School of Media, Creative Arts and Social Inquiry

The State, War and Strategy: Australia's Strategic Disconnect with its Wars of Choice in Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf Region, 1990–2014

Gavin David Briggs

0000-0003-1321-3921

**This thesis is presented for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of
Curtin University**

27 October 2022

Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

Signature: Gavin David BRIGGS

Date: 27 October 2022

Abstract

Australian governments have deployed elements of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to three wars in the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) from 1990–2014. Australia deployed military power in these wars of choice as part of the United States (U.S.) led coalitions that was involved in the 1991 Gulf War, 2003 Iraq War, and in 2014, the International Coalition against Deash in Iraq and Syria. The dissertation examines whether Australia ensured internal consistency between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power, and strategy. The research has centred on whether a strategic disconnect existed during one or more of these three selected wars of choice. The period that will be tested is the international security crisis phase that preceded the warfighting. Each operational deployment was in preparation for war and are Operation DAMASK (1990–91), BASTILLE (2003), and Operation OKRA (2014). Their selection for research will be to determine Australia's military posture and force structure at the time of crisis. Each operation will be contextualised by quantitative approaches to determine the ADF's personnel size and Defence budget at the time of crisis and war. Each operation will be assessed through a qualitative approach of document analysis into the then most current Defence White Paper. The purpose is to determine whether the government's strategic outlook and strategic approaches to defence and strategy is in alignment with each deployment of force. The cross-case study will seek to see if each deployment for war was consistent with the then most recent Defence White Paper, which outlines the nation's strategic outlook and approach to war, military power and strategy. If a deployment proved inconsistent with government policy on defence and strategy, it will be found that a strategic disconnect occurred. If the research identifies the presence of one or more strategic disconnects, then a broader constructed security paradox will have resulted. The significance of such an outcome is that will have delayed Australia's response to address a more consequential security environment, one characterised by the increased likelihood of a future war in its region between the major powers.

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road to survival or ruin.

Sun Tzu

The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.

Thucydides

Acknowledgements

Contents

Chapter Eight: Research Results - Deployment of Force in the Middle East Area of Operations

Chapter Nine: Conclusion

Figures

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AI	Artificial Intelligence
AATTV	Australian Army Training Team Vietnam
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
ADO	Australian Defence Organisation
AEC	Australian Electoral Commission
ADF	Australian Defence Force
AEST	Australian Eastern Standard Time
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ALP	Australian Labor Party
AMAB	Al Minhad Air Base
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand and United States
APH	Australian Parliament House
APS	Australian Public Service
ASPI	Australian Strategic Policy Institute
ATG	Air Task Group
AUKUS	Australia, United Kingdom, United States
AWM	Australian War Memorial
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CDT	Clearance Diving Team
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CFLCC	Coalition Forces Land Component Command
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
C1	Case One
C2	Case Two
C3	Case Three
DDG	Guided Missile Destroyer
DIO	Defence Intelligence Organisation
DMO	Defence Materiel Organisation
DoD	Department of Defence
DWP	Defence White Paper
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ERC	Expenditure Review Committee
FFG	Guided Missile Frigate
FY	Financial Year

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
HMS	Her Majesty's Ship
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
INOC	Iraq National Oil Company
IPC	Iraqi Petroleum Company
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JTF	Joint Task Force
JSCFADT	Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade
MEAO	Middle East Area of Operations
MIF	Multinational Interception Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSCC	National Security Committee of Cabinet
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PERS	Personnel
PRC	People's Republic of China
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RN	Royal Navy
RBGO	Rules-Based Global Order
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SOTG	Special Operations Task Group
TG	Task Group
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
U.S.	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Overview and significance of research

War is the antithesis of a stable and peaceful nation-state, yet its presence remains a constant feature of global politics and the anarchial international system. War also places "extraordinary demands on the makers of strategy and those led or driven to carry it out" (Knox 1994, 614). It is also the perspective of this dissertation that "[t]he making of strategy is the domain of *states*" (Knox 1994, 615). The research in this dissertation explores whether Australia displayed strategic inconsistency (or 'strategic disconnect') between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power, and strategy. Three operational deployments in the lead up to war provide test cases for whether Australia's strategic inconsistency occurred in one or more of the following wars: 1991 Gulf War, 2003 Iraq War and the 2014 International Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Each of these wars in the Middle East region are centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region. All three aforementioned wars are considered in this research as 'wars of choice' (Haass 2009; Freedman 2010; Fairweather 2011; Walt 2012; Lyon, 2017).

Wars are violent, complex, unordered and can variously prove conclusive or inconclusive but are nonetheless destructive, significant events. Irrespective of the numerous causes for war, military power provides states with an effective tool of statecraft. Military power can be waged not just against states, as well as non-state actors, both intra- and inter-state. Regardless of the political construct behind the threat which government's deploy force, "military power is what gets one's voice heard in world affairs" (Slantchev 2011, 3). This dissertation's research is focused on the state, military power, war, and strategy. These concepts are explored in the context of whether the Australian government has ensured its strategic approaches have aligned with its actual military posture and force structure at the times of deployment of force to wars of choice in the Middle East region during 1990–2014. The research specifically examines whether Australia ensured internal consistency between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power, and strategy.

A key role of any state's military power, especially in time of war, is to protect and advance the state and its national interests. That can be achieved by military postures which favour deterrence or compellence, whose orientations are defensive or offensive in nature. A state can exert its power and influence through a variety of sources, such as diplomatic or economic, but it is military power in war which is an extension of politics by other means. As Carl von Clausewitz claimed "[w]e maintain that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means" (1976, 605). The relationship between the state and war remains one whereby:

> *"War occupies a higher dimension in the discipline of strategic thought, because unlike other political means, once set in train, war usually produces a series of dire consequences which transforms the way of life of the entire nation and from which there may be no simple extrication."*

(Royal Australian Air Force 1990, 3)

War Studies has also been referred to as 'polemology' (Bouthoul 1968), but that approach applies a methodology from the human sciences. However, War Studies provides a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of war. It pertains to the military, diplomatic, philosophical, political, economic, social, and psychological dimensions of human conflict. War Studies allows for the examination of war in the context of strategy, military theory, military strategy, and strategic approaches. Gray summed up war as "a category of coercive behaviour substantially distinctive in and of itself" (2016, 45-46). Therefore, the study of war allows for the detailed exploration of the state, military power, strategy, and its capabilities. The distinction to note is that as a field of research, War Studies is categorised in Australia as Defence Studies, and is often grouped together as Defence and Strategic Studies. Despite variations of disciplinary naming conventions and its grouping within its named fields of research, Defence Studies provides for various methodological approaches from the social sciences, such as the disciplines of politics, economics, and international relations, as well as from the humanities, such as history.

In the context of the state and war, a constant challenge which this research addresses is that strategy is difficult (Gray 1999; 2014). This follows Clausewitz's earlier statement that: "Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean everything is very easy" (1976, 178). In an "era of catastrophic risk" (MacAskill 2022,

10), research via a general theory of strategy (Gray 2016) allows the linkage of politics and history with strategy. The research examined three selected wars from their own specific political-historical contexts. A conceptual framework identified the validity and appropriateness of the state, military power, and strategy to examine their interconnectedness as expressed by the dominant strategic approach in war time. It follows however, that for states, "military deployments always need to be linked to a *political* strategy" (Malley 2020, 275). The research sought to identify the presence of a strategic misalignment between the state, military power, and war, located in the state-actor actions of Australia's national governments' deployment of force to 'wars of choice' in the Middle East region during 1990–2014.

The theory and practice of strategy and history, and in particular military history and military strategy, offer an approach to examine the state, war, and military power. As Colin S. Gray stated, "strategy is the bridge between military power and political purpose" (2006, 1). The state's pursuit of political objectives can be achieved from its military power, through deterrence or compellence. When the state deploys military power in war, strategy provides the approach by which the deployment, and application of state-sanctioned force across various domains of warfare, is conducted not just for military objectives, but political goals. The dissertation's research explores the intersection between the state, its military power, involvement in war and its strategic approaches. When a government decides to deploy its military power, it is bounded by what its actual force in-being is at the time of an international security crisis. The research seeks to determine whether there was consistency in Australia's strategic approaches at the time when a government committed its armed forces for war. The aim of the research will determine whether Australian governments experienced a strategic disconnect between its military power and strategic approaches.

The research examines three political-historical, context-specific military deployments of force by the Australian government to the Middle East region. The selected first deployment is Operation DAMASK, which occurred towards the closing stages of the Cold War, and was in the immediate period prior to the 1991 Gulf War (or 'First Gulf War'; 'First Iraq War'; and 'Persian Gulf War'). The second deployment is Operation BASTILLE, the preparation phase prior to the 2003 Iraq War (or 'Second Gulf War'; 'Second Iraq War'; and 'Second Persian Gulf War'). The third

and final case is the 2014 initial deployment of force to Operation OKRA as part of the Australian Government's contribution to the International Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The research will conduct a cross-case study to demonstrate whether there were individual misalignments between Australia's stated strategic approaches at the time of each selected military deployment to the Middle East region. The cross case approach seeks to determine whether or not there existed a long-term constructed security paradox between military deployments and their strategic approaches.

War is a feature of global politics and the international system. The distribution of military power among states and powers influences the way in which they behave, so that states with an advantage of great military power and capabilities may act to maximise their security (Mearsheimer 2014). However, it is a great power's advantage over others which may see them disposed to act in an aggressive manner (Mearsheimer 2014). The realist perspective claims that the calculus is changed when great powers are faced with "more powerful opponents [they] will be less inclined to consider offensive action and more concerned with defending the existing balance of power from threats by their more powerful opponents" (Mearsheimer 2014, 37). It is therefore not logical to expect a great power to "charge headlong into losing wars of pursue Pyrrhic victories" however, "anarchy and uncertainty about other state's intentions create an irreducible level of fear among states that leads to power-maximizing behaviour" (Mearsheimer 2014, 37; 43). Therefore, such "constants cannot explain variation" and states live with that fear of the many ways military power might be used (Mearsheimer 2014, 43).

The constancy of the phenomena that is war requires the state to maintain the institution of military power. For military power to be an effective tool of statecraft, it must be comprised of a host of effective platforms and capabilities across various domains of warfare. When deployed against the state, force provides an opportunity to explore state-actor behaviours against the predominant strategic thinking present within that state. The research undertakes an approach that determines Australia's military power, with specific reference to its personnel size, annual budget, and dominant strategic approach at the time force was committed to the Middle East region. The research is based on the premise that war is a permanent feature of global politics, and is due to the anarchial international system in which all states operate. States continue to face multiple threats from numerous sources. Former United States

(U.S.) National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster made the claim that the continued challenge for governments and the military alike is "ensuring that conventional military forces are relevant to the contemporary security environment and capable of coping with threats form hostile states as well as non-state actors" (2008, 20). That challenge remains while the security environment includes the threat of war.

The research is based on the premise that kinetic force should only ever be deployed by governments for the express protection of the state and its core national interests of sovereignty and territoriality. Where deployment of force in war is lawful, it may not be in the national interest. If the lawful deployment of military power is committed under such circumstances, this research defines it as a war of choice. The research design explores Australia's military posture, force structure and attendant strategic approaches during a war of choice to identify if a strategic inconsistency was present. The continued rise of major power rivalry since the end of the timeframe for this research presents the very real likelihood of there being a future war between the major powers. The significance of such a war will be most consequential as it will almost inevitably involve Australia's military power alongside any U.S. involvement in such a war.

1.2 Political-historical context of the research

Australia's strategic direction and approaches for its military have been an opportunity to research whether the international security crisis provides an opportunity to frame and assess whether a state's actions in the ongoing development of its force posture use of resources, strategic planning, and approaches, misaligned or not with its decision to participate in a 'war of choice'. Therefore, Australia's past strategic outlook and approaches have proved on successive occasions during 1990–2014 as being out of alignment with the state's fundamental role of defending its sovereignty, national interests, and citizens against the most likely, consequential threat of involvement in a major power war.

This research is based on strategic assessments of the real likelihood of a consequential future war between nuclear-armed major powers. It can be concluded from the current geo-strategic environment in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, that the prospect of war and direct military confrontation between the major powers is

increasingly likely. In preparation for such a possible scenario for future war, the state's military power must be one in which the force posture and strategic approaches are in alignment. The state's force in-being can only ever draw on the available military power at the time when there is an outbreak of war. The size of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), in regard to the number of personnel, assets, platforms and associated capabilities is that which a government can draw upon at the time of an international security crisis in readiness for active-service operations in wartime.

That state's readiness for war can be impacted by a government's prior commitments to its military forces, one that can already be charged with executing multiple domestic and international military commitments. While the cumulative effect of high operational tempo has been experienced by the ADF, it is an identifier that such situations impact on personnel and materiel, capabilities, and strategic options. The consequential impact of an outbreak of war between the major powers is that the state cannot afford to have a strategic disconnect between its military power and the threat such war would bring to the state, its sovereignty, and national interests. Such misalignment could prove catastrophic.

The research is bounded by a timeframe that begins in 1990, at the final stages of the Cold War, through the inter-war period of the post-Cold War decade, post 11 September 2001, and finishes in 2014. This research shows how Australian governments displayed with empirical regularity a willingness to deploy force to the Middle East region during that timeframe. When the full suite of other ADF operational deployments are considered during this timeframe, along with Australia's prior, and numerous involvement, wars, this research considers Australia to displays characteristics as that of a 'warfighting state'. During 1990–2014 successive Australian governments made the executive decision to deploy elements of the ADF to serve as part of U.S. led military coalitions of force to fight wars in the Middle East region, centred on Iraq and the Persian Gulf region. In doing so, those decisions of the state to commit elements of its military power on expeditionary campaigns in the northern hemisphere, were well outside of Australia's immediate region, and expressed a sustained willingness to act as a 'war-fighting state'. The timeframe which this research is bounded by acknowledges that numerous party-political policies and perspectives existed regarding matters of war, defence, security, national security, and strategy. Those confluence of factors resulted in different strategic approaches on

matters central to the state, such as military power, foreign policy, and national security.

The uneven and inconsistent strategic approaches were exposed at a time of an international security crisis. When the government made the decision to deploy, it could only choose from its available military power during the crisis phase, in a period that preceded the eventual commencement of armed hostilities. Therefore, beyond the agreed political decision to commit force, factors such as the actual force in-being, pre-existing operational commitments and the capabilities afforded by available platforms and assets all informed and influenced government decisions as to the size, type, and role of the force it would deploy. The research has selected three specific ADF deployments that were deployed during 1990–2014 during an international security crisis in preparation for war that was centred on Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf region: Operations' DAMASK (1990–91), BASTILLE (2003), and OKRA (2014). These particular deployments were joint in nature and had a command structure that was either a Task Group (TG), or Joint Task Force (JTF).

To categorise Australia as a 'war-fighting state' requires political-historical contextualisation, given the nation's long participation since colonisation in violence, conflict, and wars. When six former British colonies Federated in 1901 to become the Commonwealth of Australia, colonial forces were fighting in South Africa, serving alongside the British in the Boer War (1899–1902) (AWM 2002). The ambition of Australia's colonies to gain statehood did not result in the abandonment of its close security links with Great Britain, or to pursue an independent foreign policy. Pre-Federation, imperial and colonial forces in Australia had been involved in conflict and wars, both across parts of the Australian landmass and islands as part of Frontier Wars against various First Nations' people (Reynolds 1982, 2003; Connor 2002; Owen 2016; Gapps 2022; Murray 2022). In addition, overseas service by colonial forces on British-led campaigns included the Sudan (1885) (Rogers 2022), New Zealand Wars (1845–72) (Tibbitts 2022), and the Boxer Rebellion, China (1900-01) (AWM 2022b). This history of violence, and involvement in armed conflict, both intra- and inter-state by British imperial and later, colonial forces, identifies a trajectory of Australia's willingness to commit force alongside, or in the service of, a major power. From the First Fleet in 1788, Great Britain served the role as the major power benefactor until

the Fall of Singapore in 1942 during the Second World War which thereafter, Australia shifted its strategic commitment to the U.S.

Australia's dominate strategic approaches have historically oscillated from expeditionary 'forward defence' to one centred on self-reliant continental defence, or 'Defence of Australia' (Kirk 2015). The 'globalist' school was replaced by the 'regionalist' school arrive at the conclusion of the Vietnam War (1962–72). Towards the closing stages of Australia's conclusion of deploying forces in that conflict, Millar (1971, 52) observed "there is a tendency to polarise policies between 'forward defence' and 'fortress Australia'". Australia's strategic approaches was underpinned by a persistent "fear of China" which had "cemented Canberra's policy of forward defence of Australia at a distant battlefield in a foreign land" (Ham 2007, 48). Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs in the Menzies's government had positioned "Vietnam, instead of Malaysia and Indonesia, as the line of forward defence of Australia" (Ham 2007, 49). This contrasted with the view held by the Department of Defence, which saw the threat to Australia's security "lurked in Indonesia" (Ham 2007, 49). The result was that the Menzies government extended the frontline for military deployments to the 17th parallel, that geographical line which divided Vietnam into two: in the north, The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and to the south, the Republic of Vietnam. The focus on a strategic approach of forward defence, conducted well inside the northern hemisphere, would be a scenario revisited by Australian governments during 1990–2014 in its various wars of choice centred on Iraq and the Persian Gulf region.

After the end of the Vietnam War, 'self-reliance' became the centrepiece of Australian's defence and strategic policy (White 2012). However, this thesis claims a more resurgent globalist approach began towards the end of the Cold War, one more in accordance with the state's need to project force during a consequential conflict, such as a major power conflict. Instead, Australian governments were positioned instead for deployment of force in wars of choice. As a strategic concept, its return became defiantly more observable after the events of 11 September 2001 (or '9/11'), one that still formed part of Australia's ongoing competing strategic approaches, which were laid bare during ongoing involvement in wars of choice. This is explored further in chapter four.

The expeditionary capability of Australia's armed forces has given it a reach to conduct operations far beyond its immediate region. This military capability has been available to numerous government, but the level of capability and sustainability on operations have varied since the beginning of the twentieth century and into the next, with Australia's contribution to wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Evan's noted, "the use of expeditionary warfare has become a metaphor of the remarkable strategic fusion between Australia's statecraft and strategy in the quest for national security" (2005, 46). Successive Australian governments, through "the combination of statecraft with strategy, of diplomacy with alliance politics and offshore warfare, provided the principal means for Australia to counter 20th-century threats of German militarism, Japanese imperialism and Chinese communism" (Evans 2005, 47). Expeditionary capacity, "as a generalisation, [meant] Australia has fought its wars away from its land" and when an international security crisis or war beckoned, it was claimed that "Australia saw it was in its strategic interests to commit forces overseas" (Horner 1996, 3; 9). The research tests whether such commitments to war during 1990–2014 were in Australia's strategic alignment with its defence and security approaches.

The research is grounded in political-historical contextualisation to deliver "an historical narrative" (Siracusa and Visser 2020) which assists in answering the research question, and related sub-research questions, which are outlined in the next section of this chapter. The research is structured so that its chapters first provide key political-historical context before qualitative and quantitative approaches are employed in the construction and examination of three selected case studies regarding Australia's wars of choice. As Gray noted, "it is feasible to both to be faithful to the necessarily unique detail of historical data yet open to the whole category of events or episodes" (2016, 44). The research on Australia's consistent use of force in war and conflict provides context not just for its evolution as a 'warfighting state', but to examine whether Australia's strategic approaches have been consistent with various governments willingness to deploy elements of military power to fight in a war alongside a major power. The research conducted on three selected 'wars of choice' in the Middle East region are considered within the context of the broader strategic security environment in which Australian governments made those decisions.

The political-historical contextualisation of each deployment of force in the preparation phase for participation in a 'war of choice' is a necessary precondition to

identify what this research calls a 'trend-line of threat'. The timeframe begins with the end of the Cold War through to 2014. The end date for this research is marked not just by the commencement of Australia's third war of choice in Iraq and the broader Persian Guld Region. It also intersects with significant geo-political events, such as the Russian Federation's invasion of eastern Ukraine's Donbas region, as well as Beijing's rapid militarisation of parts of the South China Sea. This research acknowledges that during 1990–2014, Australia endured periods of intense and competing operational deployments regionally and globally, especially after 11 September 2001. This research categorises each of Australia's three selected wars during 1990–2014 as a war of choice. Those selected wars are considered as such because they were not in the direct interests of the state. This research contextualises the concept of the state to illustrate how the primacy and fundamental purpose of the state can be undermined by its participation in a war of choice, which essentially is one that does not pose a direct impact on its sovereignty or territoriality.

The changing character of war and increase in transnational threats, both traditional and non-traditional, have seen Australian governments grapple with the best way to ensure its national security against internal and external threat actor. Australia's wars of choice are a clear illustration of how inconsistent strategic approaches can create a disconnect when seeking to achieve national security. A state may use military power in wars under the misapprehension that such a commitment is in its national interest. In doing so, the evolving strategic environment unfolds with a looming, and more dire situation that has a greater likelihood on a state's national security. Over the long-term, a trend-line of threat can point to an increased likelihood of a future war against major powers, such as the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China (PRC). The current trend-line of threat poses a substantial threat to the state from any future war, especially one that could begin through miscalculation or misperception, and escalate to existential proportions. That possibility remains as the major powers are all nuclear-armed and possess an array of delivery systems that can be delivered by land, sea, and air. The Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, euphemistically labelled by President Vladimir Putin as a 'special military operation', saw the return of war to Europe and the risk of escalation. The risk of war is not limited to regional security, but global security. The conduct of war by major powers and their allied states can include weapons systems with different kinetic effects that have

greater geographical reach. Therefore, the intent and capability of a state, especially a major power, delivers the security environment with an array of credible threats, which "matters because war is a contest of wills as well as arms" (Gould-Davies 2022, 10).

At the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Australian government approached the unfolding global security environment and its direct challenge to the Rules-Based Global Order (RBGO) with an increased sense of urgency towards its defence and security. The Liberal-National government led by then Prime Minister Scott Morrison (2018–22) released the *2020 Defence Strategic Update* (DoD 2020) and the following year saw Australia withdrawal from operations in Afghanistan. On 15 September 2021, the Morrison government signed a new trilateral security pact, the 'Australia United Kingdom United States Partnership' (AUKUS) (PMC 2021). That agreement committed to greater defence cooperation and increased military capabilities, with the most significant of them being AUKUS approval for Australia to acquire eight nuclear-powered submarines.

On 21 May 2022, Australia elected Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's Labor government into office (AEC 2022). Defence and security remained a matter of priority for the Albanese government, acutely aware of Australia's much-reduced strategic warning time. Constrained levels of defence funding and numbers of uniformed personnel, as well as delays in procurement and acquisition of advanced platforms, became factors behind the critical need to align the nation's strategic outlook with its approaches to defence and security. For Australia, continued instability and a precarious security situation exists across four regional flashpoints: Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula. Prime Minister Albanese and Defence Minister Richard Marles underscored the further deterioration of the global security environment with their announcement on 3 August 3, 2022, for a *Defence Strategic Review* (Shoebridge 2022). The *Defence Strategic Review* is slated to report back to government by March 2023 once it has examined "force structure, force posture and preparedness, and investment prioritisation, to ensure Defence has the right capabilities to meet our growing strategic needs" (DoD 2022). Reviews into the Department of Defence, however, have been a consistent approach for successive Australian governments into managing this portfolio. During 1973–2015 , there were no less than 50 reviews conducted into Defence (DoD 2015). Dobell (2020, 8) noted that of that amount, "thirty-five were significant reviews and many more

supplementary reviews." Over a trend line of 42 years, that represents the equivalence of one significant review conducted into Australia's Defence every 14.4 months.

The Albanese government's accelerated approach towards an ADF force posture that is prepared for the contingency of involvement in a future war between the major powers is acceptance of reduced strategic warning time and a worsened global security environment and. Australia faces its most significant threats not seen since the end of the Second World War (Jennings 2021). Any future war (Johnson 2015; Freedman 2017; Kilcullen 2020) between major powers, and not one focused solely on the changing character of war (van Creveld 1996; McFate 2019), will prove Australia's involvement in a violent, kinetic contest will be anything but a war of choice, but necessity. The opportunity came in 1990 for the Australian government to avoid a war of choice, and future, repeated occurrences. The paradigm shift in international relations that came during the final stage of the Cold War would conversely see Australia almost immediately become involved in another war.

1.3 Research question and sub-research questions

The research question examines whether during the period of 1990–2014, did Australia ensure internal consistency between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power and strategy? The research has centred on the identification of whether a 'strategic disconnect' existed during one or more of three selected 'wars of choice' in the Middle East region, centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region. The specific period of examination is during the international security crisis phase that immediately preceded the warfighting stage of actual war. These operational deployments were each in preparation for war, and have been selected for their relative commonalities and for the comparative analysis to test the presence of Australia's strategic inconsistency.

There are two sub-research questions which will also be addressed. First, what was Australia's force in-being at the time of each international security crisis? The force in-being is considered as the personnel size of the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO), with a specific focus on the ADF, by Service and in totality. Second, what was the level of Department of Defence budget funding during the financial year in which Australia deployed these military operations for eventual participation in a war of

choice? Both sub-research questions are represented in the research design as two intervening variables.

The dependent variable is the Australian government deployment of force to war in the Middle East region, centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region during 1990–2014. The independent variable is Defence White Papers, the key government document on defence and strategy. This is to test official government positions on defence and strategy, with what the actual strategic approach was for the ADF's military posture and force structure at the time they were deployed to a war of choice. Three cases will be tested against following operations and their associated wars: Operation DAMASK (1990–91), Gulf War 1991; Operation BASTILLE (2003), 2003 Iraq War; and Operation OKRA (2014), which was Australia's contribution of force to the International Coalition against Deash.

The criteria for this research to categorise those three wars as a war of choice has been addressed in the previous section. Further detail about the development and construction of the research design, conceptual framework and methods are outlined in the chapter on research methods. The next chapter examines the concepts of the state and sovereignty for the purpose of what the central roles of the state should be focused on, and how military power for war should be linked to those concepts from within a classical realist perspective. The state's actions and behaviours towards its military power and strategic approaches should only be in the interests of its security and protection of its national interests.

The causes of war are many and its understanding of them is important to identify when a state may become involved in war, and when it is not in its interests to do so. State-actor involvement in war can be a result of fear, misperception, or hubris. A state can also be misguided by its own capabilities as much as it misreads the intentions of another state. Involvement in war can also be a result of alliance management and the obligations contained within that agreement. The cause of war is an important inclusion in this research as it contextualises the key concepts of the state, war and strategy. This is explored in a later chapter.

The state, military power and strategy in war inform the conceptual framework in which this research is conducted. Australia's military power and strategic approaches are tested to determine whether they align at the time of war. The research into three

deployments of force to wars in the Middle East region during 1990–2014 will provide evidence to determine whether Australia was consistent in its strategic outlook, or suffered from strategic disconnects. The significance of whether or not the state conducted repetitive decision-making to deploy force to wars of choice is that it can prove consequential. The state must ensure its strategic approaches is not just focused, but in alignment with threats posed by a global security environment that indicates an increased likelihood of a future war between the major powers.

Chapter Two

The State, Sovereignty and Security

2.1   Introduction

The global security environment continues to be complex and challenging for states to develop and implement defence and national security policies, as well as military strategies. Australia's first Defence White Paper was released in 1976 by the Fraser government (1975–82) and the seventh, and most recent, was released in 2016 by the Turnbull government (2015–18). Dupont (2015, 2) stated "Australia's defence strategy lacks coherence" and that governments' "declaratory policy bears little resemblance to what the ADF actually does." The government's continued lack of clarity on its approaches to defence and strategy foreshadowed the continued presence of a strategic misalignment. The consequential impact was Australia's inability to focus against the growing security threat posed by a future war between major powers. Australia's strategic environment further deteriorated since then to its worst conditions since the Second World War (Jennings 2021b). It would become clear that Australia had to align it security objectives with an ADF whose force posture reflected the actual tasks, missions, and operations in which it would be required to conduct (Jennings 2021b).

A clear and effective strategy is required for the defence and survivability of the state. A defence strategy provides support to the "nation's broader political and foreign policy aims with military power, both hard and soft" (Dupont 2015, 2). For that to be realised, governments need to place its core, unassailable national interests as the defence of its sovereignty and territoriality. That is not so much a contested concept as it is the primary role of the ADF, but strategic approaches need to be framed by that fundamental underpinning should be that of a combination of the classical realist approach and mindset of a strategist, for the conceptualisation of state, sovereignty, and military power. That approach can therefore be considered as: "Strategy is an intellectual activity: it is the level of effort that orders the military behaviour that should deliver some, at least, of the consequences commanded by the political high ground of policy aims" (Gray 2015, 18). Such an understanding of, and

approach towards, strategy can guide governments to avoid military participation in wars of choice, and be prepared to fight those that are existential in nature.

For a state to have effective military power and attendant capabilities, a strategy must first exist, and be effective during its execution (White 2021). The development of defence and strategic approaches must be one that is straightforward and offers clarity of intent for its successful execution. In the midst of the Cold War period, Brodie argued: "Strategy is a 'how to do it' study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, the question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work?" (1973, 452). That approach to strategy still holds firm in the contemporary period. However, as White (2021, 133) stated, "complication derives from the variety of ways that process can be accomplished." This appears to have been a persistent issue with Australia's strategic approaches and its Defence White Papers.

For strategy to exist at the execution phase during time of war, "strategy must convert policy from ideas and objectives into the use or threat of military force" (White 2021, 133). Dupont's critique of Australia's approaches to its defence and strategy as expressed in Defence White Papers is that "they lack coherence, their messaging is poor, and many of their underlying assumptions and planning practices are questionable" (2015, 1). This 'influenced' the way government undertook defence and strategy, with a causal impact on the ADF's force posture and capabilities. This research covers a timeframe between 1990–2014, and includes the period in which Dupont characterised Australia's approaches to defence and strategy was reflected by:

> *"Strategic assumptions that are poorly conceived have been elevated into contestable dogma. Notably, it is illusory to believe that Australia's geography provides 'immutable' and 'abiding' strategic benefits or that superior intelligence can be relied upon to provide early warning of emerging threats."*
>
> (Dupont 2015, 2)

Australia's strategic approaches have oscillated between 'regionalism' and 'globalism' (Hodson 2004). Those two approaches indicated what wars and conflict which Australia would deploy elements of its military power. Edwards expressed a view that "future Australian governments aren't likely to bind themselves to strict interpretations of either the 'self-reliant defence of Australia' or support for the rules-

based global order' doctrine" (2016, 24). Edwards argued: "Instead they'll do what their predecessors have always done" and that is they will "seek the best balance between Australia's local and global interests, according to the circumstances of the day. Sometimes, no doubt, they'll get the balance right; sometimes they won't" (2016, 24). What the state needs are governments who understand that "policy determines the purpose and the character of war" (Smith 2011, 5-6). That realisation needs full expression in Defence White Papers so that strategic approaches are in alignment with the wars its military power is deployed to fight and win.

A state can be confronted with a situation where its military power is unprepared for war. Equally, the state can find that it is fighting the "wrong war", by choice as much as circumstance. This is a clear indicator that there are flaws in a nation's strategy (Gray 2007, 107). Historical lessons can inform strategy and its interrelated elements of "ends, ways and means" (Gray 2006). Current strategy can be informed by history though Howard (1966, 2) provided the caveat that: "Historical precedent can sometimes be illuminating, sometime inspiring, but often can be misleading as well." Good strategy can determine a nation's survivability in war. The importance of strategy becomes apparent to the state that does not employ it for military success because "should your adversary possess a superior strategy, or should they possess knowledge of yours, either through subterfuge or educated guess, your success will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve" (White 2021, 134).

Since antiquity, human society has been characterised by the presence of war and conflict between groups, which reflect "humanity's most terrible self-imposed affliction" (Stoessinger 2001, xvi). Large-scale, socio-political constructs and groupings have warred against one another; their causes are many and are explored in the next chapter. Meanwhile, war in human history has long preceded the state (Keegan, 1993; Dyer 2021). Therefore, violence is a feature of human behaviour in which "humans from the outset were involved in conflict, but not on any great scale" (Black 2021, 1). Since pre-modern times, the trajectory and scale of the destruction through kinetic violence in war has expanded. Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the conceptualisation of the state, explored later in this chapter, the character of war continues to change and its existence to have expanded across the five domains of warfare: land, sea, air, cyber and space (Sloan 2017). This has occurred within an

anarchical international system that maintains the threat of violence by the presence of states and their military power (Thomas 2011).

The utility of force gives states the means of violence to conduct war for political objectives. In political thought and international relations, "violence in the *ultima ratio* of politics" (Campbell and Dillon 1993, 1). For any state which deploys its military to wage war, "the primary function of an armed force is to fight in battle" (Hackett 1984, 211). As Montgomery (1982, 24) noted, "when a nation decides to resort to armed force to achieve its political ends, or is itself attacked, all must understand that the responsibility for the higher direction of the war lies in political hands." For Australian governments, an awareness of that relationship between the state and its military allows the former to achieve its political objectives through force. While tactics are always important in warfighting as part of operations conducted across the domains of warfare, strategy and strategic approaches is of paramount importance. Otherwise, a wrong-headed approach to war can lead to defeat, no matter how inspired and determined a fighting force might be. This dissertation's focus is on strategy and strategic approaches, over that of the tactical applications of force.

In the tradition of classical realism, the state continues its central position within competitive global politics and the anarchical international system. According to Waltz: "The state among states…conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence" (1979, 102). For a state-actor, military power can be used exclusively as force against another state, or as layer of defence against intra-state threats that can be used in conjunction with national security agencies and apparatuses, as a whole-of-government approach to achieve the defence of the state, its sovereignty, national interests (or 'vital interests'), and its citizens. In the case of Australia, a nation-state whose political leaders have for over a century "been engaged in the war game" (Horner 2022, 390), a legacy identified from the deployment of force to wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that "'whole of government' should mean whole of government" (Leahy 2020, 296).

The security of the nation can also be represented by the concept of national security (Snow 2020). During the post-Second World War period, that terminology represented the broadened array of intra- and inter-state threats which faced the state, as well as non-traditional and non-state security threats (Snow 2020). In the post-Cold War period, national security threats have given rise to a more complex international

security environment (Beazley 2007). Meanwhile, military power maintains its currency as an institution that offers government with a credible tool of statecraft. In liberal democracies, the role of military power is to defend the state, its national interests, or vital interests, and citizens (Snow 2020). This is most usually aimed at external inter-state threats by the employment of defensive or offensive capabilities. However, governments can, and do, use the military against intra-state threats.

The state continues to operate in an anarchical international system which presents a multitude of security threats, that includes war. The presence, or actuality, of war can be the result from one or more states, which includes the major powers. The causes for war by another state can include political, economic, social, technological, geographical, and historical factors – and not necessarily in that order. Those factors are explored in the next chapter and will provide the significance of the many reasons a state may be involved in war. In addition, states' national security and strategic approaches have broadened in a reaction to, and reflection upon, the changing character of war. Meanwhile, the threat to a state from an international crisis which can result in its involvement in war remains an ever-present possibility. War, such as that between major powers and their respective allies, remains a constant feature of global politics and the international system. While the character of war has continued to change and present new, complex challenges to the state and its military power, the nature of war has remained constant: the violent, kinetic expression of force and power.

A state's vigilance and preparedness for the likelihood of war is best advanced from a classical realist perspective. That allows for the appropriate funding, development and implementation of strategic approaches that best addresses security threats, particularly war. It is dependent on a state's acknowledgment what their political objectives are when they choose to deploy force during a crisis, or in war. It can mitigate the risk of fighting the wrong war, such as a 'war of choice'. It demands a state to have a strategic approach that is aligned with the most likely threat it faces: the continued threat of war between major powers, of the armed actions of an aggressive state actor or at a minimum, their engagement in activities below the threshold of war. As Machiavelli stated, "fortune is the arbiter of half the things we do, leaving the other half or so to be controlled by ourselves" (2003,79). The state's

primary role therefore remains its active role in the protection of its sovereignty and national interests.

2.2 The state and sovereignty

The state as a concept, both as an actor or unit of analysis, in global politics and the international system is variously contested across numerous disciplines and schools of thought, including Politics, International Relations, Strategic and Defence Studies. Similarly, the same holds for the concept of sovereignty. It too is central to the formation and maintenance of the state, and is also contested by some scholars from many different theoretical perspectives, which will be explored in a later section in this chapter. The recognition by the international community for the attainment of statehood and resultant sovereignty can be an arduous, costly process in lives and materiel as well as an internally divisive, continued fractious process after statehood is declared. In 2022, the United Nations (UN) had 193 Member states and two non-member states; Palestine, and the Vatican City (UN 2022). The struggle remains for self-determination and official recognition for statehood, one that is pursued by many ethnic groups such as, but not limited to, Palestinian, Kurd, Karen, Baluchi, and Pashtun. The Nagorno-Karabakh region in Central Asian region, or West Papuans in South East Asia None also seek statehood. While those struggles for independence are outside of the scope of this research, they are mentioned here for two reasons. First, it highlights statehood is a concept that continues to be pursued, and in turn, the pursuit of sovereignty remains unfinished. This is provided as a counterpoint to the numerous declarations since the end of the Cold War of the state's demise (van Creveld 1996; Bobbitt 2002; Smith 2005). Continued claims about the state's decline remain, but as will be explored later, such a pronouncement remains premature.

The acquisition of statehood and sovereignty, with recognition by the international community, has historically proven to not always be a peaceful process. Statehood and sovereignty provide not just a formal, recognised place in global affairs but its maintenance and security within an anarchical international system must come from military force. Securing political independence and possession of sovereignty over a selected geographical region and where relevant, waterways and littoral maritime environment, is achieved neither easily nor along a single procedural pathway that results with incontestable legal rights and privileges as a nation-state within the

international community. Rather, it is the political and legal struggle, advocacy, diplomacy, and even the use of force by a combination of internal and/or external actors, that may deliver the state into its political and legal construction as an entity with a geographically defined region. The transition from non-state status to statehood, or where an existing state undergoes a process into a different political and sovereign construct, is often characterised by violence.

Nonetheless, states order the world politically. It is not just the continued pursuit by peoples for their statehood and sovereignty. Major powers have proven intent through force, that include the means of coercion, deterrence, and employment of offensive capabilities to maximise their power, territory, and influence. The state as both concept and entity remain central within global politics. It also forms a mode for the organisation of the international system and relations between states, and multilateral fora. The state is a key unit of analysis within realism and its six identified variants "classical realism, neorealism, and four flavours of contemporary realism: rise and fall, neoclassical, offensive structural and defensive structural realism" (Jensen and Elman 2018, 18). The state and the concept of power, expressed in this research as that which relates to military power, provides a more focused approach within the field of research of Defence and Strategic Studies. This research employs strategy as the link between the state, war and military power is strategy. Strategy has many interpretative definitions which are explored in a later chapter. At its core, "strategy concerns the ways and means to achieve an end" (Dannatt 2016, 5).

The dissertation's research positions the state as the main unit of analysis because of its sustained significance in global politics and the international system. As a concept, the state is a central element in any definition of war and conflict. In this dissertation, war is defined as that fought between states. In particular, the focus is on the deployment of force during an international crisis in readiness for its eventual use in a war. Such military deployments by the state can then find it is involved in 'wars of choice' (Haass 2009; Freedman 2010; Fairweather 2011; Walt 2012; Lyon 2017), or 'niche wars' (Blaxland, Fielding, and Gellerfy 2020). This dissertation focuses on the former terminology, but very much the later term adequately describes Australia's selection and deployment of certain elements of the ADF on military operations. Under examination is how Australia kept a focus on warfighting but had policies and actions that were misaligned with its strategic approaches. The research seeks evidence as to

whether Australia experienced one or more strategic disconnects during the deployment of force in 'wars of choice'.

2.3 The Westphalian ideal and state formation

Almost four centuries after the establishment of the state, and subsequent commencement of international relations between states, the Treaty of Westphalia (the 'Treaty') or "Peace Settlement" of 24 October 1648 (Gross 1948, 26) has since continued its significance for the state. The ongoing construct of the international system and the role of states within that confirms Cohen's claim that "the state has not vanished, it adjusts" (2006, 27). This signal political event ended the destructive Thirty Years War (1618–48) and its conclusion ushered in an era where the ensuing Westphalian system saw the state become the central actor in international relations (Mock 2011). Equally, it brought about "embryonic concepts of European 'balance of power and 'collective security'" (Parrott 2004, 153). The complex and relative inconclusive European war was a conflict between Christendom's Catholic and Protestant arms, led respectively by the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III and 300 German Protestant princes, and involved a multitude of states and principalities whose forces fought over the beliefs and ideals of religion versus political liberty (DeSantis 2015, 18-19).

The Treaty would deliver the political creation of the state but would not provide any lasting conditions to prevent war. Holslag saw the conflict had largely represented "a struggle for political mastery of Europe" (2018, 468). For Kennedy, the achievement was broader and while he argued that it gave the Holy Roman Empire both political and religious *balance* (his italics), that limited the level of imperial authority previously enjoyed by much of Europe's monarchs, it was still an "untidy affair" which left France and Spain at war (1988, 51). That conflict ended with 1659 Treaty of Pyrenees (Mock 2011, 1095). Regardless of the continuation of war between states, the reverberations of Westphalia continued down the centuries as wars continued and the number of states proliferated.

This 'Peace of Westphalia' was the combination of the treaties that were the cumulative result of sustained diplomatic-driven efforts, that included "non-belligerent states" such as Denmark and England, concluded a war, whose cost in lives and

materiel, had begun to outweigh its proponent's political objectives (Colegrove 1919, 453). The Westphalian Peace Treaties had two main elements; the first was the Treaty of Osnabrück signed on 15 May 1648 between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden, followed by the Treaty of Munster on 24 October 1648 between that Empire and France (Lesaffer 1997, 71). According to DeSantis, Sweden and France could continue to intervene in the affairs of the German "congeries of principalities" but the Prussian unification of the German state in the late nineteenth-century saw them behave in a manner that made up for what preceded during the previous 200 years and drove them to become a great power (2015, 19). The catastrophe was played out in full the twentieth century, where Germany was the instigator and central culprit behind two wars. When the state or future of Europe is raised in current discourse, Walser-Burgler (2021, 4) argues that the discourse is "with a supra-national dimension – the linguistic or visual representation of "Europe" is never accidental, but usually expresses certain 'ideas of Europe' to invoke feelings of collective identity."

The political significance of the signing of these treaties created the principle of territorial sovereignty (Lesaffer 1997, 72). Westphalia delivered on several fronts for this to become possible. First, over one hundred political entities came together to negotiate them into existence and second, this act represented the dismemberment of the Holy Roman Empire and replaced it with individual political groupings that were responsible for their internal management and affairs of state, "holding equal diplomatic dignity, if not equal power" (Mock 2011, 1095). A third factor was that it gave these new political entities an equality among one another as states operating in an international order (Mock 2011). From a long, protracted war, and the intervention of successful diplomatic efforts, the peace agreements heralded "the foundations of the modern nation-state system" (Mock 2011, 1096).

However, Kiely argued that as war was fought over trading routes and "dynastic territorial claims", Westphalia could best be characterised instead as "a treaty between absolutist, personalised states, not modern, capitalist states" (Kiely 2005, 43). In contemporary times, Walser-Bürgler (2021, 6) argued "it was the pan-European aspect of the Thirty Years' War that turned it into the historically significant event it is considered today." Catastrophic war had preceded the resultant Westphalian Peace Treaties, one which "never before had so many armies, of such size, and from so many different territories waged war with each other at the same time with such

intensity" (Walser-Bürgler 2021, 6). The triumphant Westphalian system was a "dominant unit", one which saw "states constructed a diplomacy based on mutual acceptance of each other as legal equals, a practice in sharp contrast to the norm of unequal relations that prevailed in both ancient and classical and medieval international systems" (Buzan and Little 1999, 90). The role and significance of the state remains central to the realist tradition, as much as it does to Defence and Strategic Studies.

Despite the proliferation in the number of states in the international system, the significance of Westphalian Peace Treaties remains contested. The long-held traditional and dominant narrative is that the Westphalian system represents the concept of sovereignty. This concept of sovereignty is centuries old and was first recorded in 1576 by Jean Bodin, which predates the signing of the Treaty by almost three quarters of a century (trans. Franklin, 2006). The definition of sovereignty can broadly be seen as "the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains" (Ruggie 1986, 143). The foundational concepts of sovereignty include legitimate authority and territoriality, and general agreement does exist, often grudgingly, that the sovereign state is "the primary constitutive rule of international organisation" (Barkin and Cronin 1994, 107). The legal focus on what defines sovereignty however can have the effect that it is a fixed concept. This means that it cannot reflect the challenge to legitimate authority that comes from the changing definitions about notions of populations and territories, and how this also represents a change in norms (Barkin and Cronin 1994, 107). For critics, the Peace of Westphalia is just "perforated, defiled, cornered, eroded, extinct, anachronistic, even interrogated" (Fowler and Bunck, 1995, 2).

The Treaty's concept of sovereignty and position of the sovereign state as the main actor within the international system is challenged by Critical International Theory and Critical Security Studies. For some, such as Osiander, Westphalia "is a myth" because the theorising is simply of a time in history "that is largely imaginary" (2001, 251). The perspective that Westphalia represents a 'myth' is shared by Teschke (2003) and Beaulac (2004). Osiander (2001) claimed that the ideology built around the concept of sovereignty has limited the development of International Relations theory. Instead, he argued that historical phenomena may allow "a better understanding of contemporary international politics" by not focusing too narrowly on a nation's

military strength and capabilities but instead, strive for "mutual empowerment" (Osiander 2001, 280). This view offers a different perspective to the one that will be advocated in this dissertation, which considers the impacts of watershed moments on global politics, such as the collapse of Berlin Wall (1989), that symbolic event which contributed to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and precipitated the end of the Cold War, events of such magnitude that it created a paradigm shift in global politics and reverberated across the international system (Gaddis 2006; Service 2016).

Politically and economically less powerful states often seek equal status and recognition within the international system. This norm of sovereign equality among states has not been present since the signing of the Treaty (Stirk 2012, 641). The reason for this is that international society during the seventeenth century was hierarchical, and this structure persisted throughout most of the following century (Reus-Smit 1999). The central drivers of state behaviour during that period can be bundled around a state's standing amongst others, to protect honour and pursue glory (Lebow 2008). The "principle of the equality of states" became a concept increasingly advocated in the late eighteenth-century, but it was not until the nineteenth century that the Westphalian state system that the concept of state sovereignty became implicitly linked (Stirk 2012, 641-7). This foundational event is considered to have resulted in the deliverance of an oppressive and exploitative Euro-centric construct and resultant supportive narrative (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Hodgson 1993; Patterson 1997; Goody 2006; Kayaoglu 2010).

Almost 300 years after the Treaty, and in the wake of the UN becoming a key multilateral institution of the post–1945 international framework, Gross (1948) argued that a clear link existed between sovereign equality with that of the Westphalia sovereign state model. Gross stated that "for better or worse", this event defined a "majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world" (1948, 28). This became the authoritative and relatively undisputed concept regarding sovereignty that held for most of the second half of the twentieth century until critical revision took aim, and Gross's research was labelled by Stirk as plain "dubious historiography" (2012, 641). Features of the immediate post-Cold War era, such as globalisation, rapid technological advances, rise of transnational and non-state actor threats were all held up as exhibits of evidence for the serious challenge not just to the system, but to traditional Westphalian principles itself (Cusimano 2000). However, as a result, the

Westphalian system underwent rapid changes (Leonard 2001). One position argued was the negative outcome it produced in there being less global order (Rosenau 1992). For Gourevitch (1999), domestic and international politics had become "blurred" to the point where the state was no longer important in international relations. For Krasner (1999), sovereignty resembled "organised hypocrisy" and believed the discourse that claims globalisation as its transformative force is nothing less than an exaggeration (Krasner 2001). Krasner's challenge to Gross was on his four principles of "autonomy, territory, mutual recognition and control" as an over-simplified construct whose only purpose served as the analytical bedrock of neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists (2001, 17). Later still, this view continued to gain traction, with the global Westphalian order considered to have had simply reached its end (Ozluk and Cemrek, 2010, 171).

The Westphalian system of states has been criticised for the foundational basis by which European powers further expanded their imperial power and colonial territories around the globe (Mock 2011). The territorial boundaries of states were often first created during this period of colonial expansion and were not redrawn to better reflect the pre-colonial homogeneity of social, religious and ethnic groupings. This denied many people's their self-identity and social cohesion at the group level. Another criticism of the state system is centred on the fundamental aspect of sovereignty over its internal affairs, which can allow despotic rulers, military juntas and dictators to operate unimpeded within their own borders, safe from internal interference by other states (Mock 2011). The sovereignty of states can therefore be undermined when internal and external actors operate their own systems of power to gain financial and political benefits from those very arrangements. That can include the securitisation of energy, access resource extraction and security of supply lines.

The post-colonial perspective has argued that the state is an entity that will not necessarily allow other states to thrive and prosper. The more severe conditions are characterised by those states deemed to have acquired the unenviable status of being 'weak', 'failing', 'failed' or 'collapsed' (Rotberg 2003). The existence of the fragile state is seen as a direct and negative consequential outcome of the Westphalian state system (Buzan and Little 1999). Post-colonialism counters the "functional equivalence" inherent in the state as that argued by realism, and specifically by Waltz (1979) in the neo-realist tradition. The level of internal and external security

experienced by post-colonial states has been uneven and perpetuated the unequal power differential between states, with shocks within the international system felt most by poor nations with imperialism not having ended for them despite independence from the metropole (Chomsky 1993; Said 1993).

The ongoing unequal power differential between states, whether political, economic or strategic, has roots in colonial acquisitions and conquests. During the late twentieth-century, the North-South conflict moved to a frame of reference that was characterised by greater U.S. and Western dominance by scholars of the political Left, such as Chomsky (1993) and Said (1993), albeit with qualifications. For the European powers who had long ago marked out their new territories, it was a process that split tribal, linguistic, religious and ethnic groupings. When newly independent, post-colonial states gained their place in the international community, they inherited borders surveyed long before by imperial powers. Borders were also hastily drawn, as was the case with the 1947 Partition of British India, when the Indian and Pakistani borders were drawn only months before the UK surrendered their colonial power (Dannatt 2016). India and Pakistan have since gone to war against one another three times, possess nuclear weapons and continue a military standoff in the disputed Kashmir region along a disputed Line of Control. This continued fractious security situation and potential flashpoint for war contains latent historical-political tensions that have been long present between two regional powers. Since independence, these two states have sought to not only to protect their sovereignty and national interests but address these historical legacies on occasion through force.

Since the Treaty, the number of states over time has both decreased and increased. Over three centuries, there was first a rapid rise followed by a sharp decline in the number of small states when compared against the relative stability displayed by the number of middle and major powers (Maass 2009). An example of the severe fluctuation was that during the seventeenth century, when 300 political entities existed on German soil and by the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, that figure had decreased in number to a few dozen (Morgenthau 1967). During the following century in the Cold War period, there was a rapid rise in the number of small states. Driven in part by the post–1945 decolonisation process, war-weary and often bankrupt European powers sometimes provided a fast-track to independence for some colonies and clung onto others. Post–1945, the UK, France, Spain and Portugal each had self-serving

justifications for their individual state approaches and timelines for the independence of their colonies. Their foreign policy towards the independence process for colonies and protectorates stirred fury, anger, and animosity in different measures from many, that included its own metropole citizens, adjacent and newly independent states, civil society, and the international community. The decolonisation process was often marked by elements of the colony's local population engaged in opposition that became armed, conducted by a combination of approaches and tactics that included insurgency and/or terror campaigns.

The rationale for the continued possession of colonies included several elements. The first was economic, and the ability to import cheap primary commodities and conduct resource extraction, all the while having cheap labour and a protected export market. Second, was political, where the maintenance of institutions such as the military was important, foster domestic political support among voters and the simple view that the colony was often characterised as home soil, or part of the 'metropole'. Strategic interests were also a factor. Former colonies, such as Cyprus, Aden and Singapore, occupied key strategic locations near a maritime chokepoint or important Sea Line of Communication. There was often a need, especially during insurgency and terror campaigns to provide internal security and protection to local power structures, an expatriate community, businesses, infrastructure, and national companies. The fight waged by colonial powers against numerous insurgencies and terror campaigns, that formed the struggles and wars of national independence saw the final stages, though incomplete, of decolonisation produced many more small states. The support for independence came from political pressure, agitation and numerous rights movements, from both state and non-state actors. This came from a variety of sources that included the U.S. and most of their allies, which included Australia and Canada, as well as civil society, and continues to include the UN and a host of International Non-Government Organisations. Outward expressions of independence for colonies and protectorates have been seen within the context of what the superpowers gained.

The small state is seen as the major casualty of a structural problem within the Westphalian system. Some small islands, such as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, continue to be denied sovereignty by major powers. Maass (2016, 1303) stated that "individually, small states have always been irrelevant to the overall structure of the state system". That view was supported by Cohen (1995, 78-79), who described the

struggle of the small state and the strategic options available to them are almost always without exception, one for its very existence. Fazal (2007) was more precise and stated that "state death" is the likely outcome for small states. The tenuous locale of the small state in the Westphalian international system is not entirely a recent debate. Scholars such as Cruttwell (1937) have long ago argued that the small state simply faced the real possibility of "extinction".

However, Morgenthau saw fewer states "deprived the balance of power of much of its flexibility and uncertainty and, in consequence, of its restraining effect upon the nations actively engaged in the struggle for power" (1967, 334). While Morgenthau saw smaller states had a role in balancing the great powers, too many of them did not add to their security, and would neither necessarily result in their survival. The *realpolitik* for the small state in the international system is that "neither active balancing, band-wagoning or neutrality has been a reliable strategy for small states to secure their survival on their own" (Maass 2016, 1305). The PRC soft power engagement that is underway with many Pacific Island states, such as that with the Solomon Islands government of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, have accorded many of these South Pacific small states with increased strategic significance in a period of increased major power rivalry (Moore 2022).

The immediate period after the Cold War saw a proliferation of newer states, many of them small in geography size and institutional capacity (Enriquez 1999; Henrikson 1999). The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the formal dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in January 1992 saw a multitude of new states seek independence. Many were small in geographical size and inherited Soviet era institutions, structures and systems. Gilpin (1981) had earlier argued that the international system's balance of power, whether it be economic or military, becomes destabilised with the sudden fall of a great power, or the rise of a new hegemon. Gilpin saw the nature of international relations has not changed for millennia, with actors seeking to advance their interests, which may be political, economic, or other types. Shift in the balance of power occurred from a "disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power towards those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system" (Gilpin 1981, 9). Within a decade of that assessment, the uncertainty inherent within global politics was marked

by the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union. That event delivered the end of the Cold War.

The uneven distribution of political and economic power has a direct impact on a small state. From an international political economic perspective, Katzenstein distinguished the difference that existed between the large and small states is that the former category is the "rule makers" while the latter are the "rule takers", forced to act primarily with "reactive" policies (Katzenstein 1985, passim, 22, 191). The issue of small states was revisited by Katzenstein (2003), and wrote how the international and comparative political economy literature in the early 1980s focused on "the size of the territory they control and the scale of their operations" (Katzenstein 2003, 10). In the 1990s, Garrett (1998) challenged the view that openness must result in undermining the choices available to a national government. Katzenstein was supportive of that view and stated that "what really mattered politically was the perception of vulnerability, economic and otherwise" (2003, 11). Katzenstein argued that political strategy for the small state may be the harder variable to measure but it is no less important than economic outcomes and concluded that in the case of small European states, they adapted to "internationalisation or globalisation, the underlying condition" (2003, 27). While they may have had the national capacity to adapt to change wrought upon them by the actions of larger states, they remained vulnerable, and proved to be a much harder proposition for small states to achieve change, especially those in Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific region.

State failure and the internal situation often characterised by internal instability, conflict and the lack of political goods is a challenge to the Westphalian notion that sovereignty is a by-product of statehood. Rotberg (2003) claimed that the failure of the state is the simple result of not being able to deliver security as a public good for its citizens. The large, or 'strong state' can protect its border whereas the fragile or failed state no longer can, just as much that it usually cannot control whole sections of its territory (Rotberg 2003). Regarding the relationship this had on the large state or major power, Maass noted that "as far as the state system is concerned, [the] small state are negligible units; great powers are not" (2016, 1319).

Despite the abundance of states, "with respect to their security, small states are ultimately at the mercy of the international state system" (Maass 2016, 1304). While this does not make them any less legitimate, their vulnerability was disproportionate

to numerous stressors and shocks, whether socio-economic or a natural disaster, it is compounded by "system-level features, dynamics and processes" and concluded that "small states are, ultimately, small enough to fail" (Maass 2016, 1304; 1320). The common feature between states or all geographical sizes is the presence of war and its persistent feature of global politics and the international system. States are united in the impact of broader security threats they face, which is not limited to war, but can include non-kinetic security threats such as climate change, pandemics and cyberattacks.

Much strident criticism exists regarding the concept of the state and the Westphalian system. For example, when that global political ordering is linked with the state and military power, assessments from a Critical Theory perspective about those concepts and their employment in war provide different points of view to that held from this research's lens of classical realism. Derrida's post-Structuralist assessment of the First Gulf War, summed up in his title of *The Gulf War did not Happen* (1991; 1995), offered his view that the media's coverage and presentation of the war meant many in the West assumed warfighting on the ground did not take place. Such theoretical abstraction is the result of an inductive approach of theory first, then material sourced to support such a perspective. There remains no shortage of perspectives provided by Critical Theory scholars and others across various disciplines and their many theoretical approaches.

The review of those oppositional theoretical perspectives on the state and the Westphalian system is outside the scope of this research however, a brief view on some aspects is provided. According to Phillips (2009, 95), the state is not happening because its very existence was nothing but "a utopian allegory exemplifying the American experience". Phillips challenged the concept of the state system as essentially an "irrational response" to the decline of American hegemonic power and the rise of multipolarity, in which the paradigm shifted consistently ranked "overstated threats" above opportunities and therefore the expansion of multiple non-state actor threats had overplayed the impact on states (2009, 95). A challenger to that perspective was from one whose earlier claim was that the Westphalian "moment" did not occur, but did result in an identifiable political order which came "from other *generic* political forms, such as empires, feudal orders, Italian city states, or Indian tribes, while setting

out the defining characteristics of the genus type" (Navari 2007, 594). The caveat for Navari is that Westphalia "does exist, but it is a category, not a type" (2007, 594).

Despite criticism levelled at the Treaty's implications and resultant global political ordering that is based on the Westphalian ideal, the state has maintained a primacy in global politics. This research utilises the state as the unit of analysis at the international level as well as the referent for its institutions, such as military power. According to Wendt (1999), Jackson (2000), Schrijver (2000), Philpott (2001) and Clark (2005), the prominence and significance of the Treaty has been its ability to endure to understand international relations. Schrijver (2000) argued that the Treaty's specific inter-related concept of sovereignty does exist and has evolved through the development of international law. Schrijver acknowledged that while the seventeenth-century state is vastly different to its present incarnation, the continual and progressive uptake of international law by states, such as arms control and disarmament, as well as peace and security, are proof that states are not "withering-away" (2000, 65). Since the turn of the new millennia and arrival of newer security threats, the state has remained, both as concept and the physical representation of sovereignty. The state has proven to be the most effective means for the political ordering of its institutions, such as military power. This allows the state the means to best defend its national interests and citizens by force. The role of the military provides an important tool of statecraft. It is a role undiminished in its importance and significance to the state, given the continued threat of future war.

2.4 State, war, and the search for security

The state is the central unitary actor in global politics and the anarchial international system. Realism shares across its different strands the view "that the character of relations among states has not altered. Where there is change, it tends to occur in repetitive patterns" (Jensen and Elman 2018, 18). The behaviour of states "is driven by leader's flawed human nature", or by the anarchial international system that has no higher overarching authority (Jensen and Elman 2018, 18). In regards to the use of force by states, "nothing has replaced annihilation as the single universal organising principle for militaries" (Kelly and Brennan 2010, 46). It can be deduced that war has presented "a multitude of contending propositions and theories that purport to describe

what wars will be like in the future" (Kelly and Brennan 2010, 46). The challenge for states therefore is the constant presence of war, acknowledgement of its numerous causes, as well as the various known and unknown forms it may take across the various domains of warfare. In response to such uncertainty, states must determine the most appropriate strategic approaches required to address such threats. Since the end of the Cold War, Australian governments have been challenged by an array of security threats which require an alignment with appropriate strategic approaches so that the utility of force can remain as an effective tool of statecraft.

The nature and conduct of warfare in the contemporary period can be grouped into two dominant categories. The first is that which "in the wake of the end of the Cold War, a discontinuity and accompanying paradigm shift in the conduct of international relations" (Coghlan 2010, 165). The second categorisation belongs to those "who believe claims of such a shift are overstated, and that a realist approach will remain the dominant paradigm for the foreseeable future" (Coghlan 2010, 165). This dissertation's research is framed via the theoretical lens of classical realism, and agrees with the second categorisation made by Coghlan (2010). Classical realists provide those two key elements as the consistent cause for war. Morgenthau saw the struggle for power as an end in itself which came from either the desire to secure scarce goods, or the "other root of conflict and concomitant evil" – "the *animus dominandi*, the desire for power" (1946, 192). Classical realism has a long view of global politics in the international system as evil, abetted by bad people who pursue foreign policy through malevolence and violence (Spirtas 1996, 387-400). Such characterisation of classical realism is therefore one of a "pessimistic and prudential view of international relations" (Jensen and Elman 2018, 18). The twenty-first century's trajectory towards increased major power rivalry and use of military power in war for political objectives has again presented classical realism as a most applicable theoretical lens to view the state and war.

Neorealism claims that the structure of the international system as composed of a structure with interacting units (Waltz 1979, 77). The two constants in that structure are the lack of an overarching authority, which is the anarchial environment, and all states act in the "principle of self-help" for their survival, while the structural variable is the "distribution of capabilities" (Waltz 1979, 88; 99). This approach differs from classical realism as Waltz claimed neorealism's "theory is not based on leaders'

motivations and state characteristics as causal variables for international outcomes, except the minimal assumption that states seek to survive" (Jensen and Elman 2018, 21). This dissertation's research is based on the theoretical assumptions of classical realism that the motivations of state leaders, and the pursuit of power politics. This is not just as a causal factor for war, but how the behavioural actions of a leader can indicate the behaviour of states.

Structural realism has states "cast as unitary actors wanting at least to survive, and are taken to be the system's constituent units" (Waltz 1988, 615-28). The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy – the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force." Defensive structural realism grew out of neorealism and "shares neorealism's minimal assumptions about state motivations, suggesting that states seek security in an anarchical international system" (Jensen and Elman 2018, 22-23). The main threat to the state is that from other states (Walt 2002; Glaser 2003). Walt's (1987, 2000) balance of threat theory argues that states balance against the concentration of power, where offence-defence balancing will favour balance. Walt claimed that "in anarchy, states form alliances to protect themselves. Their conduct is determined by the threats they perceive, and the power of others is merely one element in their calculations" (1987, x). States who feel threatened will act in response and increase their security and this security dilemma results not from the evil within states but a condition of the structure of international relations (Glaser 2003). However, the aggressive actions of major powers are not served when states do not respond to Moscow and Beijing without similar threats of retaliatory levels of force. The tragedy of war lies not just in the structure of the anarchical international system, but the dark side of human nature as expressed by bellicose leaders through power politics. Naivety and ignorance in the face of authoritarian malevolence by major powers will only compound the tragedy of a future war against such aggressor states.

Negative critiques of realism by that of Buzan and Little of is that the state and power "assumes that the high politics of war and military rivalry dominate the international agenda, and that states will subordinate other objectives to those priorities" (1999, 90). The philosophical assumption of this dissertation's research is in firm agreement with realism, and specifically classical realism, for its conceptualisation of the state, military power and war, as well as the causes for war. As Freedman succinctly linked two of those concepts, "war is a function of the

ambiguities in the state system" (1994, 3). Military power, through deterrence or compellence, is most potently expressed through war. The state's use of military power in war affords it the kinetic means to achieve political objectives and when the threat of future war by major powers remains present, this is where the significance of the state and military power for war has not been diminished or lost its agency.

This research however places security within a state-centric construct. National security can include military power however, this research focuses on the Australian state and military power. In the Australian context, national security refers to the Departments' of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Attorney General, Home Affairs, those agencies that comprise the Australian Intelligence Community, as well as federal and state law enforcement agencies. There are other Commonwealth government departments which form Australia's whole-of-government approach to national security. They include the departments and agencies of those ministers represented by their membership of the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC). The concept of military power in this research is that represented by the ADF. While there is an overlap between defence and the nation's national security apparatus, as an overarching whole-of-government approach to the defence of the state, this research is focused on the warfighting component. This is represented throughout the research by the concept of military power. To address the research question, and associated sub-research questions, the dissertation's research design includes the Department of Defence. It is included because it is both part of, and in service of, Australia's military power. The structure of the Department of Defence is a diarchy between the leadership of both uniformed members of the armed Services, and the supporting government bureaucracy of the Australian Public Service. The Department of Defence is included in this research for its the support and funding roles, as well as its involvement in the development and implementation of strategic approaches. This government department is integral to the ADF, its uniformed personnel, capabilities and force posture.

This dissertation acknowledges the existence of criticism about state-centric approaches to security, national security and strategic approaches to defence and strategy. However, the classical realist tradition places the state as the central unit of analysis which best explains the presence and expression of military power in the anarchial international system. An appreciation of understanding security within such

a theoretical framework allows for the concepts of the state, war, and military power to be explored alongside strategy as the means by which force is used for political purposes. The purpose of this approach is to inform the research's conceptual framework, where both explanations and justifications are provided in chapter four.

The state, and its use of military power, is the referent for this research. The research explores whether Australia's approach to security and involvement in war was in alignment with its strategic approaches. The anarchical international system remains under constant challenge by the relationship between states, including major powers and nuclear-armed states. The state therefore remains relevant as a political unit of analysis. The research considers military power as a unit of analysis to determine the armed capabilities afforded to the Australian state. This provides the means to explore if deployments of force to wars of choice during the timeframe under review indicates whether a strategic disconnect existed between the nation's strategic outlook and its kinetic approaches to inter-state threats.

A state's possession of military power and its capabilities conversely provide a more overt means by which states, and major powers especially, can impose their political will on another. The application of military power and its capabilities can be expressed by various approaches across five domains of warfare: land, sea, air, space and cyber. Those various approaches can be applied singularly, or most often, across warfighting domains within a joint environment. This a clear illustration of how force can be applied, either from a position of deterrence or compellence. The more extreme expression is their kinetic application through war. In combination with strategy, it is the strategic approach by which the state can execute its military power. Since Westphalia, armed intervention by one or more states against another has a long and bloody history. The international system has attempted to restrain and temper the use of force by states but the act of war however has proven to be the most overt means of one state's violent involvement against the affairs of another. As a warfighting state, Australian governments have implemented various strategic approaches to address the likelihood of involvement in war, which is explored in chapter four.

Involvement in the domestic affairs of another state, especially through force, has a range of negative impacts. First, it breaches a state's autonomy, severely weakens their control and challenges the geographical integrity, all to the point where it can produce population displacement and have borders redrawn. Since the onset of

Westphalia, such behaviours by major powers, either alone or in concert with others, have remained an entrenched feature of the international system. This behaviour by states continues as a result of the non-presence of an all-encompassing, overarching authoritative structure that can singularly act to oppose and prevent armed intervention by one state on another. The anarchical nature of the international system means that military power is a means to secure the ability to shape global politics. The state's ability to govern and protect its sovereignty has been under sustained and increased challenges from cross-border, inter-state, non-military forces such as the internationalisation of finance, capital, transport, information communications technology, the environmental commons, and civil society.

Numerous breaches against the internal machinations of a sovereign state are not a new phenomenon of global politics. The Westphalian concept posits the state with sovereignty over its territory and the expectation that its domestic affairs are not for the interference by other states. However, that aspect of the conceptualisation behind the state, its intent, and purposes, have been challenged. Since Westphalia, many states, and especially the major powers, have been involved in covert missions and measures in the affairs of other states, such as the indirect interference into the internal affairs of another state continues to take place in many forms, and context specific. Covert actions may include intelligence-gathering, counterintelligence, information operations, grey and hybrid wars, cyberattacks, assassinations, election interference, economic destabilisation, and military coups.

The anarchical international system means states have used their military power against another state in an overt and direct application of force. Under the autocratic rule of Saddam Hussein, Iraq's military invaded Iran in 1980, and Kuwait in 1990. Later transgressions alleged by the U.S. against Iraq were framed under the concept of "democracy by force" (Lambert 2008, 46). The post 9/11 Bush Doctrine was framed by the 2002 *U.S. National Security Strategy* and executed in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was considered the first preventative war in U.S. history (Silverstone 2007). The U.S. military's capabilities and reach proved again that it is global, deployed to achieve their nation's political and strategic objectives. The Second Gulf War was testament to how the use deployed force against another state. That was On 20 March 2003, Iraq was invaded by the U.S. and a coalition of allies that included the UK, Australia, and Spain (Tripp 2007, 273).

