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# 1 Introduction

## Reform and Improvement in Early Modern Europe

*Adriana Luna-Fabritius, Ere Nokkala,  
Marten Seppel and Keith Tribe*

### Setting the Agenda

Over the course of two or three centuries the states and societies of early modern Europe experienced change on multiple dimensions: political, social, economic, literary, demographic, technological and last but not least, religious. Entire historiographies dedicated to understanding this process have come and gone, seeking to knit headlong change on many fronts into a coherent historical narrative of progress, but also of decay and decline. Here, rather than presenting yet another narrative of change, we are concerned with the manner in which contemporaries understood the political changes occurring around them: with what kind of language did they write about changes to government and society, and what are the implications of the way in which they conceptualised their world? We focus primarily on two leading ideas: of “improvement” and of “reform”. While “revolution” is a related concept, its use prior to the final decade of the eighteenth century was disconnected from the practical efforts to change economy or society that are our principal focus here. Nor was it a regular part of Enlightenment vocabulary in any modern sense.<sup>1</sup>

Paul Slack defines improvement as “gradual, piecemeal, but cumulative betterment”,<sup>2</sup> an idea that he considers particularly English. Here we join those who emphasise the significance of the concept, but suggest that it is in no way exclusively English. The actual presence of the idea of “improvement” in early modern Europe has attracted relatively slight attention until quite recently, reference to the idea surviving only perhaps in relation to agricultural improvements.<sup>3</sup> Our aim here is to redirect attention towards the conceptual tools used to formulate and execute projects major and minor, taking our cue from conceptual history, which is premised on the idea that conceptual changes were themselves important signs of, and factors in, political innovation and early modern developments.<sup>4</sup> “Improvement” and “reform” are linked ideas, but we need to be careful that we understand their contemporary use and connection.

Current historical literature speaks quite generally, if casually, of military, fiscal, administrative, judicial, agrarian and other state “reforms” in early

modern Europe.<sup>5</sup> However, given that our contemporary sense of “reform” as progressive, forward-looking change to polity and public administration developed only in the course of the nineteenth century, it is anachronistic to apply this sense to actions and arguments advanced during the early modern period, or indeed redescribe diverse initiatives as “reforms”. By so doing we render past actions intelligible in our own terms, but attribute to historical actors conceptions and motivations that they would not necessarily have shared. As Reinhart Koselleck has emphasised, we need to understand the conceptual frameworks used by historical actors, for these frameworks themselves became an active factor in shaping the assumptions and expectations of actors in contemporary events and situations, guiding the decisions they made and the resulting course of events.<sup>6</sup>

In present-day usage, “reform” implies rational, deliberate, considered structural change, primarily to public institutions and procedures but also encompassing the personal sphere. A “reformed character” is someone who has put bad habits behind them, so implying movement into a future that departs from previous practice. Here, we can see that the modern sense of “reform” has a temporal directionality and objective that sets it apart from the more open sense of “improvement”, moving away from a past state by moving forward into a new one. This modern sense of “reform” is distinct from earlier usage that implied the restoration of a prior condition – moving forward perhaps, but by going backwards.<sup>7</sup> Thus while we might primarily think today of reform in terms of electoral reform, land reform, school reform or tax reform – as rectifying some existing negative condition – “improvement” has a more general application, as piecemeal, incremental and progressive change, to homes, persons and manners, for example. Nonetheless, it can be linked to “reform” through its emphasis on the same kind of positive outcome to which “reform” is more systematically oriented.

Historically, both ideas are more complex than they at first appear, and our understanding of the politics and language of early modern Europe requires that we recognise this complexity. Placing both ideas in the perspective of political thought provides an axis by means of which the interconnection of reform and improvement can be articulated. Or one can perhaps put it the other way around: “reform” and “improvement”, and the language associated with them, have a role in forming political and economic thoughts. This volume studies the tension between “reforms” and “improvements” that profoundly challenged prevailing fiscal, social, political and economic circumstances, together with those changes that only aimed at enhancements to prevailing conditions. The tension between these different kinds of reorganisation and “improvement” had a crucial impact on early modern economic and political thought.

From the mid-seventeenth century onwards “improvement” emerged as a leading concept used by those promoting the advancement of the capabilities of individuals as well as of the resources of whole societies and states.<sup>8</sup> While improvement and reform have not generally been considered

standard constitutional concepts, nor necessarily concepts of classical state theory, they become part of a political language if we take into account the contemporary process of politicisation,<sup>9</sup> where events and situations might be altered by our actions. Koselleck emphasised the substantive location of linguistic usage – its *Standortsbezogenheit*<sup>10</sup> – and that with the diversification of the social world the social location of those addressed, and of language users, was subject to systematic change. He called this process “politicisation”, involving not only the generation of new terms for new conditions, but also action oriented by these ideas: addressing and mobilising new social and political groups. This results in a complex learning process, in knowledge transfer and the creation of new objectives.<sup>11</sup>

Several chapters in this collection emphasise that the cameral sciences of Central Europe and the political economy of Western Europe were discourses oriented to change that mediated this process, expressed in terms of improvement. However, rather than treat them as the forerunners of modern economic thought, we emphasise that these were oeconomic discourses, hence focussed on the organisation and reorganisation of states, and fostering a regime of improvement conceptualised in terms of a contemporary vocabulary. But the economic language of today has little connection with that language: it developed on our side of the divide that Koselleck dubbed the *Sattelzeit*, the period of conceptual transition that took place from the mid-eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. The political economy of the nineteenth century displaced and replaced the political oeconomic of the eighteenth century; there is no inherent continuity between the two.<sup>12</sup>

The meaning of “improvement” has however remained relatively stable since the seventeenth century, and our emphasis upon the term is intended to draw attention to the frequency and significance of its historical use, and the varied uses to which the term was put. “Reform” by contrast is less straightforward, not least because contemporary usage often ran counter to modern understanding: closer to the more negative sense of restoration, of changes intended to restore a real or imagined former condition. Moreover, modern historians have also been unusually profligate in the application of the language of “reform” to actors and projects that might not in fact have made use of the term at all, but talked in rather different ways about “change”.

The work of Franco Venturi in particular has linked the Enlightenment to “reform”, such that all change is conceived as constitutive of the “age of reform”. He also depicted the process of Enlightenment as a movement that oscillates between reform and utopia, between an enlightened elite seeking to further civil society and those who came to represent a counter-Enlightenment, the opponents of “reform”. Subsequent writers have opted for hybrids such as “enlightened reform”,<sup>13</sup> or “reform absolutism”,<sup>14</sup> reviving the older organising concept of Absolutist rule to characterise the European seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and upgrading it into a property of the Enlightenment. In the case of the Habsburg lands, this idea was used to highlight the centralisation of administration in the hands of lawyers

drawn from the minor nobility who sought to constrain the power of the established nobility.

