The International Missions in Kosovo: What is in a Name?

Vjosa MUSLIU & Jan ORBIE[*]

This article problematizes the concept of 'mission' in international interventions, who is entitled to missionize and how the missionized subject is conceptualized. By looking at the international missions in Kosovo (those of the UN and particularly the EU), we problematize how the EU mission in Kosovo is entrenched in a trajectory of 'missionizing' that makes it bear the stigma of a structure non-responsive and non-sensitive to the local. Employing Derrida's deconstruction, we explain that the criticism (academic, dogmatic, ideological and empirical) of international missions relates not so much to how they operate in their host countries, or to the policy choices they make. Rather, looking at the path dependency of missions in the Western historical and civilizational trajectory, we maintain that the problem derives from the idea and very concept of 'mission' as intervention in itself.

1 INTRODUCTION

To understand the broader metaphysical foundation of intervention as a development and the international missions, this article looks at the European Union (EU) mission in Kosovo (along with other international missions deployed there in the post-war period) to shed light on how international missions come and need to exist. Using Derrida's deconstruction, the article problematizes the following questions: what is the power, as in the degree of agency, of the mission; how is the structure conceptualized; how does a mission become necessary and what are the 'critical conditions' that require the establishment of a mission; who decides that; where is the idea of having a mission inseminated; and whose missions are they, and for whom are they?

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, democracy has come to embody the very idea of legitimate statehood in international politics, largely through defining a new standard of civilization, in which 'democraticness' determines the limits of international society and helps to construct relations with non-democracies

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[*] Vjosa Musliu, PhD Candidate at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University (Vjosa.Musliu @ugent.be).
Jan Orbie, professor at the Department of Political Science and Director of the Centre for EU Studies. (Jan.Orbie@ugent.be).

'beyond the pale'.[1] The early 1990s witnessed an increase in 'missions' deployed abroad by the EU, the United Nations (UN), the United States (US) and other international actors, making missions the iconic model of international intervention to end intra-state wars, regime/system changes, ethnic and religious conflicts, etc. Interventions for democracy promotion and/or peace building spread (Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, East Timor, and former Yugoslavia) under the paradigmatic Western-democratic project, focusing primarily on human rights, rule of law and democracy. Orbie and Wetzel argue that EU democracy promotion is becoming more and more a focus of EU foreign policy, even though it is still unclear what the EU aims to further achieve in third countries.[2] In his critique of the ethics of foreign policy, Paris argues that peace building and democratizing missions represent an updated version of the mission civilisatrice,[3] or the colonial-era notion that the 'advanced' states of Europe had a moral responsibility to 'civilize' the indigenous societies they were colonizing.

It is important to clarify at this stage that when looking at recent history, the metaphysics of missions and missionizing do not bear the stamp of the European Union per se. As a matter of fact, this ideology finds itself very much present in the case of the United States' interventionism. The UN and the EU can sometimes be considered as following this tradition/trajectory. Thus, rather being the 'inventor' of the missionizing ideology, the case of the EU in Kosovo shows it to be merely a propagator. When it comes to the Western Balkans, for the first time in its history, the EU is involved in the process of building its future Member States. Along with the development and democratizing agenda, the EU has paved the way for bringing the former Yugoslav countries into the EU. In the case of Kosovo, however, the stigma of missionizing as civilizing becomes a bit stronger. Unlike other countries in former Yugoslavia that became fully fledged sovereign states after the dissolution of the federation, Kosovo still struggles in finalizing its statehood. De facto, it is no longer part of Serbia, although its internationally recognized name points towards it being part of Serbia. Its internationally cited name is 'Kosovo (as defined under the UNSCR/1244)' – a denomination still used while under the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). For the EU, Kosovo is known as 'Kosovo (without prejudice to the UNSCR/1244)'. Thus, for the very first time, the EU is engaging in a 'serious relationship' with a non-country.

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[1]   C. Hobson, *Democracy as Civilisation*, 22 Global Society 1, (2008).
[2]   J. Orbie & A. Wetzel, *On Narrow Paths and Through Shallow Waters? Discussing the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion*, 16 European For. Affairs Rev., Special Issue (2012).
[3]   R. Paris, *International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'*, 28 Review of International Studies 4, 637–656 (2002).

In this article, we engage with a meta-theoretical critique to understand the epistemological and metaphysical foundations of the mission as such. By this we also seek to surpass the criticism of the democratizing mission in terms of its practical application. The problem we deconstruct here, is how the 'mission' as an idea and structure of the current democratizing agenda remains rather detached of the local reality/ies, which in turn makes it appear an extension of the previous 'civilizing' Western missions. The article looks at how the concept of Christian missioning, colonizing missions and the late developmental missions mirror the idea of today's democratizing missions. Understanding the materialization of the mission's idea in the case of Kosovo, the article is based on: (1) literature on Christian missions and missiological texts to understand the early concept of 'missions' and 'missionizing'; (2) two study visits to the Colonial Museum in Tervuren, Belgium; (3) two official visits to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) headquarters in Prishtina, to gather evidence on the concrete materialization of a 'democracy' mission; and (4) thirty-four interviews around Kosovo with local and international actors to allow them to craft and articulate their own perceptions about the international missions.