The U.S. led military coalition exposed the limitations of the Iraqi armed forces and their capabilities when faced with such overwhelming military superiority. The pre-emptive invasion was exacted by the U.S. led coalition as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in response to Saddam Hussein's regime's alleged possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The faulty *casus belli* to launch the full-scale invasion had been formalised in the U.S. Congress on 16 October 2002 when it passed a "Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq" (Bluemel and Mansour 2020, 4). Hussein gave an unconditional agreement to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution (UNSCR) 1441 on 14 November 2002, and UN weapons inspector Hans Blix informed the UNSC on 7 March 2002 that there was no evidence Iraq possessing a nuclear weapons program. Neither action nor statement prevented war. Post-invasion, it was June 2004 when the U.S. formally handed back Iraq's sovereignty (Tripp 2007, 277).

In 2005, a formal request by the Blair government was made to the Australian government to increase its military commitment in Iraq, with a focus on the Al Muthanna Province (Taylor and Ball 2007). The NSCC deliberated that request on 16 February 2005, and then on 22 February, the Howard government announced the formation of an Al Muthanna Task Group, which was 450 soldiers drawn from the ADF's 1st Brigade (Brown 2016, 9). That decision satisfied the strategic and operational needs of the U.S. and her allies, specifically the UK and Japan (Taylor and Ball 2007; Brown 2016; Horner 2022). The ADF battle group would be based in Tallil, and the Australian defence minister said it "is looking after things in Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces under the operational command of the British" (Nelson 2008, 139). The cost of that deployment was $200 million during 2005-06 fiscal year (Taylor and Ball 2007, 16). However, that decision also strengthened the Australian-Japanese security relationship (Taylor and Ball 2007; Brown 2016). This war of choice is examined as part of the case studies in chapter eight.

This highlights how Australia's strategic approaches and involvement in war of choices have been shaped by its relationship with major powers. During the time of the Vietnam War, Miller (1968) claimed that historical experience showed greater power pressure was a key factor for "conditions for co-operation" between states. That co-operation could be in response to act "in concert to a common danger", though the pressure to act could be "strong or subtle, open or concealed, militarily, political, or

economic in character" (Miller 1968, 201-02). The evolution of Australia's strategy and strategic approaches is explored further in chapter four.

The causes of war are many and the purpose of understanding them is to understand global politics and the anarchial international system, as this has a direct relationship on the state, and its engagement with war. This is explored in the next chapter. However, the use of military power and its capabilities, especially those of an offensive capability, provide options to a state that seeks to employ such force against another. States can and will use such capabilities in a pre-emptive manner if their national security is threatened. Kinetic actions wielded through military power by a state actor is not always limited or tempered by norms, allies, the international community, or civil society.

How a state uses force and employs military power for an international crisis, that is most likely to result in an inter-state war, can provide insights into not just the levels of a state's preparedness and readiness to fight, but whether that force embodies strategic alignment with that very same threat. The alignment between a state's particular strategic approach at the time of a significant international crisis that warrants the deployment of its forces can be an indicator to whether the state has correctly assessed whether it has a force in being to deploy that meets not just its military deployment requirements, but that it can achieve the political objectives set by its government. Australia's military power serves its national security though as a concept, national security is normally understood to be the various non-military elements of a whole-of-government approach to the security of the state, its national interests, and citizens.

The international system, characterised by war, conflict and crises, will continue to employ force. Uncertainty and the ever-present challenges of a complex security environment does not provide ready-made answers or solutions. One ongoing and constant feature of the internationals system is that some states will use force against another. It also holds true that the use of force will remain a tool of statecraft for governments with the means, intent and political will to wield it. Such actionable policy options can allow the state to use military power for use in war, regardless whether it is legitimate or not within the current RBGO and parameters of international law. This is one reason that a state's strategic approaches must align with its overarching approach to a nation's security, so that it can meet and address real threats,

kinetic and non-kinetic. The state can utilise its military to wage war, defensive or offensive, and should be guided by the desire to protect its sovereignty and secure its national interests.

2.5 Military power and the 'diminished' state

Realism is a theoretical paradigm of political thought, located in the discipline of International Relations, and has its philosophical foundations in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, all of whom are outlined later in this chapter. Carr (2017, 86) wrote that "Machiavelli's doctrine are the foundation stones of the realist philosophy." The first tenant is that "history is a sequence of cause and effect, whose course can be analysed and understood by intellectual effort but not (as the utopians believe) directed by 'imagination'" (Carr 2017, 91). History continues to record war's fixture and military power provides the state with the ability to wage war. Carr described the matter as:

> *"[t]he supreme importance of the military instrument lies in the fact that the ultima ratio of power in international relations is war. Every act of the state, in its power aspect, is directed at war, not as a desirable weapon, but as a weapon which it may require in the last resort to use" (2017, 91).*

The conceptualisation of war being fixed, permanent, and unchangeable is due to the classical realist perspective of human nature and the impact of an anarchial international system but this perspective has its critics. Just one case is that argued by the transnationalist thesis (Koehane and Nye, 1971) which long ago claimed that increased economic cooperation and interdependence between states would make force become obsolete due to the rise and role of transnational actors. It was argued that such actions reduce the utility of force. Koehane and Nye (1977) continued the attack against realism's central tenants: the primacy of the state in global politics; the focus on security and power; and for strategy and the military being a dominant consideration over the economy. However, among the many theoretical perspectives who take aim at the classical realism, the concepts of the state, military power, and war have taken on increased significance in more recent times. Since the end of the Cold War, several theoretical perspectives have taken continuous aim at the state. This has proven to be a luxury of intellectual indulgence, one which contemporary times

cannot afford, given the rise of transnational security threats and the risk of war between the major powers.

However, by the end of the Cold War, the role of the state was again further challenged by the transnational thesis. Rosenau (1990) claimed that "turbulence" in global politics was the result of globalisation and transnationalism, which had reduced the state to no longer be the central player in the international system. Rosenau claimed "non-state actors who have become the main determinant of international politics" stood in contrast with the realist perspective of a state-dominated world system, one focused on the maintenance of sovereignty and pursuit of security and power (Cohen 2006, 2). Cohen outlined how that view was "a 'bifurcation' between the 'state-centric world' and the 'multi-centric world', each following contradictory principles" (2006, 3). Rosenau claimed that while the state-centric system remained, it "coexists with an equally powerful, though more decentralized, multi-centric system" (1990, 11). Strange made the claim that "where states were once the masters of the markets, now it is markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the governments of states" (1996, 4). Later, Strange stated that "[f]rom a globalist, humanitarian and true political economy perspective, the system known as Westphalian has been an abject failure" (1999, 345). After the events of 11 September 2001, scholars still advanced the decline of the state. One such view was Cohen, who argued that "the end of the Cold War and globalisation have led to the decline of the nation-state, to a considerable loss of its sovereignty and its privileged position at the top of the hierarchy of actors in the international system" (2006, 7).

Fukuyama's earlier *End of History* (1989) article in *The Nation*, which was later published in a longer form as *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), heralded the rise of liberal democracy as where the historical trajectory had achieved its 'natural' culminating point. While the end of the Cold War witnessed events such as student protests in Tiananmen Square during June 1989 and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, people sought not just political rights and economic wealth but social identity and cultural recognition (Butler-Bowdon 2015, 107). In 1992, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the unipolar society of states came into being (Bell 2007, 29). The post-Cold War period ushered in a new era where the rules of the international relations were going to be re-written through a series of tests. As Halberstam (2001, 73) stated: "The all-purpose

directive that had defined American policy for forty years – all eyes on Moscow, with quick glimpses towards Beijing, Western democracies good, communist countries and satellites bad – had suddenly been pulled from the table." The paradigm shift that created a new global order was underscored by triumphalism, one which "Australia shared in the West's joyous triumphalism" (Mahbubani 2022, 71).

The end of the Cold War offered the opportunity for the transnationalist thesis to be tested. Mearsheimer argued that bipolarity delivered peace during the Cold War that its end meant "[d]eterrence is more difficult in a multipolar world because power imbalances are commonplace, and when power is unbalanced, the strong becomes hard to deter" in which the "[b]alance of power dynamics can counter such power imbalances" (1990, 15). An analysis of theories that explained for the violence prior to the Cold War gave and the causes for two previous global wars may yet appear again, Mearsheimer stated that "those theories predict about the nature of international politics in a post-Cold War multipolar Europe" (1990, 9). Soon after, Mearsheimer (1994) noted how the paradigm shift in global affairs gave a "false promise of international institutions", one which would not render war obsolete or the anarchial international system. Tellingly, the end of the Cold War did not blunt the continued utility of force.

The period between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001 was characterised as a period of lost opportunities that came from the end of a bipolarity and superpower rival. The sudden shift to unipolarity after the cessation of the Soviet Union's on 25 December 1991 would prove not to be the moment that history ended. Thereafter, global shifts towards eventual multipolarity would come from the PRC, whose political and economic rise would continue for the next three decades. This new paradigm shift would pose many challenges to the U.S. According to Halberstam (2001, 3), "in the future, they may look at the era that just passed with unusual distaste as a time of trivial pursuits and debate in our public sector, and singular greed in the private one, with unacceptable rewards to the heads of our largest corporations" (2001, 3). Halberstam added, with misguided optimism, that "[w]ith luck, that era of consummate self-indulgence has passed." (2001, 3) It has come to pass that such aspirational hopes did not transpire.

Since that significant 'watershed' moment in international relations on 11 September 2001, the *Al Qaeda*-led terrorist attacks on New York and Washington,

D.C. gave reason for some to interpret these asymmetric acts by a transnational terrorist organisation was proof that the state in a weakened position. Cohen argued "[t]he September 11 attacks have revived this vision of the 'powerless state', incapable of controlling the '*enfants terribles*' of globalisation" (2006, 2). However, the events of 11 September 2001 pushed away announcements of the decline of both the state and the utility of force. On matters of national security and the deployment overseas of military power, it was the state as the unitary actor in an anarchical international system that would use its capabilities. These military actions were not always unilateral. They were often conducted in alliance with states that shared common values and purpose to protect their respective national interests and citizens from state and non-state threat actors.

2.6   Summary

The research has explored the significance of the intersectionality between concepts such the state, sovereignty, war, strategy, national security and military power. A state's warfighting capabilities is provided by its military power but to be effective, it needs to be in alignment with strategic approaches that can successfully negate the threats it is required to address. Those capabilities need to be organised within specific strategic approaches that give governments the options to pursue key political objectives. Importance must continue to be given by elected governments to the protection of the state, its sovereignty, national interests, and citizens. They can be enhanced by alliances and an assumed level of assistance during wartime. While it is acknowledged that the threat environment is fluid, war is a central feature of global politics and the international system. It is therefore incumbent on all governments to identify the most likely and consequential threat remains a future war from major power confrontation.

This chapter has shown that despite major wars and paradigm shifts in the international system, the concept of the Westphalian state remains. The state maintains its significance within global politics, both as a political entity that represents sovereignty over people and territory. The continued presence of the phenomenon of war also remains a feature of the anarchial international system. Despite Australia's involvement in war during the period that this dissertation's research covers,

governments considered throughout 1990–2014 that the prospect of major war to be a very remote possibility. This chapter has demonstrated that war remains a persistent, violent phenomena which can have a direct impact on the state. Therefore, the concepts of the state, military power and war are not just interrelated but contain a significance and relevance over time as the likelihood of a future war between the major powers increases.

In regard to inter-state war, the state's military power is the institution which governments employ the armed capabilities and kinetic means to fight, regardless of whether its orientation is offensive or defensive. This dissertation's research is centred the significance of the state and war, with an objective to identify the many causes of war and to contrast that with Australia's involvement in wars of choice. The purpose is to highlight the risk of government unpreparedness for the prospect of a major war. To restate the research question, it examines whether Australia ensured internal consistency between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power and strategy. The two sub-research questions are first, what was Australia's force in-being at the time of each international security crisis; and, Department of Defence budget during the financial year these operations were deployed for war.

The next chapter explores the state as the central actor in global politics and the international system state, the phenomena of war, and arguments for what causes war. Those concepts are integral parts of the research and its conceptual framework. Its design is to explore how war can demonstrate that misalignment can exist between the state, military power and strategy. The establishment of concepts are also contextualised for the purpose of establishing how Australia used its military power on overseas deployments in wars of choice, and whether they ran counter to the government's strategic outlook and the strategic approaches it employed towards defence and security.

Chapter Three

Arguments on the Causes of War

3.1 Introduction

War and conflict have continued to inflict death and destruction throughout human history (Black 2021). The apogee to the human cost in lives from war was greatest during the twentieth century (Ferguson 2006). Since the creation of the Westphalian system, war has been defined as that fought between states. The significance of the relationship between war and the state is best expressed by Tilly: "war made the state, and state made war" (1975, 42). The continued presence of war in global politics and a feature of the international system, used by states as a tool of statecraft, necessitates a review and understanding of its causes. The purpose is to highlight that regardless of the specific conditions for the outbreak of war, it is a deadly phenomenon that is conducted inter-state. The state and its military power is the responsibility of governments to protect the nation's sovereignty, national interests, and citizens. The state can use military power for deterrence or compellence. That state also approves the strategic use of armed force on war-like operations and military campaigns, for kinetic means to be used against a state's adversaries for political objectives. Since Federation, Australian governments "have been engaged in the war game" (Horner 2022, 390). As a warfighting state, Australian governments have continued to deploy force since the closing stages of the Cold War, and included the involvement of the ADF to serve as part of U.S. led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This chapter explores the various causes for war. The purpose is to inform Australia's historical experience of, and participation in, war. In doing so, it both establishes and acknowledges past and "current patterns of war and conflict are both cause and effect of such structural fault lines in the international system" (Clarke 2012, 647). Despite war's continued presence, "[t]here has never been a definitive answer to the universal question of what causes wars to occur" (Clarke 2012, 647). This provides the rationale for this chapter's exploration of war's occurrence. In the political-historical context of wars and conflicts in the Middle East, there is "an obligation to remember and learn, as agreed upon conclusions, as to why events played out as they

did, particularly as they are likely to shape current public discourse, as well as serve as future policy axioms in Washington and elsewhere" (Siracusa and Visser 2020, vi). This approach is particularly applicable to Australia's use of force as well as the development and implementation of its strategic approaches.

Modern history and politics continue to highlight that the maintenance of armed forces are an expensive undertaking for the state. As Slantchev stated: "Creating and maintaining armed forces is among the costliest undertakings for a nation short of their employment in hostilities" (2011, 3). The requirement then for states which all operate within an anarchial international system, there exists a nexus not just between the state and war, but also between war and strategy. Howard wrote of how the central role of force defines strategy as well as how "military force is a necessary element in international affairs" (1969, x). Howard (1969) qualified his statement by arguing that such a dominant view existed prior to 1914 but less so after the end of the First World War. Howard's perspective on military force was informed by that represented by classical strategy and classical strategists, one that was defined earlier by Liddell Hart (1967, 335): "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy."

In the twenty-first century, strategy retains its significance for the state and military power. Dannatt (2016, 5) distilled the essence of strategy as "at its simplest, strategy concerns the ways and means to achieve an end." Dannatt claimed "war is the agent of change" but "the political class and its decision makers place choice over necessity when deciding on deploying force" (2016, 5). That view is central to this research, whether it is an exploration of the various causes of war, or the state's involvement in war, it is based nonetheless on whether the state should be involved in war, especially when there is a clear choice to not willingly participate. As Dannatt wrote, "choice over necessity" simply becomes "conflicts of choice" (2016, 5). A state needs to recognise strategy in the context of its military power and the war it faces, especially as war can be fought across all five domains of warfare: land, sea, air, cyber and space. The challenge for the state has been complicated since the advent of nuclear weapons and their later horizontal proliferation among nuclear-armed states. This complicated approach to strategy challenges how military power can be applied in war however, force remains central in any definition of strategy. Strategy has many may have once been defined as "the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to

resolve their dispute" (Beaufre 1965, 22). However, the use of force in war has its risk. The risk or option for escalation in war, especially between major powers, can prove to be not just consequential but existential.

War has been studied to identify its many aspects, such as its principles, lessons from history, and the essence of strategy. Scholars and military theorists use strategy as a means "to describe the approach taken by a polity to the conduct of war, and particularly to the conduct of an individual campaign" (Bachrach and Bachrach 2017, 336). The purpose has been to gain knowledge, offer insights and to educate. The available audience is broad, and can include leaders, decisionmakers, advisers, military commanders, and the practitioner. Former U.S. Marine Corps General and Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, implored that "reading sheds light on the dark path ahead" (2019, 42). The sources from learning the lessons of past wars to inform the present and future war includes military history and strategy. Mattis expressed his rationale for learning from the past:

> *"We have been fighting on this planet for ten thousand years; it would be idiotic and unethical to not take advantage of such accumulated experiences. If you haven't read hundreds of books, you are functionally illiterate, and you will be incompetent, because your personal experiences alone aren't broad enough to sustain you"* (2019, 42).

Strategy and history are linked. That interrelationship, however, has been argued that in regard to strategic thought, it is constrained to time and place (Aron 1970). According to Aron, "[s]trategic thought draws on its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose" (1970, 25). Gray's perspective however is that "those equipped with a Clausewitzian understanding of the nature of war and the function of strategy can turn their minds to the details of the problem of the hour" and claimed that "strategic theory is about education, not training or doctrine" (2006, 2). Gray wrote his principles of war, predominately distilled from Clausewitz's theory of war and the enduring nature of war. Gray's dictums, in descending order, are: "War is a political act conducted for political reasons"; "There is more to war than warfare"; "There is more to strategy than military strategy"; "War is about peace, and sometimes vice versa"; and "Style in war-fighting has political consequences" (2006, 86). The sixth dictum is of particular note for the focus of this and remaining chapters: "War is caused, shaped, and driven by its

contexts" (2006, 86). The many explanations provided for the causes of war provides in particular the political-historical contextual placement of Australia's wars of choice and the research seeks to identify them for their significance as to whether a strategic disconnect existed between the political decision for war, its strategic outlook, and strategic approaches.

In the twenty-first century, war and conflict continue to present challenges to the state and its military power. An ever more complex security environment has developed due to the changing character of war, expansion of capabilities across the five domains of warfare and aggressive major powers. The significance of war is that it represents the most extreme expression of physical violence that can be employed by one state against another. The means of kinetic violence can be delivered across a multitude of means and platforms. That can be from conventional weapons and various operating systems across all domains of warfare. Illegal and non-conventional weapons also form both the official and non-official arsenal and stockpiles of states and major powers alike. They include, but are not limited to, cluster munitions and land mines through to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Newer disabling and killing systems are constantly in development and include semi- and yet to be realised fully automated weapons systems, lasers, and concentrated sound and thermal weapons. Future war will be further impacted by the arrival of Artificial Intelligence (AI), which could deliver fully autonomous weapons systems. Such a development has been likened to, after gunpowder and the atomic bomb, as the "Third Revolution in Warfare" (Walsh 2018). Through the development of robotics (Singer 2018), AI and "algorithmic warfare", the character of war will again be revolutionised (McFate 2019, 50). Ryan (2019, 35) noted that "as artificial intelligence starts to be applied to tactical activities across the land, sea, air, cyber and space domains, it will start to change the balance of power in tactical military endeavours." The cumulative impact is that "a marginal technological advantage in AI is likely to have a disproportionate effect on the battlefield" (Payne 2018, 35).

This chapter conducts a systematic literature review on the arguments on the causes of war. The different perspectives provide multiple reasons for the conditions and circumstances for war. The phenomenon of war has remained ageless and poses a significant, constant threat to the security of the state. War, both as concept and physical reality, requires states to accept its persistent presence in global politics and

the international system. The preparation for the likelihood of future war is always based on contingent yet variable factors. However, its presence remains, and the risk of war always becomes heightened when global security events can point to the possibility of future war between the major powers. Since 2014, authoritarian powers such as the Russian Federation and PRC have shown a willingness to use military power to assert their state and challenge the RBGO. Future war, despite specific causes for its outbreak between the major powers, may start with conventional weapons and be theatre-specific, though escalation always remains possible. That escalation could include its geographical reach, weapons type employed and kinetic impact. This chapter explores the causes of war because of its direct relationship to the state and its role and responsibilities in such times for the defence of its sovereignty, national interests, and citizens.

3.2 Classical realist explanations

Historians, political philosophers, and strategist have studied war since antiquity. Sun Tzu, Herodotus, Thucydides, Pericles, Xenophon, Marcus Aurelius, Scipio Africanus, Tacitus, and Plutarch are a small yet significant sample of those who represented early intellectual endeavours to describe, distil and explain the essence of power, the use of force and strategy. These foundational thinkers on history, politics and strategy studied, contemplated, and chronicled lessons from their time whose legacy has informed the present. Violence has remained an unfortunate and unavoidable feature of global politics. A political-historical review can provide lessons learned that can be applied in readiness for current and future threats. This serves the development of the most appropriate strategy for the corresponding use of force to be readied, so that any such force posture in real time can counter threats, by deterrence, disruption, or destruction. This section examines the causes of war because it is indicative to the conditions in which a state might find itself in war. It is also a warning from the past that the state should be prepared and able with capabilities to conduct warfighting. Uncertainty is a feature of the anarchial international system, yet war is its permanent feature. It is incumbent on the state to develop a strategic logic to execute strategic approaches in war, and "that demands the ability to think strategically" (Heffington, Oler and Tretler 2019, 1).

The realist theoretical perspective is millennia-old, and at its core are the theoretical underpinnings provided by the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. Their seminal works came from a combination of observation, the lived experience and analysis of power, politics, and war. Their political writings provided frameworks for the analysis of power and the state, and informed how relations among other states could be explained and understood (Bull 1981, 717-18). These three foundational thinkers on power and theories about the causes of war proved central to the philosophical foundations of the realist tradition, as did another pre-twentieth century contributor to political realism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Williams 1989). Political realism in the twentieth century was joined by its own seminal works. They included Edward Hallett Carr (1939) and Hans Morgenthau (1948). Realist approaches were also employed by U.S. policymakers, with early important contributions from George F. Kennan (1951) and Henry Kissinger (1957). The growth of realism over successive decades saw realism become arguably the most dominant theoretical perspective within the study of international affairs (Glaser 2013). The significance of this theoretical approach is also its reach, whereby "the realist tradition has exercised an enormous influence over the field of security studies" (Jensen and Elman 2016, 18). Six variants of realism have been grouped by Jensen and Elman (2016) and are classical realism, neorealism, and four forms of contemporary realism; defensive structural realism, neoclassical realism, offensive structural realism, and rise and fall realism (Jensen and Elman 2016). The shared commonalities across the different variants of realism for explanations on war and conflict is their focus on power, fear, uncertainty, and anarchy (Griffiths, O'Callaghan, and Roach 2008, 295).

Politics is considered in this research as an expression of power as defined by Harold Laswell (1936) and Mearsheimer (2014). Politics and the actions taken by leaders is important for the protection of the state's vital interests. This action is linked to strategy as it "has been required throughout all of history, even though this need has been expressed with different emphases in particular places and periods" (Gray 2016, 43). Australia's strategic behaviour is expressed through political decisions for the role of military power and national security. The focus of this research is the institutional role of politics and military power, as that located respectively within the executive arm of parliament and the nation's military forces. With the development and execution of a strategic logic, a strategic situation that could present harm to the state

require analysis of the challenge and its context which it presents (Heffington, Oler and Tretler 2019). The roles of those institutions, along with those agencies and departments that represent the Australian Intelligence Community provide a whole-of-government approach to deal with threats. The actual commitment of force to a 'war of choice' to defend vital interests is always contextual on time and place, but is dependent on the fact that "war is political and certainly always about politics" (Gray 2016, 45).

Antiquity provides a starting point for the historical arc of a trajectory that continues to unfold across time. Innumerable violent actions by organised groups can be represented by religion, ethnic identity, political affiliation, and ideologies, which have been expressed more fully by the state, military power, and war. Thucydides, an Athenian military commander, historian, and author of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, asked what the causes of war were and concluded it can be located in honour, fear and interest (Thucydides 1998, 43). The imperfect characteristics of human nature are central to this explanation why the nature of war will remain unchanged over millennia (Thucydides 1998, 43). His historical narrative analysis of the Peloponnesian Wars is considered a classic that resonates "by virtue of the sharp political realism at its core" (Kindt 2017, para 37). From the realist perspective, it has stood as a sustained and cautionary tale of human nature and why states will continue to wield power through force.

The realist tradition draws its lineage from two-and-a-half millennia ago, with Thucydides as their founding father. Thucydides famously stated that his study on the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta was a "possession forever" which informed "what has happened and what will happen again…in the same or a similar way" (Kagan 1995, 1). Herodotus and "rationalism [did] not challenge his traditional piety" claimed Kagan (2000, 9). When compared against Thucydides and his rational analysis of human behaviour, as a product of the Greek enlightenment, it delivered "a spectacular leap into modernity" (Kagan 2000, 9). Thucydides (1998) viewed war as one that can result from the challenges posed by the rising power and the hegemon. He also provided insights into human nature and its consequential impact on conflict through the pursuit of power and avoidance of dominance by others (Murray 2013, 31). The shaping of the Peloponnesian War came from "alliances, competing perceptions, and geopolitics", the nature of war came from "the depths that men will

go to acquire, hold, and exercise power" (Gilchrist 2016, para 5). Over millennia, Thucydides remained a credible explanation for the causes and centrality of war, because "power is what matters" (Krasner 2009, 21). In the Melian Dialogue, he encapsulated that sentiment when he wrote that "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (Thucydides 1972, 402).

The significance of Thucydides continued over centuries and gave a particular relevance to the understanding of international relations in the twentieth century. At the commencement phase of the Cold War, a speech in 1947 by then U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall at Princeton University, noted that "basic international issues today" were not reviewed without the reflection on that of "the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens" (Kagan 2010, 1). Thucydides ongoing influence on politics and foreign affairs has continued into the current era and not just his view of the individual in society and their resultant behaviours in the wider *polis*, Thucydides can continue to be found on the reading list of many war colleges and military academies, such as the *Australian Army Reading List for 2019* (Foster 2018, 3). Applicable to the contemporary strategic environment, past applications of Thucydides writings as an explanation for the causes of war provide an insight and warning for what major power competition can mean to the security of states and their region. Despite advances in human rights, improvements in measurable life outcomes, and the growth of civil society, major power competition in the twenty-first century characterises relations among states.

At the strategic level, the concept of 'Thucydides Trap' as advanced by Allison (2015, 2017) describes the balance of power struggle that exists between an emerging power with an established power(s), or that between existing powers. The Thucydides Trap is what results when an environment of fear and mistrust between rival powers could result in war (Allison 2017). There are two main drivers which characterise this powerful interaction between powers. First, the rival power on the rise has a sense of entitlement, pursues greater influence, and is buoyed by rising self-confidence (Allison 2015). The second feature is how the established power is challenged and prepared to respond to maintain the status quo (Allison 2015). Underlining those two drivers is the speed in which this challenge occurs between two rivals. Presently, the multipolar world is characterised by the continued economic rise of the PRC, whose ascendency as a great power is being translated into greater strategic and military capabilities.

The Thucydides Trap is a realist frame of reference that has been applied to explain the dynamic of China's continued rise and placement as a direct rival to the U.S. (Brzezinski 2014; Allison, 2015). The inevitability of a Thucydides Trap-style confrontation was earlier rejected by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2015 during on an official state visit to the U.S. (Tiezzi 2015). The phrase of 'New Type of Major Power Relations' has been a term used by Xi to describe great power rivalry which can co-exist peacefully exist and avoid war, despite increased U.S.-China tensions (Byun 2016). However, Er argued that this is "peaceable rhetoric", especially when U.S. East Asian allies, such as Japan in the East China Sea region, and the South China Sea claimant states of The Philippines and Malaysia are all being challenged (2016, 42-43). The Chinese rhetoric may be designed to avoid confrontation, Er argued that it is logical for both powers to avoid conflict but China's ally on the Korean Peninsula and U.S. allies near the East and South China Seas as well as across the Taiwan Strait, which may "unleash a chain of events that drags the great powers into a war just like the allies of Sparta and Athens" (2016, 37). The possible conflagration of any of those four Asian flashpoints could do more to threaten global order than any other regional rivalry (Taylor 2018).

3.3 War as power politics

The end of the Cold War did not see the abolition of major power rivalry, nor the ongoing potentiality for future war. What remained was the constancy of war and conflict. During the twenty-first century's second decade, the constant fearful presence that states have to contend with is the geo-political realities that are dictated by the international system that continues to have the ever-present threat of war by major (and middle) powers, some equipped with nuclear weapons and attendant delivery systems. The third decade of the current century presents an increased pessimistic assessment of the likelihood of a future war between major powers (Kilcullen 2021). If a major power war were to occur between the U.S. and the PRC, it would pay historic homage to the ongoing presence of the Thucydides Trap (Allison 2017; Rudd 2022). Furthermore, if such a catastrophic event were to occur, it would be defined by escalation, both in the number of nations directly and indirectly involved. A future war between major powers in an armed struggle between ascendancy and decline would be shaped by the possible escalation of the type of weapons unleashed. The Cold War

concluded in peace, an outcome that had mercifully devolved to use of nuclear weapons however, while no major military confrontation occurred between the superpowers, a future war between nuclear-armed major powers means the use, albeit limited, of nuclear weapons remains a viable military option for some nuclear-armed states and their decision-makers.

The realist perspective was also emboldened by the work of Machiavelli, whose insights into the causes of war are that the state must always pursue self-interest, which provided the foundation for its *raison d'état* (Hale 1969, 32-33). It was during the late fifteenth-century and early sixteenth century that the state began to secure its essential purpose, which allowed it to operate an autonomous set of principles and values which ran counter to church-based religious morality and individual conscience of late Renaissance Europe (Hale 1969, 23). The state's approach towards the protection and promotion of its interests can be surveyed by the way it conducts its affairs with other states, as well as non-state actors. During Machiavelli's lifetime, the role of a politician underwent great change, due in part to the once unitary European structure, a diarchic system with the Holy Roman Emperor managing the political affairs while the Pope conducted the spiritual and religious matters, altered the relationship between church and state (Bachrach and Bachrach 2017). One result was the realisation that a state's direction was within their own power construct, and that it "could be advanced by purely national self-interest" (Hale 1969, 23).

This secularist view of politics led many state leaders thereafter, such as Bismarck and Hitler, for their self-justification of policies and actions that led their country directly to war (Hale 1969, 33). This perspective has been followed by many state leaders, who has had legitimised their decision-making that will lead to war is underpinned by the realisation that to protect their way of life and its citizens requires use force on occasion. Over the centuries, much moralising and critiquing has been made of Machiavelli's writings, yet a dispassionate assessment of his work should be seen as the "pugnacious common sense of Machiavelli the man" (Hale 1969, 33). Any state which can grasp the centrality of self-interest as its *raison d'état* will invariably seek a strategy that correspondingly allows it to deal with innumerable threats posed by an anarchical global system, especially one characterised by major power competition. That self-interest should be expressed as national interests and protected

by a strategic approach that ensures an effective whole-of-government approach to national security.

Machiavelli's *The Prince* has been labelled "dogmatic, extreme and epigrammatic" (McHale 1969, 23). However, if read in isolation to another of his works, *The Art of War*, it negates the influence he had not just on the state but military affairs. Importantly, Machiavelli advised "there is simply no comparison between a man who is armed and one who is not" (2003, 48). Therefore, his advice offered to the ruler is that they must pay attention to a broad suite of factors, which included: mental and physical aspects of warfare, which included leadership; command; troop preparation; doctrine; training; geography; understanding local conditions; and the application of arms (Machiavelli 2003, 48-49). Machiavelli also gave the study of history an important place in the intellectual pursuit of a ruler, with a special focus to those conflicts from antiquity. As Hale argued, Machiavelli was practical, but his reading of history gave insight "because it could teach" (1969, 24). He exhorted rulers to intellectually understand the reasons for history's victories and defeats, to allow them to "avoid the latter and imitate the former" (Machiavelli 2003, 49). Complacency, arrogance, and hubris are enemies of empire and state. For Machiavelli, the mental and physical activities must be pursued by a ruler in peacetime so that "when his fortunes change, he will be found ready to resist adversity" (2003, 49).

3.4 The Hobbesian state of nature

The fear and insecurity presented by war and conflict has long plagued humankind. The Hobbesian state of nature is famously recorded as that "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes [1651] 2018, Chapter X111, para 9). Like Thucydides, Hobbes too outlined three main causes for war. For Hobbes however, the three "principal causes of quarrel" were competition, diffidence, and glory (Hobbes [1651] 2018, Chapter XIII, para 6). He further explained that men invade another's territory under the notion of "competition" for gain; that "diffidence" is done for safety; and that "glory" is undertaken in the interests of reputation (Hobbes [1651] 2018, Chapter X111, para 7). Accordingly, he wrote that a "common power to keep them in awe" was required as without it, all humans remain in a condition of war. (Hobbes [1651] 2018, Chapter

XIII, para 9). The Hobbesian materialist view did not subscribe to the existence of a natural order or a single, simple solution to the multitude of political problems that humankind faced (Minogue 1969, 56). Rather, his telling of the state of nature included the observation that the existence of inequality did not bring superiority or immunity to those in positions of power as they remained privy to the destructive rage of others, yet it was the construction and establishment of sovereign authority that could deliver an "objective rule of right and wrong" (Minogue 1969, 59).

The association of Hobbes with the realist perspective has been aided by his statement in *Leviathan* that the "state of nature as a state of war" may have been considered a "novel and original idea" (Merriam 1907, 152). Merriam claimed that Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and John Milton all predate this concept (1907, 152). However, such a statement by Hobbes has seen him cast as the "archetypal realist" (Moloney 2011, 190). Interestingly, Hobbes made very few direct statements about inter-state war and instead, his references to war were linked to the state of nature where he considered it was every man against one another (Hobbes [1651] 1996, 96). Hobbes focused more on civil war, concerned that from it came nothing but "slaughter, solitude, and want of all things" ([1651] 1983, 8). What can be drawn from this is that the fear and insecurity remains in different forms in contemporary times, with a selection of security threats expanded to include traditional and non-traditional, conventional and unconventional, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic. The state maintains its place in contemporary times as that entity citizens hold responsible for security and their protection against, though not exclusively, inter-state threats.

There have been challenges to the realist interpretations of Hobbes, yet this school of thought has him firmly ensconced within scholarship on international relations. Hobbes provides International Relations scholars with a theory of politics and is referenced in both "logical and descriptive terms" (Yurdusev 2006, 305). Many twentieth-century realist scholars openly declared their shared lineage with Hobbes, included Carr (1939) and Morgenthau (1946, 1948). Some forthright declarations, such as Forde (1992, 75), claimed Hobbes as a "founder…and a principal contributor" of classical realism. Bull stated Hobbes contribution to international political thought offered an explanation behind the "the attainment of international peace and security more difficult" but the Hobbesian proposition of particular value for realists is that the state of nature is that of a state of war (1981, 718; 720). That constant state of being,

has Hobbes share with Thucydides the concept of fear as both rational and a "prime motive" for action, as it impacted "states all the time" (Bull 1981, 721-22).

The Hobbesian view of international relations and his lineage with realism has come under challenge. Armitage (2006) claimed Hobbes's contribution added nothing to international relations until it was co-opted by realist scholars during the early to mid-twentieth century period. Malcom (2002, 452) affirmed such a position, and claimed much of Hobbes writing is actually present in "what modern theorists describe as an 'international society': shared practices, institutions and values." Further, Jahn (1999) argued Hobbes contributed to this field of study well before he was claimed by realists as one of their founders. While Hobbes unknowingly gave international realism the concept of anarchy, his theorising on the state of nature, savagery in the New World and the omission to not accord non-European societies with sovereign state status all came in for later criticism (Moloney 2011). According to Hodgen (1964), it amounted to a judgment that cruelly placed indigenous peoples in a subservient and lowly position. Moffit and Sebastian criticised Hobbes for his "sweeping philosophical devaluation of untamed American savagery" (1996, 284-85). Further, Nichols claimed the conceptualisation of the "state of nature" gave a representation that "symbolically, and politically defeat the Amerindian peoples" (2005, 46). For Moloney (2011, 189), such Hobbesian "cultural stereotypes" unfairly devalued indigenous peoples. Cumulatively, these scholarly views claim the Hobbesian influence deliver negative implications for many peoples, one that continues in the contemporary period.

Peace has historically remained in a precarious and fragile condition. Paradoxically, it is during a period of prolonged peace that it tends to be forgotten that the reason why the state and its structure is in place is for the protection of its citizens and national interests. This is especially so in liberal democracies where the legitimacy accorded by its citizens for the allocation of revenue for force, and its occasional use, can be challenged at elections. The Hobbesian view in an "age of doubt" is that while the main threat of political danger lies not always with government but with "the behaviour of peoples", one can realise that the "business of politics is peace, and that those who believe that politics is for enforcing truth will achieve neither truth nor peace" (Minogue 1969, 65). Minogue claimed that *Leviathan* not only allows an understanding of major power behaviour but provides a challenge to the Marxist view that the state will ultimately wither away. Tellingly, Minogue's Hobbesian-inspired

warning is that "our modern plural societies contain elements of a divided sovereignty which cannot be easily held together" (1969, 66).

The diffidence argument was another interpretation of the Hobbesian explanation for the main cause of war (McNeilly 1968). This formalised approach worked "out the structure of the reasonable calculations" (McNeilly 1968, 164-65). Under conditions of anarchy and uncertainty, the state can formulate responses to the potential actions of others, which leaves the incentive a state to act first. Hence, in this calculated approach, it is driven not primarily by malevolence or hate but the advantages that come from pre-emption, especially when the true motivations of another are uncertain but considered a most likely course of action. In turn, such an approach based on the assessment of the motivations of other states is a security dilemma all states face (Glaser 1977). This is another element of the structural realist argument, which claims that power politics and war are key to understanding relations among states. Kavka (1983, 298-99) argued that Hobbes did not contemplate a third option outside the binary relationship of threat or the benign and neutral behaviour by others. Kavka (1983) argued that any notion of a "third way", an option that is possible from coalition or alliance arrangement which acted in the interests of mutual survival, did not exist in a state of nature.

Contemporary counter arguments have been offered to that which would otherwise describe a world plagued by ceaseless security threats. According to Pinker (2011, 283), "the logic of Leviathan" and his invocation of Elias's (2000) "civilizing process" happened during the age of sovereignty, which meant wars were "becoming less frequent but more damaging". Pinker (2011) acknowledged that for most of the past millennia, European history was characterised by almost constant warring between various organised political units (individuals and clans are left out of this categorisation) and its global nadir came with devastating proportions. During the twentieth century, approximately 55 million people were killed from 1933 until the end of the Second World War (1939-45) (Pinker 2011, 283; 299-300). However, the period since 1945 has been considered the 'Long Peace', a result from fewer inter-state wars. Pinker (2011) claimed the reasons for that included "Democratic Peace"; better defined state borders; presence of a nuclear balance of terror; and the rise of liberal states. Similarly, Goldstein (2011, 15) added U.S. hegemony, capitalism, and

the feminisation of politics as other causal effects on the reduction of the incidence of warfare.

Since the decline of the Hobbesian state of nature, one that had existed approximately 5,000 years ago until more recent centuries, the rise of the state-Leviathan arrangement of human groupings into social units, has led to a corresponding decrease in violent mortality (Gat 2013, 150). Studies by Levy (1983b), Keeley (1996), LeBlanc (2003) and Gat (2006) all supported the view that the trajectory of violent mortality has decreased over time. Gat (2013) supported Pinker's (2011) proposition that there are two main reasons for the decrease over time in violent deaths: first, a state-Leviathan approach enforced internal peace among its citizenry; second, lower mobilisation rates meant fewer citizens came into direct contact with war. Muchembled (2012) advanced a similar view to Pinker, who argued that the retreat of medieval anarchy and the correspondent rise of state-Leviathans across Europe gave rise to internal authority and forms of official justice that led to a reduction in violent behaviour.

An earlier assessment undertaken by Gurr (1981) also argued that this took place across parts of Europe, especially where Enlightenment humanitarianism had been established. This stands at odds with Levy and Thompson (2012), whose view is that the rise of the state resulted in greater numbers of violent deaths but decreased over the past two centuries. Similarly, another counterpoint is that by Mann, who argues that "war has not declined, and current trends are slightly in the opposite direction" (2018, 37). For Mann (2018), war's transformation can largely be sourced from the North. He claimed that war, technology, and long-range weaponry "especially in the North, [went] from being 'ferocious' to 'callous' in character" (Mann 2018, 37). Pinker labelled Hobbes as an "inquisitive psychologist" but one whose "deliberate application of reason was necessary precisely because our common habits of thought are not particularly reasonable" (2018, 9). Pinker added philosophical thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, and economist Adam Smith, alongside Hobbes as those "all too aware of our irrational passions and foibles. They insisted that it was only by calling out the common sources of folly that we could hope to overcome them (2018, 8-9). The presence of violence in human nature and its expression as war at the state-level may challenge reason but its continued outbreaks warrant preparation against it.

3.5 Multi-disciplinary arguments on war

War as a phenomenon of societal behaviour and interaction, remains an ongoing feature of human society, across global politics and within the international system. In contrast to the realist interpretation for the cause of war, a survey of theoretical approaches and explanations from different disciplines are provided in this section. In seeking the cause of war, Grayling cautioned that "few occurrences of any kind have single causes" (2017, 2). The "causal complexity" behind the release of destructive violence can be predicated on a host of inter-related factors, one where war "might reveal whether there are underlying commonalities" (Grayling 2017, 3). Grayling claims war is "the armed conflict between states or nations, or between identified and organised groups of significant size and character" (2017, 139). This section's broadened purview on various multi-disciplinary and theoretical approaches on the causes of war is that while "there are many definitions of war, but no unified view" (McLean and McMillan 2003,564). The research in this dissertation remains bounded by the cause of war from classical realism and its roots in human nature Definitionally, war is also framed as that waged by one or more states against another, or others, or against a non-state actor that operates within the jurisdiction of another state.

Research conducted by Blainey (1973) on the causes of war surveyed international wars fought over a 300-year period (1700-1970) and identified key determinates for why nations fight one another. Blainey claimed that it "was the study of history" which offered "essential clues towards an understanding of war" (1973, ix). Through "the abacus of power" one could locate the various outcomes from the "way in which praise, blame and partisanship produce misleading theories of war" (Blainey 1973, vii). Blainey viewed war as an old problem but in a more modern and nuanced way, because peace as a concept had both its weaknesses and few supporting studies, but that the "outbreak of peace provides a mechanism that helps explain the cause for war" (1973, viii).

The analysis of wars conducted by Blainey (1973) through a historical time frame of three centuries covered the entire period of the industrial revolution, as well as several decades that lead into that historical epoch. While he acknowledged that the barrier between international war and civil war was "misty" and led Blainey to classify the American Civil War (1861–65) as an international war (1973, ix). Interestingly,

given the broad historical survey of his analysis for the causes of war, Blainey also downplayed some altogether as being too minor to be classified as such. One example was the Malayan-Indonesian War (1963-66), known in Australia as Confrontation (or '*Konfrontasi*'), determined its categorisation in that research because its death toll was limited to "only" 740 soldiers (Blainey 1973, ix). Australia's military involvement resulted in the loss of 23 soldiers during that campaign (AWM 2022c). That conflict is explored later as part of the political-historical arc of Australia's expeditionary use of armed force.

The study of war by Blainey (1973, 1988) was based on the premise that "one of the most dangerous fallacies" is that war's causes and its actual events can be put into separate compartments "and reflect different principles" (Blainey 1973, 109). He argued that tendency in International Relations was to view the balance of power as the cause for war which gave it "the soothing sound of the panacea" that comes from a "respectable concept" (1973, 109). His analysis came with an assessment that the Cold War's balance of terror was a better approach than the then dominant view that it was the result of a balance of power (Blainey 1973). That conceptual analysis of the balance of terror proved a factor that helped the Cold War superpower nuclear rivalry remain in relative check until the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union. The number of nuclear-armed powers and states have increased since the end of the Cold War and a version of the balance of has terror has remained as a feature of the anarchial international system.

There are any number of strategic factors which lead to war, but then there are those which can contribute to its escalation. What can start as a limited, or low-intensity war, has the potential to cross over into a major war. Such escalation can result when other states are drawn into the fray, with the deployment of military forces, which may spread out from the original region from which it began, as well as the employment of different weapon systems, and targets. A state which is drawn into an active role in war can ultimately prove to be not just protracted. Involvement in war can prove costly in terms of reputation, status, personnel, and materiel. Another element for consideration by a state, such as Australia, in the deployment of force to serve in war, is its current operational tempo, what it capabilities it can add, as well as the current and evolving intensity of said deployment. Added is the political objectives and expectations that the deployment of force is expected to deliver. That requires a

clear strategic overview of how the state wants to employ force overseas, and how that fits into an overarching strategic approach that aligns with the force in-being, and yet adapt to changes, whether at the strategic or operational-level.

A society's willingness to fight is framed in this research by the state as the unitary actor, and its military power, which comprises members of its citizenry and serve in the interests of the state. A nineteenth century conservative view of war and the role of military power is that it was considered as a social good. According to Buckle (1857), the "decline of the warlike spirit in Western Europe" came as a result of "the progress of knowledge and intellectual activity" (cited in Blainey 1973, 20). Political economist Cairnes (1871) held the view that "all the leading currents of modern civilization" drove society towards peace (cited in Silberner 1946). Silberner explained that Cairnes realised that a certain amount of militarism was required but states development of militias should only be for resistance and defence purposes, thereby limiting their ability to fight aggressive wars as they only "end in failure" (Silberner 1946, 67). Such idealism from a liberalist perspective viewed that the seeds of war could be in "ignorance and misunderstanding" (Blainey 1973, 21). Blainey stated how this misguided "faith in the progress and in the goodness of man" would constantly produce an explanation for the cause of war being nothing but a tragic accident (1973, 23).

Rationality and its practice of reason and logical discussion spawned corresponding actions that were considered would produce a peaceful society. Nef (1963) argued that the nineteenth century was built on traditions of the previous century, though ongoing incorporation of laws, customs, and European culture produced for a sustained period of relative peace. That perspective however does not account for the actions of European powers who used military force for colonial expansion and consolidation, and to dominate over intra-state dissent and armed insurgencies. Nef (1963) argued the rise of militarist cultures eroded cultural influences, with the consequence that European states diverted increasing amounts of resources to their military, which became a causal factor for war in 1914.

The rejection of "crude biological determinism" has countered views and explanations on the inevitability of war. Horgan (2012) claimed similarly the research by Levy and Thompson that warfare and violent deaths had decreased over time. Gat (2013, 155) argued Horgan's claims were "fatuous", his major criticism being

"extensive warfare" had long been widespread since pre-state times, well before the agricultural revolution. Gat (2013, 155) also likened Horgan to an earlier claim, and similarly dismissed, by anthropologist Margaret Mead (1940), who believed "war was an addictive invention". The significance of this viewpoint is that it simplifies the notion of war as an invention. Such a premise implies war can simply be 'unlearned'. Mueller (1989) shared a similar viewpoint, who claimed war's decline during the period prior towards what would be marked by the end of the Cold War, was due to a changes in societal attitude. Specific details on what lead to those changes societal changes were imprecise. However, decades on from such scholarship, the presence of war remains, and the likelihood of conflict between the major powers is in ascendancy.

A revisionist viewpoint on the cause of war is based on the lack of a common framework around language and its meanings (Tuck 1989, 1998). That perspective claims the cause of war is grounded in the "lack of a common moral language" whose solution can be found in having "an authoritative mechanism for governing moral language used in social interaction" (Abizadeh 2011, 299). An "authoritative mechanism" however, does not exist in an anarchical world to moderate relations among states, despite globalisation and advances in information communication technologies and related platforms, as well as efforts by multilateral institutions such as the UN and the International Criminal Court. The centrality of the state in the anarchial international system, and the role of major powers within that structure, continue to demonstrate that the use of military power may be only slightly ameliorated by dominant norms shaped by a RBGO that is consistently contested by powers such as the Russian Federation and the PRC.

Mathematical models have contributed to the debate over the causes of war, thereby offering another means to analyse the source of conflict. The statistical approach as an explanatory tool for the identification of the causes behind war and conflict can be found in the research by Wright (1942), during the immediate post-1945 period by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), and later by Richardson (1960; 1960b) and Schelling (1960). A systematic and statistical-based approach was first conducted by Richardson (1919), whose research was based on applied psychology and mathematics, and began with the publication of *The Mathematical Psychology of War* (1919). That initial research applied a traditional "application of mathematics in the social sciences" and became one of the first that employed it towards a systematic

study of war (Richardson 1961). That pamphlet debunked a then dominant view that a shared language prevented war.

After the Second World War, Richardson's research on the causes of war continued a quantitative approach to gather and interpret statistical data from a sample of wars and conflicts during 1820-1949. The first publication was *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (1960), followed by *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War* (1960b). The data from the first 1960 published study grouped together a "large scale example" from which he apprised the presumptive causes of wars and conflicts as "deadly quarrels" (Wilkinson 1980). The second text used data collected from his previous volume and applied it again to mathematical models, an approach labelled "deterministic models of conflict behaviour" (Richardson 1961). Wilkinson (1980) noted that Richardson (1960b) saw the fault with many previous studies on war was their single-causal approach, which limited the cause to war onto one all-encompassing factor that came at the expense of other important fields of research, which he ranked in descending order of importance as psychology, economic and geographic. That assessment saw multidisciplinary approaches enriched attempts to understand the causes of war. Similarly, strategic and defence studies may have "no clear parameters, and it relies on arts, sciences, social sciences for ideas and concepts" however, it is a subject with a sharp focus – the role of military power" (Baylis and Wirtz 2019, 5). While military power on its own may not always be the cause of war, it is what launches and conducts one.

Psychological reasons provide another grouping for the causes of war. The Preamble to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has states "since wars begin in the minds of men" (1945, 2), war is viewed as a manifestation of the more negative aspects of the human conditions, base thoughts, desires and emotions, all of which are expressed through violence and harm. According to Morgenthau (1948), realism has a relationship with psychology, as it has a central concern with evil and power which can be found at the core of human nature. It can then be extrapolated to an international level where there are fewer limitations and inhibitions between states. The desire to investigate war and its causes has been a strident academic pursuit in biological and social sciences, each standing at opposite poles of the nature versus nurture debate, yet are accompanied by a host of academic disciplines that include Anthropology, Sociology, Justice Studies, and Criminology.

Criminology provides another disciplinary approach for perspectives on the causes of war. Research by Gloyd and Leal (2018) claimed that people may take direction into reputable occupations, such as U.S. armed forces, can have a positive influence on the behaviour and life direction of delinquent youths. Earlier research in criminology by Laub and Sampson (1993) argued that the age-graded theory of informal social control is a developmental theory of crime, which studied people's choices and consequential life trajectories, and the different life outcomes that resulted. Later research by Laub and Sampson (2003) found employment and marriage were the two important turning points for people, and in the case of delinquents, it offered them a new structured routine and pro-social bonds that resulted in "desistance" from offending and criminality. In comparison to the state as a unitary body of analysis, disciplinary approaches study their subject matter across a range of sample sizes and controls. What it highlights that there is often seen that the conditions of the individual can have an impact on positive or negative life outcomes. The multi-disciplinary approaches can engage at either end of the nature versus nurture argument but in the classical realist tradition, the actions of state and military power are driven by their leaders, individuals who are driven human nature.

Different analytical approaches provide alternative perspectives and definitions. Security and national security are no different. The discipline of Security Studies and its various strands and schools of thought began its development into its own distinct and comprehensive field of scholarship. In doing so, it distinguished an array of security threats that moved away from the traditional concept of the state and war. It moved from a narrow scope on the material over the ideational, and expanded beyond the primacy of the state, military power and the use of force (Walt 1991; Kolodziej 1992). The demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War provided a changed strategic environment that saw the notion of what constituted a security threat begin to include more fully the individual, group, and non-state actor (Kolodziej 1992b). That analytical approach allowed for the inclusion of security threats beyond just the military, such as the political, economic, social, environmental. For Katzenstein (1996), the post-Cold War environment allowed for norms, identities, and culture to become more central factors in what affected national security.

The immediate post-Cold War period brought new theoretical approaches that sought to not only inform, but challenge traditional conceptual understandings of the

previous era, as well as what was likely to unfold. The new paradigm shift that occurred had its international norms coalesce around a rules-based system that would be termed in the twenty-first century as the RBGO. Meanwhile, change and transformation in the post-Cold War strategic environment heralded new theoretical approaches to explain the end of the bi-polar, geo-political global system and the rise of security studies. They sought to challenge realism and its central focus on power. Katzenstein was clear that while he did "not offer a theory of national security" (1996, 5), he pursued an approach that was "'defining,' not 'defending' the national interest" (1996, 2). Supported by earlier research from Johnston (1996), Herman (1996) and Berger (1996), Katzenstein stated how their contribution sought to "redress the extreme imbalance between structural and realist styles of analysis and sociological perspective on questions of national security" (1996, 5). Katzenstein specifically identified "two underattended determinants of national security policy: the cultural-institutional context of policy on the one hand and the constructed identities of states, governments, and other political actors" (1996, 4). Sociological institutionalism was the theoretical approach for the examination of those determinants (1996, 4).

Context is an important element in framing the subject being researched. The institutional perspective allowed for an investigation of "the context, both domestic and international, in which states and other actors exercise power" (Katzenstein 1996, 2). This perspective had been earlier undertaken by Powell and DiMaggio (1991), and Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth (1992). Katzenstein outlined his pursuit was to address "the uncertainties that mark international relations scholarship" (1996, 4). His position was that the analysis "through the sociological use of such concepts as norms, identity and culture as summary labels to characterise the social factors" and that "these factors result from social processes, purposeful political action, and differences in power capabilities" (Katzenstein 1996, 5). For Katzenstein, the international security environment could be understood by an emphasis on "culture and identity as important determinants of national security policy" (1996, 499). This provided an alternative conceptualisation of what constituted international relations and security as well as the means by which to assess those identified determinates and factors.

3.6 Causal factors for war: hubris to misperception

The temptation rests on a single theory approach, for a single causation behind the cause of war. Such an over-simplification is insufficient to account for the phenomena that is war (Sobek 2009). As previous sections have outlined, different disciplines have provided their explanations for the causes of war. There are many multidisciplinary approaches and theoretical perspectives that compete and contest the causes for war, however an in-depth examination of them is outside the scope of this research. Studies into the causes of war however do illustrate the importance of understanding factors which then influence a state's decision to go to war. There is not always a single lineal, directional pathway behind such decision making. It is also not contingent on a finite set of factors which always dictate the eventual determination of a state's use of its military power in war, regardless of whether those capabilities are offensive or defensive in orientation.

There are several single cause explanations for war and a small sample include "systemic distribution of resources" (Waltz 1979), "power transition" (Organski and Kugler 1980), and "disagreements over the distribution of capabilities" (Blainey 1988). Single cause explanations for war lack a certain depth to the complexity that exists behind the outbreak of war between states. In doing so can exclude other equally important and plausible factors and conditions. The complexities behind the decision taken by a state's leadership can have war placed firmly between "rationality and irrationality" (Sobek 2009, 1). However, to understand war as a phenomenon requires not only the identification of "risk factors" but whether a state was rational if it only applied force sparingly and with "conditionality" (Sobek 2009, 2). Sobek claims that many single cause explanations actually "all represent risk factors that are important to any analysis of international conflict" (2009, 2). Perspectives that provide a single cause for war are deterministic, simplistic, and naive. They are also generally case specific.

The causes of war have long occupied multidisciplinary attention to explain its outbreak and prevalence. North's assessment is a legitimate one in that he argued: "The circumstances and details will differ between the Peloponnesian War and World War I or War II; but the sources, patterns, and generalized consequences of anxieties, fears, and perceptions or expectations of threat, injury, or annihilation may not be dissimilar" (1967, 103). Holsti, Brody and North (1969) argued that the First World

War was a prime example of the accidental war, an assessment shared by Taylor (1969) in *War by Timetable*. Further, in the case of the First World War, conditions for war came from the escalation of the crisis through alliance *blocs* and their political decisions that resulted in military actions, were Clark argued, that "without the blocs, the war could not have broken out in the way that it did" (2012, 124). The mapping of a state's foreign policy in the nineteenth century, and the creation of the alliance system led to what Martel described as "changes in what is usually referred to the 'Balance of Power'" (2017, 16). It contributed to a global war that was characterised by the large-scale, industrialised warfare waged across the domains of land, sea and air that led to the deaths of millions of combatants and civilians.

Almost at the mid-point of the twentieth century saw a second global war fought to its conclusion, and was heralded the beginning of the nuclear age. The development of the atomic bomb and subsequent use in wartime against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 marked the arrival of what Brodie (1946) termed as "the absolute weapon". The Soviet Union tested its own nuclear device in 1949 and rose to become a major nuclear power rival throughout, both during and after the Cold War period. A more current situational assessment of that threat, presented to the U.S. Congress in January 2020, claimed: "While opportunistic, and possibly even reckless, the Putin regime does not appear to be suicidal" (Woolf 2020, 35). The technological advancement of nuclear weapons, and later thermonuclear weapons, meant its proliferation among several states during the First Nuclear Age (1945-1991) posed a dilemma for states (Walker 2011).

The impact on international security required new strategic approaches as to how war could be fought, how an appropriate strategy needed to be developed to accommodate the presence of such weapons, and how to prevent the escalation of war that could result in their far-reaching, destructive use. Schelling remarked that "nuclear warheads are incomparably more devastating than anything packaged before. What does that imply about war?" (2020, 18). Schelling stated non-nuclear means had long been available to destroy large parts of humanity, which "against a defenceless people there is not much that nuclear weapons can do that cannot be done with an ice pick" (2020, 19). For Schelling (2020, 20), the difference was "nuclear weapons can do it quickly. That makes a difference." The immense destructive power of nuclear weapons has been revolutionised since 1957 by technological advances and deployment of

automated supersonic weapon delivery systems, such as inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) (Hatzivassiliou 2020). The risk of their use by nuclear-armed powers and states can occur through miscalculation that leads to war, or escalation during war.

War can be used by states as an opportunity to create a major distraction from internal, domestic problems. This was one among many causal reasons where the phenomenon of war was compiled as part of Wright's *A Study of War* (1942), his *magnus opus* on the development of a systematic approach to understand the causes of war. Wright conceptualised war as problem, definitional, and its manifestations but argues that "in the broadest sense war is a violent contact of distinct but similar entities" (1942, 5). While not an original idea, one where states go to war to divert attention from domestic problems, it has been a causal factor not just decades before that publication, but decades since. One example is the 1982 invasion of the British overseas territory of the Falklands Islands, executed by the Argentinian military junta to deflect attention from their repressive internal policies, dire economic situation and the desire to rally domestic political support through the retaking of the Malvinas. Freedman (2017, 116) labelled the Falklands War as having "just passed the threshold of a conflict" though the miscalculation by the Argentinian military junta saw the UK government deploy a JTF some 8,000 miles from their homebases to positions in the South Atlantic Ocean region to conduct military operations that recaptured the Falklands Islands within three-months of its occupation.

Flawed decision-making by a state's national government and institutions can be shaped by biases, misperceptions and hubris about another state's military power can be underestimated or outright incorrect. Such assessments can also be about a state's national leader, the political and military leadership. A state that has been targeted by an aggressive state-actor or major power may be able to request and receive call support from allies and alliance partners. That level of political and military support in the face of adversarial state actions through armed warfare may be available from a major power, or a coalition of states. If an aggressive state's decision-making process for going to war fails to forecast the level of support available to the state that it invaded, it could be based on several factors.

Hubris, according to Horne (2015), is a central factor for most wars fought throughout the twentieth century. In regards to the 2003 Iraq War, Fairweather (2011) argued that the involvement of the U.S. and her allies was steeped in hubris. To avoid

such wars, Fairweather argued "changing how decisions are made pre-deployment should only be the first step in overhauling how Britain goes to war. The military must discard the idea of a 'quick' war" (2011, 348). That is a lesson which Australian governments could also apply when involved in making the decision to deploy force to war. As Horner (2022, 390) emphasised, a "war leader's most important decision is whether to commit the nation to war." Other factors that can cause hubris among state leaders are incorrect assessments based on false or imprecise intelligence, as well as the motivations and intentions which can deliver a course of action that is based on an underestimation how on adversary will respond, as well as their actual military strength, warfighting capabilities, resources, national character, and political will; as well as international and domestic political support (Stoessinger 2001, 255-56).

Misperception by leaders and states is an ongoing issue in international relations. Jervis (1976) argued that world views are created by a combination of historical experiences, "cognitive consistency", deeply held belief systems as well as a desire to acquire something labelled as the truth. The problem for states is their attempt to determine from afar the intentions of another, and whether they can be construed as benign or otherwise. Jervis (1976) asserts that reality is complex, and the problems arise when decision makers seek to reduce factors to a false simplicity. Jervis later stated that his research on the relationship of perception and political psychology with international politics has a strong identification with constructivism, where "the overlap is greatest, but is not absent from the other two"; which refers to International Relations paradigms of realism and liberalism (2017, xxvi).

Misperception between nuclear armed major powers brings more risk to any decision for a major power to use the utility of force in war. Freedman pointed out, "to write on misperception assumes an ability to discern reality" (1978, 95). Also, as interchangeable terms, perception and misperception can represent the same outcome of a misread in an adversary's true intention against one's state and its national interests. That challenge has been present with U.S. and Chinese major power rivalry and is significant in that it forms how they perceive and construct threats in one another (Johnston and Shen, 2015). An earlier Cold War example that illustrates how misperception nearly led the world to nuclear annihilation. In 1983, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted *Exercise Able Archer* and the Soviet Union interpreted such activities in the context of other intelligence it had gathered and

through a process of confirmation bias, concluded that it all pointed towards a key component of the West's preparation to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the Russians (Jones 2016; Ambinder 2018). That Soviet's misperception of Western political and military activity saw Moscow come within hours of launching a pre-emptive nuclear attack (Downing 2018). This is but one example of the risk posed by miscalculation but remains a key factor as a cause for war.

While hubris and misperception are likely to deliver defeat, they remain causes for war in the twenty first century. Military and strategic assessments undertaken in the decision-making process for war can lend to an advantage being held with the aggressive state to take the initiative and launch an offensive war. This can often be considered the favourable position of a major power over a smaller state. However, a combination of hubris, misleading intelligence and misperception of an invaded state's willingness and ability to fight back may find the aggressor state involved in a prolonged military campaign. After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, a low-intensity armed conflict was waged against Ukraine in the Donbass region by Russia through proxy forces under false-flag operations. Russia conducted a grey-war campaign, or hybrid war, against Ukraine, which operated just under the threshold of outright war (Galeotti 2016). When Russia launched its illegal invasion and outright war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it was erroneously designated by the state as a "special military operation" (Gill 2022). It would have been apparent to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, his ministers and military commanders that the scale of the war would present numerous challenges to its military power and the state's very existence. However, despite being pitted against a numerically superior military that had launched offensive operations on three fronts, Ukraine continued to conduct military operations against seemingly overwhelming and insurmountable odds. Ukraine was in the position that it was an existential fight for the survival of their country. The causes behind that war were overtaken by the violent kinetic realities of warfighting and the conceptualisation of war again proved it was no longer one of speculation or theoretical abstraction, but violent reality.

Optimism is offered as a major reason why nations go to war (Blainey 1973; Stoessinger 2001). The rationale is that nations can hold the view that war can be short and decisive, delivering the protagonist with complete and total victory. The First World War is an example where the warring alliances held firm views on their

respective military's superior fighting capabilities. The political and military leadership were also emboldened by their "reservoir of conscious superiority", which compliant command staff reinforced that view (Blainey 1973, 41). That misplaced optimism prevented them from hearing what they needed to know and instead, cast away the counsel of doubt or concern, lest it be signalled as "the voice of the enemy" (Blainey 1973, 55).

The optimism present at the outbreak of the First World War arrived in part from Europe's recent historical precedent of decisive short wars. Additionally, the approach to war advocated by Clausewitz long influenced the Prussian-German approach to warfare, as well as the other great powers, such as Great Britain, France and Russia, all of whom embraced "the cult of the offensive" (Grayling 2017, 92). This perspective claimed that the advantage of an offensive approach to military campaigns is its strategy, "which is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the War" (Clausewitz 1984, 241). Therefore, the advantage lay with offensive warfighting which culminated in winning the decisive battle, whereas defence was considered the precursor to defeat (Clausewitz 1984).

False optimism is another side of the same coin that is 'optimism'. It is the foundation on which the cause for war can be considered why modern states would pursue that course of action, knowing that there are political and materiel risks. This factor has states go to war which. according to Van Evera, is "a potent and pervasive cause of war" (1999, 16). The motivation to be involved in warlike operations against an opponent, or alongside an ally, can be played out either by balancing or bandwagoning (Walt 1987). In regard to states cooperating together in the same military campaign, an aspect of alliance management will be discussed briefly later. It is an important aspect of the exploring the reason behind Australia's decision to participate alongside in U.S. led military operations during 1990–2014, which includes Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf region. However, if a state's decision to deploy force is misguided or misinformed, it may give the impression that victory can be both achievable and easy, and in turn will in turn shape the role, size, and type of its military commitment. This dissertation will determine what level the political and strategic factors shaped the decision going to 'wars of choice' in Iraq, and second, the size, type, and role of those ADF military deployments as a determinate of strategic misalignment between outlook and approach.

States may formally link with their allies in going to war if the premise presented is that victory will be swift and decisive. Such false optimism was present in the decision to launch U.S. led forces against Iraq in March 2003. This military commitment, a projection of force far from continental U.S., attracted only a few key allies, such as the UK, Australia and Spain, yet was largely rejected by most NATO member states such as Germany, France, Italy, and Canada (Kilcullen 2016). Those states which did participate in the pre-emptive invasion, and remained for varying periods in-theatre during the ensuing occupation of Iraq that finally ended in 2011, committed force based on their respective government's involvement during the pre-invasion crisis phase. The assumption was that if it came to an invasion of Iraq, it was calculated that regime change would occur quickly and result in a clear victory.

U.S. decision-makers and war planners sought a wartime victory that was framed by a view of its own exceptionalism, technological superiority, capitalisation of fighting against a politically and militarily fragile state, one that had been weakened by years of sanctions and embargo (Moeans 2004; Ricks 2006; Hixon 2016). Further, the exploitation of the unipolar moment and willingness to erode levels of global support that had been had garnered in the immediate post-9/11 period saw the U.S. eventually bypass UNSC endorsement for support and instead launch a pre-emptive invasion. That action was to prove a pyrrhic victory as regime change left a power vacuum that was exploited by the Sunni and Shi'a sectarian divide, anti-U.S. forces such as Iran, as well as terror groups such as *Al-Qaeda*. False optimism led to an eight-year quagmire of in-country fighting against hostile insurgencies and foreign fighters which devolved for a period into civil war.

False optimism can have disastrous results, both at the operational and strategic levels of war. It can also be formed from two positions. First, incorrect assessments about an opponent can be caused by intelligence failures. Misreading the real military competency can include false assessments of an opponent and the types of weapons they possess, numerical strength, national support, and the will to fight. This can result in grave consequences as the state or coalition of forces will then draw up their invasion and battle plans accordingly. It can mean less ground troops are deployed, and the way war is fought. In Iraq, it was initially pitched against conventional forces, yet the quick land battle soon became a counter-insurgency operation, one that the invading force did not envisage, and took years to refocus their military. This was in

response to the war they were fighting, rather than the one they had falsely hoped it would be. Second, ignorance of an opponent's military capabilities can be based on a state's self-belief of their own superiority, the very hubris which has undone many a fighting power. The dismissive contempt about an opponent's warfighting ability has resulted in many serious miscalculations about an opponent's ability to fight, not least of which can start with Thucydides account of the Athenian invasion of Sparta from 431–404 BCE (Thucydides 1972).

The existence for false optimism is based on two concepts, which according to Van Evera are "first-move advantage and offense dominance" (1999, 24). The first is caused by any state which hides its true military strength and because it cannot be readily assessed as being otherwise, is a behaviour of design to create conditions in their opponent that soften them into complacency, which then makes them vulnerable to a surprise attack (Van Evera 1999, 24). Second is the offense dominance approach, where states that maintain a tight veil of secrecy about their military strength so an adversary might under- or over-estimate their true fighting capabilities, which results in false assessments and drive to arm accordingly (Van Evera 1999, 24). Throughout the Cold War, incorrect assessments were made about the perceived numerical strength of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact's conventional forces. That vulnerability was popularised in the West and misread the actual balance of power that existed, which influenced strategic and defence policies, despite some available scholarship which outlined that this disparity had existed since the 1950s (Mearsheimer 1982), again during 1961-1969 (Enthoven and Smith, 1971) and throughout the 1970s and early 1980s (Evangelista 1982-83).