A recent collection of essays has explicitly taken Venturi's approach as a template for the European Enlightenment, focussed on the language of reform. The contributors examine the semantics, strategies, rhetoric and reflections of reform in the eighteenth century; they acknowledge the presence of the concept of improvement in the eighteenth century, but treat it only as a contemporary synonym for reform.<sup>15</sup> This in turn is interpreted very broadly and applied to a variety of changes not necessarily at the time conceived as "reforms", but simply as reorganisations, thus lending these diverse activities a particular unifying ideology. By contrast, our collection of essays re-examines ideas of change and movements for change in early modern Europe without presuming that "progressive" change was the outcome of "reforms".

Conversely, while "improvement" was part of a contemporary vocabulary, its real presence has been obscured by the natural languages in which it was expressed. However, although "reform" was a root term encountered across European states in different languages, contributors to this volume seek to establish what was meant by such usage. As already suggested, in the eighteenth century "reform" could mean either a movement back to earlier conditions, or a movement forward to new conditions. This collection of essays critically assesses both common and divergent features in a political process too often treated as a uniform movement towards modernity. The contributions address ideas articulated in Russia, Sweden, Prussia, France, Portugal, Habsburg Lombardy, Habsburg and Bourbon Naples and Bourbon Spain that, before 1800, proposed change of some kind, all of which are usually dubbed "reforms" in the historical literature, whether contemporaries actually used the "language of reform" or not.

### **The Language of Change**

Undoubtedly the winds of change<sup>16</sup> blew right across early modern Europe. The expansion and consolidation of states and steady cultural diversification were linked to reorganisation and innovation.<sup>17</sup> The current tradition of history writing tends to describe all such larger changes as the outcome of "reforms". It is some time ago that Derek Beales directed attention to the fact that modern historians use the word "reform" rather differently than earlier sources.<sup>18</sup> During the last three decades of the eighteenth century "reform" did become a central political concept in England, but as often as not arguments for parliamentary reform presupposed a return to supposedly ancient liberties, not the creation of new ones. What today might look like "progressive" ideas were often founded recursively, not oriented to the future but to an imagined or rhetorically modified past. The creation of new liberties was more the feature of France in the final decade of the century, but this process was everywhere called a revolution, eventually a counter-concept to reform. And as Anna Plassart has shown, subsequent

emphasis upon dispute between Edmund Burke and Tom Paine on the significance of the French Revolution has obscured the broad and cross-cutting influence of Scottish historical writers, such as John Millar, William Robertson and James Mackintosh.<sup>19</sup> Tim Blanning and Peter Wende suggested some time ago that the historiography of “revolution” has overshadowed its shifting relationship to “reform”,<sup>20</sup> and this seems to remain true.<sup>21</sup>

The term “improvement” can be found widely in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sources, together with equivalents such as *amélioration*, *miglioramenti*, *mejorias* and *Verbesserung*. The evolution and diffusion of this concept was much more uncomplicated than the emergence and adoption of the concept of reform in the modern sense. “Improvement” became a fashionable term in early modernity, unlike “reform”, which only became widely used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Whenever the terms reform/reformation were used in eighteenth-century German literature it usually denoted improvement. Correspondingly, talk of an “age of reform” in connection either with the Enlightenment or with Britain before the second third of the nineteenth century is either premature, or directly misleading. Derek Beales maintained that for England before the middle of the nineteenth century the “age of improvement”, as Asa Briggs entitled his book,<sup>22</sup> would be much more closer to contemporary thinking and language than the label “age of reform”, as claimed by Llewellyn Woodward in 1938.<sup>23</sup> The same seems to be true in regard to the period of “enlightened absolutism”. For instance, Friedrich II of Prussia used both “reform” and “improvement” in his Political Testaments of 1752 and 1768, writing in French. He clearly expressed his desire to improve and enrich the country and the condition of its people, both noblemen and peasants.<sup>24</sup> But almost to the same extent as he used the noun and the verb *amélioration/laméliorer*, he wrote of his reforming plans – to reform (*réformer*) laws, the existing order, tariffs, troops, manners, courts of justice and schools.<sup>25</sup> When he demanded “reform”, he clearly meant a correction, a necessary change; although in one case in his Testament of 1752, he explicitly defined reform as a return to original, prior institutional order (*il faut par conséquent y apporter de temps en temps la réforme où elle est nécessaire, et ramener toutes les choses au but de leur institution*).<sup>26</sup>

However, if one considers Prussian or Habsburg legislation of the eighteenth century no such thing as an act of “reform” can be found. While prior to the eighteenth century the noun or verb “reform” occasionally appeared in laws, instructions and orders, often expressing a need for change,<sup>27</sup> this does not correspond to the meaning widespread in modern history writing. German legislative language during the eighteenth century was much more likely to use the term *Verbesserung* (“improvement”) than “reform”, in the sense of betterment, reorganisation or innovation.<sup>28</sup> For instance, Joachim Georg Darjes uses the noun and verb “Reformation” and “reformiren” as synonymous with “Verbesserung” when he argues for improving the sciences and teaching methods in his essay on reforming in 1748.<sup>29</sup> For Darjes, reforming meant first of all a change, as he put it: “everyone understands that reforming

is nothing other than changing something into what is already to be found in it" (*ein jeder gestehen wird, reformiren nichts anders, als eine Sache in dem, was bereits bey ihr zu finden, verändern*).<sup>30</sup> The aim of a reasoned or wise reform for him was to remove faults, to extinguish imperfection and to foster the perfection of a thing.<sup>31</sup> Darjes did not speak of state or governmental reforms; reform was a matter for everyone who had an interest and was active in the field concerned. Even those who were not successful with the "reforms" of science deserved praise as improvers.<sup>32</sup> He concluded: "I will never believe that I wasted time that I used for my or your betterment."<sup>33</sup>

