Kristina Stoeckl, Dmitry Uzlaner (Eds.):
Postsecular Conflicts
© 2020 innsbruck university press
ISBN 978-3-903187-99-3, DOI 10.15203/3187-99-3

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Introduction: What Are Postsecular Conflicts?

Every human society is heterogeneous and characterized by internal diversity. This truism is particularly evident when we think about religious diversity in modern societies. Secularization has changed the social position of religion. Modern societies no longer conceive of human coexistence as regulated by divine commands, but as the result of autonomous collective self-determination. The "sacred canopy," which according to Peter Berger once enveloped the entire social and temporal order, has ceased to exist.[1] In the secular age in which we live, multiple religious creeds are on offer and unbelief has become, for many, the default option.[2] And yet, religious pluralism was, for centuries, the cause for wars. In Europe, kings and rulers tried to curb the explosive power of religious pluralism within state borders: religious homogeneity was imposed on territories in the Peace of Westphalia (1684), and non-conforming heretics were exiled. As José Casanova points out in his book *Europas Angst vor der Religion* (Europe's fear of religion), the settlement of the newly discovered Americas by groups of Europeans escaping the religious wars in their home countries enabled European societies to preserve an artificial religious uniformity that did not correspond to the actual state of diversity.[3] Today religious diversity exists even within relatively homogenous European societies through the rise of numbers of non-believers, through new religious movements, and through migration. The societal changes usually subsumed under the label "1968" have likewise furthered diversity through greater individualism and the diversification of the political spectrum. European societies today are internally highly diverse in terms of worldviews, religions, and everyday ways of life. From the point of view of sociology, this pluralism is inevitable and cannot be reversed. It is the defining feature of modern societies.

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[1] **Peter L. Berger,** *The Sacred Canopy* **(New York: Doubleday, 1967).**

[2] **Charles Taylor,** *A Secular Age* **(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).**

If the pluralism of modern societies is the result of their history, what attitude can individuals as historical agents develop in this regard? This is, in the broadest sense of the term, a political question. Political philosophy distinguishes two trends in the attitudes of people vis-à-vis the pluralism of their societies. The first is a conservative stance that views changes in society with suspicion and sees old, predefined structures as guarantors of social unity. The second is a progressive stance, which welcomes change and would like to throw the burden of what is old overboard in favor of diversity.

This edited volume gathers materials and debates that are located in the first, in the conservative, and also in the second, the progressive camp. Some of the presented material is anti-liberal, even on the extreme right of the political spectrum; it praises "tradition" as a bulwark against diversity. Other texts are closer to the progressive side; they engage in the difficult task of evaluating what "tradition" can mean under conditions of diversity.

The progressive stance is often called liberalism, but in this introduction I would like to reserve the term for an analytical position from which to evaluate the two camps (and the authors presented in this volume): postsecular political liberalism as represented by John Rawls and – in German speaking countries – by Jürgen Habermas.[4] Postsecular political liberalism operates under the assumption that pluralism is not a (deplorable or commendable) state of affairs, but a norm. It is the norm of the polity that we call liberal democracy.[5] The main representative of this idea of postsecular political liberalism, John Rawls, says that the framework of norms in a polity is the result of an overlapping consensus.[6] By this, he means that the citizens of a state should be capable of finding a consensus about basic laws even if the reasons why they think that these laws are good are not the same. Rawls does not assume that those who give one reason know the reasons of other people or even value them. They might despise them, but as long as the outcome is the same, the overlapping consensus is real. Jürgen Habermas expresses a similar view using the concept of deliberative democracy, but the implications are different.[7] He formulates a more demanding concept of the mutual understanding of citizens. Habermas imagines that citizens should be able to explain to each other the reasons why they support a given understanding of good political order over another. When Habermas talks about a *postsecular society*, he intends a pluralist society that is no longer governed by just *one* worldview that is always right and determines the political and social horizon, but one that must bring diverse ideas about what a "good life" is actively into accord.[8]

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[3] **José Casanova,** *Europas Angst vor der Religion* **(Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2009).**

[4] **For a definition, see: Kristina Stoeckl and Dmitry Uzlaner, "Four Genealogies of Postsecularity," in** *Routledge Handbook of Postsecularity*, **ed. Justin Beaumont (New York: Routledge, 2019).**

How realistic, how viable is this vision of postsecular society? Habermas reminds the participants in public discourse of the need for "mutual translation." He advocates a "complementary learning process" based on the readiness of religious citizens to translate their views into a language comprehensible to non-religious people and on the willingness of secular citizens to *really* pay attention to what their religious co-citizens have to say.[9] Habermas assumes that more "translation" between religious and non-religious people could lead to better mutual understanding and thus to a better quality of the democratic process.