A state or power may have the military capability and political will to launch a surprise armed invasion or pre-emptive attack. On occasion, such a state-based action by its military forces can be considered a strategic surprise. The advantage gained from such an attack can be considered high stakes if it is not followed up soon after by the actual defeat of their opponent, and removal of them as military threat. A strategic surprise may pursue the political objective of the complete destruction of a state. In the case of Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Operation Barbarossa was the largest military invasion in history, with over three-million German troops deployed (Beevor 2012). The political and strategic desire for a quick military victory over Stalin's forces did not eventuate after German defeats at the

Battle for Moscow (1942), followed by Stalingrad (1943) and Kursk (1943), later culminated in their total defeat at the conclusion of the Battle of Berlin (1945) (Beevor 2012).

The Japanese had similarly conducted a surprise attack, on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 but did not deliver their planned total destruction of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet and its capital ships and aircraft carriers (Hyslop and Kagan 2021). The U.S. responded by entry into the Second World War on the side of the allies and began it military campaign against Imperial Japan, and when Nazi Germany unilaterally declared war on the superpower, it soon became a global war between all the world's major powers. This saw "the Americans favoured a 'direct' Germany-first approach to defeating the Axis powers, the British preferred the 'indirect' or 'peripheral' method'" but a review of Anglo-American strategic planning showed the British grand strategy (Golub 2022, 1). That approach "wasn't a strategy of annihilation, but instead consisting of encircling the Germans in a war of attrition before directly attacking the main force on the European continent" (Golub 2022, 19). The launch of a surprise attack is the result of an aggressive state's calculation for war, one that decides is based on the strategic advantage resides with sudden, offensive behaviour is often high-risk if outright victory is not secured soon after.

There are inherent risks contained in the strategic assessment process conducted by a state regarding their calculus for war. Indicators may determine that the act of war is the favour of the attacking state but once commenced, there is "historic difficulty of assessing wartime performance behaviour" (Gartner 1997, 2). The "battlefield can confuse decision makers" and according to Gartner, it is neither from pathology or some malignant force but that "this confusion may derive from organisations doing their jobs as best they know under difficult and uncertain conditions" (1997, 177). This indicates that state institutions and decision makers encounter limitations into their military's power once war commences, however "rather than being solved, this problem will become exacerbated by technology" (Gartner 1997, 177). The issue of their not being "pure information" in existence means that states are therefore influenced by a multitude of information and biases that become more pronounced when strategic assessments are made by states who possess nuclear weapons.

The bipolar superpower rivalry of the Cold War was explored early during that period by strategists such as Wohlstetter and Hoffman (1954), Wohlstetter (1959) and Schelling (1960). The post-1945 strategic environment was characterised by "crisis instability" and a "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" which mattered greatly as the real risks were evident by the nuclear-armed superpower rivalry. To remove a potential cause for war, stability theorists such as Snyder (1961) and Bull (1965) advocated for the removal of all surprise capabilities, which included proposed counterforce measures such as anti-ballistic missile systems. Critics of stability theory included Rosen (1981), Betts (1987), Gray (1979, 1980) and Gray and Payne (1985), all of whom made strident critiques in the dismissal of such a proposal as their argument was against the removal of surprise capabilities that came from nuclear weapons delivery systems such as ICBMs because it would have increased the risk of war. Wholstetter (1959) encapsulation of this risk in the *Delicate Balance of Terror*, and the superpower doctrinal concept of Mutually Assured Destruction remained a norm for the remainder of the Cold War period. The risk however did not vanish and is present feature of global politics. The risk of conventional war between nuclear-armed powers remains possible, and since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the likelihood has increased. However, if such a war involved more than one major power, the risk is that it would not remain a limited war but face quick escalation of the deployment of nuclear weapons by either side.

3.7 Summary

State actor behaviour in the international system can result in the use of military power for war. Hubris and misperception are two recurrent factors as causes for war. The post-Cold War period delivered the Second Nuclear Age and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear-armed states. The geostrategic risk posed by nuclear-armed states remains a feature of global politics. The major powers have sizeable nuclear arsenals and delivery systems with long range capabilities that can variously be launched from land, sea, and air. Therefore, hubris and misperception can most likely misinform the decision-making process as causes for war between the major powers, albeit with catastrophic consequences if fought between nuclear-armed states. However, many states and the major powers have sizeable conventional forces which are equally deadly and can deliver victory through the military defeat of their foe.

Warfare that is limited to conventional weapons is no less deadly, and can also deliver the political and existential end of a state. The risk of escalation during wartime is that combatant major powers could use nuclear weapons and this is a further justification for the significance of conducting research on the state and war.

This chapter has explored numerous multi-disciplinary approaches and theoretical arguments on the causes for war. The classical realist perspective on the phenomenon of war is one that has had its continued presence throughout human history and continues to have an impact on global politics and the anarchical international system. The analysis of works by foundational thinkers of the classical realist tradition provided insights into the reasons behind war, the expression of power politics through force, and the importance of the state to provide the authority and means to protect and defend its citizens. For Thucydides, the cause of war could be explained by honour, fear and interest. Machiavelli explained that power politics can be expressed in part by the art of war, while the Leviathan of Hobbes offered a means for a higher authority for the security of its inhabitants. Each contribution was informed by the political-historical specificity of their time, yet each is shares commonalities grounded in their assessment that human nature is constant.

Those insights into concepts such as war, power and the state informed and contributed the twentieth century International Relations theoretical paradigm of realism. The philosophical assumption of this research is based on the classical realist tradition. The next chapter outlines, from a classical realist viewpoint and elements of strategic thought, how the research's theoretical approach informs the development of this dissertation's conceptual framework. Strategy, and in particular military strategy and strategic planning, can provide the means to align the state in the best application of its military power in war. It can also avoid the risk of a strategic disconnect in the face of future war between major powers.

Chapter Four

Theoretical Approach and Conceptual Framework

4.1   Introduction

Concepts such as the state, war, and strategy can be interrogated via any number of theoretical lenses. As noted earlier, this dissertation's field of research in Defence Studies is multidisciplinary, which allows for the incorporation of different disciplines in developing a conceptual framework for the study of war and military power. This field of research also explores how a state's strategy and strategic approaches can also be the very same identifiers as to whether Australian governments have produced strategic misalignment between the state and its military power. The "methodological reflexivity approach" (Deschaux-Dutard 2018, 48) is employed here to allow for the research to be centred on the study of war and yet readily utilise concepts and research from the disciplines of History, Politics, International Relations, Defence and Strategic Studies. In regards to Defence and Strategic Studies, military strategy and strategic planning are explored to locate how the state's use of military power can actually be in strategic misalignment when force is deployed to wars of choice.

The research's political-historical specific wars of choice during 1990–2014 provides for a comparative analysis over the aforementioned timeframe when Australian governments deployed force to the Middle East region. The purpose is to determine of those events point to a strategic misalignment. That misalignment, or strategic inconsistency, will be indicated through governments non-alignment of key strategic documents, such as the Defence White Paper, with their actual strategic approaches. The research seeks to uncover if that was apparent when governments made such a decision during several international security crises centred on Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf region, which resulted in the contribution of force to serve alongside the U.S. when the crisis tipped over into war. The actual ADF force posture at that time of each selected international security crisis during 1990–2014 proved to be what the Australian government's actual force in-being at that time, and from that, what it was able to choose for deployment in an expeditionary capacity to the northern hemisphere. Repeated occurrences of war time gave period of possible misalignment,

or a strategic disconnect. Over the longer-term, the risk is that it could expose the state to more consequential threats from a potential future war with a major power.

This chapter explores the research's theoretical approaches, philosophical assumption, and overarching conceptual framework. The purpose is to provide a frame of reference for to explore how the state can use military power in war by following a strategic approach that can run counter to not just the war it is involved in, but can undermine the purpose of the military by a government's continual deployment of force to a war of choice. The purpose is that by conducting research within the fields of strategic and defence studies allows a focus on the analysis of military power. This dissertation identifies with Vennesson's definition of Strategic Studies is "an inter-disciplinary field of study which at its core examines the preparation, threat, use, control and consequences of organized force for political purposes in the course of dynamic interaction of (at least) two competing wills" (2020, 494). Defence and Strategic Studies are complementary, inter-related fields of research which offers multi-disciplinary, reflexive methodological approaches. Despite criticism, such as that by Buzan and Hansen (2009) and Wæver (2015) against traditional state-centric Security Studies, and by inference Defence Studies, is that "it leaves out too much of what is really important for security and world politics because it is rationalist, materialist, and retains an uncritical view of knowledge production" (Vennesson 2020, 495).

This research follows the rationalist and materialist approaches but is anything but uncritical. Previous coverage has been provided of criticism levelled against classical realism. However, the research is grounded in realism and undertakes a deductive approach towards theory building. The state in war, the conduct of power politics and strategic thought for the use of military power allows for historical lessons to guide future actions. The research methods are covered in chapter five however, it is noted here that it involves a cross-case study approach, and combination of quantitative (statistical analysis) and qualitative (content analysis) approaches.

4.2 Theory development and approach

In Defence Studies, strategy is how the state employs and projects military power, especially in war. Strategy can be located between policy at one end, and action

at the other. This dissertation's research is from a classical realist theoretical perspective, and views global politics as one framed by states and military power, which operates within an anarchical international system. This research's conceptual framework is based on the concepts of state, military power and war. This research links strategy with those concepts by a strategic theoretical approach. First however, theory needs to be outlined. Kainikara (2011, 19) has cast theory as "abstract and unfettered by any consideration, constraint or even practicality." Kainikara (2011, 20) added that theory "is at best ephemeral and at worst flights of fantasy." Such a critique is one that could be levelled at an indictive approach towards research. For Gray, theory "explains the nature and basic functioning of its subject, without privilege or prejudice to particular issues" (2015, para 3). Theory can also be considered simply as "a set of ideas formulated (by reasoning from known facts) to explain something" (*Australian Modern Oxford Dictionary* 2007, 872).

In any given discipline or field of study, theories offer different perspectives as to its research on a given subject matter. While theoretical approaches differ greatly, they can be grouped under the two broad headings of deterministic and probabilistic. The former is grounded in the natural sciences, and the latter is social science, yet both share a cause-and-effect approach. The deterministic approach has an "always follows if 'x' appears, then 'y' will follow" which stands in contrast to that in the social sciences which explains social phenomenon as the "presence of x means more likely that y will follow" (Sobek 2009, 7). Sobek pointed out that "states and individuals do not act mechanistically, nor consistently" (2009, 9). The confirmation of a theory requires the demonstration of "both a general, statistically significant correlation and a casual pattern within a set of cases" (Sobek 2009, 10). This thesis shares that viewpoint, with the aim to highlight how Australian governments acted neither "mechanistically, nor consistently" when it made their decision to deploy force overseas. It will also test how such responses came from their own set of political and strategic factors at the time of each case.

According to Jaccard and Jacoby (2010, 28), "at their core, all theories consist of concepts and relationships between those concepts." Jaccard and Jacoby distil theory as "a set of statements about the relationship(s) between two or more concepts" (2010, 28). For a definition on theory with a scientific orientation reads:

"a scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena; a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or experiment, and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the known facts; a statement of what are held to be the general laws, principles, or causes of something known or observed."

(Oxford English Dictionary 1989)

There exists the polemological perspective on war, one that is an "interdisciplinary and historical approach to the study of war" which cannot reduce the causation of war to a single factor (Gardner and Kobtzeff, 2012, para 7). As outlined previously, the causes of war are not explained by a single theory, where verification can be tested against all cases. The interdisciplinary and historical approach advocated by Gardner and Kobtzeff (2012) has enlarged the scope of research on war. This approach incorporates interrelated factors such as the geostrategic, military, political-economic, legal, and socio-cultural but can be further broadened to include ideological, bio-political, dialogical, natural environment and psychological factors (Gardner and Kobtzeff 2012).

The justification for a widened and diverse interdisciplinary approach is based on Gardner and Kobtzeff's interpretation of the methodological approach found in Waltz's seminal text, *Man, State and War* (1959), cited as having "recognised that any full understanding of the origins of conflict must show its interrelationship of war" (Gardner and Kobtzeff 2012, para 7). This dissertation's research agrees with their argument against any mono-causal approach to understand the cause for war. However, caution remains to any approach whose disciplinary breadth of possible causal factors can make the methodological approach include any factor that then seeks to be held up as the single factor within a framework which claims to be the determinate factor behind the cause for war. The next chapter outlines in detail the research design and theory testing which this research will conduct.

Theory's "core function", according to Gray (2016, 54), is an "explanation – whether it is simple, or complex is of no consequence for its function, which is universal and eternal." Gray added that "of course, it may be wrong, if and when new and different empirical evidence gives rise to demands for a change in theory" (2016, 54). Gray (1999, 2011) was instrumental in the development of the concept of strategic

history. What Gray's development of strategic history enabled is what White (2021, 134) claimed was "the firmest of foundations for those charged with the conversion of policy into the use of force." History informs strategy and the significance of strategic history is one that "should your adversary possess a superior strategy, or should they possess knowledge of yours, either through subterfuge or educated guess, your success will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve" (White 2021, 134). For strategists, what theory provides is not just a foundation but an approach where "its application must reflect the adaptability that real-life requires" (White 2021, 134).

4.3 Philosophical assumptions

Classical realism holds true to the nature of war and its persistence. It also views military power can be used for the purpose of protecting and advancing the interests of the state. The institution of the military plays a central role for the state, and military power and its use of force can be used for deterrence or compellence. The pursuit of power and increased state capabilities by either a leader or "domestic political systems" can therefore be found in the flaws and failure of humankind (Jensen and Elman 2018, 19). Such a perspective's inherent pessimism can also be seen as a rational approach for any state to undertake, especially as it operates within an uncertain, often hostile, anarchical international system. Different courses of action and strategic approaches are available to the state, its executive-level leadership and national government. A rational assessment of the costs and benefits can identify possible courses of action. It is that process which "gives theoretical meaning to the facts of international politics" (Morgenthau 2005, 5).

Classical realism is the first realist approach in the twentieth century. With the publishing of Carr's *The Twenty Year's Crisis* (1939), the onset of another global war gave credence and relevancy to the real-world actions of major power conflict. Carr (1939) saw power in three forms: military, economic and the power over opinion, and placed the most emphasis on military power. That view contrasted with the alleged dominance of the inter-war liberalist perspective, but the Second World War proved his thesis correct. Later classical realists included Niebuhr (1940), Wight (1946), Morgenthau (1948), and Keenan (1951). Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (1948)

became the post-war period's centrepiece not just on political realism, but as the realist theory of international politics. At the core of Morgenthau's work was his argument of "the flawed nature of humanity" which maintained an environment where "states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities" (Jensen and Elman 2018, 19).

This research follows the assumptions of the realist tradition, and is grounded in the statement that "sound theories are based on sound assumptions" (Mearsheimer 2014, 30). The realist tradition is one that frames the international system as anarchial, where major powers possess offensive military capabilities, operate with a level of uncertainty about other state behaviours and motives, will act in rational self-interest, and seek survival in an uncertain global security environment (Mearsheimer 2014, 30-31). In particular, the research subscribes to the major realist theory of human nature realism, in that states compete for power due to their inherent "lust for power" and that "states maximise relative power, with hegemony as their ultimate goal" (Mearsheimer 2014, 22). Mearsheimer argument is that "calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them" (2014: 12). What strategies do states employ when confronted by another great power? For Mearsheimer, the main strategies states will be to pursue are "blackmail and war" (2014: 13).

The preparation for the use of force in wartime has remained a pivotal requirement by the state in order to protect its sovereignty, national interests, and citizens. However, the uneven or incorrect use of the military, or studied neglect and lack of appropriate resources and readiness to address security threats to the state and its national security has been shown through empirical regularity to have catastrophic consequences. As outlined by Thucydides, or the writings by Machiavelli and Hobbes, the phenomena of war has continued to hold its place in global politics and as a permanent, persistent feature of the anarchial international system. When war has involved Western military forces since the end of U.S. and Australian involvement in the Vietnam War (1962–72) resulted in general "incredulity" that war can occur. Such a view came not so much by pacifists, because as Strachan (2008, 32) noted: "Pacifists, however strident and impassioned their tone, use powerfully articulate arguments." In more recent times, "the overwhelming response was more emotional: it was one of surprise, even of shock. The dominant instrument of Cold War strategic thought,

deterrence, had created the assumption that real wars were things of the past, not of policy" (Strachan 2008, 32).

The classical realist approach to power, global politics and the anarchial international system best reflects the presence of war and states' use of force through military power, or capability. Regarding the difference of meaning for capability, Biddle stated: "If capability is the ability to succeed at an assigned mission, different states will thus assess capability very differently for the same forces – no single, undifferentiated concept of 'military capability' can apply to all conflicts in all places and times" (2004, 5-6). Therefore, the selection of political-historical events that involve war, military power, and a state's strategic approaches, are contextualised in time and place but further commonalities that can be deduced across cases. Gray (2016, 61) pointed out that "[t]he fundamental reason why strategy is a field governed by speculative theory is because the empiricism required for science is unavailable" but that does not deny or diminish strategic theory. Due to its many dimensions, the anticipation, "even predicted causal connections leading to advantageous consequences, is an exercise in theory" (Gray 2016, 61).

The philosophical assumption of this research is grounded in the flawed aspects of human nature which historical accounts have shown provides a consistent presence through war and the use of military power. This research has been conducted from a perspective which accords with the theoretical lens of classical realism, and its conceptualisation of the state, war, and military power. Equally, there is a link to strategy and strategic theory. Strategy offers a closer alignment between itself and the three concepts of state, war and military power. An exploration of strategic approaches for attainment of political objectives offers a means to examine the continued utility of force and readiness of military power, and whether they can be in closer alignment to the actual strategic environment, even at the time of a future war between major powers.

This dissertation characterises Australia as a war-fighting state which has been an active participant in wars and conflicts from European settlement to the present. The willingness to commit force on a regular basis, this dissertation provides a conceptual framework as a means to analyse and explore why the state deployed force overseas, and committed elements of its military to wars of choice in the Middle East region, 1990–2014. The significance of that period, and its focus on three ADF

deployments to Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region during that period, were shaped by the commitment of small 'niche' forces (Blaxland, Fielding and Gellerfy 2020). Chapter eight conducts a cross-case study to examine these three selected deployments of force that prepared for ADF participation in wars of choice in the Middle East region and the wider Persian Gulf region.

Since the end of the Cold War, the security environment has become more complex, challenging, and dangerous. Security threats against the state exist across all five domains of warfare. This includes the broadening of the threat spectrum to include hybrid warfare and grey-zone warfare. Those two concepts which are reshaping state interaction and are "part of a multidomain warfighting approach to disrupt and disable an opponent's actions without engaging in open hostilities" (Bachmann, Dowse and Gunneriusson 2019). Major power competition and rivalry will be exacerbated in any future war by the technological advances with unmanned and uninhabited systems, the weaponisation of space and anti-satellite weapons, and in time, AI will deliver fully autonomous weapons systems (Royal Australian Air Force n.d.; Ministry of Defence, UK, 2015). Meanwhile, authoritarian major powers' national military strategy and strategic approaches employ concepts which allow it to conduct operations below the threshold of war. This is exemplified by China's Indirect Approach and Three Strategies of Warfare (Newmyer 2009; Thomas 2014; Tianliang 2022) as well as Russia's continued employment of *Maskirovka*, enhanced by non-lineal, weapons of the new way of war (Galeotti 2016, 2022; Sohl 2022).

The Weberian concept of the state is that it is "the key actor in human societies" which has "the monopoly of violence within its own defined territorial bounds (a major issue in contemporary international politics since many state do not meet that criteria at all)" (Hashim 2019, 85). This dissertation's research views the state, and its role in global politics through the theoretical lens of classical realism, and affords the role of the state with the responsibility to provide for the security and protection of sovereignty, territory, and citizens. The state is central for the construction, maintenance and execution of military power, national security and strategy to address various state and non-state threat actors. Changes are continuing within and across the domains, or full-spectrum, of warfare. This has a kinetic and non-kinetic impact on both the state and war. As Brooks (2016, 225) noted: "New kinds of war and state war making are, in turn, re-making – and in some way un-making – the state itself, and are

also transforming the international order and relationships between individuals and states."

4.4 Conceptual framework

The main purpose for a state's military force is to protect the state and its sovereignty against threats. That requires the protection and maintenance of its territorial integrity and where that state has a littoral aspect, its maritime environment and sea lines of communication. These are foundational, but not exclusive, aspects of a state's national interests and is extended to include the protection and security of its citizens, as well as its economy. However, the institution of the military, and its war-fighting arms across the various domains of warfare, provides a cornerstone for governments to achieve political objectives. That can be possible if a force posture provides a force in being that is alignment with the political aims of a government, and one that also reflects the actual threats present, or emerging, in the strategic environment. A state's military can deliver a combination of deterrence and coercion but is dependent on what past and present governments have committed to, and funded accordingly.

This research acknowledges the perennial, key tenants of classical realism, as well as aspects of the neo-classical realist approach which highlight how domestic elements within a state can shape its international relations within the global anarchial system. Further, this dissertation argues that the sub-discipline of strategic and defence studies offers the best means to explain how the state can use military power to achieve political outcomes. In the context of the state and the deployment of force in wartime, as part of the pursuit of its national interests, such as but not limited to, sovereignty and alliance management, strategic and defence studies provide for a detailed focus on the military that can explain how it is not only an important institution of the state but provides an explanatory power that is posited deep within political science, and further again within international relations.

The concept of the state, and the phenomena of war, can be better understood when they are linked by an examination of the role the military has as an institution, along with support from executive government and defence bureaucracy. Those concepts are explored more fully later in this section. A key element of the military is

that its state institutional power which governments can use as a tool of statecraft. That can be applied as violent, state-sanctioned use of kinetic force in order to achieve political objectives. Another element is the support role that defence bureaucracy can have. It can inform governments the budget requirement for personnel, operating costs, capital investment in program and procurement projects. This can assist in what the funding levels; procurement programs; resultant size, structure and force posture; as well as the alignment of the strategic outlook with a strategic approach. A final element is the role of the Australian executive government, that includes specifically the prime minister and defence minister, can deploy force to warlike operations. That decision can by-pass parliament, and instead come from consultation with ministerial colleagues of the NSCC. There are several permutations in how the Australian government has deployed expeditionary force to several overseas wars, but what it ultimately affords a liberal democratic state is the use of elements of its military power for the use of force to achieve political objectives.

Not every state possesses a large military, and neither does it necessarily equate with being a well-equipped defence force, which has the requisite array of platforms and capabilities to deploy effective force, whether that be in the direct protection of its sovereign borders, or as an expeditionary deployment. Therefore, knowing what a state has in the way of its military force goes well beyond its size, though that can be an important fact, but what Defence and Strategic Studies provides is an almost forensic approach to what represents a state's actual military forces. It provides explanations as to what the various capabilities and reach of a given military force, the domains of warfare it can operate within, the level of training and effectiveness of its personnel, warfighting doctrine, and what congruent lines of effort exist between its strategic outlook and force posture with its strategic approaches to warfighting. Such a thorough understanding of the military, and its supporting bureaucracy, as institutions of the state, provides a nuanced insight to what that actual armed force can deliver the state when it is potentially applied as a tool of statecraft in its international relations.

The state and power are closely intertwined. As Jasny points out: "States generally start with somebody's defeat" (1985, 15). At the centre of a state's power lies in its ability to project intent and purpose, and that which comes from military power provides "an important means and end" (Sobek 2009, 20). The state in the international system and the distribution of power offers many explanations for how

that interaction contributes to conditions of peace or war. When there is a transition of one hegemon to another, that can be considered "a high-risk scenario in terms of major power wars" (Sobek 2009, 14). That is the present situation between the U.S. and the PRC, whose peer competition is referred to being at risk of the Thucydides Trap (Allison 2015, 2017).

Power across the international system is diffused and uneven among states. The level of power held by states and especially major powers, is not in final agreement to its relative amount. Instead, the level of power is fluid and is contested about how it should be shared among states. According to Waltz (1979), the different international systems that offer the best chance for stability is a construct that is multipolar or bipolar. During the Cold War, Jervis (1986) opined that states operate under an international system characterised by anarchy. However, as Blainey (1988) explained, the cause of war is when extreme disagreement exists between states. Sobek's assessment of Blainey's approach is that "the balances of power are more war-prone" (Sobek 2009, 12). The anarchial international system went from bipolarity at the end of the Cold War to a period of unipolarity, and in the twenty first century, it has become multipolar, with hegemonic contestation underway between the U.S. and PRC which challenges the current balance of power. Throughout these shifts, the anarchial international system remains a constant.

The previous review on war gave a survey and analysis of the various perspectives that provide explanations on the causes for war. The purpose of doing so was to highlight the various factors that can lead to war that can involve the state, and threaten its sovereignty, national interests, and its citizens. The phenomenon of war and its kinetic application can be most consequential, even existential. The state remains a central actor in global politics and the international system, and through military power, can deploy force for deterrence or compellence, and use it in war to achieve a government's political objectives. Those objectives should be the defence of the state, its sovereignty, national interests, and its citizens.

National interests is a term that incorporates the defence of sovereignty and citizens, the full listing of each, grouped concept allows for an appreciation of how the conceptual framework will analysis the state, war, and strategy as it can influence a nation-state and its citizens (Snow 2020). Strategy and its application through strategic approaches can shape military strategy and strategic planning. They are aspects of how

strategy can provide the direction of a state's use of military power in war. That use of military power represents not just how a state fights in war, whether those capabilities are offensive, defensive, or a combination of both. How a state's force posture corresponds to its ability to deter, deny or destroy threats and aggressors across various domains of warfare. To do so is shaped by state's and their military power's strategic approaches to war. Therefore, the state, war, and strategy, along with military power and military strategy, are integral parts of the research's conceptual framework.

An expression of a state power, especially power politics, can be in its military power and attendant capabilities. The use of such force is a tool of statecraft which states can employ for the attainment of political objectives. The reification of power sits at the apex of the state, allowing it to remain in a state of being and as an entity among others in a system of that is characterised by the unequal yet contested distribution of power. The international system remains characterised by the use of force from some states and powers, or the threat of its use. The use of force through a state's military power use can be legitimate and lawful. If used in the tradition of Just War Theory and in accordance with International Law. The more powerful a state, the lesser the constraints may be imposed on its use of force. As Thucydides wrote in the Melian Dialogues, "the strong do as they will and the weak suffer as they must" (Sobek 2009, 21). In this context, the state's application of power politics can be expressed through military power and kinetic force.

A state's institutions shape the decision-making process for a state to go to war. Thucydides insight into the causes of war casts its shadow across millennia. The institutions of liberal democracies are not immune to the negative impact and influences of honour, interest, and greed. Institutions are led by individuals, some of whom may not share the collective values and behaviours prescribed by its nation, rule of law and good governance. Institutions such as parliament, the executive, military, and public service are comprised by individuals, and variously led and/or managed by individuals. Culture, at the strategic and national level, or organisational level, shape and influence the decision-making process, what type of decisions are made at the various level, the importance and significance accorded to why those decisions are made at the different levels, and by which institutions (Dean 2016).

The organising principle for a state's national interests and its related ministerial and portfolio responsibility are assisted by state institutions that include

executive government, parliament, bureaucracy, and the military. Each institution is managed and led by people in teams, from the department-level, down the organising formation, through branches and business units, all of which are led and managed by individuals. The significance of the 'micro-player' in this decision-making chain is apparent for their role in the construction and formation of strategic issues for an executive-level decision. This significance applies to the level of commitment, provision of timely and quality advice as well as actionable intelligence.

When it comes to the use of the military as a tool of statecraft, the examination of the political-historical arc of major decisions made by consecutive Australian governments regarding the deployment of elements of its military, is telling for how a disconnect existed between its strategic approaches, the actual force in-being and decision to deploy elements of its armed forces for readiness in military engagement in the Middle East region. The option for government to deploy force in readiness for the likely eventuality of war was framed by advice from the Defence portfolio and deliberations by the Prime Minister and selected Cabinet ministers. However, due to agreed strategic approaches undertaken that had been heralded in previous Defence White Papers, all had a bearing on portfolio funding, personnel size of the ADF, procurement program and operational commitments, as well as actual, available platforms and assets.

The political and strategic decisions made by the Australian government to commit elements of the ADF in so-called wars of choice were not just framed by the size of the Defence budget, or its size of active military personnel, but were also constrained because not just the limits placed on funding, but had a direct correlation to force procurement for the types and roles of the platforms and assets acquired, but that they represented in real-time the actual force in being available to government. From the closing stages of the Cold War to the first immediate inter-state military conflict, the 1991 Gulf War highlighted not just the structural and operational limits that had been imposed on the ADF, it can be shown that the significance of the political and strategic decisions made at the time of that particular international crisis, as did the next two wars in the Persian Gulf region that centred on Iraq, give an awareness of the systemic disconnect present between Australia's strategic approaches and the actual strategic environment in which it chose to participate in wars of choice.

The state's military power is supported by defence and security policies that provide political support for budget and personnel levels that can support the military capabilities it requires to detect, deter, deny, and destroy threats. Force posture, defence and security policies and their strategic approaches, are not created in a political and economic vacuum. Many variables can account for the different levels of defence spending and the size of the ADF, types of military platforms and assets it has as part of its force in-being or is in the process of acquiring. The next chapter explains the research methods employed to focus on just two independent variables, which is the Defence portfolio budget and the size of the ADO. Defence White Papers will be the independent variable as they represent the then-latest available government agenda-setting document on defence and strategy. This is outlined further in the chapter on research methods.

Defence and security policy can always be located within its own political-historical context. Its funding levels and force posture is an outcome of how threats are perceived by governments, the military and other security agencies, such as the intelligence community. Defence funding is always against other competing interests for the allocation of government revenue. Defence budgets will be explored in each case study that is provided for analysis as a war of choice. Defence force posture, strategic planning and allocated funding levels are informed by processes that assess the array of immediate and emerging threats that face the nation-state. The strategic outlook is based on the most likely scenarios the state faces from the emerging strategic environment. The timeframe for the strategic forecasting is the medium to long-term. Assessments will determine current and emerging threats that will most likely impact the state and its national interests. The strategic forecasting allows state-actor responses of a kinetic nature to address those threats that are kinetic in nature. The research has argued that strategic theory is central to effective defence and security policies and strategic approaches that make the most effective use of military power.

Of particular significance, since the end of the Second World War until 11 September 2001, the U.S., UK, and Australia had not won most of the wars and conflicts in which it had deployed force. However, the one victory all three states shared was the 1991 Gulf War. Prior to then, the British had conducted a successful counter-insurgency campaign in the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) and victory in a conventional conflict over Argentina in the Falklands War (1982). The utility of force

has not diminished but challenges and complexity for when and how military power can be deployed have increased. Factors which account for that are the changing character of war, a desire to avoid direct major power confrontation between nuclear-armed states, post-Cold War, the 'peace dividend' expectation from citizens, and the influence of civil society and the electoral cycle in liberal democracies (Miller 2001; Pinker 2011; Dannatt 2016).

4.5 Strategic theory and practice

Strategy is derived from the ancient Greek term of generalship, whose origin is from the ancient Greek word, *strategia* (στρατηγία) (McLean and McMillan 2003). A variation is that *strategos* means the art of the general (Smith 2011, 40). The origin of strategy is millennia old and maintains its relevance in contemporary times across industry sectors and academic disciplines, but, for the purposes of this research, it is that centred in the field of Defence and Strategic Studies. Strategy can be considered as "an art that pertains to the conduct of war" (Smith 2011, 41). Strategy, as an 'art of war' as expressed by Sun Tzu (1983), "should not however be confused with statecraft, which, among other aspects of government practices, includes the use of made of the war or threat of war for the purpose of a policy objective" (Smith 2011, 41).

Gray argued that "security is the conclusive purpose of strategy" (2016, 54). He added that "nearly all strategy, at all times and everywhere, is intended by policy to advance the security condition of a polity" (2016, 54). The complexity of issues faced by the polity when seeking the protection of the state can and does rely on military power as one of its key means to address the diversification and proliferation of threats. According to Bowditch (2013, 2): "The enormous number of rational and irrational factors that went into the creation of strategy in war, bereft of any certainty, was thought to be beyond systemic calculation by the average man, leading many to conclude that strategy and war were atheoretical." Like war, strategy can be persistent in what foundational aspects remain centuries later such as the writings of Clausewitz and its refinement by Delbrück influenced the "capstone doctrinal manual, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Staff 2013), the U.S. military still only recognized two theories of military strategy, annihilation, and erosion" (Bowditch 2013, 3).

Military power has continued to retain its utility against nation-states and major powers despite the claims to the contrary. For example, General Sir Rupert Smith, former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander made the assertion that: "War no longer exists" (2005, 1). However, Smith (2005 1;17) qualified that statement to acknowledge "[c]onfrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all around the world" but "the sides are mostly non-state." The state, military power and the utility of force remains relevant. As Christopher Smith (2001, 36) earlier confirmed:

> *"Military force, it is argued, is suboptimal for resolving the complex problems that characterise contemporary conflict. Theorists argue that contemporary conflict requires comprehensive approaches involving all the agencies at a government's disposal (along with non-government agencies and commercial organisations) in which military force is often a lesser means. The theory is not necessarily wrong, just narrowly focused and incomplete."*

Strategy is the commitment of the military in wars, but is also "the theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political purposes" (Gray 1999b, 1). The securing of political objectives by military means and the deployment of force, is where strategy links the state and conduct of war. While Gray's definition rightly points out that strategy is also about the threat of force, strategy also provides a state with guidance on how to use military kinetic force and adapt to changed circumstances (White 2021, 134). The strategic theoretical approach employed in this dissertation finds itself located within the sub-disciplines of defence and strategic studies. It does so in acknowledgement that "strategic studies cannot however be regarded as a discipline in its own right" due to it has "no clear parameters, and relies on arts, sciences, and social science subjects for ideas and concepts" (Baylis and Wirtz 2020, 5). This does not negate the that strategic studies can be undertaken as "an idle pursuit for its own sake", it does so because of its latent practical and policy relevant approach which can be summed as "strategic theory is a theory of action" (Brodie 1973, 452).

A definition of classical strategy provided by Liddell Hart is: "The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy" (1967, 335). Though, Howard pointed out, "that whether this remains adequate in the nuclear age is a matter of some controversy" (1969, 18). When Howard made the statement reflecting on the adequacy of Liddell Hart's definition, there were five nuclear-armed

powers. In 2022, the vertical proliferation of nuclear-armed states has seen its membership increase to nine. Yet, strategy remains a concept that is in various forms contentious and misapplied, often as an adjective, or as a reference for a length of time. Howard claimed that what gave strategy its central defining feature is the "element of *force* [his italics]which distinguishes 'strategy' from the purposeful planning in other branches of human activity to which the term is often loosely applied" (1969, 18). There was a general assumption that was woven in strategic from the eighteenth century, through the works of Clausewitz and Antonie Jomini, and later, early twentieth century strategic thinking was "a fairly simple model of international relations within which armed conflict might occur, as well as a basically stable technological environment" (Howard 1969, 32). The advent of the nuclear bomb and advanced weapons technology put to rest such earlier assumptions.

The classical school of strategic theory is closely linked with the realist perspective. That link comes from a shared logical assumption about force and the military and the structure of the anarchial international system. Crawford (1991, 292) stated that strategic studies scholars "tend to view international relations from perspective of anarchy in a Hobbesian sense." Williams (1993, 104) described that perspective is akin to a "neo-realist framework within which it has traditionally been located." The Strategic Studies perspective has been described as the "military-technical wing" of realism (Buzan and Hansen 2009). Duyvesteyn and Worrall (2017, 350) meanwhile argued that realism "formed a cornerstone of the field." Others have claimed the relationship between realism and strategic studies is "ambiguous" (Doeser and Frantzen 2020). They added that "realism, particularly neorealism, investigates the deep and underlying drivers of behaviour, the strategic perspective examines to a greater extent its immediate and precipitating causes" (Doeser and Frantzen 2020, 10).

Defence and strategic studies have viewed politics and history as central to their approach (Freedman 2013; Gray 2108; Strachan 2013). While the central role of the state is stronger in realism than strategic studies, Doeser and Frantzen state that what does link them is their "interest in the political uses of force" (2020, 10). It is for that reason why the political-historical context is important in the strategic approach undertaken by this research. That is purposeful for the examination of the development and application of strategy more broadly, and more specifically, in strategic theory. This applies equally in any understanding of the concepts of the state, force and war

and their investigation regarding their political-historical context. Therefore, this was why chapter three outlined the political philosophy of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. It is their views and observations on the concepts of war and the state that are central to the classical realist theoretical perspective. Accordingly, the classical realist tradition is very much central to the development of strategic theory. The Australian experience of theoretical interpretations regarding the state, war, military power and strategy remains contested, though in Defence and Strategic Studies, it is considered a "dominant paradigm for the foreseeable future" (Coghlan 2010, 165).

The previous chapter's exploration of the various causes for war provided many multi-disciplinary explanations for its persistent occurrence. Its presence is a negative feature of humanity, and in modern history, a recurrent element within global politics and the international system. As an explanatory means for its origin, persistence, centrality to power politics and its impact on the state, strategic theory is provided as the most focused of the disciplines when examining the impact of war on the state, as well as the use of force by the state. It is with that in mind that the next section focuses on strategy through an exploration of its as theory and concept. The purpose is to demonstrate how its correct application provides the state with a real ability to focus on the protection of its national security, where the correct application of strategic theory can link its military approaches and uses of force to address real and serious threats to its national security. It can conversely, yet just as significantly, caution the state not just how best to employ strategic approaches to a looming, but its avoidance in any participation in a war of choice.

Definitions of strategy have persisted with its narrow focus on military power. That perspective was particularly influential during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Clausewitz's definition of war positioned the role of strategy is the way for its conduct to achieve political objectives: "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means" (1989, 87). Prussian-German General Helmuth Von Moltke applied Clausewitz's theory on war (Hughes 2009). According to Rosinski (1939), Von Moltke influenced generations of the Prussian General Staff, and provided a practical application across various military campaigns and wars, which was to attain the political object in war. French strategist André Beaufre later defined strategy as a Hegelian concept as "the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of the

dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute" (Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, 2007). Such views saw strategy through a military lens, to counter force wielded by another state or power yet was employed to achieve a nation-state's political objectives.

To understand the role of war as part of strategy is that it has remained as a central, viewed as an instrument of policy. Clausewitz stated that at its heart, war is "nothing but a duel on a larger scale" whereby its object "is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" (1989, 75). He stated how kindness was to be admonished because "war is no pastime" and "a serious means to a serious end" (Clausewitz 1989, 86). The practical advice for the state and its military power was that as a fundamental organising principle, "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means" (Clausewitz 1989, 87). For Strachan "[s]trategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its political objectives" (2013, 43). Strachan's outline of strategy's function is described by Gray as one that "is arguably unduly restrictive, but nonetheless it targets by far the most troublesome of a state's duties conducted on behalf of its citizens" (2016, 37).

The intent and purpose behind Clausewitz's writings have been hugely influential (Brodie 1986) despite his share of critics and a perception that "his views on the relation between war and policy were considered anachronistic" (Howard 1986, 33). Smith claimed Clausewitz's view of "war needed to be understood not as an independent variable but as a function of policy" (2004, 64). This contrasts with Keegan's (1993) challenge of Clausewitz's concept of war as a continuation of politics, to instead present war as a cultural phenomenon. Paret's earlier misgivings about *On War* and its "unevenness of its execution" did find its strengths lay in it being "an essentially consistent theory of conflict" which provided an understanding into Clausewitz's "thoughts on the timeless aspects of war" (1986, 4-5). As a policy option and dedicated tool of statecraft, this conceptualisation of war remained influential in an understanding for the cause of war, exacerbated by the ongoing malignant, aggressive behaviour of individual states. If such states happen to be a major power, caught in major power rivalry within an anarchical international system, that forces them to act with self-interest.

The research has conceptualised strategy to be the ways and means in which the state and national governments can deploy force through military power, as a tool of statecraft for the attainment of political objectives. At its core is the threat of violent, kinetic means. If the decision to deploy force against a hostile state or non-state actors results in eventual war, then it can be considered that "the conduct of war is usually known as strategy" (van Creveld 1991, 95). But which strategic approach does a state choose, and how is it to know that it is the most applicable to address current and emerging threats? The way in which war can be fought from a state's base of military power is often the outcome of prior preparation undertaken in readiness for any number of contingencies along the spectrum of conflict. In the case of war, those decisions are almost always invariably tied to government, including those which preceded an incumbent. Government decision-making and funding for the force posture it desires, or at least can afford, is contingent on the strategic approach it seeks to shape such a force. The force-in being at the time of an international security crisis that results in war, or war that comes from a strategic surprise, will find one's armed forces are structured for strategic approaches that may not be in alignment with the war it has to fight. The remainder of this section now turns focus onto the development of strategic theory. Its purpose is to thereafter outline how particular schools of thought influenced Australia's force posture and various strategic approaches.

There are many different definitions for strategy, and they reflect the breadth and diversity of disciplines and industry sectors which employ this term. However, there are aspects of strategy which contain almost universal, ongoing aspects that can be mapped over millennia. Freedman (2013, 3) claims that "that there are elemental features of strategy that are common across time and space". Those "big three" elements are behaviours that can be witnessed throughout human history, even in the behaviour of primates, and include the use of deception, violent force, and the formation of alliances (Freedman 2013). Of importance is that those three behaviours have "a vital strategic quality" (Freedman 2013, 5). Equally, they are also social in their application and political in their execution. Freedman (2013) argued that human history's extensive back catalogue of war and conflict has seen the need for strategy to be developed so that people could survive and operate in complex social environments that were characterised by the regular arrival of loss, deprivation, and threats.

The evolution of strategic thinking has not been the exclusively the domain of political and military leaders, philosophers and theologists, but primatologists. Research by Byrne and Corp (2004) into the neocortex size of primates from all 18 branches of the species were able to determine a correlation to brain size and the level of social intelligence, "including the ability to work together and manage conflict", as well as deception (Freedman 2013, 5). According to Byrne, "the concept of 'Machiavellian intelligence'" existed among primates "established a link between strategy and evolution" (Freedman 2013, 5). Other studies demonstrated evolutionary similarities to humans when it came to the use of violence and strategy. Wrangham (1999) stated killing came from the "imbalance-of-power hypothesis" and "inter-group hostility, and large power asymmetries between rival parties" but most tellingly, his research into "adult male chimpanzees establish 'the costs and benefits of violence'" (Freedman 2013, 8). The survey Freedman (2013) conducted on the selected works by primatologists and their findings regarding aggression, violence and conflict included Goodall (1986), who showed that chimpanzees can determine such power differentials by another group, and a closer symmetry of those numbers determined "visual and auditory display exchanges without conflict" (cited in Freedman 2013, 8). Bigelow (1969) and his study of apes saw an attack would not occur when they deemed themselves as weaker but attacked the opposing group when they determined to be in a stronger position to do so. Freedman's assessment of these studies is that primates displayed a "pragmatic attitude to violence underlined its instrumentality" (2013, 8).

Early societies and studies on primates show that strategy does not need to rely just on the use of violence to be effective. According to Gat (2006, 115-117), "hunter-gatherers and primitive agriculturalists" had developed warfare that exploited conditions of those attacked and were conducted in a way that avoided open warfare. Keeley (1996) argued how raids, particularly at night, were limited in reach yet actions over time were of prolonged attrition, punctuated by the occasional massacre were designed to avoid war over long distances for a sustained period of time, but structured for the attacking tribe to deliver eventual complete victory. As Freedman characterised that period of human history and its "so-called primitive warfare" is that patterns can be found where "the elements of strategic behaviour have not changed, only the complexity of the situations in which they must be applied." (2013, 8; 9).

The challenge to the evolution of strategic thought is from the viewpoint which argues war is not an inevitable feature of human relations or state behaviour. This paragraph is offered as a counterpoint to that outlined above. Lebow argued "realists have oversimplified Thucydides - and international relations theory - by accepting the argument of Book I at face value" (1996, 231). Lebow leaned on Kagan (1995) to support his thesis to make the claim that he too had challenged Thucydides' structural explanations for war. Lebow claims: "He further contends that the second war was not inevitable but the result of bad judgment by Pericles. I agree that miscalculation was the immediate cause of war" (1996, 231). For Kagan (1995), the "truest cause" for the Peloponnesian War was the rapid rise of Athenian power, which provide lessons that remain true in modern times regarding the causes for war, which sit alongside other causes, such as arms races and alliance systems. Kagan states that "[t]he Thucydidean view of political analysis involves no adamantine chain of determinism and in fact takes real cognizance of the unaccountable," which was "intended to supply some perceptive individual with the insight (gnome) with which to see the course of political events and to control them" (1995, 15).

Thucydides identification of lessons, or enduring principles inherent in human nature, were observed from the Peloponnesian Wars, which "would seem closer to a 'modern', impersonal perspective", one where his documentation of war focused on factors grouped together by "quantifiable facts such as chronological events, material resources, money, equipment, troop numbers, casualties, and the like" (Desmond 2016, 359). The analytical tool that brought a boundary to the many causes of war to be in "honour, fear and interest" has had sustained interpretation, including the focus on the motivations of the defender. According to Zilincik, that "conveys an incomplete picture of war causation by focusing on the aggressor's motivation while ignoring that of the defender" (2021, 10). Strategic affairs, claims Zilincik, can be enhanced by a move from Thucydides "holy trinity" as it "conveys an incomplete picture of war causation by focusing on the aggressor's motivation while ignoring that of the defender. It also insufficiently explains motivations for hostile behaviour by omitting salient stimuli and the variance of emotional motives across cultures" (Zilincik 2021, 10). Regardless of a nation's strategic culture or ways of fighting, by aggressor or defender, the state's use of military power in war is the systemic response for any number of causal links for war.

Known for the re-employment of the indirect approach to a twentieth-century audience, Liddell Hart stated that "thus strategy has not necessarily the simple object of seeking to overthrow the enemy's military power" (1967, 334). To hold that position as a central reason for any state faced with a military threat to its sovereignty and national interests, strategy must not be immutably fixed in time and place, but responsive and adaptable (Liddell Hart 1956, 334). Therefore, when a state is at war, its government should always alter the direction of their military campaigns "to adapt it to conditions which often change as a war progresses" (Liddell Hart 1967, 334). With that realisation, war provides a constant array of considerations that do not follow lineal processes, nor ample warning times. Therefore, according to Liddell Hart, the concept of strategy requires for its success to be based "on a sound *calculation and coordination of the end and the means* [his italics]" (1967, 336). Such conceptualisation of a successful strategy is that based around notions of proportionality, "but relativity is inherent because, however far out knowledge of the science of war be extended, it will depend on art for its application" (Liddell Hart 1967, 337).

In an echo to Clausewitz's famous dictum, Liddell Hart's provided a shortened definition on strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy" (1967, 335). Liddell Hart stated that the aim of strategy and "the perfection strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting" (1967, 338). That view is counter to the Clausewitzian approach to war, where the aim was the conduct of a decisive battle that resulted in the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. Liddell Hart (1967) was influenced by his direct experiences during the First World War and sought to have future war avoid that characterised by attrition warfare, and instead advocated for a strategic approach that employed dislocation of the enemy through an indirect approach. Heuser (2007, 138) argued that "Clausewitz's definition of strategy, as given *On War*, is very unsatisfactory" in that the war aims achieved in victory requires not just the enemy's defeat. Heuser (2007, 138) argued that what is required is "a change in the enemy's mind about the situation, and not just a breaking of his will. The enemy must be convinced that he has a stake in the peace, not just be temporarily disabled." Only then according to Heuser, is military victory achieved by war's actual end, and "not a prelude to the next war" (2007, 138).

The theoretical development of strategic thought has highlighted the centrality of concepts such as the state, war and military power with military strategy and strategic planning. The relationship between these concepts and approaches allow governments and the military to address and prepare for kinetic threats posed by aggressive states and non-state actors. The anarchial international system in which states operate necessitates the state to accept the threat posed by war, and especially one between major powers. Awareness alone by a government of one or more major security threats is on its own insufficient. The state must always prepare for the incidence of threats, which may be achievable if enough strategic warning time exists. Otherwise, the state may find its immediate option one that involves the deployment of available military power with a force posture that may have a strategic approach that is counter to the kinetic threat it is charged to deal with. Adaptation over time can resolve such a situation though this approach is high-risk during war.

Strategic thought can provide a state with the most appropriate strategic approach and corresponding force posture for a state's military power. Given the uncertainty of states geo-strategic security environment, this is a challenge for states. The long lead-in time for the procurement and acquisition of platforms can take decades. This can result in a capability gap when one class of military platform is retired, as its capabilities have been become dated or redundant, and there is a wait on the arrival of more advanced platforms. As Gray noted, "the core meaning of theory is explanation, the role of strategic theory is usually clarified, though not entirely without some trouble from irony and occasionally paradox" (2016, 61). What this research does is to apply strategy as a concept, which is deployed by the state and its military in political-historical specific settings that identifies whether misalignment existed present a government's strategic outlook and approaches to defence.

4.6 Australia's evolving strategic approaches during war

According to the ADO, "strategy means the calculated relationship between ends, ways and means" and further, strategic, planning is that which "identifies goals [ends], determines how to pursue these goals [ways] and decides what resources are applied [means]." (Department of Defence 2010, 1). Fundamental to that definition is the contextualised view of strategy and its role to the state within an anarchial system

is that "strategic factors themselves constitute an important element in international relations" (Howard 1969, 32). That has been the case for Australia's participation as a nation-state in war, especially those classified as wars of choice. However, strategic theory and its practice brings an approach to understand the use of military power in the pursuit of political objectives, yet it is the link of past political-historical events that can draw its patterns of use. Past perceptions and actual actions of threat against Australia have shaped its "patterns of strategic choice" (Cheeseman 1996). While the examination of Australia's strategic culture is out of scope for this research, it is acknowledged that non-military factors have influenced the nation's policies towards defence and security.

From the First Fleet (1788) and until Federation (1901), there existed a perceived need for Australia to be aligned with an out-of-region major power for a substantial amount of its defence (Boyce 2015). For almost a century, British troops remained in Australia on garrison duties until 1870 (Wilcox 2003). After Federation, the nation's colonial past saw it continue involvement in out-of-region campaigns alongside the British. This continued throughout the First World War, and entry into the Second World War. The relationship with Great Britain from settlement until the Fall of Singapore (1942) covered a period of 160 years, and several reasons have been provided for that period of sustained political and strategic ties. One view is based on Australia's sense of isolation and efforts to "preserve whiteness and Britishness rather than risk loss of identity" (Hudson 1988, 4). Another is that Australia's long coastlines and initial small population base saw the task of defence as almost impossible without the assistance of an outside power (Dupont 1991). For Renouf (1979), he simply made a claim that Australia was "a frightened country", a nation fearful of the threats posed by Asia.

These were some factors behind subsequent "patterns of strategic choice", by a nation from the outset of White settlement which it had considered itself "was basically defenceless" had then "led Australia's early strategic planners to look to others for protection" (Cheeseman 1996, 261). This references Australia's current strategic alliance with the U.S., which came as a direct result of the Fall of Singapore, when Great Britain's defeat by Imperial Japan reinforced Australia's long held "fear of abandonment" (2017, 5). At the conclusion of the Second World War, Australia's regional commitments of expeditionary armed force continued, which included the

Malayan Emergency (1948–60) and the Korean War (1950–53) (AWM 2022d). Australia also deployed Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft outside its immediate or near strategic region, for missions out of the UK for participation in the Berlin Airlift (1948–49) (Royal Australian Air Force 2002).

The most enduring of Australia's strategic alliance began early in the Cold War period; the *Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America*, or Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty ('Alliance' or 'U.S. alliance'), which was signed on 01 September 1951 and came into effect on 29 April 1952 (JSCFADT 2006, 5). A concise assessment of this Alliance's strategic significance and possible consequences on Australia is made by Starke (1965, 235): "Many of the statements made about the American guarantee under ANZUS have an ambivalent flavour, or at least imply two inconsistent propositions." Stark outlined the dilemma governments continue to face is that: "[T]he United State is not under a definite obligation to furnish armed assistance to Australia and New Zealand in the event of an armed attack upon them in the Pacific area" (1965, 235). Also, the Alliance is one that can be considered "more favourable to the United States, because the latter is more likely to be attacked in the Pacific than Australia or New Zealand" (Starke 1965, 235). These questions have remained relevant and pertinent up to and beyond the end of the Cold War, and especially so since 11 September 2001. Its continued significance is that the Alliance has had an ongoing influence on Australia's approaches to defence and strategy.

The ANZUS Treaty excluded the British government from Australia's strategic agreement with the U.S. (Bramston 2021). In 1954, the United Kingdom (UK) was included in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) but this regional strategic agreement had ended by 1977 (Buszynski 1981). Meanwhile, the government of Prime Minister Robert Menzies had actively sought the ANZUS Treaty, which was "drafted in the shadow of the cold war and the increasing instability arising from the consolidation of communist power on the mainland of China, and overt communist aggression in Korea" (JSCFADT 2006, 1). ANZUS was however, the "opportunistic brilliance" of the Menzies government's foreign affairs minister, Percy Spender, who secured "an asymmetrical alliance" of security assurances from the Truman Administration (Kelly 2022, 20). The U.S. has remained since then Australia's main strategic partner, and the Alliance survived the Vietnam War period (1962–72).

Australia's concern about the impact of communism and its expansion throughout Southeast Asia, characterised by the Domino Theory, helped advance the government's early rationale for military deployments during the Vietnam War (Girling 1967).

Other government decisions supported the expeditionary force deployed to confront the threat of communist expansion. In the Indonesian Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*), an undeclared war which saw Australia conduct military operations from its base in Malaysia, stationed there as part of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, also served as part of the British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group (Dennis, Gray, Morris, Prior 1995). That conflict provided an insight into not just the Australian strategic approach to armed threats in its immediate region, but how it risked escalation that could have gone beyond, and contrary to, its stated political objectives and priorities. During September-October 1964, Indonesian regular forces conducted cross-border air and seaborne assaults against Labis and Pontian in Malaysia, and that action raised the stakes for escalation between several regional states and an outside power (Dennis, Gray, Morris and Prior 1995). In January 1965, the Australian government agreed to requests from the UK and Malaysian governments for military support, and in March, deployed an infantry battalion, represented by the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), to Borneo and served in Sarawak with replacement forces rotating through this theatre of operations (Finlayson 2017, 108).

Australia's military engagement and deployment of force in Southeast Asia continued throughout almost the entire Cold War period. Its use of force was a combination of both overt and covert military operations. Confrontation represented one of Australia's "wars of diplomacy" during the 1950s and 1960s but came perilously close to being elevated from a minor war and into a major one (Edwards 1999, 44). Despite Australia's strategic approach of 'forward defence' towards its foreign and defence policies being focused on Southeast Asia, it was a concept conducted alongside the armed forces of either the U.S. or UK, both of which operated military forces in the region (Edwards 1999, 44). Confrontation demonstrated that "Australia was especially anxious not to make a lasting enemy of Indonesia" as it shared a common land border with its Territory of Papua and New Guinea but consoled itself in the belief that in a worst-case scenario, any such escalation with Indonesia

would have the Australian government seek the intervention and assistance of the U.S. through the ANZUS Alliance treaty (Edwards 1999, 44; 46). Nevertheless, Australia ensured that its cross-border operations against the Indonesians were done covertly, and not widen the war to compete for personnel and materiel already committed to its major military campaign in Vietnam.

The path to Australia's involvement with warfighting elements in the Confrontation had begun a year before its initial deployment in 1965 of 3RAR. In April 1964, the Australian government of Prime Minister Robert Menzies deployed to Borneo two Royal Australian Navy (RAN) minesweepers, Army combat engineers, RAAF helicopters and transport aircraft, which represented personnel and assets from across all three Services but with a singularity of purpose: "free Malaysian and British units for service against the Indonesians" (Edwards 1999, 47). This initial offer of military support towards Confrontation was designed to avoid direct confrontation with Indonesia, with the original rationale to deploy the 3RAR along the Thai-Malaysian border was to free up British and Malaysian troops to redeploy along the Malaysian-Indonesian border (Edwards 1999, 47). The Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) began operational deployments in July 1962 to be part of the U.S. concept of combatting communism and the "successive crises in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam" with an Australian government mindful of limiting escalation while supporting its major power allies (McCarthy 2003, 130). However, the escalation of armed commitment towards Confrontation progressed from an initial deployment of support elements that enabled British and Malaysian military forces to the 1965 deployment of an Australian infantry battalion (Finlayson 2017, 107-108).

The escalation of military force came with a proviso by the Australian government that its troops would not operate inside Indonesia territory (Edwards 1999, 48). As part of operations codenamed CLARET, the British were conducting cross-border raids of up to 10,000 yards into Indonesian sovereign territory, which the Australian Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Air Chief Marshall Scherger, made clear during a meeting with the British Commander in Borneo, that his forces would not participate in such operations (Edwards 1999, 48). Such non-participation proved a complete fiction, because in the interests of military support to its major power allies operating in Southeast Asia, Australia would in total deploy 3RAR, 4RAR, and two Special Air Service Regiment squadrons; all were secretly approved

as part of covert activities tied to CLARET (Edwards 1999, 48). It was not until regime change came in Indonesia, when General Soeharto's accession to power via a military coup, provided suitable conditions for a formal end to Confrontation, and was secured in August 1966 with a formal agreement signed in Bangkok between Indonesia and Malaysia (Dennis et al. 1999, 173). Australia's attention then turned more fully towards its military involvement alongside the U.S. in the Vietnam War.

Australia's commitment to Vietnam began in July 1962 when 30 Army instructors of the AATTV were deployed, and their number increased over the next two years (Millar 1969). On 29 April 1965, Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies approved for the deployment of an infantry battalion upon a request from the South Vietnamese government, and deployed 1RAR in June that same year (Millar 1965). By the end of the decade, the size of the Australian Task Force numbered 8,000 personnel, which included three infantry battalions, armour, artillery, three RAAF squadrons, one RAN destroyer and other escorts, with the navy placed under the command of the U.S. Seventh Fleet (Millar 1969). During the later stage of that war, Australian strategist T.B. Millar asked why his nation was in Vietnam and stated that "primarily, one suspects, because of U.S. pressure…but this is too simple an explanation" (1969, 89). Instead, Millar claimed it "may still be directly in the interest of Australia's security, in terms of the situation in South-east Asia as well as the Australian-American alliance" (1969, 89).

A major influence on not just on Australia's foreign policy, but its strategic theory, thought and approaches to its defence and security came from several pivotal decisions made by the UK and U.S. in the late 1960s. In January 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the withdraw of its military bases 'East of Suez' (Gyngell 2017, 64). President Richard Nixon's 'Guam Doctrine' came in July 1969, labelled later as a "very un-reassuring bombshell" of continued U.S. regional military support (White 2019, para 9). Nixon's announcement affirmed U.S. commitment to its alliances but was a factor behind Australia's end of Forward Defence and the development towards its geostrategic doctrinal successor, the Defence of Australia (White 2019b). The 1972 election of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam saw the return of a Labor government in Australia for the first time in 23 years. It also resulted in the nation's conclusion of its 10-year military commitment in Vietnam, and saw the

commencement of the conceptual and doctrinal development of the Defence of Australia (White 2019b).

The Prime Minister Whitlam's Labor Government (1972–75) challenged the foreign policy orthodoxy of the previous twenty-three years of Liberal-Country Party governments, delivered by an election was considered "as one of the great watersheds of Australian history" (Butler 1973, 1). The Whitlam government's election on 2 December 1972 "released a torrent of change in Australian foreign policy" (Gyngell 2017, 102). It also delivered the lowest point in the alliance relationship between Australia and the U.S., which resulted from the Whitlam government's criticism of the Nixon Administration's bombing campaign in December 1972 against targets in Hanoi and Haiphong during the Vietnam War (Loosely 2021). During the early 1970's, the deterioration of "the alliance came perilously close to a terminal breakdown", which had resulted from "dramatic realignments [that] occurred simultaneously in domestic politics in Canberra and Washington and in regional and global geopolitics" (Edwards 2021, para 12). Despite serious differences, the relationship proved its resilience throughout the period of the Whitlam government (Loosely 2021).

Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's Liberal-Country Party coalition government (1975–82) approach to foreign policy was described by Gyngell as one of "dour realism" (2017, 135). Fraser voiced his strategic concerns about increased Soviet activity and capabilities in the Indian Ocean region and sought greater U.S. military involvement as a result because of concerns whether ANZUS would apply to events that came from the Indian Ocean region against Australia (Girling 1977). Decades later Fraser joined a growing number of critics of the nation's reliance on the Alliance and stated that it came from the "need for dependence on a major power lies deep in the Australian psyche – it is in our DNA" (2014, para 2). Fraser argued "after 1990, an opportunity for greater independence appeared, and the capacity to build a strategic capacity to be fully aster of our own decisions" and "since 1991, we have become more closely entwined and committed to U.S. policy than ever before" (2014, para 6; 7).

In January 1985, Prime Minister Bob Hawke's Labor government was forced to renege on an earlier agreement with the U.S., one first made by the Fraser government and then supported by Hawke, to allow the test flight of the new MX missile, an ICBM that would be launched from California and land in Australian waters (Evans 2014). Pressure had come from Cabinet ministers and caucus members to address "Hawke's

almost unthinking pro-Americanism" (Evans 2014, 55). The significance was that the decision came "in the context of the furore about New Zealand's attitude to nuclear ship visits" by Prime Minister David Lange's Labour Party, which had been elected in July 1984 (Evans 2014, 48). For that stance, New Zealand was suspended from ANZUS but a situation characterised by Catalinac (2010, 317) as an "intra-alliance opposition by a small state towards its stronger ally." The Alliance remained in place for Australia and continued beyond the "great confrontation" (Cleveland 2006), the formal conclusion of the Cold War that came with the dissolution of the Soviet Union (State Department US, 2020).

The alliance relationship strengthened both before and after the end of the Cold War. According to Kelly, the two "decisive eras being that of Hawke-Reagan and Howard-Bush" (Kelly 2021, para 9). That strategic partnership between Australia and the U.S. took on heightened significance after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. Before that momentous event, Evans characterised a "tyranny of dissonance" as an explanation for Australia's "strategic theory and its way of war" which had begun from the end of the Vietnam War in 1972 and into the second year of the Howard government in 1997, which saw the Defence of Australia as the standalone geostrategic doctrine which the ADF pursued on behalf of government policy (2005, 1). Later, Australian "declaratory strategic theory bore little resemblance to actual strategic practice, as demonstrated by later Australian military operations in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq" (Howard 2005, 2).

That watershed moment in global politics and international relations saw the Howard government invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first time (JSCFADT 2006, 5). Regional concerns about Australia's continued drive to have a modern defence force with the ability to project force far from its shore, and its willingness to partner alongside the U.S. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the unilateral invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Australia's then Federal Opposition Leader Kim Beazley claimed that such involvement had damaged the U.S Alliance. The first was the way diplomacy had been conducted in Washington and second, the negative impact "on the foundation of the alliance in Australian public opinion" (2007, 158). Beazley surmised that "broad support for the for the U.S. alliance in Australia must be built on a robust conviction that the alliance serves direct and specific Australian strategic interests, and that it constitutes a sound cost-effective strategic investment in Australia" (Beazley 2007,

158). Beazley described Australia's state of the ADF at the time of the 2003 Iraq War "reflects disarray in Australia's strategic policy" (2007, 160).

That momentous decision by the Howard government to invoke the ANZUS Treaty must be framed in the broader context of Australia's continued alliance management efforts towards the U.S. The justification provided by a government for the deployment of military power may be found in part to on alliance management and treaty obligations that is does not mean that it is neither an automatic nor uniform response towards the actions or expectations of a powerful ally. The use of military power can serve political ends however, to justify the means, it must serve in the interests of the state. All states operate in an anarchial world, and as described above, such a course of action to send force to war for alliance management can be a reasonable and appropriate approach, just as it can also be to not commit force overseas for war.

For over a generation since 1990, Australian governments, Labor and conservative, had approved the deployment of elements of the ADF to serve alongside U.S. led military operations in the Middle East region. Australia's executive government, led by the Prime Minister and selected Cabinet ministers, such as those with portfolio responsibilities for Defence, and Foreign Affairs and Trade, were tasked with a decision-making process to arrive at such an outcome. Those selected deployments of force were chosen from the force-in being available to each government at the time of the executive-level decision-making. For each government, when presented with their international security crisis centred on the Middle East region, they had available that force in-being which represented the only true and accurate reflection of what constituted their nation's true military power. That military force and its capabilities was in part the result of guiding key strategic documents, such as Defence White Papers, and the strategic approaches that came from them.

The geo-strategic significance of the Area of Operations for these three selected deployments of force, made during the period of an international security crisis, for involvement in eventual wars of choice, was that it was well outside of Australia's immediate region. The expeditionary nature and sustainment of those deployments of force, as well as resultant military operations, were conducted in the Middle East region. These northern hemisphere-based operations covered broad geographical areas, such as the maritime environment and littoral states of the Indian

Ocean region. Access to airspace over these regions during each selected war of choice were not uniform. However, the significance is that by sea and air, it extended Australia's military reach for warlike operations outside of its immediate region and well beyond its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The use of Australia's military power and overseas deployment of force for war became a demonstration of its continued state behaviour as an actor that is referred to in this research as a war fighting state. Three Australian governments during 1990–2014 deployed force for active service military operations in the Middle East region. The research's specific focus is on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region. In 1990, the Labor Government led by Prime Minister Bob Hawke committed elements of the ADF on Operation DAMASK, the crisis phase prior to the eventual 1991 Gulf War. Conservative Prime Minister John Howard's Coalition government deployed elements of the ADF as part of Operation BASTILLE in the crisis phase that precipitated the 2003 Iraq War. Over a decade later in 2014, conservative Prime Minister Tony Abbott's Coalition government also deployed elements of the ADF as part of Operation OKRA, which would be Australia's contribution to the International Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

From the beginning of the twenty first century, Australia was involved as an observer nation with NATO, a regional-delimited military structure where it deployed ADF troops served in Afghanistan alongside the International Security Assistance Force (IASF) in the immediate post-September 11 period until November 2002, where Australia was as a major coalition partner alongside the U.S. on combat operations in Afghanistan, as part of their overarching Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Soon after the withdrawal of the ADF in 2002 from Afghanistan, forces were readied for participation in the conduct of combat operations against Iraq, which began in March 2003. The ADF later redeployed to Afghanistan in August 2005 as part of ISAF (Brangwin and Rann, 2010, para 6). The ADF operated within the ISAF structure until 2014, and continued a scaled-down, in-country deployment until August 2021 (Pegram 2021). It is through the research and analysis of strategy and defence politics that the intersection between state and war can demonstrate how and why a state decides to deploy force overseas despite the apparent strategic inconsistency between its strategic outlook and approaches to war, military power, and strategy.

A key feature of the research into the selection of three of Australia's deployments to the Middle East region during 1990–2014 were alongside its most important strategic alliance partner. The U.S. Alliance continues to endure, and has for over 70 years despite several stressors (Edwards 2022). Recent challenges have included the 2016 election of the U.S. Trump Administration and resultant "isolationist, pacifistic extreme" policies towards Russia (Snow 2020, 379). Another is the shift from "cooperation to strategic competition" between Australia and the PRC (Raby 2020, 2). A third factor is the anarchical international system and the increase in levels of great power rivalry (Rodrik and Walt 2022). To prevent conflict between the Washington and Beijing, one that if it went to war would most likely involve Australia, former Australian Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2007–10; 2013) argues for "managed strategic competition" to prevent what he believes is an avoidable war (Rudd 2022, 2). For White (2022), he claims that the current trend of state behaviour by Australia and its alliance with the U.S. will result in the former's "sleepwalk" towards a war against China. It is a fair and reasonable undertaking to agree with his assessment that "the rise of China changes everything in Australia's international environment" (White 2019, 27).

Critical views of Australia's ongoing strategic reliance on the U.S. have continued to be raised. Barker questioned whether it has "passed its use-by date" and claims "that departing ANZUS would, in fact, have limited security consequences for Australia" (2011, para 7). Regarding increased levels of defence spending, Davies argued that Australia "will not achieve a self-reliant military" (2018, 43). Behm offered his blunt assessment to say that "ANZUS no longer has great strategic utility" (2022, 92). However, the strategic situation for Australia is claimed by Blaxland (2017, 19) that the situation is in "so much flux, Australia must hedge its bets by reinvigorating a broad range of regional bilateral and multilateral relationships, including with the United States." Meanwhile, the impact of the Australian government's lack of preparation for the likelihood of major power war is of consequential importance. As Jennings (2022, para 20) argued, Australia is "losing the opportunity to build a stronger ADF for the mid-2020s, the likely time of greatest strategic risk to the region since World War II", the paradox will be that its alliance is what it requires for its defence but will also be the main reason it enters into future war between the major powers.

4.7 Legal framework for war

The UN does not have a specific definition of war but uses aggression as its supplementary term which seeks to limits the use of force. It took considerable time and four UN committees before final agreement could be reached and its eventual adoption on 14 December 1974 as *General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), with the Definition of Aggression annexed to it* (Wilmshurst 2008, 1). Agreement on acceptance of the meaning of that term was delayed in part from those who did not want too strict a definition that would limit UN flexibility of action, while other actors considered it necessary for a clearly defined position to attend to the Cold War's unceasing proliferation of threats, such as the Suez Crisis (1956), Cuban Missile Crisis (1961), Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), as well as the protracted wars in Vietnam (Wilmshurst 2008, 2). The UN preference was for the term 'aggression' as a substitute term for what States would declare as 'acts of war'.

