

für meinen Mann

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Ethnicity and Sinicization

The Theory of Assimilative Power in the Making of the Chinese Nation-State (1900s–1920s)

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Abbreviations

CCP = Chinese Communist Party (*Zhongguo gongchandang*)

KMT = Kuomintang (*Guomindang*), Chinese Nationalist Party

LSPQJ = *Liu Shiwei quanji* (Liu Shiwei: 1997).

PLA = People's Liberation Army (*Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun*)

PRC = People's Republic of China (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo*)

YBSHJ = *Yinbingshi heji* (Liang Qichao: 1983).

ZTYQJ = *Zhang Taiyan quanji* (Zhang Taiyan: 1984).

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Introduction

“In every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it (In jeder Epoche muß versucht werden, die Überlieferung von neuem dem Konformismus abzugewinnen, der im Begriff steht, sie zu überwältigen).”¹

Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (1969).

The aim of my dissertation is to research into the intertwining of Han Chinese nationalist and historiographical thinking and its approach towards the Non-Han other in late Imperial and early Republican times in China (1900s–1920s). I analyze the development and the spread of the theory of a Han Chinese “assimilative power (*tonghuali*),” which appeared during that time. By this I aim to show, first, how the histories of the Non-Han peoples and their dynasties were constructed and politicized by Han Chinese political thinkers during the 1900s; and second, how the theory of an “assimilative power” became the accepted basis for the understanding of China’s history, enabling historians to legitimate the inclusion of Non-Han histories in the 1920s, when history evolved as a modern university discipline.

The theory of a Han Chinese “assimilative power” claims that as a result of an assumed ethnical and cultural superiority of the Han Chinese² people, Non-Han³ ethnic

¹ Benjamin: 2007 [1969], “Theses on the Philosophy of History” VI. German original in Benjamin: 1980 [1955], “Über den Begriff der Geschichte,” p. 253.

² Every scholar writing about ethnicity in China has to decide, which term he/she wants to use in order to refer to the ethnicity calling itself *Hanzu*. After having thought about the different possibilities – the ethnic term “Han,” the general term “Chinese,” the elegant way out “Sinic,” – I have decided to call them “Han Chinese” or “Han.” When using only the term “Han” it refers to a strictly ethnic meaning. When I use the term “Han Chinese” this will mostly be in cases, where usually the term Chinese is used, i.e. Chinese nationalists become Han Chinese nationalists in my dissertation. By this, I want to clarify that the Han Chinese nationalists do not speak for all inhabitants of what they considered China, but mainly from their Han Chinese perspective and for their Han Chinese fellow people. (See also Mullaney et al (eds.): 2012.)

Today, the Han ethnicity is the largest ethnic group in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Han also hold the political power and dominate the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beside the Han, who make more than 90 % of the population of the PRC, there exist fifty-five officially accepted – and many more not (yet) officially

groups in East Asia inevitably assimilate to the Han Chinese people and culture possibly to the point of being undistinguishable, in other words sinicize, when they come into close contact, possibly to the point of being undistinguishable.⁴ One important factor of the theory is the assumption that especially Non-Han people, who conquered Han Chinese inhabited regions, most importantly the Tuoba or Northern Wei (386–534), the Khitan Liao (907–1125), the Tangut or Western Xia (1038–1227), the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234) and the Manchu Qing (1644–1912), automatically assimilated to their Han Chinese subjects. It thus forms a handy strategy to integrate Non-Han people into Chinese nationalist history and into a Chinese nation-state by creating an image of homogenization.

My main research questions are: Due to which conditions was the idea of a Han Chinese “assimilative power,” that is, a power to sinicize Non-Han ethnicities developed? Did it become an influential paradigm of historiography in China and if yes, how? How are Han Chinese and Non-Han people perceived on the basis of this idea and what does this mean for the image of a Chinese nation-state? Did alternative approaches develop? And what are the consequences of the acceptance of an assimilative power for historiography on Non-Han dynasties, peoples, and cultures?

This dissertation is a broad *Begriffsgeschichte* of terms like “assimilation (*tonghua*),” “fusion (*ronghe*),” and “mixing (*fuzha*)” in late Imperial and early Republican texts. By analyzing the metamorphosis of the political catch phrase of a certain “assimilative power” of the Han Chinese people into a basic and widely accepted concept of historiography, it aims at revealing the close relationship between early Han Chinese nation-building and nationalist thinking, the development of Han Chinese academic historiography and the effects on our modern understanding of Chinese history. It will also challenge the existing theories on Han Chinese national identity-building by showing in how far older culturalist concepts of identity were basic for the building of a modern Han Chinese national identity.

An analysis of early nationalist political and historiographical thinking with regard to the Non-Han people and the question how to integrate them into a Chinese nation-state has not been done before. It provides the field of Chinese studies, but also that of studies in nationalisms and nation-building, with new understandings not only of the development of nationalist historiography in general, but moreover with insights in

registered – ethnicities. In the context of this dissertation the most important ones are the Tibetans, the Mongols, the Manchus and the Uyghurs. Their importance stems from the fact, that they are amongst the ten largest ethnic groups, but also that the territories they inhabited nearly alone until the beginning of the migration politics of the CCP are extremely expanded and together form more than 60 % of the PRC's territory. (See also Leibold: 2007, p. 9.)

³ When I use the term “Non-Han” in this dissertation, I always refer to the Non-Han people inside the borders of the Qing Dynasty, especially to the four most important ones, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Turkish Muslims (today called Uyghurs). (See also Mullaney: 2012, p. 9.)

⁴ Of course, the term “sinicization” is also used in other contexts, i. e. the sinicization of Buddhism during the 1st century AD. (Zürcher: 1959, p. 2–4.) But what I refer to here – and what is also meant by the historians in questions – is the theoretical idea of an assimilation of people. (See also Gordon: 1975, p. 84.)

how far modern Chinese historiography and sinological scholarship are still influenced by it. Moreover, it is a study in the question of how national identities were imagined and build and what place was assigned to the Other. I approach this topic from the outsider's perspective, by dealing with those Non-Han others, who are outside Han Chinese identity or at its border as well as by looking to these others through the eyes of those inside, the Han people; and last but not least by coming from another outside myself, both timely and spatially.

In the introduction I will give an overview on what is regarded as scholarship of nations and nationalisms in general, but which is in fact American- and Euro-centered. I will turn to scholarship on Chinese nationalism and show in how far it resembles Euro-centered approaches and how it differs from them. I will then come back to a general picture of the relationship between the historian and the nation and what this means for historiography in general and Chinese historiography in particular.

Nation and Nationalism

Like European nationalism, Chinese nationalism has been analyzed thoroughly by many scholars, historians as well as political and social scientists. What is interesting though is the fact that by established scholars of nationalism in general China has more often than not been left aside under the pretext that its nationalism would be an exception among nationalisms. Scholars on Chinese nationalism like James Leibold and Henrietta Harrison criticize this assumption of China's special position. Leibold especially refers to the most profound scholars in nationalism studies, who have brought forward the field by their groundbreaking works, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith⁵, and Liah Greenfeld.⁶ Harrison adds Benedict Anderson to this list, claiming that China would be neglected in the works of these scholars.⁷ Of course, Leibold and Harrison are not mistaken. In defense of these most eminent scholars on nationalism it has to be stated though that they all took Europe and its history and social structure as their point of origin. One could maybe criticize the generalized titles of their works implying a much more global approach than they actually employ. However, this is common among Europeanists and reflects their Euro-centrism, which results from their concentration on those areas they have most expertise in.

Scholars researching into the issue of Chinese nationalism can of course nevertheless profit from studies on European or American nationalism. And they can provide the field with a new insight into nationalism in general by adding another puzzle piece and

⁵ Anthony D. Smith is a former student of Ernest Gellner.

⁶ Leibold: 2007, p.17. He especially refers to the following works: Hobsbawm: 1990; Gellner: 2006 [1983]; Smith: 2000; Greenfeld: 1992.

⁷ Harrison: 2001, p.1.

thereby showing once more that there cannot be one definition of nationalism suitable for all, but that nationalisms as nations are extremely depending on their individual situation and historical context. In Anthony D. Smith's opinion "historical experience and the 'deposit' left by these collective experiences" is responsible for the variations between nations, thus "'myths' and 'memories,' 'symbols' and 'values' [...] often define and differentiate nations."⁸ I would like to broaden Smith's lists of abstract issues by adding even aspects such as geopolitical and territorial, ethnical and political preconditions.

It is bemoaned by many students of the subject that to define nationalism is difficult and even more so due to the fact that "definitional controversies"⁹ go on among scholars on nationalism, who do not agree at all what it is or could be.¹⁰ This has led some scholars to sensibly classifying certain schools of definition of nationalism. James Townsend lists altogether "three version of what nationalism" can refer to. First, "nationalism as a doctrine or set of ideas," an approach put forward by Hans Kohn, who "centres the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired,"¹¹ and Elie Kedourie, who writes that nationalism is a doctrine claiming "that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government."¹² Second and not so influential, nationalism is seen as a "political action or movement," which strives for the constitution of an autonomous nation-state.¹³ And, third, "nationalism as sentiment, consciousness, or state of mind, emphasizing individuals' awareness of and loyalty to the nation and its traditions."¹⁴ Scholars such as Benjamin Akzin, Boyd C. Shafer and Louis Snyder are listed as representatives of this school of definition. Also Paul Lawrence gives three major ways how nationalism is defined, as an "abstract ideology," which assumes that the world is naturally divided into nations; as a "political doctrine," which adds to the first definition that these natural nations should govern themselves; and as "national identity," that is, a sentiment of the people in a nation.¹⁵

Whereas I agree that there are many different definitions of nationalism, I do not think that this is a handicap for its study, but rather that this teaches us that nationalisms cannot be the same as long as nations are not the same. This has already

⁸ Smith: 2008, p. ix.

⁹ Townsend: 1993, p. 103.

¹⁰ Benjamin Akzin titles his chapter on literature on nationalism "The terminological jungle," thereby expressing the despair many scholars feel in the fact of most diverse definitions and usages of the term. (Akzin: 1964, p. 7–10.) Other scholars bemoaning the difficulty to find a definition are Arthur N. Waldron and Peter Alter (Waldron: 1985, p. 416; Alter: 1985, p. 1. See also Zhao: 2004, p. 2.)

¹¹ Hans Kohn: "Nationalism", *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. 1968, vol. 11, p. 63. Cited in Townsend: 1992, p.104.

¹² Kedourie: 1961 [1960], p. 9. See also Townsend: 1992, p. 104.

¹³ Townsend: 1992, p. 104–105. Townsend mentions Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden and Crawford Young as examples for this definition of nationalism.

¹⁴ Townsend: 1992, p. 105.

¹⁵ Lawrence: 2005, p. 3–6.

been shown by Smith in his *Theories of Nationalism* (1971), where he lies down a system of definitions of different nationalisms, which by its insightful distinctions manages to include many different phenomena.¹⁶ General definitions have to fall short at least for the time being, as they are mostly always a “matter of overgeneralizing from specific European cases.”¹⁷ Whereas Johann P. Arnason thinks that this problem is not limited to the definition of nationalism, but also to other aspects of modernity, he nevertheless has the impression that “in this particular field, the projections seem more resistant to criticism.”¹⁸ This had also been observed before by Benedict Anderson, whose critique is even harsher. “An unselfconscious provincialism had long skewed and distorted theorizing on the subject [of nationalism]” based on “European scholars, accustomed to the conceit that everything important in the modern world originated in Europe.”¹⁹ What startles him even more is the fact that his own “crucial chapter on the originating Americas was largely ignored” and thus “this Eurocentric provincialism remained quite undisturbed.”²⁰

To avoid this overgeneralizing of a definition based on European experience Arnason suggests not to define nationalism as an ideology, but to follow Miroslav Hroch and perceive it as inseparable from the nation in the sense that it is “an awareness of membership in the nation, coupled with a view that this membership is an inherently valuable quality.”²¹ Hroch’s definitions of nationalism and national consciousness also point to the fact that a definition of a certain nationalism has to rely on the definition of the nation it ‘belongs’ to. Chinese nationalism or rather Chinese nationalisms for instance cannot be defined without a deeper understanding what the (imagined) Chinese nation is in the mind of the divers nationalists or even of the nation people themselves. Consequently, it might be considered to be a paradox that on the one hand there exists a certain “formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept,” whereas there prevails an “irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations” at the same time.²² This is one of the several paradoxes, which according to Benedict Anderson make it so “notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyze” nation, nationality and nationalism.²³ Therefore, a general definition of nationalism can either never do justice to all nationalisms, it then is “too exclusive,” or it is so extremely broad and therefore rather superficial in the end, that is, “too inclusive.”²⁴ The paradox

¹⁶ Smith: 1971.

¹⁷ Arnason: 2006, p. 45.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. xiii.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Hroch: 2000, p. 12. Cited in Arnason: 2006, p. 44.

²² Anderson: 2006, p. 5.

²³ Ibid., p. 3.

²⁴ Waldron: 1985, p. 426. However, even the definition given in the Encyclopaedia Britannica and aiming to be such a broad inclusive definition might be considered incorrect by many scholars of the field. There, nationalism is defined as an “ideology based on the premise that the individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass other individual or group interests” and is moreover considered to be entirely modern,

becomes easier to understand, thought, when following Anderson's suggestion and treating nationalism not as a political ideology, but as a general basic concept like religion. Religion exists universally, but not uniformly.²⁵

Arthur N. Waldron concludes that due to the difficulty to define nationalism, it would only be useful to define "general situations, [but] it is not very useful in explicating specific events."²⁶ I rather think Waldron's conclusion is true for the case of a too inclusive definition, because in that case one cannot profit from it neither to explain general situations nor specific ones. If one, however, does not strive to give a definition of nationalism, which can be valid for many cases or even for nationalism *per se*, but rather limits one's definition, not only with regard to time and space, but also to geopolitics and ethnic-cultural backgrounds, a definition is still difficult enough, but stands in the realm of possibility. Taking certain preconditions as the basis of a definition of nationalism might prove to be quite useful, at least to "explicate specific events," like for instance to explain the intertwined and specific developments of Chinese political and historiographical thinking with regard to Non-Han people among early Chinese nationalists.

Another important precondition underlying the definition of nationalism is the above mentioned understanding of nation that stands behind it. Hugh Seton-Watson, "one of the foremost historians of nationalism,"²⁷ states:

"Thus I am driven to the conclusion that no 'scientific definition' of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists. All that I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one."²⁸

To define a certain nation, which can even be a nation only *imagined* by nationalist thinkers and not actual existing – as in case of a Chinese nation (and nation-state) before the decline of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 – will prove to be useful to understand a certain nationalism and the events linked to it. Though according to Eric Hobsbawm "the real 'nation' can only be recognized *a posteriori*," the nation, which is planned and imagined on the other hand, can be identified before it really exists.²⁹ In case of Chinese nationalism, both nations, the imagined one in the thinking of nationalists and the real nation have to be defined. Moreover, imagined nations go on to exist parallel also after the establishment of the first Chinese nation-state, the Republic of China (1912–1949).

although due to "its dynamic vitality and its all-pervading character, nationalism is often thought to be very old." ("nationalism." 2010. Encyclopaedia Britannica.)

²⁵ Anderson: 2006, p. 5.

²⁶ Waldron: 1985, p. 427.

²⁷ Smith: 2008, p. x.

²⁸ Seton-Watson: 1977, p. 5.

²⁹ Hobsbawm, Eric J.: 1972. "Some Reflections on Nationalism." In: Nossiter, T. J./Hanson, A. H./Rokkan, Stein (eds.): *Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences: Essays in Memory of Peter Nettle*. London: Faber. Cited after Hobsbawm: 1990, p. 9.

The question most intimately intertwined with the definition of nationalism, that is, “the concept of ‘the nation’,”³⁰ is to speak with Ernest Renan (1823–1892): “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? – What is a nation?”³¹ Renan’s starting point in his famous lecture from 1882 was to differentiate between divers concepts of groupings, i.e. vast agglomerations of men, tribes, cities, assemblies of various territories, communities, which are without a *patrie*. They are maintained by religious bonds, nations, confederations and ties, which are established by race, or rather language.³² Renan aimed at disentangling the confusion of terms he claimed to witness. In contrast to those before him and many afterwards, who referred to the objective or rather pseudo-objective criteria “race, language, material interest, religious affinities, geography, and military necessity,” Renan claims that these ingredients are not sufficient to explain the “spiritual principle (*principe spirituel*)” of the nation.³³ He defines nation by more subjective and moreover historical criteria, that is, “the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common.” On the one hand Renan refers to “common glories in the past,” but maybe even more important is that “they have forgotten many things,” as “forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error (*l’erreur historique*), is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation.”³⁴ In Renan’s opinion the nation is based on a common consciousness “to have performed great deeds together” in the past and the “wish to perform still more” in the future.³⁵

More than hundred years later, Renan is followed in his refusal of objective criteria to define a nation by Eric Hobsbawm. However, Hobsbawm does not approve of a definition entirely based on subjectivity, because that would suggest “that all that is needed to be or to create a nation is the will to be one.”³⁶ Instead, Hobsbawm first seems to avoid a clear definition claiming that “agnosticism is the best initial posture of a student in this field” and not wanting to give an “*a priori* definition of what constitutes a nation.”³⁷ But then his “working assumption” in the end turns out to be a rather subjective definition after all, when he defines that “any sufficiently large body of people, whose members regard themselves as members of a ‘nation,’ will be treated as such.”³⁸ The only difference to a definition entirely based on subjectivity is that Hobsbawm does not allow *any* grouping to think of itself as a nation, but demands a “sufficiently large body of people,” whatever this might mean in concrete numbers. In the end, Hobsbawm gives his understanding of nationalism, which he says is “the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The original was a lecture delivered at the Sorbonne, March 11th, 1882. It can be found in Ernest Renan: *Oeuvres Complètes*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947–1961, vol. 1, p. 887–906. I am quoting here from the English translation “What is a nation” by Martin Thom, in Bhabha: 2008, p. 8–22.

³² Renan: 1882, 3 ; 2008, p. 8.

³³ Renan: 1882, 27–28; 2008, p. 19.

³⁴ Renan: 1882, 9–10; 2008, p. 11, 19.

³⁵ Renan: 2008, p. 19.

³⁶ Hobsbawm: 1990, p. 8.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

concept of the 'nation'."³⁹ He derives his definition from Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* (1983): "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."⁴⁰ And so, Hobsbawm's definition of the nation guides us back to a definition of nationalism. We have reached the point where we started.

We can see that the difficulties encountered by scholars of nationalism to define their own field of study are reflected in their equal difficulties to define a nation. Consequently also here we can find scholars, who helpfully try to classify different types of definition. Smith identifies the biggest gap with regard to a definition of nation between "statists" and "ethnicists."⁴¹ In the understanding of statist, nations would be "territorial-political units," whereas ethnicists would see a nation as a "large, politicized ethnic group defined by common culture and alleged descent."⁴²

On the surface, Gellner and Hobsbawm can both be classified as statist, as they emphasize the role politics played in the creation of nations by their basic definition of nationalism. Moreover, especially Gellner links the emergence of nations to the change from the agrarian stage to the industrial age, as the "agrarian society [...] is not at all favourable to the nationalist principle, to the convergence of political and cultural units and to the homogeneity and school-transmitted nature of culture within each political unit."⁴³ Of course, this statement is put into question by many non-European nations and nationalisms, and most certainly by the Chinese case. And also in Europe itself, especially in the South, the East and the Southeast, examples can be found, which do not support Gellner's claim.

An important aspect, however, which has been put forward by Gellner can be found among his list of preconditions for the formation of the nationalist principle – the idea that "homogenization processes have been central to the history of nationalism."⁴⁴ In *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), which was one of the books written in order to argue against Elie Kedourie's *Nationalism* (1960), Gellner writes:

"The kind of cultural homogeneity demanded by nationalism is one of them [= the essential concomitants of industrial society], and we had better make our peace with it. It is not the case, as Elie Kedourie claims that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism."⁴⁵

John A. Hall illustrates Gellner's approach for the European case and writes that the "practices of Hitler and Stalin (genocide, population transfer, ethnic cleansing and

³⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁰ Gellner: 2006 [1983], p. 1. See also Hobsbawm: 1990, p. 9.

⁴¹ Smith: 1971, p. 176.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Gellner: 2006, p. 38–39.

⁴⁴ Hall: 2006, p. 38. See Gellner: 1981, p. 763–769; 2006, p. 38–51.

⁴⁵ Gellner: 2006, p. 38.

boundary changes)” homogenized large parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Homogenization also happened more recently, when multi-ethnic states like Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke up. According to Hall the existence of minorities and multiculturalisms today would be marginal to most European states.⁴⁶ Gellner’s aspect of homogeneity in his approach towards nationalism is important with regard to an ethnicist approach to nations, because the question of ethnical-cultural homogeneity lies at its basis. Moreover, Gellner’s theory of homogenization being a crucial demand of nationalism is revealing with regard to the topic of this dissertation, because it is intimately linked with the question of dynamics of social and cultural change like assimilation, acculturation, fusion and the like, ultimately targeted at homogenization. It has to be mentioned though that Gellner saw cultural homogeneity not only as a demand by nationalism, but of industrial society, whose development was closely related to that of nation-states. His idea of homogenization was thus a cultural rather than an ethnic one. However, due to the idea of Han Chinese identity being cultural and civilized opposed to Non-Han identity being ‘barbarian’ and uncivilized, Gellner’s idea of homogenization can be applied for the Chinese case.

What does Gellner’s assumption that cultural homogenization would be demanded by nationalism mean for China? From the general viewpoint of European scholars on nationalism it is exactly the aspect of homogeneity that makes China and with it East Asia in general “an anomaly,”⁴⁷ because “China, Korea and Japan [...] are indeed among the extremely rare examples of historic states composed of a population that is ethnically almost or entirely homogenous,” as Hobsbawm thinks.⁴⁸ As mentioned above, scholars working on Chinese nationalism criticize that theorists of nationalism have often claimed China to be an exception of theses on nationalism and thereby justified their non-integration of Chinese nationalism into general studies on this subject. However, the grave so to speak was dug by scholars of Chinese studies themselves when they convinced not only themselves, but after a short while also others that China was in fact rather homogenous. Peter C. Perdue writes about Hobsbawm’s “extraordinary statement” about China, Korea and Japan that “this is a perfect example of the power of nationalist myth not only among members of the nations themselves, but on supposedly more detached observers.”⁴⁹ By this he refers to the fact that China is, of course, not homogenous at all. However, nationalist historiography has convinced Chinese and Non-Chinese alike that the minorities in China are negligible with regard to nationalism. That the character of the existence of so-called “minority ethnicities” or “minority nationalities (*shaoshu minzu*)” in China differs very much from European

⁴⁶ Exception are multinational states like Spain, Great Britain, Switzerland and Belgium. (Hall: 2006, p. 38.)

⁴⁷ Leibold: 2007, p. 17. Gellner writes that “in China a high culture linked more to an ethic and a state bureaucracy than to a faith and church was perhaps untypical [...]” (Gellner: 2006, p. 134.)

⁴⁸ Hobsbawm: 1990, p. 66.

⁴⁹ Perdue: 2005b, p. 186.

countries is a knowledge re-discovered only recently and still not entirely acknowledged among sinologists themselves.⁵⁰ (That also the group labeled “Han Chinese” is also not as homogeneous as often believed goes without saying and is also a research topic, which got more attention recently.⁵¹) This dissertation is one further work aimed at clarifying how the assumption of a homogeneous Chinese nation has been politically exploited and historically manifested. Consequently, it can hardly be expected that scholars like Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith, Greenfeld and Anderson would know about these renewed insights, which are challenging their idea of China as an exception among nations. When they wrote their works, the discussion on the validity of the assumption of a homogenous Chinese nation and history had just begun among sinological scholars in the late 1980s.⁵²

Gellner’s claim that homogeneity would be demanded by nationalism makes his idea of nationalism much closer to Smith’s second group of scholars, the ethnicists, who define nation as a “large, politicized ethnic group defined by common culture and alleged descent.”⁵³ However, the most profound difference between Gellner and Hobsbawm on the one side and Smith, who himself claims to belong to the ethnicists on the other side, is their answer to the question, *when* nations were formed. The “perennialist”⁵⁴ Smith emphasizes the “importance of the ethnic roots in the formation of nations,”⁵⁵ whereas he does not think that the nation is “a ‘primordial’⁵⁶ and natural unit of human association outside time.”⁵⁷ In general, the perennialists refer to the “antiquity and perhaps ubiquity of the national form.”⁵⁸ In contrast to that, the “modernists” Gellner and Hobsbawm, but actually most scholars of nationalism assume that the formation of nations is an entirely modern phenomenon that appeared in connection with and parallel to the industrial age, the age of the American and French Revolutions.⁵⁹ Gellner contradicts Smith directly, when he assumes that pre-modern societies are too separated along cultural lines and thus cannot create an ideology,

⁵⁰ After those sinologists, who were also trained in other languages and cultures like Paul Pelliot (1878–1945), Owen Lattimore (1900–1989), Herbert Franke (1914–2011) and Joseph Fletcher (1934–1984) died or became inactive, the non-Han Chinese part of China’s history was generally neglected. But since the late 1980s, Manchu studies have experienced a comeback among Sinologists like Nicola Di Cosmo, Morris Rossabi, Evelyn Rawski, Pamela Crossley and Mark Elliott, who understand themselves not limited to Chinese language and culture, but also learn other languages in order to integrate Non-Han histories in the realm of sinology like especially Mongolian and Manchu, but also Tibetan and Uyghur.

⁵¹ See Mullaney et al. (ed.): 2012.

⁵² Pamela Crossley and Evelyn Rawski triggered the discussion, which was answered by Ho Ping-ti. (Crossley: 1990a; Rawski: 1996; Ho: 1998.) It was then bolstered by many new studies on the Manchu Qing Dynasty published in after 1990. (Crossley: 1990b, 1999; Elliott: 2001; Millward: 1998; Perdue: 2005; Rawski: 1998; Rhoads: 2000. See also Cohen: 2010, p. lxiin25.)

⁵³ Smith, 1971, p. 176.

⁵⁴ The term “perennialist” stems from the Latin adjective *perennis*, meaning “constant,” “permanent.”

⁵⁵ Smith: 2008, p. x.

⁵⁶ The term “primordial” stems from the Latin noun *primordium*, meaning “the beginning.”

⁵⁷ Smith: 2008, p. 3.

⁵⁸ Kumar: 2006, p. 13.

⁵⁹ “nationalism.” 2010. Encyclopaedia Britannica; Hobsbawm: 1990; Anderson: 2006; Gellner: 2006.

which would overcome this separation.⁶⁰ Also Anderson contradicts Smith when he broadens Gellner's emphasis on industrial society as a precondition for nation-building by linking it to the "technology of communication (print)."⁶¹

What I think is more important is that the opinion of perennialists and modernists does not differ at all, when it comes to nationalism. Smith agrees with the modernists in that

"nationalism, as an ideology and movement, is a phenomenon that dates from the later eighteenth century, while a specifically 'national' sentiment can be discerned little earlier than the late fifteenth or sixteenth centuries in Western Europe. The 'nation-state,' too, as a political norm is quite modern. [...] Even the 'nation' and its 'national character' would appear to be modern."⁶²

Like Gellner and Renan, also Smith tries to manifest the meaning of nation or rather "national community" by basing it on subjective factors. In contrast to Renan, he rejects "collective will, attitude, even sentiment," and refers to "the more permanent cultural attributes of memory, value, myth and symbolism [...] immortalized in the arts, languages, sciences and laws of the community."⁶³

As we have seen, Smith divides scholars on nationalism into two groups based on their opinion on when nations emerged, perennialists and modernists. Krishan Kumar identifies even three schools of scholarship on nationalism based on the same criterion, when nations emerged. He also identifies perennialists and modernists, but moreover primordialists. Actually, primordialism is very close to perennialism in that it also assumes an ancient-old existence of nations. It differs insofar as it does not see the emergence of nations as a historical occurrence, but interprets nations as something natural.⁶⁴ The question if nations are ancient old or rather modern is central especially for historians. Thus, perennialists and modernists can mainly be found among this academic group, whereas primordialists can mainly be found among sociologists.⁶⁵

Kumar's two categories correspond with Smith's ethnicists, who are mostly perennialists, and statist, who are mostly modernists. It soon becomes clear that most scholars on nationalism, both historians and sociologists, are modernists and approach nationalism from an entirely European background – Eric Hobsbawm, John Breuilly, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Patrick Geary. The ethnicist-perennialist Smith and the primordialist-perennialist Liah Greenfeld are rare exceptions.

But how is the situation among scholars analyzing Chinese nationalism? Can we also find these categories of statist-modernists opposed to ethnicist-perennialists and

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 38–39; Smith: 2008, p. 10.

⁶¹ Anderson: 2006, p. 43; Smith: 2008, p. 10.

⁶² Ibid., p. 11.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁶⁴ In 1996, Gellner asked "do nations have navels?" (Gellner: 1996.)

⁶⁵ Kumar: 2006, p. 12–16.

primordialist-perennialists among them? And do the categorizations of studies on nation and nationalism help us for the Chinese case?

Nation and Nationalism in China

With regard to China the question, when nationalism, nationhood or national consciousness developed, becomes important once again and like in the cases of European nationalisms these these issues are discussed. Some scholars working on Chinese nationalism have the impression that the phenomenon of a nation is much older in China than it is in Europe. Some of them moreover think that a national consciousness existed well before modernity, an idea that is rarely met among scholars working on European nationalism as we have seen. However, usually scholars of Chinese nationalism do not dwell on this point too thoroughly and therefore do not give concrete ideas in how far it is possible to speak of a premodern Chinese nationalism. Prasenjit Duara for instance claims that only the system of nation-states is modern, whereas “nationalism as a form of identification”⁶⁶ is older and an “ethnic nation”⁶⁷ has been in existence already during Song times (960–1279). He makes the point that the question would not be if nationalism existed in premodern times, but if premodern societies would be able to develop political self-awareness, too.⁶⁸

In passing, James Townsend mentions that he accepts “the possibility of a premodern nationalism that lacks the core proposition of modern nationalism: that nations should be states [...] in a world order properly composed by such states.”⁶⁹ With regard to China, he writes that “a Han Chinese nation has existed for centuries, recognized by the Chinese and others as a distinct cultural and political community.”⁷⁰ He tends to follow Wang Lei, who dates the foundation of the Chinese nation back to the unification under Qin Shi Huangdi (259–210 BC, reign 221–210 BC) in 221 BC.⁷¹ But when he then tells the story of the Chinese nation it soon becomes clear that this early origin theory is highly problematic. Townsend lists the facts he thinks made China a nation already early on: distinction from others by “sense of common history with myths or origin and descent; distinctive written language and literary forms [...]; some common folklore, life rituals and religious practices; and a core political elite.”⁷² These preconditions, however, existed also in other states and empires in premodern times and do not necessarily make them nations in the opinion of most scholars of nationalism.

⁶⁶ Duara: 1993b, p. 2, 9.

⁶⁷ Duara: 1993a, p. 786; 1996, p. 34–35.

⁶⁸ Duara: 1993a, p. 782.

⁶⁹ Townsend: 1992, p. 105.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁷¹ Wang Lei: 1983. “The definition of ‘nation’ and the formation of Han nationality.” In: *Social Sciences in China* 4.2, p. 167–188. Cited in Townsend: 1992, p. 124.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

A more detailed attempt to localize nationalism in pre-modernity has been made by Hoyt Cleveland Tillman in 1979. There, Tillman cleverly divides nationalism in “political nationalism fathered by Jean Jacques Rousseau and expressed through the French Revolution and romantic nationalism fathered by Johann Gottfried Herder and exhibited in the national community movements of Central and Eastern Europe.”⁷³ He claims that only by linking nationalism to the concepts modernization, democratization, social mobilization and nation building the assumption has been fixed that nationalism temporally emerged in the late 18th century and spatially in Northwestern Europe and North America. However, according to Tillman the romantic nationalism developed in Central and Eastern Europe in the 19th century has much more in common with Chinese Medieval sentiments, which were triggered by the many foreign conquests of Chinese inhabited regions. It focuses on a rather vague concept of *Volk*, based on “mother tongue, ancient folk traditions, common descent, or national spirit.”⁷⁴ Also Rolf Trauzettel comes to the conclusion in a study about Song identities, that they can be interpreted as nationalism.⁷⁵ Tillman and Trauzettel lead us back to the differentiation between modernists and perennialists.

It seems obvious that definitions of Chinese nation and nationalism can also be divided into the scholarly camps identified by Anthony D. Smith. On the one hand, Townsend, Tillman and Wang Lei can be identified as being perennialists accepting the idea of a pre-modern Chinese nation. It is important to mention though that few of them also accept a pre-modern Chinese nationalism. ‘Complete’ modernists, that is, scholars assuming that both nation and nationalism is entirely modern, predominate the field of study and are led since the 1950s by Joseph R. Levenson, who was the first to publish thorough studies of early Chinese nationalist thinking.⁷⁶ Levenson deeply imprinted the study of Chinese nationalism with his “culturalism to nationalism thesis.”⁷⁷ Consequently, scholars in the field like James P. Harrison, John Fitzgerald, Jonathan Unger and many others see the emergence of a Chinese nation and Chinese nationalism as entirely modern.⁷⁸ This is reflected in the concentration of scholarship on the modern era.

Let us further concentrate on scholarship on Chinese nationalism and its definitions of the term. Following Anthony D. Smith, Townsend divides nationalism into “ethnic” and “state nationalism,” both entirely modern defined terms.⁷⁹ It is important, however, that Townsend bases this differentiation on their different ways of approaching Non-Han people. Whereas ethnic nationalism understands them as minorities and encourage assimilation making them part of the ethnic nation, state nationalism sees them as

⁷³ Tillman: 1979, p. 404.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 405.

⁷⁵ Trauzettel: 1975.

⁷⁶ Levenson: 1958; 1959.

⁷⁷ Levenson: 1959, p. 109–122; 1958, p. 98–104; Townsend: 1992.

⁷⁸ Harrison: 1969; Fitzgerald: 1995; Unger (ed.): 1996; Wei/Liu (eds.): 2001.

⁷⁹ Smith: 1971, p. 176.

autonomous nationalities themselves and intends to unite them nevertheless in a territorial state.⁸⁰ Townsend claims that the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang = KMT, *Guomindang*)⁸¹ tends to ethnic nationalism with its implication of assimilation. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (*Zhongguo gongchandang*), on the other hand, uses state nationalism as its doctrine after 1949. “In doctrine, then, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] had established a single Chinese nation coterminous with the territorial state.”⁸²

Whereas Townsend is right in the sense that KMT and CCP had different ways of approaching the Non-Han people theoretically, James Leibold shows that on a practical level their approaches were in fact similar. The differences were mainly based on their “ideal discursive imagining of the Chinese nation-state,”⁸³ which was not identical with their every-days politics. In the case of the KMT, they aimed at imagining the Chinese nation-state as “ancient, unified, and homogeneous,”⁸⁴ but in fact adopted the “laissez-faire frontier policies of the late Qing empire” in order to deal with the Non-Han people as little as possible, because all their energy had to go to the centre.⁸⁵ Still, Leibold ultimately does not challenge Townsend’s differentiation between nationalisms based on the different imagined nation-states and nations.

We can see that there exist many different approaches to the question when a Chinese nation emerged, but not with regard to the question when Chinese nationalism developed. The latter is seen as an entirely modern phenomenon. However, the idea of China being a nation already in Song times can be convincing, if the definition of nation stays very broad. But the discourses on nation and nationalism are definitely modern. Of course, identities based on common culture, language, traditions, also ethnicity and other unifying aspects “akin to nationalism”⁸⁶ have been in existence before modernity, and some scholars might refer to them as nationalism.

In my opinion this approach would make the term extremely inclusive and in the end the meaning of “nationalism” would be so broad that nearly every group identity could be called nationalism. When Hobsbawm and Gellner define nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent,”⁸⁷ and at the same time argue that nationalism is modern, this means that the idea of a national unit being congruent with the political unit is new, that is, nationalism means that the state is supposed to represent the nation. Political units, states, are not modern, and also nations must not necessarily be modern, but what is modern is the idea of and discourse on a group defined by nationalism, what Hobsbawm

⁸⁰ Townsend: 1992, p. 127.

⁸¹ For the KMT, I use the Wade-Giles transcription instead of Pinyin. On the one hand it is generally more common, on the other hand, it is the transcription the KMT uses itself.

⁸² Townsend: 1992, p. 128.

⁸³ Leibold: 2007, p. 52.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Lawrence: 2005, p. 2.

⁸⁷ Gellner: 2006, p. 1. Also cited in Hobsbawm: 1990, p. 9.

calls a national unit. I thus interpret nationalisms as modern, because its emergence as a group identity is closely linked to both the developing system of nation-states and the parallel discourses on nationalism. The discourses on nationalism(s) are Foucault's *dispositif* of the emergence of nationalism(s) as group identities. What makes nationalisms different from earlier identities and ways of identity-building is not so much its being new in content but the discourse taking place on these questions related to it, a discourse on nationalism, but also on the question of group identity linked to political unit. Therefore, it is not contradicting that I do not see great differences between nationalism(s) and earlier ways of imagining identities and identity-building with regard to their contents. The difference lies in the fact that the questions of identity were discussed under the main principle of nationalism. With regard to Chinese nationalism(s) and approaches to Non-Han people this will become even clearer. This approach seems to be entirely based on earlier pre-nationalist notions and concepts. But it is discussed in the terms and the language of the nationalist discourse and that makes it modern.

The Historian and the Nation

After having given so many different definitions of nations and nationalisms, the question remains, where these attempts to define the nation and nationalism and further to classify these definitions can lead us? With regard to the definition of nationalism I have already stated that it relies heavily on the question what kind of image of the nation it refers to. If realities of nations let alone images of nations are different, then the content of the particular nationalisms also have to differ from each other. Moreover, Miroslav Hroch voices his concerns that the use of the term nationalism is so “controversial and misleading [...] that it has almost lost its explicative value,” because it is “used both as political label and as scientific term.”⁸⁸ He thus suggests to use “the terms ‘*nation formation*’, ‘*national identity*’, ‘*national consciousness*’, and ‘*patriotism*’” instead.⁸⁹ Whereas Hroch's arguments make sense with regard to the fact that nationalism is defined so very differently, in the end also he cannot avoid to give this definition by using auxiliary terms. And so in his proposed alternative terms, “nationalism” still is at the basis, and he has to define what he means by “national” consciousness or identity.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Hroch: 2006, p. 21.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Earlier, Hroch (1984) had already given his definition of national consciousness as being “an awareness of membership in the nation, coupled with a view that this membership is an inherently valuable quality.” (Hroch: 2000, p. 12.) Based on this definition, it becomes clear that Hroch's understanding of “national consciousness” and in the end nationalism links him to Renan's, Gellner's and Hobsbawm's approach.

Is it inevitable to define the terms nation and nationalism before beginning this work as a historian of Chinese intellectual history focusing on early nationalism and nationalist historiography? Before finally answering this question, let me first refer to the special case of historians' "social construction of reality" with regard to nations and nationalisms.⁹¹ Philosophers and sociologists put forward their idea of a social construction of reality already in the 1960s, but in the beginning Michel Foucault's structuralism was regarded as an attack on historiography by most historians. Only in the 1970s, the implications for historiography of his idea that discourses would take a most important role in this construction of reality became an integral part of historiography.⁹² Foucault's notion of discourse is the basis of the assumption that historians by historically "narrating the nation" take part in the "construction of the Janus-faced discourse of the nation."⁹³

Based on John Breuilly's idea how the nation can be treated by historians, Krishan Kumar presents an illuminating analysis of the three relations, in which "historians are crucial to nationalism"⁹⁴: Firstly, the historian as creator of nationalism; secondly, the historian as commentator/critic of nationalism; and thirdly, the historian as narrator of nationalism.⁹⁵ It is obvious that if a historian is a critique of nationalism he will at the same time be a narrator. The second and third relationship are thus closely linked to each other in the role of the critic-narrator.

About the historian being crucial as a creator of nationalism Hobsbawm writes provocatively: "Historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market."⁹⁶ This is based on his understanding that "what justifies one nation against others is the past and historians are the people, who produce it."⁹⁷ Hobsbawm does not perceive himself as a creator of nationalism, because a "serious historian" could *per definitionem* not be "a committed political nationalist," as "nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so."⁹⁸ He bases this opinion on Renan's claim that "getting history wrong is part of being a nation."⁹⁹ Who then belongs to this first group of historians as creators? Kumar names truly nationalist historians like Nikolay Mikhailovich Karamzin (1766–1826) for Russia, "Father of the nation" František Palacký (1798–1876) for Czechia, Mykhailo Serhiyovych Hrushevsky (1866–1934) for Ukraine, Heinrich Gotthard von

⁹¹ Burke: 2002, p. 2. About the basic question of social construction of reality in philosophy and sociology see Berger/Luckmann: 1967.

⁹² This paradigm shift was connected to the so called "linguistic turn" most prominently put forward by Hayden White. (Schöttler: 1997, p. 134; White: 1973. See also Sarasin: 2003, p. 10–28.)

⁹³ Bhabha: 2008, p. 3.

⁹⁴ Kumar: 2006, p. 8–16. See also Breuilly: 2002.

⁹⁵ John Breuilly differentiates three ways, in which "the nation can be deployed by historians" based on eras: first, in the time 1900–1945; second, 1945–1970; and third, since the 1970s. (Ibid.)

⁹⁶ Hobsbawm: 1996, p. 255. See also Kumar: 2006, p. 7.

⁹⁷ Hobsbawm: 1996, p. 255.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹⁹ Hobsbawm's citation of Renan is actually a rather free translation of Renan's above mentioned claim. (Renan: 1882, 9–10; 2008, p. 11.)

Treitschke (1834–1896) for Germany, Jules Michelet (1798–1874) for France and Edward Augustus Freeman (1823–1892) for England.¹⁰⁰ These are historians, who did not question nationalism in their work, but hurled themselves into the task to support their nations and nationalisms by producing nationalist histories based on the “common glories of the past.”¹⁰¹

That historians can also most effectively act as critics of nationalism is shown by many of those scholars I have mentioned above, who have worked on nations and nationalisms and are mostly critic-narrators. However, they employ different grades of critique. Scholars like Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson are “highly skeptical of nationalist claims while at the same time arguing for the necessity and functionality of nationalism.”¹⁰² Andreas Wimmer writes that they and also Karl Deutsch and Anthony D. Smith see nationalism as “*integrative* political and social forces transforming older, exclusionary and hierarchical societies.”¹⁰³ They thus tend to ignore certain exclusionary characteristics of nationalism and therefore “durable inequalities that groups may suffer if their culture or physical appearance made assimilation into the nation difficult.” Other scholars like Elie Kedourie (1926–1992), who interpreted nationalism as entirely negative, bringing about destruction and violence, and Hans Kohn (1891–1971), who analyzed its becoming totalitarian in character when combined with authoritarian rule, criticize nationalism and nation-states as a system *per se*.¹⁰⁴ Also but not only due to his personal experiences as a Jewish boy growing up in Baghdad and having to experience the pogrom against the Jewry of Baghdad in 1941, Kedourie concluded that “‘actually existing’ nationalism is anti-individualist, despotic, racist, and violent.”¹⁰⁵ Also Kohn, who was born into a Jewish family in Prague during *k.u.k.* times and came into Russian war captivity in World War I, developed a sharp criticism of nationalism, especially in East Europe and Germany.¹⁰⁶ Apart from those scholars, who despite their critique accepted nationalism as a necessary, and those, who despised nationalism, there are also those historians, who “played a leading role in debunking nationalism,”¹⁰⁷ like Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger as editors of *The Invention of Tradition* (1983).¹⁰⁸ By showing that basic ingredients for a nationalist identity are in fact invented, they undercut its authenticity.

However, historians as creators and historians as critic-narrators cannot be seen as “the older, ‘uncritical,’ historian coming up against the modern ‘scientific’ historian,

¹⁰⁰ Kumar: 2006, p. 7.

¹⁰¹ Renan: 2008, p. 11, 19.

¹⁰² Kumar: 2006, p. 11.

¹⁰³ Wimmer: 2006, p. 334.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

¹⁰⁵ Beattie: 1998, p. 119; Moreh: 2000, p. 432.

¹⁰⁶ Kohn: 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Kumar: 2006, p. 11.

¹⁰⁸ See *Ibid.*, p. 11–12.

telling it ‘as it really was.’” Kumar rather sees them as “players in the same game,”¹⁰⁹ which they cannot escape, because the very discipline of history has developed parallel to the emergence of nationalism and thus “historians have been complicit in the view that all history is essentially nationalist history.”¹¹⁰ Is it possible for historians today to escape this trap? One first step towards this direction is the de-centering of national history, or, as Prasenjit Duara puts it, the “rescuing history from the nation.”¹¹¹ Only if attempts are made to first develop a certain sensibility to the fact that history is in many cases national history, and then to disentangle history from national approaches and to write alternative histories, historians can begin to look at history from a non-national view.

The question whether a clear-cut definition of nationalism is necessary or not is closely linked to the role one takes as a historian with regard to nationalism – that of a creator, critic or narrator. Of course, also in the scholarship on Chinese nationalism, different relationships between historians and nationalism can be noticed. Like in the European case, there are many nationalist historians, that is, historians as creators of nationalism, and it is the texts of these historians I will refer to in this work. Many of them were very aware of their role, because this had been made their foremost aim by the journalist-intellectual Liang Qichao (1873–1898) in his ground-breaking and defining essay “Xin shixue (Renewal of historiography)” (1902).¹¹² There, he requested all historians to write history in order to create a Chinese national sentiment, in order to create the nation, an idea which was profoundly influenced by Japanese models. Many historians responded to this quest and tried their best to bolster nationalism, especially after the introduction of history as a modern academic university discipline in 1917 at the Peking University (*Beijing Daxue*, also only *Beida*).¹¹³

The historians as critics-narrators of Chinese nationalism can be found much less among Chinese historians, because nationalism is still an important driving force in Chinese historiography. It is more common among Western scholars and Chinese scholars affiliated with Western universities. Critiques and narrations of Chinese nationalism therefore often come from the outside.¹¹⁴ Particularly critiques are also not necessarily written by historians, but often by journalists.¹¹⁵ Especially the critiques-narrations of modern Chinese nationalism are often based on a kind of fear of China as an emerging world power and tend to portray Chinese nationalism “as anti-Western, focusing on Chinese nationalists’ obsession with a powerful state and on the ambition to

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 10; see also Duara: 1993a. The same is stated for archaeology which is also a science which came into existence parallel to nation-states. (Leibold: 2012, p. 335.)

¹¹¹ Duara: 1995.

¹¹² Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 2–3; Wang: 2012, p. 103–105; Zarrow: 2007, p. 25–28.

¹¹³ Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 16.

¹¹⁴ Nationalism in late Imperial and Republican times: Levenson: 1959, *passim*, especially p. 109–122; Wei/Liu (eds.): 2001; Karl: 2002; Esherick: 2006; Leibold: 2007; Matten: 2009. Modern nationalism: Whiting: 1983, 1995; Garver: 1992; Barmé: 1995; Christensen: 1996; Zhao Suisheng: 1997; Downs/Saunders: 1999; Gries: 2001.

¹¹⁵ Kristof/WuDunn: 1994; Bernstein/Munro: 1997.

recover the glory of China's historical empire," as Lei Guang writes.¹¹⁶ As he observes, this understanding is based on China's problematic relations with the West and "overemphasizes the impact of China's unique history, culture, and politics."¹¹⁷ Especially the "emphasis on the Western-directedness of Chinese nationalism" causes a problem, a factor, which is also important with respect to scholarship on early Chinese nationalism: it underestimates the role Chinese nationalism plays with regard to non-Western states and ethnicities.¹¹⁸ A second problem Lei Guang locates within the scholarship on modern Chinese nationalism is the neglect of its "international sources of ideas and ideals."¹¹⁹ Whereas this is in fact a problem with regard to post-1949 nationalism, this is not evident in scholarship in late Imperial and early Republican nationalism. Here, rather the opposite is the case and for a long time the root for Chinese nationalism has been seen as lying entirely outside of China in the West.¹²⁰

The Historical Setting: Nationalist Thinking and the Non-Han Regions in Late Imperial and Early Republican Times

In my dissertation it will become clear that one important driving force of Chinese nationalism lay within the borders of the last dynastic Empire ruling over China, the Manchu Qing (*Manzhou Qing*) (1644–1912). This driving force was the fact that a greater part of the Qing geo-body was inhabited – scarcely, but still rather exclusively – by Non-Han people, the main groups being Mongols, Tibetans, Turkish Muslims and to a lesser degree Manchus. This situation made it a basic quest for Han Chinese nationalists to first of all think about the borders of their intended nation-state. As most of them quickly came to the conclusion that a Chinese nation-state had to adopt the borders of the Qing Empire, a next quest posed itself: how to integrate the Non-Han people in a Chinese nation-state – ideologically, historically and of course politically?

These circumstances were an important trigger for Han Chinese nationalism and development of specific Han Chinese models of nationalism. To be a Han Chinese nationalist did not come naturally. The thinkers had to define and argue very clearly what they meant by a Chinese nation and consequently nation-state. The questions of ethnicity and culture, superiority and inferiority, and moreover of territory played a crucial role in these definitions. There was no intention by Han Chinese thinkers to use nationalism to form their nation-state, but rather to use nationalism as a tool to strengthen the existing territorial state. Therefore, their theories of nationalism were

¹¹⁶ Lei: 2005, p. 487, see also p. 508.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 487.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 489.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ See for example Levenson: 1959, p. 109f.

born out of the actual political situation. The Qing Empire was to be maintained territorially, but changed and strengthened with regard to ethnicity and culture.


That the most influential Chinese nationalists around 1900, Kang Youwei (1858–1927), Liang Qichao (1873–1929) and Zhang Taiyan (also Zhang Binglin, 1868–1936), imagined the Chinese nation-state in the borders of the Qing Empire was also a consequence from their first steps as nationalist reformers, who did not want the Qing Dynasty to abdicate, but called for reforms. They were willing to accept the Manchus as emperors as long as they would try to bring China on a way to what they considered modernity. Already in 1898, several reformers tried to launch a political reform – later called the Hundred Days' Reform (*Wuxu bianfa*) – with the help of the young Guangxu emperor (1871–1908, reign time: 1875–1908). But his aunt Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908, ruling time: 1861–1908), who in effect was in power, put an end to these efforts executing six of the reformers, among them Tan Sitong, and causing the flight of the others, the most important ones being Kang Youwei and his disciple Liang Qichao, who went to Japan. The Hundred Days' Reform aimed at a political change towards a more democratic oriented constitutional monarchy. It was a first though meanwhile unsuccessful step towards the modernization of the Qing empire with the ultimate aim of making it a nation-state. This at least was the intention of the men involved in the reforms and this also explains why from the start these men imagined the Chinese nation-state in the borders of the Qing Empire.

Shortly after and partly due to the failed Hundred Days' Reform, more and more nationalist thinkers turned to an anti-Manchu revolutionary approach. Men like Zhang Taiyan, Sun Yat-sen [= Sun Yixian] (1886–1925)¹²¹, Liu Shiwei (1884–1919) and Tan Sitong (1865–1998) called for an overthrow of the Qing dynasty out of anti-Manchu sentiments. It is often claimed that many of them came to the conclusion that a Chinese nation-state would consist only of Han Chinese inhabited regions and that this approach would have been lead by Zhang Taiyan.

All nationalist thinkers simultaneously considered nationalist and ethnic-cultural sentiment and self-consciousness as crucial for building a nation-state. At the same time they all considered homogeneity as a basic precondition for stability and safety. Their concrete ideas for the Chinese nation-building and propositions of how to achieve them were different, however.

After the first Chinese nation-state, the Republic of China (1912–1949), had been officially founded, the imagination of the national community was still not congruent with the actual state. The political situation of East Asia after the foundation of the Republic of China was such that the Republic of China and the powerfully imagined Chinese nation-state differed. Illustrations of this fact are maps of Republican times, which include regions into the Republic of China, which were *de facto* not controlled by the Republican government.

¹²¹ In Mandarin, his pseudonym Sun Zhongshan is mostly used. Sun Yixian is one of his literary names.



Map 1 Map of the Republic of China's humiliations (*Zhonghua guochi ditu*)” [1929].¹²²

On Map 1 one can see Outer Tibet, Outer Mongolia, East Turkestan and Manchuria as parts of the geo-body of the Republic of China. The name of the map, “Map of the Republic of China’s humiliations (*Zhonghua guochi ditu*),” and the accompanying texts indicate that the makers of the map complain about China’s territorial losses and the bad conditions the unequal treaties meant for China, but they do not refer to the separation of Non-Han regions, which appear as fast parts of the symbolically yellow colored nation-state.

Moreover, the independence of regions like (Outer) Mongolia, (Outer) Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang) was officially not acknowledged. This made it possible to continue imagining them as parts of the Chinese nation-state although they had already declared themselves as independent states. But this also meant that it was still very important to support this imagination by further extending it to the past and creating a national history, which would manifest the Chinese nation-state in the desired borders as ancient-old.

To understand why especially the four large Non-Han regions, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang), played a crucial role in the Chinese nation-building process and why they have therefore also have to acquire this role in a history of

¹²² “Zhong hua guo chi di tu,” Map Collections, Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress. Online version retrieved November 15th, 2012, <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/gmdhome.html>.

Chinese nationalism, it is necessary to shortly explain these regions' situations in the time just before the downfall of the Qing Dynasty.

When the Qing empire started to decline in the 19th century, large territories like Mongolia, Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang), which formed more or less loose entities by geographical, cultural, linguistic and religious reasons, started to regain power. Inner Mongolia had been controlled by the Manchus already before the foundation of the Qing Dynasty in 1644. Outer Mongolia came under Manchu rule in 1691. After having been conquered in 1720, the Southern part of East Turkestan, that is, the Tarim Basin and the Dunhuang Basin, became independent in 1864 and was reconquered in 1881. Dzungaria, the Northern part of East Turkestan, was defeated in 1757–1758, after 70% of the Dzungars had been killed by the Manchus in a genocide and by a small pox epidemic. Qing control in Outer or Western Tibet (Ü-Tsang and Western Kham) and Inner Tibet (Amdo and Eastern Kham) was established in 1720. Outer Tibet reassumed *de facto* independence in the 1870s, although it officially remained under Qing suzerainty until 1912. Due to their weakness and the need for engagement of their military in the East during the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), the Qing government was not able to maintain its power constantly. And after the last Qing emperor's abdication in 1912, Outer Mongolia and Outer Tibet immediately achieved independence and formed states on their own, and East Turkestan (Xinjiang) remained under the control of the former Qing official Yang Zengxin (1867–1928), who officially declared that it would be a province of the Republic of China, but kept on acting rather independently.

An important factor was that these regions were heavily threatened from outside. At the end of the 19th century, Russia used the power gap in Central Asia to strengthen its power there and even conquered parts of the Qing Empire, the Ili valley, which today belongs to Kazakhstan. This was part of the so-called “Great Game.”¹²³ The term “Great Game,” also called the “Tournament of Shadows,” refers to the strategic conflict between Britain and Russia in Central Asia, which began in 1813 with the Russo-Persian Treaty¹²⁴, and ended in 1907, when the Anglo-Russian Convention¹²⁵ was signed. So, with regard to the Qing geo-body Britain tried to enlarge its influence in Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang), and Russia tried the same also in East Turkestan, but moreover in Mongolia.

¹²³ Hopkirk: 1990.

¹²⁴ Also called Treaty of Gulistan. This was a peace treaty after the First Russo-Persian War (1804–1813), which made Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Eastern Georgia parts of Russia.

¹²⁵ The Conventions solidified borders of control in Central Asia, i.e. Persia was divided in three parts and Afghanistan was put under British control.



Map 2 “New map of the Republic of China, indicating provinces (*Zhonghua minguo fensheng xintu*)” [1933?] (English descriptions mine).¹²⁶

Having been part of the Qing geo-body for centuries although politically independent for the moment, Tibet, Mongolia and East Turkestan remained part of China at least in the minds of Chinese nationalist thinkers and politicians. Thus, when the Republic of China was founded in 1912 these highly embattled regions and their political situations were serious points of interest as the founders of the young state intended to integrate all former subjects and territories of the Qing empire. But unlike before when the Chinese empires waited

“for the ‘barbarians’ to *laihua* (come and be transformed) [...] the newly conceptualized *shaoshu minzu* [...] needed to be integrated [...] through the active process of *hanhua* (sinification or literally, the act of ‘becoming Chinese’), lest their territory be lost to competing nation-states.”¹²⁷

¹²⁶ “*Zhong hua min guo fen sheng xin tu*,” Map Collections, Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress. Online version retrieved November 15th, 2012, <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/gmdhome.html>.

¹²⁷ Leibold: 2007, p. 5.

James Leibold analyzes the diverse strategies, by which the KMT and CCP theoretically and practically tried to integrate these regions. In my dissertation, Leibold's view is adopted that although the Non-Han regions might be border regions from the geopolitical viewpoint of a Chinese nation-state, they were much more central from the national-historical viewpoint.¹²⁸ That they were moreover central from Mongolian, Tibetan and Turkish Muslim points of view reflected in their own nationalisms and nationalist historiographies goes without saying and will not be an issue here.¹²⁹

My Definitions

With regard to Kumar's division of relationships between the historian and nationalism, my role is that of a narrator. I narrate the history of nationalism linked to a specific question – that of the Non-Han people and their integration into a Chinese nation-state. Therefore, there are in the end two conflicting answers to the question whether I have to define nationalism and nation: yes and no.

No, because I do not have to define nation and nationalism by myself. This is done, so to speak, by the thinkers themselves, whose definitions I narrate and analyze. I am analyzing their diverse definitions of nation, especially of the Chinese nation, definitions, which differ from thinker to thinker, and sometimes even from text to text. But I am not giving my own idea of how the (Chinese) nation could or should be defined. (That the Chinese term usually translated as “nation (*minzu*, also *guojia*)” poses a special challenge will be explained further below.)

Yes, because I do have to define what I mean by early Chinese nationalism and early Chinese nationalist thinkers. I use these terms to classify certain Chinese thinkers from around 1900 to the late 1920s and group them together, analyzing them from the spatial as well as the temporarily outsider's perspective. If I have no certain understanding of what nationalism means in this context it would make no sense to use the term to describe them and their thinking at all.

My basis for calling certain thinkers' nationalist thinkers and certain historians nationalist historians is the fact that all of them wrote about their idea of a Chinese nation and of a Chinese nation-state using the *equivalent Chinese terms*. They tried to imagine this nation-state before as well as after its actual founding as a state construct in 1912 in spatial as well as in historical expansions. The basic fact hereby is that they use the terms *minzu* and *minzuzhuyi*, which are today often translated as “nation” and “nationalism.” My classification of these thinkers as nationalists therefore relies on

¹²⁸ Leibold writes that when space was enclosed in the process of the world becoming a system of nation-states “borderlands were bordered.” (Leibold: 2012, p. 335.)

¹²⁹ About Mongolian nationalism see the Lattimore: 1955; Bulag: 1998. About Tibetan nationalism see Smith, W. W. Jr.: 1996. About Uyghur nationalism see Rudelson: 1997.

today's general accepted translation of *minzu* and *minzuzhuyi*.¹³⁰ This is admittedly not unproblematic, because the translations of the both terms in fact cannot be fixed to “nation” and “nationalism” only. Although today, *minzu* indeed is mostly translated as “nation,” it can moreover mean “ethnicity,” “people,” “race,” and “nationality.”¹³¹ In late Imperial and early Republican times, the term *minzu* mostly has to be translated as “ethnicity” and also “race,” rather than nation.¹³² This implies the underlying ethnic idea of Chinese nation and nationalism.¹³³ Consequently, it could make sense to re-think the translation of *minzuzhuyi* not as “nationalism,” but as “ethnic nationalism” or “ethno-nationalism” like it is done in case of the Japanese parallel term *minzokushugi*, which is written with the same characters like the Chinese *minzuzhuyi*. The thinkers would then be “ethnic nationalists.” Rebecca Karl takes this approach and translates *minzuzhuyi* as “ethno-nationalism” (opposed to *C. guojiazhuyi* and *J. kokkashugi* as “nation-statism”).¹³⁴

Contrary to that, I think that a description of Chinese nationalist thinkers as “ethnic nationalists” in general would focus too much on a certain ethnic approach of some of them. Although Chinese nationalists were strongly emphasizing ethnicity and race as aspects of nationalist sentiment, they were in fact torn between statist and ethnic nationalism. This was connected to the specific political situations they were confronted with. With regard to national sentiment, they wanted their nation-state to be formed by an ethnic, that is, purely Han Chinese nation. But with regard to dimension, they wanted the nation-state to embrace the Qing Empire's geo-body. Therefore, the basic term “nationalists” seem to me the most appropriate one to describe the thinkers, whose texts I analyze.

Another reason for calling the Chinese thinkers, whose texts I analyze, nationalists is their aim at strengthening a “national sentiment (*minzu sixiang*)” in order to consolidate the Chinese state and to finally making it a nation-state, that is, a state with a national people.

Based on the thinking of these men, I define early Chinese nationalism as a theoretical idea, which these thinkers implied in their writings in order to strengthen a identificatory feeling among an imagined community, that of the Chinese nation. The nationalisms of these thinkers, however, were as different as their notion of the Chinese nation. I am concentrating on their ideas of nation with regard to the question of ethnicity and territory, that is, how Non-Han people and the territories they inhabited would and could be integrated into the nation and the nation-state and into national

¹³⁰ In late Imperial and early Republican times, the term *aiguozhuyi*, usually translated as “patriotism,” is very close to these terms. It is used much less though and does not play a role with regard to Non-Han ethnicities at all.

¹³¹ Moseley: 1965, p. 20.

¹³² Dikötter thinks that “race and nation overlapped in the term *minzu*,” but I think that in the texts from the 1900s *minzu* does not necessarily imply a nation. (Dikötter: 1992, p. 108.)

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Karl: 2007, p. 15.

history. There are of course many more ways to analyze their nationalisms, the most important one being an analysis based on the Chinese self-assertion against imperialist powers (anti-Western, anti-Japanese nationalism), but also revolutionary anti-monarchic nationalisms and reformist constitutionalist nationalisms, both being forms of statist or state nationalism, focusing on the questions how a Chinese nation-state should be formed politically and then defining the nation according to this state.¹³⁵ All these various nationalisms also overlap each other.

Chinese Nationalist Thinkers: Creators of Different Images of the Chinese Nation

With regard to the diverse imaginations of nationalisms I will analyze here, that is, late Imperial and early Republican Chinese nationalisms, it has already come to the fore that different “schools” of nationalists seemingly can be identified when focusing on the question of territory. There are those, who wanted to use the territory of the Qing Dynasty as a blueprint, and others, who wanted to cut off the Non-Han inhabited parts. An equally important way of identifying nationalist schools, which is in fact closely connected to the territorial question, is the approach to defining the national ethnical-cultural Self and a certain Other outside this nation.¹³⁶ Are the Non-Han ethnicities under Qing rule, the most important ones being the Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Turkish Muslim, but also all other Non-Han ethnicities seen as part of the national Self or do they belong to the Other? The narrow image of a purely Han Chinese nation-state is usually ascribed to the so-called nationalist revolutionaries, who are philosophically linked to the so-called Old Text school of thought. Those thinkers imagining the Chinese nation-state in the Qing borders, embracing all Non-Han people are usually seen as belonging to the group of so-called nationalist reformers, who are philosophically linked to the so-called New Text school of thought.

I think that this assumed confrontation between the two schools of nationalist thought is highly exaggerated. When they thought of a future Chinese nation-state, most Han Chinese nationalist thinkers, reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao as

¹³⁵ Like Levenson did already in 1953, Lei Guang and James Townsend criticize that scholars would often analyze Chinese nationalism on the assumption that it was mainly directed against Western and Japanese Imperialism. (Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 109; Townsend: 1992; Lei: 2005, p. 493.)

¹³⁶ The formation of the idea that this Other could become part of the Xia/Hua/Chinese Self is traced to the Western Han dynasty (206 BC–8 AD), but some also find evidence for it as early as in Zhou times (1045–256 BC) or even Shang (1600–1046 BC) times. Nicola Di Cosmo refers to the *Shiji* (*Records of the Grand Historian*) by Sima Qian (ca. 145–86 BC). Frank Dikötter writes that the idea of cultural assimilation stems from the *Chunqiu* (*Spring and Autumn Annals*), the official chronicle of the State of Lu between 722–481 BC, which is traditionally ascribed to Confucius (trad. 551–479 BC). Lothar von Falkenhausen states: “Zhou ritual conventions became increasingly a recognized barometer of civilization, the contrast between Chinese [...] and Barbarians became even more accentuated over the course of the Eastern Zhou period.” Shelach refers to the Late Shang period. (Di Cosmo: 2002, p. 2; Dikötter: 1992, p. 2–3; Von Falkenhausen: 1999, p. 544, Shelach: 1996.)

well as revolutionaries like Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yat-sen, imagined it in the borders of the Qing empire. To bolster their vision of the Chinese nation-state in these large borders, Han Chinese nationalist thinkers turned to history and like in all other nationalisms, history became an integral part of nation-building and the nation-state.

The question concerning us here is what was the reason for most of the political thinkers' wish to include the Manchus and other Non-Han people and consequently the territories inhabited by them into a nevertheless Chinese nation-state? On the one hand and as I have already pointed out, it was a kind of habit to envision the Chinese nation-state in the borders of the Qing empire, because many Chinese nationalists were originally reformers, who did not necessarily want to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. On the other hand, this image of the Chinese nation-state was motivated geopolitically and power politically.¹³⁷

Apart from the Mongol empire (1206–1368), which was legitimated in China under the dynastic name Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368), the Manchu Qing Empire was the largest area a dynasty in China – although not an ethnic Han Chinese dynasty – ever reigned. Its larger part consisted of territories inhabited by Non-Han ethnicities. The integration of these areas and the assimilation, that is, sinicization of the people living there was seen as a prerequisite for the building of a powerful Chinese nation-state.¹³⁸ James Townsend explains that “no Chinese government would abandon territorial claims so closely linked to national tradition and security.”¹³⁹ The Qing Empire's regions Tibet, East Turkestan (Xinjiang), Mongolia and Manchuria – often called Outer China – formed important buffer zones protecting Inner China especially from Great Britain and Russia, which controlled Central Asia and India and had already shown willingness to invade China in the 1870s, and of course also from Japanese invasions.

Chinese political thinkers thus had to solve a problematic situation. On the one hand, they wanted to build a Chinese nation-state based on the precondition that its inhabitants shared a certain national sentiment with the Han Chinese as its core. On the other hand, the majority of them wanted to build a state in the borders of the multi-ethnic Qing Empire. Thus, they had to legitimate the incorporation of areas inhabited by Non-Han people. We will see that the theory of an “assimilative power” seemed a hand strategy.

The idea of nation-building did not only enter Han Chinese political discourse, but also that of Non-Han people, who consequently started to form nations and to build

¹³⁷ Already since the 19th century the British and the Russians had been threatening Qing China through Tibet, Mongolia and East Turkestan (Xinjiang). After 1912, when the Republic of China had been founded, the politicians of the leading political party, the KMT, tried to win over these areas by words, but when the Communists founded the PRC in 1949 they both had the military power and also the ideological background to conquer and keep these regions finally. About the different strategies of the KMT and later the CCP see Leibold: 2007, p. 51–109 (Part I “Strategies of Political Intervention”).

¹³⁸ Tan Sitong: 1981 [1884]; Kang Youwei: 1981 [1898]; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p.75–77; 1983 [1921], p. 26–27; 1983 [1922_1], p. 31–34; Sun Yat-sen: 1994 [1924], p. 23; see also Rawski: 1998, p.2-3.

¹³⁹ Townsend: 1992, p. 127.

nation-states. Witnessing tendencies of independence and later nation-building processes among Non-Han people, especially Tibetans and Mongols, the Han Chinese nationalists needed an explanation, why they wanted to deny these people their own nation-states and how to imbed their nationalisms into one Chinese national sentiment. James Townsend differentiates between an ethnic nationalism, which would “encourage assimilation [...] or, less acceptable, independence” and a state nationalism, which would accept different ethnicities as single nations and nevertheless unite them in one greater community.¹⁴⁰ I think that already in late Imperial and early Republican times, that is, in the 1900s until the 1920s, state nationalism was the less agreeable option. Most Han Chinese nationalist thinkers saw the implementation of state nationalism as the leading concept of a multi-ethnic nation-state only as a pre-stage. But the ultimate aim was – with the help of sinicization – an ethnic nationalism, which would lead to a nation-state with a united and possibly Han Chinese nation.¹⁴¹ The political thinkers and historians of late Imperial and Republican time have laid the foundation for the official subliminal strategy of sinicization despite the fact that until today its mainly negative effects for the inner stability of the nation-state are obvious – one of the most important ones being the strengthening of minority nationalisms in form of “perpetuative-rational nativism” rather than weakening such sentiments.¹⁴²

If we now turn back to Gellner’s assumption that homogeneity was not an outcome of nationalism, but a demand of nationalism, the approach of the early Chinese nationalist thinkers makes in fact sense. They were aware that the multi-ethnicity in the intended nation-state territory would cause difficulties for the application of the nation-state system to this territory. Nationalism as the basis of a political system was not made for plurality, but for homogeneity. Thus, they tried to create this homogeneity – firstly, by imagining it in their political thinking, secondly, by inventing it in historiographical writing, and thirdly, by imposing it by political measures. The first two steps shall be analyzed here.

Most of the political thinkers thereby employed a certain nationalism, which might be called “including” or “culturalist nationalism,” but which can better be characterized as being a kind of “ambivalent nationalism.” Eminent early nationalist thinkers like Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan first used it and later it was adopted by nearly all nationalist historians as we will see. Liang himself called the nationalism he aimed at “large nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi*).”¹⁴³ Liang and Zhang belonged to two different and in many aspects opposed political camps. Liang favored reformism, a change of China without bloodshed, even if that meant to accept the Manchus as monarchs in a

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Also in the PRC (1949–today) both kinds of nationalism have been applied. Officially, the CCP government accepts national pluralism reflected in the official autonomy of ethnic minorities. But at the same time, it denies this cultural pluralism reflected in the lack of real autonomy and political measures aiming at assimilating Non-Han people.

¹⁴² Linton: 1943, p. 231, 233–234.

¹⁴³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75.

constitutional monarchy. Although Zhang also supported the reform movements at the end of the 19th century, he was in fact an anti-Manchuist, whose actual wish it was to overthrow the Manchu Qing Dynasty by all means. Also with regard to the integration of Non-Han people it is claimed that they stand for opposed opinions. These opinions are also based on their belonging to the two main, but opposed philosophical schools in late Imperial China, the New Text and the Old Text school. In the first and the second chapter it will become obvious though that Liang and Zhang were closely connected with regard to the integration of Non-Han people and that their aims were united at least in this respect.

Liang and Zhang were attracted by nationalism and wanted to use it as a practical tool to strengthen China and the Chinese state. Hoping to be able to cope with the imperialist powers in the West and to stop the breaking apart of the Qing geo-body, they turned to this new idea, which seemed to have already helped Japan in becoming a modern state during the Meiji restoration. They approached nationalism in a very distinct way by first defining a Chinese nation-state, that is, defining its concrete and desired borders, and then developing a nationalism, which fitted the conditions they found in this territory. Because they defined their nationalism before the actual founding of the state, it is not entirely justified to call it a state nationalism. But this was indeed what Liang and Zhang intended nationalism to be – a nationalism strengthened and defined by the state. The crux was that they based their image of the Chinese nation-state on territory and thereby on pre- and non-nationalist considerations. Thus, the basic problem was that this nation-state included many Non-Han people and put the challenge to unify and nationalize them before the nationalist thinkers.

The fact that former Chinese states never had to deal with the most important of these Non-Han people – Manchus, Mongols, Uyghurs and Tibetans – as powerful members of state elites before increased the problem. Before, Han Chinese thinkers had only dealt with them either as “barbarians” outside the borders, or as conquerors, which were clever enough not to interfere too much with the administrative structures in the Han inhabited regions they conquered. Therefore, Liang and Zhang could not revert to earlier Han Chinese experiences in order to develop strategies how to integrate them. The only state models, which included these Non-Han people, were the Non-Han dynasties. Especially the Manchu Qing presented itself as a useful model, because Liang and Zhang themselves lived under their government, and because it was one of the most successful dynasties in East Asian history with regard to territory and also with regard to prosperity at least until the beginning of the 19th century.

But Liang and Zhang turned to the Qing only as their territorial, but not as their political model, which then might have led them to a more federalist idea of a modern state.¹⁴⁴ Instead, they turned to Han Chinese models, which originally were not designed

¹⁴⁴ Only in the 1920s Zhang would turn in this direction and engage in a movement for “federal self-government (*Liansheng zizhi*).” (Duara: 1995, p. 187–188.)

for integrating all these people in a state in reality, but were highly theoretical.¹⁴⁵ To develop their groundbreaking models of Han Chinese nationalism and the Chinese nation-state, Liang and Zhang used the idea of the universalist understanding of All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*), often called culturalism as the basis of their theories of integrating Non-Han people in a Chinese nation-state.¹⁴⁶ Culturalism thus forms the starting point of the ethnic and cultural approach of Chinese nationalists.

The term culturalism had been introduced by the eminent scholar of Chinese history Joseph R. Levenson in the 1950s in order to describe the turn from an earlier notion of Chinese self-definition based on culture and the notion that Chinese culture would be culture *per se*, – or as Joseph R. Levenson described it: “I think; therefore I am Chinese”¹⁴⁷ – to a nationalist approach to self-definition. Levenson was one of the very first historians, who analyzed Chinese nationalism and his studies are still highly valued. He originally introduced the term culturalism to refer to the ostensible exclusively cultural definition of Chineseness before the introduction of nationalism, assuming that nationalism caused a shift to an ethnical and political definition. When Liang “urged China to become new and to become a nation”¹⁴⁸ he wanted at the same time to make a “*kuo-chia* [nation-state] of *t’ian-hsia* [All-under-Heaven].”¹⁴⁹ Levenson claimed that culturalism, that is, the idea of a cultural universalism would have been the basis of Chinese self-perception in imperial times.¹⁵⁰ This universalism denies the possibility of multiculturalism or in other words of other people having achieved their own distinctive cultures. It implies that those, who want to cultivate themselves, will inevitably turn to the one universal culture, which had been already achieved by the Chinese but is not Chinese. It is closely connected, in fact to a great extent synonymous to John K. Fairbank’s concept of Sinocentrism, which also implies “an assumption of Chinese superiority.”¹⁵¹ The concept of All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*), however, constitutes itself around the Son of Heaven (*tianzi*), the emperor, who is “the catalyst of the transformative power of culture.”¹⁵² Only in times of Non-Han rule it seems, the Son of Heaven “ceases to be a source of ‘civilization’.”¹⁵³ Then, the task to transform lies in the conquered Han Chinese people, whose power of culture is however seen as sufficient to cope with this.

Based on a cultural approach, Han Chinese nationalist thinkers like Liang Qichao did not imagine the Chinese nation-state as a multicultural state. It should become more and more homogenous, using assimilation as a means to bring about this homogeneity

¹⁴⁵ Fairbank: 1970, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ That this approach is still prevalent in late 20th century shown by Philip C. C. Huang. (Huang: 1998, p. 192.)

¹⁴⁷ Levenson: 1959, p. 110.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 109–122; Fairbank (ed.): 1970, p. 2f.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁵² Di Cosmo: 2012, p. 22.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

based on a Chinese image of ethnicity and culture. In fact, Liang's inner-state idea of a Chinese nationalism is heavily based on culturalist ideas and here culturalism was by no means replaced by nationalism. On the contrary, older ideas of a Chinese cultural superiority were merged into a picture of the Han Chinese as the cultural and racial centre of a nation-state in the borders of the Qing Empire. The idea of a Chinese nation-state was implemented into the concept of culturalism and permitted its protagonists to completely ignore or deny Non-Han people in the territory of Qing China the right of their own nationalisms or strives for nation-state-building or even only state-building. Liang and his fellow nationalist reformers still were guided by the concept of All-under-Heaven when they revealed their ideas for a nation-state.

James Townsend similarly criticizes the paradigm of what he calls Levenson's "culturalism to nationalism thesis," which claims that "the modern history of China, then, is one, in which nationalism replaces culturalism as the dominant Chinese view of their identity and place in the world."¹⁵⁴ His critic concludes that this thesis would be imprecise and also oversimplified. He argues that on the one hand the thesis would be much more limited than generally admitted by class and also by alternative ways of defining Chineseness such as statecraft and ethnicity, and on the other hand, that would have left its deep imprint on Chinese nationalism nevertheless.¹⁵⁵ The legacy of culturalism in nationalism can be seen, according to Townsend, in two important implications: first, culturalism was still the basis of the legitimation of "Chinese rule over Non-Han peoples as well as Non-Han rule over the Chinese."¹⁵⁶ Thereby, it was an important part of Chinese state nationalism. And second, it manifested the understanding of the culture of the nation-state, the possibility of others to participate in this culture and the impossibility of the Chinese to defect from it. Thereby, it was an important part of Chinese nationalism.¹⁵⁷

John Fitzgerald limits the culturalism of the nineteenth-century Chinese reformers as being one early kind of nationalism. He criticizes that culturalism is "customarily distinguished from nationalism in Western historiography. Indeed, we generally presume later developments in nationalist thought [...] to be the definite form of nationalism."¹⁵⁸ Fitzgerald's critique refers directly to my understanding of a definition of Chinese nationalism, which is that it is not possible and therefore not desirable to limit it to one definition of nationalism, which then can be valid for all nationalisms developing among Chinese thinkers since the late 19th century.

Also Benjamin I. Schwartz and Frank Dikötter criticize the two implications of Levenson's idea of culturalism, first, that it was the only identity concept at the end of

¹⁵⁴ Townsend: 1992, p. 97. See for example Levenson: 1959, p. 109–122; Fairbank/Reischauer/Craig (eds.): 1973, p. 177–179, 195–197.

¹⁵⁵ Townsend: 1992, p. 111–113.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113–114.

¹⁵⁸ Fitzgerald: 1995, p. 80.

the Qing dynasty, and second, that it was replaced by nationalism after 1900.¹⁵⁹ And in fact, culturalism was by no means the only identity concept in China, let alone the most prevalent over all times. Other and often narrower ways of identity formed and manifested over time. Especially in times of Non-Han conquest, Chinese scholars would concentrate on a narrow ethnic and cultural belonging. The so-called Ming loyalists in early Qing times and also earlier thinkers during Song and Yuan times would not refer to the cultural concept of All-under-Heaven, but would try to exclude Non-Han people from their identity group and they were important role models for late Qing nationalist thinkers. Their ways of defining a Han Chinese identity influenced another nationalism, the “excluding” or “racial nationalism” of Liu Shipei and also of the early Zhang Taiyan in the first years of the 20th century. Also Liu and an early Zhang turned to Chinese ideas of perceiving the Self and the Other, but not to the all-embracing and all-explaining culturalism, but they more heavily based their theories of a national Self on the ideas of the Ming loyalists. The Ming loyalists, who in turn relied on Fang Xiaoru’s (1357–1402) anti-Mongol theories and racial ideas from the early Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), were members of the Chinese literati elite, whose families had held official positions during the Ming Dynasties.¹⁶⁰ The loyalists were born at the end of the Ming and had experienced the change from the Ming to the Manchu Qing Dynasty in the middle of the 17th century. They turned to an exclusively defined image of the Chinese cultural and racial identity based on their rejection of the Manchus as their overlords in particular and of Non-Han people in general. But they also referred to a new method of reading the ancient classics, the method of evidential research (*kaozheng*) developed by the Ming loyalist and eminent philosopher Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), and based their philosophical understanding moreover on Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) Neo-Confucianism.

One of the most famous Ming loyalists, the philosopher Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), thus developed not only his materialistic philosophy and an evolutionary understanding of history, but – with respect to the late Qing racial nationalists even more importantly – an idea of the state (*Reichsidee*), which could be interpreted as proto-nationalist and led to his popularity in the late Qing Dynasty.¹⁶¹ Wang Fuzhi declined the culturalist understanding of identity, but developed a geo-determined understanding of cultural-ethnic belonging. According to him, each race had its own *Lebensraum*, outside of which it could not survive.¹⁶² With regard to China, Wang Fuzhi claimed, that the regions of China proper (with the ancient nine provinces at its centre) would form a geographical unity, the “central region (*zhongqu*)” or “sacred region (*shenqu*)” and consequently the people living there would form a natural community.¹⁶³ However, in Wang’s understanding the Chinese community could only survive if it was regulated by a strong

¹⁵⁹ Schwartz: 1968; Townsend: 1992; Dikötter: 1992; Fitzgerald: 1995. See also Dikötter: 1995, p. 56–57.

¹⁶⁰ Fincher: 1972.

¹⁶¹ Vierheller: 1968, p. 7.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

Chinese political system and if its inner peace was ensured by keeping the community pure by excluding Non-Han people. Thus, the Non-Han people were not dangerous for China as long as they stayed in their own *Lebensraum*. But when they conquered China, both, the Chinese as well as the Non-Han people were in danger. The Non-Han people, who left their natural *Lebensraum*, would lose their beastliness, on which their power was originally based, thus they would decline. The Chinese would barbarize due to their contacts with the Non-Han people. Therefore, the invasion of Non-Han people had to be rejected.¹⁶⁴

In the 1860s after the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), the powerful Chinese military general Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) issued a new edition of Wang Fuzhi's works, which enabled Chinese intellectuals to study his philosophy. Liu Shipei, Zhang Taiyan and Tan Sitong (1865–1898), but in fact also 'inclusive' nationalists like Liang Qichao were deeply influenced by Wang's and other Ming loyalists' ideas in their understanding of the Chinese Self and in their ideas of a Chinese nation.¹⁶⁵

Both major groups of nationalist thinking, the inclusive as well as the exclusive nationalists were further influenced by Western thinking, with regard to ethnic identity most importantly by Social Darwinism and pseudo-scientific theories on racial belonging and character, a factor I will refer to in the analyzes themselves more thoroughly. All of them and especially Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan occasionally shifted in their ideas, changed the direction of their understanding of ethnic belonging and definition of Self and Other.

Assimilation

The most important effect culturalism had on nationalist thinkers was their belief in the power of the Han Chinese ethnicity culturally and also racially. The idea of All-under-Heaven included the belief in a superiority of the Han Chinese people and that this superiority would help to make inferior ethnicities and cultures homogenous parts of the Han Chinese. Above, I have already mentioned that the early inclusive nationalist thinkers imagined the Chinese nation-state as becoming more and more homogenous based on the Chinese cultural-ethnic identity, and that this homogeneity was imagined to be brought about by assimilation. Today, the term sinicization (*huahua* or *hanhua*) is often used for this (imagined) process, as it refers especially to the assimilation to the Han Chinese culture and/or race and/or ethnicity. Like nationalism, assimilation (*tonghua*) was regarded as a tool and embedded in the theories on inclusive nationalism

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 46–48. It is obvious that Wang's thinking was not consistent, because if culture would really be geo-determined how could the Chinese be barbarized?

¹⁶⁵ Other Ming loyalists were Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi (1610–1695) and Lü Liuliang (1629–1683). (Fisher: 1977, 1978; Santangelo: 1988; Struve: 1988; McMorrin: 1975, 1979. See also Laitinen: 1990, p. 21–30.)

to achieve a strong nation-state. That a homogeneous population is important to the formation of a nation-state has become obvious by Gellner's above mentioned definition of nationalism.¹⁶⁶ Hall states with regard to European history that "the processes, by which homogeneity was established were often so repulsive that much effort has gone into thinking about ways, in which multinational arrangements can be maintained."¹⁶⁷ Such repulsive processes have been the above mentioned ethnic cleansings undertaken especially by Hitler and Stalin. However, Hall writes that all this should not "detract [one] from the claim that presence of homogeneity has functional benefits," such as economic flexibility, welfare spending and democratic politics.¹⁶⁸

Also the Chinese nationalist thinkers were aware of certain "benefits" ethnic homogeneity would mean for their nation-state, but they did not refer to considerations of economy and democracy, but of the possibility to strengthen the state in a global context by making all national people homogeneous in their strong national sentiment for the state. This would enable China to take back its important position among world states. In the Chinese context, this idea was not only based on Western derived models of nation-states, but more importantly on the above mentioned philosophy of the Ming loyalists and on a general belief in the ideal of the "Great Unity (*da yitong*)" as being a cosmological necessity.¹⁶⁹ As we have seen, they proposed mainly two different solutions, an inclusive and an exclusive one. As I will show in my analyses the exclusive solution quickly lost its influence and until the late 1910s was replaced by or rather merged with the inclusive one completely. In short, the exclusive solution was based on an exclusive nationalism. In this nationalism, Non-Han ethnicities would be excluded from the Chinese nation-state and the possibility of their inclusion was denied from the first. At the basis of this approach was the understanding of ethnicity and race based on the Ming loyalists and also on Western ideas as being geo-determined and thus natural and unchangeable. Such a nation-state would necessarily be much smaller than that intended by the inclusive nationalists.

The inclusive and obviously more attractive solution was based on an inclusive understanding of nationalism and the allowance for others to change their ethnic or racial identity. In the Chinese context this change was generally considered as being one-directional. Only the Non-Han people living in the intended nation-state would assimilate to the Chinese, whereas the Chinese would "swallow" them without being changed themselves.¹⁷⁰

Although I have described inclusive and exclusive nationalisms as two separate schools of thought, this does not mean that scholars could not shift between those two

¹⁶⁶ Gellner: 2006, p. 38–39. See also Hall: 2006, p. 38.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 38–39.

¹⁶⁹ About the emergence of this ideal see Pines: 2000, p. 280f.

¹⁷⁰ With regard to the Non-Han ethnicities, Liang Qichao writes in 1921: "It is irrelevant [...] whether one swallows a stone or an egg yolk – we use our stomach's power to digest them." (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_1], p. 27.)

or try to merge them into each other. In the first chapter it will become obvious how Liang Qichao, who became the foremost inclusive nationalist, earlier defined ethnic national identity based on geo-determinism until he realized that this would exclude most Non-Han people and their territories from the nation-state, which he intended to integrate. Consequently, he tried to change the basis of his definition of ethnic identity. That it was still extremely difficult and in fact not entirely possible to find an all-embracing definition of the Chinese nation is the reason, why I call inclusive nationalism also “ambivalent nationalism.” Its ambivalence lies in many different facts. One ambivalence comes to the fore by Liang’s often made claim that all Non-Han – especially the Manchus, but he also referred to the Mongols, the Miao, the Tibetans, the Turkish Muslims and many more – would in fact be already assimilated to the Chinese and be one with them. Two contradictions lay in this. First – occasionally even admitted by Liang –, it was obviously not true. Second, even if these people were assimilated in Liang’s opinion, he also could not and would not deny that a certain underlying difference was still noticeable and made it natural that political and cultural power would always stay in the capable hands of the Han Chinese.

History as an Academic Discipline – “De-Centering” Chinese Nationalism

Benedict Anderson and also other scholars on nationalism see the introduction of history as an academic discipline being closely related to the emergence of nationalism at the end of the 18th century. Anderson claims, that chairs in history as an academic discipline were established as a consequence of a growing idea of a “wholly intramundane, *serial* view of social causality,” first in 1810 at the University of Berlin and then in 1812 at the Sorbonne.¹⁷¹ According to him, this had been caused by the parallelism of the Creole nationalism culminating in the United States Declaration of Independence (1776) and European nationalist movements, the French Revolution (1789) being the first.¹⁷²

Anderson’s dating of the establishment of chairs in history is not entirely correct. Already much earlier in the 16th century, chairs of history usually combined with another discipline like law, rhetoric, Greek or Latin were established at many European and later also American universities. At first, these were chairs for certain persons, but beginning in the 18th century, they were established as de-personalized chairs.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ Anderson: 2006, p. 194.

¹⁷² Other important triggers according to Anderson were the starting mass production of watches and the publishing of newspapers and novels, as both “made intelligible our synchronic transoceanic pairings.” (Ibid., p. 192-194.)

¹⁷³ For instance at the University of Leiden (for Justus Lipsius in 1579 and for Gerrit Janszoon Vos in 1622), University of Cambridge (1627), University of Edinburgh (1719), University of Oxford (1724), Collège de France (1775), Yale University (1778). (Momigliano: 1990, p. 40-41.)

However, historians of historiography do not necessarily conclude that these chairs automatically meant that history was already an academic discipline. Although some date it to the 17th century or 18th century, that is, in the early modern period, most historians think that history as an academic discipline indeed emerged around the same time as the French Revolution (1789–1799) happened.¹⁷⁴

In the late 19th century, academic history became more and more mature. At the same time scholars became increasingly attracted to nationalism. Although not being a historian himself, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770–1831) statement that “nations may have had a long history before they finally reach their destination – i.e. that of forming themselves into states,”¹⁷⁵ had had a deep effect on historians and resulted “in the heyday of positivist historiography.”¹⁷⁶ The German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886) criticized Hegel's philosophy of history and positivist historiography “for its speculative violation of facts.”¹⁷⁷ Ranke laid the foundation of modern history and strengthened the idea that every epoch had its own individual history and could not be explained by universal laws of nature. Also due to his influence, historiography became to a growing extent nationalist.¹⁷⁸

“Historians have been complicit in diffusing the view that all history is essentially national history, and that the important identities are national identities.”¹⁷⁹ On the other side, however, historians have been and still are often highly critical of nationalism, although exactly this nationalism has probably led to the strengthening of their disciplines in the first place. Kumar is of course right in pointing out that this is “no necessary contradiction,”¹⁸⁰ and one could say that it only speaks for the growing self-consciousness of historians and their becoming aware of their own entanglement in nationalist historiography. On the other hand, this entanglement is in some cases still so deep that it is rather difficult to break it open and disengage oneself as a historian from an all-underlying nationalism.

In the case of China, the connection between nationalism and historiography is maybe even more prevalent than in Europe. At European, American and Australian Universities the academic discipline called “Sinology” or “Chinese Studies” is often based on Chinese nationalism with regard to territory and realm of history. It claims to study China as a whole society and more often than not treats it as a homogenous nation.¹⁸¹ This becomes obvious when looking into the noncritical usage of the name

¹⁷⁴ 17th and 18th century: Topolski: 1987, p. 191; Rösen/Blanke: 1984. 19th century: Schleier: 1994, p. 67; Muhlack: 1991. See also Lingelbach: 2003.

¹⁷⁵ Hegel: 1975, p. 134.

¹⁷⁶ Woolf: 1996, p. 3. See also Gellner: 2006, p. 47.

¹⁷⁷ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 273.

¹⁷⁸ Lingelbach: 2003, p. 92; Woolf: 1996, p. 2–3. How nationalism still influences history (and vice versa) in postmodernism is shown by David M. Potter. (Potter: 1962.)

¹⁷⁹ Kumar: 2006, p. 10.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ John Breuilly also criticized this in his introduction to Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* not only with regard to China, but also to the USSR. (Breuilly: 2006, xviii. See also Dabringhaus: 2006, p. 127; Rawski: 2012.)

“China (*Zhongguo*)” for every state founded by an acclaimed Chinese ethnicity and even also for states founded by Non-Han ethnicities ruling over Chinese subjects. With regard to space, the term “China” then refers to extremely different territories and with regard to time to extremely different state constructs. Regardless if speaking about for instance the Tang Dynasty, the Ming Dynasty or for that matter even the Qing Dynasty, the term “China” is nevertheless often used. That in the cases of Tang, Ming and Qing the differences are tremendous with regard to ethnicity (Xianbei, Chinese and Manchu), social descent of the imperial clans (poor peasant family, aristocracy, tribal chieftain) and religion (Buddhism, Confucianism, Shamanism etc.), but also with regard to territory and ways of governance cannot be reflected by using the term “China.”¹⁸²

Even narrators of Chinese nationalism are not free from these preconditions the field of Sinology provides and often do not take into account the questions raised by the Non-Han character of large parts of the Chinese nation-state’s territory and acclaimed history.¹⁸³ These narrators often treat Non-Han ethnicities and their nationalisms in the same way like Chinese nationalism is treated by European scholars of nationalism – with neglect and disregard. Leibold argues that sinology “tended to erase ethnic and cultural differences from the story of China’s past.”¹⁸⁴ (The Manchus are an exception and are often mentioned in connection with the awakening of Chinese nationalism, because they are seen as an important trigger.¹⁸⁵ However, also they are mentioned rather in a negation, that is, as anti-Manchism among Chinese nationalists, rather than in their own respect.)

Many sinologists’ approach to Chinese nationalism thus is rooted in the Han Chinese people’s anti-feelings (anti-Western, anti-Imperialist, anti-Manchu), and mostly refers to the Non-Han people as geopolitically peripheral.¹⁸⁶ This is reflected in the description of the Non-Han territories as “border regions,” “frontier regions” and “periphery.” These terms are true from the Han perspective, but not from that of the Non-Han. However, there are attempts to break open this approach to nationalism in China, i.e. James Leibold’s book *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism* (2007), where he aims “to place the frontier and its indigenous inhabitants at the centre of the state and nation-building process in modern China, shedding new light on the important role of the periphery in shaping the modern sense of ‘Chineseness.’”¹⁸⁷

In contrast to Leibold, who focuses on the history of nationalism in KMT and CCP party politics during the 1920s, when nation-building was a most practical issue, this

¹⁸² Sabine Dabringhaus writes that this approach was further supported by the “division of work between Sinology and Central Asian studies.” She names Owen Lattimore, Paul Pelliot, Herbert Franke, Joseph Fletcher, Morris Rossabi and Nicola Di Cosmo as the few scholars who were able to overcome these lines of division. (Dabringhaus: 2006, p. 127.)

¹⁸³ Harrison: 2001; Townsend: 1992.

¹⁸⁴ Leibold: 2007, p. 18.

¹⁸⁵ Karl: 2002, p. 117f.

¹⁸⁶ Lei: 2005, p. 493.

¹⁸⁷ Leibold: 2007, p. 2.

study will concentrate on intellectual nationalism and nation-building in the period of breaks and shifts in late Qing and early Republican times from around 1900 until the 1920s. It aims to analyze the attempts of Chinese intellectual and scholarly elites to achieve the conceptual integration of Non-Han people into a Chinese nation-state.

As a starting point, I accept the New Qing historians' revitalized and persuasive reasoning for refusing sinicization as a basic theory to analyze Non-Han histories, which fall into the realm of Sinology.¹⁸⁸ On the hand this refusal is based on many studies published already since the 1940s showing that the contacts between Han Chinese and Non-Han did not inevitably result in sinicization of the Non-Han.¹⁸⁹ On the other hand it is based on the methodological weakness of the theory of sinicization as such, which according to Pamela Crossley lies in a "circularity," which she describes as "to be 'sinicized' was to become 'like the Chinese,' who were only those, who had been previously sinicized."¹⁹⁰

With the present research I want to add a crucial puzzle piece to both the picture of Chinese nationalism and Chinese cultural, ethnic and racial thinking. I want to show how the idea of sinicization as a tool for nationalism emerged and became a standard theory within historiography. I claim that the theory being in existence in a somewhat commonplace way since previous times was employed consciously by Liang Qichao to point out a possible way how China could change from Manchu monarchy to a Chinese nation-state possibly without bloodshed and definitely without having to loose territory governed by the Qing dynasty. Thinkers like him, who were not only politically engaged, but also researched in history, perpetuated the theory as a reliable interpretation of the past, thus suggesting the possibility of its usage as a way to form a Chinese nation in the huge borders of the Qing empire integrating Non-Han people with ease by making them also Chinese.

Chapter Outline

The dissertation is divided into two major parts, based on my chronological approach. Part one deals only with texts written and published before the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. It contains three chapters, in which mainly political but also historiographical – sometimes this division is not even possible – texts of three most important Chinese nationalist thinkers of that time are analyzed. Chapter one is about the development of

¹⁸⁸ The so called New Qing history emerged in the late 1980s and is based on the opinion that the usage of the sinicization thesis for the Qing Dynasty and the Manchus oversimplifies its complexity. The most important scholars initiating this way of thinking and belonging to that school are Pamela Crossley, Evelyn Rawski and Mark Elliott. (See also Waley-Cohen: 2004.)

¹⁸⁹ Xiang Da: 1988 [1957], p. 1–3, Chen Yinque: 1998 [1945], p. 1–2; Wittfogel/Feng: 1949, p. 14f; see all publications of Pamela Crossley and Evelyn Rawski since the 1990s.

¹⁹⁰ Crossley: 1990a, p. 2.

Liang Qichao's path-breaking usage of the Mencian "using the Xia (Chinese) to change the Yi (barbarians) (*yong Xia bian Yi*)" into his new understanding of a "Chinese assimilative power (*Zhongguo tonghuali*)" and also his general approach to ethnic identity and belonging and history. Chapter two is about Zhang Taiyan, who is usually perceived as belonging to the opposite political camp of Liang, because they are considered as having been opposed in their political-nationalist (reformer vs. revolutionary) and philosophical opinions (New Text vs. Old Text school). It will come to the fore, though, that with regard to the question what to be done with the Non-Han people in a Chinese nation-state, Liang and Zhang are united. In chapter three, the texts of a third influential important thinker of that time, Liu Shipei, shall be analyzed. He is a rare example of a thinker, who is opposed to the inclusion of Non-Han regions into a nation-state, and still was rather well-known and well-read.

Part two consists of two chapters. Here, texts from late 1910s until late 1920s are analyzed, the main focus now shifting from political to historiographical and historiographical-methodological writings, based on the fact that history became institutionalized as a university discipline in 1917, but also because the ideas about assimilation of Liang and Zhang and also of Liu about Non-Han people more and more became integral parts of historiography.¹⁹¹ There are two text groups I analyze. One is dealing with methodology of history, especially with the major question of periodization. Different ways of periodize Chinese history and the connection of these approaches with regard to Non-Han history shall be analyzed in chapter four. In the same chapter I will show how Liang Qichao continued to influence and form Chinese scholarship and how his ideas of history became on the one hand more influenced by political reality, and on the other hand more mature in the 1920s. The last chapter five will deal with the outcomes of Liang's and Zhang's earlier call for general histories of China. How did the historians Liu Yizheng and Lü Simian, who wrote two of the earliest general histories based on modern historiography, include Non-Han histories?

The thinkers and historians, whose texts I have chosen as my primary material, can all be counted among the most influential, path-breaking thinkers of their times, belonging to the Han Chinese *elite*. What Joshua A. Fogel said of Zhang Taiyan, that his "life spans the late Qing and early Republican period and he came into contact with all the major currents of thought, East and West, of those times" is also valid for Liang Qichao and Liu Shipei.¹⁹² Liang, Zhang and Liu seem to stand opposed to each other based on the assumption that they belonged to different political camps. I analyze in how far these differences concern their approaches to Non-Han people. Liang Qichao plays the most prominent role in my research, because I consider him to be the starting point of the sinicization theory. It was him, who assigned the term "Chinese assimilative power" great importance in his texts. He most probably was the first, who used it. He thus

¹⁹¹ Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 16.

¹⁹² Fogel: 1977, p. 348.

introduced an ancient old motto under a new and academic-sounding disguise. It was also him, who began to theorize this motto. Therefore, his texts about ethnicity and assimilation will appear in both parts of this dissertation. Zhang Taiyan's answers to the questions of nation-building, among them that of the integration of Non-Han ethnicities into a Chinese nation-state, are usually seen as being opposed to Liang Qichao's reformist approach. I show in how far this is true for their ideas about Non-Han people in connection to Chinese nation-building. Liu Shiwei was the first to write a book on China's ethnicities and also published a widely read polemic against the inclusion of Non-Han people. He provides the most prominent view on Non-Han people opposed to Liang Qichao (and Zhang Taiyan as we shall see). The texts I analyze in the first part touch many different disciplines as at that time the disciplinary boundaries were not as fixed as they would become in the modern academic starting in the 1920s. The topics they touch more often than not in one and the same essay range from history (*lishi*) and historiography (*lishixue*), historical geography (*lishi dilixue*), ethnology (*minzuxue*) and anthropology (*renleixue*) to political polemics, nationalist propaganda and pseudo-scientific 'racism' or racialism.¹⁹³

The thinkers, whose texts are analyzed in the second part, are equally important and influential. Fu Sinian's methodological article about periodization of China's history is one of the first attempts to theorize history in China.¹⁹⁴ His arguments are put into relation with early approaches to periodizations of China's history around 1900 and with those appearing after Fu's article was published. Liang Qichao's methodological essays from the 1920s were equally influential and put his early theory of "China's assimilative power" into a more academic framework. And last but not least the two general histories of Liu Yizheng and Lü Simian shall serve as first examples how Liang's and Zhang's requests for nationalist general histories turned out and how Liang's idea of an assimilative power found its way into them.

Terminology

The central terms, which appears in every text analyzed here, are terms for groups of people based on ethnicity with racial and/or cultural connotation: *minzu*, *zhongzu*, *zu* and *zhong*. In the texts analyzed here, *zu* and *zhong* are relatively unproblematic to translate. I say relatively, because both can refer to all kinds of (cultural-)ethnic groupings, i.e. "tribe," "people," "ethnicity," and "race," although it is often stated that *zu* has a meaning based on tribal and clan relation, translated as "lineage" and *zhong*

¹⁹³ Joshua A. Fogel prefers to use "racialism," "because of the connotation of black slavery and the Warren Commission report which the latter [= racism] brings to mind in the American consciousness." (Ibid., p. 371n6.)

¹⁹⁴ Wang: 2001, p. 79.

would be more related to pseudo-academic racial connotations.¹⁹⁵ In the texts analyzed here, *zu* functions as an abbreviation of both binoms *minzu* and *zhongzu* and *zhong* does the same only for *zhongzu*. Both are mostly used as suffixes, coming after names for ethnicities. Used as a suffix *ren* can have the same function as *zu* and *zhong*, i.e. Han Chinese ethnicity (*Hanzu*), Han Chinese race (*Hanzhong*) and Han Chinese people (*Hanren*), Tungusic ethnicity (*Tonggusizu*) and Tungusic race (*Tonggusizhong*), Mongol ethnicity (*Mengguzu*), Mongol race (*Mengguzhong*) and Mongol people (*Mengguren*), etc.

The binom *minzu* is much more unseizable without context. *Minzu* and its “ism” *minzuzhuyi* are Chinese neologisms introduced already in the 1870s, but used in its modern understanding as nation only after 1900.¹⁹⁶ They were borrowed from the Japanese neologisms *minzoku* and *minzokushugi*.¹⁹⁷ Frank Dikötter claims that *minzokushugi* “literally meant ‘racism,’ and expressed a nationalist vision based on race.”¹⁹⁸ Today, *minzokushugi* is mostly translated as “ethnic nationalism,” “ethnicism” or “ethnism,” opposed to *kokkashugi* as “state nationalism,” “official nationalism,” or “statism.” The term *minzoku*, Charlotte Furth assumes, was used to translate the German work *Volk*, when the political scientist and social-Darwinist Katô Hiroyuki (1836–1916) translated *Lehre vom modernen Staat (The theory of the modern state)* (1869) in 1873 written by the Swiss political thinker and politician Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808–1881).¹⁹⁹ According to Bluntschli, the German term *Volk* has the same meaning as the English “nation,” thus implying a more political and less ethnical meaning of *minzu*.²⁰⁰ Furth traces the Chinese *minzu* and its spreading among Chinese thinkers to Liang Qichao’s and other nationalists’ writings around 1901. She assumes that “the term caught the attention of Chinese through Liang’s essays on Bluntschli,”²⁰¹ which were based on Katô’s translation.²⁰²

Today, *minzu* can be translated as “ethnicity,” “people,” and “race,” but moreover as “nation.”²⁰³ Regarding the first three meanings, *minzu* seems to be interchangeable not only with *zu*, but also with another modern binom, *zhongzu*, which is mostly translated as “race,” but can also mean “ethnicity” and “people.”²⁰⁴ But the connotation of “nation” differs from the three other meanings and seems to give *minzu* a statist meaning. *Zhongzu* on the other hand consists of the above explained *zu* and of *zhong*. *Zhong*

¹⁹⁵ Dikötter: 1992, p. 28, 70–71.

¹⁹⁶ Matten: 2009, p. 5–9. Matten writes that Liang Qichao was the first to use *minzu* as a political concept in several articles he published in 1902. Also others dwelled on the history of the term. (Wu: 1991, p. 161; Karl: 2002, p. 135; Leibold: 2007, p. 8.)

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 8–9.

¹⁹⁸ Dikötter: 1992, p. 108.

¹⁹⁹ Furth: 1976, p. 131, see also Leibold: 2007, p. 8.

²⁰⁰ “Wir heissen den *Staatsbegriff Volk* (populus), welchen die Westvölker eher nation nennen.” (Bluntschli: 1965, vol. 2, p. 91.) In the English version, this passage is not translated literally, but reads: “The political idea we rather express by ‘Nation,’ which the Germans call *Volk*.” (Bluntschli: 1885, p. 82.)

²⁰¹ Most importantly Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903].

²⁰² Furth: 1976, p. 131.

²⁰³ Fogel: 1977, p. 351.

²⁰⁴ Frank Dikötter translates it as “breed of lineage.” (Dikötter: 1992, p. 70.)

originally means “to sow” and “seed,” but also “offspring” and “type” of things and of people. Therefore, *zhongzu* is generally seen as having a more racial, that is, genealogical meaning than the more culture-based *minzu*. However, as Fogel stated in 1977, even at this time the two terms were still much more similar than is assumed today, and this is especially valid for the texts I analyze for this research.²⁰⁵ As we will see below, in late Imperial and early Republican times, *minzu* and *zhongzu* were used interchangeably, as *minzu* is nearly never used in its meaning of “nation,” in which it indeed differs from *zhongzu*. I decided, however, to translate the term *minzuzhuyi*, although clearly derived from *minzu*, as nationalism and as I have explained above not as ethno-nationalism.

Another important group of terms are the words used to refer to assimilation. The most important one is *tonghua*, which depending on context is translated as an active “to assimilate” others, a passive to “be assimilated” by others and also as the noun “assimilation.” Additionally, other terms are used to describe the process of assimilation: “to absorb (*xishou*),” “to soak (*rouran*),” “to change into (*hua yu*).” To the same group belong also terms implying ethnic, racial and cultural mixing like “to fuse (*hunhe*),” “to intermingle (*rong*),” “to unify (*hebing*)” and “to intermingle and enter (*hunru*).”

And last but not least it has to be mentioned that in the texts analyzed in this study plenty of terms are used to refer to the Han Chinese people and to China as a state construct, and for the Non-Han people when referring to them as one group opposed to the Han Chinese and of course when referring to the different ethnicities individually.

It has often been assumed that already in late Imperial and early Republican times, the term *Zhonghua* or *Zhonghua minzu* would refer not only to the Chinese people, but to “the five major stocks of the Hua people of the middle land,” meaning the five major ethnicities of Qing times, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Turkish Muslims and Han.²⁰⁶ However, in the texts here this view is contradicted. Here, *Zhonghua* (*minzu*) refers by definition to the Han people only in late imperial texts as well as those from the 1920s, although at that later time it would not be in use widely anymore. Other terms for the Chinese people are *Han*, *Hanren*, *Hanzu*, *Xia*, *Zhongxia*, *Zhongguoren*, *Zhongguo minzu*, *Hua*, *Huaren*, and *Huaxia*. These terms are in my understanding and partly by definition of the writers used interchangeably and synonymously.

Terms for the Non-Han are as plenty. The most often used term for the Non-Han as a combined group is *Yi*, but also other general terms appear frequently like *Man*, *Di*, *Rong*, *Hu*, *yeman*, and also in combinations like *Rong Di*, *Yi Di* or *Man Yi* are used. Like in the case of the terms for Chinese people these terms are used interchangeably. They can, however, also be used to refer to certain ethnicities, like the Eastern Hu (*Dong Hu*) or the

²⁰⁵ Fogel refers to the Morohashi as the only dictionary allowing for this “possibility of overlap in meaning,” whereas others use to stress their difference too sharply. (Fogel: 1977, p. 351.)

²⁰⁶ Wu: 1991, p. 162; Leibold: 2007, p. 10.

Dī in antiquity. The terms referring to particular Non-Han ethnicities are countless and will not be listed here. When they are mentioned in the text they are explained there.

Chapter 1. Liang Qichao: Chinese Nationalism and Its Implications for History

“If one is able to change people, so that they become the same as oneself, it is called assimilative power.”²⁰⁷
Liang Qichao (1902).

The journalist-intellectual Liang Qichao is crucial for the development of the concept of assimilation, which in turn was basic for the imagination of a homogenous Chinese nation-state. It was Liang, who introduced the idea that the Han Chinese had a certain “assimilative power (*tonghuali*),” first imagining it as a passive power, then suggesting it as a method to be applied actively. At the same time, he insisted that historians had to take the responsibility for the nation’s history and thereby for the formation and strengthening of the nationalist sentiment and patriotism of the nation’s inhabitants, the nation-people. Therefore, the embedding of the concept of assimilation into modern Han Chinese nationalist historiography was unavoidable due to his own methodological and ideological approach to historiography and the challenges of modern Han Chinese historians.

Liang’s life and work melt into one. His works and essays are direct reflections of what happened around him: the profound political and historical incidents, which altogether made the time between the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century the threshold of China’s modern history. These years also coincided with Liang’s years of adult life, and moreover were directly influenced and formed by him as one of the most influential thinkers of his times. Therefore, Liang’s biography is on the one hand a necessary part of this work as his texts are the starting point for the history of the idea of assimilation as a nationalist political and methodological historical

²⁰⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_5], p. 11.

concept. On the other hand, Liang's biography will also recall the events of that time, which was so crucial for modern Chinese thinking.

1.1 Liang Qichao's Biography

Besides Joseph R. Levenson's (1920–1969) biography of Liang Qichao, which was the earliest one in a Western language when it appeared in 1953, there are several others, in the first place Liang's autobiography about his early years.²⁰⁸ But Liang's life has not lost its fascination until today and also in more recent times Liang had his biographers and scholars interested in his life and thinking.²⁰⁹

Levenson calls Liang's youth and beginnings as a thinker (1873–1898) "Metamorphosis," his time in Japanese exile (1898–1912) "Brave New World,"²¹⁰ and the years after Liang's return to China (1912–1929) "Remembrance of Things Past." The characterizing titles reflect Liang's development from a very young and hot tempered Hundred Days' reformer, still in a process of personal and political change and refinement, over the mature methodical and hopeful Liang in his twenties and thirties at the height of his political and societal influence to the reflective and somewhat nostalgic Liang in the last one and a half decades of his relatively short life (he died at the age of 55 years). However, in the first years after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912 Liang was still rather hopeful and actively tried to form politics. Only in 1919, after the Paris Peace Conference he resigned from his official and unofficial post and confined himself to writing and teaching. Therefore, it seems useful to add a fourth part to Levenson's division between 1912 and 1919.

Youth and Beginnings as a Reformist Thinker (1873–1898)

Liang was born into an educated family near Guangzhou (also called Canton) in Guangdong province in 1873. He received a traditional education at home. Already at that early age, Liang claims to have been especially fond of talking about "the sad affair

²⁰⁸ Levenson: 1959 [1953]; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4].

²⁰⁹ Chang: 1971; Ding Wenjiang/Zhao Fengtian: 1983; Tang Xiaobing: 1996; Fogel (ed.): 2004.

²¹⁰ This is a citation of both Aldous Huxley's most well-known book of the same title of 1932 and Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, where the term originally derives from. Levenson's choice of a title for Liang's first decades of life is very fitting as Miranda's exclamation "O brave new world!" in *The Tempest* and John Savage's identical exclamation in Huxley's book are rather ironic as they say it naively in the sight of people who seem good to them in their inexperience but are not. (Grushow: 1962.) This is a parallel to Liang who was overwhelmed by the new and exciting knowledge befalling him from Japan and the West in his naïveté and inexperience.

when the Song and the Ming dynasties lost the state,” that is, when China was conquered by Mongols and Manchus.²¹¹ In 1883, he passed the *xiucaï* degree, the primary degree in the civil service examinations. From 1884 to 1889 he attended the renowned academy *Xuehai tang* (*Sea of Learning Hall*) in Guangzhou.²¹² Already in 1889 he passed the *juren* degree, the middle degree in the civil service examinations, as the youngest successful candidate at that time. Impressed by his performance, his examiner arranged a marriage between his younger sister and Liang in Beijing in 1891.²¹³ Despite this good start Liang never managed to gain the highest civil service degree, the *jinshi* degree. In 1890, he failed it for the first time.

On his way from Beijing back to Guangzhou Liang passed through Shanghai. There he got into the possession of Xu Jiyu’s (1795–1873) *Yinghuan zhilüe* (*A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit*) (1840).²¹⁴ Later he claimed that this work made him aware that there existed other countries and even continents outside Qing China. Back in Guangzhou he got acquainted with the prominent New Text scholar Kang Youwei (1858–1927). Although Liang and Kang often had different political standpoints they became close friends, Kang taking a tutor’s position for Liang. Until 1917, they generally shared their political aims, but then Kang unlike Liang supported attempts to restore the Qing dynasty. In 1891, Kang founded the school *Wanmucao tang* (*The Thousand Thatched Hall*) at his home town Nanhai in Guangdong province and Liang became a teacher there.²¹⁵ In 1893 and in 1895, Liang again tried to gain the *jinshi* degree, but failed both times. Nevertheless, he and Kang became the leaders of more than one thousand *jinshi* candidates, who wrote a letter of protest to the Qing government against the in their opinion humiliating conditions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) ending the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). They also directly referred to the throne to ask for reforms in the famous “Memorial of the Candidates (*gongju shangshu*).”²¹⁶

In 1896, Liang became the chief secretary of Kang’s newly founded *Qiangxue hui* (*Reform Club* or *Mutual Improvement Society*)²¹⁷ in Beijing.²¹⁸ Already in January 1896 the government closed the society’s journal *Wanguo gongbao* (*Globe Magazine*)²¹⁹ down. Liang

²¹¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4], p. 15–16.

²¹² This academy, which was one of the best ones in the 19th century, was founded in 1820 by the eminent scholar and eminent New Text scholar and member of the Hanlin academy, Ruan Yuan (1764–1849).

²¹³ The name of Liang’s first wife was Li Huixian (dates of life unknown). (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4], p. 15–16.)

²¹⁴ Xu Jiyu: 2001 [1848]. See also Drake: 1972, 1975.

²¹⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4], p. 17. In 1894, the *Wanmucao tang* had to be closed on official orders. After the Hundred Days’ Reform, when Empress Dowager Cixi was not able to catch Kang Youwei, she had the school burned down and the graves of the Kang family destroyed. (Wong: 1992, p. 537.)

²¹⁶ Wong: 1992, p. 517; Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 19.

²¹⁷ Literally “Association for the Study of (National) Power.” (Britton: 1933, p. 90. See also Wong: 1992, p. 518.)

²¹⁸ Soon afterwards, counterpart organisations were also established in other Chinese cities – Shanghai, Hankou, Nanjing, Wuchang and Tianjin. (Cameron: 1931, p. 28.)

²¹⁹ There was another journal with the same Chinese and English names, *The Globe Magazine* (published weekly: 1875–1883; and monthly: 1889–1907) edited by the American missionary Young John Allan (1836–1907). Britton states, that “the reformers paid Allan a tremendous compliment by entitling their daily the *Wan-kuo*

moved to Shanghai, where he founded a new journal together with friends and members of the Shanghai branch of the *Qiangxue hui*, the scholar-reformer Tan Sitong (1865–1898) and the diplomat-poet-reformer Huang Zunxian (1848–1905).²²⁰ Liang became chief editor of the *Qiangxue bao* (*Journal for the Study of (National) Power*)²²¹, later renamed *Shiwu bao* (*The Chinese Progress*)²²², which became extremely influential.²²³

In 1898, Liang failed to obtain a *jinshi* degree for the fourth time. While in Beijing, he joined Kang in his vote against the “eight-legged essay (*baguwen*).” Some officials appreciated their initiative and as a result, Kang, Liang and also Tan were recommended by several high officials and Liang was made director of a translation bureau.²²⁴ Due to his new obligations, Liang had to withdraw from his post as editor of the *Shiwu bao*.²²⁵

Kang’s, Liang’s and the other reformers’ most important aim was the introduction of a constitution. In 1898, Kang submitted several memorials with reformist quests.²²⁶ During the same time, he and occasionally Liang and others seem to have met secretly with the Guangxu Emperor Wenzong (1871–1908, reign time 1875–1908).²²⁷ But a

Kung-pao.” (Britton: 1933, p. 53–55, 90.) The reformers’ journal was later renamed *Zhongwai jiwén* = *The Chinese and Foreign Record*. (Published daily: 1895–1896.)

²²⁰ Wright, D.: 1994, p. 551. As the Councillor to the Legation of the Qing Dynasty, Huang Zunxian had lived in Japan (1877–1882), in the United States (1882–1885), and in London (1890–1891). In 1897, Tan Sitong together with Huang Zunxian and Xiong Xiling (1870–1937) established the school *Shiwu xuetang* (*Hall of Current Affairs*) at Changsha, where Huang Zunxian was holding the office of a Surveillance Commissioner. Liang agreed to be their chief lecturer. (Huang, P. C.: 1972, p. 26.)

Xiong Xilin later became the Premier of the Republic of China for a short time (1913–1914) in Yuan Shikai’s cabinet. He was a brilliant intellectual and became Hanlin scholar at the age of only twenty-four. (*Qingshi gao*, ch. 464, p. 12742.)

²²¹ Published daily: 1896.

²²² Literally “The Needs of the Times.” Published on a ten-day schedule: 1896–1898. (Britton: 1933, p. 92.)

²²³ Yoon: 2002; Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 22–24.

²²⁴ The *Qingshi gao* writes: “The *juren* Liang Qichao is granted brevet rank of the sixth class and will manage the affairs of the translation bureau.” (*Qingshi gao*, ch. 24, p. 923. Translation by Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 28n64). The translation bureau seems to have been established in the late years of the Guangxu reign period (1875–1908). (*Qingshi gao*, ch. 145, p. 4265.)

²²⁵ A reform oriented Censor, Song Bolu (1855–1932), who played an important role in the Hundred Days’ Reform, because it was him who transferred Kang Youwei’s letters to the emperor, consequently suggested to turn the journal into an official one with Liang as the editor. However, the senior official Sun Jia’nai (1827–1909), who had just been granted Minister of Personnel, Assistant Grand Secretary and Grand Minister of the Palace School, rather favoured Kang. Levenson suspects that this was not so much owing to Liang’s growing obligations as head of the translation bureau as Sun claimed, but rather because Sun wanted to kick Kang upstairs in order to get rid of him – the *Shiwu bao* was seated in Shanghai and therefore would take Kang away from Beijing. (Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 29–30.)

²²⁶ Wong: 1992, p. 516–518.

²²⁷ The translator of the *Peking Gazette* states after the translation of an imperial decree concerning Kang: “Although the decree merely states that Kang Yü-wei [= Kang Youwei], the Great Reformer of China, was only given one formal audience, which was true, the fact is that Kang attended upon the Emperor secretly every night at the Palace for nearly six weeks, the majority of his Majesty’s reform decrees having been framed by Kang Yü-wei and approved of as coming from the Emperor himself. Naturally the world was not to know of these nightly visits of Kang to the Palace, and he was often accompanied by other members of the Reform Party such as T’an Szetung [= Tan Sitong] – the son of the then Governor of Hupeh – Liang Ch’i-ch’ao [= Liang Qichao] – ex-Editor of *Chinese Progress* – and others. The Emperors during these nightly interviews and periods of talk and advice given on Reform threw off all reserve and ceremony, making his welcome visitors sit on lounges by his side, instead of talking to them while kneeling at the foot of the Emperor’s divan which was a most serious and glaring breach of Court etiquette in the eyes of the Conservatives.” (*The Translation of the Peking Gazette for 1898*: 1899, p. 78–79.)

reactionary sentiment was slowly developing amongst Qing officials. When Zeng Lian (1857–ca. 1928), a teacher in Hunan and member of the *Hunan shoujiu dang* (*Hunan Conservative Party*), which strongly opposed the Hundred Days' Reform, submitted a memorial and asked for the death penalty for Kang and Liang, the Guangxu Emperor would not give in. But he was overrun by the sudden reaction of the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908, regency 1861–1908)²²⁸, who restored her authority and put the emperor under house arrest.²²⁹ Cixi also ordered Kang's and Liang's arrest, but they managed to escape to Japan.²³⁰

Liang Qichao in Japan and Abroad (1898–1912)

The Japanese government, or rather the agents of statesman Ôkuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) then foreign minister of the cabinet²³¹ of Prime Minister Matsukata Masayoshi (1835–1924) helped Liang and Kang to escape to Japan. At the beginning, Ôkuma's *Shimopotô* (*Progressive Party*) funded their stay in Japan. It also supported Sun Yat-sen [= Sun Yixian]²³² (1886–1925), the leader of the Chinese revolutionary movement and founder of the *Xing Zhong hui* (*Revive China Society*).²³³

Liang occupied himself with writing and teaching and founded an influential journal, the *Qingyi bao* (*Pure Criticism Journal*) = *China Discussion*²³⁴ in 1898. During this time Liang wrote some of his most influential essays, i.e. “Zhongguo shi xulun” (1901), “Xin shixue” (1902) and “Xinmin shuo” (1902). In 1899, he became member of Kang's newly established *Baohuang hui* (*Protect the Emperor Society*), which existed under changing names until 1913. Also in 1899, Liang met with Sun Yat-sen to discuss ideas for a union between reformers and revolutionaries and planned to found a unified society. But Kang heavily mistrusted the idea. He sent Liang to Hawaii to promote their ideas and collect funding for the *Baohuang hui*.²³⁵ Finally, Liang went to Honolulu in December 1899.²³⁶ Sun was not amused when he heard that Liang was successfully promoting the *Baohuang hui*

²²⁸ From 1861 until 1881 she reigned concurrently with Empress Dowager Ci'an (1837–1881), first as regent for the under age Tongzhi Emperor Muzong (1856–1881, reign time 1861–1875), Cixi's son. When Emperor Muzong died, they reigned together for the underage Guangxu Emperor Dezong (1871–1908, reign time 1875–1908), Cixi's nephew, until Empress Dowager Ci'an's death. Afterwards, Cixi remained Regent for Emperor Dezong until he came of age in 1889, but continued her unofficial but strong influence afterwards. After the Hundred Days' Reform (1898) Cixi restored her power as Regent.

²²⁹ *Qingshi gao*, ch. 24, p. 926; *The Translation of the Peking Gazette for 1898*, p. 81.

²³⁰ *Qingshi gao*, ch. 24, p. 926.

²³¹ It was also called Matsukuma cabinet, a combination of the names of “Matsu”-kata and Ô-“kuma” due to Ôkuma's great influence.

²³² In Mandarin, his pseudonym Sun Zhongshan is mostly used. Yixian is one of his literary names (zi).

²³³ The Society was founded 1894 and merged into the *Tongmenghui* (*Chinese United League* or *Chinese Revolutionary Alliance*) in 1905, together with Cai Yuanpei's (1868–1940) *Guangfu hui* (*Restoration Society*) (founded 1904).

²³⁴ Published: 1898–1901.

²³⁵ Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 60–61.

²³⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4], p. 18–19. Sun had spend his youth on Hawaii, where his brother lived. He helped Liang giving him a commendatory letter. There exists a famous and widely discussed diary of Liang's stay in Hawaii. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1900]. See also Karl: 2002, p. 66–79.)

among the Chinese in Hawaii, so that it outrivaled his formerly strong *Xin Zhong hui* there.²³⁷

Liang also wanted to travel to Canada and the United States, but things seemed to progress in China.²³⁸ In June 1900, the Boxer Rebellion had begun and Liang set for Shanghai “waiting in south China for a possible call for power.”²³⁹ The *Baohuang hui* under the reformer Tang Caichang²⁴⁰ (1867–1900) was also making a military attempt in Hankou in order to foster a revolution. However, in the end, not only the Boxers, but also the troops of the *Baohuang hui* and Sun’s *Xing Zhong hui*, which had also tried to join the revolution, were defeated by the Qing armies. Liang could do nothing but leave Shanghai and made a detour on his way back to Japan via Hong Kong, Singapore, Ceylon, Australia and the Philippines.²⁴¹ In 1901, he was back in Japan and continued to write and publish. In 1902, he founded the *Xinmin congbao* (*New People’s Periodical*)²⁴², which had great influence in Qing China as well as in the Chinese overseas communities.²⁴³

In 1903, Liang left for a second journey abroad. This time it brought him to Canada and from there to various U.S. American cities.²⁴⁴ At the end of the year he returned to Japan. In 1905, Sun and other members of the *Tongmenghui* (*Chinese United League* or *Chinese Revolutionary Alliance*), the successor of the *Xing Zhong hui*, founded the *Minbao* (*The People*)²⁴⁵, which became the rival of Liang’s *Xinmin congbao*. Among the *Minbao*’s editors were the revolutionary scholars Liu Shiwei (1884–1919) and Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936).

In the meantime, the Guangxu emperor and Empress Dowager Cixi died in 1908. Earlier begun reforms were continued. Kang’s *Baohuang hui*, renamed *Xianzheng dang* (*Constitutionalist Party*) was legalized in China and helped to organize first provincial assemblies and even a National Assembly (*Guomin dahui*) in 1910.

In 1911, Liang went to Taiwan to learn about the Japanese way of colonization. He planned to apply similar methods to the Non-Han regions in China, like Manchuria and Xinjiang.²⁴⁶ After his return to Japan, it soon became clear that his days of Japanese exile were counted. After the Xinhai Revolution had begun on October 10th the National Assembly soon petitioned for Liang’s and Kang’s amnesty. On December 29th Sun was

²³⁷ Only in 1915, when Liang and Sun again agreed in their opposition against Yuan Shikai’s (1859–1916) restoration of the monarchy, they became allies again.

²³⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4], p. 18–19.

²³⁹ Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 66. See also Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4], p. 19.

²⁴⁰ Tang had been befriended with Tan Sitong. In 1899, he had visited Kang and Liang in Japan and had returned to China together with other reformers to bring forward political reforms, funded by Kang and Liang.

²⁴¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_4], p. 19.

²⁴² Published semimonthly: 1902–1907.

