



SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE

Implementing the Humanitarian-development-peace nexus in a post-pandemic world: Multilateral cooperation and the challenge of inter-organisational dialogue

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Abstract

Engaging with the UN Secretary General's call for a more effective, networked and inclusive approach to multilateralism (Our Common Agenda, 2021), this paper discusses the main challenges to the implementation of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus concept. Institutionalised by the UN in 2016, such cross-policy effort at global governance has been neglected by the IR and IPE literatures. To start filling this gap, the paper identifies strengths and weaknesses of multilateral inter-agency cooperation on the Nexus approach. Based on previous research on inter-organisational performance and regime complexity, it investigates select evidence from three organisations (UN, EU, World Bank), in pre- and post-COVID-19 contexts. Identifying tangible elements of experimentalist governance in the HDP global endeavour, the paper concludes with a synthetic overview of the comparative advantages that each organisation offers to implement the Nexus.

1 | INCLUSIVE MULTILATERALISM AND THE PROMISE OF THE TRIPLE NEXUS

By 2030, more than half of the global extreme poor will live in fragility, conflict and violence-affected contexts (FCV) (WBG, 2020), with conflict accounting for 80% of global humanitarian needs. Forcibly displaced persons doubled between 1990 and 2021, when 89.3 million individuals were stranded due to persecution, conflict and violations of human rights (UNHCR, 2022). More than a year into the Covid-19 pandemic but before the food crisis prompted by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, through the 'Our Common Agenda' (OCA) Report of September 2021, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Guterres urged joint responses to these global challenges, calling for 'a stronger, more networked, and inclusive multilateralism...anchored in the UN' (UNSG, 2021, 4). Against this background, the paper reviews select instances of progress and

challenges encountered in the implementation of the Triple (Humanitarian-Development-Peace, HDP) Nexus, a novel policy concept that gained institutional relevance in 2016 (UNSG, 2016).

Anchored in the UN Agenda for Humanity (2016) and Sustaining Peace Agenda (2018), and compared to previous multilateral humanitarian, development or peace ventures, the HDP nexus is the first institutional triple-policy framework to pursue inter-agency and broader multi-stakeholder cooperation. On substance counts, the Nexus promotes a people-centred (as opposed to country-based), conflict-sensitive approach (as opposed to 'one size fits all'). Premised on advancing rights-based pro-poor local agency, and different from earlier approaches to either development or peacebuilding, it is informed by an explicit requirement to support subaltern claims and marginalised actors, to redress gender biases and major disparities (UNSG, 2022).

While not openly recalled in OCA, the Nexus approach has inspired numerous efforts undertaken

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since the 2010s. Based on prima-facie evidence from targeted interviews (2019–2022), and corroborated by an extensive review of official documents and grey literature,¹ this paper claims that the Nexus' absence in the Secretary General 2021 Agenda stems from the particular nature of the endeavour, that conforms to several global experimentalist governance (GXG) traits, and that is still largely a work in progress. According to De Búrca et al. (2014) GXG is characterised by 5 features: a shared perception of a common problem (1); the creation of a framework for a common understanding on how to respond to such problem to achieve open-ended goals (2), which are implemented by lower levels that have better knowledge of—and adaptability to local contexts (3); the production of continuous feedbacks from local contexts on outcomes that are peer-reviewed horizontally (4), and a periodic re-evaluation and revision of goals and practices (5). Albeit first orchestrated by the UN, the Nexus is a collective approach, whose success rests on effective cooperation among a plurality of actors at several governance levels.² In addition to the UN, the paper focuses particularly on the European Union (EU), whose Member States (MS) and institutions remain the major collective donor, and on the World Bank Group (WBG), the focal institution in the regime complex for development financing.³