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[5] Alessandro Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[6] John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[7] Jürgen Habermas, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls' *Political Liberalism*," *Journal of Philosophy* 92 (1995), 109–131.

[8] Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere," *European Journal of Philosophy* 14, no. 1 (2006), 1–25.

[9] Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in Der Öffentlichkeit: Kognitive Voraussetzungen für den 'Öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauch' religiöser und säkularer Bürger," in *Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005).

Against Habermas, one could argue that there already exists a sociological model that conceptualizes the moral and religious diversity of modern societies, only in less consensual terms: the model of *culture wars* described by James D. Hunter.[10] In the United States this concept denotes the conflict between representatives of a culture holding on to traditional teachings, values, and life plans on the one hand, and the representatives of a culture of change and individual freedom on the other. Where Habermas's idea of *postsecular society* highlights consensus, the *culture wars* model highlights conflict. Both operate under the assumption that pluralism is the default condition of modern societies, but they come to different conclusions. Habermas's conclusion is optimistic, Hunter's is pessimistic. Culture wars, Hunter writes, precede shooting wars.[11]

This introduction is not the place to settle the question whether conflicts over values in modern pluralistic societies always take the form of a postsecular consensus or a culture war. Instead, what this introduction, this edited volume, and in general the whole *Postsecular Conflicts* research project[12] tries to do, is to define in greater detail the conditions of these conflicts. By "conditions" we mean what actors, what political dynamics, and what ideas and intellectual genealogies are at play in today's postsecular conflicts?[13]

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[10] James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

[11] James Davison Hunter, *Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America's Culture War* (New York: Free Press, 1994).

[12] The Postsecular Conflicts (POSEC) research project is a research project and group active at the University of Innsbruck from 2016 to 2021. It is funded by the European Research Council under the Horizon 2020 framework (ERC-STG-2015-676804).

[13] The handshake between two figures, one symbolizing the United States and the other Russia, on the cover of this edited volume is a reference to James D. Hunter's book Culture Wars. The cover of Culture Wars (1991) showed an arm-wrestle between stars and stripes, symbolizing an American society in conflict. Twenty years later, the conservative side in this conflict is in friendly relations with Russia. The handshake on the cover symbolizes the transnational moral conservative alliances and the global dynamics of postsecular conflicts studied in this volume.

Postsecular Conflicts

Postsecular conflicts are conflicts over values in modern pluralistic societies. We propose the term as a neutral, descriptive category; one that allows us to analyze constellations of conflict without seeing them, a priori, as grounds for postsecular consensus (the optimistic outcome) or for culture wars (the pessimistic outcome). The following four features are characteristic of postsecular conflicts:

First Defining Feature: Postsecular Conflicts Revolve around the Definition of Explicit and Implicit Norms.

The first feature of postsecular conflicts is that they arise when it comes to codifying norms into laws. In modern pluralistic societies, explicit and implicit norms of living together are being called into question. One example that illustrates this fact very well is the question of "marriage for all": In 2017, the German parliament passed a law that gave heterosexual marriages and homosexual partnerships (legal in Germany since 2001) equal status. All the parliament did was to change the wording of article 1353 of the German Civil Code from "marriage is entered into for life. The spouses have a mutual duty of conjugal community" to "marriage is entered into by two people of different or the same sex for life." Representatives of the Christliche Demokratische Union and the Christlich-Soziale Union in particular voiced concerns before the vote that the change might be unconstitutional. They argued that marriage for all would be possible only by changing the constitution (*Grundgesetz*). Article 6 of the German *Grundgesetz* grants marriage and the family special protection by the state. It does not mention explicitly that only a man and a woman can marry, but when the *Grundgesetz* came into force in 1949, this was self-evident. The question whether social change should result in a change of the constitution led to controversy among German legal experts. They had to answer the following question: What was the deeper, implicit meaning of the article of the German constitution that grants special protection to marriage and the family: a heterosexual relationship, the procreation of offspring, or simply mutual solidarity? The German example goes to show that often it is not the rights granted by the law that are questioned, but their interpretation. Either an interpretation of the law that has its roots in history is challenged or underdetermined concepts in the law result in new interpretations – for instance in the idea that "marriage for life" can also be entered into by same-sex partners.