In the plethora of international missions literature there is a recurring theme pointing to the emergence of a crack in the relationship between the mission and the subject concerned. An argument that is frequently made is that international missions show the tendency to remain detached from the local reality/ies where they deploy, not only because of arguments of their inherent mission civilisatrice nature,[4] but also for the arbitrary modes of intervention and the insensitivity towards local peculiarities;[5] the dominance of neo-liberal intervention[6] and other reasons related to power extension towards the 'non-Europe' – sites with weak democracies.[7] Literature on 'interventions' and foreign (western) missions falls largely into a normative set of binary opposites – that is, looking at the missions as well- or not well intentioned; as responsive or non-responsive to the cause, etc. Positivist-informed literature looks at this issue from the perspective of 'what went

[4]   *Ibid*.; R. Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in a New World Order*, Knopf Doubleday Publishiing Group (2004); K. Brown, *Do We Know How Yet? Inisder Perspectives on International Democracy Promotion in the Western Balkans*, The National Council of Euroasian and East European Research University of Washington (2009).
[5]   S. Drakulic, *Desperately Seeking Europe* (Archetype Publications, 2003); V. Musliu, *Challenges for the EU Mission in Kosovo: Democracy Building and/or Economic Development?*, 73 (Catholic University of Leuven, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2010).
[6]   S.Z.A. Hamza, *From Myth to Symptom: the Case of Kosovo* (Kolektivi Mazterializmi Diaelektik, 2013).
[7]   D. Bulley, *Home is Where the Human Is? Ethics, Intervention and Hospitality in Kosovo*, 39 Millenium – Journal of International Studies 43, 1–22 (2010). D. Chandler, *The EU and Southeastern Europe: The Rise of Post-liberal Governance*, 31 Third World Quarterly 1, 69–85 (2010).

wrong'.[8] Post-positivist literature (critical theory, post-colonial) explains how the uneven dynamics between the local and the intervener challenge the very concept of intervening 'to do good'.[9] The constructivist pursuit would look at how norms, values, rules and identity inform the foundation of the mission.[10] Foucauldians address the nature and the functioning of power.[11] Other post-colonial theories as employed by Jean Baudrillard and/or David Chandler re-emphasize the logic of simulation and the neo-colonial aspects of missions respectively. This article discusses what is so inherently problematic (to say the least) that galvanizes criticism towards foreign missions in general and to EU missions in particular. Epistemologically, how do we deal with tautological findings of the locals reporting that the internationals are 'just not interested in the 'local' or needs, only in it as a canvas for the projection of Western values and institutions'.[12] Or why are 'natives' (locals) globally so disillusioned and alienated by intervention structures?.[13] In focusing on the EU mission, we do not merely look at its ex-post results; rather, we look at the metaphysical foundations of how the mission comes to and needs to exist.

Because the enlargement agenda is widely accepted as the only sound project for the countries in the Western Balkans, when it comes to the EU–Western Balkans relations, there is little literature taking a post-colonial, neo-Marxist, feminist or other post-positivist approach. In this regard, by deconstructing the EU mission we shed light on a set of issues taken together – cultural, historical, metaphysical, political and imperial. We maintain that deconstruction as practiced by Derrida provides a more comprehensive way of studying the case of Kosovo. As an intervention in text and discourse, deconstruction is known for questioning the establishment, knowledge, the given, the 'common sense'. Kosovo in itself is also a very 'questionable' entity and its existence is constantly deconstructed in the

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[8]   W. Koeth, State Building Without a State: The EU's Dilemma in Defining its Relations with Kosovo, 15 European For. Affairs Rev. 2, 227–247 (2010); V.D.H. Kramer, Kosovo After Independence. *Is the EU's EULEX Mission Delivering on its Promises?*, International Policy Analysis (2009); M.A. Vachudova, *The Balkan Recipe for EU Entry*, 1 Central and Eastern European Online Library (2006).

[9]   D. Chandler, *The EU and Southeastern Europe: The Rise of Post-liberal Governance*, 31 Third World Quarterly 1, 69–85 (2010); Paris, *supra* n. 3; O.U. Rutazibwa, *In the Name of Human Rights. The Problematics of EU Ethical Foreign Policy in Africa and Elsewhere*, PhD thesis, 135 (Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University, 2013).

[10]   A. Wendt, *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory*, 41 International Organisations 3 (1987). F. Kratochwil, *Norms, Rules and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[11]   A. Calcagno, *Foucault and Derrida: The Question of Empowering and Disempowering the Author*, Human Studies (2009).

[12]   O.P. Richmond, *De-romanticising the Local, De-mystifying the International: Hybridity in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands*, 24 The Pacific Review 1, 115–136 (2011); V. Ferati, *Critical Discourse Analysis (De-) Constructing EULEX Discourse*, 22 (Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 2012).

[13]   S. Dossa, *Slicing up 'Development': Colonialim, Political Theory, Ethics*, 28 Third World Quarterly 5, 887–899 (2007).

political, economic, sociological, nation-building, and national identity sense. The article contributes to the debate and the rethinking of intervention and missionizing in foreign policy. A significant part of Derrida's work consists of his relentless questioning and reversing of hierarchies, providing an intervention in colonial thinking. This article also speaks to dimensions of the decolonization of thinking by dissolving hegemonic establishments and foundations. Defining 'deconstruction' as a way to intervene to text, the interpretivist school explains that 'alike all other approaches, deconstruction interprets. And like in all other studying inquiries, we deconstruct, as we look beneath and we try to find explanations. The important dimension is which aspect of deconstruction is used once taking it from literature studies to bring it to social sciences'.[14]

