



Faculty of Arts & Philosophy
Department of English

Systemic-Functional Linguistics and the Notion of Grammatical Metaphor

A theoretical study and a proposal for a semiotic-functional integrative model

Miriam Taverniers

2002

Doctoral dissertation

Doctoral committee:

Promotor: Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenberghe, University of Gent
Co-Promotor: Kristin Davidse, Catholic University of Leuven
Committee: James R. Martin, University of Sydney
Geoff Thompson, University of Liverpool
Mieke Van Herreweghe, University of Gent

© 2002 Miriam Taverniers.

Doctoral dissertation, University of Gent: Department of English.
Rozier 44, B-9000 Gent, Belgium.

An electronic version of this dissertation is available on CD-rom.
For further information: miriam.taverniers@rug.ac.be.

ISBN 90-15913-4

Systemic-functional linguistics and the notion of grammatical metaphor

UNIVERSITEIT GENT
Faculty of Arts & Philosophy
Department of English

Systemic-functional linguistics and the notion of grammatical metaphor

A theoretical study and a proposal for a semiotic-functional integrative model

Miriam Taverniers

Proefschrift
ingediend tot het behalen van de graad van
Doctor in de Taalkunde
aan de Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte,
Universiteit Gent

2002

Promotor: Prof. Dr. A.-M. Simon-Vandenberghe
Co-Promotor: Prof. Dr. K. Davidse

Dank

Bij het voltooiën van deze scriptie is het me een groot plezier om mijn oprechte dankbaarheid uit te drukken tegenover een aantal mensen die mij op één of andere manier geholpen hebben tijdens de voorbereiding en het schrijven ervan.

Eerst en vooral wil ik mijn promotor, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenberg, bedanken, in de eerste plaats omdat zij mij de kans heeft gegeven deze scriptie te schrijven. Het was Anne-Marie die, gedurende mijn licentiaatsstudies, in mij de interesse opgewekt heeft voor metafoor in het algemeen, en het was zij die mij in contact heeft gebracht met systemisch-functionele linguïstiek, en verder met het concept ‘grammaticale metafoor’. Ik wil Anne-Marie speciaal danken voor het vertrouwen dat ze altijd heeft gehad in mijn werk, voor de aanmoediging die ze me gaf, en omdat ze voor mij de ideale professionele omstandigheden heeft gecreëerd om deze doctoraatsthesis te kunnen schrijven.

Ik ben heel erg dankbaar aan mijn co-promotor, Kristin Davidse, voor haar nooit aflatende ondersteuning tijdens de belangrijkste fase van het schrijven van deze scriptie. Kristins interesse voor mijn werk is voor mij altijd zeer motiverend geweest, en haar gedetailleerde commentaar op proefversies van het overgrote deel van mijn tekst hebben mij enorm geholpen.

Mijn dank gaat ook uit naar Jim Martin, Geoff Thompson en Mieke Van Herreweghe, die zich bereid hebben verklaard om tot de leescommissie te behoren.

Ik ben dankbaar aan het “Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen”, dat me het voor mij mogelijk gemaakt heeft om gedurende vier jaar te werken aan deze scriptie.

In 2000 had ik het geluk drie maanden te kunnen doorbrengen aan het departement linguïstiek van de University of Sydney, waarvoor ik ook het “Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen” wil danken voor de financiële ondersteuning van dit studieverblijf. Ik ben dankbaar aan Jim Martin, die dit verblijf aan zijn departement mogelijk heeft gemaakt, om de vele gesprekken die we gehad

Thanks

Having completed this dissertation it gives me great pleasure to express my deepest gratitude to all those who have helped me, in one way or another, during its preparation and writing.

First of all I wish to thank my supervisor, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenberg, for giving me the chance to write this dissertation in the first place. It was Anne-Marie who first kindled my interest in metaphor in general during my licentiate studies, and who introduced me to systemic-functional linguistics and ultimately to the notion of 'grammatical metaphor'. I especially thank Anne-Marie for the confidence she has always shown in my work, for her continual encouragement, and, on a more practical level, for creating a professional atmosphere that was ideal for finishing a doctoral dissertation.

I am most grateful to my co-supervisor, Kristin Davidse, for her unfailing support during the most important stage of the writing of this dissertation. Kristin's interest in my work has always been an encouragement to me, and her painstaking comments on drafts of the majority of chapters in this work have been most helpful.

Thanks too to Jim Martin, Geoff Thompson and Mieke Van Herreweghe for agreeing to be members of the reading committee.

I am grateful to the "Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders", which has allowed me to work on this study for four years.

In 2000 I had the advantage of being able to spend three months at the Department of Linguistics at the University of Sydney, for which I am also indebted to the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research for its financial support. I wish to thank Jim Martin for having made my stay possible, for discussing my work, and for giving me the opportunity to present my work to the wider community of linguists – and particularly systemic-functional linguists – at Sydney. The Friday afternoon seminars, and the informal workshops on gram-

Dank

hebben over mijn werk. Ik wil hem ook danken omdat hij me de kans heeft gegeven mijn werk voor te stellen aan de verdere gemeenschap van taalkundigen – vooral systemisch-functionele linguïsten – in Sydney. De traditionele seminars op vrijdagmiddag in Sydney, en de informele workshops over grammaticale metafoor die ik kon organiseren, zijn bijzonder stimulerend geweest voor mijn doctoraatsstudie. Ik wil speciaal die mensen danken die deelgenomen hebben aan de workshops over metafoor, voor de interessante uitwisseling van ideeën: Chris Cléirigh, Jim Martin, Christian Matthiessen, Clare Painter en Louise Ravelli.

Mijn bijzondere dank gaat ook uit naar Michael Halliday, die me tijdens mijn verblijf in Sydney uitnodigde om mijn werk over grammaticale metafoor met hem te bespreken. Ik heb een levendige herinnering aan zijn enorme vriendelijkheid, en ik bewonder de bescheidenheid waarmee hij zijn ideeën over grammaticale metafoor voorstelde. Ik zal ook nooit vergeten hoe verwonderd ik was over de grote klaarheid van geest waarmee hij de schema's analyseerde die ik meegebracht had om met hem te bespreken. Deze halve dag in Manly, waar we de aard van grammaticale metafoor bespraken in het kader van SFL in het geheel, is mijn onderzoek bijzonder ten goede gekomen. Bovendien heeft Michael mij vooral geholpen in te zien welke onderzoeksvragen prioritair zijn om tot een beter begrip te komen van het complexe fenomeen 'grammaticale metafoor'.

Sommige van de ideeën die uitgewerkt zijn in deze scriptie werden voorgesteld tijdens congressen en workshops in de voorbije vijf jaar. Voor stimulerende vragen en gesprekken die mijn denken beïnvloed hebben, ben ik vooral dankbaar aan: Robin Fawcett, Rick Iedema, Mary Schleppegrel, Paul Thibault, Geoff Thompson and Peter White.

Ik wil ook graag mijn collega's en vrienden bedanken in de Vakgroep Engels, in het bijzonder in de sectie taalkunde, van de Universiteit Gent, voor het begrip dat ze altijd opbrachten voor mijn situatie, en omdat ze mijn opdracht en aan de universiteit tot een minimum herleidden, vooral in de belangrijkste fasen van mijn werk; een speciaal dankjewel voor hun samenwerking. Hoewel ik vooral thuis heb gewerkt aan het schrijven van deze scriptie, heb ik het altijd aanmoedigend gevonden om 'gebaseerd' te zijn in een vakgroep waar een algemene sfeer heerst van vriendelijke ondersteuning.

Ik wens ook alle vrienden te danken buiten de universiteit, en mijn familie in het algemeen, voor de interesse die ze toonden voor mijn werk, en voor hun woorden van bemoediging.

Thanks

mational metaphor which I was able to organize at the department were highly stimulating. I owe a special debt of gratitude to those who participated in the workshops, with whom I could exchange ideas, especially Chris Cléirigh, Jim Martin, Christian Matthiessen, Clare Painter and Louise Ravelli.

My sincerest thanks go to Michael Halliday, who invited me to discuss my work on grammatical metaphor with him during my stay in Sydney. I have a vivid memory of his tremendous kindness and stand in admiration at the modesty with which he expressed his ideas on grammatical metaphor. Nor will I forget my awe at the enormous clarity of mind with which he considered the schemes I had brought along to discuss with him. My thinking has much benefited from this half-day at Manly, where we discussed and explored the nature of grammatical metaphor in the framework of SFL as a whole. Moreover, Michael has especially helped me to decide which research questions should be addressed first in coming to grips with the intricate complexity of grammatical metaphor.

Some of the ideas on which this dissertation is based have been presented at conferences and workshops over the past four years. For all those pertinent questions and discussions which have influenced my thinking, I am especially grateful to: Robin Fawcett, Rick Iedema, Mary Schleppegrel, Paul Thibault, Geoff Thompson and Peter White.

I am also grateful to my colleagues and friends at linguistics section of the Department of English at the University of Gent, for understanding my situation, and for reducing my tasks at the university to a minimum during the most crucial stages of my work; a special thanks for their cooperation. Though I have written most of this work at home, the general atmosphere of friendly support and the concern expressed by the members of the 'vakgroep' (department) has always been encouraging.

I wish to say thank you to all my friends outside the university, and my extended family, for the interest they have shown in my work, and for their encouragement.

I wish to thank my sisters and brothers, Isabel, Katelijn, Johan, Birgit, Sofie, Filiep and Pieter, for having put up with their eldest sister writing a dissertation! They kept their vow of silence near my room and even moved the piano

Dank

Ik ben dankbaar aan mijn zussen en broers, Isabel, Katelijn, Johan, Birgit, Sofie, Filiep en Pieter, voor de hele tijd die ze hebben moeten leven terwijl hun oudste zus aan het werken was aan een doctoraat! Ze hebben er alles voor gedaan om het zo stil mogelijk te houden in de nabijheid van mijn kamer, en zelfs de piano hebben ze daarvoor verplaatst, zo ver mogelijk uit mijn omgeving. Zij hebben ook altijd mijn 'werkjes' overgenomen in huis, en hebben me op verschillende manieren aangemoedigd. Mijn oudste zus Isabel verdient een speciaal woordje van dank voor haar praktische hulp in de allerlaatste fase van de voorbereiding van deze scriptie.

Ik dank van ganser harte mijn ouders, die mij een geest van doorzetting hebben bijgebracht in een huis dat zij "Were Di" genoemd hebben. Ik ben dankbaar aan mijn overleden vader, die mijn interesse voor taal heeft opgewekt toen ik een kind was. Hij is het ook, die, door zijn enorm uitgebreide kennis over een grote waaier van onderwerpen, in mij een geest van benieuwdheid naar kennis en geestdrift in studie heeft wakker gemaakt. Mijn vader heeft mijn studie en het schrijven van mijn doctoraatsscriptie niet mogen meemaken, maar ik weet dat hij bijzonder trots zou geweest zijn, en deze gedachte heeft mij altijd gesterkt toen ik aan deze scriptie werkte.

Uiteindelijk wend ik mij tot mijn moeder en tot Paul. Zij beiden zijn de allerbelangrijkste personen geweest tijdens de voorbereiding van dit werk. Zij hebben mij enorm geholpen met tal van praktische zaken, maar mijn diepste dankbaarheid aan hen ligt op een totaal ander niveau dan alle andere schatplichtigheid die ik hier al heb vermeld. Ik zal geen poging doen om te omschrijven welke rol zij hebben gespeeld tijdens mijn hele doctoraatsproject; elke beschrijving zou enkel een fletse weergave kunnen zijn van de diepe dankbaarheid die ik voel tegenover hen. Daarom, aan mama en aan Paul, uit de grond van mijn hart:

Dankjewel !

Thanks

as far away as possible in order not to disturb me. They also took over my tasks in the house, and encouraged me in every way possible. My eldest sister Isabel deserves a special thank you for her practical help during the very last stage of preparation of this work.

I wish to thank wholeheartedly my parents in general, for having taught me the spirit of perseverance in a home that they called “Were Di” (‘take courage’ in Middle Dutch). I am grateful to my late father, who fired my interest for language from early childhood and who, through his encyclopaedic knowledge and enthusiasm for a whole array of topics, initiated in me a attitude of curiosity and a vigour in study. My father was unable to witness my studies and their culmination in this dissertation, but I know he would have been very proud and this thought has always been a motivating force for me throughout.

Finally, I turn to my mother and to Paul. They have been the most important for me in the preparation of this work. They have helped me enormously with all sorts of practical matters, but my deepest gratitude to them lies on a totally different level than all the thankfulness expressed above. I will not even try to specify how important they have been during the whole enterprise, since any words expressed here would only be a weak representation of the profound gratitude I feel towards them. So, to my mom and to Paul, from the bottom of my heart:

Thank you !

Table of contents

Thanks	i
Table of contents	v
Figures	xv
Tables.....	xxi
Key to colours and typographical conventions	xxv
Introduction	1
<hr/>	
1 The notion of ‘grammatical metaphor’: An initial characterization.....	3
1.1 Grammatical metaphor as similar to lexical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological approaches to variation	3
1.2 Grammatical metaphor versus lexical metaphor: A shift in perspective	10
2 The theoretical significance of ‘grammatical metaphor’	12
3 Major motifs in this dissertation.....	18
I The need for a fundamental, theoretical study.....	18
II The necessity of a historical perspective	20
III A plea for a fundamentally semiotic and a fundamentally functional approach	21
IV A recognition of grammatical metaphor as a distinct phenomenon with its own type of semiosis.....	23
4 Organization of this dissertation	23

Part I	
Setting the scene	27
Chapter 1	
Dimensions of systemic-functional linguistics	29
1 Systemic motif	30
1.1 System networks and the interaction between system and structure	30
1.2 Topology.....	39
2 Functional motif: Stratification and metafunctional diversity	49
2.1 Stratification & realization	49
2.2 Metafunctions	61
3 Dynamic motif: Instantiation and semogenesis	76
3.1 Instantiation: Linking system to process	76
3.2 Semogenesis: Dynamic dimensions of language	82
4 Theoretical dimensions of SFL: Review and prospect	83
Chapter 2	
A semiotic basis: Hjelmslev's theory of language	91
1 Introduction	91
2 Content-expression	94
3 Form-substance-purport	103
4 System-process, paradigm-syntagm	118
5 Conclusion and outlook	120

Part II	
Major dimensions: Stratification and metafunctional complementarity	123
Chapter 3	
Stratified systemic models of language	125
<hr/>	
1 Starting point: The nature of ‘realization’ in the multi-stratified model and in system networks	126
2 Precursory systemic models	132
2.1 Systems of grammatical classes	
System-structure theory I: Scale-&-category model	133
2.2 System networks of grammatical functions with ‘semantic’ relevance	
System-structure theory II: On the verge of a functionally diversified model	136
2.3 A functionally diversified model	
The ‘semantic’ motivation of networks is functional.....	141
3 General types of stratified systemic-functional models.....	143
3.1 A central question: ‘Semantic’ and/or ‘lexicogrammatical’ networks?	144
3.2 Four general types of stratified systemic-functional models.....	145
3.2.1 BASIC TWO-LEVEL MODEL VS. MORE EXPANDED STRATIFICATION MODELS	147
3.2.2 EXTENDED STRATIFICATION MODEL	151
3.2.3 ENHANCED STRATIFICATION MODELS: SITUATION-SPECIFIC AND GENERALIZED	153
I The basic two-level model placed in a more general framework.....	154
II The situation-specific enhanced stratification model.....	156
III The generalized enhanced stratification model	164
4 Major types of stratified models: Review and prospect	167

Chapter 4	
Metafunctional diversity and stratification: The ontogenetic basis	173
<hr/>	
1 Introduction: The framework of ontogenesis as a way into explaining the complementarity between different models	174
2 Presentation of Halliday's theory of language development	181
2.1 Phase I: Proto-language from NLO to NL5-6	182
2.2 Phase II: Transition from proto-language into adult language	188
2.3 Phase III: Adult language	194
2.4 Halliday's model of ontogenesis: Summary	197
3 Further analysis of Halliday's model of ontogenesis	198
3.1 Halliday's explanation of the transition phase: Discussion	200
3.2 A more dynamic transition model	203
3.2.1 PRESENTING THE GENERAL DIMENSIONS OF THE REFINED MODEL: EMERGING STRATIFICATION AND TWO TYPES OF PERSPECTIVES	203
3.2.2 THE ORIGIN OF STRATIFICATION: TR1	210
3.2.3 OVERLAPPING MODELS: TR2	213
I TR2 seen 'from above': Reorganization of the 'semantic' systems	214
II TR2 seen 'from below': The expanding lexicogrammar	219
[1] Introduction: The appearance of multifunctional lexis	219
[2] Icon-index-symbol in a developmental perspective: The appearance of a symbolic-indexical function	222
[3] The multifunctionality of lexis in TR2: Initial illustrations of symbolicity and indexicality	226
[4] The expansion of lexis in TR2 in relation to the intrinsic linguistic function	228
III TR2 · conclusion: The stratal and developmental types of perspectivization combined	229
3.2.4 THE FINAL TRANSITION INTO ADULT LANGUAGE	230
I Final transition · view 'from above': The interpersonal system of SPEECH FUNCTION	231
[1] Introduction: The further abstraction of the pragmatic-mathetic contrast in the final transition into adult language	231
[2] Davies' <i>Semantics of Grammar</i> and the system of SPEECH FUNCTION	233
[3] The abstraction of the pragmatic-mathetic contrast: An explanation in terms of Davies' semantic theory	243
II Final transition · perspective 'from below': Symbolic-indexical developments	247
III Final transition: Conclusion	249
3.3 Emerging stratification and metafunctional diversity in ontogenesis: Summary and conclusion	250

Chapter 5	
Stratification and metafunctional complementarity:	
A clarification and a proposal for a refined model	257
<hr/>	
1 A ‘fundamentally semiotic’ view on defining linguistic categories	258
2 ‘Stratification’: A Hjelmslevian re-interpretation.....	267
2.1 The ‘internal stratification of the content plane’	
and the semiotic relationship of instantiation	269
2.1.1 STARTING POINT	269
2.1.2 LEVELS AND SEMIOTIC RELATIONSHIPS IN THE SCALE-AND-CATEGORY MODEL	273
2.1.3 THE SCALE-AND-CATEGORY MODEL IN RELATION TO HJELMSLEV’S STRATIFICATION SCHEME: LEVELS/STRATA.....	277
2.1.4 THE SCALE-AND-CATEGORY MODEL IN RELATION TO HJELMSLEV’S STRATIFICATION SCHEME: SEMIOTIC RELATIONSHIPS	280
I ‘Instantiation’ in the expression plane.....	282
II ‘Realization’ between content-form and expression-form	285
III ‘Realization’ within content-form.....	286
IV ‘Instantiation’ in the content-plane	292
2.2 ‘Contextual semantics’	293
2.2.1 COLLOCATIONAL SEMANTICS: MICRO-INSTANTIATION.....	293
2.2.2 ONTOLOGICAL SEMANTICS: MACRO-INSTANTIATION AND CONSTRUAL.....	297
I Ontological semantics and its relation to formal meaning	297
II Ontological semantics as experiential.....	302
III The status and role of an ontological semantics in the formal study of language.....	303
2.2.3 SPEECH-FUNCTIONAL SEMANTICS: CONNOTATIVE INSTANTIATION AND CONSTRUAL	307
I Speech-functional semantics as a connotative content-plane.....	307
II The notion of ‘content-substance’ in the internal organization of speech-functional semantics: Micro-instantiation	311
III The semiotic relationship between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar	314
2.2.4 THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN INTERPERSONAL INDICATION AND EXPERIENTIAL DESIGNATION IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF LANGUAGE	319
3 Summary and conclusions	320

Part III	
Modelling lexicogrammar	329
Chapter 6	
Modelling lexico-grammar: Delicacy and metafunctional modes of expression	331
1 Agnation and enation: The differential treatment of the metafunctional components	333
1.1 Gleason's concepts of 'agnation' and 'enation' and their relevance to SFL	333
1.2 The organization of textual and interpersonal networks	340
1.3 The organization of an experiential network	344
1.4 Conclusion	347
2 The nature of the experiential component	349
2.1 The organization of experiential lexicogrammatical systems: 'Delicacy' in the experiential component	349
2.1.1 STARTING POINT: CRITERIA AND METHODS FOR EXPERIENTIAL CATEGORIZATION	349
2.1.2 GENERAL TYPES OF EXPERIENTIAL PARADIGMS	350
I TYPE OF PROCESS	351
II VOICE	353
III TYPE OF CONSTRUAL	355
IV Further possibilities in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS	357
2.1.3 CONCLUSION: DELICACY IN THE EXPERIENTIAL COMPONENT	362
2.2 The 'particulate' mode of expression	364
3 The nature of the interpersonal component	364
3.1 The organization of interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems: 'Delicacy' in the interpersonal component	364
3.1.1 STARTING POINT: THE CONCEPTION OF 'INTERPERSONAL LEXIS' IN SFL	364
3.1.2 APPROACHING INTERPERSONAL LEXICOGRAMMAR FROM THE GRAMMATICAL END: PRIMARY INTERPERSONAL SYSTEMS	370
3.1.3 MORE DELICATE INTERPERSONAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INTERPERSONAL GRAMMAR AND INTERPERSONAL LEXIS...	372
3.1.4 DELICACY AND THE INTERPERSONAL SEMANTICS OF SPEECH FUNCTION	382
3.2 The 'prosodic' mode of expression	392

Chapter 7	
Grammatical metaphor in SFL: The basis	395
<hr/>	
1 Halliday 1985	395
1.1 Grammatical metaphor and the lexicogrammar continuum	396
1.2 Ideational grammatical metaphor	399
1.2.1 INTERPERSONAL GRAMMATICAL METAPHOR	401
1.2.2 IDEATIONAL AND INTERPERSONAL METAPHORS: GENERAL ASPECTS	402
1.2.3 CONCLUSION	403
2 The theme of congruency in earlier work	404
2.1.1 THE CONCEPT OF CONGRUENCE IN EARLY WORK BY HALLIDAY	405
I Congruence, markedness and probability value	405
II Congruence and social varieties of language	405
2.1.2 CONGRUENCE IN THE INTERPERSONAL COMPONENT: HALLIDAY 1984	408
2.1.3 CONGRUENCE IN THE IDEATIONAL COMPONENT: FAWCETT 1980	411
3 An initial framework for ideational grammatical metaphor: Ravelli 1985, 1988	413
4 Review and prospect: Leading motifs in the initial studies of grammatical metaphor	421
[1] Incongruence	422
[2] Metaphor and realization	423
[3] Metaphor and system network representations	423
[4] Types of metaphor	426
[5] The analysis of metaphors	426
[6] Functions of metaphor	426

Chapter 8	
Locating the grammatical heart of language	429
<hr/>	
1 Recent developments in SFL: ‘Semantic’ models	431
1.1 Appraisal theory	432
1.2 The ideation base	435
1.3 Discourse semantics	440
2 ‘Grammatical metaphor’: An evaluation in view of a semiotic-functional model of language	448
2.1 ‘Grammatical metaphor’ and the architecture versus internal structure of language	449
I Interpersonal metaphors of mood	449
II Interpersonal metaphors of modality	453
III Experiential grammatical metaphors	461
IV Conclusion: The macro-semantic approach to grammatical metaphor in SFL	463
2.2 The structure of interpersonal and experiential metaphor	464
2.3 Grammatical metaphor and markedness: The notion of ‘incongruence’	465
2.4 Beyond experiential metaphor: ‘Word classes’ and ‘grammatical categories’	466
3 The grammatical heart of language in a semiotic-functional model	473
3.1 Starting point: Micro-stratification and the realization-exponence complex	473
3.2 Discourse semantics: Textual instantiation	476
3.3 Grammatical categories and syntagmatic structure: Tactic instantiation	480
I Lexis and morphotactics	482
[1] The role of word categories	482
[2] Lexemes and morphemes	483
[3] Lexis as part of a more general ‘elemental’ level in language	485
II Lexicogrammar and syntagmatic structure	489
III Conclusion: The internal organization of lexis and lexicogrammar	490
3.4 The explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs	491

Part IV Semiosis	495
----------------------------	-----

Chapter 9 The explanatory stratum of semiotic-functional motifs	497
--	------------

1 The semantic functions of type specification, instantiation and grounding	499
1.1 Langacker’s type–instance motif	499
I The type–instance motif in the nominal group	499
II The type–instance motif in the clause	504
1.2 Davidse’s systemic-functional re-interpretation of the type–instance motif	511
2 Type specification – instantiation – grounding: A metafunctional reinterpretation	515
2.1 Type specification and the experiential metafunction	515
2.2 Grounding and the interpersonal metafunction	519
2.3 Instantiation and the textual metafunction	520
2.3.1 THE SECOND-ORDER NATURE AND ENABLING ROLE OF THE TEXTUAL METAFUNCTION	521
2.3.2 THE TEXTUAL NATURE OF INSTANTIATION: PRESENTATION AND CREATION OF RELEVANCE	524
2.3.3 THE ENABLING ROLE OF INSTANTIATION.....	525
I Instantiation and the formation of a syntagm.....	526
II Instantiation as a hinge between type specification and grounding: The orchestrating role of the textual metafunction	526
[1] The enabling role of the Instantiator	527
[2] The enabling role of the domain of instantiation	529
[3] The enabling role of the indication of an occurrence value	530
[4] Conclusion	530
3 Semiotic-functional motifs: Conclusion	531

Chapter 10	
The semiosis of grammatical metaphor	535
<hr/>	
1 Introduction:	
Towards semiotic-functional definition of grammatical metaphor	536
2 Grammatical metaphor as doubling of semiosis	536
3 Experiential metaphor	539
3.1 The categorial modi into which the class verb can enter	541
3.1.1 VERBAL FORMAL SCHEMATA AND THEIR MEANINGS	544
I Verbal root forms and basic verbal schemata	544
II The inherent meaning of verbal root forms as atemporalizing elements	546
III The meaning of verbal formal schemata: Schematic instantiation	548
3.1.2 THE CATEGORIAL MODI INTO WHICH VERBAL ROOT FORMS ENTER AND THE FORMATION OF SYNTAGMS	550
3.2 Types of experiential metaphor	559
4 Interpersonal metaphor	567
References	577

Figures

Introduction

Figure 0-1 · Lexical metaphor.....	3
Figure 0-2 · Lexical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological perspectives.....	4
Figure 0-3 · General parallels between lexical metaphor, experiential grammatical metaphor and interpersonal grammatical metaphor	6
Figure 0-4 · Interpersonal grammatical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological perspectives.....	8
Figure 0-5 · Experiential grammatical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological perspectives.....	9
Figure 0-6 · A semiotic and functional approach to language	22
Figure 0-7 · The organization of this dissertation	24

Chapter 1 · Dimensions of systemic-functional linguistics

Figure 1-1 · Elements of a system	31
Figure 1-2 · Ranks and grammatical classes.....	36
Figure 1-3 · Illustration of intersecting systems in the area of modality.....	40
Figure 1-4 · Intersecting sub-systems of MODALITY represented in a matrix diagram.....	41
Figure 1-5 · Matrix diagram (speech functions and types of mood) revealing a coding gap in English.....	44
Figure 1-6 · Types of processes: primary delicacy.....	45
Figure 1-7 · Blends between relational and mental processes, illustrating topology as a representational tool.....	47
Figure 1-8 · Strata	50
Figure 1-9 · Stratification of the content plane into a ‘semantics’ and a ‘lexicogrammar’	53
Figure 1-10 · Studies inspiring the stratified view of language: two perspectives.....	55
Figure 1-11 · Metaredundancy relationships between strata: accumulative realization cycles	58
Figure 1-12 · Metafunctional diversity.....	62
Figure 1-13 · Studies inspiring the metafunctional view of language: two perspectives.....	65
Figure 1-14 · Structural analysis: metafunctional layering and class labelling.....	69
Figure 1-15 · Univariate and multivariate structures: illustration	74
Figure 1-16 · Major theoretical dimensions of SFL: overview	84

Chapter 2 · A semiotic basis: Hjelmslev's theory of language

Figure 2-1 · The layered nature of a Hjelmslevian connotative semiotic and metasemiotic.....	97
--	----

Figures

Figure 2-2 · The layered structure of a connotative semiotic in Barthes's semiotic theory	100
Figure 2-3 · Hjelmslev's primary characterization of the linguistic sign by means of two differentiating dimensions: content–expression, and form–substance–purport.....	112
Figure 2-4 · The interaction between the content–expression and the form–substance dimensions in a connotative sign.....	117
Chapter 3 · Stratified systemic models of language	
Figure 3-1 · The central role of realization in the stratified model of language and in the system network representation	127
Figure 3-2 · Illustration of system network: Experiential metafunction: TYPE OF PROCESS.....	131
Figure 3-3 · Illustration of system network: Interpersonal metafunction: MOOD TYPE	131
Figure 3-4 · Types of non-stratified systemic models.....	133
Figure 3-5 · The scale-&-category model.....	134
Figure 3-6 · Illustration of the scale-&-category conception of structure (syntagmatic relations such as S, P, C, A) and systems of classes	135
Figure 3-7 · Intermediate system-structure model	140
Figure 3-8 · A functionally motivated system-structure model.....	143
Figure 3-9 · Four general types of stratified systemic models	146
Figure 3-10 · Micro-functional components in proto-language (19 months), illustrated with interactional and regulatory 'semantic' system networks and examples of realizations [based on Halliday 1976e/1973].....	148
Figure 3-11 · A basic two-level model of restricted semiotic systems	149
Figure 3-12 · Extended stratification model	151
Figure 3-13 · Halliday's analysis of a system of parental control as an example of a basic two-level model (based on Halliday 1973d/1972).....	156
Figure 3-14 · Situation-specific enhanced stratification model	157
Figure 3-15 · A 'semantic' network in a situation-specific enhanced stratification model: Halliday's network of threats and warnings in a context of parental control [based on Halliday 1973d/1972]	161
Figure 3-16 · Generalized enhanced stratification model.....	164
Figure 3-17 · The semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION: primary options	167
Figure 3-18 · The lexicogrammatical system of MOOD: primary options	167
Figure 3-19 · Overview of types of systemic stratified models: graphic presentation	168
Figure 3-20 · Overview of types of stratified systemic-functional models: matrix presentation	169
Chapter 4 · Metafunctional diversity and stratification: The ontogenetic basis	
Figure 4-1 · Overview of Halliday's model of ontogenesis	176
Figure 4-2 · The semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION grafted onto the pragmatic and mathetic systems of proto-language in the transition phase	196
Figure 4-3 · Language development, Phase II (transition phase): processes preparing the transition of the child's organization of language into the adult system.....	198
Figure 4-4 · Contradictions in the explanation of the transition phase.....	203
Figure 4-5 · A refined model of the transition from proto-language into adult language	208
Figure 4-6 · Halliday's general model of semogenesis [based on Halliday 1992b: 27].....	211
Figure 4-7 · The appearance of stratification in TR1	211

Figures

Figure 4-8 · TR2: aspects of the intrinsic linguistic function in the general ‘semantic’ network	218
Figure 4-9 · The interpersonal component of language: aspects of Davies’ interpersonal theory (highlighted) combined with Halliday’s model.....	242
Figure 4-10 · Interactive-informative dimensions of ‘information’ in the adult ‘semantic’ system, as expansions of the pragmatic–mathetic system of proto-language in TR2	245
Figure 4-11 · The place of grammar as the organizational heart of adult language, in relation to the areas of language which have come into focus by taking a developmental perspective.....	255
Chapter 5 · Stratification and metafunctional complementarity: A clarification and a proposal for a refined model	
Figure 5-1 · Categories of linguistics as metalinguistic signs	259
Figure 5-2 · Two types of linguistic categories in a Hjelmslevian metalinguistic semiotic.....	260
Figure 5-3 · The internal stratification of the content plane interpreted as a differentiation into content-substance and content-form	270
Figure 5-4 · The general systemic-functional scheme of stratification projected onto the Hjelmslevian stratification scheme.....	271
Figure 5-5 · The scale-&-category model of linguistic levels, and its motivation in relation to the Hjelmslevian stratification scheme.....	276
Figure 5-6 · Hjelmslev’s strata and Halliday’s scale-&-category levels combined	279
Figure 5-7 · Semiotic relationships in Hjelmslev’s theory and in Halliday’s scale-&-category model.....	281
Figure 5-8 · Primary stratification and micro-stratification	290
Figure 5-9 · Micro-instantiation	297
Figure 5-10 · The semiotic relationship between formal semantics and ontological semantics: Variation in two directions.....	301
Figure 5-11 · The interpersonal semantics of speech function as a connotative content plane.....	308
Figure 5-12 · The relationship between the interpersonal semantics of SPEECH FUNCTION and lexicogrammar: Variation in two directions	316
Figure 5-13 · Hjelmslev’s relationship of ‘be a sign for’ extended to the notion of a connotative semiotic.....	319
Figure 5-14 · Different types of ‘semantics’ and semiotic relationships, focussing on the outer edges of a semiotic-functional model of language	321
Chapter 6 · Modelling lexicogrammar: Delicacy and metafunctional modes of expression	
Figure 6-1 · The system of VOICE	337
Figure 6-2 · Experiential categories distinguished on the basis of agnation.....	338
Figure 6-3 · The textual system of THEME (indicating options for experiential Theme only)	340
Figure 6-4 · The interpersonal system of MOOD	342
Figure 6-5 · Primary interdependent systems in the experiential network.....	345
Figure 6-6 · Simultaneous systems in the experiential component	351
Figure 6-7 · General agnation patterns and general verb classes in the experiential component	357
Figure 6-8 · Systemic representation of the interpersonal component: major types of lexicogrammatical systems (showing primary levels of delicacy only), in relation to the semantic stratum	368

Figures

Figure 6-9 · Interrelations between interpersonal semantics and lexicogrammar across the delicacy scale	384
Chapter 7 · Grammatical metaphor in SFL: The basis	
Figure 7-1 · Two perspectives on metaphor (after Halliday 1994/1985: 342).....	396
Figure 7-2 · Analysis of transitivity metaphors	399
Figure 7-3 · SPEECH FUNCTION: primary options.....	409
Figure 7-4 · MOOD: primary options	409
Figure 7-5 · Congruence network proposed by Fawcett [1980: 93].....	412
Figure 7-6 · Ravelli's alternative model of grammatical metaphor as a 'semantic' compound [from Ravelli 1988: 137, 1999: 104]	414
Figure 7-7 · Levels in a network representation of grammatical metaphor [from Ravelli 1988: 137; 1999: 101]	419
Chapter 8 · Locating the grammatical heart of language in a semiotic-functional model	
Figure 8-1 · APPRAISAL network	433
Figure 8-2 · Halliday & Matthiessen's system network of the ideation base [based on Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 67].....	436
Figure 8-3 · Martin's interpretation of CONJUNCTION as a logical semantic system (primary options only).....	443
Figure 8-4 · The system of IDEATION in Martin's [1992b] discourse semantics (primary options only).....	445
Figure 8-5 · The system of IDENTIFICATION in Martin's [1992b] discourse semantics (primary options only).....	446
Figure 8-6 · The system of NEGOTIATION in Martin's [1992b] discourse semantics (primary options only).....	446
Figure 8-7 · Martin's model of discourse semantics in relation to the metafunctional components of lexicogrammar in Halliday's model of language	447
Figure 8-8 · Metaphorical and non-metaphorical mappings between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar	451
Figure 8-9 · The location of metaphors of modality in the network of MODALITY [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 360; Matthiessen 1993a: 497]	454
Figure 8-10 · Starting point for exploring the organization of the internal structure of language	474
Figure 8-11 · The relation between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar.....	477
Figure 8-12 · Size-based stratification in relation to lexicogrammar, lexis and phonology	481
Figure 8-13 · The elemental level of language: types of meanings and linguistic items.....	486
Figure 8-14 · Elemental and constructional levels in the organization of the internal structure of language.....	488
Figure 8-15 · The explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs	492

Figures

Chapter 9 · The explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs

Figure 9-1 · Davidse's refined model of the type–instance motif in the clause	514
Figure 9-2 · Functional type specification modelled in terms of daughter dependency	517
Figure 9-3 · The relationship between functional and syntagmatic type specification	518
Figure 9-4 · Grounding	520
Figure 9-5 · Semiotic-functional motifs: Terminology and visualization	532

Chapter 10 · The semiosis of grammatical metaphor

Figure 10-1 · Grammatical metaphor as a doubling of semiosis	538
Figure 10-2 · Primary systems in the logical component of language	540
Figure 10-3 · Primary types of experiential metaphors placed in a larger framework of complementation and word formation.....	542
Figure 10-4 · Root verb forms, basic formal schemata and the formation of syntagms.....	551
Figure 10-5 · A framework for exploring interpersonal grammatical metaphor	540

Tables

Introduction

Table 0-1 · Lexicogrammatical resources exploited by grammatical metaphor.....	17
--	----

Chapter 1 · Dimensions of systemic-functional linguistics

Table 1-1 · Three representational tools compared	42
Table 1-2 · Stratification: example illustrating realization cycles between strata.....	51
Table 1-3 · General descriptions of the three metafunctions	63
Table 1-4 · Class–function matrix of English lexicogrammatical systems	68
Table 1-5 · Different types of structures as realizations of metafunctional ‘meanings’	76
Table 1-6 · Instantiation: variant glosses of the dialectic between system and instance.....	76
Table 1-7 · Realization, delicacy and instantiation compared	80
Table 1-8 · Three modes of semogenesis	82
Table 1-9 · Major theoretical dimensions of SFL: complementarities.....	85

Chapter 2 · A semiotic basis: Hjelmslev’s theory of language

Table 2-1 · The relevance of Hjelmslev’s theory of language to systemic-functional thinking about stratification and instantiation	92
Table 2-2 · Hjelmslev’s content–expression distinction in relation to Saussure’s <i>signifié–signifiant</i>	96
Table 2-3 · Aspects of the content plane in a connotative semiotic recognized by Hjelmslev.....	98
Table 2-4 · The significance of the form–substance–purport differentiation within the content and expression planes of a linguistic sign	109
Table 2-5 · Hjelmslev’s form–substance–purport differentiation: terminology	116

Chapter 3 · Stratified systemic models of language

Table 3-1 · Realization in stratification and in system networks.....	128
Table 3-2 · Questions for guiding the exploration of ‘stratification’ and ‘realization’	129
Table 3-3 · The intermediate system-structure model in contrast with the scale-&-category model.....	138
Table 3-4 · Three types of stratified models indicated by Halliday [1985b] and three types of systemic representations mentioned Halliday & Fawcett [1987], in relation to the four types of models distinguished in the present work for combining stratification and systemic representation	147
Table 3-5 · The basic two-level model and the extended stratification model compared	152

Chapter 4 · Metafunctional diversity and stratification: The ontogenetic basis	
Table 4-1 · Phases distinguished in Halliday’s theory of ontogenesis.....	181
Table 4-2 · Proto-language: the first four micro-functions	183
Table 4-3 · NL1: Basic binary setup per micro-function	184
Table 4-4 · Proto-language: the imaginative and heuristic micro-functions.....	186
Table 4-5 · The informative micro-function	192
Table 4-6 · Stratal perspectives and the transition from proto-language to adult language	205
Table 4-7 · Brief outline of Peirce’s semiotic classification of signs	221
Table 4-8 · Speech roles and operations in Davies’ semantic theory [definitions taken from Davies 1979: 48]	234
Table 4-9 · Dimensions of the telling operation in Davies’ interpersonal semantic theory	236
Table 4-10 · Davies’ interpersonal semantic theory and Halliday’s model of speech functions compared	242
Table 4-11 · ‘Information’ in contrast with ‘goods-&-services’ in various linguistic frameworks.....	244
Chapter 5 · Stratification and metafunctional complementarity: A clarification and a proposal for a refined model	
Table 5-1 · Functional-semantic glosses used to characterize the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions	263
Table 5-2 · The nature of an ontological semantics in the ideational component of language	303
Chapter 6 · Modelling lexicogrammar: Delicacy and metafunctional modes of expression	
Table 6-1 · Major types of interpersonal and experiential lexicogrammatical systems.....	332
Chapter 7 · Grammatical metaphor in SFL: The basis	
Table 7-1 · Two perspectives on metaphorical variation.....	398
Table 7-2 · Basic options in the SPEECH FUNCTION system and their congruent realizations (after Halliday 1984: 16)	410
Table 7-3 · Ideational metaphor types in Ravelli 1988	415
Table 7-4 · Expressions used by Halliday to characterize congruence and incongruence.....	422
Chapter 8 · Locating the grammatical heart of language in a semiotic-functional model	
Table 8-1 · Major types of grammatical metaphor as explained by Halliday & Matthiessen [1999: 246ff].....	438
Table 8-2 · An ontological-semantic characterization of ‘grammatical classes’	466
Chapter 9 · The explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs	
Table 9-1 · Langacker’s type–instantiation–grounding motif in the nominal group.....	501
Table 9-2 · Langacker’s characterization of the type–instantiation–grounding motif at the level of the clause, compared to that of the nominal group.....	510

Tables

Table 9-3 · A metafunctional reinterpretation of the type–instance motif: Basis.....515
Table 9-4 · The nature of the textual component of language compared to the other
two metafunctions524

Chapter 10 · The semiosis of grammatical metaphor

Table 10-1 · Basic formal schemata of a verbal lexeme:
Atemporal and processual patterns545
Table 10-2 · Semantics of verbal root forms: Inherent meaning547
Table 10-3 · Semantics of verbal formal schemata: Instantiational meaning550

Key to colours and typographical conventions

Colours used in figures and tables

Metafunctional diversity:

- Interpersonal** metafunction: ■ pink
- Experiential** metafunction: ■ violet
- Logical** metafunction: ■ red
- Textual** metafunction: ■ dark red

Stratification:

- Context:** ■ yellow
- Semantics:** ■ green
- Lexicogrammar:
grammatical functions: ■ turquoise
- Lexicogrammar:
grammatical 'classes': ■ blue
- Phonology:** ■ grey

Typographical conventions used in text

- ' ' Single quotation marks are used:
 - 1) for meanings;
 - 2) for expressions and terms emphasized in the text.
- “ ” Double quotation marks are used:
 - 1) to cite wordings from other authors in the text;
 - 2) to indicate titles of articles in the text.
- example* Font used to indicate examples (sentences, expressions, and lexemes) cited in the main text.
- SYSTEM Font used to indicate names of systems, for example TRANSITIVITY, MODALITY.

Key

- option Font used to indicate systemic features,
 for example interrogative, mental
- | Indicates a systemic contrast,
 for example interrogative | declarative
- > Indicates a step in delicacy,
 for example MODALITY > MODALIZATION or interactant > speaker
- : A colon is used to separate a name of a system and (the)
 options which are available or which are selected within that
 system, for example INDICATIVE TYPE: interrogative
- Subject Functional items of structure are capitalized, e.g. Subject,
 Predicator, Phenomenon
- › ◀ Indicates an instance of experiential grammatical metaphor,
 for example ›*John's writing of a letter*◀ *only took five minutes.*
- ↪ Indicates an instance of interpersonal grammatical metaphor,
 for example *I think* ↪ *I left the lights on.*

References in the text

- [] All references (bibliographical references, and cross-
 references to other parts of the text) in the text are indicated
 by square brackets.

Bibliographical references

Wherever this is relevant for historiographical reasons, the date of the original publication or presentation of material is indicated as follows:

- 1994/1985 The year following the slash indicates the first year of
 publication
- 1977 <1965> (in list of references only) The second year indicates the time
 when the material was first presented (as a paper, lecture,
 etc.)

Source of examples

CB	Cobuild Corpus
BNC	British National Corpus

Introduction



This dissertation has found its origin in an exploration of the concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’, a concept which has been introduced in systemic-functional linguistics (henceforth SFL) and which is unique to that framework, and the status of this concept in a systemic-functional model of language as a whole. The central question which initially formed the basis for this exploration was: is grammatical metaphor a useful concept?

‘Metaphor’ in general is intrinsically a ‘second-order’ phenomenon in language: a linguistic expression can only be labelled ‘metaphorical’ by virtue of there being a comparable non-metaphorical expression.¹ Likewise, the concept of *grammatical* metaphor emerged in systemic-functional theory as a second-order resource, a resource which contrasts with and builds on other, non-metaphorical resources, which in this way form a non-metaphorical “baseline”.²

In order to come to an understanding of the concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’, it is therefore necessary to explore, on a fundamental, theoretical level, the design of the linguistic model which has made the introduction of

¹ This inherent ‘second-order’ nature of metaphor has played a major role in metaphorological studies ever since Aristotle, who, according to Ricœur, “defined metaphor for the entire subsequent history of Western thought” [Ricœur 1994/1978: 14-15]. This nature is also reflected in the etymology of the word: its origin is Greek μεταφerein, from μετα, a general prefix meaning ‘changed in form, altered’ + φerein ‘to bear, carry’, hence, ‘a carrying over, a transference’ [Klein 1971; cf. also Taverniers 2001].

² The notion of “baseline” in this context is used by Halliday [1984: 14].

this concept possible (and indeed, necessary, as will be shown in this dissertation). Accordingly, this dissertation has two major interrelated aims:

- (1) On the one hand, it is a *theoretical study* of the systemic-functional model of language in general. In this study, attention is paid first and foremost to the general modelling of non-metaphorical linguistic resources in SFL, which form the ‘baseline’ which is exploited by grammatical metaphor. In relation to the study of the baseline model, it can then be investigated how and why the concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’ was introduced in SFL.
- (2) On the other hand, on the basis of this theoretical study, this dissertation proposes a refinement of the systemic-functional model of language, which will be motivated as a *semiotic-functional model*. This model is suggested as a ‘general’ model of (baseline, non-metaphorical) language, but one of its features is that ‘grammatical metaphor’ is fully incorporated in it. In this sense, the model which will be proposed is called *integrative*.

These two aspects describe the overall twofold aim of this dissertation. In the remainder of this Introduction,³ an initial characterization of ‘grammatical metaphor’ will be given [Section 1], so as to indicate its theoretical significance [Section 2]; then the twofold aim of this dissertation and its theoretical aspiration will be further specified [Section 3]; important motifs underlying the study will be introduced, and the major tenets of this dissertation will be briefly presented [Section 4]; and finally, it will be indicated how this dissertation is organized [Section 5].

³ Readers who are not familiar with SFL are advised to read Chapter 1 before reading this Introduction. In Chapter 1, the major theoretical concepts on which SFL is built are introduced.

1 The notion of ‘grammatical metaphor’: An initial characterization

1.1 Grammatical metaphor as similar to lexical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological approaches to variation

In order to get an initial picture of the ‘second-order’ nature of grammatical metaphor, it is useful to take the more familiar lexical metaphor as a starting point. Consider the variation between the following examples:

- (1) a. *Transamerica will sweep out the senior manager.*
- b. *Transamerica will dismiss the senior managers.*
- c. *You’ve got to sweep the street in front of the shelter.* [a,c: CB]

The recognition of a metaphorical expression is inherently linked to *variation* of some type: an expression is metaphorical, because it is at variance with non-metaphorical expression. In the examples at hand, the metaphorical expression in (1a) contrasts with two non-metaphorical expressions, indicated in (1b) and (1c). In Figure 0-1, the metaphorical variant is represented in between two non-metaphorical alternatives.




Figure 0-1 · Lexical metaphor

The two non-metaphorical expressions with which example (1a) is contrasted, indicate two alternative perspectives on metaphorical variation, which are visualized in Figure 0-2.




Figure 0-2 · Lexical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological perspectives

In the contrast between (1a) and (1b), the element which is kept constant is the lexeme *sweep*. What is highlighted in this opposition, is that lexical metaphor is an *alternative use* of a lexeme, a use which is at variance with the use of this lexeme in a more literal sense. In this alternative use, the lexeme serves to express a figurative, transferred meaning which it otherwise does not have. This perspective has been called an **semasiological** one,⁴ since the starting point is a particular form or expression, and the central question is: what kinds of ‘meanings’ are or can be expressed by this form? In this

⁴ On the difference between semasiological and onomasiological perspectives in the study of linguistic ‘meaning’, see, for example Coseriu [1988: 137].

perspective, then, metaphor is based on a variation between different ‘meanings’ expressed by the same ‘form’.

The alternative perspective is an **onomasiological** one. Here, the starting point is a certain ‘meaning’, such as ‘dismiss someone’, and the central question is: how is or can this ‘meaning’ be *expressed*? In this viewpoint, the metaphorical construal in (1a) is contrasted to an expression such as (1b). What is kept constant in this opposition is the overall ‘meaning’ of ‘dismiss’. The metaphorical and literal sentences in this contrast are then regarded as metaphorical and literal *variant expressions* of the ‘same meaning’.

The variation involved in grammatical metaphor can now be related to this framework of a twofold characterization of lexical metaphor. Examples of the major types of grammatical metaphor – interpersonal metaphor and experiential metaphor – are given in (2a), (3a) and (4a), together with alternative non-metaphorical construals with which they contrast. In SFL, a metaphorical construal is termed ‘incongruent’, whereas non-metaphorical language is regarded as ‘congruent’.⁵

- (2) a. *It’s quite likely that ↗ we’ll be in France this time next year.*
 b. *We’ll probably be in France this time next year.*
 c. *Another rise of prices later this month is quite likely.*
- (3) a. *Could you ↗ open the door please?*
 b. *Open the door.*
 c. *Was the door open?*
- (4) a. *↖John’s writing of a letter↖ surprised his father.*
 b. *John wrote a letter.*
 c. *The results of the experiment surprised her.*

⁵ Since I do not believe that a notion of ‘congruence’, as understood in SFL, is useful in order to characterize the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor [cf. Chapter 8], the terms ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruent’ will be put between inverted commas when referring to the general systemic-functional conception of grammatical metaphor.






Figure 0-3 · General parallels between lexical metaphor, interpersonal grammatical metaphor, and experiential grammatical metaphor

Figure 0-3 shows how the alternative constructions in the example sets pertaining to grammatical metaphor can be modelled in a way which is completely parallel to the characterization of lexical metaphor given above. Let us look at each of the major types of grammatical metaphor in turn.

Example (2a) is considered as an **interpersonal grammatical metaphor** because the modal ‘meaning’ of ‘probability’ is construed by means of an separate element (*It’s quite likely that ...*), whereas in another type of construal which is regarded to be the default, non-metaphorical one, the modal meaning is expressed in the Mood element, by modal operators and/or modal Adjuncts (in this example: *will* and *probably*). This type of metaphor is therefore regarded as a **metaphor of modality**. (3a) exemplifies a second type of interpersonal metaphor called **metaphor of mood**. The metaphorical nature of this type of construal is attributed to the fact that the ‘meaning’ of a ‘command’ (which is specified in a ‘semantic’ system⁶ of various types of SPEECH FUNCTION) is realized by means of an interrogative rather than an imperative [cf. (3b)], which is regarded as the default, non-metaphorical construal of a ‘command’. It is clear that this characterization of interpersonal metaphors of modality and mood is based on an *onomasiological* perspective: a certain type of interpersonal ‘meaning’ is taken as a starting point, and alternative construals of this ‘meaning’ are distinguished, amongst which there is a ‘default’ non-metaphorical construal, and a metaphorical construal. This perspective is visualized in Figure 0-4 below.

Interpersonal metaphor can also be looked at from a *semasiological* perspective. In this view, metaphors of modality are based on a particular use of certain expressions which enables them to construe interpersonal, modal meanings. The expressions which are taken as a starting point in a semasiological perspective can be adjectival, as in the examples (2a) and (2c) given above, but they can also be verbal [cf. (5)] or nominal [cf. (6)]:

⁶ As will be indicated further on in this Introduction, the question of what is meant by ‘semantics’ is one of the central questions which is taken up in the theoretical study in this dissertation. Before specific definitions of ‘semantics’ are offered in Chapter 5, the terms ‘semantics’ and ‘meaning’ will be put between inverted commas. Since the interpretation of what constitutes ‘lexicogrammar’, in a stratified model, depends on how one views ‘semantics’, this term will be treated likewise.

- (5) a. *I **think** ↪ they don't know.*
 b. *I've been **thinking** about you all day.*
- (6) a. *There's a slight **possibility** ↪ that it will rain tomorrow.*
 b. *The **possibility** of a new rise in prices worries him.*

Similarly, metaphors of mood are based on the use of certain types of moods (especially interrogative) to construe a speech-functional 'meaning' which is regarded not to be its 'default' 'meaning': the metaphor of mood illustrated in (3a) exploits the interrogative mood, whose default speech-functional meaning is a 'question' (a request for information rather than for goods-&-services) [cf. (3c)].




Figure 0-4 · Interpersonal grammatical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological perspectives

Experiential grammatical metaphor can also be characterized from two complementary perspectives, as shown in Figure 0-5.

Taking a *semasiological* perspective, the example in (4a) above is regarded as an instance of experiential grammatical metaphor, because the nominal group ›*John's writing of a letter*‹ designates a 'process' rather than a 'thing',

which is regarded as the default meaning expressed by a nominal group, as indicated in (4c). The *onomasiological* perspective, in this case, takes as a starting point the meaning type ‘process’, and considers the way in which this meaning can be designated in a language. In this vein then, the clause is regarded as the ‘default’, non-metaphorical construal of a ‘process’, while the nominal group, whose own default type of meaning is ‘thing’, is defined as an extra, metaphorical possibility for construing the meaning of a ‘process’.




Figure 0-5 · Experiential grammatical metaphor: Onomasiological and semasiological perspectives

In this sub-section, the general onomasiological and semasiological approaches to variation in ‘meaning’ and in ‘forms’ in language have been brought up in order to characterize grammatical metaphor, qua *metaphor*, in relation to the more familiar type of lexical metaphor. In the following sub-section, we will focus on the differences between these two types of metaphoricality. In this way, it will be specified in which sense grammatical metaphor is essentially a *grammatical* rather than a lexical phenomenon. An

appreciation of the grammatical nature of grammatical metaphor is important, since it is this feature which turns ‘grammatical metaphor’ into a concept that is of high theoretical significance, as will be argued further on [Section 2].

1.2 Grammatical metaphor versus lexical metaphor: A shift in perspective

As we have seen above, ‘lexical’ (or ‘conceptual’) metaphor involves a variation in meaning associated with a variation in the ‘use’ of a word (lexemes), which can be studied in an onomasiological or a semasiological perspective. Of these two possible perspectives, the latter prevails in the study of lexical metaphor: metaphors are recognized and analyzed in terms of alternative uses of the same lexeme. More specifically, a particular use of a word which creates a metaphorical meaning is contrasted to the literal use of the same word.⁷

‘Grammatical metaphor’, as we have seen, is explained in SFL in terms of a semantic variation associated with a variation between grammatical forms. While this variation is in principle recognized on both the ‘semantic’ and ‘lexicogrammatical’ sides, the basic starting point for theorizing and analyzing grammatical metaphor has often been a comparison between congruent and incongruent *forms*.⁸ Through this approach, a theme which has come to prevail in the study of grammatical metaphor is the notion that metaphor is based on an ‘**alternative realization**’ of a meaning which can also

⁷ The very expressions ‘metaphorical use of a word’ and ‘literal use of a word’ indicate the primacy of the onomasiological perspective in the linguistic study (and commonsense, folk-theoretical conception) of lexical metaphor.

⁸ As we will see [Chapter 7], the difference in emphasis between the traditional approach to lexical metaphor and the systemic-functional approach to grammatical metaphor which is being considered here is used by Halliday [1985a] as the starting point for introducing and explaining the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor, although Halliday does not refer to the complementarity between onomasiological and semasiological perspectives in general. This shift in emphasis, which has important consequences for the whole subsequent development of a sub-theory of grammatical metaphor within SFL, will be further clarified in relation to the overall evolution of the systemic-functional modelling of language in general [Chapter 8].

be expressed congruently: a congruent form and an incongruent form are alternative realizations of the same ‘meaning’.

Besides its quasi-parallelism with lexical metaphor [cf. Section 1.1], and due to the shift in emphasis in the approach to metaphor, ‘grammatical metaphor’, as it is conceived in SFL, differs from lexical metaphor in two important ways which are interrelated:

(1) On the one hand, grammatical metaphor is based on a difference between construction types⁹ rather than a variation between different meanings of the same lexeme. Accordingly, *grammatical* metaphor is more regular (more routinized),¹⁰ and therefore, in terms of innovative creativity, is more restricted than lexical metaphor: grammatical metaphor itself can be defined in terms of a limited number of construction types.¹¹

(2) On the other hand, precisely because of this, the ‘variation’ involved in grammatical metaphor is more broadly conceived than the variation characterizing lexical metaphor. This broader conception of grammatical metaphor is concomitant with the shift in perspective explained above – viz. the focus on alternative *expressions*. Lexical metaphor in general is conceived in terms the alternative (metaphorical) use of a lexeme, as we have seen above.

⁹ ‘Construction (type)’ is here used in a imprecise, non-technical sense referring to a type of grammatical pattern in general, for example, a modalized clause vs. a construction assembled by a projecting process and a projected clause; a full clause vs. a nominal group; and so on.

¹⁰ This is not to say that grammatical metaphor is more productive than lexical metaphor. What is meant is that, while lexical metaphor is primarily based on the rich (*unlimited*) shades of lexical meanings (denotative and connotative) of ‘words’ and hence, each new ‘metaphorical use’ of a word may be totally creative or innovative, grammatical metaphor, in contrast, is based on a *relatively more restricted* range of types of constructions, and each new instance of grammatical metaphor, as a grammatical phenomenon, is built on a particular *type* of construction which allows for a metaphorical construal of a type of ‘meaning’: for example, a construction type referred to as ‘nominalization’ (experiential metaphor) or a construction type based on a projecting mental process (interpersonal metaphor).

¹¹ Importantly, this is one of the reasons why phenomena which are conceived as grammatical metaphors in SFL are not regarded as ‘metaphorical’ in other linguistic schools or in ‘off-shoots’ of SFL which have become distinct types of frameworks (most notably, in terms of their criticism and rejection of ‘grammatical metaphor’ as a useful concept, Gregory’s Communication Linguistics [cf. especially Asp 1992] and McGregor’s Semiotic Grammar [cf. McGregor 1997]).

Grammatical metaphor, in contrast, involves *different types of variations* between constructions, which are definable in terms of a number of different parameters which are relevant in characterizing grammatical constructions in general (i.e. whether metaphorical or not). In other words, on the basis of the type of variation which is involved, different types of grammatical metaphor can be distinguished, such as the basic types ‘experiential’ and ‘interpersonal’ grammatical metaphor, and further sub-types within these groups.

Importantly, the types of parameters which define grammatical metaphor in terms of a variation between construction types have to do with fundamental theoretical notions in SFL, such as stratification, metafunctional diversity, delicacy and rank. In this dissertation, these major theoretical themes will be conceived of as **aspectualizing dimensions** characterizing SFL as a linguistic theory, because these concepts indicate dimensions along which differentiations are made, in SFL, between complementary facets of language: for example ‘semantics’ vs. ‘lexicogrammar’ (stratification), experiential vs. interpersonal ‘meaning’ (metafunctional diversity), lexical vs. grammatical meaning (delicacy), grammatical class vs. grammatical function. It is precisely because grammatical metaphor, as a second-order phenomenon of language, can only be characterized in relation to the basic aspectualizing dimensions in SFL, that it has such a high theoretical significance. This feature of grammatical metaphor is further explained in the next section.

2 The theoretical significance of ‘grammatical metaphor’

The recognition and definition of a concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’ in SFL is intrinsically linked to the aspectualizing dimensions on which SFL is based, in that grammatical metaphor is seen as *exploiting* the relationship between such complementary facets as ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’, experiential meaning and interpersonal meaning, and so forth. This section focusses on the way in which grammatical metaphor bears upon the aspectualizing dimensions of stratification, metafunctional diversity, delicacy, rank and class vs. function, by exploring general ways in which grammatical metaphor has been explained in SFL.

Let us return to some of the examples given above:

- (7) a. †*The writing of a letter by John*† (only took five minutes).
 b. *John wrote a letter (in five minutes).*
- (8) a. *I think ⇨ they don't know.*
 b. *It's quite likely that ⇨ we'll be in France this time next year.*
 c. *There is a slight possibility that ⇨ it will rain tomorrow.*
 d. *We'll probably be in France this time next year.*
 e. *It may rain tomorrow.*

As we have seen above, the *experiential metaphor* in (7a) is explained, in general terms as 'a process being construed as a thing'. The variation between a congruent construal of a process, and a metaphorical construal of 'a process as a thing' is then explained in more detail as being based on a variation between lexical meaning of a word and the meaning of a grammatical form, i.e. in terms of the dimension of **delicacy**. The grammatical facet of the congruent and incongruent construals can then be described in two ways, which are interrelated: in terms of **rank** or in terms of **class** ('grammatical class' being regarded in SFL as a more refined specification of types of constituents which are first defined in relation to a rank scale).¹² Taking as a starting point the (inherent) lexical meaning of a lexeme such as *write*, viz. an 'activity' or 'process', the variation between a congruent vs. metaphorical construal can be explained as follows.

- (1) Experiential metaphor as based on a difference in rank: congruent clause vs. metaphorical nominal group [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 351],
- (2) Experiential metaphor as based on a difference in grammatical class: verbal construal (e.g. *John **wrote**, John **has written***) vs. nominal construal (e.g. †*the **writing** of a letter by John*†, †*John's **writing***†) [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 352].¹³

¹² See Chapter 1 [Section 1.1, and especially Figure 1-2].

¹³ The term 'nominalization', which plays a crucial role in relation to ideational metaphor, and the subtypes of words formed through nominalization indicated by the traditional labels (used in studies on word-formation), such as 'deverbal nouns' (*cycling, augmentation, resemblance, development, growth*), 'deadjectival nouns' (*kindness, privacy, diversity, warmth, hardship*), illustrate the importance of grammatical class vs. lexical meaning in the explanation of ideational metaphor.

In the systemic-functional explanation of interpersonal metaphor, the notions of delicacy, rank and metafunctional diversity are drawn on. Each of the examples in (8) is regarded as a realization of the interpersonal meaning of expressing the likelihood of the occurrence of an event (MODALITY: probability). (8d) and (8e) are ‘congruent’ construals, using *grammatical* coding means to express the probability value: a modal adverb [8d: *probably*] or modal operator [8c: *might*] incorporated in the overall structure of the clause. In (8a), by contrast, the probability value is expressed through a projecting mental process, which occurs as a separate element (i.e. which is not incorporated within the structure of the proposition whose probability is assessed). The encoding of the probability value in (8b) is equally based on a separate element, i.e. a relational process.

The variation lying at the basis of interpersonal metaphor is explained in general terms as a difference between an implicit encoding of subjectivity within the clause, which is regarded as congruent, and an explicit encoding of subjectivity in a separate element outside the clause (such as projecting process, or a relational process), which is regarded as metaphorical. This variation is explained in more detail in three ways:

- (1) In general, the difference between a single clause construal and a construal with a separate ‘element’ is described in terms of the **rank** scale: congruent simple clause vs. metaphorical clause nexus.¹⁴ The ‘separate element’ itself is further explained as follows.
- (2) In terms of *grammatical vs. lexical* encodings of subjectivity (i.e. in terms of **delicacy**): as indicated above, the congruent construals are based on a relatively limited range of grammatical¹⁵ means (modal operators and modal adverbs); interpersonal metaphors, by contrast, build on a wider range of lexical means to express subjectivity, such as the lexical meanings of mental

¹⁴ Bringing in the rank scale opens up the further possibility of considering the role of grammatical class in relation to interpersonal metaphor as well. Although, to my knowledge, grammatical class has not explicitly been mentioned in studies of interpersonal metaphor, its role is self-evident: construal of ‘probability’ as a modal auxiliary or a modal adverb vs. construal of probability as a ‘lexical’ word (noun, adjective, full verb). (The distinction between lexical and grammatical words and the relevance of this distinction in relation to the interpersonal component will be dealt with in Chapter 6)

¹⁵ In a wider framework, this means, more precisely: ‘grammaticalized’ means of encoding.

processes (especially of cognition and volition, and related expression with the same value), adjectives and (deadjectival) nouns, as the further examples below illustrate. These various types of lexical encodings are construed in a proposition,¹⁶ which is combined in one way or another with the proposition which is being interpersonally assessed (in terms of modalization or modulation). The range of such possible metaphorical construals based on lexical elements which serve to express ‘subjective’ ‘meanings’ is quite wide, as illustrated in the following examples:

- (9) Subjectivity expressed in **processes of cognition** and related verbal expressions (modalization):
- a. *I have the impression that ↗ they don't know.*
 - b. *It may be assumed that ↗ they don't know.*
 - c. *However, compared to the 1989 figures it can be seen that ↗ these industries are not without their difficulties.* [BNC]
- (10) Subjectivity expressed in **processes of volition** and related verbal expressions (modulation):
- a. *I would strongly advise you ↗ to take a look at it.*
 - b. *I want you ↗ to take a look at it.*
- (11) Subjectivity expressed in **adjectival** Attribute: modalization:
- a. *It's highly unlikely that ↗ they know.*
 - b. *It's crystal-clear that ↗ they don't know how to deal with it.*
- (12) Subjectivity expressed in **adjectival** Attribute: modulation:
- a. *It's advisable ↗ to stay here.*
 - b. *It would be wise ↗ for you to stay where you are.*

¹⁶ Another type of construal in which lexical elements are used to encode subjectivity, are prepositional phrases which combine with the proposition being assessed as Interpersonal Adjuncts, such as *in my opinion*, *in all probability*. Halliday [1994/1985: 355] describes these forms as “intermediate” between the implicit (congruent) and explicit (incongruent) types of construals, arguing that the prepositional phrase (in general) “is a sort of halfway house between clausal and non-clausal status”. (This ties in with the fact that, in SFL in general, prepositions are regarded as ‘mini-processes’.)

- (13) Constructions based on a **nominal** expression of subjectivity:
modalization:
- a. *It is my belief that ↗ the nature and scale of the change needed is unprecedented.* [BNC]
 - b. *We have to take into account the possibility that ↗ they may not know how to deal with it.*
 - c. *The conclusion is that ↗ they don't know how to deal with it.*

- (14) Constructions based on **nominal** expression of subjectivity:
modulation:
- a. *It's against the rule ↗ to leave your room after 10pm.*
 - b. *You have the obligation ↗ to stay in your room after 10pm.*

(3) In terms of **metafunctional diversity**: the variation between a lexical vs. grammatical encoding of subjectivity has also been explained in terms of a difference between interpersonal vs. experiential construals. Interpersonal metaphor has been theorized in terms of “[a] borrowing [of] ideational resources to construe interpersonal meanings” [cf. Martin 1997: 28], or in terms of an “ideational construal standing for interpersonal enactment” [Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 584]. The encoding means which are regarded as ‘ideational’ and which are exploited by interpersonal metaphor are certain types of processes (especially projecting mental process), adjectives and nouns.

In conclusion, besides the dimension of *stratification*, which plays a prominent role in the conception of metaphor in general, the dimension of *delicacy* is also drawn on in the systemic-functional clarification of the nature of both ideational and interpersonal metaphor, although it is used in different ways in relation to these major types of grammatical metaphor. The rank scale and grammatical class serve as a basis for explaining the nature of ideational metaphor. With respect to clarifying the nature of interpersonal metaphor, the role of the dimension of delicacy is interrelated with that of *metafunctional diversity*: the ‘separate element’ which characterizes interpersonal metaphors is explained in terms of grammatical vs. lexical, or interpersonal vs. ideational resources.

Hence, while stratification is the basic aspectualizing dimension for defining ‘metaphor’ and ‘grammatical metaphor’ in general, the dimensions of

delicacy and metafunctional diversity are drawn on in order to characterize interpersonal and ideational grammatical metaphors as distinct types. In this respect, it is important to note that the variation in lexicogrammatical resources (or coding means) which is exploited by grammatical metaphor is explained in SFL in different ways, putting different emphases, in relation to the two major metafunctional components of language (ideational and interpersonal), as summarized in Table 0-1.

	Ideational metaphor	Interpersonal metaphor
General characterization	'process construed as thing' 'process construed as quality' 'quality construed as thing'	implicit (congruent) vs. explicit (incongruent) construal of subjectivity
Role of rank	clause vs. group	clause vs. clause nexus
Semasiological perspective	<div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #e6e6fa; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;">meaning of a lexeme (e.g. 'activity' or 'process')</div> ↓ realization, e.g.: <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; margin-top: 10px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #e6e6fa; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">clause vs. group verb vs. deverbal noun</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f0e6ff; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">modal operator vs. proposition modal adverb vs. (separate element)</div> </div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f0e6ff; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 5px;">subjective meaning</div> ↓ realization: <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; margin-top: 10px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f0e6ff; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">modal operator vs. proposition modal adverb vs. (separate element)</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; background-color: #f0e6ff; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">proposition (separate element)</div> </div>
Explanation in terms of lexicogrammatical resources	different grammatical classes different ranks	grammatical vs. lexical resources vs. resources interpersonal vs. ideational resources vs. resources

Table 0-1 · Lexicogrammatical resources exploited by grammatical metaphor

The way in which the aspectualizing dimensions and the interactions between them are drawn on in order to explain 'grammatical metaphor' as a second-order phenomenon of language – and especially the question why, in relation to the two major metafunctional components, variations between coding means are explained in different ways – calls for a clarification at a fundamental, theoretical level. Furthermore, inasmuch as grammatical metaphor is explained in terms of the relationships between complementary facets of language *as they are modelled in SFL*, the very notion of 'grammatical metaphor' itself should be recognized as a consequence of the systemic-functional model as such. It is in this sense that, in order to explore whether 'grammatical metaphor' is indeed a useful concept in SFL, one must first

investigate the nature of the systemic-functional aspectualizing dimensions, and the way in which they interact in the overall model of language.

3 Major motifs in this dissertation

In this section I specify a number of general motifs on which this dissertation is built, and which are further corroborated throughout this work. These motifs are:

- [1] A need for a fundamental, theoretical study of the systemic-functional model of language.
- [2] The necessity to take a historical perspective in such a theoretical study.
- [3] A plea for a fundamentally semiotic and a fundamentally functional approach, both on the theoretical and descriptive level.
- [4] A recognition of grammatical metaphor as a distinct phenomenon in language, with its own characteristic semiosis.

I The need for a fundamental, theoretical study

I regard a *theoretical* linguistic study to be a study of the overall *design* of a linguistic model (or theory). As has already been indicated above, the theoretical study of the systemic-functional model of language which will be undertaken in this dissertation concentrates on the following major themes in SFL: stratification, metafunctional diversity, delicacy, rank and grammatical class vs. function. These themes are called the aspectualizing dimensions around which SFL is organized. It has been argued that a study of these dimensions is necessary in order to come to an understanding of grammatical metaphor, because the possibility of or the need for a concept such as grammatical metaphor in SFL is intrinsically linked to the design of the systemic-functional model. Now the nature of the theoretical study which is offered in this dissertation can be further specified.

As will be further made clear in Chapter 1, the significance of the aspectualizing dimensions in SFL lies in their role of ‘carving up’ language so that it can be studied (theorized and described). Naturally, such analytical tools are important in any form of linguistics (and in any scientific

endeavour, for that matter), and ‘strata’, ‘metafunctions’, a ‘delicacy scale’ and a ‘rank scale’ – as they are conceived within SFL – are specific manifestations of analyticity peculiar to the systemic-functional paradigm. In a wider perspective, the aspectualizing dimensions in SFL appear against the background of a more general, fundamental-theoretical issue in linguistics: the issue of distinguishing *different levels* in linguistics, and, more importantly, *different types of ‘meaning’* in language. This issue will be referred to as the **analytical question** in linguistics. This is a huge issue, to say the least, but it has an undeniable relevance for the theoretical study undertaken in this dissertation, since ‘grammatical metaphor’, as we have seen, is generally characterized in terms of a variation in ‘form’ and a variation in ‘meaning’ (or, in a more restrictive interpretation, it is conceived of in terms of alternative realizations of the ‘same’ ‘meaning’). Hence, in order to arrive at a model of language in which grammatical metaphor can be fully integrated, we have to confront the issue of defining ‘meaning’ in precise terms.

The theoretical study in this work is carried out in three moves, which differ in their degree of generality. Across these moves, the running thread is the question of how to define ‘meaning’. This question will be primarily approached in relation to the dimensions of **stratification** and **meta-functional diversity**, which therefore function as leitmotifs across the three moves in the overall study. Hence, the dimensions of stratification and metafunctional diversity are regarded as the most fundamental dimensions in SFL which have a direct relevance to the analytical question: (1) stratification is the dimension by which a relationship between a ‘semantics’ and a ‘lexico-grammar’ (or, in a non-technical sense, a relationship between ‘meaning’ and ‘form’) is theorized in SFL; and (2) metafunctional diversity refers to the fact that, within SFL, three general types of ‘meanings’ are recognized, which are realized in three different types of structures. Metafunctional diversity will be regarded as the most unique insight in SFL, and will be assigned a major role in the model which will be proposed in this dissertation.

In the first move of the overall study [Part II], then, we will look at the dimensions of stratification and metafunctional diversity in the most general sense. In exploring how the interaction between these two dimensions can be clarified, two further theoretical concepts will be important, which play a central role in SFL: **realization** and **instantiation**.

In exploring the interaction between stratification and metafunctional diversity in this most general sense, different types of ‘stratification’ and hence different types of ‘semantics’ will be distinguished. On the basis of this, two different perspectives will be specified, viz. [1] an external perspective which looks upon language from extra-linguistic reality, and hence theorizes the relationship between language and this reality, and [2] an internal perspective, which focusses on the internal organization of language in systems of ‘form’–‘meaning’ couplings. It is in these two different perspectives that ‘meaning’ and ‘semantics’ have different senses.

In the first move in the overall study, considering only stratification in relation to metafunctional diversity, the nature of **external perspective** is further specified. In this way, the ‘edges’ of the overall semiotic-functional model which is proposed in this dissertation are defined.

The second and third moves in the overall study then take an **internal perspective** on language, and hence focus on the internal organization of language around its *lexicogrammatical* ‘heart’. In the second move [Part III], further dimensions are taken into account which pertain to lexicogrammar: **delicacy**, **system–structure**, **functional structure–class structure**, and **rank**; and these dimensions are explored in relation to the leitmotifs of stratification and metafunctional diversity. The third move [Part IV] concentrates on the most central type of ‘theorem’ in SFL which unites stratification and metafunctional diversity, viz. the hypothesis that different types of ‘meanings’ are realized in different types of structural patterns (i.e., in informal terms, the ‘particle–wave–field’ idea).

As will be further explained below when the overall organization of this dissertation is indicated [Section 4], in each of these moves, the theoretical study as such is complemented with a proposal for a refined model, both in relation to the baseline and in relation to grammatical metaphor.

II The necessity of a historical perspective

I believe that a fundamental-theoretical study of the systemic-functional model of language must take into account the historical evolution of the model. Hence, the necessity of taking a historical perspective constitutes a second major motif which guides this study as a whole. This motif is

especially important in relation to grammatical metaphor: in order to understand why, at a certain point in its overall evolution, the concept of grammatical metaphor was introduced into the systemic-functional model of language, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the theoretical-historical background of this model.

The overall evolution of SFL is sub-divided into three stages:

- [1] Stage I (1950s–1960s) refers a precursory stage in SFL (when Halliday’s model of language was not yet called systemic-functional) based on Halliday’s scale-and-category model of language. The version of the theory in that stage will generally be referred to as a system-structure theory.
- [2] Stage II (1970s–1980s) refers to what can be regarded as the ‘basic’ stage in SFL, since in that stage, the major aspectualizing dimensions were introduced and situated in relation to each other in an overall systemic-functional model.
- [3] Stage III (1990s onwards) refers to a recent stage in mainstream SFL,¹⁷ which indicates, evidently, a further development of the basic model of Stage II, especially in terms of the introduction of separate semantic networks.

III A plea for a fundamentally semiotic and a fundamentally functional approach

A third motif which guides the investigation in this dissertation is a plea for a *fundamentally semiotic* and a *fundamentally functional* approach to modelling language in general, and modelling grammatical metaphor in particular. The model which is proposed in this dissertation is therefore called a *semiotic-functional* model. ‘Semiotic’ and ‘functional’ refer to two types of approaches which are interrelated and hence have a common core, as indicated in Figure 0-6.

¹⁷ From Stage II onwards (and more prominently in Stage III), various sub-models and offshoots of SFL have emerged [cf. Fawcett’s ‘Cardiff Grammar’ as an example of the former; McGregor’s ‘Semiotic Grammar’ as an example of the latter].




Figure 0-6 · A semiotic and functional approach to language

What is common to a semiotic and a functional approach to language is the premise that the central units of language (that is, of language looked at from an internal perspective) are **form–meaning couplings**. This premise is semiotic in that a solidary relationship between a form and a meaning, or an expression and a content, constitutes a *sign* in Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory of language. This idea also lies at the basis of the functional principle of structuralism in general:¹⁸ a form–meaning coupling is a *functional unit* in language, i.e. it is a unit which has a particular function which is distinguishable from other units in the overall paradigmatic organization of language.

Each of the ‘semiotic’ and ‘functional’ types of approaches – as they are understood and drawn on in this dissertation – then have additional features which are connected to this central concept of a coupling between ‘form’ and ‘meaning’. Importantly, these further features also pertain to the most fundamental aspectualizing dimensions in SFL, viz. stratification and metafunctional diversity. An additional feature of a ‘functional’ approach which play an important role in this dissertation, is precisely Halliday’s notion of metafunctions, and more crucially, his hypothesis that different metafunctional meanings are realized by different types of structures.

An additional feature of a semiotic approach, as it will be used here in Hjelmslev’s sense, is Hjelmslev’s conception of stratification,¹⁹ which is in

¹⁸ Cf. Coseriu [1988: 172ff].

¹⁹ It should be noted that ‘stratification’ in Hjelmslev’s sense is not the same as the systemic-functional concept of stratification, although Hjelmslev’s stratification scheme will be used in this dissertation in order to elucidate the systemic-functional notion of stratification.

part based on the content–expression dimension which is fundamental in the linguistic sign.²⁰ Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory of language will play a crucial role throughout this dissertation.

IV A recognition of grammatical metaphor as a distinct phenomenon with its own type of semiosis

A fourth general motif which will be important in this dissertation has already been hinted at above: ‘grammatical metaphor’ will be recognized as a distinct linguistic phenomenon which has its own distinctive type of semiosis, a type of semiosis which can be regarded as ‘metaphorical’. This metaphorical semiosis can be explained as a second-order semiosis, i.e. it can be fully accounted for in terms of the general, non-metaphorical resources in language. As indicated above, it is in this sense that the model which will be proposed in this dissertation is regarded as an *integrative* model.

4 Organization of this dissertation

The general organization of this dissertation is visualized in Figure 0-7 below. The subdivision into parts and chapters is related to the four general motifs indicated in the previous section. Part I has a scene-setting role; Parts II to IV constitute the main body of this dissertation.

In PART I, the two theories which are centrally involved in this dissertation, and which form the basis for the semiotic-functional model which will be proposed, are introduced: SFL and Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory. In **Chapter 1**, special attention is paid to the various aspectualizing dimensions in SFL. **Chapter 2** deals with a number of dimensions which have the same ‘aspectualizing’ role in Hjelmslev’s theory.

²⁰ Another sense in which the approach taken in this dissertation is ‘semiotic’, is that, to a minor extent, also Peirce’s classification of signs into icon, index and symbol will be drawn upon.

Introduction




Figure 0-7 · The organization of this dissertation

PART II, as hinted at above, constitutes the first move in the overall theoretical study undertaken in this dissertation, dealing with the central dimensions of stratification and metafunctional diversity. In **Chapter 3**, a number of different types of stratified models which have been proposed in SFL are distinguished. In **Chapter 4**, the theme of stratification is linked to that of metafunctional diversity, and the interaction between these two dimensions is explored in the context of Halliday's study of the ontogenesis of language, which formed a major background for Halliday's conception of the metafunctions. In **Chapter 5**, the interaction between stratification and metafunctional diversity is explored from a more abstract perspective, taking into account the relationship between realization and instantiation. In this chapter, the 'edges' of a refined semiotic-functional model are sketched out, specifying an external perspective on language in general.

In PART III we take an internal perspective on language, focussing on its lexicogrammatical heart. In **Chapter 6**, the modelling of lexicogrammar in SFL is considered in terms of the system–structure dimension. Two general aspects are looked into: the organization of the lexicogrammatical networks (systemic aspect), and the nature of different metafunctional types of expression (structural aspect, in the sense of functional structure). **Chapter 7** brings in the concept of grammatical metaphor – as pertaining to lexicogrammatical variation, which is either explained in terms of alternative realizations of the same 'meaning', or which is seen as involving variation in 'meaning'. **Chapter 8** constitutes the second move in the presentation of the semiotic-functional model advanced in this dissertation, concentrating on the centre of that model. It proposes a model of the internal structure of language, on the basis of an evaluation of (1) the systemic-functional treatment of grammatical metaphor; and (2) the conception of 'grammatical classes', which, as will be shown is intertwined with its conception of grammatical metaphor. In this chapter, also the relation between lexicogrammar and a level of semiotic-functional motifs (based on the idea of particle–wave–field) is specified.

PART IV then turns to this interaction between an explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs and lexicogrammar, in order to clarify the general semiosis of the different metafunctions [**Chapter 9**], and of grammatical metaphor [**Chapter 10**].

Part I

Setting the scene

The general objective of Part I is to lay out a lattice, on which the discussion of the systemic-functional baseline model and its conception of grammatical metaphor will be based. This lattice is built up in two steps:

Chapter 1 gives a systematic overview of SFL as a linguistic theory, organizing its major theoretical tools into a number of meta-theoretical notions.

Chapter 2 focusses on Hjelmslev's theory of language, which will play a crucial role throughout this dissertation as a semiotic basis for exploring SFL and grammatical metaphor.

As indicated in the introduction to Part I, Chapter 1 serves to outline the themes which characterize SFL as a linguistic theory. This general objective has two more specific underlying aspects:

(1) General introductory role. Although this chapter is not intended as an overall, comprehensive introduction to SFL,¹ it is hoped that the theoretical base specific to SFL is presented in such a way that it is comprehensible for readers who are not familiar with the systemic-functional framework.

(2) Scene-setting role in this dissertation. This chapter has a scene-setting function in relation to this dissertation as a whole, and the theoretical themes introduced here will serve as an organizational frame for the further study. Because of its framing role, the present chapter presents the theoretical basis of SFL in a specific way, introducing a number of meta-theoretical terms which will be important in subsequent chapters: *theoretical motifs*, *aspectualizing dimensions*, and *complementary facets*.

Systemic-functional theory views language as a semiotic *resource*: a resource for creating 'meanings'. The model of language is organized around a

¹ For introductions to SFL focussing on general theoretical dimensions, see Halliday [1985b, 1992a], Halliday & Matthiessen 1999 [Ch. 1], Matthiessen & Halliday in prep. For introductions focussing on explaining the descriptive tools of SFL, see Berry [1975, 1977], Morley [1985], Halliday [1994/1985], Downing & Locke [1992], Eggins [1994], Martin et al. [1997], Thompson [1996], Butt et al. [2000/1994].

number of interacting **theoretical dimensions**, each of which aims at articulating a characteristic aspect of this general view of ‘language as a resource’, and in this way, brings out particular facets of language.

The exploration of these dimensions in this chapter is organized in terms of three **theoretical motifs** which form the basis of systemic-functional theory. We will subsequently deal with: [1.1] the *systemic motif* and the interaction between system and structure; [1.2] the *functional motif* comprising the themes of stratification and metafunctional diversity; and [1.3] the *dynamic motif*, indicating a perspective on language which is based on the concepts of instantiation and semogenesis.

1 Systemic motif

1.1 System networks and the interaction between system and structure

Within SFL, the **system network** formalizes the idea that language is a *potential* from which *choices* can be made in particular *environments*. Each *system* in a system network is a point of choice [Halliday & Matthiessen in prep.]: it consists of an *entry condition* (the environment of the choice), a system name, and a number of **systemic terms** or features (the choices available in the environment). Each system represents a dimension along which differentiations are made in order to characterize a linguistic phenomenon (an aspect of structure, as we will see below). An example is given in Figure 1-1. The differentiation between declarative and interrogative indicates a dimension of choice (in this case, a contrast), labelled MOOD TYPE (the name of the system), which is available at clause level. In SFL, each linguistic sign, each instance of ‘meaning’, is defined in terms of a (combination of) selection(s) of (a) feature(s) from a system network. It is in this sense that the system network represents language as a meaning potential: the various systemic features in a network indicate possible instantiations of ‘meaning’ which are available in a particular language. Besides being defined by the systemic feature(s) which has/have been selected, each sign is structurally characterized by means of a **realization statement**, which is also indicated in the system network. A realization

statement specifies aspects of the **structure** in which the selected systemic feature(s) is/are realized in the lexicogrammar and/or phonology. The symbol preceding the realization statement, ‘ \triangleright ’, means ‘is realized by’. In the example at hand, the feature declarative is realized as a structure in which the Subject precedes the Finite.²




Figure 1-1 · Elements of a system

The **system network** is regarded as a tool which represents both paradigmatic and syntagmatic organization axes in language: the network itself represents the paradigmatic axis, and the realization statements, which indicate how one choice from a system is realized in the structure of language, are then seen as forming a link between the paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis.

The system network, which is the major formalism within SFL, incorporates the two most fundamental types of semiotic relationships which play a crucial role throughout the systemic-functional theory of language, viz. (1) **instantiation**, which refers to the selection of options from a network, and (2) **realization**, which refers to the way in which meaningful options from a network are structurally realized. These two notions, which will be of central importance in this dissertation, will be further described below [Sections 2 and 3]. In relation to the system network, Halliday explains ‘instantiation’ and ‘stratification’ as follows:

‘Instantiation’ is the process of selecting within the sets of options (the systems) that make up the meaning potential (the system). It is the process of choosing. By this step particular paths are traced through the network of paradigmatic alternatives. [...] ‘Realization’ is the process of making manifest

² The symbol ‘^’ means: ‘precede(s)’. The notion of order at the level of structure will be further commented on below.

the options that have been selected. It is the process of expressing the choices made. [Halliday 1981a: 14]

The systemic-functional interpretation of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes in language is ultimately based on the concepts of system and structure as they were viewed in Firth's theory of language – a theory which has served as one of the inspiring frameworks for Halliday's early work in the late 1950s and early 1960s [cf. especially Halliday 1961]. However, as noted by Halliday [in Halliday et al. 1992b: 58] and Martin [1992b: 4], for Firth *structure* was the predominant organizing principle; and whereas “Firth himself didn't really believe in the ‘system’ in the general sense of language as a system” [Halliday et al. 1992b: 58], Halliday's development of the system network assigns a major role to the *system* as a formal means to represent the potential in language, and, in this way, is primarily aimed at building a theory which is based on choice [cf. also Kress 1976: 33]. The focus on paradigmatic rather than syntagmatic relationships in language is the major dimension in which systemic-functional linguistics radically differs from other functional theories in language [cf. e.g. Halliday 1992a: 62].

As to the paradigmatic, systemic dimension of the system network, the systemic relation between options in a system network is generally called **agnation**. This term has been adapted from Gleason and, as has been shown by Davidse [1998a], it has been generalized in SFL in a rather loose manner, dismissing Gleason's original precision.³ The role of agnation in the baseline model will be further explored in Part III below. As we will see, agnation plays an important role in the analysis of grammatical metaphor.

Before the role of **structure** in a system network can be explained, it is necessary to first point out three general aspects by which the structural dimension is modelled in SFL: the rank scale, grammatical classes and functional configurations.

(1) The structural units of grammar are defined in terms of part-whole relations, or constituency relations. The units are hierarchically ordered in a **rank scale**, in which each rank consists of units of the rank immediately

³ More precisely, Davidse [1998a] has shown that the notion of agnation, in its original Gleasonian sense, does not apply in the same way to the different metafunctions.

below. For English, four grammatical ranks are recognized: clause, group, word and morpheme.

As a constituent hierarchy, the rank scale is a general indication of the syntagmatic and functional-structural potential of units: it shows which units (constituents) of smaller sizes can take up functions within other units of larger sizes. For instance, a group is a unit which can function within a clause.⁴ The basic hierarchical organization of the general rank scale is complemented by two types of recursion: rankshift and linear recursion.⁵

Rankshift or **embedding** refers to the phenomenon where, for example, clauses, which are not themselves constituents of any higher rank, are downranked,

⁴ Ever since Plato and Aristotle, different linguistic (and philosophical) theories have approached the question of defining grammatical units (and more crucially, as we will see below, of defining grammatical categories or classes) from alternative vantage points, highlighting different types of criteria. While within SFL in general, it is recognized that grammatical units cannot be defined independently of grammatical functions, it should be noted that, in different stages of theory, and also, for different purposes, variant viewpoints have been taken.

In his early 'scale-&-category' model of language (which will be dealt with in further detail in Chapter 3), Halliday [1961] defined grammatical units (e.g. 'clause', 'group') and classes (e.g. 'nominal group') first and foremost in functional terms, i.e. in terms of their relationship to *functional elements of structure* (emphasizing, for example, the relationship between the functional element 'Subject' and the grammatical class 'nominal group').

In more recent (especially general or introductory) works [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: Chapters 1–2, Matthiessen 1993a: Chapter 2, Thompson 1996: Chapter 2, cf. also Halliday and Matthiessen in prep.], grammatical units and classes are often introduced first in relation to the general notion of '*constituency*' and a 'general' rank scale, while the different layers of functions are then explained in relation to these units and classes. As will be noted, this is also the approach which is taken in the present, introductory chapter, as a starting point for the further discussion in this dissertation. The shift in emphasis from Halliday's scale-&-category model to later versions of SFL will be further explained in Chapter 3.

With regard to different approaches to defining units and classes in SFL, it should also be noted that, recently, Halliday & Matthiessen [1999] have provided a characterization which is explicitly 'semantically'-oriented, indicating the "semantic types" [Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 66] which are encoded in the different units and classes in terms of different categories of *phenomena* (for example, clauses are 'figures' and groups are 'elements'). We will briefly look into Halliday & Matthiessen's semantic approach to defining units and classes in Chapter 8.

The semiotic-functional model which will be presented in this dissertation entails a proposal for an alternative approach to defining units and classes [cf. Part III, especially Chapter 8].

⁵ The resources of embedding and linear recursion, which expand the basic possibilities inherent in the concept of the rank scale, have played an important role in the characterization of grammatical metaphor in SFL.

taking a constituent position which is normally that of groups, and hence also acquiring the functional potential which is typical of groups.⁶ This can be seen, for example, in relative clauses (cf. example (1a)). Prepositional phrases which function as Postmodifiers in groups (1b) and nominal groups which follow the preposition in a prepositional phrase (1c) are likewise regarded as being downranked. In grammatical analysis, a downranked element is surrounded by square brackets ([[]] for downranked clauses, [] for downranked groups or phrases):

- (1) a. *A review paper is designed to summarize, analyze, or synthesize information [[that has already been published]].*
 b. *the picture [on the next page]*
 c. *on [the next page]*

⁶ Rankshift or embedding is generally defined in SFL in terms of constituency, i.e. in relation to the rank scale. The reference to the *functional potential* of downranked constituents which is given here is based on Halliday's earlier characterization of rank shift in the framework of his scale-&-category model [see also the previous note on the functional orientation of this model]:

In cases of (downward) rankshift, an item normally having the function of (entering into the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations associated with) rank *x* characteristically 'loses' these functions on taking over those of rank *y*: a clause operating in group structure cannot enter into direct syntagmatic relations with clauses outside the structure of that group. There are good reasons, in other words, for saying that the relevant functional environment for *who came to dinner*, in *the man who came to dinner*, is that of group structure [Halliday 1966c: 114]

McGregor's [1997: 127] definition of rankshift ties in with the functionally-oriented approach of the scale-&-category framework, and it is more precise than the general constituency-based definition offered in SFL:

Rankshifting refers to the process whereby a unit of a given rank is as it were demoted in size, and *reclassified* as a unit of lower rank, *as a result of which it takes on the grammatical and semantic properties inherent to the lower ranking unit.* [McGregor 1997: 127; emphasis MT]

McGregor's definition brings out more clearly than a purely constituency-based definition that the unit (and hence class) status of an element (i.e. whether it is a clause or a group, or whether it is a group or a word) hangs together with the way in which this element functions in another unit: it is by taking on the "grammatical and semantic properties" of a lower-rank unit, that a unit of a certain rank is able to function in another unit which is of the same level (i.e. a downranked clause within another clause, a downranked phrase within another phrase) rather than in a unit which is of the rank next above in the rank scale.

Linear recursion⁷ roughly corresponds to the traditional notions of coordination (parataxis) and subordination (hypotaxis), as exemplified in (2) and (3) respectively:

- (2) a. *She closed the door and left.*
 b. *He ate nor drank.*
- (3) a. *He started working for a company when he left school.*
 b. *He emphasized that we should be on time.*

(2) Within each rank, the units are classified in terms of **grammatical class**. The system networks for grammatical classes at the levels of clause and group are given in Figure 1-2.⁸

(3) Class labelling is one way of describing units and syntagms of units. Elements are also specified by means of *functional* labels. In functional labelling, an element is described in terms of the **grammatical function** it plays in the next higher unit. In this way, the structure of a syntagm is analyzed as a configuration of functions. In SFL this means, more particularly, that the structure is interpreted in terms of the systems of the language which are available at the particular rank which is under consideration [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 29]. Different types of functional configurations will be further described below. Examples are given in (2):

⁷ The term “linear recursion” was introduced by Huddleston [1965: 578]. Resources of ‘linear recursion’ are interpreted by Halliday as constituting a logical subcomponent of the ideational metafunction [Halliday 1968: 209]. This type of recursion is also referred to as “systemic recursion” [Matthiessen 1993a: 90].

⁸ This representation is based on Halliday [1994/1985: 214] and Matthiessen [1993a: 77]. There is no consensus about class divisions in SFL, especially with regard to the position of conjunctions. The class of adjective is seen as intermediate between verb and noun, but with more nominal than verbal features in English; therefore, it is classified as one type of nominal word. Although prepositional phrases differ from groups in their internal structure, they are regarded as parallel to groups on the basis of their functioning in the next higher unit, the clause. Matthiessen [ibid.] therefore uses the term “groupphrase” to refer to the general class comprising different types of groups, and the class prepositional phrase. The rank at which groups and prepositional phrases prevail is referred to as the group rank, i.e. prepositional phrases are interpreted as units at group rank.

- (4) a. Subject + Finite
- b. Actor + Process + Goal
- c. Theme + Rheme

The rank scale and grammatical class on the one hand, and grammatical function on the other hand, are seen as two general complementary facets of ‘structure’ as a theoretical dimension in SFL.

In a system network, structure plays three distinct but related roles:

(1) First, units of the rank scale, whether specified for grammatical class or not, play a role in the specification of the initial entry condition of a system network, which is called the *point of origin* [Halliday 1966b: 62] or the root of a system network [Matthiessen 1993a: 77]. For example, system networks can be set up with the clause, or the nominal group as point of origin.




Figure 1-2 · Ranks and grammatical classes

(2) Secondly, both grammatical class (class labelling) and functional configuration (functional labelling) are important in the representation of *realization statements*. Three general types of grammatical realization statements are distinguished [Matthiessen 1993a: 20; Matthiessen & Halliday in prep.]:

1. functional configurations, such as “+Subject”, or “Subject^Finite”;
2. confluences of different types of functions, such as “Subject/ Actor”;
3. specification of grammatical features of a constituent: combination of a function and a grammatical feature of the element fulfilling that function, for example: “Subject/nominal group”. The grammatical feature can be a grammatical class, or a finer distinction within the general class network, as in “Subject/singular”.

(3) Thirdly, the system network as a whole specifies the options which are available for various aspects of possible structures in a language. These various aspects are represented in the network by means of different systems which are simultaneous (these ‘various aspects’ and types of systems will be described in the next section). The final output of paths through the dependent and simultaneous systems in a network is a **syntagm**, whose internal organization is characterized in terms of the options which have been selected, along these paths, from the different systems in the network. In other words, the final output of the network is a type of syntagm in which the chosen options and their corresponding realization statements are brought together.⁹

One further theoretical dimension needs to be mentioned which plays a role in system networks, and the interaction between system and structure: **delicacy**. In SFL, ‘delicacy’ is a scale along which grammatical features are ranged from more general to more specific, or more delicate. Delicacy is one type of the semiotic relationship of instantiation or schematicity,¹⁰ which we will turn to in Section 3.1 below. In the systemic-functional model of language, delicacy is important in two ways:

⁹ The distinction between functional structure and syntagmatic structure (i.e. the syntagmatic pattern which is regarded in SFL as the final output of a system network, and which brings together various layers of functional structure, as will see Section 2) will play a major role in the semiotic-functional model which will be proposed in this dissertation [cf. especially Parts III and IV]. The nature of this distinction, which is rooted in Halliday’s early work in the framework of his scale-and-category model, will be further clarified in Part II. Henceforth I will reserve the term *syntagm* (or *syntagmatic structure*) to refer to pattern of grammatical classes onto which different layers of *functional structure* are mapped.

¹⁰ The term ‘instantiation’ is here used in a broader sense than that which is usually intended in the systemic-functional use of the term. As indicated, the notion of instantiation will be further described in Section 3.1 below.

(1) Systemic dimension. In a system network, the scale of delicacy can be perceived in the horizontal *progression through the network*: with each step moving towards the right, further and further sub-systems are entered and the systemic terms become more delicate.

(2) Structural dimension. In the rightward progression through a system network, also the structural realization statements become more delicate. In certain types of networks,¹¹ the delicacy scale can be perceived as a continuum ranging *from grammar to lexis*: in the initial systems in a network, the realization statements are described by means of grammatical structures (class structure and/or functional structure), as we saw above; in moving into more delicate systems in large, detailed system networks, the realization statements come to be expressed by means of groups of lexemes. This can be seen, for example, when fine distinctions are made which only apply to certain groups of verbs (or verbal lexemes). An example given by Matthiessen [1993a: 327] is: *go + mad | crazy | insane | bananas | bonkers*.

The conception of grammar and lexis as two ends of a continuum, lexico-grammar, is typical of SFL and the notion of a delicacy scale was presented in early developments of the theory [cf. Halliday 1961: 267]. In this view, lexis is interpreted as “most delicate grammar” [ibid.] and for areas of lexemes (lexical sets), “local grammars” [Matthiessen & Halliday in prep.] can be set up, which are not organized in terms of class structure or functional structure, but rather in terms of collocational patterns.

¹¹ Subsequent choices from *dependent* systems in a network, for example indicative > interrogative > polar interrogative, form what Halliday [1976c/1969: 4; 1978b/1974: 40] has called a “path” through a system network. It is in such a path that the progression towards the right is a progression in terms of increasing delicacy. In Part III [esp. Chapter 6], we will see that the nature and role of dependent systems is different in different (metafunctional) components of language, and consequently, (1) that the notion of ‘delicacy’ pertains differently to different types of networks; and (2) that a continuum between grammar and lexis needs to be conceived of in different ways in relation to the different components of language.

1.2 Topology

The system network is the major tool in SFL for representing the paradigmatic potential of language. It has played a role since Halliday's early theorizings starting in the late 1950s, and its crucial importance within the theory as a whole is reflected in the name 'systemic-functional linguistics'. In the 1990s, a different type of representation has been proposed, viz. a **topological** representation.

Topology – a notion which is derived from mathematics – has been introduced into SFL by Jay Lemke.¹² In relation to topology, the original network representation is referred to as **typological** [cf. Martin & Matthiessen 1991]. Typological and topological representations are seen as alternative, complementary approaches to formalize language (or an area of language) as a system. The difference between the system network and a topology can be explained as follows.

As we have seen above, in a system network, linguistic phenomena ('meanings', or types of structures) are characterized in a *taxonomic* way and along a scale of specificity or 'delicacy': towards one end (the left part of the network), general distinctions are made, i.e. a limited number of systemic features are characterized as constituting a primary degree of delicacy; towards the other end, classes of phenomena indicated by systemic features are subdivided into more specific – more delicate – sub-types. In this type of representation, a linguistic structure is specified in terms of the systemic feature(s) selected from one or more systems which is/are realized by this structure. In the system network, each system represents a dimension of

¹² Lemke [n.d., as quoted in Martin & Matthiessen 1991] characterizes the concept of topology as it is used in mathematics as follows:

A topology, in mathematical terms, is a set of criteria for establishing degrees of nearness or proximity among the members of some category. It turns a 'collection' or set of objects into a *space* defined by the relations of those objects. Objects which are more alike by the criteria are represented in this space as being closer together; those which are less alike are further apart.

Lemke first applied the concept of topology to linguistics as a tool to represent text types (genres). On the relevance of topology to SFL see especially Martin & Matthiessen [1991], also Halliday & Matthiessen [1999: 68ff.]. For further, more general work on topology in a trans-disciplinary perspective (focussing on dynamics), see Lemke [1998, 1999].

differentiation. When for a given type of structure, multiple types of distinctions are relevant, these are represented in the network as simultaneous systems. For example, in the area of MODALITY, a number of differentiating dimensions intersect, such as the VALUE of the modality and its ORIENTATION, as represented in Figure 1-3.




Figure 1-3 · Illustration of intersecting systems in the area of modality

Keeping options from other simultaneous systems, which are not taken into account in this simplified illustration, constant,¹³ these two intersecting systems have the following realizations:

- (5) a. VALUE: high & ORIENTATION: subjective
 ↳ *must*
- b. VALUE: median & ORIENTATION: subjective
 ↳ *will*
- c. VALUE: low & ORIENTATION: subjective
 ↳ *may*
- (6) a. VALUE: high & ORIENTATION: objective
 ↳ *certainly*
- b. VALUE: median & ORIENTATION: objective
 ↳ *probably*
- c. VALUE: low & orientation: objective
 ↳ *possibly*

¹³ Sub-systems of the modality network which are ignored here include TYPE (modalization | modulation) and MANIFESTATION (implicit | explicit). In the illustration of realizations, the options from those systems which are kept constant are: TYPE: modalization and ORIENTATION: implicit.

Both the system network and the topological representation are organizational tools for representing different dimensions along which linguistic phenomena can be classified and defined in a systematic way. However, they use different means for formalizing these dimensions, each of which has its own advantages over the other. Whereas the system network is taxonomic, and is built up as a *dendrogram*,¹⁴ a topology uses *space* as an organizational basis: in a topological representation, the dimensions along which phenomena are differentiated are seen as constituting a multidimensional space. Each phenomenon (i.c. a type of structure, a class of lexemes or a single lexeme) is then defined through its position in the topology.

The basic organizational features of a network (i.e. systems of contrastive systemic features), and of a topology (i.e. spatial indication of relatedness between phenomena) are combined in a **matrix diagram**, which is a useful tool for representing areas of language which can be analysed in terms of two major differentiating dimensions. In a matrix diagram, linguistic phenomena are organized into *cells* of a table whose columns and rows represent dimensions of differentiation. Figure 1-4 shows how the two simultaneous sub-systems of MODALITY illustrated above can be represented in a matrix diagram.




Figure 1-4 · Intersecting sub-systems of MODALITY represented in a matrix diagram

¹⁴ ‘Dendrogram’ (‘tree-diagram’ – From Greek δένδρο-, ‘tree’; cf. Indo-European base **derew(o)-*, Gothic *triu*, Old English *treo*, *treow* > English *tree* [cf. Klein 1971]) is the general name to refer to this type of classificatory tool. It is widely used as an analytical instrument in different areas of study, especially in life sciences (for example in biology, in classifications of flora and fauna). Apart from the systemic-functional ‘system networks’, dendrograms also have various roles in linguistics (for example syntactic tree diagrams to represent compositionality, taxonomic diagrams of vocabulary).

In Figure 1-4, two intersecting sub-systems from the system of MODALITY (network representation) are visualized as the horizontal and vertical dimensions (topological representation) of the matrix diagram. Using an organizational feature of a network, this representation shows two simultaneous systems occurring at the same level of delicacy; using an organization feature of a topology, this representation shows the relatedness between structures by means of space: it is indicated, for example, that *certainly* is more closely related to *must* than to *will*, because *certainly* and *must* lie along the same horizontal dimension.

The main characteristics of the system network, the topological map, and the matrix diagram which is a hybrid kind of representation combining typology and topology, are summarized in Table 1-1. Whereas each of the representational tools is intended to systematize linguistic phenomena by means of a number of differentiating dimensions, they are based on different organizational principles, and therefore each form of representation has its own advantage, and goes along with a specific stance for theorizing language.

Features	System network	Matrix diagram	Topology
Contrasting types	TYPOLOGICAL	(intermediate)	TOPOLOGICAL
Organizational basis	Taxonomic: dendrogram	Tabular: matrix	Spatial multidimensional space
Dimensions for differentiation	(Simultaneous) sub-networks	Horizontal and vertical dimensions of table	Multiple dimensions spread across space
Types of categories and their representation	Distinct categories as terms (options) in a network	Distinct categories as cells in a table	Graded categories as (shaded) areas in space
Theoretical stance	Meaning depends on choice		Meanings and hence categories are graded or overlapping
Major advantages	Representation of delicacy	Investigation of the representativeness of possibilities indicated by the different cells in a particular language or language variety	Investigation of affinities between categories

Table 1-1 · Three representational tools compared

As we have seen in the previous section, the *system network* is designed to represent (paradigmatic) options which are available in a particular

(syntagmatic) environment. It is useful at this point to spell out the specificity of this type of representation vis-à-vis the matrix diagram and the topological map. The system network has at least two advantages:

- 1) As pointed out above, the system network is an important tool in SFL because it is a means to formalize the notion of ‘choice’ and in this way highlights the characteristic view of language as a meaning potential.
- 2) The system network enables a systematic representation of different degrees of specificity:¹⁵ as indicated, steps in delicacy are visualized in the rightward progression through a network.

The *matrix diagram* is useful for an in-depth study of a particular area of language in terms of a limited¹⁶ number of differentiating dimensions. Its tabular form indicates the different types of structures, represented by distinct cells, which are theoretically possible by combining two (or more) cross-cutting systems. In this way, the matrix diagram is an ideal tool for investigating the representativeness¹⁷ of these possibilities in a language, a language variety, or a text type. This representativeness can be interpreted in terms of markedness or, in relation to a particular language as a whole, in terms of the coding capacity of this language: the matrix indicates where ‘gaps’ occur in this coding, when a theoretical possibility does not occur as formally coded in the language.¹⁸ An example of a matrix diagram showing a

¹⁵ As indicated above [cf. the introduction of the notion of ‘delicacy’ in Section 1.1], the nature of the ‘different degrees of specificity’ which are represented in a system network will be further explored in Part III [esp. Chapter 6].

¹⁶ The table representation allows two major dimensions of differentiation. However, further distinctions (such as more delicate systems, or other simultaneous systems) can be indicated *within* the cells of the table.

¹⁷ I.e. investigation of the coverage of the domain which is indicated by the table as a whole: which of the ‘logical’ possibilities (indicated in the distinct cells) do actually occur in the language (or language variety/ text type) under consideration, and what is their frequency relative to other possibilities?

¹⁸ The term ‘coding gap’ was introduced by Langacker [1991: 286], see also Davidse [1991: 3]. The notion of a ‘coding gap’ was already recognized in early 20th century structuralism, where it refers to the possibility inherent in a language system that certain combinations of meaningful oppositions in a particular language (‘distinctive features’, i.e. features which play a role in defining the content-side of existing signs in that language) do not have a realization within the coding system of that language, although the oppositions themselves exist (are functional) in the system. Meillet referred to this phenomenon as “case vide” [Coseriu 1969: 125, 127; cf. also Coseriu’s “leeres Fach”, Coseriu 1988: 211)].

‘coding gap’ in the English language (and most Indo-European languages) is presented in Figure 1-5. Whereas the categories ‘statement’, ‘question’ and ‘command’ labelling different types of SPEECH FUNCTION each have a distinct coding pattern (viz. the MOOD types indicative > declarative, indicative > interrogative, and imperative), the fourth ‘logical’ possibility¹⁹ in this matrix of types of speech functions, i.e. ‘offer’ (combining the options ‘goods-&-services’ and ‘demanding’), does not have a specific pattern.




Figure 1-5 · Matrix diagram (speech functions and types of mood) revealing a coding gap in English

The spatial organization of a *topology* offers possibilities which are absent from the system network representation (and which cannot be exploited in a matrix diagram either). The positioning of linguistic phenomena in a multi-dimensional space, showing the relatedness between them in terms of proximity along various dimensions, opens up the possibility of systematically analysing types of structures which cannot unequivocally be assigned to one specific category. In other words, it creates the possibility to include those phenomena in the map which have features of two categories which would be systemically distinct (contrastive) in a network representation.

As a simple illustration of the advantages of a topological approach, the system organizing types of processes can be taken as a basis. The ‘standard’ system network representation of PROCESS TYPE makes six primary distinctions, as shown in Figure 1-6.

¹⁹ I.e. a possibility identified by exploring all the possible combinations of the features which define the other types of speech functions (in this case: ‘giving’ or ‘demanding’, and ‘information’ or ‘goods-&-services’).




Figure 1-6 · Types of processes: primary delicacy

In analyses of types of processes [e.g. Halliday 1994/1985], it is argued that material, relational and mental processes are the major types, whereas the other three categories represent processes which lie on the borderlines in between these major types, each of them combining features of two major types (verbal in between mental and relational; behavioural in between mental and material; existential in between material and relational). Such an analysis cannot be indicated in a system network. Besides the relation between major and ‘intermediate’ types of processes, other kinds of grading and overlap occur. This is exemplified in the following varieties of clauses:

- (7) a. *I think of it as a funny story now, sort of Carry On In The Store, but if I'm honest, it **did frighten** me at the time.*
- b. *If you decide to have a horsedrawn carriage and also church bells, check that the horses **will not be frightened** by the noise.*
- c. *The anaesthetic had taken effect for the pain but Joni **was** still conscious at this point, very aware of each step, and **frightened at the implications**.*
- d. *In fact he **is frightened of everything**.* [all: CB]

- (8) a. *He dare not drive a car or fly in a plane, and he is so timid he cannot pick up our chickens because they **scare** him.*
- b. *And so a lot of people who really needed help **were scared** by that bureaucratic answer, and I think a lot of people were compelled to shut up.*
- c. *People in Tunbridge Wells **are scared of the future** and afraid to spend.* [all: CB]

- (9) a. *We don't need to **convince** him that what we ask of him is morally right.*
- b. *MPs gave her sympathetic applause but many **were not convinced** by her apology.*
- c. *She said: "I **was** always **convinced of their innocence**".* [all: CB]

In each set of examples, the processes construed in the a-sentences can clearly be defined as mental, whereas those in the c- and d-sentences are of the relational type.²⁰ The processes occurring in the b-sentences can be regarded as 'blends'²¹ of the mental and relational types: they can either be analysed as passivized mental processes, or as relational processes where the Attribute expresses an emotion. In this way, they represent an area of overlap in between mental and relational processes, which can be spatially represented in a topology, as in Figure 1-7.

²⁰ More specifically: mental processes > emotion > please-type; and relational processes > attributive. For specific criteria for distinguishing process types, see, for example, Halliday [1994/1985: 106ff], Matthiessen [1993a: 212ff].