During the last few decades the legal systems of Europe have moved in the direction of an increasingly inclusive pluralist social model. This involves the complete equality of religious, cultural, and sexual minorities. Since the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* prohibits discrimination, many countries have changed their laws to do away with unequal treatment. The drivers of these changes are frequently the European Court of Human Rights, the European Union, or the United Nations treaty framework. The process, which is called *norm diffusion* in the scientific literature,[14] can either take place "top-down" or "bottom-up," depending on whether lawmakers react to existing discrimination by changing the laws or whether an affected individual reminds his or her government of its duty (e. g., by taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights) to observe the international anti-discrimination regulations it signed. In short, the explicit and implicit norms of living together in society, which reflect a largely unquestioned status quo rooted in history, are being challenged. These explicit and implicit norms in many cases involve the domains of public or even private morals as well as religion and culture.

Second Defining Feature:
There Is No Clear Solution to Postsecular Conflicts

The second feature of postsecular conflicts is that there are no obvious or direct ways of resolving them. This is also why in the theoretical literature consensus is either envisioned as indirect ("overlapping") or absent ("culture wars"). In situations where a generally valid solution to moral or religious conflicts is not possible, the commonly applied political answer is exemptions. The best known type of exemption is the right to refuse an action on grounds of conscience, for example, conscientious objection to military service. In contemporary postsecular conflicts, the instrument of "exemptions" encounters two kinds of limits.[15] The first limit is set by those who are supposed to profit from the exemptions. This is the case when actors refuse the benefit of exemptions because they want to give shape to the political and legal system as such, as would be the case of claims to outlaw abortions in a country where medical personnel have the right to refuse to conduct abortions on grounds of conscience.[16] The second limit to exemptions, however, is nowadays set by the majority as well, who are less and less prepared to accept exemptions. It takes a certain amount of tolerance among members of the majority to accept that people in their midst may refuse to perform certain acts or activities for conscientious reasons. This tolerance is dwindling, as, for example, attempts to change the law on conscientious objection in Italy demonstrate.

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[14] Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Third Defining Feature: Postsecular Conflicts Are Transnational

The third feature of postsecular conflicts is that they are transnational. Even though conflicts normally arise in national contexts, transnational dynamics may come into play and change the conflict on a national level. This transnational aspect of postsecular conflicts is one of the main topics studied by the *Postsecular Conflicts* project, which has investigated the role of transnational norm entrepreneurs in areas such as family values, anti-abortion mobilization, or homeschooling. "Transnational" means that controversies that mobilize only small minorities in a national context can create political leverage on the international level through the work of transnational advocacy groups and non-governmental organizations. Transnational actors that appeal to international courts, like the

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[15] Kristina Stoeckl, "Political Liberalism and Religious Claims: Four Blind Spots," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 43 (2017), 34–50.

[16] Susanna Mancini and Kristina Stoeckl, "Transatlantic Conversations: The Emergence of Society-Protective Anti-Abortion Arguments in the United States, Europe and Russia," in *The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the Balance between Religion and Equality*, ed. Susanna Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 220–257.

European Court of Human Rights, influence domestic politics, including causes on both the progressive and the conservative agenda.

