

Conditioning and expressing indifference with choice functions

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We want to broaden

probability theory

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Sets of desirable gambles are very successful imprecise models.

Working with them is simple and elegant.

Sets of desirable gambles allow for conservative inference.

They can be ordered according to an
“is not more conservative than”
relation.

We want to use identical ideas for choice functions.

Motivating example



$$\mathcal{X} = \{h, t\}$$




Motivating example

fair coin



$$\mathcal{X} = \{h, t\}$$



Motivating example

coin with identical sides of unknown type



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$$p_h(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = h \\ 0 & \text{if } x = t \end{cases}$$

$$p_t(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x = h \\ 1 & \text{if } x = t \end{cases}$$

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
Sets of desirable gambles

Gambles

The random variable X takes values x in the possibility space \mathcal{X} .
A **gamble** $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is an uncertain reward whose value is $f(X)$.
We collect them in \mathcal{L} (or $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})$).



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
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


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Coherence for a set of desirable gambles

An assessment can be given as follows:


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
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
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
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
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
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


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

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

Given a collection $\mathbf{D} = \{\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2, \dots\}$ of coherent sets of desirable gambles, then the infimum (under the relation \subseteq)

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

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



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$$\bigcap \{ \mathcal{D} \text{ coherent} : \mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{D} \}.$$

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Alternative representation

With a coherent set of desirable gambles \mathcal{D} there corresponds a binary relation (called **preference relation**) $\prec_{\mathcal{D}}$ on the set of gambles:

$$f \prec_{\mathcal{D}} g \Leftrightarrow g - f \in \mathcal{D}.$$


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


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


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


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Conversely, from a coherent preference relation \prec on the gambles, define

$$\mathcal{D}_{\prec} := \{f: 0 \prec f\}.$$

We can use these representations interchangeably:

$$\mathcal{D}_{\prec_{\mathcal{D}}} = \mathcal{D}.$$

Example: coin flip

Example



$$\mathcal{X} = \{h, t\}$$



$$p_h(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = h \\ 0 & \text{if } x = t \end{cases} \quad p_t(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x = h \\ 1 & \text{if } x = t \end{cases}$$

Define $f \prec_h g$ if $E_{p_h}(f) < E_{p_h}(g)$ (equivalently $f(h) < g(h)$),

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



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


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No distinction between a “coin with identical sides” and a “vacuous coin”!

Choice functions

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A choice function C is a map

$$C: \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L}) \rightarrow \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L}) \cup \{\emptyset\}: O \mapsto C(O) \text{ such that } C(O) \subseteq O.$$

As an equivalent representation, we define $R(O) := O \setminus C(O)$ as the rejection function.

Choice relations

Another equivalent representation is the choice relation $<$ on $\mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L})$:

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Given a choice relation $<$ we define the corresponding rejection function as

$$R_{<}(O) = \bigcup \{O' \subseteq O : O' < O\},$$

and we can use these representations interchangeably:

$$R_{<_R} = R.$$

Coherence for choice functions

A choice function C is called **coherent** if

1. $\emptyset \neq C(O)$,
2. if $g < f$ then $\{g\} < \{f\}$ (or equivalently, $g \notin C(\{f, g\})$),
3. 3.1 if $O_1 \subseteq R(O_2)$ and $O_2 \subseteq O_3$ then $O_1 \subseteq R(O_3)$,
3.2 if $O_1 \subseteq R(O_2)$ and $O_3 \subseteq O_1$ then $O_1 \setminus O_3 \subseteq R(O_2 \setminus O_3)$,
4. 4.1 if $O_1 \subseteq R(O_2)$ then $O_1 + \{f\} := \{g + f : g \in O_1\} \subseteq R(O_2 + \{f\})$,
4.2 if $O_1 \subseteq R(O_2)$ then $\lambda O_1 := \{\lambda f : f \in O_1\} \subseteq R(\lambda O_2)$,
5. if $f_1 \leq f_2$ and for all $g \in O_1 \setminus \{f_1, f_2\}$:
 - 5.1 if $f_2 \in O_1$ and $g \in R(O_1 \cup \{f_1\})$ then $g \in R(O_1)$,
 - 5.2 if $f_1 \in O_1$ and $g \in R(O_1)$ then $g \in R(\{f_2\} \cup O_1 \setminus \{f_1\})$,

for all $O_1, O_2, O_3 \in \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L})$, $f, f_1, f_2, g \in \mathcal{L}$ and $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}$.

“not more informative” relation

Given two coherent choice functions C_1 and C_2 , we call C_1 “not more informative than” C_2 if

$$C_1(O) \supseteq C_2(O) \text{ for all } O \in \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L}).$$

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Given a collection $\mathbf{C} = \{C_1, C_2, \dots\}$ of coherent choice functions, its infimum (under the “not more informative than” relation)

$$\inf \mathbf{C}(O) = \bigcup_{C \in \mathbf{C}} C(O) \text{ for all } O \in \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L})$$

is a coherent choice function as well.