1.1   Derrida's deconstruction in international missions

Despite the discomfort he displayed toward the term itself, Derrida had numerous occasions to define deconstruction, one of which is particularly important for this article. This definition is rather metaphysical and relies on: (1) attacking the Platonistic hierarchies (e.g., order vs. chaos)[15] – or what he refers to as Western metaphysics, meaning that order could be reduced to a variation of chaos; (2) redefining chaos and pointing out that every order/chaos is temporal; (3) changing the term's orthography, for example, writing 'différence' (evidenced in appearances when we recognize their temporal nature).[16] Derrida argues that Western philosophical tradition rests on binary oppositions: unity/diversity, identity/difference, presence/absence, and universality/specificity;[17] democracy/dictatorship; rule of law and order/chaos and anarchy; civilized/uncivilized, etc. The leading terms are accorded primacy; their partners are represented as weaker or derivative. Yet the first terms depend on and derive their meaning from the second to such an extent that the secondary terms can be seen as generative of the definition of the first terms. [18] Transmitting the 'leading terms' of the binary opposites has become the new 'modernist cause' for the West to export.[19] The receiving end is downgraded to a degraded structure in need of intervention. In

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[14]   D. Yanow, *Interpretation and Theory* (2013). The same dilemmas exist with the interpretive turn in social sciences and the transposition of ethnographic approaches (rather anthropological in nature) in the broader spectrum of social sciences.

[15]   Invisible or intelligible and the visible or sensible; between essence and appearance; between the soul and body; between living memory and rote memory; between *mnēmē* and *hypomnēsis*; between voice and writing; between finally good and evil.

[16]   Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *Jacques Derrida*, (2006).

[17]   S. Critchley, *Derrida: The Reader*, 27 Cardozo Law Review 2, 253–265 (2005–2006).

[18]   *Ibid.*

[19]   R. Kanth, *Eurocentrism, Realism and the Anthropic Cartography of Emancipation. Realism Discourse and Deconstruction* (a. J.M.R. Jonathan Joseph, 2003). Kanth argues that modernism, which is nothing more

this inner dynamic, the giver (of the good values) gains the power, its presence becomes a necessity and its intervention is seen as a salvation, and through repetition it turns into a duty and becomes an institution – or what Derrrida calls fetishism.[20] A duty to intervene, to protect, to end conflicts, to help after natural disasters, also to enlighten, to civilize, and to democratize.[21]

Before dwelling on deconstructing the 'mission', we have to clarify the semantics/diction of both Western metaphysics – a core concept in informing and framing the puzzle – and of mission. The term 'West' is not an attempt to map the hemispheres of power (even less so to map it from a Euro-centric perspective); nor does it denote (strictly) the geography of the Western European countries and the US. Looking at Western-Christian metaphysics, the 'West' denotes sites all the way down to the Pyrenees, with the Spanish and Portuguese being involved in religious missions. Instead, we look at the 'West' as seen and conceptualized by the natives/locals – the sites of intervention and missions. In Guatemala, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Iraq, Congo, East Timor, the 'West' is a linear/unitary concept denoting the time/space civilizing missions, including the initial Spanish Christian missionaries, the continental European developmental missions of enlightenment, the colonial powers, and todays' US, UN and EU structures of democratizing missions. For local people in Kosovo, the consequent interventions and missions deployed are part of the same set: 'Kosovo is a Western project. There is a recycling of the same people and logic from UNMIK to the EU mission'.[22]

With metaphysics, Derrida refers to Platonism. He writes:

> Traditionally (going back to Plato's myths but also Christian theology), we think that there was an original pure state of being (direct contact with the forms or the Garden of Eden) which accidentally became corrupt. In contrast, Derrida tries to show that no term or idea or reality is ever pure in this way; one term always and necessarily 'infects' the other.[23]

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than Europeanism, rests on three foundations: (1) a fairly blind faith in science (defined as European in origin); (2) an equal firm belief in some or other (usually self-justifying) notion of 'progress'; and (3) a shared metaphysics of materialism.

[20]   J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International* (Routledge, 2006). In *Spectres of Marx*, Derrida writes that as soon as there is a production, there is fetishism, idealization, autonomization and automatization, dematerialization and spectral incorporation.

[21]   Derrida, *supra* n. 16. He argues further that this in turn makes 'productions' into something like religion: 'The basic argumentation always attempts to show that no one is able to separate irreplaceable singularity and machine-like repeatability (or 'iterability', as Derrida frequently says) into two substances that stand outside of one another nor is anyone able to reduce one to the other so that we would have one pure substance (with attributes or modifications. Machine-like repeatability and irreplaceable singularity, for Derrida, are like two forces that attract one another across a limit that is indeterminate and divisible'.

[22]   Ylli Hoxha, Interview (Prishtina, 2012).

[23]   Derrida, *supra* n. 16.

Linguistically, 'mission' is 'any important task or duty that is assigned, allotted or self-imposed …' Another explanation of it is 'a group or committee of persons sent to a foreign country to conduct negotiations, establish relations . . . or the like'.[24] At the Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885 – which paved the way to the colonization of African peoples – the European colonial powers agreed to 'bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being', with the aim of 'instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessing of civilization'.[25] This legacy sheds light on how the trajectory of missions and missionizing has travelled in time and how it remains entrenched in the broader metaphysical premises of the missionary as superior and the 'other' who needs to be   intervened/missionized/enlightened/saved/democratized.   The   Berlin Conference, or, as it is usually referred to, the 'Scramble for Africa', represents the epitome of Western superiority (or more generally any sort of imperialism) in which land as a mere geographical denomination was divided between the European powers of that time. Grosfoguel reminds us that we cannot think of decolonization in terms of conquering power over the juridical–political boundaries of a state, that is, by achieving control over a single nation-state; global coloniality is not reducible to the presence or absence of a colonial administration or to the political/economic structures of power.[26] At the EU–Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, the EU set forward the project of 'EU integration' for the Western Balkans as a salvation:

> We all share the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, solidarity and a market economy, fully aware that they constitute the very foundations of the European Union . . . and the EU reiterates its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries . . . and the on-going enlargement encourages the countries (of the Western Balkans) to follow the same successful path.[27]

The Summit Declaration also determines that the Western Balkan countries belong to the EU club, not to Russia or any other system. The European Union Office in Kosovo points out in its mission statement that 'the Office plays a pivotal role in realizing the European agenda in Kosovo . . . and helps to consolidate the

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[24]   Cambridge Dictionary Online.