²⁴³ Britton: 1933, p. 119–120; Huang, P. C.: 1972, p. 5f; Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 46f.

²⁴⁴ He travelled to Vancouver and Ottawa in Canada, and to New York, Cambridge MA to visit Harvard University and New Haven CT to visit Yale University, Washington, where he met Theodore Roosevelt in a not very fruitful reception, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, New Orleans, St. Louis, Chicago, Kansas City, some cities in Montana and Idaho, Walla Walla, Seattle, Portland OR and Los Angeles. (Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 69–70.)

²⁴⁵ Published monthly: 1905–1910.

²⁴⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1904]. See also Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 79–80.

elected the provisional President of the Republic of China in Nanjing. On February 12th, 1912, the Xuantong Emperor Puyi (1906–1967, reign time 1908–1912) abdicated. On March 10th Sun had to retire prematurely from his post, and the former exiled Qing official and powerful Beiyang warlord Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) forced his rise to power as the second provisional President. In August 1912, Sun's *Tongmenghui* and five smaller revolutionary parties merged into the newly founded *Guomin dang* (*Chinese Nationalist Party*)²⁴⁷ in order to contest the first national elections. And last but not least, in October 1912, Liang finally returned to China.

Active in Politics (1912–1919)

When Liang came back to China in 1912, he was immediately involved in the rivalry between Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen, who both tried to win him over. Liang himself was publicly welcomed in China. The first national elections in December 1912 were won by the *Guomin dang* led by party president Song Jiaoren (1882–1913). When Song was assassinated in March 1913, the rumor that Yuan Shikai was involved in the assault fearing Song's influence in the parliament. Song was followed by Sun Yat-sen as the party president of the *Guomin dang*.

Liang realized that his *Minzhu dang* (*Democratic Party*)²⁴⁸ would not be able to gain enough political power to influence politics on its own. Therefore, he fused it with other parties. In May 1913, Liang's *Minzhu dang*, the Yuan Shikai's *Gonghe dang* (*Republican Party*) and the *Tongyi dang* (*United Party*) co-founded by Zhang Taiyan merged into one big party, the *Jinbu dang* (*Progressive Party*) in order to oppose Sun's powerful *Guomin dang* in the new Parliament. Vice president Li Yuanhong (1864–1928) was the nominal leader of the *Jinbu dang* and Liang was the head behind its ideology and policy.²⁴⁹ By committing to provisional president Yuan Shikai Liang made a stand against the *Guomin dang*. For a brief time span, Liang even became part of Yuan's cabinet as Minister of Justice (from September 1913 until February 1914).²⁵⁰ In October 1913, Yuan was finally officially elected president.

Due to the growing pressure Yuan Shikai put on the *Guomin dang*, Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan in late 1913. Yuan Shikai immediately removed all *Guomin dang* members of the parliament and then dissolved also the rest of the parliament in January 1914. Consequently, the cabinet and with it Liang resigned. But already in March 1914, Liang took over a new post in Yuan's government, that of the first Director of the Monetary Bureau. In June 1914, Liang also became a member of the Council of the State, which was

²⁴⁷ The KMT has existed without interruption until today, first in mainland China and since 1950 in Taiwan.

²⁴⁸ The *Xianzheng dang* was the former *Baohuang hui*, founded in 1899 by Kang Youwei.

²⁴⁹ Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 175. Liang drafted the constitution. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1912_2].)

²⁵⁰ Xu Xiaoqun: 2008, p. 60.

headed by prime minister Duan Qirui (1865–1936), Yuan’s trustee from the *Beiyang jun* (*Beiyang Army* or *Beiyang Clique*).²⁵¹

In late 1915, Yuan Shikai declared himself emperor of the Chinese Empire (*Zhonghua diguo*). But resistance awoke fast. Together with others opposed to Yuan Liang formed a countermovement to protect the Republic. The provincial leaders of Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, Shandong, Hunan, Shanxi, Jiangxi and Jiangsu joined forces against Yuan Shikai’s *Beiyang Army* in the National Protection War (*Hu guo zhanzheng*) (1915–1916). Even when Yuan finally abdicated from his emperorship on March 22nd, 1916, and declared himself president of the Republic of China again, the Southern provinces did not want to give in. Only if the legally constituted vice-president Li Yuanhong succeeded Yuan, Liang wanted to end the separatism in the South. However, due to Yuan’s sudden death on June 6th, 1916, Li Yuanhong achieved presidency faster and easier than thought and quickly reinstated the parliament. Duan Qirui stayed as the premier. The *Jinbu dang* split and Liang merged one part of it into his newly founded *Xianfa yanjiu hui* (*Association for Constitutional Research*), usually called *Yanjiu xi* (*Research Clique* or *Yanjiu Clique*). In July 1917, Liang became Minister of Finance.

But soon first disunities between president Li supported by the *Guomin dang* and premier Duan supported by the *Yanjiu hui* emerged when they had to decide whether China should join World War I. Li was against, Duan for it. Finally, Li dismissed Duan, who sought help from his friends of the *Beiyang jun*. Consequently, they declared seven provinces in the North as independent. The *Beiyang jun* sent their general Zhang Xun (1854–1923) to Beijing to mediate. But to the surprise of all, Zhang not only conquered Beijing and dissolved the parliament, but furthermore announced Emperor Puyi’s restoration with the support of Kang Youwei. This support brought about the break of friendship between Liang and Kang. After twelve days, however, this short interlude was ended, premier Duan was reappointed and the former vice president Feng Guozhang (1859–1919), a leading general of the *Beiyang Army*, replaced Li as president. In the end, China joined World War I.

In November 1917, premier Duan resigned followed by Liang and other members of the *Yanjiu xi*. When the *Yanjiu xi* became only third behind the *Wanxi junfa* (*Anhui Clique*)²⁵², a faction split from the *Beiyang jun*, and the *Jiaotong xi* (*Communications Clique*)²⁵³, in the election for a new National Assembly in 1918, Liang retreated from politics. At the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, Liang served as an unofficial adviser, but did not succeed in his demands. The former German colonies in Shandong were granted to

²⁵¹ The *Beiyang jun* was an army in Western style, which had been founded already by the Qing, but consisted of mainly Han Chinese troops. The army and its generals continued to play an important role also after the downfall of the Qing Dynasty. *Beiyang* means “Northern Ocean” and refers to certain Northeast coastal areas in the provinces Zhili (today’s Hebei), Liaoning and Shandong.

²⁵² When Duan returned to politics in 1919, he was supported by the *Wanxi junfa*.

²⁵³ They had been crucial in Yuan’s attempt to become emperor.

the Japanese, and Liang disillusioned returned to China and retreated from active politics.

Resignation and Renewed Journalist and Teaching Activities (1919–1929)

Liang concentrated on teaching at the Southeast University (*Dongnan daxue*) in Nanjing²⁵⁴ and at the Tsinghua University Research Institute (*Qinghua daxue kexueguan*) in Beijing. After having been too occupied by his political engagements in the years before than to write much, he again began to publish in journals like *Zhexue = Philosophia*.²⁵⁵ He also edited an own journal, *Jiefang yu gaozao (Emancipation and Reconstruction)*, later renamed *Gaizao = La Rekonstruo*.²⁵⁶ His articles were mainly about history – cultural and literary history and historiography –, Western and ancient Chinese philosophy and Buddhism. After his publishing activities in the 1900s, this is a second phase during, which Liang wrote influential essays and articles in the field of history and methodology. He revisited topics and problems he had written about in the 1900s and extended his then begun thinking on methodology and history.

In January 1929, Liang died in a hospital in Beijing at the age of 55. He left two wives and nine children, of whom many became outstanding intellectuals. At his funeral, a Buddhist ceremony was performed, reminding one of his deep interest in Buddhism, “which had stubbornly persisted throughout his youthful Confucian-reformist phase and the years of western-oriented nationalism which succeeded it.”²⁵⁷

1.2 Liang Qichao as a Nationalist Thinker

The Renewing of Historiography

Liang Qichao was one of the most influential journalists and intellectuals of late Imperial and early Republican China.²⁵⁸ His essays and articles cover a wide range of political and historical topics, and he was also a profound theorist on historiography and political science.

²⁵⁴ Levenson says it is in Shanghai, but this must be a mistake. (Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 190.)

²⁵⁵ Published in unknown frequency: 1921–1926.

²⁵⁶ Published monthly: 1919–1922.

²⁵⁷ Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 191.

²⁵⁸ See nearly all essays in Moloughney/Zarrow (eds.): 2012.

Probably Liang's most well-known and influential essay is "Xin shixue,"²⁵⁹ often translated as "New History/Historiography/Historical Studies,"²⁶⁰ probably rather meaning the "Renewing of historiography."²⁶¹ Liang wrote it while in Japanese exile after 1898, and it appeared as a series in 1902 in his journal *Xinmin congbao*.²⁶² It was a cornerstone in the process of accepting the Western concept of history-as-science and was received very positively, especially among the Han Chinese scholarly and student community in Japan.²⁶³

"Confronted by a series of escalating conflicts with foreign powers, the intensification of imperialism, and massive internal rebellions" in the course of the 19th century Han Chinese scholars began to concern themselves with the possible reasons for these developments by analyzing those foreign countries, which appeared to be so much more powerful than the Qing Empire.²⁶⁴ Wei Yuan (1794–1857) published his famous *Haiguo Tuzhi (Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms)* in 1843.²⁶⁵ Shortly afterwards Xu Jiyu published the above mentioned *Yinghua zhilue* (1849). Both works aimed at a historical, political and geographical understanding of the West. Also others like Wang Tao (1828–1897) tried to understand the West by turning to its historical development.²⁶⁶ At the same time, Han Chinese scholars began to think about the validity of their own historical models based on Confucian philosophy, like historical atrophy (*lishi tuihua*), a belief in the great achievements of the so-called Golden Age and the general notion that the past could provide a model for present-day politics.²⁶⁷ These questions laid the foundation for the attraction of a linear model of history and the acceptance that "history advances but never regresses."²⁶⁸

However, it was the traumatic defeat of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) that "sparked the real transformation in Chinese historical writing."²⁶⁹ Han Chinese thinkers tried to understand the Qing Empire's weakness by turning to foreign history, and thus the amount of translations of foreign historical texts increased dramatically after the War.²⁷⁰

²⁵⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1].

²⁶⁰ See for example Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 91n14; Zarrow: 2007, p. 25; Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 3; Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 103; Wang, F.: 2012, p. 138.

²⁶¹ I am grateful to Professor emeritus Rudolf Wagner, Heidelberg University, for pointing this out to me.

²⁶² *Xinmin congbao* 1, 3, 11, 14, 16, 20 (1902).

²⁶³ Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 104.

²⁶⁴ Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 4.

²⁶⁵ This first edition contained fifty chapters. In two later editions, he added chapter. The 1847/1848 edition had sixty chapters, the 1852 edition one hundred chapters. Also his works *Shengwu ji (A military history of the Qing Dynasty)* (1842) and *Daoguang Yangsou zhengfu ji (A history of the combat and pacification of foreign battleships in the reign of the Daoguang emperor)* (1893) are directly linked to foreign aggression in the Qing Empire.

²⁶⁶ Wang Tao, who was James Legge's assistant his translations of the Chinese Classics, wrote i.e. *Pu Fa zhan ji (A History of the Franco-Prussian War)* (1874) and *Faquo zhi lue (Brief History of France)* (1890).

²⁶⁷ Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 4.

²⁶⁸ Wang, F.: 2012, p. 135.

²⁶⁹ Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 5.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

Liang's "Xin shixue" was one of the main reasons for the transformation of Han Chinese historiography, which followed the introduction of nationalist thinking on the foot. Like other Han Chinese scholars, Liang was deeply influenced by the publications of Japanese historians, who tried to establish a modern historical discipline. In turn, the Japanese historians were mainly inspired by German historiography, especially by Ranke's student Ludwig Rieß (also Riess) (1861–1928), who held the first history professorship at the new Tokyo Imperial University from 1887–1902 and had been a student of Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886).

Among Han Chinese historians, the book *Shigaku genron* (*Introduction to Historical Study*) (1898), also known as *Shigaku tsûron*, by one of the most famous historians of that time, Ukita Kazutami (1859–1946) became "the most influential work on historical methodology" among Chinese scholars in the early 20th century.²⁷¹ Some passages in Liang's essay "Xin shixue" are in fact translations from Ukita's book, and Liang's statements about the necessary reformations of Chinese historiography also mainly derived from Ukita's ideas.²⁷²

"Xin shixue" inspired its readers to "espouse and expound nationalism and progressive history in textbook writing."²⁷³ In the essay, Liang puts forward his idea that historiography should be directly linked to nationalism and proposes methods how historians could achieve this. He writes that "the scholarship of historiography is the greatest and most urgent one. It is the mirror of the nation-people (*guomin*) and the origin of a patriotic heart (*aiguo xin*)."²⁷⁴ In contrast to other modern academic disciplines, Liang argues that "of all the disciplines that have recently come from the West, the only one already present in China is history."²⁷⁵ In Liang's opinion, history thus takes a special position, but in order to survive it has to undergo a fundamental reformation. Although some parts of traditional Chinese methodology, especially evidential methods (*kaobian*) used in evidential learning (*kaoku* or *kaozheng*) would have been quite reasonable, on a whole they would have to be remade.²⁷⁶

Already in 1901, Liang had mentioned this connection between historiography and nationalism in the first paragraph of another influential essay, "Zhongguo shi xulun (Introductory essay to China's history)"²⁷⁷:

²⁷¹ Q. Edward Wang counts alone six different (partial) translations of this work into Chinese during 1902 and 1903. (Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 116–117, see also *ibid.* p. 104–105; Price: 2004; Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 7; Zarrow: 2007, p. 26.)

²⁷² Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 117–118. Ishikawa Yoshishiro writes that Liang also relied on another book of Ukita, *Seiyô jôko shi* (*Ancient Western History*) (1898). (Ishikawa: 2003, p. 15.)

²⁷³ Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 105.

²⁷⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 1, line 1–2.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, line 1. Translation by Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 3.

²⁷⁶ Luo: 2012, p. 49f.; Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 3.

²⁷⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1].

“Modern historians must examine the actions and progresses of the whole human world. So, they must discuss all kinds of historical processes of the nation-people (*guomin*) including their mutual relations.”²⁷⁸

But in his eyes Chinese historians had not achieved these foremost obligations of historiography. Liang gives four reasons for this failure in “Xin shixue.” He calls them the “causes of the disease”:

First, “knowing only about dynastic courts and not about the nation-state (*guojia*).”²⁷⁹

Second, “knowing only about individuals and not about the community (*qunti*).”²⁸⁰

Third, “knowing only about enumerations and not about the obligation to serve the present.”²⁸¹

Fourth, “knowing only about facts and not about ideals.”²⁸²

Liang criticized Chinese historiography for being history without causalities and links, written by historians, who only list events, connecting them neither among each other, nor with the present. But besides the obligation for modern historians to reorganize “the past as a rational, collective experience around a reinvented agency,”²⁸³ history should form and strengthen a national spirit, a (Han) Chinese national identity, also called national essence (*guocui*). It should create national unity, which was what the people in the Qing Empire lacked, but which in Liang’s and other nationalists’ opinion was obligatory in order to build a nation-state and resist Western and Japanese imperialism – the threats of those days.²⁸⁴

But what was this Han Chinese national identity and how could it be formed through historiography? What was supposed to be the Chinese nation, Liang presumed to be not yet existent? When analyzing diverse sources it becomes obvious that there was not one, but many definitions of a (Han) Chinese nation or national identity among late Qing nationalist thinkers and also in Liang’s own writing. According to different political intentions intellectuals of late Imperial times defined the Chinese nation in different ways and on different levels.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., line 3–4.

²⁷⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 3, line 1.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., line 9. The term *qun* is in fact an important political concept, “modernized, redefined, and endorsed by leading reformist thinkers such as Huang Zunxian, Yan Fu, and Zhang Binglin.” (Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 65–69, esp. p. 68. See also Mazur: 2007, p. 115.)

²⁸¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 3, line 15.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 4, line 9. See also Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 62–63.

²⁸³ Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 36.

²⁸⁴ The term *guocui* was a loan word from the Japanese *kokusui*. It was also linked to the term *Deutsche Seele* (German soul) from the German nationalist discourse. National soul had been translated as Japanese *kunidamashii* and Chinese *guohun*. (Lin Xiaoqing: 1999, p. 8; Liu, L.: 1995, p. 242; Sang Bing: 2004, p. 179.)

First, there were definitions of what nation-hood as such was, defining what characteristics a people must have to become a nation. These definitions focused on the question if China was already a nation or not and how it could become one.

Second, there was the territorial definition of the Chinese nation. It is often claimed that the Anti-Manchu fraction (*paimanjia*) among the Chinese intellectuals like Zhang Taiyan (Zhang Binglin) and Liu Shiwei, also called (nationalist) revolutionaries, in contrast to the (nationalist) reformers like Liang, would have defined the territorial Chinese nation-state along the borders of Ming China, or China proper (*Zhongguo benbu*)²⁸⁵, excluding those areas of the Qing empire, which were inhabited by Non-Han people. In contrast, reformers like Liang and Kang Youwei would always have assumed the possible territory of a Chinese nation-state to be in the borders of the Qing empire and thus including the large Non-Han areas in the North, West and Southwest – Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria.

And third, there was the ethnical definition, which was closely linked to the territorial definition. Some Anti-Manchuists among the revolutionaries, i.e. Liu Shiwei were very clear about this. What they wanted was a truly Han Chinese nation-state, which corresponded with one nation – the Han Chinese nation. But for the others, especially the reformers it was a more complicated task, as they intended a nation-state in the Qing borders. This meant that many Non-Han people would have to be part of the nation-state. How was it possible to include these people politically, culturally and territorially?

Liang Qichao's Essay about Johann Kaspar Bluntschli

In the early 1900s Liang Qichao called for two closely related renewals as we have seen above. On the one hand, he demanded a historiography, which would form a nation and on the other hand, he asked for historians, who would write history in the adequate way to achieve this aim. In order to understand what Liang in fact meant by this request for a nationalist history, it is crucial to understand Liang's idea of nationalism.

In 1903, Liang presented his ideas on nation-people and a nation-state most thoroughly in an essay about Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881), “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo (Teaching of the Great *Staatswissenschaftler* Bluntschli).”²⁸⁶ This Swiss political thinker and politician is not particularly well-known anymore in Europe,

²⁸⁵ China proper is a somewhat vague term which subsumes those regions which were mainly inhabited by Han people in Qing times. Often China proper is contrasted with the four large Non-Han areas of the Qing empire (Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang). (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 3; Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 1.)

²⁸⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903]. Marianne Bastid-Bruguère mentions that an essay bearing exactly the same title had been published by Liang in the same year also in the *Xinmin congbao* (May 25, 1903, no. 32). Unlike the essay I am referring to here, it is not included in the *Yinbingshi heji*. Although signed with one of Liang's pen names, it is the translation of a text by Bluntschli made by somebody else. (Bastid-Bruguère: 2004, p. 117.)

except in his home country Switzerland and his adopted country Germany.²⁸⁷ Bluntschli had studied law and political science in Zurich, did his doctorate in law at the University of Berlin, and another doctorate in political science at the University of Bonn. From 1833 to 1847, he was a professor in his hometown Zurich, from 1848 to 1861 in Munich and after that until his death in 1881 in Heidelberg. He was a moderate liberal, publishing profound works on law and political sciences, but also on historical and philosophical method, and was especially concerned about concepts of “people” and “nation.”²⁸⁸

Due to the translations of his works by the political scientist and social-Darwinist Katô Hiroyuki (1836–1916) Bluntschli was considered an important thinker on law and political science in the late 19th and early 20th century in Japan. In 1872, Katô translated Bluntschli’s *Allgemeines Sta[a]tsrecht (Public Law)* (1851–1852)²⁸⁹ and it was published in 1874 as *Kokuhô hanron*. In 1873, Katô also translated Bluntschli’s *Lehre vom modernen Sta[a]t (The Theory of the Modern State)* (1869)^{290, 291}

Already in 1899, Liang published the translation of a text by Bluntschli as a series under the title “Guojia lun (On the state)” in his journal *Qingyi bao* in Japan.²⁹²

With regard to Liang’s article about Bluntschli published in 1903 analyzed here, Marianne Bastid-Bruguère claims that

“almost the entirety of this article [...] is a word-for-word plagiarism of Bluntschli’s *Deutsche Staatslehre für Gebildete [German Political Science for the Educated Public, 1874]* as translated by Azuma Heiji [as *Kokka ron (Discussion of the Nation-State)*], without a single original idea added by Liang, except the bold statement that he fully agreed with Bluntschli’s views and his admission of personal commitment against republican revolution and anti-Manchuisim in China.”²⁹³

However, as Bastid-Bruguère states, this does not mean that the text becomes insignificant, because it was not written by himself. By declaring himself sharing

²⁸⁷ Bluntschli’s most famous works are *Lehre vom modernen Sta[a]t (The Theory of the Modern State)* (1869) and *Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch (A Lexicon of the German State)* (1857–1870).

²⁸⁸ Bastid-Bruguère: 2004, p. 111–114.

²⁸⁹ Bluntschli: 1868. See also Bastid-Bruguère: 2004, p. 106.

²⁹⁰ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886]. English translation: Bluntschli: 1885. In fact, *Lehre vom modernen Sta[a]t* was a revised and supplemented edition of *Allgemeines Sta[a]tsrecht* and consisted now of two parts, “Allgemeine Sta[a]tslehre” and “Allgemeines Sta[a]tsrecht.”

²⁹¹ Huang, P. C.: 1972, p. 81. Tang Xiaobing writes that Liang knew Bluntschli through two Japanese introductory essays about Bluntschli, written by Katô Hiroyuki, “Kokutai Shinron (New Theories on the State)” (1875) and “Rikken seitairyaku (Introduction to Constitutional Government)” (1868). (Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 123.)

Philip C. Huang claims that Liang also knew the Japanese translation of parts of *Allgemeines Sta[a]tsrecht* by Katô. Moreover, Liang was influenced by two other books on social Darwinism by Katô, *Tensoku hyaku wa (Hundred Essays on the Law of Evolution)* (1899) and *Kyôsha no kenri no kyôshô (Competition and the Right of the Strongest)* (1893). (Huang, P. C.: 1972, p. 56.)

²⁹² It were parts of “Allgemeine Sta[a]tslehre” translated into classical Chinese by Azuma Heiji (dates of life unknown) under his own name. It was in fact the first translation of a Western text of political science published in the *Qingyi bao*. (Bastid-Bruguère: 2004, p. 105–106.)

²⁹³ Bastid-Bruguère: 2004, p. 118.

completely the opinion of Bluntschli, Liang would have transformed Bluntschli's thought into his own and one of the foremost results of Liang's publications of and about Bluntschli would be that it made Chinese thinkers "bind absolutely the imagined community of the nation to the political entity of the state."²⁹⁴ Moreover, Bastid-Bruguière neglects the parts Liang did in fact add to Azuma's translation of Bluntschli's text and which are crucial for the analysis here. Liang added many of his own thoughts, which directly refer to the situation in the Qing Empire and also critically questioned Bluntschli's suggestions and theories as they did not seem to fit in his idea for the Chinese case.

The most important part of Liang's essay with regard to the inclusion of Non-Han people into a Han Chinese nation-state is the second chapter titled "Lun guomin yu minzu zhi chabie ji qi guanxi (About the differences between and relations of nation and ethnicity)."²⁹⁵ This chapter is based on Azuma's translation of the second chapter of the first part of Bluntschli's *Deutsche Sta[a]tslehre für Gebildete*, titled "Nation und Volk (People and nation)."²⁹⁶

Liang starts by citing Bluntschli's short historical background of nation-states. Bluntschli claims that at the time of the French Revolution "nation-states (*guojia*) were the same as societies (*shehui*)."²⁹⁷ According to Bluntschli the connection between state and ethnicity was very superficial at that time. Only after 1840 their connection would have become more and more important, until the concept of ethnicity would have become crucial to the concept of states – nation-states.²⁹⁸

Of greater importance is Liang's quotation of Bluntschli's differentiation between the two German terms *Nation* and *Volk*. Bluntschli himself translates the German *Nation* as the English "people [= people]" and the French *peuple*, and *Volk* as English and French "nation." *Nation*/people would be the results of cultural history (*Kulturgeschichte*) and would thus not follow borders, whereas *Volk*/nation would have a political meaning and would define the inhabitant of a certain country.²⁹⁹

Liang's understanding and definition of the term *minzu* becomes clear when one takes into account that he translates the German *Nation* (English: people) as *minzu*, and the German *Volk* (English nation) as *guomin*. This is a very important issue, as Liang's and other early and later nationalists' *minzu* is often translated as nation in English, but here we see that *minzu* in fact refers to the German *Nation*, which in turn is English people or

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 124.

²⁹⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 71–77.

²⁹⁶ Bluntschli: 1874, p. 36–43. Many of Bluntschli's thought in this chapter though reappeared in his later first volume of *Lehre vom modernen Sta[a]t*, titled "Allgemeine Sta[a]tslehre (General Political Science)." (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886].)

²⁹⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 72, line 9. See also Bluntschli: 1874, p. 39.

²⁹⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 72, line 9; Bluntschli: 1874, p. 39.

Later Bluntschli wrote that since Rousseau and until his days, the French political science would tend to equalize the terms *nation* and *people* and to identify them with the concept of society. (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 118; 1885, p. 103.)

²⁹⁹ Bluntschli: 1874, p. 36.

in fact ethnicity and *not* nation.³⁰⁰ In his understanding of *minzu* Liang depends on the German *Nation* and not the English nation. Therefore, the first characteristic of *minzu* are certain flexible factors, which can transcend state borders. They will be explained further below. *Volk/nation/guomin* on the other hand is defined as a political construct confined by state borders.³⁰¹

In the essay, Liang begins by elaborating Bluntschli's basic assumption of the connection between state and *Volk/nation/guomin*: "Therefore, if there is a nation-people (*guomin*), there also will be a nation-state (*guojia*). But if there is no nation-state, then there will also be no nation-people."³⁰² Liang agrees with Bluntschli's idea that the constituting of a nation-people would automatically result in the creation of a nation-state and vice versa, because a nation-state "must rely on the active spirit of the nation-people (*guomin huodong zhi jingsheng*) to be [...] complete."³⁰³

In contrast to *Volk/nation/guomin*, Liang quotes Bluntschli that *Nation/people/minzu* would be the result of the development of ethnic customs (*minsu*) (Bluntschli's cultural history) and lists eight criteria, which would be crucial for the formation of a *Nation/people/minzu*, adding three to Bluntschli's original five criteria³⁰⁴:

"Same place, same blood relation, same physical appearance, same language, same script, same religion, same tradition, same way of living. And language, script and tradition are the most important ones."³⁰⁵

Liang's definition of the term *Nation/people/minzu*, which is based on Bluntschli's definition reveals how *minzu* has to be understood in this text of Liang and as I think

³⁰⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 71.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, line 13–14, p. 72, line 3–4; Bluntschli: 1874, p. 36, 38. See also Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 91ff; 1885, p. 82f.

³⁰² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 72, line 5. Bluntschli writes: "And we cannot imagine the state without the nation and the nation without the state (Und wir können uns den Staat nicht ohne das Volk und das Volk nicht ohne den Sta[a]t denken)." (Bluntschli: 1874, p. 38.)

In *Lehre vom Modernen Staat*, Bluntschli said something else, in fact partly contradicting the above quotation: "We may say, 'no State, no Nation.' [...] We cannot quite say, 'no Nation, no State' (Man kann sagen: **Kein Volk ohne Staat**. [...] Insofern läßt sich **nicht** sagen: **Kein Staat ohne Volk**)." (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 97.)

Also here, Bluntschli gives the translation of *Volk* as the English nation: "We call the state concept *Volk* (populus) which is called rather nation by the Western nations [, the English and the French]. (Wir heissen den **Staatsbegriff Volk** (populus), welchen die Westvölker eher nation nennen)." (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 91; see also Bluntschli: 1885, p. 82.)

For Bluntschli, the state could well exist without the nation, because "despotism knows nothing of Nations; only of subjects (die Despotie weiß nichts von Völkern, sondern nur von Untertanen)," but not the other way round. Liang's misunderstanding is not severe though, because in this context the first part is more important as we will see.

³⁰³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 72, line 4–5. See Bluntschli: 1874, p. 38.

³⁰⁴ In 1874, Bluntschli lists only five criteria, way of living, customs, physical appearance (by which he does not seem to refer to skin colour but to different similar features as they can be found in families), religion, and language. Here, he does not emphasize language as much as Liang does. But in *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, Bluntschli lists two main factors, language and religion. They are complemented by three further criteria, country and habitation, way of life, occupation and customs, and political union. (Bluntschli: 1874, p. 37; Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 93–95; 1885, p. 84–85.)

³⁰⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 14–15. See also *Ibid.*, p. 71, line 14–p. 72, line 2, where he lists the same criteria.

forms the basis of his usage of *minzu* in his other texts as well. It cannot be translated as a political term but has to include cultural-ethnic identifiers, thus the translation of *minzu* as ethnicity and not as nation seems once more justified.

Liang gives a list how ethnicity and nation-state can be related, which he claims to quote from Bluntschli, but which in fact does not appear in Bluntschli's book. Liang's first case is that the nation-state is founded and inhabited by one single ethnicity, which therefore becomes the nation-people. The keeping of its purity is one important way of keeping the nation-state unified.³⁰⁶ Second, unity could also be achieved if the nation-state consists of several different "tribes of the same ethnicity (*tongzu zhi bumin*)": "The spirit and power inherent in its [= the state's] original tribes (*benzu*) must be totally absorbed (*xina*), then they will be unified (*tongyi*) in a nation-state (*guojia*)."³⁰⁷ And third, – and Liang writes that this would be the most frequent case – a nation-state is formed by more than one ethnicity. Although unity would not be as easily achieved as in the other two cases, the multi-ethnic character of a nation-state not necessarily means a disadvantage. However, this multi-ethnic character should not mean that "several equally powerful peoples live next to and with each other in One State," but that "One People (*Eine Nation*)" takes a superior position among them. Only then, a multi-ethnic state would be united.³⁰⁸ Liang adapts Bluntschli's idea by giving a simile from metallurgy:

"The civilizations of the world were all completed through mutual teaching and mutual guidance of all kinds of ethnicities (*zhu zhong minzu*). Regarding the affairs of a single state they are also often achieved and improved through the help and assistance of other ethnicities. [This is] like the casting of coins: one does not only use pure gold and silver, but also mixes and adds one or two cheap metals. Only then the coins are quite complete, and the lines and colours are prettier."³⁰⁹

For both it seems clear that any nation-state requires one core ethnicity guiding and dominating other and smaller ethnicities. This idea fits perfectly into Liang's imagination of the Chinese nation-state and the role the Han people would have in this state. They would be the "gold," whereas the Non-Han people would be the necessary but inferior "cheap metals" needed to make the "coin," that is, the nation-state, complete.

Bluntschli moreover points out that there exist an elective affinity (*Wahlverwandtschaft*) between *Nation/people/minzu* and *Volk/nation/guomin*. The most basic precondition for this affinity would be characterized in the question whether the territory of the state is smaller or larger than the expansion of the *Nation/people/minzu*. Based on this different preconditions, Bluntschli develops his models of nation-states

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 72, line 13–15.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 72, line 16–p. 73, line 1.

³⁰⁸ Bluntschli: 1874, p. 41.

³⁰⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73, line 2–4.

and Liang follows him.³¹⁰ Either, state borders are smaller than the expansion of one ethnicity³¹¹ or state borders wider than the expansion of one ethnicity and several ethnicities are connected in one state.³¹² With regard to China, Liang recognizes that the second case is especially important as it describes the situation there. Liang quotes four strategies from Bluntschli how states can deal with this situation³¹³:

1. The state tries to connect “many diverse ethnicities (*duoshu zhi minzu*)” in the state and form a new ethnicity. By Bluntschli’s examples it comes to the fore that one superior ethnicity would assimilate others, his catch phrases are Romanization and Hellenization, but he also refers to the change of language and customs in the cases of the United States of America and Belgium, which would be actively implied by the state.³¹⁴
2. If “all ethnicities (*zhu zu*)” in the state want to be divided, then they should found independent nation-states.³¹⁵
3. “Language, traditions and other things of all ethnicities (*zhu minzu zhi yanyu feng deng*)” are all allowed and they are just let be like they always were – only politically they strive for a unified way.³¹⁶
4. The last case is the “condemnable and dangerous (*verwerflich und gefährlich*)” attempts of a state to insight the different ethnicities against each other in order to keep power.³¹⁷

When Liang searched among these strategies to find the suitable for China, he claims that “all paragraphs Bluntschli wrote about different ethnicities [living] in one state are not suitable for the situation of today’s China, because the ways of development of all countries are different.”³¹⁸ One basic fact of a Chinese nation-state would be that it would be constituted of many different ethnicities (*minzu*). But these ethnicities could

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 73–74; Bluntschli: 1874, p. 42–43; see also Bluntschli: 1885, p. 95.

³¹¹ For this case, Bluntschli and Liang list two possibilities: either the state tries to form its inhabitants into a new people like it would have happened in antique Athens and Sparta, in Medieval Venice, Genoa and Florence, and later in Zurich, Bern, Austria, Bavaria, the Netherlands and Switzerland. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73; Bluntschli: 1874, p. 42. See also Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 108; 1885, p. 95–96.)

³¹² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73, line 12; Bluntschli: 1874, p. 42–43. Bluntschli gives nearly the same list in *Lehre vom modernen Staat*. (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 108ff.; 1885, p. 96–97.)

³¹³ Liang leaves out Bluntschli’s fifth case of people living intermingled and inseparably in one state. (Bluntschli: 1874, p. 43.)

³¹⁴ As examples Bluntschli gives the ancient Roman Empire, today’s Northern America’s United States and Belgium. (Bluntschli: 1874, p. 42; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73, line 13.) In *Lehre vom modernen Staat* Bluntschli describes more detailed, that one dominant group of people, superior to the others, would gradually assimilate all the others. (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 108–109; 1885, p. 96.)

³¹⁵ As examples he gives three secessions in European history: France and Germany (9th century), the Netherlands and Spain (16th century) and the Belgians and the Netherland (19th century). (Bluntschli: 1874, p. 42; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73, line 14–15. See also Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 109; 1885, p. 96.)

³¹⁶ As “the happiest example (*das glücklichste Beispiel*)” he gives Switzerland. (Bluntschli: 1874, p. 42; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73, line 16–p. 74, line 1. See also Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 109–110; 1885, p. 96–97.)

³¹⁷ The example is Austria. (Bluntschli: 1874 p. 43; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 74, line 2; see also Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 110; 1885, p. 97.)

³¹⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 12–13.

not be politically equal, but in China “one mighty powerful ethnicity (*qiang you li zhi zu*) must be made the centre (*zhong xindian*), which unifies and leads all ethnicities (*zhu zu*).”³¹⁹ In fact, Bluntschli gives exactly this as his first strategy how to deal with the situation of several ethnicities to be united in one nation-state. Liang limits Bluntschli’s first strategy to a fusion of diverse ethnicities into a completely new ethnicity, which would then constitute the nation and found the nation-state. As mentioned above Bluntschli’s examples for the first case already indicate that also he had one core superior ethnicity in mind, which would assimilate the others in *Deutsche Sta[a]tslehre für Gebildete*. In another work, *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, he refers to the same cases and writes more thoroughly:

“The State, resting on the superior civilization of **one** people, tends gradually to **assimilate** the other elements, and so to **transform** the whole nation **into one people** (Die Tendenz des Staates, gestützt [gestützt] auf die hervorragende Kultur **einer** Nationalität, allmählich die anderen nationalen Elemente zu **assimilieren** und dadurch das ganze Volk zu **Einer Nation umzuwandeln**).”³²⁰

However, there is one important pre-condition:

“This only succeeds where the dominant people is decidedly superior to the rest in education, mind and power (Diese **Nationalisierung** gelingt nur da, wo die herrschende Nation den übrigen an Bildung, Geist und Macht entschieden überlegen ist).”³²¹

In Liang’s view, in case of Chinese nation-building a Chinese nation-state should include the Non-Han Qing territories outside from China proper, but on the other hand,

“this large nation (*da minzu*)³²² has to take the Han people (*Hanren*) as its centre and its organization has to be formed by the hands of the Han people. Regarding this fact, there can be nothing to argue about.”³²³

As quoted above Bluntschli gives certain examples for this in *Deutsche Statslehre für Gebildete*. In *Lehre vom modernen Staat* he further develops the examples and attributes the wish to assimilate to them: the Romanization (*Lateinisierung*) of the Occident and the Hellenization of the Orient, which finally failed because of the “resistance of the Germans and of the Persians;” the Gallicization (*Französisierung*) of “the higher classes of

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 73, line 4.

³²⁰ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 108; 1885, p. 96. The emphasis is in the German original, but not in the English translation.

³²¹ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 109; 1885, p. 96.

³²² Here, *minzu* has to mean nation like in Liang’s idea of “large Nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi*)” opposed to a small one he refers to later in this essay. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 15–16. See also below in this chapter.)

³²³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 8–9.

the Flemish population” in Belgium; and the Russification of the Poles “by forces.”³²⁴ Besides the Belgium case, the cases of antique Rome and modern Russia are both interpreted negatively by Bluntschli, one because it failed in the end, and one because it is a forced change.

Bluntschli connects the ability to form states with his ideas of races and racism. This part of Bluntschli’s thinking does not appear in Liang’s essay, because it does not come to the fore in the chapter he uses, but mainly in another book, the *Lehre vom modernen Staat*. There, Bluntschli claims that the “Aryan nations of Europe (*europäisch-arische Völker*)” would be most talented with regard to “history of states, development of rights” and also to language:

“On this rests the claim of these Aryan nations of Europe to become, by their ideas and institutions, the political leaders of the other nations of the earth, and so to perfect the organization of mankind (Darauf ist das Recht dieser **europäisch-arischen** Völker begründet, die übrigen Völker der Erde mit ihren Ideen und ihren Institutionen politisch zu leiten und so die Organisation der Menschheit zu vollziehen).”³²⁵

The “Aryan nations of Europe,” who would have been most significant, were the Greeks and the Romans in antiquity, the Teutons (*Germanen*) in Medieval times and the modern civilization formed of a “mixture of Graeco-Roman and Teutonic elements,” mainly the English, (“whose very *race* is a mixed one”), the French (“Old Celtic and Romance with Teutonic elements”) and the Prussians (“self-confidence and sense of Law (*Rechtssinn*) of the Teutons is combined with the pliancy and submissiveness of the Slav”³²⁶).³²⁷ Also the North Americans are counted among this civilization.

Bluntschli contrasts this positive report of the “nations of the daylight (*Tagvölker*)” (Carus) with those of the three other races: the “yellow race” of Asia, the “red races” of the American Indians and the dark “nations of the night” of Africa.³²⁸ His deeply racist understanding of human kind comes to the fore, when he writes:

“There are, indeed, many thinkers, who in theory deny the mental inequality of these races, but scarcely one does not constantly recognise it in practical life (Es gibt wohl manche selbst sehr geistreiche Männer, welche die geistige

³²⁴ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 109; 1885, p. 96.

³²⁵ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 89–90; 1885, p. 80.

³²⁶ The German original read somewhat differently: “[...] in denen germanischer Rechtssinn und männlicher Trotz mit dem Autoritätsbedürfnis und der Fügsamkeit der Slaven verbunden worden, [...]” (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 13.)

³²⁷ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 12–13; 1885, p. 11.

³²⁸ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 85–91 (“Die Menschheit, die Menschenrassen und die Völkerfamilien”); 1885, p. 81–85 (“Mankind, the races of men, and families of nations”).

Ungleichheit dieser Rassen in der Theorie leugnen, aber schwerlich einen, der dieselbe im praktischen Leben und Verkehr nicht fortwährend beachtet).³²⁹

Although Liang does not refer to Bluntschli's racist ideas in connection to the ability to form a state, he probably was aware of this part of Bluntschli's thinking as well, as the work it appeared in had been translated into Japanese by Katô (see above). It is reflected in his own approach to the same question and his answer as we will see below. Parallel to his layout of Bluntschli's ideas concerning nation and ethnicity, Liang more and more develops his own concept of nationalism in the Chinese actual political situation. Liang in fact adopts a similar idea like Bluntschli when he claims a similar position for the Han people in China and East Asia as Bluntschli does for the "Aryan nations of Europe" and ascribes to the Han the same role Bluntschli had ascribed to the "Aryans": that they were destined to be the guides for all people around them and lead them to the nation-state. The Han thus would have to form the centre of a Chinese nation-state. Regarding this Liang poses three questions he "cannot stop doubting about," and which are crucial not only for Liang, but for Han Chinese nationalism in general³³⁰:

First, "do the Han people indeed have the qualification to form a new state?"

Second, "does 'removing the Manchus (*paiman*)' mean that they are removed because they are Manchu people? Or does that mean that they are removed because of their bad government?"

Third, "do we [first] have to separate (*li*) from the Manchus, and only afterwards can found a state (*quo*)? Or can we intermingle (*rong*) with the Manchus and all those ethnicities, that is, Mongols, Miao, Turkish Muslims, Tibetans, and still can found a state?"

Regarding the first question about the ability of the Han people to form a nation-state, Liang refers to Bluntschli's three conditions, under which an ethnicity can found a state: "First, an inherent spirit to build a state, second, the ability to carry it out, and third, the wish to carry it out."³³¹ Liang claims, the Han people, would have an inherent disposition and also the wish to found a nation-state. Only the ability to carry out the building of a nation-state would be a problem. This inability would be caused by the fact that the Manchus could not be removed so easily. Liang claims not to be an Anti-Manchuist like Zhang Taiyan. Nevertheless, he thinks that without the Manchus the Han would have the ability to form a nation-state.³³²

³²⁹ Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 86; 1885, p. 82.

³³⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 74, line 5– p. 75, line 12.

³³¹ Ibid., line 6–7. Bluntschli writes somewhat differently that a people needs "the mental awareness and insight," "the manly character of self-composure," and that it should not be "too small or too weak" in order to be able to form viable state. (Bluntschli: 1874, p. 39. See also 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 107, 111–112, 115; 1885, p. 95, 98–99, 101.)

³³² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 74, line 11–12.

The second question is therefore directly linked to this thought. As mentioned before, Liang did not advocate Anti-Manchuism. But he was aware of the possible driving force of such sentiments for strengthening a Han nationalism. He claims that

“the government of today and the Manchus (*Manzhou*) are two things, which have the relationship of a unity. Therefore, hating the government will also mean hating the Manchu people (*Manren*). [...] Taking this as a method for encouragement is possible. Taking this as a theory for reality is impossible.”³³³

Liang accepts the sentiment of hatred against the Manchu people, as they seem to be equal with the dictatorial government, but in his eyes this equality is rather accidental. So he strongly rejects revenge and criticizes those, who seem to forget about the foremost aim of nation-building, blinded by their short-sighted anti-Manchu hatred.³³⁴

Also, the third and most important question refers to the crucial problem, which ethnicities the nation-state should include in Liang’s opinion. Let me first repeat the question:

“Do we [first] have to separate from the Manchus, and only afterwards can found a nation? Or can we intermingle with the Manchus and all those ethnicities, that is, Mongols, Miao, Turkish Muslims, Tibetans, and still can found a nation?”³³⁵

This last question is answered more thoroughly than the other two. Here, Liang reveals his ideas for a Chinese nation-state most clearly and openly and also does not quote Bluntschli to substantiate his arguments anymore. He argues against the revolutionary nationalist argument of an ethnic pure Han nation-state – he calls it “small nationalism (*xiao minzuzhuyi*)” – and instead writes: “We have to support large nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi*)!”³³⁶

“Small nationalism” is what the Han people feel regarding other ethnicities inside the borders of the state, that is, in the Qing empire (*guonei*). And “large nationalism” consequently is, what “all people in the [borders of] the state united, aboriginals (*benbu*) and from other places (*shubu*), [feel] regarding all people outside the state (*guowai*).”³³⁷

But how to achieve that the people identify with this “large nationalism”? Now, Liang introduces the idea of an “assimilative power of China (*Zhongguo tonghuali*).”³³⁸ Because the process of assimilation is considered to be one involving people, “China (*Zhongguo*)” must refer to the “Chinese people (*Zhongguoren*),” that is, the Han ethnicity. By trying to find a solution for Qing China’s situation with regard to nation-building, Liang thus

³³³ Ibid., line 14–15.

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 74–75.

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 74, line 11–12.

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 75, line 15–16.

³³⁷ Ibid., p. 75, line 16–p. 76, line 1.

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 76, line 1.

formulates a thesis, which would become the basis of modern historiography on Non-Han people in Chinese East Asia.³³⁹

Liang had written about “assimilative power” already in the essay “Lun minzu jingzheng zhi dashi (About the great force of ethnic struggles)” published one year earlier in 1902.³⁴⁰ There, he gives a definition of the term: “If one is able to change people, so that they become the same as oneself, it is called assimilative power.”³⁴¹

This power can be used by “superior ethnicities (*youqiang minzu*)” in order to “swallow inferior weak ethnicities and wipe their frontiers.”³⁴² In this essay, Liang mentions the United States as the foremost example. In this text, he does not yet use the term in connection with China. The passages in the Bluntschli essay, however, are crucial for the understanding of Liang’s thesis of a “assimilative power,” which he thought to be inherent in the Han people. Therefore this passage shall be analyzed thoroughly.

Liang’s First Introduction of the “Assimilative Power of China”

Liang starts by trying to introduce his thesis not as new, but rather as a traditional and widely accepted concept: “The strength of the assimilative power of China (*Zhongguo tonghua li zhi qiang*) is recognized by Eastern and Western historians in a similar manner.”³⁴³ By referring to international scholarship – without in fact mentioning any names – Liang tries to put his idea on a firm basis. Therefore, one proof for the existence of such a “power” lies in the past, accepted and reported of by “historians.” But another argument of Liang is closer and more present to his readers: “Today it is said that the Manchu have already totally assimilated to China (*gai tonghua yu Zhongguo*).”³⁴⁴ Thus, not only historians are aware of such a power, but everyone living in the Qing empire would be able to notice the assimilation of the Manchu and therefore accept Liang’s thesis. However, Liang knew of course that this claim was not based on clear evidence as the Manchu were perceived as being decidedly different from the Han by many – and also perceived themselves as being so.³⁴⁵ In his essay, however, Liang limits those, who disagree with his opinion that the Manchu are already assimilated to the in his opinion unteachable Anti-Manchuists. But instead of only claiming that they are wrong, he

³³⁹ The term “assimilative power (*tonghuali*)” also appeared in the famous text “Xin min shuo (Talk about the renewing of the people).” (Liang Qichao 1983 [1902_3].)

³⁴⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_5].

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 11, line 10.

³⁴² Ibid., p. 11, line 10.

³⁴³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 1.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ The claim that the Manchus “became more Chinese than the Chinese” is still widely in use and is stated in countless academic works on Chinese history. However, it has been proven wrong in many works on the Qing since the 1990s. (Crossley: 1990b, 1997, 1999; Elliott: 2000; Rawski: 1996; Rhoads: 2000.)

pretends to understand their reasons why they do not want to accept that the Manchu are assimilated, by admitting that not only “the Anti-Manchuists do not want to speak of it [= that the Manchus are already assimilated] – even I do not want to speak of it!”³⁴⁶ However, “the historical evidence can not be slandered.”³⁴⁷ After this short and somehow personal introduction, Liang bases his argumentation on some selected historical background. To parallel the case of the Manchus, he refers to other Non-Han dynasties in China’s history, interpreting them as further examples of assimilation:

“All in all the assimilation of the Northern caityiffs (*bei lu*)³⁴⁸ to us has been a bit difficult. But that of the Eastern Hu (*Dong Hu*) was comparatively easy. If one compares the Jin, the Yuan and the Qing with each other, then it is quite clear: the Yuan kept their nomadic way of live for the ninety years [of their regency 1279–1368]. When the Jin and the Qing invaded the Central Plains, they immediately lost their special characteristics. Today, the Manchus inside the borders of China proper,³⁴⁹ who can understand Manchu script and can speak the Manchu language, are [as rare as] a phoenix’s feather and a unicorn’s horn. [...] The Manchus have already totally changed (*huacheng*) to the Han people’s traditions.”³⁵⁰

In 1922, nearly twenty years after the first introduction of the “assimilative power of China,” Liang reworked this idea and gave a thorough definition of it.³⁵¹ However, the outline of his idea becomes clear already in this short passage from 1903: the assimilative power applies especially to those people Liang calls here Eastern Hu, that is, the Jurchen and Manchus. As historical examples Liang therefore favorites times of Tungusic conquest dynasties, describing them as phases when they were in political power, but nevertheless culturally inferior, so that they naturally turned to Han culture. The Yuan dynasty, which was founded by the Central Asian Mongols, on the other hand does not fit in this picture. The Mongols did not assimilate as easily as the Tunguses. In the text from 1903, Liang mentions only two Tungusic people, the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234) and the their ancestors, the Manchu Qing (1644–1912). However, in other texts, the Tuoba Wei, also Northern Wei (*Bei Wei*) (386–535) and the Khitan Liao (907–1125), whom Liang claims both to belong to the Eastern Hu (Tunguses), were also listed as assimilated dynasties.³⁵²

Regarding the question if the Han people would have to separate from the Manchus to found a nation-state Liang answers by giving the allegory of different metals melted together in a furnace: “If the Han people have the qualification to make themselves a

³⁴⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 1–2.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, line 2.

³⁴⁸ This is an established swear word for Northern Non-Han people, already to be found in the *Hou Hanshu* (*Book of the Later Han*) (5th century). (I.e. *Hou Hanshu*, ch. 1, p. 76.)

³⁴⁹ Literally: “inside the [Jiayu] pass (*guannei*).”

³⁵⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 2–4.

³⁵¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922]. See below Chapter 4.3 (subchapter “Attempt of a More Precise Approach in 1922”).

³⁵² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 23, line 1–2; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7, line 26.

nation-people, then the Manchus have to intermingle and enter into the same melting furnace (*yi lu*).³⁵³ This again alludes to the simile he gave before of coins (= nation-states), whose quality would be best if one does not use pure silver (= Han Chinese), but also cheaper metals (= Non-Han people). In the end the different metals cannot be told apart in the coin's appearance.³⁵⁴

After having dwelt on the question how to integrate the Manchus, who take an outstanding position as the ruling ethnicity in the Qing Dynasty, into the nation-state, Liang turns to the other Non-Han people. He calls his readers to

“unite Han, unite Manchus, unite Mongols, unite Turkish Muslims, unite Miao, unite Tibetans and form one large nation (*yi da minzu*). Then we will form one third of the world's population. And we will extend widely about the five continents.”³⁵⁵

However, Liang immediately limits the position of the Non-Han people:

“If this [unification] is really achieved, then this large nation (*da minzu*) has to take the Han people as their centre (*zhong xindian*). Moreover, their organisation has to be formed by the hands of the Han people. About this fact, one cannot argue.”³⁵⁶

Liang does not give a thorough reason, why in his idea the Han people have to be at the centre of a nation-state. In *Lehre vom modernen Staat* Bluntschli elaborates on the superior qualities and thus outstanding role of the “Aryan nation of Europe” with regard to nation-building, and Liang readily takes over this role for the Han in an East Asian context in his essays from the 1900s. But why this is so is never explained thoroughly neither by Liang nor by Bluntschli, but mainly accepted as a given fact.

Regarding the borders of a Chinese nation-state, Liang reveals no doubt that the territory of this state would be identical with that of the Qing empire when he lists the ethnicities, which would be part of it: the “five ethnicities (*wu zu*)” of the Qing (Han, Manchus, Mongols, Turkish Muslims, and Tibetans) and the Miao as the “aboriginal” people of China. He not only perceives the Han people as the only possible driving force behind the strive for a nation-state, but he also denies the Non-Han peoples the qualification to found their own nation-states, that is, they lack the inherent disposition, the ability and the wish to found a nation-state.³⁵⁷ Bluntschli provides the basis for Liang's approach by giving a clear report of the inabilities of some people to found their own nation. Bluntschli claims that the “one-sided theory of nationality (*Nationalitätstheorie*)” would claim that “every people is called to become a nation and a

³⁵³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 4–5.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 73, line 3–4.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 76, line 7–8.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 76, line 8–9. A similar sentence appears also earlier in Liang's essay. (Ibid., p. 73, line 4. See also above.)

³⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 74, line 6–7.

state.”³⁵⁸ But this could not be so as some people just lack the ability to form a state. The abilities they lack have been quoted above, but Bluntschli also gives examples from the European situation. He refers to several people, we can call them “ethnic minorities,” who would not have been able to found their own states and were thus integrated into abler people’s nations: the Celtic people in Great Britain, the Basques in Spain and the Wends in Prussia.³⁵⁹ These examples in fact closely resemble what Liang wants for the Non-Han people. Although Liang does list Bluntschli’s European examples, he uses Bluntschli’s basic assumption that despite the claim of the “theory of nationality” not every people could be a nation. The decision if a people has the ability to found a nation or not seems to lie with those people, who found themselves able.

In his 1903 essay about Bluntschli, Liang aims at a nation-state with the Han people at its political core. But he also aims at showing that the Han people have the ability and power to assimilate other ethnicities in order to integrate them in a nation-state and form one large nation. This nation would be Han having absorbed the others and melted them together to one – like the silver coin needs cheap metal to stabilize itself, but nevertheless looks silver.³⁶⁰

1.3 Liang Qichao as a Nationalist Historian

In his essay about Bluntschli, Liang reveals an important connection between presence and past, that is, between his present-day political thinking and history. Not only can the Han people “use other countries’ histories as guidelines for our country.”³⁶¹ But they can also use their own history to learn how to act in present times. An important historical reference of Liang is connected with his idea of an “assimilative power” of the Han people. Liang wants to prove that it is possible to use this power as a tool for unifying all people in the Qing empire, strengthening “large nationalism” and founding a nation-state. As mentioned above, he refers to certain Non-Han dynasties’ histories, Tuoba Wei, Jin, Liao and Qing, to show that this power was effective in the past and therefore can be used today.

But Liang was not only a political and nationalist thinker, who constantly tried to find solutions for China’s momentary desperate political situation and used history merely as a tool for his political opinions. He was also interested in theory and methods

³⁵⁸ Bluntschli: 1874, p. 39.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 40.

³⁶⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73, line 3–4.

³⁶¹ Ibid., p. 75, line 13.

of historiography. To understand Liang's historical approach until the end of the Qing dynasty it is necessary to return to his essay "Xin shixue," this time analyzing it as a text on historiography and using it as a starting point to turn to Liang as a historian and a thinker on historiographical methodology.³⁶²

When Liang called for a "renewal of history" he wanted historians to get rid of the traditional Chinese pattern of historiography, rather taking the nation and the community as their starting point and concentrating on the ideals underlying historical facts and using them as tools for building up Chinese national sentiment. Liang wanted historiography to strengthen and promote nationalism. Although Liang's intentions were clearly not to falsify history or to use history merely as a tool to help forming the nation, he was still strongly biased for the sake of strengthening the nation-people and their patriotism, that is, the "heart that loves the country (*aiguoxin*)."³⁶³ Not only with regard to ethnic identity, but also to his historical ideas it is obvious that although Liang claimed to intend a "large nationalism," which would be able to unify the Han and other East Asian ethnicities, he in fact intended this "large nationalism" only territorially. In terms of politics, culture and even ethnicity it was still a rather "small nationalism" with the Han people and culture as the defining identifiers. This had already become clear when showing Liang's approach to a Chinese nation-state, and it becomes even more clear in the project of a general history of China, which was supposed to be the fundamental essence of a renewed historiography in China.

Liang Qichao's Idea of a General History for China

Already in 1901, Liang had begun to write a general history of China (*Zhongguo tongshi*). He never finished this work, but published parts of it as essays, i.e. "Zhongguo shi xu lun (Introductory essay on China's history),"³⁶⁴ which was published in 1901 in the *Qingyi bao*, and also as a part of his "Xin shixue," published in the *Xinmin congbao* in 1902.³⁶⁵ Liang divided "Zhongguo shi xu lun" into eight sections of diverse length, which form a kind of methodological and ideological basis for a general history.³⁶⁶

1. Definition of history
2. Scope of China's history (*Zhongguo shi*)
3. Name for China's history (*Zhongguo shi*)
4. Topography
5. Races (*renzhong*)

³⁶² In 1921, Liang wrote another important essay on historiographical methodology, "Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa (Research Method for China's History)." (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2].)

³⁶³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 1, line 1-2.

³⁶⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1].

³⁶⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1]; Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 42-43.

³⁶⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 1-12.

6. Chronology
7. Prehistorical era
8. Division of eras (*shidai zhi qufen*)

In the first part Liang gives his reasons for creating a general history of China. The next part about the scope or area of China's history is mostly an argument for China as the cradle of Asian civilization. In part four³⁶⁷, five³⁶⁸, seven and eight, Liang tries to define what would be or is the range of China's history in space and time, that is, which territory and people and which time span it should cover. Part six deals with the question, which calendar would be adequate.

This general outline of a history of China is supplemented by "Xin shixue" written in the following year 1902 dealing with six topics, which are partly overlapping³⁶⁹:

1. China's outdated histories (*Zhongguo zhi jiushi*)
2. The definition of historiography (*shixue*)
3. The relation between history and race (*renzhong*)
4. About legitimacy
5. About calligraphy
6. About chronology

In part one and two, the most well-known and influential parts of this generally widely read article, Liang lays down his famous critique of traditional historiography, explains how modern historiography should be in his opinion and defines it according to nationalist demands.³⁷⁰ But with regard to the question how to integrate Non-Han people into a General History of China, the third and fourth part are especially interesting. Part three "The relation between history and race" reveals Liang's general perception of races and includes his famous remark that "there are races with and races without history."³⁷¹ The fourth part "About legitimacy" regards the question whether it is useful to define legitimate dynasties opposed to illegitimate ones. As legitimacy can be defined in many different ways, Liang concludes that this way of reviewing dynasties cannot be valuable. The fifth and sixth part are of no interest here.

In the first part of "Zhongguo shi xu lun," Liang argues for his ideal of a national history, which is linear and progressive.³⁷² He uses similar arguments as in "Xin shixue," although they are not as clearly divided as there, where he not only lists the four "diseases" of traditional historiography, but also describes them thoroughly.³⁷³ In "Zhongguo shi xu lun," Liang states that modern historians should not only list facts,

³⁶⁷ See also below Chapter 1.3 ("History and Geography: The Range of China's Historical Territory").

³⁶⁸ See also below Chapter 1.3 ("Connection between Geography and Ethnicity, Culture and Civilization").

³⁶⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 1-32.

³⁷⁰ Wang, Q. E.: 2001, p. 42-50; 2012, p. 103-105; Zarrow: 2007, p. 25-27.

³⁷¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12. See Chang Hao: 1971, p. 158f.; Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 76.

³⁷² See also Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 277.

³⁷³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 3-4.

but connect them and see their “cause and effect (*yuanyin jieguo*),” they should not only report about those ones in power, but about the movements and progresses of all people.³⁷⁴ And he resumes: “So all parts of the historical process of the nation-people to the point of their mutual relations is what he [that is, the historian] must discuss.”³⁷⁵

The next part about the scope of China’s history is mostly an argument for China as the cradle of Asian civilization and therefore for its general importance among Asian countries:

“The main impetus (*zhu dongli*) of the Far East lies totally in China. Therefore the position of the Chinese ethnicity (*Zhongguo minzu*) among the history of the Far East is exactly like the position of the Aryan ethnicity among the history of the world.”³⁷⁶

Although Liang does not define what he means by “Chinese ethnicity (*Zhongguo minzu*),” it becomes obvious by his comparison with the “Aryan ethnicity” and with reference to other texts from that time that he refers to the Han people. In Liang’s opinion a general history of China would deal most prominently with the Han, as they are at the centre of the state culturally and ethnically. The Non-Han people would only come second.

Liang Qichao’s Periodization of China’s History

Liang’s division of eras will lead us directly to the question about the Non-Han dynasties in China’s history. Instead of drawing only on dynastic names like it was common in traditional Chinese histories, Liang divides historical time in three eras adjusting European models of periodization, which were considered to be of universal validity, to his view of China’s epochs: antiquity (*shang shishi*), Middle Ages (*zhong shishi*), and modernity (*jin shishi*).³⁷⁷ Arguing for a periodization of China’s history based on European models, Liang claims that “history describes the phenomena of evolution of the human community (*renqun*) and searches for what are its general principles and laws.”³⁷⁸ Liang’s periodization therefore symbolizes one crucial difference between traditional and renewed historiography. Underlying the new idea of history was the assumption that a character of development was inherent in history. According to this, all histories could be periodized based on “the same universal and linear time axis. [...] Differences between two countries or regions meant simply that they occupied different points in

³⁷⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 1, line 1, 2–3.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 1, line 3–4.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 2, line 12–13.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 11, line 9–p. 12, line 9. See also below Chapter 4.3 (“Periodizations: Japanese Models – Chinese Ideas”).

³⁷⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 10, line 2.

‘time’ construed as linear progress.”³⁷⁹ This inevitable progress would mean a progress in cultural and civilizing ways, too.³⁸⁰ In the case of Chinese history, Liang links this temporal-cultural progress to territorial and especially racial progresses³⁸¹:

1. **Antiquity** (*shangshi*): China’s China (*Zhongguo zhi Zhongguo*)

Time: From Huangdi until the unification under the Qin dynasty (27th century–221 BC).

Space: Mengjin [district] in Zhou times, fifty states in Spring and Autumn period, seven princedoms of Warring States period, then Qin territory.

Ethnicity: Han ethnicity, annexing aboriginal Man ethnicity’s (*tuzhu Manzu*) territory (but no racial mixture), afterwards only contact with the Miao ethnicities (*Miaozu zhuzu*).

2. **Medieval times** (*zhongshi*): Asia’s China (*Yazhou zhi Zhongguo*)

Time: From the unification under the Qin dynasty until the last years of the Qianlong period of the Qing dynasty (221 BC–1796).

Space: According to each dynasty.

Ethnicity: The Han ethnicity fights with all Asian ethnicities:

“The Xiongnu race (*Xiongnu zhong*), the Tibetan race (*Xizang zhong*), the Mongol race (*Menggu zhong*) and the Tungusic race (*Tonggusi zhong*) one after the other mixed (*cuoza*) were in war with the Han race (*Hanzhong*).”³⁸²

“Until the last years of this epoch all races of Asia gradually proceeded to a united power to coordinate the movements of all. And they united to a race (*zhongzu*) very different from those outside.”³⁸³

3. **Modernity** (*jinsi*): Global China (*shijie zhi Zhongguo*)

Time: From the last years of the Qianlong period until today (1796–1901)

Space: according to each dynasty

Ethnicity: Chinese ethnicity united and contracted with all Asian ethnicities, had contracts and concurrence with the Western people (*Xiren*)

³⁷⁹ Conrad: 1999, p. 73.

³⁸⁰ This is view of history is initiated by Liang’s growing knowledge of European Enlightenment’s ideal of progress and it’s implications for history.

³⁸¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11, line 9–p. 12, line 9. Tang Xiaobing argues, that “the periodization of Chinese history remained inseparable from a punctuating territoriality, a collective and bounded experience of space defined through ethnic and national interaction and confrontation.” He then goes on that “Geography proved to be a central interpretive category in Liang’s outline of Chinese history.” (p. 44) The second statement it true. So far I could not find a strong emphasis on territory in history. Therefore, it was possible for Liang to connect the new temporal division with an also progressive history of China’s space. (Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 43ff.)

³⁸² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11, line 16.

³⁸³ Ibid., p. 12, line 1–2.

According to this periodization of China's history, there had been parallel progressive developments with regard to time, space and ethnicity. With time proceeding, China not only enlarged its territory – phases of complete loss of this territory are omitted by Liang – but has assimilated more and more other ethnicities, until it had achieved complete assimilation of all inner Chinese, that is, inner Qing Non-Han peoples. Assimilation can thus also be seen as part of the progressive development – the more homogenous the better.³⁸⁴

Ethnicity and History: The Case of Non-Han Dynasties in East Asia

It has often been said that traditional Han Chinese understanding of history and time would be cyclical, contradicting an evolutionary view of history as a stringent, connected line of advancement.³⁸⁵ And the acceptance of the evolutionary idea of history can be called the essence of change Liang initiated in Chinese historiography. Before, dynasties had been seen as being slightly changed and modified repetitions of their predecessors, partly following patterns, diminishing sooner or later to make place for another dynasty. Non-Han dynasties easily found their place among these patterns. But in a new scheme of historiography, where China's history had to be seen as the description of the progress of its nation, it was a major point of interest how Non-Han dynasties could be integrated into China's history.

This question was indeed a complicated one, as it included several layers of questions. First of all, what was China and what would be a Chinese nation-state? What was the Chinese ethnicity and who would be China's nation-people?

The problematic of the Non-Han conquest dynasties' integration into China's history was closely linked to the perception of ethnicity (*minzu*) and race (*renzhong*).³⁸⁶ After certain proper names, both *zu* and *zhong* are used as suffixes, often actually having the same meaning (for example *Miaozu* and *Miaozhong*). The terms are not used in a stable way and show the yet not definite meaning of these terms, which had started to change already after 1727, when the Yongzheng Emperor (1678–1735, reign time 1722–1735) introduced a policy of differentiation due to ethnicity based on “objective” genealogies

³⁸⁴ With this claim – which by no means was reflected in late Imperial reality – , Liang anticipates ideologically, what the sociologist Ernest Gellner (1925–1995), one of the most important scholars working on nationalism, has seen as one crucial pre-condition of modern nation-states: the homogenization of people. (Hall: 2006, p. 38–41.)

³⁸⁵ Huang/Zürcher: 1995, p. 3–14, in particular p. 7–8; Harbsmeier: 1995, p. 49–71. Axel Schneider points out that traditional Chinese views of history have moreover been interpreted as being linear or regressive. (Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 273. For literature see *ibid.*: p. 290n9.)

³⁸⁶ With regard to Non-Han people in East Asia, Liang Qichao mostly used the term ethnicity (*minzu/zu*), whereas the term race (*renzhong/zhong*) is mostly used for unifications of several ethnicities, i.e. the European race, the Asian race, etc.

and not longer on “subjective” personal identification.³⁸⁷ Under the Qianlong Emperor (1711–1799, reign time 1735–1796) this ethnic policy became even more influential as it was now based on several publications, which all were aimed at distinguishing the Manchus from others by manifesting a perception of blood relation among themselves especially through genealogies and family histories.³⁸⁸ This general shift from identification as a feeling of cultural belonging and identity to a institutionalized one based on genealogies was further manifested during the late Qing, also due to the introduction of Herbert Spencer’s (1820–1903) works with the catch phrase “survival of the fittest (*youshengliebai*)” and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s (1744–1829) theory of soft inheritance, so-called “Lamarckism,” through the translations of Yan Fu (1853–1921).³⁸⁹

Liang considers the Qing empire as the territory of a future Chinese nation-state. Therefore, he also defines the ethnicities, which would form China’s nation-people, according to this territory. Consequently, China’s history is defined geographically as the history of all these ethnicities, living and having lived in the territory of the Qing empire. But as seen above, Liang nevertheless intends the Han people to be at the core of a nation-state of China. To legitimate this claim, he bases this raising of the Han above the other ethnicities on historical evidences. Therefore, the history of China is the history of Non-Han ethnicities, too, but it is most important for Liang to expound their relation with and their inferiority compared to the Han people. But with regard to phases of Non-Han conquest it is especially difficult to uphold and argue for the superiority of the Han.

Whereas Fu Sinian later emphasizes that the phases of Non-Han conquest dynasties were eras of weakness and decline rather than of progress of the nation, Liang does not accept the nation being weak.³⁹⁰ Therefore, he develops his special understanding of the relations between the Han ethnicity and Non-Han conquest dynasties’ ethnicities, later taken over by other historians – his idea of an “assimilative power of China,” in 1922 rephrased as the “assimilative power of the Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu tonghua li*),” Zhonghua being defined as the Han ethnicity.³⁹¹ This power is supposed to be a cultural tool of the Han people, helping them to change every Non-Han people – be they conquerors or not – and thus keeping their dominance at least culturally. The assumption of such a powerful gift of the Han people makes it possible for Liang to pull wool not only over his own but also over his readers eyes by stating about the 10th to 14th century during, which major conquest dynasties came to power: “Seen from the angle of outer appearances the Han race often lost, but seen from the angle of inner spirit, the Han race often won.”³⁹²

³⁸⁷ Elliott: 2001, p. 326–329.

³⁸⁸ Crossley: 1990, p. 5, in particular 21ff., 77–78.

³⁸⁹ Dikötter: 1992, p. 67f., 98ff.

³⁹⁰ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1227/179.

³⁹¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 32.

³⁹² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11–12.

Races and History: Liang Qichao's Idea of Racial Categories

Liang's perception of nation was strongly connected to ethnicity and he considered ethnic identities to be the basis of a nation. At the same time he considered history would create and strengthen national sentiment and identification. He tried to show the connection between ethnicity and history in its relevance for the nation. Thus Liang claimed that all human beings could be divided into two groups: "There are races with history and there are races without history."³⁹³ To fully understand how closely this statement is connected to the question of Non-Han dynasties it is, however, necessary to read the passage in full:

"There are races with history and there are races without history. They are equally races. But how to differentiate between those with and those without history? Those, who could bind themselves together, are those with history. Those, who could not bind themselves together, are those without history. Why? Those, who could bind themselves together removed others. And those, who could not bind themselves together were removed by others. Those, who removed others, could enlarge their original race (*benzhong*) and overcome other races. Very fast they monopolized the stage of global history. The original races of those, who were removed by others, by and by declined and disappeared. They did not only not enlarge to the outside, but also declined in the inside. Subsequently, they lost their former position in history and the historical stage was conquered by others."³⁹⁴

In Liang's opinion there were only two races with history, "the white and the yellow race (*huang bai liang zu*)."³⁹⁵ Although it remains somewhat unclear what Liang means qualitatively by "binding (*jie*)" in this context, it becomes clear, which races form these

³⁹³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12, line 4.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, line 4–7.

In fact, the differentiation between races which constitute or have history and the others appears in Bluntschli's *Lehre vom modernen Staat* which Liang knew through Japanese translations and abstract: "Sie [= die "Tagvölker" = weiße Rasse] sind vorzugsweise die historischen Völker. Sie bestimmen die Geschichte der Welt. (They [= the "nations of the daylight" = the white race] are pre-eminently the nations which determine the history of the world.)" (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 89; 1885, p. 80.) However, Liang's argumentation why this is so – and of course his inclusion of the "yellow race" – differs from Bluntschli, who emphasises not the formation of bonds, but the breeding of founders of "higher religions," philosophy, inevitable military superiority and conquest of others, "höhere Staatenbildung (higher political development)," "höchste Zivilisation und die Vervollkommnung der geistigen Zustände der Menschen (highest achievements of the human spirit)." (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 89; 1885, p. 80.)

Bluntschli acknowledges that China and Japan are "civilized nations (*Kulturvölker*)" and grants them "subtle political philosophy," "ideals of humanity" and the earnings instead of birth right. He also admires their abilities in the area of agriculture, craft, education and police. However, their law system is too much bound to moral ideas and family obligations, their government is benevolent, but despotic, and last but not least, "ihr Ehrgefühl ist unempfindlich und die Volksfreiheit bei ihnen nicht entwickelt (they have little sense of honour and no idea of national freedom)." (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 88–89; 1885, p. 79–80.)

³⁹⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12, line 14. See also Dikötter: 1992, p. 68.

bonds among each other, when he lists, which groups and ethnicities belong to them. For the yellow race he gives the following list³⁹⁶:

Yellow race (*huangzhong*)

1. East Asian people:
 - Chinese people (*Zhongguoren*)
 - Japanese people (*Ribenren*)
 - Korean people (*Chaoxianren*)
 - Thai people (*Xianluoren*)
 - Other East Asian people
2. North Asian people:
 - Mongol people (*Mengguren*)
 - Tartar people (*Dadaren*)
 - Xianbei people (*Xianbeiren*) (today's Siberian people (*Xiboliyaren*))
 - Other North Asian people
3. European people of the yellow race:
 - Turkish people (*Tu'erqiren*)
 - Hun people (*Xiongjialiren*)
 - Others European people of the yellow race

With this list, Liang refers to those people belonging to the “yellow race,” which are living in his present time. It seems useful to put Liang's list in comparison with that of the Japanese historian Kuwabara Jitsuzô's (1871-1931) in his *Chûtô tôyôshi (History of East Asia for Highschools)* (1898).³⁹⁷ Many differences between Liang's and Kuwabara's list come to the fore:

Liang's list of people belonging to the “yellow race” from 1902:

1. East Asian people: Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Thai, others
2. North Asian people: Mongols, Tartars, Xianbei, others
3. European Asian people: Turks, Huns, others

Kuwabara's “Asian races” from 1898³⁹⁸:

1. Chinese races: Han, Tibetan, Cochinchinese ethnicities
2. Siberian races: Japanese, Tungusic, Mongol and Turkish ethnicities

Liang identifies three main groups of related “people (*ren*)” in Asia – Eastern, Northern and European Asian people with altogether nine subgroups of “people.” Kuwabara

³⁹⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 13. He also gives a detailed list of the people belonging the “white race.” (Ibid., p. 13–14.)

³⁹⁷ Kuwabara: 1898, p. 22–24. In his *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (1905) Liu Shiwei lists the “Asian races” (*Yaxiya renzhong*) and claims to be citing from Kuwabara's *Chûtô tôyôshi (History of East Asia for Highschools)* (1898). (He refers to it as *Dongyang shi (History of East Asia)*.) (Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 1, line 8–p. 2, line 11.)

³⁹⁸ Kuwabara: 1898, p. 22–24.

counts only two “races (*renzhong*)” – Chinese and Siberian – with altogether seven subgroups called “ethnicities (*zu*).” Whereas among the ethnicities Kuwabara lists all of the so-called Qing “Five Ethnicities (*wu zu*)” (Manchus, Mongols, Han, Turkish Muslims and Tibetans) usually seen as the main ethnic groups in Qing China can be found, Liang does not mention the Manchus and the Tibetans at all. Where both of them part of the Chinese people? Or did he mean the Manchus being part of the Xianbei people as the Xianbei are interpreted as being their forefathers? But why then did he claim that the Xianbei would be today’s Siberians?

To make things even more complicated, let us turn to another list of ethnicities by Liang, published only one year before the list above. In the fifth part of his essay “*Zhongguo shi xu lun*” of 1901, Liang divides races in Asia, who according to him belong to “the scope of China’s history.” The term “*zhong*,” suffixed after the specific names, is used in the same way as Liang is using “*ren*” in “*Xin shixue*” and “*zu*” in other texts especially since 1906. However, it is peculiar – or it might be a misprint – that in this 1901 text, Liang uses the term “*zu*” only for one people – the Tunguses. He writes: “There are no less than ten [races in the scope of China’s history], but the most well-known ones, which are of importance, are altogether six”³⁹⁹:

1. Miao race:

China’s aboriginal race

territory: Today they live in Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi, Vietnam (*Annan*) and Birma (*Miandian*).

2. Han race:

The successors of civilization, the children and grandchildren of the Yellow Emperor

territory: Today they live everywhere in the country.

3. Tibetan race (*Tubotezhong*):

territory: Today they live in Tibet and Burma.

line of succession: Dī/Qiang [Shang/Zhou time] → Yuezhi [Qin/Han times] → Tufan [Tang times] → Western Xi (*Xi Xia*) [Song times]

4. The Four Mongol races (*si Mengguzhong*)

The Yuan was their time of bloom, they “united China (*hunyi Zhongguo*).”⁴⁰⁰

territory: Today they live Inner and Outer Mongolia and Tianshan Northern Route.

5. Xiongnu race (*Xiongnu zhong*):

³⁹⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 5, line 11–12. Liang is aware that Westerners debate about the total number of “races” in the world, whether there are 5, 3 or 7 (p. 5, line 10). In “*Xin shixue*” he mentions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 22, 60 and 63, also giving the names of the men claiming these numbers. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12, line 9–14. For the list see Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 5, line 13– p. 6, line 11.)

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6, line 6–7.

territory: Today they live in Tianshan Southern Route and Central Asia.

line of succession: Xianyun [Zhou times] → Xiongnu [Han times] → Rouran [Nan Bei Chao times] → Tujue [Sui times] → Huihe [Tang times] and today's Turks (*Tu'erqi*) in Europe

6. Tungusic ethnicity (*Tonggusi zu*):

territory: They originally came from Northern Korea (*Chaoxian*), then they expanded to the shores of the Heilongjiang.

line of succession: Eastern Hu [Qin/Han times] → Xianbei [Han times] → Mohe [Sui/Tang times] → Khitan (*Qidan*) [Late Tang/Wudai times] → Jurchen (*Nüzhe*) [Song times] → today's Qing Dynasty

In contrast to Liang's list of 1902, his list of 1901 is much more similar to Kuwabara's list of the "Asian races (*Ajia jinshu*)," in fact, for the Tibetans, Mongols, Xiongnu and Tunguses Liang seems to have copied Kuwabara's line of succession from *Chûtô tôyôshi* (*History of East Asia for Highschools*) (1898).⁴⁰¹ The main difference between Liang's and Kuwabara's lists is that Liang lists only six races, whereas Kuwabara lists seven and that Liang does not assort the races in two groups. Of the seven ethnicities in Kuwabara's list, Liang leaves out the Japanese and the Cochinchinese, because they do not live in the region of the Qing Empire. He instead introduces the Miao as "China's aboriginals."

It became clear that Liang's list of 1901 differs greatly from that of 1902. Of course, this is also due to the fact that in 1901 Liang lists the "most well-known (*zui zhuming*)" six races in the "scope of China's history" and in 1902 the "historical races (*lishi de renzhong*)" of the "yellow race (*huangzhong*)." However, in both texts Liang claims to list races (*renzhong*). In 1902, he subsumes an unknown group of people under the heading "Chinese people." Are the six "races in the scope of China's history" (Han, Miao, Tibetans, Mongols, Turks and Tunguses) of 1901 part of this group? This is not entirely the case: Mongols and Turks are listed separately in both texts. The four other races do not appear separately in 1902, probably because Liang counts them among the general term "Chinese people."

Liang must have been influenced by Kuwabara's list in 1901 and used it as a basis, but developed his own ideas in 1902, when his list profoundly differs not only from Kuwabara, but also from his own list of 1901.

Neither Liang nor Kuwabara writes, on which criteria his classifications are based, i.e. language, way of living, traditions, region, etc. In his 1902 list, Liang seems to differentiate according to region (Eastern, Northern and European Asians). However, he did not remain true to this criterion as there are exceptions in each category: in the group of East Asian people, the Thai people seem to be misplaced; in the group of North Asian people, it is not clear, who Liang means by "Tartars," as this is a very fluid term

⁴⁰¹ Kuwabara: 1968 [1898], p. 23–24.

and nowadays considered to be a general term for many diverse people in Central Asia, including Mongols and Turks⁴⁰²; in the group of European Asian people, it is likewise not clear, who Liang means by the “Huns.” Like the Xianbei, it usually refers to a group of people, which ceased to exist in the first millennium AD. But to which living people Liang refers here has to remain unsettled.

One year after the publishing of the discussed list, in 1903, Liang states in his essay about Bluntschli that language, script and tradition would be the most important criteria to define ethnic belonging.⁴⁰³ However, applied to his list from 1902, language and script do not seem to be the classifying criteria. The Koreans created their own script, the Hangul, in the 15th century AD and their usage of Chinese characters as a main script more and more diminished, although they are still used as auxiliary characters. The Thai never used Chinese characters. And even the Japanese have their own additional scripts, complementing Kanji. As to the other two groups, language and script can also not be applied as a group defining criteria. Considered as a whole, it appears that Liang’s defining criteria for this period of time therefore have to remain unclear.

Two further points are of interest regarding Liang’s lists. In the list of 1902, he leaves out the Manchus, maybe to show that they already have assimilated and can be regarded part of the groups he calls Chinese. In the earlier 1901 list Liang claims that all those people from the Northeast already completely assimilated to the Han Chinese.⁴⁰⁴ The “Qing dynasty” is still listed as being the bloom of the Tunguses, thereby contradicting his own claim of the assimilation of all Northeast people.

Moreover, in 1901 he writes that the Mongols “united China (*hunyi Zhongguo*).”⁴⁰⁵ Again, it becomes obvious here that the territory Liang claims to be “China” is definitely not only China proper. It seems to be irrelevant to Liang that the overlords of this united “China” were of Non-Han ethnic background, and that this China was in fact only a small part of the world’s second largest empire. His statement sounds as if China’s unification had been the only purpose of the Mongols. Moreover, the usage of the term “to unify” implies that these regions were meant to be united and belonged together naturally – an interesting interpretation of the policy of expansion and conquest under the Yuan. Generally speaking, Liang’s effort to integrate the Mongol Empire into China’s history is an attempt to keep the illusion upright that the driving force behind the

⁴⁰² Liang does not use the term “Tartar” regularly. The term can be found in a much later text where he puts the Tartars in the line of descent of the Mongols, but as a gone ethnicity dissolved into the Mongols. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 7, line 2.) Liu Shippei speaks of “Khitan Tartars (*Qidan Tata*)” and thus links them with the overlords of the non Han dynasty of the Liao (907–1125), also long gone. (Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 39, line 25.) Another hint might be found in an English article from the 1870s, where the Tartars are equalled with the Jin people, that is the Jurchen. However, also they are long gone and Liang seems to refer to some existent Tartars here living in Northern Asia. It must therefore remain unclear who exactly he had in mind. (Howort: 1876.)

⁴⁰³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 14–15; p. 71, line 14–p. 72, line 2.

⁴⁰⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 15–p. 5, line 2.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6, line 6–7.

Mongols were still Han and that the most important task of the Mongols had been their unification of China. But it is also an attempt to integrate the Mongol Empire territorially into China's history, making its geographical range a natural claim of a Chinese nation-state. This brings us directly to the question of a more detailed definition of this territory.

History and Geography: The Range of China's Historical Territory

The fourth part of “Zhongguo shi xu lun” – “Topography”⁴⁰⁶ – is concerned with the question, which territory would be part of China's history, revealing Liang's general vision of China as a state or later nation-state. He writes about the geographical range of China in its history: “The area China's history administers can be divided into five large parts: first, China proper, second, Xinjiang, third, Qinghai and Tibet⁴⁰⁷, fourth, Mongolia, fifth, Manchuria.”⁴⁰⁸ The same description is given in his essay “Zhongguo dili dashi lun (The general tendency of development of China's geographical conditions)”⁴⁰⁹ published one year later in 1902:

“The territory of China today can be generally divided into two areas: first, China proper. [...]”⁴¹⁰; second, the subordinated regions (*shubu*)⁴¹¹ – Manchuria, Mongolia, the Turkish Muslim part (*Huibu*) and Tibet.”⁴¹²

It becomes obvious that in Liang's opinion, “China” embraces more than China proper. He also counts four large regions as belonging to China, all added by Manchu Qing emperors – or in fact rather the other way round: the Qing added four parts to their Manchurians homeland, thus creating a vision of China and its territory kept upright until today.

Liang argues in terms of topology to explain why China proper, Xinjiang, Tibet and Qinghai, Mongolia and Manchuria belong together and why the latter five are not just accidentally parts of China.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 3–5.

⁴⁰⁷ “Xizang,” literally meaning “Western Tibet,” is normally translated as Tibet, but, in fact, Xizang only covers the Western and central part of the regions traditionally inhabited by Tibetan people, who also live in larger numbers in Qinghai and Western Sichuan, and also Western Gansu and Northwestern Yunnan. Therefore, the literal translation would in fact come closer to its meaning.

⁴⁰⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 3, line 8.

⁴⁰⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_6].

⁴¹⁰ Liang lists the eighteen Branch Secretariats [administering provinces] (*xingsheng*): Zhili, Shandong, Hubei, Zhejiang, Hunan, Yunnan, Gansu, Anhui, Sichuan, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, Guangxi and Guizhou. (Ibid., p. 97, line 18–p. 98, line 2.)

⁴¹¹ This is no official term for these regions. However, their administrative systems differed from those of the provinces in China proper until the late Qing. Xinjiang became province only in 1884, Manchuria was divided in three regions, which were given provincial status only in 1907.

⁴¹² Ibid., p. 78, line 6.

“China is a country of great unity by nature! People are united, language is united, culture is united, religion is united, tradition is united. And the reason for that must lie in topology (*dishi*)⁴¹³.⁴¹⁴

Liang bases these topological reasons on the location of mountain ranges and rivers. He calls the Himalayas, the Pamir and the Altai “natural borders (*tianran zhi jiexian*),” dividing Tibet from India and China from Russia. The argument to rank the Himalaya, Pamir and Altai as natural and therefore also cultural borders runs that they did not permit the Chinese high culture to join with those of India and Asia Minor, whereas Liang does not see the Kunlun shan and the Tianshan, although equally high, as “natural borders,” because according to him they did not block cultural exchange on a broader range.⁴¹⁵

The major rivers of China connect the country and are its traditional trading routes. Liang divides them into two groups: first, those rivers originating in Tibet and Xinjiang and flowing through China proper: the Huanghe (Yellow River), the Yangzijiāng (Yangtze River), the Xijiang (Xi or West River)⁴¹⁶, and the Jinshajiang (Jinsha or Golden Sands River).⁴¹⁷ And second, those rivers flowing through China’s Northeast originating in Mongolia: the Heilongjiang (Amur River) and its headwaters, the Wonanhe (Onon River)⁴¹⁸ and the Ke’erlunhe (Kherlen River)⁴¹⁹, the Nenjiang (Nen River), the Selengehe (Selenge River), the E’erkunhe (Orkhon River), etc. All these rivers connect China’s five major regions. Especially Tibet and Xinjiang are brought closer to China proper by rivers, whereas Manchuria provides the link to Mongolia.⁴²⁰

By producing topological arguments, Liang wants to verify his perception of China in the borders of the Qing empire. These borders seem (or at least he pretends so) natural to him, as if China’s borders could not be elsewhere. By referring to the natural connection between geography and state borders, Liang shows why the people living inside these natural borders are very closely connected geographically and therefore also culturally – rivers connecting them internally and mountain ranges cutting them off externally.

Concepts of borders and ethnicity overlap and contradict each other here. Liang claims that the borders of China – and thereby the Chinese nation-state – would be

⁴¹³ Liang himself gives the English translation “permeability” in the essay “Yaxiya dili dashi lun.” However, this does not really seem to fit. (In: Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_7], p. 70.)

⁴¹⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_6], p. 77, line 1–2.

⁴¹⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 3, line 14–p. 4, line 2. That the mountain ranges cutting off Tibet from China in the East were in reality much more impermeable than the Himalaya in the South becomes obvious by the fact, that “Tibetan monks and lay scholars seldom, if ever, learned Chinese, thus remaining to this day generally ignorant of Chinese literature and religion.” These Tibetan scholars were much more influenced by Indian culture and partly also by interactions with Mongols. (Snellgrove: 1971, p. 332; Rawski: 2012, p. 57.)

⁴¹⁶ Today considered to be a tributary of the Zhujiang (Pearl River).

⁴¹⁷ Today considered to be a part of the Yangzijiāng (one of the major headwater streams of it).

⁴¹⁸ Via the Shilka River (Shileke He), the Onon River flows into the Amur.

⁴¹⁹ Via the Argun River (Ke’ergunahe), the Kherlen River flows into the Amur.

⁴²⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 3–4.

defined naturally due to mountain ranges and rivers. But apart from the Han, the Tungusic people and the Mongols Liang has to admit that other ethnicities, which are part of China, do not stick to the natural borders.⁴²¹ Thus, the Miao “also live in Vietnam, Burma and other places,” the Tibetans also live in Burma, and the Turks “occupy the territory from the Southern Route of Tianshan to Central Asia” and even founded “Turkey in Europe.”⁴²² However, Liang neither claims Burma or Vietnam to be part of China nor the Turkish populated parts of Central Asia nor Turkey.

We can thus conclude that Liang defines China primarily geographically. The territory of the Manchu Qing empire is Liang’s first reference for the borders of a Chinese nation-state. He refers to the five parts of China, which are the five parts of the Qing empire based on the “five ethnicities” of the Qing – Manchu, Mongol, Han, Tibetan and Turkish Muslim. In his 1901 essay, Liang even claims that a foreign conquest dynasty, the Yuan, unified the Chinese territory. He thus takes his other territorial model for a Chinese state territory from the Mongolian Yuan. Consequently, two Non-Han empires, of which China proper was part, are the blueprint for Liang’s borders of a Chinese nation-state. The Manchus and the Mongols had close relations to their Han and Non-Han neighbors alike. This was due to religious, lingual, cultural and also trading connections, i.e. many of the Mongols and Tibetans followed the same Buddhist school and also had a similar script. At the same time Tibetans, Manchus and Mongols also had a similar religion of older origin and based on shamanism. The very diverse Muslim people living in the oasis towns around the Tarim Basin provided the trading (and cultural-religious-lingual) connection to all countries in Central Asia, and the Tibetans had the same role, albeit to a much lesser degree, with regard to South Asia. Of course, all of them also maintained more or less close relations of diverse nature to the Han people. But it is not surprising that the large empires, which included all these people, were Non-Han empires.

Of course, it is possible in case of Central Asia to take the extreme high and thus nearly unpopulated and not easily passable mountain ranges of the Himalaya, the Pamir and the Altai as borders. In case of the Qing, these borders are congruent with state borders. But in case of the Yuan, the empire was much bigger and in case of other dynasties of course much smaller. This was also due to the fact that natural borders exist in China itself. The Tianshan and the Kunlun shan are mentioned by Liang, but dismissed as borders, because they would not block exchange. However, would Liang refer to other than the Yuan and the Qing dynasties, these mountain ranges would indeed manifest not only natural but also state borders. The same can be said for the mountain ranges in the East and Southeast and North of the Tibetan plateau – Min Mountains (Minshan), the Qilian Mountains (Qilian shan), the Altun Mountains and the

⁴²¹ Ibid., p. 5, line 13–p. 6, line 11.

⁴²² Ibid., p. 5, line 14, p. 6, line 4, 8, 9.

Yunnan and Sichuan mountain regions –, which were actually the borders of the Ming empire.

In the first decade of the 20th century China was not a fixed and clearly defined term yet. Like many other historians after him – Liu Shipei, Xia Zengyou (1863–1924) and Zhang Taiyan – Liang thought it therefore very important to find a suitable name for China and its inhabitants.⁴²³ Liang himself lists the names referring to “our country (*wo guo*)” – whatever that means territorially – in history: the various Xia (*zhu Xia*), Han people (*Hanren*), Tang people (*Tangren*), and the names according to all other dynasties.⁴²⁴ Foreigners would refer to it as *Zhendān* (that is an ancient Indian name for China) or *Zhina*. But all these names do not seem proper for Liang as they either refer to historical eras or were given to China by foreigners. Only “China (lit. Middle Kingdom, *Zhongguo*)” seems adequate to him, because “that is what we people are used to say.”⁴²⁵ Therefore, at last Liang decides that the history of “our country” should be called “history of China (*Zhongguo shi*).” And this history of China includes the histories of many Non-Han people, because the territory of Liang’s China includes them.

A strange ambivalence reveals itself here and has not been solved until today. China’s history – also in Sinology outside China – will always on the one hand refer to the history of everything in the PRC or even Qing China territorially, thus defining Sinology rather geographically, and on the other hand neglects Non-Han histories in comparison with China’s Han history, thereby treating Non-Han history as being inferior or less important, also because it is less easy to achieve and understandable for Sinologists due to language problems and other difficulties.

In the case of the Mongol and the Tibetan studies the situation differs from that of Manchu studies and that of Non-Han dynasties in general in China. Mongolian and Tibetan studies are quite established as academic disciplines independent from Sinology. In case of Mongolian studies this is maybe due to the fact that there also exists a Mongolian nation-state interested in an independent history of Mongols and Mongolia. Why this is also the case with Tibetan but not with Xinjiang history would be interesting to analyze, but is going beyond the scope of this dissertation. One reason might be the fact that Tibet was perceived as a more or less stable and defined state-like construct existing until the 1950s, although not always sovereign. Manchu studies had been a field of study for a long time, were neglected since several decades and are just about to become a subsection of Sinology again.

But returning to the question what China is for Liang one can conclude that before 1912 Liang clearly had the territory of the Qing empire in mind with its large Non-Han parts. He also clearly divides the inhabitants of China into diverse ethnicities or “races,” naming six most influential and important ones – the Miao, Han, Tibetan, Turks,

⁴²³ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 1–2; Xia Zengyou: 2000 [1904–1906], p. 9–10; Zhang Taiyan: 1982 [1907_1], p. 253. See also Cassel: 1997, p. 18.

⁴²⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 3, line 2.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3, line 5.

Tunguses and Mongols. Still, in his definition of China, ethnicity is secondary as an defining matter. Mainly, Liang accepts the borders of Qing China and tries to legitimate this way of thinking via geographical natural borders and topology. As this is very arguable it becomes clear that Liang either naively accepts the Qing empire as the “real China” or – what is rather more probable – uses topological arguments to legitimate a power-political claim, knowing that Qing China’s circumference is of course much larger than i.e. Ming China. Although a nation-state in China proper would be much easier to legitimate in terms of nationalism than one in the Qing empire borders, Liang and most other nationalist thinkers stuck to this model.

Connection between Geography and Ethnicity, Culture and Civilization

In General

Liang not only claims that there exists a close relation between geographical conditions and China’s state territory, but he also claimed for some time that there exists a similar close relation between geographical conditions and ethnical characteristics, especially the ability to found a civilization. Geographical conditions lead to certain attitudes of certain ethnicities revealed through history.

That people would form their ethnic character according to their natural surrounding was a theory since antiquity in China as well as in Europe. But only in the late 19th and early 20th century, geographical determinism, also called environmental or climatic determinism became an influential concept especially in Western geography. Based on her teacher Friedrich Ratzel’s (1844–1904) writings, but also on Lamarckism, partly Darwinism and Herbert Spencer’s theory of an “analogy between natural and social progresses,” geographers like Ellen Churchill Semple (1863–1932) developed the idea that culture would be determined by physical environment.⁴²⁶ Thus, “nature was given a causal power that could not be scientifically justified.”⁴²⁷

Others had accepted the idea already earlier, most importantly Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) in his lecture “Geographical basis of history,” which became part of his introduction to his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (*Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, also *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History and Philosophy of History*) (1837) and the historian Henry Thomas Buckle (1821–1862) in the *History of Civilization in England* (1857–1861).⁴²⁸ In the fifth chapter “Rekishu to chiri (History and geography)” in *Shigaku genron* (1898), Ukita Kazutami (1859–1946) included

⁴²⁶ Peet: 1985, p. 312–313, 317. See also Ishikawa: 2004, p. 168.

⁴²⁷ Peet: 1985, p. 309.

⁴²⁸ Hegel: 1914 [1857], p. 83–107; Buckle: 1864.

his understanding of Hegel and Buckle with respect to geographical determinism.⁴²⁹ Apart from Ukita, Liang based his geographical determinism also on the work of another Japanese scholar, Shiga Shigetaka's (1863–1927) *Chirigaku (Geography)* (1897).⁴³⁰ Liang was moreover influenced by Yan Fu's and Ma Junwu's (1881–1940) translations of Herbert Spencer's works and through this by Darwinism and Lamarckism, and finally by Bluntschli, who also accepts the assumption that climate and geography form ethnic character.⁴³¹

In 1902, Liang published his essay “Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi (The relation between geographical condition and civilization)”⁴³² which is in fact “an adaption” of Ukita's “Rekishu to chiri.”⁴³³ Together with three other essays of Liang on the subject of human geography, it marked “the birth of the discipline.”⁴³⁴ However, Liang does not refer to Ukita or any other modern theorist, but to the English philosopher and Enlightenment thinker John Locke (1632–1702), the ancient Chinese politician and philosopher Guan Zhong (d. 645 BC) of the Spring and Autumn period and the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC) to argue for his acceptance of geographical determinism.⁴³⁵ He cites all three of them one after the other to strengthen the argument of a close connection between geography or rather geographical conditions and history. According to him, John Locke said:

“The relation between geography and history is like that of body and soul. If the body is perfected, then the soul will come to live. If the geographical conditions are suitable, then the history of civilization will arise.”⁴³⁶

In the *Guanzi*⁴³⁷ it would be said that “if the granaries are full, they will know propriety and moderation. When their clothing and food is adequate, they will know the distinction between honour and shame.”⁴³⁸ And last but not least Liang cites Aristotle:

⁴²⁹ Ukita: 2007 [1903], p. 75–84.

⁴³⁰ Ishikawa: 2004, p. 160–161, 163.

⁴³¹ Yan Fu translated *A Study of Sociology* (1883), published in 1903. Ma Junwu translated *Principles of Sociology* (1884), published in 1903. See also Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 255ff.

⁴³² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8].

⁴³³ And Ukita's chapter was again an “excerpted translation” of parts from Hegel's “Geographical basis of history” and the introduction to Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*. (Ishikawa: 2004, p. 160–161.)

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

⁴³⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8], p. 106, line 10–p. 107, line 2.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 106, line 10–11. I could not locate the original source, if there is one, in Locke's works.

⁴³⁷ This work is named after Guan Zhong and he is traditionally seen as one of the authors, although it is a much later compilation.

⁴³⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8], p. 106, line 12–p. 107, line 1. Citation from *Guanzi*: vol. 1, p. 2 (Mu min (On shepherding the people), Guo song (Concepts of State); translation by Allyn Rickett. (Rickett: 2001, vol. 1, p. 52.) Confucius says the contrary: “1. Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said, ‘The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler.’ 2. Tsze-kung said, ‘If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first?’ ‘The military equipment,’ said the Master. 3. Tsze-kung again asked, ‘If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be foregone?’ The Master answered, ‘Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the

“One must be able to nourish one’s necessities, fulfil one’s needs, then noble thoughts and deed will arise.”⁴³⁹

In all cases the argument runs that only if the necessities of live are provided by certain climatic circumstances a civilization can develop. To turn the argument on its head, it means that people living in areas where these bare necessities can not be easily achieved cannot develop civilization.

In the fourth chapter of “Zhongguo shi xulun” on topography, Liang introduces several “general rules” for his idea of geographical determinism:

“High plateaus are adequate for pasturing, lowlands are adequate for agriculture, seashores and riverbeds are adequate for trade. People of the cold zone are well versed in warfare (*zhanzheng*). People of the warm zone can develop civilization (*wenming*). This is all according to the general rules of topology and history.”⁴⁴⁰

Similar rules are also cited in the 1902 essay “Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi.”⁴⁴¹ Liang writes:

“Why can people in cold and hot zones not have progress? Their mental and physical abilities are blocked due to natural powers and cannot develop. [...] In places of extreme cold and extreme heat the people [feel] the power of miserable conditions, so they cope with the repeated restraint of natural borders and still there is not enough. For that reason the history of civilization only bloomed in the warm zone.”⁴⁴²

Liang describes the continents of the Northern hemisphere – Asia, Europe and North America – as all being situated in the warm zone, whereas the Southern continents – Australia, Africa and South America – would be situated in the hot zone.⁴⁴³ And he concludes:

“The people of the hot zone get clothes and food too easily and don’t think about progress. The people of the cold zones get clothes and food too difficultly and cannot progress. Only those, who live in the warm zone, have the change of the four seasons. [...] Therefore, the civilized nation-people rose on the vast plains of the Northern hemisphere.”⁴⁴⁴

people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the State.’” (Legge: 1972, vol. 1, (Book XII. Yen Yüan, Chap. VII), p. 254.)

⁴³⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8], p. 107, line 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 8–9.

⁴⁴¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8]. Here Liang deals with the subject on a general level. However, the main task of the essay is to show why Asian countries have so far lagged behind Europe regarding cultural progress.

⁴⁴² Ibid., p. 106, line 11–p. 107, line 2.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., p. 107, line 7.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 107, line 12–14.

Besides climates, Liang also mentions that the altitude plays an important role. There are three kinds of territory: high plateaus, lowlands and coastal areas. Only people living in lowlands or coastal areas are able to found civilizations. In China, this were the people living in the areas of the Huanghe and the Yangzijiang, but Liang also mentions other so-called high cultures, India, Babylon and Egypt.⁴⁴⁵ Liang admits, however, that “heroes like Genghis Khan arose among barbarians (*yeman*).”⁴⁴⁶ But as these people from high plateaus were never able to “establish durable empires, one cannot speak of civilization [in their cases].”⁴⁴⁷

The Chinese case

In “Zhongguo shi xu lun” from 1901, Liang divides China’s people based on their geographical surroundings:

“The territory of our China embraces three zones - warm, cold, and hot. It has extremely high mountains, extremely long rivers, extremely wide plains, extremely long coasts and extremely large deserts. It is suitable for farming, pasturing, hunting, fishing, handicraft and trade. Of all geographically important conditions and special characteristics, our China has none not.”⁴⁴⁸

However, although China embraces divers regions, civilization only developed and bloomed in one of them, in the warm zone in the lowlands, coastal areas and riverbeds of the Northeast and Southeast. In his 1902 text “Zhongguo dili dashi lun,” Liang claims that these areas are “sovereign of the world (*zongzhu*)”: “Asia is sovereign of the world. China is sovereign of Asia. [China] proper is sovereign of China.”⁴⁴⁹

In contrast to Liang’s other texts, this text is extremely self-confident regarding China’s position in the world.⁴⁵⁰ However, about the position of China proper among Asia, he always thinks that it is superior: “Have we Zhonghua [people] not been the centre of the Asian continent and have we not been the masters (*zhuren*) since several thousand years?”⁴⁵¹ And elsewhere: “The main impetus power (*zhudongli*) of the Far East lies totally in China.”⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 108, line 4–7.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 108, line 2–3. By pointing out state building of people outside the suitable environment like the Mongol medieval empire as exceptions, Liang is touching the soft spot of Marxist theory of historical progress with this statement. “A unilinear Marxist theory of social progress assumed, primordially, changes from lowest economical forms to the highest ones. However, the economic ‘basis’ of pastoral societies has remained unchanged. [...] Thus, nomadism drops out of a unilinear Marxist dialectic of history.” (Kradin: 2002, p. 370.)

⁴⁴⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8], p. 108, line 3.

⁴⁴⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 9–11.

⁴⁴⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_6], p. 78, line 6–7.

⁴⁵⁰ See his essay “Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi,” where he explains why Asian progress in culture and civilization is not as far as in Europe. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8], p. 110, line 4–8.)

⁴⁵¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_7], p. 74, line 3.

⁴⁵² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 2, line 12.

In Liang's view, geographical determinism is strongly connected to history, because topology and geographical conditions determine the historical development and progress of people. According to Liang, there are several important geographical conditions in the case of China, which resulted in historical developments: mountain ranges, major rivers, landscape and climate.

About the mountain ranges has been spoken before. Liang chooses those, which cut China off from India, Central Asia and Siberia/Russia – the Pamir Mountains, the Himalayas and the Altai Mountains – as the natural borders, and those, which are situated in the middle of China, especially the Kunlun Mountains, he illustrates not as a border, but as “the main column (*zhugan*)” of China.⁴⁵³

More important for Liang are rivers, also mentioned before. At the beginning of the 20th century it was a well-known fact that the so-called “high cultures” were river civilizations – Egypt at the Nile, Babylonia at Tigris and Euphrates, China at the Yellow River and India at the Ganges and Indus.⁴⁵⁴ Liang himself mentions these ancient civilizations in “Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi” (1902).⁴⁵⁵ However, Liang extends the argument of the ancient “river civilizations” timely and uses it for modernity, too.⁴⁵⁶

In “Zhongguo shi xu lun” (1901) Liang counts ten major rivers of China, including those in the regions apart from China proper.⁴⁵⁷ As the four most important ones he ranks the Yangzijiāng, having displaced the Huanghe over time, which now ranks second, the Xijiāng and the Heilongjiāng.⁴⁵⁸ In his essay “Zhongguo dili dashi lun” (1902) Liang argues that the Huanghe had been “the symbol of the whole country” since Zhou times. It had been supplemented by the Yangzijiāng since Han times. Only since 1800, a third river had become “symbol of the whole country” – the Xijiāng.⁴⁵⁹ The role of the Heilongjiāng is not explained further.

These rivers also stand for the extension of civilization starting from China proper in the North (Huanghe), proceeding via the Middle regions (Yangzijiāng) to the South (Xijiāng).⁴⁶⁰ In Liang's view the Northern regions at the Huanghe had been the cradle of Han civilization since the times before and until Zhou. During the Han dynasty, the Middle regions at the Yangzijiāng began to supplement the Northern regions as another “symbol” of China. And only at the beginning of the 19th century, the Xijiāng has been added.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵³ Ibid., p. 3, line 8–13.

⁴⁵⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8], p. 108, line 4–7; Bluntschli gives nearly the same list. (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 261.)

⁴⁵⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_8], p. 108, line 4–6.

⁴⁵⁶ Liang actually also uses the “river civilization argument” not only for modern China, but for other modern cultures as well. (Ibid., p. 109, line 15–18.)

⁴⁵⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 3–4.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid., line 5.

⁴⁵⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_6], p. 78, line 14–15.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 78, line 8–9.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., p. 78, line 14–15.

This basic assumption of where and when civilization developed in East Asia is important regarding Non-Han people and the positions Liang ascribes to them with regard to culture and civilization. Liang asks: “Why could China become one of the five founders of world’s cultures? Because the two great rivers Huanghe and Yangzijiāng cross the warm zone and water the plains.”⁴⁶²

The people living in this area of the lower reaches of the Huanghe and the Yangzijiāng were the Zhonghua or various Xia people, that is, people, who used a Chinese dialect for communication and considered themselves distinct from other people living in the North, South and West from them and considered to be the direct ancestors of the Han Chinese by Liang. The Huanghe and the Yangzijiāng are the lifelines of China proper. Liang ascribes culture undoubtedly to these forefathers of the Han people, by ascribing the origin of China’s high culture in the regions where they dwelt. At the same time, he denies other people in Asia the ability to form an own culture and civilization. In Liang’s opinion, the geographical conditions of the Han people’s *Lebensraum* enabled them and only them to achieve a “high culture” in East Asia.

When Liang divides China in “Zhongguo dili dashi lun” (19021) into two parts – the “original” parts of China proper and the “subordinated parts” – he neglects the second parts completely in the rest of the essay as being unimportant, undoubtedly because he considers their cultures as inferior or rather non-existent. However, Liang states repeatedly that conquest always came from the North (the Five Hu, the Jurchen Jin, the Mongols and the Manchu), but this would not be because of their cultural but because of their military superiority, which they would have due to the hard climate they grew up in.

“How could it happen that until the Ming those of the Northern regions increased their power constantly and those of the Southern regions narrowed their power constantly? Because the people of the cold zone are usually wild and fierce (*han lie*), and those of the warm zone are cultivated and weak (*wen ruo*).”⁴⁶³

And in another text he resumes that “regarding government, the Northern parts look at the Southern parts and often conquered them with [military] superiority.”⁴⁶⁴ Liang explains this with geographical determinism:

“How could all these various Hu (barbarians) from the Northeast (*Dongbei zhu Hu zhong*) in turns usurp China (*Zhongxia*) in the last two thousand years? Because they grew up in a region of hunting and pasturing, were used to be at war with weather and wild beasts only to keep alive. Therefore, their character is good at war and merciless in fight. They are also used to move around for pasturing,

⁴⁶² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 11–12.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 4, line 14–15.

⁴⁶⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_6], p. 79, line 2.

following water and grass to live. Therefore they do not like settled inhabitants and are good at invasion and conquest. But the character of the Chinese ethnicities is adapted to the opposite. How could these ethnicities (zu) once they had entered China (*Zhongguo*) lose their original character and assimilate to the Han people? Again the geographical [caused] characteristics lead to this.”⁴⁶⁵

In this passage, “China (*Zhongguo*)” and the “Han people (*Hanren*)” are obviously one in opposite to Liang’s usage of “China” in other texts as we have seen above, where it embraces also the Non-Han regions Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria and Mongolia.

Liang’s answer to the question how “the short, tight skin of the nation”⁴⁶⁶ can be stretched over Non-Han regions is assimilation. In this text Liang bases his understanding of cultural development on geographical determinism and this has to argue that assimilation would happen according to the migration of the “Northeastern barbarians” from their harsh and cold surroundings to the pleasant and mild South because of their conquests. But this conclusion would in fact mean that people, who continue to live in these colder and more difficult to live in regions, could never assimilate or become cultivated and civilized. Geographical determinism would not solve the problem of the integration of Non-Han people satisfactorily, and Liang had to turn to other explanations of development of civilization in order to make his idea of “large nationalism” work.

Liang’s Assimilation Theory

The emergence of the theory in Liang’s thinking (1901–1906)

Through the diverse aspects of Liang’s historical, racial and geographical thinking analyzed above, it has become clear that Liang on the one hand sees the territory of the Qing empire as the model for a Chinese nation-state, and on the other hand that is aware that the integration of the Non-Han regions needed explanation and justification. He has two main arguments. First, in the Qing empire Han Chinese culture would be the most superior culture, maybe even the only culture, in comparison with the Non-Han peoples’ (non-) cultures. Second, the territorial range of a state in East Asia would be defined naturally by geographical conditions. These two basic assumptions enable Liang to argue that the Non-Han people in the future Chinese nation-state should and would become civilized, and that this civilizing would mean assimilation to the Han people or in other words sinicization. But how assimilation could happen was not clear to Liang from the start. I will begin this section by shortly revising Liang’s differing

⁴⁶⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 15–p. 5, line 2.

⁴⁶⁶ Anderson: 2006, p. 86.

ideas in three texts from 1901, 1903 and 1906, where the development to an idea of the “assimilative power of China,” which Liang displays in the latest essay comes to the fore.

Indirect forerunner: Geographical determinism and its implication for cultural change: “Zhongguo shi xu lun” (1901)

In the essay “Zhongguo shi xu lun” (1901), Liang does not write about assimilative processes in particular. Still, a central point concerning assimilative thinking is Liang’s demonstration of the argument of geographical determinism already analyzed above. He emphasizes that peoples’ character would be determined by the climatic and geographical conditions of their natural surrounding and therefore develop automatically. Consequently, they would be able to change when they moved to a different surrounding. If uncivilized people from cold or hot surroundings moved to temperate zones, they would adapt to these new conditions and civilize. Liang does not regard change of ethnic character as something that happened in contact to other people, but as a process people would undergo automatically when their *Lebensraum* changed. Applied to the Non-Han dynasties, this would mean that only those conquerors, who migrated to China proper, would assimilate.⁴⁶⁷

Enthusiastic Introduction of a Half-Baked Theory: “Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo” (1903)

In 1902, Liang introduces the idea of a “assimilative power,” and one year later, his keyword of “China’s assimilative power.”⁴⁶⁸ According to his view this is the basis of all encounters between Han and Non-Han ethnicities in East Asia. Regarding China, Liang accentuates the assimilation of the Tungusic people. He compares them to the Mongols, who in contrast did not assimilate and kept their own way of life. Again, Liang employs a territorial aspect to his idea of an assimilative power fitting into the concept of geographical determinism, when he writes that only those Manchus “inside the borders” would be completely assimilated.⁴⁶⁹ About the reason for this geographical confinement one can only speculate: Geographical determinism would suggest that it is the influence of the “warm climate” in China proper slowly changing the Manchus into civilized people.

However, if the “assimilative power of China” was constrained to the temperate zone only, than those parts of the Qing empire, which were situated in the cold zone and

⁴⁶⁷ Already in an essay of 1902, “Zhongguo zhuanzhi zhengzhi jinhua shi lun (Historical talk about the evolution of the absolutist government in China),” Liang uses the terms “*hua*” and “*tong*” with regard to the Manchu. He describes how the appointment of officials was uncoupled from ethnic belonging in Qing times: “After the middle period [of the Qing dynasty] everything changed to Han customs. After all were equal (*tong*), the concurrence was chosen by heaven and the natural fate.” (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_2], p. 79, line 7.)

⁴⁶⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_5], p. 11, line 10; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 1.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, line 3.

which Liang and others wanted to be part of a future Chinese nation-state could not be integrated with this theory. Therefore, the concept of assimilation had to be released from its geographical determined component.

Contradictions: “Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi guan cha” and “Fu: Shiji ‘Xiongnu zhuan’ Rong Di mingyi kao” (1906)

In 1906, Liang wrote an essay about the topic of ethnicity in China, his “Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi guan cha (Reflection about China’s ethnicities in history),”⁴⁷⁰ where the contradictions within his theory of a “assimilative power of China” come prominently to the fore. Liang claims that this essay would be written in the spirit of renewed historiography. His motive for writing it he describes as follows:

“When you study this discussion of mine, it shall call up our nation’s corporate feeling (*wo minzu gongtong zhi ganqing*) and shall restrain the further increasing of our nation’s feeling of differences (*wo minzu zhenyu zhi ganqing*).”⁴⁷¹

This call to strengthen the feeling of national unity seems to be directly aimed at Liang’s earlier introduced idea of a “large nationalism.”⁴⁷² Liang gives two premises, of which the second shows how he perceives the role of historiography:

“The analyses of this essay belong to the academic area and not to the area of political commentaries. Therefore, I will not discuss the eras of change of guest people (*ke zu*) having the sovereignty over the hosting people (*zhu zu*).⁴⁷³ I will only discuss those [things], which have an influence on the evolution (*jinhua*), the degeneration (*tuihua*), the unification (*hebing*) and drifting from each other (*qiantu*) of every ethnicity.”⁴⁷⁴

Liang demands historiography to strengthen a political identity of unity and collective. But in the same breath he denies that his historiographical essay has the character of a political commentary. History speaks for itself and it speaks the language of unity. It is Liang’s declared aim to strengthen the people’s unity with the help of historiography, and the power to strengthen lies in history. If historians approach history according to

⁴⁷⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1].

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., p. 1, line 5–6.

⁴⁷² The term *wo minzu*, which I have translated with “our nation” here, is not entirely clear. It is possible that Liang includes the Non-Han ethnicities in it, especially because he refers to a certain “feeling of differences” among them. But it could also be translated as “our ethnicity” and then would refer to the Han ethnicity only. In a later text, Liang also bemoans the absence of a feeling of unity among the Han people only. However, in this context, the first translation seems to make more sense.

⁴⁷³ The terms host (*zhu*) and guest (*ke*) originally referred to the position of a country in a listing of several countries, i.e. lists of parties of alliances, meetings and wars. The host would be the country listed first, the others would be guests. (Gentz: 2001, p. 96, 114, see also p. 114n129.) Also here it refers to a certain order of people, the hosts being settled above the guests.

⁴⁷⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 1, line 10–11.

Liang's new ideas, then history reveals this power without the historian having to change or falsify history. It just has not been emphasized by traditional historians so far, as they stuck to the histories of dynasties and individuals and were not interested in the collective and national history.⁴⁷⁵

Contrary to Liang's premise, however, this essay is of course highly politicized. It concentrates on the question, who the main or "hosting ethnicity of our China (wo *Zhongguo zhu zu*)" is.⁴⁷⁶ This "hosting ethnicity" Liang also calls "Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*)" and "Hua ethnicity (*Huazu*)," defining it as the Han ethnicity: "the 'Zhonghua ethnicity' of today is generally and popularly called Han ethnicity."⁴⁷⁷

That Liang equals the term "Zhonghua" with "Han" is very important in order to understand his and his contemporary texts. Usually, "Zhonghua" is often interpreted as a term for all people living in the PRC of today and before that in the nearly same territory of the Qing Empire. In the foreword to his book *Reconfiguring Chinese nationalism* (2007), James Leibold suggests that for Liang "Zhonghua minzu was broad and ambiguous enough to incorporate both the Sinic and the non-Sinic peoples of the Qing empire,"⁴⁷⁸ although he admits in a footnote that in 1907, Liang "employs the term as a synonym for the Hanzu."⁴⁷⁹ Leibold assumes that Liang's definition of the "Zhonghua ethnicity" would differ from a nationalist definition of the Han ethnicity and would therefore include the Non-Han population of the Qing. As we have just seen in 1906 Liang defined the "Zhonghua ethnicity" as the Han people not including "non-Sinic" or Non-Han ethnicities at all. He used the same restricted definition as the nationalist revolutionary Zhang Taiyan in his famous essay "Zhonghua minguo jie (Explanation of the Zhonghua nation-state)," published in 1907.⁴⁸⁰ Also others, i.e. Tao Chengzhang's (1878–1912) in his long essay "Zhongguo minzu quanli xiaozhang shi (The history of the growth and decline of power of China's ethnicities)" (1904) states at the beginning that "the Zhonghua ethnicity, also called Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*), calls itself Zhonghua people or China's people."⁴⁸¹ We have to conclude that during this time, that is, in the first decade of the 20th century, "Zhonghua" referred to the Han people only, although it might have changed its meaning later.⁴⁸²

By Liang's own definition "Zhonghua ethnicity" refers to the Han people. The same becomes clear when he describes, which ethnicities were assimilated to the "Zhonghua ethnicity" in antiquity and are now an indistinguishable part of them. Liang lists the diverse ethnicities living in China proper before the Qin dynasty apart from "the group

⁴⁷⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 3, line 1, 9.

⁴⁷⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 1, line 8.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2, line 1.

⁴⁷⁸ Leibold: 2007, p. 10.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 186n42.

⁴⁸⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1982 [1907_1], p. 252–256. However, it has to be mentioned with regard to James Leibold's claim that Liang – and not only him – changed his mind later and broadened the meaning of 'Zhonghua.' See also chapter 4 "Attempt of a more precise approach in 1922."

⁴⁸¹ Tao Chengzhang: 1986 [1904], p. 215.

⁴⁸² See below Chapter 4.3 (subchapter "Methodological Approach to China's History in 1921").

of the Hua ethnicity, [which descended from] Emperor Yan and Emperor Huang [= the Yellow Emperor].”⁴⁸³ He counts eight ethnicities partly subsuming them in pairs and gives explanations about their whereabouts, whether they assimilated and when⁴⁸⁴:

1. Miao and Man ethnicities (*Miao Man zu*)
2. Shu ethnicity (*Shuzu*)
3. Ba and Dī ethnicities (*Ba Di zu*)
4. Xu and Huai ethnicities (*Xu Hiao zu*)
5. Wu and Yue ethnicities (*Wu Yue zu*)
6. Min ethnicity (*Minzu*)
7. The hundred ethnicities of Yue [Guangdong] (attributing the Dan ethnicity) (*bai Yuezu (fu Danzu)*)
8. The hundred ethnicities of Pu [Henan] (*bai Puzu*)

(As further ethnicities living in Northern Yunnan today Liang gives the Moxie and the Guoluo.⁴⁸⁵)

About these people Liang states:

“The eight ethnicities (*zu*) discussed above together form the most important elements of the Chinese ethnicity (*Zhongguo minzu*). If in ancient times these ethnicities were indigenously [from China] or if they came from outside, one cannot proof today, because they lived in China since the time we have historical records of. Apart from two ethnicities, the Miao and the [hundred tribes of] Pu, all have already assimilated to the Zhonghua ethnicity. There are no traces of different characteristics left, which can be located. I claim that apart from these ethnicities one can not [find] any other in the Hua ethnicity.”⁴⁸⁶

Consequently, he reasons:

“Those, who were obviously perceived as a foreign ethnicity (*wai zu*) after late antiquity (*jingu*), are in most cases of a different race (*yi zhong*) today, and only in rare cases they were absorbed (*ronghua*) in the Hua ethnicity.”⁴⁸⁷

In a supplement essay, titled “Fu: *Shiji* ‘Xiongnu zhuan’ Rong Di mingyi kao (Supplement: An analysis of the names of the Rong and Dī in the ‘Xiongnu zhuan’ of the *Shiji*),”⁴⁸⁸ Liang analyses those ethnicities, which were summarized under the names of Rong and Dī in Antiquity as their identity “is vague and one cannot differentiate and classify [them].”⁴⁸⁹ He divides them into three main groups according to their assumed

⁴⁸³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 5, line 7–8.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 5, line 9–p. 12, line 10.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 12, line 11–14.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 13, line 5–7.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., line 7–8.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 15–23.

⁴⁸⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_2], p. 15, line 2.

place of origin: those from today's Shaanxi and Shanxi, those from Gansu and those from Liaodong. Liang claims that those Rong and Dí from Shaanxi, Shanxi and Gansu assimilated in ancient times.⁴⁹⁰ But those from Liaodong, earlier called Mountain Rong (*Shan Rong*) or Eastern Hu

“are [indeed] the Khitan and the Manchu from the spring of the Gold River (*Jinyuan*)⁴⁹¹ of later times. In Western languages they are called Tungusic ethnicity. Tonggusi [or] *Tunguse*⁴⁹² is a phonetic transcription of the two characters *dong hu* [= Eastern Hu]. From the Spring and Autumn Period onwards, these people lived wild and unbridled in the Northeast. For [the state of] Yan (11th century–222 BC), they meant disaster and bitterness until Duke Huan from Qi (*Qi Huan gong*) (?–643 BC) made an expedition into the North and brought peace to Yan. He greatly suppressed their fighting spirit. From there on they stopped [their attacks].”⁴⁹³

In this essay Liang claims that only the Eastern Hu were able to oppose the Xiongnu, the most important opponents of the Han people in Antiquity, and stayed an independent ethnicity. Moreover, they also kept their cultural independence with regard to the Han:

“When we look at the history of the several thousand years after the Han [dynasty], then those ethnicities, which live in today's Siberia and Manchuria, and those ethnicities, which live in today's Mongolia, all could not assimilate.”⁴⁹⁴

In fact, these two essays from 1906, “Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu shi” and “Fu: *Shiji* ‘Xiongnu zhuan’ Rong Di mingyi kao,” are the only essays I could find, in which Liang assumes that assimilation did not happen after late antiquity. He admits that there are only “rare cases” of ethnicities, which assimilated to the Han ethnicity also after that time, but he clearly does not count the Tunguses as being among them.

Turning to the question of the identity of the “hosting ethnicity” of China, that is, the “Hua ethnicity”, the “Zhonghua ethnicity” both identical with the “Han ethnicity” in his 1906 essay, Liang tries to approach the answer by posing eight rather rhetorical questions. On the surface the questions refer to one problem: which ethnicities originally added to the Han people and from which ethnicities the Han people originally descended from.

However, there exists a second layer underneath – the question how to form the Zhonghua ethnicity today and Liang's idea and call to form it actively. It is only revealed

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 19, line 14–15.

⁴⁹¹ Liang refers to the Anchuhu River here, Anchuhu meaning ‘gold’ in Jurchen. The Chinese name of the river today is Ashenhe.

⁴⁹² Liang gives this term in Latin letters.

⁴⁹³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_3], p. 23, line 1–3.

⁴⁹⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_2], p. 23, line 6–7.

in some of the eight questions and only touched lightly and indirectly in a somewhat unusual “insert paragraph (*fu yan*)” in the middle of the essay.⁴⁹⁵

On first sight, the eight questions look like a chain connected by the topic of the essay, that is, China’s ethnicities and the question, which ethnicities formed the Zhonghua ethnicity. But in fact rather than questioning anything they form one chain of argument. All of them are rhetorical questions and are asked in order to make a point and not to receive an answer. The first six questions lay the foundation for the last two, which are central to the underlying problem of the integration of Non-Han into the nation-state and the proposed solution of assimilation.

The first four questions seem innocent enough and refer to the question, which ethnicities contributed to the formation of the Zhonghua ethnicity: Did the Zhonghua ethnicity descend from one ethnicity or from several ethnicities, which gathered together?⁴⁹⁶ The second question reveals the answer to this: If the Zhonghua ethnicity descended from several ethnicities as Liang assumes, can they still be distinguished, and which were the most important ones?⁴⁹⁷ Thirdly, if there were several waves of intermingling (*hunhe*), which people were the most important ones during these waves?⁴⁹⁸ Fourthly, are there still traces of the exchange by migration of these people?⁴⁹⁹

Liang’s fifth question marks a first step towards a challenge of this idea: Were there also other ways for exchange and intermingling than migration?⁵⁰⁰ Liang thinks that there was also a possibility that intermingling was caused deliberately and actively. Moreover, this is one first step away from the conditions of geographical determinism, according to which it had to be assumed that assimilation was only possible by a change of environment. How this could come about he answers with the sixth question: Did the Zhonghua ethnicity only found empires inside China proper or also outside?⁵⁰¹ With the seventh question Liang indirectly answers the sixth question and shows, what happened when the Zhonghua ethnicity conquered Non-Han regions and people:

“Regarding the Zhonghua ethnicity it is said that its assimilative power is most powerful. How do so many tribes coming from outside assimilate to us although one cannot say that all our provinces, prefectures, departments and counties assimilated totally out of own power?”⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 4, line 7–p. 5, line 1.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2, line 1–2.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, line 3–4.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, line 5–6.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, line 7–8.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, line 9.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, line 10–11. Liang could be sure that his readers were familiar with China’s history and knew that some Chinese dynasties had conquered territories “outside the borders” inhabited by Non-Han people, namely the Han and the Tang dynasties.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, line 12–13.

Like in 1903, Liang deliberately assumes that the “assimilative power” of China or here more specifically of the “Zhonghua ethnicity” would be a well-known and widely accepted fact by using the phrase “it is said.”⁵⁰³ But what interests him here is the tactic of this power. How did the Zhonghua ethnicity put the assimilative power into work? And consequently, Liang’s last question runs: “Does our ethnicity (*wo zu*) today no longer have the ability to achieve total assimilation? Or does it still have it? If it has it, then what is its method?”⁵⁰⁴

In the earlier texts mentioned above, Liang had been positive about the ability of the Han ethnicity to assimilate others also in present times. In this text, however, he assumes that this power is inoperative at the moment, although it is still inherent in the Han people. He clearly aims at inspiring a revival of this power.

He answers to the last question about the method of assimilation indirectly in an “Insert paragraph (*Fu yan*)” in the middle of the essay.⁵⁰⁵ In this paragraph Liang exposes his point of view regarding the present-day situation of the Manchus. It is an excursus in so far as the essay as such deals with China’s antiquity until the Han Dynasty. Therefore, this detour to the present-day Manchu people seems academically somewhat out of place, but politically – contradicting Liang’s affirmation at the beginning of the essay – it gives a direct idea of the ideological background of the essay.