The following example clarifies this third, transnational feature of postsecular conflicts. Homeschooling is forbidden in Germany and only a small group of people in Germany have challenged the legal situation, mostly for religious reasons. One was the Wunderlich family, a strictly observant Christian family that refused to comply with the German law on compulsory schooling. The parents were faced with penalties, including temporary loss of custody of their children. The Wunderlich family found legal support with two US-based advocacy groups that are active on a transnational level, the Alliance Defending Freedom and the Home School Legal Defense Association, which took the case to the European Court of Human Rights. The advocates contended, among other things, that the fact that homeschooling is formally recognized as a right in the vast majority of countries that are party to the European Convention of Human Rights means that this right should exist in Germany also.[17] The example makes clear, first, that religious and moral conflicts that concern only small minorities in domestic contexts can acquire international significance through the work of transnational advocacy groups and, second, that norm diffusion mechanisms like strategic litigation, commonly associated with the American culture wars and the court system in the United States, have become a global strategy.

Fourth Defining Feature: Postsecular Conflicts Do Not Evolve along Religious-Secular, but along Conservative-Liberal Fault Lines

The fourth point to be made about postsecular conflicts is that they are not conflicts between secular and religious worldviews, but between liberal-progressive positions and conservative-traditionalist positions. When Habermas coined the term “postsecular society,” he had in mind debates between religious and secularist actors. In some difficult moral debates, he contended, religious actors may have sensibilities that secularists do not share. Habermas also assumed, however, that the religious actors engaged in public debate would already have come to terms with the challenges of modern consciousness, such as religious freedom or the priority of profane science. He thereby set a high threshold for religious actors to enter the public sphere, which is also the point he has been most criticized for.[18] As a matter of fact, religious arguments in the public sphere range from liberal-progressive to conservative-traditionalist positions. On some issues, for example, social justice, liberal-progressive religious actors will have more in common with secular liberals than with conservative-traditionalist religious actors.

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[17] **Roger Kiska and Michael P. Donnelly, “Application to the European Court of Human Rights,” Case of Wunderlich v. Germany, Application no. 18925/15, 2015, 8.**

To summarize: Postsecular conflicts revolve around the definition of explicit and implicit norms, they have no clear solutions, are transnational, and evolve along the conservative-liberal fault line. *Postsecular conflicts* is the term we use, in the context of this research project, to define in greater detail the conditions of these conflicts over values in modern pluralistic societies – without, a priori, seeing them as grounds for postsecular consensus or for culture wars. By asking what type of actors, what political dynamics, and what ideas and intellectual genealogies are at play in such conflicts, we hope to identify conditions unter which conflicts over values develop into one or the other; in other words, when such conflicts may actually lead to democratic consensus or, instead, to polarization and culture wars.

Shifting Coordinates of the Conservative Worldview

In the first part of this edited volume, we publish four interviews conducted in the context of the *Postsecular Conflicts* research project. The four interviews – with Allan C. Carlson, Rod Dreher, R. R. Reno and Alexander Dugin – are selected as representative of the conservative political vision implicated in today's postsecular conflicts. They define the contours of a coherent worldview on the political right in the twenty-first century – in the case of Dugin even on the extreme right. In the interviews, we asked our interlocutors to define their attitude with regard to liberalism, Russia, the concept of the culture wars, and religion. What we gather from their answers is that the coordinate system of the "conservative mind" has changed since the time of the Cold War.

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[18] **Cristina Lafont, "Religion and the Public Sphere,"** *Philosophy and Public Criticism* **35, nos. 1–2 (2009), 127–150; Maeve Cooke, "Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic Contents of Religion: The Limitations of Habermas's Postmetaphysical Proposal,"** *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* **60, no. 1/3 (2006), 187–207.**

The coordinates have, firstly, shifted from left to liberal. While the main antagonist for a thinker in the politically right and conservative camp during the Cold War was the leftist (Marxist, Communist), it is now the "liberal." In an ideological framing deeply rooted in the political panorama of the United States, for our conservative American interlocutors Marxism and liberalism represent the same thing. Sometimes they use the term "left-liberalism" to draw a more subtle distinction, given that conservatives, on the whole, endorse liberal economic ideas. This wholesale identification of Marxism and liberalism also existed in the European context, but it was never as mainstream as in the United States; instead, in Europe, the identification of Marxism and liberalism belonged to the ideology of the Far Right. It owes more to Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger than to concrete struggles between social conservatives and social progressives on questions of public morality in the post–World War II years. In fact, a Russian thinker like Dugin had to learn – to his amazement – from his interlocutors of the French *Nouvelle Droit* "why I hated Communism. But I also understood why the West was not an alternative" (p. 62).