[25]   S.F.W.J. Mommsen, *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: the Berlin Africa conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford University Press, 1988).

[26]   R. Grosfoguel, *Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge and Global Coloniality in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System*, 25 Review 3, 203–224 (2002).

[27]   The European Council Presidency, *EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki*, http://europa.eu/rapid /press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm (Retrieved 1 Sep. 2013).

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms …'.[28] Similarly, the mission statement of EULEX states that it 'continues to concentrate on the fight against corruption and works closely with local counterparts to achieve sustainability and EU best practices in Kosovo'.[29]

In a similar vein, the meaning of 'civilizing mission' is not fixed, nor does it conform to a single interpretation. Weist suggests that in relation to the Christian missionaries of nineteenth century imperialism, the notion of a 'civilizing mission' often had a positive connotation, with the implicit image of Christian missionaries being 'a special breed of heroic persons bringing Christ to foreign lands'.[30] By contrast, the suggestion that they might be undertaking a 'civilizing mission' is considered to be offensive and overly deterministic. This is because the 'civilizing mission' has been linked to the discredited concept of imperialism. However, even though the nineteenth-century style of imperialism no longer prevails, the theme of the 'civilizing mission' is still commonly referred to in the field of contemporary international relations.[31]

When we explain how the legitimacy of the missions to intervene comes to exist, we look at the Christian, developmental, colonization missions and therefore map what we perceive to be the tautology of a) pathologizing 'the other' by making its moral/political/cultural problems as something biological and clinical; and b) objectifying 'the other' as something invaluable/inferior. We have conceptualized these two themes so as to be able to compare how the new democratizing missions mirror the ideological/conceptual/political/discursive of the previous Western missions, which in turn sheds light on the problems with the missions at their core. What follows is an explanation of how/by whom the missions in Kosovo were invited, to further deconstruct this as a logic of pathologizing and objectifying the other.

1.2   (Self) invitations to intervene

When every discourse guarantees that 'democracy' is the only acceptable type of political regime for emancipated humanity that has come of age and that has no other purpose

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[28]   Mission statements, press releases and other documents related to the activities of the European Union Office in Kosovo can be accessed here: <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.htm>.

[29]   <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/eu_kosovo/political_relations/index_en.htm>.

[30]   J.-P. Wiest, *Was the Christian God Partial to the Hakaka People?*, Historie de Missions (1997).

[31]   M. Hirono, *Introduction: Christian "Civilizing Missions" of the Past and Present*, (Palgrave, 2008). For more see C.A. Watt & M. Iann, *Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia* (Anthem Pressmorina, 1991); J. Donnelly, *Human Rights: A New Standard of Cilvilization?*, 74 International Affairs 1 (1998).

itself, then the very idea of democracy loses its colour, becomes blurred, and perplexes us.[32]

In neither of the cases discussed above (the Berlin Conference and the Thessaloniki Summit) has there has been a decision or an agreement between two equal partners, who have ownership in the decision of the mission or in the mission itself.[33] The decision to missionize is taken by the intervener – the developed, prosperous, Western-democratic agent. Being endowed with these values, the intervener gives itself conceptual legitimacy to transmit this 'miracle' to the local. The local[34] – 'the other' – is the 'tribal' 'orientalist'/the 'Balkans', plagued by chaos, disorder and inefficiency. 'The aim of the international community…was to build this poor, mountainous and tribal land based on 'Western' values',[35] two former UNMIK officials report in their book – which has become a widely quoted book in the field. In opposition to the 'local', Bilgin argues, the international sees itself un-reflexively as Western, muscular, masculine (though gender equal), capitalist, efficient, normatively and governmentally superior, and able to supplant non-liberal, customary, everyday forms of politics, society, government and economics.[36]

In the post-war Western Balkans, the introduction of a democracy agenda has been a rather hegemonic choice in replacing the old/inglorious system. The 'yes' to democracy was to imbue not only the 'yes' to European values but a 'no' to everything 'bad' the previous system brought. The 'yes' in quotation marks here is the 'implied approval' of the locals. It is a consensus fabricated after the missions were installed. Because an intervention usually comes as a salvation after a crisis, war or dictatorial regime, or else the 'yes' is implied. Yet, the inability to choose, that is, not having the freedom to say 'yes', or potentially 'no', should be considered in more depth when looking at 'missions' and the detachment they build with the context where they deploy. In Rouges, Derrida argues that 'wherever freedom is no longer determined as power, mastery, or force, or even as a faculty, as a

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[32]   J.-L. Nancy, *On the Multiple Senses of Democracy. The Politics of Deconstruction* (M. McQuillan, Pluto Press, 2007).

[33]   In 2003, Kosovo was under UN administration and no specific mention was given to it per se. The discourse had an 'en block' strategy for the people of the Western Balkans.

[34]   'Local' here does not merely refer to the local population in its form of existence. Beyond the material dimension, the local refers to the social construct and mind-set of the local population; the local perception of needs and development as well as the historical past and mentality which reflects very much on what is considered to be the overriding 'reality' nowadays; customs, traditions and indigenous practices. This, however, also includes aspects of 'modernity' and the impact of liberal state institutions and markets.

