PROOF COVER SHEET

Author(s):	Bram Wauters
Article Title:	IT TAKES TIME: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF GENDER QUOTA
Article No:	RREP860911
Enclosures:	1) Query sheet
	2) Article proofs

Dear Author,

1. Please check these proofs carefully. It is the responsibility of the corresponding author to check these and approve or amend them. A second proof is not normally provided. Taylor & Francis cannot be held responsible for uncorrected errors, even if introduced during the production process. Once your corrections have been added to the article, it will be considered ready for publication.

Please limit changes at this stage to the correction of errors. You should not make insignificant changes, improve prose style, add new material, or delete existing material at this stage. Making a large number of small, non-essential corrections can lead to errors being introduced. We therefore reserve the right not to make such corrections.

For detailed guidance on how to check your proofs, please see
http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/checkingproofs.asp.

2. Please review the table of contributors below and confirm that the first and last names are structured correctly and that the authors are listed in the correct order of contribution. This check is to ensure that your name will appear correctly online and when the article is indexed.

Sequence	Prefix	Given name(s)	Surname	Suffix
1		Bram	Wauters	
2		Gert-Jan	Put	
3		Bart	Maddens	

Queries are marked in the margins of the proofs.

AUTHOR QUERIES

General query: You have warranted that you have secured the necessary written permission from the appropriate copyright owner for the reproduction of any text, illustration, or other material in your article. (Please see http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/preparation/permission.asp.) Please check that any required acknowledgements have been included to reflect this.

QUERY NO.	QUERY DETAILS
AQ1	Caul 2001 not in references: 1999 only
AQ2	Vanlangenakker et al. forthcoming not in references: 2013 only
AQ3	Andy or André?
AQ4	Andre or André?
AQ5	'Not shown in Figure': OK as edited? Also, which figure?

**How to make corrections to your proofs using Adobe Acrobat**

Taylor & Francis now offer you a choice of options to help you make corrections to your proofs. Your PDF proof file has been enabled so that you can edit the proof directly using Adobe Acrobat. This is the simplest and best way for you to ensure that your corrections will be incorporated. If you wish to do this, please follow these instructions:

1. Save the file to your hard disk.

2. Check which version of Adobe Acrobat you have on your computer. You can do this by clicking on the "Help" tab, and then "About."

If Adobe Reader is not installed, you can get the latest version free from http://get.adobe.com/reader/.

- If you have Adobe Reader 8 (or a later version), go to "Tools"/ "Comments & Markup"/ "Show Comments & Markup."

- If you have Acrobat Professional 7, go to "Tools"/ "Commenting"/ "Show Commenting Toolbar."

3. Click "Text Edits." You can then select any text and delete it, replace it, or insert new text as you need to. If you need to include new sections of text, it is also possible to add a comment to the proofs. To do this, use the Sticky Note tool in the task bar. Please also see our FAQs here: http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/production/index.asp.

4. Make sure that you save the file when you close the document before uploading it to CATS using the "Upload File" button on the online correction form. A full list of the comments and edits you have made can be viewed by clicking on the "Comments" tab in the bottom left-hand corner of the PDF.

If you prefer, you can make your corrections using the CATS online correction form.

IT TAKES TIME: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF GENDER QUOTA

Bram Wauters, Gert-Jan Put and Bart Maddens

We have estimated the changes in parties' behaviour following the introduction of quota regulations in Belgium. We expected to find a curvilinear effect: shortly after the introduction, women candidates would be worse off due to, amongst others, reluctance of the party elite to support women in the electoral contest. But after some time, their situation would improve—we hypothesise—either because parties become more convinced of women's qualities or because of strategic considerations. Our results do show an initial setback followed by a modest increase, but this increase takes longer than we initially assumed.

Introduction

Worldwide, politicians devote increasing attention to the socio-demographic representativeness of political institutions. The under-representation in political institutions of specific groups, women in particular, is increasingly considered a democratic problem (Phillips 1995). To counter the lack of representativeness, many countries have undertaken action. At present, over a hundred countries worldwide have adopted a form of quotas (Dahlerup 2007; Krook 2007).

The presence of women in parliaments has also been high on the research agenda for several decades. Not surprisingly, considerable scholarly attention has been given to quota regulations. One strand of research has focused on the effects of quotas. Increasingly, researchers are becoming convinced that to evaluate the effects of quotas, one should go beyond an analysis of the number of elected women (Franceschet et al. 2012). In this article, we will adopt such an approach by assessing whether quotas have provoked behavioural changes of party elites in the election process. By looking at a number of indicators influenced by parties' behaviour, we will evaluate whether parties[1] have become more supportive of women candidates. The indicators we use are women candidates' seniority, campaign expenses, list position and preferential votes. As we will demonstrate below, all these variables are at least partially influenced by party elites. By comparing the values on these indicators before and after quota regulations are introduced, we conduct a quasi-experimental analysis in which the presence of quota functions as an independent variable.

The focus is on candidates for the Belgian Senate elections in the Flemish region. In contrast to previous research (Murray 2010) that evaluates quotas by analysing the profile and activities of women parliamentarians, our study also includes candidates, enabling us to investigate party behaviour more fully.

We start with a brief overview of quota research and with a situation of our approach. We then deal more extensively with the indicators of parties' behaviour. Next, we sketch the Belgian institutional context. Then, we explain our methodology and discuss our results.