The UN legal definition of aggression can therefore be considered as the re-framing of acts of war. Aggression is defined in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) Article 1 as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition" (UN 1974, 143). An explanatory note added for the term State "includes the concept of a 'group of states' where appropriate" (UN 1974, 143). Article 3 outlines State actions which are considered aggression, even if they are conducted without the declaration of war. For example, of the seven subsection in Article 3, section (d) states: "An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State" (UN 1974, 143). Such an act of aggression would still be considered without hesitation or ambiguity by a State for what it truly represented, and that is an unequivocal act of war.

The Australian Constitution does not provide express guidance on who can declare war and that had created real uncertainty from the period of Federation until the *Statute of Westminster 1931* (UK) when it was uncertain "whether Australia [even] had the power to declare war" (McKeown and Jordan 2010). A declaration of a 'time of war' was made before that decade's end on 3 September 1939 when Prime Minister Robert Menzies of the United Australia Party stated on a radio broadcast to the nation that the due to Great Britain being at war, "as a result, Australia is also at war" (Freudenberg 2008, 204). Australian military support to Great Britain and the defence

of Empire was something Menzies soon realised that the threat in the Far East and Australia's strategic position in the Pacific was a "concern but not a priority" for the Imperial Service Chiefs in Whitehall (Henderson 2014). It was not until 1942 when John Curtin's Labor government ratified the *Statute of Westminster Adoption Act* (1942) and used that legislation to retrospectively declare war on the Axis powers (Gyngell 2017). According to Gyngell, that act by Curtin signalled the "indisputable marker of the nation's sovereignty as a full member of the international community" (2017, 10). It became a decisive shift from the unalloyed military support accorded to Great Britain and her Empire's strategic objectives to one that now focused on maintaining an enduring strategic partnership with the U.S. This juncture proved pivotal in Australia's later decisions to participate in several wars of choice.

The literal legal interpretation of the Australian Constitution and Defence legislation remains unclear on the specific powers of declaring war and the deployment of force. It is considered that the protocol and practice are now "matters for the Prime Minister and Cabinet and do not involve the Governor-General or the Federal Executive Council" (McKeown and Jordan 2010). Section 4 of the *Defence Act 1903* allows the Governor-General to declare a 'time of war' and according to McKeown and Jordan's interpretation of that power, it "appears to be a legal requirement or safeguard to ensure that legislation passed by the Commonwealth under section 51(vi) of the Constitution in support of the war effort is supported by the defence power" (2010). That power allows for the legislation of defence powers and the need for parliamentary approval. Crucially, it means that the Australian government does not actually need parliamentary approval to declare war and deploy force overseas, and neither is there any legislated parliamentary oversight for that.

Since the end of the Second World War, the Australian Government has not always adhered to the UN Charter's 2(4) *Prohibition of threat or use of force in international relations*, which expects State's sovereignty territorial integrity and political independence (UN, 2020). Two controversial examples are the wars in Vietnam (1962–72) and Iraq (2003). In both instances, Australia was the junior partner in U.S.-led military operations. Australia has otherwise generally sought approval of the UNSC before the engagement of hostilities or warlike operations (McKeown and Jordan 2010). The explicit reference to the powers of the UNSC on this matter are contained in Article 24 of the UN Charter, whereby they have "primary responsibilities

for the maintenance of international peace and security" (UN 1945). It would be considered illegal under international law if a State used force that was in contravention of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter or did not meet either of two related exceptions; self-defence (as per Article 51) or receive UNSC authorisation, as per chapter VII (Scott 2017). However, the veto power that can be invoked by any permanent member of the UNSC can prevent the collective action and international response against acts force and aggression.

The Australian Constitution provides the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia "power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to…the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth" (Australian Constitution, Section 51 (vi)). The Australian Constitution provides authority to the Commonwealth Government but is established through the *Defence Act 1903* which includes a concept for civil authority over the ADF (Australian Defence Force 2002). The role of the Command-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Force is vested in the Governor-General but exercises their powers on the advice provided by the Commonwealth Government, a role which is "entirely titular" (Thomson 2004, 15). Under the *Defence Act 1903*, it is the Minister for Defence who is responsible for the general control and administration of the ADF (Australian Defence Force 2002).

Management of a state's military is done at an institutional level by a bureaucratic department, which is not the same as the direct command of military operations. In the case of Australia, it is therefore "important not to confuse the day-to-day management of the Department of Defence with the command of military operations" (Thomson 2004, 14). In Australia, "the actual control of the ADF resides with the executive government through the National Security Committee of Cabinet" and while roles are shared between the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary in the management of the Department of Defence, "the Secretary plays no role in the command of the ADF" (Thomson 2004, 15).

The CDF and the Secretary of the Department of Defence jointly administer the defence force in a diarchal arrangement that is subject to, and in accordance, with any directions of the Minister. Further, under Australian law, the CDF is from one of the three Services and as the most senior officer, has command of the entire ADF. The

three Service Chiefs (Chief of Navy, Chief of Army and Chief of Air Force) are directly responsible to the CDF position of for the command of their respective Services. Accordingly, "as is the case with administration, the exercise of command must also be subject to and in accordance with any directions of the Minister" (Australian Defence Force 2002, 7). Beyond the Australian Government's domestic concerns and arrangements with the provision of national security and the defence of Australian and its national interests, there are also multilateral force which it strongly supports as an active participant. This is the case with "Australia is bound by, and strongly supports the provisions of, the United Nations Charter" and "in the maintenance of international peace and security, friendly relations among nations, and international cooperation, Australia has worked assiduously towards building world peace" (Australian Defence Force 2002, 8).

Just War Theory (*jus ad bellum*) is the main principle for when war can be considered lawful. Legal frameworks can make the use of force illegal in the eyes of the international community. Such legal frameworks also seek to frame how war is conducted, such as proportionality. The 'conduct in war' (*jus in bello*) is also for the mitigation of the worst excesses and non-use of certain types of weapons, such as landmines, cluster munitions and chemical weapons. *Jus in bello* has been expressed in *The Australian Approach to War* that: "While armed conflict nearly always involves death and destruction, the Law of Armed Conflict provides an internationally accepted 'code of conduct' that seeks to prevent the worst excesses of warfare" (2002, 8).

Australia has been an active participant in many international fora and includes UN-authorised peace operations. The Department of Defence states that by doing such activities, "Australia also seeks to ensure that events elsewhere in the world do not directly threaten its territorial integrity. More importantly, it ensures that Australia's regional and international interests are advanced." (2002, 8). As per the classical realist approach, such intentions however of the good global citizen operating within the RBGO, the threat to territorial integrity will most likely come from those states and major powers who challenge that order and ignore any sanction that may result from their use of military power through war. The Australian Government has stated at the time leading to the research's second case of the 2003 Iraq War, that: "Australia also adheres to the Law of Armed Conflict, which is the body of international law governing how armed force may be used legitimately in resolving conflict" (2002, 8).

The Law of Armed Conflict provided for the "humane treatment of prisoners; distinction between combatants and civilians; protection of objects of historical or cultural significance; and, prohibition of the use of certain kinds of weapons" (Australian Defence Force 2002, 08).

4.8 Summary

Liberal democratic states have the capacity to declare war, yet fewer willingly, or can, deploy military capabilities overseas. Sometimes that is the result of being in alignment with international law and the concept of self-defence, or in accordance to meet the mutual obligations bound within alliance treaties. More powerful states, liberal democratic or otherwise, can ignore such legal constraints or the norms of the RBGO. However, at a state-level unit of analysis, states which are liberal democracies more often operate within a politico-legal framework's where institutions provide checks and balances on what executive powers are permissible in the deployment and use of its military forces. The simple processes of citing key legal documents, such as a constitution and associated legislation, frame a state's powers and jurisdiction on matters regarding the use of armed force. In regard to the Commonwealth of Australia, that process is not so clearly spelt out. That was an issue ultimately overcome by the Australian public when the governments led by Hawke (1983–91), Howard (1996–2007) and Abbott (2013–15), each of whom deployed elements of the ADF to serve alongside the U.S. in the Middle East region on warlike operations centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region.

As the classical realist perspective appreciates, war is an unwanted presence in global politics but is a constant, if irregular, feature of the international system. The prevention of war is not achievable by legal means alone. Military power can deter war, though when it comes, compellence through kinetic responses are required for the defence of the state, its sovereignty, national interests, and citizens. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine is the expression, if unwanted, the military power remains a tool of statecraft in global politics. The prospect of future war between major powers, one that could see the U.S. involved, would also involve its allies and alliance partners alike, such as Australia. The deployment of Australia's military power in such a conflict would be most consequential, one that could escalate across all domains of

warfare and weapon types. It could be extrapolated from such a scenario that such a war could rapidly deteriorate into one that becomes existential in nature for all state's involved in such a war. Therefore, Australia might find the ADF deployed in such a future war between the major powers.

Chapter Five
Research Methods

5.1   Introduction

The research methods are employed for the purpose to examine whether Australia experienced strategic inconsistencies between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power and strategy. The identification of a strategic disconnect is that between its then current Defence White Paper and the actual force in-being when the government deployed force to the Middle East region in a war of choice. The research methods chosen are to conduct the systematic tracing between key defence and strategic documents and deployment of force to war. The data seeks to elicit evidence for a causal process that can confirm a link between Australia's approaches to defence and strategy in war represented a strategic disconnect. The research seeks to then determine whether Australia's use of military power in readiness for warfighting during these wars of choice between 1990–2014 were part of a longer trend towards a constructed security paradox. The significance is to identify how the misguided use of a state's military power had an impact on Australia's preparation of more consequential risks to its sovereignty, territory, national interests, and citizens.

The research will conduct content analysis of Defence White Papers against the ADFs military posture and force structure at three points in time, when the government deployed force to war. The specific date range for each case covers the deployment of force to an international security crisis which that preceded war. What this research seeks to prove is that it is during the period when a government decision to deploy a preparation force in readiness for commitment to war can be shown whether a strategic disconnect exists. The three operational deployments in preparation for war are: Operation DAMASK (1991 Gulf War); Operation BASTILLE (2003 Iraq War); and Operation OKRA, which is the operational deployment name from the beginning of the 2014 International Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

The selection of research methods are used to undertake a deductive approach at theory building to test whether Australia developed a constructed security paradox over the period these deployments fought in the Middle East region during 1990–2014. For such a condition to be valid, it will be tested whether Australia

experienced a strategic disconnect between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power and strategy. Three deployments were selected, each with a role of preparation for war during the international security crisis phase. These cases will test Australia's strategic inconsistency at the point when the pre-positioning of force was readied for use in war. The case study approach is outlined in a later section in this chapter, as are the quantitative and qualitative approaches is that are consistently employed across each case.

5.2 Research design

The research design has been built around a deductive theory building process. The research has been guided by the fact that strategy has utility for decision-makers, policymakers, and military commanders alike if they "need to counter challenges and align resources to obtain desired objectives" (Hoffman 2021, 112). Those objectives, either political or military, can be achieved by the application a strategic studies approach and its focus on the military. However, "the final purpose of strategy, too often overlooked, is the development of either missing capacity of the inadequate capability of an instrument of national power" (Hoffman 2021, 112). The Australian state, and its institutional use of military power through the ADF, can be assessed and analysed through a research design that has applied both quantitative and qualitative methods. The structure of military power in Australia is "the diarchy - the division of the management of Defence under the minister, between the Chief of the Defence Force and a civilian secretary" (Edwards 2006b, 264). The importance of investigating those two arms of Defence is that "civilians and military continue to contribute to advice on strategic and international policies and to decisions on force structure" (Edwards 2006b, 264).

The methodological approach incorporates classical realism and strategic studies, and their shared conceptual understanding of state, war, military power and the anarchial international system. This allows a research approach that will identify how military power can be used by the state in war. In doing so, it seeks to explore whether the deployment of force to war is against the interests of that state, and if the approaches employed are consistent with key, stated documents on defence and strategy. The research design included an aggregate of three wars of choice over the

period of 1990–2014, and their selection had to meet four criteria. First, an expeditionary force of elements from the ADF was deployed. Second, force was deployed in the same Area of Operations within the Middle East region but one that specifically centred operations on Iraq and the Persian Gulf region. Third, a minimum of one Service committed both personnel and platform(s) during the crisis phase before the onset of the 'war of choice'. Four, the decision to deploy force was not a result of a direct kinetic attack by a state against Australia's sovereignty or its citizens. None of those wars involved war between major powers. Each selected deployment is part of deductive theory testing to determine the presence of a deployment-specific strategic disconnect, or the collective representation of that over time created a constructed security paradox.

For comparative purposes, the dependent variable across each case is the deployment of force to the Middle East region. According to Roselle and Spray (2016, 10), "[p]olitical scientists refer to the circumstances, topics, policies, or phenomena that they want to understand as dependent variables." While this research is not conducted within the discipline of political science, or its approaches, the dependent variable has been chosen as the deployment of force to the same Middle East region and wider Persian Gulf region to identify whether that is a signal of a strategic disconnect in the Australian government's approach and actions towards war. While each case study is located within its political-historical context, there is a slight variation on the geographic-specific Area of Operations.

Each case is located within the same broad geographical frame of reference that these selected military operations deployed, and did so during the crisis phase in readiness for war. The dependent variable therefore in each case shares the same common geography, that all military operations centred on Iraq and the Persian Gulf region. In support to each operational deployment was a variety of other regions, with case-specific anomalies that was a result of the specific political-historical context of each crisis and resultant war. The geographical expanse of the regions were those in direct support of the three specific ADF operations and include, though not limited to, the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean region, in particular the Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden as well as other regions, such as Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean, and the Central Asian state of Kyrgyzstan.

The key Australian defence and strategy document to be examined is the Defence White Paper. As the research's independent variable, that document type remains constant across each case. There are also two intervening variables in each case, and they too are constant. The first intervening variable is the ADO's total personnel size. Data subsets on the ADF total personnel number versus the Department of Defence Australian Public Service (APS) numbers, as well as subsets of data regarding ADF numbers include by Service, permanent and reservist. The second intervening variable is Defence portfolio budget data, which provided the annual estimated and actual spending on defence. The data gathered on both intervening variables are sourced from the Department of Defence annual reports. The quantitative process develops tables to measure the scale of both intervening variables. That allows for analysis to be conducted against the independent variable, which is Australia's strategic position as per the Defence White Paper. That analysis allows the identification of the actual ADF force in-being at the time the government deployed force to a war of choice. Statistical analysis of the overall ADF military posture and force structure at the time of each deployment for war provides a quantitative measure of whether the independent variable signals government's strategic inconsistencies when it comes to the deployment of force to wars of choice.

5.3 Data collection and quantitative approach

The research conducted data collection from several sources for each selected case study. A quantitative approach was undertaken for data collection against two intervening variables: Defence portfolio funding and ADF personnel levels. The purpose is to analyse data from the financial year when an Australian government made the executive-level decision to deploy force into one of the three selected ADF operational deployments to the Middle East region. The scope of the data collection in each case study is broadened to include the financial year before and after each selected operational deployment. The three financial years create a data set for each case, and are as follows: Case One (C1): 1989–90 FY, 1990–91 FY, and 1991–92 FY; Case Two (C2): 2001–02 FY, 2002–03 FY, and 2003–04 FY; and Case Three (C3): 2012–13 FY, 2013–14 FY, and 2014–15 FY. The data is sourced from Department of Defence Annual Reports, and have been chosen as they are independently audited by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) and any identified errors or anomalies are

reported in the following year's annual report. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) also provides a very credible data source for the purpose of cross-referencing.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) also proves as a most credible and accurate source of defence budgets and matters regarding defence economics. Their annual *The Cost of Defence* began in 2002–03, and provides a host of data and information on budgets, defence economics and capability. There have been variations to the naming conventions for these series by ASPI, such as the *Your Defence Dollar: The 2004-05 Defence Budget*; their quantitative and qualitative assessments are all provided within the context of Australia's strategic environment. In the *ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2021–2002*, ASPI executive director Peter Jennings said: "Over those 20 years, I haven't seen as uncertain and potentially dangerous a strategic environment as the one Australia currently faces" (Hellyer 2021, 4). ASPI's frank assessment of the Australian Government's *2020 Defence Strategic Update* (DSU) was that "the DSU made the usual observations that things had changed faster than we had anticipated" (Hellyer 2021, 14). ASPI viewed the 2016 Defence White Paper "probably didn't get things broadly right" but "the DSU overturns many of those assumptions built into the 2016 DWP and Australian strategic thinking more broadly" (Hellyer 2021, 14).

Data on Defence budgets and personnel informs the level of interest governments deliver have towards the ADF, and is an indicator on the force posture size and budget that governments can call upon when military power is required to achieve political objectives. The case studies seek to test if a strategic disconnect was present when government deployed force to a war of choice. The significance is that while Defence has not always ranked as a government high priority, in the post-2014 period, the changed security environment accelerated, highlighted in the Morrison government's 2020 DSU and then followed by the Albanese government's 2022 *Defence Strategic Review*. The case study approach of Australian government's deployment of force during 1990–2014 against the budget and personnel size in those years can not only indicate a strategic disconnect, but whether a long-term trend persisted that the changing security environment was misaligned to the strategic approaches undertaken.

The context of defence budgets is that it can be illustrative of the significance government's accord the strategic environment. This can be shown by the Australian government's 2021–22 defence budget and that "as always, defence ranks low among

Australia's concerns, but there's growing mistrust of China, while support for the alliance with the US remains strong" (2021, 14). It was not until 2020–21, after "the ninth straight year of real growth" that the defence budget represented above two percent of GDP, at 2.04 percent (Hellyer 2021, 5). Hellyer's assessment of current defence economics for the ADF is that there is "$100 billion in investment in guided weapons planned and the policy for industrial fundamentals for local production in place, there are good prospects for a huge leap forward for military and industrial capability and the mitigation of supply chain risks" (Hellyer 2021b, para 9). While a decade's long objective by successive Labor and Liberal-National Party Coalition governments has been achieved, the 2020 DSU noted Australia's deteriorating strategic situation since the 2016 Defence White Paper, however, Hellyer noted that "Defence's funding model hasn't changed since then" (201b, para 17).

The importance of defence budgets and economic data is that they "provide a starting point for assessing efficiency in a nation's armed forces" (Hartley 2018, 53). It could be considered that the quantitative data provided from "[d]efence budgets appear to be a simple statement of annual miliary expenditure, but in fact they are the result of a variety of complex choices on resource allocation" (Hartley 2018, 54). When tested against other factors, such as what has been planned and documented in Defence White Papers, content analysis can demonstrate whether there exists misalignment between those documents, what is funded, the actual military capabilities, and where that force is deployed. Defence budgets provide forecasts for funding levels allocated for 'out-years', which provide an indication of a state's potential future force posture, which indicates the ADF's likely force structure, personnel numbers, and capabilities. Dependent on the program, its complexity, budget, and timeline, the successful acquisition of advanced weapons systems and platforms for its intended Service and their domain of warfare, can either singularly or in a joint environment, increase the ADFs capabilities.

The research design has sought to capture the exact funding levels governments provided at the time it made the decision to deploy force in the preparation phase of a war of choice. The data also selected for capture and interpretation is the size of the ADF. Therefore, the key indicators that bound the composition of the ADF and its force in-being is defence funding amounts and levels of personnel size. Those two indicators are independent variables which can are assessed against the same

dependent variable: the deployment of elements of the ADF to the Middle East region in government wars of choice. At points in C1, C2 and C3 are also expanded its reference to include the FY prior and afterwards. That design of the research is to extend a trend line for the year prior to the deployment of force when the international security crisis was not seen. Also, the FY after the deployment of force in the preparation phase year it was afforded to levels that allow for a credible force increased in the determination of prior strategic disconnects is more in alignment with the current strategic environment and reduced strategic warning time

5.4 Qualitative approach and document analysis

The independent variable for this research is the Defence White Paper. This document is a primary source of official government policy and the strategic direction it seeks to shape the strategic approaches of the ADF to achieve various objectives. The central objective of government policy is however the defence of Australia. This primary source document represents official government positions on defence and strategy. They are not released annually and allows for a qualitative assessment on whether the direction of governments for its military is in alignment when force is deployed for war. Further, Defence White Papers were chosen to determine whether a strategic disconnect existed at the time of those deployments to war in the Middle East region. A Defence White Paper is not enshrined in legislation, and provides a government manoeuvrability within an international security environment characterised by change and uncertainty.

These documents for the purpose of document analysis of official government statements and pronouncements regarding Australia's strategic environment, proposed force posture, planned acquisitions, defence and security policies, and the political-historical context of identified threats, current and emerging. The Defence White Papers chosen are those that immediately preceded each selected deployment. Those documents for each respective case study are: C1, *The Defence of Australia* (1987); C2, *Our Future Defence Force* (2000); and C3, *2013 Defence White Paper*. Other primary sources include Hansard records from the Senate and House of Representatives. They provided content from parliamentary debates and official statements made in the national parliament by the Prime Minister, Defence Minister,

and Cabinet ministers of the NCSS, and elected members of parliament. That source provided for the political-historical contextualisation for government decisions to deploy force to war.

These primary sourced documents are open-source and publicly available documents. They have been collected for document analysis, and grouped around the subject of government decisions and policy that relate to Australia's defence and security. According to Olsen (2012, para 2), this form of analysis provides a research method where "these documents have been created through ongoing day-to-day activities unrelated to the present research they can provide authentic records that shed light on multiple facets of the case." The source and content of these documents can also be validated as a correct public record and relevant to the research question. In regard to the verification of a document's authenticity, Merriam (1992) suggests researchers check under what circumstances and purpose that the document was published. The research will identify each Defence White Paper within its political-historical period. As the independent variable, these documents provide an official source of government statements about their position on military posture, force structure and strategic approaches. In conjunction with the intervening variables, a qualitative assessment on whether deployments to war in the Middle East region during 1990–2014 represented strategic disconnects.

5.5 Case study approach

The case study approach "if well-constructed, allows one to peer into the box of causality to the intermediate cases lying between some cause and its purported effect" with the effect that its value "also aid in theory development" Gerring (2004, 348). The qualitative approach will follow a case study approach, as a research method where it "can demonstrate a causal factor at work" (Sobek 2009, 9). Sobek recognised too that "qualitative analyses provide the opposition to trace casual mechanisms with a set of cases" and this "allows scholars to move closer to understanding causation as opposed to correlation" (2009, 10). Sobek (2009, 9) contrasted that with the quantitative approach because, while the use of statistics and data may conclude a single position, a few cases may "obfuscate a more general pattern". His criticism of a

quantitative analysis approach is that they "are exceptionally useful at finding generalizable correlations between variables" (Sobek 2009, 10).

The political-historical exploration of Australia's involvement in war for the first time since the Vietnam War is examined as a stand-alone case study that relates to the first case; Operation DAMASK. The purpose for a case study approach centred on that deployment of force is that it provided the opportunity for research and analysis on the political and strategic factors of the Hawke Government's decision to commit elements of the ADF to war. That decision during a pivotal international security crisis saw elements of military power deployed overseas in support of the U.S. led international coalition conduct operations against another state. The state's actions in the anarchical international system are explored in chapter seven but prior to that is a chapter that frames the case for war.

The research design employs a cross-case study approach as it offers a "causal pathway" between one case to the next (Gerring 2011, 1135). This research avoids biased case selection and chose the dependent variable as Australian government deployments of force to the Middle East region during 1990–2014. The time frame was chosen by the selection of three separate deployments that prepared Australia's involvement in war. Each case is represented by one of three operational deployments: Operations' DAMASK, BASTILLE and OKRA. In regard to Operation OKRA, the preparation phase of that operational deployment prior to almost immediate warlike operations into Northern Iraq and targets in Syria shared the same naming convention for the operation, both preparation phase and actual in-country training of Iraqi security forces and warfighting against Daesh.

The preparation phase for war in each selected operation was chosen for analysis as it provided not just the government's decision to deploy force, or what was agreed for deployment, but how that stood in relation to their current strategic approach. The research design allows for each case to identify what the ADF's budget and personnel size was during the financial year of the actual individual operational deployment. Governments had the ability to choose from the force in-being at the time of the crisis, from across the ADF's three Services, respective platforms, assets, and personnel numbers. The cross-case study allowed for the testing of the research question which is whether there existed a strategic disconnect in one or more of the cases of operational deployment, and if it did, whether that created a constructed

security paradox over the longer term between 1990–2014. This approach follows the pathway of conjecture, and not refutation.

The quantitative and qualitative research methods employed utilised as part of the research design locates each case within its political-historical context. The research design has followed an "empirical process, [where] theoretical formulations are accepted only when they are confirmed in a test in the sample from which the proposition was built" (Hak and Dul 2012). While not strictly a theory-building process, the empirical evidence over the three cases is taken at those specific times to see whether there was a sustained, long-term ability by government to provide clear and articulate direction on strategic approaches that aligned with their decision to deploy force on three wars of choice in the Middle East region.

Australia's continued willingness for behaviour as a war-fighting state may sound extremis but on each occasion of each of the three selected cases, was part of a U.S. led alliance. In those three wars, the Australian government was successful in the deployment of a small element of its overall military power, and represented a small part of the overall U.S. military force. Hence, since 1990, when Australian governments has deployed force for war in the Middle East region, it provided on each occasion a relatively small, yet niche and professional, capability to the overall U.S. led war effort. Therefore, the test for whether a constructed security paradox appeared during 1990–2014 is the level of annual defence spending, each financial year, and the personnel numbers of full-time and reservist uniformed members. Despite the ADF's high operational tempo since its deployment to East Timor in 1999, it ramped up post 9/11. The ADF is relatively small given the size of the nation's population, and its Defence budget fell below two per cent and remained under that threshold until 2021–22 (Hellyer 2021, 5). Meanwhile, Australia continued to participate in warlike operations that can be classified as wars of choice.

The involvement of Australia as a regular participant on the global stage as a war-fighting state is one that has its contradictions. Since the end of the Cold War, the ADF has participated in numerous operations in the Middle East region, of which the research design selected just three. The rationale is that they all met the criteria as a war of choice and were also in preparation during an international security crisis that resulted in wars against the Iraqi state (1991 and 2003), and against a non-state terrorist organisation that had invaded Iraq (2014). The next chapter explores the political-

historical contextualisation of the Iraqi state up to the period when the regime of Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. That event precipitated an international security crisis which saw states such as Australia, respond with the deployment of elements of its military, which later became involved in the 1991 Gulf War.

5.6 Limitations

The main limitation is that classified material from more two later deployments for C2 and C3 yet to be declassified and released by the Australian National Archives. Cabinet documents that relate to those two case studies remain classified. They could have provided information on government deliberations on the deployment of force on Operations' BASTILLE and OKRA. However, the research design has been solely based on the collection, collation, and analysis of open-source materials. Those primary source materials included Department of Defence annual reports, Defence White Papers, and Hansard for parliamentary debates and official statements.

A host of secondary sources have been acquired from international defence libraries, think-tanks, government agencies and departments. Peer reviewed journal articles on security, strategic and defence studies as well as international relations, politics and history have informed the research design and analysis of the material collected. However, there are no electronic Department of Defence annual reports for the period which covers C1 (i.e. 1989–92). With the closure of many Defence libraries in the past three-years, hard copies of those annual reports were eventually sourced. The data was then available for the construction of quantitative tables in C1.

In summary, the research design and methods employed are based on methodological reflexivity (Deschaux-Dutard 2018). While it can be claimed "that one method is not better suited for defence studies than another," this approach "necessitates reflexivity so as to explain the conditions under which data is constructed" (Deschaux-Dutard 2018, 48). Methodology, such as "blended methodologies" (Soeters, Shields and Rietjens 2014), "should remain a problem or research-driven issue (Deschaux-Dutard, 2018, 48). The research collected a range of open-source primary material for analysis, with each case located within its specific

political-historical context but it is the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches that make it possible for a thematic analysis across the cases (Coffey 2013).

5.7 Summary

Strategy is a methodological approach, strategy can "be used to solve specific types of problems. These are problems where an objective – an endpoint – can be defined. The strategy adopted may not succeed, but the intention is to try to achieve this desired outcome" (Layton 2022, 106). The problem statement behind this research has been guided by the question "what is it all about?" and to then explore that by identifying "the salient characteristics of the strategic situation" (Heffington, Oler and Tretler 2019, 9). Therefore, this research design has approached methods that address exploring whether strategic disconnects have existed and whether that created a longer-term issue for Australia's approaches towards defence and security. Data that has been sourced which provides accurate annual Defence portfolio funding levels as well as ADF personnel numbers. That statistical data represents not just the financial year in which the pre-deployment and warfighting operations took place, but the financial year prior, and after, each case and its selected deployment of force.

The cross-case study approach provides for a long-term trendline regarding Australia's approaches to defence and strategy and provides a measure of whether government consistency was present during 1990–2014. The research design and its methods have informed this dissertation's conceptual framework, which is to examine the presence of a strategic disconnect in Australia's defence and strategy policies and the deployment of force to wars of choice. That will then determine whether Australia developed over the longer-term a constructed security paradox, a situation whereby the Australian government invested in defence and deployed force to wars of choice yet was in misalignment to its stated and actual strategic approaches while not adequately preparing for involvement in more consequential future threats, such as major power war.

Chapter Six

Causes and Context for Australia's Military Involvement in the Middle East Area of Operations

6.1 Introduction

In August 1990, the Gulf Crisis came as a result of Iraqi state aggression, borne out by its invasion of Kuwait. That state act of war came from a collection of related political and strategic motivations that were a continuation of Iraq's political-historical arc, one in which saw the involvement of Australia's military power as part of U.S. led international coalitions of force in three wars that were centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region. This chapter provides political-historical context for Iraq's eventual rise as a modern state and regional power that used military power in war, actions which directly created international security crisis that drew Australian armed forces into the region. The first Australian deployment of elements of the ADF began in 1990, and after the preparation phase, resulted in war in January 1991. This signalled the first of what would be three wars over the period 1990–2014 in which the Australian government would deploy its military out of region and centre military operations on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region.

Iraq's modern history was characterised by periods of European imperialism and major power occupation, internal struggles, and war. The trajectory towards statehood and becoming a regional power with large-scale land forces saw the Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein use its military power in war to further political objectives. Iran was invaded in 1980 and during its eight-year war, Iraq was supported by the West, including Australia. This chapter explores the political-historical contextualisation of how the Iraqi state deployed military power for the acquisition of political and strategic objectives up to period when it invaded Kuwait. The political-historical period explored in this chapter begins during the Ottoman Empire's final years and ends with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The analysis of this period provides a foundational understanding of Iraq's political-historical trajectory for the reasons why it used force against two regional states. In the case of the Gulf Crisis (1990–91) and resultant 1991 Gulf War, this chapter's contextual background provides an appreciation of the strategic environment in which state aggression was deployed against a smaller state, and would see Australia deploy the ADF into the region.

The cause for that war and the justification by the Iraq came well before that invasion. As an authoritarian state led by an autocratic dictator, Iraq had previously demonstrated a decade earlier a precedence and its preference for the use of force against internal and external threat actors, both state and non-state. This chapter outlines the significant historical and political foundational events which not only posited Iraq's strategic position within the geo-political strategic environment within the construct of the Middle East region, but the trajectory which Saddam's regime used force in war. To provide the necessary political-historical contextualisation on this subject matter, this section begins with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War and continues through to the Iraqi state's culminating point with the West when Saddam's regime invaded Kuwait.

6.2   Fall of Ottoman Empire and rise of the modern Iraqi state

The formative modern-state history of Iraq came at the end of the Ottoman caliphate and the creation of colonial protectorates by the victorious Allies. In July 1918, the death of Mehmet V saw power handed to Mehmet VI, and the new Ottoman sultanate-caliphate signed a treaty with the British and French on 20 October 1918 at Mudros (Kennedy 2016). That treaty favoured European powers and came two-weeks before the 11 November 1918 Armistice, which marked not just the cessation of hostilities on the Western Front, but an end to the First World War (Kennedy 2016). The Ottoman Empire shrank further with the August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which delivered further territorial losses and the creation of what were effectively zones of occupation, with the Ottoman state reduced to an area around Anatolia (Kennedy 2016). In 1922, the Nationalists drove the Greeks from Turkey, and their victorious leader, Kamal Ataturk declared on 1 November 1922 the abolishment of the sultanate and separation of the caliphate from the new Turkish state (Kennedy 2016). This ended the Ottoman Empire's 600-year reign (1286 – 1922) (Karpat 2001). The declaration of a republic on 24 March 1924 came soon after the deposing of the new Caliph, Abd al-Majid II (19 November 1922 - 3 March 1923) (Kennedy 2016). The end of the office of the caliph and its 101st Sunni ruler also signalled a period when most of the Muslim lands had now come under European colonial rule (Kazimi 2008).

The territory that would eventually become the Iraqi state had long held a geostrategic importance which the British had recognised well before the demise of the Ottoman Empire. As Robertson stated, "the history of Iraq has been mightily influenced by Iraq's geographical situation" (2015, 34). Britain's decades-long interest in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf region was not just because it was located on the western approaches to imperial-controlled India, but as a major power, it wanted to uphold its political and commercial dominance in the region (Kent 1996, 165). That region constituted the outer territories to the 'Great Game', a major power contestation and rivalry between Britain and Russia over Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier during the nineteenth century, and into the early twentieth century (Wyatt 2011).

The discovery of oil in neighbouring Persia in the early twentieth century, that area of present-day Iraq, increased the strategic relevance of that region on a scale that had not previously existed (Yergin 2008). The outbreak of the First World War gave Britain cause to avoid Ottoman domination of Iraq for several reasons. The first was its desire to protect the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oilfields in Persia and to keep open its lines of communication into India but of utmost strategic significance was that by 1914, the Royal Navy's (RN) fleet had undergone a conversion from coal-power to oil (Yergin 2008). The shift in energy type for the world's largest navy meant that the RN became heavily reliant on oil from the Persian Gulf region so it could maintain its dominance as a major power as well as project power globally. To that end, Britain's seizure of Iraq's southern oilfields and maintaining a grip on its energy security needs became a strategic priority (Crowley 2004, 336).

The British suffered its worst defeat by the Ottoman Empire in the First World War at Kut-al-Amara. The eventual reversal of that defeat would set the scene for the direct political interference in Iraq by the British government for almost another three decades (Robertson 2015). When British forces retook Kut-al-Amara, General Maude's forces advanced unopposed into Baghdad on 11 March 1917 but the strategically important oilfields around Mosul in northern Mesopotamia remained under Ottoman control until war's end with Turkey on 29 October 1918 (Robertson 2015, 248). Mosul's oilfields were later captured within a week, falling to the British on 3 November 1918 (UK National Archives, 2020). At the end of the First World War, Britain would remain ensconced in several Ottoman provinces. In 1920, this European major power acquired a mandate which gained official formalisation two

years later from the League of Nations for the creation of a Mesopotamian state (Robertson 2015).

The Kingdom of Iraq came into existence at the 1921 Cairo Conference (Porch 2008, 19). The construction of the new state came from the merging of three former Ottoman administrative regions, or *vilayets* which included Mosul in the north, Baghdad in the central region, and Basra in the south (Tripp 2007). While this arrangement was the foundation for the modern state of Iraq, it "was an artificial entity with no clear source of national identity" (Dannreuther 1991, 5). Divisions were already present in this new, artificially created attempt at state-building and would remain in place for successive generations. The Kurds in the north saw themselves as separate to the rest of the Arab population, and the ethnic Sunni and Shi'i were vehemently opposed, while Britain continued the Ottoman policy of the locus of administrative control to remain in Baghdad but continued with the Sunni minority to have rule over civil administration of the state (Robertson 2015, 253). However, foreign intervention by Britain for the best part of nearly two decades in its attempts to create a stable, liberal sovereign state would fail (Dodge 2006).

Iraq's post-war period was punctuated with continuous and destabilising rebellions and uprisings. The internal conflict waged against its imperial occupiers was in response to the outcomes of European diplomatic decisions and the impact of imperialism. Mather (2014) has argued there remains direct links from that period to the present, and the rise of Islamic State. Britain and France's Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 was "cartographic conniving" in 1920, underwent formal ratification between the victorious allies and the defeated Ottomans with the resultant Treaty of Sèvres, and later "abrogated in favour of the Treaty of Lausanne" (Karber 2012 152). Meanwhile, the Iraqi Revolt of June 1920 was a direct response to occupation and colonialism. A wide array of religious and ethnic groups attacked British and Indian colonial troops, but the four-month rebellion ultimately failed due to a lack of cohesion and coordination (Robertson 2015, 254).

During the Second World War, vital to Great Britain's war effort and Churchill's broader Mediterranean strategy, was to secure the continued westward flow of oil along the Kirkuk to Haifa pipeline (Delaney 2002). The decision to conduct military action against Iraq had the strategic intention of the halt to further Axis intervention in that part of the Middle East for the remainder of the war and to protect

144

neighbouring Persia's oil fields (Porch 2002). After the removal of the pro-Axis government and having fought off an underwhelming German attack, Iraq came under British occupation for the remainder of the Second World War.

The failure was that "no uniformly thought-out plan was developed for the exploitation of the Arab nationalist movements" (Nicosia 1980, 366). The British had an effective strategy that served its interests and saw off the Nazi threat but left woefully unresolved was the growing hatred among Iraqis to such foreign interference. Not long after the retaking of Baghdad on 1 June 1941, the British soon after installed a pro-British regent (Porch 2008). This nominal figurehead may have been pro-Allie, but the position's weakness came from a reliance on the very forces which represented the "Second British Occupation" (Wichhart 2013). One RAN vessel, HMAS *Yarra*, was the sole Australian contribution as part of the British-led military operations conducted against Iraq during 1941 (Pelvin 2003).

6.3 Saddam Hussein's accession to power

Saddam's rise to power was a relatively slow but calculated. Revolution toppled the monarchy in 1958 and Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qassem became president of the new Iraqi republic (Robertson 2015, 280). The state remained authoritarian in structure and conduct, but Qassem was not immune from continuous threats to his rule, having to deal with numerous coup attempts (Dannreuther 1991). Until his departure in 1963, his final two years of rule included a civil war fought against the Kurds (Robertson 2015, 281). The Baath Party regained power briefly from February-November 1963 but were ousted, and it was not until July 1968 that they staged their counter-military coup, regained power and installed one of their military officers, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr (Robertson 2015, 281). One of his main trusted deputies was Saddam, who waited until July 1979 to strike out and use his "power base to take over the mantle of President and ease Bakr out to retirement" (Dannreuther 1991, 6). The road to power was patient and methodical but led nonetheless to that as supreme ruler of the oil-rich Iraqi state.

The history of the modern Iraqi state has a close association with oil, that most highly desired strategic commodity. The discovery of oil in Iraq instantly accorded that region a heightened strategic significance. In 1926, British Petroleum (BP)

discovered the first commercial oil reserves in Iraq to the north, at Khanaqin in the Kurdish administrative area (Karber 2012, 152). The following year on October 27, a major landlocked oilfield was discovered near Kirkuk, and its first productive oil well was drilled at Baba Dome (OPEC, 2020). In 1929, the Turkish Petroleum Company, which had previously been founded in 1911, was renamed the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) but its internal structure "referred to the three associated companies incorporated in Britain and based in London" (Saul 2007, 747). The political and economic significance was that they held the monopoly on all of Iraq's oil production until 1940 (Saul 2007). The control and ownership of oil cemented Iraq's ongoing strategic significance for Britain. This state of affairs continued as Iraq was second only to Iran as the major Middle Eastern oil producer state but in 1946, fell to third position to Saudi Arabia, and in 1950, dropped a further place to Kuwait (Saul 2007, 747). All three regional states would be considered by Saddam to represent not simply as rivals but as inter-state threats to his regime's survival.

Iraq was a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), along with the oil producing developing states of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela (McLean and McMillan 2003, 385). The establishment of OPEC took place at the Baghdad Conference on 10-14 September 1960 with the stated objective to "coordinate and unify petroleum policies among member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers" (OPEC 2020b). The international oil market at that time was dominated by the French national oil company *Compagnie Française des Pétroles* (now Total) and the group of 'Seven Sisters' oil companies. The Seven Sisters was comprised of "four U.S. firms that cooperated to form Aramco in 1947 to develop Saudi oil: Jersey (later Exxon), Socony-Vacuum (later Mobil), Standard of California (later Chevron), and Texaco" (Singer 2008, 125). The other three 'sisters' were Gulf, Royal Dutch/Shell and BP, which after the Second World War, developed Kuwaiti oil for global markets (Singer 2008, 125). The domination by Anglo-American oil companies, their comprehensive ownership arrangements, extraction, and production of oil would eventually be challenged by OPEC, and would have a significant and lasting effect on the geo-politics of the greater Middle East region (OPEC 2020b).

The intersection of politics and economics framed the nationalisation of Iraq's oil industry. While the intent of the OPEC membership "was to check and control the

majors as much as possible through collective action", the hawks among the organisation deigned to interpret the Statement as "the nationalisation of the Arab petroleum industry was a national necessity" (Matsumura 1972, 31; 34). The Iraqi government had successfully produced and marketed oil through the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), with Western and Eastern bloc nations involved in INOCs output (Dietrich 2011). In June 1972, the Baath government nationalised the IPC, and was the singular act that effectively put an end to foreign oil companies operating in Iraq (Dietrich 2011). That action is considered as a collision between the concept of raw material sovereignty "with an important orthodoxy of the early Cold War: energy security" (Dietrich 2011, 451).

6.4 The autocratic state and war with Iran, 1980-88

Saddam's undemocratic accession as Iraq's autocratic ruler in 1979 came decades after the states' independence and only several years after the previous regime had nationalised the oil industry. The long gestation period of Saddam's political ambition delivered him absolute power of, and control over, the Baath party. As supreme ruler, his political party had gained post-independence power for several periods before his eventual entry to the leadership of the state. The political, economic, and social conditions inherited from the colonial period and foreign interference, by major powers and their transnational commercial entities exploited and hampered the new state and would feed a false narrative that could be falsified to explain away the need to act in an aggressive manner, not just against domestic actors, but those states which shared its borders. For Iraq, it would export force and hostile, antagonistic actions well beyond its borders, as it did against Israel. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Iraq deployed approximately 100 aircraft, over 300 armoured tanks, and approximately 18,000 troops to fight alongside the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces (Terrill 2000). The impact of those forces was hugely overstated. Iraq falsely asserted to have prevented the fall of Damascus from possible Israeli occupation, but its actions on the Golan Heights did slow the Israeli Defence Force's northern advance (Terrill 2000). It became a recurrent theme that the Iraqi leadership would overstate the fighting ability of its forces, regardless of the actual outcome.

The Iraqi state created a foundational national narrative, reinforced by a cult of personality that centred upon Saddam's guiding leadership of the state against an array of intra- and inter-state security threats. An attempt of "cooperative foreign policy reciprocity" with Iran during the 1970s marked a period of détente between the two states (Donovan 2011, 68). It culminated in the Algiers Agreement (also 'Algiers Accord') of 13 June 1975 and delivered a two-state acceptance regarding the "demarcation of the land frontier" of the Shatt al-Arab waterway (UN, n.d.). This strategic waterway was at the joint mouth of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, which formed a channel to the Persian Gulf (The Times 2006, 78-79). It was a vital link for the export of oil and the import of agricultural commodities.

The Algiers Agreement did not end Kurdish independence aspirations, but it aided Iraqi strangulation of their lines of communication from Iran. The period of 1975–79 witnessed a period of détente between Baghdad and Tehran, where this period of normalisation of inter-state relations saw the "solidification of Iraqi domestic control and Iranian regional dominance" (Donovan 2011, 68). The end of the decade marked a departure from the Algiers Agreement, which had given away territory for the withdrawal of Iranian "military support from the destabilizing Kurdish separatist movement in northern Iraq" (Donovan 2011, 104-105). Iraq exploited Iran's revolution and changed domestic political situation for its own ends. On 17 September 1980, in the prelude to war with Iran, Saddam appeared on television and in theatrical flourish, tore up the Algiers Agreement (Tabaar 2019, 484). That act put an end to that diplomatic agreement, and the use of force loomed against their neighbouring sovereign state. Karsh argued that Saddam's behaviour, in the prelude for this looming war, and later against Kuwait, "lie in his chronic political insecurity and the lengths to which this drove him", occupied his "permanently beleaguered mind" (Karsh 2003, 169). The assessment from this research concurs with Karsh (2003, 169), that Saddam's approach to politics was one of "ceaseless struggle for survival, where the ultimate goal of staying alive in power justifies all means."

The exploitation of external events within the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic of Iran served Saddam to consolidate his domestic standing and extend his political influence throughout the Persian Gulf region. The Iran-Iraq (1980–88) war was not inconsequential. It became "one of the largest conflicts of the twentieth-century" (Murray and Woods 2013, 33) and one its longest (Tabaar 2019). Entry into

this war by both states is considered by Murray and Woods (2003, 49) as one marked by "incompetence" as well as "deeply flawed assumptions." One factor behind Iraq's decision for war was weighed against the risk it might cause unrest among its Shi'i population over an opportunity to capitalise on the internal dislocation caused by the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution (Dannreuther 1991). On 22 September 1980, Saddam ordered the military invasion of Iran, but its immediate air and land offensives gave no "sense of achieving significant strategic or operational gains" (Murray and Woods 2013, 38).

The Iran-Iraq War's area of operations expanded beyond these states and into the Persian Gulf region due to a shift in the selection of targets which sought to acquire tactical and strategic advantages. During the first three years of the war, Iran absorbed and did not retaliate to indiscriminate Iraqi naval and air campaigns launched against Iranian shipping, critical infrastructure, and energy nodes ("The Tanker War" 1992). Targets included oil platforms, refineries, and pipelines on Kharg and Sirri Islands, as well as sites at Bushehr, Shiraz, Khorrasmshrar, Ahvas, and Bandar Khomeini ("The Tanker War" 1992). The Tanker War officially began on 27 March 1984 when an Iraqi air force Super- Étendard fired an Exocet AM–39 missile against the Greek oil tanker *Filikon L.* as it departed Kuwait, a moment when "Iran became the principal belligerent in a campaign of attrition against tankers." ("The Tanker War in the Gulf, 1984–88" 1992, para. 2). The rationale behind that attack was in response to Iran's ground force advances, and was Iraq's attempt to cripple Iran's economy by disrupting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf ("The Tanker War" 1992). From 1984 onwards, Iran and Iraq targeted international shipping and oil tankers, and between 1981 to war's end, "approximately 60 per cent (340 out of 550) of ships hit were tankers." ("The Beginning of the Tanker War" 1992, para. 3).

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad received Western support, as well as that from Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saddam was fully aware that the U.S. "was the most influential power in the Middle East during the post-war period, and its policies helped shape the geo-political context within which rulers like Saddam operated" (Brands and Palkki 2012, 625). Meanwhile, Russia resumed its "traditional alliance with Iraq" and provided them military hardware but that came only after Tehran had "rebuffed" Russia's overtures (Dannreuther 1991, 10). Saddam's overture to the West stood at pole's end to its relationship to that bloc during the 1970s,

when it was the pariah state for its sponsorship of terrorism, direct stance against Israel and anti-Zionism (Dannreuther 1991, 20). The start of a new decade saw Iraq pre-emptively launch a war against Iran, against a state the U.S. reviled far more than Iraq. Saddam was now perceived positively by the West and his actions tempered accordingly to align with the moderate Arab axis of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and resulted in his 1982 decision to support a political Arab-Israeli solution and outwardly tone down his anti-Zionist rhetoric (Dannreuther 1991). Brands and Palkki (2012, 626) noted that "what is remarkable about Saddam's view of the United States is how consistently and virulently hostile it was." Saddam's view came in part from the U.S. ongoing support for Israel, and to the Kurds during the 1970s but such "apprehension did not prevent Saddam from doing business with Washington when his interests dictated" (Brands and Palkki 2012, 626).

Saddam Hussein's short-term concessions were to guarantee the flow of military hardware and materiel in his nation's war against Iran. Saddam's nuclear ambitions suffered a major reversal when a cross-border Israeli air raid on 7 June 1981 destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor, conducted by Israel in an "act of national self-defense" (Boudreau 1993, 24). Despite the destruction of the Osirak reactor, Saddam's outward anti-Israeli rhetoric remained muted. To alter his outward hatred of Israel in the short-term was simple *realpolitik* in action. The strategic objective remained unmoved, and "the nuclear weapons program experienced a consistently high growth rate, despite general economic hardship during the Iran-Iraq War" (Braut-Hegghammer 2011, 117). Towards war's end and despite massive debt, the Al-Hussein Project shifted away from nuclear research and development to one of weaponisation and deployability (Braut-Hegghammer 2011, 123-124). In January 1989, the full reactivation Iraq's nuclear programme began with a focus on weapons design and came under the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (Braut-Hegghammer 2011, 124). With an estimated cost between USD\$5–10 billion, to achieve that weapons platform, both the weapon and its delivery system, accounted for slightly less than one-sixth of Iraq's entire annual gross domestic product (Dannreuther 1991). Despite the ravages of war, the militarisation of Iraq continued and pursued technological advances which it would leverage against states in the Persian Gulf region.

6.5 Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, 1990-91

The Iraqi state borders inherited from the Mandate period meant it provided Saddam's regime with a justification to right the historical wrongs imposed on it by European imperial powers. Iraq created a world view that linked Kuwait, a much smaller sovereign state, as a threat to its security and had to be corrected by force if necessary. The Iraqi government on occasion "asserted its claim" over Kuwait, arguing it "had been part of the Basra vilayet during the Ottoman occupation" whose shared borders "had never been demarcated by a bilateral agreement" (Dannreuther 1991, 16). Much to Iraq's consternation, and then anger, Kuwait steadfastly refused to enter formal discussion to resolve the issue (Dannreuther 1991, 16).

Geo-politics and sovereignty had intersected with domestic intra-state factors which the debt and economic pressures that had been a result of eight-years of war with Iran. Iraq's concern regarding the continued impact that adverse economic conditions was having on the regime was a key factor in Saddam's decision to use force against Kuwait (Freedman and Karsh 1995). By the end of its war against Iran, Iraq had already exhausted its USD$100 billion surplus (Lewis 2007, 319). Further, the Iraqi state was further weakened with USD$70 billion in debt (Stoessinger 2001, 195). Failed debt relief attempts meant that its internal economic situation demanded a political solution, which for Saddam, was geographical and lay adjacent to his borders. Kuwait resumed its inter-state relations with both Iraq and Iran after those two nations had concluded their war. Kuwait's future difficulties with Saddam's regime came from its unwillingness and unresponsiveness to write-off wartime loans it had provided to Iraq during 1980–88 (Carlisle 2010). The cost of war for Iraq was very much financial as it was political, economic, and strategic.

Iraq conflated the alleged injustices and economic sacrifices that the state had suffered in efforts to leverage ongoing inter-state territorial disputes. Kuwait had long refused "to cede or lease the two northern islands of Warbah and Bubiyan, which would have given Iraq greater access to the Gulf" (Dannreuther 1991, 16). The geo-political significance of those strategically located islands are their location at the mouth of the delta to the Shatt al-Arab waterway, northeast of Kuwait Bay. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait protected its national interests and denied Iraq access or possession of Bubiyan Island (Gray 1991, 5). That decision resulted in a direct economic impact for Iraq and resulted in the loss of revenue from potential oil

exports. This was not the only disputed territorial matter that existed between these two states. The al-Rumaila oilfield was a disputed border region between Iraq and Kuwait, which Saddam accused the small kingdom of stealing USD$2.4 billion worth of oil and drilling diagonal oil wells into the Iraqi side of the border (Carlisle 2010, 26-27). In 1990, the cause for Iraq's growing dire economic situation was falsely levelled against the smaller neighbouring state to its south. This was a situation Iraq would use to give cause for war and the use of military force.

Saddam's tenure as Iraq's supreme political leader and military commander (1979–2003) was characterised by his use of force against both domestic and external threats. There were no limitations on his excesses as he commanded absolute control of the state institutions, such as the judiciary and legal system as well as the violent subjugation of oppositional forces, whether armed or political in nature. The amassed internal security apparatus, from intelligence, police, to his armed forces ensured Saddam's power for 24 years. His authoritarian rule maintained the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his state at the cost of his citizens civil and human rights but through military power deployed against other states, and intra-state actors, he attempted to maintain control over the Iraqi state. His inter-state use of military force began in 1980 against Iran, and once again in 1990 against Kuwait. However, to fund the large budget expenditures for large-scale military forces required a steady revenue stream which predominately came from oil production. During 1985–90, Iraq had used that oil revenue to become the world's single largest importer of weapons (McKinley 1991).

While in direct competition with other Persian Gulf region states for a share of the global oil market, in 1990 Iraq possessed thirteen percent of the world's then known oil reserves (Oil and Gas Journal, 1991). During 1972–90, Iraq produced approximately 22 billion barrels of oil (Oil and Gas Journal, 1991b). Over that same period, the wealth amassed from oil revenues funded military expenditure to a value of over USD$100 billion (Cordesman 1994, 69). Output over the decade up to the Gulf War delivered annual revenues between USD$6.8 billion to USD$26 billion (CIA, 1991). In 1990, Iraq's average daily oil production rate stood at approximately two million barrels (CIA, 1991) but the significance of oil revenue had "always been the single most important source of the country's economic viability, growth and reconstruction" (Alnasrawi 1992, 340). The eight-year war with Iran had resulted in

catastrophic economic losses, compounded by the destruction of its southern oil-producing capacity. According to Mofid, despite a "drastic fall in Iraq's foreign exchange earnings" from war against Iran, military expenditure had continued to increase but was made possible through the financial support of many states but, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1990, 41). As a headline figure, it was estimated that the economic cost of war for Iraq "amounted to USD\$452.6 billion" (Alnasrawi 1992, 336). That meant on an annual basis "Iraq lost the equivalent of 112 percent of its GNP every year for the period of the war, 1980–88" (Alnasrawi 1992, 336). Over the same period, Iraq's oil production amounted to USD\$103.9 billion but there was a calculated loss of 435 percent of its oil revenue (Alnasrawi 1992).

The significance of sustained economic losses from reduced oil revenue during the Iran-Iraq War resulted in less gross national income for the state. Large-scale military expenditure had continued and gave Iraq an ability to bring compellence on some Gulf-based states. A decline in the price of oil placed severe pressure on Iraq's revenues. Between January and April 1990, the price of a barrel of oil declined by 30 percent to USD\$13.67, which it was estimated that "for every USD\$1 decline in the price of oil, Iraq lost \$1 billion per year" (Alnasrawi 1992, 341). Despite budgetary pressures from the continued fall in the price of oil, Iraq maintained high levels of expenditure for its military. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (1990–91; 1991–92) claimed that in 1990, Iraq spent approximately \$8.6 billion on military expenditure. Cordesman noted "there is no way to relate this figure to what Iraq had to spend on the Gulf War" (1994, 70). Similarly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2021) provides no data for Iraq's military expenditure during 1988–2003. Similarly, the World Bank (2021) also has no data for an even more extended period, from 1982–2003. In 1990, Iraq possessed the world's fourth largest military force with a capability to mobilise nearly two million personnel (Cordesman 1994, 77; Svet 2015; Collins 2019). When Iraq launched its invasion of Kuwait, its army had mobilised 955,000 men, which included 480,000 reservists, and amounted to placing some 60–66 divisions in the field (Cordesman 1994, 77).

In the case of Saddam's regime, the growing threat generated by its actions and rhetoric was generated by domestic political and strategic considerations of the impact reduced oil revenues had, and the threat it posed to the survivability of the regime. Pre-invasion, the threat of military force had been part of Saddam's approach to foreign

policy in order to extract financial and territorial concessions. The militarily stronger Iraqi state was in a position that when "oil ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar" met on 11 July 1990 in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia" it forced a decision to reverse of oil overproduction (Verleger 1990, 19). Iraq's enhanced position had come from being the second-largest importer of military weapons (Svet 2015). The acquisition and procurement of arms, argued Svet (2015), was a direct outcome of Baathist decision-making policies which through its military might, afforded the regime a position of supremacy in inter-state affairs.

Iraq had previously demonstrated its willingness to deploy force against another neighbouring state. On 21 July 1990, Iraq positioned 100,000 troops, or approximately 10 divisions, along its southern border with Kuwait, which made them immediately halt the overproduction of oil and raise the price of a barrel of oil to USD$21 (Dannreuther 1991, 17). It was the first time in four years Kuwait had raised its production price (Stoessinger 2001, 195). The threat of force from the region's pre-eminent military power achieved concessions from Kuwait but proved insufficient for Iraq's needs. As Iraq continued its pressure for additional concessions, a meeting was held in Jeddah on 1 August 1990, where the Kuwaiti Crown Prince, Sheikh Sa'd al-Abdullah al-Sabah refused the Iraqi demand to pay USD$30 billion if the disputed Iraqi - Kuwaiti border was not resolved to their satisfaction (Salinger 1995, 596).

The pre-invasion approach towards Iraq by the George W.H. Bush Administration displayed a diplomatic preference for its continued support to progress Iraq along a path that was both moderate and pro-Western. Key U.S. diplomatic efforts included a visit to Baghdad during February 1990 by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John Kelly, followed on 16 April 1990 by U.S. Senator Robert Dole, who was accompanied by four U.S. senators, met with Saddam and reported to Washington that he was a moderate force in the Middle East region (Dannreuther 1991, 20). In April 1990, Iraq's economic woes worsened, with an inflation rate of 40 percent and with just three-months of cash reserves to meet government expenses (Brigham 2013, 11). The military expenditure consumed a large part of the national budget outlays and had reached a level where it represented USD$700 for every Iraqi citizen, a disproportionately high figure when compared against the 1990 average yearly income of USD$1,950 (Brigham 2013, 11).

6.6 Summary

This chapter has outlined the political-historical trajectory of the Iraqi state, from its post-Ottoman Empire construction through to the 1991 Gulf War, and how Australia began a military commitment to the region that would extend for the next thirty years. That war included Australia, which was part of a larger U.S. led international coalition of force would retake Kuwait by force. The period of authoritarian rule of the Iraqi state by Saddam Hussein was characterised by a period of almost continuous war. The foreign policies to use military force and initiate war against Iran, as well as the development of a nascent nuclear program and attendant delivery system, conspired to result in a costly eight-year war that almost brought Iraq's economy to almost complete collapse. After the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the UN-sanctioned, U.S. led international force that was prepared to retake Kuwait by force had Australia as was one of the first states to commit force.

Saddam's justification for the use of force against Kuwait was over a small, disputed border region between the two states; one which contained vast oil reserves. War and occupation of the small Persian Gulf littoral state included its onshore and offshore oilfields and related critical infrastructure. Saddam's use of force achieved his political objectives in the short-term but the international response and sustained build-up and preparation for eventual war to militarily retake Kuwait. The Hawke government gave a firm commitment of armed support, and the political and strategic details of that deployment of ADF force is explored in the next chapter. The significance of Australia's 1990 deployment during the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis would mark the commencement of 30 years of military deployments in the Middle East region (Pegram 2021). This period also saw Australian governments display internal inconsistency between its strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power, and strategy.

Chapter Seven

Australia's Considerations for the Deployment of Force:
The Gulf Crisis (1990-91) and 1991 Gulf War

7.1 Introduction and overview

The Gulf Crisis came as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait which "by any standards, one of the most significant international crises of the post-1945 epoch" (Halliday 1994, 109). From the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 until the outbreak of war on 16 January 1991 launched by the U.S. led international coalition against Iraq, the research identified the Gulf Crisis cycled through two distinct phases before international events conspired for its third and final phase, which was an inter-state major war. The mobilisation of troops to the 1991 Gulf War would number approximately one million troops (Halliday 1994, 109). This major war involved large-scale military formations, which later executed joint operations by land, sea, and air (Horner 1992). The U.S. contributed the majority of the allied military force that retook Kuwait, along with varying levels of military support from other states, which included Australia.

The research selected Australia's wars of choice that were centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region and began during the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis. The conceptual framework for this research has examined key political-historical specific events in this region, as well as the concepts of state, war, military power, and strategy. In combination, it allows for the exploration on how the Australian government committed itself to a war of choice and deployed elements of force in readiness for, and ultimately commitment, to war in the Middle East region. This contextualisation is significant as it outlines how the broader strategic environment and specific Area of Operations were shaped by international, regional, and domestic political factors and strategic consideration which saw states use military power in war.

This international security crisis which proved as a prelude to war, came from a series of specific state actor actions, and non-actions, by Iraq. This was not solely limited to the period from February-July 1990, which was outlined in the previous chapter. The trajectory of Iraq's political and strategic conduct can be found at the end of the Ottoman Empire, through to the period when Iraq engaged in an eight-year war

against Iran. Second, this historical arc provides the strategic context in which out-of-region states made the political decision to deploy elements of their military power for possible warfighting in the Persian Gulf region. For the purposes of analysis undertaken in this chapter and identifying the factors for Australia's involvement, the first phase of the Gulf Crisis began when Iraq used military force and invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Accordingly, the significance of the commencement date for this international security crisis not only signalled a clear act of aggression by one sovereign state against another, but that inter-state conflict was marked later that very same day by a largely unified international response with the passing of UNSCR 660. The crisis then travelled along a continuum of events in which various international efforts were conducted by multilateral institutions and individual states, both diplomatic and with the threat of force, to try and avert war. As that happened, the first phase of the crisis transitioned towards a second phase, which would be the use of a UN-sanctioned force by a U.S led international coalition that would be sanctioned to eject Iraqi forces by force from Kuwait.

The research determined that the demarcation point for the second phase of the Gulf Crisis was 29 November 1990. That was the point when UNSCR 678 sanctioned the use of military force through the phrase of "all necessary means" (UNSCR 678 1990, 27-28). The first phase of the Gulf Crisis had eleven UNSCRs passed before the pivotal UNSCR 678; its twelfth resolution on the matter of the Gulf Crisis, and gave complete legal and moral authority for the use of force. This provided the international coalition, with its massed military forces deployed in the Persian Gulf region, the full authorisation under international law to retake Kuwait if Iraq chose to not withdraw its forces by the 15 January 1991 deadline (UNSCR 678 1990, 27). Therefore, 29 November 1990 marked the start of the second phase of the Gulf Crisis, based on the rationale that it marked a clear readiness to shift towards warlike operations should diplomacy fail. The second phase is a period characterised by the acceleration of preparation towards warlike operations. Australia's Operation DAMASK covers both phases and is the prelude to the 1991 Gulf War.

For precision, the specific date and time the Australian government recorded its approval for the participation of its naval taskforce to be involved alongside the international coalition against Iraq, was at a time onwards from 1600 hrs, Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST), 16 January 1991 (Hawke 1994, 521). To align with

most of the literature on this subject, as well as concur with UNSCR 678, the 15 January 1991 is the end date of the second phase. Accordingly, 16 January 1990 marks the commencement of the third phase because legal authorisation was granted for the execution of "all necessary means" from that date forward. The third phase is significant moved from crisis to war. The mobilisation of almost one million troops was now in place for armed conflict in a major war (Halliday 2004). Australia was one of 35 nations as part of this international coalition, though its personnel numbers were a very tiny sliver of the overall troop numbers (Pegram 2021).

This third phase signalled a major shift in the role of Australia's naval commitment, which during the two first phases of the crisis, had been deployed in the Gulf of Oman, and then Persian Gulf region as part of a multinational taskforce charged with the enforcement of a maritime embargo against Iraq (Horner 1992). The third phase marked the ADF deployment as being in a state of instant readiness to participate in a major war. The dates for the research in this chapter for the third and final phase is the day after the expiry of UNSCR 678's mandated deadline of 15 January 1991, and ended with the halt in hostilities that took place at 1600 hrs (AEST) on 28 February 1991 (Hawke 1994, 525). The war did not commence immediately at the beginning of phase three but is a reference point when international law allowed the use of force anytime thereafter. Combat operations began on 17 January 1991, and the U.S. led international coalition launched military operations against Iraq to retake Kuwait (Pemberton 2007, 242; AWM 2020, para two).

7.2 Australia's military commitment to the Gulf Crisis

An assessment on the Australian governments then recent government Defence White Paper, *The Defence of Australia* (1987), claimed that "[t]he Persian Gulf is of no direct military strategic interest to Australia, since the north-west Indian Ocean is well beyond the area of Australia's primary strategic interest" (Rakisits 1988, 126). However, just two years later and Australia had defence assets deployed in that region in response to the Gulf Crisis, and was in preparation for their eventual participation in the 1991 Gulf War. However, as this chapter explores, political and strategic considerations had been part of the ADF's force posture and capabilities would now influence what elements of force could be deployed as part of Operation DAMASK.

Those considerations to participate in this war of choice reflected the actual size, type and role of the military forces committed to warlike operations in the third and final phase.

Australia's participation and military contribution during the Gulf Crisis (1990–91) and 1991 Gulf War were shaped by domestic political factors and strategic considerations that included Australian government executive-level support to the U.S. alliance. Domestic factors also shaped what Australia's deployment of force would be, especially at a time in global politics when the Cold War was in its closing stages. Australia's strategic outlook and the evolving security environment was conducted with an approach that included alliance management. This 'push-pull' between domestic political realities of the incumbent political party in power which sought to stay in office, was aware of the intra-state pressures a liberal democracy's electoral cycle brings while balancing the pressures and expectations that came from the U.S. alliance. Domestic considerations have played a central role in what, and how, a state may operate externally within the framework of the RBGO. When it comes to the deployment of military force by a state, this research points identified a direct, causal effect between the domestic political and strategic factors and what the type, size and role of Australia's military contribution was during this conflict.

From the outset of the Gulf Crisis to the time the UNSC gave authorisation for the use of force, that first phase of the crisis witnessed numerous sovereign states provide elements of their military forces to coercive and reverse the illegal actions of Saddam Hussein's regime against Kuwait. That first phase saw the commencement of economic sanctions and the blockade of Iraqi ports, coercive acts that were conducted by naval vessels. The threat of force ensured such measures were largely complied with and allowed diplomacy an opportunity for success. The threat of force was employed during the first two phases of the crisis, and after the deadline of 15 January 1991 passed, the third phase was the marker for the use of force. Throughout the crisis, the U.S. approached many UN member states for military contributions for deployment in the Persian Gulf region and meanwhile restrained Israel from entering the conflict which would have otherwise threatened the cohesion of the assembled alliance, which included Arab nations (Pressman 2008). The first operational role was to participate in the enforcement of economic sanctions. As diplomacy faltered and looked increasingly unlikely as the option to convince Saddam

to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, some states deployed a military contribution into the region in which it could pivot, if so inclined, towards involvement in an offensive campaign.

In response to a direct appeal made by President George W.H. Bush, the Australian government's military contribution was almost immediate. Within one week of the Iraqi invasion, the Australian government made a public commitment of military force as part of the U.S. led international response to this crisis. On 11 August 1990, the Hawke government announced it would deploy a Naval Task Force that comprised of three RAN vessels: Her Majesty Australian Ships (HMAS) *Adelaide*, *Darwin,* and *Success* (Grey 2008). On 13 August 1990, after just two days of warning for the Fleet, instead of the usual six-month's notice for deployment, the guided missile frigates (FFG) HMAS *Adelaide* and *Darwin* departed Sydney for their 6,500-mile westwards journey to be on station in the Gulf of Oman, to the north of the Arabian Sea (Michael 2020). On 14 August 1990, the supply ship HMAS *Success* left for the Area of Operations and rendezvoused with the other Task Force vessels in a location just south of the Strait of Hormuz (Michael 2020). Naval patrolling began in September 1990 and by the end of December that year, the Task Force had "conducted 1627 interrogations, 11 interceptions, eight boardings and two diversions of ships to other ports" (Grey 2008, 270).

The various state contributions of military force gained legal authority through a series of UNSCRs but strident U.S. diplomatic efforts and pressure on its allies widen not just international support but a coalition that committed elements of military force. During the first phase of the crisis, it was not a foregone conclusion that the crisis would escalate to a major U.S. led war against Iraq. As the second phase of the crisis came into being, through the approval of UNSCR 678, force became a legal option for the amassed coalition in the event Iraq failed to withdraw its forces by 15 January 1991. The number of states, including those who gave a non-military contribution, numbered 38 states (Bunn 2016). The Australian government argued its involvement was in the national interest, which included the opportunity to enhance its relationship with the U.S. alliance by responding to the request to provide a military contingent to the Persian Gulf region. However, this was a war of choice which was paradoxically severely constrained by political and strategic factors that limited the size, type and role of the force deployed for war.

The six-month period from the start of the crisis through to the start of the Gulf War, marked by Operation *Desert Shield* and then Operation *Desert Storm,* saw large-scale movement of U.S. military personnel, mechanised, and armoured formations transported from the U.S., Western Europe and other parts of the Middle East and pre-positioned in the Persian Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia. Additionally, military aircraft and naval vessels were readied for combat operations. The U.S. represented the vast amount of military force deployed and committed to combat operations against the Iraqis, while the next five major contributing states were Britain, Egypt, France, Germany, and Japan (Bennett, Lepgold and Unger 1994, 39). The contribution from Germany and Japan was financial. However, the U.S. "took the lead and much of the burden itself" (Bennett, Lepgold and Unger 1994, 41). Through its leadership group, the U.S. "were able to elicit contributions from dependent allies" and key normative factors for participation were built around the concept of "the public good of oil market stability and inviolable borders" (Bennett, Lepgold and Unger 1994, 41). Force was considered a legitimate tool of statecraft to uphold Kuwait's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but particularly access to its oil supplies for the global market.