[35]   I. King & W. Mason, *Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed in Kosovo* (KOHA print, 2007).

[36]   P. Bilgin, *Thinking past Western IR*, 29 Third World Quarterly 1, 5–23 (2008).

possibility of the 'I can', the evocation and evaluation of democracy as the power and the demos begins to tremble'.[37]

In the trajectory of international presence in Kosovo, two different 'invitations' were made to the UN and the EU. After the conflict with Serbia, Kosovo came under UN administration, whose paradigmatic aim was to create 'a peaceful environment for all inhabitants of Kosovo… and ensuring human rights protection'.[38] The invisibility/absence of the agency (as a subject) who makes the decision for the deployment gives the impression that the UN mission is indeed invited by the cause of 'humanitarian intervention' and the duty to bring peace. This establishment was also aided by the fact that in practice the 'winner' (NATO had bombed Serbia for seventy-eight days) and the 'defeater' (Milosevic surrendered after NATO's campaign) were signing an agreement on a newly created entity that would come under UN administration.

The 'invitation' for EULEX's deployment is rather different. EULEX was a planned, operationalized and coordinated action. Peculiar in its case was the attempt to simulate and create agency that could invite the mission. Article 1 of the Ahtisaari Plan[39] provides that: 'The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all necessary power to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of this Settlement… Kosovo shall also issue an invitation to the international community to assist in successfully fulfilling its obligations to this end'.[40] In this case the invitation for the mission is made by a foreign subject but stated in such a way that it appears the locals have asked the UN to require the deployment of an EU mission. Why is this interesting? The decision is not only made by a 'peace sponsor' but he goes further in proposing and stating that the locals shall issue the invitation (i.e., recite the invitation he wrote). The intervener is unequivocally clear what the locals want and powerful to decide what they need to be inviting and what sort of mission they need to be subjected to. On the one hand, the aim is to create the idea of some sort of ownership (procedural ownership at least) that the local has in calling for a mission. On the other hand, the local becomes merely a reciter of the wishes/needs as defined by the intervener, but the local has no agency to think/conceptualize/articulate and 'issue' an invitation. The tradition of deciding for Kosovo continues to date. As Prishtina based researcher Engjellushe Morina states, 'we still don't decide for

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[37]   J. Derrida, *Rouges* (Stanford University Press, 2003). He questions that if one values freedom in general, before any interpretation, then one should no longer be afraid to speak without or against democracy? Is the right to speak without taking sides *for* democracy, that is, without committing oneself to it, more or less democratic?.

[38]   <www.unmikonline.org>.

[39]   After failing to reach an agreement in the negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade, former UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari compiled his plan for Kosovo, setting the blueprint for its independence.

[40]   UN Security Council, *Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement* (2007).

ourselves. Even those decisions we pretend to have made are pre-set from the state donors'.[41]

Talking about hospitality, Derrida argues that 'absolute hospitality must break hospitality by right, or duty of the juridico–political laws of hospitality which are always conditional…like the asylum and immigration laws in any country, they put a variety of conditions upon hospitality, ask a variety of questions, etc.'.[42] Unconditional (absolute) hospitality according to him is impossible to organize; it is utopic as no state could write it into laws. On the one hand, we could cynically suggest that the invitation is in a way surpassing the post-structuralist debate on absolute hospitality.[43] When talking about 'absolute hospitality' – not only welcoming the 'other' as another human, but the welcoming of the animal, of the tree, the plant etc., Derrida says that 'humans offer hospitality only to humans' (see for more: *Of Hospitality)*. A 'rational' mind would think what a strange thing would be for a human to offer hospitality to an animal let alone a plant, given the *ontologizing* discourse that hospitality is a human virtue. Derrida likes to take certain concepts to their limit to see their ontological metamorphosis. The discourse seems to offer this wishful thinking of post-modernist hospitality when setting forward that Kosovo as such belongs to all of its inhabitants. As such, it is a step ahead the post-structural concept of identity, of hospitality, of home and as such, supersedes Derrida's conceptualization of 'hospitality to the other'.

Beyond ironies, the problem here stretches out to the concept of home as the precondition of hospitality is lost. The guest has become the host as they have the power to invite themselves. Bulley argues that hospitality requires some notion of an 'at-home' for its possible performance: 'Despite the contradictory nature of hospitality and the ontopological 'at-home', both must be negotiated to keep them as open, responsible and ethical as possible. This giving place means not simply allowing them to occupy part of our home, giving them shelter and asking no questions, but that they literally take our place. If they take our place then we are no longer in the simple position of host. Indeed, effectively, the positions have been reversed – we are now a guest'.[44] In the case of Kosovo, the very concept of home, and consequently of hospitality, is upside-down. If we would think of home as a state, half of the interventions in Kosovo (except for NATO's) have occurred in nobody's home, as Kosovo was under UN administration and de facto was not part of Serbia any longer. In such a scenario, can we talk about hospitality as home

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[41]   M. Engjëllushe, Interview (Prishtina, .2013).
[42]   J. Derrida, *Of Hospitality* (Standford University Press, 2000).
[43]   Derrida, J. (2005). The Principle of Hospitality. Paper Machine. J. Derrida. Stanford, Stanford University Press.
[44]   D. Bulley, *Negotiating Ethics: Campbell, Ontopology and Hospitality*, 32 Review of International Studies, 645–663 (2006).

in Derrida's fashion, or can we even talk about it as a deterritorialization of responsibility in the way Campbell does?[45] In a rapidly changing world and with the changing concept of sovereignty, can we re-think/humanize home in foreign policy as an issue not necessarily legally defined as a political entity with an internationally recognized border, a seat at the UN, etc.?