²¹ The notion of 'blends' (more specifically, "syntactic blends") was introduced by Bolinger [1961] in an analysis of an array of adjectival constructions with complementation by *to*-infinitive clauses (for instance, *The food is ready to eat*, *John is eager to go*, *He is splendid to wait*, and other related types). Set against the background of transformational generative grammar, which was gaining ground in the United States in the early 1960s, Bolinger's article is a warning against a transformational approach which attempts to set up distinct types of constructions by assigning each type to one specific transformational origin. He demonstrates the inadequacy of such an approach by showing that the range of adjectival constructions which are possible is much larger than the range which is recognized in a transformational approach, and, more importantly, should be regarded as lying on a number of interrelated continua, rather than forming a list of distinct types. These continua are explained in terms of 'blends' across different patterns, 'gradient' types, 'crossovers' between types, 'convergences' of constructions, 'central' types versus types lying in a 'periphery' at various points from the 'centre', constructions 'verging' on a particular types, and 'bridges' between types [cf. especially Bolinger 1961: 376–380].



Figure 1-7 · Blends between relational and mental processes, illustrating topology as a representational tool

The advantages of a topology can be described at two levels:

- 1) On a practical or methodological level, using ‘space’ as a general organizational basis, a topology is a tool for systematically representing different types of relationships between phenomena by locating them in a multidimensional space. These phenomena can be whole categories (to show the relationship between categories), and/or linguistic structures (to show their interrelationships, or to delineate categories). The specific means which are exploited by a topology are shaded (or coloured) areas, and various²² dimensions laid out through a space.
- 2) On a more fundamental, theoretical level, a topology opens up the possibility of conceiving of the relationships between categories in a flexible way, taking into account ‘borderline’ cases which cannot be assigned to one specific category. In a topological approach, such cases can be theorized in two ways: (1) in terms of *graded* categories, with prototypical representative structures at the centre of a ‘categorical area’, and less prototypical types positioned in a periphery – a position which may indicate an affinity with one or more other graded category/ies which border on the first one; (2) or in terms of a partial *overlap* between independent categories.

²² Due to the limits of literally two-dimensional paper, these ‘dimensions’ are represented by differently oriented lines.

Hence, ‘topology’ is a concept with two facets: it refers to a visual type of representation exploiting space as an organizational tool, and it indicates a conceptual tool highlighting the graded nature of categories. Although the term ‘topology’ as such is rather new, the concept itself – in its visual and conceptual aspects – has a long tradition in linguistics as well as philosophy.²³ Within SFL, the visualization of linguistic phenomena as laid out in a space has often been exploited as a representational tool, before the notion of ‘topology’ was introduced, in different types of diagrams, including

²³ In its visual-spatial facet the notion of ‘topology’ has for example been used in phonology, in the representation of ‘cardinal vowels’ in a four-sided trapezium-shaped figure symbolizing the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of the mouth. Another illustration of the use of the spatial metaphor to organize linguistic phenomena is the theory of lexical and conceptual fields (cf. the original terms ‘Wortfelder’ and ‘Sinnfelder’), which was advanced by a number of linguists in Germany and Switzerland in the 1920s – most notably, Trier [1931] and Porzig [1934] (for an overview, see Lyons [1963, 1977: 250ff.], who introduced the notion of ‘semantic field’ in the English-speaking linguistics community [cf. Lehrer & Lehrer 1995: 36] and Coseriu [1973]), and which has been further explored, especially by Weisgerber, and which has later been elaborated into a general theory of ‘semantic fields’ [e.g. Kittay 1992].

With respect to the conceptual and methodological dimension of a topology, it should be noted that, apart from Bolinger’s early exploration of syntactic continua [as mentioned above], the conception of categories as graded has become especially important in a number of linguistic frameworks since the early 1970s. After the introduction of the notion of prototypes by Rosch [1971, cf. also 1978], who worked with psychological experiments, the idea of indeterminate categories and ‘fuzzy concepts’ was further explored in linguistics: Lakoff [1973] highlights the role of prototypicality in everyday speech by analysing different types of hedges (sort of, kind of), while Ross emphasizes the indeterminacy of grammatical categories, setting up a number of squishes (or continua), for example a ‘Nouniness Squish’ [Ross 1973] and a continuum indicating various degrees of clausehood (‘Clausematiness’) [Ross 1975] [see also Ross 1987, 1995, Newmeyer 1998: Chapter 4].

The notion of prototypicality plays an important role in various aspects of cognitive linguistics in general, for example: in defining linguistic categories [e.g. Langacker 1991: passim, esp. 6, 142], in relation to (lexical and conceptual) metaphor (which is seen in terms of extensions from one semantic domain to another) [cf. Rudzka-Ostyn 1988, who also gives a ‘topological’ visualization of the metaphorical extensions she analyses], and in the concept of ‘blending’ (the integration of aspects from different conceptual domains) [cf. Fauconnier & Turner 1996, 1998, Sweetser 1999].

In this dissertation, I will use the expressions ‘topology’ and ‘topological’ to refer to matters which have to do with gradedness and continua, because they are convenient labels indicating a contrast with a typological (or intrinsically systemic) approach, and also, because they emphasize the role of the *spatial metaphor* in conveying of phenomena (topology), and further, the *visualization* of graded phenomena by means of areas laid out in a space.

matrix diagrams but also more extended types of visual representations.²⁴ However, the more fundamental theoretical feature of a topological approach, viz. the fact that it enables a flexible view of categories, has only just started to be explored in SFL.

2 Functional motif: Stratification and metafunctional diversity

2.1 Stratification & realization

Systemic-functional grammar models language as a **stratified** semiotic resource: language is viewed as comprising a number of levels of symbolization, which are called *strata*. The major strata are: *context*, *semantics*, *lexicogrammar* and *phonology* (or *graphology*); in explanations about the specific contribution of each stratum, these levels are commonly referred to as the level of ‘doing’, the level of ‘meaning’, the level of ‘wording’ (or ‘saying’²⁵) and the level of ‘sounding’. Since Martin & Matthiessen [1991], they have come to be represented by four cotangent²⁶ circles, as in Figure 1-8.

²⁴ It is not stretching a point to claim that representation and especially visual diagramming has always been an important issue in SFL. An early example of a topological representation *avant la lettre* is Halliday’s [1970] diagrammatic overview of the relationship between modality and modulation.

²⁵ From the introduction of the stratified conception of language, the strata have been referred to in everyday-language terms beside the linguistic ones. As we will see further down in this section, the stratified view of language was inspired from two perspectives, and this explains the double term for the level of lexicogrammar (saying/wording): taking a view ‘from above’, a stratification was proposed in terms of a level of what speakers ‘*can do*’ (context), what they ‘*can mean*’ (‘semantics’) and what they ‘*can say*’ (lexicogrammar) [Halliday 1973c/1971: 57, 1978b/1974: 40]; taking a view ‘from below’, the strata came to be seen as ‘a level of *soundings*’ (phonology), ‘a level of *wordings*’ (lexicogrammar) and a ‘level of *meanings*’ (‘semantics’). Later, *wording* has superseded *saying* as a common term to refer to the lexicogrammatical stratum.

²⁶ Cléirigh [1998: 17] points out that the circles in this representation are cotangent rather than concentric, as is often stated [e.g. Martin 1992b: 20, Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 4]. The circles do not have a common centre, but rather, they meet at a common point which is located at the same angle on each separate circle. (*Tangent* means ‘touching; meeting at a point without intersecting’, from Latin *tangens*, present participle of *tangere*, ‘to touch’, probably cognate with Old-English *þaccian*, ‘to pat, flap’ [Klein 1971: 744].)




Figure 1-8 · Strata

The relationship between the various strata is called **realization**: aspects of the context are realized as ‘meanings’,²⁷ ‘meanings’ are realized as ‘wordings’, and wordings are realized as sounding. Realization is a relationship of *symbolization* or *coding*: a stratified model views language as a system of multiple coding [Halliday 1978b/1974: 42], with the interfaces between the various strata representing realizational cycles. Table 1-2 gives an example of such a realizational cycle.²⁸ Being a fundamental category of SFL theory, realization will play a crucial role throughout this dissertation. The notion will be further explained in relation to other dimensions of systemic-functional theory (viz. instantiation and delicacy) in Section 3 below.

²⁷ The notions of ‘meaning’ and ‘semantics’ cover different senses in SFL, as in linguistics in general. More importantly, even when specifically referring to *a stratum* within the stratified conception of language, ‘semantics’ (and ‘meaning’) has been interpreted in different ways within SFL. As was indicated in the Introduction, an elucidation of different types of ‘semantics’ and their role in an overall, semiotic-functional model of language constitutes one of the major aims of this dissertation.

²⁸ In this example, only dimensions pertaining to the interpersonal metafunction are spelt out. The theme of metafunctional diversity will be introduced in the next section below.

Stratum	General description	Description of example
Context	Social roles of interactants	Situation of parental control: social relationship between parent (in control) and child
Semantics	Linguistic (speech functional) roles of interactants System of SPEECH FUNCTION	✚ 'Asking goods-&-services' = 'command' + 'giving goods-&-services' = 'offer' > 'warning'
Lexicogrammar	System of MOOD	✚ Mood type: imperative > jussive + mood type: imperative > oblativ
Phonology	Articulation, intonation	✚ articulation and intonation in spoken utterance
Final outcome		<i>Don't do that again, or I'll smack you.</i>

Table 1-2 · Stratification: example illustrating realization cycles between strata

The general stratified conception of language creates the possibility of identifying and examining linguistic phenomena from alternative views. In this sense, the notion of stratification offers what Halliday [1996: 16]²⁹ has calls a **trinocular vision**: any system can be looked at (1) from its own level, *from around*; (2) from the higher stratum, *from above*; and (3) from the lower stratum, *from below*. Being a functional theory, SFL assigns priority to the perspective 'from above': in order to give a functional explanation of a linguistic phenomenon one must approach it 'from above', from a 'semantic' perspective.³⁰

²⁹ See also: Halliday [1977, 1992a, 1996], Halliday & Matthiessen [in prep.].

³⁰ In relation to the two strata organizing 'meaning' in the most general sense – 'semantics' and 'lexicogrammar' (i.e. the strata belonging to the content plane of language [cf. below, esp. note 32, p. 52]) – the notion of a 'trinocular vision' takes the systemic organization of 'lexicogrammar' (the systems) as the central focus point (the perspective 'from around'), while the perspective from the 'semantic' stratum is regarded as a perspective 'from above', and the viewpoint of the structural organization of systemic features is regarded as a perspective 'from below'. It is clear that the conception of these three perspectives is inherently tied to the general stratification scheme, and especially the top-down orientation by which the notion of 'stratification' is conceived of in SFL. Since the notion of 'stratification' in SFL (most particularly the relationship between a 'semantics' and a 'lexicogrammar') and the concomitant top-down conception of the relationship between 'strata' will be thoroughly reinterpreted in this dissertation, the different stratal perspectives 'from above', 'from around' and 'from below' will be indicated in inverted commas.

■ **Motivation of the stratified view of language.** With a view to the more detailed exploration of stratification and the relationship of realization further on in this dissertation, a number of general aspects about stratification must be mentioned, which pertain to the contexts in which the stratified conception of language arose in SFL.

The conception of a multi-stratified model of language was inspired by two frameworks of studies: on the one hand, studies of language development, on the other, an investigation of the use of language in social contexts.

A stratification of ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’ was proposed in the early 1970s,³¹ and was inspired by language development studies – more particularly, studies on how the early linguistic system of a very young child (called proto-grammar) gradually elaborates into an adult language. According to Halliday [1976e/1973, 1984] the proto-linguistic system can be modelled in terms of a simple coding relationship between contents and expressions:³² a particular expression realizes a particular content or use of language. As the language develops, it has to fulfill more functions in more diversified contexts (we will focus on the importance of ‘function’ in this development below), and a one-to-one relationship between content and expression no longer obtains. In modelling this expanding resource, a new interface is needed, in addition to the traditional levels of content and expression. This is the interface between ‘semantics’ (‘meanings’) and ‘lexicogrammar’ (‘wordings’) *within* the content plane³³ [cf. Figure 1-9]. The

³¹ Before the conception of a stratified content plane [cf. below], in Halliday’s ‘Scales-and-categories’ model of language [Halliday 1961], three *levels* are distinguished: the Saussurean form and substance, and context. *Form* in this model comprises lexis and grammar, *substance* is phonic or graphic, and *context* refers to ‘contextual meaning’. Context and phonology are regarded as ‘interlevels’. An *exponence* scale links the levels of form and substance; two degrees of exponence are distinguished: *manifestation* (in substance) and *realization* (in form). We will return to these aspects of Halliday’s early theorizing in Chapters 3 and 5 [cf. also next note].

³² ‘**Content** (plane)’ and ‘**expression** (plane)’ are used here in Hjelmslev’s [1963/1943: 59–60] sense. What exactly is meant by these notions within the SFL model, especially ‘content’ and the ‘internal stratification’ of this Hjelmslevian plane, will be explored in more detail in Part II. The sketch of stratification which is given at this point is intended so as to present an initial picture, serving as a preparation for the more detailed discussion below.

³³ It is interesting to note that the need for this additional interface has alternatively been viewed as a need for a ‘grammar’ or a need for a ‘semantics’ as an extra level: for example,

content plane rather than the expression plane is internally stratified, since the relationship between ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’ is ‘natural’ [cf. below], whereas phonology generally relates to ‘lexicogrammar’ in an arbitrary way.




Figure 1-9 · Stratification of the content plane into a ‘semantics’ and a ‘lexicogrammar’

The study of language development inspired a stratified conception of language ‘from around’: starting from the initial content–expression relationship in proto-grammar, in a model of adult grammar an additional interface within the content plane becomes necessary in order to account for more complex types of utterances.³⁴

The investigation of the use of language in social contexts (so-called studies of language in relation to ‘social man’ [Halliday 1973a: 48, 1978a]) in the

“It is at this point that we need a *grammar*: a level of organization intermediate between content and expression” [Halliday 1973c/1971: 67]; “There must therefore be a level of organization of meaning: a *semantic* level, or in Lamb’s terms ‘semological stratum’” [Halliday 1976f: 30][emphases MT]. The need for both a ‘lexicogrammar’ and a ‘semantics’ is explained in terms of an **internal stratification of the content plane**, as visualized in Figure 1-9, with ‘content’ plane as complementary to an ‘expression’ plane in the Hjelmslevian sense, as pointed out above. The nature of such an ‘internal stratification’ of a content plane will be examined in detail in Part II [esp. Chapter 5] in relation to Hjelmslev’s theory of language.

³⁴ Halliday’s theory of language development will be explored in detail in Chapter 4.

1970s calls for a stratification of language which is motivated ‘from above’. In this framework, language in general is regarded as one type of social behaviour. In theorizing the way in which language is able to function in social settings, a ‘semantic’ stratum is needed as a ‘bridge’ in between a stratum of (social) context and a lexicogrammatical stratum. More specifically, in keeping with the fundamental view of language in general as a resource, and the important underlying notion of ‘choice’ [cf. above], social behaviour is conceptualized as a ‘behaviour potential’: “[i]t is what the speaker *can do*” [Halliday 1973a: 51; emphasis MT]. In order to link language to the more general social behaviour in which it is embedded, the relationship must be defined between ‘what the speaker *can do*, socially’ and ‘what the speaker *can say* in language’. This relationship is not a direct one, since ‘can do’ as such is not a linguistic concept [cf. *ibid.*]: it is mediated through a step of ‘what the speaker *can mean*’. Hence, an important role is assigned to a ‘semantics’ as an intermediate level between context and lexicogrammar: the ‘semantic’ stratum indicates those aspects of social context which are linguistically meaningful, i.e. which are coded in the ‘lexicogrammatical’ system of a language. Here again, the creation of ‘meaning’ in language is viewed as involving various coding cycles, or realizational cycles: behaviour potential is realized in meaning potential, which is in turn realized in lexicogrammatical potential – or, what speakers ‘can say’ codifies what they ‘can mean’, which in turn symbolizes what they ‘can do’ in various social contexts.³⁵

³⁵ In Chapter 3, the way in which the study of language in social contexts inspired a stratified modelling of language will be further explained.




Figure 1-10 · Studies inspiring the stratified view of language: two perspectives

The two perspectives which inspired a stratified conception of language are visualized in Figure 1-10. In both perspectives – i.e. ‘from around’ (exploring how the content plane in the content-expression complex of proto-language is expanded into two strata, a ‘lexicogrammar’ and a ‘semantics’, in the adult system) and ‘from above’ (investigating the role of social context in which language is embedded) – two levels play a dominant role: ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’.³⁶ These two strata can be seen as the core of the linguistic

³⁶ These are the two strata which mark the *internal stratification of the content plane*. It should be emphasized, in this respect, that both the ‘semantic’ stratum and the ‘lexicogrammatical’ stratum are inherently meaningful (since both belong to the general content plane), although in a more restricted sense, ‘meaning’ refers to the ‘semantic’ stratum, the equivalent of ‘meaning’ at the level of ‘lexicogrammar’ being ‘wording’. Cf. Halliday [in Thibault 1987: 614]:

Firth always insisted that each level is itself meaning-creating, and he didn’t like the term “meaning” to be siphoned off to refer only to what I am calling semantics. [...] Jim Martin has pulled me up for [...] making too close a tie-up between “meaning” and this notion of a specifically “semantic” level. I admit I have done that, and I think it’s wrong; the whole system is meaning-creating. Meaning is the product of the interrelations among the parts.

It should be noted at this point that, on a general level, in relation to the internal stratification of the content plane, ‘meaning’ already has at least three interrelated senses. It refers to:

- (1) the overall ‘meaning’ of the content plane [cf. “the whole system is meaning-creating” in the above quotation: language in general is a resource for creating ‘meaning’, and language is regarded as a meaning potential],
- (2) ‘meaning’ pertaining to the ‘semantic’ stratum (related to ‘semantic’ options such as ‘command’ or ‘statement’ in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION), and

system, ‘lexicogrammar’ being the only level which is inherently internal to language, and ‘semantics’ being an intermediate level which links this internal organization of language to aspects which are external to language, especially social context.³⁷ It must be emphasized that the realization interface between these two strata cannot be exactly located, since the boundaries between them are fluid. The relationship between ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’, and the ‘fluid’³⁸ nature of this relationship, will play a crucial role in further discussions in this dissertation.

■ **Metaredundancy.** The stratified model of language, and especially, the internal stratification of ‘linguistic content’ into a ‘semantics’ and a ‘lexicogrammar’, is a theoretical hypothesis about the way in which language is capable of *functioning*, as a semiotic system, in an environment of other systems, semiotic and non-semiotic, which are, as such, non-linguistic.

(3) ‘meaning’ pertaining to the stratum of ‘lexicogrammar’ (comprising ‘lexical meaning’ and ‘constructional meaning’).

The informal distinction between these kinds of ‘meaning’ in relation to ‘stratification’ as understood in a general sense constitutes an initial, preparatory step towards the differentiation of more specific senses of ‘meaning’, which will be undertaken in this dissertation. (Stratification is only one dimension along which such differentiations are made, and, as will be argued in this study, ‘stratification’ itself has been interpreted in different ways in throughout SFL).

³⁷ Being the level which is inherently internal to language, lexicogrammar is characterized by Halliday [in Thibault 1987: 616] as “the central processing unit of language”: “[...] insofar as language plays a part in the total array of social semiotics, the central processing unit of language is grammar. We have to understand that, in order to get any kind of sensible interpretation of the whole.”

³⁸ In an interview with Parret, Halliday [1978b/1974: 43] has highlighted that in his overall conception of stratification, the boundary between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’ is regarded as fluid, although, on a theoretical level, the boundary can be defined by reserving ‘lexicogrammar’ to refer to the stratum of the internal, formal organization of language. Also, depending on the purpose of the linguistic study, strata may be defined in different ways. As indicated, the relationship between different strata (especially ‘semantics’–‘lexicogrammar’) will be a recurrent theme in the theoretical exploration undertaken in this dissertation. A separate chapter [Chapter 3] will be devoted to the dimension of stratification as such, in which different types of stratified models which have been proposed in SFL will be explored in detail.

Since the mid 1980s, the concepts of stratification and realization have been linked to notions from the theory of dynamic complex systems,³⁹ through work by Lemke [1984]. In this framework, contextualizing relations in general are described in terms of **redundancy**, where ‘redundancy’ is defined in a neutral way (i.e. without the negative connotations of the use of this word in ordinary language): “two things are ‘redundant’ when they go together in a predictable way” [Lemke 1995: 168]. Interpreting the relations between the different levels (strata) of language as contextualizing relations (in which a higher level is regarded as forming the context for a lower level), the system of language is conceived of as a hierarchy of *metaredundancy*⁴⁰ relations. In this framework, then, the realization cycles between strata are theorized as *accumulative*: the prefix *meta-* in metaredundancy indicates that options in one level do not simply co-occur with options in another, separate, level; rather, one level is metaredundant with a *combination* of two or more other levels which are in turn linked through a (meta)redundancy relation. In this sense, the stratum of phonology (or graphology) is redundant with lexicogrammar, this redundancy is in turn redundant (metaredundant) with ‘semantics’, and the metaredundancy between ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’ is again metaredundant with the stratum of context. This accumulative conception of realization cycles can be represented as in Figure 1-11.

³⁹ The theoretical framework referred to here goes under different names, including dynamics, system theory, complexity theory, chaos theory, and the more semiotically-oriented variants: information theory, cybernetics.

⁴⁰ As pointed out by Lemke [1995: 169], the notion of ‘metaredundancy’ was introduced by Bateson [1972] in his *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*.




Figure 1-11 · Metaredundancy relationships between strata: accumulative realization cycles

In the framework of dynamic complex systems, ‘redundancy’ is especially important because of its link with predictability or **probability**: two sub-levels of a system are linked by a redundancy relationship when options in one level tend to co-occur in a predictable way with options in another level (recall the definition of redundancy given above). It is precisely the relationship of metaredundancy between the levels of a system which enables it to function as a dynamic, open, complex system, i.e. a system which persists through time by constantly changing in interaction with its environment. In other words, it is the flexible relationship of metaredundancy between the levels of a system which makes it possible for that system to be ‘metastable’ in this sense: in the evolution of a system through time, the probabilities which characterize the relations between its sub-levels change.

Halliday [1987]⁴¹ links the notions of stratification and realization to the concept of metaredundancy, pointing out that “the relationship of metaredundancy is the general relationship whose manifestation in language

⁴¹ As indicated, the notion of ‘metaredundancy’ was first introduced in SFL by Lemke [1984], although it has been Halliday [in 1987] who has spelt out the connection between realization and metaredundancy. For further explanations and explorations of the concept of metaredundancy in relation to other dimensions of SFL, see Halliday [1992b]. Thibault [1997: 155, 217ff] argues that Saussure’s explanation of the relationship between signified and signifier already contains the basic ideas which have later been brought out through the concepts of stratification and metaredundancy.

we are accustomed to referring to as ‘realisation’” [Halliday 1987: 140]. As an equivalent of the process ‘realize’, which characterizes the coding relationship between the linguistic strata (‘semantics’ realized by ‘lexicogrammar’, and so on), he proposes the process ‘redound with’: phonology redounds with ‘lexicogrammar’, the relationship between phonology and ‘lexicogrammar’ metaredounds with ‘semantics’, and so forth.⁴²

⁴² The concept of metaredundancy (with its basis in the (non-linguistic) study of dynamic complex systems) provides an alternative framework for theorizing the concept of *probability* in relation to the analysis of language in general, and for further exploring two of the most crucial theoretical notions in SFL: *realization* (through the parallelism between ‘redundancy’ and the interstratal realization relationship, as highlighted by Halliday’s further, systemic-functional interpretation of metaredundancy), and *instantiation* (through the intrinsically dynamic nature of ‘metaredundancy’; as indicated, the notion of instantiation will be further looked into in Section 3 below). The systemic-functional climate which enabled the assimilation of the concept of metaredundancy in the late 1980s and also, later developments within mainstream SFL which were inspired by this new framework are highly significant to the theoretical study which will be undertaken in this dissertation, both with respect to the investigation of baseline modelling, and the theorizing of grammatical metaphor. In anticipation of the further discussion, at this point it is useful to briefly point out the relevance of metaredundancy and probability to the notions of realization and instantiation, which play a key role in SFL.

The framework of metaredundancy, focussing on the overall dynamic and open (susceptible to change) nature of the coding cycles between strata, assigns a major importance to *changing* probabilities in the relations *between* strata, i.e. in what are called interstratal realization relations in SFL. This means that the notion of ‘probability’, understood in this sense as related to ‘metaredundancy’, is based on both *realization* and *instantiation*. More importantly, the concept of ‘probability’ is based on a postulated interdependency between realization and instantiation: it is through the continual instantiation (successive actualizations) of the overall system in different (and new) environments that the probabilities of the ‘realization’ relationships between strata are said to change, and, in turn, it is by virtue of these changing probabilities that the overall system can continue to be functional in different (and new) environments.

In purely systemic terms (and especially in studies predating the introduction of the concept of ‘metaredundancy’ into SFL), however, the notion of *probability* is usually linked to the relationship of instantiation, which is *intrastratal*. As we will see in the following section, (especially) *within* the stratum of lexicogrammar, the notion of probability may be indicated in system networks by assigning probability values to the alternative options (indicating their likelihood of occurrence in the environment of a specific entry condition) within one system. In Part II, it will be argued that the notion of ‘metaredundancy’, as linked to ‘probability’, mixes up the semiotic relationships of ‘instantiation’ and ‘realization’, and that ‘metaredundancy’ can only be linked to ‘stratification’ in certain, but not all, senses of ‘semantics’. Anticipating the further discussion the following can be noted: whether or not, in strictly systemic terms, ‘probability’ also pertains to the interstratal relationship of

The notion and term ‘(meta)redundancy’ differs in at least two ways from realization:

(1) On the one hand, ‘redound with’, as a term (i.e. the verb as such, *redound with*), is a symmetrical process. Whereas ‘realization’, as a concept, refers to a symmetrical interstratal coding relationship, the name of the process indicating this relationship suggests a directionality: it is either ‘realizes’ or ‘is realized in/by’ [cf. Halliday 1992b: 24].⁴³

realization, depends on how the stratum of ‘semantics’ is conceived of, in general (in the stratified model), and in relation to the system network as a representational and methodological tool. More specifically, it depends on whether or not *separate* system networks are set up for the ‘semantic’ stratum (as for example the system of SPEECH FUNCTION); or, put differently: whether ‘semantic’ (non-formal) generalizations are either incorporated into otherwise lexicogrammatical networks or, are disentangled from lexicogrammar and represented in separate ‘semantic’ networks.

In a model with separate ‘semantic’ networks, a relationship of probability holds between any selected option in a ‘semantic’ network, and the possible realizations of this choice in a lexicogrammatical network: for example, between the ‘semantic’ option ‘command’ (‘asking’ & ‘goods-&-services’) and the lexicogrammatical options which can realize this ‘semantic’ option: imperative, indicative > interrogative, indicative > declarative, and further, more delicate options. In other words, it is only in a model which postulates separate ‘semantic’ networks that the notion of ‘probability’ can also (besides its fundamental intrastratal role) be linked to the realization relationship (i.e. between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’).

In the mid-1980s (i.e. around the same time when Lemke [1984] presented the notion of ‘metaredundancy’ and its relevance to the analysis of language), Halliday [1984] had proposed a model of language with a separate ‘semantic’ network for the interpersonal component (i.e. lexicogrammar: the ‘traditional’ networks of MOOD, MODALITY, and so forth; ‘semantics’: SPEECH FUNCTION). Such a type of model, which explicitly assigns a place to a network of non-formal ‘meanings’ (‘offer’, ‘command’, ‘statement’, ‘question’, and more delicate types of speech functions) which are then realized through various types of lexicogrammatical codings, provided a suitable background for appropriating the notion of ‘metaredundancy’ into SFL.

From the mid-1980s onwards (and more noticeably, throughout the 1990s), mainstream SFL has tended to further accentuate ‘semantics’, conceived as a stratum with its own (non-formal) networks, highlighting the relationship of probability (and markedness or ‘congruency’) between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’. As we will see in Part III [Chapter 6], this tendency has played a crucial role in the introduction and further theorizing of the concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’.

⁴³ Cf. also Halliday [in Halliday et al. 1992b: 64]: “The problem is, you can’t talk about realization without imposing this directionality: *a* realises *x*, *x* is realised by *a*, where *a* is Token and *x* is Value. I would prefer some neutral term like Jay [Lemke]’s ‘metaredundancy’, where each term can be said to ‘redound with’ the other”.

(2) On the other hand, ‘metaredundancy’ is a more dynamic concept than realization.⁴⁴ Because it is defined in terms of probabilities, metaredundancy characterizes the relationships between the strata of the language system as potential ones: it refers to coding correspondences between strata which are likely or predictable (i.e. which have a high degree of (statistical) probability), implying that the overall probabilities of these interstratal relationships can change in different environments and through time.⁴⁵

2.2 Metafunctions

The relationships between the levels of ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’, and between ‘semantics’ and context are regarded as solidary or ‘natural’, in the sense that they are *functionally motivated*. Language is seen as organized around three **metafunctions**: ideational, interpersonal and textual. The notion of ‘metafunctional diversity’ is a hypothesis about language which is relevant at two levels: (1) on a general, macro-level,⁴⁶ it is a hypothesis about the way in which language is capable of functioning in the whole of human life in general, and (2) on a more particular, intralinguistic level, it is a hypothesis about the way in which language, and most notably linguistic structure (lexicogrammatical form), is organized. In general, it is referred to in SFL as the **metafunctional hypothesis**.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ As has been indicated above, this feature of ‘metaredundancy’ is due to the fact that it mixes up realization and instantiation.

⁴⁵ The way in which SFL theorizes the dimension of time in connection to language will be dealt with in Section 3 below.

⁴⁶ ‘Macro’ is intended here as a technical term, indicating a link with the macro-theoretical level of characterizing language, which was initially defined in the Introduction. The specific sense of ‘macro’ in this respect will be further clarified in Chapter 5.

⁴⁷ Besides its general meaning referring to the overall functioning of language in different human contexts, and the functional organization of the language system in general, the term ‘metafunctional hypothesis’ also has a more restricted sense in SFL, which emphasizes the organization of lexicogrammar into types of systems which cluster together in three groups, indicating three *distinct* metafunctional components. This sense of ‘metafunctional hypothesis’ is based on Halliday’s original lexicogrammatical motivation of the metafunctions (which we will return to below):

while within each group of options there is a very high degree of interdependence, between any two groups the amount of interdependence,

Following Matthiessen [1993a], the metafunctions can be represented as three general areas spread across the content levels of language, as in Figure 1-12.




Figure 1-12 · Metafunctional diversity

The metafunctions can be summarized as follows (Table 1-3⁴⁸ gives further specifications for each metafunction):

- **Ideational** ‘meanings’ *construe* our *experience* of reality, both our experience of things and happenings occurring in the world around us, and internal experiences.
- The **interpersonal** component is concerned with the *enactment* of *roles* which are taken up by speaker and hearer in an *interaction*, social roles as well as speech roles.
- The **textual** metafunction is of a second-order nature compared to the other two metafunctions. On the one hand, it is carried by the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions; on the other hand, it has an

though by no means negligible, is very much less. This provides a syntactic basis for the concept of language functions [...] [Halliday 1968: 207–208]

⁴⁸ This table is based on descriptions in Halliday 1979, 1994/1985, 1996, Matthiessen 1992.

‘instrumental’ or ‘enabling’ relation [Halliday 1970: 325] to the other two components: it enables the integration of ideational and interpersonal ‘meanings’ by providing them a *texture*, i.e. by *presenting* them as texts.

Ideational	Interpersonal	Textual
construal of experience	enactment of roles	creation of texture
language as representation	language as interaction	language as presentation
language as reflection	language as action	language as relevance
oriented towards (external and internal) natural reality	oriented towards intersubjective reality	oriented towards semiotic reality
speaker as observer	speaker as intruder	

Table 1-3 · General descriptions of the three metafunctions

■ **Motivation of the metafunctional view of language.** The modelling of language as metafunctionally diversified has been inspired by three general frameworks of systemic-functional studies in the 1960s–1970s: grammatical studies [esp. Halliday 1967a,b, 1968 and 1970], and the two frameworks mentioned above (investigations into language development, and explorations of the use of language in various social contexts). Because the fundamental concept of ‘metafunction’ will play an important role in theoretical discussions in this dissertation, it is useful to point out how the metafunctional conception of language emerged within SFL in general in order to see the motivations which lie behind it. Halliday presented his functional conception of language (i.e. based on a general *functional* diversification in terms of *ideational*, *interpersonal* and *textual* functions) before he proposed a stratified model of language in two contexts:

(1) First, in his early work on grammar, Halliday distinguished three or four areas of syntactic choice, which he linked to *areas of ‘meaning’* and functions of language.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ In “Notes on transitivity and theme”, Halliday distinguishes three “main areas of syntactic choice” (viz. transitivity, mood and theme) [Halliday 1967b: 199] and later “four components in the grammar of English representing four functions that the language as a communication system is fulfilling” (viz. experiential, logical, discoursal and speech functional or interpersonal) [Halliday 1968: 207–209]. In “Functional diversity in language”, these types of systems are interpreted in terms of three “*functions* of language” [Halliday 1970: 324ff.], which are called ideational/experiential, interpersonal and textual [compare Halliday 1976f: 29, 1973c/1971: 66].

(2) Second, in the study of the development of child language into adult language, it is proposed that the adult system of language is organized around three general functions, called *macro-functions*, which are groupings of more diverse functions or uses of language in the child system.⁵⁰

Initially, these components of language are alternatively termed ‘functions’ or ‘macro-functions’ in these two frameworks. Later, after the introduction of the stratified model of language, the label ‘metafunction’ appears as a general term.⁵¹

As with the emergence of the stratified view of language [see the previous section], two perspectives can be recognized in the motivation for a metafunctional interpretation of language. In this case, the study of the development of language is a motivation ‘from above’: the macro-functions of adult language are groupings of the (more diversely differentiated) uses of the child’s language in various contexts. The study of grammar, on the other hand, motivates a metafunctional view of language ‘from below’: taking this perspective, the metafunctions explain different types of lexicogrammatical structures which can be grouped in different systems. In this sense, the term ‘metafunction’ links the ‘macro-functions’ of the language development perspective to the ‘areas of meaning’ of the grammatical description perspective. Each of these two perspectives [see Figure 1-13] will now be further described.

In the first presentations of a functionally motivated ‘partitioning’ of grammar, Halliday refers to the earlier proposals in the Prague School, especially Daneš’s [1964] ‘Three-level approach to syntax’ and Svoboda’s [1968] interpretation of Daneš’s theory in terms of ‘systems’ [cf. Halliday 1976f: 27]. In an article published in *Brno Studies in English*, Halliday also refers to Poldauf’s [1964] article on ‘the third syntactical plan’ in relation to the interpersonal component, and Firbas’s [1966] textual theory of ‘Functional Sentence Perspective’ in relation to the textual component [cf. Halliday 1969: 81].

⁵⁰ Initially, these three general functions in the adult system are called *macro-functions* (ideational or representational, interpersonal and textual) [Halliday 1976e/1973 (based on a 1970 paper)]. We will return to the term macro-function below.

⁵¹ Cf. Halliday [1978b/1974: 50]: “All three [ideational, interpersonal and textual functions, MT] could be called *metafunctions* – *meta-* rather than *macro-*, the point being that they are *abstract*; they represent functions of language *as incorporated into the linguistic system*.” [emphasis MAKH]. Below, more reasons for the use of the label *meta-* will be pointed out. In Chapters 3 and 4, the different stages in the metafunctionally diversified and stratified conception of language will be looked at in more detail.




Figure 1-13 · Studies inspiring the metafunctional view of language: two perspectives

In the child's proto-grammar, where a one-to-one relation obtains between contents and expressions [cf. above], simple linguistic signs serve to function in a limited range of contexts, so that a small set of *uses* of language, or *macro-functions* can be distinguished, for example instrumental, interactional, imaginative uses.⁵² As the proto-grammar expands, language is used in more and more diversified social contexts, and as a result, the linguistic signs become functionally complex: a single utterance now combines various of the earlier 'simple' uses of language. This process engenders and is in turn enabled by an internal stratification of the content plane, as we saw above. The new interface within the content plane (i.e. between a 'semantics' and a 'lexicogrammar') is crucial in the development of an adult language system, where the functioning of complex many-to-many relations between expressions and forms in varied social contexts is organized through an intermediary 'semantic' stratum.

⁵² Halliday [e.g. 1973e] distinguishes seven types of macro-functions: instrumental, regulatory, interactional, personal, heuristic, imaginative and representational. The term *macro-function* is used in connection with proto-language, to distinguish this type of function from the *metafunctions* in the adult system. Before the general term 'metafunction' was introduced as a term to link the contextual functioning of language and the functional components of 'meaning' in a stratified model, the child's uses of language were called *micro-functions*, and the general functions of language in the adult system were labelled *macro-functions*.

As indicated above, Halliday's theory of language development will be explored in further detail in Chapter 4.

In adult language, the ‘semantic’ stratum is modelled as being shaped into three distinct **metafunctional components of ‘meaning’**: ideational, interpersonal and textual [Halliday 1970: 325]. These components are called ‘meta-functional’ because they are general, abstract groupings compared to the more specific macro-functions in proto-grammar. This conception has an important consequence: in their role of modelling the functional complexity of adult language (i.e. the many-to-many mappings between content and form related to a multitude of contextual functions), the metafunctions are regarded as being *simultaneous* in each act of creating ‘meaning’: in each utterance, the three metafunctions can be recognized as three simultaneous levels of structure, with each layer contributing its own specific metafunctional type of ‘meaning’.

The second perspective which motivates a metafunctional view of language, a perspective ‘from below’, takes as its starting point the level of lexicogrammatical structure and its organization in system networks. In the grammar of the English clause, Halliday recognizes four components which are relatable to the way in which language functions:

If we represent the set of options available to the speaker in the grammar of the English clause, these options group themselves into a small number of subsets, distinct from one another in that, while within each group of options there is a very high degree of interdependence, between any two groups the amount of interdependence, though by no means negligible, is very much less. This provides a syntactic basis for the concept of language functions, and suggests how the diversity of functions recognizable at the semantic levels may be organized in the course of realization.

It seems possible to set up four components in the grammar of English representing four functions that the language as a communication system is required to carry out [...] [Halliday 1968: 207–208]

In the stratified model of language, these components of the ‘lexicogrammar’ are seen as the manifestations of “functionally defined areas of meaning” [Halliday 1976f: 29]. Grammatical structure is seen as “the means whereby the various components of meaning, deriving from the different functions of language, are integrated together” [ibid.].⁵³ Viewed ‘from below’, i.e. from

⁵³ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, i.e. especially before the tri-stratal conception of language was introduced, the grouping of lexicogrammatical systems into three

the level of lexicogrammatical structure, four metafunctions can be distinguished, with the ideational metafunction split into a logical and experiential one. This subdivision within the ideational component is motivated in terms of different types of structure, a dimension we will turn to further below.

■ **Metafunctions in system and structure.** At the level of lexicogrammar, the contributions of each type of metafunction can be specified with reference to the dimensions of system and structure as outlined in Section 1 above.

(1) In a system network, the metafunctional diversity is represented in *simultaneous systems*. Taking the clause as point of origin, examples of simultaneous systems from the interpersonal, ideational and textual metafunctions are: MOOD, TRANSITIVITY and THEME. Surveys of the various types of systems in ‘lexicogrammar’ are often represented by means of a rank/class–function matrix, i.e. the rank scale (with the units subdivided in terms of grammatical class) and the three metafunctions are regarded as the two major dimensions according to which various aspects of the lexicogrammatical potential can be synoptically represented. A preliminary version of the matrix of systems which will serve as a reference framework in this dissertation is presented in Table 1-4.⁵⁴

metafunctional components was motivated in terms of the kinds of ‘meanings’ which are realized in those systems. Towards the end of the 1970s, in concentrating on the theme of metafunctional diversity as seen from a perspective ‘from below’ (i.e. the grammatical description perspective which motivated the metafunctional hypothesis in the first place in the late 1960s, but now focussing on the nature of the level of lexicogrammar *in a stratified model*), Halliday [1979, 1981c] adds further strength to the metafunctional hypothesis by also specifying what are the *structural* characteristics of the different lexicogrammatical components, defining distinct types of structural realizations which correlate with the different metafunctional ‘meanings’. These structural ‘modes of expression’, as they were called, will be looked into in Part III [esp. Chapter 6], when we will deal with the structural dimension of the metafunctions in general.

⁵⁴ The first rank–function matrix diagram was proposed in Halliday [1970: 327] and forms the basis for various subsequent refinements. The diagram which I give in Table 1-4 is based on the system networks proposed in Martin [1992b], Matthiessen [1993a], Halliday & Matthiessen [1999]. This matrix diagram, which represents a ‘standard’ version of the allocation of systems to ranks and to metafunctions, will be further discussed in Part III [Chapter 6].

	Rank	Class	Interpersonal	Textual	Experiential	Logical
GRAMMAR	Non-structural			REFERENCE SUBSTITUTION/ ELLIPSIS CONJUNCTION		
GRAMMAR	Structural	Clause	MOOD > MOODFULNESS > INTERPERSONAL STATUS > POLARITY > MOOD TYPE > MOOD PERSON > CLAUSAL DEICTICITY > temporal deixis: PRIMARY TENSE > modal deixis: MODALITY > MODALIZATION > • MODULATION • MODAL ASSESSMENT (= COMMENT)	THEME	(MAJOR) TRANSITIVITY > PROCESS TYPE > AGENCY > TYPE OF CONSTRUAL MINOR TRANSITIVITY	
		Group				
		Verbal	<i>FINITENESS</i> (grammatical) PERSON	VOICE • MODULATION •	EVENT TYPE	SECONDARY TENSE PHASE CONATION • MODULATION •
		Nominal	INTERPERSONAL DEICTICITY > NOMINAL MOOD (= MINI-MOOD) > NOMINAL PERSON MODAL POST-DETERMINATION ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION	DEIXIS (= PHORICITY)	THING TYPE (TYPE OF PARTICIPANT)	MODIFICATION > QUALIFICATION > CLASSIFICATION > EPITHESES > QUANTIFICATION
		Adjective	SUB-MODIFICATION (= INTENSIFICATION)		QUALITY TYPE	
		Adverbial & prep.	MODAL ASSESSMENT (= COMMENT)		CIRCUMSTANCE TYPE (MINOR TRANSITIVITY)	
LEXIS	Word		connotation evaluative lexis	LEXICAL COHESION (= COLLOCATION)	denotation	
PHONOLOGY	Information unit		KEY (= TONE)	INFORMATION		

of clause
 O, M
 Pg
 Lr
 Eo
 Xu
 Ip
 Ns
 G
 and
 words

Table 1-4 · Class-function matrix of English lexicogrammatical systems

[*italics*: systems which are also represented in the same metafunction at a higher rank;
 •: systems about which there is no consensus regarding their metafunctional nature]

	But	surely	they	will	find	their way	soon
Grammatical functions	Ideational			Actor	process: material	Goal	Circ: time
	Inter-personal	Mood			Residue		
		Conjunctive Adjunct	Mood Adjunct	Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
	Textual	Theme			Rheme		
Textual Theme		Interpersonal Theme	Ideational Theme				
Grammatical classes	Conjunction	Adverbial group	Nominal group	Verbal group		Nominal group	Adverbial group

Figure 1-14 · Structural analysis: metafunctional layering and class labelling⁵⁵

(2) With regard to structure, the metafunctions are indicated in SFL as *simultaneous strands of structuring*: each metafunction contributes a strand or layer of structuring, which is represented as a specific functional configuration. Figure 1-14 illustrates how this ‘metafunctional layering’ [cf. Matthiessen 1988] is shown in a diagram: the different functional layers are mapped onto one another, and (optionally) onto a level specifying the class of the elements in the given syntagm (as we have seen in the previous section, there are two complementary types of labelling: in terms of function, and in terms of grammatical class). It is important to note that these metafunctional layers are simultaneously present as *parallel* strands of structuring: each element in the syntagm can be linked to an ideational, an interpersonal and a textual function. In this respect, SFL differs from other types of functional linguistics which propose a *hierarchical* layering of structure.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ While they are regarded as textual elements and hence do not belong to the Mood-Residue structure of the clause, Conjunctive Adjuncts are represented in the layer showing the interpersonal analysis [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 83f.]. This is done in order to show the difference between Conjunctive Adjuncts, which lie outside the interpersonal Mood-Residue structure, and other types of Adjuncts: on the one hand Mood Adjuncts and Comment Adjuncts, which belong to the Mood element, on the other hand, Circumstantial Adjuncts, which belong to the Residue. As can be seen from the example given here, the general conception of the metafunctions as *simultaneous* layers of ‘meaning’ and structure in a clause does not hold completely for each single element: Mood Adjuncts (*surely* in the example above) do not serve an ideational function, and Conjunctive Adjuncts only have a textual function (no ideational, nor interpersonal function is indicated).

⁵⁶ On different types of layering in functional schools, see Butler [1991, 1996a, 1996b]; Nuyts [2001].

■ **Metafunctional diversity and stratification: the location of the metafunctions in the stratified model.** As we have seen above, the metafunctional hypothesis is essentially a hypothesis about the way in which language can function as it does in human life. As such, it concerns the way in which language is ‘meaningful’ in general:⁵⁷ it pertains to the content plane, with its strata of ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’, and hence to the way in which language relates to the higher stratum of context, i.e. the context in which language becomes functional. In this vein, the metafunctions themselves are primarily conceived as *abstractions about the content plane* of language: on the one hand, they are abstract groupings of various more diversified functions which language fulfills as a semiotic system; on the other hand, they are equally abstract groupings of options (in systems) which are available in the lexicogrammar. It is in this sense that Halliday motivates the term *meta-function*: “the point being that they are *abstract*; they represent functions of language *as incorporated into the linguistic system*” [Halliday 1978b/1974: 50, emphasis MAKH] [cf. also note 53 above].

The two perspectives which motivate the metafunctional view of language explain the central ‘location’ of the metafunctions in a ‘semantic’ stratum in the stratified model of language, that stratum which is itself centrally located as the interlevel between context (which lies outside language) and a ‘lexicogrammar’ (which is that stratum within the content plane which is completely internal to language) [cf. Figure 1-13 above]. Due to the very nature of the ‘semantic’ stratum as an ‘intermediary’ level in the general functioning of language, the metafunctional organization of the other strata (in the stratum of (social) context and the structural stratum of lexicogrammar) can only be explained in relation to the ‘semantic’ stratum. Conversely, a definition of the metafunctions at the level of the ‘semantic’ stratum inherently points to the metafunctional diversification at the other strata below and above.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ The sense of ‘meaning’ which is intended here is the one associated with the content plane of language in general (comprising ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’).

⁵⁸ Cf. Halliday [in Thibault 1987: 608]: “Let me say clearly that I see the metafunctional organization as belonging to that interface which is what we mean by semantics. But for that very reason it also determines the form of the grammar. The relation between the grammar and the semantics is non-arbitrary. People have said to me: sometimes you say the

These two aspects of the metafunctions – i.e. their nature as abstractions about the content plane of language, and their central location in the ‘semantic’ stratum pointing to the surrounding strata above and below – explain why the metafunctions are most often described in relation to ‘meaning’, or in ‘semantic’ terms:⁵⁹ as “areas of meaning” [cf. Halliday 1967b: 199], ‘(functional) components of meaning’ or ‘functional components of the ‘semantic’ system’ [Halliday 1976f: 28, 1977: 194, 1994: 179].⁶⁰

The metafunctional organization of the three content strata can be summarized as follows.⁶¹

metafunctions are in the semantics, sometimes you say they’re in the grammar; where are they? They’re in both. The metafunctions are the theoretical concepts that enable us to understand the interface between language and what is outside language – and it is this interfacing that has shaped the form of the grammar”.

⁵⁹ I.e. both ‘meaning’ and ‘semantic’ in the ambiguous sense of either ‘pertaining to the content system in general’ or ‘pertaining to the semantic stratum more specifically’. Either or both of these two facets of ‘meaning’ may be highlighted when metafunctions are described in ‘semantic terms’.

It is important to note, in this respect, that, while Halliday originally (cf. late 1960s and throughout the 1970s) emphasized the nature of the metafunctions in relation to the content plane as a whole, and more specifically, in relation to the ‘form’–‘meaning’ correlation (‘lexicogrammar’–‘semantics’), the stratum of ‘semantics’ has tended to be highlighted in recent work (1990s onwards, i.e. Phase III in SFL) in a major strand of SFL associated with Sydney [cf. especially, the textually-oriented ‘semantic’ approach focussing on a ‘discourse semantics’ in Martin [1992b], the interpersonally-oriented ‘semantic’ approach focussing on ‘meanings’ which have to do with ‘appraisal’ [e.g. Martin 1997, White 1998], and the experientially-oriented ‘semantic’ approach focussing on the ideation base in Halliday & Matthiessen [1999]]. It is against the background of this evolution in mainstream SFL that McGregor [1997] has proposed his ‘Semiotic Grammar’, in which he re-emphasizes and further explores the semiotic ‘form’–‘meaning’ correlation of language in relation to different metafunctional components.

(The recent work on ‘semantics’ will be further commented upon in Chapter 8, especially Martin’s theory of ‘discourse semantics’, which is important in relation to grammatical metaphor. McGregor’s semiotic approach to metafunctional diversity will also be drawn on in motivating the model of grammatical metaphor which will be proposed in this dissertation [Part IV].)

⁶⁰ Compare also “the metafunctional organisation of meaning” [Martin 1992b: 7f.], “semantic parameters” [Martin 1996: 340].

⁶¹ For a study of the metafunctional organization of the phonological stratum, see Cléirigh [1998]. The stratum of phonology is not relevant for the aims of this dissertation, and its internal organization will not be described in this section. Henceforth, when referring to the

The stratum of *context* is seen as being metafunctionally diversified into the following three components [cf. Halliday 1978a passim, and especially 1977]:⁶²

- *Field* (ideational) concerns the type of social action which takes place in the text, determining the experiences which are construed, especially the ‘subject-matter’;
- *tenor* (interpersonal) refers to the social role relationships which are enacted in language, determining the types of speech function roles which are taken up by the interlocutors;⁶³
- *mode* (textual) is the type of symbolic organization (the status of the text as instrumental to field and tenor), including the medium (e.g. written vs. spoken language).

In the analysis of a specific stretch of language, the metafunctional organization of the ‘*semantic*’ stratum can be specified as follows:

- the *ideational* component pertains to the subject matter of the text at hand;
- the *interpersonal* metafunction refers to the linguistic (speech functional) roles which are taken up by the interactants, and the speech functions

metafunctional diversity of language, only the content strata of language will be assumed as being metafunctionally organized.

⁶² With regard to the stratum of *context*, the metafunctional hypothesis offered a re-interpretation or a more functional explanation of three dimensions of contextual variation which had already been recognized in earlier work: field, tenor and mode [e.g. Halliday, McIntosh & Strevens 1964, Strevens 1964, Spencer & Gregory 1964, Gregory 1967].

⁶³ Halliday [1977: 143-144] makes a distinction between first-order and second-order variables of field and tenor. First-order field refers to “the nature of the activity” taking place in a text, the social action in which the participants take part (e.g. teaching, football match); while second-order field is the subject matter (e.g. subject which is taught, aspects of the football game as a subject matter, for instance instructions given during the game). First-order tenor refers to the social roles of participants which are defined without reference to language (e.g. teacher, pupil, roles of players in a football match); second-order tenor pertains to roles which are linguistically defined, i.e. speech functional roles (e.g. the role of ‘asking a question’, ‘giving an answer’, ‘giving advice’, ‘thanking’, ‘threatening’, and so on). Halliday emphasizes that first- and second-order aspects of context are not clearcut distinctions, but rather form different ends of the same contextual continuum, with one end being furthest from language, and the other end closest to the ‘semantic’ stratum of language. As will be explained below, parallel to Martin [1992b: 571ff.], I will interpret second-order variables of context (speech functional roles and subject matter) as belonging to a (certain type of) ‘semantic’ stratum.

which are realized in the text (e.g. ‘commanding’, ‘threatening’, ‘advising’, ‘thanking’, ‘encouraging’);


- semantically, the *textual* metafunction refers to the texture which is formed by interpersonal and ideational ‘meanings’: on the one hand, the sequence of speech functions (e.g. ‘question’ and ‘answer’, ‘giving goods-&services’ and ‘thanking’); on the other hand, the texture which is created by the occurrence of ideational ‘meanings’ belonging to the same subject matter (or to interrelated subject matters).

The organization of the stratum of ‘lexicogrammar’ into distinct types of systems formed a *systemic* motivation for the metafunctional hypothesis, as we have seen above. The class–function matrix presented in Table 1-4 above gives an overview of types of lexicogrammatical systems per metafunction. These systems will be dealt with in more detail in Part III [Chapter 6].

The *structural* dimension of ‘lexicogrammar’ is also interpreted in a metafunctional way. The subdivision between logical and experiential components within the ideational metafunction is generally motivated in SFL as based on a distinction which can only be seen ‘from below’, taking the perspective from the lexicogrammatical structure. Logical structures are defined as being **univariate** or as coding **dependency** relations (i.e. they involve a head and (a) dependent(s)⁶⁴), whereas experiential structures are seen as **multivariate** or as coding **constituency** relations (i.e. they involve different items which each have their own distinct function in the syntagm as a whole). Examples are given in Figure 1-15.

⁶⁴ Systemically, the dependent is potentially recursive.

Logical ideational structure: **univariate**



Experiential ideational structure: **multivariate**




Figure 1-15 · Univariate and multivariate structures: illustration⁶⁵

As we have seen, the ideational metafunction is concerned with the representation and construal of reality. In terms of this general characterization of the ideational component, the experiential subfunction is then regarded as construing reality in a 'concrete' way, in terms of different kinds of 'phenomena' which can have various 'roles' in the representation as a whole. The logical subfunction, by contrast, is seen as representing reality in a more abstract way, in terms of abstract relations [cf. Halliday 1979]. These two aspects only refer to a subdivision within the ideational component which is presented in SFL as being structurally motivated.

⁶⁵ The first example is from Martin [1988].

Halliday [1979] assigns a particular type of structure to each of the four metafunctions, so that four metafunctional “modes of expression” are distinguished, parallel to the four general metafunctions as “modes of meaning”. The idea that each type of metafunctional ‘meaning’ is realized by a distinctive mode of expression will be referred to as the **semiotic-functional hypothesis** in this study. It forms an important complementation of Halliday’s original metafunctional hypothesis and it will be an important role in the semiotic-functional model which will to be proposed in this dissertation. Halliday’s semiotic-functional hypothesis specifies that structure can be organized in different ways, depending on the type of metafunctional ‘meaning’ it realizes:

(1) *Ideational* structure in general is **configurational**: it is a constellation of distinct elements. Experiential ‘meaning’ is typically realized in a constituency structure, in which each element makes its own contribution to the structure as a whole (part–whole relations). Logical ‘meanings’ are expressed in interdependency structures, consisting of a head and one or more dependents (part–part relations).

(2) The *interpersonal* mode of expression is characterized as **prosodic**: interpersonal ‘meaning’ is “strung throughout the clause as a continuous motif or colouring”, it is “distributed like a prosody throughout a continuous stretch of discourse” [Halliday 1979: 66].

(3) *Textual* ‘meaning’ is regarded as being realized in a **culminative-periodic** structure, in which two systems of prominence (thematic prominence and focal (information) prominence) organize the textual stretch of discourse into a number of message units or “quanta of information” succeeding one another [Halliday 1979: 68].

Halliday relates the general modes of expression (ideational, interpersonal and textual) to Pike’s view of language as **particle, field** and **wave**: the ideational mode of realization is particulate, the interpersonal field-like and the textual wave-like. Pike [1972/1959] interprets this threefold conception of language (which is based on physics: as three ways in which light can be theorized) as three complementary perspectives, each of which brings out a particular facet of the nature of language. Although Halliday’s metafunctional components are different from Pike’s definitions of language

as particle, field and wave, the link which Halliday makes with Pike's theory emphasises the complementarity of the three metafunctions at the level of lexicogrammatical structure [cf. also Halliday 1977: 197]. The different types of structure are summarized in Table 1-5.

Experiential	Logical	Interpersonal	Textual
particulate	particulate	field-like	wave-like
constituency (part-whole)	interdependency (part-part)	prosodic	culminative-periodic
segments	chain	prosody	pulse

Table 1-5 · Different types of structures as realizations of metafunctional 'meanings'

3 Dynamic motif: Instantiation and semogenesis

3.1 Instantiation: Linking system to process

Instantiation refers to the dialectic relationship between the system, as a meaning potential, and the '*actualization*' of the system in specific 'acts of meaning'. The various ways in which the instancial and the potential have been glossed in SFL are summarized in Table 1-6.

System	Instance
Language as code	Language as behaviour
Language as meaning potential	Actualization: acts of meaning
System	Process
System	Text

Table 1-6 · Instantiation: variant glosses of the dialectic between system and instance

The concept of instantiation has already been briefly touched upon above, in introducing the notion of a system network, and in relation to the concept of delicacy [Section 1.1]. In relation to the system network, as we have seen, instantiation refers to the selection of systemic features. In this sense, an instance, as an 'act of meaning', is interpreted as a specific path through a

network. It is in this sense, as indicated above, that the notion of ‘delicacy’ is linked to ‘instantiation’. In an alternative, more concrete sense, an ‘act of meaning’ also refers to the creation of ‘meaning’ in actual *texts*. In this sense, instantiation indicates the relationship between the system of language, and the usage of this system in a particular text. In order to indicate these different but related senses of ‘instantiation’, they will be referred to as **delicacy** and **actualization** respectively.

The relationship between system and instance can be understood in terms of the concept of *probability*, as already hinted at above in connection with the notion of metaredundancy. The system representation of language, built on the idea of ‘choice’, opens up the possibility of attaching ‘probability values’ to the systemic options, showing their likeliness of occurrence (i.e. their chance of being selected) in particular texts, and in this way, indicating their degree of markedness. As Halliday points out, “[f]requency in text is the instantiation of probability in the system” [Halliday 1991: 42]. The notion of probability also explains the intrinsically *dialectic* relationship between system and instance: the probability values of a system can only be statistically arrived at, by analysing a large number of instantiations of this system (i.e. particular texts); whilst the frequency of selected options in a specific text can be made sense of by relating the ‘attested’ values to the probability values of the overall system from which the options have been selected.

An important further feature of instantiation should be pointed out. Instantiation is an *intra-stratal* relationship: referring to the link between the potential and the actual, instantiation can be perceived within a stratum. Most typically, it is relevant within the stratum of lexicogrammar, where it indicates the interaction between the lexicogrammatical system and the way in which this system is actualized in particular texts. Instantiation is also relevant at the level of context: a specific (actual) speech situation is an instance of a type of context of situation, as characterized on a delicacy scale from context of culture to context of situation.

Being intra-stratal relationships, actualization and delicacy should be kept apart from realization, which is a coding relationship *between* strata, as we

have seen above.⁶⁶ With a view to further discussions in this dissertation, it is important to point out the differences between realization and instantiation in general, and also between the two types of instantiation, actualization and delicacy. The contrast between these three types of semiotic relations is summarized in Table 1-7.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Martin [1992b] connects the concepts of realization and instantiation as follows: “system is related to process through the concept of realisation – realisation formalises the instantiation of system in process” [Martin 1992b: 5]. This view can be explained in terms of the following path of reasoning: system vs. structure (realization) :: paradigmatic oppositions vs. syntagmatic oppositions :: potential relations vs. actual relations :: system vs. process (instantiation). Although I do not agree with the statement that realization can be regarded as the formalization of the instantiation relationship between system and process, I believe that the path of reasoning just mentioned is interesting and deserves further clarification: as will be explained in Part III, I believe that this course of thought contains an important grain of truth – the idea that syntagms can be theorized in relation to the concept of ‘instantiation’ – which has not received sufficient attention in SFL in general.

As we will see in Chapter 2, the idea of mapping the system–process contrast onto the differentiation between paradigm–syntagm is due to Hjelmslev.

⁶⁷ This table is in part based on Davidse’s [1992] clarification of the concepts of ‘realization’ and ‘instantiation’. Davidse explores the complementarity between these types of semiotic relations by analysing the way in which they are grammaticized in language in, on the one hand, the identifying and on the other hand, the attributive and existential (respectively) types of relational processes. The concept of realization has played an important role in the conception of grammatical metaphor as it has been theorized in SFL, as already hinted at in the discussion of metaredundancy above. As indicated in the Introduction, in the present work, the role of realization in defining grammatical metaphor will be further clarified in relation to both instantiation and delicacy. Table 1-7 serves as a basic and introductory summary of the complementarities between these three types of semiotic relationships.

It is important to point out that in other linguistic frameworks which have theorized the notions of schematicity and actualization, most notably Lyons’s theory of ‘semantics’ and Langacker’s cognitive grammar, both *type-sub-type relations* (i.e. relations referred to by the notion of ‘delicacy’ in SFL – instantiation in this restricted sense is called “elaboration” by Langacker [e.g. 1991: 61]) and *type-instance or type-token relations* (i.e. what I call actualization, referred to in general as ‘instantiation’ in SFL) are referred to as *instantiation*. In this framework, actualization is seen as a limiting case of delicacy. An example which is often cited in this context, and which goes back to studies in logic (on the intension vs. extension of a term), is one particular dog, called Fido. In a general type–sub-type–token hierarchy, the individual dog called Fido can be represented as follows: *animal* > *mammal* > *dog* > *Fido* [see Langacker 1991: 61]. In this view, actualization is regarded as the final step in an elaboration hierarchy (which corresponds to a path of delicacy through a network in SFL).

The **type–instantiation motif**, and especially insights about ‘instantiation’ (in general) which have been proposed in cognitive grammar and which have been further explored in an SFL framework by Davidse, will play a major role in the baseline model and the model of grammatical metaphor which will be presented in this dissertation [cf. Part IV]. However, I will keep to the original distinction between delicacy and instantiation (proper) as conceived

The most important difference between realization and instantiation, as Davidse [1992] has pointed out, lies in their directionality: realization is a *symmetrical* (bidirectional) relationship, while instantiation is *unidirectional*. Realization is a relationship of *abstraction* between different levels of coding; instantiation is a relationship of *schematicity* between different degrees of generality (or, viewed from the other end, specificity). Actualization, as a type of instantiation, refers to a specific type of schematicity, viz. the case where a concrete example, and not just a sub-type (as in delicacy) instantiates a general schema. Further distinctions between delicacy and actualization pertain to the fact that delicacy in general is a more abstract kind of relationship than actualization. As hinted at above, actualization is *bipolar*, relating two contrasting dimensions (the potential and the actual-instantial); while delicacy is equally based on a relationship between potential and instantial, here this relationship recurs along a continuum, so that delicacy appears as a *scalar* relationship, linking points on a scale from least to most delicate. With respect to the range of related items which are covered by the semiotic relationships – compared to the bipolarity of actualization and the scalarity of delicacy, realization is *accumulative* (as we have seen above in considering the notion of metaredundancy): it refers to the relationship between any two adjacent levels of coding (context and ‘semantics’, ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’, ‘lexicogrammar’ and phonology), but taking into account the entire stratified system, these levels are hierarchical, as is theorized in the concept of metaredundancy (it is ‘lexicogrammar’ *together with* its encoding in phonology which is the realization of ‘semantics’, and so on).

in SFL – a distinction which will prove to be extremely valuable to come to a further understanding of the type–instantiation motif.

Anticipating the further discussion, it should be spelt out at this point that in the model which will be presented in this thesis, realization is seen as grammaticized in identifying relational processes, delicacy-instantiation in attributive processes and actualization--instantiation in existential processes. It should be made clear that this view departs from Davidse’s analysis of ‘instantiation’, in that ‘instantiation’ is split up in delicacy and actualization. Davidse’s interpretation of the instantiation motif will be dealt with in Chapter 9.

	Realization	Instantiation = schematicity	
		Delicacy	Actualization
Term used in SFL	Realization	Delicacy, instantiation	Instantiation
Location of relationship in SFL model	stratification, and realization statements in system networks inter-stratal: context ⇔ semantics ⇔ lexicogrammar ⇔ phonology	system networks intra-stratal: primary features ⇒ more delicate, refined features	relation between the linguistic model and actual texts intra-stratal: potential system ⇒ acts of meaning (texts)
Meaning of relationship in SFL model	coding	categorization, classification	actualization
Directionality	symmetrical (reciprocal)	unidirectional (inconvertible)	unidirectional (inconvertible)
Range	accumulative: different cycles of coding: (meta)redundancy	bipolar relationship which recurs along a scale: different degrees of delicacy	bipolar: potential vs. actual
Related items	value ⇔ coded representation	type ⇒ sub-type	model ⇒ instance [type ⇒ token]
Glosses for relation	A ⇔ B: A redounds with B, B redounds with A A is realized by B, B realizes A A is encoded by/in B, B is decoded in/by A	A ⇒ B: B is a sub-type of A A is classified into B ₁ , B ₂ , B ₃ , ...	A ⇒ B: B instantiates A A is attested in B A is evidenced in B
Semiotic dimension	abstraction: relationship between levels of different orders of abstraction	schematicity: relationship between dimensions of different degrees of generality (or specification)	exemplification as a special case of schematicity: relationship between contrasting dimensions of actuality
Equivalent terms from everyday language and other meta-languages	meaning ⇔ form	genus ⇒ species	instance: sample, specimen theory ⇒ practice
Other linguistic terms	signifié ⇔ signifiant content ⇔ expression	superordinate term ⇒ subordinate term	langue ⇒ parole competence ⇒ performance

Table 1-7 · Realization, delicacy and instantiation compared

The second general feature of instantiation which needs to be indicated, is its relation to the dimension of *time*. The system, as we have seen above in dealing with metaredundancy, is metastable: it continues to function by

constantly changing in the interaction with the environment. The ‘interaction with the environment’ mentioned above is only brought about through the actualization of the system: it is the instantiations of the system, the actualizations in specific texts, which interact with different types of environments (contexts of situation), and in this way, have the potential to change the system. Halliday explains the evolutionary dimension of the system-process interaction by illustrating it with the relationship between climate and weather:

Consider a physical system such as that of climate. This is instantiated in the form of weather [...] Take any one component of a climate: say, temperature. The exact temperature at any one place at any one moment of time seems to be of little significance; but when at many different places the daily minimum and maximum go up by an average of one degree a decade for five decades, we say that the climate is changing. This is not because no such temperatures had ever occurred before; no doubt they had. But now the probability has changed. In fact, every single instance alters the probabilities of the system in some measure; but such perturbations are too small to be taken account of, and, mostly cancel each other out. When they build up to form a trend, however, we recognize that the system is undergoing change. [Halliday 1991: 41–42, emphasis MAKH]

Because it brings out the dimension of time, instantiation has been defined by Halliday as “variation in the observer’s time depth”: the relation between system and instance “is in fact a cline, a continuous zoom; and wherever we focus the zoom we can take a look into history” [Halliday 1992b: 20]. The evolutionary-historical aspect referred to so far (and also in the example of the climate) refers to the *system* in general as changing over time, through interactions between its actualizations with different environments. This represents only one of three possible types of history relevant to language. The variation between different types of linguistic histories is dealt with in the next section.

3.2 Semogenesis: Dynamic dimensions of language

In SFL, three types of semogenesis (the history of ‘meaning’) are recognized [cf. the summary in Table 1-8]:⁶⁸

- (1) **Phylogenesis** refers to the history of the system language as a whole: it focusses on how ‘meaning’ *evolves* through the course of different stages in a language. This is the evolutionary dimension referred to in the previous section: the evolution of a language system is brought about by constant adaptations to different (new) environments.
- (2) **Logogenesis** is the term used to refer to the history of a particular text, which highlights the way in which ‘meaning’ *unfolds* as a text is being built up. Logogenetic history is characterized as a history of individuation: throughout the course of a text, ‘meanings’ are uniquely created. Because of its focus on the unfolding of ‘meaning’ in a text, the dimension logogenesis emphasizes the textual component of language: options from the textual systems of INFORMATION, THEME and REFERENCE (or PHORICITY) can only be usefully interpreted if the unfolding of ‘meaning’ in the text at hand is taken into account.
- (3) **Ontogenesis** refers to the dimension of language *development*: the history of growth which characterizes the learning of language by one individual child.

Phylogenesis	Ontogenesis	Logogenesis
<i>evolution</i> of language	<i>development</i> of the language of an individual (a language learner)	<i>unfolding</i> of text
history of adaptation	history of growth	history of individuation

Table 1-8 · Three modes of semogenesis

Viewing language from either of these semogenetic dimensions is defined as taking a **dynamic** perspective, which contrasts with the **synoptic** perspective which focusses on the (static) relations within one (more or less generalized)

⁶⁸ On the different modes of semogenesis, see Halliday [1992b: 26f, 1998b]. For further work focussing on specific dimensions of semogenesis, see especially, on ontogenesis: Halliday [1975, 1984]; on phylogenesis: Halliday 1999; on logogenesis: Martin [1985], Matthiessen [1993b].

type of linguistic system (with ‘type’ defined as a particular point on the instantiation scale of generality).

4 Theoretical dimensions of SFL: Review and prospect

In this chapter, the theoretical foundation of SFL has been characterized in terms of a number of fundamental *theoretical dimensions*. The various theoretical tools which have been explained above are summarized in Figure 1-16. The basic theorem of SFL of viewing language as a ‘semiotic resource’ and as a ‘meaning potential’ is reflected in each of its major theoretical motifs as indicated above: (1) the *systemic motif* models language in terms of ‘choices’ which are available in a given structural environment; (2) the *functional motif* theorizes language as a stratified and metafunctionally diversified semiotic system – realizational cycles and abstract *metafunctional* components model language as a dynamic open system, a resource which is able to function in different contexts; (3) the *dynamic motif* models the relationship between the potential and the actual (system and text or process, or instance) by bringing in the concept of instantiation, and more generally, by adding the time axis to the model of language (time as represented in ontogenesis, logogenesis and phylogenesis).

The diversity of theoretical tools available in SFL leads to a number of complementarities: each of the major theoretical dimensions we have looked at indicates an aspect along which linguistic phenomena can be viewed from alternative perspectives. The trinocular vision which is made possible through the stratified model of language is just one instance of such a complementarity. Other types of alternative perspectivizations are presented in Table 1-9 below, which shows how the pattern of theoretical complementarities pervades the whole theory. Because of these complementarities, Halliday characterizes SFL as an ‘extravagant’ theory of language, a theory which creates the possibility for “having things both ways” [Halliday 1998a].




Figure 1-16 · Major theoretical dimensions of SFL: overview

Motif	Dimension	Complementary facets
Systemic motif	Systemic representation: axis	System — structure, regarded as indicating the complementarity between paradigm – syntagm in SFL
	Structure: general complementarity	Class structure — functional structure
	Delicacy	Grammar — lexis
Functional motif	Stratification	‘Semantics’ — ‘lexicogrammar’
	Trinocular vision	Views ‘from above’ — ‘from around’ — ‘from below’
	Metafunctional diversity	Ideational metafunction — interpersonal metafunction
		First-order metafunctions (ideational + interpersonal) — second-order, enabling metafunction (textual)
Functional structure: metafunctional complementarities	Particulate structure — field-like structure — wave-like structure	
Dynamic motif	Instantiation	System — process, text, instance

Table 1-9 · Major theoretical dimensions of SFL: complementarities

Having reviewed the major themes of systemic-functional theory as they have been explored in this chapter, and looking ahead of further discussions, the significance of the notion of ‘theoretical dimensions’ can now be clarified.

The basic sense of ‘**theoretical dimension**’⁶⁹ as it is intended here as a meta-theoretical term is derived from the use of the term ‘dimension’ in mathematics, more particularly, analytical geometry: in analytical geometry, a ‘dimension’ is an *axis* (such as the X-, Y- and Z-axes in analytical geometry) along which differentiations (in mathematics: in terms of measuring points) are made in order to *analyse* a phenomenon. In other words, the theoretical dimensions characterized in this chapter and summarized in Table 1-9 above specify the axes along which different facets of language are *distinguished* for the sake of theory and description. In this sense, they are *analytical tools*.

⁶⁹ It is interesting in this respect to refer to the etymological basis of *dimension*: *dimension* derives from the Latin *dimēnsionem*, accusative of *dimēnsiō* = ‘a measuring’ < *dimēnsus*, past participle of *dimēnsūrī*, from *di-* = ‘apart’, and *mēnsūrī* = ‘to measure’ [cf. Klein 1971].

The aspectualizing dimensions have a theoretical and a descriptive role. From a *theoretical* viewpoint, the dimensions of stratification, delicacy, metafunctional diversity, and so forth, are the tools for thinking about (i.e. theorizing) and further specifying the theoretical motifs of SFL, i.e. the functional, systemic and dynamic motifs. They are tools for theorizing and explaining language in terms of a (limited) number of viewing dimensions, each of which specifies a limited number of complementary facets of language: this theoretical and explanatory task can take the form of exploring and elucidating the relationships between different dimensions and facets of language. The way in which analytical tools are defined from a theoretical perspective forms the basis for the description and more detailed analysis of (areas of) language. From a *descriptive* viewpoint, therefore, aspectualizing dimensions (as they are defined on a theoretical level) provide the ground for identifying, on various scales of magnitude, ‘areas’ of language which can be singled out to form the focus of linguistic description and further analysis; and they indicate alternative perspectives which can be taken in this analysis.

In this dissertation in general, the *theoretical* perspective is pivotal. Focussing on the nature of these theoretical dimensions in relation to the phenomenon of language *as it is conceived in SFL*, it is important to emphasize the more specific nature of their analytical function as theoretical tools in this linguistic paradigm. From a theoretical perspective, two points should be spelt out characterizing the nature of the theoretical dimensions at issue in SFL:

(1) The first point pertains to the relationships *between* the various theoretical dimensions. By using theoretical dimensions such as stratification, metafunctional diversity, delicacy, instantiation, and so on, language is viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. What is important, from a theoretical perspective, in this respect, is the types of dimensions which are distinguished, and more crucially, the way in which the proportions between the different dimensions are theorized, i.e. the explanatory weight which is assigned to the dimensions (which dimensions are primary?), and the ways in which they are related to one another in a coherent model of language.

(2) The second point concerns the relationships between complementary *facets within* one type of theoretical dimension. Although the theoretical

dimensions indicate the axes along which language is ‘carved up’ in order to theorize and describe it, the function of the theoretical dimensions is not to indicate ways in which language can be partitioned into ‘sections’, conceived as building blocks together making up the whole of language. Rather, they are **aspectualizing dimensions**: as has already been hinted at above, they indicate the different aspects of language which appear by taking different types of perspectives. In order to emphasize this important feature of the theoretical dimensions, the complementarities which they indicate will be referred to as **complementary aspects** or **facets** of language. ‘Facets’ and ‘aspects’ are intended here as meta-theoretical terms. They highlight the nature of the complementarities as different *appearances* of language, which emerge when taking different perspectives (‘aspect’) along one viewing dimension (or, in the metaphorical sense which is highlighted by ‘facet’, complementarities which are the result of a particular method of carving and which then light up depending on the view one takes).⁷⁰ The sense of these terms, which are borrowed from everyday language, is metaphorically applied here to the systemic-functional conception of language, in order to accentuate the *perspectival* role of the theoretical dimensions (as opposed to a componential role of such dimensions which prevails in a number of other linguistic paradigms, as we will see below).

In relation to this second feature of the theoretical dimensions – i.e. their ‘aspectualizing’ role in distinguishing complementary facets of language – what is important, in a theoretical study, is the ways in which the interrelationships between facets within one dimension are conceived. As has already been hinted at (in the discussion of the dimensions of stratification, delicacy and instantiation), various possibilities occur: the complementarity facets can be seen as lying on a continuum (delicacy) or as being separate components (metafunctions, instantiation); they can be regarded as different aspects in their own right (instantiation, metafunctions, delicacy), or as facets

⁷⁰ ‘Facet’ and ‘aspect’, which are pervasive multi-purpose words, are here metaphorically applied to the theorizing of language, in their more specific and etymological senses. ‘Aspect’ is intended to call forth the sense of its Latin original, *aspectus*, meaning ‘glance, sight, appearance, countenance’ [cf. Klein 1971]. ‘Facet’ as it is metaphorically used here is intended to invoke its specialized sense as ‘a surface of a cut gem’.

arising from a contrast which recurs as a cycle through the dimension (cf. realization cycles in the theoretical dimension of stratification).

On the whole, a *theoretical* study has to take into account (1) the relationships and interactions between different facets of language and (2) the relationships and interactions between the aspectualizing dimensions along which these facets are specified. It is exactly with such a type of theoretical investigation that the study of grammatical metaphor, as a second-order phenomenon of language, can *interlock*: (1) on the one hand, a fundamental study of grammatical metaphor must be embedded within such a type of theoretical investigation; (2) on the other hand, it is a theoretical study highlighting the role of aspectualizing dimensions and complementary facets which can benefit from a study of grammatical metaphor. In other words, the framework of aspectualizing dimensions, as theoretical tools which characterize SFL, forms the basis for approaching the general twofold aim of this dissertation: an investigation of the systemic-functional model of language in interaction with a study of the modelling of grammatical metaphor.

The reason for this has been anticipated in the preface: it is the complementary facets of language, as theoretical constructs, which play a key role in understanding the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor and its relation to the baseline; and conversely, a study of how grammatical metaphor builds upon the relationships between complementary facets of baseline language provides further insights about these complementarities in the baseline model in general.

Importantly, it is the very existence of such complementarities in systemic-functional theory, and the conception of the theoretical dimensions along which these complementary facets are specified – especially *stratification*, *metafunctional diversity* and *delicacy* – which has made the introduction of a concept such as ‘grammatical metaphor’ possible, and indeed, necessary. Grammatical metaphor, as it is conceived of in SFL as a second-order phenomenon of language can be regarded as exploiting the interplay between these complementarities. As will be explained in Parts III and IV, it is on a pre-theoretical level that grammatical metaphor can be understood as being based on a de-coupling and re-coupling of the complementary facets by

which language has come to be theorized in SFL, and it is this pre-theoretical conception of the relationships between complementary facets of language which formed the intellectual context in which a notion such as ‘grammatical metaphor’ could be introduced into the theory of SFL. In sum, it is the complementary facets of language, as theoretical constructs, which play a key role in understanding the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor and its relation to the baseline; and conversely, a study of how grammatical metaphor, as a second-order phenomenon, builds upon the relationships between complementary facets of baseline language provides further insights regarding the nature of these complementary facets of language and their interrelations – i.e. insights which feed back into the baseline modelling of language in general.

Chapter 2

A semiotic basis: Hjelmslev's theory of language

This chapter deals with Hjelmslev's semiotic theory of language, which will serve as a theoretical basis for the study undertaken in this dissertation as a whole. After considering the importance of Hjelmslev's framework to the systemic-functional model of language [Section 1], we will subsequently look at three major aspectualizing dimensions on which Hjelmslev's theory is built [Sections 2–3]. The chapter ends with a short conclusion indicating the relevance of Hjelmslev's work to the subject of this dissertation [Section 4].

1 Introduction

A framework which has played a foundational role in Halliday's theorizing is Hjelmslev's semiotic theory of language. As has been emphasized by Halliday and others,¹ at different points in the development of SFL, Hjelmslev's framework has formed a basis for the systemic-functional theorizing of a number of themes. Especially *stratification* (and the related concept of realization) and *instantiation* (the system–text interaction) are mentioned in this respect. The relevance of Hjelmslev's framework in relation to these two concepts in SFL is summarized in Table 2-1.

¹ See, for instance, in relation to stratification: Halliday [1973d/1972: 72, 1976f: 30; Halliday in Thibault 1987: 604], Martin [1992b: 493], Halliday & Matthiessen [1999: 4]; in relation to instantiation: Halliday [in Thibault 1987: 603].

Stage in SFL	Dimensions of SFL framework which is explored	Dimensions of Hjelmslev's theory which inspired this exploration
Instantiation:		
(general)	Relation between <i>system</i> and <i>instance</i> (process)	Relation between <i>system</i> and <i>process</i>
Stratification:		
Stage I 1950s-60s	Scale-&-category model: distinction between <i>levels</i> of language	Preliminary adaptation of Hjelmslev's terms <i>form</i> and <i>substance</i>
Stage II 1970s-80s	Stratified model of language, theorized in terms of an <i>internal stratification of the content plane</i>	Relation between <i>form</i> , <i>substance</i> and <i>purport</i> within the content plane
	Stratified model of language, theorized in terms of <i>metaredundancy cycles</i>	<i>Connotative semiotic</i> (based on the relation between <i>content</i> and <i>expression</i>)
Stage III 1990s	J.R. Martin: exploration of <i>discourse semantics</i> and different levels of <i>context</i> ("planes")	<i>Connotative semiotic</i> (based on the relation between <i>content</i> and <i>expression</i>)

Table 2-1 · The relevance of Hjelmslev's theory of language to systemic-functional thinking about stratification and instantiation

The principal aim of Hjelmslev's magnum opus, *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* [1963/1943], is to construct a theoretical model for analysing language, which is based on a limited number of precisely defined terms (distinctions), premises and procedural methods [cf. Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 15ff.]. Such a theory is regarded as "a calculation from the fewest and most general possible premisses" [ibid.: 15], or an "algebra" [ibid.: 80], which is called *glossematics* ("to mark its difference from previous kinds of linguistics" [ibid.: 80]).² The theory is built up around a number of distinctions, in which

² In view of the further exploration of Hjelmslev's differentiations below, it is useful to note that the new kind of linguistics which is proposed by Hjelmslev is a linguistic theory which concentrates solely on linguistic *form* as such, i.e. a theory which is characterized by a "basic independence of non-linguistically defined substance" [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 80]. The categories of this kind of linguistics are "unnamed entities, i.e., arbitrarily named entities without natural designation" [ibid.: 79], which means that the categories are not *primarily* 'motivated' in relation to semantics or phonetics (and are not 'taken over from' everyday language [ibid.: 122]), but are set up on an internal, formal basis. It is also in this sense that the term 'algebra' is used. The categories of glossematics, which are thus defined in an irreducible way on the basis of such an algebra are called glossemes [ibid.: 80]. In his review of Hjelmslev's *Prolegomena*, Martinet [1942-45] has warned against a reduction of linguistics to an algebra of 'unnamed' pure forms which dismisses semantics and phonetic substance.

three types of differentiations which had originally been formulated by Saussure play a key role: *content–expression*, *form–substance–purport* and *system–process*. As will be made clear below, the particular theoretical aim of his work leads Hjelmslev to characterize the original Saussurian distinctions in a more abstract way, and to indicate further semiotic features of the differentiations which follow logically from his abstract, theoretical framework.³

Apart from its historical importance as an inspirational framework in relation to systemic-functional theorizings, the focus of Hjelmslev’s work on a number of differentiations – which, according to him, are necessary and sufficient for studying language – turn it into a theory which is of germane significance in relation to the theoretical study undertaken in this dissertation. As will be shown in the exploration of systemic-functional baseline modelling, besides the concepts of *stratification* and *instantiation* (which have frequently been linked to Hjelmslev), also the specific design of the dimensions of *metafunctional diversity* and *delicacy* can be clarified, in relation to stratification and instantiation, by invoking Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory [cf. esp. Chapter 5].

Therefore, it is useful to briefly look at Hjelmslev’s framework as presented in his *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* [1963/1943]. Hjelmslev’s semiotic

The privileged status of ‘form’ in Hjelmslev’s thinking about how language can be theorized and analysed will become clear further on in this chapter. The relationship between form and substance will play a key role in the theoretical investigation of both baseline modelling and grammatical metaphor undertaken in this dissertation.

³ Hjelmslev’s abstract logical framework, or an algebra, and hence further theorizing of the original Saussurian distinction, is essentially based on a postulated parallelism between a content-plane and an expression-plane in language. Kurylowicz [1960/1949: 16] refers to this feature of glossematics as ‘isomorphism’. In European as well as North-American linguistics around the middle of the 20th century, an exploration of the isomorphisms between the phonic side and the content side of language was predominant [cf. Bazell 1953, referred to in Matthews 2001].

Martinet has criticized Hjelmslev’s conception of the content and expression side of language as being symmetrically organized, proposing an alternative view based on the idea of a ‘double articulation’ inherent in language [Martinet 1949b, 1977, 1997], and in this way laying the foundation of his own variant of structuralism. Martinet’s notion of ‘double articulation’ corresponds to Hockett’s concept ‘duality of patterning’, which was formulated about a decade later [Hockett 1958] as a distinctive feature of human language, setting it off from other communication systems.

theory of language will be related to two other linguistic-semiotic frameworks, which will also be drawn upon in further discussions of the systemic-functional baseline modelling: Saussure's theory (of which Hjelmslev's is an interpretation), and Barthes's semiotics (which further builds upon Hjelmslev and has also played a role in SFL).

2 Content–expression

The major Hjelmslevian distinction is that between **content** and **expression**, which is parallel to the Saussurean contrast between *signifié* and *signifiant*. The distinction refers to the two sides of the linguistic sign: “the sign is an entity generated by the connexion between an expression and a content” [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 47]. The content- and expression sides of language in general are referred to as *planes* [ibid.: 59]. Apart from being characterized as two reciprocal dimensions of the linguistic sign, ‘content’ and ‘expression’, as such, are not explicitly defined as technical terms in Hjelmslev's theory.⁴ It is a characteristic of these two concepts, as is emphasized by Hjelmslev, that they can only be defined in relation to one another:

The terms *expression plane* and *content plane* and, for that matter, *expression* and *content* are chosen in conformity with established notions and are quite arbitrary. Their functional definition provides no justification for calling one, and not the other, of these entities *expression*, or one, and not the other, *content*. They are defined only by their mutual solidarity,^[5] and neither of them can be identified otherwise. They are each defined only oppositively and relatively, as mutually opposed functives of one and the same function. [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 60]

⁴ This is a significant observation, since Hjelmslev takes it as an important aspect of his theory to explicitly define his technical terminology. This defining is described as a semiotic practice itself, and the importance of this task is reflected in the register of defined terms which is presented at the end of the book, and which is set up by the author in order to give an overview of the mutually defining terminology used in his semiotic model. The lack of definitions for ‘content’ and ‘expression’ is clear from the main text, but also from this register.

⁵ ‘Solidarity’ is a technical notion in Hjelmslev's framework, referring to the interdependence between terms.

It is this ‘reciprocal’ characterization of content and expression which lies at the basis of the notion of a connotative semiotic, as we will see below.

In order to come to an understanding of the content–expression relation, which is the primary division line in Hjelmslev’s theory, and which plays an important role in SFL, the contrast will be further explored here at two levels:

- (1) on a primary level, the content–expression contrast refers to the *linguistic sign* as such;
- (2) on a more abstract level, content and expression refer to two general dimensions of *semiosis* (whether in language or in other semiotic systems). It is this more abstract vision which leads to the concept of a connotative semiotic (and also that of a ‘metasemiotic’, as we will see) as a ‘second-order’ semiotic.

I will refer to these two types of descriptions, which differ only in their levels of abstraction, as Hjelmslev’s **primary** and **second-order**⁶ characterizations of the content–expression distinction.

On a primary level, content and expression can be characterized – in a non-technical glossing of the concepts – as ‘thought’ and ‘speech’, or ‘concept’ and ‘sound’. This interpretation is clear from the following passage:⁷

there can be no content without an expression, or expressionless content; neither can there be an expression without a content, or content-less expression. If we *think* without speaking, the *thought* is not a linguistic *content* and not a functive for a sign function. If we *speak* without thinking, and in the form of a *series of sounds* to which no content can be attached by any listener, such speech is an abracadabra, not a linguistic *expression* and not a functive for a sign function. [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 49; emphasis MT]

⁶ The use of the term ‘second-order’ in order to refer to Hjelmslev’s second characterization of the content–expression contrast is inspired by Barthes’s further study of connotative systems, which we will turn to below.

⁷ The term “functive” is used by Hjelmslev to refer to either of the two poles of a sign (which is regarded as a sign function).

Hence, whereas the notions of content and expression as such are abstract, mutually defining aspects of language which recur throughout the linguistic system (as we will see below), in *explaining* the nature of the linguistic sign, Hjelmslev makes a primary distinction between a layer of thought and a layer of sound, which is completely parallel to Saussure's conception of the sign. In a thorough re-analysis of Saussure, Thibault refers to these two dimensions as semiotic 'orders' and calls them 'conceptual' (content) and 'phonic' (expression) [Thibault 1997: 59]. Table 2-2 gives an overview of the content-expression contrast as it is viewed Hjelmslev and by Saussure, together with further explanations offered by Thibault of the distinction as it was originally introduced by Saussure.

Hjelmslev		Saussure		Thibault [1997]: further explanation of Saussure
terms	paraphrase	terms	paraphrase	
<i>content</i>	'thought'	<i>signifié</i>	le plan [...] des idées	conceptual order
<i>expression</i>	'speech', 'sound'	<i>signifiant</i>	celui [le plan] [...] des sons	phonic order

Table 2-2 · Hjelmslev's content-expression distinction in relation to Saussure's *signifié-signifiant*⁸

On a more abstract level, the interaction between content and expression, and hence the emergence of 'signs', does not only refer to the relationship between thought and sound. Rather, it is a relationship which can recur, at various levels of abstraction, throughout various types of semiotic systems, including language. Hjelmslev's most unique contribution to our understanding of semiosis is his conception of the possibility of a semiotic to have multiple sign layers, which he theorized in terms of a distinction between denotative semiotic, connotative semiotic and meta-linguistic semiotic.⁹

⁸ It should be noted that Thibault [1997] further explains this distinction as it was originally introduced by Saussure; i.e. he does not refer to Hjelmslev. However, at the primary level focussed on at this point, Hjelmslev's content-expression distinction is completely parallel to Saussure's *signifié-signifiant*, as pointed out above.

⁹ Hjelmslev himself uses the term *semiotics* instead of *semiotic*. I will use the term *semiotic* to refer to a semiotic system, because this is the term which has been adopted with this sense in SFL, to indicate the difference with *semiotics*, which is commonly used to refer to the

A **connotative semiotic** is a semiotic whose expression plane is itself a semiotic, i.e. whose expression plane consists of a content layer and an expression layer. A simple semiotic, whose expression plane cannot be analysed as a content–expression constellation, is termed, in contrast, **denotative semiotic** [cf. Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 114ff.]. The counterpart of a connotative semiotic is called a **metasemiotic**: a metasemiotic is a semiotic system whose content plane is a semiotic, i.e. it is a scientific semiotic (for example linguistics) which has another semiotic (for example language, or any other type of semiotic) as an object of study.¹⁰ In this framework as a whole, a *denotative semiotic* is defined as a semiotic system neither of whose planes is a semiotic [cf. Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 114]. The *layered* nature of the two types of non-denotative semiotic systems can be visualized as in Figure 2-1.




Figure 2-1 · The layered nature of a Hjelmslevian connotative semiotic and metasemiotic

discipline (the study of signs); for the latter, Hjelmslev has the term *semiology* [see also the following note].

¹⁰ ‘Metasemiotic’ is a general term which logically contrasts with ‘denotative semiotic’. When a metasemiotic has a non-scientific semiotic as its object of study (i.e. as its content plane), it is termed a **semiology**. This term is taken from Saussure, and is intended to refer to any discipline which studies signs, in the original Saussurean sense [cf. Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 107]. With respect to linguistics, in this vein, ‘semiology’ (the study of signs and sign systems (semiotics) in general) is distinguished from glossematics (the study of linguistic form, i.e. linguistic signs in the narrow sense), in that semiology is broader, since it also comprises Saussure’s ‘external linguistics’ (which takes into account sociological and psychological aspects of language). On Saussure’s conception of semiology as part of social psychology, see Thibault [1997: 3f, 25ff, 49].

Taking language as the basic, denotative semiotic on which further semiotic systems can be built (the systems indicated in black in Figure 2-1), Hjelmslev explains the metasemiotic and connotative semiotic systems which are thus formed as follows. A linguistic metasemiotic (a metalanguage, or a linguistics) is a semiotic that treats of language as a semiotic system [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 119–120]. It is a system which has as its expression plane a metalinguistic term, and as its content plane the semiotic system of language itself.

A linguistic connotative semiotic is a semiotic in which the expression plane is a language (i.e. a language system), a linguistic sign, or a particular linguistic usage, and in which the content plane consists of aspects pertaining to different types of styles, tones, and/or varieties of language. The aspects of a connotative content plane which Hjelmslev distinguishes are outlined in Table 2-3.

Aspects of a connotative content plane		Examples
Stylistic forms		verse; prose
Styles		creative style; imitative 'normal' style
Value-styles		higher value-style; neutral value-style; lower value-style ('vernacular')
Media		speech; writing; gesture; flag code; etc.
Tones		angry; joyful; etc.
Idioms	Vernaculars	the common language of a community; jargons of various cliques or professions
	National languages	
	Regional languages	standard language; local dialect; etc.
	Physiognomies	idiom characterizing one person's use of language [idiolect]

Table 2-3 · Aspects of the content plane in a connotative semiotic recognized by Hjelmslev

Besides studying language as a denotative semiotic, it is claimed, the task of an exhaustive linguistic study¹¹ is also to analyse geographical, historical, political, social, psychological and other related aspects which are connoted by language. In order to do so, linguistics must take into account contributions made by “[m]any special sciences, in the first place, presumably, sociology, ethnology and psychology” [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 125]. Any sign of denotative language (specific utterances, or a denotative language as a whole system) must be characterized in relation to the various connotive aspects, which often interact. In this way, the linguist can define *connotators*, such as ‘jargon’ (creative style that is neither a higher nor a lower value-style), ‘pulpit style’, ‘chancery style’.

Hjelmslev himself, who, in his *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, is mainly concerned with forming a theoretical framework for analysing language, does not investigate the possibilities of a connotative semiotic in further detail.

The notion of a connotative semiotic has been further explored by the French semiotician Barthes, who applies it to other types of semiotic systems beyond language, including visual communication, clothing (fashion systems), furniture and architecture. In extending Hjelmslev’s language-based notion of a connotative semiotic to other areas, Barthes arrives at a more concrete view of connotation. It is his further theorizing of a connotative semiotic which is important in relation to more recent systemic-functional conceptions of stratification proposed in the 1990s, as we will see below.

Barthes’s theory is founded on the Hjelmslevian layered conception of a connotative semiotic in terms of content–expression: a connotative semiotic is characterized as “*a second-order semiological system*”, it is “a peculiar system, in that it is constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it” [Barthes 1957: 114]. However, due to the widening of application, the connotative content (i.e. what is connoted) is no longer limited to an aspect

¹¹ Importantly, this is the task of *semiology*, not of glossematics, which is a linguistic theory which concentrates on form: a semiology is a semiotic whose content plane is another semiotic in its totality, and this object semiotic may be of any type (i.e. possibly a connotative semiotic) [cf. also the previous note].

of style connoted by a linguistic denotative semiotic. Rather, what is signified in a connotative semiotic is more broadly viewed as “a fragment of ideology” [Barthes 1957: 151].

In view of later discussions, it is useful to briefly consider Barthes’s terminology. Barthes refers to content and expression as **concept** and **form**: a concept is a signified in general, a form is a signifier.¹² **Meaning** is the term used to refer to the association of a concept and a form in general, and, in particular, it is reserved for a first-order (i.e. denotative) semiotic. In his early work [esp. Barthes 1957], connotative systems are regarded as *mythologies*: second-order, hidden ‘meanings’ which are connoted by a text (or any sign) are regarded as ‘myths’. In semiotic terms, the myth, or the ‘meaning’ arising from a connotative sign is termed **signification**. Barthes’s terminology is summarized in Figure 2-2 (compare Hjelmslev’s notions in Figure 2-1 above).




Figure 2-2 · The layered structure of a connotative semiotic in Barthes’s semiotic theory

A connotative meaning (signification) is characterized by Barthes as a second-order sign which arises *in a particular situation*, and which further builds upon a (first-order) sign defined in a denotative system. One of the examples he gives in *Mythologies* is a picture on the cover of a French magazine (the example should be read in the context of France in the 1950s):

¹² It is important to note that Barthes’s use of the term ‘form’ is distinct from Hjelmslev’s, as will be indicated below.

I am at the barber's, and a copy of *Paris-Match* is offered to me. On the cover, a young Negro in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour. All this is the *meaning* of the picture. But, whether naively or not, I see very well what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors. I am therefore again faced with a greater semiological system: there is a signifier, itself already formed with a previous system (*a black soldier is giving the French salute*); there is a signified (it is here a purposeful mixture of Frenchness and militariness); finally, there is a presence of the signified through the signifier. [Barthes 1957: 116, emphasis RB]

Three features of a connotative signified (a concept) should be emphasized:

- (1) As this illustration shows, the connotative signified (or the concept) “is filled with a *situation*” [Barthes 1957: 119] and a *history*. In the present example, the concept is linked to such aspects as the history of France, its colonial past, its present image in relation to this past, and so forth. The signification which arises from a connotative sign is based on associations contained in its concept.
- (2) Because it is based on associations, the concept of a myth is *open-ended*.
- (3) The connotative signified is also described as *intentional* and is characterized in relation to ‘functioning’ in a *context*. The concept is the motivation behind the myth [Barthes 1957: 118], it is “a formless, unstable, nebulous condensation, whose unity and coherence are above all due to its function” [ibid.: 199]. This function, in turn, depends on a context. Barthes refers to this feature of myth as appropriation:

the fundamental character of the mythical concept is to be *appropriated*: [...] French imperialism must appeal to such and such group of readers and not another. The concept closely corresponds to a function, it is defined as a tendency. [Barthes 1957: 119]

By way of concluding this section on the content–expression relationship, it is useful to compare Hjelmslev's and Barthes's approaches to connotative semiotic systems. As hinted at above, the major difference between the two frameworks lies in their focus and their degree of abstraction. Hjelmslev's *Prolegomena* is first and foremost a *theory* of language. Since his major aim is to provide the necessary and sufficient

theoretical tools (the ‘calculus’) on the basis of which language can be studied in a systematic way, his conception of language is embedded and linked to a more abstract view of semiosis in general. His conception of non-denotative semiotic systems (i.e. connotative systems and metalanguage) then, is based on a logical extension¹³ of the basic content–expression relationship which inheres in the linguistic sign.

Barthes’s starting point, by contrast, is signs in general – as they *occur* in language, but also in a wide range of other semiotic systems. Hence, he *applies* the content–expression relationship to other semiotics apart from language. Due to his widening of focus and his interest in the application of a theory of signs to different types of semiotics, Barthes arrives at a more concrete view of the content–expression relation. Barthes’s conception of a connotative semiotic focusses on the ‘sign’ as such in its relation to secondary ‘meanings’ which arise in *different possible situations*. The latter specification is crucial in Barthes’s framework, and indicates an important contrast with Hjelmslev’s theory: while both Hjelmslev and Barthes define connotative ‘meaning’ in relation to factors which are psychological, social, geographical, cultural, and so forth, only Barthes specifies the connotative type of sign as being tied to the particularity of a specific situation and a specific history.

Because the distinction between these different conceptions will play a crucial role in the exploration and clarification of the systemic-functional baseline model, it is important to comprehend the exact nature of the difference between Hjelmslev’s and Barthes’ conceptions of connotative signs. In Barthes’s theory, connotative meaning, in general, is a second-order meaning arising in a particular situation, in addition to a first-order meaning. The distinguishing feature of a connotative meaning is its contingency on an individual, particular situation. In this, a connotative meaning contrasts to a denotative (basic, first-order) meaning (i.e. meaning proper, in his terminology), which refers to what is general or common to various situations, what is ‘standardized’.

¹³ I.e. a ‘logical’ extension which surfaces naturally within the bounds of the abstract, theoretical calculus set up for language as such, as a denotative semiotic.

In Hjelmslev's theory, a connotative semiotic is defined, purely in abstract terms which follow from the theoretical framework itself, on the basis of the relation between an expression plane and a content plane as the different orders of abstraction making up a sign. A connotative semiotic, as a sign whose expression plane is another semiotic system, is the logical counterpart of a metalanguage. Most crucially, *the notion of situation-specificity is not relevant in Hjelmslev's definition of a connotative sign*. In other words, in Hjelmslev's view, a connotative content by itself is not necessarily dependent on a specific situation, although, if one does take into account particularities pertaining to the specific situation, situational factors can play a role in connotative content, just as well as they can feature in each of the planes of a denotative sign. In Hjelmslev's theory, the distinction between, on the one hand, 'general' or 'standardized' aspects of signs, and on the other hand, more specific aspects arising in specific situations, is regarded as constituting a separate semiotic dimension which interacts with the content–expression dimension, viz. the distinction *form–substance–purport*, which will be dealt with in the next section.

3 Form–substance–purport

In Hjelmslev's theory of language, the major distinction defining the linguistic sign is that between content and expression: it is the relation between two orders of abstraction (conceptual and phonic), the interaction between a content plane and an expression plane, which constitutes a sign. However, this distinction is cross-cut by another differentiation, viz. between form, substance and purport.

Both content and expression can be further analysed into form, substance and purport. Hjelmslev's conception of **form** and **substance** reiterates Saussure's earlier distinction (*forme–substance*). The third term in the threefold differentiation, **purport**, corresponds to Saussure's unformed *pensée* and *son*. By using a general term 'purport' and in this way highlighting the general nature of the form–substance–purport differentiation as pertinent to both content and expression, Hjelmslev offers a more abstract semiotic view compared to Saussure.

Hjelmslev's triad form–substance–purport will be explained here in two steps, which correspond to two different levels of abstraction at which Hjelmslev defines his concepts:

- (1) First, the basic nature of the three concepts will be described as they appear, on a primary level, in the two planes of a sign, content and expression.
- (2) After that, Hjelmslev's more abstract characterization of the triad will be looked into.

Since, as with the definition of Hjelmslev's content–expression contrast, these two characterizations of the differentiation between form–substance–purport (which again only differ in terms of their levels of abstraction) will be important in the further discussion in this dissertation, I will use different terms to refer to them: they will be called Hjelmslev's **primary** and **secondary** interpretations of the form–substance–purport triad.¹⁴

Within the content plane, purport refers to unformed and unanalyzed thought.¹⁵ **Content-purport** (Saussure's unformed *pensée*) is an amorphous thought-mass.¹⁶ In an a priori characterization constructed for the sake of the argument, Hjelmslev describes content-purport as that factor of the content of a sign which is common to different languages: content-purport can provisionally be seen as a type of 'meaning'¹⁷ which can be taken as a basis for comparing different signs in different languages. Hjelmslev gives the following example:

¹⁴ Notice that the terms I use to refer to the more abstract definitions are not parallel: *second-order* in the case of the content–expression contrast, versus *secondary* in the case of the form–substance–purport triad. This has to do with an inherent difference in Hjelmslev's more abstract treatment of his major differentiating dimensions, a difference which will prove to be relevant in the further theoretical discussion of instantiation and realization, as will be explained in Parts II and IV.

¹⁵ Recall that the content plane in a linguistic sign in general is defined as the side of 'thought', in contrast to the expression plane, the side of 'sounds'.

¹⁶ Hjelmslev's content-purport corresponds to what Kant has called *noumenon* or "*Ding an sich*" [See Thibault 1997: 168, who describes Saussure's 'pensée' in relation to Kant's noumenon; see also Willems 1994: 40–50, on Husserl's phenomenological re-interpretation of Kant's *noumenon*].

¹⁷ It is significant, in this respect, that Hjelmslev's original, Danish, term for purport is '*mening*' [cf. Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 153].

- (1) a. *jeg véd det ikke* (Danish)
 b. *I do not know* (English)
 c. *je ne sais pas* (French)
 d. *en tiedä* (Finnish)
 e. *naluwara* (Eskimo)

[Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 50]

The content-purport in these expressions, is the meaning factor they have in common, i.e. “the thought itself” [ibid.: 50]. In another illustration, Hjelmslev refers to colour terms:¹⁸ for English *green*, French *vert* and Welsh *glas*, the content-purport is the colour itself which is referred to by the different words in the three languages.

In an initial characterization, then, in these two illustrations, it is possible to ‘extract’ an unformed purport from the different ranges of expressions. However, further contemplating the examples, it can be seen that this ‘purport’ *in itself* cannot be labelled: as soon as such a labelling is attempted, for instance by saying that in the examples, the purport is the meaning ‘I don’t know’, or ‘green’, the purport is being *formed* in one way or another, and in this way it is viewed from the perspective of a particular language, it is viewed as a **content-substance**. Content-substance is purport viewed from a language: a content-substance is an area of purport which appears, qua area, as the result of the specific way in which a particular language carves up or ‘forms’ this purport. Hence, a content-substance is dependent on a ‘forming’ process in a language.¹⁹ Hjelmslev emphasizes this feature of content-substance by defining it *in relation to a content-form*:

¹⁸ In twentieth century linguistics (and more broadly in cognitive sciences such as cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology), colour terms are often cited in discussions of linguistic relativity and proto-typicality, although in such discussions, Hjelmslev is seldom mentioned. This area of language has so frequently been brought up in related types of discussions that its use as an illustration seems superfluous. However, the nature of colour terms will be referred to here, in order to adhere to Hjelmslev’s illustrations. The commonality of the illustration, which appears with hindsight from a twenty-first century perspective, can serve as a basis for understanding Hjelmslev’s concepts ‘content-form’, ‘content-substance’ and ‘content-purport’, which in themselves are rather difficult to grasp, and which have been interpreted in different ways by different linguists, including systemicists, as will be shown in Part II.

¹⁹ Hjelmslev [1963/1943: 79] refers to content-substance as ‘semantics’. In Part II, the nature of ‘semantics’, as it has been theorized in SFL, will be elucidated in relation to Hjelmslev’s notion of ‘content-substance’.

the substance depends on the form to such a degree that it lives exclusively by its favor and can in no sense be said to have independent existence. [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 51]

The content-form can be defined only in relation to the sign function [ibid.: 54] as characterized above in terms of the interaction between a content and an expression. In other words, the *content*-form is that which, together with an *expression*-form, constitutes a unit which functions as a sign in a language. From the point of view of the purport, a content-form is arbitrary.

The concepts of content-substance and content-form can be further explained by returning to the two sets of examples cited above. In the first illustration, the content-substance, in English, is 'I do not know', as a specific meaning in a particular occurrence of the sign *I do not know*. This substance appears only as a substance for a content-form: it appears as a significant content by being linked to a content-form. The content-form is the '*content*' which is *expressed* in the construction consisting of four words *I do not know* and which is defined in terms of the formation principles of the English language. This assembled (in this case, the sign is constructional, as opposed to elemental) content can be analyzed in terms of different parameters, such as a first person pronoun 'I', a negative particle 'not', a lexical verb 'know', a periphrastic auxiliary used to construct the content 'negative', and so forth. Each of these aspects of the content-form are defined through their functioning, together with an expression level (the distinct words), as signs, in the English language: the content of the sign expressed as *I* is defined in relation to the contents of other signs, expressed, for example, in *you* or *they*, or *my*.

In the second illustration featuring colour terms, the content-substance, in English, is 'green'. This substance refers to that area of the whole colour spectrum (the purport), which, in English, is delimited as a major colour, 'green'. The content-form is the content 'green', purely defined in opposition to other content-forms, expressed for example in *yellow*, *blue* or *red*. Although a 'thought' of the same colour, as a non-linguistic entity which can be visually perceived, can be seen as extractable from the expressions *green* in English and *glas* in Welsh (i.e. they can be regarded as having a common purport), the two expressions have different content-substances, because English and Welsh carve up the colour spectrum in different ways. Welsh has

another sign to refer to another shade of what is referred to as *green* in English (viz. *gwyrdd*), whereas what is called *glas* in Welsh is expressed in English as either *green*, *blue* or *grey*.

A similar differentiation between form, substance and purport inheres in the expression plane, i.e. in the phonic order of semiosis. **Expression-purport** is defined, parallel to content-purport, as an amorphous, unanalyzed sequence of sounds, a “vocalic continuum” [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 52]. Through the existence of an expression-form (which exists by virtue of being connected with a content-form in a linguistic sign), the expression-purport is formed into an expression-substance. An **expression-substance**, then, is a sound sequence pronounced in a particular language, by an individual person, hic et nunc, for example, the sound [ˈrɪŋ]. An expression-substance, i.e. a particular pronunciation by an individual person, only exists qua substance by virtue of its relationship to an expression-form, i.e. by being the substance for a form. An **expression-form**, finally, is a sound sequence, which is interpreted, within a particular language, in terms of the phonemes by which this language carves up and selects from the complete range of possible human vocalizations.²⁰ The phonemic (formal) nature of sound is in turn determined by its being linked to a content. In other words, also in the expression plane, ‘form’ is characterized in relation to the sign function: an *expression-form* is defined by forming a connection with a *content-form* and in this way constituting a sign (in the example referred to above: the sign *ring*). Within the expression plane, the distinction between form and substance conforms to the contrast between phonology and phonetics.²¹

²⁰ Another example given by Hjelmslev is the phonemic formation, in different languages, of one and the same name: “*one and the same expression-purport may be formed differently in different languages. English [bəˈlɪn], German [bɛrˈliːn], Danish [bɛæʁˈliːn], Japanese [bɛ[u]ɪnu] represent different formations of one and the same expression-purport (the city-name Berlin)*” [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 56].

²¹ As has been cursorily noted above, the study of the phonic side of language in the late 19th and early 20th centuries has played an important role in inspiring new insights about the nature of language in general, especially at a theoretical level, in relation to the analytical question. (The study of linguistic sound had received a new impetus in the latter half of the 19th century through technological innovations, and had an eminent place in both European and North-American structuralist schools – in the latter also through the analysis of ‘exotic’

languages without a tradition of writing.) The framework of the study of sounds has been important in relation to at least three dimensions:

- (1) the coding relationship between content and expression;
- (2) the differentiation between form and substance;
- (3) further differentiations within substance (types of variants).

With respect to the distinction between form and substance [item 2], which is under consideration at this point, it is important to recognize, in a theoretical perspective, that both Saussure's formulation of this distinction and Hjelmslev's more abstract reinterpretation of it should be understood against the background of a general theoretical tendency in linguistics around the turn of the century and in the first half of the 20th century, in which a distinction between what came to be called phonology vs. phonetics gradually became more important, and evolved into an 'established' (albeit not yet completely understood – cf. the quotation from Whorf below) theme in linguistics around the time when Hjelmslev wrote his *Prolegomena*. In this respect it is useful to note, also, that Hjelmslev explains and illustrates his differentiations most extensively in terms of the phonic plane of language, emphasizing that distinctions which have been noted for this plane should equally be applied to the content plane of language [cf. Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 61–70, esp. 70, 82]

According to Jakobson [1966], a precursory version of the phonemic principle occurs in the 1870s, in the (independent) work of two European linguists: Sweet [1877], who distinguished between sound distinctions which “may correspond to differences of meaning” and those which “are not significant and cannot alter the meaning” (for the former he devised a system of notation called “Broad Romic”) [Sweet 1877:103, 182, as quoted in Jakobson 1966: 243], and Baudouin de Courtenay (whose lectures appeared in English in the *Bulletin of Kazan University* (Poland) in the 1870s), who distinguished between phonetics dealing with the physical and physiological dimension of producing sounds, and “phonetics in the true sense of the word”, dealing with “sounds in connection with word meaning” [quoted in Jakobson 1966: 246]. In 1873, the term *phonème* had been proposed by Dufriche-Desgenettes simply as a French translation of the German *Sprachlaut*.