One important premise for Liang’s idea of assimilation in this paragraph is the idea that language (*yanyu*) would be a better indicator to differentiate races (*renzhong*)⁵⁰⁶ than physical appearance (“skin and bones (*pifu guge*)”).⁵⁰⁷ Liang refers to “the German profound scholar of anthropology” Friedrich Max Müller⁵⁰⁸ (1823–1900), who in fact was not an anthropologist, but a philologist and orientalist specialized in Sanskrit and Indian religion.⁵⁰⁹ Liang cites him to argue for the definition of racial identity based on language: “Blood may be thicker than water, but language is thicker than blood.”⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 1.

⁵⁰⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2, line 14.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 4, line 7–p. 5, line 1.

⁵⁰⁶ Although Liang uses the term “race” (*renzhong*) in his 1906 essay, he means the same as with the term “ethnicity” (*minzu*) he uses 1903.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 2, line 16–p. 3, line 1.

⁵⁰⁸ Liang uses the unusual transcription Maishi Miaola. The usual modern transcription is Makesi Moule. Liang probably knew Müller’s writing through Japanese scholarship. Two important Japanese scholars on Buddhism had studied Sanskrit with Max Müller in Oxford, Nanjō Bunyū (1849–1927), who returned to Japan in 1884, and Takakusu Junjirō (1866–1945), Japan’s first professor of Sanskrit at the University of Tokyo. They brought Müller’s works to Japan. (Mayeda/Tanizawa: 1991, p. 529.)

⁵⁰⁹ He was the first Professor of Comparative Philology at the University of Oxford (1868–1875). Under his direction, the *Sacred Books of the East*, the fifty volume set of English translations of Asian religious writings, among them James Legge’s famous translations of Chinese Classics and Müller’s own translations of Hindu Classics, was published between 1879 and 1910.

⁵¹⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2, line 16. This passage originally stems from Müller’s essay about the Indian reformer “Rājāh Rāmmohun Roy (1774–1833)” from 1883. In the passage in question, Müller writes that Rāmmohun Roy felt as amongst “intellectual kith and kin” when he arrived in England, because he spoke Bengali, an Indo-Aryan language Müller claims to be very similar to English materially and formally. (Müller: 1884, p. 6)

Already in 1903, when Liang had accepted Bluntschli's definition of ethnicity, he had stated that

“the definition of ethnicities according to Bluntschli runs: ‘Same place, same blood relation, same physical appearance, same language, same script, same religion, same tradition, same way of living.’ And one takes language, script and tradition as the most important [criteria].”⁵¹¹

So for Liang, language, script and tradition take a special position among the criteria to define an ethnicity in 1903 and still in 1906. In both essays he refers to the Manchu as an example of assimilation. However, in 1903 he had claimed that the Manchu would be “already totally assimilated,” whereas in 1906 he writes:

“They [= the Manchus] had a keen interest in Chinese strokes, but did not have characters of their own. But when they entered Central Plains, they used Chinese characters. [In small characters:] Regarding the Manchu script, Dahai (1595–1632) used one night's effort to create it. It completely was made by men and did not arise naturally. [...] After a certain time, they could not but let their language system go and follow our writing system. Therefore, until today those among the Manchus, who can speak the Manchu language, are less than ten percent. One can await the extinction of their language system very soon. I think that our Chinese ethnicities in antiquity originally had many different language systems, but today one can not see them anymore. The reasons for that are all just the same, only that the Manchu language system's extinction happens in these several hundred years. Therefore, we get a clear insight and can really refer to this [as a reference]. But the extinction of diverse ethnicities' language systems, which happened several thousand years before, can be proven by nobody. However, it is so that the annexation of their diverse scripts made the languages extinct. One can imagine the greatness of its [= the Chinese language's] power. Doubtlessly it affected the diverse Manchu language systems. So did it not also doubtlessly affect the diverse language systems of the ethnicities in antiquity?”⁵¹²

As mentioned above Liang claims in “Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi guancha” (1906) that the “assimilative power” would not work any more after late antiquity and also in his essay “Fu: *Shiji* ‘Xiongnu zhuan’ Rong Di mingyi kao” (also 1906), he mentions that the Tunguses and the Mongols would not have assimilated yet.⁵¹³ But in the “Insert paragraph” he raises hopes for the future. Although Liang does not assume the Manchus' complete assimilation as he had done in 1903, he nevertheless thinks that

⁵¹¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 13–15. Bluntschli writes: “A stronger influence on the separation of Peoples than that of religion is that of language. Common language is the special mark of a People (Stärker als die Religion wirkt auf die Scheidung der Nationen der Gegensatz der Sprache. Die Nation erscheint ganz besonders deutlich als Sprachgenossenschaft).” (Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 93–94; 1885, p. 84. See also Bluntschli: 1874, p. 37.)

⁵¹² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 4, line 12–p. 5, line 1.

⁵¹³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_2], p. 23, line 1–10.

they are on their irreversible way to become completely assimilated.⁵¹⁴ Thus the case of the Manchus serves as his explanation how the diverse ethnicities were merged into the Zhonghua ethnicity in antiquity – by their adoption of Chinese script and language. Moreover, the Manchu case demonstrates one important method of the “power of assimilation” to be used actively: by using Chinese script and language Non-Han people could be assimilated. Liang claims that Chinese script would be so powerful – again he uses the term *li* as in “power to assimilate” – that it would easily swallow other language systems. Based on his claim that races are differentiated by language rather than physiognomy he shows that the Manchus and all the other people, who spoke their own Non-Han languages before, lost their distinct ethnic identity through the loss of the language. Thus, Liang bases his assumption of the assimilation of the Manchus and others on their adoption of Chinese language and script.

The “Insert paragraph” confronts the reader with an important problem in connection with Manchu script and language. Consciously or not, Liang falsely claims that the Manchu had no script on their own “when they entered the Central Plains.” Afterwards they developed one, but Liang dismisses it as too artificial and does not allow it to have been in wide use. Of course, this claim of Liang is not true. The Manchu script was in wide use and it was naturally the first one among the official scripts in Qing times, the “state languages (*guoyu*).”⁵¹⁵ It was mainly based on the alphabetical Mongolian script, which again derived from the Syrian-Uyghur script and had obviously nothing to do with the Chinese logographic script. Also before they created their own writing system at the very end of the 16th century the Manchu did not use Chinese characters to write down Manchu texts. At least some of these facts must have been known to Liang, although the Manchu language and script was not in wide use anymore in Liang’s time. Still, Liang’s claims are astonishingly untrue and probably politically motivated. It is important for him to make a case by referring especially to the Manchus as they are the ruling ethnicity. The declaration of their assimilation seems to him most desirable. On the one hand, Liang strongly favored constitutional monarchism. On the other hand, he was aware that the Manchuness of the momentary emperors caused disagreement among the nationalists. The claim that the Manchus had already assimilated and thus were part of the Zhonghua or Han ethnicity, would have made it easier to gain general acceptance of the perpetuation of their monarchy. Another important reason why the assimilation of the Manchu was desirable was that their assimilation would proof the existence of the certain special feature of the Han Liang called “assimilative power.” Liang assumed that this power would be so strong that even if the Non-Han people were politically or military superior they would still be swallowed easily by Han culture and people due to the Non-Han people’s cultural inferiority. The Manchus would of course provide an optimal example for this theory.

⁵¹⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 1.

⁵¹⁵ Crossley/Rawski: 1993; Elliott: 2001, p. 290–304; Rawski: 1998, p. 36–39; Rhoads: 2000, p. 254.

It has become obvious that Liang's idea of an "assimilative power of China" was a politically motivated resumption, although it was partly based on older ideas as shall be analyzed below. It was, however, impossible for Liang to prove its existence. Therefore, he does not thoroughly analyze processes of cultural exchange, but let his hypotheses appear like universal and generally accepted truths ("it is said (*haocheng*),"⁵¹⁶ "today it is said (*jin wei*)"⁵¹⁷). Thus, it is possible for him to state obvious untruths unhesitatingly.

These untruths become especially obvious with regard to the Non-Han "conquest dynasties (*zhengfu wangchao*)." Based on the assumption of an "assimilative power" Liang claims that the founding people of these dynasties assimilated to the Han over the time.⁵¹⁸ He therefore includes them into China's history.⁵¹⁹ But on the other hand, they are still seen as being inferior, not entirely legitimate and Non-Han. That means, even if the Tuoba, Khitan, Tangut, Jurchen, Mongols⁵²⁰ and Manchu assimilated or acculturated to the Han, they could never really become Han. But if their assimilation was as inevitable and complete as Liang claimed how could they still be perceived as foreign in China's history? And how could their successors still be existent? The weaknesses of the concept lie openly. But also the reason why Liang had to accept these weaknesses lies openly: he used the concept for political purpose, to show how a Chinese nation-state could be created in the borders of the Qing empire, nevertheless being based on the Han ethnicity. With the "assimilative power" Liang wanted to persuade his fellow nationalists – and probably even himself – against better judgement that this could become reality one day.

Assimilation in Liang Qichao's Texts: Ancient Models

Liang introduced the "power of assimilation" as a new theory and thus started the discourse on the assimilation theory as a valid method to integrate Non-Han people into the (Han) Chinese nation-state. Its newness, howsoever, mainly lies in the point that Liang wanted it to be applied actively. There has been prediscursive roots of the discourse to be found in Han Chinese thinking before 1900, often called traditional thought. The question how "traditional" this way of thinking introduced below really was cannot be answered here. I hesitate though to claim that all three deciding concepts Liang's theory of an "assimilative power" was based upon were traditional in the sense that they had been basic to Han Chinese thinking since so long that it would be

⁵¹⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 72, line 12.

⁵¹⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76, line 1.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*, line 2–4.

⁵¹⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 6.

⁵²⁰ In their case, not even Liang would assume sinicization, only Sun Yat-sen would do that later. (Sun Yat-sen: 1994 [1924], p. 11. Translated by Frank W. Price in Sun Yat-sen: 1929, p. 23. See also Sun Yat-sen: 1994 [1924], p. 14, 61; 1929, p. 30, 125.)

impossible to name their beginning. On the contrary, I rather think that some aspects of them might be rather new. But this discussion would go beyond the scope of this dissertation.

The idea of sinicization, that is, assimilation to the Han was based on three patterns of various age: the idea that the civil (*wen*) stands above the military (*wu*), the All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*) model of the universe (reputedly opposed to the later state (*guo*) model), and the motto “using Xia to change Yi (*yong Xia bian Yi*).”

Civil Versus Military

A traditional pattern inherent in Liang’s classification of people according to their surrounding is the assumption of the duality of “culture/civil (*wen*)” and “warfare/military (*wu*).”⁵²¹ Liang generally claims that people of the warm zone, who developed culture-civilization (*wenming*), are naturally opposed to the people of the cold zone, who are well versed in warfare (*zhanzheng*).⁵²² In the case of China, the civilized people are the cultivated Han people, who have repeatedly been threatened by the military Northeastern people, especially by the Tunguses, by which Liang refers to the Tuoba, Khitan, Jurchen and Manchu.

The *wen-wu* dyad is based on the first two kings of Zhou, King Wen (*Zhou Wen wang*) (1099–1050 BC) and his second son King Wu (*Zhou Wu wang*) (reign time ca. 1049/6/5–1043 BC).⁵²³ In the *Liji* (*Book of Rites*) it is said about them: “To deliver the people from afflictions, King Wen used culture to rule (*Wen wang yi wen zhi*) and King Wu (*Wu wang yi wu gong*) used military power.”⁵²⁴ This dichotomy of civil and culture versus military and martial power is mirrored in the Chinese official system, which is divided into two main groups, the civil (*wenguan*) and the military officials (*wuguan*). In Zhou times “men who had *wu* (martial arts) expertise dominated the *shi* (the upper classes).”⁵²⁵ Confucius, however, favored *wen*, and after Confucianism became influential, the civil became to dominate the military.⁵²⁶ Confucius was later even worshipped as the *wen* sage (*wen sheng*) opposed to Guanyu, the *wu* sage (*wu sheng*).⁵²⁷

⁵²¹ Kam Louie translates *wen* as “cultural attainment” and *wu* as “martial valour.” (Louie: 2002, p. 4.)

⁵²² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 4, line 8–9.

⁵²³ Apart from these two kings, there are two other important embodiments of *wen* and *wu*. Confucius embodies *wen*, whereas Guan Yu (d. 220), a military leader from the Eastern Han dynasty, symbolises *wu*. (Louie: 2002, p. 14.)

⁵²⁴ Translation based on Louie and Legge. Legge translates the passage: “[...] and king Wan, who by his peaceful rule, and king Wû, who by his martial achievements (delivered the people from their afflictions)[...]” (Legge: 1885, Part II, Book XX. *Kî Fâ* or *The Law of Sacrifices*, 9; Louie: 2002, p. 11.)

⁵²⁵ Louie: 2002, p. 11.

⁵²⁶ Louie: 2002, p. 17–18. In the *Lunyu*, Confucius answers Zi Lun when he asks what would constitute a complete man (*cheng ren*) that he must have *wen*, which Legge translates as “accomplishments,” in addition to literature and music. (Legge, 1885, Book XIV. *Hsien Wân*, Chap. XIII, p. 279.)

⁵²⁷ Louie: 2002, p. 43.

Although *wen* and *wu* had been thought to complement each other until Han times, the military became to be seen as a necessary evil over time.⁵²⁸ Good government would not need military power, but only civil power to govern suitable and righteous. The development of this view is mirrored in the examination system. During Han times the forerunner of the examination system was based on the so-called “Six Arts (*liu yi*),” which included two military abilities, shooting and driving a chariot. However, these two disciplines were not included in the two Sui examination systems, the (*mingjing*) system and the *jinshi* system, which became the basis for all subsequent systems. When the *jinshi* system became the more important and later only examination system it requested the knowledge of the Classics and often also the composition of essays about them, complemented by poems. Knowledge of military methods and strategies was not expected anymore. Philosophy, or rather ethics, literature and arts were seen as the basis of good ruling. This was according to the so-called “way of the king (*wangdao*),” who should “rule without action” or to “govern efficiently without exertion (*wuwei er zhi*).”⁵²⁹ Only through his own superior behavior – and the selection of the right officials – would the king be able to rule the people. The ability to “rule without action” was achieved through philosophical education and insight and not through military training.

Non-Han people were commonly believed to be “greedy and warlike,”⁵³⁰ probably also due to the fact that most Han people only encountered them on a larger scale, when those Non-Han invaded Han Chinese inhabited regions. In the official history of the Jin dynasty, it reads:

“The [Jurchen] Jin used military power (*wu*) to conquer a state, in this they did not differ from the [Khitan] Liao. But after one generation, they established a system derived from the Tang and the Song, and there was nothing derived from the Liao generation. They used civil power (*wen*) and did not use military (*wu*) [anymore].”⁵³¹

When Liang related the Northeastern Non-Han people to *wu* – war-loving and brutal – and the Han people to the opposite *wen* – peace-loving and sensible – he also included the traditional evaluation of these characteristics that *wu* was inferior to *wen*.⁵³²

Consequently, the Non-Han could be as powerful, alarming and threatening to the Han people as they wished – as long as their societies were based on *wu*, they would always be inferior to the Han society based on *wen*. Already the writers of official

⁵²⁸ The *Shijing* says about Yin Jifu (9th/8th century BC), the minister of King Xuan of Zhou (*Zhou Xuan wang*) and ruler of the state Yin in Western Zhou times (11th century–771 BC): “For peace or for war (*wen wu*) fit is Keih-foo [= Jifu], A pattern to all the States.” (Legge: 1972, vol. 4, p. 283 (Part II. Minor Odes of the Kingdom, Book III. The Decade of T’ung Kung. III. Luh Yueh).)

⁵²⁹ Text and second translation see Legge: 1972, vol. 1, p. 295 (Book XV. Wei Ling Kung, Chap. V).

⁵³⁰ Yang, Lien-sheng: 1968, p. 27.

⁵³¹ *Jinshi*, ch. 125, p. 2713.

⁵³² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902], p. 4, line 15?.

histories had claimed that after the phase of conquest some Northerners would adapt to a phase of civilizing, a process which was interpreted by Liang as assimilation to the Han. And in the end, all Non-Han people would automatically turn to *wen* as the superior concept of life.

The Concept of All-Under-Heaven and Assimilation

Another traditional pattern inherent in the concept of “China’s assimilative power” is the idea of *tianxia*, usually translated as “All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*).”⁵³³ In the core of the *tianxia*-concept lies the assumption that the Han Chinese as a civilization are the cultural centre of the universe. Around it in a “graded and concentric hierarchy” live other people, who are inferior to the culture of the centre to different degrees.⁵³⁴ It is claimed that at least theoretically the *tianxia*-concept prohibits the acceptance or even the existence of other legitimate states.⁵³⁵

Benjamin I. Schwartz states that the Chinese perception of world order with its “notion of universal kingship linked to a widely shared sense of participation in a high culture” was not limited to China, but was inherent in all ancient higher civilizations.⁵³⁶ What would be specifically Chinese, however, is the combination of the *tianxia*-concept “with concretely Confucian criteria of higher culture.”⁵³⁷ This reveals itself in the Confucian perception of civil culture above military ability, thus classifying people, who seem to be especially good in fighting, beneath those, who might lose against them on the battlefield, but not in the official examinations.

Since Levenson’s development of the culturalism-to-nationalism-thesis it has often been claimed that the “Chinese world order” with its idea of *tianxia* and its denial of other states would have been brushed away by two things.⁵³⁸ On the one hand, the doctrine of nationalism and with it the concept of nation-states existing equally and independently came to be known in China at the end of the 19th century. On the other hand, it is claimed that the aggression of the Western imperialist powers made China aware that other high culture existed.⁵³⁹

Nationalism and Imperialism might have been severe challenges for the Chinese perception of the world and of the Other and the Self. However, in my opinion there are two issues to consider. First and in this context of minor importance, the “Chinese world order” based on the All-under-Heaven concept was not at all prevalent at all

⁵³³ Fairbank: 1968, p. 2; Dikötter: 1992, p. 2.

⁵³⁴ John King Fairbank counts three main zones: the Sinic, the Inner Asian and the Outer Zone, which corresponds with the spheres given in connection with the concept of the “Three Ages.” (See below and Fairbank: 1968, p. 2.)

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁵³⁶ Schwartz: 1968, p. 277.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*.

⁵³⁸ Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 108–120; Townsend: 1992.

⁵³⁹ Levenson: 1959 [1953] [1953], p. 104; Schwartz: 1968, p. 285.

times and among all Han Chinese people. Therefore, I think it necessary not to go on using the terms “culturalism” and “Chinese world order,” which had been so influentially put forward by Levenson and John King Fairbank without the acceptance that there had been other and equally important and influential concepts of culture and identity in China. And second and more important for the issue in discussion here, I doubt that nationalist and imperialist encounters were able to destroy the “Chinese world order,” which indeed was one of the most powerful concepts among the Han elite at least in late Qing times, although it is questionable when it developed and if it was as traditional as it is perceived today and moreover still forms a basis of PRC politics. I rather think that this world order was reduced territorially, but that large parts of it remained and still remain in existence. The conduct and attitude of the Han people towards their nearer and farer Non-Han neighbors living together with them in one state and also abroad has not changed as profoundly as a complete abandonment of the *tianxia*-concept would imply.

I do not deny, however, that there has been a definite change in the “Chinese world order” around 1900. In 1902, Liang had already completely accepted that Han culture was not culture *per se* anymore, but that other high cultures existed in the world. Thus Han China was not anymore the superior centre (*zhong*) of All-under-Heaven – reflected in the name for China as the “Middle Kingdom (*Zhongguo*).” However, Liang did not completely abdicate the idea of China as being at the centre of *something*, although it could not be at the centre of *everything* anymore. Although he does no longer presume that China is the cultural centre of the world, he still presumes that it is one of the few cultural centres of the world, the cultural centre of East and partly Central Asia and especially the regions of the Qing empire and partly beyond its borders.

By looking at Liang’s vision of Chinese history and its outline it becomes obvious that Liang does not want to give up China’s supreme position in East Asia although he has to give up China’s supreme position in the world. By sticking to the idea of “using Xia to change Yi” – an idea, which also had various opponents not only at Liang’s time, but also before⁵⁴⁰ – and even developing it further in later texts and broadening it to the keyword “China’s assimilative power,” Liang at the same time sticks to other concepts like the *tianxia*-concept, although it is no longer valid for the whole world.

This is also the basis of not only Liang’s but a general nationalist vision of a Chinese state, whose borders were intended to match with those of the Qing empire. With the preconditions required for a nation-state, this seemed only possible when the Non-Han people could be assimilated to the Han. Because Liang still perceived their cultures as being in fact non-cultures, he also denies them any right to found nation-states on their own, but automatically sees them as being part of a Chinese nation-state with the Han people (and culture) at its centre.

⁵⁴⁰ I.e. the Ming loyalists relying on Fang Xiaoru and some of the nationalist revolutionaries like Liu Shiwei.

“Using the Xia to Change the Yi” and the Three Ages

The “Mencian”⁵⁴¹ idea of “using the Xia (Chinese) [dynasty culture] to change the Yi (barbarians)”⁵⁴² has been used over history not only to express the Han people’s – as ‘Xia’ became to be understood as a term for Han people over the time – cultural superiority and inescapable radiance, but also to let phases of Non-Han rule look better. If the ruling “barbarians” were changed into cultivated Han people anyway, they could therefore be interpreted as closely related to Han dynasties and integrated in the allegedly unbroken chain of dynasties since Qin times. Of course, not all Han thinkers at all times would accept this assumption, and especially not those, who faced Non-Han rulers and their conquest during Northern and Southern Song times like Chen Liang (1143–1194)⁵⁴³, during Yuan times like Hu Han (1307–1391), Song Lian (1310–1381) and Fang Xiaoru (1357–1402) and during Qing times like the Ming loyalists Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) and Lü Liuliang (1629–1683).⁵⁴⁴

Liang picked up Mencius’ phrase already in a text from 1897 “*Chunqiu Zhongguo Yi Di bian xu* (Preface to the *Chunqiu* distinction between China and Yi and Di (barbarians)).”⁵⁴⁵ In the essay Liang claims to aim at explaining how the *Chunqiu* differentiates between Chinese and “barbarians.” But beneath its historical surface, the text is rather a political commentary and aims at showing why all non-Chinese people living in the Qing Empire are part of his idea of China or rather a Chinese nation-state. Liang cites from highest authority, that is, from three of the so-called Four Books (*si shu*)⁵⁴⁶, the Confucian canon. In the essay he argues indirectly against the expulsion of the Manchu by claiming that in antiquity the labelling of “Yi and Dí (barbarian)” in opposite to “China” was not based on “their place [of living] and their racial ethnicity (*zhongzu*),” but on “their political traditions and their conduct.”⁵⁴⁷ If one had a “barbarian” or cultivated identity was therefore shifting and unstable. In fact, everybody could be “barbarian” if he had “the conduct of Yi and Dí (barbarians) (*Yi Di zhi xing*), even if one was from China.”⁵⁴⁸ Consequently, the meaning of “to expel the Yi (barbarians) (*rang Yi*)”⁵⁴⁹ was also unstable and shifting:

⁵⁴¹ Schwartz: 1968, p. 281.

⁵⁴² The whole passage stems from the *Mengzi* (4th century BC): “I have heard of men using the doctrines of our great land to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians (*wu wen yong Xia bian Yi zhe wei wen bian yu Yi zhe ye*).” (Legge: 1972, vol. 2, p. 253–254 (Book III. Tâng Wân Kung, Part I, Chap. IV). See also Bloom/Ivanhoe: 2009, p. 58.

⁵⁴³ Trauzettel: 1975; Tillman: 1979.

⁵⁴⁴ Vierheller: 1968; Fisher: 1977, 1978; Santangelo: 1988; McMorran: 1975, 1979; Crossley: 2012, p. 63–68.

⁵⁴⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897]. Originally published in *Shiwu bao* 1897 (36).

⁵⁴⁶ The *Daxue* (*Great Learning*), *Zhongyong* (*Doctrine of the Mean*), *Lunyu* (*Analects*) and the *Mengzi* (*Mencius*).

⁵⁴⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 7–8.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 49, line 6.

⁵⁴⁹ This is a fixed phrase which appears already in various ancient classics, for example in the *Gongyang zhuan*, the *Guliang zhuan*, the *Shiji* and the *Han shu*. Liang uses not the character for Yi barbarians which is usually taken. Mostly the Di barbarians are added (*rang Yi Di*). Liu Shippei’s book *Rangshu* which will be discussed below

“What does ‘to expel the Yi (barbarians)’ mean? That one has to expel those, who have the conduct of Yi and Dí (barbarians)! And one must not take those, who are called ‘Chinese’ (*Zhongguo*) and excuse them, and take those, who are called ‘Yi and Dí (barbarians)’ and abandon them!”⁵⁵⁰

That “barbarians” adapted the way of the noble men (*junzi*) of the Middle Kingdom was achieved through the concept of “ ‘using the Xia (Chinese) to change the Yi (barbarians)’ (*yong Xia yi bian Yi*).⁵⁵¹ And it was not heard that one expelled (*rang*) them, broke them of (*rangjue*) and abandoned them (*qi*).⁵⁵² Liang grants the Yi and Di, by whom he refers to all “barbarians” or uncultivated people, the ability to learn the way of the noble man and become legitimate members of the cultivated, civilized community, that is, members of China. Liang puts the phrase “using the Xia to change the Yi” in connection with other well-known quotations from classics to show that peaceful assimilation of uncultivated “barbarians” to the cultivated Chinese ways has been an accepted strategy since antiquity. He begins with the *Lunyu*: “If there is education, then there are no [different] kinds (*you jiao wu lei*).”⁵⁵³ The next step is from the *Zhongyong*: “[The fame of the sage (*sheng*)] overspreads the Middle Kingdom (*Zhongguo*), and extends to all barbarous tribes (*Man Bo*). [...] All who have blood and breath unfeignedly honour and love him.”⁵⁵⁴ Then from the *Book of Rites*: “They pervaded China and added the Man and Mo (barbarians) (*yangyi hu Zhongguo she ji Man Bo*).”⁵⁵⁵ Liang bewails that people nowadays would use the *Chunqiu*, without fully understanding its meaning anymore:

“Confucius composed the *Chunqiu* to rule All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*) and not to rule [only] one country (*yigu*), to rule the Ten Thousand Generations (*wanshi*) and not to rule [only] one era. [...] Today, discussants keep up the doctrine of the ‘Age of Peace’ referring to the *Chunqiu* to expel the Yi and Dí (barbarians). But do they not also keep up the doctrine of ‘Age of Chaos’ referring to the *Chunqiu* to expel the various Xia [people]?”⁵⁵⁶

On the one hand, Liang accuses his contemporary thinkers that by wishing to expel the Yi and Dí, they in fact would want to expel the modern version so to speak of the various Xia people. In the “age of chaos” only the people living in the state of Lu were part of the Self and the various Xia were considered to be outside. Liang parallels the Lu

takes the phrase “to expel the Yi barbarians” as its starting point. (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], “Mulu,” p. 1, line 1–2.)

⁵⁵⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 49, line 7.

⁵⁵¹ This is a slightly altered variant of the basis “use the Xia to change the Yi (*yong Xia bian Yi*).”

⁵⁵² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 6.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, line 5. This sentence originally stems from the *Lunyu*. James Legge translates: “The Master said, ‘In teaching there should be no distinction of classes.’” (Legge: 1972, vol. 1, p. 305 (Book XV. Wei Ling Kung, Chap. XXXVIII).)

⁵⁵⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 5; Legge: 1972, vol. 1, p. 429 (Chap. XXXI).

⁵⁵⁵ *Liji, Zhongyong*, Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 5.

⁵⁵⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 3, 6–7. Translation see Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 46n28.)

people with the Han in his times and the various Xia with the Non-Han people living in the Qing empire. When one basic characteristic of the “age of peace” was that the various Xia were able to become part of the Self, then the Non-Han not only could but moreover should also become part of a (Han) Chinese nation-state. Liang was a strong opponent of the anti-Manchu tendencies among nationalists.⁵⁵⁷ He accuses them of belonging to the “age of vulgarity (*cucu*),” because they would interpret “China,” that is, the Self too narrowly.⁵⁵⁸

On the other hand, Liang accuses them not understanding in what “age (*shi*)” they actually lived. As a New Text scholar, Liang understands time as being divided into Three Ages (*san shi*), the Age of Chaos (*juluan shi*), the Ages of Peace (*shengping shi*), and the Age of Great Peace (*taiping shi*).⁵⁵⁹ The idea of the Three Ages had already been introduced by He Xiu (129–182), the Han time *Gongyang zhuan* commentator and well known proponent of the New Text School (*jinwenxue*), also called Gongyang School of Thought (*Gongyang xuepai*).⁵⁶⁰ During the Qing Dynasty the New Text School experienced a comeback.⁵⁶¹ When the revival was already nearly over again, Kang Youwei (1858–1927) reanimated the discussion. It was also him, who firmly linked the acceptance of the *Gongyang zhuan* as the leading one among the *Chunqiu san zhuan* (*Three Commentaries on the Chunqiu*)⁵⁶² to the New Text School of Thought (*jinwen jingxue*), revived by him mainly through his work *Xin xue wei jing kao* (*Examination about the Forging of the Classics by the Scholarship of the Xin Dynasty*) (1891). Consequently, Gongyang School and New Text School became “interchangeable tags.”⁵⁶³

The scholars of the modern New Text School, among them most prominently Kang Youwei, but also Liang interpreted the Three Ages as a theory of evolution and progress and also saw it as a linear model for history. Wang Fan-sen’s however claims “Kang’s Three Ages Theory was really part of a political debate, and its influence on historiography was relatively limited.”⁵⁶⁴

One sentence equally important for the Three Ages theory and for their approach to Non-Han people came from the *Gongyang zhuan*:

“The *Chunqiu* treats⁵⁶⁵ its state [i.e. Lu] as internal, and the various Xia as external; it treats the various Xia as internal and all the Yi and Dí as external. The true

⁵⁵⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_9], 1905.

⁵⁵⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48. About Liang’s interpretation of the Three Ages see below and Levenson: 1959 [1953], p. 37–41, 46.

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37–41. Wang Fan-sen calls the Three Ages the “Age of disunity,” the “Age of Rising Peace” and the “Age of Great Peace.” (Wang, F.: 2012, p. 135.)

⁵⁶⁰ Gentz: 2001, p. 244.

⁵⁶¹ Luo: 2012, p. 48; Van Ess: 1994, p. 146; Fung Yu-lan: 1953, vol. 2, p. 673f. Its main representatives were scholars and usually also officials like Zhuang Cunyu (1719–1788), Kong Guangsen (1751–1786), Liu Fenglu (1776–1829), Gong Zizhen (1792–1841) and Wei Yuan (1794–1857).

⁵⁶² The other two were the *Zuo zhuan* and the *Guliang zhuan* (*Guliang Commentary*).

⁵⁶³ Levenson: 1958, p. 82.

⁵⁶⁴ Wang, F.: 2012, p. 135.

⁵⁶⁵ This short opening sentence is mostly left out in the citations.

king's desire is to unify All under Heaven (*Chunqiu nei qi guo er wai zhu Xia nei zhu Xia er wai Yi Di wang zhe yu yihu tianxia*).⁵⁶⁶

Already He Xiu had combined the Three Ages with the passage from the *Gongyang zhuan* regarding the “inside” and “outside” cited above to assign certain phases of state-building to concrete historical phases. Thus, the Age of Great Peace (*taiping shi*) is the eldest Age and refers to the early time of the Spring and Autumn Period (*chunqiu*) and of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (722–627 BC). The Age of Approaching Peace (*shengping shi*) refers to the time shortly before Confucius's birth (626–542 BC). The Age of Disorder (*juluan shi*) refers Confucius's own age, which he witnessed himself (551–479 BC). Nearly two thousand years later Kang Youwei put the Ages in the opposite order and created an evolutionary scheme of the Three Ages based on this passage from the *Gongyang zhuan*, parts of the *Liji*⁵⁶⁷ and two major commentaries to the *Gongyang zhuan*, the *Chunqiu fanlou* (*Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn Annals*)⁵⁶⁸ and He Xiu's *Chunqiu Gongyang jiegu* (*Explication of the Gongyang commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*).⁵⁶⁹ The Three Ages symbolized his idea of “a linear and teleological view of history.”⁵⁷⁰

Based on He Xiu's and Kang Youwei's interpretation, Liang defines the Three Ages as follows:

“In the age that knows from hearsay only, the government is still vulgar. Therefore, one ‘treats its state as internal, and all the Xia as external’ (*Suo zhuanwen shi zhi shang cucu ze nei qi guo er wai zhu Xia*).⁵⁷¹

In the age that hears, the government has approached Peace. Therefore, one ‘treats all the Xia as internal and all the Yi and Dí as external’ (*Suo wen shi zhi jin shengping ze nei zhu Xia er wai Yi Di*).

In the generation that sees the government has reached the Great Peace. Therefore, ‘All-under-Heaven, be they far or close, great or small, are like one’ (*Suo jian shi zhi zhi taiping ze tianxia yuan jin da xiao ruoyi*).⁵⁷²

Here, the passages from the *Gongyang zhuan* are quoted directly for the first two Ages, but when it comes to the third and last Age it is rephrased. As we have seen, the *Gongyang zhuan* reads: “The true king's desire is to unify All under Heaven.”⁵⁷³ But Liang

⁵⁶⁶ *Gongyang zhuan* (Cheng gong, 15th year). Translation based on Yuri Pines. (Pines: 2005, p. 83.)

⁵⁶⁷ Kang Youwei concentrated on the “Li yun (The Conveyance of Rites)” section in *Liji*. (Legge: 1885, Book VII. The Lî Yun or Ceremonial usages; their origin, development, and intention.)

⁵⁶⁸ It is traditionally ascribed to Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BC), but was rather created by several authors until the 4th century AD.

⁵⁶⁹ See De Bary: 2008, vol. 2, p. 652. He translates a crucial passage from Kang Youwei's *Lunyu zhu* there.

⁵⁷⁰ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 276.

⁵⁷¹ Ruan Yuan explained the phrase “inside are [the people] of the country (*nei qi guo*)” as referring to the state of Lu, and *zhu Xia* as referring to “all the vassal countries outside its territory” in his subcommentary to the *Gongyang Commentary*. (Ruan Yuan: 1997, vol. 7, p. 7b/231.1 (Cheng gong, 15th year).)

⁵⁷² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 3–5.

⁵⁷³ *Gongyang zhuan* (Cheng gong, 15th year). Translation based on Yuri Pines. (Pines: 2005, p. 83.)

cites He Xiu's commentary and writes: "All-under-Heaven, be they far or close, great or small, are like one."⁵⁷⁴

The difference between the *Gongyang zhuan* on the one hand and He Xiu's, Liang's and Kang's version on the other hand is minor but profound. The latter eliminate "the king" and imply a broader meaning of All-under-Heaven. For Kang and Liang, this widening is linked to their modern perception of the state as being legitimated by the people and no longer by the sovereign. On the other hand, the explanation of All-under-Heaven as "far or close, great or small," refers to single groups of people, which could be counted to belong to All-under-Heaven. Whereas the original passage from the *Gongyang zhuan* presumes that the meaning of All-under-Heaven is known, He Xiu felt the necessity to explain – although rather imprecise – what All-under-Heaven actually meant.

That the unity of All-under-Heaven had to be achieved by assimilation is quickly pointed out by Liang. Without "using the Xia to change the Yi," the third Age of Great Peace could not be reached. Moreover, the quest of the anti-Manchuists to "expel the Yi (barbarians)" cannot be the right path to obtain a stable and powerful country, even if this country was not to rule All-under-Heaven for Ten Thousand Generations:

"When talking about the doctrine of ruling All-under-Heaven and ruling for Ten Thousand Generations, then the [rulers] do not have to expel like those [people demand, who refer to the *Chunqiu*, but do not understand it]. And also when talking about the doctrine of ruling one country and ruling one era, then one shall not expel them like those [people demand, who refer to the *Chunqiu*, but do not understand it]."⁵⁷⁵

Already in 1897, the old pattern of "using the Xia to change the Yi" is an indispensable tool for the building of a new state in Liang's opinion. Three years later in 1902, Liang transfers this pattern into the modern term "assimilation (*tonghua*)" and refers to antiquity to show that the Chinese since ancient times would have possessed a special gift to assimilate others – their "assimilative power."

⁵⁷⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 3–5; Fung Yu-lan: 1953, vol. 2, p. 83.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49, line 11–12.

1.4 Two Excursus to Reality

Excursus One: Liang's Judgement of the Political Reality of the Early Republic

In his essays published in the early 1900s Liang seems to assume that the “assimilative power” of the Han Chinese people would right all the ethnic induced problems easily and could turn the Qing Empire into a nation-state quickly. But when the Republic of China was established in 1912, Liang soon understood that it was not as simple as he had thought. In 1912, one year after the abdication of the last Qing emperor, Liang published a short essay about this first year of the Chinese Republic and its results, “Yi nian lai zhi zhengxiang yu guomin chengdu zhi yingshe (The one-year-old government's situation and the illumination of the grade of nation-hood)”⁵⁷⁶ Here, Liang's disappointment about the according to him negative developments regarding China becoming a nation and the shortcomings of the government become obvious. Liang thinks that the new state lacks in three respects. First, he sees only “individuality and egoism (*geren sixiang*)” and no “sense of community (*tuanti*)” at work. Therefore “one does not see that there is a nation-state (*guojia*).”⁵⁷⁷

Second, Liang bewails that both Non-Han people but also Han Chinese from “our [China] proper (*wo benbu*)” would still have strong ways of what he calls “tribal thinking (*buluo sixiang*).” Due to this way of thinking “people avow themselves to be governments, territories avow themselves to be states.”⁵⁷⁸ He especially refers to Non-Han people and their strive for independence:

“Many return to the government system of chieftains (*tusi zhengzhi*). Citizens (*guoren*) only see the independence of Mongolia and Tibet. This is called blocking education and hindering discipline (*genghua*). Moreover, Mongolia and Tibet are anti-Hanist (*paihanzu*) and establish their own governments. This is only an expression of tribal thinking.”⁵⁷⁹

Liang thinks that the Mongols' and Tibetans' tribalism would be one facet of the inability of the people to adopt a sense of community and internalize the idea that a modern state could only survive as a united nation. For him, the Mongolian and Tibetan strive for independence was undoubtedly separatism.⁵⁸⁰ He never – at least not in his

⁵⁷⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1912_1].

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 17, line 2–3.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., line 5.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., line 8–9.

⁵⁸⁰ In fact, both regions separated from China as soon as the Qing abdicated and established states under religious leadership. The newly founded Republic of China – and also no other independent state – officially

texts – considers it to be Mongol or Tibetan nation-building or state-building, what was the legitimation from a Tibetan and Mongol point of view.

Similarly, Liang thinks of the strive for independence of Han inhabited provinces as separatism, too. And he writes angrily:

“But that our [people of China] proper fight [like] chicken for worms at every province’s, prefecture’s, department’s and district’s borderlines – is that not also an expression of tribal thinking? [...] So, is it only that the Mongols and the Tibetans are not to have a state [on their own]? [No], it means that in the country not one inch of territory is to have a state [on its own]!”⁵⁸¹

In 1906, Liang had defined the *Zhonghua* ethnicity being congruent with the Han people.⁵⁸² When the Chinese Republic was founded, its name became *Zhonghua minguo* usually translated as “Republic of China,” literally meaning “*Zhonghua* nation-state” or “Central Florescence nation-state.” This name was based on Zhang Taiyan’s essay “*Zhonghua minguo jie*” (1907), which indicated this name.⁵⁸³ Liang, however, argues that such a *Zhonghua* nation-state would only be a name and not in existence in reality:

“If one only looks at the Eastern part of the Asian continent there are more than twenty tribes (*buluo*).⁵⁸⁴ Every tribe is again divided into smaller tribes. They reach a number of one thousand and several hundred and that is not all. And they are called *Zhonghua* nation-state. But where is this [nation-state]?”⁵⁸⁵

Liang criticizes the politics of the first year as being responsible for these developments: “The government, [which is in existence] since one year in fact tends towards this path [of allowing separatism]. One can bemoan and frighten nothing more than that!”⁵⁸⁶ Liang’s ideas for the Chinese nation-state proved to be more difficult to realize than Liang had claimed in an overly positive way in his political texts before the downfall of the Qing. When the time came to put his ideas into praxis, it became obvious how difficult this would in fact be.

did not recognise the independence of Tibet, but the independence of Outer Mongolia was supported by the Russian Bolsheviks and had to be accepted by the Republic of China in the end. In 1924, the Mongolian People’s Republic was proclaimed in the borders of Outer Mongolia.

⁵⁸¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1912_1], p. 17, line 9.

⁵⁸² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2, line 1.

⁵⁸³ Zhang Taiyan: 1982 [1907_1].

⁵⁸⁴ Compared to his earlier texts, Liang has changed his vocabulary. What he calls “tribe” here is what he earlier called “ethnicity” and “race.” Later, he would use the original terms again.

⁵⁸⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1912_1], p. 17, line 10–11.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, line 11–12.

Excursus Two: Historical Reality

That the idea of an “assimilative power of China,” in other words a certain power of “sinicization” is not convincing with regard to historical reality has already been shown often since its becoming a part of Chinese historiography.⁵⁸⁷ This dissertation is therefore not supposed to prove the falsity of the concept once again. However, I want to give a brief idea of the four people, who founded the large Non-Han dynasties in China with respect to the idea of an “assimilative power” and their *de facto* situation.

It has to be pointed out that the Han, who actually lived during the times of Non-Han dynasties and were in contact with either the Khitan, Tangut and Mongols, or Tuoba, Jurchen and Manchu, were well aware of the differences, which existed between themselves and these Others.⁵⁸⁸ Although the idea that others could obtain Han culture and could thus be assimilated has already been expressed in antiquity, it did by no means appear desirable to all Han people. It was also obvious that a process of assimilation was not so easily encouraged as ancient ideas suggested, which mostly seemed to have referred to individual cases. On the contrary, it also happened that Han people would adopt Khitan and Jurchen customs voluntarily during Song times and Manchu customs not quite so voluntarily during Qing times.⁵⁸⁹ It is possible and probable, however, that single persons truly, that is, in the anthropological sense, assimilated to the Han – just like Han people did vice versa.⁵⁹⁰ However, these were individual cases, although they are sometimes mentioned when it comes to evidences for a general assimilation.⁵⁹¹

From an anthropological point of view one-sided assimilation does not happen “unless the subordinated people are relocated and their family units broken up.”⁵⁹² It is revealing that the closely related term “acculturation” has first been used to describe the cultural change of North American Indians due to their contact with the Europeans, and also in their case it is most doubtful if a complete assimilation really took place, observable in the diverse Indian ethnicities recent efforts to restore language, traditions and ways of living. As the preconditions required for assimilation were never prevailing in China on a large scale, the assumption of one-sided complete or partial assimilation

⁵⁸⁷ It had already been shown before in the and until the 1940s. I will come to this literature later. The present-day understanding of Non-Han dynasties as own entities had been initiated, I think, by Pamela Crossley and Evelyn Rawski. (Crossley: 1990a; Rawski: 1996.)

⁵⁸⁸ This is i.e. evident in the travel diaries kept by Song ambassadors to report about their journeys to the Liao and Jin courts. There are translations available for many of these travel diaries. (Chavannes: 1904; Franke: 1981; Hargett: 1984, 1989; Walton: 2002; Chen: 2003. For a full list of travel records about Song missions to the Jin see Franke: 1981, p. 172–173.)

⁵⁸⁹ Liu Mingshu: 1946, p. 94; Hargett: 1984, p. 154; Rhoads: 2000, p. 59–62; Elliott: 2001, p. 332–333.

⁵⁹⁰ The definition of assimilation being that of complete adoption of another cultural/ethnic identity and abandonment of that one one had before. In Anglo-Saxon anthropology assimilation is a subtopic of acculturation. (Redfield/Linton/Herskovits: 1935; Gordon: 1954, 1961, 1975.)

⁵⁹¹ See for example Jing-shen Tao's reference to Jurchen-Han intermarriages which for him is an important aspect of the Jurchen's sinicization – he counts thirty-one cases. (Tao: 1976, p. 95–98.)

⁵⁹² *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: 1963, vol. 1, p. 83.

of more than individuals, that is, of whole ethnicities is not reflected in reality. If at all, a cultural blending or fusion of all involved ethnicities would be much more likely.⁵⁹³

Khitan

That the Khitan cannot be called a sinicized dynasty has been shown early by Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng in their still groundbreaking work on the Liao Dynasty from the 1940s.⁵⁹⁴ It is, however, rather difficult to tell what happened to them after the decline of their dynasty in 1125, at least on a long range. Some of them stayed under the rule of the Jurchen after the conquest of the latter, others went to the West and founded another powerful empire, the Kara Khitan Khanate (1124–1218), called Western Liao (*Xi Liao*) in Chinese, in the region of Southeast Kazakhstan, Northwest China and Western Mongolia between the Aral Sea in the West and the lake Khar-Us Nuur in the East. Most of them probably just went on living in the Mongolian and Northern Chinese steppes and united with the Mongols later.⁵⁹⁵

Jurchen

Although the Jurchen are often considered to be *the* example of a sinicized dynasty, i.e. reflected in Tao Jin-sheng's book title *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China: A Study of Sinicization*, this assumption seems to be proven wrongly alone by the fact that the Manchu are their ancestors. Also with regard to the Jin and Song sources it is obvious that the Jurchen – elite and lower social strata – kept their distinct ethnic identity during and after the Jin dynasty.⁵⁹⁶ Those Jurchen tribes, who returned to the North after the conquest of their dynasty by the Mongols in 1234 or had stayed there all times, were called “Jurchen” until 1635, when the first Qing emperor Hong Taiji (1592–1643, reign 1626–1643)⁵⁹⁷ renamed them “Manju (C. *Manzhou*).”⁵⁹⁸

Mongols

As said before, the Mongols are a kind of exception among the Non-Han ethnicities establishing authority over Han inhabited regions as they were nearly never perceived as being assimilated or sinicized. Since the Yuan dynasty declined in 1368, the various Mongol groups stayed an influential and determining ethnic group in East and Central

⁵⁹³ There exist plenty of studies of acculturation and assimilation as anthropological concepts. (For example Redfield/Linton/Herskovits: 1935; Gordon: 1975; Rumbaut: 1997; Rudmin: 2006.)

⁵⁹⁴ Wittfogel/Feng: 1949.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.; Biran: 2005.

⁵⁹⁶ Schneider, J.: 2011; Bol: 1987.

⁵⁹⁷ Usually, 1644 is given as the first year of the Qing Dynasty. In fact, the dynastic name Qing was proclaimed by Hong Taiji already in 1636, when he renamed the Later Jin Dynasty (1616–1636) his father Nurhaci (1559–1626, reign 1616–1626) had founded.

⁵⁹⁸ Rhoads: 2000, p. 11.

Asia. The Ming Dynasty's (1368–1644) emperors were in constant fear of a Mongol attack. The Manchus used their good relations to the Southern Mongol tribes, the so-called “Inner Mongols” and joint forces with already in the early 17th century. Also the Khalkha Mongols, the so-called “Outer Mongols” became their allies in the course of the 17th century. Only one large Mongols confederation the Dzungars, a major tribe of the Oirats posed a danger to Manchu power. The Manchus and their Mongols allies thus crusaded against them and nearly completely killed them off.

Having been relatively independent and at the same time quite influential in policy in Qing times, the Outer Mongols declared their regions as independent as soon as the Qing abdicated in 1911, and established a religious state. Although this was not officially recognized by the Republic of China, Outer Mongolia has been *de facto* independent since this time. The Mongolian People's Republic was then founded in 1924 with Soviet help and stayed under heavy USSR influence until 1992. Since then, the state calls itself Mongolia only.

Manchus

In the course of the Qing dynasty, many Manchu left their places of origin in Manchuria, because they were stationed as soldier-families in all the territories they had conquered over time. Those Manchu stationed outside Manchuria lived in so-called Manchu citadels (*Man cheng*), which separated them from the local people, be they Han or other. They started to intermarry with non-Manchu people only towards the end of the Qing dynasty more frequently when the ban on this kind of connection was lifted. Especially those Manchus, who were stationed in the Southern provinces, unlearned the Manchu language and began to speak mainly Chinese. But they nevertheless kept a Manchu identity feeling, which they exhibited through their way of living, i.e. dressing and eating habits, religious believes and traditions.⁵⁹⁹ Also after the end of the Qing dynasty, in which course many Manchus had been killed, the Manchus were perceived as such and therefore discriminated. They began to conceal their ethnic descent and only stopped doing so rather recently.⁶⁰⁰ Nowadays, their ethnic group is the third largest of the PRC's fifty-six officially recognized ethnicities counting more than ten million people.⁶⁰¹ Still, the Manchu languages are classified as “critically endangered” with only ten or less speakers left in the *Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger* published by the UNESCO in 2010.⁶⁰² With regard to language, a “sinicization” of the Manchus cannot be denied. However, on the other hand it seems obvious that the identification as belonging to the Manchu ethnicity is still prevalent, as so many people are registered as Manchu. However, these numbers have to be taken with caution. Minority rights

⁵⁹⁹ Crossley: 1990b, 1997, 1999; Elliott: 2000; Rawski: 1996; Rhoads: 2000.

⁶⁰⁰ Rhoads: 2000, p. 252–284; Elliott: 2012.

⁶⁰¹ Number from the 2010 Chinese Census.

⁶⁰² Moseley: 2010.

regarding i.e. education – members of minorities have easier access to universities due to certain quotas in their favor – and birth control – they are allowed to have more than one child – might also influence the decision to emphasize one’s Manchu descent.⁶⁰³

1.5 Conclusion: The “Assimilative Power” is the Basis of the Nation-State

Liang is a shifting and lively figure in historiography and political thinking, a fact reflected in his texts. He changes his opinion from time to time, adds something, and claims even the opposite from what he had said before. In general that makes it difficult to trace a consistent way of Liang’s thinking.

With regard to his idea of an “assimilative power of China,” however, his opinion stays more or less unchanged. In his texts he puts forward the assumption that the Han people have a special ability to assimilate Non-Han due to their superior culture. He is positive about the prospect that also when politically in power, Non-Han people can be changed and merged tracelessly into the Han ethnicity. This is Liang’s foundation for a “large nationalism,” which in his opinion is the only option for the Han people in order to resist European and Japanese imperialist threats. Liang has understood that the more united a nation-state is, the more stable and powerful it will be. Based on older ideas of Han Chinese self-perception and images of the Non-Han, he interprets national unity as homogeneity. That this homogeneity has to be formed according to the Han people’s majority culture is unquestionable for him.

Despite the fact that in his texts from the 1900s Liang seems to have a general good feeling about the “assimilative power,” he avoids more thorough explanations and an altogether analytical approach to his theory. He thus does not explain concretely how the “assimilative power” would in fact work or how it could be used actively by the Han people. He does not suggest any practical lines of action. He mainly refers to the Non-Han dynasties as examples how the “assimilative power” would have shown its power in the past and he also gives some hints in what respect Non-Han people would have to change in order to make them part of the Han Chinese Self. He especially refers to language and script as ethnical identifiers implicating that the adoption of Chinese language and script by Non-Han people would lead to their assimilation. His idea of the Han Self seems to be very wide and inclusive.

⁶⁰³ Thompson: 1997, p. 796.

With regard to his works on history this means that he does not take an effort to interpret Non-Han dynasties as assimilated to Han culture. He mostly just states that is was so, without referring to concrete reasons for his assumption.

That this was a very conscious decision by Liang becomes obvious, when turning to the texts of other thinkers from the 1900s. In the same way as Liang puts forward his assumption of the assimilation of the Non-Han dynasties being general accepted knowledge, others like Zhang Taiyan and Liu Shipei equally put forward the opposite assumption of the Non-Han dynasties not being assimilated at all as being general accepted knowledge. History, it seems, was a perfect means to express political opinions and show strategies for the present time. Sources could be used selectively in order to make a certain point. In the context of the early Han Chinese nationalist discourse and the discourse on the Non-Han people, history provided grounds for everyone, and every political and nationalist attitude could be strengthened with examples derived from history.

Chapter 2. Zhang Taiyan: The Republic of China as an Image

“It is only possible to allow other ethnicities’ assimilation, if sovereignty is in our hands.”⁶⁰⁴

Zhang Taiyan (1907).

It is often claimed that Zhang Taiyan (also known as Zhang Binglin, 1868–1936) and Liu Shiwei (1884–1919) stood in contrast to nationalist reformers like Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei and did not think it a good idea to establish a nation-state in the Qing borders.⁶⁰⁵ They are supposed to have rather favored a Chinese nation-state containing only “our Zhongxia clan (*wu Zhongxia zhi shi*).”⁶⁰⁶ Therefore, its territory could not be inherited from the Qing, but in terms of history had to be legitimated by referring to the territories of other dynasties considered to be ethnic Han. As the most important figures of these so-called revolutionary and anti-Manchu nationalists and promoters of a Chinese nation-state in the borders of the Han Chinese inhabited regions usually Zhang and Liu are given. In what way their idea of a Chinese nation-state and of Non-Han people in East Asia differed from those of Liang and if they differed as much as said will be revealed in the following two chapters.

A crucial feature of the so-called revolutionaries, among who Zhang and Liu are counted, was their anti-Manchuist thinking. Anti-Manchuism was in fact a general tendency among Han Chinese nationalist thinkers in late Imperial China. But although nearly every nationalist thinker had anti-Manchuist tendencies, not all wanted to support or stir up “anti-Manchu hatred (*chou Man*).” Although Liang Qichao for example also had anti-Manchu sentiments he was strongly against a “doctrine of revenge

⁶⁰⁴ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 255. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 25.

⁶⁰⁵ I.e. Laitinen: 1990, p. 66; Leibold: 2007, p. 34; Zarrow: 2005, p. 66–68.

⁶⁰⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 195 (ch. 20 “Zu zhi”).

(*fuchouzhuyi*),” which would worsen China’s chances to become a strong nation-state in his opinion.⁶⁰⁷

Both, Zhang and Liu belonged to the anti-Manchuists (*paimanjia*), the most extreme among the critiques of Manchu rule. Laitinen thinks that the keyword “anti-Manchu hatred (*chou Man*)” was “a means of modern propaganda, and the *Guominbao* was the earliest publication to advocate it.”⁶⁰⁸ In fact, one of the most important publications in this respect was Zhang’s essay “Zheng chou Man lun (On the Correct Hatred of the Manchus),” which appeared in the *Guominbao* [= *Chinese National Magazine*]⁶⁰⁹ in the summer of 1901.⁶¹⁰ There Zhang wrote:

“Both the Manchus and the Japanese belong to the yellow race, but as can be clearly seen from history the Japanese are of the same ethnicity (*zu*)⁶¹¹ [like us], while the Manchus are not. [...] Japan first had Chinese characters but made Japanese script later. Although both are now used together, the Chinese characters still make more than a half of the script. When it comes to the Manchus, they have their own writing, the form, of which is completely different.”⁶¹²

Liu and Zhang had become more and more anti-Manchuist after the political events in 1899 and 1900 and the Qing government’s reaction on them. They saw the Manchus as the ultimate reason for China’s inability to defend herself against the Western powers. The weakness of the Qing dynasty was explained as the racial and therefore cultural weakness of the Manchu ethnicity. It was suggested that because of their rottenness and corruption, China was not only confronted with internal problems, but also with European Imperialism.

The anti-Manchuists perceived the Han Chinese race and culture/civilization as being one of the few superior world cultures or even the most superior one and they felt that China’s position in the world should be a superior one accordingly. Only due to the Manchu’s dominance, China was forced to undue inferiority and weakness. Therefore, the anti-Manchuists promoted a strong Han Chinese ethnic feeling and fulminated against the rule of an in their opinion incompetent minority over the Han Chinese majority.

The anti-Manchuists were also critical of the Han Chinese themselves as it was obvious that the Han ethnicity of their time must also be weak in order to accept to be ruled by a foreign ethnicity. They highlighted historical restorative movements like that in the 17th century by Ming loyalists in South China prolonging the Ming Dynasty (1368–

⁶⁰⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 8–p. 76, line 5.

⁶⁰⁸ Laitinen: 1990, p. 80.

⁶⁰⁹ Published monthly: 1901.

⁶¹⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1977 [1901]. Laitinen: 1990, p. 80; Murthy: 2011, p. 62.

⁶¹¹ Laitinen translates “nation.”

⁶¹² Zhang Taiyan: 1977 [1901]. Laitinen: 1990, p. 81.

1644) until 1662 and also in the 19th century by Hong Xiuquan, who managed to install a separatist regime for fourteen years, the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (*Taiping tianquo*).⁶¹³ Nevertheless, the anti-Manchuists were sure that the Han Chinese people indeed were superior. Their latent energy and national essence (*guocui*) only had to be encouraged. They considered the idea of nationalism to be an important means to revive this energy. Like Liang Qichao, they wanted to strengthen a national sentiment, but it is generally thought that they wanted to limit it to Han Chinese people and had no intention to include Non-Han people. It will become clear, though, that the borders of thinking with regard to Non-Han people and their integration in a Chinese nation-state did not run between the reformers and the revolutionaries, but among the revolutionaries themselves.

First Zhang Taiyan, the most prominent revolutionary thinker of late Imperial times and his idea of the (Han) Chinese nation-state shall be analyzed. What did he think of Non-Han integration?

2.1 Zhang Taiyan's Biography

Like in the case of Liang Qichao Zhang Taiyan's life was deeply intertwined with political events and history, and like Liang he often directly helped forming the events and creating history. Therefore, also his biography prevents not only the personal picture of one of the most important Han Chinese thinkers of the outgoing 19th and of the 20th century, but it will also give an idea of what happened on a larger scale, although this time from another angle than in Liang's case as Zhang by and by became part of the opposing political camp than Liang. There exist several detailed biographies of Zhang, which together with his autobiography are the base of the overview given of his life on the next pages.⁶¹⁴

Zhang was born in 1869 in Cangqian in Zhejiang Province into a family of wealthy scholars. He received a traditional education at home. Already early times of foreign conquests were a constant topic in his teaching. As a consequence, he admired Ming loyalists and Song patriots. He read the works of Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi, which had been republished around the date of Zhang's birth and even adopted a pen name to honor them: Taiyan, *tai* deriving from Huang Zongxi's pen name Taichong

⁶¹³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 332; Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 16; Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 617, 622.

⁶¹⁴ Shen Yanguo: 1948; Tang Zhijun: 1979; Xiong Yuezhi: 1982; Wong: 1989; Laitinen: 1990; Jiang Yihua: 1991; Zhang Taiyan: 1986.

and *yan* from Gu Yanwu's given name Yanwu. He was moreover interested in commentaries of the ancient classics.

Because Zhang suffered from epilepsy he did not take part in the *junren* exams. In 1890, he entered a school in nearby Hangzhou, the *Gujing jingshe* (*Gujing Academy*), where the Hanlin scholar Yu Yue (1821–1907) was headmaster.⁶¹⁵ Yu stood in the tradition of the school of Evidential Learning (*kaozheng*) and introduced Zhang to the *Zuo zhuan* (*Zuo Commentary*) and to text critic and philology. During his years at the *Gujing jingshe*, Zhang wrote a profound commentary on the *Zuo zhuan*, the *Chunqiu Zuo zhuan du* (*Reading the Zuo Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals*). He became one of the last representatives of the Old Text School.

The events of 1895, however, disturbed the 26-year-old Zhang in his ongoing as a student of classical text critic, and eventually he resigned from school and joined the Shanghai branch of Kang Youwei's and Liang Qichao's *Qiangxuehui*. During this time the accordance of Zhang, Liang and Kang with regard to reform and nationalism was wider than their philosophical disagreement. In 1896, Zhang joined the *Shiwubao* in Shanghai as an editor under its chief editor Liang Qichao. In the following year Zhang left the journal, because of his growing dissent from the mysticism of Kang's New Text School. He returned to Hangzhou where he organized his own reformist society, the *Xingzhehui* (*Revive Zhejiang Society*) and the attached journal, *Jingshibao* (*Journal for Setting the Age in Order*).⁶¹⁶ But in 1898 he returned to Shanghai where he began to write articles again for the *Shiwu bao*, now called *Changyan bao* (*The Flourishing Talks*) under chief editor Wang Kangnian (1860–1911).⁶¹⁷

Despite the philosophical dissimilarities Zhang looked at the Hundred Days' Reform of Liang and Kang with hope. When it failed in autumn 1898, Zhang like Kang and Liang had to fly from China, because he had published articles in their favor. He went to Taiwan, where he had friends among the Japanese occupiers. He was invited to write for the officially financed *Taiwan nichinichi shinbun* (*Taiwan daily news*). In his articles published there, his support for the reformers and his growing anti-Manchuism come to the fore.⁶¹⁸ Laitinen claims that in an essay published in *Taiwan nichinichi shinbun*, titled "Zheng jiang lun (On Proper Borderlines)," "Zhang condemns the Manchus as being of a different "different race (*yi zhong*)" than the Han Chinese (*Zhina*, i.e. *Zhina zhi ren*), while accepting the Japanese as being of the "same race (*tong zhong*)" for the first time.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁵ Originally, the *Gujin jingshe* had been established by Ruan Yuan (1764–1849), the famous New Text scholar in 1800. (Murthy: 2011, p. 43.)

⁶¹⁶ Published on a ten-day schedule: 1897. (Janku: 2004, p. 78; Britton: 1933, p. 96.)

⁶¹⁷ Among writing articles, Zhang also edited a collection of translated essays by Herbert Spencer. (Laitinen: 1990, p. 64.) Wang Kangnian was an in-law of Zhang Taiyan and had once recommended Zhang as a member of the *Qiangxuehui*. (Wong: 1989, p. 151.)

⁶¹⁸ Laitinen: 1990, p. 65–66. Wong claims that "in some [articles] he inevitably alluded to Anti-Manchuism and even revolution, but allusion aside, Zhang was not yet ready to advocate an anti-Manchu revolution." (Wong: 1989, p. 14.)

⁶¹⁹ In: Laitinen: 1990, p. 66.

In 1899 Zhang went to Japan on Liang's invitation. During two and a half months in Japan, he continued to write articles for Kang Youwei's *Qingyi bao*, the organ of the *Baohuang hui*, because Zhang thought Kang the best candidate to lead reforms in China due to his popularity despite his refusal of the New Text school. Liang also introduced him to Sun Yat-sen, another revolutionary nationalist, who was very influential especially among the overseas community of the Han Chinese. When the Boxer Uprising broke out in 1899, Zhang returned to China.⁶²⁰

Parallel to the Boxer Uprising, which started in Shandong, other powers wanted to join the revolts. In 1900, Tang Caichang (1867–1900) founded the *Zhengqi hui* (*Righteous Spirit Society*), shortly later renamed *Zili hui* (*Independence Society* or *Self-reliance Society*) in Shanghai, financially and ideologically supported by Kang and Liang. Its motto was a famous sentence from the *Zuo zhuan*: “if he be not of our kin, he is sure to have a different mind (*fei wu zulei qi xin bi yi*).”⁶²¹ It was interpreted as an exclusive way of self-identification and a general anti-Manchu attitude at that time. The usage of this sentence as a nationalist motto is mostly ascribed to the Han Chinese revolutionaries, who are also closely connected to the Old Text school and thus prefer the *Zuo zhuan*. Here, it shows that at this times the borders between revolutionaries and reformers were not fixed, probably not existent yet.

When Zhang had published the first version of his famous *Qiushu* (*Book of Urgency*) in 1900 he had not yet turned into a revolutionary and supported the strengthening of the Manchu government despite its non-Han ethnic identity.⁶²² Thus the 1900 edition of the *Qiushu* “became a landmark: it was the last time Zhang stood for reformism.”⁶²³ But when Zhang saw how the Manchu government dealt with the Boxers and other revolts, he lost his confidence that the Qing court would be able to reform and revitalize the state. Consequently when Tang Caichang organized a meeting of a “Chinese Parliament (*Zhongguo yihui*)” also called “National Assembly (*guohui*)” with his friend, the famous translator and thinker Yan Fu (1854–1921) as vice-president in the British concession of Shanghai in July 1900, Zhang joined it. The motto of this meeting was “Protect the state, protect the race (*bao guo jiu zhong*).”⁶²⁴ Three partly contradicting goals were defined: “(1) to preserve China's (*Zhongguo*) right for self-determination, and to establish a new independent state, (2) to protest against the right of the Manchu Qing government to rule China, and (3) to request the restoration of the Guangxu Emperor to the throne.”⁶²⁵ While Zhang accepted the first two goals, he was most decidedly against the third,

⁶²⁰ Murthy: 2011, p. 65–66; Laitinen: 1990, p. 69–70; Wong: 1989, p. 15–16.

⁶²¹ Translation by Legge: 1972, vol. 5, p. 354–355 (Book VIII. Duke Ch'ing, Fourth year).

⁶²² This first edition was later called *Qiushu chukeben* (*First Block-Printed Edition of the Book of Urgency*). It consisted of fifty chapters. Between 1900 and 1902, Zhang completely revised the *Qiushu* deleting sixteen reformist essays and adding twenty-seven with a more revolutionary undertone. (Laitinen: 1990, p. 70f; Murthy: 2011, p. 66n43, 72; Wong: 1989, p. 21n85, 21n86, 27.)

⁶²³ Wong: 1989, p. 23.

⁶²⁴ Feng Ziyou: 1977, vol. 2, p. 76.

⁶²⁵ Tang Zhijun: 1979, vol. 1, p. 109.

which in fact stands in opposition to the second goal. Zhang even presented a memorandum “Qing yan ju Man Meng ru guohui zhuan (To reject resolutely membership of parliament of Manchus and Mongols),” but it was rejected by the “Parliament.” Later, Zhang cut of his queue in front of the “Parliament” to show his final aversion for the Qing and thus became an irreversible revolutionary.⁶²⁶

After Tang Caichang plans to revolt failed and he and his co-organizers were arrested and executed, Zhang, who had supported Tang, tried to make himself invisible by joining the Soochow University (*Dongwu daxue*) founded by American missionaries in Suzhou as a teacher. But due to his continued anti-Manchu activities in Suzhou, Zhang once again had to fly to Japan in 1902, and once again stayed for only three month. At the beginning of his stay, he found shelter at the publishing house of Liang Qichao’s *Xinmin congbao* in Yokohama. There he met Sun Yat-sen again, with whom he discussed China’s situation intensively. They were aware that they needed more supporters for their case and thus started to work together, hoping that also Liang and Kang could be persuaded to form an alliance with Sun, but as we have seen above this hope was in vain.⁶²⁷

When Zhang returned to China he settled in his birthplace Cangqian, where he finished his revision of the *Qiushu* changing its whole tone to his new revolutionary standpoint.⁶²⁸ He also began to work on a general history of China (*Zhongguo tongshi*), a project never to be finished. In the same year, Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) founded the *Aiguo xueshe* (*Patriotic Academy*) and in 1903 Zhang accepted Cai’s invitation to teach at this academy. There, he found a fertile soil for his anti-Manchu lectures, but this was soon to be ended due to the so-called *Subao* case.⁶²⁹ Zhang had written a foreword to Zou Rong’s (1885–1905) radical anti-Manchu work *Geming jun* (*Revolutionary Army*), which was advertised in the *Subao* (*Jiangsu Journal* or *Jiangsu Report*).⁶³⁰ The *Subao* was a reformist and progressive Shanghai journal, which increasingly radicalized under its editor Zhang Shizhao (1881–1973). After the advertisement had been published the Qing government immediately tried to arrest everyone involved in the case.⁶³¹ Zhang and Zou were sentenced to three and two years, and Zou died in captivity. But their ideas had won general attention and advocacy and their influence became more and more powerful.

⁶²⁶ Zhang Taiyan himself wrote a explanation on his doing: “Jie bian fa (An Explanation of Cutting My Queue).” (In: Zhang Taiyan: 1977, p. 148–149.)

⁶²⁷ See above Chapter 1.1 (“Liang Qichao’s Biography”).

⁶²⁸ This new version was printed in Japan in 1904 and was later called *Qiushu zongding ben* (*Revised Version of the Book of Urgency*). (See Zhang Taiyan: 1982, vol. 3, p. 8–15.)

⁶²⁹ Lust: 1964. See also Wong: 1989, p. 39–43; Laitinen: 1990, p. 90–104; Murthy: 2011, p. 69–72.

⁶³⁰ Published daily: 1896–1903. (Britton: 1933, p. 95, 113.)

⁶³¹ Zou Rong’s work became a “bestseller.” “It remains as the most widely-spread piece of anti-Manchu literature.” It is not only accompanied by Zhang Taiyan’s foreword, but also by another essay by him, “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu (Disputing Kang Youwei: A Letter on Revolution),” which Zhang had written during his trial and which was an answer to Kang Youwei’s reformist “Geming bo yi (Discussion disputing revolution),” which had been published in *Xinmin bao* in June 1903, (Laitinen: 1990, p. 92, 98. See also Wong: 1989, p. 40.)

When Zhang was released from prison in 1906 “a crowd of admirers lined up to accost him at the gate.”⁶³² And when Sun Yat-sen’s representatives accompanied Zhang to his third exile in Japan, the same happened on his arrival there. Zhang immediately became an integral part of the Han Chinese revolutionary circles in Japan. And for two years until 1908 he became chief editor of Sun’s recently founded *Tongmeng hui* organ *Minbao*, which under his editorship became a real threat for Liang’s and Kang’s reformist journal *Xinmin congbao*. At first, Sun and Zhang were closely acquainted. But after Sun had left Japan, it became known that he had accepted money from the Japanese government – obviously offered to make him leave the country. Moreover, Sun went to Hanoi, the capital of French Indochina, and initiated several attempts to invade China from there. Zhang was disappointed and criticized this strategy and especially Sun’s acceptance of help from imperial powers.

In 1908, after several warnings about the revolutionary content of the *Minbao*, the Japanese government shut the journal down. When Sun confidant Wang Jingwei (1883–1944) reissued the *Minbao* without Zhang’s knowledge and approval in 1909, Zhang and others among the Han Chinese community in Japan saw this as another treachery of Sun. Sun fought back and had Zhang insulted and ridiculed, even accused as a Manchu spy like Liu Shipai.⁶³³ Consequently, the revolutionary movement fell more and more apart.⁶³⁴

In 1910, Zhang and Tao Chengzhang (1878–1912)⁶³⁵ revived the *Guangfu hui* (*Restoration Society*), which had originally been founded by Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) while Zhang was in prison in 1904 and become rather insignificant after the founding of the *Tongmeng hui* in 1905. Now, discontent *Tongmeng hui* members came back. Zhang was also teaching Han Chinese students at a middle school in Tokyo, among them some, who would become leading scholars later. His most famous student was Lu Xun (1881–1936), the “father of modern Chinese literature,” whose thought was strongly influenced by Zhang.⁶³⁶ Zhang promoted his ideas about the “national essence (*guocui*)” not only in the class room but also in his contributions to the *Guocui xuebao* (*Journal of the Study of National Essence*)⁶³⁷, the journal of the Shanghai based anti-Manchu *Guoxue baocun hui*

⁶³² Wong: 1989, p. 47.

⁶³³ In fact, when Zhang Taiyan had been in a desperate situation in 1908, He Zhen told him of an offer by Duanfang giving him money to settle in India as a Buddhist monk. But when Duanfang told him that he had to settle in “a Buddhist holy land within Manchu jurisdiction, and the payment would be monthly,” Zhang declined the offer. (Ibid., p. 78; see also Murthy: 2011, p. 189.)

⁶³⁴ Wong: 1989, p. 75–78; Laitinen: 1990, p. 134, 136.

⁶³⁵ Tao had been involved in the Anqing Uprising (*Anqing qi yi*) (1907), one of the many uprising anticipating the Xinhai Revolution, and had to flee to Japan.

⁶³⁶ Murthy: 2011, p. 223–224; 226–235. Laitinen furthermore lists as Zhang’s students: Qian Xuanton (1887–1939), Zhu Xizu (1879–1944), Huang Kan (1886–1935), Zhu Zonglai (1881–1919), Xu Shoushang (1883–1948), Qian Jiazhi (1882–1969) and Zhou Zuoren (1885–1967). (Laitinen: 1990, p. 136.)

⁶³⁷ Published monthly: 1905–1912.

(*Society for the Protections of National Studies*)⁶³⁸, of which Zhang was member alongside Liu Shiwei and Liang Qichao.

When the Xinhai Revolution brought the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Zhang returned to China to play his important role in the establishment of a republic. When it became known that Manchu students were asking the Japanese Empire for military help to rescue the Qing Dynasty Zhang wrote an open letter, which shows his nevertheless strong realism independent from his strong anti-Manchuism. In this letter, he reassured the Manchu students not to fear a “racial revenge (*zhongzu fuchou*)” after all. They, like all others, should become equal citizens in the new republic. He asks them not to involve foreign Imperialists in the matter as this would lead to colonization like it had happened in Korea.⁶³⁹ It was also Zhang, who proposed the five colored flag to symbolize the unity of the “five ethnicities (*wu zu*)” (Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Turkish Muslims).

Zhang wanted to work together with Sun to establish a new government as soon as possible, but Sun was not willing to forget the former grudge. To begin with, Sun did not invite Zhang to a conference for all revolutionaries, and he was also excluded from the inauguration of Sun’s provisional presidency. Zhang became more and more disapproving of the methods the *Tongmeng hui* employed under Sun’s guidance, especially of the assassinations of restorationists, including Zhang’s friend Tao Chengzhang, who was killed by Sun’s young protégée Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) (1887–1975) and others in 1912.

In the end, Cai Yuanpei, *Tongmeng hui* member and Minister for Education, urged the government to assure safety for Zhang and Sun made him Presidential Adviser in his Provisional Nanjing government. However, Zhang did not go to Nanjing to officially accept the post. In the meantime, Sun more and more revealed the wish to gain more power. He was heavily criticized for filling all important posts with his close associates, restricting the freedom of press and trying to gain foreign loans by granting foreign firms rights. Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), leader of the powerful *Beiyang jun*, made use of this situation of political disunity among the republicans and forced himself into power in February 1912. Sun had to resign as a provisional president after only two month in office.

Together with the revolutionary oriented Song Jiaoren (1882–1913) Zhang founded his own political party, the *Tongyi dang* (*Unification Party*) in Shanghai. But when Zhang had left Shanghai to take his new office as Senior Presidential Advisor of Yuan in Beijing, the *Tongyi dang* began to fall apart. In the end, Zhang left the *Tongyi dang*, which lost all its influence, and Song instead became the chief organizer of Sun’s new party, the KMT. Later in 1912, Yuan appointed Zhang as a Frontier Commissioner in Manchuria. Zhang was strongly interested in the border regions due to his wish for a

⁶³⁸ Also translated as *National Learning Protection Society* or *Association for Preservation of National Learning*.

⁶³⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1977, vol. 1, p. 519–520.

stable unity of the republic's territory, which was especially endangered in Manchuria, as both, Japan and Russia, tried to enlarge their influence there. But Zhang soon had to find that neither his power nor the interest of the central government was great enough to change the situation. He resigned from the post already in the following year.

In 1913, the KMT had won many seats in the new parliament under its party president Song. When Song was assassinated in March 1913, it was generally believed that he was killed on Yuan's order in order to diminish the political influence of the KMT. Consequently, Zhang began to criticize Yuan openly and supported vice president Li Yuanhong (1864–1928), who had already been in this position during Sun's presidency. But when Sun's "Second Revolution (*er ci geming*)" failed and Sun had to leave China Yuan had himself elected as president, took Li as a hostage and in the end dissolved the parliament completely. Also Zhang was not allowed to leave Beijing and was even put under house arrest in the Buddhist Longquan Temple (*Longquan si*) in 1914. When Zhang began a hunger strike in June, influential people like the KMT general Huang Jie (1902–1995) and scholars like Ma Xulun (1885–1970) spoke for his release. Although he was not released from house arrest, he was moved into a mansion in Beijing's Dongcheng District (*Dongcheng qu*), where he stayed until Yuan died in 1916 and Li became president.

Nevertheless, through the warlord and commander of the *Beiyang jun* Duan Qirui (1865–1936) the influence of the *Beiyang jun* stayed strong. Duan became prime minister and another *Beiyang jun* warlord, Feng Guozhang (1859–1919), became vice president. But in 1917, events followed each other in quick succession: Li and Duan did not agree, which role China should play in the First World War. When Li wanted to dismiss Duan, Duan threatened to install a rival government. Li asked General Zhang Xun (1854–1923) for help. Zhang came – but immediately put Puyi on the throne! Duan reacted quickly, defeated Zhang (and the emperor) and made himself prime minister again. This time, Feng Guozhang became president. The central government was now completely in the hand of the Northern warlords.

In the same year Sun returned to China and installed his KMT headquarters as an alternative government in Guangzhou. There he was elected "Grand Marshal of the Army and Navy (*lu hai jun da yuanshuai*).” He asked all original members of the Beijing parliament to join him. Zhang agreed to become his Secretary General.

The movement for China's reunification, the "Constitutional Protection Movement (*Jiangfa yundong*)" (1917–1922), also called "Third Revolution (*san ci geming*)" in KMT vocabulary, was mainly directed against the Northern Beiyang government (1912–1928). But internal struggles lead to Sun's resignation in 1918. Zhang also left Guangzhou and had to acknowledge that the installation of a strong central government was impossible. He then became a supporter of another political movement aimed against the Beiyang government, the *Liansheng zizhi* (*Confederation of Self-Governing Provinces*) in 1920. In 1921, three Southern provinces had proclaimed their individual constitutions. But when in 1924 not only the Beiyang warlords, but moreover the revolutionary and Communist

movements in the south opposed the provinces self-governing suspecting the *Liansheng zizhi* to be a separatist movement, Zhang's hopes dwindle.

Zhang could also not agree with Chiang Kai-shek's usage of military strength to bring down the Beiyang government, manifested in the foundation of the KMT's National Revolutionary Army (*Guomin geming jun*). When Chiang Kai-shek took over the control of the Yangtze valley in 1927, Zhang retired to scholarly activities, living in the region of Shanghai and Suzhou. He never recognized Chiang's second republic in Nanjing proclaimed in 1928, starting the Nanjing Decade (*Nanjing shi nian*) (1928–1937). His ideas of federalism made him dislike any government with dictatorial character – be it under Sun Yat-sen, the Northern Beiyang warlords or Chiang Kai-shek.

After the Mukden Incident (*Jiuyiba shibian*) in 1931, Zhang felt it his duty to condemn the Japanese aggression and to call for a military reaction. When Japan conquered three more provinces in Manchuria in 1932, he travelled to Beijing and Tianjin, willing to use his personal salesmanship to persuade national leaders, especially general Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001), to react militarily. However, Zhang Xueliang had orders from Chiang Kai-shek not to resist the Japanese and Zhang's visit was in vain. After Zhang had to realize that the Nanjing government was not willing to fight Japan's aggression in Manchuria, he finally withdraw from active politics. However, he stayed involved in national opinion making. In 1933, he issued a "Declaration of two elderly scholars (*Erlao xuanyan*)" together with his friend Ma Xiangbo (1840–1939) to contradict Japanese claiming of whole Manchuria and moreover Jehol (*C. Rehe*) Province. This declaration was also distributed among the League of Nations in Geneva. At last, Zhang's hopes were answered by Feng Yuxiang, a former Beiyang warlord, who had allied with Chiang Kai-shek at first, but had tried unsuccessfully to resist Chiang's military unification of China in 1929, and then again joined forces after the Mukden Incident in 1931. Feng was strongly opposed to Chiang's hand-off approach regarding Manchuria and created an army against Japan, the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army (*Minzhong kang Ri tongmengjun*) in 1933. Chiang immediately dismissed Feng from his official position. Zhang continued to express his dissatisfaction with the government and tried not to lose hope for China.

In 1934, Zhang moved to Suzhou permanently. In 1935, he established the *Suzhou Zhang shi guoxue jiangxi hui* (*National Studies Society of Mr. Zhang in Suzhou*), teaching students at his home and also giving them shelter. At the same time he continued his research and published several works while in Suzhou. He died there in 1936. In his last will, he urged his children not to accept any official post under a foreign rule in China, fearing a Japanese invasion.

In 1955, with a delay of nineteen years, the Communists at last gave Zhang a state funeral and buried him at his chosen tomb near the Ming scholar-politician Liu Ji (1311–1375).

2.2 Zhang Taiyan's Ideas of China and a Nation-State

Zhang Taiyan's biography has shown the deep sense of responsibility he felt for (Han) China. All his life, Zhang tried to serve China's forthcoming in Asia and the world. He had to go to prison and into Japanese exile, he had to stay under house arrest and to face harsh political critique for his beliefs. He was able to adjust his opinion, if the circumstances demanded it convincingly, he did not put theory over praxis. He disgusted violence, unless China's innermost interests had to be defended. He abhorred dictatorship and autocracy.

This is at least what comes to the fore if we analyze Zhang's conduct towards Han China and its inhabitants, whose welfare always was at the core of his motivation. However, this conclusion has to be clarified, first by analyzing how Zhang imagined the Han Chinese nation-state before 1912, that is, when it still was only an image and had not yet come into being, and which people he considered to be its inhabitants, and it has to be modified; second by analyzing how his notion of China affected his conduct towards non-Han people.

The Proper Name for China

Like other political thinkers and historians such as Liang Qichao⁶⁴⁰ and Liu Shipei⁶⁴¹, Zhang thought it very important to find a proper name for China. All seem to agree that there was no name, which could be taken automatically. This becomes most obvious by the fact that all three of them decided for different terms – Liang settled for *Zhongguo* (Central State), Liu for *Da Xia* (Great Xia) and Zhang as we will see for *Zhonghua minguo* (Republic of China, literally Nation-state of the Central Florescence). In his influential and widely known essay “*Zhonghua minguo jie* (Explaining ‘The Republic of China’)” (1907), Zhang takes an effort to explain this choice of his, which was adopted as the official name of the newly founded state in 1912.⁶⁴² This essay of Zhang is probably also one of his most famous and widely read ones, because he uses an easily understandable vernacular Chinese in contrast to his other texts, which are written “in an extremely obtuse classical style – perversely so – with numerous Western and Buddhist influences, all of which make his writings exceedingly difficult to penetrate.”⁶⁴³

⁶⁴⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 3, line 2–6.

⁶⁴¹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 1–2.

⁶⁴² Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1]. It was originally published in *Minbao* 15 (July 5th, 1907).

⁶⁴³ Fogel: 1977, p. 347. Here, Lu Xun's comment about his reading of Zhang Taiyan's texts cannot be left unquoted: “I could not even punctuate the sentences let alone understand them; and the same was true of many young people in those days.” (Lu Xun: 1980, vol. 4, p. 322 (“Some recollections of Zhang Taiyan”).

Zhang begins by explaining where the different names stem, from which the people in China use for themselves, what they included in past times and which people and places they refer to today. He begins with the term *Hua* (florescence) and writes:

“The name ‘various Hua [States]’ (*zhu Hua*) comes from the place, which the ethnicity (*minzu*) first occupied. [...] However, the Divine Offspring (*shenling zhi zhou*) came from the west, and based themselves in the Yong and Liang provinces.⁶⁴⁴ [...] The Hua mountain formed the boundary, giving the country its name of Hua. Such is the origin of that name. Later, people started to migrate and spread to all the Nine Regions (*jiu zhou*).⁶⁴⁵ At the time of the Qin and Han dynasties, Korea (*Chaoxian*) and Vietnam (*Yuenan*) had become places where the Hua people tilled the soil, and thus the connotation of the name Hua had become wider. Hua was originally the name of a country (*guo*) and not the name of a race (*zhongzu*)⁶⁴⁶, but today it has become a general term for both.”⁶⁴⁷

Zhang considers the term *Hua* to be extremely flexible. Not only does he think that it was possible for territories to be included in this term when they became culturally and ethnically part of “*Hua*,” but moreover it was not limited to be a name solely for a territory or an ethnicity.

“If you want a correct name for the racial ethnicity (*zhongzu*), then *Xia* is the most appropriate. The *Shuowen [jiezhi]* (*Explaining Simple and Analyzing Compound Characters*) says: ‘The *Xia* – men from the Central Country (*Xia Zhongguo ren ye*).’⁶⁴⁸ In the *Di Dian (The Canon of the Emperors)*⁶⁴⁹ we find the passage: ‘Man and Yi (barbarians) trouble the *Xia* (*Man Yi hua Xia*).’⁶⁵⁰ [...] If you base your analysis on historical records, however, you find that the origin of the name *Xia* is indeed the *Xia River (Xiashui)*. [...] *Xia* was originally a tribe’s name, and not the name of a state. That is the reason why we say ‘the various *Xia*’ (*zhu Xia*).’⁶⁵¹

In contrast to *Hua*, the term *Xia* has to be cast aside as a name for the nation-state in Zhang’s opinion:

Zhang objects to *Xia* as a name for the Chinese nation-state because it would not include a territorial meaning, but refers to a certain tribe or ethnicity only. His

⁶⁴⁴ Both were provinces of the so called Nine Provinces (*jiu zhou*). They are said to have been located near Huashan in Shaanxi.

⁶⁴⁵ The Nine Regions was the basic of the administrative regional division allegedly since the Xia Dynasty (ca. 2070–1600 BC), but in fact only since the Later Han (*Hou Han*) Dynasty (25–220).

⁶⁴⁶ I translate *zhongzu* as “ethnicity,” because Zhang does not refer to groups defined by blood lineage, which is inherent in the English term “race.”

⁶⁴⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 252. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 16–17.

⁶⁴⁸ Xu Shen: 1979, p. 112 (Part 5.2. “Sui”). (Zhang skipped one character, *zhi*.)

⁶⁴⁹ *Di Dian* is an alternative name for the first chapter of *Shangshu (Classic of History)*, also called *Yao Dian (The Canon of Yao)*. (See also Cassel: 1997, p. 17n10.)

⁶⁵⁰ James Legge translates much more beautiful: “The barbarous tribes trouble our great land.” However, to emphasize Zhang Taiyan’s explicit reference to the term “*Xia*” in this quotation, I decided to translate it closer to the original. (Legge: 1972, vol. 3, p. 44 (Part II. The Books of Yu, Book I. Canon of Shun).)

⁶⁵¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 252–253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 17–18.

objection for it becoming part of the future Chinese nation-state' name becomes logical later in the essay when he reveals that not only the Han but also the Non-Han are supposed to be included. However, his explanation regarding the third possibility, Han, is less convincing. He writes about this term:

“When Liu Ji⁶⁵² [= Han Gaozu] took over the Nine Regions (*jiu gong*), and conquered the Xiongnu and the Western Regions (*Xiyu*), his prestige and the civilization, which spread in his wake, extended far and wide, and so we were given the name ‘Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*)’ as well. Because this name apparently comes from one king [Han Gaozu] it cannot be taken as normative.”⁶⁵³

It does not become entirely clear why Zhang dismisses Han as an alternative term for the ethnicity. Liang claimed that all dynastic names for the Chinese people had to be dismissed because like other names they had been given to the Chinese by others.⁶⁵⁴ Also Liu Shipai had argued against dynastic names, although for another reason: they were originally family names.⁶⁵⁵ In summary, Zhang concludes:

“For this reason, each of the names, Hua, Xia and Han, was used consecutively to denote three variations in meaning. By establishing Han as the name of the ethnicity (*zu*), the meaning of a state (*bangguo*) is included, and the use of Hua as the name of the state (*guo*) also incorporates the ethnical sense (*zhongzu zhi yi*) of the word. These are the reasons for using the name *Zhonghua minguo* – the Republic of China.”⁶⁵⁶

Zhang's conclusion seems strangely sudden and somehow inconsistent. How does each of the three names he lists – which are indeed the three most common ones apart from Great Qing (*Da Qing*), which must have been equally common during Qing times – refer to “three variations of meaning”? According to Zhang, Hua originally referred to the geographical dimension of the state, Xia and Han both to the ethnical dimension. But where does the term *zhong* come from in *Zhonghua minguo*? Of course, we know that it comes from *Zhongguo*, but why does Zhang think it not necessary to give an analysis of *Zhongguo* as well? And does the second part of *Zhonghua minguo* not refer to people (*min*) as well as state (*guo*)? So, why not include a term for people in the name for the nation-state?

Later in this essay when Zhang refers to his intended territorial extension of the modern nation-state it becomes at least partly obvious why *Hua* in its ancient pre-Qin meaning fulfils the need of the hour best in Zhang's opinion. Then, *Hua* referred to the

⁶⁵² Liu Ji is the *zi* of Emperor Gaozu of the Han Dynasty (256/247–195 BC, reign time 202–195 BC). He is often also referred to by his personal name Liu Bang.

⁶⁵³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Based on Cassel: 1997, p. 18.

⁶⁵⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983[1901_1], p. 3.

⁶⁵⁵ Liu Shipai: 1997 [1903], p. 2b, line 15 small characters.

⁶⁵⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Based on Cassel: 1997, p. 18.

territory Zhang has in mind for the nucleus of the Chinese nation-state. Besides the two regions Yong and Liang, where the “Divine Offspring” based itself after migrating from the West and which are bound by the Hua mountain, it includes also parts of Korea and Vietnam, which already in pre-Qin times “had become places where the Hua people tilled the soil.”⁶⁵⁷

But when Zhang begins to discuss the matter of the “Three Peripheral Regions (*san huangfu*)” – Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang – in the second half of his essay, the chosen name *Zhonghua minguo* becomes illogical once more. Zhang is aware of that:

“But if the borders of the pre-Han Commanderies and Counties exclusively constitute the territory [of China], then the Mongolian, Muslim (*Hui*)⁶⁵⁸ and Tibetan areas are not within our jurisdiction, as these areas were actually taken over somewhat later.”⁶⁵⁹

Still, in the end, Zhang does not see a problem in this. In fact, with regard to the question of different degrees of difficulty when including Non-Han areas, he argues for the inclusion of the Three Peripheral Division even before attempting to include those parts of modern Korea and Vietnam, which belonged to the old pre-Qin territory (and those of Burma, which were added to the Ming Empire as an aboriginal district,) although their “recovery (*guangfu*)” would be “a duty.”⁶⁶⁰ He states that this would be much more difficult than the inclusion of the Three Peripheral Divisions because the latter “are not ancient territory, [but] neither are they dependencies of any other country”⁶⁶¹ like the territories in Korea, Vietnam and Burma in fact would be.

Regarding the Three Peripheral Divisions, Zhang’s choice of *Hua* as a proper name for the nation-state based on the territorial argument falls short as it only includes one of the Three Peripheral Divisions or rather parts of it – Xinjiang, parts of which were added to the Han Empire by emperor Gaozong (256/247–195 BC) as the so-called Western Regions (*Xiyu*). But Tibet and Mongolia clearly cannot be included into the pre-Qin meaning of *Hua*. However, Zhang still argues for their inclusion. How his argument runs and why the meaning of *Hua* is after all not important, despite the fact that Zhang took such effort to explain it, will be analyzed below.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 252. Based on Cassel: 1997, p. 17. See also Laitinen: 1990, p. 123.

⁶⁵⁸ With the “Muslim regions” (*Huibu*) Zhang refers to the Qing province Xinjiang, which had been established in 1884. It was somewhat larger than today’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (*Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhiqu*) including the valley of the Ili river (Yili He), parts of which belong to Kazakhstan today.

⁶⁵⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 26.

⁶⁶⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 27.

⁶⁶¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

⁶⁶² See below this Chapter 2.2 (subchapter “The Proper Borders of the Republic of China”).

Zhang Taiyan's Critique of Yang Du

After having summed up the approach to a proper name for the Chinese nation-state, Zhang adds a first critique of Yang Du's (1875–1931) approach to the same topic how it appears in his *Jintiezhuyi shuo* (*Gold and Iron Doctrine*).⁶⁶³ This long essay by Yang, a supporter of a constitutional monarchy and friend of Liang, had been originally published in 1905 in the *Zhongguo xinbao*. Zhang cites Yang's arguments:

“The purpose of the name ‘The Central Country (*Zhongguo*)’ is to demarcate outer regions from central regions.⁶⁶⁴ The purpose of the name ‘Central Hua (*Zhonghua*)’ is to distinguish between the different cultural standards of the Han and the Yi (barbarians). Thus the name ‘Central Hua’ is neither the name of a single place, nor the name of a single blood lineage, but a ethnical name (*zuming*), stemming from a uniform culture.”⁶⁶⁵

Yang goes on by explaining how assimilation of “barbarians” took place in antiquity with reference to the *Chunqiu* and argues that assimilation of Non-Han still happens today. Therefore, Yang concludes: “By the name token, the origin of *Hua* can be determined in terms of culture.”⁶⁶⁶ Zhang on the other hand criticizes Yang's explanation that the term ‘*Hua*’ would derive from *hua* (flower) and would “describe the beauty of the culture.”⁶⁶⁷ In Zhang's opinion this explanation is just wrong and shows that Yang is not capable of the method of Evidential Learning (*kaozheng*) as he could not “make proper use of the meaning of different symbols, and overstates superficial meanings in characters.”⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, “even if it were true that ‘*Hua*’ was synonymous with ‘culture,’ how could you possibly say that all people with culture are Chinese?!”⁶⁶⁹ And Zhang goes even further: “To lump different people together and call them one, simply because they all have culture – is that not wide of the mark and far removed from the facts?”⁶⁷⁰

Zhang uses Yang's text to clarify his own position against an inflationary usage of the term *Hua*, against the assumption that every “barbarian” could become Han Chinese if he used the right rites and teachings and against the idea of the Han Chinese culture being the only culture, that is, culturalism.⁶⁷¹ He accuses Yang of simply embracing

⁶⁶³ Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 213–397.

⁶⁶⁴ Zhang omits a sentence here: “The difference between two ethnicities (*minzu*) is to be found in their culture.” (Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 374.)

⁶⁶⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 18. Original sources see Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 374.

⁶⁶⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 19. Original sources see Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 374.

⁶⁶⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 19. Original sources see Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 374.

⁶⁶⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 19.

⁶⁶⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 20.

⁶⁷⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 20.

⁶⁷¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 18.

everybody in his concept of *Hua*, who wants to be part of the Chinese nation-state. But Zhang's critique goes further. Whereas Yang claims that everyone in the ambit of the Han Chinese, who has culture, would have *per definitionem* Han Chinese culture and would therefore be part of *Hua*, Zhang argues that even if these people had culture, this culture was not automatically Han Chinese and therefore would not automatically make them Han Chinese.

This is an important approach in two ways. First, Zhang distances himself from the culturalist world view. Instead, Zhang states that other people had cultures despite the fact that these were Non-Han/non-*Hua* cultures. Second, Zhang argues against the simplistic usage of the assimilation theory.

The Proper Borders of the Republic of China

Zhang writes that the main problem regarding his choice of the proper name for the future Republic would be that if one takes the pre-Qin meaning of *Hua*, that is, the pre-Qin Commanderies and Counties as the model for the territory of the Republic of China, one has to consider four territorial problems for the situation today: first, **Mongolian, Muslim and Tibetan** areas not part of it; second, the Han Dynasty Commanderies Lelang and Xuantu belong to **Korea** today⁶⁷²; third, the Han Dynasty Commanderies Jiaozhi, Rinan and Jiuzhen belong to **Vietnam** today⁶⁷³; and, fourth, the Han Dynasty dependent state Linyi⁶⁷⁴ belongs to **Cambodia** today.⁶⁷⁵ Zhang analyses the four different initial situations and the possible approaches for the recovery of these regions, for some unexplained reason adding Burma (*Miandian*) and leaving Linyi.

Korea and Vietnam

In his explanation about Lelang, Xuantu, Jiaozhi, Rinan and Jiuzhen Zhang suddenly replaces these Han dynastic Commanderies with the whole modern countries they are located in – Korea and Vietnam. Zhang obviously takes the inclusion of some of their territories in the Han dynastic state as a legitimation for their complete inclusion today: “These two countries [= Korea and Vietnam] should not only be conquered by military means, it is our duty (*zhi*) to recover these territories.”⁶⁷⁶ Zhang gives two reasons for this duty: On the one hand, these countries suffer under the tyranny and control of

⁶⁷² These two commanderies were established in Han times and were positioned in present-day North Korea and eastern Liaodong province.

⁶⁷³ Also these three commanderies were established in Han time.

⁶⁷⁴ The Han dependent Linyi State also had been established in Han times. After 192 AD, the independent Champa kingdom replaced this state, which was in fact not in Cambodia, but in southeastern Vietnam.

⁶⁷⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 26.

⁶⁷⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 27.

foreign Imperialists. Therefore, to free them from their dominance would only mean “humanity (*rendao*).”⁶⁷⁷ On the other hand, the *Hua* are indebted to the Koreans and Vietnamese people due to the great similarities between their cultures: “Talking about ethnicity (*minzu*), these two countries [= Korea and Vietnam] have the same customs like *Yu Dian* [= China]⁶⁷⁸ with respect to dwelling, clothing and food.”⁶⁷⁹

Also, with regard to their languages there are many similarities, because although they differ from Chinese, their usage and reading of Chinese characters conforms with Chinese pronunciation. And last but not least, “in terms of blood lineage (*xuetong*), the Koreans are quite mixed, whereas the Vietnamese people are all ‘cap and girdle [wearing] (*guandai*)’ [= civilized] like us.”⁶⁸⁰

This sentence, I think, is revealing when it comes to the question what blood lineage in fact is supposed to mean. Zhang mixes blood lineage with civilization, when he states that “in terms of blood lineage” the Vietnamese people would “all wear cap and girdle,” that is, be civilized. Does he mean that culture would make blood lineage unimportant? Or that it could even delete original blood lineages and put people in a different blood relationship? Or that culture and blood lineage are the same and that therefore the Koreans were only half-way civilized whereas the Vietnamese were fully civilized? It seems as if Zhang himself was not entirely certain about the meaning of blood or racial lineage.

Burma

As already stated above, Zhang’s inclusion of Burma (and sudden exclusion of Linyi) comes as a surprise and is not explained. Zhang writes that the case of Burma would differ from Korea and Vietnam, because Burma did not belong to the pre-Qin territory, and only in the Ming dynasty many aboriginal offices (*tusi*) were established there.⁶⁸¹ Therefore, Zhang states, their customs differ from Han Chinese ones. However, many Han Chinese migrated there. In case of Burma, Zhang emphasizes the human duty to free them from the sovereignty of foreigners even more than in the cases of Korea and Vietnam, and indeed, there is no other convincing reason why Burmese regions should be included into a Han Chinese nation-state.⁶⁸² “Even though the foreigners’ treatment of Burma is much more tolerant than that of Korea, our assistance should not be delayed.”⁶⁸³

⁶⁷⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 27.

⁶⁷⁸ The term *Yu Dian* derives from the *Shijing* and refers to the land made cultivable by Yu. (I. e. Legge: 1972, vol. 4, p. 373 (Part II. Minor Odes of the Kingdom, Book VI. The Decade of Pih Shan, VI. Sin nan shan).

⁶⁷⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256.

⁶⁸⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 27.

⁶⁸¹ These aboriginal offices must have been indeed few, as I could not find any reference to them in general works on Burmese history. (See i.e. Seekins: 2006; Harvey 1925.)

⁶⁸² Burma was a British colony from 1824 to 1948.

⁶⁸³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

Zhang's Conclusion for the Southeast and Northeast Asian regions

In his wish to restore the pre-Qin borders Zhang is aware of the various difficulties. He therefore thinks it better to choose a certain indirect strategy although he admits that “what is easy to achieve is perhaps somewhat contrary to our priorities.”⁶⁸⁴ Therefore, instead of completely abandoning his scheme, he turns from pre-Qin times to the last ethnic Han Chinese dynasty for a territorial reference, the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644): “Today I am afraid that [...] it is necessary to take the provincial divisions of the Ming *except Burma* as the basis” of the Republic of China.⁶⁸⁵ Zhang does not explicitly explain what he means by the “provincial division of the Ming.” But according to what he wrote before he must mean Vietnam (or rather parts of it), but not Korea, because only “Vietnam was re-established as a province”⁶⁸⁶ during Ming times, whereas Korea was ruled by the Chosŏn (*Chaoxian*) Dynasty (1392–1897). He concludes:

“The restoration (*huifu*) of Vietnam and Korea is not an easy task. Not even the restoration of Burma can be accomplished at once. Even though the Three Peripheral Division [Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet] are not ancient territory, neither are they dependencies of any other country. So, if you proceed by degree of difficulty, then it would be easier to restore these than the two Commanderies [in Korea] and the aboriginal district [in Burma]. Their assimilation (*tonghua*) has varying degrees of difficulty.”⁶⁸⁷

After long explanations Zhang in the end leaves the territorial question of Southeast and Northeast Asia completely behind as in his opinion it would be unrealistic that their restoration as parts of China could happen quickly and easily. Instead, he turns to the Southwest and the Northwest and by the sheer number of pages it becomes clear that his explanations about the regions in Vietnam and Korea are in the end not important at all. The ultimate destination is the inclusion of three of the four large Qing Dynasty Non-Han territories into the Republic of China.

The Three Peripheral Divisions

Still, the Three Peripheral Divisions are complicated cases, because the legitimacy of their incorporation into Zhang's desired Republic of China is even more difficult to explain than in case of the regions in Korea, Vietnam and Burma although already in their cases Zhang's reference to pre-Qing times is not entirely satisfying. We have seen though that Zhang presumes their incorporation to be much easier. Therefore, he

⁶⁸⁴ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

⁶⁸⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

⁶⁸⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 27. Zhang must refer to the short phase of the fourth Chinese domination in Vietnam (1407–1427) during which Ming officials ruled Vietnam.

⁶⁸⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

makes a huge and sophisticated argument why these regions could be won over and how this could happen. It soon becomes clear that with regard to his earlier statement – “as for Tibet, the Turkish Muslim areas [region] and Mongolia, these could either be incorporated or rejected”⁶⁸⁸ – his personal belief is that they should be incorporated. He starts out to make his points in the second half of his essay. In fact, his legitimizing argument and strategic ideas for an incorporation of the Three Peripheral Division including his critique of the Manchus and the analysis of the question what will become of them in a Republic of China covers even more pages and lines (90 lines)⁶⁸⁹ than his discussion of the proper name, his critique of Yang Du’s opinion of this issue, his proposal of the correct borders and the discussion on Southeast and Northeast Asia together (82 lines)⁶⁹⁰. This shows also in a formal way how important the issue of the Three Peripheral Divisions is for Zhang.

Zhang’s answer to the question of how to incorporate Non-Han regions is assimilation. For the Three Peripheral Divisions this question can obviously not been answered as quickly as in the cases of the ancient Commanderies in present-day Korea, Vietnam and Burma, for which Zhang was quickly to point out their high degree of Han assimilation in a cultural and partly racial or ethnical sense. In the case of the Three Peripheral Divisions, that is, Tibet, Mongolia and the Turkish Muslim area, Zhang analyses, first, how far the assimilation to the *Hua* culture has already proceeded, and, second, what strategies there are to make this progress resulting in complete assimilation as soon as possible.

Before turning to the question of assimilation, let me first shortly show what Zhang has to say about the three regions with respect to legitimacy through former suzerainty of Chinese Empires like he had done in the cases of Southeast and Northeast regions. Zhang writes that only as late as in Ming times “titles had been appointed (*cefeng*)” in Tibet and the Muslim area. During the pre-Han period the thirty-six states in the Western Regions (*Xiyu*), now located in the Turkish Muslim regions were only “vassals (*fuyong*)” and did not belong to the “state territory (*shutu*).”⁶⁹¹ Mongolia would have never been fully subjugated by a Chinese dynasty.⁶⁹²

But despite these rather demotivating historical connections towards a possible integration of the Three Peripheral Divisions into the Republic of China Zhang nevertheless comes to the conclusion that their incorporation would be desirable. Zhang’s approach moreover shows that he does not assume Non-Han dynasties to be bases for arguments of legitimation despite their Non-Han character, as it was done by other nationalists (and is done by the CCP government of the PRC until today). Therefore, the fact that Tibet, Mongolia and the Muslim areas were part of the two

⁶⁸⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

⁶⁸⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257, line 4–p. 262, line 8.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 252, line 1–p. 257, line 4.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 256. Cassel’s translation runs different here, but I disagree at this point. (Cassel: 1997, p. 28.)

⁶⁹² Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

hugest Empires in East Asia, the Manchu Qing and the Mongol Empire, cannot be used as a legitimizing argument in Zhang's opinion.

His line of argument to integrate the Three Peripheral Regions therefore has to be based on other reasons than his argument for legitimation of recovering the Western Han/Ming territories in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma, for which Zhang argues that their culture and traditions are already very similar to Chinese ways because they had been part of a Chinese empire once and that China therefore would have an obligation to free them from their situations as colonies.

Zhang's Conclusion for the Three Peripheral Divisions

Before Zhang comes to his own reasons for a inclusion of the Three Peripheral Divisions, he criticizes the reasons his opponent Yang Du gives for their inclusion in his *Jintiezhuyi shuo*. And that is the protection of these regions against the colonizing and imperialist grip of England, Russia and France, which Yang fears would be especially strong after a revolution in China. Zhang directly quotes from Yang:

“Among the opponents, Russia is the leading nation. Russia is certainly wishing every day that it were able to snatch Mongolia and the Turkish Muslim areas. Now, when they see that there is division among China's ethnicities (*Zhongguo ge zu*), and that the Turkish Muslims and Mongols have not attained a level, at which they can establish their own countries, why should they not want to go in and occupy the Mongol and Muslim region? And when Russia has occupied the Mongol and Turkish Muslim [regions], the English will invade the Tibetan [region] and the French will invade Dian [= Yunnan] and [the two] Yue [= Guangdong and Guangxi]⁶⁹³, so the failure to keep the territory of the Han intact would result from inner division leading to the carving of our country of outsiders.”⁶⁹⁴

But Zhang argues that “although the Manchu government has not fallen yet, it is not able to contain [these powers], so why would only the age of revolution lead to [an occupation]?”⁶⁹⁵ He thinks that these regions would not be in any more danger after a revolution than they would already be now. He argues that it would cost the Europeans too much “deficient logistics and provisioning”⁶⁹⁶ to conquer the regions, and keeping those vast countries intact afterwards would also not be easy. Therefore, if the Europeans would not try to conquer the Three Peripheral Divisions now, when they would have the chance due to the weak Qing government, why should they do so after a

⁶⁹³ Guangdong and Guangxi are also called the two Yue (*liang Yue*). Yue alone usually refers only to Guangdong. However, here both provinces must be meant, because together with Yunnan they form the three southernmost provinces in China.

⁶⁹⁴ Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 378–379. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 261. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 38–39.)

⁶⁹⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 261. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 38.

⁶⁹⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 261. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 39.

revolution? And if the revolution was successful, it would still be no problem, if “our military power will certainly not be comparable with others’,” because the Europeans “often go from name to reality” and the “nascent fighting spirit will make its prestige and fame known all over the world.” Consequently, the European would believe that it is not easy to compete with China.⁶⁹⁷ Therefore, there was no need in rushing into a conquest of Xinjiang and the other regions just to fight of the imaginary attempts of the Russians and other Europeans to conquer them.

Zhang’s argument for a Chinese conquest of the Three Peripheral Divisions, consequently, runs differently from Yang’s, and is not at all based on fear of foreign invasion. In the case of Xinjiang, it is based on the Turkish Muslims inhabitants themselves. Although Zhang writes: “But if [...] they really want to establish their own country, why should we keep it through plunder?”⁶⁹⁸ he does not think that Xinjiang would fall apart in the end because he thinks the Turkish Muslims capable to consider their own situation realistically:

“They have few qualified personnel, their political system is deficient, and for every affair they will have to ask the Han people (*Hanren*) for help. [...] Although this [= our support] could help the Turkish Muslims to achieve separation, they – if they are able to distinguish between fortune and disaster, and see the differences between good and evil – will understand that the troops and persecution have all come from the Manchu people (*Manren*), and that the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*) has not at all been the driving force.⁶⁹⁹ Moreover, their country is remote, and even if it were possible to build military devices in the terrain for self-defense, they would not be as advanced as in civilized countries (*kaiming zhi yu*). If they understand all this, they will not waste any time demanding separation, but strive to assimilate to the Han people (*yu Hanren tonghua*).”⁷⁰⁰

Zhang thinks that the Turkish Muslims in Xinjiang due to their comprehension of their own situation would decide to become part of the Chinese nation-state and would “assimilate to the Han people” out of these strategic reasons. Zhang seems to turn his wish that Xinjiang should become part of the Republic of China upside down and claims that it would in the end be the wish of the Xinjiang Muslims themselves. They would see that their only chance to become a modern country would be to join the Chinese.

⁶⁹⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 261. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 39–40.

⁶⁹⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 261. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 38.

⁶⁹⁹ About the issue of the hatred of the Turkish Muslims against their Manchu overlords and the Han alike, Zhang also refers in another passage: “The Manchus’ treatment of the Turkish Muslims has been cruel and unreasonable. [...] now the Turkish Muslims also regard the Han as venomous snakes. In the Three Peripheral Divisions, only the Turkish Muslims harbour resentment, but if we recall the common roots of the different peoples, then what is the necessity of regarding the Turkish Muslims as a people that should be slaughtered? Fortunately, they will become peaceful again when they have vented their anger.” (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 261. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 38.)

⁷⁰⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 262. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 40.

The situation of the other two Peripheral Divisions, Mongolia and Tibet are not discussed at length like the case of Xinjiang. Zhang hints a possible reason for this neglect, which is his viewpoint of the higher development of the Turkish Muslims compared to the Mongols and Tibetans. Zhang thinks the Turkish Muslims much more capable of having own ideas of nation-building and consequently separation, but also of being able to look ahead their situation. But the Mongols are too “stupid (*zhuanyu*)”⁷⁰¹ to be able to think for themselves or to establish their own strong nationalism, which could lead to independent nation-building. They would also not be aware of the advantages their incorporation into the Republic of China would mean to them.

Another reason why Xinjiang was especially important for Zhang although he does not mention is might lie in the political position of Xinjiang in Zhang’s days, which differed profoundly from the situation of Mongolia and Tibet. The Inner Mongolian Alliance had been voluntarily following Hong Taiji (also Hungtaiji, C. *Huangtaiji*) (1592–1643, reign time 1626–1643) already since 1636, when he had installed the Qing Dynasty.⁷⁰² The Outer (Khalkha) Mongols took shelter under the Qing emperor’s wings in 1691. Tibet had become Qing protectorate in 1720. The Manchus had close relations to the Mongols – reflected in their appointment to the highest official posts, which were usually reserved for Manchus and also in their habit to intermarry in the highest social strata.⁷⁰³ Also the problems between the Manchus and the Tibetans never were as grave as in Xinjiang.

The Western Regions were conquered later than Tibet and Mongolia in 1759/60 and called “New border region (*Xinjiang*).” Already soon after the conquest riots broke out. In 1864, after more than one hundred years of disturbances both the Chinese⁷⁰⁴ and the Turkish⁷⁰⁵ Muslims of Xinjiang together pushed off their Manchu overlords. During the first few years of independence from Qing overlordship, Muhammad Yaqub Bek (also Yakub Beg, 1820–1877), a commander-in-chief from the Khanate of Kokand⁷⁰⁶, had managed to established a more or less unified rule over the Tarim Basin, the region of Urumqi and the Turfan Basin, leaving the Ili valley to Russia. As ruler of Kashgaria, Yaqub Bek concluded contracts with Russia and Britain, who both acknowledged his state and allowed them free trade. When Yaqub Bek died rather suddenly in 1877, his state fell into three pieces, which were constantly at war with each other. So, the reconquest of Xinjiang in 1881 seems to have been rather easy for the Qing, who were

⁷⁰¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257.

⁷⁰² Before the proclaiming of the new dynastic name Great Qing (*Da Qing*) in 1636, the Manchus already had founded a dynasty, the Later Jin (*Hou Jin*) Dynasty (1616–1636).

⁷⁰³ “The wives of emperors and princes came predominantly from a relatively small number of families belonging to the Mongol nobility and distinguished banner families” and “the ruler favored Mongol grooms” for their daughters. (Rawski: 1998, p. 131, 146–147.)

⁷⁰⁴ Chinese: *Hanhui, Donggan*. Turkish: *Tungan, Dungan*. Today, they are generally called Hui.

⁷⁰⁵ Turkish: *Musulman*. Chinese: *Hui* (since 1760 without the pig radical *shi*). Today, they are generally called Uyghurs (*Weiwu'erzu*).

⁷⁰⁶ The Khanate of Kokand (1709–1876) was a Central Asian state. Its territory lay with modern Uzbekistan, southern Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

backed up by the Chinese Shaanxi army led by Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885). So, from a Qing perspective the Turkish Muslims in Xinjiang had always caused problems and had made it quite obvious that their loyalty did not lie with the Qing Empire (although, at this point of time, it definitely also did not lie with a however natured unified Xinjiang Muslim nation-state). So, doubts were justified about their general wish to be part of a larger China-based state or nation-state.

In the end, the inclusion of Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet seems to be a prerequisite for reaching further goals for the territory of the Chinese nation-state in Zhang's opinion:

“If one of the Three Peripheral Divisions separates, the remaining two may not necessarily follow suit. If all three assimilate to us, then this will be beneficial for the realization of nationalism. *After this*, the two prefectures and the aboriginal district can be recovered, leading to the restoration of the Former Han borders and the Republic of China being established in earnest.”⁷⁰⁷ (My emphasis.)

Only *after* the Three Peripheral Regions have become part of the Chinese nation-state, Korea, Vietnam and the other regions Zhang intends to include can be recovered. This is not only due to the fact that the difficulties would be greater in the case of (re-)conquering the regions in Korea and Southeast Asia, but it is also a strategy.

Still, Zhang does not explain convincingly what other reasons than Yang's he has for including Xinjiang or for that matter Tibet and Mongolia. His argument that the Xinjiang Muslims themselves would like to be integrated and also that it would “be beneficial for the realization of nationalism” seem rather meager, but they must serve as Zhang's most important reasons – the strengthening of a possible nation-state by widening it and make it a nation-state, which could not be neglected on the global political stage due to its sheer dimension with regard to area and population. This is very much alike Liang Qichao's idea of a “large nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi*),” which Liang favors, because it would make China actually the largest nation in the world.⁷⁰⁸ As will become obvious below Zhang's idea of a Chinese nation-state is very similar to Liang's and also his way of integrating the Mongols, Manchus, Turkish Muslims and Tibetans – they have to assimilate.

⁷⁰⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 262. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 40.

⁷⁰⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75–76.

Zhang Taiyan's Idea of Race and Ethnicity and Evolution in East Asia: Men's Origin and Social Darwinism

After having analyzed Zhang Taiyan's idea of China in its territorial meaning I will now turn to what plans Zhang had for the people living in this entity. In the context of including Xinjiang, Zhang has already used the term "assimilation (*tonghua*).” On what concepts of ethnicity, race and culture is Zhang's strategy to include Non-Han territories into a Chinese nation-state based?

Since Yan Fu's translation of Thomas Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* (*Jinhualun yu lunlixue*), later titled *Tianyan lun*) had been published in 1898, the idea that evolutionary theory was also applicable to social phenomena became wide-spread and Social Darwinist thinking also influenced Han Chinese historians. In 1898, Zhang published *Sibinsai'er wenji* (*Works of Herbert Spencer*)⁷⁰⁹, a collection of translations of Spencer's texts, and in 1902 *Shehuixue* (*Study of Sociology*), a translation of Kishimoto Nobuta's (1866–1928) *Shakaigaku* (*Study of Sociology*) (1898).⁷¹⁰ In 1903, Yan Fu's translation of Herbert Spencer's *The Study of Sociology* was published. Thus, ideas about "natural selection" and "survival of the fittest" became important catch phrases in historiography.

Zhang became more and more influenced by social Darwinist evolutionary theories.⁷¹¹ This came to the fore in one essay in the first *Qiushu* edition from 1900, later called *Qiushu chukeben* (*Book of Urgency, First Edition*).⁷¹² In the eleventh chapter, "Yuan ren (On the Origin of Human Beings)"⁷¹³ he writes that "the origin of all men lies in tiny scales (*lin*)"⁷¹⁴.⁷¹⁵ Referring to this sentence Wong Young-tsu insists that Zhang could not be seen as a racist, because "under Darwinist influence he had accepted the view that all races, including the Han Chinese and the Manchus, shared the same primitive origin."⁷¹⁶ Wong's conclusion can, however, not be verified when taking Zhang's definite distinctions between human kinds based also on social Darwinist theories into account. Despite the fact that Zhang accepts a common origin of all human beings he assumes that they would belong to different races on different levels of evolution, although their

⁷⁰⁹ It was published as a series in *Changyan bao* from May to August 1898. Zhang translated it together with Zeng Guangquan (1871–1930). (Wong: 1989, p. 152n50.)

⁷¹⁰ Wang, F.: 2012, p. 140.

⁷¹¹ See Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol 3, p. 38–42 (ch. 20 "Zu zhi"), esp. 39–41; Liang Tao: 2004, p. 280–285. See also Laitinen: 1990, p. 72.

⁷¹² It consisted of fifty chapters. Between 1900 and 1902, Zhang completely revised the *Qiushu*. He deleted sixteen reformist essays and added twenty-seven with a more revolutionary undertone. (Laitinen: 1990, p. 70f; Murthy: 2011, p. 66n43, 72; Wong: 1989, p. 27.)

⁷¹³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 21–24.

⁷¹⁴ Liang Tao interprets, that *lin* would mean "fish", because Zhang Taiyan accepted evolution in his "Jun shuo (On Bacteria)" (1899) that "living creatures stem from lifeless creatures, these simplest living creatures changed into plants, plants changed into jellyfishes, jellyfishes into clams, clams into shrimps and crabs, those fish, fish into birds and beasts, beasts into apes and apes into men." (Liang Tao: 2004, p. 167–168n5.)

⁷¹⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1982, vol. 3, p. 21.

⁷¹⁶ Wong: 1989, p. 27.

affiliation could change over time.⁷¹⁷ Although he assumes that all men shared the same origin in “tiny scales” he does not assume a shared development afterwards:

“Regarding outer appearance (*hua*) there are the differences of early (progressive) (*zao*) and late (backward) (*wan*), of family clan (*bu*) and ethnicity (*zu*). Regarding character (*xing*) there are the differences of civilized (*wen*) and savage (*guang*), of Rong (barbarians) and Xia. Those kinds of the humans, who [just] do not have claws and teeth and are able to speak, have been called Rong and Di (barbarians) in antiquity and were not equaled with men. But I regret⁷¹⁸ that today this is not so anymore.”⁷¹⁹

In this text from 1900 Zhang clearly makes a distinction between civilized Xia and uncivilized “barbarians,” linking also other characteristics to the notion of civilization (progressiveness, large social identificatory units) and savagery (backwardness, small social identificatory units, beast-like in behavior).

Zhang then describes how the Europeans and Americans equal the Han Chinese in civilization and culture, being “virtuous, clever, skilled, and knowledgeable people having come from the outside (*you de hui shu zhi zhi meng*)” like the Chinese originally did.⁷²⁰ But like China, also all other high cultures had and have “their barbarians.”⁷²¹ To illustrate those of China, Zhang (like Liu Shiwei in *Rangshu*)⁷²² turns to the *Shuowen jiezi* definitions of Non-Han people and their descent from animals.⁷²³ As a résumé he gives the same characteristics he had ascribed to the wild people above, thus classifying the Non-Han people explicitly as belonging to the groups of people on a backward and uncivilized level: “In their outer appearance (*hua*) they are all late (backward) (*wan*), and in their character (*xing*) they are all savage (*guang*).”⁷²⁴

In another essay in the *Qishu chukeben*, chapter 20 “Zu zhi (System of Ethnicities),”⁷²⁵ Zhang gives his explanation for these differences between races by referring to eugenics, but also to social Darwinism:

“By inheritance of superiority or inferiority stupid and wise lines [develop]. By blood of purity and impurity strong and weak lines [develop]. ([In small

⁷¹⁷ See Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170–190 (ch. 17 “Xu zhongxing shang” and ch. 18 “Xu zhongxing xia”).

⁷¹⁸ In Liang Tao’s version the character “to regret” (*wan*) is omitted. (Liang Tao: 2004, p. 167) Thus, the whole sentence becomes a different connotation. However, when reading what comes afterwards, it gets obvious that Zhang truly regrets.

⁷¹⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 21 (ch. 11 “Yuan ren”).

⁷²⁰ Ibid. The character *meng* usually refers to people who left their native land and migrated from the outside. (Liang Tao: 2004, p. 168.)

⁷²¹ Zhang names the Eskimos, the Northern Di by which he probably means the Huns, who would have destroyed Switzerland and Prussia and a mysterious ethnicity called *Heilaguliyizu*, which would have disturbed Greece. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 21 (ch. 11 “Yuan ren”).)

⁷²² See below Chapter 3.4 (“Racial Categories”).

⁷²³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 22 (ch. 11 “Yuan ren”); Liang Tao: 2004, p. 169–170.

⁷²⁴ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 22 (ch. 11 “Yuan ren”).

⁷²⁵ Ibid., p. 38–42.

characters:] It is said that human race improves, meaning that if [someone of] inferior race marries [someone of] superior race their child will get blood, which is half superior and half inferior. If it marries again [someone of] superior race, their child will be of superior race's blood for 6/8. In the seventh generation the inferior race's blood will therefore only be 1/128, and it can be seen as completely of superior race.) By cells of complexity and simplicity dying and living lines [develop].”⁷²⁶

And elsewhere in the same essay he writes:

“Otherwise, our Zhongxia clan (*Zhongxia zhi shizu*) today, as is entirely clear and comprehensible, stems from the Five Emperors. Why did all the other people of the time of the Five Emperors ‘discontinue their sacrifices (*jue qi si*)’ [= perish]? There are no other [people left], because of natural caused eradication (*ziran zhi taotai*) [= natural selection] and of human caused eradication (*renwei zhi taotai*) [human selection]⁷²⁷, the superior ones (*youzhe*) have to prevail, while the inferior (*liezhe*) ones have to succumb.”⁷²⁸

This is a direct reference to Social Darwinism and its adaption and shift of meaning symbolized by Herbert Spencer’s (1820–1903) above mentioned catch phrase “survival of the fittest.” Originally, Spencer had introduced the idea of a most likely “survival of the fittest,” also phrased as “survival of the most adapted,”⁷²⁹ as a basic principle not only of evolution, but also of economics in *The Principles of Biology* (1864). He writes: “This survival of the fittest [...] is that, which Mr Darwin has called ‘natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life.’”⁷³⁰ Beginning with the fifth edition of his *On the Origins of Species* (1st ed. 1859, 5th ed. 1871), Charles Darwin adopted Spencer’s phrase and titled his fourth chapter “Natural Selection, or The Survival of the Fittest.”⁷³¹ However, in contrast to its original intention, the phrase “survival of the fittest” by and by got a distinct political and social meaning. Zhang applies the idea of “natural selection” in the sense based on Social Darwinism and its inherent classification of humans into different “races,” which would compete with each other. In Zhang’s idea, the descendents of the Five Emperors clearly are the “fittest.”

The continuity of the “Zhongxia clan” might have been natural in terms of natural selection in prehistoric times, but in more recent eras, this could not be taken for granted anymore. In *Qiusu chukeben* chapter eleven “Yuan ren,” Zhang briefly

⁷²⁶ Ibid., p. 40 (ch. 20 “Zu zhi”).

⁷²⁷ Zhang probably refers to a selection caused by human competition in a direct military sense. This approach was later criticized by Hu Shi, who strongly rejected the idea that “natural selection” also reigned the action of men, but suggested that there would be “human selection.” But Hu did not refer to processes of human competition, simply reflecting those of natural selection, but meant that “Heaven and Earth are inhumane” and “man can do better than Heaven. (Pusey: 1983, p. 75.)

⁷²⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 41 (ch. 20 “Zu zhi”). See also Wong: 1989, p. 21.

⁷²⁹ Spencer: 1864, vol. 1, p. 354.

⁷³⁰ Spencer: 1864, vol. 1, p. 445.

⁷³¹ Darwin: 1871, p. 84.

subsumes China's history with the Northern Non-Han people during the last 1500 years, when "there was no order between people (*min*) [= Han people] and beasts (*shou*) [= Non-Han people]." ⁷³² In contrast to the Non-Han in the South, the Northern Non-Han "often stole Jizhou ⁷³³ [= China proper], or cut it in half." ⁷³⁴ Zhang asks:

"Can we call them [= the hunting nomads from the North ⁷³⁵] human beings (*ren*)? No! They resemble men's appearance, like a macaque does. They can speak in men's language, like an orangutan can. [...] Their races are kinds (*lei*), but less than people (*min*), their leaders are outstanding persons (*hao*), but less than sovereigns (*jun*) ⁷³⁶." ⁷³⁷

Zhang goes on to belittle the Non-Han people, especially those from North Asia, for the rest of the essay. Although this mainly seems to be a polemic against the Manchu rule of his days, it is not a satisfactory explanation to claim that every racist phrase by Zhang would (only) be part of his anti-Manchu strategy. These statements, I think, have to be taken seriously in themselves. On the contrary, I would even claim that his racism was the important motivator of his anti-Manchism and his perception of the Manchu Emperors as unfit – in the Social Darwinist sense – due to their inferior racial descent.

However, there was a time not long ago when he wrote the *Qiushu*, when Zhang thought that a strong Manchu government would be necessary to keep the Europeans at bay. In 1899, Zhang published an article in Liang Qichao's *Qingyi bao* titled "Ke di (Guest emperors)," later included with a self-critical introduction in the *Qiushu chukeben*. ⁷³⁸ There he lies down why China needed a strong monarchy to repel the "white men" even if it was Manchu. He writes that "if we expel the Manchu people (*Manren*), our territory will be divided by the white men (*bairren*), and that would be a great disgrace for Shenzou [= China]." ⁷³⁹ To clarify this, Zhang turns to history and names two bad examples, when China perished because the Han Chinese were not willing to accept Non-Han rule in the first place: the Shu Han Dynasty (221–263) and the Song Dynasty (970–1279). ⁷⁴⁰ Both empires perished due to the neglect of possible powerful allies.

In 208 and 209, Liu Bei (161–223, reign time 221–223), who later founded the Shu Han Dynasty, and Sun Quan (182–252, reign time 229–252), who later founded the Eastern Wu (*Dong Wu*) Dynasty (229–280), allied to conquer the Jing Province, which was the

⁷³² Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 22 (ch. 11 "Yuan ren").

⁷³³ Jizhou is an ancient province, which embraced Shanxi, Northwestern Hebei, Northern Henan and Western Liaoning. (Liang Tao: 2004, p. 172n45.)