2   IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

What follows is a positioning of the EU mission in Kosovo in the broader perspective of Western missions. The concept of spreading 'goodness' – a belief system, development aid, an ideological system – to the 'other' who is not part of 'our moral system' is not new. What has happened throughout the historical evolution of the 'mission' is its secularization – bringing the modern democratizing missions to 'the other'. The 'otherness' of the local as morally and politically inferior to the West has been elaborated in Said's Orientalism, Todorova's Imagining the Balkans, and in the works of Grosfoguel. We maintain that this relationship is constructed first by pathologizing the other and its cultural/political traits as something almost biologically sick; second by objectifying the other as a site/laboratory for exportation of the good/superior deeds. In pathologizing we look more at the discourse of labelling the other, while in objectifying we draw attention to the mission's action. However, far from being two separate categories, as will be shown below, they are far more overlapping. Mona Ozouf explained that with the development of reason in the enlightenment era, the Biblical Holy Trinity (the father, the son, the Holy Spirit) – the exemplification of the Christian missions – is secularized. She adds that the new holy trinity becomes liberty, equality and fraternity.[46] We maintain that the new holy trinity has become democracy, rule of law and human rights. Today, the EU's

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[45]   In his work on the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, David Campbell, one of the prominent Derridean international relations scholars, argues that when it comes to intervention 'a deterritorialization of responsibility is needed. Our responsibility toward the other should not be limited by his/her existence within the inviolable borders of a nation-state (a 'home'). Intervention could have been taken to defend a non-ontopological multiculturalism'. For more see D. Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia Manchester* (Manchester Unversity Press, 1998).

[46]   In the Greek, Jewish, but especially Christian and Islamic tradition there is a privileging of the *male* figure in ethics, law, and politics, and particularly in a certain democratic model. Initially the French revolutionaries of 1789 did not include the word *fraternity* – a term which also does not appear in the Declaration of Human Rights or in the French Constitution of 1793, nor in the Charter of 1830. It appears only as an addendum to the Constitution of 1791 – an addendum which according to Mona Ozouf is the completion of another trinity. In fraternalism or brotherhoods, in the confraternal or fraternizing community, what is privileged is at once the masculine authority of the brother (who is also a son, a husband, a father), genealogy, family, birth, autochthony and the nation. Derrida, *supra* n. 37.

civilizing identity is a self-conception of its relationship to and treatment of the non-European other, but historically, civilizing missions have been colonialist projects, rooted in military power.[47]

2.1   PATHOLOGIZING THE OTHER

Derrida argues that the logic of development is the logic of Western dominance, and is located in the 'metaphysics of white mythology'.[48] Yet, its problem as 'intervention' is not merely embedded in its intentions but stretches out into further implications. In his work on development and colonization, Dossa argues that the idea of development is the core myth of Western Christianity, while 'representing a secularization of Biblical eschatology', and underlining the Occident's secular upward march. Development is constitutive of Western Christian identity and it becomes its 'evangelical' mission, its self-acclaimed role to save others.[49]

The men of the sixteenth and seventeenth century were universalists owing to the universality of their Christian faith; throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it was universalists who were putting the case for development aid. Today, it is activists of the political theology of human rights, democracy promotion and the rule of law. Speaking on the British missionaries of the eighteenth century for instance, Cox argues that 'when arrived oversees, the missionaries built elementary and secondary schools, universities, theological training schools, vocational training centres, clinics and hospitals among others'.[50] A local education expert in Prishtina, Pupovci, evidences the same pattern in the consequent missions in Kosovo: 'During 2000–2004, there was a massive flow of reconstruction funds. There are numerous cases when two to three different schools were built by different donors in a village with no more than 200 people'.[51]

Upon arriving in the Americas, the Christians encountered that fact that the 'indigenous' had no God – had no religion (as conceptualized in Christian metaphysics). The absence of God was equal to the absence of a soul – until the Pope declared that 'these people might have a soul but it is an animal soul', which makes them not human or, as Pope George claimed, 'half devil, half child'.[52] As in

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[47]   J. Mitzen, *Achoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security*, 13 Journal of European Public Policy 2, 270–285 (2006).

[48]   J. Derrida, *White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy*, 6 New Literary History 1, 5–74 (1974).

[49]   S. Dossa, *Slicing up 'Development': Colonialim, Political Theory, Ethics,* 28 Third World Quarterly 5, 887–899 (2007).

[50]   J. Cox, *What I Have Learned About Missions from Writing the British Missionary Enterprise Since 1700*, 32 International Bulletin of Missionary Research 2 (2008).

[51]   Dukagjin Pupovci, Interview (Prishtina, 2012).

[52]   R. Grosfoguel, *Cartography of Power*, Decolonial Group (2012).

the missiological texts, the locals are stripped of their subjectivity when addressed as 'these people', as something which has no identification, no representation and certainly no agency. In UNMIK's discourse, locals in Kosovo are addressed as 'inhabitants'.[53] The English dictionary defines 'inhabitant' as 'a person or an animal that is a permanent resident of a particular place or a region'.[54] As such, calling the local people 'inhabitants' takes away from them sociological identity and, in turn, objectifies them. The local thus becomes a laboratorial subject for scientific/positivist/controlled experiments. Being detached from this 'object' of study, the missionizer experiments, notices, and draws results as 'lessons learned' to be repeated/checked/validated in other 'laboratories'. Interestingly enough, both local and international EULEX workers use the term 'EULEXperiment',[55] to exemplify how the largest European Union Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission to date is testing its capabilities in Kosovo: 'EULEXperiment is the best term to indicate of what we're doing here'.