Recent trends indicate a growing relevance of the Nexus approach: since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, additional 20 million people have become extreme poor in FCV countries, and these latter's GDPs are expected to fall by 7.5% points below pre-pandemic estimates by 2023 (WBG, 2022). As discussed below, however, Nexus deliveries involving humanitarian, development and peace components have been particularly challenging. In spite of major efforts in 25 pilot countries (OECD, 2022) by the UN, EU and WB, either separately or in cooperation, problems remain with respect to joint financing and implementation effectiveness on the ground (CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness, 2021; Desrosiers, 2021; IASC, 2021). Research on the EU-World Bank cooperation in development and good governance support has shown the gains and the limitations of double delegation between large multilaterals with imperfectly overlapping memberships, revealing patterns of both cooperation and competition inside the group of Bretton Woods and Bretton Woods-inspired institutions (Baroncelli, 2021). While new divisions of labour have emerged, pointing to the benefits of relative 'specialization' within the regime complex for development financing, redundancy has at times enhanced the effectiveness of their actions (Baroncelli, 2019). As discussed in the three country cases analysed below, these dynamics have occurred at a wider scale in Triple Nexus endeavours, which, while orchestrated by the UN, witnessed an autonomous and often separate role by the EU, and a particularly cooperative

contribution to micro-processes on the ground by the World Bank.

A first goal of this policy insight paper is to call attention to the Nexus endeavour, its origins, and its innovative implications for the future of multilateral responses to HDP challenges. Second, the article maintains that the UN, the EU and the World Bank Group's cooperation will be key to advance a progressive and emancipatory understanding of the HDP concept, but that such cooperation much depends on their ability to deal with the complex cross-policy and inter-agency composition effects that are activated through its implementation. Third, this contribution argues that meaningful inclusion of the peace component in the Nexus, and genuine empowerment of local actors ('Nexus localization') in conflict areas, are inextricably linked to substantive tri-lateral support by those organisations, which while mediated by their managements and staffs, ultimately rests on the consensus of both their Western and non-Western member states.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, the origins of the Nexus are identified through a brief overview of the main evolutions in multilateral humanitarian, development and peacebuilding policies. Necessarily selective, the reconstruction is functional to explain the institutionalisation of the Triple Nexus in 2016. Section 3 explores the Nexus' double layer of complexity, cross-policy and inter-agency. Selected UN, EU and WBG Nexus activities in Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cameroon are briefly reviewed, to examine strengths and limitations of this novel approach.⁴ The focus is on the comparative advantages that each organisation brings to the HDP effort, and on the obstacles encountered so far. Section 4 concludes, arguing about the experimentalist nature of this endeavour and summarising the main benefits and challenges of the Triple Nexus approach to the global governance of cross-policy dimensions of complex humanitarian, development and peace endeavours.

2 | LAUNCHING THE NEXUS

The first endorsement of the humanitarian-development leg of the Nexus originates in the 1980s pleas to overcome the divide between emergency relief and long-term development aid, during the African food crisis (Singer, 1985, 13). After the Cold War, the waning of bipolar tutelage on proxy wars in the peripheries had generated a rise in the number and duration of internal conflicts, vis-à-vis traditional inter-state wars (Fearon, 2004). Calls to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) followed in the 1990s, while democratic peacebuilding entered its 'golden age' in the context of the 1992 UN Agenda for peace (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). In spite of its declared support to

democratic participation, after 9/11 the liberal emphasis on economic development as a key towards political freedom was coupled with securitarian counter-terrorist agendas, paving the way for a neo-liberal, stabilisation approach to peacebuilding in the 2000s.

Difficulties in each of the three policy areas emerged quite clearly, as did reciprocal frictions between policy communities and different organisations. Since the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, unmet humanitarian needs had shrunk development budgets to the advantage of relief activities. In turn, the post 9/11 'war on terror' had prompted a full-fledged securitisation of aid flows, raising the cost of 'delegation failure' for major donors that, like the EU, lacked the infrastructure to manage large development efforts on their own, and thus resorted to UN or WBG-managed trust funds (TFs), but claimed an autonomous role and distinct visibility in delegated development, to steer political dialogue with partner countries (Baroncelli, 2019). In turn, failed peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina, post-2011 Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan exposed the formidable obstacles encountered by external attempts to engineer political transitions through stabilisation, economic liberalisation and exclusive reliance on domestic authoritarian elites (Richmond, 2021).