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Quota Research

Quota regulations have been studied from different angles: the classification of various measures that are labelled quotas (e.g., Dahlerup 2007; Norris 2004) and the adoption process of quotas (e.g., Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Krook 2006) have been two major foci of scholarly attention in this perspective.

Another important line of research has examined the implementation and the effects of quotas. Most notably, the effect on the number of parliamentary seats for women and the intervening variables that play a role here (e.g., Caul 2001; Krook 2007; Murray et al. 2012; Tremblay 2008), and the effect on the substantive representation of women's interests (e.g., Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Zetterberg 2008) has attracted a lot of research attention.

AQ1

The implementation of quotas could, however, have other effects as well. The neo-institutionalist approach states that institutions constrain and stimulate particular social behaviour (Peters 2005). 'Institutions' broadly conceived include all kinds of material and immaterial social constructions, such as formal rules and informal norms. Quota regulations can be seen as such a (rather formal) institution which produces (or changes) particular social behaviour. Here, it is our aim to assess the effects of quotas on the behaviour of party elites. These are crucial actors, as they play a dominant role in the selection and recruitment process, and because it has been shown that they often have a negative impact on women's representation (for instance by complying with quota laws only in a minimal way) (Murray 2010). Apart from parties, other actors such as the electorate, the family of a politician and women politicians themselves (Bhavnani 2009) are relevant for determining the chance to become elected. We will not consider these additional actors in this article.

We operationalise party elite behaviour by looking at indicators that are strongly influenced by party elites (see below): list position, seniority, campaign expenses and preferential votes. Changes in these indicators can result from strategic considerations or from real changes in the views of party elites. These latter changes could be related to the so-called symbolic dimension of representation, which refers to the view on politics as a 'male' domain (Franceschet et al. 2012; Meier 2008). By disconnecting the exclusive link between politics and men, quotas can convince women that a political career could be an option for them. At the same time, the change in gendered ideas about political participation can also improve the views on women politicians held by a number of actors (including party elites). We should note, however, that in this article we only look at the behaviour of party elites (and the results of this behaviour), leaving aside whether this stems from a real change in the minds of party selectorates or is only prompted by strategic considerations.

Expectations

Based on previous research and theories, we do have clear expectations about the evolution in the indicators. We expect to find a curvilinear effect: first a slight decrease (or stability at best) in the indicators, afterwards an increase.

In a first phase, the scores on the indicators will remain stable or will even decrease. Three theoretical explanations support this expectation. First, male and female politicians differ in their acceptance and perception of quota regulations (Meier 2008). These different attitudes can be attributed to differences in their explanations of women's under-representation. In men's opinions, women's under-representation is due to factors on the individual level (lack of political interest, etc.) and hence women themselves should undertake action

95   in order to improve their situation. Women, on the contrary, are convinced that their disadvantaged position can be explained by structural factors, which can only be overcome by structural measures, such as quotas. Male MPs are often forced to vote in favour of quota legislation (by women's organisations, due to party discipline, etc.), but often only comply in a minimal way with this legislation afterwards (Bacchi 2006; Franceschet

100   et al. 2012).

Second, one can point to a 'distribution effect' (Niven 1998). Given the historic and current absence of women from the political sphere (in parliament as well as in parties), men are thought to be more likely to succeed in politics. On top of that, critics fear that the requirement to nominate more women candidates will lead to the election of women that

105   are not up to the job. Therefore, party elites are not likely to grant a good position to women nor to give them much support in elections.

Third, there is an 'outgroup effect' (Niven 1998; Tremblay and Pelletier 2001). Party elites responsible for selection of candidates, for distributing campaign budgets, etc., are predomi-nantly male. They see women as an outgroup and assess individual women candidates by

110   using stereotypes, leading them to judge women candidates as less politically capable. Male candidates belonging to the 'ingroup' because of the similarity to the party elite ('old boys network'), are more easily judged as politically capable.

In a second phase, however, we expect an improvement in the indicators. The distri-bution effect will change: after running some elections using quotas, parties should arguably

115   have become used to prominent women politicians and this should have a favourable effect on the selection of women and on the party support they enjoy. On top of that, if voters become more supportive of women politicians, it could be a strategic consideration to put (more) women candidates (in prominent positions) on the list (Bhavnani 2009). Finally, the 'out-group' effect will disappear as women will increasingly become part of the party elite that

120   decides on the position and the support that women are granted. The cooptation of women to the party elite (either replacing or complementing male politicians) could further the chances of women candidates. This argument states that party elite's behaviour will change because of the change in its composition.

In sum, we expect to find a curvilinear effect of quotas: in a first stage, the candidates'

125   profiles will reflect the hesitant or even averse opinions of party elites, but in the long run quotas are likely to produce women candidates that are equally supported as men. Note that our expectations differ from Bhavnani's (2009) findings based on the analysis of a system of reserved seats for women in Mumbai (India). He found an immediate effect on the chance for women to become elected at the next elections. A system of reserved seats

130   differs, however, from a quota system in two crucial aspects: in a system of reserved seats, women do not have to compete with male candidates and there are formal guarantees for a high number of female incumbents at the next elections. As competition between male and female candidates often ends at the expense of the latter and as incumbency is a crucial factor for the electoral fortunes of candidates (Villodres 2003), the risk to lose seats

135   for a party when presenting female candidates is considerably higher in a quota system. There-fore, we expect the evolution for women to go slower (and even with an initial backlash) in quota systems.