This redirection of attention to the language of change implies that we question the treatment of the European Enlightenment as an "age of reform" (*Zeitalter der Reform*).<sup>34</sup> There is of course no doubt that Enlightenment ideas were driven by the pursuit of change and improvement, or as John Robertson put it, "betterment in this world", an invitation to "live the Enlightenment", that suggests a new way of thinking about nature and culture, and between the historical context and possible responses to those challenges, as Vincenzo Ferrone has also suggested.<sup>35</sup> According to Jonathan Israel, it does not matter whether Enlighteners between 1680 and 1800 were radical or moderate; they all "sought general amelioration".<sup>36</sup> Enlightenment was therefore not only "radical", "conservative" or "secular", they were also "improving". However, Rudolf Vierhaus has emphasised that although the Enlightenment provided new motives for the reform policy of German governments and heightened awareness of the need for change, the origins of the drive for change were not directly related to the Enlightenment, but can be located much earlier.<sup>37</sup> In Sweden, for example, a discourse of improvement that emphasised the importance of economically useful natural knowledge had already become influential in the seventeenth century.<sup>38</sup> The following chapters show that improvement became a goal for intellectuals, and partly also for practitioners, much earlier than the onset of the movement for Enlightenment. For example, at the end of the sixteenth century Botero instructed the prince to improve agriculture and to pay attention to productivity: "Therefore the prince ought to favour and promote agriculture and show that he takes account of those who understand how to improve and make fertile their lands and whose farms are extremely well cultivated."<sup>39</sup> He even suggested soil improvement: "...to drain swamps, to uproot and prepare for cultivation useless or excessively wooded areas, and to aid and support those who undertake similar works."<sup>40</sup> By the eighteenth century, movement for agrarian improvement was common across (Western) Europe, reaching even the peripheral regions of Northern Europe, from Scotland to Sweden.<sup>41</sup>

Similarly, the eighteenth-century cameral sciences were oriented to change: whether as complete reorganisation or as incremental improvement. Eighteenth-century German cameralists and writers on oeconomic matters were all advocates of improvement, and Marcus Sandl has described cameralists as scholars devoted to the principle of change.<sup>42</sup> As Ere Nokkala argues in his chapter below, with improvement as a desired aim, we can

view the role of projectors in a new and more positive light. Unlike reforms, improvements do not presuppose a powerful state administration that can design and execute change; they require only specialised knowledge and an initial impetus. Improvements might be state actions, but are by no means necessarily so; they take the form of a continuous process beginning from a present condition or circumstance, not from any particular conception of a desired future state. Correspondingly, reform can in this way be distinguished from the new, future-oriented sense of “revolution” in terms of the practical, non-utopian way in which the perspective of a reform’s future is engaged. While “reform” reviews the present in the light of a possible future, “improvement” is present-centred, considering what exists and finding ways in which whatever function is performed can be incrementally changed for the better. A reform could be executed quickly, while improvement might take time.<sup>43</sup> Improvement could be an event, but it was an event in an ongoing, gradual course of betterment – something that is improved can be further improved.

A reform on the other hand marks an abrupt change, a reorganisation that turns one condition into another, desired form. At the end of the eighteenth century, many in Europe regarded precipitate change, not to mention a revolution, as definitely harmful and destructive, but accepted the need for gradual improvements carried out by government.<sup>44</sup> Of course, both reforms and improvements can be planned, proposed and discussed; and above all they needed expertise, book learning or practical knowledge. Improvements required new knowledge and learning, owned, borrowed or copied, but reforms were the fruits of the work of devoted statesmen or officials.

### **The Enlightenment and Political Economy**

In his review of the historiography of Enlightenment, John Robertson expressly limited his perspective to the period from 1740 to 1790, initiated by a “new focus on betterment in this world”, moving on from arguments about Christian faith to the nature of progress in human society.<sup>45</sup> The conditions for material betterment in this world were, he argued, assembled in increasingly systematic writing on economic affairs, a political economy

whose goals were the wealth of nations (in the plural) and the improvement of the condition of all society’s members. Understood in these terms, political economy was the key to what the Enlightenment explicitly thought of as the ‘progress of society’.<sup>46</sup>

As noted above, the prevailing eighteenth-century idea that the end of good domestic government was the happiness of a population, the material welfare of a ruler’s subjects, was reflected in the emergence of systematic reasoning on the means by which order and welfare might be created and maintained. The number of texts oriented to this end steadily increased through the century, most notably in France where the collocation *économie*



*politique* came into use for some of this literature in mid-century, picked up by James Steuart and Adam Smith and anglicised as “political oeconomy”. Book IV of Smith’s *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* was entitled “Of Systems of Political Oeconomy”, a review and critique of two systems: of the mercantile system (“the modern system”) and the agricultural system (what by 1776 had become known as Physiocracy). Smith himself advocated no specific “political oeconomy”,<sup>47</sup> rather a “system of natural liberty”. As the title of his book indicates, his argument was that “natural liberty” would further the “wealth of nations”, his own version of the existing discourse oriented to order and welfare.

It is however doubtful whether political economy can, from the early nineteenth century onwards, be unambiguously identified with this idea of betterment, of improvement. Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* then became the canonical basis for something very different: the elaboration of a nineteenth-century “political economy” today understood as a limited set of principles governing the relationship between classes of economic agent and the laws by which their activity was transformed into different sources of income – of wages, rents, profits and interest. As emphasised by David Ricardo in the “Preface” to his *Principles of Political Economy* (1817), “To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is the principal problem in Political Economy.”<sup>48</sup> Even at the time this was a very particular conception, enjoying limited support; and a much looser, popular, sense also prevailed that was more continuous with the eighteenth-century focus upon wealth and happiness.<sup>49</sup> In the United States in particular, a protectionist variant gained predominance by the mid-nineteenth century, arguing that national wealth could best be promoted through the regulation of external trade. This “American Political Economy” has been studiously ignored by historians of economics ever since because of its apparent lack of connection with the more acceptably “modern” political economy of free trade.<sup>50</sup>

In the later nineteenth century political economy began a transition from public to academic knowledge, creating in the twentieth century the modern discipline of economics. As a corollary, a narrative of the genesis of modern economics was created in the course of the twentieth century that sought in past writing the origins of modern ideas, converting past arguments into modern arguments and, where this was not feasible, simply ignoring the very extensive historical literature about wealth and economic policy that did not fit the approved retrospective history. A dual historical occultation took place: first, in the early nineteenth century, prevailing arguments about wealth and happiness were mostly displaced by a new discourse organised around theoretical principles; second, those who had fostered this new theoretical discourse were subsequently canonised by twentieth-century economists. Hence, *Wealth of Nations* was for most of the twentieth century read in much the same way that David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say and Robert Malthus had read it: as a rather jumbled exposition of economic categories that required refinement to fit into the new political economy, but a totem

with whose aid they could gain recognition for their ideas. This troubled historiography helps account for the way in which historians today have such great difficulty making sense of the political and economic language of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That some French writers adopted the name “*économistes*” simply adds to the confusion.