Only in December 2016 did the UN Secretary General Guterres call for a joint policy approach to mitigate humanitarian, development and security needs (UNSG, 2016). New developments and past experiences concur to explain the timing and nature of the Nexus launch. In 2015, the surge in Syrian refugees fleeing to Europe provided substantial traction for the humanitarian-development nexus to enter the UN Agenda for Humanity, endorsed at the World Humanitarian Summit of May 2016. In that context, the UNSG and eight UN agencies elaborated a plan to synergise short-term humanitarian priorities with long-term development outcomes (the New Way of Working, NWoW, OCHA, 2017, later endorsed by the WBG and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)).

The formal institutionalisation of a peace component in the new UN-sponsored concept was in turn rooted in decades-long efforts to work across the humanitarian-development and peace-security links (Howe, 2019). In addition to—but also as a consequence of—the evolving nature of conflicts, growing displacement and migration crucially concurred to the launch of the Nexus (DuBois 2020). Adding to long-standing conflicts (Afghanistan, Somalia), new wars (Syria, Yemen, Ukraine) and relapses (South Sudan) brought the number of forcibly displaced individuals to unprecedented peaks (65.3 million in 2015, UNHCR, 2022). The UN-WBG Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations was signed in 2017, and a UN-financed instrument, the Humanitarian Development Peace and Partnership Facility (HDPP), created to further support UN-WBG cooperation. In 2019 the OECD DAC

(Development Assistance Committee) also issued a Recommendation, mainstreaming a common 'Nexus approach' into the broader context of Agenda 2030 (OECD, 2019).

In parallel, the EU issued its own elaboration of the humanitarian-development Nexus, which included a 'conflict and peacebuilding' component (Council of the EU, 2017, 2018). In line with the 2017 EU Consensus on Development, the Union privileged internal coherence (Commission DGs, Commission and MS) over external coordination (UN, regional and multilateral development banks). Different from the immediate launch of a UN-WBG framework to implement the NWoW, the EU chose from the start a more independent path (Veron & Hauck, 2021, 2).

While the politicisation of migration surges and the evolving nature of conflicts motivate the timing of the Nexus launch, its content has been largely influenced by a reconsideration of past efforts. Compared to previous UN approaches to either humanitarian, development or peacebuilding activities, the Nexus is the first institutional three-sectoral, multi-stakeholder and multi-level policy endeavour. More substantially, the HDP concept seeks to overcome several among the obstacles that have marred the achievement of progressive transformations attempted by multilateral single-policy programmes. While coordination is attributed to UN Resident or Humanitarian Coordinators (RC, HC), country ownership and full inclusion of local implementing agencies explicitly anchor the 'triple cross pillar nexus' in partner countries, targeting its achievements towards transformative goals, that are responsive to civil society most progressive expectations, and ensure empowerment of women, youth and marginalised communities (SG 2022).

Efforts to advance the Nexus policy concept so far have shown its distinct relevance, while also exposing some challenging composition effects, at both the inter-agency and cross-policy levels. Relative to the former, HDP activities entail coordination among multiple organisations, and different units within the same organisation, at several governance levels. Issues of leadership and accountability, particularly over financing, have emerged during implementation. Relative to the latter, alleged politicisation of humanitarian goals has radically challenged the inclusion of the peace dimension, while 'humanitarianization' of development support has at times disrupted progress on the ground. While development and peacebuilding are essentially long-term transformational activities, targeted at the country and community levels, humanitarian efforts require instead swift action to preserve individual integrity. People-centred relief programmes must also remain neutral, which markedly contrasts with the need that development and peacebuilding activities have to ensure country ownership. Necessarily selective, the following examination of UN, EU and WBG Nexus

activities discusses the progress achieved, and the obstacles encountered by the three multilaterals, advocating a stronger, coordinated effort on their side, to privilege their respective comparative advantages, in service of more effective Nexus deliveries.

3 | BETWEEN CROSS-POLICY CHALLENGES AND INTER-ORGANISATIONAL COOPERATION

In 2008, a Joint EU-UN-WB Declaration on Post-Crisis Recovery Planning and Assessment supported the creation of post-conflict joint Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment Tools (RBPAs). Crucial to gather all actors around the same table, RBPAs have improved joint, nexus-informed context analyses. However, in 2017 'programming [was] still mostly individual agency-driven' and financing problematic, absent a common humanitarian-development fund to support joint NWoW programmes (IASC, 2017, 3). Subsequent evaluations have focused on the WBG-UN, the EU-UN or single-institution achievements (IASC, 2021; OECD, 2022), with only minor references to the UN-EU-WBG triad's potentially strategic role to advance the Nexus approach.