Australia was a key U.S. ally that responded to their request for a military contribution, albeit a small element that focused predominately on naval platforms and assets. In comparison, other key U.S. allies, such as the UK and France provided considerably larger-sized forces from across all three Services. Those contributions included sizeable land forces, ground troops and mechanised warfighting vehicles. Australia's quick commitment ensured it supported its strategic alliance with the U.S. as well as international obligations, in an effort to be part of the solution for the maintenance of the RBGO. Australia's early commitment gave the government the ability to frame its commitment and which form of warfare it would contribute should the crisis escalate to warfighting. The decision to send a naval taskforce meant the ADF would most likely avoid direct military operations, which would be predominately conducted by a major land and air offensive.

It is argued in this chapter that the Australian government's decision to commit naval vessels ensured it avoided involvement in a campaign that focused on land and air warfare. This does not diminish the initial risk posed to military assets deployed at sea in the Persian Gulf region. However, that risk to ADF personnel, materiel and platforms was much reduced by this decision of a naval taskforce being the main

Australian contribution of force. When the crisis took shape, and that its resolution would only come with the use of force in warlike operations, it then confirmed during operational planning that the allied offensive would commence with an air campaign, and then ground, as well as amphibious, forces. Irrespective of whether the Hawke government had factored what the most likely response would be by Saddam's Baathist regime to any diplomatic efforts to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait, the crisis was not going to be over within a short timeframe. Instead, as the crisis situation dragged on, the early commitment by the Australian government for the deployment of elements of the ADF during the first phase of the crisis gave visual cues to a symbolic act of decisiveness in the face of Iraqi state aggression. The Australian government's decision included military assets that were least likely to be part of the actual combined warfighting force that would be needed to expel the world's fourth largest military from entrenched defensive positions.

The intersection of domestic and international factors were influential in Australia's military commitment to the Gulf Crisis and resultant Gulf War. Beazley claimed that the Hawke government's involvement "represented a flowering of the possibility for a real international community under the United Nations with the end of the Cold War divide" (2003, 363). The neoclassical realist theoretical approach points to importance of domestic political factors which has an influence on state behaviour within its international strategic environment. However, the decisions made by the Australian government regarding the overseas deployment of force was very much framed by a debilitating internal leadership struggle between the Prime Minister and his ambitious deputy. What exacerbated the situation for the Hawke government was that Australia had entered what would be the worst economic recession since the Great Depression (Pitchford 1993). The government argued its involvement was in the national interest, and that included the opportunity to enhance its relationship with the U.S. alliance by responding to the request to provide a military contingent to the Persian Gulf region. However, Australia's pursuit of its national interests was constrained by federal politics and strategic factors which in turn constrained the ADF size, type and role that would be deployed for war.

The domestic political environment for the Hawke government had a direct impact on not just its strategic approach but the deployment of force for war. Alliance management and the security of oil supplies were part of government deliberations,

and the consideration of the deployment of force. In addition, the level and type of that military force were influenced by what the Australian electorate would accept, as well as what the Hawke government's parliamentary and party-political organisational factions would allow. Those consideration frames the philosophical assumptions and methodological approach undertaken in this dissertation's research. To restate the rationale for such an approach is that it was the state's political leadership and strategic approaches to conflict and war which determined what was deployed on operations in an area that became a theatre of war. Intra-state, domestic politics at the national level provides for a critical examination of how it has an impact on the ADF force posture, and how the government's military power, as expressed by the force in-being, is able to conduct the mission which it is asked to undertake. It is argued that the cumulative outcome of the national political and strategic factors highlighted the presence of a strategic disconnect that could be shown to be present with the expeditionary requirements of the deployment of force to this war of choice.

7.3 Political and strategic considerations for war

From August 1990, the Persian and Oman Gulf regions, and the persistent crisis caused by Saddam's Baathist regime, would for the next three-decades become Australia's predominate operational region where it would maintain a continuous presence. After 11 September 2001, Afghanistan would become Australia's longest war. However, in regard to the wider Persian Gulf region, alliance management, energy security and maintenance of a stable RBGO framework were factors for Australia's deployment of elements of its military power. In the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis, those factors contributed to what the ADF's actual involvement in a crisis that could become a war, and second, shaped the actual composition of that force's size, type, and role. This chapter is a case study approach to provide the political-historical contextualisation for how a state deploys its military power, and does so while claiming it is in the national interest while the decision to deploy force is not in alignment with government strategic outlook and approaches to defence and strategy.

At a time when the Cold War was in its final stage, that eventual paradigm shift in global politics afforded an opportunity for Australia to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Equally, this research is focused on defence and strategic

considerations but equally, how that watershed moment in international affairs offered an opportunity to maintain a regionalist strategic approach with a more independent manner for the way Australia deploys its military power. However, this crisis and war indicates Australia was a warfighting state, because despite its then force in-being was not geared towards an expeditionary, forward defence approach, the Hawke government still pursued military involvement in a war in the Middle East region.

Operation DAMASK was Australia's preparation phase for the 1991 Gulf War. The national political intercourse regarding the decision to send force to a future 'war of choice' operated across both major political parties, within their parliamentary parties and political factions. Those elements had a role in when and how the state deployed force for war. The identification of political and strategic factors demonstrates that the actions of the state, and its use of force, is not solely in the reaction to international forces, as the deployment of what is required to fight the correct form of warfare in the right operational circumstances, but that at the intra-state level is where such important decisions are made. The analysis of the decision to deploy force can identify that it is against the state's core national interests, which are the protection of its sovereignty and territory. The state's military power, capabilities and strategic objectives should reflect those core national interests, otherwise any such military deployment should be considered as a war of choice.

The invasion of Kuwait signalled in 1990 another flashpoint in the Middle East region. As the Gulf Crisis quickly became an international security crisis destined for war with wider state versus state engagement, the opposite situation was occurring in Europe. In November 1990, the Cold War was formally concluded with the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (Sharp 2006, 121). Troop and weapon numbers were lowered and limited for both NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs, a process that preceded the Soviet Union's dissolution as a sovereign state on 25 December 1991 (Brown 2015, 161). That date is considered as the formal end of the Cold War (Department of State 2022). However, ratification by signatory states of the CFE Treaty came into force on 17 July 1992, well after the successful conclusion of the Gulf War (Sharp 2006, 123). Irrespective of the process that led to the peaceful end to the Cold War, Iraq's armed forces had been deployed again in the Persian Gulf region which demanded an international response to such state aggression. For

Australia, it would argue its case for resolution alongside the U.S. as a participant state in what would become war in the Middle East region.

When the Gulf Crisis unfolded, the domestic political and economic situation in Australia had become less than certain than at the time when the Hawke government was returned to office at the March 1990 Federal election. Just two days prior to that election, the nation's treasurer had expressed his confidence in the management of the economy by stating "we won't let there be a recession" (Alcorn 2019, para. 19). When the latest crisis in the Persian Gulf region commenced in August 1990, the incumbent Labor government trailed in the federal polls, there were internal leadership troubles, and the national economy was in recession. The National Account figures for the September quarter recorded growth had fallen by 1.6 percent and at next reporting period on 29 November 1990, data revealed the Australian economy had been in recession for the past two economic quarters (Day 2015). The recession began in September "and lasted until the September quarter of 1991" and throughout that period, "GDP fell by 1.7 per cent, employment by 3.4 per cent and the unemployment rate rose to 10.8 per cent" (Macfarlane 2006, para. 26). The then Reserve Bank governor Ian Macfarlane later described the economic situation as "Australia's deepest post-war recession" (2006, para. 27).

The plight of citizens impacted by those economic conditions appeared to be downplayed when the treasurer gave his infamous comment at a media conference on 29 November 1990 that the figures proved it was "a recession we had to have" (Martin 1990; Day 2015). According to Millmow, "Keating canvassed the line with Bob Hawke before going public with it" (2015, para. 3). However, that statement would be associated with the treasurer, to have him further characterised by his detractors both within and outside the Australian Labor Party (ALP) as insensitive and out-of-touch with the Australian public (Gordon 1996). That depiction would also be used against him during leadership challenges and election campaigns. The official economic data had confirmed a troubled national economy, which had arrived not long after Hawke's statement in August of a "limited commitment" towards the U.S. led coalition. That allowed Hawke to demonstrate to the majority of caucus members and the Australian public that in regards to foreign policy matters, especially during a time of crisis, he maintained a grasp and competency about important security issues (Day 2015, 338). Serious pressure would came from within the ALP during the construction of the

1990–91 federal budget, where the recession forced a harder fiscal approach to all new policy proposals submitted by Ministers (Smith 2006, para. 9). The Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) had 219 new policy proposals but what caused "ongoing internal divisions" within the party was that "basically every item of new expenditure for the environment was labelled dispensable or deferrable" (Smith 2016, para. 9). Only those which the ERC had labelled under a category as 'unavoidable' were considered, and apart from 51 successful new policy proposals, another 55 were deferred and 113 were judged as dispensable (Smith 2016, para. 9).

Australia's economic situation continued to be overshadowed by the focus the Hawke government maintained on the Gulf Crisis. A two-day special meeting of parliament was held with the express purpose of gaining formal approval for an Australian military commitment to the U.S. led international coalition that was still being deployed in the Persian Gulf region (Horner 1992). This crisis allowed Hawke "a last-minute reprieve" from forces within the parliamentary federal ALP that were seeking to remove him from office and replace him with his treasure, Paul Keating (Day 2015, 338). As the crisis would later transition to war, that process gave Hawke an unexpected opportunity to shore up support for his leadership, both with the electorate but more importantly, in the immediate term, among the Labor caucus. Hawke's public handling of the crisis gave him the platform to reassert his leadership despite continued and persistent efforts to undermine him by Keating and his supporters, such as Laurie Brereton, who was Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister (APH 2022).

Internal party support for Hawke waned during 1990 but the attention given to the Gulf Crisis stemmed temporarily the tide of discontent being marshalled against him. Senator Graham Richardson said the international crisis gave Hawke an opportunity where he "revelled in the drama of it all" but added "it must be said that Australia revelled in it with him" (Richardson 1994, 307). Importantly for caucus members with an eye on their re-election chances, the Gulf Crisis allowed Hawke's personal and government approval ratings to recovery from lows experienced earlier that year, specifically in the period after having won the March federal election (Day 2015, 338). Keating was more direct in his assessment on what the crisis presented Hawke: "Essentially Bob was saved by Saddam Hussein" (O'Brien 2015, 419). For Keating, who had stalked the ALP leadership since 1987, claimed "Saddam Hussein's

invasion had completely dislocated me politically. If Bob could have slept in the flag, he would have" (O'Brien 2015, 420). Outwardly, the international crisis presented a sort of cover to the public on the internal leadership discontent that brewed among caucus. The ructions and machinations continued to plague the Hawke government throughout the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War, all the way to its eventual conclusion with a successful leadership challenge in December 1991.

An international crisis would not stymie Australia's federal political power plays and their leadership aspirants. It points to a causal relationship on the Australian government's determinations for what its military contribution would be during the crisis and war. The awareness of leadership tensions meant that that to appease Labor parliamentary colleagues who belonged variously to ideologically aligned factions, or were simply unaligned and their support too would be needed as caucus members would have to cast their vote at some stage in a party-room leadership ballot. In addition, the internal selection system employed by the ALP meant that the only people a Labor prime minister could appoint into Cabinet positions were those whom the Caucus had elected from their own number. After winning the 11 July 1987 federal election, Caucus elected all the ALP factional bosses into the Ministry, and it turn, Hawke promoted the Right's Richardson and Ray, the Left's Gerry Hand and the Centre Left's Peter Cook all into Cabinet positions (d'Alpuget 2010, 230). The impact would prove to be profound as "their presence altered the whole government power balance" (d'Alpuget 2010, 230). Dawkins described ministers being too scared "to speak against a faction boss because preselection depended on them" while Beazley spoke how indiscipline grew among backbenchers as they "were under the thumb of less formidable factional overlords" (d'Alpuget 2010, 320).

The federal election had been held less than five months before the Gulf Crisis. The Hawke government had won the 24 March 1990 federal election with a two-party preferred vote of 49.9 percent, one of only five times in which a government received less than half of the popular vote (APH 2020, Federal Election Results 1901–2016). It was a result down on its previous 1987 outing to the polls, where it had garnered 50.83 percent (AEC, 2020). The ALP's victorious re-election campaign strategy had been based on what Hawke believed showed "Labor was clearly seen as a better manager of the environment and this proved crucial in a number of marginal seats" (Hawke 1994, 397). For Richardson, a Cabinet minister who held the environment portfolio

from 1987–90, it was simply a case that he had "flogged the environment message during every waking moment" (1994, 270). The strategy for the "green election" saw the ALP "gained nearly 62 per cent of all preferences, and in the critical marginal seats, up to 80 per cent (Hogg 2003, 102). The ALP won 78 out of a possible 148 seats in parliament and with that eight-seat majority in the House of Representatives, resulted in a fourth consecutive term in office (APH 2020, Federal Election Results 1901–2016). For Balderstone, he deemed the government's focus on the environment was an example of "good policy is good politics" (Toyne and Balderstone 2003, 182).

Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer Keating recalled that "after the 1990 election, Hawke's support has come to rest much more upon the Left and Right factions from other states [other than New South Wales] along with individuals from the Centre left and those MPs who are not aligned with any faction" (O'Brien 2015, 341). The Left faction were historically suspicious and even outright hostile to U.S. foreign policy and the Gulf Crisis would prove to be no different. For Hawke, the alliance with the U.S. and maintenance of Australia's most important strategic alliance meant it would again be expected to deliver some form of military support to the U.S. led coalition (Horner 1992). The level of support that would be afforded the international efforts to put pressure on Saddam would also be determined by what the UN would decide to do about the possible use of force (Horner 2011). The crisis would move away from diplomatic efforts and when that approach failed, transitioned to the preparation and readiness to be on a war-footing, ready for the use of force to retake Kuwait. The size and role of Australia's military contribution was considered during August 1990, and over a three-week period the Iraqi post-invasion, would see only a minimal expansion of the ADF deployment on Operation DAMASK as the crisis grew (Horner 2011, 323).

The decision to commit elements of the ADF to the Gulf Crisis had an impact from the increasingly strained and distrustful relationship that grew between the prime minister and his deputy. The level of ADF military commitments would be limited, and while a small element was provided in the interests of collective security, it was calibrated and somewhat constrained by the general public's antipathy to the war and the ALP's long opposition to deploying force to war (Horner 2011, 323). Hawke was aware of that situation and needed to manage that in order to maintain and secure factional support for his continued leadership of the ALP. In an interview, Keating was

questioned by O'Brien (2015, 681) about the claim Hawke had asked what level of commitment Australia should provide, one where Keating had allegedly replied: "What's America ever done for us?" Keating's response was that the statement "was a complete lie" (O'Brien 2015, 682). It was also asserted by O'Brien to Keating that members of the ALP's Left faction saw him as a warmonger, to which he countered that he "was all about supporting the UN and going after Saddam Hussein" (2015, 681). Meanwhile, Richardson's recollection of a conversation with Left faction leaders was that "Bolkus and Hand had been unwilling to go too far in front of Keating" yet Bolkus allegedly mentioned "he would talk to colleagues about keeping the Left's options open" (1994, 296; 297). The political prize for the Left was that any shift of allegiance away from Hawke as prime minister would be that one of their own factional factionally-aligned ministers, Brian Howe, would become deputy prime minister (Richardson 1994). The Hawke government's Left faction were against the war but realised it could use it as leverage for increased power within the parliamentary party.

When the Gulf Crisis began, the prime minister's initial meeting that broached Australia's level of military contribution included the deputy prime minister, acting Foreign Minister Michael Duffy and Hawke's defence adviser, Hugh White (O'Brien 2015, 682). Defence minister Robert Ray was not present at that meeting. Keating's recollection is that he advised attendees at the meeting that based on the initial small commitments from their UK and Canadian allies, then "if we get in early and quickly our entry price will be low" (O'Brien 2015, 683). The deputy prime minister saw the U.S. would "want the moral support rather than the material support or the equipment" (O'Brien 2015, 683). This recollection is different to that by Hugh White, who kept a daily diary of events and claimed, "Keating expressed significant reservations" (D'Alpuget 2010, 300). White added that he was "paying careful attention, because this seemed pretty relevant to me" (D'Apulget 2010, 301). Keating and his adviser Don Russell, who was also in the meeting, dispute such claims (d'Alpuget 2010; O'Brien 2015). A second meeting was convened and attended by Senator John Button, whom Keating alleged was the person who remarked: "what's America ever done for us?" (O'Brien 2015, 682). That contested statement's leak and attribution to Keating incensed him further about Hawke's alleged behaviour to undermine their agreement for him to become the next prime minister. Years after Button had retired from

parliament, he was asked to own that statement, to which he did (Watson 2002, 652). Until that point, the statement had become infamous and was weaponised during the leadership tussle as part of Hawke's combative narrative that Keating was unfit to hold the highest office.

The positives going for Hawke was that he was "always on top of the detail of his brief" in Cabinet (Hayden 1996, 480) and liked by the public, as well as the majority of his parliamentary colleagues (d'Alpuget 2010, 222). However, he was "never a great parliamentary performer, however he used parliamentary Question Time to attack the opposition" (Fitzgerald 2014, 357). This contrasted with Keating who many considered as "a superior parliamentary" performer (Day 2015, 340). Former colleagues and Canberra press gallery journalists concurred with the latter assessment (Fitzgerald 2014). Yet, as Keating pursued the party's leadership, "everybody who spoke to Keating would come away saying how clever he was and how they were still unable to vote for him" (Richardson, 1994, 306). Watson claimed that "by the time of his prime ministership Paul Keating was in some fundamental ways unsuited to political life" (Watson 2020, 631). The achievement of becoming prime minister was almost a year away and an international security crisis and U.S. alliance obligations were yet to be navigated by the Hawke government.

Four months before the Gulf Crisis, Australia's defence portfolio had been led by Kim Beazley. After eighteen-months of being government, the prime minister replaced the then incumbent, Gordon Scholes, with Beazley as his new minister for Defence on 13 December 1983 (FitzSimons 1998, 224). During his tenure, Beazley attained such a stature in that portfolio that he was considered as "arguably the most effective peacetime minister for defence" (Hayden 1996, 483). Early in Beazley's new role, Paul Dibb was requested to review Australia's defence capabilities, and delivered his *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* ('Dibb Review') which became the basis for the 1987 Defence White Paper, *The Defence of Australia* (White 2007, 164). It advocated the complete departure from a 'strategy of denial' and 'forward defence' to one firmly set within the concept of self-reliance, which would be achieved within the framework of alliance management (Carr 2016, 69).

Attempts to forge a more independent strategic approach that focuses itself on the Defence of Australia had been attempted in part several years earlier. In January 1972, conservative prime minister, William McMahon, delivered a "departmental

review" that was largely drafted by the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Alan Tange, and delivered a defence white paper in all but name (Clarke 2016, 12-13). That review contained similar themes to be Beazley's defence white paper, such as self-reliance and independence in regards to security, along with a move away from expeditionary campaigns to regions outside of Australia's immediate and near regions (Clark 2016, 13).

The shift in Australia's strategic behaviour was reflected in defence policy and a defence white paper in the 1970's by another conservative government, led by prime minister Malcolm Fraser, furthered the cause for increased self-reliance capabilities. However, there was no redundancy to, or diminished relevancy of, the U.S. alliance. Rather, the approach for self-reliance came from successive governments that any military campaigns alongside the U.S. in locations across North and Southeast Asia meant "Australia would be prudent not to rest its security as directly or as heavily, as in previous peacetime history, on the military power of a Western ally in Asia" (White 2007, 165). In the immediate period that followed Australia's decade-long military commitment during the Vietnam War, the Liberal-Country Party coalition government of Fraser continued the approach towards self-reliance, and embodied that with its 1976 Defence White Paper titled *Australian Defence* (Department of Defence 1976; White 2007,165). The previous conservative governments had not ruled out the possibility for a possible future expeditionary campaign but if there was, it would most likely be geared towards Australia's immediate region. The 1976 *Defence White Paper* proposed "a fundamental transformation of the strategic circumstances that governed Australia's security throughout most of its history" (Department of Defence 1976, 20). The focus was closer to Australia's immediate strategic environment but in time, global events would conspire the need for elements of the ADF to be deployed into the northern hemisphere for a campaign centred on the Persian Gulf region.

Meanwhile, the strategy of self-reliance remained the focus from one government to the next, whether Labor or conservative, for over two-decades. The focus continued away from expeditionary capabilities and to defend interests far away. Instead, the focus was towards an ADF that could, in concert with an ally or on its own, ensure the defence of continental Australia while deterring or defeating any armed threat. That would largely be achieved through the utilisation of the sea-air gap, and specific military platforms were acquired for that purpose, such as F/A–18 Hornet

aircraft and *Collins*-class diesel electric hunter-submarines. To finance these capital expenses, the Hawke government increased investment in the ADF and to accommodate that, defence spending during the 1980's averaged 2.3 per cent of Australia's GDP (White 2007, 166). Self-reliance, however, was not mutually exclusive of the ANZUS alliance. This dominant strategic approach "worked towards a relationship in which Australia would demonstrate greater independence of mind while retaining the benefits of the alliance" (Edwards 2016, 16). According to White, an adviser to Beazley and later to Hawke during the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War, saw "self-reliance helped ease the stigma of dependency in the relationship, and made it much easier to construct an account of the alliance which enjoyed broad support across the political spectrum in Australia" (2007, 167). An element of independent, though disingenuous, thought became woven into the narrative regarding Australia's strategic approach.

The new 'defence in depth' embraced Australia's unique geo-political position, which was a single unitary state with supreme political control over an island continent. Beazley saw the defence of the nation-state would be built around the Defence of Australia via its sea-air gap (FitzSimons 1998). Beazley was Defence Minister in the Hawke Government's second (13 December 1984–24 July 1987) and third (24 July 1987–4 April 1990) ministries (Ryan and Bramston 2003). Just four months before the commencement of the Gulf Crisis, on 4 April 1990, Beazley was moved out of the Defence portfolio (Ryan and Bramston 2003). This was no reflection on his competency or ability but came as a result of the sudden resignation of Mick Young soon after Labor's historic third election win on 24 March 1990, and saw Hawke appoint Beazley as the Leader of the House (Adams 1990). Beazley was replaced as Defence minister by Senator Robert Ray, a fellow factional member of the Right, but located in that 'other place', a colloquial reference by members of the House of Representatives to those in the Australian Senate. In the House of Representatives, Gordon Scholes, in the outer Ministry role of Defence Personnel and Science, was the person who took parliamentary questions on Defence during the Gulf Crisis (Ryan and Bramston 2003).

Australia's national political struggles continued unabated despite the deployment of force of a naval taskforce, on station in the Gulf of Oman and later deployed north to positions within the Persian Gulf as the security situation

deteriorated. The struggle for the leadership of prime ministership was meant to have been resolved at a secret meeting held in Sydney at Kirribilli House during 1988, which delivered the 'Kirribilli agreement' as a formalised timetable for succession from Hawke to Keating; one scheduled to occur soon after the 1990 federal election (Richardson 1994, 295-6). The meeting was later characterised as a means to tame Keating's "destructive monster of his thwarted leadership ambitions" (Watson 2002, 81). Keating secured the Kirribilli agreement and its assurance of a transition plan that would deliver him the prime ministership. It was secured after an abortive leadership challenge earlier in the year, incensed to hear after he delivered the 1988 Federal Budget that Hawke considered "his treasurer was not indispensable" (Watson 2002, 81). Throughout 1990, Hawke came to believe only he could lead Labor to power at the next federal election, while Keating disputed that and "saw himself as the intellectual inspiration and the political muscle of the government" (Kitney 2003, 438). The destabilisation campaign began and clearly signalled the end of the electorally successful Hawke-Keating partnership, and plagued the government during the Gulf Crisis and 1991 Gulf War.

The Gulf Crisis provided an opportunity for Hawke to claim he was the best placed person within the ALP to lead the party to a fourth parliamentary term in office. When war broke out on 17 January 1991, Hawke firmed on that view Keating said, "Bob wrapped the flag around himself and went into the command bunker" (O'Brien 2015, 419). However, despite the derisiveness heaped on Hawke and his overt nationalism, Keating acknowledged that the "decision to commit to the American coalition was the correct one, but Bob used the Gulf War to break the momentum against him in caucus. Clear as day" (O'Brien 2015, 419). The outbreak of war did not place limits on Keating's prime ministerial ambitions. Adherence to what had been originally accepted as part of the Kirribilli agreement was coming apart. During the second week of the 1991 Gulf War, a second meeting was convened by Keating to reaffirm the terms of the Kirribilli agreement (O'Brien 2015).

Against the backdrop of domestic political machinations, to shore up factional support in the face of any in the face of any future leadership challenge, it had a direct impact of on the size, type and role of the ADF's Operation DAMASK. During this period, a paradigm shift in global politics that reverberated across the international system was the closing stages of the Cold War and the U.S. experiencing a "unipolar

moment" (Krauthammer 1990). That compressed period was later described by Vedrine (1999) to represent U.S. *hyper-pusissance*, or "hyper-power". Keating (2011) later described that period as squandered, one where U.S. triumphalism and exceptionalism saw it walk away from the world stage. However, such an assessment is an over-simplification. The Clinton Administration (1993–2001) was challenged in the immediate post-Cold War era by new security threats that included fragile and failing states, civil war across the former Yugoslav federation, emerging terrorist organisations, and a domestic electorate that expected a peace dividend (Halberstam 2002). Furthermore, after the events of 11 September 2001, the U.S. Administration of President George W. Bush (2001–09) would deploy military power in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003); both would be long wars and have Australian government commitments of force.

7.4 Australia's strategic response to crisis and war

On 10 August 1990, Hawke announced that Australia would contribute military personnel and assets to a U.S. led multinational force. Codenamed Operation DAMASK, the ADF deployed two naval FFGs, HMA Ships *Adelaide* and *Darwin*, as well as HMAS *Success*, a replenishment tanker (APH 2020, 2). Hawke announced, "the primary purpose of that multinational naval task force will be to enforce the blockade on Iraq and Kuwait and of course to protect the exports from other oil producing gulf countries and to protect trade in the Gulf" (APH, 2020, 2). However, Hawke said his Cabinet-endorsed decision was because "Australia had vital interests at stake" but added that "of course oil was important" (1994, 511). The Australian government decision to deploy force as part of the naval blockade came well before UNSCR 665 was passed on 25 August 1990 (Horner 1992). That particular resolution resolved the legality surrounding whether the implementation of a naval blockade complied with international law.

The significance of this initial naval presence is that it would be part of an ongoing military commitment by the Australian government to the wider Persian Gulf region well after the First Gulf War had concluded. From 1 March 1991 until 15 July 2003, the RAN conducted six-month operational deployments as part of Operation DAMASK III (AWM 2019). As part of the U.S. led maritime Multinational Interception Force (MIF), RAN assets that took part in the maintenance of ongoing

economic sanctions against Iraq, "maintained a regular single ship presence with the MIF in either the Arabian Gulf or the Red Sea" (Stevens and Perryman n.d., para 3). This form of naval operation is also referred to as Maritime Interception Operations, and during the Gulf War, were conducted as "a widely accepted form of armed conflict because they do not seek to escalate the situation and only control the passage of international shipping, rather than impede it" (Wood 2002, 26).

When the Australian government made its initial contribution of naval assets to the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis, there was no apparent risk of direct engagement in an armed conflict. From the outset, UNSCR 660 was about condemnation against aggression, and the demand to withdraw and economic sanctions (UNSCR 660 1990, 19). At the beginning of this international security crisis, during a news conference at Parliament House on 10 August 1990, Hawke said that his announcement was against a backdrop of "Australia's total unequivocal condemnation of the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait and its subsequent reported annexation" (1990, 1). In addition to the initial response Australia gave in support for sanctions, Hawke said that his government had "been in contact with Washington on this issue" in order "to give an additional response to what is happening in the gulf (sic)" (Hawke 1990, 1). At the same media conference, the prime minister said he had consulted with senior members of the government, and specifically named them: Keating (Deputy Prime Minister), and senior Cabinet ministers Evans (Foreign Affairs), Ray (Defence), Duffy and Button (Hawke 1990, 1).

The culminating point of multinational cooperation in the UN came with the Gulf crisis's twelfth UNSCR on 29 November 1990 (APH, 2020). UNSCR 678 spelt out in clear terms to Iraq that if it did not withdraw its forces from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, Member States would "be authorised to 'use all necessary means' under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait" (APH 2020, 1). On 4 December 1990, Hawke delivered a Ministerial Statement in Parliament where he informed the House of Representatives:

> *"The Government will now authorise the Australian Defence Force to deploy ships of our task force from the Gulf of Oman into the Persian Gulf to exercise and operate with allied naval forces in preparation for that role. The ADF will also now participate in allied military planning."*
>
> (Kemp and Stanton 2005, 255).

Hawke was unequivocal in underlining that the resolution's "all necessary means" meant "the use of armed force to compel compliance with the Security Council's resolutions" (APH 4 December 1990 para 3). The prime minister argued that support of the UN resolution and possible use of armed force was framed as there being "important Australian interests are at stake" (APH 4 December 1990, para 19). That same statement sought to prevent Iraqi hegemony in the Middle East and questioned the possible risk whether the regime was "backed not only by chemical weapons, but sooner or later by nuclear weapons as well?" (APH 4 December 1990, para 21).

The Australian government was now on a clear path to deploy armed force in war for the first time since its military contribution during the Vietnam War ended in 1972. During that war, Hawke was the Australian Council of Trade Unions President who had vehemently opposed the Vietnam War but a generation later, he was a serving third-term prime minister in support of a U.S. led mission against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Gulf Crisis loomed as a possible new war, one that would be U.S. led, and most likely involve elements of the ADF if Australia should offer such support. Hawke was clear that his first-order priority remained the maintenance of the international order as set out in the UN Charter, which "peace and prosperity in the Middle East" was part of the conditions to create a stable strategic environment in that region (Kemp and Stanton 2005, 254). However, the deployment of the state's military power was also about pragmatism. The unimpeded flow of trade and oil to and from the Persian Gulf region was an Australian national interest, and Hawke's statement in the Parliament on 4 December 1990 made that clear:

> *"It is an important market for our products and an important source of imports. Australia needs the Gulf's oil, and our trading partners elsewhere in the world need the Gulf's oil. So stability in the Gulf is important to all Australians"*

> (Kemp and Stanton 2005, 254).

Parliamentary debate that followed the Prime Minister's statement of 4 December 1990 was largely bipartisan support for the Hawke government's decision to contribute further military support would be part of a multinational effort to address the growing Gulf Crisis. Hawke made it clear that the risk in having RAN vessels deployed in the Persian Gulf would "be a hazardous role" and one that faced the threat from Iraqi aircraft against the naval force assembled to support operations in repelling

Saddam's forces from Kuwait (APH Hawke 4 December 1990). Hawke consulted the Opposition on the government's position and what the role of the RAN vessels would be during any conflict (APH Hawke 4 December 1990).

The Federal Leader of the Opposition, Dr John Hewson MP, delivered his Ministerial Statement the same day as the prime minister's Ministerial Statement, and in his introductory remarks, referred to how the Cold War in Europe had ended two-weeks earlier, proving a moment for future optimism, though short-lived (APH Hewson 4 December 1990). Hewson stated how "a new theatre of confrontation and high risk has emerged", which represented "one of the gravest tests of the international community since 1945" (APH Hewson 4 December 1990). Since 10 August 1990, the Opposition had been in general agreement with the Hawke Government's approach since the original decision was made to commit RAN vessels but later complained that it was not consulted when that decision was made. Hewson outlined how the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gareth Evans, gave the excuse not to consult was "that such consultations with the Opposition may not be appropriate" (APH Hewson 4 December 1990).

While broadly supportive of the Hawke government's handling of the Gulf Crisis, the Federal Opposition did criticise the process. Hewson outlined in his address to parliament how a lack of openness regarding the RAN's initial involvement in a naval blockade that sought to enforce an economic embargo on Iraq, but consultation had since improved. That included the prime minister's briefing of the Leader of the Opposition prior to the 4 December 1990 Ministerial Statement which centred on, if required, the use of armed force, as well as Shadow Cabinet being briefed the day before on 3 December 1990 by Australia's Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Hudson, and other senior Defence officers about the strategic situation that was unfolding (APH, Hewson 4 December 1990). The improvement in communication from the prime minister and minister for Defence towards the opposition went some way to further reinforce the bipartisan support that was necessary to send the ADF into harm's way. On 4 December 1990, Hewson gave his "Opposition's in-principle support for his [Hawke] decisions to broaden the geographical deployment and operational role of our Navy ships" (APH Hewson, 1990). With that support came certain caveats which Hewson sought clarification and reassurance.

The overarching bipartisan political support secured by the Hawke government did not prevent the Opposition asking pointed questions regarding operational and tactical specifics. Hewson questioned the government not just about its response on "the strategic objective to which our forces will be contributing", but also the tactical roles of the deployed vessels, the limits imposed on them, the circumstances for any increase and expansion to the size of this deployment, the chain-of-command of RAN vessels during war, Australian political control over its vessels as well as "the limits, if any, that will exist on the RAN's operational involvement" (APH Hewson 1990). The Opposition also sought to depict Hawke as captive to the demands of his Left-leaning parliamentary factions. Hewson levelled that criticism at Hawke in the House of Representatives, and that he was constrained by the influence wielded by the Left and Centre Left factions. Hawke was not a member of either faction but fully aware of their influence in Caucus. There were 31 members of the parliamentary Left faction of the ALP, and coupled with further numbers from the Centre Left, and they held fast on their ideological perspective that there was a limit to what Australia would deploy to the Gulf Crisis. In the parliamentary debate of 4 December 1990, Hewson reiterated an earlier concern from 6 November 1990, when he reminded the House that the Left faction's concern was about "a worrying lack of clarity in U.S. regional policy aims" and had also tied "a negotiated settlement of the Gulf crisis is closely linked to a withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories" (APH, Hewson 4 December 1990, para 18).

The ALP accommodates opposing viewpoints on issues such as defence and foreign policy and through the factional positions of the Left, Centre Left and Right, it provides a framework for what can outwardly seem a contradictory set of views. However, the strength of the argument and resultant policy positions are often based on the numerical realities of how many factional members occupy seats in the Australian parliament's House of Representatives and Senate. The crisis in the Middle East proved no exception to the power and influence of the factions in determining what the ALP's position in the level of Australia's military contribution to the UN endorsed, U.S. led coalition. Prior to Hawke's second Ministerial Statement to the parliament delivered on 4 December 1990, he had to first secure broad Caucus support (Hawke 1994, 519). On the 3 December 1990, Hawke met with factional leaders and claimed he "received solid support" (Hawke 1994, 518). However, this did not come

easy as Hawke stated as he was fully aware of his party's deep opposition "to war as an instrument of international policy" and had to spend much time "demolishing the grotesque attempt to equate this crisis with the Vietnam War" (1994, 518).

The Left and Centre Left factions were against the war, regardless of the circumstances that had led to the Gulf Crisis. Despite Iraq's invasion of another sovereign state, or its ongoing brutal occupation of Kuwait, or widespread global support and endorsement of various UN resolutions to provide a means to address this crisis, the ideological positions of the factions held fast. Hawke was aware of the factional angst and anger that this latest international security crisis had brought into the party-room. As leader of his parliamentary political party, Hawke stated how he "understood the deep feelings of some of my Caucus colleagues, mainly from the Left" (1994, 518). Further, it required him to spend many hours convincing those factional members on the merits of prosecuting the issue through force if necessary, and if it came to that, it would not result in another Vietnam (Hawke 1994, 518). The recall of parliament for 4 December 1990 allowed Hawke to provide an update on developments in the Persian Gulf region.

The cornerstone of the content contained in Hawke's Ministerial Statement can be drawn to that within the then most recent UNSCR that dealt with the crisis. On 29 November 1990, UNSCR 678 gave Saddam Hussein a clear deadline for the full withdrawal of his armed forces from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 (UNSCR 678 1991) Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the latest resolution linked back to the first one of the crisis and demanded "Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent resolutions" and that if it failed this "one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill to do so", it thereby authorised "member States co-operating with the government of Kuwait…to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSCR 678 1991). Iraqi forces ultimately failed to withdraw by the deadline and the restoration of peace and security in that region was to be restored through an escalation of the crisis to war. Much diplomatic ground and military preparation was covered before the UN-endorsed deadline arrived.

International efforts continued to avert the course that charted for a war in the Middle East region. Meanwhile, Australia weighed up its contribution to any final,

military assault to retake Kuwait by force. Hawke noted how he pondered throughout November 1990 that "Australia should be prepared to join others to uphold the UN resolution by force" (1994, 516). The mulling over of such a momentous decision would determine Australia's military contribution, one that could be a radical departure from the original mission. Hawke's first Ministerial Statement to parliament on 21 August 1990 was clear that the naval taskforce had "a clear mission to assist in enforcing economic sanctions" and that the mission would be characterised by "identification, contact, interrogation and warning" (APH Hawke 21 August 1990). The position in August 1990 had been calibrated to deploy the ADF along the spectrum of conflict where it could minimise wherever possible its warfighting role. A relatively small naval taskforce was stationed in the Arabian Sea, and the prime minister stated that his government's position was "our ships are not being sent to the Gulf region to attack Iraq. They will engage Iraqi armed forces only in self-defence" (APH Hawke 21 August 1990).

Just three months after that statement by Hawke, the changed strategic environment was created by a defiant Saddam, which demanded a revisit of the Australian government's original position. Hawke's second Ministerial Statement placed the crisis within a new context. It was one that would most likely incorporate the implementation of the term "all necessary means", which meant "the use of armed force to compel compliance with the Security Council's resolutions" (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4319). The prime minister claimed UNSCR 678 offered "the best prospect of a just and peaceful resolution of the crisis" and how it was "founded on the hope that a clear statement of that preparedness will in fact avoid war" (Hawke, 4 December 1990, 4319). That same statement by Hawke now creatively claimed that "this Government has never ruled out the possibility that armed force may need to be used as a last resort to resolve the Gulf crisis" (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4320). When the Gulf Crisis began, and during the initial deployment of force to the region as part of Operation DAMASK, such language was never part of any official government statement. This later characterisation about Hawke's government's long-term perspective of the crisis is disingenuous as it implied war was always going to be the outcome, yet the warfighting phase would ultimately be undertaken by a large U.S. led coalition with many contributing states (Horner 1992).

The sentiments expressed in Hansard are a historiographical means to capture the real-time process that challenges later reflections of hindsight found in diaries, as in the case of Hawkes recollections, through biography and autobiography. Later in 1994, Hawke wrote that the time during the Gulf Crisis, his Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray, offered a naval taskforce of three to five naval ships (1994, 518). The actual deployment of two FFGs was agreed because of the prime minister's key considerations that Australia's "current contribution was both substantial and proportionate", and second, the nation already "had enough young Australians at risk" (1994, 518). The total number deployed on Operation DAMASK was 1,871 ADF personnel (Galligan and Roberts 2007, 243).

The Australian government was mindful how it faced constraints on the size of its deployment. Saddam's non-compliance to UNSCR 678 meant that the crisis would most likely escalate from crisis to war, which meant the very likelihood that elements of the ADF would be operational in a war-zone, which meant hazardous, warlike conditions would place its personnel at a higher risk of death and injury. As the crisis edged towards war, the Australian government were ever mindful of not being involved as part of land forces. The political and strategic considerations extended to an awareness of an expectation from its most important strategic partner that Australia would be an early and considerable contributor of force. The risk of being neither a supporter of U.S. efforts, nor an actual contributor of force, would only be exacerbated in the knowledge that if Australia did not participate in that war which resulted in victory, it would create a lost opportunity to demonstrate an actual commitment of force to the U.S. alliance.

The heightened strategic situation increased over the months as the crisis demonstrated that Saddam had no intention of withdrawing his forces from Kuwait. This allowed the Hawke government to build its case for maintaining an Australian presence in a region that was likely to devolve into war and would therefore have the ADF operating in a Middle Eastern warzone. The parliamentary sitting day of 4 December 1990 began with an attack by the Opposition about the state of the economy and then focused on the Gulf Crisis. The Leader of the Opposition led with a Motion of No Confidence, which stated a lack of confidence "in the Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the Government for their economic incompetence, which contrary to their assurances, has resulted in the Australian economy going into recession"

(APH, Hewson 4 December 1990, 4299). The motion was voted on with a six-vote majority in the government's favour (APH 4 December 1990, 4314 - 4319). After a series of papers and reports were tabled, the main order of that day was the Ministerial Statement titled 'Middle East' (APH 4 December 1990, 4314 - 4319). The strategic situation dictated where the political debate would steer parliamentary consensus.

Despite the deterioration of the strategic situation in the Middle East, the Hawke government continued a political defence of its decision to deploy force to the Persian Gulf region and maintain an armed presence. The significance a looming war was that not since 29 April 1965 had an Australian Government announced it would deploy troops into an active warzone (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior 1995, 179). As the crisis was not going to subside it became increasingly likely that while land forces had not been committed, Australian service personnel would be serving in a theatre of operations that would rightly be classified as an area of active service. The Menzies government's 1965 decision to send an Army infantry battalion into Vietnam shares a parallel with the Hawke government's decision over a generation later (Dennis et al. 2008). The August 1990 decision to send a naval taskforce into the Persian Gulf region came with the persistent risk of having once deployed force, the strategic situation could escalate. That could result in the earlier decision becoming increasingly unpopular on the domestic front, more so if additional military commitments become an operational necessity to ensure force protection and meet mission objectives. As the Ministerial Statement of 4 December 1990 was read into Parliament, the political problems of the Hawke government had become apparent. Australia was now locked into a military commitment in the Middle East region in a situation that was unlikely to not de-escalate peacefully.

On the domestic front, the Hawke government faced non-strategic pressures that could link its Gulf Crisis military commitment as a sign of being out of touch with the electorate. Australia in late 1990 was undergoing the worst economic recession since the end of the Second World War and unemployment was at a record high and showed no signs of tapering off (ABS 1991). Meanwhile, the Hawke government had tied itself to an overseas military campaign, albeit one that was concentrated to an almost exclusive naval commitment. Despite the worsened economic conditions, this 4 December 1990 Ministerial Statement signalled a dramatic shift was underway in the focus of the U.S. led international coalition's future role in addressing the ongoing

intransigence of Saddam and his entrenched occupation force in Kuwait. It was no longer the enforcement of economic sanctions against Iraq but a departure towards the preparation for the increasing prospect of the use of force (APH 4 December 1990, 4314 - 4319). The operational requirements of the deployed forces would now move along the spectrum of conflict, ever closer now to a major war.

At the end of 1990, the ADF had force elements firmly located in the Persian Gulf region. The mission and operational requirements had remained the same as it had been since its original deployment in August 1990. That role had been the enforcement of economic sanctions against Iraq, but a shift was now clearly underway. UNSCR 678 indicated clearly that the option of the use of force meant that the ADF would likely become involved in the direct support of warlike operations. With that shift in operational requirements, the RAN taskforce would become the latest of a long list of Australian military campaigns in the Middle East region. What UNSCR 678 delivered for coalition member states was that the provision of a hard deadline before the option for war could be executed, was a known date in which planning for such a contingency would now gather apace. That UN-endorsed deadline for the use "all means necessary" meant that the real prospect of a major war was now less than six-weeks away.

The prime minister's language in the parliament during the crisis could be considered measured, serious and spoke of avoiding the past calamities when state aggression was left unchecked. Australia's direct interests were put forward as another major reason to have its ADF deployed naval taskforce plan for the preparation for possible war alongside U.S. led allied forces (APH Hawke 4 December 1990 4322). The 4 December 1990 was a pivotal day as it signalled that Australia would once again be at war. The prime minister authorised the ADF to have its naval taskforce operate alongside the international coalition, as authorised by UNSCR 678, and importantly, RAN vessels "would be available to participate in action with the allowed fleet in the Gulf" (APH, Hawke 4 December 1990, 4322). The role was defined as providing "an important contribution to its air defence capabilities" however, it did "not formally commit Australian forces to any action" (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4322; 4322-23). The escalation of the size of the ADF deployment was also announced however, it was miniscule, even tokenistic. Two medical teams were announced, and numbered just 20 personnel (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4323). Given the stance of Labor's

Left and Centre Left factions had maintained throughout the crisis, this additional contribution appeared acceptable because it was extremely small and was a non-warfighting capability.

The number of RAN vessels deployed in the area of operations had not changed throughout the Gulf Crisis, and did not either during the warfighting period of the First Gulf War. On 4 December 1990, the Australian public were informed that a second naval rotation would commence "in the next day or two", with two new RAN vessels deployed into the Area of Operations as replacement forces (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4323). Later that day, the Minister for Defence and Science Personnel, Gordon Bilney MP, acknowledged the completion of the first naval rotation, with HMAS *Adelaide* and HMAS *Darwin* soon to return to Australia from the Gulf of Oman (APH Bilney 4 Dec 1990, para 17). The deployment area was now extended however, which allowed the second rotation of RAN vessels to depart the Gulf of Oman in the Arabian Sea, and sail through the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz and situate its force within the Persian Gulf "to exercise and operate with allied naval forces in preparation for that role" (APH, Hawke 4 December 1990, 4322). On the spectrum of conflict, that role was moving towards the right, and the ADF's naval taskforce prepared to play its small part of a much larger major war.

Bipartisan political support in the Australian parliament for the Gulf Crisis also included the third largest party in the House of Representatives. The National Party had previously been a coalition member in government with the Liberal Party, and did so to gain a numerical majority over the Labor Party, and positioned itself to do so again at the next election, which was scheduled for early 1993. However, during the Gulf Crisis, former Vietnam War army lieutenant and now Leader of the National Party, Tim Fischer MP, delivered his Ministerial Statement on the Gulf Crisis on the 4 December 1990 (APH Fisher 4 December 1990). Fisher noted the small expansion of Australia's commitment to the crisis now included an ADF medical team which comprised Navy personnel and one Army member, who operated on board the USNS *Comfort*, on-station in the Persian Gulf region (APH Fisher 4 December 1990, para 7). Exact numbers of Service personnel on board RAN vessels were not divulged in any of the day's statements and debates however, Fisher noted that Army was represented on HMAS *Brisbane*, and Navy, Army and Air Force personnel were on board HMAS

Sydney, the only truly tri-Service composition of ADF elements in the Gulf region (APH Fisher 4 December 1990, para six).

The inherent conservatism of the National Party came as no surprise that its parliamentary leader acknowledged the "horrific invasion of tiny Kuwait by Iraq" but supported the U.S. to not "extend the embargo indefinitely" (APH Fischer 4 December 1990, para 11). Fisher commended the U.S. approach towards the Gulf Crisis, along with its involvement of the UN to build widespread international support, which culminated in the sponsorship of UNSCR 678 by the U.S., as well as the UK, Soviet Union, France, Canada and Romania (APH Fischer 4 December 1990, 4334). In support of the Australian contingent deployed to the Persian Gulf region, Fischer supported the Hawke government's stance, despite the severe economic impact sanctions had on the Australian Wheat Board and the Rice Marketing Board. In linguistic flourish, Fischer closed his address with "it is time that there was a total reversal of the rape of Kuwait by the Butcher of Baghdad" (APH Fischer 4 December 1990, 4335).

Australia's major political parties had now all voiced their support in Parliament of Hawke's approach to the Gulf Crisis. The debates held on 4 December 1990 continued with other members of parliament making statements regarding the Gulf Crisis. Dr Catley MP spoke of the collective security arrangement and drew analogies of the failure of the League of Nations during the 1930s to Hitler's expansionist aggression (APH Catley 4 December 1990), similar positions taken by other speakers on the day, including Alexander Downer MP (APH 4 December 1990, para 5). Downer would become foreign minister for the entirety of the Howard Government (1996–2007). Meanwhile, Andrew Peacock MP, a former foreign affairs minister during the Fraser government noted that criticisms from Opposition did not dilute "a bipartisan national position" (APH Peacock 4 December 1990, para 1). Legality existed behind each of the twelve resolutions, as was the use of force if required and were part of a legal framework that aimed to prevent the annexation of Saudi Arabia's oil fields, which could have given Saddam "access to between 50 and 60 per cent - estimates vary - of the known oil reserves of the world" (APH Peacock 4 December 1990, para 16). The Opposition was only too aware of the geostrategic consequences should Saddam's authoritarian state's further use of force to acquire the majority of the world's oil reserves.

There was also criticism of the "intelligence forces of the Western world", a smaller theme of the Opposition's parliamentary addresses that were delivered on 4 December 1990, as a failure borne from being unable to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (APH 4 December 1990 Peacock, para 22). The Leader of the Opposition first made that assessment, and was later during the sitting was elaborated on by a former foreign minister. Andrew Peacock's view was that "many of our intelligence services have not acted with the perspicacity with which they were once so capable of acting" (APH Peacock 4 December 1990, para 22). The irony of such an assessment would be writ large against the claims made for war in 2002 and 2003 during the crisis phase that characterised the arguments to launch a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq; a further instalment of war in the Persian Gulf region that involved Australia which will be examined in the next chapter. Meanwhile, the December 1990 parliamentary debate included Alexander Downer MP, who would become foreign minister in the Howard Government and during the 2003 Iraq War. Downer spoke in support of U.S. led efforts to liberate Kuwait, and was the son of a foreign minister who served during the Menzies Government. Downer gave his support to Hawke's measures against Iraq "in relation to Australia's involvement with the Persian Gulf crisis and in particular the multinational force in the Persian Gulf" (APH Downer4 December 1990, para 1). The emphasis throughout Downer's statement was for the nation to be ready for the unfortunate possibility of war and be prepared to fight, "no matter how long any military conflict may take" (APH Downer 4 December 1990, para 19).

Despite the general display of bipartisan support, antagonism existed between the government and opposition. In particular, they needled one another over the ideological settings that existed within their opponents' political factions. The line of effort ascertained from Hansard was the debate demonstrated those who advocated for an expanded military contribution were warmongers, while those who argued for the non-use of force and had severely limited Australia's military commitment to the Gulf Crisis. During the 4 December 1990 parliamentary debate, a single sentence by the prime minister came in for particular attention during an address by Labor's Member for Melbourne Ports, Clyde Holding MP (APH Holding4 December 1990, 4364). Holding was heckled by the Opposition's member for Dundas, Philip Ruddock MP, who claimed that as a result of the ALP's Left faction, the Prime Minister's position had "not proposed to make any other contribution of naval, air or ground forces" (APH

Holding 4 December 1990, 4365). While Ruddock continued that theme in his own speech, Holding replied that such a claim was proof that some in the Opposition harboured the view that "we should be sending in the Air Force, the Army; we should be going in gung-ho" (APH Holding 4 December 1990, 4365). While he supported the prime minister's statements and his party's official position regarding the Gulf Crisis, Holding still held out "reasonable hope" that a negotiated settlement would avoid war (APH Holding 4 December 1990, 4366).

The prime minister's position was supported by various parliamentary colleagues though only one member of the Left spoke that day in parliament about the Gulf Crisis. The Labor member for Calwell, Dr Theophanous MP, said "there is increasingly a new world order" and that the Left, in response to UNSCR 678 and its approval for authorised member states "to use all necessary means", wanted everything to be done to achieve a peaceful solution (APH Theophanous 4 December 1990, 4369). Theophanous pleaded that "it may be the case that there were genuine grievances on the part of Iraq in relation to Kuwait" (APH Theophanous 4 December 1990, 4370). A non-Left faction member of the ALP, Member for Fowler, Edward Grace MP, was also the Chairperson of the Caucus Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, and challenged the charge that Australia was "a lackey [of] the United States" (APH Grace 4 December 1990, 4374). Grace acknowledged "there have been inconsistencies in the world community's treatments of aggressors in the past" but claimed that an expansion of Australia's military contribution would not occur as "no other commitment has been sought or offered" (APH Grace 4 December 1990, 4374; 4375).

The spectre of the Vietnam War lingered within the Hawke government throughout the Gulf Crisis and was a view which intensified as it became likely it would transition into war. Many parliamentary members who belonged to Labor's Left or Centre Left factions were against force as an instrument of the state, especially when employed as a tool of statecraft in international relations. Many of these factionally Left-aligned members of parliament had protested against the Vietnam War, such as university sit-in's, anti-war moratoriums and marches, or avoidance from National Service; all were united and adamant that Australia should not be led into another U.S. led war (Dennis et al 2008). The Vietnam War at the time became Australia's longest war and in the process, proved politically and socially divisive. That effects of that war on Australian society cast a long shadows and impacted foreign policy, as well as

strategic and defence policies, such as how the ADF would be deployed in future overseas military campaigns (Cheeseman 1996). These various factors informed the Left's position for as long as they did, an advocated for ongoing economic sanctions against Saddam in order to give that option a chance to work and avoid going to war (Hawke 1994, 519).

As the final phase of the Gulf Crisis became edged closer to the next stage of actual war, the prime minister had met with his Party leaders and deliberated on the nation's military contribution. Hawke, along with factional heavyweights who were also Party leaders and predominately from the Right faction, included Keating (Treasurer), Ray (Defence) Evans (Foreign Affairs), Button (Leader of the Senate), all of whom made "the decision as to our future in the Gulf" (APH Ray 4 December 1990, 4867). The decision was framed around the phrase of "what is in the interests of this country", and the minister for Defence said that their collective position of 29 November 1990 was taken to Cabinet for endorsement (APH Ray 4 December 1990, 4867). The prime minister's statement in parliament of 4 December 1990 was considered assessed by foreign minister Evans that the prime minister's announcement of an additional military contribution of two medical teams to join the existing naval task force, met "a very real need and constituting a very valuable addition to the available resources now concentrated in the Gulf" (APH Evans 4 December 1990, 4898). Evans added that "it is not a contribution that we propose to increase" and expressed his view that it was neither likely an increase would be asked for (APH Evans, 4 December 1990, 4898). It was clear that this would be as far as Australia would extend its military contribution. Australia's contribution would predominately remain naval in platforms and personnel, and participate as part of a larger U.S. led allied naval contingent.

The diplomatic efforts conducted within the UN delivered 12 UNSCR resolutions and none of them produced any tangible shift or reversal from Saddam and his military occupation of Kuwait (APH Evans 4 December 1990, 4898). UNSCR 678 was the twelfth UN resolution on the Gulf Crisis that provided the legal and operational justification for military power to be readied for use. For the Australian government, UNSCR 678 became the legal instrument under international law for the authorisation of the movement of RAN vessels from the Gulf of Oman and into the Persian Gulf. The movement northwards into the Persian Gulf saw the RAN come under U.S.

operational control and to also serve alongside, the RN and Canadian warships (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4323). The prime minister made it clear that Australia maintained "priority over the assignment of our ships" and outlined the authorisation process for "ADF units will remain at all times under Australian national command" (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4323). As the final phase of crisis came close to its conclusion, the ADF were now involved in allied military planning, based on the likelihood that the deadline would almost certainly mark the end of the crisis and the start of war. The public was meanwhile assured by the government that ADF military personnel and its platforms in the Persian Gulf region "do not formally commit Australian forces to any action" (APH Hawke 4 December 1990, 4322-23).

The crisis edged ever closer along the timeline to war. On 10 January 1991, the Geneva talks between U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker III and the Iraqi Foreign Minister failed, and later that day U.S. President Bush called Hawke to provide an update on the Gulf Crisis (Hawke 1994, 520). On the 14 January 1991, the ADF's Director of Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), Major-General John Baker, briefed the prime minister and his key ministers in Canberra (Hawke 1994, 521). The hindsight factor can be found in the armchair strategist, and Hawke's recollection of events of that particular briefing is that he directly challenged Baker's assessment that the ground war could take between five to six weeks, and instead "suggested that after the air offensive it should only take a few days" (Hawke 1994, 521). That contrasted with the prime minister's first ministerial statement on the Middle East, provided just under three-weeks from the commencement of the crisis on 21 August 1990, when he described Iraq as "very powerful" and was armed with ballistic missiles and a chemical warfare capability (APH Hawke 21 August 1990, 1119). To drive the point about Iraqi's considerable military capabilities, Hawke added that "it has one of the largest armies in the world, well equipped and battle hardened, and a large air force" (APH Hawke 21 August 1990, 1119).

Despite the international coalition's ongoing military build-up throughout the crisis phase, Australia's contribution remained relatively static. In the lead up to the UN-endorsed deadline of 15 January 1991, the Australian public were largely in favour of its government deploying force overseas to this likely conflict zone. Australian opinion polls recorded a 69 per cent approval of its citizens who gave support for the military contribution to the First Gulf War (Megalogenis 2008, 280). This high

approval rating came less than one generation after defeat in the Vietnam War. From the end of the Second World War, Australian expeditionary forces deployed to fight alongside the U.S. in Korea and Vietnam, as well as British forces during the Malayan Emergency, and in Borneo to support the new Federation of Malaysia during the Indonesian Confrontation (Grey 2008, 220). During that post-1945 period, the Vietnam War became one of three campaigns that Australian troops fought during the Cold War in the Southeast Asian region; campaigns that were not only in the service of the end of Empire but represented Australia's strategic doctrinal mindset of 'forward defence' alongside the U.S.

The Gulf Crisis indicated that Australia's strategic approach had undergone a shift from the previous two-decades of 'self-reliance' and back to the past with 'forward defence'. The immediate period after the end of the Vietnam War saw the Fraser Government's 1976 Defence White Paper, *Australian Defence*, implement a new period of force structure and combat acquisitions based on the concept of 'self-reliance', a notion that "for the first time in Australia's history - was to be primarily unaided" (Dibb 2007, 110). Aside from several UN peacekeeping operations during the 1970s and 1980s, Australia's deployment of a naval task force during the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis heralded the return of 'forward defence'. The RAN deployment to the Middle East region throughout the Gulf Crisis and Gulf War remained limited. The force was capped at two *Oliver Hazard Perry* Class frigates and a supply vessel that rotated once during the period that covered the Gulf Crisis and the First Gulf War (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior 1997, 279). That naval commitment allowed an armed contribution that operated with the U.S. and alongside a core of other allied forces while the government avoided commitment of ground forces in the liberation of Kuwait. That decision avoided the potential flare-up of anti-war sentiments from segments within the ALP and across the Australian electorate.

Despite being a contributor state from almost the very outset of the Gulf Crisis, and involved in war planning, Australia was not given any advance warning when the warfighting commenced. With UNSCR 678, it declared 15 January 1991 as the firm deadline for Iraq to withdraw all its forces from Kuwait. However, the length of time between crisis and actual "all means necessary" was unknown by the Hawke government and the Australian military hierarchy. The ADF informed the government in the morning of 17 January 1991 "that action was to begin that day" however, it was

not until 09:50 (AEST) that Hawke received a phone call from U.S. President Bush, who told him that combat operations would begin within the hour (Hawke 1994, 521). The shortness of warning for the commencement of a major war in the Middle East meant that matters had moved quickly. Hawke immediately called a meeting with his key ministerial group of Ray, Evans, Keating, Button and Duffy before placing a phone call at 10:20 (AEST) to the CDF, Lieutenant-General Peter Gration, and authorised him to notify forces based in the Gulf region that they "should join operations against Iraq in accordance with Resolution 678" (Hawke 1994, 521-522).

7.5 Transition from crisis to war

The allied assault against Iraqi forces began with an air campaign on 17 January 1991, which included targets located in Kuwait and Iraq, and had 884 ADF personnel deployed in the Persian Gulf region (APH Hawke 17 January 1991, 3). As the international coalition employed air power to hit targets of military significance, the RAN Task Group 627.4 of HMA Ships *Sydney*, *Brisbane* and *Success* were on station in the Persian Gulf (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior 1997, 279). Meanwhile in Australia, the prime minister held a media conference at 12:25 (AEST) and from the next day until war's end, he received daily briefings from both the ADF and the Australian Intelligence Community about this conflict (Hawke 1994, 522). Parliament was recalled for a two-day sitting, starting on Monday 21 January 1991, which allowed MPs to debate the war as well as for the prime minister to deliver an update to the House (APH Hawke 17 January 1991, 1). When parliament resumed, there were approximately 40 nations which had contributed directly, or through sustainment to the gathered military force now taking on Saddam's military (APH Hawke 21 January 91, 4). It was at this time Australia marginally increased its military contribution of an additional ADF element that included 23 personnel of a navy clearance diving team (CDT) (DoD 1991, 22). The deployment of CDT3 undertook "explosive ordnance demolition tasks" and this specialised role was a valuable contribution to the overall commitment of force (DoD 1991, 22).

As war succeeded crisis, by the fourth day of war, the Hawke government markedly changed its language about when it all began. Hawke's Ministerial Statement of 21 January 1991 said, "it is a war now in its sixth month" which he said originated

back "on 2 August last year, when Iraq invaded Kuwait" (APH Hawke 21 January 1991, 7). No longer was the immediate previous phase considered a crisis, but a war that had complied with twelve UNSCR's every step of the way, acquired a moral authority and garnered widespread international support from one hundred and forty-four nations for what resulted in the use of force against Saddam. Hawke's statement was "never has Australian military action been undertaken with such global consent and within such a broad alliance" indicated the nation's welcomed role in the international system (APH Hawke 21 January 1991, 4). During that same parliamentary address, Hawke argued against the charge levelled at him that Australia's deployment was based solely on alliance management which served U.S. interests over that of Australia's national interests. Hawke categorically disputed such a position and argued that action in the Gulf served the interests of the UN and all its member states, "who rightly demand the freedom of collective security and individual sovereignty" (APH 21 January 1991, 6). The actions of the state were framed within the legitimate use of force, conducted in coalition with other states.

Australia's major political parties framed its themes for involvement in this war around concepts that were not exclusively tied to oil, nor the continued, unimpeded access to this strategic commodity. Instead, the appeal for legitimacy in the use of force was provided for the need to maintain a state's political independence, territorial sovereignty and the explicit cost of appeasement to an aggressive state such as Iraq against its smaller, neighbouring state of Kuwait. Such themes were provided as part of the major narrative for debate in a recalled parliament. Many members of the Hawke government spoke in favour of war against Saddam. Similarly, the Leader of the Opposition gave his party's support to UN-endorsed action in the Persian Gulf, but as Keating became the next government speaker on 21 January 1991, he too advocated the various reasons why it was seen necessary to prosecute war in the Persian Gulf region, while mindful to slay the shadow of the Vietnam War (APH Hewson; Keating 21 January 1991, 9-19). Keating sought to allay fears of any such repeat, and stated that the government would make "no further commitment by Australia beyond that undertaken to date and under no circumstances will there be any conscription of young people to the war" (APH Keating 21 January 1991, 17). Keating said Vietnam was a mistake and bore no resemblance to this war, as Australia was a

member of a multilateral force assembled under UN resolutions that acted to liberate Kuwait from an aggressive power (APH Keating 21 January 1991, 19).

The prime minister and his deputy both offered an outward appearance of solidarity on the armed commitment of the state to warlike operations in the Middle East region. As Hawke stated, and Keating reiterated, the Australian military contribution was not a war about oil. Instead, Keating argued that "ever since Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq in 1979, he has been all about oil," and gave an example how OPEC had endured Saddam's belligerent behaviour "over their cautious pricing policies was evidence again of his belief in oil power" (APH 21 January 1991, 18). The Middle East was clearly "the most important net exporter of oil in the world" (Balat 2006, 823) and from the beginning of the Gulf Crisis and throughout the 1990s, Australia began to import more oil as a percentage of its nominal GDP (Rosewall, Arculus and Pickering, 2008).

During parliament's recall of 21–22 January 1991, the Opposition's minor partner, the National Party, levelled criticism at the Hawke government's Defence White Paper and the consequence of a strategic approach that embraced self-reliance (APH Fischer 21 January 1991, 22). The strategic emphasis and force structure had been on the preparation to address low-level threat contingencies. However, that strategic assessment was crafted through the prism of self-reliance and had not envisaged how the actions of an aggressive Middle Eastern power which invaded a smaller nation five-and-a-half months earlier, that act also threatened the possibility of an onward advance into Saudi Arabia. Such a scenario, and its escalation, would see an even more increased need for an international response. That would also likely involve a request from the U.S. for an Australian commitment, one that may not be limited to a naval contingent.

The Opposition challenged the Hawke government's strategic inconsistency in the face of the preparation for war. Fischer cited the government's cited *The Defence of Australia* (1987) most recent White Paper and stated: "There are no current or prospective situations beyond our own region where Australia's direct strategic interests require a significant defence role of local circumstances offer scope for one" (APH Fischer 21 January 91, 22). The Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, Bilney MP, responded by stating that there were only two main objectives for Australian forces in the Gulf; first, the prevention of regional dominance by Saddam,

and second, to have the principles of the UN Charter become the foundation of international law (APH Bilney, 21 January 91, 29). Bilney put the case forward that Australia's military contribution from five-and-a-half months previously remained "proportionate and practical" and that in the period up to 21 January 1991, as part of the Multinational Naval Force, the RAN contingent had interrogated 698 vessels (APH Bilney, 21 January 1991, 31).

Throughout the Gulf Crisis and the 1991 Gulf War, Australia suffered no fatalities or casualties (Dennis et al. 1997, 281). The deployment did demonstrate "that the ADF could make a minor contribution at short notice" and also "gave the Australian command and control systems very valuable testing" (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior 1997, 281). While the vast majority of ADF personnel were serving on naval vessels that formed Multi-National Naval Force, there were several officers who served on exchange with U.S. and British ground forces deployed in-theatre (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior 1997, 281). Prior to the deadline to war, the expected threat from the Iraqi air force against the allied naval flotilla was real and to address the non-existent air defence capabilities on board HMAS *Success* (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior 1997, 279). To counter that capability gap, the Army deployed aboard that vessel its 16th Air Defence Regiment from Woodside, South Australia (APH Bilney, 21 January 1991, 32). The real threat came from conventional sea mines sown by Iraq in the northern Persian Gulf waters, which necessitated the deployment of CDT3, armed with RBS70 ground-to-air missiles launchers (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior. 1997, 279). In addition, "special liaison officers" were in locations further away that included Cyprus, and closer to the Area of Operations in Saudi Arabia (APH Fischer 21 January 1991, 21). Those of an indeterminate and unspecified number located in Saudi Arabia included "a small group of RAAF photo-interpreters" as well as a detachment from the Australian DIO (Dennis, Grey, Morris and Prior 1997, 279-281).

For the first time in Australia's military history, women deployed and served in combat roles during this conflict. Women served on board HMAS *Westralia* as well as in the area of operations on the USNS *Comfort* (APH Bilney 21 January 1991, 32). Their service in combat roles was on board RAN vessels had been possible since May 1990 (APH Bilney, 21 January 1991, 32). However, that decision had taken place almost three-months prior to the invasion of Kuwait. The recall of parliament gave the Hawke government the chance to show a more modern ADF that had become more

gender inclusive in some roles but had a long way to truly achieve that. As the Minister for Defence sat in the Senate, which gave Bilney an opportunity in the House of Representative to reinforce what resources the government would commit to the war. Framed at a time when the air war was underway, the prelude before allied land forces were committed to battle, Bilney said Australia would not commit ground forces or the RAAF (APH Bilney 21 January 1991, 32). He scoffed at rumours of a call-out of ADF Reservists or the impending reintroduction of conscription, though restated his government's commitment to having "volunteer armed services and has a policy that explicitly rejects conscription except in the event of an actual attack on Australia's territorial integrity" (APH Bilney 21 January 91, 32). Given the strategic circumstances, the level of military commitment could be scaled up but that was dependent on there being a direct threat against Australia however in this crisis, such a capability was not possessed by the Iraqi state, and neither was there any intent for such action.

The mismatch between the 1987 *Defence White Paper* and the war in the Persian Gulf region saw the Hawke government defend its strategic outlook, defence policies, military posture, and force structure. Bilney argued during the period of combat operations that the framework of dealing with security threats and military contributions was "defence self-reliance in the context of alliances" (APH Bilney 21 January 1991, 33). Member for Bennelong, John Howard MP, however, outwardly praised the U.S. president's ability to build a diverse coalition and "explicitly reject the notion of any kind of linkage between the Palestinian issue and the invasion and subjugation of Kuwait" (APH Howard 21 January 1991, 33). Almost four years later to the day, on 30 January 1995, Howard would reclaim the mantle of leader of the Liberal Party and with that, Leader of the Opposition, and then in March 1996, won a federal election against Keating (Errington and Van Onselen 2007, 205). Howard however, held firm on his political views, just as he had supported Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War and the nation's close ties with the U.S. alliance (Errington and Van Onselen 2007, 41). Howard was an Opposition frontbencher during the 1991 Gulf War and was later the prime minister during the 2003 Iraq War.