Saussure [1879] took over the term *phonème* in his reconstruction of Indo-European vowels [cf. Jakobson 1966: 252]. According to Hjelmslev [1963/1943: 79], the idea of describing “categories of the expression plane on a purely non-phonetic basis” was “clearly and consciously presented” in this early work by Saussure. In North-America, according to Lee [1996: 46f], the idea of distinctive speech sounds and ‘alternating sounds’ had played a role, since the late 1880s, in the work of Boas, and later also Sapir (who conceived of an internal language system as ‘points in a pattern’) and Whorf (who further explored the ‘points in the pattern model’ in terms of ‘linguistic relativity’). It was Whorf, who, in 1929, coined the term *allophone* to refer to positional variants of sounds [cf. Lee 1996: 46, 88]. Later on Whorf emphasized the importance of the ‘phonemic principle’ in relation to his own conception of relativity in language:

Discovery of the phonemic principle made a revolution in linguistics comparable to relativity in physics [...] Most linguists unfortunately haven't had a strong physical science education and don't realize that phonemics is a relativity principle. [Whorf 1940: 1–2; as quoted in Lee 1996: 46]

In Europe, the phonemic principle came to be established through work in the two major European schools of phonetics, the London School centring around Jones [cf. 1936] and the

The primary characterization of the form–substance–purport triad within the two semiotic planes of content and expression is summarized in Table 2-4. It should be emphasized that the three notions in the differentiation form–substance–purport are intrinsically defined in relation to one another. Their interrelationships are captured in the following characterization: purport provides the substance for a form [cf. *ibid.*: 52]. None of the three aspects has any ‘existence’ (or a ‘relevance’ to linguistic analysis) except through its role in relation to the others. Purport is only relevant in linguistics, insofar as it is substance for a form. Conversely, the existence of a substance is entirely dependent on a form being “projected” onto the purport, “just as an open net casts its shadow down an undivided surface” [*ibid.*: 57].

	Form	Substance	Purport
Content plane	Content-form: Aspects of content defined in relation to other elements of content within one language, and in relation to an expression plane	Content-substance: The ‘meaning’ of a sign in a particular context (<i>Semantics</i>)	Content-purport: Amorphous, unformed thought mass
Expression plane	Expression-form: <i>Phonology</i> Phonemes: sound-expressions defined in relation to other sound-expressions within one language, and in relation to a content plane	Expression-substance: <i>Phonetics</i> The pronunciation of a sound sequence by a particular person, <i>hic et nunc</i>	Expression-purport: Amorphous, unformed sound sequence

Table 2-4 · The significance of the form–substance–purport differentiation within the content and expression planes of a linguistic sign²²

Prague School centring around Trubetzkoy [cf. 1939]. The terms *phonology* and *phonetics* were introduced by Trubetzkoy in his magnum opus, *Grundzüge der Phonologie* [1939]. Hjelmslev [1963/1943: 62–65] explains that these two schools had quite different conceptions (and motivations) of the phonemic principle.

For further work on the phonemic principle which appeared in the 1930s–1940s, see Firth [1934], van Wijk [1939], Martinet [1949a].

²² As we have seen above, in explaining the form–substance contrast in the expression plane Hjelmslev invokes the established distinction between phonology and phonetics. With respect to the content plane, he refers in a rather inexplicit way (only in drawing a parallel with ‘phonetics’ in the expression plane [cf. Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 79, 96, 125]) to ‘content-substance’ as ‘semantics’ (understood in an ontological/phenomenological sense [p. 79], or

Only form has an extra defining facet. The role of form in the form--substance--purport triad is defined in relation to the sign function: both content-form and expression-form exist by interacting with a form on a reverse plane (an expression-form or a content-form, respectively), and by constituting a linguistic sign together with it. In other words, a content-form serves to 'form' an area of conceptual purport into a content-substance by virtue of being linked to a content--expression in a particular language. The same is true for expression-form: an expression-form serves to 'form' an area of phonic purport into an expression-substance by virtue of being linked to a content-form in a language.

Consequently, it is 'form' which has a privileged status with regard to the linguistic sign as defined in terms of content and expression. Focussing on the relevance of the form--substance--purport triad in relation to the distinction between content and expression which lies at the basis of semiosis, Hjeltslev refines the definition of a sign:

[...] the two entities that contract the sign function – expression and content – behave in the same way in relation to it. By virtue of the sign function and only by virtue of it, exist its two functives, *which can now be precisely designated as the content-form and the expression-form*. [Hjeltslev 1963/1943: 57, emphasis MT]

As we have seen above, the interaction between content and expression (as mutually defining sides of a sign function) is the principal characteristic defining the nature of a linguistic sign: “the sign is an entity generated by the

in a contextual sense [cf. p. 82: “contextual meanings”; we will explore different types of ‘semantics’ in relation to the notion of ‘content-substance’ in Chapter 5), which is in accordance with the general labelling of ‘purport’ (i.e. substance looked at from the other end), in the original Danish version, as *mening*. No alternative more familiar term is provided for content-form.

In view of the exploration of the systemic-functional dimension of stratification which will be undertaken in Part II, it should be noted, in the present context, that Halliday has motivated the internal stratification of the content plane into a ‘lexicogrammar’ and a ‘semantics’ in terms of the Hjeltslevian distinction between content-form and content-substance. In Chapter 5, when the semiotic foundation of the differentiation between a ‘lexicogrammar’ and a ‘semantics’ will be further investigated in relation to the dimension of metafunctional diversity, and against the background of Hjeltslev’s theory, it will be argued that this motivation of stratification only holds for one type of interpretation of ‘semantics’.

connexion between an expression and a content” [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 47]. The specific relation of *form* to the sign function, and the relationship between form and substance/purport offers an extra perspective for characterizing a sign. Besides being defined as a ‘connection’ between two semiotic orders, sound and thought, a sign is also a sign *for something* – this ‘something’ is characterized in Hjelmslev’s theory in terms of the form--substance--purport triad:

The sign is, then – paradoxical as it may seem – *a sign for a content-substance* and *a sign for an expression-substance*. It is in this sense that the sign can be said to be a sign for something. On the other hand, we see no justification for calling the sign a sign merely for the content-substance, or (what nobody has thought of, to be sure) merely for the expression-substance. The sign is a two-sided entity, with a Janus-like perspective in two directions, and with effect in two respects: “outwards” toward the expression-substance and “inwards” toward the content-substance. [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 58; emphasis MT].

The interaction between the two differentiating dimensions – viz. content--expression and form--substance--purport – in Hjelmslev’s primary characterization of a sign can be visualized as in Figure 2-3. Taking into account these two differentiating dimensions, a sign, as a connection between a content and an expression, is also a form for carving up the purport and turning it (forming it) into substance.

Importantly, Hjelmslev’s *primary* characterization of the form--substance--purport distinction (i.e. the explanation of this distinction which we have looked at so far), is essentially concerned with defining, in precise terms, that aspect of a sign by which it ‘is *a sign for something*’. In other words, on this level, the form--substance--purport distinction theorizes the semiotic relationship by which the purport, as ‘*Ding an sich*’ and as ‘sound as such’ can be linked to language, i.e. to linguistic signs or forms.




Figure 2-3 · Hjelmslev's primary characterization of the linguistic sign by means of two differentiating dimensions: content–expression, and form–substance–purport

In his article “La stratification du langage”, Hjelmslev refers to the differentiation in terms of his two major dimensions – “la double distinction entre *forme* et *substance* et entre *contenu (signifié)* et *expression (signifiant)*” [Hjelmslev 1959/1954: 44] as a stratification of language. In order to distinguish the Hjelmslevian notion of ‘stratification’ from the interpretation of this term in SFL, Hjelmslev’s ‘double distinction’ leading to a differentiation between content-form, expression-form, content-substance(-purport) and expression-substance(-purport) will be referred to as the **Hjelmslevian stratification scheme**.²³

Keeping in mind the basic relationship between the form–substance–purport differentiation and the sign (with its expression and content planes),

²³ In view of further explorations in Part II, it should be noted that this scheme is based on two distinct but interacting differentiating dimensions (cf. the two planes of the sign function, and the relationship between form and substance). Throughout this dissertation, in visual representations these two different dimensions will be indicated by means of a vertical (content–expression) as against a horizontal (form–substance(–purport)) orientation, as is shown in Figure 2-3. It is important to emphasize this multi-dimensional nature of the Hjelmslevian stratification scheme since, in SFL, stratification is generally theorized in terms of one overall dimension (vertical or diagonal, but generally top-down, visually indicated by means of cotangent circles), along which a ‘higher’ stratum is regarded as being realized in a ‘lower’ stratum.

Hjelmslev's more abstract characterization of this differentiation can now be considered. In a more abstract perspective, the differentiation between form and substance²⁴ indicates a general type of semiotic contrast which recurs along a continuum: "[w]hat from one point of view is "substance" is from another point of view "form"" [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 81]. The type of semiotic relationship which holds between form and substance is termed **manifestation**, and is described as a relationship between a *constant* and a *variable*, or between a **schema** and a **usage**: a linguistic schema (i.e. a sign, a form) is manifested in a usage (i.e. substance). In this framework, the contrast form–substance appears as a distinction which can be used to grasp the relation between language and its sign-forms, and the particular uses which are made of these signs in different situations. A schema is a constant by virtue of the sign relationship, i.e. by virtue of the connection between a content and an expression. Within the content plane as well as the expression plane, this schema (i.e. content-form and expression-form, respectively) is manifested in a particular usage (i.e. a content-substance and expression-substance). Compared to the schema, this usage is a variable, since one schema (a constant) can be manifested in various possible usages.²⁵

²⁴ Hjelmslev's more abstract characterization of the differentiation between form–substance–purport focusses on the relationship between form and substance. In this respect it may be useful to note that, in this abstract view, 'substance' stands for both substance and purport: within a schema–usage view, both substance and purport are on the side of usage. This ties in with the earlier observation (see the definition of substance above) that substance and purport only differ in terms of the perspective which is taken: *purport* is unformed thought or sound mass, which is susceptible to formation in a particular language; *substance* is purport which serves as the substance for a particular form in a particular language.

²⁵ Hjelmslev's explanation of the factor of 'heterogeneity' (in language in general) by taking recourse (almost exclusively) to illustrations from the expression plane again demonstrates the important theoretical role of studies of the phonic side of language, in late 19th century and early 20th century linguistics, as an inspirational framework for further theorizings about the conceptual side of language. In this vein it should be noted that the differentiation between varieties and variations which is proposed by Hjelmslev is in fact a semiotic generalization (because of its pertinence to the content plane, which is emphasized by Hjelmslev, although it is not worked out in his *Prolegomena*) of Trubetzkoy's [1935, 1939: 41–47] distinction, made a few years before Hjelmslev wrote his magnum opus, between "fakultative Varianten" and "kombinatorische Varianten" (Hjelmslev refers to Trubetzkoy's work with regard to the distinction between phonetics and phonology, but not in relation to the differentiation between varieties and variations). Whorf introduced the term "allophone" to refer to this type of phonic variant [cf. Lee 1996: 88]. Later, under the

Hjelmslev calls the elements which are distinguished in an analysis of form **invariants**, and those which are arrived at in an analysis of substance **variants** [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 61ff].²⁶ Later on he distinguishes between two types of variants: **variations** are ‘free’ variants, which appear independently of their environment, whereas **varieties** are ‘bound’ variants (termed “combinatory” variants by Hjelmslev), i.e. variants which appear only in a particular environment of other elements with which they are combined. While he notes that these distinctions should be extended to the content plane,²⁷ Hjelmslev explains them most extensively with reference to the expression plane (as noted above), where he can build on earlier work in phonetics and phonology. He links the highest-degree *invariant* in the expression plane to the phonological category *phoneme* [ibid.: 62] and the two types of *variants* are equally explained in terms of the phonic side of language: free variants (*variations*) are all the “possible specimens” of a sound which appear as different in “a sufficiently sensitive experimental-phonetic registration”; bound variants (*varieties*) are illustrated as follows: “into the syllable *ta* enter two varieties of two invariants, namely a variety of *t* that can appear only

influence of Bloomfield’s ‘distributionalism’, combinatorial variants (Hjelmslev’s varieties) became known as *positional variants* or *distributional variants* (variants which are ‘in complementary distribution’ [cf. Roach 1991/1983: 38f] – a well-known example is the realization of English non-voiced plosives [p t k] as aspirated or non-aspirated depending on the following sound).

As indicated above, although it is important, from a theoretical perspective, to note the foundational role of the study of linguistic sounds in relation to the theory of language as a whole, and although it is interesting to refer to the parallelisms between the phonic and the conceptual sides of language – a parallelism which also plays a crucial role in Hjelmslev’s work, in the further discussion the phonic side as such will not be further explored. For further theoretical work on the form–substance–purport distinction in the phonic plane of language, see Coseriu [1975c/1954]. (Coseriu’s theory of language [e.g. Coseriu 1975b/1952], which is based on the concept of intermediary norms (in between a language system and individual usages of that system), is a further exploration of Hjelmslev’s form–substance–purport distinction.)

²⁶ Again, this is an initial explanation of the contrast between invariant and variant as linked to the notions of form and substance respectively. As we will see below, later on, Hjelmslev argues that the difference between invariants and variants is also relevant *within* the *form* of language.

²⁷ Cf. Hjelmslev [1963/1943: 82]:

[...] in view of the present situation in linguistics, it is important to emphasize that an articulation into variants is just as possible and necessary in the science of the content as in the science of the expression.

together with *a*, and a variety of *a* that can appear only together with *t*' [ibid.: 82].

Hjelmslev's differentiation between varieties and variations as two types of variants illustrates the very abstract nature of his form–substance (schema–usage) distinction and hence the possible recurrence of this distinction along a continuum. The variety–variation contrast within the area of variants is itself motivated by a re-application of the form–substance distinction *within substance*: i.e. within the area of variants, which appear as manifestations (substance) of invariants (form) belonging to the language system, a further differentiation is made in terms of schema (varieties) and usage (variations).

Importantly, in a section called “Variants in the linguistic schema”, which occurs about 20 pages later than his ‘initial’ characterization of the difference between variant and invariant, Hjelmslev argues that this distinction is also relevant *within* the linguistic schema, i.e. within linguistic form: “Any functive in the linguistic schema can, *within the schema* and without reference to the manifestation, be subjected to an articulation into variants” [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 81]. This argument again shows that the constant–variable relationship is a very abstract kind of differentiation which recurs throughout any of the planes of language: not only is the form–substance contrast an instance of this relationship, the distinction between a constant and a variable is also relevant within both form and substance (i.e. as a distinction between invariant and variant, and between varieties and variations, respectively. It is this interpretation, in which the form–substance–purport triad is linked to a more abstract and recurring relationship between constant and variable that will be referred to as Hjelmslev's *secondary* characterization of this semiotic triad.²⁸

²⁸ Notice that, although form and substance continue to be seen as aspects of a continuum which also includes purport, in this secondary characterization, the triad is principally looked at from the side of form, and it is mainly *form* and *substance* which are more abstractly reinterpreted in terms of various degrees of schematicity (or, taking the alternative perspective, variability). This characterization contrasts with Hjelmslev's primary definition of the triad, in which, as we have seen above, the special status of '*purport*' as unnamed thought and sound mass is important in order to characterize the 'be a sign for' relationship.

As a reference basis for further discussions in this dissertation, Table 2-5 summarizes Hjelmslev's terminology related to his secondary characterization of the form–substance–purport differentiation.

Form		Substance – purport
Constant	⇨	Variable
Schema	Manifestation	Usage

Table 2-5 · Hjelmslev's form–substance–purport differentiation: terminology

Having looked at the form–substance–purport dimension in its specific (primary) and more abstract (secondary) characterizations, and its interaction with the content–expression dimension defining the sign function, we can now reconsider non-denotative possibilities of the sign function in their relation to the form–substance–purport differentiation. More specifically, we can now return to the important remark, spelt out in the previous section, regarding the difference between Barthes's and Hjelmslev's conceptions of a connotative system: it was noted that, in contrast to Barthes's view, the notion of situation-*specificity* is not relevant in Hjelmslev's definition of a connotative sign, since a relationship between standardized aspects of signs and more specific aspects arising in specific situations is theorized by Hjelmslev in a separate dimension, viz. that of form–substance–purport.

Incorporating the form–substance–purport differentiation in his specification of a connotative semiotic enables Hjelmslev to point out in further detail, and in the systematic-logical way which characterizes his theoretical approach as a whole, the different possible ways in which connotative meanings can arise on the basis of a denotative semiotic. Different types of connotative meanings can be distinguished on the basis of the content–expression and form–substance–purport dimensions as two *interacting* differentiations within the expression plane of the connotative system, as illustrated in Figure 2-4.




Figure 2-4 · The interaction between the content–expression and the form–substance dimensions in a connotative sign

As Figure 2-4 shows, meanings in a connotative content plane (i.e. connotative meanings) can pertain to *any* aspect of the denotative semiotic which forms its expression plane, i.e. they can pertain to the content-plane or to the expression-plane of language, or to both, and they can pertain to either or both of its form and substance.²⁹ For example, ‘Danish’ is a connotative content (a meaning), which has as its expression the schemata and usages of the Danish language as a whole, as a connection of contents (phonological expressions) and expressions (denotative meanings as defined in the Danish language system). A variant of language (termed ‘dialect’, ‘register’, and so forth) may be defined on the basis of phonological features (pertaining to the expression plane), or, for example, on the basis of lexical-semantic features (pertaining to the content plane). Further, a variant of language may be defined in relation to a linguistic schema or in relation to a particular linguistic usage, and since the schema–usage contrast is a differentiation which can recur along a continuum, various types of language varieties can be specified focussing on this dimension: for example, on one end, a relatively general ‘standardized’ variant (such as a geographical dialect, for instance British), on the other end, more specific varieties (idiolects), which,

²⁹ In Hjelmslev’s terminology, a connotative meaning which is based on both the content- and expression-planes of the denotative system on which it is built is termed a *connotator*, while a connotative meaning which is based on one of the four aspects of a denotative system (i.e. content-form, content-substance, expression-form, expression-substance) is termed a *signal*.

in relation to the general schema of a language appear to be based on a more particular usage (an individual person's usage of a language).³⁰

4 System–process, paradigm–syntagm

The third and final major theoretical distinction around which Hjelmslev's theory of language is organized is the contrast **system–process**. In its most general sense, this distinction does not need much clarification at this point: it corresponds to the system–instance (system–text) contrast within SFL, which has been explained in Chapter 1 above. As we have seen, the semiotic relationship which is captured by this distinction is instantiation. In regard to the Saussurian basis on which Hjelmslev's framework is ultimately built, it can be noted that this distinction – in its general sense – accords with Saussure's contrast between *langue* and *parole*.

Beyond the general characterization of the system–process contrast (described by Hjelmslev in terms of a difference between language and text), Hjelmslev gives a further specification, which deserves slightly more attention: he explains the contrast by equating it with the relationship between **paradigm** and **syntagm**. On this point, Hjelmslev differs significantly from Saussure. In his re-construction of Saussure's theory of language, Thibault [1997: 64–65] emphasizes that, in Saussure's view, the distinction between *langue* and *parole* should be disentangled from that between paradigm and syntagm. Syntagms are not part of *parole*, rather, they are regular, typical patterns of combination, defined within the system of *langue*.

The difference between Hjelmslev and Saussure regarding the nature of the relationships between system and process, and paradigm and syntagm will be important in the clarification of the baseline model of SFL, and more significantly, in motivating the type of model which will be proposed in this

³⁰ It will be noted that the two dimensions of content–expression and form–substance form a theoretical and systematic basis for distinguishing various types of language varieties, as this done in (socio)linguistics in general. As pointed out by Nöth [1985], the different possibilities of a connotative semiotic have also been further explored, in explicit relation to Hjelmslev, in the area of the theory of literature (for example, in theorizing literal meanings which arise from rhyme and/or rhythm vs. meanings which arise from semantic features, and various mixed types).

dissertation [cf. esp. Chapter 8].³¹ In view of further discussions, two contradictory points should be noted which account for the divergence between Hjelmslev and Saussure:

(1) On the one hand, there is an ‘intuitive’ sense in which the distinction between paradigm and syntagm cannot be seen as coinciding with that between system and process.³² Clearly, systemic paradigms can be set up for individual items, such as lexemes, as well as for constellations of items, or constructions (i.e. ‘syntagms’ in Hjelmslev’s and Saussure’s sense). In this perspective, ‘syntagm’ and paradigm do not form a logical opposition, but relate to different dimensions of language: the syntagm is a concept which can only be defined in relation to the notion of a rank scale, and the possibilities which are available at each distinct level on a rank scale (whether elemental or constructional, whether simple or complex) can be represented in a paradigm. The systemic-functional networks of TRANSITIVITY and MOOD, for instance, are a case in point: they are networks at clause level, indicating the options which are available for the functional (i.e. functional structure) and syntagmatic (i.e. in terms of class labels) *construction* of a clause, in its experiential and interpersonal facets.

(2) On the other hand, there is an equally ‘intuitive’ sense in which a syntagm is more ‘instantial’ than a paradigm: a syntagm provides a context in which an option, chosen from a paradigm, is instantiated. In this perspective, clausal syntagms (or groupal syntagms) serve as a context in which the instantial meaning of a word (its contextual meaning) is further specified vis-à-vis its more schematic lexical meaning as it is defined, in relation to other lexical meanings, in a (lexical) paradigm. When keeping with Hjelmslev’s broad view of ‘syntagm’, which extends the perspective to levels which are larger than the clause (or clause complex) and hence encompasses the level of ‘a text’, this point becomes even clearer: a text

³¹ Anticipating the discussion, it will be argued that Hjelmslev’s and Saussure’s interpretations indicate two complementary perspectives, which can be united if one takes into account the difference between functional structure and syntagmatic structure.

³² This point has already been alluded to in Chapter 1, in referring to Martin’s joining of the concepts of realization and instantiation, in which the contrast between syntagm and paradigm, as interpreted in a Hjelmslevian sense, plays a major role.

constitutes a con-text in which options selected from systemic paradigms are instantiated.

On the whole, the divergence between Hjelmslev and Saussure regarding the nature of system vs. text and paradigm vs. syntagm indicates the intricate connection between *instantiation* (defining a text as an instantiation of a system in a particular context), and the notion of *componentiality* as embodied in the rank scale (which defines units of language in terms of constituency, with smaller units regarded as occurring within the syntagmatic environment of larger units). The relationship between these two themes will be at issue in the exploration of systemic-functional baseline modelling, and in explaining the model which will be advanced in this dissertation [esp. Chapter 8].

5 Conclusion and outlook

In this chapter, four fundamental types of linguistic differentiations have been explored as they have been characterized by two linguists who have played a major foundational role in twentieth century linguistics in general, including SFL:

- (1) content-expression (signifiant-signifié);
- (2) form-substance-purport, schema-usage;
- (3) system-process; and
- (4) paradigm-syntagm.

The distinction between these diverse dimensions of differentiation is not always sharp. As we have seen, this is especially the case with system--process and paradigm-syntagm. Augmenting this sense of indeterminacy between the different types of dimensions, at this point it can be further noted that 'process', 'usage' and 'connotative content' are quite similar: (1) 'process' refers to the instantiation of a system in particular text chains, (2) 'usage' is the manifestation of a schema in particular contexts, and (3) a 'connotative content' is a secondary content (a content whose expression is a linguistic sign) which arises when a sign receives a further significance in relation to (contextual) factors such as sociology, culture, psychology and so on.

As a result of this indeterminacy, these types of differentiations, and the associated semiotic relations which they indicate (manifestation, instantiation, and other terms which have been used to refer to these relations), have been interpreted in variant ways by individual linguists. Important divergences between different linguistic frameworks can be explained on the basis of such variant interpretations of fundamental dimensions of differentiation. In the theoretical study undertaken in this dissertation, an attempt will be made to clarify the way in which the dimensions of realization, metafunctional diversity and instantiation are brought together in (different sub-types of) the systemic-functional modelling of language, by using the types of differentiations which lie at the basis of twentieth century linguistics in general, as formulated by Saussure and refined by Hjelmslev, as a semiotic basis.

Part II

Major dimensions: Stratification and metafunctional complementarity

This part constitutes the first move in the study of the systemic-functional model of language and the presentation of a semiotic-functional model, in which we will look at the most central aspectualizing dimensions in SFL, viz. stratification and metafunctional complementarity. This part consists of three chapters:

Chapter 3 focusses on the dimension of stratification, by looking at various types of stratified models which have been proposed in Stages I–II of SFL.

In **Chapter 4**, stratification is linked to metafunctional complementarity. This chapter deals with the way in which a stratified and metafunctionally diversified organization of language appears in the course of ontogenesis.

Chapter 5 looks at the interaction between stratification and metafunction again, from a more abstract viewpoint than the approach in Chapters 3 and 4. This chapter constitutes the first step in presenting a refined semiotic-functional model of language, specifying the ‘edges’ of this model. Different types of ‘semantics’ are distinguished and an attempt is made to clarify the interaction between stratification and metafunctional complementarity.

This chapter forms the first step in the investigation of systemic-functional baseline modelling, focussing on the most primary aspectualizing dimension: stratification. Its general aim is to explore the conception of language as a *multi-stratal* resource, and the associated concept of *realization*.

This chapter is organized into four sections:

- As a starting point for the exploration of stratification, the pertinence of the *notion of realization* will be further specified by pointing out its role in connection to the major representational tool of SFL, viz. the system network [**Section 1**].
- After this introductory section, the two following sections look into the origin and development of stratified models of language in the first *two stages* of SFL [**Sections 2–3**]. In these sections, a number of different types of stratified models will be distinguished and weighed up against one another.
- The chapter concludes with an *overview* of the different types of stratified models which have been identified, highlighting the variation between two central types of models which will be important in the further discussion of baseline modelling in relation to other aspectualizing dimensions [**Section 4**].

1 Starting point: The nature of ‘realization’ in the multi-stratified model and in system networks

As we have seen in Chapter 1, ‘stratification’, as conceived in SFL, and the modelling of language as a multi-*stratal* resource are a concept and a model which are designed to capture the view that meaning is created through *multiple* coding cycles, or *realization cycles*: context \triangleright semantics \triangleright lexico-grammar \triangleright phonology, or: a level of ‘doing’ is coded in a level of ‘meaning’, which is coded in ‘wordings’ (or ‘sayings’), which are coded in ‘soundings’. Therefore, an investigation of the stratified modelling of language must pay special attention to the realization relationship – the relationship of coding – between any two levels of abstraction, or strata.

Importantly, while the notion of realization lies at the heart of the differentiation between strata in the stratified model of language, it also plays a crucial role in the system network representation: it turns up in the *realization statements* which represent the system–structure relationship within a network.

Due to the central importance of the concept of realization, as visualized in Figure 3-1, a study of the stratified model of language must be interlaced with an exploration of the nature of the interaction between system and structure in the system network representation.




Figure 3-1 · The central role of realization in the stratified model of language and in the system network representation

Realization is one of the most fundamental theoretical concepts in SFL [cf. Halliday et al. 1992b: 64]. However, as Halliday points out, it is also “*probably the most difficult single concept in linguistics*” [Halliday 1992a: 62; emphasis MT]. This difficulty lies in two types of complex interactions at the level of theoretical dimensions:

- (1) on the one hand, in the ways in which realization plays distinct but related roles in both the general *stratified view* of language and in the major type of formalism in SFL, the *system network* representation;
- (2) on the other hand, in the ways in which realization relates to and interacts with *other theoretical dimensions*, especially metafunctional diversity, delicacy and instantiation.

The present chapter focusses on the first of these complexities; the second, which is more intricate, will be dealt with in different steps in subsequent chapters within Parts II and III.

The central role of the relationship of ‘realization’ in the general model of language as stratified and in the system network representation determines the types of questions which can be used as guidelines for exploring the

nature of ‘stratification’ in SFL. In order to formulate these questions, it is necessary to consider the specific role of realization in the environments of the stratified model as well as the system network.

In the *stratified model* of language, a stratum is seen as being realized in another stratum next below. As pointed out above in Chapter 1, in a *system network*, the realization relationship expressed in realization statements represents the link between systemic terms or features in the system and the structural coding of these features in configurations of grammatical functions and/or classes. These two types of realization are summarized in Table 3-1.

Dimension	Role of realization	Realization relationship	
stratified model	interfaces between strata, esp. between semantics and lexicogrammar	context: (social) doings	↘ semantics: meanings
		semantics: meanings	↘ lexicogrammar: wordings
		lexicogrammar: wordings	↘ phonology: soundings
system network	realization statements	system: (combinations of) systemic features	↘ structures: patterns of functions and/or classes

Table 3-1 · Realization in stratification and in system networks

The general question lying at the basis of the exploration of ‘stratification’ in this chapter is: *in which way do the multi-stratal modelling of language and the system network representation of language harmonize?* In other words: how do a model focussing on a relationship between context–semantics–lexicogrammar–phonology on the one hand, and a representation focussing on a system–structure relationship on the other hand, go together?

Keeping the relationship between the stratified model and the system network representation as a central point of attention for investigating the nature of ‘realization’, more specific guiding questions for this exploration can be identified by approaching this relationship from either side. In the following paragraphs, the interaction between the stratified model and the system network will be accessed from both directions, starting with the side of the stratified model, and then turning to the system network represent-

ation. The questions which will be arrived at in this way are summarized in Table 3-2 below.

Stratified model	System network
multiple coding cycles: context– semantics– lexico-grammar– phonology	coding relationship: system– structure (functions + classes)
In what way do the multi-stratal modelling of language and the system network representation harmonize?	In what way do the multi-stratal modelling of language and the system network representation harmonize?
How many strata can or should be distinguished? Especially: how can different strata within the content plane be distinguished?	Which strata are relevant in a systemic approach? I.e.: Which stratum (/strata) is (/are) or can be represented in system networks?
Which strata do the system networks set up to analyse language represent?	What is the nature of the realization relationship between system and structure?

Table 3-2 · Questions for guiding the exploration of ‘stratification’ and ‘realization’

As has been cursorily noted in Chapter 1, the systemic-functional conception of **stratification** is essentially flexible: while a differentiation between context–semantics–lexicogrammar–phonology is charted as a general scaffold for thinking about stratification, due to this flexible view, the number of strata which are to be distinguished in linguistic study is inherently variable. With the basic question about the number of strata – *how many strata should be distinguished?* – a concomitant, more fundamental question arises: on which basis should or can strata be identified as different levels of abstraction?

In the present chapter, stratification is explored in relation to the role of realization in the system network, which is the systemic-functional tool for representing the notion of ‘choice’. In this context, the question about the number of strata can be rendered more precise as: *which strata are (or can be) represented in the system–structure cycles of a system network?*

In the **system network**, the systemic features represent the most *abstract* categories of grammatical description, and the structure brings together different features selected for a particular point of origin [Halliday 1992a]:

choices which are made from simultaneous systems are realized into one single structure, which, as we have seen above, is a multi-layered *configuration* of *functional* elements mapped onto each other and mapped onto grammatical *classes*.

Two simplified¹ versions of interpersonal and experiential systems are represented in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. It is clear that the structures succeeding the realization arrow (“ \rightarrow ”) in a system network represents the lexicogrammatical stratum, which in general is organized in terms of the rank scale (and grammatical classes, providing a class labelling of structural elements, for instance ‘nominal group · verbal group’) and the metafunctions (providing a functional labelling of structure, for example ‘Actor · Process’, ‘Subject ^ Finite’). A crucial question turns up as to the nature of the other end of the realization relationship embodied in the system network (i.e. what is left of the realization arrow), viz. the systemic features and hence the systems themselves: *are the systems ‘semantic’ or lexicogrammatical?* This question lies at the heart of the complex interaction between the stratified model and the system network representation in SFL.

The fact that this question, and the related question about the number of strata, arise is a result of the very nature of the realization relationship between *especially ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’* in the stratified model. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the boundaries between the ‘semantic’ and the lexicogrammatical strata – which are interpreted in terms of an **internal stratification of the content plane**, and hence as the central strata of language – are essentially fluid. Consequently, the interface between the two, where the realization relationship applies, cannot be precisely defined, nor located.² The different conceptions about a differentiation between strata, and about the nature of the system networks which appear in SFL (viz. whether they are lexicogrammatical or semantic, or both), must be under-

¹ Indicating primary levels of delicacy only, and neglecting interlocking systems.

² The location of this interface can only be defined *theoretically*, as Halliday [1978b/1974: 43] points out in an interview with Herman Parret: “Well, I am not very clear on the boundaries here, between lexicogrammar and semantics. I tend to operate with rather fluid boundaries. But it can be defined theoretically, in that the lexicogrammatical system is the level of internal organization of language, the network of relations of linguistic form.”

stood in this theoretical context: the internal realization interface within the content plane *as a theoretical construct*.




Figure 3-2 · Illustration of system network: Experiential metafunction: TYPE OF PROCESS




Figure 3-3 · Illustration of system network: Interpersonal metafunction: MOOD TYPE

In this chapter, a number of different views about the mapping between a stratified conception and a systemic representation of language will be distinguished, and a number of variant models will be identified. Because of the importance of the *systemic* representation in the exploration of ‘stratification’, the following section analyses Halliday’s early systemic conception of language (Stage I: 1950s–1960s), before the notion of ‘stratification’ was introduced into SFL.

2 Precursory systemic models

The question about the stratal nature of the networks surfaces naturally as soon as the theory comes to accommodate a stratified conception of language, i.e. from the 1970s onwards (Stage II). However, the ‘precursory’ version of SFL, which precedes the stratified conception of language, and which will be generally referred to here as ‘system-structure theory’,³ will be considered in this study of stratification, for two reasons which highlight its foundational value for the further development of SFL. These reasons will play different roles in further discussions in this dissertation, which can be indicated as follows:

- (1) In relation to this chapter as a whole: Exploration of ‘stratification’. Although the notion of ‘stratification’ had not yet been introduced, the issue about the relationship between different ‘levels’ of language was already touched on and prepared in the first stage of SFL. A consideration of precursory versions of systemic models proposed in the 1950s–1960s will form the basis for understanding the introduction of an explicitly stratified model later on.
- (2) In relation to this dissertation as a whole: Exploration and explanation of the baseline model in SFL. The way in which grammatical classes are dealt with in the earliest version of Halliday’s conception of language (more specifically, the scale-&-category model) will play an basic role in motivating

³ See the Introduction for the motivation behind sub-dividing the development of SFL into three stages.

how grammatical units and classes are defined in the approach presented in this dissertation [esp. Chapter 8].

The different types (stages) of precursory systemic models which can be distinguished are summarized in Figure 3-4.




Figure 3-4 · Types of non-stratified systemic models

2.1 Systems of grammatical classes

System-structure theory I: Scale-&-category model

Halliday's early '**scale-&-category model**'⁴ is a system-structure theory in which a systemic representation is proposed as an abstract, paradigmatic model of grammatical structure. A system is basically a 'classification', and this is how it is initially conceived: as an organizing principle for *grammatical classes*.

A *structure* is seen as a pattern of syntagmatic relations, and hence its elements are defined in terms of relational labels: S, P, C, A are *elements of structure* at the level of the clause; M, H, Q are elements of structure in the unit 'group' of the 'nominal' class.⁵ An element of structure indicates a place in a pattern of syntagmatic relations. At each place, various types of items can occur, i.e. items of different types of grammatical *classes*.

Two types of grammatical classes are distinguished. *Primary classes* (e.g. verbal group, nominal group, adverbial group) are syntagmatically defined by their occurrence in a structure of a unit at a particular rank. In this way, they correspond to or 'derive from' primary elements of structure (e.g. nominal group corresponds to the element Subject, which is an element of structure in the unit clause) [Halliday 1963: 9]. *Secondary classes* are further subdivisions

⁴ Cf. Huddleston [1965: 574].

⁵ S= Subject, P= Predicator, C= Complement, A= Adjunct; M= Modifier, H= Head, Q= Qualifier.

within the primary classes along various dimensions which may cut across each other. It is these dimensions which are represented as systems.⁶

Each primary class serves as a “context of choice” [Halliday 1963: 10] or a “point of origin” [Halliday 1966b: 62] for a system network in which further subdivisions are made, defining secondary classes and further, more delicate classes. In other words, a primary class defines the syntagmatic environment in which further options become available. This is the way in which the system representation is intended as a means to represent the paradigmatic organization of language: the system specifies the various possible items which can occur at the same place in a syntagmatic pattern (or ‘structure’, in this model).




Figure 3-5 · The scale-&-category model

⁶ Halliday [1963: 7] further explains the difference between primary classes and secondary classes in terms of “chain classes” vs. “choice classes”: chain classes are defined by their (functional) status in a structure, whereas choice classes are defined in a system of differentiations along various dimensions (for example, definite | indefinite for articles, plural | singular for nominal groups).




Figure 3-6 · Illustration of the scale-&-category conception of structure (syntagmatic relations such as S, P, C, A) and systems of classes

The secondary classes relate to aspects of structure by **exponence** [Halliday 1961]: the classes which are specified by (combinations of) terms in the systems are the exponents of elements of structure. The scale-&-category model can be visually represented as in Figure 3-5.⁷ Figure 3-6 is a visual representation of an analysis which is given by Halliday [1961] as a “brief illustration” of his theoretical discussion.

In this early framework,⁸ the system networks are essentially *grammatical*; more precisely, they are an organization principle to account for distinctions which are interpreted as secondary and more delicate grammatical *classes*.

⁷ In the early scale-&-category model, systems are not visually represented. The visualization in Figure 3-5 is proposed in order to compare this model to the other types of models which will be discussed further on. It is based on the example of an analysis (of types of groups in the clause) in Halliday [1961], which is illustrated in Figure 3-6, and of the analysis of Chinese (of types of clauses in the sentence) in Halliday [1976a/1956]. The first visual representations of networks appear in Halliday [1976b (written 1964)].

⁸ Publications representing this early framework include: Halliday 1976a/1956, 1961, 1963.

2.2 System networks of grammatical functions with ‘semantic’ relevance

System-structure theory II: On the verge of a functionally diversified model

On the verge of the introduction of a stratified and metafunctionally diversified view of language, the conception of system networks changes in two ways: on the one hand, the system representation is disentangled from grammatical class; on the other hand, as a result of this, the networks are interpreted as pertaining to ‘semantics’ in addition to ‘(lexico)grammar’. This model will be referred to as an **intermediate system-structure model**.⁹

(1) As we have seen above, in the scale-&-category model, a *syntagmatic structure* is defined in terms of relational labels (such as S, P, A, C at clause level). In the late 1960s’ version of Halliday’s system-structure theory, the concepts of ‘structure’ and ‘syntagm’ are separated and redefined: a **structure** is interpreted as a *functional* configuration, and the term **syntagm** is reserved to refer to a sequence of *classes*. This has an important consequence for the conception of the system network, which is no longer seen as a means to describe different types of grammatical classes. This new conception of the system network has an opening-up effect, which will make possible the stratified and metafunctionally diversified view of language, and which in this way forms the basis of the whole subsequent development of the theory as functional and stratified.

In order to comprehend this crucial opening-up effect, it is useful to recapitulate the basic aspects of the scale-&-category model. In this model, structure is defined as a pattern of syntagmatic relations. The elements of structure (such as S, P, A, C) are places in the syntagm at which items of various classes can occur (such as types of verbal group, nominal group). The different cross-cutting dimensions which classify the types of classes that can occur as a structural element at a particular syntagmatic place are represented as simultaneous and dependent systems in a network which has as its point of origin the primary class corresponding to that structural element.

⁹ Publications representing this stage in the theory include Halliday 1976b (written 1964), 1964, 1966b, 1966c.

In the new version of system-structure theory which is proposed by Halliday [esp. 1966b],¹⁰ the *places* in a syntagm are defined, not as ‘elements of structure’ entering into syntagmatic relations, but in terms of *classes* arranged in a sequence. The ‘elements of structure’ are then seen as *functions* which can occur at the different places of a syntagm. As stated above, the syntagm is defined as a sequence of classes, whereas a structure is now regarded as a configuration of functions. Most importantly, it is now the functional aspect of structure which is seen as paradigmatic, and hence, which is represented in system networks. Table 3-3 summarizes the difference between the scale-&-category model and the intermediate system-structure model.

¹⁰ It is in this (second) version of system-structure theory that the first visual representations of networks appear [cf. Halliday 1976b (written 1964)].

	Scale-&-category model	Intermediate system-structure model
syntagm	a pattern of syntagmatic relations	a sequence of <i>classes</i> [later called class structure, as opposed to functional structure]
places in a syntagm	= <i>elements of structure</i> , defined in terms of <i>relational labels</i> (i.e. in terms of their relation to (their role in) the syntagm as a whole) e.g. at clause level: Subject, Predicator, Complement, Adjunct	defined in terms of <i>grammatical class</i> , arranged in a sequence e.g. in a clause: nominal group ^ verbal group ^ adverbial group ¹¹
structure	= syntagm	a <i>functional</i> configuration e.g. in a clause: Subject • Predicator • Complement • Adjunct
elements of structure	= places in a syntagm (relational labels)	regarded as <i>functions</i> which can occur at different places in a syntagm
system	represents the possible items, defined in terms of <i>grammatical class</i> , which can occur at the same place in a syntagm/ structure (a pattern of relations)	represents possible items, defined in terms of <i>grammatical functions</i> , which can occur at the same place in a syntagm (a sequence of classes)

Table 3-3 · The intermediate system-structure model in contrast with the scale-&-category model

In the intermediate system-structure model, a system represents the various functional options which are available in a particular syntagmatic environment. As in the scale-&-category model, this environment, which is stated as the point of origin of the network, is still represented as a class (i.e. a unit on the rank scale). However, the class which forms the root of a network is no longer defined as the class ‘corresponding to’ an element of structure, but rather, simply as a specification of the rank at which the systemic options in the network are available.

A choice in a system (or a combination of choices from simultaneous systems in a network) then specifies a certain aspect of the (functional) structure of a

¹¹ The symbols ^ and • were introduced by Halliday [1966b: 59], following Lamb, to indicate the difference between syntagmatic *sequence* (^: showing the order in which elements occur) and structural *configuration* (•, showing the mere presence of functional elements in a structure, without implying any ordering).

syntagm at a particular rank. The relation between system and structure is called **realization** (this term replaces the earlier ‘exponence’).¹² In this model, structure is seen as the integration of systemic features into a syntagm, i.e. a sequence of classes. In this way, an item in a syntagm can have composite functions, for example of Actor, Subject, Theme and Given [Halliday 1976c/1969: 5].

In sum, in the intermediate system-structure model, the starting point is no longer a structure of syntagmatic relations (i.e. a functional structure in the present model), whose elements are realized in particular types of paradigmatically defined classes (i.e. in terms of options selected from a network); rather, the structure itself is a realization of a number of paradigmatically defined functional features (selected from system networks) into one syntagm of classes. Essentially, this new model shows a shift from systems specifying grammatical classes to systems determining different types of functional patternings.¹³ The intermediate system-structure model is represented in Figure 3-7.

¹² Cf. Halliday [1966b: 59]: “I use Lamb’s term ‘realization’ instead of the earlier ‘exponence’. Lamb’s term is more widely known [...]”.

¹³ Concomitant with this general shift from paradigms of classes to paradigms of functions, is a shift in emphasis in the definition of grammatical classes. As pointed out in the previous sub-section, in the scale-&-category model, primary grammatical classes are defined in terms of their relation to (primary) elements of structure (i.e. functional elements) in the unit which is next above in the rank scale: primary classes of groups are defined in relation to the elements of structure which function in the unit ‘clause’. For instance, the type of group which occurs as the Subject (element of structure) is a nominal group.

In the intermediate system-structure model, aspects of class play two roles in a system network: (1) as the point of origin of a network, a unit (on the rank scale) indicates the syntagmatic environment in which functional patterns become available, and (2) the sequence of classes of which the unit at the point of origin is built up indicates the syntagmatic pattern onto which (different types of) functional structures are mapped in the final output of the network. Hence, aspects of class only feature at the ‘edges’ of the system network, since the emphasis is now on classifying (in systemic paradigms) *functional* structures, as we have seen above.

A result of this is that, although there is still an important link between grammatical classes and functional elements (in that functional elements are mapped onto a syntagmatic pattern (i.e. a pattern specified in terms of classes)), grammatical classes are ‘independently’ and more abstractly defined in terms of a general rank scale. More specifically, primary classes are now the units indicating different *constituents* on the rank scale (clause, group, word), whereas all further classes (i.e. including nominal group, verb, and so on, which are regarded as primary (defined in relation to primary functions) classes in the scale-&-




Figure 3-7 · Intermediate system-structure model

(2) Importantly, this shift creates the possibility of semantically motivating the options in the systems, and hence forms the basis of the later reinterpretation of this ‘semantic’ motivation as linked to the general functioning of language (metafunctions). In a passage which foreshadows the later introduction of a stratified model of language, Halliday refers to the ‘semantic’ dimension of system networks:

[...] underlying grammar [i.e. grammar represented in system networks, MT] is ‘*semantically significant*’ grammar, whether the semantics is regarded, with Lamb, as ‘input’, or, with Chomsky, as interpretation. What is being considered therefore is that *that part of grammar which is as it were ‘closest to’ the semantics may be represented in terms of systemic features*. [Halliday 1966b: 63; emphasis MT]

This ‘semantic’ aspect of the systems is symbolized as the green shade in Figure 3-7 above. Although the system networks are regarded as primarily

category model, as well as further sub-divisions such as ‘plural noun’, ‘deictic’, and so on) are regarded as further specifications which, in general, are possible as sub-types of these units. This shift in emphasis has ultimately led to the presentation of grammatical classes in a ‘general’ network in later stages of SFL [cf. Chapter 1].

The focus of the present chapter is on the general development of different types of models in SFL in relation to the dimension of stratification. Developments relating to grammatical class are briefly highlighted here because they will play an important role in the motivation of the model which will be proposed in Part III.

grammatical,¹⁴ it is recognized that they also have a ‘semantic’ dimension: they are ‘semantically significant’.

2.3 A functionally diversified model:

The ‘semantic’ motivation of networks is functional

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the study of grammatical systems inspired the metafunctional conception of language in general ‘from below’. Before the proper conception of *metafunctions* as a general (meta-)organization principle motivating the relationship between different strata in language, the system networks are regarded as pertaining to a number of general areas of meaning, which in a next step are linked to general functions of language. This type of system-structure theory on the verge of the introduction of the stratified model of language will be referred to as a **functionally motivated system-structure model**.

(1) In the study of grammatical systems in English, three major types of systems (TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME), “three main areas of choice” [Halliday 1967b: 199], come to be seen as three general “*areas of meaning*” [ibid.]. It is significant that in this framework, the grammatical systems of the TRANSITIVITY network which had been recognized earlier (viz. VOICE and the transitive | intransitive distinction¹⁵) are now complemented with a new system, which is more ‘semantic’ in nature: PROCESS TYPE [cf. Halliday 1967b, 1976d (written 1969)]. Halliday explicitly recognizes that this type of system is different from the ones which were previously distinguished in this area – the area which is now called ‘ideational’:

Transitivity is the representation in language of processes, the participants therein, and the circumstantial features associated with them. *This is an extension from the narrower meaning whereby the **form** refers simply to the types of process, as in ‘transitive and intransitive verbs’; we shall use it in the wider sense, so that transitivity here refers to the ‘**content**’, or factual-notional*

¹⁴ Cf. Halliday [1967a: 37, emphasis MT]: “The formulation is in terms of a ‘systemic’ description [...], in which *the grammar takes the form of a series of ‘system networks’*”.

¹⁵ The system containing the options transitive and intransitive is now also labelled NUMBER OF INHERENT PARTICIPANTS [Halliday 1976d: 172].

structure of the clause in its entirety. [Halliday 1976d (written 1969): 159; emphases MT]

(2) Halliday links the main types of grammatical systems which can be distinguished to general “functions that the language as a communication system is required to carry out” [Halliday 1968: 207]: “it is being claimed that all systematic contrasts in grammar derive from one or other of these functions” [Halliday 1970: 326]. Before the introduction of the stratified model of language, the grammatical systems are regarded as semantically motivated, because they can be related to the general functions of language, of which general components of meaning are derived. In this way, the options which are available in the systems are regarded as semantic. This can be illustrated with Halliday’s description of the textual component:

The organization of the clause into a theme and a rheme is a structural feature which, like other structural features, derives from *semantic options*: it is a configuration of functions expressing *a particular component in the total meaning* of the clause, namely the ‘textual’ component, its meaning as a message. [Halliday 1970: 360, emphasis MT]

Figure 3-8 visualizes this type of functionally motivated system-structure model. Although the systems are meaningful in that they pertain to functions of language, they are seen as essentially ‘grammatical’ systems: the first survey of types of systems in a rank–function matrix is referred to as “[a] suggested categorization of the *grammatical systems* of English according to function” [Halliday 1970: 326, emphasis MT]. It should be emphasized that at this stage, the relation between ‘grammar’ and ‘semantics’ is not yet interpreted in terms of a stratified model.




Figure 3-8 · A functionally motivated system-structure model

3 General types of stratified systemic-functional models

In discussing the first stage of systemic theory – Stage I: 1950s-1960s – above, we have looked at three types of precursory systemic models: the scale-and-category model, an intermediate system-structure model, and a semantically motivated model. In Stage I, these models succeed one another, i.e. new types of models appear as the theory develops, and in this way replace the older models. As has been emphasized, the precursory systemic models of Stage I are non-stratified, and the differences between them can be explained in terms of a theoretical shift: from a focus on grammatical class to a focus on semantic-functional structure.

The introduction of the stratified and metafunctionally diversified conception of language in the 1970s necessitates a reconception of the modelling of language, leading to different types of new models. From this stage onwards (Stage II), these models no longer simply represent subsequent phases of the theory, but rather, co-exist as *alternative* models, which are used for different areas of language, and/or for different descriptive and explanatory purposes. It is at this point that ‘extravagance’ arises as a natural feature of SFL.

In the present section the *variation in modelling* is indicated by spelling out four different types of systemic representations of the stratified view of language, which will be referred to as four **general types of systemic-functional models** (in contrast with the precursory systemic models, and later

developments in Stage III). Before turning to the variation between different types of models [Sub-section 3.2], the central question lying at the basis of this variation – the question which has been introduced above: whether networks are ‘semantic’ and/or lexicogrammatical – is further contextualized by indicating other work where it is addressed, and by showing its central importance in the theory as a whole [Sub-section 3.1].

3.1 A central question: ‘Semantic’ and/or ‘lexicogrammatical’ networks?

It is only after the introduction of the stratified conception of language that the question about the nature of system networks can be more precisely defined as: how to model the different realization cycles between the strata, which are theorized in the stratified view, in a systemic representation?

This question is recognized by Halliday & Fawcett [1987] in their editorial introduction to a collection of papers: summing up a number of recent developments in SFL, they mention “a continuing discussion about *levels*”, which turns around “the question of whether it is necessary (or if not absolutely necessary, desirable) to have a stratum of *system networks* at each level” [Halliday & Fawcett 1987: 7; emphases MAKH & RF]. Halliday summarizes his own position on the issue as follows:

[...] many fundamental aspects of language can be explained if one models them in stratal terms, such as metaphor (and indeed rhetorical resources in general), the epigenetic nature of children’s language, and metafunctional unity and diversity, among others. But this does not force us to locate the boundary [i.e. between lexicogrammar and semantics, MT] at any particular place. One can, in fact, map it on to the boundary between system and structure, as Fawcett does (system as semantics, structure as lexicogrammar); whereas I have found it more valuable to set up two distinct strata of paradigmatic (systemic) organization. [...] But the point is that the boundary is indeterminate – it can be shifted [...] [Halliday 1996: 29]

The inherent indeterminacy of the boundary between ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’ has also led to a fluidity in the grammatics, in the systemic representations. This overall indeterminacy in the modelling is a natural feature of an ‘extravagant’ theory [cf. Halliday 1998a], in which alternative models are set up to serve the different demands which are made on the theory: “[t]he number of strata [...] that we recognize, and the kind of

relationship between the strata, will tend to depend on the questions we are asking and the problems we are trying to solve” [Halliday 1984: 10].

From the 1970s onwards, different models have emerged to link a systemic representation to a stratified view of language, leading to divergent conceptions about certain areas of language. This diversity can be illustrated with reference to one of the most well-studied areas, the clause-level systems of MOOD, TRANSITIVITY and THEME: in some frameworks, these are referred to as “different components of the grammar” [Halliday 1984: 7]; in other contexts, they are called components of the ‘semantic’ system [e.g. Halliday 1977: 176].

Although each of the distinct models can be motivated in terms of ‘the types of questions which are being asked’ and ‘the types of problems which are being tried to be solved’, and although this variety can be appraised as a positive aspect of an extravagant theory, the indeterminacy in the modelling also has an important drawback: the exact distinction between the models has never been pointed out, and the various possible conceptions have never been brought together into an overarching framework explaining their complementarity and the specific values of each model. As a result of this, different models have come to be taken for granted as the basis for descriptions of different areas of language, especially the ideational and interpersonal components. As pointed out in the introduction to this exploration of models, an understanding of this variation in modelling for the two major metafunctional components is of crucial importance in relation to the further theoretical investigation in subsequent chapters (of the baseline modelling, as well as the modelling of grammatical metaphor), and in relation to the integrative type of model which will be proposed further on in this dissertation.

3.2 Four general types of stratified systemic-functional models

This Sub-section, which forms the basis for explaining different conceptions of system networks, focusses on the appearance of four basic types of views on system networks in relation to stratification. The aim is to clarify the differences between the distinct types of models by bringing them together into a more abstract framework. In this way, it will be shown how they are

related, and the reasons why each model brings out a particular facet of this more abstract framework will be spelt out.

The discussion of this core stage, which focusses on how the variation in modelling appeared in the first place, will build upon the descriptions of the introductions of the stratified and metafunctionally diversified models as presented Chapter 1. Especially important in explaining the variation in models which emerged will be the frameworks which inspired these new stratified and metafunctional conceptions from different perspectives: the study of lexicogrammatical structures and systems, the exploration of language development, and the investigation of the use of language in different social contexts.

As indicated, in this exploration, four general types of systemic-functional models will be recognized. A primary distinction can be made between, on the one hand, a *basic two-level model* which is used to represent proto-language and other examples of language used in restricted areas, and on the other hand, more expanded types of models representing fully-developed and fully functional language. These expanded models are of two types, which will be referred to as *extended stratified model* and *enhanced stratified model*. Within the enhanced type of stratification, it is useful to distinguish between *situation-specific* models and *generalized* models. These different types of models are distinguished on the basis of a number of cross-cutting dimensions of variation, as we will see below. Figure 3-9 gives a basic overview which can be used as a reference frame.




Figure 3-9 · Four general types of stratified systemic models

The models which are distinguished here are distilled from three types of *stratified* models mentioned by Halliday [1985b] (how many strata can or should be recognized?) and three (differently categorized) types of *systemic* representations indicated by Halliday & Fawcett [1987] (which strata can or

should be represented in system networks?).¹⁶ The distinctions made by Halliday and Fawcett are summarized in Table 4-4.

Types of stratified models in Halliday [1985b]: <i>how many strata can/should be distinguished?</i>		
Hjelmslevian model of content and expression	lexicogrammar as an extra level 'slotted in' between semantics and phonology	adding other, higher-level strata, e.g. in a theory of register
Types of systemic representations in Halliday & Fawcett [1987]: <i>which strata can/should be represented by system networks?</i>		
	networks only for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME, etc.	networks for a 'pure' and generalized semantics
		networks for a situation-specific sociosemantics ¹⁷
Combining stratification and systemic representation: four possible models		
Basic two-level model	Extended stratification model	Enhanced stratification model:
		generalized situation-specific


Table 3-4 · Three types of stratified models indicated by Halliday [1985b] and three types of systemic representations mentioned Halliday & Fawcett [1987], in relation to the four types of models distinguished in the present work for combining stratification and systemic representation

3.2.1 Basic two-level model vs. more expanded stratification models

The framework of language development can be taken as a starting point, specifying a primary distinction between a basic model representing the child's proto-language, and models of fully-developed adult language.

¹⁶ In these two articles, which function as introductions to volumes of collected papers, Halliday and Fawcett point to alternative types of models as different theoretical possibilities, without further explaining them.

¹⁷ Hasan [1996], in referring to semantic networks in general, also distinguishes between these last two types as "contextually-open" semantic networks and "context-specific" semantic networks.



Examples of selections, with their respective realizations:

- Interactional: generalized – call · Instrumental: initiating – goods: food: specific: bread
 ↳ *Hullo (narrow tone; + smile)* ↳ *more bread 'I want some more bread'*
- Interactional: personalized – call:need · Instrumental: initiating – services: amenity: water
 ↳ *Mummy come 'Mummy. I want you'* ↳ *water on 'I want the water tap turned on'*

Figure 3-10 · Micro-functional components in proto-language (19 months), illustrated with interactional and regulatory ‘semantic’ system networks and examples of realizations
 [based on Halliday 1976e/1973]¹⁸

¹⁸ The networks for two micro-functions are indicated in this summary, to show that they are *separate* (i.e. not simultaneous, as is the case with the metafunctions of the adult system) components.

The model used to represent proto-language (inter alia, as we will see below) will be called a **basic two-level model**. Proto-language, as we have seen above, can be modelled as being organized in two levels: content and expression. Taking the viewpoint of a more general framework in which also the modelling of a fully-developed adult language can be embedded, the two-level organization of proto-language is based on a simple twofold subdivision pointing to two areas which are, as such, extrinsic to language: (social) context and sounding. Since these two ‘non-lingual’ areas are the bases on which language is designed to operate as a semiotic system, they form the boundaries of an abstract framework in which the different systemic models of stratification can be related to each other: in each different conception of the relation between stratification and systemic representation, these two areas are conceived as, respectively, the upper and bottom extremes of the model.




Figure 3-11 · A basic two-level model of restricted semiotic systems

In the two-level model of proto-language [see Figure 3-11], the level of content is represented as a system of options of meanings which coincide with different (contextual) uses of language. In the “content system” [Halliday 1975], these uses of language can be grouped into a number of micro-functions, as we have seen above. Each option of meaning is realized in a particular expression, which is a sound pattern. Figure 3-10 gives an example of a part of the ‘semantic’ network of the interactional micro-function as a component of the content level of proto-language, with

illustrations of realizations. The main features of this model are:¹⁹ (1) a one-to-one correspondence between the levels: one meaning (which represents one use of language) is realized in one expression; and, (2) as a result of this, the absence of a grammatical or structural organization. It should be emphasized that the micro-functional components of proto-language are distinct systems (i.e. they are not simultaneous in the system network as a whole). Each system has its own entry point, which is the abstract label of the micro-function itself: the micro-function specifies the context-of-*use* in which the distinct options within the system become available.

Each of the more expanded stratification models of adult language is designed to bring out the role of lexicogrammatical/structural organization in a multi-stratal representation of language. Before turning to the distinctions between these more expanded, stratified, models, it is useful to briefly restate their major difference with the two-level model of proto-language – a difference which has already been hinted at above in the general presentation of stratification [Chapter 1]. Stratified models in general view language as *tri-stratal*: three linguistic strata are recognized in addition to the stratum of (social) context, i.e. ‘semantics’, ‘lexicogrammar’ and phonology.²⁰ Compared to the basic model of proto-language with its two levels of content and expression, the general stratified conception of language is most often theorized as involving an **internal stratification of the content plane**. Extending Hjelmlev’s terminology, the content plane is regarded as stratified into a *content-form* and a *content-substance* [cf. Halliday 1992b]. As we have seen, these are the strata of ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’, modelled in between phonology (which is now regarded as the basic expression plane) and (social) context. On this view, the two types of stratification models which can be distinguished (i.e. extended and enhanced stratification) differ with respect to the systemic representation of these two content-strata. It is

¹⁹ At this point, the general features of the basic two-level model are introduced in order to indicate the difference with more expanded stratification models. In sub-section IV below, the basic two-level model of proto-language will be illustrated in greater detail.

²⁰ The stratum of context is not linguistic per se: it is a level of social-contextual aspects, which are organized (realized) into linguistic meanings, which in turn are encoded (realized) in linguistic structures.

the variation between these two kinds of stratification models which will play a major role in further theoretical discussions in this dissertation.

3.2.2 *Extended stratification model*

In one type of model, which will be called an **extended stratification model**, the lexicogrammar is defined as that level which brings together meaning selections (i.e. from ‘semantic’ systems) into integrated structures.²¹

With respect to the dimension of realization, it is important to note that in the extended stratification model, the slanted realization arrows in the network represent the interface between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’ [see Figure 3-12]: in the network, the *systems* are conceived as representing the ‘semantic’ stratum, organized in three components of meaning; ‘lexicogrammar’ is seen as the *structural output* of selections from the ‘semantic’ systems.




Figure 3-12 · Extended stratification model

Within the general framework of the various possible models, the design of the extended stratification model should be understood as (1) building further upon the earlier functionally motivated system-structure model [cf. Section 2 above] and as (2) indicating a contrast with the basic two-level model. In

²¹ Cf. Halliday 1973c/1971: 67, 1976f: 29, 1973e: 42, 1977: 193, 1978f: 187-188.

both of these relationships with other models, it is the well-studied systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME which play a major role. Aspects of each of these relationships will now be further specified.

(1) The extended stratification model can be seen as a natural expansion of the functionally-motivated system-structure model, in that it naturally projects a stratification conception onto it: the stratal distinction between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’ is mapped onto a distinction which is already present in the earlier model, viz. the system–structure contrast. As we have seen above, the characterization of the networks of MOOD, TRANSITIVITY, and so forth as representing ‘semantic’ options is anticipated in the functionally-motivated system-structure theory, where, for example, the network of TRANSITIVITY has as its major system TYPE OF PROCESS, subdividing processes into the semantically significant types material, mental, relational. The extended stratification model conceives of grammar in general as being pushed as far as possible towards the semantics, or, as being semantically motivated: “a grammatical system is as abstract (is as ‘semantic’) as possible” [Halliday 1973d/1972: 95]. It is in this framework that a system such as TYPE OF PROCESS is semantically significant: for example, a material process is a ‘process of doing’, and one aspect of the functional structure encoding this type of process, is the presence of an ‘Actor’ as a functional (in this case ideational) role. It is precisely through this ‘semantic’ motivation that the systems can be conceived as being organized into three general components of meaning, which, in turn are motivated in terms of three general functions which language serves as a semiotic system.

Basic two-level model		Extended stratification model	
Content	micro-functions: groupings of distinct uses of language	≠	metafunctions: Semantics simultaneously present areas of meaning
	systems of meanings = uses of language	≠	systems of formalized meanings: MOOD, TRANSITIVITY, ...
			realization statements: ↘ Lexicogrammar structures
			final output: functionally complex syntagm
↘ Expression	sound-expression		sounding ↘ Phonology

Table 3-5 · The basic two-level model and the extended stratification model compared

(2) As an expansion of the earlier system-structure model in which the systems of MOOD, MODALITY, TRANSITIVITY, and THEME are seen as the major components around which language is organized, the extended stratification model is designed to bring out how adult language *contrasts with* (rather than emerges from) the basic set-up of the child's proto-language. In the basic two-level model, the meaning options in the system network representing the proto-linguistic content plane are contents corresponding to 'uses' of language which can be grouped into seven micro-functions, for example, the option 'respond': 'I want information: yes or no' in the pragmatic micro-function [Halliday 1984]. Each different choice in the content-network is realized in a simple sound-expression. In the extended stratification model, by contrast, meaning options are regarded as *formalized meanings* [Halliday 1973c: 99] represented in systems which are grouped in three relatively distinct *metafunctionally* defined components of meaning: MOOD & MODALITY; TRANSITIVITY; THEME & INFORMATION. The output of the different selections made in these simultaneous 'semantic' systems are lexicogrammatical structures, represented as realization statements in the networks and integrated (mapped onto one another) into one final syntagm, which in this way is *functionally complex*. This contrast between the extended stratification model and the basic two-level model is summarized in Table 4-5.

3.2.3 Enhanced stratification models: Situation-specific and generalized

An **enhanced stratification model** can be generally defined as a model in which strata representing 'lexicogrammar' and 'semantics' are both organized system networks. In general, its design with a *separate 'semantic' system network* in addition to the 'traditional' networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME provides the basis for exploring how a language system which is initially represented in a basic two-level model (for various reasons, as we will see below) can be refined into a more detailed model. In such a refinement, the basic set-up of the initial content-level system network is retained but modified into a more delicate 'semantic' network. This 'semantic' network is then seen as the input for the systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME, which in this model are regarded as *lexicogrammatical* systems.

A number of examples of enhanced stratification models are introduced by Halliday in the 1970s and 1980s,²² and the concept of a distinct ‘semantic’ system network will play a major role in new developments in SFL in the 1990s (which will be discussed as separate stages further below). In the general framework of types of models, the enhanced stratification model can be seen as a natural expansion of the basic two-level model; and it is in this context, i.e. in their relation to more basic two-level models, that the first examples of enhanced stratification models appear in SFL. Two types of enhanced stratification model can be distinguished, **situation-specific** and **generalized**, which are used in different ways as refinements of basic two-level models. A situation-specific enhanced stratification model represents types of linguistic systems for which it is useful or necessary to take a basic content-expression model as a starting point (for reasons which will be explained below). A generalized enhanced stratification model can be used to show how a fully-developed adult language *emerges from* (rather than contrasts with) the basic two-level system of the child’s proto-language.

In order to clarify the relation between the basic two-level model and the enhanced stratification model, it is useful to place the former in a more general framework, which frees it from its characterization as ‘the model of proto-language’, which was taken as a basis in the discussion of the extended stratification model above.

I The basic two-level model placed in a more general framework

The child’s proto-language is just one instance of a type of linguistic system which can usefully be represented in a basic two-level model. Compared to the enhanced stratified model, the basic two-level model can more generally be characterized as a model for types of language which are used in restricted areas. The young child’s language is ‘restricted’ in the developmental sense (i.e. it is not yet fully-developed) and this restrictedness is reflected in the protolinguistic system: it only has a limited number of expressions, realizing a limited number of meanings or uses-of-language, which can be grouped

²² Cf., introducing situation-specific enhanced stratification models: Halliday 1973c/1971, 1976e/1973, 1973d/1972, 1973e, 1975; introducing a generalized enhanced stratification model (for the interpersonal metafunction, as we will see below): Halliday 1984.


into a certain number of specific micro-functions language has in the life of the young child. Other types of restricted systems of language are, for example, the system of greetings, the language used in certain games, the system of threats and warnings used in a context of parental control.²³ These types of systems are restricted, in a more general sense, in that they are used in restricted contexts. This restrictedness can be defined from two angles: they are systems functioning in a social context which is a very specific type of situation (such as the context of parental control), or they are systems used in a context where language itself only has a very restricted, strictly defined role (this is the case, for examples, in certain games) [cf. Halliday 1973c/1971: 63].²⁴ Each of these types of restricted systems can be modelled in a basic two-level model, as a system network of a limited number of meanings, with (combinations of) options from this network being realized in a limited range of expressions. In other words, restricted systems of language can be represented as a “semantic network leading directly to formal items” [Halliday 1973d/1972: 83].

In the discussion of the child’s proto-language above, we have focussed on the simplicity of the basic two-level model, which stands in contrast with the extended stratification model: its one-to-one correspondence between content and expression, and its lack of a grammatical organization. However, in a more general framework of basic two-level models such as offered here, the representation of restricted systems in a simple content-expression framework can be positively motivated from two perspectives. (1) On the one hand, such a simple modelling is *possible* because of the limited range of expressions. (2) On the other hand, this type of modelling is *useful* because in this way, the content-level shows those specific options which are contextually relevant or socially significant; and in order to indicate this contextual meaningfulness, these options are characterized in an abstract way as ‘functions’ or ‘uses’ of language, for instance ‘blackmail’, ‘person-oriented threat’ in the example of

²³ These types of restricted systems are used as examples in Halliday 1973c/1971, 1973d/1972.

²⁴ Many instances of ‘restricted systems’ are restricted in both senses (i.e. with language having a limited role and functioning in a particular type of social situation). The child’s proto-language can also be characterized in this way: in this system, the role of language is still limited, and language is only used in certain very specific social contexts.

parental control given below, or ‘response’, ‘greeting’ in the young child’s system dealt with above.



Examples of selections, with their respective realizations:

- personal control:threat:conditional – person-oriented:child:his action
 ☛ *I'll smack you if you do that again*
- positional control:dissapprobation:direct – person-oriented:child:his action
 ☛ *that's very naughty of you*
- personal control:appeal:plea – person-oriented:child:himself
 ☛ *I don't like you to do that*

Figure 3-13 · Halliday’s analysis of a system of parental control as an example of a basic two-level model (based on Halliday 1973d/1972)

An example of a restricted system is given in Figure 3-13: this represents Halliday’s [1973d/1972] analysis of the language of parental control, illustrated with examples of paths through the ‘semantic’ network, and their realizations in specific expressions. The area which is marked off (the system of threats) will serve as the basis for the further discussion of the enhanced stratification model below.

II The situation-specific enhanced stratification model

The ‘semantic’ system network of a type of language used in a very specific social context, such as that of parental control, is open-ended: it may indicate only gross ‘semantic’ distinctions, or it may also accommodate finer distinctions, representing them as more ‘delicate’ options in the network [Halliday 1973c/1971: 60]. As more and more delicate meanings are brought

into the ‘semantic’ picture because more varied types of expressions are taken into account, it becomes useful to explore how these more delicate meanings are realized by differences in the structure of these expressions.²⁵ This can be done by indicating how the meaning options relate to certain features of the systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME, which are general (i.e. not tied to one particular context) systems characterizing lexicogrammatical structures. In this way, a **situation-specific enhanced stratification model** is set up, representing three levels which are seen as the strata of semantics, ‘lexicogrammar’ and phonology or graphology: a network of meanings which are relevant in a specific situation of social context, a level with the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME, and a level representing the final spoken or written realization [see Figure 3-14].




Figure 3-14 · Situation-specific enhanced stratification model

The three main features of the *situation-specific, enhanced, stratified* model can be specified in relation to the other types of systemic models which are distinguished in this overview.

²⁵ It will be noted that this kind of extension of the semantic network is less feasible in the case of a restricted linguistic system where the restrictedness is determined ‘from below’: in systems such as the language of certain games, where language itself plays a restricted, strictly defined role. In such types of restricted systems, the number of possible expressions is by definition (by the rules of the game) relatively limited.

(1) As an expansion of the basic two-level model, the situation-specific enhanced *stratification* model is tri-stratal (excluding the stratum of context, as indicated above).

(2) In contrast with the extended stratification model, the *enhanced* stratification model represents each of the strata of ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’ as a system network, i.e. there is a separate ‘semantic’ network, in addition to the ‘traditional’ networks of MOOD, TRANSITIVITY, THEME, which are regarded as *lexicogrammatical* systems.

As a result of this, the *stratum of ‘lexicogrammar’* consists of a systemic and a structural dimension: it comprises the lexicogrammatical networks, grouped into three functional components, as well as the realization statements and the final structural output. This means that the realization relationship represented in the slanted arrow (\triangleright) in the realization statements of the lexicogrammatical network no longer represents the stratal interface between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’, as is the case with the extended stratification model. Rather, the type of ‘realization’ indicated *within* the lexicogrammatical stratum in the realization statements is to be seen in a more general way as the coding relationship between the value of a linguistic category (a systemic feature or term) and its structural realization (the structural pattern encoding the systemic term) [cf. Halliday 1988a: 29].

In the enhanced stratification model, the ‘semantic’ *stratum* represents abstract meaning options which are contextually/socially relevant, but only those which are encoded in language. Therefore, the level of ‘semantics’ in this model can be referred to as a socio-semantics or a behavioural semantics: taking the perspective of this model, “meaning is a form of behaving” [Halliday 1973c/1971: 55] and language in general can be characterized as a behavioural potential [Halliday 1973c/1971: 63]. As an interlevel between context and lexicogrammar, the ‘semantic’ network only accommodates those social meanings which are encoded in language: the ‘semantic’ network serves as an interface showing how social aspects are organized into linguistic meanings, which are coded into lexicogrammatical patterns [cf. Halliday 1973d/1972: 80].

(3) In the *situation-specific* type of enhanced stratification model, the ‘semantic’ system network only represents meaning options which are at risk

in a particular social setting (or situation). In this model, the ‘semantic’ stratum is not organized in general metafunctional components, rather, it is a categorization (a network) of *specific* social meaning options which are open (i.e. which are at risk) in a particular context of situation. As an intermediate level, this specific stratum of ‘semantics’ relates upwards to more *general social* categories in the stratum of context and downwards to more *general linguistic* categories in the stratum of lexicogrammar.²⁶

In the downward stratal relation to lexicogrammar, the contextually relevant, situation-specific meaning selections provide the input for certain selections in the lexicogrammatical systems: a ‘semantic’ option serves as a ‘pre-selection’ for choosing lexicogrammatical options in the three simultaneous and *general* functional components of the lexicogrammatical system network. These lexicogrammatical options are specified by means of general linguistic categories as options in MOOD, MODALITY, and THEME are coded in structures which are characterized by general functional labels (such as Subject, Actor, Theme) [Halliday 1973d/1972: 93]. In the upward relation to the stratum of social context, the ‘semantics’ represents how social aspects of the setting in which language is used – which can be specified in general, sociological terms – are organized into linguistic meanings.²⁷

The situation-specific enhanced stratification model can be illustrated by taking as a starting point the two-level model of parental control which was sketched out above. The area of the basic (i.e. two-level) parental control system which will be focussed on here by means of illustration is marked off

²⁶ Cf. Halliday [1973d/1972: 101]: “the move from *general* social categories to *general* linguistic categories involves an intermediate level of *specific* categorization where the one is related to the other”.

²⁷ In the studies collected in Halliday’s *Explorations in the Functions of Language* [1973a], where the different types of models which are here called ‘enhanced stratification models’ first appear, the level of context is only referred to as the level of general social categories, which can be further specified with reference to a social (sociological) theory, as is done in the work by Bernstein. Later, after the conception of language as metafunctionally diversified has been applied to the theory of register, the context is seen as organized into the metafunctional components of field, tenor and mode. In this view then, the semantics is regarded as defining a register, a language variety whose meaning options (and, therefore also, whose lexicogrammatical patterns) are derived from the dimensions of field, tenor and mode characterizing a particular context of situation (social setting) [cf. Halliday 1977: 93, 1978d: 114].

in Figure 3-13 above. Various types of expressions can be seen as realizations of the ‘semantic’ selection ‘threat > conditional – person-oriented > child’, as illustrated in the following examples (taken from Halliday 1973d/1972):

- (1) *You’ll have to stay indoors if you go on doing that.*
- (2) a. *Daddy’ll smack you.*
 b. *You’ll get smacked*
 c. *I’ll smack you* } *if you do that again.*
- (3) a. *Don’t (you) do that again*
 b. *You stop doing that* } *or* } { *Daddy’ll smack you.*
 (4) a. *You do that again*
 b. *You go on doing that* } *and* } { *you’ll get smacked.*
- (5) a. *You’ll fall down*
 b. *You’ll get dirty*
 c. *You’ll cut your hands; your hands’ll get cut.*
 d. *You’ll tear your clothes; your clothes’ll get torn.*
 e. *Your feet’ll get wet.* } *if ...*
- [all: Halliday 1973d/1972]

In order to account for these more varied types of expressions realizing the same set of meaning choices in the basic two-level model, a situation-specific enhanced stratification model is set up by (1) refining the ‘semantic’ network, i.e. accommodating more delicate options, and (2) linking the more delicate ‘semantic’ distinctions to linguistic features in the networks of the lexicogrammatical stratum. Halliday’s refined ‘semantic’ framework of the area of threats is shown in Figure 3-15: in this network, threats are subdivided into threats proper and warnings, and a number of more delicate distinctions are incorporated.

Stratified systemic models




Figure 3-15 · A ‘semantic’ network in a situation-specific enhanced stratification model: Halliday’s network of threats and warnings in a context of parental control [based on Halliday 1973d/1972]

These ‘semantic’ options are then specified in terms of grammatical features from the systems of TRANSITIVITY and MOOD, or in terms of lexical features. For example:

- (6) a. ‘threat’ > ‘mental punishment’ > ‘by other’
 ↘ clause: TRANSITIVITY > TYPE OF PROCESS: relational > attributive;
 Attribute = adjective from Roget §900 [Resentment: *angry*, *cross*, ...]
 and condition explicit > ‘if’ type
 ↘ conditional clause
 E.g.: *Daddy’ll be cross with you if you do that again.*
- b. ‘threat’ > ‘restraint on behaviour’
 ↘ clause: TRANSITIVITY > TYPE OF PROCESS: action;
 clause: MODALITY > MODULATION: necessity;
 Actor = *you*
 and condition explicit > ‘if’ type
 ↘ conditional clause
 E.g.: *You’ll have to stay indoors if you do that again.*

- (7) a. 'threat' > 'physical punishment' > 'agency specified'
 ↘ clause: VOICE: active
 and condition implicit
 E.g.: *I'll smack you.*
- b. 'threat' > 'physical punishment' > 'agency unspecified'
 ↘ clause: VOICE: passive
 and condition implicit
 E.g.: *You'll get smacked.*
- (8) 'warning' > 'process' & 'child's own agency' > 'child as involuntary doer' & 'his 'person' > 'body'
 ↘ clause: TRANSITIVITY > TYPE OF PROCESS: resultative action & VOICE: active;
 Actor = *you*, Affected = *your* + part of the body
 E.g.: *You'll cut your hands.*
- (9) a. 'warning' > 'process'
 ↘ clause: TRANSITIVITY > TYPE OF PROCESS: action > superventive
 E.g.: *You'll fall down.* [active]
 You'll get hurt. [non-active: passive: mutative]
 You'll hurt yourself. [non-active: reflexive]
- b. warning > attribute
 ↘ clause: TRANSITIVITY > TYPE OF PROCESS: relational > attributive > mutative (*get*)
 Attribute = adjective from Roget §653 [Uncleanness], §655 [Disease], ...
 E.g.: *You'll get dirty.*
 Your feet will get wet.

Summarizing, the situation-specific enhanced stratification model is a multi-stratal model (context–semantics–lexicogrammar–phonology); in which the strata of 'semantics' and 'lexicogrammar' are represented systemically (i.e. through system networks); in which the stratum of 'lexicogrammar' comprises a systemic and a structural dimension; and in which the 'semantic' system network represents situation-specific, socially-relevant linguistic meanings. Since the *situation-specificness* of this model primarily manifests itself in the organization of the 'semantic' stratum, it is important to emphasize this aspect in relation to the overall nature of the 'semantics' in this model; this is especially important with a view to the

further discussion of the last type of model to be considered in this Sub-section, the *generalized* type of enhanced stratification model.

The design of the ‘semantic’ stratum in the situation-specific enhanced stratification model can be summarized in terms of three aspects:

(1) It is a system network of particular meanings which are significant options in a specific social setting (situation). It is this dimension which constitutes the *situation-specificness* of the model. Apart from this, two more general aspects should be pointed out.

(2) Because of the link with the higher-level stratum of social context in general, the ‘meanings’ in the ‘semantic’ network are characterized in an abstract way, i.e. the labels which are used are *as ‘semantic’ as possible* in order to make clear their *social relevance*. For example, by using an abstract meaning such as a ‘threat’ focussing on ‘physical punishment’ and ‘the child’s own agency’, the ‘semantic’ option which is so labelled is characterized in terms of the particular ‘functioning’ of language in a social context, or the ‘use’ of language as a form of social behaviour. In this example, the ‘semantic’ label identifies a particular type of structure or expression as functioning socially as a specific type of parental threat, or, in other words, it characterizes an expression as used to threaten a child with physical punishment in the context of parental control. Importantly, it is precisely due to this abstract characterization of the meaning options in the ‘semantic’ network that the enhanced stratification model can be used as a natural expansion of the basic two-level model, in which the content plane is also represented by an equally ‘abstract’ network of meanings or uses of language. We will return to this general aspect of ‘semantic’ abstraction as linked to the social-contextual ‘use’ or ‘functioning’ of language in the final conclusion to this Sub-section.

(3) The ‘semantic’ stratum in the enhanced stratification model represents socially-relevant *linguistic* meanings: the abstract ‘semantic’ network only accommodates those meaning options which are coded in language, i.e. which are encoded in lexicogrammatical features and structural patterns.

III The generalized enhanced stratification model

The major aspect in which the **generalized enhanced stratification model** [see Figure 3-16] differs from the situation-specific one, is that it is not tied to a particular social setting: it is *general* in the sense of being open to various social contexts. This difference is reflected in the design of the ‘semantic’ *stratum* in this model, which can be explained by comparing it to the organization of the ‘semantics’ in the situation-specific type of enhanced stratification model. In this comparison, it will become clear that the two types of enhanced stratification model define the ‘semantic’ stratum from different perspectives.

In the situation-specific model, as we have seen above, the ‘semantic’ network represents situation-specific socially-relevant linguistic meanings: it is a network of those highly abstract meanings which are at risk in a particular social setting and which are encoded in language. In this model, the ‘semantic’ network is primarily determined ‘from above’: it only accommodates those specific meanings which are significant in a particular context. The starting point is: which specific meanings are at risk in a given social setting? The aim of the model is to show how *social* aspects are organized in terms of *linguistic* meanings.




Figure 3-16 · Generalized enhanced stratification model

In the generalized enhanced stratification model, by contrast, the ‘semantic’ stratum is defined ‘from below’: it characterizes certain lexicogrammatical features in a more abstract (more semantic) way as ‘linguistic meanings’ and organizes these meanings in a ‘semantic’ network, in order to show how they can be socially-relevant in different contexts. Here, the main question is: which abstract meanings are encoded by the features and structural patterns of the general lexicogrammatical system networks? This question is taken as a starting point in order to show how these *linguistic* meanings can then be related to different *social* contexts in which language is functioning.

In both types of enhanced stratification model, the ‘semantic’ stratum is a network of abstract, linguistic meanings, i.e. meanings which are defined in an abstract way (i.e. as semantically as possible) in order to show their social relevance (the meanings indicate the ‘uses’ or the functioning of language in social context) and meanings which are coded in language (i.e. in lexicogrammatical features and structures). The contrast between the situation-specific and the generalized types of model lies in which of these two aspects of the ‘semantic’ stratum is taken as a starting point to set up the network: the social relevance or the linguistic coding. Put in stratal terms, the contrast can be defined as a difference in the perspective from which the ‘semantic’ stratum is primarily defined: from a *specific* context, or from the *general* options in the stratum of lexicogrammar.

In the generalized enhanced stratification model, this different perspective, ‘from below’ (from the lexicogrammar) and generalized (pertaining to the features in the general lexicogrammatical networks of MOOD, TRANSITIVITY and THEME; and open to different types of social contexts), has important consequences for the set-up of the ‘semantic’ network: it is organized in the three metafunctional components, ideational, interpersonal and textual. The conception of the generalized ‘semantic’ network as metafunctionally diversified must be understood in terms of this different perspective. On the one hand, since the ‘semantic’ stratum is seen as a network of the abstract meanings which are encoded in the different components of the ‘lexicogrammar’ (MOOD, TRANSITIVITY and THEME), it is possible to set up a distinct ‘semantic’ network for each metafunctional area. On the other hand, it is by organizing the ‘semantics’ in terms of the three general metafunctions that it can be related to different social contexts. In a particular situation,

from each of the metafunctional components meanings will be selected as 'at risk' in the given social setting; and this selection will be defined in terms of the contextual dimensions of field, tenor and mode, which are related to the general components of the semantics.

A generalized enhanced stratification model was first introduced by Halliday [1984], for the interpersonal component, in the context of the study of language development, where it is used as an expansion of the basic two-level model of proto-language: it serves to show how the language of the young child develops into adult language. In the stage of the general overview of systemic models which is at issue in this Sub-section, i.e. the stage in which different systemic representations of the stratified conception of language appeared (stage II), this is the only example of a generalized enhanced stratification model. The concept of distinct 'semantic' networks will play an important role in SFL in the 1990s, as we will see further on [Chapter 8].

At this stage, the generalized enhanced stratification model will be illustrated with Halliday's networks for the interpersonal component. Since the appearance and motivation of this model in the framework of the study of language development will be explored in detail in the next chapter, at this point, the illustration will be kept very brief: the aim here is basically to indicate what is meant by a generalized enhanced stratification model. Figures 3-17 and 3-18 show the 'semantic' and lexicogrammatical networks proposed by Halliday [1984] for a part of the interpersonal component: the 'semantic' system of SPEECH FUNCTION and its realization in the lexicogrammatical system of MOOD.




Figure 3-17 · The semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION: primary options




Figure 3-18 · The lexicogrammatical system of MOOD: primary options

4 Major types of stratified models: Review and prospect

The different types of systemic models can now be brought together in a general framework, which shows how they relate to one another. Figures 3-19 and 3-20 give an overview of the stratified and non-stratified models considered above. Figure 3-19 is a graphic representation showing the four types of stratified models (Stage II) against the background of the non-stratified models of Stage I. Figure 3-20 offers a matrix view of the stratified models, indicating the dimensions along which they differ from each other.

Looking at the overall evolution of models, following the three phases of non-stratified models in Stage I through to the four alternative stratified models of Stage II [Figure 3-19], it can be seen that, in general, ‘semantics’ has gained in importance.²⁸ This tendency, which will be referred to as **semantic inclination**, already becomes clear in the shift from the early *scale-&-category model* into the *intermediate system-structure model*, by which systems of grammatical functions supersede the earlier systems of grammatical classes, and a systemic grammar comes to be regarded as a “‘semantically significant’ grammar” [Halliday 1966b: 63].

²⁸ The tendency within SFL to become increasingly more semantic is also referred to by Butler, who speaks of an “increasing semanticisation of the grammar [SF grammar, MT]” [Butler 1990:18]: “from the mid-60s onwards, Halliday’s grammar became increasingly semantically-oriented” [ibid.: 22] [see also Butler 1996a: 167]. Halliday [1994: xix] also emphasizes the importance of semantics in SFL, although his statement does not refer to the evolution of systemic-functional theory in this respect: “a functional grammar is one that is pushed in the direction of the semantics”.




Figure 3-19 · Overview of models: graphic presentation




Figure 3-20 · Overview of types of stratified systemic-functional models: matrix presentation

This evolution continues in the *functionally motivated system-structure model*, the systemic model on the verge of the introduction of the concept of stratification and the metafunctional hypothesis. In this model, the options in the system networks are defined on the basis of ‘semantic’ considerations. The grammatical networks of clause systems are grouped into three components, which are regarded as pertaining to three general components or areas of meaning in the clause. The tendency of semantic inclination at this stage can especially be seen in the ‘widening’ of the network of TRANSITIVITY to include (semantic) types of processes (processes of doing, sensing, being) apart from the earlier systems of VOICE and the transitive | intransitive contrast.

In Stage II, the ‘semantics’ tends to become more prominent: through the stratified conception of language, it is given its own place in the overall organization of language, described in terms of ‘a level of meaning’, ‘a level of wording’ and ‘a level of sounding’. The two ‘full’ (i.e. tristratal) models of language which are proposed in the 1970s – viz. the extended and enhanced types of stratification model – appear as further refinements of the earlier non-stratified models on the one hand, and are presented as contrasting with a simpler *basic two-level model* on the other hand, which is only useful for explaining restricted types of language. The *extended stratification model* emerges as the direct stratified variant of the functionally motivated system-structure model: the stratum of ‘semantics’ is regarded as the level of the system networks, which contain ‘semantic’ options pertaining to the three metafunctions, whilst the stratum of ‘lexicogrammar’ is regarded as the structural realization of these options.

In the *generalized enhanced stratification model*, which, as noted, is proposed for the interpersonal metafunction, the tendency of semantic inclination is even taken a step further: the ‘traditional’ networks (TRANSITIVITY, THEME, MOOD and so on) are regarded as constituting the stratum of lexicogrammar, whereas a separate ‘semantic’ network is set up, forming the level which is realized through the options in the lexicogrammatical systems. As we will see in Chapter 8 dealing with Stage III in SFL, the tendency of semantic inclination, which culminates in the notion of separate ‘semantic’ networks, continues in the 1990s, when other types of separate ‘semantic’ networks

(apart from the system of SPEECH FUNCTION proposed for the interpersonal component) are explored.

Turning now to the general characteristics of the stratified models as represented in Figure 3-20, two major cutting dimensions can be recognized:

- (1) One important dividing line is the one between the basic two-level model on the one hand, and more expanded, tri-stratal models on the other hand – as will be noted, this dimension was taken as a starting point in the outline of the models above.
- (2) Another major division line is that between situation-specific models and generalized models which are open to different contexts. From a theoretical viewpoint, the contextually-open models are more important: these models are more powerful, since they can be related to specific situation types through a skewing based on register variables. As indicated, within this area of generalized models, it is the generalized enhanced stratification model which will play a major role in further developments in the 1990s.

It will be noted that, in explaining or illustrating the ‘semantic’ dimension of the *extended* stratification model, the focus has been on the *ideational* component (especially regarding the ‘semantic’ nature of the system of TYPE OF PROCESS, part of the TRANSITIVITY network); whilst an *enhanced* stratification model, as we have seen, has been proposed by Halliday for the *interpersonal* component. It is the difference between these two types of models which indicates the diverging ways in which the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions have come to be theorized in SFL. In Chapter 5, which focusses on clarifying the theme of metafunctional diversity in relation to stratification, these different ways of theorizing will be further specified.

Having indicated the importance of the variation between extended and enhanced stratified models, it is useful to consider the location of this variation in the context sketched in the present chapter. In the scheme in Figure 3-20, the area in which the different approaches to the interpersonal and ideational components of language can be spelt out is marked off by the two major cross-cutting dimensions mentioned above (number of strata and context-specificity): the extended stratification model and the generalized enhanced stratification model as complementary types of generalized

expansions of the basic two-level model. As we have seen, these three types of models occur in the context of the study of *language development*: it is in this framework that Halliday proposes the first generalized enhanced stratification model, with a separate interpersonal network, as a natural expansion of the basic two-level model of proto-language, and as an alternative to an extended stratification model. A detailed exploration of this area, in which the complementarity between the major 'full' stratified models will be further specified in relation to the theoretical dimension of metafunctional diversity, is undertaken in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Metafunctional diversity and stratification: The ontogenetic basis

In the previous chapter, the dimension of **stratification** (and its relationship to the systemic representation in SFL) has been explored. A number of stratified models have been identified, and it has been indicated that two different central types of models are associated with the two major metafunctions: (1) the extended stratification model, associated primarily with the experiential metafunction, where the network of TRANSITIVITY is conceived as indicating ‘semantic’ options realized in lexicogrammatical structures; and (2) the generalized enhanced stratification model, associated with the interpersonal metafunction, which has a separate ‘semantic’ stratum (i.e. the network of SPEECH FUNCTION) which is realized in lexicogrammatical systems (MOOD and MODALITY) and structures.

The present chapter and the following one together constitute the second step in the overall exploration of the systemic-functional model of language undertaken in this dissertation. They concentrate on the dimension of **metafunctional diversity** in relation to stratification. Their major objective is to give an initial explanation for the difference between these two central types of stratification models by spelling out the general complementarity between the major metafunctions. In the present chapter, the interpersonal--ideational complementarity will be approached from the context of study in which Halliday first introduced the notion of ‘metafunction’, i.e. the exploration of *language development* in the 1970s.

The framework which will be laid out in this chapter to offer a characterization of the complementary nature of the interpersonal and experiential components of language, and the initial clarification of the different approaches to these metafunctions which will be presented in the next chapter, will serve as a basis for the third step in the exploration of the baseline model in SFL, taken in Part III, which also brings in the dimension of **delicacy** (and further themes related to this dimension).

1 Introduction: The framework of ontogenesis as a way into explaining the complementarity between different models

As has been announced in Chapter 3, it is in the context of a discussion of Halliday's *ontogenetic studies* that the complementarity between the major types of models can be further spelt out and explained. In order to explore how the adult system which emerges from proto-language can usefully be modelled in a generalized enhanced stratification model with a separate interpersonal 'semantic' network, it is necessary to look in more detail into the different stages in the development of language. The various minor steps which Halliday [e.g. 1975, 1984] recognizes in this development are visualized in Figure 4-1. This figure can be used as a general reference framework for the discussion in the present chapter.

The reason why Halliday's studies of language development [cf. Halliday 1973c/1971, 1973e, 1976e/1973, 1975, 1984, 1992b] offer a framework for explaining the dimension of metafunctional complementarity in the systemic-functional modelling of language is twofold:

- (1) In general, as we have seen in Chapter 1 dealing with the major theoretical dimensions of SFL, the study of language development has served as an inspirational background for motivating and clarifying the systemic-functional view of language as stratified and as metafunctionally diversified.
- (2) More specifically, in Halliday's ontogenetic studies, the adult organization of language is alternatively represented by an *extended stratification model*, especially in the earlier studies in general and in focussing

on the ideational component, and by a *generalized enhanced stratification model*, which is proposed for an area in the interpersonal component of language.

Because it is the latter type of model (generalized enhanced) which is offered by Halliday [1984] as a new alternative in contrast to the extended stratification model,¹ the discussion in this chapter will initially be oriented to explaining and motivating the design of the interpersonal enhanced stratification model in the framework of language development, in order to create a basis for clarifying the general contrast between the approaches to ideational vs. interpersonal systems.

The framework of ontogenesis forms a basis for explaining the complementarity between the major types of systemic-functional models, at three levels of different orders of complexity:

- (1) On an *initial, basic level*, focussing on the development of language as such, this framework shows how the 'simple' (in the sense of not yet fully developed) setup of the child's proto-language expands into a more complex system of language which has a 'lexicogrammar' as its central core.
- (2) On a *descriptive-modelling level*, this framework shows how the child's proto-language which can adequately be modelled by a basic two-level model (recapitulating: with a content and an expression plane) develops into the system of adult language, which requires a more expanded, multi-stratified, type of model. Importantly, it is a careful consideration of how Halliday models the various sub-steps, and especially of how he explains the reorganization of the proto-linguistic micro-functional setup into a metafunctionally diversified language, which will serve as the basis for understanding and motivating the *design* of the first generalized enhanced stratification model which appears in SFL.

¹ The extended stratification model, as we have seen above [Chapter 3], is the first type of tri-stratal model building the concept of stratification into the earlier functionally motivated system-structure model.
















Figure 4-1 · Overview of Halliday's model of ontogenesis




Heuristic





Proto-language	Adult language
content level	semantics lexicogrammar phonology
new general features pertaining to pragmatic macrofunction overall interpersonal options new (pre-lexical) item with pragmatic macrofunction new general features pertaining to mathetic macrofunction new (pre-lexical) item with mathetic macrofunction meanings which remain being expressed proto-linguistically in proto-language and throughout the transition stage	interpersonal metafunction experiential metafunction textual metafunction



(3) On a *more fundamental, theoretical level*, the framework of ontogenesis is literally a *frame-work* for moving into an explanation of the setup of adult language: for this reason, it is called ‘a way into explaining different models of language’ [cf. title of this section]. As will be explained at the end of this chapter, by approaching the organization of adult language from an ontogenetic perspective, we first focus on what will be referred to as the ‘edges’ of the model of adult language. An understanding of these ‘edges’ will then be used as a framework for moving into the heart of the setup of fully-developed language, i.e. its ‘lexicogrammar’ [Part III], and for spelling out how SFL models this setup by further carving up its lexicogrammatical core and linking it to these ‘edges’.

It is important to point out that the focus in this chapter is on the latter two levels. The reason for bringing up the framework of language development is not its ontogenetic aspect per se. In other words, in pointing out the various steps in ontogenesis which are recognized by Halliday, the aim is not to give a comprehensive account of this development as such. Rather, the ultimate objective is to provide an initial explanation for the complementarity between two major types of systemic-functional models of language, and further, to provide a basis for moving into a further discussion of the lexicogrammatical heart of language.

This chapter is organized as follows:

- (1) *Presentation* [Section 2]. First, an overall presentation is given of Halliday’s studies of language development.
- (2) *Further analysis* [Section 3]. After the general framework has been presented, Halliday’s theory of language development will be discussed, in light of the initial aim of this chapter, viz. to come to an understanding of the first generalized enhanced stratification model proposed in SFL. In this discussion, a refined model will be proposed for the transition phase, highlighting the emerging stratification in the development of proto-language into adult language.

2 Presentation of Halliday's theory of language development

This section gives an overview of Halliday's theory of ontogenesis, centring around three aspects which follow the line of the development of language:

- The analysis of *proto-language* (in Halliday's study, 'Nigel's language', abbreviated as NL), indicating the expansions of the system from NL0 to NL5/6 [Phase I: Sub-section 2.1].
- Halliday's models of a subsequent *transitory* phase, divided in 'early transition' and 'late transition' (the latter representing Nigel's language on the verge of the adult system) [Phase II: Sub-section 2.2].
- Halliday's views about how the late transitory model finally expands into the *adult system* [Phase III: Sub-section 2.3].

The different phases which Halliday distinguishes in his theory of language development are summarized in Table 4-1.

Phases		Age (years · months)
Phase I: Proto-language	NL1	0·9 – 0·10½
	NL2	0·10½ – 1
	NL3	1 – 1·1½
	NL4	1·1½ – 1·3
	NL5	1·3 – 1·4½
Phase II: Transition	Early	1·4½ – 1½ (1·6)
	Late	1½ – 1·10½
Phase III: Adult language		1·10½ onwards

Table 4-1 · Phases distinguished in Halliday's theory of ontogenesis

As we have seen above, proto-language can be described in a two-level model, where the content level is a system network of meanings or uses of language grouped into a number of distinct (i.e. separate, systemically contrasting) **micro-functions**. This model represents Phase I in Halliday's study of the language of one child (Nigel).² In a second phase, which is seen as transitory between proto-language and adult language, the micro-functions

² In this dissertation, in relation to ontogenesis, only the term 'phase' will be used, reserving 'stage' to refer to the different time stages in the development of SFL.

come to be reorganized into two **macro-functions** which are simultaneous systems of options: pragmatic and mathetic, which are seen as the basis for the interpersonal and ideational **metafunctions** in the adult system.

Before turning to a more detailed consideration of this development, it is useful to repeat some general aspects which have been mentioned above [in Chapter 3] and to relate them to the phases which Halliday distinguishes. As we have seen, the development of proto-language into adult language involves an overall shift from one-to-one correspondences between contents and expressions to a system in which the final output structures are *plurifunctional*. In Phase I, one use of language is one meaning, and corresponds to one expression (or a very limited range of expressions). In Phase II, aspects of different components (initially, within different micro-functional systems and between macro-functional components) come to be combined in preliminary types of structures, and, as we will see below, this reorganization coincides with two other developments: the learning of adult *vocabulary*, and the appearance of a *grammar* organizing different types of structure. Hence, it is at this stage that a purely formal level (a level of content-form, as we have seen above) of 'lexicogrammar' gradually emerges. In Phase III the child's language comes to be generally organized as the adult system, with each utterance having both an ideational and interpersonal meaning, a metafunctional conflation which is made possible through the textual metafunction.

2.1 Phase I: Proto-language from NL0 to NL5-6

In NL0, two general semiotic (i.e. not strictly linguistic!) dimensions are recognized: *action*, realized by touch and *reflection*, realized by a simple vocalization [Ø]. Each dimension accommodates two options, which are coded by different ways of touching, and distinct intonation contours respectively: the options 'give me that' (further subdivided into 'I want it' and 'I don't want it') and 'do that' in the action dimension; and the options 'be with me' and 'see/hear that' in the personal dimension. This initial organization, with only five possible realizations, forms the basis for distinguishing more elaborate components in further phases of the proto-linguistic system.

The four major options in NL0 develop into four components in NL1, which are termed “micro-functions”: **instrumental**, **regulatory**, **interactional** and **personal**. These components as described by Halliday [1975: 37, 39] are summarized in Table 4-2.

Micro-function	General semantic gloss	Description of the use/function of language in the life of the young child
Instrumental	'I want'; 'give me'	language used to satisfy the child's material needs
Regulatory	'do this'	language used to exert control over the behaviour of others
Interactional	'me and you'	language used to establish and make contact with those people that matter to the child
Personal	'here I come'	language used by the child to express his own individuality and self-awareness

Table 4-2 · Proto-language: the first four micro-functions

As has been emphasized above, the micro-functions are separate (i.e. non-simultaneous) systems in the general content network of proto-language: each system has its own point of origin, which is the abstract label of the micro-function itself, specifying the functional environment, i.e. the context-of-use, in which the options become available.

In NL1, each of the micro-functional components is split up in two simple contrastive options, which form the primary distinctions which are relevant in each NL1 component. In the instrumental and regulatory micro-functions, these options remain the primary distinction throughout the development of proto-language. The interactional and personal systems accommodate more delicate distinctions, which will become reorganized (in terms of delicacy) in later stages of Phase I. The basic options of NL1 are summarized in Table 4-3.

Instrumental: demand	general 'give me that'	specific 'give me my toy bird'
Regulatory	normal 'do that'	intensified 'do that right now'
Interactional	initiation 'nice to see you, and let's look at this together' > normal intensified	response 'yes, it's me'
Personal	participation > interest pleasure	withdrawal 'I'm sleepy'
	interest 'look! ...' > specific general	pleasure 'that's nice/ that tastes nice' > specific general

Table 4-3 · NL1: Basic binary setup per micro-function

In NL1, the personal micro-function, which is concerned with expressing self-awareness, is already organized in terms of a basic distinction between the self and the non-self (or the environment). This distinction is indicated by Halliday within the option participation: interest refers to attention directed to external phenomena ('look! ...'), whereas pleasure is a personal reaction ('that's nice'). In NL1, each 'semantic' option is realized by a simple vocalization (combination of articulation and intonation [cf. Halliday 1984: 26]): things or actions are not yet 'named'.

A small number of names appears in NL2: especially in the personal component, in the option referring to attention to things in the environment (interest > specific > dog | ball | aeroplane | nose); in the instrumental function, 'powder' now marks a different object of desire, in addition to 'toy bird' (option demand > specific). It should be emphasized that these more specific 'names' appear in the micro-functional, proto-linguistic sense: they are not representative for the objects (they are not common names), but rather, they simply encode a 'use' of language [cf. Halliday 1975: 42]. For example, 'bird' (↘ [bø] mid tone) means 'I want my toy bird!'; 'aeroplane' (↘ [œ^wœ] mid tone) means 'Look/hear! An aeroplane!'). Apart from the introduction of more specific elements in the areas of specific command (instrumental function) and specific interest (personal function), more delicate options appear in the interactional component: different types of greetings and responses.

From NL2 onwards, expansions of the various micro-functions involve on the one hand the appearance of a wider range of particular elements or names in those cases where functions are marked as ‘specific’; and on the other hand, finer (more delicate) distinctions in the different types of uses of language. In NL3 and NL4, new specific elements turn up in the options specific command (instrumental), specific demand (regulatory), personalized greeting (interactional) and specific interest (personal). The instrumental and regulatory components are expanded with more delicate types of general demand and general command: in both micro-functions, the contrast between initiation and response comes to be coded and within these options, finer distinctions become relevant. Finally, new types of expressions of feelings turn up in the personal component (surprise and disgust).

In addition to these expansions of the four basic micro-functions, in NL3 and NL4 two new micro-functions appear: the imaginative (in NL3) and the heuristic (in NL4). The **imaginative** micro-function refers to the use of language by the child to create an imaginative environment of his own, either as pretend-play or a sound world (such as in songs). The **heuristic** micro-function is concerned with the (linguistic) exploration of the external environment, the exploration of what the world is like. It consists of two major options, initiation, which mainly refers to a demand for a name ‘what’s that (called)?’ (↘ [a::da] mid rise); and response, a reaction to an adult’s answer to this question: either a simple acknowledgement, or an imitation of the name which was asked for. The heuristic function appears as a new micro-function, indicating the importance of exploring the names of things from NL4 onwards, based on the option engagement > initiation > shared attention (‘Look! What’s that?’) in the interactional component. In a more general sense, the imaginative and heuristic micro-functions depend on the earlier contrast between self and non-self, which plays a role in the options within the personal component (on the one hand, interest, referring to attention towards the outer world; and on the other hand, personal feelings such as pleasure, surprise, disgust) [cf. Halliday 1975: 40].

Micro-function	General semantic gloss	Description of the use/function of language in the life of the young child
Imaginative	'let's pretend'	language used by the child to create an environment of his own
Heuristic	'tell me why'	language used for exploring the external environment

Table 4-4 · Proto-language: the imaginative and heuristic micro-functions

In NL5 and NL6 the expansion of the separate systems continues: again, more specific elements within the options specific demand (instrumental), specific command > request (regulatory), and as objects of the external world (in the personal component). In NL5, the feature specific command is further subdivided into two types: suggestion (a joint command: 'let's') and request ('(you) do this'). In the personal micro-function, the particular external objects (dog, ball, teddy, bird, and so on) which in earlier phases were introduced qua objects of interest, are now separate elements, placed under the heading of observation and disentangled from the feature of interest. The latter is now seen as a general expression of feeling, together with the earlier surprise and disgust, and a number of new feelings which come to be coded in NL5 (excitement, joy, warning, complaint). An important refinement in the interactional component are the different types of responses to more delicate questions asked by adults: responses to "Say ...!", "Where's ...?" and "Look!". These more specific responses contrast with the earlier simple reactions (vocalizations) to reproofs and interaction in general (cf. NL1–NL4).

An initial kind of combination of meanings appears in NL5, in the greeting system within the interactional micro-function: the original options of personalized greeting (*Anna* ∇ [an:a], *Daddy* ∇ [dada], and a new one, *Mummy* ∇ [ama], which appears to be introduced last), come to be *combined* with a new sub-system of two general types of greeting, i.e. seeking and finding. This opposition is realized by a difference in intonation (seeking ∇ level tone: mid-high + high vs. finding ∇ falling tone: mid fall + low) [cf. Halliday 1975: 67]. This is the first instance of *intersecting 'semantic' systems* (i.e. systems which are systemically simultaneous in a network) in the development of proto-language; apart from these systems, the child can only mean one thing at a time. Importantly, Halliday [1992b: 30] interprets this first combination of 'semantic' systems as a preliminary version of stratification or '**proto-**

stratification': "with the meaning 'first' construed as wording [i.e. the contrasting names] and 'then' (re)construed as sounding".

In **NL6**, more objects of desire appear in the option specific command (instrumental), and further types of request are distinguished in the option specific demand: request for permission, request for excursion, request for assistance (regulatory). The most important innovation, in NL6, is an explosive expansion of the set of objects of observation in the personal component. At this stage, the learning of adult **vocabulary** becomes prominent (as indicated by the feature label learning, instead of observation in previous stages): "the new words function mainly as a means of categorizing observed phenomena, and provide the earliest instance of the use of language as a means of learning" [Halliday 1975: 43].

Together with the lexical explosion, initial types of structures appear [ibid.: 45]. First proto-structures, and then, structures in the true sense, i.e. strings of words. Halliday indicates two types of **proto-structure**, which are already used at the outset of NL6: specific expressions used with a particular function (as we have seen) come to be combined with (1) a gesture, or (2) a general expression from the same function. For example [from Halliday 1975: 45]:³

- (1) Combinations with gesture:
 - a. Instrumental function:
[dà:bì] *Dvorak* (the feature music in the system of specific commands)+ beating time (music gesture)= 'I want the Dvorak record on'
 - b. Personal function:
[ndà] *star* + shaking head (negation gesture)= 'I can't see the star'
- (2) Combinations with general expressions:
 - a. Regulatory function:
[ɛ̃ lɔ̃] command + *hole* = 'make a hole'
 - b. Personal:
[ù æyĩ] excitement + *egg* = 'ooh, an egg!'

Structures in the true sense, i.e. strings of words, appear a few weeks after the lexical explosion, initially in the personal component, as combinations with

³ In these examples, and other examples of NL6 and later stages given below, ` = falling tone and ' = rising tone.

the newly acquired words, for example [bλbu nōumð] *bubble, no more* ‘the bubbles have gone away’. This possibility of forming structures is indicated in the personal network by the simultaneous system of appearance and disappearance as part of the option learning.⁴

2.2 Phase II: Transition from proto-language into adult language

NL6, with its lexical explosion and the appearance of word strings marks the gradual emergence of a **lexicogrammar**; in this way it is regarded as the first phase of a general transitory phase (Phase II in the general development) from proto-language to adult language. The emergence of a lexicogrammar, or more generally, the possibility of creating *structures* by combining meanings from intersecting systems, prepares the reorganization of proto-language which will finally turn it into the adult linguistic system. This reorganization is analysed by Halliday in two sub-phases within the Phase II: early transition (henceforth TR1) and late transition (henceforth TR2).

In **TR1**, the various micro-functions come to be reorganized into two more abstract components, which Halliday calls *macro-functions*: mathetic and pragmatic. The **mathetic** macro-function refers to the dimension of learning about the environment, which has become important in NL4, with the appearance of a heuristic micro-function, and further in NL5 and NL6, with the learning of adult vocabulary. In this sense, the mathetic macro-function is a grouping of the earlier heuristic and personal micro-functions. It consists of three components: observation and engagement (which are the two main systems in the personal micro-function), and exploration (derived from the heuristic micro-function). The aspects of demanding (instrumental), commanding (regulatory) and greeting (interactional) are grouped into the more general **pragmatic** macro-function as three separate components: give, do and be.

⁴ The other simultaneous system within this network, observation | recall, is not coded in NL6; it indicates a general distinction between present and past observations. This distinction is clear to the interactants in the context, since at this stage observation only refers to shared experiences, as we will see further below.

The mathetic and pragmatic macro-functions are described by Halliday [1975: 87] as “two semiotic modes”: “language as reflection” and “language as action”. The distinction between them is explained as follows:

[t]he distinction is that between language as learning and language as doing; between *separating* the self from the environment, thus identifying the one and interpreting the other, and *interacting* with the environment so as to intrude on the things and people in it, manipulating them and expressing attitudes towards them. [Halliday 1975: 55]

As Halliday emphasizes, this binary distinction between pragmatic and mathetic is based on a new distinction in intonation which is introduced by Nigel himself: a functional opposition between rising and falling tones [Halliday 1975: 46]. In TR1 (and throughout TR2 as well) the pragmatic rising tone means ‘response required’, the mathetic falling tone means ‘no response required’⁵ [ibid.: 87].

The new grouping of language functions into two generalized contexts-of-use, i.e. macro-functional components, is interconnected with the appearance of a *lexicogrammar*: on the one hand, as more specific elements appear and as these are used in more and more different types of word strings, it becomes necessary to indicate their function or their use in a clear way: they are either object or actions of desire – pragmatic function, or objects or actions which are observed – mathetic function. On the other hand, the need for a lexicogrammar, a level of structures, itself arises from the distinction between two generalized contexts-of-use, pragmatic and mathetic [cf. Halliday 1975: 55].