As the ideological position of parties often impacts on their propensity to grant chances to women (Caul 1999), we will also ~~analyse~~ whether there are differences between parties in

140   the indicators. We will ~~investigate~~, more in particular, whether leftist parties (greens and social-ists) are more supportive for women politicians than rightist parties.[2]

The Operationalisation of Parties' Behaviour

The impact of quotas on the behaviour of parties towards women in politics will be measured by analysing four indicators that are influenced by leading party actors. We are fully aware that other actors (electorate, media, etc.) could influence (some of) these variables, but they fall outside the scope of this study. Where possible, the effect of parties will be singled out in the empirical analysis (e.g., for campaign expenses). We will first show how parties influence the indicators used in the analysis.

List Position

A candidate's position on the party list is an important factor in list PR systems. Previous research has shown that candidates at the top of the list automatically draw more votes due to the 'Ballot Position Effect' (Geys and Heyndels 2003; Lutz 2010; Maddens et al. 2006), and thanks to the transfer of list votes in flexible-list PR systems, they stand a greater chance of being elected.

List positions are determined by party elites, who continue to be the main decision-makers, despite recent tendencies to give the rank and file a greater say in the composition of candidate lists (Bille 2001). Male-dominated party elites are often reluctant to lose their power and while they agree to introduce quota regulations, in practice they often undermine these regulations by preferring to pay a penalty instead of complying with the law (if possible) and by relegating women to lower positions on the party list or to more challenging (less safe) districts than men (Dahlerup 2007; Murray et al. 2012). We expect that this will change over time.

Seniority

Experience is important in the electoral process, as it helps candidates to obtain a good position on the list and a high number of votes (Schwindt-Bayer 2005). It also matters once candidates become elected. Experience allows parliamentarians to build up specialised expertise and relevant networks, which enables them to challenge the omnipotence of the government and to influence policy decisions (Beckwith 2007).

Initially, women will be less experienced since they have mainly been excluded from politics before quotas were introduced. Afterwards, there is the potential to create a pool of established and experienced women politicians. The party elite (as gatekeeper of the candidate lists) plays a crucial role in realising or hindering the gradual creation of a female political elite. A recent study has in this respect revealed that women MPs are more often deselected by the party than men (Vanlangenakker et al. ~~forthcoming~~).

AQ2

Campaign Expenses

The difference in campaign expenses between men and women can be explained both at the level of individual candidates (lack of ambition, lower self-esteem, etc.; e.g., Frederick 2007) and at the party level. The amount which a candidate is allowed to invest in the campaign is to a large extent determined by the party. In Belgium, political parties may, for instance, select a limited number of candidates who are allowed to spend a much larger amount than the regular candidates (see below). If predominantly male candidates are allowed to spend this maximum, the average expenditures of women will be lower which involves a competitive disadvantage.

Preferential Votes

Preferential votes for women in PR systems are important, as the number of preferential votes has a partial but substantial impact on the actual election and on future career prospects of politicians. At first glance, this indicator seems to reflect the general public's attitude towards women. But reality appears to be more complex: some recent studies (Murray et al. 2012; Wauters et al. 2010) have revealed that a lower number of preferential votes for women can be primarily attributed to systemic bias (by the party) rather than to voter bias. In other words, women obtain fewer voters due to inadequate support from their party. Earlier research has shown that once elements (mainly) controlled by the party such as list position, campaign expenses and media attention are included in the analysis, voters no longer discriminate against women casting a vote (Wauters et al. 2010). This proves that this variable, which is at first sight clearly linked to individual voter behaviour, is in fact strongly influenced by the party.

Electoral and Quota Systems in Belgium

Our analysis will concern Belgium, a textbook example of a society where democratically elected institutions aspire to reflect diversity, with a guaranteed representation of language groups, quota regulations for women, etc. (Meier 2000). Before starting the analysis, we will first provide some information on the Belgian electoral system and quota provisions.

In Belgium's so-called 'flexible-list system', voters can either vote for a party list or for one or more candidates (on a single party list). Candidates receiving sufficient preferential votes to pass the election threshold are automatically elected. The other candidates can make use of the list votes in order to reach this threshold. These list votes are distributed to the candidates according to their list position, offering a substantial advantage to candidates at the top of the list. However, in recent elections, more and more low-ranked candidates have managed to win more votes than higher-ranked candidates and got elected. This is due to the growing number of voters casting a preferential vote instead of a party-list vote and to a recent electoral reform halving the impact of party-list votes on the allocation of seats (An─── et al. 2012). **AQ3**

In 1994, a first quota law, stating that no more than two-thirds of the candidates on a list could be of the same sex, was introduced. In 2002, this was changed into the requirement that electoral lists should include an equal number of men and women. In addition, one of the two top (often safe, electable) positions on the list must be reserved for a woman. As a transitional measure for the 2003 election, only one of the three highest positions was reserved for a woman. Candidate quotas, however, only affect the composition of the candidate lists, not the actual election. Nevertheless, the quota legislation led to a substantial increase in women MPs. The percentage of women senators for instance rose from 12% in 1991 to 24% in 1995 and 38% in 2003. After a drop in 2007 (30%), a new high score could be noted in 2010 (43%) (Celis and Meier 2006; IGVM 2010).

In sum, Belgium combines both for the ballot structure and for the quota regulations a mix of features: both list and preferential votes and both modest and more strict quota regulations are used. As the Belgian situation presents a broad range of possible situations, our findings speak to a variety of contextual features, expanding the generalisability of our findings.