⁷³⁴ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 22 (ch. 11 "Yuan ren").

⁷³⁵ Zhang Taiyan literally calls them "the countries of bow and arrow (*yingong zhi guo*)." (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 22 (ch. 11 "Yuan ren").)

⁷³⁶ This must be a reference to Confucius's famous remark in the *Lunyu*: "The rude tribes of the east and north have their princes, and are not like the States of our great land which are without them (*Yi Di zhi you jun bu ru zhu Xia zhi wang ye*)." (Legge: 1972, vol. 1, p. 156 (Book III. Pâ Yih, Chap. V).)

⁷³⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 22 (ch. 11 "Yuan ren").

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 65–69 (ch. 29 "Ke di"). Originally published in *Qingyi bao* 15 (April 1st, 1899).

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 67 (ch. 29 "Ke di"); Liang Tao: 2004, p. 12.

⁷⁴⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 67 (ch. 29 "Ke di").

starting point for their gain in power. Liu took over the southern half, while Sun took over the Northern half. But in 219, Sun broke the ally and invaded Liu's part of the Jing province. In 221, Liu founded the Shu Han Dynasty and attacked Sun in order to reconquer the Jing province. However, he was defeated and did not dare to attack again. These problems in the relationship between Liu and Sun also effected the later relationship between the two dynasties. Zhuge Liang (181–234), Chancellor of Shu Han and regent while Liu's son and successor Liu Shan (207–271, reign time 223–263) was too young to take over the affairs of state, could never forget the hatred against Wu. Therefore, he could not form a powerful ally with it against their shared enemy, the Cao Wei Dynasty (220–265). In the end, Liu Shan and his Shu Han Dynasty were defeated by the Cao Wei armies.

The case of the Song was even more severe. Due to the disastrous defeat the Song had suffered from the Jurchen Jin in 1127, and which caused their exodus to the South they were blinded in their hatred against the Jurchen and wanted to take revenge on all costs. Accordingly Song Emperor Lizong (1205–1264, reign time 1224–1264) sought an ally with the Mongol Khagan Ögedei (1186–1241, reign time 1229–1241) in order to destroy the Jin dynasty in 1233. Although they achieved their aim and the Jurchen were defeated in 1234, the Song in the end were destroyed themselves by Ögedei's nephew, the Khagan and first Emperor of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368), Kubilai (also Shizu, 1215–1294, reign time 1260–1294). So, the Mongols prolonged the already long-lasting history of conquest and sovereignty of Non-Han over Han Chinese for another hundred years.⁷⁴¹

The lesson taught by these happenings is according to Zhang:

“Moreover, our generation also has brilliant guest emperors. [Those, who are] hammering the chest and biting the arm, regretting the past 250 years, should distant themselves from [seeing the guest emperors] as immature children (*wantong*) and make themselves familiar [seeing them] as indigenous rulers (*dizhu*). Taking the fact that the hundred families [= the Han Chinese people] have not succeeded in being assigned to posts is our own great disgrace, we should present wise mutual help to reform the old laws. This would make soldiers strong and tough, people courageous and determined, officials honest and upright and strong, in order to resist the white men's insults.”⁷⁴²

Already two years later, when revising the *Qishu*, Zhang deeply regrets his earlier approach. Together with another earlier essay, he puts “Ke di” in the very front of the *Qishu zhongdingben* even before the table of contents with the additional title “Kuang

⁷⁴¹ Ibid. (ch. 29 “Ke di”); Liang Tao: 2004, p. 12.

⁷⁴² Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 67–68 (ch. 29 “Ke di”); Liang Tao: 2004, p. 12–14.

miu (Correction of Mistakes),” adding a brief, but deeply contrite comment to the original text⁷⁴³:

“When I took refuge in 1898 and 1899, I travelled aside those, who honor the Qing [= Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao], and wrote [the essay] ‘Ke di (Guest Emperors).’ Acting with an improper heart, losing the roots and honoring [their] teachings, they flew from the actual situation so far! Moreover, even if a Han emperor is weak, one can rely that he is of the same succession, and that officials and people will die for him. The Manchus are a inferior ethnicity (*jian zu*). That people disrespect them is rooted in bones and marrow. They regard them as from the outside and even forget the foreign Europeans and Americans [about them].”⁷⁴⁴

Only two years after Zhang had supported a strong Manchu government and suggested the support of the Manchus by the Chinese as the only possibility how to repel the Imperialists, he completely withdraws from this prospect and instead argues for a Han Chinese government be it weak or strong. He had seen how the Manchu government dealt with the Boxers and he became convinced that this government would be uncivilized and “barbarian” and could not rule Han Chinese people any longer. Moreover, in this comment it becomes obvious one more time that in the *Qiushu zhongdingben* Zhang intends identity to be based on “bones and marrow.” In his opinion culture and civilization seem to be manifested in physical conditions – in case of East Asia, it does not make sense to base it on physical appearance as it was not easy to differentiate between i.e. Manchus and Han Chinese from outer criteria – or in modern words in genetics.

This again contradicts Wong Young-tsu’s and also Kauko Laitinen’s complete rejection of the idea that Zhang was a racist or racialist. Laitinen argues that Zhang’s concept of China would be based on culture and not on race as the essence of Chinese identity would lie in language, institutions and history. He claims that Zhang like Liu Shippei “inherited much from traditional Chinese culturalism, transmitting it to National Essence Movement.”⁷⁴⁵ Wong writes that Zhang “often defined race mainly in a historical sense”⁷⁴⁶ meaning that the Chinese nation was formed by a “historic race” – Wong’s translation of the term *lishi minzu* –, which would be based on genealogy.⁷⁴⁷ Marc André Matten has the same opinion and writes that Zhang tried to find a way how to separate the Chinese clearly from the other Asian people, even if this was not possible

⁷⁴³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 116–120. The other essay is “Fen zhen (Division of Powers)”. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 120–123.)

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 119–120; Liang Tao: 2004, p. 17–18.

⁷⁴⁵ Laitinen: 1990, p. 148.

⁷⁴⁶ Wong: 1989, p. 27.

⁷⁴⁷ Wong also argues that Zhang’s idea of race is profoundly different from Wang Fuzhi’s. (Ibid., p. 28. He especially refers to *Qiushu zhongdingben*, ch. 17 “Xu zhongxing shang” and the essay “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu.” (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170–186, esp. p. 170, 172; Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1903], vol. 4, p. 173. See also Liang Tao: 2004, p. 183, 189.)

on a phenotypic basis. So instead, Zhang would turn to the “criterion of the historical ethnicity (*lishi minzu*)”⁷⁴⁸ to make the distinction between the Chinese and other Asian people crystal-clear.

However, in my opinion Wong’s deduction that therefore Zhang’s idea of racial or ethnic identity would not be racist or racialist is wrong. Indeed, Zhang thinks that the Han Chinese ethnicity can be defined as a “historical ethnicity” – my translation of *lishi minzu* – being based on genealogies and written records of family successions.⁷⁴⁹ However, he does not agree that as soon as another ethnicity creates genealogies linking itself to the Han Chinese genealogical system, it can be considered automatically to be part of this “historical ethnicity” like the “people of the Wei, the Zhou, the Jin and the Yuan dynasty” tried: “To compare their usurpations by exploiting the opportunities with ‘return and change’ (*guihua*) – this classification is really not reasonable.”⁷⁵⁰

Zhang is against the uncritical integration of the Non-Han people, who in his opinion usurped power. Their adoption of Chinese family names and of the Chinese way of keeping genealogical books does not make them Chinese.⁷⁵¹ By basing his definition of ethnic belonging on history, Zhang does not automatically think of it as something permeable. Still, ethnic differentiation is based on certain characteristics, which are stable and define superiority in one ethnicity and inferiority in another. In his essay “Bo Kang Youwei lun geming shu (A letter refuting Kang Youwei’s essay on revolution),”⁷⁵² published in 1903 as an answer to one of Kang Youwei’s letters, in which Kang turns against anti-Manchuist revolution Zhang further writes about this topic:

“The present generation uses historical ethnicities (*lishi minzu*) and not natural ethnicities (*tianran minzu*) to differentiate the borders between racial ethnicities (*zhongzu*). Books say: ‘Natural (*tianran*)’ means that carrying out sacrifices and algae, offering on the altar and apes’ tails, the people (*meng*) of the six continents and the kinds (*zhong*) of the five colors – everything stems from one root! But why clamor about this?”⁷⁵³

This short passage reveals several things. First, Zhang names two different ways of defining races, historical and natural, criticizing and ridiculing the latter.

Liang Tao assumes that the method of historical differentiation would refer to the development of script and writing of records, by which some ethnicities set themselves apart from oral cultures. This interpretation would be in contrast to Liang Qichao’s historiographical understanding in his famous essay “Xin shixue,” published in 1902. Liang uses a similar term like Zhang to differentiate between “races with history (you

⁷⁴⁸ Matten: 2009, p. 68.

⁷⁴⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 172.

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid.; Liang Tao: 2004, p. 189–190.

⁷⁵¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 172; Zhang Taiyan: 1983 [1903], vol. 4, p. 173–174.

⁷⁵² Ibid., p. 173–184.

⁷⁵³ Ibid., p. 173.

lishi zhi renzhong) and races without history (*fei lishi zhi renzhong*).⁷⁵⁴ Liang does not link history with written records as Liang Tao suggests for Zhang “historical ethnicities,” but with the ability to “form relations (*zi jie*)” with others and consequently “monopolizing the stage of global history.”⁷⁵⁵ I think that Zhang intended a similar meaning like Liang’s and did not refer to “historical ethnicities” in the sense of ethnicities with a written or ‘recorded’ history in contrast to ethnicities without, that is, ‘prehistorical’ or ‘unhistorical’ ethnicities, but that he refers to ethnicities, who managed to become part of history by surviving and displacing others, that is, managed to “survive as the fittest.”

Zhang strongly objects the natural differentiation, because this would put not only most primitive creatures like “algae” and beastlike features like “apes’ tails” on a level with human beings and their practice rites and sacrifices, but also all different kinds of people would be treated as being on a level. Zhang asks “why clamor about this?” Why accentuating this disgraceful descent the Zhongxia people share with the various Non-Han “barbarians” like Kang Youwei does it so inappropriately?⁷⁵⁶

We have seen that in his texts written after the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) and until 1904, Zhang considers ethnic belonging to be rather stable. This is due to his general anti-Manchuist and, indeed, racist approach. However, only three years later, Zhang does not consider ethnicity to be a stable construct anymore. This is revealed when it comes to his very concrete ideas about assimilation in his famous essay “Zhonghua minguo jie” (1907). Zhang’s opinion seems to have changed considerably over these few years. He seems to have become more realistic about nation-building, the concrete challenge of a Chinese nation-state and the possible solution for ethnic problems directly linked with it.

Assimilation in Antiquity?

By analyzing what Zhang considers as assimilation, that is, which areas of life have to be changed to alter ethnical (and national) belonging, it will come to the fore how Zhang defines ethnical identity itself.

Wong thinks that Zhang assumes the Chinese absorbed alien races in antiquity. He bases this on a quotation from the essay “Xu zhongxing shang (Sequence on Racial Clans, first part)” from the *Qiushu zhongdingben* (1904).⁷⁵⁷ Wong’s translation, however, is doubtful in some tiny, but crucial details (in Italics):

⁷⁵⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12.

⁷⁵⁵ See above Chapter 1.3 (“Liang Qichao as a Nationalist Historian”).

⁷⁵⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1903], vol. 4, p. 173–174.

⁷⁵⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170–186.

“From Taipo’s [Da Hao]⁷⁵⁸ time on, [China] made repeated effort to build a culture, which would absorb alien races, set their lineages in order, and make them follow the civilized way (*bing bao shu zu shi zhong xing he qi yi zunlü wangdao zhe shu yi*). When the written language and the social customs became standardized, [the people], who had originally been different, became one at last (*chunhua*).”⁷⁵⁹

Wong claims that this definition of race, by which he translates *zu*, “differs significantly from the allegedly Confucian maxim that the ‘racial line between the barbarians and the Chinese should be strictly observed’⁷⁶⁰; it also differs from Wang Fuzhi’s definition of race in biological terms.”⁷⁶¹

My understanding of Zhang’s text differs from Wong’s translation with an important effect on how to interpret Zhang’s approach to assimilation. Moreover, to fully understand the context, it is necessary to read the sentences before as well. The passage then reads:

“Alas! In fact, when a state was established on the mainland it was ten thousand *li*⁷⁶² in length and breadth. Its inhabitants were many. Initially, it was therefore not [formed] by one ethnicity (*yi zu*). Since [the time of] Da Hao, efforts were put into politics, planning and organization. Furthermore, it [= the state] embraced other ethnicities and initiated the diverse family clans to mix (*bing bao shu zu shi zhong xing he qi*). It made them abide those, who followed the ‘way of the king,’ and it were plenty (*yi zun lü wang dao zhe shu yi*). Literature and script, politics and teaching became unified. Those, who were different at the beginning, improved (*chunhua*) in the end.”⁷⁶³

Foremost, this passage reveals that Zhang in principle thinks assimilation and change of ethnic belonging possible and that the way to bring it about is through civilization or “improvement (*chunhua*)” and unification in the four fields “literature and script, politics and teaching.”

I understand that Zhang mainly refers to the mythological nucleus first state. It was allegedly founded by Da Hao (traditional dates 2952–2837 or 2836 BC), which is another

⁷⁵⁸ Wong translates Da Hao as Taipo. Unfortunately, he does not give the characters of Taipo, so it is doubtful who he meant. He maybe refers to Wu Taibo (dates of life unknown), the eldest son of King Wu of Zhou (*Zhou Wu wang*) (d. 1043 BC). I could not find any other version translation Da Hao with Taibo.

That Da Hao must refer to Fuxi becomes obvious at the beginning of Zhang’s essay, where he writes about the Western origin of the Xia people. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170. See also Liang Tao: 2004, p. 184.)

⁷⁵⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 172 (ch. 17 “Xu zhongxing shang”). Translation see Wong: 1989, p. 28. See also Liang Tao: 2004, p. 189–190.

⁷⁶⁰ Xiao Gongquan: 1982, p. 677–678. Although this can be found repeatedly as a concept ascribed to Confucius, I could not find an original passage in the *Lunyu* or another Classic. Usually, this sentence is used with reference to the *Chunqiu* as being its essential thought. Liu Shipei also refers to this and calls to “clarify the borders of the Huaxia (*ming Hua Xia zhi fang*).” (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Xu,” p. 1, line 6–8.)

⁷⁶¹ Wong: 1989, p. 28, 28n17.

⁷⁶² The expression “ten thousand *li*” has symbolic character here. Around 1900, a *li* had no fixed length, but was considered to be between 550 and 650 meters. So, ten thousand *li* would be between 5.500 and 6.500 kilometers.

⁷⁶³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 172 (ch. 17 “Xu zhongxing shang”). See also Liang Tao: 2004, p. 189–190.

name for Fuxi. Fuxi was a mythological culture hero, who is said to have re-created the human kind with his twin sister Nüwa after the Great Flood and ruled it for more than one hundred years.⁷⁶⁴ In the *Qishu zhongdingben* (1904) and also in “Zhonghua minguo jie” (1907), however, Zhang accepts the “Western origin theory (*xilai shuo*).” He writes that according to the French Orientalist Terrien de Lacouperie⁷⁶⁵ (d. 1894) the Xia ethnicity of antiquity originally came from Chaldæa (*Jia’erteya*).⁷⁶⁶ Lacouperie had put forward this opinion in his famous book *Western origins of the early Chinese civilization from 2300 B.C. to 200 A. D.* (1894) where he argued that the ancient civilization in China must have been imported by people he calls Bak tribes coming from Babylonia and Chaldæa.⁷⁶⁷

He therefore omits the Great Flood but argues instead that in the time of Da Hao = Fuxi the Xia people arrived from Chaldæa. Until the time of Yu the Great (traditional dates 2200–2100 BC), another cultural hero, the Xia ethnicity had won all wars with aboriginal people, the Nine Li (*Jiu Li*) and the Three Miao (*San Miao*), and settled down.⁷⁶⁸

In my opinion, Zhang’s assumption of assimilation in the short passage about the time of Da Hao = Fuxi refers only to the limited time period of antiquity and to the limited territory of the ancient Xia state (traditional 2070–1600 BC).⁷⁶⁹ In this respect, his approach at this time reflects Liang Qichao’s view in two of his essays from 1906, where he argues that assimilative processes only took place in early antiquity, that is, before the unification under Qin Shi Huangdi.⁷⁷⁰ Like Liang, also Zhang thinks that only those people living inside these ancient borders had been improved and unified. Those outside the borders are still uncivilized “barbarians.”

In my opinion one cannot claim that Zhang’s general view “differs significantly from the Confucian maxim that the ‘racial line between the barbarians and the Chinese should be strictly observed’”⁷⁷¹ as Wong does. In his texts until 1904, Zhang emphasizes ethnical borders as being fixed and only allows them to have been penetrable in prehistoric times.

Regarding the second point of Wong that Zhang’s perception of race would differ from Wang Fuzhi’s biological based definition I also cannot fully agree. First because I think that Wang Fuzhi’s perception of race was not only based on a biological definition,

⁷⁶⁴ Huo/Ren et al. (ed.): 1994, p. 16.

⁷⁶⁵ Zhang transcribes Lacouperie as *Kepaili*. Today, he is generally transcribed as *Lakuboli*. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170 (ch. 17 “Xu zhongxing shang”); Liang Tao: 2004, p. 184.)

⁷⁶⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170 (ch. 17 “Xu zhongxing shang”). See also Zarrow: 2007, p. 33; Lacouperie: 1894, p. ix, xii, 3–7.

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁷⁶⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170 (ch. 17 “Xu zhongxing shang”).

⁷⁶⁹ Until the middle of the 20th century times the existence of the Xi Dynasty was hotly debated among historians. Then, archaeological findings indicated that the Xia Dynasty was created in mythological tales, but obviously existed around the Luo river (*Luohe*) in today’s Henan province.

⁷⁷⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 13; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_2], p. 23. See also above Chapter 1.3 (“Liang Qichao as a Nationalist Historian”).

⁷⁷¹ Wong: 1989, p. 28, 28n17.

but also that it was a geographical determined definition. Second because Zhang's perception of race and assimilation changed in the first half of the 1900s.⁷⁷²

Wang Fuzhi claimed that the Chinese people would have the duty to differentiate themselves from the Non-Han.⁷⁷³ Before 1904 Zhang's definition of ethnic belonging is not based on geography but on a certain idea of culture being a physical inherent condition, but like Wang Fuzhi he thinks that the borders between the Chinese and others should not be crossed. Also Liu Shipei bemoans in his texts from the 1900s that the Confucian aim of keeping the borders between ethnicities intact was not met in the past.⁷⁷⁴ Liu's, Wang's and Zhang's ideas on how ethnic differences are manifested differ, but their deductions are identical. They argue that the borders between ethnicities should stay intact and that a ethnic mixing would not be desirable, but they imply that it would nevertheless be possible.

Wang Fuzhi claims that geographical differences would cause ethnical differences, that is, different substance (*qi*), because the original substance or *Urmaterie* (*hongjun yi qi*) would have developed differently at different places, as well in terms of physical appearance as of customs.⁷⁷⁵ He does not accept the possibility of change or assimilation. If one stems from people from a certain region, one will always be bound to that regions, because "if the environment is not fitting anymore, nature denies its support, the own nature is not adapted to the conditions anymore and life is in danger."⁷⁷⁶

This corresponds with Liu Shipei's idea of racial belonging as being fixed and also with Zhang's opinion. In his *Qiushu* essays from 1900 and 1904 Zhang does not think it possible that assimilation can happen in his present-day. In "Yuanren," he writes:

"The difference between people (*min*) and beasts (*shou*) can be seen at a certain point. Not by outer appearance, not by language, not by homeland, not by social position, not by ordinances and commands. If a ethnicity's character is uncivilized (*zhongxing fei wen*), one cannot call it human (*bu yue ren*) in any case. If a ethnicity's character is civilized (*wen*), even if one is dismembered for one's crimes, still one is human."⁷⁷⁷

⁷⁷² See passages from Wang Fuzhi translated by Ernstjoachim Vierheller. (Vierheller: 1968, p. 30–31.) See also above chapter 1.3 "Liang Qichao as a Nationalist Historian."

⁷⁷³ Vierheller: 1968, p. 27–28.

⁷⁷⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 2, line 19–22; Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], "Xu," p. 1, line 6–8.

⁷⁷⁵ Vierheller: 1968, p. 30. Vierheller cites from *Du tongjian lun: Song lun* (*On reading the Comprehensive Mirror: On the History of the Song*). Chinese original text see Vierheller: 1968, "Anhang," C3, p. II.

⁷⁷⁶ Citation from *Du tongjian lun: Song lun*, translated by Ernstjoachim Vierheller. (Ibid., p. 31; Chinese original text see Ibid., "Anhang," C6, p. III.)

⁷⁷⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 22 (ch. 11 "Yuan ren").

Charlotte Furth translates "jiu chao" as "the Chinese," so that the whole last part runs: "If the 'kind' do not have a cultured nature, the Chinese do not call them human (*ren*). If the 'kind' do have a cultured nature, though they are dismembered for their crimes, still they are human." (Furth: 1976, p. 134. See also Laitinen: 1990, p. 72.)

Instead of "jiu chao," Liang Tao uses a "jiu xu" and explains that the whole sentence "jiu xu bu yue ren" would mean: "No matter what, one cannot regard them as humans." (Liang Tao: 2004, p. 174n65.)

Here, Zhang obviously considers racial belonging to be inherent in a certain condition of a race's character sounding quite fixed. Especially regarding conquest dynasties, or "usurpers (*jiandao*)," ⁷⁷⁸ Zhang has deep doubts about the possibility of their assimilation throughout both early *Qiushu* editions (1900 and 1904). This is due to his belief that those, who assimilate others, must be in the superior position – quite in line with modern anthropological theories. ⁷⁷⁹ Therefore, he writes regarding the Manchus:

“Now, these Manchus (*Manzhouzhe*), did they ‘return and change’ into Han people (*Hanren*)? [Or] did they oppress and command the Han people? [...] If we speak of becoming the same ethnicity (*tong zhong*), then not the Manchu people (*Manren*) have become like the Han ethnicity (*Hanzhong*), but rather the Han people (*Hanren*) have become like the Manchu ethnicity (*Manzhong*).” ⁷⁸⁰

In his famous text “*Zhonghua minguo jie*” from 1907, however, Zhang's idea of ethnic identity have changed. He now regards it as being unstable and changeable. It is also in this text that Zhang for the first time thinks about processes of assimilation in a more academic way, trying to find methods, which are applicable to the case in China. Zhang writes that it is possible and even desirable from a nationalist point of view to change ethnic identity with cultural and educational methods. He emphasizes that assimilation can only happen, when the object of it would be in the politically inferior position. This is the basis of his strategy for integrating the Three Peripheral Divisions by assimilation.

When it comes to concrete methods how to assimilate the Tibetans, the Mongols and the Turkish Muslim people in the “*Zhonghua minguo jie*” (1907), Zhang starts by analyzing their actual status with regard to three main areas: first, “language and script (*yanyu wenzi*),” second, “living and eating habits and crafts (*jushi zhiye*),” and third, “legal systems and obedience to decrees (*falü fuling*).” In these areas he requires the assimilation of Tibet, Mongolia and the Turkish Muslim regions as a precondition in order to become part of the Chinese nation-state. Therefore, one can conclude that Zhang considers these three main areas of life as definitive for ethnical belonging. If they are changed, ethnical belonging is changed as well.

With regard to Zhang's estimation of assimilation in general in his “*Zhonghua minguo jie*” is his critique of Yang's *Jintiezhuyi shuo* and of the New Text School in general. He cites a passage from Yang's essay, where Yang presents his culturalist belief of Chinese identity being solely based on “rites and teaching (*li jiao*).” ⁷⁸¹ Yang argues that as soon as one adapts these two achievements, one is assimilated and becomes part of China:

⁷⁷⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 172 (ch. 17 “*Xu zhongxing shang*”).

⁷⁷⁹ Redfield/Linton/Herskovits: 1935; article on “acculturation,” in: *Encyclopædia Britannica*: 1963, vol. 1, p. 83–84; article on “acculturation,” in: Barfield (ed.): 1997, p. 1; Gordon: 1954, 1961, 1975.

⁷⁸⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1903], p. 174, line 4–7.

⁷⁸¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 253. Original source see Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 374.

“Therefore, according to the principle of the *Chunqiu*, it did not matter if it concerned Lu and Wei, which had the same surname [as the house of Zhou], Song and Qi, which had different surnames⁷⁸², or Chu and Yue, which had no surnames at all – China could be taken by Yi and Di (barbarians) (*Zhongguo keyi tui wei Yi Di*) and Yi and Di (barbarians) could become [part of] China (*Yi Di keyi jin wei Zhongguo*). Rites and teachings (*lijiao*) were the only criterion [for Chineseness], and no distinction was made between close and remote kinship. Several thousand years have passed since then and several thousands of different races (*renzhong*) have intermixed (*hunza*), but the country is still called ‘Zhonghua’ as before.”⁷⁸³

Zhang does not accept Yang’s rather convenient culturalist approach, which was popular also among other nationalist reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. Zhang is not persuaded so easily and puts Yang’s theses to the test. He criticizes the *Jintiezhuyi shuo* in three respects. With regard to the topic in this dissertation the second critique is especially important. Zhang criticizes the

“abuse of the *Chunqiu* in order to slander historical facts.⁷⁸⁴ This [way of] argumentation originated with Liu Fenglu⁷⁸⁵ et consortes, who for generations have served the Manchus with the intention of bolstering the position of these caitiff chieftains (*lu qiu*)⁷⁸⁶ [= the Manchus]. They have made extensive use of the *Gongyang zhuan* in order to expound on various omens, yet this was not part of the old *Gongyang* theories. During the Han and the preceding period, China (*Zhongguo*) did not equal the various ethnicities of Man, Min, He and Dí with humans (*bubi yu ren*), and therefore there is no example of Yi and Dí (barbarians) being referred to as humans (*ren*). [...]

The Dí could not be humanized (*bu ke ren*), yet the Xing and Qi men humanized them (*Xingren Qiren ren zhi*) and thus demeaned themselves to the same level as the Dí.⁷⁸⁷ [That this story is recorded in the *Chunqiu*,] is not letting the Dí in as humans (*fei jin Diren*), but is a degradation the Xing and Qi men.”⁷⁸⁸

Zhang criticized the New Text scholars’ use – in his opinion misuse – of the *Chunqiu* and also of the *Chunqiu* commentary, which was most important for them, the *Gongyang*

⁷⁸² The family name of the rulers of the states of Lu and Wei was the same as that of the rulers of the Zhou dynasty, that is, Ji. In contrast to that, the family name of Song was Zi and that of Qi was Jiang.

⁷⁸³ Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 374; Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 18–19.

⁷⁸⁴ This is similar to Liang Qichao, who criticized in 1897 that some would not understand the *Chunqiu* and thus draw wrong conclusions (about the Three Ages). He refers to the Old Text scholars. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 49, line 11–12.)

⁷⁸⁵ Liu Fenglu (1776–1829) was a Qing official. He was the founder of the Changzhou school who initiated the revival of the New Text school. His disciples were the famous literati Gong Zizhen (1792–1841) and Wei Yuan (1794–1857).

⁷⁸⁶ The defaming term “caitiff (*lu*)” has been used for Northern Non-Han people since Song times, i.e. in travel diaries by Song envoys. (Hargett: 1984.)

⁷⁸⁷ This is a reference to two passages in the *Chunqiu*, where Dí men (*Diren*) are mentioned in the connection with the Xing and Qi people. (Legge: 1972, vol. 5, p. 173–4, 175 (Book V. Duke He, Eighteenth year and Twentieth Year).)

⁷⁸⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 254. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 20–21.

zhuan. These New Text scholars would try to find evidence in the *Gongyang zhuan* that barbarians in antiquity became accepted parts of the humans, that is, that Non-Han ethnicities became part of the Han ethnicity. Their argument runs that in the *Gongyang zhuan* members of the Dí tribe were called “humans (*ren*)” by the Xing and Qi men. However, whereas the New Text scholars interpreted this as the acceptance of some Dí people as humans, Zhang writes that this would merely show that the Xing and Qi men were degraded. In Zhang’s opinion the Dí never could become human.

Zhang concludes that also in ancient times ethnic-cultural borders were not easily passed, just as today when people would hate those, who passed these borders, i.e. those, who defected to the Manchus like Fan Wencheng⁷⁸⁹ (1597–1666), Hong Chengchou⁷⁹⁰ (1593–1665), Li Guangdi⁷⁹¹ (1642–1718) and Zeng Guofan⁷⁹² (1811–1872).⁷⁹³

Concluding his critique Zhang brings together his dislike of the New Text scholars’ abuse of the *Chunqiu* and their conclusions for present-day politics:

“In the *Chunqiu*, there are [records] of various degraded Xia (*bian zhu Xia*), who became like (*tong*) Yi and Dí (barbarians), but there are no [records] of entering Yi and Dí (barbarians) who became like the various Xia. [...] With regard to this, how could there be a case for the Manchus entering [into the Han Chinese ethnicity]? Those [Han Chinese], who have been appointed to the highest official ranks or bear the title ‘brave warrior (*batulu*)’⁷⁹⁴ should be dismissed as Yi and Dí (barbarians)!”⁷⁹⁵

The first two sentences of Zhang’s argument are in fact a reversion of the famous statement by Mencius (*Mengzi*), which was especially popular among New Text scholars and has been mentioned before⁷⁹⁶: “I have heard of men using the doctrines of our great land to change Yi (barbarians), but I have never yet heard of any being changed by Yi (barbarians).”⁷⁹⁷

The structure of Zhang’s sentence reflects that of Mencius but turns its meaning to the opposite:

Mencius:

吾聞 用夏 變 夷者， 未聞 變於 夷者也。

⁷⁸⁹ Han Chinese scholar, who was captured by the Manchus and became the adviser of the Manchu Khan Nurhaci (Chinese: Nu’erhachi, 1559–1626, reign time 1616–1626), who founded the Later Jin (*Hou Jin*) Dynasty (1616–1636), the forerunner of the Qing Dynasty.

⁷⁹⁰ Han Chinese general, who was captured by the Manchus and later enlisted in the Manchu Banners.

⁷⁹¹ Han Chinese statesman and scholar. He conquered Taiwan for the Qing.

⁷⁹² Han Chinese Qing general and politician. He defeated Taiping rebellion, which was threatening the Qing Empire.

⁷⁹³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 254. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 22–23.

⁷⁹⁴ This is a Manchu title, in Manchu *baturu*, bestowed during Qing times for military merits.

⁷⁹⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 255. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 24.

⁷⁹⁶ See i.e. Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 6. See also above Chapter 1.3 (“Using the Xia to Change the Yi’ and the Three Ages”).

⁷⁹⁷ Legge: 1972, vol. 2, p. 253–254 (Book III. Tâng Wân Kung, Part I, Chap. IV).

Zhang:

蓋春秋有 貶諸夏 以同 夷狄者， 未有 進 夷狄以同諸夏者。

Zhang is confronting the New Text scholars and their motto of “using the Xia to change the Yi” with events describes in the *Chunqiu*. He cannot accept the idea that the motto has been applied in antiquity. On the contrary: according to him the *Chunqiu* tells the story of how fast one could be degraded as a “barbarian” if one behaved like one, but that a change from “barbarian” to Xia was not possible. Therefore, it would be also clear that the idea of sinicization implied in the motto “using the Xia to change the Yi” cannot be applied easily today. Also the popular opinion would make Han Chinese, who defected to the Manchus, “barbarians.”⁷⁹⁸ Zhang claims that not the Manchus were changed by using Han Chinese customs, but Han Chinese were degraded to “barbarians” when they fraternized with them.

Zhang’s third critique with regard to the *Jintiezhuyi shuo* is that Yang Du would “disregards genealogies and veritable records” and therefore would come to the wrong conclusion that “the intermixed foreign ethnicities (*hunxiao shuzu*) are of countless kinds” and would still be called Zhonghua.⁷⁹⁹ Zhang criticizes Yang’s airy acceptance of every ethnicity into the Han Chinese Self, which just manages to construct a genealogy linked with the Chinese genealogies. He argues that real assimilation would only be possible under the precondition that the two ethnicities would belong to the same greater groups defined by lines of descent:

“So, one can speak of one racial ethnicity (*yi zhongzu*), even if one is not entirely of the same quality with regard to the blood lineage (*xuetong*). But if there is a great resemblance, then one blood lineage constitutes one group. This is why cultural likeness emerges from resemblance of blood lineage. Moreover, because of that other ethnicities accept our pacification and control, and consequently we achieve to change (*zhuan yi*) and absorb (*xishou*) them. But if two blood lineages are standing opposed to each other there is no possibility even if we want to assimilate (*tonghua*) them.”⁸⁰⁰

What Zhang means by two ethnicities being “opposed to each other” becomes clear when he writes about the concrete question of the Manchus’ assimilation:

⁷⁹⁸ In poem published in *Fubao* 5 (Oct. 12th, 1906), “Zhu Man ge (An Eulogy on Expelling the Manchus)” (1906), Zhang also condemns the powerful Chinese general Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) who played a crucial role in the abolition of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), the latter being interpreted by Zhang Taiyan as a earnest attempt to restore Chinese rule: “Zeng Guofan came [to help the Manchus] and therefore became a Han traitor; The Hong family [= Hong Xiuquan’s family] was killed, the Han households perished; And as ever, monkeys and apes were emperors and kings.” (Zhang Taiyai: 1979 [1906].)

⁷⁹⁹ Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 374; Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 253. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 19.

⁸⁰⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 255. (Cassel translates the passage differently. See Cassel: 1997, p. 24–25.)

“So, do we only have to guard the empty casting mould of the Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*) and fill its emptiness with other people? Some people say: ‘If that is the case, then the Manchu people (*Manzhouren*), being in the absolute minority, would have slowly assimilated to us. So why can they not be the same as China (*Zhongguo*)?’ My answer is: It is only possible to allow other ethnicities’ (*yi zu*) assimilation if sovereignty (*zhuti*) is in our hands; that would be sufficient for absorbing (*xishou*) them. The assimilation of the Manchus (*Manzhou*) has not been achieved by our pacifying and governing, but by them having overthrown our rule and their [subsequent] suppression of us.”⁸⁰¹

An important precondition for assimilation comes to the fore: those, who shall be assimilated, have to be under the political power of the assimilators. It is remarkable, however, that Zhang writes that the Manchus would have achieved assimilation by “having overthrown our rule.” So, are they or are they not assimilated? Zhang tries to clarify this by a *simile*:

“These two things [= being assimilated as subjects or being assimilate as rulers] cannot be compared. It is similar to the difference between a bridegroom and an rapist (*kou*)⁸⁰². According to the way of a bridegroom, [he] leads the woman home to his own family clan (*wu zu*), and this woman will therefore assimilate to his own family clan. According to the way of an rapist, [he] occupies our bedroom (*qin gong*) and penetrates our bed and in this way he cannot avoid to assimilate with us, but it is self-evident that we will hate him.”⁸⁰³

Actually, his *simile* does not entirely make sense. Why should the invader not be able to avoid assimilation. But anyway, even if the invader assimilates, he will not assimilate in a way that makes him acceptable as a true part of the “family clan (*zu*),” but only more detestable. Zhang concludes that only

“if we beat the enemy and win a victory so that the Manchu Khan leaves Wanping⁸⁰⁴ in order to go to the Huanglong⁸⁰⁵ prefecture, then we could [...] regard them as people of our race (*zhongren*), letting them naturally come over to us and then accepting them.”⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 255. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 25.

⁸⁰² The usual meaning of *kou* is invader, but here “rapist” makes much more sense. Also when Wong refers to this text, he writes that Zhang accuses the Manchus of having “raped” rather than ‘wedded’ the Chinese.” (Wong: 1989, p. 62.)

⁸⁰³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 255–256. Although Cassel’s translation was taken as a starting point, my translation here differs from his in some points. (Cassel: 1997, p. 25.)

⁸⁰⁴ Wanping is a fortress in Beijing, which was build in Ming times and was used as a military quarter during Qing times.

⁸⁰⁵ Huanglong was a prefecture established by the Khitan in 926 in today’s Jilin province by changing the name of the original Parhae (*Bohai*) prefecture. Its name was changed again in Jin times.

⁸⁰⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 25–26.

For present-day China this means that only when the Manchu rule has been shaken off and they have moreover returned to the Northeast, they can be truly assimilated and become a part of the Republic of China. Zhang gives another *simile*:

“If you are sick and [want to] eat porridge, you have to vomit before you can eat. If you eat before you have vomited, then you will not be able to swallow the food because you feel ill, and may even cause the disease to worsen.”⁸⁰⁷

The priority is to first “vomit” the Manchus before actually “swallowing” them again. But before they can be “eaten,” that is absorbed they have to be changed. After having shown the particular political situation Zhang considers to be general preconditions for assimilation, let us turn to the particular areas and methods of assimilation.

Areas and Methods of Assimilation

Liang Qichao thinks “language, script and tradition (*yuyan wenzi fengsu*)” to be of utmost importance when it comes to ethnic identity.⁸⁰⁸ Also Zhang selects three main aspects of life where change has to happen if true assimilation shall be achieved:

1. “Language and script (*yanyu wenzi*)”
2. “Living and eating habits and crafts (*jushi zhiye*)”
3. “Legal system and obedience to decrees (*falü fuling*)”

Zhang’s first aspect corresponds with Liang’s. However, the other two differ from Liang’s. Especially Zhang’s emphasis on legal systems and the question in how far people abide by them reflects his strong reference to present-day political needs on a very pragmatic level in contrast to Liang, whose aspect “tradition” remain rather aloof and imprecise. Also with respect to living and eating habits Zhang aims to find out present-day needs how to fit the Three Peripheral Divisions into a Republic of China. Consequently, Zhang analyses the Three Peripheral Divisions and their inhabitants with respect to these three aspects. He comes to the stylistically convenient conclusion that for every Division there would be one certain difficulty, assigning one of the three aspects to each of the three Divisions:

Language and script:

⁸⁰⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 256. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 26.

⁸⁰⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 14–15. Although he also mentions other conditions like place, blood relation, physical appearance, religion and way of living, they are not equally important for him and he does not base his argumentation on other criteria than actually language and script. (Ibid., p. 76, line 2–4; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 4, line 12–p. 5, line 1.)

“When it comes to language and script, there are many of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*) in **Xinjiang**, and as the Turkish Muslim peoples are more intelligent than the Mongols, so education (*jiao*) will penetrate the region easily. The **Mongolians** are stupid (*zhuanyu*), but they have traded with the Han people (*Hanren*) for a long time and have gradually learnt to imitate the sounds of our language. Only the **Tibetans** are estranged from us and have learnt to use the Brahmin writing. As they have their own civilized studies, and have not been influenced by others, their language may conflict with the Chinese language.

So as far as **linguistic assimilation** is concerned, Tibet will require most of our efforts.”⁸⁰⁹

Living and eating habits and crafts:

“When it comes to living and eating habits and crafts, the **Turkish Muslim people** till the soil, and their customs do not differ a great deal from the customs of the Han. They live in mansions and raise walls around their cities. The terrain in **Tibet** is mountainous and difficult to tame, and the geography does not permit extensive pasture development, therefore most people live on what they can get from the soil. [...] Although their wooden fortifications are rustic, they are better than tents. As for **Mongolia** [...] nature has only allowed them grazing lands, and they have no other choice than to raise tents for shelter. [...]

Therefore, as far as **assimilation in terms of living, eating and crafts** are concerned, Mongolia will require most of our efforts.”⁸¹⁰

Legal systems and obedience to decrees:

“When it comes to the legal systems and the obedience to imperial decrees [...] Han officials will be able to administer **Tibet** because the Qing government has been sending several officials to assist in administration there. **Mongolia** has its own tribal chiefs, and their laws are very different from those of the Central Land (*Zhongtu*). But as those Mongolian cities north of the Great Wall have ‘returned and changed (*gui hua*)’ [= submitted and naturalized], legal cases could be settled by the Sub-prefectural Magistrate’s office [...]. Only the **Turkish Muslim peoples** were truly conquered and bullied by the Manchus. [...] and harbor the deepest hatred towards the Manchus. This hatred is manifested in their attitude towards the rule of Han officials. [...]

Therefore, as far as **assimilation in terms of legal systems and obedience of decrees** are concerned, the Turkish Muslim people require most of our efforts.”⁸¹¹

In all three cases, certain weaknesses of Zhang’s argumentation come to the fore. It seems as if by all means he wants to make a stylistically well-balanced assignment: the

⁸⁰⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 29.

⁸¹⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 29.

⁸¹¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 29–30.

Three Divisions match with the three areas. Thus every Division causes problems in one of the three areas. So he ends up by assigning the difficulty of language to the Tibetans, that of living and eating habits to the Mongols and that of legal systems to the Turkish Muslims. However, as tempting his line of argument sounds on a superficial glance, the more far-fetched it becomes on closer reading. Why would it be more difficult to convince the Tibetans than to convince the Turkish Muslims to learn Chinese? Zhang argues that the Tibetans would have their own “civilized studies” and moreover would be influenced by “others,” probably referring to Brahmic script from, which the Tibetan script stems. In the case of the Turkish Muslims and the Mongols Zhang does not mention at all that both also had their distinct ways of writing, the Uyghur Arabic alphabet and the classical Mongolian script, derived from the Uyghur alphabet.⁸¹² Furthermore, the Turkish Muslims and also the Mongols clearly also had “civilized studies” and were influenced by Central Asia at least as much as Tibet was influenced by South Asia if not even more.

The same critique can be applied to living and eating habits, as not only the Mongol way of living, but also that of the Tibetans and the Turkish Muslims differed profoundly from Chinese habits (and among themselves) as much as the geographical conditions in these areas. Zhang ignores the nomadic traditions of many inhabitants of the Tibetan plateau, which resemble much more Mongolian ways of living than sedentary Chinese ones, and he also ignores the oasis agriculture of Xinjiang, which differed profoundly from East Asian farming.⁸¹³

Zhang’s last line of argumentation regarding legal systems and obedience to the law is also over-enthusiastic when it comes to Tibet and Mongolia, wiping away all possible problems from these regions and instead only turning to the problem of loyalty in the Turkish Muslim regions. But even the Turkish Muslims’ “hatred [...] towards the rule of Han officials”⁸¹⁴ could be turned into peace, “when they have vented their anger.”⁸¹⁵ He ignores that also in Tibet the Manchus did not have an easy stand and had been despised since long because their interference in Tibetan affairs through appointed officials, who were stationed in Lhasa, i.e. the choices of new important Lamas, was not appreciated.⁸¹⁶ Zhang’s lapidary statement that the Tibetans would easily accept Chinese

⁸¹² Since the 13th century, the Mongols had scripts to put their language(s) into writing. Also the Turkish and Chinese Muslim inhabitants of Xinjiang used scripts. The Chinese Muslim naturally used Chinese, but could often also read religious texts in Arabic, Persian and Turkish. The Turkish Muslims also could read Arabic and Persian, and since the 16th century used an alphabet based on Arabic for their own language(s). Before, there had been a Uyghur alphabet in use since the 8th century.

⁸¹³ Moreover, the way of “tilling the soil” among the Han also differed deeply depending on region, the most important difference being that between deepwater rice cultivation in the tropical South and arable farming in the temperate North.

⁸¹⁴ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. (Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 30.)

⁸¹⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 261. (Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 38.)

⁸¹⁶ For the first seven year after Tibet was conquered from the Qing in 1720, Tibet remained relatively independent. But in 1727, the Qing court permanently stationed two officials, in Tibetan called *amban*, in Lhasa to influence politics. After 1792, the Qing used a conflict between Tibet and Nepal to enlarge Qing power in Tibet and ordered that the two *ambans* were positioned above the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, and,

officials because the Qing officials had already assisted Tibet in its administration just ignores the *de facto* situation in Tibet. Only in case of the Mongols it is true that the character of their relationship with the Manchus was based on a more equal footing than it was the case with the Tibetans and the Turkish Muslims. This can be made out by many facts, most importantly the full incorporation of the Mongols into the Manchu banner system with all its privileges (and duties) and the reservation of the highest official posts for Manchus and Mongols only.⁸¹⁷ However, exactly because of this fast connection the Mongols' loyalty lied with the Manchus, and it was unlikely that this loyalty could easily be switched for a nationalist sentiment for a Chinese nation-state.

Strategies of Assimilation

Liang Qichao shows in his texts that he considers the adoption of the Chinese language and script as the most revealing sign of assimilation.⁸¹⁸ Yang Du goes even further and only requires that the Non-Han *understand* Chinese in order to become full members of a Chinese nation-state in the *Jintiezhuyi shuo*:

“The only precondition for allowing the Mongols, Turkish Muslims and Tibetans to vote and be elected, should be that they understand the Chinese language (*bi yi tong Zhongguo yu*).”⁸¹⁹

But Zhang demands more than just the ability to understand Chinese. He thinks that the adoption of the Chinese language alone is not enough:

“Those, who understand the Chinese language, have admittedly improved (*chunhua*) somewhat, but how could they know more than one or two things about the nature of China's society (*Zhongguo shehui*)? [...] Therefore, to simply assimilate (*tonghua*) [with regard to] language is not sufficient to participate in state politics. If we are forced to give them the right to vote then we could allow the Three Peripheral Divisions to send representatives to discuss the affairs of their own tribes, whereas they should not be consulted on the big issues of managing the State. Then no harm will be done.”⁸²⁰

what was considered to be even worse, they introduced a new method to choose the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama and other high lamas, the method of the “Golden Urn (*Jinping cheqian*).” Now, the *ambans* had to draw one from mostly three names from an urn.

⁸¹⁷ Crossley: 1997, p. 85–86, 97–98; Rawski: 1998, p. 296.

⁸¹⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 14–15, p. 76, line 2–4; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2, line 16; p. 4, line 12–p. 5, line 1.

⁸¹⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258. Original sources see Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 369–370. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 31.

⁸²⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 31.

So, besides a linguistic assimilation Zhang requires other changes to allow the Non-Han inhabitants of the Three Divisions full citizenship with all its rights and duties. He has very concrete ideas how to achieve these changes:

“If we wish to assimilate them all we have to do is to establish offices, encourage learning, and devote special attention to agriculture. Laws should, however, not be implemented at once, but only after a period of twenty years, by which time we will be able to regard them as equal to the Inner Regions (*neidi*).”⁸²¹

But “as long as they have not improved (*chunhua*), there is no question of allowing them to vote.”⁸²² Only when the people of the Three Divisions have truly assimilated, they can be entitled to “vote and express ideas.”⁸²³ However, Zhang does “not mean that before they are assimilated, we can portion them some territory and kill those, who cross the border.”⁸²⁴

Although it is obvious throughout Zhang’s essay that he considers the Turkish Muslims, Tibetans and especially the Mongols of not quite up to the level of the Han Chinese people, he regards them being capable to achieve a certain level in approximately twenty years. They could become full citizens of a Chinese nation-state, if they are provided with the correct support in the areas of politics, education, law and agriculture. What makes him different from other political thinkers, who write about the issue of the inclusion of Non-Han people into the nation-state is that to a certain degree he tries to understand the situation of the Non-Han people from their point of view especially in case of the Turkish Muslims. However, on the point of only giving full citizenship to people, who have completely assimilated in his terms Zhang is not only quite unyielding, but in contrast to Liang Qichao and Yang Du has also a thought-out strategy how to proceed:

“As long as they [the Manchus and people in the Three Peripheral Divisions] have not assimilated, the best thing would be to divide them into three provinces, each one subject to a Governor-general Office [...] and under him there should be Executive Officials. The people could also elect good and virtuous elders to serve under the Governor-general to discuss the laws of their tribe and regulate financial and fiscal affairs. [...] If we help in promoting agriculture, encouraging their skills, teaching them the language, instructing them in the written language, they could, after a period of twenty years, be elected to the central parliament.”⁸²⁵

⁸²¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 30.

⁸²² Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 30.

⁸²³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 30.

⁸²⁴ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 30.

⁸²⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 260. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 36.

Concerning fears that the people in the Three Peripheral Divisions will “rise up and fight for independence,”⁸²⁶ Zhang merely states that

“although the combined area of the Three Peripheral Divisions is wider than the Land of the Han (*Hantu*), the Muslim areas [region] and Tibet make up only a third of the Land of the Han and only Mongolia may be seen as being of equal size. But having said this, one should add that the Mongols have been divided between different princes for a long time. [...] The Tibetans are not an obstacle and the Mongolians are easy to tame (*yi xun*).”⁸²⁷

In Zhang’s opinion there is no danger from the fact that the Three Peripheral Divisions altogether are larger than the Han Chinese inhabited regions, as he does not take into account that they could ally against the Han Chinese. The two more “dangerous” Divisions, Tibet and Xinjiang, are much smaller than Han China. And as for Mongolia he expects no danger from there because the Mongols are “tamable,” a term reflecting his idea of the Mongols’ beastlike character.

Now one important question remains: if and how does Zhang intend to include the last of the four large Non-Han ethnicities in the Qing Empire – the Manchus themselves!

Zhang’s Anti-Manchuism

The Manchus are not included in Zhang’s concrete plans for the assimilation of the Non-Han regions in his essay “Zhonghua minguo jie” (1907). Still, large parts of the essay deal with the Manchus.⁸²⁸ This is due to the fact that the Manchus were in a special position being the overlords in the Qing Empire and therefore of many other ethnicities, among them the Han, the Mongols, the Tibetans and the Turkish Muslims. Regarding the question what to do with the Manchus when a Chinese nation-state would be founded, Liang Qichao asked in 1903:

“Do we [first] have to separate from the Manchus, and only afterwards can found a state? Or can we intermingle with the Manchus and all those people like the Mongols, the Miao, the Turkish Muslims and the Tibetans, and still can found a state?”⁸²⁹

In the answer to this question, which was crucial for nationalist thinkers Liang Qichao introduces his influential concept of “large nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi*),”⁸³⁰ and states confidentially that only on the basis of “large nationalism” a Chinese nation-state could

⁸²⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 260. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 37.

⁸²⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 260. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 37.

⁸²⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258–260. See also Cassel: 1997, p. 31–36.

⁸²⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, line 11–12.

⁸³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 75, line 15–16.

face the challenges Imperialism brought about, equalizing stability and power of a nation-state with its sheer number of inhabitants.⁸³¹ For Liang it is clear that in this respect the Manchus do not differ from the other ethnicities, but “have to be melted in and enter into the same melting furnace”⁸³² in order to assimilate them entirely like the other Non-Han people.

Zhang does not at all agree with Liang’s approach. In his opinion the Manchus would remain to differ from the other Non-Han even after a revolution. In the essay “Zhonghua minguo jie” it is his main aim to affront the Manchus and to give reasons why they in contrast to the Three Peripheral Divisions are definitely not to be included in the Republic of China.

The first reason is that Zhang thinks the Manchus incapable to earn their own living, because they would not know anything of the three “professions of the common people as farmers, workers and merchants,”⁸³³ so how could they be “qualified to be parliamentary representatives?”⁸³⁴ And he goes on:

“If you do not work yourself, but rely on the production of other people and if you do not pay taxes but tell other people to pay land tax and other levies, then you should not have any rights since you are not familiar with these realities. If these Manchus want to have the right of representation, they had better wait till after the revolution, when their emoluments paid in rice are abolished and they are forced to labor in the fields. Only then can they assimilate with the Han and participate in China’s politics.”⁸³⁵

He repeats several times how ignorant the Manchus are in his eyes, because they would not only know nothing about how to earn a livelihood, but moreover they would understand nothing about state affairs.⁸³⁶

Based on the presumption of a complete lingual assimilation of the Manchus, Yang Du claims in contrast to Zhang that “the cultural level of the Manchus is much higher than that of the Three Peripheral Divisions.”⁸³⁷ But Zhang does not accept this argument and writes:

⁸³¹ Ibid., p. 76, line 7–8.

⁸³² Ibid., p. 76, line 4–5.

⁸³³ Farming, working and merchandising have already been given as the three professions of the “common people (*zhongren*)” in the *Xunzi*, where it is written that “the ordinary mass of humanity should be artisans, farmers, merchants, and traders.” It can also be found in the *Shiji*. (*Xunzi*: 1994, vol. 2, p. 83 (Book 8. The Teachings of the Ru, 12. The Grade of Men); *Shiji*, ch. 129, p. 3271–3272.)

⁸³⁴ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 259. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 32–33.

⁸³⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 259. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 32–33.

⁸³⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258–259. Translation see Cassel: 1997, p. 31–34.

⁸³⁷ Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 368; cited in Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258. Cassel translates that the cultural level of the Manchus “is the highest in the Three Peripheral Divisions.” (Cassel: 1997, p. 32.)

Yang Du moreover writes that as a result of the Manchus’ two hundred years of conquest over the Han, their “language, writing became completely like that of the Han, therefore their culture also is nearly on the same level as that of the Han people, and is surpasses that of the Mongols, Turkish Muslims and Tibetans by far.” (Yang Du: 1986 [1905], p. 368.)

“In terms of China’s language and script, the Manchus have assimilated, but not in terms of profession. In the Three Peripheral Divisions, the Turkish Muslims and the Tibetans are pursuing agriculture and the Mongols are tending pastures. The Manchus are not familiar with these professions, but are what we call indolent (*duo*) people.”⁸³⁸

In contrast to the strategies of assimilation Zhang proposes with regard to the people of the Three Peripheral Divisions, he does not mention anything like that regarding the Manchus in his “Zhonghua minguo jie.” Because of their special position in politics, they also take a special position in Zhang’s thinking and are not automatically considered to assimilate and become part of the nation-state like other Non-Han people.⁸³⁹

Is Zhang Taiyan’s Anti-Manchuism a Kind of Racism?

Zhang’s early anti-Manchuism is so to speak legendary. This made several historians think it their vocation to state that Zhang Taiyan’s anti-Manchuism has been “variously misunderstood” (Wong Young-tsu) and was mainly an “effect of his nationalist concern” regarding foreign threat and thus “a practical means for strengthening nationalist spirit” (Kauko Laitinen) and that his “writings have implications that go well beyond mere anti-Manchu revolution” (Viren Murthy).⁸⁴⁰ However, Joshua A. Fogel already showed in 1977 that the Chinese scholarly estimation of Zhang has been quite differentiated.⁸⁴¹ It is thus exaggerated to claim that it would be mainly *because* of Zhang’s anti-Manchuism that his work is regarded as important, like recent scholar of Zhang lament.

As we have seen, it is moreover necessary to differentiate between Zhang’s anti-Manchuism and his general opinion of other Non-Han people. His anti-Manchuism might be generously interpreted as being a political strategy, although I doubt that is was only that. Of course it is not possible to equalize his anti-Manchuism with general racism or racialism⁸⁴² automatically. Still, as we have seen Zhang’s texts justify it to describe him as an “ethnocentric nationalist” (Charlotte Furth) or as I would rather put it, as an sinocentric culturalist-nationalist.⁸⁴³ This labeling of Zhang is not the same as calling him a racist or racialist. That Zhang had a strong tendency to perceive Non-Han

⁸³⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 258. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 31.

⁸³⁹ In a letter to Kang Youwei published *Subao* on Dec. 5th, 1903 Zhang states that the Manchu could stay part of the nation-state if they assimilate. (Zhang Taiyan: 1977 [1903].)

⁸⁴⁰ Wong: 1989, p. vii, see also p. 61–62; Laitinen: 1990, p. 147, 148; Murthy: 2011, p. 224. See also Matten: 2009, p. 66–68.

⁸⁴¹ Fogel: 1977, p. 351–354.

⁸⁴² Joshua A. Fogel prefers to use “racialism,” “because of the connotation of black slavery and the Warren Commission report which the latter [= racism] brings to mind in the American consciousness.” (Ibid., p. 371n6.)

⁸⁴³ Furth: 1976, p. 117. See also Wong: 1989, p. 62n77. Joshua A. Fogel calls Zhang’s Anti-Manchusim “thoroughly racialist or racial revengist (*zhongzu fu-chou*)” and refers to a whole group of scholars who “see the sum total of Zhang’s thought to be anti-Manchu racialism”. (Fogel: 1977, p. 351.)

people in East Asia as being inferior to the Han Chinese in terms of culture and civilization, historical import and even intelligence, clearly comes to the fore in his texts. However, as he thinks assimilation to be possible mainly by certain means of education, he cannot be classified as a racist like i.e. Liu Shipei, who denies the possibility of assimilation due his opinion that races are determined by blood lineages and cannot be changed by education.⁸⁴⁴ But to free Zhang from the blame of Han Chinese chauvinism and as I have put it sinocentric nationalist-culturalist approach is not possible – like it is not possible for in fact all Han Chinese nationalist thinkers in early times of nationalism in China. (And, one might add, it is questionable in how far it is possible to clear later nationalists from this charge.)

Regarding Zhang's anti-Manchuism Wong Young-tsu sees three aspects, which are all connected to his opinion that Zhang was not a racist, but merely used anti-Manchusism "to kindle the fire of patriotism among the Chinese literati."⁸⁴⁵ First, Wong claims that Zhang referred to Ming loyalists in order to push a racial revolution and provoke the wish for a "restoration (*guangfu*)."⁸⁴⁶ Second, Wong claims that Zhang's "polemics were political rather than scholarly for sophistication and objectivity could not possibly be maintained when propaganda was called for."⁸⁴⁷ And third, Wong ascribes Zhang's anti-Manchuism to his belief that the Manchus would rule incompetently, and that therefore also a constitution could not revive the Qing. In Wong's opinion, this was directed only against the Manchu government and not the Manchu ethnicity in general.⁸⁴⁸

For sure, Zhang felt the conquest character of the Manchu rule deeply. As Wong writes himself Zhang perceived of the Manchus as brutal conquerors, symbolized in the book burning connected with the Qianlong Emperor's *Siku quanshu* (*Complete Library in Four Branches of Literature*, or *Complete Library of the Four Treasuries*) project (1773–1782), by which he "destroyed her [= China's] history (*hui qi lishi*)."⁸⁴⁹ Zhang equals this with the Russians' destruction of the Polish language and the Turks' destruction of the Eastern Roman culture.⁸⁵⁰

Kauko Laitinen states that Zhang's anti-Manchuism was strongest during his *Subao* times (1900–1903), whereas in his *Minbao* times (1906–1908) he more and more turned towards anti-Imperialism and the Chinese revolution as an armed revolt.⁸⁵¹ Like Wong, Laitinen, whose monograph on Zhang was published one year after Wong's, claims that Zhang

⁸⁴⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], "Xu", p. 1, line 2–3.

⁸⁴⁵ Wong: 1989, p. 61.

⁸⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61–62.

⁸⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63n86, 64.

⁸⁴⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 324 (ch. 58 "Ai fen shu"); see also Wong: 1989, p. 27.

⁸⁵⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 324 (ch. 58 "Ai fen shu"). As a result of the Three Partitions of Poland, large parts of Poland came under Russian rule (1795–1918). In the 11th century, the Seljuq Turks replaced the Eastern Roman Emperors in Asia Minor with their Sultanate of Rum.

⁸⁵¹ Laitinen: 1990, p. 133; 147.

“was not a Han chauvinist and he did not insist on expelling the Manchus from China if only the great majority, the Hans were restored to governmental power, after which the Hans and the Manchus were to be treated equally.”⁸⁵²

Laitinen, too, reasons that Zhang mainly used anti-Manchuism to strengthen revolutionary nationalism.⁸⁵³ However, Laitinen himself cited from a text Zhang wrote in 1908: “The chaotic government of the Manchus results not from their laws but from their nature and customs.”⁸⁵⁴ This is again a clear statement of anti-Manchuism linking ethnic character with cultural and political abilities. Now, do we have to see Zhang’s anti-Manchuism as the sharpest output of his racialism or was Zhang in the end only “misunderstood”⁸⁵⁵ regarding his opinion about other Non-Han people? Was it merely propaganda to gain support among the revolutionaries?

Zhang’s influential essay “Zhonghua minguo jie” shows very clearly what notion Zhang had of other Non-Han peoples in the Qing borders, which is altogether a rather negative one. It is true that Zhang accepted a certain kind of “cultural pluralism.”⁸⁵⁶ However, I do not agree with Wong that in this context he “strongly pronounced the autonomy and coexistence of all individual cultures.”⁸⁵⁷ Like Liang Qichao, Zhang did not accept Tibetans, Mongols or Turkish Muslims to found their own nation-states based on their own cultures – it has become clear above that his statement “Tibet, the Muslim region and Mongolia could either be incorporated or rejected” is merely a lip service.⁸⁵⁸

Now, can Zhang be called a racist or racialist? There are in fact two answers: Zhang cannot be called “racist,” if the Western meaning of the term “race” around Zhang’s life time is taken as its basis. Western science of the 19th century based its definition of “race” on the assumption that physical characteristics were reflected in cultural behavior, and distinguished between superior and inferior races. In this view, racial classifications were concrete, rigid and permanent.⁸⁵⁹ Marc André Matten therefore states that the term “race” should be used with caution in the context of early Chinese nationalist writing, because there “phenotypic characteristics as distinguishing features can be found only seldom.”⁸⁶⁰ And clearly, Zhang did not use the idea of “race” in the Western phenotypic way, because physical differences could not easily be taken as the main distinction between the Chinese and other people living in the territory of the Qing Empire. The Western pseudo-scientific concept of “race” would put them altogether under the label “Mongol race,” mostly called “yellow race

⁸⁵² Ibid., p. 148.

⁸⁵³ Ibid., p. 147.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 126. The quote is from Zhang Taiyan’s essay “Manzhou zongdu qintun zhenkuan zhuang,” published in *Minbao* 22 (July 10th, 1908).

⁸⁵⁵ Wong: 1989, p. vii.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid., p. viii. See also Zarrow: 1994.

⁸⁵⁷ Wong: 1989, p. viii.

⁸⁵⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907], p. 257. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 28.

⁸⁵⁹ “race.” Encyclopaedia Britannica: 2010. See also Murthy: 2011, p. 53–54.

⁸⁶⁰ Matten: 2009, p. 67.

(*huangzu*⁸⁶¹/*huangzhong*⁸⁶²)” by Chinese writers in the early 20th century. In the texts from the end of the 19th century until 1911, the terms *zu*, *zhong* and *zhongzu* are used with a wide variety of meanings, always referring to groups of human beings. But the differentiation between these groups are based on divers criteria depending on the respective context. With regard to people on a global scale there are the identity markers of skin color⁸⁶³, language⁸⁶⁴, culture/civilization or character⁸⁶⁵, sometimes in combination⁸⁶⁶. But on a more local East Asian scale, skin color and other physical characteristics as criterions are not useful to differentiate between people and here mainly (imagined) grade of culture/civilization, way of living and script are used. Therefore, in this context *zhong*, *zu* and *zhongzu* cannot generally be translated as “race,” as the physical factor is the most important difference between the terms ethnicity and race.

However, it is possible to call Zhang “racist/racialist” in two other senses though. First, in the very modern sense of “racism” being equaled with a discrimination of people legitimized on the assumption of humans being divided into “separate and exclusive biological entities,” some of which are superior to others.⁸⁶⁷ And more importantly, second, in the sense of the Chinese term *zhongzu*, sometimes also only *zhong* usually translated as “race.”⁸⁶⁸ In modern Chinese “racism” is translated as *zhongzuzhuyi*. And in the Chinese sense of the word, Zhang – as well as Liang and Liu and probably most other early Chinese nationalist thinkers – was definitely a “racist (*zhongzuzhuyizhe*),” because he linked different identifications of *zhongzu* to superiority and inferiority.

⁸⁶¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12.

⁸⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 13; Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 47, line 19.

⁸⁶³ Liang Qichao writes in “Xin shixue”: “But today, generally it is spoken of five races, which are called yellow (*huang*) coloured race, white (*bai*) coloured race, brown (*zong*) coloured race, black (*hei*) coloured race and red (*hong*) coloured race.” (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12.)

⁸⁶⁴ In his essay “Xin shixue,” Liang lists some approaches to “racism” as a (pseudo-)science, referring to divers European thinkers, who divide humans into different numbers of races (Kant gives four, Blumenback five, etc.). He then states: “Many use the division of languages and differentiate one to more than two thousand races.” (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12.) Four years later, he even writes: “Therefore, using skin and bones (*pifu guge*) to divide races (*renzhong*) does not reach using language (*yanyu*) to divide races.” (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2–3.) According to this, Liang argues that the Indian people and the Europeans despite their different skin colour would belong to the same language family. (*Ibid.*, p. 3.)

⁸⁶⁵ This is Zhang’s own approach, who writes: “Regarding character (*xing*) there are the differences of civilized (*wen*) and uncivilized (*guang*), of Rong barbarians and Xia.” (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], p. 21.)

⁸⁶⁶ Zhang Taiyan writes in his *Qishu zhongding ben* essay “Xu zhongxing shang”: “On the whole world there are five races. Their colours are yellow (*huang*), white (*bai*), black (*hei*), red (*chi*) and brownish yellow (*liuhuang*). Within these borders they dwell, and regarding tradition, education and language, they are not connected.” (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 170.)

⁸⁶⁷ “racism.” In: *Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*: 2010.

⁸⁶⁸ Dikötter translates the Chinese terms *zu*, *zulei*, *minzu* and *zhongzu* as “race,” because he has the impression that they “stress the biological rather than the sociocultural aspects of different peoples.” He analyses these terms in the context of Chinese elite constructions of Westerners and Africans. (Dikötter: 1992, p. viii–ix, x.) As mentioned above, Matten criticizes the usage of “race” in the context of early 20th century texts, but nevertheless uses it himself in his work. (Matten: 2009, p. 67f.)

Zhang Taiyan as a Nationalist Historian: A General History for China

How did Zhang Taiyan's ideas and perceptions of Non-Han ethnicities effect his writing as a historian? Did he like Liang Qichao try to include Non-Han history into Chinese nationalist historiography or into a general history of China? And if yes, how?

Shortly after Liang, Zhang thought about how to reform Chinese historiography confronted with the modern evolutionary approach, which he eventually criticized.⁸⁶⁹ He especially turned to the question how a general history (*tongshi*) could be composed.⁸⁷⁰ Zhang relied on Japanese models, especially on Ukita Kazutami's (1859–1946) *Shigaku genron* (*Introduction to Historical Study*) (1898), which also Liang closely studied and copied.⁸⁷¹ Although Zhang like Liang never managed to write such a history himself, he nevertheless created a blueprint for a possible index and also a short description of a General History.

The index and the description were published in his *Qiushu zhongdingben* (1904), as supplement to the fifty-ninth chapter “Ai Qing shi (Wailing the Qing History)”: the “Zhongguo tongshi lüelie (Short Description of a General History of China)”⁸⁷² and the “Zhongguo tongshi mulu (Index of Contents of a General History of China).”⁸⁷³ In these two short pieces Zhang reveals his idea of China and Chinese history like Liang did in this “Zhongguo shi xu lun” from 1901, which too was aimed to present an outlook for a general history of China. Zhang's short description refers to Chinese historiography from Antiquity until today. At the same time it is a statement concerning China and the Manchus.⁸⁷⁴

At the beginning of the “Description,” Zhang describes the development of Chinese historiography, starting with Sima Qian (206 BC–9 AD) and continuing with several other eminent historians – Xun Yue⁸⁷⁵ (148–209), Yuan Shu⁸⁷⁶ (487?–528), Du You⁸⁷⁷ (735–

⁸⁶⁹ Viren Murthy shows that especially Japanese and Chinese scholars interpreted “Zhang Taiyan as a critique of modernity,” whereas Wong and Laitinen both saw Zhang as a modernist also with regard to evolutionary history. Murthy himself sees Zhang's critique in an even broader circle as its Buddhist character makes it “challenging a linear model of history associated with capitalist modernity.” (Murthy: 2011, p. 135–136.)

⁸⁷⁰ Wong: 1989, p. 29–30; Laitinen: 1990, p. 84–85.

⁸⁷¹ Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 117–118.

⁸⁷² Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328–332.

⁸⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 332–333.

⁸⁷⁴ See also Mazur: 2007, p. 122–126.

⁸⁷⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328. Of the Eastern Han (*Dong Han*) (25–220 AD). Historian, Confucian thinker and politician, descendant of Xunzi, author of the *Han ji*, a commentary to the *Han shu*, on the basis of the *Zuo zhuan*, ordered by Han Xiandi (181–234, r. 189–220) and of the *Shenjian* (*Treatises*). (Schmidt-Glintzer: 1999, p. 111.)

⁸⁷⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328. Of the Liang Dynasty (502–557). (Schmidt-Glintzer: 1999, p. 122.)

⁸⁷⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328. Of the Tang Dynasty (618–907). Historian and politician, compiler of the *Tongdian* (*Comprehensive Institutions*), the first encyclopaedia (*zhengshu*) in China. (Schmidt-Glintzer: 1999, p. 291, 310.)

812), Ma Duanlin⁸⁷⁸ (1254?–1325), Wang Fuzhi⁸⁷⁹ (1619–1692), Wang Wusheng⁸⁸⁰ (1722–1797) and Qian Daxin⁸⁸¹ (1728–1804).

The fifth historian, Wang Fuzhi is set apart from the others and is described in greater length.⁸⁸² This is undoubtedly not only based on Wang Fuzhi's commendation as an outstanding historian and philosopher and him being the only one among traditional historians, whose "method were also nearly deductive."⁸⁸³ Only the deductive method could bring about a mature historiography supporting comment and evaluation.⁸⁸⁴ Around 1900 Zhang was especially famous for his loyalty to the Ming and his anti-Manchuism, which was the reason for the suppression of his works by the Qing since his lifetime, but also for his renewed fame in the 19th century among Chinese scholars, who objected the Manchu more and more like Zhang and Liu Shiwei.⁸⁸⁵

Zhang was a thoughtful and refined scholar, who would not settle for mere flattery only because Wang Fuzhi was an important exemplar for anti-Manchuism. He starts by praising Wang's analytical abilities and methods, but thereafter also criticizes his insufficient approach to historiography:

“By reading the [Zizhi] *Tongjian* (*Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government*)⁸⁸⁶ and the *Songshi* (*Official History of the Song Dynasty*)⁸⁸⁷, the saint of Hengyang⁸⁸⁸ [= Wang Fuzhi] perfected his analysis so that it became most exquisite and cultivated. His methods were also nearly deductive. But because his texts are changeable and repetitive, and his words lack organization, he resembles
‘the Weaver Girls (*Zhinü*)⁸⁸⁹, who are not able to produce a cloth during the seven movements of the whole day (*zhinü zhong ri qi sai bu cheng bao zhang*).’⁸⁹⁰

⁸⁷⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328. Of the late Southern Song (*Nan Song*) (1127–1279) and early Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368). Historian, author of the *Wenxian tongkao*, using the *Tongdian* of Du You as a model. The *Wenxian tongkao* and the *Zizhi tongjian* by Sima Guang are important models of later historians. (Schmidt-Glintzer: 1999, p. 310.)

⁸⁷⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328–329.

⁸⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 329. Historian and author of the *Shiqi shi shang que* (*Discussion of the Seventeen Histories*) (1782).

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid.* Historian and linguist, author of the *Ershi'er shi kao yi* (*An Analysis of the Twenty-two Histories*) (1797), which together with Wang Wusheng's *Shiqi shi shang que* and Zhao Yi's (1727–1814) *Ershi'er shi zha ji* (*Reading Notes of the Twenty-Two Histories*) (1795) forms the three great works of Qing historiography.

⁸⁸² Sima Qian and Yuan Shu each get eight characters, Xun Yue six, all three together another twelve; Wang Wusheng and Qian Daxin get twenty together; Du You and Ma Duanlin get forty-eight together. Wang Fuzhi stands out as he gets sixty-six characters alone.

⁸⁸³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328–329.

⁸⁸⁴ Mazur: 2007, p. 123.

⁸⁸⁵ Bernal: 1976, p. 91f; Furth: 1976, p. 128f.

⁸⁸⁶ This Historiography, which was copied for its style later, covered the period after the *Chunqiu* from the 5th century BC until the 10th century AD. It was written by Sima Guang (1019–1086) and presented to the court in 1084. (Schmidt-Glintzer: 1999, p. 134.)

⁸⁸⁷ The *Songshi* was compiled under the Chief Compiler of the Dynastic Histories of the Yuan dynasty, Toqto'a (also Toghto, Chinese: Tuotuo) (1314–1356). In 1346, it was presented at the court.

⁸⁸⁸ Hengyang is a town in Hunan province, where Wang Fuzhi was born.

⁸⁸⁹ Today *Zhinü* refers to the Vega star in the Lyra constellation.

⁸⁹⁰ These are parts of the last line of the fifth and the first line of the sixth stanza of the *Shijing* poem “Da dong (Great East).” The full passage runs in Legge's translation: “And the three stars together are the Weaving Sisters, Passing in a day through seven stages [of the sky]. Although they go through their seven stages, They complete no bright work for us (*Qi bi Zhinü, zhong ri qi xiang. Sui ze qi xiang, bu cheng bao zhang*).” (Legge: 1972,

When it comes to the understanding of the rise and fall, sprawling and changing of society and political method, then this man darkens and does not illuminate.”⁸⁹¹

Regarding the other seven historians, Zhang mostly ascribes certain innovations to them, i.e. Sima Qian introduced the division of histories into the afterwards traditional four main parts,⁸⁹² Xun Yue introduced the annalistic style (*biannian*), Yuan Shu introduced the style of subsuming everything regarding a certain issue from one work and put in together (*jishi benmo*), etc.

After this very brief introductory history of the development of historiographical writing in China, Zhang gives his concrete ideas how a general history of China (*Zhongguo tongshi*) should be composed:

“If one creates a general history of China today, it should be limited to one hundred chapters; it should fuse in philosophy in order to expel petty superficialities; it should explore deeply, scooping the sunken in order to arise doubts on rigid traditions.”⁸⁹³

Zhang prefers a general history to be rather short – hundred chapters are comparatively few if thinking of single dynastic histories with up to several hundred chapters – and still deep. Moreover, it should not be captured by “rigid traditions,” but employ modern methods, although Zhang does not dwell on this subject. In general, Zhang thinks that history follows universal patterns with regard to “psychology, society, and religion” and thinks that these patterns therefore would be especially important for historians.⁸⁹⁴ They provide the basis for a historian’s approach.⁸⁹⁵

In the second part of his theoretical approach to a general history of China, “*Zhongguo tongshi mulu*,” Zhang gives the concrete table of contents he suggests for such a history. He divides the chapters in five major groups:

1. Tables (*biao*)
2. Compendia (*dian*)
3. Reports (*ji*)
4. Evidential Annals (*kao ji*)
5. Alternative records (*bie lu*)

vol. 4, p. 353–356 (Part II. Minor Odes of the Kingdom, Book V. Decade of Seaou Min, IX. Ta [t]jung). See also Zhang Taiyan: 2000, p. 859n4.)

⁸⁹¹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328–329.

⁸⁹² Ibid., p. 328. These four parts are the annals (*(ben)ji*), the biographies (*(lie)zhuan*), the tables (*biao*) and the monographies (*zhi*), formerly called treatises (*shu*). This is a very traditional way in tracing these four parts which only became “traditional” since the *Han shu* by Ban Biao and his two children Ban Gu and Ban Zhao. Sima Qian also included the genealogies (*shijia*), which were not included in later histories anymore and which are not mentioned by Zhang Taiyan. (Schmidt-Glintzer: 1999, p. 126.)

⁸⁹³ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 329.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 331.

⁸⁹⁵ Wang, F.: 2012, p. 145.

In his “Zhongguo tongshi lüelie,” Zhang explains, which topics these five parts should contain and how one should approach them. He claims that Western sociology would be divided into “stable sociology (*jing shehuixue*)” and “mobile sociology (*dong shehuixue*).”⁸⁹⁶ “Stable (*jing*),” he interprets, means “to store up the past (*zang wang*)”, and “mobile (*dong*)” as “to know the coming events (*zhi lai*).”⁸⁹⁷ According to this, the rather traditional chapter of “Tables” and the “Compendia,” which include the discussion of modern topics, belong to the first category of stable sociology.⁸⁹⁸ They “store up the past,” because “it is impossible not to refer to annals and biographies” in order to “animate and sharpen scholarly energy.”⁸⁹⁹ Laitinen claims that the “Reports” and the “Evidential Annals,” on the other hand, belong to the second category of “mobile sociology.”⁹⁰⁰ Mary G. Mazur notes that although Western influence can be found in Zhang’s approach, like the “emphasis on change,” Zhang does not use a strictly linear approach, especially not in the “Reports” and “Evidential Annals.”⁹⁰¹ Not all parts of the “Reports” refer to certain eras and those, which do refer only to selected ones, i.e. the Han period is left aside.

A further basic idea for Zhang’s model of a general history is that emperors and officials, who have nothing to do with the four categories of “politics and law, study and arts, race and ethnicity, customs and teaching” will not be worth to enter neither the “Evidential annals” nor the “Alternative records,” but will be listed only in the “Table of the emperors and kings” or “Table of chancellors.”⁹⁰²

Unlike Liang, who in his “Xin shixue” (1902) accuses traditional histories of falling short, because they would “only know about individuals and not about the community,”⁹⁰³ Zhang in fact stresses individual history in form of biographies, which are planned to form a great part of his general history.⁹⁰⁴

Regarding Zhang’s attitude towards Non-Han people and histories certain chapters in his five parts come to the fore. Among the chapters of the “Tables” there seems to be not one referring to a topic linked especially with Non-Han issues.⁹⁰⁵ But among the “Compendia” and the “Reports” three chapters seem to be of interest: the “Compendium of races and ethnicities (*zhongzu dian*),” the “Reports of Hu (barbarian)

⁸⁹⁶ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 329. This division is based on August Comte (1798–1857), who is regarded to be the founder of sociology. (Zhang Taiyan: 2000, p. 863n1.)

⁸⁹⁷ Zhang refers to one of the appendices of the *Yijing* where it is said: “By their spirit-like ability they knew (the character of) coming events, and their wisdom had stored up (all experiences of) the past (*shen yi zhi lai zhi yi zang wang*).” (Legge: 1970, p. 372.)

⁸⁹⁸ Mazur: 2007, p. 125.

⁸⁹⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1902, p. 7–8; Zhang Taiyan: 2000, p. 863, line 2; Laitinen: 1990, p. 84–85.

⁹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 84–85.

⁹⁰¹ Mazur: 2007, p. 125.

⁹⁰² Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 330; Laitinen: 1990, p. 85.

⁹⁰³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 3.

⁹⁰⁴ Mazur: 2007, p. 125.

⁹⁰⁵ Zhang lists the following five tables: “Tables of emperors and kings (*di wang biao*), of places (*fang yu biao*), of functional offices (*zhiguan biao*), of chancellors (*shixiang biao*), and of literati (*wen ru biao*).” (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 332.)

invaders (*Hu kou ji*),” and the “Reports of restoration (*guangfu ji*).”⁹⁰⁶ Unfortunately, Zhang never wrote a general history of China. It is thus not possible to know what would have been included in these three chapters. Speculating on the basis of his writing, the “Compendium of races and ethnicities” might have included Zhang’s explanation of the origin of the Han Chinese, but it might also contain a list of races still existent in what he defines as being the territory underlying his general history of China. On the other hand, it would also be possible that it refers to races and ethnicities that had been living in this territory in the past and are not there anymore. The “Reports of Hu (barbarian) invaders” might have been planned as a summary of all invasions and conquests of (Zhang’s) Chinese regions during history. On the other hand, the “Reports of restoration,” which were planned as the subsequent chapter, would probably have been about Chinese attempts to shake of Non-Han authority. However, all this is highly speculative and has to remain uncertain.

Regarding the “Evidential annals,” Zhang aims become slightly clearer, because his list of contents is more detailed.⁹⁰⁷ He wants to examine the epochs by referring to outstanding individuals. From the listed eleven persons two stand out, because only they are not acknowledged emperors like the other nine – Wang Mang (45 BC–23 AD, reign time 9–23 AD)⁹⁰⁸ and Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864, reign time 1851–1864)⁹⁰⁹. Zhang must have considered both as positive figures, as the other men in his list are usually seen as outstanding and successful model emperors. It is probable that his inclusion of Wang Mang is his standpoint regarding the Old Text/New Text Controversy. Led by Kang Youwei the New Text scholars accused Wang Mang to have ordered the editor Liu Xin to forge the classics.⁹¹⁰ The Old Text scholars, Zhang himself being the foremost and actually last one on the other hand believed that the version in the “old script (*guwen*),” which were rediscovered in 168 BC were the more reliable ones.

⁹⁰⁶ Altogether Zhang lists twelve Compendia (“Compendium of races and ethnicities, of peoples’ houses (*minzhai dian*), of building construction (*junzhu dian*), of handicraft (*gongyi dian*), of livelihood (*shihuo dian*), of script and language (*wenyan dian*), of religion (*zongjiao dian*), of science (*xueshu dian*), of rites and customs (*lisu dian*), of dress and adornment (*zhangfu dian*), of laws and rules (*faling dian*), and of defence preparations (*wubei dian*)”) and then reports (“Report of Zhou dynastic dress code (*Zhou fu ji*), of the Qin emperors (*Qin di ji*), of the descendants of the Southern [families] (*nan zhou ji*), of the foreigners of the Tang Dynasty (*Tang fan ji*), of autocratic governments (*danggu ji*), of revolutions (*geming ji*), of intercontinental relations (*lujiao ji*), of maritim relations (*haijiao ji*), of Hu (barbarian) invaders, and of restauration”). (Ibid.)

⁹⁰⁷ Altogether Zhang lists nine evidential annals (“Evidential annals of Qin shi huangdi (*Qin shi huang kaoji*), of Han Wudi (*Han Wudi kaoji*), of Wang Mang (*Wang Mang kaoji*), of Song Wudi (*Song Wudi kaoji*), of Tang Dazong (*Tang Dazong kaoji*), of Yuan Dazu (*Yuan Dazu kaoji*), of Ming Dazu (*Ming Dazu kaoji*), of the Three Qing Emperors [the Kangxi, the Yongzheng and the Qianlong Emperor] (*Qing san di kaoji*), of Hong Xiuquan (*Hong Xiuquan kaoji*).” (Ibid.)

⁹⁰⁸ Although Wang is referred to mostly with his personal name because he is traditionally seen as an usurper, he was actually the first emperor Mangdi of the short-lived Xin dynasty (9–23 AD), which has mostly been seen as an illegitimate interruption of the Han dynasty.

⁹⁰⁹ Hong declared himself emperor of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (*Taiping tianguo*) (1851–1864). This separatist and anti-Manchu state which gained a considerable area around its capital in Nanjing then called Tianjing was a great threat to the Qing and was only ended at a high price.

⁹¹⁰ Van Ess: 1994, p. 148–149, 149n6.

Zhang's inclusion of Hong Xiuquan probably refers to the Taiping's acknowledged anti-Manchuist background.⁹¹¹ Putting Hong alongside those emperors, which were considered to be the most famous and able ones otherwise makes no sense. The great civil war caused by Hong's founding of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (*Taiping tianguo*) in opposition to the Qing certainly was a drastic and far-reaching event in the 19th century, which was generally not seen as positive.

The fifth part "Alternative records" consists of persons on the field of intellectual history, who Zhang finds important enough to give them own chapters and biographies.⁹¹² He partly combines them to groups, i.e. "Alternative record of Confucius, Laozi, Mozi and Han Feizi (*Kong Lao Mo Han biele*)," or gives them own chapters like in the case of Li Si (ca. 280–208 BC) and Kang Youwei. But he also lists chapters with mere group names, without specifying, who would be included in these chapters.⁹¹³ Also, the four famous philosophers and Ming loyalists Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi and Yan Yuan (1635–1704) are assembled in one chapter.⁹¹⁴

After having given this overview on Zhang's ideas about a general history of China with regard to special points, which are interesting in the context of the question of the historiography of Non-Han people in Zhang's idea of historiography, it is obvious that Zhang's essay on such a general history can only be a starting point. Unfortunately, it is a starting point, from which we have nowhere to go, because Zhang never wrote the work he had planned so well.

In 1914, Zhang once again revised the *Qiushu* under the title *Jianlun* (*Investigative Essays*).⁹¹⁵ The chapter "Ai Qing shi" is still part of it, but the two supplements about the general history of China are not included anymore.⁹¹⁶ His views about China's history had obviously changed in the meantime.⁹¹⁷

⁹¹¹ Wong seems to be sure of that. (Wong: 1989, p. 29.) Liu Shipei lists Hong Xiuquan's Taiping Rebellion among the most important attempts to restore a Han ethnic dynasty. He looks altogether favourably upon these attempts. (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 47a.)

⁹¹² Altogether Zhang lists twenty-five alternative records. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 332–333.)

⁹¹³ "Alternative record of merchants (*huozhi biele*)," "Alternative record of assassins (*cike biele*)," "Alternative record of societies and cliques (*huidang biele*)," and "Alternative record of hermits (*yimin biele*). (Ibid., p. 332.)

⁹¹⁴ "Alternative record of Gu Jiegang, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi and Yan Yuan (*Gu Huang Wang Yan biele*)." (Ibid.)

⁹¹⁵ Zhang Taiyan: 1982 [1914], vol. 3, p. 349–628. About its publishing history see also Ibid., p. 15–20.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 585–596.

⁹¹⁷ Wang, F.: 2012, p. 145.

2.3 Conclusion: Zhang Taiyan Becomes Pragmatic

In 1907, before the Xinhai Revolution and the following confrontation with the post-revolution and post-imperial reality, Zhang like Liang Qichao finally came to the conclusion that the most reasonable way to found a Chinese nation-state would be what Liang had meant with his catch phrase “large nationalism.” Non-Han people living in the Qing Empire could never be so naïve, so Zhang thought, to assume that they could survive the Imperialist threats for their territory, when being on their own. Therefore, the only satisfactory solution for the diverse ethnicities in the Qing Empire as well as for the Han people was to continue unity and form one unified nation-state and not to fragment into several ones. Whereas Liang never truly thought through how a nation-state based on his idea of a “large nationalism” could be achieved and stabilized effectively, Zhang offered some concrete ideas.

Zhang’s influential essay “Zhonghua minguo jie” (1907) shows his approach to assimilation, which for him like for Liang is the ultimate or in fact only possibility for a stable Chinese nation-state. Although Zhang unlike Liang does not assume that assimilation would be easy to achieve or would have already been achieved, he also does not think it too difficult. After a strategic education of twenty years, so his concrete estimation, the Three Peripheral Divisions, that is, Tibet, Mongolia and East Turkestan (Xinjiang), with their Non-Han inhabitants would be ready to be incorporated completely into the Chinese nation-state. Still, Zhang’s ideas about assimilation seem simplistic to a certain degree and are forced into a certain scheme of style, although quite worked out in contrast to Liang’s undefined approach.

Zhang’s approach to Non-Han people shows that Han Chinese thinkers at the end of the Qing time were closely related in their ways of imagining the Non-Han people and in their ideas of a solution to the task how to integrate them into a Chinese nation-state. It has often been stated that nationalism replaced culturalism, when Han Chinese thinkers began to accept that they were only one small part in a global system of states and cultures and not the centre of the world. But as can be seen with regard to Zhang as to Liang Qichao, this does not apply to the image the Han Chinese had of themselves and of the nearby Other, that is, the Non-Han ethnicities in the Qing borders, and even not for other Non-Han ethnicities just beyond these borders like Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Burmese people. With regard to them, Zhang and other early Han Chinese nationalist thinkers did not assume that Han Chinese culture would have lost anything of its central and superior character. Although they had to accept other cultures and civilizations deriving them of their status as being the centre of the world, they still were the centre of East and Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3. Liu Shiwei: The Expulsion of the Non-Han from China's History

*“Some say that the Han ethnicity’s character would have a certain power. No matter for what race or ethnicity this power would be used in order to adjoin it – everyone would attach and follow [the Han ethnicity]. I do not dare to believe in this statement, unless I see it myself!
Some say that the Han ethnicity would have a special spirit. No matter what race or ethnicity migrates to China – it would finally be rejected by the Han ethnicity. I do not dare to believe in this statement looking at the Manchus night and day!”⁹¹⁸*

Liu Shiwei (1905).

Liu Shiwei (1884–1919) is usually classified as a nationalist revolutionary like Zhang. But whereas Zhang changed his opinion about what to do with the Non-Han in a Chinese nation-state from exclusion to inclusion and supported a solution based on assimilation like Liang Qichao, Liu stayed close to his belief that the Han had to exclude all Non-Han people in order to found a strong nation-state. Liu thus promoted, what Liang had once called “small nationalism” and what according to Liang could be no alternative to “large nationalism.” Liang thought that only when China managed to become a nation-state based on large nationalism, that is, to include also the large Non-Han regions of the Qing empire and form one united nation, it would be strong enough to withstand the imperialist powers. But Liu had a different opinion. He thought that the inclusion of Non-Han would pollute the Han people, in fact, that inclusion would mean to weaken the Han race. Like in Liang’s and Zhang’s understanding of nationalism a nation-state would best function when it was based on one nation, defined by one language, culture,

⁹¹⁸ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 46a.

tradition. But he did not think that a traceless incorporation of Non-Han into the Han people was possible. He thus did not accept Liang's theory of an "assimilative power." In the 1900s discourse on ethnicity, nationalism and assimilation Liu was one rare – and as we shall see in the chapters four and five soon to be extinct – example of a thinker, who was against a nation-state, which would take the Qing Empire as its territorial blueprint. His reasons were not based on liberalism or the acceptance that other people, too, could proclaim themselves to be nations and have the right to form nation-states. His reasons as we shall see in the following were purely ethnocentric, but nevertheless they led him to a maybe not so or differently biased view of history.

3.1 Liu Shiwei's Biography

Liu Shiwei was born in 1884 in Yangzhou in Jiangsu Province. He came from a family of renowned scholars of the Classics, especially the *Zuo zhuan*, and got a profound traditional education. Already in 1902, he obtained a *juren* degree, the middle degree in the civil service examinations. Liu failed to obtain a *jinshi* degree, the highest degree in the civil service examinations in 1903. On his way back from the capital, he visited Shanghai and in the end stayed for two years. There, Liu met Zhang (1868–1936) and Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), who acquainted him with revolutionary ideas. During these years, Liu authored the *Rangshu (Book of Expulsion)* (1903) and published it in the *Zhongguo baihua bao (China colloquial journal)*⁹¹⁹, one of the first journals promoting the usage of vernacular Chinese in practice. Liu strongly supported revolution, discussed the *Zuo zhuan* with Zhang and became one of the last representatives of the Old Text School of late Qing.⁹²⁰ In 1903 Liu married He Ban (later He Zhen) (dates of life unknown), who like him became a leading anarchist.⁹²¹

⁹¹⁹ Published semimonthly: 1903–1904.

⁹²⁰ Like in the case of the New Text school the roots of the Old Text school lie in antiquity. The first emperor Qin Shi Huangdi (259–210 BC, reign time 221–210 BC) had ordered the "Burning of the books and burying of the scholar (*fenshu kengru*)" in 213 BC. After the decline of the Qin Dynasty in 206 BC attempts were made to restore those pre-Qin Classics which had been destroyed in the fire. They were written down from memory in the so called "new script (*jinwen*)," and this is the origin of the name of the New Text School (*jinwenxue* or *jinwenjia*) of thought emerging in Western Han (*Xi Han*, also Former Han) times (206 BC–24 AD). Already then the New Text School's preference of the Classics written down in the new script, mainly the *Gongyang zhuan*, was rejected by another group of scholars, later called Old Text School (*guwenxue* or *guwenjia*) who did not see Confucius as a divine being, but as a human teacher. The Old Text scholars considered the new script versions of the Classics as being merely contemporary solutions. Tradition tells that in 168 BC pre-Qin versions of the classics were found in Qufu in Shandong province, the hometown of Confucius, where they had been hidden in the wall of his house. They were written in the seal script of the Warring States Period, the "old script (*guwen*)." The school regarding them as the correct versions of the classics was consequently called Old Text

In 1904 Liu entered Cai Yuanpei's *Guangfu hui* (*Restoration Society*).⁹²² Together with Zhang, Liang Qichao and others, Liu was also one of the initiators and supporters of the National Essence Movement (*guocui yundong*), which aimed at strengthening the national sentiment and identity of the Han ethnicity in order to make it powerful enough to withstand foreign powers, both Western Imperialist and Manchu conquerors. In 1905, Liu joined the anti-Manchu *Guoxue baocun hui* (*Society for the Protections of National Studies*)⁹²³ in Shanghai. This society supported the teaching of students, the publication of textbooks for middle schools and also the establishment of a library in Shanghai.⁹²⁴ A new revolutionary, but also “scholarly and esoteric”⁹²⁵ journal, the *Guocui xuebao* (*Journal of the Study of National Essence*)⁹²⁶ was founded to present the research findings and political opinions of the *Guoxue baocun hui*, but the historians, who published in it, also wanted to strengthen anti-Manchuism in order to ignite a Han Chinese wish to revolt against the Qing.⁹²⁷ Zhang and Liu became main contributors for it.⁹²⁸ However, the “National Essence Movement” did not have deep impact in general, as its supporters not only insisted “on a detailed knowledge of the extremely complicated philosophical schools of the late Chou period,” but also had a writing style, which was “almost impossible to understand.”⁹²⁹

In 1906, Liu and his wife went to Wuhu in Anhui Province, where Liu became a teacher at the *Wanjiang zhongxue* (*Wanjiang Middle School*). In 1907, Zhang, who was editing the *Minbao* (*People's Journal*)⁹³⁰ in Tokyo, invited Liu to Japan. There he joined Sun Yat-sen's *Tongmenghui* (*Revolutionary Alliance*). He wrote for the *Minbao*, which was the journal of the Tokyo group of the *Tongmenghui*, and the *Xinmin congbao* (*New People's Journal*)⁹³¹. Liu “became increasingly radical” and turned to anarcho-communism.⁹³² Together with his wife he founded the journals *Tianyi* (*Heavenly Virtue*)⁹³³ and the

School. This school became predominant in Eastern Han (*Dong Han*, also Later Han) times (25–220) and by and by replaced the New Text School. However, both schools disappeared after the collapse of the Eastern Han Dynasty in the 3rd century AD and enjoyed a parallel revival in Qing times.

⁹²¹ Information on He Zhen is scarce. Her name was He Ban before she adopted *zhen* meaning “shock” or “shake” during her stay in Japan to express her radicalisation. (Müller: 2001, p. 167.)

⁹²² The *Guangfu hui* was an anti-Qing organisation established by Cai in 1904. Many members were from Zhejiang and included Qiu Jin, Tao Chengzhang, Woo Tsin-hang, Xu Xilin and Zhang Taiyan. When the plan of an uprising in the lower Yangzi failed and several members were arrested it broke up. Many former members (Zhang Taiyan and Tao Chengzhang) entered the *Tongmenghui* one year later.

Zhang Taiyan later claimed that he and Cai together founded it. However, Zhang was imprisoned in 1904. Nevertheless, Cai regularly visited him and stated that Zhang chose the name for the society. (Wong: 1989, p. 46.)

⁹²³ Also translated as *National Learning Protection Society* or *Association for Preservation of National Learning*.

⁹²⁴ Schneider, Laurence A.: 1976, p. 65; Bernal: 1976, p. 104.

⁹²⁵ Bernal: 1976, p. 109.

⁹²⁶ Published monthly: 1905–1911.

⁹²⁷ Bernal: 1976, p. 104; Hon: 2003, p. 242.

⁹²⁸ Britton: 1933, p. 122; Schneider, L. A.: 1976, p. 60–61.

⁹²⁹ Bernal: 1976, p. 111.

⁹³⁰ Published monthly: 1905–1908.

⁹³¹ Published semi-monthly: 1902–1907.

⁹³² Angle: 1998, p. 625. See also Bernal: 1976, p. 106.

⁹³³ Published semi-monthly: 1907–1908.

Hengbao = *The Chinese Anarchist News*⁹³⁴, advocating feminism, communism and anarchism.

But this short phase of Liu's extremism already ended latest in 1908, when Liu and He returned to China, taking refuge with the reform minded Manchu governor-general of Zhejiang and Anhui, Duanfang (1861–1911). Later, it was claimed that Liu had become a traitor to the Chinese revolutionaries in Japan already in 1907 when he wrote a letter to Duanfang promising to work for him and trying to split the Han Chinese revolutionaries in Japan.⁹³⁵ Back in China in 1908 Liu probably betrayed other revolutionaries and informed officials “on some of his erstwhile companions in the revolutionary movement.”⁹³⁶ It was assumed that this led to a split with the *Tongmenghui*. As Duanfang's Private Secretary he proceeded with his studies of the Classics and again produced articles for the *Guocui xuebao*. He became an outstanding scholar of the studies of the Classics.

In 1911, he became Duanfang's Assistant Administration Commissioner. He followed Duanfang on his military expedition entering Sichuan to subdue the “Railway Protection Movement (*Bao lu yundong*).”⁹³⁷ Revolting soldiers killed Duanfang. Liu fled to Chengdu, where he began to lecture at *Sichuan guoxue yuan* (*Sichuan National High school*). When the Republic of China was founded, Zhang and Cai forgot the former grudge and published a proclamation, begging Liu to come out from the mountains.

Consequently, in 1913 Liu became a high-ranking adviser in Shanxi. But one year later he spoiled his chances again, when he went to Beijing to support Yuan Shikai's attempts to become emperor. After this last ill-fated attempt to restore the monarchy Liu withdrew from political activities. In 1917, Cai Yuanpei, new director of the *Beijing Daxue* (also *Beida*, *Peking University*), again put all former disagreements aside and asked Liu to become professor of humanities, which Liu accepted. In 1919, being only in his thirties, he died of tuberculosis. Among modern Chinese scholars of the history of literature and the classics Liu takes one of the foremost positions.

⁹³⁴ Published on a ten day schedule: 1908.

⁹³⁵ Müller: 2001, p. 169. Gotelind Müller also states that the original of Liu's letter was never found and that also its back dating is extremely unsure as some date it as early as September 1907, others only to early 1908. The copy of that letter was published in the 1930s.

⁹³⁶ Angle: 1998, p. 625.

⁹³⁷ This political protest movement formed after plans of the Qing government became known that control over local railway projects would be transferred to foreign banks. The protest started in Sichuan in August 1911 and contributed to the Xinhai revolution.

3.2 *Rangshu*, *Zhongguo minzu zhi* and *Zhongguo lishi jiaoke shu*: Liu Shipei's Intentions

Liu Shipei wrote two books dealing with the analysis of ethnicities in China, the *Rangshu* (*Book of Expulsion*) (1903) and the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (*The Ideal of an Ethnicity of China*) (1905). In both, analyses of Non-Han people form a large part. A third one, the *Zhongguo lishi jiaoke shu* (*Textbook of China's history*) (1906) mainly dealing with antiquity, also refers to the topic of Non-Han ethnicities regarding the time before 771 BC.⁹³⁸

All three books were published in the first decade of the 20th century and bring Liu's Han chauvinism and his racist ideas to the fore. The publications in 1903, 1905 and 1906 went parallel to the development of growing opposition between two groups of political thinkers, the revolutionaries, who were anti-Manchuist and promoted a Han nation-state on the political basis of a constitutional republic, and the reformers, who aimed at a constitutional monarchy with characteristics of a nation-state.

Liu was very young when he wrote these works, but his opinion towards foreign ethnicities (*yi zu*, *ta zu* or *wai zu*) seems to be set. One part of his despise of Non-Han people was his anti-Manchuism. He referred to history to verify his ideas on the basis of historical examples. Because he wanted to stir up the Han Chinese to expel their Manchu conquerors he turned to phases of foreign conquest, when the Han Chinese like during Qing times were conquered, ruled and subdued by foreign ethnicities. He repeatedly commits himself to the topic of foreign dynasties and analyzes these periods in detail. Here, the forewords, introductions and some chapters, which refer to the topic of Non-Han ethnicities, will be analyzed and linked with each other.

The *Rangshu*

The *Rangshu* was first published in 1903 by a then only nineteen-year-old Liu. It contains of sixteen chapters. Under the heading "Mulu (Table of contents)" two short introductory passages of two and three lines length are given directly before and after the table of contents.⁹³⁹

In the first of these short passages, Liu explains the title character *rang*, its origin and meanings, and how and why he uses it as a title for his book:

⁹³⁸ See also Hon: 2007, p. 95–100.

⁹³⁹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], "Mulu", p. 1a, 1b.

“The *Shuowen jiezi*⁹⁴⁰ explains *rang* as ‘to push back (*tui*).’ In his Commentary [to the *Shuowen jiezi*], Duan [Yucan]⁹⁴¹ thinks that it rather has the meaning of ‘to yield’ (*tuirang*). I think that the character *rang* takes the pronunciation of *xiang* [= to help]. [But its meaning] ‘to expel from the grounds’ (*pi tu*) is far from [the meaning] ‘to help’. Therefore, the character *rang* rather has the meaning of ‘to expel (*rang*)’ like in ‘to expel the Yi (barbarians) (*rang Yi*).’ Now, the meaning of the *Rangshu* (*Book of Expulsion*) derives from this.”⁹⁴²

That the meaning of *rang* derives from the expression *rang Yi* – “to expel the Yi (barbarians)” – was, as Martin Bernal states, in any case clear to “Liu and all men and women of his class and generation.”⁹⁴³ One prominent passage where the expression *rang Yi* is used can be found in the *Gongyang zhuan*: “Duke Huan rescued the Central Kingdom (*Zhongguo*), when he expelled the Yi and Dí (barbarians) (*rang Yi Di*). [...] This is considered to be the duty of the true king.”⁹⁴⁴ Confucius’ defense of Duke Huan’s Prime Minister, Guan Zhong (ca. 720–645 BC), who he considered to be the actual driving force behind the expulsion of the “barbarians” stands in connection to this passage from the *Gongyang zhuan*. When Zi Gong, a disciple of Confucius asked his master if Guan Zhong was not a man without honor because he served the murderer of his former master Confucius spoke for Guan Zhong because he would have had the greater aim of rescuing the civilized people from barbarization.⁹⁴⁵

With his usage of the term *rang* in its meaning derived from “to expel the Yi (barbarians)” Liu stands in the tradition of the Song writer Sun Fu (992–1057), who claimed that the device “to expel the Yi (barbarians)” would be one of the secret messages in the *Chunqiu*, and the Ming loyalists, who also used Confucius’ statement about Guan Zhong and his expulsion of the “barbarians” being a virtue positioned above loyalty to one’s overlord.⁹⁴⁶ In fact, Liang Qichao criticized this approach to the *Chunqiu* taking “to expel the Yi (barbarians)” as its central meaning and stated that Confucius compiled the *Chunqiu* with a larger idea of the time and space: “Confucius composed the

⁹⁴⁰ The *Shuowen jiezi* is the earliest comprehensive ancient dictionary of Chinese characters, completed by Xu Shen (ca. 58–147) in 100 and presented to the emperor in 121. (Wilkinson: 2000, p. 63.)

⁹⁴¹ The work is *Shuowen jiezi zhu* (*Annotated Shuowen Jiezi*) (1813–1815). There were four main commentators of the *Shuowen jiezi* in Qing times, Duan Yucan (1735–1815) being one of them.

⁹⁴² Liu Shipai: 1997 [1903], “Mulu”, p. 1a.

⁹⁴³ Bernal: 1976, p. 94.

⁹⁴⁴ *Gongyang zhuan* (Xi gong, 4th year).

⁹⁴⁵ “1. Tsze-kung [= Zi Gong] said: ‘Kwan Chung [= Guan Zhong], I apprehend, was wanting in virtue. When the Duke Hwan [= Huan] caused his brother Chiû [= Jiu] to be killed, Kwan Chung was not able to die with him. Moreover, he became prime minister to Huan.’ 2. The Master [= Confucius] said: ‘Kwan Chung acted as prime minister to the Duke Hwan, made him leader of all the princes, and united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to the present-day, the people enjoy the gifts which he conferred. But for Kwan Chung, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our coats buttoning on the left side.’ 3. ‘Will you require from him the small fidelity of common men and common women, who would commit suicide in a stream or ditch, no one knowing anything about them?’” (Legge: 1972, vol. 1, p. 282–283 (Book XIV. Hsien Wân, Chap. XVIII.)

⁹⁴⁶ Bernal: 1976, p. 94, 371n17.

Chunqiu to rule All-under-Heaven and not to rule [only] one country, to rule the Ten Thousand Generations and not to rule [only] one era.”⁹⁴⁷

In this one respect, the Old Text scholars like Liu, who usually preferred the *Zuo zhuan*, took the *Gongyang zhuan* as their basis. The phrase “to expel the Yi (barbarians)” was used with regard to oppose westernization, as well as with regard to the Manchu emperors.⁹⁴⁸ By using the title *Rangshu* Liu makes the direction of his book clear enough. The *Rangshu* is aimed at expelling those, who are considered to be “barbarians,” but in a more theoretical way than Guan Zhong once did. Liu wanted to differentiate all Non-Han people in the surroundings in order to clarify what is left – the Han Chinese people. To achieve this goal he proceeds from various directions. His sixteen chapters are about Han and Non-Han descent and races⁹⁴⁹, Non-Han history in connection with China and its allegedly bad effects⁹⁵⁰, right and wrong inheritance lines⁹⁵¹ and also about general philosophical themes⁹⁵². Especially the first half the book is occupied with the topic of the perception of the Self in contrast to the Other.

The *Zhongguo minzu zhi*

The *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (*The Ideal of an Ethnicity of China*) was first published in 1905. It consists of eighteen chapters with two introductory chapters, the “Xu (Preface)”⁹⁵³ and the “Lun ben shu da zhi (Great aims of this book),”⁹⁵⁴ where Liu puts down his general theses, on which the book is based. These two paragraphs are essentially longer than the introductory passage in the *Rangshu*. Here his ideas on ethnicity and nation become very clear. Concluding his preface Liu writes: “I wrote the *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, so that we, the people of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu zhi min*), also know about the advantage and the disadvantage [of nationalism (*minzuzhuyi*)].”⁹⁵⁵

⁹⁴⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1897], p. 48, line 3. Levenson’s translation see Levenson: 1959, p. 46n28.

⁹⁴⁸ Bernal: 1976, p. 95.

⁹⁴⁹ “Huaxia (The Huaxia people)”, “Yi yi (The Yi [barbarian] neighbour people)”, “Yi zhong (The different kinds of Yi [barbarians])”, “Miao Li (The Miao and Li)” and “Bian Xia (Changing the Xia people).” (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 1a–8a, 16b–18a.)

⁹⁵⁰ “Hu shi (Foreign Histories)”, “Yu Dao (Selling the Way)” and “Di Hong (Emperor Hong [Xiuquan]).” (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 8a–9b, 18a–20b.)

⁹⁵¹ “Su xing (Thinking back to family names)” (about the ancient habit of maternal family lines), “Du xing (Dispraising of family names)” and “Bian xing (Distinguishing between family names).” (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 9b–16b.)

⁹⁵² “Zui gang (The mistake of classes)”, “Shi zhi (Officials of history)”, “Zhou Yi (The *Yijing* of Zhou times)”, “Kong Lao (Confucius and Laozi)” and “Zheng ming (Rectification of names).” (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 20b–32a.)

⁹⁵³ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1a–b.

⁹⁵⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi”, p. 1a–2a.

⁹⁵⁵ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1b.

The book contains of eighteen chapters covering history since prehistoric times until Liu's days in chronological order.⁹⁵⁶ Especially four chapters seem important because they deal with Non-Han conquest dynasties: the tenth chapter "Tonggusizu zhi geju (The separatist regimes of the Tungusic people)"⁹⁵⁷; the thirteenth chapter "Wudai Song yi zu zhi qinru (The invasion of foreign ethnicities during the Five Dynasties and the Song)"⁹⁵⁸; the fourteenth chapter "Mengguzu zhi neiqin (The invasion of the Mongols)"⁹⁵⁹; and the sixteenth chapter "Manzu zhi neiqin ji Hanzu zhi mouguang (The Manchu ethnicity's invasion and the Han ethnicity's plans for restoration)."⁹⁶⁰

The *Zhongguo lishi jiaoke shu*

The *Zhongguo lishi jiaoke shu* (*Textbook of China's history*) was first published in 1906, only one year after the *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, by the anti-Manchu *Guoxue baocun hui*, a self-financed organization in the foreign concessions of Shanghai, which Liu had joined in 1905.⁹⁶¹ It is by far the longest of the three books and consists of three parts.

The *Zhongguo lishi jiaoke shu* is not so much a history book than a political treatise, which uses the history of the Western Zhou (*Xi Zhou*) (1046–771 BC) to "shed light on the political structure of late Qing China."⁹⁶² Like the other two it has a general introductory chapter.⁹⁶³ In this chapter, Liu reveals his general ideas of China's history and its historiography. He thinks that traditional histories would be too scarce and contradicting in their ideas about antiquity, and too many and too repetitive regarding later times. Moreover, hitherto textbooks (*jiaokeshu*) would be too simple and therefore not useful. Therefore, Liu's aim is to write a concise but nevertheless understandable and precise history of China in order "to explain the theory of the evolution of human

⁹⁵⁶ 1. Report of East Asian ethnicities and the rise and origin of the Han ethnicity; 2. The expansion of the Han ethnicity and its relation with the Miao ethnicity; 3. The situation of the Xia and Yin and the relations of the Western Zhou and foreign ethnicities; 4. Rise and Fall of foreign ethnicities in the Spring and Autums era; 5. Rise and Fall of foreign ethnicities in the Warring States period; 6. The unification of the Qin and its relations with the Xiongnu; 7. The relations of the Western Han with foreign ethnicities; 8. The Rise of the Eastern Han and the gradual invasion of foreign ethnicities; 9. The era of the Five Hu barbarians invading (Sixteen Kingdoms 304 to 439 AD); 10. The separatistic regimes of the Tungusic people; 11. The relations of the Sui and Tang with foreign ethnicities; 12. The invasion of foreign ethnicities at the end of the Tang; 13. The invasion of foreign ethnicities during the Five Dynasties and Song; 14. The invasion of the Mongols; 15. The restoration of the Ming people and their relations with foreign ethnicities; 16. The invasion of the Manchu ethnicity and the plans for restoration of the Han ethnicity; 17. Report of each province's ethnicities; 18. The invasion of the white race. (Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], "Mulu," p. 1a–b.

⁹⁵⁷ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 27a–30a.

⁹⁵⁸ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 36a–40a.

⁹⁵⁹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 40b–43a.

⁹⁶⁰ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 46a–48a.

⁹⁶¹ Hon: 2007, p. 81, 95.

⁹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁹⁶³ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1906], "Fanli," p. 1a–b.

society.”⁹⁶⁴ He writes that like in Western histories he would write a “civilizational history (*wenmingshi*)” divided into certain periods.⁹⁶⁵ Although Liu admits that this method would be mainly used in Western works, he claims that

“to distinguish periods nearly resembles the annalistic style (*biannianti*) of Chinese historiography, and furthermore, to distinguish categories nearly resembles the style of the Three Comprehensive [Works] (*San tong ti*)⁹⁶⁶.”⁹⁶⁷

Although Liu tries to link his approach to traditional Chinese historiographical methods, the genre of civilizational histories had been introduced to China via Japanese scholarship. In the second half of the 19th century, Western civilizational histories had reached Japan as *bunmeishi*. The most important translations were Henry Thomas Buckle’s (1821–1862) (unfinished but) gigantic *History of Civilization in England* (1857–1861) and François Pierre Guillaume Guizot’s (1787–1874) *Histoire de la civilisation en Europe* (1828).⁹⁶⁸ Among Chinese scholars, especially Japanese adaptations of civilizational histories for Chinese history gained influence. Naka Michiyo’s (1851–1908) *Shina tsûshi* (*General History of China*) (1888–1890) was a first “serious and successful attempt to rewrite Chinese history” in the new genre, also adopting the Western style three periods.⁹⁶⁹ Also Kuwabara Jitsuzô’s (1871–1931) *Chûtô tôyôshi* (*History of East Asia for Highschools*) (1898) became very influential among Chinese scholars.⁹⁷⁰ Liu’s *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* written in this style became “an acclaimed exemplar” of the new style civilizational history books, promoting nationalism and progressive linear history.⁹⁷¹

The title of Liu’s book and also its introduction implicate that *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* is a general history of China (*Zhongguo tongshi*), but it turns out that it is constricted to two eras only. The first part covers what Liu calls antiquity (*gudai*), that is, the time before the 11th century BC. The second and third part cover the time of the Western Zhou (*Xi Zhou*) (11th century–771 BC). According to the thematic link and the continuing numeration of the chapters the second and third part of *Zhongguo lishi jiaoke shu* in fact form one and not two separated parts. They also have their own “Xu li (Preface and instruction)”⁹⁷² and also a conclusion titled “Zhiqu (Purposes).”⁹⁷³ In the preface to the second part Liu indicates that part one on the one hand, and part two and three on the

⁹⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 1b. See also Wang, F.: 2012, p. 147.

⁹⁶⁵ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “Fanli,” p. 1a.

⁹⁶⁶ The Three Comprehensive [Works] are three historical books from Tang, Song and Yuan times. Although they were never counted among the official histories, they nevertheless were held in high esteem. The three works are Du You’s (735–812) *Tongdian* (*Comprehensive Institutions*) (801), Zheng Qiao’s (1104–1162) *Tongzhi* (*Comprehensive Annals*) (1161) and Ma Duanlin’s *Wenxian tongkao* (*Comprehensive Examination of Literature*) (1317).

⁹⁶⁷ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “Fanli,” p. 1a.

⁹⁶⁸ Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 106.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 113; Naka: 1899 [1888–1890].

⁹⁷⁰ Kuwabara: 1968 [1898]. Liu Shipei refers to it as *Dongyang shi* (*History of East Asia*). (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 1a.)

⁹⁷¹ Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 126.

⁹⁷² Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “Di er ce,” “Xuli,” p. 1a–2a.

⁹⁷³ Ibid., “Di san ce,” p. 50a–52b.

other hand were originally planned as two separate works and were combined as one textbook only later.

What becomes clear in the second part of this work though is that in Liu's opinion the Western Zhou time is a key point in history, because the Six Classics – the basis of Han Chinese philosophy and learning, and moreover, intellectual identity – were created during that time: “All Six Classics⁹⁷⁴ are historical books of the Western Zhou. The political events, the whole situation and the decrees and rites in general can be seen in the text body of the Six Classics.”⁹⁷⁵ Therefore, the Western Zhou “is the one mostly taken as a model by later dynasties.”⁹⁷⁶ Liu also tries to persuade his readers to rely on the Western Zhou, because it would be the “one, which mostly coincides with Western politics.”⁹⁷⁷

The reference to Zhou times was a basic approach of the scholars attached to the National Essence Movement. As Hon Tze-ki writes the historical writings published in the organ of the *Guoxue baocun hui*, the *Guocui xuebao*, aimed at identifying “the particular kind of Chinese cultural heritage that would usher the country into the twentieth-century.”⁹⁷⁸ They claimed that this particular kind of cultural heritage in pre-Qin times, that is, before 221 BC, which was considered the “Golden Age” of the Zhou dynasty and cradle of Han Chinese culture. During this time “local autonomy and independent thinking” predominated over unifying tendencies.⁹⁷⁹ They saw proof for this claim in the point that before 221 BC there had been a great variety of philosophical schools, Confucius being only one philosopher among many. Moreover, they emphasized that during Zhou times scholars did not necessarily stem from aristocratic families or hold official positions.⁹⁸⁰

In contrast to that, they considered the time after the unification of China in 221 BC as a “Dark Age.” The devaluation of this time according to Hon was based on two major trends. On the one hand, the National Essence scholars criticized the centralization with the help of officials, who stood under the growing predominance of Confucian orthodoxy. On the other hand, they saw this centralization increasing under foreign rule, i.e. the Mongol Empire and the Manchu Qing. Therefore, they referred to the Zhou times as being the bearer of the National Essence of China, which could free China from “absolute monarchy and political oppression.”⁹⁸¹

⁹⁷⁴ *Shijing* (Book of Odes), *Shujing/Shangshu* (Book of History), *Liji* (Book of Rites), *Yuejing* (Classic of Music), *Yijing* (Book of Changes), *Chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals).

⁹⁷⁵ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1906], “Di er ce,” “Xuli,” p. 1a.

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, “Di san ce,” p. 52a.

⁹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52b.

⁹⁷⁸ Hon: 2003, p. 247.

⁹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

3.3 Liu Shipei's Idea of China's History

Unlike his contemporaries, Liu Shipei felt obligated to take up the cudgels for Chinese historiography, and although relying on modern Western approaches like the genre of civilizational history, which framed history in periods he insisted that similar methods would have been in existence in Chinese historiography. But like Liu and Zhang he also criticized traditional Chinese historiography:

“Chinese history books (*Zhongguo shishu*) are detailed about rulers and officials, but scant about the people (*renmin*), detailed about heroic deeds, but scant about system of decrees, detailed about later generations, but scant about antiquity.”⁹⁸²

Liu's critique that Chinese histories would concentrate on rulers and officials is nearly identical with Liang Qichao's critique of traditional Chinese historiography, which would only refer to individuals and dynastic courts and not on the community and the nation-state, brought forward in “*Xin shixue*” (1902).⁹⁸³ Both allude to the new genre of civilizational history, analyzing the whole nation and its evolution, which they find much more suitable with regard to a Chinese national history than traditional approaches.

Because Liu finds both critique and approval with Western and Chinese historiography he bases his periodization of Chinese history on both, Western models and Chinese forerunners. In his opinion categories and topics should be analyzed according to eras, and the most important topics would be:

“First, the differences and similarities of dynastic governments;
second, complete history of racial-ethnic division and unity (*zhongzu fen he*);
third, a survey of system changes;
fourth, the steps of social progress; and
fifth, general tendencies of intellectual progress and regress.”⁹⁸⁴

To achieve his goal to analyze all these diverse topics Liu intends to use Chinese records and books and additionally modern Western archaeological works about China.⁹⁸⁵

⁹⁸² Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “*Fanli*,” p. 1a.

⁹⁸³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 3.

⁹⁸⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “*Fanli*,” p. 1a-b.

⁹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1b.

The Proper Name for China

Like Liang in 1901⁹⁸⁶ and Zhang in 1907⁹⁸⁷, Liu worries about the proper name for China. Liang comes to the conclusion that “Middle State (*Zhongguo*)” would be the most proper name for China, and Zhang would later settle for “Republic of China (*Zhonghua minguo*).” But Liu thinks differently in the *Rangshu*. He lists diverse traditional names the Han people have given themselves – Xia, Great Xia (*Da Xia*), the various Xia (*zhu Xia*), Huaxia, the various Hua (*zhu Hua*) – and others, which were given to them – the Western term China (*Zhina*) and the Russian *Kitaj*, both deriving from the name for the Non-Han ethnicity Khitan (*Qidan*).⁹⁸⁸ In the end he laments: “China (*Zhongguo*) has no country name. To name our country we used dynastic names, which were also family names.”⁹⁸⁹

According to Liu the first step to maintain the borders between the Han people and the “barbarians” would be to give oneself a proper and lasting name. Like Liang Liu despises the names of foreigners’ and also dynastic and therefore timely limited names.⁹⁹⁰ Unlike Liang, however, he does not take *Zhongguo* into account (without giving a reason), but draws a different conclusion, which name would be proper: “If China wants to strengthen itself then it is impossible not to use Great Xia (*Da Xia*) as a country name!”⁹⁹¹ And he asks: “Is it not so that we can only use Great Xia as a country name [if we want] to distinguish ourselves from the Yi (barbarians) of [all] four [directions] (*si Yi*)?”⁹⁹²

Indirectly it becomes clear why Liu favors Great Xia as the most proper name. He writes that the name Great Xia would first be mentioned in the *Shan hai jing* (*The Classic of the Mountains and Seas*), traditionally considered to be of pre-Qin origin.⁹⁹³ The name “various Xia (*zhu Xia*)” would even be of earlier origin and would date from the time of the half-legendary ruler Great Yu (*Da Yu*) (traditional dates 2200–2100 BC). Liu chooses Great Xia because it displays the connection to the “Golden Age” of Zhou and at the same time refers to the origin of the Han ethnicity as an ancient old cultural civilization. It is interesting, though, that Liu himself seems not to be able to settle with one single term. Throughout his book, he constantly uses different terms for his land and people.

⁹⁸⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901], p. 3, line 2–6.

⁹⁸⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 253. See also Cassel: 1997, p. 18.

⁹⁸⁸ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1903], p. 1a–2b.

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2b, in small characters.

⁹⁹⁰ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1906], “*Di yi ce*,” p. 15b. See also Liang Qichao who also searched for an appropriate name for China. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901], p. 3, line 2–6.)

⁹⁹¹ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1903], p. 2b, in small characters.

⁹⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1. The final version of the *Shan hai jing* dates is based on writings by Guo Pu (276–324), but the material stems from the 3rd/2nd century BC. (Schmidt-Glitzner: 1999, p. 77.)

The Periodization of China's History and the Inclusion of Foreign Dynasties

In his three books, Liu clearly equalizes China's history – he refers to it as *Zhongguo lishi*, *Zhongguo shi* or *Zhong shi* – with ethnic Han history and tries to exclude Non-Han histories as far as possible. This is congruent with his declared aim in the *Rangshu*, which is to expel the “barbarians” from a Han nation-state not only in the present, but also from China's past history by no longer treating especially Non-Han dynastic but also other Non-Han histories as if they would be part of it.⁹⁹⁴ The second introductory part of the *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, the “great aims of this book,” which are listed after the preface and the table of contents, gives a further idea of Liu's intentions: “The idea of this work is taking the Han ethnicity as host (*zhu*) and the other ethnicities (*ta zu*) as guests (*ke*).”⁹⁹⁵ Liu creates a clear dichotomy by defining the Han, the Self, the “inside (*nei*)” as the “hosts (*zhu*),” and the “barbarians,” the Other, the “outside (*wai*)” as the “guests (*ke*).” There are three aspects, under which Liu examines the “hosting” role of the Han ethnicity and the “guest” position of the other ethnicities⁹⁹⁶:

First, “the expansion of the borders by the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*)”

Second, “the powerful conquests by foreign ethnicities (*yi zu*)”

Third, “the fusion of the Han ethnicity with foreign ethnicities”

To clarify his perception of the encounters between Han and foreign ethnicities Liu gives two lists of important eras in the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* with regard to these aspects. One list refers to “the expansion of the borders by the Han ethnicity” outside their “aboriginal territory China proper (*Zhina benbu*).”⁹⁹⁷ The other refers to the invasions and conquests of foreign ethnicities.⁹⁹⁸ (The third point the “fusion of the Han people with other people” is not divided in clear-cut phases (see below).⁹⁹⁹) As a result, Liu presents a kind of periodization to his readers. It is a rather uncommon one because he does not try to fit every single era and dynasty into the three-era system of antiquity, medieval times and modernity adopted from the West and popular since around 1900 in China.¹⁰⁰⁰ Liu distinguishes four important phases regarding the territorial expansions by the Han Chinese¹⁰⁰¹:

1. 221 BC–9 AD:

⁹⁹⁴ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 9, line 1–4.

⁹⁹⁵ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 1a, line 1.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 1a–2a.

⁹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 1a.

⁹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 1a–b.

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 1b.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Hon: 2007, p. 85f.

¹⁰⁰¹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 1a.

Characterized by the erection of the Great Wall during Qin times and the conquest of the Western regions (*Xiyu*), pacification of the Xiongnu, Western and Southern Yi (*Xinan Yi*), conquest of [the Four Commanderies of] [Ko]chosōn ([*Gu*]chaoxian) (2333–108 BC)¹⁰⁰², and defeat of the Minyue kingdom (334–110 BC) during Early Han times especially by Han Wudi (r. 141–87 BC).

2. 25–220:

The Eastern Han defeated the Northern Xiongnu, held the Western regions and conquered the Ailao¹⁰⁰³.

3. 581–907:

In Sui times the kingdom of Linyi¹⁰⁰⁴ (192–758) was conquered in the South and Koguryō¹⁰⁰⁵ in the East. In Tang times, the Tujue Turks were pacified and the Western regions and the Four Garrisons (*si zhen*)¹⁰⁰⁶ were established.

4. 1368–1644:

In Ming times Vietnam (*Annan*)¹⁰⁰⁷ was conquered, Turfan (*Tulufan*) and Hami were subdued.

Liu declares that he does not consider the expansions under the Northern Wei, the Mongols and the Manchu Qing because they would not be part of the Han ethnicity.¹⁰⁰⁸

The breaches between these four eras are nearly filled by the five phases regarding the second point, the conquests by Non-Han people¹⁰⁰⁹:

1. 8th century–476 BC:

Since the reign of last king of the Western Zhou, King You of Zhou (*Zhou You wang*) (795–771, reign time 781–771 BC), Western Rong (*Xi Rong*) and Eastern Yi (*Dong Yi*) invaded China. In the Spring and Autumn Period, the Xianyu¹⁰¹⁰ in the North, the Yiqu¹⁰¹¹ in the West, the Hundred Pu (*Bai Pu*) in the South and the Yi in the East invaded China.

2. 2nd century–420:

¹⁰⁰² Liu writes that Han Wudi would have defeated Kochosōn (*Guchaoxian*), but he must refer to the conquest of the Four Commanderies (*Han si bu*) on the former territory of Kochosōn. They came under control of the Han Dynasty after the fall of Kochosōn. Two of them remained under Han dominance until the early 4th century AD.

¹⁰⁰³ The Ailao were an ethnicity living in the today's border regions between Yunnan province and Myanmar.

¹⁰⁰⁴ This kingdom was probably located in today's South China and North Vietnam.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Liu writes Koryō (*Gaoli*) (918–1392), but this is a abbreviation for Koguryō (*Gaajuli*) (37 BC–668 AD) here.

¹⁰⁰⁶ This must refer to the Four Garrisons of Anxi (*Anxi si zhen*), which were stationed in four cities in today's Xinjiang, Kashgar (*Kashi*), Kucha (*Kuche*), Karashahr (*Yanqi*) and Khotan (*Hetian*).

¹⁰⁰⁷ The Ming defeated the short lived Hò (*Hu*) dynasty (1400–1407) and ruled Vietnam for twenty years until 1427.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], "Lun ben shu da zhi," p. 1a.

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1a–b.

¹⁰¹⁰ This is the name of a chiefdom of one subgroup of the White Di (*Bai Di*).