The coordinates have, secondly, shifted from the West to the East, to Russia. Whereas the main antagonist for a conservative thinker during the Cold War was the Communist East, the new antagonist is now inside the West. It is the "dying West," as the American conservative Pat Buchanan wrote in 2001, and by which he means contemporary secular and liberal society.[19] Conservatives interpret political correctness not as a way to manage radical pluralism in the public sphere, but, as Rod Dreher puts it, as "a threat" (p. 26). American conservatives' fascination with

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[19] **Patrick J. Buchanan,** *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Culture and Civilization* **(New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2001).**

Russia is based on admiration for the unbridled Russian disdain for political correctness and the robust defense of Orthodox privileges inside the Russian state over and against minority rights. The admiration for Russia is paradoxical, because the country restricts not only the freedoms of LGBTQ+ people, but also of minority faiths. This contradiction notwithstanding, one of our interviewees, R. R. Reno, concludes that American social conservatives "have become kind of pro-Putin" (p. 55).

The coordinates have, thirdly, shifted from religion to tradition. Whereas the main conflict line for conservatives during the Cold War was between religious and secular (especially atheist) worldviews, the new front line is now between traditionalist religious views and liberal religious views. Religious teachings are evaluated on their conservative and traditionalist and not evangelical or theological credentials. This idea is exemplified by Carlson, who welcomes the leadership of the Patriarch of Moscow because he considers Pope Francis of the Catholic Church "as kind of pulling back on these social issues" (p. 48). The exact meaning of "tradition" and "traditional values," however, is only vaguely defined by the people interviewed in this volume. It comprises a heterosexual family model, patriarchy, conservative social mores, and anti-modernist content from Christian teaching. This limited understanding of tradition is criticized by the authors included in the second part of the volume, who all object – from within Orthodox theology – to the identification of Orthodoxy with conservative traditionalism.

The coordinates have, fourthly, shifted from democracy to authority. While conservatives during the Cold War defended democracy over and against autocracy, which was associated with the USSR (and also against critics from the left who saw in Western democracy a hegemonic project), the conservatives of the twenty-first century no longer trust democracy. They ask, in the words of Reno, for "strong gods," for authority.[20]

The four interviews presented here are first-hand material for an analysis of the ideas and intellectual genealogies at play on the political right. Anti-liberalism, Russia, tradition, and authority emerge from this material as the four angles of the conservative coordinate system.

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[20] **R. R. Reno,** *Return of the Strong Gods: Nationalism, Populism, and the Future of the West* **(Washington, DC: Gateway Editions, 2019).**

To some extent, the conservatism of the beginning of the twenty-first century brings us back full circle to the continental European conservatism of the 1920s and 30s, which was just as anti-liberal, fascinated with the East, traditionalist, and authoritarian. But it also adds some new elements that need to be weighed carefully in future analysis, like the narrow focus on questions of private morality (sexuality, family, abortion).[21]

It should be added that these four interviews constitute only a small part of a large body of interview data compiled in the context of the *Postsecular Conflicts* project. They stand out because they represent in a particularly clear manner the problematics addressed in that project. The interviews are also special because the interviewees agreed to waive confidentiality and to see their conversation published. Sociologists do not often give authentic "voice" to the subjects of their research and rarely publish interviews at full length. Instead, they anonymize their interviews, they code and analyze them and feed the data into a scholarly argument that is different from the story told by the interviewed persons. As scholars we do not share and we may not like the intellectual positions that we encounter during our fieldwork and that constitute the material for our analysis and publications in the Postsecular Conflicts project.[22] As part of our publication strategy, in this edited volume we lay open some of the data collected in this project, in order to encourage scholars to engage firsthand with the overall historical, political, sociological and intellectual picture that emerges from this material. The analysis of the dynamics that determine today's postsecular conflicts requires the critical study of ideas on the political and Christian right and the tracing of the intellectual genealogies at play in the transnational connections between moral conservatives.

