence to evaluate applications and decide about the granting of a visa, but should motivate the refusal since recently. If students must seat a selection exams before his/her enrollment, the student is currently granted a touristic visas (while before it was a short length visa for studying purposes), and the candidate should apply again for a new visa if selected. To obtain a visa, students – as it for permits – student must have a valid health insurance, a minimum sum to sustain themselves, another one to buy his returning tickets/a A/R tickets, plus a residency where to stay in the country (EMN 2019). Moreover, students must submit all the relevance supporting documents in relation to their academic career, so to prove their have a title which grant access to a degree of the study cycle chosen by the students. Furthermore, the have to prove the necessary knowledge of Italian language, as certified by a number of Italian accredited schools. Following the procedure and after having satisfied requirements, and if the students does not appear in the Schengen Informatic System, the diplomatic seats release the visa.

[42] See for more info https://vistoperitalia.esteri.it/home/it

interviews. The most striking finding in relation to the ministry of foreign affairs emerged however to be linked to the different co-existing frames of international students within the MAECI, where the same issue is approached as a great opportunity in terms of economic development – or at least as a necessity to foster the Italian country system in the contemporary international economy environment - and contextually as a dangerous phenomenon linked to migration flows, by definition a treat to country security. During the aforementioned 2018 *MoviMenti* conference, by way of example, a MAECI Consul pointed out to the efficacious collaboration undertaken with the MIUR for the promotion of student mobility, pointing out the way MAECI is releasing a higher number of visas for studying in the last years, in a not easy effort to balance ISM promotion taking into account the connected migratory risk in place (Bianchi 2018). A responsible of his own office, short later, underlined instead the extent to which diplomatic seats activities of releasing visas clashes with university institutional autonomy, and that Italy 'accept basically everyone…', commenting in a negative way the relaxation of visa requirements.

Beyond severe problems in the phases of implementation and frames of ISM, moreover, structural obstacles such a releasing visa calendar completely disconnected by the academic timetable emerged. Italian legislation foreseen the granting of legal papers necessary only few months (often less) before the beginning of the academic years – student cannot apply more than three months in advance -, while prospective international students worldwide usually decide where to enrol at university even one year in advance (see also CRUI 2019). Further, it should be noted that diplomatic seats are very different and often count on limited personnel (Baldi and Nesi 2015), which is demanded to evaluate visas for studying and research while not often properly trained on tertiary qualifications, research programs and practice. For example, the definition of '*Alta ricercar (high-advanced research)*', as stressed by a MAECI officials at the MoviMenti conferences, leaves high room of interpretation (Russo 2018). To this regard, interviewers pointed out how officials of the MAECI often have no familiarity with current HE Italian panorama, made up of bachelors and master degrees plus a number of additional possibilities and ramifications after the 509/99.

In conclusion, integration emerged as disrupted both vertically, as this result in the lowest level of policy making harming the goal of the higher one (i.e. the one promoting the country system internationalization), but also horizontally, as different frames of ISM and different objectives and priorities coexist within the ministry.

4.3.4 Economy and the labor market

Italy is the eighth largest economy of the world, and a key economy for the EU and the Eurozone. In 2017, it had a GDP of 1726 billions of Euro. In 2018, the most important sectors of Italian economy were wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food services (21.4%). Italian government debt stood at 152.6 in 2019, and the total tax of revenue constituted the 42.4% of GDP in the same year (OCED 2019d).

For the year 2018, the EU reports that intra-EU trade accounted for 65% of Italian exports, with Germany, France and Spain the main commercial partners, while 59% of Italian imports from EU member states account for 59% of the total, with Germany, France and Spain plus the Netherlands the most important commercial partner (EU 2020). In 2017, Italian main commercial partners were Germany (13%) and the United States (9%), but slightly more than the half of export happened within the EU borders (EU 2020). Italy main commercial partners in imports, beyond EU member states, are China (7.25%), the USA (3.75%), the Russian Federation (3,51%), Switzerland (2,57%) and Turkey (2.12%). In relation to export they are instead the United States (3.75%), Switzerland (4,8%), China (2.82%), Turkey (1.89%) and Romania (1.69%) (WB 2020).

In 2015, Italy spent respectively the 8.9 (2017), 17.1 and 3.0% of its GDP in health care, pensions and education, from primary to tertiary included. Imports of goods and services accounted for 28.2% of

GDP in 2019, confirming a positive good trade balance since 2012, with exports standing at 62.9 in 2019 (OCED 2019b). Italian unemployment rate, in 2017, was at 11.2%, and long term unemployment stood at 6.5 and a far worse 34.8 was the unemployment rate for cohorts between 15 and 24 years old (OECD 2019b).

(Toniolo, 2012), 8) argues that one single 'catching up paradigm' can be used to frame the economic development of Italy from the half of the XIX century and the nineties: 'one of Europe's 'peripheral' countries converging to the 'core' of the early industrializers'. The main question to be addressed relating Italian economy, according to the author, is to understand why Italy growth at an even higher rate of European countries and the US between 1879 and 1992, to then dramatically decrease its ability to grow. As the author note, although the two world wars, the Italian economic development trend since unification to 1992 was a one of 'converging' towards richest and most developed countries. Toniolo (2012) points immediately out how Italian economic development during the golden age was driven no only by the catch up trend, but also by peculiar characteristics of the country, such as a large adaptation to the Fordist model, abundant labour force with basic education, and a small but 'sophisticated cadre of engineers'. Moreover, 'public enterprises under excellent middle managers were an engine of investment and technical progress (Toniolo 2012, 27)'. In this timeframe, the authors continues, even the 'north-south income gap narrowed for the first and only time since unification'.

In those years emerged also the origin of the public support to Italian enterprises, following the economic crisis of the seventies, when it became clear that companies faced increased competition due to the public support granted by foreign companies (Lorenzi 2019). Law Ossola permitted to domestic companies to benefits of profit done abroad as banks covered operations' commercial costs, and introduced SACE, a special section for export credit insurance. While the law was able to support exports, it was not enough to develop a comprehensive approach for the internationalization process, something that will emerge during the nineties and still presents a number of constrains (Lorenzi 2019). Before, Italian governments also intervened with two laws, 394/1981, which introduced a revolving fund to support programs abroad with dedicated cut rates, and the aforementioned law 49/1987, which reformed Italian cooperation and it introduced incentives to the creation of firms operating in developing countries (ICE 2006 nd).

Interpretation about the consequences of Italian economy of the eighties and nineties are not yet entirely shared across scholars. (Rossi, 2010), for example, considers the 1992 crisis no other than the culmination of consequences of the social and economic Italian policies of the previous decades, where thanks to inflation and money borrowed to future generations, Italian policy makers could implement generous social protection schemes and policies. In a sharper fashion, he stated that 'in the 1970s and 1980s Italians elected to live beyond their means, building up debt with future generations (Franco et al. 1999), and with the rest of the word (Rossi 2008, 9)'. Toniolo (2012, 30) argues that the 'cost of Italy's inability to change […] would come to a head in the 1990s', while others authors argue the country macroeconomic policies of those time helped to support employment and to lower the costs of disinflation (see Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989 and Boltho 1986, in Toniolo (2012)).

In the meantime, the quality of the school system deteriorated, the labour market became more rigid and the country remained specialized in medium-technological product, especially concentrated in small medium enterprises (SMEs), more flexible but also less capable of R&D (Toniolo 2012). SMEs had the great advance to assure flexibility to the country economy, but also drove a relevant loss of capability in R&D throughout the country. Moreover, the increasing high debt reached values before saw in peacetime only after the country unification, resulting in an incredible high fiscal pressure for companies (Toniolo 2012). Beyond the rapid process of European integration, the years following the 1992 crisis were also marked by a technological revolution, the emergence of two giants such as India and China, and an opening of world markets for goods, services and capital, which did not find ready any large European countries, but found Italy as 'possible the least successful in making the productive, social

and cultural changes needed to turn each shocks from fetters into growth opportunities (Toniolo 2012, 36)'.

Since 1992, the country convergence trend toward more developed countries eventually came to an end, and major reforms destined to have a long-term impact occurred in Italian labour market. In fact the Treu law, and the following Biagi law of 2003, relaxed regulations for hiring within the framework of new 'atypical' temporary contract, but did not revise 'the employment protection for open-ended contracts (EC 2017). Rossi (2010, 13) writes they result in an 'army of young people in chronically precarious employment (Rossi 2010, 13)', and employers trapped by the idea they could not fire people – with any incentive to instil loyalty via training. The EC (2007) argues that

> 'In the specific case of Italy, an important stream of literature identified the 1990s reforms of the labour market as one of the root causes of the productivity slowdown that characterised the second half of the decade. According to this literature, the reform, by introducing more flexible part-time and fixed terms contracts, facilitated the entry into the labour market of less productive workers and reduced the incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital, for both employers and employees (see also Sestito, 2002; Garibaldi and Taddei, 2013; Daveri and Parisi, 2015). At the same time, by maintaining the strict regulation of permanent contracts, it continued to hamper turnover and the possibility of rapidly adjusting employment to external shocks (EC 2017, 10).'

In the early nineties two law also intervened substantially on the support of firms abroad, which was not functioning as foreseen. They instituted SIMEST S.p.a. (law 100/1990) and the Finest S.p.a. (191/1991). The first one was a body who had to participate and to sustain investments abroad, and the second one focused specifically in the area of the tri-Veneto due to its special peculiarity of being a European bordering zone (Lorenzi 2019, ICE 2006 nd). ICE (2006) consider law 100 the one who substantially introduced a public support to firms investments abroad, and they point out the rationales behind its promulgation: the awareness that international competitivity meant that Italian enterprise could not just export goods, but they also needed to have a role in foreign markets; the necessity to support Italian firms in new markets in light of the economic transition of many countries of the former Soviet block; and finally the need to close the gap Italy already acquired (also) in this sector in comparison to other industrialized countries.

The reforms of the nineties to the public support to firms' internationalization were not however able to respond to the fast evolving domestic and international transformation, and the need of a structural reform of public support to internationalization become clear again. Also given the 'constrains' of having joined European monetary mechanisms, Italy could not play only with Lira devaluation anymore (ICE 2006 nd). These reforms are relevant to our discussion as they constitute the playground for the current system of public support to internationalization, a leg of the 'country system' discussed above. As Banca d'Italia (2013) note, the country system is in fact not the result of an organic process of reform, but rather the outcome of the stratification of a number of normative interventions. Several reforms of the system followed: a season occurred in the late nineties, a third in the mid 2000s and another after the financial earthquake of the late 2000s, and finally additional intervention followed the economic crisis.

The legislative decree 143/1998 introduced CIPE, an Inter-ministerial Committee for the economic planning, the permanent V commission, with the aim to coordinate and address Italian foreign trade policy, often called also as the *Cabina di Regia per L'internazionalizzazione* (Lorenzi 2019). The Cabina is composed, among the others, by the ministries of foreign trade, treasure, budget, economic planning, foreign policy, industry and commerce. The law transferred to SIMEST the competence to manage any kind of support to firms' internationalization, and instituted regional offices for the support of firms' Italian system internationalization, with the aim to bring closer those in charge of managing the phenomenon and those who should have benefits by it (ICE 2006). The law also gave increasing

power to regions in relations to the promotion of firms internationalization, as according to law 59/1997, and it instituted dedicated new regional office called SPRINT (Lorenzi 2019).

This governmental intervention followed a more general period of administrative reforms begun with law Bassanini (57/1997) which attempted to reform the Italian public administration. Among the other things, the law foreseen the redefinition and rationalization of the normative framework of support for internationalization (ICE 2006 nd). Therefore, together with the constitutional reform of 2001 that further granted regions competence in a number of matters (as we already saw in foreign affairs), it also 'introduced new dimensions of complexity to the action of the country system [..] reducing the margin of manoeuvre of the country system in its complexity (Banca d'Italia 2013, 7)'.

In 2001, it was signed a first agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, ICE and CRUI to involve universities in the process. The latter included their integration in matters of internationalization, in light of their knowledge production together with the company world, including their relationship with local productive systems, industrial district and Italian/foreign technological parks, plus the promotion of the Italian HE system abroad.

The following normative intervention, laws 56/2005 and 80/2005 aimed to provide an harmonization of the system. Law 80/2005 intervened once more both on SIMEST and SACE, while law 56 introduced the Sportelli Italia, one-stop offices abroad, to create a single reference points for actors abroad. Their activities had to be coordinated with ICE, the regional offices, ENIT, plus the system of the Italian chamber abroad and yet actors such as credit institutions (Lorenzi 2019). The law also foreseen the creation of a Code for Internationalization, and focused again on universities, recognizing them as relevant actors for the country economy. According to article 4, the law foreseen the implementation of the 2001 agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, ICE and CRUI. Since then, the Ministry of productive activities is also in charge of coordinating, together with the MAE and MIUR of i) the effective use of nets in place to promote universities and attract foreign students, ii) the collaboration between universities and ICE with other key actors, iii) to foster applied research by universities for promotion of internationalization activities (Law 56/2005). As we shall see below, this path did not emerged however as relevant for the promotion of ISM in Italy.

According to Toniolo (2012) Italy was able to won the first Italian race to be part of the Euro and also a founder of the new coin, but lost the challenge to adapt itself to the technological and market revolution (Toniolo 2012), as the second crucial challenge of technological innovation required entrepreneurial forces and developed human capital. A Banca d'Italia (2011, 27) report which investigated the linkages among human capital development and economic growth reveals the link emerged between economic grow and the salience of human capital in a date period. The authors shows how when Italy had large availability of low skilled workers, the economy was growing as a context of scarce human capital facilitated the fast development of a new-born industrial sector, who did not demand skilled labour. While currently, in the 'in the late 20th century globalization' the comparative advantage of low skilled labour has been reduced by the expansion of economic opportunities in new contexts, and at the same time low education 'may again be an obstacle to socio-economic progress in a country that appears to be poorly equipped to increase the quantity and quality of its human capital (Banca d'Italia 2013, 27)'.

The 2015-2020 Italian Research plan took into account the low internationalization of Italian research system and its low capacity of engaging in Global Value Chain (MIUR 2015). The report is worth of mention as it directly link the low capacity of Italy to attract the best talents on the more general discussion of the low national capacity of attracting researchers and private investments. It underlines the way international students help to improve both the quality of the Italian learning environment and boost the Italian research system development. However, flows of direct international investment follow a decreasing trend, with -3.8% point between 2007 and 2012.

As we saw in the previous paragraph, both the need of restore country balance budget and to stimulate Italian economy lies behind its increasing involvement in new key region of the world, such

as China in Asia, something made even more relevant following the 2008 subprime crisis that impacted structurally the country with long lasting consequences (Rossi 2018). To our discussion are of specific relevance the additional reforms of the internationalization support system occurred with the Monti government, which followed the MAE ministerial reorganization.

This intervention re-establish ICE as an agency after its suppression in 2011, and it placed peculiar attention of the fund for sustainable growth, aiming to increase competitiveness within the framework of national relevant projects (Lorenzi 2019). The novel ICE has the main aim of promoting Italian companies abroad throughout a series of different actions, including the marketing of the Italian system, by way of instance with roadshows and start-up incubator projects. Activities are currently managed according to the yearly program of the Cabina di Regia, including consultation with the diplomatic network abroad and a wide range of stakeholders. Part of this program is reserved to joint initiatives with regions and universities, other than civil society organizations and chambers of commerce (Lorenzi 2019): the first program, begun in 2013, foreseen about 80 initiative, involving technological and university parks (framework structures which connect universities, start up, and companies, especially in innovation and research). The intervention also created Desk Italia, bodies which should jointly operate as a junction among the actors involved, as according to the guidelines arriving by the *Cabina di Regia per l'Internazionalizzazione*, which has been also reformed by the Development decree that granted to MISE and MAECI its management. The Cabina di regia, which is the V permanent commission within the CIPE (the inter-ministerial committee for economic planning), constitutes a part of the Cabina di Regia that we encountered in the previous section, the coordination body of the country system.

Eventually, as Banca d'Italia (2013) notes, the actors' composition of the Italian country system is currently very complex as a result of the normative, with many substantial reforms but not comprehensive legislative reformation of the entire system of public to internationalization. Also Lorenzi (nd) shares these concerns, and argue as the principal observation of an Italian country system observer is the high number of players involved. The very last reform, begun in 2018, attempt to respond to the too many institutional referent in charge and finally transferred competence in supporting Italian firms abroad from the MiSE to the MAECI (MAECI 2019), and more specifically to the General Directorate for the Promotion of the Country System, the DGSP (MAECI 2020). As according to MAECI, this transfer of competences also 'recognize economic diplomacy as a necessary component of Italian foreign policy (MAECI 2019).

As section two largely shown, the emergence of mobility within the country, following the very first developments around the Erasmus programs of the nineties, mostly developed during the new years of the millennium, the cradle of the global knowledge economy, when Italy had an obsolete higher education system and a rigid labour market. Still today, however, the situation did not change to a relevant extent. Primary expenditure is in Italy still importantly composed by social spending, pensions unemployment benefits, subsidies to families, housing and poverty (Rossi 2010). The HE system dramatically experiences underfunding since more than a decade. Youth unemployment is very high, and few Italians youths obtain a tertiary degree. Obsolete logics are yet in force, and investments in human capital are surely not an Italian strengthen. The development of student mobility, core of the global knowledge economy, found no grounds to mature in such context.

As we saw, however, with all the limits of the case, the salience of mobility did emerged after the economic crisis, for example with an increased attention placed in the potential of out-going (credit) mobility in terms of increased employability (but as we saw in the chapter introduction, the percentage of Italian students with a foreign abroad experience in tertiary education is still niche). Most importantly to our discussion are the few aforementioned actions implemented within the framework of economic diplomacy: they are also the only practical implemented actions retrieved in ISM within the new approach of promotion of the country system.

The aforementioned IYTI program, which enable students for strategic countries to work in Italy, such as Brazil, China, Egypt has been in fact thought and developed to offer integrated chance of HE and traineeship to third national of crucial economic partners for Italy. As in the words of the former DGSP General Director, IYTY is a scholarship programs which connect foreign students to Italian universities and enterprises, many of which collaborate of the programs (CAMERA 2016). The program has been relaunched in 2016 in its fourth edition. Renamed IYTY 2.0., it had been relaunched with a new partnership with ICE-Agenzia and the Uni-Italia organization, together with the support by Unioncamere and Confindustria MAECI (2016). The program constitutes a best practice between the public and private words (MAECI 2016ibidem). Despite its very limited scope (about 40 grants foreseen for this edition, around 100 in 2018 (MAECI 2018)) declarations in the MAECI press release reveal that business world supports the program with the ambition to train the next managerial class of foreign enterprises (MAECI 2016).

Also the Uni-Italia two programs Marco Polo and Turandot have been framed this way and they strongly testify the constant increasing salience of China for Italian foreign policy and trade. The scope of those actions, whose figures are neglectable when compared to the Erasmus programs or to European partners data, appear however to be very limited in comparison to the official salience placed on student flows within the larger framework of foreign policy.

Additional evidence supports wide disparity among the official rhetoric of ISM as priority instrument of economic diplomacy and panorama retrieved. In the first place, it is clear how the ISM potential has been and still is strongly underestimated across the country. Moreover, the Italian labour-market shaped mobility. Almost the half of foreign students working in Italy during their studies found a job within the black market, more specifically the 47,8 %, with higher values in central and southern Italy in comparison to the north of the country. Only about the 34,6 % of international students declared to work part time while studying, as per regulation related to visas and permits to study in Italy. While this phenomenon appear to follow a decreasing trend (it was about the 61,7% before 2006), it point out to Italian economy and labour market idiosyncrasies (EMN 2012?).

Further, any official esteem of the contribution of international students has been retrieved, once more in contrast to the large majority of developed countries. Material interview even emerged a reference to foreign students as a 'cost' for universities rather than as an economic 'opportunity' for the country. The IX Annual Report published by the Ministry of work and Social Policy about foreign nationals and the Italian labour market only refer to the low amount of international students into Italian universities and labour market. Out of 135 report pages only 10 lines were dedicated to this migrant subset. Nor the National Strategy for the promotion of the HE mention student economic contribution to the national economy, and any document by DGSP provided data of such kind. By contrast, a study has been developed to evaluate the actions implemented for the promotion of the country system. According to an analysis of Prometeia (MAECI nd, Prometeia 2017, MAECI 2017), the overall action of economic diplomacy esteem for the single year 2015 had an impact for the Italian GDP of about the 1.1%, resulting in 16.4 billions of Euros of added value, about 6.7 of tax income plus 234.000 job places. The analysis included 90 countries and 756 projects worldwide in the years 2014-2015, including export of goods, infrastructures, services, industrial and energetic infrastructures), but in available material ISM was not mentioned. While official data are not available for ISM, Fondazione Leone Moressa engaged in 2012 in a very detailed esteem of the yearly amount of foreign students in Italy, summarized by table 4.14, which revealed a contribution of about 71 millions of euros (Benvenuti V. 2012). Such esteem appear coherent with other esteem of expenses by international students in Italy, resulting by an ad-hoc survey undertook within the framework of the VI EMN Italy report on the condition of international students (EMN 2012). As the table above shows, this esteem highlights the way these students positively impact on Italian economy, as they have to sustain expenses related to accommodation, food, health insurance, university fees and didactic material, but also traveling and leisure (i.e. holidays, sports, consumption, cafes and restaurants).

TABLE 4.14 | Esteem of annual expenses of foreign students

Expenses list	Yearly amount (in millions of €)	Categories involved in the calculation
Tuition and Fees	71,7	a + b
Accommodation	147,8	b + c
Other expenses for the house	70,2	b + c
Textbooks and teaching materials	22,3	a + b
Food	96,2	b + c
Transportation	114,8	a + b
Clothing	53,2	b + c
Communication	15,6	b + c
Leisure	30,1	b + c
Residence permit	3,4	a + b
Health Insurance	7,4	a + b
Visits of relatives	30,2	b
Visits of friends	37,2	b
Trips to go home	18,4	b
Total		718,5
Impact of international students on Italy's GDP		0,05
Annual expenditure of international students per capita		15421
(a) = foreign students with ITA diploma.	(b) = foreign students with foreign diploma.	
(c) foreign students with ITA diploma 'fuori-sede'		

Source: Elaboration Fondazione Leone Moressa in EMN (2012), on data by Miur, Eurostudent, Istat, Federconsumatori, Politecnico di Torino, Università degli Studi di Milano, Informagiovani, Banca d'Italia, www.edreams.it

Table 4.14 - Esteem of annual expenses of foreign students

Moreover, the entire networks of the Italian Institutes of Cultures did not emerged involved in ISM development (exception made for the 2017 strategy, financed by a fund belonging to this general direction). Further, the high number of foreign American students alone – as aforementioned in the introduction – stresses the strongly underestimated large potential of Italy as a country destination for international students, and reveals the extent to which the newly developed system to steer ISM development is underperforming.

The missing link between the internationalization of the higher education system to the one of internationalization of Italian companies and economy is clearly reflected by the words of the former DGSP Director during a recent meeting of the Permanent committee for Italian abroad and the promotion of the country system : 'we do not only risk our school and academic system reputation, but also our system competitiveness in internationalization'(CAMERA 2016). The low institutional capacity of coordinating the efforts of Italian enterprises into foreign markets with the HE system constitutes another 'missed opportunity' for ISM development. Only two Italian experts raised up the connection among Italian trade, export and more generally internationalization of Italian economic system and the international mobility of students spontaneously. One of them declared that:

'we saw that in moments were our economic system was having a big… push towards the world troughs internationalization, we saw that... it all meant that… I mean also the attractiveness of our language […] increased…. Because students understood it was not just about to come in Italy to study language, culture, art and music […] but they come to study in Italy and declared they did so to work, to word with companies, with Italian companies'. 'By contrast Italy is… it does have I mean…. It never had a policy a unitary policy and above all it was never been equipped with unitary instruments for… for internationalization. But this is true for students and for exports, because it is possible to see that… every company think to be like autonomous… I mean there have been even attempts… […] but they did not have that power they had in other countries… '

'but Italy works in watertight compartments… and it works like this also in this sector. System mission… system mission we have five or six every year. Before it goes the MAECI with companies, then

companies with universities. Then universities go with some companies, and then regions go with some…
with the Ministry for Economic development'.

In conclusion, it appears safe to argue that this exploratory analysis on the connection between Italian economy and labour market confirms Italy had an inadequate ecosystem for ISM to mature. Moreover, it also add evidence on the extent of dramatic disintegration of the Italian system, this time as according to its horizonal tier given the enormous number of player involved by it country system.

5. CHAPTER V | POLICY INTEGRATION IN PROCESS & OUTPUT

This chapter illustrates the analysis carried out to test the analytical framework developed in order to explain the process and output of policy integration. As introduced previously, the chapter is structured in four main sections. The first one provides an overview of the extent of PI reached within sectors in the two countries analysed. The second section illustrates instead the core of the analysis, comparatively assessing PI in process along the six dimensions identified by the framework. Section three focuses then on the overall output of PI, comparing the extent to which both countries implemented an integrated policy on the international mobility of students. Finally, the last section presents and discusses systematically the findings of the analysis, setting the grounds for the conclusive chapter. Annex V provides additional extensive material based on the expert interviews conducted.

5.1 Policy Integration In Process Within Policy Fields

The framework developed to explain the process of PI takes into account the specificity of each policy sector involved, including dynamics of the different actors' subsystems. Chapters III and IV provided detailed evidence on the process of evolution of policy making in the four fields considered by the analysis and its interlinkages with ISM, introducing therefore the extent of policy integration emerged within each of them. This section systematizes the empirical evidence emerged, summarizing the extent of policy integration also along its vertical and horizonal axes, beginning with a summary of findings emerged by chapter III and IV.

5.1.1 Higher Education

In Australia, political commitment on the HE sector has been constant for decades, and ISM has been a fixed priority in the political agenda of the domestic sector. A number of peak bodies emerged, and stakeholders have been able to organize themselves in different ways and to create avenues to shape the policy process. The dominant frame of ISM within this domain sees ISM as a huge opportunity for the domestic system and for the overall country. Both inbound and outbound mobility are relevant, and they relate with other issues in other policy domains. ISM is considered as a positive experience at the individual level, as well as an asset at the institutional and system levels. Inbound students constitute a huge stream of revenue and also allows to have worldwide recognized international campuses – core component of the so called 'internationalization at home' strategies, beyond the fact they strongly subsidize the research of Australian institutions. Outbound mobility, a part from its recognized benefits for individuals both for their personal and professional life, it guarantees increasing cooperation at the institutional level and in bi and multi-later relations, and it responds to identified necessities of the Australian labor market. A range of policy instruments have been implemented to steer ISM in the higher education system. Instruments have been substantially implemented, and several of them have been jointly developed or implemented by different departments.

Since about 2008, however, a contrasting frame of ISM as a treat emerged in this actors' subsystem. The ever growing number of international students, and especially of Chinese students concentrated in few degrees and levels of study, lead in fact to relevant concerns linked to the quality of Australian degrees. Further, the consequent increase of the specific weight played by Chinese students stream of revenues fuelled this emerging frame. According to this view, inbound current policy is a treat for the entire Australian tertiary system, since it causes excessive exposure of its own institutions to market volatility, and it also lowers the quality of education offered to domestic students. Such frame resulted however marginal to the higher education system, at least prior to the Covid-19 outbreak.

In Italy, although the establishment of the Erasmus and of the Bologna Process - foundation of student mobility across Europe - have been strongly driven by high level Italian public servants, firm political commitment toward ISM is missing since the years of Bologna declaration. The ministerial capacity to steer the system emerged to be very low, and the ministry of education suffers a clash of competence with the ministry of foreign affairs. Despite a recent attempt to handle mobility, its room of manoeuvre appears limited. As a consequence, following the loss of the original European positive connotation around mobility, emerged a policy frame of ISM as a necessity, for compliance purposes rather than strategically. ISM appears to be done more in light of marketing and reputational purposes by many universities, while concerns due to European benchmarking exercises emerged at the ministerial level. However, since the early 2000s, a weak but stable political commitment on student mobility strictly connected to Sino-Italian relation developed starting with the establishment of the Sino-Italian University in 2003 and peaking with the call of the President of the Italian Republic, Mattarella, of establishing of a 'silky way of knowledge' between the two countries.

Chapter IV extensively highlighted the structural and cultural patters of the Italian HE system that harmed the development of student mobility in the country within this policy domain. The lack of an effective system of governance, of stable political commitment and of basic technology to implement mobility strongly impacted ISM development. Moreover, the long-standing idiosyncrasies of the Italian tertiary system discussed by chapter III, profoundly affected ISM development. This is visible in relation to both incoming and outgoing flows.

ISM implementation of student mobility has been dramatically opposed on cultural grounds by a large majority of professors, which by way of example, kept controlling students' workload abroad according to personal criteria before recognising exams rather than supporting them to profit of different teaching methods and new learning opportunities - ending up to strongly disincentive students to engage with ISM. A frame of mobility as a 'treat' for the Italian academic system emerged therefore dominant, as ISM contextually constitutes a treat 'to the status quo' and to core values of actors' subsystem, and it is also perceived as a treat to the quality of HE in relation to some flows of international students, Chinese in the first place. Policy instruments embraced were for the large part procedural, with no real impact, as the inclusion of ISM in the ordinary fund for universities discussed in chapter IV testify.

To conclude, in Australia, PI emerged to be developed both across its vertical and horizonal tiers in the HE domain, with a system able to move toward a clear direction, a strong vertical transmission belt and a high capacity of actors' subsystem to coordinate themselves and their action over the time, to shape the policy process in a constant process of adjusting and refining existing public policies. Italy, instead, has a strongly fragmented higher education system, and the capacity of its ministry to steer it is very weak. Both vertical and horizontal PI within the higher education actors' subsystem is low, with disintegration prevalent in multi-level and multi-actors governance.

5.1.2. Immigration

ISM emerged to be a crucial pillar of the Australian GMF, and large attention has been placed from governments in the regulatory framework around ISM. Inbound mobility is largely approached as an opportunity for the country far beyond its direct contribution to export. By far, this is the dominant

frame of ISM spread since the 1999 shift that linked HE to PM. This actors' coalition held since then a compatible and complementary frame of ISM as an opportunity, which strengthen the sectorial objectives of the higher education domain. Over the time, a large number of policy instruments have been developed to tackle ISM, also jointly with other governmental departments. However, the 2017 abolition of the department of immigration represents a turning point for this actors' subsystem which should be further investigated. Moreover, it is worth to note the emergence of a frame of ISM as a treat, linked to the consequences of the long term 'temporary migration approach' which is having a strong impact at the local level, it is polarizing the debate around immigration and international students and it poses relevant questions of social cohesion.