This is surprising, if one considers the sustained leadership in aid provision by the EU and its MS (43% of total Official Development Aid-ODA in 2021),⁵ and the assets that Team Europe could channel towards Nexus activities (Veron & Hauck, 2021, V). In addition to its established development and humanitarian roles, Brussels also possesses a comparative advantage in peacebuilding, via its Delegations' networks in priority countries, vis-à-vis the WBG, that has incumbency in multilateral aid financing but no political mandate (Baroncelli, 2019). Within the EU Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework, the EU is also working on HDP Action Plans, an indication of Brussels' intention to strengthen its Nexus efforts with EU-dedicated institutional frameworks at the country level.

In Myanmar, the second largest recipient of EU ODA in Asia, the Union has played a catalytic role since the competitive elections of 2015, convening a multi-donor Joint Peace Fund (JPF), managed by UNOPS but owned by the newly elected democratic government. Allocated \$100 mn over the period 2016–2021, the JPF was to help Myanmar's Government and the Ethnic Armed Forces to achieve inclusive peace. After the government's persecutions of the Rohingya since 2017, and the rise to power of a military junta in February 2021, however, the legitimacy of the UN's position in the country has severely declined (Interview, Forsea.co; Mathieson, 2022). Nonetheless, most UN agencies have remained engaged, and so has the EU, partnering with UNOPS in 2020, to launch a Nexus Response Mechanism (NRM). Albeit small in its initial effort

(\$15mn), and in light of the UN difficulties, the NRM potential to enhance the EU's role in compacting a multilateral effort to advance dialogue with Myanmar's domestic actors has perhaps been underestimated. The Union in fact also cooperates with UNHCR and IOM, in humanitarian-development programmes for Rohingya refugees and host communities in the Cox Bazaar Camp in Bangladesh, where the WBG also launched a \$100mn emergency crisis response project in 2020. While Bangladesh has accepted Rohingya refugees from Myanmar for decades, recent multiple cyclone-induced disasters and the Covid-19 emergency have tilted its position further towards repatriation. Coordinating efforts with the UN and WBG Nexus activities, the EU's role could be key to include a genuinely transformational peacebuilding element. However, this would require a strategic re-targeting of Nexus efforts by the three organisations in both countries, to advance political dialogue with all domestic Myanmar forces (Interview, EU).

The absence of a common Nexus governance framework stands out as a singularity also with reference to WBG concessional lending in FCV environments (enhanced between the 17th and 19th IDA replenishments) and to WBG dedicated Trust funds (such as the Afghanistan and Iraq TF, or the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, Baroncelli, 2019). The WBG further integrated a development-security component in its activities, creating the State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) in 2009, the largest global facility to finance activities in FCV contexts, and issuing a globally impactful report on Conflict, Security and Development in 2011. In addition to its partnership with the UN, in March 2020 the WBG also launched a dedicated strategy to enhance the effectiveness of its activities in FCV areas.

Developing innovative shock response social safety nets programmes, the WBG has further played a strategic role to address complex conflict-health-humanitarian emergencies. Supported by the WBG SPF and implemented by the DRC government between April and December 2019, a cash-for-work social safety net project greatly alleviated emergency health needs, re-establishing trust in local communities through the provision of 12,000 temporary jobs in hotspots built to face the Ebola outbreak in 2018–19. Financing infrastructural road works, the WBG restored access to local communities by aid and humanitarian workers, who had previously been the target of violent attacks, amidst widespread aversion to external players (Bisca & Grumelard, 2020). UN MONUSCO peacekeepers, deployed in DRC since long, were involved in a joint data gathering effort on conflict trends, that helped to adapt strategies to unforeseen occurrences. Other UN agencies also cooperated across the three legs of the Nexus, and an additional \$50 million cash-for-work contingency fund

was secured from IDA19, for peacebuilding and stabilisation through the DRC Eastern Recovery Project. Beyond project financing, the WBG has successfully tested an innovative template to bridge humanitarian-health interventions with longer term development solutions, while simultaneously ensuring conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding achievements (Interview, WBG). As in other countries, however, the inclusion of the peace dimension remains particularly challenging in DRC Nexus efforts, both with respect to the protection of emergency health workers and to the perception of armed personnel by local communities (Interview, DWB).