Robertson’s direct association of Enlightenment discourse with political economy therefore requires qualification. If we understand by this that the roots of a modern discourse of political economy can be found in the mid-eighteenth century we will be seriously misled. If, on the other hand, we understand this association of Enlightenment and political economy as relating to a practical concern, as measures and policies for betterment and improvement, then we might be better able to reconstruct what “political oeconomy” meant in the later eighteenth century. As Luigi Alonzi has documented,

...around the mid-eighteenth century the meaning of the noun *oeconomy* referred to rational order, functional structure, efficient administration, the regular arrangement of things. There was still no room for an interpretation of this concept in nineteenth-century terms; there was not yet any connection between the idea of *oeconomy* as order and discourses upon State and commerce, with their associated reflections on value, money and prices.<sup>51</sup>

By the 1760s the term “*économie politique*” had entered circulation in France, linked to the internal administration of the state<sup>52</sup>; there was a hesitant dual use in both France and in Italy of *économie publique* and *économie politique*, of *economia civile and scienza economica*, as synonyms.<sup>53</sup> Terms such as “oeconomic order”, “oeconomic rule” or “oeconomic administration” were in mid-century simply tautologous.<sup>54</sup> “Animal oeconomy”, about which François Quesnay wrote in 1747, referred to the “structure and the motion of the parts”.<sup>55</sup>

## **Police and Policy**

Seen in this perspective, even the limited corpus of writings that twentieth-century historiography had identified as the approved source of modern economic science does not appear so distant from the German *Kameralwissenschaften* that have never been successfully recruited to this emergent narrative of the history of economics, at best registered through exclusion, as *Merkantilismus*. The specific connection in these apparently distinct national literatures is the role that *Polizei* plays in German language discourse,<sup>56</sup> *police* in French writing<sup>57</sup> and police/policy in English.<sup>58</sup> *Polizei/police/policy* provided a switchboard through which plans for reform and improvement might be elaborated, as did also the related newly emerging discourse of *économie politique/political oeconomy*. We can see how this

works by considering the textbook that Joseph von Sonnenfels began to draft following his appointment to the new Viennese chair for *Polizei- und Kameralwissenschaften* in 1763.

At this time, the project of a systematic codification of civil law in the Austrian monarchy was already in progress, and the compilation of penal laws had also been initiated. Sonnenfels was initially unaware that work on a political code was just about to start too. As Knemeyer makes clear, by the 1760s this long-established framework was shifting:

If the extent of the concept “*Polizei*” at the beginning of the eighteenth century is considered (and at the same time disregarding nuances and the diverse construals of the term) the slogan “establishment and maintenance of order” can be used, albeit crudely, to characterise the meaning of the term up to that date. “Good order” here referred both to protection from danger and to concern with matters of welfare. Since these two concerns lie at the heart of domestic administration, a conceptual equivalence emerged between “*Polizei*” and “domestic administration”. This all-embracing conception which had been valid for over three hundred years underwent, however, at the beginning and then principally during the century a shift and restriction in meaning which presages the foundations of the present-day concept.<sup>59</sup>

As Ivo Cerman indicates, reconciling local administrative regulations linked to security and welfare across the entire Austrian Monarchy was an endless, looping process, and Sonnenfels’ new textbook was supposed to provide the conceptual framework that could possibly reconcile these diverse ordinances. His text was in three parts – on *Polizei*, on commerce and on state finances – the first part published in 1765 covering only *Polizei*. It was this first volume that would provide the handbook for his work on the Codex, while the material in the other two volumes, on commerce and state finances, provided the rationale for it.

In 1765 Sonnenfels begins his exposition by defining the relationship between the state and its members – as was usual at the time, the state was defined as “a society of citizens who have joined together to achieve a particular higher good through their united powers.”<sup>60</sup> As such, the citizens formed a single moral personality pursuing a defined end, the common good of society: the pursuit of “public welfare” in a condition of civic peace. Public welfare combined the security and comfort of life, the “secure enjoyment of a comfortable life.”

§13. The *comfort* (*Bequemlichkeit*) of life consists in the *ease with which each can be secured by their own hard work*. The more diverse the means of subsistence, the easier that hard work can be rewarded. The general comfort of life is therefore acquired through the *multiplication of the means of subsistence* (*Vervielfältigung der Nahrungswege*).<sup>61</sup>

It was possible to compile the principles according to which such welfare could be achieved, divided into those concerned with external security (*Politik*), and those with domestic security (*Polizeiwissenschaft*) (§17). Commercial science (*Handlungswissenschaft*) taught the manner in which means of subsistence might be multiplied through the advantageous development of that which the earth and hard work produced – and a footnote here clarified that “householding” was one part of commercial science.<sup>62</sup> Financial science, the subject of the third volume, would show how state revenues could be raised most advantageously, and here again there was a clarificatory footnote:

Polizey, commerce and finance are also included in the word science of the state, or they are called the *oeconomic sciences*. The latter two are also especially called the *cameral sciences*, after the chambers of the rulers in which the relevant matters are usually administered.<sup>63</sup>

Moving on to elaborate these basic definitions, Sonnenfels emphasised that the growth of population rendered the state more secure against external threats, and the larger a population was, the greater the prospect of domestic prosperity, for

The more people, the more needs, and thus the more diverse the *domestic* means of subsistence. The more hands, the more numerous the products of *agriculture* and *hard work*, the material of external exchange, hence the basis of commercial science.<sup>64</sup>

And so equally the more people there were, the greater was the contribution to public costs, reducing the share borne by each individual while not reducing public revenues – hence, Sonnenfels argued, the basic principle of financial science.

Having established the framework that would govern the three parts of his text, Sonnenfels then turned directly to *Polizei*, “a science to found and manage the domestic security of the state.”<sup>65</sup> Emphasis is placed on security and order, but the focus on population leads eventually into the specification of measures to prevent suicides, duels and abortion. Illegitimate pregnancies were not to be punished, but those about to give birth were to be conveyed to places where they could deliver their child incognito and then “return to the bosom of virtue”, having left their child in an orphanage.<sup>66</sup> Sonnenfels ploughs on relentlessly, listing measures necessary to secure good order, a healthy population and the “multiplication of means of subsistence”. There are always areas of social activity that threaten to escape the specifications of *Polizei*.

While as Knemeyer suggests there is in the course of the eighteenth century a shift from the direct promotion of good order and happiness to the identification of possible obstacles to its realisation and the specification of appropriate remedial action, this too proves to be an unending task that is

continuous with the established idea that good order is a deliberate administrative creation, not the outcome of any Smithian “natural liberty”. Hence the burgeoning literature of oeconomic order seeks to specify the policy that has to be followed, what kind of changes might be needed to establish or re-establish good order. Hence also the centrality of improvement, since this was incremental and present-centred.