In Italy, ISM has yet never been approached as a matter of migration flows, and did not resulted crucial in the political debate in any period, exception made for a failed attempt to lobby for a law focusing on foreign students in the late eighties. The evidence shown that the country never developed a long-term solid strategy to approach immigration, and it was neither able to develop a distinctive frame around international students. Students are very often considered as a potential threat to the country, in the vest of foreign criminals using education as a gateway to illegal immigration/activities, in the first place by street level public officials, whose relations with international offices of university are truly compromised in many cases. The so-far eradicated *binomium* immigration-security, as discussed by Chapter IV, strongly fuelled the growth of this frame around ISM within the migration domain. Immigration legislation had (and has) profound implications on the development of student mobility, and it has been only recently (partially) soften due to European directives. It constitutes yet a structural obstacle to the development of ISM, having a direct impact on policies implemented by other ministries involved in the steering of student mobility. Moreover, evidence suggests that students and universities does not seem to follow the same legislation, as the latter is implemented with great disparity as according to cities, offices and public officials.

In conclusion, the immigration policy domain in Australia appears as characterized by substantial vertical PI, as the full implementation of crucial migration reforms largely testifies. In contrast, horizontal integration, for long time strongly developed, seems to have been impacted by the recent abolition of the immigration department in 2017. Regarding Italy, the immigration policy domain is strongly characterized by disintegration rather than PI both at the horizontal and vertical levels.

5.1.3 Foreign Policy

The political commitment by Australian government to ISM in the field of foreign policy is somehow a recent aspect of the overall ISM development. Its origin dates back about in 2007, with the Rudd government in cabinet, in the year in which Bishop, at the time shadow minister, was drafting out the New Colombo Plan.
Currently, ISM constitutes a pillar of the Australian Indo-Pacific diplomatic strategy. It is framed as a profitable opportunity to expand Australian influence across the entire geographical space going from Kenia's cost to far east islands in the pacific ocean, including the Arabic peninsula and the sub Indian continent. It is a pillar of a wider foreign policy agenda that attempt to contain China expansion in the entire Asian basin. This frame of ISM appear dominant across this subsystem, despite while solid in the case of outbound students, it clearly clash with the current approach to inbound flows. It makes manifest the Australian contradiction of seeing in China a necessary economic partner *and* a real military treat at the same time. A minoritarian but clearly frame of Chinese students as a treat to Australian national security also emerged, despite marginal at least prior to the beginning of the pandemic. A number of different policy instruments have been developed and embraced to manage ISM in this policy domain, in many case implemented by agencies such as AUS-Aid and AUS-trade, or jointly with other departments, especially the one of education, as for the the New Colombo Plan.

In Italy, despite ISM has been constantly linked to foreign policy, only a very timid commitment to mobility emerged at the ministerial level in the last decade. Flows of students have their roots in the pillars of Italian international relations, notably the European Union, the Atlantic Pact and multilateralism, but these linkages appear to be more to a path dependency process rather than the result of ad-hoc developed policies. Flows of mobility within European schemes, for example, never emerged to be salient within the foreign policy space. Barely no commitment on ISM has been identified in the political discourse in this policy domain, exception made for the stable (and weak) around China mentioned above. The analysis revealed that two conflicting frames of ISM, a sort of treat-opportunity dilemma, emerged in the case of the ministry for foreign affairs. Within the MAECI directorate for the promotion of the country system internationalization (DGSP), in fact, ISM emerged as framed in terms of opportunities, and as a salient instrument of economic diplomacy. Across the unite of the MAECI in charge of releasing visa to foreigners and in many diplomatic seats abroad, instead, a framing of mobility as a treat for the country emerged.

Evidence also revealed that the MAE 2010 reorganization, which established the DGPS and the facto drove to this approach to ISM as an diplomatic opportunity, resulted in a clash of institutional competence in relation to the internationalization of the higher education system between the MAECI and MIUR, worsening fragmentation among actors emerged after the constitutional reform of 2001 (which granted extensive power to Italian regions in matters of foreign affairs and international trade). Summed together, this two events dramatically increased the number of domestic players involved in ISM management in the country. Vertical integration within this sector emerged also strongly undermined by the high level of discretion during the implementation process by diplomatic seats abroad in charge of releasing visas.

In conclusion, a solid vertical transmission belt emerged in the Australian foreign policy domain. The policy framework around ISM appears developed and articulated, and actors are able to translate systematic objectives into implemented and complementary people-to-people programs. Horizontal integration also appear within this actors' subsystem, as presented by chapter III. However, the coherence of the overall Australian foreign policy emerged to be largely questioned and weaken by its contradictory approach to China, which continues to be seen contextually as a profitable economic partners and a real treat to country security.

In Italy, once again, disintegration emerged both horizontally and vertically, with different actors within the same ministry having contrasting policy frames around ISM, and disintegration occurring in multi-level governance. The framing of ISM in terms of foreign policy emerged however as the most advanced attempt to develop an 'integrated cross sectoral approach to mobility' in the country, the unique to link the fields of higher education, immigration, foreign policy as well as trade and labour market.

5.1.4 Labor Market and Trade

ISM is at the centre of Australian governments' economic agenda since the very beginning of the period analysed, with the introduction of the full fee policy in 1985. Commitment to ISM in this field has been constant and crucial for the entire period, lately including also outbound flows initially neglected. ISM constitutes to this regards a multi-facets opportunity for the country, which goes well beyond the direct contribution to Australian exports and labour market. This is the unique dominant frame emerged within this domain since the beginning of the timeframe under analysis. A range of instruments have been implemented to handle ISM over the time, with a large predominance of substantial instruments since the very beginning.

The uncapped full fee policy in force since over thirty-five years revealed however since a long while its negative externalities. The latter *de facto* obliges in fact institutions to count on Chinese students stream of revenue to fund basic activities such as research, overexposing the entire HE system to market fluctuation of one single country. It also weakens Australian foreign policy, as a single move of the

Chinese governments may have disruptive consequences for Australia, as the diplomatic tensions following the pandemic shown.

In Italy, the complete dearth of relevance of ISM in Italian economy and labour market ended following 2010, since when mobility has been recognized as an instrument of economic diplomacy under the new MAECI Directorate within the larger framework of firms' internationalization. However, political commitment is very sporadic, and the engagement at the ministerial level emerged to be yet more formal than substantial, anyway marginal in comparison to the main frame spread of ISM as a treat. The issue is not relevant in the public discourse: chapter IV presented the exploratory overview on the linkage between ISM and Italian economy, revealing that almost no literature focused on this matter. The framing of international student mobility as an opportunity for Italian economic diplomacy attempts to link four policy domains, and it emerged as the most developed integrated exercise around which Italian domestic actors engaged so far. However, also in this case, integration appear strongly disrupted along the vertical tier of multi-level governance, with a number of several attempt to reform the system which layered on each other, fuelling further horizonal disintegration given the plethora of actors involved, as just discussed above in relations to foreign policy.

In conclusion, while the Australian trade and policy domain appears characterized by effective integration both horizontally and vertically, its core policy instrument have structural negative externalities in other policy sectors, an aspect which undermine the overall solidity of the Australian approach to ISM. In Italy, as for the other policy sectors analyse, disintegration emerged instead both across policy actors and in multi-level governance.

5.2. Policy Integration In Process Across Policy Fields

The section above set the ground for the analysis of PI in process, which is the focus of this section and the core of the overall analysis of PI, presented below as per the six different dimensions identified building and bridging previous contributions.

5.2.1 Institutional/policy context

As discussed by chapter II, the 'institutional-policy context' is considered within this framework in a broader sense than in most of the illustrated studies of PI. This approach is motivated by the necessity to more comprehensively encompass the overall domestic environment in which it occurs. To assess PI in this dimension, I took into account the domestic form of state and payed special attention to the multi-level governance dynamics of both countries, their peculiarities and administrative traditions, their type of higher education system, and the dominant mode of governance in force. Finally, I considered the division of competences between institutional bodies.

We shall set the discussion beginning with the domestic form of state, which is federal in Australia and unitary in the case of Italy. While this situation is nowadays formally the same, relevant changes occurred in both countries: in Australia the Commonwealth acquired additional competences, while Italy moved in the opposite direction, transferring powers to lower level of policy makings over the time. Both shift have been relevant to ISM development.

In Australia, the competence in higher education, immigration, foreign policy, labor-market and trade domains relies entirely on the hands of the commonwealth since 1988, following the watershed introduction of the Unified System and the consequent transfer of HEIs funding prerogative from the States to the federation. Australian states kept however their competences in a number of policy domains, among which transport, housing and urban planning policies: while apparently de-connected by ISM, this aspect is relevant to assess the Australian multi-level governance dynamics, as their involvement grew over the time. As federal policies around ISM quickly pushed an high increase in the number of international students, in fact, a number of policy concerns related to congestion, housing

infrastructures and the integration of international students into local communities emerged and requested the direct intervention of the Australian state level of policy making.

In Italy, the central government has full competence in HE, immigration, trade and labor market, but it shares its competences and responsibilities in foreign policy with Italian regions and autonomous provinces since the constitutional reforms of 2001. Moreover, while Italian regions do not have competences in HE, they are competent for student welfare and also in charge of distributing funds for outgoing mobility and of a part of basic infrastructure required by incoming flows, such as students' dorms. Italian regions also manages directly European structural funds such as the European Social Fund and the Cohesion fund, through which additional measures around ISM can be developed and funded.

As introduced, the biggest break to integration along the multi-level governance axe in Australia concerns its federal dynamics in policy fields indirectly involved by ISM. As chapter III presented, this aspect became evident following the turbulent Melbourne events of 2008: until then, states were barely involved by ISM promotion and implementation. But as soon as the process of integration further developed across fields, the need of a more pro-active involvement became manifest: congestion in major cities, lack of accommodations, insufficient and ineffective public transports, ghettoization of students, dearth of security and welfare services, and, last but not least, the growing public discontent of local citizens living in areas close-by university campuses, were the main issues at the edge of the public discussion between 2008 and 2010. It should also be noted that, given the high concentration of the population in Australia, few states and local governments were strongly impacted by the federal policy of immigration in the initial phase especially.

Integration along the vertical level of policy making, pushed by the 2008 shock, developed since then in a nonlinear manner, with periods of increasing and decreasing integration between levels of policy making. Following the 2008 events, it has been the COAG to develop the ISSA, later released in 2010. Concerns risen by states have been addressed in large part in those years with a number of critical issues addressed. More recently, multi-level dynamics seems instead to suffers increasing tensions due to the long term implications of Australian federal temporary migration policies, given the failure of communicate a real demographic transformation to the wider Australian public during the entire last decade. Moreover, as it will be more extensively discussed in the section on actors' subsystem relations, increasing contraposition between Australian states emerged in the very recent phase, also in light of the very different interests of regional and 'bush' states versus New South Wales and Victoria (i.e. as in the case of the debate unleashed by the recent proposal of sending international students only to the bush, blocking arrivals to Melbourne and Sydney). As chapter III extensively showed, however, despite general tension exists in relation to the division of competences among the federal and state level, the multi-level governance at the base of the Australian domestic institutional context appear functioning correctly, and the country emerged equipped with a solid transmission belt until the lower levels of policy making.

In Italy, beyond the structural fragmentation and overlapping of competences in the foreign policy domain between the central authority and Italian regions, a more careful observation of multi-level dynamics return instead a spread presence of policy dis-integration. Although the central authority has full competence in the steering of higher education, the ministry suffers since decades of low capacity to steer its own system, it embraces procedural instruments and leave a strong power to the academic guild. As discussed, the same holds for the foreign policy domain, with the complication of an unclear repartition of competences. Neither in the field of immigration the central authority is able to enforce legislation, once again leaving high discretion to single departments and decentralized offices, in turn among single street level public officials. To put it simpler, disintegration in the vertical tier of the intuitional policy context emerges linked to the presence of a very weak central authority, also when the division of competences between different levels of government is not a source of tensions. As we shall discuss more extensively later in the chapter, the spread disruption of multi-level

governance translates in disintegration not only on the vertical tier, as the latter directly impact any horizontal attempt to advance integration.

This preliminary assessment of the institutional policy context reveals higher level of fragmentation in Italy than in Australia, pointing out to strong differences in multilevel governance dynamics. The Australian case study reconstruction revealed the centrality of its functioning multi-level governance in several domains of policy as at least favouring vertical integration. As shows by table 5.1, also the present tension between the Australian state and the state level of policy making emerged to be linked more to temporary political dynamics, rather than to features of the Australian form of state. The evidence of the Italian case study highlights instead that the country compromised vertical multi-level governance strongly harmed the development of vertical integration beyond structural characteristic strictly linked to its form of state following the 2001 constitutional reform.

The two countries provide also a very different current picture also in relation to the clarity in the division of competences among institutional bodies, a theme barely emerged in Australian interviews and instead predominant in the Italian case, as shown by Annex V shows. It is worth to note how the unclear division of competences among institutional bodies, currently present in Italy, is similar to the one which characterized Australia prior to the introduction of the full fee policy, when DET and DFAT were partially involved with no central coordination and student mobility was 'contended' on different grounds by both department, and the ministry of immigration yet opposed it on security grounds.

Chapter III extensively described how the Australian development leading to a clear repartition of competences around ISM passed by a turbulent phase, and how this process has not been linear, with domestic actors holding different (and contrasting) views several times. Although so, institutional actors have been able to avoid and/or overcome situations of impasse reaching general agreement, as in the early eighties in the case of the AECs net, initially managed by IDP. Currently, neither the division of competences among institutional bodies, nor discretion in the implementation phase of public policy emerged by the interview material collected and more generally by the analysis of the country case. In Italy, instead, problems related to the lack of clarity in who should do what and why, and who is specifically competent on a matter, persist since the early years of implementation of student mobility.

The current Italian institutional panorama is very similar to the Australian one prior to 1985 also in light of additional factors. Until the early eighties, both countries were in fact also characterized by a poorly efficient public administration, strongly based on hierarchies and unbounded by external efficiency assessment, with poorly performant weak governments. Their higher education system was strongly dependent by public funds, and their universities were heavily subsidized inward oriented institutions, monocultural and monolingual. Australia accomplished a transition from a procedural traditional old style of governance to a steering at distance mode, and governments have been able to implement important coherent reforms in a number of policy domains over the time. In great contrast to Italy, where the academic system is yet driven by old and obsolete logics, Australian higher education was also deeply reformed and evolved into an international competitive eco-system.

In conclusion, a number of features of the Australian institutional-policy context were profoundly transformed over the time in a coherent fashion. Australian governments have been able to implement a series of structural reforms over the time that created an efficient ecosystem to pursue integration across policy domains and levels, and in one case the government also intervened to acquire a competence once relying on states. The lack of involvement of Australian states and local government point out to existing room of manoeuvre to further increase integration in this dimension of policy integration, but overall the Australian one emerged to be a favourable policy-domestic context, characterized by clear division of competences, a steering at distance mood of governance and an efficient public administration.

In Italy, in contrast, the institutional policy context emerged to act as real a break to the evolution of policy integration around ISM. The institutional architecture of the country evolved toward further

decentralization, it central authority remains very weak, and its public administration has never been substantially reformed and it is driven by obsolete logic and cultural heritages, which strongly harm mobility implementation. Discretion is pervasive, and the process of implementation is strongly distorted, altered or hindered.

Table 5.1 | institutional policy context, Selected quotes of expert interviews

[Multi-level governance] We have in Australia we have local government, state and territory governments, and the Australian Government they won't always be headed … by the same political party at the time they've got different budgets, different priorities depending on the geographic location of the state… [...] So it's about making… … the difficulty comes in understanding the priorities of the different level of governments and the support that's behind it and looking at where the gaps are… and how we fill those and that's not always an easy conversation to have…

[Multi-level governance, higher education] with the prevalence of political or administrative roles, exerci professors, you think rectors ministers, heads of department, the ministry has lost a little its admini structure, let's say, the old administrators who knew everything... what happens? that... now so, it is my perc I would not want that the teaching component, which has had more and more important roles in the minis privileged the teaching aspect of internationalization and not the student aspect of internationalization

[Multi-level governance] And so this is true in Australia. So if you talk to the State Government and you talk to local governments they are less interested in all of this… although over time they become after a while it suddenly occurs to them that maybe it is a good thing that there are foreign students here and they are supporting universities …but this is not their first inclination. This is not the way they are.

[Multi-level governance, Immigration] You see that therefore, and here you understand the Ministry Interior, and also the availability of local authorities, that is to say, you see... it's really the authority, it's national Ministry of the Interior

[Multi-level governance] But it's more and then it gets complicated in Australia as a federation with state governments to actually have legislative power over universities but don't fund them. And so it's a bit mixed as to whether they play a role or not.

[Multi-level governance, Immigration] ... the application of laws continued to be an application that did n pace with reality.... so not exactly lax, but very lame ... and this is obviously reflected on refugees for ex on workers, on international students

[Multi-level government] And then realized... So student welfare is really the responsibility of state governments and so they have been focused in the last five years on things like student accommodation, investment so attracting investors to build student accommodation near university campuses in the cities… And I'll show you some of them around here… it's huge… Billions of dollars going into building high rise student accommodation and cities and then so regulation planning controls for… to ensure that the student accommodation is high quality. And so that's one area… so with six hundred 600,000 young people you want to make sure the … there's good places for them to live.

[Multi-level governance, Foreign Policy] The problem of visas in the sense that universities have to kn they have different attitudes depending on the type of consulate is unacceptable. This is certainly the p with a capital I or with a capital P of Italian universities with... with public institutions.

[Multi-level governance] These are key factors are that… I guess the different levels of government more or less work reasonably well state federal …a federal state and local government…

[Multi-level governance, Foreign Policy] It seems to me that in the embassies then there are some intere kind that leave... but I say this and I deny it. I ... issue the visa ... only ... in some embassies. [...] If it is di , I am sure that [...] there is not the local X official who...

[Multi-level governance, Foreign Policy] This means that there is an awareness that diplomatic representations operate in very different contexts from each other. Even within the same country you can have different specificities.

SOURCE: AUTHORS' EXPERT INTERVIEW MATERIAL

Table 5.1 Institutional policy context, interview material

Table 5.1 CONTINUED | institutional policy context, Selected quotes of expert interviews,

AUSTRALIA	ITALY
[Multi-level governance] Well I think over time though there's the state governments, and city governments have been much more significant… because I think what we've recognised in the last few years is that… the reputation …or the demand for study in Australia is there…	[Multi-level governance]... that in Italy there has been little attention paid to these issues and that, above all, each level of the State has gone its own way... it is more than evident
[Multi-level governance] And then you have the state governments as well with their own interests of they want if there's going to be international students coming to Australia. They want them to come to their state of course … … because they want the money. And of course the state governments don't have to worry about immigration. That's a federal responsibility. So the state governments can assume that whoever comes here is good…. That I've you know been approved through appropriate processes and that this is money that the state government can make... So state governments will make their representations to Canberra.	[Multi-level governance] if the data are not requested by the centre, the peripheries do not send them, the peripheries have the data, because in any case in the peripheries the data must be there, because these foreign students have taken courses, they have taken exams, they have been present, therefore in the local information systems they must have been registered
[Multi-level governance] And so that's something that didn't exist 10 years ago that government focused on student life… And so I think that's a big shift. That's something that [local] governments have recognised that they can do… And I guess it requires a certain scale of international activity for governments to preventing this ... I mean they're spending millions of dollars a year on those sorts of services. But it's… I guess the… the risk is that without those sorts of services …	[Multi-level governance, Higher Education] so the autonomy of the university had grown, because we could plan the courses indicating what they wanted to be the results etc. ... on this yes, this beginning, let's say, of accountability, overlapped with the evaluation system that has immediately castrated, told me No.... indeed yes, you can do what you want but within all this ... laughs ... and if you do not ... funding, money, things etc. .... well this is my vision
[Multi-level governance] And we failed we really didn't deal we didn't really include local government in any significant way. Uhm … local government in Australia is a bit … I think third rate … even though they deliver important services no one really deals with them very much. They they basically accept whatever happens in the sense.	[Multi-level governance, Higher Education] I tell you my vision, with the passage of the century, or rather of the millennium, at least in Italy we are witnessing a decisive retreat, but really decisive retreat, of academic autonomy. From a decade in which, let's say, we thought we had universities that were becoming independent social actors from every point of view of management, administration and salaries, we have moved on to an extremely centralised system.
[Multi-level governance]… actually state governments are very relevant for planning transport infrastructure. Whether they've done a good job is open to debate… like… I mean again I can speak based on Melbourne because, you know, up until a year ago that's where I was based … there were big controversies around the size of apartments that developers were building, … … putting up these buildings as quickly and as cheaply as they could to accommodate as many international students as I could, without regard to all these apartments actually nice places to live in	[Multi-level governance, Higher Education] the same didactics is evaluated in a very quantitative way, but parameterizes, parametric as well as quantitative, all reasons that slow down the innovation rate of the country, of the Italian academic system, they slow it down a lot...the universities try do, to follow...When there is a parametric model, it is inevitable that for obvious financial reasons, the parametric model is somehow, that is, it deforms the system until everyone conforms, who succeeds better and who worse, to the parametric model. This seems to have no relation with Erasmus, but it does philosophically, politically,
[Multi-level governance] We meet with our state and territory government counterparts and those discussions then feed into… discussions of councils so, you know… it's definitely provides that structure in order to coordinate better but it will always be a challenge for us. But that's why we have the council.	[Multi-level governance, higher education] But internationalisation policies are left to the universities according to the old model

SOURCE: AUTHORS' EXPERT INTERVIEW MATERIAL

5.2.2 Transversal political commitment to ISM

Table 5.2 - Scale of integration

	absent	low	medium	high	full
Political commitment	The issue need yet to enter the agenda as a transversal issue. No commitment in institutional documents and neither in political discourse	The issue is formally framed as a transversal issue, but commitment only emerges sporadically in political discourse or policy documents, and/or the process of integration is confined to only two policy domains. There is any clear official vision or medium-term strategy to pursue.	The issue is framed as transversal, and it is linked both to a short and medium timeframe. Commitment is bipartisan and emerges both from time to time in institutional documents, political discourse and developed policies/instrument embraced. At least some transversal policy instrument has been developed. Cross-sectoral commitment encompass additional policy domains.	The transversal issue is among the priorities of the government and follow at least a medium term vision, while a long term strategy is under development. Commitment is evident in institutional documents political discourse, in different policy domains, and in new instruments developed and/or implemented. There is bipartisan agreement on the core of the transversal policy developed.	The transversal issue is a top priority of the government, and follows a medium and long-term vision. Commitment is evident in institutional documents, political discourse, and in the set of policy instrument embraced to implement developed integrated policies. There is bipartisan agreement on the core of the transversal policy developed.
Australia	(until 1983)	(1983-1986)	(1986-1999))/ (2016-present)	(1999-2008)	(2008-2016)
Italy	(until 1987) (1992-1999) (2003-2008)	(1987-1992) (1999-2003) (2010-present)			

Table 5.2 Policy Integration in political commitment

Chapter three and four shown that neither in Australia nor in Italy, at the beginning of the timeframe considered, there was PI in political commitment. At that time, in fact, policies around ISM were seen within the framework of aid cooperation, which will then loose its centrality in both countries. Over the time, Australia reached in this dimension full PI, as ISM became a transversal issue of crucial relevance for Australian governments which constantly committed to its promotion and implementation. Political commitment is visible in institutional documents in different fields, also beyond the four taken into account. In Italy, by contrast, the process of development did not brought to reach full PI. Also at the end of the period analysed, ISM is neither a key priority nor fully framed as a transversal issue in political discourse or policy statements and documents.

While in Australia commitment has been constant and bipartisan since the early years of Keating, in Italy it has been sporadic and concentrated in small period of times, the years of the launch of the Erasmus program and immediately following the Bologna declaration, and more recently (and far reduced scope) with ministers Profumo and Giannetti. Stable political commitment emerged around ISM with specific reference to China, but it also emerged not relevant in the wider political discourse.

In great contrast, Australian governments have been able to implement a developed comprehensive policy framework around the international mobility of students recurring to a number of substantial reforms, first and foremost those in HE and of the immigration legislations. The solid and persistent bipartisan political commitment to ISM has also enabled several governments to develop an overall transversal policy goal around ISM, as according to the peculiarities of each policy domains involved and sectorial domestic actors' subsystems. As chapter III largely shown, the main transversal goal attached to ISM, of enhancing country prosperity, has been translated in a number of well-defined smaller and complementary policy objectives in each policy domain, ranging from the increasing of educational service export to the internationalization of Australian universities, passing by the attraction of skilled human capital and the contrast to the ageing of population. The institutionalization of this political dominant framing of ISM as an opportunity for Australian prosperity allowed to 'operationalize' the action needed to pursue different but complementary and coherent objectives in different policy domains.

In contrast, the lack of such solid political commitment reinforced traditional sectoral policy goal and objectives in Italy, ranging from protecting the country from illegal migration and terroristic infiltration to the one of strengthening its economic diplomacy. ISM has been extensively regulated via ministerial decrees, and laws barely referred to mobility (usually with few articles, but it has been rarely the case that mobility was the main object of such laws). Already in 2004, when describing the policy panorama of the seventies and the eighties, Forcesi (2004) noted that the many norms and disposition promulged at the ministerial level to manage ISM were a way to cover the dearth of the political commitment on this issue: a situation which currently persists at the end of the timeframe analysed. The difference in political commitment in Italy also visible looking to the extent of development of the technology to assess mobility, almost absent in Italy while very developed in Australia.

It is worth to note that in both countries moments of strong political commitment around ISM did result in policy actions. In Italy, the few years characterized by strong commitment coincide with several attempts to push for an integrated mobility development, notably with the introduction of laws 168/1989 and 509/99, the establishment of the Sino-Italian university and of Uni-Italia. In Australia, both the Labor and the Coalition parties strongly committed to the promotion of ISM for decades, even when it has meant to overcome ideological objection, such as for Labor in 1985 with the full fee policy introduction and with U turn made by the Howard government, initially arrived in power with the aim of shutting immigration. More recently, Australian politics became however more short-term oriented and begun to experience political instability, to the point of changing 6 different prime minister since 2007, and a loss of long term political commitment around ISM emerged. As introduced when discussing multi-level governance dynamics, the current government acts more as according to a short term electoral horizon rather than as a medium or long term vision around ISM, for the large part in light of its new approach to immigration. The whole discussion around ISM also became politicized, soaked by nationalist and xenophobic views. In light of this evidence, despite Australia did reach full level of political commitment in this dimension, a medium level of PI appears the one currently present. The loss of long-term horizon of ISM related policy, summed with a new sectorial approach to immigration, disrupted in fact the extent of PI reached. The government lost its role of being a key actor gluing together the governance system according to a clear long term national transversal goal, as we saw happened for the entire timeframe under analysis in Italy, where there is currently only a low level of PI.

Table 5.3 | | Political Commitment to ISM as a transversal issue, Selected quotes of expert interviews

AUSTRALIA	ITALY
But a very market liberal … Labour government… which was committed to working with the labour movement… So the unions, but also in liberalizing the economy. So they tried to… they dramatically reduced the tariffs and allowed protected industries to die, manufacturing industries collapsed. Lots of low level manufacturing, clothing textiles for example. And at the same time they tried to promote new export industries … so high tech exports and knowledge industries... so education was seen as an export industry	Let's say that when the concept is there, the instrument may take up to 20 years in Italy, but we find it when it is missing... the concept is like saying that there is no political endorsement for wanting to do something. So it is important, they seem like nonsense, but sometimes a small word in an official document, in a regulatory document, frankly opens up a world of possibilities .... and then we have to work on it. But, it is precisely the political endorsement that is needed, that is the political will to say I'll get people moving, who will I get to move? Who do I consider worthy of moving?
But the point was that the new government, the new Hawke government, both Bob Hawke, and Bill Hayden, were fairly inclined to reform, they were reformist. And the whole government was reformist. It is accepted now if you read Australian economic history, that period from about 83 to 90, during the period of the Hawke Labor government, was a period of considerable reform. And it tended to be pro-market and liberal reform.	or there is a will not to do things.... [...] maybe it is not perceived as a priority or it is not enough [...] And when I say this, in my opinion, there is a lack of political will that is not inherent in the directors of the ministries, but inherent in the various governments that follow one another... therefore... there has never been an ... ... approach... within the governments, in the programmatic documents of the governments in which international students were seen as a resource...
What happened increasingly though was that… government decided in control of budgets to reduced funding to universities. It was convinced that it could allow universities to raise more money through international students, as the economies of East and South East Asia prospered, their rising middle class for which their own universities were still not catching up.	the problem is the political input they receive, the ministers' cabinets, which very often put the brakes on the accumulation of skills, experience and abilities that are in our directorates-general in the various ministries. In short, because they may have innovative ideas, but they are not able to put them into practice [...] in reality, we need commitment and guidelines from central authority
And at that point the Prime Minister switched and said '*Okay let's adjust the points and we'll monitor that but I'm now convinced that we should turn around on this'*. And so he did two things, This is John Howard at the end of his first period of governments and he was in government for another 10 years after that, he built in student incentives into the migration system	So certainly in the first years of the 2000s there was a decline in political interest, I repeat, it should be read "in filigrana" (in a way that is not immediately apparent) in conjunction with other international phenomena, there is also another fact. Let's say, always at the turn of the century[...] the structure of the parties goes into crisis, that is, it's no joke. [...] With 2002, [...] at that point, there is an emptying of parties, they began to run out of resources, we always talk about new parties [...] So party politics is not deficient, it is very deficient.
And so the pressure was on us [the immigration department], the government turned around and said 'Well, how are we going to increase the skilled migration intake, help the overseas student industry and address the problems of aging? What are you going to do?'	both, look, both things are valid, there is no governance and no political will [...] There are no, even there, strategic lines and that... that indicate a policy [...] we do not build strategies, there is no political strength to build strategies, and everyone goes their own way...
… the way Australian Government looks at its economic league determined, who has the highest rates of employment, lowest rates of unemployment etc…	... it takes willpower to do so, because if there is no political will then ... [...] ...
So the normal one is… you have something because you have something like the Asian century… So the Government's in power, they do a big white paper… They say we need to get them more focused on Asia. Big Idea. Right. And then the Minister for Education or the other ministers tell... Yeah. 'Well what can we do with my portfolio … yeah we can send some more students.	immediately after the subprime crisis broke out... in 2008 the economic crisis, let's say, the overwhelming one, the one that still lasts... and this theme begins to become the last of the problems...[...] imagine Erasmus, it is a theme that... if the professors decrease of 15%, if there is a contraction of the staff, of the employees, of the workforce... of 15% in the public administrations.... you can imagine if the problem can be the organization of the Erasmus... but it is not possible...
Our, our foreign minister who launched it… is our former Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, she is no longer our foreign minister but she launched this program, She wanted this program to be a rite of passage for Australian students which means…, trying to work out how to explain that,… it means that she wants every Australian undergraduate to go to university with the expectation that they will as part of their course or degree have an overseas experience to improve their understanding of the region and to build connections with the region	I have to say, I think in systems where ... how to say, there is no strong political line and in the end things are very much based on people. So probably the German system that is, how to say, where once a decision has been taken the whole system moves in the same direction, probably it is not repeated in Italy, where we are still more tied to the individual than to a system logic. But, alas, this can be seen in everything, and so this can probably also be one of the simple reasons why at a certain point there was perhaps someone or something that no longer pushed, things came to a halt... simply because of inertia, I don't know....