7.6 Assessment of the war's strategic disconnect

The 1991 Gulf War exposed the strategic disconnect between Australia's then current Defence White Paper. The 1987 release of *The Defence of Australia* had not placed emphasis on an expeditionary capacity for the ADF to project force overseas in any considerable, or sustainable, manner. The Australian government responded to this latest Middle East security crisis and development of a U.S. led international coalition however, the adaptation meant the deployment of elements of the ADF required assets that would need to sustain the commitment while being conveniently placed away from any involvement in land warfare operations. The build-up towards war was a reminder to the Australian government that an out-of-region international security crisis could lead to an expectation from the U.S. that a contribution of force from Australia was expected. Such a deployment of force could prove costly in both terms of personnel and materiel. The changed operational realities of overseas deployments alongside a U.S. led coalition meant that at the time of this particular international security crisis in the Middle East, Australia's military posture and force structure was not exactly aligned to what unfolded.

The Opposition made this distinction in their parliamentary debates. Former National Party Leader and Member for New England, Rt. Hon. Ian Sinclair MP, linked his comments to the incumbent government's 1987 Defence White Paper. Sinclair claimed that the military procurement program undertaken as a result of the 1987 Defence White Paper's strategic approach of self-reliance state his concerns how "the Anzac vessels would be capable of exercising the same role in the Middle East as the DDGs and the FFGs that are serving there" (APH Sinclair 21 January 1991, 45). Such an assessment illustrated how the military procurement process had been linked to a specific strategic approach that was centred on the concept of self-reliance, which did result in some major and key platform acquisitions. However, those acquisitions were for platforms that could provide defence of the air-sea gap and the approaches to Australia. Those strategic decisions, and resultant purchases during the mid to late 1980s meant they had certain limitations regarding their operational range and sustainment capabilities.

The ground offensive lasted for only four days at the end-stage of Operation DESERT STORM (Horner 1992). Parliamentary sitting days during the 1991 Gulf War, coincided with Operation DESERT STORM, which began with the allied air

campaign that operated until 0400 on 24 February 1991 when the ground offensive began (Horner 1992). When the ceasefire came into effect 100 hours later at 0800 on 28 February 1991, it was considered "one of the most spectacularly successful in military history" (Horner 1992, 53). During this relatively short war, the actual parliamentary sitting days in the Australian House of Representatives and Senate for 1991 were held on 21–22 January, 12–14 February, and 18–21 February (APH 2002). The Australian Senate did not sit during the days of the allied land offensive, and its next set of scheduled sitting days did not begin until 5 March 1991 (Journals of the Senate, 1991). When parliament sat for the second sitting day of 1991, debates were allowed in the House of Representatives for MPs the opportunity to express their personal view, some of whom condemned the war.

Federal MP, who were against the war, were given an opportunity to speak not just in the parliament, but more broadly to the Australian public, and specifically, to their electorate. Labor's Member for Lilley, Elaine Darling MP, the first woman from Queensland elected to the House of Representatives (APH Darling 22 January 1991), declared herself a long-time supporter of the UN but would not support UNSC Resolution 678 and its authorisation of force against Iraq. She viewed such action just perpetuated war, that "overwhelming social cancer" which blighted human society (APH Darling 22 January 1991, 102). Fellow Labor backbencher and Member for Macarthur, Dr Stephen Martin MP, said he would "not support an increase in Australia's involvement under any circumstances" (APH, 22 January 1991, 110). Labor's Member for Lalor and former Minister, Barry Jones MP, criticised how the decision was made which led Australia into war. Jones identified "the comparative remoteness of the Parliament and the Caucus from the decision-making process" and expressed concerned about the lack of substantial debate on the matter, citing the previous debates on the matter held on 21 August 1990 and 4 December 1990 had just 13 speeches (APH Jones, 22 January 1991, 116).

The ALP's Left and Centre Left stamped their dissent and dismay over Australia's involvement in the war against Iraq. Jones reminded the parliament that Saddam had only become a monster on 2 August 1990, and that the West had been complicit in arming and supporting him in his eight-year war against Iran (APH, 22 January 1991, 116). Jones also pointed out "we have helped to construct a demonology" but in the years prior to the invasion of Kuwait, the West were only too

aware of "his own final solution to the Kurds" and the deployment of chemical weapons against them (APH Jones 22 January 1991, 116). He also linked the U.S. need to maintain its access to cheap oil as another important factor why war was being waged, and the embryonic recognition of the growing awareness climate change was present in the debate. Jones ultimately supported the government motion but went on the record to describe the U.S. as both "the most wasteful user of fuel" and that they had resisted any "attempts to secure an international target for reducing CO_2 emissions" (APH Jones, 22 January 1991). Present in his position on war, and that by many other members of the government's Left and Centre Left factions, was a willingness to argue the case against war and Australia's military involvement that was not framed solely around misguided alliance management with the U.S.

The 1991 Gulf War also gave an opportunity whereby future parliamentary party leaders, government and shadow ministers all provided a personal perspective on matters on war, national security, defence, and strategy. During the January 1991 parliamentary debates that took place during the final phase of the Gulf Crisis, and once war had begun, members of the Federal Opposition went out of their way to state their support for the George H.W. Bush Administration. A senior member of the Opposition, the Liberal Member for Flinders, Peter Reith MP, gave an effusive tribute to President Bush as well as "his colleagues Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and to the American people for the leadership they have provided the world" (APH Reith, 22 January 91, 120). Reith credited the Labor prime minister for his handling of the war and his deployment of force, but did so through one of the main reasons for the U.S. led international coalition to liberate Kuwait. That cause for war was framed through the lens of energy security, and for the resumption of the continued supply of oil. Reith noted on behalf of many in his party and the majority of parliament that "the possible economic consequences" of the majority of the world's oil reserves being controlled by Saddam Hussein would be most consequential (APH Reith 22 January 1991, 120).

The factional composition of the ALP was on display during the second day of parliamentary schedule for 1991. Labor's John Kerin MP, who became Keating's successor as treasurer after the latter's unsuccessful challenge against Hawke for the party's leadership, was blunt. This non-member of the Left or Centre left factions stated how "there is yet no such thing as international morality" and that "power and

its projection is rarely benign" (APH Kerin 22 January 1991, 122). He went further and asked of those who claimed the war was just about oil, said "the anti-Americans so beloved by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation say this is all about the US wanting to get cheap oil" (APH Kerin 22 January 1991, 123). The crisis and war against Iraq had increased the price of petroleum, and shared similarities with the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks that had an adverse impact on the U.S. and global economy (US Congress, 1990). According to Kerin, the earlier non-action by the U.S. and failure of OPEC to manage its cartel were proof that this latest war was not some trend-line in military adventurism based on oil (APH Kerin 22 January 1991, 123). Hawke's Minister for Resources Alan Griffiths MP, said a day earlier that it was not a war about oil however, "the security of the world's oil supply is clearly a relevant factor in our policy considerations", who claimed Saddam's motivation was based on "oil was a primary consideration in his mind" (APH Griffiths 21 January 1991, 41).

7.7 Summary

Australia provided a small military contingent to the 1991 Gulf War. As Horner (1992, 201) stated: "The most important point to grasp about the ADF's commitment in the Gulf War is that it was driven by political considerations." Many in Hawke's government saw the crisis, and eventual war, as an international security issue which gave them cause to support the decision to contribute elements of the ADF to the U.S. led international coalition. Another factor was the continued supply of oil, though that came from differing perspectives. For many of Hawke's Cabinet ministers and Right faction members, it was about the security and continuity of the supply of oil from a region of entrenched instability as well as support to the U.S. alliance. Domestic political support was harder to secure and was a major reason for the limited military contribution. The other contributing factor for the ADF deployment's size, type, and role was the incumbent government's approach to defence and strategy; one centred on the Defence of Australia and self-reliance. That resulted in a force posture that did readily avail to a sustained expeditionary capabilities but allowed for niche contributions that also provided the government with an advantage of not being involved in any land offensive, and thereby reducing the risk of casualties.

The next chapter explores how this, and a further two, wars of choice in the Middle East region saw Australian governments commit elements of the ADF to participate in operational deployments to stand-alone international security crises. All three cases focus on the period of the selected international security crisis. While each operation was deployed in the preparation phase for war, all were in readiness for an eventual war that did transpire. There were often other ADF operations in the region and already underway. Other operations came as a direct result of war, and followed immediately after the initial pre-deployment operation. Each ADF operation that is researched in this dissertation came with its own government defined scope and mission objectives. Each of these operations represented the deployment of elements of Australia's military power for participation in U.S. led military campaigns. The link between the state, military power, and strategic approaches is through strategy. As Alastair Buchan (1965, 81-82) stated, "the real content of strategy is concerned not merely with war and battles but with the application and maintenance of force so that it contributes most effectively to the advancement of political objective." The next chapter now examines three ADF operational deployments across three wars in the Middle East region to test whether Australia ensured consistency between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power, and strategy.

Chapter Eight

Research Results:

Deployment of Force to the Middle East Area of Operations

8.1 Introduction

This cross-case study approach explores three selected periods when the Australian government made the executive-level decision to deploy elements of the ADF to the Middle East region. The specific area is that geographic region are those three operations which is centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region. Therefore, the region remains constant for the deployment of force in war. The timeframe begins with the first case in 1990, when Operation DAMASK prepared for the 1991 Gulf War, through to the third case in 2014, when Operation OKRA was the involvement of the ADF in the International Contribution against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The particular focus of each of selected war is the immediate period which preceded the commencement of warfighting operations in war. That specific period was therefore the preparation phase for war, when the Australian government deployed elements of the ADF to participate in U.S. led military coalitions. That period in this research is an international security crisis, a phase that ultimately transitioned into war.

The research design has been outlined in chapter five but to summarise the key salient points, the main purpose is to identify the presence of a strategic disconnect at the time the Australian government deployed elements of the state's military power to a war of choice. The purpose is to test the presence of a strategic disconnect existed either singularly or collectively, and if that created a constructed security paradox. The cross-case study approach allows for the testing of that hypothesis. The research design has the dependant variable as the deployment of the ADF for war in the Middle East region, and the two independent variables are the personnel size of the ADF and the budget level of the defence portfolio. The intervening variable is the key strategic documents which the Australian government had in place to guide for its strategic outlook. This design is to capture the actual force in-being in the year which the Australian government committed elements of force to wars of choice and whether it was consistent with its strategic outlook and approaches to war, military power, and strategy.

8.2 Case One: Operation DAMASK (1990–91)

The situational political-historical context of this international security crisis and resultant war is the first of three cases that are explored in this chapter to analysis the state of Australia's military power at the time when the government tasked the ADF to deploy elements of force to the Middle East region as part of the U.S. led international coalition. The other two cases in this chapter will be situated within their specific political-historical context. These cases are framed within that period of preparation for war which came during the phase of an international security crisis. As in all three cases, the preparation phase of each deployment was in readiness for war, when warlike operations then commenced. This section analyses the quantitative data collected and collated from the Department of Defence. They are the ADF personnel numbers (Figure 8.1), ADO personnel numbers (Figure 8.2), and portfolio budget figures (Figure 8.3.) The Department of Defence data has been extracted from its annual reports over the financial years of 1989–90, 1990–91, and 1991–92. The verification of the datum was conducted by the ANAO as part of the auditing process undertaken before the release of each annual report. The mid-point of these financial years is 1990-91, which represents the reporting period when Operation DAMASK was conducted. The financial year before and after this deployment provides for a more nuanced quantitative and qualitative analysis across the period that captures before, during and after the 1991 Gulf War.

The Hawke Government's Defence White Paper at the time Operation DAMASK was *The Defence of Australia* (1987) (or 'DWP 87'). That strategic document was presented to the Australian Parliament in March 1987 by the Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley MP. That document rejected the previous narrow and limited concept of 'continental defence' and sought instead "a strategy on which self-reliance is based establishes an extensive zone of direct military interest" (DWP 87). The Defence White Paper positioned argued "defence self-reliance must be set firmly within the framework of our alliances and regional associations" (DWP 87, vii). The Hawke government's key guiding defence and strategy document sought a "policy of self-reliance in defence requires both a coherent defence strategy and an enhanced defence capability" and a central aim of self-reliance was to acquire capabilities to that ensured the sea and air gap would make it difficult for an aggressor to cross (DWP 87, vii). Geography influenced the longer strategic warning time available for Australia,

which contrasted with northern hemisphere allies who "may have to respond to timescales measured in days and weeks" (DWP 87, 30). In DWP 87, China was mentioned only four times, and just twice on the document's maps (Edwards 2016, para 10).

Geography and self-reliance were at the centre of the DWP 87's strategic concepts, defence planning and force structure orientation. On geography and self-reliance, it was a "military strategy, 'defence in depth, layered defence and denial'" (Beazley 2016b, 86). The Defence of Australia became the Hawke, and later Keating, governments' approach towards Labor's defence strategy (Beazley 2016b). The DWP 87 contained two previous reports which Beazley had both commissioned. The first was Paul Dibb's *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* (1986) (the 'Dibb Review'), and the second was Robert Cooksey's *Review of Australia's Defence Facilities* (1987). The previous two decades of Australia's "strategic thinking" was characterised by an approach that Beazley called an "outside-in" approach, yet Dibb's was "inside-out", which was credited as a capability plan and review as: "taken together, those two documents for the first and, arguably, only time in government presentation, put out force structure in its complete strategic and military context" (2016b, 86).

The conceptualisation of the Defence of Australia by Dibb was achieved through a "layered geographical construct to defence planning" which considered Australia's middle power status and its moderate sized military forces (Rimmer and Ward 2016, 59). Dibb's training in geography was "the foundation on which his views about power, strategy, and Australian defence planning rest" (Ball 2016, 4). Dibb as the geo-strategist was credited by Rimmer and Ward as one who "long recognised geography as a decisive factor in the fortunes of nation states" (2016, 46). Dibb's geostrategic conceptualisation of Australia's region and area of interest were his "arc of instability" to Australia's north, and strategic concepts such as the 'Area of Direct Military Interest' and 'Area of Primary Strategic Interest' (Ball 2016, 4-5). The significance of the Dibb Review remained long-standing and according to Jennings (2016, 122), Australian governments continued Dibb's approach which shaped the direction of all successive Defence White Papers ever since. However, those Defence White Papers released in 1994, 2000, 2009, 2013 and 2016 were "quickly followed by

a reduction in growth of defence" with the exception of only the Howard government's *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force* (Jennings 2016, 122).

Australia's oscillation between the 'globalist' and regionalist' strategic approaches, characterised the type of force in-being available to the Australian government at the time it was faced by international security crises. The evolution and contested nature of those opposing strategic approaches have been outlined previously in chapters one, two and four. However, by the time of this case study, 'defence in depth' gave priority to maritime (naval and air) forces (DWP 87). The Army did not have any priority or need for expeditionary capabilities, as it was considered that "ground forces would also be needed to take offensive action against the forces the adversary had landed" (DWP 87, 31). Geography was a central feature in DWP 87, as the sea and air gap provided "a formidable barrier for any enemy" (Dobell 2016b, para 12). The DWP 87 (viii) stated that "for the first time in peacetime a major portion of the Navy's surface and submarine fleet will be based in Western Australia". The Hawke government's announcement of a 'Two Ocean Policy' was considered by Beazley as "fundamental to improving defence self-reliance, our contribution to regional stability and our support for allies which underpin our defence policy" (1988, 18). The Indian Ocean region was not considered by government as completely benign but previously expressed in its *Defence Policy Information Paper* of March 1987 that "the Persian Gulf region is of no direct military strategic interest to Australia, since the north-west Indian Ocean is well beyond the area of Australia's primary strategic region" (Rakistis 1988, 126).

Australia's strategy and defence policy has long experienced since "an inadequate way of framing the strategic rationale behind capability acquisitions" (Jennings 2016, 113-114). According to Jennings, that situation was a problem which Dibb had also identified, but "the modern Australian Defence Organisation seems largely to have overcome - or at least hides more effectively - deep conceptual divisions over key force-structuring concepts" (2016, 114). When the Hawke government deployed force to the wider Persian Gulf region, the government's strategic approach was "based on the concept of defence in depth" (DWP 87, 31). The ADF's force structure had been one based on Dibb's 'strategy of denial', which was "a layered defensive concept that put a premium on air and maritime capabilities protecting the approaches to Australia" (Jennings 2016, 119).

The international security crisis that resulted from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait occurred in August 1990. Operation DAMASK I and later DAMASK II became the Australian government's deployment of force throughout the Gulf Crisis and 1991 Gulf War. The previous chapter outlined the force's composition but in summary, the RAN Task Group 627.4 included two rotations of two RAN FFGs, HMA Ships *Sydney* (IV), *Adelaide* (II), *Brisbane* (II), and *Darwin*; supply vessels HMA Ships *Success* and *Westralia*; RAN CDT3, Army's 16th Air Defence Regiment; RAAF intelligence photo-interpreters; four medical teams; as well as DIO personnel (Dennis et. al 2008, 247; Galligan and Roberts 2007, 243). A total of 1,871 ADF personnel were deployed and includes those who served anytime during from the commencement of the crisis in August 1990 through to the cessation of post-war support operations for the enforcement of UN sanctions in September 1991 (Galligan and Roberts 2007).

Figure 8.1 ADF Personnel Statistics, 01 Jul 89 – 30 Jun 92

FY	RAN Full-time, trained PERS	RAN Includes Reservists and in training	Army Full-time, trained PERS	Army Includes Reservists and in training	RAAF Full-time, trained PERS	RAAF Includes Reservists and in training	ADF (Total) Full-time, trained PERS	ADF (Total) Includes Reservists and in training
1989-90 (a)	13,404	15,064	27,298	33,040	19,770	21,859	61,781*	132,599**
1990-91 (b)	13,547	15,191	26,809	32,007	19,365	21,560	59,721	128,479
1991-92 (c)	13,396	15,063	27,259	32,467	19,621	21,220	60,326	129,076

Sources:

(a) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1989-90*, pp. 6; 25-26; 100.
*Note: Under the column headed *ADF (Total) Full-time, trained PERS*, the higher figure is accounted for those non-Service categories listed as 'Trained Force', under the Annual report's sub-headings of 'ADF Command' (637 personnel), 'Defence Development (97 personnel), 'Defence Support' (45 personnel), and 'Corporate Services' (530 personnel).
**Under the heading of *Total (ADF) Includes Reservists and in training*, an additional 855 personnel were listed as 'Training Force' under the non-Service category of 'ADF Command' (p. 6). Reservist statistics was derived as "the average number of full-time equivalent reserves for the year. For budget purposes, the average number of staff is calculated from the number of training days" (1990, 6).
(b) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1990-91*, p. 187.
(c) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1991-92*, p. 203. For this financial year, figures for each Service included total trained forces as well as those in training, Reservists, and for Army and Air Force, Ready Reservists as well. The way Reservists are numerically factored into the reporting period is that full-time equivalent member was based on the total number of training days. Figures excluded those ADF members by Service which were grouped elsewhere into other Defence reporting categories of Forces Executive, Strategy and Intelligence, Acquisition and Logistics, Budget and Management, and Science and Technology.

Figure 8.2 ADO Personnel Numbers, 01 Jul 89 – 30 Jun 92

FY	ADF *Inc. Reservists and in training*	Civilian (APS) *All Services & Categories*	Total ADO (ADF & APS)
1989-90 (a)	132,599*	23,922	156,521
1990-91 (b)	128,479	24,108	152,587
1991-92 (c)	129,076	23,750	152,826

Sources:

(a) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1989-90*, pp. 6; 25-26; 100.
*Note: Under the column headed *ADF (Total) Full-time, trained PERS*, the higher figure is accounted for those non-Service categories listed as 'Trained Force', under the Annual report's sub-headings of 'ADF Command' (637 personnel), 'Defence Development (97 personnel), 'Defence Support' (45 personnel), and 'Corporate Services' (530 personnel). Also, under the heading of *Total (ADF) Includes Reservists and in training*, an additional 855 personnel were listed as 'Training Force' under the non-Service category of 'ADF Command' (p. 6). Reservist statistics was derived as "the average number of full-time equivalent reserves for the year. For budget purposes, the average number of staff is calculated from the number of training days" (1990, 6).
(b) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1990-91*, p. 187.
(c) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1991-92*, p. 203. For this financial year, figures for each Service included total trained forces as well as those in training, Reservists, and for Army and Air Force, Ready Reservists as well. The way Reservists are numerically factored into the reporting period is that full-time equivalent member was based on the total number of training days. Figures excluded those ADF members by Service which were grouped elsewhere into other Defence reporting categories of Forces Executive, Strategy and Intelligence, Acquisition and Logistics, Budget and Management, and Science and Technology.

Figure 8.3 ADF Expenditure, 01 Jul 89 – 30 Jun 92

Financial Year	Budget Estimate $'000	Budget & Appropriation (Revised Estimate) $'000	Actual Expenditure $'000
1989-90 (a)	$8,670,860	$8,933,722	$8,905,628
1990-91 (b)	$9,307,748	$9,066,674	$9,067,480
1991-92 (c)	$9,770,533	$9,990,367	$9,823,168

Notes: Consolidated Revenue Funds is comprised of two sources: annual and special appropriations. Also, the figures presented here are not adjusted for inflation. The column titled 'Actual Expenditure' accounts for the reporting year ending 30 June.

Sources:

(a) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1989-90*, pp. 188-189. Note: It was reported that "steps currently in process are expected to allow audit review of Program information in 1990-91 and full disclosure of the value of fixed assets by 1994-95" (1990, 187).
(b) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1990-91*, p. 258. Note: not audited at time of publication.
(c) Department of Defence *Annual Report 1991-92*, p. 306. Note: This was the first annual report whereby Defence was "subject to a full audit examination of all information", which was provided in the 1991-92 financial statements (1992, 305).

8.3 Research results

The financial year prior to Australia's commitment of force to the 1990–91 Gulf Crisis, the government declared in its Department of Defence (DoD) *Defence Report 1989-90* (i.e., 'Annual Report') that it sought "to further a favourable strategic situation in South East Asia and the South West Pacific and to promote a sense of strategic community between Australia and its neighbours in our area of primary strategic interest" (1990, 3). The report's key objective for its current defence force in-being is "for contingencies within Australia's area of direct military interest, in defence of Australia and its interests at sea, on land, in the air, or combination of these" to achieve three main elements around peacekeeping missions, credible contingencies such as incursions and raids, "provide a suitable basis for timely expansion to meet higher levels of threat if Australia's strategic circumstances deteriorate over the longer term" (DoD 1990, 17). There was no mention in the annual report for a possible contingency in the Middle East region except for one direct reference and that applied to a then current peacekeeping mission commitment; the UN Iran - Iraq Military Observer Group, which included of two rotations of 15-man contingents (DoD 1990, 39). The other reference was the deployment of HMA Ships *Tobruk*, *Sydney* and the submarine *Oxley* to Turkey for the Gallipoli 75th Anniversary (DoD 1990, 31). Major joint and combined exercises continued, including some held overseas, such as *Rimpac 90* (DoD 1990, 31). At this stage, Defence's operational requirements was almost negligible and international engagement kept to the essentials.

For the financial year that included the 1990 - 91 Gulf Crisis and resultant 1991 Gulf War, the *DoD Defence Report 1990-91* gave double-billing to war and policy in its 'Year in Review'. It stated: "Two very public events dominated the year for Defence: involvement in the Gulf war and the Force Structure Review and associated reviews" (DoD 1991, 7). Alongside the overview of Australia's first participation in war since the end of the Vietnam War, this document stated that "[t]he other major achievement for 1990-91 was a significant internal restructuring to support the Government's policy of defence self-reliance" (DoD 1991, 7). The government's position was affirmed that "we have accepted the need to provide for our own defence" and "applied the principles set out in the 1987 *Defence White Paper* and in the classified Government document, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*" (ASP 90) (DoD 1991, 7).

Immediate changes in the strategic environment saw the government release an unclassified ASP 90, with a preface by the Minister for Defence Senator Robert Ray that stated despite the end of the Cold War and involvement in the 1991 Gulf War, "they did not change Australia's immediate security environment" (ASP 90 1992, iii). Ray claimed therefore his government "found no reason to change the fundamental defence approach set out in the 1987 White Paper" and that "Labor's policy of self-reliance in defence, effective regional cooperation and strong alliances leaves us well placed to provide for our own security and to contribute to the security of the region" (ASP 90, 1992, iii). The Defence Minister concluded "there is no reason to rush into a major overhaul of our defence policy" (ASP 90, 1992, iv).

Soon after the end of the Gulf War, the Minister for Defence delivered a statement in Parliament on 30 May 1991 gave focus back to the *Force Structure Review* and outlined its initiatives and defence reforms (DoD 1991, 8). In his effort to hold back expectations gained from the experiences of the Gulf War for new strategic approaches and technologically advanced platforms, Ray stated: "Such so called experts rarely acknowledge that Australia has no land borders with any country, and that distances in Australia's northern environment are mostly measured in hundreds of thousands of kilometres" (DoD 1991, 9). The Defence of Australia would remain the focus of the Labor government's approach to defence and strategy. The Minister for Defence's Gulf War lessons included "broad strategic observations; that is, success in military undertakings is critically related to military professionalism backed by national will and economic strength" and that "militaristic and aggressive regimes run the risk of being met with concerted action, which will extend, if necessary, to military force" (DoD 1991, 10).

After the 1991 Gulf War, the Hawke government framed how that experience had reiterated its stance on defence and strategic matters that included upholding the U.S. alliance, continued cooperation with the region, and for a self-reliant defence force that could provide a contribution to out of area operations in support of allies (DoD 1991, 10). In the aftermath of that war and the continued implementation of government policy as per the DWP 87 and the *Force Structure Review*, the Department of Defence flagged changes. The Department of Defence stated that "personnel changes flowing from these Government decisions and internal Defence efficiency measures will amount to almost 10,500 regular personnel (over 1,000 from Navy,

5,200 from Army, and 4,200 from Air Force) together with more than 3,800 Defence civilians" (DoD 1991, 13). Dibb's influence was beginning to be seen in defence and strategic policy. Dibb later stated that "at the military operational level, whether a country has land borders or is surrounded by water has defined the fundamentals of its security throughout history" (2006, 247).

The ADF's personnel numbers fluctuated in the financial years before and after the deployed to the war in the wider Persian Gulf region. The total full-time ADF members, or 'regulars', uniformed personnel numbers in the 1989–90 financial year were 61,781 and declined for the next two years (Figure 8.1). In regard to the total part-time ADF members, or 'Reservists', personnel numbers in the 1989–90 financial year also declined in for the next two years in which the data was collected (Figure 8.1). By Service, the breakdown of numbers for Navy is that their full-time members from 1989–90 FY to 1991–92 FY declined almost negligibly from 13,404 to 13,396. This was a similar situation for Navy's Reservists, and can be claimed to be held constant from 1989–90 FY to 1991–92 from a figure of 15,064 to 15,063 (Figure 8.1).

Army represented the largest Service in the ADF during the 1989–90 FY to 1991–92 FY and their overall full-time personnel numbers also increased (Figure 8.1). That remained the situation in the next two cases, during 2002–04 (Figure 8.4) and 2013–15 (Figure 8.7). The Army has remained the largest Service both in all three case, despite the initial focus on the Defence of Australia strategic approach had favoured Navy and Air Force, due in large part one could have assumed for the increased role in the denial of aggressors in the sea and air gap. However, there were then long lead-in times for large-scale capability programs. It could also be argued that the Navy and Air Force tend to have smaller personnel numbers relative to Army because of their Service's respective platforms, which provide greater force projection and operate at a much higher kinetic output per uniformed member. The overall number of Army Reservists however decreased from 33,040 in the 1989–90 FY to 32,467 in 1991–92 FY (Figure 8.1). Taken as a cumulative figure, Army's total personnel numbers dropped by just 612 members, and most were from the Army Reserve (Figure 8.1).

The Air Force represented the second largest Service in the ADF during this reporting period (Figure 8.1). Its overall full-time and part-time personnel numbers declined from 41,629 in 1989–90 FY to 40,841 in 1991–92 FY (Figure 8.1). The

decrease in Air Force member numbers had occurred during 1990–91 FY when the Gulf War was underway (Figure 8.1). This was a similar case with Army, which experienced a fall in personnel numbers for both Regulars and Reservists but similarly, regained most of those numbers in the year after the Gulf War, which is accounted in 1991 - 92 FY (Figure 8.1). However, after the Gulf War, total Navy personnel numbers fell for both their permanent and part-time members from 1990–91 FY to 1991–92 FY (Figure 8.1).

The ADF's full-time personnel numbers were less after the Gulf War than the financial year before it started (Figure 8.2). While there was a decrease in 1990–91 FY by 2,060 personnel on the previous financial year, but had risen back to a full-time total of 60,336 in 1991–92 FY (Figure 8.2). The APS component over the three financial years saw a marginal total decline of 23,922 in 1989–90 FY to 23,750 in 1991–92 FY (Figure 8.2). As a total, the ADO personnel, and staffing levels, for both the ADF and APS, slightly increased in 1991–92 FY on the previous year (Figure 8.2). The ADO's financial situation improved each financial year and had increased from $8.905 billion (1989–90) to $9.823 billion (1991–92) (Figure 8.3). Those figures have not taken accounted for inflation.

The first full financial year after the Gulf War, the DoD Annual Report 1991–92 stated that there were two major themes that arose for the Department and the ADF. The first was "our active involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. The other is that the micro-economic reform projects within Defence started to produce results" (DoD 1992, 5). Acknowledgement to DWP 87 continued, as borne out by the statement that "[t]his regional approach is an inevitable outcome of the policies set out in the 1987 Defence White Paper" (DoD 1992, 5). Australia was in an economic recession and almost ten per cent of the budget was spent on defence and employed one per cent of the nation's workforce, yet the ADO had increased its funding on the previous financial year (DoD 1991, 5). That amount however was not ten per cent of GDP. The Hawke Government's review of the previous financial year had been built on DWP 87 and was "a total package" and "strategy, foreign policy and domestic reform" (DoD 1991, 6). In regard to the Military Strategy and Force Development Sub-Program, the Department reported "operational concepts were developed for maritime patrol and response operations and for responses to regional requests for military assistance" and

defined the sub-program's success on "the extent to which development of the ADF's force structure and capability proceeds coherently" (DoD 1991, 17; 16).

The Defence of Australia as outlined in DWP 87 continued after the Gulf War despite the deployment of force was well outside the doctrine of the Defence of Australia. As shown above, the narrative in DoD Annual Reports sought to explain that anomaly and recast it as the means by which Australia had a capability to support allies on UN-sanctioned missions and use of force. The Defence of Australia remained the central approach of Australia's defence and strategy policy for the next Labor Government, led by prime minister Keating (1991–96). The *Defending Australia Defence White Paper 1994* (DWP 94) was released in November 1994. Defence Minister Ray stated that "the fundamental precepts of self-reliance remain valid, the approaches we take to developing and sustaining our defence capabilities and strategic relationships will need to continue to evolve" (DWP 94, iii).

The Keating government maintained DWP 87 had provided "a clear and rigorous analytical basis for defence self-reliance" (DWP 94, iii) with four key documents had informed the development of the then most recent Defence White Paper: 1990 *Report on the Defence Force and Community* (1990), the *Force Structure Review* (1991), the Price *Report on Defence Policy and Industry* (1992) and the *Strategic Review* (1993). While DWP 94 and the *DoD Annual Report 1993–94* are outside the scope of this case, it is provided how the Defence of Australia concepts of the DWP 87 translated into capabilities and assets for the protection of the nation's sea and air approaches. For example, the *DoD Annual Report 1993–94* reported that the first *Collins*-class submarine was launched in August 1993, and work continued on RAAF Base Scherger in Far North Queensland and RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory (DoD 1993–94, 4). Dibb's influence on Australia's defence and strategic policy was influential (White 2007). That would continue but the Howard government began a more globalist orientation after its 1996 election, and recalibrated the overall defence and strategic approaches in their first Defence White Paper.

8.4 Case Two: Operation BASTILLE (2003)

The Howard government (1996–2007) released its first, and the nation's fourth, Defence White Paper in December 2000. The release of the *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force* (DWP 2000) was the first time in over three decades when an Australian government had spoken about the possibility of war in its keystone defence and strategy policy document (Edwards 2016, para 11). When the Howard government was elected to office in 1996, there was "a revision of the logic of DOA [Defence of Australia] and the principle of self-reliance" (Stapleton 2014, 7). The first declaratory position statement of the new government was *Australia's Strategic Policy* (1997). That document saw the concept of self-reliance had become "more qualified and contextualised, with its narrative outlining an intent to 'maximise self-reliant ability', albeit noting that this did not mean developing self-sufficiency across all areas of capability" (Stapleton 2014, 7). DWP 2000 became a "blueprint for the ADF's future force structure and options" (Hodson 2004, 64). The document's stated main priority for the ADF would be to "maintain the capacity to defend Australian territory from any credible attack without relying on the help from the combat forces of any other country" and added that "we are confident that forces built primarily to defend Australia will be able to undertake a range of operations to promote our wider strategic objectives" (DWP 2000, 46).

The new Defence White Paper indicated that the government would take the lead of coalition operations "within Southeast Asia or the South Pacific", and that its capabilities would be to contribute to coalition forces (DWP 2000, 52). In regard to supporting wider interests, this was listed as a third-order priority, one where "Australia's forces is to be able to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond our immediate neighbourhood where our interests are engaged" (DWP 2000, 51). The ADF was also heavily reliant on Reservists, which made up 42 per cent of its total personnel size, considered as a mobilisation force in times of a major war or conflict (DWP 2000, 69). The U.S. was also identified as the most likely lead in any coalition of force, "and we would expect our forces to work closely with US forces. Beyond the Asia Pacific region we would normally consider a relatively modest contribution to any wider UN or US-led coalition" (DWP 2000, 51-52). This would influence a drive to greater interoperability between Australian and U.S. forces, influence major defence acquisitions, and be provided "within the

capabilities we develop for the Defence of Australia and for operations within our immediate region" (DWP 2000, 52). Under the DWP 2000 *Defence Capability Plan*, the government anticipated a projected $16 billion spend on capability enhancements over the 2001–02 to 2010–11 period in five capability groupings: Land Forces, Air Combat, Maritime Forces, Strike, and Information Capability (DWP 2000, 97).

The 11 September 2001 *Al-Qaeda* terrorist attacks on targets in New York and Washington D.C. changed global politics. Howard was in Washington D.C. at the time to address a joint sitting of Congress the following day when *Al-Qaeda* conducted their "audacious, cruel and hideously successful acts" of terror (Howard 2010, 382-383). On 12 September 2001, Howard conferred with his foreign minister Alexander Downer, and they agreed that with Cabinet approval, they would invoke the ANZUS Treaty would be invoked (Howard 2010, 386). The Australian government gave its support to invoke the ANZUS Treaty and was secured on Howard's return. It was described by Howard as "the unanimous view of cabinet that Australia stood ready to cooperate, within the limits of its capability, in any response that the United States may regard as necessary in consultation with her allies" (2010, 386). On 12 October 2002, the Bali bombings by terrorist organisation *Jemaah Islamiyah* killed 202 people, which included 88 Australians (AFP 2022). As the threat of transnational terrorism grew, a U.S. pre-emptive invasion against Iraq loomed.

In February 2003, the government released *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003* which did not include any major changes to the principles articulated in DWP 2000, neither was any increases in the size or role for the ADF. As a consequence of the 1999 East Timor crisis, the concept of self-reliance tested the ADF's operational capabilities. A Joint Standing Committee on Foreign affairs, Defence and Trade report on *Australia's Maritime Strategy* (2004) confirmed the ADF's deployment was found wanting due to budget constraints, the consequential emphasis on the Defence of Australia, as well as limitations imposed from no direct U.S. military assistance (JSCFADT 2004). The ADF's previous effort to project an expeditionary force to East Timor exposed the misalignment that existed between Australia's strategy and capability. Evans (2005, 76) described the Defence of Australia as "strategic myopia". Jennings wrote that "Australia's strategists continue to debate whether the terrible events of September 11, 2001, changed everything or changed nothing" (2005, 3). The two opposing views that existed were grouped into

one that saw the threat of terrorism had overcome the limits of geography in defence planning and strategy, whereas "a contending school argues that, especially in Asia, the potential for conventional war between states remains sufficiently high that we should still focus on the immediate region" (Jennings 2005, 3).

The U.S. President's State of the Union Address in January 2002, saw George W. Bush refer to an 'axis of evil' which singled out the threat posed by Iraq, a process that began straight after 11 September 2001 by senior members of his Administration (Armstrong 2002). By December that year, even the president's speechwriter, Mike Gerson, told White House officials to get him "the best case for going after Iraq" (Moeans 2004, 167). Post 11 September 2001, the global security environment led the U.S. to declare its adoption of the 'global war on terror' strategy to "deterring and defeating the so-called 'axis of evil', (a term meant to describe a perceived 'non-deferable' nexus of terrorist rogue states)" and prevent such states providing WMD's to terrorist organisations such as *Al Qaeda* (Lambert 2008, 46). The 2002 *U.S. National Security Strategy* framed the 'Bush Doctrine' of pre-emption, whereby "preventative war remains the ultimate anti-proliferation policy tool to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction" (Silverstone 2007, 2). The Bush Doctrine's four pillars were "American primacy; preventative war; war on terrorism; and democracy promotion" (Lambert 2008 46).

The Bush Doctrine and all four pillars were employed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East region (Buckley and Singh 2006). In regard to the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. conducted a preventive war. Until that point, U.S. policy on Iraq since 1991 was containment, conducted by measures that included enforcement of a northern no-fly zone, intelligence operations in Kurdish territory and occasional kinetic strikes against Iraqi military targets (Ricks 2006, 12). The push for large-scale military operations against the Iraqi state came from the argument of pre-emption versus preventive war. The difference is that "pre-emption lies in evidence of a credible, imminent threat, the basis for prevention lies on the suspicion of an incipient, contingent threat" (Kegley and Raymond 2003, 385). After the U.S. military misadventure in the 2003 Iraq War and its subsequent aftermath, was later seen that "more operations on this scale suggests that Iraq, rather than being the new paradigm, is an exception, and probably an aberration, in US strategic policy" (Thomson 2004, 6).

A war of choice was what the UK government's search for *casus belli* to initiate war by invasion against a sovereign state was one based on the premise that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed WMD's, as well as chemical and biological weapons. In 2016, The Iraq Inquiry (the 'Chilcot Inquiry') concluded that: "The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - WMD - were presented with a certainty that was not justified." (2016, para 5). The Chilcot Inquiry found that "military action at that time was not a last resort" (2016, para 4) and the planning for war, "[d]espite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate" (2016, para 5). The Inquiry also found that while "military action might have been necessary later, but in March 2002, "there was no imminent threat from the then Iraq leader Saddam Hussein; the strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time" (Chilcot 2016, para 83).

Australia too was involved alongside the U.S. and participated in, and was aware of, the planning being implemented for a preventive war against Iraq. An ADF liaison officer from "the Australian National Headquarters Middle East Area of Operations" was attached to "Third US Army's Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) to support campaign planning" (Field 2003, 35). That role was central for "the C5 Plans Operational Planning Group and the C35 Future Operations Operational Planning Team [which] were the centres of gravity for CFLCC planning during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*." (Field 2003, 36). It could be assumed that liaison role may not have been pivotal, or neither greatly influenced nor shaped U.S. war planning however, it identified the readiness of the Australian government to be present in the planning in this war of choice. In Australia, Defence Minister Senator Robert Hill described the executive level political decision-making process as: "I don't think there were too many formal cabinet decisions [on Iraq]. Howard was doing a lot of it bilaterally" (Kelly 2009, 261). The Secretary of the Department of Defence Ric Smith claimed that war planning was conducted with the expectation of an Iraqi WMD capability (Kelly 2009, 261).

During the preparation phase for war, the Australian government's Operation BASTILLE began on 19 January 2003 and its mission was the "the pre-deployment of additional ADF assets to the MEAO in support of potential future operations. It was

designed to add to the pressure on the Iraqi regime, while ensuring that Australian forces were prepared should a diplomatic solution not be found" (Navy n.d., para 12). On 15 February 2003, HMAS *Kanimbla* joined two FFG's, HMA Ships *Darwin* and *Anzac* as they entered the MEAO (Navy n.d., para 12). That operation was supported by Operation SLIPPER, another Australian operation in the Middle East and wider Persian Gulf region. Since 11 September 2001, as part of Operation SLIPPER, "Australia had also deployed a Special Forces Task Force and RAAF airborne refuelling aircraft to central Asia" (APH 2005, 7).

Australia's Operation FALCONER was the warfighting phase of the 2003 Iraq War, the period when offensive operations began on 20 March 2003. The total Australian contribution was 2,058 ADF personnel and were organised across five task groups (Dennis et al. 2008, 248). Operation BASTILLE was the preparation and deployment phase for war, and the five Task Groups (TG) readied for Operation FALCONER were: TG 633.0 - National Headquarters; TG 633.1 - Fleet Element that consisted of HMA Ships *Darwin* and *Anzac*, and supply ship HMAS *Kanimbla*; TG 633.2 - Maritime Surveillance Element - AP-3C Orion aircraft; TG 633.3 - Special Forces Element, which included a rotary wing detachment of CH-47 Chinook and combat services support group; TG 633.4 - Combat Air Wing Element - Squadron of F/A-18 Hornet fighter aircraft, CH-130 Hercules and expeditionary combat support services. (Dennis et al. 2008, 248). Operation CATALYST was the third and final phase of Australia's military contribution, and its mission was "the withdrawal of the Australian contingent and the subsequent support of democracy and natin-building in Iraq (Dennis et al. 2008, 248).

For political-historical context, Baghdad fell on 9 April 2003, and was less than one month after the US led invasion (Bluemel and Mansour 2020). The fall of the Iraqi capital signalled regime change and war's end, announced by U.S. President Bush on 1 May 2003 that U.S. military operations in Iraq "have ended" (Bluemel and Mansour 2020, 5). The post-war occupation of Iraq was under the control of the U.S. Department of Defense and oversaw "violent sectarian conflict and the disintegration of the nation" (Hixon 2016,435). Meanwhile, the situation was characterised as "quagmire, fiasco or folly, Iraq is turning into a defining moment for US strategy and future military policy. The change in US military thinking caused by Iraq will impact on close American allies such as Australia," (Dobell 2007, 96). An assessment of the

2003 Iraq War and post-war engagement in the region was summed up by Dobell that "Iraq was discretionary, a war of choice" (2007, 99).

As prime minister, Howard signalled in 2006 a flexibility with Australia's strategic approaches but stated "attempts to shoe-horn Australia's national security agenda into a form of geographic determinism are even less relevant than in the past" (2007, 99). Howard's decision to commit force to war came from his being in Washington at the time of the 11 September 2001 attacks, where he stated: "Being on the spot had a powerful effect on me" (Middleton 2011, 29). Howard committed his government to send the ADF to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 on the basis that "[i]t is right, it is lawful and it's in Australia's national interest" (Horner 2022, 356). It was not until 2011 that the ADF finally left Iraq, but debate continued throughout the preceding period between Australia's regionalists and globalists (Evans 2005; Dupont 2006; Dibb 2006).

Meanwhile, the 2003 Iraq War proved for Australia as "one of the most contentious conflicts in the past half-century" (Kelly 2009, 260). Howard later reflected on his decision and concluded "it was the most difficult decision I ever took. Yet I have never wavered in my belief that it was right" (Bramston 2022, 16). However, Australia's second war in the Middle East region, which followed the 1991 Gulf War, was a war of choice however, demonstrated government defence and strategic policy was more in accordance with some of the objectives outlined in DWP 2000. The ADF's military posture and force structure had become more globalist and its deployment alongside U.S. led coalition forces was closer in alignment with the principles and concepts expressed in DWP 2000 however, the Howard government's involvement in a war that deployed elements of the ADF into Iraq proper, and the surrounding Persian Gulf region was once again confirmation of Australia's willingness to act as a warfighting state in its commitment to another war of choice in the MEAO.

Figure 8.4 ADF Personnel Statistics, 01 Jul 01 – 30 Jun 04

FY	RAN *Full-time*	RAN *Reservists*	Army *Full-time*	Army *Reservists*	RAAF *Full-time*	RAAF *Reservists*	ADF *Full-time only*	ADF *Total (inc. Reservists)*
2001-02 (a)	12,598	1,544	25,012	15,669	13,322	1,655	50,932	69,800
2002-03 (b)	12,864	1,616	25,289	17,172	13,638	2,800	51,791	73,379
2003-04 (c)	13,133	1,881	25,446	16,445	13,455	2,162	52,034	72,522

Sources: Australian Government Department of Defence Annual Reports' for 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04.

Notes: The Australian financial year reporting period is from 1 July to 30 June.
(a) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2001-02*, pp. 285.
(b) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2002-03*, pp. 408-409.
(c) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2003-04*, pp. 260; 263.

The Australian National Audit Office conducted an independent audit report for the *2001-02 Annual Report* for the period ended 30 June 2002 and provided their signed qualified audit opinion to the Minister for Defence on 25 October 2002 (DoD 2002, 135-137).

Asset Management: "Defence manages some $50 billion in total assets, of which the largest share is about $31 billion in specialist military equipment" (DoD 2002, 208).

Figure 8.5 ADO Personnel Numbers, 01 Jul 01 – 30 Jun 04

FY	ADF *Includes Reservists*	Civilian (APS) *All Services & Categories*	Total ADO (ADF & APS)
2001-02 (a)	69,800	18,370 (b)	88,170
2002-03 (c)	73,379	19,088 (d)	92,467
2003-04 (e)	72,522	19,028 (f)	91,550

Sources: Australian Government Department of Defence Annual Reports' for 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04.

Notes: The Australian financial year reporting period is from 1 July to 30 June.
(a) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2001-02*, p. 285.
(b) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2001-02,* p. 288.
(c) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2002-03*, pp. 408-409.
(d) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2002-03*, p. 409. This figure is represented by, and expressed, as "APS figures include full time, part time, ongoing, non-ongoing, paid and unpaid employees" (Defence 2003, 409). Also, of that amount, 2,118 personnel were posted overseas "for long-term duty and deployments" (Defence 2003, 409).
(e) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2003-04*, pp. 260; 263.
(f) The APS included the following 'Defence Groups' for their total 2003-04 figure of 18,385. They included: Navy, Army, Air Force, Defence Materiel Organisation, Corporate Services and Infrastructure Group, Defence Personnel Executive, Defence Sciences and Technology Organisation, and Other Groups (Defence 2004, 261). In addition, ADO included for the first time the additional standalone category of 'Professional Service Providers', "persons contracted for finite periods" (Defence 2004, 267). That particular category totalled 1,878 staff, and that figure was included in the overall APS total. However, in the 2004-05 Annual Report, it stated that the actual APS figure at 30 June 2004 was 19,028 Defence 2005, 96). That revised figure has been inserted into that cell, and has updated the final ADO figure for 2003-04.

Figure 8.6: ADF Expenditure, 01 Jul 01 – 30 Jun 04

Financial Year	Budget Estimate $'000	Budget & Appropriation (Revised Estimate) $'000	Actual Expenditure $'000
2001-02 (a)	$20,750,346	$21,390,103	$21,549,483
2002-03 (b)	$21,859,018	$22,158,243	$22,389,181
2003-04 (c)	$17,641,475	$551,326,000	$18,192,801

Notes: Consolidated Revenue Funds is comprised of two sources: annual and special appropriations. Also, the figures presented here are not adjusted for inflation. The column titled 'Actual Expenditure' accounts for the reporting year ending 30 June.

Sources:

(a) Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2001-02,* p. 31.
(b) Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2002-03*, p. 31.
(c) Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003-04*, p. 37.

8.5 Research results

At the start of the decade, the Howard government's spending levels on Defence during the 1999–2000 financial year was 1.9 per cent, just under the accepted Western benchmark of two per cent of GDP (Babbage 2000, 13). That level of defence spending had corresponded to levels "close to the average we spent during the 1960s, 70s and 80s" (Babbage 2000, 13). The events of 11 September 2001 occurred during the reporting period of DoD 2002. As outlined earlier in this case, that event proved a paradigm shift in the way the Australian Government, ADF and Department of Defence faced regional and global threats. To address the persistent challenge of uncertainty in the anarchial international system, as well as the impacts of recent changes on the global security environment after 11 September 2001, there was a requirement to align the ADFs military posture and force structure with changed operational requirements.

As DWP 2000 outlined its willingness to move from a purely regionalist strategic approach as had been dictated by the previous government's adherence to frame defence and security through geography, as expressed in the Defence of Australia. As part of that process, Defence instigated its first *Annual Strategic Review* (DoD 2002, 114) during the 2001–02 reporting period. The brief behind that review was to "consider developments within our strategic environment" along with "assess the validity of our key planning principles"; "determine the priorities and challenges that face our international defence relationships"; "measure how well our defence capabilities match major tasks set by the government"; and a fourth requirement to "measure how well our defence capabilities match the major tasks set by the Government" (DoD 2002, 114). The overall aim was to provide recommendations for change "to priorities in the long-term defence capability plan" (DoD 2002, 115).

The *Department of Defence 2001–02 Annual Report* (DoD 2002) reported immediate leadership changes after the 30 June 2002 reporting period, which included the retirement of Admiral Chris Barrie as CDF in July 2002, who was replaced by General Peter Cosgrove. The new CDF had previously been the Chief of Army, and in turn was replaced by Major General Peter Leahy, who became Lieutenant General when he assumed the role of the Chief of Army in late June 2002 (DoD 2002, 41). This was the senior leadership group that would be in position from the outset of the 2003 Iraq War. Other changes at the most senior levels of the ADF was Vice Admiral

David Shackleton, Chief of Navy, whose retirement in July 2002 saw him replaced by Vice Admiral Chris Ritchie (DoD 2002, 41).

As part of 'Output Five', strategic policy advice was provided by the Department of Defence, and was "on Australia's strategic circumstances and specific security issues. This advice contributed to the achievement of Australia's strategic objectives of supporting global security and supporting stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region" (DoD 2002, 114). The same Departmental output included the role of Military Strategy and Command, and its requirement to provide the CDF with assistance "in the command and the control of the ADF by contributing to the provision of military strategic advice, monitoring ADF operations, and shaping and influencing the whole-of-government crisis management process. It also involves developing strategic guidance for decisions about capability and warfighting" (DoD 2002, 117). Their outputs included "policy guidance documents to inform decision making" and key publications included "an updated version of *Australia's Military Strategy*, and an updated *Chief of the Defence Force's Preparedness Directive*, the new *Australian Illustrative Planning Scenarios,* and the new doctrinal publications, *The Australian Approach to Warfare* and *Force 2020*" (DoD 2002, 117). Each document sought Defence's attempts to align military posture and force structure with the current and emerging security environment, both regionally and globally.

The *Department of Defence Annual Report 2002–03* (DoD 2003) recorded a very high operational tempo, "and reaffirmed Defence's ability to deploy and maintain forces in distant theatres and in difficult conditions" (DoD 2003, 4). The ADF was deployed in East Timor and on U.S. led operations in Iraq. In February 2002, for the first time since the Second World War, the Army Reserve deployed overseas, and with 1,000 personnel sent to the UN Mission in Support of East Timor (DoD 2003, 3). Meanwhile, the financial cost of the 2003 Iraq War to the Australian government for its deployment of force as part of Operations' BASTILLE and FALCONER (2002–03), as well as the support provided by Operation SLIPPER, totalled $710.6 million (DoD 2003, 45).

The implementation of DWP 2000 was done in conjunction with the Minister for Defence's release of *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003*. A long-term capability had been achieved with the completion of all six *Collins*-class submarines being commissioned, with HMAS *Rankin* in March 2003 (DoD 2003,

130). The expeditionary capabilities required by the Howard government's more globalist strategic approach had come not just because of to the changed security environment since 11 September 2001, but to expand on that as set out in the earlier DWP 2000. Defence's strategic policy began a Strategic Review of Interoperability between the ADF and U.S. Forces, and projects across all domains of warfare, including aerospace, maritime, land warfare, joint logistics and electronic systems (DoD 2003, 163; 273).

The total ADF personnel figure in 2002–03 FY had increased by almost 4,000 members to 73,379 (Figure 8.4). However, most of that increase, approximately three-quarters, were Reservists across all three Services (Figure 8.4). Despite the increased operational tempo which continued into the following financial year, there was an actual decrease in the size of the ADF. In the 2003–04 FY, the total number of ADF personnel had dropped by 857 separations, to have the combined forces figure drop to 72,522 (Figure 8.5). In the 2002–03 FY, the ADO had also increased in size. The overall increase had come from rise in the number of ADF personnel and APS staff to a total of 92,467 (Figure 8.5). Despite a continuation of the demands and pressures of an increase in operational tempo, there would be a decrease the following year in both the ADF and APS (Figure 8.2).

The *Department of Defence Annual Report 2003-04* (DoD 2004) revised its DWP 2000 funding amounts projected between 2001–02 to 2013–14 to reflect the prices as per 2004–05. In doing so, showed that the total cost of Defence was revised upwards to be $15.3 billion (2003–04) and at $21.9 billion (2013–14), while the total amount for the entire period (i.e., 2001–02 FY to 2013–14 FY) would stand at $235.9 billion (DoD 2004, 34). This long-term trend to increase levels of defence spending was, as a yearly snapshot decreased in 2003–04 on the previous year (Figure 8.6). That reporting year also saw total ADF personnel numbers increase with increases in permanent Navy and Army members, and falls in Army Reserve numbers (Figure 8.4). However, Figure 8.4 records that increase of permanent members was 243, based on that data provided in the DoD 2003, whereas amended figures provided in DoD 2004 showed slight variations which means that the ADF permanent members was 254 (DoD 2003; DoD 2004). The statistics however maintained the same figures as published in each annual reporting year for consistency and the variation in that number above, was a difference of 21 individuals. In 2004, when compared with data

from DoD 2003 (Figure 8.4), Air Force experienced a slight decline in permanent members, which represented seven per cent of total ADF separations but was the lowest of all Services, and below the average total ADF separations at 10 per cent (DoD 2004, 274).

Personnel numbers is part of any calculus in the overall assessment of any state's military posture and force structure. O'Neill highlighted prior to the release of DWP 2000 that an aspect that needed serious consideration was that "the most important element in determining or not the *Defence Review 2000* will be judged a success will be whether Government brings together, keeps together and trains superbly the mid-levels of the Defence Force. We are not going to be short of senior commanders and planners" (2000, 48). O'Neill honed onto that issue in the wider context of how "history teaches us that it is usually foolish to plan specifically to meet any one set of contingences because the international environment is too unpredictable" (2000, 47). The events of 11 September 2001 proved that statement correct, and participation in the 2003 Iraq War proved the presence of a strategic disconnect. While participation in the latest war of choice was in close alignment to the government's stated strategic intention in DWP 2000, the war was not in Australia's vital national interests of the protection of its sovereignty or territory.

8.6 Case Three: Operation OKRA (2014)

Operation OKRA would be Australia's third deployment of force to the Middle East and the wider Persian Gulf region since the closing stages of the Cold War period. The Australian government led by Prime Minister Tony Abbott (2013–15) deployed elements of the ADF on 31 August 2014 as part of a U.S. led international mission whose objective was the destruction and defeat of Daesh. That terror group was also known variously as *Islamic State* (IS), *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria* (ISIS), or *Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant* (ISIL). That mission was in response to the direct threat which this non-state terrorist organisation posed, which by mid-2014, Daesh had gained territory not just in Syria, but across northern Iraq and was poised for a southwards advance towards Baghdad (Kilcullen 2016).

In the Abbott government's first year in office, Defence Minister Senator David Johnston released its *Defence Issues Paper 2014* for public consultation into the forthcoming Defence White Paper and in September, Abbott raised the National Terrorist Threat Level to 'High' (Abbott 2015, 2). As Operation OKRA continued, Abbott launched on 23 February 2015 *Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Strengthening Our Resilience* (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015). Abbott announced a suite of sweeping changes to funding, legislative reform, and a whole-of-government approach that included counter-terrorism and countering violence extremism measures, as well as national security, intelligence, law enforcement and border protection agencies to address "a new, long-term era of heightened terrorism threat" (2015, 6). Abbott's announcement did not refer to Daesh by name, or its other known organisation's names of IS, ISIS or ISIL. Abbott (2015, 2) spoke of an "Islamist death-cult", where Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi's declaration of a caliphate was not mentioned by name but was a terror group that had "declared war on the world." Abbott (2015, 1) framed this threat in pseudo-apocalyptic terms, and claimed: "We have seen on our TV screens and in our newspapers the evidence of the new dark age that has settled over most of Syria and Iraq."

Two-years prior before this case of a 'war of choice' against Daesh, the *Department of Defence Annual Report 2012–13* (DoD 2013) had reported that "after more than a decade of high deployment tempo, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) concluded two overseas operations" (DoD 2013, 7). Both operations were within Australia's immediate region. The first was in April 2013, when Operation ASTUTE

in Timor-Leste came "13 years after Australia's first deployment under International Force East Timor" (DoD 2013, 7). The second was in September that year when Operation ANODE, "our decade-long commitment to the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands" came to an end (DoD 2013, 7). The ADF also had 60 personnel on five UN peacekeeping missions, situated across the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the significant deployment of "four Royal Australian Navy frigates which patrolled the Middle East Area of Operations as part of the Australian-led Combined Task Force 150" (DoD 2013, 7).

The following year, the *Department of Defence Annual Report 2013–14* (DoD 2014) stated that the forthcoming White Paper "will provide the Government's long-term strategic direction for Australia's defence, aligning defence policy, strategy, force structure and organisation in an affordable and achievable way" (DoD 2014, 7). That Defence White Paper had its release date delayed till 2016 because Abbott was removed in a leadership ballot that saw Malcolm Turnbull (2015-17) installed as the leader of the Liberal Party, and prime minister of the governing Liberal-National Party coalition. That period is within the scope of this research, as the research design included one additional financial year before and after each selected case of a deployment of force to a 'war of choice'. However, the examination of the DWP 16 was not included as the research design as it released after Operation OKRA began, hence the reference below to DWP 2013, as the most recent Defence White Paper which preceded this third deployment. To note, the original release date of DWP 16 was to have been in mid-2015 (DoD 2014, 7).

Before the incoming Abbott government, two previous Defence White Papers had been released during the Rudd-Gillard Labor prime ministerships (2007–2013). Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2007–10; 2013) released *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* (2009) (DWP 09), which complemented his 4 December 2008 release of the nation's first *National Security Statement*. This was the first Defence White Paper since DWP 2000, and its comparison to Howard's approach to defence and strategy was " series of specific strategic positions about the privatisation of war, our proximity to the US, ANZUS as a global alliance, and the importance of the army" whereas Rudd's DWP 09 "emphasised a 'return to classic settings' in Australian strategic thinking - a pull-back towards inter-state warfare, self-

reliance, ANZUS as a regional alliance, and the importance of maritime service" (Lyon 2015,5).

Prime Minister Julia Gillard (2010–13) released the *2013 Defence White Paper* (DWP 13) and the financial details indicated defence funding would sink to "historic lows" of 1.6 percent of GDP (Layton 2013, para 5). Layton compared that figure with the then average spend of "East Asian US-allies and non-US allies on average now spend about 1.73% GDP on Defence (2012 figures)" (2013, para 5). Gillard followed with a Defence White Paper but had previously released *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper* (2012), followed in January 2013 with a *National Security Strategy* (Gillard, 2013). Those two documents were described as "the bridge that links the optimistic liberal internationalism of the Asia Century White Paper" (Dobell 2013, para 5). In November 2012, U.S. President Barak Obama addressed the Australian Parliament and visited RAAF Base Darwin to signal a pivot and "US rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region" (Blaxland 2016, 131).

Labor's fourth Defence White Paper was released on 3 May 2013 by Gillard and Defence Minister Stephen Smith. DWP 13 linked its foreign policy White Paper and National Security Strategy as "a comprehensive strategy for assuring Australia's future security and prosperity in our diverse and challenging region" (Smith 2013, para 5). In regard to the rise of China and the threat posed by an increase in major power rivalry with the U.S., the shift went away from DWP 09 assessments and was now one where Smith claimed that for Australia "it's not a zero-sum game. It's a win-win" (Smith 2013, para 8). The Defence Minister said Australia, "can have an ongoing relationship, military alliance included (sic) with the United States, a growing relationship with China" (Smith 2013, para 8). Australian strategists similarly supported this viewpoint, such as Rod Lyon, who stated that "a dark combative Asia is, fortunately, a relatively unlikely prospect, and no more likely, in fact, than a bright, cooperative Asia with great community spirit – no higher than a 5% likelihood" (2012, 35).

DWP 13 also outlined the ADF's first *Force Posture Review* in a quarter of a century, expanded the immediate geographical frame of reference beyond Rudd's 'Asia-Pacific' to the Indo-Pacific region. DWP 09 and DWP 13 both restated the U.S. alliance's ongoing importance and the government's willingness to operate with them, and regional allies, in Southeast Asia. Beazley stated DWP 13 was "unequivocal in its

endorsement of the US presence" (2016, 219). While this latest defence and strategy document spoke of a rising China and some increase in the level of tension and contestation in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions, the government fell short of being able to fund and delivery the core capabilities outlined in the previous DWP 09. In 2013, government spending on Defence was well below the GDP threshold of two percent "at 1.56 percent of GDP, the lowest since the 1930s" (Brown 2017, 70). Funding levels were not set at levels to provide the military posture and force structure that government claimed it sought to acquire.

Energy security was included in the Defence White Paper released before this selected 2014 war of choice, and found its way into the section titled 'Middle East and Africa'. It noted that Australia relied on twenty per cent of its hydrocarbons from the region while the world sourced approximately thirty per cent of its global petroleum supplies (DWP 13, 17). Highlighted was the fact that "Australia has a strategic interest in supporting Middle East stability" (DWP 13, 17). That was reflected by the ADF's ongoing involvement in maritime security operations in the wider Persian Gulf region, as well as UN peacekeeping and U.S. led operations (DWP 13, 17). Australia also had a presence at Al Minhad Air Base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which directly supported operations across the Middle East and wider Persian Gulf region. Operation SLIPPER was one of them, and provided an air-bridge to the ADF's military operations in land-locked Afghanistan's Oruzgan Province (DWP 13, 17). Less than 18-months after the release of DWP 13, Australia deployed force again for military operations centred on Iraq. This would be the third time since 1991 when the ADF conducted warfighting duties in a war of choice in this region.

Operation OKRA commenced on 31 August 2014 with its mission to combat the threat posed by Daesh. The deployed ADF elements into the Middle East and wider Persian Gulf region included the deployment of an Air Task Group (ATG) and Special Operations Task Group, with the latter group of 200 troops moved on 11 November 2014 from AMAB and into Taji, Iraq (Griffiths 2014). The ATG began operations on 1 October 2014 and operated out of Al Minhad Air Base (AMAB) in the UAE. The aircraft deployed were either six F/A–18 Hornets, or F/A–18F Super Hornets, one E-7A Wedgetail and a KC-30A and over 2,700 strike missions were flown against ISIS targets in Northern Iraq and Syria until its seventh, and last, rotation concluded its last air combat mission on 22 December 2017 before its return to Australia (Australian

Aviation 2017). The Wedgetail and KC–30A remained at AMAB in support of other missions still underway at the time in the Middle East and wider Persian Gulf region (Australian Aviation 2017). Operation ACCORDIAN was the overarching ADF support mission to Operations' OKRA and MANITOU, as well as other ADF taskings from within the Gulf States region (Air Force 2022). The Persian Gulf region has an 'Australian National Headquarters – Middle East Region', also referred to as Headquarters Joint Task Force 633 (HQJTF 633) (Air Force, 2022).

Figure 8.7 ADF Personnel Statistics, 01 Jul 13 – 30 Jun 16

FY	RAN *Permanent*	RAN *Reservists*	Army *Permanent*	Army *Reservists*	RAAF *Permanent*	RAAF *Reservists*	ADF *Permanent only*	ADF *Total (inc. Reservists)*
2013-14 (a)	13,862	2,021	28,568	14,662	13,934	3,058	56,364	76,105
Actual Funded Strength	13,921		29,010		13,991		-206 (-0.4%) 2012-13	
2014-15 (b)	14,070	2,073	29,366	14,301	14,076	2,988	57,512	76,874
Actual Funded Strength	14,088		29,534		14,096		-176 (0.3%) 2013-14	
2015-16 (c)	14,232	1,803	29,635	14,402	14,194	3,133	58,061	77,399
Actual Funded Strength	14,290		30,014		14,274		58,035 (+631)	

Sources: Department of Defence *Annual Report 2013-14 Volume One*; Department of Defence *Annual Report 2014-15 Volume One*; and Department of Defence *Annual Report 2015-16 Volume One*.

Notes:

(a) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2013-14 Volume One*. Permanent forces data (p. 128), and "figures in this table [8.3] are average strengths; they are not a headcount'. Reservists undertaking full-time service are included." Reservist and APS data (p. 132). As a proportion of the overall APS figure, DMO represent 5,216 personnel.

(b) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2014-15 Volume One*, p. 128. The variation of -0.3 per cent was based on the "ADF permanent force for average funded strength, 2013-14 and 2014-15" was -0.3 per cent. Reserve data was sourced from page 130. APS data sourced from page 131 notes that the data used in Table 8.7 "are average FTE; they are not a headcount". For the purposes of this analysis, the figures represented are used as the aggregate number of people which constitute the overall number of what would normally represent a FTE equivalent workforce.
The Department of Defence *Annual Report 2014-15* stated: "Some 30 June 2014 figures have been adjusted from what was reported in the *Defence Annual Report 2013–14* to account for retrospective transactions" (p.15). The figures as delivered to the Minister for Defence on 31 October 2013 is the data used for this analysis.

(c) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2015-16 Volume One*. Data sourced from "Table 7.1: ADF Permanent Force average funded strength, 2014-15 and 2015-16" (p. 89); "Table 7.4: ADF Reserve paid strength, 2014-15 and 2015-16" (p. 93); and "Table 7.5: Civilian workforce (APS and contractor), average full-time equivalent, 2014-15 and 2015-16" (p. 94). Regarding APS data, it includes 421 contractors.

Figure 8.8 ADO Personnel Numbers, 01 Jul 13 – 30 Jun 16

FY	ADF *Includes Reservists*	APS Includes DMO	Total ADO (ADF & APS)
2013-14 **(a)**	76,105	20,496	96,601
2014-15 **(b)**	76,874	19,703	96,577
2015-16 **(c)**	77,399	18,492	95,891

Sources: Department of Defence *Annual Report 2013-14 Volume One*; Department of Defence *Annual Report 2014-15 Volume One*; and Department of Defence *Annual Report 2015-16 Volume One*.

Notes:
(a) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2013-14 Volume One*. Permanent forces data (p. 128), and "figures in this table [8.3] are average strengths; they are not a headcount'. Reservists undertaking full-time service are included." Reservist and APS data (p. 132). As a proportion of the overall APS figure, DMO represent 5,216 personnel.
(b) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2014-15 Volume One*, p. 128. The variation of -0.3 per cent was based on the "ADF permanent force for average funded strength, 2013-14 and 2014-15" was -0.3 per cent. Reserve data was sourced from page 130. APS data sourced from page 131 notes that the data used in Table 8.7 "are average FTE; they are not a headcount". For the purposes of this analysis, the figures represented are used as the aggregate number of people which constitute the overall number of what would normally represent a FTE equivalent workforce.
The 2014-15 Annual Report stated: "Some 30 June 2014 figures have been adjusted from what was reported in the Department of Defence *Annual Report 2013–14* to account for retrospective transactions" (p.15). The figures as delivered to the Minister for Defence on 31 October 2013 is the data used for this analysis.
(c) Department of Defence *Annual Report 2015-16 Volume One*. Data sourced from "Table 7.1: ADF Permanent Force average funded strength, 2014-15 and 2015-16" (p. 89); "Table 7.4: ADF Reserve paid strength, 2014-15 and 2015-16" (p. 93); and "Table 7.5: Civilian workforce (APS and contractor), average full-time equivalent, 2014-15 and 2015-16" (p. 94). Regarding APS data, it includes 421 contractors.

Figure 8.9 ADF Expenditure, 01 Jul 13 – 30 Jun 16

Financial Year	Budget Estimate $,000	Revised Estimate $,000	Actual Expenditure $,000
2013-14	-	$29,287,088	$28,836,856
2014-15	$29,328,696	$30,911,618	$30,774,181
2015-16 (a)	$32,732,285	$33,698,898	$33,914,463

Sources: Department of Defence *Annual Report 2013-14,* p. 15; Department of Defence *Annual Report 2014-15,* p. 12; and, Department of Defence *Annual Report 2015-16*, p. 58.

Notes: The total cost of Defence outcomes and programmes in this table were conducted on an accrual basis. The column titled "Actual Expenditure" accounts for the reporting year ending 30 June.

(a) These figures sourced from 'Table 4.2 Total cost of Defence outcomes and programs on an accrual basis, 2015-16' (p. 58). For the column labelled here as "Actual Expenditure", the heading in the Department of Defence table was labelled "2015-16 actual result $'000".