Stated in this way, there is a clear connection with contemporary French oeconomic literature too often reduced to the work of Quesnay and “The Physiocrats”. Loïc Charles and Christine Théré have forcefully argued that it was only in the later 1760s that there was any consistent characterisation of “Physiocracy”, and its linkage to the figure of François Quesnay.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, it could be argued that the apparent unity of a “Physiocratic movement” was a construction of its critics, and that, for example, the ambiguous placement of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot with respect to this movement – as either a reformer, or a theorist, but not both – is evidence of this.<sup>68</sup> In any case, as Keith Tribe suggests below in his review of French usage, neither “reform” nor “improvement” were consistently associated with the writings of either the circle around Vincent de Gournay, or with those who broadly associated themselves with what became known as the Physiocratic movement. Turgot is an important figure here since he was both a practical public administrator and the author of a significant treatise on wealth, whereas a “Physiocrat” was more or less by definition a “writer”. Underlying Physiocratic arguments was a rationalist vision of the kind of *politique* that would be needed to bring about change in *oeconomie*, something that might well fit with Enlightenment thinking, but which lacked the essentially practical element of “reform” or “improvement”.

### **Genovesi and Civil Oeconomy**

Sonnenfels is significant because the textbook he wrote was for his Vienna lectures; and Vienna was the centre of a dispersed Austrian Monarchy (the “Habsburg Empire”) linking Central Europe, Northern Italy and the Low Countries, through which his writings subsequently diffused in many editions and condensations. In the same year that Sonnenfels published the first volume of his *Sätze* Antonio Genovesi published the first of two volumes of his own Naples lectures on commerce. This work also had ramifications beyond its immediate location: for Naples was linked to the Spanish monarchy, and Spain was at this time much more than Iberia: it was still a global empire, dominating what would become today’s California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas, Central America and much of Southern America, and the Philippines. Genovesi’s text echoed through the Spanish and Portuguese Empires rather like Sonnenfels did through the Habsburg lands.

And this brings us back to Venturi, whose dissertation on Diderot and work on Jean Jaurès had treated them as models’ reformers oscillating between reform and utopia;<sup>69</sup> and who went on to identify Genovesi’s *Lezione*

*di economia civile* as a textbook for administrative reform much like Sonnenfels. Many of those who have subsequently adopted Venturi's approach to the Enlightenment and reform have taken this characterisation of Genovesi as read, without however it seems examining the *Lezioni* very closely. For Italian scholars in particular the text has taken on a canonical status, although as Adriana Luna-Fabritius demonstrates, explicit support in the text for Venturi's linkage of Enlightenment to reform is limited. Venturi's *Settecento riformatore*<sup>70</sup> treats Genovesi as an originator of new thinking, and this has led Italian historians to treat Genovesi's text as the foundation for what comes after, rather than the culmination of what had come before. In Britain there was a clear shift from the policy and casuistry of *Wealth of Nations* to the structured principles of political economy as expounded by Malthus, Ricardo, James and John Stuart Mill; in France, Jean-Baptiste Say simply initiated argument by principles rather than cases; in the German territories, the new *Nationalökonomie* simply displaced the older *Kameralwissenschaften* in university lecture rooms. In Naples and Spain, Genovesi's *Lezioni* became a leading source for practical arguments regarding university teaching, as a substitute for moral philosophy; and even though it was censored by the Spanish Inquisition,<sup>71</sup> it was drawn upon during constitutional argument in Cadiz and in Spanish America.<sup>72</sup> But by the early nineteenth century Genovesi's text was already very much part of the previous century, and not a source for modern argument. If Genovesi had once represented a "new science", then this was the "new science" of his predecessors, of Vico's generation. As we can see with John Robertson's account of the Neapolitan Enlightenment, Genovesi's "political economy" has been treated as a master discourse of modernisation. But as Luna-Fabritius argues, Genovesi rarely used the concept of reform; instead, he used the concept of improvement as piecemeal, incremental change. By clearly distinguishing reform from improvement in this way we can become clearer about both the rhetoric and practice of change during the Enlightenment.

The emphasis of this volume on improvement is not new, but in many ways the importance of improvement as a social, political and economic key concept has been neglected. Indeed, as early as 1984 Hans Erich Bödeker had outlined a project that would focus upon the positive sense of improvement as a key concept for an emerging enlightened public. While this outline never developed beyond a proposition, many of the points raised then continue to have resonance today. As Bödeker argued, while there had been broad discussion of the social and political implications of reform programmes, the actual practice and execution of reform had been relatively neglected.<sup>73</sup> Rather than stake all on reform, and an implied gamble on the restoration of older practices or the introduction of untried ones, "improvement" represented a pragmatic way forward that sought the amelioration of present conditions rather than their replacement with untried procedures. Improvement was not necessarily tied to institutional structural changes, for not every minor correction was necessarily "reform". Bödeker

also questioned the common approach of dividing between “reforms from above” and “reforms from below”, since this duality polarised Enlightenment and Absolutist rule in a manner that was demonstrably misleading in the German context. As a solution he called for a series of case studies: systematic investigations of the motivations, of the intensity and of the implementation of enlightened social practices. Only in such case studies could the different conditions under which improvement was formulated be properly understood. He pointed out that the economic crisis following the Seven Years’ War, the food shortages of the early 1770s, as also the sense of backwardness, were impulses for improvement.<sup>74</sup>

This volume developed from a workshop in Helsinki during November 2019 that brought together two parallel research projects: “Cameratism as a European Political Science: A Reassessment” (Adriana Luna-Fabritius, Ere Nokkala, and Kari Saastamoinen, University of Helsinki), and “Breaking the Ground for Reorganisation. Politico-economic Reason and Advocacy for Change in the Early Modern Baltic Region” (Marten Seppel, Keith Tribe, Tartu University). Although some additional contributors have subsequently broadened the scope of this volume, the framework from which it developed was not originally conceived as a comprehensive approach to the nature of reform and improvement in an Enlightenment context, but rather one that sought to link Northern, Central and Southern Europe in a new way.