Initially in TR1, each new utterance (i.e. each new word or word string) appears in either one of the macro-functions. Some examples are [based on illustrations in Halliday 1975: 46, 97–98]:

(3) Pragmatic macro-function:

- a. *gláss* ‘I want my milk in a glass’

⁵ ‘Response’ is seen here in the narrow, proto-linguistic sense, as an action (giving objects, performing tasks). As we will see below, in TR2 the concept of ‘response’ will become more abstract, so that an utterance such ‘What’s that?’ (spoken on a falling tone in TR1 and hence part of the mathetic component in TR1), which requires a *linguistic* response, is reinterpreted as realizing an option in the pragmatic component.

more bréad

- b. *squéeze* ‘squeeze the orange for me’
- cárry* ‘carry me’
- star for-you* ‘make a star for me’⁶
- c. *play chúffa* ‘let’s play with the train’
- d. *Mummy cóme*

(4) Mathetic macro-function:

- a. *green càr, big bàll, red swèater, big one*
- b. *mummy bòok* ‘its mummy’s book’ (frequent on picking up book and finding no pictures inside)
- c. *baby dùck* in picture; also: mummy dùck
- d. *that bròke* ‘that’s broken’

[based on Halliday 1975]

Later in TR1, structures which were originally introduced in one macro-functional context also come to be used in the other one: expressions “become *functionally derestricted*, so that the structure represented by *more meat* becomes compatible with the mathetic sense ‘look there’s some ...’, and that of *green car* with the pragmatic sense of ‘I want the ...’” [Halliday 1975: 47, emphasis MT]. What happens is that structures which were originally functional-specific (being either mathetic or pragmatic) come to be “transferred to the other function” [ibid.: 47]. At the end of TR1, the same strings of words can be used alternatively with a pragmatic function or a mathetic function.

The disentangling of word strings from particular macro-functional contexts plays a crucial role in the reorganization of proto-language which will finally turn it into the adult system. In **TR2**, structures are not simply used *alternatively* with either one of the two macro-functions, but rather, the two general functions now come to be combined in the same utterances. It is at this stage that **plurifunctionality**, which is a fundamental characteristic of adult language, appears in the child’s linguistic system; and it is the level of lexicogrammar, emerging as a new stratum in between meaning (semantics or contexts-of-use) and sound (phonological expression), which makes

⁶ Until the final transition into adult language, the child whose language was investigated by Halliday used *you* to refer to himself.

possible the combination of macro-functions in single utterances. For example, an utterance such as *Cake!* can now mean at the same ‘That’s cake, and I want some!’ [Halliday 1975: 57].

Importantly, this new possibility of plurifunctional utterances depends on a “recasting of the concept of ‘function’ on to a more abstract plane” [Halliday 1975: 47]. ‘Function’ is no longer seen in the proto-linguistic sense, as a specific *use* of language in the life of the young child, with different functions indicating different, distinct uses of language. Rather, in TR2, ‘function’ comes to be reinterpreted in a more *abstract, linguistic* sense, in terms of generalized semiotic modes of language, which are simultaneously present in each utterance, viz. language as intrusion (pragmatic) and language as observation (mathetic): “The child, at Phase II, makes the crucial discovery that, with language, he can both observe and interact with the environment at the same time” [Halliday 1975: 57]. What this amounts to, is that ‘function’ comes to be reinterpreted in the sense of the ‘metafunctions’ of adult language, and it will be clear, at this point, why the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions are regarded as precursors of the interpersonal and ideational components, as briefly pointed out in the introduction to this presentation of Halliday’s theory of language development.

Apart from the expansion of lexicogrammar, the second major development in TR2 is the learning of **dialogue**. A conception of ‘dialogue’ appears quite late in the development of language, because it depends on an abstract comprehension of language as *linguistic interaction* (cf. “the idea that language is itself a form of interaction” [Halliday 1975: 31]) and as such it relies on a mastery of roles which are solely defined by language itself, i.e. *communication roles* [cf. Halliday 1975: 30]. This new conception of language appears in the pragmatic component, whose general meaning, as we have seen above, is ‘response required’). This is reflected in the organization of the pragmatic system network for TR2, which also includes an option referring to utterances which require a verbal response [cf. Halliday 1984: 28]. The feature exploration (‘what’s that?’), in the mathetic component in TR1, now also falls within the pragmatic macro-function and is spoken on a rising tone, parallel with other types of questions which will appear later in TR2 (such as yes/no questions). What this means is that the child now reinterprets the expression ‘what’s that?’ more generally as a question initiating a dialogic

exchange, rather than as an utterance (not a question!) which is solely used to find out more about the environment.

Therefore, in TR2, the pragmatic component refers to a general dialogic mode in language, which later on will appear as complementary to a narrative mode, which will emerge as a reinterpretation of the mathetic function, as we will see below. This again, leads to a more abstract and more generalized conception of the pragmatic function:

the child learns dialogue; he learns to adopt, accept and assign linguistic roles, and thus to measure linguistic success in linguistic terms. From now on, success consists no longer simply in obtaining the desired material object or piece of behaviour, but rather in playing one's part; in freely accepting the roles that one is assigned, and getting others to accept those that one has assigned to them. [Halliday 1975: 51]

In TR2, a new *micro-function*⁷ appears alongside the other two: an **informative** function. The informative function (summarized in Table 4-5 for purposes of comparison with the other micro-functions tabulated above) refers to language as a means of communicating new information to someone, i.e. information which is not yet known by that person.

Micro-function	General semantic gloss	Description of the use/function of language in the life of the young child
Informative	'I've got something to tell you'	language used by the child as a means of communicating information to someone who does not already possess that information

Table 4-5 · The informative micro-function

The informative micro-function is the only component which is completely intrinsic to language: it is “the only use of language in a function that is definable solely by reference to language” [Halliday 1975: 21], and as such, its appearance is dependent on the concept of dialogue, i.e. the idea of language as *linguistic* interaction.

⁷ In the further discussion of Halliday's model of language development further below, the question will be taken up why this component is referred to as a *micro-function*, while it appears at a stage when the other components of language are already seen as *macro-functions*.

Focussing on the networks which Halliday presents [1984: 28] for TR2 (cf. Figure 4-1), it will be seen that the mathetic macro-component accommodates a new option, 'I'm telling you what you don't know', which clearly derives from the informative micro-function. This option now contrasts with the earlier option of expressing shared experience ('I'm telling you what we both saw/heard'), and the mathetic component is more generally glossed as 'I'm telling you'. As a result of the further elaboration of a lexicogrammar and the appearance of an informative micro-function, the mathetic component can now more generally be defined as a **narrative** mode.

The development of a lexicogrammar, and especially of longer strings of words or structures, and the reinterpretation of the pragmatic and mathetic components on a more abstract plane, redefining them as semiotic modes (language as intrusion vs. observation, or language as dialogue vs. language as narrative) characterize the organization of the child's language in TR2 on the verge of adopting the adult system. These various processes of development engender and are in turn further motivated by the appearance of a text-forming or **textual** component, at the end of TR2. Texture refers to a type of abstract structuring which goes beyond grammatical structure [Halliday 1975: 111]: it is a general type of 'semantic' organization by which utterances are joined together in a way that is relevant to a context. Therefore, texture implies a concept of genre [ibid.]. In this sense, Halliday interprets the appearance of texture as interconnected with the reinterpretation of the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions in terms of dialogic and narrative modes, which are generic modes. At the end of TR2, the utterances of the child are structured in a generic sense: they have texture as dialogue or as narrative.

The transitional set-up of the child's language in Phase II changes into the adult organization when the pragmatic–mathetic intonation system (i.e. the functional opposition between rising tone and falling tone) breaks down. The breakdown of this intonation system is a necessary condition for the transition into adult language, for two reasons: (1) on the one hand, the rising/falling distinction has a different meaning in the adult system; (2) on the other hand, the pragmatic–mathetic intonation system "imposes a dominance of one mode over the other" [Halliday 1975: 110]. This latter aspect refers to the fact that the intonation contrast is no longer appropriate

for the expression of utterances which are functionally complex: the requirement of pronouncing an utterance either on a pragmatic rising tone or on a mathetic falling tone necessarily fixes its meaning on one of the two macro-functions, even if the utterance as a whole is meant as expressing both functions at a time. Halliday [1975: 110] illustrates this with the following example:

there is a pragmatic element in the meaning of *dada ready nòw* ‘Daddy’s ready now – at least I want him to be’, as seen from the fact that, on finding that Daddy was not in fact ready, he repeats the same sentence on a rising tone: *dada ready nów* (‘please!’).

2.3 Phase III: Adult language

Halliday explains the natural transition between the child’s system at the end of TR2 and the adult system of language in general by focussing on a **functional continuity**, as already noted above: at the end of TR2, the child’s system has incorporated the possibility of plurifunctional structures, which lies at the heart of the organization of adult language. The functional strands themselves are also continuous, through this transition: after their more abstract reinterpretation in TR2, the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions naturally develop into the adult interpersonal and ideational metafunctions, and a textual component appears as an extra supporting strand at the end of TR2.

In *Learning How to Mean* [1975] Halliday explains the transition into adult language by taking an *extended stratification model* as a basis for characterizing the adult system, where the lexicogrammatical systems (MOOD, MODALITY, TRANSITIVITY) are regarded as inherently meaningful lexicogrammar (explained as ‘the semantic system’, hence assuming ‘semantic’ options realized in lexicogrammatical structures), without postulating separate ‘semantic’ networks. This can be gathered from the following passages:

The pragmatic is oriented towards meanings such as ‘I want’, ‘will you?’, ‘may I’, ‘let’s’; so it provides the context for the interpersonal systems of the grammar, typically those of mood, modality, person, attitude and the like. The mathetic is oriented towards experiential meanings, and so provides the context for ideational systems such as those of transitivity (the grammar of

processes), time and place, qualifying and quantifying, and so on. [Halliday 1975: 57]

When we say that the mathetic function creates the conditions for the emergence of the ideational component in the semantic system, and the pragmatic for the interpersonal component, this means that the ideational systems – transitivity (types of process, participants, circumstances), lexical taxonomy (hierarchy of thing names), quality and quantity &c. – evolve first and foremost in mathetic contexts, while the interpersonal systems – mood (indicative, declarative and interrogative, imperative), modality, person, intensity, comment &c. – evolve first and foremost in pragmatic contexts. [...] What we are describing is the evolution of the concept of function, from its Phase II sense of ‘generalized context of language use’ to its Phase III sense of ‘*component of the semantic system*’. [Halliday 1975: 108–109, emphasis MT]

In this model of language development, the original, abstract meanings or uses-of-language of the child’s content system are linked to the systems of MOOD, MODALITY, TRANSITIVITY and so on, which constitute the general components of the adult ‘semantic’ system.

In “Language as code and language as behaviour” [1984], Halliday focusses on the development of dialogue, as an interpersonal dimension, from the child’s proto-language to adult language. In this study, the adult interpersonal component is represented by a *generalized enhanced stratification model*, i.e. with a separate, general (i.e. context-neutral) ‘semantic’ network in addition to the lexicogrammatical network comprising the systems of MOOD, MODALITY and so on. Importantly, this adult interpersonal ‘semantic’ system, the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, is grafted onto the general features of the pragmatic and mathetic components as sketched in TR2. Halliday’s presentation of the transition between these systems, indicated by one sub-step, is summarized in Figure 4-2.




Figure 4-2 · The semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION grafted onto the pragmatic and mathetic systems of proto-language in the transition stage

2.4 Halliday's model of ontogenesis: Summary

In the presentation of Halliday's theory of language development, we have first looked into the minor steps within Phase I, from NL0 to NL5-6, in which the networks of four initial micro-functions (instrumental, regulatory, interactional, personal) and two additional components which appear in the middle of that phase (imaginative and heuristic) gradually come to be expanded by incorporating more delicate distinctions and more specific elements (names of things and actions).

In the presentation of Phase II, we have considered those processes which prepare the transition of proto-language into adult language: the regrouping of the micro-functions into two generalized macro-functions (pragmatic and mathetic), which are distinguished on the basis of their distinct phonological realizations (rising tone vs. falling tone); the emergence and further expansion of a lexicogrammar, making possible expressions which are functionally complex (indicating the emergence of plurifunctionality); the learning of dialogue; the appearance of an informative micro-function; the appearance of a textual component; a more abstract reinterpretation of the macro-functional components as general semiotic modes (dialogue and narrative); and finally the breakdown of the pragmatic–mathetic phonological system.

Finally, in considering the development into the adult language (Phase III), we have focussed on two aspects: (1) Halliday's general explanation of this transition in terms of functional continuity, and (2) the two alternative models of adult language which have been proposed in this framework (extended stratification model in 1975, generalized enhanced stratification model with a separate interpersonal network in 1984).

The aspects which are important in explaining the overall transition from proto-language to adult language (Phase II), centred around the two major themes of an emerging plurifunctionality and functional continuity between the two systems, are summarized in Figure 4-3.




Figure 4-3 · Language development, Phase II (transition phase): processes preparing the transition of the child's organization of language into the adult system

3 Further analysis of Halliday's model of ontogenesis

Halliday's theory of language development will now be further discussed in the framework of the general theme of this chapter, viz. an exploration of metafunctional diversity and its interaction with stratification, and with a view to the ultimate objective, which crystallized out of the discussion of stratification in the previous chapter, i.e. to provide an initial explanation for the divergence between different stratification models set up for the interpersonal and ideational components.

More particularly, what is at issue here is the appearance of the first generalized enhanced stratification model with a separate 'semantic' network for the interpersonal component, proposed in 1984 in the context of the study of ontogenesis, as an expansion of the basic two-level model of proto-language, and as alternative to an extended stratification model which had hitherto been taken as a basis (in the 1970s studies, as reflected in Halliday 1975). As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the ultimate aim of this discussion is to come to an understanding of the design of this *enhanced stratification model*: why does this model appear in the framework of the

theory of language development, and why does it have a separate ‘semantic’ network for the interpersonal component only?

In order to clarify these questions, a refinement will be proposed for the model of the *transition phase* offered by Halliday. As will be shown, this refinement is based on analysing an important observation which is offered by Halliday in his explanation of the transition phase, but which has not been explicitly worked out in his theory.

The focus of this section is on the transition phase as such, as a phase which is transitory between proto-language and adult language. It is precisely in the transition phase that the adult metafunctions start to develop (albeit first in the form of generalized macro-functions), in tandem with the emergence of proto-stratification, and hence, it is the phase in which adult plurifunctionality begins to appear. By concentrating on the transition phase, the theme of *metafunctional diversity* can be explored, on a primary level, purely in its interaction with *stratification*, without yet taking a further step and moving into the lexicogrammatical heart of language – a step which would force us to take into account the dimension of *delicacy* (and the concomitant themes of a rank scale, grammatical classes and structural modes of expression) interlacing with stratification and metafunctional diversity in adult language. As has already been indicated, this further step will be taken in Part III.

The further analysis of the transition phase will be organized as follows:

- (1) Halliday’s explanation of the transition phase will be further explored. In this exploration, a number of interrelating dimensions will be revealed which appear to contradict one another [Sub-section 3.1].
- (2) A refined model will be suggested for the transition phase, in which these dimensions are placed in a more abstract context. In this way, the contradictions inherent in the transition from proto-language to adult language can be elucidated [Sub-section 3.2]
- (3) The appearance of the adult organization of language will be explained in relation to the major dimensions of proto-language in the transition stage [Sub-section 3.3].

3.1 Halliday's explanation of the transition phase: Discussion

The important observation by Halliday which lies at the basis of the further analysis to be proposed here occurs in the following passage from *Learning How to Mean* [Halliday 1975: 107]:

In Phase II terms, each utterance is either pragmatic or mathetic; this is attested in Nigel's phonology, in which everything must be either rising or falling tone [...]. In Phase III terms, however, all utterances are both ideational and interpersonal at the same time; and this is true – inescapably – from the moment the child builds a lexicon into the system. As soon as the utterance consists of words-in-structure, it has an ideational meaning – a content, in terms of the child's experience; and an interpersonal meaning – an interactional role in the speech situation. (The choice between mathetic and pragmatic is itself an interpersonal system, since it encodes the semiotic role the child is adopting for himself and assigning to the hearer.) This is what we mean by saying that Phase II is transitional. It is not so much a system in its own right, intermediate between baby language and adult language, but rather a period of overlap between the two. The interpretation in terms of the 'Phase II functions', pragmatic and mathetic, an opposition that turns up frequently under different names in language development studies, is one way of explaining the nature of this overlap; but it is also more than that – it is actually Nigel's major strategy for making the transition, as shown by the fact that he clearly assigns every utterance to one mode or the other.

This passage indicates two lines of thought: its main line is about conceiving the transition phase as a period of overlap; a second line of thought, presented in brackets, concerns a meta-interpretation of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast in its entirety as interpersonal. Let us consider each of these two aspects in turn.

The latter, bracketed line of thought, as we have seen above, has been worked out in Halliday's article "Language as code and language as behaviour" [1984], where a generalized enhanced stratification model is proposed with a separate interpersonal 'semantic' network, which is engrafted onto the systemic options in the mathetic and pragmatic macro-functions. This *interpersonal meta-interpretation* of the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions is well-argued by Halliday, and, as shown in Figure 4-1 above, it appears as naturally motivated by the pragmatic and mathetic systems themselves. Nevertheless, it seems to be at variance with the important idea of functional continuity between proto-language and adult language, viz. the argument

that the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions are precursors of the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions respectively. More precisely, in this line of thought, the following question arises: in what way is the mathetic macro-function to be seen as the basis of the ideational component, if its general options are reinterpreted as being part of the interpersonal metafunction?

The main line of thought presented in the passage above concerns the conception of the transition phase as a period in which two types of linguistic organization overlap: on the one hand, the proto-linguistic model, in which the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions are distinct options, each of which is available in a particular context-of-use; on the other hand, the adult linguistic system, where the metafunctions are generalized components which are simultaneously present in each utterance. In terms of the overall framework of different types of systemic models sketched in the previous chapter, these two types of linguistic organization can be recognized as a basic two-level model with one-to-one correspondences between content and expression and a more expanded stratification model (whether extended or enhanced)⁸ respectively.

The *overlap* between models is explained by Halliday as a *difference in perspective* onto the same transitory system: taking the viewpoint of Phase II as such, the distinction between pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions cannot be questioned, since it is realized by a clear contrast in intonation. Viewing the Phase II system from the perspective of the adult model which is gradually arising in that stage, its expressions are plurifunctional. In writing about this important theme of an emerging plurifunctionality, in the passage cited above, but also in the book as a whole, Halliday indicates two aspects. (1) It is the appearance of a lexicogrammar which creates the possibility of plurifunctional utterances. As we have seen above, this process is explained in terms of names of things (words, the first lexicogrammatical items which appear), which are first used in one macro-functional context but then transferred to the other, and which finally come to be used with both macro-

⁸ The distinction between an extended enhanced stratification model (as in Halliday 1975) and a generalized enhanced stratification model (as in Halliday 1984) does not matter to Halliday's argument.

functional meanings. (2) The plurifunctionality is more generally explained in terms of the cooccurrence of an ideational content and an interpersonal interactional role in each utterance.

Here again, a contradiction arises. On the one hand, the *emerging* plurifunctionality, in Phase II, can only be explained with reference to the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions, which lie at the basis of the interpersonal and ideational metafunctional components: it is aspects of these two macro-functions which come to be combined. On the other hand, an explanation of plurifunctionality in terms of combining aspects from the two macro-functions is difficult to motivate in that it runs counter to other observations explaining the transition phase. Importantly, this difficulty arises in both perspectives. (1) First, taking the view from Phase II itself, the idea of a combination of macro-functional aspects clashes with the fact that each macro-functional component has its own, distinct phonological realization. As we have seen above, this contradiction is important in the development of language itself, in that it lies at the basis of the breakup of the mathetic-pragmatic contrast in Phase II. (2) Second, taking the view from the adult system, the idea of a combination of macro-functional aspects contradicts the interpretation of the features of *both* macro-functional components as distinct options in the *same* interpersonal 'semantic' system.

Summarizing, the conception of the transition phase as a period of overlapping models (i.e. the model of Phase II itself, and the adult model), which can be theorized in terms of a difference in perspective and a meta-reinterpretation of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast as interpersonal, fails to solve a number of contradictions. These contradictions pertain to two important themes in the explanation of the transition, which will be referred to as **developmental themes**: the theme of **functional continuity** between proto-language and adult language (i.e. the (micro- and) macro-functions are precursors of the metafunctions), and **plurifunctionality**, a characteristic which emerges in Phase II and which lies at the heart of the organization of adult language. The contradictions pertaining to these two themes are summarized in Figure 4-4, which also indicates the overlap between two models in terms of a difference in perspective.




Figure 4-4 · Contradictions in the explanation of the transition phase

3.2 A more dynamic transition model

3.2.1 Presenting the general dimensions of the refined model: Emerging stratification and two types of perspectives

As we have seen above, certain contradictions in the explanation of the transition phase cannot be solved by conceiving the transition as an overlap of models, explained in terms of two different perspectives. The overlap explanation *as such* cannot resolve the contradictions, because they cannot simply be assigned to the difference in perspective which this explanation aims to bring out: the contradictions remain, *within* the view from Phase II itself, and *within* the view from the adult model.

The contradictions can be elucidated by building the **emerging stratification** into the model of the transition phase. Importantly, this suggestion is based on the very idea of overlapping models proposed by Halliday: a transition between a basic two-level model (proto-language) and a tristratal model (adult language) which is theorized in terms of an overlap can only be

explained dynamically by gradually building the more expanded stratification (i.e. the tristratal organization) into the two-level model. As we have seen in the presentation of Halliday's theory, it is the theme of an emerging stratification which lies at the heart of explaining the transition phase in general.

Incorporating the emerging stratification into the model of the transition phase opens up new explanatory possibilities, especially since in this way, the two perspectives which theorize the overlap between types of linguistic organization (i.e. the perspective from Phase II itself, and the perspective from the adult model) can be related to a more abstract type of perspectivization, viz. the *trinocular view* which goes together with the theme of stratification. Since it is a stratum of lexicogrammar which gradually appears in the transition phase, the lexicogrammatical systems – as paradigms of functional structure and as the basis of plurifunctionality – can be taken as the focus point for exploring the trinocular view. Therefore, taking into account the final shift into adult language with its complex stratal setup, the trinocular perspectivization which will be adopted in the discussion of the transition phase indicates the following complementary perspectives [see also Table 4-6]:

- (1) A 'semantic' perspective *'from above'*. From the viewpoint of proto-language, this means the general content-plane (contents–uses-of-language). From the viewpoint of adult language, this perspective focusses on the meta-interpretation of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast into the interpersonal 'semantics' of speech function.
- (2) A systemic-lexicogrammatical perspective *'from around'*. As we have seen, this perspective is irrelevant in proto-language, which is organized in a basic two-level setup (content and expression). In adult language, this perspective refers to the 'lexicogrammatical' networks organized into three metafunctions.
- (3) A structural-lexicogrammatical perspective *'from below'*. From the viewpoint of proto-language, the perspective from below refers to the expression plane. In adult language, in Halliday's sense, this perspective focusses on functional and syntagmatic structure (patterns of grammatical classes) and lexemes.

As will become clear in the following discussion, it is especially the two outer stratal perspectives, i.e. different perspectives ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ developing within the content plane, which play a role in the transition phase, since a fully developed ‘lexicogrammar’ (system networks and functional structure) is not yet in place. It is precisely the development of these outer perspectives (as ‘edges’ of the adult content plane) which prepares and instigates the further emergence of a powerful lexicogrammar lying at the heart of adult language.

Proto-language	Developmental ← perspectives → Stratal perspectives ↓	Adult language	
content plane	‘from above’ ‘from around’	Content	(speech-functional) semantics systemic lexicogrammar: metafunctional networks: paradigms of metafunctional structure
expression plane	from below		structural lexicogrammar: realization statements (functional structure) mapped onto syntagmatic structure (classes) + ‘lexical realization’
		Expression	phonology/graphology

Table 4-6 · Stratal perspectives and the transition from proto-language to adult language

In general terms, building the theme of an emerging stratification into the model of the transition phase means adding an extra dimension which brings with it new possibilities of perspectivization: (1) on the one hand, the transition can be theorized by looking at it from the two **developmental perspectives** (i.e. from Phase II itself, and from the model of adult language) and by investigating how these two perspectives intersect; (2) on the other hand, the transition can also alternatively be viewed from different **stratal perspectives**, i.e. ‘from above’, ‘from around’ and ‘from below’. It is the interaction between these two types of perspectivization which forms the basis of the model proposed here.

Apart from the fundamental concept of an overlap between models, in this more abstract framework for the transition phase, the developmental themes which are important in explaining the transition can be embedded: *functional continuity* between models and emerging *plurifunctionality*. In this framework also the general *interpersonal reinterpretation* of the contrast between pragmatic and mathetic options can be clarified. It is by bringing together these various aspects in terms of an emerging stratification, that the contradictions noted above can be elucidated.

The model of the transition phase proposed here is graphically presented in Figure 4-5. Let us first focus on the major dimensions of this model, which form the framework for further analysing the transition and for understanding the complementary models for the ideational and interpersonal components in adult language. In this figure, the two types of perspectivization explained above are indicated as the vertical and horizontal dimensions: (1) horizontally, the *difference in developmental perspective*, i.e. a perspective from the left, from Phase II itself, and a perspective from the right, from Phase III (the adult system); (2) vertically, the *emerging stratification*, focussing on the strata of ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’, which, as we have seen in Chapter 1, are traditionally visualized in SFL in a top-down orientation (theorized in terms of two stratal perspectives: a perspective ‘from above’, i.e. from the ‘semantics’; and a perspective ‘from below’, i.e. from the emerging lexis(-grammar)).

As indicated, the conception of the transition phase as a period of overlap must be understood in terms of *both* of these dimensions, i.e. not only in terms of a difference in perspective (Phase II vs. adult model). The reversed S-curve in the middle of Figure 4-5 indicates how the horizontal and vertical dimensions come together in TR2 and in this way marks *the overlap between the proto-linguistic model and the adult model as a mapping between a ‘semantic’ stratum and a lexicogrammatical stratum*: in TR2, the ‘semantic’ stratum is organized proto-linguistically, with a systemic contrast between mathetic and pragmatic functions, realized by different intonations; whereas the lexicogrammatical stratum is organized in terms of the adult model of language, with plurifunctional words-in-structure.

The interaction between the developmental and stratal dimensions will now be further explained by looking into the steps within the transition phase. We will subsequently deal with:

- (1) the origin of stratification in TR1 [Sub-section 3.2.2];
- (2) the overlap in TR2 [Sub-section 3.2.3]; and
- (3) the appearance of the adult organization of language (Phase III) [Sub-section 3.2.3].

In each step, the complementary stratal perspectives, 'from below' and 'from above', will be analysed. With a view to explaining the adult model of language which appears in the context of Halliday's ontogenetic study [cf. the aims of this exploration], the discussion will be embedded in two alternative frameworks: (1) on the one hand, Peircean semiotics, which will be useful in the perspective 'from below', focussing on lexicogrammar and approaching this stratum from the lexical end (which appears first in logogenesis); and (2) Eirian Davies' interpersonal semantic theory of speech roles, which is particularly valuable in the perspective 'from above'.

As indicated in the general introduction to this sub-section, the aim of proposing a more refined model for explaining the transition from proto-language into adult language is to provide a framework, based on Halliday's theory of language development, for explaining the variation in models for adult language, more specifically, for motivating the *generalized enhanced stratification model with a separate interpersonal 'semantic' network*, which appears as complementary to an extended stratification model and, on the basis of this, for providing a further step in explaining *a general difference between approaches to the interpersonal and ideational components in SFL*.





Figure 4-5 · A refined model of the transition from proto-language into adult language

Stratification & metafunctional complementarity: The ontogenetic basis



Adult language

3.2.2 *The origin of stratification: TR1*

As we have seen in the presentation of Halliday's theory of language development, TR1 is characterized by two general changes. On the one hand, the micro-functions come to be grouped into two macro-functions, which are realized by distinct intonations. On the other hand, specific items (words and word strings) which were originally used in one macro-functional context come to be transferred to the other macro-function, i.e. a lexis(-grammar) appears, with lexico-holophrastic⁹ items that can be used alternatively with a mathetic or pragmatic meaning. Recall Halliday's examples referred to above: "the structure represented by *more meat* becomes compatible with the mathetic sense 'look there's some ...', and that of *green car* with the pragmatic sense of 'I want the ...'" [Halliday 1975: 47].

These two changes can be regarded as marking the beginning of a stratification into a 'semantics' and a 'lexicogrammar', which can be modelled by disentangling specific ('lexicogrammatical') items from the general pragmatic and mathetic options, i.e. by presenting these two aspects in two different, simultaneous system networks [see Figure 4-5 above]. This modelling builds further upon Halliday's analysis of the transition phase, in which the specific micro-functional components of Phase I are grouped together into two more abstract macro-functional components. It is the conception of the mathetic and pragmatic components as *general contexts-of-use* which makes possible the appearance of a level of lexis, a level of *specific linguistic items* which can be used in these pragmatic and mathetic contexts.

⁹ In studies of language development in general, the term 'holophrase' refers to a sequence of words (i.e. a kind of phrase), which as a whole, and in combination with contextual inferences, has a specific meaning in the interaction at hand [cf. for example, Mills 1992: 203], for example, *green car*, meaning 'I want the green car'. This kind of proto-structure (i.e. not yet a grammatical structure in the sense of adult language) is also referred to by Halliday as 'words-in-structure'.




Figure 4-6 · Halliday's general model of semogenesis¹⁰
[based on Halliday 1992b: 27]

In “How do you mean?”, an article focussing on the conception of language as a dynamic open system which is metastable through semogenesis, Halliday [1992b] refers to the appearance of simultaneous systems as a general mechanism by which meaning potential comes to be expanded in semogenesis. Halliday’s visualization of this process is represented here as Figure 4-6. In the presentation of language development above, we have seen how the appearance of two small simultaneous systems in the interactional micro-function is characterized by Halliday as “proto-stratification”: this occurs in NL5 within the area of personalized greetings, where the system indicating *specific* names used in greetings (Anna | Daddy | Mummy) comes to be combined with a more *general* distinction between seeking and finding. The onset of stratification in TR1 must be understood in the same sense, as a splitting and regrouping of general and specific aspects, which come to be re-organized as two simultaneous systems lying at the basis of ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’. Figure 4-7 shows how this interpretation of TR1 tallies with Halliday’s [1992b] general model of semogenesis.




Figure 4-7 · The appearance of stratification in TR1

¹⁰ The numbers accompanying the options in the second phase represent probability values.

Looking back at the development of proto-language from NL0 to NL5 [see the general overview in Figure 4-1 above] with hindsight, from the viewpoint of the emerging stratification in TR1, it can be seen that throughout Phase I, specific elements (which are highlighted in Figure 4-1) play a role especially in the instrumental and regulatory micro-functions, on which the pragmatic macro-function is primarily built, and within the personal micro-function, which forms the major input for the mathetic macro-function.

As explained above, within the proto-linguistic organization of NL1–4, these specific elements are not yet conceived as lexical elements: in this phase of ontogenesis, a distinction between on the one hand, simple vocalizations, and on the other, articulations which appear to be imitations of adult lexical items, is not relevant. It is only in NL5, with the appearance of a heuristic micro-function marking the learning of adult vocabulary, that the child has internalized a conception of specific elements as ‘names’ for things and actions. It should be noted at this point that the various options leading to the system of expression of feeling in the personal component, represented as engagement in the mathetic macro-function in TR1, continue to be realized proto-linguistically (i.e. as non-lexical vocalizations) throughout Phase I and up to TR1 [cf. Halliday 1984: 27]. Hence, in TR1–1, the items which are realized *lexically* by specific elements are objects and actions which are wanted by the child (pragmatic component), and objects, states, and properties of the external world which fall within the general mathetic option of observation. By the end of TR1 (TR1–3), the same lexical items are used alternatively with pragmatic (‘I want’) and mathetic (‘I see/saw’) meanings.

The origin of stratification in TR1 is marked by *the emergence of lexis* (and the beginning of lexico-grammar more generally) *in between the original levels of content and phonological expression*. This process is already prepared at the end of Phase I (in NL5), and in NL6 (which indicates the beginning of the transition phase in Halliday’s theory), where specific items are recognized as ‘names’ contrasting with more general options in the micro-functional networks (especially the features general demand and general command): whereas the general options are realized proto-linguistically as simple vocalizations (for example, general demand \sphericalangle [m̃], general command \sphericalangle [ã]), names are *lexically encoded* in addition to being realized phonologically as

articulations, i.e. their meaning is defined through the lexical system of a language.

The appearance of this new level of lexis(-grammar) in the transition phase, pointing at the emerging stratification of the content plane of language, calls for a differentiation of two types of theoretical-stratal perspectives, as indicated: a perspective 'from above' (focussing on the 'semantics' of 'contexts-of-use') and a perspective 'from below' (focussing on the emerging lexis(-grammar)). In looking at the subsequent sub-stage of proto-language in the transition phase below, each of these perspectives will be considered in turn.

3.2.3 Overlapping models: TR2

As we have seen above, Halliday explains TR2 in terms of four interrelated changes [see Figure 4-3 above]:

- (1) the learning of dialogue;
- (2) the appearance of an informative micro-function;
- (3) a reorganization of the pragmatic and mathetic networks and a more abstract conception of these two functional components;
- (4) a further expansion of lexico-grammar, with the emergence of plurifunctional words-in-structure.

In the analysis of the transition phase proposed here, TR2 plays a crucial role in that it is at this point that the overlap between models can be clarified. The central factor, which unites the four changes characterizing TR2, is the more abstract re-conception of the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions: this re-conception is directly related to the appearance of an informative micro-function and a textual component; it makes possible the combination of both macro-functional aspects in single lexicogrammatical structures (theme of plurifunctionality); and in a more general way, it prepares the final transition into the adult model with its interpersonal and ideational components (theme of functional continuity). It is at this point too, that the contradictions pertaining to the developmental themes of plurifunctionality and functional continuity turn up.

In the explanation which follows, these contradictions will be approached from the most general one, viz. the divergence between, on the one hand, the

conception of the two macro-functions as precursors of the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions, and on the other hand, the overall interpersonal interpretation of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast. As will be shown, this contradiction directly arises from the re-conception of the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions in TR2 (the more abstract interpretation of these components points to two contradictory directions), and can be elucidated by relating it to the stratal dimension of the transition, i.e. the emergence of stratification.

In the analysis of TR2, the re-conception of the macro-functions will subsequently be looked at ‘from above’, focussing on the reorganization of the pragmatic and mathetic ‘semantic’ networks; and ‘from below’, turning to the expansion of lexicogrammar. A running thread through this analysis will be the informative micro-function: the further explanation of TR2 which will be suggested below builds upon Halliday’s analysis by re-interpreting the informative micro-function on a more abstract level, in order to reveal a parallelism between developments in ‘lexicogrammar’ and in ‘semantics’ and, in this way, to provide a basis for explaining the ‘overlap’ in TR2, and the different types of models in adult language.

I TR2 seen ‘from above’: Reorganization of the ‘semantic’ systems

Halliday defines the **informative micro-function** straightforwardly as the use of language to *inform*: it refers to the function of language “as a means of communicating information to someone who does not already possess that information” [Halliday 1975: 21]. Although the major functional components in the transition phase are called “macro-functions”, the informative dimension is referred to as a “micro-function”, parallel with the smaller functional components of Phase II: whereas the macro-functions are generalized components in which more specific uses of language are based, the informative function is such a specific *use of language*. This informative micro-function is brought out as a feature within the mathetic system: while in TR1, the feature observation refers to the expression of shared experience, a new possibility in TR2 is the use of language as an *alternative* to shared experience (‘I’m telling you what you don’t know’).

This analysis, which incorporates the informative dimension – qua *micro*-function – within the **mathetic** component, is based on viewing ‘information’ as ‘information about *experience*’ (as can be seen in the description of the features in the mathetic component in TR2 [see Figure 4-5]), and in this way brings out the nature of the mathetic macro-function as precursory to the ideational metafunction of adult language (the metafunction whose experiential dimension is concerned with the construal of experience). More generally, this view hinges on an association of ‘information’ with ‘content’: the informative micro-function refers to the use of language “to communicate a *content* that is (regarded by the speaker as) unknown to the addressee” [Halliday 1973e: 35, emphasis MT]. It is significant in this respect that Halliday first referred to the informative micro-function as the “representational” function [ibid.: 35], and that he proposes the term informative as more accurate in view of later developments in adult language, which he specifies in rather negative terms:

I had referred to this [the informative microfunction, MT] in a general way as the ‘representational’ function; but it would be better, and also more accurate, if one were to use a more specific term, such as ‘informative’, since this makes it easier to interpret subsequent developments. In the course of maturation this function is increasingly emphasized, until eventually it comes to dominate, if not the adult’s use of language, at least his conception of the use of language. The adult tends to be sceptical if it is suggested to him that language has other uses than that of conveying information; and he will usually think next of the use of language to *misinform* – which is simply a variant of the informative function. [Halliday 1973e: 35, emphasis MAKH]

In the role it plays in the *mathetic* system in TR2, ‘information’ has two dimensions which are interrelated:

(1) On the one hand, information as ‘construal of experience’. The aspect which is focussed on here is that of information as a shaping of meaning (a process of *in-formāre* ‘to put in shape, to form’ in a semiotic sense). This sense is linked to the concepts of ‘representation’ and ‘content’.

(2) On the other hand, information as a ‘use’ of language: ‘to inform (someone)’.

Both dimensions are important in the new option which appears in the mathetic system in TR2, i.e. ‘I’m telling you what you don’t know’, where language is used not just as an expression, a representation of shared experience, but rather, as semiotically shaping this experience (i.e. construing

this experience in language) in a way which is meaningful to a hearer who has not shared it.

So far we have focussed on the relevance of the informative micro-function in the mathetic component of TR2, which is the aspect of the informative dimension of language which is most emphasized by Halliday, and which explains its being theorized as a *micro*-function. At other places, Halliday characterizes the informative micro-function more generally as a ‘secondary’ function which is totally intrinsic to language and therefore appears quite late in ontogenesis. This broader definition of the informative micro-function has an important inspirational role for the model proposed here, in that it opens up the possibility of further re-interpreting the ‘informative’ aspect at the level of lexicogrammar, as we will see further below. The following passages define the informative micro-function as ‘secondary’ and intrinsic to language:

- [...] the informative function, which seems to be in some sense *secondary*, *derived* from others that have already appeared. [Halliday 1973e: 37; emphasis MT]
- It [the informative micro-function, MT] is the only *purely intrinsic* function of language, the only use of language in a function that is *definable solely by reference to language*. [Halliday 1975: 20; emphasis MT]
- The use of language to inform is a very late stage in the linguistic development of the child, because it is a function which *depends on the recognition that there are functions of language which are solely defined by language itself*. All the other functions [i.e. micro-functions, MT] in the list are extrinsic to language. They are served by and realized through language, but they are not defined by language. They represent the use of language in contexts which exist independently of the linguistic system. But *the informative function has no existence independent of language itself*. [Halliday 1975: 31; emphasis MT]

As we have seen in the general presentation of Halliday’s theory, the appearance of the informative micro-function as an intrinsic linguistic function is dependent on the concept of **dialogue**, i.e. the conception of language as *linguistic* interaction. Hence, in its more generalized characterization as language-internal and as interrelated with the notion of dialogue, the informative micro-function pertains to the **pragmatic** component. In this vein also, it is primarily the concept of dialogue which explains the reinterpretation of the ‘What’s that’ expression (i.e. the feature

observation in the mathetic component in TR1) as a *request*: it is an utterance initiating a linguistic interaction and therefore it has a pragmatic function. ‘What’s that?’ is a request because it *asks* for a reply, just as a request for an object or an action (goods-&-services) solicits a reply. The informative micro-function further clarifies this type of utterance as a request for *information*. The new concepts of dialogue and the informative micro-function together explain the conception of this type of utterance as a *question* (a request for information).

As indicated, the broader, general definition of the informative aspect as a secondary and purely linguistic dimension of language will play a major role in the further analysis of TR2 offered here. In its generalized sense, the function at issue here will be called the **intrinsic linguistic function** of language. When focussing on the dimension of this function which is important in the general ‘semantic’ network, it will be referred to as the **interactive-informative function**. ‘Interactive’ alludes to the new concept of asking information, as in an interactive move, in the *pragmatic* component; ‘informative’ refers to the two senses of information in the *mathetic* component, as indicated above. The various facets of the intrinsic linguistic function at the level of ‘semantics’ in TR2 are summarized in Figure 4-8. It is important to point out that in this sense, the interactive-informative dimension is not a micro-function: rather than being a specific use of language, which can be interpreted as falling under one of the macro-functional components, it is by definition a more abstract aspect, which leads to a reorganization of the mathetic as well as the pragmatic general options.




Figure 4-8 · TR2: aspects of the intrinsic linguistic function in the general 'semantic' network

So far we have approached the system of TR2 'from above': we have focussed on the 'semantic' system network containing the general pragmatic and mathetic options in TR2 (i.e. the TR2-circle in the upper half of the model in Figure 4-5). The appearance of an interactive-informative function, which is intrinsic to language, explains the reorganization of the pragmatic and mathetic networks, and in this way, the more abstract interpretation of these functional components. In this exploration we have taken a linear developmental perspective, considering TR2 in terms of how it differs from the previous phase in ontogenesis.

Reasoning from the opposite developmental perspective, i.e. considering the development in TR2 in view of the later shift into the adult system, it can be seen that the interactive-informative function lies at the basis of the general interpretation of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast as *interpersonal*: in Halliday's interpersonal 'semantic' network of SPEECH FUNCTION, the informative aspect appears as the feature information, contrasting systemically with goods-&-services within the system of COMMODITY. However, in TR2, *the 'semantic' system is still organized in proto-linguistic terms*. (1) First, it is not realized by the system of MOOD, as in adult language, but rather by the proto-linguistic pragmatic–mathetic intonation system (i.e. the contrast between rising and falling tones). (2) Second, the feature of giving information is not yet understood as an abstract interpersonal option: in TR2, 'giving information' is primarily associated with conveying a *content* (or, taking the view from the adult system: construing experience). In this vein, the aspect of

giving information ('I'm telling you') constitutes the mathetic component, which contrasts systemically with the pragmatic 'I want' dimension. (3) Finally, due to these two features, in TR2 the general 'semantic' system as such does not enable *simultaneous* choices from different functional components: the pragmatic and mathetic macro-functions are distinct systemic options (realized by different intonation patterns), not simultaneous systems.

II TR2 seen 'from below': The expanding lexicogrammar

[1] Introduction: The appearance of multifunctional lexis

We now turn to the perspective 'from below', which focusses on the emergence of a lexico(-grammatical) level in TR2. Whereas in TR1, word(string)s are used alternatively with a pragmatic or a mathetic meaning, in TR2, the two macro-functional aspects come to be combined in single utterances, which in this sense are plurifunctional. Initially, this means that a single expression realizes both the 'I want' (the features 'do' and 'give' in the pragmatic component) and 'I see' meaning (the feature observation in the mathetic component) at the same time, as is illustrated in the *Cake!* ('That's cake', and 'I want some') example mentioned above [cf. Halliday 1975: 42]. Another example given by Halliday is *Holes!*, meaning 'there are holes – and something must be done about them'. As Halliday explains, this utterance combines two types of meanings: the child's experience "as an observer of holes" and "his personal stake in the matter, his own intrusion into the situation" [ibid.: 72].

Later, the plurifunctionality of words-in-structure is more abstract in that the pragmatic facet of specific utterances is generalized: it now refers to the indication of a 'stance' towards what is mathetically construed. Halliday describes and illustrates this plurifunctionality as follows:

mathetic utterances also involve *some kind of stance vis-à-vis the environment*; the sort of *intensification* and *evaluation* that appear in *very old trèe, loud nòise, big bàng* and expressions with *too* – *too* is particularly complex, since it is an evaluative element interpretable in terms only of some *reference point*, and this reference point may be *the speaker's opinion*. [Halliday 1975: 108; emphasis MT]

What emerges here is a *lexico(-grammar)* which is *plurifunctional in the sense of the adult linguistic system*: approaching lexicogrammar from the lexical end, which is the first aspect of this stratum emerging in the development of language, the plurifunctionality is seen in the co-occurrence of a mathetic-experiential construal of experience (*cake* and *holes* as experienced things; *old*, *loud*, and *big* as experiential qualities of things) and pragmatic-interpersonal dimensions, which appear at this stage as connotation, evaluation and intensity. In this sense, in TR2, the basic organization of the *lexico-grammatical* stratum is that of the adult linguistic system, although it is not yet as complex: the major ideational and interpersonal *lexicogrammatical systems* (TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, MODALITY, and so on) still have to appear, in addition to further possibilities of lexis which characterize adult language (to be discussed below).

In taking a perspective ‘from above’, considering the general ‘semantic’ system with its pragmatic and mathetic options [cf. the previous sub-section], we have seen that, in TR2, the macro-functions come to be conceived in a more abstract sense, due to the appearance of the concept of dialogue and an informative micro-function, which are purely linguistic notions. Taking an alternative perspective ‘from below’, focussing on the stratum of lexicogrammar, it can be seen that the macro-functional components likewise come to be interpreted more abstractly. In this case, the more abstract view recasts the original mathetic and pragmatic components (i.e. mathetic and pragmatic *uses* of specific lexical items) into the more abstract dimensions of denotation and connotation, and hence indicates a shift into the adult system, with its experiential-representative and interpersonal-attitudinal dimensions.

Importantly, the more abstract reinterpretation of the macro-functional components at the level of lexicogrammar equally depends on a conception of language as purely *linguistic* interaction. In explaining TR2, Halliday mainly zooms in on the perspective ‘from above’: he theorizes the reorganization of the general pragmatic and mathetic networks in TR2 by focussing on the notions of dialogue and an informative micro-function. In the model proposed here, which is built on the idea of bringing out more explicitly the emerging stratification in the transition phase, a perspective ‘from below’, focussing on the new level of lexis-(grammar), deserves equal attention.

As an equivalent of the interactive-informative function, which lies at the basis of explaining the reconception of the general (semantic) mathetic-pragmatic network in TR2, I propose to explain the emergence of a plurifunctional lexicogrammar in TR2 as based in a **symbolic-indexical function**. The terms **symbol** and **index** as they will be used here are based on an interpretation of Peirce's semiotic theory. They will be related to the third term in Peirce's triadic classification of signs, viz. **icon**. A very brief outline of Peirce's classification of signs, and the way in which these signs are defined in this dissertation is given in Table 4-7.¹¹

Type of sign	Classification of signs in Peirce's theory		Interpretation of the types of signs in the present work
	According to the nature of the signified object	According to the relation between sign and signified object	
Icon	Firstness: quality, feeling	Similarity, fitness of resemblance	Iconic = representative function: the sign stands for the object
Index	Secondness: the individual, the here and now	Contiguity, factorality	Indexical = indicative function: the sign locates the object in an "indexical ground" [Peirce's term], which includes the interlocutors' here-and-now (<i>ego hic et nunc</i>),
Symbol	Thirdness: thought, abstraction	Convention	Symbolic = designative function: designation = representation and construal: the sign does not only represent, but also semiotically construes the object

Table 4-7 · Brief outline of Peirce's semiotic classification of signs

¹¹ The presentation of Peirce's classification is based on Deledalle [1987] (as cited in Goethals [1999]) and Hawkes [1977]. Peirce's theory of signs is extremely intricate, as it is based on various types of triadic classifications, which ultimately lead to some sixty-six classes of signs [cf. Simms 1997: 79]. In addition to this complexity, the dimensions of iconicity, symbolization and indexicality are defined in two ways: on the one hand, in terms of the type of phenomenal nature of the object which is signified, on the other hand, on the basis of the relation between the sign and the object signified.

As a consequence of its complexity, Peirce's theory of signs has been interpreted in a large number of diverse ways, by authors in linguistic semantics and philosophy (see for example Lyons [1977: 99–109], who mentions different readings of Peirce by semanticists and gives his own version). My own interpretation of the three types of signs is mainly influenced by Simms [1997], who focusses on indexes: "indexes locate objects in the world, as opposed to representing them (icons) or describing them (symbols)" [Simms 1997: 80].

It should be emphasized that the aim of bringing in Peirce's semiotic theory, at this point, is not to examine how this theory in general can complement the systemic-functional framework.¹² Peirce's analysis of signs will be used with two interrelated purposes:

- (1) Focussing on the *development* of language: the *more abstract* reconception of the macrocomponents in TR2 at the level of lexis (or words, lexis being the simplest level of linguistic *signs*) will be clarified in term of the Peircean types of signs.
- (2) Focussing on the *plurifunctionality* of the lexical level: the features indicating this plurifunctionality as they appear in TR2 will be explained in terms of a complementarity between indexicality and symbolicity. This purpose will be further explained and motivated below.

The semiotic characterization of the TR2 level of lexico-grammar (approaching it from the lexical end, from the end of word-signs) as it will be presented in the present section [3.2] is intended as a *preliminary* sketch of the plurifunctionality of lexis, which will be further laid out when dealing with the final shift into the adult linguistic system [cf. Section 3.3 below]. In the following two sub-sections, the themes of the developmental abstraction and the plurifunctionality of TR2 lexis will be addressed in turn [Sections 2–3]. Afterwards, the discussion of the TR2 perspective 'from below' will be concluded [Section 4] by relating the lexical development to the abstraction of the general mathetic and pragmatic contexts-of-use ('perspective from above', as described in the previous sub-section [I]).

[2] Icon–index–symbol in a developmental perspective: The appearance of a symbolic-indexical function

The appearance of a symbolic-indexical function can be explained in general terms as follows.¹³ In Phase I, the child's utterances are proto-linguistic

¹² For explorations of how Peircean semiotics and systemic-functional linguistics can complement one another, see Goethals [1999], Melrose [1995]. We are neither concerned here with examining how Peirce's classification of signs can be used in the study of language development (on this subject, see for example Piaget [1967]).

¹³ As indicated, at this point, the Peircean threefold distinction between icon–index–symbol is used in order to characterize the abstraction which develops, through the ontogenesis of

icons: they are vocalizations which represent – stand for – expressions of ‘feelings’ or, more generally, dimensions of consciousness, such as ‘that’s nice’, ‘I want that’, ‘I want you to do that again’. By the end of Phase I, a level of lexis appears, in that the child conceives of specific items as *names* for things-actions, which are encoded in the lexical system of language in addition to being realized by articulation. In the proto-linguistic system, these names are used with a pragmatic or mathetic iconic dimension: i.e. a specific item either stands for the expression of a desire (the item qua object of desire), or the expression of an observation (the item qua object ‘out there’ which the child finds interesting, i.e. which is observed here and now).

In Phase II, in NL6 and TR1, the specific items come to be conceived as **proto-symbols**, first in the context of the mathetic macro-function: in NL6, the specific items are not just used to realize the option of observation (which refers to observation here and now), but also recall. At this point children have internalized the notion that the specific lexical items they have learnt can *represent* (past) experience, i.e. objects and actions observed or experienced by the interlocutors before the time of speaking. In TR1, the same lexical items are used alternatively as representations of experience (in the mathetic macro-function), or as names of objects or actions which are wanted (in the pragmatic macro-function). As we have seen in the presentation of Halliday’s theory, it is in the context of the original mathetic micro-functions (i.e. personal and heuristic) that adult vocabulary or lexis is learnt.

It is in TR2 that lexical items come to be conceived as **symbols** in the sense of adult language, due to the appearance of an intrinsic linguistic function. In TR2, lexico-grammatical expressions are not simply used to *represent shared* experience (present observations, or past experience), but rather to *construe*

language, leading to the multifunctional nature of lexis in TR2. This account presents this process of abstraction in terms of a developmental growth comprising the following steps: icons – specific names used iconically – proto-symbols – symbolic-indexical signs. Although ‘icons’ appear here as the initial type of linguistic sign which is later superseded by more abstract and more complex index-symbols, it should be pointed out that adult language also has an iconic dimension, which is different from, but of basically the same semiotic nature as the first types of signs occurring in proto-language. As has been announced in the Introduction, ‘iconicity’ will play an important role in the type of model which will be proposed in this dissertation.

experience *linguistically*. At this stage children have completely internalized the notion of language as purely *linguistic* interaction: they have learnt that they themselves can ‘mean’, that they can create new meanings which will inherently be meaningful to the hearer (i.e. even if the hearer has not shared the experience which is being linguistically construed), by using the symbolic (at this stage primarily *lexical*) system of a language.

This new conception of language as enabling the creative construal of new meanings is inherently interwoven with the possibility (or perhaps the unavoidable necessity) of indicating a personal perspective. Besides being based in the symbolic system of language, linguistic utterances also have an *indexical* dimension, by which the symbolic construal is anchored in the *ego hic et nunc* context from which it is being created: in Peirce’s terms, this context is called “the **indexical ground**” of a sign. At this point, the indexical ground can preliminarily be specified as ‘the interactants’ subjective here-and-now context’. This specification will serve as a temporary definition of the notion of ‘indexical ground’, which will be further spelt out in the next chapter.

The plurifunctionality of lexis, which appears in TR2 as an important step towards the final transition into adult language, can preliminarily be described in terms of a co-presence of symbolic and indexical dimensions in *lexemes*: the one being rooted in the symbolic system of language, the other being linked to the interactants’ subjective here-and-now context.

The stratal perspective ‘from below’ zooms in on a lexicogrammar as it emerges and expands in the child’s language, in TR2, *from the lexical end*. Hence the focus is on the abstraction of the mathetic and pragmatic components, and the resultant possibility of plurifunctionality, as processes taking place in and characterizing transitional lexis. In an attempt to further clarify these processes from the opposite developmental perspective, i.e. to reason with hindsight and to consider these processes from the viewpoint of adult language and its systemic-functional modelling in terms of metafunctional diversity, we are faced with the absence of a unified and unanimous approach to lexis in SFL.

As we will see in Chapter 7, the complex nature of lexis and hence the lack of consensus about its status within the systemic-functional model as a whole has to do with two dimensions: *metafunctional diversity* (how do the complementary interpersonal and experiential facets of language appear at the lexical end of lexicogrammar?), but also, *delicacy* and the way in which the idea of ‘lexis as most delicate grammar’ can be conceived in the different metafunctions. A more detailed specification of the complexity of lexis, and a further exploration of this complexity in relation to lexicogrammar as a whole (i.e. highlighting the dimension of delicacy) will be offered in Chapter 7.

The present chapter concentrates on metafunctional diversity, exploring this dimension as it appears, in interaction with stratification, in ontogenesis. With regard to the aspect of this ontogenesis which is currently focussed on – viz. the initial appearance of multifunctionality in lexis in TR2 – it can be noted that metafunctional diversity at the level of lexis has generally been regarded in SFL in terms of the traditional contrast between denotation and connotation,¹⁴ with further interpersonal aspects referred to as ‘intensification’ and ‘evaluative lexis’ in general.¹⁵ While the interpersonal import of connotation, intensification and evaluative lexis can intuitively be understood (they have to do with a ‘subjective’ stance), their interpersonal nature has never been precisely defined.¹⁶

¹⁴ This contrast is referred to as lexical ‘content’ vs. lexical ‘register’ in Halliday’s first rank–function matrix [cf. Halliday 1970].

¹⁵ The three aspects referred to here as characterizing interpersonal lexis in SFL – connotation, intensification, and evaluative lexis – have occurred in general overviews of the metafunctional components since Halliday’s first presentation of a rank–function matrix in 1970. These notions can also be recognized as three pillars underpinning the interpersonal sub-theory of appraisal, which started to develop in the 1990s: connotation and evaluation are subsumed under ATTITUDE, while intensification is referred to as GRADUATION (White) or AMPLIFICATION (Martin).

¹⁶ This observation also holds for appraisal theory, which, although it offers a refined picture of interpersonal (lexical) semantics, has not provided a precise definition of the interpersonal nature of (most importantly) ‘evaluative lexis’. This lack of a definition has led to a very broad and flexible view about what ‘belongs to’ interpersonal lexis. For example, in appraisal theory mental processes expressing a type of evaluation, such as *like*, *detest*, *prefer* and so on, are regarded as interpersonal lexis, whereas, from another (more general and more traditional) point of view, such processes construe emotive experience and hence belong to the experiential component in general.

It is in this context – the lack of a clear definition of the interpersonal and the experiential in the area of lexis – that the second motive behind bringing in Peirce’s semiotic theory [cf. the explanation of this motivation in general in the introduction [Section 1]] must be understood: apart from its role as a semiotic basis for explaining the development of lexis (i.e. the level of words and hence the simplest (atomic) kinds of signs in language) in TR2 [as dealt with in the present section], Peirce’s theory of signs will be used here to specify the complementarity and interaction between the interpersonal and experiential components at the level of lexis in a semiotic framework, in terms of indexicality and symbolicity. Indexical and symbolic aspects of lexis will first be illustrated in two steps, in accordance with the final stages of the transition phase (TR2 and final transition).

In the next sub-section the symbolic and indexical dimensions of lexis are given a preliminary characterization and are illustrated as they appear in TR2. In the final section of this chapter, i.e. after we have also considered further aspects of indexicality as they appear in the final transition into adult language, the complementary dimensions will be further specified and defined.

[3] The multifunctionality of lexis in TR2: Initial illustrations of symbolicity and indexicality

As a provisional characterization of symbolicity, it suffices to point out, at this stage, that the **symbolic** dimension of lexis will be defined as what is traditionally referred to as *denotation* (in its contrast to connotation). The way in which symbolic lexis (or experiential lexis) ‘means’ will be termed **designation**. ‘Designation’ refers to the construal of experience as linguistic *content*, by means of content blocks which are defined in the symbolic system of language, i.e. in terms of language-specific *sense* relations. Each of the notions characterizing symbolicity will be further explained in a more comprehensive semiotic framework at the end of this chapter.

In TR2, the **indexical** dimension, whose way of expressing meaning will be referred to as **indication**, appears in two ways, as shown in Halliday’s

illustration of how the child starts to express a personal stance:¹⁷ on the one hand, as *connotation*; on the other hand, as *grading*, realized through gradable words and intensification (which is either realized lexically, as in *too* in Halliday's illustration above, or phonologically).

Connotation, in Martin's [1996: 143] terms, refers to "ideational tokens standing for emotions of various kinds"; i.e. it characterizes the potential of experiential construals to connote, i.e. to evoke certain emotions. In terms of the semiotic classification of signs presented above, connotation refers to the semiotic process by which a symbolic sign points to the interactants' (especially the speaker's) indexical ground by *indicating* (the process 'indicate' is used to refer to the indexical function of language) an emotive meaning which is significant in relation to that ground. This meaning is not *designated* (i.e. not symbolised or denoted) by the utterance. Rather, it is interpretable by the interactants in relation to their indexical ground: connotative meanings relate to the speaker's stake in the matter which is symbolically construed. The pragmatic meanings which Halliday refers to in the examples *Cake!* and *Holes!* from Nigel's language in TR2 are meanings which are connoted, not designated, by these utterances: *Cake!* designates the meaning 'There's some cake!' and connotes 'I want some!'; similarly *Holes!* designates 'There are some holes!' and connotes 'Something must be done about them!'. As we will see below in dealing with the final transition into adult language, these types of connotative expressions are precursors (mainly expressed through the interpersonal system of KEY) of a more refined resource of connotation which characterizes adult language.

¹⁷ The two aspects of indexicality which are here attributed to TR2 – connotation and grading – are based on the examples which Halliday adduces in order to indicate the multifunctionality which appears at that stage, as cited above. The characterization of the type of 'subjectivity' (the expression of the speaker's personal angle) which appears in TR2 given here in terms of these two aspects does not aspire to serve as a comprehensive account of how the notion of 'subjectivity' develops in the ontogenesis of language. Rather, it is intended as an illustration, picking up on two particular aspects which indicate how the more abstract level of lexis in TR2 creates the potential of expressing a personal viewpoint. In dealing with the final transition and focussing on the nature of lexis in adult language, the aspects of connotation and grading will be placed in a wider framework, further explaining the complementarity between 'subjective' and 'objective' dimensions in language.

Evaluative adjectives and intensifiers are indexical in another sense. Halliday's characterization of *too* as "an evaluative element interpretable *in terms only of some reference point*" [Halliday 1975: 108, emphasis MT] can be extended to all intensifiers (such as *very, terribly, extremely*) and equally applies to gradable words in general. What is 'old' or 'loud', for example (cf. *very old tree, loud music*), does only have this quality in terms of the speaker's (subjective) assessment: something is 'old' or 'loud' relative to a certain reference point (on a scale of 'oldness' or 'loudness') which inheres in the speaker's opinion [cf. Halliday *ibid.*: "this reference point may be the speaker's opinion"]. By qualifying things in this way, assessing them in terms of their personal quality scales, speakers take a 'stance' [cf. the quotation from Halliday above] towards the experience they construe through language. Because they imply a scale of gradability, evaluative adjectives and intensifiers will be referred to in general as **grading elements**. It is precisely because the meaning of constructions with grading elements is related to a reference point which is anchored in the speaker's opinion that such constructions are indexical. Hence, besides their experiential role as construing experience, such constructions inherently pertain to the interpersonal dimension of language.

[4] The expansion of lexis in TR2 in relation to the intrinsic linguistic function

In the above, the developmental abstraction and the plurifaceted nature of the new level of lexis in TR2 have been characterized in general in terms the semiotic distinction between three types of sign: symbol, index and icon. Two aspects have been noted in order to illustrate the new possibility of linguistically expressing a personal viewpoint in TR2: connotation on the one hand, and grading elements on the other hand. The subjective nature of these two aspects of language has been characterized as related to indexicality.

The concept of indexicality (and the notion of an indexical ground), which will be used in this dissertation to characterize the interpersonal component of language, will be further defined in relation to symbolicity and iconicity, when dealing with the final transition into adult language [Sub-section 3.3], after further facets of indexicality characteristic of adult language will be explored.

With regard to TR2, the symbolic-indexical function brings out the dimension of the intrinsic linguistic function which pertains to the level of lexis-grammar, as a lexical equivalent of the interactive-informative dimension which bears upon the more general ‘semantic’ level. It is important to emphasize the parallelism in the developments at the level of the ‘semantic’ networks and at the level of an emerging lexico-grammar. In general, the plurifunctional nature of lexis (and preliminary types of structure) in TR2 depends on the notion of an intrinsic linguistic function. On the one hand, the symbolic dimension of lexis is interrelated with the notion of ‘information’ in the mathetic ‘semantic’ system in the sense of ‘construal of experience’ (the *īn-formāre*, or forming, facet of in-formation). It is in this sense that the mathetic component is the most important environment for the expansion of lexis, as Halliday explains [cf. the general presentation of Halliday’s theory of ontogenesis above]. On the other hand, the indexical dimension of lexis is linked to the pragmatic component which can be defined in general as being concerned with the indication of a personal stance towards the environment. However, whereas the primary pragmatic options of TR2 only allow an elementary desiderative stance towards actions and things (cf. the meanings ‘I want’ or ‘I don’t want’), indexical lexis opens up possibilities for expressing different shades of subjective assessments.

The symbolic-indexical function is proposed as a broader and more positive re-interpretation of Halliday’s rather one-sided characterization of the informative micro-function in relation to content: it disentangles ‘information’ from its association with truth (recall Halliday’s reference to the possibility of *misinformation* quoted above) and, more importantly, it also indicates its interpersonal facet.

III TR2 · conclusion:

The stratal and developmental types of perspectivization combined

Summarizing, in looking at TR2 from two alternative stratal perspectives, ‘from above’ and ‘from below’, we have focussed on the more abstract interpretation of the macrofunctional components in both ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’. We have seen how, in each perspective, this new interpretation depends on an abstract conception of language as purely *linguistic* interaction. This dimension, which is explained by Halliday in terms

of the concepts of dialogue and an informative micro-function at the level of semantics, has been related to the appearance of a symbolic-indexical function at the level of 'lexicogrammar' .

The overlap between models which characterizes the transition phase can now be clarified. In TR2, the proto-linguistic system and the adult organization of language overlap in the following way: on the one hand, although the more abstract conception and reorganization of the 'semantic' network in TR2 already points to general interpersonal reinterpretation of this network, in TR2, the 'semantic' systems are still organized proto-linguistically (with a contrast between mathetic and pragmatic options); on the other hand, the 'lexicogrammar' which gradually emerges in the transition phase comes to be organized in terms of the adult system, with plurifunctional words-in-structure, combining the construal of experience and subjective assessment of experience in single utterances.

In the framework of this stratal explanation of the overlapping models in TR2, the contradictions indicated above can be elucidated. The themes of functional continuity and an emerging plurifunctionality appear clearly and unequivocally in taking the perspective 'from below': the organization of lexis-grammar as combining symbolicity and indexicality indicates a shift into the adult system, with its ideational and interpersonal dimensions as simultaneous metafunctions. In TR2, the overall setup of the 'semantic' network (perspective 'from above') is ambiguous in that, on the one hand it is organized proto-linguistically (because of the systemic contrast between mathetic and pragmatic features), and on the other hand, its very abstract and generalized options (conceived in this way due to the intrinsic linguistic function) already point to their general interpersonal character. This ambiguity, which can be clarified in terms of the two developmental perspectives (from Phase II itself, and from the adult system) will disappear in the final shift into the adult system, which we turn to in the next section.

3.2.4 The final transition into adult language

The final transition into adult language (henceforth 'final transition') is characterized in general by four processes:

(1) the breakdown of the pragmatic–mathetic intonation system;

- (2) the further abstraction and overall interpersonal reinterpretation of the general pragmatic and mathetic options (perspective ‘from above’);
- (3) the further expansion of lexico-grammar (perspective ‘from below’); leading to the appearance of the adult lexicogrammatical systems (TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, and so on) and indicating a new perspective ‘from around’; and
- (4) the appearance of a textual metafunction.

In discussing the final transition, we will keep the same track as before, initially taking alternative stratal perspectives ‘from below’ and ‘from above’ [this section], i.e. focussing on the ‘semantics’ of speech functions [Sub-section 3.3.1] and the specific plurifunctional set-up of lexis in adult language [Sub-section 3.3.2].

I Final transition · view ‘from above’: The interpersonal system of SPEECH FUNCTION

[1] Introduction: The further abstraction of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast in the final transition into adult language

In the final transition, the ‘semantic’ network with the general pragmatic and mathetic options shifts into the *interpersonal* ‘semantic’ system of SPEECH FUNCTION, whereas the dimension of the mathetic component which is concerned with information as the construal of experience (*īn-formāre*) becomes a second generalized metafunctional component, the *ideational* metafunction, which is *parallel* with the interpersonal one, rather than an option contrasting systemically with pragmatic options.

Focussing on the re-organization of the TR2 ‘semantic’ network [see Figure 4-5] into the network of SPEECH FUNCTION, it can be seen that, in the final transition, the TR2 mathetic system (‘I’m telling you’) is disentangled from its primary association with representing or construing experience, and is reinterpreted as a general speech-functional dimension, viz. giving information, the ‘semantic’ option referred to as ‘statement’. In the adult interpersonal semantic system a ‘statement’ is defined as a combination of selections from the speech-functional systems of ORIENTATION and COMMODITY (ORIENTATION: ‘giving’ (vs. ‘demanding’) & COMMODITY: ‘information’ (vs. ‘goods-&-services’)), and in this way,

contrasts systemically with other combinations defined as ‘question’, ‘offer’ and ‘command’. Whereas in TR2, the general pragmatic and mathetic options are realized by a contrast in intonation, in adult language, a choice in the ‘semantic’ system of SPEECH FUNCTION is realized by options in the interpersonal lexicogrammatical system of MOOD.

The overall interpersonal reinterpretation of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast in the final transition is based on a reconception of ‘information’ which brings out the importance of types of *speech functions* as a general, interpersonal organizing principle in the setup of adult language. This reinterpretation involves two aspects.

(1) Interactive dimension. In the adult interpersonal ‘semantics’ of SPEECH FUNCTION, ‘information’ is primarily defined interactionally, as a type of COMMODITY which can be exchanged in a linguistic interaction. This definition is a further interpersonal abstraction of the interactive dimension of the TR2 ‘semantic’ system.

(2) Informative dimension. The facet of the mathetic component which relates to ‘information’ as a ‘construal of experience’ (the *‘in-formāre’* sense of information, as defined above) develops into the ideational component of adult language. As we have seen above, the general mathetic dimension of ‘construing experience’ in TR2 is realized in a lexis(-grammar) which is plurifunctional in the sense of adult language, being symbolic but also potentially indexical. The way in which this TR2 lexis(-grammar) further develops into the adult ideational ‘lexicogrammar’ will be discussed in the next section, which takes a perspective ‘from below’; the focus of the present section is on the plurifunctionality in the ‘semantic’ organization of adult language.

In the adult organization of language, the metafunctional components are simultaneously present in each utterance: the interpersonal realization of a speech-functional meaning is simultaneous with the coding of an ideational content. In this way, the co-presence of ideational and interpersonal dimensions in single utterances creates a possibility where the ideational encoding contributes to bringing out interpersonal meanings, either by *pointing to* or *indicating* (recall that ‘indicate’ is used here as a process bringing out the indexicality of language), or by *designating* further interpersonal, speech-functional shades of meaning.

The twofold nature of ‘information’ in the ‘semantic’ organization of adult language – viz., as an interpersonal, speech-functional feature and as an experiential content – can be further explained in the framework of Eirian Davies’ [1979] *The Semantics of Grammar*, which offers an abstract ‘semantic’ framework, built on the notion of speech roles, which is basically interpersonally-oriented but which also takes into account the import of experiential aspects at that abstract level.

Davies’ theory will be brought up here for two reasons:

- (1) As indicated, with respect to the present discussion, it is a framework which can be used to explain the shift of the pragmatic-mathetic opposition into, on the one hand, a more abstract, generalized interpersonal network (SPEECH FUNCTION) in adult language, but also, on the other hand, into the complementarity between an interpersonal and an experiential component.
- (2) Secondly, a number of aspects of Davies’ theory (especially the notion of ‘occurrence value’) will be taken up further on, in Part IV, in explaining the model of grammatical metaphor which is proposed in this thesis.

The following sub-section deals with Davies’ interpersonal theory, bringing it into relation with Halliday’s conception of the interpersonal ‘semantic’ system of SPEECH FUNCTION. On the basis of this, Sub-section [3] then explains the further abstraction of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast in the final transition.

[2] Davies’ *Semantics of Grammar* and the system of SPEECH FUNCTION

Davies’ semantic approach to English grammar is built on the notions of primary and secondary **speech roles**.¹⁸ Davies proposes a number of

¹⁸ Davies’ study titled *On the Semantics of Syntax* appeared before the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION was proposed in SFL in order to explain interpersonal grammatical features. Davies analyses mood and condition by embedding these grammatical aspects in a semantic framework of speech roles and speech activities (“operations”) which are associated with these roles.

Only the major themes of Davies’ theory will cursorily be summarized here in order to clarify some important aspects of the interpersonal semantic stratum, especially aspects which have not explicitly been spelt out in (other) SFL studies.

“secondary roles” with which each of the traditionally recognized general speech roles of *speaker*, *addressee* and *third party* can be associated (the traditional speech roles are called “primary roles”). The secondary speech roles are labelled *performer*, *knower*, *teller* and *decider*. The speech activities corresponding to those roles are called “operations”. Davies’ definitions are summarized in Table 4-8. It should be made clear that only the decider, knower and teller roles can be interactive roles or communication roles in the strict sense.¹⁹

Speech operation	Speech role	Definition
Telling	Teller	The role of the one who dominates the conversation at a given point, and holds and uses the conversational initiative.
Knowing	Knower	The role of one in a position to know the truth, or otherwise, of a given description of an event or state of affairs; one who can vouch for whether or not something is the case.
Deciding	Decider	The role of the one in a position of authority to decide whether or not a particular event shall take place.
Performing	Performer	The role of one envisaged as carrying out an action in the ‘real’ world.

Table 4-8 · Speech roles and operations in Davies’ semantic theory
[definitions taken from Davies 1979: 48]

¹⁹ Cf. Davies [1979: 49]:

[...] the interesting point is that the role of performer is obligatorily ‘linguistic’ in quite a different sense: that in which it constitutes the result of an analysis within interpretational [i.e. ‘experiential’ in SFL terms, MT] meaning. That is, even taken loosely as another term for the grammatical subject, and therefore as a cover term for several types of ‘actor’ (and none), the role of performer involves categories for the analysis of ‘reality’ which are established within the interpretational semantics of a language [...].

In defining the role of performer, Davies refers to the dimensions of *mood subject* and of *actor/agent/initiator* (without explicitly indicating the differential metafunctional nature of these dimensions). In this way, although the role of performer is primarily defined as the mood subject, it is *linguistic* in the sense of being construed linguistically by being mapped onto an experiential participant role. In the same vein, the roles of knower, decider and teller are also construed through ‘interpretational semantics’ (i.e. experiential meaning), rather than being interactionally enacted, when they are occupied by a third party.

The *teller* role is the most general and most basic interactive role: it is the role of “the one who dominates the conversation at a given point, and holds and uses the conversational initiative” [Davies 1979: 48], and it is the speech operation of telling which “constitutes a verbal social move” [ibid.: 65]. The **telling** operation consists of two facets:

(1) *Construction of a description*. On the one hand, the teller constructs a description: he/she chooses what to talk about by “select[ing] elements in extra-linguistic reality and organis[ing] them within the rules governing categories of literal interpretational meaning and their realization” [ibid.: 67]. Hence, the construction of a description involves two interrelated aspects: the choice of topic (‘what to talk about’), and the construction itself, i.e. the creation of a “literal interpretational meaning”. A description in this sense is a description of an event or a state-of-affairs in extra-linguistic reality [ibid.: 67].

(2) *Presentation of a description*. On the other hand, the teller presents the linguistic description to the interlocutor(s) in a speech interaction [cf. ibid.: 65]. As Davies points out, it is primarily this aspect of telling as presentation which is associated with conversational dominance [ibid.: 65]. Telling as presentation has two facets in Davies’ theory.

First, the dimension of *mode of telling* refers to different ways in which the teller-role can be assigned to speaker and hearer in a linguistic interaction. This general dimension deals with possibilities of turn-taking (such as ‘holding’ the teller role, imposing the teller role on the addressee and so on) and is realized phonologically.

Second, in presenting the description, the teller indicates the “*occurrence value*” of the described state-of-affairs in reality, i.e. he/she indicates if (positive/ negative) and when (either actually or potentially) the event takes place. This dimension of telling, referred to as *type of presentation* [ibid.: 105], is realized in interaction with the other major speech operations, which in this sense are defined as “mediating operations”: knowing and deciding. The knower is the “one who can vouch for whether or not something is the case” and the decider is the “one who is in a position of authority to decide whether or not a particular event shall take place” [ibid.: 48]. In Davies’ theory, the operation of *knowing* is realized in the declarative | interrogative distinction in the MOOD system, and through the MODALIZATION dimension of the

MODALITY system. The operation of *deciding* is realized in the imperative and subjunctive moods, in addition to the declarative and interrogative moods used in combination with the MODULATION dimension of MODALITY.²⁰

Telling		
Construction of a description	Choosing what to talk about	
	Creating a literal interpretational meaning (construction of a state-of-affairs)	
Presentation of a description	Mode of telling (turn-taking)	
	Type of presentation (indication of the occurrence value of the description)	Telling as type of presentation is implemented in interaction with the mediating operations:
		deciding
		knowing

Table 4-9 · Dimensions of the telling operation in Davies' interpersonal semantic theory

The various dimensions of telling, which is the central organizing concept in Davies' interpersonal semantics, are summarized in Table 4-9. In order to use Davies' theory as an explanatory framework, it is necessary to spell out the relation between Davies' speech *roles* and the systemic features in Halliday's system of speech *functions*.²¹

²⁰ This is a simplified representation of Davies' detailed analysis. It should also be pointed out that Davies herself does not use the systemic-functional *terms* 'modalization' and 'modulation'.

²¹ Halliday does deal with 'roles' in characterizing the interpersonal component, but places these roles in the context of situation (i.e. in the component of tenor). He distinguishes between two types of social roles: (1) first-order social roles, which "are defined without reference to language", are "all social roles in the usual sense of the term"; (2) second-order roles only come into existence through language and are defined by the linguistic interaction, they comprise "questioner, informer, responder, doubter, contradicter and the like" [Halliday 1977: 202]. Halliday also mentions that "[o]ther types of linguistic symbolic action, warning, threatening, greeting and so on, which may be realized either verbally or non-verbally, or both, define roles which are some way intermediate between the two" [ibid.]. As anticipated above, parallel with Martin [1992b: 571–572], I will regard second-order roles as belonging to the semantic stratum rather than the context of situation. The reason for this can now be further specified: second-order social roles are directly linked to the options in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION (Martin refers to these roles as "speech functional roles"). (This is also Eirian Davies' view, although she does not explicitly refer to a stratified organization of language.) In addition, I will also regard Halliday's 'intermediate' roles associated with for example threatening, warning, and so on, as belonging to the semantic stratum, since, as will be indicated further down in this section, they are linked

Davies' two mediating speech operations of deciding and knowing relate to the features of goods-&-services and information (respectively) in Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION. In this way the dimension of telling which has to do with the *type of presentation* relates to the distinction between *proposals and propositions* in Halliday's interpersonal system: the outcome of a telling-deciding operation is a proposal, whereas a proposition arises from an operation of telling-knowing. The other, more general facet of telling, i.e. *mode of telling*, can be linked to the concept of *dialogue* in Halliday's framework. In general, Halliday explains the appearance of a notion of dialogue in language development in terms of the learning of speech roles (cf. Halliday's explanation of this new notion cited above: "the child learns dialogue; he learns to adopt, accept and assign linguistic roles" [Halliday 1975: 51]). In relation to the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, the notion of dialogue defines the different types of speech functions ('statements', 'questions', 'offers' and 'commands') as *moves* in a linguistic interaction. Davies' dimension of mode of telling as dealing with turn-taking²² is primarily indicated in the interpersonal 'semantic' network by the sub-systems of TURN (with the options 'initiating' | 'responding to') and ORIENTATION ('giving' | 'demanding') which are systemically simultaneous with COMMODITY.

The dimensions of the two frameworks mentioned so far are purely interpersonal: the aspects of *mode of telling* and *telling as presentation* constitute the overall interactive facet of Davies' theory; likewise, the speech-functional options and the general notion of a dialogic mode are interpersonal aspects in Halliday's model. What remains to be elucidated is how the 'interpretive' facet of telling, viz. telling as *constructing a description*, is brought out in Halliday's model of speech functions. On the one hand, it is clear that, in general systemic-functional terms, this feature relates to the ideational component. Davies' argument that "[t]elling in its construction of description

to more delicate types of speech functions realized through various lexicogrammatical resources.

²² Apart from the assignment of turns, the dimension of *mode of telling* in Davies' theory also involves a general distinction between immediate telling and distanced telling. In SFL this dimension is indicated in the interpersonal lexicogrammatical system of STATUS (free clause | bound clause), as we will see in the next chapter.

aspect is everywhere implemented” [Davies 1979: 69] points to this general nature of constructing a description: as an ideational construal, it is mapped together with interpersonal facets in every utterance.

On the other hand, Davies also emphasizes that the construction of a description has an inherently interactional (in SFL terms: interpersonal) dimension:

The choice of description is a major element in the verbal social move which the teller makes towards his addressee in presenting it [...] For example, a teller may choose to present a proposition on which he knows the addressee holds strong views, and his making this choice may be interpreted as signifying that he wants the addressee to talk at length and to extend the conversation (? ‘discourse significance’) or that he is challenging or encouraging the addressee (high level interactional significance). [Davies 1979: 66]

The aspect of the construction of a description which is intrinsically interactional is the choice of “what to talk about” [ibid.: 66]. Davies points out that this interpersonal aspect is primary: the construction of the description itself (i.e. the purely ideational aspect) depends on the interpersonal dimension of choosing what to talk about.²³

Importantly, Halliday refers to a similar kind of interpersonal effect of ideational construals. In the following passage, taken from an article in which the “functional basis of language” is explained in the framework of ontogenesis, Halliday illustrates the plurifunctionality of adult language, pointing to interpersonal dimensions in a way which can be linked to Davies’ explanation considered above:

One very familiar type of phenomenon which illustrates this fact [i.e. that every adult linguistic act serves more than one function at once, MT] is that of denotation and connotation of word meanings. For example, after the F.A. Cup Final match between Leeds and Chelsea, a friend of mine who is a Londoner greeted me with *I see Chelsea trounced Leeds again*, using the word *trounce* which means ‘defeat’ plus ‘I am pleased’. But the functional multivalence of this utterance goes much further than is signalled by the word-

²³ Cf. also Davies [1979: 66]: “‘Choosing what to talk about’ and ‘constructing a description’ are different aspects of the same activity. The latter in one sense depends on the former; for to construct any description involves not constructing its complementary, and this is what is involved in choice of topic.”

meaning of *trounce*. The speaker was conveying a piece of information, which he suspected I already possessed, together with the further information (which I did not possess) that he also possessed it; he was referring it to our shared experience; expressing his triumph over me (I am a Leeds supporter and he knows it); and relating back to some previous exchanges between us. [Halliday 1973e: 34–35]

In Halliday's view then, the interpersonal significance of an ideational content lies in the interaction between denotation and connotation at the lexical level, but also more widely, in the particular significance of the information which is exchanged in the context of the relationship between speaker and hearer.

Bringing together Davies' and Halliday's explanations, the interpersonal significance of ideational content can generally be defined as the choice of what to talk about in the context of the interlocutors' here-and-now. The aspect of choice which is prominent in Davies' explanation, is implied in Halliday's illustration cited above: the speaker opts for the utterance *I see Chelsea trounced Leeds again*, although this information, as such, is already known to the hearer, because of its interpersonal significance in terms of his relation to the hearer. The dimension of the speaker-hearer relationship, which Halliday emphasizes, is also referred to in Davies' example: "a teller may choose to present a proposition *on which he knows the addressee holds strong views*" [Davies 1979: 66, emphasis MT].

In the above we have seen how the interpersonal effect of ideational choices, an aspect which is explicitly taken into account in Davies' interpersonal theory in relation to the teller-role, is also recognized in general by Halliday; and how this dimension can generally be defined as the choice of what to talk about in relation to the interlocutors' here-and-now context. The question which has to be addressed next is how this dimension relates to the interpersonal 'semantic' network of SPEECH FUNCTION in SFL. In IFG, Halliday provides a clue as to how this dimension can be dealt with in speech-functional terms: the four speech functions of 'statement', 'question', 'offer' and 'command' are "just the bare bones of the system" [Halliday 1994/1985: 363], they are the basic speech functions to which other, more delicate types of

speech functions or speech acts can be related.²⁴ The interpersonal effects which are indicated in Davies' and Halliday's illustrations presented above, viz. challenging and encouraging (Davies) and triumphing (Halliday) can be regarded as such more delicate types of speech function.

Halliday gives the following example in order to show how the more delicate types of speech functions can be defined in relation to the four basic speech functions:

for example, 'threat' is 'give' (as opposed to 'demand') 'goods-&-services' (as opposed to 'information') 'oriented to addressee' (as opposed to 'oriented to speaker' or 'neutral') and 'undesirable' (as opposed to 'desirable') e.g. *I'll shoot the pianist!*, reported as *he threatened to shoot the pianist*. If we substitute 'desirable', keeping the rest constant, we get 'promise'; if we substitute 'oriented to speaker' then instead of 'desirable/undesirable' we get 'sacred' ('vow') versus 'profane' ('undertaking'); and so on. [Halliday 1994/1985: 363]

In the example which is given by Halliday, the basic meaning of 'giving goods-&-services', i.e. the root speech function of 'proposal', is encoded interpersonally in the modal operator *will*, which is of the modulation > inclination type. The more 'delicate' recognition of this speech act as a threat depends on the ideational content selected by the speaker, i.e. the material process of *shooting*, *I* as Actor of *shooting the pianist*, *the pianist* as Goal of the *shooting*. It is the ideational construal which has a particular interpersonal significance in the interlocutors' here-and-now: in the example at hand, the undesirability of shooting pianists in general (negative connotation associated with this process), and the orientation of the speech act towards a third party (*pianist* encoded in the transitivity role of Goal).²⁵ Other examples given by

²⁴ Halliday gives the following list of more delicate types of speech functions, and emphasizes that this is "to name only a few": "offering, promising, threatening, vowing, undertaking, ordering, requesting, entreating, urging, persuading, commanding, instructing, encouraging, recommending, advising, prohibiting, dissuading, discouraging, warning, bribing, intimidating, blackmailing, shaming, cajoling, nagging, hinting, praising, reproving, blaming, flattering, parrying, hedging, complaining, insulting, boasting, claiming, stating, predicting, hoping, fearing, preaching, arguing, contradicting, submitting, insisting, asserting, denying, accusing, teasing, implying, disclosing, acknowledging, assenting, querying, disputing, accepting, doubting, responding, disclaiming, consenting, refusing, proclaiming, assuring and reassuring" [Halliday 1994/1985: 363].

²⁵ Although the *utterance* is addressed to the hearer (hearer as addressee), the *speech act* 'threat' is oriented towards a third party (rather than the hearer, as Halliday indicates in his

Halliday [1994/1985: 365] as variant encodings of the speech function of 'threat' further illustrate the role of ideational elements:

- (5) a. *I'll shoot that bastard of a pianist.*
- b. *I'll shoot the pianist if he doesn't play in time.*
- c. *I promise you I'll shoot the pianist.*

[Halliday 1994/1985: 365]

The type of construal exemplified by (5c), a construal with a performative process (in this case *promise*), is regarded as an interpersonal grammatical metaphor and will be explored in further detail in Part IV below. In (5a), the lexical connotation carried by *bastard* further contributes to the meaning of the utterance as a threat, whereas in (5b), this meaning is further highlighted through a conditional clause.

In general, therefore, the basic types of speech functions are realized interpersonally in the Mood element, through selections from the MOOD system, potentially in combination with selections from other (sub-)systems such as that of MODALITY (modal operators) and MODAL ASSESSMENT (interpersonal Adjuncts). The more finegrained meaning of more delicate types of speech functions is carried by the ideational content of the speech act, which is selected by the speaker because of its interpersonal significance in the interlocutors' here-and-now context (because of connotational meanings, but also more generally, for example in terms of transitivity roles). It is in the more delicate types of speech functions that Davies' aspect of telling as constructing a description can be related to Halliday's interpersonal 'semantic' network of SPEECH FUNCTION.

The overall picture of interpersonal 'semantics' which is arrived at by bringing together Davies' theory based on the concept of speech roles and Halliday's modelling of this interpersonal area by means of a network of SPEECH FUNCTION is presented in Figure 4-9. Table 4-10 gives an overview of how the major themes in both theories can be related to each other.

example), i.e. the person designated by *the pianist*. This contrasts with threats oriented towards the hearer, such as (taken from the system of parental control which has been used as an illustration above): *I'll smack you if you do that again*.




Figure 4-9 · The interpersonal component of language: aspects of Davies' interpersonal theory (highlighted) combined with Halliday's model

Davies: speech roles & operations		Halliday: SPEECH FUNCTION	
Telling as presentation of a description	Mode of telling (esp. turn-taking)		system of TURN
	Type of presentation (occurrence value) → mediating speech roles:	Deciding Knowing	Exchange of goods-&-services: proposals Exchange of information: propositions
Telling as construction of a description	Choice of what to talk about		Choice of ideational meanings ⇒ more delicate types of speech function
	Creation of a literal interpretational meaning		Ideational meaning mapped together with interpersonal meaning

Table 4-10 · Davies' interpersonal semantic theory and Halliday's model of speech functions compared

**[3] The abstraction of the pragmatic–mathetic contrast:
An explanation in terms of Davies’ semantic theory**

It is in the abstract semantic framework offered by Davies that the twofold nature of ‘information’ (as a speech-functional feature, and as ideational content) can be explained. This brings us to the starting point of this discussion – viz. the development of the pragmatic–mathetic ‘semantic’ system of proto-language into the adult ‘semantic’ system of SPEECH FUNCTION, a development which is based on a more abstract, interpersonal re-interpretation of ‘information’: this development can be clarified by spelling out the metafunctional nature of ‘information’ in the adult system.

In relation to the ‘semantic’ interpersonal area of speech functions, the notion of ‘information’ has two senses, one which is strictly interpersonal, and one which is based in the ideational component:²⁶

(1) In a first sense, the notion of ‘information’ is a speech-functional option contrasting systemically with ‘goods-&-services’. In this sense, it is defined as a type of ‘commodity’ which is exchanged in the linguistic interaction: in contrast with goods-&-services, information is a purely *linguistic commodity*. The system of COMMODITY represents the most general type of interpersonal ‘semantic’ distinction, viz. the contrast between ‘propositions’ and ‘proposals’, to which the different types of basic and more delicate speech functions can be related (cf. ‘statements’ and ‘questions’ as types of ‘propositions’; ‘offers’ and ‘commands’ as types of ‘proposals’). This aspect of information appears clearly in the network of SPEECH FUNCTION, and the contrast between exchanging information and exchanging goods-&-services, which will be referred to as **type of exchange**, is well-established in SFL and in linguistics as a whole, as can be seen in Table 4-10, which illustrates some of the ways in which this distinction plays a role in various frameworks. In the present work, propositions and proposals will be referred to as the **root speech functions**.

²⁶ In SFL in general, there is also a third sense in which the notion of ‘information’ is used, viz. in the textual system of INFORMATION, realized in the textual functions of Given and New.

Framework	Dimension	Exchange of <i>information</i>	Exchange of <i>goods-&-services</i>
Halliday	general types of speech functions	proposition	proposal
Davies 1979	mediating speech roles	knowing	deciding
Berry 1981	types of exchange	knowledge	action
Thibault 1995	domain under negotiation	semiotic difference	material difference
Lyons 1981	modal nature of illocutionary force	factuality	desirability
Halliday	types of modality	modalization	modulation
philosophically oriented linguistics	modality	epistemic modality	deontic modality

Table 4-11 · ‘Information’ in contrast with ‘goods-&-services’ in various linguistic frameworks

(2) In a second sense, ‘information’ also refers to an ideational content, *inasmuch as the ideational coding is selected because of its potential interpersonal effect* in the context of the interlocutors’ here-and-now. This effect can be to inform (as in a statement *tout court*: giving information), but it can also be to persuade, to express anger, to encourage, to express hope, and so on. In this sense, the ideational ‘piece of information’ can also be chosen in order to express a command or an offer, which, in general speech-functional terms, are proposals (i.e. expressions encoding an exchange of goods-&-services). The second sense of ‘information’ indicates how the reflective dimension of language (i.e. the ideational dimension of construing experience) can be used in order to achieve effects which pertain to ‘language as action’ (i.e. the interpersonal component).²⁷

²⁷ The contrast between ‘*language as action*’ and ‘*language as reflection*’ is used by Halliday [e.g. 1992b] to characterize the complementary nature of the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions [see also Chapter 1 above]. It is important to disentangle the two senses of ‘information’ as indicated here, in order not to conflate ‘proposal’ | ‘proposition’ with action/-reflection, as Cloran [1994: 167] does:

it may be said that the distinction between language as action and therefore ancillary, and language as reflection and therefore more or less constitutive corresponds to the basic distinction within the interpersonal system of the exchange status of a message – the message as the exchange of information (i.e. propositions) versus goods and services (proposals).

The major, primary (i.e. least delicate) distinctions in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION are realized by selections from the systems of MOOD and MODALITY. The specific interpersonal character of more finegrained types of speech functions depends on more delicate interpersonal systems (as we will see below), but also on the ideational information which is encoded in the utterance. Figure 4-10 shows how the adult ‘semantic’ system expands the pragmatic-mathetic ‘semantic’ system of proto-language in the transition phase (TR2).




Figure 4-10 · Interactive-informative dimensions of ‘information’ in the adult ‘semantic’ system, as expansions of the pragmatic–mathetic system of proto-language in TR2

The characterization of the system of SPEECH FUNCTION as an **interactive-informative** system reflects the twofold import of ‘information’ in the interpersonal ‘semantic’ organization of adult language.

(1) The interactive aspect refers to the utterances as moves in an interaction, (especially the aspects of ‘initiating’ | ‘responding’ and ‘giving’ | ‘demanding’), to the interaction itself as an exchange, either of ‘goods-&-services’ or of ‘information’, and to the speech-functional significance of each move (as a ‘proposition’ or ‘proposal’, and further more delicate types of speech functions).

(2) The informative aspect refers to ideational information in its potential to designate or indicate (the difference between designation and indication in this connection will be important in further discussions below) more delicate shades of interpersonal meanings. ‘Informative’ is intended here in a purposive, speech-functional sense: it refers to the use of ‘information’ (ideational content) *in order to* create finegrained interpersonal effects, i.e. the choice of a type of ideational coding because of its potential to

create interpersonal meanings. The way in which ideational information can have an interpersonal significance is illustrated in Halliday's examples cited above, which are repeated here:

- (6) *I hear Chelsea trounced Leeds again.*
- (7) a. *I'll shoot the pianist.*
 b. *I'll shoot that bastard of a pianist.*
 c. *I'll shoot the pianist if he doesn't play in time.* [Halliday 1994/1985: 365]

Finer shades of speech-functional meanings are brought out through connotative lexis (*trounced* in (6), *shoot* in (7), *bastard* in (7b)), through transitivity roles (the choices of Actors and Goals in the two examples), through expansions of the main utterance which strengthen the speech-functional significance (the conditional expanding clause in (7c)). Importantly, the semiotic process by which interpersonal, more delicate speech-functional meanings are indicated by ideational encodings constitutes a wider type of indexicality which can be linked to the relation between connotation and denotation at the level of lexis: in addition to lexical connotation, aspects which are more distinctly grammatical (such as transitivity roles and expansions) play an important role in *indicating* delicate types of speech functions.

The various dimensions by which the interpersonal 'semantics' has been characterized above – as an *interactive-informative* system centred around the notion of *speech functions* – are concentrated in Martin's [2000a] concept of "**interpersonal telos**": the telos of an exchange is defined by Martin as "its global purpose in the interaction at hand". This concept of 'telicity' characterizes the basic nature of interpersonal semantics: analysing an utterance from an interpersonal point of view means exploring which role it has as a move in a speech interaction, which type of speech function it realizes, and which shades of interpersonal effects are signified by the information encoded in the utterance.²⁸

²⁸ The concepts of 'telos' and 'telicity' as used here (and also further above, in referring to the choice of experiential elements *because of* their interpersonal significance) are intended as abstract notions which are akin to 'speech function' but which characterize the nature of the interpersonal component in a more general way. It should be emphasized that, in this sense,

II Final transition · perspective ‘from below’: Symbolic-indexical developments

In viewing the transition from proto-language into adult language ‘from above’, we have explored how the network of mathetic and pragmatic contexts-of-use gradually becomes more abstract (TR1–TR2), and eventually develops into the adult interpersonal ‘semantics’ of speech functions (final transition). Parallel with this development is the appearance of a new level of words (and the first types of words-in-structure), indicating the emerging stratification in ontogenesis, and in this way, calling for an alternative theoretical-stratal perspective ‘from below’. As we have seen, this new level of lexis(-grammar) becomes plurifunctional in TR2; this plurifunctionality has been preliminarily characterized in terms of the linguistic dimensions of connotation vs. denotation and indexicality vs. symbolicity.

The present sub-section briefly specifies the further possibilities of connotation in adult language, and indicates a general extra dimension of lexico(-grammar) in adult language, which is not yet present in TR2, viz. the symbolization of subjectivity. Although these new dimensions are important in lexico-grammar as a whole, they will be approached here from the lexical end of the lexicogrammatical continuum.

As indicated above, an important development in TR2 is the new conception of language as linguistically construing experience. Whereas in TR1, the dimension of observation refers to the *representation* of shared experience in language (representing things and actions which are being/have been observed by the child and the hearer), in TR2 children learn that they can *construe* experience *linguistically* in such a way that the utterance which is created will be meaningful to other interlocutors, even if the latter have not shared the experience which is thus construed. As we have seen, this new possibility in TR2 depends on the concept of an intrinsic linguistic function and can be specified in two ways, depending on the perspective from which language is viewed: (1) in focussing on the general ‘semantic’ networks in

these notions should not be primarily associated with conscious, deliberate actions on the part of the speaker. Rather, ‘interpersonal telos’ indicates the possibility, which is open to interactants in a speech interaction, of manipulating social power relationships through language.

TR2, the construal of experience can be related to the informative dimension of language (in the mathetic component); (2) in looking at the organization of lexis, focussing on words as the first types of linguistic signs which appear in the development of language, the construal of experience can be defined as the symbolic dimension of language, which is potentially complemented by an indexical dimension.

The new notion of construing non-shared experience in TR2 paves the way for linguistically construing subjective (internal-personal, inherently non-shared) experiences – i.e. **symbolizing subjectivity**, a possibility which only emerges after the final transition into adult language. The types of subjective *meanings* which are at issue here do already occur from the onset of language development. They are modelled by Halliday in the subsequent steps of ontogenesis as follows [see also Figure 4-1 summarizing Halliday’s model, where these subjective meanings are highlighted]:

- in NL1–4: in the personal micro-function, in the features interest > general | pleasure | surprise | disgust;
- in NL5–6: in the system labelled EXPRESSION OF FEELING, which now also accommodates the options excitement, ritual joy, warning, complaint, in addition to the options which were already present in NL1–4;
- in the transition phase: in the system of ENGAGEMENT.

Throughout the development of proto-language (i.e. including the transition phase) [cf. Halliday 1984], such kinds of ‘subjective meanings’ are only realized proto-linguistically (i.e. iconically, in terms of the semiotic classification explained above), by simple vocalizations.²⁹ Although adults also use non-linguistic, iconic, vocalizations to express surprise, excitement, complaints and so forth, the adult system of language does have a range of possibilities for *designating* subjective meanings, especially in mental processes (the ideation of internal experiences, in particular mental processes of the emotive and desiderative types) and in inherently attitudinal lexis (lexemes such as *good, funny, awful, terrible, wonderful*, and so on).

²⁹ As Torr & Simpson [forthc.] point out, an exception is *want*, which does occur in the transition phase in order to express a request for (especially) goods or services.

Apart from the wider range of vocabulary (which continues to be expanded through an individual's life), and the new possibility of construing internal experiences, adult language differs from transitional proto-language, in that it also has a **wider connotative potential**. In TR2, the types of connotations which have been described above as indicated in Halliday's examples have to do with (pragmatic) inferences on the part of the hearer (in this case, the parent and linguist investigating child language) and are mainly based on the intonation and voice quality of the utterance (the interpersonal system of KEY): for example, the connotation associated with *Holes!*, viz. 'Something must be done about those holes!', is expressed by the "rising tone and plaintive voice quality" [Halliday 1975: 72] in which the utterance is spoken. Adult language equally has the potential of evoking connotations through the interpersonal system of KEY, but there are further, lexical possibilities: in fully developed language, connotation depends on a *choice* of one lexeme above another because of its expressive (or neutral) value. This choice can be based on stylistic considerations, or on the attitudinal meanings associated with lexemes.

'Connotation' in general can be subdivided into two major dimensions, which are not contrastive, but rather lie at two ends of a continuum:

- (1) **stylistic connotation**, which refers to subjective value attached to lexis through an association with a particular style, especially in terms of formality (or, seen from the other end, familiarity) (e.g. swearing, taboo words, technical vocabulary, slang); and
- (2) **attitudinal connotation**, which pertains to the associative, attitudinal meanings pointed at by denotational meanings (especially denotative lexis used metaphorically (i.e. as lexical metaphors) to express a value judgement and words which have value-laden associations which are based in cultural or social contexts, or in personal experiences).

The notion of connotation and its role in the interpersonal component of language will be further specified in the following chapter.

III Final transition: Conclusion

In discussing the final transition of proto-language into adult language, we have zoomed in on the new dimensions of the adult organization of language

which come into view in taking two opposing stratal perspectives, viz. ‘from above’ and ‘from below’:

- ‘from above’: the appearance of the interpersonal ‘semantic’ system of SPEECH FUNCTION as an interactive-informative system, and the reinterpretation of the mathetic option of construing experience as an ideational ‘semantic’ component, which is simultaneous with the interpersonal one in adult language;
- ‘from below’: the further expansion of *lexis* as a symbolic-indexical system, especially the new possibility of linguistically designating internal experiences in adult language and the wider connotative potential of the adult system.

3.3 Emerging stratification and metafunctional diversity in ontogenesis: Summary and conclusion

In this section we have explored the dimension of metafunctional diversity, concentrating on the complementarity between the major two metafunctions (experiential and interpersonal), as it appears, in tandem with stratification, in the transition from proto-language to adult language. In this exploration, which has been presented as a further analysis of Halliday’s theory of language development, a refined model has been proposed of the ontogenetic ‘transition phase’.

Taking the theme of metafunctional diversity as the central topic, the investigation in this section has focussed on the notion of a *functional continuity* from proto-language through a transition phase into adult language – a notion which forms the specific hallmark of Halliday’s functional theory of ontogenesis. While the concept of functional continuity in general captures the development from specific micro-functions in proto-language, to generalized macro-functions in a transition phase, and further to the abstract metafunctions of adult language, with a view to explaining the complementarity between the two major metafunctions, the major point of attention has been a *contrariety* in this functional development:

- (1) on the one hand, the development of the transitional macro-functions (pragmatic and mathetic) into the major metafunctions of adult language (interpersonal and experiential);

(2) on the other hand, the abstraction of the transitional pragmatic–mathetic contrast into the interpersonal ‘semantic’ system of SPEECH FUNCTION.

In order to account for this seemingly contradictory twofold development which lies at the basis of the metafunctional relationship between an interpersonal and an experiential component in adult language, the proposal for a refined transition model special attention has been based on:

(1) An incorporation of the dimension of *stratification*. It has been explained how the abstraction of the micro-functional components into two generalized macro-functional ‘contexts-of-use’ marking the beginning of the transition phase in Halliday’s theory goes together with the emergence of a multi-stratal setup of language, in contrast to the basic two-level organization of proto-language in Phase I. We have seen how, through the abstraction and generalization of functional components, the content-plane of proto-language comes to be reorganized into two strata, each with their own paradigms: the abstract contexts-of-use appear as general options which can be combined with more specific, lexical elements. The emerging stratification has been explained as being based on a re-grouping of the options in the original content-network³⁰ into two simultaneous networks which differ in terms of their degree of generality or abstraction. This explanation of the origin of (multi-)stratification in TR1 has been motivated in relation to Halliday’s presentation of two cases of ‘proto-stratification’ in Phase I, and in relation to his overall model of semogenesis indicating in a general fashion how simultaneous systems appear.

(2) A further analysis of the role of an *informative function* in the gradual abstraction of the transitional macro-functions into the metafunctions adult language (in TR2 and the final transition). Halliday’s informative micro-function has been re-interpreted as an overall *intrinsic linguistic function*, building upon Halliday’s general explanation of this function,³¹ and further

³⁰ I.e. the overall organization of the content-plane in proto-language (Phase I) as a network comprising the various micro-functional components as *different* (i.e. contrastive, non-simultaneous) systems.

³¹ As we have seen, this general explanation contrasts with his characterization of the informative *micro-function* as the function to inform (or to misinform), a characterization which has led Halliday to conceive of this function as a micro-function, and, more

emphasising the fact that, in the transition phase, children internalize the notion of communication as *linguistic interaction*.

The specification of the way in which an internal stratification of the content plane characterizes TR1 has made it possible to analyse the further developments in the transition phase (TR2 and the final transition) in more detail by taking two complementary stratal perspectives: a perspective ‘from above’, bringing into focus the development of the generalized network of pragmatic and mathetic contexts-of-use, and a perspective ‘from below’, highlighting the expansion of lexis(-grammar). In each of these stratal perspectives, the role of an intrinsic linguistic function has been further specified: (1) in relation to the perspective ‘from above’, this function has been characterized as ‘interactional-informative’, emphasizing the nature of the pragmatic and mathetic contexts-of-use as abstract ‘semantic’ options; (2) in relation to the perspective ‘from above’, the intrinsic linguistic function has been refined as ‘symbolic-indexical’, in order to emphasize the interaction between two types of functionality at the level of lexis.

By conceiving of the intrinsic linguistic function as a general function (rather than as a micro-function as per Halliday) which plays a specific role in each of the content strata, it has been emphasized that the gradual abstraction of the macro-functional components takes place, in a parallel fashion, in the general, speech-functional ‘semantic’ network and in the more specific level of the emerging lexico-(grammar).

Two alternative theories of language have been drawn on in order to explain this gradual functional abstraction:

(1) In order to explain the functional abstraction at the level of the abstract ‘semantic’ network, and especially the twofold, seemingly contradictory nature of this abstraction (i.e. of the pragmatic–mathetic options into the interpersonal network of speech function, and into the contrast between an interpersonal and experiential component), Eirian Davies’ interpersonal semantic theory has been brought in, especially because, although it is primarily interpersonally oriented, this theory also takes into account the

importantly, to link it to the representation of content and to emphasize its role especially in relation to the mathetic component.

contribution of the experiential metafunction at a highly abstract, semantic level.

In a framework set up by integrating Davies' insights on speech operations with Halliday's conception of the interpersonal 'semantics' of speech functions, the complex, multifaceted nature of the notion of 'information' in adult language has been spelt out, and the twofold development marking the abstraction at the most general 'semantic' level has been explained in relation to this multifaceted concept of 'information'.

(2) Peirce's threefold classification of signs has been drawn on in order to explain the functional abstraction at the level of lexis, the level of word-signs. At this level, the abstraction has been clarified as an overall development from proto-linguistic icons, to 'names' used in an iconic context, to lexemes with a symbolic and indexical function. Illustrations of the expansion of lexis in TR2 and in the final transition have been related to the semiotic notions of symbolicity and indexicality and, in this way, the complementarity of experiential and interpersonal facets of lexis in adult language has been given a preliminary characterization in semiotic terms.

In approaching the theme of metafunctional diversity through an exploration of the way in which the two major metafunctions appear in the course of ontogenesis, we have arrived at an *initial picture* of the complementarity between interpersonal and experiential facets in adult language. This complementarity has been illustrated, at the level of lexis, in terms of denotation, connotation, grading and evaluation, which have been linked, in a preliminary fashion – as has been emphasized, to the semiotic notions of indexicality and symbolicity. In exploring the abstraction of the general pragmatic and mathetic functional-semantic options as a twofold development, into the metafunctional contrast between interpersonal and experiential components on the one hand, and into the interpersonal network of SPEECH FUNCTION on the other hand, the major metafunctions have been initially described in the following way:

- the experiential component – as an abstract 'meta'-function which is simultaneous with an interpersonal component – has been characterized

as pertaining to the *‘in-formāre’* facet of ‘information’, the facet emphasizing the semiotic formation of ‘content’;

- the ‘semantic’ network of SPEECH FUNCTION has been characterized as forming the basis of an interpersonal semantics, while it has been made clear that experiential codings can also contribute to convey speech-functional meanings, especially in an indicative way, i.e. through connotation, but also by designating those speech-functional meanings.

This initial picture of the complementarity of interpersonal and experiential facets of adult language has appeared by taking two opposing stratal perspectives, the two perspectives by which the emergence of stratification, marking the beginning of the transition phase, can be modelled: ‘from below’ and ‘from above’. It has been explained at the beginning of this chapter that this type of ontogenetic exploration, by which we approach adult language through two opposing stratal perspectives, allows us to concentrate on the dimension of metafunctional diversity in its relation to stratification, without yet having to take into account the further complexities pertaining to *lexico-grammar*, viz. the dimension of delicacy and further differentiating dimensions such as a rank scale, and the relationship between grammatical functions vs. grammatical classes.

In relation to the two stratal perspectives focussed on in this section, the two opposing perspectives which suffice to explain the origin of stratification in the transition phase of ontogenesis, grammar appears as a central *core* in the organization of adult language – a core which comes into view by taking a perspective *‘from around’*. It is in this sense that the two areas highlighted in the initial picture of adult language which has so far been sketched constitute the ‘edges’ of the overall model of adult language.

Figure 4-11 is an attempt to visualize the ‘place’ of those areas in the overall setup of adult language, as ‘edges’ in relation to the grammatical heart of this setup. With a view to the further exploration of the *lexico-grammatical* heart of language further on in Part III, and on the basis of the picture which has so far been arrived at in the present chapter through an analysis of ontogenesis, the next section clarifies in more detail the nature of the ‘edges’ of adult language, concentrating on metafunctional diversity, and its relationship to stratification.




Figure 4-11 · The place of grammar as the organizational heart of adult language, in relation to the areas of language which have come into focus by taking a developmental perspective

Chapter 5

Stratification and metafunctional complementarity: A clarification and a proposal for a refined model

Having explored how the major metafunctions appear, as *meta*-functions, in the course of ontogenesis [previous chapter], we can now return to the question which has served as a starting point for taking the second step in exploring the baseline model in SFL [cf. the introduction in the previous chapter]: how can the variation in the modelling of the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions – i.e., respectively, by an enhanced stratification model vs. an extended stratification model – be explained? More specifically: why is the interpersonal metafunction theorized in terms of a model with a separate ‘semantic’ network, in contrast to the experiential metafunction?, and: how can the interpersonal model with the separate ‘semantic’ network be motivated in the context of a study of ontogenesis, the context in which this model was originally proposed by Halliday?

In this chapter, these questions will be approached from an abstract viewpoint focussing on the interaction between stratification and metafunctional diversity. From this viewpoint, the above specific questions can be reformulated into one general fundamental question, viz. *what is the nature of ‘semantics’* (and hence, ‘lexicogrammar’) as interpreted in SFL in general, and especially in the variant models we have considered in the previous chapters. Hence, it is at this point in the theoretical study of the baseline model in SFL that we are confronted with the key issue of defining ‘meaning’, or, what I have called the fundamental analytical question in linguistics [cf. Introduction].

In attempting to answer the central question about ‘meaning’, and hence, the more specific question about alternative models in SFL, the present chapter offers a fundamentally semiotic clarification of stratification and of the experiential–interpersonal complementarity as it has been theorized in SFL, and proposes a refined model of the interaction between stratification and metafunctional diversity. In this way, it specifies the edges of the semiotic-functional model which is proposed in this dissertation.

This chapter is organized in four sections. First [**Section 1**], the nature of a fundamentally semiotic approach to defining linguistic categories, such as ‘interpersonal’ and ‘experiential’, will be specified. In **Section 2**, the nature of ‘stratification’, as it has been interpreted in SFL, will be further clarified in relation to Hjelmslev’s foundational distinctions (the *Hjelmslevian stratification scheme*, as explained in Chapter 2), and in this framework, a global difference between the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions will be revealed. In a concluding section [**Section 3**], on the basis of these the semiotic specification of the nature of interpersonal and experiential facets in language, the variation between the different stratification models which have been proposed in SFL to model the major metafunctions will be explained in relation to Halliday’s approach to the ontogenesis of language.

1 A ‘fundamentally semiotic’ view on defining linguistic categories

In order to explain what is meant by a ‘fundamentally semiotic’ approach to defining the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions, it is necessary to consider the semiotic nature of defining linguistic categories in general.

In a semiotic perspective, a ‘sign’ is defined as a relationship between two levels of abstraction or levels of coding, which can be referred to, with Hjelmslev, as a content plane and an expression plane. This equally applies to linguistic categories, as signs. More importantly, as *metalinguistic* signs, the categories used in linguistics to explore language are more complex: in Hjelmslev’s theory, they are signs whose content plane is another semiotic system – that of language, as visualized in Figure 5-1 [taken from Chapter 2].