Third, and perhaps most striking, is the absence of a more assertive role by the UN, the early agenda setter of the HDP concept, and the orchestrator of multiple Nexus initiatives. Recent partnerships such as the UN-DAC Dialogue and the Nexus Academy, launched in 2022, confirm the UN's persistent effort to overcome the 'siloes mentality' that separates humanitarians, development specialists and peacebuilders and to approximate languages and practices towards a more coherent and progressive Nexus implementation (Interview, UN).

At the country level, one among many notable examples of the UN's potential to foster HDP progress has been the creation of a Nexus multi-actor Task Force in Cameroon, in 2019. While accounting for just 2% of total ODA accruing to that country in 2018 (Devint 2020), the UN is the main orchestrator of nexus activities in Cameroon, where most bilaterals do not have resident missions. Co-chaired by the UN RC and HC, the Task Force has coordinated efforts by more than a hundred HDP players, effectively targeting ODA to three previously neglected areas of crisis⁶: the North and Far North regions, in the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram has exerted a destabilising impact; the East and Adamawa regions, where CAR refugees have increased since the escalation of conflict in 2014; and the Southwest and Northwest regions, where the conflict between the English speaking minority and the government has erupted in 2016. Through the UN-led Task Force, all three organisations have strengthened the dialogue with the government, to advance a national Recovery and Peace Consolidation Strategy (RPC), pursuing joint needs assessment, consultation and strategic coordination, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on a joint RPBA, the RPC produced a framework to address the needs of IDPs and host communities in the three crisis regions and, in 2021, a Roadmap to operationalise the Nexus in Cameroon, involving national and regional authorities, alongside UN, WBG and other Nexus stakeholders. Coordination among UN agencies and between the UN and the WB has been fine-tuned, and a Cameroon-dedicated TF approved (Government of Cameroon et al., 2022).

However, at the end of 2022 a common action plan in the targeted areas is still missing, and overall Nexus

coordination mechanisms are yet to be established. Integration of the Nexus Approach into Cameroon's national development strategy is also pending. To obtain progress, the three multilaterals should join in a credible effort to advocate the anchoring of Cameroon's support of refugees, IDPs and the English-speaking minority in the country's development strategy. As in Myanmar and DRC, the meaningful involvement of Cameroon's authorities in Nexus activities necessarily depends on the UN-EU-WB triad's resolve to better target their joint effort.

Membership universality and cross-policy mandates put the UN in a unique position vis-à-vis the EU (that has unparalleled resources and potential in the three nexus areas but only regional membership) and the WBG (that has universal membership and unrivalled capabilities in development support, but no formal political clout and no direct humanitarian expertise). In practice, however, the veto system and the predominance of the 5 permanent members in the UN Security Council have weakened the UN's effective resort to its peace-support tools, leaving the organisation mainly as a humanitarian multi-purpose agency, with a residual capacity to support development efforts. In spite of its early agenda setter role thus, the UN's ability to provide coherent global leadership to the Triple nexus remains much a work in progress.

4 | CONCLUSION: THE UN, THE EU, THE WBG AND THE FUTURE OF THE HDP EXPERIMENTALIST APPROACH

Different from regimes, organised as hierarchies around focal organisations, the HDP venture is an instance of post-hierarchical regime complexity, that in some respects approximates the five characteristics of the GXG ideal type. First, as discussed in this paper, since 2016 a shared perception emerged that HDP challenges constituted a common problem. Second, immediate steps were taken to develop a common framework to address HDP cross-policy effects in fragile countries and to define open-ended goals, by the UN, WBG and IOM (through the NWoW in 2017), and by the EU's Council Conclusions of 2017. Collaborative endeavours followed between the UN and the WBG, and a DAC Joint Recommendation was issued in 2019, setting Nexus principled and operational guidelines. The Triple Nexus endeavour also conforms to the third characteristic of GXG, that is the essential role of national and local governance levels to implement such open-ended goals. As discussed in the previous sections, governments' buy-in, and involvement of implementing agencies, are crucial to ensure effectiveness to any Nexus activity. Additionally, and different from other forms of adaptive management that do not

empower local actors explicitly, these latter liaise with multilateral partners through a continuous stream of feedbacks—informing monitoring and assessment exercises, the fourth characteristic of GXG. Fifth, Nexus' means and goals are evaluated and redefined through continuous assessments, as demonstrated by the multitude of progress reports sponsored by the UN, the OECD DAC, IASC, the EU, the WBG, several bilaterals and countless NGOs.