Part I provides a conceptual history of the two terms that are central for all chapters: “reform”, and “improvement”. As already suggested above, these were in the eighteenth century connected, but in no respect substantively or conceptually homologous. Developing on points made by Eike Wolgast in the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* entry on “Reform, Reformation”, Keith Tribe shows in Chapter 2 the very particular usage of these terms in the course of the eighteenth century, and that this usage was in no respect unambiguously linked to any Enlightenment conceptions of “progress”. Marten Seppel then demonstrates how prevalent in the German language the idea of *Verbesserung* was as a term denoting betterment, improvement, using in addition anonymous sources to counter any sense that those who promoted “betterment” had any personal stake in so doing. The implications of this approach are explored in Chapter 7 by Ere Nokkala, who argues that the characterisation of eighteenth-century “projectors” as unrealistic and self-aggrandising individuals requires modification, that “projects” often involved a genuine commitment to improvement of the kind advocated by anonymous advocates. Chapter 4 expands on the concept of “reform”, Alexandre Mendes Cunha focussing primarily on Portuguese and Spanish usage with particular reference to Brazil, emphasising the more conservative connotation of “reform” by examining a range of sources. This idea is taken up in Chapter 5 by Sergey Polskoy, who re-emphasises this sense in the case of Catherine the Great of Russia, who has often been associated with an Enlightenment idea of progressive change through her relationship with Diderot in particular. Part I is then concluded by Adriana Luna-Fabritius who

tackles the centrality that Franco Venturi attributed to change as “reform” in the Italian Enlightenment, opening out Venturi’s intellectual development from the 1930s onwards and thereby explaining why it was that he came to attach such great importance to the work of Antonio Genovesi in Naples.

Part II brings together a number of case studies that elaborate the collection’s main themes. As already mentioned, Ere Nokkala in Chapter 7 examines in part the work of projectors, but more generally makes the case that late cameralist discourse should be read as advocacy for change – although not for reform. On the other hand, Ivo Cerman in Chapter 8 makes use of rediscovered documents relating to work on the Austrian Political Codex to show how the work of Joseph von Sonnenfels, holder of the Vienna chair for *Polizey* and *Cameralwissenschaft* from 1763, was involved in efforts to standardise the work of *Polizei* throughout the Austrian Monarchy, emphasising a linkage between *Kameralwissenschaft* and reform that Nokkala places in question. The focus remains on Habsburg lands with the contribution by Alexandra Ortolja-Baird, who examines the book market of Habsburg Lombardy, and in particular the implications of the translation of Sonnenfels’ work into Italian.

The final four chapters shift attention away from Central Europe. First of all, Edward Jones-Corredera considers Spanish diplomatic activity and the work of reform, examining career paths throughout the Empire and elaborating on his recent study of the “diplomatic Enlightenment”.<sup>75</sup> Then two chapters turn the attention north to Sweden, but with very different agendas. Måns Jansson and Göran Rydén examine the practicalities of Swedish iron-making and its improvement, an issue of central importance to Sweden in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following this, Lars Magnusson presents a discussion of Swedish “national economy”, a nineteenth-century discourse of reform and improvement that was continuous with many eighteenth-century ideas of national wealth and happiness, but which historians had in the twentieth century been inclined to neglect since it lacked the theoretical appeal that they believed was central to political economy. Finally, Kari Saastamoinen provides an epilogue that links the introductory arguments about reform and improvement to both the language of modern Finland, and that of Pufendorf in the seventeenth century – and showing that as important as what Pufendorf wrote in Latin was, how his work was then translated into German, French and English is also part of this story.

## Notes

- 1 Reinhart Koselleck, “Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution”, in his *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 46–49.
- 2 Paul Slack, *The Invention of Improvement. Information and Material Progress in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1, similarly vii, 257.



- 3 Although here again, historical argument in Britain has aligned around the timing of a supposed “Agricultural Revolution” (by analogy with an “Industrial Revolution” that was itself first so named by analogy with the “French Revolution”). On closer inspection, the changes in question turn out to be incremental improvements – see Robert C. Allen, “Tracking the Agricultural Revolution in England”, *Economic History Review* 52 (1999): 209.
- 4 Terence Ball, James Farr, Russell L. Hanson, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 2 especially.
- 5 Keith Tribe has demonstrated, for example, that the “Prussian Reforms” of the early nineteenth century were first labelled as such in the 1870s, in the wake of German unification and as part of its narrative. In the same way, the idea that the German university system was modelled on a reformed University of Berlin founded in 1810 dates from around 1900; and the ideals then attributed to the “Humboldtian University” could more readily be exemplified by the University of Göttingen, founded in 1737. See his “Revision, Re-organization, and Reform. Prussia, 1790–1820”, in Béla Kapossy, Isaac Nakhimovsky, Sophus A. Reinert, Richard Whatmore, eds., *Markets, Morals, Politics. Jealousy of Trade and the History of Political Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 136–60; and his *Constructing Economic Science. The Invention of a Discipline, 1850–1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), 21.
- 6 In his “Einleitung” to the first volume of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, Koselleck defined the project’s guiding question as “the investigation of the dissolution of old world and the emergence of the new in terms of the history of its conceptual comprehension.” – Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, Vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta, 1972), XIV.
- 7 The entry for “Reform” in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* opens with the statement that “reformare” was used in Antiquity to denote the “need to change present corrupted circumstances towards the restoration of previous circumstances”. The term translated here with “restoration” is *Wiederherstellung*, lit. “re-placing”, “re-introducing” or “re-producing”. Only in the course of the eighteenth century did a historicisation of this idea occur, with *Reformator* becoming “the social subject of political change”: Clemens Zimmermann, “Reform”, in Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, eds., *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Vol. 8 (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1992), col. 409. See in this context also Christian Wilhelm von Dohm’s distinction of *Förmer*, *Reformatoren* advocating gradual change or improvement, and *Störmer*, those who were advocating rapid change, or reforms – “Förmer und Störmer oder die Reformatoren. Ein Nachtstück”, *Deutsches Museum* 1 (1776): 85–94.
- 8 Joel Mokyr, *A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Paul Warde, “The Idea of Improvement, c. 1520–1700”, in Richard W. Hoyle, ed., *Custom, Improvement and the Landscape in Early Modern Britain* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 127–48.
- 9 Hans Erich Bödeker, Ulrich Herrmann, “Aufklärung als Politisierung – Politisierung der Aufklärung”, in Hans Erich Bödeker, Ulrich Herrmann, eds., *Aufklärung als Politisierung – Politisierung der Aufklärung* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 5; Hans Erich Bödeker, “Prozesse und Strukturen politischer Bewußtseinsbildung der deutschen Aufklärung”, in Bödeker, Herrmann, eds., *Aufklärung als Politisierung*, 17, 26–27.
- 10 Koselleck, “Einleitung”, XVIII.
- 11 See Helge Jordheim, “Communication, Politicization, Enlightenment: Vertrag on the Move”, in Jonas Gerlings, Ere Nokkala, Martin van Gelderen, eds., *Enlightenment as Process: Essays in Honour of Hans Erich Bödeker* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, forthcoming).