Figure 5-1 · Categories of linguistics as metalinguistic signs

Hjelmslev’s semiotic interpretation of a metalinguistic sign makes clear two important features about the relationship between linguistic categories and the phenomena of language which are named and theorized through these categories:

- (1) The categories can pertain primarily to content-facets of language, or to expression-facets, or to both: categories of linguistics have a functional or ‘semantic’ side, and a structural, ‘realizational’, or formal side.
- (2) The categories themselves can be defined in two ways, according to the two sides of their content plane. In other words, the ‘meaning’ of the category (i.e. its content plane *at the metalinguistic level* [see Figure 5-1]) can be specified in relation to two types of questions: (1) which meaning in language does the category name? what is its function in the system of language as whole?, and/or (2) how is this category represented in language? how is it expressed? In a reflection on “The ineffability of linguistic categories”, Halliday [1988a] also refers to two possible ways of defining linguistic terms, which he calls “definition by *decoding*” (‘what does the category mean?’), and “definition by *encoding*” (‘how is the category realized?’) [cf. Halliday 1988a: 28].¹

¹ Halliday’s exploration of how we define linguistic categories is embedded in a larger theoretical framework of reflecting on the relationship between language and the theory of language, or more specifically, between grammar (the coding forms of language) and the way in which we think about grammar – Halliday coined the term ‘*grammatics*’ to refer to the

Either of its two sides may be highlighted by the category, either in its name, and/or in the way in which the category is explained. Hence, linguistic categories can be (interpreted as) **content terms**, or **expression terms** (structural concepts). Figure 5-2 visualizes the two types of linguistic categories in the framework of a Hjelmslevian metalinguistic semiotic.²




Figure 5-2 · Two types of linguistic categories in a Hjelmslevian metalinguistic semiotic

latter. The idea that the relationship between grammar and grammatics can be used as a heuristic to probe into either of them has inspired Halliday since the late 1970s, and has led to a cross-fertilization in both directions: in his thinking on both language and on 'doing linguistics'. Being embedded in this larger theoretical framework, Halliday's specification of these two types of definitions is inspired by his earlier in-depth study of relational processes [cf. Halliday 1968: esp. 228], where he distinguished between two directions of coding: encoding and decoding. Davidse has likewise taken up the motif of the grammar–grammatics relation as a heuristic, especially in her studies of relational processes [cf. Davidse 1992a, 1996b, 2000].

Halliday's and Davidse's specifications of the different directions which are possible in these processes are similar to the two types of linguistic terms which are distinguished here in relation to Hjelmslev's notion of a metasemiotic. However, it should be pointed out that Halliday and Davidse concentrate on the way in which 'defining' is crystallized in grammar by drawing a parallel with the nature of 'defining' in linguistics (grammatics). Since their focus is on language and the parallel types of processes which are used in metalanguage, the more abstract consideration that linguistic terms, as metasigns, are not on the same level of abstraction as the object language itself (as is highlighted in Hjelmslev's framework), is not germane to their purposes.

² Compare Chapter 2 above, where the possibilities of a non-denotative semiotic system have been illustrated for the connotative variant.

This difference can be illustrated by considering one of the most central types of linguistic categories, viz. the grammatical categories or word classes ‘noun’, ‘verb’, ‘adjective’ and so forth.³ Grammatical categories are *functional-semantic* concepts when they are defined in terms of their ‘semantics’:⁴ for instance, in Langacker’s [1987a: 189, 1987b: 58] framework, a noun “designates a region in some domain”, a verb designates a “process”, and adjectives and adverbs designate “atemporal relations”. A similar kind of ‘semantic’ definition of grammatical categories occurs in SFL, where a noun is referred to as “Thing”, an adjective as “Quality”, and a verb as “Process”. When they are interpreted as *formal-realizational* concepts, the definition of grammatical categories may focus on morphological or ‘morphosyntactic’ properties: for example [cf. Lyons 1977: 425ff], a noun is a type of word which can be inflected for number and case (it can have plural or, for example, possessive endings), a verb is a word which may be inflected for tense, aspect, voice and mood, an adjective is a word which may take a comparative and superlative form.⁵

³ In linguistics in general, *word classes* are commonly regarded as *grammatical categories*. In functional theories, these are called *grammatical classes*, and are contrasted to *functional classes* (such as ‘Agent’, ‘Medium’, ‘Senser’, ‘Subject’, ‘Theme’), which then constitute a second major type of grammatical categories. ‘Linguistic categories’ is a more general label referring to all categories (terms) used in linguistics, also including grammatical categories. More general types of linguistic categories include ‘metafunction’, ‘stratum’, ‘semantics’, ‘interpersonal’, and so on. ‘Word classes’ are here called ‘central’ types of linguistic categories, because they can be seen as belonging to the basic core of virtually any type of linguistic framework (in contrast to, for example, categories such as ‘metafunction’, ‘experiential’, ‘logical form’, ‘X-bar’). Hence, it is also these ‘word classes’, as grammatical categories, which illustrate par excellence the different possibilities of defining them.

In Chapter 8, we will further explore the nature a ‘semantic’ definition of ‘word classes’ [see also note 5 below].

⁴ A definition of linguistic categories in semantic terms has also been called a *notional* definition [cf. Quirk et al. 1985: e.g. 74; Newmeyer 1998: 206]. This sense of ‘notional’ categories is also reflected in the term ‘notional subject’ (used in traditional grammar, and in mainstream grammar textbooks [e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 1413]), which is used to refer to the constituent which is ‘semantically’ the ‘subject’ of the verb in an existential construction, where existential *there* is then considered as the ‘grammatical subject’.

⁵ The definition of the grammatical categories ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’ is brought up here as a simple and familiar illustration to make clear the distinction between a functional-semantic and a formal-realizational way of defining linguistic concepts, pertaining to the content-side or expression-side of the object of language within the metalinguistic semiotic system. Evidently, the problem of defining grammatical categories is vastly more complex

As we have seen in Chapter 1, and also in considering Halliday's illustrations of how multifunctionality appears in the language of a young child [Chapter 4], the experiential metafunction is associated with 'content', and the representation and construal of experience through language, whereas the interpersonal metafunction is characterized in terms of taking a subjective stance towards the matter which is being linguistically construed, and in this way, more broadly, taking up a kind of (social) role. Glosses which have been used to identify the major metafunctions, in general (recapitulating Chapter 1), and in relation to the study of ontogenesis are outlined in Table 5-1 below, together with the areas of language of which illustrations have been given, in the previous chapter, in order to show the emergence of multifunctionality in ontogenesis.

than sketched out in this simple illustration. The reason for this is that language itself is not a simple (denotative, in Hjelmslev's terms) semiotic system consisting solely of one expression plane interfacing with one content plane: in a functional view, *multiple* strata are needed in order to theorize the complexities of language.

In consideration of the intricacy of multiple strata, 'functional' definitions referring to the (grammatical) functioning of the categories in language, have not been mentioned in the above illustration – for example: 'a 'noun' is a word that is preceded by a determinating element'. Such 'functional' definitions can themselves be oriented towards the formal-realizational side of language (when the presence of a determinating element is regarded as a formal (positional or distributional) criterion for recognizing a 'noun'), or towards its functional-semantic side (when the combination of a noun with a determinating element is regarded as a semantic aspect having to do with the way in which a noun designates a region in some domain – a region which is 'determined' by a determinating element).

Grammatical categories as such are not at issue at the present stage of exploring systemic-functional baseline modelling. As has been indicated above, the problem of defining grammatical categories (which is also germane to an understanding of grammatical metaphor) will be further explored in Chapter 8. In this exploration, it will be argued that the notions of 'word class' and 'grammatical category' should be teased apart, because they indicate two different types of phenomena in language.

		Interpersonal	Experiential
General characterization:		<i>construal of experience</i>	<i>enactment of roles</i>
		language as <i>interaction</i>	language as <i>representation</i>
		language as <i>action</i>	language as <i>reflection</i>
		oriented towards <i>intersubjective reality</i>	oriented towards (external and internal) <i>natural reality</i>
		speaker as <i>intruder</i>	speaker as <i>observer</i>
Glosses used in Chapter 4:	Halliday	'stance'; evaluation in terms of "some reference point", which "may be the speaker's opinion" [Halliday 1975: 108]	'content'
		speech function connotation, intensification, evaluative lexis	denotation
	Davies	telling operation: 1) construction of a description: choosing what to talk about 2) presentation of a description in the speech interaction knowing operation deciding operation	telling operation: construction of a description: construction of a "literal interpretational meaning"

Table 5-1 · Functional-semantic glosses used to characterize the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions

The glosses which are summarized in Table 5-1 are general characterizations of the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions, explaining their nature, as metafunctions, in *functional-semantic* terms: (1) either by referring to the functional 'role' of the speaker which is brought out by each (for example, the speaker as 'intruder' vs. the speaker as 'observer'; language as 'action' vs. language as 'reflection'), or (2) by indicating which kind of 'meaning' is highlighted in each (for instance, meanings pertaining to an external world vs. meanings pertaining to an intersubjective world; speech-functional and connotative or evaluative meanings vs. denotative 'content').

Since the metafunctions are first and foremost *functional* components of language, and, accordingly, since they are characterized by Halliday as being *centrally* located in the *semantic* stratum of language [as we have seen in Chapter 1], it is natural to specify them in *functional-semantic* terms, as has been done ever since Halliday introduced them in the late 1960s. In this vein, the metafunctions have been identified in relation to the following questions:

(1) what is the function of the interpersonal and experiential components in language?, and (2) which types of meanings are expressed in these two components? As we have seen throughout the previous chapter, also Halliday's illustrations of how the major metafunctions appear in the development of language have been primarily functionally-'semantically' oriented. Clearly, in the environment of an ontogenetic study, the functional-'semantic' approach is equally natural, since the starting point of the investigation is the original *content*-plane of proto-language, and the study concentrates on the functional diversification of that content-plane in the development towards adult language.

As has equally been emphasized in Chapter 1, a differentiation between interpersonal and experiential facets, as *meta*-functions, permeates the whole system of language. Most importantly, it is a consideration of a clear clustering of grammatical systems into three different components (i.e. three separate system networks: TRANSITIVITY, MOOD & MODALITY, THEME & INFORMATION) which led Halliday to propose his **metafunctional hypothesis** in the late 1960s [see Chapter 1]; and it is especially the connection between different components in the grammar and the general functioning of language, which marks SFL as a linguistic theory which advocates *intrinsic functionalism*. Hence, ever since the explicit introduction of the concept 'metafunction' in SFL, the realization of different types of metafunctional meanings in the distinct networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD & MODALITY, and THEME & INFORMATION has constituted a formal-realizational definition of the different metafunctions.

However, although it lies at the basis of building an intrinsically functional theory, the mere recognition of a connection between extrinsic functions of language and different components in the grammar of language which serve to realize these functions does not yet provide an explanation for the design of these different grammatical components: this recognition highlights the fact that the construal of experience is realized through the system of TRANSITIVITY, whereas the enactment of social relations and the indication of a personal stance are realized through the systems of MOOD and MODALITY. The formal-realizational side of defining the metafunctions has been given more explicit attention in the late 1970s. In his paper "Modes of meaning: Modes of expression", Halliday [1979] focusses on the formal-realizational question: what are the typical ways in which meanings from the different

metafunctions are expressed or realized? [see also Halliday 1981c]. This has led Halliday to enrich the original metafunctional hypothesis with what I have called a **semiotic-functional hypothesis**, which specifies, for each metafunctional mode of meaning a characteristic *mode of expression*. We have seen in Chapter 1 that these modes of expression have been characterized as ‘prosodic’ (interpersonal), ‘segmental’ (experiential) and ‘culminative-periodic’ (textual), inspired by the field–particle–wave motif in physics. However, whereas the notions of ‘particle’ and ‘wave’ can naturally (and intuitively) be linked to experiential and textual grammar, as reflected in the systems of TRANSITIVITY and THEME & INFORMATION respectively, the notion of ‘prosody’ (and ‘field’), in relation to the interpersonal metafunction, has remained rather elusive: while it does seem to capture the interpersonal ‘semantic’ effect created by for example swear words, its specific link with the interpersonal grammatical systems of MOOD and MODALITY has not been pointed out.

In the Introduction, it has been briefly explained what is meant by a ‘semiotic-functional’ approach to linguistic ‘meaning’. Having considered the definition of linguistic categories in general as a metasemiotic activity, and having reviewed the specific way in which the categories referring to the metafunctions have so far been defined in SFL – as an intrinsically functional theory, it is now possible to spell out and motivate the nature of the ‘fundamentally semiotic’ characterization of the major metafunctions which will be proposed in this chapter.

The approach to defining metafunctional diversity which will be taken below is ‘fundamentally semiotic’ on two levels:

- (1) On a general level, it is fundamentally semiotic because it focusses on the relation between the functional-semantic side and the formal-realizational side of the categories ‘interpersonal’ and ‘experiential’ as metasemiotic signs, and the way in which the design of the formal-realizational side of language can be functionally explained in relation to its semantic-functional side.
- (2) On a more specific level, this approach is fundamentally semiotic because it explores the interaction between the dimension of metafunctional

diversity and that of stratification by spelling out the nature of these two dimensions in the framework of two explicitly semiotic theories:

- The dimension of stratification will be further specified, as it is theorized in the interpersonal and experiential components of language, in relation to semiotic distinctions made by Hjelmslev.
- The nature of the concepts ‘experiential’ and ‘interpersonal’ will be specified in relation to the Peircean concepts of symbolicity, indexicality to general types of signs.

Importantly, the fundamentally semiotic characterization of the major metafunctions which will be proposed concentrates on those aspects of language which have come to be highlighted in the previous chapter, in approaching adult language from an ontogenetic perspective: i.e., in the perspective ‘from above’, (1) the general semantic-functional differentiation between an interpersonal and an experiential component, and (2) the specific nature of the interpersonal network of SPEECH FUNCTION in the stratum of semantics; and, in the perspective ‘from below’, (3) the metafunctional nature of the lexical end of ‘lexicogrammar’.

As has been pointed out, the focus on these areas of language which appear in two opposing stratal perspectives in the course of language development, and which form the ‘edges’ of the organization of adult language, makes it possible to concentrate on the relationship between metafunctional diversity and stratification without having to take into account the grammatical heart of (adult) language. More specifically, in relation to the fundamentally semiotic approach which will be taken, this means:

- (1) In view of exploring the relation between metafunctional diversity and stratification in the framework of Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory: the two areas of language which indicate the appearance of stratification in ontogenesis (the general ‘semantics’ based on the earlier pragmatic--mathetic contrast, and the more specific level of an emerging lexis(-grammar)), but which only constitute the ‘edges’ of a more elaborately stratified organization of adult language, form a first basis for exploring why different stratified models are used for the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions.

- (2) In view of exploring metafunctional diversity: the lexical end of ‘lexico-grammar’ – the end of ‘words’, as elemental kinds of *signs* – can be taken as the basis for exploring the categories ‘experiential’ and ‘interpersonal’ in relation to Peirce’s sign types.

This perspective, approaching language from the outside, as it were, and not yet taking into account its grammatical heart and the way in which this centre can be modelled, is defined as an external approach. In the remainder of this chapter, the nature of this external perspective, and its status and role in a more comprehensive semiotic-functional model of language will become clear.

2 ‘Stratification’: A Hjelmslevian re-interpretation

Stratification and metafunctional diversity are the most central aspectualizing dimensions in SFL, regarded as those dimensions which are necessary in order to explain the way in which we are able to ‘mean’. The emphasis which has – rightly – been placed on ‘stratification’ as a general aspectualizing dimension does however have a drawback: due to the focus on ‘stratification’ as a general dimension, the question as to *what is the basis of stratification*⁶ has only been dealt with in general terms, tacitly assuming the generality of this question over the different components of language.⁷

In Chapter 3 we have explored different types of stratified models of language which have appeared in the course of Stages I and II of SFL. This exploration was guided by two very specific questions: (1) are the networks of

⁶ This question is different from, but related to, the question which has been focussed on in Chapter 3, i.e. ‘how many strata should be distinguished?’ The question which is highlighted here lies at a more fundamental, theoretical-semiotic level, as will be explained further on in this section.

⁷ As has been indicated in Chapter 1, the problems resulting from the lack of an explicit consideration of the nature of stratification especially pertain to unqualified generalizations across metafunctions (especially regarding delicacy and agnation), or the failure to recognize generalizations across different metafunctions (especially regarding the notion of ‘stratal tension’ in relation to grammatical metaphor). It will be noted that the issue which is dealt with in this sub-section, viz. the unqualified generalization of a general notion ‘stratification’ across the metafunctions, lies at the basis of these further problems.

TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so forth ‘semantic’ or lexicogrammatical? and (2) how many strata should be distinguished; especially, how many strata of system networks? In this section, different types of ‘stratification’ will be distinguished from a more abstract theoretical viewpoint, in which the focus is on the relationship between a ‘semantics’ and a ‘lexicogrammar’. In other words, as has been announced in the introduction to this chapter, this section concentrates on the question of what can be the basis for distinguishing a level of ‘semantics’ in a stratified model in general.

By specifying different types of ‘stratification’ on a theoretical level, the variation between different types of stratified models of language distinguished in Chapter 3 will be clarified in relation to a more abstract framework. Within this framework, it will be proposed that the key to understanding the nature of the complementarity between the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions lies in recognizing that ‘stratification’, although it is a *general* aspecualizing dimension and hence pertains to all components of language, does not apply *unequivocally* to the different metafunctions. In informal terms, it will be shown that ‘stratification’ does not mean the same in the interpersonal vs. experiential components, i.e. it is claimed that *different* interpretations have been given to the notion of ‘stratification’ in the interpersonal and experiential components of language. The recognition of these different interpretations is based on a careful consideration of ‘stratification’, as a systemic-functional aspecualizing dimension, in relation to the differentiating dimensions specified by Hjelmslev in his semiotic theory of language. The aim of this section, then, is to spell out different types of ‘stratification’, especially with regard to the two major metafunctions, on a theoretical level, in precise, Hjelmslevian semiotic terms.

2.1 The ‘internal stratification of the content plane’ and the semiotic relationship of instantiation

2.1.1 Starting point

As we have seen in previous chapters,⁸ the general differentiation between ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘semantics’ in SFL has been theorized by Halliday in terms of an *internal stratification of the content plane* of language. This idea can be taken as a starting point for further exploring systemic-functional ‘stratification’ in a Hjelmslevian framework. In the context of his ontogenetic studies, Halliday describes this internal stratification as follows:

With the very young child, the uses of language seem to be rather discrete; and each has its own ‘grammar’, or ‘proto-grammar’ since it has no stratal organization. [...] But the adult use of language is such that, with minor exceptions, each utterance has to be multifunctional – while at the same time having an integrated structure. There must therefore be a level of organization of meaning: *a semantic level*, or in Lamb’s terms ‘semological stratum’. *In Hjelmslev’s terms, the ‘content purport’ has to be separated from, and organized into, a ‘content substance’ as a precondition of its encoding in ‘content form’.* [Halliday 1976f: 30–31, emphasis MT]

In other words, the internal stratification of the content plane – the only plane which interfaces with an expression plane in the basic two-level model of proto-language, is explained by Halliday as a differentiation into content-substance and content-purport:⁹ the ‘*semantic*’ level is the Hjelmslevian *content-substance*, which is organized into or coded into (i.e. formed by or realized in) a level of ‘*lexicogrammar*’, a level of *content-form*. In keeping with the general type of visualization which is used in SFL to represent ‘stratification’,¹⁰ this can be shown as in Figure 5-3.

⁸ See Chapter 1 [Section 2.1], Chapter 3 [Sections 1, 3.2.1 and 3.3].

⁹ See also Halliday [1998b: 189].

¹⁰ This means: in keeping with the entrenched systemic-functional ‘convention’ to conceive of stratification in terms of a *vertical dimension*, and hence also to indicate different strata along a vertical dimension in visual representations (compare also the basis of this figure in Chapter 1, where ‘stratification’ in general has been introduced). It is necessary to specify that this figure is based on the *systemic-functional* convention, since, as will be recalled from Chapter 2 where Hjelmslev’s theory of language has been discussed, in this dissertation the Hjelmslevian dimension of schematicity reflected in the form–substance distinction is in principle visually represented along a horizontal dimension (see Chapter 2 for the




Figure 5-3 · The internal stratification of the content plane interpreted as a differentiation into content-substance and content-form

The way in which the general systemic-functional scheme of stratification (i.e. the coding cycles context ↘ ‘semantics’ ↘ ‘lexicogrammar’ ↘ phonology or graphology) is presented by Halliday in relation to the Hjelmslevian stratification scheme can be visualized as in Figure 5-4.

motivation behind this). In anticipation of the further discussion about the nature of stratification, it may be noted, in this respect, that the general visual (and conceptual) entrenchment of the vertical dimension as the basis for thinking about ‘stratification in general’ forms part of the problem related to the unqualified generalization of one notion of ‘stratification’ across the different metafunctions.




Figure 5-4 · The general systemic-functional scheme of stratification projected onto the Hjelmslevian stratification scheme

What is immediately noticeable, when one considers Figure 5-4, is that, whereas the systemic-functional scheme only involves one aspectualizing dimension, i.e. ‘stratification’ as it is commonly defined in SFL as a distinction of different ‘levels’ in language, in Hjelmslev’s scheme two differentiating dimensions are involved, i.e. content–expression and form–substance–purport. This means that the SFL scheme is organized in terms of one semiotic relationship, viz. that of realization or coding, whereas again, the Hjelmslevian model is based on two different kinds of semiotic relationships: connection (the sign function) and schematicity.

Most crucially, a consequence of this general difference between the two models is that, whereas in SFL, ‘semantics’ is seen as being realized in ‘lexicogrammar’, in Hjelmslev’s theory, it is ‘content-form’ (‘lexicogrammar’) which is defined as being manifested in ‘content-substance’ (‘semantics’): it seems as if two opposite directions are involved, in the two theories, in the way in which ‘semantics’ is defined in relation to ‘lexicogrammar’. That this is not a mere terminological difference is indicated by the fact that, in Hjelmslev’s view, the relationship between form and substance in general is one of *schematicity* (form being more schematic than substance), while in

SFL, the notion of schematicity is theorized in the semiotic relationship of ‘*instantiation*’, which is regarded as *intrastratal*, in contrast to the *interstratal* relationship of coding, for which the term ‘realization’ is reserved. It is precisely this striking observation regarding the seemingly opposite relationship between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’ in the two theories, considered in view of the fact that Halliday does motivate his ‘stratification’ model in terms of an ‘internal stratification’ of the content-plane of language into the Hjelmslevian form and substance, which calls for a more detailed study of the relationship between Halliday’s and Hjelmslev’s stratification schemes.

Since Hjelmslev himself uses ‘semantics’ as an alternative label for his ‘content-substance’, as we have seen in Chapter 2 [Section 3], Halliday’s equation of his ‘semantics’ with Hjelmslev’s ‘content-substance’ provides a basis for exploring how the precise semiotic nature of the systemic-functional ‘internal stratification’ can be elucidated in a Hjelmslevian framework. Let us therefore consider how Halliday characterizes his ‘semantics’ and the status he assigns to it as a new stratum (complementary to a ‘lexicogrammar’), a ‘content-substance’ in the organization of adult language.

In the passage quoted above, Halliday links the appearance of a ‘semantics’ (and hence a ‘lexicogrammar’) to the new feature of multifunctionality inherent in adult language, and this motif has also formed a running thread in the previous chapter: it is the stratal organization of the content plane which makes it possible that utterances serve multiple functions at the same time, which are coded in ‘integrated structures’.¹¹ The link between the appearance of a ‘semantics’ and the metafunctional organization of language is further emphasized in the paragraph immediately following the passage cited above:

¹¹ It will be noted that, in the previous chapter (where ontogenesis has been tracked until the appearance of *lexis* or ‘words-in-structure’ as a preliminary form of the later ‘*lexicogrammar*’), this multifunctionality has been characterized in terms of the indexical-symbolic nature of signs, although, in a more general sense, what Halliday here calls ‘integrative structure’ is intended to refer to the layered structure of (adult) language, with different metafunctional strands mapped onto one another, and onto a syntagmatic (class) structure, as we have seen in Chapter 1.

What we are calling *the functions of language* may be regarded as the generalized categories of ‘*content substance*’ that the adult use of language requires. [Halliday 1976f: 31; emphasis MT]

Interpreting the ‘functions of language’ as the metafunctions, this description reflects the general conception within SFL that the metafunctions, although they permeate the whole system of language, are centrally located in a stratum of ‘semantics’ [as we have seen in Chapter 1].

In the remainder of this section, it will be argued that Halliday’s abstract characterization of a ‘semantics’ in relation to the (meta)functionality of language cannot be conceived as corresponding to Hjelmslev’s definition of a stratum of ‘content-substance’. This argument will be motivated by comparing the systemic-functional conception of stratification in terms of ‘coding cycles’ to the Hjelmslevian stratification scheme. It will further be argued that the lack of correspondence between the systemic-functional and Hjelmslevian frameworks with regard to ‘stratification’ is due to a particular interpretation of Hjelmslev’s theory which has been proposed by Halliday in his scale-&-category model of language.

2.1.2 Levels and semiotic relationships in the scale-and-category model

It is in the context of motivating his new conception of language as stratified – a conception which is intertwined with his equally new notion of ‘metafunctions’ –, i.e. at the time when his theory becomes ‘systemic-functional’ (Stage II of SFL), that Halliday explicitly refers to the Hjelmslevian notions of ‘content-form’ and ‘content-expression’, in order to motivate his ‘stratification’ as an ‘internal stratification’ of the Hjelmslevian content plane. However, in his earlier scale-&-category model of language, which is not yet explicitly stratified, Halliday also uses Hjelmslev’s concepts of ‘form’ and ‘substance’ in describing different ‘levels’ of language.

In the scale-&-category model, the levels of language are defined as follows:

The primary levels are “form”, “substance” and context”. The **substance** is the material of language: “phonic” (audible noises) or “graphic” (visible marks). The **form** is the organization of the substance into meaningful events: “meaning” is a concept, and a technical term, of the theory [...]. The **context** is the relation of the form to non-linguistic features of the situations in which language operates, and to linguistic features other than those of the item

under attention: these being together “extratextual” features. [Halliday 1961: 243–244]

Form is said to consist of two related sub-levels, “grammar” and “lexis”, and hence refers to the later *‘lexicogrammar’*. ‘Meaning’, which as a ‘technical term’ defines the level of form, is further specified as *formal meaning*, which is distinct from “contextual meaning” – the type of meaning which refers to the level of context. Formal meaning is defined as “a function of the operation of (a term in) a system” [Halliday 1961: 245]. Contextual meaning is considered to be “an extension of the popular – and traditional linguistic – notion of meaning” [ibid.], and it is regarded as dependent on formal meaning:

The contextual meaning of an item is its relation to extratextual features; but this is not a direct relation of the item as such, but of the item in its place in linguistic form: *contextual meaning is therefore logically dependent on formal meaning*. [Halliday 1961: 245; emphasis MT]

Interestingly, Halliday notes that he uses the term “context” rather than “semantics” to refer to the level of contextual meaning, because ““semantics” is too closely tied to one particular method of statement, the conceptual method” [ibid.: 245].¹²

In linguistics in general, it is argued, it is the level of form which is most important: “formal criteria are crucial, taking precedence over contextual criteria” [ibid.]. In relation to the central level of form, the levels of context (contextual meaning) and phonology (and also graphology) are regarded as functioning as “**interlevels**” [Halliday 1961: 244, 269], since they link the level of ‘form’ to ‘situation’ and ‘substance’ respectively.

¹² Halliday here refers to a type of ‘semantics’ which was rejected by Firth in favour of a “contextual semantics”, which plays a major role in Firth’s theory of language [cf. Firth 1957, 1968/1957: 180; see also Lyons 1966]. The type of semantics referred to here, which has often been called ‘conceptual’ or ‘traditional’ semantics, a ‘semantics’ which is associated with the traditional notion of ‘denotation’, was rejected in structuralism in general, and different structuralist schools have either discarded it altogether (Hjelmslev’s glossematics) or replaced it with an alternative type of ‘semantics’ (American structuralism (both in its Bloomfieldian and Sapirean strands), Prague structuralism). We will return to this ‘traditional’ or ‘conceptual’ ‘semantics’ and the other variants of ‘semantics’ alluded to here further on in this chapter.

The relationship between ‘form’ and ‘substance’ is called “**manifestation**” [ibid.: 250]. Manifestation is further described as constituting one end of a more general scale called **exponence**, which is a scale “which relates the categories of the theory, which are categories of the highest degree of abstraction, to the data” [Halliday 1961: 270]. The other type of exponence is labelled “**realization**”: this type of semiotic relationship holds within the level of form, where it relates the “formal categories” (also called ‘descriptive categories’, for instance, ‘Subject’ as an element of structure)¹³ to “formal items”, of which Halliday gives the following examples: “the lexical item “cat”, the word “cat” as member of the word class of noun, the morpheme “-ing”” [ibid.: 250].¹⁴ Thus, more precisely defined, ‘manifestation’ refers to the relationship between a formal item (which is “the boundary of grammar [i.e. form, MT] on the exponence scale” [ibid.: 271]), and the ‘material’ appearance of this item, either phonic or graphic, in a language.

¹³ See Chapter 3, where the notion of ‘element of structure’ has been further explained.

¹⁴ The only three examples of exponence ‘in form’, i.e. ‘realization’, which Halliday gives, all in footnotes, are the following:

[...] the exponent of the *element* P in in the structure of the unit “clause” is the *class* “verbal” of the unit “group”. [Halliday 1961: 257n; emphasis MAKH]

The *formal item* “the old man” is exponent of (is a member of) a *class* (“nominal”, of the unit “group”). The *class* “nominal group” is exponent of (operates at the place of) an *element of structure* (S or C, of the unit “clause”). [Halliday 1961: 264n; emphasis MAKH]

[...] for example, the formal item “were driven” may be exponent of: (i) the *unit* “group”, (ii) the *element* P in *structure*, (iii) the *class* “verbal”, and (iv) the *term* “passive” in a *system* of secondary classes. All these statements are interdependent [Halliday 1961: 265; emphasis MAKH]

These three examples show that exponence as realization is a complex kind of relationship, involving a number of ‘cycles’ from ‘element of structure’ to ‘formal item’, in which the notion of grammatical class and the rank scale is crucially involved.




Figure 5-5 · The scale-&-category model of linguistic levels, and its motivation in relation to the Hjelmslevian stratification scheme

Halliday's description and visualization of these levels (along a horizontal dimension) are represented in Figure 5-5, which also indicates where

Halliday draws a link between his levels and the strata distinguished by Hjelmslev.

2.1.3 The scale-and-category model in relation to Hjelmslev's stratification scheme: Levels/strata

Having considered the way in which Halliday defines different levels of language in his scale-&-category model, we can now turn to the question of how this model is/can be related to the Hjelmslevian scheme of stratification. As noted above, the Hjelmslevian notions which Halliday uses in his theory are 'form' and 'substance'; in other words, Halliday refers to only one of Hjelmslev's differentiating dimensions, and, in addition to that, he only takes into account two aspects of Hjelmslev's form–substance–purport triad.

Looked at in isolation, the description in Halliday's "Categories" article which comes closest to Hjelmslev's theory is his definition of 'form': "The form is the organization of the substance into meaningful events" [Halliday 1961: 243]. However, if one also takes into account the further context in which the definition of 'form' occurs in Halliday's framework, it should be recognized that it is not fully Hjelmslevian: immediately before this definition is given, it is stated that "The substance is the material of language; "phonic" (audible noise) or "graphic" (visible marks)." [ibid.] What is problematic here, in view of Hjelmslev's stratification scheme, is Halliday's commonsense ('literal') interpretation of 'substance' as the material side of language. In more specific terms, Halliday fails to take into account the dimension of content–expression as *different from* that of form–substance. Due to this particular interpretation of 'substance', Halliday does not reach the same degree of abstraction and logical precision which is characteristic of Hjelmslev's framework, although, as we will see below, his general scheme of linguistic levels is essentially Hjelmslevian in a more basic sense. Furthermore, it is precisely as a result of this lack of (Hjelmslevian) precision in the scale-&-category model that Halliday was later able to equate his stratum of 'semantics', connected to the notion of metafunctionality of language, to Hjelmslev's content-substance.

It is only when we also project Hjelmslev's complete stratification scheme, i.e. incorporating his content–expression distinction and his threefold form--

substance–purport differentiation, onto the scale-&-category model of linguistic levels that we will recognize that Halliday’s model is in essence Hjelmslevian. In doing so, *each* of Halliday’s levels will be linked to a stratum in Hjelmslev’s scheme, and it is in this way that we will arrive at a precise, semiotic characterization of one type of a ‘semantic’ stratum as it is used in SFL.

Figure 5-6 indicates how Hjelmslev’s strata are reflected in Halliday’s levels, which are no longer represented along a horizontal dimension, but in a way which alludes to the current systemic-functional representation of strata by means of circles.¹⁵

Incorporating the distinction content–expression into the Hallidayan scheme, the first semiotic refinement which should be made to that scheme is that *both* ‘lexicogrammar’ and phonology (and ortography/graphology)¹⁶ constitute, together, the form of language: ‘lexicogrammar’ is content-form, *phonology* is *expression-form*. Halliday’s ‘substance’ or *phonetics*, in this perspective, is ‘expression-substance’. Further taking into account that, in Hjelmslev’s framework, form and substance are part of a more elaborate threefold distinction which also comprises a ‘purport’, a level of ‘*sound as such*’ – indicating ‘expression-purport’ – can be added as a sixth level to the Hallidayan scheme.

¹⁵ The lower half of this figure, represented in scales of grey, shows the organization of the expression plane as parallel to that of the content plane. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that Prakasam (one of the few linguists who studies the phonic side of language in an SFL framework) talks about “phonetic and phonological *strata*” [Prakasam 1987: 275, emphasis MT].

¹⁶ This level as a whole will henceforth be referred to as ‘phonology’ for short.




Figure 5-6 · Hjelmslev's strata and Halliday's scale-&-category levels combined

In the content-plane, Hjelmslev's form–substance–purport distinction can more directly be projected onto Halliday's levels:

- (1) The formal end of this triad, i.e. '*lexicogrammar*', is explicitly regarded by Halliday as the form of language; this is, more precisely, 'content-form'.
- (2) Halliday's '*situation*', defined in terms of "extratextual features" and "features of the situations in which language operates" clearly corresponds to Hjelmslev's 'content-purport'.
- (3) The interlevel¹⁷ of '*contextual meaning*' (called 'context') relating the situation to the form of language is equivalent to content-substance in the Hjelmslevian scheme.¹⁸

¹⁷ Notice that, from a Hjelmslevian perspective, Halliday's 'phonology' is not an interlevel in the same sense as his 'contextual meaning' is. Halliday focusses on what he calls form, and identifies as interlevels the two levels which are adjacent to form on either side. Redefining Halliday's form as 'content-form', the two strata in Hjelmslev's scheme which are directly related to the content-form are indeed content-substance (Halliday's 'contextual

Thus we arrive at a combined picture of the levels of Halliday's scale-&-category model and the strata in Hjelmslev's stratification scheme, as visualized in Figure 5-6. It is within this framework that we obtain a characterization of a level of '*meaning*' which can be set off from a level of 'lexicogrammar' in precise, semiotic terms, i.e. in terms of Hjelmslev's distinction between substance and form: this is the level of contextual meaning, which will henceforth be called **contextual semantics**. Hence it is also in this framework – with 'semantics' thus defined as 'contextual semantics' – that Halliday's semiotic, Hjelmslevian motivation of his stratified model of language in terms of an 'internal stratification of the content-plane of language' can be corroborated.

2.1.4 The scale-and-category model in relation to Hjelmslev's stratification scheme: Semiotic relationships

Using the combined picture in Figure 5-6 as a basis, we can now turn to the kinds of semiotic relationships which are defined in Halliday's and Hjelmslev's theories. At this point we have to address the question of how it can be that in the two frameworks, the relationship between 'semantics' and 'lexicogrammar' seems to be defined in opposite directions, as we have seen above: 'semantics' as realized in 'lexicogrammar' (Halliday) versus 'lexicogrammar' as manifested in 'semantics' (Hjelmslev).

meaning'), and expression-form (Halliday's phonology), but these are related to the content-form in two fundamentally different ways, i.e. in terms of the two basic differentiating dimensions on which Hjelmslev's scheme is built: connection and schematicity. We will return to the semiotic relationships involved in the two theories below.

¹⁸ The characterization of 'contextual meaning' as a content-substance in Hjelmslev's sense will be further motivated below in connection with the semiotic relationships involved in Hjelmslev's theory (especially manifestation or schematicity).




Figure 5-7 · Semiotic relationships in Hjelmslev's theory and in Halliday's scale-&-category model

The types of semiotic relationships involved are: (1) Hjelmslev's sign function (connection between content and expression) and the schematicity relationship between form and substance (manifestation), (2) the relationship of 'realization', which in SFL in general is seen as holding between strata, and (3) the relationship of 'exponence', split into 'realization' and 'manifestation', in Halliday's scale-&-category model. Let us start again from the scale-&-category model. In order to see how Halliday theorizes the semiotic relationship of 'exponence' in this model, we have to take into account the internal organization of his level of 'lexicogrammar', since it is here that his relationship of 'realization' obtains. Figure 5-7 visualizes the semiotic relationships defined in the scale-&-category model, using as a basis the combined picture of levels/strata we have arrived at above.

I ‘Instantiation’ in the expression plane

Since we are mainly concerned here with the relationship between a ‘lexicogrammar’ and a ‘semantics’, in comparing Hjelmslev’s and Halliday’s models the focus must be Hjelmslev’s ‘manifestation’ (since it is this relationship which links content-form to content-substance) and the way in which Halliday’s like-named concept of ‘manifestation’ is related to Hjelmslev’s conception. As we have seen above, in the scale-&-category model, ‘manifestation’ is one type of ‘exponence’, supplementing ‘realization’: ‘manifestation’ is exponence “in substance”, whereas ‘realization’ is exponence “in form” [Halliday 1961: 250n]. Apart from this general characterization of ‘realization’ and ‘manifestation’ in terms of an overall scale of ‘exponence’, later on (in the section dealing with exponence), Halliday – again in a footnote – gives a more refined definition of the link between ‘realization’ and ‘manifestation’, as follows:

Strictly speaking the relation of the formal item to its exponent in substance [i.e. ‘manifestation’, MT] entails a two-fold relation of abstraction, *one* of whose dimensions is **exponence** (and is therefore a prolongation of the scale which relates the category to the formal item [i.e. ‘realization’, MT]). The other dimension is the **abstraction, by likeness**, of a “general” event (class of events, though not in the technical sense in which “class” is used here) from a large number of “particular” events, the individual events of speech activity. For theoretical purposes the exponence scale can be regarded as comprehending this dimension of abstraction, which takes place then in that part of the scale which relates formal item to exponent in substance. [Halliday 1961: 271n; italics: MAKH, bold: MT]

In this passage, ‘manifestation’ is not just regarded as a continuation of ‘realization’ (together forming a scale of ‘exponence’) in substance; ‘manifestation’ itself is refined as comprising two different kinds of relationships:

- (1) on the one hand, it involves ‘realization’, and in this sense it is a ‘prolongation of the scale which relates the category to the formal item’;
- (2) on the other hand, it also entails a totally different kind of relationship, which is not named, but which is defined as a kind of abstraction “by likeness, of a “general” event [...] from a large number of “particular”

events.¹⁹ I will refer to this relationship, for the time being, as “abstraction by likeness”.

It is clear that the central point at which ‘manifestation’, defined in Halliday’s sense as the link between content-form and expression-substance, breaks into ‘realization’ and ‘abstraction by likeness’ is the level of expression-form, or the phonological level, which in Halliday’s general model of levels is defined as a type of ‘interlevel’.²⁰ Furthermore, taking into consideration the ‘combined picture’ of Halliday’s levels and Hjelmslev’s strata, it appears that Halliday’s ‘abstraction by likeness’ corresponds to what Hjelmslev calls ‘manifestation’. In other words, what is a major differentiating dimension in Hjelmslev’s theory – the relationship of ‘manifestation’ – appears in the scale-&-category model as one facet of a more broadly defined relationship of ‘manifestation’ which also comprises a type of ‘realization’.

It will be clear, at this point, that the fact that Halliday does not assign a more important status to the relationship of ‘abstraction by likeness’ in his scale-&-category is due to two factors: the commonsense interpretation of ‘substance’ as the ‘material’ of language, and, related to this, the one-dimensionality of his model of levels (in contrast with Hjelmslev’s stratification scheme, which is based on two differentiating dimensions). His scale of ‘exponence’ is a general scale “which relates the categories of the theory, which are categories of the highest degree of abstraction, to the data” [Halliday 1961: 270]. The major break-up point in this general scale is determined by his characterization of ‘substance’: ‘realization’ is a relationship which holds within ‘form’ (regarded as content-form only in Hjelmslevian terms) and ‘manifestation’ is then the link between the form of language and the phonic, material side of language.

¹⁹ In Figure 5-7, these two relationships correspond to the vertical part and the slant part (respectively) of the arrow representing ‘manifestation’ (indicated in orange). The vertical part shows the ‘prolongation’ from the relationship of ‘realization’, which is equally represented on the vertical dimension.

²⁰ This is the interlevel between his ‘form’ (i.e. Hjelmslev’s content-form) and his ‘substance’ (i.e. Hjelmslev’s expression-purport). Halliday does no longer refer to the status of his interlevel in his treatment of exponence.

In conclusion, in the framework of exploring how Hjelmslev's stratification scheme can be projected onto the scale-&-category model of levels, it is again the recognition that there is also 'form' in the expression plane of language which lies at the basis of a refinement of the scale-&-category definition of semiotic relationships. In this vein, expression-form is the central break-up point in relating categories of the grammar to the appearance of these categories in phonic data, since expression-form, in the Hjelmslevian sense, is defined (as expression – form) in terms of *two* fundamental types of semiotic relationship: as *expression-form* it is related to the *content-form* of language through the relationship of connection defining the sign-function; and as *expression-form* it is related to *expression-substance* through the relationship of manifestation.

The former relationship, between content-form and expression-form will be dealt with in the following sub-section. The term **manifestation**, which will play an important role in the remainder of this chapter, will henceforth be used in the Hjelmslevian sense, and in this way, also refers to Halliday's relationship of 'abstraction by likeness'. Manifestation will also more generally be referred to as **schematicity** or **instantiation**, two terms which have been introduced in exploring Hjelmslev's theory in Chapter 2 above [recall also Chapter 1, where general definitions of these concepts have been given].

Halliday's notion of a type of relationship which involves 'abstraction by likeness' of a 'general event' from more 'particular, individual events' corresponds exactly to Hjelmslev's concept of schematicity: it refers to the relationship by which 'invariables' are *instantiated* in different 'variables'. More specifically, this is the relationship between phonemes and specific, phonetic manifestations of these phonemes. As we have seen in the discussion of Hjelmslev's theory [Chapter 2], in what I have called Hjelmslev's secondary, abstract characterization of the form–substance–purport triad, the relationship between form and substance is theorized in terms of a very general semiotic relationship between schema and usage/instance, which can recur along a continuum. It is in this sense then, that the relationship between phonology and phonetics has to be understood,

since possible intermediate cases, such as allophones, can be incorporated into the formal description of the expression plane as bound variables.²¹

Importantly, Halliday has more recently recognized the separate status of a dimension of ‘instantiation’ within his earlier ‘exponence’:

Firth’s concept of exponence is the product of these two relations: his “exponent” is both instantiation and realization. [Halliday 1992b: 20]

II ‘Realization’ between content-form and expression-form

Until we have looked in more detail into the ‘internal’ organization of ‘lexicogrammar’ [Chapter 6, and especially Chapter 8], the overall relationship between ‘lexicogrammar’ and phonology will be referred to as an ‘exponence–realization complex’. At this point, this complex relationship as a whole will not be further specified. Only the dimension of ‘realization’ needs further comment, since it plays an important role in the general conception of stratification in SFL. **Realization** will preliminarily be defined as corresponding to Hjelmslev’s relationship of ‘connection’: in very general terms, it refers to the solidarity between an aspect of content and an aspect of expression, which, through this relationship of solidarity, together constitute a linguistic sign. In this sense, realization is linked to what I have called Hjelmslev’s primary characterization of the content–expression contrast in language [cf. Chapter 2], the more specific characterization which highlights the role of the content–expression connection in constituting a linguistic *form*: a content-form is only form by virtue of its being connected to an expression-form, and vice versa. By means of illustration, Hjelmslev’s simple example of the sign *ring* can be brought up again: *ring* is a sign because a content ‘ring’ (as a meaning defined in relation to other lexemes) is solidary with an expression /^lrɪŋ/ (as a phonemic sound image, which is defined in terms of distinctive features of phonemes, and in contrast with other sound images, such as /^lsɪŋ/ or /^lθɪŋ/).

²¹ Also referred to as distributional or positional variants, or variants which are in complementary distribution [cf. Chapter 2, Section 3].

III 'Realization' within content-form

So far we have mainly focussed on types of semiotic relationships which pertain to the expression side of language: this side, with its facets of expression-form and expression-substance, is centrally involved in Halliday's 'sole' semiotic scale, viz. his 'exponence'. Within the content plane, Halliday distinguishes only one type of semiotic relationship, that of 'realization' as a subtype of exponence. As we have seen above [cf. Section 2.1.2], this relationship is in fact quite complex and involves a number of interdependent sub-relationships. As indicated, at this point, we will not look in detail into the internal organization of 'lexicogrammar' and the types of semiotic relationships which are involved within this stratum,²² since our main concern here is with the way in which contextual semantics, as one type of semantics, is distinguished from lexicogrammar. Therefore, the aggregate of sub-relationships which Halliday indicates as being involved in 'realization' *within* lexicogrammar will, again, be referred to as an 'exponence–realization complex'.

However, as with the relationship between content–form and expression–form, one facet of this exponence–realization complex within lexicogrammar, viz. realization, needs to be further specified in view of the importance of a general notion of 'realization' in the later systemic-functional conception of stratification. Furthermore, this realization *within lexicogrammar* needs to be clarified in relation to the type of realization we have defined above, i.e. realization as the connection between lexicogrammatical content and phonological expression. With regard to the internal organization of lexicogrammar, the notion of realization will be reserved for referring to the relationship between *systemic* terms and lexicogrammatical *structures*, and, crucially, is regarded as *one* facet of an aggregate of semiotic relationships which hold within lexicogrammar. This is the notion of realization which Halliday proposed in his intermediate system-structure model [cf. Chapter 3: Section 2.2] as a replacement of the older

²² As we have seen above, in the relationship of realization/exponence various aspects are involved: terms or features of a system, grammatical class and units on the rank scale, and formal items. As indicated, we will turn to the concepts of 'realization/exponence' in Chapter 8.

term ‘exponence’,²³ and it corresponds to the well-entrenched concept of a ‘realization statement’, which specifies the way in which a (combination of) systemic feature(s) is encoded in lexicogrammatical structure.

This type of realization within lexicogrammar is further characterized as a variant of the type of realization which holds between lexicogrammatical form and phonological content as defined above. More specifically, the relationship between a systemic feature and a structural realization of this feature is theorized as a recurrence of the basic content–expression contrast *within* lexicogrammar. This specification of realization within lexicogrammar is based on extending Hjelmslev’s second-order characterization of the content–expression contrast, i.e. his more abstract interpretation of this contrast (no longer tied to the ‘concrete’ notions of a conceptual side and phonic side in language), in which the interaction between a content and an expression is regarded as a general type of relationship, which can recur, on

²³ As we have seen in Chapter 3 [Section 2.2], one of the most important characteristics of Halliday’s intermediate system-structure model, is his distinction between structure and syntagm. It is in this model, as we have seen, that the term ‘realization’, indicating the link between system and structure, is proposed as an alternative to the earlier exponence. The definition of the relation of realization within lexicogrammar which is given in the present chapter is intended to emphasize, especially in relation to the scale-and-category model, where Halliday stresses that various types of interdependent sub-relations are involved in the complex relationship of exponence/realization, that the relation between system and structure does not account for the whole internal organization of lexicogrammar: realization, as the relation between system and structure, is only *one* facet of the complex of interdependent relations defined in the scale-and-category model and here referred to as an exponence–realization complex. In other words, it is argued that Halliday’s new concept of realization in his intermediate system-structure model – a concept which plays an important foundational role with regard to the further development of SFL – can not be regarded as a simple alternative or the earlier exponence–realization complex, in that it is a more restrictive term.

It is further argued that the status which has been assigned to the system–structure relation since Halliday’s intermediate system-structure model, theorizing it in terms of a specific type of semiotic relationship, viz. realization, which also plays a fundamental role in relation to the stratified conception of language, has caused the notion of syntagm to be resided to the background in SFL, where it is simply regarded as the ‘final output’ of a system network. However, the system–structure relationship as such does not say anything about the mapping of various (metafunctional) layers of structure onto one syntagm. The relation between (functional) structure and syntagm (alternatively called ‘class structure’ in SFL, in keeping with traditional terminology, but in obliteration of the scale-and-category distinction between structure and syntagm) will play an important role in the further exploration of the internal organization of lexicogrammar in Chapter 8.

different levels of abstraction, throughout a semiotic system [cf. Chapter 2: Section 2]. In fact, the distinction between a content and an expression within lexicogrammar is a theoretical specification, based on Hjelmslev's semiotic theory of language,²⁴ of the traditional-informal notion of a relationship between 'meanings' and the 'forms' in which these meanings are 'expressed'.²⁵ In this perspective, the description of lexicogrammar in terms of form–meaning couplings is 'formal' in a truly Hjelmslevian sense: lexicogrammatical signs are defined on the basis of a solidary relationship between a content-form, a 'meaningful feature' defined in contrast to other 'meanings' in a network (e.g. the feature effective), and a an expression-form, a structure in which this feature is encoded.

As indicated, this type of realization needs to be kept apart from the realization which holds within lexicogrammar, i.e. the realization relationship between lexicogrammatical form and phonological form defined above – a relationship which is based on Hjelmslev's primary interpretation of content–expression in terms of a conceptual side and a phonic side of language. Therefore, the realization relationship between a lexicogrammatical form and phonological form will be referred to as the **primary realization** relationship in language. The distinction between categories on the basis of this dimension, i.e. lexicogrammar and phonology, is regarded as one type of stratification, which will be called **primary stratification**. In this vein, then, the phonic side of language is interpreted as the **primary expression plane** of language, and the general conceptual side of language will be called its **global content plane**. In contrast to primary realization, the type of realization which holds *within* lexicogrammar, and which is based on an abstract

²⁴ As we have seen in Chapter 2, in his second-order, abstract interpretation of the content–expression relationship, Hjelmslev himself only distinguishes a connotative semiotic and a metasemiotic.

²⁵ It should be emphasized that 'form' in this traditional-informal notion of a relationship between 'meaning' and 'form' does not correspond to the more abstraction Hjelmslevian category of 'form'; rather, it refers more literally to the way in which meanings are expressed in 'formal' patterns (structures).

It is also interesting to note, that the concept of 'formal meaning' is ambivalent in this respect: on the one hand, it can refer to content-form, and in this interpretation contrasts with content-substance (which is then 'contextual meaning'), on the other hand, it can refer to the meaning of grammatical forms in a more general sense.

interpretation of the content–expression relationship, will be referred to as **micro-realization**. The distinction between a content-sub-level and an expression sub-level *within* lexicogrammar will equally be interpreted as a form of stratification, and will be termed **micro-stratification**.

As has been indicated above, this interpretation of micro-stratification is based on an extension of Hjelmslev’s second-order characterization of the content–expression relationship. There are two further areas in language where a similar relationship of micro-stratification is relevant: lexis and phonology. In the area of lexis,²⁶ a relationship of micro-realization holds between systems of lexical distinctive features, and the realization of combinations of such features in individual lexemes: for, example, the lexeme *horse* realizes the features [– human]–[+ animate], and further, more specific lexical features. In the area of phonology, a relationship of micro-stratification holds between distinctive features organized in systems (systems and options such as MANNER OF ARTICULATION: consonant > plosive, and VOICING: voiceless), and the realization of (combinations of) such features in individual phonemes (e.g. /p/). The distinction between primary stratification and micro-stratification, and the terminology which is proposed in connection to this distinction, is visualized in Figure 5-8.²⁷

²⁶ We will return to this area of ‘lexis as such’ below.

²⁷ The relationship between ‘lexicogrammar’ and ‘lexis’, which are indicated as two distinct areas in Figure 5-8, will be dealt with in Chapter 8, when we look further into the organization of lexicogrammar.




Figure 5-8 · Primary stratification and micro-stratification

It might be prompted, at this point, that by recognizing a stratification relationship between the systemic dimension and the structural dimension of lexicogrammar, I subscribe to what I have called the 'extended stratification model' in Chapter 3, in which a distinction between 'semantics' and 'lexicogrammar' is regarded as being mapped onto that between system and structure; and that in this perspective, what is in fact being described here in relation to the notion of micro-stratification in lexicogrammar, is the extended stratification model. This is true only to a limited extent, in that the differentiation between content and expression within lexicogrammar, as it is

proposed here, is not regarded as *the* distinction between ‘semantics’ and ‘lexicogrammar’ and hence *the* basis of a stratified model of language: in the more abstract framework which is proposed in the present chapter, the distinction between lexicogrammatical content and lexicogrammatical expression is regarded as one type of stratification in general, and, more importantly, one type of a stratification, within the content plane of language, between a ‘lexicogrammar’ and a ‘semantics’.²⁸ In this abstract perspective, the question whether lexicogrammatical systems are ‘semantic’ or ‘lexicogrammatical’ is merely a terminological issue: rather, what is important, is the way in which the relationship between system and structure within lexicogrammar is theorized, in relation to other (related and different) types of semiotic relationships in the overall organization of language. However, in any linguistic study, whether descriptive or theoretical, one has to make terminological choices; and as will have been gathered from Figure 5-8, the possibility opted for here is to refer to the systemic side of lexicogrammar as **lexicogrammatical semantics** or **constructional formal meaning**.²⁹ This type of semantics (or more precisely each path of selections

²⁸ It will be clear, at this point, that the abstract framework dealt with in the present chapter is arrived at by asking more fundamental-theoretical questions, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter. In the exploration of different types of stratified models in SFL, we started from the same question as the one which, inexplicitly [as noted in Chapter 3] lies at the basis of the different proposals of stratified models in SFL itself: how is *the* general scheme semantics \searrow lexicogrammar \searrow phonology to be interpreted – i.e. where is the borderline between semantics and lexicogrammar to be located? In the present chapter, by contrast, we are concerned with the question of how *a* ‘semantics’ can be defined in general, starting from the assumption that there might be different kinds of ‘semantics’. This question is related to a more fundamental one: which kinds of semiotic relationships (realization, instantiation, and so forth) should be recognized in relation to language?, and, as a further step: how do these relationships relate to the notion of a stratified model of language? – again starting from the assumption that ‘stratification’ can be motivated in terms of different types of such semiotic relationships.

²⁹ The view that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are ‘semantic’ was the predominant interpretation in the 1970s (i.e. this is an interpretation in terms of an extended stratification model) [cf. Halliday 1973c/1971: 67, 1976f: 29, 1973e: 42, 1977: 193, 1978f: 187–188; recall also Chapter 3]. This interpretation has formed the basis for Fawcett’s own development of a grammar from the 1970s onwards (cf. also Fawcett [2001] on the importance of this interpretation to his own model of language) [as we have noted in Chapter 3], and within SFL in general it has continued to form a general, albeit implicit, basis to theorize the relationship between formal meaning (i.e. lexicogrammatical meaning, described as features in a system network) and structure.

from its networks) is related through realization to **lexicogrammatical structure**, which is represented in system networks by means of realization statements. The term ‘lexicogrammatical semantics’ has been chosen for two interrelated reasons. (1) First, this term is intended to highlight that the realization relationship within lexicogrammar holds between a *content*-level to an expression-level. (2) Second, the term ‘lexicogrammatical semantics’ indicates that this level in language is only a separate level in terms of a micro-stratification *within* lexicogrammar. In other words, as has already been emphasized above, in the approach which is taken here, lexicogrammatical semantics is not regarded as *the* semantics which is separated from lexicogrammar in a general stratification scheme of semantics ↘ lexicogrammar ↘ phonology. Rather, it is only one type of ‘semantics’ in a framework which also recognizes other types of ‘semantics’.

IV ‘Instantiation’ in the content-plane

In his scale-and-category model Halliday does not specify any type of semiotic relationship which theorizes the connection between his ‘form’ (lexicogrammar) and ‘context’ (contextual semantics). However, taking into account Hjelmslev’s form–substance–purport distinction within the content plane, it is clear that the relationship between lexicogrammar, as content-form, and contextual semantics, as content-substance, is equally one of instantiation / schematicity / manifestation. In other words: lexicogrammar is manifested in contextual semantics. This, then, is the most important upshot, with regard to our purposes in this chapter, of exploring how Hjelmslev’s stratification scheme can be projected onto Halliday’s scale-and-category model of linguistic levels: the recognition that *the distinction between lexicogrammar and semantics, defined as ‘contextual semantics’, is based on instantiation rather than realization*, as the general SFL scheme of stratification

In fact, it has only been in relation to exploring other types of models (such as the model with a separate interpersonal network [Halliday 1984]), or in alluding to other models (such as the statement in IFG that “At the present state of knowledge we cannot yet describe the semantic system of a language” [Halliday 1994: xx]) that this basic conception seems to be subdued (cf. also Matthiessen’s *Lexicogrammatical Cartography: English Systems*, which also starts from the assumption [Matthiessen 1993a: 28] that there is a separate stratum of semantics beyond (or rather, above) lexicogrammar.

in terms of semantics ↘ lexicogrammar ↘ phonology or graphology would have it.

2.2 ‘Contextual semantics’

Now what exactly is such a ‘contextual semantics’ which is related to lexicogrammar through instantiation? In the following sub-sections, three types of ‘contextual semantics’ will be distinguished, each of which will be defined in relation to Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory, and each of which has a different bearing on the systemic-functional notion of ‘stratification’.

2.2.1 Collocational semantics: Micro-instantiation

Using Hjelmslev’s secondary, abstract characterization of the form–substance–purport triad as a basis, a ‘contextual semantics’ is defined as a type of ‘meaning’ which is related to lexicogrammar (or to lexicogrammatical, i.e. formal ‘meaning’), through the *general* semiotic relationship of *schematicity*. Parallel to the relationship between phonology and phonetics in the expression plane, this relationship is a continuum along which “[w]hat from one point of view is “substance” is from another point of view “form”” [Hjelmslev 1963/1943: 81]. In other words, this conception is equally based on Hjelmslev’s secondary, abstract characterization of the form–substance–purport triad, a characterization which views this triad primarily from the side of form, and in which the form–substance relation is theorized in terms of a continuum based on the abstract semiotic relationship of instantiation, i.e. a continuum formed by the recurrence of schema–instance contrasts.

In fact, a recognition of a continuum relationship between lexicogrammar (or, in his conception, ‘formal meaning’ or the formal system of language) and a type of ‘contextual semantics’ is inherent in Firth’s linguistic theory, although Firth himself never linked his conception of semantics to Hjelmslev’s theory. One of the most important contributions of Firth’s theory of language, which forms the major background against which Halliday developed his scale-and-category model, is his notion of *collocation*, by which the contextual meaning of lexemes in actual texts is studied on the basis of

‘word accompaniment’ [Firth 1968/1957: 180]. Collocation in general refers to “the association of lexical items that regularly co-occur” [Halliday & Hasan 1976: 284]. Through its focus on *typical* patterns of co-occurrence, collocation is a way of theorizing how *variant* contextual meanings of a lexeme can be incorporated into the formal description of the content side of language in terms of distributional variants, in the same way as distributional variants (or allophones) can be incorporated into the phonological description of the phonic side of language.³⁰

In his scale-and-category model, Halliday further elaborates Firth’s concept of collocation,³¹ by specifying the way in which collocational contextual meaning can be formally described, using the description of the formal

³⁰ It is interesting to note, in this respect, that Firth’s two major areas of study were contextual semantics (focussing on the actualization of meaning in texts), and phonology-phonetics. Here we find again an example of what Kurylowicz has called an “isomorphism” between the study of the content plane and that of the expression plane in linguistics [cf. Chapter 2], where it is especially the study of the expression plane (with its distinction between phonology and phonetics, which was made quite early in 20th century structuralism) which serves as an inspirational framework for approaching the content side of language.

While, as we have seen in Chapter 2, in the 1930s, linguistics were mainly concerned with the relationship between a phonological and a phonetic level in language, in the 1950s, the most important question in linguistics was :what is the nature of ‘semantics’, and to what extent can a level of ‘semantics’ (as parallel to phonetics) be a part of linguistics? As we have seen above, in Hjelmslev’s theory of language, a ‘semantics’ as ‘content-substance’ is not regarded as part of linguistics. Other structuralist schools did not totally reject ‘semantics’ but proposed alternative ways of incorporating the study of ‘meaning’ in linguistics. In fact, Firth’s contextual meaning, theorized in relation to his concept of collocation, is precisely such type of semantics (characterizing the London school of structuralism), proposed as an alternative to the traditional ‘ontological semantics’. We will turn to the notion of an ‘ontological semantics’ (and other alternatives to this type of ‘semantics’ proposed in other structuralist schools) below.

³¹ It should be noted that in his “Categories” article, Halliday does *not* link the notion of collocation to that of a contextual semantics (or his ‘context’). This is due to the fact that Halliday focusses on the formal end of the relationship between lexicogrammar–contextual semantics–‘situation’, and in his view, ‘collocational meaning’ is fully incorporated in the *formal* level of lexicogrammar (the content-form). Indeed, his own treatment of collocation is a further plea to treat this aspect of meaning as part of the form of language, as the statement quoted in the next note indicates. Firth, by contrast, approached the relationship between lexicogrammar–contextual semantics–‘situation’ from the other end, focussing on the meaning of words in actual texts.

meaning of lexicogrammar as a reference framework:³² a collocational set is regarded as the systemic dimension of collocation, and “collocation”, standing for ‘collocational pattern’, refers to the structural dimension³³ of the notion of collocation [cf. Halliday 1961: 276]. Significantly, in taking a Hjelmslevian perspective it can be seen that Halliday’s proposal for setting up “theoretical categories for the *formal* description of lexis” [Halliday 1961: 275; emphasis MT] is based on recognizing that within collocation, there is a level of content (the collocational set, as defining a type of meaning which is distinguished from the meaning central in other collocational sets) and a level of expression (the collocational pattern), which are solidary and hence together constitute a form–sign.

The notion of collocation is then linked to the **delicacy** scale ranging from grammar to lexis [cf. also Halliday 1966a]: it is by taking into account the collocational patterns into which lexemes enter that lexis can be seen as ‘most delicate grammar’. The collocational sets which are arrived at in the study of collocation are then regarded as very delicate classifications of (lexical) meaning, which extend the less delicate classifications found in grammatical systems, which are based on more general, grammatical criteria. For example, a schematic pattern such as Agent · Process · Medium at the grammatical end can be linked, through various steps of specification, to more specific patterns such as “human · material action of disposal involving change of Medium · alienable object”, and further, more specific patterns [cf. Hasan 1987]. Within SFL, the notion of collocation – and the related concept of delicacy – has mainly been studied in relation to the experiential component of language,³⁴ as the example just given illustrates. Therefore, I

³² Cf. Halliday [1961: 275]: “What are needed are theoretical categories for the formal description of lexis”.

³³ In his “Categories” article, Halliday [1961: 276] refers to these two dimensions as the ‘paradigmatic’ and the ‘syntagmatic’ aspects of collocation, respectively. However, in view of his later distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘syntagm’ (in what I have called Halliday’s ‘intermediate system-structure model’ [cf. Chapter 3, Section 2.2]), I prefer to treat ‘collocational pattern’ as structural (i.e. in terms of *functional* structure) rather than syntagmatic.

³⁴ As has been noted in Chapter 1 [Section 1.1], the relationship of delicacy has a different status in the interpersonal and the ideational components of language. Delicacy will be further looked into in Part III, when we turn to the modelling of lexicogrammar. At this point, it can be noted that the notion of ‘collocation’ also plays a different role in the two

will regard the notion of a **collocational semantics**, as it is defined here, as pertaining to the experiential metafunction.³⁵

It is clear that the distinction of a collocational semantics, as one type of a contextual semantics, does not constitute a basis for stratification: precisely because of the fact that collocational meaning can be incorporated into the formal description of language, the relation between lexicogrammar and collocational semantics is the *intrastratal* one of delicacy. The type of ‘instantiation’ which is inherent in the systemic-functional concept of delicacy, will be called **micro-instantiation**. This intrastratal type of relationship refers to any relationship between a system and a more delicate sub-system. Within the experiential metafunction more particularly, **experiential micro-instantiation** refers to the link between lexicogrammar and collocational semantics, and by extension to. The concept of micro-instantiation is visualized in Figure 5-9.

major metafunctional components. In general, collocation as such refers to the combination of one lexical item as such with (a group of) other lexical items. However, the ‘span’ of a collocation is defined in different ways in the ideational and interpersonal components. (1) In the ideational component, collocational patterns can be recognized as further specifications or further sub-categories of schematic functional configurations which, at the grammatical end, are specified only in schematic terms [cf. the example given above]. (2) In the interpersonal component, the notion of collocation has been linked to the prosodic mode of expression which characterizes this metafunction: lexemes are characterized as carrying a positive or negative “semantic prosody” [cf. Louw 2000]. This prosody, as the term itself suggests, is not based on structural patterns as is the case in the ideational component, rather, it is spread over larger stretches of language.

³⁵ In Section 2.2.3 below, we will explore the equivalent of a collocational semantics in the interpersonal metafunction.




Figure 5-9 · Micro-instantiation

In view of the specification of other types of contextual semantics which will be proposed in the following sub-sections, it is important to emphasize that the notion of a collocational semantics is based on Hjelmslev's secondary, abstract interpretation of the form–substance–purport triad, in which this triad is viewed from the side of form, and in which the focus is on the relationship between form and substance, interpreted in an abstract sense as a relation between invariants and variants in language. Importantly, as we have seen in Chapter 2, this is an interpretation in which a 'purport' as such, as a non-linguistic dimension, does not play a significant role. Indeed, the type of 'context' which is taken into account in a collocational semantics is inherently linguistic: it is the environment of other lexical meanings. This is not the case in other types of 'contextual semantics', which will be dealt with in the following two sub-sections.

2.2.2 *Ontological semantics: Macro-instantiation and construal*

I **Ontological semantics and its relation to formal meaning**

As we have seen in Chapter 2, in Hjelmslev's primary characterization of the triad form–substance–purport, the focus is on the relationship between form and purport: this characterization is concerned with the way in which 'purport', which is essentially non-linguistic, can be related to language

(more specifically to linguistic signs which constitute the form of language), or, approaching the triad from the other end, the aspect of linguistic signs which is highlighted here is the relationship of ‘being a sign for’ something (i.e. extralinguistic reality). As has been indicated in Chapter 2, in the content plane, the ‘purport’ which plays an essential role here is Kant’s ‘*Ding an sich*’ or *noumenon*.

The type of contextual semantics which is ‘content-substance’, in this perspective, will be defined as an **ontological semantics** or a **phenomenological semantics**.³⁶ As content-substance, an ontological semantics does not belong to the form of a language, and hence, strictly speaking – speaking from a Hjelmslevian perspective – ontological semantics does not form a part of linguistics.³⁷ In this respect it is useful to refer to a distinction which is made in German linguistics, viz. that between *Bedeutung* and *Bezeichnung* [cf. Lyons 1977: 199]. Coseriu, who has played an important role in theorizing this distinction, gives the following description:

Wenn die Bedeutung die einzelsprachliche *Gestaltung*, d. h. eine Einteilung oder Abgrenzung, eine *Form* der Erfassung des Außersprachlichen darstellt, so entspricht die *Bezeichnung* dem jeweils Erfassten, Gestalteten oder Eingeteilten: Sie ist der in verschiedenen Sprachen von der Bedeutung verschieden geformte *Stoff*. [Coseriu 1987c: 186; emphasis EC]

In other words, *Bedeutung* refers to the ‘meaning’ which is formalized in the linguistic system of language, and in this sense, lexicogrammatical meaning

³⁶ The term ‘ontological’ in general refers to the existence (being) of (things in) reality and the way in which we perceive this reality: the prefix *onto* is derived from Greek *οντοζ*, which is the present participle of *ειναι*, ‘to be’, and hence means ‘being’ [cf. Klein 1971]. The term ‘phenomenological’ is based in Husserl’s phenomenological theory of ‘meaning’. In this theory, Husserl argues that there is no “an sich”, no *noumenon* [cf. Willems 1994: 40–50], but only our subjective perception, and for this Husserl uses the term “Phänomenon”.

Hjelmslev, as has been noted in Chapter 2, uses both ‘ontological’ and ‘phenomenological meaning’ to refer to the aspect of the content plane which has to be excluded from linguistics, on the account that it is not part of the form of language.

³⁷ ‘Ontological semantics’, as it is defined here, is the type of semantics which, in 20th century structuralism in general, was rejected as a sub-component of linguistics, because it was regarded as not being part of the form (in Hjelmslev’s sense) of language. Firth’s proposal for a study of meaning in terms of collocation is essentially a reaction to the traditional notion of an ontological semantics, as we have seen above.

(or constructional formal meaning) defined above is one facet of *Bedeutung*. *Bezeichnung*, on the other hand, is the extralinguistic ‘meaning’ which in various languages can be formed in different ways.³⁸ To give a simple example, ‘*Bezeichnung*’ refers to the meaning which is common in the following expressions:

- (1) a. *Peter gave Jane a present.*
 b. *Jane was given a present by Peter.*
 c. *Jane received a present from Peter.*

Importantly, the relationship between formal meaning and ontological meaning is one of *variation*, in the general sense, *in two directions*. On the one hand, in terms of Hjelmslev’s theory, the relationship between formal meaning and ontological meaning is again one of *schematicity* or *instantiation*: the formal meaning of linguistic signs, defined in terms of the system of a particular language, is schematic to the various instances of extralinguistic meanings which it can apply to. This is exactly the ‘formative’ aspect of formal meaning: linguistic signs are categories or classifications which a particular language projects on extra-linguistic meanings. In this sense they are abstractions ‘by likeness’ (to use Halliday’s expression again [cf. Section 2.1.4, §I above]) of general categories from particular extra-linguistic meanings, where ‘likeness’ is interpreted in different ways in different languages: each language carves up ‘purport’ in different ways. Recall Hjelmslev’s illustration by means of colour terms in this respect: the Welsh *glas* designates various shades of colour which in English are construed through the signs *green*, *blue* and *gray* [cf. Chapter 2].

The type of instantiation which is involved here is not the graded relationship of delicacy (based on recurring schema–instance contrasts) but rather the bipolar relationship of **actualization**:³⁹ formal meaning and ontological

³⁸ It will be noted that, in this interpretation of content-substance based on Hjelmslev’s primary characterization of the form–substance–purport triad, the type of contextual semantics which is specified here – viz. ontological semantics – is content-substance as looked at from the side of substance, whereas the collocational semantics defined above is essentially a content-substance looked at from the side of form.

³⁹ Cf. Chapter 1, where general differences between instantiation as delicacy and instantiation as actualization have been specified.

meaning refer to different dimensions of ‘reality’, in that formal meaning is language-internal, whereas ontological meaning is tied to extra-linguistic reality. Within the general framework of types semiotic relationships which is set up in the present chapter, this type of instantiation will be called **macro-instantiation**.

On the other hand, as has been indicated above, the relationship between the form of language and an ontological semantics is also one of ‘being a sign for’: the different examples of expressions given above are different signs for the same extralinguistic meaning. Now in SFL in general, the relationship between language and extralinguistic reality is called **construal**,⁴⁰ and in this sense, the three examples given above [cf. (1)] *construe* reality in different ways. Hence, in the present framework, the relationship of construal is regarded as the reverse of instantiation: actualization.

The fact that two kinds of semiotic relationships are relevant in order to theorize the link between a formal semantics and an ontological semantics, has to do with the *bipolarity* of this link, which in turn is based on the intrinsic difference in status between an internal-linguistic meaning (defined in terms of a language system) and an extralinguistic meaning (making sense in relation to the extralinguistic world). It is also as a result of this bipolarity that there is variation *in two directions*, as visualized in Figure 5-10 below.

⁴⁰ The term ‘construal’ has two different meanings in SFL: on the one hand, it indicates the general relationship between language and extra-linguistic reality; on the other hand, ‘construal’ defines the ideational component of language, and in this sense is contrasted to ‘enactment’ in the interpersonal component. I will use ‘construal’ here in the former sense, and use ‘designation’ vs. ‘indication’ in order to refer to the nature of ‘construal’ in the different metafunctions.




Figure 5-10 · The semiotic relationship between formal semantics and ontological semantics: Variation in two directions

Furthermore, precisely because of the distinct status of a formal semantics vis-à-vis an ontological semantics – i.e. because of the bipolar rather than the gradual nature of their distinctiveness, the contrast between these two types of ‘meaning’ constitutes a basis for stratification. This type of stratification, which will be referred to as **macro-stratification**, is then defined as a contextualizing relationship between language and non-linguistic reality. Crucially, *this type of stratification is based on instantiation rather than realization*. In other words, when in a general stratified model of language, a stratum of ‘semantics’ is set up in order to theorize the way in which language (and especially its core of lexicogrammar) interacts with extra-linguistic contexts, the relationship between the strata is one of instantiation. It is in such a perspective that probability relations can be studied between ‘strata’, and hence, it is precisely in such a framework that the notion of metaredundancy has to be understood.

In Part III, it will be claimed that much of the systemic-functional conception of ‘stratification’ is based on what is here called macro-stratification. This specific interpretation of ‘stratification’ in general and of a relationship between a ‘semantics’ and a ‘lexicogrammar’ in particular has important consequences for the conception of a notion of ‘grammatical metaphor’, as we will see in Part III.

II Ontological semantics as experiential

In keeping with the general aim of this chapter to explore, on a theoretical level, the interaction between stratification and metafunctional diversity, a second aspect of ontological semantics which needs to be considered, is its relation to the notion of metafunctions. I would argue, in this respect, that an ontological semantics is only relevant to the *ideational* component of language.

With respect to **lexis**, ontological semantics corresponds to what is traditionally called **denotation**, which is defined by Lyons [1977: 208] as

the relationship that holds between [a] lexeme and persons, things, places, properties, processes and activities external to the language system.

The formal semantics which denotation relates to at the level of lexis, can then be regarded as **sense** or what I will refer to as **lexical semantics** or **lexical formal meaning** [cf. also Figure 5-8 above], whereas denotation refers to the classes of aspects of reality (defined ontologically as ‘entities’, ‘processes’ and so forth) which are construed in particular lexical items, the sense of a lexical item is determined by its position in the system of a language, where it is defined in relation to other lexemes in two ways: (1) in terms of lexical *distinctive features* [which have already been introduced above, cf. Section 2.1.4, §3] such as [+ animate], [– human] (e.g. *horse*), and the further concept of *semantic fields*, which classify lexemes on the basis of shared lexical features (2) in terms of *sense relations*, such as synonymy, antonymy, hyperonymy, and so on [cf. Coseriu 1973: Chapter 4; Lyons 1977: Chapters 8 and 9].⁴¹

With respect to **grammar**, ontological semantics is that level of ‘meaning’ at which notions such as ‘instrument’, ‘undergoer’, ‘possession’, and so on are defined in a pre-theoretical sense, as general and quasi-universal concepts, rather than as linguistic categories, which are in principle defined in terms of content–expression couplings which are part of the *formal* system of a

⁴¹ The ‘structuralist’ study of lexical meaning in terms of sense relations and lexical features is another type of reaction against the traditional notion of an ontological semantics. In the English speaking community of linguists, the study of lexical sense has been inaugurated by Lyons.

particular language.⁴² Coseriu [1987c: 183] calls such types of ontological meanings “universelle Bezeichnungstypen”. Table 5-2 summarizes how an ontological semantics can be further specified in relation to the ideational component of language.

	Formal system of language	Ontological semantics
General terms	<i>Bedeutung</i>	<i>Bezeichnung</i>
Grammar	lexicogrammatical semantics: constructional formal meaning cf. Part III ⁴³	<i>universelle Bedeutungstypen</i> , e.g. ‘instrument’, ‘possession’, etc. as quasi-universal concepts
Lexis	lexical semantics: lexical formal meaning - sense relations - lexical features and semantic fields	denotation

Table 5-2 · The nature of an ontological semantics in the ideational component of language

III The status and role of an ontological semantics in the formal study of language

Having considered the exact nature of an ‘ontological semantics’, in relation to ideational lexis and grammar, we can now be more specific about the role of an ontological semantics in relation to the *form* of language, and further, on the status of an ontological semantics in linguistics in general. As we have seen above [cf. Chapter 2, and the present chapter], in Hjelmslev’s strict conception of linguistics as an algebra which studies the *form* of language, there can be no room for an ontological semantics (which is the content-substance of language, and hence is not part of its form); and Firth’s study of

⁴² It will be noted that, in referring to grammar, I focus on the *functional* side of grammatical structure. As will be noted further on in Part III, the *syntagmatic* aspect of grammatical structure can also be defined in ontological terms, where, for example, a noun or a nominal group is defined as designating a ‘thing’ or an ‘entity’. This type of definition, as we will see, has played an important role in the systemic-functional conception of grammatical metaphor [cf. especially Chapter 8 below].

⁴³ Recall that, in this part, we focus on the relationship between stratification and metafunctional diversity as such, without taking into account the internal organization of a lexicon.

meaning in terms of collocation is essentially a reaction against the ‘traditional’ recourse to ontological meaning in linguistics.

In the general framework of the 1950s’ concern, in linguistics, with determining what should and what should not be part of the formal study of ‘meaning’ (a discussion which evolved as parallel to the discussion of similar questions with regard to the phonic side in language in the 1930s, as we have seen), Pike [1954] proposed the terms *emic* and *etic*, to refer to two general observer perspectives in the study of language (and any cultural phenomenon).⁴⁴ The emic side of language refers to a linguistic system, and to “form-meaning composites” [cf. also Pike 1972/1955: 102ff] which are defined in that system; the etic side of language refers to what is observed from an outsider’s perspective: with regard to the phonic plane of language this means phonetic sound images, with regard to the content plane of language, this means ‘meanings’ in the ontological sense as defined above.

With regard to the ‘role’ of an etic, outsider’s perspective, or the ‘status’ of an ontological semantics in linguistics, I will adopt Coseriu’s view. From his definition of *Bedeutung* and *Bezeichnung*, which we have considered above, he concludes:

Dies bedeutet zunächst, daß die Bezeichnung die notwendige Bezugsebene für jede Betrachtungsweise und für jede Tätigkeit ist, die mehr als eine Sprache betrifft. Sie ist somit das *tertium comparationis* für jeden expliziten oder impliziten Sprachvergleich, ein Raster für die sinnvolle Gegenüberstellung von verschiedenartig strukturierten Bedeutungssystemen. [Coseriu 1987c: 186]

In other words, on an initial level, ontological meaning is evidently important in comparative linguistics: it serves as a *tertium comparationis* in order to define one particular language system in comparison to the systems of other languages. In this framework it is interesting to note that Hjelmslev could not make his point about form–substance–purport in the content plane of language without emphasizing the differences between the formal systems of *different*

⁴⁴ Obviously, the terms *emic* and *etic* are derived from the distinction between phonemes and phonetic manifestations of phonemes, which had become well entrenched in linguistics in the 1940s. Pike uses the contrast between *emic* and *etic* not only in relation to linguistics, but in relation to the study of culture in general; *emic* units in a culture are defined as “*behavioremes*” [cf. Pike 1954, see also Headland et al. (eds.) 1990].

languages: different languages carve up purport in different ways (recall his example of colour terms).

However, ontological semantics is also important on a more fundamental level, with reference to the study of one particular language, as Coseriu indicates:

Für die richtig verstandene funktionelle einzelsprachliche Grammatik schließlich *ist die Bezeichnung die Grundlage der Heuristik der Bedeutung*; sie stellt den universellen Raster dar, auf den die einzelsprachliche Gestaltung sozusagen “projiziert” bzw. dem gegenüber diese Gestaltung in ihrer Eigentümlichkeit abgehoben wird. Denn eine Sprache in ihrer Eigentümlichkeit, d. h. als Bedeutungssystem, als besondere Gestaltung der allgemeinen Bezeichnungsmöglichkeiten zu beschreiben, bedeutet eben, *diese Sprache mit jeder anderen virtuell zu kontrastieren*. [Coseriu 1987c: 187; emphasis MT]

With reference to the functional study of one particular language, Coseriu defines the usefulness of an ontological semantics as a universal framework against which the particular, specific design of the system of that language can be recognized as unique. In this vein, ontological semantics is useful as a heuristic for defining the organization of formal meaning in one language (the way in which this language ‘carves up purport’, in Hjelmslevian terms) against the *virtual* background of other, alternative possible types of organization.

In keeping with the characterization, proposed earlier in this section, of the relationship between the formal system of language and an ontological semantics as a relationship of variation in two directions, I will take Coseriu’s reasoning one step further, and argue that ontological semantics is also useful within the study of one language as such (i.e. without comparing it to other languages, actual or virtual), as a *heuristic* for *recognizing* the variation between different types of construals *within* that language. Two points should be emphasized in this formulation: (1) first, ontological semantics, or Pike’s outsider’s perspective, is regarded as a *heuristic* for probing the variation between types of linguistic signs, (2) second, as a result of this, it is not claimed that by taking recourse to ontological semantics, the

variation between different types of construals can be *accounted for*; rather, it can only be *recognized*.⁴⁵

Summarizing, in this section we have defined a second type of ‘contextual semantics’ as a ‘ontological semantics’. It has been argued that this type of semantics is only relevant in relation to the ideational component of language, and we have briefly looked at the specific nature of this semantics in relation to ideational lexis and grammar. The role of an ontological semantics in linguistics has been specified as a heuristic for recognizing the variation between different construals in language.

In view of the specification of a different type of ‘contextual semantics’ pertaining to the interpersonal metafunction, which will be given in the following section, a general label which covers the different metafunctional types of ‘contextual semantics’ is necessary. Adapting a distinction introduced by Coseriu [e.g. 1988: 294ff], I will call the variation between types of construals in a language its **architecture**.⁴⁶ The architecture of a language will be defined as contrasting with, and complementary to its **internal structure**, which is organized in systems of form–meaning couplings. The architecture of a language in general refers to the way in which language interacts with non-linguistic reality, i.e. the way in which language is ‘meaningful’ in relation to non-linguistic contexts. The semantics which belong to the architecture of language, and which are related to the internal structure of language through the relationship of macro-stratification, will be called **macro-semantics** in general. The architecture of the ideational component of language, then, is defined as the relationship between language and an ontological semantics. This relationship, as we have seen in this section, is bipolar and each of its directions is relevant to the study of language: (1) ontological meanings are *instantiations* or *actualizations* of formal

⁴⁵ As will be argued in Part III, such a formal account of this variation can only be given in terms of the internal organization of the system of a language, rather than in relation to an ontological semantics as such.

⁴⁶ It should be noted that the way in which I use this distinction here does *not* correspond exactly to Coseriu’s definition of a contrast between the ‘architecture’ and ‘structure’ (which I here term ‘internal structure’ in order to avoid confusion with ‘structure’ in the more restricted, lexicogrammatical sense), although my definition is ultimately based on Coseriu’s proposal.

meanings, defined in the linguistic system of a language, and, conversely, (2) formal meanings define the specific way in which ontological meanings are *construed* in the system of a language. The type of construal involved in the ideational metafunction, i.e. construal of ontological meanings in language, will be termed **designation**.

In the following section, we turn to the nature of a ‘contextual semantics’ in the interpersonal component of language, and hence, to the architecture of the interpersonal metafunction.

2.2.3 Speech-functional semantics: Connotative instantiation and construal

As we have seen in the two previous chapters in Part II, with regard to the interpersonal metafunction, there is a type of ‘semantics’ which has been explicitly defined as a separate stratum in SFL, and whose internal organization has been described in terms of a system network, viz. the semantics of SPEECH FUNCTION. In this section, I will argue that this interpersonal semantics is another type of ‘contextual semantics’, comparable to an ontological semantics in the ideational metafunction. However, the nature and role of a ‘content-substance’, on which the general definition of a ‘contextual semantics’ has been based [cf. Section 2.1.4 above], is different in relation to interpersonal ‘meaning’, indicating the distinctiveness of the interpersonal metafunction vis-à-vis the experiential one. The aim of this section then, is to specify, again in precise semiotic terms based on Hjelmslev’s theory of language, the nature of the semiotic relationship between a ‘lexicogrammar’ and a ‘semantics’ in the interpersonal metafunction.

I Speech-functional semantics as a connotative content-plane

There is an intuitive sense in which the interpersonal semantics of speech function is a ‘*contextual* semantics’: it specifies the ‘meaning’ an utterance has in (the context of) the speech event as ‘command’, ‘question’, ‘threat’, ‘advice’ and so on. As has been noted in Chapter 4,⁴⁷ this speech-functional meaning is intrinsically tied to *roles* which interactants take on in the speech

⁴⁷ Cf. especially note 21, p. 236.

situation. We have seen that these interactant roles can be specified on two levels, which Halliday [1977: 202] terms “first-order” and “second-order”, and which indicate two ends of a continuum:

- (1) second-order roles are roles which emerge “in and through language”; they are the roles of ‘commander’, ‘questioner’, ‘responder’, and so on. Martin [1992b: 571–572] calls these “speech functional roles”.
- (2) First-order roles are social roles in a more general (and more usual) sense; they are roles which can be defined without reference to language (e.g. ‘teacher’, ‘pupil’, ‘parent’, ‘child’, and so forth).

In between these two types of roles is a whole array of ‘intermediate’ roles, which are realized both linguistically and non-linguistically: these are roles which have to do with (speech) functions such as ‘threatening’, ‘warning’, ‘greeting’, and so on.

How can a ‘semantics’ of speech-functional ‘meanings’ related to interactant roles be interpreted in terms of Hjelmslev’s stratification scheme? I believe that the key to understanding the nature of a speech-functional semantics lies in Hjelmslev’s second-order interpretation of the content–expression relationship [cf. Chapter 2: Section 2]. More specifically, I propose that the systemic-functional interpersonal semantics of speech function can be theorized as a *second-order content plane*, i.e. a *connotative content-plane* in Hjelmslev’s terms. The set-up of such a second-order content plane within the overall framework of Hjelmslev’s types of strata is visualized in Figure 5-11.




Figure 5-11 · The interpersonal semantics of speech function as a connotative content plane

At least three reasons can be adduced why an interpersonal semantics of speech functions, as defined in SFL, can be regarded as a second-order content-plane in the Hjelmslevian sense. (1) First, the speech-functional meanings of ‘question’, ‘command’, ‘threat’, ‘advice’, and so on only appear as meaningful in the context of the speech interaction and the roles taken up by the interactants: they are based on the social relationships between the interactants (especially the first-order ones), and they in turn create these relationships (especially the second-order ones). Especially in terms of their interdependence on first-order social roles, speech functions are connotative meanings: their expression plane is ‘language’ in general, but their ‘meaning’ – their content plane – appears only in relation to a larger context of *general* sociological and psychological aspects⁴⁸ which interact with ‘language’ proper.

(2) As we have seen in Chapter 2, Hjelmslev emphasizes that a connotative meaning can be based on *any* aspect of the denotative system which constitutes its expression plane. If we extend the idea of diversity in the connotative expression plane to the systemic-functional notion of *metafunctional* diversity, this feature of a connotative system suggests a second reason why a semantics of speech function can be regarded as a connotative semantics: speech-functional meanings, as noted in Chapter 4 [Section 3.2.4], are not only indicated by the interpersonal lexicogrammar of MOOD (comprising MODALITY), but can also be designated⁴⁹ through the experiential

⁴⁸ ‘General’ is highlighted here in order to emphasize that the notion of a connotative semiotic which is at stake here is to be understood in Hjelmslev’s original sense, and not in the sense of Barthes’s re-interpretation of this notion, which has become more popular. This observation will be important further on in this section, when we consider the status of a ‘content-substance’ in relation to an interpersonal semantics.

As we have seen in Chapter 2, in Barthes’s view, a connotative semiotic is defined in relation to one particular situation, i.e. connotative meanings depend on the interpretation of one particular language user in one particular setting. In Hjelmslev’s theory, as has been emphasized in Chapter 2, the notion of a connotative semiotic is based on an extension of the content–expression dimension, which follows logically from Hjelmslev’s very abstract and systematic theoretical framework. In this framework, the relationship between general (standardized aspects of language, and particular aspects which arise in individual contexts) is theorized by means of a separate dimension, i.e. the form–substance–purpose differentiation.

⁴⁹ The distinction between designation and indication, which has already been briefly explained in the previous chapter, will be further clarified below.

coding in an utterance. As we have seen, the role of the experiential metafunction in relation to expressing speech functions is twofold. [1] Speech-functional meanings can be designated through experiential ‘content’, i.e. they can be encoded in the experiential *lexical* meaning – which can now be further specified as ‘sense’ [cf. the previous section above] – of lexemes such as hope (speech function: hoping), shoot (speech function: threat), or [2] they can be coded in the experiential grammatical structure of the utterance (especially the participants in transitivity configurations, and the relation of these participants to the interactants in the speech event).

(3) Finally, we have also seen in the previous chapter that speech-functional meanings can be indicated through connotative meanings expressed by lexemes. Taking connotative lexical meaning as the lexical end of an interpersonal semantics of speech function, this constitutes a third reason for interpreting this interpersonal semantics as a connotative content plane in the Hjelmslevian sense. That this argument is not based on a terminological coincidence between the traditional notion of lexical ‘connotation’ and the Hjelmslevian concept of a connotative semiotic, will be shown further on in this section.

Summarizing, the sense in which an interpersonal semantics of speech function can be theorized as a connotative semiotic pertains to its relationship to, on the one hand, the two ‘levels’ with which it interacts: a non-linguistic level of sociological and psychological aspects (context), and lexicogrammar; and on the other hand, to the concept of a grammar–lexis continuum within the interpersonal metafunction.

In order to arrive at a more precise, Hjelmslevian characterization of the interpersonal semantics of speech function, two further questions need to be addressed, viz. (1) what is the nature and role of Hjelmslev’s ‘*content-substance*’, in relation to a speech-functional semantics? and (2) how to define the *semiotic relationship* which holds between lexicogrammar and the interpersonal semantics as a connotative content plane? Each of these questions is needs to be taken up in order to specify the status of an interpersonal speech-functional semantics within the overall semiotic-functional model of ‘stratification’ which is being set up in this chapter.

II The notion of ‘content-substance’ in the internal organization of speech-functional semantics: Micro-instantiation

The question as to the nature of Hjelmslev’s content-substance in relation to a speech-functional semantics is important, first of all because, in the general exploration of how Hjelmslev’s stratification scheme can be projected onto the systemic-functional view of stratification, Hjelmslev’s ‘content-substance’ plays a crucial role as a central hookup-point for interpreting the systemic-functional ‘semantics’, and especially its relation to a ‘lexicogrammar’, in Hjelmslevian terms. Furthermore, by exploring the role of a ‘content-substance’ in relation to a connotative semiotic, a further argument will appear for interpreting the interpersonal semantics of speech function as a connotive content-plane in Hjelmslev’s sense.

As we have seen in Chapter 2, and as has been further emphasized in the present chapter, Hjelmslev’s form–substance–purport distinction is a *general* semiotic differentiation which cross-cuts the distinction between content and expression. As noted in Chapter 2, besides indicating the possibilities of a connotative semiotic and a meta-semiotic as second-order systems, which follow logically from his abstract semiotic framework, Hjelmslev himself does not further explore the possibilities of a connotative semiotic, nor does he specify the internal design of a second-order content-plane or expression-plane. However, his abstract, secondary interpretation of the form–substance–purport distinction can be taken as a basis for further elucidating the internal organization of a connotative content plane. More precisely, it can be argued that *within* the connotative content plane there is a continuum of interdependencies between invariants and variants (schema–instance pairs), in precisely the same way as such a continuum appears within a denotative (first-order) content plane and expression plane. In this vein, two contrasting types of connotative, speech-functional meanings should be recognized, which indicate the end-points of a continuum: (1) speech-functional meanings can either be formalized, belonging to the *content-form* of a connotative content plane, or (2) they can appear as further particularizations of schematic speech functions, indicating very specific speech-functional meanings which are not formalized in the system of the language which is being considered, and hence being part of the *content-substance* of its connotative content plane.

This general schema–instance continuum can be illustrated in relation to both the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, and the interpersonal lexical dimension of connotation. With regard to the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, we can again recapitulate illustrations given in the previous chapter, and reinterpret them in Hjelmslevian terms. As we have seen, the primary speech functions of ‘statement’, ‘question’, ‘offer’ and ‘command’, are the most schematic types of speech functions, which do have a distinctive type of construal which is formalized in the lexicogrammar of a language, for example MOOD: imperative as construing the speech-functional option ‘command’.⁵⁰ Other, *more delicate* types of speech functions are, for instance, ‘threatening’, ‘fearing’, ‘persuading’ and so on. In the present discussion, two features of these more delicate speech functions are important. First, in contrast to the primary speech functions, they do not have a single formalized type of construal in language, but can be construed (indicated and/or designated) through a myriad of encodings, both interpersonal and experiential. Second, these more delicate types of speech functions, as Halliday argues, can be regarded as very specific sub-types of the primary speech functions, for example, a ‘threat’ is a very specific, undesirable kind ‘offer’, a ‘promise’, in the same sense, is a very specific, desirable kind of ‘offer’, and so forth. In Hjelmslevian terms, the more delicate types of speech functions are highly particularized instantiations of the general schemata, defined in the English speech-functional system as ‘offer’, ‘command’, ‘question’ and ‘statement’. Each of these two features of delicate speech functions – i.e. their non-formal character, and their relation to primary speech functions in terms of the general semiotic relationship of schematicity – illustrates the significance of a form–substance differentiation within the semantics of SPEECH FUNCTION.

⁵⁰ The notion of a ‘formalized’ ‘distinctive type of construal’ is used here for the sake of illustrating, on a preliminary level, the form–substance or schema–instance differentiation in relation to the semantics of speech function. However, even at this most schematic level within the interpersonal semantics of speech functions, the notion of a formalized ‘distinctive type of construal’ is not absolute, as will be further emphasized below. The notion of a ‘formalized type of construal’ corresponding to the speech function of ‘offer’, which is rather uncommon compared to the other types of primary speech functions, will be further explained in dealing with interpersonal grammatical metaphor below [Part IV: Chapter 10].

The area of lexical, connotative meaning also indicates the relevance of Hjelmslev's form–substance dimension in relation to the interpersonal speech-functional semantics. In its non-technical, commonsense meaning, 'connotation' is associated with a particular *subjective* feeling which an individual attaches to words. Halliday's [1970: 327] general characterization of connotation as "lexical register" gives more weight to the *intersubjective* nature of connotations arising in a particular linguistic register. Even beyond the intersubjective level, certain connotations can also be argued to belong to the system of a language, as indicated in dictionaries by terms such as 'slang', 'informal' (stylistic connotation) or 'pejorative' (attitudinal connotation).⁵¹ Furthermore, the study of interpersonal semantic prosodies in large computerized corpora [cf. e.g. Louw 2000],⁵² which is still in its infancy, is likely to reveal arrays of interdependent connotative meanings which are entrenched, i.e. formalized, in the system of a language.

In conclusion, both the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION as such, and the area of lexical connotative meanings (which contribute to the specification of delicate types of speech functions, as we have seen above) indicate that the connotative content plane of interpersonal semantics is internally organized in terms of Hjelmslev's form–substance dimension, in the sense of Hjelmslev's abstract, secondary interpretation of this dimension (in terms of recurrent invariant–variant pairs). Within the interpersonal connotative content plane, Hjelmslev's notion of a content-substance indicates a particularization of speech functions and lexical connotative meaning in specific contexts of use. In this sense, the relationship between formalized speech functions and more delicate speech functions, and between standardized connotations, and more specific situational connotations within the interpersonal semantics of speech function is semiotically similar to the relationship between a lexicogrammar and a collocational semantics in the experiential metafunction, and will therefore be called **interpersonal micro-instantiation**. There is a striking similarity between the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions, in this respect: while, in the experiential

⁵¹ The distinction between attitudinal connotation and stylistic connotation was made in Chapter 4 [Section 3.2.4: II].

⁵² Cf. note **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, p. 295 above.

metafunction, more delicate meanings are revealed through the study of collocational patterns, in the interpersonal metafunction, the notion of semantic prosodies provides a similar basis for revealing specific connotative meanings.

As we have seen above, micro-instantiation does not constitute a basis for stratification. One type of stratification which has been defined above in relation to the experiential metafunction is based on a different sense of a 'contextual semantics', specified in terms of Hjelmslev's primary interpretation of the form–substance–purport differentiation, viz. an ontological semantics. However, the equivalent type of stratification in the interpersonal metafunction is not based on form–substance–purport distinction, rather, it is brought about by the very nature of the interpersonal connotative semantics as a second-order content-plane, as we will see in the following sub-section.

III The semiotic relationship between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar

The final question which has to be taken up, in relation to the interpersonal semantics of speech function, is: how to define the semiotic relationship which holds between interpersonal lexicogrammar, and the semantics of speech function defined as a second-order, connotative content-plane in Hjelmslev's sense. Hjelmslev himself does not specify a distinctive type of semiotic relationship in connection with his concept of a second-order semiotic. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the type of relationship which seems to be evoked in the general context of Hjelmslev's theory as whole, in Hjelmslev's concept of a second-order semiotic, is a second-order cycle of the content–expression relationship. Hence, what needs to be further specified is the precise way in which a second-order content–expression relationship, especially that between a second-order, connotative content-plane and the denotive semiotic which constitutes its expression plane, is different from – i.e. is *second-order vis-à-vis* – the 'ordinary' content–expression relationship in a denotative semiotic system.

As we have seen in Chapter 2 and as has further been made clear in the present chapter [cf. § I above], the characteristic nature of a second-order

content plane is its relationship to contextual aspects of a general psychological and sociological kind. In relation to the connotative content-plane of a speech-functional semantics, these ‘contextual aspects’ have been defined as first-order social roles which are taken up by the interlocutors in a speech interaction. It has been emphasized that first-order social roles, as such, are defined extra-linguistically, although they may intermingle with linguistically defined speech-functional roles, and although their relationship to such linguistically defined roles is gradual (i.e. there are various types of ‘intermediate’ roles which are both defined linguistically and non-linguistically).

Because of the inherent *contextualizing* role of a speech-functional semantics as an interface between language as such and *non-linguistic* aspects of context which interact with language, the relationship between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar will be regarded as a relationship of **macro-instantiation**: ‘instantiation’ stands for the contextualizing nature of the semantics, and ‘macro’ stands for the extra-linguistic nature of the context which this semantics links to language as such. This relationship is considered to form a basis for a type of stratification, which is termed, in the semiotic-functional framework set up in this chapter, **macro-stratification**, i.e. a type of stratification which has been defined [cf. Section 2.2.2 §I] in general as a contextualizing relationship between language and non-linguistic reality. In this sense, the relationship between an interpersonal speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar on the one hand, and that between an experiential ontological semantics and lexicogrammar on the other hand are regarded as semiotically similar. Yet, it should be emphasized at this point that this similarity holds only on a primary, macro-level – the level which is being considered in the present chapter – which focusses on the *contextualizing* role of ‘semantics’, and its relationship to *non-linguistic* context in general. However, beyond these two shared features, it should be kept in mind that, in contrast to the distinction of an ontological semantics, the distinction of an interpersonal semantics is *not* based on Hjelmslev’s primary interpretation of the form–substance–purport differentiation. The most important consequence of this difference is that the interpersonal semantic stratum, defined as a second-order content-plane in its own right, intrinsically *incorporates* a dimension of linguistic form (i.e. formalized

speech-functional and connotative meanings), whereas the experiential ontological semantics, defined as a content-substance, is by definition *distinct* from experiential linguistic form.

The different nature of the interpersonal speech-functional semantics and the experiential ontological semantics will be important in clarifying the differential treatment, in terms of stratification, of the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions in SFL [cf. Section 3 below]. The peculiarity of the interpersonal semantics as a second-order content-plane which incorporates a dimension of form will be further explored in Part III [esp. Chapter 8], when we look in more detail into the formal organization of language in relation to its lexicogrammatical core. At this point, we will further concentrate on the general nature of the link between a speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar in terms of the semiotic relationship of macro-instantiation.

As we have seen above, macro-stratification is based on a relationship of variation in two directions. This equally pertains to the two directions of the relationship between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar, as summarized in Figure 5-12.




Figure 5-12 · The relationship between the interpersonal semantics of **SPEECH FUNCTION** and lexicogrammar: Variation in two directions

The notion of *macro-instantiation* theorizes the direction from lexicogrammar to speech-functional semantics: variant speech-functional meanings of an expression are macro-instantiations of its lexicogrammatical meaning appearing in the framework of a speech interaction.⁵³ For example, a construal characterized as MOOD: indicative > interrogative, such as *Could you come here for a moment?*, can have variant instantiations at the level of speech-functional semantics: it can be instantiated as a ‘question’ (request for information), or it can be instantiated as a ‘command’ (request for goods-&-services). The reverse of the semiotic relationship of macro-instantiation, as we have seen above, is *construal*. In this sense, a type of speech-functional meaning can be construed in variant lexicogrammatical ways. For example, the speech functional meaning ‘command’ can be construed by an expression of the lexicogrammatical type MOOD: imperative (2a) or by an expression of the type MOOD: indicative > interrogative (2b):

- (2) a. *Come here!*
 b. *Could you come here for a moment?*

Due to the connotative, second-order nature of the interpersonal semantics of speech function, the notion of ‘variant construals’ in the interpersonal metafunction is also linked to variability in terms of metafunctional diversity: as we have seen above, interpersonal, speech-functional meanings can be construed by interpersonal and/or by experiential lexicogrammatical means. As has been cursorily noted above,⁵⁴ these two general metafunctional types of construal will be termed **designation** (experiential) and **indication** (interpersonal): a speech-functional meaning can be *indicated* in various ways by interpersonal lexicogrammatical means, and in addition, it can also be *designated* in various ways by experiential grammatical means, such as the expression *would like*, and the participant roles assigned to *you* and *I* in the following example:⁵⁵

⁵³ ‘A speech interaction’ does not refer to one particular instance of a speech interaction, but to the general context of a speech interaction as such, as different from lexicogrammar per se.

⁵⁴ Cf. note 49, p. 309 above, and also the previous chapter.

⁵⁵ It will be noted that this example is an instance of interpersonal grammatical metaphor, and hence points to the characterization of this type of metaphor as a designation (rather than indication) of interpersonal meaning. We will return to this possible characterization

(3) *I would like you to come here for a moment.*

As we have seen in connection with the experiential ontological semantics, the semiotic relationship of construal refers to what Hjelmslev calls the relation of ‘being a sign for’ something: an experiential meaning which is formalized in the system of a language is a sign for a (quasi-universal) ontological meaning. I would argue that, in the same sense, a lexicogrammatical expression (both with its interpersonal and experiential aspects) is a sign for an interpersonal speech-functional meaning. In this vein, I propose that Hjelmslev’s notion ‘be a sign for’, which characterizes the relationship between a *sign*, defined as a solidary content–expression coupling, and what lies outside the sign, can be extended to the concept of a second-order semiotic system. Hjelmslev’s characterization of the ‘be a sign for’-relationship focusses on a basic, denotative semiotic system, and in such a system, what lies outside the sign is substance–purport: in this sense, Hjelmslev’s content–expression coupling *is a sign for* a content-substance, and *a sign for* an expression-substance. However, in the broader perspective of a second-order semiotic system, such as a connotative semiotic, what lies outside the primary sign is also the second-order semiotic plane: in the case of connotative semiotic, this is the second-order content plane. These two types of relationship of ‘be a sign for’ are visualized in Figure 5-13.

of interpersonal grammatical metaphor in Part IV (where it will be argued that this characterization as such does not *explain* the nature of interpersonal metaphoricity).




Figure 5-13 · Hjelmslev's relationship of 'be a sign for' extended to the notion of a connotative semiotic

2.2.4 The complementarity between interpersonal indication and experiential designation in the architecture of language

In the two preceding sections [2.2.2 and 2.2.3], two types of macro-semantics have been defined in relation to the two major metafunctions in SFL: an experiential ontological semantics, and an interpersonal speech-functional semantics. An important aspect about the relationship between these two types of 'meanings' in the overall architecture of language needs to be noted.

We have seen that ontological meaning and speech-functional meaning are related to the internal structure of language in different ways: whereas the former is a 'pure' content-substance, which is related to the content-form of the internal structure of language; the latter has been defined as a second-order, content plane in a connotative semiotic relationship in which the internal structure of language serves as an expression plane. The ways in which language construes ontological meaning on the one hand and speech-functional meaning on the other hand have been called designation and indication. An important result of this difference between two types of construals – a result which is connected to the difference in the semiotic organization of the interpersonal and experiential architecture of language – is that, on the one hand, any type of 'meaning' can be designated in

language, including interpersonal meanings, and, on the other hand, because it is related to language in terms of an overarching, second-order content plane, an interpersonal, connotative meaning can be indicated by any type of linguistic sign in language, including experiential signs. We will not further look into this feature of the complementarity between the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions – a feature which appears by taking an external perspective on language focussing on its architectural organization, since it will be taken up again in relation to grammatical metaphor in part IV below.

3 Summary and conclusions

In this chapter we have focussed on the relationship between a ‘semantics’ and a ‘lexicogrammar’, and the various ways in which such a relationship can be defined, without yet taking into account the internal organization of lexicogrammar. In this way, we have arrived at a picture of what can be called the outer edges of a semiotic-functional model of language. Figure 5-14 gives an overview of the types of semantics, and the different types of semiotic relationships which have been distinguished in this chapter.

Taking as a starting point Halliday’s explanation of his stratified model of language in terms of an ‘internal stratification of a content plane’, and the observation that, in this view, ‘semantics’ must be defined in terms of Hjelmslev’s ‘content-substance’, three major types of ‘meaning’, and hence ‘semantics’ have been distinguished: *collocational meaning*, *ontological meaning* and *speech-functional meaning*. In the process of defining these semantics, two further types ‘meaning’ in language have been specified, viz. *constructional formal meaning*, representing the systemic side of lexicogrammar, and *elemental formal meaning*, or sense, representing the systemic side of lexis as such.




Figure 5-14 · Different types of ‘semantics’ and semiotic relationships, focussing on the outer edges of a semiotic-functional model of language

These various types of semantics have a different bearing on the notion of ‘stratification’. The distinction of a collocational semantics does not constitute a basis for stratification: the relationship which holds between lexicogrammatical semantics and collocational semantics is the relationship of delicacy, which is one type of instantiation or schematicity. Because a collocational semantics can be incorporated into a formal description of

language (in that for each collocational set a collocational pattern can be defined, and hence the notion of collocation itself can be organized into a formal system of meaning–form couplings), the relationship which is at stake here is called *micro*-instantiation.

The delineation of an ontological meaning and speech-functional meaning on the one hand, and constructional formal meaning and elemental formal meaning on the other hand, do form a basis for stratification, but each in different ways. The relationship between constructional formal meaning and lexicogrammatical (functional) structure, and the parallel relationship between elemental formal meaning and lexemes is completely internal to language in is therefore called *micro*-stratification. As has been noted, a further exploration of this type of stratification is reserved for Part III, when we look into the internal organization of language focussing on lexicogrammar.

The relationship between an ontological semantics and the internal structure of language, and between a speech-functional semantics and this internal structure, has been called *macro*-stratification, and hence these two types of semantics are referred to in general as macro-semantics. The relationship between macro-semantics and the internal structure of language has been defined in general as a contextualizing relationship between language and extra-linguistic reality. Although ontological meaning and speech-functional meaning can be defined in terms of a general relationship of macro-stratification, the precise nature of their link with the internal structure of language is different. Ontological semantics is a ‘pure’ content-substance in Hjelmslev’s sense, whereas speech-functional semantics has been regarded as constituting a connotative content plane which is ‘superimposed’ on the internal structure of language in a connotative semiotic. As such, i.e. as a separate semiotic plane in its own right, speech-functional semantics is not a pure content-substance, but incorporates a content-form.

In comparison to the other types of semiotic relationships which hold within the *internal* structure of language (such as micro-stratification and micro-instantiation), both ontological meaning and speech-functional meaning are defined as belonging to an external perspective on language. The organization of these two types of semantics, and their relationship to the internal

structure of language has been called the architecture of language. Importantly, it has been argued that this relationship involves variation in two directions. One direction, from lexicogrammar to these types of semantics is called ‘macro-instantiation’ – this is another type of instantiation or schematicity (in contrast with micro-instantiation or delicacy), also generally called actualization [as defined in general terms in Chapter 1]. It is important to emphasize this aspect of macro-stratification, since in the general systemic-functional view, ‘stratification’ is only theorized in terms of realization, not instantiation.

The reverse of actualization is called construal. The notion of construal refers to the relationship ‘be a sign for’, which is also defined in Hjelmslev’s theory of language, and which, in the view which is taken here, has been extended to the concept of a connotative semiotic. The way in which the internal structure of language construes ontological meaning and speech-functional meaning is again different, due to the semiotic nature of the link between these meanings and formal meaning (as content-substance, or as a second-order content plane, respectively). The construal of ontological meaning, which is linked to the experiential metafunction, is called designation, whereas the construal of speech-functional, interpersonal meaning is termed indication.

Designation and indication are related to the two general types of signs which have been defined in the previous chapter, in Peircean terms, symbol and index. In this way, the general organization of the interpersonal and experiential architecture of language is reflected in the notions of denotation and connotation which have been characterized in the previous chapter in connection with lexical signs.

Now the different stratified models which have been proposed in SFL, especially the contrast between an extended stratification model for the experiential metafunction, and an enhanced stratification model, with a separate network representing a speech-functional semantics, can be clarified in terms of the semiotic re-interpretation of ‘stratification’ proposed in this chapter. As indicated in the introduction to this and the previous chapter, an understanding of the way in which Halliday has modelled the ontogenesis of language – the framework in which the enhanced stratification mode for the

interpersonal component was first introduced – can aid in such a clarification of the differential treatment of the interpersonal and experiential meta-functions.

The key to explaining why, in the basic stage of SFL,⁵⁶ the interpersonal metafunction has been modelled with a separate semantics with its own system network network (viz. that of SPEECH FUNCTION) in addition to the lexicogrammatical network of MOOD, while the experiential component is regarded in terms of one major network (viz. TRANSITIVITY)⁵⁷ lies in the status of ‘form’, in the Hjelmslevian sense, in relation to speech-functional meaning and ontological meaning. In this chapter, it has been argued that, as a connotative content plane, *speech-functional semantics* has its own facet of form, since a form–substance–purport differentiation inheres in any semiotic plane, also a connotative content plane. It is in this sense that a network of SPEECH FUNCTION can be set up, which can be related to the lexicogrammatical network of MOOD in terms of content–expression couplings: each option in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION can be linked to an option in the MOOD system with which it enters in a solidary sign relationship. For example, ‘command’ is linked to imperative, ‘question’ is linked to interrogative, and so on. These relationships between SPEECH FUNCTION and MOOD are based on the dimension of form which inheres in speech-functional semantics.