An example of the denial of locals' subjectivity is evidenced in the EU's discourse towards ethnic minorities, where instead it refers to 'communities', which in turn is a mutilation of the ethnic identity attribution: 'The rule of law is commitment and merit of each individual from all communities'.[56] 'Community' is defined as 'a particular area or place considered together with its inhabitants'.[57] Prishtina-based artist, Heta, explains that 'this is the only case and the first experiment of a non–nation state. In its Constitution Kosovo has 'communities' and not citizens, or ethnic groups/ethnic minorities because it is pictured to become the place of communities not the place of its actual ethnic configuration'.[58]

Another unwavering evidence of this argument is exhibited at the Colonial Museum in Tervuren, Belgium: 'Belgium wants to make Congo a model colony. The colonial authorities want to forget the past. Citing 'civilizing mission' they look towards the future'.[59] Both the UN and the EU missions in Kosovo have been notorious for their approach of 'leaving the past in the past', meaning that besides the judicial institutions, no debate has been promoted about dealing with the past by talking about it, be it in the form of transitional justice, a healing

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[53]   United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, United Nations Security Council. S/2000.538 (2000).
[54]   Oxford English Dictionary.
[55]   'EULEX periment' is a famous slogan coined by the then nationalist/radical movement Vetevendosje!, which has been steady in its criticism of what they call the neo-colonial missions in Kosovo.
[56]   European Union Rule of Law Misison in Kosovo, *The Rule of Law is Commitment and Merit of Each Individual from All Communities* (EULEX, Prishtina, 2010).
[57]   Cambridge Dictionary Online.
[58]   Albert Heta, Interview (Prishtina, 2013).
[59]   The text of the Colonial Museum in Tervuren is accessible in http://www.woodcollab.com/con go/museum_section/museum2.html.

process, or the like. In the aftermath of the conflict, the term 'war' became unusable and instead the word 'conflict' was infused; establishing an attempt for collective amnesia.[60] Prishtina-based civil society actor, Ylli Hoxha, explains that 'in the perception of the EU, the only difference between Kosovo and Congo is that we (Kosovo) are part of the enlargement package'.[61]

2.2   OBJECTIFYING 'THE OTHER': IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT

As explained in the previous section, the local's traits as undeveloped, clientelist, patriarchal, patrimonial and corrupt are pathologized as a permanent condition. What follows in this stage is objectifying the other as a site for intervention, repair, help, correctional service, etc.

Throughout the thousand-year span during which Europe was converted to Christianity, one prominent mission theme was that of competition between the 'civilized' religion of the sacred book of Roman laws, and the 'uncivilized' religion of orality and nature-based spirits.[62] These interactions between 'civilized' and 'barbarian# communities were critical in structuring the explicit standard that accompanied and followed Europe's more robust engagement with the rest of the globe, in the form of imperialism and empire building. This way, in line with the supremacist and expansionist European attitude, the mission society in Europe agreed, in principle, that the colonization of India had a divine purpose; it was the duty of the colonizers and missionaries to civilize and Christianize the natives[63] and this way, India 'had to be dusted, disinfected, and injected with a Western style of education, jurisprudence, and religion'.[64]

On the basis of this self-proclaimed legitimacy, the religious missionaries embarked to spread the 'good' monotheistic-Christian belief to tribal and primordial areas. This idea was already established with Pope Gregory the Great, who wrote in 601 what has become a classic missiological text on cultural accommodation:

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[60]   In his renown account on nationalism 'Imagined communities', Benedict Anderson coined the term collective memory – that is a shared sense of heritage and commonality with many human beings of our 'group' (i.e., nation) we have never met.

[61]   Ylli Hoxha, Interview (Prishtina, 2012).

[62]   D.L. Robert, *Historical Trends in Missions and Earth Care*, 35 International Bulletin of Missionary Research 35 (2011). Bowden argues that the clear precursors of the 'classical' civilization dialectic can be found in medieval times in relations between Christendom and the Infidels, and even more noticeably in European encounters with the New World, B. Bowden & L. Seabrooke (eds), *Global Standards of Market Civilization* (Routledge/RIPE Studies in Global Political Economy, 2006).

[63]   J. Dharmaraj, *Ninetenth and Twentieth Century European Mission to India: Reconsideration*, PhD thesis (Faculty of Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago University, 1990).

[64]   M. Debnath, *The Invisible Agenda: Civilisng Mission or Missionizing Civilisation*, 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 3, 461–473 (2011).

> The heathen temples of these people need not be destroyed, only the idols which are to be found in them…If the temples are well built, it is a good idea to detach them from the service of the devil and to adapt them for the worship of the true God…If we allow them these outward joys, they are more likely to find their way to the true inner joy.[65]

The deterministic discourse implying the ultimate solution to the worship of the true God not only signals a hegemonic choice, but also undermines the existence of anything locally worshiped as having any value. The statement establishes that the locals believe in the devil – as defined and mythologized by the West – and as such shall be saved from this savage tradition. The ability or freedom to choose is confined to the 'worship of the true God', as opposed to the 'service of the devil'.