¹⁰¹¹ This is the name of a chiefdom of the Western Rong (*Xi Rong*).

In late Eastern Han times many tribes invaded China, i.e. the Qiang Hu and the Xianbei. During the Jin Dynasty (265–420), the Five Hu (*Wu Hu*) and the Rong caitiffs (*Rong lu*) invaded China and the Tuoba founded the Northern Wei (386–534).

3. 4th century–1368:

The Jin dynasty saw the founding of the Yan dynasties (337–436) by Tungusic (in fact, Xianbei) people. During Tang times, the Tangut (*Dangxiang*) and Tibetan ethnicities (*Xizang zu*) invaded China. During Xia, Liao, Jin and Yuan times “the territory of the Han ethnicity eternally became a foreign country (*yi yu*).”

4. 1368–1644:

In mid-Ming times the Manchus (*Manzhu*) gained power and at the end invaded China (*Zhonghua*).

5. 19th century:

In late Qing times the Westerners (*Xiren*) penetrated Eastwards into China proper and the Europeans (*Ouzhou*) invaded the territory.

In contrast to Liu’s first list where he does not include any Non-Han dynasties here they are naturally included. The Tuoba Wei, Western Xia, Liao, Jin, Yuan and Qing dynasties are listed as representatives of the foreign ethnicities conquering China. Although the Qing dynasty seems to be also included as a so to speak conquered dynasty because it “did not repel the Eastern invasion of the Western people” it becomes clear that Liu is only interested in the history of Chinese inhabited regions, that is, China proper, which he says has entirely been divided among the sphere of European power.¹⁰¹²

Liu gives his anti-Manchu and general xenophobic opinion freely. The “hosts” are clearly positioned higher than the “guests.” His aim to exclude the “barbarians” from Han Chinese history and politics is not only based on a mere difference between them, but it is a moral obligation, because he considers the Non-Han as morally inferior and thinks that they would have already “polluted” the Han. Liu’s aim is to re-purify the Han by the very expulsion he calls for.

When Liu refers to Non-Han dynasties it becomes obvious that he does not assume their assimilation and thinks that their histories should not be included in China’s history, especially not as legitimate dynasties with official histories. In his eyes foreign people just do not belong to China’s history:

“The [Khitans] Liao, [Jurchens] Jin and Mongols were inferior ethnicities (*jian zu*) from the North and the desert. Well, the time of their bloom was parallel to that of the Song and Ming. But [historical] literature turned caitiff chieftains into holy men, bemoaned their morale and narrated their benevolence after their decline.

¹⁰¹² Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 1b.

Bewailing the end of their fate is a contradiction and hinders the commemoration of the past. It is the guilt of Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072)¹⁰¹³ and Song Lian (1310–1381)¹⁰¹⁴. How could they escape from that [guilt]? ([In small characters:] That Tuo Tuo used Yi (barbarian) men (*Yiren*) to compile the histories cannot be criticized enough.)

Now, when emperor Mingzong of the [Later] Tang dynasty (r. 926–936) [founded by the Shatuo Turks] prayed to heaven he called himself ‘servant (*chen*)’¹⁰¹⁵ – an originally Hu (barbarian) man (*ben hu ren*) hoped to be become a wise lord. Yang Weizhen (1296–1370) was born during the Mongol times and he did not count the Liao and Jin dynasty as orthodox. I fear I am the only one, who is resolute about that the Yi (barbarians) shall not replace the Xia!

So, after [the decline of the Song Dynasty in] 1276¹⁰¹⁶ there was no orthodox [dynasty] for about one hundred years and after [the decline of the Ming Dynasty in] 1644¹⁰¹⁷ there was no orthodox [dynasty] for three hundred years. What are called ‘histories’ are in fact Hu (barbarian) histories (*hu shi*) and not Hua (Chinese) histories (*Hua shi*). The everlasting night forever waits for the morning! There was no time when historical ministers did not analyze balderdash and turned it up into orthodoxy.”¹⁰¹⁸

This is Liu’s refusal of all Non-Han histories even official dynastic histories, and his stand against ever Non-Han aspect incorporated alongside Han Chinese history into the cultural memory of the Han people. In general Liu takes a definite despising standpoint regarding Non-Han people. Therefore, his books, especially the *Rangshu*, but also even the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* are no analyses of ethnicities in Asia although some of their chapters imply it. They are rather polemic pamphlets against everything Non-Han and an urgent appeal to all Han people to unite and re-erect the borders, thus excluding Non-Han from their midst and thereby strengthening the Han Chinese ethnicity by National Essence.

¹⁰¹³ He directed the compilation of the *Xin Tangshu* and the *Xin Wudai shi*.

¹⁰¹⁴ He directed the compilation of the *Yuanshi*.

¹⁰¹⁵ This is a term generally used by underlings of all kinds. In this context, Liu Shipei probably refers to Mingzong’s self-regard as being the legitimate son of heaven, rightfully calling himself the servant of heaven when praying to it.

¹⁰¹⁶ The end of the Song Dynasty.

¹⁰¹⁷ The end of the Ming Dynasty.

¹⁰¹⁸ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 9a.

3.4 Racial Categories

Defining Ethnicity

In both the *Rangshu* and the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* Liu gives his ideas how the category of ethnicity is defined. His standpoint shifts from 1903 to 1905. In the *Rangshu* from 1903 Liu takes a definition entirely based on culture in contrast to his later rather racial definition of ethnicity from 1905. The *Rangshu* definition is close to Liang Qichao's idea from the same time, based on culturalism and not on racist or racialist ideas.

Max Weber (1864–1920) is seen as the first to claim that the racial criterion was not a part of ethnic group identities based on reality, but that it was “a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type (*äußeren Habitus*) or of customs (*Sitten*) or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration.”¹⁰¹⁹ Already in the 1920s Weber called these groups “ethnic groups (*ethnische Gruppen*)” and claimed that in reality “it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists.” For him, “ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere.”¹⁰²⁰ Weber disclosed that the reason for the propagation of such group formation would be a political one.¹⁰²¹ Weber's definition of ethnicity as a subjective construction became leading in modern, one could maybe call it “post-nationalist” sociology and anthropology – Anderson's “imagined communities” and Hobsbawm's and Ranger's “invented traditions” serve witness to this development.¹⁰²²

Although Liu claims to base his approach in the *Rangshu* (1903) on Confucius, it resembles the modern idea of ethnic identity being constructed. According to Liu Confucius “especially relied on reputation and cultural achievements (*shengming wenwu*) [to differentiate between the inside and the outside].”¹⁰²³ Belonging to one ethnic group

¹⁰¹⁹ Weber: 1978 [1968], vol. 2, p. 389; Weber: 1922, p. 219. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* of 2010, however, still lists race as one defining aspect of ethnicity. (“ethnic group.” In: *Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*: 2010.)

¹⁰²⁰ Weber: 1978 [1968], vol. 2, p. 389; Weber: 1922, p. 219. The last sentence run slightly differently in the German original: “Die ethnische Gemeinschaft (im hier gemeinten Sinne) ist demgegenüber nicht selbst Gemeinschaft, sondern nur ein die Vergemeinschaftung erleichterndes Moment. Sie kommt der allerverschiedensten, vor allem freilich erfahrungsgemäß: der politischen Vergemeinschaftung, fördernd entgegen.”

¹⁰²¹ Weber: 1978 [1968], vol. 2, p. 389; Weber: 1922, p. 219.

¹⁰²² Anderson: 2006; Hobsbawm/Ranger: 1983.

¹⁰²³ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 2b. The phrase “reputation and cultural achievements” is a reference to the *Zuo zhuan*, where it is said: “Cultural achievements (*wenwu*) can be used to record, reputation (*shengming*) can be used to demonstrate.” (Translation by Legge: 1972, p. 38 (Book II. Duke Hwan, Second year.) Hu Zhihui translates more literally: “Patterns and colours are used to record the norms of conduct. Sound and light are used to publicise these norms.” (*Zuo zhuan*: 1996, vol. 1, p. 52–55 (Huan gong, 2nd year.) The context is that a festive ceremony is held at the royal ancestral shrine, but it is not suitable with the rites. Therefore, Zang Aibo tells Duke Huan of Lu (*Lu Huan gong*) (d. 694 BC, reign time 711–694 BC) that such a conduct is false. He lays

– in Liu’s case the Han – is identical with belonging to a certain cultural group. Blood relations or physical appearance as racialism requires do not seem to be important for Liu in the *Rangshu*.

In the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* in 1905 Liu’s idea shifts. He begins his introduction with a citation from Giuseppe Mazzini (*Mazhini*) (1805–1872), a Genoese revolutionary and a champion of the movement for Italian unity known as “il Risorgimento”¹⁰²⁴ with the statement that “the Italian Mazzini says: ‘All those of a common race (*renzhong*), common customs and language can form a state (*guo*).’”¹⁰²⁵ Liu claims that this would in fact be a definition of nationalism (*minzuzhuyi*).

In 1903, Liang Qichao had based his definition of ethnicity (*minzu*) on a European author, too. He lists eight criteria – place, blood relation, physical appearance, language, script, religion, tradition and way of living –, which he claims to have adopted from Bluntschli, who in fact only lists five.¹⁰²⁶ When comparing Liang’s/Bluntschli’s criteria to Mazzini’s they can be grouped together: Liang’s/Bluntschli’s blood relation and physical appearance reflect Liu’s/Mazzini’s racial argument; Liang’s/Bluntschli’s language and script are downsized to language in Liu’s/Mazzini’s definition; Liang’s/Bluntschli’s tradition and way of living might be equalized with Liu’s/Mazzini’s customs. Liang

before him how it should be, mentioning the embroidered ceremonial garments. All embroideries would have certain meanings regarding norms of conduct, “sound and light” would be used to make these norms widely known. Although Zang Aibo’s words were not followed, but his effort was praised.

¹⁰²⁴ Giuseppe Mazzini was a “chief inspirer and leading agitator of the Italian Risorgimento.” But his influence surpassed Italy and “at his time, he ranked among the leading European intellectual figures.” It is claimed that “his life and writings inspired several patriotic and anticolonial movements in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as early Zionists, Gandhi, Nehru, and Sun Yat-sen.” (Mazzini: 2009, p. 1–2 (introduction by Recchia and Urbinati); about his life see *ibid.*: p. 3–7.)

He was a “Genoese propagandist and revolutionary, founder of the secret revolutionary society Young Italy (1832), and a champion of the movement for Italian unity known as the Risorgimento. An uncompromising republican, he refused to participate in the parliamentary government that was established under the monarchy of the House of Savoy when Italy became unified and independent (1861).” (“Mazzini, Giuseppe.” In: *Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*: 2010.)

That the Risorgimento was well-known also in China is revealed by the fact, that also Liang Qichao wrote an essay about it, including a report about Mazzini. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_10], p. 5–10, 13–14.)

¹⁰²⁵ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1a. I could not find the original passage from which Liu could have drawn this citation. However, it is most unlikely that Mazzini wrote something meant in the way Liu understands this quotation, as Mazzini writes “language, territory, and race are just indications of *nationality*.” (Mazzini: 2009, p. 65.) He considered these factors to be “not sufficient for the emergence of self-determining political units, and certainly unable in and of themselves to legitimate national independence.” For Mazzini, the most important factors of a nation are “equality and democracy” (Recchia/Urbinati: 2009. “Introduction.” In: Mazzini: 2009, p. 12.) Moreover, Mazzini was not an advocator of nationalism, he considered it to be “politically dangerous and morally wrong.” (*Ibid.*, p. 16.) Indeed, Mazzini defined “nation” as follows: “a nation is a larger or smaller aggregate of human beings bound together into an organic whole by agreement in a certain number of real particulars, such as ethnicity, language, physiognomy, historical tradition, intellectual peculiarities, or active tendencies.” As examples he gives the Russians, the French, the English and the Spaniards. (Mazzini: 2009, p. 214, “Noninterventions.”)

However, there is a similarity between Liu Shipei and Mazzini as well as between Italy and China, and that is that both countries were ruled by foreigners and both men argued against conquest rule. (*Ibid.*, p. 178–192.)

¹⁰²⁶ Bluntschli lists way of living, customs, physical appearance, religion, and language. (See above Chapter 1.2 (subchapter “Liang Qichao’s Essay about Johann Kaspar Bluntschli”); Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75; Bluntschli: 1874, p. 37. See also Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 71–72, where he lists the same criteria.)

implies that language, script and tradition would be the most important factors to form an ethnicity.¹⁰²⁷

As we have seen above Liu also emphasizes culture leaving language and script aside in the *Rangshu*. But two years later Liu emphasizes blood relations. Although he gives Mazzini's three criteria of nationalism (*minzuzhuyi*) his own definition of ethnicity (*minzu*) runs differently and is confined to the racial aspect:

“Those, who are an ethnicity (*minzu*), are those, who – coming from a consanguine family (*tong xuetong zhi jiazhu*) – change and unify (*huahe*) other ethnicities of different blood, and form one group.”¹⁰²⁸

It becomes obvious that if ethnicity is defined via blood relations or race assimilation happens by change of “blood.” Liu probably refers to eugenics here like Zhang did in 1901.¹⁰²⁹ Zhang concretely explained how inferior races could be changed into superior ones by intermarriage: if someone of a “superior race” intermarries with someone of an “inferior race,” their descendants of the seventh generation would be completely superior if they kept on marrying only superiors afterwards.¹⁰³⁰ It seems as if Liu has the same idea of ethnic identity and assimilation in 1905.

The Origin of Ethnic Difference

At the beginning of his first chapter “Huaxia (The Huaxia people)” in the *Rangshu* Liu states:

“When the two principles *qian* and *kun*¹⁰³¹ manifested the ten thousand things differences developed according to environment. The Rong (barbarians) and the Xia had distinct characters, races were different. Therefore all [people] are not identical (*bu tong*).”¹⁰³²

This is a reference to the *Zuo zhuan* citation so crucial for Old Text scholars like Liu: “If he be not of our kin, he is sure to have a different mind (*fei wu zulei qi xin bi yi*).”¹⁰³³

¹⁰²⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75.

¹⁰²⁸ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1a.

¹⁰²⁹ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 40 (ch. 20 “Zu zhi”).

¹⁰³⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰³¹ These two principles are also better known as the two principles *yin* and *yang*, of which they are the graphic representations. Heaven and Earth are their physical representations. *Qian* and *kun* are two of the eight Trigrams of the *Yijing*. The Appendices of the *Yijing* equalled *qian* and *kun* with *yin* and *yang*: “*Ch'ien* is a *yang* thing; *k'un* is a *yin* thing.” (Legge: 1970, p. 395.) They are thought to be the matter of origin of the universe, opposing and completing each other, causing genesis and change. (See also Fung: 1952, vol. 1, p. 382ff.)

¹⁰³² Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 1a.

¹⁰³³ Legge: 1972, vol. 5, p. 354–355 (Book VIII. Duke Ch'ing, Fourth year). See also *Zuo zhuan*: 1996, vol. 1, p. 568–569 (Cheng gong, 4th year).

Moreover, it is a the explanation for the existence of different ethnicities based on “environmental determinism,” an explanation Liang had also favored in 1903 but put aside later.¹⁰³⁴ The basic assumption is that different environments lead to different ways of life. And different ways of life are seen as the basis for differences in habit and custom. But like Liang Liu is not really interested in Non-Han ethnicities. This becomes obvious by the fact that he does not try to see them in a differentiated way, but employs the stereotype dichotomy of the Han versus the “barbarians” (Liu calls them Rong here). The opposition of Han versus “barbarians” not only fits into the system of the two principles, but moreover into the Han-centered thinking, which forms the base of culturalism. Liu did not want to create a picture of China or its history as realistic as possible, but rather a picture that would serve his purpose best – to expel the “barbarians” from the history, the territory and ultimately from the mind of modern China. By subsuming all Non-Han people of East Asia to one group of “barbarians” their exclusion would seem much easier than when giving them individuality and differentiation.

In *Zhongguo minzu zhi* Liu explains the development of different ethnic groups by referring to environmental determinism: “The beginnings of human groups could not but follow the development of natural dispositions (*tianxing*); and the striving for a way to band together began then.”¹⁰³⁵ This explanation is very similar to the one in the *Rangshu*. But in *Zhongguo minzu shi* Liu’s ideas about ethnicities do not end with the question about their coming into being. What interests him most is how the differences between ethnicities resulted in their rivalry and competition:

“From striving for one group’s happiness it developed to striving for one ethnicity’s happiness. But the enlargement of one group’s power could not but harm other groups. This is the reason why wars between ethnicities (*minzu jingzheng*) arose.”¹⁰³⁶

In the *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* (1906) Liu indirectly gives the Han ethnicity as those, who originally started ethnic rivalries in China (*Zhongguo*), because “the Han ethnicity originally lived in the Western lands (*Xifang*) until the people became more and more and they moved to the East as the peoples’ colony.”¹⁰³⁷ Based on Terrien de Lacouperie’s

In fact, in the *Zuo zhuan* this sentence is claimed to be a citation from another work, the book *Zhi* by the historiographer Yi (*shi Yi*). The context is that Duke Cheng of Lu (*Lu Cheng gong*) (reign time 590–573 BC) is treated without respect when he visits the state of Jin. He plans to join forces with the state of Chu to revolt against Jin. His adviser (and relation) Ji Wenzhi (ca. 651–568 BC) advises him against this plans and says that Jin is not only very powerful, but also that Chu would not be of the kin of Lu. He cites the above mentioned sentence to strengthen his argumentation and doubts that Chu would help Lu. Finally, Duke Cheng abandons his plans.

¹⁰³⁴ See above Chapter 1.3 (subchapter “Connection between Geography and Ethnicity, Culture and Civilization”).

¹⁰³⁵ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1a.

¹⁰³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁷ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “Di yi ce,” p. 12a.

“Western origin theory (*xilai shuo*),” Liu assumes that this migration happened in prehistoric times.¹⁰³⁸ To illustrate what happened he refers to the settlement of the Spaniards in America and of the British in India – the two most powerful early modern European empires to Chinese prehistory by equalizing the eastwards migration of the Han ethnicity with much later events.¹⁰³⁹ The advance of Han settlers to the East ultimately resulted in the appearance of the Western Zhou (*Xi Zhou*) Dynasty (1046–771 BC), which is crucial for him because he considers it to be the “Golden Age.” The parallels between Chinese antiquity and European early modernity continues when Liu equalizes the political system of the Zhou Dynasty with European policy elsewhere in the text.¹⁰⁴⁰ This assumed political similarities are the basis for Liu’s logic to equalize the migration processes.¹⁰⁴¹

What interests me here are the people in the territories newly opened up and colonized by the migrating Han people. The aboriginal people seemed not to have been able or willing to reject the new settlers. Liu states that when “they [= the Han people] went from the West to the East, they lived intermingled (*zachu*) with other ethnicities (*yi zu*).”¹⁰⁴² This intermingled living is not mentioned again by Liu. In fact in the rest of the text Liu claims that the other ethnicities are mostly subdued and their territories opened up. This process is described in the sixth chapter in the *Zhongguo lishi jiaoke shu*:

“The Xia [ca. 2070–1600 BC] subdued the Eastern Yi (*Dong Yi*). That was the beginning of the opening up of the coastal areas. The Yin [ca. 1600–1046 BC] subdued the Guifang.¹⁰⁴³ That was the beginning of the opening up of the two areas Yunnan and Guizhou. And the territory of the China (*Zhongguo*) consequently became the homeland of the Han ethnicity.”¹⁰⁴⁴

In this passage Liu differentiates between two Non-Han ethnicities, the Eastern Yi and the Guifang. But after this passage the “other ethnicities” are referred to only as one group, the so-called “Yi and Di (barbarians)” for the rest of this chapter in the *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu*.

Also in the three chapters in the *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* devoted to the contacts between the Han and other ethnicities, Liu does not analyze the Non-Han people in

¹⁰³⁸ See also above Chapter 2.2 (“Assimilation in Antiquity?”) and Hon: 2007, p. 97.

¹⁰³⁹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], p. 12a. See also Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 3a.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “Di san ce,” p. 52b.

¹⁰⁴¹ In prehistory and early antiquity, the Han people lived in the West, but when they became too many, they moved eastwards. There they, developed new ideas of statecraft and laid the foundation of the Zhou dynasty, during which political theories and ideas were further developed and caused the “Golden Age.” These processes are reflected in the West in early modern times, when the British and Spanish people also became too many, so that they had to migrate to other continents, America and India, where they equally developed new ideas of statecraft and laid the foundation of modernity and the founding of nation-states. In the phase of the nation-states, political (reform) ideas were further developed.

¹⁰⁴² Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “Di yi ce,” p. 12a.

¹⁰⁴³ An ethnicity living in the Northwest of China in ancient time.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1906], “Di yi ce,” p. 13a.

greater detail.¹⁰⁴⁵ He lists several dozens of Non-Han ethnicities from antiquity and Western Zhou times and partly explains their encounters with the Han, but he does not give them individuality. The general attitude concerning Non-Han ethnicities, that is, to construct a dichotomy with the Han people is not challenged. Liu merely explains how they were defeated by the Han one after another and then came to pay tribute. With a clear reference to the situation of his time he resumes that “since then, the other ethnicities have lived intermingled (*zaju*) and the calamities have only increased in their urgency!”¹⁰⁴⁶ As a consequence from the existence of distinct ethnicities Liu claims that xenophobic thinking developed. As cited above, Liu claims in 1905 that as a consequence of ethnicities’ expansion wars broke out between them. And as a consequence from these wars “anti-foreign thinking (*paiwai zhi sixiang*) developed.”¹⁰⁴⁷

Liu sees this anti-foreign thinking as something positive and crucially important for China’s chances to strengthen itself. Therefore he calls out:

“I do not say that what the officials and high ministers shall promote is the clarifying of the borders of the Huaxia (*ming Huaxia zhi fang*), but I say it is the fixing the differences between China and the outside (*ding Zhong wai zhi yi*). How else could their [the Huaxia’s = Han ethnicity’s] national sentiment (*minzu sixiang*) reach that of other countries?”¹⁰⁴⁸

Only in phases when the Han people concentrated on the development of national sentiment and its differentiation to the outside China was strong. The construction of Great Walls (*changcheng*) during Qin (221–207 BC) and Han times (207 BC–220 AD) and the establishment of the Four Regions (*si zhen*) in Tang (618–907) times resulted in

“the increasing of power. [Further] plans to enlarge the border regions were enforced. It is said that this was not [based on] a national sentiment (*minzu sixiang*), but in fact this was its beginning and peace lasted long.”¹⁰⁴⁹

Liu concludes that the strengthening of a national sentiment and the clear differentiation of the Han Chinese from others would be crucial for China’s future existence. This is also his critique of the New Text school’s approach:

“I do not say ‘the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm (*wangzhe wu wai*).’¹⁰⁵⁰

Rather I say: The high regard for unity (*yitong*) calls for a distinct state (*ji guo*)!

¹⁰⁴⁵ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1906], “Di yi ce,” p. 20a–23a, “Di er ce,” p. 20b–23a.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1906], “Di er ce,” p. 22b–23a.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1a.

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1b.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Citation from the *Gongyang zhuan*. It appears in several chapters. (*Gongyang zhuan* (Yin gong 1st year; Huan gong, 8th year; Xi gong, 24th year; Cheng gong, 12th year).) Yang Lien-sheng whose translation I am using writes that this catchphrase from the *Gongyang zhuan* meant that “the ideal king should be a truly universal king, and not separate from the internal and the external.” (Yang Lien-sheng: 1968, p. 26.)

Rather I say: China calls for neighbor states!

Rather I say: Regarding the Yi and Di (barbarians) [one should] initiate the sentiment that condemns the enemies as well as block the progress of exchange!”¹⁰⁵¹

Liu insists on three things. First, he calls for the founding of a “distinct,” that is a Han nation-state. Second and closely related to the first he calls for the acceptance of neighbor states, that is, the acceptance of the separation of Non-Han people and consequently the release of the Han people from the burden of integrating all the Non-Han in their state as Liang and also Zhang imagined it. And third he calls for the strengthening of anti-foreign thinking, which he interprets positively because it would lead to defensive demeanor among the Han people and prevent exchange, thus enabling the Han to “re-purify” themselves:

“Alas, did disaster of foreign ethnicities’ invasions since the time of the Three Dynasties [= Xia, Shang and Zhou, ca. 2070–256 BC] has only once not existed? After founding the [state in the] Central Plain (*Zhongyuan*), its aboriginal ancient ethnicities were dispelled. Since then it relied on the Chinese (*Zhonghua*) and the neighbor states were recorded as being Yi and Di (barbarian). One cannot say that there were no schemes [by the barbarians] to oppress the Han ethnicity. Therefore, would it not be good to use the Han ethnicity’s anti-foreign thinking against these treacherous betrayers [= the barbarians]?”¹⁰⁵²

With the help of anti-foreign thinking Liu wants to make the Han people aware of their unity and seclusion to the outside.¹⁰⁵³ He wants them to nourish their national Han pride to strengthen their will to found an own nation. As an incentive he gives the examples of three European countries, which in his eyes give proof of the positive consequences when nationalism as the leading political ideal and concept is engaged.

“I observed that in Europe the time of the 19th century was the era of nationalism. The Greece left their land¹⁰⁵⁴ and founded a country. The Italians drove away

¹⁰⁵¹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1b.

¹⁰⁵² Ibid.

¹⁰⁵³ Of course, Liu is strongly influenced by Wang Fuzhi. See translation of the beginning of the first chapter of the *Huangshu* in Vierheller’s major work on Wang Fuzhi, where Wang gives the reasons for a differentiation between Huaxia and barbarians. (Vierheller: 1968, p. 27–28.)

¹⁰⁵⁴ It is not clear what is meant by “leaving their land (*li tu*).” However, Liu Shippei must refer to the Greek War of Independence (1821–1830), when Greece managed to shake off the Ottoman overlordship.

Austria and founded a state.¹⁰⁵⁵ The Irish, who had been subdued by England, arise now and fight for the right of self-government.^{1056**1057}

In Liu's opinion the era of nationalism now swept over to Asia and like other subdued nations the Han people had to join in this new development in order to free themselves of their Manchu overlords. What the Ottoman, Austrian and English monarchies were for the Greek, Italian and Irish nations the Manchus were for the Han people. Liu calls for a national and by that he means ethnical revolution.

East Asian Races

To judge to present political situation and in this context also the Manchus is an important issue of Liu in his *Zhongguo minzu zhi*. We have seen that Liu was an anti-Manchu revolutionary and contrary to another thinker, who is labeled as a revolutionary, Zhang, wanted to exclude all Non-Han people from the Han Chinese nation-state. But how does Liu treat Non-Han ethnicities with regard to history? Against the background of his political opinion it would make sense if Liu would not try to integrate them, but expel them. As we have seen above this is in fact the declared aim of his book when he states that “the idea of this work is taking the Han ethnicity as host and the other ethnicities as guests.”¹⁰⁵⁸ But how does he proceed concretely and what does the terms host and guest mean here?

In the first chapter of *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, “Ya dong minzu shulüe ji Hanzu zhi quyuan (Overview of the ethnicities in East Asia and the origin of the Han ethnicity)” Liu quotes the detailed list of “races (*renzhong*)” in East Asia and their relations among each other by the Japanese historian Kuwabara Jitsuzô (1871–1931) from his *Chûtô tôyôshi (History of East Asia for Highschools)* (1898).¹⁰⁵⁹ The Chinese version *Dongyang shiyao (History of East Asia)* was one of the first modern Japanese history books translated into Chinese and was published only one year later in 1899.¹⁰⁶⁰ This book was considered to be the basis for teaching in East Asian history and its Chinese version was republished many times.¹⁰⁶¹

¹⁰⁵⁵ This refers to “il Risorgimento” already mentioned above and especially the Second Italian War of Independence (1859), when the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia together with Napoleon III of France successfully fought against the Austrian Empire.

¹⁰⁵⁶ In 1905, when Liu wrote this text Ireland was not yet independent. It would partly become so in 1921 with the Anglo-Irish Treaty. However, Irish nationalists had been active since the early 19th century and tried to install the “Home Rule” since the 1860s.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1b.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 1a.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Kuwabara: 1968 [1898]. Liu Shippei refers to it only as *Dongyang shi (History of East Asia)*. (Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 1a.)

¹⁰⁶⁰ Kuwabara: 1899.

¹⁰⁶¹ See also Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 114, 119.

In *Chûtô tôyôshi*, Kuwabara classifies the ethnicities, who he thinks belong to the “Asian races (*Ajia jinshu*),” also subsumed under the term yellow races (*kiiro jinshu*).¹⁰⁶² In fact, Liu translates nearly Kuwabara’s complete third chapter “Races (*Jinshu*)” word for word, that is, the list and the short texts before and after.¹⁰⁶³ Here, I will give an abbreviated form of Kuwabara’s and Liu’s¹⁰⁶⁴:

Asian races (J. *Ajia jinshu*, C. *Yaxiya renzhong*):

A) **Chinese races** (Shina jinshu, Zhina renzhong):

1. **Han ethnicity** (J. *Kanzoku*, C. *Hanzu*):

The Han would be the “most important (*youyao*) race in East Asian history.”¹⁰⁶⁵

Its living place would be China proper (*Zhina benbu*).

Line of succession: They came from the West in prehistorical times, then settled at the shores of the Huang He.

2. **Tibetan ethnicity** (J. *Chibetto zoku*, C. *Xizang zu*):

The Tibetans would live in Tibet, Kashmir, Nepal and Burma.

Line of succession: Dī Qiang (Yin and Zhou times) → Yuezhi (Qin and Han times) → Tufan (Tang times) → Western Xia (*Xi Xia*) (Southern Song times)

3. **Cochinchinese ethnicity** (J. *Kouchin Shina zoku*, C. *Jiaozhi Zhina zu*):

The Cochinchinese would live in Southeast China (Yunnan and Guizhou provinces), Vietnam and Thailand.

Line of succession: Miao people (*Miao min*), Jing, Man (pre-Zhou time) → Southern Zhao (*Nan Zhao*) (Tang times)

B) **Siberian races** (J. *Saihatogi jinshu*, C. *Xiboli renzhong*):

1. **Japanese ethnicity** (J. *Nippon zoku*, C. *Ribenzu*):

The Japanese would live in the South of the Korean peninsula and in Japan.

2. **Tungusic ethnicity** (J. *Tsungûsu zoku*, C. *Tonggusi zu*):

The Tunguses would live in the North of Korea and in Manchuria near the Heilongjiang.

Line of succession: Eastern Hu (*Dong Hu*) (Qin and Han times) → Xianbei (Han times) → Mohe (Sui and Tang times) → Khitan (*Qidan*) (Late Tang times) → Jurchen (*Nüzhen*) (Song times) → today’s Qing dynasty “also derives from this ethnicity, in its heydays it unified (*tongyi*) China.”¹⁰⁶⁶

3. **Mongol ethnicity** (J. *Mongoru zoku*, C. *Mengguzu*):

¹⁰⁶² Kuwabara: 1968 [1898], p. 22.

¹⁰⁶³ Kuwabara: 1968 [1898], p. 22–24; Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 1a–2a. Liu Shipei only omits the first paragraph about races in Asian in general. Also Liang Qichao had copied large parts of Kuwabara’s list of ethnicities in 1901. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901], p. 6.)

¹⁰⁶⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 1a–2a; Kuwabara: 1968 [1898], p. 22–24.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 1a; Kuwabara: 1968 [1898], p. 23, line 7.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 2a.

Originally, the Mongols would have lived in Siberia and in the East of the Lake Baikal. Today, they live in Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Tianshan Northern Route (in today's Xinjiang province).

During the Yuan dynasty they “unified the world (*tongyi shijie*).”¹⁰⁶⁷

4. **Turkish ethnicity** (J. *Toruko zoku*, C. *Tu'erqizu*):

Originally, the Turks lived in Inner and Outer Mongolia. Today, they spread to the West, in the Tianshan Southern Route (in today's Xinjiang province) and whole Central Asia,

Line of succession: Xunyu/Xianyun (Zhou times) → Xiongnu (Han times) → Rouran (Nanbeichao times) → Tujue [Turks] (Sui times) → Uyghurs (*Huihe*) (Tang times)

Liu agrees with Kuwabara that although the Han ethnicity is a part of the Chinese races its origins do not lie in China, but that the Han originally came from the region of the West and originally are of the “same ethnicity (*tong zu*)” as the Europeans.¹⁰⁶⁸ He finds evidence in parallel Chinese and Western explanations of human origin and sees this as a proof for their shared origin:

“Therefore, the Classical books from the Central Region (*Zhongtu*) all claim that they [the Han ethnicity] originate from Pan Gu¹⁰⁶⁹, and in Western books the name ‘Baku [= Bactrian] ethnicity (*Bagu minzu*)’ is reported. ‘Pan Gu’ and ‘Baku’ are sounding nearly identical. So, the blooming of the world's races all began in the Pamir Mountains. [...]

Therefore, the Han ethnicity originally came from the same race (*tongzu*) like the Europeans. When they grew and gradually became more they could not but plan to resettle people. One part moved to the Northwest and became the people of the Caucasian ethnicity (*Gaojiasuzu zhi min*), one part moved to the Southeast and became the people of China proper (*Zhina benbu zhi min*).”¹⁰⁷⁰

When the forefathers of the Han arrived in China proper they encountered the people already living there: in the North settled the forefathers of the Turks, the Xianyun, and in the South the Miao. Both were driven away by the Han:

“Furthermore, the tribal ethnicities of ancient time roamed around without steadiness, city walls had not been erected, dwelling houses had not been established. The Han ethnicity reclaimed more and more borderland and made

¹⁰⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 2a–b; Kuwabara: 1968 [1898], p. 23.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Pan Gu is the mystic creator of the universe and the first living being on earth.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 2b.

the other ethnicities (*yi zu*) live between mountains and valleys and fly to and hide in the forests. One can pity their vanishing into thin air to secure their lives!”¹⁰⁷¹

Liu pities the aboriginal ethnicities, but he also admires the Han ethnicity’s efficiency: “Alas! The hardship of our forefathers’ pioneer work – how can one forget this and be it only for one day?”¹⁰⁷²

That the Han people did not originate from China proper but originally came from the West, the so-called “Western origin theory” was a widespread thesis at the beginning of the 20th century.¹⁰⁷³ This idea originated from the book *Western origins of the early Chinese civilization from 2300 B.C. to 200 A. D.* (1894) by the French Orientalist Terrien de Lacouperie (d. 1894).¹⁰⁷⁴ It was introduced to the Chinese scholars via a Japanese summary of Lacouperie’s theory and especially accepted among the “National Essence” scholars.¹⁰⁷⁵ Bernal states that “it is strange that nationalists like Liu [Shipei] and Chang [= Zhang] should have accepted a theory that stressed the derivative nature of Chinese culture and divided Chinese people, whose homogeneity was so important to most patriots.”¹⁰⁷⁶ Later the “Western origin theory” was perceived as an imperialist theory, its influence in Han Chinese historiography diminished and eminent historians like Fu Sinian (1896–1950) and Qian Mu (1895–1990) criticized it.¹⁰⁷⁷ After the foundation of the PRC and until the late 1970s nationalist approach on archaeology became even stricter and it was politically incorrect to perceive Han Chinese civilization other than “originating from a narrowly circumscribed area long the middle reaches of the Yellow River.”¹⁰⁷⁸ Only in the post-Mao era it became possible to think openly about other theories of the development of Han Chinese culture and civilization in prehistory, which had been implied by archaeological findings already since the 1960s.¹⁰⁷⁹

According to the “Western origin theory” the Han were not the first to settle in China, but there were several aborigines. Generally, the Miao were considered as the aborigines living in China proper before the Han people arrived.¹⁰⁸⁰ (Liu also mentions the Xianyun once as aborigines living in the North, but he does not refer to them again in this context.¹⁰⁸¹)

¹⁰⁷¹ Ibid., p. 3a.

¹⁰⁷² Ibid.

¹⁰⁷³ See Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 5.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Terrien de la Couperie actually writes, that “the civilisers arrived in China from South-west Asia”, thus arguing that the Chinese “old civilisation” was “not apart of the concert of civilised nations in antiquity”, which all originated from West Asia. He lists the Egyptians, Babylonians, Elamites, Assyrians, Egaeans, and Pseudo-Hittites. (Lacouperie: 1894, p. ix, xii.)

¹⁰⁷⁵ Hon: 2012, p. 312; see also Leibold: 2012b, p. 219f.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Bernal: 1976, p. 97.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Leibold: 2007, 126, 129. Martin Bernal claims that Liu Shipei already rejected the Western origin theory in the *Zhongguo minzu zhi*. I could not find any evidence for that. (Bernal: 1976, p. 97, 372n36.)

¹⁰⁷⁸ Falkenhausen: 1995, p. 198.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Friedman: 1994, p. 70.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 5; see also Zarrow: 2012, p. 184–186.

¹⁰⁸¹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 2b.

The Miao make the most welcomed aboriginals because since ancient times their military power had never been great enough to match the Han. Therefore, one could claim them to be the real aboriginals without risking to give away legitimacy. In case of other ethnicities like the Tibetans, Tunguses, Turks or Mongols, who had founded their own powerful empires and states, often ruling over the Han regions, this would have been different. It might have made it more difficult to legitimate a Han nation-state based on an ancient old right to settle in China proper if the aboriginals were of an ethnicity powerful enough to challenge Han Chinese claims.

The Question of Fusion

As said above Liu gives three main points in the second introductory part of the *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, which he aims at discussing in his book (“The expansion of the borders by the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*),” “The powerful conquests by foreign ethnicities,” and the “The fusion (*hunhe*) of the Han ethnicity with foreign ethnicities.”¹⁰⁸² The first two points and the periodizations, which go with them, have already been discussed above.

The third – “fusion of the Han people with other people” – is illuminating regarding Liu’s ideas of processes of social, cultural, ethnical and racial change of and exchange between diverse ethnicities, races, and nations.¹⁰⁸³ This has been a constant point of contention between nationalist thinkers of different ideological backgrounds constituting the basis, upon which arguments regarding the design of a (Han) Chinese nation-state could rest. Unlike the reformers, foremost Liang Qichao, but also Zhang, who believed that a large Chinese nation-state could be founded and stabilized through assimilation to the Han be it methodologically applied or spontaneously achieved, Liu could not accept this idea because in his opinion it would “contaminate” the Han people.

Liu does not give clear-cut phases, during which fusion happened, like he does for the other two points. He merely shortly describes the fusing processes, which according to him already began before the Yellow Emperor.¹⁰⁸⁴ He examines the situation of the Han people since then and comes to the general conclusion that “the mixture of China’s ethnicities (*Zhongguo minzu zhi fuza*) persists since a long time. How can the entire Han ethnicity be still pure (*chun*)?”¹⁰⁸⁵ Liu notes that the Han people have experienced “fusion (*hunhe*)” and mutual “blending (*xiangrong*)” with diverse Non-Han people. This has resulted in the Han people’s impurity. Nevertheless he stresses the influence of the

¹⁰⁸² Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 1a–2a.

¹⁰⁸³ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 1b–2a.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 1b. The Yellow Emperor is traditionally considered to have lived in the 27th century BC.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 2a.

Han on the Non-Han by claiming that the Han would be superior – at least culturally when they were the “hosts” but also when they were the “guests”:

“Did it not happen that foreign ethnicities were the hosts [= rulers] and the Han ethnicity was the guest [= subject]? But when the Rong, Dí, Man and Yi during Zhou times (1046–256 BC) and the Hu¹⁰⁸⁶, Jie¹⁰⁸⁷, Di¹⁰⁸⁸ and Qiang¹⁰⁸⁹ during Jin times (265–420) turned the [Han] people into the guest ethnicity (*ke zu*) and lived in the territory of the Middle lands (*Zhongbang*). Even when each of the Northern Wei [= Tuoba], Jin [= Jurchen] and Yuan [= Mongol] ethnicities (*zu*) [founded their] dynasties they abandoned their original rites and chose the Han ethnicity’s civilized culture (*Hanzu zhi wenming*).

Did it not happen that the Han ethnicity was the host and foreign ethnicities were the guests? [As for times of Han ruling,] I examined that after foreign ethnicities entered China (*Zhonghua*) or became officials at the great court or acted as soldiers, the ethnicities intermingled (*hunhe*).”¹⁰⁹⁰

Liu argues that if Non-Han ruled over Han, the Non-Han would adapt to Han Chinese civilization sooner or later. And if the Han ruled over Non-Han, the latter would intermingle. It is not entirely clear what Liu means by “intermingling (*hunhe*).” One hint is the description Liu gives with regard to what happens when Non-Han rule Han. He writes that the Non-Han would adopt the “Han ethnicity’s civilized culture (*Hanzu zhi wenming*)” and abandon their original rites. Liu interprets rites and culture as a crucial factor for ethnic identity.

This introduction of civilization and rites as part of Liu’s definition of ethnicity contradicts his former definition, which had been restrained to racial aspects.¹⁰⁹¹ His idea of intermingling ethnicities in this paragraph comes much closer to Liang Qichao’s definition of ethnicity based on Bluntschli.¹⁰⁹² In the end Liu seems also to be influenced by the concept of culturalism. But what does Liu concretely mean by mixture and intermingling? And how does he evaluate these processes?

¹⁰⁸⁶ Liu Shipei must refer to the Five Hu or (*Wu Hu*) ethnicities here, who founded the Sixteen Kingdoms (304–439) in North China. The Five Hu’s uprising (304–316) caused the Jin to retreat to the South of the Huai river.

¹⁰⁸⁷ They founded the Later Zhao (*Hou Zhao*) dynasty (319–351) in North and Northeast China.

¹⁰⁸⁸ During the era of the Sixteen Kingdoms, the Di founded several dynasties, Cheng (306–338), Han (338–347), Former Qin (*Qian Qin*) (351–394) and Later Liang (*Hou Liang*) (389–403), and several kingdoms without dynastic names, Former and Later Chouchi (*Qian/Hou Chouchi*) (296–371, 385–443) and Dangchang (?–564).

¹⁰⁸⁹ They founded the Later Qin (*Hou Qin*) dynasty (384–417) and the Dengzhi kingdom (430–554).

¹⁰⁹⁰ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 2a.

¹⁰⁹¹ “Those which are an ethnicity (*minzu*) are those, which – coming from a consanguine family [ethnicity] (*tong xuetong zhi jiazu*) – change and unify (*huahe*) other ethnicities of different blood and form one group.” (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Xu”, p. 1a.) See also above this Chapter 3.4 (“Defining Ethnicity”).

¹⁰⁹² See above Chapter 1.2 (subchapter “Liang Qichao’s Essay about Johann Kaspar Bluntschli”); Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75; Bluntschli: [1886] 1965, vol. 2, p. 93–95. See also Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 71–72, where he lists the same criteria.

The Han People and Their “National Essence”

In the seventeenth chapter of *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, “Ge sheng minzu shulüe (Short description of the ethnicities in all provinces)” Liu lays down his idea of the Han as an ethnicity.¹⁰⁹³ He tries to show that the Han – despite all the intermingled settling (*zaju*) and Liu’s opinion that they are no longer a “pure (*chun*)” ethnicity – have nevertheless kept their special character or “national essence (*guocui*).” The emphasis laid on a certain national character developed in late 18th century Europe and reached Japan in the 1880s as “national essence (*kokusui*)” as a strategy of defense against Europeanisation and its equalization with civilization.¹⁰⁹⁴ Generally, the idea of “national character” automatically gains strength with the developing of nationalism itself. A distinct national character is believed to be one of the most important features if not *the* most important basic feature to found a nation-state. The Japanese Movement for the Preservation of the National Essence (*Kokusui hozon shugi*) directly inspired Han Chinese nationalists in the face of China’s Westernization. Bernal argues that the assumption that every nation has its own character defines a break with the vision of All-under-Heaven, because China has to be seen now as one nation among others with other distinct characters.¹⁰⁹⁵

On the other hand, the assumption of an inherent national essence or character enables the Han to be not only a distinct ethnicity, but in the long run also to strengthen their identity as a distinct nation and to found a nation-state. Liu writes:

“The existence of a nation people (*guomin*) relies on the special character of these nation people. Generally speaking, the people of one ethnicity (*yi zu zhi renmin*) must have the special character of one ethnicity (*yi zu zhi tuxing*).”¹⁰⁹⁶

Liu claims that

“originally the Han ethnicity beat foreign ethnicities (*yi zu*) and formed an entirely pure ethnicity (*chunquan zhi minzu*). But already since a long time back in history they live intermingled with foreign ethnicities. From an entirely pure Han ethnicity (*chunquan zhi Hanzu*) they changed into a mixed Han ethnicity (*fuza zhi Hanzu*).”¹⁰⁹⁷

This in fact is the major problem in Liu’s opinion: as long as the Han ethnicity is impure it has no legitimation to be a nation and found a nation-state:

¹⁰⁹³ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 48–52.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Teters: 1962; Bernal: 1976, p. 101.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Bernal: 1976, p. 103.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 48a.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 48a.

“We, the Han ethnicity, must protect the special character of [our] whole ethnicity. Only then we can expect [our] nation’s independence (*minzu zhi duli*). But is our ethnicity today not an extremely mixed ethnicity? And is it not fused with several [other] ethnicities under the same government?”¹⁰⁹⁸

But Liu is positive that the Han ethnicity despite all mixing and fusing kept its own distinct character, its national essence hidden somewhere. To verify this belief he analyzes script (*wenzi*), religion (*zongjiao*), and traditions (*xishang*) of the Han compared to four large ethnicities around them, the Manchus, Mongols, Turkish Muslims and Miao. (Without giving reasons he does not mention the Tibetans, who are usually among this grouping instead of the Miao.) These four ethnicities seem to be those, which threaten the Han ethnicity’s ability to be a nation with a distinct character the most. By showing that there is still a distinction between them and the Han Liu shows that the Han are still “pure” enough to form a nation. Regarding script Liu points out that the Manchus, the Mongols, the Turkish Muslims and even the Miao all have their own scripts. The script of the Han people is distinct from theirs.¹⁰⁹⁹ Regarding religion Liu writes that the upper people of the Han honor Confucianism, whereas the lower people honor Buddhism and also belief in other spirits. But the Manchus would follow Lamaism, the Turkish Muslims would have their distinct Islamic religion, and the Miao would have a Shamanistic religion. Therefore, also with regard to religion the Han people would differ from all others.¹¹⁰⁰ And finally also the Han traditions would be different from those of the people surrounding them. Whereas the Han would be a civilized ethnicity with a highly developed culture, the Manchus would be hunters and gatherers, the Mongols nomads. And when it comes to the other two Liu does not even refer to concrete ways of living anymore, he just states that the Turkish Muslims would be “fierce and brutal (*zhihan*)” and the Miao “wild and uncivilized (*pizhen*).”¹¹⁰¹ Therefore, with regard to script, religion and traditions

“the Han ethnicity [are] unlike all other ethnicities!

From this one sees that the Han ethnicity finally has the special character of a nation people. But it has not yet developed nationalism. Therefore, we must strive for it. I do not think that the calamity of the nations’ wars today developed in Europe. It derives from the separation of religions [...], from the separation of scripts [...] and from the separation of traditions [...]. The reasons for wars all lie in the special characters of nation people. Why do we people of the Han ethnicity have not heard of that until today?”¹¹⁰²

And he answers:

¹⁰⁹⁸ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 51a–b.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 51b.

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁰¹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 51b–52a.

¹¹⁰² Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 52a.

“Today, China (*Zhongguo*) does not have a just constitution. Moreover, of the intermingled people it is the barbarian people (*yeman zhi min*), who reign the civilized ethnicity (*wenming zhi zu*), the inferior ethnicity (*liedeng zhi zu*), who governs the superior people (*youdeng zhi min*). How was it possible that this impasse prevails for such a long time? I can not but burn incense and pray that this generation will bring men like Mazzini and Kossuth^{1103!}”¹¹⁰⁴

Unlike Liang Qichao, who always tried to show the similarities between the Han and the other people surrounding them and to emphasize the assimilation of Non-Han people into the Han ethnicity, Liu aims at the direct opposite. His most important aim is the legitimation of a Han Chinese nation-state. In his eyes, the basis of a nation-state is a distinct ethnicity. So he strives to show that the Han ethnicity has all qualities to form a nation-people and found an own nation-state. Liu also strongly opposes the theory of an inherent power of the Han people to assimilate others easily. His most important counter-example are the Manchus, whom he sees as decidedly distinct from the Han. But also the other larger ethnicities, the Mongols, Muslims and Miao are different in ways of script, religion and traditions. Although he mentions Switzerland as a possibility for different people living together in one state – the most important precondition being an equal level of development of the diverse people and a just legislative system – he favors the case of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Italy and Hungary separated from Austria and formed their own nation-states.¹¹⁰⁵ This becomes clear when he formulates his wish that China had freedom fighters like the Italian Giuseppe Mazzini and the Hungarian Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894). Both Italy and Hungary aimed at independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the House of Habsburg. Italy had achieved this already in 1861 when it became a constitutional monarchy. Hungary would follow later in 1918, when it became Hungarian People’s Republic for not even two years and then a constitutional monarchy. With this reference Liu places the Han people in the position of the Italians and Hungarians, who aimed at liberating their nations from foreign overlordship and establishing their own nation-states. This clearly refers to Liu’s wish for the Han to break away from all Non-Han people especially their overlords, the Manchus and have a pure Han nation-state.

Theory of an “Assimilative Power”

The sixteenth chapter “Manzu zhi neiqin ji Hanzu zhi mou guangxu (The invasion of the Manchu ethnicity and the Han ethnicity’s plans for restoration)” in the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* refers to the discourse about Liang Qichao’s idea of an “assimilative power” of the

¹¹⁰³ Lajos Kossuth (*Gasushi*) (1802–1894) was a Hungarian lawyer, journalist, politician and freedom fighter. He moreover was a bellwether of democracy in Europe.

¹¹⁰⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 52b.

¹¹⁰⁵ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 52a–b.

Han people, although Liu does not mention Liang by name.¹¹⁰⁶ But he addresses his critique to his theory when he writes:

“Some say that the Han ethnicity’s character would have a certain power (*qiang you li*) as their maxim. And no matter for what race or ethnicity this power would be used in order to adjoin it, everyone attaches (*tie*) and follows (*fucong*) [the Han ethnicity].

I do not dare to believe in this statement, unless I would see it myself!

Some say that the Han ethnicity would have a special spirit (*teli zhi jingshen*). And therefore, no matter what race or ethnicity would migrate to China it would finally be rejected by the Han ethnicity (*wei Hanzu suo pai*). Looking at the Manchu ethnicity night and day I do not dare to believe in this statement!”¹¹⁰⁷

Liu flatly denies that the Han people nowadays would have the ability to assimilate others automatically, nor would they have the ability to protect themselves against influences and conquests from other ethnicities. Liu’s strongest argument against Liang Qichao is the fact that the Manchu would still exist as Manchu and would not have assimilated although having been the overlords of the Han people for 250 years. They would have lived among them, but would not have adapted to their ways in a degree that they could be mistaken for Han. When Liu wrote his texts in the first decade of the 20th century, the differences between Han and Manchu were to a certain degree visible.¹¹⁰⁸ Liu decides not to ignore these differences in contrast to Liang. Both have their own purpose for doing so. Liang denies his present-day reality to legitimize his idea of large nationalism, Liu emphasizes and probably exaggerates it to argue for a purely Han nation-state.

Liu refers to Confucius to argue against assimilation of Non-Han people. He does not deny that assimilation of other people was possible and even admits that the Han people once had a certain power in this respect. However, Liu thinks that the Han people could only absorb others in pre-Qin times. Therefore he strongly objects the implication that an “assimilative power of China” could or should be used to form a nation-state based on “larger nationalism.” Whereas Liang and other scholars of the New Text School referred to the *Gongyang zhuan* to support the idea of assimilation, the Old Text scholar Liu attacks the *Gongyang zhuan* as being a false interpretation of the *Chunqiu*:

“Since Confucius it had been said that ‘the people from far away do not plot against the Xia, and the Yi (barbarians) do not disturb the Hua (*Yi bu mou Xi Yi bu luan Hua*).’¹¹⁰⁹ So the borders (*fang*) between Hua (Chinese) and Yi (barbarians)

¹¹⁰⁶ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 46–48.

¹¹⁰⁷ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 46a.

¹¹⁰⁸ Crossley: 1990b, 1997, 1999; Rawski: 1996; Elliott: 2000, 2012; Rhoads: 2000.

¹¹⁰⁹ The sentence is a quote from the *Zuo zhuan*. James Legge translates: “Those distant people have nothing to do with our great land; those wild tribes must not be permitted to create disorder among our flowery States.” (Legge: 1972, vol. 5, p. 774, 777 (Book XI. Duke Ting, Tenth year).) Hu Zhihui translates closer to the text:

have been passed down for hundred generations and are fixed. But in the *Chunqiu Gongyang zhuan* one reads: If the Yi and Di (barbarians) are allowed to enter the Central Kingdom (*Zhongguo*), how to call them then (*jin Yi Di yu Zhongguo you heyi cheng yan*)?¹¹¹⁰ Liu Guanghan¹¹¹¹ [= Liu Shipei] says [= I say]: ‘Gongyang [Gao]¹¹¹² means to praise the Central Kingdom (*Zhongguo*) for its [strategy of] ‘using the Xia to change the Yi (barbarians).’¹¹¹³ [In contrast to that,] Confucius said that he worried that later generations would use the Yi (barbarians) to change the Xia (Chinese)!’¹¹¹⁴

Instead of blurring the division line or – to speak in Liu’s terms – the “border” between the inside Han and the outside Non-Han, Liu supposes that Confucius considered strengthening and sustaining as being essential for the preservation of the Han ethnicity: “If one state cannot achieve an individual culture the more barbarian racial ethnicities (*yeman zhongzu*) enter it, the more it will not be able to preserve its existence for long.”¹¹¹⁵ In Liu’s opinion Confucius foresaw that in later generations the borders would become blurred and the Han people would try to incorporate “barbarians” into their state by the method of “using the Xia (Chinese) to change the Yi (barbarians).” But in Liu’s opinion keeping the Han people distinct from others is the only way to secure their existence. If they do not save their individual culture, they would lose their ability to keep a state in existence or transferred to modern times to found one at all.

Herein lies Liu’s critique of the method of “using the Xia to change the Yi,” which he cites repeatedly in the *Rangshu*.¹¹¹⁶ The promoters of the concept, that is, mainly the New Text scholars would argue that only with its implementation the Great Unity (*datong*), the basis of a functioning nation-state could be achieved. However, to achieve this Great Unity, which was equalized with Great Peace (*taiping*)¹¹¹⁷, “one [must] totally abolish the borders between Hua and Yi (barbarians), so that there are no more differences.”¹¹¹⁸ But

“Outsiders must not be permitted to create disorder among the people of the central plain.” (*Zuo zhuan*: 1996, vol. 2, p. 1442–1443 (Ding gong, 10th year).) Confucius was an official during the reign of Duke Ding of Lu (*Lu Ding gong*), 26th ruler of Lu (reign time 509–495 BC). Acting upon the advice of an official, the ruler of Qi tried to attack Lu on a meeting planned as being friendly. Confucius told him that a proper ruler would not act so. The Qi ruler consequently withdrew his troops.

¹¹¹⁰ In this exact words, this sentence cannot be found in the *Gongyang zhuan*. Still, there are many passages which refer to this question. On several occasions, it is asked in the *Gongyang zhuan* why the terms “man” (*ren*) and “prince” (*zi*) are used for barbarians. The answers are different and not always easy to understand in their reasoning. However, there seems to be the general understanding, that if barbarians are loyal to the Middle States (*Zhongguo*) there can bear titles like “prince” and can also be called “men”. (*Gongyang zhuan* (Huan gong, 15th year; Zhuang gong 23rd year; Xuan gong, 15th year; Xiang gong, 5th year; Ding gong, 4th year; Ai gong, 13th year).)

¹¹¹¹ Liu’s adopted name Guanghan literally means “to light the Han.”

¹¹¹² The acclaimed author of the *Gongyang zhuan*.

¹¹¹³ Legge: 1972, vol. 2, p. 253–254 (Book III. Tâng Wân Kung, Part I, Chap. IV).

¹¹¹⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 2b.

¹¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁶ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 2b, 3a, 12a, 13b, etc..

¹¹¹⁷ Bernal: 1976, p. 95. He states that Kang and Liu would equalise the two terms.

¹¹¹⁸ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 3a.

the attempt to abolish the borders had caused the Han people's gradual decline until the present-day.

In contrast to Liang, who saw the implementation of the method "using the Xia to change the Yi" as the ultimate expression of Han superiority and the most convenient way to incorporate Non-Han people and regions into a Han dominated nation-state, Liu criticizes the strategy. The Han people should rather differentiate themselves from the others and not intermingle with them, because this would diminish their chance for independence.

With historical examples Liu illustrates how the strategy of "using the Xia to change the Yi" – implied consciously or unconsciously – had caused problems. He regards the turbulent centuries after the Han Dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period, that is, the era of the Jin Dynasty (265–420), its retreat to the South in 317 AD due to the uprising of the Five Hu (*Wu Hu*) and the Sixteen Kingdoms (304–439), as a crossover when the Han people's decline began due to the massive intrusion of Non-Han people:

"The time before the Three Kingdoms [220–280] is that of a gradual immigration (*jianru*) of foreign ethnicities (*yi zu*). The time after the Three Kingdoms is that of a conquering invasion (*qinru*) of foreign ethnicities."¹¹¹⁹

Liu claims that since the 3rd century the Non-Han people could no longer be integrated tracelessly, because they did not come as settlers but as conquerors and in great numbers. Independent from Han culture they became powerful rulers on their own. Since that time

"the caitiffs' masses migrated and the Hu (barbarian) armies penetrated deeply [into China proper]. They disrespected the fertile belt of farmland [around the capital] and insulted the clans and people of the Central countries (*Zhongbang*)."¹¹²⁰

Also in the ninth chapter of the *Rangshu* (1903) "Bian Xia (Changing the Xia people)" Liu refers to the consequences derived from encounters of the Han Chinese and others in general.¹¹²¹ This chapter gives a concise overview of Liu's opinion regarding the effects of contacts between Han and Non-Han people and the change of these effects over time.

Liu admits that the Han people had a certain ability to assimilate others like Liang assumes only until the 3rd century BC:

¹¹¹⁹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 22b.

¹¹²⁰ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 17b.

¹¹²¹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 16b–18a.

“When I look back to the time of the Eastern Zhou (770–256 BC), the customs of the Rong and Man (barbarians) gradually became the same like the Hua (*su jian yu Hua tong*), the saying ‘connecting the races (*tong zhong*)’¹¹²² was achieved.”¹¹²³

He verifies this with the reference to three marriages between Han and Non-Han aristocrats and goes on:

“Why is there no evidence for ‘connecting the races’ of the foreign people and the Han people handed down from Qin times (221–207 BC)? Because [at that time] the foreign people had unified with the Han people (*yu Hanzu xianghe*) to such a great extent.”¹¹²⁴

Although Liu uses terms like “to connect (*tong*)” and “to unify (*xianghe*)” it is nevertheless clear that he refers to processes of assimilation of the Non-Han to the Han. He agrees that there once had been an assimilative ability of the Han, which gave them the power to change others, but not be changed. But unlike Liang he limits its power to Zhou and Qin times.¹¹²⁵

During Han (202 BC–220 AD) and Wei (220–265) times, the Han Chinese were still trying to hold up, although the Rong were already living inside the borders. The Han people “relied on the pretty term of ‘return and change (*gui hua*)’ [= submit and naturalize] to put the disorder right.”¹¹²⁶ However, in the end, the Five Hu put an end to this. Due to their migration to North China a phase of chaos began, which would not end until Liu’s present-day: the Five Hu were followed by the (Northern, Eastern and Western) Wei (386–557), later came the Liao, Western Xia, Jin and Yuan “and the world (*tiandi*) was divided – this caused the greatest loss.”¹¹²⁷ In Liu’s opinion the situation of the Han people changed during the Wei dynasty, when Non-Han began to migrate in great numbers. Consequently, the territories inhabited by them were barbarized and there was no longer a change to Han Chinese ways, but rather to Non-Han traditions: “The people followed the Yi (barbarians) and modesty and reason dispersed.”¹¹²⁸

Although the Han culture seems to have been preserved in the South of the Huanghe and since Jin times (1115–1234) at least in the South of the Huai River, those Han Chinese people in the North, who mixed with the “barbarians” are in Liu’s opinion lost:

¹¹²² Liu explains that “connecting the races” refers to marriages of kings and dukes with barbarians girls, i.e. the marriage between King Xiang of Zhou (*Zhou Xiang wang*) (reign period 651–619 BC) and a Dí girl. (Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 17a.)

¹¹²³ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 17a.

¹¹²⁴ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 17a in small characters.

¹¹²⁵ Although Liang Qichao generally claims that the Han never lost their ability to assimilate others, there is one essay from 1906 where Liang states nearly the same like Liu here. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_2], “Fu”, p. 23a. See Chapter 1.3 (subchapter “Contradictions: “Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi guan cha” and “Fu: Shiji ‘Xiongnu zhuan’ Rong Di mingyi kao” (1906))”).

¹¹²⁶ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 17a.

¹¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹¹²⁸ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 17b.

“I fear after hundred years the increasing elimination inevitably reached a [state] without culture, and everyone became Yi (barbarian). After one thousand years the human spirit was eradicated. It had turned back to the beginnings at primitive times. Everyone was beastlike.”¹¹²⁹

Liu refers to nearly all previous Non-Han dynasties. He only leaves out the present Manchu Qing, thus only indirectly judging the situation with Manchus ruling over the Han. If the migration of the Non-Han in former times caused the degradation of Han people, this consequently would be the case under the dominance of the Manchu, too.

Liu Shipei's Perception of Non-Han People

Their Beastly Descent

As already shown above, Liu Shipei links modern Non-Han ethnicities with ancient people, a method often used by Han Chinese historians to establish the well-liked continuous chains from antiquity until present times. In the third chapter of the *Rangshu*, “Yi zhong (The different kinds of Yi (barbarians))” he goes a step further and adopts the *Shuowen jiezi* linkage of ancient Non-Han people to animals.¹¹³⁰ Although one could also understand the *Shuowen jiezi* as referring to the written characters only, it means more. The double meaning of the English word “character” expresses exactly how Liu reads the *Shuowen jiezi*. The written characters used for the Non-Han reflect their ethnic character:

“In the South are the **Man Min**, who derive from the insect (*chong*).¹¹³¹

[In small characters:] Under the entry of the character ‘Man’ the *Shuowen jiezi* says: ‘The Southern Man (*Nan Man*) are of the snake’s kind. [...]’ Under the entry ‘Min’ it says: ‘The Eastern and Southern Yue (*Dongnan Yue*) are of the snake’s kind. [...]’

In the North are the **Dí**, who derive from the dog (*quan*).

[In small characters:] Under the entry of the character ‘Dí’ the *Shuowen jiezi* says: ‘The Red Di (*Chi Di*) originate from the dog’s kind. The Di are said to be obscene and pervert. [...]’

In the East are the **Mo**, who derive from the worm (*zhi*).

[In small characters:] Under the entry of the character ‘Mo’ the *Shuowen jiezi* says: ‘The [people of the] Northern Regions are of the worm’s kind. [...] Confucius said: ‘The Mo are said to be evil.’¹¹³² [...]’

¹¹²⁹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 18a.

¹¹³⁰ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 3b–6a. Zhang Taiyan does the same in one chapter of his *Qiushu*, titled “Yuan ren.” (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1900], vol. 3, p. 21 (ch. 11 “Yuan ren”); see also Liang Tao: 2004, p. 169–170.)

¹¹³¹ This might be a misprint for the character snake (*she*) which is similar to that for insect (*chong*). But it might also be on purpose because Liu later links the Han with the snake. Usually, However, the Man Min are linked to the snake (*she*).

In the West are the **Qiang**, who derive from the sheep (*yang*).

[In small characters:] Under the entry of the character ‘Qiang’ the *Shuowen jiezi* says: ‘The [people from the] Western Rong Range (*Xi Rong mu*) are shepherds. They stem from the human kind and from the sheep. [...]’

Those, who derive from the humans (*ren*), are only the **Bo** people (*Bo ren*), the **Jiaoyao**, and the **Eastern Yi** (*Dong Yi*) and that is all.

[In small characters:] Under the above mentioned entry ‘Qiang’ the *Shuowen jiezi* gives a commentary: ‘The Southwestern Bo people (*Xinan Boren*) and the Jiaoyao stem from the human kind. Thus, they live in the *kun* region. They have a rather proper (*shunli*) character. Only the Eastern Yi stem from the [character] ‘great (*da*),’ and ‘great’ is ‘human kind (*ren*).’ The customs of the Yi are benevolent (*ren*). The benevolent ones have a long life, they have wise men (*junzi*) and a state, which does not decline (*bu si zhi guo*).’”¹¹³³

This quite positive description of the “barbarians,” which stands in opposition of what Liu otherwise has to say about them requires an explanation, which is given by Liu himself as follows:

“[In small characters:] I think that the former Southwestern region is today’s Sichuan (*Shu*). In the times of the Yellow Emperor [traditional 27th–26th century BC], [his son] Changyi¹¹³⁴ was born in Ruoshui¹¹³⁵. Therefore, the peoples’ customs were tamed (*shun*) by and by. If one looks at Wenweng¹¹³⁶, who established learning, and Yin Zhen [79–162]¹¹³⁷, who taught them, one knows that the Southwestern people changed (*yihua*). This is like in the territory of [Ko]chosŏn ([*Gu*]chaoxian) [2333–108 BC], which used the teachings of Jizi¹¹³⁸ and the Japanese Yamato ethnicity (*Dahe minzu*, *Yamato-minzoku*¹¹³⁹), which is also not the same like the Man ethnicity, [which derives from beasts]. Generally speaking this is the reason why the character *Yi* stems from human kind (*ren*).”¹¹⁴⁰

According to Liu the fact that the name characters for the Bo people, the Jiaoyao and the Yi derive from human kind is due to the fact that these people had been “tamed”

¹¹³² I could not find the original of the citation in the *Lunyu* or any other Classic.

¹¹³³ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 3b–4a.

¹¹³⁴ Changyi was the second son of the Yellow Emperor.

¹¹³⁵ In central Sichuan.

¹¹³⁶ Official of Western Han times under emperor Jingdi (r. 156–141 BC). He was responsible for opening up the border regions in Sichuan.

¹¹³⁷ Scholar of Eastern Han time.

¹¹³⁸ 12th BC. He is said to have been a Chinese sage who ruled the ancient kingdom Kochosŏn on the Korean Peninsular. This was later contradicted by Korean historians. (Rawski: 2012, p. 48; Allan: 1990.)

¹¹³⁹ This is a term, which came in use in the 19th century to distinguish the majority ethnicity in Japan from other smaller ethnicities. It also refers to the assumption of a pure and ancient old Japanese race. (Bernal: 1976, p. 101, who cites from the Japanese nationalist Shiga Shigetaka’s (1863–1927) essay “*Nihonjin ga kaiho suru tokoro no shigi o koku hakasu* (Explanation of the principles held by *The Japanese*). In: *Shiga Shigetaka zenshu* (Complete Works of Shiga Shigetaka). Tokyo: Shiga Shigetaka Zenshū Kankōkai, 1927–1929, 8 vols., vol. I, p. 1.)

¹¹⁴⁰ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 4a.

and “taught” by Han people in antiquity. It is obvious that the characters (*zi*) used for these people are also graphic symbols of their character and not only hollow phonograms for Liu. He clearly says so himself:

“That the names of the descendants of the Yi (barbarians) can be recorded so clearly is because they lived up to their names in reality. How could one not send punitive expeditions? Well, the descendants of Yan [Di] and Huang [Di] are only the Han people (*Hanzu*). Outside the Nine Provinces [= China proper] everything was remote and waste.”¹¹⁴¹

Liu assumes that in this remote and waste regions outside also in his present-day would live Non-Han people, who would still resemble the animal-like characters their acclaimed forefathers had been attributed with. Liu claims that the Tungusic people would stem from the worm (via the Mo from the East), the Turks from the dog (via the Di from the North), the Tibetans from the sheep (via the Qiang from the West) and the Cochinchinese from the snake (via the Man and Min from the South).¹¹⁴² Liu was of course aware of the insult the linkages of these ethnicities to beasts rather than human beings would mean.¹¹⁴³ Not surprisingly Liu comes to the following conclusion:

“All these ethnicities (*zu*) live in waste regions and have untaught traditions. They have unusual names, strange characteristics and are of a different race. [Their] kind varies from the wise kings’ [kind]. They are [like] raptors and wild beasts, which are a danger to the domestic animals [= the Han people]. [...] The past records give proof of it [= the barbarians’ descent from beasts]. Although what is written in the historical books are words meant to defame, [it is nevertheless so] that at the beginning of prehistoric times the human kind (*renlei*) developed out of animals. Therefore, also the kings of the central region (*Zhongtu*) are the metamorphosis of dragons’ bodies and snakes’ corpora. But [in contract to them,] the different traditions of the Yi and Dí (barbarians) developed like slow grass in the gloomy thicket. Even now that the world of primitive times has changed they still kept the traditions of wild plants and wild animals.”¹¹⁴⁴

Liu seems to employ evolutionary ideas here. However, according to him, who either had only a very superficial knowledge of evolutionary theory or did not want to dwell on it too exactly here as this would not have supported his point, different ethnicities stem from different animals. And whereas the emperors and kings and therefore also the people of the central region descended from dragons and snakes – both creatures

¹¹⁴¹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 4a–b.

¹¹⁴² Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 4b.

¹¹⁴³ Especially so in the case of the Turks living in China who are linked to dogs. Most of them belong to the branch of Sunni Islam. In Sunni Islam dogs are considered to be ritually unclean.

¹¹⁴⁴ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 4b–5b.

with extremely positive implications in Han mythology – the Non-Han people would in fact still not have left the habitat of beasts, from which they stem.

Their Histories in the Chinese Canon

Having stated this crushing judgment of the Non-Han people Liu consequently also wants to exclude the histories of these “beasts” from Han Chinese historiography. In the *Rangshu*’s fifth chapter “Hu shi (Hu (barbarian) histories)” he condemns the inclusion of Non-Han histories into the canon of Han Chinese dynastic histories, who caused the Han people’s exodus from the North.¹¹⁴⁵ Again, he bases himself on the authority of Confucius, who would not have included the illegitimate states Jing, Wu, Xu and Yue in the *Chunqiu*. Also the Grand Historian and author of the first official dynastic historical record *Shiji* (*Historical Records*), Sima Qian (ca. 145–86 BC), and the author of the *Hanshu* (*Book of Han*), Ban Gu (32–92), would have put the chapters about Non-Han people at the very end of their works “to prevent the chieftains of the Man and Yi (barbarians) to attack the Central Kingdom once again.”¹¹⁴⁶ Liu states that the advice of these grand men would not have been taken seriously by later generations – official histories of the Northern Wei, Liao, Jin, Yuan and Qing had been produced.

I will turn to Liu’s opinion of those Non-Han dynasties, which were generally, but not by him perceived as legitimate, based on the fact that their histories were included into the canon of official dynastic histories. I will especially analyze Liu’s ideas of the large Non-Han dynasties, on the one hand those he considered to have been founded by Tungusic people, the Tuoba Wei, the Khitan Liao, the Jurchen Jin and the Manchu Qing, and on the other hand the Mongol Yuan.¹¹⁴⁷

Liu’s general opinion of the Tungusic ethnicity (*Tonggusi zu*) is:

“The Eastern Hu (*Dong Hu*) live in high mountains and deep forests. They dress in wool and eat [raw] meat. They hunt with bows to make a living. They plead their hair, dress in Hu (barbarian) [style] and often have mighty fortresses. They are called Tungusic ethnicity.”¹¹⁴⁸

Let us now see what he writes about their dynasties in detail.

¹¹⁴⁵ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 8a–9b.

¹¹⁴⁶ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 8a. The *Hanshu* was in fact not only compiled by Ban Gu, but also by his father Ban Biao (3–54) and his sister Ban Zhao (45–ca. 116).

¹¹⁴⁷ As usual in the early 20th century Liu classifies the Khitan among the Tungusic ethnicities. This was also due to Kuwabara above mentioned list of ethnicities in East Asia which was considered pivotal at this time. In the 1940s Wittfogel and Feng write about the difficulties of classifying the Khitan as being either or Tungusic or (Proto-)Mongol or even Turkic-Uyghur ethnicity. (Wittfogel/Feng: 1949, p. 21–23 (“Historical Background of the Ch’i-tan people”))

¹¹⁴⁸ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 4b.

The Northern Wei

Liu's opinion of the Tuoba, the founders of the Northern Wei Dynasty (386–534) shifts from 1903 to 1905. In the *Rangshu* (1903) he considered them to have assimilated, because they adapted the Han Chinese system of monosyllabic family names.¹¹⁴⁹ He writes about them in his eighth chapter “Bian xing (The Change of Family Names)”¹¹⁵⁰:

“[Due to the method of] ‘using the Xia to change the Yi,’ [the Tuoba] changed and followed Han customs (*Han su*), and [consequently] changed all [their family names] into monosyllabic names.”¹¹⁵¹

But in the *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, published two years later, Liu chooses another tone:

“The Tuoba tribe stems from Yi and Dí (barbarians). Their culture was not developed. They originated from the regions of the Northern deserts and wastelands. They practiced vulgar, crude, cruel and harsh customs. When [the Tuoba Wei Emperor] Xiaowen [467–499, reign time 471–499] ascended to the throne, the court ceremonials all imitated the customs of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu zhi feng*). Hu (barbarian) dress was forbidden and banished. In marriages and names they borrowed from the rites of China (*Zhongguo zhi li*). They pretended to be an ethnicity (*zuxing*) from the Central plains (*Zhongyuan*), appeared impressive and imperial and made honest sacrificial ceremonies. They haltered the people with dishonest culture. They pretended themselves to be of peaceful appearance. The fruit this action yielded was that there were some Han ethnicity's influences and some Tungusic ethnicity's influences.”¹¹⁵²

Here Liu criticizes the Tuoba's adaption of Han customs as pretension and malicious disguise. , By this account the Tuoba only took over Han customs to legitimate themselves. However, this adaption turned out badly for the Tuoba, as

“one ethnicity's bloom must rely on one ethnicity's special characteristics (*te zhi*). Now, the Yuan Wei [= Tuoba Wei] abandoned the customs they had from old, and chose weak and delicate traditions. The biting energy expelled the plain traditions of old. The chopping off of the state's power and overcoming of the Yi (barbarians) was consequently based upon this.”¹¹⁵³

Moreover, the Tuoba were not even able to truly adapt as they would always stay “barbarian” and beast-like in their inmost: “An ape wearing a hat is really comical, like when they [= the Tuoba] played, thinking they would govern.”¹¹⁵⁴

¹¹⁴⁹ Kang Youwei argues in the same way. (Kang Youwei: 1981 [1898], p. 341–342.)

¹¹⁵⁰ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 13a–16b.

¹¹⁵¹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 13b.

¹¹⁵² Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 28a–b.

¹¹⁵³ Liu Shippei: 1904, p. 28b.

¹¹⁵⁴ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 28b–29a.

The Tuoba Wei Dynasty was often seen as a kind of prototype of a truly sinicized dynasty.¹¹⁵⁵ Liu judges the Tuoba differently, although the result is the same in the end. In his eyes, the Tuoba merely used Han customs as a tactic to deceive their Han subjects. In the long run, however, this disguise could not secure their power. On the contrary Liu reveals a reluctant respect for the Tuoba's "plain traditions of old," which originally brought them to power. Against this background the decline of the Tuoba is explained by just this sinicization and their consequent degradation. Had they kept their own culture and tradition, their empire would not have ceased so fast.

It is a pattern in Chinese historiography to take sinicization as the most important reason for the decline of Non-Han dynasties and empires. It is presumed that Han traditions would just not be in line with these peoples characters and that they could therefore not unfold their primitive but nevertheless mighty energy anymore, which originally had brought them into power.¹¹⁵⁶ It is also a reference to Wang Fuzhi's approach and to geographical determinism.¹¹⁵⁷

The Khitan Liao

About the Khitan Liu writes relatively little. In 1903 he only mentions that the Khitan are said to have "worshipped the pig and obeyed the swine."¹¹⁵⁸ Liu claims that although this statement was originally intended merely as an insult, it would nevertheless not be completely unfounded, because the character and nature of these people would still be undeveloped and beast-like. In 1905, his opinion of the Khitan becomes a bit clearer. He counts them among the Tungusic people and sees them as part of the third wave of conquests by foreign ethnicities of Han territory.¹¹⁵⁹ He also states that since their conquest of the North and their invasion into the South Han people lived under their rule as prisoners of war and as officials at the Liao court. Therefore, the Khitan turned to "Hua customs (*Hua feng*)."¹¹⁶⁰ It is obvious that the Khitan do not interest Liu very much. This might be due to the fact that the Khitan were generally not seen as the ancestors of the ruling Manchus despite their appearance as Tungusic people in Kuwabara's list. The Manchus never claimed to be the ancestors of the Khitan, but referred to the Jurchen as their forefathers.¹¹⁶¹ Thus the Jurchen and their history are

¹¹⁵⁵ Kang Youwei: 1981 [1898], p. 341–342; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 32; Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 533.

¹¹⁵⁶ Lü: 1989 [1934], p. 164; Mikami: 1984, p. 233–235, 261; Toyama: 1964, p. 45. Critique of this idea see Woluobiyuefu [Vorob'ev]: 1990, p. 119–120; Tsang: 2007, p. 105.

¹¹⁵⁷ See above Chapter 1.3 (subchapter "Connection between Geography and Ethnicity, Culture and Civilization").

¹¹⁵⁸ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 4b–5a. He write that this story would derive from the *Qidan guo zhi* (*Record of the Qidan Kingdom*), compiled and written by Ye Longli (*jinshi* 1247).

¹¹⁵⁹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 1b–2a; "Lun ben shu da zhi," p. 1a–b; see also p. 35b.

¹¹⁶⁰ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 39a.

¹¹⁶¹ Crossley: 1987.

more important for Liu, who could indirectly clarify his position regarding the Manchus through them.

The Jurchen Jin

Therefore Liu refers to the Jurchen as an individual ethnicity much more often than to others. In the *Rangshu*, he first mentions the Jurchen as an ethnicity with the following words:

“The Jurchen (*Zhushen*) were an despicable kind (*chou lei*) living remotely at the Eastern border. They shot while riding, wore caps and skirts. They claimed themselves that they originally stemmed from the Sushen.¹¹⁶² Therefore, their people’s customs were raw and grim. They did not cultivate cultural treasures. I want to refer to the *Chunqiu*, which says, when ‘the Yi and Di (barbarians) are allowed to enter China (*jin Yi Di yu Zhongguo*),’¹¹⁶³ it meant that the lowest ranked, worthless devils could sacrifice to god (*pei Haotian Shangdi*)!¹¹⁶⁴ Therefore, ‘the superior man would say of them that they did not know [the nature of] those usages (*junzi wei zhi bu zhi li*)’¹¹⁶⁵.”¹¹⁶⁶

This passage is full of citations and references to the Classics. It also reveals most clearly how Liu regards the Non-Han people, the “Yi and Dí (barbarians)” in general, living next to the Han since antiquity, as the passages he cites from the Classics do not refer to the Sushen, the acclaimed forefathers of the Jurchen only. He sees the Non-Han as being completely different from the Han, as being inferior with regard to culture, and therefore also not being able or worth to communicate with Heaven directly. When they enter China they would sacrifice to Heaven, not knowing that this means that – as the *Liji* (*Book of Rites*), one of the Classics, writes – “they did not know [the nature of] those

¹¹⁶² In the *Jinshi* it is said that the Jurchen directly derived from the Sushen of old via the Mohe, or, more exactly, the Black Water Mohe (*Heishui Mohe*), and the Wuji. (*Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 1.) The *Zuo zhuan* states that the Sushen were living in the Northern regions. (*Zuo zhuan*: 1996, vol. 2, p. 1134–1135 (Zhao gong, 9th year).)

¹¹⁶³ Liu mentions this passage before which fully runs: “If the Yi and Di [barbarians] are allowed to enter China, how to call them then (*jin Yi Di yu Zhongguo you heyi cheng yan*)?” (Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1903], p. 2b.) See above Chapter 3.4 (subchapter “The Question of Fusion”).

¹¹⁶⁴ The sacrifice to the Supreme Lord [in Great Heaven] (*[haotian] shangdi*), which can also be referred to only as Heaven (*tian*), is a ritual mentioned often both in the classics and in the dynastic histories. Usually the emperor, the Son of Heaven (*tianzi*), performed this sacrifice.

¹¹⁶⁵ Citation from the *Liji*. This sentence stands in following context: “(The things used in performing) the rites should be suitable to the season, taken from the resources supplied by the ground, in accordance with (the requirements of) the spirits, and agreeable to the minds of men; according to the characteristics of all things. Thus each season has its productions, each soil its appropriate produce, each sense its peculiar power, and each thing its advantageousness. Therefore what any season does not produce, what any soil does not nourish, will not be used by a superior man in performing his rites, nor be enjoyed by the spirits. If mountaineers were to (seek to) use fish and turtles in their rites, or the dwellers near lakes, deer and pigs, *the superior man would say of them that they did not know (the nature of) those usages.*” (Legge: 1885, Part I, Book VIII. The *Lî Khî* or Rites in the formation of character, Section I. 3.)

¹¹⁶⁶ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1903], p. 12b–13a.

usages,” that is the correct usages.¹¹⁶⁷ The *Liji* argues in the same passage and with regard to the question what the correct “[nature of] those usages” was that rites should harmonize with season and resources – in the mountains one should not use water animals to perform them and near lakes not forest animals.¹¹⁶⁸ In the context of the Yi and Di trying to perform sacrifices to Heaven, this means that the Yi and Di cannot be seen as naturally fit for this performance. Their raw and uncultivated character would not enable them to perform these rites suitably and their performance had to be dispraised as being not according to the way, in which the rites should be performed. Like one should not use water animals to perform rites in the mountains, one should also not allow Yi and Di in the temple of the Son of Heaven to perform them.

In another passage Liu furthermore clarifies his opinion that a true assimilation – at least of the Jurchen and their successors – would not be possible. On the contrary, the Han people would adapt to Non-Han ways if they intermingled for a too long time:

“Since the Wei and Jin dynasties (220–420) the dividing line between the Hua [= the Han people] and the Yi (barbarians) (*Hua Yi zhi fen*) was the Great River (*Dahe*) [= Huang He]. After the Jurchen [Jin Dynasty], the dividing line between the Hua and the Yi (barbarians) was the Jiang-Huai area (*Jiang Huai*) [= the area between the Yangtze River and the Huai River]. This caused the people of Shenzhou [= the Han] leading a dishonorable life and seeking illusory peace. Day after day they lived intermingled with the Yi (barbarians). I fear that after one hundred years [under Jin dominance, 1115–1234] the inevitable infinite calamities reached a [state] without culture. Not one had not become Yi (barbarian). Since one thousand years the hope for survival has been eradicated.”¹¹⁶⁹

Liu regards the Jurchen as being those of the medieval Non-Han dynasties causing the most far-reaching consequences: they pushed the frontier of the Northern people further South till it reached beyond the Huai River. Therefore, they forced Han people to live intermingled with them and imposed their way of living on them until the Han were “barbarized.” Due to their conquests, a Han “spirit for survival” based on national essence was inexistent until today. But this spirit was needed to shake off the Manchu dominance.

Impact of Jurchen Southern Expedition on the Han

In the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* Liu writes about the diverse impacts the southward invasions of the Liao and Jin dynasties had on the Han ethnicity. He counts three major ones:

First, “the Han ethnicity’s migration to the North (*Hanzu zhi bei tu*) [...]”;

¹¹⁶⁷ Citation from the *Liji*. (Legge: 1885, Part I, Book VIII. The *Lî Khî* or Rites in the formation of character, Section I. 3.)

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶⁹ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1903], p. 18a.

second, the intermingled living with the Yi (barbarians) (*yi zu zhi zachu*) [...]; third, the development of anti-foreign thinking among the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu sheng paiwai sixiang*).¹¹⁷⁰

The first two impacts are similar. Both take migration into foreign territory as their main point. In the first case, it is the Han people, who move northwards and have to encounter the dreads of Non-Han influence. In the second, it is the Jurchen moving to the South to exploit the “felicitous land (*yue tu*)” of the Han people, using it as pasture and thereby not only destroying soil, but also culture.¹¹⁷¹ Whereas most other historians saw (and see) especially the southward movement of the Jurchen as the starting point of their sinicization, Liu draws the contrary conclusion.¹¹⁷² Especially because of their southward moving he thinks that the (negative) impact of the Jurchen was decidedly greater than of the Khitan, who stayed in the North of the Huang He. In contrast to the Khitan, who would have turned to “Hua customs,” the Jurchen were not so easily dealt with:

“When the [Jurchen] Jin people invaded the South, the Han people suffered most deeply from calamities. They went to steal beautiful women. In fact, the pivotal point was the Han ethnicity’s migration to the North. Moreover, the Han ethnicity could not free itself from the gradual influence of the Yi (barbarian) customs (*jinran Yi feng*).”¹¹⁷³

The southward movement of the Jurchen during Jin times had an even deeper influence not only on the Han ethnicity, but on the whole Northern region until today:

“In the fifth year of the Jin reign period Huangtong [1145], State Farm military units (*chuntian jun*) were introduced. All Jurchen and Khitan people moved from their home countries to the central region (*Zhongtu*) [= China proper]. According to their households land was assigned to them and they lived intermingled with the [Han] people (*min*). They were called Battalions and Companies (*ming’an mukun*).¹¹⁷⁴ Altogether, they were ten thousand people. Moreover, the [Jurchen] Jin Yi (barbarians) used foreign people (*yi zu*) to enter China. They gave rein to their wild and brutal power to unrestrained murdering. They stole their territory with its mountains and rivers, enjoyed their children’s jade and silk. Moreover, I am afraid the Han ethnicity did not reject this captivation! So in the end, the

¹¹⁷⁰ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 39a/b, 40a.

¹¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁷² *Jinshi*, ch. 5, p. 100; ch. 24, p. 572; ch. 83, p. 1862–1863; Tao: 1976, p. 44; Yao: 1976 [1959], p. 47–64; Lü: 1989 [1934], p. 164.

¹¹⁷³ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 39a.

¹¹⁷⁴ Liu Shippei refers to the Jurchen system of Battalions (thousand households) and Companies (hundred households) (*meng’an mouke*) here. *Meng’an mouke* are the transcriptions of the Jurchen terms, whereas *qianhu* and *baihu* are the Chinese names for these military units, which were both also military titles for the Leaders of these units.

The most thorough analyses of this system stems from Mikami Tsugio and Cheng Nina. (Mikami: 1984, p. 128–526; Cheng Nina: 1999, p. 78–97, 186–200.)

pasturing Man (barbarian) people (*Manmin*) followed the felicitous land of the Zhonghua [people]. Consequently, China was turned into pasture land (*yi Zhongguo wei muyang*). I read that the North of the Yangtze River, the Huai River and the Huang He was called a fertile region and a country of cultural treasures. But today everywhere in the Northern provinces talented men have vanished into thin air and there is no culture. Because of the Yi (barbarians) it has become a region that never bloomed. There lies the reason for the assimilation to the Man (barbarian) ethnicity (*yu Manzu tonghua*). So, ‘they sucked out the marrow of All-under-Heaven (*qiao piao tianxia zhi gusui*),’¹¹⁷⁵ and wiped off the cultural treasures of the Central Plains (*Zhongyuan*) again and again. In the *Jinshi*, sixth year of the Tianhui reign period [1140]¹¹⁷⁶ one reads that it was forbidden for people to wear Han dress and it was ordered that the people cut their hair.¹¹⁷⁷ And alas! Not one of the Han ethnicity’s rites and traditions did not change to Yi (barbarian) [ways].”¹¹⁷⁸

In this passage Liu excludes the Jurchen from All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*) and therefore from humanity itself when he writes that they “sucked out the marrow of All-under-Heaven.” The sentence is a citation from the *Mingyi daifang lu* (*Waiting for the Dawn*), a work by the Ming loyalist Huang Zongxi (1610–1695). This work had been re-discovered by late Qing revolutionaries, who were stimulated by it, “because portions of it, in their eyes, seemed precociously to advocate democracy.”¹¹⁷⁹ In the original context, the autocratic “lord (*jun*)” is the subject. The similarities between the “lord” in Huang’s text and the Manchus in Liu’s text do not end with their marrow-sucking qualities, but go further. Huang employs the well-known duality of “host (*zhu*)” and “guest (*ke*)” and writes:

“The people in ancient times took All-under-Heaven as hosts (*zhu*) and the lords as guests (*ke*). Those, for whom the lords planned and organized in their lifetime, were All-under-Heaven. Today, the lords are taken as the host (*zhu*) and All-

¹¹⁷⁵ This is a only very slightly altered citation from *Mingyi dai fang lu* (*Waiting for the Dawn*) by Huang Zongxi (1610–1695). Huang Zongxi criticises the egomaniac lords of his time: “After having managed to become [lords], they violently suck out the marrow of All-under-Heaven and tear apart the children of All-under-Heaven, to satisfy the egoistic and obscene pleasures, and considering all this as natural.” (Huang Zongxi: 1985 [189-?], p. 2–3. See also Struve: 1988.) The *Mingyi daifang lu* has been translated by William Theodore de Bary. (Huang Zongxi: 1993.)

¹¹⁷⁶ Both, Jin Taizong and Jin Xizong used this period name. However, Liu Shiwei refers to 1140 here, although at this time Xizong had already changed the period name to *tianjuan*. In proper counting 1140 is the third year of the *tianjuan* period.

¹¹⁷⁷ Actually, this passage cannot be found in the *Jinshi*, but in the *Sanchao beimeng huibian* (*Compendium of Treaties with the Northern [Neighbours] during the Three Reigns [of Emperors Huizong, Qinzong, and Gaozong]*) by the Song official Xu Mengxin (1126–1207). (Xu Mengxin: 1973, ch. 132, p. 5a.)

¹¹⁷⁸ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 39b–40a.

In this passage Liu refers to the dynastic history of the Jin, the *Jinshi* twice, – although the reference to the *Jinshi* is incorrect in the case of the dress and hairstyle regulations. In the *Rangshu*, he condemned the *Jinshi* as a “foreign” and therefore illegitimate history. (Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1903], p. 9a.) However, the *Jinshi* is obviously only illegitimate with regards to its placement among the official histories, and it does not detain Liu from using the *Jinshi* as a source.

¹¹⁷⁹ Struve: 1988, p. 475.

under-Heaven as guests (*ke*). Those, for whom All-under-Heaven are without land and seek for peace, are the lords.”¹¹⁸⁰

Huang’s work is a general critique of autocracy. However, the lords of his lifetime were Manchu, although he did not refer to them directly. In Liu’s text the subject also is more than the “lord” in general. It refers to the Jurchen, but moreover to all Non-Han overlords in China’s history. In this context Liu twice uses the character *Mán* to refer to Northern people.¹¹⁸¹ The Man people are a certain group of Southern Non-Han people in antiquity – Liu himself mentions them as the ancestors of the snake in the *Rangshu*.¹¹⁸² Like other terms, which originally referred to specific Non-Han people in antiquity, i.e. the *Yi* and *Dí*, *Mán* became a general term for “barbarians,” but it is not used for people from the North.

Who is meant by *Mán* here? One has to take two facts into account to understand what Man refers to here. *Mán* is nearly homonymous with *Mǎn*, the Chinese character for the Manchu. Normally, the two characters are not interchangeable, but Liu himself refers to the similarity of the two characters later in the text, when he refers to another ethnicity, which invaded Northern China, the Naiman. Liu annotates that the *Nǎimǎn* are the “*Nǎimán* of the *Yuanshi*.”¹¹⁸³ Thus, Liu himself stresses the direct connection between the two characters. I therefore think that when he uses the character *Mán* to refer to those people from the North, who entered the Central Plains and caused the Han peoples migration and consequent barbarization, he makes a reference to the Manchu.

One of Liu’s foremost aims is to persuade his readers that the overlordship of the Manchu is unnatural and illegitimate. He shows that the Jurchen were the prominent beginning of a cultural decline of the Han people and that their descendants, the Manchus, perpetuate this development with their policy. He therefore not only uses the most severe terms to describe the character of the Jurchen – i.e. he ascribes a “wild and brutal power to unrestrained murdering” to them, sees them as people without culture, accuses them as thieves, who conquered and thus “robbed” the land of the Han people – , but moreover he links nomad habits to them. Nomadism was traditionally perceived as *the* most “barbarian” habit and it also constituted the most obvious contrast to the sedentary Han ethnicity. This also fits perfectly into Liu’s dichotomy of the Han Self versus the Non-Han Other.

That the Jurchen in reality were not nomads did not fit into this picture. Their way of living in the fertile riverbeds of Manchuria were similar to the traditions of Northern Han people and consisted of farming and sedentary husbandry, especially piggery. But

¹¹⁸⁰ Huang Zongxi: 1985 [189-?], p. 2.

¹¹⁸¹ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 39b.

¹¹⁸² Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1903], p. 3b.

¹¹⁸³ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 39b–40a in small double-lined characters. Actually, in the *Yuanshi*, both forms are used, although *Nǎimǎn* is used much more often than *Nǎimán*.

for Liu it is not essential to give a true account of Jurchen way of life, but he wants to draw a picture of them as “un-Han” and uncultivated as possible. He thereby also ascribes the slogan of “turning China into pasture land” to them, which is rather unusual in connection with the Jurchen and is generally only used for describing the policy of the Mongols during the Yuan dynasty.

The third impact the Southern invasion of the Liao and Jin dynasties had on the Han ethnicity, was that

“the Han ethnicity developed anti-foreign thinking (*paiwai sixiang*). The Han ethnicity suffered from the catastrophe [caused] by the [Jurchen] Jin people (*Jinren*). The people carried anger in their hearts, and the scholars, united in their hatred, thought of the phrase ‘to expel the Di (barbarians) (*rang Di*)’¹¹⁸⁴ from the Classics. [...] They [= the scholars] made contributions and achievements, supporting the [principle of] *qian* and *kun*¹¹⁸⁵ to clear the Central Plains from disgrace.¹¹⁸⁶ [...]

The Song Confucian scholars did not know about the people (*ren*), and the people did not have national sentiment (*minzu sixiang*). Therefore, they could not develop the sentiment of a nation state’s people (*guojia minzu sixiang*). Nation peoples (*guomin*) have individual characters. If they can maintain these [individual characters], they will persist. If they lose them, they will decline.

I read that the Song Confucians promoted ‘inside are the Xia (Chinese), outside are the Yi (barbarians) (*nei Xia wai Yi*)’,¹¹⁸⁷ and I say that the Han ethnicity should protect what they left behind and taught. [...] By examining this, [one can see that] the merit of rejecting foreign ethnicities (*pai yi zu*) and protecting the own ethnicity (*bao tong zu*) already developed then [= in Song times].”¹¹⁸⁸

Liu tells the story of how anti-foreign thinking and moreover national sentiment developed during Song times. This laid the foundation for national sentiment although the Song Confucians did not develop nationalism as such. Liu’s location of these developments in Southern Song times stands in congruence with what some modern historians think. They describe the Song’s confrontation by the Khitan and especially the Jurchen as the trigger for anti-foreign and moreover for proto-nationalist thinking among Han people.¹¹⁸⁹

¹¹⁸⁴ This is a reference to the *Gongyang zhuan*. (*Gongyang chuan* (Xi gong, 4th year). See also this Chapter 3.2 (“The *Rangshu*”).

¹¹⁸⁵ See above this Chapter 3.4 (subchapter “The Origin of Ethnic Differences”); Liu Shippei: 1997 [1903], p. 1a.)

¹¹⁸⁶ Liu names Chen Liang (1143–1194) as an example here. Chen Liang was a philosopher and political thinker in Southern Song times. He advocated a strong patriotism, a most severe resistance against the Jin dynasty and political reforms to bolster this.

¹¹⁸⁷ This a shortened citation from the *Gongyang zhuan*, later seen as characterizing the Age of Approaching Peace (*shengping shi*), the second of the Three Ages: “The *Chunqiu* [...] treats all the Xia as internal and all the Yi and Di as external.” (*Gongyang zhuan* (Cheng gong, 15th year). Translation based on Yuri Pines. (Pines: 2005, p. 83.)

¹¹⁸⁸ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 40a.

¹¹⁸⁹ Tillman: 1979; Trauzettel: 1975; Duara: 1993b, p. 2, 9.

In general, Liu is re-using phrases and connections he already used in the *Rangshu* (1903). He refers to the expression “to expel the Dí (barbarians)” – he phrases it as “to expel the Yi (barbarians)” in the *Rangshu* – he derives from the Classics. In 1903, his whole book was based on the wish to expel the “barbarians” from China’s history and self-consciousness. In 1905 he uses the term as the point of origin, from which the Confucian scholars of Southern Song times derived their idea of anti-foreign thinking. He claims that they further strengthened the development of the inside, We/Self, Xia/Han strongly opposed to the outside, They/Other, Yi/Dí. This thinking of the world being divided into two principles is also further promoted by Liu by referring to *qian* and *kun*, a reference he also uses in 1903.¹¹⁹⁰ Liu uses the two principles to state that people differentiate themselves by their distinct characters. Moreover, if they lose this distinction their decline would be inevitable, because a general principle would be violated.

The Manchu Qing

As already discussed above the existence of the Manchu ethnicity and its dynasty are Liu’s chief arguments against the idea of an “assimilative power” of the Han people. He must believe that his argument is strong enough to speak for itself as he does not further explain his doubts, but only writes that seeing the Manchus night and day makes it impossible for him to believe in the idea of the Han people having the ability to assimilate others.¹¹⁹¹

In the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* Liu gives a short description of the founding history of the Qing dynasty. He mentions general Wu Sangui (1612–1678), “who guided the Manchu ethnicity to invade Beijing,”¹¹⁹² and also Zheng Chenggong (in Western writing also Koxinga (1624–1662), “who seized Taiwan to protect one glint of the Han ethnicity’s independence.”¹¹⁹³ When the Kangxi Emperor (1654–1722, reign time 1661–1722) in the end defeated Koxinga, “China was not the China of the Han ethnicity anymore.”¹¹⁹⁴ In Liu’s opinion this was the most important effect of the Manchu invasion. Although there would have been several attempts to restore a Han Chinese dynasty, all of them failed.¹¹⁹⁵ As the most important ones Liu mentions the White Lotus Sect’s (*Bailian jiao*) uprising in Shandong led by Wang Lun (d. 1774), the Eight Diagram Sect’s (*Bagua jiao*) uprising in Zhili led by Lin Qing (d. 1813), the Miao Rebellions (1735–1736, 1795–1806, and 1854–1873), and the Taiping Rebellion and the establishment of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace (*Taiping tianguo*) (1851–1864) led by Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864) and Yang

¹¹⁹⁰ See above this Chapter 3.4 (subchapter “The Origin of Ethnic Differences”).

¹¹⁹¹ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 46a.

¹¹⁹² Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 46b.

¹¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁵ Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 47a.

Xiuqing (d. 1856).¹¹⁹⁶ However, all these rebellions failed in their aim to regain freedom or restore a durable Han Chinese dynasty. Liu gives two main reasons for this:

“The first [reason] is: The Han ethnicity helps foreign ethnicities and kills its own kind (*tong zhong*)!

Nation people (*guomin*) should take the power of unity to resist against foreign ethnicities (*wai zu*). Therefore, rejecting foreign ethnicities (*yi zu*) and protecting the own kind is an immense merit. Helping foreign ethnicities (*wai zu*) and destroying the own kind is an immense guilt. Why do we people of the Han ethnicity (*wu Hanzu zhi min*) know nothing of having a nation-state (*guojia*), know nothing of having a society (*shehui*), not thinking of the way of grouping and binding (*tuanjie*) and not understanding the method of adapting and opposing (*shunni*)?”¹¹⁹⁷

As representatives of Han people, who “helped foreign ethnicities,” Liu gives Zhonghang Yue (dates of life unknown), who helped the Xiongnu during Western Han times (206 BC–9 AD), Wu Haozhang (dates of life unknown), who helped the Western Xia Dynasty (1038–1227) during Song times, Hong Chengchou (1593–1665) and the above mentioned Wu Sangui, who both helped the Manchus at the beginning of Qing times, and Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885), Hu Linyi (1812–1861) and Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), who helped the Qing to defeat the Taiping Rebellion.

The second reason why at least the most important of the restoration movements, the Taiping Rebellion, was unsuccessful, was that “the Manchu ethnicity guided the white race (*bai zhong*) to kill the yellow race (*huang zhong*).”¹¹⁹⁸ Liu claims that due to the Manchus the Westerners gained a strong foothold in China. And only with their help the Manchus were able to overthrow the Taiping rebellion.¹¹⁹⁹ Liu also reminds his readers that “the grief of losing the state has already been seen earlier in China (*Zhongguo*).”¹²⁰⁰ But circumstances would be more severe today: “Particularly with regard to nationalism (*minzuzhuyi*) at this pivotal point of survival or ruin time is short. And it is at the Han ethnicity to make a choice for itself.”¹²⁰¹

Liu uses the chapter about the Manchus to appeal to the Han people to take destiny in their own hands, to use nationalism in order to strengthen their ethnicity. Foreign overlordship had happened before and has not brought the Han people to their knees. With nationalism at hand, the Han people should not pass up a golden opportunity to establish a purely Han nation-state now.

¹¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹⁷ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 47a–b.

¹¹⁹⁸ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 47b.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰⁰ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 48a.

¹²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

The Mongols: Another Reason for China's Desolate Situation

Liu writes not much about the Yuan. His most important statements can be found in the *Zhongguo minzu zhi* from 1905 in the fourteenth chapter “Menggu zu zhi neiqin (The invasion of the Mongols ethnicity).”¹²⁰² Generally speaking, Liu considers the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368) as another important phase in Han history leaving a deep imprint. The most important difference between the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and all previous Non-Han dynasties is the extent of the Mongols’ conquest, which covered all regions inhabited by Han people:

“Alas, the southward invasions of the Northern Wei and the Jin people only reached China’s Northern regions (*Zhina beibu*) and ended there. But during the time of its bloom the Mongol ethnicity also took China’s Southern regions (*Zhina nanbu*). Therefore, from then on the Han ethnicity had no place for refuge. Therefore, from then on China (*Zhongguo*) was really in decline!”¹²⁰³

During Yuan times no Han Chinese dynasty existed parallel as it had been the case during Northern Wei, Liao and Jin times, when the Southern Dynasties, the Five Dynasties and the Song existed. No ethnic Han and therefore in Liu’s opinion no legitimate emperor could be kept on the throne during Yuan times. Liu considers this a heavy blow. His exclamation “from then on, China was really in decline” refers to the discontinuity of the chain of Han Chinese dynasties – and dynastic histories – caused by the Mongols.

Moreover, Liu blames the Mongols for China’s current inability to act and claims that

“since the Hu (barbarian) Yuan Dynasty culture and teaching declined, territory and borders were invaded and cut. What prevents our China (*wu Zhongguo*) today from progress is only the guilt of these foreign ethnicities (*yi zu*). Therefore, the hundred years of the Yuan Dynasty were the era of the most immense decline of the force (*shili*) of the Han ethnicity.”¹²⁰⁴

Like the politics of the Jin and to a lesser degree the Liao Dynasty, those of the Yuan Dynasty add up to the Qing Dynasty’s inability to deal with the present-day situation. Liu thinks that the basic reasons for China’s momentary desolate situation, its backward society and the low moral among the Han people are rooted in the times of Non-Han conquests, which weakened and demoralized the Han people, sometimes even “barbarized” them. Foreign influence had had so bad effects on the Han ethnicity and the only possibility to save it was to turn to the national essence and strengthen it. Only

¹²⁰² Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 40b–43a.

¹²⁰³ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 40b–41a.

¹²⁰⁴ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 42b.

when the Han national essence regained power it was possible to found a nation-state strong enough to withstand foreign aggressions, be they Western or Eastern.

3.5 Conclusion

Liu is interpreted as standing scholarly, intellectually, but also politically and ideologically in close connection to Zhang Taiyan. Both were Old Text scholars, but both are also considered to have been revolutionaries. Also with regard to their ideas of a Chinese nation-state it has been stated that the nationalist revolutionaries like Zhang Taiyan and Liu equally wanted a purely Han nation-state.¹²⁰⁵

It has come to the fore that this is not true for Zhang. Although Zhang like Liu opposes a multi-ethnic nation-state he finds a loophole by referring to the “assimilative power” of the Han people, a thought brought up by Liang Qichao. With regard to the question of ethnicity and assimilation in an imagined nation-state, Liang and Zhang are thus much closer than Liu and Zhang, because in contrast to them, Liu does not believe in this “assimilative power.” It seems that he considers those, who believe in it, as being blinded by their political ambitions and ideas. Although Liu admits that in antiquity one-sided assimilation would have happened, he strongly rejects the idea that this could still be the case in his present-day. In Liu’s opinion the era of one-sided assimilation was over since Non-Han ethnicities discovered how to reign an empire effectively and how to use Han ways consciously in order to disguise themselves. Liu thinks that when Non-Han ethnicities conquered Han inhabited regions time and again, the opposite happened and the Han people became barbarized rather than assimilating others.

Liu argues that as long as the Han people would not have a strong and stable state the thought of assimilating others like in pre-Qin times was just out of the question. In his opinion the Han people did not have a position powerful enough to be able to absorb others since the Han Dynasty (207 BC–220 AD). Since that time, in fact, they would have lost this power by losing their distinct characteristics, because they would have accepted too many Non-Han in their midst. Moreover, the Non-Han became more and more superior militarily. Therefore, Liu thinks that in the present situation the reasonable thing to do was to re-gather strength, concentrate on the national essence, re-purify the race and then found a powerful nation-state.

Liu was backed up by other thinkers in this opinion linked to the “National Essence Movement,” like the anti-Manchuist writer Huang Jie (1873–1935), co-founder of the

¹²⁰⁵ Leibold: 2007, p. 34–35.

Guocui xuebao, who argued similarly in his *Huangshi (History of the Yellow Race)* (1905–1908). Like Liu, Huang had a deeply negative image of the Non-Han in East Asia in general and the Manchus in particular, and thought of the time after the Han Dynasty as a continuum of humiliations and weaknesses of the Han ethnicity, because it could not prevent others from dominating China.¹²⁰⁶

This image of the Han ethnicity embedded in an exclusive nationalism, in Liang’s words “small nationalism,” that is, a nationalism, which excludes Non-Han people, vanished from Han Chinese nationalist discourse after the decline of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. At the same time, the discourse on ethnicity and assimilation with regard to Chinese nation-building became more and more homogenized. Already before, Zhang, usually thought to have been an anti-Manchuist revolutionary like Liu and Huang, changed his attitude from favoring an exclusive nationalism to an inclusive one, and supported a strategy of nation-building including Non-Han based on active assimilation. A position like that, which Liu had put forward in his books discussed above, does not reappear in prominent places after 1912. And by the 1920s, anti-Manchuism and exclusive Han nationalism seemed to be past – at least in the political and historical discourse.

¹²⁰⁶ Schneider, L.: 1976, p. 61, 66; Hon: 2003, 253–255.

Chapter 4. The Non-Han People in Periodizations and Assimilationist Theories

“But change happened only in one direction – there was no fusion. Only the Yi (barbarians) were changed, but the Han were not.”¹²⁰⁷

Fu Sinian (1918).

When the Qing government and especially the Regent Zaifeng¹²⁰⁸ (also Prince Chun (*Chun qinwang*) 1883–1951, regency time 1908–1912) proved incapable of continuing political reforms after the death of the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908, regency time 1861–1908) in 1908, the Chinese reformers at last withdrew from their aim of making the Qing Empire a constitutional monarchy. They joined the revolutionaries in their idealistic and practical struggle to end the dynasty. In late 1911, the processes that were about to bring the end of the Manchu Qing Dynasty and a crucial change for China culminated. In October, the Xinhai Revolution began. On December 29th, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was elected the provisional President of the Republic of China in Nanjing and on January 1st, 1912, the Republic was officially established. Finally, on February 12th, Empress Dowager Longyu (1868–1913, regency 1908–1912) signed the abdication treaty for the infant emperor Puyi (1906–1967, reign time 1908–1912). The Qing Dynasty ended and a new era began.

¹²⁰⁷ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1227/179.

¹²⁰⁸ Zaifeng acted as Regent for his son, the underage Xuantong Emperor Puyi (1906–1967, reign time 1908–1912). Officially he had this post together with the Empress Dowager Longyu (1868–1913, regency time 1908–1912), the wife of his brother, the late Guangxu Emperor (1871–1908, reign time 1875–1908).

4.1 The New Setting

Political Thinkers after 1912

The political situation after 1912 in the Non-Han territories officially incorporated into the Republic of China provides the background for the essays analyzed below. Their instability and *de facto* separation was an important precondition for the authors to write them. Against the background of the political situation as a whole, it will also come to the fore why no influential texts were written on the topic analyzed here during the first years of the Republic of China, that is, until the late 1910s. The biographies of the thinkers, whose texts had been analyzed in the first part of this dissertation, reveal that they were involved in the complicated political life of the young Republic of China. Their biographies can serve as representative examples for most important thinkers and many scholars of that time.

Zhang Taiyan founded the United Party (*Tongyi dang*) (1912), was member of the first parliament (1912), adviser of Yuan Shikai (1912–1913), under house arrest¹²⁰⁹ (1914–1916), minister of Sun Yat-sen's new parliament (1917–1919) and then engaged in the *Liansheng zizhi* (*Confederation of Self-Governing Provinces*) movement, especially against the separatist Beiyang government.

Liang Qichao reorganized his Democratic Party (*Minzhu dang*) (1912), founded the new Progressive Party (*Jinbu dang*) (1913), became Minister of Justice (1913–1914) and First Director of the Monetary Bureau (1914), launched a press campaign against the “Twenty-One Demands (*Ershiyi tiao*)” (1915), organized the countermovement to end Yuan Shikai's Empire of China (*Zhonghua diguo*) (1915–1916), merged the Progressive Party into the Association for Constitutional Research (*Xianfa yanjiu hui*) (1916) and became Minister of Finance. In 1918, he retreated from politics after a bad result of his Association for Constitutional Research in the election for a new National Assembly.

Liu Shipei retreated from politics (1911), came back and became a high-ranking adviser in Shanxi (1913–1914), supported Yuan Shikai's emperorship (1914–1916), withdraw from politics again and became professor at the Peking University (1917–1919) until his early death in 1919.

These political thinkers, who had been busy writing essays bringing forward their ideas about Chinese nation-building during the final years of the Qing Dynasty, were now occupied with finding their way in the new situation. They wanted to participate actively in politics, but politically speaking, they became more and more

¹²⁰⁹ He used this time to revise earlier works. (Wong: 1989, p. 112–115.)

marginalized.¹²¹⁰ Others, who had been politically and militarily active already before 1912 like i.e. Sun Yat-sen, Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zuolin (1875–1928), gained influence. Moreover, also the time of the thinker-politicians was scarce and the texts they wrote during that time did not deal with Non-Han ethnicities and the question of their integration, as the problems they faced in the new Republic were already plenty even without touching the issue of the split-up of the “Five Ethnicities (*wu zu*).”

Besides the fact that their time-consuming political activities prevented them from writing much in general, there was probably also another reason for their little interest in this topic, and that was the unsatisfying and unsolved political situation in the Non-Han regions themselves. In order to understand this phase and its situation, a short historical outline about what happened in Xinjiang, Mongolia, Tibet and Manchuria after the abdication of the last Qing Emperor Puyi until the early 1930s will be given. We will see that the regions, which had been part of the Qing Empire’s geo-body, did not automatically become parts of the Republic of China.¹²¹¹

East Turkestan (Xinjiang): Turkish Republics and Soviet Russian influence

Xinjiang’s situation was rather stable until 1928. After 1912, Xinjiang officially came under the control of the Republic of China, which exercised power through a former Qing official, Yang Zengxin (1859–1928, *jinshi* 1889), who was made Governor of Xinjiang. Only when Yang was assassinated in 1928 and followed by Jin Shuren (1879–1941), Chinese power in Xinjiang dwindled and a chaotic period began. The Kumul Rebellion (1931–1934) and other unrests made it possible for leaders in the Kashgar region to claim independence. They founded the unrecognized short-lived First East Turkestan Republic, also Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (1933–1934). It was destroyed in the Battle of Kashgar (1934) by Chinese Muslim allies of the KMT under the warlord-general Ma Zhongying (ca. 1910–1936).¹²¹²

The Russian Empire (1721–1917) had been interested in the region since the late 19th century and so was its successor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), also Soviet Union (1922–1991). Already in 1931, warlord Sheng Shicai (1897–1970) had allied with the Soviet Union to suppress the Kumul Rebellion. In exchange, Sheng had to grant the Soviets political influence.

In 1934, KMT warlord-general Ma Zhongying wanted to replace the Soviet Union’s puppet Sheng and reconquer whole Xinjiang. In order to prevent this, the Soviet Russian Red Army collided with their opponents, the Russian anti-communist White Guards, and invaded Xinjiang. For years, the political situation remained unsolved with

¹²¹⁰ For a more detailed account of the event in that time, see Zarrow: 2005; Fairbank/Feuerwerker (eds.): 1986; Fairbank (ed.): 1989; Levenson: 1958.

¹²¹¹ See Map 2 above in the Introduction, p. 21.

¹²¹² About the Ma warlord clan see Lipman: 1984.

different powers trying to get the upper hand. In 1949, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) entered Xinjiang and incorporated it into the PRC.¹²¹³

Outer Mongolia: Theocratic state and People's Republic

Mongolian inhabited regions had been divided into Inner and Outer Mongolia already since the beginning of Manchu rule in the 17th century. There existed many differences between the two regions, also with regard to their reactions to the new Republic of China.¹²¹⁴ Immediately after the abdication of the last Qing Emperor, Outer Mongolia claimed independency as a theocracy under the Bogd Khan (1869–1924).¹²¹⁵ This was based on the Outer Mongols' understanding of their position in the Qing Empire. They saw themselves as having been on an equal level with the Han Chinese. Therefore, after the Qing's decline it was without question for them to found their own state and not become subjects of a Chinese state.¹²¹⁶

The Republic of China did not officially acknowledge the Outer Mongols' independent theocratic state. When at last warlord Xu Shuzheng (1880–1925) could muster enough military power in 1919, he invaded Outer Mongolia and forced the Bogd Khan to withdraw his declaration of independency. But already in 1921, Russian anti-communist White Guards under the Lieutenant general Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg (1885–1921) invaded Outer Mongolia and drove Xu's troops away. Baron von Ungern-Sternberg reinstated the Bogd Khan, and Outer Mongolia was proclaimed an independent theocratic monarchy again. Later that year, the Outer Mongolian Revolution (1921) broke out. With the help of the Soviet Russian Red Army, Mongolian revolutionaries expelled the White Guards. At the beginning, the Bogd Khan was kept as a nominal leader, but when he died in 1924, the Mongolian People's Republic (1924–1990) was officially proclaimed. It existed until 1990, when the first free election took place in (Outer) Mongolia.

In the 1910s the Inner Mongols had accepted Bogd Khan's rulership and some of them tried to rebel against the Republican government, but in 1913 Yuan Shikai put an end to the attempts of the Mongol wars of unification and Inner Mongolia was merged into the Republic of China.¹²¹⁷

¹²¹³ See also Lattimore: 1962, p. 187–205.

¹²¹⁴ See above Introduction (subchapter "The Historical Setting: Nationalist Thinking and the Non-Han Regions in Late Imperial and Early Republican Times").

¹²¹⁵ Also known as Bogdo Lama. He was of Tibetan origin. As a baby, he was recognized as the eighth reincarnation of the Khalkha Jebtsundamba Khutuktus, the "Holy Venerable Lord," who also held the title Bogd Gegen, by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in Lhasa. Afterwards, he went to Mongolia in 1874 and never left it again.

¹²¹⁶ Tatsuo: 1984.

¹²¹⁷ See also Lattimore: 1962, p. 97–102; Liu Xiaoyuan: 2006, p. 3–111.

Tibet: Theocratic State under the Dalai Lama

Already since 1720, Tibet had also been divided into two parts: Inner Tibet consisting of Amdo (*Anduo*) and Eastern Kham (*Dong Kang*) and Outer Tibet consisting of Ü-Tsang (*Weizang*) and Western Kham (*Xi Kang*).¹²¹⁸ Like Bogd Khan in Outer Mongolia, the 13th Dalai Lama Thubten Gyatso (1876–1933, reign time 1879–1933) declared Outer Tibet's independence as a theocratic state immediately after the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. From Lhasa, the 13th and 14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935, reign time 1937–1950, since then in exile) reigned the regions of Outer Tibet, which more or less form today's Tibet Autonomous Region (*Xizang zizhiqu*).

One part of Inner Tibet, that is, Eastern Kham, which is separated from Western Kham by the Yangtze River and positioned in today's Sichuan province, was under the control of the Han Chinese warlord and KMT Governor Liu Wenhui (1895–1976). In the other parts of Inner Tibet, Amdo and Western Kham, control was shifting between the Dalai Lama and Han Chinese and Chinese Muslim¹²¹⁹ warlord cliques.

In 1930, the 13th Dalai Lama tried to conquer portions of land in Amdo and Western Kham. The Sino-Tibetan War (1930–1932) broke out between the Tibetan armies and the KMT warlords' armies. Finally, the Chinese Muslim warlord in Amdo, Ma Bufang (1903–1975), and Liu Wenhui in Western Kham defeated the Dalai Lama. He asked for British help. Under British pressure, the KMT then had to end the hostilities and sign a peace treaty. The situation remained relatively calm until the 1950s, when the PLA incorporated Tibet into the PRC militarily.¹²²⁰

Manchuria: Puppet of Foreign Powers

Manchuria's late imperial history made its situation in Republican times quite distinct from that of the other three large Non-Han regions. The main difference was the fact, that at the beginning of the 20th century people and territory were no longer connected as in the cases of East Turkestan, Mongolia and Tibet. Until 1912, the Manchus had been the ruling ethnic elite of the Qing Empire, the Imperial family was entirely of Manchu and Mongol origin, all high official posts were given to Manchus and Mongols.¹²²¹

In the course of the conquests in the 17th and 18th century many Manchus had abandoned Manchuria to be garrisoned as banner people (*qiren*) among the non-Manchu population in all regions of the growing Qing Empire. Many of them lived in Northern

¹²¹⁸ Amdo's borders nearly match with the Qinghai Province of the PRC today. Western Kang was a special administrative district of the Republic of China until 1939. Then it became a province under Governor Liu Wenhui. It covered the Western Sichuan regions and the Eastern part of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

¹²¹⁹ Today, the Chinese Muslims are referred to with as Hui. However, in sources from early Republican times and earlier, Hui usually refers to the Turkish Muslims. Until Republican times, the Chinese Muslims were usually referred to with the Chinese transcription of their Central Asian name, Dungan (*Donggan*).

¹²²⁰ See also Lattimore: 1962, p. 233–237, Smith: 1996.

¹²²¹ Many Mongol princesses from certain noble families could become empresses, but Han Chinese women never entered the palace as such. (Rawski: 1998, p. 131.)

China, especially in Beijing, where they probably formed a fourth or a fifth of its inhabitants.¹²²² Due to the migration politics in Manchuria, initiated by the Manchu General of Heilongjiang Province, Tepuqin (1801–1887) in the 19th century, when Han Chinese were finally allowed to settle in Manchuria, the Manchus had no homeland where they could return to after the downfall of their dynasty. Manchuria was already populated by others, mainly Han Chinese, and only very few Manchus were left there. Moreover, many Manchus had been killed in the course of the Xinhai Revolution (1911) and many more died afterwards due to impoverishment and starvation.¹²²³ Because of the hostile attitude of Han Chinese civilians and politics, many Manchus began to conceal their Manchu identity and went under Han Chinese disguise. The official number of Manchus of 1953 was 2.42 million, which was only half the estimated number of banner people in late Qing times.¹²²⁴ Edward J. M. Rhoads and Mark Elliott reason that although many Manchus had been killed after and during the Xinhai Revolution and also starved to death due to their desperate economical situation, there must be a considerable number, which “disappeared by passing themselves off as Han.”¹²²⁵ Elliott claims that the assimilation of the Manchus really began only in 1911 and was pushed on by the Manchus themselves, who were objects of constant ethnic discrimination, being blamed for the desperate state of China.¹²²⁶

Already during Qing times a considerable part of Manchu inhabited territory had fallen to the Russian Empire through the Treaty of Aigun (*Aigun tiaohé*) (1858) and the (First) Convention of Peking (*Beijing tiaoyue*) (1860). The Treaty of Aigun incorporated the region between the Amur River (*Heilongjiang*) and the Outer Khingan (or Stanovoy) Range (*Wai Xing'an ling*) into Russian Siberia. The Convention of Peking, one of the unequal treaties, moreover assigned the parts in the East of the Ussuri River (*Wusulijiang*) to Russia. Russian Manchuria, also called Outer Manchuria (*Wai Dongbei*) was never claimed to be part of a Chinese nation-state later. It belongs to the Russian Federation today.

In 1860, following the Treaty of Aigun, the Manchu General of Heilongjiang Province, Tepuqin (1801–1887), suggested to finally open up (Inner) Manchuria to Han Chinese farmers to thwart Russian Imperialism. The effect was as immediate as maybe unexpected. The migration of Han Chinese settlers to Manchuria, later called “Crashing into Manchuria (*Chuang guan dong*),” began and quickly turned the Northeast into a mainly Han populated region. But also Russian influence continued to spread into

¹²²² Gamble: 1921, p. 99.

¹²²³ The changes the 1911 revolution meant for the Manchus are often neglected. For the Han Chinese the revolution might not have resulted “in a future clearly different from the past,” but for the Manchus the future was distinctively unlike the past. (Zarrow: 2005, p. 30; see also Elliott: 2012.)

¹²²⁴ Elliott: 2012.

¹²²⁵ Rhoads: 2000, p. 276. About the Manchus going under disguise see also Crossley: 1990b, p. 217f. About to the Manchus' fate after 1912, listen to Mark Elliott's lecture given in on June 20th 2012 at the Australian Centre on China and the World. (Elliott: 2012. The lecture will be published in the e-journal *China Heritage Quarterly*, but has not yet been when this dissertation was finished.)

¹²²⁶ Elliott: 2012.

Manchuria, especially when the Qing Empire granted a concession to the Russian Empire to build the Chinese Eastern Railway (*Dong Qing tielu*) through Manchuria, which as a side effect connected the port city Vladivostok and the then only tiny Chinese village Harbin. Harbin consequently turned into a Russian enclave.

After Japan's defeat of the Qing Empire in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Treaty of Shimonoseki (*Maguan tiaoyue*) (1895) defined that the eastern Liaodong Peninsula came under Japanese sovereignty. But already in 1898, Germany, France and Russia urged Japan to give the Liaodong Peninsula back to the Qing, so that Russia could lease the Peninsula. It was then called Kwantung Leased Territory (*Guandong zhou*). In the same year, the South Manchurian Railway (*Nan Man tielu*) was constructed under the control of the Russian Empire to link Harbin to the ice-free Lüshun Port (*Lüshun kou*) at the southern end of the Liaodong Peninsula.

After Russia's defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the two states signed the Portsmouth Treaty (1905). According to the Treaty Japan replaced Russia as a leaseholder of the Liaodong Peninsula and gained extraterritorial rights in the South Manchurian Railway Zone (*Mantie fushu di*). The South Manchurian Railway Company (*J. Minami Manshû Tetsudô Kabushiki-gaisha*, C. *Nan Manzhou tiedao zhushi huishe*) founded by the Japanese Empire in 1906 took over these rights. Japanese influence continuously increased in Inner Manchuria.

After the abdication the Qing Emperor, the Republican government tried to keep Manchuria with the help of the powerful warlord Zhang Zuolin (1875–1928). They did not object to his quasi independent reign as long as he kept local order. When Yuan Shikai declared himself emperor in 1915, Zhang supported him. However, when Yuan died in 1916, and with him his short-lived dynasty, Zhang was obviously too powerful to be put away. The Republic of China made him military and civil governor of Liaoning.

Until the late 1910s, Zhang further established his rule in Manchuria until he ruled nearly the whole region except some areas under Japanese influence. The Republican government bestowed him the title of Governor-General of the Three Eastern Provinces and otherwise continued to accept his *de facto* independency. With his strong basis in Manchuria, Zhang even managed to capture Beijing in 1924 and make himself Grand Marshal of the Republic. Only in 1926, Sun Yat-sen's successor as leader of the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) and his KMT troops were able to defeat Zhang's Fengtian¹²²⁷ Clique Army (*Fengxi junfa*). Zhang had to retreat to Manchuria, where he was assassinated by a Japanese officer in 1928. His son Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001) took over the rulership of Manchuria.

In 1931, Japan used the Mukden Incident (*Jiuyiba shibian*)¹²²⁸ as a pretense to invade Manchuria and install a puppet Manchu State, Manchukuo (C. *Manzhouguo*, J.

¹²²⁷ During that time, Fengtian was the name for Liaoning province.

¹²²⁸ Fu Sinian calls it “the change of Shenyang (*Shenyang zhi bian*),” Shenyang meaning China. For him the Mukden Incident was one of the most important historical break. (Fu Sinian: 1932, p. 1.)

Manchûkoku, later Great Empire of Manchuria (C. *Da Manzhou diguo*, J. *Dai Manshû Teikoku*), 1932–1945). The Kwantung Leased Territory stayed under the direct control of Japan. After the Japan's defeat in the Second World War, it retreated from the East Asian mainland. Manchuria became a base area of the PLA in its war against the KMT troops.¹²²⁹

East Turkestan, Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria, the four large Non-Han regions of Qing times, did not become stable parts of the Republic of China after 1912. On the contrary, their status was shifting, and more often than not they came under the influence of other powers, Russian, British and Japanese. For Han Chinese nationalist thinkers the threat of losing territory was always visible. Moreover, they had to accept that Tibet, East Turkestan and Mongolia were not will-less passive stretches of wasteland – as in contrast to them, Manchuria rather was –, but were inhabited and controlled by people, who had their own political ideas and strategies. The declarations of Mongolian and Tibetan independence in 1912 were conscious decisions, as were their alliances with Russian and British powers. It was obvious to Han Chinese nationalist thinkers that an inclusion of these territories into their nation-state would not only need legitimation and justification, but also would mean a burden, although of course it was highly desirable to stop the growth of Russia, Britain and Japan on the cost of former Qing territory. Although the Qing Emperors had had an extremely clever way of dealing with their non-Manchu subjects, already during their dynasty it had become obvious that governing people of different ethnic-cultural background often proved difficult.¹²³⁰ Not least this was visible in the Han Chinese's anti-Manchu reaction at the end of the 19th century and the subsequent ending of the Qing Dynasty.