Methodology and Research Questions

In countries with legislative quotas, the most appropriate method to assess the effect of quotas on parties' behaviour is to compare this behaviour before and after the introduction of

quota regulations (Francheschet et al. 2012).[3] As such, a sort of quasi-experiment could be set up in which the effect of the presence (or change) in gender quota functions as independent variable.

We will analyse the Belgian Senate elections from 1995 until 2010. Ideally, we should have included 1991 and perhaps also even 1987 in the analysis as elections without quota. The electoral districts (both for the House and for the Senate) were, however, drastically reformed after the 1991 elections, which would have rendered a comparison between these elections and the elections under scrutiny here very complex and difficult.[4] Analysing the House elections (instead of the Senate elections) would make the analysis even more complex, since electoral districts for these elections were reformed a second time in 2003. Belgian Senate elections are held in region-wide electoral districts that have remained unchanged for the last five elections (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2010). ~~Hence, we have two elections with a moderate quota system~~ (1995 and 1999 ~~elections~~, when no more than two-thirds of the candidates on a list could be of the same sex) and three elections with stricter quota regulations (2003, 2007 and 2010, when the lists were required to have an equal number of candidates of each sex). Senate elections have a special status in Belgium: despite the fact that the Senate's powers are more limited than that of the House, the possibility to be on a candidate list covering the territory of a whole region has turned the Senate elections into a battleground where party leaders and government ministers compete with each other to become the most popular candidate (Deschouwer 2009). Apart from these heads of list, Senate candidates on lower-ranked positions include (former) ministers, leaders of the parliamentary party and other party figures known all over the Flemish region (instead of only in their own electoral district). In addition, campaign expenses of Senate candidates are on average higher than those of House candidates (Wauters et al. 2010), indicating that Senate elections are highly competitive (both between and within parties). In sum, Belgian Senate elections are thus clearly not second-order elections. If the curvilinear effect occurs even in these high-profile elections, then it seems plausible that it will also appear in elections in which less prominent party figures run for office.

We expect the introduction of each quota regulation to result in initial setbacks in the indicators at issue here, followed by an increase. We also expect a smaller drop in 2003 (i.e., when a more strict quota regulation was introduced) ~~than in 1995~~ because by then parties were already used to the principle of quotas (which were first used in the 1995 elections).

Given the huge number of data to be collected, we decided to limit the analysis to parties of only one region, i.e., Flanders,[5] which is the largest Belgian region. Flemish parties compete with each other in the Dutch(-speaking) electoral constituency,[6] in which 25 out of 40 directly elected seats are distributed. Moreover, the parties, the party system and the electoral context in the other Belgian regions differ, which would make the analysis more complicated. Usually, analyses of the effects of quotas focus on members of parliament (see, e.g., Murray 2010), but in order to assess changes in the recruitment, selection and election process we decided to include also candidates in our analysis.

The research population (N=887) consists of all candidates, both effective and substitute candidates.[7] The dataset contains information about sex, list position, campaign expenditures and preferential votes of all candidates for the five Flemish parties participating in the last five consecutive Belgian Senate elections (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2010). These parties are the Christian-democratic party CD&V (previously CVP), the social-democratic party SP.A (previously SP), the liberal party OpenVLD (previously VLD), the green party Groen! (previously Agalev) and the extreme right party Vlaams Belang (previously Vlaams Blok).

Each trend is considered from a double perspective: among women candidates as such and in comparison with male candidates (as a trend observed among women might simply reflect a general evolution unrelated to quotas).[8]

Results

List Position

The introduction of more stringent quotas in 2003 has resulted in better representation of women at the top of electoral lists. The percentage of women candidates occupying the top three positions on the list increased from 20% (in 1995) and 33.3% (in 1999) to 40% (in 2003 and 2007), when it became compulsory to have at least one woman in the top three (2003) and top two (2007 and 2010) places, respectively. As mentioned above, the parties initially only complied with the minimum requirements concerning the top list positions. In 2003, only six of the 15 top three positions were occupied by a woman (whereas, given that five parties are analysed, a minimum of five was required by the quota law), and in both 2003 and 2007 only one of the top five places (head of list) was granted to a woman. In 2010, the situation had improved as two out of five lists were headed by women.

At the same time, women candidates' average position on the list systematically declined until 2007. In 1995, women obtained an average position of -12.2[9] (taking into account only the 25 effective candidates, not the substitutes), against an average position of only -13.8 in 2007 (Figure 1). Initially, there were few women on candidate lists, but they were rather highly positioned on the list. In 2010, the average list position increased again to -12.9. However, these differences should not be overstated, as they are not statistically significant.[10] Even so, the pattern seems to be curvilinear, as expected: the introduction of quotas at first leads to a significant

FIGURE 1
Average position on the list (25 effective candidates only: values range from -1=first position to -25=last position) (N=625)

330 deterioration in the position of women candidates, but this tendency is reversed after a few elections. The pattern of a decrease of the position of women in 1999 is apparent in most parties, with the exception of the ecologists and the liberal-democrats (where women already had a good average list position in 1995). The increase in 2010 is less consistent across the various parties.

335

Candidate Seniority

We expect an influx of new women candidates in the first elections after the adoption of quota regulations (1999 and 2003). The number of newly recruited women candidates should 340 decrease once selectors gain confidence in the political role of women and in the creation of a female political elite.