   Paris argues that 'like European colonialism a hundred years ago, today's peace-building operations convey norms of acceptable or civilized behaviour into the domestic affairs of less-developed states'.[66] This resembles how the UN and the EU have dealt with the legacies of previous systems in Kosovo. For them, institutions and systems practiced by the locals and existing prior to the intervention are stigmatized as something intrinsically inefficient, corrupt and unprofessional, as opposed to the 'European values' of democracy, human rights and rule of law. 'They have discredited the socialist legacy as something utterly inefficient',[67] argues Nita Luci, lecturer of social anthropology at University of Prishtina, explaining the orientalist logic behind the statement. In their book Peace at any Price, King and Mason (former UNMIK employees in Kosovo) explain that 'in the aftermath of the conflict, the EU was hoping to clean the inefficient socialist legacy and to enable the economic environment to catch up with the remaining part of the continent'.[68]

   In this discourse, the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo is seen as the ultimate salvation for 'Balkan inefficiency',[69] not only to break the 'inefficiency' trajectory but also to be the ultimate corrector of previous inglorious systems which have established rotten institutions and traditions. 'We are here to offer advice. But the Balkans are good in signing documents but not in implementing them',[70] argues the chief of staff at the EULEX headquarters in Prishtina, pointing to the problem as something deeply entrenched in the culture and the identity of the region. Another EULEX official argues that 'there is an utter lack of professionalism in

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[65]   N.E. Thomas, Classic Texts in Mission and World Christianity New York (Orbis Books, 1995).
[66]   R. Paris, International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice', 28 Review of International Studies 4, 637–656 (2002).
[67]   Nita Luci, Interview (Prishtina, 2012).
[68]   King & Mason, supra n. 35.
[69]   At this point, it would be necessary to also look at the metamorphosis of the term 'Balkans'. Throughout time, the term has been defoliated of its intrinsic geographical meaning and today it represents a different political/moral/ideological/civilizational/cultural cluster. Inefficiency, ethnic hatred, system failure and primordial nationalism have all been pathologized as 'Balkan'.
[70]   Thomas Muehlmann, Interview (Prishtina, 2013).

every single sector in Kosovo… and here (in Kosovo), everyone, from the bus driver all the way to the members of the parliament are trying to find a grey area to do things'.[71] This discourse points out that notwithstanding the good will of the mission to endow Kosovo with a set of 'best practices from the EU', the environment represents the exact opposite pole of these values, making it practically impossible to put it on the right track. The term Balkans and/or Balkanization in contexts like these incites firm reactions, particularly amongst Prishtina-based artists and cultural workers. Albert Heta, head of Stacion Cultural Centre explains that 'the Balkans exists only in the mind of Europe (the political Europe). There was rule of law and a system of regulation here throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Law and order did not start with the EU'.[72]

The argument that states in the region suffer from historical 'path dependencies' which have undermined the relations between states and their societies is quite the norm in the dialectics of the EU mission in the region 16. Valentin Inzko, the Austrian official serving as the EU High representative in Bosnia argued the lack of political progress was a result of what he felt that Bosnia suffered 'from a "dependency syndrome" that dates back centuries, to when it was part of the Ottoman Empire'[73] – and setting forward that the mere existence of an EU mission is to actually break that evil, orientalist tradition. In a similar vein, when confronted with the question when would EULEX potentially leave Kosovo? senior EULEX official alarms that 'EULEX judges are a must. Imagine how this country would be if we would leave'.[74]

3   CONCLUSION

Kagan argues that after having found its own perpetual peace, the transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's new mission civilisatrice. The metaphysics of good versus evil supports Europe's ideal of a civilizing mission at home and abroad. The battle between the two binary opposites – European democracy, liberal values, and human rights vs. authoritarian and non-democratic regimes – 'creates' the need for the figure of Europe to intervene. Edward Said writes that the rhetoric of the civilizing mission is 'what has been called "a duty" to natives, the requirement in Africa and elsewhere to establish colonies for the "benefit" of the natives, or for the "prestige" of the

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[71]   Annonymous Interview (Prishtina, 16 Nov. 2012).
[72]   Astrit Salihu, Interview (Prishtina, 2012); Nita Luci, *supra* n. 67; Albert Heta, *supra* n. 58.
[73]   D. Chandler, *The EU and Southeastern Europe: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance*, 31 Third World Quarterly 1, 69–85 (2010).
[74]   EULEX official X 1, Interview (Prishtina, 2012).

mother country'.[75] This identifies not only the asymmetrical relationship between the so-called civilized and the uncivilized but also sets forward the self-proclaimed duty to 'civilize' the 'uncivilized'.

In conclusion, when dwelling on studies of international interventions and missions, it is important to be aware of the dimensions, ideologies and politics of how we engage with both the local and the mission. Arguably, there is a fertile ground for academic critique of international missions. First, is the tendency of pointing to missions' unresponsiveness leading to the fetishizing of the 'local' on the one hand, while simultaneously keeping the focus on the problems of deployed missions? Do we also in turn orientalize principles of autonomous recovery and self-determination of the local? Second, accepting that system/regime change, war, and other forms of system reformation are natural circles of mankind, how does this inform and influence the way intervention and mission come into existence? How does it legitimize it? How do we think of autonomous recovery at the same time? Where is the thin line of epistemological entrapment into yet another set of binary opposites of missionizing and autonomous recovery? The range of 'solutions' does not need to be downgraded to alternatives that, while trying to be more responsive to the 'local', end up producing 'models/frameworks' that denote the 'locals' (subjects of intervention) as a homogenous category. That would merely be a recycling of the top-down and patronizing approach. An important step in surpassing this is for missions to consciously and healthily drop from the trajectory of holy trinities, where they constantly save/purify/emancipate less glorious systems. Interventions and missions (if they unequivocally need to happen) should engage more genuinely and respectfully with individual 'locals', acknowledge their agency and respect 'difference' as a means of learning diversity that would also shape the 'intervener'.

[75]   E. Said, *Orientalism New York* (Penguin, 1979).