Example

Coin flip

The two sides of the coin are identical of unknown type.



$$\mathcal{X} = \{h, t\}$$




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
Define $C_{\mathbf{S}}(O)$ as those $f \in O$ for which there is a $p \in \mathbf{S}$ such that f maximises expected utility under p and f is undominated in O .

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
Define $C_S(O)$ as those $f \in O$ for which
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


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


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


Define $C_{S'}(O)$ as those $f \in O$ for which there is a $p \in S'$ such that
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
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
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
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
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
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
$$C_{S'}(\{\bullet, \blacktriangle, \blacksquare, \blacklozenge\}) = \dots$$




C_S and $C_{S'}$ are different




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
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
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Connection between desirability and choice functions

Connection between \mathcal{D} and C

From C to \mathcal{D} .

Let C be a coherent choice function.

Look at the behaviour of the choice relation $<_C$ on singletons.

We define the set of desirable gambles \mathcal{D}_C as

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{D}_C &= \{f - g : \{g\} <_C \{f\}\} \\ &= \{f - g : \{f\} = C(\{f, g\}) \text{ and } f \neq g\}.\end{aligned}$$

If C is coherent, then \mathcal{D}_C is coherent as well.

Connection between \mathcal{D} and \mathbf{C}

From \mathcal{D} to \mathbf{C} .

Let \mathcal{D} be a coherent set of desirable gambles.

Define the **compatible choice functions** $\mathbf{C}_{\mathcal{D}}$ as those choice functions that have the same binary relation as \mathcal{D} :

$$\mathbf{C}_{\mathcal{D}} = \{C: (\forall f, g \in \mathcal{L}) \{f\} <_C \{g\} \Leftrightarrow g - f \in \mathcal{D}\}.$$

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We are looking for the infimum of $\mathbf{C}_{\mathcal{D}}$:

$$C_{\mathcal{D}}(O) := \inf \mathbf{C}_{\mathcal{D}}(O) = \{f \in O : (\forall g \in O) g - f \notin \mathcal{D}\}$$

for all $O \in \mathcal{O}(\mathcal{L})$.

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Equivalently, in terms of choice and preference relations:

$$O_1 <_{C_{\mathcal{D}}} O_2 \Leftrightarrow (\forall f \in O_1)(\exists g \in O_2) f \prec_{\mathcal{D}} g$$

for all $O_1, O_2 \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L})$.

Some nice properties

When working with desirability, we **can** work with choice functions **without losing information**:

$$\mathcal{D}_{\inf\{C_{\mathcal{D}_1}, C_{\mathcal{D}_2}\}} = \inf\{\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2\} \quad \text{or} \quad \mathcal{D}_{C_{\mathcal{D}_1} \cup C_{\mathcal{D}_2}} = \mathcal{D}_1 \cap \mathcal{D}_2.$$

When working with choice functions, we **cannot** work with desirability in general **without losing information**:


$$C_{\inf\{\mathcal{D}_{C_1}, \mathcal{D}_{C_2}\}}(O) \supseteq (\inf\{C_1, C_2\})(O) \text{ for all } O \text{ in } \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L})$$

or

$$C_{\mathcal{D}_{C_1} \cap \mathcal{D}_{C_2}}(O) \supseteq (C_1 \cup C_2)(O) \text{ for all } O \text{ in } \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L})$$


Example

Coin flip



$C_S(O)$ are those $f \in O$ for which there is an $x \in \{h, t\}$ such that $f(x) \geq g(x)$ for every $g \in O$ and f is undominated in O .

Coin flip



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
$$C_{\mathcal{S}}(\mathcal{O}) = \inf\{C_{p_h}, C_{p_t}\}$$

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and undominated.

Coin flip






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
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


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Conditioning

Conditioning with sets of desirable gambles

You have a coherent set of desirable gambles $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})$ and you have the **only additional information** that X belongs to some subset B of \mathcal{X} .

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We define the **set of desirable gambles conditional on B** by

$$\mathcal{D} \upharpoonright B := \{f \in \mathcal{L}(B) : f\mathbb{I}_B \in \mathcal{D}\}.$$

Here, $\mathbb{I}_B \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})$ is the **indicator** of B :

$$\mathbb{I}_B(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \in B \\ 0 & \text{if } x \notin B \end{cases}$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$.

Then

$$f \in \mathcal{D} \upharpoonright B \Leftrightarrow f\mathbb{I}_B \in \mathcal{D}.$$

If $B \neq \emptyset$, then $\mathcal{D} \upharpoonright B$ is a coherent set of desirable gambles on B .