Figure 2 shows the percentage of candidates that have been a candidate before (either nominated for one of the elections to the House, the Senate, the regional parliaments or the European Parliament since 1987). The percentage of women candidates with prior electoral 345 experience remained constant in 1999 (48.4%) and rose to 60.8% in 2003, before decreasing again to 53.8% in 2007. It is only in 2010 that a marked increase in experienced women candidates could be noted (81.0%) and that the percentage of women with prior electoral experience is higher than the percentage of men. This is the case for every party: the percentage of experienced candidates amongst women is substantially higher in 2010 than in 1995, and in 350 most cases even higher than the percentage amongst men.

If we subtract the percentage of experienced male candidates from the percentage of experienced female candidates, we find a curvilinear effect, but one that develops rather slowly. New quota regulations cause an influx of new candidates in the first few elections, which levels off afterwards. A X^2 test confirms that in 1999 and 2007 the number of candidates 355 with previous experience is significantly lower amongst men than amongst women.[11] For the other elections, this difference is not significant. Seniority can also be measured on the basis of incumbency, i.e., whether or not a candidate was a member of parliament (at the federal, regional or European level) or a minister during the preceding legislature (Figure 3). In 1999, the percentage of incumbents on the candidate lists

360

365

370

375 **FIGURE 2**
Percentage of established candidates (previously candidate for either House, Senate, European or Flemish Parliament since 1987) (N=887)

FIGURE 3
Percentage incumbent candidates (as MP or minister) (N=887)

increased amongst both men and women, to 24.7% and 18.5%, respectively. Subsequently, it remained constant amongst the female candidates, but continued to increase (to about 38%) amongst the male candidates. In 2007, this 'stagnation' amongst women candidates was obviously related to the unexpected high inflow of new (and hence by definition non-incumbent) women candidates. In 2003 and 2007, the difference in the percentage of incumbents amongst men and women is statistically significant, in 1995, it is borderline significant.[12]

In 2010, the percentage of incumbent women again remained constant, but due to a decline in male incumbents, the difference between men and women became less marked and no longer significant. To a certain extent, this difference exhibits a curvilinear pattern, although we should note that the 2010 difference is still larger than that observed in 1999.

When split up according to party the data show a more erratic pattern, but in all parties except one (the liberal-democrats) the percentage of incumbents amongst women candidates is substantially higher in 2010 than in 1995.

Campaign Expenses

As explained above, a distinction has to be made between 'regular' candidates subject to lower spending limits (typically 10,000 Euro) and candidates granted a substantially higher spending limit (of about 80,000 Euro). The number of these latter candidates (the so-called maximum expenditure candidates) equals the number of seats obtained at the previous election plus one. If a party obtained two seats, for instance, then the two candidates at the top of the list as well as one candidate chosen by the party are entitled to

spend the maximum amount. Thus, whether or not a candidate may spend this maximum amount is partly determined by the place on the list and partly by the party (which may freely pick one additional candidate). Parties thus play a crucial role as they determine both the order of the candidate list and the extra candidate. It is to be expected that the quota rules with regard to top positions will lead to an increase in the percentage of women entitled to spend the maximum amount. This was indeed the case in 1999, when the percentage of women amongst the candidates with the highest spending cap increased substantially from 27.5% (in 1995) to 43.2% (in 1999). But in the subsequent elections, this percentage declined to 37.5% in 2003 and 31% in 2007, increasing again to 38.5% in 2010 (Figure 4). An X^2 test shows that the under-representation of women amongst the candidates allowed to spend the maximum amount is statistically significant in 2007 and borderline significant in 2003.[13] For the other elections, this relationship is not significant.

The percentage of candidates with the highest spending cap amongst women also declined: in 1995, 22.9% of the (limited) number of women candidates was allowed to spend the maximum amount. This percentage increased slightly to 24.6% in 1999 to decline substantially to 15.5% in 2003 and to 9.8% in 2007 and 10.5% in 2010.

In 2003 and 2007 the difference between men and women peaks at about 10 percentage points, to decrease to 5.7 percentage points in 2010.

This difference is reflected in the development of the mean campaign expenses of men and women (see Figure 5).[14] In 1995, the average expenses of male (18,908 Euro) and female (18,380 Euro) candidates were more or less comparable, but from 1999 onwards the average expenses of women candidates started to decrease, resulting in a difference of 7179 Euro in 2003. The somewhat smaller differences in 2007 (6631 Euro) and in 2010 (3819 Euro) are due to sharp decreases in male candidates' average expenses. These differences between men and women with regard to spending are statistically

FIGURE 4

Percentage of men candidates allowed to spend maximum amount, percentage of women candidates allowed to spend maximum amount, and difference between them (N=887)

FIGURE 5
Average campaign expenses per candidate: all candidates (N=887)

significant for 2003 and 2007, but no longer for 2010.[15] This pattern is also apparent in most parties: the gap between men and women with regard to expenses initially widens but decreases slightly in 2010. This pattern is not due to the expenses incurred by the 'regular' candidates: among these candidates, the difference between men and women disappeared from 2003 onwards (due to a sharp increase in the expenses of women candidates in 2003) (not shown in figure).