Source: author's expert interviews material

Table 5.3 | Political Commitment, interview material

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Table 5.4 | Legislative Framework in force around ISM, Selected quotes of expert interviews

AUSTRALIA	ITALY
Yeah yeah absolutely [there is a comprehensive normative framework]. I guess because we've had, I mean compared with other destination countries we've had a high proportion of international students. Now like a quarter of the university population, for example. And so because of the scale in Australia…it's been significant from the beginning. And that's kind of pushed regulatory responses to happen more quickly than in other places where it's a small activity right? [...] So I think over time the regulatory frameworks have been more and more robust, And so on good… It's a I'm surprised about the scope of work that we actually do on… but there that no other country in the world has stuff… Well I think the answer is yes. There is not much opposition, there is a little concern in some areas… but there is not much opposition and I think in general most people would say that this has been a success [the policy framework around ISM]… a big… in fact most people say this is a big success So our key policy documents are the guidelines, they're called… and I'll send those to you. There's two lots and those guidelines set the rules for the program and they have criteria. And they spell out what we're looking for, and how we make our decisions, that provide us with some flexibility around how we make those… Yeah. Yeah absolutely. […] So I hear that there are very very strong policies and legislation indeed to ensure that students who come to Australia get what they paid for and we… so when… we have a legislative framework really that I like... we have the national strategy, the 2025 document, [...] and we've got the Council for International Education which I've got government ministers on it but also experts from the education sector, so they drive a range of work to deliver again the strategy. We've also had it kind of falls under this policy framework... … We also have you know legislation that looks at a tuition services, which… which provides I guess a safety net for students who come here and all of a sudden the providers pull out, We've got the national code of practice for providers of education and training to overseas students… So that is a code that providers have to comply with, to make sure that they're providing adequate support to international students. So there's a range of different policy and legislative pieces in place that we have to make sure that we're looking after our international students. Yes I think that that is accurate. I mean if you look at… I've got it hasn't just got in my head… the inbound degree framework, you know, for universities to actually handle inbound students. And the fact that providers have to be registered with CRICOS and yeah I think in terms of international education we're probably ahead of most of the world… in terms of policy. [...] No not particularly but there is a lot of policy framework there… Sure. […] I think there are many pieces and the government has typically done a pretty good job I think across… across all those different elements… you know what I mean. There's a lot of pieces with the with the… The different… different ways that they regulate universities and try to increase quality and then also try to… you know provide good quality for international education provide … for students coming to do international studies and they have guarantees that if providers go broke that they will move them to other institutions and that's all. That's quite complex as a lot of pieces to that I don't think a lot of countries have… that many sophisticated elements… yeah…	It is clear that we then need clear policies and strategy... things that our country has never had, has never had less even of promotion of the system... not even of promotion of the system, of the country system. [...] on this issue, there is, how to say, there is a defect in our country... is that precisely of... not having all... then... and not having univocal policies, clear, on this the ministry was all about this evaluation regulatory excess, things, etc. etc. You consider that the circular...the circular for the access of foreign students [...], was always a document of dozens and dozens of pages. I mean... But how does a young man get his bearings in such a document? That is... it was a circular that was born and grew because of the addition of rules... we had also found rules that there were related to the Greeks era, in the era of the colonels, that had never been removed, and so it accumulates, accumulates, accumulates and it is clear, however, that then we fail to be attractive even on this. it is like that [there are no laws about it]. There isn't something that affects tens of thousands of students every year, such as students, and there isn't a structure that can't put order into a system that was unhappily regionalised so many years ago Let's say that... on the one hand, scholars agree in saying that Italy has long had policies based on letting go, no? On laxity [...] the [immigration] policies have continued to be policies that were lame... [...] because in reality it has not been possible to regulate the flows... for example, the entry authorisations and the "flow decrees", which were, let's say, issued, approved as policies, because then for 8 years, for about 6 years, they are no longer made in reality The only laws that had a systemic approach are those of Ruberti, the four-leaf clover, but we are talking about an isolated episode ... 68, 390 and 341 ... all laws that had some idea of directing, laws that direct the system, not forcing it in, but directing it, providing general frameworks ... this was lacking ....[...] by now every law is a law of exasperated technicality, that is, if you think about it... they are not laws, they are rules as you know... for us making laws means making rules.... there is a beautiful phrase [...]... Regulatory bulimia! So it seems to us that we lose time in making guidelines and we don't lose time in making norms... Exactly! Every budget weighs 700 or 800 norms, then what should be done? We don't know what we need to do It's always the same thing [...], for example, there is a significant visa question, especially for incoming students. We have joint titles, but then the students must be able to arrive, they must have permits to stay, plus a whole series of other things, we can go to housing policies... [...] No, a non-existent policy, that is, domestic internationalisation has arrived as, in my opinion, as a theme of effective action by the universities... it came much later

SOURCE: AUTHOR'S EXPERT INTERVIEWS' MATERIAL

Table 5.4 Legislative Framework, material interview

Look I think we have a fairly robust policy framework and compliance framework for international education and you know it's I I would say it's probably as it's probably as good as anywhere in the world in terms of looking after students and the. But I think we have to be very clear about the sorts of students we're talking about too

Well at the end of the day the government sets the legislation that we operate by. So… … when there's a lot of change in that process… it can mean changes in terms of things that we have to be doing or not doing on whatever. So… yes… So if that base is constantly changing… then it has the potential for the policies that you want to change

I think it managed to set up comprehensive… you know infrastructure to you know attract international students bring them in. You know the whole overseas marketing, the visa process, the you know the facilities to bring in students, to keep them engaged… You know the university obviously doesn't want to drop out because if they drop out there goes the revenue. I think that's been done successfully… whether that's been… because the policy has been comprehensive or just that they've been lucky… that other… No, no… I think there has been a lot of good systematic work but that… I feel it's a yes and no this sort of thing that… …well this policy has been very variable and yet it's also been had a consistent call… And I think that's part of the important thing that the consistent goal of we want international students means that it is broadly worked out in the sense of successfully bringing and keeping international students… Yeah

I mean there are probably attempts to do that sort of thing through some of the … known… the International Education Committees … but trying to make it more of a whole of government approach to things like that… but I certainly don't think that's succeeded yet. Because if they add then things like recruiting international students wouldn't be at odds with things like you know, broader urban development issues, things like how do we finance universities, how to be financed a tertiary education system… these things seem to be playing against each other rather than working in some sort of cohesive fashion to me… …

Short answer yes… but let me talk me a little bit through… so let's but again the international students bit of support is the big bit, that's 80 percent of the conversation.

I think it's reasonably well got there I think... I'm not very competent to judge where we are at the moment because I've been retired to nearly five years, […when I left…] We've tightened up a lot, some of the problems that have been seen with the with the big buildup of private providers some of whom were a bit unscrupulous, so it's much harder for them to operate now. I think there's a visa policy which is reasonably settled, although the Government's coming under pressure of that right now. I think the state governments who are primarily responsible around accommodation issues and… and transport which was another issue, I think that they're much more on the ball about those. I think that the on the employment side, the employment ombudsperson… or ombudsman has been much more proactive. So I think that's a reasonably good policy framework [..] of course it takes time to get there…

And I repeat, the origin is always the same, and maybe it is also natural, but the ministries move if there are norms, if there are no norms they hardly commit themselves, and as you noticed Erasmus is almost nowhere talked about, so it is a theme that gives many problems... [...], in Italy the norms do not talk about Erasmus, it is as if it didn't exist. [...] So there is a lack of an infrastructural policy, a lack of a reception policy, both at student and non-student immigration level, certainly... ... the flows are quite complicated, with respect to the immigration of both students and researchers...

from a simple crystal-clear document here it would have been enough to say these are the things... how many bodies are there in the universities now? there are at least three or four internal structures that have stratified over time, because the reforms have overlapped without eliminating the previous structures...

there is [a shortlist of comprehensive policies on ISM] but we have to know how to read them. But they are not immediately readable. So there are all the pieces of the puzzle, but it is missing ... the big picture ...we have to stand there and do it. When one gets to the end, a gust of air comes in and VOOM, you start all over again [...] it is that unfortunately it is a patchwork job... one of the big jobs of [XXXX XXXX] is to build the patchwork ... that is, try to hold together several pieces, within the scope of our skills and our possibilities... Trying to put together a framework from the bottom up, sure that is not how it should be done managerially. Everyone works on what they have [each ministry, other key players]

I mean, while in some other countries you can find occasionally a white book, a published strategy, a policy document... We make decrees, decrees and decrees... [...] But if you look at the three-year planning document that the minister, the three-year planning decree that the minister signs, publishes, every three years, for the past ten to fifteen years, there have always been actions and indicators that refer to the international dimension. So, universities are always asked to present plans that have to do with internationalization and mobility

This concept of the international student, of course, is also beginning to enter into the various institutions, and into the various regulations, the entry procedures for students applying for visas, with foreign qualifications in Italy, produced by the Miur, but this is not always the case for statistical data.

Well, I would say yes, [there's a shortlist of policies on ISM], in the sense that, let's say... one of the strongest political actions taken by the Italian government during the ascending negotiation phase of the new European Union budget was a joint action with Spain to suggest even a tenfold increase in resources for Erasmus CINQUEPALMI

SOURCE: AUTHOR'S EXPERT INTERVIEWS' MATERIAL

Table 5.5 | ITALY, National body for ISM, selected quotes of expert interviews

I'll give you a... You see, as the ministry becomes a political-administrative actor again and doesn't opt for remote guidance or whatever it's called, it's clear that the agency cannot be born, the agency is born in a system in which the political-administrative power REALLY manages the system remotely and has independent structures that know it, spread the knowledge and give the indications of policies, if one has the power to ... to guide, how to say, not to guide, to regulate the system, to regulate it ... and what does one do with an agency?

There isn't one in Italy. one of the greatest deficiencies....I know, I know, this is one - I've said it many times - it's one of the greatest deficiencies ... we miss... and it's not INDIRE, not because I don't want to, but not because they're not good at INDIRE, but you know INDIRE was born with... ?... but you know how many years I've been deluding myself that I could somehow create it, incentivize it.... but I've never succeeded because... Italy didn't want to equip itself

Or however, a point that Italy has never resolved, has never resolved, in my opinion, for a certain...cultural sphere of ours, so it is not even wrong not to resolve it, is that we have never had a national agency to promote the system. This is not a discourse of today, but already in the eighties there was a lot of talk about this... or rather the creation, like DAAD, British Council, etc., of a point that promotes the Italian higher education system. This situation has never been closed, it has never been resolved, also because the institutions about this, already had a body which, in my opinion, already promoted or was the promoter of the system related to the institutions, but we are talking about academic institutions, that is the Rectors' Conference... which objectively, and according to certain approaches of autonomy of the institutions, has in itself the task of promoting its own system, its own aims... So this is a big big difference that Italy already has, there is no agency that is at the head of a promotion of the system

What we lack is a mobility agency... in Italy. Italy lacks a real mobility agency. Various subjects occasionally propose themselves, do, ourselves. Several times we have proposed ourselves with some actions to promote mobility, to promote the attractiveness of the system ... But an agency that supports and promotes mobility and, through mobility, the internationalization of the system, in Italy does not exist and I see that there is no will to do so. There is the idea, there is the desire. But the will to create an agency that has that mission, a dedicated budget... There is no such thing. At the moment, I can't say whether there's a lack of funding... that is, whether there aren't sufficient financial resources, so we decide not to do it. Or if they decide not to do it with the excuse that there are not enough financial resources. But other countries that are experimenting with the institution of a strong mobility agency, a governmental agency, which has political endorsement, which has dedicated funding, and which can develop policies... that can also consult on mobility and internationalization policies... because I see it going together, in Italy it doesn't exist.

We have also tried to ask for these various subjects to be brought together. The CRUI, CIMEA, the ministries... but to create a structure that should not be thought of as an office or a director, because when one thinks of the structure in Italy, immediately we start thinking of who is the director, who is the secretary, who is the board of directors... Not because we don't just create an office. That's not the point, it's that despite the attempts, despite the divergence of opinions, the convergence at times, in reality there is no agency in Italy.... ... It's not an agency, just like the CRUI cannot be, because that's what we do, it's voluntary work ... [...] Each one of us does a little piece. If we were all together under one hat and with dedicated funding lines, then yes ... we also have the agency that managed the Erasmus.

It is not so, but, let's say, as I see it, from my experience within ministry, there is an attention on these issues, but not... but not... there is not a direction cabin, a direction cabin that should put together four or five ministries, because it should put together also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because we talk about everything, internationalization, the productive ministries, because in series this is what you get with the internationalization, and clearly the Ministry of Interior.... there have been experiences, websites to provide information, etc., with the participation of ministries... but we really need a more proactive policy".

This in Italy does not exist, it does not exist, that is to say... there has been an attempt of construction... but also there is... there is a strong ambiguity on this issue, on whose ... whose competence it is on this field... because, in reality... the only embryo, let's say, of a structure of this type is not found within the Ministry of Education, University and Research, but is found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs... and then, in short, it is something born as if by chance, here... I'm not... and above all, at the beginning, directed to the attraction... to the attraction of students, of students coming from China. And I'm talking about UNITALIA, which is the only embryo, which was born more from the will of individuals than from a... from a project from a political and... from a project from a political and strategic project of our country

SOURCE: Interview material, held in Italy, Jan 2019-May 20

Table 5.5 | National body ISM, Italy

5.2.3 Policy integration in actors relations'

Table 5.6 - Scale of policy integration				
	absent	**low**	**medium**	**high**	**full**
actors' subsystem relations	Subsystems have no relations among each other, exception made for formal ones. There is one dominant subsystem, while others are indirectly involved. There is no information exchange between actors' subsystems. Each subsystems has different goals and frames of the transversal issue.	Beyond formal relations, actors' subsystems have sporadic relations among each other at the horizontal level. There may be one dominant subsystem but the indirect involvement of other subsystems is recognized. Information exchange is sporadic. Actors' subsystems have different policy goals and frame and they perceive consequent shortfalls, but act to preserve their own	Different actors' subsystems have formal and informal relations both at the horizontal and vertical level. Information exchange is constant. Actors' subsystems engage in adjusting their policy goals and frame to be coherent among different subsystems. There is clear division of roles, and the government push the system towards to reach cross-sectoral goal, including stakeholders. Ad hoc bodies have been established.	Different actors' subsystems have fruitful relations both at the vertical and horizontal level. Formally, there is no a dominant subsystem as the process of integration resulted in a new actors' subsystem which include all relevant players, including stakeholders. Information exchange is formal and informal, as well as cooperation, collaboration and coordination both horizontally and vertically. Shared goals and policy frame develop across different coalitions. Clear division of roles and responsibilities and ad hoc bodies works	All relevant actor subsystems ar involved in the ongoin process of integratio both formally an informally, and eac subsystem is aware o its own role. Clea division of roles an responsibilities bot formally an informally. There is full information exchange, cooperation, collaboration and coordination among different subsystem both vertically and horizontally. They share policy goals in relation to the cross-cutting issue and frame it the same way.
AUSTRALIA	**(until 1985)**	**(1985-1989)**	**(1989-1999)**	**(1999-2013) (2016-present)**	**(2010-2016)**
ITALY	**(until 2010)**	**(2010-present)**			

Table 5.6 - Policy Integration in subsystem actors' relations

As per theoretical premises of the analytical framework derived, this section discusses and compares the evolution of PI in the dimensions of actors' subsystem, focusing on aspects such as the role of the government in steering the wide cross-sectoral governance system, the presence of institutional, formal and informal mechanisms for cross-sectoral consultation, and actors' system dynamics between institutional bodies and between them and stakeholders. The section also refers to policy goal and frames, which will be more extensively discussed by the next section.

Chapter III and IV carefully provided a detailed description of the domestic panorama of actors in the two countries analysed and revealed that PI in this dimension was absent at time zero in both. As for PI in political commitment, they shared a common ground with important fragmentation among domestic actors in the eighties, with actors' relations happening mostly within the boundaries of each policy domain: while the Australian panorama of actors largely evolved, Italy presents a similar panorama to the one of the early eighties.

Evidence points out that Australia reached a full level of PI over the time, as a wide constellation of domestic actors has been substantially involved in the ISM promotion and development, including institutional bodies and non-governmental actors. Competences and responsibilities between actors were clearly assigned and domestic actors shared a main dominant frame of ISM as opportunity, anchoring it to a set of more defined sectorial policy objectives coherent to the main goal of the policy. In contrast, evidence on the Italian case reveals a low grade of PI in actors' subsystem relation also at time one, where domestic actors' cross-sectoral attempts to cooperate often fail, and joint actions, long terms strategies and a transversal goal around ISM emerged to be very difficult to be developed and shared. Complex, conflictual and non-institutionalized relations emerged both between institutional bodies and between them and stakeholders.

Chapter III described in detail the several governmental interventions behind the establishment of an institutional body in charge of coordinating the new policy around ISM in Australia (originally the AIEF, in turn quickly reformed into the AIE) in the early period, as well as the long process which brought to the establishment of the Council of International Education, when it became clear that a body

such as AIE, developed within the single space higher education, was not enough to address the complexity implied by ISM. Further, the chapter shown the several additional offices established over the time, ranging from the AECs of the early nineties to the Ombudsman Student Office establishment in 2010, and the transfer of appointments of some bits of the policy from AUS-Aid to AIE and lately to AUStrade. These constitutes clear examples of the capacity held by domestic actors to search for, develop, and quickly implement solutions to policy problems emerged. It is worth to note that a number of joint and complex instruments have been developed with the aim of overcoming situations of impasse during the process of development of integration in actor's subsystem relations, beginning with the development of the risk assessment system in the early nineties.

Italy, in contrast, never implemented ad hoc body for the steering of student mobility, and this persistent lack translated in a panorama where small 'bits' of the policy framework around ISM are in charge of a real plethora of different actors (acting with no clear transversal policy goal and contrasting sectorial policy objectives). As often underlined by experts interviewed, actors' conflictual relations blocked the development of such body, and its creation is still motive of tensions between domestic actors.

As introduced in section 5.1, Italy emerged characterized by a very harsh institutional policy context for the development of PI in this dimension, among the many reasons due to the poorly efficient multi-level governance and the lack of clear repartition of competences across institutional bodies. These features translate in a strong break to the development of PI. At the ministerial level, the three crucial ministries (attempt to) pursue sectorial contrasting objectives, with the ministry of education pushing European mobility, the ministry of foreign affairs economic diplomatic relations and international cooperation, contextually to the country protection by terrorism and similar concerns, plus the interior who aim to enforce public security. In practice, this translates in universities clashing with both diplomatic seats abroad and interior street level offices in the national soil when trying to implement programs supported by the education ministry, such as the Erasmus programs. Even students directly sponsored by the ministry of foreign affairs faces similar problems. As shown, moreover, the normative around mobility is not uniformly enforced vertically: each attempt of the domestic ministries to steer the lower unites involved in the implementation has not effect, further complicating horizontal relations among peak institutional actors and at their street level divisions.

Universities are engaged with the MIUR, CRUI, CIMEA, and the Bologna Expert group to foster the promotion of European incoming and outgoing credit mobility, while they partner mostly with MAECI, Uni-Italia, Italian regions, cities and chambers of commerce among the many, to promote in-coming degree mobility, with any institutional coordination mechanism existing among these path, which evidently hold different priorities in terms of objectives and geographical targets.

In strong contrast to Italy, governments in Australia have been also able to create a series of different venues for consultation, both within institutional actors and between the latter and stakeholders, by way of example often reoccurring to interdepartmental committees. Chapter III described this aspect as well as the increasing inclusion of stakeholders by Australia governments in the national policy making process over the time. Both policy advisor and stakeholders' high-level representatives argued that 'there are good and many ways to shape national policies' since there is 'a good level of consultations during the process of change', something which makes up 'good and cooperative relations between the government and stakeholders'.

Once again, Italy reveals a very different panorama, with far less room for consultation both within institutional bodies and with other stakeholders. The lack of information exchange emerged as a crucial obstacle for a coordinated action among different ministries, especially between MIUR, MAECI and the interior. Institutional mechanisms of consultation are scarce and merely formal, such as during the yearly process behind the annual inter-ministerial circular setting the available places for foreign students. The venues that brings together institutional actors appear to be the few in place with stakeholders, that most of the times are informal venues such as working groups or common events,

largely managed by CRUI. It is worth to note that, since the establishment of Uni-Italia, these occasions became more frequent. Lack of fruitful relations emerged also with universities, which again appear to follow their own path of development around ISM and more generally internationalization. In Australia, stakeholders have been able to organize themselves to shape the process of policy making and the development of policies around ISM, as already visible in the late eighties with the drafting of the code of conduct for HEIs prior to the enactment of the ESOS Act in 1991, or with the effort organized to promote outgoing mobility along to incoming flows since the early 2000s. As discussed, moreover, while a number of new peak stakeholders bodies were established in Australia, such as IIEA and ISANA, in Italy no similar organizations emerged.

The qualitative scale derived to assess this dimension of PI consider the role of the government within the cross-sectoral constellation of actors. What is of relevance to highlight is how, if in Australia the strong governmental engagement around ISM acted as a true glue of the cross-sectoral governance system, in Italy the dearth of governments' engagement has reinforced instead sectorial logics and the procedural implementation of a un unclear policy framework. As a result, cooperation among institutional bodies even emerged as one of the biggest challenge to be solved. This does not means that Australian governments have been immediately able to address contrasts among institutional departments. Expert interviewed pointed out to periods of unsystematic coordination and communication across policy departments, government and key stakeholders, but the governmental action has been described as 'practice based', 'evolutionary', 'refined over the time, 'reactive' and 'inclusive', and the basic challenges of coordinating actors' action in different domains of policies have been addressed since the introduction of the ESOS Act, the risk assessment system, the C.R.I.C.O.S. register and P.R.I.S.M. database.

Evidence shows that integration in actors subsystem relations' relations reached high levels of policy integration since the alignment of permanent migration and higher education occurred in 1999. A number of actors subsystems' were jointly engaged in the promotion and implementation of student mobility in the fields of higher education, immigration, trade and labor market. Clear division of competences was in force, and actors shared the only dominant frame of ISM as an opportunity for Australian development. As former Universities Australia representative put it, 'there was no single voice against ISM at that moment'. This period begun in 2010, year that marked the grounding of the dominant frame of ISM within the framework of Australian foreign policy (with the introduction of the OS-HELP and the transfer of competences from AIE to AusAid and AUStrade), adding the department of foreign affairs and trade along the peak institutional bodies involved by student mobility. Within that period, every condition implied by the developed scale of PI in this dimension was reached, with all relevant actors' subsystems involved in the promotion of both incoming and outgoing mobility. Moreover, we discussed above that it is in this period that also Australian state, and also governments, begun to be involved among the cross-sectoral governance system for the first time. Using Sharps' (1992) vocabulary, a situation of positive coordination emerged, with the presence of a substantial nets of relations with no dominant subsystem steering it, which jointly pushed toward the same direction.

The abolishment of the immigration department summed to the current very critical political attitude toward immigration, resulted in a shock to policy integration in actors' subsystem relations: the frame of ISM within the department of Home Affairs is evidently different than those held since 1999 by the department of immigration. Moreover, as introduced, the issue of international students became strongly politicized and a relevant political argument at the local level of policy making, causing di-integration among Australian states and local governments. Moreover, in this last phase, what Sharp (1994) defined a situation of 'negative coordination' emerged, as the Department of Foreign Policy and Trade appears to have taken the lead of the process. Currently, DFAT manages all the incoming and outgoing mobility schemes, following the suppression of the Endeavour Program in 2019, the last one remained under the management of the education department since the launch of the NCP.

In conclusion, although the common grounds for development was the same in Australia and Italy, the process of evolution has been opposite, barely evolving in the Italian case and experiencing instead a true incremental development in Australia. In the latter, both institutional and non-actors have been able to organize themselves and profit from the new opportunities of an more integrated policy around ISM, pushing themselves for its promotion and further development in the first place. In Italy, instead, the process just brought to pass by a situation of absent integration to one of low levels, but it is worth to note that, despite different actors does not engage in adjusting their own policy frame and their sectoral objectives around ISM, they do perceives consequences and at least additional formal venues of coordination have been developed.

5.2.4 Policy Integration in goals and frames

TABLE 5.7 | Scale of integration				
absent	**low**	**medium**	**high**	**full**
Policy goals and frames Goals and frames are narrowly-oriented and refer to specific policy sectors, and they may conflict among each other. Actors belonging to one subsystem are not aware of such differences among goals and frames of different coalitions. Goals and frames also differs by level of policy making. Actors act to preserve their own frames and goals.	Goals and frames are narrowly oriented and refer to specific policy sectors, and they may conflict among each other also by level of policy making. Actors belonging to one subsystem do not share goals and frame by of other subsystems, and act to preserve their own, while they are aware of such differences.	A transversal goal is under development, but frames are still narrowly oriented, both between levels and policy domains. Different frames are present. However, actors belonging to one subsystems still act to preserve their own frame of the issue, while they are aware of negative externalities which block the process.	A transversal goal is present and it jointly developed across N policy sectors. A dominant shared frame is Shared by different actors' subsystems (horizontally and vertically). Opposite new contrasting frame may however emerge.	A transversal long term goal has been developed in light of the N policy sectors involved by the transversal issue, and actors share a dominant policy frame of the issue. Different actors' subsystems share them and jointly works to strengthen performance.
AUSTRALIA Until 1985	(1985-1989)	(1989-1999)	(1999-2010) (2016-present)	(2010-2016)
ITALY Until 1987	(1987-1999) (2003-2010)	(1999-2003) (2010-present)		

Table 5.7 | Policy Integration in policy goals and frames

Also in this dimension of integration, Italy and Australia shown common ground of departure, with absent level of PI in policy goal and frames around ISM, vertically and horizontally. In both case, ISM was mostly linked to international aid cooperation, and a task of foreign affairs department. Contrasting frames were present, with international students approached as a profitable socio-cultural diplomatic opportunity for the country in the education and cooperation domains and a potential treat to it by the immigration department. As the previous sections introduced, the framing of mobility as a treat will accompany the entire development of ISM policies in Italy, while it became marginal in Australia for a long period of time to reappear only in the last phase. The tables in annex V presents with detail additional empirical evidence supporting the findings presented by this section.
Currently, in Australia a shared transversal frame of ISM as an opportunity for Australian prosperity is present. It emerged to be largely dominant among domestic actors, which further decline it anchoring to it more defined sectorial policy objectives. By contrast, different and contrasting ISM frames are yet present in Italy, beyond across sectors, also within single policy domains. Another key difference emerged is that in Australia exists a clear policy goal – enhancing Australian prosperity - around ISM, and coherent sectorial objectives and targets have been developed over the time: as illustrated, they span from boosting Australian educational related export to strengthen the Australian higher education system, passing by their contribution to Australian fertility and employment rates. In strong contrast to

the Italian case study, moreover, these policy objectives and the transversal goal attached to ISM are among national key priorities. In Italy, instead, such transversal goal around mobility never emerged.

The development of a transversal goal around ISM in Australia begun at the very beginning. As the process of integration between the sector of HE and trade begun, the double goal of generating revenue by educational export and make universities more efficient and prestigious institutions was immediately clear. A frame of ISM as a 'necessity' for the country emerged, but it will never be predominant.

A real transversal policy goal was finally developed however in 1999, when the frame of ISM became pervasive going well beyond its direct contribution to export and to the internationalization of higher education. Since that moment, mobility responded to several compatible and complementary policy objectives, aiming to the single transversal long term goal of enhancing the country prosperity. As largely discussed, it has been exactly in 1999 that also the immigration department 'decided [that ISM] was good for Australia'. The shift of ISM framing as from a treat to and opportunity by this department has been in fact crucial for the overall development of ISM in Australia: as soon as its approach became coherent to those dominant in the higher education, labor market and trade domains, and to the political commitment of further opening Australia to (at least) skilled migrants, incoming flows saw a steep increase: the department did not opposed such shift, but rather worked to strengthen that approach across the entire cross sectoral governance system involved. For this reason, I argue that in 1999 PI in this dimension in Australia reached a 'high' level, as institutional domestic actors begun to jointly develop a transversal policy goal attached to ISM promotion and they also arrived to share a frame of ISM as an opportunity.

Following 2010, ISM begun to be approached also in terms of foreign policy, and the transversal policy goal developed around mobility was expanded and grounded into the Australian Indo-Pacific strategy, becoming a core pillar of Australian cultural diplomacy. In that period, Australia had adjusted sectorial policy objectives in immigration and trade, allowing a more balanced integration among the two domains. In this period, most specifically between 2010 and 2016, integration reached a full level of policy integration in policy goal and frames (the previous section shown that this moment also matches with the involvement of Australian states), culminating with the establishment of the Council for International education. It is worth to underline how the very large majority of policy experts interviewed presented ISM evolution in the country as according to the lenses of analysis of ISM in their policy domain of belonging, but always concluded their reasoning highlighting the huge transversal opportunity that ISM constitutes for Australia. For example, experts in education mostly told a story beginning with the initial worries related to the *mercification* of higher education, and continuing with the huge turn when HEIs begun to capitalize on the new policy. Others, belonging to the migration space, marginally referred to higher education, while strongly pointed out to Australian skilled labor shortages and the country ageing trend. Yet, some others, mostly told a story on the transformation from a mono-lingual and mono-cultural Australia to a multicultural country, or as according to Australian relations with South East Asia since the time of the Colombo Plan until the launch of Bishop New Colombo Plan. Rephrasing, Australia has been able to developed a common coherent ground around which approach ISM, where sectorial policy objectives complemented each other and different actors pursue different policy objectives within a common wider design oriented toward a shared goal.

Once again, chapter four extensively described an opposite panorama in Italy, where different dominant frames still exists within and across policy domains: a shift such as the one of 1999 in Australia, following which a 'treat' frame of ISM disappeared by the discourse to be substituted by an opportunity driven approach never happened in the country.

The first frame, always present since the early eighties, is the frame of ISM as a treat to the country. Given the normative grounded in the framework of public security, foreign students are often perceived as 'potential illegal migrants' from which the country should be protected. Within the space of foreign

policy, moreover, ISM is framed in terms of treat as it may imply the arrival of 'potential terrorist' in the national soil. The treat frame emerged further within the higher education domain, spread mostly among the academic guild, where it is grounded on a series of negative perceived consequences such as the loss of quality in education or the substitution of Italian with English, and most importantly, as a treat to the status quo of the higher education system, as largely discussed by chapter four. International students are also seen as a treat as they are entitled to student aid programs and they do not pay fees.