GXG is not devoid of a centre, but actually finds a new one as the policy process unfolds. In the HDP endeavour three main poles have emerged at the multilateral level: an early multi-mandate orchestrator (the UN), an eager runner-up and generous donor (the EU), and a focal institution in development financing (the WB).

Iterative learning and participatory policymaking have produced promising results in joint assessment and programming. Among others, the UN and WBG's prominent roles have emerged in Cameroon and DRC, respectively. Potential exists also for a more strategic EU's role to incorporate the peace dimension via its Nexus activities in Myanmar. HDP joint performance has clearly benefited from inter-agency support. As discussed above, this has occurred in the humanitarian-development track in Myanmar, where the EU has compensated for the UN's diminishing credibility, and in the health-humanitarian-development track in DRC, where the World Bank has coordinated multi-agency activities through its shock response social safety net programme. Compared to previous single or double-policy endeavours, flexibility in the division of labour, but also redundancy, when parallel programmes are run by different organisations, have unveiled the benefits of synergic triple-policy efforts.

Multilateral agreement on a global strategy for joint financing seems, however, premature. In that respect, HDP actors still operate along hierarchical, regime- and organisation-specific governance rules, at considerable distance from the ideal type of global experimentalism. Substantively, the inclusion of the peace leg and an effective 'localization' of Nexus efforts have appeared particularly challenging. Providing the Nexus endeavour with the necessary traction to pursue political mediation and engage domestic actors in progressive dialogue on these two components ultimately depends on the political will of key stakeholders, both old and new. Disagreements within the Western camp and turf battles between different organisations are coupled with regressive choices by domestic authoritarian elites, that often marginalise the voices of those most in need. While the UN, the EU and the WBG have each lead multilateral efforts across the HDP endeavour, this paper has argued that their success in ensuring domestic ownership, and effective inclusion of subaltern claims, will depend ultimately on their ability to join up their respective efforts, flexibly relying on each other's comparative advantages to advance the Nexus transformative approach towards a just and sustainable peace.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Six interviews were conducted with officers from UNHCR (2), the WBG and Forsea.co (2019), the EU and Doctors Without Borders (DWB) (2022). The review has also benefited from inputs provided by Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), NATO, OSCE, Agency for Peacebuilding and Danish Refugee Council officers, as well as by practitioners and academics that participated to two international Conferences on the future of global governance, held in Bologna (2019) and Leuven (2021). See the supplementary information in the Data statement.
- ² Orchestration entails the creation, support and integration of a multi-actor system of indirect governance, to pursue common goals that neither the orchestrator nor the orchestrated players would be able to achieve separately (Abbott et al., 2015, p.4).
- ³ IPE research on inter-organisational performance and regime complexity has shed light on the interactions between large multilaterals in development policymaking (Baroncelli, 2019, 2021; Heldt & Schmidtke, 2019), and also appears to provide vantage points to analyse their cooperation within the Nexus framework. Due to scope and space constraints, this policy paper offers preliminary insights in that respect, leaving a dedicated analysis to future research endeavours.
- ⁴ Section 3 examines the benefits of the HDP approach, but does not discuss the (supposed) optimality of the Triple Nexus, which, as argued throughout the paper, is very much a work-in-progress.
- ⁵ Between 2009 and 2020, EU Institutions financial support to the Nexus oscillated between 7% and 10% of total ODA devoted to HDP activities of OECD and non-OECD commitments to fragile countries (OECD, 2022).

⁶ In 2018, these regions received a mere 9% of total Cameroon ODA inflows, with 36% of EU funds and 40% of WBG funds directed to humanitarian initiatives (Development Initiatives, 2020).

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

Data S1. Supporting Information

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