Against this background of political reality, the image Chinese political thinkers and academic historians in early Republican times had of Non-Han peoples' realities, histories and identities becomes more concrete and graspable. This political reality is also one important factor for the acceptance of the theory of a Chinese “assimilative power,” introduced by Liang Qichao shortly after 1900, in Han Chinese historiography. Already at the beginning of the 20th century Chinese historians had begun to write history books, stimulated on the one hand by Japanese developments and achievements in this scholarly discipline, and on the other hand by the reforms of the education system by the Qing.¹²³¹ A similar stimulus was the establishments of history departments at universities, beginning in the late 1910s, but most of them being founded in the 1920s and later.¹²³² History as a modern academic discipline became more and more accepted and was manifested in form of institutes and chairs around 1920.

It will be texts from mainly this time, that is, from the 1920s, which will be analyzed in the following chapters. I will turn away from political thinkers and turn towards

¹²²⁹ More about Manchuria during the Republican era see Lattimore: 1932; 1962, p. 141–150.

¹²³⁰ Lattimore: 1932, 1955, 1962; Millward: 1998.

¹²³¹ Hon: 2007; Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 113–127.

¹²³² Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 16–17.

historians' texts. Of the three main authors, whose texts I analyzed in the first part, only Liang Qichao will prominently reappear, because it is his theory of an "assimilative power" and the question in how far it was accepted by modern academic historians, which is put to the test. In the 1920s, Liang added some crucial explanations, which clarified his idea of assimilation in East Asia and provided a further and more concrete theoretical basis for historians when turning to Non-Han people and dynasties. But apart from Liang, all other authors I am dealing with in chapter four and five are scholars specialized in the study of history. They were Han Chinese academic historians of the first hour and helped shaping history as a university discipline in China.

In the fourth chapter, I will analyze texts dealing with methodological questions and their impact on Non-Han histories. The first part deals with the question how to periodize China's history and how to integrate Non-Han dynasties, which form a considerable part of it into this periodization. Japanese models of periodization from the late 19th to early 20th century shall be shortly introduced along with their Han Chinese copyists during that time. This is the background, against which Fu Sinian wrote his famous essay about and critique of the most influential Japanese model of periodization in 1918. Fu's essay was "one of the earliest attempts made by a Chinese historian to address theoretical issues in Chinese historiography."¹²³³ It thus continues the general discourse about periodization and methodology, which had started already in late Qing times and deeply influenced Han Chinese historians' approaches in the Republican era. In the fourth chapter furthermore some of Liang Qichao's essays from the 1920s will be analyzed, in which he once again turned to the idea of a Han Chinese assimilative power, this time much more elaborated and detailed and presented as an academic concept useful for national historiography. Liang also set out to think and write about methodological questions related to history once more. His essays from the 1920s form "a distant dialogue" with those theoretical essays published in the 1900s.¹²³⁴ This and his further approach to Non-Han histories and the question how to include them in a Chinese national and general history will be analyzed here. Therefore, Liang will be included into the second part of my dissertation, although he is an exception being the only non-historian among the authors of the texts considered here.

In the fifth chapter I will turn to the histories, which were then written in this newly requested modern way of academic historiography, based on theoretical and methodological thinking from the 1900s by Liang, Zhang Taiyan and also Liu Shiwei, who had marked the beginning of a new Chinese historical thinking with nationalism being its driving force, and from the texts published around 1920 discussed in chapter four. I will analyze general histories by Liu Yizheng and Lü Simian, and essays by Feng Chengjun and Chen Yuan, with regard to their image of Non-Han histories and people. All of them tried to write histories just as Liang and Zhang had envisioned them in the

¹²³³ Wang, E. Q.: 2001, p. 79.

¹²³⁴ Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 205.

1900s.¹²³⁵ They wanted to write them in a mode, which could strengthen the nation and the national sentiment of the people. They created the basis how Chinese history was written and interpreted from then on and in many cases until today. I will analyze how they tried to create academic history, standing up to modern criteria, while at the same time remaining true to the quests of nationalist historiography. If they wanted to give a comprehensive idea of China's history, they had to include Non-Han people and their histories, while at the same time they were guided by political considerations and national issues. This tightrope walk was the point of origin of the theory of "assimilative power" becoming a foundation of the understanding of Non-Han history in modern Chinese historiography.

4.2 Periodizations: Japanese Models – Chinese Ideas

Attempts to adopt other than dynastic periodizations of history had been made by Han Chinese historians based on Japanese works on China's history since the beginning of the 20th century.¹²³⁶ Based on works like Naka Michiyo's (1851–1908) *Shina tsûshi* (*A General History of China*) (1888–1890) and Kuwabara Jitsuzô's *Chûtô tôyôshi* (*History of East Asia for Highschools*) (1898), Chinese scholars developed their own periodizations or copied the Japanese models.¹²³⁷

Naka divided China's history in three main eras, which were based on European models:

1. **Antiquity** (*shangshi*): before 221 BC
2. **Middle ages** (*zhongshi*): 221 BC–1115 AD
3. **Modernity** (*jinshi*): 1115 AD

Kuwabara developed a four-era periodization, which differed profoundly from Naka's with regard to time lines and designation, because Kuwabara skipped the idea of middle ages in Chinese history:

1. **High antiquity** (*shanggu*): before 221 BC
2. **Middle antiquity** (*zhonggu*): 221 BC–907 AD
3. **Recent antiquity** (*jingu*): 907–1644
4. **Modernity** (*jinshi*): since 1644

¹²³⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1]; Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1904], vol. 3, p. 328–333.

¹²³⁶ Hon: 2007, p. 85–89.

¹²³⁷ Naka Michiyo: 1888–1890, see tables of contents at the beginning of each volume; Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 25–26.

Based on these Japanese models, Liang Qichao introduced a three-era periodization in his famous essay “Zhongguo shi xulun” (1901)¹²³⁸:

1. **Antiquity** (*shangshi*): until 221 BC
2. **Middle ages** (*zhongshi*): 221 BC–1796
3. **Modernity** (*jinshi*): since 1796

Liu Yizheng (1880–1956) (indirectly) presented a four-era periodization in his *Lidai shilüe* (*Historical Outlines of Various Dynasties*) (1902). *Lidai shilüe* is a revised translation of Naka’s *Shina tsûshi*. Nevertheless, Liu does not take over Naka’s three-era periodization, but copies Kuwabara’s four-era periodization, albeit using different terms for the first three eras¹²³⁹:

1. **Antiquity** (*shangshi*): 221–207 BC
2. **Middle ages** (*zhongshi*): 618–907
3. **Modernity** (*jinshi*): 907–1644
4. **Unnamed era**: since 1644¹²⁴⁰

In his *Zuixin zhongxue Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* (*The Newest Middle School Textbook of China’s History*) (1904)¹²⁴¹ Xia Zengyou (1863–1924) adopts the three-era periodization and the idea that the unification of Qin Shi Huangdi in 221 BC marks the beginning of a new period – he calls it middle antiquity like Kuwabara.¹²⁴² The second part of his book, “Zhonggu shi (History of the Middle Antiquity),” ends with the unification under the Sui Dynasty in 589, and it seems that this is were also the second era ends in Xia’s opinion.¹²⁴³ However, in the foreword to the second part, Xia writes that this part “was originally planned [to cover] the time from the Qin Dynasty until the Five Dynasties Period” and that this period forms a consistent era, but that it would have been too much to explain all events in one volume.¹²⁴⁴ Xia’s periodization runs accordingly:

1. **High antiquity** (*shanggu*): before 221 BC
2. **Middle antiquity** (*zhonggu*): 221 BC–960 AD
3. **Unnamed era**: since 960

¹²³⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11–12.

¹²³⁹ Hon: 2007, p. 85–90; Zarrow: 2012, p. 176; Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 119.

¹²⁴⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1905?, p. 5–6. See also tables of content at the beginning of each volume. Peter Zarrow writes that Liu Yizheng’s Antiquity would last until the end of the Qin Dynasty in 206 BC and that his Modernity would start only with the Song, but these must be mistakes. (Zarrow: 2012, p. 176.) The fourth period is implied as Liu Yizheng states that modernity would last only until the end of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and his book also ends with the Ming Dynasty.

¹²⁴¹ Xia’s book was republished in 1933 by the Commercial Press under another title, *Zhongguo gudai shi* (*Ancient History of China*). (Xia Zengyou: 2000 [1904–1906]; Hon: 2012, p. 95.)

¹²⁴² Xia Zengyou: 2000 [1904–1906], “Di yi pian fanli,” p. 4.

¹²⁴³ Xia Zengyou: 2000 [1904–1906], “Mulu,” p. 3–8, p. 6–7. See also Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 124–125; Zarrow: 2012, p. 176.

¹²⁴⁴ Xia Zengyou: 2000 [1904–1906], “Di er pian fanli,” p. 6.

Liang, Liu and Xia perceive the time before the unification under Qin Shi Huangdi in 221 BC as a distinct period, calling it antiquity or early antiquity. Here they all follow the models by Naka and Kuwabara. But all three have different periodizations with regard to the other division lines. Naka interprets the coming into power of the Mongols at the beginning of the 13th century, symbolized in the downfall of the Jin Dynasty in 1115, as the start of modernity. But for Liu, modernity begins already in 907, when the Tang Dynasty (618–907) finally declined and their empire was divided into several kingdoms and empires during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (907–960).¹²⁴⁵ Xia sees the beginning of modernity only after the Five Dynasties, when the Song Dynasty (960–1279) began.¹²⁴⁶ Both, Liu’s and Xia’s division line between medieval and modern times are rather early compared to Liang’s starting point of modernity in 1796, at the end of the Qianlong era (1736–1796). This era, the reign time of emperor Hongli (1711–1799), is often interpreted as the heyday of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912). Liang reasons that only then, at the end of the 18th century, China was no longer an Asian China (*Yazhou zhi Zhongguo*), but became a global China (*shijie zhi Zhongguo*).¹²⁴⁷ In contrast to Liang and Xia, Liu adds a fourth era after 1644, that is, at the end of the Ming (1368–1644) and beginning of the Qing Dynasty, but he does not name a concrete fourth period.¹²⁴⁸

Periodizations were means to delineate an evolutionary scheme of China’s history, but at the same time they served to bring the philosophical and political approach of the writer to the fore. In contrast to most Western periodizations, especially the earlier attempts to periodize China’s history by Chinese historians were not necessarily progressive, i.e. both Liu and Xia thought of the “ancient period as a golden age” and the later ages as eras of decline.¹²⁴⁹ To the same extent as eras of Han Chinese power were interpreted as phases of stability and development, the notion of decline was in many cases linked to Non-Han people gaining strength. In general it can thus be said that periodizations were often based on Han Chinese encounters with Non-Han people and the results of these encounters.

One example is Liang Qichao’s periodization from 1901. Liang links historical progress to racial development. In antiquity, he writes, no racial mixture would have happened. But the middle ages would have marked the beginning of unification of divers Asian races into a Chinese race. In modernity the racial unification would have been concluded.¹²⁵⁰ That Non-Han history played an important role when it came to a periodization of China’s history had already become obvious in some of the Japanese sinologists’ periodizations. I.e. Naka Michiyo sees the division line between medieval

¹²⁴⁵ Liu Yizheng: 1905?, p. 5–6.

¹²⁴⁶ Xia Zengyou: 2000 [1904–1906], “Di er pian fanli,” p. 6.

¹²⁴⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11–21. See also below.

¹²⁴⁸ Liu Yizheng: 1905?, p. 6a. See also below.

¹²⁴⁹ Zarrow: 2012, p. 176. See also Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 124.

¹²⁵⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11–12.

times and modernity in 1200s when the Mongols began their conquest of Eastern, Central and Western Asia.¹²⁵¹

Also Kuwabara Jitsuzô's periodization from 1898 takes moments as dividing time lines, when Han Chinese power waned and Non-Han people became more and more powerful.¹²⁵² His periodization is considered to have been extremely influential in Han Chinese scholarly circles.¹²⁵³ Fu Sinian writes in his article that "history text books published in the last years generally take Mr Kuwabara as their guideline."¹²⁵⁴ This generally accepted periodization by Kuwabara runs:

1. **High antiquity** (*shanggu*): before 221 BC
"Era of expansion of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu pengzhang shidai*)."¹²⁵⁵
2. **Middle antiquity** (*zhonggu*): 221 BC–907 AD
"Era of the Han ethnicity's greatest power (*Hanzu youshi shidai*)."¹²⁵⁶
3. **Recent antiquity** (*jingu*): 907–1644
"Era of the Mongol ethnicity's greatest heyday (*Mengguzu zui sheng shidai*)."¹²⁵⁷
4. **Modernity** (*jinshi*): since 1644
"Era of the Invasion into the East of the Europeans (*Ouren dong jian shidai*)."¹²⁵⁸

In contrast to Naka, Liang and Xia on the one hand, Kuwabara and Liu on the other divide history into four eras. But there are still many similarities between the three-era and the four-era schemes of late Imperial times. First of all, they all see the division line between the first and the second era in 221 BC, at the point of Qin's unification (C. *Qin zhi yitong*, J. *Shin no ittô*).¹²⁵⁹ Like Kuwabara's, Liu Yizheng's third era starts in 907. And the beginning of Kuwabara's modernity at the beginning of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) corresponds loosely with Liang's beginning of modernity during Qing times in 1796.

What becomes obvious though is that only rarely historians, Japanese and Han Chinese alike, abandoned the dynastic scheme completely. Despite the fact that they put several dynasties together in one era, they set the beginning of these eras inevitably at points of time, when one dynasty ended or began, sometimes also when China was

¹²⁵¹ Naka gives two different but exact dates, the years of Song Ningzong's (1168–1224, reign time 1194–1224) reign period Kaixi (1205–1207) and the end of Jin Zhangzong's (1168–1208, reign time 1189–1208) reign in 1208. (Naka Michiyo: 1899 [1888–1890], table of contents.)

¹²⁵² Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 24–26.

¹²⁵³ Wang, F.: 2012, p. 136.

¹²⁵⁴ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1225/177.

¹²⁵⁵ Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 25. Fu writes that Kuwabara Jitsuzô "calls it the epoch of the founding of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu dizao shidai*)."¹²⁵⁵ (Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1225/177.)

¹²⁵⁶ Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 25. Fu Sinian writes that Kuwabara "calls it the epoch of the absolute heyday of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu jisheng shidai*)."¹²⁵⁶ (Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1225/177.)

¹²⁵⁷ Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 25. Fu Sinian writes that Kuwabara "calls it the decline of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu jianshuai*), the epoch of the bloom of the Mongol ethnicity (*Mengguzu*)."¹²⁵⁷ (Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1225/177.)

¹²⁵⁸ Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 25–26; Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1225/177.

¹²⁵⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11; Naka Michiyo: 1968 [1899], p. 43.

unified in one way or another: the beginning of the Qin Dynasty in 221 BC, which was also a unification (Kuwabara, Naka, Liang, Liu and Xia); the unification of the Sui Dynasty in 589 (Xia); the end of the Tang Dynasty and beginning of the Five Dynasties (Kuwabara, Liu); the end of the Jin Dynasty (Naka); and the end of the Ming and beginning of the Qing Dynasty in 1644 (Kuwabara). Only Liang breaks open the dynastic presetting with the beginning of his modernity in 1796 at the end of the Qianlong era in the middle of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912).

Non-dynastic periodizations prevailed to be *en vogue*, when academic historiography emerged in China in the late 1910s and 1920s. Today, it is often considered to have broken down “the dominance of dynastic division in Chinese historiography.”¹²⁶⁰ Sebastian Conrad even claims that “‘Europe’ not only designated the geographical origin of modern historiography but remained the prime model for all interpretations” especially referring to time as a linear progress, reflected in the succession of antiquity, middle ages and modernity.¹²⁶¹ But in practice non-dynastic periodizations did not completely replace dynastic divisions, which still are quite popular in East Asian history.¹²⁶² This is also due to the fact that no concrete agreement exists about the benchmark data of Chinese historical era. Although terms like Chinese antiquity, medieval China and also modern China are often used, there seems to be no fixed and generally accepted definition of these terms and they can refer to very different periods of times, depending on which context they are used in.

What did have long lasting impact though was the acceptance that historical progress would happen in certain universal valid stages and a linear and progressive understanding of history.¹²⁶³ Spatial differences were explained by temporal differences. Thus, many Han Chinese historians accepted that China had ‘not yet’ reached the same stage as Western countries and that this was the reason for its unsuccessfulness. Therefore, certain things were interpreted as necessary to reach the desirable stage of modernity, most important the development of a strong nationalism, which would provide the ability to consequently build a strong nation-state.

Fu’s approach to a periodization of China’s history stands fully in this mode and accepts both, the precondition of linear history as well as the quests of nationalist history.

¹²⁶⁰ Wang, E. Q.: 2001, p. 80.

¹²⁶¹ Conrad: 1999, p. 69–70, 73.

¹²⁶² Nearly every scholarly work on China general history is divided along dynastic schemes, the most important example being the *Cambridge History of China*.

¹²⁶³ Wang, F.: 2012.

Fu Sinian's Periodization and Critique of Kuwabara Jitsuzô's Approach

In May 1918, an article by the only twenty-two-year-old Fu Sinian (1896–1950), then student of the Peking University (*Beijing Daxue*, also only *Beida*), was published in the *Beijing daxue rikan* (*Peking University Daily*). It was titled “Zhongguo lishi fenqi zhi yanjiu (Analysis of the periodization of China’s history).” Fu criticizes the influential approach to periodization of China’s history by the Japanese historian Kuwabara Jitsuzô (1873–1931). As described above, Kuwabara had presented a division of China’s history into four eras in his *Chûtô tôyôshi*, which had been taken over by many Chinese historians since then.¹²⁶⁴ Besides his critique of Kuwabara, Fu also presents his own ideas of a possible periodization of China’s history. As states above, Fu’s essay was a benchmark in the sense that it marked the beginning of a discourse on method and theory among Han Chinese academic historians.¹²⁶⁵ It has to be stated though that this essay and its implications of Fu’s general ideas stand in clear contrast to Fu’s later approaches to history. Axel Schneider counts only two essays Fu wrote about historiography before he went to Europe in 1920, where he spend six years at diverse universities, one being “Zhongguo lishi fenqi zhi yanjiu.”¹²⁶⁶ His time abroad deeply molded him as a historian and he came back as a different scholar. Therefore, the 1918 essay provides only Fu’s early attitude. Still, it had a deep impact on his fellow Han Chinese historians.¹²⁶⁷

Fu was a Han Chinese modern historian of the first hour. He was born into a impoverished gentry family in Liaocheng in Shandong Province. He was one of the historians best trained in the Classics, having been taught privately at home until he was fourteen. Only then he went to a modern middle school in Tianjin. In 1916, Fu began to study at the Department of Chinese Literature at Peking University. His studies of Chinese literature and language were linked to his understanding of history and especially of the Classics. In this respect, Fu was deeply influenced by his teacher Huang Kan (1886–1935), who had been a favorite student of Zhang Taiyan. In 1918, Fu met Hu Shi (1891–1962) and was quickly aroused by his ideas of a literary reform. While “most students followed him [= Hu Shi] because they could not write literary Chinese well” and were therefore thrilled by the idea of a vernacular writing style, Fu was one of the few, who in fact was a master of classical Chinese and therefore added much to the respectfulness of the movement.¹²⁶⁸ In the same year Fu founded the journal *Xinchao* (*New Tide*) with Hu Shi as the chief adviser, which became extremely popular. One year later Fu became a leading figure of the May Fourth Movement (1919). From 1920 until 1926 he studied abroad in Europe, at the University College London and Humboldt University of Berlin, where he especially became interested in experimental psychology.

¹²⁶⁴ Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898].

¹²⁶⁵ Wang, E. Q.: 2001, p. 79.

¹²⁶⁶ Schneider, A.: 1997, p. 146–147.

¹²⁶⁷ About Fu’s later approach see Schneider, A.: 1996; 1997.

¹²⁶⁸ Wang, E. Q.: 2001, p. 77.

After his return Fu became one of the initiators of the research institution Academia Sinica (*Zhongyan yanjiuyuan*). The Academia was founded in 1928 in Nanjing with Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940) as its first president (presidency: 1928–1940). It was modeled on French and German institutions and was explicitly politically non-partial.¹²⁶⁹ Fu was especially involved in the founding of the Institute for History and Philology (*Lishi yayan yanjiusuo*), of which he became director. In 1945, he moreover became assistant director of the Peking University.

After the defeat of the KMT in the Chinese Civil War (1927–1949), Fu flew to Taiwan. When the Academia Sinica was reestablished there in 1949 Fu again became academic member of the institution. Moreover, he became director of the National Taiwan University (*Guoli Taiwan daxue*, also only *Taida*). He died one year later in 1950.¹²⁷⁰

When Fu wrote his critique of Kuwabara's periodization, "Zhongguo lishi fenqi zhi yanjiu" (1918), it was already twenty years ago that Kuwabara's book had first been published in Japan.¹²⁷¹ Still, Fu claims that Kuwabara's periodization would be very important for Han Chinese scholars.¹²⁷² Fu criticizes that Kuwabara would lean his periodization of China's history on different criteria and would not stick to one in order to make it more comprehensible. Moreover, Kuwabara's periodization would be one of East Asian history in general and not of China's history. This would be shown by the fact that Kuwabara would refer to divers ethnicities to establish time frames – the Han Chinese, the Mongols and the Europeans. This is Fu's first main point of critique.¹²⁷³ According to Fu one has to take one consistent criterion to divide history, at least on the level of the major division. For subdivisions other criteria would be possible. But if one takes "racial change (*zhongzu zhi bianqian*)" for defining antiquity and middle antiquity, then one also would have to take it for defining medieval times and modernity, and could not suddenly use other criteria like "political reform (*zhengzhi gaige*)" or "change of traditions (*fengsu yihua*)."¹²⁷⁴ Thus, by first using the "rise and fall of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu sheng jiang*)" as a dividing criterion and then the "contacts between East and West (*Dong Xi jiaotong*)," Kuwabara's division would not be consistent.¹²⁷⁵

The second profound error of Kuwabara in Fu's opinion is the assumption that a consistent Han ethnicity would always have been in existence.¹²⁷⁶ But according to Fu "in every dynastic era one can [find] the traces of intermingling (*hunru*) [of the Han

¹²⁶⁹ Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 19.

¹²⁷⁰ Detailed biographies of Fu Sinian can be found in Schneider, A.: 1997, p. 33–56; Wang, F.: 2000 [1993].

¹²⁷¹ A classification of this essay by Fu into his general historical and philosophical approach can be found in Schneider, A.: 1997, p. 146–149.

¹²⁷² Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1225/177–1226/178.

¹²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 1226/178.

¹²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷⁶ See also Wang, F.: 2000 [1993], 98–125 (ch. 3 "Toward a theory of plural origins of Chinese civilization: Hypotheses on ancient Chinese history").

ethnicity] with foreign ethnicities (*wai zu*).”¹²⁷⁷ If one wants to divide China’s history in eras one would have to consider four things, which Fu analyses in four short chapters:

First, “one has to know the great change of what is called ‘Han ethnicity’ in China during the Chen Dynasty [557–589] and the Sui Dynasty [589–618].”¹²⁷⁸

Second, “one has to know that the traces of increase and decrease of Han and Hu (barbarians) in the two dynasties Tang [618–907] and Song [960–1279] and the decline of the Southern Song [in 1279] are also pivotal points in China’s history.”¹²⁷⁹

Third, “one has to use the change and rise and fall of China’s race (*Zhongguo zhongzu*) as the criterion of division.”¹²⁸⁰

Fourth, “one has to differentiate between subdivisions and not mix them up with the main divisions.”¹²⁸¹

With regard to Fu’s general and methodological ideas how to periodize China’s history, the third point is the most important one. It clarifies what criterion Fu himself considers the best to divide China’s history – the criteria of “the change and rise and fall of China’s race.”¹²⁸² Later in his text it becomes clear that by “China’s race” he refers to the Han ethnicity only. He explains:

“To divide history today, one has to choose one aspect as a criterion. It seems that it is most suitable to take the change and rise and fall of the Han ethnicity as this criterion. If one analyzes the history of one state, one cannot but first divide its races (*bian qi zhongzu*). One really must take one aspect of history, not only take the sum of mutual invasions of races and places [like Kuwabara]. Races have their racial character (*zhongzuxing*), also called *Racial colour* or ‘*zhongzuse*.’ Everyone masters certain abilities. As soon as a race changes, history must suddenly change its face, too.

Now we take the fall and rise of change of the Han ethnicity as a standard for dividing the eras. [...] It seems to bring the quintessence of the change of China’s history to the fore. Compared to this, Mr Kuwabara suddenly speaks about rise and fall of the Han ethnicity and suddenly about the coming East of the Westerners. And he wrongly thinks that this is simply the same.”¹²⁸³

Based on this approach Fu assumes that China’s history would have been divided by the two profound phases of change quoted above, which were essentially contributing to the change of the Han ethnicity: the late 6th century AD, which was a phase of transition

¹²⁷⁷ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1226/178.

¹²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 1227/179–1231/181.

¹²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 1229/181.

¹²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 1230/182.

¹²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 1230/182–1233/185.

¹²⁸² Ibid., p. 1230/182. See also Wang, F.: 2000 [1993], p. 106.

¹²⁸³ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1230/182.

from the Chen Dynasty (557–589) to the Sui Dynasty (581–618),¹²⁸⁴ and the year 1279, when the Southern Song Dynasty (1125–1279) finally declined due to the Mongols' aggressions.¹²⁸⁵ Based on these two points in time, Fu develops his periodization of China's history. A third important point in time seems to be 1912 as Fu states that a fourth era would have begun with the end of the Manchu Qing Dynasty. He does not give arguments for this last period, but it seems self-explanatory with regard to his criterion for periodization: a new era for the Han ethnicity definitely began in the opinion of Han Chinese nationalists and nationalist historians. Fu's periodization goes:

1. **Antiquity** (*shanggu*): until 581
Fu also calls it “first China (*di yi Zhongguo*)”
2. **Middle Ages** (*zhongshi*): 581–1279
Fu also calls it “**second China** (*di er Zhongguo*)”
3. **Modernity** (*jinshi*)¹²⁸⁶: 1279–1912
4. **Present time** (*xianshi*)¹²⁸⁷: since 1912¹²⁸⁸

Fu writes that in antiquity China would have been “the China of a pure Han ethnicity (*chuncui Hanzu zhi Zhongguo ye*).”¹²⁸⁹ Until the end of antiquity in 581 AD, the contacts between the Han ethnicity and other ethnicities like the Northern Dí and the Southern Man (*Beidi Nanman*) would have resulted in the Non-Han people's “assimilation to the Han ethnicity (*tonghua yu Hanzu*)”:

“But change happened only in one direction (*xianghua*) – there was no fusion (*hunhe*). Only the Yi (barbarians) were changed, but the Han were not (*dan you bian Yi er wu bian Xia*).¹²⁹⁰ Those, who at that time were perceived as being of Han ethnicity by the Han ethnicity, did not cause increase or reduce [of the Han ethnicity].”¹²⁹¹

In the middle ages, Fu assumes that “the Han ethnicity intermingled with the Hu (barbarians) (*Hanzu wei Huren suo xie*).”¹²⁹² He writes that the Sui and Tang dynasties would have been, in fact, “foreigners' states (*waiguo*).”¹²⁹³ Thus, in the time of the Sui, Tang and Five Dynasties,

¹²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1227/179–1229/181.

¹²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1229/181.

¹²⁸⁶ Fu does not mention the name “third China” for this period.

¹²⁸⁷ Fu does not mention the name “fourth China” for this period.

¹²⁸⁸ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1231/183. In Fu's graphic of China's history's divisions and subdivisions, the present time is classified as the fourth phase.

¹²⁸⁹ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹²⁹⁰ By using the character *Yi* for the barbarians and *Xia* for the Chinese, Fu indirectly refers to the motto “Use the *Xia* to change the (Yi) barbarians (*yong Xia bian Yi*)” from the Mengzi. (See above Chapter 1.3 (subchapter “Assimilation in Liang Qichao's Texts: Ancient Models”).)

¹²⁹¹ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1227/179.

¹²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 1229/181.

¹²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1228/180, line 4. Feng Chengjun also claims that the Tang Imperial family was in fact mixed with the Xianbei: “Apart from that there are even more important examples and even more numbers of marriages

“the traditions and customs and the politics and religion of that time was a mixture of Han and Hu (barbarian), although the later the time, the weaker the barbarian energy, but this barbarian energy could not be eliminated totally.”¹²⁹⁴

However, mutual assimilation would have happened only until the 950s. Then, a process of re-purification of the Han ethnicity would have started. This only would have changed during the Later Zhou dynasty (951–960), when

“the Hu (barbarian) energy more and more disappeared, until it reached its non-existence [until it existed no more]. In those three hundred years [= from the Later Zhou until the end of the Song in 1279] there was only the Han tradition (*Han feng*).”¹²⁹⁵

In modernity

“everything was luck for the Hu (barbarian) caitiffs (*hu lu*), although in between the Ming dynasty restored the situation from before (*guangfu guwu*), but in the end this luck did not last long.”¹²⁹⁶

Based on Fu’s periodization and his descriptions for each era it comes to the fore that in 1918 Fu’s approach was ethnic, but not multi-ethnic. Only after Fu’s return from Europe he would change his opinion and then mainly with regard to antiquity, the era he concentrated on in the 1920s and 1930s.¹²⁹⁷ In 1918, Fu strongly emphasizes the relevance of the Han ethnicity’s rise and fall based on their position with regards to the Non-Han, who actually form one large more or less homogenous group in Fu’s periodization. Fu implies clearly that the Han would have the ability to “re-purify” after phases of foreign influence. He names the Song, the Ming and also the post-1912 period as being such periods, during which the Han ethnicity was able to completely push back every Non-Han influence and become pure again – if culturally, racially or in both ways remains unclear, but it is clear that this process of pushing back Non-Han influences is considered positive by Fu when he uses the humiliating term “barbarians caitiffs (*hu lu*)” especially for the Khitan, Jurchen and Mongols and claims that the Ming Dynasty

between foreign ethnicities (*yi zu*) and the Tang imperial family. To claim that the Tang imperial family descend from the Han race (*Hanzhong*) – who would believe that!” (Feng: 1930, p. 72.) Feng Chengjun’s opinion is reinforced by Chen Sanping’s article “Succession struggle and the ethnic identity of the Tang imperial house” where she shows that the Non-Han identity was not only much stronger than thought, but that the denial of this identity was due to the fact that the historians who wrote the Tang histories were in fact Chinese. (Chen Sanping: 1996, p. 379–380.) As Chen Sanping also shows, the idea that the Tang Dynasty might after all also be a conquest dynasty was not popular in Western Sinology. Although in Chinese historiography the Xianbei descent of the Tang imperial Li clan was discussed, this was in the end not so important as anyway, the Li were considered to be sinicized. (Chen Sanping: 1996, p. 381.)

¹²⁹⁴ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹²⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁹⁷ Schneider, A.: 1997, p. 195.

was a time of restoration, the Chinese term literally meaning “revive the light (*guangfu*).”¹²⁹⁸

With regard to the question of contacts between Han and Non-Han people and their possible impact Fu’s periodization of China’s history from 1918 points out two main issues. First, in Fu’s antiquity, that is, until the late 6th century AD the Han ethnicity was able to assimilate Non-Han people in East Asia. During this time, the Han themselves did not undergo any cultural changes. Second, despite phases of decline of the Han ethnicity during the Sui, the Tang and the Five Dynasties and later during Yuan and Qing times, the Han ethnicity has managed to re-establish and re-purify itself again during Later Zhou and Song times, in Ming times and obviously since the founding of the Republic of China in 1912.

Compared to the earlier periodizations from around 1900, the main difference between them and that of Fu is certainly his late ending of antiquity. Whereas Naka, Kuwabara, Liang, Liu and Xia all considered Qin Shi Huangdi’s unification as the beginning of a new era, Fu skips it in his large scheme.¹²⁹⁹ In Fu’s periodization antiquity stopped to play a unique role. Fu boldly links Zhou time (1046–256 BC) philosophy with the chaotic times of the Southern and Northern Dynasties (420–589 AD) and with the Sui (581–618) and the Tang Dynasties (618–907). Of course, by adding subdivisions (*zhifen*) Fu does not neglect differences altogether. He states that the politics and customs of the Eastern Zhou (770–256 BC) would differ from both, those before during Western Zhou times (1046–771 BC), and those afterwards during Qin and Han times (221 BC–220 AD). But still, he puts them all together under the designation ‘antiquity.’ The time when historians interpreted antiquity as a golden age,¹³⁰⁰ that is, like Liu Yizheng in 1902 considered the time of Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Laozi, Mozi, Zhuangzi and the other philosophers during the Spring and Autumn Period (771–476 BC) and the Warring States Period (476–221 BC) as the climax of culture and civilization seemed to be over.¹³⁰¹ We will later see, however, that Fu still considers the periods of China’s history not necessarily as progressive and linear, when he describes antiquity as “the China of the pure Han ethnicity”¹³⁰² and as a model for modern times due to this assumed racial pureness.

In 1923, Lü Simian (1884–1957) in his *Baihua benguo shi* (*Vernacular History of Our Country*) again accepts the elder parameter and divides history into four eras, the first one ending in 221 BC.¹³⁰³ But Liu Yizheng (1880–1956) in his *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (*History of Chinese Culture*) (1925–1929, 1928) published more than twenty years after his *Lidai*

¹²⁹⁸ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1231/183.

¹³⁰⁰ Zarrow: 2012, p. 176. See also Wang, Q. E.: 2012, p. 124.

¹³⁰¹ Liu Yizheng: 1905?, vol. 1, “Mulu,” p. 2; p. 68–75; Xia Zengyou: 2000 [1904–1906], p. 77–100.

¹³⁰² Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹³⁰³ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], p. 10–11.

shilüe (1902) changes his earlier opinion and assigns the Qin and the Han to antiquity like Fu does. Liu “presents an interpretation of the Golden Age of the Three Dynasties [Xia, Shang and Zhou, 21st–3rd century BC] that is thoroughly demythologizing and historicizing.”¹³⁰⁴ In fact, the most prominent historiographical debate, the Doubting Antiquity Movement (also Disputing Antiquity Movement, *Gushi bian*) initiated by students of Hu Shi (1891–1962) in the 1920s, questioned the role of the philosophies of the pre-Qin era by trying to prove that the texts had in fact been written later.¹³⁰⁵

An important change probably essentially encouraged by Fu’s methodological approach is that Han Chinese historians began to give their criteria for dividing history in certain eras in the 1920s.¹³⁰⁶ Fu made the beginning by choosing “the fall and rise of change of the Han ethnicity as a standard for dividing the eras.”¹³⁰⁷ Lü Simian in his *Baihua benguo shi* (1922) still seems to be doubtful about the approach based on periodization and somewhat lapidary writes that historians lately would use periodizations for the sake of “research convenience.” Therefore, he would also use it.¹³⁰⁸ But Liu Yizheng follows Fu in so far as he explains the criterion for his division of history in *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (*History of Chinese Culture*) (1925–1929, 1928). It would be based on the development of Han Chinese culture.¹³⁰⁹

Liang Qichao’s Periodization of China’s History of Ideas in 1924

Also when Liang Qichao introduces a new six-era periodization in his essay “Ming Qing zhi jiao Zhongguo sixiangjie ji qi daibiao renwu (China’s schools of thought and its representative figures during the transition from Ming to Qing)” (1924), he gives China’s history of ideas (*Ideengeschichte, C. sixiang shi*) as his basic criterion to divide history. Liang’s periodization is based on earlier periodizations, but also shows that Liang tried to suggest a new approach.¹³¹⁰ Like to title of the essay tells, it is mainly about the hundred transitional years from the Ming to the Qing Dynasty, that is 1624 to 1724. But before concentrating on this time Liang gives a general periodization of China’s history of ideas, which he also links to other developments of Han Chinese culture and society. He distinguishes six (nameless) intellectual periods, which only partly reflect other historical or cultural-historical periodization we have seen above. The period, which had often been called medieval times or middle antiquity in the periodizations developed around 1900, Liang divides into three shorter, but individual eras, taking the

¹³⁰⁴ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 279.

¹³⁰⁵ Moloughney: 2012, p. 241–270; Schneider, A.: 1997, p. 96–100; see also Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 295n45.

¹³⁰⁶ Of the earlier historians, only Liu Yizheng writes lapidary that he divides history according to rise and fall of politics, scholarship and borders. (Liu Yizheng: 1905?, “Lishi dazhi,” p. 5.)

¹³⁰⁷ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1230/182.

¹³⁰⁸ Lü Simian: 1922, p. 10–11.

¹³⁰⁹ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], p. 1.

¹³¹⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 27–29.

idea of a phase of transition at the end of the 6th century AD brought forward by Fu into consideration. His six-era periodization thus runs¹³¹¹:

1. 551–222 BC¹³¹²

This was the phase of the first unification of the ethnicities¹³¹³ in the geographical centre along the Huang He: “In this period, the ethnicities of China proper completely unified.”

2. 221 BC–219 AD¹³¹⁴

The Qin and Han Dynasties supported political unification and a strong central state, which embraced the Korean peninsula (Gaoli), Vietnam (Annan) and Xinjiang.

3. 220–589¹³¹⁵

Despite political separation and consequent great chaos, Non-Han people were assimilated. The geographical centre shifted from the North to the Yangtze River.

4. 590–959¹³¹⁶

This was the phase of the “second unification of the ethnicities (di er ci minzu tongyi)” The powerful state embraced Inner and Outer Mongolia, Siberia, West Turkestan and North Central India.

5. 960–1643¹³¹⁷

This was a phase of cultural and ethnical weakness of the Han people and of the bloom of the Northeast “wild and barbarian ethnicities (yeman minzu),” that is Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols and Manchus. Of them, only the Mongols had “the power ‘to reject assimilation’ (‘ju tonghua’ de liliang).”¹³¹⁸

6. 1644–today¹³¹⁹

The Manchus assimilated entirely and Han Chinese culture was not harmed.

The differences between Liang’s and the other periodizations are not only caused by their different points of origin – Liang refers to *Ideengeschichte*, the others to history or a combination of history and culture –, but they are also a direct image of their political

¹³¹¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 27–29.

¹³¹² Like Naka Michiyo (1888–1890), Kuwabara Jitsuzô (1899), Liang Qichao (1901), Liu Yizheng (1902), Xia Zengyou (1904–1906), Lü Simian (1922).

¹³¹³ Liang does not use this phrase himself. I deduct that this is his opinion from the fact that he calls the fourth period “the second unification of the ethnicities.” (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 28.)

¹³¹⁴ Liu Yizheng (1925–1929, 1928) similarly sees a break in 220 AD.

¹³¹⁵ Fu Sinian (1918) similarly sees a break in 581.

¹³¹⁶ Xia also sees a break in 960, Liu Yizheng (1902) and Kuwabara somewhat earlier in 907.

¹³¹⁷ Nearly like Kuwabara’s and Liu Yizheng’s (1902) third era (907–1644). Later, Liu Yizheng (1925–1929, 1928) see a break in 1644.

¹³¹⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 29.

¹³¹⁹ Like Kuwabara and Liu Yizheng (1902 and 1925–1929, 1928).

opinions and intentions. Liang frequently refers to the political situations caused by encounters between the Han and Non-Han people and how this would have effected the history of ideas. So, although Fu bases his periodization (1918) on “the rise and fall of the Han ethnicity” and Liang bases his (1924) on the development of the Chinese schools of thought, the two periodizations share a common basic methodology, which is that they base their periodizations on the Han ethnicity’s interactions with Non-Han people and their impact on the Han ethnicity as a cultural entity. Fu uses this criterion to analyze the grade of pureness of the Han ethnicity. He does not define what he means by “ethnicity,” so we do not know whether his idea of the Han ethnicity becoming impure from time to time is related to foreign cultural or “blood” influences or both. Similarly, Liang uses the Han/Non-Han interactions to analyze in how far Han culture was effected by the Non-Han people and to find out the grade of power the Han culture had to assimilate others.

In the end, Liang and Fu come to different conclusions and divide history differently although they have the same starting point:

Liang’s periodization:	Fu’s periodization:
551–222 BC	
221 BC–219 AD	
220–589	before 581 (antiquity)
590–959	581–1279 (middle ages)
960–1643	1279–1912 (modernity)
after 1644	after 1912 (present time)

Fu’s argument to see the time before 581 (antiquity) as one more or less homogenous phase is that before the foundation of the Sui the Han ethnicity would have been “pure (*chuncui*).”¹³²⁰ In his opinion, this pureness would have been unchallenged or rather even characterized by the inclusion of invading Non-Han people. In Fu’s opinion the Non-Han people’s inclusion would have been so complete, that it could not be detected anymore after it happened. Fu assumes that based on their pureness the Han would have been able to develop cultural superiority and assimilative power during this time.

Liang divides Fu’s antiquity into three individual periods interpreting the founding of the Qin Dynasty (221 BC) and the end of the Han Dynasty (220 AD) as points of change. Liang argues that the time before 221 BC would have been a kind of preparatory phase for China’s unification, its culture being based in the Huang He valley. But afterwards, when the territory of China expanded to other areas due to the conquests of Qin and Han emperors, unification and centrality would have been strengthened and perfected. Liang sees a second break at the end of the Han Dynasty in 220. Then an ambivalent phase began, which lasted until the re-unification of China under the Sui Dynasty in 589. The ambivalence of this period lies in its political separation, which caused the cultural

¹³²⁰ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

centre to shift to the Yangtze River on the one hand, and in Liang's assumption that the Han people still were able to assimilate the Non-Han people due to their cultural superiority on the other, although political power more often than not lied in the hands of the Non-Han.¹³²¹

Despite their different ways of dividing the time before the Sui Dynasty (581–618), Fu's and Liang's general perception of the time before the 580s is in fact very similar. Both assume that this was the time, during which the Han ethnicity's culture would have been the most superior and powerful one in East Asia. Even in times of political separation and chaos, they assume that the Han would have been able to assimilate and absorb others completely, without being changed themselves.

When it comes to the time after the 580s Liang's and Fu's opinions differ and they emphasize different events. For Fu, the middle ages are a phase of nearly seven hundred years from 581 until the end of the Song Dynasty in 1279. However, he subdivides this time into subperiods, which correspond with Liang's periodization. Fu states that the Later Zhou (951–960) and the Song Dynasty (960–1279) would have a special position within the middle ages, because it would have been a time of re-purification of the Han ethnicity.¹³²² Also Liang sees a break in the 10th century, when the Song Dynasty was founded. However, he does not ascribe a special position to the Song, but rather sees the whole phase as a time of empowerment of northeastern people.¹³²³

Another parallel appears between Fu's and Liang's periodization not visible on first glance. Fu thinks that the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) marks the beginning of modernity, characterized by powerful Non-Han people, conquering and re-conquering the Han territories.¹³²⁴ Also Liang regards the rise of the Mongols as an important landmark, because he assumes that they would have been the only northern Non-Han ethnicity conquering China or parts of it, who would have been able to withstand assimilation. Therefore, Liang considers the Yuan Dynasty as a time of great cultural loss.¹³²⁵

It is interesting, though, that neither Liang nor Fu attaches much importance to the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), a dynasty, which had been considered so important by early nationalists based on their reading of the Ming loyalists.¹³²⁶ Although Fu writes that the Ming was a phase of restoration of the Han ethnicity, he considers the two most powerful Non-Han Empires in East Asia, the Mongol and the Manchu Empire, which enframe the Ming, as more important. Although Liang considers 1644, that is, the end of the Ming, as a division line, the Ming seems to be as unimportant as the Song in his

¹³²¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 27–29.

¹³²² Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹³²³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 28.

¹³²⁴ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹³²⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 29.

¹³²⁶ See also above Introduction "Chinese nationalist thinkers: Creators of different images of the Chinese nation."

periodization. It nearly seems as if Liang was possessed by the role Non-Han people played in China's history and their impact on its culture.

The most important difference between Liang Qichao and Fu is their approach to the Qing Dynasty, and it is with regard to the Qing that their different political ideas come to the fore. Fu assigns the Qing Dynasty to his third historical era, modernity (1279–1912), which he characterizes as a period of “luck for the barbarian caitiffs,” that is, for the Mongols and the Manchus.¹³²⁷ As stated above, the Ming Dynasty is interpreted as an interlude, soon to be ended by the Manchus. In contrast to that, Liang considers the founding of the Qing Dynasty as the starting point of a whole new intellectual era, which is lasting until his present-day.¹³²⁸ By assuming the complete assimilation of the Manchus Liang is able to see this phase of Non-Han political power as a time of Han cultural superiority and bloom of Han culture. In contrast to that, Fu denies that during the Qing Dynasty Han culture could further develop, because this would contradict his perception of the Qing as an altogether barbarian dynasty. In the case of the Yuan Dynasty, Liang agrees with Fu's judgement and also thinks that culture went down. But as soon as a Non-Han dynasty assimilates, Liang sees no contradiction to include it in his Han based cultural periodization. That in fact both could be true that the Manchus could stay a distinct Non-Han ethnicity, and Han culture despite this or – as one might say with regard to the political methods of the Manchus – because of it blossoming, does not seem to be an option for neither Fu nor Liang.

4.3 Liang Qichao's Historiographical Handling of Reality in the 1920s

As shown in chapter one, Liang Qichao was confronted with the political reality of the newly founded Republic of China in 1912 as it differed painfully from his intended picture of a nation-state. In the first decade of the Republic, Liang Qichao was mainly occupied with political tasks. His attendance at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 was his last although unofficial political task. But when the Allied victors of World War I decided to give the German concessions in China to Japan and not to return them to Chinese sovereignty, Liang rather disappointedly withdraw from politics.

His focus shifted back to the publishing of essays. During this time in the 1920s, Liang wrote especially three essays closely dealing with assimilative processes of Non-Han

¹³²⁷ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹³²⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1924], p. 29.

people in East Asia.¹³²⁹ His opinion, anyway challenged by the difficult situation of the Republic regarding its claims to the four Non-Han regions of former Qing – Tibet, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria – varies in the texts and shows the deep uncertainty of Republican thinkers and historians how to deal with this situation.

Denial of Reality in 1921

Liang's essay "Lishi shang Zhonghua guomin shiye zhi chengbai ji jinhou gejin zhi jiyun (Success and Failure of the Aim of the Chinese Nation People in History and Its Future Change)" (1921) was published in his own influential journal *Gaizao*.¹³³⁰ In this essay, Liang claims that all major Non-Han ethnicities in Chinese East Asia had already assimilated to the Han people or at least that the process of their "total extinction (*wanquan jieju*)" has already begun.¹³³¹ He admits that the danger of separatism would still be great in the Chinese nation-state, because many different ethnicities would live in it together. Therefore, a solution of this difficult task would be most important for the future existence of the nation-state.

"Until today, the question regarding inner-state foreign ethnicities' (*yi minzu*) governments is not solved entirely. Because we have a large quantity of foreign ethnicities (*yi minzu*) living with us, the breakup of power will increase daily if we do not approach this problem."¹³³²

Indirectly, Liang gives his idea for a solution. He picks out four main groups of Non-Han ethnicities living in China – Miao, Qiang (Tibetans of modern times), Xiongnu (Mongols of modern times) and Eastern Hu (Tunguses of modern times) – and declares that the beginning of their "total extinction" had already begun long ago. Only in the case of the Miao the name has not changed since antiquity, for the other three, Liang uses the ancient terms attributed to them.¹³³³ Traditional lineages, which he had already used in 1901, enable him like they had enabled historians since long times to track their whereabouts from antiquity until the present-day, although in many cases these lineages are mere guesswork and it cannot be verified anymore how and if these

¹³²⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_1]; 1983 [1921_2]; 1983 [1922_1].

¹³³⁰ Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 197–198. The original title of the journal was *Jiefang yu gaozao*. It was published monthly from 1919 until 1922.

¹³³¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_1], p. 26, 27.

¹³³² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_1], p. 29.

¹³³³ In fact, Zhang Taiyan had criticized this simplistic approach to ethnic names, especially the Miao, already in 1908, where he explains in detail how and why the Three Miao (*San Miao*) of ancient times are not the same as the modern Miao. Admittedly, his approach has a definite political reason. He wants to show why the argument of some thinkers – that the Manchu are for the Han, what the Han themselves had once been for the Miao, when they expelled them from their *Lebensraum* in antiquity and settled in the Central Plains – is wrong. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1908], p. 263–267.)

ethnicities with different names were in fact related to each other. As a generally accepted result the Qiang are considered to be the forefathers of the modern Tibetans¹³³⁴, the Xiongnu are supposed to be the forefathers of the Mongols¹³³⁵ and the Eastern Hu (*Donghu*) are seen as the forefathers of the Manchus¹³³⁶. Liang claims that the existence of the offspring of the Miao, Qiang, Xiongnu and Eastern Hu would be doomed and shortly outlines how.¹³³⁷

According to Liang the “beginning of the total extinction” of the Miao began in early Qing times, when first during the Yongzheng reign period (1722-1735) and then during the Jiaqing period (1796-1820) “land improvements were made in Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan and Guilin twice, and they [= the Miao] retreated and scattered.”¹³³⁸ The fate of the Tibetans (Qiang) was sealed when “in early Qing times during the Qianlong [1735-1796] and Jiaqing periods the aboriginal offices (*tusi*) were subordinated and during the Guangxu period [1875-1908] Xinjiang became a province.”¹³³⁹ The decline of the Mongols (Xiongnu) began when “the Ming expelled the Hu (barbarian) Yuan (*Hu Yuan*) dynasty and the Qing incorporated” them.¹³⁴⁰ And the Manchus’ (Eastern Hu’s) existence only lasted until the “founding of the nation-state and the abdication of the Manchu Qing.”¹³⁴¹

In this essay Liang claims that all necessary assimilative processes to form a united Chinese nation-state have already begun and are on their way to perfection. He writes:

“About those, who are called extinct, it cannot be claimed that they opposed their extinction, and thus they were absorbed and united with all [the other] ethnicities (*xi ju zhuzu*). They sloughed and changed their original character and became one integral part of our ethnicity (*rong bian qi yuanzhi zuowei wo zu zhi yi chengfen*). They broadened its contains. Today, in every province in the interior, there is not one bit of a trace of all these ethnicities (*zhu zu*) in existence anymore. Indeed, no matter of which province one recommends people (*renmin*), there are no blood traces of the Qiang, Miao, Xiongnu, Eastern Hu or of any other foreign ethnicity

¹³³⁴ Qiang – Yuezhi – Tufan – Western Xia/Tangut – (Wusizang – Western Fan (*Xi Fan*)) – Tibetans. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 6. Those people in brackets are only listed in Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7.)

¹³³⁵ Here, the lineage is not entirely clear. Until today, two lineages are debated. First, the Mongols descend from the Donghu (Donghu – Shanrong – Wuhuan – Xianbei – Tuyuhun – Xi – Khitan – Shiwei – Tartars (*Tata*) – Mongols). (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7.) Second, they descend from the Xiongnu. Liang claims that the Xiongnu were the forefathers of the Turks (Xianyun – Xiongnu – Rouran – Tujue – Huihe – Turks). (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 6; 1983 [1922], p. 7.) Liu Shippei also sees a connection between the Xiongnu and the Turks. (Liu Shippei: 1997 [1905], p. 27b.) This is also the traditional assumption. However, in this text Liang seems to withdraw from this opinion and interprets the Xiongnu as the forefathers of the Mongols.

¹³³⁶ Donghu – Xianbei – Mohe – Khitan (or Parhae) – Jurchen – Manchu. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 6. Those people in brackets are only listed in Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7.)

¹³³⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_1], p. 26–27.

¹³³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹³³⁹ Xinjiang became provincial status in 1884, three year after its reconquest in 1881 by Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885). Xinjiang had been part of the Qing empire already in 1759-1864, but it was not given the status of a province then. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_1], p. 27.)

¹³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

(*qita zhu yi zu*). And today there is only the one name of the Zhonghua nation people (*Zhonghua guomin*), which can be seen worldwide.”¹³⁴²

To further verify the logic of his claim, Liang collects examples from other countries, where “these ethnicities’ change and fusion (*huahe*) did happen in the same way.”¹³⁴³ Without referring to certain time period he gives the fusion of the Normans (*Namanzu*), Angles (*Angeluzu*) and Saxons (*Sakesunzu*), which today would form the English people (*Yinglanren*).¹³⁴⁴ This equation is not very suitable, as Liang must have been aware of. What he claims to have happened in China is a one-sided process of sinicization, whereas in his example of the English there happened a fusion of three people into one without one of them claiming such an outstanding position like he claims for the Han people in China. Why the Han people are superior to others and always assimilate them and do not assimilated themselves to others, Liang had explained in the essays written in the 1900s where he put forward his idea of an “assimilative power.” He had argued that this power’s existence would be due to the superiority of the Han people regarding their ethnical counterparts in East Asia. Here, Liang compares the Han people to a stomach, to which “it is irrelevant [...] whether one swallows (*tun*) a stone [= Non-Han people] or an egg yolk [= Han people] – we use our stomach’s power to digest.”¹³⁴⁵ And he goes on: “Being surrounded by them [= the barbarians], our nation (*wo guomin*) mixed the diverse ethnicities (*fuza zhu min*), which originally exited in the country, into one cast (*ye wei yi lu*).”¹³⁴⁶

In his text from 1921, Liang Qichao claims that the assimilation of all Non-Han people in the Chinese nation-state is on a good way. Liang does not neglect the problem of separatism deriving from the existence of all these ethnicities, but he does not dwell on it and rather puts forward the good prospects due to the soon to be expected amalgamation. It seems as if Liang was wistfully denying the geopolitical situation in East Asia. Tibet had already separated nearly a decade ago although the Republican government did not officially accept it and Manchuria was under the quasi independent rule of warlord Zhang Zuolin. Already at the beginning of 1921 when Liang wrote his essay, Outer Mongolia declared itself as an independent theocratic monarchy with the help of Russian White guard troops. Later in this year, the Outer Mongolian Revolution broke out and Mongolia was ruled by the theocratic leader Bogd Khan together with the People’s Party (and Soviet Russia). The question why Liang stays so confident can not be answered definitely. In my opinion, he did not want to make his readers losing hope and further aimed at strengthening the self-confidence of the nation. Already at the

¹³⁴² Ibid.

¹³⁴³ Ibid.

¹³⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 26. The same symbolism from metallurgy or rather of an alloy of superior and inferior metals making the best coins referring to the mixing of Han and barbarians in a figurative sense had been used by Liang before. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73.)

beginning of the 20th century, Liang had understood that nationalism was mainly a sentiment and had frequently ignored realities in order to make a certain point especially concerning history, ethnicity and territory. If the Han people only felt strong enough that the inhabitants of Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria and South China were part of the Chinese ethnicity and thus the nation-state, this could become true. What Liang and Han Chinese nationalists in general missed to take into account were the sentiments of the Non-Han Others. Moreover, it was not enough if the Han imagined these people to have already assimilated if they had in fact not. It would have taken more than persuading the Han that these Non-Han were part of the Han ethnicity if Liang wanted to make the Non-Han consider becoming part of a Chinese nation-state. But due to the difficult political and also financial situation the Republican government faced there were no other means. And thus, Liang had nothing to subtend the process of large parts of the Qing geo-body one after the other breaking away from the geo-body of the Republic of China.

Methodological Approach to China's History in 1921

Later in 1921 Liang wrote his book-like essay “Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa (Research Method for Chinese History),” which was based on lectures on history he gave at Nankai University (*Nankai daxue*) in Tianjin and Qinghua College (*Qinghua xuexiao*) in Beijing.¹³⁴⁷ Like “Lishi shang Zhonghua guomin shiye zhi chengbai” it was originally published in his journal *Gaizao*. Tang Xiaobing calls this essay “a distant dialogue” with “Xin shixue” (1902) published nearly twenty years earlier.¹³⁴⁸ In my opinion it is moreover a distant dialogue with Liang’s other influential methodological work on history of the 1900s, “Zhongguo shi xu lun” (1901). In “Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa” Liang presents his further refined approach to China’s history based on the new methods of historiography, which he began to develop at the beginning of the 20th century but transcending and further developing it. The essay consists of a foreword and six parts of divers length.¹³⁴⁹

At the beginning of the 20th century, Liang’s attitude towards traditional Chinese historiography is altogether critical. Twenty years later, however, he accepts that also modern historians cannot avoid to acquaint themselves with traditional historical works. However, as there are so many of them, “it is impossible not to read them, but it is also impossible to read them.” The only way to get out of this dilemma is “therefore

¹³⁴⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], “Zi xu,” p. 2; Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 205.

¹³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴⁹ Part 1: “Shi zhi yi yi ji qi fanwei (The meaning of history and its scope),” p. 1–7; Part 2: “Guoqu zhi Zhongguo shixuejie (The limits of past Chinese historiography),” p. 7–29; Part 3: “Shi zhi gaizao (History’s reform),” p. 30–39; Part 4 “Shuo shiliao (About historical material),” p. 40–68; Part 5 “Shiliao zhi souji yu jianbie (Collection and differentiation of historical data/material),” p. 69–107; Part 6 “Shiji zhi lunci (Order of historical relicts),” p. 108–136.

the *opus* of a renewed historiography [, which] can be called the most urgent task of our scholarly world today,” so that historians would not need to start reading history books as children “and becoming white headed without having been able to finish them.”¹³⁵⁰ So, once again, Liang sets out to establish rules and a frame for this yet to write work and once again he does not manage to write it himself.¹³⁵¹ One basic rule is included in Liang’s definition of China’s history, which he gives at the beginning of his first chapter “The meaning of history and its scope (*Shi zhi yiyi ji qi fanwei*).”¹³⁵² Liang thinks that historians are *per se* obliged to write history in order to help the nation by holding a (historical) mirror up to it:

“That, which specializes in narrating the activities of ancient Chinese people (*Zhongguo xianmin*) to provide the modern Chinese nation people with an auxiliary mirror (*xiandai Zhongguo guomin zhi zi jian*)¹³⁵³, is called Chinese history (*Zhongguo shi*).”¹³⁵⁴

Further below, he writes even more explicitly:

“Therefore, if we want an auxiliary mirror providing the modern Chinese people (*xiandai Zhongguoren*) with an idealistic history of China today, scholars are necessary, who are experienced in renewed history and have a portion diligence.”¹³⁵⁵

These definitions do not differ much from Liang’s definition of historiography (*shixue*) in 1902 when he wrote: “Historiography is the greatest and most urgent [task] to scholarship; it is the mirror of the nation people (*guomin zhi mingjing*); it is the source of patriotic hearts (*aiguoxin*).”¹³⁵⁶ However, there is a slight difference despite the similar word choice. In the 1900s, Liang’s emphasis lies on the positive effects history can have on the nationalist sentiments of people, assuming that a renewed Chinese national history should mainly be dedicated to the aim of strengthening nationalism in the hearts of the people thus telling the tale of the Han people as positive as possible. In 1921, history turns out to be a treasure trove of both, positive and negative experience, ready to help solving present-day situations also by providing the possibility of not making the same mistakes twice.¹³⁵⁷ It is dedicated to the strengthening of the *de facto* political nation-state rather than the sentiment of the nation people.

¹³⁵⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], “Zi xu,” p. 1; Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 206.

¹³⁵¹ Sang Bing writes that “throughout his entire life, Liang never did produce a single outstanding work for posterity.” (Sang Bing: 2004, p. 188.)

¹³⁵² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 1–7.

¹³⁵³ The term *zi jian* is a reference to a famous reference historical work, the *Zizhi tongjian* (*Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government*) by the great historian Sima Guang (1019–1086), published during the Northern Song Dynasty in 1084. This work was highly appreciated also by modern historians.

¹³⁵⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 1. Translation based on Tang Xiaobing. (Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 206–207.)

¹³⁵⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 4–5.

¹³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1902_1], p. 1.

¹³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1921_2], p. 3.

At the end of the first chapter of “Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa,” Liang lists “the important twenty-two subareas” a history of China should embrace. Of these twenty-two subareas, four are of special interest with regard to Liang’s approach to Non-Han ethnicities. They all refer to questions of ethnicity and national identity of the Han people, still called Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*) by Liang as in his 1900s texts, with references to Non-Han people. The four subareas related to the topic are:

First, “is the Zhonghua ethnicity an aboriginal people of China or a migrating people?”

Second, “of the mixture of how many ethnicities’ did the Zhonghua ethnicity develop? What traces of mixing and improving are there?”

Third, “altogether how many barbarian ethnicities (*man zu*) coming from the outside, i.e. the Xiongnu, the Tujue et cetera, controlled this country with us? Where lied their origins? What were the influences on our culture through the results of the conflicts? What were the influences on them through our culture?”

Fourth, “what are the traces of success and failure of controlling other ethnicities and being controlled by other ethnicities?”¹³⁵⁸

Liang states that by subsuming China’s history in these subareas one would also automatically analyze four crucial points. These four points are especially revealing as all of them directly refer to the Han ethnicity in relation to the outside:

First, “explain the traces of the foundation and development of China’s ethnicity (*Zhongguo minzu*) in order to analyze the reasons for its continuity and magnificence, and moreover to examine if there are or are not evidences for declining.”

Second, “explain, which ethnicities (*zu*) were most active in history in China’s borders. What are the traces of our ethnicity’s (*wo zu*) mixings and conflicts with other ethnicities (*ta zu*)? And what are the results?”

Third, “explain, on what basis China’s ethnicity (*Zhongguo minzu*) developed culture. What are the mutual influences of it and cultures of other global areas?”

Fourth, “explain the position among human beings and the special character of China’s ethnicity (*Zhongguo minzu*), and the future duties it has for all human kinds.”¹³⁵⁹

For Liang, generally ethnicities’ relations and interactions and especially Non-Han people and their relations to the Han are obviously one major, if not even *the* major field of responsibility of Han Chinese historians. It is remarkable that Liang does not use the term Han people in this essay, but only the expressions “Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*),” “China’s ethnicity (*Zhongguo minzu*),” “we (*wo*)” or “our ethnicity (*wo zu*).” As

¹³⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 5–6.

¹³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 6. Translation see also Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 207. Among other differences, Tang Xiaobing translates *Zhongguo minzu* as “Chinese nation,” *wo zu* as “Han Chinese” and *ta zu* as “other races.”

mentioned above, Liang had defined Zhonghua ethnicity as Han ethnicity in 1906.¹³⁶⁰ To find out what he exactly means by the terms “Zhonghua ethnicity” and “China’s ethnicity” in 1922, it is necessary to analyze Liang’s approach to Non-Han ethnicities in “Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa.”

In the sixth part of the essay “The order of historical relicts (*Shiji zhi lunci*)”¹³⁶¹ Liang explains why history has to know about the time of origin of relicts in order to be able to put them into relation and deduct historical events.¹³⁶² This is based on Liang’s new approach to history by studying processes over long durations rather than focusing on single events, listed dynasty per dynasty.¹³⁶³ Liang’s first example to clarify his method are historical relicts regarding “our ethnicity’s” relations with and, as it turns out, challenges or problems (*wenti*) with diverse other ethnicities. Once again this reveals Liang’s strong emphasis on a part of China’s history, which is closely linked to the Non-Han ethnicities and their assimilation.

He lists the Miao Man (five thousand years of shared history)¹³⁶⁴, the Qiang and Hui (four thousand years of shared history)¹³⁶⁵, the Xiongnu (three thousand years of shared history)¹³⁶⁶, Eastern Hu (three thousand years of shared history)¹³⁶⁷ and Chosŏn (three thousand years of shared history)¹³⁶⁸. What is revealing with regard to his present-day situation are his comments on the problems these people obviously mean for the Han people. I.e. Liang refers to the question of supremacy, which occurred between the Han ethnicity and the Eastern Hu/Manchus since the Spring and Autumn Period. The “problem” with the Eastern Hu and their successors, the Manchus, Liang writes, “is completely solved since the Xinhai Revolution, when the Qing court abdicated.”¹³⁶⁹ It has

¹³⁶⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2, line 1.

¹³⁶¹ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1921_2], p. 108–136.

¹³⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

¹³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 2–3. See also Tang Xiaobing: 1996, p. 209.

¹³⁶⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 108. He lists the Yellow Emperor’s war with Chi You, Yao’s and Shun’s divide of the Three Miao, King Zhuang of Chu and his actions in Yelang, Han Wudi and the Western and Southern Yi barbarians (*Xinan Yi*), Ma Yuan’s (14 BC–49 AD) and Zhuge Liang’s (181–234) Southern expeditions, the Tang and the Six Zhao tribes (*liu Zhao*), the Song and Nong Zhigao (1025–ca. 1055), an ethnic Zhuang chieftain et cetera, until the Southern expeditions during Qing periods Yongzheng and Qianlong and the defeat of Du Wenxiu’s (1823–1872) rebellion during the periods Xianfeng and Tongzhi.

¹³⁶⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 108. He lists King Cheng Tang of Shang and the visits of the Dí Qiang, King Wu and the visits of the Qiang Mao, the five Liang dynasties during Jin times, the Western Xia of Song times et cetera, until the Qing, when the Hui were pacified in the Qianlong period, and Xinjiang province was established during Guangxu.

¹³⁶⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 108–109. He lists the Yellow Emperor’s defeat of the Xinyu, Shang emperor Gaozong’s (trad. reign time 1250–1192 BC) defeat of Guifang, King Xuan of Zhou’s (*Zhou Xuan wang*) defeat of the Xianyun, the contacts of the State of Jin and the Qin and Zhao dynasties with them, Han Wudi’s and Hedi’s expeditions against them, but he gives no example in more recent times.

¹³⁶⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 109. He lists the Mountain Rong or Shanrong of the Spring and Autumn Period, the Xianbei of the Five Hu or Wu Hu barbarians, the Khitan, Jurchen and the Manchus (*Manzhu*).

¹³⁶⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 109. He lists Korea becoming a vassal state during the Gija (*Jizi*) period (until 194 BC) and uprisings and subjugations during Han, Sui and Tang times. To liberate Korea and its history from China, was later attempted by Korean historians, most prominently by Choe Nam-seon (1890–1957). (Allan: 1990.)

¹³⁶⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 109.

been solved satisfactorily and irreversibly. For the Manchu people, Liang considers their chapter in a history of China closed, their time of bloom, or rather their time at all over forever. Their history so to speak ends in 1911.

In contrast to that, the Korean “problem” has not been finally decided yet:

“Regarding the Korean problem [...], since the *xiawu* year of the Guangxu reign period [1894]¹³⁷⁰ it was solved by a defeat. This problem thus fell out of our history’s radius (*wo lishi quan*) for the time being. But another day its solution will occupy our offspring. So it is not yet finally [decided].”¹³⁷¹

With regard to Korean people and their relation to the Han people Liang does not consider their mutual history to be ended yet, but sees a possibility for the Han people to regain influence there. The same Liang thinks of the Tibetan “problem,” which according to him has persisted since one thousand five hundred years, always changing its status between “nearly solved and not solved.”¹³⁷²

What becomes obvious in this influential essay by Liang is that one important part of China’s history is formed by the many encounters of diverse ethnic people in East Asia. Moreover, Liang’s approach reveals that his feeling of superiority of the Han people as being the nucleus of China’s history is as strong as ever. The Han stand in the historical centre and thus should stay in the political one. Only events, which are directly linked to them, count as being part of this history. Encounters between ethnicities only appear if one of the actors are the Han people, independent of where these encounters happen. This shows once again the ambivalence of the integration of the Non-Han people into a history of China. They are part of it as long as they interact with the Han and influence the Han people’s fate, but as soon as they turn to someone else, their histories become unimportant. In Liang’s idea China’s history in the end is only the Han people’s history. This stands of course in striking contrast to the political aim of reunifying the Qing geobody and ending the divers separatisms. If the Republic of China wanted to be a state, which was attractive to join also for Non-Han people, then it had to include these people in its history properly and not half-heartedly.

Attempt of a More Precise Approach in 1922

In 1922, Liang Qichao wrote his essay “Zhongguo lishi shang minzu zhi yanjiu (Survey of Ethnicities in Chinese History).”¹³⁷³ It was first written as part of a lecture series Liang

¹³⁷⁰ In 1894, the Qing dynasty lost its influence in Korea to Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War.

¹³⁷¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2], p. 109.

¹³⁷² Ibid.

¹³⁷³ Ibid.: 1983 [1922]. It was originally planned as a chapter of a book titled *Wu qian nian shi shi niaokan* (A Survey of Five Thousand Years of History), which never came into being.

held in spring and summer 1922 at Qinghua University in Beijing titled “Wuqian nian shi shi niaokan (Survey over the situation of five thousand years of history),” but he was not satisfied with it and kept it to revise it. Later in 1922, he published an abridged version.¹³⁷⁴

Some few analyses of China’s ethnicities had been published before at the beginning of the century, i.e. Liu Shiwei’s *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (1905) and Liang’s own essay “Lishi shang Zhongguo minzu zhi guan cha” (1906) mentioned above, moreover Tao Chengzhang’s (1878–1912) “Zhongguo minzu quanli xiaozhang shi (The history of the growth and decline of power of China’s ethnicities)” (1904).¹³⁷⁵ And plenty had been published afterwards, i.e. Zhang Qiyun’s (1901–1985) *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (1928), Wang Tongling’s *Zhongguo minzu shi (History of the China’s Ethnicities)* (1928) and Lü Simian’s (1934) and Song Wenbing’s (dates of life unknown) (1935) books with the same title to name only the earliest ones.

Like in his essay from 1906, in 1922 Liang’s main argument is about the assimilation of people in East Asia to the Han ethnicity. As mentioned, he nearly never uses the term “Han ethnicity” to refer to his own people, but “China’s people,” “Zhonghua ethnicity” and “our ethnicity (*wo zu/wu zu*)”.¹³⁷⁶ Sometimes when Liang refers to antiquity, he uses “various Xia.” Why does he avoid *Han*? Is there a difference between *Zhonghua* and *Han*?

In 1906, Liang wrote that nowadays “Hua ethnicity (*Huazu*)” as well as “Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*)” would be the same as “Han ethnicity.”¹³⁷⁷ And when the Republic of China was called *Zhonghua minguo* in 1912, this choice was based on Zhang Taiyan’s famous essay “Zhonghua minguo jie (Explaining ‘The Republic of China’)” (1907). In this essay, Zhang himself explains that he chose this name because *Hua* would embrace two meanings. Originally it would only have been the name for the country, but now it would also be the name for the Han ethnicity.¹³⁷⁸ (He does not explain why he adds *zhong*.) Was the meaning of *Zhonghua* still confined to the Han ethnicity in 1922?

I think that Liang indeed intended to broaden the meaning of *Zhonghua*. But he intended this broadening only in order to refer to his opinion that Non-Han people had been absorbed in the past. As these Non-Han elements are not visible anymore, the usage of *Zhonghua* instead of *Hanzu* is a mere lip service. As will become obvious in the following analysis, Liang does not really change his opinion of the *Zhonghua* ultimately being identical with the Han. They might have Non-Han blood in their veins, but this does not mean that they are not culturally belonging to the most superior ethnicity in East Asia. So, the only new about Liang’s idea of his own ethnicity in 1922 is that in its blood Non-Han elements are existent. But for his main approach, this does not change

¹³⁷⁴ These information is given in small characters at the beginning of the essay. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 1).

¹³⁷⁵ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905]; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1]; Tao Chengzhang: 1986 [1904].

¹³⁷⁶ Only at the end of the essay, he becomes a bit more lax and uses “Han people (*Hanren*)” three times and “Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*)” once. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 26, 27.)

¹³⁷⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2.

¹³⁷⁸ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 252. Based on Cassel: 1997, p. 16–17.

anything. I do therefore not agree with James Leibold, who repeatedly writes that the term *Zhonghua* would include “both the Sinic and non-Sinic people of the Qing empire” already in the 1900s.¹³⁷⁹ Leibold also claims that Liang Qichao himself although initially using “the term [*Zhonghua minzu*] as a synonym for the Hanzu [...] in his highly influential writings he boldly rejected the revolutionaries’ attempts to exclude the Manchus and other non-Han peoples from this topos of Chinese identity.”¹³⁸⁰ By reading Liang’s texts concerning ethnic identity and the question how to integrate Non-Han people in a Chinese nation-state it becomes however clear that Liang went on to use the term *Zhonghua minzu* synonymous with *Hanzu*, but the ambivalence in this and Liang’s uneasiness with it also comes to the fore. But Liang’s usage of *Zhonghua* in the essay from 1922 was certainly a starting point for the later development of *Zhonghua* into a term with broader meaning. And Leibold is of course right that “the term became more and more ambiguous and by and by began to “be simultaneously be rendered as “*the Chinese minzu*” or “the various minzus of China.”¹³⁸¹ But this did not happen in the 1900s, but only in the late 1920s. In 1922 *Zhonghua* is still mainly interchangeable with “Han ethnicity” and identical with how Liang used this term earlier as will become clear below.

Liang’s essay consists of five numbered yet untitled parts:

1. Preface¹³⁸²
2. Discussion of diverse questions concerning the origin of the *Zhonghua* ethnicity¹³⁸³
3. Description of the five major Non-Han ethnicities in China in his present-day (Mongols, Turks, Tunguses, Tibetans, and divers people in the South)¹³⁸⁴
4. Detailed list of the aboriginals of China and later invaders and migrants (taking the 6th century BC as a model and listing the eight main tribes of that time, their names and settlement areas)¹³⁸⁵
5. Description of the histories of the eight tribes listed in the fourth part, especially the processes of assimilation in older times¹³⁸⁶

The first part contains some of Liang’s assumptions, which form the basis of his argumentation. Twenty years after he made the demand in his essay “*Xin shixue*” that historians should take the strengthening of a national sentiment as their main aim when writing history Liang himself still follows his own request. He gives the most

¹³⁷⁹ Leibold: 2007, p. 10, p. 186n42.

¹³⁸⁰ Leibold: 2012b, p. 214.

¹³⁸¹ Leibold: 2007, p. 102. See also Mullaney: 2011, p. 2, 16. About the meaning of *Zhonghua minzu* in modernity see Zhou Minglang: 2012, p. 19; Jacob/Park: 2012, p. 165–166.

¹³⁸² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 1–2.

¹³⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 2–6.

¹³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6–7.

¹³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7–11.

¹³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11–34. A conclusion is included in the fifth part. (*Ibid.*, p. 31–34.)

important condition for the foundation of a nation – “ethnic consciousness (*minzu yishi*),” which he defines as the feeling of “them (*bi/ta*)” versus “us (*wo*).”¹³⁸⁷ In order to clarify how a differentiation can be made between the self and the other, he discusses the difference between ethnicity (*minzu*) and race (*zhongzu*) on the one hand and ethnicity and nation-people (*guomin*) on the other.¹³⁸⁸

“The difference between ethnicity and *race*:

Race is the subject of ethnological research. The skeleton and other differences based on physiognomy are its markers. One race can be divided into countless ethnicities. Like Teutons are divided into English, Germans and other ethnicities, and Slavs are divided into Russians, Serbs and other ethnicities. One ethnicity can include countless races. Like the Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*) includes the Qiang race (*Qiang zhongzu*) and the Dí race (*Di zhongzu*). Like the Japanese ethnicity includes China’s race (*Zhongguo zhongzu*) and the Ainu race (*Ainu zhongzu*).”¹³⁸⁹

“The difference between ethnicity and *nation-people*:

Nations are the subjects of judicial research. The facts of living together in one region and having a fixed nationality (*guojie*) are its markers. One ethnicity can be divided into more than two [nation-people]¹³⁹⁰ like China (*Zhongguo*) was during the times of the Warring States period, the Three Kingdoms period and the Six Dynasties. One nation-people can include more than two ethnicities like the Zhonghua nation-people (*Zhonghua guomin*) today, of whom the Mongol, Muslim and Tibetan ethnicities form parts at the same time.”¹³⁹¹

Liang’s differentiation between ethnicity (*minzu*) and nation-people (*guomin*) seems confusing at first because he uses the same term *Zhonghua* as a name for an ethnicity and a nation-people, each time including different groups of people. Above I have stated that Liang’s idea of what *Zhonghua* includes does not differ from his approach in the 1900s, that is, that *Zhonghua* ethnicity is still congruent with the Han ethnicity. This becomes clear in the passage above. The *Zhonghua* ethnicity, he claims would include the racial traces of other people such as the Qiang and the Dí. By this Liang claims that in prehistoric and antique times, the *Zhonghua* ethnicity had intermingled with the Qiang and the Dí and at that time had included their blood in the *Zhonghua* ethnicity.

The *Zhonghua* nation-people on the other hand, would include more than one, that is, the Han ethnicity. It would also include the Mongols, the Turkish Muslims and the Tibetans. Liang does not mention the Manchus here, because – as we will see below – he

¹³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹³⁸⁸ In 1903, Liang quoted a similar differentiation, that is Bluntschli’s differentiation between ethnicity (*minzu*) and nation-people (*guomin*). (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 71, 72; Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 91ff; 1885, p. 82f.)

¹³⁸⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 1.

¹³⁹⁰ Liang writes “ethnicities (*minzu*),” but that must be a mistake.

¹³⁹¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 1.

considers them completely assimilated.¹³⁹² Therefore, of the “Five Ethnicities” of Qing times only them do not form an exclusive ethnicity anymore. As to the other three, they still exist apart from the Zhonghua ethnicity and along with it would be part of the Zhonghua nation-people.

Liang has given a similar differentiation between ethnicity and nation-people already in 1903 in his essay about Bluntschli.¹³⁹³ But although race and ethnicity are defined differently, in the quotation above the differences between them seems rather imprecise and the terms’ contents seem to overlap each other. True to the pseudo science of “racism,” Liang defines race via the quasi objective physiognomic criteria. Liang’s definition of ethnicity, however, is new. His most important criteria to analyze borders between diverse ethnicities are not longer “blood line, language and believe”¹³⁹⁴ like before, although he still uses them occasionally.¹³⁹⁵ Here, he puts forward the marker of “ethnic consciousness (*minzu yishi*).”¹³⁹⁶ Under this pretext Liang shows how other ethnicities were merged into the Zhonghua ethnicity. He gives three examples. The first example is that of the Chu people (*Churen*) or Hubei people (*Hubeiren*), whose ethnical consciousness at the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period let them think of themselves as Man barbarians. “I am a Man Yi (barbarian) (*Man Yi*),” says Xiong Qu, the King of Chu (reign time 887–877 BC) in the *Shiji* cited by Liang.¹³⁹⁷ But according to Liang during the Warring States period they became part of the Zhonghua ethnicity, when “there were seven states [where one] wore caps and belts, and Chu was one of them.”¹³⁹⁸ The second example runs similar. Liang again quotes from the *Shiji* that a king of the Southern kingdom Southern Yue (*Nan Yue*) (ca. 203–111 BC)¹³⁹⁹ refers to himself as a “great Man Yi (barbarian) leader” in the time of Han Wendi (202–157 BC, reign time 180–157 BC).¹⁴⁰⁰ But then in the time of the 3rd to 5th century AD, the Yue people (*Yueren*) also became a part of the Zhonghua ethnicity. Only Liang’s third example dates from modernity and refers to the Manchu people.

“When the Manchu people (*Manzhouren*) founded the Qing dynasty they called our kind Han people (*Hanren*) and themselves banner people (*qiren*). But today

¹³⁹² Ibid., p. 2.

¹³⁹³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 71, 72; Bluntschli: 1965 [1886], vol. 1, p. 91ff; 1885, p. 82f.

¹³⁹⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 1. This differs from Liang’s definition in 1903, “same place, same blood relation, same physical appearance, same language, same script, same religion, same tradition, same way of living.” (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 75, see also p. 71–72.)

¹³⁹⁵ To show how the others differed from the self in antiquity, Liang lists their special ways of hairstyle and body art, language and religion. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 10.)

¹³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 1.

¹³⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 2. He cites from the *Shiji*, ch. 40, p. 1695.

¹³⁹⁸ Ibid. In the middle of the Warring States period, mainly seven states were left fighting. Apart from Chu, this were Qin, Qi, Yan and the three Jin states, Han, Wei and Zhao.

¹³⁹⁹ Nanyue was a kingdom in the region of North Vietnam and the South Chinese provinces Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 2. He cites from *Shiji*, ch. 113, p. 2970.

these names and ideas do not exist anymore. Therefore, all Manchus are now a part of the Zhonghua ethnicity.”¹⁴⁰¹

And later he states: “Although the Qing dynasty lasted more than two hundred years, they successively assimilated (*tonghua*) to us. Until today they nearly totally lost their ethnicity’s autonomy.”¹⁴⁰²

Opposed to the fate of these people Liang names the Mongols, who until today are not part of the Chinese ethnicity and still think of themselves as “Mongol people (*Mengren*)” and of the Chinese as “Han people (*Hanren*).”¹⁴⁰³ In a text from 1924, Liang ascribes this to the Mongols’ “power to reject assimilation (*ju tonghua de liliang*).”¹⁴⁰⁴

Once again, Liang does not explain how this shift of ethnicity, in this case of ethnic consciousness happens. How and why do the Chu people change from barbarians into one of the belt and cap wearing seven states and how do the Yue people become part of the Zhonghua ethnicity? His argumentation in case of the Manchus is even more obviously guided by prejudices and not by analytical approach. That the political system of the banners declined after the abdication of the Manchu emperor does not mean that the Manchus do not use other self-depicting terms. But while Liang fails to bring real arguments to the fore, his opinion is still widely accepted as can be seen in later works by various historians, be they about Chinese history in general or about Non-Han Dynasties in particular.

Apart from his general remarks at the beginning of the essay from 1922, Liang devotes the largest part of it to analyses of Non-Han ethnicities living in the territory he defines as “China.” Of special interest are two different lists of ethnicities in China with regard to his integration of Non-Han people into China’s history and also to his earlier arguments about the assimilation of Non-Han people.

Short List of Six Modern Ethnicities in China (1922): Similarities and Differences to Earlier Lists (1901 and 1921)

As we have seen, in the essay “Lishi shang Zhonghua guomin shiye zhi chengbai ji jinhou gejin zhi jiyun” (1921), Liang claims that “apart from the Zhonghua ethnicity, in which the aboriginal ethnicities (*guyou minzu*) are contained, only four other important ethnicities (*zhuyao minzu*) exist” in China today: the Miao, the Tibetans (Qiang), the Mongols (Xiongnu) and the Manchus (Eastern Hu).¹⁴⁰⁵ In the third part of his text from 1922, Liang gives the same list of the Zhonghua ethnicity and four Non-Han ethnicities

¹⁴⁰¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 2.

¹⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1924], p. 29.

¹⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1921_1], p. 26–27.

under slightly different names, but he adds a sixth ethnicity, the “Tujue, which are the Turks (*Tu'erqizu*).”¹⁴⁰⁶ Already more than twenty years earlier Liang had given a similar list of six ethnicities in “Zhongguo shi xulun” (1901).¹⁴⁰⁷ In the essay from 1922 his list runs as follows¹⁴⁰⁸:

1. Zhonghua ethnicity
2. Mongol ethnicity
3. Tujue ethnicity
4. Eastern Hu ethnicity (“in Eastern books ‘Donghu’ is the translation for the Tungusic ethnicity”)
5. Dī Qiang ethnicity
6. Man Yue ethnicity

Liang writes about the Zhonghua ethnicity in part two of his essay.¹⁴⁰⁹ There, he lies down his rejection of the Western origin theory, calling it “foreign origin theory (*wailai shuo*),” claiming that the question if the Zhonghua ethnicity would stem from within or from the outside would not have been existent in “our national educational circles.”¹⁴¹⁰ Only the Europeans would have brought about the whole issue. Liang writes that they theorized about the Hua ethnicity (*Huazu*) stemming from all kinds of places: Central Asia¹⁴¹¹, the Pamir Mountains¹⁴¹², Khotan¹⁴¹³, Outer Mongolia, the Malay Peninsula, India¹⁴¹⁴, Egypt¹⁴¹⁵, and even America¹⁴¹⁶. But Liang, although claiming to be most interested in the issue, is unconvinced and does not see enough evidence.¹⁴¹⁷ By putting the discussion of the “Western origin theory” at the very beginning of the part about the Zhonghua ethnicity, Liang however admits its importance and wide influence, which makes it impossible to ignore it. Liang himself thinks that the Zhongxia ethnicity in antiquity, then called various Xia (*zhu Xia*), did not stem from one single tribe (*buluo*) and

¹⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.: 1983 [1922], p. 6.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.: 1983 [1901_1], p. 5–6. He lists Miao, Han, Tibetans, four Mongols, Xiongnu (Turks) and Tunguses.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Later in the text, Liang claims that today the Man and Yue are the Miao and Baiyi (= Dai) in Guizhou, Yunnan and Guangxi, who also live beyond the borders in Annan (North Vietnam) and Thailand. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7.)

¹⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 2–6.

¹⁴¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2–3.

¹⁴¹¹ Liang claims that an Englishman named Robinson (I could not verify to whom he refers) claimed this.

¹⁴¹² This was Terrien de Lacouperie’s claim.

¹⁴¹³ The German geographer Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen (1933–1905) is given as the source of this claim.

¹⁴¹⁴ Liang writes that Jean-Pierre Guillaume Pauthier (1801–1873), a French orientalist, and an Englishman named Davis (I could not verify who he refers to) claimed this.

¹⁴¹⁵ Joseph de Guignes (1721–1800) was a French orientalist, sinologist and turkologist, who claimed that the Chinese stemmed from Egypt.

¹⁴¹⁶ The French Joseph Arthur Comte de Gobineau (1816–1882), who developed the theory of an Aryan master race, is given as the source of this claim. However, in his famous “Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races)” (1853–1855) he writes that “an Aryan colony from India brought the light of civilization to China also.” (Gobineau: 1915, p. 212.)

¹⁴¹⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 2–3.

remained “pure,” but that many smaller tribes intermingled and formed the various Xia.¹⁴¹⁸

In part three, Liang gives a short abstract of the lineages and the present areas of settlement for each of the five listed Non-Han ethnicities. In “Zhongguo shi xulun” (1901), he had already given nearly identical lines of succession and living places.¹⁴¹⁹ And this 1901 list is again similar to Kuwabara’s list of Asian ethnicities from *Chûtô tôyôshi* (1898).¹⁴²⁰

In 1922, Liang reuses these lists, partly copying Kuwabara’s and his original analyses, partly changing it or adding information¹⁴²¹:

1. Mongol ethnicity

line of succession: Eastern Hu → Mountain Rong → Wuhuan → Xianbei → Tuyuhun → Xi → Khitan → Shiwei → Tartars (*Tata*) → Mongols

territory: One million people in Inner and Outer Mongolia and Qinghai

2. Tujue ethnicity

line of succession: Xinyu → Xianyun → Xiongnu → Rouran → Tiele → Huihe → Geluolu → Naiman → Kyrgyz (*Xiajiasi*) → Tujue → Huihui → Turkish ethnicity (*Tu'erqizu*)

territory: In Xinjiang, Gansu and Yunnan

3. Eastern Hu ethnicity

line of succession: Mohe → Parhae (*Bohai*) → Jurchen → Manchu

territory: None (assimilated)

4. Dī Qiang ethnicity

line of succession: Yuezhi → Tufan → Western Xia → Wusizang → Western Fan (*Xi Fan*)

territory: In Outer Tibet (*Xizang*), Yunnan (then called Guoguo), borders of Sichuan (then called Tufan), in Burma and Northern India

5. Man Yue ethnicity

line of succession: Miao/Man/Pu → Southern Yue (*Nan Yue*)/Ouyue/Cuanbo → Six Zhao (*liu Zhao*) → Miao/Baiyi

territory: In Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi, Vietnam (*Annan*) and Thailand (*Xianluo*)

The most revealing point in this list is that the Eastern Hu are a dead end so to speak. In 1901 Liang had given the living place of the Eastern Hu’s descendants, the Manchus in North Korea and the Heilongjiang’s shores, but in 1922 he does not give a distinct area

¹⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3–6.

¹⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1901_1], p. 5–6.

¹⁴²⁰ Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 22–24. See also above Chapter 1.3 (“Races and History: Liang Qichao’s Idea of Racial Categories”).

¹⁴²¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 6–7.

anymore, because he classifies the Manchus as assimilated. Liang still thinks them important enough to include them in the list, but in his understanding they are not in existence as a distinct ethnicity anymore.

Two other differences refer to the analysis of ethnic descent and anthropology. In 1901 Liang thought that the Mongols were an ethnicity, which came “out of the blue” and were only recognized as being in existence with the bloom of the Mongol Empire. In 1922, Liang is convinced that the Mongols stem from the Eastern Hu and therefore are linked to the Tungusic people, namely the Manchus. The Khitan are now listed among the Mongols’ forefathers and not among the forefathers of the Manchus anymore as in 1901.¹⁴²² Moreover, in 1901 and also twenty years later in 1921, Liang did not give any line of succession for the Miao, but assumed that they stem directly from the people called the Three Miao (*San Miao*) already in antiquity.¹⁴²³ But in 1922 he tries to develop a succession line for the Miao as well.¹⁴²⁴ All this gives the impression that Liang’s purpose in this essay is an academic and thorough approach, although a certain political and nationalist aim cannot be denied.

In contrast to earlier essays Liang does not generally claim the assimilation of Non-Han people, but makes differentiations. We have seen that in contrast to that Liang claims in 1921 that every Non-Han ethnicity would be on its way to “total extinction,” that is, vanish in the realms of the Zhonghua ethnicity. But here, he regards the Mongols and the Turks as not assimilated at all, the Tibetans and the ethnicities from Southeast China as only partly although mostly assimilated, and only the Manchus as completely assimilated.¹⁴²⁵ Whereas in ancient times several ethnicities like the Hundred Yue (*Bai Yue*), the Eastern Yi (*Dong Yi*) and the Jing Wu assimilated, the Manchu people are the only ones, who he claims to have fully assimilated in modern times.¹⁴²⁶ It comes to the fore that with regard to assimilation, the Manchus obviously take a special position in this text:

“But during the two hundred years of the Qing Dynasty, one after the other assimilated to us (*tonghua yu wo*). Until today, they have nearly completely lost their ethnicity’s special character (*minzu de dulixing*).”¹⁴²⁷

This is a direct reflection of the geopolitical situation in the four large Non-Han areas I have shortly outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Whereas it quickly had become clear that Tibetans, Mongolians and Turkish Muslims were independent and from the

¹⁴²² As stated before, the ethnic relations and descent of the Khitan is until today not entirely clear.

¹⁴²³ See for example in *Mengzi*. (Legge: 1972, vol. 2, p. 349 (Book V. Wang Chang, Part I, Chap. III).)

¹⁴²⁴ See also above p. 196n126 about Zhang Taiyan’s critique on simply thinking that modern ethnicities are the same as ancient ones if they have the same or similar names. (Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1908], p. 263–267.)

¹⁴²⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7, 9.

¹⁴²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9, 7, 27.

¹⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Han Chinese point of view unloyal actors, only the Manchus vanished as a political relevant group of people.

Lists of Ancient Ethnicities (1922): Part of the Zhonghua Ethnicity's "Blood"

The second list of ethnicities appears in part four in Liang's essay and consists of people, who he claims have inhabited China proper in the middle period of Spring and Autumn times (771–476 BC) and were completely or to a great part included into the various Xia already in antiquity and form an invisible part of the Zhonghua ethnicity today.¹⁴²⁸ The nucleus is the group of the various Xia (*zhu Xia zu*). Others, like the Jing Wu group (*Jing Wu zu*), the Eastern Yi group (*Dong Yi zu*) and the group of the hundred Yue (*Bai Yue zu*) were completely included. The Miao Man group, the Dī Qiang group (*Di Qiang zu*) and the collective Mo group (*qun Mo zu*) were included to a great part. Only the collective Dí group (*qun Di zu*), the forefathers of the Xiongnu, Guifang, Xinyu, Xianyun and Kunyi, are not said to be included in the Zhonghua ethnicity.

In the fifth part of this text, Liang again refers to these ethnicities of the second list.¹⁴²⁹ This time, he picks only six of the originally eight groups leaving the various Xia and the collective Mo aside without giving his reason. He gives a detailed explanation of the remaining six Non-Han ethnicities living in ancient China, especially with respect to their assimilation. Although in his introduction to this list Liang states that it refers to ethnicities in antiquity, he does not always stay narrow to this rule, but also refers to acclaimed modern successors of the ancient ethnicities. Therefore, this long analysis of Non-Han people becomes crucial with regard to the question how Liang integrates Non-Han people into China's history. It is also illuminating with regard to Liang's idea of assimilation and differentiation of ethnicities.

The groups listed are the Eastern Yi, the Jing Wu, the Miao Man, the hundred Yue, the Dī Qiang and the collective Dí. While they correspond with six groups from list two, they do not correspond with the six ethnicities from the first list. Still, some of the ethnicities appear also on list one. Why is that so? List one is a list of the people in the territory and at the borders of China in Liang's present-day in the 1920s. In this list Liang gives the lines of succession of these people, thus already mentioning some of the people appearing in list two and three as ancient forefathers of present-day ethnicities. List three is a list of the people in the same territory, but beginning in antiquity and analyzing what becomes of them over time. Liang claims that some of the people, which formed one ethnicity in antiquity divided into several ethnicities over time (i.e. the

¹⁴²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁴²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 11–31.

collective Dǐ), while others completely disappeared by assimilation or elimination (i.e. the Eastern Yi and the Jing Wu).¹⁴³⁰

According to list three, the modern ethnicities of the Mongols, the Turks and the Tunguses all derive from the same ancient ethnicity, the collective Dǐ, and therefore are merged into one group. The Dǐ Qiang from list one appear under the same heading in list three, because they are considered being only the forefathers of the Tibetans and thus can still be referred to with this term. The Man Yue from list one are divided into the Miao Man and the hundred Yue in list three.¹⁴³¹ So, two groups appear in list three, which are not included in list one: the Eastern Yi and the Jing Wu.¹⁴³² Why this is so becomes clear in my analysis of list three below.

In list three, Liang's order of listing seems to be a kind of climax, especially with regard to length of the sections and number of ethnical subgroups assigned to each of the six large groups. He starts with two groups of ethnicity, which according to him assimilated completely in antiquity, the Eastern Yi (21 lines) and the Jing Wu (13 lines).¹⁴³³ Then follow three groups he claims to have largely but not completely been assimilated in antiquity, the Miao Man (28 lines), the hundred Yue (23 lines) and the Dǐ Qiang (55 lines).¹⁴³⁴ The last and most complex group is listed under the umbrella term collective Dǐ. This section is longer than the other five in total (182 lines).¹⁴³⁵ In list one, the Dǐ had been defined only as the forefathers of the Xiongnu and thus the Turks. Here, apart from the Turks, Liang also lists the Mongols and the Manchus as descendants of the Dǐ, an issue he had not mentioned in list one where the Eastern Hu are given as the forefathers of both. This means that the subgroups of the Dǐ become very important because they with regard to the important ethnicities still in existence in China today they are the forefathers of half of them. The list runs:

1. Eastern Yi
2. Jing Wu
3. Miao Man
4. Hundred Yue (bai Yue)
5. Dǐ Qiang
6. Dǐ

The first five Non-Han are less important. According to him they all assimilated sooner or later. The Eastern Yi¹⁴³⁶ originally had three subgroups, two of which

¹⁴³⁰ Later in the text, Liang claims that today the Man and Yue are the Miao and Baiyi (= Dai) in Guizhou, Yunnan and Guangxi, who also live beyond the borders in Annan (North Vietnam) and Thailand. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7.)

¹⁴³¹ Ibid., p. 11–31.

¹⁴³² Both, however, appear on list two.

¹⁴³³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 11–13. That they already completely assimilated in antiquity, is said in list two (ibid., p. 9.)

¹⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 13–20.

¹⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 20–31.

¹⁴³⁶ Also called Nine Yi (*jiu Yi*); three most important tribes Laiyi, Huaiyi and Xurong. (ibid., p. 11–13.)

completely assimilated and one just vanished. Therefore, “since the Han dynasty, the name Yi did not reappear in this region.”¹⁴³⁷

The Jing Wu¹⁴³⁸ are the ethnicities, who lived in the ancient states Chu and Wu (today’s Sichuan). Liang claims that especially Chu’s fate was the precedent for what happened later to the Xianbei, the Jurchen and the Manchus: despite the fact that they conquered the various Xia states due to their military supremacy, they nevertheless assimilated due to their cultural inferiority, following the ancient motto of “using the Xia to change the Yi.”¹⁴³⁹

About the Miao Man¹⁴⁴⁰ Liang writes that although the Miao would still be in existence today, most ethnicities of the plenty ancient Miao Man peoples would have assimilated already in Antiquity: “The Chinese ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*) living in the four provinces Hunan, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou have mixed blood of the Miao Mao ancestors, I fear it is eighty or ninety per cent.”¹⁴⁴¹

Liang claims that the Hundred Yue¹⁴⁴² were of the same stock as the collective Man (*qun Man*) and belong to the greater group of the Miao Yue.¹⁴⁴³ Of the five subgroups he lists, two would be completely assimilated and three partly.¹⁴⁴⁴

Of the originally seven tribes of the Dī Qiang¹⁴⁴⁵, Liang claims that only one would not have entirely assimilated: the Dī Qiang outside the borders.¹⁴⁴⁶

The Dī¹⁴⁴⁷ are the largest one of Liang’s six groups. With the term Liang generally refers to the Non-Han people of the Northwest and gives altogether four subgroups of diverse importance: the Xiongnu, the Eastern Hu (*Dong Hu*), the Diverse Hu (*za Hu*), and other foreign ethnicities¹⁴⁴⁸, which are of no consequence here.¹⁴⁴⁹

¹⁴³⁷ Liang claims that the Laiyi assimilated before the Warring States Period, the Huaiyi before the Spring and Autumn Period and the Xurong completely vanished in Antiquity. (Ibid., p. 13.)

¹⁴³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 13–15.

¹⁴⁴¹ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁴⁴² Ibid., p. 15–17.

¹⁴⁴³ This is very similar to the sixth group in list one, called Man Yue, but also including the Miao. (Ibid., p. 7.)

¹⁴⁴⁴ Liang claims the Yue and the Mountain Yue (*Shanyue*) to be completely assimilated, and the not completely assimilated group of Ouyue, Minyue and Southern Yue (*Nanyue*) which are still in existence as the Min people in Fujian. (Ibid., p. 17–20.)

¹⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴⁶ The assimilated ones are the Qin tribe (*Qin xi*) (since Spring and Autumn times), the Yong tribe (*Yong xi*) (since the period of the Five Barbarians, 304–439), the Shu tribe (*Shu xi*) (after Qin and Han times), the Qiang in a narrow sense (i.e. the Tanguts), the Dī in a narrow sense (disappeared since Tang times) and the Dī Qiang (after Han times).

Liang also lists the empires which were founded by the Dī Qiang ethnicity: Yuezhi (3rd century BC–1st century AD), Tuyuhun (284–672), Tufan (until 842) and the Western Xia Dynasty founded by the Tangut (1038–1227). (Ibid., p. 20.)

¹⁴⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 20–31.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Here Liang lists ethnicities who had contacts with East Asia, some of them might have also migrated to and settled under East Asian dynasties, but they never became part of any Chinese empire on a large scale. He lists Wusun, Scythians (*Saizhong*), Persians (*Pisi*), Arabs (*Alabo*) and Jews (*Youtai*). (Ibid., p. 30–31.)

¹⁴⁴⁹ Liang claims that the Xiongnu tribe had been the largest one, but there were also the Xianbei and others like the Red Dī (*Chi Di*), the White Dī (*Bai Di*) and the Large Dī (*Chang Di*). Sometimes they were also called Rong.

Liang claims that those Xiongnu, who lived among the various Xia would have assimilated during the Spring and Autumn period and also during Han times.¹⁴⁵⁰ As a proof he gives marriages with dukes and kings of the various Xia and Han Chinese officials with family names, which originally pointed out Dí origin. Consequently, the Han Chinese ethnicity of today's Shanxi and Zhili would have mixed Xiongnu blood from 2500 or 2600 years ago. Also later during the time of the Five Barbarians (*wu hu*) when the Xiongnu established their own kingdoms, Liang claims that they would have been deeply influenced by China's culture (*Zhongguo wenhua*). As a proof Liang writes that they used Han Chinese names.

About the Eastern Hu Liang writes that among "our" contacts with foreign ethnicities, those with the Eastern Hu people were the most important ones in more than two thousand years of history and they also caused the most pain, but the Eastern Hu "also assimilated to us most completely (*qi tonghua yu wo ye yi zui wan*)."¹⁴⁵¹ "The Eastern Hu ethnicities completely changed into a part of the Chinese ethnicity."¹⁴⁵² Altogether, Liang lists six subgroups of the Eastern Hu: the original Eastern Hu¹⁴⁵³, the Wuhuan, the Xianbei, the Khitan, the Parhae (*Bohai*) together with the Jurchen and the Manchus. All of them would have assimilated at different points of time. Especially important here are the latter four because for them Liang gives at least some explanation what he means by assimilation or rather how this assimilation took place in his opinion.¹⁴⁵⁴ The Xianbei were "changed and united (*huahe*)" with the various Xia ethnicities gradually. As a proof he gives that they used Han family names and further writes that "the ethnical consciousness of the Xianbei already disappeared early in the middle period of the [Northern] Wei Dynasty (386–534). And consequently they thought of themselves as people of China (*Zhongguoren*)."¹⁴⁵⁵ The Khitan, Liang claims, "used Han people" in order to found their Liao Dynasty (916–1125).¹⁴⁵⁶ "Therefore, after the decline of the Liao clan, the Khitan ethnicity also ceased to exist."¹⁴⁵⁷ The Parhae (*Bohai*) and the Jurchen both completely assimilated, at least "those [Jurchen] inside China proper assimilated to the Han people."¹⁴⁵⁸ Originally they had been fierce, but after they conquered Bian, the capital of the Northern Song Dynasty (960–1127) they "completely assimilated to China (*quan tonghua yu Zhongguo*)."¹⁴⁵⁹ And last but not least the Manchus would be the descendants of those Jurchen from the shores of the Sungari, the Heilongjiang and from Jilin, who did not assimilate. Liang claims they were the same

¹⁴⁵⁰ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 22.

¹⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁴⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵³ Also called Northern Rong (*Bei Rong*) and Mountain Rong (*Shan Rong*). (*Ibid.*, p. 24.)

¹⁴⁵⁴ Of the other two Liang claims that the Eastern Hu assimilated during Warring States times and the Wuhuan were absorbed (*xishou*) by the Chinese ethnicity after Han times. (*Ibid.*, p. 24–25.)

¹⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

ethnicity like the Parhae. In Qing times, Han Chinese-Manchu marriages were forbidden and the usage of Manchu script was supported. But Liang claims that these measures could not preserve Manchu language and tradition and after the conquest the Manchus changed from conquerors to cultural emperors. After 1912 they declined.

By Diverse Hu Liang refers to those Non-Han people living beyond Mongolia, mostly Turkish people. “Tujue, Huihe and Shatuo are all Turkish people from the old Xiongnu line. They are one of the five big ethnicities of the Republic of China today.”¹⁴⁶⁰ The most important ones are Rouran¹⁴⁶¹, Tujue,¹⁴⁶² Uyghurs (*Huihe*)¹⁴⁶³ and the Mongols. Liang strangely mixes the groups up because he claims that the Uyghurs would in fact be a part of the Tujue. It also does not become clear why Liang does not add the Rouran, Tujue and Uyghurs to his item on the Xiongnu as he thinks that they in fact belong them, but lists them together with the Mongols although he clearly states that the Mongols would not be of Turkish origin. He claims that they appeared latest of the diverse Hu.¹⁴⁶⁴ But they “did not become very assimilated (*bu shen shou tonghua*)” and kept their ethnicity’s character.¹⁴⁶⁵ Until today they would be one of the five ethnicities of the Republic of China (*Zhonghua minguo*).

Although the *Zhonghua* are left out in the third list, Liang intersperses that “bloodlines” of some of the ancient ethnicities would still be existent in the modern Han people. I.e. in the veins of the Han people living in Shanxi and Zhili today the blood of the Xiongnu form around 2500 BC would still be running. The same could be said in case of the Han people living in the Southern provinces Hunan, Guangxi, Yunnan and Guizhou. Also, the Eastern Hu or Eastern Hu would form an important part of the Han ethnicity.

In fact, all ethnicities, which Liang claims to have assimilated to the Han or the various Xia, still constitute a part of their “blood,” although this is not visible in outward appearance or culture and tradition. This seems to be an important shift from Liang’s earlier texts, where he depicts the Han ethnicity as having unbroken and “unpolluted” bloodlines, pervading through time (and space) from the various Xia of Antiquity to the Han ethnicity of today.¹⁴⁶⁶ Then, Liang had equalized the Han ethnicity

¹⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁴⁶¹ “They changed and united with our ethnicity, their influence was but minor.” (*Ibid.*, p. 28.)

¹⁴⁶² Liang claims that the Tujue would be today’s Turks, another tribe of the Xiongnu. Western Turks live in Europe today, Eastern Turks were the Shatuo, Uyghurs (*Huihe*) and Tufan. They founded the Later Tang Dynasty (923–936) and are the only Turks who invaded and ruled the Central Plains. (*Ibid.*, p. 28–29.)

¹⁴⁶³ Liang claims that they never conquered China or parts of it. They assimilated to the various Xia ethnicities relatively little, but there were Turkish officials during Tang times. (*Ibid.*, p. 29.)

¹⁴⁶⁴ He writes that old books say that they were one of the Tiele tribes, but Liang doubts it, because he thinks that the Tiele were Turks and the Mongols not. The *Jiu Tangshu* says about the Shiwei that parts of them are called Mengwu Shiwei, and Liang claims that Mengwu would sound like the Chinese term for Mongols *Menggu*. Liang claims that the Mongols through the Mengwu Shiwei would descend from the Eastern Hu, whereas Western scholars would claim that they are a mixture of Eastern Hu and Tujue. (*Ibid.*, p. 30.)

¹⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1901_1], p. 6.

with the Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*).¹⁴⁶⁷ Still, also at that time Liang had advocated his opinion of assimilation, which automatically must mean a certain inclusion of other “bloodlines” into the Han’s. But then, Liang had not explicitly referred to this as a pollution of the Han ethnicity as Liu Shipei for instance had done.¹⁴⁶⁸ In his earlier texts, Liang’s idea of assimilation was that as long as a Non-Han ethnicity became part of the Han by changing foremost language, but also culture and tradition, it would not mean a pollution of the Han blood, but merely be a contribution, which would completely be absorbed without leaving any trace of distinctiveness.

In 1922, Liang seems to broaden the term Zhonghua claiming that those ethnicities, which seem to have vanished in antiquity, in fact were incorporated into the ethnicity of the various Xia, slowly widening into the Zhonghua ethnicity. Only some of the ancient ethnicities or rather their descendants would still be in existence today, partly having absorbed others, partly having divided themselves and formed new independent lines. But if examining Liang’s idea of the Zhonghua ethnicity in 1922 closely, it comes to the fore that his idea of its “content” so to speak and also his idea of assimilation has in fact not changed much. Although Liang writes that Non-Han or non-Xia people’s blood would still constitute a part of the Zhonghua ethnicity’s blood, this is still not visible for anyone. So, even if the “blood” could still tell about the ancient relations and assimilations it was without consequences for the actual identity.

The “Assimilative Power” in 1922: A Strategy for Stability

Liang’s extensive analysis of this large number of Non-Han people, who lived and live in what he calls China, referring to different territories over time, mainly serves his purpose to clarify, which of these people assimilated and which not (yet). However, when it comes to the question how the assimilative processes of these people happened concretely, Liang’s explanations seems strangely shallow and unconvincing. At the beginning of his essay, he refers to “ethnic consciousness” as the marker of ethnic belonging.¹⁴⁶⁹ But in his descriptions of assimilative processes he gives the same rather unsatisfying arguments as in earlier texts: loss of native language (Manchus), change from conquerors’ to cultural attitude (Manchus, Jurchen, Parhae), adoption of Han family names (Xianbei, Xiongnu), marriages with Han people (Xiongnu), becoming officials of Han states (Xiongnu and partly Turks).¹⁴⁷⁰ Even in the case of those people, whose assimilation seems most obvious to him, the Tungusic people, Manchus, Jurchen and Xianbei, his argumentation is not persuasive. The model of their assimilation he

¹⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.: 1983 [1906_1], p. 2.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], “Lun ben shu da zhi,” p. 2a.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 2,.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 23–27, 29.

says is the state of Chu, where the ancient method of “using the Xia to change the Yi” found its earliest application:

“Because the culture of the various Xia was higher than theirs [= the Chu people’s], they wanted to reign the state they had defeated. Consequently, from then on they could not but assimilate to it. And that is the most important motive of the Chu people to ‘use the Xia to change the Yi.’ Afterwards, when the Xianbei, the Jurchen and the Manchus faced us, they all ‘returned and changed [= assimilated] (*gui hua*) because they had conquered [us]. Their original precedent was Chu.”¹⁴⁷¹

The reason given for assimilation here is as simple as it is superficial. The conquerors do not know how to deal with the Han Chinese conquered state and people and naturally turn to the superior Han Chinese culture, which would be perfect for this task. Liang avoids to analyze this theory in depth or to give substantial reasons why the political usage of Han Chinese culture in order to govern Han Chinese subjects means assimilation.

With respect to another group of people, the Miao Man, Liang gives further hints how in his opinion the process of assimilation proceeded. According to Liang, the Miao Man’s assimilation took place in four ways¹⁴⁷²:

1. In the time of the Sixteen Kingdoms and Five Barbarians (304–439), the Miao Man migrated to Qi and other Northern regions. “Consequently, they assimilated to the Han people (*Huaren*).”¹⁴⁷³
2. Han people entered their ethnicity as chieftains.¹⁴⁷⁴
3. Until Tang times, the Miao Man were bought and sold as slaves and thus became a part of China’s nation-people.
4. Until early Qing times they were “assimilated by force (*qiangpo tonghua*)” when their territories were conquered militarily.¹⁴⁷⁵

Liang’s description of assimilative processes of the Miao Man reveals once again his definite assumption of a certain superiority of the Han people and their culture: if people intermingle with the Han, it automatically implies that the Non-Han people assimilate and it never means a mutual mixing; if Han people became part of Miao Man

¹⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 12–13.

¹⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Liang only gives one example for this case in the 5th century, referring to the *Weishu* (*Book of the Wei Dynasty*) (comp. 551–554 by Wei Shou). He claims that the chieftain of the Man barbarians called Huan Dan would be the son of Huan Xuan (369–404). Liang claims that after his father’s short-lived Chu Dynasty (403–404) was defeated, Huan Dan fled to the Man people. However, in the official histories, Huan Dan is not listed as a son of Huan Xuan, who had only one son, Huan Sheng. That Huan Dan seems to share the same family name is probably a coincidence. (*Weishu*, ch. 97, “Liezhuan,” ch. 85, “Daoyi Huan Xuan,” p. 2117–2125.)

¹⁴⁷⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 14–15.

tribes it would be in the superior position of chieftains and again, not they would assimilate to the Miao Man, but only assimilate them.

At the end of his general description of Non-Han people in China, Liang brings three conclusions to the fore:

“The Zhonghua ethnicity is an extremely complex (*fuzha*), but also an extremely stable (*gonggu*) ethnicity.

This complex but yet stable ethnicity has paid an extremely high price to form itself.

This ethnicity will not at all decline in future, but has the capability to even enlarge.”¹⁴⁷⁶

To strengthen his last item Liang at last comes to give his ideas of strategies how to gain this enlargement. This would obviously not be a passive process, but needed practical support. As a conclusion he derives from the assimilations of Non-Han people described by him, after having made his readers wait for more than twenty years and in this essay until the end of their reading, Liang gives a full explanation and definition of his old idea of a “Chinese assimilative power (*Zhongguo tonghuali*).” He renames it as “assimilative power of the Chinese ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu tonghua li*).”¹⁴⁷⁷ For the first time, however, he does not only use it as a catch phrase, but tries to give a systematic explanation. He begins by listing eight different situations, in which assimilative power can appear¹⁴⁷⁸:

1. “Other ethnicities (*zhu yi zu*)” come into contact with “our ethnicity (*wo zu*)” on an equal basis:
As an example Liang gives the people of Qin, Chu, Wu and Yue and claims that they assimilated to the “various Xia (*zhu Xia*)” during the Spring and Autumn Period (771–476 BC).¹⁴⁷⁹
2. “Our ethnicity conquers other ethnicities (*ta zu*)”:
Liang states that by using political power, people like the Dī Qiang and the Miao Man have been made to practice shifting agriculture, but after all, agriculture.
3. “Our ethnicity is resettled in areas controlled by other ethnicities”:
Liang claims that by using political measures i.e. Qi assimilated the Laiyi, Jin assimilated the Red Dī (*Chi Di*) and Qin assimilated Shu during the Zhou Period (1046–256 BC).
4. “Our ethnicity defeats other ethnicities and resettles them in China proper”:

¹⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 31–32.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 32–33.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Actually, he states before in the same essay, that Chu assimilated to the various Xia because it “wanted to govern the state it had destroyed.” So, the contact between Chu and the various Xia at least was not on an equal basis. (Ibid., p. 13.)

By military power, Liang writes, the states Qin (778–207 BC) and Jin (11th century–376 BC) resettled the Rong, Han (221 BC–220 AD) resettled the Hundred Yue, Han and Wei (220–265) resettled the Dí Qiang and Tang (618–907) resettled the Tujue.

5. “Our ethnicity freely spreads and settles in the living space of other ethnicities because of economic interests”:

Liang gives the examples of the Fujian people, who opened up Taiwan (since the 17th century), and the Shandong people, who opened up the Dongshan Province (*Dongshansheng*).

6. “Other ethnicities conquer our ethnicity” and consequently assimilate:

Liang’s three examples are the founders of three important dynasties, the Xianbei, who founded the Tuoba or Northern Wei Dynasty (386–534), the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234) and the Manchu Qing (1644–1912).

7. “Single persons or tribes of other ethnicities come to surrender or because of other reasons, getting to know China’s civilization and consequently become Chinese people (*Zhongguoren*)”:

Liang’s examples are the two Xiongnu men Jin Midi (134 BC–86 BC) and Liu Yuan (d. 310) and a great number of foreign officials in Tang times (618–907).

8. “Foreign people settle in China to trade, and assimilate after some time”:

Liang’s example is the Arab merchant Pu Shougeng (1245–1284).

The case, which is of special interest concerning foreign conquest dynasties, is the sixth case, according to which other ethnicities, which conquer our ethnicity, consequently assimilate. Together with the fourth case (conquering and resettling of others) Liang describes this phenomenon as a specialty of China. The particular nature of the Han ethnicity contributes to this, because the Chinese would never be “objects (*keti*),” but always “subjects (*zhuti*)” in the process of assimilation and they would never have split up in two or more different ethnicities.¹⁴⁸⁰

The second point is crucial for Liang and he gives eight points why “ten thousands of people could be accumulated into the whole world’s largest nation”¹⁴⁸¹:

1. The *Lebensraum* in a great plain
2. The pictographic Chinese script
3. The ideal of general peace, the reluctance of conquest, welcome of others and uncommonness of xenophobia
4. The mixing of different people in sparsely populated regions
5. The love of piece and the golden mean and its influence on others
6. Due to the fact that people with the same family name do not marry each other, marriages between “us” and others were advocated
7. A certain economic ability

¹⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

8. The strong cultural influence, independent from “us” being conquered or conquerors¹⁴⁸²

The most important characterization with regard to the Non-Han conquest dynasties is the eighth as it again underlines the Han peoples ability to assimilate under every circumstance and independent from the political situation. What counts are their cultural abilities, which do not waver. According to the list, these cultural abilities are fixed by place of living, script, ethic and philosophical attitudes, and economic skills. His assumption of the assimilation of Non-Han people even if they were conquerors and therefore politically in the superior position, seems a highly overestimated application of his idea of the assimilative power. He bases this idea on historical examples he gives in the third, fourth and fifth part of his essay. How do his historical arguments and evidences run with regard to the reality of conquest dynasties? How does he manage to make the Han subjects of assimilation even if they were objects of conquest? In the style of short case studies Liang’s analysis referring to the three medieval so-called conquest dynasties and the ethnicities, who founded them, – the Tangut, the Khitan and the Jurchen – shall be introduced.

In list one of ethnic groups in China “today,” that is in the 1920s, Liang lists the Dī Qiang.¹⁴⁸³ With this antique term, he refers to the modern Tibetans. He lists the founders of the Western Xia (1038–1227), the Tangut people, among their ancestors.¹⁴⁸⁴ In list three, Liang goes into more detail and lists the Tanguts (*Dangxiang*) as a sub-subgroup of the Dī Qiang.¹⁴⁸⁵ They would be part of the Qiang in a stricter sense, therefore being called Tangut Qiang (*Dangxiang Qiang*).¹⁴⁸⁶ Liang writes that

“they founded the empire of the Western Xia. It lasted 250 years. During the last years, they totally assimilated to the various Xia (*chun yu zhu Xia tonghua*). In the *Songshi* it is said: ‘They established a system of officials, which totally resembled that of the Song. The ceremonies of court congratulations, they used a mixture of Tang and Song [rituals]. But their musical instruments and tunes were that of the Tang.’¹⁴⁸⁷ It further says: ‘They established a National University and installed three thousand Government Students, who worshipped Confucius as their highest god.’¹⁴⁸⁸ Today they are part of the Chinese ethnicity in the area of Qinlong [in Gansu].”¹⁴⁸⁹

¹⁴⁸² Ibid.

¹⁴⁸³ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 17–20.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 18–19.

¹⁴⁸⁷ See *Songshi*, ch. 486, p. 14028.

¹⁴⁸⁸ See *Songshi*, ch. 486, p. 14030.

Liang leaves out and summarizes the slightly longer passage.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 18).

As proof for the Tanguts' assimilation Liang gives their adoption of Tang and Song customs, their paying tribute to Confucius and their establishment of an educational system. This way of argumentation became common in the description of assimilative processes: A short citation from a historical source, mostly from an official dynastic history about the adoption of certain ways of dynasties considered Han is interpreted as a proof of assimilation.¹⁴⁹⁰

At the same time, Liang lists the Tangut as the forefathers of a still distinctly existing ethnicity, the Tibetans. He remains silent about the question how the Tibetans could still be distinct from the Han if their Tangut ancestors really were assimilated. This contradiction is not an uncommon one in Liang's writings and people, whom he claims to be assimilated completely, appear as the forefathers of another not assimilated people in his writings.

In list one, the Khitan are mentioned as ancestors of the Mongols, whose history according to Liang is nearly inseparable from that of the Tungusic people.¹⁴⁹¹ The Mongols still exist as a separate ethnicity.¹⁴⁹² In list three, Liang suddenly lists the Khitan as a part of the Tungusic people and indicates that they would have followed their fellow tribal members and assimilated after the decline of the Liao dynasty:

“During the time of the Five Dynasties [907–960], China proper had no leader. The Khitan violently conquered the Northeast and changed the name of their empire into Liao. [...] At the beginning, their tribe was very weak. The tribal people ‘used Han people’¹⁴⁹³ [as advisers]. The Tungusic people, who were already assimilated¹⁴⁹⁴, were very many. So after the decline of the Liao family clan, the Khitan did not come into existence again.”¹⁴⁹⁵

Liang does not explicitly state the assimilation of the Khitan to the Chinese, the whole tribe just seemed to have ceased to exist.¹⁴⁹⁶ However, by mentioning their usage of Han people and the fact that many other Tungusic people were already assimilated Liang implies that the Khitan took the same path. Like in the case of the Tanguts and the Tibetans, this is directly contradictory with Liang's claim in the essay that the Khitan would be ancestors either of the Mongols (list one) or of the Manchus (list three), both being in existence also after the fall of the Liao Dynasty.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], ch. 2.20, vol. 2, p. 527–543.

¹⁴⁹¹ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7.

¹⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 7, 30.

¹⁴⁹³ The phrase “yi Hanren,” often also formulated as “yong Hanren” is often used already in the official histories to refer to the usage of Han people as political advisers by Non-Han conquest rulers.

¹⁴⁹⁴ Liang listed them already before: parts of the Northern Rong (*Bei Rong*) and Mountain Rong (*Shan Rong*) and of the Wuhuan and the Xianbei. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 24–25.)

¹⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁴⁹⁶ In fact, after the Jurchen defeat of the Khitan, some Khitan went West and founded another empire, Kara Khitan or Black Khitan, also Western Liao (*Xi Liao*), which influence in Central Asia was very wide for another hundred years. This influence is also supposed to be the reason for many languages using names derived from the Khitan to refer to China, i.e. the Russian Kitaj, Mongol Qitad and Uyghur Hitay.

In list one, the Jurchen are listed as the descendants of the Eastern Hu, defined as the Tungusic people.¹⁴⁹⁷ Also in list three, the Jurchen are discussed as part of the Tungusic people.¹⁴⁹⁸ In contrast to contemporary historians (and the *Jinshi*), Liang does not claim the Black Water Mohe (*Heishui Mohe*)¹⁴⁹⁹ as the ancestors of the Jurchen as it is usual done, but the Parhae and through them the Sungari Mohe (Sumo Mohe).¹⁵⁰⁰ He writes that after the Khitan conquered the Parhae, they called the people living in the North of this former kingdom Raw Jurchen (shu Nüzhen). Later the Raw Jurchen founded the Jin dynasty. Liang writes: “When the Jurchen first invaded inner China, they were extremely cruel. But after they moved to Bian [in 1127]1501, they totally assimilated to China (quan tonghua yu Zhongguo).”¹⁵⁰² But in the next section about the Manchus, the descendants of the Jurchen, Liang writes that only certain Jurchen assimilated and this did not happen in 1127, but a hundred years later: “After the Mongols destroyed the Jin dynasty [in 1234], the Jurchen, who lived in China proper, assimilated to the Chinese people (*tonghua yu Hanren*).”¹⁵⁰³

Liang – unlike i.e. Liu Yizheng and Lü Simian as we will see in the fifth chapter – does not claim that the Jurchen were assimilated before they found their dynasty.¹⁵⁰⁴ But when it comes to their assimilation Liang does not satisfy the question how it took place. He gives two different dates, when this assimilation took place, either after the conquest of the Northern Song capital Bian in 1127 or after the Mongol defeat in 1234. A certain hint is his remark about Bian’s conquest. Liang does not specify it further, but in Liu Yizheng’s famous history book *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (1925–1929, 1928), one finds a broader explanation:

“The cultural treasures of the Northern Song were assembled in Bian. Bian fell and the Jin seized it. [...] Despite the cruelty of the Jurchen, who could hardly study them [= the riches] understanding their value one by one, the riches they inherited could not but influence the [Jurchen] nation.”¹⁵⁰⁵

¹⁴⁹⁷ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 6, 7.

¹⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26–27.

¹⁴⁹⁹ This is a reference to the Amur or Heilongjiang, the Chinese name meaning “Black Dragon River.”

¹⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26; *Jinshi* ch. 1, p. 1; Tao: 1976, p. 6. Lü Simian also names the Sungari Mohe as the Jurchen’s ancestors. (Lü Simian: 1933, vol. 3, p. 63.) Liu Yizheng names the Black Water Mohe as the Jurchen’s ancestors and the Sungari Mohe as those of the Parhae people. (Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 536.) In the *Da Jinguo zhi* (*Record of the Great Jin Kingdom*) and also in Korean sources the Black Water Mohe rather than the Sungari Mohe are given as the ancestors of the Jurchen. (Tao: 1976, p. 5; Yuwen: 2000, p. 160–161.) Most modern historians just refer to the Mohe as being among the Jurchen’s ancestors as a whole.

¹⁵⁰¹ Bian or Bianjing was the capital of the Northern Song, today Kaifeng. When Jin Taizong conquered it and also captured the imperial family, he caused the Southern exodus of the Song and the end of their Northern empire. (*Jinshi*, ch. 3, p. 56; ch. 125, p. 2713.)

¹⁵⁰² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 27.

¹⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰⁴ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 536; Lü Simian: 1933, vol. 3, p. 65.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 536.

Liang uses similar words to describe the Jurchen calling them “extremely cruel (*canbao*),” while Liu ascribes “cruelty (*xiaobao*)” to them. It is possible that Liu and Liang either were using the same source or one imitated the other’s ideas about the Jurchen’s assimilation. Who copied from who is difficult to find out as both deducted their works from lecture series they gave in the early 1920s, Liang at the Qinghua University in Beijing and Liu probably at Liangjiang Normal College (*Liangjiang shifan xuetang*).

In the essay “Zhongguo lishi shang minzu zhi yanjiu” from 1922 Liang does not consider the Mongols, the Turks, the Tibetans and the ethnicities from Southeast China as completely assimilated, and he says nothing about the “beginning of their complete extinction” as he had done in 1921.¹⁵⁰⁶ Here, Liang only seems to consider the Tungusic people as completely assimilated, because they

“assimilated to us most completely (*qi tonghua yu wo ye yi zui quan*). [...] The Tungusic people have all changed into a part of the Chinese ethnicity (*quanbu bian wei Zhonghua minzu zhi chengfen*). We can only consider ourselves lucky because of the enlargement of our people.”¹⁵⁰⁷

What brought this apparent change between the two texts? How is it possible that Liang’s idea of the inner-Chinese peoples’ assimilation is so different in 1921 and 1922? How can he write in 1921 that all major Non-Han ethnicities have already assimilated to the Chinese people or are in their process of “total extinction” and then claim in 1922 that only the Manchus are completely assimilated, whereas the Mongols and Turks are not at all?¹⁵⁰⁸

I think that the 1922 text had a different purpose than that of 1921. “Zhongguo lishi shang minzu zhi yanjiu” (1922) was aimed at an educated audience at Qinghua University. The hearers were students and maybe also other scholars. Therefore, this was not so much a propagandist text, but Liang obviously tried to be more realistic and academic here. The essay of 1921 on the other hand had been published in his journal *Gaizao*, the readers were reform oriented and liberal, but also nationalist. There, Liang leaves no doubt that the complete assimilation of all Non-Han inhabitants of the Republic of China (*Zhonghua minguo*) was possible, but in contrast to the text from 1922 he claims that this assimilation would in fact be on a good way and nearly completed in the case of most ethnicities. With this text, he wanted to make people believe in the idea of “large nationalism” despite the problems China was facing with all the Non-Han people. To claim that all the work was already done was as good as doing it. Claiming that all Non-Han people were already assimilated and their individual ethnic characters extinct was an attempt to reassure people that it was possible to do it as the aim was already nearly achieved.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922], p. 7.