The second frame emerged is of ISM as a necessity, anchored to far pragmatic consideration such as benchmarking, especially in relation to the Erasmus and the Bologna process. This frames has a clear European-driven origin, and it was originally grounded in a wider positive understanding of mobility in terms of academic values such as knowledge exchange and social cosmopolitan values. This frame emerges however to have substituted the original European-driven frame of ISM as a socio-cultural opportunity. The evidence presented showed such frame never became dominant within the Italian HE system. As a result, two contrasting frames of ISM remain present within the single higher education sector, as the ministerial level seems to approach ISM more as a necessity than an opportunity, while the academic guild sees it as a treat. This is also the case for MAECI, where, contextually to the treat frame, a frame of ISM in terms of opportunity emerged: more recent and definitely minoritarian, it has been developed around an approach of ISM light of its potential for the development of Italian economic diplomacy and trade: it constitutes the first frame of ISM in terms of ISM as an opportunity, as well as the first attempt to develop a transversal goal that bridges together the domains of higher education, foreign policy, trade and even labor market for the country.

A new frame of ISM as a treat also emerged following the steep increase of Chinese international students - which so far count for about the 40% of international students – in Australia. Chinese students are perceived as a strong treat to the quality of foreign students. Moreover, their enormous weight in domestic revenues of institutions also fuelled a frame of ISM as a treat which overexpose the domestic higher education system to market fluctuation of one single country. Being that country China, contextually an economic partner and a potential military treat, this frame found relevant ground and it is currently clearly visible among actors, while – at least prior to the pandemic – it resulted to be minoritarian. Since 2016, moreover, as presented in relation to PI in political commitment, the transversal goal around ISM emerged strongly weaken by the current governmental political position in the field of migration, which directly contrast with the basis of the over Australia 'traditional' transversal approach to mobility.

In conclusion, Australia currently presents high level of policy integration in this dimension rather than full integration, after a backward process begun in 2016. In Italy, instead, integration in policy goals and frames appear to be at a 'low' level also at the end of the timeframe of this analysis. Current frames of ISM are largely incompatible among each other, and the development of integration in this dimension imply a loss of core value of at least one key actors' subsystem. Domestic actors emerged aware of both the presence of contrasting frames of ISM and to the dearth of a common direction to pursue, and some timid attempt to overcome this impasse emerged since about a decades. However, the 'treat' frame emerged to be currently the predominant across the country.

5.2.5 Policy Integration in Instruments

Table 5.8 | Scale of integration				
absent	**low**	**medium**	**high**	**full**

	absent	low	medium	high	full
Policy Instrument	Policy instruments are merely sectoral and they conflict among each other. The set of instruments derives by layering. Policy instruments have different and contrasting policy objectives.	Policy instruments are merely sectoral and they may conflict among each other, having different policy objectives. Basic cross-sectoral instrument have been developed	Some cross-sectoral sets of instrument are developed, and they take into account both multiple goals, policies and level of policy making. However, some instruments are sectoral-oriented and may contradict each other.	The set of instruments developed is cross-sectoral and allow to meet cross-sectoral goals. Policy instruments are coherent to multiple goals and levels, but relevant negative externalities are still in place	The set of instruments developed is cross-sectoral and allow to meet cross-sectoral goals. Policy instruments are coherent to multiple goals, policies and level of policy-making. Minor or desirable negative externalities may be present
AUSTRALIA	(until 1985)	(1985-1989)	(1989-1999)	(1999-2010) (2016-present)	(2010-2016)
ITALY	(until 1987)	(1987-present)			

Table 5.8 | Policy Integration in policy instruments

As in many others, also in this dimension of integration Australia and Italy shown a common ground of departure and a very different evolution in time. In both countries, there were no transversal policy instruments implemented in the eighties. Instruments belonged only to the policy domain of aid cooperation, and were confined to aid scholarship and mobility schemes. Immediately after the launch of the full-fee policy, new instruments transversal to a number of policy domains have been developed in Australia, starting with the new visa policy entered in force in 1986, the creation of the OSO, the introduction of the ESOS Act and the CRICOS register in 1991. As discussed, the government also intervened directly with the establishment of an ad hoc bodies such as AIEF (later AIE), and with the funding additional of ad hoc ISM programs, with a focus on education (i.e. the Endeavour and Merit Scholarship) and on foreign policy (AusAid mobility schemes). Over the time, moreover, a number of cross-sectoral policy instruments were transversal in their own nature, such as the introduction of work rights during/after degree, the MODL and later the SOL, the PRISM database, and the OS-HELP loans. In Italy, instead, despite a very wide range of policy instruments have been embraced to develop, implement and promote the international mobility of students, the analysis revealed the dearth of implemented transversal policy instruments. The few implemented, notably the exchange programs of MAE-Crui internship, Invest Your Talent in Italy and Turandot, resulted limited in their scope and profile. The annual inter-ministerial circular, basic cross-sectoral instrument since ever in place, result to be a procedural instrument implemented with great variation.

As already in other dimensions of policy integration several inconsistencies among instruments were in place in the first phase of Australian policy development around ISM. The biggest concerns were related to visa and permits policy instruments, which harmed the higher education institutions new objective of recruiting foreign students and in turn the implementation of the full fee paying students. As discussed in chapter III, it was after the China crisis of 1989, which made manifest these inconsistencies, to that Australia swiftly responded with the development of cross-sectoral instruments, in the first place the risk assessment system, which mixed the necessity of the foreign affairs, immigration and higher education institutions (something similar happened also with the PRISM register). Italy never developed any similar system, and main concerns related to security are yet a key obstacle for the development of international student mobility, as the country has no infrastructure to track, assess and monitor the mobility of students.

TABLE 5.9 | Overview of cross-sectoral policy instruments currently implemented		
	AUSTRALIA	**ITALY**
Cross-sectoral policy instruments	C.R.I.C.O.S. Register and P.R.I.S.M database	Annual Inter-ministerial Circular
	Immigration Risk Rating System Simplified Student Visa Framework	
	Education Visa Consultative Committee	
	Council of International Education Student Ombudsman Office	Uni-Italia
	ESOS Act	
	New Colombo Plan Australian Awards	Invest Your Talent in Italy program Marco Polo program MAE-CRUI internship program
	Global Alumni Strategy	2017 National Strategy for the Promotion of the higher education system abroad
	National Strategy for International Education 2025	
SOURCE: Author elaboration		

Table 5. 9 - Overview of cross-sectoral policy instruments currently implemented

Despite Australia developed highly integrated policy instruments over the time, evidence point out to a core contradiction in the set of instrument embraced around ISM. In fact, after decades of its enforcement, the full fee trade policy is showing important negative externalities in both the higher education and foreign policy domains, as discussed already above. With this caveat in mind, at time one of the analysis, evidence revealed that Australia reached an high level of policy integration in this dimension, while Italy shows a low level in integration in policy instrument, with dis-integration rather than integration manifest.

5.2.6 Turbulent event and policy integration

Despite rarely assessed in the study of policy integration, the framework developed fully includes turbulent event: this conclusive paragraph of the analysis of integration in process illustrates preliminary empirical evidence on this regard, setting the ground to confirm the theoretical expectation emerged by past research.

In both cases, turbulent events of different type and with different scope occurred, and had a relevant role in the overall evolution of PI, acting both as PI drivers and breaks. Moreover, turbulent events occurred in several dimension of PI, at the level of the institutional-policy domestic context, in political commitment, in policy frames and goals and actors' subsystem relations. The evidence collected shows that shocks are not negative by definition for the process of development of policy integration.

In Australia, turbulent events often tightened rather than disrupted PI development, at least beyond the initial 'emergency' phase. For example, following the China crisis of 1989, Australia begun to develop the risk assessment, in this way responding to pressure of the immigration department and providing a solution to the different priorities of domestic departments in relation to ISM (in short developing basic technology to manage flows). Also the reaction to the so called 2008 perfect storm set the ground for the development of both the current Australian public diplomacy strategy on which ISM has been grounded, and the 'whole of government approach' to international education which lead to the CIE establishment.

Turbulent events also emerged, in some case, to constitute direct profitable policy windows for policy integration. In both countries, and across the entire timeframe under analysis, some of them occurred and they had the capacity to activate a process of ISM re-framing, allowing to encompass an additional

policy domain. The switch points of 1983 (integration between HE and trade field), 1987 (Erasmus introduction), 1999 (integration between HE, trade, labor marked and skilled migration), 2008 (Australia begin to integrated also the foreign policy domains), and 2010 (MAE ministerial reorganization) provide large evidence to support this claim - leaving aside the fact that policy windows in Italy always turned to be lost occasion of change.

Disruptive turbulent events that strongly affected, negatively, the process of policy integration however occurred in both countries, as in the case of the period around 2003 in Italy, with the stiffening of international affairs contextually to the launch of the Erasmus mundus program.

Par excellence, Covid-19 emerged to be the most disruptive for Australia. One after the other, the pillars of the entire framework developed around ISM strongly felt the outbreak implications: in the first place, enormous numbers of students found themselves stranded abroad at the eve of the beginning of the Australian academic year, including a relevant part of the biggest single source of income for Australian higher education institutions, which in turn collapsed overnight. Consequently, due to the persistent forced closure of companies, huge numbers of temporary residents outside social security scheme – among which many students – found themselves with any income, to the point that the Prime minister suggested them to go back home, revealing all together the many weakness of Australian temporary migration policy, core of the framework around ISM since the MODL abolition. Thirdly, the pandemic turned to be a diplomatic war and a true break to Australian-Sino relations, enlightening the contradictions of grounding ISM to the core of Australian Indo-Pacific containment strategy against China, its main commercial partner and source country of international students.

In conclusion, this preliminary overview on turbulent events provides valuable evidence showing the relevance of both endogenous and exogenous events. Further, on the way turbulent events may activate a process of re-framing of a transversal issue leading to the inclusion of an additional policy domains to the process of integration development, or in contrast activate a disrupted domino effect that may structurally impact an integrated policy. Table 5.10 below presents a systematic overview of turbulent events occurred.

TABLE 5.10 | Turbulent event to Policy integration process around ISM policies (external in bold)		
	AUSTRALIA	**ITALY**
To the institutional-policy context	1988, Introduction of unified system	2001, Constitutional Reform 2010, MAECI ministerial reorganization
To political commitment	1985, Full fee policy introduction 1999, Direct link He-immigration 2013, New Colombo Plan introduction 2017, Loss of commitment	1987, **Erasmus Introduction** 1999, **Bologna Declaration signature** -509/99 introduction
To policy goal and frames	1999, Direct link He-immigration 2008, Melbourne (development of the soft power frame of ISM as treat to quality and foreign policy) 2020, **Covid-19 outbreak**	1987, **Erasmus introduction** (Mobility framed in European terms) 2003, **Stiffening of international relation panorama** 2010, economic diplomacy
To actors' subsystem relations	1999, Direct link He-immigration 2008, Melbourne (development of the whole of government approach) 2020, **Covid-19 outbreak**	1987, Erasmus Introduction 2003, Mobility as a treat 2010, MAECI ministerial reorganization, Uni-Italia establishment
Source: Elaboration of the author		

Table 5.10 Turbulent event to Policy integration process around ISM policies (external in bold)

5.3 Policy Integration In Output

TABLE 5.11	IPISM Ideal-type	
Building blocks	**Qualitative Indicators**
Presence of clear and transversal policy goal and political commitment to it	ISM is transversally framed across sectors, and it is a national priority. ISM is transversally mentioned in political discourse and policy documents coherently to its cross cross-sectoral policy goal.
Establishment of ad hoc bodies and clear appointments of tasks to providers of ISM related services	An ad-hoc national body (or more) have been established to manage ISM. Competences have been clearly assigned to actors of ISM involved in ISM management Actors involved engages in joint actions to promote ISM
Establishment of ad hoc transversal policy framework, technology and resources transversal to field involved	There is a shared definition of international student mobility which encompass its many declinations (for study, research, training, short and long term, by level of study); There is a clear cross sectoral policy framework for ISM, and of optimum levels of funding to promote the integrated policy. Full technology to map and assess the new policy is implemented There are several cross-sectoral initiative to promote ISM are in force.
Presence of coherence between ISM transversal goal and sectorial objectives, frames and instruments across policy levels and fields	ISM had been developed and implemented according to a jointly cross-sectorial policy goal, common across levels and fields. Success of the integrated policy do not harm specific policy domains Important negative externalities are identified and tackled

Table 5.11- IPISM Ideal-type

As largely discussed, the analytical framework developed approaches PI as a continuous process of development which manifest itself in a number of dimensions, and the output of PI is considered as a *caesura* in time of a wider process. Although so, a direct assessment of the two countries under analysis at the end of the timeframe has been carried out as it allows to deepen the understanding of the overall extent to which PI occurred, whose result are briefly reported below.

As discussed in chapter II, an ideal type of an integrated policy has been developed to this regards. Given the dearth of policy assessment in the literature around national policy on ISM, the IPISM ideal type has been developed almost from scratch. It is based on four different pillars, each of which constitutes a pre-condition for the presence of an implemented integrated policy. Table 5.11 above reports the operationalization of these four pillars, showing the qualitative indicators on which each pillar has been assessed, which span across the dimensions of integration investigated in the previous sections in light of their intrinsic connections. The section presents the result of this assessment of the two case study against these four pillars in the first place, and provides a final assessment of the results, providing the conclusive empirical evidence and therefore setting the ground for the final section of this chapter.

5.3.1 Presence of clear and transversal policy goal and related political commitment

The first pillar of the IPISM developed cuts across two different dimensions of policy integration, notably PI in political commitment and policy integration in frames and goals.

As the previous section illustrated, a transversal policy goal around ISM has been developed and it has been solid and predominant across the Australian cross-sectoral governance system for about two decades. Moreover, ISM is a crucial issue for the entire country, it is often mentioned both in political discourse and in policy and institutional documents of a number of different policy fields, including some not considered by this analysis, first and foremost tourism and research and development policies.

In the case of Italy, there is not clear transversal goal to pursue in relation to ISM, despite the recent discussed timid transversal attempt to frame it bridging the domain of higher education, foreign policy and trade of MAECI. ISM is rarely mentioned by institutional and policy documents, and, even when mentioned, references are vague and information partial. ISM is not a priority in the country. Political commitment is missing, and the issue still need to enter the political discourse and its agenda.

Rather than a truly transversal policy goals, different and often contrasting policy sectorial objectives emerged to be linked to ISM.

In Australia, instead, evidence point out a loss of transversal and to more short term political commitment to ISM only in the late stage of analysis. Since few years, in fact, political governmental objectives within the migration spaces appear to contrast to the dominant transversal goal pursued since the late eighties. The latter, moreover, appears also questioned by Australian current foreign policy, as inbound flows seems to directly weaken Australian strategy of Chinese containments in the Indo-Pacific rather than strengthen it.

5.3.2 Establishment of an ad hoc bodies and clear appointments to providers of ISM related services

In Australia, several institutional bodies have been constituted ad hoc for the purpose of ISM over the time, and a number of other existing bodies have been appointed specific tasks. Currently, the most relevant national body for ISM is the CIE. In Italy, instead, there is not national agency, body or unite of any kind in charge of managing issues transversally in relation of mobility, as it happens in the large majority of European countries. Uni-Italia, a recent body created within the ministry of foreign affairs, jointly with the education and the interior ministries, constitutes the closest attempt to the establishment of an ad hoc national body which has the promotion and implementation international student mobility as its core goal.

In both countries, an increasing involvement over the time of foreign affairs ministries at the expenses of the one of education in the national panorama of actors emerged. Both process begun in the late 2000, in Italy with the establishment of the DGSP and indeed with the creation of Uni-Italia. In Australia, in 2010, IE group tasks were substantially lowered and transferred to Aus-trade and Aus-Aid, agencies under the control of the DFAT. Moreover, following the suppression of the Leadership program, DFAT manages every mobility program in force in Australia, exception made for Destination Australia.

In Australia, ISM related tasks and competences are divided among few domestic bodies, notably the DET troughs mostly the IE group, DFAT with its unite on scholarships, AUS-aid and AUS-trade, the home department who enforce the SSVF, jointly with higher education institutions, peak bodies, state and local governments. Australia emerge as currently characterized by a rich and efficient panorama of domestic actors engaged in the development, promotion and assessment of international student mobility. Several stakeholders' peak bodies have been established and are currently relevant actor for the policy process around ISM, and institutional bodies have clear division of competences. IIEA, for example, acts as the convener of CIE.

In Italy, the Ministries of education and the one of foreign affairs are in charge of 'promoting internationalization', the first one of the higher education and the second one more generally of the country system. Within the department of foreign affairs, five different unites, in different ways and with different manners, are involved by ISM development and implementation (notably the General Direction for the Country System, the Visa Centre, the General Direction for Italian Culture and Language, the Unite for bi and multilateral Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the General Direction for International Cooperation). The ministry of immigration has also two different offices involved to manage ISM, the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration and the Department of Public Security – Central Direction of Immigration and of border control. Any institutional body or institutional mechanism of coordination among these body has been established, and the inter-ministerial circular setting the yearly quota of foreign student admitted is the most important cross-sectoral instrument in place. There is a 'control room' for international Italy - Cabina di Regia per l'Italia Internazionale – and another *Cabina di regia* – CIPE V Commissione Permanente – which included the General Direction for the country system, further complicating the panorama of actors which have a say in issue strongly connected to international student mobility. Finally, the MIUR has one general direction for the internationalization of the higher education system, while another general direction

hosts the national authority for Erasmus funds. There is the national agency for Erasmus implementation, INDIRE, and the several regional bodies for the right to study. Stakeholders did not established any peak bodies as it happened in the case of Australia, are represented by the CRUI, and involved with Uni-Italia for what regards flows of Chinese students and marketing. The figures 5.12 and 5.13 below graphically represent the cross-sectoral governance system current present in Australia and Italy.

Table 5.12 Panorama of key bodies involved by ISM in Australia

Table 5.13 - Panorama of key bodies involved by ISM in Italy

TABLE 5.14 | Australia, National body for ISM, selected quotes of expert interviews

I've done lots of different governments committees. This is the most powerful government committee I think I've ever been although... It's probably because it reports to six ministers… So what you get is every other committee reports to one minister and then they take it to cabinet and they have to… but when you've got six they have to worked it out among them.
I was so impressed with what was sitting there there's like nine of us who are just regular members and then the six ministers… Powers… And I raise the question mark said 'well you know' we're having this real problem with getting visas for PhD students, it's taking too long to get it… And I had the Science Minister on one side, I had the Immigration Minister on the other side and the science minister looks down to the Immigration Minister and says 'you've got to fix this or I'm not going to meet my targets'… So that's what I mean by having said that… They could really push each other… …
Well... structurally the challenge of policy coordination has been resolved… theoretical… through a ministerial council… I mentioned the ministerial council if you look at the structure of that it involves I think a five federal ministers meeting with 15 representatives of all… of the education sector not just university staff and EIAA and also. And I think EIAA chairs that council… So structurally there's been a breakthrough, what actually happens within… within the discussions… who sets the agenda, because I'm not sure industry sets the agenda. I think it's set by a government… I think there's probably a gap still, between the idea and the reality, structurally there is something now and theoretically the ministers all there together are getting a whole of government approach to it.
So... it was that lack of coordination of different agencies which allowed the disaster ... And so… really what meant the solution to that now is the National Council for International Education and so on… that council it's chaired by the Ministry of Education but also has the Minister for Immigration, Trade, the International Education Association, Universities Australia, TAFE Directors Australia… a public vocational providers', schools, peak bodies, and so on and representative… I think from the state so much… But that group I think it's like 16 people they meet every month or two. And they talk about key issues in the sector. And so if there's an issue that one department has raised its referred to the appropriate department and then they have to do something and report back to the next meeting … all the key stakeholders is sitting around the table and it's very visible who's acting and who's not. And so that's it's something that the association was very active in pushing for a long time, and now the CEO of the IEAA, Phil Honeyhood, he is the convenor of that group
So I think where one of the only countries in the world that actually have the Council for International Education, and that has I think six in six government ministers sitting on it, which is which is quite amazing and we also have individual experts from the sector. So having that kind of focus from six ministers is quite unusual no matter what the policy space. So it's definitely, you know the focus is definitely intentional, It's a really important area [...] And that's I guess the reason why the count that was developed so that we could have all those different voices at the table and talking about the same issues …and trying to find how we can create better support for international students, and address the issues that are coming up in this sector because there are certain things that government can do but there are also a lot of things that government can't do… … But the sector may be able to say that's kind of it's the challenge of council is that there's so many different voices but it is also its greatest asset because it's the one way we get all the different voices at one table talking about the same things… .
I think the government has intention with that too... what is the Council of International Education… the International higher education…which is relatively recent, I think setting up something like that… is definitely a step in the right direction in creating a truly systematic approach to inbound and outbound across all levels…
I think the … … you know like I said we're one of the only countries that have the council something like our council … and that's sort of where we can at least start to have those more joined up discussions and start to create that coordination and it's happening a lot already we also have... …

SOURCE: Interview material, held in Australia, Nov-Dec 2018

Table 5.14 - Australia, national body

5.3.3 Establishment of ad hoc transversal policy framework, technology and adequate resources

The current legislative framework in force around ISM in Australia results developed. The normative cuts across a number of policy domains both for inbound and outbound flows, as shown by table 5.8 below. It should be highlighted that it does not respond to the increasing concerns on the quality of Australian degrees with disproportionate number of international students, neither about the language requirements to follow an academic courses, with institutions setting their own requirements. In Italy, an endless number of laws, D.P.R., d.p.c.m., legislative and ministerial decrees, plus ministerial notes, currently regulate the many aspect of international student mobility. Out of three main reforms of the Italian higher education system, three reforms of immigration and two on international cooperation promulged in the timeframe of this research, only few articles are dedicated to the matter. There is not consequently a transversal policy framework around ISM. By contrast, many incoherence and conflicts among national legislations in different (and in some case in the same) policy domains constitutes one of the crucial obstacles to the development of international student mobility.

Australia appears as equipped with the necessary technology to steer mobility, and it is also equipped with a development data collection and assessment system which allow to control the phenomenon development. Clear definitions of mobility are present, despite they are not always comparable with foreign/international definition (they distinguish for incoming and outbound flows, short and long terms mobilities, mobility for study, research and internship, level of degree). Further, as section 3.4 revealed, an enormous number of reports and studies have been commissioned over the years to study the phenomenon, including surveys to cover relevant aspects not assessed directly.

In Italy there is not a clear definition of mobility, nor a sub-definition by purposes, level of study or length of time (while the situation is better within the framework of the Erasmus program, whose model is the one largely taken into account). Italy has not a comprehensive dataset on its student population. Several actors collect data that are often contrasting or not comparable. Information is still provided in annual reports of national ministries, and any cross-sectoral database is available. Very few reports and studies have been undertaken to study and investigate the phenomenon beyond the framework of the single ERASMUS program and the Bologna Process, for which there is instead plenty of research.

Despite high amount of resource is invested to promote and implement ISM in Australia, the current policy in force clearly emerges as not sustainable in the long term. The overdependence on Chinese students, which account more than the forty per cent of international students is the true Achille heels of the entire policy developed in Australia around ISM. Already evident following the 2008 events with the fluctuation of Indian students, it became a huge boomerang as the pandemic outbreak hit Australian universities. Support to outbound mobility increased instead over the time, including funds to universities to organize mobility programs and directly to students, with the establishment of the OS-HELP load and the abolition of its up-front fee, but are still far way to become a normal experience for Australian students.

Italy is characterized instead by scarce resource to implement international student mobility. As discussed, lack of funds has been found to be one of the key obstacles for outgoing mobility within the framework of the Bologna Process research effort and of the ERASMUS, that remains itself an 'elitist' program mostly engaging students whose family can importantly invest in their education. Moreover, the persistent underfunding of higher education institutions, which attempt to address this issue, affect both incoming and outgoing flows.

TABLE 5.15 | ISM Current legislative framework in force in Australia and Italy

Policy Field		AUSTRALIA	ITALY
Higher Education	Recognition of previous studies	Recognition of previous studies depends on the profession and it is assessed by Australian states. For the purposes of studying, universities are in charge of assessing previous studies prior to admission. The main criteria is having a comparable qualification to the one granted by the 12th year of secondary schools. Foundation years to reach entry requirements are commonly offered by higher institutions	Formally, the recognition of foreign qualification is on behalf of universities for academic degrees and to the Ministry of Education in the case of PhDs. A crucial requirements for the admission to first cycle is the e main criteria is the prove of 12 schooling years. Italy ratified Lisbon Convention and the issue is regulated by law 148/2002, but large disparity in its application emerged. Foundations years to reach criteria are not commonly available
	Funding	The government supports higher education institution for the promotion of outbound student mobility, thanks a dedicated line of funding, currently within the framework of the New Colombo Plan. Universities and other bodies sponsor a number of additional scholarships to fund mobility experiences.	There is a National Fund for mobility, established in 2003 by law 170/2003. The Ministry of education also allocates a 500€ scholarship to outgoing students (DPCM 9/04/2009), which regional bodies and single universities top up within the framework of the Erasmus program. A fund for bright students has been also established by the ministerial decree 755 of 4/09/2013 Additional support is offered by regional and local bodies, but no systematic evidence exists (regulations are anyways not nationally relevant.
	Incentives	Universities retains full fees from international students*	ISM is included in the performance base quota according to which the Ministry allocate funds to universities, and it is considered by quality assurance procedures*
	Quality and Accreditation	Higher Education institutions offering courses to international students must be registered to the C.R.I.C.O.S. register and must follow the National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students	Higher education institutions are assessed by national quality assurance procedures that include international student mobility
	Ad hoc programs	Destination Australia [inbound] A large number of institution offers a range of mobility opportunities	Beyond the Erasmus+, any national mobility scheme exists. However, most universities, grants scholarship to study, research and training abroad. A number of regional programs usually called Master & Back also finance student mobility.
	Portability of scholarship/grants/loans	The government support outgoing students with the OS-HELP loans scheme, which fund mobility abroad and it is increased for exchange within the Indo-Pacific Area. Full Portability is present.	Scholarships, grants and loans are partially portable
	Information/awareness campaign	Within the framework of the New Colombo Plan, an important awareness campaign to promote outbound student mobility has been implemented.	Any awareness campaign implemented. Some efforts emerged around the Erasmus program.

Source: Elaboration of the author basing on policy documents

*As the two HE systems belong to different tradition, this 'incentive' shall not be directly compared

Table 5.15 – Legislative Framework

TABLE 5.15 CONTINUED | ISM Current legislative framework in force in Australia and Italy

POLICY FIELD	AUSTRALIA	ITALY

Immigration	Range of different visas and permits	Recently reformed (in 2016), visa and permits are legislated by the Simplified Student Visa Framework (SSVF), key component of the National Strategy for International Education 2025. Two different visa are present, the student visa and the Student guardian. Students can also bring their spouse, including same-sex partners, and dependents, including children's' and parents.	The legislative framework is set by the Testo Unico dell'Immigrazione, law 40/1998. A range of different visa may be granted to international students, and there is wide variation in the normative implementation. The overall system is based on quotas available as according to the higher education institution supply.
	Admission requirements	Defined by the SSVF, among the many: incoming students need to fulfil English requirements as according to the institutions guidelines and course chosen, be enrolled or in exchange into an Australian Institution, have an health insurance, demonstrate to have adequate financial capability and meet course requirements.	Defined by law 40/1998 and its following modifications (PD. N394/1999, Law no 189/2002, PD n. 334/2004, DL 154/2022, DL 17/2008, ID 11/05/2011, DL 108/2012, LD 163/2017, DA 71 of 11/04/2018. Among the many, students must fulfil language requirement, have an health insurance, demonstrate adequate financial capability. There is wide discretion in the application of the normative.
	Language requirements	A range of international English certificated are recognised to apply	Adequate knowledge of Italian may be assessed by consular representations, by Italian Cultural Institutes abroad and as per certificated released by the two universities for foreigners and the Dante Alighieri company (PLILDA).
	Procedures to apply/grant visas and permits	The procedure to apply is made online via the ImmiAccount, on the website of the Department of Home Affairs. International students are tracked via the PRISM system, which dialogue with the C.R.I.C.O.S. register.	The procedure to apply is mostly based on paper. There is no digital procedure and it is necessary to reach the closest consular seat/embassy.
	Risk Assessment System	The Immigration Risk Rating (IRR) is based on the overall evidence level based on a range of indicators related to students and providers and countries, under the Simplified Student Visa Framework, as per SSVF.	The granting of the visa is competence of the diplomatic seat abroad and it understate the approval of the consul appointed. The possibility to recur has been introduced in 2013.
Foreign Policy	International Cooperation	International Student Mobility is considered within the 2014 *Australian aid: promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability* Australian Awards the main program to implement this policy vision.	Universities are recognised as actors competent for international cooperation activities as per law 125/2014. A number of binational universities and cooperation scheme have been implemented.
	Diplomacy	International Student Mobility constitutes a pillar of Australian economic diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific Area as according to the 2017 Foreign Policy White Papers Australia Global Alumni Strategy [GAS]	ISM is indirectly legislated by the normative around the internationalization of Italian companies and of the integrated promotion of the country system. Universities as relevant actors for the development of the country economy, as per Law 56/2004 and 56/2005, and their successive modifications.
	Ad hoc programs/actions	New Colombo Plan [diplomacy, outbound] Australian Awards Scholarships [International cooperation, inbound] Australia Awards pacific Scholarships [international cooperation, for Pacific students to go in another Pacific country]	Bi-National Universities [France, Germany, China, Turkey] MAE CRUE internship [diplomacy, outbound] Marco Polo Program [inbound] Invest your Talent in Italy [inbound] MAECI scholarship [inbound]

Source: Elaboration of the author basing on policy documents

POLICY FIELD		AUSTRALIA	ITALY
Labor-Market / Trade	Consumer protection	ESOS Act	/
	Trade policies	Full Fee Policy to international students	/
	Permits to work during/after studying	International students can work during their studies for a maximum of 40 hours each fortnight (14 days period). They can remain in Australia for working purposes for a number of years depending on the years of their degree. The Graduate Work stream provides further chances to remain longer in Australia. Students may qualify for permanent residence	International students can work during the period spent in Italy with a student visa. They must respect condition limiting them to work full time for six month each year or part-time all year long. Students can stay in Italy for a number of years as their degree after graduation, and a graduate visa has been introduced. However, these policies are yet not fully implemented .
	Marketing Campaign	AUStrade runs marketing campaign systematically both online and abroad	Release of the first National Strategy for the Promotion of the Higher System Abroad in 2017 as per law 232/2016
Other policy fields	Health Policies	Overseas Student Health Cover (OSHC), or MEDICARE if bilateral agreement in force	International students must enrol to the Italian National Health System
	Housing Policies	No National framework. States are responsible of housing policies. The large majority of Australian higher education institution have campuses which welcome international students.	Regional bodies for the 'right to study' manages students accommodation to which international students are eligible. Neglectable numbers are however available on a national scale. No national framework.
	Right to Study	/	International Students are eligible for national scholarship, basing on the ISEE parameter, as domestic students
	Others state benefits	Scholarships are tax exempted	Scholarships are tax exempted
	Data Collection and Assessment	DFAT sponsors the Australia Awards Global Tracer Facility; The International Education group of the Department of Education regularly provides statistical information about ISM. AUStrade manages the MIP Orbis interactive data, which provide detailed and processed data. The department of Home Affairs provides open, longitudinal and detailed data about visas issued. DESE manages U-Cube and other databases which provide additional statistical evidence. The Australian Bureau of Statistics tracks a number of aspects related to student mobility. Data are available both for incoming and for outgoing students. The government regularly sponsors additional studies to assess the phenomenon, as departments involved do.	Data about international students mobility are not systematically collected. Data are comprehensive only within the framework of the Erasmus+ and Uni-Italia's coordinated programs. The national database ANS collects information only for students enrolling to bachelor and master programs, excluding PhDs and students enrolled to other types of degree, and it includes second and third generation migrants. MIUR manages three different databases containing statistical information, which overlaps to some extent with data provided by the national institute of statistics (ISTAT). Both MAECI and MIUR does not manage any database collecting the number of visas and permits, information published in annual reports. Almalaurea provides analysis and statistics on student mobility covering about the 90% of the student population.