Conditioning with choice functions

For a choice function C , we want a **conditioning rule** that leads to the same relation for \mathcal{D}_C :

$$\mathcal{D}_C|_B = \mathcal{D}_C|B := \{f \in \mathcal{L}(B) : f\mathbb{1}_B \in \mathcal{D}_C\}.$$

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We define for each option set $O \in \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L}(B))$ the sets

$$O \uparrow^f := \{g_1 \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X}) : g_1\mathbb{1}_{B^c} = f\mathbb{1}_{B^c} \text{ and } (\exists g_2 \in O)g_1\mathbb{1}_B = g_2\mathbb{1}_B\} \in \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X}))$$

for each $f \in \mathcal{L}(B^c)$ and $B \subseteq \mathcal{X}$, and for each option set $O \in \mathcal{Q}(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X}))$

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Proposition Given a coherent choice function C , then $\mathcal{D}_{C \downarrow B} = \mathcal{D}_C \downarrow B$.

Question

Is there an intuitive interpretation for our conditioning rule

$$C \downarrow B(O) = C(O \uparrow^f) \downarrow_B ?$$

Modelling indifference

Indifference with sets of desirable gambles

To model **indifference**, we need a second set of gambles: the **set of indifferent gambles** \mathcal{I} .

Two gambles f and g are called **indifferent** (we write $f \approx g$) if

$$\mathcal{D} + \mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{D},$$

where

$$\mathcal{I} := \{\alpha(f - g) : \alpha \in \mathbb{R}\}$$

is the set of indifferent gambles.

Then $f \approx g \Leftrightarrow f - g \approx 0$.

Indifference with choice functions

There are two ideas. A coherent choice function C expresses indifference between f and g if:

Seamus Bradley

$$f \approx g \Leftrightarrow (\forall O \supseteq \{f, g\})(f \in C(O) \Leftrightarrow g \in C(O))$$

Gert de Cooman

$$f \approx g \Leftrightarrow (\forall O \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L})) C(O)_{f \leftrightarrow g} = C(O_{f \leftrightarrow g})$$

where $O_{f \leftrightarrow g}$ is obtained from O by “changing f for g or g for f ”:

$$O_{f \leftrightarrow g} := \begin{cases} O & \text{if } (f \notin O \text{ and } g \notin O) \text{ or } (f, g \in O) \\ \{f\} \cup O \setminus \{g\} & \text{if } f \notin O \text{ and } g \in O \\ \{g\} \cup O \setminus \{f\} & \text{if } f \in O \text{ and } g \notin O \end{cases}$$

Indifference with choice functions

Seamus Bradley

$$\begin{aligned} f \approx g &\Leftrightarrow (\forall O \supseteq \{f, g\})(f \in C(O) \Leftrightarrow g \in C(O)) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (\forall O \supseteq \{f, g\})(f \in R(O) \Leftrightarrow g \in R(O)) \end{aligned}$$

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Given a coherent set of desirable gambles \mathcal{D} that expresses indifference:

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Does $R_{\mathcal{D}}$ fulfil Seamus Bradley?

Indifference with choice functions

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$$(\exists h_2 \in O) h_2 - f \in \mathcal{D}$$

Indifference with choice functions

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hence $g \in R_{\mathcal{D}}(O)$, so $R_{\mathcal{D}}$ fulfils Seamus Bradley.

Indifference with choice functions

Gert de Cooman

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Connection between Seamus Bradley and Gert de Cooman

Gert de Cooman implies Seamus Bradley:

$$(\forall O \supseteq \{f, g\})(f \in C(O) \Leftrightarrow g \in C(O)) \Rightarrow (\forall O \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L}))C(O)_{f \leftrightarrow g} = C(O_{f \leftrightarrow g})$$

Indifference from C to \mathcal{D}_C

Conversely, assume a coherent choice function C that “reflects indifference” between f and g . What properties need C in order for

$$\mathcal{D}_C + \mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{D}_C$$

to hold?

Indifference from \mathcal{C} to $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{C}}$

Conversely, assume a coherent choice function \mathcal{C} that “reflects indifference” between f and g . What properties need \mathcal{C} in order for

$$\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{C}} + \mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{C}}$$

to hold?

Take arbitrary $h \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{C}} + \mathcal{I}$, then

$$\begin{aligned} (\exists h_1, h_2 \in \mathcal{L}, \alpha \in \mathbb{R}) h_1 \in R(\{h_1, h_2\}) \text{ and } h &= (h_2 - h_1) + \alpha(f - g) \\ &= (h_2 + \alpha f) - (h_1 + \alpha g) \\ \Rightarrow (\exists h_1, h_2 \in \mathcal{L}) h_1 + \alpha g \in R(\{h_1 + \alpha g, h_2 + \alpha f\}) &\text{ Gert de Cooman} \\ \Rightarrow h \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{C}} \end{aligned}$$

whence **Gert de Cooman** is a sufficient property.

Question

Which of the two “rules” seems the most intuitive?

Does **Seamus Bradley** imply that $\mathcal{D}_C + \mathcal{I} \subseteq \mathcal{D}_C$?