As for the candidates with the highest spending cap, women spent more than men in 1995.[16] In 1999, their campaign expenditure decreased sharply, resulting in a difference with men of 11,562 Euro. But in 2007, it increased substantially, thus narrowing the gap with the men's average expenditure to 7308 Euro. Although the campaign expenditures of women candidates allowed to spend the maximum amount dropped slightly in 2010, the gap with men shrank to 4270 Euro (as the expenditures of the men entitled to spend the maximum allowed had fallen more sharply).[17] Thus, the trend observed amongst women candidates with the highest spending cap is more or less in line with the expected curvilinear pattern, although the expense level is not yet as high as in 1995.

In sum, the overall pattern of a widening gap between male and female campaign expenditures in 2003 and 2007 is due both to the lower spending amongst the women allowed to spend the maximum amount and to the fact that there were relatively fewer women than men allowed to spend this maximum. The convergence observed in male and female expenditures in 2010 can be attributed to an increase of both of these factors.

Preferential Votes

Women candidates obtain fewer preferential votes than men (see Figure 6). The gender gap with regard to preferential votes widened in 1999 and 2003. In 2003 this difference is statistically significant: a male candidate on average obtained 1.16% of the total number of valid votes in the constituency, against 0.53% for a woman candidate.[18] However, this divergence

**AQ5**

520

525

530

FIGURE 6

535

Average number of preferential votes (as a percentage of the total number of valid votes in the constituency) (N=887)

was not due to a loss of preferential votes amongst women (there was actually a slight increase) but to the much stronger increase amongst men. In 2007, the gender gap narrowed

540

as the percentage of male candidates decreased while that of women increased. In 2010, this gap had almost completely disappeared (and is no longer significant) as men faced a sharp fall in preferential votes (to 0.68%), while preferential votes for women decreased only slightly (to 0.54%).[19]

This pattern recurs in almost every separate party (except for the green party, Groen,

545

where women always obtain more preferential votes): the male lead with regard to preference votes increases from 1999 onwards, to decrease (and in the case of the Christian-democrats even to disappear) in 2010.

However, this picture is somewhat blurred by fluctuations in the overall number of preferential votes cast (André et al. 2012). In order to control for these fluctuations, we calculated

550

the number of preferential votes for women candidates as a percentage of all preferential votes cast (Figure 7). As this percentage of votes evidently correlates with the percentage of female candidates on the list, we also calculated the difference between these two percentages. Both the percentages of votes and of candidates increase over time, though not to the same extent. In 1995, the 31.2% of women candidates obtained 24.1% of all preferential

555

votes cast, resulting in a difference of 7.1%. In 1999, the percentage of women candidates rose, but the percentage of preferential votes rose to a lower extent. Consequently, the difference between these two percentages increased to 12.4%. In 2003, when women candidates accounted for 50% as a result of the more stringent quota laws, this gap grew even wider to 18.8%. In 2007, female candidates managed to narrow the gap somewhat to 12.6%. In

560

2010, 49% women candidates received 42.9% of all preferential votes, resulting in an even smaller difference of 6.1%.

This pattern generally conforms to our expectations. The initial sharp increase in preferential votes for men is probably due to the fact that, after the less popular male candidates

FIGURE 7
Percentage of preferential votes for women candidates and percentage women candidates
on the lists (N=887)

were replaced by women candidates (in order to comply with the quota regulations), the
remaining men on the list tended to be more popular than the neophyte women. But by
2007, these new candidates seem to be considered by the party as politically 'mature', received
more support and were consequently able to attract a larger share of preferential votes,
although a (small) gap with men remained.

The fact that women candidates obtain fewer preferential votes than men and that
this gap widened in 1999 and 2003 is obviously related to the other variables discussed
above (Wauters et al. 2010). The number of preferential votes is primarily determined by
a candidate's position on the list. Thus, the lower a female candidate's rank on the list,
the fewer preferential votes she will receive. We also know that campaign finance has a
significant effect on the number of preferential votes (Wauters et al. 2010). Thus, women
are electorally sanctioned because their campaign expenses are lower, which, as shown
above, is partially due to the fact that they are less often selected as candidates allowed
to spend the maximum allowed.

Conclusions

In this article, we have evaluated the effects of quotas on parties' behaviour towards
women politicians. We have estimated the changes in the behaviour of party elites by
looking at the evolution in list position, campaign expenses, candidate seniority and the
number of preferential votes after the introduction of gender quotas. All these variables are
to a large extent influenced by party elites. The focus was on the Belgian Senate elections,
which are highly competitive and tend to attract high-profile candidates.

We expected to find a curvilinear effect. Shortly after the introduction of quotas, women
would be worse off due to the difficulties faced by (male) party elites in coping with the new
regulations and by implicit assumptions about what constitutes a good candidate. After some
time, this negative effect would disappear—we hypothesised—because parties would

become accustomed to women taking prominent positions in politics, because women are increasingly included in party elite networks and because of strategic considerations.

The results of our analysis do indeed show in general an initial setback followed by a modest increase in the indicators. This pattern could mostly be found for all parties: the ideological position of parties (left–right) does not appear to play a large role in this respect.

It remains unclear, however, whether this increase is due to a change in party elites' attitudes or to strategic considerations. Further research focused on candidate selectorates could shed more light on this discussion. Bhavnani's (2009) analysis suggests that party elites tend to become more supportive for successful women candidates only, which implies that strategic considerations prevail.