However, a speech-functional semantics is also inherently a connotative content plane. As such, speech-functional meanings can by definition be construed in different ways. Therefore, the content–expression couplings ‘command’–imperative, ‘question’–interrogative and so on indicate default couplings: due to the inherent relationship of variation between a connotative content plane and its expression plane, each of the connotative contents (‘command’, ‘question’, etc.) can be linked to different expressions. In the

⁵⁶ It should be kept in mind that the difference in the systemic-functional treatment of the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions only holds for the second stage in SFL, which has been referred to as its basic stage. As has been indicated in Chapter 3, in a third stage (1990s onwards), a separate semantic network was also proposed for the experiential metafunction. This proposal, which is intrinsically linked to the conception of experiential grammatical metaphor, will be briefly looked at in Part III [esp. Chapter 8].

⁵⁷ As we have seen in Chapter 3, the network of TRANSITIVITY can then either be regarded as lexicogrammatical, or as constituting the ‘semantic’ stratum in the experiential component of language.

terminology introduced in this chapter, it can therefore be said, for example, that 'command' can also be indicated by an interrogative (*Could you open the door?*) or a declarative (*I would like you to go now*).

In contrast to speech-functional semantics, *ontological semantics* does not incorporate a facet of form. Rather, it is itself defined as a content-substance which is related to the content-form of language through the semiotic relationship of schematicity. In a strict view, which is a Hjelmslevian view, and which was also the view taken in structuralism in general, as we have seen above, in this view ontological semantics is considered not belong to the formal description of language, and hence it is in principle not to be regarded as a part of linguistics. This was also Firth's view, and consequently, Halliday's view, especially in the first stage of SFL, when he presented his scale-and-category model of language. Indeed, as has been noted above, a collocational semantics was proposed in the London school of structuralism as an alternative to ontological semantics. In this perspective, a single network of TRANSITIVITY, which, towards its most delicate end incorporates a collocational semantics, in the basic stage in SFL, is regarded as the single necessary network to account for experiential formal meaning.

Let us finally consider the way in which Halliday explains the emerging notion of a complementarity between experiential and interpersonal meta-functions in the development of language. What Halliday describes as the interpersonal component of adult language is theorized as emerging from the most general options in the proto-linguistic system of the very young child, such as 'initiation' and 'response', which are already present in the very first stage of ontogenesis, or 'demand', 'command', 'greeting', and so on. These options are highlighted in Figure 4-1 in Chapter 4 [cf. p. 179ff above] by pink boxes. In the transition into adult language, these options are theorized as very general functions in language, which can be expressed in various ways.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ That these functions are conceived of in a very general sense, is also shown by the fact that the overall function of the experiential component of language (the reflective component), which is termed *mathetic* in transition phase, is in fact incorporated as a feature in the overall semantic network of SPEECH FUNCTION, where it lies at the basis of the combined features 'giving' + 'information'. The double nature of information (both interpersonal and experiential), which has been dealt with in detail in Chapter 5, is very relevant in this respect.

In this sense Halliday's explanation of the emergence of an interpersonal metafunction emphasizes the general, overarching nature of the semantic network of SPEECH FUNCTION, which can be linked to its semiotic definition presented in this chapter in terms of a second-order, connotative content plane.

With regard to the experiential metafunction, the general analysis of the transition phase which has been presented in Chapter 5 illustrates the fact that the form–substance dimension constitutes a basis for stratification in the experiential component. This observation holds for each of the stratal perspectives which have been taken in this analysis:

(1) In relation to the perspective 'from above', which focusses on the general, semantic-functional complementarity between the experiential and interpersonal components: the general characterization of the experiential component as that facet of language which brings out the '*in-formāre*' aspect of the notion of 'information' highlights the fact that specific contents are created through a semiotic process of 'formation'.

(2) In relation to the perspective 'from below', which focusses on the appearance of lexis in the development of language, it is especially the notion of symbolic signs which is important. The concept of a standardized 'form' which can be manifested in different usages is germane to explaining the new level of word-signs which characterizes the transition into adult language: as we have seen in Chapter 5, the new level of lexis appears precisely then, when children have internalized the conception that they themselves can 'mean', i.e. when they have learnt that they can create new meanings – meanings which will be inherently meaningful to an interlocutor,⁵⁹ by using the standardized word-forms of a language. In the analysis in Chapter 5, these new adult word-forms – and particularly their semiotic nature compared to the earlier iconic signs of proto-language – have been

⁵⁹ That is, in contrast to the iconic expressions used earlier in proto-language, as expressions which *stand for* an immediate perception (mathetic component) or an immediate desire for an object or action (pragmatic component), and equally in contrast to the later expressions – referred to as proto-symbols above – used in a mathetic context to *represent* (rather than *construe*) (present or past) experience which is/has been shared with the interlocutor [See Chapter 5].

characterized as symbolic-indexical signs. It has been argued that, as word-signs, the new lexemes are first and foremost *symbolic* or experiential signs, whose meanings, and hence the basis of their potential to construe experience, are established in the symbolic system of a particular language. The symbolic nature of word-signs highlights the relevance of the form–substance contrast in relation to the experiential component of language.

Part III

Modelling lexicogrammar

This part constitutes the second stage in the study of the systemic-functional model of language and the presentation of a semiotic-functional model, in which we will look at more specific kinds of aspectualizing dimensions in SFL which are associated with the central stratum of lexicogrammar in language: especially the system–structure dimension, delicacy, the notion of different metafunctional modes of expression, the relation between grammatical class and grammatical function and the rank scale.

This part consists of three chapters:

In **Chapter 6**, lexicogrammar is explored in terms of the relation between system and structure, focussing on two themes: the organization of system networks, and the different modes of expressions which characterize the different metafunctions.

Chapter 7 turns to grammatical metaphor, as involving variation in lexicogrammar, which has been theorized, either in combination with the idea of a variation in ‘semantics’, or in terms of ‘alternative realizations’ of the ‘same’ ‘meaning’. It gives an overview of the introduction of the notion of grammatical metaphor in SFL, paying special attention to the background

which made the introduction of such a concept possible or even necessary in the systemic-functional model.

In **Chapter 8**, the central core of the semiotic-functional model whose basis has been set up in Chapter 5 will be specified, concentrating on the internal structure of language. This is linked to an assessment of the systemic-functional treatment of grammatical metaphor, and recent developments in mainstream SFL (Stage III).

Chapter 6

Modelling lexico-grammar: delicacy and metafunctional modes of expression

As has been announced in the introduction to Part III, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the internal organization of lexicogrammar as it has been modelled in SFL in terms of the system–structure relationship. It therefore concentrates on two themes: (1) the organization of the *system networks*, especially in relation to the notion of delicacy as it has been conceived of in the different metafunctions, and (2) the *structural realization* of systemic features, especially the notion of distinct metafunctional modes of expression ('particle, wave, field'). In keeping with the approach to metafunctional diversity which has been set up in Part II, we will mainly focus on the complementarity between the two major metafunctions, interpersonal and experiential.

This chapter is organized as follows. In **Section 1**, we will consider a general difference in the set-up of experiential and interpersonal networks, in relation to the notions of agnation and enation. The experiential and interpersonal components will be explored in more detail in **Sections 2** and **3**. For each metafunction, we will look at the organization of the networks, and the characteristic structural pattern of realization.

The major experiential and interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems which are at issue here are summarized in Table 6-1. This table represents the relevant area from Halliday's rank–function matrix as proposed in 1970, augmented with more delicate systems as presented by Matthiessen [1993a].

Rank	Class	Interpersonal systems	Experiential systems
Clause		MOOD > MOODFULNESS > INTERPERSONAL STATUS > MOOD TYPE > MOOD PERSON > CLAUSAL DEICTICITY > temporal: PRIMARY TENSE > modal: MODALITY MODAL ASSESSMENT	TRANSITIVITY > PROCESS TYPE > AGENCY > TYPE OF CONSTRUAL MINOR TRANSITIVITY
Group	verbal	(grammatical) PERSON FINITENESS	PHASE + verb classes [EVENT TYPE]
	nominal	<i>NOMINAL DEICTICITY</i> > NOMINAL MOOD (= MINI-MOOD) > NOMINAL PERSON > MODAL POST-DETERMINATION ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION	MODIFICATION: > QUALIFICATION > CLASSIFICATION > EPITHESES > QUANTIFICATION + noun classes [THING TYPE]
	adjectival	<i>MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION</i>	+ adjective classes [QUALITY TYPE]
	adverbial gr. and prep. phrase	classes of interpersonal Adjuncts	[CIRCUMSTANCE TYPE]
Word		CONNOTATION	DENOTATION

Table 6-1 · Major types of interpersonal and experiential lexicogrammatical systems¹

¹ Items indicated by “+” are mentioned in brackets by Halliday [1970, 1973a]. The more delicate systems (preceded by >) are based on Matthiessen [1993a]. The system termed TYPE OF CONSTRUAL is based on Davidse’s [1991, 1992b] work on transitivity vs. ergativity; other systems indicated in italics represent areas which are proposed as additional interpersonal systems in the present work. The motivations behind these additional systems will be briefly indicated when they are introduced in the course of this chapter.

It should be noted that **deixis** has been treated in different ways in SFL. Focussing on the two authors on which this table is based, the variety can be outlined as follows. Halliday [1970, and throughout his work] places DEIXIS in the **textual** component. In his analysis, deictic elements occur as Deictics in the nominal group, or as relative adverbs in adverbial groups (e.g. *however late*). The deictic nature of these elements is explained in terms of a “general sense of ‘identity to be retrieved elsewhere’” [Halliday 1994/1985: 51], and “a form of orientation by reference to the speaker” [ibid.: 181]. The reason for regarding deictic elements as textual are twofold. First, they are obligatorily thematic: a relative or interrogative group or phrase obligatorily functions as the Theme of a clause [ibid.], a Deictic functions as the [mini-]Theme of a nominal group [cf. also Matthiessen 1993a: 641]. Second, Deictics are related to the textual system of REFERENCE (dealing with types of phoricity: personal | demonstrative | comparative and anaphoric | cataphoric | exophoric | homophoric) [Halliday 1994/1985: 312].

1 Agnation and enation: The differential treatment of the metafunctional components

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the system network is regarded as the major formalization in SFL to represent both the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes in language: the paradigmatic axis is indicated in the relations between features in the network, while the syntagmatic axis is said to be represented in the structural realization statements which accompany (combinations of) paths of choices in a network. As has been noted, in this sense, the system network in general represents the paradigmatic variation between structural patterns in a language. It is on this paradigmatic, systemic dimension of the system network that we focus in the present section.

1.1 Gleason's concepts of 'agnation' and 'enation' and their relevance to SFL

It has been noted in Chapter 1 that the paradigmatic aspect of a system network is theorized in SFL in terms of the notion of *agnation*: different options in a network are regarded as agnates.² In order to come to an understanding of the role of 'agnation' in the set-up of a systemic-functional network, it is necessary to return to Gleason, who introduced the concept in 1963. As Davidse [1998a] has shown, by reconsidering the relationships

In Matthiessen's framework, DEIXIS is a system embracing two dimensions: (1) DETERMINATION, which is his label for the system organizing types of Deictics in nominal groups [Matthiessen 1993a: 368], and (2) DEICTICITY, which consists of the systems of PRIMARY TENSE (or temporal finiteness) and MODALITY (or modal finiteness). DEICTICITY as a system is regarded as **interpersonal**. DETERMINATION and POST-DETERMINATION in general are placed under the **textual** metafunction, although some facets of nominal Deictics are analysed as interpersonal (in terms of the systems of NOMINAL MOOD and NOMINAL PERSON, which will be explained below), and although some types of Post-Deictics are linked to modality, which is inherently interpersonal [Matthiessen 1993a: 702]. Matthiessen's systemic analysis further refines Halliday's theorizing on finiteness (theorized in general as interpersonal, whereas TENSE as a system is placed in the logical component in Halliday 1973e) and on deixis in the nominal group (although the system of DEIXIS is placed in the textual metafunction, Halliday also points to interpersonal dimensions of Deictics, especially when realized by possessive pronouns (relation to person) [Halliday 1994/1985: 191]).

² See, for example Halliday [1976g/1967: 182, 1973d/1972: 76, 1994/1985: 129, 344], Hasan [1996: 110ff]; Martin [1992b: 507, 560ff] extends the notion of 'agnation' to a theory of genre.

between features in systemic-functional networks in relation to Gleason's original sense of the concept of 'agnation', an important difference between the organization of experiential and interpersonal networks is revealed.

Gleason introduced the concept of 'agnation' in his 1963 textbook, *Linguistics and English Grammar*, which belongs to a generation of 'general-structuralist' textbooks (assembling the insights which had been achieved in the major schools of structuralism), which appeared in North-America and Europe from 1955–1965,³ on the verge of the emergence of smaller, more specific (post-)structuralist linguistic schools,⁴ and just before the rise of Chomskyan transformational-generative grammar in the US.⁵ In Gleason's book, the term agnation is proposed in combination with a complementary term called enation.⁶ Agnation and enation refer to two "contrasting types of relations [between structures, MT], neither of which can exist without the other" [Gleason 1965/1963: 199]. In a preliminary definition which will be further refined below, **enation** can be described as a relationship which holds between constructions which have, in Gleason's terms, "identical structures" [ibid.], as illustrated in the following examples:

- (1) a. *The dog bit the man.*

³ Other textbooks which belong to this 'generation' include: based on North-American structuralism: Hockett [1958], Gleason [1955], Nida [1960]; based on the London structuralist school: Robins [1964]; indicating the emerging new direction of a distinct European functionalist school: Martinet [1962, 1964].

⁴ These more specific schools include, in North-America, stratificational linguistics (to which Gleason also turned) [Lamb 1964, 1966; Gleason 1964; Lockwood (ed.) 1972] and tagmemics [cf. Brend (ed.) 1972]; in Europe, Halliday's scale-&-category theory of language, Martinet's Functional Grammar.

⁵ It is useful to consider the historical-intellectual context in which Gleason's notion of 'agnation' appeared: on the one hand, it is interesting to note that Gleason's concept of agnation appears as a particular interpretation of a more general structuralist tool, viz. that of mutation – an interpretation which can also be found, in a slightly different context, in Whorf's theory of language; on the other hand, it should be emphasized that Gleason's notion of agnation is different from Chomsky's 'transformation' (which, as Coseriu [1988: 233ff] has shown, can no longer be regarded as being based on structuralist principles).

⁶ Gleason [1965/1963: 199n] notes that the terms "are derived from Latin *enatus* 'related to the mother's side' and *agnatus* 'related to the father's side'".

b. *The cat ate the canary.*

[Gleason 1965/1963: 197]

Two sentences are regarded as structurally identical by Gleason “if the elements (say, words) at equivalent *places* in the sentences are of the same *classes*” [ibid.: 199]. In keeping with the distinction between functional structure and syntagmatic (class) structure,⁷ enation can preliminarily be defined as a relationship between constructions which have the same *syntagmatic structure*. In the examples given, the syntagmatic pattern which underlies the various enate sentences is NP ^ VP ^ NP.

Gleason defines **agnation** as a relationship between constructions which have “the same major vocabulary items” but “different structures” [ibid.]. Each of the following examples shows a pair of agnate sentences (\Leftrightarrow is Gleason’s sign to indicate agnation):

(2) a. *The dog bit the man.* \Leftrightarrow b. *The man was bitten by the dog.*

[Gleason 1965/963: 198]

(3) a. *The man seemed a stranger.* \Leftrightarrow b. *The man seemed to be a stranger.*

[Gleason 1965/963: 203-204]

According to Gleason, a difference in structure, which lies at the basis for recognizing a relationship of agnation, can be shown in various ways: “by differences in arrangements, in accompanying function words, or other structure markers” [ibid.: 202].

The interdependence between enation and agnation shows up if one no longer focusses on pairs of expressions in isolation. Agnation, Gleason claims, is “based on the pervading patterns of the language”; as such it does not only hold between isolated pairs of expressions, rather, it is “a recurrent thing, involving large numbers of sentences” [ibid.: 202]. In exploring large numbers of sentences, a recurrent, systematic relationship of agnation can only be defined on the basis of enation: it is a whole group of enate sentences which is agnate with another group of enate sentences, as shown in the following examples:

⁷ This distinction will further be highlighted in the course of Part III.

- (11) a. *He saw a stranger.* ⇔ d. *Did he see a stranger?*
 (12) a. *He seemed a stranger.* ⇔ d. *Did he seem a stranger?*

In order to capture the idea of degrees of enation, Gleason introduces the concept of **partial enation**: expressions can be enate to a certain extent, in that they may share certain (very general) types of agnates, such as the polar interrogative construction in (6), but not others (such as the passive construction in (5)).

Taking a systemic-functional perspective, it appears that the distinct groups of partial enates in (5), i.e. (5a)–(5c) versus (5d), are different in terms of their experiential structure, and furthermore, that their different behaviour in relation to different types of agnates (especially passivization) is determined by their experiential structure. More precisely, the example in (5d) is a middle construction, and hence it is not passivizable, since the active | passive contrast is only available for constructions of the effective type:⁸ the type of construal marked as effective is the entry condition for the sub-system of active | passive, as indicated in Figure 6-1.




Figure 6-1 · The system of VOICE

Considering the significance of Gleason's notions of agnation and enation in relation to the systemic-functional tool of a system network, two conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the illustration in Figure 6-1:

- (1) The *experiential* category 'effective' can be defined as a label for a *class* of constructions whose members are **enate** to the extent⁹ that they have a

⁸ And in a more limited sense, also pseudo-effective constructions.

⁹ In the strict sense, and from a more general perspective, this is a case of partial enation, since the category 'effective' contains further sub-categories which can again be distinguished

shared agnate pattern, viz. the passive construal. In the same sense, the ‘middle’ category is distinguishable on the basis of its impossibility to be passivized. The ‘pseudo-effective’ is intermediate in this respect, in that it allows only a marked ranged passive. These available or non-available agnate patterns are indicated in relation to the experiential categories in Figure 6-2.




Figure 6-2 · Experiential categories distinguished on the basis of agnation

(2) Conversely, the options ‘active’ and ‘passive’, which constitute a type of (sub-)system which is generally regarded in SFL as pertaining to the *textual* metafunction,¹⁰ are **agnates**: the recurrent, systematic relationship of agnation between them can be defined on the basis of a large class of ‘enate’ constructions for which the agnate variant patterns are available, viz. clauses of the effective type.

in terms of shared vs. non-shared agnation, as we will see below. As will be argued further on, the epithet *partial*, in ‘partial enation’ can be considered as superfluous in the experiential domain as a whole.

¹⁰ In this connection, it should be noted that the *systemic* representation of ‘general’ agnate systems, such as the textual ones, needs further exploration in SFL: on the one hand, they can be represented as general systems in a separate component of language, i.e. the textual component; on the other hand, they can be indicated as further sub-systems in the networks of the experiential metafunction, attached to the experiential option which serves as their entry condition, such as the option ‘effective’ in the experiential metafunction. It could be argued that the availability of ‘general’ textual and interpersonal systems in relation to experiential options needs further investigation in general. Another example which can be brought up in this context is the interpersonal option of imperative, which is only available to certain types of construals which can be specified in an experiential sense (in this case, in relation to the experiential notion of agentivity).

Davidse [1998a: 288–289] has revealed that the options in textual and interpersonal networks are related through agnation, whereas the categories in an experiential network are partially enate.¹¹ In this vein, interpersonal and textual options indicate very general types of construals which can be applied, as agnates, to larger or smaller classes of experiential sets of patterns, whereas experiential categories are groupings of enate¹² constructions, which can be defined on the basis of shared versus non-shared agnates. Hence, the design of interpersonal and textual networks is intrinsically different from that of an experiential network. Let us further explore these different types of networks in turn, starting with the interpersonal and textual ones.

¹¹ Davidse describes the experiential type of system network in terms of partial enation in combination with *non-enation*. She introduces the term ‘non-enation’ to refer to the relationship between constructions which “share hardly any or no agnates” [1998a: 283]. By incorporating a notion of ‘non-enation’, the concept of ‘enation’ is re-defined more strictly as a relationship of structural identity in the sense of *functional structure* only: in this conception, there has to be at least some shared (schematic) functional-structural pattern in order to talk of ‘partial enation’. In this perspective, then, the most schematic types of experiential categories – that is, those categories which constitute a primary level of delicacy in the experiential network, i.e. the options in the simultaneous systems of VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL – are regarded as *non-enate*, and more delicate distinctions are considered to be partially non-enate/partially enate [cf. Davidse 1998a: 297].

As has been hinted at above, there is one type of agnate which is shared by *all* types of experiential construals, viz. the polar interrogative. In this sense, types of construals which are similar only in terms of their *syntagmatic* structure, such as the examples based on the syntagm NP ^ VP ^ NP explored above (*The man seemed a stranger* and *The man saw a stranger*), are related through *partial enation* in Gleason’s sense. In this vein, *throughout* the experiential system pertaining to the clause rank, there can only be *partial* enation, since there is one basic pattern of agnation which is shared across the whole of this system as a kind of ‘root’ agnate. In fact, the nature of this ‘root agnate’ is intrinsically related to the general nature of the ‘experiential’ component at clause level: the minimum requirement for the construction of an experiential functional pattern is the presence of at least one participant which partakes in a process. In the interpersonal metafunction, this participant can be mapped onto the Subject role and hence a polar interrogative can be construed (even if this participant is only a ‘pseudo-participant’, such as ‘ambient *it*’ in *It is raining* ⇔ *Is it raining?* or *It’s getting late* ⇔ *Is it getting late?*).

¹² To the extent that all enation within the experiential domain is by definition *partial* enation [cf. the previous note], the epithet ‘partial’ will henceforth be left out.

1.2 The organization of textual and interpersonal networks

Above we have considered the textual agnation between active and passive, which is applicable only to construals of the effective type. Another type of textual system is illustrated in Figure 6-3.¹³




Figure 6-3 · The textual system of THEME
(indicating options for experiential Theme only)

The option unmarked theme indicates the default thematic construal which is available for any type of clausal syntagm (i.e. any type of experiential construal).¹⁴ Further distinctions within the textual network, although they

¹³ This network is a further interpretation of Matthiessen's textual network [1993a: 518ff; cf. also Halliday 1968: 204ff]. I have reorganized the possibilities in terms of two primary simultaneous systems, indicating options available for the TYPE OF THEME, and options available for the TYPE OF THEMATIC CONSTRUCTION.

The option theme identification refers to a type of structure which has been called thematic equative [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 40ff]. The feature theme predication characterizes a construction which has been referred to as a 'cleft sentence' in formal grammars; the type of Theme which is formed by this construction is called a predicated Theme [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 58ff].

¹⁴ Notice that this textual construal, which in this case does not indicate a possible type of construal (as was the case with the primary contrast between indicative and interrogative > polar in the interpersonal component), but rather *the* default type of thematic organization, is

are still available for very large classes of types of experiential construals, are restricted in terms of experiential functional structure. For example, the option non-subject participant theme is only available for non-middle construals, since in the middle construal there is only one participant which is by definition mapped onto the Subject, and hence also the Theme function.¹⁵

As a final illustration in relation to the textual metafunction, consider the textual category characterized by the combined features theme identification and process theme, as exemplified by *What the dog did was bite the man*.¹⁶ Within this textual category, further sub-classifications can be made according to two cross-cutting dimensions which are interrelated,¹⁷ viz.

- (1) the number and types of participants which are included in the nominalized Theme (i.e. which are combined with the periphrastic verb in the nominalization); and
- (2) the type of pro-verb which is used in order to represent the process in the nominalization (*do* or *happen*).

The following examples illustrate some of the possibilities and impossibilities in this area:

- (13) a. *The general marched the soldiers.*
- b. *What the general did was march the soldiers.*
- c. *?What the general did to the soldiers was march them.*
- d. *What the soldiers did was march.*
- e. *?What happened to the soldiers was that they marched.*

again linked up with the basic requirement of an experiential construal, i.e. the presence of at least one participant role, which can then be mapped onto the thematic function of Theme.

¹⁵ An exception here is the existential middle construction, where the Theme is mapped onto existential *there*, and not onto the only existential participant (i.e. the Existent).

¹⁶ Examples where the feature theme identification is combined with alternative types of themes (other than process theme) are: *Who broke the glass was the cat* (+ unmarked Theme (Theme/Subject)), *What John gave to his uncle was the letter* (+ non-Subject participant theme), *Where the man saw a stranger was near the bus stop* (+ circumstantial theme).

¹⁷ These dimensions are interrelated because it is only the nominalized theme with *happen* which allows a construal which does not incorporate a participant in the nominalization: *What happened was that the cat broke the glass*.

- (14) a. *The dog bit the man.*
 b. *What the dog did was bite the man.*
 c. *What the dog did to the man was bite him.*
 d. **What the man did was bite.*
 e. **What happened to the man was that he bit.*
- (15) a. *John sold the books.*
 b. *What John did was sell the books.*
 c. *What John did to the books was sell them.*
 d. **What the books did was sell.*
 e. *What happened to the books was that they sold.*

As has been shown by Halliday [1968: 196ff] and Davidsen [1992a], the applicability of the alternative types of textual agnates illustrated in the constructions (b)–(e) in the examples above depends on a number of experiential features, which pertain to both VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL (ergative vs. transitive, a distinction we will turn to below).




Figure 6-4 · The interpersonal system of MOOD

Finally, let us consider the interpersonal metafunction. Options in the interpersonal lexicogrammatical system of MOOD [cf. Figure 6-4] characterize types of constructions which again range from, on the one hand, constructions which are very general, such as the option interrogative > polar, which, as we have seen, is available for any type of clausal syntagm, to, on the other hand, constructions which are more restricted in their availability. A case in point illustrating the latter type, is the imperative. The imperative in the more

general sense is restrained in terms of participants involved, in that the expressed or implied Subject (or Mood person [cf. Matthiessen 1993a: 423]) must be of a first person or second person participant:

- (16) imperative > suggestive
 ↘ Subject = 'me and you'
Let's go!
- (17) imperative > oblativ
 ↘ Subject = 'me'
Let me go now.
- (18) imperative > jussive
- a. implicit
 ↘ implied Subject = 'you'
Go to school now.
 - b. explicit
 ↘ Subject = 'you'
You go to school now!

The 'imperative' in the narrower sense (i.e. jussive with implied Subject) is even more restricted in its availability, as shown in the following examples:

- (19) a. *Be brave!*
 b. **Be old.*
- (20) a. *Don't be disappointed by the results.*
 b. *?Be surprised by the results.*
 c. **Be given a present for your birthday.*
- (21) **Seem a stranger.*

In the traditional account [e.g. Quirk et al. 1985: 827], the applicability of the jussive has been linked to whether or not the process can be given a *dynamic* reading: it is only dynamic constructions which can occur with the imperative > jussive mood. Dynamicity vs. stativity of processes has to do with their Aktionsart (which is part of their lexical meaning or sense [cf. Chapter 5]) and with the types of participants which are involved (especially in terms of aspects such as 'potency' or 'agency', and 'consciousness'). Again, these types of meanings belong to the experiential component of language, and

hence, the availability of the jussive mood can be specified in terms of experiential features.

1.3 The organization of an experiential network

Further exploring the heuristic value of agnation in relation to the experiential component, within the set of examples which has been used above, more specific sub-categorizations can be distinguished, for example within the category 'effective', on the basis of the following patterns of agnation:

- (22) b. **The dog made the man bite.* a. *The dog bit the man.* c. **The man bit.*
- (23) b. *The cat made the glass break.* \Leftrightarrow a. *The cat broke the glass.* \Leftrightarrow c. *The glass broke.*

The different agnation relationships in these examples show that (22) and (23) belong to different sub-classes within the group of effective construals: they are what Davidse [1992, 1999] calls transitive (22) versus ergative (23) construals. Within the experiential network as a whole, this contrast cross-cuts the distinction between effective, pseudo-effective and middle, and hence constitutes another sub-system which is simultaneous with VOICE. This system can be termed TYPE OF CONSTRUAL, as shown in Figure 6-5.¹⁸

¹⁸ The categories which indicate the possible interlockings between VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL are termed by Davidse [e.g. 1992, 1999] as follows:

	Transitive construal	Ergative construal
Effective voice	Transitive	Ergative
Middle voice	Intransitive	Non-ergative
Pseudo-effective voice	Ranged construction	Setting construction

In what follows, the category of pseudo-effective within the system of VOICE will not be further taken into account. In order to distinguish between the sense of 'transitive' as indicating a TYPE OF CONSTRUAL (contrasting with ergative), and the sense of 'transitive' as indicating a type of VOICE (contrasting with intransitive) within the category of a transitive construal, I will use subscripts: transitive_c and transitive_v, respectively; and similarly, ergative_c and ergative_v.




Figure 6-5 · Primary interdependent systems in the experiential network

The illustration in (22) and (23) shows another important feature of the organization of the experiential network which needs to be mentioned. The types of agnates which are used as ‘tests’ in order to define experiential categories in this illustration are two types of *alternations*:¹⁹ on the one hand, a periphrastic construction with *make* (examples b), on the other hand, a kind of alternation which is ‘inherent’ in the ergative_c construal, in that the lexical verb is retained, as such,²⁰ as process, but only the participant constellation is changed (example 23c). In comparing the three types of constructions in (23), it will be noted that two of them can be regarded as causatives (23a and 23b), which, using a traditional terminological distinction, can be referred to as an analytic causative (i.e. the periphrastic form in (23b)) and a synthetic causative (23a). The interrelationships between the three forms in (23) are of the agnation type, since across these three types of constructions, the lexical content verb *break* is kept constant.²¹

Now, importantly, the agnation relationship between examples (23a) and (23c) pertains to the contrast between effective and middle *within* the group of ergative_c construals, which, within the ergative_c domain, can be further specified as ‘ergative_v’ and ‘non-ergative’ respectively [cf. Davidse 1992, 1999]. In other words, within the ergative_c domain, the categories effective and middle do not indicate enate groups of construals, as is the case in the transitive_c domain (as we have seen above), but rather, they are agnates.

This means that, in relation to the organization of the experiential lexicogrammatical network, the notion of ‘agnation’ has a double role.

¹⁹ The notion of alternation will be further specified below [Section 2.1.2].

²⁰ I.e. without additional, periphrastic causative verbs such *make*, *let* or *cause to*.

²¹ We will return to the different types of agnation relationships involved in the examples in (23) in Section 2.1.2 below.

- (1) On the one hand, agnation can be used as a heuristic in order to define experiential categories. For example, the passive type of construal is a type of agnate which is only available for the group of ‘effective’ construals, and hence marks off this group as a category.
- (2) On the other hand, certain types of systemic differentiations in the experiential component indicate a variation between construals which is of the agnation, rather than enation, type, in that the process lexeme is kept constant across these different construals. This has been illustrated with regard to the effective | middle contrast within the category of ergative_c construals. It can be argued that such a type of *experiential agnation* is based on the grammaticalization of a type of alternation within a certain group of lexemes, such as ergative_c processes.²²

In this section as a whole, we have encountered three types of agnates which can be used as ‘tests’ in order to define experiential categories: textual agnates (e.g. passivization and various types of construals defined in the system of THEME), interpersonal agnates (e.g. imperative), and alternations (such as a periphrastic causative). In view of the further discussion in Part IV below, one additional type of agnate should be mentioned which serves as a heuristic in relation to experiential categorization, viz. nominalization:

- (24) a. *John wrote the letter.*
 b. *The writing of the letter.*
 c. *The writing of John.*

²² The fact that, in the ergative_c domain the variation between effective and middle constructions is of the agnation rather than enation type is due to the cyclical model of causation which is inherent processes of the ergative_c type, as Davidse [e.g. 1998a: 296] has shown. In other words, in ergative_c processes, two cycles of causation are grammaticalized: an ‘inner’ obligatory cycle which marks the relationship between the ergative_c participant (Medium) and the process (*The boat was sailing*), and a second cycle which is optional, and which indicates the external instigation of the ergative_c process by a second participant (Agent) (*Mary sailed the boat*).

The transitive_c type of construal does not incorporate a similar cyclical model of causation, i.e. the notion of cycles of causation is not grammaticalized in the transitive_c type of process: external causation, in this domain, can only be indicated by periphrastic verbs (*cause to*, *make*, *let*).

The notion of grammaticalization in relation to agnate types of variation within the experiential domain needs further investigation. We will briefly return to this issue in Section 2 below.

- (25) a. *The cat broke the glass.*
 b. **The breaking of the cat.*
 c. *The breaking of the glass.*

This type of agnate alternative construal will be referred to as a *syntagmatic reconstrual* (because a clausal syntagm is reconstrued as a nominal syntagm).²³

1.4 Conclusion

This section has focussed on the role of Gleason's concepts 'agnation' and 'enation' in different types of networks as modelled in SFL. By way of conclusion, the following can be noted.

In the *interpersonal* and *textual* networks, the options are *agnates*: they are general types of possible construals, which can apply either to any kind of clausal syntagm (e.g. unmarked theme, polar interrogative) or to relatively large classes of structures which can be specified in terms of experiential features (e.g. the passive construal is available for effective structures).

In the *experiential* network, the relationship between the systemic features is either based on enation or on agnation. Features defined through *enation* are labels for classes of construals whose members are enate, in that they share certain types of agnate alternatives. For example, the categories *effective* and *middle* as sub-types of *transitive_c* construals, can be defined in terms of the availability vs. non-availability (respectively) of a passive agnate alternative. Types of agnates which can serve as 'tests' in order to define experiential categories include *interpersonal* or *textual* agnates, several types of *alternations*, and *syntagmatic reconstruals*.

Experiential agnation refers to a relationship of agnation between different types of construals which are available *within* one experiential category. The relationship between two or more sub-categories within an experiential feature is of the agnation type, when these sub-categories do not indicate subgroupings of classes of processes (which is largely the case with the categories

²³ It is obvious that these types of agnates can be related to the concept of experiential metaphor. The notion syntagmatic reconstrual (and its relation to agnation) will be dealt with in Part IV below.

effective and middle within the transitive_c category), but rather, when they indicate a variation between alternative construction types which are available to a whole class of processes (such as the categories effective and middle within the ergative_c category). Experiential agnates then refer to alternative types of construals which are grammaticalized possibilities inherent in a particular class of lexemes (e.g. ‘ergative_c verbs’: *The boat sailed* ⇔ *Mary sailed the boat*).

The interdependency between agnation and enation can be summarized as follows. Enation refers to the internal unity within a group of constructions, which can be set off from other groups of constructions in an overarching more general class, on the basis of their similar reaction to an agnation test – i.e. on the basis of the observation that a certain type of alternative pattern (an agnate) is applicable to that group of constructions but not to other groups. Agnation refers to the variation between alternative types of construals which are available in a particular environment, i.e. which are applicable to a certain class of constructions. Although both enation and agnation have to do with the grouping of similar phenomena into linguistic categories, their focus is different: agnation focusses on the applicability of certain construals (or a variation between construals) in a particular *environment*, whereas enation focusses on a *classification* of formal meanings (e.g. types of processes) from a general class into more specific sub-classes.

In the following two sections, the design of the experiential and interpersonal networks as modelled in SFL will be explored from a different perspective, focussing on the notion of delicacy. In this exploration, the differences and similarities between the two components, and the complementary relationship between enation and agnation will be further specified.

2 The nature of the experiential component

2.1 The organization of experiential lexicogrammatical systems: 'Delicacy' in the experiential component

2.1.1 Starting point: Criteria and methods for experiential categorization

The experiential component of lexicogrammar construes ontological meanings by means of configurations of processes, participants and circumstances, or nominals and their qualifications (e.g. Epithet · Thing). Focussing on the level of the clause (process configurations), categorization within the experiential domain thus has to do with three factors:

- (1) the inherent meaning of the *process*, including its (lexical) sense and its Aktionsart;
- (2) the *number of participants* involved, and
- (3) the *nature of the participants* involved, especially in terms of agentivity and affectedness (agenthood and patienthood), and related, more specific features such as potency, consciousness, animacy, intentionality or voluntariness (intentional vs. non-intentional, voluntary vs. involuntary action), and so forth.

Besides these general experiential classification criteria, and in interaction with these criteria, three 'techniques' can be used in the delineation of sub-categories in experiential grammar.

- (1) *Enation*: a grouping of constructions which are enate in that they share a particular type of agnate constructions (or more types of agnates). For example, the effective category within the transitive_c construction type can be distinguished on the basis of its possibility to occur in the passive voice.
- (2) *Experiential agnation*: a distinction between agnate construals *within* an experiential category. For example, the categories effective and middle are agnates within the category of ergative_c constructions: it is an inherent feature of an ergative_c process that it can occur in an effective or a middle voice (*The cat broke the glass* vs. *The glass broke*).
- (3) *Collocation*: the distinction between types of constructions in terms of different types of collocational patterns which occur with a particular type of process. For example, on the basis of corpus research Davidse &

Geyskens [1998: 171ff] define three collocational patterns for the ergative_c verb *spread* in terms of three classes of Mediums: “chemical substances” (liquids, gases, and so on; cf. example (26)), “infections and diseases” (27), and “‘contagious’ semiotic constructs” (*rumours, news*, and so on; cf. example (28)).

(26) *We had to stop the fire getting out of control and spreading.*

(27) *Scabies is spread by skin-to-skin contact.*

(28) *The news quickly spread.*

[all: Davidse & Geyskens 1997]

In the remainder of this section, we will consider the interaction between these categorization methods and the general criteria for experiential classification mentioned above, in order to explore how the notion of delicacy and hence, the idea of ‘lexis as most delicate grammar’, can be clarified in relation to the experiential component. First, we will look into the different types of groupings which are involved in the experiential network of TRANSITIVITY [Sub-section 2.1.2], and after that, the interdependence between these different types of groupings will be specified in an overall framework which highlights the relationship between lexis and grammar in the experiential component [Sub-section 2.1.3].

2.1.2 General types of experiential paradigms

In this chapter so far, only VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL have been mentioned as experiential systems [cf. also Figure 6-5 above]. In the experiential network as a whole (TRANSITIVITY), these two systems are simultaneous with a further system, viz. that of TYPE OF PROCESS, as shown in Figure 6-6 below.²⁴

²⁴ It should be noted that the *systemic* relationship between VOICE, TYPE OF CONSTRUAL and TYPE OF PROCESS has not been explored in detail in SFL. In a complete network, it should also be indicated in what way the simultaneous systems intersect, since not every option in one system (e.g. TYPE OF CONSTRUAL) is available for every option in another, simultaneous system (e.g. TYPE OF PROCESS). For example, the options *effective_v* (VOICE) and *transitive_c* (TYPE OF CONSTRUAL) are not available for existential processes (TYPE OF PROCESS), which are thus defined as non-effective and ergative_c [cf. Davidse 1991, 1999: 279].




Figure 6-6 · Simultaneous systems in the experiential component

The three general classification criteria and the three methods of sub-categorization mentioned in the previous sub-section play a different role in relation to the three major experiential systems, and lead to different types of ‘groupings’ or different types of paradigms in the experiential component in general. In this sub-section, we will concentrate on these different types of paradigms.

I TYPE OF PROCESS

Each of the primary options in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS indicates a separate class of process-lexemes, or *verb classes*. These classes, and further sub-divisions within them, are distinguished on the basis of the general classification criteria mentioned above, for example: the Aktionsart of the

verb, whether or not it can or normally does appear in the progressive tense (delineating mental processes, which only occur in a progressive construction in marked cases); the nature of participants which can enter into the process configuration, or more generally, the ‘complementation’ of the process (delineating mental and verbal processes, which can combine with projected clauses, in contrast to all the others).²⁵

To the extent that the categories in the system of type of process refer to completely distinct classes of processes which are realized in English in different lexemes, these categories indicate **lexicalized** distinctions in the English experiential component. However, these distinctions are grouped, especially towards the more schematic side, left side of the network (the primary categories) in terms of their grammatical ‘behaviour’. The *general* criteria which are used in order to determine this ‘grammatical behaviour’ (especially regarding agenthood and patienthood of the participants involved) shade into more specific criteria towards the opposite, right side of the network – until these criteria are specified in lexical terms, i.e. in terms of the lexical environment, or the collocational patterns into which a specific class of process, or even an individual process enters.²⁶ Hence, collocation, as a method of experiential categorization, only applies to paradigms which specify distinct verb classes, in the sense of distinct verbal lexemes. The system of TYPE OF PROCESS, however, is not the only experiential system which defines distinct verb classes, and neither is a differentiation into verb classes the only type of categorization which is involved in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS.

The distinctions in the systems of TYPE OF CONSTRUAL and VOICE cross-cut the verb classes distinguished in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS, and hence in this sense, the systems of VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL can be regarded as the most general systems in the experiential area. However, the role which these ‘general’ types of systems have within the overall organization of the

²⁵ For an elaborate overview of criteria which are used in order to define the categories within the system of TYPE OF PROCESS, see Matthiessen [1993a: 212ff], Halliday & Matthiessen [1999: 134ff].

²⁶ This approach is well illustrated in Hasan’s work [1987] on the lexicogrammar of dividing and scattering.

experiential network of TRANSITIVITY is twofold, and here we come to an intricate difficulty in the experiential component, which has to do with the continuum from grammar to lexis, and with the complex interaction between enation and agnation.

II VOICE

The system of VOICE can be dealt with in brief terms, at this point, since the different role of this system in relation to the transitive_c and ergative_c categories of constructions has already been noted above [Section 1.3] in explaining the notions of enation and agnation. As we have seen, in relation to the transitive_c type of construal, the VOICE distinction between middle and effective refers to a differentiation between two verb classes, i.e. two groupings of *enate* constructions: transitive_v verbs and intransitive verbs. In other words, within the class of transitive_c construals, the distinction between middle and effective voice is again a distinction which is **lexicalized** in English [cf. Davidse 1992b: 108], in that each transitive_c process either belongs to the middle category or the effective category. For example, *wait*, *arrive*, *go* belong to the middle (i.e. intransitive) class; *catch*, *like*, *give* belong to the effective (i.e. transitive_v) class.²⁷

In relation to the category of ergative_c construals, effective and middle constructions are *agnates*: they refer to two an experiential variation between two types of constructions which are available for each process of the ergative_c type. For example, for the ergative_c verb *break*:

- (29) a. Ergative_c middle, i.e. unergative
The glass broke.
- b. Ergative_c effective, i.e. ergative_v
The cat broke the glass.

The relationship of agnation between these two types of constructions refers to a **grammaticalized** possibility of experiential variation which is inherent in (and indeed, which defines) the experiential category of ergative_c construals.

²⁷ As Davidse argues, transitive_v processes which can occur without explicit Goal, such as *write* (*He kept writing*), *win* (*They won*), *enter* (*I saw them enter*) can still be regarded as inherently transitive_v, because a Goal is implied in these types of constructions: Davidse [1992b: 108] calls these constructions “inherently goal-directed”.

In Section 1 above, I have called the agnation relationship between examples such as (29a) and (29b) a type of *alternation*. In view of the further discussion in this chapter, this notion can now be further specified. An **alternation** can be defined in general as a relationship of agnation between two *different* types of transitivity constructions which, at a higher level in schematicity (i.e. a lower level of delicacy), belong to the *same* experiential category. ‘Belonging to the *same* experiential category’ means that at least one participant, who is the primary participant²⁸ in either one or both of the compared construction types, and its relation to the process are kept constant in the two alternating constructions.²⁹ The *difference* between two alternating transitivity constructions lies in the structure of their overall participant configuration.

A **grammatical alternation** will be defined as an alternation (in the sense just defined) between two constructions which have the *same lexical content*, especially the same lexical verb around which their participant configurations are built up. Hence, grammatical alternation corresponds to experiential agnation. It is useful to distinguish between two types of grammatical alternation, adapting a traditional terminological distinction. An **analytic grammatical alternation** is a grammatical alternation between two construction types which differ in terms of the addition of a periphrastic verb in one of them. This is the relationship which holds between the examples given in (29) above and the following constructions:

- (30) a. *The cat caused the glass to break.*
 b. *The cat made the glass break.*

The alternation between (29a) and (29b), then, is an instance of **synthetic grammatical alternation**. This can be defined as a grammatical alternation which only differs in terms of the participant configuration.

²⁸ The primary participant in a transitivity configuration is that participant which is mapped onto the Subject role in the interpersonal layer of structure.

²⁹ It will be noted that this is a less restrictive definition of experiential variation than agnation, since in agnation, a requirement is that the lexical content of the agnate constructions is kept constant.

III TYPE OF CONSTRUAL

Let us finally consider the system of TYPE OF CONSTRUAL. Here, we find a similar kind of double categorization role, defining lexicalized distinctions on the one hand, and a grammaticalized distinction on the other hand. However, the situation is more complex than with the system of VOICE considered above.

On the one hand, the system of TYPE OF CONSTRUAL distinguishes two groups of process-lexemes, i.e. two *verb classes*, which are defined as distinct because they have different agnates, as we have seen above. In this sense, for example, *break* belongs to the *ergative_c* class and *paint* belongs to the *transitive_c* class. Some of the categories distinguished by the system of TYPE OF PROCESS, which, as we have seen, equally indicate distinct *verb classes*, can be directly related to the *ergative_c | transitive_c* distinction. For instance, the class of existential verbs entirely belongs to the *ergative_c* category. In other cases, for example, with the material process type, the distinction between *ergative_c* and *transitive_c* constitutes a further sub-grouping of the process category defined in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS (cf. the two examples given above: *break* vs. *paint* are two different types of material processes). In this perspective then, the systemic contrast *transitive_c | ergative_c* refers to a distinction which is **lexicalized** in the English language, in that different sets of lexemes are used in order to construe *transitive_c* versus *ergative_c* process configurations.

On the other hand, however, there is also a type of *ergative_c* construction which indicates a general possibility for an alternative construal which is available for processes of the middle type (VOICE) and – this is significant – of the *transitive_c* category, i.e. ‘intransitive’ processes in the traditional sense.³⁰ Davidse [1992b: 121ff; cf. also Davidse & Geysels 1998] calls this type of *ergative_c* construction “instigation-of-action”. This is the type of construction which has been illustrated in example (13) above, which is repeated here together with other examples:

- (31) a. *The general marched the soldiers.*
 b. *The boss is working his secretaries from eight till six.*
 c. *Mother sat the baby up.*

[Davidse 1992b]

³⁰ Recall that, in an overall system combining VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL sub-systems, ‘intransitive’ refers to the combination of the options *transitive_c* (from TYPE OF CONSTRUAL) and middle (from VOICE) [cf. note 18, p. 344 above].

These constructions are agnate with the following intransitive clauses:

- (32) a. *The soldiers were marching.*
 b. *The secretaries work from eight till six.*
 c. *The baby was sitting up.*

In other words, the ergative_c ‘instigation-of-action’ construal is a type of synthetic causative which is available for intransitive processes. As such, the relationship between the examples in (29) and those in (30) is one of synthetic grammatical alternation, i.e. agnation. In these examples, the distinction ergative_c | transitive_c, which appears here more specifically as effective ergative_c | middle transitive_c, does not indicate a differentiation between distinct verb classes, but an agnation relationship which pertains to the category of middle transitive_c construals (i.e. intransitives). Instead of indicating a contrast which is lexicalized, in this perspective, the effective ergative_c | middle transitive_c contrast refers to a **grammaticalized** possibility which is inherent in the category of intransitives.

Concluding, the ‘general’ system of TYPE OF CONSTRUAL has a twofold role in the overall organization of the experiential system network. On the one hand, it indicates a distinction between different verb classes (i.e. groupings of *enate* constructions), and hence a distinction which is *lexicalized* in English (e.g. *break* vs. *paint*). On the other hand, the contrast ergative_c | transitive_c reappears, in a more specific form in combination with features from the system of VOICE, i.e. as effective ergative_c | middle transitive_c, as a contrast indicating a synthetic *grammatical* alternation, and hence a variation of the *agnation* type. The reason why this distinction between an ergative_c and a transitive_c type of pattern is of the agnation type, is because it incorporates the ergative effective | middle contrast, which indicates agnate constructions. Hence, this type of agnation involved in the ‘instigation-of-action’ construction, which combines the ergative_c | transitive_c contrast and the effective | middle contrast, can be analysed as in Figure 6-7.

Figure 6-7 shows that the cross-cutting systems of VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL, which are the most general systems in the experiential metafunction, further intersecting with the system of TYPE OF PROCESS, lie at the basis of two general types of categorization in the experiential component: on the one hand, a differentiation between three **general verb classes** or groupings of *enate* con-

structions (ergative_c verbs, transitive_v verbs and intransitive verbs), on the other hand, two **general patterns of agnation** or synthetic grammatical alternations: a VOICE alternation between ergative_v and non-ergative in within the ergative_c type of construal, and a hybrid type of alternation between effective ergative_c and middle intransitive.




Figure 6-7 · General agnation patterns and general verb classes in the experiential component

IV Further possibilities in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS

In the three preceding sub-sections [§ I–III], we have considered two general types of experiential categorization, viz. a distinction between different verb classes and a distinction between experiential agnates within one experiential category. These different types of categorization have mainly been described and illustrated in relation to the two ‘general’ systems of VOICE and TYPE OF CONSTRUAL, and primary distinctions within the system of TYPE OF PROCESS. Before we wind up this discussion of experiential paradigms, one further possibility must be noted with regard to the system of TYPE OF PROCESS.

The distinction between a categorization in terms of verb classes versus agnate structures is also relevant in relation to more delicate sub-systems within the system of TYPE OF PROCESS. A major type of grammatical alternation which we have considered above is the synthetic one between middle and effective in the category of ergative_c construals. Within this area, the alternation has to do with the number of inherent participants involved in the ergative_c process, and this alternation has been explained, in the framework of Davidse's model of ergativity, in terms of the cyclical model of causativity construed by ergative_c processes in general [cf. note 22, p. 17 above].

Similar kinds of alternations also occur in the area of transitive_c construals. In this area, the alternation does not have to do with the number of inherent participants, but rather, with the directionality of the transitive_c process. Such alternations can be specified in relation to transitive_c processes in the three major categories in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS, viz. material, relational and mental. We will not explore the different types of alternations in detail here; only a general extra possibility which we have not considered so far, but which is important in connection with the relationship between lexis and grammar, needs to be noted.

In Halliday's view, identifying relational processes (which are inherently transitive_c) designate a relationship of 'realization': "one element is as it were the realization of the other" [Halliday 1967b: 228]. Since realization is inherently a bidirectional relationship [cf. Chapter 1], the relationship between the two elements in an identifying process can also be construed in two directions: the realization relationship can either be "an observation about the semantics" or "an observation about the phonetics" of something. Davidse [2000: 22] calls these directions "expression", representing a relationship similar to that "from grammar to semantics, i.e. from "more concrete" to "more abstract"", and "motivation", representing a relationship similar to that "from semantics to grammar, i.e. from "more abstract" to "more concrete"". ³¹ The distinction between these two directions inherent in

³¹ Davidse, who has further explored the area of relational processes [cf. Davidse 1992a, 1996b, 2000] has defined two directional dimensions in identifying processes. Besides the one referred here, there is also a reversible relationship of identification, with two directions depending on which participant is Identified and which is Identifier.

identifying processes is indicated by different verb classes [cf. Davidse 2000: 22–23]: for instance, *express*, *represent*, *indicate*, *manifest*, *embody* are expression verbs, whereas *motivate*, *explain*, *account for* are motivation verbs. The difference can be illustrated as in the following examples:

(33) Expression

- a. *A circumstantial expression of Reason* [concrete] **represents** *the reason for which a process takes place* [abstract]. [Halliday 1985: 140]
- b. [...] *the end of the New* [abstract] is **marked by tonic prominence** [concrete] [Halliday 1985: 275] [Davidse 2000]

(34) Motivation:

- a. *The restructuring* [abstract] will **involve** *the transfer and lay-off of employees in U.S. operations* [concrete].
- b. *Rates* [concrete] are **determined by the difference between the purchase price and face value** [abstract]. [Davidse 2000]

In material processes belonging to the transitive_c type of construal, there is a comparable kind of alternation in the direction of the relationship between the second and third participants in the ditransitive sub-class, which is traditionally called ‘dative alternation’ [cf. Davidse 1996a]. Consider the following examples:

- (35) a. *I think you owe me an explanation.*
- b. *I owe €10 to her.*

Davidse [1996a: 119] has argued that only a limited number of verbs occur commonly in both types of construals. The majority of material ditransitive verbs show preferential tendencies to occur in either one or the other type of alternative: verbs which typically construe the prepositional variant include *administer*, *donate*, *contribute*, *extend*, *transfer*; while verbs such as *feed*, *give*, *offer*, *pay*, *sell* typically construe the nominal variant:

- (36) a. *We **donated** \$10 to the fund.*
- b. *He will **contribute** two chapters to the book.*
- (37) a. *I **sold** him my car.*
- b. *They **offered** her a job in the company.*

Let us finally consider the area of mental processes. A type of alternation involving the directionality of the process which is very clear in this area is the distinction between what are commonly called, in SFL, processes of the ‘please-type’ and processes of the ‘like-type’. In this case, the distinction is reflected in completely distinct verb classes [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 117]:

- (38) a. *The gift **pleased** Mary.*
 b. *The possibility of an earthquake **frightens** the inhabitants.*
- (39) a. *Mary **liked** the gift.*
 b. *The inhabitants **fear** the possibility of an earthquake.*

In this sub-section we have considered three types of alternations which indicate more delicate distinctions within the system of type of process: the variation between motivation and expression construals in identifying processes, the dative alternation in ditransitive material processes, and the distinction between processes of the please-type and processes of the like-type in mental processes. Each of these alternations indicates, to a higher or lesser extent, a difference which is lexically marked in English: either in terms of totally distinct verb classes (mental processes), or in terms of preferential tendencies which can be defined through extensive corpus research (dative alternation) (the alternation between expression and motivation in relational processes represents an intermediate case, involving both distinct lexicalizations (for some verbs), and preferential tendencies (for other verbs)).

The nature of the experiential paradigms which are involved here can now be further specified in relation to the other general types of experiential categorization distinguished above. The types of categorization we have looked at so far [§ I–III] are twofold: (1) on the one hand, a differentiation of distinct *verb classes*, as found in the primary classification in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS, and in the ‘general’ distinctions between ergative_c and transitive_c processes, and between transitive_v and intransitive processes within the transitive_c category [cf. Figure 6-7 above]; (2) on the other hand, a variation of the *agnation* type, termed grammatical alternation, as found in the ergative_v | non-ergative contrast within the ergative_c category, and in the alternation between an effective ergative_c (‘instigation-of-action’) and a middle transitive_c.

I would argue that the three cases of variation in the areas of material, relational and mental processes dealt with in this section indicate yet another type of experiential categorization, which is intermediate between the two general ones distinguished so far (distinct verb classes and experiential agnation).

On the one hand, to the extent that the patterns of variation in material, relational and mental processes are reflected in *different verb classes*, they are similar to the ergative_c | transitive_c and transitive_v | intransitive contrasts, and to the primary classifications in the system of TYPE OF PROCESS. On the other hand, the variations dealt with in this section have been referred to as *alternations*, and in this sense they are also similar to, for example, the relation between the middle and effective voice within the ergative_c category. However, the various patterns of variation within the domain of transitive_c construals cannot be considered as instances of agnation relationships, as is the case with the ergative_c | non-ergative contrast in the ergative_c domain, exactly because they involve *different lexical* realizations: as we have seen in Section 1, agnation is defined as a relationship between two construction types which have the *same* lexical content.

It is precisely for this reason – in order to accommodate the variation involved within the area of transitive_c construals into a general framework of types of experiential categorization – that I have introduced the term alternation above, and defined it more broadly than agnation. The types of variation involved in the material, relational and mental categories can now be termed lexical alternations. A **lexical alternation** is a type of alternation in that it indicates a variation between two types of transitivity constructions which belong to the same category at a higher level of schematicity. In other words, in these types of alternations, again, at least one participant and its relation to the process is shared by the two alternative patterns, and the difference between the two alternating constructions is a difference in the structure of their overall participant configurations. The specificity of lexical alternation in the transitive_c category lies then in the fact that *two* participants are shared by the alternative patterns (for example, *Senser* and *Phenomenon* in the mental category),³² and that the difference in structure refers to a difference in

³² In the area of mental processes, these are the roles of *Senser* and *Phenomenon*; in the area of relational processes, *Token* (agentive) and *Value* (patientive). In relation to the alternation

the directionality of the relationship between these two participants construed in the process. This type of alternation further contrasts to the relationship of grammatical alternation [cf. p. 354 above], in that it does not require that the process lexeme is kept constant across the alternative constructions.

2.1.3 Conclusion: Delicacy in the experiential component

The interdependence between the different types of experiential categorizations distinguished in the previous section can now be reconsidered in terms of their relation to the general notion of delicacy, by which the horizontal progression through a system network and the interaction between grammar and lexis are theorized in SFL.

One aspect of experiential categorization which is important in relation to the delicacy scale needs not much explanation here, since it has been

in the area of identifying processes, Davidsen has introduced two abstract participant roles which are similarly kept constant across the alternation, but which are related in terms of different directions in the two alternatives: *Implicans* (agentive) and *Implicatum* (patientive). These roles are defined by Davidsen as variants of the Token and Value roles in the relational category.

Notice that the participants which are related in terms of different directions in these three types of alternations are termed at different levels of abstraction in the mental domain on the one hand, and in the material and relational domains on the other hand. In the material and relational domains, *Implicans* and *Implicatum*, and *Token* and *Value* refer to the schematic roles of *Agent* and *Patient* which are inherent in transitive processes in general. Because they are defined at a high level of schematicity (the *Agent* or primary participant is the participant who is mapped onto the *Subject* role in the interpersonal layer of structure) these roles are kept constant – qua *Agent* and *Patient* – across the two alternative constructions in the alternation, for example, expression: *The end of the New (VI) is marked by tonic prominence (Tk)*, and motivation: *Rates (VI) are determined by the difference between price and value (Tk)*. In the mental domain, by contrast, the roles *Senser* and *Phenomenon* are more specific, and hence they also alternate across the different alternatives in the please | like alternation: the *Senser* is the agentive participant in the like-construction (*I liked the presentation*), while it is the patientive participant in the please-construction (*The presentation pleased me*). The equivalents of the mental roles termed *Senser* and *Phenomenon* in the other domains are, in the relational domain, the more specific roles of ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ participants (indicating two levels in the relationship of coding – these ‘roles’ are indicated in the examples (33)–(34) given above, cf. p. ref); and in the material domain of ditransitive processes, ‘possessed’ and ‘possessor’, as in *He sold me (possessor) his car (possessed)* vs. *We donated \$10 (possessed) to the fund (possessor)*. The relationship between different levels of schematicity in defining participant roles is an issue which needs further investigation in SFL.

explored in more detail in the previous chapter. This is the categorization method based on collocation, which is especially relevant at the more delicate end of the experiential network. As we have seen, this method is a refinement of (or a more delicate version of) the method based on grammatical criteria such as the nature of the agenthood, patienthood involved, in that it takes into account the lexical environment (and hence the lexical nature of the participants) into which a type of process can enter. In this way, very specific verb classes are distinguished.

Another aspect of experiential categorization which is relevant to the notion of delicacy, is the difference between categories which are distinct verb classes and categories which indicate possible alternations, and the area of overlap between these two types of categories. It is also in the interdependence between these different types of categorizations that the intricate interaction between grammar and lexis appears in the experiential area, albeit in a different guise than in the gradual increase in delicacy within verb classes (up to the classification into individual lexemes). The way in which different types of alternations, and the interactions between them, can be theorized in relation to the notion of delicacy is an area of study which deserves further attention in SFL. What is especially important here, is the complementarity between *lexical alternations*, indicating significant variations in the structure of process configurations which are lexicalized within one particular class of verbs, and *synthetic grammatical alternations*, which indicate similar variations which are grammaticalized within one particular class of verbs. The relationship between each of these alternations, especially the latter one, and the additional type of *analytic grammatical alternations* also needs to be further explored, in order to define the status of analytic grammatical alternations within the experiential component, and the location of such alternations in the experiential system network. In such further study, then, finally, what should also be clarified is the relationship between these types of experiential alternations and the patterns of agnation in the textual and interpersonal metafunctions, which can be regarded as types of alternations (e.g. the passive alternation) which do not involve a difference in the experiential functional structure, but rather, a difference in the syntagmatic organization of this experiential structure.

2.2 The ‘particulate’ mode of expression

As indicated in the introduction, this chapter is concerned with both the systemic and the structural sides of lexicogrammar in the two major metafunctions. In this section we will briefly consider the particulate mode of expression which characterizes experiential structure [cf. Halliday 1979, 1981b]. The structural side of the experiential metafunction will be dealt with in very brief terms, since, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the notion of particulateness in relation to the experiential metafunction is intuitively clear. The aim of this section, then, is merely to create a basis for comparison with the interpersonal metafunction, whose ‘prosodic’ mode of expression needs further clarification.

The notion of a ‘particulate’ mode of expression which characterizes the experiential metafunction refers to the structure of configurations of processes, participants and circumstances, and configurations of nominals and their qualifications. Each of these structures (clausal and groupal) is a type of *configuration*, in the sense that it is a constellation of discrete elements, or particulate elements [Halliday 1979: 64]. As Halliday argues, these constellations can be represented, as particulate types of structures, in two complementary ways, as a **dependency** structure (with, for example for the level of the clause, the process as centre) or as a **constituency** structure. [ibid.: 64]. Both of these representations indicate the contribution of each of the elements to the structure as a whole.

3 The nature of the interpersonal component

3.1 The organization of interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems: ‘Delicacy’ in the interpersonal component

3.1.1 Starting point: The conception of ‘interpersonal lexis’ in SFL

In SFL in general, the interpersonal dimension of lexis has been theorized in two ways: on the one hand, in terms of evaluation (attitude) and graduation (amplification, intensity) [as in the illustration from Halliday’s study of ontogenesis in Chapter 4]; on the other hand, in terms of the traditional contrast between connotation (interpersonal) and denotation (experiential)

[cf. Matthiessen 1993: 88]. In terms of the model which has been proposed in Chapter 5 above, these dimensions seem to pertain to two types of criteria: on the one hand, *what kind of meaning is construed* (attitudinal and intensifying interpersonal meanings as opposed to other, ‘objective’ experiential meanings), on the other hand, *how this meaning is realized* (is it evoked (interpersonal: connotation) or designated (experiential: denotation)). The first criterion defines interpersonal lexis in terms of the architecture of language, whereas the second one focusses on the organization of the internal structure of language in terms of form–meaning couplings.

Taking the **connotation/denotation** distinction as the primary dividing line, all lexis (lexical words as content words vs. two types of words which do not have a denotative content: grammatical words, and purely expressive words such as *bloody, Damn!, Hooray!*) is experiential, and the interpersonal dimension of lexis is seen as an ancillary dimension to ‘content’, as in connotative-stylistic shades of meanings expressed by denotations (‘same ‘content’, different style’). This perspective is reflected in Halliday’s indication of the ideational and interpersonal dimensions at the level of words as ‘lexical content’ vs. ‘lexical register’ [Halliday 1970: 141].

This view also guides Tucker’s [1998] *Lexicogrammar of Adjectives*, where system networks are set up of adjectives, and where the interpersonal dimension of lexis is again theorized in terms of a choice in relation to tenor variables (degree of formality and “personal and social lexical variation” [Tucker 1998: 111]).

Matthiessen [1993] also uses the connotation/denotation distinction, but in addition to connotative interpersonal lexis (“interpersonal lexis in combination with ideational lexis”), he indicates a second type of interpersonal lexis, labelled “independent interpersonal lexis”, which is grammaticalized in terms of interpersonal grammatical systems (especially lexis occurring in interpersonal Adjuncts, such as *surely*).

In studies which exemplify what I will call a *grammar-based* approach to interpersonal lexis, the dimensions of **attitude and intensity** are mentioned in relation to specific grammatical environments, which are characterized in terms of the ideational component in general, specified in its logical or experiential dimension: (1) Halliday refers to “attitudinal Modifiers” [e.g.

Halliday 1973: 142] and hence links the interpersonal dimension to the grammatical environment characterized in terms of the logical metafunction (MODIFICATION); (2) Matthiessen [1993: 687] links attitude to “attitudinal Epithets”, and in this way points to interpersonal aspects of the experiential system of EPITHESES. An additional area which is relevant here is intensification (sub-Modifiers in adjective groups, e.g. *very*). As will be pointed out, the grammar-based approach to evaluative lexis opens up possibilities for exploring the ‘lexis as most delicate grammar’ motif in the interpersonal area, but has not explicitly pursued this idea: the studies mentioned above merely point out two grammatical areas (MODIFICATION in the nominal group and SUB-MODIFICATION in the adjectival group) which have the potential of being realized through evaluative lexis.

Appraisal theory, a *lexically-based* sub-theory of SFL which was set up as a framework to deal with ‘evaluative language’ (an area which until the 1990s has been largely neglected in SFL), takes an alternative perspective, treating all lexis which expresses evaluative meanings (of various types formalized in system networks) as interpersonal. In this view, the denotation/connotation contrast does not map onto the distinction between the ideational and interpersonal components of language: interpersonal meanings can be inscribed (denoted) or evoked (connoted) [cf. e.g. Martin 1996: 144]. In this theory, the distinction between an enactment and a construal of meanings seems to be lost, since systems such as AFFECT, JUDGEMENT, APPRECIATION, which *designate* feelings (as internal experiences, especially mental processes) and evaluations, are regarded as interpersonal resources.

A burning question which is brought to light through the study of appraisal, but which has not been dealt with in this framework, is: looking at lexicogrammar from the lexical end, how can the interaction between the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions be modelled? The way in which metafunctional diversity is interpreted at the lexical end of lexicogrammar is important for an understanding of how interpersonal grammatical metaphor has been theorized in SFL. As has been indicated in the Introduction, interpersonal metaphors are generally regarded as depending on an ideational *construal* of interpersonal meanings: they are theorized in terms of “borrowing ideational resources to construe interpersonal meanings” [cf. Martin 1997: 28], or in terms of an “ideational construal standing for inter-

personal enactment” [Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 584]. Such a characterization of interpersonal metaphor is undermined when the distinction between enactment and construal is eliminated, as seems to be done in appraisal theory.


The major aim of this section on the organization of the interpersonal network is to propose a way in which delicacy can be theorized in the interpersonal component. As we have seen in Chapter 5, an important feature of the interpersonal lexicogrammatical system is its relation to the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION: interpersonal lexicogrammatical options can be regarded as emerging in the framework of and in interaction with the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, basically as construals of the semantic, speech-functional options.³³ Therefore, the notion of interpersonal delicacy will be explored in relation to both the lexicogrammatical network, and the semantic network, and the interaction between these two systems.

A systemic map of the interpersonal component is presented in Figure 6-8. Let us focus on each of the interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems in turn in order to indicate their relation to the ‘semantic’ network of SPEECH FUNCTION.³⁴ The systems will first be outlined in general, so as to specify their respective contributions [Sections 3.1.2–3.1.3]; afterwards, the ways in which each system relates to the interpersonal semantics will be focussed on [Section 3.1.4].


³³ This sweeping characterization of interpersonal realization is only proposed as a way into explaining the metafunctional nature of the interpersonal component. It will be further refined below.

³⁴ The outline of systems represented below is primarily based on Halliday [1994/1985] and Matthiessen [1993a].

Semantics



Lexicogrammar






Figure 6-8 · Interpersonal metafunction: semantics and major lexicogrammatical systems

3.1.2 Approaching interpersonal lexicogrammar from the grammatical end: Primary interpersonal systems

The primary interpersonal lexicogrammatical system which the clause enters into, is MOODFULNESS:

- MOODFULNESS (major | minor) indicates the type of contribution an utterance makes to the speech interaction [cf. Matthiessen 1993a: 385]. The system of MOODFULNESS distinguishes between two general types of contributions to a speech interaction: major clauses express an exchange of information or goods-&-services and hence constitute interactive moves, whereas minor clauses are used to support the interaction without exchanging a commodity. Minor clauses include exclamative interjections (*Wow! Great!*), expressions used to mark the beginning or the end of an exchange (calls and greetings) or to sustain the continuity of an interaction (continuatives such as *Uh*).

The major clause is the point of origin for a number of further interpersonal systems, which together make up the system of MOOD. MOOD comprises the following sub-systems:

- INTERPERSONAL STATUS (free | bound) differentiates between free expressions, which indicate a move in an interaction, and bound expressions, which do not in themselves constitute an interactional move, but rather, are dependent on a free clause. Bound expressions occur as expansions of free clauses, or as projected clauses in indirect speech or thought. Grammatically, they are either hypactically dependent or rankshifted (embedded). The specific interactional significance of this distinction lies in the dimension of relative arguability: because they are not encoded as 'self-reliant' moves, bound clauses are less arguable than free clauses, i.e. they are presented as not or less open to negotiation.
- POLARITY pertains to the choice between positive and negative utterances. It is the primary (i.e. least delicate) system on which the arguability of an utterance is based, in that the fundamental interpersonal value which is put up for negotiation is whether or not something is the case (for propositions: 'it is so' vs. 'it isn't so'), or whether or not something has to

be done (for proposals: ‘do!’ vs. ‘don’t do!’) [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 75; Matthiessen 1993a: 476].

- MOOD TYPE is the system which differentiates the fundamental types of lexicogrammatical codings associated with the basic, primary speech functions of statement, question, offer and command. The primary distinction within the MOOD TYPE system is between indicative and imperative: this opposition reflects the speech-functional distinction between exchanging ‘information’ vs. exchanging ‘goods-&-services’. The INDICATIVE TYPE system further subdivides the indicative option into declarative (construing the speech-functional choice of ‘statement’) and interrogative (construing a ‘question’). The imperative is further differentiated into three types, in interaction with the system of MOOD PERSON [cf. below]: jussive (*Go!* – MOOD PERSON: addressee), oblique (*Let me go* – MOOD PERSON: speaker) and suggestive (*Let’s go* – MOOD PERSON: speaker-plus) [cf. Matthiessen 1993a: 423]. Only major, free clauses select for MOOD TYPE: bound clauses are invariably of the indicative > declarative type.

An equivalent system of MOOD TYPE at the level of the nominal group is NOMINAL MOOD (or MINI-MOOD [cf. Matthiessen 1993a: 636]). This system distinguishes between determinative (e.g. *this, your*) and interrogative (e.g. *which, whose*) types of Deictics, which in this way are interpreted interpersonally as related to the speech-functional distinction between ‘giving’ and ‘demanding’ ‘information’.

- The system of MOOD PERSON intersects with that of MOOD TYPE. It specifies the nature of the Subject of a clause in relation to the interactants’ context, distinguishing between speaker, addressee and non-interactant (i.e. Davies’ [1979] primary speech roles). As noted above, when entered from an imperative clause, the system of MOOD PERSON leads to a differentiation between three types of imperatives (jussive | oblique | suggestive). As we will see below, MOOD PERSON, indicated by the interpersonal function of Subject, is also relevant in a more general sense in the environment of indicative clauses. The system of MOOD PERSON is primarily a clause-level system, since it is linked to the interpersonal clausal function of Subject. However, because the Subject is realized as a nominal group, the same threefold distinction also obtains within the nominal group level, where it is called NOMINAL PERSON. NOMINAL PERSON is realized through determinative

(*we, it, they, ...*) and possessive personal pronouns, functioning as Determiner/Deictic or Head/Thing (respectively) in the nominal group.

- CLAUSAL DEICTICITY, which comprises two sub-systems, MODALITY and PRIMARY TENSE, is concerned with placing the proposition or proposal in a realm of actuality (especially past and present tense) or potentiality (especially expressions referring to the future, and modalized utterances). This realm is interpretable in relation to the interactants' here-and-now context, either directly (tense, which is interpretable in terms of the time of speaking), or through the speaker's assessment in relation with current knowledge, evidence or decisive power. As we have seen above, these systems are related to Davies' speech operations of knowledge and decision. The clause systems of PRIMARY TENSE and MODALITY are structurally realized as Finite operators within the verbal group (in focussing on the verbal group itself, this dimension is called FINITENESS).

The interpersonal systems mentioned so far primarily pertain to the *grammatical* end of the lexicogrammatical continuum. They are realized through grammatical functions such as Subject and Finite in the Mood-Residue functional structure of the clause, or Deictics in the nominal group. Focussing on lower-rank levels, grammatical functions are mapped onto grammatical (vs. lexical) word categories, such as modal auxiliaries (realizing Finite: modal) or determiners and pronouns (realizing Deictics); or are realized by morphological means, such as suffixes marking tense or grammatical person.

3.1.3 More delicate interpersonal systems: The interaction between interpersonal grammar and interpersonal lexis

The contribution of lexis to interpersonal lexicogrammar has been theorized in SFL in various ways, as summarized in the introduction to Section 3. The present sub-section gives an outline of what will be referred to as a *grammar-based approach* to delicate interpersonal lexicogrammar (in contrast with the lexis-based approach of appraisal theory). This grammar-based approach originated in the 1970s and dominates Phase II of SFL, with which we are concerned at this point. It centers around a number of systems which involve interpersonal lexis, but which further characterize this lexis, grammatically, in terms of the grammatical environments in which it occurs: MODAL

ASSESSMENT at clause level; ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION (or ATTITUDINAL EPITHEIS) at nominal group level and INTENSIFICATION at the level of the adjectival group. In this section, these systems will be summarized, and two additional delicate interpersonal systems will be introduced (viz. MODAL POST-DETERMINATION and MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION) in order to emphasize the continuum between grammar and lexis in the interpersonal area.

It is proposed that *lexis* contributes to the interpersonal lexicogrammar in two overall ways, which have been pointed out in Chapter 4 in discussing the appearance of an adult lexicogrammar in TR2 and the final transition into adult language: (1) through *connotation*, which, as we have seen, is dependent on denotation (connotative lexis); and (2) through evaluative words *denoting* interpersonal meanings (evaluative lexis). In terms of the semiotic approach to lexis which has been explained above, these two aspects are on the one hand, the indexical dimension of lexis, and on the other, the symbolization of interpersonal meanings. Matthiessen [1993a: 113] refers to these two dimensions as interpersonal lexis occurring “in combination with ideational lexis” versus “independent” interpersonal lexis.

It should be emphasized that ‘denoted’ or designated interpersonal meanings belong to the interpersonal component only from an external perspective on language [as defined in Chapter 5]. From the perspective of the internal structure of language, these types of construals are, strictly speaking, experiential. Designated ‘interpersonal’ lexis in this way indicates a borderland area between the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions, which can be further defined as either interpersonal or experiential, depending on the perspective one takes.³⁵

³⁵ In this sense, also the ‘grammatical environments’ of interpersonal lexis which are specified here (especially interpersonal Adjuncts in the clause, Post-Deictics and Epitheis in the nominal group, and Sub-Modifiers in the adjectival group), are, strictly speaking, intermediate between the experiential and interpersonal components. One further grammatical environment for interpersonal lexis which is not mentioned in this chapter, is the Attribute in an attributive relational process. As a grammatical environment for interpersonal lexis, this type of structural element (and the structure as a whole) can again be regarded as intermediate between the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions. In Part IV, it will be argued that there is something distinctly interpersonal about attributive relational processes.

Both connotative and denotative types of interpersonal lexis are scattered through the language, being encoded in nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs. Interpersonal lexis and grammar meet in the systems of MODAL ASSESSMENT, MODAL POST-DETERMINATION, ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION, and MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION, which model grammatical environments (respectively: interpersonal Adjuncts in the clause, Post-Deictics and Epithets in the nominal group, and Sub-Modifiers in the adjectival group) which either depend on interpersonal lexis for their realization (MODAL ASSESSMENT), or which are a primary environment for an encoding through interpersonal lexis (MODIFICATION > ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION, SUB-MODIFICATION > MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION, POST-DETERMINATION > MODAL POST-DETERMINATION).³⁶

- MODAL ASSESSMENT, the most delicate sub-system within the system of MOOD (i.e. the most delicate interpersonal system at the level of the clause) is a system which provides options for further assessing interpersonal dimensions of an utterance in more delicate (Adjuncts of modality) and additional (Adjuncts of mood and comment) ways compared to the resources in the system of DEICTICITY. Choices from the system of MODAL ASSESSMENT are realized by interpersonal Adjuncts, which are of two general types: *Mood Adjuncts* are integrated in the Mood element of the clause (where they occur together with the Subject and the Finite), whereas *Comment Adjuncts* are expressed outside the overall Mood/Residue structure of the clause, as a separate ‘comment’.

³⁶ It should be pointed out that, although one of the basic premisses of SFL is that lexis is to be regarded as “most delicate grammar” [Halliday 1978b: 43], the relationships between grammar and lexis, especially in the interpersonal area, have not been the subject of thorough study. Whereas ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION has been recognized as a lexicogrammatical interpersonal *system* [since Halliday 1970] pertaining to the nominal group, the major functional environment *in the clause* where evaluative adjectives occur, viz. that of the Attribute in a relational process, has not been theorized in *grammatical* interpersonal terms in SFL. Evaluative adjectives, *qua words*, are dealt with in the lexically-oriented framework of appraisal theory, which will be discussed further below. At the levels of nominal and adjectival groups, the functions of Post-Deictics and Sub-Modifiers (respectively) have not been systematically analysed and theorized into interpersonal systems, although, in grammatical descriptions, their interpersonal significance has been pointed at, as will be indicated below. I will refer to these dimensions as MODAL POST-DETERMINATION and MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION. The terms are proposed as parallels to Halliday’s “ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION”. Below, these systems will be illustrated and their link to other work in SFL will be briefly pointed out.

Mood Adjuncts are of three types: *Adjuncts of modality* and *Adjuncts of temporality* provide types of assessment which pertain to the same ‘semantic’ dimensions involved in the systems of MODALITY and PRIMARY TENSE: for example probability, usuality, obligation; time, typicality. Adjuncts of mood relate to the dimensions of intensity and degree. The last type will henceforth be referred to as *Adjuncts of graduation*.³⁷ The different types of Mood Adjuncts are illustrated in the following examples:

- (40) MODAL ASSESSMENT: mood assessment > of modality > modalization > probability
 ↘ Mood Adjunct
- a. *If he is defeated and forces a byelection, the party would **probably** be obliged to expel him.*
 - b. ***Maybe** we'll get some idea of that from the medical report.* [BNC]
- (41) MODAL ASSESSMENT: of temporality > typicality
 ↘ Mood Adjunct
- a. *Anderson: Well, **occasionally** new people move into the area and try to get an election so their dog or cat or – I believe one instance, their goat – could run against the mayor.*
 - b. *Who stays and who goes when administrations change? That's the question we put to Professor Cal McKenzie, the author of two books on presidential appointments. **In most cases** it's pretty clear which positions the new president can appoint and which he cannot. Cabinet secretaries come and go with presidents, federal judges do not.* [CB]
- (42) MODAL ASSESSMENT: of graduation > degree
 ↘ Mood Adjunct
- a. *The roads are excellent. They **almost** gleam, and every street has its own name.*
 - b. *Rohrabacher listened to it all and said outright he would like to be rid of the NEA **entirely**.* [CB]

³⁷ I replace Halliday's "Adjuncts of mood" by *Adjuncts of graduation* in order to avoid confusion with the broader category of "Mood Adjuncts" (which contrasts with Comment Adjuncts, and of which Adjuncts of graduation are a sub-type), and in order to link this type of interpersonal adjuncts with a general dimension of interpersonal semantics, viz. scaling, which, as we will see below, also turns up in two lower-rank systems (MODAL POST-DETERMINATION and MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION).

Three types of Comment Adjunct can be distinguished:³⁸ Adjuncts which comment on the exchange itself, especially on the way in which it is presented by the speaker or the way in which it is to be taken by the hearer (e.g. *seriously, honestly, broadly speaking, believe me*); Adjuncts which point to aspects of the speaker's knowledge (especially regarding the type of knowledge (beliefs, perceptions, expectations, and so on)) on the basis of which information is given (e.g. *apparently, to my mind, seemingly*); and Adjuncts which indicate the speaker's attitudinal assessment of the information given (e.g. *fortunately, surprisingly, regrettably*). More elaborate examples are:

- (43) modal assessment: comment assessment > assessment of the exchange
 ↘ Comment Adjunct
- a. *I think, myself, that's a serious mistake because the sheer economic and human impact of the war is going to dictate, at least in part, the political evolution of the area in the next few months. **In other words**, that could lead to further disruption, in particular political instability, as the full impact of the war is felt on the local political systems.*
 - b. **Seriously though**, I am of the opinion that women need their own space to talk freely without the presence of men. [BNC]
- (44) MODAL ASSESSMENT: comment assessment > assessment of the basis of information
 ↘ Comment Adjunct
- a. *I suspect that they may indeed try to find another prime minister, try to rework this coalition. **No doubt** that will take quite a bit of time.*
 - b. **To my knowledge** most directors in Australia follow those rules.
 - c. **Rather unexpectedly**, I am having company for Christmas. [BNC]
- (45) MODAL ASSESSMENT: comment assessment > attitudinal assessment of information
 ↘ Comment Adjunct
- a. *She had her purse with her, **luckily**, but there wasn't much in it.*

³⁸ The differentiation between three types of Comment Adjuncts as presented here is not used in SFL. It is based on distinctions which have been proposed in a number of linguistic frameworks [cf. Davies 1967, Greenbaum 1969, Quirk et al. 1985, Biber & Finigan 1988, 1989, Dik et al. 1990, McGregor 1997, Conrad & Biber 2000].

- b. *Meanwhile Senna was negotiating a second run, **much to my annoyance**.*

[BNC]

The systems of MODIFICATION, POST-DETERMINATION and SUB-MODIFICATION are not interpersonal *per se*. They do however provide grammatical (functional) environments for the expression of interpersonal lexis, in that the functions of Epithet and Post-Deictic in the nominal group, and Sub-Modifier in the adjectival group, *can* be realized through modal and other evaluative adjectives. Parallel to the notion of ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION, proposed by Halliday [e.g. 1970] (referred to as “attitudinal epithesis” by Matthiessen [1993a: 692] to deal with nominal Modifiers which indicate attitudinal meanings, the functional areas of Post-Deictics and Sub-Modifiers expressing modal meanings indicated through evaluative adjectives can be referred to as MODAL POST-DETERMINATION and MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION.

The systems of MODAL POST-DETERMINATION and MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION are the equivalents of the clause-level system of MODAL ASSESSMENT, pertaining to nominal and adjectival groups respectively. In this sense, they organize resources which express the same range of modal meanings, as is shown in the examples below.

- The system of MODAL POST-DETERMINATION, available for the nominal group, is realized through evaluative adjectives functioning as Post-Deictics:³⁹

³⁹ It should be pointed out that the system of POST-DETERMINATION has not been linked to that of MODAL ASSESSMENT in SFL. The examples given here illustrate correspondences between the types of interpersonal meanings expressed by Post-Deictics and the semantics realized by the features in the system of MODAL ASSESSMENT. (One type of MODAL ASSESSMENT which is not represented in the system of Post-Deictics is attitudinal assessment: in the nominal group, this type of meaning is not expressed through Post-Deictics, but rather, through attitudinal Epithets, as we will see below.)

Matthiessen [1993a: 702], who, as noted above, treats POST-DETERMINATION in general as a textual system, analyses Post-Deictics in terms of the logical dimensions of projection and expansion. In his analysis, Post-Deictics belonging to the category of projection are of two types: probability (*certain, possible, probable; alleged, hypothetical, purported; obvious*) and usuality (*customary, habitual, normal, ordinary, typical, usual*). Post-Deictics of the expansion-type are for example *identical, same; certain, famous, well-known; above, aforementioned, earlier*. Matthiessen characterizes POST-DETERMINATION as being concerned with indicating the “status” of nominal groups as “representatives of the general experiential category [encoded in the Head, and its optional Modifiers, MT] – whether they are the same or another set of representatives, whether they instantiate the category exclusively, whether they are usual or probable instantiations” [cf. Matthiessen 1993a: 702].

- (46) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: mood deixis > modality > modalization > probability
- a. *She offers a **likely** scenario.*
 - b. *But her approach was an **undoubted** success in Manchester.*
 - c. *The National Transportation Safety Board has announced the **probable** cause of last year's Atlantic Southeast Airlines crash in Brunswick, Georgia, in which former Texas Senator John Tower was killed.* [BNC]
- (47) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: mood deixis > modality > modalization > usuality
- a. *He bade me come in and sit down and asked me whether I would smoke it (a **usual** compliment nowadays among saints and sinners), but this no way suited me.*
 - b. *I may take an **occasional** Monday off.* [BNC]
- (48) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: mood deixis > temporality > time
- a. *I'm the **acting** 1st sergeant here.*
 - b. *Djibouti is a **former** French colony used as a staging area for the deployment of French troops in the Persian Gulf.* [BNC]
- (49) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: mood deixis > temporality > typicality
- a. *The degree of risk that one faces is so tiny in the **ordinary** course of general practice medicine ...*
 - b. *It is clear Hanson was an **habitual** offender.* [BNC]
- (50) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: mood deixis > graduation > intensity
- a. *that sounds like a **feeble** reason for not acting*
 - b. *The reaction from the--the--the Republican women I talked to was one of **utter** dismay, **utter** disgust, **utter** shame that--that a Republican man would talk to a woman the way he talked to Anita Hill.* [BNC]

This characterization harmonizes with Halliday's definition: "The post-Deictic identifies a subset of the class of 'thing' by referring to its fame or familiarity, its status in the text, or its similarity/dissimilarity to some other designated subset" [Halliday 1994/1985: 183].

(51) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: mood deixis > graduation > degree

- a. *Some top government leaders said the resignation was a **complete** surprise to them, and there was no immediate announcement of who would replace Shevardnadze.*
- b. *These changes in form thus occur at a multitude of levels, from the molecular to that of an **entire** population, and are conserved by genetic transmission.*

[BNC]

(52) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: commentative deixis > assessment of the exchange

- a. *In summary, the **aforementioned** claims represent and suggest that the articles are intended to affect the structure and function of the human body.*
- b. *Er another operation we put in was a compulsory one-week Easter vacation course which consisted of erm looking at a number of industries related industries in the **given** area.*

[BNC]

(53) MODAL POST-DETERMINATION: commentative deixis > assessment of the basis of information

- a. *The man, a **well-known** former Gympie cricket club fast bowler, bled profusely and was taken by ambulance to Gympie Hospital.*
- b. *yesterday double the **expected** crowd turned out*

[BNC]

- In the adjectival group, the system of MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION organizes modal meanings realized through the function of Sub-Modifier.⁴⁰ As with the system of MODAL POST-DETERMINATION in the nominal group, these

⁴⁰ This interpersonal dimension of adjectival groups is referred to as “intensifiers” by Halliday [1970], indicated as falling under the general heading of ATTITUDE in the nominal group, together with attitudinal modifiers, (as we have seen above, ‘nominal group’, in Halliday’s view, comprises adjectival groups) in his class–function matrix. Matthiessen [1993a] does not explicitly deal with the system of SUB-MODIFICATION. However, in an exploration of the parallels between clauses and nominal groups, he mentions in a note: “Metaphorical comment Adjuncts can also be submodifiers of Epithets; for example: *a surprisingly frank discussion about their son*” [Matthiessen 1993a: 680].

In his lexicogrammar of adjectives, Tucker [1998] refers to adjectives functioning as Sub-Modifiers as “temperers”, and subdivides this category into two types: degree temperers and adjunctival temperers. His own analysis focusses on degree temperers, and he refers to a collocational study by Johansson [1993] in indicating the meanings expressed by adjunctival temperers: emphasis, manner, time, space, viewpoint and respect, evaluation of truth, basic and typical qualities, value judgement and quality and state. The classification which is given here is based on Johansson’s study, although the categories have been reshuffled in order to indicate parallels between MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION and MODAL ASSESSMENT.

meanings are parallel to the those expressed through interpersonal Adjuncts at the level of the clause. Some examples are:

- (54) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: mood modification > modality > modalization > probability
- a. *The piece has an **apparently** unassailable history.*
 - b. *Everywhere we looked, around every corner, over every rise, a **seemingly** endless array of lochs and lochans beckoned.* [BNC]
- (55) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: mood modification > modality > modalization > usuality
- a. *The remainder of the meeting was conducted at an **unusually** vigorous pace.*
 - b. *Acrodelphids, **uncertainly** related to the living Ganges River dolphin, included some species with an **exceptionally** long, narrow, flattened beak.* [BNC]
- (56) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: mood modification > temporality > time
- a. *It is an interpretation of and a parallel to the singing of seven Chinese poems about the **ever** transient phases in the life of Man.*
 - b. *It was a different matter with Cuzco, the **once** imperial Inca city.* [BNC]
- (57) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: mood modification > temporality > typicality
- a. *Mr Dobbs sighs: ‘This is a **typically** British bureaucratic response’.*
 - b. *Because of their traditional background they are easy to handle and have a **notably** long life: one cow produced and reared 30 calves of her own.* [BNC]
- (58) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: mood modification > graduation > intensity
- a. *If this was pragmatism, it was of a **positively** mystical kind.*
 - b. *The implications of this were **absolutely** breathtaking.* [BNC]
- (59) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: mood modification > graduation > degree
- a. *Sometimes the necessity to solve technical problems obliges you to rethink a project starting from a **completely** new point.*
 - b. *I continued playing as the Brigadier sped away in his jeep, to the cheers of the **fairly** large crowd.* [BNC]

- (60) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: commentative modification > assessment of the exchange > viewpoint
- a. *David has no street sense at all but he is **academically** clever.*
 - b. *As both emphasize, moral education cannot proceed effectively in an **economically** unjust society.* [BNC]
- (61) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: commentative modification > assessment of the basis of information
- a. *By Roman standards, the Celtic Church was **indubitably** heretical.*
 - b. *However, the new minister on arrival soon found that he was faced with a **seemingly** impossible task.* [BNC]
- (62) MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION: commentative modification > attitudinal assessment
- a. *The hens have been doing **frightfully** well.*
 - b. *Consider the **wonderfully** natural portrait of Lady Holland (1766), caught in the moment of looking up from her book.* [BNC]

As we have seen the adjectival and nominal systems of MODAL SUB-MODIFICATION and MODAL SUB-DETERMINATION express the same range of shades of modal meanings as coded in interpersonal Adjuncts at the level of the nominal group, except for the option of *attitudinal* assessment, which, in the nominal group is not encoded through Post-Deictics. In the nominal group, the system of ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION offers resources for expressing a vast range of attitudinal meanings, of which the types of meanings which are also available at clause level in the system of MODAL ASSESSMENT form a sub-area: apart from meanings coded in lexemes such as *regrettable*, *surprising*, *astonishing*, extra meanings which are available in the environment of the nominal group include: *healthy*, *tremendous*, *ugly*, *unfair*, *nasty*, *funny*, *strong*, *excellent*, *worthless*, and so on.

The final interpersonal dimension to be mentioned in this outline, connotation, is 'purely' lexical:

- Connotation is generally mentioned in overviews of the interpersonal component,⁴¹ but has not been represented as a system network, since it is

⁴¹ Halliday uses the term "LEXICAL 'REGISTER'" (as opposed to the ideational "LEXICAL 'CONTENT'") [1970: 327, 1973a: 141], and also uses the expression "connotations of attitude" [1977: 180]. Matthiessen [1993a: 88] indicates this dimension by "CONNOTATION".

not tied to a particular structural environment.⁴² It can be subdivided into two major dimensions, which are not contrastive, but rather lie at two ends of a continuum: (1) *stylistic connotation*, which refers to interpersonal value attached to lexis through an associated with a particular style, especially in terms of formality (e.g. swearing, taboo words, technical vocabulary, slang); and (2) *attitudinal connotation*, which pertains to the associative, attitudinal meanings pointed at by denotational meanings (especially ideational lexis used metaphorically (i.e. as lexical metaphors) to express a value judgement and words which have interpersonal, value-laden associations which are based in cultural or social context, or in personal experiences).

3.1.4 Delicacy and the interpersonal semantics of speech function

The various lexicogrammatical systems are related to the semantics of SPEECH FUNCTION in different ways, which can be spelt out in terms of their degree of delicacy. Figure 6-9 gives an overview of the interrelations between interpersonal semantics and lexicogrammar, arranged along the scale of delicacy (these steps in delicacy and their relation to the semantics are also represented systemically in Figure 6-8).

In order to bring out the specific relations between interpersonal lexicogrammar and semantics, the semantics can be characterized in terms of two dimensions: (1) on the one hand, a *speech-functional* dimension, which refers to the organization of the interpersonal semantics in terms of the systemic network of SPEECH FUNCTION; (2) on the other hand, there are the more general aspects of the interaction as a *speech event*: the interaction itself and its sub-facets (exchange, negotiation and so on), and the interactants, their role in the speech event (Davies' speech roles, Halliday's first order and intermediate interactive roles [cf. note 21, p. 236 above]), and their indexical ground, including, as defined above, their shared frame of reference (their here-and-

⁴² Cf. Halliday [1977: 223]: "This is not to say that there are not elements of the different kinds of meaning in the makeup of smaller units, but merely that these do not appear as independent systems and structures. For one thing, there are connotative choices in verbs and adverbs as well as in nouns; note the choice of *said* in contrast to *wuffled* or *gurbled* [...]"

now context) and what will be referred to as their personal mind settings (their thoughts, intentions and emotions, including their assessment of the interaction situation, especially of their relationship to other interlocutors).

As we have seen, the more grammatical (i.e. least delicate) interpersonal systems construe the least delicate, **basic interactive options**:

- choices from MOODFULNESS specify the *type of contribution* which is made to the interaction: major clauses constitute moves, minor clauses support the interaction in various ways, without exchanging a commodity.
- Both INTERPERSONAL STATUS and POLARITY are concerned with primary options pertaining to the *negotiability* of an utterance. INTERPERSONAL STATUS deals with the *types of move* which can be made: a free clause stands on its own and enters as a move in the interaction and, as such, is presented as negotiable; a bound clause enters in the interaction in an indirect way, by being enfolded (in various grammatical ways) in a free clause; in this way it is presented as less arguable. The most basic type of arguability of an utterance applies to its POLARITY value, i.e. what is negotiable is whether or not something is or should be the case.
- The primary options in the system of MOOD TYPE (imperative | indicative) are connected with the speech-functional distinction between propositions and proposals, and hence form the primary lexicogrammatical encoding of the *root speech functions* (the *types of exchanges*, differentiated, in Thibault's [1995] terms, according to the "domain under negotiation").

More delicate types of lexicogrammatical systems serve to link the utterance to the speech event, to **the interactants' here-and-now** context, and in this way indicate more delicate aspects of interpersonal semantics.




Figure 6-9 · Interrelations between interpersonal semantics and lexicogrammar across the delicacy scale

- The more delicate distinctions which become available within the imperative and indicative choices in intersection with the system of MOOD PERSON⁴³ – i.e. IMPERATIVE MOOD PERSON: jussive | oblique | suggestive and INDICATIVE TYPE: declarative | interrogative – construe the *primary speech functions* of ‘statement’, ‘question’, ‘demand’ and ‘offer’.

Both MOOD PERSON (encoded in the Subject) and DEICTICITY > PRIMARY TENSE & MODALITY (encoded in the Finite) are important in indicating how the interactive move relates to the interactants’ here-and-now:

- The Subject, in Halliday’s terms, is the “‘resting point’ of the argument” [Halliday 1994/1985: 77], it is the element “by reference to which the proposition can be affirmed or denied” [ibid.: 76], or still, the element

in whom is vested the success or failure of the proposition. He [‘he’ refers to the Subject in an example, but the description which follows characterizes the Subject in general, MT] is the one that is, so to speak, being held responsible – responsible for the functioning of the clause as an interactive event. [Halliday 1994/1985: 76]

When entered from the MOOD TYPE option imperative, it is the system of MOOD PERSON which determines the jussive | oblique | suggestive distinction, and hence organizes the primary lexicogrammatical encoding of the speech functions command, (personal) offer and joint offer. In the environment of the imperative, therefore, the Subject is the element by reference to which the proposal can or cannot be actualized, through an action in reality carrying out the proposal, or the absence of such an action. In the environment of the indicative, the Subject is the element by reference to which the proposition, qua proposition, can be affirmed or denied.

- The system of DEICTICITY is available for indicative types of utterances only. As we have seen, its sub-systems of PRIMARY TENSE and MODALITY provide options for placing a proposition in a realm of actuality (tense) or potentiality (modality), which is interpretable in the context of the interactants’ here-and-now. Halliday describes the Finite element, by

⁴³ Matthiessen [1993a: 423] explicitly links the types of imperative to the system of MOOD PERSON by referring to the system comprising the jussive | oblique | suggestive options as “IMPERATIVE MOOD PERSON”. The types of indicatives are distinguished, not so much by the type of MOOD PERSON, but rather, by the position of the functional element through which the mood person is grammatically encoded, i.e. the Subject, in the Mood.

which choices from the system of DEICTICITY are realized, as the element which

brings the proposition down to earth, so that it is something that can be argued about. A good way to make something arguable is to give it a point of reference in the here and now; and this is what the Finite does. It relates the proposition to its context in the speech event. [Halliday 1994/1985: 75].

The Subject and Finite, together constituting the Mood element of the clause, are the functional elements by which the clause is tied to the speech event. Hence, as Halliday argues, the Mood element “carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event” [Halliday 1994/1985: 77]. The interpersonal aspects to which the arguability of a clause (which is ultimately based in its polarity value, as we have seen above) applies are structurally located in the Subject and the Finite, as is shown in the following example, taken from Halliday [ibid.: 78]:

(63) *The duke has given your aunt a new teapot, hasn't he?*

a. *No he hasn't. But **the duchess** has.*

b. *No he hasn't. But **he's going to**.*

[Halliday 1994/1985: 77]

The relation between the more delicate lexicogrammatical systems of IMPERATIVE MOOD PERSON, INDICATIVE TYPE, MOOD PERSON, and DEICTICITY > PRIMARY TENSE & MODALITY and the interpersonal semantics can be summarized in terms of the general-interactional and speech-functional ‘semantic’ dimensions. (1) In speech-functional terms, the more delicate systems serve to indicate more delicate types of speech functions. This is explicitly indicated by the systems organizing subtypes of imperative and indicative, construing different types of proposals and different types of propositions. DEICTICITY further contributes to the refinement of speech functions, especially through the subsystem of MODALITY, but also through PRIMARY TENSE. Modalized and modulated utterances serve to construe different types of ‘commands’, ‘offers’, ‘statement’ and ‘questions’. For example, the system of MODULATION makes available resources for expressing various degrees of obligation and of inclination, in this way opening up possibilities for construing more refined types of ‘commands’ (permission, obligation, compulsion, and more delicate distinctions) and ‘offers’ (readiness, willingness, determination, and more delicate distinctions). Primary tense also plays a role in the encoding of more delicate interpersonal

meanings which are speech-functionally significant, for example, in utterances where the use of past tense indicates a mitigated proposition, encoding, for example, a polite type of request.⁴⁴

(2) In terms of the general interactional dimensions of the interpersonal semantics, the Subject and Finite (the Mood element) – i.e. the interpersonal functions through which options from the systems of MOOD PERSON and DEICTICITY are realized – indicate those interpersonal aspects in the clause which, in interaction with the clause's polarity value, are put up for negotiation. In this way, MOOD PERSON and DEICTICITY pertain to more delicate aspects of negotiability compared to the system of POLARITY. It is in this sense that MODALITY is a system which makes available lexicogrammatical options for encoding meanings which lie in between the polar positive/negative values of the system of POLARITY.⁴⁵

In discussing the relation between lexicogrammatical interpersonal systems and the interpersonal semantics of SPEECH FUNCTION, we have started at the grammatical end of the lexicogrammatical continuum, and so far we have looked at those systems which are primarily encoded through grammatical means. In the progression from less to more delicate types of systems, we have focussed on the question of what each further step in lexicogrammatical delicacy contributes to the interpersonal semantics, which is organized in terms of dimensions of the speech interaction. We have seen how these contributions serve to indicate more delicate types of meanings pertaining to interpersonal telos. These shades of interpersonal meanings have been stipulated in terms of two dimensions of the speech interaction: general aspects of the speech event, and speech-functional meanings [cf. the visual representation in Figure 6-9 above]. The picture of interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems which is arrived at in this way zooms in on those

⁴⁴ This dimension is referred to as “distanced” telling by Davies [1979: 69], who gives the example *I wanted to see the black pair in the window please*. Taking a phylogenetic perspective, PRIMARY TENSE is also important in the origin of modal operators, in that the ‘oblique’ types of modal auxiliaries, which equally express more mitigated shades of modal meanings compared to the other modal auxiliaries, originated as past tense forms of lexical precursors of the non-oblique modals (cf. *will/would, can/could, may/might, shall/should*).

⁴⁵ Cf. Halliday [1994/1985: 356]: “Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies in between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.”

semantic dimensions indicated by each more delicate system vis-à-vis the less delicate ones.

It is equally important to acknowledge the characteristic role of the primary types of systems vis-à-vis the more delicate ones. Semantically, the less delicate systems serve to delineate the interpersonal ‘semantic’ area in which further, more refined shades of meanings, indicated through the more delicate systems, become obtainable. For example, starting with the least delicate system, MOODFULNESS differentiates between two types of utterances according to their *contribution* to the interaction; through the system of INTERPERSONAL STATUS, this contribution is further specified in terms of types of moves, which are differentiated according to their degree of negotiability; at the same level of delicacy, the features in the system of POLARITY construe the interpersonal basis by which a move becomes negotiable. In this sense, the interpersonal semantics of ‘a contribution to an interaction’ serves as the area in which ‘negotiable moves’ obtain as further refinements.

Systemically, and structurally, the least delicate systems serve to specify the conditions for entering more delicate systems. The system of MOOD, with its various sub-components, is only open to the major type of clause, specified through the less delicate system of MOODFULNESS; in other words, the major type of clause is the structural environment in which the resources of MOOD become available. In the same vein, the options of MOOD TYPE only obtain in free clauses (specified through INTERPERSONAL STATUS), and features from the systems of PRIMARY TENSE and MODALITY can only be realized in the environment of indicative types of clauses. The structural dimension of interpersonal lexicogrammar will be further looked into in the next sub-section.

Taking yet further steps in delicacy brings us to the lexicogrammatical systems which depend on interpersonal lexis for their realization (MODAL ASSESSMENT and ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION), and to the primarily lexical system of CONNOTATION. These systems organize resources for encoding the speaker’s judgement of the information given in the interactive move, and hence pertain to ‘**subjective assessment**’ as a general ‘semantic’ dimension of the speech event.

As we have seen above, MODAL ASSESSMENT deals with those lexicogrammatical resources for encoding a subjective assessment, at clause level, through interpersonal lexis occurring in the functional-structural (i.e. grammatical) environment of interpersonal Adjuncts. In this way, the delicate interpersonal lexis through which the different types of interpersonal Adjuncts are realized creates the possibility of bringing out *more delicate types of speech functions*, such as hoping, insisting, giving advice, encouraging, predicting, regretting, persuading, and so on, as illustrated in the following examples:

- (64) SPEECH FUNCTION: proposal > command > insistence
 ↳ Mood Adjunct: Adjunct of modality: obligation
*And that means that this whole Rota—Grand Old Man business must be kept secret **at all cost**.* [CB]
- (65) SPEECH FUNCTION: proposal > command > advice – encouragement
 ↳ Mood Adjunct: Adjunct of graduation: intensity
*Government officials were about to evict the black families again when a sudden swell of pressure from churches and human rights groups persuaded them that in the new South Africa, they should **really** help the people instead.* [CB]
- (66) SPEECH FUNCTION: proposition > statement > prediction
 ↳ Comment Adjunct: assessment of the basis of information: prediction
*The national convention of the Communist Party USA will be held in December. There the wrangling and frustration and orthodoxies will **predictably** continue.* [CB]
- (67) SPEECH FUNCTION: proposition > statement > regret
 ↳ Comment Adjunct: attitudinal assessment of information: desirability: regret
 a. *“Apart from the damage to people’s health through acute stress and being deprived of their sleep, noise pollution from neighbours **regrettably** leads to violence on very many occasions,” he said.*
 b. *Ri—Richard, **unfortunately**, we’ve only got about 40 seconds left.* [CB]
- (68) SPEECH FUNCTION: proposition > statement > persuasion
 ↳ Comment Adjunct: assessment of the exchange: persuasion
 a. *If a person is committed to perpetuating fraud in a system, **believe me**, they can do it as we know from fraud in other*

systems that we have in government – namely, income tax. But quite frankly, we have had no fraud in Minnesota due to motor-voter ...

- b. *“Perhaps you’d like to sing it for the class.” Gosh, thanks, but I don’t think so. Everybody in the class says, “Sing it!” Except for Cynthia Stewart. She said, “Oh, this is just ridiculous.” Mr. Revitz said, “Bill.” And **honestly**, I can’t tell you why, but I stood up and I walked to the front of the class. (Singing) Zanzibar, Zanzibar, Zanzibar is very far. You can’t get there in a car. It’s too far to Zanzibar.*

[CB]

The examples illustrate how delicate speech-functional meanings are indicated by interpersonal Adjuncts *in interaction with* other aspects of interpersonal lexicogrammar (the grammatical dimensions of mood and modality, and lexical connotations) and designations of interpersonal meanings.⁴⁶ It is in this sense that interpersonal meanings are characterized by Halliday as ‘**prosodic**’: they are “strung throughout the clause as a *continuous motif or colouring*” or “*distributed* like a prosody throughout a continuous stretch of discourse” [Halliday 1979: 66, emphases MT], or still, “interpersonal meanings tend to be *scattered* prosodically through the unit” [Halliday 1994/1985: 190, emphasis MT].

Apart from the grammatical environment of interpersonal Adjuncts, whose paradigmatic potential is represented in the system of MODAL ASSESSMENT, interpersonal lexical items can occur as attitudinal Epithets or modal Post-Deictics, organized through the interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems of ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION and MODAL POST-DETERMINATION which are available for the nominal group. The occurrence of interpersonal lexis in these environments contributes to the creation of an interpersonal lexical scatter at the level of the clause. This scatter is further brought about by other interpersonal lexical items, which are not associated with a specific grammatical environment which is typically realized through interpersonal lexis, and hence, which have not been theorized in terms of interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems: attitudinal adjectives occurring in Attributes, attitudinal nouns and verbs

⁴⁶ The two examples given have to do with counterexpectation and surprise. These interpersonal meanings are expressed primarily by the interpersonal Adjuncts, but also by other means. In (68) the combination of perpetuating and fraud; in (69) the combination of *Gosh, thanks, but I don’t think so*, *Oh, this is just ridiculous*, *I can’t tell you why* and *but*.

occurring in a multitude of grammatical environments, and more generally, connotative lexis. The ‘prosodic’ effect characterizing the interpersonal metafunction can be seen most clearly (but not exclusively, as will be made clear below) in interpersonal lexis, which is scattered over the clause, and which construes interpersonal meanings in symbiosis with more grammatical interpersonal encodings.

It is important to point out that the interpersonal notion of ‘prosody’ has both a structural and ‘semantic’ dimension. ‘Prosody’ first and foremost specifies the structural *mode of expression* which characterizes the interpersonal metafunction, in contrast with the particulate and culminative-periodic modes of expression associated with the experiential and textual metafunctions. However, because the “different types of structure are non-arbitrarily related to the kinds of meaning they express” [Halliday 1979: 61], the notion of ‘prosody’ also characterizes the type of meaning which is thus indicated. That these two dimensions, the structural and semantic, are inextricably interconnected is reflected in Halliday’s circumscriptions of ‘prosody’ [my emphases throughout]:

- This *interpersonal meaning* [...] is strung throughout the clause as a *continuous motif or colouring*. [Halliday 1979: 66]
- *the meaning* is distributed like a prosody throughout a continuous stretch of discourse. [Halliday 1979: 66]
- *Interpersonal meanings* tend to be scattered prosodically throughout the unit [Halliday 1994/1985: 190]

‘Prosody’ will henceforth be used in general to refer to the prosodic effect of interpersonal elements over a stretch of language; this stretch can be the clause, but it can also be interpreted at group rank (nominal, verbal, adjectival groups) and it can extend beyond the clause, into longer stretches of discourse. This definition is deliberately glossed in unspecific terms in order to make possible further specifications which explicate the ‘semantic’ and structural aspects of ‘prosody’, since it is interpersonal meanings which are construed through the prosodic mode of expression. Semantically, the prosodic effect refers to Halliday’s [1979: 66] “*continuous motif or colouring*” which is “strung” throughout a stretch of language: it pertains to a ‘semantic’ motif whose interpersonal significance extends over a stretch of language.

Structurally, the prosodic effect of interpersonal elements refers to their being “*distributed* like a prosody” [ibid.] over a stretch of discourse.

The *structural* dimension of the interpersonal metafunction, which is concentrated on ‘prosody’ as a mode of expression, will be briefly illustrated in the next sub-section. The present sub-section deals with the relation between the interpersonal lexicogrammatical systems and the interpersonal *semantics* organized in the network of SPEECH FUNCTION. In exploring which types of meanings are indicated by the different systems of varying degrees of delicacy, we have reached the most delicate end of the lexicogrammatical continuum, focussing on lexicogrammatical systems which depend for their realization on interpersonal lexis (MODAL ASSESSMENT, ATTITUDINAL MODIFICATION, MODAL POST-DETERMINATION), and attitudinal and connotative lexis in general, which has not been theorized into interpersonal systems, but which is scattered throughout the language. Above, the general semantics construed through these delicate interpersonal systems, i.e. the semantics specified in terms of dimensions of the speech event [cf. Figure xx above], has been characterized in terms of a ‘subjective assessment on the part of the speaker’. The speech-functional dimension of semantics brought out by this delicate area of lexicogrammar has so far only been specified for the most grammatical (i.e. least delicate) of these systems at clause level, viz. MODAL ASSESSMENT, encoded in interpersonal Adjuncts: at the level of the clause, the system of MODAL ASSESSMENT makes available lexicogrammatical resources for encoding refined, delicate shades of speech-functional meanings through interpersonal lexis, as has been illustrated in examples (31)–(35).

From this delicate area of interpersonal lexicogrammar (lexicogrammar depending on interpersonal lexis for its realization), it is the more grammatical, clause-level system of MODAL ASSESSMENT which can most easily be linked to semantics of SPEECH FUNCTION, through the important concept of delicacy as a progressive refinement of meanings.

3.2 The ‘prosodic’ mode of expression

As we have seen above, the role of the less delicate interpersonal systems vis-à-vis the more delicate ones is to delineate the environment in which the

more delicate distinctions become obtainable: systemically, the less delicate systems specify the conditions for entering more delicate systems (i.e. the entry conditions). The delineating role of the less delicate systems is reflected structurally, in that they define the structural environment in which more delicate options can be realized. This dimension pertains to interpersonal structure as viewed from the grammatical end of the interpersonal lexicogrammatical continuum. Looking at the same continuum from the more delicate, lexical end, ‘structure’ appears as ‘prosody’: an interpersonal prosody is created through interpersonal lexical items which occur as dispersed throughout the clause.