Source: Elaboration of the author basing on policy documents

5.3.4 Presence of coherence between the transversal policy goal, in frames and instruments across levels and field

For what that regard this pillar of the integrated policy, Australia has been able to develop a coherent frame of ISM as an opportunity for the country, and to attach several but clear and interlinked policy objectives to it in a number of policy domain, shared also by actors involved in different level of policy making. A contrasting frames of ISM as a treat, yet strongly minoritarian, emerged however as spread in a number of domains in the last decade, and sees ISM as a treat both for the domestic higher education system quality and for country security.

In Italy, a timid first attempt to decline ISM in terms of economic diplomacy appear to have set the ground, at least formally, for the development of a transversal policy goal attached to ISM which involves several policy domains, as well as to increase the relevance of ISM across the country. However, the latter is not dominant and not shared by domestic actors. Objectives attached to ISM still differs across policy domains and within policy levels. Contrasting frames of ISM are present both within and across fields and levels.

As the entire chapter largely introduced, Australia was able to implement an integrated policy on the international student mobility, at least in part. However, current evidence pinpoints that the success of such policy is having important negative externalities in a number of policy domains.

5.3.5 Remarks

The empirical evidence derived from the analysis of PI in output definitely support the preliminary findings emerged by the previous section. In the very first place, this additional assessment add precious insights on the crucial role of the presence of political commitment to reach a well-defined transversal policy goal for the overall PI process, summarizing what already emerged by the analysis of the two related dimension of its process. Second, it offer a more detailed big pictures of the cross-sectoral governance system PI development implies, showing its dynamics in a case where higher level of PI were reached and the one of Italy yet strongly shaped by sectorial dynamics and fragmentation in its vertical tier, therefore also adding insights on competences repartition, partially already addressed when discussing PI and the institutional context. Table 5.9 below provides a summary of this assessment in output.

TABLE 5.16 ASSESMENT OF IPISM DEVELOPMENT IN 2020, AUSTRALIA AND ITALY

	AUSTRALIA	ITALY
Presence of a clear and transversal policy goal around ISM and of political commitment to this goal	ISM is transversally framed across sector, and it is supported and implemented since decades with the ultimate long term goal of enhancing Australian prosperity. ISM continues to be mentioned in the political discourse and in policy documents across a range of policy domains, and it is a national priority. The ground of this transversal goal appears questioned in the very last period, in light of the negative externalities of the full fee policy over exposing higher education institutions to market volatility and harming the quality of HEIs given the disproportionate number of international students. Moreover, the constant political commitment to ISM vanished, also due to the interlinkage with migration policies, it has become short-term oriented.	ISM is not yet fully transversally framed, and there is not overall transversal goal according to which orient its promotion and development. ISM is rarely mentioned in political discourse, but it appears from time to time in policy documents in the fields of higher education, migration and foreign policy/economy. ISM is not a priority issue in Italy.
Presence of ad-hoc transversal policy framework, technology and resources transversal to field involved	Australia has a clear definition of international students, both for incoming and outgoing flows, declined for type of activity. A clear, comprehensive and materially implemented transversal policy framework around ISM is in force. A wide range of different technologies have been developed for its development, implementation and assessment. Consistent funds have been allocated for outbound mobility, but the policy is not sustainable for the incoming stream of students.	Italy has no clear definition of international students, and it follows criteria defined with the Erasmus/Bologna Process. There is no organic policy framework implemented and the legislation in force is implemented with great disparity, and the majority of recent intervention follow the reception of European regulation. The country misses the basic technology to develop, implement and assess ISM, and the lack of funds emerged as a key obstacle for ISM promotion.
Establishment of ad-hoc bodies/ providers of services to manage ISM or clear appointment to existing entities	The Australian Council for International Education is been established as a body of coordination among institutions and peak bodies involved. Prior to the council, AIEF later AEIF were established with the task of coordinating the policy process. A Ombudsman Student Office has also been established. Competences are clearly divided between institutions, the DET, DFAT (including AusAid and AUStrade), and Home Affairs among the others.	There is no ad hoc body developed for the handling of student mobility. However, CIMEA has been created and appointed as the NARIC/ERIC contact point, INDIRE as the national agency for the Erasmus program, and Uni-Italia as an agency for the promotion of the higher education system abroad. Competences among key players, MIUR, MAECI, the ministry of interior, regions and institutions are not clearly assigned.
Presence and coherence between the transversal policy goal, policy frames, instruments and across policy fields and actors' sub coalitions about ISM	Australia developed a main transversal goal according to which promote and develop ISM. However, a contrasting emerging policy frames of ISM as a treat questions the dominant frame of ISM as an opportunity for Australia and the consequent transversal goal of enhancing Australia prosperity. Moreover, policy instruments in the field of trade (the full fee policy) appear to harm both the higher education and foreign policy domains.	Different, not compatible and contrasting frames of ISM are currently spread among domestic actors, and undermines chance of developing a transversal policy goal according to which promote and develop ISM. Policy instruments in a number of sectors harm the overall policy objective of other policy domains. Strong disintegration emerges across domestic actors.

SOURCE: Authors' elaboration

Table 5.16 - Assessment of IPISM Development in 2020, Australia And Italy

5.4 Findings

The main goal of this doctoral dissertation has been the one to investigate the evolution of the policy making process around the transversal issue of ISM, exploring *how* and *to which extent* the process of PI occurred over the time in Australia and Italy. The research has both a theoretical and issue-based relevance, given that ISM has never been approached as a transversal issue, and most importantly, a comprehensive analytical framework according to which explain PI is missing although decades of research. The dissertation aimed therefore to test if the synthetic analytical framework developed is able to explain PI in its complexity. The framework has been grounded in institutional theory and it embraced an actor centred approach, allowing to carefully encompass domestic actors' dynamics as they are implied by any dimensions or axes in which integration occurs. Five main expectations have been derived to test the framework. I engage both in confirming already formulated ones or at least already tested in part (E1, E5), and derived new expectations (E2, E3, E4), as illustrated in chapter II. We shall discuss them below.

The evidence emerged revealed that in Australia the process of integration has found a fertile terrain: it has been favoured by profitable actors relations, as well as from an effective control room able to steer the whole public machine, in turn able to substantially implement reforms and adjust to profound processes of changes implied by PI development. Australia engaged in a profound public administration reform, until then poorly performant, already in the eighties. The Australia vertical belt of transmission works, and several governments have been able to substantially reform a number of policy domains, including those considered by this analysis. Governments have been able to embrace a steering at distance governance, to push and shape the system as according to long term political goals.

In Italy, instead, the institutional context acted as a true handbrake for the development of policy integration, as it implies fragmented and complex actors' relations across levels of policy making, policy domains, and both between and across institutional bodies and stakeholders. Previous sections showed Italy is characterized by a compromised vertical transmission belt, a procedural mode of governance, a party system with no core political culture, an old and inefficient public administration marked by high level of discretion, plus a Napoleonic-based academic system – all factor that negatively affected PI causing important contrasts among domestic actors. As discussed in chapter II, many of these factors have been considered and investigated in relation to PI. This framework understood instead the institutional context in a wider sense, and for this reason a number of its facets have been considered in the analysis.

The evidence emerged confirms expectation one (E1), according to which a wider understanding of the institutional domestic contexts allows to better grasp the domestic environment in which PI process occurs and develops. Already past work noted that the single formal form of state was not sufficient to look at the domestic context, enlightening the relevance of less formal multi-level governance dynamics. It is therefore worth to underline the extent to which findings in relation to the form of state confirm what argued by scholar pointing out the latter does not explain the PI development. First, while it could be intuitive to expect that federal countries show higher level of PI, findings show in fact a different reality. Second, they point out to the relevance of the administrative coordination. As the evidence presented in both chapter III and IV underlined, while Australia emerged to be equipped with a working and coordinated public administration 'able to push' toward the same direction, Italy emerged to be strongly fragmented and to miss the necessary hardware to jointly operate and push central and peripheric administration toward a common point of arrival. Third, the chapter enlightened the importance of the party system, as discussed for both case analysed. This work add therefore insights on the necessity to further expand the interpretation of domestic environments in the study of PI, as the exclusion of any element would strongly reduce the capacity of this dimension to grasp institutional dynamics in place strongly relevant for PI development.

As discussed in chapter two, the institutional policy context constitutes the 'boundary' of the domestic policy space. The framework developed acknowledges in fact that also external shocks and more generally 'events' may occur and impact or alter the domestic policy arena. Turbulent events have been therefore fully encompassed in the analysis of PI, also in light of past work pointing out to their relevance. Eventually, the evidence confirms that both exogenous and endogenous turbulent events impacted PI, occurring in a number of dimensions - notably of political commitment, policy goals and frames, and actor's subsystem relation. More specifically, evidence confirms

expectation two (E2), according to which external turbulent events can act both as activators or breaks to PI development, depending on the ability of the institutional policy context and the newly governance system emerged around the transversal issue to respond and tackle them. For example, in 1989, the 'china crisis' shock discussed in chapter III translated on the short term in a tightening of visas policy around foreign students, but it then driven a fast process of integration and resulted to be the ground for both the ESOS Act, the risk assessment system and the CRICOS register. As shown, also the 2008 event translated in the immediate push to policy disintegration in the very short term, with the abolition of the direct link between HE and immigration after almost a decades, but it soon became the playground of the so called 'whole of government approach to international education', culminating with the establishment of the International Council for International Education in 2016. By contrast, in Italy, both the Erasmus introduction, the Bologna declaration, each of them 'positive' events for the development of ISM, resulted instead to act as a break for its development as contrasting frames were present among domestic actors'. Contextually – although too early to be evaluated – the Covid-19 shock strongly disrupted the integrated policy implemented over the time by Australia, as the system had any plan b (despite domestic actors were aware of the inexistent room of manoeuvre to handle any kind of huge shock in Chinese flows of students).

Empirical evidence demonstrates also that turbulent events can act as policy windows of opportunity to reframe policy integration leading to the inclusion (or exclusion) of policy fields. As partly introduced, in fact, both turbulent external events and endogenous shocks turned to be windows of opportunity in this sense. First and foremost, this is the case of the 1999 Australian shift, which reframed the main goal of the overseas student policy evolving around a more complex transversal goal which included the immigration policy domain. While far smaller in scope, this is also true following the 2010 MAECI ministerial re-organization of 2010 in Italy, since when student mobility has been framed in terms of foreign policy and economic diplomacy allowing the development of at (least a formal) transversal goal, until then never emerged. Also 2008 events in Australia driven a re-framing of ISM grounded in the foreign policy domain, and to some extent also the Bologna Declaration drove a temporary shake of connections among higher education and international cooperation, culminated with the 2004 memorandum between MAE and universities.

Evidence also demonstrates that full level of PI may result in a too tighten integrated policy. To use other words, it shows that efforts of this transversal policy making exercise should focus on the search of the optimum level of integration (for a date integrated policy and in a date moment in time) rather than aspire to full levels of policy integration. This evidence already further insights on the extent to which a processual understanding of PI, unbounded by any normative 'positive' assumption, opens the path to more detailed and punctual analysis of PI. It derives that the evidence validates the third expectation (E3) of the framework, according to which full level of PI are after all not so desirable: a very tighten integrated policy has the intrinsic weaknesses of being too exposed to disruption by definition. Especially if not equipped with institutional and policy mechanisms thought to respond to turbulent events, a too tighten integrated policy may turn to be a boomerang on the long term. Covid-19 impact in Australia is of precious evidence to this regard, as it made manifest the real Achille heel of Australian IPISM until then developed, notably the overdependence on Chinese students. This findings underlines full level of integration may not be desirable by definition in

light of different reasons. Scholars pointed out high level of PI may have negative externalities and conflict with political values, such as decentralization, or lead to a normative undesirability of specialization (Candel 2019), to loss of autonomy (Meijers and Stead 2004), to turf and accountability (Peters 2018).

Another crucial conceptual premise of the analytical framework developed was the presence of political commitment and shared transversal policy goal and frames around the transversal issue as precondition for the development of integration. The evidence confirms the fourth expectation (E4) of the study. In both countries, in fact, the process of PI progressed in period marked by strong political commitments and clear transversal policy goal and frames in relation to ISM, while it has been blocked by or at least decreased in periods when political commitment was low or a transversal policy goal was weak or absent. Italy is a great example to show how political commitment has been crucial twice for the advancement of ISM development, fostering a process of integration among levels and fields both in the years of the Erasmus introduction and those following Bologna, which permitted the development of at least some basic technology to implement mobility. Both times, however, the country ended up in a situation of impasse following the decrease and then the total dearth of political commitment. By contrast, the end of more than thirty years marked by stable governments and strong political commitment to ISM in Australia emerged as already impacting the overall process of integration, which constantly developed since the eighties, while decisive moments of extraordinary political commitment allowed to reach very high levels of policy integration both across fields and level. While such a shift did not occurred in Italy, the evidence shown that also the 2010 MAECI reorganization in Italy enabled the development of a new frame of ISM declined around economic diplomacy policy objectives as an opportunity. Since that moment, an ad hoc bodies involved with international student mobility has been even established, and additional ad-hoc programs were developed together to cross-sectoral consultation venues for the first time.

We shall turn in conclusion to a core assumption of the analytical framework developed, concerning the multi-dimensional and multi-level processual understanding of PI, largely validated by empirical evidence presented above, confirming therefore expectation (E5). In Australia as in Italy, dimensions of integration did not developed according to a linear process, and different levels of integration coexisted, across the six dimensions of integration identified, in different moment of time, for brief or long periods, as tables 5.10 and 5.11 below summarize. At the same time, empirical evidence illustrated that mutual dependency exists among these dimensions, as each of them is necessary to reach advanced level of integration. This emerged to be especially true for the dimensions of policy integration in political commitment and in policy goal and frames, whose relation is evident both in the case of Australia – passing by a situation of institutionalized long term political commitment to ISM to a more politicized and short-term oriented commitment in few years with already visible consequences – and in Italy, where the persistent dearth of transversal political commitment reinforced sectorial oriented practices and frames around ISM, and most importantly, the long term features of its institutional policy context emerged to strongly integration development. While not assessed trough a qualitative scale, also the assessment of the institutional context revealed the extent of mutual dependency among these dimensions of policy integration.

TABLE 5.17 | LEVELS OF INTEGRATION DURING THE ANALYSED TIMEFRAME, AUSTRALIA AND ITALY

Dimension of PI	country	Absent PI	Low Pi	Medium PI	High PI	Full PI
PI in political commitment	**Australia**	until 1983	1983-1986	1986-1999 2016-present	1999-2008	2008-2016
	Italy	until 1987 1992-1999 2003-2008	1987-1992 1999-2003 2010-present			
PI in actors' relations	**Australia**	until 1985	1985-1989	1989-1999	1999-2013 2016-present	2010-2016
	Italy	until 2010	2010-present			
PI in policy goal and frames	**Australia**	Until 1985	1985-1989	1989-1999	1999-2010 2016-present	2010-2016
	Italy	Until 1987	1987-1999 2003-2010	1999-2003 2010-present		
PI in policy instruments	**Australia**	until 1985	1985-1989	1989-1999	1999-2010 2016-present	2010-2016
	Italy	until 1987	1987-present			

Table 5.17 - Levels Of Integration During The Analyzed Timeframe, Australia And Italy

**TABLE 5.18	IPISM in 2020**	**AUSTRALIA**			**ITALY**		
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
Presence of clear and transversal policy goal and political commitment to it			X	X		
Establishment of ad hoc bodies and clear appointments of tasks to providers of ISM related services			X	X		
Establishment of ad hoc transversal policy framework, technology and resources transversal to field involved		X		X		
Presence of coherence between ISM transversal goal and sectorial objectives, frames and instruments across policy levels and fields		X		X		

Table 5.18 - Levels of Integration by IPISM pillars, Australia And Italy

CONCLUSION

A concluding overview: strengthens and constrains of this research and future research path

The main goal of this doctoral dissertation was the one to investigate the evolution of the PI process in national policies around the transversal issue of ISM, exploring *why*, *how* and *to which extent* PI occurred over the time in Australia and Italy. Two main research questions drove this analysis, and notably, 'to which extent did Australia and Italy developed and implemented an integrated policy on international student mobility in 2020?' and 'Why and how did the process of policy integration occur and develop in Australia and Italy in relation to the international mobility of students, since the eighties onward?'. This section wraps up the entire dissertation, highlighting a number of constrains of this research in part already illustrated in chapter II, contextually linking them to further research path. In fact, important choices have been done when developing the boundaries of this dissertation and its research design, and a number of relevant aspects remained unexplored.

Evidence collected within this research sheds light on the motivations behind the initial input of PI around ISM in both countries, answering to one of the main driving question of the study, *why* PI process begun. Findings revealed it begun in response to exogenous pressure of different nature in the eighties, more grounded in trade in Australia and within geopolitics considerations in Italy. This period has been the playground setting the scene for ISM consequent development in both case. In the Australian case, PI occurred in response to changing international market dynamics of the time, to which Australia reacted opening its economy and 'becoming a friend' of a number of Asians neighbouring countries. Leaving behind its cooperation approach and establishing a market within HE, Australian approach was based on prospective Asian international students demands. In Italy, instead, the input which lead to overcome the sectorial foreign policy aid approach has been grounded within the larger process of European integration, peaking with the Erasmus program introduction. In both countries, these events reframed ISM perception of domestic actors, expanding it beyond the unique policy domain of international cooperation, which had been predominant until then.
Chapter I discussed extensively the extent to which national public policies regulating ISM remains a black box, as research developed mostly following specific and watertight lenses of analysis. This dissertation provided preliminary comparative evidence allowing

to un-pack ISM related national policy making process by policy domains, policy levels and according to the six dimensions of PI identified. The study responded therefore to another main question of this dissertation, shedding light on *how* this process of PI occurred in the two countries.

The manuscript illustrated the complex dynamics between domestic actors engaged at any stage of ISM development, as well as the extent to which they may have very different perceptions of this *phenomenon,* ranging from ISM as a worrying treat to ISM as a profitable national opportunity. It also presented a framework which allow to order the vast plethora of policy instruments that may be embraced for ISM implementation, and it illustrated the cruciality of the institutional policy context suggesting the necessity of addressing its several components. Further, evidence illustrated shed light on the crucial necessity of a clear, strong and stable transversal political will around ISM, which appeared as a key dimension of the overall process. Findings also shown the extent to which ISM development has been shaped by a number of exogenous and endogenous events, ranging from the introduction of key mobility programs to constitutional reforms. The evidence illustrated by chapters three, four and five also demonstrate the theoretical solidity of the analytical framework tested, which embraced an institutional actor centered approach basing on a processual, asynchronous and multi-dimensional understanding of PI. PI developed according to different speed and dynamics in different dimensions in both countries, showing however strict connections between many of them (as Candel and Biesbroek 2016 already demonstrated), in the first place the interlinkages between linking political commitment, actors' subsystem relations and political goal and frames. These conclusive pages expand the boundaries of this discussion, putting them in perspective.

In the first place, findings suggest the existence of hierarchy (of importance) among dimensions of integration. The dimension of political commitment emerged as a crucial dimension of the overall PI process, as its lack is able to block the entire PI development. To use different words, evidence analyzed suggest the presence of PI in this dimension constitutes a necessary condition for the evolution of the entire process, in line with results obtained by Steurer (2007) and Stead and Meijers (2004). This findings appear in line with traditional (see for example Briassoulis (2004) and Boyeller (2011)) and recent literature placing specific attention to the political component of integration, highlighting aspects related to party politics (see Trein and Ansell 2020, Maggetti and Trein 2021), political capacity (see Howlett and Saguin 2018, Candel 2019) and indeed to political commitment (see Dupont 2013). Each of this aspects of PI emerged by this analysis, as illustrated by the previous chapter. Notably, chapter three extensively shown the presence of a stable party system in the Australian context for decades as well as its bipartisan commitment to the issue. Further, the capacity to show an 'integrative leadership', as Crosby and Bryson (2014,57) called 'the work of integrating people, resources, and organization across various boundaries'. While Italian governments emerged not to be able to show such capacity, it is worth to underline the role played by Italian high level politicians in the development of the Erasmus program and of the Bologna Process, at least in their very early phases. Findings of this research highlights the necessity of more systematically address this political component of policy integration, perhaps developing a finer operationalization. Most specifically, aspects related to party politics shall be investigated more in detail in light of this evidence. Another avenue for further research related to the political dimension of PI would be the one to explore more in detail how external pressures on a transversal issue impact

political' responses, for example analyzing similar governments' response to pressure from the European Commission analyzing the case of the Erasmus program.

Findings also suggested higher level of PI in political commitment resulted to be linked to higher PI in the dimension of goal and frames. Chapter five discussed they seems to be more likely linked to the presence of a transversal goal, as well as to the presence of compatible, if not shared, policy frames of the transversal issue. This could be explained by the fact that the lack of strong political commitment on a transversal issue may strengthen sectorial perceptions and partial objectives, rather than fostering actors to jointly work for a common goal. These findings add evidence to the claims of Rietig (2018, nd) and Rietig and Dupont (2021), according to which the presence of compatible policy frames and political commitment around a transversal issue are crucial conditions for an integrated policy. Rieting (2018) even linked policy failure to the presence of 'contested belief' of actors, as finding suggested to be the case in Italy. Also findings by Cejudo and Michel (2021) confirm policy frames are among the three key instruments for the purpose of PI implementation. Consequently, findings of this dissertation suggest the political component of PI also seems to be crucial for the development of PI dimension of subsystem' actor relations, given its inevitable link to actor's preferences and interests. A possible venue of further research to this regard could also be the one to build on the concepts of internal and external actors' relation (Dupont 2013) as well as on Rieting (2018) collaborative and adversarial policy subsystems, as to further unpack the dynamics behind the complex cross-sectoral, multi-level and multi-actor governance system touched by the integration process, as well as the government's role, actors' preferences and aim.

Moreover, future research effort may explore the comparison of countries with similar level of political engagement around ISM. By way of example, the framework could be tested in countries which shows high level of political commitment, for instance Australia, Canada and Germany, or vice versa countries which show very political commitment to ISM similarly to the Italian case study. Scholars interested in the study of this issue may also build on this research to test this framework in more 'average' cases than Australia and Italy, or use it to explore whether recurring patterns of PI development appear in specific contexts (i.e. English Speaking Countries and Non-English Speaking Countries; between countries including education in GATS agreements and those who did not; to investigate the patterns within the signatures countries of Bologna Declaration). Moreover, this framework could be used to explore PI process around ISM in non-democratic contexts. The episodes of the killed Cambridge PhD Italian student in Egypt, the new national law enacted in Singapore, the moving of the Central European University are all events of strong relevance when it comes to student and academic mobility. In fact, while the research design section highlighted the motivation behind the selection of ISM within the larger framework of academic mobility due to feasibility constrains in the first place, the framework developed may be embraced in the future to advance current knowledge on national policies on academic mobility, encompassing additional policy domains.

As already addressed regarding the political component of policy integration, the operationalization of a number of dimensions observed to analyze the process of PI posed important methodological challenges of different kind. This research also highlights also that it is not sufficient to focus on single components of the institutional policy context, be they formal or informal, to explain PI. While the analytical framework developed took into consideration a number of aspects, a finer operationalization of this

dimension would surely strengthen the framework developed and help to better exploit its impact for policy integration. Moreover, further research may explore whether countries' institutional context characterized by cooperative and fruitful relations among domestic actors are associated to higher level of PI, as well as if a country administrative culture may help in explaining favorable or harsh context for PI development. The evidence emerged by this research also underlined a dramatic relevance of the administrative tier when tackling policy integration. The framework developed included this layer, given its wide understanding of the institutional policy context. However, findings of this research suggest the necessity of further unpacking and exploring the practical implications of policy integration at the administrative level. This insights could be more extensively analyzed in light of recent literature of the linkages among policy integration and administrative coordination. Similarly, further research could also explore the linkages among administrative capacity and the dimension of actors' subsystem relations.

Chapter three, four and five focused extensively on the plethora of policy instruments embraced by the two governments to implement the mobility of students. Evidence to this regards suggests that even if only a low-to-medium level of PI in instruments is reached, with few compatible sectorial and cross-sectoral policy instruments implemented, PI may develop in other dimensions (especially those of actors' relation and policy goal and frames). This was the situation of Australia following 1989, after that few basic policy instruments were enforced and resolved the most crucial problems emerged after the establishment of the full fee paying policy (notably, the CRICOS register to track institution, the ESOC Act which introduced consumer protection legislation, and the risk assessment system). At the same time, evidence also suggests that the disruption of PI in instruments along the vertical tier may lead to the disruption of PI in others dimensions, especially in actors' subsystem relations, as any effort of horizontal PI by any subsystem would be in vain. While this insight could constitute the base for further research, it is worth to note that the qualitative scale developed to assess PI in policy instruments enabled me to analyze the extent of policy integration *generally* in policy instruments, but resulted weak as a tool to analyze specific policy instruments and assess the extent to which a certain instrument may be considered transversal and integrated.

We shall now turn on the last driving question the entire analysis aimed to respond to, meaning the extent to which Australia and Italy implemented a national integrated policy around ISM. Building on the evidence illustrated by chapter three and four, and on the analysis carried out presented by chapter five, the answer to this question will not surprise the reader: Australia did implemented a 'developed integrated policy around the international mobility of students', while Italy shows a complete dearth of it. Throughout chapter III, and continuing with the previous two section, empirical evidence highlighted however also the Achille heel of the Australian policy framework around ISM, notably with overdependence by Chinese students' revenues. Table 5.18 in chapter five also enlightened that Australia did not reach full integration in two out of four pillars of the IPISM developed. The policy does not emerge in fact to be sustainable in the medium and short term, and its main pillars begun to contrast among each other, with success in one policy area harming other domains, especially those of higher education sector (and especially since the pandemic begun). Howlett and Ramesh (2009), defined an integrated policy a policy with 'a design in which, first, multiple policy goals can be coherently pursued at the same time, and, second, policy instrument mixes are consistent,

in the sense of being mutually supportive in the pursuit of policy goals': the current 'IPISM' implemented in Australia is instead characterized by some policy instruments which contrast among each other. Underdal (1980) stressed that a 'perfectly integrated policy' is a policy 'where all decisions and significant consequences of that same policy are recognized in decision premises, and policy options are evaluated on the basis of their effects on some aggregate measure of utility, and where the different policy elements are consistent with each other (Underdal 1980, 162), which as we saw, it is not always the case. In conclusion, this research shows that also in countries commonly considered frontrunner in light of their national framework around ISM, important constrains remain in place, adding evidence on the complexity governments face when handling the *phenomenon* also in those commonly considered as ISM frontrunner. This also adds empirical evidence supporting Perri's (2004) claim according to which the integration of public policies do pose a very complex policy puzzle also when strong political commitment is present.

This discussion is strongly linked to the core of the framework developed, which approached PI beyond any normative assumption, notably with no end-point to be reached by definition. The complexity of the Australian cases study permits to further discuss the extent to which full PI level may not be desirable by definition. The country did experience a clearly appreciable development of PI around ISM in its national policy making problems, but as we saw by the analysis of PI in output important constrains are currently in place: they already appear as the results of an excessive alignment between the domains of higher education and trade, whose un-wanted implications are currently emerging one by one.

We also discussed above the relevance of turbulent events, which appear indeed to have the right potential to disrupt a (partially) integrated policies, especially if any shock-response mechanism has been developed contextually. This findings therefore suggest that further research ought to address a different question, notably to engage in the exploration on the optimum level of PI necessary to profit by this process before its negative spill overs begins to occur. This brings to a constrains of this dissertation related to the analysis of turbulent events, which may in fact be events of very different scope and intensity. While during the country case cross sectoral reconstruction the specificity of the events occurred has been addressed, a more detailed analysis distinguishing different type of turbulent events have on PI remained beyond the boundaries of this research. A finer design exploring differences between critical junctures, shock and less invasive turning points would surely advance the current understanding of PI process.

Further research may also concentrates on the consequences of this process at the individual level for mobile students as well as for officials and individuals engaged in ISM promotion and implementation. The complexity of addressing such phenomenon, and the yet understudies national policies around ISM prevented in fact to address comparatively the impact the latter may have at the micro-level of analysis.

While the design of this thesis is qualitative, also a mixed research design could have been developed. A systematic quantitative text analysis of experts interviewed and of policy documents, for instance, would have surely strengthen the findings emerged, but it was unfortunately beyond the feasibility of this research. Moreover, the main effort of the dissertation has been conceptual, being engaged in the development of a single framework that approached PI as a process encompassing a series of its facets. It is moreover worth to state that also a quantitative approach could be developed, testing the

framework propositions thanks to a large N survey of policy experts belonging to several fields, level of policy making involved and country of residence.