Our results show further that 'in the long run' takes a rather long time (and several elections). It is often not in the first nor in the second elections but only in the third elections after the introduction of gender quotas that a rise in our indicators can be noted. On top of that, the final score obtained by women candidates for, e.g., list position and campaign expenses, is still lower than their initial level. These scores also remain well below the scores of men. The reluctance among party elites to support women in the electoral process appears to be stronger than expected and seriously impedes an evolution towards more equal representation. This reluctance becomes apparent, for instance, from the limited number of women designated as privileged candidates allowed to spend a higher amount of money on their campaign.

This proves that quota systems will continue to be necessary for a while in order to ensure greater political participation of women. This is at odds with Bhavnani's (2009) findings: in a system with reserved seats, he found that even when this provision was lifted, the position of female candidates continued to be improved at the next elections. Since the quota system discussed in this article does allow for competition between male and female candidates and does not formally guarantee the creation of a pool of female incumbents, the risk to lose seats due to quota regulations is higher for parties. Therefore, it takes longer to really improve women's position in electoral contests than in a system with reserved seats. But the positive trend observed encourages the hope that one day quotas will become superfluous as parties will then support men and women equally.

NOTES

1. Parties and party elites are used interchangeably here. We look at parties, but parties' behaviour is to a large extent determined by party elites.
2. We should be cautious, however, as the number of observations becomes small when splitting up the analysis on party basis.
3. An alternative approach could be a comparison of the situation before and after quota regulations were withdrawn (e.g., Bhavnani 2009).
4. As such, we try to control for the institutional context (electoral system) over the period under investigation. Apart from this institutional context, there are other factors that could possibly have affected parties' behaviour, such as international conferences, pressure from women's movements, etc. It is not possible to control for all these factors. Consequently, one should be aware that the effects could not solely be attributed to quota regulations alone, but that other factors can also play a (minor) role.

5. Parties are organised on the regional level. There are Flemish parties and French-speaking parties in Belgium.

6. For the Senate, there are two constituencies (the Dutch(-speaking) and the French(-speaking) constituency) and three electoral disticts (Flanders, Wallonia and the bilingual district Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde). The Dutch(-speaking) constituency consists of the Flemish electoral district and the votes for Flemish parties in the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde district (in which Flemish parties have to compete with French-speaking parties). Seats are distributed on the level of the constituency.

7. In 1995 and 1999, there were 25 effective and six substitute candidates per list. In 2003, 2007 and 2010 the number of substitute candidates increased to 14. In very exceptional cases, a politician runs both as effective and substitute candidate. In that case, only the position as effective candidate was taken into account.

8. ~~Taking into account that the analysis is not based on a sample but on the entire population of candidates, there is no need to check whether the obtained differences or trends are statistically significant.~~

9. In order to obtain a graph comparable to the other graphs (a positive slope always means an improvement for women), we coded this variable by the negative value of the actual list position. Someone at the head of the list has a value of -1, the second on the list has -2, and so on.

10. Based on the results of an analysis of variance with the position on the list as dependent variable and election year as class variable, for the women candidates.

11. For 1999 (X^2=6.95, p=0.0084) and for 2007 (X^2=8.16, p=0.0043)

12. For 2003 (X^2=9.1608, p=0.0025) and 2007 (X^2=6.6356, p=0.01), the difference is statistically significant, for 1995 (X^2=3.2009, p=0.0736) it is borderline significant.

13. For 2007 (X^2=4.02, p=0.045) and for 2003 (X^2=3.15, p=0.076).

14. All amounts are calculated in Euros and in prices of June 2010 so as to control for inflation and to make them comparable over time.

15. Based on the results of an analysis of variance with the expenditures as dependent variable and gender as class variable, separately for each election year. 2003: F=5.31, p=0.0223; 2007: F=4.50, p=0.0352.

16. There is a strong relationship between being allowed to spend the maximum amount and actually obtaining a seat. Hence, the results are very similar if we limit the analysis of the campaign expenses to the subset of (110) winning candidates. In 1995, the female winning candidates spent more than the male winning candidates, but this difference was reversed in 1999 and decreased in 2010.

17. An analysis of variance shows that these differences are not statistically significant, but this is also due to the low N.

18. An analysis of variance (with the relative number of preferential votes as dependent variable and gender as class variable, for each election separately) shows that the difference between men and women is statistically significant in 2003 (F=6.96, p=0.009) and borderline significant in 2007 (F=2.69, p=0.1024).

19. The results are similar for the subsets of the 110 winning candidates, who obtained a seat, and the 777 candidates who did not. For both groups, the gender gap increases in 2003, but starts to decrease from 2007 onwards and almost disappears in 2010. We also obtain similar results for these two subsets when we calculate the share of the preference votes obtained by the candidates (see below).

REFERENCES

ANDRÉ, AUDREY, BRAM WAUTERS and JEAN-BENOIT PILET. 2012. It's not only about lists: explaining preference voting in Belgium. *Journal of Elections, Parties and Public Opinion* 22 (3): 293–313.

BACCHI, CAROL. 2006. Arguing for and against quotas: theoretical issues. In *Women, Quotas and Politics*, edited by Drude Dahlerup. London: Routledge, pp. 32–52.

BECKWITH, KAREN. 2007. Numbers and newness: the descriptive and substantive representation of women. *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40 (1): 27–49.

BHAVNANI, RIKHIL. 2009. Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural experiment in India. *American Political Science Review* 103 (1): 23–35.

BILLE, LARS. 2001. Democratizing a democratic procedure: myth or reality?. *Party Politics* 7 (3): 363–80.