Matthiessen [1990] distinguishes between two types of interpersonal prosodies: continuously realized prosodies and boundary prosodies. Matthiessen gives four types of illustrations to show what is meant by *continuously realized prosodies* (no definitions are given):

(69) Continuously realized prosody: polarity:

- a. ***I don’t** want **never** to see him again, **I don’t**.* (G.B. Shaw, Pygmalion)
- b. *If there **wasn’t no** Federal Government there **wouldn’t** have been **no one** to fix up **any** problems that would have occurred in the community.* (from a student essay)

(70) Continuously realized prosody: modality:

***I think I might perhaps** have waked out too from all the accounts.*

(71) Continuously realized prosody: attitude:

***God damnation,** I’ll crown that **bastard**.*

(72) Continuously realized prosody: vocatives:

- a. ***Anthony Anderson:** I arrest you in King George’s name as a rebel.* (G.B. Shaw, The Devil’s Disciple)
- b. *I come, **sir**, on your invitation.* (ibid.)

[all: Matthiessen 1990]

The last examples, vocatives, are given in order to illustrate how “[c]ertain interpersonal features have potential positions strung out prosodically through the clause” [Matthiessen 1990: 14]. *Boundary prosodies* occur at the boundaries (the beginning or the end) of a clause, and are typically realized

through interpersonal particles, of which Matthiessen gives examples in Japanese, Chinese, Arabic and French (*est-ce que*).

Whereas attitudinal Epithets and modal Post-Deictics contribute to the interpersonal scatter at the level of the clause, *within* the nominal group they function as boundary prosodic elements: positionally, Post-Deictics are the first lexical elements occurring in the nominal group, and attitudinal Epithets generally occur before non-interpersonal (i.e. experiential) types of Epithets.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Cf. Halliday [1994/1985]: “Attitudinal Epithets tend to precede experiential ones”.

This chapter presents the concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’ as it has been introduced and developed within the theory of SFL. Its purpose is purely historiographic, i.e. it merely *presents* the emergence of a framework for exploring grammatical metaphor in the 1980s, paying special attention to the theoretical context which formed the background for the introduction of this new concept in SFL.⁰ The systemic-functional conception of grammatical metaphor, as presented in this chapter, will be assessed in the next chapter in relation to the semiotic-functional model proposed in this dissertation.

1 Halliday 1985

The concept of grammatical metaphor was introduced in Halliday’s *Introduction to Functional Grammar* [1985], in a separate chapter on this subject: “Beyond the clause: Metaphorical modes of expression”. In this chapter, the term ‘grammatical metaphor’ is launched as a type of metaphor complementing the more commonly known lexical metaphor, and two types are distinguished: ideational and interpersonal grammatical metaphors.

⁰ Since its aim is purely historiographic, in this chapter no inverted commas will be used in order to indicate concepts which are reinterpreted in this dissertation. However, as a general prefatory note to this chapter, it can be pointed out that these are: ‘congruent’/‘incongruent’, again, ‘semantics’ and ‘meaning’ (as above), ‘realization’ used in connection with the conception of grammatical metaphors as ‘alternative realizations’.

1.1 Grammatical metaphor and the lexicogrammar continuum

Halliday places his introduction of the term grammatical metaphor in a more general framework outlining traditionally recognized types of ‘rhetorical transference’ or ‘figures of speech’: metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. Focussing on metaphor, he expands the traditional definition in a number of steps, thus making room for a newly-identified type, grammatical metaphor.

First, a different type of perspective on metaphor is introduced. Traditionally, metaphor is viewed as variation in the use of words, i.e. variation in *meaning*: “a word is said to be used with a transferred meaning” [Halliday 1985: 321]. In this sense, a lexeme with a certain *literal* meaning can have *metaphorical*, transferred uses or meanings. In terms of the general types of perspectives which are distinguished in SFL [cf. Chapter 1], this is a view ‘from below’, taking the words as starting point, and then saying something about the meanings these words realize.

This view can be complemented by a perspective ‘from above’, as Halliday shows. Here, the starting point is a meaning and the relevant question is: which are the different ways in which this meaning can be expressed or realized? Looked at from this angle, metaphor is defined as “variation in the *expression* of meanings” [ibid., emphasis MT]. The two alternative perspectives are visually represented in Figure 7-1 (based on Halliday’s figure [1994/1985: 342]).

	View ‘from below’		View ‘from above’	
Meaning	literal meaning	metaphorical meaning	starting point: one meaning: ↓ ‘many people protested’	
	‘a moving mass of water’	‘a moving mass of feeling or rhetoric’		
	↖	↗	↙ ↘	
Expression	<i>flood</i> ↑ starting point: one lexeme		<i>a large number of protests</i>	<i>a flood of protests</i>
			congruent form	metaphorical form

Figure 7-1 · Two perspectives on metaphor (after Halliday 1994/1985: 342)

Taking this view ‘from above’, it is argued, “we recognize that lexical selection is just one aspect of lexicogrammatical selection, or ‘wording’; and that metaphorical variation is lexicogrammatical rather than simply lexical”

[1994/1985: 342]. In this perspective, different expressions of one meaning are compared. In general, it is hard to find alternative expressions of a given meaning which only differ from each other in one lexeme. Halliday gives the following example: the expression *protests flooded in* can be linked to *protests came in in large quantities*, *protests were received in large quantities* or *very many people protested*. In none of these, the variation is purely lexical, there is also a difference in the grammatical configuration: in *protests came in in large quantities*, a prepositional phrase is added, in *very many people protested* the noun *protests* is now represented by a verb. This brings Halliday [1985a: 320, 1994/1985: 342] to grammatical metaphor:

There is a strong grammatical element in rhetorical transference; and once we have recognized this we find that there is also such a thing as grammatical metaphor, where the variation is essentially in the grammatical forms although often entailing some lexical variation as well.

In the area of grammatical metaphor, Halliday claims, the term ‘literal’ is no longer appropriate. The variation between the different expressions of the same meaning is defined in terms of *markedness*: certain forms can be recognized as unmarked expressions of the given meaning, conforming to the “*typical ways of saying things*” [ibid.: 321, emphasis MT] – these forms are the non-metaphorical variants, which are called ‘**congruent**’ realizations.

Before we turn to the more detailed description of types of grammatical metaphor which Halliday gives further on in this chapter, it is useful to point out some general aspects of the shift in perspective – from a focus on lexical variation to a focus on grammatical variation – which lies at the basis of Halliday’s introduction of the concept ‘grammatical metaphor’.

Crucially, the very recognition of a ‘grammatical’ type of metaphor is a consequence of the ‘view from above’, which is introduced as an alternative to the traditional view on metaphor – and the nature of this perspective determines the major aspects of Halliday’s further characterization of grammatical metaphor in this chapter. Since these aspects also form a running thread through the various explorations of grammatical metaphor in later work, it is important to explicitly explain them against the background of this general ‘perspective from above’.

As Halliday indicates, the main feature of the view ‘from above’ is that it defines metaphor as variation in the *expression* of a given meaning, rather than variation in the *meaning* of a given expression. This has important consequences which are not explicitly pointed at by Halliday [see the summary in Table 7-1]:

- (1) What comes to be compared are grammatical *configurations*, whereas in the traditional perspective, the focus is on meanings of a single lexeme. It is exactly this feature which brings in grammatical variation, which can then be interpreted in terms of metaphor.
- (2) *Various* different types of configurations can be compared as expressions of the same meaning. This means that, whereas in the traditional perspective, there is a simple opposition between literal and metaphorical, there is now *a scale of congruency*: some expressions are typical realizations of the given meaning, and are defined as congruent, others are more or less incongruent, as compared to the congruent realization(s). This feature will be important in the *description* of various types of metaphors in later work.
- (3) The concept of *realization* comes to play an important role: what is compared, in this view, is different realizations of the same meaning. This aspect will be important in the *theoretical* characterization of grammatical metaphor in later work.

Traditional view: ‘from below’	New view: ‘from above’
focus on lexical metaphor	focus on grammatical metaphor
metaphor as variation in the <i>meaning</i> of a given expression	metaphor as variation in the <i>expression</i> of a given meaning
comparison of the meanings of one <i>lexeme</i> (in different collocational contexts)	comparison of various grammatical <i>configurations</i> as expressions of the same meaning
<i>literal versus metaphorical</i> (transferred) meanings of a given lexeme	<i>degrees of (in)congruency</i> : congruent and less congruent expressions of a given meaning
[realization inherently plays a role in lexical metaphor, but the concept is not used in the traditional view on metaphor]	the feature of congruency applies to <i>realizations</i> of the same meaning

Table 7-1 · Two perspectives on metaphorical variation

1.2 Ideational grammatical metaphor

Ideational grammatical metaphors are called **metaphors of transitivity**. The grammatical variation between congruent and incongruent forms here applies to transitivity configurations, and can be analysed in terms of the functional structure of these configurations. In order to bring out the metaphorical nature of an incongruent expression, it is compared to an equivalent congruent realization. The functional analyses of the two expressions are combined into a single diagram with a congruent and incongruent layer, so that grammatical contrasts between the constituents are shown in the vertical dimension: “[t]he technique here is to match the elements vertically as closely as possible” [Halliday 1985a: 325, 1994/1985: 346]. In this way also variations pertaining to lexical metaphor become clear, and suggestions can be made as to the reasons (e.g. in terms of Theme-Rheme distribution) why a metaphorical construal was chosen. Examples given by Halliday are *•Mary came upon a wonderful sight•* and *•a wonderful sight met Mary’s eyes•* as metaphorical variants of *Mary saw something wonderful*. In Figure 7-2, these are analysed according to the type of representation which Halliday proposes. Another of Halliday’s oft-cited examples is *•the fifth day saw them at the summit•* (congruent: *they arrived at the summit on the fifth day*).

Congruent	Mary	saw	something wonderful.	Mary	saw	something wonderful.
	participant: Senser	process: mental:perceptive	participant: Phenomenon	participant: Senser	process: mental:perceptive	participant: Phenomenon
Incongruent	A wonderful sight	met	Mary’s eyes.	Mary	came	upon a w. sight.
	participant: Actor	process: material	participant: Actor	participant: Actor	process: material	Circumstance: location

Figure 7-2 · Analysis of transitivity metaphors

In the analysis of more complex types of transitivity metaphors, it is possible to indicate a “*chain of metaphorical interpretations*” [Halliday 1985a: 328, 1994/1985: 349] as steps in between the metaphorical form under analysis and a (completely) congruent expression. An illustration of such a chain given by Halliday is included below as example (1) (with (e) representing the most congruent form).

- (1) a. *•Advances in technology are speeding up the writing of business programs.*

- b. †*Advances in technology are making the writing of business programs faster.*
- c. †*Advances in technology are enabling people to write business programs faster.*
- d. †*Because technology is advancing, people are (becoming) able to write business programs faster.*
- e. *Because technology is getting better, people are able to write business programs faster.* [Halliday 1994/1985]

A number of aspects are mentioned about the distribution of transitivity metaphors. Ideational metaphors are found in all types of adult discourse. Complete congruency and complete incongruency are rare [Halliday 1985a: 328, 1994/1985: 349]:

It seems that, in most types of discourse, both spoken and written, we tend to operate somewhere in between these two extremes. Something which is totally congruent is likely to sound a bit flat; whereas the totally incongruent often seems artificial and contrived.

In general, Halliday argues, written language has more ideational metaphors than spoken discourse. This is attributed to a more general difference in types of complexity: written language is said to be “lexically dense”, whereas spoken language is “grammatically intricate”. In written language, various lexical meanings are often ‘packed’ into one single nominal group. This is the context in which ideational metaphor occurs. (Halliday does not further explain this aspect of the distribution of metaphor.)

Throughout the history of language, demetaphorization occurs: grammatical metaphors gradually lose their metaphorical nature, and in this way become “domesticated” [ibid.]. Halliday gives three types of what he regards as ‘domesticated’ transitivity metaphors in English:

- (1) expressions of the type †*have a bath*†, †*do a dance*†, †*make a mistake*†: in these forms, the meaning of the process is expressed in the Range rather than the verb;
- (2) examples such as †*she has brown eyes*† (congruent: *her eyes are brown*) or †*he has a broken wrist*† (congruent: *his wrist is broken*);
- (3) expressions such as †*he writes good books*† (congruent: *he writes books, which are good*) or †*we sell bargains*† (congruent: *the things we sell are cheap*).

1.2.1 Interpersonal grammatical metaphor

Since interpersonal grammar in general is organized in two systems, viz. of MOOD and MODALITY, accordingly, two types of interpersonal grammatical metaphor can be distinguished.

In **metaphors of modality**, the grammatical variation which occurs is based on the logico-semantic relationship of projection. Whereas modal meanings are congruently realized in modal elements in the clause (i.e. modal operators, modal adjuncts or mood adjuncts), interpersonal metaphors are defined by Halliday as expressing modal meanings *outside the clause*, for instance by means of an additional projecting clause, as is illustrated in example (2). In this way, metaphors of modality are *explicit* realizations of modal meanings. Speakers can express their opinions in separate clauses in various ways – some further possibilities given by Halliday are illustrated in (3).

(2) a. ***I think*** ⇨ *it's going to rain.*

b. Congruent: *It is **probably** going to rain.*

[Halliday 1985a]

(3) *it is obvious that* ⇨ ...

everyone admits that ⇨ ...

the conclusion can hardly be avoided that ⇨ ...

no sane person would pretend that ⇨ ... *not ...*

commonsense determines that ⇨ ...

you can't seriously doubt that ⇨ ...

[Halliday 1985a]

Because of the great diversity in explicit expressions of modal meanings, Halliday states, “[i]t is not always possible to say exactly what is and what is not a metaphorical representation of modality” [1985a: 334; 1994/1985: 355]. Typical examples of interpersonal metaphor (involving projection) are characterized by two features (it is these features which suggest that these expressions are metaphorical):

- (1) The proposition is expressed in the projected clause, rather than the projecting one. This is shown by the fact that the tag represents the projected clause, as in *I think ⇨ it's going to rain, isn't it?* (not: *don't I?*).
- (2) When the proposition is negative, the negation can either be expressed in the proposition itself, or in the projecting clause. This is illustrated in (4),

where (a) and (b) (with transferred polarity feature) are said to have the same ‘meaning’.

- (4) a. *I think* ⇔ *Jane doesn't know*.
 b. *I don't think* ⇔ *Jane knows*.

Halliday describes **metaphors of mood** in a similar way as metaphors of modality: in this type of interpersonal metaphor, a mood meaning is not expressed in the clause, but rather as an explicit element outside the clause. Typical examples of mood metaphors are “speech-functional formulae” [1994/1985: 365], of which Halliday gives the following examples:

- (5) ‘Command’ functioning as a ‘warning’:
 a. *I wouldn't* ⇔ ... *if I was you*.
 b. Congruent: *don't ...!*
- (6) Modalized ‘offer’, typically functioning as ‘threat’:
 a. *I've a good mind to* ⇔ ...
 b. Congruent: *Maybe I'll ...*
- (7) Modulated ‘command’, typically functioning as ‘advice’:
 a. *She'd better* ⇔ ...
 b. Congruent: *She should ...*

The possible explicit expressions of mood meanings are very diverse, and it is not easy to decide whether a given expression should be interpreted as a mood metaphor.

1.2.2 Ideational and interpersonal metaphors: General aspects

In the final paragraphs of his chapter, Halliday points to the interaction between ideational and interpersonal metaphors, and mentions some general aspects which characterize both types.

Some expressions contain both interpersonal and ideational metaphors. Halliday illustrates this with the example *look at the way they cheated before*. As an expression of a ‘request’ with the meaning ‘*consider the fact that they cheated before*’, this form is metaphorical in the ideational sense

only. However, when taken as an incongruent realization of the meaning ‘*the evidence is (the fact) that they cheated before*’, both interpersonal and ideational metaphors are involved (*look at* → ‘*the way they cheated before*’).¹

Halliday finally suggests that the concept of grammatical metaphor “enables us to bring together a number of features of discourse which at first sight look rather different from each other” [1985a: 343, 1994/1985: 366]. In this sense, interpersonal and ideational metaphors are “really instances of the same phenomenon arising in these two different contexts [ideational and interpersonal, MT]”. All the instances of grammatical metaphor which are analysed can be linked to the same general features:

In all the instances that we are treating as grammatical metaphor, some aspect of the structural configuration of the clause, whether in its ideational or in its interpersonal function or in both, is in some way different from that which would be arrived at by the shortest route – it is not, or was not originally, the most straightforward coding of the meanings selected. [Halliday 1985a: 343, 1994/1985: 366]

1.2.3 Conclusion

In this section, we have looked at the first presentation of grammatical metaphor as offered by Halliday in his *Introduction to Functional Grammar* [1985a]. Halliday introduces the concept as an equivalent of lexical metaphor on the opposite end of the lexicogrammatical continuum. We have seen that the recognition of this type of metaphor depends on a shift in perspective – starting from the semantics rather than the lexicogrammar, which redefines metaphor as variation in the expression of a given meaning. I have argued that the nature of this new perspective determines the main features of the framework in which grammatical metaphor is understood: *various configurations* are compared as alternative *realizations* of the same meaning;

¹ Although the specific contribution of the interpersonal and ideational metaphors is not explicitly described by Halliday, it can be assumed that the imperative mood is an interpersonal metaphor (since the meaning is not ‘request’ but ‘statement’), whereas the realization of the proposition *they cheated before* as an embedded expansion in the nominal group ‘*the way*’ *[[**they cheated before**]]’ can be interpreted as an ideational metaphor (compared to the ideationally congruent realization as an embedded projection: *consider (the fact)* *[[**that they cheated before**]])).

their variation is analysed in terms of their *functional structures*; and they can be placed on a scale of *congruency*, the metaphorical variants being termed ‘incongruent’.

The notion of congruency is characterized in terms of *markedness*: congruent expressions are the unmarked, typical realizations of the given meaning. In this initial description, the new concepts of grammatical metaphoricity and incongruency are characterized in relation to intuitive notions: what is congruent is conforming to ‘the typical ways of saying things’, it is the form of coding ‘arrived at by the shortest route’, ‘the most straightforward coding of the meanings selected’. No explicit definition of grammatical metaphor is given, and while the intuitive explanations seem plausible in the descriptions of ideational and interpersonal metaphors, it is not clear *why exactly* the analysed expressions are metaphors. More specifically, it is difficult to see why exactly the different types of expressions mentioned (metaphors of transitivity, metaphors of modality and of mood) are all metaphorical, i.e. what is common in their structure.

2 The theme of congruency in earlier work

In his *Introduction to Functional Grammar* [1985a], Halliday introduces grammatical metaphor as a specific phenomenon which has to be accounted for in a grammar, and characterizes it in general in terms of congruence. Although the term ‘grammatical metaphor’ first appears in this context, the concept of incongruence (and even metaphor in a broad sense) turns up at different points in earlier work by Halliday and by Robin Fawcett. This section aims to outline the various meanings of ‘congruence’ in these different contexts. Because of the role of ‘congruence’ in the characterization of grammatical metaphor, these meanings can be seen as the general background against which the concept of grammatical metaphor emerged.

2.1.1 The concept of congruence in early work by Halliday

I Congruence, markedness and probability value

Halliday's "Grammatical categories in Modern Chinese" [Halliday 1976a/1956] is the first publication in which the term 'congruent' appears. In this article, Halliday describes different types of grammatical structures in Chinese. In cases where alternative forms exist of a basic structure (differing, for example, in word order), the likelihood of occurrence of each form is expressed as a probability value (such as " $\frac{1}{2}+$ ", meaning 'is likely to occur'; " $\frac{1}{2}-$ ", meaning 'may occur'). In this context, "a grammatical structure which reflects a contextual structure (by matching it with maximum probability)" [Halliday 1976a: 42] is termed '*congruent*'. In language, this is indicated in the *unmarked* phonological reflection of that form. Halliday gives an example of given-new structures [ibid.]:

Here the congruent grammatical form is that in which given precedes new; in the congruent form, stress is facultative (that is, there is no stress system at this point), while in the incongruent form the formal mark of incongruence is the phonological reflection of the new by stress. The use of the concept here, and the choice of the phonologically unmarked member as the congruent term, are justified by the probability function taken together with the stress marking of the one form and not the other.

II Congruence and social varieties of language

The theme of congruence turns up in two studies of language in social contexts (a major theme in SFL in the 1970s, cf. Chapter 1). In the article on "Language in urban society", Halliday [1978e] deals with the use of different social varieties of language in different contexts. The use of high varieties of language in formal contexts and low varieties in informal contexts is called "the congruent pattern" [Halliday 1978e: 156]. It is the pattern in which a language variety is used in that context by which it is defined as the *norm*. A speaker can also use a language variety incongruently, i.e. in a context where it is not the norm. This incongruent use of language is meaningful, Halliday stresses, because it creates a *foregrounding* effect.

Congruence is linked to the idea of metaphor in an article devoted to "Anti-languages" [Halliday 1978c]. An antilanguage is a type of language created

by and maintaining an antisociety, which is set up within an existing society as a form of resistance. As a conscious alternative to standard language, an antilanguage has its own types of codings, which are variants of the standard ones. This can be seen at various levels in the antilanguage, especially phonology and morphology, but also lexicogrammar and semantics (Halliday illustrates these variants with expressions from the Calcutta underworld language):

- (1) Phonological variants are formed through processes such as metathesis, back formation, consonantal change, syllabic insertion.
- (2) Morphological variants differ from standard language through derivational processes: suffixing, compounding, shift of word class.
- (3) Lexical variants involve lexical borrowing or alternation (i.e. lexical metaphorical transfers).
- (4) Syntactic variants are formed through expansions.²
- (5) Semantic variants are new forms which have no 'semantic' equivalent in the standard language.

The term *variants* is used here as in Labov's [1969] variation theory, in the sense of "alternative ways of 'saying the same thing'" [Labov 1969, quoted by Halliday, quotation marks WL]. Halliday points out that each of these (types of) variants can be described in more general terms as "an *alternative realization* of an element on the next, or on some, higher stratum" [Halliday 1978c: 173, emphasis MT]. Morphological, lexical and syntactic variants are alternative lexicogrammatical realizations of the same meaning; phonological variants are alternative realizations of the same word (and hence, also, the same meaning). In general, "[a]ssuming the semantic stratum to be the highest within the linguistic system, *all* sets of variants have the property of being identical semantically; *some* have the property of being identical lexicogrammatically as well" [Halliday 1978c: 173, emphasis MAKH]. This is a general way in which the variants can be understood. On the other hand, Halliday observes:

² Although it is clear that expansion is not to be read here in its technical sense of the logico-semantic relation (expansion as opposed to projection), Halliday does not explain the type of syntactic variety.

Now the significant thing about the items that are phonologically or morphologically distinctive in the underworld language is that many of them are not, in fact, variants at all; they have no semantic equivalent in standard Bengali. This does not mean that they cannot be *translated* into standard Bengali (or standard English, or standard anything else): they can. But they do not function as *coded* elements in the semantic system of everyday language. [Halliday 1978c: 173, emphasis MAKH]

Halliday dismisses this issue of whether variants have the same meaning or not by calling them “metaphorical variants”:

There is no way of deciding whether such metaphorical representations ‘have the same meaning’ as everyday forms or not, i.e. whether they are or are not variants in Labov’s definition. [...] Nor is there any need to decide. We can call them all ‘metaphorical variants’, since it is helpful to relate them to variation theory; what is most important is the fact that they are metaphorical. [Halliday 1978c: 175]

However, Halliday keeps the general idea that variants are alternative realizations of an element at the next higher stratum – and in this vein, he recognizes a fifth type of variant: semantic variants. Semantic variants realize the same element in the stratum of the cultural context: they “‘come together’ (i.e. are interpretable) at the higher level, that of the culture as an information system” [ibid.: 177].

The variants are referred to as *phonological metaphors*, *grammatical metaphors* (which are morphological, lexical or syntactic) and *semantic metaphors*. As alternative realizations, the variant expressions in an antilanguage can generally be defined as new ways of *coding* which do not occur in the system of everyday language.

The stratum of the context of culture is important in an understanding of antilanguage in general. Halliday explains this by using Lévi-Strauss’s [1966] interpretation of social systems in terms of metaphor and metonymy: an antisociety is a metonymic extension of (mainstream) society, and its realizations (both in its social structure and in its language: in an antilanguage) can be regarded as metaphorical to the mainstream realization (mainstream society and everyday language). The metaphorical nature of the antilinguistic variant forms, Halliday argues, is precisely what sets off an antilanguage from the standard language against which it is created as a

conscious alternative. Therefore, an antilanguage in general can be seen as “a metaphor for everyday language” [ibid.: 175].

Because an antilanguage as a whole is a metaphor for everyday language, it is only with reference to everyday language that the antilinguistic variants can be called metaphorical. Within the antilanguage as such, these expressions are the *norm*, they are “the *regular* patterns of realization” [ibid.: 177, emphasis MT].

Whereas antilanguage as a whole is a metaphor of everyday language, metaphorical expressions naturally occur *within* everyday language as well. Halliday explains the phenomenon of metaphor as a natural feature of language in terms of coding:

Conversation [...] depends for its reality-generating power on being casual; that is to say, it *typically* makes use of *highly coded* areas of the *system* to produce *text* that is *congruent* – though once coding and congruence have been established as the norm, it can tolerate and indeed thrives on a reasonable quantity of matter that is incongruent or uncoded. ‘Uncoded’ means ‘not (yet) fully incorporated into the system’; ‘incongruent’ means ‘not expressed through the most typical (and highly coded) form of representation’; and both concepts are of a ‘more or less’ kind, not ‘all or nothing’. [Halliday 1978c: 180, emphasis MAKH].

In certain types of social context, the coding process itself is important, and through this the aspect of (in)congruence comes to be foregrounded. This is the case in the language of young children, where a system is still emerging; or in what Halliday calls “verbal contest and display”, where the coding is foregrounded because of a particular function of the system, for example, as a form of resistance. An antilanguage is such a type of ‘verbal context and display’.

2.1.2 Congruence in the interpersonal component: Halliday 1984

In the article “Language as code and language as behaviour: A systemic-functional interpretation of the nature and ontogenesis of dialogue”, Halliday [1984] deals with the relationship between system (language as code, as a potential) and process (language as actual behaviour) in the interpersonal component. The general aim of this paper is to show how systems are actualized in dialogue, and how an analysis of dialogue leads to a refinement

of the systems. Halliday illustrates this system-process interaction with examples from the ontogenesis of language, setting up interpersonal systems for various stages in the development of one child’s language.

The concept of incongruence plays a role in the relationship between system and process. Halliday first indicates this for the adult interpersonal systems, and then turns to the ontogenetic development of language. In this summary, we will only focus on the first part of the paper.

After a description of basic interpersonal systems at the levels of context (move), semantics (speech function) and lexicogrammar (mood), the question is how these strata are linked to one another through realization, and here the concept of congruence comes in. Options from the system of the move (NEGOTIATION³) have congruent realizations in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION; options in the SPEECH FUNCTION network have congruent realizations in the MOOD system. A congruent realization is defined as “that one which can be regarded as *typical* – which will be selected in the absence of any good reason for selecting another one”, a realization which is “*unmarked*” [Halliday 1984: 14, emphasis MT].

Focussing on the relations between semantics and lexicogrammar, the relevant system networks are given in Figures 7-3 and 7-4. Congruent mappings between selections in the two systems are represented in Table 7-2 (based on Halliday 1984: 16).




Figure 7-3 · SPEECH FUNCTION: primary options




Figure 7-4 · MOOD: primary options

³ The ‘move’ is not the name of a system, but rather an entry condition. “NEGOTIATION” is the label which Martin [1992b: 50] uses to refer to the system which is meant by Halliday.

		goods-&-services		information	
		semantic option	congruent realization	semantic option	congruent realization
initiating	give	'offer'	[various]	'statement'	<i>full declarative</i>
	demand	'command'	<i>full imperative</i>	'question'	<i>full interrogative</i>
responding	give on demand	'compliance' (response offer)	[various]	'answer' (response statement)	<i>elliptical declarative;</i> <i>minor</i>
	accept	'acceptance' (response command)	<i>elliptical imperative;</i> <i>minor</i>	'acknowledgement' (response question)	<i>elliptical interrogative;</i> <i>minor</i>

Table 7-2 · Basic options in the SPEECH FUNCTION system and their congruent realizations
(after Halliday 1984: 16)

Table 7-2 only shows the typical, congruent mappings between semantics and lexicogrammar. When turning to language as behaviour, as it actually occurs in dialogue, this basic matrix has to be extended: more delicate options can be indicated, and, more importantly, in this process, incongruent realizations have to be taken into account. As Halliday indicates, there is a link between incongruency and increased delicacy: “*many of the more delicate distinctions within any system depend for their expression on what in the first instance appear as non-congruent forms*” [Halliday 1984: 14; emphasis MAKH].

In the realization relationships between SPEECH FUNCTION and MOOD, incongruent types of expressions are especially important in particular areas. In general, Halliday notes, there is a greater tendency to incongruence in the exchange of ‘goods-&-services’. According to him, this is “hardly surprising”: since information is inherently linguistic, it is only natural that language has clear categories, declarative and interrogative, to express different types of exchange of ‘information’. The exchange of ‘goods-&-services’, by contrast, takes place outside the system of language: as such it is not dependent on an expression in language. As a result, language does not have a clearly defined type of pattern which is specialized for the expression of exchanges of ‘goods-&-services’.

This can be seen most clearly in the area of ‘offers’: there is no single type of expression in English which can be regarded as a congruent realization of an ‘offer’ – various possible patterns can be used as verbalizations of ‘proposals’.

Halliday gives the following examples: *here you are!*, *would you like a newspaper?*, *shall I hold the door open for you?*.

For 'commands', the imperative can be regarded as the unmarked, congruent realization, but, Halliday argues, non-congruent forms are more often used to express the 'command' function.

In the second part of this paper, Halliday illustrates the emergence of incongruence in the ontogenesis of language. He shows how a child's language gradually evolves from an initial system in which there is a small number of clear-cut, congruent options, into a more elaborate adult system, which heavily relies on incongruent realizations as well, and where indeed, in some areas (especially 'commands' and 'offers' [cf. below]), there is no clearly-defined congruent option.

2.1.3 Congruence in the ideational component: Fawcett 1980

Before the term 'grammatical metaphor' had been introduced into SFL, Fawcett [1980] proposed a general 'congruence network', in which nominalized types of construal (which, as we have seen above, in Halliday's later account form the principal type of experiential metaphor), are systemically represented, in general, as less typical variants of other, 'straightforward' construals.

Fawcett's "congruence network" is proposed in order to "handle the complex range of possible relationships between the referent as a raw input to the linguistic system and the input to the various system networks" [Fawcett 1980: 91]. The congruence network does not belong to any functional component: it is regarded as the "first system network in the semantics",⁴ the network which specifies the possible entry conditions for further systems.

The entry condition of the congruence network, which is represented here as Figure 7-5, is the input to linguistic processing in general, termed the 'referent'. The network then indicates the various ways in which this referent

⁴ In Fawcett's linguistic theory, the stratal relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar is mapped onto the relationship between system and structure: the system networks form the semantics, while the structural realization rules form the lexicogrammar.

may be processed. At the primary level of delicacy, the referent may be processed in three ways: regarded as situation, regarded as thing, and regarded as quality. For each of these general options, more delicate further possibilities are specified. At this point the concept of ‘congruence’ comes in, interpreted in Halliday’s sense:

The term congruence [...] provides an apt label for the system network in which we decide whether or not to use the typical set of semantic options – and so the typical syntactic unit – for a referent. [Fawcett 1980: 92]

For example, for the option referent regarded as situation, three further possibilities are available, of which one is congruent (termed ‘straightforward’ and marked with an asterisk), as realized in, for example *Ivy quickly refused his offer*. Other types of construals of this same referent regarded as situation, are (1) a construal as ‘possessed’ situation (‘gerund’), as in *Ivy’s quickly refusing his offer*, and (2) a construal as quasi-thing (nominalization or ‘mixed nominal’), as in *Ivy’s quick refusing of his offer*.




Figure 7-5 · Congruence network proposed by Fawcett [1980: 93]

A selection from the congruence network, rather than a ‘syntactic’ label, such as ‘clause’, then forms the input (the entry condition) for further functionally-specific system networks. For example, the point of origin of the

illocutionary force network is the following selection from the congruence network: referent > regarded as situation > straightforward [Fawcett 1980: 201ff.].

3 An initial framework for ideational grammatical metaphor: Ravelli 1985, 1988

In “Grammatical metaphor: An initial analysis”, Louise Ravelli [1988]⁵ presents a framework for the study of ideational metaphor. She focusses on three main aspects: general *models* explaining the phenomenon of grammatical metaphor; different *types* of ideational grammatical metaphor and how they can be recognized; and ways in which grammatical metaphor influences the *complexity* of a text.

As we saw in Section 1 above, Halliday compared two different views on the phenomenon of metaphor in general and took a ‘view from above’ in order to introduce ‘grammatical metaphor’. Ravelli takes the same ‘view from above’ as a starting point – defining grammatical metaphor in terms of alternative lexicogrammatical realizations of the same meaning. However, following a suggestion by Halliday, she proposes a refinement of this model which takes into account the fact that metaphor also involves ‘semantic’ *variation*. It is not completely accurate to say that two alternative lexicogrammatical realizations (a congruent one and a metaphorical one) have ‘the same meaning’. Instead, the incongruent form “has a feedback effect into the semantics” [Ravelli 1988: 137, cp. 1999: 104], and this is especially so because a metaphorical expression may select or omit different aspects of the meaning configuration which is realized by an equivalent congruent expression. In general, Ravelli argues, “[e]ach expression thus shares some semantic content, but differs in detail” [1988: 137]. In this view, grammatical metaphor is interpreted as “a combination of semantic features” or a “semantic compound” [Ravelli 1988: 137]. This new model, indicating the ‘semantic’ feedback effect of metaphor, is visually presented by Ravelli as in Figure 7-6.

⁵ This article is based on a 1985 PhD dissertation (University of Sydney), which is published in the *Monographs in Systemic Linguistics* series, see Ravelli 1999.

What is crucial in this refined model, is that the starting point is no longer one single meaning: it is recognized that metaphor also involves a *meaning difference*. However, Ravelli indicates, in the present state of systemic theory it is not yet possible to bring out the exact nature of the ‘semantic’ difference, since in order to achieve this, “it would be necessary to represent the level of semantics with system networks as for the lexicogrammar” [ibid.: 138]. Therefore, although this model is theoretically more powerful, it can not yet be used in descriptions of metaphor. For this reason Ravelli takes Halliday’s general view ‘from above’, with ‘one meaning – different realizations’, as the underlying framework in the rest of her paper.




Figure 7-6 · Ravelli’s alternative model of grammatical metaphor as a ‘semantic’ compound
[from Ravelli 1988: 137, 1999: 104]

On the basis of an exploration of metaphors in different texts, Ravelli proposes a classification of ideational metaphors into nine general types. These types are summarized in Table 7-3. With reference to the problem of modelling mentioned above (viz. the absence of system networks for the semantics), she notes that the ‘semantic’ choice which forms the basis of each type of metaphor is here represented in terms of grammatical labels, which are “terms with which we are familiar” [ibid.: 139], such as ‘material process, circumstance, participant’.

Semantic choice	Metaphorical realization		Congruent realization	Example
	Function	Class	Class	
1a material process	Thing	nominal group	verbal group	the appointment of an ambassador
1b mental process	Thing	nominal group	verbal group	it changed our perception of the situation
1c relational process	Thing	nominal group	verbal group	the sheer cost of it
1d verbal process	Thing	nominal group	verbal group	we had no talks last year
1e behavioural process	Thing	nominal group	verbal group	its continuation
2 process	Epithet, Classifier	nominal group	verbal group	incoming soviet missiles
3a quality of a Thing	Thing	nominal group	adjective	peace through strength
3b quality of process	Thing	nominal group	adverb	a sense of security
3c quality of a process	Epithet, Classifier	adjective	adverb	its intrinsic worth
4a modality	Epithet	adjective	(modal) adverb	the possible outcome
4b modality, modulation	Thing	nominal group	adjective, passive verb	first strike capability
5a logical connection	Thing	nominal group	conjunction	for that reason
5b logical connection	Process	verbal group	conjunction	the arms race contains the threat
6 circumstance	Process	verbal group	prepositional phrase	night follows day
7a participant	Classifier	adjective	nominal group	economic development
7b participant	Thing	nominal group	nominal group	the art of generalship
8a expansion	Relative Act, Clause	embedded clause	ranking clause	WWIII is more likely than [[peace breaking out]]
8b projection	Fact	embedded clause	ranking clause	[[all it can do]] is [[to retaliate]]
9 circumstance	Epithet, Classifier	adjective	prepositional clause	historical experience

Table 7-3 · Types of experiential metaphor distinguished by Ravelli [1988]
(based on Ravelli [1988: 139], examples added)

Specific aspects pertaining to particular types of metaphor are commented on:

- (1) **Nominalization** is claimed to be the type of ideational metaphor “of which there is the greatest awareness” [ibid.: 140], and Ravelli links this to the first type in the classification, which is found to account for 35% of all examples of metaphors in the analysed texts.
- (2) There is a relationship of **metaphorical dependence** between categories 1 and 3b: when a process is metaphorically expressed as a Thing, a constituent qualifying the process must be realized as an Epithet modifying the metaphorical Thing.
- (3) Of the fourth type, Ravelli writes that it “takes some account of interpersonal metaphor”, since the congruent realization here is a modal adverbs (4a: *it will **possibly** turn out that*) or “an adjective or a passive verb” (4b: *they are **capable** of striking first*). The effect of these metaphors is an objectifying and backgrounding of the opinion expressed by the speaker.
- (4) Types 3c, 4b and 7b show a general feature characteristic of ideational metaphor, which Ravelli calls **paradigmatic plurality**, or **paradigmatic recursion**: “a metaphorical realization can pass through the network a second time, again being realized metaphorically” [ibid.: 140]. Ravelli shows that two steps of metaphorical realizations are exemplified in these types, for example: *they feel **secure*** (congruent realization) → ›*their **secure** feeling*› (1st metaphorical realization) → ›*their feeling of **security***› (2nd metaphorical realization). Although this feature of recursion is only illustrated here in types 3c, 4b and 7b, it is argued that “it is possible that recursion is general to all categories of metaphor” [ibid.: 141].

Ravelli explores the possibility of representing grammatical metaphor in a *system network*, which would be especially valuable for two reasons: [1] in general this would explain grammatical metaphor in terms of a *choice* in a system where also other, congruent options are available; [2] more specifically, a system network could account for different types of *recursion* effects found in metaphor.

Paradigmatic plurality, it is argued, is a type of recursion which is not systemic as such, and therefore cannot be represented as an option in a

network⁶: it is simply a “rewiring mechanism” [Ravelli 1988: 141, 1999: 62], an extra possibility for a metaphorical realization, to enter *again* at a different point in the system.

When “more than one item of a clause may be a metaphorical realization”, this is accounted for in terms of “**syntagmatic plurality**”: in such cases one occurrence of grammatical metaphor is syntagmatically dependent⁷ on another process of metaphor [Ravelli 1999: 66, 99]. In this type of recursion, the recursive option has to be prepresented as a network feature [Ravelli 1988: 141].

The feature of syntagmatic plurality leads Ravelli to make a distinction between two levels at which ideational metaphors can be analysed. Simple metaphors can be distinguished from other types of expressions, in which various instances of metaphorical realizations interact with each other. All the simple types of metaphors outlined in Table 7-3 are referred to as metaphors which occur at a **micro level**, whereas metaphors involving syntagmatic plurality are called metaphors at a **macro level** [Ravelli 1988: 142, 1999: 66–67]. In this sense, macro-level metaphors are clusters of micro-level metaphors. Ravelli illustrates this difference with the following example:

(8) ... *(it) will have a real impact on political thinking* [Ravelli 1988, 1999]

This clause contains four micro-level metaphors: ›*real*‹, ›*impact*‹, ›*political*‹ and ›*thinking*‹, which are grouped into two macro-level metaphors: ›*real impact*‹ and ›*political thinking*‹.

Ideally then, both micro- and macro-level metaphors could be represented in a system network allowing recursion – a feature which, Ravelli

⁶ By “an option in a network”, Ravelli means an option in a *system of RECURSION* (with two features: ‘stop’ and ‘go on’). A system of recursion occurs in the logical system network for complex units (simultaneous with two other systems: TAXIS [hypo/para] and TYPE OF INTERDEPENDENCY [expansion/projection]). Ravelli refers to the logical system network in the full version of her study [1999: 62; 34].

⁷ From the description and the example which is given [cf. below, example (14)], it is clear that this is the type of dependence which Ravelli referred to earlier with reference to the relationship between types 1 and 3b in the classification of metaphors.

states, is usually indicated in a network by means of simultaneous systems⁸. Ravelli refers to Fawcett's [1980, cf. Section 2.1.3 above] 'congruence network' as a possible model. However, she notes, because it is based in Fawcett's general cognitive-functional theory of language, this network represents "the speaker's 'knowledge of the world'" rather than "observable systems of semiotics" which provide the "context for language" in a systemic-functional theory. By 'observable systems of semiotics', Ravelli means the strata of semantics and lexicogrammar.

A systemic-functional representation of grammatical metaphor has to take into account a 'semantic' and lexicogrammatical level. Ravelli offers an initial visualization which is reproduced here as Figure 7-7.

⁸ That is, a system of RECURSION is represented as simultaneous with other systems in a network..

Ravelli does not explain the *systemic* nature of paradigmatic and syntagmatic recursion. In describing the two types of recursion, she refers to a difference in terms of their role in a system network representation:

Note that the recursive option as described here [re. paradigmatic plurality, MT] is not an option in the network, but a rewiring mechanism at a point of realization, to bring a realization of the network back into the system at a less delicate point. Apart from paradigmatic plurality, grammatical metaphor also exhibits the feature of syntagmatic plurality, where the recursive option IS the network feature. [Ravelli 1988: 141, emphasis LR; cp. Ravelli 1999: 62]

On the other hand, when focussing on the possibility of representing grammatical metaphor in the ideational networks, Ravelli writes:

A recursive option is needed in the network to account for both syntagmatic plurality (where more than one item of a clause may be a metaphorical realisation) and paradigmatic plurality (where one item, itself a metaphorical realisation, may re-enter the network with the potential for a subsequent metaphorical realisation.) [Ravelli 1999: 99]

The difference between paradigmatic and syntagmatic plurality, and the feature of metaphorical recursion will be discussed in the Section 2.1.4 below.




Figure 7-7 · Levels in a network representation of grammatical metaphor
[from Ravelli 1988: 137; 1999: 101]

Ravelli [1999: 101] indicates that Fawcett’s network is useful in that it can be modified to serve as a network at the level of the semantics. The ‘semantic’ network would indicate the common meaning realized by different expressions: in this example, this is the initial choice ‘process’, represented as the entry condition for a system. The meaning difference (cf. above) arising from a congruent vs. incongruent realization of this initial choice would be represented as a system, i.e. as a further step in delicacy within the ‘semantic’ network (in this case: the options “process” and “participant”). The realizations of these further choices “would then carry through to the lexicogrammar” [Ravelli 1999: 101]. However, the level of lexicogrammar poses many problems. In order to represent grammatical metaphor in the network, and to make recursion possible, there must be a clearly defined entry condition for the systems containing metaphorical options, i.e. “the rank or delicacy at which grammatical metaphor becomes an option must be determined” [ibid.: 99]. It is precisely this determination which is problematic:

Grammatical metaphor cannot be a feature at the rank of clause, because although the entire clause *may* be metaphorical, often only parts of a clause are metaphorical. Thus grammatical metaphor would appear to be a feature at the rank of group/phrase – the constituents of the clause. Yet it is not the case that *groups* – such as nominal groups, for example – may be realised metaphorically: the group *is* the metaphorical realisation of something else. [Ravelli 1999: 99, emphasis LR]

Ravelli concludes: “Thus it is extremely difficult to capture any descriptive generalisations about grammatical metaphor at the level of lexicogrammar” [ibid.].

As to the recognition of grammatical metaphor, Ravelli proposes two devices which can be useful in determining whether a given expression is incongruent or not:

- (1) **Derivation.** Many metaphors are formed through derivational processes. However, it is noted that this is not a reliable recognition criterion, since “many metaphorical examples are found without any derivational suffixes, and [...] not every suffix indicates a metaphorical form” [Ravelli 1988: 141].
- (2) **Agnation.** Any metaphorical expression has (an) agnate form(s) which show(s) its (more) congruent realization(s). The rewording of a metaphorical expression into a (more) congruent one is referred to as “*unpacking*” the grammatical metaphor [Ravelli 1999: 77]. Although a comparison between different agnates is very useful in recognizing metaphorical realizations, it becomes difficult or impossible in cases where lexical metaphor is also involved. [ibid.].

Ravelli’s study also involves an investigation of the relationship between grammatical metaphor, mode and complexity. The hypothesis formulated by Halliday [1985a, cf. Section 1 above] that written versus spoken varieties of language exhibit a different type of complexity, viz. lexical density versus grammatical intricacy, is borne out in Ravelli’s analysis. Moreover, she found that a high frequency of grammatical metaphor correlates with a high level of lexical density and a low level of grammatical intricacy [cf. Ravelli 1988: 144–145, 1999: 73–75]. Ravelli offers the following explanation for this correlation: in congruent grammar, process meanings are related to each other through clause complexing (i.e. using the logical resources of taxis and logico-semantic relations), and in this way, a text which is largely congruent is grammatically intricate. Grammatical metaphor, which construes processes as nominal groups, makes it possible for two process meanings to be linked to each other *within* a clause; this type of incongruent construal leads to a higher lexical density (more lexical words in the same clause) and a lower grammatical intricacy (the systems of clause complexing are avoided).

Finally, Ravelli also points out another major effect of grammatical metaphor which she found in the analysis of texts. When process meanings are metaphorically construed as Things, this creates new possibilities for the

textual organization of a clause: a process meaning can now function as the Theme of the clause (whereas in the congruent pattern, the Theme function is restricted to participants and circumstances [Ravelli 1988: 145]), and it can also become the unmarked focus of information (in the Given/New structure). It is argued that a recognition of such textual effects is essential to an understanding of grammatical metaphor, since it provides a functional explanation of the phenomenon.

4 Review and prospect: Leading motifs in the initial studies of grammatical metaphor

In this chapter, we have considered the first studies in which grammatical metaphor and incongruence appear within SFL. We have focussed on the introduction of the concept 'grammatical metaphor' by Halliday in 1985; the theme of 'congruence' in earlier studies (probability values and social variation in Halliday's early work, incongruence in the interpersonal component (Halliday) and incongruence in the ideational component (Fawcett)); and the framework of ideational metaphor proposed by Ravelli.

The initial accounts of metaphor and incongruence which we have considered in this chapter involve three general types of issues: a *theoretical characterization* of the phenomenon 'grammatical metaphor', a *description of types* of metaphor, and a *functional explanation* of the effects of metaphor in texts. The keynote motif in all these studies is the characterization of metaphor in terms of '**alternative realizations**'. This basic idea is theoretically expanded in two ways: on the one hand, it is linked to the motif of *incongruence*, which was already used before the concept of grammatical metaphor was introduced; on the other hand, the idea of 'alternative realizations' is explored in relation to two important aspectualizing dimensions in SFL: *stratification* and the *system-structure* relation. These various aspects indicate the major features of the early study of grammatical metaphor .

[1] Incongruence

The general characterization of grammatical metaphor in terms of ‘alternative realizations’ naturally leads to the concept of ‘congruence’: in general, when there is variation among types of expressions, some realizations are congruent, whereas others are incongruent – as was already recognized in very early work by Halliday [1976a/1956]. The concept of congruence is described in various ways. It is most often associated with *markedness* [Halliday 1976a/1956, 1984, 1985a] or *typicality* [Halliday 1984, 1985a]: congruent expressions are typical, unmarked ways of realizing a feature. A number of expressions used to describe the distinction between congruence and incongruence are summarized in Table 7-4.

Congruency	
• congruent form = “ unmarked ” form	Halliday 1976a/1956: 42
• “a grammatical structure which reflects a contextual structure (by matching it with maximum probability)”	Halliday 1976a/1956: 42
• “the regular patterns of realization”	Halliday 1978c: 177
• “he [the speaker] may also use the forms [variants of language] incongruently: that is, outside the contexts which define them as the norm ”	Halliday 1978e: 156
• a congruent realization = “that one which can be regarded as typical – which will be selected in absence of any good reason for selecting another one ”	Halliday 1984: 14
• “the typical ways of saying things”	Halliday 1985a: 321
• “that [structure] which would be arrived at by the shortest route ”	Halliday 1985a: 321
• “the most straightforward coding of the meanings selected”	Halliday 1985a: 321
Incongruency	
• “‘incongruent’ means ‘not expressed through the most typical (and highly coded) form of representation”	Halliday 1978c: 180

Table 7-4 · Expressions used by Halliday to characterize congruence and incongruence

In the context of the systemic representation of variation (i.e. in system networks), the concept of congruence is linked to two fundamental scales in SFL: instantiation and delicacy. These aspects of congruence will be treated below [cf. [3]].

[2] Metaphor and realization

The general characterization of grammatical metaphor in terms of ‘alternative realizations’ is stated more precisely as ‘alternative *lexicogrammatical* realizations of a choice in the *semantics*’ [cf. Ravelli 1988: 135]. The concept of realization, and especially the interstratal coding relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar play an important role in the recognition and understanding of grammatical metaphor as a specific phenomenon of language. The early studies of metaphor show two lines of thinking on this subject. On the one hand, Halliday’s [1985a] ‘view from above’, which is proposed as an alternative to the traditional conception of (mostly lexical) metaphor, leads to a recognition of grammatical metaphor in a framework of ‘alternative realizations of the *same* meaning’ [cf. Section xx above]. On the other hand, as Ravelli [1988, 1999] indicates, it is not true that an incongruent expression has ‘the same meaning’ as the congruent realization to which it is compared: instead, the incongruent variant has its own feedback effect into the semantics, leading to ‘semantic’ *variation*. We have seen that the issue of whether or not metaphorical variant expressions have the same meaning as their non-metaphorical counterparts was recognized but dismissed in Halliday’s [1978c] study of antilanguage. The two lines of thinking which characterize the early studies of grammatical metaphor – i.e. ‘same meaning, different forms’ versus ‘semantic variation as well as lexicogrammatical variation’ – will lead to different conceptions about the networking of metaphor, as we will see below [cf. [3]].

[3] Metaphor and system network representations

The idea of ‘*alternative* realizations’ inherently implies a conception of metaphor in terms of *choice*, a fundamental concept in SFL which is formalized by means of *system networks*. The concept of choice is the general motivation behind the exploration of how metaphor can be represented in system networks: to show that a metaphorical expression is a meaningful choice, an option which has been selected in contrast to more congruent realizations. In the ideational component, there are two more specific, structural motivations for exploring how metaphor can be networked: a network representation of metaphor would indicate the systemic relationship between congruent expressions and their incongruent *agnates* which are used in the analysis to determine their metaphorical structure; and a network

could also contain an option of *recursion*, which is found to be important in the structure of ideational metaphors [Ravelli 1988].

In the studies of metaphor and incongruency which we have considered, the possibility of incorporating grammatical metaphor in system networks has been approached in different ways. In one type of approach, the feature of congruence is directly indicated in the options in a system network. This is exemplified in Fawcett's [1980] '*congruence network*', where congruent and incongruent options are represented as systemic features within a system, the congruent ones being indicated by an asterisk. Although in his early description of Chinese, Halliday [1976a/1956] did not yet use the system network as a formal representation, whenever different types of expressions are possible for the same basic form, they are assigned a *probability value*, which indicates whether they are congruent or not within the set of possibilities. In these early proposals, incongruency is built into the description as an aspect of variation at a certain level: in Halliday's study, this is the level of lexicogrammar, in Fawcett's it is the level of 'the speaker's knowledge of the world'.

Later studies [Halliday 1984, Ravelli 1988] take into account the stratified model of language, and conceptualize metaphor in terms of the coding relationship of realization between a 'semantic' and a 'lexicogrammatical' stratum. Here, the question is how the idea of 'alternative lexicogrammatical realizations of a choice in the semantics' can be represented in a system network. Halliday [1984] and Ravelli [1988] make different proposals for interpersonal and ideational metaphor.

Halliday [1984] explains *interpersonal metaphors of mood* in terms of mappings between the 'semantic' system of SPEECH FUNCTION and the lexicogrammatical system of MOOD. Congruent coding relationships are indicated between the primary options of both systems, for example the 'semantic' choice 'statement' (initiating–giving–information) is congruently realized in the lexicogrammatical choice major mood > free > indicative > declarative. When looking at the instantiation of both systems in actual texts, incongruent expressions have to be taken into account. An incongruent realization of a 'semantic' (speech functional) choice is then indicated as a more delicate option in the MOOD network (i.e. taking into account simultaneous or more delicate systems, such

as MOOD PERSON, MODALITY): for example a modulated interrogative with interactant > addressee as MOOD PERSON (e.g. *Could you ...?*) is an incongruent realization of the ‘semantic’ option ‘command’.⁹

Ravelli [1988] explores how metaphor can be represented in *ideational* system networks. In keeping with her important observation that an incongruent lexicogrammatical realization does not have exactly the same meaning as its congruent equivalent(s), but rather has a feedback effect into the semantics [cf. above], she makes an initial proposal for a network presentation in which a variation between congruent and incongruent alternatives is also shown at the level of the semantics [cf. Figure 7-7 above]. However, Ravelli does not actually set up a network for ideational metaphor, because of two problems:

- (1) There is not yet a system network representation of the stratum of semantics, although, Ravelli notes, Fawcett’s ‘knowledge’ network can be modified for this purpose. (It should be added here that this remark only applies to the ideational component, with which Ravelli is concerned.)
- (2) The level of lexicogrammar is problematic because it is difficult to represent an option for a metaphorical expression in terms of the rank scale, i.e. it cannot be determined which grammatical unit serves as an entry condition for a system in which grammatical metaphor is an option. Let us reconsider Ravelli’s formulation of the difficulties in order to see what lies at the heart of the problem alluded to:

Grammatical metaphor cannot be a feature at the rank of clause, because although the entire clause *may* be metaphorical, often only parts of a clause are metaphorical. Thus grammatical metaphor would appear to be a feature at the rank of group/phrase – the constituents of the clause. Yet it is not the case that *groups* – such as nominal groups, for example – may be realised metaphorically: the group *is* the metaphorical realisation of something else. [Ravelli 1999: 99, emphasis LV]

As Ravelli presents it, the difficulty lies in determining the rank at which grammatical metaphor is an option (i.e. is a systemic feature). However, the

⁹ I give this example to make clear the basic distinction between Halliday’s and Ravelli’s proposals for networking incongruence. Halliday [1984] does not give specific examples of incongruent realizations in the adult system, and in his ontogenetic study in the second part of the paper, most examples illustrate the relationship between the levels of context (NEGOTIATION) and semantics (SPEECH FUNCTION), with which this thesis is not concerned.

exact way in which ‘grammatical metaphor’ is a feature in a system is not defined, and is stated in contradictory ways: when grammatical metaphor ‘is a feature at a certain rank’, does this mean (1) that units of this rank are metaphorical realizations, or (2) that the meanings of units of this rank are realized metaphorically? This contradiction is revealed when Ravelli argues that, on the one hand, the clause cannot be the rank at which grammatical metaphor appears as a feature, because the clause as such is not a metaphorical realization (i.e. only parts of the clause may be metaphorical), and on the other hand, the group/phrase cannot be an entry condition for the feature grammatical metaphor, because “it is not the case that groups [...] may be realized metaphorically”.

[4] Types of metaphor

In the initial studies of grammatical metaphor, two general types are distinguished pertaining to the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions. Halliday subdivides interpersonal metaphor into two sub-types, according to the primary interpersonal systems at the level of lexicogrammar: mood and modality. Ravelli proposes a classification of ideational metaphors into a larger number of types, distinguished in terms of grammatical class and function.

[5] The analysis of metaphors

A metaphorical realization is analyzed by rewording – or *unpacking* – it into a (more) congruent agnate form, and by comparing its structure to the congruent structure. Halliday presents this analysis in diagrams showing the functional structure of each expression as a separate layer, so that metaphorical shifts become visible in the vertical dimension of the diagram. With complex (especially ideational) metaphors, it is sometimes necessary to unpack them in various steps, so that a ‘chain of metaphorical realizations’ [cf. Halliday] can be set up.

[6] Functions of metaphor

Ravelli indicates two general effects of ideational metaphor, which, as she states, are important in the functional explanation of the phenomenon. These

effects pertain to the textual metafunction: ideational grammatical metaphor can be used to organise a text into a particular thematic or information structure, for example it enables a 'process' to function as Theme or to get an unmarked information focus.

Chapter 8

Locating the grammatical heart of language

In the two previous chapters in this part on the modelling of lexicogrammar in SFL, we have looked at, on the one hand [Chapter 6], the organization of experiential and interpersonal *system networks*, and the modes of expression which characterize the *structural realization* of options from both of these networks; and on the other hand [Chapter 7], the notion of grammatical metaphor which has been introduced in SFL in order to deal with certain types of *variation* in lexicogrammar, which, as we have seen are modelled either in terms of ‘alternative realizations’ of the ‘same’ ‘meaning’, or in relation to a parallel variation in ‘semantics’. An aspect of lexicogrammar which we have not explicitly considered so far, is *syntagmatic structure*, or the way in which functional structures from the diverse metafunctions are mapped together onto one syntagmatic structure and in this way form a syntagmatic unit, such as a clause. This is the aspect of lexicogrammar which is commonly conceived of, in SFL, as the final output of a system network, where selections from different networks come together. Syntagmatic units, such as clause and nominal group, are theorized in terms of a *rank scale* in SFL (e.g. nominal group as a constituent of a clause), and in connection with the notion of ‘*word class*’ (e.g. noun as head of a nominal group).

The interaction between systemic features, functional structure and syntagmatic structure will be called **semiosis**. Semiosis thus defined refers to the creation of meaning within the internal structure of language, i.e. what has been referred to as *Bedeutung* in Chapter 5. The semiosis of language in

general, and of grammatical metaphor in particular, will be dealt with in Part IV below. The present chapter concentrates on the organization of the internal structure of language, paying special attention to the role of syntagmatic structure in this organization. It proposes a model of the various aspects which make up the internal structure of language, and the semiotic relationships between these aspects, and it proposes a way in which syntagmatic structure and especially the notion of ‘grammatical class’ can be theorized. As such, this chapter plays an important intermediary role between what we have covered so far, and the treatment of semiosis which will be offered in Part IV, in two ways.

- (1) This chapter constitutes the second move in the presentation of the overall semiotic-functional model which is proposed in this dissertation: whereas in Chapter 5 above, we have concentrated on the edges of this model, specifying an ‘external perspective’ on language in which different types of macro-semantics are important, the present chapter turns to the centre of this model. In this way, it locates, within this model as a whole, what can be considered ‘the grammatical heart of language’.
- (2) This chapter also assesses the conception of ‘grammatical metaphor’ in SFL in relation to the semiotic-functional model proposed in this dissertation. In this assessment, the notion of ‘word class’ plays an important role, since, as will be shown in this chapter, the notion of ‘word class’, as it is currently understood in SFL, is intertwined with its conception of grammatical metaphor.

These two aspects will be dealt with in **Section 3** and **Section 2**, respectively. Before that, in **Section 1**, we will briefly consider recent developments in Stage III of SFL, especially three types of ‘semantic’ networks which have been set up: the interpersonal theory of appraisal, Halliday & Matthiessen’s [1999] treatment of the ideation base of language, and Martin’s [1992b] discourse semantics. The relevance of these ‘semantic’ models to the overall discussion in this chapter will be explained in Section 1.

1 Recent developments in SFL: 'Semantic' models

As has been announced in Chapter 3, where we have considered various types of stratified models of SFL, a third stage in the overall development of SFL is characterized by a number of proposals for separate 'semantic' networks, which are regarded as complementary to the 'standard' lexicogrammatical networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on. Three types of 'semantic' models have been set up, which pertain to the three metafunctions: *appraisal theory* deals with the 'semantics' of the interpersonal metafunction, Halliday & Matthiessen's [1999] 'semantic' model focusses on what they call the "*ideation base*" of language, and Martin's [1992b] theory of *discourse 'semantics'*, although in a general sense it pertains to each of the three metafunctional components of language, in another sense is based in the textual metafunction.¹

These three types of 'semantic' models are brought up at this point in this dissertation, because each of them has a distinct relevance to the further discussion in the present chapter: appraisal theory and the model of the ideation base are important in relation to interpersonal and experiential grammatical metaphor; as a sub-aspect of this, the model of the ideation base, and its relation to experiential metaphor, are further especially relevant in connection with the conception of 'word class' in SFL; and the model of discourse semantics will be of theoretical relevance to the model of the internal structure of language which will be proposed further on in this chapter [cf. also note 1].

Each of the three semantic models will now be looked at in very brief terms; only their major features will be noted, especially in terms of their relation to lexicogrammar, and we will consider some of the networks which have been set up.

¹ The 'dual' nature of a 'discourse semantics' (as proposed by Martin [1993b]) in relation to the three metafunctions in SFL will be assigned an important theoretical role in the further elaboration of the semiotic-functional model of language offered further on in this chapter.

1.1 Appraisal theory

Appraisal theory,² as has been briefly noted in Chapter 6,³ has been set up in SFL in order to account for ‘evaluative language’ in a systemic way. In appraisal theory, the numerous shades of evaluative ‘meanings’ which can be expressed in language are classified into various types and subtypes, which are organized in a system network. An overview of systems which have been set up in studies of appraisal is given in Figure 8-1.⁴

As can be gathered from Figure 8-1, various types of interpersonal grammatical metaphor are linked to options in the APPRAISAL network (especially in the sub-system of ENGAGEMENT), which indicates the role of a notion such as interpersonal metaphor in relation to the theory of appraisal in general. Indeed, White [1999] notes that it has been through the notion of interpersonal metaphor, that systemic-functional linguists perceived the myriad of lexicogrammatical means which can be used in order to express interpersonal ‘meanings’ as pertaining to a common ‘semantic’ area:

it is by means of the notion of grammatical metaphor that we can map a diversity of lexico-grammatical forms onto essentially the same semantic space. Thus it is by the notion of interpersonal metaphor that we discover a common, or at least connected functionality for a range of rather different lexico-grammatical structures. [White 1999: 1]

Appraisal theory sets as its major aim to link various types of evaluative language to such a common semantic space, and it does so by modelling the organization of this space in a semantic system network, as shown in Figure 8-1. The lexicogrammatical means which are thus drawn together by the notion of appraisal, and which construe the options in this system network, are extremely diverse, and range from grammatical to lexical, as shown in the following examples:

² Representative studies include: Iedema et al. [1994], Martin [1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b], White [1998, 2000].

³ Cf. p. 366 above.

⁴ This figure is based on Martin [1997: 18ff] and White [1998].

Locating the grammatical heart of language




Figure 8-1 · APPRAISAL network

- (1) GRADUATION > FORCE: explicit
- a. General grading adjectives: *slight, severe, steep*
 - b. Adjectives of measure: *small, medium, large*
 - c. Adverbs: *slightly, somewhat, rather, really, very* [cf. White 1998: 111]
- (2) ENGAGEMENT: hetero-gloss > close > disclaim > deny
- a. relational processes:
***It's not true** the premier viewed the documents.*
 - b. polarity:
*The premier **didn't** view the documents.*
 - c. Circumstantial Adjuncts:
***At no time** did the premier view the documents.*
 - d. projecting mental processes:
***I deny** the premier viewed the documents.* [cf. White 1998: 89]
- (3) ENGAGEMENT: hetero-gloss > close > disclaim > deny
- a. Comment Adjuncts:
***Amazingly**, the Prime Minister has announced his resignation.*
 - b. Epithets:
*The **surprising** victory by the Labour Party.*
 - c. adverbs such as only, just, even, still, already
*The Premier **merely** glanced over the documents.*
 - d. concessive conjunctions:
*Ben didn't improve his time **although** he trained very hard.* [cf. White 1998: 91]
- (4) ATTITUDE > AFFECT: desire
- a. > (un)happiness > misery
+ surge of emotion:
behavioural processes: *whimper, cry, wail*
+ disposition:
adjectives: *down, sad, miserable*
 - b. > security > confidence
+ surge of emotion:
verbal processes: *declare, assert, proclaim*
+ disposition:
adjectives: *confident, assured*
adverb: *together* [cf. Martin 1997: 22]

(5) ATTITUDE > JUDGEMENT: social esteem > capacity

adjectives: <i>powerful, vigorous</i>	vs. <i>mild, weak, whimpy</i>	
<i>insightful, clever, gifted</i>	vs. <i>slow, stupid, thick</i>	
<i>balanced, sane</i>	vs. <i>flaky, neurotic</i>	[cf. Martin 1997: 23]

(6) ATTITUDE > APPRECIATION: reaction

adjectives: <i>lovely, beautiful</i>	vs. <i>plain, ugly</i>	
<i>appealing, welcome</i>	vs. <i>repulsive, revolting</i>	[cf. Martin 1997: 24]

1.2 The ideation base

Halliday & Matthiessen's book *Construing Experience through Language* is concerned with ideational semantics [Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 2], or what they refer to as the "ideation base" of language.⁵ Their major aim is to construct the ideation base of language in systemic terms [ibid.: 3], i.e. to model it in terms of a system network. The network they propose is represented in Figure 8-2 below (indicating only primary options).

A 'phenomenon' is regarded as "the most general experiential category" [ibid.: 48], and thus forms the root of the system network. Three primary types of phenomena are distinguished, which indicate three orders of complexity: the simplest type of phenomenon is an 'element', a 'figure' is a configuration of elements, and a 'sequence' is a complex of figures. It is immediately clear from these definitions that these features are in fact semantic glosses for three types of lexicogrammatical elements, which are similarly ordered, in terms of complexity, on a lexicogrammatical rank scale: respectively, group/phrase, clause and clause complex.⁶ In this respect it is useful to compare the network of ranks and classes presented in Chapter 1 [cf. Figure 1-2, p. 36

⁵ The term 'ideation base' has to be understood in relation to text generation, which is one of the contexts in which Halliday & Matthiessen's book evolved. In the area of text generation, the term 'knowledge base' (from which 'ideation base' is derived) refers to one of the input components of a text generation program, in which propositional content, or ideational information is specified in terms of states-of-affairs, i.e. events, participants and accompanying circumstances [cf. Teich 1995: 71]. What is specified in the knowledge base is what is called in formal linguistics 'logical form' (Fawcett [2001: 209] also adopts this term in his variant of systemic-functional linguistics).

⁶ Compare the network of ranks and classes presented in Chapter 1 [Figure 1-2, p. 36 above].

above]. In the same vein, the more delicate distinctions indicated by Halliday & Matthiessen within the category of 'element' are semantic glosses of 'grammatical classes': 'process' (verb), and, within the category of 'participant', 'thing' (noun) and 'quality' (adjective).




Figure 8-2 · Halliday & Matthiessen's system network of the ideation base
[based on Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 67]

Halliday & Matthiessen do not just link their primary semantic features straightforwardly to lexicogrammatical units, but, whenever they do refer to lexicogrammatical units,⁷ they emphasize the notion of typicality in the relationship between their semantics and lexicogrammar: for example, “[g]rammatically, the nuclear process, its participants, and its circumstances are *typically* represented as constituents in the transitivity structure of a clause” [Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 54, emphasis MT]. The reason why this needs to be emphasized, in Halliday & Matthiessen’s view, lies in the very nature of a ‘semantics’:

the semantic categories themselves (seen from above, as it were) are much more fluid and indeterminate than their realizations in wording imply. The notion of semantic space allows us to adopt a complementary standpoint from which we can view these phenomena topologically, bringing out the inherently elastic quality of the dimensions involved [Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 98]

The elasticity of the semantic categories is then further highlighted in the chapter on grammatical metaphor. Here, Halliday & Matthiessen explore the way in which semantic categories can be construed in the lexicogrammar, focussing on the various possibilities of non-congruent ‘realizations’, i.e. metaphorical constructions. In relation to the early theorizing of grammatical metaphor in Stage II of SFL [as represented in Chapter 7], it should be noted that Halliday & Matthiessen’s semantic model of the ideation base provides the semantic system network which Ravelli [1988: 138] considered as necessary in order to account for the ‘semantic’ difference between a ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruent’ construal, but which was not yet available at that stage [cf. Chapter 7, p. 414 above].⁸

⁷ Throughout Halliday & Matthiessen’s work, grammatical units do not play an important role, except in the extensive chapter on grammatical metaphor, which we will turn to below. At the beginning of each chapter dealing with a distinct type of semantic phenomenon, it is indicated by which type of lexicogrammatical unit the phenomenon is typically represented in language [cf. Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 54, 99, 177].

⁸ In the period in between 1985 (the introduction of grammatical metaphor) and 1999 (the appearance of an experiential semantic network in Halliday & Matthiessen [1999]), semantic categories become increasingly more important in studies of grammatical metaphor. Compare, for example, Halliday [1988b: 171], Halliday & Martin [1993: 13], Halliday [1998b, 1999].

Incongruent example	Congruent equivalent	Semantic category	Grammatical class	Grammatical function
		thing	noun	Thing
unstability; speed	unstable; quickly	♦ quality	adjective	Epithet/Attribute
transformation	transform	♦ process: event	verb	Event
prospect	will/be going to	♦ process: tense	auxiliary verb	Auxiliary
possibility, potential	could	♦ process: modality		
attempt	try to	♦ process: phase	catenative verb	Catenative
desire	want to	♦ process: contingency		
accompaniment	with	♦ circumstance: minor process	preposition	Minor Process
destination	to			
[dust is] on the surface	surface dust	♦ circumstance: minor process + thing	prepositional phrase	Minor Process + Thing
cause, proof	so	♦ relator	conjunction	Conjunctive
condition	if			
		quality	adjective	Epithet/Attribute
increasing [poverty]	[poverty] increases	♦ process: event	verb	Event
previous	was/used to	♦ process: tense	auxiliary verb	Auxiliary
constant	must/will	♦ process: modality		
initial	begin (to)	♦ process: phase	catenative verb	Catenative
accompanying	with	♦ circumstance: minor process	preposition	Minor Process
[marks are] on the surface	superficial [marks]	♦ circumstance: minor process + thing	prepositional phrase	Minor Process + Thing
previous	before	♦ relator	conjunction	Conjunctive
resultant	so			
		process	verb	Process
concern	(be) about	♦ circumstance: minor process	preposition	Minor Process
replace	(be) instead of			
traverse	(go) across			
box; house	(put) in a box; (put) in a house	♦ circumstance: minor process + thing	prepositional phrase	Minor Process + Thing
follow	then	♦ relator	conjunction	Conjunctive
cause	so			
complement	and			
		circumstance: minor process	preposition	Minor Process
in times of	when	♦ relator	conjunction	Conjunctive
because of	because			
		circumstance: minor process + thing	prepositional phrase	Minor Process
as a result	so	♦ relator	conjunction	Conjunctive
under/in conditions of [snow]	if [it snows]			

Table 8-1 · Major types of grammatical metaphor as explained by Halliday & Matthiessen [1999: 246ff]

Interestingly also, Halliday links the major reason why separate semantic networks are important to the modelling of grammatical metaphor. In an interview with Thibault [cf. Thibault 1987], Halliday compares his conception of semantics to that of Martin (who later developed his model of discourse semantics, which we will look at below):

he [i.e. Jim Martin, MT] 's not convinced that you need to have a separate semantic representation of all the features that are there in the grammar. He considers that you don't need *a semantic cycle for the transitivity system over and above the transitivity system itself as represented in the grammar*. I think you do. [...] He sees the need for a semantics of the interpersonal component, but not for a general semantic stratum.⁹ I think that one phenomenon we've been working on a lot lately, that of *grammatical metaphor, demonstrates that we do need this*. [Halliday in Thibault 1987: 615; emphasis MT]

Halliday & Matthiessen's [1999] chapter on grammatical metaphor, which is the most extensive treatment of experiential grammatical metaphor to date, then offers a very systematic model of experiential metaphor, in which the different types of lexicogrammatical shift involved in metaphor are related to semantic shifts. Table 8-1 above presents the major types of experiential metaphor distinguished by Halliday & Matthiessen [1999], and the way in which they are described by them as lexicogrammatical and semantic shifts.

Highlighting, as noted above, the elasticity of semantic categories (which in this sense are called semantic domains), metaphor is explained in terms of one semantic domain being construed metaphorically in terms of another one. For instance, "the categorial domain of 'process' can be construed metaphorically in terms of the domains of (i) thing and (ii) quality" [Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 244], or, a 'quality' may be construed as a 'thing':

(7) 'process' → 'thing'

a. *Prolonged **exposure** will result in rapid deterioration of the item.*

b. *Your **escape** was a miracle.*

[Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 256, 261]

(8) 'process' → 'quality'

a. *Lung cancer death rates are associated with **increased** smoking.*

b. *A cow is a **ruminating** quadruped.*

[Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 231, 261]

⁹ As we will see in the following sub-section, Martin does in fact see the need for a separate semantics, but this semantics, in his view, does not incorporate a second cycle of transitivity, repeating the same features of the lexicogrammatical system of TRANSITIVITY, and reglossing them in more semantic terms, as is done in Halliday & Matthiessen's [1999] semantic model [cf. Figure 8-2 above]. Martin's [1992b] model of discourse semantics, as we will see, theorizes 'semantics' in a way which is rather different from Halliday & Matthiessen's conception of 'semantics'.

(9) ‘quality’ → ‘thing’

a. *What we seek is a **capability** for early initiative.*

b. *The colonel declared his **innocence**.*

[Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 292, 253]

1.3 Discourse semantics

In his book *English Text*, Martin [1992b] develops his model of discourse semantics as an “elaboration” of Halliday & Hasan’s [1976] *Cohesion in English* [cf. Martin 1992b: 1]. However, he explains, the division of labour between grammar and text or discourse is interpreted in different ways in the two models:

Like *Cohesion in English*, *English Text* uses systemic functional grammar to ask questions about text structure, and complements the grammar by developing additional analyses which focus on text rather than the clause [...]. *Cohesion in English* organises this division of labour as the opposition between grammar and cohesion (between structural and non-structural resources of meaning). *English Text* organises this division of labour in a different way – stratally, as an opposition between grammar and semantics (between clause oriented and text oriented resources for meaning). [Martin 1992b: 1]

A semantics which is thus defined as focussing on “text-size” rather than “clause-size” meanings is called a discourse semantics.¹⁰ Martin adduces three reasons for setting up a separate system of semantics.

(1) A separate semantic stratum is regarded as necessary in order to model “*semantic motifs*” which, it is argued, cannot be generalized at the level of lexicogrammar “because of their diverse structural realizations” [ibid.: 16]. ‘Semantic motifs’ Martin means the ‘meaning’ which is common in, for example, the following set of expressions:¹¹

¹⁰ Martin indicated that his view of stratification is influenced by Gleason’s approach to discourse structure in the framework of stratificational linguistics [Martin 1992b: 1]. This note will be relevant in Section 3 below, when we consider Martin’s conception of stratification in relation to the semiotic-functional model proposed in this dissertation, and especially the types of stratification which are distinguished in this model.

¹¹ It will be noted that these are the types of ‘meanings’ which are also referred to in relation to topology as a type of modelling which is alternative to a typology or a systemic representation [cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.2, p. 39ff].

- (10) a. Behavioural process:
*Ford **is smiling** because Trillian arrived.*
- b. Mental process:
*It **pleases** Ford that Trillian has arrived.*
- c. Relational process:
*Ford **is happy** that Trillian has arrived.*

[Martin 1992b: 16]

- (2) The second reason for a separate semantic stratum which Martin gives is the modelling of *grammatical metaphor*. In this respect, it is emphasized that what this semantics has to model is not “meanings which are then expressed congruently or metaphorically in grammatical forms”, since selecting a metaphorical construal means “encoding additional layers of meaning” [ibid.: 17].¹²
- (3) The modelling of *textual patterns* constitutes a third reason for setting up a stratum of discourse semantics. A semantics is needed because “the grammar provides only a partial account of textual patterns”. More precisely, the most embracing unit which can be accounted for in terms of grammar¹³ is the clause complex (if one takes into account taxis, which belongs to the logical component), or even, in a more restricted sense, the clause (if one focusses on experiential and interpersonal resources). However, as is emphasized in the work by Halliday & Hasan [1976], various types of textual patterns are construed in a non-structural way, especially through what they term a textual system of COHESION. One of the most significant features of a discourse semantics is then that it “both generalises across grammatical resources and accounts for relations between as well as within clause complexes” [ibid.: 19].

This third type of motivation behind setting up a separate system of semantics is especially important in that it marks off Martin’s conception of such a semantics from the other types of semantic models we have considered above. Martin’s proposal for a discourse semantics is essentially based on a reinterpretation of cohesive resources in language, both in theoretical and

¹² The parallelism here with Halliday’s motivation behind setting up a separate semantic network for the experiential metafunction is apparent.

¹³ ‘Grammar’ is here interpreted in a narrow sense as the account of *structural* resources in language.

descriptive terms. The origin of this reinterpretation is already indicated – and more extensively argued for – in an earlier article in which Martin focusses on the system of CONJUNCTION, which is a sub-component of COHESION in Halliday’s view [cf. e.g. Halliday 1973a: 141; Halliday & Hasan 1976: 228ff]. Let us briefly consider Martin’s earlier treatment of CONJUNCTION, in order to understand the theoretical origin of his model of discourse semantics.

In his 1983 article on CONJUNCTION,¹⁴ Martin offers a more abstract reinterpretation of textual resources in two senses. On the one hand, it is a *metafunctional reinterpretation*. The system of CONJUNCTION is expanded, compared to Halliday & Hasan’s conception of CONJUNCTION, and it is no longer treated as a textual system: both non-structural conjunctive relations (i.e. the resources of CONJUNCTION in Halliday & Hasan’s sense) and structural ones (tactic relations, which are seen as belonging to the logical component by Halliday)¹⁵ are incorporated in a generalized network of CONJUNCTION, which is thus regarded as *logical* rather than textual.¹⁶

¹⁴ In relation to the general evolution of the conception of stratified models of language in SFL, especially as explained in Chapter 3 below, it is interesting to note that Martin’s [1983] article on CONJUNCTION, which interprets the system of CONJUNCTION as a semantic system, appears at that time in the development of SFL when the notion of a separate semantic network starts to be explored (i.e. the enhanced stratification model, an example of which was introduced by Halliday in relation to the interpersonal metafunction in 1984, as we have seen in Chapter 3). Later on, when the question about the number of strata which are necessary is explicitly addressed by Halliday & Fawcett [1987] [cf. pp. 146–147 above], in the volume for which Halliday & Fawcett’s [1987] article constitutes the editorial introduction, Martin [1987] concentrates on the difference between formal and non-formal features in a system network, and explores the system of DEIXIS in relation to this difference. This exploration can be regarded as a further preparatory move towards the later introduction of his model of discourse semantics.

¹⁵ In the ‘standard’ view in SFL (based on Halliday [1973], Halliday & Hasan [1976], and Halliday [1994/1985]), CONJUNCTION is sub-system in the *textual* network of COHESION, and only refers to *non-structural* realizations of ‘conjunction’ as cohesive ties *between* clause complexes, as illustrated in *He missed his train. Consequently, he couldn’t make it to the meeting*. Conjunctive ties *within* clause complexes, which are regarded as *structural* (as in *He couldn’t make it to the meeting because he missed his train*), are dealt with in terms of the system of TAXIS or INTERDEPENDENCY, which is seen as belonging to the *logical* component. However, both CONJUNCTION and TAXIS (together with a series of other systems, such as CIRCUMSTANTIATION, PHASE, CONATION, ATTRIBUTION and IDENTIFICATION (in relational processes)) are further described in relation to the logico-semantic relations of projection and expansion,

On the other hand, Martin offers a stratal reinterpretation of CONJUNCTION, in that the system of CONJUNCTION is regarded as semantic rather than lexicogrammatical. The features in Martin’s system of CONJUNCTION, which is represented here in Figure 8-3 (indicating primary options only), are semantic features, which can be ‘realized’ in various lexicogrammatical ways, including both structural and non-structural means. In this respect, in connection with the sub-system indicating the contrast between subordinating and non-subordinating conjunction, Martin remarks that “[i]t is embarrassing to have to resort to grammatical terms in these networks but it is not clear what single semantic distinction is relevant” [Martin 1983: 39]. In a like manner, in relation to another grammatical distinction incorporated, viz. finite | non-finite, he notes that, again, “the semantic reasons for choosing one or the other type of relation are unclear” [ibid.: 41].




Figure 8-3 · Martin’s interpretation of CONJUNCTION as a logical semantic system (primary options only)

which, as a system (LOGICO-SEMANTIC RELATION), are seen as a sub-component of the logical metafunction again.

¹⁶ Cf. the title of the article: “Conjunction: The logic of English text”.

As a semantic system, CONJUNCTION is placed on a par with SPEECH FUNCTION, CONTINUITY, REFERENCE and LEXICAL COHESION,¹⁷ which are all regarded as “instrumental in forming text” [ibid.: 59]. However, immediately following on this observation, Martin adds: “But some caution must be exercised before assuming that this automatically assigns them to the textual metafunction” [ibid.: 59].¹⁸

English Text then constitutes a further development of Martin’s 1983 treatment of CONJUNCTION. In this model, the stratum of discourse semantics consists of four semantic systems, which are related to three metafunctions: the logical system of CONJUNCTION, an interpersonal system of NEGOTIATION, an experiential system of IDEATION, and a textual system of IDENTIFICATION [see Figures 8-4–8-6]. The system of NEGOTIATION is an extension of an earlier model of exchange structure proposed by Berry [1981]. It is a model of types of speech acts, which are related to each other in dialogue.¹⁹ IDEATION focusses

¹⁷ REFERENCE and LEXICAL COHESION are also part of the general textual system of COHESION in Halliday’s view. CONTINUITY is a semantic system which Martin [1983: 42ff] sets up in order for expressions such as *already, finally, at last, still, yet, also, as well, too*, and so on, as in *John worked for hours and at eleven he finally finished*.

¹⁸ A specific reason which Martin gives for not regarding CONJUNCTION as textual, is that there are two types of CONJUNCTION which can be related to the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions, i.e. internal and external CONJUNCTION respectively. Precisely because of this metafunctional distinction within the area of CONJUNCTION, Martin argues that CONJUNCTION cannot be assigned to the textual metafunction:

While it is clear that CONJUNCTION is one of the crucial resources upon which English draws in forming text, to assign CONJUNCTION to the textual metafunction, and then subclassify it as internal or external is contradictory. [Martin 1983: 59]

However, I do not see why reinterpreting CONJUNCTION as a *logical* system solves this ‘contradiction’, except if one also reinterprets the logical metafunction as pertaining both to the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions, rather than as a sub-component, together with an experiential component, of an ideational metafunction. Such an interpretation of the logical metafunction will be offered in Part IV below, in further specifying the type of semiotic-functional model which is proposed in this dissertation, and it is also with respect to this reinterpretation of the logical metafunction that Martin’s model of discourse semantics is important in relation to the model advanced in this dissertation.

¹⁹ The system of SPEECH FUNCTION is also regarded as a part of a discourse semantics. NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are different in terms of the semantic rank to which they pertain: NEGOTIATION applies at the rank of the exchange, while SPEECH FUNCTION is a system at the level of the move. We will return to the notions of semantic units and a semantic rank scale below.

on the discourse function of experiential relations (called sense relations in Chapter 5 above) such as synonymy, antonymy, hyperonymy and so forth. The textual system of IDENTIFICATION deals with the tracking of participants in a text in terms of reference patterns.




Figure 8-4 · The system of IDEATION in Martin's [1992b] discourse semantics (primary options only)²⁰

²⁰ The primary options in this system refer to three types of areas to which lexical cohesion pertains: taxonomy refers to lexical relations in the traditional sense (i.e. sense relations such as synonymy, hyponymy, and so on); nuclear relations are cohesive relations which are created in configurations of “actions with people, places, things and qualities” (i.e. process configurations) such as *cook + meal, breakfast, lunch, curry, pasta*, and activity sequences are sequences of configurations, such as *player serve – opponent return – player volley* [Martin 1992b: 292–293].




Figure 8-5 · The system of IDENTIFICATION in Martin's [1992b] discourse semantics (primary options only)




Figure 8-6 · The system of NEGOTIATION in Martin's [1992b] discourse semantics (primary options only)²¹

Thus, although the roots of Martin's discourse semantics lie in Halliday & Hasan's *textual* system of COHESION, and hence, it is in a basic sense a textual semantics, in a more abstract sense, the level of discourse semantics is a *general* stratum which is itself functionally diversified in terms of different metafunctional components. As has been noted above, the distinguishing feature of a discourse semantics, which motivates its status as a separate

²¹ A-event and B-event are Berry's [1981] terms to refer to an exchange initiated by the primary knower/actor, and an exchange initiated by the secondary knower/actor, respectively. Knowledge and action, which again are Berry's terms, correspond to information and goods-&-services.

stratum in its own right, it the *size* of linguistic phenomena which it accounts for: a discourse semantics models patterns of meaning which are created across clause complexes, across larger stretches of text. These patterns are construed through lexicogrammatical resources from each of the meta-functional components of language. The way in which the discourse-semantic systems are related to lexicogrammatical resources is visualized in Figure 8-7. This figure also indicates how Martin reinterprets Halliday & Hasan's [1976] textual system of COHESION in setting up his model of discourse semantics.²²




Figure 8-7 · Martin's model of discourse semantics in relation to the metafunctional components of lexicogrammar in Halliday's model of language

²² Halliday's systems of SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS are placed in the grammar in Martin's model. SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS at clause rank are related to the semantic system of NEGOTIATION, whereas at group rank they are related to IDEATION [cf. Martin 1992b: 389].

A final important feature of Martin's discourse semantics which should be noted is that, in this model, the stratum of discourse semantics is theorized as a full stratum in its own right, which means that it is set up with a level of system networks, and a level of structure. Throughout his book, Martin pays special attention to the structural dimension of his stratum of discourse semantics. In this way, he distinguishes a number of types of discourse-semantic units. The *exchange* is the highest type of unit, and is the level at which the system of NEGOTIATION applies. *Moves* are the units which are linked through the system of SPEECH FUNCTION; they are related to the clause as the lexicogrammatical unit which selects for MOOD. A *message* is regarded as a logical semantic unit, which is linked to other messages through the system of CONJUNCTION; it is related to a participant configuration in lexicogrammar. The units which are linked through the system of IDEATION are called *message parts*; they correspond to various types of elements in lexicogrammar: Event, Thing, Circumstance, Epithet, Manner adverb. The semantic units linked by the system of IDENTIFICATION are *participants* [cf. Martin 1993b: 325, 385].

2 'Grammatical metaphor': An evaluation in view of a semiotic-functional model of language

In this section, the notion of 'grammatical metaphor', as it is theorized in SFL, will be assessed in relation to the semiotic-functional model of language which is proposed in this dissertation. More precisely, we will evaluate the 'basis' of the modelling of grammatical metaphor in SFL [as presented in Chapter 7] in combination with those recent 'semantic' models in SFL in which grammatical metaphor plays a central role – i.e. appraisal for interpersonal metaphor and the model of the ideation base for experiential metaphor, by reconsidering them in view of that part of the semiotic-functional model which has been presented in Chapter 5 above (i.e. the edges of that model). In this way, three major reservations about the current systemic-functional conception of grammatical metaphor will be specified [Sections 2.1–2.3]. These reservations will form the starting point for further exploring how grammatical metaphor can be theorized in a semiotic-functional model in Part IV below.

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the evaluation of the conception of grammatical metaphor, especially the experiential type, will be related to an assessment of a more general issue, viz. the way in which ‘grammatical class’ or syntagmatic units (rank units) are theorized in SFL. The assessment of the systemic-functional treatment of ‘grammatical class’ which will be given in this Sub-section 2.4 constitutes the basis for the following section, in which a model will be laid out of the internal structure of language, as embedded within the more general semiotic-functional framework which has so far been set up [in Chapter 5]. In this model, special attention will be paid to the status of ‘grammatical class’ and syntagmatic structure in general.

2.1 ‘Grammatical metaphor’ and the architecture versus internal structure of language

At various points in this dissertation, it has been noted that ‘grammatical metaphor’ essentially has to do with the relationship between a ‘lexico-grammar’ and a ‘semantics’. In Chapter 7 we have seen that this relationship can either be conceived of in terms of ‘alternative realizations’ in the lexico-grammar of the ‘same’ ‘meaning’ or area of ‘meaning’ in the ‘semantics’; or it can be regarded as involving semantic variation as well. A first question which needs to be taken up in evaluating the notion of grammatical metaphor on a theoretical level, is: how is a stratum of ‘semantics’ conceived of in explanations and descriptions of grammatical metaphor? This question can be explored in the framework of the different types of semantics which have been distinguished in Chapter 5.

I Interpersonal metaphors of mood

The type of semantics brought up in relation to grammatical metaphor which can be most clearly assessed in theoretical terms, is the *speech-functional semantics* drawn on in relation to interpersonal metaphors of mood. As has been indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, this is also one of the first types of separate ‘semantics’ which has been proposed in SFL, just on the verge of the

introduction of the notion of grammatical metaphor [i.e. in Halliday 1984].²³ We have seen in the previous chapter that speech-functional meanings are used in order to explain the variation between expressions such as the following:

- (11) a. *Pass the salt!*
 b. \Rightarrow *Could you pass the salt please?*
 c. *Would you mind* \Rightarrow *passing the salt please?*
- (12) a. *Don't stay there any longer.*
 b. \Rightarrow *You shouldn't stay there any longer.*
 c. *I advise you* \Rightarrow *not to stay there any longer.*

The mappings between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar which are referred to in explaining such metaphors of mood are visualized in Figure 8-8. The starting point in an analysis of sets of variant expressions such as (11) and (12) is the observation that a 'command' may be either 'realized' as an imperative, which is its 'congruent' 'realization', or as an interrogative or a declarative, which are 'incongruent' 'realizations'. If one also takes into account the semantic feedback effect of incongruent realizations, it is recognized that metaphorical expressions have two meanings, an 'incongruent' one (in this case 'command') and a 'congruent' one: in (11b) the 'congruent' meaning is 'question', in (12b) it is 'statement'. Hence an expression such as *Could you pass the salt please?* has two interpersonal interpretations which can be taken up in the speech interaction: it can be interpreted in terms of its face-value meaning, as a simple 'question'; or it can be interpreted in terms of its metaphorical meaning, as a 'command'. In the first case, what is negotiated is 'information', in the second case, it is 'goods-&-services'.

²³ See Chapter 3, p. 166, and Chapter 4, p. 195 above.

Speech-functional semantics




Figure 8-8 · Metaphorical and non-metaphorical mappings between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar in the interpersonal metafunction

Depending on the level of delicacy of the analysis, the semantic value of the metaphorical expressions may then be further specified in terms of more delicate types of speech functions. In this perspective, (11b) expresses a 'polite request', and (12b) indicates an 'advice'. These more delicate speech functions are regarded as more specific sub-types within the category of 'command'. As we have seen in Chapter 7, this is the approach taken by Halliday [1985a] in IFG, where he introduces the notion of grammatical metaphor. In this view, then, only the primary types of speech functions have a congruent 'realization' in the lexicogrammar, while more delicate types of speech functions are expressed through interpersonal metaphors.

Now the systemic-functional conception of interpersonal metaphors of mood can be further examined in relation to the semiotic-functional model proposed in Chapter 5 above. As we have seen, in the approach taken in that model, a speech-functional semantics is theorized in terms of a second-order, connotative content plane in Hjelmslev's sense. In this view then, the relationship between speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar is not regarded to be realization, but rather, *instantiation:actualization*. We have seen that this relationship is one of variation in two directions, i.e. lexicogrammatical expressions can be instantiated in various ways in speech-functional semantics, whereas speech-functional meanings can be construed in various ways in lexicogrammatical expressions – construal being defined as the converse of realization. In this perspective, then, the inherent variation which is involved, both lexicogrammatically and semantically is explained as follows: the metaphorical and non-metaphorical expressions in examples (11a) and (11b), and (12a) and (12b), are alternative construals of the schematic speech-functional meaning 'command'; conversely, in a speech interaction, an expression such as *Could you pass the salt please?* can be instantiated or actualized in two alternative meanings, either 'command' and/or 'statement'.

The partial formal nature of a connotative content level – i.e. the fact that, as a content plane in its own right, a speech-functional semantics has its own dimension of content-form – is also instructive in relation to interpersonal metaphors of mood. For certain types of speech-functional meanings a solidary expression can be recognized. These 'formalized' speech functions

are the ones which are defined at the least delicate end of the system of SPEECH FUNCTION or the most schematic options in that system, i.e. 'command', 'statement' and 'question'.²⁴ This is in accordance with the orientation of the differentiation between form–substance–purport in general, by which Hjelmslev theorizes the dimension of schematicity in semiotic systems. However, because a speech-functional semantics is a connotative content plane, its contents (speech-functional meanings) are by definition expressible in various ways in the 'denotative' (in Hjelmslev's sense) semiotic system of language, i.e. in lexicogrammar. As we have seen in Chapter 2, this is a characteristic feature of the organization of a second-order semiotic, such as a connotative one. In this sense, then, the solidary relation between, for example, 'command' and imperative is not the only possible relationship which creates the meaning of 'command': the same content can be expressed or connoted – in the abstract Hjelmslevian sense – by other expressions, such as declarative or interrogative.

II Interpersonal metaphors of modality

With regard to interpersonal grammatical **metaphors of modality**, the situation is more complex. Consider the following examples illustrating the variety of metaphors of modality (in relation to two 'congruent forms' (a–b)):

- (13) a. *Caesar was certainly very ambitious.*
 b. *Caesar must have been very ambitious.*
 c. *I think ⇨ Caesar was very ambitious.*
 d. *Everyone admits that ⇨ Caesar was very ambitious.*
 e. *It stands to reason that ⇨ ...*
 f. *It is obvious that ⇨ ...*
 g. *It's self-evident that ⇨ ...*
 h. *You can't seriously doubt that ⇨ ...*

[cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 355]

²⁴ The speech function of 'offer' is an exception in this respect: it does not have a solidary type of expression *in language*. We have seen in Chapter 1 that this exception can be interpreted in terms of Langacker's notion of a coding gap or the structuralist notion of *case vide*. The qualification 'in language' is important in the above statement; as will be argued in Chapter 10, 'offers' do have a basic realization pattern which is physical-material rather than linguistic.

As we have seen in Chapter 7, the reason why these expressions are regarded as metaphorical by Halliday, is that the meaning of ‘modality’ – in the examples in (13), this is the modal meaning of ‘certainty’ – is not expressed in the Mood element, as is the case in ‘congruent’ expressions such as (13a) (Modal Adjunct *certainly*) and (13b) (Modal operator *must*), but rather in a separate element: “the modality is being dressed up as a proposition” [Halliday 1994/1985: 355]. In contrast to the treatment of metaphors of mood, interpersonal metaphorical expressions of modality are accounted for in the lexicogrammatical system of MODALITY: they are regarded as explicit ‘realizations’ of modal meanings, contrasting with the implicit ones expressed in the Mood element. This contrast is indicated as a system (MANIFESTATION in Matthiessen’s [1993a: 497] account) which is simultaneous with other systems in the network of MODALITY. The location of metaphors of modality in the system network of MODALITY is shown in Figure 8-9.




Figure 8-9 · The location of metaphors of modality in the network of MODALITY
[cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 360; Matthiessen 1993a: 497]

In Halliday’s first presentation of interpersonal metaphors of modality (i.e. in IFG), as we have seen, such metaphors are generally referred to as projecting

clauses, and two types are distinguished in terms of the simultaneous system of ORIENTATION: objective and subjective metaphors. Halliday explains this with regard to the modal meaning of probability:

What happens is that, in order to state *explicitly* that the probability is subjective, or alternatively, at the other end, to claim *explicitly* that the probability is objective, the speaker construes the proposition as a projection and encodes the subjectivity (*I think*), or the objectivity (*it is likely*), in a projecting clause. [Halliday 1994/1985: 355; emphasis MAKH]

Furthermore, Comment Adjuncts such as *in my opinion*, *in all probability*, which are neither part of the Mood element, which construe a modal meaning in a prepositional phrase, are regarded as “intermediate between explicit and implicit” [Halliday 1994/1985: 355].

Matthiessen [1993a: 502] does not only regard projection as a source of interpersonal metaphor. In his view, an expression (clause: proposition or proposal) can also be modalized or modulated by being embedded, as in the following examples:

- (14) a. *That Henry has gone to London seems very likely.*
b. *That Henry has gone to London is quite certain.*
c. *For Henry to go to London is necessary.*

[Matthiessen 1993a: 502]

Two remarks can be formulated regarding the systemic-functional treatment of interpersonal metaphors of modality. The first remark is a specific methodological one, in that it pertains to the systemic organization of the network of MODALITY. I believe that the incorporation of a feature accounting for metaphorical expressions of modality, i.e. explicit, into this network is untenable for three reasons. First, the type of construal where a modal meaning is expressed in a separate proposition rather than in the Mood element of the clause which is being modalized, is not just an option which is systemically contrastive to the non-metaphorical construal of modality in the Mood element. Rather, the metaphorical construal, where the modal meaning occurs in a ‘separate element’ may combine with (and even interact

with)²⁵ a non-metaphorical one: when a clause is ‘modalized’ by being construed as a projected clause, it may itself *also* have a non-metaphorical expression of modality in its own Mood element:

- (15) a. ***I think*** ↗ *it **won't** rain this afternoon.*
 b. ***I don't think*** ↗ *it **will** rain this afternoon.*

Second, metaphorical expressions of modality are systemically different from non-metaphorical ones, in that they are recursive:²⁶

- (16) a. *I think* ↗ *it's impossible that* ↗ *they didn't know.*
 b. *I'm convinced that* ↗ *there is a good chance that* ↗ *we will win.*

Third, precisely because, in metaphors of modality, the modal meaning is construed in a *separate* element rather than in the Mood element of the clause which is being modalized, such expressions cannot be incorporated in a network whose entry condition is the *clause*, as is the case with the system of MODALITY.²⁷ In modal metaphors based on projecting processes, as in (17)

²⁵ This interaction can be seen in the variation between direct negative and transferred negative expressions, as shown in examples (15a) and (15b) (respectively) below.

²⁶ In contrast, a distinctive feature of modal operators is that they cannot co-occur (**It will might rain*). The two types of non-metaphorical expressions of modality, i.e. modal operators and modal adverbs can co-occur (*Caesar **must certainly** have been very ambitious*) [cf. Hoyer 1997], and modal adverbs of different sub-types can also co-occur (e.g. probability and usuality, as in ***Certainly**, you **must always** lock the door behind you*), but these are not cases of systemic recursion within one category.

²⁷ The problem which is referred to here regarding the organization of system networks, and the status of entry conditions, is a more general one. It does not only pertain to the network of MODALITY (when it incorporates a feature to indicate metaphors of modality), but it also applies to the network of THEME [cf. the representation of such a thematic network in Chapter 6, p. 340 above], where periphrastic constructions such as theme identification and theme predication again no longer pertain to the clause as such, but create a unit which is larger than one clause, or which is in any case is different in complexity from the single clause in which theme is construed in a non-periphrastic way (e.g. *What happened was that the glass broke; What John did was break the glass, Who broke the glass was John* vs. *The glass broke; John broke the glass*). This problem is also relevant in the experiential metafunction: to the extent that a participant relationship between an Actor, Goal and Recipient is construed in a nominal group such as *John's gift of a ring to Mary*, the entry condition clause in the experiential network of transitivity is similarly problematic. In Section 3 below, it will be argued that a first step towards avoiding such problems (which are clearly related to the notion of grammatical metaphor, in both the interpersonal and

below, the overall unit which is created through the metaphorical construal is a *clause complex* rather than a clause (through projection as a hypotactic type of interdependency). In metaphors based on relational processes, this overall unit can be of two types: (1) when the relational process is projective,²⁸ as in (18), it is again a *clause complex*; (2) when the relational process is non-projective,²⁹ the overall unit created is a *combination of two clauses*, in which the modalized clause is embedded in the relational clause which expresses the modal meaning metaphorically, as shown in (19):³⁰

- (17) a. ||| *I think* ' || *it won't rain this afternoon.* |||
 b. ||| *It's generally assumed* ' || *Caesar was ambitious.* |||
- (18) a. ||| *It's likely* ' || *they didn't know.* |||
 b. ||| *It's certain* ' || *Henry has gone to London.* |||
- (19) a. [[*That Henry has gone to London*]] *is quite certain.*
 b. [[*That Henry has gone to London*]] *seems very likely.*

A second remark regarding the systemic-functional treatment of interpersonal metaphors of modality is more general and more fundamental, although it is not unrelated to the methodological point raised above. While metaphorical expressions of modality are accommodated in the *lexico-grammatical* network of MODALITY in terms of a distinct option, explicit, which contrasts systemically with implicit, no specification is given of what there is in the *structure* of these expressions in general, which characterizes them as metaphorical interpersonal expressions. The examples which are given are described in terms of projection and expansion, or in terms of projecting mental and verbal processes and relational processes (projecting and/or

experiential components), is to clearly disentangle functional structure from syntagmatic structure, and to assign a more fundamental role to syntagmatic structure than is currently done in SFL.

²⁸ As in Halliday's [1994/1985: 355] and Matthiessen's [1993a: 502] interpretation of examples such as (18).

²⁹ That is, in Matthiessen's [1993a: 502] interpretation of examples such as (19).

³⁰ In Halliday's notation, ||| indicates a sentence boundary, || indicates a clause boundary, and [[]] indicates an embedded clause [cf. also Chapter 1, p. 34 above]. The sign ' indicates projection.

expanding; involving hypotactic expansion or embedding expansion),³¹ which are logical and experiential categories, respectively. However, no indication is given of a structural (schematic) feature of these *experiential* and *logical* resources which makes them suitable for the expression of interpersonal meanings, especially modality.

Due to the lack of such a structural specification, questions arise as to the boundaries of grammatical metaphor: for instance, is it projecting mental processes in general then, which serve as metaphorical expressions of modality? When Halliday gives examples of interpersonal metaphors based on active projecting processes, it appears that the Senser of the projecting process is either *I* (or *you* in interrogatives), as in (20), or a nominal group which allows a generic interpretation, as in (21):

- (20) a. ***I think*** ↗ *it's going to rain.*
 b. ***I don't believe*** ↗ *they didn't know.*
- (21) a. ***Everyone*** admits that ↗ ...
 b. ***No sane person*** would pretend that ↗ ...
 c. ***All authorities on the subject*** are agreed that ↗ ... [cf. Halliday 1994/1985: 355]

In this perspective it is not clear whether expressions such as those in (22) below, where the projecting Agent (Senser) is not restricted in this sense, would also be regarded as interpersonal metaphors:

- (22) a. ***John*** believes that *they didn't know.*
 b. ***The Prime Minister*** argues that *it's necessary to make cuts in military spending.*

If one also accepts, as Matthiessen does, expressions such as (14) and (19), in which the modalized proposition is embedded and the modal meaning is expressed in a relational process, as instances of interpersonal metaphor, the same question as to the limits of grammatical metaphor applies to the area of relational processes. Consider examples (24), which have the same structure (as relational processes) as the examples given by Matthiessen above (which

³¹ The distinction between projection and expansion, and between taxis and embedding in relation to interpersonal metaphor will be further looked into in Chapter 10.

are repeated here as (23)). Again it is not clear if these expressions are interpersonal metaphors, and why or why not:

- (23) a. *That Henry has gone to London **seems very likely**.*
 b. *That Henry has gone to London **is quite certain**.* [Matthiessen 1993a: 502]
- (24) a. *That Henry has gone to London **is regrettable**.*
 b. *That they had already left **is rather surprising**.*
 c. ***It's surprising** that they had already left.*
 d. ***It's regrettable** that they had already left.*

Since no overall, schematic, structural feature is attributed to *all* expressions of modality, whether metaphorical or non-metaphorical, the term ‘modality’ or ‘modal deixis’ in the overall interpersonal system of DEICTICITY³² appears to be a *semantic generalization* rather than a schematic structural term in a network, which is then instantiated into more specific types of structuralizations. From this observation, a further conclusion can be drawn in relation to the semiotic-functional model presented in Chapter 5. I would argue that the ‘modal *meaning*’ which is referred to in systemic-functional analysis of metaphors of modality is in fact a ‘meaning’ which appears from a macro-perspective on language. This means that it is either seen as a speech-functional meaning, or as an ontological meaning. The speech-functional perspective in fact appears clearly when Halliday states, just before he gives a range of possible metaphorical expressions of modality, that “speakers have indefinitely many *ways of expressing their opinions*” [Halliday 1994/1985: 355]. In this perspective, the expression of ‘modality’, or more specifically the expression of ‘probability’, ‘possibility’ and ‘certainty’³³ is regarded as a general kind of speech function which can be achieved by means of various lexicogrammatical means. In the approach taken in Chapter 5, these lexicogrammatical resources are seen as different types of *construals* or *indications* of a speech-functional meaning ‘expressing opinion or expressing modality’, rather than as realizations of this meaning.

³² Cf. the visual representation of this system, as embedded in the overall interpersonal lexicogrammatical system network, in Chapter 5, pp. 368–369 above.

³³ Or similar types of meanings expressing ‘usuality’, ‘obligation’ or ‘inclination’ rather than ‘probability’.

In the speech-functional perspective, it is emphasized that it is speakers who express opinions which have to do with the likelihood of an event to take place (or to have taken place). In an alternative, complementary, perspective, which is equally a macro-perspective on language, the meaning of ‘modality’ is assumed as an ontological meaning. The lexicogrammatical expressions which are then recognized as related to this meaning are in fact different construals or designations of this ontological meaning. Let us take an example the ontological meaning of ‘certainty’. We have seen in Chapter 5 that, as an experiential semantics, ‘ontological semantics’ is most clearly related to that formal aspect of language which is called the sense of lexical expressions. In this perspective then, an exploration of the way in which the ontological meaning ‘certainty’ can be construed in language, can start with the lexeme *certain*. The various expressions which are recognized then as related to the meaning ‘certainty’ are of two general types: (1) the possible types of constructions in which the lexeme *certain* occurs, as in (25); and (2) constructions in which lexemes are used which are related to certain in terms of sense relations, especially synonymy, as shown in (26):³⁴

- (25) a. *It’s certain that we will win.*
 b. *We will certainly win.*³⁵
 c. *I’m certain that we will win.*
 d. *It’s by no means a certainty that we will win.*
- (26) a. *It’s sure that ...*
 b. *I’m sure/convinced/confident that ...*
 c. *It’s my conviction that ...*

³⁴ In a further analysis, also other types of sense relations can be taken into account, indicating again further alternative, expressions of the overall meaning ‘modality’. For example, the relation of antonymy reveals contrasting expressions based on lexemes such as *uncertain*, *doubtful*, *doubt*, and so on.

³⁵ In Halliday’s view, adverbs such as *certainly*, *probably* and *possibly* (as expressions of probability; alongside similar adverbs such as *always*, *usually* and *sometimes* in the area of usuality) are regarded as ‘congruent’ expressions of modality. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that Martin [1992b: 413] only takes modal verbs as ‘congruent’ expressions of modality and treats modal adverbs as metaphorical.

In a similar vein, I would argue that the common ‘areas of meaning’ which play an important role in the model of appraisal (which incorporates interpersonal grammatical metaphor, as we have seen in Section 1.1), are likewise ontological meanings, or the formalization of such meanings in lexical sense. Before we move on to further conclusions to be drawn from the macro-semantic or lexical semantic approach to interpersonal grammatical metaphor (whether of mood, or of modality) and appraisal systems in SFL, let us consider the treatment of experiential grammatical metaphor.

III Experiential grammatical metaphors

As has been noted in Section 1, the ‘meanings’ which are drawn on in studies of experiential modality from the late 1980s and the 1990s,³⁶ are especially ‘thing’, ‘quality’ and ‘process’. The experiential semantic categories of ‘thing’, ‘quality’ and ‘process’ suffice to explain three major types of experiential metaphor, viz. ‘process’ → ‘thing’, ‘process’ → ‘quality’ and ‘quality’ → ‘thing’, as illustrated in Section 1 above.³⁷ We have also seen above that these meanings have later been organized into a semantic system network for the experiential component by Halliday & Matthiessen [1999], and that these semantic categories are linked to ‘grammatical classes’: nominal group, adjective (adjectival group which is regarded as a type of nominal group in SFL), and verbal group.

In terms of the semiotic-functional model which has been set up in Chapter 5, I would argue that these ‘semantic’ categories are again either to be seen in an ontological sense, or as schematic classes of lexemes (which are also termed noun, adjective, verb. The ontological perspective is in fact clear from Halliday & Matthiessen’s [1999] approach in constructing an experiential semantic network: although they emphasize that the semantic categories which they set up are based on distinctions which are coded in lexicogrammar, the categories themselves are essentially classifications of

³⁶ See note 8, p. 437 above.

³⁷ See examples (8)–(10), p. 439–440 above. As has been indicated, these are not the only types of metaphors distinguished by Halliday & Matthiessen [1999]. Other types are on the one hand, shifts to other categories than ‘thing’ and ‘quality’, such as shift to ‘minor process’ and to ‘process’, as shown in Table 8-1.

phenomena in reality,³⁸ as is explicitly indicated in their semantic system network, which has as its root the category ‘phenomenon’.

As has been indicated in above,³⁹ there are two aspects to the use of ontological semantic categories in SFL, which are related but which should be disentangled in a theoretical study: they are used in connection with experiential grammatical metaphor, and they are used in order to define, in a ‘semantic’ way, ‘grammatical classes’. I believe that no objection can be raised against the use of ontological categories in order to explain the semantic variation involved in experiential grammatical metaphor, *as long as* it is recognized that this is an explanation from a macro-perspective on language, which means, more specifically: as long as it is recognized that the relationship between an ontological semantics and lexicogrammatical expressions is not one of realization, but again instantiation and construal. In this sense, a ‘process’ can be *construed* (rather than realized) non-metaphorically as a verbal group or metaphorically as a nominal group. In the latter case, an additional meaning which is construed and which constitutes the metaphorical meaning of the expression is that of ‘thing’, because the nominal group, in non-metaphorical expressions, construes ‘things’. However, a crucial further qualification should be noted: this does not mean that the ‘process’ is turned into a ‘thing’;⁴⁰ it only means that the ‘process’ is construed **as if** it was a ‘thing’.

The use of ontological-semantic categories in order to define grammatical categories such as verbal group, nominal group and adjectival group,⁴¹ however, is problematic and needs further exploration. We will return to this issue in Section 2.4 below. Before that, first further conclusions will be drawn from the general macro-semantic approach to grammatical metaphor [§ IV

³⁸ Recall from Chapter 5 that an alternative term for ontological semantics is phenomenological semantics, because it pertains to the way in which we perceive (and classify) phenomena in reality; see note 36, p. 298 above.

³⁹ See the introduction to this chapter, and the introduction to Section 2 more particularly.

⁴⁰ The statement that in the type of experiential grammatical metaphor which is used as an example here, a ‘process’ is turned into a ‘thing’ is again based on the assumption that the nominal group *in fact realizes* a ‘thing’.

⁴¹ Henceforth, I will refer to groups such as *very interesting, rather boring, more than enough*, and so forth as ‘adjectival groups’ rather than ‘nominal groups’ as is done in SFL [see Chapter 1].

below], and further consequences of this approach will be specified [Sub-sections 2.2–2.3 below].