¹⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*: 1983 [1921_1], p. 26, 27.

However, both texts also share a common basic assumption, and that is Liang's credo that the assimilation of the Non-Han people was a basic and desirous precondition for a strong Chinese nation-state. He never seems to waver in his idea that assimilation was an important tool of nation-building and that it was inevitable to make it reality if the Chinese wanted a stable state in East Asia. This directly connects to his equally firm conviction that the Chinese nation-state had to control the territories of all these people. The idea to let at least the larger Non-Han ethnicities separate from the Qing geo-body never seems to occur to him.

4.4 Conclusion: Modern Historiography and Politics

In the texts analyzed above it has come to the fore, how Han Chinese historians integrated Non-Han people and their histories into their image of a general history (*tongshi*) of China around 1920. What becomes obvious is that it was impossible for them to stay unbiased in the face of the deeply disturbing geopolitical events around them. Their approach to Non-Han history was influenced by the *de facto* separations of Outer Tibet, Outer Mongolia, parts of Xinjiang and also Manchuria, and by the imminent danger of Japanese power in the Northeast. They felt that they had to legitimate and strengthen a certain image of a Chinese nation-state by their historiographical approach. Fu's and Liang's essays cannot be considered to be historiographical texts in the modern sense. The political driving force behind them is obvious and the authors did not wish to and did not see the need to deny this. They felt that they had to follow what they considered their duty, not only as scholars writing on historiographical methodology, but as nationalist Han Chinese trying to strengthen the Chinese nation-state.

By basing his periodization on the rise and fall of the Han people, Fu wants to strengthen the role of the Han as historical actors and their position at the core of history, not only in the past, but also in the present. In Liang's approach to periodization, the Non-Han people appear as triggers, but not as active agents, who can create history. Both writers reserved this role for the Han.

That this is still a common approach to the understanding of inner Asian nomadic empires by historians is described by Nicola Di Cosmo, who claims that they are perceived as "eruptions, explosions, and outbreaks" in the sense of "natural catastrophes" or "environments."¹⁵⁰⁹ Still, as being in nearly constant interaction with

¹⁵⁰⁹ Di Cosmo: 1999, p. 3–4.

the Han, Non-Han people are inevitably part of China's history. For nationalist historians, however, the question was how to integrate them, how to show that they are a part of China's history (and thus also of China as a nation-state), and at the same time not to give them a too active and independent role in this history in order to maintain the superior position of the Han people in history and in the present time.

The answer how to achieve this turned out to be surprisingly simple and was readily accepted as we will see in chapter five: The Non-Han people are integrated as if they would only exist in their making contact with the Han. The other parts of their histories unrelated to Han Chinese history, where the Non-Han would have appeared as autonomous active historical agents, are left out. This is legitimated by the declaration that the Han people are at the core of history, are a historical people. In contrast to that the Non-Han people are only active in their conquests, but this activity is neutralized by the story of their later assimilation on the one hand and the often made claim that they would have only been able to found conquest dynasties because of the help of Han advisers on the other hand. Only by turning to Han style politics and culture could these Non-Han people survive as conquerors. This approach to history paints a picture of the Non-Han conquerors, which is passive and reactive. As we will see in the next chapter, the historian Liu Yizheng goes even further and traces the impulse of Non-Han tribal chieftains to found a dynasty solely to their Han Chinese advisers.

Of course, the fact that in a history about one certain group of people, and more so in a national history, only the perspective of these people is taken into account is nothing new. In a general history of any state this would appear as normal. However, in the case of China's national history this approach must strike one as noticeable with regard to the fact that the Non-Han people are by definition declared to be part of this nation and their histories part of the national history. And still, their histories are neglected, marginalized and reduced. This is symbolic for the constant ambivalence of Han Chinese historians in the face of Non-Han people and histories and the question how to integrate them into the nation-state and the national history.

Chapter 5. The Non-Han People in Modern

Academic History in the 1920s

“But even the bravest and most fearless ones of the foreign ethnicities all have been assimilated to the Han ethnicity long time ago. And when they had vanished into the Han ethnicity, both sides forgot about it.”¹⁵¹⁰

Liu Yizheng (1928).

“The Han race is like a great ocean and the Xianbei, Turks, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols and Manchus are like rivers. All rivers flow into the ocean. How could one still tell apart the rivers’ water from the ocean’s water?”¹⁵¹¹

Feng Chengjun (1930).

In this chapter effects of and outcomes from Liang Qichao’s and Zhang Taiyan’s call for a general history of China put forward in the 1900s and from Fu’s and Liang’s methodological essays written around 1920 will come to the fore. The change of Chinese historiography had been initiated already when Liang wrote “Xin shixue” (1902), but related to the May Fourth Movement at the end of the 1910s these new developments really became apparent in a general impact. The question, which shall be answered here, is whether this was also the case with regard to the approach to Non-Han histories. Can here, too, a major change be seen after the May Fourth Movement?

Not only with regard to those developments related to the inclusion of Non-Han history into China’s national histories it will come to the fore that the 1920s can be interpreted as both, a beginning and an end of a historiographical development. They are a beginning in so far as the historical works written in the 1920s at last put into

¹⁵¹⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 3–4.

¹⁵¹¹ Feng Chengjun: 1930, p. 67.

practice, what Liang and Zhang had imagined in the 1900s – a general history of China – and manifested the new way of historical writing in a nationalist and generalist mode. Although they were not written according to the original plans and outlooks of Liang and Zhang in every respect – i.e. they are not chaptered along topics, but rather along chronology –, they heavily relied on their ideas and methodologies. All modern historians try to be concise and to shorten complex historical events, they use more or less vernacular and easily understandable language, and they try to highlight and strengthen the Han Chinese national sentiment. Especially the last stands in close relation to the approach to the Non-Han peoples and their histories.

In this respect the historiographical works of the 1920s are an end. In this chapter it will come to the fore how historians of the 1920s put an end to any other than the assimilative approach to Non-Han peoples. They fully accepted Liang’s premise of an “assimilative power (*tonghuali*)” of the Han people and their superiority of culture as the methodological basis to approach Non-Han histories.

How did Liu Yizheng and Lü Simian approach Non-Han people and in how far did they think their histories to part of a general history of China? Did they use Liang’s idea of an “assimilative power” and if yes what did that mean for their picture of the Non-Han people in general? To give a broader idea of the usage of Liang’s theory of an “assimilative power” of the Han people two essays by Feng Chengjun and Chen Yuan using the term “sinicization (*Hanhua, Huahua*)” probably as the first of their time shall be additionally analyzed. What did “sinicization” means for them on a theoretical level and what does that mean for assimilative processes and the idea of Han and Non-Han cultures?

5.1 Liu Yizheng’s *Zhongguo wenhua shi*

Liu Yizheng’s (1880–1956) *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (*History of China’s Culture*) (1925–1929, 1928) was widely read “among scholars and college students throughout the 1930s and 1940s” and was reprinted in 1932, 1935, 1947 and afterwards.¹⁵¹² Until today it considered to be a basic work on China’s cultural history.

Liu was one of the first modern historians. Over a time span of more than forty years he published several important works about China’s history and culture, the *Zhongguo wenhua shi* being one of them. With it he invented the genre of the cultural history

¹⁵¹² Hon: 2004, p. 514–515.

(*wenhua shi*) in China.¹⁵¹³ The *Zhongguo wenhua shi* was originally written as a lecture series in the late 1910s. At that time Liu was a lecturer at Liangjiang Normal College (*Liangjiang shifan xuetao*) in Nanjing.¹⁵¹⁴ In the early 1920s it was published as a series in the journal *Xueheng* (*Critical Review*)¹⁵¹⁵, which Liu had co-founded in 1922 and of which he was assistant editor.¹⁵¹⁶ Because of great demand (and many pirated copies), its first complete version was already published in 1928 in Nanjing before the series had been completely printed in *Xueheng*.¹⁵¹⁷

Liu was born in 1880 in Dantu District in Jiangsu Province into an elite family. He received a classical education. During a short journey to Japan in 1902, Liu came in touch with modern Western ideas on historiography filtered through Japanese works. As a result, he translated and adapted an important Japanese work, Naka Michiyo's *Shina tsûshi* (1888–1890), into Chinese and published it under his own name as *Lidai shilüe* (*Historical Outlines of Various Dynasties*) (1902). In the 1920s, Liu became active academically in Nanjing, he taught at the newly founded National Southeastern University (*Guoli dongnan daxue*) and later became the director of the Jiangsu Library for National Studies (*Jiangsu shengli guoxue tushuguan*). In 1948, he became member of the Academia Sinica in Shanghai, but when the Academia was moved to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Liu Yizheng stayed in mainland China.¹⁵¹⁸

Liu is described as a conservative historian, because he concentrated on some traditional methods of historiography in the times of the May Fourth Movement (1919–1921). The May Fourth Movement was named after the student demonstrations, which began on that day, against the Treaty of Versailles (1919), especially against the transfer of Germany's rights in Shandong to Japan. The Movement is “inextricably associated with political, social, and cultural liberation”¹⁵¹⁹ and also was an important stimulant for new views of historiographical methodology.¹⁵²⁰ However, Hon Tze-ki shows that this classification of Liu as a conservative historian is caused by the overestimation of the May Fourth historians, especially those of the Doubting Antiquity Movement (*Yigu yundong*) or Doubting Antiquity School (*Yigu pai*) as the “paradigm of modern Chinese historiography.”¹⁵²¹ Therefore, Hon writes, especially Liu's contribution to

¹⁵¹³ The other two were the *Lidai shilüe* (*Historical Outlines of Various Dynasties*) (1902), which was in fact a translation of a Japanese book, and the *Guoshi yaoyi* (*Main Principles of National History*) (1948). (Liu Yizheng: 1905?; 1988 [1928]; 2000 [1948]. See Hu/Zhang: 1991, p. 348–349; Hon: 2004, p. 509.)

¹⁵¹⁴ Liangjiang Normal College was founded in 1902 under another name, Sanjiang Normal College (*Sanjiang shifan xuetao*). Later it became Nanjing University (*Nanjing daxue*). (Cai Shangsi: 2001, “*Zhonghua wenhua shi daoxu*.” In: Liu Yizheng: 2001 [1928], p. 2.)

¹⁵¹⁵ Published monthly 1922–1927, and bimonthly 1928–1933.

¹⁵¹⁶ Cai Shangsi writes that it was first published already in 1919, but I could not find such an early edition. (Hon: 2003, p. 262; Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 293n29; Cai Shangsi: 2001, “*Zhonghua wenhua shi daoxu*.” In: Liu Yizheng: 2001 [1928], p. 2.)

¹⁵¹⁷ Hon: 2004, p. 514–515.

¹⁵¹⁸ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 278–279.

¹⁵¹⁹ Zarrow: 2005, p. 149.

¹⁵²⁰ Hon: 2004, p. 508f; Hu/Zhang: 1991, p. 321–322; Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 276.

¹⁵²¹ Hon: 2004, p. 507.

historiography by creating the new genre of cultural history (*wenhua shi*), but also his support of local self-government (*difang zizhi*) has been neglected.¹⁵²² Axel Schneider states that Liu was a conservative with regard to “basic assumptions about human life,” but that especially his approach in *Zhongguo wenhua shi* would “fit our image of a modern, nationalist historian.”¹⁵²³

Liu is considered as being conservative also because he was co-editor of the south-China based journal *Xueheng*. The *Xueheng* took a contrary position to the New Culture Movement (*Xin wenhua yundong*). But whereas Liu was against the approach of Gu Jiegang (1893–1980) and Hu Shi (1891–1962), who initiated the Doubting Antiquity School, he was still a supporter of a new or modernized historiography.

There have been some few remarks by scholars about Liu’s approach towards Non-Han people in the *Zhongguo wenhua shi*. Generally, Liu’s idea of other, farer off foreigners is taken to be also idea of inner Chinese Non-Han. Thus Hon Tze-ki considers Liu’s *Zhongguo wenhua shi* to be an attempt to find “a common ground among different ethnic groups in China” in order to demonstrate that “there was a way to articulate the collective identity of the Chinese without hiding their ethnic, linguistic, and geographical differences.”¹⁵²⁴ Axel Schneider writes that Liu “is not putting forward a view of Chinese history as a unified, glorious progress of the Han nation,” but would also stress “intermingling with and assimilation of external influences.”¹⁵²⁵

By critically analyzing Liu’s book I will show that while he might have accepted that Indian and Western influences had a deep impact on Han Chinese culture and identity, this is not the case for Non-Han people in the direct neighborhood. On the contrary, Liu reveals his strong support for the idea of a Han Chinese assimilative power and his general degradation of other intrastate cultural identities apart from the Han people’s. In fact, he used the idea of an assimilative power of the Han people as the theoretical basis for his analyses of Non-Han people.

Liu and other historians, who began to write cultural histories in the 1910s, might have “replaced race (*zhongzhu*) with culture (*wenhua*) as the primary category in envisioning the collective identity of the Chinese,”¹⁵²⁶ but in the end this did not cause any different approach to the Non-Han people. Their histories still had to fit into the frame of the national history Liang had developed in his “*Xin shixue*” (1902). In Liu’s chapters about Non-Han ethnicities and cultures in *Zhongguo wenhua shi*, he describes them as passive non-cultures without the ability to form cultivated state structures, managing to gain power only they with the help of Han Chinese advisers. In Liu’s book the idea of culture being *per se* Han culture prevails for the former Qing geo-body, which

¹⁵²² *Ibid.*, p. 509–510.

¹⁵²³ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 279, 286.

¹⁵²⁴ Hon: 2004, p. 508–509.

¹⁵²⁵ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 279–280.

¹⁵²⁶ Hon: 2004, p. 508.

defines the geographical outline of his book. Like Liang Liu accepts the possibility of Non-Han people to assimilate, but he denies them a culture of their own.

Liu Yizheng's General Approach to China's History

Liu Yizheng uses the term *Zhongguo* (China, literally translated as Middle Kingdom or Central State) very ambivalently. In his foreword, he claims that *Zhongguo* would be one of the world's largest countries. This characterization of *Zhongguo* clearly refers to the territory claimed by the Republic of China, which in the 1920s was in fact fragmented into many parts, which were partly independent and partly ruled or dominated by others as we have already seen. Though never officially recognized Tibet declared its independency already in 1911. Xinjiang was just falling apart when *Zhongguo wenhua shi* was published, but still quite stable when Liu wrote it in the earlier 1920s. Outer Mongolia declared its independency in 1911 and again in 1921 when due to Soviet support it was at last officially accepted by the Republic of China. And last but not least, Manchuria was independently ruled by the warlord Zhang Zuolin since the late 1910s.

Whereas Liu includes the Non-Han regions into *Zhongguo wenhua shi* territorially, he excludes them and their peoples historically and culturally. He mentions them only in connection to the Han or not at all, but nevertheless calling his work *Chinese* or *China's history of culture*. This is symbolic for the ambivalent attitude Han Chinese thinkers had towards Non-Han regions with their cultures and peoples. By not treating them as equals historically, Han Chinese historians negate their cultures and even their existence although in their territorial image they include them.

Liu sees "cause and effect (*yin guo*)" as the driving points of history.¹⁵²⁷ This is based on Liang's "Zhongguo shi xu lun" (1901), where Liang writes that historians should analyze the "causes and effects (*yuanyin jieguo*)" of historical events.¹⁵²⁸ Both, cause and effect, are applied to human action and cannot be without their counterpart: it is human action that cause certain effects. Schneider thus writes that in Liu's idea history does not function according to "an impersonal quasi-mechanical principle," but is manifested by human actions and the effects of them.¹⁵²⁹ Accordingly, Liu defines the task of historiography as putting the seemingly chaotic affairs of human kinds in order and explaining what is cause, what effect. He further states that in his book he has mainly two basic interests, "first, to find out the rules of human evolution, and second, to understand the truth behind our people's peculiarity."¹⁵³⁰ Liu believes in evolutionary progressive history and also in an altogether linear history, which basic principles

¹⁵²⁷ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 1.

¹⁵²⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 1.

¹⁵²⁹ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 283.

¹⁵³⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 1.

would be valid for all human histories. For him, no event and no action stands alone, one is linked to the other by “cause and effect.” The historian’s aim is to deduct general rules from special cases, in this case China. But although there exist general rules Liu claims that there are differences or peculiarities between peoples. This comes to the fore in his foreword, where he lists the three “special characteristics (*teshu zhi xingzhi*)” or “phenomena (*xianxiang*),” which in his view are typical for China and distinguish it from other countries.¹⁵³¹

The basic two special characteristics of China would be its territorial extension, which in its extreme large dimension would rarely have its equal in the world, and its age as a civilization especially highlighted by the fact that it would be the only ancient culture, which survived until today – in contrast to Babylonia, Egypt and India.¹⁵³²

The third peculiarity, which is especially of interest in the context of Non-Han ethnicities, is the complexity of the races (*zhongzu*) Liu ascribes to China.¹⁵³³ For his present time, he writes that there would be the so-called “Five Races (*wu zu*),” Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Turkish Muslims, but additionally four more, Miao, Yao, Zhuang and Man.¹⁵³⁴ The largest one is that of the Han, which would not be entirely pure of blood, but actually mixed, because it “absorbed and assimilated (*xishou tonghua*)” other races during the last millennia.¹⁵³⁵ Liu lists some of the more than one hundred people, which according to him would have assimilated, some of them in fact being the forefathers of the Non-Han people he mentions as still being in existence in the China of his present-day. (He uses terms for ethnicities as well as place and state names):

“About those, who were called Man, Yi, Rong and Di in the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, we do not [even] have to talk. After Qin and Han times, [people] like the Xiongnu, Xianbei, Qiang, Xi, Hu, Turfan (*Tufan*) [people], Shatuo [Turks], Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols, Mohe, Koryō (*Gaoli*)¹⁵³⁶ [people], Parhae (*Bohai*)¹⁵³⁷ [people] and Vietnam[ese], assimilated to the Han ethnicity over the time (*shishi you tonghua yu Hanzu*). They changed their names [into Chinese names], were versed in [Han Chinese] culture and education, and connected themselves [with the Han Chinese] through marriage. Apart from them those people from countries like Yuezhi, Parthians, (ancient) Indians, Uyghurs,

¹⁵³¹ Ibid., p. 2–5.

¹⁵³² Liu Yizheng refers to two Japanese historical works, Ukita Kazutami’s (1860–1946) *Seiyō jōko shi* (*Ancient Western History*) (1898), which was well-known also among Han Chinese intellectuals, and Takakuwa Komakichi’s (1869–1927) *Indo gosennen shi* (*Five thousand years of Indian history*) (1908) as sources showing that China is in fact the only ancient high culture which survived until the present-day. (Ibid., p. 4–5.) I.e. Liang Qichao also used Ukita’s work. (Ishikawa: 2003, p. 15.)

¹⁵³³ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 3–4.

¹⁵³⁴ Today, the Yao are the second largest officially acknowledged ethnicity in the PRC after the Han. The Miao are the fifth largest and the Yao the thirteenth. Whom Liu Yizheng means by “Man” is not clear, probably he refers to a south Chinese ethnicity. This term is not used for a certain group but is a general term for Non-Han people from the South since antiquity.

¹⁵³⁵ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 3.

¹⁵³⁶ A dynasty in today’s Korea (918–1392).

¹⁵³⁷ A kingdom in today’s Korea (698–926).

Tanguts, Kankali (*Kangli*) [Turks], Asud (*Asu*) [Mongols], Cuman (*Qincha*) [Turks], Öngüid (*Yonggu*) [Mongols] and Syrians (*Fulin*), gradually merged into (*hunru*) the Han ethnicity from Han and Wei times until Yuan and Ming times, so that one does not know how many there were of them. [...]

But even the brave and fearless ones of these different races have all been assimilated to the Han ethnicity (*duo tonghua yu Hanzu*) long time ago. And when they had vanished (*min*) into the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*), both sides forgot about it. One must ask, however, what effect it had upon our people, to incorporate (*rongna*) and connect (*goutong*) all these races?”¹⁵³⁸

To answer these questions, according to Liu, one can only refer to historical records, which China has especially many of – Liu himself counts alone 3543 chapters in the twenty-four official histories.¹⁵³⁹ For Liu it is completely clear and unquestioned that many Non-Han people assimilated to the Han and merged into them without leaving any trace in the course of history. However, he describes certain phases, during which especially many Non-Han assimilated. They stand in relation to his periodization.

In his foreword Liu explains his arrangement of chapters, which is a reflection of his periodization of China’s history.¹⁵⁴⁰ He cuts it into three main periods, an approach based on the periodization popular in Western thinking of antiquity and modernity with a middle phase in between, the Middle Ages in Western context. However, in the Western context, the Middle Ages were considered to be a transitional phase, during which the classical culture had declined, called the “Dark Age” by the Italian scholar Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374). As this is obviously not suitable for China’s history, some Han Chinese historians do not use the term “middle ages (*zhongshi*)” for their second period, but like Liu here “middle antiquity (*zhonggu*).”¹⁵⁴¹

Liu periodizes China’s history as follows:

1. **Antiquity** (*shanggu*): until 220
2. **Middle antiquity** (*zhonggu*): 220–1644
3. **Modernity** (*jinshi*): since 1644

¹⁵³⁸ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 3–4.

¹⁵³⁹ He lists *Shiji*, *Hanshu*, *Hou Hanshu*, *Sanguozhi*, *Jinshu*, *Songshu*, *Nan Qishu*, *Liangshu*, *Chenshu*, *Weishu*, *Bei Qishu*, *Zhoushu*, *Suishu*, *Nanshi*, *Beishi*, *Jiu Tangshu*, *Xin Tangshu*, *Jiu Wudaishi*, *Xin Wudaishi*, *Songshi*, *Liaoshi*, *Jinshi*, *Yuanshi*, *Xin Yuanshi* and *Mingshi*. (Ibid., p. 5.)

¹⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 1–2.

¹⁵⁴¹ Kuwabara Jitsuzô: 1968 [1898], p. 25; Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], p. 10–11. Especially early historians mostly use the term “Medieval Times (*zhongshi*).” (Naka Michiyo: 1888–1890, see tables of contents at the beginning of each volume; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 11; Liu Yizheng: 1997 [1905]?, p. 5–6; Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1231/183.)

The chapters for each period get less as the time frame gets shorter. Whereas part one about antiquity contains thirty-three chapters, part two on middle antiquity only twenty-six, and part three on modernity nineteen.¹⁵⁴²

Liu strongly emphasizes the role, which the Indian and Western cultures played in China's history, and their merging into China's culture.¹⁵⁴³ He writes that during middle antique times, when "Indian culture entered our country, it was at first repelled but then melted into our country's inherent culture."¹⁵⁴⁴ And later in modernity when "Chinese and Indian cultures were both already in decline, Far Western sciences, thinking, religion and policy and law were imported."¹⁵⁴⁵ However, this should not lead to the premature conclusion that Liu generally accepted cultural fusion, mixing and merging as basic rules of contacts between cultures and people as agents of culture.¹⁵⁴⁶ On the contrary, when it comes to other intrastate Non-Han cultures and people, Liu's standpoint is one of a strong supporter of the assimilation theory.

In order to fully understand Liu's idea of the Non-Han people and his reasons for and ways of inclusion of their histories into his book it is necessary to critically analyze some relevant chapters in this respect. Therefore, the crucial chapters in the *Zhongguo wenhua shi*, in which Liu writes about the Non-Han so-called conquest dynasties, will be highlighted. As said before, Liu's opinion towards the people living in the direct neighborhood of the Han people differs from his acceptance and even high esteem of the Indian Buddhist and Western cultures entering and infiltrating Han Chinese culture. Regarding the other inhabitants of East Asia, Liu does not accept any cultural influence from their side and generally considers them as assimilated. In his foreword he has made it clear that the assimilation of most of them was so perfect that no traces were left. In some chapters, Liu gives concreter and more detailed descriptions and analyses of the processes of assimilation, and it is some of these chapters I will analyze in greater detail. Especially three are revealing, which cover the time from the Han Dynasty until the beginning of the Yuan Dynasty, that is, from the 2nd century BC until the 13th century AD. They are about the time from the 2nd century BC to 618 AD, which Liu considers to be the first phase of assimilation of Non-Han people, and about the time from the 10th to the 13th century AD, which he considers to be the second phase of assimilation, when the Han Chinese dynasties were defeated militarily, but nevertheless assimilated the three major Non-Han dynasties, which existed parallel to the Song

¹⁵⁴² There is a certain regularity in this, as each part has seven chapters less than that before (33-7 = 26 and 26-7 = 19).

¹⁵⁴³ In the first decade of the 20th century, Zhang Taiyan had also shown great admiration for India. For him, it was a country equalling China in many respects. It was an ancient old culture with influencing traditions of religion and philosophy, and it was also an extremely large nation. He also mentioned the Indian Buddhist influence in China especially. For his present-day, he hoped for an Indian-Chinese alliance against imperialism and therefore was a founding member of two Pan-Asian alliances founded in 1907 in Tokyo, the *Asian Friendship Association* and the *Alliance for the Suppressed East Asian Nations*. (Laitinen: 1990, p. 128-129.)

¹⁵⁴⁴ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 1.

¹⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴⁶ Hon: 2004, p. 508-509.

Dynasty in the Northeast and the Northwest, the Khitan Liao (907–1225), the Tangut Xia, also Western Xia (*Xi Xia*) (1038–1227) and the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234).¹⁵⁴⁷

Assimilation and Han Chinese Culture in the Shifting Phase between Antiquity and Middle Antiquity: Basic Principles

Liu's rough periodization of three periods is divided into shorter eras. One of these eras, which Liu considers crucial with respect to cultural and ethnical contacts and impacts of these contacts, are the years from 196 to 589.¹⁵⁴⁸ In 196, chancellor Cao Cao (155–220) of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220) de facto took over the reign from the last Han Emperor Xiandi (181–234, reign time 189–220). Liu obviously sees Cao Cao's coming into power as a kind of coup d'état, although Cao Cao never usurped the throne. With this coup began a period of disunity, that is, of separated kingdoms in the former Han territory, which lasted until nearly four hundred years later in 589, when Emperor Wendi (541–604, reign time 581–604) of the Sui Dynasty (581–618) reunified China and ended the chaotic period of the Three Kingdoms (220–280), the Jin Dynasty (265–420), the Sixteen Kingdoms (304–439 AD) and the Southern and Northern Dynasties (420–589).¹⁵⁴⁹ For China, these years had been “a time of disturbances and division.”¹⁵⁵⁰ Fu in his essay “Zhongguo lishi fenqi zhi yanjiu” (1918) also interprets the phase before the Sui unification in 589 as crucial with regard to assimilation and writes that then “only the Yi [barbarians] were changed, but the Han Chinese (*Xia*) were not.”¹⁵⁵¹

In chapter 2.3 “Zhu zu bing xing ji qu tonghua (The bloom and assimilation of ethnicities)”¹⁵⁵² Liu gives his reasons how and why the first large wave of the Han ethnicity's assimilation of others took place. Especially during Western and Eastern Jin times (304–439) “various mixed usurpers of Hua and Yi [barbarian] background (*Hua Yi zarou zhi tiejie*)” confronted the Han people.¹⁵⁵³ Liu writes that sometimes this era would be called “a time, during which foreign tribes destroyed the Han Chinese (*Zhongxia*). [But] it is [also] called a time, during which the foreign tribes assimilated to the Han Chinese (*tonghua yu Zhongxia*).”¹⁵⁵⁴ Liu Yizheng tends to the latter conclusion:

¹⁵⁴⁷ Chapter 2.3 “Zhu zu bing xing ji qu tonghua (The bloom and assimilation of ethnicities),” chapter 2.16 “Tang Song jian shehui zhi bianqian (The change of society between Tang and Song times),” and chapter 2.20 “Liao Xia Jin zhi wenhua (The culture of the Liao, Xia and Jin dynasties).” (Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 357–366; vol. 2, p. 488–496; p. 527–543.)

¹⁵⁴⁸ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 357.

¹⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵¹ See above Chapter 4.2 (“Periodizations: Japanese Models – Chinese Ideas”); Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1227/179.

¹⁵⁵² Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 357–366.

¹⁵⁵³ Ibid., p. 357.

¹⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

“So, the Huaxia culture (*Huaxia zhi wenhua*) surpasses by far [all others] in the East. Moreover, since a long time it has had the power to absorb (*xishou*) foreign tribes and instill (*guanshu*) its culture to them, like in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods, when the places, which were called the lands of the Man, Yi, Rong and Di [barbarians], later were all changed into Huaxia [regions] (*hua yu Huaxia*). Although they [= the Han Chinese] did not reach up on the grounds of military power, on the grounds of culture and teaching they could change (*zhe*) hearts freely and easily. Therefore, it is a phenomenon ascribed especially to our nation in history. Only before the Han dynasty, the governmental power was entirely the Xia ethnicity’s (*Xiazu*), and other tribes were governed by them and assimilated (*tonghua*). After the Han dynasty, the governmental power was not anymore entirely the Xia ethnicity’s, but the other tribes, although they conquered them, [nevertheless] assimilated (*tonghua*).”¹⁵⁵⁵

This paragraph shows that Liu fully accepts Liang’s thesis of an “assimilative power” of the Han people. Like Liang he writes that this “phenomenon” would be one of the Chinese peculiarities. He admits that the military abilities of the Non-Han would be generally better, but the Han people would have a much better ability at their hand – that to absorb and change the others so that they become part of the Han people.

How and why this assimilation took place only one-directional Liu explains as a consequence of, firstly, “intermingled living (*zaju*)” and the fact that Non-Han people were already used to Han politics and teachings; secondly, that Han politics and teachings had a universal validation and “All-under-Heaven generally knew about them”; and, thirdly, that all Non-Han people, who founded separatist kingdoms (*haiju*), “used Han people (*yong Hanren*)” to govern them successfully.¹⁵⁵⁶ Especially the first two points are directly linked to Liang’s and Zhang’s culturalism and the idea of a generally accepted superiority of Han Chinese culture as being culture *per se*, because of their universality and the general knowledge of them. Only when based on the first two assumptions the third one makes sense: only if also the Non-Han people knew about and accepted the superiority of Han Chinese culture they would come and seek the advice of Han men in order to establish their own dynasties.

Consequently, the power to assimilate Liu ascribes exclusively to the Han people:

¹⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 364. Pamela Crossley writes that the historian Jin Yufu (1887–1962) challenges “sinicization as a historical concept” by using the phrase “exploiting of Han scholars (*liyong Hanren*).” (Crossley: 1990, p. 4.) To begin with, I think the translation of *liyong* as “to exploit” is too far-fetched. Liu Yizheng uses the similar expression of “using the Han men (*yong Hanren*)” to state the complete dependence and inability of Non-Han people to found stable states without help of Han Chinese advisers. In the context of Jin Yufu’s usage of the phrase, it becomes obvious that he uses it in the same way as Liu Yizheng. When he writes about the things the “Han men taught (*jiao*)” the Khitan, he does not aim at challenging the concept of sinicization at all. (Jin Yufu: 1996 [1946], p. 20.)

“During the Jin dynasty (265–420) many ethnicities became repeatedly powerful. On the one side, they were soaked (*rouran*) with our country’s Confucianism, on the other side, they were mediators for Indian thinking.”¹⁵⁵⁷

According to Liu, Indian (religious) culture in the form of Buddhism entered China with the Non-Han people as mediators. But according to him the Non-Han people are like empty vessels without any individual cultures, ready to be filled with Confucianism or to carry Buddhism.¹⁵⁵⁸ No strong culture on their own would disturb this transitional process.¹⁵⁵⁹ And in the end “the beliefs and religions of the foreign ethnicities were changed by the Han Chinese people (*shi Xiaren wei yi*).”¹⁵⁶⁰ This of course brings the general ideas and patterns of approach of colonialism to the mind, where region, which are to be colonized, are interpreted as empty in a cultural and civilizational way. It has been called “the myth of emptiness” with regard to European colonialism, but this catch phrase also fits for the case of the Han Chinese and their approach to the Non-Han as comes to the fore in Liu’s idea of history.¹⁵⁶¹

Complementing the introduction, this chapter gives a further sharpened view of Liu’s idea of the different effects of cultural exchange. On the one hand, Indian Buddhism entered China and unfolded its influential power with the help of Non-Han people. On the other hand, these Non-Han people were never able to inflict their cultures, which are rather non-cultures in Liu’s descriptions, on the Han people. This viewpoint fits into the idea of high cultures, which Liu mentions in his introduction in another context: only a powerful high culture like the Han Chinese or the Indian culture could effect and influence others. Traditions and customs of the Non-Han people, which are not considered to be high cultures, cannot be powerful and tempting enough to be imitated by or to be included into a high culture like the Han Chinese. This is also Liu’s second and culturalist explanation on how assimilation happened practically: he claims that everyone knew about China’s policy and teaching, because they were universally valid.

This is a clear statement in favor of an assumed unequalled superiority of Han Chinese culture. Moreover, Liu’s other two arguments for assimilation – mixed settling and Han as officials and advisers in Non-Han states – only work, if the middle argument is accepted as valid, that is, only if the Han Chinese culture is considered to be superior and dominant, intermingled living automatically means assimilation of the Non-Han to the Han Chinese and not mutual exchange and partly fusion. This is of course a truly culturalist argument and shows that the former All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*) have been

¹⁵⁵⁷ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 365.

¹⁵⁵⁸ A similar notion existed in Europe with regard to those cultures they colonized, although in their cases this emptiness was not only perceived as cultural, but most importantly as an emptiness of people. James M. Blaut called this construction the colonized countries the “myth of emptiness.” (Blaut: 1993, p. 15.)

¹⁵⁵⁹ Buddhism was, in fact, deeply influenced by all those other cultures it “passed” before it reached China. (Heirman/Bumbacher: 2007; Zürcher: 2007 [1957].)

¹⁵⁶⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 365.

¹⁵⁶¹ Blaut: 1993, p. 15. See also Conclusion below.

successfully merged into the nation. And only then, the usage of Han Chinese advisers could result in general acceptance of their culture among their Non-Han overlords as Liu assumes.

The Reappearance of Liu Shipei's *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (1905) in Liu Yizheng's *Zhongguo wenhua shi*

Although not reflected in Liu's big scheme of periodization he considers the time beginning with the An Lushan Rebellion (*An Shi zhi luan*)¹⁵⁶² (755–763) until the foundation of the Song Dynasty in 960,¹⁵⁶³ as crucial. The most important change was the growing military inability of the Tang court, which went on during the Five Dynasties. At the same time, other ethnicities like the Shatuo (Turks), the Khitan and the Tangut rose and finally founded empires in East Asia.¹⁵⁶⁴ To explain the whereabouts of these people Liu quotes three passages from Liu Shipei's *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (1905), where Liu Shipei also laments that the Non-Han peoples' "power grew daily (*shili ri sheng*)" and ultimately resulted in the decline of the Tang.¹⁵⁶⁵ Also Liu Yizheng considers this time as special because "the chaos of the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*) went on and on, and it was as it has never been before."¹⁵⁶⁶

To clarify why he thinks this time to be especially chaotic, Liu Yizheng again quotes Liu Shipei. But whereas before the quotation was a rather neutral one, this one is in fact opposed to Liu Yizheng's own approach to and idea of China's history.

As we have seen above Liu Shipei was strictly against the inclusion of Non-Han people into China's history (or nation-state and culture). He also opposed to the idea of general assimilation. Though he admitted that assimilation was possible he never suggested that it was a special power of the Han Chinese to assimilate or that it was a general principle of encounters between Han Chinese and Non-Han.¹⁵⁶⁷

The passage quoted by Liu Yizheng reveals Liu Shipei's attitude towards the history of Non-Han dynasties, which is on the one hand rather hostile, but on the other hand seems to be more differentiated than that of the historians, who put Liang's theory of

¹⁵⁶² In Chinese, it is called "Rebellion of An (Lushan) and Shi (Siming)," as it was not alone organized by An Lushan (ca. 703–757) of Sogdian origin, but also by his friend Shi Siming (703–761) of Tujue origin, both generals of the Tang Dynasty.

¹⁵⁶³ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 1. Fu Sinian also thinks that a certain break could be seen between the Tang and the Song, the latter standing for a restoration of purely Han ethnic culture. (Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.) Lü Simian includes the An Lushan Rebellion in his periodization of China's history in his *Zixiu shiyong Baihua benguo shi* (*Self-study applicable Vernacular History of Our Country*) (1924). He considers it important enough to mark the beginning of one of his eras, modern antiquity (*jingu*) (755–1279). (Lü Simian: 1964 [1924], p. 11 and table of contents.)

¹⁵⁶⁴ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 488.

¹⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 490. The original can be found in Liu Shipei: 1997 [1905], p. 35a–b.

¹⁵⁶⁶ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 491.

¹⁵⁶⁷ See above Chapter 3.4 (subchapter "The Question of Fusion").

the Han people's "assimilative power" at the basis of their analyses. In *Zhongguo minzu zhi*, Liu Shiwei assumes that when "the Liao and the Jin came to the South," that is, when they conquered Han inhabited regions, they influenced the Han people in three ways. Liu Yizheng quotes two of these three ways:

"First, the resettlement of Han people to the North [of the Huai River]. Since the Khitan had conquered the [Han inhabited regions in the] South [of the Huai River], the North was occupied by enemies. Han people were captured, indeed many were resettled. Some went to the caityiffs' court, some were arrested at other places, but the Khitan ethnicity (*Qidan minzu*) consequently followed Han Chinese traditions (*zhuxiang Hua feng*). When the Jin people besieged the South, the misfortune and calamities of the Han people were very profound. In reality, this was the big essence of the movement and resettlement of the Han ethnicity. Adding the inertness of the Han ethnicity, under the influence of (Yi) barbarian traditions (*qinran Yi feng*), the mountains and rivers of their ancestral country they threw away like bad devices. Even worse, they lead a careless live, [like] when the Western caityiffs put down the Han. That is the first kind of influence on the Han ethnicity.

Second, the intermingled living with other ethnicities (*yi zu*). In the fifth year of the Jin reign period Huangtong [1145], State Farm military units (*chuntian jun*) were introduced. All Jurchen and Khitan people moved from their home country to the central region (*Zhongtu*). According to their households, land was assigned to them and they lived intermingled with the [Han] people (*min*). They were called Battalions and Companies (*ming'an mukun*).¹⁵⁶⁸ Altogether, they were ten thousand people (*ren*). [...] ¹⁵⁶⁹ The pasturing (Man) barbarian people (*Manmin*) followed the felicitous land of the Zhonghua [people]. Consequently, China was turned into pasture land (*yi Zhongguo wei muyang*). [...] ¹⁵⁷⁰ In the *Jinshi*, sixth year of the Tianhui reign period [1140]¹⁵⁷¹ one reads that it was forbidden for the people to wear Han dress and it was ordered that the people cut their hair.¹⁵⁷² [...] ¹⁵⁷³ Not one of the Han ethnicity's rites and traditions did not change to (Yi) barbarian [ways]. [...] ¹⁵⁷⁴ That is the second kind of influence on the Han ethnicity."¹⁵⁷⁵

¹⁵⁶⁸ Usually, the Battalions and Companies are referred to as *meng'an mouke*.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Liu Yizheng omits several lines of Liu Shiwei's essay.

¹⁵⁷⁰ Liu Yizheng omits several lines of Liu Shiwei's essay.

¹⁵⁷¹ Both, Jin Taizong and Jin Xizong used this period name. However, Liu Shiwei refers to 1140 here, although at this time Xizong had already changed the period name to Tianjuan. In proper counting 1140 is the third year of the *tianjuan* period.

¹⁵⁷² Actually, this passage cannot be found in the *Jinshi*, but in the *Sanchao beimeng huibian* (*Compendium of Treaties with the Northern [Neighbours] during the Three Reigns [of Emperors Huizong, Qinzong, and Gaozong]*) by the Song official Xu Mengxin (1126–1207). (Xu Mengxin: 1973, ch. 132, p. 5a.) Herbert Franke translated the third chapter completely. (Franke, H.: 1975.)

¹⁵⁷³ Liu Yizheng omits only two characters but thus changes the character of Liu Shiwei's original meaning. Liu Shiwei starts this sentence with "And alas (*er tan*)!" (Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 39b.)

¹⁵⁷⁴ Liu Yizheng omits several lines of Liu Shiwei's essay.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 490. Quotation from Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1905], p. 39a–b.

Liu Shipei assumes – realistically as I might add – mutual influences when ethnicities live intermingled. With regard to the Khitan Liu Shipei and Liu Yizheng share the opinion that they indeed became quite adapted to Han culture.¹⁵⁷⁶

But in case of the Jurchen Liu Shipei contrasts Liu Yizheng’s opinion profoundly. Liu Shipei assumes that the Han assimilated to Jurchen customs – Liu Yizheng thinks that it was the other way round. It is unclear why Liu Yizheng quotes passages from Liu Shipei, which contradict directly what he himself writes about the Jurchen four chapters later, as we will see.

The Theory of “Assimilative Power” Put into Practice: The Khitan, the Tangut and the Jurchen

In his main chapter about the medieval Non-Han dynasties, “Liao Xia Jin zhi wenhua,” Liu Yizheng is quite certain that the Khitan, Tangut and Jurchen assimilated during the course of their dynasties – in contrary to his quotation from Liu Shipei.¹⁵⁷⁷ This chapter gives a thorough impression of Liu’s usage of the assimilation theory when it comes to the concrete analysis of Non-Han ethnicities and their culture.

In the first paragraphs Liu reveals his general estimation of the Han Chinese culture during the time of these three dynasties:

“Regarding the weakness of the Song people, it is often assumed that the culture of China was totally destroyed (*hai*) together with the empire and the race (*zhongzu*), as they did not have a military like the barbarian races (*yeman renzhong*) at their disposal, who could disregard the civilized countrymen (*wenming guoren*). But if one examines the history of all those empires, one will notice that that was not the case. On the whole, all foreign races (*yi zu*), who used military force to prosper, generally assimilated (*tonghua*) to the culture and teachings of the Han Chinese people, [...]”¹⁵⁷⁸

This is nearly the same Liu had said about the time between the decline of the Eastern Han Dynasty until the unification of China under the first Sui emperor (196–589), the first phase of assimilation.¹⁵⁷⁹ Also about this time Liu had written that it would be

¹⁵⁷⁶ Liu Yizheng bolsters this argument by the quote from Liu Shipei’s book with a footnote claiming that the Jurchen of Jin times called the Khitan “Han people (*Hanren*),” what is, in fact not quite true. There are many references to the Khitan in the *Jinshi*. In contrast to the Han people, they often enjoyed the same privileges like the Jurchen. Unlike the Han and Bohai, for example they were not excluded from the hereditary titles of the Battalion and Company Commanders. Only Jin emperor Shizong (b. 1123, r. 1161-89) abrogated Khitan Battalions and Companies and subordinated their households under Jurchen Battalion and Company Commanders. (Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 495n3; *Jinshi*, ch. 80, p. 1809; ch. 44, p. 991–993; ch. 8, p. 132.)

¹⁵⁷⁷ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 527–543.

¹⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 527.

¹⁵⁷⁹ See also above this chapter.

commonly said that “foreign tribes destroyed the Han Chinese (*Zhongxia*)” but that he would instead claim that it was a time, during which “the foreign tribes assimilated to the Han Chinese (*tonghua yu Zhongxia*).”¹⁵⁸⁰ Liu tries to convince his readers that even in times generally considered to be times of disgrace and weakness the Han people would still have been in power, at least culturally.

This indeed is the most important point of the assimilation theory in Han Chinese context. Only when assuming a (cultural) superiority of the Han ethnicity so total that it would mean assimilation for everyone, who comes under its spell, phases in the Han Chinese history that were in fact phases of foreign conquest and thus disgrace could be interpreted positively as Liu does it with the four centuries after the Eastern Han Dynasty and the five centuries after the Tang Dynasty.

In his chapter Liu goes on analyzing the cultures of the three dynasties in question, starting with six pages about the Liao, going on with two about the Xia and ending with seven about the Jin. The method Liu uses for analyzing not only the three dynasties in question, but employs in all his other chapters, too, is to make a case in one or two sentences and to verify it with one or several quotations from sources he thinks highly reliable, so that the largest part of his book is made up by word-for-word quotations mostly from primary sources, but also from other academic works. Liu’s concentration on textual sources is one reason why he was generally considered to be a conservative historian in the 1920s. Liu only refers to textual sources throughout his whole book. Thus, he is in contrary position to the Doubting Antiquity School, which had been initiated by Hu Shi in the 1910s and was continued by his pupil Gu Jiegang in the 1920s, challenging traditional historiography and especially criticizing its relying on non-material, but exclusively textual sources.¹⁵⁸¹

For the Liao, Xia and Jin he lists altogether fifty-five of these ‘thesis-evidence’ pairs. Most evidence quotations are from official histories, *Liaoshi* (*History of the Liao*),¹⁵⁸² *Xin Wudaishi* (*New History of the Five Dynasties*),¹⁵⁸³ *Songshi* (*History of the Song*)¹⁵⁸⁴ and *Jinshi* (*History of the Jin*).¹⁵⁸⁵ Seven quotations refer to Yuan and Ming sources,¹⁵⁸⁶ five to Qing sources¹⁵⁸⁷ and three to a then very recent Republican source.¹⁵⁸⁸

¹⁵⁸⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 357.

¹⁵⁸¹ Hu/Zhang: 1993, p. 322–325; Hon: 2004, p. 515. However, as reasonable as the ideas of the Doubting Antiquity School were, in the end they did not lead to a general inclusion of material sources in historical works on a wide scale. With regard to Non-Han dynasties this would moreover have been rather difficult in the 1920s as archaeology became interested in them only in the 1930s. Torii Ryûzô (1870–1953) was the most important pioneer in Northeast Asian archaeology. That the Japanese got so interest in this field of study in the 1930s is connected to their political interest in the region and their wish to show that the people there were not so much connected to the Han Chinese, but rather to other Asian people like the Japanese, Korean and Mongols. (Wittfogel/Feng: 1949, p. 29; Leibold: 2012, p. 351.)

¹⁵⁸² The *Liaoshi* was compiled during the Yuan dynasty under the Mongol Tuo Tuo (Toghtô, Tokto) (1314–1355).

¹⁵⁸³ The *Xin Wudaishi* was compiled during the Northern Song dynasty by Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072).

¹⁵⁸⁴ The *Songshi* was compiled during the Yuan dynasty under the Mongol Tuo Tuo.

¹⁵⁸⁵ The *Jinshi* was compiled during the Yuan dynasty under the Mongol Tuo Tuo.

¹⁵⁸⁶ *Da Jingguo zhi* (*Annals of the Great Jin Empire*), a so-called private history (*yeshi*) of the Jin dynasty (according to the preface presented to the Song court in 1234, probably misattributed to Yuwen Maozhao (dates of live

For the Liao, he lists twenty-six thesis-evidence pairs, of which twenty are directly concerned with the Han Chinese influence on the Khitan or their sinicization, mainly in the cultural area.¹⁵⁸⁹ For the Xia he lists only eight thesis-evidence pairs, five of which are directly concerned with the sinicization of the Xia.¹⁵⁹⁰ For the Jin he lists twenty-one thesis-evidence pairs, twelve of which refer to sinicization directly and another six indirectly.¹⁵⁹¹

As said above, Hu Shi criticizes Liu for using only textual primary sources and not referring to any material source in his *Zhongguo wenhua shi* already in 1933.¹⁵⁹² One could moreover criticize that also Liu's choice of textual sources does not seem well-balanced. His main focus lies on official histories written under the Northern Song and Yuan dynasties' surveillance. Apart from the *Da Jinguo shi* (14th or 15th century) he does not use private histories or travel diaries (*youji*), which are also highly informative regarding this time.¹⁵⁹³ And apart from the most recent work he uses, the *Xi Xia guo shu lüeshuo* (1919), the other works he refers to, are not specialized on the three dynasties, but are general surveys.

In order to fully understand Liu's image of the Han people as being able "to change hearts freely and easily"¹⁵⁹⁴ in general, at least those of the Non-Han around them, I will use his understanding of the foundations of three central Non-Han dynasties, the Liao (907–1125), the Tangut or Western Xia (*Xi Xia*) (1038–1227) and the Jin (1115–1234). The foundations are a very good if not the best example as in Liu's idea they form the basis for one of his three general reasons why the "assimilative power" is effective only in one direction. As described above, these three main reasons for the Han people's ability to assimilate others are the assumption of a general acceptance of the Han culture's

unknown) and a forgery from the Yuan dynasty); *Shushi huiyao* (*The Essentials of the History of Calligraphy*) (1376) by Tao Zongyi (1316–1399?); *Xu Wenxian tongkao* (*Continuation of the Comprehensive Investigation of Literary Heritage*) (1586) compiled by Wang Qi (*jinshi* 1565).

¹⁵⁸⁷ *Ershi'er [nian'er] shi zhaji* (*Reading Notices of the Twenty-two Histories*) (1796) by Chao Yi (1727–1814); *Tieqin tongjian lou cangshu mu* (*The Bibliography of the Book Collection of the Iron Qin and Copper Sword Tower*) by Qu Yong (fl. 1857); *Yu shi* (*On Stones*) (1909) by Ye Changchi (1847?–1917) and *Jin shi cuibian* (*Anthology of the Essence of Bronze and Stone*) (1805) by Wang Chang (1724–1806).

¹⁵⁸⁸ *Xi Xia guo shu lüeshuo* (*Short Talk about the Book of the Western Xia Empire*) (1919) by Luo Fuchang (1896–1921).

¹⁵⁸⁹ Fifteen are from the *Liaoshi* and seven from the *Xin Wudaishi*. The other four cite from different books of diverse ages. *Shushi huiyao*, *Yu shi* and the *Jin shi cuibian*.

¹⁵⁹⁰ Five are from the *Songshi* chapter about the Western Xia. Liu Yizheng refers to it as "Xi Xia zhuan," but it is in fact the two chapters are just titled "Xianguo shang" and "Xianguo xia." (*Songshi*, ch. 485–486.) Three are from the *Xi Xia guo shu lüeshuo* and deal with the Tangut script.

¹⁵⁹¹ Of the other three, one refers to the Liao (to state that their school system wasn't as systemized as the Jin's) and two to the Jurchen script.

Thirteen are from the *Jinshi*, one from the *Da Jinguo zhi* (*Annals of the Great Jin Empire*), a private history of the Jin dynasty. (Yuwen: 2000.) The other seven are from four books, which he partly also used before for the Liao (*Ershi'er [nian'er] shi zhaji*, *Jin shi cuibian*, *Xu Wenxian tongkao*, *Tieqin tongjian lou cangshu mu*).

¹⁵⁹² Hon: 2003, p. 276–278; 2004, p. 515.

¹⁵⁹³ Fan Chengda's (1126–1193) *Lanpei lu* (*Register of Grasping the Carriage Reins*); Cheng Zhuo's (1153–1223) *Shi Jin lu* (*An Account of an Embassy to the Jin*), Lou Yue's (1137–1213) *Beixing rilu* (*A Daily Account of a Northern Excursion*); and Zhou Hui's (dates unknown) *Beiyuan lu* (*An Account of Northbound Thills*). (For a full list of travel records about Song missions to the Jin see Franke: 1981b, 172–173. See also Hargett: 1984; 1989; Franke: 1981b; Chen Xuelin: 2003; Walton: 2002; Chavannes: 1904.)

¹⁵⁹⁴ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 357.

superiority, that is, culturalism. This is the basis for the other two reasons, the Non-Han peoples' usage of Han people to found their own empires and intermingled living.¹⁵⁹⁵

Although the three dynasties in question were founded by people of very different ethnic and regional descent – the Liao Dynasty was founded by the Yelü clan of Khitan ethnicity, the Western Xia Dynasty was founded by the Li clan of Tangut ethnicity and the Jin Dynasty was founded by the Wanyan clan of Jurchen ethnicity – Liu Yizheng describes their respective dynastic foundations as similar. His explanations will serve to deduct what he regards as the basis of the Liao, Western Xia and Jin culture in general and what he thinks of their ability to found their own dynasties in particular.

Liu characterizes the ascension of the first Liao emperor Taizu (872–926, reign time 907–926)¹⁵⁹⁶ with the words: “The raise of Taizu was actually based on the teachings of the Han people (*Hanren zhi jiao*).”¹⁵⁹⁷ In the following, he quotes a comparatively long passage from the *Xin Wudaishi*, where it is said (among other things):

“The Han people taught Abaoji [= Liao Taizu]: ‘The king of China is not replaced by another one, who ascends the throne.’¹⁵⁹⁸ Therefore, Abaoji increased his power and controlled all tribes, while he was not willing to abdicate.”¹⁵⁹⁹

The Han people, who are mentioned as Liao Taizu's advisers here, were captives from some conquered Tang Dynasty towns. According to the source they gave him advice on the Han way of reigning, the greatest difference to the Khitan tradition being the live-long reign of one leader. Through these advisers Liu assumes that Liao Taizu developed the idea of expanding his power and not abdicating after three years, as was the Khitan tradition. Liu gives the impression that Liao Taizu's initiative of achieving unlimited supreme command of the Khitan was only possible because of the teaching by Han people. According to this assumption, the basis of the Liao dynasty was therefore Han teaching and culture – the first step of their assimilation was done with the foundation of their dynasty.

The Western Xia Dynasty was founded by Tangut people more than hundred years after the Liao in 1038. Liu's first step to argue that the Tanguts were assimilated is to claim that they would have descended from the Tuoba, who once founded the Northern Wei Dynasty (386–534).¹⁶⁰⁰ The Tuoba, Liu writes, “served as Tang and Song officials for generations, thus mastering the Han culture (*tong Hanwen*).”¹⁶⁰¹ Usually the Tuoba, which were part of the Xianbei ethnicity, are considered to be the ancestors not of the Tangut, but of the Tunguses and thus forefathers of the Jurchen (and the Manchus), and Liu does

¹⁵⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 364.

¹⁵⁹⁶ Khitan name: Abaoji.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 527.

¹⁵⁹⁸ They alluded to the Khitan tradition of electing a new highest chieftain every three years.

¹⁵⁹⁹ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 528.

¹⁶⁰⁰ The Tuoba clan, which is considered to be of Xianbei ethnicity, were the founders of the Northern Wei dynasty (386-534), another so called foreign conquest dynasty.

¹⁶⁰¹ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 533.

not give any hint why he gives this uncommon ethnic connection between the Tuoba and the Tangut here.

His second step is that the Tangut were not only already soaked with “Han culture” through their assumed Tuoba forefathers, but that the Tangut later also used Han customs to establish their dynasty. Liu writes that “the foundation of offices and the installation of officials were all based on the Tang and the Song [official systems].”¹⁶⁰² This argument runs parallel to one of his basic rules for assimilation, the Non-Han peoples’ usage of Han people for founding empires.

With regard to the Tuoba and the Tangut Liu oversimplifies even more than in the case of the Liao and as we will see the Jin. As soon as individual Tuoba served as officials of a Han Chinese dynasty, their whole ethnic group is considered to have assimilated and pass this assimilation on to their successors, the Tangut. And also the Tangut, who bring the assimilated precondition from the Tuoba, are considered to have assimilated, because they allegedly use a Han style administration. This simplistic approach was first made by Liang Qichao and became more and more influential.¹⁶⁰³

With regard to the Jin dynasty Liu takes a little detour in order to make the case that their dynasty was also based on Han knowledge. It is similar to his approach to the Tangut, because he bases the Jurchen’s assimilation on the assimilation of an ethnicity Liu installs as their assumed ancestors, the Parhae (*Bohai*). He thus has to prove that the Jurchen indeed stemmed from the Parhae people and that the Parhae were assimilated.

His first step is to link the Jurchen to a certain people called Sungari Mohe (*Sumo Mohe*), who were generally accepted to be the descendants of the Parhae. Usually, however, another group of the Mohe, the Black Water¹⁶⁰⁴ Mohe (*Heishui Mohe*) are considered to be the ancestors of the Jurchen. By boldly claiming that these two groups were in fact “one race (*tong yi zhong*)” Liu is able to construct a strong connection between the Parhae and the Jurchen. Consequently, when Liu claims that the Parhae would have been assimilated to the Han, this was also a valid argument for the assimilation of the Jurchen. Liu writes:

“The ancestors of the Jin descended from the Mohe. During Tang times the Sungari Mohe founded the Parhae kingdom.¹⁶⁰⁵ They had a system of culture and script, rites and music, officials and administration, order and system. [...]

In the time of the Five Dynasties [907–960], the Parhae kingdom declined and the Raw Jurchen (*sheng Nüzhen*) of the [tribe of the] Black Water Mohe replaced them and rose. When one looks at the situation of their ascent, one cannot but see the influence of the Parhae culture they experienced. The Black Water [Mohe] and the Sungari [Mohe] are actually one race, the Sungari [Mohe] as being the progressive ones could absorb the culture and teaching of China. Although the Jurchen, who

¹⁶⁰² To verify this, Liu cites from the *Songshi* listing Western Xia offices and official titles. (Ibid., p. 534.)

¹⁶⁰³ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 18.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Black Water refers to the Amur River, in Chinese *Heilongjiang*.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Parhae was founded in Tang times in Manchuria. The Liao conquered it.

rose after them, came to power only by force of arms, they changed by becoming soaked with Han Chinese customs.”¹⁶⁰⁶

Thus by claiming, first, that the Parhae were assimilated, second, that their descendants, the Sungari Mohe, were thus also assimilated, and third, that the Sungari and the Black Water Mohe were in fact one and the same and thus the Black Water Mohe were equally assimilated Liu achieves that he can interpret the founding of the Jin Dynasty as only possible with Han Chinese knowledge and culture, brought to the Jurchen by several middlemen, but still strong enough to “soak” them with Han Chinese customs.

With all three founding stories Liu tries to show that the Non-Han dynasties would have gotten into contact with Han culture already before the dynastic foundations, in fact, that the dynastic foundations would only have been possible because of this earlier assimilation.

The Ambivalence of the Theory of an “Assimilative Power”: Chapters about the Manchus

In chapter 3.3 “Ming ji zhi fubai ji Man Qing zhi boxing (The Corruption at the End of the Ming and the Rise of the Manchu Qing),”¹⁶⁰⁷ Liu Yizheng reveals his view on the last of the Non-Han dynasties, the Manchu Qing (1644–1912). For him Manchu culture is rather a non-culture: “These completely cultureless Manchu people (*haowu wenhua zhi Manzhouren*) used a [power] gap to invade and conquer China (*Zhongguo*).”¹⁶⁰⁸ He declares that

“in the time of their [= the Manchus’] initial rise, they did not yet have script and borrowed Mongol characters to produce Manchu literature. [...] And despite the achievements of Dahai (1595–1632),¹⁶⁰⁹ they could still not develop a state’s scholarliness, but could only borrow by translating Han works.”¹⁶¹⁰

Like Liu stated before with regard to the Liao, Western Xia and Jin Dynasties, he claims that the Manchus, too, would have relied completely on Han achievements, and not only culturally. According to Liu they were not very innovative, also with regard to political institutions:

¹⁶⁰⁶ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 536.

¹⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 665–674.

¹⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 667.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Dahai is said to have developed the Manchu script in 1632.

¹⁶¹⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 668.

“After they [= the Manchus] had entered the borders, they only used military force and the force of punishment to compulsory control the Han people, and they did not establish anything else. [...] The Han officials had no power, and the Manchu officials had no knowledge.”¹⁶¹¹

Although Liu also seems to find positive aspects in the Manchu tribal traditions because due to the smallness of their tribes, “those above and those below were of one heart, the affairs were mostly publicly announced and they could not cheat secretly,”¹⁶¹² his general estimation of the Manchu Qing dynasty is a negative one:

“That our state has no government of the people (*minzhi*) began in Qing times. The Qing’s breaking of people’s rule began with the scholars. At those days, those narcissistic scholars, who submitted themselves [to the Qing], ignored the regional misery and did not dare [to initiate] one plan for common welfare.”¹⁶¹³

In another chapter on the Manchus, Chapter 3.5: “Qingdai zhi kaituo (The Reclamation of Land by the Qing Dynasty),”¹⁶¹⁴ Liu analyses the problems the Qing had due to their expansion in territories where Non-Han people lived and how they tried to integrate them.

“When the controlled territory is so large, it will not be easy to govern it, be it due to religious differences, be it due to ethnical otherness. Although they are under the control of one sovereign, their cultures go into opposite directions, therefore to the present day, it was not yet possible to unify them.”¹⁶¹⁵

Liu analyzes the diverse regions the Qing conquered in the course of their reign one by one. The Southwestern provinces are an exception, because the Non-Han people there had learnt Han rites and customs and “gradually assimilated to the Han people (*yu Hanren tonghua*)” already before the Qing conquered them and the Qing also supported these processes of assimilation.¹⁶¹⁶

But in contrast to these regions, the great Non-Han regions in the West, North, Northwest and Northeast had not been fully integrated during Qing times and still pose a problem for the Republic of China in Liu’s days. About the Eastern provinces Liu writes:

¹⁶¹¹ Ibid., p. 669.

¹⁶¹² Ibid., p. 668. It is in fact until today a pattern to judge the “pure,” “simple” culture the Non-Han people are assumed to have had before they conquered Han inhabited regions. (Liu Pujiang: 2000, p. 176. See also Hsu Ping-yu: 2001, p. 274; Yao Congwu: 1976 [1959], p. 131.)

¹⁶¹³ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 673–674.

¹⁶¹⁴ Ibid., p. 696–705.

¹⁶¹⁵ Ibid., p. 697.

¹⁶¹⁶ Ibid., p. 700. He cites from four books: Li Zongfang’s (1779–1846) *Qian ji* (Report about Guizhou), Lin Pu’s (jinshi 1852) *Guzhou zaji* (Short Notes about Ancient Provinces), Tan Zu’s (dates of life unknown) *Shuo Man* (Talking about the Man) and Yan Ruyu’s (dates of life unknown) *Miao jiang fengsu kao* (Report about Traditions and Customs in Miao Regions). The people he speaks of are the Miao, Yao, Man, Luoluo, Gelao, Yi, and natives in general (*turen*) living in Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan’s border regions.

“Well, the region of Liaodong has belonged to China since a long time. And since Liao and Jin times [907–1234] its culture reversed at the borders between a day and a night. [But] when the Qing entered the borders they protected their customs of old at all costs. All Three Eastern Provinces [= Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang] were governed with Generals (*jiangjun*) and Commanders-in-Chief (*dutong*), very differently from the political system in China proper (*neidi*). Only in the last year of the Guangxu reign [1871–1908] they began to establish the provincial system of China proper, [...]. That culture did not enter these [Three Eastern Provinces] is due to these [conditions].”¹⁶¹⁷

Liu states that another reason why the Three Eastern Provinces have not been assimilated would be that “the Han people are unhappy when they have to go to the region [of the Three Eastern Provinces] and only live there when exiled or garrisoned. The soil there is fallow and meager.”¹⁶¹⁸ We have seen above that the situation in the Northeastern regions was in fact quite different and that when Manchuria was at last opened for Han settlers, it attracted many more migrants than the Qing officials had thought.¹⁶¹⁹

Liu claims that the Mongol regions in the North would not have been territorially developed yet, although they belonged to the Qing Empire since its founding time. This is due to the fact that the Qing

“wished them [= the Mongols] to be ignorant and untaught [...]. Because the land is wide and people are scarce, it is especially difficult to develop it. In the final years [of the Qing dynasty], they began to promulgate law, but they were already too late to make the damage good. So, although there were Han people, who entered Mongolia, attending to farming or trade, there were no big effects.”¹⁶²⁰

In the Tibetan provinces, he refers to Qinghai and Xizang, Liu writes that the Qing used the system of “Loose Rein (*Jimi*).”¹⁶²¹ And Xinjiang only developed when it got provincial status in 1884. In conclusion Liu declares:

“From this it becomes obvious that [with regard to] opening up new territories only the Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*) fully understands the power of propagating culture, but the Manchu people (*Manren*) do not know anything about it.”¹⁶²²

The chapter on the conquest politics of the Manchus is Liu’s legitimation of the Chinese Republican claims on the territory of the Qing Empire. He argues in two ways: first, he claims that all the Non-Han people in the South and Southwest would have already been

¹⁶¹⁷ Ibid., p. 701.

¹⁶¹⁸ Ibid., p. 702.

¹⁶¹⁹ See above Chapter 4.1 (“The New Setting”).

¹⁶²⁰ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 703.

¹⁶²¹ See also Yang, Lien-sheng: 1968, p. 31–33.

¹⁶²² Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 704.

assimilated by the Han. With this argument he aims to show that the Han are able to assimilate other easily. Thus it should not be difficult for the Han to fulfil a complete political but also a cultural and civilizational integration of the other Non-Han regions by assimilation as well. Second, he writes that the Manchus would not have managed to assimilate anybody. Thus he aims to show that although the Manchus managed to found a large empire and stand out from the other Non-Han people at least in this respect, they were culturally incapable to truly create an united state. The only ethnicity capable to fulfil both, a political, but also a civilizational integration of Others would be the Han ethnicity. It was therefore legitimate for them to claim the territorial geo-body of the Qing as belonging to their nation-state. Liu interprets “opening (*kaituo*)” and “development (*kaifang*)” of land in the sense of a settled farming way of living and he sees it as a clear improvement for these regions. Nomadism in this approach stands in a clear opposition to a certain positive development and political and cultural integration. This is linked to the general assumed impossibility of integrating nomads into a nation-state due to their instability and the fact that they can defy state control. Only an ethnicity dominant enough to assimilate others would be able to integrate the Non-Han regions into a stable nation-state, because it would put an end to these different and inferior ways of living.

Also in Liu’s third chapter on the Manchus, chapter 3.6 “Man Qing zhi zhidu (The System of the Manchu Qing)”¹⁶²³ he accuses the Manchus of their barbarians status and their inability to rule properly using rather harsh words, which reveals the ongoing anti-Manchuism also a decade after the decline of the Manchu Qing Dynasty. They would “mostly be unlearned and without abilities. They led a parasitic life of luxuries, and temporarily rivaled with the Han official for power.”¹⁶²⁴ He also criticizes the Manchu’s overvaluation of military affairs, although exactly this caused the Qing Empire to be so large (and consequently the Republic of China to claim the same large territory to belong to it):

“As the whole empire’s policy was called military affair (*junji*), it is obvious that the Manchu people only considered military (*jun*) as important in ruling our country, but did not know that there is something called state policy (*guozheng*).”¹⁶²⁵

In Confucian ideals, the “state policy” was seen in a strong connection to the civil (*wen*) and has always been considered standing above the military (*wu*). I have already shown this in the first chapter with regard to Liang Qichao and his confronting of the counter-poles *wen* and *wu*.¹⁶²⁶ The Non-Han dynasties are considered to be on the *wu* side. And

¹⁶²³ Ibid., p. 706–714.

¹⁶²⁴ Ibid., p. 706.

¹⁶²⁵ Ibid., p. 707.

¹⁶²⁶ See above chapter 1.3 (subchapter “Assimilation in Liang Qichao’s Texts: Ancient Models”).

although Liu Yizheng claims that the Manchus assimilated to the Han ways, he still regards their policy to be barbarian and raw. As already said before, he even sees the Manchu rule as the beginning of true unjust policy in China when he writes that “the autocratic ruling and nobody being able to control it began during Qing times.”¹⁶²⁷

Liu’s ideas about the Manchus reveal the strange ambivalence Han Chinese historians found themselves in caused by their nationalist feelings. On the one hand, nationalist feelings forbid it that only one piece of the territory the Republican State claimed to have inherited from the Qing could be given away by allowing Non-Han people to have own identities and thereby a foundation, on which they could build nationalisms and legitimate nation-states themselves. Therefore, their complete and absolute assimilation or at least the possibility and easiness to achieve it had to be assumed for the sake of the territorial integrity. But on the other hand, nationalist feelings also forbid to praise Non-Han dynasties in the past, especially the Qing Dynasty, which had been overthrown to erect the nation-state. Liu Yizheng equalizes the badness of their policy with their ethnic background thus legitimating the overthrow of their dynasty. But how could the Manchus be completely assimilated to Han culture as Liu states in his introduction and at the same time still be so barbarian that only because of their wild and at the same time autocratic way of ruling the whole dynastic system had to be destroyed?

5.2 Alternative Approaches: Feng Chengjun’s and Chen Yuan’s Essays about Sinicization

But did other historians of the 1920s not imagine and describe the histories of Non-Han people, also the histories of contacts and exchanges between the Non-Han and the Han in different ways? Or had Liang Qichao’s model of a national history together with the older concept of Han Chinese identity as All-under-Heaven been so influential that already in the 1920s all histories were soaked with his idea of an assimilative power?

As examples two articles by two influential historians published parallel to Liu Yizheng’s *Zhongguo wenhua shi* shall be critically analyzed. Both articles have been very influential – one of them has been translated into English due to its scholarly importance.

¹⁶²⁷ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 710.

At the same time they mark the beginning of the usage of the term “sinicization (*Huahua, Hanhua*),” that is the introduction of a special term for the assimilation solely to the Han Chinese culture and ethnicity for “assimilative power” of the Han people.

At the same time when Liu’s *Zhongguo wenhua shi* was published, the essay “Yuan Xiyuren huahua kao (Analysis of the Central Asian people’s sinicization during the Yuan Dynasty)” (1923 and 1927) by the historian Chen Yuan (1880–1971) appeared.¹⁶²⁸ This work reveals general ideas on and theories of sinicization. It deals with a terminated period of time, the Yuan Dynasty, and limited regional reference, the people from the Western regions (*Xiyu*), that is, Central Asia. As one of the first Han Chinese historians if not the first, Chen used the term “sinicization (*huahua*)” in his title.

One part of his introduction is entitled “Huahua yiyi (The Meaning of Sinicization).”¹⁶²⁹ His explanation of the term here is, in fact, rather indirect as he describes mostly what sinicization is not. His positive description is limited to the first sentence: “As regards my definition of sinicization, it is limited to [something] that is acquired after birth and that is exclusively [a feature] of the Han Chinese people (*Huaren*).”¹⁶³⁰ Chen then explains that the adaption of characteristics common for the human race or inherited like “loyalty and righteousness, filial piety and friendship, politics and government, achievements and successes” cannot be called sinicization.¹⁶³¹ And he further writes:

“Even in the case of art and literature, which are acquired after birth, if the literature is their native literature, and if their art is not Han Chinese art, we can only call it the literature of the Western regions’ people and the art of the Western regions’ people. And we cannot call it Han Chinese literature of the Western regions’ people or Han Chinese art of the Western regions’ people.”¹⁶³²

Chen means that only those Western regions’ people, who have done something “in the field of the Han ethnicity’s culture especially worthy to record,” can be considered as being sinicized.¹⁶³³ Does Chen thus mean that only those people from the Western regions, whose cultural opuses are part of the Han Chinese cultural tradition, can be

¹⁶²⁸ It was published in two parts in 1923 and 1927. This version included only part 1–4 of the later revised work, which was published separately in 1935, entitled *Zhongke Yuan Xiyu huahua kao* (Analysis of the Central Asian people’s sinicization during the Yuan Dynasty, Revised Edition). Of the original two parts, the first part was published in the newly founded *Guoxue jikan* (*Journal of Sinological Studies*) 1.4, the second part in *Yanjing xuebao = Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies* 2. (Forte: 1996, p. 646; Chen Yuan: 1966, p. 1; Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 11–12.) When it was published as a separate work in 1935, the historian Chen Yinke (1890–1969) wrote the introduction to it. (Reprinted in Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 157–158.) Later, it was translated into English entitled *Western and Central Asians in China Under the Mongols*. (Chen Yuan: 1966.) In late 1923 or early 1924, Chen Yuan sent this work – or probably parts of it – to the Japanese historian Kuwabara Jitsuzô to ask his opinion on it. Kuwabara published his critique on certain points in 1924. However, Chen Yuan seems not to have considered them. (Forte: 1996, p. 645–646.)

¹⁶²⁹ Chen Yuan: 2000, p. 3–4, translated as “Definition of sinicization” in Chen Yuan: 1966, p. 6–8.

¹⁶³⁰ Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 3; translation based on Chen Yuan: 1966, p. 6.

¹⁶³¹ Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 3.

¹⁶³² *Ibid.*; alternative translation see Chen Yuan: 1966, p. 6.

¹⁶³³ Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 3; alternative translation see Chen Yuan: 1966, p. 6.

considered as truly sinicized? This would be, indeed, quite a hurdle to clear before being truly sinicized and it would also differ profoundly from the rather casual demands other historians like Liu Yizheng, Liang Qichao and even Zhang Taiyan have on Non-Han to regard them as assimilated to the Han Chinese, that is, sinicized. But elsewhere, Chen's approach becomes clearer, and there it can be seen that it was part of the general idea of assimilation to the Han people shared by the other historians. This is based on the fact that Chen makes differentiations between ethnicities:

“Because the civilization of these people [= the Mongols, Khitan and Jurchen] was immature (*youzhi*), it is not surprising that they should become assimilated to the Hua ethnicity (*tonghua Huazu*). As regards the people of Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam, who have been using the written language and institutions of China for a long time, their sinicization is also not to be wondered at. But the Uyghurs, Turks (*Tujue*), Persians, Arabs and Syrians all had written languages and religions of their own. [...] Nevertheless, once these people lived in Han Chinese regions (*Huadi*), they changed and followed Han Chinese customs (*gai cong Huasu*).”¹⁶³⁴

It comes to the fore that Chen differentiates between three kinds of culture and their ability to sinicize: The primitive and “immature” cultures of Mongols, Khitan and Jurchen are most easily sinicized. The Japanese, Korean, Ryukyuan and Vietnamese cultures, which in the opinion of many Han Chinese historians have integrated parts of the Han culture, most importantly script and religion, are equally easily sinicized. Based on this assumption, these two cases need no further explanation in Chen's essay. High cultures, on the other hand, which are different from the Han Chinese, illustrated in their different scripts and religions like the diverse Central Asian cultures, are not so easily changed. That the Mongols also had their own written language and they and the Khitan and Jurchen had also distinct religions is not taken into account by Chen. Also his argumentation based on written language and institutions in case of the people from Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam is rather doubtful. Chen argues, however, that the sinicization of the Central Asian people needs a more thorough explanation, because they would have their own written languages and religions and it would therefore be unlikely for them to sinicize.

What becomes clear is that Chen's argumentation in the end does not differ from Liu Yizheng's or other nationalist historians' approaches. Like Liu, Chen considers culture – religion, literature, art and general customs – to be the main marker of ethnic identity. If these are considered to be Han Chinese, the people can be called sinicized.

With regard to the Central Asian people Chen does not describe a group process, but gives cases of individuals, who migrated to China and integrated themselves into the society they found. This is a whole different set of assimilation than that assumed for

¹⁶³⁴ Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 2; translation based on Chen Yuan: 1966, p. 3–4.

the other closer Asian people mentioned above. It is, in fact, mainly in these individual cases anthropology assumes that assimilation can indeed happen.¹⁶³⁵

Another perception of assimilation is put forward by the historian Feng Chengjun (1887–1946) in his essay “Tangdai Hanhua fanhu kao (Analysis of the sinicization of the barbarians during the Tang Dynasty),” published somewhat later in 1930.¹⁶³⁶ He partly contradicts Chen in his perception of identity markers, although his perception of general results of assimilation are similar to Chen’s.

At the beginning, Feng clarifies his idea of race (*renzhong*). In general, he claims that all cultural and historical races, that is, the races one speaks about in the field of sociology and history, would be “mixed races (*zazhong*).”¹⁶³⁷ This means that also “the Han race (*Hanzhong*) is a mixed race.”¹⁶³⁸ However, he stated that the term “mixed” would be by no means an abusing term, but “culturally superior history does not have this saying, one rather calls it a compliment then a cuss.”¹⁶³⁹ So, the Han race is a mixed race, but actually, this does not have to change anything in the self-perception of the Han people, because,

“the Han race is like a great ocean, and Xianbei, Turks, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols and Manchus are like rivers. All rivers flow into the ocean. How could one still tell apart the rivers’ water and the ocean’s water?”¹⁶⁴⁰

Feng gives an anthropological differentiation of the “mixing and uniting of racial ethnicities (*zhongzu zhi chanhe*)”:

“One can analyze two kinds of phenomena: one is blending (*jiaohua*), one is assimilation (*tonghua*). Blending happens when two kinds of people are of similar numbers, do not have a different racial character (*zhongxing*), and live in the same region for a long time. Assimilation happens when these three conditions are not completely existent.”¹⁶⁴¹

Regarding the Han people it is clear for Feng as it is clear for his colleague historians that contacts between the Han and other people always would result in the assimilation of the others and that a process of blending never takes place as far as the Han are concerned.¹⁶⁴² Feng argues:

“We know this when we examine the Han race regarding the existence of a racial character. In the course of history racial ethnicities did not preserve their purity

¹⁶³⁵ Teske/Nelson: 1974, p. 361–363.

¹⁶³⁶ Feng Chengjun: 1930.

¹⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

¹⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁶⁴² *Ibid.*

with regard to blood relation, so their difference from other racial ethnicities was not based on blood relations, but on their own individual special characteristics.”¹⁶⁴³

This argument now differentiates Feng from Chen. As we have seen above, Chen claimed that “**loyalty** and **righteousness** (*zhong yi*), **filial piety** and friendship (*xiao you*), politics and government (*zhengzhi*), achievements and successes (*shigong*)”¹⁶⁴⁴ (bolds mine) were common among all human beings and not exclusively characteristic for the Han Chinese. In contrast to him, Feng writes:

“The racial character of the Han race (*Hanzhong zhi zhongxing*) can be subsumed with the two characters ‘**loyalty** and **filial piety** (*zhong xiao*).’ The former was the primary base of the feudal society, the latter was the origin of the clan society. Based on these two virtues countless rites and **righteousness** (*li yi*), laws and rules (*ke tiao*) were developed.”¹⁶⁴⁵ (Emphasis mine.)

Feng writes that the Han people of old judged whether someone belonged to themselves or was part of an other on the basis of a “having or not having rites and righteousness, laws and rules.” According to him these are features the Han Chinese only developed out of their racial character defined by loyalty and filial piety. Chen Yuan ascribes both values to all human beings.¹⁶⁴⁶ This means that Feng’s perception of sinicization is in a sense much broader than Chen’s as his definition of the Han Chinese people’s racial character is much more inclusive. If people lose their racial character and are “absorbed (*xishou*) by other racial ethnicities” Feng writes, they decay.¹⁶⁴⁷ In his idea this means that if Non-Han people turn to rites and righteousness, laws and rules, they lose their own racial character and become Han Chinese. (Of course, this means at the same time that other people do not have loyalty and filial piety, on which they can build rites and righteousness, laws and rules.) Feng concretely refers to the Xianbei, the Turks (Tujue), the (early) Uyghurs (Huihe), the Tibetans (Tufan), the Khitan and the Jurchen.¹⁶⁴⁸

In conclusion, although Chen and Feng have different understandings about the Han Chinese “racial character” and also about sinicization, their conclusions regarding the Non-Han dynasties are the same. Of course, both articles do not deal with the Non-Han dynasties’ assimilation in the first place. But despite their specialized topics both articles deal with questions of “sinicization (*huahua*)” on a broader level, and both use the Non-Han dynasties as examples for cases, in which sinicization worked exceedingly well according to their opinion. This links them to Liu’s and also Liang’s and Zhang’s

¹⁶⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴⁴ Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 3.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Feng Chengjun: 1930, p. 68.

¹⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 68–69.

general ideas and believes concerning processes of cultural exchange between Han people and other people around them.

5.3 Lü Simian's *Baihua benguo shi*

The historian Lü Simian (1884–1957) wrote several general histories on China, all in vernacular Chinese. The earliest was the *Baihua benguo shi* (*Vernacular History of Our Country*) (1923).¹⁶⁴⁹ The “Xu li (Foreword and rules)” of the *Baihua benguo shi* are dated to 1920, but the book was first published only three years later in 1923 by the Commercial Press, for which Lü had worked until 1919 as an editor.¹⁶⁵⁰ Like Liu Yizheng's *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (1925–1929, 1928) and Liang Qichao's “*Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa*” (1921), Lü Simian's book was based on drafts of lectures he had given at universities.¹⁶⁵¹

Here, Lü's approach to intrastate Non-Han ethnicities in the *Baihua benguo shi* shall be put to the fore in order to give a second case study of early Han Chinese general histories written in the modern sense of historiography and their approach to Non-Han ethnicities and dynasties. Through this analyses it will become possible to understand if and how Liang Qichao's idea of an assimilative power, the later called “traditional absorption theory”¹⁶⁵² or sinicization thesis infiltrated Han Chinese understanding of cultural processes in history and what that would mean for their situation in the then present day, that is, the 1920s.

Lü Simian was a classically trained historian, born in 1884 in Wujin District in Jiangsu Province. He received a classical education at home and became specialized in history in his early twenties. Afterwards, he accepted teaching positions in various institutions in Suzhou, Changzhou and Shanghai until 1914.¹⁶⁵³ Then he changed his sphere of action and became an editor for the Shanghai branches of the two large publishers in China, the Zhonghua Book Company (*Zhonghua shuju*) and the Commercial Press (*Shangwu yinshuguan*). After this interlude, he returned to teaching in 1920, first in Changzhou and

¹⁶⁴⁹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923]. Another influential one was the *Lü zhu Zhongguo tongshi* (*Lü's General History of China*) (1940–1944) which he wrote nearly twenty years later. (Lü Simian: 1992 [1940, 1944].) He also wrote a general work on ethnicities, *Zhongguo minzu shi* (*History of China's Races*) (1934).

¹⁶⁵⁰ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], “Xu li,” p. 4.

¹⁶⁵¹ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928]; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1921_2]; Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], “Xu li,” p. 1.

¹⁶⁵² Wittfogel/Feng: 1949, p. 14.

¹⁶⁵³ He taught at Soochow University (*Dongwu daxue*, also Central University in China (*Zhongguo yang daxue*), today Soochow University (*Jiangsu daxue*)), Changzhou Senior High School (*Changzhou fu zhongxue tang*, later Changzhou Senior High School of Jiangsu Province (*Jiangsu sheng Changzhou gaoji zhongxue*)), Nantong National Literature Institute (*Nantong guowen zhuan xiuliao*) and Shanghai Private First Class Business School (*Shanghai sili jiazhong shangye xuexiao*).

then in Shanghai.¹⁶⁵⁴ During this time he became a follower of Hu Shi's and Gu Jiegang's Doubting Antiquity School. In 1926, he befriended Qian Jibo (1887–1957), the headmaster of the Shanghai Guanghua University (*Guanghua daxue*)¹⁶⁵⁵, who asked him to become professor for history in the same year. Lü remained there for more than thirty years until his death in 1957.¹⁶⁵⁶

General Approach, Periodization and the Proper Name for the Han Ethnicity

In the foreword Lü claims that his approach would be novel and would differ from all former books on history in certain respects, i.e. he announces that he would use new methods of analysis, that he would intend not only to “foolishly list events,” but to include the thoughts and discussions of others, and that his book would be understandable and readable for everyone.¹⁶⁵⁷

Lü's basic understanding of historical events is like in the case of Liu Yizheng based on Liang Qichao's “*Zhongguo shi xu lun*” (1901).¹⁶⁵⁸ Also Lü writes that historiography would be the analysis of human society's development and the knowledge of the relations of “cause and effect (*yin guo*)” of its changes. These continuous changes Lü defines as being nothing else than “evolution (*jinhua*).”¹⁶⁵⁹

Apart from his renewals, Lü also lists some basic rules of the book. Lü believes that

“China's history has many relations with all kinds of Southeast and Central Asian countries (*guo*) and ethnicities (*minzu*). If one wants to understand China's history deeply, one generally also has to narrate those countries' and peoples' histories.”¹⁶⁶⁰

But as one has to find measures to limit the space, Lü decides to concentrate on those only, which “entered China (*ru Zhongguo*) and changed into an ethnicity of China (*bian wei zhongguo zhi yi minzu*).”¹⁶⁶¹ However, he does not further explain. what he means by

¹⁶⁵⁴ He taught at the Second Jiangsu Provincial Normal School (*Jiangsu shengli di er shifan daxue*, today Shanghai Middle School (*Shanghai zhongxue*)), Hujiang University (also University of Shanghai, *Hujiang daxue*, today University of Shanghai for Science and Technology (*Shanghai ligong daxue*)).

¹⁶⁵⁵ Also Kwang Hua University. Founded in 1925. In 1951, it was united with another university and renamed East China Normal University (*Huadong shifan daxue*).

¹⁶⁵⁶ Li/Pan/Yu: 1992, p. 123f.

¹⁶⁵⁷ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], “*Xu li*,” vol. 1, p. 2.

¹⁶⁵⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 1.

¹⁶⁵⁹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 1, p. 1. See also Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶⁰ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], “*Xu li*,” p. 3.

¹⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*

entering and changing and who he refers to concretely in his foreword.¹⁶⁶² By taking a look at his “Ben shu de fenqi (This book’s periodization)” and his table of contents it is possible to get first ideas. who he plans to integrate in his history of China and who therefore falls under his category of having “changed into an ethnicity of China.”¹⁶⁶³ Lü Simian divides China’s history into the following five eras, some of which have subdivisions:

1. **Antiquity** (*shanggu*): until 221 BC
2. **Middle antiquity** (*zhonggu*): 221 BC–755 AD
 - a. 221 BC–2nd century AD: from the Qin Dynasty until the end of the bloom of the Later Han Dynasty
 - b. 2nd century–589: from the decline of the Later Han until the end of the Southern and Northern Dynasties
 - c. 589–755: from the unification under the Sui Dynasty until the end of the bloom of the Tang Dynasty
3. **Modern antiquity** (*jingu*): 755–1279
 - a. 755–960: from the decline of the Tang until the end of the Five Dynasties
 - b. 960–1127: Northern Song Dynasty
 - c. 1127–1279: Southern Song Dynasty
4. **Modernity** (*jinshi*): 1271–1796?
 - a. 1271–1368: Yuan Dynasty
 - b. 1368–1644: Ming Dynasty
 - c. 1644–1796?: Qing Dynasty until its middle period (1796?)
5. **Most recent modernity/present time** (*zui jinshi/xiandai*)¹⁶⁶⁴:
from the time of eastward advancing of Western powers until today.

It has to be mentioned that Lü’s periodization in his table of contents differs from the one in his chapters with respect to the Song-Yuan-Ming transition. In “Ben shu de fengqi,” Lü sees the transition from Modern Antiquity to Modernity in the 1270s, the phase of dynastic change from the Song to the Yuan Dynasty. In the text body of his book, however, Lü seems to set it later in 1368, that is, the dynastic change from the

¹⁶⁶² Lü uses the two words *ru* and *bian*. But “entering and changing” could also be re-translated into Chinese by the old term “to come and be transformed (*laihua*), pointing to the old belief in the ability of the Chinese to change others into Chinese as long as they life among Chinese people. (Dikötter: 1992, p. 2.)

¹⁶⁶³ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 1, “Baihua benguo shi mucu,” p. 1–11; vol. 1, p. 10–11.

¹⁶⁶⁴ This era is called “most recent modernity (*zui jinshi*)” in the “Ben shu de fengqi” and “present time (*xiandai*)” in the table of contents and in the chapters dealing with this time.

Yuan to the Ming Dynasty. Here, he assigns the Yuan Dynasty to Modern Antiquity like the Song.¹⁶⁶⁵

Lü does not explain, which criteria he uses for his periodization, but it seems that he has two main ones. On the one hand, unifications – in 221 BC under Qin Shi Huangdi, in 589 AD under the Sui emperor Wendi, in 960 under the Song emperor Taizu, and in 1271 under the Mongol Khagan Kubilai Khan, also known as Yuan Taizu – and their breaking apart – in the 2nd century AD, when the Han Dynasty was in decline, in 755, when the Tang Dynasty had to face the An Lushan Rebellion, and in 1127, when due to Jurchen Jin aggressions the Song Dynasty had to abandon its capital Kaifeng and migrate South – are important to him especially for early and middle antiquity. On the other hand it seems that he considers Non-Han conquest dynasties and events related to them as being important parts of China’s history. The mentioned exodus of the Song to the South in 1127 is a subdivision line, and the Yuan and Qing Dynasty are listed as distinct sub-periods. (However, during both periods no Han Chinese dynasty existed, according to which these sub-periods could have been named.)

An issue of great importance not only for early Han Chinese political thinkers, but also for historians dealing with a general history of China is the explanation and evaluation of the diverse names the Han Chinese people had been given themselves and to their state. Twenty years earlier in the 1900s Liang Qichao¹⁶⁶⁶, Zhang Taiyan¹⁶⁶⁷ and Liu Shiwei¹⁶⁶⁸ had tried to find names for the country. Now Lü Simian sets out to find one for the people:

“Since recent times, some people say: ‘The character *Han* is the name of a dynasty and not the original name of the racial ethnicity (*zhongzu de benming*).’ They advocate to call us ‘Hua ethnicity (*Huazu*)’ or ‘Zhonghua ethnicity (*Zhonghua minzu*)’ instead. Do they not know that the character *Han* has been used as a term for the racial ethnicity (*zhongzu de mingcheng*) for already two thousand years? [...] Moreover, one has to differentiate between the usage of the two characters *zhong* and *zu*. [Therefore,] Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*) cannot be changed into Hua race

¹⁶⁶⁵ Among late Imperial historians often used as models also for Republican periodizations both approaches are unusual. Only Naka Michiyo (1888–1890) interprets the rise of the Mongols as a division line between two eras. But Kuwabara Jitsuzô (1898), Liang Qichao (1901) and Liu Yizheng (1902) see the gap only later in 1644 between Ming and Qing. In 1918, however, Fu Sinian also thought the Mongols to be at the beginning of a new era, together with the Ming and the Qing. In more recent scholarship, the Yuan Dynasty is often assigned to the other so called foreign conquest dynasties and therefore classified as belonging to the same period as Liao, Jin and Song. See for example the sixth volume of the *The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 6, Alien regimes and border states, 907-1368*, which embraces all Non-Han dynasties in one volume. (Franke/Twitchett, (eds.): 1994; see also above Chapter 4.2 (“Fu Sinian’s Periodization and Critique of Kuwabara Jitsuzô’s Approach”).)

¹⁶⁶⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1901_1], p. 3. See also above Chapter 1.3 (“History and Geography: The Range of China’s Historical Territory”).

¹⁶⁶⁷ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 253. See also Cassel: 1997, p. 18. See also above Chapter 2.2 (“The Proper Name for China”).

¹⁶⁶⁸ Liu Shiwei: 1997 [1903], p. 2b in small characters. See also Chapter 3.3 (“The Proper Name for China”).

(*Huazhong*). But the term Hua ethnicity (*Huazu*) is sometimes used for noble families (*gui zu*) and one could not avoid confusion.”¹⁶⁶⁹

Lü also rejects the term *Zhonghua minzu*, which Zhang Taiyan proposes already in 1907 and which is still used by Liang Qichao in the 1920s with in the meaning of Han ethnicity.¹⁶⁷⁰ It would “not be convenient,” because *Zhonghua* would be the name of a state today and the state would not only consist of the Han people, but of the “Five Ethnicities (*wu zu*).” Thus, the usage of *Zhonghua minzu* would also cause confusion.¹⁶⁷¹ Therefore, according to Lü it would be both unavoidable and logical to use Han ethnicity (*Hanzu*) as a name for the Han Chinese people.¹⁶⁷² In the early 1920s, the name for the people obviously still needed discussion. Some years later, in *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (1928) Liu Yizheng does not think it necessary anymore to give reasons for his choice, but seems to take “Han ethnicity” for granted. However, this might only be a pretended implicitness, in fact being a well considered decisions.¹⁶⁷³

In Lü’s opinion it is a general “principle (*daoli*)” that when a state is founded one ethnicity is the subject or the “sovereign (*zhuti*),” gradually “absorbing (*xishou*)” all other ethnicities.¹⁶⁷⁴ The term “subject” or “host (*zhu*)” is also used by Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan in connection with processes of assimilation. Based on this Lü imagines that the first state in China came into existence and gained superior power, because the Han ethnic subjects assimilated the Non-Han objects and integrated them.¹⁶⁷⁵ Lü thinks that the Han ethnicity migrated to China from the outside and formed the nucleus of a core state afterwards. He assumes that the ancestors of the Han came from the Pamir Mountains. He argues against two other opinions, one being Lacouperie’s “Western origin theory (*xilai shuo*),” the other being the idea that the Han ethnicity’s origins would lie in the Kunlun Mountains.¹⁶⁷⁶ His refusal of the “Western origin theory,” which had been widely accepted by earlier Han Chinese thinkers as we have seen, is also the refusal of the idea that the civilization in China would be much younger than the three other ancient civilizations, the Chaldean, the Hittite and the Egyptian cultures.¹⁶⁷⁷ One of Lacouperie’s main arguments for his theory was that the civilization in China appeared “in a curious state of relative completeness, among mongoloid races renowned for their character ultra-conservative and non-progressive.”¹⁶⁷⁸ When Lü claims that the civilization in China would have originated from the Pamir region, this

¹⁶⁶⁹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 1, p. 13.

¹⁶⁷⁰ Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 255. Translation based on Cassel: 1997, p. 25.

¹⁶⁷¹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 1, p. 13–14.

¹⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 14.

¹⁶⁷³ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928].

¹⁶⁷⁴ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 1, p. 13.

¹⁶⁷⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 33; Zhang Taiyan: 1984 [1907_1], p. 255.

¹⁶⁷⁶ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 1, p. 14–16. In fact, there existed a “long line” of such theories, also called “foreign origin theories (*wailai shuo*).” (Leibold: 2012b, p. 219.)

¹⁶⁷⁷ Lacouperie: 1894, p. 3.

¹⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

means that he puts it on the same level with the other ancient civilizations and thinks that all developed at the same time in the Central Asian region.

How to Make Jurchen Han Chinese: Lü Simian's Manual

Although Lü does not mention the Non-Han dynasties of his period middle antiquity in the “Ben shu de fengqi,” but only the allegedly ethnic Han Tang Dynasty, Five Dynasties and Song Dynasty, he devotes several subchapters to their histories, always based on their relations with the parallel existing ethnic Han dynasties. Lü analyses two of the Non-Han dynasties of the Middle Antiquity, the Jin and the Liao Dynasty, in four chapters together with the Northern and Southern Song.¹⁶⁷⁹ He sees all dynasties of the 10th to 13th century, Han Chinese and Non-Han, in strong relation to one another. Nearly every chapter about this period refers to both, the developments under the Song and its Non-Han counterparts.¹⁶⁸⁰

What is Lü's opinion of the Non-Han dynasties and the ethnicities, who founded them? I will show this by an exemplary analysis of Lü's approach to the Jurchen's origin. As the history of the Jurchen, at least those parts related to the Han people, are an integral part of Lü's general history he obviously considers them to be one of those people, who “entered China and changed into an ethnicity of China (*Zhongguo zhi yi minzu*).”¹⁶⁸¹ As mentioned above Lü had argued that the Han people stood into contact with many other ethnicities in Asia, but that not all of their histories could be integrated into a general history of China. Thus only the histories of those, which were assimilated and “changed into an ethnicity of China” would become part of his book.¹⁶⁸² By analyzing Lü's chapters about the Jurchen it is possible to find out what he in fact means “changing,” and how assimilative processes in his idea happen.

Lü begins by giving the usual, yet in his case abbreviated chain of ethnicities, from which the Jurchen derive and in which they would resolve later.¹⁶⁸³ Then he explains the origins of the term *Manzhou*, claiming that it derived from the title given to highest chieftains among the Jurchen and transcribed as *manzhu* in Ming times. But the people would have called themselves *Zhushen*, which would be the same like Jurchen (*Nüzhen*), which again would directly derive from the antique *Sushen/Suoshen*, a term, which

¹⁶⁷⁹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923] vol. 3, p. 22–39 (3a.3 “The Five Dynasties' Rise and Fall and the Invasion of the Khitan;” in table of contents p. 448–465), vol. 3, p. 61–115 (3a.5 “The Rise and Fall of Northern Song, Liao and Jin Dynasty;” 3b.1 “The War between Southern Song and Jin Dynasty;” “The Rise and Fall of the Southern Song, Jin and Yuan;” in table of contents p. 487–541).

¹⁶⁸⁰ Only ch. 3a.4 is an exception: “The weaknesses of the Northern Song.”

¹⁶⁸¹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], “Xu li,” vol. 1, p. 3.

¹⁶⁸² Ibid.

¹⁶⁸³ *Sushen of ancient times – Yilou of Han times – Mohe of Nanbeichao and Tang times – Jurchen since Liao times – Manchus since Ming times.* (Ibid., vol. 3, p. 61.) Already in the *Sanchao beimeng huibian* and in the *Jinshi*, the *Sushen* and the (Black water) *Mohe* are given as the ancestors of the Jurchen. (*Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 1. Translation see Franke: 1978b, p. 415. Xu Mengxin: 1973, ch. 3, p. 1–2. Translation see Franke: 1975, p. 122.)

already appears in the *Shangshu*.¹⁶⁸⁴ By linking three ethnic names from diverse temporal origin Lü aims to show that the Jurchen (= Sushen/Suoshen, Zhushen) have been in existence under the same name since several thousand years.¹⁶⁸⁵

When he comes to the rise of the Jurchen as a force to be reckoned with in Northeast Asia, Lü gives a first clue how his basic rule – that his history is only about people who “entered China and changed into an ethnicity of China” – refers to the Jurchen. Lü understands that cultural change could mean change into an ethnicity of China. He writes that the Jurchen “used the Tang Dynasty as their model and were not at all ashamed to turn to the civilized state (*wenming zhi guo*) in the East of the sea.”¹⁶⁸⁶ Apart from some few original Jurchen tribal offices, “the rest of the offices were all conveniently set up imitating the Han system (*Han zhi*).”¹⁶⁸⁷ Lü mentions that the Jin emperor Shizong (1123–1189, reign time 1161–1189) wanted “to preserve the culture of his original tribe,” and therefore founded the School for the Jurchen Sons of the State (*Nüzhi guozi xue*) and established Jurchen *jinshi* examinations.¹⁶⁸⁸ That Shizong’s measures were in vain becomes clear when Lü turns to the Jurchen military system. Lü claims that several decades after the Jin emperor Hailing wang (1122–1161, reign time 1149–1161) resettled Jurchen social-military units, that is, the Battalions (Thousand Households) (*meng’an*)¹⁶⁸⁹ and Companies (Hundred Households) (*mouke*),¹⁶⁹⁰ their “martial tradition and spirit” declined and ultimately lead to their defeat by the Mongols.¹⁶⁹¹

However, the real proof why the Jurchen are a part of China’s ethnicities through their blood anyway, and, in fact, did not necessarily have to become a part of it by cultural change, can be found later. Lü writes:

“The Imperial clan of the Jin Dynasty¹⁶⁹² simply are blood related descendants (*xue ying*) of the Han ethnicity. Why? Because the Jin clan (*Jin shi*) from the Korean Peninsula emerged from China (*Zhongguo*).”¹⁶⁹³

To prove that the Jurchen are blood relatives of the Han ethnicity, that is, that they belong to the same ethnicity not only cultural but moreover in terms of blood relation, Lü aims to show by two combined conclusions: first, that the Jurchen descend from the

¹⁶⁸⁴ The first time, Lü uses these characters for the Sushen, the second time he calls them Suoshen. (Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 61–62.)

¹⁶⁸⁵ That the similar sounding antique ethnic name Sushen/Suoshen seems to have vanished completely after Han times and suddenly reappears out of nowhere again as Jurchen (*Nüzhen*) in Wudai times does not seem to bother him.

¹⁶⁸⁶ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 463.

¹⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 151.

¹⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 156. See also *Jinshi*, ch. 51, p. 1131, 1133, 1140. See also Tillman: 1995, 34, Tao: 1995, 53.

¹⁶⁸⁹ Chinese: *qianhu*.

¹⁶⁹⁰ Chinese: *baihu*. Actually, when Taizu introduced this unit, it consisted of three hundred households. (*Jinshi*, ch. 2, p. 25.)

¹⁶⁹¹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 105–112; 161.

¹⁶⁹² Lü refers to the Wanyan clan.

¹⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 65.

Koreans, and, second, that the Koreans descend from the Han.¹⁶⁹⁴ This is a very complicated and highly assumptive approach.

Step One: The Jurchen Descend from the Koryŏ People

Lü refers to the *Jinshi*, where it is written that the ancestor of the imperial clan, Hanpu (10th century), originally came from Koryŏ (*Gaoli*) (918–1392). He concludes from this that the Jurchen as a whole ethnicity descend from Koryŏ people.¹⁶⁹⁵ In the *Jinshi* it is indeed said that Hanpu came from Koryŏ, but it further says that he joined the later imperial Wanyan clan as an outsider. *Only* Hanpu came from Koryŏ, but not the rest of the Wanyan clan. And only after Hanpu married a woman from the Wanyan clan and had two sons and one daughter with her, “he became a member of the Wanyan clan.”¹⁶⁹⁶

Lü further claims that the Jurchen derived from the Sungari Mohe and through them from the Parhae (*Bohai*) people, who established the Parhae kingdom (698–926) in the regions of today’s North Korea and today’s provinces Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang.¹⁶⁹⁷ A similar point of view is also taken in the 1920s by Liang Qichao, who claims like Lü that the Jurchen descended directly from the Parhae, and also by Liu Yizheng, who states that the Black Water Mohe were the same race as the Sungari Mohe and thus equally sinicized.¹⁶⁹⁸ Today, this connection of the Jurchen to the Parhae is rather unaccepted based on the sources from Jin and Yuan times.¹⁶⁹⁹

For Lü’s idea of the Jurchen’s assimilation to the Han the thesis of them descending from the Parhae people is however very important. According to the *Jinshi* the Parhae people had “script, rites and music, officials and offices and institutions.”¹⁷⁰⁰ Lü claims that the Parhae imitated the Tang in both “institutions and culture,”¹⁷⁰¹ and for him this meant that they were assimilated to the Han. If the Jurchen indeed derived from the Parhae people, then they were already assimilated to the Han before they founded the Jin Dynasty.

In contrast to Lü’s claim the *Jinshi* in fact describes clearly that whereas the Parhae descended from the Sungari Mohe, the Jurchen descended from the Black Water Mohe, who lived further in the North at the river banks of the Black Water (*Heishui*), today

¹⁶⁹⁴ See also Byington: 2002.

¹⁶⁹⁵ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 63–64; *Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 2.

¹⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. 1, p. 2–3. Translation see also Franke: 1978b, p. 417.

¹⁶⁹⁷ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 63. Parhae is the name of a kingdom, but it is often also used as a term for the ethnicity, which founded the kingdom. In the *Xin Tangshu* (*New History of the Tang Dynasty*) it is stated that it has been founded after Koguryŏ (called Gaoli as an abbreviation of Gaojuli in the text) (37 BC–668 AD) went down. (*Xin Tangshu*, ch. 219, p. 6179.)

¹⁶⁹⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 26; Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 2, p. 536.

¹⁶⁹⁹ In the *Da Jinguo zhi* and also in Korean sources the Black Water Mohe rather than the Sungari Mohe are given as the ancestors of the Jurchen. (Tao: 1976, p. 5; Yuwen: 2000, p. 160–161.)

¹⁷⁰⁰ *Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 1. Translation based on Franke: 1978b, p. 415.

¹⁷⁰¹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 63.

literally called “Black Dragon River (*Heilongjiang*)” in Chinese and Amur River in Western languages:

“The Sungari Mohe were first subject to Koryŏ and had the clan name ‘Great (*Da*).’ When Li Ji (594–669)¹⁷⁰² defeated Koryŏ, the Sungari Mohe defended the Dongmou Mountains (*Dongmou shan*).¹⁷⁰³ Later they became the Parhae and called (their rulers) kings, which has been transmitted for over ten generations. [...] The Black Water Mohe [...] living in the south were registered by the Khitan and called ‘cooked [= civilized] Jurchen (*shu Nüzhi*),’ whereas those living in the north were not included in the Khitan registers and called ‘raw [= wild] Jurchen (*sheng Nüzhi*).’”¹⁷⁰⁴

The *Jinshi* assumes that the Sungari Mohe, later Parhae, and the Black Water Mohe, later Jurchen, shared a common origin. But already in Tuoba Wei times (386–534) they were accounted as two different tribes. Thus, they must have split up already before the Parhae established their kingdom at the end of the 7th century.¹⁷⁰⁵

Also the Song official Xu Mengxin (1126–1207) states in his *Sanchao beimeng huibian* (*Compendium of Treaties with the Northern [Neighbors] during the Three Reigns [of Emperors Huizong, Qinzong, and Gaozong]*)¹⁷⁰⁶:

“Some think they [= the Jurchen] are of Black Water Mohe stock and thus a separate tribe of the Parhae. Or [some think that they are] the Chinhan (*Zhen Han*) [1st century BC–4th century AD] of the Three Han (K. *Samhan*, C. *Sanhan*).”¹⁷⁰⁷

During Jin times and also afterwards it was thought that the Jurchen derived from the Black Water Mohe. But Xu also gives an important hint when he writes that there are sayings about the Jurchen’s descent from the Chinhan, one of the Three Han confederations. As we shall see this is important with regard to Lü’s further approach.

Step Two: The Koreans Descend from the Han Ethnicity

After having claimed that the Jurchen derive from the Parhae, Lü tries to go even further and hopelessly ties himself up in knots on the way. To manifest his claim that the Jurchen are in fact blood relatives of the Han ethnicity, he must undertake the in fact impossible task to place their origin to the *southern* Korean Peninsula.

Lü claims to have shown in an earlier chapter that the inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula would stem from the Han ethnicity.¹⁷⁰⁸ However, what he tells in this earlier

¹⁷⁰² Li Ji, also Li Shiji, was a famous general of the Tang Dynasty under Emperor Gaozong.

¹⁷⁰³ The Dongmou Mountains are situated at the lower course of the Huifa River, a left tributary of the Sungari. (Yanai/Inaba/Matsui: 1912–1914, vol. 1, p. 340–342.)

¹⁷⁰⁴ *Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 1–2. Translation based on Franke: 1978b, p. 415–416.

¹⁷⁰⁵ *Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 1–2. Translation based on Franke: 1978b, p. 415.

¹⁷⁰⁶ Xu Mengxin: 1973.

¹⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 3, p. 1a; Translation based on Franke: 1975, p. 122.

chapter – without any source reference – is a rather complicated story of the forefathers of the founders of states on the Southern Korean Peninsula originally coming from Han Chinese places since Qin times. He names the founders of Silla (*Xinluo*) (57 BC–935 AD), and of three states later annexed by it, Chinhan (1st century BC–4th century AD), Pyōnhan (*Bianhan*) (until the 4th century) and Kaya (*Jialuo*) (43–532/562). Already in this chapter, he begins to exaggerate these assumptions and suddenly applies them not only to Silla and the states annexed by it, but moreover to all Three Han confederations (K. *Samhan*, C. *Sanhan*), although his original argument was only about two of them, Chinhan and Pyōnhan.¹⁷⁰⁹ By including also the third of the Three Han confederations in his argument, Lü territorially speaking comes closer to the region outside the Korean Peninsula in the Sungari and Amur regions where the forefathers of the Jurchen, be they Sungari or Black Water Mohe, came from.

Step Three: All People of the Korean Peninsula Descend from the Han Ethnicity

Indirectly, a further broadening is added in case of the Jurchen. Besides referring to the passage from the *Jinshi*, where it is said that one ancestor of the Jin imperial clan, Hanpu, came from Koryō, Lü cites a report from the *Koryōsa* (*History of Koryō*) (1451) compiled under the Chosōn (*Chaoxian*) Dynasty by Kim Chong-sō (1390–1453).¹⁷¹⁰ The passage is about Jurchen envoys, Huaifu (Lü quotes his name as Huaifushi) and others, sent to the court of Koryō to ask for peace. Actually, the way, in which Lü cites this passage, is rather strange for several reasons. Lü gives an inexistent date, the eighth year of the reign devise Chongning of Song Huizong (1082–1135, reign time 1100–1126). The reign devise Chongning in fact only lasted five years (1102–1106).¹⁷¹¹ Second, Lü writes that the envoys were sent by the Jin, but as the visit happened in 1108 or 1109 and the Jin Dynasty was only found in 1115, this is not possible.¹⁷¹²

¹⁷⁰⁸ He refers to a section in ch. 2b.1.6 “Chaoxian bandao Sanguo he Zhongguo de guanxi.” (In: Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 2, p. 167–168.)

¹⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷¹⁰ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 65, in small characters; *Koryōsa*, vol. 8, ch. 13 (Yejong, 4th year, 6th month). Lü refers to a source he calls *Hanguo xiaoshi* (*Han’guk sosa*). Although it seems as if he would refer to *Han’guk yōktae sosa* (*Short History of Korea’s epochs*) (1922) by Kim T’aeg-yōng (1850–1927), it is a word-for-word citation from the *Koryōsa*. The *Han’guk yōktae sosa* also refers to the event, but not with the same words. (Kim T’aeg-yōng: 1987 [1922], vol. 1, p. 469–470.)

¹⁷¹¹ In the *Koryōsa* and the *Han’guk yōktae sosa* the event is listed under the fourth year of the reign of king Yejong (*Muzong*) of Koryō (1079–1122, reign time 1106–1122), that is 1109. In the *Han’guk yōktae sosa* the alternative date according to the Song calculation of time is given as the third year of the reign devise Dagan of the Song emperor Huizong. Lü is also incorrect in the sense that if the reign devise Chongning would have had an eighth year, it would have been 1108.

¹⁷¹² In the *Koryōsa*, it is said that the envoys were sent by the “Eastern Fan (barbarians)” (*Tongbōn*, *Dongfan*), which seems to be a general term for both Jurchen as well as Tangut. Also the term Jurchen (*Yōjin*) appears frequently, but naturally the Jin Dynasty is not mentioned. According to the envoy himself he was sent by Wuyashu (1061–1113), chief of the Wanyan clan, and indeed the elder brother of the first Jin emperor Taizu. Wuyashu was posthumously called Kangzong. His brother Aguda (1068–1123, reign time as Jin emperor 1115–

Besides all these mistakes or misunderstandings the main point of interest for him is what Huaifu says to the king of Koryŏ:

“The Great Chief (*taishi*)¹⁷¹³ Yingge¹⁷¹⁴ often said that our ancestors came from this great country (*da guo*) [= Koryŏ] [...]. Also the present Grand Chief Wuyashu thinks of this great state as the land of his parents (*fumu zhi guo*).”¹⁷¹⁵

In fact, a similar passage can be found in the *Jinshi*, where it is said that Aguda, later Jin Taizu (1068–1123, reign time 1115–1123) sent two ambassadors¹⁷¹⁶ not to Koryŏ, but to the Parhae (*Bohai*) people to tell them in a similar way: “The Jurchen and the Parhae originally stem from the same one family.”¹⁷¹⁷ Both declarations sound indeed like diplomatic strategies to secure alliances by strengthening the believe in a common descent. For Lü, however, this is another strong evidence for his claim that the Jurchen were of the same origin as the Koryŏ people and – through them – blood related to the Han ethnicity.

It has to be remembered that Lü originally already broadened his hypothesis of the Han descent of people on the Korean peninsula to the Three Han Confederations in the South, which is approximately the territory of South Korea today. By quoting one obscure passage from a contemporary history where a common descent of the Jurchen and the Koryŏ people is claimed for political reasons in the framework of peace negotiations, Lü assumes that the Jurchen were related to the people of Koryŏ. Moreover, without further explaining how this happened he also suddenly assumes that the people of Koryŏ, which embraced the whole Korean Peninsula, were in fact of Han descent. To put a long story short, Lü completes his chain of proofs as follows:

The founders of some southeastern states on the Korean Peninsula are supposed to have come from Han Chinese regions since Qin times and thus to be blood related to the Han people. Lü broadens this to the assumption that all people from the Korean Peninsula including the Koryŏ people came from China and were thus Han people.

1123) followed him as chief in 1113 and two years later proclaimed the Jin Dynasty. (Biography of Wuyashu see *Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 16–17; see also ch. 2, p. 21–22.)

¹⁷¹³ The translation of *taishi* would be Grand Preceptor in a Chinese context. But here it refers to a supreme tribal chieftain.

¹⁷¹⁴ Wanyan Yingge (1053–1103) was an uncle of Wuyashu and Aguda. He was posthumously called Muzong. (Biography see *Jinshi*, ch. 1, p. 12–15.)

¹⁷¹⁵ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 65 in small characters.

¹⁷¹⁶ Their names are Liang Fu and Wodaci or Gandaci. At another place it is said that they were Bohai people themselves. (*Jinshi*, ch. 2, p. 25.)

¹⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 1, p. 2 and ch. 2, p. 25. And the *Jinshi* resumes: “So, they all were once of the seven tribes of the Mojie [= Mohe].” (*Ibid.*, ch. 1, p. 2.) That the seven tribes of the Mojie were united in Sui times and called Mohe is stated in the *Jinshi*. The *Sanchao beimeng huibian* writes that the Mojie of Tuoba Wei times are in fact the Heishui tribe of Sui and Heishui Mohe of Tang times. (*Ibid.*, ch. 1, p. 1, see also Franke: 1978b, p. 415; Franke: 1975, p. 123, translated from third chapter.)

Hanpu, one of the ancestors of the Jurchen Imperial clan, came from Koryō. Lü broadens this to the assumption that all Jurchen people were related to the people of Koryō and thus to the Han people.

And if these arguments are not sufficient proofs of the Jurchen being part of China's people, Lü still has the argument of their connection to the sinicized Parhae up in his sleeves.

Territorial Assimilation

Although Lü has interpreted the Jurchen as being part of China with regard to their descent (via Hanpu, Koryō and the Three Han and also via the Sungari Mohe and Parhae), the territory they inhabit seems not to be part of China, at least not in modern antiquity (755–1279). This becomes clear when Lü speaks of certain regions, that is, the “sixteen prefectures (*liushi zhou*),”¹⁷¹⁸ which the Khitan conquered and of which fourteen were taken over by the Jurchen later.¹⁷¹⁹ In this context, the Khitan are said to “invade China (*qinru Zhongguo*),” when they conquered these regions, and later to loose these “territories of China (*Zhongguo difang*)” to the Jurchen again. This implies that neither the Khitan nor the Jurchen came from within China, but that they certainly came from “outside the country (*guowai*),” although they conquered and reigned Han Chinese regions, which nevertheless stayed Han Chinese also during their overlordship. Here, Lü considers only those regions as China (*Zhongguo*), which are inhabited albeit not governed by Han people.¹⁷²⁰

What is China shifts over time. Lü shows this with regard to the Korean Peninsula. He states that Han Wudi added Korea to “China's territory (*Zhongguo de bantu*),” but when China's power was not sufficient to influence Korea anymore, it was lost again.¹⁷²¹ So, Non-Han regions reigned and influenced by Han Chinese are Han Chinese, but would become Non-Han again when this reign and influence stopped, whereas regions inhabited by Han people, but reigned by Non-Han can still be considered to be part of China.

¹⁷¹⁸ *Liaoshi*, ch. 37, p. 437.

¹⁷¹⁹ Liao Taizong had conquered the sixteen prefectures from the Song in 937. Since then, the Liao reigned them with help of the puppet regime of the Shatuo Turkish Later Jin Dynasty (*Hou Jin*) (936–947). Two of them were re-conquered by the Later Zhou Dynasty (951–960) and incorporated in the Song Dynasty, the political successor of the Later Zhou.

¹⁷²⁰ Already the Khitan and later the Jurchen organized their subjects with regard to ethnic identity using the term “Han people (*Hanren*),” although ethnicity might have had another meaning. However, based on ethnic identity they tended to divide people into different political classes with very practical effects on policies. Later, the Manchu Qing would do the same.

¹⁷²¹ Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 2, p. 166.

Lü does not seem to consider the regions inhabited by the Jurchen during middle antiquity and called Manchuria today as belonging to China in his chapters about Song times.¹⁷²² But for modernity (1279–today) Lü argues:

“Originally, the three Provinces outside the east of the [Hangu] pass were the native place of the Qing Dynasty. But actually, it can not be counted as their native place, because Liaodong and Liaoxi (*Liaodongxi*) originally were Han Chinese Commanderies (*jun*) and Districts (*xian*).”¹⁷²³

Liaodong and Liaoxi, positioned in today’s Liaoning and Hebei provinces, were indeed Commanderies of the Qin Dynasty (221–207 BC).¹⁷²⁴ Again, Lü clarifies that a region once Han Chinese will always stay Han Chinese. In this case he does not gladly use the opportunity to make the Manchus Han Chinese because they claim a region to be their native place, which in fact is Han Chinese. Strangely, he denies them their native place with explanatory statement that these regions would have been Han Chinese Commanderies and therefore could not be the native place of the (Non-Han) Manchus. So, in case of Manchuria, assimilation is achieved differently: by migration of Han people, which began in Qing times and made the Three Northeastern Provinces an integral part of China.¹⁷²⁵

In contrast to Lü’s approach to the Jurchen, he does not try to put the Khitan ethnically closer to the Han people.¹⁷²⁶ Also with regard to culture, Lü does not seem to be keen on showing the assimilation of the Khitan, it even seems as if he wanted to differentiate them especially from the Jurchen case. This comes to the fore in a chapter about “Song Liao Jin Yuan si chao de zhengzhi he shehui (The governments and societies of the four dynasties: Song, Liao, Jin and Yuan),” the concluding chapter of the part on modern antiquity.¹⁷²⁷ Lü mentions several times that the way of the Jurchen was different from that of the Khitan. He refers to the fact that the Khitan’s government was divided into two distinct systems in the North and the South in order to meet the different administrative requirements of the Han sedentary farmers and the Khitan nomadic cattle drovers. Only the Southern system would have been an imitation of Han Chinese institutions.¹⁷²⁸ In contrast to that, the Jurchen would have completely taken over the Han style institutions and also based their laws on Sui, Tang, Song and Liao codes. Lü explains that this was due to the fact that the Jurchen were a small and moreover primitive ethnicity and thus had to rely on others, whereas the Khitan were a

¹⁷²² Ibid., vol. 3, p. 68.

¹⁷²³ Ibid., vol. 4, p. 65.

¹⁷²⁴ They had originally been established during the reign of King Zhaoxiang of Yan (*Yao Zhaoxiang wang*) (d. 279 BC) during the Warring States Period.

¹⁷²⁵ Ibid., vol. 4, p. 65–67.

¹⁷²⁶ He writes that they stem from the Yuwen clan of Xianbei ethnicity and that the Xianbei themselves were very close to the Xiongnu. (Ibid., vol. 2, p. 143–144, see also vol. 3, p. 25.)

¹⁷²⁷ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 145–194.

¹⁷²⁸ Ibid., vol. 3, p. 149–150; 165–166.

large ethnicity.¹⁷²⁹ Similarly, Lü writes about official examinations that the Khitan introduced them only to recruit Han officials for the Southern government, whereas the Jurchen moreover introduced Jurchen official examinations, because especially emperor Shizong wanted to support Jurchen cultural progress.¹⁷³⁰ With regard to their military system, Lü has not much to say about the Khitan, but gives a more detailed account of the Jurchen's system. He claims that the Jurchen always would have been rather weak because of their small numbers and thus had included other ethnicities in their military units. But then emperor Xizong weakened the troops by excluding Han and Parhae people from the Battalions and Companies. Without the help of the Han, Lü claims that the Jurchen Jin would have been doomed.¹⁷³¹

Lü considers both, cultural assimilation as well as ethnical relations as important arguments for the Jurchen's integration into a history of China. On the one hand, Lü follows Liang Qichao and Liu Yizheng in their claim that the Jurchen in fact did not descend from the Black Water Mohe, but from the Sungari Mohe, because only then it was possible to create a link to the Parhae people, who were generally considered to be sinicized. That this claim is against all main primary sources does not seem to bother them.

What seems equally important to Lü is the Jurchen's integration into China's ethnicities in terms of blood relations by tracing their descent to the Han. This is rather uncommon and proves extremely difficult. Lü's analysis of the Jurchen imperial clan's ancestry and his conclusion that they originated from Han stock is so important to him that he dedicates many pages to proof this farfetched and rather complicated theory.

One question remains open and that is Lü's miss of explaining in an equal way why he integrates the other Non-Han dynasties, especially the Khitan Liao and the Mongol Yuan into his general history, because in their cases he does not seem to be so confident that they were assimilated as he is in case of the Jurchen. The most probable explanation, although Lü does not give it, is that they ruled over Han inhabited regions. However, this is also the case with the Jurchen. Why was it more important to show that the Jurchen were assimilated than to show the same for the Khitan and the Mongols? In my opinion, Lü's emphasis of the Jurchen has two reasons. On the one hand, it is a reaction on the Japanese growing interest in Manchuria. It seemed necessary to make the historical point that Manchuria with all its inhabitants became part of China culturally and ethnically already one thousand years before. On the other hand, the Jurchen are the forefathers of the Manchus and if their assimilation is proven then the Manchus also can be assumed to be assimilated.

In his argumentation, Lü is following Liang Qichao. Also for Liang, the Jurchen are the Non-Han conquerors, who inevitably sinicized, whereas his statements about the Khitan

¹⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 150, 166.

¹⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 155–156.

¹⁷³¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 160–162.

are not as explicit.¹⁷³² But for Liang the sinicization thesis is in the end valid for every ethnicity coming into contact with the Han, whereas Lü emphasizes the Jurchen's assimilation above the others. Although Lü's ideas about the racial unity of Han and Jurchen seems farfetched, his analyses of the Jurchen's assimilation with regard to cultural issues is not illogical. Liang does not bother to analyze processes of assimilation deeply, but Lü does. And so, Lü comes to the conclusion that the Jurchen were in fact much more assimilated than the founders of other Non-Han dynasties, because the Jin Dynasty developed a more extensive centralization than the Liao or the Yuan did. That the Jin emperors made most skilful use of Han Chinese institutions to attain their goal of a autocratic system was and still is often interpreted as sinicization. Although this conclusion is debatable, Lü obviously tried to approach Non-Han dynasties more analytical than Liang or Liu Yizheng did.¹⁷³³

5.4 Conclusion: Historiography in the 1920s and Their Approach to Non-Han Dynasties and People

The approaches to Non-Han histories and the question of assimilation in Liu Yizheng's *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (1928) and Lü Simian's *Baihua benguo shi* (1923), but also the theoretical idea of sinicization in Chen Yuan's "Yuan Xiyuren Huahua kao" (1923 and 1927) and in Feng Chengjun's "Tangdai Hanhua fanhu kao" (1930) show that the scholarly discourse on an "assimilative power" inherent in the Han people had come to a temporary halt. From the beginning it had not been a strongly multi-layered discourse, as the premises for it were, in fact, shared by all participants: the Han people were perceived as culturally superior to the surrounding Non-Han. I have argued above how this reveals that a certain part of culturalism continued to be an important concept of self-image of the Han people, although it was clearly territorially diminished by the Imperialists.

In the 1900s, Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan had combined the culturalist idea of the Han people with the new requirements of nationalism and came to the idea that an "assimilative power" of the Han people would enable them to include also the vast Non-Han regions of the Qing Empire into a nevertheless Han Chinese nation-state. Liu Shippei had argued the opposite and called for an exclusive Han nationalism, but his approach was also based on the culturalist assumption of cultural superiority of the Han people.

¹⁷³² Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 13, 26.

¹⁷³³ See also Schneider, J.: 2012.

In the texts of the 1920s it comes to the fore that culturalism is still at the basis of the idea of Han people's identity when compared to that of the Non-Han around them. This meant that neither Liu Yizheng nor Lü, Feng or Chen developed multicultural approaches to China's history in the 1920s. They accepted that in the context of China's history there would always have been a (culturally) dominant ethnicity, the Han "subject of assimilation,"¹⁷³⁴ opposed to many other (culturally) dominated or even uncultivated ethnicities, the Non-Han objects. Non-Han histories are included into the big picture as long as they are related to Han history, but they are not fully fledged parts of national history.

Liu's and Lü's main point to include Non-Han conquest dynasties is to show how and that they assimilated. Using their approaches to certain Non-Han dynasties – the Khitan Liao (907–1125), the Tangut or Western Xia (1038–1227), the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234) and the Manchu Qing (1644–1912) – I have shown that they try to use scholarly means to verify the assimilation of the founding ethnicities, but that they tend to generalize and simplify their histories. This means that although Liu and Lü include Non-Han histories in order to show how the Non-Han people and their territories became part of China, they do not treat them as full and equal parts of history in contrast to their Han counterparts. Their histories are mostly only depicted in connection to Han history.

Liu accepts that an "assimilative power" of the Han people exists. However, in his reasoning why this power exists his ideas differ from Liang's. As we have seen in the fourth chapter, Liang at last approached his theory of an "assimilative power" in a more or less academic way in 1922. He gave a list of eight reasons for the Han assimilative power and especially for its impact independent from the Han being politically and militarily inferior or superior.¹⁷³⁵ Liang mentioned certain factors, which on the one hand provided for a strong feeling of unity among the Han people and on the other hand empowered them to assimilate others. Among other things, he lists the *Lebensraum*, the script, a generally peaceful attitude towards the world, the economic ability, and a strong cultural influence, independent of being conquered or conquerors.¹⁷³⁶ Liu on the other hand gives only three reasons for the assimilative power of the Han people: Non-Han people were used to Han politics and teachings, Han politics and teachings were generally valid and known, and Non-Han conquerors used the help of Han people to govern.¹⁷³⁷

Whereas Liang's lists contains seven general characteristics and only one, which is directly connected to the Han peoples's relation with the Non-Han people, that is, the strong cultural influence of the Han people on everyone be it conqueror or conquered, all three points of Liu are directly linked to the Non-Han people. But although Liang and Liu seem to have different approaches with regard to their lists, it becomes obvious with

¹⁷³⁴ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 33.

¹⁷³⁵ See above Chapter 4.3 (subchapter "Attempt of a More Precise Approach in 1922").

¹⁷³⁶ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 33.

¹⁷³⁷ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 364.

regard to their concrete case studies that in fact they have very similar ideas. I.e. Qichao argues that one reason for the Miao people's assimilation was that Hua people became high-ranking members of Miao tribal societies.¹⁷³⁸ This is in accordance to Liu's idea of Han political advisers in the Liao, Jin and Western Xia societies. Both also share the belief in a general validity and knowledge of Han traditions, ethics and customs outside the Han Chinese world.