Contextually, a number of additional research path are possible in relations to policy domains. This research took into account four different policy domains of major relevance when discussing ISM national policies for the reasons explained in chapter II. Findings supported the choice of concentrating in the first place on the domains of higher education, immigration, foreign policy, trade and the labor market: evidence also demonstrated these are not the unique policy sectors of relevance. As already discussed throughout the entire dissertation, ISM implications at the national level emerged in the first place in research, development and innovation domains, defense, tourism, social protection and health. Few authors engaged in the investigation of PI including these domains (See for example Guruz 2008, Pelkonen et al 2011 & Braun 2008). Against the background of the so called global knowledge economy, and the consequent strengthening connections across policy fields, the implication and interlinkages among mobility in the research and development and innovation domains deserve further attention in the first place. The analysis also enlightens the relevance that ISM policies are currently acquiring within foreign policy and more specifically within the space of defense and national security. Preliminary evidence on armies using mobility exchange as an instrument to send personnel which operate in foreign countries as a 'covered' international students has been provided by a number of authors, among which Birrel and Babones in the Australian case study. This aspect, which clearly emerged in Australia, has been also addressed in the United States, and it seems to acquire a peculiar salience in the case of PhD students in 'strategic' disciplines such as ICT or undertaking research on 'sensible issues'. The transfer of knowledge poses in fact important challenge on the way to tackle the exchange of knowledge for 'nefarious purposes', and as one policy expert argued back in Canberra:

'as you can imagine that's an incredibly difficult thing to do because when you live in a global economy that's based on knowledge, the transmission of knowledge is part of your… economy! [she laughs] So they were trying to develop a piece of legislation that would control… […] what they were trying to do was stop information being exchanged for nefarious purposes. […]'.

Further research may also more deeply explore the spill-over of mobility within the domain of tourism policies, whose economic impact emerged to be salient by the Australian case study. The pandemic outbreak also points out the necessity of further and better addressing the public provision of social protection service to international students, as well as (the many) implications in the health domains. Both in the Australian case and in Italy, the implementation of mobility at the national level of policy makings also rises question linked to housing policies and more generally related to the domestic state of infrastructures, resulting in further research paths to be explored.

In conclusion, while the framework developed resulted able to explain PI process and output in the cases of Australia and Italy, it should be underlined how it represents a preliminary attempt to put into a single system several domestic factors, and it therefore needs further research and additional evidence to fully confirm its validity. The same holds for the IPISM ideal type developed, which already constitutes a valid

and solid tool to carry out comparable policy research. Additional research may strengthen its capacity and further synthetize the framework developed.

Is this of any help in real life?

Findings of the research shows PI development occurs in different dimensions, and underline the extent to which PI constitutes a process which is multi-dimensional beyond being asynchronous, and that it does not follow a linear nor logical development by definition. Findings supports the argument underlining the necessity to shift the approach of PI empirical research, enlightening the importance of understanding the extent to which PI is necessary in its many dimensions, objects, layer, or tiers, rather than on the search of the right receipt for full integration, taking into account the specificities of each different context and jurisdiction.

As stated at the very beginning of the dissertation, to find the right receipt for integration and to solve nots of disintegration of public policies constitutes a dream for policy makers since long time. Results of this research are also salient in terms of applied policy making. In the first place, in fact, they shed light on the extent to which a firm and stable cross-sectoral political commitment constitutes a precondition to successfully implement policies regulating ISM (and more generally transversal issue) in a coherent fashion. Further, they shows the strategic role of the government in creating and fostering a cross-sectoral governance system, developing sectorial policy objectives which strengthen each other's ones and contribute to reach a common aim. Findings underline the necessity of the early establishment of consultative bodies able to bring together institutional actors and stakeholders involved at different levels, in different domains and in moments of time by ISM development and implementation. They also show the crucial role of the government to establish and nourish these venues over the time and to avoid ceremonial adhesion, a tasks barely impossible in case of missing political commitment. In turn, results of this dissertation point out such spaces for information exchange and joint actions are necessary to develop a common understanding of the transversal issue across institutional departments and levels of policy making, or to use a more technical word, to develop a common or coherent policy framing of. Findings supporting Rietig's (2018) argument according to which compatible policy frames already qualify as a condition to let PI develop also appear of specific interest of policy makers engaged by ISM development and implementation. The research also revealed how the presence of a solid information system, and more specifically the availability of a detailed statistical pictures of flows, emerged to be fundamental to address transversal issues, as evidence based data provide actors a common playground to find joint solution to complex policy challenges. In this case, by way of instance, joint data collection of information about international students by the ministries of immigration and university, together with universities, may reduce perceptions and real risks related to the welcoming of bogus students.

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Annex I

An overview of past graphical representation of ISM

This annex provides a number of graphical representations related to ISM which have been largely consulted during the definition of the research puzzle. This annex also provides further insights on the extent of poor comparable statistical data to map, observe and monitors students flows, given the lack of worldwide shared definition of a 'mobile student', showing evidence provided by the Bologna Follow Up Group (BFUG) and a simplified table showing the many caveats should be taken into account to correctly and comparatively collect statistical data.

♦ Knight (2012)

Category	Forms and conditions of mobility		
	Development ⟶ Cooperation	educational ⟶ linkages	commercial ⟶ trade
People Students Professors/scholars Researchers/experts Experts/consultants	↓	Semester/year abroad Full degrees Field/research work Internships Sabbaticals Consulting	
Programs Course, program sub-degree, degree, postgraduate	↓	Twinning Franchised Articulated/validated Joint/double degree programs Online/distance	
Providers Institutions Organizations Companies	↓	Branch campus Virtual university Merger/acquisition Independent institutions	
Projects Academic projects Services	↓	Research Curriculum Capacity building Educational services	
Policies Academic Management Institutional and national	↓	Quality assurance Degree levels Qualification frameworks Academic credit	

Figure 5.4. Four approaches to cross-border post-secondary education

Import strategies

Export strategies

CAPACITY BUILDING

Rationales

Same as mutual understanding plus:
- Meeting demand for higher education
- Enhancing the country's human capital
- Building a better higher education system thanks to spill-overs coming from partnerships with foreign institutions

Main policy instruments
- Encouraging foreign educational institutions and scholars to come to the country under regulated conditions
- Facilitating the study abroad of domestic students and their return

Examples: Malaysia; China; Hong Kong, China; Singapore; Indonesia....

REVENUE GENERATION

Rationales

Same as skilled migration plus:
- Developing higher education as an expert industry
- Using cross-border education to finance the domestic higher education sector and change its governance

Main policy instruments

Same as skilled migration plus:
- Full tuition fees for international students
- Possibility for public educational institutions to have for-profit operations abroad

Examples: Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom (for non-EU citizens), United States (for undergraduates), Malaysia...

SKILLED MIGRATION

Rationales

Same as mutual understanding plus:
- Attracting highly skilled people to build or maintain the receiving country's knowledge economy
- Enhancing the competitiveness of one's higher education sector

Main policy instruments
- Marketing of domestic higher education
- Special programmes for international students
- Facilitation of labour and migration in the receiving country subsequent to study

Examples: Germany, France, United Kingdom (for EU citizens), Denmark, Sweden, Norway

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Rationales
- Academic
- Cultural
- Geostrategic
- Political
- Social
- Economic (through the creation of an international network of elites and enhancement of human capital)

Main policy instruments
- Student mobility programmes

Examples: Mexico, Korea, Poland, Norway, Italy....

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Rationales
- Academic
- Cultural
- Geostrategic
- Political
- Social
- Economic (through the creation of an international network of elites and enhancement of human capital)

Main policy instruments
- Student mobility programmes
- Development assistance

Examples: Japan, Spain, Czech Republic....

Strong economic rationales

Weaker economic rationales

♦ **BFUGI 2010**

Student categories

Annex II

A Graphical Depictions of Policy Integration

This annex provides an overview of selected graphical representations of the concept of policy integration emerged by previous research, which have been largely studied and consulted to develop the graphical representation of the analytical framework presented and tested by this research. These depictions help to grasp the underlying ideas behind a 'linear' understanding of policy integration, as well as the complexity tackled by authors who engaged in the effort to draft a 'model' of policy integration able to take into account its processual nature. As figure X, X and X shows, the several dimension of policy integration are here taken into account at least in part, with authors making explicit both its horizontal and vertical axes, as well as different dimensions (be they intended as 'operational or political layer' either as policy objects or goals).

♦ **Metcalfe (1994) – A milestone in the study of policy integration**

Level 9 Government strategy
Level 8 Establishing central priorities
Level 7 Setting limits on ministerial action
Level 6 Arbitration of policy differences
Level 5 Search for agreement among ministries/agencies
Level 4 Avoiding divergences among ministries/agencies
Level 3 Consultation with other ministries/agencies (feedback)
Level 2 Communication to other ministries/agencies (information exchange)
Level 1 Independent decision-making by ministries/agencies

Figure 1. Policy coordination scale
Source: Adapted from Metcalfe (1994: 281)

♦ **Braun (2008), A different guttman scale**

Figure 2. A Guttman scale of political coordination

- ♦ **Zimmerman (2004)** – A revised scale of Metcalfe (1994) scale, including criteria to assess a date stage of PI

Table 1: Policy coordination scale (adopted after Metcalfe, 1994; OECD, 1996)

Step		Description
Step 1	Independent decision-making	Each agency retains autonomy within its own policy domain.
Step 2	Communication to other agencies (information exchange)	Agencies keep each other up to date about what issues are arising and how they propose to act in their own areas.
Step 3	Consultation with other agencies	As well as informing other agencies of what they are doing, individual agencies consult other ministries in the process of formulating their own positions.
Step 4	Avoiding divergences among agencies	Ensuring that ministries do not take divergent negotiating positions.
Step 5	Interagency search for agreement (seeking consensus)	Beyond negative coordination to hide differences, agencies work together, through, for example, joint committees and project teams, because they recognise their interdependence and their mutual interest in resolving policy differences.
Step 6	Arbitration of interagency differences	Where inter-organisational differences of view cannot be resolved by the horizontal coordination process, central machinery for arbitration is needed.
Step 7	Setting parameters for agencies	A central organisation of inter-organisational decision-making body may play a more active role by setting parameters on the discretion of individual organisations. These parameters define what organisations must not do, rather than prescribing what they should do.
Step 8	Establishing government priorities	The centre of government may play a more positive role by laying down main lines of policy and establishing priorities.
Step 9	Overall government strategy	This case is unlikely to be attainable in practice.

- ♦ **Stead and Mejeers (2007)**

12   International Public Management Journal   Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007

Figure 1. Horizontal Integration Continuum.

- ♦ **Briassoulis (2004)**

Figure 2. The object of policy integration

270

♦ **Steurer in Berger and Steurer (2009)**

Figure 1: Horizontal, vertical and diagonal policy integration (© Steurer)

♦ **Magro et al (nd)**

Figure 1.- Complexity in STI policy

Source: authors' own elaboration

Annex II bis

A Methodological overview of expert interviews

This annex provides a detailed overview about the fieldwork conducted in Australia and Italy to collect expert interviews, whose list is visible by table I below. As introduced in section 2.3.4 of chapter II, a total of 40 interviews have been conducted in English and Italian in the two countries, and they constitute a core sources for this dissertation. Experts interviews have been conducted following a semi-structure methodology, and they for the large part face-to-face, exception made them where it was the only possibility available. Due to Covid-19 out-break, few interviews with Italian experts have been conducted face-to-face virtually, using software such as Teams, Skype and Zoom. A range of additional questions have been sent to a selected sample of seven Australian experts following the Covid-19 outbreak, and three of them participated.

Interviews in Australia have been conducted in a single period, between November and December 2018 in light of evident organizational necessities. The phase of construction of the Australian sample has been favored by the extensive availability and interest in this research showed by experts contacted, and some additional person and organization/institutions which contributed to this research.
As visible by table I, the Australian sample includes at least an interview with each of the peak body involved by ISM implementation, ranging from the departments of foreign affairs and trade, higher education and immigration, to key bodies such as the Council of International Education and Universities Australia, to others peak bodies such as the Group of Eight, the International Education Association of Australia and third party providers such as Aim Overseas. The initial sample has been drafted between September and October 2019, and hence refined while overseas, mostly thanks to the snowball effect. The criterion of saturation has been reached and overcame with the aim to further grasp the turning points of 1999 and 2008. It is evident that among the Italian sample interviews with key departments, such as the ministries of immigration and of foreign affairs, are missing. Both departments have been contacted several times with different channels and although some initial contacts were possible in a number of cases, any interview has been agreed.

Data collection in Italy have been planned in three different period due to the complexity to find the initial material according to which begin to draft an expert sample, exception made for experts currently involved by ISM. The dearth of specific scholar literature and documentation available also requested to collect additional data as the research proceeded, following the snowball effect and exploring the new inputs that mostly each interview offered. As discussed by chapter five, interviews in Italy strongly differs among each other's, which experts discussing very different aspects of ISM without a common frame of what exactly student mobility is. In some cases, experts refer to the more general framework of internationalization, in some others they focus on the Erasmus Program or on the Bologna Process, and further on long standing migration path, or discussing more general foreign policy trends of international cooperation and economic diplomacy. The feasibility of such program helped to organize data collection in Italy in this way while based in Florence at the SNS Department of Political Science and Sociology. More specifically, interviews have been conducted between January and February 2019, October 2019 and February 2020. Due to Covid-19 outbreak, some of them have been postponed and held online March and May 2020.

The semi-structured grid followed is visible by table II, and it constituted a support to guide the conversation rather than a fixed list of question to be followed. The grid has been developed prior to fieldwork and it has been refined after the interviews, although with minor adjustment. Table II report the final grid. Interviews have been than transcribed with the support of dedicated software in the first place, more in detail thanks to the tools 'Happy Scribe' and the 'transcription' tool provided by Google. Each interview has been than refined manually, listening and transcribing the conversation at real speed. Interviews have been transcript as close as the original conversation as possible per available technology, while they have been adjusted to avoid that the oral sentence's construction may be of difficult understanding if presented in a written form (repetitions, minor mistakes, uncompleted sentences and similar have been deleted where they prevented to understand the main message of the whole period.

As introduced by Chapter II, interviews have been largely used to reconstruct the cross-sectoral policy development and to identify the turbulent events occurred during this process. Moreover, they have also been manually coded during the analysis. The manual coding of the interviews has been done using keywords in the first place, and it have been strongly refined reading throughout each transcription in a second stage. This work poses the bases for the development of a systematic code book to be used in further research. Interviews with Italian experts have been than translated to English. Interviews held in Italian have been translated manually, keeping sentences as close as possible to the original meaning, avoiding literal translations. Interviews have been collected for the large part in the cities of Canberra, Rome and Melbourne, and an appreciable number of them also at distance. This four makes up about the eighty per cent of the total sample. As the final graphs shows, experts interviews sample have been constructed keeping a balance to cover the whole periods under analysis, the different levels and actors involved, the main fields of interests of experts. The graphs below reports shows the level of involvements of experts and their affiliation.

ANNEX III | SAMPLE OF EXPERT INTERVIEWED

CASE	NAME	AFFILIATION	ROLE	PLACE	DATE
AUS	Anderson Kent	University of Western Australia, Deputy Vice Chancellor (Community & Engagement)	Member of the Australian Council for International Education (CIE)	Canberra	26/11/18
ITA	Barni Monica	Former Assessor for Education, Tuscan Region	Former Rector UNISSTRASI	at distance	08/05/20
ITA	Bianchini Stefano	University of Bologna, Uniadrion, IECOB	Delegate of the Rector for Eastern European Countries	at distance	05/06/20
AUS	Brett, Andre	University of Wollongong	Researcher, Historician	Wollongong	20/11/18
ITA	Cammisa Antonella	University of Rome La Sapienza, MURST	Former high level public servant at MURST (80s'/90s')	Rome	18/02/19
ITA	Castellucci Scalera	Ministry of University (MUR)	MIUR, DG Internationalization, Office N. V	Rome	07/02/19
ITA	Cavallini Marina	Conference of Italian Rectors (CRUI)	International Relation Contact Person	Rome	28/10/19
AUS	ANONIMOUS	Peak Australian University	Chief International Education, Life member of IEAA	Canberra	26/11/18
ITA	Cinquepalmi Federico	Ministry of University (MUR)	MIUR, DG Internationalization, Office N. V, Director	Rome	07/02/19
ITA	Damiani Maria Sticchi	Bologna Follow-Up Group Member	Coordinatrice Gruppo di Esperti Bologna CHEER 16 18	Rome	27/11/19
ITA	Fioramonti Lorenzo	Ministry of University (MUR)	Former minister	at distance	05/05/20
ITA	Foroni Marzia	Ministry of University (MUR)	Bologna Follow Up Group (BFPG) Member	Rome	18/01/19
AUS	International student #1	Australian National University	Indonesian PRIVATE International Student	Canberra	30/11/18
AUS	International student #2	Australian National University	Indian SPONSORED International Student	Canberra	15/12/18
ITA	Ann Katherine Isaacs	University of Pisa, Bologna Experts	Bologna Process Expet Group, CHEER 16 18, Italian member	Pisa	21/02/19
AUS	ANONIMOUS	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	DFAT Scholarships and Alumni Branch Secretary, High Level Public Servant	Canberra	13/12/18
ITA	Lantero Luca	Centro Italiano Mobilità Equivalenze Accademiche (CIMEA), Italian ENIC/NARIC	CIMEA Director	Rome	04/02/19
ITA	Lorusso Leonardo	Lombardy Region	Expert in Education and Training for Italy at European Council	at distance	09/03721
AUS	Malicki Rob	AIM Overseas	Director, AIM Overseas Board for the New Colombo Plan, Member	Canberra	17/12/18
AUS	Mc Cawley Peter	Australian National University, Indonesia Project - Arndt Corden Department of Economics	Member of the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program (1983) Australian National University Deputy Director General in the Australian aid agency	Canberra	06/11/18

CASE	NAME	RELEVANT AFFILIATION	RELEVANT ROLE	PLACE	DATE
AUS	McDonald Peter	University of Melbourne	Researcher and Professor of Demography Member of the Ministerial Advisory Council on Skilled Migration (2012-2014)	Melbourne	12/12/18
ITA	Modica Luciano	University of Pisa	University of Pisa Former Rector State Secretary for Education 2006-2008	Pisa	25/1172019
AUS	ANONIMOUS	Monash University	Chief, International Education	Melbourne	04/12/18
AUS	Murray Dennis	University of Melbourne / IEAA	Senior Honorary Fellow at University of Melborne, Founder and CEO of IEAA	Melbourne	05/12/18
ITA	Naldi Carlo	Politecnico di Torino	Former Vice-Rector, Politecnico di Torino Uni-Italia, Coordinator of Scientific Committee	Torino	19/11/19
AUS	Nerlich Steve	Department of Education	Director, International Research and Analysis Unite	Canberra	12/11/18
AUS	Norton Andrew	Australian National University, Professor in the Practice of Higher Education Policy	Grattan Institute, Former Director of the Higher Education Program. Policy Advisor to Minister Kempt 1997-1999	Melbourne	07/12/18
AUS	Pratik Ambani	Australian Federation of International Students (AFIS)	President of the Australian Federation of International Students (AFIS)	Melbourne	07/12/18
ITA	Pruneti Francesca	University of Parma	CINECA, Director S.C. MIUR	Bologna	14/02/19
ITA	Remiddi Adriano	Global Campus	Global Campus, Project Manager (UNTL) ERMA Academic Coordinator	at distance	24/05/20
ITA	Ricci Antonio	IDOS Ricerche	Senior Researcher, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione	Rome	21/12/19
AUS	Rivzi Abul	Department of Immigration	Deputy Secretary and Senior official, nineties since 2007 Public Service Medal & Centenary Medal	Canberra	30/11/18
AUS	Ross John	The Times of Higher Education	Journalist	Sydney	19/11/18
AUS	ANONIMOUS	Group of Eight	ANONIMOUS	Canberra	30/11/18
ITA	Sblendorio Antonio	Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia	Director, Office for International Relations	Modena	05/02/20
AUS	Walter Colin	Department of Education	Senior Official, Head of the Australian delegation to India 2009	Canberra	17/12/18
AUS	Wellard John	Universities Australia	Policy Director, International	Canberra	16/11/18

ANNEX III | SAMPLE OF EXPERT INTERVIEWED (CONTINUED)					
CASE	**NAME**	**AFFILIATION**	**ROLE**	**PLACE**	**DATE**
AUS	Woolfe, Claudia	Ministry of Education	High Level Public Servant	Melbourne	17/12/18
AUS	Zigurras Cristopher	Royal Melbourne Institute of Technologies Expert/ Professor	International Education Australian Association, Founder and Life member	Melbourne	06/12/18

INTRO

This type of interview usually starts with a BRIEF PRESENTATION from your side… affiliation, role, former experiences…I would also be interested in knowing how you got involved with the issue of international student mobility…

1) **According to your perception, which have been/are the MAIN POLICY RATIONALES FOR THE PROMOTION of the set of national policies towards the international mobility of students?** I am interested in the period beginning since the eighties.

2) **To what extent do you perceive these Australian POLICY RATIONALES HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATIC over the time, across policy areas beyond higher education?** According to your own experience and point of view, of course

3) **COULD YOU WALK ME THROUGH THE PROCESS OF POLICY MAKING at the national level, from the idea to policy output… according to your own experience, perhaps using an example you remember?**
For example, the process of adoption of a new legislation, a new policy instrument or a new scheme of mobility…

4) **According to your opinion, which have been the MOST INFLUENTIAL PROGRAMMATIC DOCUMENTS and ideas related to the development and promotion of international student mobility, beginning by the eighties, here in Australia/Italy?**

5) As the wide range of published material about student mobility shows, a quite high number of bodies are involved in issue related to the international mobility of students in different manners. **According to your opinion, which have been/are the biggest challenges to reach effective levels of POLICY COORDINATION in place across policy sectors, and therefore among policy instruments enforced by different actors?**

6) **According to your perception, which are the main POLICY INSTRUMENTS to implement the international mobility of students?**

7) **Would you say it is correct to argue Australia/Italy has so far set up COMPREHENSIVE POLICIES that fully address issues related to the international mobility of students (both incoming and outgoing)?**

8) **How did the landscape of KEY BODIES evolve over the time?**

9) **Why would you agree with the statement that there are/have been, here in Australia/Italy, EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS in place within governmental bodies and between the latter and stakeholders?**

10) **According to your experience, in which way ARE EXPERTS ABLE TO SHAPE POLICY PROCESS according to their knowledge, own ideas, perspectives and interests during the process of policy making?**

CONCLUSION

Unless you would like to add something or to better address a specific question/topic, between the one we covered today, you answered my questions and the interview is finished.

Graph 1 - N. of Interviews held by country

- AUS
- ITA

Graph 2 - N. of interviews by case study in percentage points

45.00%

55.00%

- AUS
- ITA

Graph 3 - N. of interview held in person, by phone and virtually, in percentage points

5.00%

2.50%

47.50%

- face-to-face
- phone
- virtual face-to-face

Graph n. 4 - N. of interviews conducted by periods and place of data collection

Legend:
- I
- II
- III
- IV

Values: AUS: 22; ITA: 8, 5, 5

Graph 5 - Cities in which interviews have been collected in percentage points

Pie chart values: 2.50%, 2.50%, 12.50%, 32.50%, 2.50%, 2.50%, 20.00%, 17.50%, 5.00%, 2.50%

Legend:
- Bologna
- Canberra
- Melbourne
- Modena
- Pisa
- Rome
- Torino
- Wollongong

Graph 6 - Level of involvement of experts interviewed

■ institutional

■ national

Graph 7 - Affiliation of experts interviewed

■ Institutional body

■ Stakeholder

■ Stakeholders (Only university)

Annex III - Australia

Commencement of International Students in Australia in higher education
Source: PRISMS DATA

Historical trends of (HE) Inbound and Outbound flows in Australia
SOURCE: AIE, OECD and uCube data

Flows of Chinese and Indian International students to Australia (2002-2020)
SOURCE: AIE data

Annex III | Number of outbound students by type of experience 2010-2017								
	2010	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**
Exchanges	6696	7703	7813	8571	8750	8539	9046	9205
semester programs	228	473	513	233	340	1517	1594	1042
Short terms	5889	7137	8570	10158	13870	15748	19669	22992
Internships	2650	2727	3707	5874	5259	7934	8334	10094
Research related	2309	2448	3866	4056	2135	3257	3960	4461
Volunteering					858	807	1234	1030
Other	568	418	292	595	700	342	208	439
Total	18340	20906	24763	29487				

Department of Education (Various Years), Research Snapshot 2014 and April 2019

Annex III || Number of OS-HELP granted			
2006	1916	**2011**	5675
2007	2454	**2012**	6373
2008	2626	**2013**	10986
2009	2651	**2014**	12818
2010	4086	**2015**	14861
2011	5035	**2016**	

Department of Parliamentary Services (2018)

Annex III || Key numbers of the NEW COLOMBO PROGRAM			
	Scholarships	grants	Tot
2014/2015	40	1300	1340
2015/2016	69	3100	3169
2016/2017	100	5450	5550
2017/2018	105	7400	7505
2018/2019	120/250*	7400	
2019/2020		11817	

SOURCE: IEAA (2018)

Annex III || Estimated Chinese Student Fee revenue for seven focus universities II

University	Total university revenue from continuing operations (DET data for 2017)	Estimated Chinese student fee revenue	Estimated Chinese student fee revenue as a % of university revenue	Level of confidence in the estimate
Adelaide	$929,210,000	$119,681,285	13%	High
ANU	$1,225,585,000	$163,879,359	13%	High
Melbourne	$2,501,975,000	$410,032,930	16%	Very low
Queensland	$1,828,356,000	$256,873,215	14%	Medium
Sydney	$2,345,182,000	$534,069,100	23%	Very high
UNSW	$2,018,976,000	$446,266,620	22%	Very high
UTS	$953,561,000	$178,570,580	19%	Very high

Source: Babones (2019)

Annex III || Estimated loss due to Covid-19 outbreak for university income

Estimated revenue losses compared to BAU	2020	2021	2022	2023
a) International students' fees	-20%	-40%	-30%	-20%
b) Other private/unregulated income	-15%	-20%	-10%	-5%

Source: Universities Australia 2020

Annex III || Estimated Chinese Student Fee revenue for seven focus universities I

University	International students as a % of all students (DET data for 2017)	Chinese students as a % of international students (best available data)	% of international student revenue generated by Chinese students†	International student fee revenue (DET data for 2017)
Adelaide	28.2%	53.8%	58.6%	$204,088,000
ANU	35.8%	59.1%	64.4%	$254,396,000
Melbourne	36.6%	50%*	54.5%	$752,354,000
Queensland	29.5%	50%*	54.5%	$471,327,000
Sydney	35.7%	66.7%	71%	$752,210,000
UNSW	33.8%	68.8%	74%	$603,063,000
UTS	31.8%	52.3%	59%	$302,662,000

Source: Babones (2019)

	ANNEX III | Australia, New Colombo Plan, Selected quotes from expert interviews material
Quote #1	'The New Colombo Plan is run out of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and it concentrates on the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on business and diplomatic relations with our neighbors…We need the NCP because Australian graduates are not good at doing business with Asian countries. We need to increase our familiarity with the region. We need every Australian to have basic Asia capability.
Quote #2	I think it's called the New Colombo Plan, and that did encourage…she provided some scholarships and has encouraged young Australian students to go out to Asia, usually for short periods. There are some I think for longer periods but usually for short matters… so there is a recognition. I would say not enough. I don't think it's enough. You've got to remember you're talking to a person here who is very pro Asian. MC
Quote #3	what is the most important rationales on …. there … I think probably it was about giving skill to a lot of young Australians… that was probably the chief rationales, but more recently we've seen driving nationality around employability, the other factors, and from a government perspective, we see around the soft power initiatives, so particularly with Julie Bishop the New Colombo Plan. So that was a big shift
Quote #4	… so the New Colombo Plan and that it was… well the other one had all been focused on what skills does the individual get, new Colombo plan I think was the first time for Australia where we shifted to what are what does the Australian government get out of this. And so it was a shift from the focus on the individual to focus on nation or soft power...
Quote #5	What's happening with the New Colombo Plan is so much money coming across… And Julie Bishop was so good in raising the profile with the press dealt, with the vice chancellors… that all of a sudden universities started really caring about the student mobility about getting students out…
Quote #6	The thing that probably… the major policy change that's taken plan in the last…. Five years was the introduction of funding schemes specifically to support student mobility and probably the best known and best described as the New Colombo Plan
Quote #7	We focus on it because from a foreign policy perspective it's [student mobility] a really great avenue of soft power and economic partnerships with countries across the world. We also administer the New Colombo Plan to the DFAT, which again provides opportunities for Australian students to study in the Indian Pacific region.
Quote #8	So Foreign affairs does like to keep benign interest, and particularly around the Asian region things like the New Colombo has been very much welcomed by foreign affairs… and of course it was Minister Julie Bishop who helped drive that through, she was a former education minister as well.
Quote #9	… since Paul Keating back in the early 90s really shifted Australia's focus to Asia, Australia's focus has been increasingly towards now… our role in the region. And it's been one of those things that's been gathering momentum from both side of politics over... over several decades... and culminating in something like the New Colombo Plan where you have a very active foreign minister... who I think... has absolutely correctly picked the... the right moment to implement something like this, to really drive our engagement in the region even further. [...] it's been an escalation in support for this... for this part of diplomacy. And yet the Colombo Plan has taken that to a whole new level again.
Quote #10	I think it started to come as a slight… complication in foreign policy, particularly in the relationship with China.
Source: Elaboration of the author of expert interview material	

Annex III | GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS ENROLLEMENT IN SELECTED AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES - 2001-2019

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	% INCREASE 2001-2019
Deakin University	3,378	4,286	5,557	6,505	6,5	6,709	6,786	7,342	7,656	8,142	8,428	7,815	7,468	7,759	8,567	9,705	11,646	14,31	16,193	**379,37%**
Macquarie University	4,72	6,616	7,899	8,767	9,541	10,463	11,202	11,596	12,408	12,935	12,612	11,48	10,069	9,25	8,617	10,101	11,682	11,748	12,263	**159,81%**
Monash University	12,809	14,481	15,993	17,093	17,155	17,102	17,82	19,063	21,117	22,279	22,72	22,17	22,14	24	26,216	29,459	33,528	38,295	41,383	**223,08%**
RMIT University	12,299	13,356	14,028	15,15	15,017	17,896	19,836	22,487	24,684	26,573	27,14	26,63	26,59	26,744	26,911	27,868	29,315	31,552	33,81	**174,90%**
Swinburne University of Technology	2,988	3,189	3,719	3,964	4,591	5,79	7,026	8,363	9,494	9,637	9,403	9,678	9,016	8,788	8,75	9,121	9,554	10,429	10,774	**260,58%**
The Australian National University	1,582	2,012	2,647	3,078	3,046	3,269	3,378	3,702	4,299	4,952	5,363	5,405	5,566	6,106	6,292	7,426	9,07	10,575	10,526	**565,36%**
The University of Adelaide	1,796	2,484	2,988	3,738	4,416	4,931	5,478	5,846	6,263	6,978	7,119	7,114	6,935	7,284	7,057	7,366	7,571	7,839	9,001	**401,17%**
The University of Melbourne	6,514	7,827	8,823	9,229	8,936	10,372	11,199	11,724	12,029	11,873	11,946	12,805	14,166	16,13	18,375	20,899	23,833	26,568	28,545	**338,21%**
The University of Queensland	4,823	5,621	5,937	6,412	6,35	6,621	6,984	7,548	8,818	10,518	11,348	11,334	11,519	12,193	12,672	13,382	15,409	18,055	20,254	**319,95%**
The University of Sydney	5,785	7,364	9,391	9,776	9,456	9,67	10,436	11,293	11,999	12,147	11,754	11,447	12,278	13,888	15,958	19,296	22,967	26,041	30,076	**419,90%**
University of New South Wales	9,288	10,328	10,207	9,487	8,995	8,62	9,384	10,377	11,48	13,217	13,701	13,301	13,132	13,637	14,379	16,698	20,217	23,114	24,838	**167,42%**
University of Technology Sydney	4,288	5,24	6,652	7,393	8,114	8,963	8,131	7,587	8,289	9,129	9,733	9,477	10,054	10,741	11,519	12,874	14,269	15,257	15,579	**263,32%**

SOURCE: Elaboration of Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment, Higher Education Statistics Data Cube (uCube)

ANNEX III | Australia, Juncture of 1986, Selected quotes from expert interviews material

Quote #1	It was an accident, a Committee foreign AID reforming higher education, but we were demand responsive! […] It was a moment of major policy change, open universities to foreigners. Basically, we said that we were subsidizing foreign students giving free education in Australia. There was a market, so why not to liberalize? We had to allow universities to open up and sell! But this clashed with the Goldring Committee.' […] But see there are two philosophical points of view, one that sees education as a public good, and another one which see it as commercial…
Quote #2	'We wanted to open Australia to Asia. […] This is a great example of liberalization in Australia, movement toward Asia! And there is the emergence of China'
Quote #3	the government withdrew the subsidized money from universities and my university had about six or seven million dollars from its budget cut, and this happened with all the universities in Australia… so my vice chancellor who I was working for is his executive officer turned to me and he said 'You've got to set up an international office and you've got to get 7 million in the next six months
Quote #4	Okay, all right look… it was the Jackson committee that triggered the challenge. That was the trigger. And of course the Goldring committee was relevant but it got pushed aside now since then I have not followed it closely
Quote #5	up until what was it 1985, you know, the Australian university sector basically just taught domestic students… the only international students we had by and large were those that were here on scholarships or as part of aid programs to assist Southeast Asia and… And then of course the, you know, get the deregulation of various parts of the economy during the 1980s and… …I think Australia was looking at Britain and saw that the British had… had some success through bringing in international students and thought 'Hey, we can make money out of this as well' and start looking at international students not as a sort of you know benevolent aid to assist poorer countries in the region but as trade
Quote #6	In 1986-87 passed legislation which is actually critical in the history of international education in Australia. The legislation permitted the enrollment of full fee paying students. So for the first time that meant student were coming in and they were paying.
Quote #7	What happened increasingly though was that… government decided in control of budgets to reduced funding to universities. It was convinced that it could allow universities to raise more money through international students as the economies of East and South East Asia prospered, their rising middle class for which their own universities were still not catching up. Looked to overseas education, they mostly looked to Europe and North America, but they also began to look at geographically proximate Australia, and they were willing to pay a bunch of money for Australia and New Zealand, high fees, so as government money was withdrawn, foreign student revenues came in and government removed restrictions on charging high fees, so instead of paying students to come here, students paid to come to Australia.