- 12 See Luigi Alonzi, “The Term ‘Political Oeconomy’, in Adam Smith”, *Intellectual History Review* 31 (2021): 321–39 for the origins of the term “political oeconomy”; and Keith Tribe, “Framing the *Wealth of Nations*”, *History of Political Economy* (forthcoming) for the argument that the political economy of the early nineteenth century was discontinuous with what is usually assumed to be its forerunner and foundation.
- 13 Gabriel Paquette, “Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies in the Long Eighteenth Century”, in Gabriel Paquette, ed., *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750–1830* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 11–12.
- 14 Günter Birtsch, “Aufgeklärter Absolutismus oder Reformabsolutismus?”, *Aufklärung* 9/1 (1996): 101–109; Günter Birtsch, “Reformabsolutismus und Gesetzesstaat. Rechtsauffassung und Justizpolitik Friedrichs des Grossen”, in Günter Birtsch, Dietmar Willoweit, eds., *Reformabsolutismus und ständische Gesellschaft. Zweihundert Jahre Preussisches Allgemeines Landrecht* (Berlin, 1998), 47.
- 15 Susan Richter, Thomas Maissen, Manuela Albertone, eds., *Languages of Reform in the Eighteenth Century. When Europe Lost Its Fear of Change* (New York: London: Routledge, 2020), 2.
- 16 In English political language, the phrase “winds of change” is associated with a speech made by Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, to the South African Parliament on 3 February 1960, saying that “the wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact”. But he had already delivered the same speech in Accra on 10 January, where it had gone largely unreported – a clear example of *where* something is said being very relevant to understanding *what* its political significance is thought to be.
- 17 For example, Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic, and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002); Rudolf Vierhaus, “Aufklärung und Reformzeit. Kontinuitäten und Neuansätze in der deutschen Politik des späten 18. und beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts”, in Rudolf Vierhaus, *Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert. Politische Verfassung, soziales Gefüge, geistige Bewegungen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 249–61.
- 18 Derek Beales, “The Idea of Reform in British Politics, 1829–1850”, in T. C. W. Blanning, Peter Wende, eds., *Reform in Great Britain and Germany 1750–1850*, Proceedings of the British Academy 100 (1999), 159–74, here especially 160, 173.
- 19 Anna Plassart, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7.
- 20 T. C. W. Blanning, Peter Wende, “Introduction”, in T. C. W. Blanning, Peter Wende, eds., *Reform in Great Britain and Germany 1750–1850*, Proceedings of the British Academy 100 (1999), 1.
- 21 Noteworthy exceptions are Christof Dipper, “Réforme”, in Rolf Reichardt, Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, eds., *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820*, Vol. 19–20 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000), 3–25; Thomas Maissen, “Bringing a Despotic Agenda Into the Public Sphere - Concluding Remarks on Languages of Reform”, in Susan Richter, Thomas Maissen, Manuela Albertone, eds., *Languages of Reform in the Eighteenth Century. When Europe Lost Its Fear of Change* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 405–24.
- 22 Asa Briggs, *The Age of Improvement, 1783–1867* (London: Longmans Green, 1959).
- 23 Llewellyn Woodward, *The Age of Reform: 1815–1870* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), cited in Beales, “The Idea of Reform”, 162.
- 24 *Die Politischen Testamente Friedrichs des Grossen*, ed. Gustav Berthold Volz (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1920), 4–5, 10, 17, 26, 35, 132.

25 *Ibid.*, 2, 5, 99, 103, 111, 129, 132, 137.

26 *Ibid.*, 2.

27 For example, in the instruction for the Hofkammer of 1698: “...die für nöthig befindliche änderungen und riformen”: Hansdieter Körbl, *Die Hofkammer und ihr ungetreuer Präsident. Eine Finanzbehörde zur Zeit Leopolds I* (Wien; München: Böhlau; Oldenbourg, 2009), 438.

28 For example, unlike the word “Verbesserung”, the noun or verb “reform” never appears in the titles of the Prussian legislation between 1751 and 1800: *Repertorium novi corporis constitutionum Prussico-Brandenburgensium praecipue marchicarum, I. Chronologicum. II. Reale. oder doppeltes Register, über die neue Sammlung der Königlich Preußischen und Churfürstlich Brandenburgischen, besonders in der Chur- und Mark-Brandenburg ergangenen und publicirten Ordnungen, Edicte, Mandate, Rescripte, welche in 50 Jahrgängen von 1751. bis 1800 mit Allergnädigster Königl. Bewilligung durch Höchst-Dero Academie der Wissenschaften zum Druck befördert worden* (Berlin: August Brink, 1803).

29 Joachim Georg Darjes, “Vorrede vom Reformiren der Wissenschaften und Anwenden der Philosophie auf andere Theile der Gelahrheit”, in Gottlieb Stolle, *Kurtzgefaßte Lehre der Allgemeinen Klugheit* (Jena: Güth, 1748), 3–59. For this essay and Darjes’ other plans on science and higher education, see Ulrike Löttsch, *Joachim Georg Darjes (1714–1791). Der Kameralist als Schul- und Gesellschaftsreformer* (Wien: Böhlau, 2016), especially, 195–202.

30 Darjes, “Vorrede”, 7.

31 “Die Absicht einer vernünftigen Reformation ist die Unvollkommenheit bey einer Sache zu zerstören, und durch diese Zerstörung der Sache Vollkommenheit zu befördern”: Darjes, “Vorrede”, 27.

32 *Ibid.*, 54.

33 *Ibid.*, 58.

34 So e.g. Siegfried Jüttner, Jochen Schlobach, “Einleitung”, in Siegfried Jüttner, Jochen Schlobach, eds., *Europäische Aufklärung(en). Einheit und nationale Vielfalt* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1992), IX; see also Pascal Firges, Johan Lange, Thomas Maissen, Sebastian Meurer, Susan Richter, Gregor Stiebert, Lina Weber, Urte Weeber, Christine Zabel, “Introduction: Languages of Reform and the European Enlightenment”, in Richter, Maissen, Albertone, eds., *Languages of Reform*, 1–26. See especially p. 6 where the authors argue that “After all, is not the Enlightenment the quintessential age of reform?”

35 John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment. Scotland and Naples 1680–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8, 28–31; Vincenzo Ferrone, *The Enlightenment. History of an Idea* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 12–26.

36 Jonathan I. Israel, *Democratic Enlightenment. Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750–1790* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 7.