This also seems to be the basis of Lü's understanding of the processes of assimilation to the Han people. In contrast to Liu and Liang, Lü does not elaborate on his ideas about an "assimilative power," although he uses it as a basic theory for his approach to the Non-Han. In my exemplary analysis of Lü's construction of the assimilation of the Jurchen it comes to the fore that Lü also considers the aspect of blood relation as crucial for the assimilative process. By constructing a complicated lineage from the Jurchen back to the Han people of Qin times (221–206 BC) and at the same time trying to show the cultural assimilation of the Jurchen, Lü is able to interpret the Jurchen not only as culturally assimilated, but moreover integrated into the Han race with regard to their blood relation. In this one respect, Lü differs from the other historians' ideas of assimilation.

In their essays, Chen and Feng give their general ideas and theoretical approaches to the theory of assimilation to the Han people, a process for which they use the new terms *Hanhua* and *Huahua*. It comes to the fore that they share the culturalist idea of the assimilation of the Non-Han people living closely to the Han. Chen makes a clear distinction between the founders of Non-Han dynasties in what he considers to be China with their "immature" culture (Khitan, Jurchen and Mongols) and other Non-Han people, who according to him would have been influenced by Chinese script and institutions since a long time (Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese and Ryukyuan), on the one side, and people outside this sphere of influence, who developed their own cultures (Uyghurs, Tujue Turks, Persians, Arabs and Syrians), on the other. The former would easily sinicized, whereas the latter would only sinicize if they lived in China.¹⁷³⁹ Also Feng writes that sinicization would mainly refer to the change of "racial character" and absorption of Non-Han people around the Han (Xianbei, Tujue Turks, Uyghurs, Tufan Tibetans, Khitan and Jurchen). Although Feng's and Chen's image of the Han people's "racial character" differs – Feng's image being much more inclusive than Chen's – they come to the same conclusion that the Non-Han around them would have merged into "the great ocean" of the Han race.¹⁷⁴⁰

Liu, Lü, Chen and Feng similarly believed in the idea of a cultural superiority of the Han Chinese and the quasi natural and automatic assimilation of others coming into their sphere of influence, Liang's "assimilative power." Liu's description of Non-Han

¹⁷³⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1922_1], p. 14–15.

¹⁷³⁹ Chen Yuan: 2000 [1923–1927], p. 2; see also Chen Yuan: 1966, p. 3–4.

¹⁷⁴⁰ Feng Chengjun: 1930, p. 67.

people as being empty vessels to be filled with culture, that is, Han Chinese culture, is valid for the images of all these historians despite their different social, academic and political background. The acceptance of Liang's "assimilative power" seems to complete and unquestioned. The historians of the 1920s use it as a basic assumption, even as a basic theoretical background for their analyzes of Non-Han cultures and histories. The discourse so to speak was closed for the time being.

Let me refer to one last example: that of the eminent historian Gu Jiegang (1893–1980). He was one of the most important and influential historians of the 20th century and was already active in the 1920s. He is famous for having been involved in the Doubting Antiquity Movement (*yidu yundong*), the "most prominent academic debate of the 1920s."¹⁷⁴¹ It is assumed that Gu imagined "China as a multiethnic and many-cultured country" and that he showed a "high regard for China's minority ethnic groups."¹⁷⁴² Especially with regard to antiquity, Gu's idea of China was multicultural and multi-ethnic. In his famous book *Gushi bian* (*Debates on Ancient History*) (1926–1944), Gu puts forward his opinion that when China was unified under Qin Shi Huangdi in 221 BC, the earlier ethnical and cultural diversity had been concealed and the origin of the united "nine regions (*jiu zhou*)" was claimed to have lied not only in the Warring States Period but already earlier.¹⁷⁴³ By this approach Gu put himself in opposition to the official KMT reading of China's history as being one of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous China since five thousand years.¹⁷⁴⁴ About the Non-Han people after Han times Gu writes in 1926 that "if it had not been for the invasion of the Five Hu (*Wu Hu*) Barbarians, the Khitan, the Jurchen and the Mongols [4th–14th century], by which the Han ethnic people gained a bit new blood, I fear that the Han ethnicity could not have survived until today."¹⁷⁴⁵ However, Gu's assumption that "fresh blood" let the Han regain strength does not mean that he accepted multi-culturalism for the time after antiquity. Leibold traces this approach to the "American and British paradigm of diffusionism," which refers to the theory that the mixing of different ethnicities brings about a stronger and "evolutionary dynamic civilization."¹⁷⁴⁶ Gu explains that the new opponents of China, which endanger its integrity would be the imperialist powers, which would be culturally superior to the Han – unlike the neighboring Non-Han ethnicities, with which the Han had to deal before. Like the other historians in the 1920s he assumes that the Non-Han "usually assimilated to us (*yiban gei women tonghua*)."¹⁷⁴⁷ Gu would eventually change his opinion. But in the 1920s with regard to the Non-Han, with which the Han Chinese came

¹⁷⁴¹ Moloughney/Zarrow: 2012, p. 23. About Gu Jiegang's role in the Doubting Antiquity Movement see also Moloughney: 2012, p. 241–246.

¹⁷⁴² Hon: 1996, p. 320.

¹⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 319–321.

¹⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¹⁷⁴⁵ Gu Jiegang: 1926, p. 89. Modified translation based on Hummel: 1966 [1931], p. 166–167 and Hon: 1996, p. 320.)

¹⁷⁴⁶ Leibold: 2012, p. 344. See also Marvin Harris' chapter on "Diffusionism" in Harris: 2001, 373–392.)

¹⁷⁴⁷ Gu Jiegang: 1926, p. 89.

into contact after antiquity, Gu like the others, Liu, Lü, Chen and Feng assumes their assimilation due to their inferior cultures.

The idea put forward by Gu that the Han ethnicity in origin was not pure had actually already been put forward by Liang Qichao in the 1900s. Similar to Gu, Liang saw this impureness as an advantage – symbolized by his simile of the coin, which becomes prettier when cheap metals are added –, but also made it very clear that it did not change the Han in the end, but that the Non-Han elements were merged into the Han invisibly.¹⁷⁴⁸ Another idea was that put forward by Fu Sinian in 1918 and Liu Yizheng in the 1920s, who both assumed contrary to Gu that the Han ethnicity had originally been pure and became mixed with others only in the first millennium AD. But like Gu and Liang, Fu and Liu did not assume that these mixings had cultural impact on the Han Chinese. The Non-Han elements were merged into the Han Chinese and became invisible.¹⁷⁴⁹ Because the Han Chinese culture was perceived as superior and dominant and therefore immune against changes from the outside, the concession that the Han ethnicity also contained Non-Han elements was rather an easy one. Mixing did not pose a problem to any Han Chinese nationalist historian – as long as ethnical impureness did not result in cultural impureness.

In the 1930s the “plural origins theory of Chinese civilization” like Gu had put it forward became more and more supported by Han Chinese scholars.¹⁷⁵⁰ Also Fu Sinian changed his opinion from his 1918 idea of a “China of pure Han ethnicity”¹⁷⁵¹ in antiquity to the acceptance that in prehistoric China there existed not only the Xia ethnicity’s culture but also others, which later became one.¹⁷⁵² This stayed the dominant understanding among Han Chinese scholars until early PRC times.¹⁷⁵³

¹⁷⁴⁸ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73. About Liang’s assumption that the Han ethnicity descended from several ethnicities, see *Ibid.*: 1983 [1906], p. 2. See also above Chapter 1.2 (“Liang Qichao’s Essay about Johann Kaspar Bluntschli”).

¹⁷⁴⁹ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181; Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 3.

¹⁷⁵⁰ Leibold: 2012, p. 350.

¹⁷⁵¹ Fu Sinian: 1980 [1918], p. 1229/181.

¹⁷⁵² *Ibid.*: 1934.

¹⁷⁵³ Leibold: 2012, p. 351.

Conclusion

“‘Nationalism’ is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as ‘neurosis’ in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a similar built-in capacity for descent into dementia, rooted in the dilemmas of helplessness thrust upon most of the world, and largely incurable.”¹⁷⁵⁴

Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain* (1977).

If we look at the map of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of today, we can see that most of its territory has been inhabited nearly exclusively by Non-Han people until recent times, when the government of the PRC advocated a migration politic, encouraging people from the densely populated Eastern parts of China – mostly ethnic Han – to move into these Non-Han areas. Before, the Han Chinese inhabitants of the PRC – adding up to more than ninety percent of the population – lived only in about forty percent of the territory in the East, whereas most of the official acknowledged fifty-five other ethnicities settled in the remaining sixty percent, although they constituted less than ten percent of the inhabitants.¹⁷⁵⁵ These conditions immediately pose the question, why the PRC is politically and demographically a Han Chinese dominated nation-state, although territorially its larger part is Non-Han?¹⁷⁵⁶ Why were Non-Han regions and

¹⁷⁵⁴ Nairn: 1977, p. 359.

¹⁷⁵⁵ Today, ethnic affiliation in China is defined on the one hand by the government, which officially acknowledges fifty-six ethnicities, and by the people themselves, who can claim to belong to one of these official acknowledged ethnicities. Thus, the basis of ethnic classification is identity and self-perception, but also the choice made by the state to acknowledge certain ethnicities and others not.

¹⁷⁵⁶ Eric Kaufmann and Oliver Zimmer suggest that there is an important interplay between the “manifestation of dominant group ethnicity” and the nation. Usually, “today’s norms of Western cultural liberalism are increasingly forcing dominant ethnic groups to define their ‘nations’ in inclusive ways that draw an ever firmer line between a once hidden dominant ethnies and its national covering.” In the case of China the Western norm of liberalism does not seem to play an influential role and the Han Chinese as the dominant group ethnicity – furnishing the nation “with legitimating myths, symbols and conceptions of territory” – seems unchallenged, and the major shift in nation-states Kaufmann and Zimmer assume to have happened

people included in the visions of this nation-state in the first place and later in the actual state? Or in other words, why has the CCP “inherited and recolonized” the Non-Han parts of the Manchu Qing geo-body?¹⁷⁵⁷

Recent events in the PRC have made it obvious that the official vision of the PRC as a “multi-ethnic” or “multi-national state (*duo minzu guojia*)” is contradicted by two facts. First, by the effective tension between the politically dominant Han ethnicity and other ethnicities labeled “minority ethnicities” or “minority nationals (*shaoshu minzu*).”¹⁷⁵⁸ Especially with the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, but in recent times also with the Mongols in Inner Mongolia there exist constant conflicts, which are also noticed outside the PRC, especially since they culminated around the Olympic Games in Beijing in August 2008. And second, by the not ungrounded accusations of the “minority groups” that the government tries to assimilate and marginalize them and their cultural traditions and thus *de facto* does not accept or support the PRC’s acclaimed multi-ethnicity but rather aims at homogenizing all inhabitants by certain strategies of sinicization.

In fact, tensions by reason of different ethnic and cultural background of people living in one Chinese nation-state began earlier than the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Already in 1912, after the decline of the Manchu Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the ethnic differences between Han and the large Non-Han ethnicities became especially threatening. The Qing had reigned a huge empire covering more space than any dynasty in East Asia before, except for the Khans of the Mongol Empire in the 13th and 14th century. Being Manchu and thus Non-Han themselves, they found a more or less stable course of integrating not only the Han inhabited regions, but also the large areas with other non-Manchu inhabitants like Tibet, East Turkestan (Xinjiang), Mongolia and the South of their empire by skillfully employing different methods of governance.¹⁷⁵⁹

When at the end of the 19th century Han Chinese political thinkers became attracted to nationalist theories and hoped for nationalism as a kind of silver bullet against all threats from the outside, but also as a cure-all for the problems within, they acted within their situation as Qing subjects and had the intention to reform the Qing government in a way that would lead to nation-building. At the beginning, a revolution

since the 1960s – “from ethnic to civic, from dominant ethnicity to multicultural, from *gemeinschaft* to individualism” – has not happened in the PRC yet. (Kaufmann/Zimmer: 2004, p. 66–67.)

¹⁷⁵⁷ Shih: 2011, p. 709.

¹⁷⁵⁸ According to James Leibold this term first appeared in the 1924 manifesto of the United Front of CCP and KMT. (Leibold: 2007, p. 11.)

¹⁷⁵⁹ Rawski: 1996, p. 831; 1998; Crossley: 1990a, 1990b, 1997; Elliott: 2001; Rhoads: 2000. However, also for the Manchus it was at times very difficult to integrate all non-Manchu people in one state. They had constant conflict especially with the Turkish (and Chinese) Muslims and at the beginning of the Qing Dynasty also with the Outer Mongols. The Tibetans also resisted too close control from the Manchu emperors despite their support of Tantric monasteries and studies. And of course the Han were a constant threat, sometimes by their open opposition like the Ming loyalists and the anti-Manchuists, but also because of their sheer number and their ongoing attempts to gain political influence. Peter C. Perdue writes that with their politics the Qing indeed “created proto-nationalities and proto-autonomous regions long before Sun Yat-sen or Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) came along to name them.” (Perdue: 2005b, p. 187.)

against and an overthrow of the Qing Dynasty was not what most of them aimed at. The state construct they acted in and thought of was politically, but also territorially the Qing Empire. At the beginning of Han Chinese nationalist thought around 1900 stood the idea that the Manchu Qing Empire could be made a Chinese nation-state, possibly with a constitutional monarchy.

Due to the unsatisfying reaction of the Qing government to political progress and reforms in the 1900s, the nationalist thinkers slowly began to think about building a new, non-monarchic Chinese nation-state. They continued to imagine it in the borders of the Qing Empire, both, the so-called reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao as well as the so-called revolutionaries like Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yat-sen. Although this image of a Chinese nation-state was also based on geopolitical and power political motives, the initial point lay in the beginnings of the nationalist movement as a reform movement, which tried to adjust the situation of the existing state the reformers lived in.¹⁷⁶⁰

The more these nationalist thinkers concerned themselves with nationalism, not only politically, but also theoretically, the more they got the impression that the Qing Empire's multi-ethnicity would be rather problematic under the pretext of nationalism and that a nation-state was more powerful, if it was united in the nationalist sentiments of its inhabitants. Although the nation-state was imagined as a multi-national state, most nationalist thinkers did not consider the idea that this multi-national character could lead to an equal distribution of political power between the diverse ethnicities.¹⁷⁶¹ Incited by genuine concepts of identity like the culturalist All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*) concept and influences of Western theories like social Darwinism and racism, they felt that due to the sheer numbers and their assumed cultural dominance and superiority of the Han Chinese, they should be in charge and at the core of this nation-state.¹⁷⁶² Their nationalist approach was therefore based on a territorial idea of the nation, but their ultimate aim was to establish an ethnic nation-state.

In order to build a strong nation-state the strengthening of homogenous national sentiment was desirable, if not inevitable. But how could they make Non-Han people

¹⁷⁶⁰ Already since the 19th century the British and the Russians had been threatening Qing China through Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang. After 1912, when the Republic of China had been founded, the politicians of the leading political party, the KMT, tried to win over these areas by words, but when the Communists founded the PRC in 1949 they both had the military power and also the ideological background to conquer and keep these regions finally. About the different strategies of the KMT and later the CCP see Leibold: 2007, "Part I: Strategies of Political Intervention", p. 51–109.

¹⁷⁶¹ Liang Qichao knows of the Suisse case but rejects this possibility for China. (Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 73.) The five-colored flag, which the Republic of China officially used from 1912 to 1928 – disrupted by the short interlude of Yuan Shikai's emperorship in 1916 –, was meant as a symbol for the unification of the five ethnicities in one nation-state. Each color stood for one ethnicity: red for the Han, yellow for the Manchus, blue for the Mongols, white for the Turkish Muslims and black for the Tibetans. The motto "Five Races under One Union (*wuzu gonghe*)" was, however, not reflected in politics. The ultimate aim was that the Non-Han ethnicities would eventually assimilate to the Han majority. (See also Leibold: 2007, p. 37–44.)

¹⁷⁶² See also Smith: 2008, p. 138f.

part of this nation-state not only territorially, but moreover ideologically and culturally? And how could Han Chinese nationalists legitimize their claim to the Qing Empire's geo-body if these people did not want to become part of the Chinese nation-state and had to be integrated against their will?

To bolster their vision of the Chinese nation-state in these large borders Han Chinese nationalist thinkers turned to history. Like, in fact, in all other nationalisms history became an integral part of Han Chinese nation-building. However, what makes Han Chinese nationalist historiography different from Western nationalist historiography is that it was based on a long tradition of using history as a guideline for present-day political legitimacy, a common strategy in Chinese political thinking since antiquity. In Europe, before the modern period "history was nothing but a private pastime for personal edification far removed from the centres of political power."¹⁷⁶³ But Han Chinese historians have always taken a central position politically and socially. Moreover, most late Imperial and early Republican political thinkers had received a traditional education during the Qing Dynasty and were broadly educated in Chinese history and historiography.¹⁷⁶⁴ Thus, they automatically turned to history in order to find strategies for the difficult situations they faced. Especially Zhang Taiyan but to a lesser degree also Liang Qichao and Liu Shipei were not only political thinkers, but also respected historians. They formed a most direct connection between political thinking and historiography in personal union. In his famous essay "Xin shixue (Renewing of Historiography)" (1902) Liang Qichao built on this traditionally high status of historians and made it the foremost aim of modern Chinese historians to strengthen Chinese nationalism, because historiography would be "the mirror of the nation-people (*guomin*)."¹⁷⁶⁵

When the Qing Dynasty proved more and more incapable to handle external, but also internal problems, and at the same time resisted reforms, first after the Hundred Days' Reform (1898), and then again after Cixi's death in 1905, even reformist thinkers came to the conclusion that the urgently needed reforms were not possible under the Qing government and that it therefore had to be overthrown. Already before the Qing emperor abdicated, the question of how to deal with the Manchu people became an important issue. For few like Liu Shipei, the Non-Han identity of the Qing emperors was an unbearable threat and led them to the conclusion that the Manchus, but also the other Non-Han people had to be excluded from a Chinese nation-state politically, but also territorially. Most nationalists never seemed to have earnestly considered to exclude the Non-Han regions from a Chinese nation-state, that is, territorially. Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen and since the later 1900s also Zhang Taiyan aimed at

¹⁷⁶³ Schneider, A.: 2012, p. 273.

¹⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 273–275.

¹⁷⁶⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 1.

an incorporation of all Qing Non-Han regions including Manchuria. To achieve this in a peaceful way, they expected them to become Han, that is, to sinicize so that they would be full members of a thus culturally-ethnically defined Chinese nation-state. Some of them also claimed that the Manchus had already assimilated and used this as an example for how easy sinicization would also be in the cases of other Non-Han peoples. If those Non-Han, who had been in a superior political position, were able to assimilate to the Han Chinese, this should be even easier for those in politically weaker positions.

Liang was the first of a long line of political thinkers and historians, who referred not only to the Manchu Qing, but also to other conquest dynasties, especially the Tuoba Wei (386–534), the Khitan Liao (907–1125) and the Jurchen Jin (1115–1234), to make a case for the validity of the theory of sinicization.¹⁷⁶⁶ Confirming his claim with historical evidences, Liang ascribed a certain “assimilative power (*tonghuali*)” to the Han people, which in his eyes was one of their foremost characteristics. It even provided him with an explanation why phases of foreign conquest in the history of the Han Chinese people had not necessarily to be interpreted as phases of decline. The Han people’s “assimilative power,” Liang claimed, was so forceful that it even worked, when the Han were in the political inferior position, conquered by Non-Han people. Liang claimed that despite its often unconscious appliance this power nevertheless would be so strong that Non-Han people coming into contact with the Han could not escape being assimilated, even if they had political power over them. He came to the conclusion that only the Mongols had resisted sinicization, but all others, be they conquerors or conquered, could not retain their own culture and sooner or later dissolved in the Han.¹⁷⁶⁷

Liang was the first historian, who tried to put the idea of an “assimilative power” of the Han people – based on older models of Han self-identity like the “Mencian” idea of “using the Xia to change the Yi (*yong Xia bian Yi*),” the All-under-Heaven concept and so-called culturalism – on a more or less theoretical basis.¹⁷⁶⁸ His essays from the 1900s can be seen as the beginning of an academic discourse about the sinicization theory and its gradual development into a generally accepted and widely used theory in historiography. In the 1900s, Liang propagated his idea of an “assimilative power” of the Han people in texts, which were mainly political despite their references to historiography, history, geography, anthropology and ethnology. It was a crucial part of his call to create national identity through history.¹⁷⁶⁹

In contrast to Liang, Liu Shipei and also at first Zhang Taiyan thought of ethnic identity as being fixed and unchangeable. In their opinion Non-Han people could not

¹⁷⁶⁶ The Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) was mentioned by Sun Yat-sen as an example for a sinicized dynasty as well. But mostly they were not seen as an example for assimilation. (Sun Yat-sen: 1994 [1924], p. 11; Liang Qichao: 1983 [1903], p. 76.)

¹⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.: 1983 [1906_1].

¹⁷⁶⁸ Schwartz: 1968, p. 281.

¹⁷⁶⁹ Bhabha (ed.): 2008; Duara: 1995; Anderson: 2006; Hobsbawm/Ranger (eds.): 2009.

become fully Han. Even if they adopted Han culture and civilization they would always stay beneath the Han. Zhang slowly changed his opinion. He began to admit that cultural change was possible, but at first he did not accept Liang's idea that the Han could assimilate others, even if they were politically inferior. In Zhang's opinion until the first half of the 1900s it was much more likely that the Manchus would have assimilated the Han than the other way round. Only in his famous essay "Zhonghua minguo jie" (1907) Zhang completely accepts the validity of the theory of an "assimilative power" and develops a rather detailed plan how Non-Han people, he mainly refers to Mongols, Tibetans and Turkish Muslims, could be sinicized in order to stabilize the future Chinese nation-state.

As political and historical thinking were so closely intertwined not least in the personal union of the thinkers themselves, Liang's and Zhang's ideas about assimilation and thus homogenization were rather quickly transferred to historiography. On the one hand this was done on a theoretical level by historians like Fu Sinian, who integrated the theory of an "assimilative power" in his idea of a periodization of China's history in 1918 and also by Liang himself. In the 1920s, Liang put the theory of an "assimilative power" on a further developed analytical foundation and thus succeeded in helping to further entrench it in historiography. On the other hand, historians took over the theory more and more and began to apply it automatically when writing on Non-Han people in general histories. When history as a modern academic university discipline evolved in China, the theory of an "assimilative power" became a basic starting point in historiography. In the 1920s, historians like Liu Yizheng, Feng Chengjun, Chen Yuan and Lü Simian did not explain why they accepted the assumption that Non-Han people were generally assimilated, but used the theory of an "assimilative power" as an accepted and basic concept of their approaches.¹⁷⁷⁰

That the Non-Han people and their dynasties nevertheless posed an unsolved problem to Chinese historians becomes obvious in general histories such as Liu Yizheng's *Zhongguo wenhua shi* (1925–1929, 1928). On the one hand, in the introduction Liu claims that it is his basic assumption that all Non-Han dynasties, people and cultures in China were assimilated and tracelessly integrated into the Han ethnicity. On the other hand, his chapter about the Liao, Western Xia and Jin dynasties is mainly the attempt to prove their assimilation to the Han in every possible aspect and not at all a history of their dynasties.¹⁷⁷¹ Also Lü Simian in his *Baihua benguo shi* (1924) sets out to prove in a fantastically complicated and nearly desperate way, in how far the Jurchen would in fact be of Han ethnic background.¹⁷⁷²

¹⁷⁷⁰ Fu Sinian: 1918, p. 1227/179–1229/181; Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], p. 3–9, 527–543.

¹⁷⁷¹ Liu Yizheng: 1988 [1928], vol. 1, p. 3–4, vol. 2, p. 527–543.

¹⁷⁷² Lü Simian: 1933 [1923], vol. 3, p. 61–65.

In both books a basic dilemma of the theory of an “assimilative power” comes to the fore. On the one hand, the historians claim that the Non-Han dynasties and their histories would rightfully be integrated into a general history of China or of Chinese culture, because based on the sinicization theory both authors think that the Non-Han ethnicities, which founded these dynasties, would have been sinicized in the course of their overlordship of Han inhabited regions. On the other hand, they do not truly analyze their histories as full parts of a general history. Despite their claim that these dynasties and peoples would belong to China’s history, they fall short in truly integrating them. The reason is that they only analyzed them with regard to two points: first, in relation to what they considered Han Chinese history; and second, with regard to their from the nationalist perspective necessary sinicization. These two points in fact are build on each other.

The Non-Han dynasties’ histories could not possibly be part of a Han Chinese nationalist history, as they had more often than not been the vis-à-vis of the Han in this history. The Liao for example had either been at war with the Northern Song or made them pay large amounts of tribute and address the Khitan emperors and empresses with respectful titles, and the Jin kidnapped the Song emperor and nearly the whole imperial family, causing the traumatizing exodus of the Song to the South in 1127, which is still referred to as the “humiliation of the Jingkang reign period (*Jingkang zhi chi*).”¹⁷⁷³ How could these people be part of a national history, which aim it was in Ernest Renan’s words to create “a heroic past, great men, glory (*un passé héroïque, des grands hommes, de la gloire*)” in order to produce “the social capital upon which one bases the national idea (*le capital social sur lequel on assied une idée nationale*)”?¹⁷⁷⁴ How could these for the Han painful and humiliating encounters be interpreted as “common glories in the past (*des gloires communes dans la passé*)”? How could one claim that these people and the Han had “performed great deeds together (*avoir fait de grandes choses ensemble*)”?¹⁷⁷⁵ This was not easily possible and also nationalist historians could not change the “cultural memory (*kulturelles Gedächtnis*)” of the Han people so much to make them believe that history had been one of joint glory of Khitan, Jurchen and Han.¹⁷⁷⁶

But Liang’s idea of an “assimilative power” of the Han provided a solution, which maybe was not very elegant, but convincing enough to make historians accept it as an approach. By claiming that the martially victorious Non-Han people were culturally defeated by the civilized Han, it could be stated that the Han won the day in the end. When this usage of the theory of an “assimilative power” was manifest in general

¹⁷⁷³ Wittfogel/Feng: 1949, p. 326–327.

¹⁷⁷⁴ Renan: 1882, p. 28; 2008, p. 19.

¹⁷⁷⁵ Renan: 1882, p. 28; 2008, p. 19.

¹⁷⁷⁶ In the case of the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Qing emperors this is sometimes tried by interpreting them as Chinese emperors and incorporating their conquest successes as positive parts of China’s history.

histories, it also reached more specialized works concentrating on contacts between Han and Non-Han people and foreign conquest dynasties in China.¹⁷⁷⁷

Liang's theory of a Han "assimilative power" had always been politically motivated. But it is often assumed that in the 1920s its political implication became more and more indirect, although it never completely disconnected from being part of political propaganda. This comes to the fore, when scholarship emphasizes that only after a phase of non-political historiography in the 1920s, the political aspect and impact of writing history had a vital comeback among Han Chinese historians in the 1930s, when the events in the Northeast of China re-strengthened the nationalist tendencies among Chinese historians enormously and made them political strategists.¹⁷⁷⁸

Since the beginning of the 20th century, but especially in the 1930s and 1940s Japanese historians had been interested in the history of what they called Manchuria.¹⁷⁷⁹ The Japanese historians tried to support the view of a culturally and politically independent Manchuria, thus legitimizing Japanese seizure of it in 1931 and Japanese installation of the last Qing emperor as a puppet emperor of the Manchu State (*Manchukuo*). Chinese historians answered this perception of an independent Manchuria by also turning towards the long neglected northeastern history to manifest its strong connection to and dependence on China. Five historians planned a collective work titled *Dongbei shigang* (*An Outline History of Northeast China*). In the end, only Fu Sinian published his part *Gudai zhi Dongbei* (*The Northeast in Antiquity*) in 1932.¹⁷⁸⁰ His work was translated into English and presented by the KMT government to the Lytton Commission of the League of Nations, which was meant to arbitrate between China and Japan after the Mukden Incident in 1931.¹⁷⁸¹ Fu and the other historians involved in the Northeastern history project used the theory of sincization to support geopolitical claims. Hon Tze-ki states about historical geography that it became "a strategic study of national defense" in the 1930s due to the Mukden Incident. This could equally be said for historiography.¹⁷⁸²

While I agree that the Mukden Incident was a major event having long-lasting effect on historiography especially on the Northeast and also supported the Han Chinese insistence of the validity of the theory of an "assimilative power," I also think that

¹⁷⁷⁷ See for example the works of Lü Simian and Jin Yufu (1887–1962). (Lü Simian: 1989 [1934], p. 153–194; 1992 [1940, 1946], p. 425–429; Jin Yufu: 1996 [1946], p. 100f.)

¹⁷⁷⁸ As Tze-ki Hon shows, this development in historiography is paralleled by the processes in historical geography (*lishi dili*). (Hon: 2012.)

¹⁷⁷⁹ Takeda: 1935; Shiratori: 1913, 1934; Inaba: 1914, 1935. See also Rawski: 2012, p. 47. The Chinese kept on calling this region the Northeast (*Dongbei*), implying it being a part of China and being defined by its position in the Chinese perspective.

¹⁷⁸⁰ Fu Sinian: 1932. Later Fu Sinian's part was simply called *Dongbei shigang*, although the other four parts were not included. Fang Zhuangyou (1902–1970), Xu Zhongshu (1989–1991), Xiao Yishan (1902–1978) and Jiang Tingfu (1895–1965) originally wanted to analyze the Northeast from Sui to Yuan, in Ming and Qing times, its official system and migration and its foreign affairs. Only Jiang Tingfu managed to publish parts of his findings in an essay in 1932. (Jiang Tingfu: 1932; see Parng: 1997, p. 14–20; Wang, Q. E: 2001, p. 171.)

¹⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.172.

¹⁷⁸² Hon: 2012, p. 325. About historiography in this respect see Schneider, A.: 1997; Wang F.: 2000.

events in other Non-Han regions, i.e. the Tibetan and Mongol declarations of independence, had a deep impact on Han Chinese historiography that has been neglected so far. Was the separation of Tibet and Mongolia in 1912 and the insecure situation in Xinjiang unimportant in comparison with the situation in Manchuria after the Japanese invasion? The Mukden Incident might have made the Han Chinese finally understand that the system of nation-states was “the tool of imperialist powers to dominate the world” and not the highest level of progressive linear history.¹⁷⁸³ Thus, the reflection of the Mukden Incident is probably more outstanding. But Han Chinese historians had been startled up already before by Mongolia’s and Tibet’s declarations of independence and by the unclear situation in East Turkestan, and had tried to argue for their inclusion with their historical writings in the 1920s.

In the years after the Mukden Incident, the 1930s and 1940s some few Han Chinese historians like Xiang Da (1900–1966) and Chen Yinque (1890–1969) rejected the theory of an “assimilative power” at least partly, but after the founding of the PRC in 1949 sinicization was taken as a basic historical theory, again used as one way of legitimizing the intended borders of the new Chinese state, being nearly the same as of the Qing Empire and the incorporation of Non-Han ethnicities.¹⁷⁸⁴ In Western historiography the theory was readily accepted. Only the Karl A. Wittfogel (1896–1988) and Feng Jiasheng (1904–1970) showed its worthlessness at least for the Khitan Liao dynasty already in the 1940s.¹⁷⁸⁵ Although they claimed the general falsity of what they called “traditional absorption theory” their critic went nearly unheard. Not until the 1990s a debate about the validity of the concept was raised and its use was modified on a greater scale at least for the Qing dynasty, the so-called New Qing History.¹⁷⁸⁶

In my dissertation I have shown how the politically motivated idea of an “assimilative power” of the Han people became an integral part of Han Chinese historiography by tracing its origin to Liang Qichao’s essays from the 1900s, but also by showing that its acceptance was not only limited to the so-called nationalist reformers, but moreover spread to the so-called nationalist revolutionaries. By taking a closer look into Zhang Taiyan’s essay “Zhonghua minguo jie” it has become obvious that also he considered the Non-Han regions as part of the Chinese nation-state and that also he aimed at using the “assimilative power” of the Han as a political tool to make the Non-Han part of this nation-state. The strict differentiation between reformers and

¹⁷⁸³ Ibid., p. 306.

¹⁷⁸⁴ Xiang Da: 1957, p. 1–3, Chen Yinque: 1945, p. 1–2.

¹⁷⁸⁵ Wittfogel/Feng: 1949, p. 14f. Feng Jiasheng already in the 1930s demanded that Chinese historians should pay more attention to border history. His reasons, however, were mainly national-political: “Foreign scholars are so eager to study our nation’s borders because of geopolitics. [...] Yet, their studies ultimately serve the interest of their nations, preparing for an expansion into our country.” If the Chinese wanted to secure their territory, they had to know about their border regions themselves. (Feng Jiasheng: 1935. “Dongbei shidi yanjiu zhi yiyou chengji.” In: *Yugong banyuekan* 2.10, p. 2. Cited from Hon: 2012, p. 324.)

¹⁷⁸⁶ Waley-Cohen: 2004; Zheng Xiaowei: 2003.

revolutionaries, which Frank Dikötter describes by attributing Liang's catch phrase of "large nationalism (*da minzuzhuyi*)" exclusively to the reformers, whereas the revolutionaries all would have favored "small nationalism (*xiao minzuzhuyi*)," is once again challenged by their identical approaches and imaginations of a Chinese nation-state with regard to Non-Han regions and people.¹⁷⁸⁷ Reformers like Liang Qichao and revolutionaries like Zhang Taiyan alike imagined the nation-state in the Qing borders, Liu Shipei being a rare exception. All of them, also Liu Shipei perceived Non-Han ethnicities as inferior in ways of culture and civilization, or even as having no culture at all. This is due to the reformers' and revolutionaries' shared ideas of ethnicity and culture, rooted in the All-under-Heaven concept, which is often equalized with culturalism.

Reformers and revolutionaries resemble each others opinion and also dilemmas with regard to their image of Han Chinese culture and ethnicity. Cultural and ethnical belonging are both seen as basic for identity in general, but also for national identity – "soft" cultural identifiers like custom and tradition, script and language, way of living and occupation, but also ethnic belonging terms of blood relation. In the context of nationalism and national identity, ethnic and cultural identity become blurred and undistinguishable.

We must thus reevaluate the opinion that those thinkers, who aimed at an exclusion of Non-Han people from a nation-state, it is said that they national identity as something fixed, based on pseudo-scientific racism. But Liu Shipei did not construct identity as stable, but admitted that others could join the Han culture and ethnicity. But he argued against these mixtures and fusions, because they would weaken the Han people and therefore also their possibilities to build a nation-state.

Those who aimed at an integration – and we have seen that nearly all reformers and revolutionaries wanted this – had to construct cultural and ethnical identity as unfixed, unstable and open for others to join. With regard to cultural identity this was not difficult and the assumption of assimilation was acceptable for everyone. That racial assimilation in forms of i.e. eugenics seemed to be much more difficult was not an important issue for the Han Chinese nationalist thinkers, because most people they wanted to integrate into the Han Chinese nation did not look very different with regard to their physical appearance.

Neither those nationalists favoring an including nationalism like Liang and Zhang, nor those favoring an excluding one like Liu seemed to have thought about what the Non-Han people wanted and planned. The fact that in the 1900s reformers and revolutionaries alike considered the Non-Han people as inferior with regard to cultural and ethnic characteristics shows that there is no abrupt change from earlier ways of Han Chinese self-identification to nationalist ones as reasoned by Joseph Levenson, that

¹⁷⁸⁷ Dikötter: 1992, p. 97.

is, not with regard to the differences between the Han Self and the Non-Han Other. In the case of Liang, Zhang and also Liu, a certain part of culturalism seems to be at the basis of their ideas of identity. This might also be due to the fact that with regard to culturalism two points have been stressed too much in my opinion: that in the setting of culturalism and the concept of All-under-Heaven the Han would have perceived of themselves as the *only* culture in the whole world; and that it would have come as somewhat like a shock when the Han discovered that they were not the only culture, but that there were other cultures, which were equal to the Han Chinese culture. But I think that with regard to the Han Chinese image of the Non-Han another inherent assumption of culturalism is more important. The culturalist idea is that there exists a hierarchy of cultural grades, which differ according to the distance from a certain cultural centre.¹⁷⁸⁸ That there was not only one cultural centre on earth, but also others might once have been new and disturbing, but these other centres were still far. There were enough people living much closer to the Han, whom they considered culturally inferior, to make them feel to be at least at one of the cultural centres. Moreover, I do not agree that the Han only began to discover that there were other people with cultures when they came into contact with the Europeans. This happened earlier, as they stood in contact with other civilizations before that as well which must have made them aware of this fact, i.e. the Buddhist-Indian, Arabic and Near Eastern (from the Chinese point of view near Western) cultures.

With regard to the Non-Han people it is not important, whether the Han people thought that their own cultural identity was the only one in the world. What is important, though, is that Han Chinese thinkers assumed that the Han and the Non-Han people were positioned on different stages of cultural development. The nationalist thinkers did not abandon this certain aspect of culturalism, that is, the idea of Han Chinese culture being superior to the 'barbarian' ways of those surrounding them closely, that is, the Non-Han people. Although culturalism lost its importance for an interpretation of the world, Liang, Zhang, and Liu stayed in its context, when interpreting the Non-Han people. Liang and Zhang thought that the Non-Han others should be helped to escalate these stages towards their highest level – Han Chinese culture and civilization – in order to become full members of a Chinese nation-state. Liu thought that the stages should stay fixed and everyone born on a certain cultural level should stay there in order to stabilize the Han Chinese nation-state. Non-Han should be prevented from climbing the stages of cultural development.

Although it is generally thought that culturalism and its inherent idea of cultural stages in China does not stem from modern times but seems to have been in existence since time immemorial, it became closely linked to other "isms," which have evolved in the recent centuries: first, historicism, that is, the notion of a universal pattern of linear

¹⁷⁸⁸ See also Fairbank: 1970, p. 2f.

progressive history, which is interpreted as following a universal pattern of cultural, historical, material and social progress leading automatically upwards towards modernity. Based on historicism, progress is perceived as being desirable and real. It can also be used to explain why some groups of people reach this modernity later than others. At the same time, it is a basic characteristic of culturalism. Second, a kind of what Shih Shu-Mei calls “China’s internal colonialism” (or “continental colonialism” in contrast to European colonialism overseas), which the Han nationalists wanted to inherit from the Manchu Qing Dynasty, maintaining and even to strengthening it.¹⁷⁸⁹

Chinese Historiography of the Non-Han and Said’s Theory of Orientalism

It is with three basic theories – culturalism, historicism and continental colonialism – where the early Han nationalists’ approach to the Other, that is, the Non-Han people in the Qing borders, resembles that of another modernism, which originally refers to the approach of Europeans to “another Other,” that is, the orient and the orientals: Edward Said’s orientalism.¹⁷⁹⁰ In the context of Han Chinese historiography and political thinking of the 1900s until the early 1920s it was not Westerners constructing the orient and the orientals, but Han Chinese historians and political thinkers constructing the Non-Han regions and people. The general pattern, however, is similar.

This comes to the fore when comparing the three basicisms of the Han Chinese nationalists’ approach towards the Non-Han people, culturalism, historicism and internal colonialism, with Edward Said’s epistemological foundations of orientalism, subsumed by Arif Dirlik: universalizing historicism, culturalist essentialism and intellectual imperialism. Historicism means that “spatial differences were thereby rendered into temporal differences,” culturalist essentialism “ignores differences within individual societies,” and imperialism aims at “dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”¹⁷⁹¹ This is in unison with Han nationalist historiography, which aims at depicting an image of the Non-Han inferior to the Han and assimilative by them; their culturalist approach, which assumes that the Non-Han people strive automatically to culture, synonymous with Han Chinese culture; and their wish to continue the Qing Empire’s colonization of and dominance in the Non-Han regions.

Both, orientalism and the approach of the Han Chinese nationalist thinkers and nationalist historians are closely linked to the question of the relation between the intellectual on the one side and political thinking and the state on the other. Said has shown the close relationship between scholarship and politics, the scholar and the state

¹⁷⁸⁹ Shih: 2011, p. 710–711.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Said: 1978.

¹⁷⁹¹ Dirlik: 1996, p. 97–98. See also Said: 1985, p. 102 and Conrad: 1999.

and has asked in how far non-political scholarship is even possible.¹⁷⁹² In the context of Chinese nationalist thinkers, a denial of a close relationship between intellectual and political thinking not even intended. Also with regard to Han Chinese historians, a clear differentiation between them and political thinking and the state does not seem to be an important desire. The fast connections between history and political thinking are in fact a basic and as I have described above not at all new condition in Han Chinese intellectual life. Naturally, also modern historians in the 1920s felt responsible for their state.

A last similarity between orientalism and the approach towards Non-Han people by Han Chinese nationalist thinkers and historians is their overgeneralization and homogenization of diverse individual societies and peoples. In Orientalism this happens literally under the term “orientals.” In the case of the Non-Han people it happens theoretically by treating them very much alike, and by not giving them much individuality, neither culturally nor historically.

Why orientalism in its construction of the Orient (by Europeans and as Dirlik points out also by Orientals themselves) is so similar to the construction of the Non-Han by Han Chinese nationalist thinkers probably lies in the answer to a central question Said poses: “Does the notion of it [= a distinct culture] always get involved either in self-congratulation (when one discusses one’s own) or hostility and aggression (when one discusses the ‘other’)?”¹⁷⁹³ Said argues that in the case of orientalism this would not be an automatism, but that the perpetuation of the orientalist approach would be a result of a “guild tradition of orientalism” taking over “the scholar, who is not vigilant, whose intellectual consciousness as a scholar is not on guard against *idees revues* all too easily handed down in the profession.” This unconscious, maybe naïve and inconsiderate acceptance helped that orientalist ideas “acquire authority, ‘normality,’ and even the status of ‘natural’ truth.”¹⁷⁹⁴

The same happened with the notion of Non-Han people in Han Chinese historiography and especially with regard to the theory of an “assimilative power” as we have seen. Han Chinese nationalist thinking definitely had and has a strong desire to dominate, restructure and take possession of the Non-Han people. This is based, first, on the notion of the Other being barbarian, uncultivated and beneath the Self, that is, the Han Chinese people and culture, and, second, the modern wish to integrate them into the imagined and the real Chinese nation-state. Liang moreover called Han Chinese historians to take up their intellectual arms in order to strengthen the Han Chinese national sentiment, and they felt that they had to join politics and form opinions in this way or the other. At first, the theory of an “assimilative power” had been applied

¹⁷⁹² Said: 1978, p. 326.

¹⁷⁹³ Ibid., p. 325.

¹⁷⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 326.

consciously, but it became more and more what Said calls “natural truth” in historiography since the 1920s, when it was used automatically as a basis for analyzing Non-Han people and their histories.

By comparing orientalism with the theory of an “assimilative power” and its implications for the histories of Non-Han people I do not want to suggest that the latter emerged from orientalist and orientalists’ influences on Han Chinese thinkers and historians. Here, my opinion differs from Dirlik’s, who claims that Western orientalist ideas were an “integral component” of Han Chinese history rewritten in the context of early Han Chinese nationalism.¹⁷⁹⁵ It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to show in how far orientalist approaches with regard to China were indeed not mainly based on the construction of Asia by Europeans, but on constructions of Asia by Asian themselves. To assume that the picture of China brought back to Europe by sinologists in the 18th, 19th and early 20th century was only shaped by their own ideas would mean to deny the Chinese themselves any influence in this image, which in my opinion is not at all likely.¹⁷⁹⁶

The parallels between orientalism and the approach towards Non-Han by Han Chinese nationalist thinkers and historians show that Han Chinese nationalist identity-building was not merely a case of self-orientalism by Han Chinese thinkers and that they did not only imagine a Chinese nation based on what they had learnt via Japan from the West. A very conscious usage of older concepts and strategies to construct the Self and the Other adapted to the needs of the hour become obvious in their constructing, imagining and narrating the history of the Non-Han people around them. Moreover, with regard to the Non-Han people and their integration into a Chinese nation-state there was no handy European strategy, which could be used right away for the situation in China. In case of the Non-Han people, history and identity were mainly constructed by Han Chinese – and partly Japanese – historians and taken over by Western sinologists.¹⁷⁹⁷ One question remains of course, and that is in how far the Non-Han were involved in creating their own picture. Others, who are better acquainted with modern Mongol, Tibetan, Uyghur and Manchu history, will have to answer or already have answered this question elsewhere.¹⁷⁹⁸

¹⁷⁹⁵ Dirlik: 1996, p. 107.

¹⁷⁹⁶ Dirlik suggests to view orientalism as a product of “contact zones,” a term which refers to borderlands or zones of exchange and which he borrows from Mary Louis Pratt. (Ibid., p. 112.) On the other hand, Dirlik seems to assume that Chinese themselves came to shape orientalist images of China only second after the Europeans when he approves of Lionel Jensen’s idea of a Jesuit “invention of Confucianism.” (Jensen: 1997, p. 26; Dirlik: 1996, p. 105.) It seems highly improbable to me to assume that the Jesuit were not at all influenced by constructions and images of Confucianism as a state orthodoxy by the Chinese dialog partners. It makes much more sense to assume that the Jesuits took over the Chinese images of themselves than constructing completely new ones, which then in turn got back to China in a kind of self-orientalism.

¹⁷⁹⁷ For the case of the Jurchen Jin see for example Schneider, J.: 2011, p. 348–362.

¹⁷⁹⁸ See i.e. Lattimore: 1955; 1962; Smith: 1996; Rudelson: 1997; Bulag: 1998; Liu X.: 2006.

In this dissertation I have shown that there existed the fast opinion among nationalist thinkers that the assimilation of Non-Han people, which was seen as a cultural progress, was considered to be not only desirable, but moreover necessary in order to build the Chinese nation-state. This contradicts the notion of many modern scholars of Han Chinese nationalism and nationalist historiography with regard to the Non-Han. They often claim that Han Chinese nationalist thinkers from late Imperial but also from Republican times aimed at a multi-ethnic nation-state and that this was also reflected in their approach to history. James Leibold states that one of the most important contributions of the Qing Dynasty to a “modern Chinese identity” was that “of a multiethnic empire of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Sino-Muslim peoples that provided the foundation for reconstituting the new Chinese nation as a unitary yet multi-ethnic state.”¹⁷⁹⁹ Peter Zarrow writes that “late Qing and early Republican histories had shared a sense of ‘China’ as a multiethnic project: politically unified (except when it wasn’t) but ethnically divers. Nationalist history books [from the late 1920s] instead stressed Han ethnic identity of China, and the ‘foreignness’ and oppressive rule of both the Manchu-Qing and the Mongol-Yuan.”¹⁸⁰⁰ But even in the later history books, he writes that national identity was based “on the state, not race. The state [...] transcended both races and dynasties.”¹⁸⁰¹

As shown in my dissertation Han Chinese nationalism was build on earlier notions of identity. It was therefore not an entirely modern way of identity thinking, but one merged into older concepts. The Han Chinese nationalists looked on the Non-Han people at their borders – and I do not mean political or territorial borders, but identity borders, borders between what belongs to the Self and what belongs to the Other – in the same way as most Han Chinese thinkers had looked at them before: Mongols, Manchus, Turkish Muslims and Tibetans were not perceived as cultured or even individual. Through the eyes of Han Chinese thinkers, their Non-Han counterparts are strangely passive, they are interpreted as inferior objects (*ke*), which can be handled by superior subject (*zhu*), the Han. Due to their assumed passiveness, which also means that they are not considered to be able to speak for themselves, they are imagined as being easily assimilated. They seem to resemble empty vessels to be filled with culture. As mentioned before in the context of European colonialism this image of the outside Other has been called “the myth of emptiness”. Non-European countries were perceived as empty “of ‘rationality,’ that is, of ideas and proper spiritual values,” empty “of basic

¹⁷⁹⁹ Leibold: 2007, p. 19.

¹⁸⁰⁰ Zarrow: 2012, p. 174.

¹⁸⁰¹ Ibid., p. 186.

cultural institutions,” and sometimes even empty of people.¹⁸⁰² Due to the assumed emptiness, assimilation inevitably must be a progress.

The difference between the Non-European Other in the European case and the Non-Han Other I have analyzed in my dissertation is that between Europeans and non-Europeans there existed also physical differences. These were linked to cultural differences and formulated as pseudo-scientific racism. (Of course, this also happened in China with regard to different looking people.¹⁸⁰³) The main difference between racism and what is called ethnocentrism is the possibility of the Other becoming the Self, that is, the possibility to change one’s identity. In the opinion of the Han Chinese nationalist thinkers, their Non-Han Other (Tibetans, Mongols, Manchus and Turkish Muslims) was as barbarian as the Other farther away and of different looks. But whereas most of the Han Chinese thinkers due to political necessity and geopolitical demands came to the conclusion that the neighbor Other could become the Self by assimilation, the far away and different looking Other, that is, the Other in a racist sense could not become the Self (or only difficultly, the only possible way being eugenics).¹⁸⁰⁴ With regard to identity the Non-Han were seen nearly as different as people of different outer appearance, because culture, way of living, language and tradition were seen as important parts of identity. But the Non-Han could be taken for Han if they lived according to Han traditions and culture and spoke Chinese, because their outer appearance was not very and in some cases not at all different from the Han people.

Since Frank Dikötter published his study on *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (1992) emphasis has been laid on the fact that racism existed also in China and is not a development of the European colonialist and imperialist states only. Dikötter shows how the definition of race changed over the time from the late 18th until the 20th century. Pseudo-scientific racism had linked physical appearance to certain imagined characteristics in order to legitimize Western imperialist countries to conquer vast areas and peoples in all continents and plunder their riches. Also many Han Chinese thinkers accepted this racist approach to people of different outer appearance. They usually put the “yellow race” on one level with the “white race” and interpreted the “brown,” “red,” and “black races” as weak, inferior and without history.¹⁸⁰⁵

Based on his analysis of the Han Chinese approach to the farer away Other Dikötter comes to the conclusion that “racial categories of analysis started to supersede

¹⁸⁰² Blaut: 1993, p. 15. Moreover, and also this runs parallel to the case of the image Chinese thinkers had of Non-Han people, “non-Europe is ‘ahistorical,’” whereas “Europe is ‘historical.’” (Ibid., p. 14–15. See also Lévi-Strauss: 2001, p. 1–9.)

¹⁸⁰³ Dikötter: 1992, p. 10–17, 136–142.

¹⁸⁰⁴ See Frank Dikötters chapter about eugenics. (Ibid., ch. 6 “Race as seed,” p. 164–190.)

¹⁸⁰⁵ Liang Qichao: 1983 [1902_1], p. 12. Kang Youwei claimed in his *Da tong shu* (finished in the 1900s, first published in 1935) that darker races should be eradicated by eugenics or sterilization. (Kang Youwei: 1994 [1935], p. 138–140; Dikötter: 1992, p. 89–90.)

ethnocentric senses of identity” in the course of growing nationalism.¹⁸⁰⁶ He claims that nationalists like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao would have thought of the Han Chinese being part of the greater yellow race and that this would have been “the most common symbol of national cohesion, permanently replacing more conventional emblems of cultural identity.”¹⁸⁰⁷

With Dikötter’s theory that in China a cultural idea of ethnic identity changed into a racial one, the approach of Han Chinese nationalists towards Non-Han people has been neglected as a study object, because it was claimed that the nationalists would have interpreted the Non-Han people as being part of the larger “yellow race” and thus would have accepted them as part of their national Self.¹⁸⁰⁸

In my dissertation I have shown that this is not the case in early Han Chinese nationalism and historiography of the 1900s until the 1920s. When early Han Chinese nationalist thinkers looked at the Other outside of the Qing geo-body and later outside the Chinese nation-state, they indeed saw the Han as part of the larger “yellow race,” including most other Asian ethnicities. But when they looked to the inside of the Qing geo-body, they did not perceive all inhabitants of this territory as belonging to the same identity groups as themselves, but rather defined themselves as a group opposed to the Non-Han people, especially the four important ones, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Turkish Muslims. They continued to perceive the Han Chinese people’s culture as superior, basic and definitive. By mixing two different Others, that outside the Qing geo-body with that inside, Dikötter oversees that with regard to the inside not much changed until the 1920s and that older concepts of identity like culturalism or the All-under-Heaven concept were influential at least until then. This is also due to the fact that Dikötter translates all terms, which are related to group identities like *zu*, *zhong*, *zulei*, *minzu*, *zhongzu* and *renzhong* as “race” and thus ignores their differences.¹⁸⁰⁹ It has come to the fore, however, that the terms *zu* and *minzu* are mainly used for Non-Han people in the meaning of “ethnicity,” and that only the terms *zhong*, *zhongzu*, and *renzhong* are used in the sense of “race.” In the early 1900s the terms are still mixed up, when Liang uses *zhong* as a suffix of ethnicities. Later, however, the distinction becomes clearer.

Regarding the Non-Han people the situation thus was different from that Dikötter describes for the far away Other of different appearance. The Han Chinese nationalist thinkers inherited their image of a Chinese nation-state’s territory from the Manchu Qing Empire, which consisted to a large part of “internal colonies.” In fact, the Han

¹⁸⁰⁶ Ibid.: 1994, p. 407.

¹⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰⁸ The idea that pan-Asianism was in fact used by Han Chinese thinkers to “secure national solidarity” since the 1930s, especially by the KMT close journal *Xin Yaxiya* = *New Asia* is suggested by Prasenjit Duara. (Duara: 1997, p. 1040.)

¹⁸⁰⁹ Dikötter: 1992, p. viii. This makes Dikötter claim that Liang divided the people in China into ten different “races,” although Liang refers to ethnicities. (Ibid., p. 86.)

inhabited regions originally were among these colonies. Like the colonial powers in the West the Manchus had acted imperialistic and colonialistic, only that their conquests took place closer to their political centre and that they did not enlarge their territory in other continents. Ideologically the Manchus had not felt the need to legitimize their conquests by constructing other people as inferior as the European colonial powers did. The Manchus turned to strategies of persuasion and even flattery, and moreover disguised themselves perfectly as promoters of Han, Mongols or Tibetan (not so much Turkish Muslim) culture respectively, rather than positioning themselves too obviously at the top level culturally and ethnically. Only in the course of the 18th century the Qianlong Emperor began to emphasize ethnic ancestry as a criterion for identity, which was important with regard to political career, and legal and fiscal status.¹⁸¹⁰ State imposed ethnic differentiation was reflected in different treatment with regard to the assignment of influential offices. This resulted in a growing feeling of inequality especially on the side of Han Chinese officials and elite members. In combination with the Qing Dynasty's defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the following disgraceful Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) it seems that the Manchu emperors themselves lay the foundation for a growing anti-Manchuist nationalism among Han Chinese and the anti-Manchuist motivation to overthrow their dynasty. For many of the Han Chinese nationalists the fact that the Qing Emperor was Manchu was an important reason for refusing his reign as a disgrace.

Han Chinese nationalists, be they anti-Manchuist or not, wanted to include the Non-Han regions in their nation-state as we have seen. But how to achieve their peaceful and stable integration? One way they thought was to strengthen the feeling that their own Han Chinese culture was superior to others in the world and since the end of the 19th century at least still in Asia and that this superiority had been accepted by Non-Han people since hundreds of years. Based on history they imagined that All-under-(the-Qing Empire's)-Heaven, that is, the Non-Han people had always been attracted by Han Chinese culture and changed accordingly.

For legitimizing a Chinese nation-state in the borders of the Qing Empire, that is, the continuation of a colonial holding of Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang and a new colonialism of Manchuria, the Han Chinese nationalist thinkers could not turn simply to Western racism because of the reasons mentioned above, but had to develop their own discourse on Non-Han ethnicities, that is, of identity groups, which did not differ with regard to physical appearance, but to culture and tradition, way of living and religion, language and script. Based on culturalism and nationalist ideology this discourse on Non-Han ethnicities let most nationalist thinkers come to the conclusion that the Non-Han people not only were able to change as culturalism had always implied, but had to be changed actively as nationalism and its quest for homogeneity demanded.

¹⁸¹⁰ Crossley: 1989.

Culturalism meant that Non-Han people were on an inferior level, because of their spatial and ideological distance to the cultural centre of the world (or of Asia). And the closer they moved to this centre the more cultivated they would become.

With Liang's idea of an "assimilative power" the radiance of the centre could be strengthened actively – indirectly by controlling and inventing the history of the Non-Han ethnicities, and also directly as implied by Zhang Taiyan as modern technology and transport systems could reduce the distance between cultural centre and periphery. One did not have to wait until the Non-Han people approached the centre out of their own will and "came and be transformed (*laihua*)," but could bring the centre closer to their homes.

An Outlook

I have written above that culturalism was a concept of Han Chinese identity older than nationalism, but that I like some other scholars think that there was no clear-cut break between the two, but that culturalism was merged into nationalism or rather the other way round – contrary to Joseph Levenson's culturalism-to-nationalism thesis. I have also stated that in my understanding certain factors of the Han Chinese idea of culture have been overemphasized in connection with culturalism – the idea of Chinese culture being the only culture and a general invitation for others to join this culture, – while other factors of the Han Chinese idea of culture have been left aside, especially the notion of certain levels of culture with the Han Chinese culture being on the highest level and a general disregard for Non-Han people as having non-cultures. It has become clear that certain aspects of an older way of Han Chinese identity and the perception of Non-Han others continues to be part of the discourse on Han Chinese national identity and nationalism.

A next important step in understanding Chinese identity-building is the question how influential and paradigmatic the idea of culturalism really was and if it really was the most common way of Han Chinese identity. James P. Harrison assumes that the basic reasons for the development of culturalism are two, first, a real and *de facto* cultural superiority of the Han Chinese which would have been accepted by all those living around them, an idea most prominently put forward by John King Fairbank in the volume *The Chinese World Order* by which he referred to the All-under-Heaven (*tianxia*) concept¹⁸¹¹; and second, that "if conquerors succeeded in convincing educated Chinese that they were good Confucians, as did the Manchus, the native literati not only

¹⁸¹¹ Fairbank: 1968, p. 5–10, see also rest of the book; Harrison, J. P.: 1969?, p. 4.

accepted but even protected the rule of the legitimate government, foreign or not.”¹⁸¹²
He concludes:

“The Chinese might be overrun, but Chinese civilization seemed the only possible cultural alternative. Because of the size of the Han Chinese population and bureaucracy and because of the backwardness of the much smaller number of nomads, the nomads could be taken only as a military threat, but not as representatives of rival states. Even if successful, they could only rule China in the Chinese way.”¹⁸¹³

Harrison claims that although different and more exclusive concepts of identity probably developed in times of foreign threat, they “never became the ideal.”¹⁸¹⁴ Although some other scholars criticize that alternative concepts of Han Chinese self-identity have been neglected, they nevertheless generally assume that culturalism had been the most important way of the Han Chinese self-identification until it was challenged in the late 19th century.¹⁸¹⁵ It is assumed that culturalism “had always served as an ideology of empire, justifying Chinese rule over non-Chinese peoples as well as non-Chinese rule over the Chinese.”¹⁸¹⁶

First of all, the assumption that times of foreign dominance and the ways of identity-building connected to them based on xenophobic thinking were exceptions rather than the rule forms one important basis for the general notion that culturalism was the most common concept of identity. That this idea of Chinese history is false is revealed by the fact that it was not at all an exceptional situation for Han Chinese people to be ruled by Non-Han lords, especially for those living in the North of the Huai River. Also during the Tang Dynasty (618–907) the attitude towards the Other could change and become rather hostile, as it happened after the An Lushan Rebellion in 755.¹⁸¹⁷ These phases of Non-Han rule and dominance thus were a historical fact and were reflected in certain ways of Han Chinese self-identification like those put forward by anti-Liao and anti-Jin, anti-Mongol and anti-Manchu thinkers. The question is if they really were only exceptions or maybe rather common?

Second, due to recent but also older research it is moreover obvious that both acclaimed foundations of culturalism – cultural superiority and the ability to sinicize Non-Han emperors – are not supported by historical evidence. Plenty of studies have

¹⁸¹² Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁸¹³ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁸¹⁴ Ibid., p. 5. See also the earlier studies on Song and Ming loyalist concepts of identity called proto-nationalism. (Vierheller: 1968, p. 7; Trauzettel: 1975; Tillman: 1979.)

¹⁸¹⁵ Levenson: 1959, p. 109–122; Dikötter: 1992, p. 3, 18; Harrison, J. P.: 1969?, p. 2–6; Townsend: 1992, p. 109–110; Duara: 1993a, p. 784f.; Harrison, H.: 2001, p. 3.

¹⁸¹⁶ Townsend: 1992, p. 113.

¹⁸¹⁷ See above Chapter 5.1 (subchapter “The Reappearance of Liu Shipei’s *Zhongguo minzu zhi* (1905) in Liu Yizheng’s *Zhongguo wenhua shi*”).

shown that the theory of an “assimilative power,” also called theory of sinicization or “traditional absorption theory” is “conceptually flawed, intellectually inert and impossible to apply to real history.”¹⁸¹⁸ In turn, the idea that the Han Chinese really perceived their culture as superior was also based on the assumption that Non-Han ethnicities also in cases of their conquest would in fact assimilate. But if this assumption is proven wrong does this also imply that the Han Chinese did not have the impression that their culture really was a superior one?

I have shown in my dissertation that *de facto* cultural superiority and the ability to assimilate others, that is, two basic assumptions of culturalism are part of an imagined cultural memory and are nationalist inventions and constructions of history. They were images, which were further strengthened by nationalist political and historiographical thinkers since the 1900s. They were moreover bolstered by Liang Qichao’s theory of an “assimilative power” of the Han Chinese in order to make Non-Han history part of Han Chinese nationalist history and simultaneously Non-Han regions part of the Han Chinese nation-state. Moreover, these assumptions served as means to make the history of the Han Chinese a nationalist history, strengthening the self-consciousness of the Han Chinese people, especially in the 1920s.

I have quoted Ernest Renan’s requirements of a nationalist history, and I have written that the Non-Han conquest dynasties and conquering people could not be part of this history. But they were merged into it by strengthening the culturalist idea that the Han Chinese would be culturally superior and able to assimilate others. These assumptions indeed create “a heroic past, great men, glory” and produce “the social capital, upon which one bases the national idea,” as Renan suggested.¹⁸¹⁹ By referring to their superior culture, which would give them the power to assimilate others, the Han Chinese thinkers could interpret the past encounters with Non-Han people as performing “great deeds together” and thus finally had “common glories in the past,” on which they could build their nationalist identity.¹⁸²⁰

¹⁸¹⁸ Crossley: 1990a, p. 2. Again, I refer to Wittfogel’s and Feng’s study on the Liao Khitan, to New Qing History, but also to nearly all modern studies specialized on Non-Han dynasties, especially from Euro-American scholars, but also from those based in Hong Kong and Taiwan. (Wittfogel/Feng: 1949; nearly all publications by Pamela Crossley since the 1980s and by Evelyn Rawski since the 1990s; Elliott: 1990, 2000, 2001; Hsu, P.: 2001, Tsang, C.: 2007.) PRC scholarship still often tries to support the sinicization theory in their approaches. (For the Jin Dynasty see Song, D.: 1991; Zhang, B. et al.: 1992; Liu, P.: 2000; He, G.: 2004.)

Scholars not directly involved in Non-Han history but referring to it rather generally still sometimes think the theory of sinicization valid. This can be seen exemplary in Ho Ping-ti’s 1998 answer to Evelyn Rawski’s critique of his usage of the theory of sinicization published in 1996 to an article written by him already in 1967. In his rebuttal he insists that the usage of the sinicization theory would still be historically useful and valid. Ho, however, is not a specialist in Manchu Qing history, but rather tries to give a macrohistorical perspective, showing in how far the Manchu Qing Dynasty contributed to the present Chinese state. (Ho: 1967; 1998; Rawski: 1996.)

¹⁸¹⁹ Renan: 1882, p. 28; 2008, p. 19.

¹⁸²⁰ Ibid.

To find out more about the roots of Han Chinese nationalist identity-building it would be necessary to answer to question in how far this notion of the Han Chinese always being the cultural “winners” also in cases of foreign conquests was a construction of nationalist thinking and in how far it had forerunners in earlier thinking on Han Chinese identity. It has been shown that there was an equal Other, which challenged the Han Chinese self-image and from time to time made it difficult to keep a culturalist image up. Many studies have shown that Han China was challenged militarily, but also culturally by foreign threats. The idea that the Tuoba, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols, Manchus and the other ethnicities, which founded empires and dynasties and conquered Han Chinese inhabited regions, were only threatening the stability of East Asia and did not add to or change the Han Chinese people’s cultural, political, juridical or religious identities has been proven wrong many times.¹⁸²¹ It is a fact that Han Chinese culture was not a monolith since antiquity, but that it was changed not only due to internal developments, but also due to external influences, not only but deeply so in times of foreign conquest.¹⁸²²

Moreover, the phases of Non-Han rule over Han Chinese inhabited regions cover nearly altogether nine hundred years since the Tuoba established their Northern Wei Dynasty in 386 until today, and the empires of greatest circumference and power were Non-Han empires, the Mongol and the Manchu Qing Empire.¹⁸²³ Victor Mair lists certain characteristics of Non-Han dynasties, among them the fact that most unifying dynasties were founded by peoples with Non-Han background, that the largest expansions occurred under their rule, that following Han Chinese dynasties invariably lost these large territories, and that the Non-Han dynasties mostly had the greatest longevity.¹⁸²⁴ Consequently, he suggests that it would be time “to posit the unthinkable: that it was the north(west)erners and their heirs, who, after migrating south, were responsible for most of the major polities in the EAH [= East Asian Heartland].”¹⁸²⁵ Although Non-Han are neglected in the main genre of nationalist historiography, that is, the general histories of China, they definitely have been major actors in East Asian and Han Chinese history, not only militarily and politically, but also socially and culturally. Thus, Mair concludes: “Were it not for the north(west)ern peoples, there would be no China.”¹⁸²⁶ Whereas

¹⁸²¹ Especially regarding state formation and influences from Northern and Northwestern Asian people see Mair: 2005 and Di Cosmo: 1999.

¹⁸²² That not only foreign conquerors, but also foreign religions could be seen as threats to the identity can be seen in the case of the Tang persecution of Buddhism in 845.

¹⁸²³ Apart from all the usually acknowledged Non-Han dynasties, Victor Mair moreover lists the Sui (581–618) and the Tang (618–907). (See also the detailed list of ruling houses, their ethnic and regional affiliations by Victor Mair. Mair: 2005, p. 56–62.)

¹⁸²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 78–79.

¹⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49. See also Nicola Di Cosmo’s suggestion of a periodization of Asian history with regard to nomadic empires. (Di Cosmo: 1999, p. 26–37.)

Mair's conclusion might be a bit overdrawn, he certainly touches a tender spot with his analysis.

Did the Han Chinese nevertheless perceive their culture as universal culture at most times? Was that even possible? If the basic assumptions for the development of a culturalist perception of identity were not given, did culturalism develop nevertheless and was it the main concept of identity for Han Chinese? And if it developed was it then based on other preconditions not yet known? Or was culturalism a much later development, maybe only slightly younger than nationalism and a kind of precursor of the concept of a nationalist identity? One possible approach to answer these questions lies in the analysis of the image, which Han Chinese thinkers had of Non-Han people and dynasties and how they integrated them in their image of Han Chinese history. An analysis of relevant texts with regard to the Han Chinese idea of their Non-Han neighbors can provide us with a further understanding what concepts of Han Chinese identity existed and on what earlier notions nationalist ideas were based. I have provided this with my dissertation for the crucial phase of Han Chinese nationalism, the early 20th century.

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Glossary

- Abaoji 阿保机
Aguda 阿骨打
Ai fen shu 哀焚書
Aigun tiaohu 璦琿條約
aiguo xin 愛國心
Aiguo xueshe 愛國學社
aiguo zhuyi 愛國主義
Ailao 哀牢
Ainu zhongzu 倭奴種族
Ai Qing shi 哀清史
Ajia jinshu アジア人種
Alabo 阿剌伯
Anchuhu River 安出虎水
Anduo 安多
Angeluzu 盎格魯族
An Lushan 安祿山
Annan 安南
Anqing qiyi 安慶起義
An Shi zhi luan 安史之亂
Ashenhe 阿什河
Asu 阿速
Azuma Heiji 吾妻兵治
.....
Ba Di zu 巴氏族
Bagua jiao 八卦教
- Bagu minzu 巴枯民族
baguwen 八股文
bai 白
bai Di 白狄
baihu 百戶
baihua 白話
Baihua benguo shi mucu 白話本國史目次
Bailian jiao 白蓮教
Bai Pu 百濮
bai Puzu 百濮族
bairén 白人
Baiyi 擺夷
Bai Yue 百越
Bai Yue zu 百越組
bai Yuezu (fu Danzu) 百粵族 (附蠻族)
bangban dachen 幫辦大臣
bangguo 邦國
bao guo jiu zhong 保國救種
Baohuang hui 保皇會
Bao lu yundong 保路運動
bao tong zu 保同族
batulu 巴圖魯
Beida 北大
Beidi Nanman 北狄南蠻

Beijing Daxue 北京大學
Beijing daxue rikan 北京大學日刊
Beijing tiaoyue 北京條約
Beijing yuanren 北京猿人
bei lu 北虜
Bei Rong 北戎
Beishan zhi shi 北山之什
Bei Wei 北魏
Beixing rilu 北行日錄
Beiyang 北洋
Beiyang jun 北洋軍
Beiyuan lu 北轅錄
benbu 本部
ben hu ren 本胡人
benji 本紀
Ben shu de fenqi 本書的分期
benzhong 本種
benzu 本族
bi 彼
Bian 汴
Bianhan 弁韓
Bianjing 汴京
biannian 編年
biannianti 編年體
bian qi zhongzu 辨其種族
bian wei zhongguo zhi yi minzu 變為中國之一
 民族
Bian Xia 變夏
Bian xing 辨姓
bian zhu Xia 貶諸夏
biao 表
bie lu 別錄
bing bao shu zu shi zhong xing he qi 並包殊族
 使種姓和齊

bing bao shu zu shi zhong xing he qi yi zun lü
 wang dao zhe shu yi 並包殊族使種
 姓和齊以遵率王道者數矣
bi yi tong Zhongguo yu 必以通中國語
Bohai 渤海
Bo ren 燹人
bu 部
bubi yu ren 不比於人
bu ke ren 不可人
buluo 部落
buluo sixiang 部落思想
bumin 部民
bunmeishi 文明史
bu shen shou tonghua 不甚受同化
bu si zhi guo 不死之國
bu tong 不同
bu yue ren 不日人
.....
Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培
canbao 殘暴
Cangqian 倉前
canzheng yuan 參政院
Cao Cao 曹操
Cao Wei 曹魏
cefeng 冊封
Ci'an 慈安
Cixi 慈禧
changcheng 長城
Chang Di 長狄
Changyan bao 昌言報
Changyi 昌意
Changzhou fu zhongxue tang 常州府中學堂
Chaoxian 朝鮮
Chaoxian bandao Sanguo he Zhongguo de
 guanxi 朝鮮半島三國和中國的關
 係

Chaoxianren 朝鮮人	Chunqiu Zuo zhuan du 春秋左傳讀
Chao Yi 趙翼	chuncui 純粹
chen 臣	chuncui Hanzu zhi Zhongguo ye 純粹漢族之
Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀	中國也
Cheng 成	chunquan zhi Hanzu 純全之漢族
Cheng gong 成公	chunquan zhi minzu 純全之民族
Cheng gong si nian 成公四年	chuntian jun 屯田軍
Cheng Zhuo 程卓	chun yu zhu Xia tonghua 純與諸夏同化
Chen Liang 陳亮	Churen 楚人
Chen Yinque (also read Chen Yinke) 陳寅恪	Chûtô tôyôshi 中等東洋史
chi 赤	cike bielu 策客別錄
Chiang Kai-shek see Jiang Jieshi	Cuanbo 爨爨
Chibetto zoku チベット族	cucu 羸犴
Chi Di 赤狄	cuoza 錯雜
Chirigaku 地理學
Chi You 蚩尤	Da/da 大
Choe Nam-seon 崔南善	Dadaren 韃靼人
chong 虫	Da dong 大東
Chongning 崇寧	Daguan 大觀
Chosŏn 朝鮮	da guo 大國
chou lei 醜類	Dahai 達海
chou Man 仇滿	Dahe minzu 大和民族
Chu 楚	Da Hao 大嶧
Chuang guan dong 闖關東	Dahe 大河
chun 純	Dai 傣
chunhua 醇化	Dai Manshû Teikoku 大滿州帝國
Chun qinwang 醇親王	Dai Zhen 戴震
Chunqiu/chunqiu 春秋	Da Manzhou diguo 大滿洲帝國
Chunqiu fanlou 春秋繁露	da minzu 大民族
Chunqiu Gongyang jiegou 春秋公羊解詁	da minzuzhuyi 大民族主義
Chunqiu nei qi guo er wai zhu Xia nei zhu Xia er wai Yi Di wang zhe yu yihu tianxia 春 秋內其國而外諸夏內諸夏而外夷 狄王者欲一乎天下	Dangchang 宕昌
Chunqiu san zhuan 春秋三傳	dangdi xiahui 蕩滌瑕穢
	danggu ji 黨錮記
	Dangxiang 黨項
	Dangxiang Qiang 黨項羌
	Dantu 丹徒

- dan you bian Yi er wu bian Xia 但有變夷而無
變夏
- Daoguang Yangsou zhengfu ji 道光洋艘征撫
記
- Da Qing 大清
- datong 大同
- Da tong shu 大同書
- Da Xia 大夏
- da yitong 大一統
- da yi zhi dao 大易之道
- Da Yu 大禹
- Dengzhi 鄧至
- Dezong 德宗
- Dí/Dí 狄
- Dī/Dī 氐
- Dian 滇
- dian 典
- Di Dian 帝典
- Di er ce 第二冊
- di er ci minzu tongyi 第二次民族統一
- Di er pian fanli 第二篇凡例
- di er Zhongguo 第二中國
- difang zizhi 地方自治
- Di Hong 帝洪
- Ding gong shi nian 定公十年
- ding Zhong wai zhi yi 定中外之異
- Dī Qiang 氐羌
- Di Qiang zu 氐羌組
- Di san ce 第三冊
- dishi 地勢
- di wang biao 帝王表
- Di yi pian fanli 第一篇凡例
- di yi Zhongguo 第一中國
- Di zhongzu 狄種族
- dizhu 地主
- dong 動
- Dongbei 東北
- Dongbei shidi yanjiu zhi yiyou chengji 東北
史地研究之已有成績
- Dongbei shigang 東北史綱
- Dongbei zhu Hu zhong 東北諸胡種
- Dongcheng qu 東城區
- Donggan 東干
- Dong Han 東漢
- Donghu/Dong Hu 東胡
- Dong Kang 東康
- Dongmou shan 東牟山
- Dongnan daxue 東南大學
- Dongnan Yue 東南越
- Dong Qing tielu 東清鐵路
- Dongsansheng 東三省
- Dongshansheng 東山省
- dong shehuixue 動社會學
- Dong Wu 東吳
- Dongwu daxue 東吳大學
- Dong Xi jiaotong 東西交通
- Dongyang shi 東洋史
- Dongyang shiyao 東洋史要
- Dong Yi 東夷
- Dong Yi zu 東夷組
- Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒
- Duanfang 端方
- Duan Qirui 段祺瑞
- Duan Yucai 段玉裁
- duo 惰
- duo minzu guojia 多民族國家
- duoshu zhi minzu 多數之民族
- duo tonghua yu Hanzu 多同化與漢族
- dutong 都統
- Du tongjian lun Song lun 讀通鑑論宋論

Du Wenxiu 杜文秀
 Du xing 瀆姓
 Du You 杜佑

 E'erkunhe 鄂爾坤河
 Enming 恩銘
 er ci geming 二次革命
 erlao xuanyan 二老宣言
 Ershi'er [nian'er] shi zhaji 二十二 [廿二] 史劄
 記
 Ershi'er shi kao yi 二十二史考異
 Ershi'er shi zha ji 二十二史札記
 ershiyi tiao 二十一條
 er tan 而嘆

 Faguo zhi lue 法國志略
 faling dian 法令典
 falü fuling 法律符令
 Fan Chengda 范成大
 fang 防
 Fang Xiaoru 方孝孺
 fang yu biao 方輿表
 Fang Zhuangyou 方壯猷
 Fanli 凡例
 fantizi 繁體字
 Fan Wencheng 范文程
 fei jin Diren 非進狄人
 fei lishi zhi renzhong 非歷史之人種
 fei wu zulei qi xin bi yi 非我族類其心必異
 Feng Guozhang 馮國璋
 Feng Jiasheng 馮家昇
 fengsu yihua 風俗易化
 Fengtian 奉天
 Fengxi junfa 奉系軍閥
 fenshu kengru 焚書坑儒
 Fen zhen 分鎮
 fuchouzhuyi 復仇主義
 fucong 服從
 Fulin 弗林
 fumu zhi guo 父母之國
 Fu Sinian 傅斯年
 Fuxi 伏羲
 Fu yan 附言
 fuyong 附庸
 fuza 複雜
 fuza zhi Hanzu 複雜之漢族
 fuza zhu min 複雜諸族

 gai cong Huasu 改從華俗
 gai tonghua yi Zhongguo 蓋同化於中國
 Gaizao 改造
 Gandaci 幹答刺 also 幹答刺
 Gaojiasuzu zhi min 高加索族之民
 Gaojuli 高句麗
 Gaoli 高麗
 Gaozong 高宗
 Gasushi 噶蘇士
 Gaya 鶯洛
 Gelao 仡佬
 Geluolu 葛邏錄
 Geming bo yi 革命駁議
 geming ji 革命記
 Geming jun 革命軍
 genghua 梗化
 geren sixiang 個人思想
 Ge sheng minzu shulüe 各省民族述略
 gonggu 鞏固
 Gonghe dang 共和黨
 gongju shangshu 公車上書
 Gongyang xuepai 公羊學派
 Gongyang zhuan 公羊傳
 gongyi dian 工藝典

Gong Zizhen 龔自珍
goutong 溝通
guandai 冠帶
Guandong zhou 關東州
guang 獷
guangfu 光復
guangfu guwu 光復故物
Guangfu hui 光復會
guangfu ji 光復記
Guanghua daxue 光華大學
Guangxi 廣西
Guangxu 光緒
Guangzhou 廣州
guannei 關內
guanshu 灌輸
Guan Yu 關羽
Guan Zhong 管仲
Guchaoxian 古朝鮮
gudai 古代
Gudai zhi Dongbei 古代之東北
Guifang 鬼方
gui hua 歸化
guiyou 癸酉
Guizhou 貴州
gui zu 貴族
Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛
Gujing jingshe 詁經精舍
Guliang zhuan 穀梁傳
guo 國
guocui 國粹
Guocui xuebao 國粹學報
guocui yundong 國粹運動 x
guohui 國會
guohun 國魂
guojia 國家

Guojia lun 國家論
guojie 國籍
Guoli dongnan daxue 國立東南大學
Guoli Taiwan daxue 國立臺灣大學
Guoluo 猓獯
guomin 國民
Guominbao 國民報
Guomin dahui 國民大會
Guomindang 國民黨
guomin geming jun 國民革命軍
guomin huodong zhi jingsheng 國民活動之精神
guomin zhi mingjing 國民之明鏡
guonei 國內
Guo Pu 郭璞
Guoqu zhi Zhongguo shixuejie 過去之中國史學界
guoren 國人
Guo song 國頌
guowai 國外
Guoxue baocun hui 國學保存會
Guoxue jikan 國學季刊
guoyu 國語
guozheng 國政
Gushi bian 古史辨
guwen 古文
guwenjia 古文家
guwenxue 古文學
Gu Yanwu 顧炎武
guyou minzu 固有民族
Guzhou zaji 古州雜記
.....
hai 海
Haiguo Tuzhi 海國圖志
haiju 割據
Hami 哈密

Han (state) 韓
 Han (dynasty) 漢
 Hanhui 漢回
 haijiao ji 海交記
 Han Feizi 韓非子
 Han feng 漢風
 Han Gaozu 漢高祖
 Hangu 函谷
 hanhua 漢化
 Han ji 漢紀
 Hankou 漢口
 han lie 悍烈
 Hanlin 翰林
 Hanpu 函普
 Hanren 漢人
 Hanren zhi jiao 漢人之教
 Han shu 漢書
 Han si bu 漢四部
 Han su 漢俗
 Hantu 漢土
 Han Wendi 漢文帝
 Han Wudi 漢武帝
 Han Wudi kaoji 漢武帝考紀
 Han Xiandi 漢獻帝
 Han zhi 漢制
 Hanzhong 漢種
 Hanzhong zhi zhongxing 漢種之種性
 Hanzu 漢族
 Hanzu de youlai 漢族的由來
 Hanzu dizao shidai 漢族締造時代
 Hanzu jianshuai 漢族漸衰
 Hanzu jisheng shidai 漢族極盛時代
 Hanzu pengzhang shidai 漢族膨脹時代
 Hanzu sheng jiang 漢族升降
 Hanzu sheng paiwai sixiang 漢族生排外思想
 Hanzu wei huren suo xie 漢族為胡人所挾
 Hanzu youshi shidai 漢族優勢時代
 Hanzu zhi bei tu 漢族之北徙
 Hanzu zhi feng 漢族之風
 Hanzu zhi min 漢族之民
 Hanzu zhi wenming 漢族之文明
 hao 豪
 haocheng 號稱
 [haotian] shangdi [昊天]上帝
 haowu wenhua zhi Manzhounren 毫無文化之滿洲人
 Harbin 哈爾濱
 He 貉
 He Ban 何班
 hebing 合並
 hei 黑
 Heilaguli yizu 黑拉古利夷族
 Heilongjiang 黑龍江
 Heishui 黑水
 Heishui Mohe 黑水靺鞨
 Henan 河南
 Hengbao 衡報
 Hengyang 衡陽
 Hetian 和田
 He Xiu 何休
 He Zhen 何震
 hong 紅
 Hong Chengchou 洪承疇
 hongjun yi qi 洪鈞一氣
 Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全
 Hong Xiuquan kaoji 洪秀全考紀
 Hou Han 後漢
 Hou Jin 後金
 Hou Jin 後晉
 Hou Liang 後涼 (389-403)

<i>Hou Liang</i> 後梁 (907–923)	<i>Huaren</i> 華人
<i>Hou Qin</i> 後秦	<i>Hua shi</i> 華史
<i>Hou Zhao</i> 後趙	<i>Huaxia</i> 華夏
<i>Hu</i> 胡	<i>Huaxia zhi wenhua</i> 華夏之文化
<i>hua</i> 化	<i>Hua Yi zarou zhi tiejie</i> 華夷雜糅之僭竊
<i>Hua/Hua</i> 華	<i>Hua Yi zhi fen</i> 華夷之分
<i>hua</i> 花	<i>hua yu</i> 化于
<i>huacheng</i> 化成	<i>hua yu Huaxia</i> 化于華夏
<i>Huadi</i> 華地	<i>Huazhong</i> 華種
<i>Huadong shifan daxue</i> 華東師範大學	<i>Huazu</i> 華族
<i>Hua feng</i> 華風	<i>Hubeiren</i> 湖北人
<i>Huaiyi</i> 淮夷	<i>Hu guo zhanzheng</i> 護國戰爭
<i>huahe</i> 化合	<i>Hu Han</i> 胡漢
<i>huahua</i> 華化	<i>Hui/Hui</i> 回
<i>Huahua yiyi</i> 華化意義	<i>Huibu</i> 回部
<i>Huan Dan</i> 桓誕	<i>huidang bielu</i> 會黨別錄
<i>huang</i> 黃	<i>huifu</i> 恢復
<i>huang bai liang zu</i> 黃白兩族	<i>Huihe</i> 回紇
<i>Huanghe</i> 黃河	<i>Huihui</i> 回回
<i>Huang Jie</i> 黃杰 (KMT general)	<i>hui qi lishi</i> 毀其歷史
<i>Huang Jie</i> 黃節 (anti-Manchuist writer)	<i>Huizong</i> 徽宗
<i>Huang Kan</i> 黃侃	<i>Hujiang daxue</i> 滬江大學
<i>Huanglong</i> 黃龍	<i>Hu kou ji</i> 胡寇記
<i>Huan gong</i> 桓公	<i>Hu Linyi</i> 胡林翼
<i>Huangshi</i> 黃史	<i>hu lu</i> 胡虜
<i>Huangtaiji</i> 皇太極	<i>Hunan</i> 湖南
<i>huangzhong</i> 黃種	<i>Hunan shoujiu dang</i> 湖南守舊黨
<i>Huang Zongxi</i> 黃宗羲	<i>hunhe</i> 混合
<i>huangzu</i> 黃族	<i>hunru</i> 混入
<i>Huang Zunxian</i> 黃遵憲	<i>hunxiao shuzu</i> 混淆殊族
<i>Huaifu</i> 裒弗	<i>hunyi Zhongguo</i> 混一中國
<i>Huaifushi</i> 裒弗失	<i>hunza</i> 混雜
<i>Huan gong</i> 桓公	<i>huozhi bielu</i> 貨殖別錄
<i>Huan Sheng</i> 桓昇	<i>Hu Shi</i> 胡適
<i>Huan Xuan</i> 桓玄	<i>Hu shi/hu shi</i> 胡史

- Hu Yuan 胡元
.....
Indo gosennen shi 印度五千年史
.....
Ji 姬
ji 記
Jia'erteya 加爾特亞
Jialuo 駕洛
jiandao 僭盜
Jiang 姜
Jiangfa yundong 護法運動
Jiang Huai 江淮
Jiang Jieshi 蔣介石
jiangjun 將軍
Jiangsu 江蘇
Jiangsu daxue 江蘇大學
Jiangsu sheng Changzhou gaoji zhongxue 江蘇
省常州高級中學
Jiangsu shengli di er shifan daxue 江蘇省立第
二師範大學
Jiangsu shengli guoxue tushuguan 江蘇省立國
學圖書館
Jiang Tingfu 蔣廷黻
jianru 漸入
jian zu 賤族
jiao 教
jiaohua 交化
jiaokeshu 教科書
Jiaotong xi 交通系
Jiaoyao 焦僥
Jiaoyu jinyu zazhi 教育今語雜誌
Jiaozhi 交趾
Jiaozhi Zhina zu 交趾支那族
Jie 羯
jie 結
Jie bian fa 解髮辮
- Jiefang yu gaozao 解放與改造
Jifu 吉甫
ji guo 己國
Jilin 吉林
Jimi 羈縻
Jin 晉
Jinbu dang 進步黨
Jing 荊
jing 靜
Jingdi 景帝
jing shehuixue 靜社會學
Jingshibao 經世報
jingu 近古
Jing Wu 荊吳
Jing Wu zu 荊吳組
Jinhan 辰韓
jinhua 進化
Jinhualun yu lunlixue 進化論與倫理學
Jingkang zhi chi 靖康之恥
Jin Midi 金日磾
Jinping cheqian 金瓶掣籤
jinran Yi feng 浸染夷風
Jinren 金人
Jinshajiang 金沙江
Jinshi 金史
jinshi 進士
jinshi 近世
Jin shi 金氏
Jin shi cuibian 金石萃編
jin shishi 近世史
Jinshu 人種
Jin Shuren 金樹仁
Jin Taizong 金太宗
Jin Taizu 金太祖
jin wei 今謂

<i>jinwen</i> 今文	<i>ju tonghua de liliang</i> 拒同化的力量
<i>jinwenjia</i> 今文家
<i>jinwen jingxue</i> 今文經學	<i>kaifang</i> 開放
<i>jinwenxue</i> 今文學	<i>kaiming zhi yu</i> 開明之域
<i>jin Yi Di yu Zhongguo you heyi cheng yan</i> 進夷 狄於中國又何以稱焉	<i>kaituo</i> 開拓
<i>Jinyuan</i> 金源	Kaixi 開禧
<i>Jin Yufu</i> 金毓黻	<i>Kangli</i> 康里
<i>Jin Zhangzong</i> 金章宗	<i>Kang Youwei</i> 康有為
<i>jishi benmo</i> 紀事本末	<i>Kangzong</i> 康宗
<i>jiu chao</i> 九趙	Kanji 漢字
<i>jiu gong</i> 九共	<i>Kanzoku</i> 漢族
<i>Jiu Li</i> 九黎	<i>kaobian</i> 考辨
<i>Jiu Tangshu</i> 舊唐書	<i>kaoji</i> 考紀
<i>jiu xu</i> 九盪	<i>kaoju</i> 考據
<i>jiu xu bu yue ren</i> 九盪不日人	<i>kaozheng</i> 考證
<i>jiu Yi</i> 九夷	<i>Kashi</i> 喀什
<i>Jiuyiba shibian</i> 九一八事變	Katô Hiroyuki 加藤弘之
<i>Jiuzhen</i> 九真	<i>ke</i> 客
<i>jiu zhou</i> 九州	Ke di 客帝
<i>Ji Wenzi</i> 季文子	Ke'ergunahe 額爾古納河
<i>Jizhou</i> 冀州	Ke'erylunhe 克爾倫河
<i>Jizi</i> 箕子	<i>Kepaili</i> 科派利
<i>jue qi si</i> 絕其祀	<i>keti</i> 客體
<i>juluan shi</i> 據亂世	<i>ke tiao</i> 科條
<i>jun</i> 軍	<i>ke zu</i> 客族
<i>jun</i> 君	<i>kiiro jinshu</i> 黃色人種
<i>jun</i> 郡 (Commandery)	Kim Chong-sŏ 金宗瑞
<i>junji</i> 軍機	Kishimoto Nobuta 岸本能武太
<i>Jun shuo</i> 菌說	Kitaj Китай
<i>junzhu dian</i> 浚築典	Kochosŏn 古朝鮮
<i>junzi</i> 君子	<i>Kokka ron</i> 國家論
<i>junzi wei zhi bu zhi li</i> 君子謂之不知禮	<i>kokkashugi</i> 國家主義
<i>juren</i> 舉人	<i>Kokuhô hanron</i> 國法汎論
<i>jushi zhiye</i> 居食職業	<i>kokusui</i> 國粹
	<i>Kokusui hozon shugi</i> 國粹保存主義
	<i>Kokutai Shinron</i> 國體新論

- Kong Guangsen 孔廣森
 Kong Lao 孔老
 Kong Lao Mo Han bielu 孔老墨韓別錄
 Koryōsa 高麗史
 kou 寇
 Kouchin Shina zoku 交趾支那族
 Kuang miu 匡謬
 Kuche 庫車
 kun 坤
 kunidamashii 國魂
 Kunlun 崑崙
 Kunyi 昆夷
 Kuwabara Jitsuzō 桑原隲藏
 Kyōsha no kenri no kyōsō 強者の權利の競争

 laihua 來化
 Laiyi 萊夷
 Lakuboli 拉庫伯里
 Lanpei lu 攔轡錄
 Laozi 老子
 lei 類
 Lelang 樂浪
 Li 李
 li 離
 li 力
 Liang 梁
 Liang Fu 梁福
 Liang Qichao 梁啓超
 liang Yue 兩粵
 Liangjiang shifan xuetang 兩江師範學堂
 Liansheng zizhi 聯省自治
 Liaocheng 聊城
 Liaodong 遼東
 Liaodongxi 遼東西
 Liaoning 遼寧
 Liao Ping 廖平
- Liaoshi 遼史
 Liao Taizu 遼太祖
 Liao Xia Jin zhi wenhua 遼夏金之文化
 liedeng zhi zu 劣等之族
 liezhe 劣者
 liezhuan 列傳
 Li Guangdi 李光地
 Li Hongzhang 李鴻章
 Li Huixian 李惠仙
 Li Ji 李勣
 Liji 禮記
 lijiao 禮教
 lin 鱗
 Lin Pu 林溥
 Lin Qing 林清
 Linyi 林邑
 lishi 歷史
 Lishi dazhi 歷史大旨
 lishi de renzhong 歷史的人種
 lishi dilixue 歷史地理學
 Li Shiji 李世勣
 lishi minzu 歷史民族
 lishi tuihua 歷史退化
 lishixue 歷史學
 Lishi yayan yanjiusuo 歷史語言研究所
 Li Si 李斯
 lisu dian 禮俗典
 li tu 離土
 Liu Bang 劉邦
 Liu Bei 劉備
 Liu Fenglu 劉逢祿
 Liu Guanghan 劉光漢
 liuhuang 流黃
 Liu Ji 劉基
 Liu Ji 劉季 (zi of Han Gaozu)

Liu Shan 劉禪
 Liu Shiwei 劉師培
 liushi zhou 六十州
 Liu Wenhui 劉文輝
 liu yi 六藝
 liu Zhao 六詔
 Liu Yizheng 柳詒徵
 Liu Yuan 劉淵
 li yi 禮義
 liyong Hanren 利用漢人
 Li Yuanhong 黎元洪
 Li yun 禮運
 Lizong 理宗
 Li Zongfang 李宗昉
 Longquan si 龍泉寺
 Longyu 隆裕
 Lou Yue 樓鑰
 Lu 魯
 Lu Cheng gong 魯成公
 Lu Ding gong 魯定公
 lu hai jun da yuanshuai 陸海軍大元帥
 Lu Huan gong 魯桓公
 lu jiao ji 陸交記
 Lü Liuliang 呂留良
 lun ben shu da zhi 論本書大旨
 Lunyu 論語
 Luo Fuchang 羅福萇
 Luohe 洛河
 Luoluo 倮倮
 lu qiu 虜酋
 Lüshun kou 旅順口
 Lü Simian 呂思勉
 Lu Xun 魯迅

 Ma Bufang 馬步芳
 Ma Duanlin 馬端臨
 Maguan tiaoyue 馬關條約
 Maishi Miaola 麥士苗拉
 Ma Junwu 馬君武
 Makesi Moule 馬克斯繆勒
 Man/Mán 蠻
 Man/Mǎn 滿
 Man cheng 滿城
 Manchûkoku 滿州国
 Mangdi 莽帝
 Manmin 蠻民
 Man Min 蠻閩
 Man Mo 蠻貊
 Man Qing zhi zhidu 滿清之制度
 Manren 滿人
 Mantie fushu di 滿鐵附屬地
 Man Yi 蠻夷
 Man Yi hua Xia 蠻夷猾夏
 Man Yue 蠻越
 Manzhong 滿種
 Manzhou 滿洲
 Manzhouguo 滿洲國
 Manzhouren 滿洲人
 Manzhou Qing 滿洲清
 Manzhouzhe 滿洲者
 Manzhou zongdu qintun zhenkuan zhuang
 滿洲總督侵吞賑款狀
 Manzhu 滿珠
 manzhu 滿柱
 Manzhu 曼珠
 Manzu 蠻族
 man zu 蠻族
 Manzu zhi neiqin ji Hanzu zhi mouguang 滿
 族之內侵及漢族之謀光復
 Matsukata Masayoshi 松方正義
 Ma Xiangbo 馬相伯

Naka Michiyo 那珂通世
Namanzu 那曼族
Nanjing 南京
Nanjing daxue 南京大學
Nanjing shi nian 南京十年
Nanjô Bunyû 南条文雄
Nankai daxue 南開大學
Nan Man tielu 南滿鐵路
Nan Manzhou tiedao zhushi huishe 南滿洲鐵
道株式會社
Nan Song 南宋
Nantong guowen zhuan xiuliao 南通國文專修
科
Nan Yue 南越
Nan Zhao 南詔
nan zhou ji 南胄記
nei 內
neidi 內地
nei qi guo 內其國
nei Xia wai Yi 內夏外夷
nei zhu Xia er wai Yi Di 內諸夏而外夷狄
Nenjiang 嫩江
Nong Zhigao 儂智高
Nu'erhachi 努爾哈赤
Nüwa 女媧
Nüzhen 女真
Nüzhen Jin 女真金
Nüzhi 女直
Nüzhi guozi xue 女直國子學
.....
Ôkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信
Ouren dong jian shidai 歐人東漸時代
Ouyue 甌越
Ouzhou 歐洲
.....
paihanzu 排漢族

paiman 排滿
paimanjia 排滿家
paiwai sixiang 排外思想
paiwai zhi sixiang 排外之思想
pai yi zu 排異族
Pan Gu 盤古
pei Haotian Shangdi 配昊天上帝
pifu guge 皮膚骨格
pingjun diquan 平均地權
Pisi 波斯
pi tu 關土
pizhen 狃榛
Pu 濮
Pu Fa zhan ji 普法戰紀
Pu Shougeng 蒲壽庚
Puyi 溥儀
Pyönhan 弁韓
.....
Qi 齊
qi 棄
qi 氣
qian 乾
Qian/Hou Chouchi 前/後仇池
Qian Daxin 錢大昕
Qiang 羌
Qiang Hu 羌胡
qiangpo tonghua 強迫同化
Qiangxue bao 強學報
Qiangxue hui 強學會
qiang you li 強有力
qiang you li zhi zu 強有力之族
Qiang zhongzu 羌種族
qianhu 千戶
Qian ji 黔記
Qian Jiazhi 錢家治
Qian Jibo 錢基博

- Qian Qin 前秦
- Qianliang hutong 錢糧胡同
- Qianlong 乾隆
- qiantu 遷徙
- Qian Xuantong 錢玄同
- qiao piao tianxia zhi gusui 敲朴天下之骨髓
- Qi bi Zhinü, zhong ri qi xiang. Sui ze qi xiang, bu
cheng bao zhang. 跂彼 織女、終日
七襄。雖則七襄、不成報章。
- Qidan 契丹
- Qidan guo zhi 契丹國志
- Qidan Liao 契丹遼
- Qidan minzu 契丹民族
- Qidan Tata 契丹塔塔
- Qi Huan gong 齊桓公
- Qilian shan 祁連山
- Qin 秦
- Qincha 欽察
- Qin di ji 秦帝記
- Qing 清
- Qingdai zhi kaituo 清代制開拓
- Qinghai 青海
- Qinghua daxue kexueguan 清華大學科學館
- Qinghua xuexiao 清華學校
- qin gong 寢宮
- Qing san di kaoji 清三帝考紀
- Qing yan ju Man Meng ru guohui zhuan 請
嚴拒滿蒙入國會傳
- Qingyi bao 清議報
- Qinlong 秦隴
- qinran Yi feng 浸染夷風
- qinru 侵入
- qinru Zhongguo 侵入中國
- Qin Shi Huangdi 秦始皇帝
- Qin shi huang kaoji 秦始皇考紀
- Qin xi 秦系
- Qin zhi yitong 秦之一統
- qiren 旗人
- Qitad Хятад
- qita zhu yi zu 其他諸異族
- qi tonghua yu wo ye yi zui quan 其同化於我也
亦最全
- qi tonghua yu wo ye yi zui wan 其同化於我也
亦最完)
- Qiushu chukeben 旭書初刻本
- Qiushu zongdingben 旭書重訂本
- quan 犬
- quanbu bian wei Zhonghua minzu zhi chengfen
全部變為中華民族之成分
- quan tonghua yu Zhongguo 全同化於中國
- Qufu 曲阜
- qun Di zu 群狄組
- qun Man 群蠻
- qun Mo zu 群貊組
- qunti 群體
- Qu Yong 瞿鏞
-
- rang 攘
- rang Di 攘狄
- rangjue 攘絕
- rang Yi 攘夷 (in the Rangshu)
- rang Yi 攘彝
- rang Yi Di 攘夷狄
- Rehe 熱河
- Rekishito chiri 歷史と地理
- ren 人
- ren 仁
- rendao 人道
- renlei 人類
- renleixue 人類學
- renmin 人民

renqun 人群
renwei zhi taotai 人為之淘汰
renzhong 人種
Ribenren 日本人
Ribenzu 日本族
Rikken seitairyaku 立宪政体略
Rinan 日南
Rong 戎
rong 融
rong bian qi yuanzhi zuowei wo zu zhi yi
chengfen 蛻變其原質作為我族之
一成分
Rong Di/Rong Di 戎狄
ronghe 融合
ronghua 溶化
Rong lu 戎虜
rongna 容納
Rouran 柔然
rouran 濡染
Ruan Yuan 阮元
Ruoshui 若水
ru Zhongguo 入中國
.....
Saihatogi jinshu 西伯利人種
Saizhong 塞種
Sakesunzu 撒克遜族
Samhan 三韓
san ci geming 三次革命
Sanhan 三韓
san huangfu 三荒服
Sanjiang shifan xuetang 三江師範學堂
San Miao 三苗
san shi 三世
San tong ti 三通體
Seiyô jôko shi 西洋上古史
Selenggehe 色楞格河
Shakaigaku 社会学
shanggu 上古
Shanghai ligong daxue 上海理工大學
Shanghai sili jiazhong shangye xuexiao 上海私
立甲種商業學校
Shanghai zhongxue 上海中學
shangshi 上世
shang shishi 上世史
Shangshu 尚書
Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館
Shan hai jing 山海經
Shan Rong 山戎
Shanyue 山越
shaoshu minzu 少數民族
Shatuo 沙陀
she 蛇
shehui 社會
Shehui zhuyi jiangxi hui 社會主義講習會
sheng 聖
shengming 聲名
shengming wenwu 聲名文物
sheng Nüzhen 生女真
sheng Nüzhi 生女直
shengping shi 昇平世
Sheng Shicai 盛世才
Shengwu ji 聖武記
Shenjian 申鑒
shenling zhi zhou 神靈之胄
shenqu 神區
Shenyang zhi bian 瀋陽之變
shen yi zhi lai zhi yi zang wang 神以知來知以
藏往
shi 世
shi 豕
shidai zhi qufen 時代之區分

Shigaku genron 史学原論	Shizong 世宗
Shigaku tsûron 史学通論	shou 獸
Shiga Shigetaka 志賀重昂	Shu 蜀
Shiga Shigetaka zenshu 志賀重昂全書	shu 書
shigong 事功	shubu 屬部
shihuo dian 食貨典	Shu Han 蜀漢
Shiji 史記	Shujing 書經
shijia 世家	shun 馴
shijie zhi Zhongguo 世界之中國	Shun dian 舜典
Shijing 詩經	shunli 順理
Shi Jin lu 使金錄	shunni 順逆
Shiji zhi lunci 史蹟之論次	shu Nüzhen 熟女真
Shileke He 石勒喀河	shu Nüzhi 熟女直
shili 勢力	Shuo Man 說蠻
Shiliao zhi souji yu jianbie 史料之蒐集與鑑別	Shuo shiliao 說史料
shili ri sheng 勢力日盛	Shuowen jiezi 說文解字
Shimpotô 進步黨	Shuowen jiezi zhu 說文解字注
Shina jinshu 支那人種	Shushi huiyao 書史會要
Shina tsûshi 支那通史	shutu 屬土
Shin no ittô 秦の一統	Shu xi 蜀系
Shiqi shi shang que 十七史商榷	Shuzu 蜀族
shishi you tonghua yu Hanzu 時時有同化于漢族	shu zu 殊族
Shi Siming 史思明	Sibinsai'er wenji 斯賓塞爾文集
Shiwei 室韋	Sichuan guoxue yuan 四川國學院
Shiwu bao 時務報	si da ming chen 四大名臣
Shiwu xuetang 時務學堂	Siku quanshu 四庫全書
shixiang biao 師相表	Silla 新羅
shi Xiaren wei yi 視夏人為易	si Mengguozhong 四蒙古種
shixue 史學	Sima Guang 司馬光
shi Yi 史佚	Sima Qian 司馬遷
Shi zhi 史職	si shu 四書
Shi zhi gaizao 史之改造	sixiang shi 思想史
Shi zhi yiyi ji qi fanwei 史之意義及其範圍	si Yi 四夷
	si zhen 四鎮
	Song 宋

Song Bolu 宋伯魯
Song Huizong 宋徽宗
Song Jiaoren 宋教仁
Song Lian 宋濂
Song Liao Jin Yuan si chao de zhengzhi he shehui 宋遼金元四朝的政治和社會
Song Ningzong 宋寧宗
Songshi 宋史
Song Wenbing 宋文炳
Song Wudi kaoji 宋武帝考紀
Subao 蘇報
Sui bu 爻部
su jian yu Hua tong 俗漸與華同
Sumo Mohe 粟末靺鞨
Sun Fu 孫復
Sun Jia'nai 孫家鼐
Sun Quan 孫權
Sun Yat-sen see Sun Yixian
Sun Yixian 孫逸仙
Sun Zhongshan 孫中山
Suo jian shi zhi zhi taiping ze tianxia yuan jin da xiao ruoyi 所見世治致太平則天下遠近大小若一
Suoshen 索慎
Suo wen shi zhi jin shengping ze nei zhu Xia er wai Yi Di 所聞世治進昇平則內諸夏而外夷狄
Suo zhuan wen shi zhi shang cucu ze nei qi guo er wai zhu Xia 所傳聞世治尚麤犗則內其國而外諸夏
Sushen 肅慎
Su xing 溯姓
Suzhou Zhang shi guoxue jiangxi hui 蘇州章氏國學講習會

.....
ta 他

tai 太
Taichong 太冲
Taida 台大
Taiping/taiping 太平
taiping shi 太平世
taiping tianguo 太平天國
taishi 太師
Taiwan nichi'nichi shinbun 臺灣日日新報
Taiyan 太炎
Takakusu Junjirô 高楠順次郎
Takakuwa Komakichi 高桑駒吉
Tan Sitong 譚嗣同
Tang Caichang 唐才常
Tang Dazong kaoji 唐太宗考紀
Tang fan ji 唐藩記
Tangren 唐人
Tang Song jian shehui zhi bianqian 唐宋間社會之變遷
Tan Zu 檀卒
Tao Chengzhang 陶成章
Tao Zongyi 陶宗儀
Tata 韃靼
ta zu 他族
teli zhi jingshen 特立之精神
Tensoku hyaku wa 天則百話
Tepuqin 特普欽
teshu zhi xingzhi 特殊之性質
te zhi 特質
tian 天
tiandi 天地
Tianjin 天津
Tianjing 天京
tianjuan 天眷
tianran 天然
tianran minzu 天然民族

tianran zhi jiexian 天然之界限
Tianshan 天山
tianxia 天下
tianxing 天性
Tianyan lun 天演論
Tianyi 天義
tianzi 天子
tie 帖
Tiele 鐵勒
Tieqin tongjian lou cangshu mu 鐵琴銅劍樓藏
書目
tong 同
tong 通
Tongbōn 東蕃
Tongdian 通典
Tonggusi zhong 通古斯種
Tonggusi zu 通古斯族
Tonggusizu zhi geju 通古斯族之割據
tong Hanwen 通漢文
tonghua 同化
tonghua Huazu 同化華族
tonghuali 同化力
tonghua yu Hanren 同化於漢人
tonghua yu Hanzu 同化於漢族
tonghua yu wo 同化於我
tonghua yu Zhongxia 同化與中夏
tonglei 同類
Tongmenghui 同盟會
tongshi 通史
tong xuetong zhi jiazu 同血統之家族
tongyi 統一
Tongyi dang 統一黨
tongyi shijie 統一世界
tong yi zhong 同一種
Tongzhi 同治

Tongzhi 通志
tong zhong 同種
tong zhong 通種
tongzu 同族
tongzu zhi bumin 同族之部民
Torii Ryûzô 鳥居龍藏
Toruko zoku トルコ族
tuanjie 團結
tuanti 團體
Tubotezhong 圖伯特種
Tu'erqi 土耳其
Tu'erqiren 土耳其人
Tu'erqizu 土耳其族
Tufan 吐蕃
Tufan 突厥 (Turfan)
turen 土人
tui 推
tuihua 退化
tuirang 退讓
Tujue 突厥
Tulufan 吐魯番
tun 吞
Tsongûsu zoku ツングース族
Tuoba 拓拔
Tuoba Wei 拓拔魏
Tuotuo 脫脫
tusi 土司
tusi zhengzhi 土司政治
Tuyuhun 吐谷渾
tuzhu Manzu 土著蠻族
.....
Ukita Kazutami 浮田和民
.....
wai 外
Wai Dongbei 外東北
waiguo 外國

wailai shuo 外來說	Wei Yuan 魏源
Wai Xing'an ling 外興安嶺	Weizang 衛藏
wai zu 外族	wen 文
wan 晚	Wendi 文帝
wan 輓	wenguan 文官
Wang Chang 王昶	wenhua shi 文化史
wangdao 王道	wenming 文明
Wang Fuzhi 王夫之	wenming guoren 文明國人
Wang Kangnian 汪康年	wenmingshi 文明史
Wang Lun 王倫	wenming zhi guo 文明之國
Wang Mang 王莽	wen ru biao 文儒表
Wang Mang kaoji 王莽考紀	wen ruo 文弱
Wang Qi 王圻	wen sheng 文聖
Wang Tao 王韜	Wen wang yi wen zhi 文王以文治
Wang Tongling 王桐齡	Wenweng 文翁
Wanguo gongbao 萬國公報	wenwu 文物
Wang Wusheng 王鳴盛	wen wu 文武
Wang Yangming 王陽明	Wenxian tongkao 文獻通考
wangzhe wu wai 王者無外	wenyan dian 文言典
Wanjiang zhongxue 皖江中學	Wen yi shang 文藝上
Wanmucao tang 萬木草堂	wenzi 文字
Wanping 宛平	Wenzong 文宗
wanquan jiejie 完全解決	wo 我
wanshi 萬世	wo benbu 我本部
wantong 頑童	Wodaci 斡答刺 also 斡答刺
Wanxi junfa 皖系軍閥	wo guo 我國
Wanyan 完顏	wo guomin 我國民
Wanyan Yingge 完顏盈歌	wo lishi quan 我歷史圈
Wei 魏 (state)	wo minzu 我民族
Wei 衛	wo minzu gongtong zhi ganqing 我民族共同之 感情
wei Hanzu suo pai 為漢族所排	wo minzu zhenyu zhi ganqing 我民族畛域之 感情
Wei Ling Gong 衛靈公	Wonanhe 斡難河
Wei Shou 魏收	wo Zhongguo zhu zu 我中國主族
Weishu 魏書	
Weiwu'erzu 維吾爾族	

wo zu 我族	Xia 夏
Wu 吳	Xianguo shang 夏國上
wu 武	Xianguo xia 夏國下
wubei dian 武備典	Xiajiasi 黠戛斯
Wuchang 武昌	xian 縣
Wudai Song yi zu zhi qinru 五代宋異族之 侵入	Xianbei 鮮卑
wuguan 武官	Xianbeiren 鮮卑人
wu Hanzu zhi min 吾漢族之民	xiandai 現代
Wu Haozhang 吳昊張	xiandai Zhongguo guomin zhi zi jian 現代中國 國民之資鑑
Wuhu 蕪湖	Xiandi 獻帝
Wu Hu 五胡	Xianfa yanjiu hui 憲法研究會
Wuhuan 烏桓	xiang 襄
Wuji 勿吉	Xiang Da 向達
Wujin 武進	xianghe 相合
Wuqian nian shi shi niaokan 五千年史勢鳥瞰	xianghua 嚮化
wu sheng 武聖	Xiang jun 湘軍
Wusizang 烏斯藏	xiangrong 相融
Wusulijiang 烏蘇里江	Xianluo 暹羅
Wu Taibo 吳太伯	Xianluoren 暹羅人
Wu wang yi wu gong 武王以武功	xianshi 現世
wuwei er zhi 無為而治	xianxiang 現象
wu wen yong Xia bian Yi zhe wei wen bian yu Yi zhe ye 吾聞用夏變夷者未聞變於 夷者也	Xianyu 鮮虞
Wu Sangui 吳三桂	Xianyun 獫狁
Wusun 烏孫	Xianzheng dang 憲政黨
Wuxu bianfa 戊戌變法	xiaobao 虓暴
Wuyashu 烏雅束	xiao minzuzhuyi 小民族主義
Wu Yue zu 吳越族	Xiaowen 孝文
wu Zhongguo 吾中國	Xiao ya 小雅
wu Zhongxia zhi shi 吾中夏之氏	Xiao Yishan 蕭一山
wu zu 五族	xiao you 孝友
wu zu 吾族	Xiashui 夏水
.....	Xia Zengyou 夏曾佑
Xi 奚	Xia Zhongguo ren ye 夏中國人也
	Xiazu 夏族

Xiboliyaren 西伯利亞人
Xiboli renzhong 西伯利人種
Xi Fan 西番
Xifang 西方
Xi gong 僖公
Xi Han 西漢
Xijiang 西江
xi ju zhuzu 吸聚諸族
Xi Kang 西康
xilai shuo 西來說
Xi Liao 西遼
Xin 新
xina 吸納
Xinan Boren 西南僊人
Xinan Yi 西南夷
Xinchao 新潮
xing 性
Xing 邢
Xingren Qiren ren zhi 而邢人齊人人之
xingsheng 行省
Xingzhehui 興浙會
Xing Zhong hui 興中會
Xinjiang 新疆
Xinjiang Weiwu'er Zizhiqu 新疆維吾爾自治區
Xinluo 新羅
Xinmin congbao 新民叢報
Xin min shuo 新民說
Xin Nanshan 信南山
Xin wenhua yundong 新文化運動
Xin Wudaishi 新五代史
Xin xue wei jing kao 新學偽經考
Xin Yaxiya 新亞細亞
Xinyu 獯鬻
Xiongjialiren 匈加利人
Xiongnu 匈奴
Xiongnu zhong 匈奴種
Xiong Qu 熊渠
Xiong Xiling 熊希齡
Xiren 西人
Xi Rong 西戎
Xi Rong mu 西戎牧
xishang 習尚
xishou 翕受
xishou 吸收
xishou tonghua 吸收同化
xiucai 秀才
Xi Xia 西夏
Xi Xia guo shu lüeshuo 西夏國書略說
Xi Xia zhuan 西夏傳
Xiyu 西域
Xizang zhong 西藏種
Xizang zizhiqu 西藏自治區
Xizang zu 西藏族
Xi Zhou 西周
xu 序
Xuantong 宣統
Xuantu 玄菟
Xuehai tang 學海堂
Xueheng 學衡
xueshu dian 學術典
xuetong 血統
xue ying 血胤
Xu Hiao zu 徐淮族
Xu Jiyu 徐繼畬
xu li 序例
Xunyu 獯鬻
Xun Yue 荀悅
Xunzi 荀子
Xurong 徐戎
Xu Shen 許慎

- Xu Shoushang 許壽裳
 Xu Shuzheng 徐樹錚
 Xu Wenxian tongkao 續文獻通考
 Xu Zhongshu 徐中舒
 Xu zhongxing shang 序種姓上

 Ya dong minzu shulüe ji Hanzu zhi quyuan
 亞東民族述略及漢族之起原
 Yamato minzoku 大和民族
 Yan 燕
 yan 炎
 Yan Fu 嚴復
 yang 羊 (sheep)
 yang 陽
 Yang Du 楊度
 Yang Weizhen 楊維楨
 yangyi hu Zhongguo she ji Man Bo 洋溢乎中國
 施及蠻貊
 Yang Zengxin 楊增新
 Yangzhou 揚州
 Yangzijiang 揚子江
 Yanjing xuebao 燕京學報
 Yanjiu xi 研究系
 Yanqi 焉耆
 Yan Ruyu 嚴如煜
 Yanwu 炎武
 yanyu 言語
 yanyu wenzi 言語文字
 Yan Yuan 顏元
 Yan yuan 顏淵
 yanyu wenzi 言語文字
 Yao 傜
 Yao Dian 堯典
 Yao Zhaoxiang wang 燕昭襄王
 Yaxiya renzhong 亞細亞人種
 Yazhou heqin hui 亞洲和親會
 Yazhou zhi Zhongguo 亞州之中國
 Ye Changchi 葉昌熾
 Yejong 睿宗
 Yelang 夜郎
 Ye Longli 葉隆禮
 Yelü 耶律
 yeman 野蠻
 yeman minzu 野蠻民族
 yeman renzhong 野蠻人種
 yeman zhongzu 野蠻種族
 yeshi 野史
 ye wei yi lu 冶為一爐
 Yi/Yí/Yi 夷, sometimes 彝
 yiban gei women tonghua 一般給我們同化
 Yi bu mou Xi Yi bu luan Hua 裔不謀夏夷不亂
 華
 yi da minzu 一大民族
 Yi Di 夷狄
 Yi Di keyi jin wei Zhongguo 夷狄可以進為中
 國
 Yi Di zhi xing 彝狄之行
 Yi Dí zhi you jun bu ru zhu Xia zhi wang ye 夷
 狄之有君不如諸夏之亡也
 yiguo 一國
 Yigu pai 疑古派
 yigu yundong 疑故運動
 yi Hanren 以漢人
 yihua 易化
 Yijing 易經
 Yili He 伊犁河
 yi lu 一爐
 yimin bielu 逸民別錄
 yi minzu 異民族
 Yin 殷
 yin 陰

Yingge 盈歌
 Yinghuan zhilüe 瀛寰志略
 Yinglanren 英蘭人
 Yin gong 隱公
 yingong zhi guo 引弓之國
 yin guo 因果
 Yin Jifu 尹吉甫
 Yin Zhen 尹珍
 Yiqu 義渠
 Yiren 夷人
 yi xun 易馴
 Yi yi 夷裔
 yi yu 異域
 yi zhi dao 易之道
 Yi zhong 夷種
 yi zhong 異種
 yi Zhongguo wei muyang 以中國為牧場
 yi zhongzu 一種族
 yi zu 一族
 yi zu 異族
 yi zun lü wang dao zhe shu yi 以遵率王道者數
 矣
 yi zu zhi renmin 一族之人民
 yi zu zhi tuxing 一族之特性
 yi zu zhi zachu 異族之雜處
 Yōjin 女真
 Yong 雝
 Yonggu 雍古
 yong Hanren 用漢人
 Yong xi 庸系
 yong Xia bian Yi 用夏變夷
 yong Xia yi bian Yi 用夏以變彝
 Yongzheng 雍正
 you de hui shu zhi zhi meng 有德慧術知之氓
 youdeng zhi min 優等之族

youji 遊記
 you jiao wu lei 有教無類
 you lishi zhi renzhong 有歷史之人種
 youqiang minzu 優強民族
 youshengliebai 優勝劣敗
 Youtai 猶太
 youyao 尤要
 youzhe 優者
 youzhi 幼稚
 Yuan 元
 Yuan Dazu kaoji 元大祖考紀
 Yuan jun 原君
 Yuan ren 原人
 Yuan Shikai 袁世凱
 Yuan Shu 袁樞
 yuanyin jieguo 原因結果
 Yu Dao 鬻道
 Yu Dian 禹甸
 Yue 粵 (ethnic name)
 Yue 越 (state and ethnic name)
 Yuejing 樂經
 Yuenan 越南
 Yueren 粵人
 yue tu 樂土
 Yuezhi 月氏
 Yugong banyuekan 禹貢半月刊
 yu Hanzu xianghe 與漢族相合
 yu Manzu tonghua 與蠻族同化
 yunei 域內
 Yunnan 雲南
 Yu shi 語石
 Yu shu 虞書
 yuwai 域外
 yuyan wenzi fengsu 語言文字風俗
 Yu Yue 俞樾

<i>zachu</i> 雜處	<i>zhengzhi</i> 政治
Zaifeng 載豐	<i>zhengzhi gaige</i> 政治改革
<i>za Hu</i> 雜胡	<i>Zhen Han</i> 辰韓
<i>zaju</i> 雜居	<i>Zhexue</i> 哲學
Zang 藏	<i>Zhi</i> 志
Zang Aibo 臧哀伯	<i>zhi</i> 豸 (worm)
<i>zang wang</i> 臧/藏往	<i>zhi</i> 職 (duty)
<i>zao</i> 蚤	<i>zhi</i> 志 (monographies)
<i>zazhong</i> 雜種	<i>zhi</i> 之
Zeng Guofan 曾國藩	<i>zhifen</i> 枝分
Zeng Guangquan 曾廣銓	<i>zhiguan biao</i> 職官表
Zeng Lian 曾廉	<i>zihhan</i> 鷺悍
Zhai fa 祭法	<i>zhi lai</i> 知來
Zhang Binglin 章炳麟	<i>Zhili</i> 直隸
<i>zhangfu dian</i> 章服典	<i>Zhina</i> 支那
Zhang Ji 張繼 (also: 張繼)	<i>Zhina beibu</i> 支那北部
Zhang Qiyun 張其昀	<i>Zhina benbu zhi min</i> 支那本部之民
Zhang Shizhao 章士釗	<i>Zhina nanbu</i> 支那南部
Zhang Taiyan 章太炎	<i>Zhina renzhong</i> 支那人種
Zhang Xueliang 張學良	<i>Zhina wangguo erbaisishier nian jinian hui</i> 支那亡國二百四十二年紀念會
Zhang Xun 張勳	<i>Zhina zhi ren</i> 支那之人
<i>zhanzheng</i> 戰爭	<i>Zhinü</i> 織女
Zhang Zhidong 張之洞	<i>zhinü zhong ri qi xiang bu cheng bao zhang</i> 織 女終日七襄不成報章
Zhang Zuolin 張作霖	
Zhao 趙	<i>zhiqu</i> 旨趣
Zhao gong jiu nian 昭公九年	<i>Zhi yan</i> 制言
Zhao Yi 趙翼	<i>Zhi yan ban yue kan</i> 制言半月刊
<i>zhe</i> 折	<i>zhong</i> 中
Zhendān 震旦	<i>zhong</i> 種
Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功	<i>Zhongbang</i> 中邦
<i>zhengfu wangchao</i> 征服王朝	<i>zhonggu</i> 中古
Zheng ming 正名	<i>Zhonggu shi</i> 中古史
Zheng Qiao 鄭樵	<i>Zhongguo</i> 中國
<i>Zhengqi hui</i> 正氣會	<i>Zhongguo baihua bao</i> 中國白話報
<i>zhengshu</i> 政書	

- Zhongguo benbu 中國本部
 Zhongguo de bantu 中國的版圖
 Zhongguo difang 中國地方
 Zhongguo ge zu 中國各族
 Zhongguo gongchandang 中國共產黨
 Zhongguo keyi tui wei Yi Di 中國可以退為夷狄
 Zhongguo lishi 中國歷史
 Zhongguo minzu 中國民族
 Zhongguo minzu shi 中國民族史
 Zhongguo minzu zhi fuza 中國民族之複雜
 Zhongguoren 中國人
 Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun 中國人民解放軍
 Zhongguo ribao 中國日報
 Zhongguo shehui 中國社會
 Zhongguo shi 中國史
 Zhongguo shishu 中國史書
 Zhongguo tonghuali 中國同化力
 Zhongguo tonghua li zhi qiang 中國同化力之強
 Zhongguo tongshi 中國通史
 Zhongguo tongshi lüelie 中國通史略例
 Zhongguo tongshi mulu 中國通史目錄
 Zhongguo wenhua 中國文化
 Zhongguo xianmin 中國先民
 Zhongguo yang daxue 中國央大學
 Zhongguo yihui 中國議會
 Zhongguo zhi jiushi 中國之舊史
 Zhongguo zhi li 中國之禮
 Zhongguo zhi yi minzu 中國之一民族
 Zhongguo zhi Zhongguo 中國之中國
 Zhongguo zhongzu 中國種族
 Zhonghang Yue 中行說
 Zhonghua 中華
 Zhonghua diguo 中華帝國
- Zhonghua guochi ditu 中華國耻地圖
 Zhonghua guomin 中華國民
 Zhonghua minguo 中華民國
 Zhonghua minguo fensheng xintu 中華民國分省新圖
 Zhonghua minzu 中華民族
 Zhonghua minzu tonghua li 中華民族同化力
 Zhonghua shuju 中華書局
 Zhonghua wenhua shi daoxu 中国文化史导读
 Zhongke Yuan Xiyu huahua kao 重刻元西域人華化考
 zhongqu 中區
 zhongren 種人
 zhongren 眾人 (common people)
 Zhong shi 中史
 zhongshi 中世
 zhong shishi 中世史
 Zhongtu 中土
 Zhongwai jiwen 中外紀聞
 Zhongxia 中夏
 Zhongxia zhi shizu 中夏之氏族
 zhong xiao 忠孝
 zhong xindian 中心點
 zhongxing 種性
 zhongxing fei wen 種姓非文
 Zhongyan yanjiuyuan 中央研究院
 zhong yi 忠義
 Zhongyuan 中原
 zhongzu 種族
 zhongzu de benming 種族的本名
 zhongzu de mingcheng 種族的名稱
 zhongzu dian 種族典
 zhongzu fen he 種族分合
 zhongzu fuchou 種族復仇
 zhongzuse 種族色

zhongzuxing 種族性	Zhu Xizu 朱希祖
zhongzu zhi bianqian 種族之變遷	zhuyao minzu 主要民族
zhongzu zhi chanhe 種族之羸合	zhu yi zu 諸異族
zhongzu zhi yi 種族之義	zhu Zang dachen 駐藏大臣
zhongzuzhuyi 種族主義	zhu zhong minzu 諸種民族
zhongzuzhuyizhe 種族主義者	Zhu Zonglai 朱宗萊
Zhou fu ji 周服記	zhu zu 諸族
Zhou Hui 周輝	zhu zu 主族
Zhou Wen wang 周文王	Zhu zu bing xing ji qu tonghua 諸族開興及 其同化
Zhou Wu wang 周武王	Zi/zi 子
Zhou Xiang wang 周襄王	zi 字
Zhou Xuan wang 周宣王	zi jian 資鑑
Zhou Yi 周易	zi jie 自結
Zhou You wang 周幽王	Zili hui 自立會
Zhou Zuoren 周作人	ziran zhi taotai 自然之淘汰
zhu 主	Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑
Zhuang 僮	zong 棕
Zhuang Cunyu 莊存與	zongjiao 宗教
zhuanyi 轉移	zongjiao dian 宗教典
zhuanyu 顛愚	zongzhu 宗主
zhu dongli 主動力	Zou Rong 鄒容
zhugan 主幹	zu 族
Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮	Zui gang 罪綱
zhu Hua 諸華	zui jinshi 最近世
Zhujiang 珠江	Zuixin zhongxue Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu 最新 中學中國歷史教科書
zhu minzu zhi yanyu feng deng 諸民族之言語 風等	zui zhuming 最著明
zhuren 主人	zuming 族名
Zhushen 珠申	Zuo zhuan 左傳
zhuti 主體	Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠
zhu Xia 諸夏	zuxing 族姓
zhu Xia zu 諸夏組	Zu zhi 族制
zhuxiang Hua feng 遂向華風	