Source: Elaboration of the author of expert interview material

ANNEX III | Australia, Juncture of 2008, Selected quotes from expert interviews material |

Quote #1	And so I think what happened prior to 2008 2009 was that people were seeing a big building up in the number of international students, but they were reluctant to actually look at whether there was an issue there…
Quote #2	There wasn't any single correspondent of an India Newspaper or television outlet here in Australia! The whole thing was being driven by social media. So people were taking pictures in particular there were quite serious incident involving an Indian student in Melbourne and they were being sent back to India and given huge publicized. [...] Then the government sort of brought a group together to actually look up... well what was really happening here because we were getting all sort of stories [..] The Indian High Commissioner at the time [...] talked to a lot of students and she came back and said to us 'well they're being exploited other accommodation and they're being exploited over employment'.
Quote #3	'This was all driven by social media, by people taking pictures and sending them back to India and then it just grew… the Government had to get involved because of the adverse consequences for our relations with India. It became necessary to tackle it'
Quote #4	These qualifications get you extra points but not just any degree…. and so those qualifications enrolments we've gone through the roof. So at one point the cheapest way to get permanent residency was to do a six months' qualification in hairdressing, or commercial cookery … Yeah. And then there were private colleges started offering these courses very cheap… but without really… with very low academic standards and attendance requirements so students would … a bit of collusion I think between students and migration agents and accommodation providers and so on [...] a few years ago the Immigration Department realized that any direct an automatic relationship between a program of study and PR (permanent residency) would lead to a balloon enrolment which would overwhelm the migrant intake. So they had to come up with another way
Quote #5	The private providers are regulated by state governments. The state governments weren't used to that scale of activity. And the Commonwealth Education Department wasn't really able to cope. And the Department of Immigration wasn't able to cope either… So… a lot of institutions were saying to ministers, to government officials of many government departments, State and Federal, we have a real problem with this college right, it's a fake college, it's recruiting… It's, it's got two levels of an office building in Melbourne, just rented office, accommodation. It has a thousand students enrolled in this course. We don't know where these thousand students are, there's a problem. And yet the… it was very difficult to get government to respond to those concerns. The Immigration Department said it's not our problem to credit colleges it's the state government, state government would say 'well we only have three college inspectors and we have 200 new private colleges we can't possibly even visit them all… you know, we looked at the paperwork, the paperwork is in order. They've filled in all the appropriate forms'
Quote #6	But I think… I mean a real wakeup call for Australia was when there was assaults on Indian students in 2008 and … at large.
Quote #7	The difference was that that group of young guys were so angry… any time anything happened it was on 24 hour cable news in India… And so Australia in in India and around the world … Australia got painted as a racist society. Right? And Indian students were on television constantly saying … 'have a look at the apartment where I'm staying, it's terrible. There's 10 of us living in bunks' and we are saying 'why you guys are living in bunks???'
Quote #8	There's also attack going to go against Indian students in…. There weren't so that many but the ones that happened were really nasty… and the Indian media just went crazy about them painting a picture of Australia as racist horrifically violent place and that had an effect on schools.... on international Education as well.
Quote #9	That's part of protecting… your ability to engage in international education for education purposes, and also to maintain your cash flows. And the India outbreak was a particular case where they … they lost on both fronts […] What got lost … sight of though with the flow, and I know this from some personal experiences. I tried to get the universities to hold back on supporting massive expansion of migration too fast too much.

Source: Elaboration of the author of expert interview material

	ANNEX III | Australia, Juncture of 2020, Selected quotes from expert interviews material |
Quote #1	The virus impact could not have been foreseen but there is probably the realization now that the finances of Australian universities has been too dependent upon foreign students fees. This means that some Australian universities will be less eager to recruit as many international students as they did in the past.
Quote #2	The potential for threat to healthy international education sector could well have been foreseen. The earlier experience of NZ in having Chinese students banned and the Australian experience with an Indian Student Crisis over onshore treatment and those of students, were clear warnings as to the fragility of the sector's prosperity. And the need to build in resilience. A more diverse source of students was resisted and, given all sources were now affected anyway, representations on appropriate policy support for students in crisis was totally ineffectual. Success had come too easily.
Quote #3	No, this particular event could not have been foreseen. Covid-19 has been a huge "exogenous shock" to the global economy and I don't think it could (in any reasonable scenario) have been foreseen. What we can say is that there will be large exogenous shocks from time to time. Looking to the future, universities perhaps need to undertake more analysis of future risks.
Quote #4	Issues concerning student mobility (into Australia) have been greatly complicated during the past 12 months by the confrontational relationship that has developed between Australia and China. Relations between Australia and China have seriously deteriorated in various ways in the past 12 months. China has retaliated in various ways including by issuing warnings to Chinese students of the disadvantages of studying in Australia. It is not clear what the effect of these internal Chinese warnings has been because it is, in any case, difficult for Chinese students to come to Australia, Nevertheless, Australian universities have expressed concern over the warnings. Many university managers believe that there will be a need for universities to look to wider international markets when the Covid problem passes

Source: Elaboration of the author of expert interview material

Quote #1	there are now some security concerns with China. So it's related a little bit to both, suggesting that some of these students have a military background, they're being … for example to get training in computers, with cyber security issues… and there are probably a few with military background … to other things probably true the world is not perfect. And you know it is probably true. The question is… it's a question of not whether it is true but whether it is self-sufficient of a worry to change policies. And that's Always a question
Quote #2	I think Australian universities are hopelessly overexposed to variations in the international market and don't have a plan to address it. So if something happened in China tonight that immediately stopped Chinese students coming to Australia… Australian universities would be staffed. They had absolutely no idea what to do. Because they're dependent on it and so many thousands of them come here now that it's such an important part of our revenue stream and… you look at it you look at America when the Iranian revolution happened in 1979 and suddenly Iranian students who used to make up a decent number of international students in the States… overnight, Gone…! And what do you do. And I don't think Australian universities… Really know what they would do… If especially Chinese and Indian students suddenly stopped coming… I'm not sure they're even prepared for a more long term trend away … … because of some Chinese universities are getting better that ranking higher and higher … more Chinese students are going to study at home
Quote #3	the issue that Australia has to deal with is that… we have…. Many of our providers whether they be universities of whether they be other providers… have been very successful in recruiting students from China […] And that's great… that's great when students what to come from China at the level that they are coming at the moment. The question that we have and the problem we have to deal with at some point in time is what happens when China changes its own system, and makes its own system more attractive to other markets... [...] So what's the plan B. Do we have a plan B?
Quote #4	And so as the 80's and the 90's progressed the number of Chinese students grew… the restrictions that the Chinese… And then everyone sat back and said 'goodness me you, know there's far more in this than we ever thought possible. And in a way recently the concerns has been more that there's been too much dependence on China. We should try and diversity and get more students from other countries
Quote #5	The Chinese government has much greater control over what people do, where they travel, and so on so forth… where they invest and so therefore…. Making sure that they understand what's going here and we deal with any of their concerns…
Quote #6	But I think the Australian government in now very concerned about Chinese activity within Australia and with some concern about the activities of Chinese students in particular… and then about what leverage.. Australian's reliance on Chinese students might keep the Chinese government in its relations with Australia. So I think there is a concern that relationship which has got to be a negative issue. [...] So i had one just a personal example of a guy who complained to speak, he basically gone to see the Dalai Lama in Sydney... and then his parents back in Shanghai received a visit from the police... they're basically telling them tell him to stop going to Dalai Lama'
Quote #7	If geo-politically China decides to punish Australia… for.. there… There are many reasons why you might do that, and then the number of students coming from China to study, that would be [are people are saying now] a huge risk, a huge over-exposure, it.. And particularly if you look at the numbers i will send you, the percentage of international revenues of some of the big universities' budgets are well beyond low risk, you know, they are really beyond medium risk, they are really into high risk, because international education is entirely vulnerable to formulating good national policies, and it is also vulnerable to geopolitical shocks on which you have no control really
Quote #8	So one of the jokes I make is that in the square mile with the University of Melbourne and RMIT there are more young Chinese women the density is … of Chinese women is higher than anywhere in China.

Source: Elaboration of the author of expert interview material

Annex IV – Italy

Annex IV| Esteem of international student incoming flows

YEAR	ANS Foreign diploma	Erasmus Incoming students	AFAM Foreign students	Unitalia Programs	TOT Esteem
2004/05	24.272	13373			40.469
2005/06	28.095	13923			45.614
2006/07	31.101	14590			50.223
2007/08	34.430	16261			55.577
2008/09	36.557	17492		776	54.825
2009/10	37.682	18137		1099	56.918
2010/11	38.590	19172	4257	1438	63.457
2011/12	38.125	20204	5264	1737	65.330
2012/13	37.155	19963	7110	2479	66.707
2013/14	36.435	20204	8893	2425	67.957
2014/15	35.037	21580	10228	2465	69.310
2015/16	34.544	23942	11095	2636	72.217
2016/17	36.198	26294	12010	2910	77.412
2017/18	39.492	27945	12463	2452	82.352

Source: Elaboration of the author of MIUR and ANS data, Erasmus and Unitalia annual report

Erasmus flows in Italy
SOURCE: Erasmus Annual Reports

······ incoming   ——— outgoing

Annex IV | | Foreign students enrollments filtered by foreign diploma

	tot enrolments	tot of enrolled foreign students	%	tot of enrolled foreign students with foreign diploma	%	tot of enrolled foreign students with foreign diploma by citizenship	
						European	Extra-European
2004/05	1.341.970	33.647	2,45	24.272	1,81	8295	15.941
2005/06	1.541.407	39.359	2,55	28.095	1,82	9188	18.878
2006/07	1.642.259	44.746	2,72	31.101	1,89	9697	24.231
2007/08	1.716.627	50.476	2,94	34.430	2,01	17158	21.384
2008/09	1.749.797	55.291	3,16	36.557	2,09	10187	26.357
2009/10	1.786.004	59.811	3,35	37.682	2,11	9972	27.697
2010/11	1.789.259	63.315		38.590	2,16	9737	28.842
2011/12	1.766.099	66.108	3,76	38.125	2,16	9365	28.751
2012/13	1.725.052	68.211	3,95	37.155	2,15	8699	28.446
2013/14	1.701.745	70.130	4,12	36.435	2,14	8233	28.194
2014/15	1.679.546	71.345	4,25	35.037	2,09	7340	27.689
2015/16	1.673.031	73.328	4,38	34.544	2,06	6808	27.728
2016/17	1.696.671	78.137	4,61	36.198	2,13	6743	29.446
2017/18	1.730.011	85.361	4,93	39.492	2,28	6838	32.635
2018/19	1.763.143	90.843	5,15	42.174	2,39	6791	35.351

Source: Elaboration of the author of data of the Anagrafe Nazionale degli Studenti (National Student Database), retrieved online Jun 20th, 2020. Data refers to academic years.

Annex IV | FFO quota related to internationalization of HE system and to ISM, 2000-2016

YEAR OF FFO	Signed by	Reference to Internationalization and/or ISM (in bold)	legislative Reference		Article	Fund allocated and Indicators (if present)
2000	Zecchino	any reference	any reference			
2001	Guerzoni (state Secretary)	Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	DM 13 del 26/01/2001. DM 21/05/198 n. 242 25/06/97 and 2/08/1999	DM	5. Call of experts working abroad	50 billions of Lire (20 for hiring professionals, 20 for financing their projects, 10 for hiring fully professors working abroad)
2002	-	Direct funds allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad	-		5. Additional Actions (compensation, professionals abroad, young HEIs, extraordinary needs)	€ 14,7 m
2003	Moratti	Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	D.M. 501 del 20/03/2003		5. Call of experts working abroad	€ 7 m
2004		Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	D.M. 501 del 20/03/2003		5. Call of experts working abroad	€ 7 m
2005		Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	D.M. 501 del 20/03/2003		4. Call of experts working abroad	€ 15 m
		Actions to promote interuniversity cooperation projects and attract international students	*D.M. n. 18 del 1.2.2005.*		*3. Actions for the evaluation and re-balance of public HEIs*	*€ 5 m*
2006	Mussi	Call of international experts	Art. 1. c. 1 L. 230/2005		5. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 3 m
		Actions to promote interuniversity cooperation projects and attract international students	*-*		*Art. 6. Actions of structured inter-university cooperation*	*€ 5 m*
2007		Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	D.M. n. 18 1.2.2005		4. Call of experts working abroad	€ 1,5 m + € 3 m
		Actions to promote interuniversity cooperation projects and attract international students	*-*		*Art. 6. Actions of structured inter-university cooperation*	*€ 5 m*
2008		Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	Art. 1. c. 1 L. 230/2005 DD.MM. n. 13 del 26.1.2001, n. 501 del 20.1.2003 e n.18 del 1.2.2005		5. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 1,5 m + € 3 m
		Actions to promote interuniversity cooperation projects and attract international students	*-*		*Art. 6. Actions of structured interuniversity cooperation*	*€ 5 m*
2009	Gelmini	Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities & young researchers working abroad	Art. 1. c. 1 L. 230/2005 DD.MM. n. 13 del 26.1.2001, n. 501 del 20.1.2003 e n.18 del 1.2.2005		5. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 2,5 m + € 6 m
		Actions to promote interuniversity cooperation projects and attract international students	*-*		*Art. 6. Actions of structured inter-university cooperation*	*€ 6 m*

YEAR OF FFO	Signed by	Reference to Internationalization and/or ISM (in bold)	legislative Reference	Article	Fund allocated and Indicators (if present)
2010		Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities & young researchers working aboard	Art. 1. c. 1 L. 230/2005 DD.MM. n. 13 del 26.1.2001, n. 501 del 20.1.2003 e n.18 del 1.2.2005,	6. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 1 m + € 5
		Actions to promote inter-university cooperation projects and attract international students	*-*	*Art. 7. Actions of structured inter-university cooperation*	*€ 4 m*
2011	Gelmini	Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities & young researchers working abroad	Art. 1. c. 1 L. 230/2005 DD.MM. n. 13 del 26.1.2001, n. 501 del 20.1.2003 e n.18 del 1.2.2005	6. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 1 m + € 5
		Actions to promote inter-university cooperation projects and attract international students	*-*	*Art. 7. Actions of structured inter-university cooperation*	*€ 4 m*
		Additional funds for HEIs to fund approved and direct collaboration with Italian expert abroad	L. 240/2010	Art. 13 Ad hoc Actions	€ 340.000
2012	Profumo	Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	Art. 1. c. 1 L. 230/2005 DD.MM. n. 13 del 26.1.2001, n. 501 del 20.1.2003 e n.18 del 1.2.2005,	4. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 1,50
		Attraction of youth researchers working abroad	art. 24, comma 3, lettera b), legge 30 December 2010, n. 240,	6. Program for young researchers "Rita Levi Montalcini".	€ 5 m
		Internationalization of HE system	-	Art 13. Additional Actions	€ 3.000.000* not only for that
2013	Carrozza	Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	Art. 5 DM n.71 16/04/2012	4. Direct call to professionals working abroad	+ 3,5 m
		Attraction of youth researchers working abroad	art. 24, comma 3, lettera b), legge 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240,	5. Program for young researchers "Rita Levi Montalcini".	€ 5 m
2014	Giannini	*Evaluation results linked to didactic activities in relation to international component*	*DL 10/11/2008, art 2 c.2, n. 180 and Law 1/2009*	*Art. 3 Allocation for Performance based funds*	*10% of Performance base funding (€ 1.215.000.000) Indicators: n. Incoming/Outgoing Erasmus Students, n. ECTS earnt abroad, N. graduates with at least 9 ECTS earnt abroad*
		Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	Art. 1. c. 1 L. 230/2005 DD.MM. n. 13 del 26.1.2001, n. 501 del 20.1.2003 e n.18 del 1.2.2005, n.230/2009, n. 486/2011	5. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 3,5 m
		Attraction of youth researchers working abroad	art. 24, comma 3, lettera b), legge 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240,	6. Program for young researchers "Rita Levi Montalcini".	€ 5 m
		Internationalization of PhD degrees	DL 45/2013	10. Actions deriving from legislative disposition, Comma C, 2 (among which support to ISM)	40% depending upon quality of research from degree professors' board, plus 10% n. of students enrolled to PhD with a LM granted abroad] of €. 148.046.300
		Promotion of international student mobility	DL 9/05/2003 n.105 & L. 170/2003	10. Actions deriving from legislative disposition, Comma C, 2 (among which support to ISM)	€ 65.185.469

YEAR OF FFO	Signed by	Reference to Internationalization and/or ISM (in bold)	legislative Reference	Article	Fund allocated and Indicators (if present)
2015	Giannini	*Evaluation results linked to didactic activities in relation to international component*	*DL 10/11/2008, art 2 c.2, n. 180 and Law 1/2009*	*Art. 3 Allocation for Performance based funds*	**7% of performance based fund depending of international component (out of € 1.385.000.000. [Incoming& Outgoing Erasmus Students, n.ECTS earnt abroad, N. graduates with at least 9 ECTS earnt abroad]**
		Direct fund allocated to hire foreign professionals or Italian working abroad into Italian universities	art. 24, comma 3, lettera b), legge 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240,	5. Direct call to professionals working abroad	€ 10.000.000
		Attraction of youth researchers working abroad	art. 24, comma 3, lettera b), legge 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240,	6. Program for young researchers "Rita Levi Montalcini".	€ 5 m
		Internationalization of PhD degrees	*DL 45/2013*	*10. Actions deriving from legislative disposition, Comma C, 1 (among which support to ISM)*	*€. 122.986.381 [40% quality of research from degree professors' board, 10% n. of students enrolled to PhD with a LM granted abroad]*
		Promotion of international student mobility	*DM 29/12/2014 n. 976*	*11. Actions deriving from legislative disposition, Comma C, 2*	*€ 5 m [to be allocated as per art. 10 above]*
2016		Attraction of youth researchers working abroad	art. 24, comma 3, lettera b), legge 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240,	6. Program for young researchers "Rita Levi Montalcini".	€ 5 m

SOURCE: Elaboration of the author of legislative framework on the FFO

Annex IV | Chinese foreign students enrolled within the framework of Unitalia programs

	turandot	marco polo	total
2007/08		776	776
2008/09	130	969	1099
2009/10	447	991	1438
2010/11	743	994	1737
2011/12	1327	1152	2479
2012/13	1428	997	2425
2013/14	1522	943	2465
2014/15	1652	984	2636
2015/16	1907	1003	2910
2016/17	1723	729	2452
2017/18	1464	714	2178
2018/19	1744	727	2471

Source: UNITALIA reports

Esteem of Italian students who undertook an experience abroad

	%	Survey total n. of students	Real total
2004/05	11,3	116113	138019
2005/06	10,8	147794	175906
2006/07	10,3	159287	185361
2007/08	11,7	161720	184669
2008/09	11,7	169558	187359
2009/10	12,2	174384	189746
2010/11	12,3	174901	192358
2011/12	12,3	199449	215525
2012/13	12,2	208478	226799
2013/14	12,2	211742	229966
2014/15	12,4	209463	228240
2015/16	12,2	235992	265742
2016/17	12,4	230970	272225
2017/18	12,8	255269	276195
2018/19	13	258971	280230
2019/20	14,5	268461	290224

Source: Elaboration of Almalaurea data

Annex IV | Number of American students studying in Italy in American Universities

	UK	ITA	%	tot outgoing USA
1998/99 (c)	27.720	11.281	nd	nd
1999/00	29.289	12.930	nd	nd
2000/01	30.289	16.127	nd	nd
2001/02	30.143	17.169	nd	nd
2002/03	31.716	18.936	10,84	174.629
2003/04	32.237	21.992	11,49	191.321
2004/05	32.071	24.858	12,07	205.983
2005/06	32.109	26.078	11,67	223.534
2006/07 (d)	32.705	27.831	11,51	241.791
2007/08	33.333	30.670	11,69	262.416
2008/09	31.342	27.362	10,51	260.327
2009/10	32.683	27.940	10,33	270.604
2010/11	33.182	30.361	11,08	273.996
2011/12	34.660	29.645	10,46	283.332
2012/13	36.210	29.848	10,31	289.404
2013/14	38.250	31.166	10,24	304.467
2014/15	38.189	33.768	10,77	313.415
2015/16	39.140	34.894	10,73	325.339
2016/17	39.851	35.366	10,63	332.727
2017/18	39.403	36.945	10,81	341.751
2018/19				

Source: institute of international education IIE, USA Annual reports 1998-2017. Data refers to first solar year of the academic one reported

Annex IV | Comparison between foreign graduates and enrolled students

YEAR	Graduated foreign students (both with ITA and foreign school diplomas)	Enrolled foreign students (both with Ita and foreign school diplomas)
2004/05	2824	33.647
2005/06	3596	39.359
2006/07	4532	44.746
2007/08	4886	50.476
2008/09	5517	55.291
2009/10	5899	59.811
2010/11	6187	63.315
2011/12	6811	66.108
2012/13	7054	68.211
2013/14	6838	70.130
2014/15	6799	71.345
2015/16	6342	73.328
2016/17	6314	78.137
2017/18	6483	85.361

Source: Elaboration of the author of ANS data

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Year	Visa Tot				Visa for Studying				Visa for Traineeship				Visa for Research			
	VSU	NAZ	VTL	TOT	VSU	NAZ	VTL	TOT	VSU	NAZ	VTL	TOT	VSU	NAZ	VTL	TOT
1998	528.399	107.357	105.321	741.077	7.826	17.458	869	26.153	641	162	129	932	-	-	-	-
1999	665.873	113.326	55.577	834.776	10.150	21.090	371	31.611	629	366	15	1.010	-	-	-	-
2000	808.141	163.714	37.117	1.008.972	11.287	23.906	433	35.626	466	232	6	704	-	-	-	-
2001	723.513	186.230	37.579	947.322	11.205	26.780	381	38.366	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
2002	533.124	155.018	165.393	853.535	8.295	30.890	1.474	40.659	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2003	648.539	178.532	47.803	874.874	10.890	32.077	490	43.457	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	737.893	196.825	49.781	984.499	12.804	30.940	877	44.621	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2005	811.006	224.080	41.594	1.076.680	13.756	31.691	835	46.282	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	947.916	217.875	32.376	1.198.167	13.216	32.929	716	46.861	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2007	1.130.266	363.277	26.273	1.519.816	14.314	34.933	328	49.575	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2008	1.201.354	318.872	43.341	1.563.567	15.490	37.236	797	53.523	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2009	1.051.919	301.627	48.261	1.401.807	17.314	34.462	583	52.359	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2010	1.274.988	218.319	50.102	1.543.409	16.848	36.794	604	54.246	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2011	1.446.861	231.740	36.060	1.714.661	9.469	39.905	468	49.842	-	-	-	-	85	190		275
2012	1.634.656	198.104	39.634	1.872.394	9.136	40.211	453	49.800	-	-	-	-	48	371		419
2013	1.917.261	169.055	39.149	2.125.465	10.436	41.466	596	52.498	-	-	-	-	64	384		448
2014	2.052.475	141.805	22.050	2.216.330	9.739	41.976	263	51.978	-	-	-	-	86	369		455
2015	1.901.804	127.659	13.699	2.043.162	10.059	41.960	180	52.199	-	-	-	-	120	369		489
2016	1.677.221	131.559	4.467	1.813.247	9.433	44.114	60	53.607	-	-	-	-	134	406		540
1017	1.707.073	135.481	4.945	1.847.499	9.824	47.582	64	57.470	-	-	-	-	168	429		597
2018	1.707.494	145.165	4.308	1.856.967	10.047	50.000	25	60.072	-	-	-	-				

Source: Elaboration of MAE/MAECI National Reports

		PERMITS WITH LIMITED VALIDITY IN TIME								Tot
YEARS	**Long Periods**	**Work**	**Family**	**Residence**	**Religious**	**Study**	**Tourism**	**Humanitarian**	**Others**	
1992		423.977	92.073	35.548	38.971	**21.145**	8.279	10.220	18.722	648.935
1993		358.521	104.069	35.170	42.606	**24.212**	7.612	3.933	13.334	589.457
1994		399.940	118.061	35.064	45.372	**25.157**	7.262	3.268	14.978	649.102
1995		405.475	135.502	36.019	48.236	**25.588**	6.979	3.058	16.934	677.791
1996		433.833	156.169	37.591	50.336	**26.194**	5.440	2.968	16.628	729.159
1997		656.585	188.008	40.359	51.286	**26.484**	4.429	3.060	15.809	986.020
1998		660.335	214.709	42.359	53.675	**26.556**	5.678	3.625	15.959	1.022.896
1999		660.630	271.498	43.943	54.208	**28.671**	4.721	8.140	19.009	1.090.820
2000		827.618	334.129	53.537	53.578	**31.537**	6.575	8.249	25.432	1.340.655
2001		837.945	365.894	53.747	53.160	**30.476**	4.753	9.519	24.255	1.379.749
2002		840.966	421.761	54.392	54.689	**33.215**	4.764	13.320	25.285	1.448.392
2003		829.761	477.959	56.903	53.610	**38.012**	5.857	15.883	25.301	1.503.286
2004		1.479.381	545.300	58.510	52.997	**37.367**	9.740	17.005	27.267	2.227.567
2005		1.412.694	624.404	61.876	53.249	**40.355**	9.332	17.833	25.805	2.245.548
2006		1.419.285	682.365	41.573	34.251	**48.718**	9.025	14.932	35.875	2.286.024
2007		1.463.058	763.744	44.847	32.081	**51.625**	….	29.526	30.091	2.414.972
2008 (b)		1.239.263	1.238.678	11.452	24.297	**45.458**	….	35.787	26.645	2.621.580
2009 (b)		1.387.063	1.424.680	12.525	26.177	**46.836**	….	53.510	36.698	2.987.489
2010 (b)		1.612.541	1.608.322	11.624	24.433	**49.908**	….	57.003	34.185	3.398.016
2011 (b)	1.638.734	1.054.659	691.256	6.243	25.076	**40.833**	….	56.387	22.874	3.536.062
2012 (b)	1.896.223	1.001.643	586.012	6.691	26.682	**49.012**	….	53.034	18.427	3.637.724
2013 (b)	2.045.662	833.211	703.229	6.850	27.432	**50.974**	….	76.803	20.075	3.764.236
2014 (b)	2.179.607	817.596	691.996	4.880	26.811	**52.059**	….	81.952	19.825	3.874.726
2015 (b)	2.248.747	771.548	684.905	5.415	26.943	**53.481**	….	118.020	20.857	3.929.916

Annex IV | Type of residence permits released to foreigners between 1992 and 2015

Source: ISTAT data based on interior ministry release

Annex IV | Quotas foreseen by *decreti flussi:* conversion of permits from studying to working

	Dependent work	Independent work	Total
2010			4500
2011			0
2012	6000	1000	7000
2013	6000	1000	7000
2014	6000	1050	7050
2015	6500	1500	8000
2016			
2017			
2018			
2020	4750	700	5450

SOURCES: Elaboration of the author of GAZZETTA UFFICIALE (2020), 'decreti flussi'

Annex IV | N. of Cooperation Agreement: Historical Series 1992-2018

Year	Culture	Cultural/ Science	Science/ Technology	Culture/ Scientific/ Technology	Total
			(signed)		
1992	–	–	1		1
1993	–	–	2		2
1994	1	–	1		2
1995	1	–	1		2
1996	–	2	–		2
1997	2	8	5		15
1998	2	3	5		10
1999	1	3	1		5
2000	–	4	3		7
2001	–	1	2		3
2002	–	2	1		3
			(in force)		
2003	59	17	39		139
2004	49	27	43		119
2005	58	30	48		136
2006	64	21	55	11	151
2007	59	15	50	27	151
2008	66	11	49	27	153
2009	59	62	52	23	144
2010	59	10	52	23	144
2011	56	14	46	26	142
2012	60	17	48	30	155
2013					
2014	57	10	43	26	136
2015	60	10	44	27	141
2016	63	12	45	24	144
1017	63	14	40	31	148
2018	61	12	41	33	147

Source: Elaboration of the author based on MAE/MAECI national reports

Annex V

This annex provides an overview of selected material that has been manually coded in the phase of analysis of this research. The tables that follows shows further evidence which support the finding discussed by chapter V. It is constituted mainly by expert interview material, but it also includes other key sources such as media releases, speeches, and other kind of sources consulted as discussed in the research section of chapter II.