8.7 Research results

Australia's deployment of elements the ADF as part of the Abbott government's contribution to the International Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria occurred during the 2014–15 financial year. The *Department of Defence Annual Report 2014–15* (DoD 2015). That was the reporting period when Operation OKRA began though specific references to that operational deployment was not covered in detail in that document until the following financial year of 2015–16, which is provided in the *Department of Defence Annual Report 2015–16* (DoD 2016). It is for this reason that the research design had incorporated not just the single Department of Defence annual report of the year Australian governments committed force to wars of choice during 1990–2014, but the financial year both before and after the operation commenced. The addition of the previous year's departmental annual report provided a snapshot of the ADF's force in-being, the military posture and force structure that was a most complete representation in place at the time when this international security crisis arrived.

The crisis posed by Daesh's terror activities and their 2014 military offensive from Syria and into Northern Iraq had the attention of the Australian government and its allies. Australia had a national security strategy in place to deal with the threat posed by terrorist organisations however, the deployment of military power would be undertaken to address Daesh's land warfare offensive from Syria into Northern Iraq. In this crisis that led to war, Australia maximised its power within the international system through its participation alongside the stronger state in its involvement in a war of choice. Australia's deployment of force alongside the U.S. allowed it as a middle power to maximise its military power against Daesh. Australia's behaviour is reflective of offensive realism, where it was again bandwagoning with the U.S. to conduct military actions in the Middle East region.

Australia's participation in a third war of choice was done despite Department of Defence admissions that under investment would impact on the ADF's warfighting capabilities. The *Department of Defence Annual Report 2013–14* (DoD 2014) was the financial year that preceded Operation OKRA. Departmental Secretary Dennis Richardson stated that "the department continued to downsize, with full-time equivalent staff reducing from around 22,300 in mid-2012 to around 19,500 in October 2014" (DoD 2014, 2). There was an admission that "the focus over the years on

Defence APS staffing numbers has distorted rational management of the workforce" (DoD 2014, 3). The downward trend of APS staffing numbers continued from 2013–14 through to 2015–16 (Figure 8.8). The departmental secretary's criticism of government policy in such a public and formalised manner was not limited to just his concerns about the effect it was having on the public service but the ADF as well and risked a negative impact on its warfighting capabilities. Richardson made it clear to government that if "under-investment in facilities is starting to catch-up with us and, unless addressed, will have a negative impact on ADF capability. This will be the focus in the 2015 White Paper but will need to be balanced against other capability needs" (DoD 2014, 3). As explained in the section above, that Defence White Paper's release was delayed by almost one year.

Defence's operational tempo remained high in the year before a third war of choice in the Middle East region. During 2013–14, there were 1,765 ADF personnel serving overseas on twelve operations, which included Afghanistan and Iraq (DoD 2014, 4). It was reported that other key outward focused activities included, but not limited to, Australia's upgrade of its relations with NATO, conduct of a MH17 recovery operation in eastern Ukraine, and search for the missing MH370 commercial airliner as a whole-of-government effort conducted in the Southern Indian Ocean region (DoD 2014, 2-4). The role of the ADF remained broad, one not limited to warfighting. With an eye on the yet to be released Defence White Paper, CDF General David Hurley said the "next generation force in accordance with the strategic direction of the upcoming 2015 Defence White Paper" and that objective included the ability for the ADF to "continue to conduct successful global operations" (DoD 2014, 5). However, Richardson made clear that "the essential challenge in the White Paper will be to better align money and capability" (DoD 2014, 3). The ADF's military posture and force structure would have to be achieved by a modest sized defence force (Figure. 8.8) and annual budget levels that remained less than two per cent of GDP (Figure 8.9).

In 2015, Australia's CDF stated in the *Department of Defence Annual Report 2014-15* (DoD 2015) that the nation was experiencing "one of the most unpredictable periods in our recent history" (DoD 2015, 4). Lieutenant-General Angus Campbell outlined the reporting period began with "humanitarian aid drops to Iraqi civilians trapped in the country's north and, by mid-September, our Air Task Group (ATG) was

in the Middle East, awaiting government approval to commence air strikes against Daesh in Iraq" (DoD 2015, 4). The ATG was considered "one of the most capable ever deployed" and 300 ADF personnel were deployed in Iraq in a "Building Partnership Capacity" mission, located at Taji as part of Task Group Taji" which was "complemented by our 170-strong Special Operations Task Group" (SOTG) (DoD 2015, 4). The role of the SOTG was to "advise and assist the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service" who capacity building role included them "to prepare and plan operations, joint fires, air support and artillery" (DoD 2015, 4). This approach was symptomatic of Australia's defence planners, one that relied on niche capabilities over the deployment of larger personnel numbers and the use of land forces. According to Blaxland (2021), this had come to pass in the ADF's deployments in Afghanistan. This more broadly "pointed to the enduring peacetime mindset that saw no great urgency in expanding the land force" and operational tempo was "not sustainable without capping Australia's involvement to carefully calibrated niche contributions" (2021, 15).

The cost to the Australian government for Operation OKRA during 2014–15 was $159.4 million (DoD 2015, 79). The ADF's objective was a clear one, to "conduct operations in support of the coalition response to the Iraq crisis" and ensure it "executed air operations and land force training" (DoD 2015, 83; 82). Meanwhile, Australia had 400 ADF personnel in Afghanistan on NATO-led mission, Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT. In December 2014, combat operations ceased as security was handed over to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (DoD 2015, 4). The Middle East region remained the centre of additional ADF operations and taskings. JTF 633 housed Australia's National Command and Support Element, with 400 ADF personnel involved in "command, communications and logistics support to multiple operations across Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf States" (DoD 2015, 4). There were maritime operations in the wider Persian Gulf region, three peacekeeping operations across the Middle East and Africa and a host of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief operations, as well as domestic operations based on the consequences of High-Risk Weather Season events (DoD 2015, 4).

The last document analysed as part of the research in this third and final case, was The *Department of Defence Annual Report 2015–16* (DoD 2016). The ADO's budget was approximately $32 billion (Figure 9.3) and edged ever closer on the slow

march back towards the two per cent of GDP benchmark, set to be achieved by 2020–21 (DoD 2016, 2). Increased capabilities across all domains of warfare, or "warfighting spectrum", were claimed to reflect a changed region (DoD 2016, 94). The CDF Review spoke of an "expansion of Operation Okra air operations into Syria and the addition of Australia's Building Partner Capacity Mission in Iraq in 2015 increased our operational tempo and the number of Australian Defence Force personnel on deployment" (DoD 2016, 4). The cost of Operation OKRA was $286.6 million, and the approximately 1,450 ADF personnel across all Services that were part of JTF 633 across the Operations' OKRA, HIGHROAD and ACCORDIAN (DoD 2016, 5). The cost of three other operations were: HIGHROAD (Afghanistan) was $203.2 million; MANITOU $33.6 million; and SLIPPER $25.3 million (DoD 2016, 63). In 2016, the number of ADF personnel deployed in Afghanistan fell to 270 (DoD 2016, 4). In Australia, the sixth United States Marine Corps rotation began in the Northern Territory and included 1,250 marines (DoD 2016, 4; 32).

When the 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP 16) was launched on 25 February 2016, its key announcements included the future acquisition of twelve "new regionally superior submarines" (DoD 2016, 8). A thorough review and analysis of DWP 16 falls outside the scope of this research but the nation's seventh defence and strategy direction setting document had assessed Australia's strategic environment was being shaped by heightened major power rivalry between the U.S. and China. Despite the military threat and heightened security environment, some claimed that "for middle sized countries, periods of flux and uncertainty are the times of greatest opportunity" (Carr 2015, para 8). For the Defence of Australia's geo-strategist, DWP 16 marked "the return of geography to defence planning. Not that it had ever entirely disappeared" (Dibb 2016, para 1). However, Australia's continued distraction in wars of choice in the Middle East region delayed the implementation of a strategic approach that aligned with countering the threat of war by a major power. Reduced defence portfolio funding and limited personnel numbers impacted on the nation's warfighting capabilities.

In 2016, the ADO decreased in size slightly but can be explained by the reduction of APS staffing levels (Figure 9.2). However, for a nation that numbered 26.4 million people in the 2016 Census (ABS, 2016), the total full-time component of the ADF was approximately 58,000 personnel (Figure 9.1). That continued to reflect Australia had a relatively small military despite being a member of the G20 and claims

of being a middle power. While defence and strategy were discussed in terms of principles, concepts, and strategic approaches, much continued to be asked of the ADF on operations around the globe. The commencement of Operation OKRA in August 2014 continued a trend line of Australian government's use of military power in wars of choice. There was, however, a moral imperative and legal justification to conduct force against Daesh but the decision to commit platforms, assets and personnel projected significant capabilities into this Area of Operations, relative to the overall size of the ADF, both in terms of personnel and budget.

This third case highlighted that the Australian government continued to grapple with its strategic approaches considering its military posture and force structure, considering an ever more complex security environment. As the conclusion will outline, Operation OKRA could be considered to not have been an example of a complete strategic disconnect, it nonetheless was a war of choice. The strategic environment significantly deteriorated between the commencement of Operation OKRA and the release of the Australian Government's DWP 16. The changed strategic environment included a more assertive Beijing and challenges to the RBGO. However, the results in the third case indicated the strategic disconnect had once again taken place with Australia's participation in a war of choice centred on Iraq and the Persian Gulf region. Leahy (2020) has argued that there are clear legacies emanating from Australia's participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. He argued that "any decision to go to war should be subject to parliamentary debate and vote" as well as an ongoing acknowledgment that "the alliance with the United States is important but it is not the only reason to go to war" (Leahy 2020, 296). Further, Horner stated that it would in Australia's ongoing interests "to treat any US plan for war with deep suspicion" (2022, 395).

The Australian government deployment of force on Operation OKRA in 2014 was in service against an adversary that posed a risk to the Iraqi state and regional security in the Persian Gulf region. If ISIS had held onto its territory, it undoubtedly would have served as a base to support its terrorist activities. However, the strategic outlook contained in DWP13 did not identify the presence of the threat which the Australian government considered the following year was significant enough to deploy elements of the ADF to fight against. The significance of this research is that while Australia has many strategists, there lacks a military strategy. It is a situation where

"[d]efence must organise at the strategic level to develop, implement, monitor and adapt military strategy" (Scott 2022, 39). This third case is similar with the other two previous cases in that they all displayed a default position by Australian governments in that they committed internal inconsistency between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power, and strategy.

There are several lessons that can be distilled from participation in wars of choice. Australia's former Chief of Army, Peter Leahy (2020, 295), argued there are "major lessons and legacies for the Australian Army from the deployment to the Middle East from 2001 to 2014." While Leahy's focused on just one Service, the lessons apply equally across all three Services of the ADF. The nine lessons in descending order are: "be ready for the most likely conflict"; "have a strategy"; "you can't go to war quickly without introducing risk"; "you can't make a flexible and versatile force out of nothing"; "equipping the force is difficult, expensive and time consuming"; "doctrine is important"; "when designing the force, a clear mission is essential"; "whole of government' should mean whole of government"; and, "a combined arms approach is essential" (Leahy 2020, 296). If the aforementioned lessons are applied as a collective whole, then a state is more likely to avoid a strategic disconnect. The strategic alignment between strategy, strategic approaches and military is then more likely than not to achieve a government's political objectives.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

9.1 Research results

Since Federation, the Commonwealth of Australia has been a constant contributor of force to war and conflict. Since the closing stages of the Cold War, and beyond the events of 11 September 2001, Australian governments have continued a willingness to deploy force on warlike operations alongside the U.S. in the Middle East region, centred on Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region. As a state actor in global politics, and as part of the anarchial international system, Australia deployed military power to what this research categorises as wars of choice. This has reflected characteristics of a war-fighting state. This outcome is not ideational or based on emotion-based inductive reasoning but one which this research has demonstrated with empirical regularity. The reason Australia can be considered a war-fighting state is that both Labor and conservative governments have since 1990 regularly deployed military power for political objectives. The Australian government's executive-level decision-making has sought to achieve their political objectives through coercion during the crisis phase, and then compellence when it came to war. The government's military capabilities are expressed through the ADF's force in-being, and includes its platforms, assets, and personnel. It is from the force in-being which governments deploy elements of force at the time it commits to the international security crisis, in the knowledge that it could transition into war.

The research showed that the Australian government made such decisions from the closing stages of the Cold War, again in the immediate post 11 September 2001 period, and later in 2014 with a contribution of force to the International Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. During that period of 1990–2014, three Australian prime ministers made the executive-level decision to give approval to commit force, often with minimal Cabinet deliberation or parliamentary debate, to authorise the state's use of its military power in an overseas war. The research explored three specific operational deployments that represented Australia's preparation for war. The three cases were Operations' DAMASK (1990–91), BASTILLE (2003) and OKRA (2014). Each operation's mission objective was the pre-deployment of force in the

preparation for warfighting in war: 1991 Gulf War, 2003 Iraq War, and the 2014 International Coalition against Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

The research found a strategic inconsistency existed at the time of each operation. While each government provided legal and moral justifications for their political decision to deploy force for war, there was an inconsistency between the nation's strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power, and strategy. The research found the strategic misalignment present during the international security crisis which precipitated war. That pre-war phase marked the differences contained in government defence and strategic policy. The research into each case clearly showed that the data identified the ADF's personnel size and portfolio budget level, which gave a true representation of the force in-being. This was compared with the strategic outlook stated in Defence White Papers. The content analysis in each case shows key defence and strategic policy-setting documents expressed a military posture and force structure that challenged the tasking asked of the ADF as it deployed overseas to the Middle East region for warfighting. As Dupont stated, the current ADF force posture "is far from ideal" and during our most strategically dangerous period since the Second World War "an imbalance between where our forces are and where they need to be" (2022,17).

Each case has pointed to the repetitive willingness by Australian governments to participate in war. Australia's use of military power in these wars of choice were part of a larger U.S. coalition of armed force. These wars were part of Australia's alliance management and "force posture cooperation" (Davies, Jennings, Nichola and Schreer 2014, 6) which did assist in a closer strategic alliance with the U.S. The continuation of strategic engagement and support of the U.S. alliance has been part of Australia's long association with a major power. This has seen Australian governments continue with the force projection of its military via expeditionary means to locations well beyond its immediate and near regions, and far from the nation's sovereign territory and EEZ. Participation in wars alongside the U.S. for the past seventy years has seen the two nations enjoy a strong strategic partnership that has become more significant due to increased major power rivalry across the Indo-Pacific region.

The research has shown however that since 1990, Australia has participated in wars of choice and that represented an ongoing inconsistency between its strategic outlook as stated in Defence White Papers, and its defence and strategic approaches.

Each Australian government that deployed force ensured it was professional and well-trained, but provided essentially niche capabilities, capped the size of its military commitment wherever possible, and leaned towards Services that avoided involvement in large-scale land warfare operations.

9.2 Australia's constructed security paradox

The research tested the hypothesis that Australia experienced a constructed security paradox for a quarter of a century, one that began at the closing stages of the Cold War through to 2014. The research can confirm the existence of a paradoxical situation between the state, military power, and strategy. First, Australia continues to display characteristics of a war-fighting state. Second, there is consistent government willingness to deploy overseas elements of military power in warfighting operations alongside the U.S. Third, involvement in these wars in the Middle East region were conducted within tight caveats that limited the number of personnel, especially ground forces, and relied on limited, albeit one of quality, niche elements of force. The operational forces in the preparation phase for war were predominately Navy, Air Force and Special Forces. Fourth, these wars were all one of choice as none had any direct impact on the state, its sovereignty or territory.

The constructed security paradox that resulted from Australian governments' consistent deployment of small elements of force to wars of choice was designed to limit casualties. The ongoing reliance placed on niche elements meant that it did not utilise larger formations, such as regular Army battalions in any of these Area of Operations. The ADF operational tempo increased after the deployment of force to East Timor in 1999 and more so after 11 September 2001, saw greater numbers of ADF personnel undertake operational service. The campaign in Afghanistan was a substantial and sustained contribution of force which would represent Australia's longest war and not end until August 2021, after a nearly twenty year long campaign. The research also shows that across all three cases, Australia's military posture, force structure and strategic approaches were not aligned when it came to the deployment of force during Operations' DAMASK, BASTILLE, and OKRA.

The cross-case study of the selected deployments of force to a war of choice between 1990–2014 is a clear indicator of strategic inconsistency between the nation's

strategic outlook and its approaches to war, military power and strategy. The research shows how the strategic outlook expressed by government in the 1987, 2000 and 2013 Defence White Papers were challenged by the actual force in-being at the time governments made the decision to deploy force to war in the Middle East region. This situation was reinforced by the ADF's moderate personnel size and budget levels. The Australian government only achieved two per cent GDP on defence expenditure in 2020–21 and any future increases will likely be met with "stiff competition from other public policy priorities ranging from health care to environmental protection" (Bourke 2022, para 3).

Since 2014, Australia's security environment has become more complex and contested. For Australia, the main strategic threat is now China (Jennings 2019, 2020b; Sheridan 2022). The likelihood of a future war in the region between the major powers only continues to increase. According to Australian strategist Ross Babbage, it is clear which power represents a threat to Australia: "[N]ow we do know the identity of the primary serious threat, the nature of its forces, the goals of its national leadership. There is a need for a much more focused, and much faster, system of defence force developments" (Sheridan 2021, 13). However, the deterioration has been particularly visible since 2014. Geo-political events have included inter-state war, such as the Russian Federation invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Closer to Australia's strategic region, Beijing declared on 23 November 2013 an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (Lu 2020), and in 2014 onwards, continued extensive militarisation of parts of the South China Sea. Authoritarian states have shown their willingness to use of military force to advance their national interests, even if it is in defiance of international law and the RBGO. Meanwhile, Australia's strategic alliance partner remains the U.S., a military superpower with global reach, nuclear trident capabilities, and the ability to fight simultaneously a major war and a small war. Major power confrontation in Australia's region will most likely take place between China and the U.S., and any such scenario will also most likely involve Australia.

Since the commencement of the post-Cold War period, Australia has deployed force overseas on operations, some that can be classified as wars of choice. In the case of East Timor (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), the nature of those ADF deployments differed but highlighted how Australian governments utilised force as tool of statecraft to achieve political and strategic objectives. Governments and their military have

realised that there exists an ongoing challenge to address both the complexity and array of threats. Fundamentally, however, the state's role remains the defence and security of its sovereignty, territory, vital national interests, and its citizens. Threats have increased and come in part from actions that operate just below the threshold of war, such as grey wars and information operations. However, the changing character of war continues, as do the kinetic threats that exist across the five domains of warfare.

While the complexity and array of threats have continued to expand, the state and its military remain the most viable, though not exclusive, entities to address kinetic threats. This is especially so when planning and preparing for war that involves the likelihood of war against another state, especially one that is likely to involve a major power. This research has argued that the state's strategic outlook must have that scenario at the forefront of its defence and strategic planning. Many liberal democratic states operate on the premise there will be sufficient strategic warning time to rearm and refocus its military to deal with the threat of war. The likelihood and threat posed by a future war from an adversarial major power would prove consequential in lives and materiel. However, a future war has always been a constant presence in global politics and the international system, one that has never gone away.

The research also showed that the period of Australia's participation in wars of choice highlighted a strategic disconnect in each of the three cases examined. The paradox is that while the ADF maintained a high operational tempo from the time it deployed to East Timor in 1999, Australian governments appeared to lack an ability to acknowledge that a more multipolar world would more likely bring major power competition and rivalry again to the fore, one that could in time deliver a direct impact on Australia and its national interests. The strategic environment severely deteriorated since 2014, and has accelerated from 2020. Any involvement in a future war will most likely prove to be a war not of choice but one of existential necessity. The role of the state, its military power, force posture and strategic approaches must all be aligned in readiness for such a scenario.

From a classical realist perspective, the state must always maintain a realisation that war is an ever-present possibility. This theoretical approach is one of "how the world is" and the lens from which global politics and the international system must be viewed, is to ensure that the state has its strategic approaches avoid any disconnect between the force in-being and the war in which governments are most likely to deploy

force. That should always be a major priority of the state, but not for deployment in wars of choice. As the period of strategic warning that frames the timeframe to refocus and recalibrate efforts and resources to preparing for such an eventuality has diminished. The decades since the end of the Cold War have proven that war is not an anachronism, despite misguided and short-term views held by many. The actions and official statements of aggressive authoritarian powers such as Russia and China is reason enough to understand that to counter kinetic threats is to ensure at a minimum that government strategic documents align with the doctrinal and strategic approaches that best addresses the risks posed by war from a major power across, potentially, all five domains of warfare. As Dupont has advocated, "Australia should develop and pursue a 'full spectrum' military strategy in recognition of the need to provide protection against military threats emanating from outer space and cyber space, as well as the land, sea and air" (2015, 12). The arrival of AI will revolutionise warfare and add further levels of uncertainty and complexity to the ever-changing character of war.

War will continue to be the most consequential threat which faces any state, and this is no different for Australia. War will bring its challenges because, as Knox stated, "conflict is the realm of contradiction and paradox" (1994, 645). The Australian government will continue to find itself faced with decisions to make over an international security crisis, and one that requires the consideration of military involvement. One probable scenario is the deployment of elements of the ADF alongside the U.S. in a future war that involves major power confrontation. In order to ensure there is no repeat of a strategic disconnect, any such consideration for involvement in such scenario must be based on three key principles. First, war remains a feature of global politics and the anarchical international system. Second, the deployment of military power must be in the most vital and direct interests of the state, which is the defence and protection of its sovereignty and territory. Third, the nation approach to defence and strategy must ensure it is reflected in the ADF's military posture and force structure. That alignment must deliver strategic approaches that addresses the worst-case scenario as a matter of priority, which includes the scenario of Australia's direct military involvement alongside the U.S. in a war between the major powers.

Not since the Second World War has Australia's security environment been more complex, challenging and threatening. Australia's strategic approaches must be

readied for consequential, even existential, war between the major powers. Slantchev pointed out that "military preparedness is an essential ingredient of one's ability to fight well, and so moves that increase it also increase the probability of victory" (2011, 75). Military preparedness is best served by an alignment between strategic outlook and appropriate approaches towards strategy and defence, as well as Defence portfolio funding to be well above two per cent of GDP. Edward Meade Earle's statement on strategy holds true in this century because it "deals with war, preparation for war, and the waging of war" and not just in wartime but as "an inherent element of statecraft at all times" (1943, viii). What is required are strategic approaches that allow for war's preparation in accordance with those most likely threats that are consequential in nature to the state. This is necessary because "military power requires concepts for the application of force that are robust because they are precise" (Strachan 2006, 53). War and strategy will continue to guarantee levels of complexity and uncertainty. As Michael Howard (2015) stated: "No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is not to be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed."

This research demonstrated that on three separate occasions over a quarter of a century, the Australian government deployed elements of its military power, albeit limited and niche, to much larger U.S. led military operations in wars of choice in the Middle East region. Each military involvement in war represented a clear strategic disconnect from its then current strategic approach. From a classical realist perspective, such deployments should never have been considered by Australian government as a *fait accompli* as none of these wars posed a direct threat to the state, its sovereignty or territory.

The research identified the presence of a strategic disconnect in each of the wars of choice fought during 1990–2014. Each strategic disconnect was identified during that period when the Australian government sent elements of the ADF on an operational deployment in the preparation for eventual war in Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region. The significance of these strategic disconnects is that it proved the existence of a misalignment between a government's strategic outlook and its strategic approaches, as well as the then-current Defence White Paper and the ADF's actual force in-being. These wars of choice were expeditionary in nature, conducted well outside of Australia's immediate and near regions. The cumulative effect was a

constructed security paradox. Despite Australia's active and willing participation as a warfighting state, serving as part of U.S. led military operations in Iraq and the wider Persian Gulf region, they were wars of choice was that they operated over a period characterised by relatively moderate to low ADF personnel numbers, and low levels of Defence funding which remained consistently below two per cent of GDP. The research highlights the need for Australian governments to ensure strategic consistency, one that is alignment between the strategic outlook and strategic approaches employed to provide the state with defence and security. In the very real likelihood of a future war between the major powers, it will most likely see Australia serve alongside the U.S. Therefore, without strategic alignment, the impact of being involved in such a future war it could well prove consequential, even catastrophic, for the state, its sovereignty and national interests.

Bibliography

Abbott, Tony. 2015. "The Hon. Tony Abbott MP - National Security Statement." *Speech*, February 23, 2015, Canberra. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22media/pressrel/3676115%22.

Abizadeh, Arash. 2011. "Hobbes on the Causes of War: Disagreement Theory." *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 298-315. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41495067.

Adams, David. 1990. "Political Review April-July 1990. *The Australian Quarterly* 62 (2): 183-200. https://doi.org/10.2307/20635584.

Air Force. n.d. *History*. Available from: https://www.airforce.gov.au/about-us/history.

Air Force, 2022. *Middle East.* https://www.airforce.gov.au/operations/middle-east.

Alcorn, Gay. 2019. "Remembering the Recession: 'The 1990s Experience Changed my View of the World'." *The Guardian*, November 17, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/nov/17/remembering-the-recession-the-1990s-experience-changed-my-view-of-the-world.

Alker Jr, Hayward R. 1992. "The Humanistic Moment in International Studies: Reflections on Machiavelli and Las Casas: 1992 Presidential Address." *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (4): 347-371. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600730.

Allison, Graham. 2015. "The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?" *The Atlantic*, September 24, 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/.

Allison, Graham. 2017. *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides' Trap?* Melbourne: Scribe.

Alnasrawi, Abbas. 1992. "Iraq: Economic Consequences of the 1991 Gulf War and Future Outlook." *Third World Quarterly* 13 (2): 335-352. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992780.

Armstrong, David. 2002. "Dick Cheney's Song of America: Drafting a Plan for Global Dominance." *Harper's Magazine* (October). https://harpers.org/archive/2002/10/dick-cheneys-song-of-america/.

Ambinder, Marc. 2018. *The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Anderson, Malcolm. 1997. *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley.

Armitage, David. 2006. "Hobbes and the Foundations of Modern International Thought." In *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, edited by Annabel Brett and James Tully, 219-235. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aron, Raymond. 1970. "The Evolution of Strategic Thought." In *Problems of Modern Strategy*, edited by Alastair Buchan. London, Chatto & Windus, for the Institute for Strategic Studies.

Art, Robert, and Kenneth Waltz. 1999. *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*. 5th ed. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

Australian Aviation, 2017. "Australian Operation Okra Air Combat Mission to End." 22 December 2017, *Australian Aviation*. https://australianaviation.com.au/2017/12/australian-operation-okra-air-combat-mission-to-end/.

Australian Bureau of Statistics. 1991. "Labour." In *1301.0 - Year Book Australia, 1991*. https://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/free.nsf/0/E219776FDC7A9819CA257AFA001124D6/$File/13010_1991_chapter7.pdf.

Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2016. *Australia: 2016 Census All Persons Quick Stats*. https://www.abs.gov.au/census/find-census-data/quickstats/2016/0

Australian Electoral Commission. 2022. *2022 Federal Election: House of Representatives – Final Result*s. https://results.aec.gov.au/27966/Website/HouseDefault-27966.htm.

Australian Federal Police. 2022. *A Timeline: How we Handled a Crisis that Shook the Nation.* https://www.afp.gov.au/bali/timeline-how-we-handled-crisis-shook-nation.

Australian Government. 1987. *The Defence of Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Government. 1990. *Department of Defence Annual Report 1989-90*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Government. 1991. *Department of Defence Annual Report 1990-91*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Government. 1991. *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Government. 1992. *Department of Defence Annual Report 1991-92*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Government. 1994. *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Government. 2000. *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Australian Government. 2002. *Department of Defence Annual Report 2001-02*. Canberra: Department of Defence.

Australian Defence Force, 2002. *The Australian Approach to Warfare*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/publications/docs/taatw.pdf.

Australian Government. 2003. *Department of Defence Annual Report 2002-03*. Canberra: Department of Defence.

Australian Government. 2004. *Department of Defence Annual Report 2003-04*. Canberra: Department of Defence.

Australian Government. 2009. *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*. Canberra: Department of Defence.

Australian Government. 2010. *The Strategy Framework*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.sadig.org.au/imagesDB/wysiwyg/TheStrategyFramework2010.pdf.

Australian Government. 2012. *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper: Australia's Roadmap for Navigating the Asian Century*. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Australian Government. 2013. *2013 Defence White Paper*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/WP_2013_web.pdf.

Australian Government. 2013. "Defence White Paper 2013." *Media Statement*. Canberra: Department of Defence.

Australian Government. 2014. *Department of Defence Annual Report 2013-14, Volume 1*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-10/AR-2013-14.pdf.

Australian Government. 2015. *Department of Defence Annual Report 2014-15, Volume 1*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-10/AR-2014-15.pdf.

Australian Government. 2015. *First Principles Review, Creating One Defence*. Canberra: Department of Defence. www.defence.gov.au/Publications/Reviews/First principles/Docs/FirstPrinciplesReviewB.pdf.

Australian Government. 2016. *Department of Defence Annual Report 20015-16, Volume 1*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-10/AR-2015-16.pdf.

Australian Government. 2016. *2016 Defence White Paper*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf.

Australian Government. 2020. *Defence Strategic Update*. Canberra: Department of Defence. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update.

Australian Government. 2022. *Joint Statement – Defence Strategic Review*. The Hon. Anthony Albanese and The Hon. Richard Marles, 3 August 2022. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2022-08-03/joint-statement-defence-strategic-review.

Australian Modern Oxford Dictionary. 2007. 3rd ed. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press.

Australian Parliament House. 1990. *House of Representatives, Official Hansard*. No. 172, 21 August 1990. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/1990-08-21/toc_pdf/H%201990-08-21.pdf.

Australian Parliament House. 1990. *House of Representatives, Official Hansard*. No. 174, 4 December 1990. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/1990-12-04/toc_pdf/H%201990-12-04.pdf.

Australian Parliament House. 1990. *Senate, Official Hansard*. No. 142, 4 December 1990. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansards/1990-12-04/toc_pdf/S%201990-12-04.pdf.

Australian Parliament House. 1991. *Statement by the Prime Minister – The Gulf*. 17 January 1991. https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00008245.pdf

Australian Parliament House. 1991. *House of Representatives, Official Hansard*. No. 175, 21 January 1991. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/1991-01-21/toc_pdf/H%201991-01-21.pdf.

Australian Parliament House. 1991. *Senate, Official Hansard.* No. 143, 21 January 1991. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansards%2F1991-01-21%2F0017%22;src1=sm1.

Australian Parliament House. 1991. *House of Representatives, Official Hansard*. No. 175, 22 January 1991. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/1991-01-22/toc_pdf/H%201991-01-22.pdf.

Australian Parliament House. 2017. *Federal Election Results 1901-2016*. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1617/FederalElectionResults.

Australian Parliament House. 2022. *Hon Laurie Brereton MP*. https://www.aph.gov.au/Senators_and_Members/Parliamentarian?MPID=5T4

Australian War Memorial. n.d. "The Australian Army." https://www.awm.gov.au/learn/understanding-military-structure/army.

Australian War Memorial. n.d. "Colonial period, 1788-1901."
https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/colonial.

Australian War Memorial. 2019. "Operation DAMASK III."
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/E84802.

Australian War Memorial. 2020. "Gulf War & Iraq."
https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/gulf.

Australian War Memorial. 2022. "Australia and the Boer War, 1899-1902."
https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/boer.

Australian War Memorial. 2022b. "New Zealand Wars, 1845-72."
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/CN2.

Australian War Memorial. 2022b. "Sudan (New South Wales Contingent) March –
June 1885." https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/sudan.

Australian War Memorial. 2022b. "China (Boxer Rebellion), 1900-01."
https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/boxer.

Australian War Memorial. 2022c. "Indonesian Confrontation, 1963-66."
https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/indonesian-confrontation.

Australian War Memorial. 2022d. "Malayan Emergency."
https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/atwar/malayan-emergency.

Babbage, Ross. 2000. "New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues to get Right."
Australian Defence Force Journal, Issue 143 (July/August): 11-13.

Bachmann, Sascha D., Andrew Dowse, and Hakan Gunneriusson. 2019.
"Competition Short of War – How Russia's Hybrid and Grey-Zone Warfare are a
Blueprint for China's Global Power Ambitions." *Australian Journal of Defence and
Strategic Studies* 1 (1): 41- 56.

Bachrach, Bernard S., and David S. Bachrach. 2017. *Warfare in Medieval Europe
c.400-c.1453*. London: Routledge.

Balat, Mustafa. 2006. "The Position of Oil in the Middle East: potential Trends,
Future Perspectives, Market and Trade." In *Energy Sources, Part A: Recovery,*

Utilization, and Environmental Effects 28 (9): 821-828.
https://doi.org/10.1080/009083190951384.

Baldwin, David A. 1995. "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War." *World Politics* 48 (October): 117-141. https://doi.org/10/1353/wp.1995.0001.

Ball, Desmond, and Sheryl Lee. 2016. "Introduction." In *Essays in Honour of Paul Dibb*, edited by Des Ball and Sheryn Lee, 1-14. Canberra: ANU Press.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn5rx.6.

Barkin, J. Samuel, and Bruce Cronin. 1994. "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations." *International Organisation* 48 (1): 107-130. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706916.

Barker Cat, Claire Petrie, Joanna Dawson, Samantha Godec, Holly Porteous, and Pleasance Purser. 2017. "Oversight of Intelligence Agencies: A Comparison of the 'Five Eyes' Nations." *Research Paper Series 2017-18*. Parliament of Australia: Department of Library Services, December 15, 2017.
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/OversightIntelligenceAgencies.

Barker, Geoffrey. 2011. "Has ANZUS Passed its Use-by Date?" *Inside Story*, June 13, 2011. https://insidestory.org.au/has-anzus-passed-its-use-by-date/.

Barnet, Richard J. 1972. *Roots of War.* New York: Atheneum.

Barreiros, Daniel, and Daniel Ribera Vainfas. 2019. "Clausewitz, Keegan, and the Big History of Warfare." *Journal of Big History*, 4 (1): 4-12.
http://dx.doi.org/10.22339/jbh.v4i1.4130.

Barry, Ben. 2016. "Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War: Conclusion." *Adelphi Series* 56 (461): 141-152.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2016.1285596.

Baylis, John, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray. 2019. *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beaufre, André. 1965. *Deterrence and Strategy*. Translated by R. H. Henry. London: Faber.

Beaulac, Stephane. 2004. "The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth." *Australian Journal of Legal History* 8 (2): 181-213. https://search.informit.org/doi/pdf/10.3316/ielapa.345957784564165.

Beazley, Kim. 1988. "Policy of Increasing Australian Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean." In *Australia and the Indian Ocean: Strategic Dimensions of Increasing Naval Involvement*, edited by Robert H. Bruce, 9-20. Perth, WA: Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, Curtin University of Technology.

Beazley, Kim. 2003. "The Hawke Years: Foreign Affairs and Defence." In *The Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective*, edited by Susan Ryan and Troy Bramston, 347-366. North Melbourne, Victoria: Pluto Press Australia.

Beazley, Kim. 2007. *National Security: Report to the Constituents of Brand, A Collection of Speeches*. Perth, Western Australia: Glide Pty Ltd.

Beazley, Kim. 2016. "Sovereignty and the US Alliance." In *Australia's American Alliance*, edited by Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor, 203-223. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Beazley, Kim. 2016b. "Paul Dibb's Impact on Australian Defence Policy." In *Essays in Honour of Paul Dibb*, edited by Des Ball and Sheryn Lee, 85-91. Canberra: ANU Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn5rx.13.

Beckett, Ian. 2016. *A Guide to British Military History: The Subject and the Sources*. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military.

Behm, Allan. 2022. *No Enemies, No Friends: Restoring Australia's Global Relevance*. Perth, Western Australia: Upswell Publishing.

Begley, Jason. 2013. "Is the RAAF Optimally Configured to Undertake Expeditionary Operations?" *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 191: 75-86.

Bell, Coral. 1988. *Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Bell, Coral. 2007. "Global Change and Strategic Priorities." In *History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia's Defence Policy*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 167, edited by Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher, 29-48. Canberra, Australia: ANU E Press.

Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger. 1994. "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War." *International Organization* 48 (1): 39-75.

Berger, Thomas. 1996. "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 317-356. New York: Columbia University Press.

Betts, Richard. 1987. *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Betts, Richard. 1997. "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" *World Politics* 50 (October): 7-33. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00438871000014702.

Beeson, Mark. 2003. "Australia's Relationship with the United States: The Case for Greater Independence." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 387-405. https://doi.org/10.1080/1036114032000133958.

Beeson, Mark. 2011. "Can Australia Save the World? The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power Diplomacy." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65 (5): 563-577. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2011.607149.

Beevor, Antony. 2012. *The Second World War*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Bickerton, Ian, and Michael Pearson (eds.). 1991. *43 Days: The Gulf War*. East Melbourne, Victoria: The Text Publishing Company in association with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

Biddle, Stephen. 2004. *Military Power*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Bird, Thomas C. 1970. "British East of Suez: A Victim of Economic Necessity." *Naval War College Review* 22 (5) 54-70. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44639560.

Black, Jeremy. 2016. "Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty*." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (5-6): 922-924. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1144455.

Black, Jeremy. 2021. *A Short History of War*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Blackburn, Gary. 2015. "UK Defence Policy 1957–2015: The Illusion of Choice." *Defence Studies* 15 (2): 85-104. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2015.1033849.

Blainey, Geoffrey. 1973. *The Causes of War*. New York: The Free Press.

Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. 3rd ed. New York: The Free Press.

Blaxland, John. 2016. "US-Australian Military Cooperation in Asia." In *Australia's American Alliance*, edited by Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor, 121-143. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Blaxland, John. 2017. "Strategic Balancing Act: Australia's Approach to Managing Chia, the USA and Regional Security Priorities." *Security Challenges* 13 (1): 19-39.

Blaxland, John, Marcus Fielding and Thea Gellerfy (eds.). 2020. *Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2014*. Canberra, ACT: ANU Press.

Blaxland, John. 2021. "Twenty Years in Afghanistan." *Wartime* Issue 96 (Spring): 10-16.

Bluemel, James, and Renad Mansour. 2020. *Once Upon a Time in Iraq: History of a Modern Tragedy*. London: BBC Books.

Bobbitt, Philip. 2002. *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of Human History*. New York: Knopf.

Boot, Max. 2007. "Iraq and the Consequences of Failure." *Australian Army Journal* 4 (2): 7-16.

Boudreau, Donald D. 1993. "The Bombing of the Osirak Reactor." *International Journal on World Peace* 10 (2): 21-37. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20751886.

Bourke, Rob. 2022. "Budgets, the Economy and the Defence Strategic Review." *Strategic Insights*, August. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/budgets-economy-and-defence-strategic-review.

Boyce, Dean. 2015. *Invasion of Sydney: Fears and Counter-measures of an Isolated Colony*. Ultimo, New South Wales: Halstead Press.

Boyd, Joshua. 2020. "Australia's Foreign Policy Needs a Strategic Update." *The Strategist*. July 30, 2020. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-foreign-policy-needs-a-strategic-update/.

Bramston, Troy. 2021. "Treaty Architect Percy Spender 'Thought ANZUS was a Great Win for Australia'." *The Weekend Australian – Inquirer*, August 28, 2021. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/treaty-architect-percy-spender-thought-anzus-was-a-great-win-for-australia/news-story/804301888ab4948531f804a85d75cb85.

Bramston, Troy. 2022. "You Have to Keep Arguing for Something." *The Weekend Australian Magazine*, August 13-14, 2022: 12-16.

Brands, Hal, and David Palkki. 2012. "'Conspiring Bastards': Saddam Hussein's Strategic View of the United States." *Diplomatic History* 36 (3): 625-659. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44376191.

Brands, Hal, and William Inboden. 2018. "Wisdom Without Tears: Statecraft and the Uses of History." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41 (7): 916-946. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1428797.

Brangwin, Nicole, and Ann Rann. 2010. "Australia's Military Involvement in Afghanistan Since 2001: A Chronology." *Background Notes.* Parliament of Australia: Department of Parliamentary Affairs, July 16, 2010. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/1011/MilitaryInvolvementAfghanistan.

Brangwin, Nicole. 2020. "ANZAC Day 2020: 30th Anniversary of the Gulf War: A Quick Guide." *Research Paper Series, 2019-20*. Parliament of Australia: Department of Parliamentary Services, April 14, 2020. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick_Guides/AnzacDay2020-30thAnniversaryGulfWar.

Brathwaite, Robert. 2016. "Dirty War: Chemical Weapon Use and Domestic Repression." *Defence Studies* 16 (4): 327-345. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1220804.

Braut-Hegghammer, Målfrid. 2011. "Revisiting Osirak: Preventative Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks." *International Security* 36 (1): 101-132. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41289690.

Brigham, Robert K. 2014. *The United States and Iraq since 1990: A Brief History with Documents*. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=1215783

Breitenbauch, Henrik, and André Ken Jakobsson. 2018. "Defence Planning as Strategic Fact: Introduction." *Defence Studies* 18 (3): 253-261. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1497443.

Broder, Emma. 2015. "The ADF and Strategic Culture." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 197: 33-42.

Brodie, Bernard (ed.). 1946. *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Institute of International Studies. https://www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/16380564.

Brodie, Bernard. 1959. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=4070654.

Brodie, Bernard. 1966. *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Brodie, Bernard, 1971-72. "Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?" *Foreign Policy* 5: 151-161. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147725.

Brodie, Bernard. 1973. *War and Politics*. London: Cassell.

Brom, Shlomo, and Yiftah Shapir (eds.). 2002. *The Middle East Military Balance: 2001-2002*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Brooks, Rosa. 2016. *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*. New York; Simon and Schuster.

Brown, Archie. 2015. "The End of the Soviet Union." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 17 (4): 158-165. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/606024.

Brown, James. 2016. "Firing Line: Australia's Path to War" Quarterly Essay 62. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=4528888.

Brown, Louise. 2017. "The ADF Beyond Afghanistan – Four Possible Scenarios." *Australian Army Journal* Issue 201: 29-34.

Brown, Peter. 2013. "Some Defence Budget Ideas from the UK." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 191: 108-119.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 2014. "Can China Avoid the Thucydides Trap?" *New Perspectives Quarterly* 31 (2): 31-33. https://doi.org/10.1111/npqu.11444.

Buckley, Mary, and Robert Singh. 2006. "Introduction." In *The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences*, edited by Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, 1-11. London and New York: Routledge.

Buchan, Alastair. 1966. *War in Modern Society: An Introduction*. London: C. A. Watts.

Buel, Richard. 1995. "Reviewed Work: *A History of Warfare* by John Keegan." *History and Theory*. 34 (1): 90-106. https://doi.org/10.2307/2505586.

Bull, Hedley. 1961. Review of "*Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War,* by Lewis Fry Richardson. *International Affairs* 37 (3): 350. https://doi.org/10.2307/2610948.

Bull, Hedley. 1961. *The Control of the Arms Race; Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age*. Volume 2. With the Cooperation of a Study Group in the Institute. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson for the Institute of Strategic Studies.

Bull, Hedley. 2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. 4th ed. Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bull, Hedley. 1966. "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach." *World Politics* 18 (3): 361-377. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.2307/2009761.

Bull, Hedley. 1981. "Hobbes and the International Anarchy." *Social Research* 48 (4): 717-38. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970843.

Bunn, James. 2016. "Kuwait, US Remember Liberation 25 Years Later." *U.S. Army*, February 5, 2016. https://www.army.mil/article/161939/Kuwait__US_remember_liberation_25_years_later.

Burleigh, Michael. 2013. *Small Wars, Far Away Places: The Genesis of the Modern World, 1945-65*. London: Macmillan.

Butler, David. 1973. "Thoughts on the 1972 Election". *Australian Journal of Political Science* 8 (1): 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1080/00323267308401312.

Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. 1999. "Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the 'Fall'". *Review of International Studies* 25 (5): 89-104. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599000893.

Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen. 2009. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=461087.

Buszynski, Leszek. 1981. "SEATO: Why it Survived until 1977 and why it was Abolished." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12 (2): 287-296. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463400009887.

Byun, See-Won. 2016. "China's Major-Powers Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era: Tragedy of Great Power Politics Revisited?" *Asian Perspective* 40 (3): 493-522. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44074793.

Campbell, David, and Michael Dillon. 1993. "Introduction. The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations." In *The Political Subject of Violence*, edited by David Campbell and Michael Dillon, 1-3. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Campbell, Peter. 2019. "Military Autonomy: Its Origins, Limits, and the Politico-military Dialectic of War." *Defence Studies* 19 (3): 277-296. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2019.1634472.

Carlisle, Rodney P. 2010. *Iraq War*. New York: Infobase Publishing.

Carr, Andrew. 2015. *Winning the Peace: Australia's Campaign to Change the Asia-Pacific*. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Publishing.

Carr, Andrew. 2016. "ANZUS and Australia's Role in World Affairs." In *Australia's American Alliance*, edited by Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor, 66-85. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Carr, Andrew. 2017. "Time to Harness the Motivating Force of Fear." *The Interpreter,* February 7, 2017. Sydney: The Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/time-harness-motivating-force-fear.

Carr, Edward Hallett. 1939. *The Twenty Year's Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations.* Reissued with a New Introduction and Additional Material by Michael Cox, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95076-8_9.

Carr, Edward Hallett. 2017. "Reading 2.4 Realism and Idealism." In *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 5th ed., edited by Richard E. Betts, 84-101. New York and London: Routledge.

Carroll, John. 2003. "Twin Towers Revisited: A Cultural Interpretation of Modern Terrorism" *Australian Army Journal* 1 (2): 59-65. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/aaj_2003_2.pdf.

Carter, William H. 1908. "When Diplomacy Fails" *The North American Review* 187 (626): 23-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25106058.

Cashman, Greg. 2013. *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict*. 2nd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=1273782.

Catalinac, Amy L. 2010. "Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing 'Opposition for Autonomy' in Asymmetric Alliances." *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6 (4): 317–338. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00115.x.

Central Intelligence Agency. 1991. *The 1991 CIA World Factbook*. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. https://archive.org/stream/theciaworldfactb00025gut/25.txt.

Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 2006. *The Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908*. New York: Routledge.

Cheeseman, Graeme. 1996. "Back to 'Forward Defence'." In *Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking after the Cold War,* edited by Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce, 251-271. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Chilcot, John. 2016. "Sir John Chilcot's Public Statement, 6 July 2016." The Iraq Inquiry. London: The National Archives. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20171123124608/http://www.iraq inquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/sir-john-chilcots-public-statement/.

Chomsky, Noam. 1993. *Year 501: The Conquest Continues*. London: Verso.

Chong, Alan. 2015. "Smart Power and Military Force: An Introduction." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (3): 233-244. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.1002915.

Clark, Ian. 2005. *Legitimacy in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=679451.

Clausewitz, Carl von. 1976. *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Clausewitz, Carl von. 1982. *On War*, edited with an introduction by Anatol Rapoport. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Cleveland, Harlan. 2006. *Keynote Address: The Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: William G. McGowan Theatre, The National Archives and Record Administration, October 21, 2006. https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/symposium/cleveland.html.

Coffey, Amanda. 2013. "Analysing Documents." In *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*, edited by Uwe Flick, 367-379. London: SAGE. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.

Coghlan, David. 2010. "War and the Strategist of the Twenty-first Century." *Australian Army Journal* 7 (1): 165-172.

Cohen, Samy. 2006. *The Resilience of the State: Democracy and the Challenge of Globalization*. Translated by Jonathan Derrick. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Cohen, Stuart A. 1995. "Small State and Their Armies: Restructuring the Militia Framework of the Israeli Defense Force." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18 (4): 78-93. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399508437620.

Coker, Christopher. 2017. "War." In *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, 2nd ed., edited by Myriam Dun Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq, 243-255. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=4579031.

Colegrove, Kenneth. 1919. "Diplomatic Procedure Preliminary to the Congress of Westphalia." *The American Journal of International Law* 13 (3): 450-482.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2188262.

Collins, Jeffrey R. 2005. *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=453593.

Collins, Shannon. 2019. "Desert Storm: A Look Back." *U.S. Department of Defense*. January 11, 2019.
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Features/story/Article/1728715/desert-storm-a-look-back/#:~:text=On%20Aug.,the%20world%20at%20that%20time.

Commonwealth of Australia. 1987. *The Constitution as Altered to 30 June 1987 Together with Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 Australia Act 1986 and an Introduction and Outline*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Commonwealth of Australia. 2015. *Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Strengthening Our Resilience.* https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing-subsite/Files/australias-counter-terrorism-strategy-2015.pdf.

Connor, John. 2002. "The Hawkesbury-Nepean Frontier War." *Wartime* Issue 18 (Summer): 48-50.

Cooksey, Robert J. 1988. *Review of Australia's Defence Facilities: Report to the Minister for Defence*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Copeland, Dale C. 2000. *The Origins of Major Wars*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=3138435.

Cordesman, Anthony. 1993. *After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pqorigsite=primo&docID=4659843

Cordesman, Anthony. 1994. *Iraq's Military Forces: 1988-1993*. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, D.C.

Craig, Gordon A. 1986. "The Political Leader as Strategist." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, 481-509. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=909145&ppg=1.

Craig, Campbell. 2003. *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Crawford, Neta. 1991. "Once and Future Security Studies." *Security Studies* 1 (2): 283-316. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419109347469.

Crowley, P. T. 2004. "Operational Lessons of the Mesopotamia Campaign, 1914-18." *Defence Studies* 4 (93): 335-360. https://doi.org/10.1080/1470243042000344795.

Cruttwell, Charles R. M. F. 1937. *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dannatt, Richard. 2016. *Boots on the Ground: Britain and her Army since 1945*. London: Profile Books Ltd.

Danner, Mark. 2016. *Spiral: Trapped in the Forever War*. New York and London: Simon and Schuster.

Dannreuther, Roland. 1991. "The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis." *Adelphi Papers* 32 (264): 3-88. https://doi.org/10.1080/05679329108449065.

D'Alpuget, Blanche. 2010. *Hawke: The Prime Minister*. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Davies, Andrew, Peter Jennings, Daniel Nichola and Benjamin Schreer.2014. "Expanding Alliance : ANZUS Cooperation and Asia-Pacific Security." *Strategy*, December. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/expanding-alliance-anzus-cooperation-and-asia-pacific-security.

Davis, Evan. 2003. "'All About Oil?' The Economics of War". In *The Battle for Iraq*, edited by Sally Potter, 170-180. London: BBC Worldwide Limited.

Davis, Paul K. 2018. "Defense Planning when Major Changes are Needed." *Defence Studies* 18 (3): 374-390. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1497444.

Dawisha, Adeed. 1999. "'Identity' and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq." *Middle East Journal* 53 (4): 553-567 https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329390.

Day, David. 1992. *Reluctant Nation: Australia and the Allied Defeat of Japan 1942-45*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Day, David. 2015. *Paul Keating: The Biography*. Sydney: Fourth Estate.

Dean, Peter J. 2016. "The Alliance, Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War." In *Australia's American Alliance*, edited by Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor, 224-250. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

de Jasny, Anthony. 1985. *The State*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell**.**

Delaney, Douglas E. 2002. "Churchill and the Mediterranean Strategy: December 1941 to January 1943." *Defence Studies* 2 (3): 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430208405038.

Delcourt, Barbara. 2006. "Pre-emptive Action in Iraq: Muddling Sovereignty and Intervention?" *Global Society* 20 (1): 47-67. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820500405475.

Dennis, Peter, Jeffery Grey, Ewan Morris and Robin Prior. 1997. *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press Australia.

Dennis, Peter, Jeffery Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior and Jean Bou. 2008. *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*. 2nd ed. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press Australia.

Department of State. 2020. *Dissolution of USSR*. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union.

DeSantis, Marc G. 2015. "The Peace of Westphalia (1648)" *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, 28 (1): 18-19. https://www.proquest.com/docview/1708151452/E250C0705E8E4305PQ/10?accountid=10382.

Deschaux-Dutard, Delphine. 2018. "Methods in Defence Studies." In *Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies*, 40-50. London: Routledge. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.4324/9781315650463.

Desmond, William. 2006. "Lessons of Fear: A Reading of Thucydides." *Classical Philology* 101 (4): 359-379. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/519183.

Dibb, Paul. 1983. "Issues in Australian Defence." *Australian Outlook* 37 (3): 160-166. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718308444823.

Dibb, Paul. 1986. *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister for Defence*. Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service.

Dibb, Paul. 2007. "The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea." In *History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia's Defence Policy*, edited by Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher,11-26. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 167. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.

Dibb, Paul. 2016. DWP 2016: The Return of Geography." *The Strategist.* Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 1, 2016. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/dwp-2016-the-return-of-geography/.

Dibb, Paul. 2019. "Planning to Defend Australia in an Era of Profound Strategic Change." *The Strategist*, October 15, 2019. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/planning-to-defend-australia-in-an-era-of-profound-strategic-disruption.

Dietrich, Christopher R. W. 2011. "Arab Oil Belongs to the Arabs: Raw Material Sovereignty, Cold War Boundaries, and the Nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, 1967-1973." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 22 (3): 450-479. https://www-tandfonline-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/doi/full/10.1080/09592296.2011.599648.

Dimitriu, George. 2020. "Clausewitz and the Politics of War: A Contemporary Theory." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 43 (5): 645-685. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1529567.

Dobell, Graeme, 2013. "A Strategy as a Statement." *The Strategist*, January 24, 2013. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-strategy-as-a-statement/.

Dobell, Graeme. 2016. "Seven Defence White Papers by the Numbers (1)." *The Strategist*, March 7, 2016. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/seven-defence-white-papers-by-the-numbers-part-1/.

Dobell, Graeme. 2016b. "Oz Strategists: Paul Dibb." *The Strategist*, July 25, 2016. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/oz-strategists-paul-dibb.

Dobell, Graeme. 2020. "The Big Defence Beast." *Security Challenges* 16 (2): 3-12. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26910347.

Dodge, Toby. 2006. "Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective." *Third World Quarterly* 27 (1): 187-200. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4017667.

Doeser, Frederik, and Filip Frantzen. 2020. "The Strategic and Realist Perspectives: An Ambiguous Relationship." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1833860.

Donovan, Jerome. 2011. *The Iran-Iraq War: Antecedents and Conflict Escalation*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=615014.

Downing, Taylor. 2018. *1983: The World at the Brink*. London: Abacus.

Dupont, Alan. 1991. *Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 82, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra.

Dupont, Alan. 2015. "Full Spectrum Defence: Rethinking the Fundamentals of Australian Defence Strategy." *Analyses,* March 11, 2015. Sydney: Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/full-spectrum-defence-re-thinking-fundamentals-australian-defence-strategy.

Dupont, Alan. 2016. "Transnational Security." In *Strategy and Security in the Asia Pacific*, edited by Rob Ayson and Desmond Ball, 103-120. Crows Nest, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Dupont, Alan. 2022. "Get Ready for the Fight of our Lives." *The Weekend Australian - Inquirer*, 17; 20, October 1-2, 2022.

Dusza, Karl. 1989. "Max Weber's Conception of the State." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 3 (1): 71-105. https://jstor.org/stable/20006938.

Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, and James E. Worrall. 2017. "Global Strategic Studies: A Manifesto." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (3): 347-357. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1269228.

Dyer, Gwynne. 2021. *The Shortest History of War*. Carlton, Victoria: Black Inc.

Earle, Edward Mead (ed.). 1943. *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Earle, Edward Mead. 1943. "A Study of War by Quincy Wright." *The American Political Science Review* 37 (1): 150-153. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1949013.

Echevarria II, Antulio J. 2016. "Rediscovering US Military Strategy: A Role for Doctrine." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (2): 231-245. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115035.

Edwards, Peter, 1999. "Confrontation: Australia's Curious War of Diplomacy." *Wartime* Issue 5: 44-48.

Edwards, Peter. 2016. "Defence White Papers at 40." *Strategy,* December 2016. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Edwards, Peter. 2016b. *Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins*. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Ehlert, Allison. 2003. "Iraq: At the Apex of Evil." *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 21 (3): 731-770.

Ehrenreich, Barbara. 1997. *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War*. New York: Metropolitan Books / Henry Holt and Company.

Elias, Norbert. 2000. *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations; translated by Edmund Jephcott*, revised edition, edited by Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom and Stephen Mennell. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers.

Ellis, John. 1995. *From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counter-Insurgency Warfare, from the Romans to the Present.* London: Greenhill Books.

Enriquez, Juan. 1999. "Too Many Flags?" *Foreign Policy* 116: 30-32; 34-49. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1149642.

Enthoven, Alain C., and K. Wayne Smith. 1971. *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969.* New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. Revised edition by RAND Corporation, 2005. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB403.html.

Er, Lam Peng. 2016. "China, the United States, Alliances and War: Avoiding the Thucydides Trap?" *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 43 (2): 36-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2016.1150765.

Erdeniz, Robert. 2016. "Operations Planning Revisited: Theoretical and Practical Implications of Methodology." *Defence Studies* 16 (3): 248-269. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1187567.

Errington, Wayne, and Peter Van Onselen. 2007. *John Winston Howard.* Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Evangelista, Matthew. 1982-83. "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised." *International Security* 7 (3): 110-138. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538554.

Evangelista, Matthew. 1998. "The 'Soviet Threat': Intentions, Capabilities, and Context." *Diplomatic History* 22 (3): 439-449. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00128.

Evans, Gareth. 2014. *Inside the Hawke Keating Government: A Cabinet Diary.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Evans, Michael. 2001. *From Deakin to Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian Strategy in the 20th Century.* Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No. 113. Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre.

Evans, Michael. 2003. "Present at the Creation: America and the Remaking of the Middle East." *Australian Army Journal* 1 (1): 111-118. https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/ielapa.8111422083.

Evans, Michael. 2003. "Of Smoking Guns and Mushroom Clouds: Explaining the Bush Doctrine and the Rise of Military Pre-emption." *Australian Army Journal* 1 (2): 15-34. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/aaj_2003_2.pdf.

Evans, Michael. 2005. *The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia's Strategic Culture and Way of War 1901-2005*. Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No. 306. Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre.

Fairweather, Jack. 2011. *A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003-09*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Farrell, Brian P. 2006. *The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940–42*. Brimscombe Port, UK: The History Press.

Ferguson, Niall. 2006. *Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West*. New York: Penguin Press.

Feldman, Shai. 1982. "The Bombing of Osiraq - Revisited." *International Security* 7 (2): 114-142. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446751/summary.

Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsey. 2007. "Mutual Optimism and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (4): 738-754. https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=0b85c978-d3f0-4c96-930f-6e7653ea6e1b%40redis.

Field, Chris. 2003. "Planning in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Observations of an Australian Liaison Officer." *Australian Army Journal* 1 (2): 35-44. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/aaj_2003_2.pdf.

Field, Chris. 2011. "An Analysis of Strategic Planning – Four Ideas for the Australian Defence Organisation." *Strategic Management Series*. Canberra: Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies. https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/documents/StratMgmt/2011/Publcns _StratMgt_110530_AnAnalysisofStrategicPlanning.pdf.

Finlayson, Ian. 2017. *A Brief History of the Australian Army*, 5th ed. Campbell Park, Canberra: Australian Army History Unit.

Fisk, Robert. 2005. *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*. London: Fourth Estate.

FitzSimons, Peter. 1998. *Beazley: A Biography*. Pymble, Sydney: Harper Collins *Publishers*.

Fleming, N. C. 2016. "Review: Conquest, Empire, and the Struggle for Supremacy." *War in History* 23 (2): 251-256. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26059766.

Forbes, Cameron. 2010. *The Korean War: Australia in the Giant's Playground.* Sydney: Macmillan.

Forde, Steven. 1992. "Classical Realism." In *Traditions of International Ethics*, edited by Terry Nardin and David R. Maple, 62-84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521768.005.

Fortune, Dan. 2014. "Self-reliance: An Outdated and Unaffordable Concept for the ADF." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 193: 5-15.

Foster, Duncan. 2018. *The Australian Army Reading List 2019*. Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre.

Foulkes, Paul. 1965. "The Classical Age." In *Growth of Ideas: The Evolution of Thought and Knowledge*, edited by Jill Cameron, 224-241. London: Macdonald.

Fowler, Michael R., and Julie Bunck. 1995. *Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University.

Frankel, Benjamin. 1996. "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction." *Security Studies* 5 (3): 9-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429274.

Franklin, Julian H. (ed.). 2006. *Jean Bodin*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Fraser, Malcolm, and Cain Roberts. 2014. *Dangerous Allies.* Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Fraser, Malcolm. 2014. "Australia's Dependence on a major power lies deep in our national psyche." *The Guardian*, April 29, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/29/australias-dependence-on-a-major-power-lies-deep-in-our-national-psyche.

Freedman, Lawrence (ed.). 1994. *War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. 1995. *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Freedman, Lawrence. 1989. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan in association with the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Freedman, Lawrence, and John Keegan. 2001. *The Cold War: A Military History*. London: Cassell.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. *Deterrence*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2006. *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs*. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203820001.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2009. *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2010. "On War and Choice." *The National Interest* No. 107 (May/June): 9-16. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42896305.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2013. *Strategy: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2015. "Social Science and the Cold War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (4): 554-574. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1038900.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2017. "Academics and Policy-making: Rules of Engagement." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (1): 263-268. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1269982.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2018. *The Future of War: A History*. London: Penguin Books.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2019. Review of *Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security*, by Michael Desch. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (7): 1027-1037. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1668105.

Freedman, Lawrence, and Jeffery Michaels. 2019. "The End of the Cold War." In *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 4th ed., 543-551. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57350-6_36.

Fretz, Lewis. 1991. "Reflections on the Persian Gulf War." *New Zealand International Review* 16 (5): 11-14. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45234078.

Freudenberg, Graham. 2008. *Churchill and Australia*. Sydney: Pan MacMillan Australia.

Frühling, Stephan. 2009. "The Missing Link: Politics, Strategy and Capability Priorities." *Security Challenges* 5 (2): 41-50. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26459243.

Frühling, Stephan. 2009b. *Australian Strategic Guidance Since the Second World War: A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945*. Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.

Frühling, Stephan. 2014. *Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War*. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315818764.

Frühling, Stephan. 2016. "Wrestling Commitment: Geography, Alliance Institutions and the ANZUS Treaty." In *Australia's American Alliance*, edited by Peter J. Dean, Frühling, Stephan, and Brendan Taylor, 13-35. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16: 1-12.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man.* London: H. Hamilton.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 2006. *The Cold War: A New History*. London: Penguin.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 2018. *On Grand Strategy*. London: Penguin Books.

Gair, Kieran. 2021. "Two Words Launched Desert Storm's Blitz." *The Weekend Australian*, January 23-24, 2021, 8.

Gallarotti, Guilio M. 2015. "Smart Power: Definitions, Importance, and Effectiveness." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (3): 245-281. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.1002912.

Galligan, Brian, and Winsome Roberts (eds.). 2007. *The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics*. South Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Galeotti, Mark. 2016. *Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina?* London: Mayak Intelligence.

Galeotti, Mark. 2022. *The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Galliott, Jai. 2016. "Defending Australia in the Digital Age: Toward Full Spectrum Defence." *Defence Studies* 16 (2): 157-175. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1165596.

Gapps, Stephen. 2022. "Tumble Down White Fellows." *Wartime* Issue 97 (Summer): 26-31.

Garfinkel, Ben, and Allan Dafoe. 2019. "How does the Offense-Defense Balance Scale?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (6): 736-763. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631810.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gartner, Scott S. 1997. *Strategic Assessment in War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gat, Azar. 2001. *A History of Military Thought: From Enlightenment to the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gat, Azar. 2005. "The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity." *World Politics* 58 (1): 73-100. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/wpot58&i=87.

Gat, Azar. 2006. *War in Human Civilization.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=430870.

Gat, Azar. 2007. "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers." *Foreign Affairs* 86 (4): 59-69.

Gat, Azar. 2013. "Is War Declining – and Why?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (2): 149-157. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23441182.

Gat, Azor. 2012. "The Roots and Evolution of Conflict: From Cain to Present." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to War*, edited by Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff. London: Routledge. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=834046.

Gause III, F. Gregory. 2002. "Iraq's Decision to Go to War." *Middle East Journal* 56 (1): 47-70. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329720.

Gauthier, David P. 1969. "I, Yet Another Hobbes." *Inquiry* 12 (1-4): 449-465. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201746908601579.

Gavin, Francis J. 2017. "Policy and the Publicly Minded Professor." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (1-2): 269-274. https://doi.org/10.1081/01402390.2016.1269983.

Gawthorpe, Andrew J. 2016. "A Guide to National Security: Threats, Responses and Strategies." *Defence Studies* 16 (1): 89-90. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2015.1092285.

Gerring, John. 2013. "The Case Study: What it is and What it Does." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Robert E. Goodin, 1133-1165. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0051.

Gerring, John. 2004. "What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?" *The American Political Science Review* 98 (2): 341-354. http://link.lis.curtin.edu.au/gw?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4145316.

Gewen, Barry. 2020. *The Inevitability of Tragedy: Henry Kissinger and His World*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Ghiselli, Andrea. 2020. "Civil–military Relations and Organisational Preferences Regarding the use of the Military in Chinese Foreign Policy: Insights from the Debate on MOOTW." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43 (3): 421-442. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1438892.

Gilbert, Felix. 1986. "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, 11-31. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gilchrist, Mark. 2016. "Why Thucydides Still Matters." *The Strategy Bridge,* November 30, 2016. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/11/30/why-thucydides-still-matters.

Gill, Terry. 2022. "The Jus ad Bellum and Russia's 'Special Military Operation' in Ukraine." *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 25 (2): 121-27. https://doi.org/10.1163/18754112-25020002.

Gillard, Julia. 2012. *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper*. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/2010380/upload_binary/2010380.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/2010380%22

Gillard, Julia. 2013. "A Strategy for Australia's National Security." *Transcripts from the Prime Ministers of Australia*, 23 January 2013. Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-19006.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1996. "No One Loves a Realist." *Security Studies* 5 (3): 3-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429275.

Girling, J. L. S. 1967. "Vietnam and the Domino Theory." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 21 (1): 61-70. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357716708444262.

Girling, J. L. S. 1977. "Australia and Southeast Asia in the Global Balance: A Critique of the 'Fraser Doctrine'." *Australian Outlook* 31 (1): 3-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357717708444587.

Glaser, Charles L. 1977. *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Glaser, Charles L. 1997. "The Security Dilemma Revisited." *World Politics* 50 (1): 171-201. doi:10.1017/S0043887100014763.

Glaser, Charles L., and Chaim Kaufmann. 1998. "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security* 22 (4): 44-82. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446911.

Glaser, Charles L. 2013. "Realism." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, 3rd ed., edited by Alan Collins, 13-27. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gloyd, Elizabeth, and Wanda E. Leal. 2018. "'About Face' for Delinquent Youth: Military Service as a Turning Point Across the Life Course." *Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology* 5 (5): 461-479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40865-018-0096-7.

Goldman, Emily O. 2001. "New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine." *Journal of Strategic Affairs* 24 (2): 43-76. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390108565554.

Goldrick, James. 2020. 'Defence Strategic Update 2020: A First Assessment." *The Interpreter*. Sydney: Lowy Institute, July 2, 2020. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/defence-strategic-update-2020-first-assessment.

Goldstein, Joshua. 2011. *Winning the War on War*. New York: Dutton Adult.

Golub, Grant. 2022. "The Eagle and the Lion: Reassessing Anglo-American strategic planning and the foundations of U.S. grand strategy for World War II." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 1-29. https://10.1080/01402390.2022.2104837.

Goody, Jack. 2006. *The Theft of History*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gordon, Michael. 1996. *A True Believer*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Gould-Davies, Nigel. 2022. "Putin's Strategic Failure." *Survival* 64 (2): 7-16. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2055818.

Goure, Daniel. 2015. "Building the Right Military for a New Era: The Need for an Enduring Analytical Framework." In *2015 Index of U.S. Military* Strength: *Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense*. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation.

Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. 1999. "The Governance Problem in International Relations." In *Strategic Choice and International Relations,* edited by David Lake and Robert Powell. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Gray, Colin S. 1971. "Strategists: Some Views Critical of the Profession." *International Journal* 26 (4): 771-790. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40201075.

Gray, Colin S. 1999. "Why Strategy is Difficult." *Joint Force Quarterly* Issue 22: 6-12. https://www.proquest.com/docview/203644294/fulltextPDF/2FE7E69E4407426DPQ/4?accountid=10382.

Gray, Colin S. 1999b. *Modern Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gray, Colin S. 2006. "What is War? A View from Strategic Studies." In *Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice*, 185-189. London: Routledge.

Gray, Colin S. 2014. *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gray, Colin S. 2015. "Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power, and International Order." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (6): 873-897. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1018412.

Gray, Colin S. 2015. *The Future of Strategy*. Cambridge: Polity Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=4182796&ppg=1.

Gray, Colin S. 2016. *Strategy and Politics*. London: Routledge.

Gray, Colin S. 2018. *Theory of Strategy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gray, Jerry. 1991. "U.N. Chief to Report on Iraq-Kuwait Island Battle." *New York Times*, August 30, 1991. https://search-proquest-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/docview/428152646?pq-origsite=primo.

Grayling, Anthony C. 2017. *War: An Enquiry*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Green, Ted. 2012. "The Fall of Singapore 1942." *Historian* Issue 116 (Winter): 6-10.