CAUL, MIKI. 1999. Women's representation in parliament: the role of political parties. *Party Politics* 5 (1): 79–99.

CELIS, KAREN and PETRA MEIER. 2006. *De macht van het geslacht*. Leuven: Acco.

DAHLERUP, DRUDE. 2007. Electoral gender quotas, between equality of opportunity and equality of result. *Representation* 43 (2): 73–92.

DAHLERUP, DRUDE and LENITA FREIDENVALL. 2005. Quotas as a 'fast track' to equal representation for women: why Scandinavia is no longer the model. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7 (1): 26–48.

DESCHOUWER, KRIS. 2009. *The Politics of Belgium: Governing a Divided Society*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

FRANCESCHET, SUSAN and JENNIFER M. PISCOPO. 2008. Gender quotas and women's substantive representation: lessons from Argentina. *Politics & Gender* 4 (3): 393–425.

FRANCESCHET, SUSAN, MONA LENA KROOK and JENNIFER M. PISCOPO. 2012. Conceptualizing the impact of gender quotas. In *The Impact of Gender Quotas*, edited by Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook and Jennifer M. Piscopoct. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–26.

FREDERICK, BRIAN. 2007. Political parties, self perceived qualifications and political ambition: examining the role of sex in the candidate emergence process for open U.S. House seats. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 30 August – 2 September.

GEYS, BENNY and BRUNO HEYNDELS. 2003. Influence of cognitive sophistication on ballot layout effects. *Acta Politica* 38 (4): 295–311.

IGVM. 2010. De politieke vertegenwoordiging van vrouwen na de verkiezingen van 13 juni 2010. Short research note, Brussels: IGVM.

KROOK, MONA LENA. 2006. Reforming representation: the diffusion of candidate gender quotas worldwide. *Politics & Gender* 2 (3): 303–27.

KROOK, MONA LENA. 2007. Candidate gender quotas: a framework for analysis. *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (3): 367–94.

LUTZ, GEORG. 2010. First come, first served: the effect of ballot position on electoral success in open ballot PR elections. *Representation* 46 (2): 167–81.

MADDENS, BART, BRAM WAUTERS, JO NOPPE and STEFAAN FIERS. 2006. Effects of campaign spending in an open list PR-system: The 2003 legislative elections in Flanders/Belgium. *West European Politics* 29 (1): 161–8.

MEIER, PETRA. 2000. The evidence of being present: guarantees of representation and the example of the Belgian case. *Acta Politica* 35 (1): 64–85.

MEIER, PETRA. 2008. A gender gap not closed by quotas: the renegotiation of the public sphere. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 10 (3): 329–47.

MURRAY, RAINBOW. 2010. Second among unequals? A study of whether France's 'quota women' are up to the job. *Politics & Gender* 6 (1): 93–118.

MURRAY, RAINBOW, MONA LENA KROOK and KATHERINE OPELLO. 2012. Why are gender quotas adopted? Party pragmatism and parity in France. *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (3): 529–43.

NIVEN, DAVID. 1998. Party elites and women candidates. *Women & Politics* 19 (2): 57–80.

NORRIS, PIPPA. 2004. *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PETERS, GUY B. 2005. *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'*, 2nd ed. London: Continuum.

PHILLIPS, ANNE. 1995. *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

SCHWINDT-BAYER, LESLIE A. 2005. The incumbency disadvantage and women's election to legislative office. *Electoral Studies* 24 (2): 227–44.

TREMBLAY, MANON (ed.). 2008. *Women and Legislative Representation: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Sex Quotas*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

TREMBLAY, MANON and REJEAN PELLETIER. 2001. More women constituency party presidents: a strategy for increasing the number of women candidates in Canada?. *Party Politics* 7 (2): 157–90.

VANLANGENAKKER, INE, BRAM WAUTERS and BART MADDENS. 2013. Pushed towards the exit? How women MPs leave parliament. *Politics & Gender* 9 (1): 61–75.

VILLODRES, CARMEN ORTEGA. 2003. Intra-party competition under preferential list systems: the case of Finland. *Representation* 40 (1): 55–66.

WAUTERS, BRAM, KAROLIEN WEEKERS and BART MADDENS. 2010. Explaining the number of preferential votes for women in an open list-PR system: the 2003 federal elections in Flanders (Belgium). *Acta Politica* 45 (4): 468–90.

ZETTERBERG, PÄR. 2008. The downside of gender quotas? Institutional constraints on women in Mexican state legislatures. *Parliamentary Affairs* 61 (3): 442–60.

Bram Wauters is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of Ghent University. His research interests include political representation, electoral systems and political parties. He has recently published on these topics in journals such as *Party Politics*, *Political Studies*, *Politics & Gender*, *Acta Politica* and *Local Government Studies*. Email: bram.wauters@hogent.be

Gert-Jan Put is a researcher at the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) affiliated to the Public Management Institute of the University of Leuven. His research interests include political party organisation, candidate selection, geographic representation, legislative turnover and campaign spending. Email: GertJan.Put@soc.kuleuven.be

Bart Maddens is Professor of Political Science at the University of Leuven. His research, which is mainly about elections and party and campaign finance, has been published in *Electoral Studies*, *West European Politics*, *European Journal of Political Research*, *Political Psychology*, *Politics & Gender* and *Regional Studies*. Email: Bart.Maddens@soc.kuleuven.be