Interviews' selected quotes have been anonymized in the tables that follows, as the large majority of experts given consent to state their full name under this condition. Some parts of this quotes have been deleted for this purpose. Italian interviews have been translated to enhance the original meaning of the transcription, and sometimes the original word is used and explained in brackets.

As introduced and discussed already during the analysis in chapter IV, and more in detail by the two chapter focused on the cases study under the analysis, it is possible to further observe the underlying differences between the Australian and Italian panorama. In the first case, in fact, it is evident the extent to which Australians experts discussed the issue within clear boundaries of ISM, globally providing coherent responses and views (even when contrasting among them). The tables below shed instead further light on the extent to which ISM is not a 'defined' issue in the case of issue, and experts contributions emerge as disconnected and related to different parallel flows of mobility or issues on the table.

	AUSTRALIA	ITALY
ISM as a treat	[higher education, China] There are problems. Some of them don't have very good English. And there are some problems of standards that people have paid quite a lot of money and some of the courses are quite expensive. There's some pressure on the academics to at least pass… maybe not give them high marks. But if a person is paid 50,000 60,000 dollars … is reluctant to fail, so is the universities getting into a stage where they are really just selling courses. You can buy a university degree without meeting standards, so of course there are these problems. And the university sector in Australia today is grappling with them…as a question of getting the balance right.	[Higher Education] ... that is, there is something, or so I call it, of jealousy or, if you want to be worse, of "academic fury", whereby it is believed that no one can teach the subject as well as Professor X here, and therefore verification interviews and additional exams are needed.
	[Foreign Policy/Higher Education, China] False information about prior academic achievement, false information about English language ability, false information about whether I've got the financial resources to survive in Australia....	[Higher Education] Within academia, I call it resistance to change, if we talk about culture, we talk about an academic culture and cultures don't change with their norms... cultures change themselves, they self-reform, they change slowly with a process of change...
	[Higher education/Trade, China] And that's great… that's great when students what to come from China at the level that they are coming at the moment. The question that we have and the problem we have to deal with at some point in time is what happens when China changes its own system, and makes its own system more attractive to other markets... [...] So what's the plan B. Do we have a plan B?	[Higher Education] it is said that the teacher must not consider the exam that he hold as the best ever, and he must not think that if the student goes abroad to attend a course in place of his own, without thinking that will be a graduate with a little deficit, but then ...
	[Higher Education, Trade, China] And the everyone sat back and said 'goodness me, you know, there's far more in this than we ever thought possible. And in a way recently the concerns has been more that there's been too much dependence on China. We should try and diversity and get more students from other countries	[Higher Education] So let's say there is this limit to the Erasmus that comes from a certain academic jealousy, it's something that tends not to consider as valid the studies carried out in other universities. That is to say, if you have not studied what I think, professor, I mean, I am not so sure that you are really matured... the culture, the experience, the notions necessary for the degree... [...] a very remarkable and still existing resistance of Italian teachers to accept the education given abroad...
	[higher education/ Trade, China] TESQA, the regulator put out a report just recently which looked at the growth of international education and the potential sort of danger to it… [...] . It's a very conservative with its language but it was pointing out some real problems in the co-dependency between international education and university finances …	[Higher Education] But when an Erasmus coordinator... is not put in a position to decide about the didactic structure, because then maybe the colleague says no, stay calm, because you don't recognise my exam, and then here is one of the solutions about the topic of academic approval, always touching the macro of didactics, is that of freeing it in some way from the decision of the individual teacher...
	[Higher Education/Trade China] I think Australian universities are hopelessly overexposed to variations in the international market and don't have a plan to address it. So if something happened in China tonight that immediately stopped Chinese students coming to Australia… Australian universities would be staffed. They had absolutely no idea what to do. Because they're dependent on it and so many thousands of them come here now that it's such an important part of our revenue stream and… [...] And I don't think Australian universities… Really know what they would do… If especially Chinese and Indian students suddenly stopped coming… I'm not sure they're even prepared for a more long term trend away ... because of some Chinese universities are getting better that ranking higher and higher … more Chinese students are going to study at home.	[Higher Education] has moved on to blaming the language, and so we do all the English courses ... we act as if Italian was not one of the oldest languages, let's say, and as if it was not studied abroad ... and then we discover instead that Italian is one of the most studied languages abroad
	[Foreign Policy/Higher Education/Trade, China] If geo-politically China decides to punish Australia… for.. there, there are many reasons why you might do that, and then the number of students coming from China to study, that would be [are people are saying now] a huge risk, a huge over-exposure...And particularly, if you look at the numbers i will send you, the percentage of international revenues of some of the big universities' budgets are well beyond low risk, you know, they are really beyond medium risk, they are really into high risk, because international education is entirely vulnerable to formulating good national policies, and it is also vulnerable to geopolitical shocks on which you have no control really	[Higher Education] it's been said for some time that it arises ... and Italian students are against foreigners, because actually those who come from countries like China have economic parameters, very often fake, so in the merit rankings of XXXX they pass in front of all the Italians. That's it. [...] And so in the scholarships, all these things are seen especially by the Chinese, even a bit by the Vietnamese, bypassed by all those countries where there is not something like the 730 or 740.

[Foreign Policy, China] there are now some security concerns with China. So it's related a little bit to both, suggesting that some of these students have a military background, they're being … for example to get training in computers, with cyber security issues… and there are probably a few with military background … to other things probably true the world is not perfect. And you know it is probably true.

[Foreign Policy, China] But I think the Australian Government is now very concerned about Chinese activity within Australia, and with some concern about the activities of Chinese students in particular …and then about what leverage …Australia's reliance on Chinese students might keep the Chinese government in its relationship with Australia. So I think there is concern about that relationship which has got to be a negative issue [...] probably the highest level concern is with PhD Chinese students who might have access to sensitive information as part of their PhD studies. But at a lower level about the activities of Chinese coursework students … and some of this is simply on reporting back to China on the activities of other Chinese international students...spying on each other basically.

[Foreign Policy, China] I also think China - and I don't know whether you're aware of China's demography - China's demography will mean that over the next 10 years China will go from a country of net emigration to a country of net immigration. What is more China will target not developing countries, China will target ethnic Chinese who have lost their citizenship in developed countries. So all those Chinese students who have migrated here and who may have lost their Chinese citizenship… will be the target. […] They could be second generation, they can be third generation they can do it they can be the grandchildren of the 1989 Chinese students.

[local issues] the pressure that having such a huge international education industry and recruiting such huge numbers of international students puts on… on the general social infrastructure of places like … well in particular inner city Sydney and Melbourne… and the flow on effects of that has on the people who live in those places… And then, you know, people complaining about a skilled migration or international education becoming a bit of a political issue... where… it's not, you know, people blame it for things and unfairly blamed the students for it certainly not the students fault that these things are happening

[local issues, China] But I think that you know we have roughly as many international students as we have Indigenous Australians, you know it's almost a part… … I live right near University of New South Wales, few suburbs from here, you know the number of Chinese… what appear to me to be Chinese international students is…very disproportionate in terms of the number of people who… who live in the area. And you know, that has implications for housing prices and things like that, because sometimes these people experience… when one houses… all this sort of stuff… you know I'm not arguing against any of these things but… when you have such a concentration of people in an area then that really has an impact on the other people who live there

[local issues] the surge in immigration is driven by overseas students, the overseas students live in a little circle around the university, and where all the congestion problems? they're in little circles around the universities! If you if you go back two kilometres around a university that's where all the congestion problems are. Go to Melbourne! All the congestion problems around come Brunswick, they're in Melbourne union RMIT. You got to Sydney? Same thing!

[Higher Education, Cina] A problem that I see as a very big one, for example, is that sometimes, I'll give you a specific example, with China we are asking... [...] The national score that we were asking for until last year was very low. That is to say, in China you didn't get into university.... We were attracting a lot of people who were not likely to get into their institutions.... [...] So either we're afraid of not being attractive, but we are, or may say ... we'll do with fewer numbers. But is the problem making a lot of numbers or making quality numbers that then bring added value? This is my question

[Higher Education, China] the large period when there was the push on China and India so. More or less in the last ten years starting... between 2005 and 2015.[...] there has been a push to bring in CHINESE people. All have more than us and now they realise that we have a lot of students who are not succeeding because we have taken them, with the entry threshold too low. [...] We have certainly pleased the MAECI, which for political reasons wanted a policy of political and economic expansion towards certain geographical areas to be accompanied by a policy of cultural and scientific expansion. But we found the problem at home afterwards with the consequent criticism [on quality]...

[Foreign policy] [a Pakistani student who comes to study in Italy] is a potential terrorist for the MAECI, I can assure you of that. If the US student comes, golden carpets... they might run into the mistake that the intentions are exactly the opposite.

[Foreign Policy] I guess that their problem is if a student, I don't know, of Iraqi origin came from France, he might be without a visa. So I think they need information that is transversal. After all, at this moment the situation is delicate, you can agree or disagree... Obviously. Honestly, as a citizen, I don't feel all this urgency or anxiety....

[Foreign Policy, Immigration] not to give the study visa for study reasons, thinking that it is... the migration for study reasons is a strategy to come to Italy to look for a job ... and these clearly are not data that support this thesis ... indeed let's say the experience that we have seen, this analysis that in any case made it to come, in reality, generally tends to go away because Italy is not a country that offers great opportunities for the qualified and therefore there is this background of work immigration behind the study immigration, but only partially

[Foreign policy, Immigration] But there is also a problem ... there is also the problem ... that many ... that is, in short. If there is someone who plays on these things... Understood? Therefore the problem is to welcome... but to be careful to whom we welcome, also for this reason we cannot open this way...

[Foreign Policy, Immigration] but what happens is that there is always this unquestionable judgment of the head of mission who takes over the whole process. And I don't feel like saying that it's wrong. But I hear that it penalises because, yes, I can argue so

AUSTRALIA	ITALY
/	[Foreign Policy, Immigration] In the end they see it a bit too much as a migratory flow. This is the limit, according to MAECI, that is to consider academic mobility in the same way as any other type of migratory flow...
	[Foreign Policy, Immigration] But the fact remains that at some point terrorism, problems, etc., etc., the Ministry of the Interior began to put heavy brakes ... and therefore, apart from the fact that there had always been this procedure through the Consulates... do you know the procedure for the request?
	[Foreign Policy, Immigration] In the sense that we are not .... we are quite bound by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [...] not totally in the European sphere, we are a little bit more in the non-European sphere, especially when a non-European has to come, has to apply for a visa, has to open a bank account, and so on...
	[Foreign Policy, Immigration] Because what the various Consuls tell you is that we already favor illegal immigration
/	[Immigration] there was a stiffening also at the level of the Ministry of the Interior for fear of terrorist infiltration etc. etc... and there this discourse of visas started to become more problematic, while it never was... maybe there was no reason why it was so before, because there was not this great influx of extra students... it started with Erasmus Mundus...
	[Immigration] on the side of the Ministry of the Interior, the non-European student is still seen as a possible source of danger and therefore there are two different points of view that do not match and in which I have the sensation that each one remains on his own position. The Ministry of the Interior somehow warns that the universities do not understand the danger and do not understand that behind the student who asks to enroll may pass other flows and therefore in reality, there is.... There is a rigidity that is not yet composed, that is to say, a difference that has not yet decomposed...
	[Immigration] But you know, the migratory flows are...are...are frozen [...] So if I read it there is also a change... stiffening of the borders, a breaking down of the borders inside the Union with Schengen but a stiffening outside, also for the students... due to closure, political choice
/	[Immigration] On the other hand, on the side of the Ministry of the Interior, the non-European student is still seen as a possible source of danger, and therefore there are really two points of view that do not match and where I have the feeling that everyone still remains on their own position.
	[Immigration] The Ministry of the Interior somehow warns that the universities do not understand the danger and do not understand that behind the student who asks to enroll may pass other flows and therefore in reality, there is... There is a rigidity that is not yet composed, that is to say, a difference that has not yet decomposed...

ISM as an opportunity	[Higher education, Foreign Policy] that there are many answers to that. [...] But also to study and learn within another foreign education system, probably quite different structures and approaches to education. So it's, you know, it gives of a broader sort of global perspective on how things work, how the world works, and also I think there will be that direct sort of global influence on their education. So it's one thing, you know, as well as the Australian governments which we're also interested in building our own relationships with other countries so. We feel that the mobility of students in both directions is a kind of soft diplomacy.	[Higher Education] I believe that mobility is a fundamental element of tertiary education and therefore of higher education. Not only because it guarantees the necessary cultural contaminations that enrich the educational pathway of a student during his career. They are not only of an educational nature, obviously, from the point of view of the narrow educational pathway that a person goes through and therefore of the accumulation of better knowledge, but also of a human educational nature, therefore of the relationships that develop between people when they leave their own narrow cultural context and put themselves in relation with more complex cultural contexts, they produce positive effects on their open-mindedness, and on the capacities of these people and are also an unquestionable boost from the point of view of their career
	[Trade, Foreign Policy] I think over… over time … the economic… there's been a realization that there's a much broader and deeper economic benefits from receiving very large numbers of students in that it creates dysphoric connection between Australia and influential groups in business and society throughout the region, yes… And that that… over time I think it's morphed from just generating revenue to deeper economic connections. And now there's a realizations that the soft power benefits of that as well…	[Higher Education] there is no doubt that programmes like Erasmus show how mobility [telephone rang] is most important, [an officer go to see] is to build a common consciousness across borders. And so, I think there is no other programme like Erasmus that is achieving this.
	[higher Education, Foreign Policy, Trade] And so from all points of view it is a good thing, it is a good thing for Australian universities to become more open. It really forces Australian universities to look at Asia, to go and visit Asia, to think about the it a system to be open to the world. And this is a good thing that breaks down parochialism here. But also it is a good thing to earn revenues and boost the economy of the country, this part it is part of Australia becoming … developing links with Asia…	[Higher Education, Foreign Policy, Trade] bearing in mind that not in 2030 but in 2050 one third of the population will be African... so if we want to live as a academic institution we have to go outside, absolutely, because the demand for entry into Europe will be much lower than other regions... and we have to use and export what is attractive and of high quality and also, how to say, enhance it.
	[Foreign Policy, Labour Market, Trade] we need to promote this, our relationships with these countries, starting at the undergraduate level and that the more students we can send into the region to get to know other countries the more they understand them, the more connections they make, both people to people and institutional connections, the closer our countries will be. And that will contribute to more trade… more stability… better security and closer relationships. In particular, there are… a number of reports have been done about Australian business and how they're basically not very good at doing business with Asian countries. We do a lot of business with the United States, with the UK and China, for example, but a lot of our smaller and medium businesses don't do much business with Asia, especially Southeast Asia. And we think that we need to grow familiarity among our future leaders with the region so that they are more… they will go into businesses and they will have Indo-Pacific skills and understanding…and that will promote close closer relationships.	[Foreign policy] the MAECI should reconsider a lot also what is the discourse of the Risk Assessment, we are a society more and more globalized and therefore to close the doors to the students of the African countries because there is, let's say, a great risk of irregular migration is actually counter-productive because it is potentially a discrimination, but they are countries that have growth rates much greater than Italy and with respect to which we will not have a strategic interest to tighten relations. The temporary international student could be the trait-d'union between Italy and African countries... [...] the entrepreneurial world, to support the internationalization of the enterprises, was clearly supporting local research on the international students, thinking precisely that they can be a prodrome or a catalyst for attention of the internationalization of the enterprises.... and in fact they are right...[...] therefore we say that to create a system also means to put inside the Ministry of Productive Activities, and of the Economy etc. because we have so much need of the highly qualified who... because ... maybe through them we can break the long economic stagnation that Italy is experiencing, no? With innovation, giving them more opportunities and international students can make their contribution on this, in conclusion ...

	[Foreign Policy, Higher Education, Trade, Labor Market] So we've moved by just from student driven for the same student recruitment to one which is actually dealing with the bilateral relationship between countries and institutions. So why do we do this?… what's the policy rationale for doing this?… well a lot of these around internationalizing our institutions and… making our institutions as internationalized as they can possibly be... even though we do have a large proportion of … our student bodies who do have an international experience we still have many students who are unable to have any international experience. And so what you do is you bring international experience to the students who are… who are still in the domestic… the domestic domain... and but what it also does to is… is it has trade-offs in terms of any and… internationalized university attracting international workforce and international his workforce is very important in terms of research and research collaboration. It then has a knock on effect in terms of the recognition and rankings of institutions. It's a virtuous cycle that attracts students and staff and the cycle goes… goes round and round

[Higher Education, Trade, Foreign Policy] Let's say it better this way, it invested [Germany], on the presence of foreign students in their academic system to then ... how to say make them ambassadors of their economies, things that we have never done. I always remember that it was done, that it was done at that time by chance, the case of trains, that is, if the Chinese bought Siemens trains it is not by chance, that is why then the engineers were trained in the academic system, in the German academic system.

ISM as an opportunity	[Higher Education, Foreign Policy, Trade, Labor Market, *New Colombo Plan*] Universities love it because they get a lot of money from us to run programs into the region and love the money of course. Why wouldn't you? And it means they can provide a more enriched educational experience for students. It helps them be competitive… and helps them open up relationships with other universities in the region. Business like it because we have lots of business sponsors and they provide internships, in the region, so a student, a scholar might go and study for example in Singapore for a semester and then they might do an internship for a semester with a company or a non-government organization or a UN body. And so business love it because it's… they see that it's like a pool of talent… of students who are getting experience and then when they come back to Australia they're quite experienced and businesses want to employ them. And it's also giving them skills to make businesses work better. And finally other governments in the region love it because they see that as a clear demonstration of the commitment that Australia has to understanding and working with them… because we've been running many scholarship programs where we bring people from other countries to Australia. And that's important but this shows that we are interested in getting to know them. So we're sending all of our young people out to find out about you know… how Thailand works or how Papua New Guinea or all of those other countries in the region and governments love it. They see it as a great people to people project

... at the most political level I follow, I have seen this thing from 2012 onwards [...] and I have seen that the part of the triennial organization, the part of the funding has seen the funding for the students, for mobility, there have been substantial funding for mobility, so it is a part that anyway interests and then the Ministry is important that is to say, not that there is the fear ... in case of ... not that one tries to stop the mobility, one tries to favour it. So I think that the exchange or the mobility is... is absolutely.... well seen by the ministry MIUR.

SOURCE: AUTHOR'S EXPERT INTERVIEW MATERIAL

ISM as a necessity	[Trade] And then there's the economic argument too, and that's… that's really come home to the government in recent years, because it stands out so much now, if you look beyond material exports, and look at the services sector then education has become a huge thing in the country.	[Foreign policy] So where, for example, political relations are hardened, cultural and scientific relations must be softened, because otherwise... it's clear that it's a balancing play.
	[Labour Market] I think within certain disciplines areas, probably particularly areas like medicine there would be … and nursing probably too an example to an extent there would be a definite recognition amongst policy specialists in those areas that we really need skilled migration to make sure that we have an adequate workforce in those areas…	[Higher Education] So on one hand there is certainly an interest, a little more available space favourable by the universities and the Ministry of Universities, also to be comparable with the data circulating at European level on the number of international students enrolled, there is a favourable system ...
	[Higher Education] because Australian universities are so dependent upon income from our international students that… anything that's international… the number one stakeholder is going to be universities. And what universities want more than anything else is money. So any policy that gives us money we'd like… any policy that gives us more money… we'd like more… any idea we have that can get us more money… the reality that we'll put forward…	[Higher Education] we have certainly entered an era in which Italy too, as we were saying before, has realised that the international student who enrols at university brings value. Why does he bring value? Both because in some way he increases the parameters of national financing, and because he brings money, and because in many universities - but this is not yet the case everywhere - the non-European student, like what he sees in other European countries, has some fees, higher entry fees.
	[Trade] the obvious one is that it's 30 billion dollars a year in education exports… which is our highest services export as you would know and that supports 240000 jobs. And so it's a huge boon for our economy…. And if that took a dive that would have a huge impact on the economy… …	[Higher Education] On one hand, increasing international mobility, so we have to attract students, we have to be attractive, our education system has to be attractive, even for geographical areas that are traditionally not covered, or to attract students from areas of the world that have a high human development index to not always do just cooperation or assistance...
	[Trade] So… I'm sure you've probably seen this somewhere but student recruitment, education, international education is Australia's third biggest export after iron ore so … so there's a lot it is an economic incentive for universities or for the government to actually take a more coordinating role…	[Higher Education] Since the Bologna process had elaborated the principle that in 2020 - the only form of benchmarking that the Bologna process has elaborated is relative to mobility and you certainly know this - in any case, it was in 2000 they decide that the 20% of the students must have had an experience of... there you can see the integration between the two things, here it says 'considered the strategic objective etc. etc.' and therefore are given... these are funds for young people, "Fondo Giovani", these funds are given to facilitate mobility
	[Trade] I mean I'd say there's probably been quite intentional… quite systematic … I mean in our international education has such a huge impact on… on… our own economy is the big part of our trade relationship as you say…. So I'd say it's been you know it's been quite intentional and the government has put in an incredible focus on international education for those reasons	[Higher Education] If a country decides not to undertake, it does not undertake the recommendations of the European Commission with respect to the financing of the university, with respect to the number of students, the benchmark of graduates and so on. If you like... but then you suffer, in quotes, the consequences in terms of international comparisons.
	[Trade] but overwhelmingly this has been regarded as a commercial industry that brings in substantial revenue to Australia. And quite possibly from the government's point of view it takes some of the pressure off them to generously fund universities are quite capable of making significant amounts of money from international students… … …	[Higher Education] And so here too, the presence of students has become, how can I say, a necessity... That's why, however you come... you are evaluated and therefore... the universities have implemented individual actions of internationalisation...
	[Trade] It is a big it's been a huge success. Like it is a big export industry. It's our third largest export overall and it's our largest services export and I tell all the data and numbers	[Higher Education] Because yes, how can I say, there is a... sometimes, when for example, in the strategic plans of the universities there is an aim to increase the number of ECTS acquired by the students abroad with respect to those who are in Italy, it seems almost like saying something of fulfilment, in short, a circular arrives, and you try to apply it and push to acquire more ECTS...
	[Labour market] The labor shortages were important too, yes, and it never hurts to make, maximise, increase export income and it never hurts to improve the budget. Yes of course you know those don't hurt. RIVZI	[Higher Education, Labor Market] But there is also the awareness that the business world demands a type of graduate that is certainly more performing to the extent that he or she also has international experience that has been able to enrich his or her academic career and also experience.

AUSTRALIA	ITALY
[Between Institutional bodies] This caused a controversy about it attracting some quite some publicity and but it hasn't been…So if this process is not perfect but as I told you in Australia we… we don't mind regulation. So the response was 'well we've got to check them, we've got to tighten up the regulations, it may be that the regulations are going to lose'. People said 'okay the regulations speak to this type of', so there wasn't an ideological objection is more technical. Okay there's a technical problem we better fix it. So but overall it's been a success and it has been well received … and the different branches of Australian Government have received a great deal.	[Between institutional bodies] In fact, the strategy on internationalization on which... however ... is a historical fact ... for Italy ... because the States General of higher education have never been... so that is a point that, also as a strategy, has been established in agreement between the two ministries. The other very important point of transition from the 70s and 80s to today is the fact that today mobility does not only take place with the foreign student, but mobility is based on the concept of the international student. This concept of the international student, of course, is also starting to enter the various institutions
[Between institutional bodies] I really think we've coordinated across the states and across agencies in Australia quite well, the agencies have been, have done a pretty good job both at the Commonwealth Fund and the state level.	[Between Institutional bodies] Ministries do not talk to each other unfortunately, that is, a dialogue that presupposed a... Rational planning and programming... These mechanisms are entrusted to the sensitivity of individuals. It happens that there are individual officials, directors-general or directors who have the sensitivity to understand that we could get together when working on common areas or fields and there are those who do not have it...
[Between Institutional bodies] I think this is… generally speaking I don't think… it's shared… generally speaking… I think you have your key department, take my place, in order in this case education that is charged with coming up with the policy and then other departments are there to support it.	[Between institutional bodies] If one has to identify a moment when started to perceive a greater bilateral consultation, it was certainly between 2005 and 2010. But it was related to Marco Polo... then I realized that was the perception that I had. Some people might have a different perception than the one I had, relations between the MIUR and the MAECI then intensified... even there with non-trivial frictions. But a friction presupposes a relationship, doesn't it? They stopped ignoring each other [LAUGHTER]
[Between institutional bodies] There are a number of phases that you go through, so often there will be, you know, well well identify a problem or an issue that needs some kind of government or sector or response to an often a well identify what those are in cooperation with other departments such as foreign affairs… then what will usually happen is you know their departments will only together undertake… arrange a research into the issue that they're trying to look at… often with policy development and government, there'll be some kind of a discussion paper… So for example I would work with my colleagues at the Foreign Affairs Department to develop a range of questions based on the research that we've done and it would then be made public and we… will make a call for public submissions…. [...] Then what generally happens is there will be a consultation phase. So stakeholders will be… well … will be able to respond to that discussion paper or in writing depending on the issue and depending on the budget, you know, I could go in and actually consult in person with the stakeholders that we think are the most important or are the most vocal… And then based on the feedback that we would get from those consultations… that's when the actual policy drafting happened and so that's when we'd work across governments in developing a policy that would then again be consult, we've been consult on, you know the draft or whatever policy we were coming up with we'd need to get it to prove to ministers… if there is something that requires agreement by a range of ministers we'd then have to work with their respective departments to make sure they were comfortable with it. And then once we've done the adequate consultation and we've gotten the approvals within government that's when we will jointly release a policy or a program..	[Between Institutional bodies] No, it has nothing to do with the ministry. Here it's... Look, Italy is one of the evils and maybe it's a good thing, I don't know about Italy, it's just that every official does what he wants. The immigration law is the same throughout Italy. But if you saw how the rules change from one consulate to another... it's crazy. So, there is a problem. This is a national problem that should perhaps be emphasized [...] So, certainly, the unequal treatment that consulates give to students when they get their visas is the most unacceptable thing. Italian universities, it's the thing they complain about the most, all the universities complain about it, and it's not in any other country [...] But, in reality, they give the regulations, and they don't want to intervene in every single case. In fact the problem is between one consulate and another, that depending on how the consul, or the official at the lowest level of the consul interprets the rules, it can change and change, with the same consul, the official changes, maybe changes and suddenly everything becomes easier.
[Between institutional bodies] Well… typically it's pretty much always the same. Say you have got an issue such as where to take international education policy. The starting point will often be setting up an inter-departmental committee. And so that might be chaired by one of the departments or by Prime Minister and Cabinet and it will bring together all the departments with an interest and so they also send an official … and they will try and draw up recommendations that go up to …Cabinet [...] I think I mean these processes are quite well known in Australia and the government the state governments would do much the same thing [...] I mean of course politically sometimes when the government finds itself in a particular corner it might decide not to go through all of this and suddenly make an announcement. [...]but this is the normal way things would operate and nearly always has operated in the education space…	[Between institutional bodies] It coordinates education, but obviously the coordination of education means... making deals with whoever welcomes you, that is embassies, with whoever welcomes you here in Italy, police headquarters... no? And every time that we make the conferences of the services, in fact, there are us with Miur who would like everything to be more free, that we don't have the certainty nor to tighten on entering the project and therefore we find ourselves, in fact, as Ministry, in the background.... that is, we are the ones who want to break the rules, understand?

I had close contacts both with foreign institutions dealing with these issues in the world and with Italian institutions, and therefore the Ministry of University and Research, at that time Miur, at that time it was Miur, but also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And so here the first fragmentations begin because it is not clear whose competence is on these issues.... And then also with the Ministry of the Interior.

The teaching of Italian, for example, in the world, no? It is done, it is carried out through teachers of the Italian school system, tenured teachers, who go to teach Italian, to be Italian lecturers in schools or universities in the world. Then all this is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so when they leave the system, when they leave the ministry and go out, the teachers become, like saying, PERSONNEL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and they no longer have any relationship with the Ministry of Education! You understand that this is a CRAZY thing, and crazy... apart from the fact that, for years, they have been sending out personnel who knew how to teach in their own country, but who knew nothing about how to teach a language, a second language or very little...

Here the commitment of the Italian diplomatic representations on the academic world, on the one hand deprives them of resources and commitment for other important actions, and on the other hand puts them in the position of not having any real knowledge of the subject.

Like saying, there, let's put it this way, the various actors at present, where there is no certain definition of who does what, they risk, if they do not coordinate, sometimes stepping on each other's toes, no?

Is a promotion that, let's say, takes place in a joint manner between two ministries, the MAECI, obviously also because of their territorial presence, and also because of their mandate to promote the "Sistema Italia" and... the MIUR, therefore the Education, University and Research part, which must also deal with promotion. The fact that they have a double competence in this area can obviously create overlaps or a difficult, let's say, alignment

The law foresees, the law or the MIUR regulation... but, because everything that enters in the internalization is Ministry of Foreign Affairs not Ministry of Education... and one of the diatribes between the two ministries, among other things, [...] because it is the MAECI that justifies the fact that by law, I would say, they are the ones who have to deal with the processes of internationalization. Whereas Miur doesn't want to hand it over to MAECI.

There is a strong ambiguity on this issue about of who is... of who is the competence on this field... because, in reality...[...] And, in short, here begin the first fragmentations because one never understands the competence of who is [MIUR or MAECI] on these issues... And then also with the Ministry of the Interior

In my opinion there is a lack of governance, that is, there is a lack of... who has to do things, that is, we don't know, because... First of all, [...] But it is clear that if you don't have a governance, you don't control the processes, that is, there is nothing to do

That is, in our country it is all hard on this, you know, because then... as I said before, competences are... We don't really know whose they are, and therefore, that is, even the Ministry of the University has been very very absent from the tables. I think I have almost never seen him at the tables of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of course I was always there, because, so ... also as, like saying, a representative of that institution that was, how to say, the entrance door of the students in the Italian academic system, I attended hundreds of meetings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but, in short, I saw few representatives of the Ministry of Education.