Grey, Jeffrey. 2008. *A Military History of Australia*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grey, Jeffery. 2015. *The War with the Ottoman Empire*. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press.

Griggs, Emily Hill. 2001. "A Realist before 'Realism': Quincy Wright and the Study of International Politics between Two World Wars." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24 (1): 71-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390108437823.

Grattan, C Hartley. 1944. "*Black Australians: A Survey of Native Policy in Western Australia, 1829-1897* by Paul Hasluck." *The American Historical Review* 49 (2): 293-294. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.2307/1838636.

Griffiths, Emma, 2014. "Australian Troops 'Moving into Locations' in Iraq to Assist with Fight Against Islamic State." November 11, 2014, *ABC News*. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-11/government-left-open-possibility-of-sending-more-troops-to-iraq/5881640.

Griffiths, Martin (ed.). 2005. *Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics*. London and New York: Routledge.

Griffiths, Martin, Terry O'Callaghan and Steven C. Roach. 2008. *International Relations: The Key Concepts.* 3rd ed. London: Routledge. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=1613782.

Gross, Leo. 1948. "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948." *The American Journal of International Law* 42 (1): 20-41. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.2307/2193560.

Guía, Pedro Valdés. 2020. "The Logic of War: An Instituting Duel." *Defence Studies* 20 (4): 336-352. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1829973.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1981. "Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A Critical Review of the Evidence." In *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*, vol. 3, edited by Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, 295-353. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Gyngell, Allan. 2017. *Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the World since 1942*. Carlton, Victoria: La Trobe University Press.

Haass, Richard N. 2009. *War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Haass, Richard. 2017. "World Order 2.0: The Case for Sovereign Obligation" *Foreign Affairs* 96 (1): 2-9.

Hackett, John. 1984. *The Profession of Arms*. London: Sidgwick & Jackson.

Hak, Tony, and Jan Dul. 2012. "Theory-Building with Cases." *In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, edited by Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe, 933-937. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Inc. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397.

Halberstam, David. 2001. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals.* London: Bloomsbury.

Hale, J.R. 1969. "Machiavelli and the Self-sufficient State." In *Political Ideas*, edited by David Thomson, 22-33. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Halliday, Fred. 1994. "The Gulf War 1990-1991 and the Study of International Relations." *Review of International Studies* 20 (2): 109-130. https://www.jstor.org.stable/20097363.

Halliday, Fred, and Justin Rosenberg. 1998. "Interview with Kenneth Waltz." *Review of International Studies* 24 (3): 371-386. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097532.

Ham, Paul. 2007. *Vietnam: The Australian War*. Pymble, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers.

Hamilton, Nigel. 2010. *American Caesars: Lives of the US Presidents: From Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush*. London: The Bodley Head.

Hampton, Jean. 1986. *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri, 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. http://search.ebscohost.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk &AN=281919&site=ehost-live.

Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2004. *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: The Penguin Press.

Hartley, Keith. 2018. "Defence Budgets." In *Routledge Handbook of Defence Studies*, 53-71. London: Routledge. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.4324/9781315650463.

Harvey, David. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=886664.

Hashim, Ahmed S. 2019. "Is Strategic Studies at Risk?" *Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies* 1 (1): 83-98.

Hassan, Hamdi A. 1999. *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and Otherness in the Analysis of War and Conflict*. London: Pluto Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=3386044.

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. 2020. "The View from NATO: Sputnik as a Catalyst, 1957-8." *The International History* Review 42 (6): 1137-1154. https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1700543.

Hawke, Bob. 1994. *The Hawke Memoirs*. Port Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia.

Hayden, Bill. 1996. *Bill Hayden: An Autobiography*. Pymble, Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Heffington, Steven, Adam Oler and David Tretler (eds.). 2019. *A National Security Primer*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.

Hellyer, Marcus. 2021. *The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2021-2022*. Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Hellyer, Marcus. 2021b. "Funding on Track but Strategic Circumstances Worsening: The Cost of Australia's Defence." *The Strategist*, May 26, 2021.

Henrikson, Alan. 1999. "Small States in World Affairs: The International Political Position and Diplomatic Influence of the World's Growing Number of Smaller Countries." Paper presented at the *World Bank-Commonwealth Secretariat Conference on Small States*, St Lucia, February 1999.

Herman, Robert. 1996. "Identity, Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 271-316. New York: Columbia University Press.

Heuser, Beatrice. 2007. "Clausewitz's Ideas of Strategy and Victory." In *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, 138-162. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232024.003.0009.

Heuser, Beatrice. 2010. The *Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hiatt, Fred. 1984. "Navy Defuses Iraq Missile in Tanker's Hull." *The Washington Post*, April 6, 1984. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/04/06/navy-defuses-iraq-missile-in-tankers-hull/1108354a-397a-49d2-8ee1-402d235c68e5/.

Hinrichsen, Simon. 2019. "Tracing Iraqi Sovereign Debt through Defaults and Restructuring." *Economic History Working Papers*, 304, December 2019. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Hiro, Dilip. 1990. *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict*. London: Paladin.

Hiro, Dilip. 2002. *Iraq: In the Eye of the Storm*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press / Nation Books.

Hirsh, Michael. 2020. "Welcome Back to Kissinger's World." *Foreign Policy*, June 7, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/07/kissinger-review-gewen-realism-liberal-internationalism/.

Hirst, Paul. 2001. *War and Power in the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hixon, Walter L. 2016. *American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History.* London and New York: Routledge.

Hobbes, Thomas. 2018 [1651]. *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civill*. Minneapolis: First Avenue Editions. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=5443203

Hobbes, Thomas. 1968. *Leviathan*. Edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson. Ringwood, Victoria: Pelican Books.

Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger (eds.). 1992. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=1864711.

Hodgen, Margaret. 1964. *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S. 1993. *Rethinking World History: Essays in Europe, Islam, and World History.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodson, Stephanie. 2004. "Regionalism Versus Globalism: Australia's Defence Strategy After 11 September 2001." *Australian Army Journal* 2 (1): 61-68.

Hoffmann, Andrew. 2015. "The Future of the ADF." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 196: 51-59.

Hoffman, F. G. 2021. "Distilling the Essence of Strategy." *Comparative Strategy* 40 (2): 112-116. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1880807.

Holslag, Jonathan. 2014. "China: A Deterrence Paradox." In *Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation*, edited by Harsh V. Pant, 132-145. London: Routledge.

Holslag, Jonathan. 2018. *A Political History of the World: Three Thousand Years of War and Peace.* London: Pelican Books.

Holsti, Kalevi Jaakko. 1968. *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 5th ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Holsti, Kalevi Jaakko. 1991. *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holsti, Kalevi Jaakko. 2016. "On the Study of War." In *Major Texts on War, the State, Peace and International Order*. Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice, 42 5-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28818-5_2.

Holsti, Ole, Richard, A. Brody, and Robert North, 1969. "The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations," in *Theory and Research on the Causes of War*, edited by Dean G. Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, 62-79. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Honig, Jan Willem. 2016. "The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy: Small (and Large) States in a Double Bind." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39 (2): 261-279. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1115036.

Horgan, John. 2012. *The End of War*. San Francisco: McSweeney.

Horne, Alistair. 2015. *Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Horner, David. 1990. "The Defence of Australia: Australia 1973-1979." In *Duty First: The Royal Australian Regiment in War and Peace*, edited by David Horner, 281-303. North Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia.

Horner, David. 1992. *Gulf Commitments: The Australian Defence Force's First War*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Horner, David. 1996. 'The Australian Way of Warfighting', unpublished paper presented to the Australian Command and Staff College, June 24, 1996, Fort Queenscliff, Victoria.

Horner, David. 2011. *Australia and the New World Order: From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement 1988-1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1017/CBO9780511779459.

Horner, David. 2022. *The War Game: Australian War Leadership from Gallipoli to Iraq*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Howard, John. 2006. *Address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Global Forces 2006 Conference on 'Australia's Security Agenda'*. Canberra, September 26, 2006. http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2006/speech2150.cfm.

Howard, John. 2010. *Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography*. Pymble, Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers.

Howard, Michael. 1966. *The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War*, Lees-Knowles Lectures at Triunity College, Cambridge University. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Howard, Michael. 1969. "The Classical Strategists." *The Adelphi Papers* 9 (54): 18-32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05679326908448125.

Howard, Michael. 1976. "Order and Conflict at Sea in the 1980s." *Adelphi Series* 58 (472-474): 227-240. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2018.1721788.

Howard, Michael. 1976. *War in European History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Howard, Michael. 1976. "The Strategic Approach to International Relations." *British Journal of International Studies* 2 91): 67-75. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20096758.

Howard, Michael. 1983. *The Causes of War and Other Essays*. London: Temple Smith.

Howard, Michael. 1986. "Clausewitz." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, 186-213. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Howard, Michael. 1991. *The Lessons of History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Howard, Michael. 1993. "The Use and Abuse of Military History." *The RUSI Journal* 138 (1): 26. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1080/03071849308445676.

Howard, Michael. 2001. *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870-1871*. 2nd ed. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Howard, Michael. 2008. *Interview Transcript*. June 5, 2008. London: The Institute of Historical Research. http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/interviews/Howard_Michael.html.

Howard, Michael. 2015. "The Challenge." In *Strategic Trends Programme Future Character of Conflict*, Ministry of Defence, 3. Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486301/20151210-Archived_DCDC_FCOC.pdf.

Howard, Michael. 2018. "An Interview with Sir Michael Howard." *Adelphi Series* 58 (472-474): 13-30. https://doi.org/10.1080/19445571.2020.1721770.

Howard, Tiffany. 2014. *Failed States and the Origins of Violence: A Comparative Analysis of State Failure as a Root Cause of Terrorism and Political Violence*. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Hudson, W. J. 1988. "The Australian People and Foreign Policy". In *In Pursuit of National Interests: Australian Foreign Policy in the 1990s,* edited by F. A. Mediansky and A. C. Palfreeman, 1-15. Sydney: Pergamon Press.

Hyslop, Stephen G., and Neil Kagan. 2021. "Pearl Harbor and the War in the Pacific." *National Geographic*. New York: Meredith Corporation.

International Institute of Strategic Studies. 2014. *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

International Institute of Strategic Studies. 2014. *Regional Security Assessment 2014: Key Developments and Trends in Asia-Pacific Security*. Singapore: KHL Printing Co Pte Ltd.

"Iraq's Rocket Research." 1990. *Janes Foreign Report*. March 1, 1990. https://customer-janes-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/Janes/Display/frp00283-JIWK-1990.

"Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme." 1990. *Jane's Intelligence Review*. June 1, 1990. https://customer-janes-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/Janes/Display/jir00038-jir-1990.

"Iraq – Ballistic Missiles." 1990. *Janes Intelligence Review*. October 1, 1990. https://customer-janes-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/Janes/Display/jir00136-jir-1990.

"Iraq – Chemical Warfare Potential." 1990. *Janes Intelligence Review*. October 1, 1990. https://customer-janes-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/Janes/Display/jir00137-jir-1990.

Jaccard, James, and Jacob Jacoby. 2020. "Science as an Approach to Understanding." In *Theory Construction and Model-Building Skills: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists*, 2nd ed., edited by James Jaccard and Jacob Jacoby. New York: Guildford Publications.

Jackson, Robert. 1990. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, Robert. 2000. *Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=3053246.

Jahn, Beate. 1999. "IR and the State of Nature: The Cultural Origins of a Ruling Ideology." *Review of International Studies* 25 (3): 411-434. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097608.

James, William. 2018. Review of *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought*, by Lukas Milevski. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41 (7): 1072-1074. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1520792.

Jennings, Peter. 2005. "Time for a New Defence White Paper." *Strategic Insights* February 2005. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Jennings, Peter. 2016. "The Politics and Practicalities of Designing Australia's Force Structure". In *Essays in Honour of Paul Dibb*, edited by Desmond Ball and Sheryn Lee, 113-138. Canberra: ANU Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn5rx.11.

Jennings, Peter. 2019. "As Strategic Storm Clouds Gather, We Can't Remain Neutral in the New Cold War." *The Weekend Australian - Inquirer,* 15, July 13-14, 2019.

Jennings, Peter. 2020. "If We're Sliding Towards War, The Money Must Flow." *The Strategist*. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2, 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/if-were-sliding-twoards-war-the-money-must-flow.

Jennings, Peter. 2020b. "National Security Strategy can help us Build Key Alliances." *The Weekend Australia - Inquirer*, 14, May 2-3, 2020.

Jennings, Peter. 2022. "Defence must Secure Northern Australia Amid Gravest Risk Since WWII." *The Strategist* 4 April 2022. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Jensen, Michael A., and Colin Elman. 2018 "Realisms." In *Security Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Paul Williams and Matt McDonald, 17-32. London: Routledge.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30 (4): 167-214. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958.

Jervis, Robert. 1984. *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Johnson, Robert. 2015. "Predicting Future War." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 196: 70-78.

Johnston, Alastair. 1995-1996. "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence." *International Security* 20 (3): 5-42. https://muse-jhu-edu.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/issue/23815.

Johnston, Alastair. 1996. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 216-270. New York: Columbia University Press.

Johnston, Alastair, and Mingming Shen (eds.). 2015. "Perception and Misperception in American and Chinese Views of the Other." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Brief*. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief-SecurityPerceptionsReport.pdf

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. 2004. *Australia's Maritime Strategy*, June 21, 2004. Canberra: Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/maritime/report#fullreport.

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. 2006. *Australia's Defence Relations with the United States*. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. 2007. "Australia's Military Contribution Toward the Reconstruction of Iraq." In *Visit to Australian Defence Forces Deployed to Support the Rehabilitation of Iraq*, 7-10. Canberra: Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/iraqdelegation/chapter2.

Jones, Archer. 1987. *The Art of War in the Western World*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Jones, Nate. 2016. *Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost Triggered Nuclear War*. New York: The New Press.

Journals of the Senate. 1991. *Parliamentary Business - Journals of the Senate*. Canberra: Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Chamber_documents/Senate_chamber_documents/Journals_of_the_Senate/Pre_2002_Journals/1991.

Kagan, Donald. 2010. *Thucydides: The Reinvention of History*. New York: Penguin Books.

Kainikara, Sanu. 2011. *A Fresh Look at Air Power Doctrine*. Canberra: Air Power Development Centre.

Karber, Phil. 2012. *Fear and Faith in Paradise: Exploring Conflict and Religion in the Middle East*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=951054.

Karlsson, Rebecca. 2016. "Campaign Planning and Evaluation." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 199: 39-48.

Karpat, Kemal H. 2001. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. New York: Oxford University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=279755&ppg=583

Karsh, Efraim. 1990. "Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War." *Middle East Journal* 44 (2): 256-268. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328101.

Karsh, Efraim. 2002. *The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

Karsh, Efraim. 2003. "The Middle East and the Gulf War: A Decade Later." In *The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered*, edited by Andrew Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, 167-179. London: Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=1520982.

Katzenstein, Peter 1996. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 1-32. New York: Columbia University Press.

Katzenstein, Peter 1996. "Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 498-537. New York: Columbia University Press.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003. "Small States and Small States Revisited." *New Political Economy* 8 (1): 9-30. https://doi.org/10.1080/1356346032000078705.

Kavka, Gregory. 1983. "Hobbes's War of All Against All." *Ethics* 93 (2): 291-310. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2380421.

Kayaoglu, Turan. 2010. "Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Review* 12 (2): 193-217. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00928.x.

Kaysen, Carl. 1990. "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay." *International Security* 14 (4): 42–64. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446854/summary.

Kazimi, Nibras. 2008. "The Caliphate Attempted." *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 7 : 5-49, 130. https://www.proquest.com/docview/1437625208/369320C625B24FEDPQ/3?accountid=10382.

Keating, Paul. 2011. *After Words: The Post-Prime Ministerial Speeches*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Kedourie, Elie. 1968. "The End of the Ottoman Empire." *Journal of Contemporary History* 3 (4): 19-28. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200946800300402.

Keegan, John. 2004. *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme*. 2nd ed. London: Pimlico.

Keegan, John. 1994. *A History of Warfare*. London: Pimlico.

Keeley, Laurence. 1996. *War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kennan, George F. 1947. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25 (4): 566-582. https://doi.org/10.2307/20030065.

Keenan, George F. 1951. *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kegley, Charles W., and Gregory A. Raymond. 2003. "Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order." *International Studies Perspective* 4 (4): 385-394. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44218848.

Kelly, Justin, and Mike Brennan. 2010. "Looking for the Hedgehog Idea." *Australian Army Journal* 7 (1): 41-56.

Kelly, Paul. 2009. *The March of Patriots: The Struggle for Modern Australia*. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Kelly, Paul. 2014. *Triumph and Demise: The Broken Promise of a Labor Generation*. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Kelly, Paul. 2021. "ANZUS Treaty: Australia's US Military Alliance Stands Test of Time." *The Weekend Australian – Inquirer*, August 28, 2021. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/anzus-treaty-australias-us-military-alliance-stands-test-of-time/news-story/96e5d9e5515be8ee5af6c07dbd08a182.

Kemp, David, and Marion Stanton (eds.). 2005. *Speaking for Australia: Parliamentary Speeches that Shaped the Nation*. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Kennedy, Hugh. 2016. *Caliphate: The History of an Idea*. New York: Basic Books.

Kennedy, Paul. 1988. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. London: Fontana Press.

Kennedy, Paul (ed.). 1991. *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Kent, Marian. 1996. *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*. 2nd ed. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=235218&ppg=176.

Keogh, E. G. 2007. "The Study of Military History." *Australian Army Journal* 4 (2): 148-164.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert (ed.). 1986. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Keohane, Robert. 2013. "Big Questions in the Study of World Politics" In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*, edited by Robert E. Goodin, 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0036.

Kiely, Ray. 2005. *Empire in the Age of Globalisation: US Hegemony and Neoliberal Disorder*. London: Pluto Press.

Kilcullen, David 2009. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. Melbourne: Scribe.

Kilcullen, David. 2013. *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*. Melbourne: Scribe.

Kilcullen, David. 2016. *Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror.* Carlton, Victoria: Black Ink.

Kilcullen, David. 2020. *The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West*. Melbourne: Scribe.

Kindt, Julia. 2017. "Guide to the Classics: Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War." *The Conversation*, June 13, 2017. http://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-thucydidess-history-of-the-peloponnesian-war-71550.

Kirk, Paul. 2015. "Conceptualising 'Defence of Australia' in the 21st Century." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 197: 80-87.

Kissinger, Henry A. 1957. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Kiszley, John. 2019. "The Political-Military Dynamic in the Conduct of Strategy." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (2): 235-258. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1497488.

Kitney, Geoff. 2003. "The Hawke Government: An Assessment from the Outside." In *The Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective*, edited by Susan Ryan and Troy Bramston, 426-439. North Melbourne, Victoria: Pluto Press Australia.

Knox, MacGregor. 1994. "Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Making of Strategy." In *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*, edited by Williamson Murray, MacGregor Know and Alvin Bernstein, 614-645. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kolodziej, Edward A. 1992. "What is Security and Security Studies? Lessons from the Cold War." *Arms Control* 13 (1): 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1080/01440389208403977.

Kolodziej, Edward A. 1992b. "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (4): https://doi.org/10.2307/2600733.

Kowers, Paul, and Jeffrey Legro. 1996. "Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 451-497. New York: Columbia University Press.

Krasner, Stephen. 1993. "Westphalia and All That." In *Ideas and Foreign Policy*: *Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert E Keohane, 235-264. New York: Cornell University Press.

Krasner, Stephen. 1995-1996. "Compromising Westphalia." *International Security* 20 (3): 115-151. https://muse-jhu-edu.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/issue/23815.

Krasner, Stephen. 2001. *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, Stephen. 2001. *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York: Columbia University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=909282.

Krasner, Stephen. 2009. *Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations*. London: Routledge.

Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. "International Organisation: A State of the Art on an Art of the State." *International Organization* 40 (4): 753-775. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027363.

Krauthammer, Charles. 1990-1991. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1): 23-33. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=bsu&AN=9104080723&site=ehost-live&custid=s8423239.

Krieg, Andreas, and Jean-Marc Rickli. 2018. "Surrogate Warfare: The Art of War in the 21st Century?" *Defence Studies* 18 (2): 113-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2018.1429218.

Kroenig, Matthew. 2013. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes." *International Organization* 67 (1): 141-171. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282155.

Lambert, Alexandre. 2008. "Democracy by Force." In *Handbook of Defence Politics*, edited by Isaiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest, 46-63. London and New York: Routledge.

Langford, Ian D. 2012. "Towards an Expeditionary Army." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 189: 79-86.

Larsdotter, Kersti. 2019. "Military Strategy in the 21stst Century." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (2): 155-170. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559151.

Lasswell, Harold D. 1936. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* New York: Whittlesey House.

Laub, John H., and Robert J. Sampson. 1993. "Turning Points in the Life Course: Why Change Matters to the Study of Crime." *Criminology* 31 (3): 301-325. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/crim31&i=311.

Law, Tim. 2015. "Rebalancing What, Exactly? Analysing the United States' Pacific Pivot." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 198: 23-30.

Layton, Peter. 2013. "Defence and Money: How to Manager Money in an Age of Austerity?" *The Strategist*, July 10, 2013. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-and-money-how-to-manage-in-an-era-of-austerity/.

Layton, Peter. 2015. "The 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review Choices: Grand Strategy, Risk Management or Opportunism?" *Defence Studies* 15 (1): 28-45. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2014.1002286.

Layton, Peter. 2022. "Military Strategy Fundamentals." *Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies* 4 (1): 105-114. https://doi.org/10.51174/AJDSS.0401/JTYZ5777.

Leahy, Peter. 2020. "Lessons and Legacies of the Use of Force." *In Niche Wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001–2014*, edited by John Blaxland, Marcus Fielding and Thea Gellerfy, 295-311. Canberra: ANU Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1d5nm2f.27.

LeBlanc, Steven. 2003. *Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1994. "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism." *International Organization* 48 (2): 249-277. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706932.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2010. *Why Nations Fight*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leffler, Melvyn P. 1990. "National Security." *The Journal of American History* 77 (1): 143-152. https://www-proquest-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/docview/224933982/BF421D57C1584D6CPQ/14?accountid=10382.

Lessaffer, Randall (ed.). 1997. "The Westphalia Peace Treaties and the Development of the Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements Prior to 1648." *Grotiana, 18 (1): 71-95.* https://heinonline-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/grotia15&id=69&men_tab=srchresults.

Levy, Jack S. 1983. "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems." *World Politics* 36 (1): 76-99. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010176.

Levy, Jack S .1983b. *War in the Modern Great Power System 1495–1975*. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.

Levy, Jack S. 1998. "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1): 139-165. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.139.

Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2011. *The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation and Transformation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lewis, Adrian R. 2007. *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom*. New York: Routledge.

Libel, Tamir. 2020. "Rethinking Strategic Culture: A Computational (Social Science) Discursive-institutionalist Approach." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43 (5): 686-709. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1545645.

Liddell Hart, Basil. 1967. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach,* 2nd ed. London: Faber & Faber Ltd.

Lee, James. 2020. "US Grand Strategy and the Origins of the Developmental State." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43 (5): 737-761. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1579713.

Lin, Sharat G. 2007. "US Lying about Halabja: Justifying the Invasion of Iraq." *Economic and Political Weekly* 42 (36): 3625-3632. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40276361.

Lobell, Steven, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffery Taliaferro (eds.). 2009. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lockyer, Adam. 2015. "An Australian Defence Policy for a Multipolar Asia." *Defence Studies* 15 (3): 273-289. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2015.1105461.

Lonsdale, David J. 2007. *Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy*. London: Routledge.

Lonsdale, David J. 2016. "Ordering and Controlling the Dimensions of Strategy." *Defence Studies* 16 (4): 390-407. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1228430.

Lonsdale, David J. 2019. "The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A Return to Nuclear Warfighting?" *Comparative Strategy* 38 (2): 98-117. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1573074.

Lonsdale, David J. 2021. "Colin Gray's Universal Strategic Theory." *Comparative Strategy* 40 (2): 117-121. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1880809.

Looney, Robert. 2003. "Oil Prices and the Iraq War: Market Interpretation of Military Developments." *Strategic Insights* 2 (4). https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/25431.

Loosely, Stephen. 2021. "ANZUS at 70: Christmas Cheer - Nixon, Whitlam and Vietnam." *The Strategist*, August 25, 2021. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/anzus-at-70-christmas-cheer-nixon-whitlam-and-vietnam/

Lu, Li-shih. 2020. "Is China Preparing to Set Up an ADIZ in the South China Sea With Taiwan in Mind?" *The Diplomat,* 13 November 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/is-china-preparing-to-set-up-an-adiz-in-the-south-china-sea-with-taiwan-in-mind/.

Luttwak, Edward. 1996. "A Post-Heroic Military Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (4): 33–44. https://doi.org/10.2307/20047657.

Lyon, Rod. 2012. *Strategic Contours: The Rise of Asia and Australian Strategic Policy*. July 31, 2012. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/strategic-contours-rise-asia-and-australian-strategic-policy.

Lyon, Rod. 2015. "Making Strategic Policy: What's Involved?" *Strategic Insights*, 7 May 2015. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/making-strategic-policy-whats-involved.

Lyon, Rod. 2017. "Wars of Necessity, Wars of Choice." *The Strategist*, April 26, 2017. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/wars-necessity-wars-choice/.

Lyon, Rod. 2019. "Australia: In Search of its own Sun Tzu." In *CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2019 and ARF – The Next 25 Years*, edited by Ron Huisken, 33-36. Canberra: CanPrint Communications.

McCarthy, Dayton. 2003. *The Once and Future Army: A History of the Citizen Military Forces 1947-1974*. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press.

McFate, Sean. 2014. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and what they mean for World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McFate, Sean. 2019. *Goliath: Why the West Doesn't Win Wars. And what we need to do about it*. London: Michael Joseph, Penguin Random House.

McIntosh, Christopher. 2020. "Theorizing the Temporal Exception: The Importance of the Present for the Study of War." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 5 (4): 543–558. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz040.

McKeown, Deirdre, and Roy Jordan. 2010. "Parliamentary Involvement in Declaring War and Deploying Force Overseas." *Background Notes*. Parliament of Australia: Parliamentary Library. March 22, 2010. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0910/ParliamentaryInvolvement.

McKinley, Michael. 1991. "The Battle." In *43 Days: The Gulf War*. Edited by Ian Bickerton and Michael Pearson, 180-193. East Melbourne, Victoria: The Text Publishing Company in association with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

McLean, Iain, and Alistair McMillan. 2003. *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McMaster, H. R. 2008. "On War: Lessons to be Learned." *Survival* 50 (1): 19-30. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330801899439.

McNeilly, F. S. 1968. *The Anatomy of Leviathan*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

MacAskill, William. 2022. "The Beginning of History: Surviving the Era of Catastrophic Risk." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (5): 10-24.

Maass, Matthias. 2009. "Small Enough to Fail: The Structural Irrelevance of the Small State as Cause of its Elimination and Proliferation since Westphalia." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29 (4): 1303-1323. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1242556.

Mahnken, Thomas G. 2016. "The Australian-US Alliance in American Strategic Policy." In *Australia's American Alliance*, edited by Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor, 36-44. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Macfarlane, Ian. 2006. "The Real Reasons why it was the 1990s Recession we had to have." *The Age*, December 2, 2006. https://www.theage.com.au/business/the-real-reasons-why-it-was-the-1990s-recession-we-had-to-have-20061202-ge3pce.html.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1965 [1521]. *The Art of War*. Translated by Ellis Farneworth (1775), Introduction by Neal Wood. New York: De Capo Press.

Machiavelli, Niccolò. 2003 [1513]. *The Prince*. Translated with Notes by George Bull, Introduction by Anthony Grafton. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Mahnken, Thomas G., and A. Bradley Potter. 2021. "Timeless and the Temporary: Strategic Thinking for 21st Century Strategy." *Comparative Strategy* 40 (2): 122-127. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1880810.

Mantovani, Mauro, and Marcel Berni. 2020. "Visualizing Strategy: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis and Teaching of the Conduct of War." *Defence Studies* 20 (4): 373-389. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1807339.

Maiden, Emma. 2014. "Coercion as an Essential Component of Counterinsurgency." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 194: 58-64.

Maley, William. 2020. "Lessons and Legacies of the War in Afghanistan." In *Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2014*, edited by John Blaxland, Marcus Fielding and Thea Gellerfy, 271-283. Canberra, ACT: ANU Press. https://www.jstor.org/stablej.ctv1d5nm2f.25.

Malik, Jag Mohan. 1992. "The Gulf War: Australia's Role and Asian-Pacific Responses." *Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence,* 90. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

Mann, Michael. 1988. *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology*. Oxford: B. Blackwell.

Mann, Michael. 2018. "Have Wars and Violence Declined?" *Theory and Society* 47 (1): 37-60. DOI:10.1007/s11186-018-9305-y.

Martel, Gordon (ed.). 2015. *Twentieth-Century War and Conflict: A Concise Encyclopedia*. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=1712896

Martel, Gordon. 2017. *Origins of the First World War*. 4th ed. London: Routledge.

Martin, Amy. 2020. "It's been 30 Years since the Last Recession. Here's What Life in 1990 Looked Like." *The Canberra Times*, June 3, 2020. https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/6780306/its-been-30-years-since-the-last-recession-heres-what-life-in-1990-looked-like/.

Mather, Yassamine. 2014. "The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and Current Conflict in the Middle East." *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 42 (3): 471-485. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1080/03017605.2014.972151.

Mattelaer, Alexander. 2017. Review of *International Organisations and Military Affairs,* by Hylke Dijkstra. *Defence Studies* 17 (1): 111-113. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1260996.

Matthews, Ken. 1993. *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*. London: Taylor & Francis. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=179301.

Matsumura, Seijiro. 1972. "'Participation Policy' of the Producing Countries in the International Oil Industry." *The Developing Economies* 10 (1): 30-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1972.tb00266.x

Mahbubani, Kishore. 2022. "Australia's Choice: Can it be a Bridge to Asia?" *Australian Foreign Affairs* Issue 15 (July): 70-89.

Mayer, Michael. 2019. "Trigger Happy: The Foundations of US Military Interventions." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (2): 259-281. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559155.

Mazourenko, Elena, and Mark Jobst. 2014. "A Theory-based Framework for Critical Thinking in Defence Planning and Assessment." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 193: 77-90.

Markovic, Nina. 2010. "NATOs New Strategic Concept and Issues for Australia." *Background Notes*. Canberra: Parliament of Australia's Parliamentary Library, December 17, 2010. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/1011/NATO.

Mattis, Jim, and Bing West. 2019. *Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead*. New York: Random House.

Mead, Jonathan. 2019. "Protecting Australia's Sea Routes." *United Service* 70 (1): 5-7.

Mead, Margaret. 1940. "Warfare is only an Invention – not a Biological Necessity." *Asia* 15, 402-405.

Mearsheimer, John. 1990. "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War." *The Atlantic* 266 (2): 35-42. https://www-proquest-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/docview/223113977/22029061B3834066PQ/11?accountid=10382.

Mearsheimer, John. 1990b. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International Security* 15 (1): 5-56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538981.

Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078.

Mearsheimer, John. 2014. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Revised edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mearsheimer, John. 2016. "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 95 (4): 70-83. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4396934.

Megalogenis, George. 2008. *The Longest Decade*. Revised edition. Melbourne: Scribe.

Melamid, Alexander. 1968. "The Shatt al-Arab Boundary Dispute." *Middle East Journal*. 22 (3): 350-357. https://www.jstor.org/stabl/4324304.

Merriam, Charles E. 1907. "Hobbes' Doctrine of the State of Nature." *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association* 3: 151-157. doi:10.2307/3038543.

Michael, David. 2020. *Gulf War: Logistics Support for RAN Ships Operation Damask: 1990-1991*, Occasional Paper 88, August 26, 2020, Naval Historical Society of Australia. https://www.navyhistory.org.au/occasional-paper-88-gulf-war-logistics-support-for-ran-ships-operation-damask-1990-1991/.

Middleton, Karen. 2011. *An Unwinnable War: Australian in Afghanistan*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Milevski, Lukas. 2016. *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Milevski, Lukas. 2019. "Western Strategy's Two Logics: Diverging Interpretations." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1672158.

Millar, T. B. 1969. *Australia's Defence*, 2nd ed. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Millar, T.B. 1971. "Trends in Australian Defence Policy." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2 (1): 49-55. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20069902.

Miller, J.D.B. 1968. "The Conditions for Co-operation." In *India, Japan, Australia: Partners in Asia?* edited by J.D.B. Miller, 195-212. Canberra: Australian National University Press. https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/115129/2/b11184218.pdf.

Miller, David. 2001. *The Cold War: A Military History*. London: Pimlico.

Millmow, Alex. 2015. "Twenty-five years on from the Recession we had to have." *The Sydney Morning Herald*, December 1, 2015. https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/twentyfive-years-on-from-the-recession-we-had-to-have-20151201-glc9kn.html.

Ministry of Defence. 2015. *Strategic Trends Programme Future Character of Conflict*. Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/486301/20151210-Archived_DCDC_FCOC.pdf.

Minogue, Kenneth Robert. 1969. "Thomas Hobbes and the Philosophy of Absolutism." In *Political Ideas*, edited by David Thomson, 53-66. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Mitzen, Jennifer, and Randall L. Schweller. 2011. "Knowing the Unknown Unknowns: Misplace Certainty and the Onset of War." *Security Studies* 20 (1): 2-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.549023.

Mock, William B. 2011. "Treaty of Westphalia." In *Encyclopaedia of Global Justice*, edited by Deen K. Chatterjee, 1095-1096. Salt Lake City, Utah: Springer. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5.

Moeans, Alexander. 2004. *The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush*. Aldergate, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Mofid, Kamran. 1990. *The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War*. London: Routledge. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.4324/9780203992104.

Moloney, Pat. 2011. "Hobbes, Savagery, and International Anarchy." *The American Political Science Review* 105 (1): 189-204. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41480834.

Monten, Jonathan. 2005. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy." *International Security* 29 (4): 112-156. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137499.

Montgomery, Bernard. 1982. *A History of Warfare*. London: Book Club Associates.

Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2020. "Signals of Strength: Capability Demonstrations and Perceptions of Military Power." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43 (2): 309-330. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1626724.

Moore, Clive. 2022. "The Mouse the Roared: Manasseh Sogavare, China, and Australia." University of Queensland-Solomon Islands Partnership Seminar Paper, 25 May 2022, St Lucia, Queensland.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1954. *Politics Among Nations*: *The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 2nd ed. New York, Alfred A Knopf.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1955. "Unites States Policy Towards Africa." In *Africa in the Modern World*, edited by Calvin W. Stillman, 317-328. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Muchembled, Robert. 2012. *A History of Violence: From the End of the Middle Ages to the Present*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Mueller, John. 1989. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York: Basic Books.

Murray, Angus. 2022. "Wiray Birmirr Madhu." *Wartime* Issue 97 (Summer): 32-36.

Murray, Williamson, and Mark Grimsley. 1994. "Introduction: On Strategy." In *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, edited by Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, 1-23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murray, Williamson. 2013. "Thucydides: Theorist of War." *Naval War College Review* 66 (4): 30-46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26397416.

Murray, Williamson, and Kevin Woods. 2013. "Saddam and the Iran-Iraq War: Rule from the Top." In *The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives*, edited by Nigel Ashton, and Bryan Gibson, 33-55. London: Taylor & Francis. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-rigsite=primo&docID=1097796.

Murphy, Caryle. 1990. "Iraq Accuses Kuwait of Plot to Steal Oil, Depress Prices; Charge Seen Part of Gulf Power Move by Saddam Hussein: FINAL Edition." *The Washington Post* July 19, 1990. https://search-proquest-com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/docview/307282541?pq-origsite=primo.

National Museum of Australia. 2020. *Fall of Singapore*. https://www.nma.gov.au/defining-moments/resources/fall-of-singapore.

Navari, Cornelia. 2007. "States and State Systems: Democratic, Westphalian or Both?" *Review of International Studies* 33 (4): 577-595. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021050700767X.

Navy. n.d. *HMAS Darwin – Part 3*. https://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-darwin-part-3.

Nef, John. 1963. "Truth, Belief, and Civilization: Tocqueville and Gobineau." *The Review of Politics* 25 (4): 460-482. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500006410.

Nelson, Brendan. 2008. "Building Future International Stability: A Need for Nations to Emerge from the Shadows of Conflict." *Australian Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Engineering* 6 (2): 137-142. https://doi.org/10.1080/14488388.2008.11464776.

Nelson, Chad E. 2018. "Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran." *Middle East Journal* 72 (2): 246-266. https://doi.org/10.3751/72.2.14.

Nelson, Keith L., and Spencer C. Olin, Jr. 1979. *Why War? Ideology, Theory and History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Newmyer, Jacqueline. 2009. "Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese military Modernization." *Orbis* 53 (2): 205-219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2009.01.010.

Nichols, Robert L. 2005. "Realizing the Social Contract: The Case of Colonialism and Indigenous Peoples." *Contemporary Political Theory* 4 (1): 42-62. DOI:10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300153.

Nicosia, Francis. 1980. "Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933-1939: Ideological and Strategic Incompatibility." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (3): 351-372. https://www.jstor.org/stable/163006.

North, Robert C. 1967. "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis." *Journal of International Affairs* 21 (1): 103-122. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24381356.

Norheim-Martinsen, Per M. 2016. "New Sources of Military Change – Armed Forces as Normal Organizations." *Defence Studies* 16 (3): 312-326. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1195234.

Nye, Joseph F. 2017. "Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea" *Foreign Affairs* 96 (1): 10-16.

O'Brien, Kerry. 2015. *Keating*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Olsen, Margaret. 2012. "Document Analysis." In *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, edited by Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe, 319-320. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397.

O'Neill, Mark. 2006. "Time to Move on in the Defence Policy Debate." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60 (3): 358-363. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710600865630.

O'Neill, Robert. 1982. "An Introduction to Strategic Thinking." In *Strategy and Defence: Australian Essays*, edited by Desmond Ball, 27-41. North Sydney, NSW: George Allen & Unwin.

O'Neill, Robert. 2000. "Australia's Security Needs Dilemma." *Australian Defence Force Journal* 143 (July/August): 47-48.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 2020. *Iraq Facts and Figures*. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/164.htm.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 2020b. *Brief History*. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm.

Organski, Abramo Fino Kenneth, and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/1961475.

Osiander, Andreas. 2001. "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth." *International Organization*, 55 (2): 251-287. Pelvinhttps://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140577.

Owen, Chris. 2016. *'Every Mother's Son is Guilty': Policing the Kimberley Frontier of Western Australia, 1882-1905*. Crawley, Western Australia: UWA Press.

Oxford English Dictionary. 1989. Prepared by J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner. New York: Clarendon Press.

Özlük, Erdem and Murat Çemrek. 2010. "Burying Sovereignty in its Birthplace: Back to the Middle Ages." In *Order and Disorder in the International System*, edited by Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, 171-182. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=605148&ppg=184.

Palazzo, Albert. 2017. "The Future of War Debate in Australia. Why Has There Not Been One? Has the Need for One Now Arrived?" *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 201: 59-72.

Parrott, David. 2004. "Review of *The Peace of Westphalia* by Guido Braun with acknowledgment to the work of Kriemhild, Goronzy and Achim Tröster." *Journal of Early Modern History* 8 (1): 153-159. https://doi.org/10.1163/1570065041268979.

Parasiliti, Andrew T. 2003. "The Causes and Timings of Iraq's Wars: A Power Cycle Assessment." *International Political Science Review* 24 (1); 151-165. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1177/0192512103024001010.

Patterson, Thomas C. 1997. *Inventing Western Civilization*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Payne, Keith B., and Colin S. Gray. 1984. "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition." *Foreign Affairs* 62 (4): 820-842. https://doi.org/10.2307/20041909.

Payne, Kenneth. 2018. "Artificial Intelligence: A Revolution in Strategic Affairs?" *Survival* 6 (5): 7-32. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1518374.

Peden, G. C. 2012. "Suez and Britain's Decline as a World Power." *The Historical Journal* 55 (4): 1073-1096. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23352191.

Pegram, Aaron. 2021. "A Very Long Engagement." *Wartime* Issue 96: 38-42.

Pelvin, Richard. 2003. "Gulf War, 1941." *Wartime* Issue 23: 42-45.

Pemberton, Joanne. 2007. "Gulf War (1991)." In *The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics*, edited by Editors Brian Galligan and Winsome Roberts, 242-243. South Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press.

Phillips, P Michael. 2009. "Deconstructing our Dark Age Future." *Parameters* 39 (2): pp. 94-110. https://www-proquest-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/docview/198034124/41EF3548C1784824PQ/9?accountid=10382.

Philpott, Daniel. 2001. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=713813.

Pinker, Steven. 2011. *The Better Angels of our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity*. London: Penguin Group.

Pinker, Steven. 2018. *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress.* New York: Viking.

Pitchford, John. 1993. "Macroeconomic Policy and Recession in Australia, 1982–1992." *Australian Economic History Review* 33 (2): 96-111. https://doi.org/10.1111/aehr.332006.

Pizzorno, Alessandro. 1971. "The Operation of Power." In *Political Sociology*: *Selected Readings*, edited by Alessandro Pizzorno, 83-84. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Poggi, Gianfranco. 1990. *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Pollack, Kenneth. 2002. *The Threatening Storm*: *The Case for Invading Iraq*. New York: Random House Inc.

Porch, Douglas. 2002. "The Other Gulf War: The British Invasion of Iraq 1941." *Strategic Insights* 1 (10): 1-8. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25458.

Porch, Douglas. 2008. "Churchill's Counterfeit Nation." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* 20 (3): 7, 16-25. https://www.proquest.com/docview/223683268/BD35C14C36724B10PQ/8?accountid=10382.

Popescu, Ionut C. 2018. "Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy in the Conduct of Foreign Policy." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41 (3): 438-460. https://doi.org/10.1080/0142390.2017.1288109.

Porter, Bruce D. 1994. *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*. New York: The Free Press.

Powell, Walter, and Paul DiMaggio (eds.). 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Pressman, Jeremy. 2008. *Alliance Restraint in International Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=3138278.

Prime Minister and Cabinet. 2021. *Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS)*. Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/AUKUS-factsheet.pdf.

Quandt, William B. 1990-1991. "The Middle East in 1990." *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1): 46-69. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=bsu&AN=9104080725&site=ehost-live&custid=s8423239.

Raby, Geoff. 2020. *China's Grand Strategy and Australia's Future in the New Global Order*. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Rapoport, Anatol. 1957. "Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War." *Conflict Resolution* 1 (3): 249-299. https://www.jstor.org/stable/172540.

Rakistis, Claude G. P. 1988. "Australia and the Persian Gulf Conflict: The Public Perception of the War." In *Australia and the Indian Ocean: Strategic Dimensions of Increasing Naval Involvement*, edited by Robert H. Bruce, 122-138. Perth, WA: Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, Curtin University of Technology.

Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92 (2): 377-389. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2585670.pdf.

Renouf, Alan. 1979. *The Frightened Country*. Melbourne: Macmillan.

Resnick, Evan N. 2015. "I Will Follow: Smart Power and the Management of Wartime Alliances." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38 (3): 383-409. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.1002913.

Reus-Smit, Christian. 1999. *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Reynolds, Henry. 1982. *The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia*. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin.

Reynolds, Henry. 2013. *Forgotten War.* Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=1340908&ppg=4.

Richardson, Graham. 1994. *Whatever it Takes*. Sydney: Bantam Books.

Richardson, Lewis F. 1919. *Mathematical Psychology of War.* Oxford: W Hunt.

Richardson, Lewis F. 1960. *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*. Edited by Quincy Wright and C. C. Lienau. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.

Richardson, Lewis F. 1960b. *Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War*. Edited by Nicolas Rashevsky and Ernesto Trucco. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press.

Ricks, Thomas. 2006. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. Camberwell, Victoria: Allen Lane.

Rimmer, Peter J., and R. Gerard Ward. 2016. "The Power of Geography." In *Essays in Honour of Paul Dibb*, edited by Desmond Ball and Sheryn Lee, 45-69. Canberra: ANU Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn5rx.11.

Robertson, John. 2015. *Iraq; A History*. London: Oneworld Publications.

Robinson, Eric W. 2017. "What Thucydides Teaches us about War, Politics and the Human Condition." *War on the Rocks*, August 9, 2017. https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/what-thucydides-teaches-us-about-war-politics-and-the-human-condition/.

Robinson, Stephen. 2021. *The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Art of War*. Dunedin, New Zealand: Exisle Publishing.

Rodrik, Dani, and Stephen M. Walt. 2022. "How to Build a Better Order: Limiting Great Power Rivalry in an Anarchic World." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (5): 142-155.

Rogers, Thomas J. 2022. "Avenging General Gordon." *Wartime* Issue 97 (Summer): 10-15.

Roselle, Laura, and Sharon Spray. 2016. *Research and Writing in International Relations*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Rosen, Stephen Peter. 1981. "Nuclear Arms and Strategic Defense." *The Washington Quarterly* 4 (2): 82-99. https://doi.org/10.1080/01636608109451769.

Rosenau, James N. 1992. "Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics." In *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, edited by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 1-29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511521775.

Ross, Ken. 2016. "ANZUS: 'Our Richest Prize' or 'That Scrap of Paper'?" *New Zealand International Review* 41 (2): 6-9. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48551886.

Rosewell, Tom, Robert Arculus and Callam Pickering. 2008. "Oil Prices and the Australian Economy." *Reserve Bank Bulletin*, September 22, 2008. Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia. https://apo.org.au/node/4088.

Rotberg, Robert (ed.). 2003. "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States; Causes and Indicators." In *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror,* 1-28. Cambridge, Massachusetts: World Peace Foundation. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=3004407.

Royal Australian Air Force. n.d. *Beyond the Planned Air Force: Thoughts on Future Drivers and Disruptors*. Canberra: Air Power Development Centre.

Royal Australian Air Force. 1990. *The Air Power Manual*. RAAF Base Fairbairn, Canberra: Airpower Study Centre.

Royal Australian Air Force. 2002. *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power*. 4th ed. Fairbairn, Canberra: Aerospace Centre.

Rudd, Kevin. 2008. "National Security Speech." Parliament of Australia, House of Representatives, December 4, 2008. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22chamber/hansardr/2008-12-04/0045%22.

Rudd, Kevin. 2021. "Short of War: How to Keep U.S.-Chinese Confrontation from Ending in Calamity." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (2): 58-72.

Rudd, Kevin. 2022. *The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China.* New York: Public Affairs.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations." *International Organization* 47 (1): 139-174. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004732.

Ryan, Susan, and Troy Bramston (eds.). 2003. *The Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective.* North Melbourne, Victoria: Pluto Press Australia.

Ryan, Mick. 2019. "Extending the Intellectual Edge with Artificial Intelligence." *Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies* 1 (1): 23-35.

Said, Edward. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism.* London: Vintage.

Salinger, Pierre. 1995. "The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War." *Middle East Journal* 49 (4): 595-613. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328866.

Sanyal, Joyobroto. 2020. "Australia, the Grey Zone and National Security." *Australian Army Journal* 16 (1): 167-176. https://search.informit.org/doi/epdf/10.3316/informit.333343874435650.

Saul, Samir. 2007. "Masterly Inactivity as Brinkmanship: The Iraqi Petroleum Company's Route to Nationalisation, 1958-1972." *The International History Review* 29 (4): 746-792. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40110926.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 2020 [1966]. *Arms and Influence.* Introduction by Anne-Marie Slaughter. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. doi/10.12987/9780300253481.

Schmidt, Brian C., and Michael C. Williams. 2008. "The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists." *Security Studies* 17 (2): 191-220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410802098990.

Schmidt, Brian C. 2013. "The Enduring Logic of the Three Images: Kenneth N. Waltz's Man, the State and War." In *Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation*, edited by Henrik Bliddal, Caspar Sylvest and Peter Wilson, 80-88. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=1323338.

Schrijver, Nico J. 2000. "The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty." *The British Yearbook of International Law*, 70 (1): 65-98. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1093/bybil/70.1.65.

Scott, Michael. 2022. "Many Strategists but Little Strategy: Addressing a Deficiency in Australia." *Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies* 4 (1): 39-64. https://doi.org/10.51174/AJDSS.0401/MXGR3751.

Scott, Shirley V. 2017. *International Law in World Politics: An Introduction.* 3rd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=6191476.

Schweller, Randall. L. 2008. *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=664576.

Service, Robert. 2016. *The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Pan Macmillan.

Sharp, Jane O. 2006. *Striving for Military Stability in Europe: Negotiation, Implementation and Adaptation of the CFE Treaty*. London: Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=496379.

Sheridan, Greg. 2021. "Our Focus Must be China, China, China." *The Weekend Australian - Inquirer*, 13-14, June 19-20, 2021.

Shifrinson, Joshua. 2020. "The Rise of China, Balance of Power Theory and US National Security: Reasons for Optimism?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43 (2): 175-216. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1558056.

Shoebridge, Michael. 2020. "Defence Strategic Update Promises Real Change but More is Needed." *The Strategist*, July 1, 2020. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-strategic-update-promises-real-change-but-more-is-needed/.

Silberner, Edward. 1946. *The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Silverstone, Scott A. 2007. *Preventive War and American Democracy*. London and New York: Palgrave.

Simpson, Emile. 2012. *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=4704139&ppg=14.

Singer, Clifford E. 2008. *Energy and International War: From Babylon to Baghdad and Beyond*. New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Company. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=1193344.

Singer, Peter W. 2009. *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Penguin Press.

Siracusa, Joseph M., and Laurens J. Visser. 2020. *Going to War with Iraq: A Comparative History of the Bush Presidencies*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Slantchev, Branislav. 2011. *Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sligo, Graeme. 2004. "The British and the Making of Modern Iraq." Review Essay. *Australian Army Journal* 2 (2): 275-286.

Smith, Hugh. 2004. *On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Smith, Rupert. 2005. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern Age*. London: Allen Lane.

Smith, Christopher R. 2011. "Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-first Century." *Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper*, 320. Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre.

Smith, Stephen. 2013. "Minister for Defence - Interview with Peter van Onselen, Australian Agenda." *Department of Defence*, May 5, 2013.

Smith, Mark. 2017. "Shock and Awe? An Examination of the Terrorist Group ISIL and its Future Prospects." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 202: 45-52.

Smith, Warwick. 2016. "Cabinet Papers 1990-91: Lessons from the Recession We Didn't Have to Have." *The Conversation*, January 1, 2016. https://theconversation.com/cabinet-papers-1990-91-lessons-from-the-recession-we-didnt-have-to-have-52153.

Snow, Donald M. 2020. *National Security*. 7th ed. New York: Routledge.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1961. *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1996. "Process Variables in Neorealist Theory." *Security Studies* 5 (3): 167-192. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429279.

Sobek, David. 2009. *The Causes of War*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Sohl, Ben. 2022. "Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare in Russia's Grand Strategy." *The Washington Quarterly* 45 (1): 97-111. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113.

Sondhaus, Lawrence. 2006. *Strategic Culture and Ways of War*. London: Routledge.

Spirtas, Michael. 1996. "A House Divides: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory." *Security Studies* 5 (3): 385-423. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429284.

Stapleton, Nathan. 2014. "The Values of the Past in Contemporary Defence Policy Challenges." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 194: 50-57.

Starke, J. G. 1964. *The ANZAC Treaty Alliance*. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

Stein, Janice Gross. 1992. "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?" *International Security* 17 (20): 147-179. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539171.

Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds.). 1992. *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stevens, David. n.d. "How Old is Australia's Navy?" http://www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-histories/how-old-australia%E2%80%99s-navy.

Stevens, David, and John Perryman. n.d. "The RAN in the Gulf - Two Years On." https://www.navy.gov.au/history/feature-histories/ran-gulf-two-years.

Stirk, Peter M. 2012. "The Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality." *Review of International Studies* 38 (3): 641–660. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000192.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2021. "Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2018) US$ m., 1988-2019." Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20in%20constant%20%282018%29%20USD.pdf.

Stockings, Craig. 2020. "The Official History of Australian Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Australian Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor." In *Niche Wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001*-2014, edited by John Blaxland, Marcus Fielding and Thea Gellerfy, 313-323. Canberra: ANU Press.

Stoessinger, John G. 2001. *Why Nations go to War*. 8th ed. Boston, Mass: Bedford/St. Martin's.

Stone, John. 2021. "Thomas Hobbes as Strategist." *Defence Studies* 21 (1): 67-83. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1842205.

Strachan, Hew. 2006. "The Lost Meaning of Strategy." *Survival* 47 (3): 33-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248102.

Strachan, Hew, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.). 2007. *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strachan, Hew. 2008. "Strategy and the Limitation of War." *Survival* 50 (1): 31-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/0039633080809470.

Strachan, Hew. 2019. "Strategy in Theory; Strategy in Practice." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (2): 171-190. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1559153.

Strachan, Hew. 2020. "Strategy and Democracy." *Survival* 62 (2): 51-82. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1739949.

Strange, Susan. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strange, Susan. 1999. "The Westfailure System." *Review of International Studies* 25 (3): 345-354. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097604.

Strnad, Vladislav, and Nik Hynek. 2020. "ISIS's Hybrid Identity: A Triangulated Analysis of the Dabiq Narrative." *Defence Studies* 20 (1): 82-100. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2020.1720513.

Sun, Tzu. 1993. *The Art of War*, translated by General Tao Hanzhang with an introduction and notes by Norman Stone. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Reference.

Sutton, Paul. 2011. "The Concept of Small States in the International Political Economy." *The Round Table 100* (413): 141-153. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2011.565625.

Tabaar, Mohammad Ayatollahi. 2019. "Factional Politics in the Iran–Iraq War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (3-4): 480-506. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1080/01402390.2017.1347873.

Talmadge, Caitlin. 2019. "Emerging Technology and Intra-war Escalation Risks: Evidence from the Cold War, Implications for Today." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42 (6) 864-887. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811.

Taylor, A. J. P. 1969. *War by Timetable: How the First World War Began*. London: Macdonald.

Taylor, Brendan, and Desmond Ball. 2007. "Historical Overview." In *Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle*, edited by William T. Tow, Mark J. Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, and Satu Limaye. London: Routledge , pp. 11-22. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203939000.

Taylor, Brendan. 2018. *The Four Flash Points: How Asia Goes to War*. Carlton, Victoria: La Trobe University Press.

Telhami, Shibley. 1993. "Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War." *Political Science Quarterly* 108 (3): 437-452. https://doi.org/10.2307/2151698.

Terrill, W. Andrew. 2000. "Iraq's Role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 11 (3): 1-20. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592310008423287?needAccess=true.

Teschke, Benno. 2003. *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations*. London: Verso.

Thayer, Bradley A. 2021. "Colin Gray and Strategic Thought." *Comparative Strategy* 40 (2): 128-132. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1880811.

"The Beginning of the Tanker War." 1992. *Janes Intelligence Review* November 1, 1992. https://customer-janes-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/Janes/Display/jir00537-jir-1992.

"The Tanker War." 1992. *Janes Intelligence Review* May 1, 1992. https://customer-janes-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/Janes/Display/jir00537-jir-1992.

"The Tanker War in the Gulf, 1984-88." *Janes Intelligence Review* May 1, 1992. https://customer-janes-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/Janes/Display/jir00212-jir-1992.

The Times. 2006. *Atlas of the World*, Desktop Edition. London: Harper Collins.

Thomas, Claire. 2011. "Why Don't We Talk About 'Violence' in International Relations?" *Review of International Studies* 37, 1815-1836. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001154.

Thomas, Timothy L. 2014. "China's Concept of Military Strategy." *Parameters* 44 (4): 39-48. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/chinas-concept-military-strategy/docview/1665220174/se-2.

Thomas, M. A. 2019. "Spaghetti: Systems Thinking and the US Army." *Defence Studies* 19 (2): 149-169. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2019.1596741.

Thompson, Marcus. 2016. "The ADF and Cyber Warfare." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 200: 43-48.

Thomson, David. 1966. *Europe Since Napoleon*, revised edition. London: Penguin Books.

Thomson, Mark. 2004. "A Trillion Dollars and Counting: Paying for Defence to 2050." *Strategy*, March 2004. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Thomson, Mark. 2004b. "Your Defence Dollar: 2004-05 Defence Budget." *Strategy*, July 2004. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Thomson, Mark. 2005. "Punching Above our Weight? Australia as a Middle Power." *Strategic Insights*, 18. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Thomson, Mark. 2016. "Defence White Paper 2016: *The Strategist* Decides." *Strategic Insights* April 2016, 15-16. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Thucydides, translated by R.B. Strassler (ed.). 1998. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War.* New York: Touchstone.

Thucydides. 1972. *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner with an introduction and notes by M.I. Finley. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books.

Tianliang, Xiao. 2022. *In Their Own Words: The Science of Military Strategy 2020.* Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute, January 2022. Montgomery, Alabama: National Defense University Press.

Tibbitts, Craig. 2022. "The River and the Redoubts." *Wartime* Issue 97 (Summer): 38-43.

Tiezzi, Shannon. 2015. "*What Did Xi Jinping Have to Say on Cyber Issues in His Big Seattle Speech?" The Diplomat*, September 23, 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/what-did-xi-jinping-have-to-say-on-cyber-issues-in-his-big-seattle-speech/.

Trachtenberg, Marc. 1989. "Strategic Thought in America, 1952-1966." *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (2): 301-334. https://doi.org/10.2307/2151586.

Tripp, Charles. 2007. *A History of Iraq*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tuck, Richard. 1989. *Hobbes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tuck, Richard. 1998. "Introduction." In *On the Citizen*, edited and translated by Richard Tuck, viii-xxxiii. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808173.

UK National Archives. 2020. *Battles – The Mesopotamia Campaign*. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/battles/mesopotamia.htm.

United Nations. 1974. *Resolution 3314* (XXIX). https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/da/da.html.

United Nations. 1987. "The Situation between Iran and Iraq." July 20, 1987, 5-6. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IQ%20IR_870720_Security%20Council%20Resolution%20598%20%281987%29.pdf.

United Relations. 1990. *UNSC Resolution 660 – Iraq-Kuwait (2 August)*. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/660.

United Nations. 1990. *UNSC Resolution 661 – Iraq-Kuwait (6 August)*. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/661.

United Nations. 1990. *UNSC Resolution 665 - Iraq-Kuwait (25 August)*. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/665.

United Nations. 1990. *UNSC Resolution 667 - Iraq-Kuwait (16 September)*. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/667.

United Nations. 1990. *UNSC Resolution 678 - Iraq-Kuwait (29 November).* http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678.

United Nations. 2002. *UNSC Resolution 1441 - The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait.* http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1441.

United Nations. 2014. *UNSC Resolution 2170 - Syria and Iraq (15 August 2014).* https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/508/49/PDF/N1450849.pdf?OpenElement.

United Nations. 2014. *UNSC Resolution 2178 - Syria and Iraq (24 September 2014).* https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/547/98/PDF/N1454798.pdf?OpenElement.

United Nations. 2015. *United Nations Charter, and Statute of the International Court of Justice.* New York: United Nations. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf.

United Nations. 2019. "Security Council Resolution 598: Iraq-Islamic Republic of Iran", *United Nations Peacemaker.* https://peacemaker.un.org/iraqiran-resolution598.

United Nations. 2020. *Member States.* https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html.

United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 1945. *The Constitution of UNESCO.* http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2019. *Nuclear Weapons.* https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/.

United States Government. 1990. *The Persian Gulf Crisis,* Joint hearings before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on International Operations. https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/101st%20Congress/The%20Persian%20Gulf%20Crisis%20(1543).pdf.

van Creveld, Martin. 1996. "The Fate of the State." *Parameters* 26 (1): 4-18. https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.1764.

van Creveld, Martin. 1999. *The Rise and Decline of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Vasquez, John A. 1993. *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vayrynen, Raimo (ed.). 2006. *The Waning of Major War*. London and New York: Routledge.

Vedrine, Hubert. 1999. "To Paris, U.S. Looks like a 'Hyperpower'." *International Herald Tribune*, February 5, 1999. https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/news/to-paris-us-looks-like-a-hyperpower.html.

Vennesson, Pascal. 2017. "Is Strategic Studies Narrow? Critical Security and the Misunderstood Scope of Strategy." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (3): 358-391. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1288108.

Vennesson, Pascal. 2020. "Is Strategic Studies Rationalist, Materialist, and A-Critical? Reconnecting Security and Strategy." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 5 (3): 494–510. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz032.

Verleger, Philip K. 1990. "Understanding the 1990 Oil Crisis." *The Energy Journal* 11 (4): 15-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41322669.

Viggers, Will. 2020. "Politics, Strategy and Tactics: Rethinking the Levels of War." *Australian Army Journal* 16 (1): 47-60. https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/20200715_AAJ_2020_Vol%20XVI%20No%201_DIGITAL%20alias.pdf.

von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1953. *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*. 3rd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wæver, Ole. 2015. "The History and Social Structure of Security Studies as a Practico-Academic Field." In *Security Expertise, Practice, Power, Responsibility*, edited by Trine Villumsen Berling and Christian Bueger, 76-106. London: Routledge.

Waldman, Thomas. 2019. "Buy Now, Pay Later: American Military Intervention and the Strategic Cost Paradox." *Defence Studies* 19 (1): 85-105. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2019.1565404.

Walker, William. 2011. *A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order*. London: Routledge.

Walser-Bürgler, Isabella. 2021. "*Reflections of 'Europe' and Continental Thinking? The Language of Inclusion in the Instrumenta Pacis Westphalicae (1648).*" *The Seventeenth Century* 36 (1): 3-31. https://doi.org/10.1080/0268117X.2019.1704852.

Walt, Stephen. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?pq-origsite=primo&docID=3138515.

Walt, Stephen. 1991. "The Renaissance of Security Studies." *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (2): 211-239. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471.

Walt, Stephen. 2012. "Top 10 Lessons of the Iraq War." *Foreign Policy*, 20 March 2012. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/20/top-10-lessons-of-the-iraq-war-2/.

Walt, Stephen. 2019. "The End of Hubris: And the New Age of American Restraint. *Foreign Affairs* 98 (3): 26-35.

Walter, James. 2006. "Why Prime Ministers Go Too Far: The Case of John Howard." In *Australian Security After 9/11: New and Old Agendas*, edited by Derek McDougall and Peter Shearman, 189-206. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate.

Walton, C. Dale. 2016. "The Second Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century." In *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 5th ed., edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray, 195-211. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walsh, Toby. 2018. *2062: The World AI Made*. Melbourne: La Trobe University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Relations*. New York: Random House.

Warbrick, Colin. 1991. "The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 40 (2): 482-492. https://www.jstor.org/stable/759738.

Watson, Bruce (ed.). 1991. *Military Lessons of the Gulf War*. Frome, Somerset: Butler & Tanner Limited.

Watson, Don. 2002. *Recollections of a Bleeding Heart: A Portrait of Paul Keating PM*. Sydney: Knopf.

Weatherall, Dennis. 2019. "Naval Gun Support HMAS ANZAC 2002-2003." *Camaraderie* 50 (2): 29-30.

Weber, Eugen. 1989. "The Nineteenth-century Fallout." In *The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and its Legacy, 1789-1989*, edited by Geoffrey Best, 155-181. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

West, Bing. 2008. *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq*. New York: Random House.

Westwood, Chris. 2017. "Securing Space: Australia's Urgent Security Policy Challenge for the 21st[t] Century." *Australian Defence Force Journal Issue* 201: 35-45.

White, Hugh. 2006. "Old, new or Both? Australia's Security Agendas at the Start of the New Century." In *Australian Security After 9/11: New and Old Agendas*, edited by Derek McDougall and Peter Shearman, 13-27. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate.

White, Hugh. 2015. "Understanding Australia's Role Leading Up to the Intervention." In *East Timor Intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET*, edited by John Blaxland, 26-38. Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing.

White, Hugh. 2019. *How to Defend Australia*. Carlton, Victoria: La Trobe University Press.

White, Hugh. 2019b. "A Very Unreassuring Bombshell: Richard Nixon and the Guam Doctrine, July 1969." *The Strategist*, July 25, 2019. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-very-unreassuring-bombshell-richard-nixon-and-the-guam-doctrine-july-1969/.

White, Hugh. 2022. "Sleepwalk to War: Australia's Unthinking Alliance with America." *Quarterly Essay*. Issue 86.

White, Kenton. 2021. "Strategy: Theory for Practice and the Use of History." *Comparative Strategy* 40 (2): 133-137. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1880812.

White, Michael. 2005. *Machiavelli: A Man Misunderstood*. London: Abacus.

Wichhart, Stefanie K. 2013. "Selling Democracy During the Second British Occupation of Iraq, 1941-5." *Journal of Contemporary History* 48 (3): 509-536. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23488420.

Widen, J.J. 2007. "Sir Julian Corbett and the Theoretical Study of War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30 (1): 109-127. https://doi-org.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/10.1080/01402390701272533.

Wiers, Jochem. 2017. "Building a Bridge or Nurturing the Gap?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40 (1-2): 283-286. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1269985.

Wilcox, Craig. 2003. "A Different Type of Digger." *Wartime* Issue 23: 54-55.

Wilkinson, David. 1980. *Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of War*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Williams, Howard. 1993. "Political Theory and International Relations." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 28, 347-349.

Williams, Michael C. 1989. "Rousseau, Realism and Realpolitik." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 18 (2): 185-203.

Williams, Michael. 1993. "Neo-Realism and the future of strategy." *Review of International Studies* 19 (2): 103-121. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500118984.

Willrow, Nathan. 2016. "Operation DAMASK: RAN Operations Against Iraq During the Gulf War." *Naval Historical Society of Australia,* June 2016. https://www.navyhistory.org.au/operation-damask-ran-operations-against-iraq-during-the-gulf-war/.

Wilmshurst, Elizabeth. 2008. *Definition of Aggression*. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs. https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/da/da_e.pdf.

Wivel, Anders. 2013. "The Politics of International Theory: Reading Waltz 1979 as a Classic." In *Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation*, edited by Henrik Bliddal, Caspar Sylvest and Peter Wilson, 157-166. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/reader.action?docID=1323338.

Wohlforth, William C. 2017. "Realism and Security Studies." In *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, 2nd ed., edited by Myriam Dun Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq, 25-37. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=4579031.

Wohlstetter, Albert. 1959. "The Delicate Balance of Terror." *Foreign Affairs* 37 (2): 211-234. https://doi.org/10.2307/20029345.

Wood, B.A. 2002. "The Applicability of Navigational Rights Under UNCLOS During Times of Armed Conflict." *Australian Defence Force Journal* No. 156: 19-29.

Woolf, Amy F. 2020. "Russia's Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization." January 2, 2020. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1092439.

World Bank. 2021. "Military Expenditure (Current USD) - Iraq." New York: World Bank Group. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=IQhttps://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2019&locations=IQ&start=1960&view=chart.

Worley, Vidisha Barua. 2010. "Violence and Warfare." In *21st Century Anthropology: A Reference Handbook*, edited by H. James Birx, 839-847. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications. ttps://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412979283.n84.

Wright, Kane. 2021. "'Where to from Here?' The Australian Defence Force's Pursuit of National Security and the 2020 Defence Strategic Update' *Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies* 3 (2): 235-246.

Wright, Quincy. 1949. "Method in the Study of War." *World Politics* 1 (2): 243-256. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2008846.

Wright, Quincy. 1965. *A Study of War, with a Commentary on War Since 1942.* 2nd ed. Edited by Louis Leonard Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wu, Zhengyu. 2018. "Classical Geopolitics, Realism and the Balance of Power Theory." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 41 (6): 786-823. https://doi.org/10.1080/0142390.2017.1379398.

Wyatt, Christopher. 2011. *Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire: Diplomacy and Strategy During the Great Game*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Wylie, J. C. 2014. *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control.* Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.

Yergin, Daniel. 2008. *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*. New York: Free Press.

Young, Leon. 2016. "Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of Strategic Thinking." *Australian Defence Force Journal* Issue 199: 55-64.

Yurdusev, A. Nuri. 2006. "Thomas Hobbes and International Relations: From Realism to Rationalism." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 60 (2): 305-321. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710600696191.

Zacher, Mark W. 2001. "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force." *International Organization* 55 (2): 215-250. https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140568.fZacher.

Zaidi, Waqar H. 2018. "Stages of War, Stages of Man: Quincy Wright and the Liberal Internationalist Study of War". *The International History Review* 40 (2): 416-435. https://doi.org/10/1080/07075332.2017.1323774.

Zilincik, Samuel. 2021. "Why the 'Fear, Honour and Interest' Trinity Harms Our Understanding of War." *The RUSI Journal* 166 (2): 10-17. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2021.1939771.

Legislation and Treaties:

Defence Act 1903 (Cth)
http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/da190356/.

Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America
[ANZUS] (San Francisco, 1 September 1951). Entry into force generally: 29 April
1952. Australian Treaty Series, 1952 No. 2. Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service.
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inqui
ries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb.

Theses:

Bowditch, Randall G. 2013. "Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts." Doctor of
Philosophy Dissertation, University of Nebraska, June 2013.
https://www.proquest.com/docview/1423160674/52E01F4F5C2045D9PQ/1?account
id=10382.