37 Rudolf Vierhaus, “Aufklärung und Reformzeit”, 253–54.

38 Carl Wennerlind, “The Magnificent Spruce: Anders Kempe and Anarcho-Cameralism in Sweden”, *History of Political Economy* 53 (2021): 427; Carl Wennerlind, “The Political Economy of Sweden’s Age of Greatness: Johan Risingh and the Hartlib Circle”, in Philipp R. Rössner, ed., *Economic Growth and the Origins of Modern Political Economy. Economic Reasons of State, 1500–2000* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 169–70, 177; Carl Wennerlind, “Theatrum Oeconomicum: Anders Berch and the Dramatization of the Swedish Improvement Discourse”, in Robert Fredona, Sophus Reinert, eds., *New Perspectives on the History of Political Economy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 104–106.

39 “Deue dunque il Principe favorire, e promuovere l’agri coltura, e mostrar di far conto della gente, che s’intéde di migliorare, e fecodare i terreni; è di quelli, i cui poderi sono eccellètemète coltivati”: Giovanni Botero, *Della ragione di stato, libri dieci* (Venetia, 1598), 207.

- 40 Botero, *The Reason of State*, ed. and trans. Robert Bireley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 135.
- 41 See R. H. Campbell, “The Scottish Improvers and the Course of Agrarian Change in the Eighteenth Century”, in Louis M. Cullen, Thomas Christopher Smout, eds., *Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History, 1600–1900* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1977), 204–15.
- 42 Marcus Sandl, “Development as Possibility: Risk and Chance in the Cameralist Discourse”, in Philipp R. Rössner, ed., *Economic Growth and the Origins of Modern Political Economy. Economic Reasons of State, 1500–2000* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 139–55.
- 43 The understanding that a “reformation” (but not in the sense of a state reform but as a reorganisation and an improvement of one’s manorial economy) means quick (*schnelle*) changes can be found already e.g. in “Briefe, den Reformiergeist, und das Schriftstellerwesen in Deutschland betreffend”, *Schwäbisches Magazin zur Beförderung der Aufklärung* 2 (1787): 119, 128–29.
- 44 So e.g. Theodor Schmalz, *Encyclopädie der Cameralwissenschaften. Zum Gebrauch academischer Vorlesungen* (Königsberg, 1797), 164. See also Heinz Mohnhaupt, “Spielarten “revolutionärer” Entwicklung und ihrer werdenden Begrifflichkeit seit dem Zeitalter der Aufklärung”, in Heinz Mohnhaupt, ed., *Revolution, Reform, Restauration. Formen der Veränderung von Recht und Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988), 1–36.
- 45 Robertson, *The Case for Enlightenment*, 8.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 29.
- 47 Smith himself stated that among the work upon which he drew the “agricultural system” was at the time the “nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of political oeconomy” – *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, W. B. Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), IV.ix.38.
- 48 David Ricardo, *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, ed. Piero Sraffa, with M. H. Dobb, Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo 1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 5.
- 49 As shown by Lars Magnusson’s chapter in this collection.
- 50 See Christopher W. Calvo, *The Emergence of Capitalism in Early America* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2020), Ch. 6.
- 51 Luigi Alonzi, ‘Economy’ in *European History. Words, Contexts and Change over Time* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022), 98.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 122.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 125.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 88.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 95. See François Quesnay, “Essai physique sur l’œconomie animale” (extract), in *Œuvres économiques complètes et autres textes* t. 1 (Paris: Institut National d’Études Démographiques, 2005), 5–60.
- 56 See Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, “Polizei”, *Economy and Society* 9 (1980): 172–96 for a translation of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* entry on this term.
- 57 Claude-Jacques Herbert, *Essai sur la police générale des grains, sur les Prix et & sur les Effets de l’Agriculture* (Berlin, 1755).
- 58 Adam Smith’s Glasgow “Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms”, in R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, P. G. Stein, eds., *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 5.
- 59 Knemeyer, “Polizei”, 182.
- 60 Joseph von Sonnenfels, *Sätze aus der Polizey, Handlungs- und Finanz-Wissenschaft* (Vienna: 1765), §2, 10.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 16.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 18.
- 63 *Ibid.*

- 64 *Ibid.*, 23.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 29.
- 66 *Ibid.*, 136–37.
- 67 Loïc Charles, Christine Théré, “The Physiocratic Movement: A Revision”, in Steven L. Kaplan, Sophus Reinert, eds., *The Economic Turn: Recasting Political Economy in Enlightenment Europe* (London: Anthem Press, 2019), 43. For an enumeration of the sheer diversity of institutions and persons linked to the “movement”, see their discussion on p. 45.
- 68 Richard van den Berg was commissioned to write a chapter for this volume, and he planned to contribute on “Turgot: Reformer of the *Ancien Régime* State?”, but was unfortunately prevented by illness from doing so.
- 69 Franco Venturi, *Le Origini dell’Enciclopedia* (Florence: Edizioni U (Biblioteca oltremontana), 1946), 10.
- 70 Franco Venturi, “Alle origini dell’illuminismo napoletano: Dal carteggio di Bartolomeo Intieri”, *Rivista Storica Italiana* 21 (1959): 416–56; *Settecento riformatore* (Turin: Einaudi, 1969–1990), 5 vols, and *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
- 71 Jesús Astigarraga, Javier Usoz, “The Enlightenment in Translation: Antonio Genovesi’s Political Economy in Spain, 1778–1800”, *Mediterranean Historical Review* 28 (2013): 24–45; and Adriana Luna-Fabritius, “Camerarism in Spain. *Polizewissenschaft* and the Bourbon Reforms”, in Ere Nokkala and Nicholas B. Miller, eds., *Camerarism and the Enlightenment. Happiness, Governance and Reform in a Transnational Perspective* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 245–66.
- 72 Adriana Luna-Fabritius, “El modelo constitucional Napolitano en Hispanoamérica”, in Adriana Luna-Fabritius, Pablo Mijangos, Rafael Rojas, eds., *De Cádiz al siglo XXI. Doscientos años de tradición constitucional en Hispanoamérica* (México: Taurus, 2012), 23–152.
- 73 Hans Erich Bödeker, “Gesellschaftliche ‘Verbesserungen’ in Nordwestdeutschland im späten 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert”, *Nachrichten der Lessing-Akademie* 4 (1984): 6–10.
- 74 *Ibid.*, 8–9.
- 75 Edward Jones-Corredera, *The Diplomatic Enlightenment: Spain, Europe, and the Age of Speculation* (Leiden: Brill, 2021).