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[21] Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga, eds., *New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

[22] See the publications of the project here: https://zenodo.org/communities/postsecularconflicts/.

Orthodox Critiques of Traditional Values Conservatism

The second set of texts in this edited volume represents viewpoints and debates that are closer to the progressive side in postsecular conflicts. They are not mirror images of the conservative camp; they do not represent the conservative's imagined liberal, Western, secular, and democratic antagonist. Instead, our intention with this selection of one interview and four essays is to offer an insight into attempts to critique and contextualize the conservatives' predilection for traditionalism, Russia, and Orthodox Christianity "from within." All of the authors in this second part are Orthodox Christians; they come from Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. In their texts, they engage in the difficult task of evaluating what "tradition" can mean under conditions of modernity and in the face of attempts to claim tradition exclusively for the conservative cause.

For Alexander Filonenko, the conservative fascination with Russia, with Putin, and with Orthodoxy is a sign of the failure of the Orthodox Church. Politicization of Orthodoxy, he says in his interview, is the opposite of bearing witness to one's faith. His view is echoed by Sergey Horujy, who writes about the need to "protect Tradition from the Traditionalists." Horujy scrutinizes the ideas expressed by Dugin critically and in detail. For this prominent and authoritative scholar of the Orthodox theological tradition, traditionalists like Dugin "steal the past and hijack the future." Andrey Shishkov adds analytical clarity to the debate by offering a brief genealogy of two understandings of tradition in Orthodox theology, one liberal, one conservative. For Aristotle Papanikolaou, following Alasdair MacIntyre, "the viability of a tradition depends on how well it can answer the challenges and questions of a particular era." Tradition understood in this way presupposes the willingness for debate and mutual recognition of divergent positions. Tradition, he argues, must not be used as a "conversation stopper" between progressive and conservative views, but as the shared basis for conversation. Sergey Chapnin, finally, engages in the work of terminological archeology to find out when the concept of "traditional values" entered the Russian Orthodox discourse and became dominant. His analysis brings to the fore contradictions in the Russian traditional values discourse which those who propagate this discourse tend to ignore or gloss over.

What unites the authors in this section is not only their underlying intention to challenge the conservative discourse on traditional values. They also share a specific method for developing their criticism, namely genealogy: in order to understand what concepts mean today, one needs to understand where they come from and in which context they operate and unfold. The epistemic stance of self-reflexivity prohibits them from identifying with the conservative fascination with Russia and traditionalism that we find expressed in the interviews in the first section.

Mapping Postsecular Conflicts

Postsecular conflicts, as explained above, revolve around the definition of explicit and implicit norms, they have no clear solutions, are transnational, and evolve along the conservative-liberal fault line. Defining the conditions of such conflicts in detail means diving into the empirical reality of the type of actors, the political dynamics, and the ideas and intellectual genealogies that are at play. This edited volume presents firsthand material and debates that offer a glimpse into this vast empirical reality: the actors are intellectuals, activists, politicians, and church leaders; the political dynamics are struggles over the values and norms that inform political community; and the ideas and intellectual genealogies put at stake the meaning of tradition.

Postsecular conflicts can be “mapped” in two different ways. The first intellectual map is the one behind the concept of the culture wars. It is a map in black and white, which traces an unbridgeable antagonism between a conservative coordinate system of anti-liberalism, the East, authority, and tradition, and a liberal coordinate system of liberalism, the West, democracy, and secularism. It expresses an antagonism between two public moralities, between two social “sacreds” that cannot be reconciled and that are bound to clash. The second intellectual map is the one behind Habermas’s concept of postsecular society. This map is different, it comes in a varied range of colors and shades and it outlines the different areas of possible overlaps between these two coordinate systems.[23] The former map is not wrong; it can explain many of the dynamics that the first part of this edited volume documents (see the epilogue by Dmitry Uzlaner). But it is not exhaustive. We also need the second map in order to explain phenomena like the defense of tradition from within tradition, as exemplified by the authors in the second part of this volume.

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[23] I am grateful for this insight to José Casanova, who attributes the former view to Durkheim, the latter to Kant.

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