IV Conclusion: The macro-semantic approach to grammatical metaphor in SFL

In this sub-section [2.1], it has been argued that the various types of grammatical metaphor which have been recognized in SFL – i.e. interpersonal metaphors of mood and of modality, and experiential metaphors – have mainly been approached from a macro-semantic perspective. In other words, the types of meanings which are drawn on in order to explain the variation in meaning which is involved in grammatical metaphor have been characterized macro-semantic meanings, i.e. speech-functional meanings (especially in relation to interpersonal metaphor) and ontological meanings (especially in relation to experiential metaphor). In this vein, it has been claimed that grammatical metaphor does not involve an *alternative realization* of a common area of meaning which is accompanied by a semantic variation, but rather, that metaphor is based on a **variant construal** of macro-semantic meanings: interpersonal metaphors *indicate* speech-functional meanings in a different way than non-metaphorical interpersonal expressions, and by the same token, experiential metaphors *designate* ontological meanings in a different way than non-metaphorical experiential expressions.

These observations can now be further developed in relation to the approach defended in Chapter 5 above. What is especially important, in this respect, is the status of a macro-semantic perspective in linguistics in general. When metaphor is defined from a macro-perspective, in terms of the relationship of construal between macro-semantics and lexicogrammar, what is characterized is the architecture of metaphor, rather than its internal structure. It has been argued in Chapter 5 that a macro-perspective, or an external perspective on language, is valuable in a heuristic sense, in order to identify variation in lexicogrammatical means. This is exactly what the notion of grammatical metaphor reveals: that various types of lexicogrammatical expressions can be drawn together on the basis of the ‘meaning’ they construe. However, as has been argued in Chapter 5, an external perspective must be complemented by an internal one, which focusses on the *internal structure* of linguistic phenomena in terms of *solidary* form–meaning couplings.

Importantly, because it only takes into account the architecture of language, i.e. the relationship between language and macro-semantics, an external approach to grammatical metaphor can only *identify and characterize* the types of variation which are involved in metaphorical construals. A macro-semantic approach to grammatical metaphor cannot *define* ‘grammatical metaphor’ as a structural phenomenon in language, i.e. as a linguistic category. This then, is the major conclusion to be drawn from an exploration of how the ‘semantics’ which is referred to in systemic-functional explanations of grammatical metaphor is conceived of: the argument that it is necessary to complement the approach which has so far been taken in studies of grammatical metaphor with an internal approach in which the structure of grammatical metaphor is specified in semiotic-functional terms, i.e. in terms of form–meaning couplings. This conclusion has two further, more specific aspects which are noteworthy, because they indicate two specific requirements for a semiotic-functional structural definition and explanation of grammatical metaphor. These will be briefly looked at in the following two sub-sections.

2.2 The structure of interpersonal and experiential metaphor

A result of the lack of a general *structural* specification of what exactly is metaphorical in the various types of expressions – interpersonal metaphors of mood and of modality, and experiential metaphors – is that it is neither specified what is *common*, in structural terms, in the two major types of grammatical metaphor, i.e. interpersonal metaphor and experiential metaphor. Therefore, a first requirement for a semiotic-functional structural characterization of grammatical metaphor is that it should specify the structural features which are characteristic of ‘grammatical metaphor’ in general, and it should then relate interpersonal and experiential metaphors to this general definition as two general types of metaphor which are different in a metafunctional sense.

2.3 Grammatical metaphor and markedness: The notion of ‘incongruence’

As we have seen in Chapter 7, an important aspect of the systemic-functional view of grammatical metaphor is that it is characterized as a *marked* type of construction. It is precisely in this sense that the term ‘*incongruent*’ is used in order to refer to metaphorical expressions in SFL, whereas non-metaphorical expressions are then termed ‘congruent’: metaphors are expressions which do not conform to “the *typical* ways of saying things” [Halliday 1985a: 321; emphasis MT].⁴² The important role which is assigned to markedness in relation to grammatical metaphor can now be further clarified in relation to the observations made above regarding the macro-semantic approach which prevails in systemic-functional treatments of grammatical metaphor. What is important in this respect, is the relationship of ‘variation in two directions’ which holds between a macro-semantics and lexicogrammar, i.e. the relationship of macro-instantiation/construal. Wherever variation appears, the notion of *probability* becomes relevant: in certain registers or in a language as a whole, some variant instantiations/variant construals are more likely to occur than others. Those expressions which have a low probability value can then be specified as ‘marked’ constructions in the register or language which is under scrutiny.⁴³

In an internal linguistic perspective, the notions of probability and markedness are irrelevant, since what is focussed on, in this perspective, is *solidary* form–meaning couplings. The special or characteristic feature of grammatical *metaphor*, in this perspective, then, is not its markedness vis-à-vis other types of constructions, but rather its ‘second-order’ nature, i.e. the way in which it

⁴² See Chapter 5, p. 397 and especially p. 422. We have also seen in Chapter 5 that the notion of incongruence has a long tradition in SFL which precedes the introduction of the concept of ‘grammatical metaphor’ [cf. Chapter 5, Section 2].

⁴³ In this sense, ‘probability’ and ‘markedness’ are inherently relative notions: a type of expression is only marked or unmarked in a specific context, i.e. in the environment of a specific register or language. Hence, when grammatical metaphor is regarded as a marked type of construction in language in general, this does not exclude that in particular registers, most notably, in this case, scientific discourse, grammatical metaphor may be the unmarked type of construction. The relativity of the very notion ‘markedness’ is in fact another reason why ‘markedness’ cannot serve to *define* ‘grammatical metaphor’ as a linguistic category.

For this reason and the one which will be noted in the following paragraph, I will not use the term ‘incongruent’ to refer to metaphorical expressions.

builds upon the non-metaphorical resources of language, and in this way extends them. A second requirement for a semiotic-functional, structural definition of grammatical metaphor is thus to specify its ‘second-order’ nature vis-à-vis non-metaphorical types of constructions in structural terms.

2.4 Beyond experiential metaphor: ‘Word classes’ and ‘grammatical categories’

In this section we turn to the issue, referred to above, of defining grammatical classes in macro-semantic terms, i.e. in terms of ontological meanings. The definitions which will be at stake here are summarized in Table 8-2 below. As has been noted, this issue is important in a general theoretical sense and has to be disentangled from the macro-semantic characterization of experiential metaphor, where ontological meanings are a heuristic basis to identify and characterize variation between metaphorical and non-metaphorical construals in language. As we have seen in Chapters 1 and 4, the notion of grammatical class has to do with syntagmatic structure in language, in that a syntagmatic structure, in contrast to a functional structure, is characterized as a sequence of classes. Because, as will be argued in Part IV, in defining and explaining the metaphoricity of ‘grammatical metaphor’ in structural terms, both functional structure and syntagmatic structure will be important, besides its general theoretical relevance, the issue of defining ‘grammatical classes’ is also relevant in relation to an internal perspective on grammatical metaphor.

‘Grammatical class’	Ontological category
Noun – nominal group	‘thing’
Verb – verbal group	‘process’ or ‘event’
Adjective – adjectival group	‘quality’

Table 8-2 · An ontological-semantic characterization of ‘grammatical classes’

As has been noted in Chapter 5, the problem of defining grammatical classes – as examples of linguistic categories *par excellence* – is a huge issue which has a very long-standing tradition in linguistics and philosophy, starting with

Aristotle.⁴⁴ In this section, we will focus on the problematic nature of an ontological-semantic characterization of grammatical classes such as the one in Table 8-2. A possible alternative treatment of ‘grammatical class’ and syntagmatic structure more generally will be proposed in Section 3 below.

The reservation regarding an ontological characterization of grammatical classes which will be presented here, is based on Coseriu’s [1992] theoretical discussion of the definition of *Wortarten* or *partes orationis*. Coseriu points out two general types of problems pertaining to the definition of ‘grammatical classes’. First, there is a confusion between, on the one hand, linguistic notions or concepts which are termed in the metalanguage of linguistics, and phenomena on the other hand (a confusion between “Begriff und Gegenstand” [Coseriu 1992: 366]). It is clear that this type of confusion is the result of a failure to distinguish between the internal structure of language, and its architecture, between linguistic signs as form–meaning couplings, and macro-semantic meanings, or between *Bedeutung* and *Bezeichnung*. It has been argued in Section 2.1 that a macro-semantic perspective has a significant heuristic value in relation to grammatical metaphor: it is by taking such an external perspective on language that various types of variant construals can be recognized and can be brought together in terms of one notion, i.e. ‘grammatical metaphor’. As we have seen, this is precisely one of most important merits of the introduction of the concept ‘grammatical metaphor’ in SFL. However, notwithstanding this incontestable value of ‘grammatical metaphor’ as is has so far been conceived of in SFL, it has been noted that what is still lacking, due to the prevalence of an external perspective, is a structural *definition* of ‘grammatical metaphor’ as a linguistic category.

Now, ‘grammatical categories’ such as ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’ are categories of the *internal structure* of language. Indeed, as has been noted in Chapter 5,⁴⁵ the notions ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’, whatever the way in

⁴⁴ See Chapter 5, p. 261–262 above. On the problem of defining ‘word classes’, see, for example, Croft [1991], Newmeyer [1998: 206ff] and especially Coseriu [1992] (and references therein), whose discussion of defining ‘grammatical classes’ will be drawn on in the present section.

⁴⁵ See p. 261 above.

which they are conceived of – as ‘word classes’ or ‘grammatical classes’ – are ‘grammatical categories’ par excellence, which are important in any type of linguistic theory. In this sense, although such categories might in an informal or prelinguistic characterization be linked to ontological meanings such as ‘thing’, ‘process’ and ‘quality’, such meanings cannot *define* the internal-structural nature of the categories ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’ *as linguistic categories*.

The second problem which Coseriu identifies in relation to defining grammatical categories is more complex: it is a failure to distinguish between different levels of abstraction (“Abstraktionsebenen”) within the analysis of what I have called the ‘internal structure’ of language [Coseriu 1992: 367]. In this respect, the major mistake, Coseriu argues, is that grammatical categories such as ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’ are conceived of as lexical “classes”, which are defined as different groups of lexemes/words. In this (common) view, each word in the lexis of a language is then seen as belonging ‘naturally’ to one of the ‘grammatical classes’.

In keeping with Coseriu’s analysis, I will henceforth indicate the different levels of abstraction which are important in the definition of notions such as ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’ by making a consistent distinction between **class** and **category**, or more fully, “grammatical classes” or “word classes” on the one hand, and “grammatical categories” (or ‘word categories’, although this term is less common in linguistics than ‘word classes’) on the other hand. The exact theoretical nature of this distinction will become clear in the further discussion. Coseriu adduces at least two reasons⁴⁶ why a conception of grammatical categories in terms of classes in general, or word classes in particular, is untenable.

First, a grammatical category can lie at the basis of setting up a class of words, but this thus not mean that this category can be *defined* as this class: a category is not a class, as such, but it is the more abstract basis on which a class can be set up. What is at issue here is an important theoretical distinction between the *definition* of abstract categories and the *classification* of

⁴⁶ These ‘two reasons’ described below are based on my own interpretation and summary of Coseriu’s intricate theoretical discussion.

phenomena (even when these phenomena themselves are the result of an abstraction, such as words) [Coseriu 1992: 368].⁴⁷ Coseriu explains this problem by means of an analogy:

So können wir wohl die Klasse der dreieckigen Gegenstände bilden, doch bedeutet das keine Definition der “Dreieckigkeit”, die eben nicht die Klasse dieser Gegenstände ist, sondern im Gegenteil der Grund dafür, daß die Klasse entsteht [...] [Coseriu 1992: 368].

In the same sense, the nature of the grammatical category ‘noun’ for example, i.e. the nature of ‘nominality’ or ‘nouniness’ cannot be *defined* by setting up a class of nominal lexemes. Rather, what has to be defined lies at a more abstract level: is precisely the feature which the various lexemes in this class have in common.

Coseriu further argues that, when grammatical categories are explicitly described or implicitly understood in an ontological sense *without recognizing this*, a number of phenomena in language – such as what is commonly referred to as ‘nominalization’ – are characterized and explained in an incoherent way. Because this observation further strengthens what was noted regarding the macro-semantic approach to experiential metaphor,⁴⁸ it is useful to quote Coseriu in extenso on this topic. He starts again with an analogy which demonstrates in a very pungent way the limits of ontological meanings with regard to defining linguistic phenomena:

dies [i.e. the failure to distinguish between Bezeichnung and Bedeutung, MT] verursacht in der grammatischen Praxis schwerwiegende Inkohärenzen, wie etwa die – um nur ein einziges Beispiel zu geben –, daß man von “Nominalformen des Verbuns” spricht (was – wenn man annimmt, die Klasse des Nomens und die des Verbuns kämen durch dasselbe kategorielle Kriterium zustande – genau so wäre, als wollte man von “Dreiecksformen des Quadrats”

⁴⁷ Cf. Coseriu [1991: 368]:

Dabei darf die Definition – als eine auf Begriffe gerichtete Operation – nicht mit der Klassifizierung verwechselt werden, die immer eine Operation existentieller Natur ist, auch wenn sie sich an Gegenständen vollzieht, die aus einer Abstraktion hervorgehen.

⁴⁸ I.e. the observation that a macro-perspective on grammatical metaphor can be useful in a heuristic sense, *only* if the nature and limits of this perspective are recognized. In such a perspective, it is also recognized that characterizations of experiential metaphors in terms of *shifts* from ‘process’ to ‘thing’ (‘a ‘process’ is turned into a ‘thing’) are untenable.

sprechen). Und eben dies ist auch der Grund für so manches in Kritik und Theorie der Wortkategorien feststellbare Mißverständnis, wie etwa, wann es heißt, daß “Wörter wie *Hunger*, *Traum*, *Flucht*, *Unterhaltung* unabhängig von der Form als Verben betrachtet werden müßten, da sie Vorgänge bezeichnen”; daß Wörter wie *Schnelligkeit*, *Schönheit*, *Größe* “Eigenschaften bezeichnen, ohne Adjektive zu sein”, oder daß man in *lumière du soleil* und *lumière solaire* mit dem Nomen *soleil* “dasselbe” wie mit dem Adjektiv *solaire* sage; daß das Substantiv “Eigenschaft” (Beispiel: *Schönheit*) und “Vorgang” (Beispiel: *Ankunft*) bedeuten könne; sowie daß frz. *verdure* – *verdoyer* bzw. *marche* – *marcher* “denselben Begriff” ausdrücken usw. [Coseriu 1992: 374–375]

Second, grammatical categories cannot be defined *as* word classes, because word classes are not purely and simply classifications of distinct ‘meanings’ (e.g. ‘noun’ of ‘thing’ as a schematic lexical meaning): as classes, they are constituted in a particular way which has to do with the grammatical functioning of these words in language. This nature of word classes is revealed in, again, a common type of reasoning in which it is stated that the word *fire* can either be a noun or a verb, depending on whether it is preceded by, on the one hand, *a* or *the* (*a fire*: noun) or, on the other hand, *to* (*to fire*: verb).

In the preceding paragraphs in which we have looked at two general problems regarding the definition of grammatical categories, three overall levels of abstraction have been mentioned. It is in the framework of these three different levels that the internal-structural nature of grammatical categories, as the most abstract of these levels, can be characterized. The first level is the more ‘concrete’ level of *ontological meanings* as such, where ‘thing’, ‘process’ and ‘quality’ are regarded as extra-linguistic characterizations of phenomena in reality.⁴⁹ The second level is the linguistic level of *word classes* as lexical classes. On this level, each lexeme in a language belongs naturally to a specific word class (or to more than one word class, as we have seen in the case of *fire*), which indicates a highly abstract lexical meaning which has

⁴⁹ In a Whorfian perspective, it should be recognized that this level is not purely extra-linguistic, since one’s conception of phenomena as ‘things’, ‘processes’ and ‘qualities’ as such may be inherently influenced by the way in which these phenomena are lexicalized in a particular language. In the same vein, the very terms which are referred to here are lexemes drawn from one particular language (*thing*, *process* and *quality* in English).

grammatical relevance,⁵⁰ such as ‘thing’. On this level the nature of lexis as classifying our experience of aspects of reality is highlighted.

The third and most abstract level is the level of *grammatical categories*. As abstract linguistic notions, Coseriu characterizes grammatical categories as “Seinsweisen der Wörter” [Coseriu 1992: 368] or also, “Bedeutungsmodi” [Coseriu 1975c/1957: 221ff].⁵¹ Word categories are “Gußformen, in denen sich der lexikalische Inhalt im Sprechen organisiert” [Coseriu 1992: 370]. The expression “im Sprechen” is important in the definition just cited: it is precisely because of their link to speech, or the actualization of language in general that grammatical categories are *parts of speech*, or *partes orationis*.

If grammatical categories cannot be regarded as classes of words, how can they be defined? In Coseriu’s view, grammatical categories such as ‘noun’, ‘verb’, ‘adjective’ (or rather, ‘substantivity’ or ‘nounhood’, ‘verbhood’ and ‘adjectivity’) are universal or potentially universal [Coseriu 1992: 371, 379]. As such, a grammatical category can be defined purely theoretically as “eine geistige Form, die allein der Bewußtseinsinnerlichkeit zugehört” [ibid.: 378]. Coseriu argues that such a definition is of no interest to the description of individual languages:

⁵⁰ The ‘grammatical relevance’ lies in the fact that these different classes of lexemes (i.e. word classes characterized as ‘noun’, ‘verb’ and ‘adjective’) occur in different grammatical environments, as we have seen in the very simple ‘test’ in relation to the lexeme *fire* (*a fire*: noun, *to fire*: verb). One step further in delicacy, there are other types of abstract lexical classes (or word classes) which have grammatical relevance, for example: the distinction between countable and non-countable nouns, the distinction between different types of Aktionsart in verbs, gradable and non-gradable adjectives, and so on.

⁵¹ There is a striking similarity between the characterization of word *classes* and grammatical categories which is given here, and two general types of experiential categorizations which have been distinguished in Chapter 5 [cf. p. 361 above]: a distinction of word classes is similar to a differentiation of distinct verb classes (which are also lexically distinct), which is also based on the grammatical behaviour (in terms of the types of agnation relationships they enter into) of these classes; and agnate categories which indicate purely grammatical types of distinctions are similar to word *categories* in that they also indicate ‘modi’ (two variant construals in a grammatical alternation) in which a particular verb class can occur. This observation needs to be further investigated in the framework of an overall study of the interaction between lexis and grammar in the experiential component, in which both the nature of word classes/categories and the nature of complementary types of categorizations in the network of TRANSITIVITY should be taken into account.

die Definition einer Wortkategorie hat zwar ein theoretisches Interesse für die Sprachkenntnis im allgemeinen, doch kein instrumentelles Interesse zur äußeren Beschreibung einer bestimmten Sprache. Eine solche Definition kann uns andererseits nichts über die materielle Struktur einer Sprache sagen, noch uns "ein Nomen" als etwas Physikalisches erkennen lassen. [Coseriu 1992: 378]

In a study of grammatical categories in an individual language, Coseriu further argues, the only aspects which are relevant are the questions which of the universal categories are present in that language, and of how they are encoded in 'formal schemata'.

In conclusion, I regard Coseriu's disentangling of grammatical *class* and grammatical *category* and his characterization of grammatical categories as '*modi*' in which lexemes occur as his major contributions to our understanding of the nature of notions such as 'noun', 'verb' and 'adjective', and these two insights of Coseriu's will be incorporated in the model which will be presented in Section 3 below. However, regarding the way in which grammatical categories can be defined, I will not follow Coseriu's argument. More specifically, with regard to English, I believe that what can be defined and what is interesting is not only the formal schemata which encode the grammatical categories occurring in that language. As will be argued further below, the categories themselves, as they occur in English, can also be defined semantically; and moreover, this semantic characterization has to be constructed in tandem with a characterization of the formal patterns in which the grammatical categories are realized. This argument will be incorporated in the model of the internal structure of language which will be proposed in the following section, and it will be further explored in Part IV below.

3 The grammatical heart of language in a semiotic-functional model

In Chapter 5, the nature of a semiotic-functional model of language has been indicated, and the edges of the overall model which is advanced in this dissertation have been presented, focussing on the architecture of language. As indicated, in the present section we will turn to the centre of such a model, i.e. the organization of the internal structure of language. Parallel to the exploration in Chapter 5, a number of *components* which play a role in this internal organization will be indicated, and the *semiotic relationships* which hold between these components will be specified.

3.1 Starting point: Micro-stratification and the realization-exponence complex

A starting point for specifying the organization of the internal structure of language has already been set up in Chapter 5 (see Figure 8-10 for a visual summary).⁵² A relationship between a systemic and a structural side has been identified on three levels: (1) between a lexicogrammatical semantics (system network) and functional structure; (2) between a level of lexical distinctive features organized in terms of systems, and lexemes as such; and (3) between a level of phonological distinctive features again organized in systems, and phonemes as such. The semiotic relationship which holds between the two complementary components (systemic and structural) at each of these levels has been characterized as **realization**.⁵³ This relationship has been identified in Chapter 5 in order to specify a basic kind of stratification, termed **micro-stratification**, to which the other types of stratification distinguished in relation to the architecture of language (two types of macro-stratification) could then be contrasted. At this point it should be emphasized that it is the relationship of realization between a systemic feature and its encoding in a structural pattern which defines the signs of language as solidary form—meaning couplings. In order to distinguish it from other types of internal-

⁵² See Figure 5-8, p. 290, and compare also Figure 5-14, p. 321 above.

⁵³ See p. 286 above.

structural semiotic relationships which will be identified in this section, this type of realization will henceforth be referred to as **micro-realization**.




Figure 8-10 · Starting point for exploring the organization of the internal structure of language

In Chapter 5, the semiotic relationship of realization between system and structure has been related to two frameworks which have been used as a basis for formulating a semiotic-functional model. (1) In relation to Hjelmslev's semiotic theory, the realization relationship between system and structure has been characterized as an extension of the relationship between a conceptual side and a phonic side in language, which is defined by Hjelmslev

as constituting the sign function.⁵⁴ In this sense, the three types of relationships between a systemic and a structural side indicated in Figure 8-10 above are relationships between a content and an expression, and it is precisely in this sense that they indicate solidary form–meaning couplings at each of the three levels shown in this figure.

(2) In relation to Halliday’s scale-&-category model of language, realization has been specified as one aspect of an aggregate of a number of interdependent relationships which has been referred to, in a preliminary way, as a ‘realization-exponence complex’. It has been noted that it is precisely the nature of this ‘realization-exponence complex’ which needs to be further specified in exploring the organization of the internal structure of language. Halliday’s characterization of a ‘realization-exponence complex’ therefore constitutes a second starting point for the further exploration in this section. By means of an example which Halliday gives, it has been shown that this complex kind of relationship involves a number of ‘cycles’ from ‘element of structure’ to ‘formal item’, in which the notions of ‘grammatical class’ and the rank scale are crucially involved:

[...] for example, the formal item “were driven” may be exponent of: (i) the *unit* “group”, (ii) the *element* P in *structure*, (iii) the *class* “verbal”, and (iv) the *term* “passive” in a *system* of secondary classes. All these statements are interdependent [Halliday 1961: 265; emphasis MAKH]

In this section then, the interdependent relationships involved in the ‘realization-exponence complex’ will be further specified. In this specification, two frameworks which have been looked at above will be drawn on, viz. Martin’s model of discourse semantics, and Coseriu’s characterization of grammatical categories. A distinction will be made between three types of semiotic relationships which, together with the relationship of micro-realization, characterize the internal structure of language. As announced in the introduction to this chapter, in specifying these relationships, the nature of word categories and syntagmatic structure will play a central role.

⁵⁴ Recall that the Hjelmslevian relationship referred to here has been termed *primary stratification*, and the two levels which are linked by this relationship, the *primary expression plane* of language, and the *global content plane* of language.

3.2 Discourse semantics: Textual instantiation

Before we look into the internal organization of *lexicogrammar*, it is useful to consider the status of a discourse semantics, understood in Martin's sense as described in Section 1.3 above, in the overall internal structure of language. I propose that a discourse semantics can be theorized as a textual connotative content plane embracing the different metafunctional components in lexicogrammar. I believe that such a view of discourse semantics is justifiable in that there are a number of significant parallels between an interpersonal speech-functional semantics and a textual discourse semantics. Both types of semantics have to do with an overall type of meaning, i.e. the expression of a speech function and cohesion, or the creation of texture, which can be construed on the basis of various types of lexicogrammatical means. In both cases, the variation between these lexicogrammatical means is metafunctional: each type of semantics has an overall metafunctional meaning (interpersonal and textual), but can be construed in terms of any of the three metafunctional components of lexicogrammar.

In Chapter 5, the relationship of *macro*-stratification (macro-instantiation/-construal) which holds between a speech-functional semantics and lexicogrammar has been defined as a contextualizing relationship by which the internal structure of language is linked to extra-linguistic meaning (in this case: speech-functional meaning).⁵⁵ The relationship between a textual discourse semantics and lexicogrammar can similarly be defined as a contextualizing relationship: certain types of lexicogrammatical patterns construe cohesion, not as such, but through the way in which they function in a discourse.

⁵⁵ We have also seen that speech-functional semantics is less 'extra-linguistic' than the parallel semantics in the experiential metafunction, i.e. ontological semantics, in that certain types of speech roles are intrinsically defined in terms of language (such as questioner, commander).




Figure 8-11 · The relation between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar

However, in this respect, i.e. in connection with the contextualizing function of a ‘semantics’, there is also a difference between the nature of a textual discourse semantics and an interpersonal speech-functional semantics. In contrast to speech-functional semantics, the discourse-semantic context to which lexicogrammar is related is completely *intra-linguistic*. The type of

stratification between discourse-semantics and lexicogrammar is not based on a contextualization in terms of extra-linguistic meaning, but rather, as indicated by Martin, a contextualization in terms of a text or discourse as a type of semiotic construct which is larger than the maximal units accounted for in lexicogrammar. This type of stratification which is internal to language, and which is based on *size*, will be referred to as **meso-stratification**.

Parallel with the treatment of a speech-functional semantics, the relationship of meso-stratification is regarded as being based on instantiation/construal, rather than realization. This type of relationship will be referred to as **textual instantiation**. In order to refer to the textual type of *construal*, the same term can be adopted as used in relation to the interpersonal semantics of speech function, viz. *indication*. In this perspective, on the one hand, a lexicogrammatical pattern can instantiate a cohesive link when it occurs (as such, or together with other patterns) or is actualized in a text. On the other hand, cohesive links in texts can be construed or indicated by various types of lexicogrammatical resources.

Finally, a more general type of parallelism should be noted between an interpersonal speech-functional semantics and a textual discourse-semantics, which has to do with the overall metafunctional nature of each of these types of semantics. The contextualizing role of both types of semantics can be explained in terms of the notions of deicticity or indexicality. Throughout this dissertation, up to this point, we have concentrated on the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions, as the two 'major' components of language, and in this context, the notion of 'indexicality' has been linked to the interpersonal metafunction.⁵⁶ However, in a more general perspective in which also the textual metafunction is taken into account, two types of deicticity or indexicality can be distinguished, viz. an interpersonal type and a textual type, which can be specified in relation to a speech-functional semantics and a discourse semantics: each of these types of contextualizing semantics pertains to the speaker-now context, or what has been referred to as the indexical ground to which each utterance is related. In the interpersonal type of semantics, the dimension of the ground which is most relevant is that of the interactants as intersubjective agents, who exchange

⁵⁶ See Chapter 4, especially p. 228 above.

different types of semiotic commodities (information and goods-&-services), and who express opinions about the likelihood of occurrence of events which are talked about. These interpersonal facets of the indexical ground have been explained in Chapter 6 as different aspects of what Martin [2000a] calls interpersonal telos.

The dimension of the ground which is most relevant in relation to the textual metafunction (in discourse semantics), is that of the interactants as creators of a cohesive text or discourse. The discourse-semantic system in which the role of a deictic ground is most clearly highlighted is that of IDENTIFICATION, which has to do with phoricity [Martin 1992b: 98].⁵⁷ This system deals with the way in which participants mentioned in a text are construed as identifiable or non-identifiable to the interactants by means of various types of phoric elements. The identifiability of participants introduced in a text depends on information which the interactants store throughout the interaction, and which can be retrieved at any time during this interaction. In Martin's terms, "phoric items require that information be recovered from the context" [Martin 1992b: 99].⁵⁸ The relationship between interpersonal and textual facets of the speaker-now-context or deictic/indexical ground to which utterances are related will be further explored in Chapter 9 below.

The relationship of meso-stratification is visualized in Figure 8-11. As shown in this figure, the interpersonal speech-functional semantics is regarded as embracing the textual discourse semantics, rather than vice versa. The reason for adopting this order is that certain types of cohesive links as identified in a discourse-semantic perspective, can be further specified in relation to an

⁵⁷ In Halliday & Hasan's [1976] approach this system is termed REFERENCE and is regarded as a sub-component of COHESION. REFERENCE is also the term used by Halliday [1994/1985: 312ff] in IFG. In explaining REFERENCE, Halliday [1994/1985: 312ff] indicates two interdependent dimensions of differentiation: personal | demonstrative | comparative and anaphoric | cataphoric | exophoric | homophoric.

⁵⁸ It is interesting to repeat, in this context, what has been noted above [Chapter 6, note 1, p. 332 above] about the treatment of deicticity in SFL: on the one hand, certain aspects of deixis, i.e. Deictics in the nominal group are regarded as belonging to the *textual* metafunction and are accounted for in the textual system of REFERENCE; on the other hand, the same aspects of deixis in the nominal group and aspects of deixis pertaining to the clause are interpreted as *interpersonal*, and are accounted for in the systems of DETERMINATION (for the nominal group) and MODAL DEICTICITY (or MODALITY) and TEMPORAL DEICTICITY (or PRIMARY TENSE) (for the clause) [See the interpersonal system network in Chapter 6, p. 368–369 above].

interpersonal connotative content plane. This can be seen in a type of cohesive relation, termed internal conjunction, which expresses an internal meaning besides a general textual meaning (the meaning of linking expressions) [cf. Davies 1979, Verstraete 1998]:

- (27) a. *Is John still here, because I would like to talk to him.*
 b. *John must still be working, because the lights are still on.*

In the construction in (27a), the *because*-clause does not indicate the reason why the state of affairs expressed in the main clause takes place, but rather, the reason why this expression is uttered, i.e. the reason for creating the speech function of ‘question’ expressed *Is John still here*. In (27b), the *because*-clause indicates the reason why the speaker thinks and can say that John is still working. In other words, it indicates the degree of certainty the speaker has, which is a general modal meaning, in order to utter the expression *John is still working*. Verstraete [1998: 181] refers to these two types of conjunction as *speech act conjunction* and *epistemic conjunction*, respectively.

3.3 Grammatical categories and syntagmatic structure: Tactic instantiation

In the preceding section, we have concentrated on the relationship between lexicogrammar and discourse semantics as a general type of size-based stratification. In this perspective, a discourse semantics has been characterized as a second-order content plane in a Hjelmslevian connotative semiotic, in which the whole of lexicogrammar (including its three metafunctional components) constitutes the expression plane. I would argue that a similar type of size-based stratification is relevant *within* lexicogrammar.

More precisely, I believe that a size-based stratification is relevant in relation to each of the components indicated in Figure 8-10 (i.e. lexicogrammar, lexis as such, and phonology), in order to clarify the way in which linguistic items which are specified by each of these components (i.e. functional structures, lexemes, and phonemes) *appear* in actual language. In other words, each of the components of lexicogrammar, lexis, and phonology has to be complemented with a further level which is larger in size, and which has a contextualizing role in relation to that component. For ease of reference, these levels will preliminarily be called ‘larger-size levels’.




Figure 8-12 · Size-based stratification in relation to lexicogrammar, lexis and phonology

The different types of ‘larger-size’ levels which will be discussed in this section are indicated in Figure 8-12. As can be seen in Figure 8-12, it is at this point in our exploration of the internal structure of language that the notions of grammatical categories and syntagmatic structure come in. Since we are not concerned with the primary expression plane of language, in the remainder of this section, we will concentrate on the components of lexis as such and lexicogrammar; the component of phonology is only represented in Figure 8-12 above in order to illustrate the parallelism between different types of larger-size levels in language in general.

I Lexis and morphotactics

[1] The role of word categories

Let us start with the component of lexis. I believe that it is different types of **word categories** which indicate the way in which lexemes (and certain types of morphemes, as will be explained below) occur in actual language. The larger-size level which relates to lexis, and where *words* are constructed with a certain type of categorial meaning (especially ‘noun’, ‘verb’, ‘adjective’), is morphology, or, in a terminology which indicates the parallelism between various types of larger-size levels (as will become clear below), **morphotactics**.⁵⁹ In Chapter 5, the component of ‘lexis as such’ has been introduced and briefly characterized as a component which is organized in a similar way as lexicogrammar (i.e. with a systemic side and a realizational side), in order to indicate the recurrent nature of the relationship of micro-stratification (realization) in the internal structure of language. So far, no further specifications have been given regarding this level of ‘lexis as such’, and up to this point, the terms ‘lexeme’ and ‘word’ have been used interchangeably. Now

⁵⁹ The term *morphotactics* is used in stratificational linguistics [e.g. Gleason 1964]. The types of larger-size levels which are specified in this section are similar to certain types of levels (‘strata’) which are distinguished in stratificational linguistics, although the general organization of strata in stratificational linguistics, and the way in which the internal structure of language is defined here are not compatible. Below, the relevance of stratificational linguistics (which has also been indicated by Martin in relation to his discourse semantics [cf. note 10, p. 440 above]) in relation to the levels presented here, will be further noted below.

we can further explore the organization of lexis in relation to morphotactics. This exploration will serve as a basis for motivating why it is useful to distinguish a separate level of 'lexis as such' besides the 'traditional' level of *lexicogrammar* in SFL. Both the organization of 'lexis as such' and its status as a level in its own right which is distinct from lexicogrammar will be important in the further discussion of grammatical metaphor (especially experiential metaphor) in Part VI below.

[2] Lexemes and morphemes

Lexemes are regarded as one type of minimal meaningful units in language, whose meaning is a sense defined in terms of lexical features. Defined in this way, lexemes as such do not occur in actual constructions in language. Rather, the lexical items which occur in constructions are **lexical words**. Lexical words are thus characterized as indicating the occurrence of lexemes in actual constructions, in units which inherently have a categorial meaning. In this sense, in English, lexemes occur as 'nouns', 'verbs' or 'adjectives'. It will be noted that these definitions are based on Coseriu's characterization of grammatical categories [cf. Section 2 above]: a word inherently incorporates a categorial *modus* which indicates the *way in which* the lexeme on which it is based can occur in a particular language. Conversely, certain types of lexemes can occur in different types of words, i.e. in different word categories. For example, in English the lexeme *modify* can occur in the following words: *modify* as verb, *modification* as noun, *modifiable*, *modifying*, and *modified* as adjectives. These different words are defined as different instantiations of the lexeme *modify*. Hence, the semiotic relationship between lexis and morphotactics is defined as **instantiation**. Below, after we have looked at the level of lexicogrammar, the type of instantiation which it is at issue here will be further specified in contradistinction to the other types of instantiation which we have considered in Chapter 5.

As indicated, the larger-size level at which words are constructed is morphotactics. Now in mainstream linguistics, the linguistic units which are dealt with in morphotactics or morphology are traditionally called *morphemes*. As Coseriu [1988: 111] indicates, his sense of the term morpheme

is based in a tradition which is rooted in North-American and Prague school structuralism and which has superseded linguistics in general.⁶⁰ I will not adopt this usage of the term. Rather, I will follow an older European tradition⁶¹ in which ‘morpheme’ is defined in a functional way:⁶² a **morpheme** is a minimal meaningful unit of language whose meaning is not a specific lexical meaning (i.e. a lexical content or sense), but rather a more general *instrumental* meaning.

Two types of morphemes can be distinguished according to a traditional distinction: **inflectional morphemes** such as *-ed* indicating past tense, *-s* indicating third person singular, *-s* indicating plural, and so on; and **derivational morphemes**, such as *-able* (*understandable, distinguishable*), *-ess* (*lioness, princess*), *-(at)ion* (*transformation, solution*), *-let* (*bracelet, leaflet*) and so on. Inflectional morphemes are purely grammatical types of morphemes, and will not further be commented on in this section. Derivational morphemes can be subdivided into two types. **Classematic morphemes**,⁶³ as in *princess* and *leaflet*, indicate schematic lexical meanings and in this way create sub-classes of word classes: *-ess* indicates the meaning ‘female’, *-let* indicates the meaning ‘small’. **Categorial morphemes**, as in *transformation, understandable* change the grammatical category of a word. While classematic morphemes are lexical in that they can be defined as indicating a schematic type of lexical meaning, categorial morphemes lie on the borderline between lexis and grammar. Categorial morphemes will be important in the exploration of grammatical metaphor in Part IV below,

⁶⁰ In this tradition a morpheme is defined as the smallest kind of meaningful formal unit in language in general (irrespective of whether this meaning is lexical or grammatical) [cf. also Coseriu 1988: 111ff; Matthews 2001: 82ff]. This conception of the notion ‘morpheme’ is again based on the method, widespread in structuralism, of studying the content side of language by drawing parallels with the phonic side of language [cf. Chapter 2, note 3 on p. 93 above]: *one* type of minimal unit is distinguished in the content plane of language, as the equivalent of the phoneme in the expression side of language.

⁶¹ Coseriu [1988: 111ff] notes that this older tradition is also adopted by Hjelmslev.

⁶² In adopting this older sense of the term ‘morpheme’, I am again following Coseriu [1988: 111ff].

⁶³ My use of the term ‘classematic’ here is derived from Coseriu’s [1973: 53] notion of a “Klassem”, which refers to a feature that is common within a sub-class of words. (Coseriu illustrates this notion by means of the German adjectives *jung, klug* and *blond*, which share the classeme ‘applicable to living being’.)

where it will be argued that the notion of experiential grammatical metaphor can form a basis for distinguishing further types of categorial morphemes.

[3] Lexis as part of a more general 'elemental' level in language

In §2 above, we have referred to lexical and grammatical morphemes, and an area 'in between' (categorial morphemes). This suggests that on the level of 'lexis as such', a differentiation can be made between more lexical aspects and more grammatical aspects of language. The status of 'lexis as such', especially in relation to lexicogrammar, can be further clarified in terms of this differentiation.

Linguistic items belonging to 'lexis' as such are lexemes and derivational morphemes, and if one takes into account the interaction between lexis and morphotactics, also lexical words. What lies outside this component, but is to be regarded as belonging to the same linguistic *level*, are grammatical morphemes (inflectional morphemes), and also, grammatical words. This means that what has hitherto been called 'lexis as such' represents one end – the more specific or more delicate end – of a more general level which can be termed an **elemental level** in language. Before we consider how and why this level is to be distinguished from lexicogrammar, it is useful to specify the nature of grammatical words in terms of the distinct types of meanings defined in §2 above.

Grammatical words are of two types.⁶⁴ **Categorial words** are words which do not have a lexical content, but which have a categorial meaning. For example, personal pronouns (*I, you, they*), other types of pronouns functioning as Heads of nominal groups (reflexive: *myself, yourself*; demonstrative: *this, these*; possessive: *mine, yours*; interrogative: *who, what*; various types of indefinite pronouns: *some, any, one*), adverbs such as *here, there*, and the interrogative adverbs *where* and *when*. These types of words are strictly speaking intermediate between grammatical and lexical, in that the categorial meaning (the meaning of *I, mine* as 'nominal group') can be

⁶⁴ The distinction between between categorial words and morphemic words is based on Coseriu [1987b: 87], although Coseriu does not term these two types as 'grammatical'.

further specified in grammatical terms (e.g. plural | singular) or schematic lexical terms (e.g. male | female).

The second type of grammatical words are **morphemic words**. These are words which do not have a lexical content, but which have a purely instrumental meaning. This instrumental meaning is always a meaning in relation to a lexical word: morphemic words do not occur independently, but always in combination with lexical items. Typical examples are articles and auxiliaries indicating modality and primary tense, which have a determining role in relation to lexical nouns and verbs respectively. The types of meanings and items which have been distinguished on the elemental level of language are summarized in Figure 8-13.




Figure 8-13 · The elemental level of language: types of meanings and linguistic items

Now the relationship between ‘lexis as such’ and lexicogrammar can be further specified. It is clear that, as belonging to a general elemental level of language, the component of ‘lexis as such’ is distinguished from lexicogrammar in terms of rank, or, in terms of ‘size’: the elemental level is the level of lexemes, morphemes and words. In contrast to the elemental level, the higher level of lexicogrammar, whose items are groups and clauses, can be termed a **constructional level**. The distinction between these two levels is not to be interpreted in terms of delicacy, since a delicacy scale holds *within* each of the elemental and constructional levels.⁶⁵

There are two reasons why it is useful to distinguish a component of lexis as such, which is distinct from lexicogrammar. First, as has been shown in this

⁶⁵ The component of colligational patterns, which is represented in Figure 8-14 as the more delicate side of the level of syntax, will be briefly commented upon in Section II below.

section, the component of lexis has its own type of larger-size level – i.e. it has its own type of *tactic level*, which indicates the way in which lexemes occur in language (potentially in combination with derivational morphemes), viz. as words which have a categorial meaning. Second, the types of meaning which are dealt with at the level of lexicogrammar are different from but build further upon the meanings distinguished in lexis as such, in two ways. (1) On the one hand, part of the lexical meaning of words indicates the way in which these words can be combined with other words. For example, lexical meanings such as ‘animate’, ‘conscious’, and so on are necessary in order to specify which types of Agents certain verbs can take. (2) On the other hand, the sense relations (e.g. synonymy, hyperonymy, and so on) into which particular lexemes enter are relevant in the study of collocation (which pertains to the level of lexicogrammar, as we have seen in Chapter 5): as Halliday & Hasan [1976: 285] argue, “there is cohesion between any pair of lexical items that stand to each other in some recognizable lexicosemantic (word meaning [i.e. sense, MT]) relation”.

The interaction between the elemental and constructional levels of the internal organization of language is visualized in Figure 8-14. The relationship between lexicogrammar and ‘lexis as such’⁶⁶ will be termed **exponence**, which, as we have seen in Chapter 5, is one aspect of a complex amalgamate of relations between systemic features and formal items in Halliday’s scale-&-category model. In this sense, Halliday’s *formal items* can be further defined as words with a categorial meaning. In this perspective, then, in cases where features in the experiential system of TRANSITIVITY indicate distinct verb classes, and particular verbs are enumerated which belong to this verb class (for example, *read*, *make*, *like* and so on as transitive_c effective processes), these verbs are *exponents* of the feature which is thus defined.

⁶⁶ I.e. not lexis in the collocation sense, but in the sense referred to in this section: lexis as part of an elemental level of language which has its own system network and realizations, and its own tactic level.




Figure 8-14 · Elemental and constructional levels in the organization of the internal structure of language

II Lexicogrammar and syntagmatic structure

We now turn to the component of lexicogrammar. The ‘linguistic items’ which are the realizations of options in lexicogrammatical systems are different types of patterns of functional structure, such as experiential and interpersonal functional structures. A functional structure does not occur as such in actual constructions in language, rather it is combined with structural patterns from the other metafunctional components, and this combination is mapped onto a syntagmatic structure. For example, the structural patterns realizing the features indicative > interrogative (i.e. \blacktriangledown Finite \wedge Subject) and, for instance, mental process (i.e. \blacktriangledown Senser \cdot Phenomenon \cdot Process) are mapped together into the syntagmatic pattern verbal group \wedge nominal group \wedge nominal group, as in the expression, *Did she like the play?*

In this sense, the level at which syntagmatic structures are formed, i.e. a level which can be called **syntax**, is that larger-size level which indicates the way in which lexicogrammatical structures can appear in actual language. A syntactic component is regarded as the equivalent, on the constructional level of language, of the morphotactic component on the elemental level of language, i.e. constructional syntagmatic patterns are parallel to elemental words within categorial meaning. Importantly, in parallel with the relationship between lexemes/morphemes and words with categorial meaning, the relationship between functional structure and syntagmatic structure is defined as one of instantiation. This type of instantiation can now be further refined as **tactic instantiation**.⁶⁷

I believe that it is in this sense that Hjelmslev’s conception of the relationship between paradigm and syntagm, i.e. as a relationship between system and process, has to be understood. The paradigmatic dimension refers to types of functional structure which are defined in terms of a (combinations of)

⁶⁷ Notice that a level of tactic instantiation is relevant to both the most grammatical end and the most lexical end of lexicogrammar: while functional structures are linked to syntagmatic structures, the more specific collocational patterns are linked, at the level of syntagms, to *colligational* patterns, defined in Firth’s sense as patterns of associations between grammatical classes (i.e. grammatical categories in the terminology adopted in this chapter) [cf. Mitchell 1966].

feature(s) in a system network. The syntagmatic dimension indicates the patterns in which functional structures are instantiated or actualized in actual language use. In this way, I would argue that the confusion between Hjelmslev's and Saussure's interpretation of the paradigm–syntagm contrast, which we have considered in Chapter 1,⁶⁸ can be clarified by disentangling functional structure and syntagmatic structure.

III Conclusion: The internal organization of lexis and lexicogrammar

In this section we have concentrated on the organization of the central part of the internal structure of language. Two types of relationship between various levels in this organization have been defined in terms of a size-based stratification: (1) on the one hand, a relationship between a constructional level and an elemental level, theorized in terms of the notion of *exponence*; (2) on the other hand, a relationship between functional structure and syntagmatic structure, and between lexemes/morphemes and words with categorial meaning, which has been termed *tactic instantiation*. The latter type of semiotic relationship, it has been noted, does not only recur in the constructional and elemental levels of the global content plane of language, but also holds within the primary expression plane.

It has been noted that a size-based type of stratification has been introduced in stratificational linguistics,⁶⁹ which is one of the first types of linguistic theories which are explicitly stratificational (in that language is conceived of in terms of a number of different strata⁷⁰). As we have seen in Section 1.3 above, Martin indicates the size-based type of stratification proposed in stratificational linguistics lies at the basis of his model of discourse semantics. In this chapter, we have followed an opposite track: we have first considered the relationship of textual instantiation between lexicogrammar

⁶⁸ See Chapter 2, Section 4, p. 118 ff above; see also note 66, p. 78 regarding Martin's interpretation of realization and instantiation.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Lamb [1966], Lockwood (ed.) [1972]. Strata recognized in stratificational linguistics are: semology (or sememics), lexology (or lexemics), morphology (or morphemics) and phonology (or phonemics) [Lamb 1964, Gleason 1964].

⁷⁰ I.e. more strata than a content plane and a expression plane, which are recognized in virtually any type of linguistic theory, and also, within the content plane, more strata than the basic levels of meaning and form.

and discourse semantics, and then we have explored similar types of size-based relationships which hold within the internal structure of lexico-grammar and lexis.

3.4 The explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs

This chapter has started with the observation that one aspect which we had so far not dealt with in our exploration of 'lexicogrammar' in the general sense, is syntagmatic structure. Syntagmatic structure has been characterized, in the introduction to this chapter, as having a fundamental role in what has been called the *semiosis* of language, defined as the complex interaction between system, functional structure and syntagmatic structure. The exploration of the internal organization of language undertaken in this chapter constitutes a first step in clarifying syntagmatic structure and semiosis, in that (1) it has indicated the *status* of syntagmatic structure in relation to other components of language, and (2) it has specified the interconnections between components involved in semiosis in terms of three types of *semiotic relationships*: micro-realization, tactic instantiation and exponence.

What has not yet been *explained*, however, is the nature of syntagmatic structure, the way in which it serves as a basis for combining metafunctional different layers of (functional) structure, and the way in which grammatical categories, as the equivalent of syntagmatic structure at the level of lexis, can be defined. This issue will be taken up in Part IV below. A final task for the present chapter is to indicate the *level* at which these three aspects can be explained, in the framework of the model of the internal structure which has been set up above. In this way, this final section constitutes a link between this chapter and the further exploration in Part IV.




Figure 8-15 · The explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs

I believe that the three aspects mentioned above – syntagmatic structure, its interaction with functional structure, and the nature of grammatical categories – can be explained in terms of Halliday’s general characterization of the three metafunctions in terms of particle, wave, field, i.e. what I have

called Halliday's semiotic-functional hypothesis.⁷¹ We have seen that the 'motifs' of particle, wave and field indicate the realizational modes of expression which are characteristic of the three metafunctions, and in Chapter 7, we have explored the realizational patterns of the two major metafunctions (experiential particulate patterns, and interpersonal field-like or prosodic patterns).

In view of the framework created in the present chapter, these motifs or structural patterns can now be regarded as the *expression*-side of a level at which the *semiosis* of the three metafunctions can be explained in general terms. In Part IV, general *semantic* characterizations will be offered of the semiosis of the three metafunctions, and these characterizations will be linked to the different modes of expression, as shown in Figure 8-15. A combination of a mode of expression and a semantic characterization of a metafunction will be regarded as a form–meaning coupling in an abstract level explaining the semiosis of the metafunctions. Such a coupling of a semantic and realizational explanation will be referred to as a **semiotic-functional motif**. In this sense, the semiosis of each metafunction will be explained, not just in terms of a realizational motif specifying its characteristic type of structure, but in terms of a more comprehensive semiotic-functional motif, which also specifies the overall semantics of the semiosis of each of the metafunctions. It is precisely the interaction between functional structure, syntagmatic structure and grammatical categories (which defines the semiosis of language), which will be clarified through semiotic-functional motifs.

In terms of the semiotic-functional model of language built up in Chapter 5 and the present chapter, in which a number of levels and the semiotic relationships between them are defined, the level of semiotic-functional motifs will be interpreted as an abstract level which is superimposed on the central core of the internal organization of language, as shown in Figure 8-15. It will be considered as a separate stratum, set up in order to *explain* in a semantic and formal way the semiosis of language. The type of stratification which is thus involved here is not a distinction between different levels *in* the organization of language, but rather a distinction which is drawn up for the

⁷¹ See Chapter 1, Section 2.2., p. 75 above.

sake of explanation, i.e. it is a distinction at the level of grammatics rather than grammar. Therefore, the type of stratification between the explanatory level of semiotic motifs and the internal organization of language will be referred to as **meta-stratification**.

Part IV

Semiosis

This part constitutes the third and final move in presenting a semiotic-functional model of language, focussing on what has been called the semiosis of language, i.e. the interaction between functional structure, syntagmatic structure and grammatical categories.

In **Chapter 9**, the semiosis of the interpersonal, textual and experiential metafunctions will be modelled in terms of an abstract, explanatory level of semiotic-functional motifs.

In **Chapter 10**, the semiosis of grammatical metaphor, as a second-order phenomenon of language, will be clarified in the framework of the model set up in Chapter 9.

At the end of the previous chapter, the explanatory value of semiotic-functional motifs in language, as based on Halliday's semiotic-functional hypothesis (the 'particle-wave-field' motif), has been briefly indicated. More specifically, it has been argued that it is by exploring the role of general semiotic-functional motifs, which are both *semantic* and *formal*, that the semiosis of language – especially the nature of a **combined syntagm**¹ (integrating different layers of functional structure), and the role of grammatical categories – can be explained. It has been indicated that, in the overall framework of the semiotic-functional model which is advanced in this dissertation, these semiotic-functional motifs constitute an abstract explanatory level which is superimposed on the central core of the internal structure of language through a relationship of meta-stratification.

The present chapter concentrates on this abstract level of semiotic-functional motifs, exploring the way in which they can be used as a basis for clarifying two aspects of the semiosis of language: (1) the different types of semiosis which are characteristic the experiential, textual and interpersonal meta-functions and the interaction between the different metafunctions; (2) the nature of an integrated syntagm. In this way, a basis will be laid for the following chapter, in which we will explore the semiosis of grammatical

¹ The expression 'combined syntagm' will be used as a term to refer to a syntagmatic pattern, in order to emphasize the role of syntagmatic structure in bringing together a number of metafunctionally different layers of functional structure.

metaphor and, in relation to this, the nature of grammatical categories and the way in which they can be defined.

As has been noted in the previous chapter, Halliday's specification of the 'particle-wave-field' motif, characterizing the complementarity between three general metafunctional modes of expression (particulate, periodic and prosodic) pertains to the *expression* side of the level of semiotic functional motifs, and needs to be complemented with an equally abstract-general *semantic* characterization of the different types of metafunctional semiosis.² The majority of this chapter therefore explores the semantic side of the semiotic-functional motifs. I believe that this semantic side of the semiotic-functional motifs can be specified in terms of Langacker's semantic 'motifs' of *type specification*, *instantiation* and *grounding* and Davidse's further elaboration of these motifs in a systemic-functional framework.

This chapter is organized as follows. In **Section 1**, we will consider Langacker's model of type specification, instantiation and grounding, and Davidse's further refinement of this model in the framework of a systemic-functional view on the interpersonal metafunction in language. In **Section 2**, the type-instance motif will be reinterpreted in relation to the dimension of metafunctional complementarity in SFL. In this way, the content side of the different metafunctional types of semiosis will be specified in terms of semantic motifs; and the nature of a combined syntagm will be clarified. In **Section 3**, we will explore how the general semantic motifs can be related to Halliday's realizational motifs of particulateness, periodicity and prosody,

² Of course, Halliday, in presenting his semiotic-functional hypothesis, also refers to the semantics of the different metafunctions, since otherwise his specification of modes of expression would make no sense (an expression is always an expression of some meaning). Moreover, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the metafunctions are first and foremost *semantic* generalizations regarding the nature of language, linked to a clustering of systems into three different components in the lexicogrammar. However, I believe that the semantics of the metafunctions have not been specified in SFL in abstract-general terms which can clearly be linked to the expression motifs of particulateness, periodicity and prosody. When the overall meaning of the metafunctions is described, this is either done in terms of the functionality of language, i.e. by indicating the way in which language functions in human life (language as enactment vs. language as reflection; the expression of a personal stance vs. the construal of experience), or this is done in relation to the 'meaning' of the lexicogrammatical systems (for example, prosody is linked to the spread of evaluative meanings in language, particulateness is linked to configurations of processes, participants and circumstances).

and in this exploration, these realizational motifs will in turn be further specified.

1 The semantic functions of type specification, instantiation and grounding

1.1 Langacker's type–instance motif

Langacker [1991: Chapters 1–6] introduces the notions of type specification, instantiation and grounding in explaining the conceptual structure of the clause and the nominal group in English, starting with the nominal group, and then drawing a parallel with the organization of the clause. In this section, we will follow this order of presentation.

I The type–instance motif in the nominal group

With regard to the nominal group, the notion of 'type' refers to the nominal head as such; this type can be further specified, qua type, by means of various kinds of modifiers (adjectival, nominal, prepositional; excluding determining modifiers). The following examples which Langacker [1991: 53] gives illustrate increasingly specific **type specifications**:

- (1) a. *convention site*
 b. *excellent convention site*
 c. *excellent convention site in the Midwest*

A nominal type specification as such merely indicates an entity as a representative of some class (type), without referring to any particular instance of such an entity. A type inherently incorporates a characterization of some "basic (aspect)" [ibid.: 56], which points to the **domain of instantiation** within which instances of this type can be located. In the case of nouns, this domain is space.³ In English, each simple noun type evokes this domain of

³ 'Space' can have different more specific meanings, including: 'physical space' (in nouns such as *tree*, *pencil*, *house*; *sand*); 'quality space' (in nouns designating a brand or a type, e.g. *wine*, *glue*; in abstract nouns such as *hope*, *fear*).

instantiation by inherently belonging to one of three basic classes: singular count nouns designate a bounded region in space (*pebble*), mass nouns refer to an unbounded region (*gravel*), and plural nouns indicate a replication of bounded entities which together constitute an unbounded region (and hence are regarded as a type of mass noun) (*pebbles*).

A type specification is turned into an **instantiated type** (or instance for short) by being “anchored at a particular location in the domain of instantiation” [ibid.: 75]. In the case of nouns, an instance is presupposed when a type specification is **quantified** (as in *some gravel, seven pebbles, one pebble*). An instantiated type is **grounded** when it is indicated how it relates to the ground, defined as “the speech event and its participants” [ibid.: 53]. In nominals, grounding is realized in relative quantifiers, articles, demonstratives, and possessives. Each of these “grounding predications” indicates some relation to the speech-act participants in terms of three basic kinds of “factors”: “definiteness, specificity, and referentiality”. (1) *articles* indicate whether the instance is perceived as definite or indefinite (identified or non-identified in the context of the interaction); (2) *relative quantifiers*, such as *all, most, some, every*, can only be understood in terms of some reference mass, which is again presupposed in the speech interaction; (3) *demonstratives* inherently refer to the speech interaction because they presuppose that the entity designated is definite (identified), and also because they indicate the proximity of this entity to the participants (proximal vs. distal deixis [ibid.: 102]); (4) *possessives*, finally, are a special kind of grounding predication which again presuppose the specificity of the entity designated. Grounding predications are highlighted in the following examples:

- (2) a. **most of his** friends
- b. **those** three books on the table
- c. I bought some apples and **a** melon.

Grounding presupposes instantiation, and some types of grounding predications inherently incorporate an instantiating meaning (e.g. *a, this, that, these, those* also specify the size of the entity (quantification)), in the same way as qualification presupposes the conception of an instance, and instantiation presupposes the conception of a type. In this sense, the different types of semantic functions defined by Langacker – type specification,

instantiation (and quantification), and grounding – are said to indicate a kind of **layering** in the structure of nominal groups [Langacker 1991: 143]: within this structure as a whole, the type specification is regarded “a kind of nucleus” [ibid.: 54], or the “innermost functional layer” [ibid.: 143], while a grounding predication is added as “the outmost layer” [ibid.: 54]. Since type specification, instantiation and grounding are semantic functions, this layering is interpreted by Langacker as primarily semantic (cf. his label ‘functional layer’): it refers to the fact that instantiation presupposes type specification, and grounding presupposes instantiation.

However, as can be seen in the way in which these semantic motifs are realized in a nominal syntagm, this layering is also reflected in the form of the syntagm: non-determining modifiers are closest to the nominal head, while grounding expressions occur at the border of the nominal group as a whole. In this sense, the formal organization of the nominal syntagm can be said to be iconic to the interaction between different types of semantic motifs which are realized in this syntagm. It is precisely for this reason that I propose to use Langacker’s model of the type–instance motif, as a basis for clarifying the nature of a combined syntagm [cf. Section 2].

Table 9-1 gives an overview of Langacker’s semantic functions and the way in which they are realized in language.

Semantic function	Grounding	Quantification	Instantiation	Type specification	Type
Realization	articles relative quantifiers demonstratives possessives	absolute quantifiers	[an instance conception is presupposed through quantification]	non-determining modifiers	nominal head incorporating specification of basic ‘aspect’: singular, plural, mass
Further dimensions	degrees of subjectivity	actual vs. structural domains of instantiation			

Table 9-1 · Langacker’s type–instantiation–grounding motif in the nominal group

Table 9-1 also indicates two additional aspects of Langacker’s type–instantiation–grounding motif which will play a role in the discussion of grammatical metaphor in the following chapter: the distinction between an actual and a structural plane of instantiation (which pertains to instantiation

and quantification), and different degrees of subjectivity (which pertain to grounding).

Instantiated types are said to be instantiations in an actual plane or in a structural plane, depending on whether or not their location in the domain of instantiation is *specific*. The distinction between actual and structural refers to two levels of specificity within a more general “instance plane” (contrasting to “type plane”, which indicates a non-instantiated type specification): instances in the **structural plane** are regarded “generalizations about the “structure of the world”” [Langacker 2000: 274], whereas instances in the **actual plane** are particular, actual entities (with regard to nominals; actual events with regard to clauses, as we will see below), which can then be further linked to the ground. Langacker illustrates the distinction with the following examples [Langacker 2000: 276]:⁴

- (3) a. *A messenger just delivered a package.*
- b. *A messenger will deliver this package this afternoon.*
- (4) a. *A messenger always delivers a package on time.*
- b. *Messengers deliver packages on time.*
- (5) *This messenger delivers packages on time.*

The nominals in (3) are instances on the actual plane: *a messenger*, *a package* and *this package* refer to actual participants which are further located with respect to the ground (in (3a) both the messenger and the package are non-identified (indefinite) in relation to the ground; in (3b) the package is specified in terms of proximity deixis). In contrast, the participants in examples in (4) are construed as structural instances. In (4a), *a messenger* and *a package* are not actual instances of the participants designated, but rather they are what Langacker calls “arbitrary instances”, which is “conjured up” by the speaker just in order to specify a general aspect of the structure of the world. In (4b) the generalization is construed by means of plural instances (*messengers* and *packages*). In (5), *this messenger*

⁴ It should be noted that the distinction between an actual and a structural plane of instantiation in a nominal construction can only be made when these nominals are contextualized in a clause. In many cases, also, the overall level of instantiation of a clausal expression depends on an interaction between the clausal instantiation as such (which we will turn to below), and the nominals which are involved in the event which is designated.

invokes an actual individual, whereas *packages* is again a generalization. As we will see in the following chapter, the distinction between an actual and a structural instance plane will especially be relevant in characterizing experiential grammatical metaphor.

The distinction between degrees of subjectivity has to do with the ‘epistemic nature’ of grounding. Grounding predications are further defined by Langacker as **epistemic predications**: it is by means of grounding expressions that “the speech-act participants establish contact with the conceived situation and relate it to their own knowledge and situation” [ibid.: 90]. In making this context, knowledge of the situation plays an important role, hence the label ‘epistemic’:

They do so [establishing contact with the conceived situation, MT] by means of relationships between themselves and the most prominent entities within the situation [...] Since these relationships pertain to their knowledge of instances and their ability to single them out, grounding predications are said to be epistemic. [Langacker 1991: 90].

Epistemic predications point to (knowledge of) aspects of the situation of the speech event, which function as *reference points* for situating certain designated entities in relation to that situation. Two types of reference points play a role in nominal expressions: the ground itself and a reference mass (in relative quantifiers). Reference points may be indicated in several possible ways within the nominal expression as a whole, of which epistemic predications are just one. These different possibilities are accounted for by Langacker in terms of different **degrees of subjectivity**. When the ground is explicitly referred to, the reference point is said to be construed *objectively*: by bringing it to the fore within the structure of the nominal as a whole, the reference point is ‘objectified’. This is the case for example in *the table near me*: *near me* serves as a reference point for identifying *the table*, in which an aspect of the ground, viz. *me* or the speaker, is explicitly mentioned. The opposite type of construal is found in epistemic predications, which are hence defined as being maximally subjective [ibid.: 193]: in an epistemic expression such as *this (table)*, reference to the ground – in this case proximity to the interactants – is left completely implicit (although it plays an important role in the grounding function of *this*). In between these two contrasting types of construal, various intermediate ways of referring to the ground are possible,

as in *the first office to your right* ('first' and 'to your right' as considered from the interactants' viewpoint), *yesterday's newspaper* ('yesterday' in relation to the time of speaking) [cf. Langacker 1991: 89ff, also 1990, 2000: Ch. 10].

II The type–instance motif in the clause

Having considered how Langacker defines the conceptual structure of the nominal group, we can now turn to his modelling of the clause, which he sets up in parallel with his characterization of the nominal group, using the latter as a reference framework. The structure of the clause appears to be more intricate than that of the nominal group, and it is especially Davidse's further elucidation of this intricacy, in relation to a systemic-functional conception of language, which will be taken as a basis in this chapter.

According to Langacker, at the level of the clause, the **type**, or the innermost layer in the overall clause structure, corresponds to the main or 'content' verb head, together with auxiliary elements, except those indicating tense and modality. These auxiliary elements, called "secondary auxiliaries" in SFL, indicate the 'basic aspect' of the clausal type, and hence are parallel to the categorization of nominal heads into singular countable, mass and plural types. They are realized by paired auxiliary items (an auxiliary and a suffix) expressing three kinds of meanings: (1) perfective aspect (*have + en: have written*), (2) progressive aspect (*be + ing: be writing*) and (3) passive (*be + en: be written*). As we have seen above, the 'basic aspect' of a type refers to the characteristic **domain of instantiation** within which instances of this type can be located. In this way, as noted above, a type specification inherently points to a domain of instantiation. This is a very important feature which, at the level of the clause, will be especially relevant to the discussion of grammatical metaphor in the following chapter.

In the case of nouns, which designate entities, we have seen that the domain is space. Clauses do not designate entities but events (in which entities participate), and hence the domain of instantiation which is inherent in the clausal type is *time*. Just like the distinction between singular and plural, mass and countable in noun types pertains to space (boundedness in space), the 'basic aspect' distinctions inherent in a clausal head pertain to time. However, since the auxiliary elements come in pairs, the situation is more

complex here: both the semantic import of the auxiliaries and of the morphemes need to be accounted for. In Langacker's view, the morphemes *-ing* and *-ed* are inherently *atemporal*, or more precisely, when they are added to a verbal stem, they construe an atemporal relation: expressions such as *written* and *writing*, when they occur as such (without an accompanying aspectual auxiliary), designate atemporal relations. One of the contexts in which such expressions can occur (independent of their matching auxiliary), is as modifiers in nominal groups [Langacker 1991: 203, 210]:

- (6) a. *a written exam*
 b. *students writing their essays on a PC*

Within the auxiliary-morpheme pair as a whole, it is the auxiliary which indicates the 'basic aspect' of the clausal head in relation to time: the auxiliary turns an inherently atemporal expression (*writing*, *written*) into a temporal or *processual* one (*have written*, *be writing*, *be written*). Langacker [1991: Ch. 5] explains the temporal 'aspect' expressed by each of the types of auxiliary elements in relation to 'perfectivity' in general.⁵

In Langacker's model, the combination of a clausal head plus secondary auxiliaries is regarded as the **type specification** at the level of the clause. The conception of a type such as *be writing* is then turned into an **instance** by being tied to particular participants (e.g. *John + be writing + a letter*),⁶ and this instantiated type can then be **grounded** by providing indications of tense, modality, and what Langacker refers to as "negation" [ibid.: 90], as in the following examples:

- (7) a. *When I came in, John **was** writing a letter to his brother.*
 b. *You **have to** write your brother a letter.*

⁵ There is no room to go into these explanations here. It is easy to see that the progressive aspect inherently pertains to 'time' as domain of instantiation (and arguably, this type of the clausal 'basic aspects' is closest to the nominal distinction between bounded and unbounded regions in space), in terms of boundedness; the perfective aspect is explained in terms of 'current relevance' (i.e. relevance in relation to some temporal reference point). The passive is most difficult to be linked to 'time' as domain of instantiation (and in traditional grammar, the passive is not regarded as a verbal 'aspect'). Langacker explains the temporal aspect of the passive in terms of notions such as "an internal change of state" [1991: 202].

⁶ An instantiated type as such, i.e. non-grounded, only occurs in nominalizations, such as *John's writing of a letter* [Langacker 1991: 33].

c. *The letter **hasn't** been written yet.*

Through the tense-modal complex, events are construed as being part of “known reality” [Langacker 1991: 244], and in this sense, the meanings expressed by temporal and modal grounding elements in the clause is similar to the meaning of ‘definiteness’ in the nominal group grounding. Furthermore, the distinction between present and past in the tense system corresponds to the proximal/distal deixis realized in demonstratives [ibid.].

In parallel with the treatment of the nominal group, grounding expressions in the clause are regarded as *epistemic predications*, which are defined as being maximally subjective. Langacker explores different degrees of subjectivity at the clause level in more detail than in his modelling of the nominal group. Since the notion of subjective vs. objective types of construals will play an important role in characterizing interpersonal grammatical metaphor, it is useful to consider how Langacker defines subjectivity in the clause. The maximally subjective types of expressions in language, such as temporal auxiliaries, or epistemic modal auxiliaries, are often the result of a process of grammaticalization in language, which is specified by Langacker as ‘subjectification’. We will briefly consider three of the various kinds of examples which Langacker [1990, 1991: Ch. 5, 1999] explores in detail: *be going to* as a periphrastic auxiliary indicating a future meaning, epistemic modals in general, and the perfective auxiliary *have*. Only general aspects of the process of subjectification will be mentioned, in order to get an overall picture of different levels of subjectivity in the clause.

Langacker describes the verb *go* as displaying three degrees of subjectivity. In its most literal meaning, *go* is a purely *objective* construal referring to spatial movement, as in:

- (8) *Can't you **go** any faster?*

In a purely objective construal, *go* refers to a spatial path along which a participant moves, without implying a reference to the ground, or the speech situation: the path is viewed from the perspective of the mover. In a less objective type of construal (which is not yet regarded as a case of

subjectivity), the movement along a spatial path is interpreted in terms of the location of the interactants:⁷

- (9) a. *You don't have to **go** to school tomorrow.*
 b. *You don't have to **come** to school tomorrow.*

The implicit incorporation of a reference point becomes clear when (9a) is contrasted to (9b). Although the path is viewed from the perspective of the speaker, it is still a participant which, literally, moves along this path.

A more subjective type of construal, which is regarded as a **first degree of subjectification** in an overall framework which will become clear further on, is illustrated in the following example:

- (10) *John's **going to** ask her tomorrow.*

Here, *go* refers to future time, and the path which it evokes is a temporal path. Again this path is viewed from the interactants' viewpoint, but here no movement of the central participant (John) is involved. Rather, the speaker mentally moves along a path of time in order to situate the event which is construed in relation to a temporal reference point. This reference point may coincide with the time of speaking, but this is not necessarily so, as is shown in the following sentences:

- (11) a. *Actually, when you came in, I **was going to** leave.*
 b. *John said he **was going to** ask her the next day.*

The examples in (11) show that expressions of the first degree of subjectification are not grounding expressions, since they are themselves grounded in terms of tense: **was going to**.

Different degrees of objectivity/subjectivity in construals can be discerned in the evolution of content verbs to epistemic modal verbs, or in the (synchronic) variation between a number of which reflect this evolution:

- (12) a. *Stay or go, as you **will**.*
 b. *When he was younger he **could** stay up all night.*

⁷ The level of objectivity/subjectivity indicated by the examples in (9) is not mentioned by Langacker.

- (13) a. *John **will** be at home tomorrow.*
 b. *He said he **would** be at home the following day.*
 c. *I **can't** come tomorrow.*
- (14) a. *John **will** be at home at this time of night.*
 b. *John **should** be at home at this time of night.*

The sentences in (12) exemplify a fully objective construal. What is typical here is that an inherent kind of ‘potency’ is ascribed to the Subject: in (12a), whether the addressee will stay or go, depends entirely on his/her will; similarly, in (12b), the fact that this person can stay up all night is a result of his inherent capacity to do so.⁸

A first degree of subjectification is illustrated in (13). The modal meaning expressed here is *pure prediction*: a future event is predicted on the basis of reality-context. This event is seen as part of a *future* in terms of a reference point, which may (13a, c) or may not coincide with the time of speaking (13c). Instead of a ‘potency’ located with or ascribed to the Subject, a ‘potency’ or ‘potentiality’ is more generally here, and is located in circumstances: for instance, I can’t come tomorrow because I have other things to do. In both the groups of sentences in (12) and (13), the modal expressions do not have a grounding function, since they are themselves grounded in terms of tense (cf. the contrast between (12a) and (12b), and between (13a, c) and (13b)).

The examples in (13) indicate **a second degree of subjectification**. In terms of Davies’ semantic model of interpersonal aspects in language [cf. Chapter 5 above], the type of modality expressed here pertains to the speaker’s role of ‘knowing’ [Davies 1983: 122ff]. The modal meaning can be characterized in general term as ‘*inference*’: an inferential relation is established between known reality and a projected reality. Importantly, this projected reality may refer to past, present or future time. In such cases there is no tense marking. Rather, it is the modal expression which fulfill the grounding function in the

⁸ In the study of modality in general, such types of expressions are referred to as “dynamic modality”, “root modality” or “subject-oriented modality” [cf., for example Miyahara 1981, Simon-Vandenberg 1984, Palmer 1987, Sweetser 1990]. The two examples given here pertain to the areas of volition and ability (in English, other dynamic types of ‘modal verbs’ have become obsolete).

clause, and the type of grounding which is expressed is epistemic: in Langacker's terms, an instantiated type is located in terms of "epistemic distance" to the speaker [Langacker 1991: 245].

Another case of subjectification is illustrated in the verb *have*:

- (15) *He **has** about one hundred books about astrology.*
- (16) a. *I don't think she **has** enough courage to deal with those kids.*
 b. *He's **had** the benefit of an expensive education.*
- (17) a. *We **have** a lot of coyotes around here.* [Langacker 1990: 30]
 b. *The porter **has** a taxi ready.* [Quirk et al.1985: 1411]
- (18) a. ***Have** you been in this country before?*
 b. *I **haven't** seen her since her operation.*

In its most objective sense, *have* describes a relationship of literal possession, in the sense of "direct physical control" [Langacker 1990: 29] between two participants, as in example (15). The notion of physical possession is slightly more "attenuated" [ibid.] in expressions such as those in (16), where 'possession' refers to a general "kind of potency", rather than physical ownership.

The examples in (17) illustrate a kind⁹ of subjectification. Here, according to Langacker, the relationship of 'potency' changes into a more general relationship of 'relevance': in (17a), which is an example given by Langacker, the idea is that "the presence of coyotes is potentially *relevant* to the trajector [i.e. the participant indicated by we, MT]" [Langacker 1990: 31]. This type of construal is regarded as relatively subjective, because the reference point for the relationship of 'relevance' is not only the main participant (we in (17a), the porter in (17b)), but also the speaker/conceptualizer: the presence of coyotes is also construed as relevant to the speaker [ibid.: 31]. Langacker's

⁹ In his explanation of the various degrees of objectivity/subjectivity in expressions with *have*, Langacker does not specify a first and a second degree of subjectification. This is because the last degree which is mentioned here, perfective *have*, is not a grounding expression, as we will see below. Langacker notes that the *avoir* of the French *passé composé* has evolved to a further degree of subjectification compared to the English perfective *have* [Langacker 1990: 32].

first degree of subjectification in the verb *have* is well illustrated in what Quirk et al. [1985: 1411f] call the “*have*-existential device”. One of their examples is given here in (17b).

The perfective auxiliary *have* indicates a further degree of subjectification: in the examples in (18), *have* indicates a relationship of accomplishment, and a notion of ‘current relevance’: the accomplishment remains relevant for the main participant and/or for the speaker [Langacker 1990: 31].

Table 9-2 summarizes the way in which Langacker conceives of the semantic functions of type specification, instantiation and grounding at the level of the clause, in relation to his characterization of the nominal group. It will be noted that at this level, again, the type–instance motif indicates a layered type of structuring of the clausal syntagm.

Semantic function	Grounding	Quantification	Instantiation	Type specification	Type
Realization in NG	articles relative quantifiers demonstratives possessives	absolute quantifiers	[an instance conception is presupposed through quantification]	non-determining modifiers	nominal head, incorporating specification of ‘basic aspect’: singular, plural, mass
Realization in the clause	tense, modality, negation	?	participants	content verb head & ‘basic aspect’ expressed by secondary auxiliaries	

Table 9-2 · Langacker’s characterization of the type–instantiation–grounding motif at the level of the clause, compared to that of the nominal group

In exploring the type–instantiation–grounding motif at the level of the clause, Langacker pays most attention to the role of auxiliary elements (in the broad sense, comprising auxiliaries and inflectional morphemes), which appear to pertain to the two extremes of the type–instantiation–grounding layering: secondary auxiliaries are important in the *clausal type specification*, as we have seen above, while primary auxiliaries (tense and modality) realize the *grounding* at the level of the clause. The focus on the role of auxiliaries has two consequences: (1) Langacker does not specify an aspect of *quantification* at the level of the clause (that area which is parallel to absolute quantification in the nominal group); and (2) the nature of the intermediate semantic

function of ‘instantiation’ at the clause level is not explicitly dealt with in Langacker’s work.¹⁰ Hence, as can also be seen from Table 9-2, within the ‘middle’ area in between type and grounding (i.e. type specification, instantiation, quantification) Langacker does not explicitly indicate a parallelism between the nominal group and the clause.¹¹ It is especially with regard to the area in between the type as such and grounding, that Davidsen proposes a number of refinements of Langacker’s model, based on further exploring this model in relation to Halliday’s characterization of the interpersonal component of language.

1.2 Davidsen’s systemic-functional re-interpretation of the type–instance motif

As a starting point for refining the type–instance motif on the level of the clause, Davidsen [1997, 1998b] relates Langacker’s type specification–instantiation–grounding pattern to Halliday’s analysis of the interpersonal structure of a clause into Mood and Residue. In Halliday’s interpersonal model of the clause, the functional elements of Subject and Finite play a

¹⁰ Outside the context of exploring a type–instantiation–grounding distinction, in dealing with argument structure (and hence the nature and role of participants in an event, which are here related to instantiation at clause level), Langacker introduces the concept of “elaboration”, which is regarded as a type of instantiation in general. The argument structure of a verb is defined as an abstract constructional schema consisting of a number of schematically characterized participants. This schema serves as “a template for assembling novel expressions” [Langacker 1991: 37] by lexically specifying (or ‘elaborating’) the abstract schematic participant roles.

In general terms, this type of instantiation is what is called ‘delicacy’ in SFL, whereas the ‘instantiation’ involved in the type–instantiation–grounding is of the ‘actualization’ type [cf. Chapter 1 for general types of instantiation; cf. also Langacker 1991: 61, who refers to the distinction between type–sub-type and type–token/instance relations]. We will return to Langacker’s notion of elaboration in Section 2 below.

¹¹ With regard to the clause, it is also this middle area which has received least attention, as indicated in the previous note. Besides that, Langacker is not clear on the status of participants (or subject, objects and complements) in relation to the type/instance motif: on the one hand, the indication of a subject, objects and complements is regarded as turning a type specification into an instantiated type [Langacker 1991: 33]; on the other hand, it is argued that “what is traditionally known as “subject-verb agreement” is analyzed as being part of the grounding predication” [ibid.: 247].

central role: together they constitute the Mood element of the clause,¹² and each of them contributes a specific aspect of interpersonal meaning to the clause as a whole.

- (1) The Finite element, in Halliday's view, "brings the proposition down to earth, so that it can be argued about" [Halliday 1994: 75]. Bringing the proposition 'down to earth' here means relating it to the context of the speech event. According to Halliday, a relation to the speech event is established through the systems of PRIMARY TENSE and MODALITY. Apart from these two features (which are realized in a verbal operator), a further aspect of finiteness is POLARITY: in order for a proposition to be arguable, it has to assert or deny something.
- (2) The Subject, then, is regarded as the second major element which is needed in order to create a proposition or a proposal. It is defined by Halliday as that element "by reference to which the proposition can be affirmed or denied", or the element "in whom the speaker vests the success or failure of the proposition" [Halliday 1994/1985: 76]. For example, if I say *Jane has been given the letter*, I "rest my case" (to use another of Halliday's expressions used in this context [ibid.]) on *Jane*; whereas if I say *He has given the letter to Jane*, it is the element *he* on which the validity of the proposition "is made to rest".

It can be seen that Halliday's notion of 'finiteness', with its three aspects of primary tense, modality and polarity corresponds exactly to Langacker's. A major difference between the two models lies in the role which is assigned to the Subject, since in Langacker's view, the Subject, together with other elements such as Complements and Circumstantial Adjuncts (using systemic-functional terms) has an instantiating role and thus has nothing to do with the grounding function, which in his model is restricted to finiteness and negation.

Adducing a number of arguments which corroborate the view that the Mood element (with Finite and Subject) has a distinctive status in the interpersonal structure of the clause, Davidse defines it as the **instantiating complex** in the clause [Davidse 1997: 422]. Highlighting the central interpersonal role which

¹² Apart from Subject and Finite, the Mood element may also contain Modal Adjuncts (e.g. *probably, maybe, regularly, absolutely*), as we have seen in Chapter 6.

Halliday assigns to the Subject, she calls the Subject the “**Instantiator**” of the clause [ibid.]. It is argued that the function of Instantiator in the clause is realized in two ways: (1) the Subject itself (i.e. the lexicogrammatical specification of the Subject) is an explicit or *objective* realization of the instantiating function; (2) the indication of grammatical number in the Finite is regarded as an implicit or *subjective* marking of the instantiating function [Davidse 1997: 422].

As we have seen above, Langacker does not specify how **quantification** is realized at the level of the clause. In Davidse’s view [1997: 422, 1998: 159], it is the system of *polarity* which realizes the function of quantification in the clause. Davidse links polarity to Davies’ notion of “occurrence value” [cf. Chapter 4, Section 3.2.4 above] (negative polarity: occurrence value = nil, positive polarity: occurrence value = at least one), and specifies that polarity is realized in two ways in the clause, as recognized by Matthiessen [1995a: 472]: (1) as fused with the Finite (e.g. *I haven’t seen her today*), (2) or in the Subject (e.g. *No-one has seen her today*).

With regard to **grounding**, Davidse specifies an additional grounding function beyond primary tense and modality, viz. **person deixis**. This is motivated by drawing a parallel with the structure of the nominal group:

Whereas the nominal group may be grounded *either* in terms of spatial proximity (via demonstratives) *or* in terms of person deixis (via possessives), the clause is grounded *both* in terms of temporal/modal proximity and person deixis [...] [Davidse 1997: 422]

As with the instantiating function of the Subject, the grounding function of person deixis can be realized either objectively, in the Subject itself, or subjectively, in the Finite [Davidse 1997: 422, 1998: 166].

What is especially relevant in relation to person deixis, is the distinction between first and second person on the one hand, which realize participants involved in the speech interaction (*I* as encoder, *you* as decoder), and third person on the other hand, which realizes participants which lie outside the speech interaction. This distinction has to do with a further semantic function which Davidse adds to the type specification–instantiation–grounding pattern, viz. the construction of the **speech function** of an utterance. This semantic function has no parallel in the nominal group, since it is only

clauses, not nominal groups, which realize speech functions. While nominal groups designate entities or persons and identify them in relation to the speech event, clauses go one step further: beyond designating processes in which entities and persons are involved, and beyond relating these processes to the speech event, clauses also serve to *exchange commodities* (which are either purely linguistic, i.e. ‘information’, or physical-material, i.e. ‘goods-&-services’ [cf. Chapters 4 and 6]). In Davidsse’s model, then, speech function is characterized as an extra semantic function in the clause which is ground-related: it specifies the nature of the exchange in terms of three “ground-related primitives of I-you, give-ask, knowable-desirable” [Davidsse 1998: 163].

Finally, it should be noted that Davidsse further emphasizes Langacker’s model of a layered structuring of the clause by interpreting this layering in terms of orientation: “the four semantic functions of type specification, instantiation, quantification and grounding tend to be reflected *iconically* in a right-to-left reading of the NG’s structure” [Davidsse 1998b: 155, emphasis MT].

Davidsse’s refined model of the type–instance motif at the level of the clause is summarized, in relation to Langacker’s model, in Figure 9-1.




Figure 9-1 · Davidsse’s refined model of the type–instance motif in the clause

2 Type specification – instantiation – grounding: A metafunctional reinterpretation

In the previous section we have considered Langacker’s model of type specification, instantiation and grounding, and Davidse’s reinterpretation of this model in a systemic-functional framework. As we have seen, Davidse’s reinterpretation has been guided by Halliday’s model of the interpersonal component of language. Conversely, her refined model of the semantic functions of type specification–instantiation–grounding is especially intended to further elucidate the *interpersonal* layer of structure in a systemic-functional model of the clause. As has been noted in the introduction to this chapter, I believe that the type–instance motif can be used as a basis for specifying the semantics of the *three* metafunctional types of semiosis, viz. interpersonal, textual and experiential. In this section we will explore the possibility of reinterpreting the semantic functions of type specification, instantiation and grounding in metafunctional terms. In this reinterpretation, both Langacker’s and Davidse’s views on the type–instance motif will be drawn on.

The basis of the metafunctional reinterpretation of the type–instance motif which I would like to propose, is summarized in Table 9-3. It should be noted that this table only presents a rudimentary scheme which will serve as a starting point and a basic reference framework for the discussion below.

Semantic motif	Grounding	Instantiation	Type specification
Metafunction	♦ Interpersonal	♦ Textual	♦ Experiential

Table 9-3 · A metafunctional reinterpretation of the type–instance motif: Basis

2.1 Type specification and the experiential metafunction

Let us again start with the innermost semantic motif in Langacker’s model, i.e. type specification. As indicated in Table 9-3, I regard the motif of type specification as an experiential motif. It is clear that this conception is based on Davidse’s model of the type–instance motif, in which *participants* other than the Subject together with the content verb are regarded as the type specification of the clause. However, from an experiential perspective as

understood in SFL, the participant which is (or rather, which happens to be) mapped onto the Subject role is just a participant in the same sense as the other participants involved in the process are. In this sense, it is Langacker's conception of the role of participants which seems to be closer to the experiential perspective in SFL: in his view, *all* participants are assigned a similar role in relation to the process, viz. that of elaboration (as a type of instantiation).

I believe that Langacker's and Davidse's views on the role of participants in relation to the type–instance motif are not incompatible, if it is recognized that two different levels of type specification are involved. In fact, the very recognition of these two levels is inspired by the notion of an experiential metafunction in SFL. The two levels at which an experiential type specification is relevant, are a level of functional structure and a level of syntagmatic structure. Hence the two kinds of type specification will be referred to as functional type specification and syntagmatic type specification. Since our focus in this section as a whole is on the clause as a kind of syntagm, an alternative term for syntagmatic type specification is clausal type specification.

A **functional type specification** refers to the relationship between schematic participant roles (and circumstances)¹³ and a process type. This is a central aspect of the experiential functional structure at the level of the clause: as we have seen in Chapter 6, different types of configurations of participants (number of participants, type of involvement in the process, and so on) and the schematic (lexical) nature of these participants (for example, in terms of animacy, consciousness and so on) constitute a basis for recognizing different types of processes in the experiential network of TRANSITIVITY. I will refer to a functional type specification as a **process configuration**.

¹³ Circumstances are mentioned between brackets here, because further on in this chapter, circumstances will be placed in an intermediate area between the experiential and textual metafunctions.




Figure 9-2 · Functional type specification modelled in terms of daughter dependency

As we have also seen in Chapter 6, a process-participant configuration can be modelled in terms of constituency or dependency. In this respect, it is perhaps the representation in terms of daughter dependency which captures best the nature of a functional type specification of a process: in such a model, the process is regarded as head, and the schematic participants are modelled as specifications of this head. This view, which is taken in valency models of transitivity, is visualized in Figure 9-2.¹⁴

¹⁴ It should be noted that functional type specification, as defined here, does not correspond to Langacker's conception of the role of participants, although this conception has been described above as closest to the experiential perspective in SFL. As we have seen, the general role which Langacker assigns to all participants in relation to the type–instance motif, is *instantiation* rather than type specification. However, it has also been noted that outside his treatment of the type–instance motif, Langacker also theorizes the relationship between participants and a process in terms of *elaboration*, which corresponds to delicacy in SFL.

I believe that neither of these relationships applies to the connection *between* participants and a process, i.e. the relationship which holds *within* a process-participant configuration, and which has been characterized as functional type specification. (1) The instantiation which Langacker refers to pertains to actualization within one participant, i.e. it is the actualization of a schematic participant role, such as Phenomenon, into an instantiated and grounded nominal group, such as *the play* (as in *Did she like the play?*). (2) The relationship of elaboration or delicacy again does not pertain to the connection *between* participants and processes: delicacy is a general type of semiotic relationship, which, in the experiential metafunction, applies to transitivity configurations as a whole, and hence which holds between a schematic configuration (defined in grammatical terms), and a more specific type of configuration (defined in lexical-collocational terms). In this view, when the participants in a configuration are elaborated, i.e. rendered more precisely or lexically, the process is likewise elaborated, i.e. it is rendered as a more specific type of process (with a more specific, lexical sense).

A **syntagmatic type specification** refers to that part of a syntagm which constitutes a type specification in contrast to other instantiating and grounding elements, i.e. it is that part of a syntagm which does not have an instantiating or a grounding role. Hence, a syntagmatic type specification only comes into being through the semantic function of instantiation, since there is no syntagmatic type specification without there being an instantiating and grounding component to which this type specification – qua non-instantiated component – is related. In this sense, since it depends on the function of instantiation, syntagmatic type specification is not a purely experiential phenomenon.¹⁵




Figure 9-3 · The relationship between functional and syntagmatic type specification

¹⁵ This is also suggested by the fact that, as we have seen in considering Langacker's model above [Section 1.1, § II], a syntagmatic type specification inherently points to the domain of instantiation in which it can potentially be instantiated. This feature, as has been indicated above, will be further explained in Chapter 9 in relation to grammatical metaphor.

The only aspect which deserves further attention, at this point, is the difference between functional and syntagmatic type specification. What happens when an experiential functional structure is mapped onto a syntagmatic structure, is that one of its participants is singled out to take the role of Subject. In the terminology used in this chapter, one participant of a functional type specification is singled out as Instantiator, and the rest of the process configuration is typified. A syntagmatic type specification will therefore be called a **typified process configuration**. It should be noted that a typified configuration is not a general type of process, but rather a particular way in which a configuration is turned into a clausal type specification in a particular syntagm. In this sense, a typified configuration can be, for example, *write a letter, be assigned a different role, give a present to John, be given a present by Mary* and so on. The relationship between functional type specification and syntagmatic type specification is visualized in Figure 9-3.

2.2 Grounding and the interpersonal metafunction

We now turn to the other end of the grounding–instantiation–type specification continuum, i.e. grounding. We skip the complex area of instantiation for the time being, so that it can then be specified in relation to both type specification and grounding in the following section. It is evident that the semantic function of grounding is interpersonal, and therefore this aspect of the type–instance motif does not require much further explanation. In keeping with Davidse’s interpretation of the type–instance motif, I consider *modality, tense* and *person deixis* (i.e. the system of MOOD PERSON, cf. Chapter 6 above)¹⁶ as expressions of interpersonal grounding. These two aspects are interpersonal grounding expressions, in that they relate clausal constructions to the interpersonal ground¹⁷ of the speech interactants in their role as intersubjective agents, who exchange commodities, and who express their opinion about the likelihood of occurrence of events which are designated. I will visualize the semantic function of grounding as in Figure 9-4.¹⁸

¹⁶ Cf. p. 371 above.

¹⁷ Cf. the definition of the interpersonal ground in Chapter 8, p. 478-479 above.

¹⁸ The layering of temporal grounding and modal grounding is a subject which needs further investigation. The layering which is given in Figure 9-4 is proposed in order to account for




Figure 9-4 · Grounding

2.3 Instantiation and the textual metafunction

Having considered the two opposite ends of the type specification--instantiation--grounding continuum, we can now turn to the centre of this continuum, viz. the semantic function of instantiation. As shown in Table 9-3 above, I will propose a metafunctional reinterpretation of instantiation as a textual type of function.

Throughout this dissertation so far, in dealing with the dimension of metafunctional diversity, we have mainly focussed on the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions, which have been interpreted as the two major, complementary metafunctions of language. We have briefly considered the cohesive sub-component of the textual metafunction in connection with a discourse semantics in Chapter 8 above. At this point I wish to bring in the textual metafunction in order to explore its role in the creation of a combined syntagm. As has already been hinted at above, the nature of instantiation (as

expressions where modal operators are themselves located in time, as in, for example, *He has told me he **would** come tomorrow*. However, there is another sense in which temporal grounding (grounding in time as the clausal domain of instantiation) forms a layer which is closer to the type specification than modal grounding, in that, (1) a type specification inherently indicates the domain of instantiation (especially in the secondary auxiliary sets, cf. *have written, be writing, is written*), and (2) modal grounding through modal operators incorporates both a modality value and a more abstract interpretation of temporal grounding (in that time, which is an aspect of reality, is reinterpreted as potentiality, which is an aspect of a projected reality) (e.g. *He **must** have left by now*, modal grounding: certainty, temporal grounding: present).

the central core of the type specification–instantiation–grounding continuum) is more complex than the two functions looked at so far, because instantiation interacts with both type specification and grounding. Furthermore, it has been noted that this interaction indicates areas of overlap between metafunctions; these can now be specified as overlaps between the textual component of language and the other two metafunctions. Because of the inherent complexity of this ‘middle area’, the function of instantiation will be explored in more detail than the other two functions we have considered above. In this exploration, both the peculiar nature of the textual metafunction vis-à-vis the other two (as indicated in Chapter 1), and the intermediary role of instantiation in the type specification–instantiation–grounding continuum will be further specified.

2.3.1 The second-order nature and enabling role of the textual metafunction

As we have seen in Chapter 1,¹⁹ the textual metafunction differs from the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions in two respects. On the one hand, it is of a *second-order nature* compared to the other metafunctions, in that it builds upon experiential and interpersonal resources of language in order to create texture. On the other hand, the textual metafunction has an instrumental or *enabling role* vis-à-vis the other two metafunctions, in that it makes possible the integration of interpersonal and experiential resources in the overall creation of texture.

In explorations of the textual metafunction in SFL, it is especially its **second-order nature** which has come to be highlighted. This second-order nature of the textual metafunction is clearly demonstrated in the role of a discourse semantics, which, as we have seen in Chapter 8, pertains to cohesion as a *semantic* textual phenomenon which is created through various types of resources from each of the metafunctional components in lexicogrammar. In addition, Matthiessen [1990, 1992] has shown that the central *lexicogrammatical* systems of the textual component, viz. INFORMATION and THEME, exploit the other metafunctions, in that experiential and interpersonal structures function as “‘carriers’ of textual waves” [Matthiessen 1992: 47].

¹⁹ Cf. p. 62–63 above.

Due to its particulate, segmental organization, experiential structure serves as a carrier of the textual system of *THEME*, which is realized through the sequence of experiential segments. Parallel to this, due to its prosodic nature, interpersonal structure functions as a carrier of the textual system of *INFORMATION*, which is realized through intonational peaks in the clause, or what Matthiessen calls ‘pitch prosodies’ [see Matthiessen 1992: 46].

The **enabling role** of the textual metafunction with respect to the other two metafunctions is explained in connection with its second-order nature, as can be seen in Matthiessen’s characterization:²⁰

Because of its second-order, enabling nature, the textual metafunction operates in terms of the resources brought into existence by the other metafunctions; this is manifested in lexis (lexical cohesions) as well as in grammar (theme, information, ellipsis, etc.). [Matthiessen 1992: 54]

According to Halliday, the enabling role of the textual metafunction lies in the fact that “it is only in combination with textual meanings that ideational and interpersonal meanings are actualized” [Halliday 1978d: 113]. Both Matthiessen’s and Halliday’s explanations of the nature of the textual metafunction show that its feature as ‘enabling’ and its second-order feature as ‘building upon’ other resources are theorized as interdependent: textual resources (such as *COHESION* (or discourse semantics), *THEME* and *INFORMATION*) are based on experiential and interpersonal resources, and it is precisely because experiential and interpersonal resources inherently also construe (i.e. Halliday’s ‘combine with’) textual meanings, that they come into existence in actual language use, i.e. in the creation of texts.

As has already been hinted at above, the perspective which has usually been taken in SFL in considering the textual metafunction, is to highlight its second-order nature, rather than its enabling nature, vis-à-vis the other two metafunctions. In this perspective, textual resources of language have been characterized in terms of the ways in which they employ aspects of the other metafunctions. As we have seen above, this approach is clearly illustrated in the systemic-functional conception of *COHESION* (and especially also Martin’s conception of a discourse semantics), *THEME* and *INFORMATION*.

²⁰ See also Halliday [1970: 325, 1976e/1973: 25, 1978d: 112–113].

In my view, both features of a ‘second-order nature’ and an ‘enabling role’ are essential in characterizing the textual metafunction. However, I believe that the characterization of these two dimensions of the textual metafunction as interdependent does not do justice to the unique contribution of each of these features to explaining the nature of the textual metafunction.²¹ In other words, I believe that in order to value both the second-order nature and the enabling role of the textual metafunction, these two aspects should be disentangled, rather than being defined as interdependent. I would argue that with respect to textual resources such as COHESION, THEME and INFORMATION, a perspective which highlights the second-order, rather than enabling nature of the textual metafunction (i.e. the perspective which has been taken in SFL) is the *only* perspective which is feasible; and furthermore, that it is indeed this perspective, and this explanation of the systems of COHESION, THEME and INFORMATION which motivates the conception of the textual metafunction as of a second-order nature.

I believe that the enabling role of the textual metafunction – as disentangled from its second-order nature – lies on a different level than the systems just mentioned. More specifically, I propose that the enabling role of the textual metafunction can be defined in terms of the semantic function of *instantiation* in the clause. Two aspects need further explanation in order to motivate the proposal to characterize the enabling role of the textual metafunction in terms of the semantic function of instantiation: (1) the interpretation of instantiation as a *textual* function, which is less obviously straightforward than the interpretation of type-specification as experiential and of grounding as interpersonal; and (2) the interpretation of instantiation as having an *enabling* role with respect to the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions, i.e. vis-à-vis type specification and grounding. These two aspects will be dealt with in the following two sub-sections.

²¹ Since it is primarily the second-order nature of the textual metafunction which has received most attention in SFL (in relation to characterizing the systems of COHESION, THEME and INFORMATION), it is especially the notion of an enabling role of the textual metafunction which suffers most in this respect: there is no *specific* explanation of this enabling role in terms of textual systems in which it is realized. In this respect, the proposal which will be made further on in this section for defining the semantic function of instantiation in the clause as an enabling textual resource is offered as a possible readjustment of this imbalance in the systemic-functional characterization of the peculiarity of the textual metafunction vis-à-vis the other metafunctions.

Before this further argumentation can be given, however, it is necessary to be clear on what constitutes ‘instantiation’ in the interpretation which is offered here. I consider three types of resources as belonging to the core area²² of instantiation in the clause: the *Instantiator* (/Subject) and concomitant to this, *grammatical number* marked on the verb in English; an indication of the *domain of instantiation* (i.e. time) in which a clausal type specification can be located; and *polarity* (i.e. the assignment of an occurrence value).

2.3.2 The textual nature of instantiation: Presentation and creation of relevance

The interpretation of the function of instantiation as a *textual* function can be motivated in relation to general characterizations of the textual metafunction which are proposed in SFL, and which we have looked at in Chapter 1. Those aspects which are especially relevant, in this respect, are summarized in Table 9-4.²³

Ideational	Interpersonal	Textual
language as representation	language as interaction	language as presentation
language as reflection	language as action	language as relevance

Table 9-4 · The nature of the textual component of language compared to the other two metafunctions

Two overall meanings which are attached to the textual metafunction, in order to differentiate it from the other two, are relevance and presentation:

the textual component is language is **relevance** (the speaker as relating to the portion of reality that constitutes the speech situation, the context within which meanings are being exchanged). [Halliday 1979: 60; emphasis MT]

The textual metafunction is concerned with the creation of text – with the **presentation** of ideational and interpersonal meanings as information that can be shared by speaker and listener in text unfolding in context. [Matthiessen & Halliday in prep.; emphasis MT]

²² I use the expression ‘core area’ here, because further on in this section, further aspects of instantiation will be recognized, which interact with type specification and grounding.

²³ See also the more elaborate version of this table in Chapter 1, p. 63 above.

In the framework of the semantic functions of type specification–instantiation–grounding, it is instantiation which does no more and no less than presenting and indicating the relevance of a typified process configuration. As we have seen above, in order to be actualized in a text, a functional type specification must be reconstrued into a syntagmatic type specification, i.e. one of its participants must be singled out to take up the role of Instantiator. It is the function of instantiation which *presents* a process configuration as a syntagm in a text, and it does so by setting up a relationship between an Instantiator and a clausal type specification, and by assigning an occurrence value to this relationship. In this way, an instance of an event is presented (but this event is not yet grounded in terms of tense or modality).²⁴ By creating an instantiated type the function of instantiation indicates the relevance which the event has to the interactants. In other words merely presenting an occurrence of an event, the speaker implies that this event must have some relevance to the speech interactants.

2.3.3 The enabling role of instantiation

The second aspect which needs to be motivated, regarding the textual interpretation of the role of instantiation in the clause, is the further view of instantiation as having an *enabling* role with respect to the experiential and interpersonal metafunctions, i.e. vis-à-vis type specification and grounding. In this section, this enabling or constitutive role of instantiation will first be characterized in general terms [§ I], defining instantiation as the central basis for forming a syntagm, and hence, defining the enabling function of the textual metafunction as a function to form syntagms. After that [§ II], we will consider the constitutive role of the different resources for instantiation in the clause.

²⁴ At the level of the simple independent clause, a non-grounded instantiated type does not occur as such. (It is indeed an inherent feature of an independent clause, as independent, that it has its own grounding, i.e. that it does not depend on other constructions in order to be grounded.) Constructions indicating a non-grounded instantiated type include nominalizations, e.g. ›*John's writing of a letter*‹, or ›*With John still writing his letter*‹, ›*we had to wait more than half an hour before we could leave*‹. Such types of constructions are examples of experiential grammatical metaphor, and will be looked at in further detail in Chapter 10.

I Instantiation and the formation of a syntagm

The enabling role of instantiation is inherent in its nature as intermediate between type specification and grounding. With regard to type specification, the role of instantiation is twofold: on the one hand, it is only through the combination of a typified configuration and an Instantiator that a process configuration can occur in a clausal syntagm. On the other hand, when a syntagmatic type specification occurs as such, i.e. without as such being instantiated, it inherently points to the domain of instantiation within which it can potentially be instantiated. This is a complex feature of a syntagmatic type specification which, as has been noted, will be further looked into in relation to grammatical metaphor in the following chapter. With regard to grounding, the enabling role of instantiation is even clearer, since, as we have seen in Section 1, grounding cannot occur without instantiation, i.e. grounding presupposes instantiation.

Because of the fundamental constitutive role of instantiation in relation to both type specification and grounding, and because the continuum of type specification–instantiation–grounding is regarded as characterizing the organization of a combined syntagm, I would argue that the enabling role of the textual metafunction is precisely its *syntagm-forming role*: although the interpersonal and experiential metafunctions each contribute their own structure to a combined syntagm, it is especially the textual metafunction which, in a more abstract sense, lies at the basis of the formation of a syntagm.

By way of concluding this section, it is useful to reconsider the central role of instantiation in the syntagm in view of Halliday's characterization of the enabling role of textual metafunction: "it is only through the encoding of semiotic interaction as text that the ideational and interpersonal components of meaning can *become operational in an environment*" [Halliday 1977: 202, emphasis MT].

II Instantiation as a hinge between type specification and grounding: The orchestrating role of the textual metafunction

In this section, I propose to interpret the function of instantiation as a hinge between type specification and grounding. This hinge inherently points in

two directions, and thus holds together type specification and grounding. In more specific terms, the clausal resources for instantiation inherently also interact with type specification and grounding. By exploring instantiation in such terms, its constitutive role vis-à-vis the other semantic functions will be further specified, and, in turn, the nature of type specification and grounding will be further elucidated. Let us consider each of the clausal resources for instantiation in turn, starting with the central role of the Instantiator.

[1] The enabling role of the Instantiator

The most central, *instantiating*, aspect of the Instantiator lies in its role in creating an instance of an event, which can be presented (either as such, as in nominalization, or in order to be further grounded, as in independent clauses) as relevant in a speech interaction.²⁵ This aspect of the Instantiator is encoded in the **textual** system of VOICE: in order for a process configuration to be presentable in a syntagm, it must always be assigned a voice, i.e. one of its participants must be singled out to be mapped onto the role of Instantiator.

The role of the Instantiator in the construction of an instantiated type also has an **interpersonal** facet: in Davidse's interpretation of the type–instance motif, the Instantiator, as the Subject of a clause, refers to that element which Halliday describes as being modally responsible; it is the element on which the validity of the instantiated process 'is made to rest'. This interpersonal dimension of the Instantiator lies at the basis of further grounding aspects which are encoded in the Instantiator, viz. person deixis (realized through the interpersonal system of MOOD PERSON). Person deixis is important in a general interpersonal sense in that it anchors the Instantiator in the interactants' intersubjective ground. It also has a more specific interpersonal role in indicating a speech function value.²⁶

²⁵ It should be noted that by assigning such a textual role to the Instantiator, I interpret this role in a more abstract sense than Subject. In other words, in my interpretation, the Instantiator is a highly abstract role which brings together the interpersonal role of Subject and

²⁶ The speech-functional meaning which is expressed through the role of Instantiator is the root speech-functional distinction between giving and demanding commodities. One of the aspects which contributes to encoding this distinction is an I/you contrast expressed in the Instantiator.

Finally, the relationship between an Instantiator and a typified process configuration is also a relationship between a Subject and a Predicate. Here ‘Subject’ is understood in a more traditional sense²⁷ than the interpersonal Subject in SFL. In order to indicate this distinction, I will refer to this dimension of the Instantiator as the **Predication focus**. It is through a relationship between a Predication focus and a Predicate that a predication is constructed, i.e. an instantiated process is created. This is the textual role, as defined above, of the Instantiator vis-à-vis a typified process configuration as merely ‘instantiating’ that process. However, I believe that in the reverse direction this relationship is inherently **experiential**. In other words, I interpret the predicating function of the Predicate vis-à-vis the Predication focus as an experiential function which is made possible through the textual function of instantiation, in the same sense as the interpersonal Subject as the element which is modally responsible is an interpersonal role which comes into being through the textual function of instantiation.

In this view, the Predicate *characterizes* the Instantiator by specifying the process configuration in which the Instantiator participates, i.e. the configuration in which the Instantiator, as a participant, is anchored. In a process configuration (i.e. a functional type specification), each participant can potentially be characterized in terms of its participation in the process. In the creation of a syntagm, when the process configuration is turned into a typified configuration, one participant is singled out as the primary focus of a predication relationship. I will say that the Predicate indicates the experiential **domain of significance** in which the Instantiator is anchored. In this sense, also, the syntagmatic type specification, as Predicate, inherently incorporates an anchor point which ‘points to’ a Predication focus which is construed outside this type specification (or which is not explicitly construed, as we will see in the following chapter in relation to grammatical metaphor). This feature of the clausal type specification ties in with (and adds an extra dimension to) Langacker’s description of the type specification as inherently pointing to the domain of instantiation in which it can potentially be located. As indicated, this aspect of a syntagmatic type specification, which will be

²⁷ This is the sense which motivates the very use of the term ‘Subject’, i.e. the Subject as the item of which something is said.

important in characterizing grammatical metaphor, will be further explored in Chapter 10.

[2] The enabling role of the domain of instantiation

As has been pointed out in Section 1.1, according to Langacker, it is an inherent feature of a type specification that it incorporates an indication of the domain of instantiation in which an instance of this type specification can be located. I would argue that, since a syntagmatic type specification (or a typified process configuration) is only formed through the role of instantiation, this feature of the syntagmatic type specification is a consequence of the function of instantiation. In this sense, an instantiated type such as *John's writing of a letter* inherently indicates a potential location of this instance in time, which means, a potential grounding of this instance in time. Therefore, it is the textual indication of a domain of instantiation which makes possible the further, **interpersonal** grounding of an expression in that domain of instantiation in terms of the system of TENSE.

While the domain of instantiation is implied in the construction of a typified process configuration, I believe that it is also explicitly indicated in an **experiential** way, in the role of circumstantial adverbials within the process configuration. In *John's writing of a letter this morning*, *this morning* construes a location in time as a domain of instantiation in an explicit, experiential manner.²⁸ This location can also be indicated in relation to another occurrence of an event, as in *Before he left this morning, John wrote a letter to his uncle*.

²⁸ Time is not the only type of meaning which can be experientially construed in circumstantial adverbials. I believe that circumstantial meanings such as time, reason, place and condition are inherently linked to the notion of 'instantiation' as such, while for example manner has to do with the mode of instantiation. The role of various types of circumstantials in relation to type specification and grounding needs to be further investigated. This can be done by exploring the scope of different types of circumstantials, where those adverbials which have the widest scope are more closely linked to the notion of instantiation. Work done in other functional schools which propose a layered structure of the clause – and of adverbials – can be revealing in this respect [e.g. in Functional Grammar, cf. especially Dik et al. 1990; and in Role and Reference Grammar, cf. Foley & Van Valin 1984, Van Valin 1990]. Davies's [1967] exploration of different types of adjuncts is also very valuable with regard to this issue.

[3] The enabling role of the indication of an occurrence value

The indication of an occurrence value has a constitutive role with respect to grounding resources, in a similar way as the indication of a domain of instantiation. In this case, it is the interpersonal grounding in terms of modality which further builds upon the mere presence of an occurrence or a non-occurrence. Modality grounds this (non)occurrence in two general ways: (1) when no explicit modal operators are used, the (non)occurrence is grounded as absolutely certain (in the case of propositions) or absolutely obligatory (in the case of proposals); different types of modal operators construe lower levels of certainty and obligation, indicating various values which are in between 'yes' and 'no'.

[4] Conclusion

In this section we have explored the enabling role of instantiation with respect to grounding and type specification. It has been shown that it is through the central function of instantiation in the formation of a syntagm that the construction of a syntagmatic type specification (as incorporating an indication of a domain of instantiation, and an anchor pointing to a potential Predication focus) and the construction of a grounded instance can be brought about. In this sense the enabling role of the textual metafunction (which, as has been argued, is crucially concerned with 'instantiation') has been characterized as a syntagm-forming role.

The central role of instantiation in relation to type specification and grounding, and the fundamental role of the textual metafunction in relation to the other metafunctions, is summarized in Figure 9-5.




Figure 9-5 · The central role of instantiation in the type specification–instantiation–grounding continuum

3 Semiotic-functional motifs: Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored how the semantic side of the different metafunctions can be explained in terms of the semantic functions of type specification, instantiation and grounding:

- (1) The *experiential* metafunction has been related to *type specification*, both as a functional type specification, which refers to a process configuration, and a syntagmatic type specification, which refers to a typified process configuration, which is related to an Instantiator in the formation of a clausal syntagm.
- (2) The *interpersonal* metafunction has been linked to the semantic function of *grounding*.
- (3) With regard to the *textual* metafunction, it has been argued that *instantiation* characterizes the *enabling role* of this metafunction with respect to the other metafunctions. Besides this enabling role, the textual metafunction also has a *second-order nature* vis-à-vis the other two metafunctions, which is encoded in the lexicogrammatical systems of THEME and INFORMATION, and the semantic system of COHESION (or more generally, a discourse semantics).

The final task for this chapter is to link each of these semantic characterizations to the motifs of particle, wave and field, which Halliday has

identified in order to explain the basic modes of expression which are characteristic of the three metafunctions. This can be done in brief terms, since we have considered these realizational motifs in Chapter 6.

In this section two additional terms will be introduced in order to characterize the complementarity between the *interpersonal* and *experiential* modes of expression, which tie in more clearly with the semantic specifications which have been given in this chapter. In addition to that, the *textual* mode of expression will be characterized at different levels, reflecting its enabling role (textual metafunction as instantiation) and its lexicogrammatical (THEME and INFORMATION) and semantic (COHESION/discourse semantics) second-order nature. Figure 9-5 gives an overview.




Figure 9-5 · Semiotic-functional motifs: Terminology and visualization

The particulate mode of expression characterizing the experiential metafunction will also be referred to as **bundling**: the semantic function of type specification or process configuration is realized in the creation of a participant bundle, i.e. a bundle of experiential building blocks. This term is suggested because it harmonizes with the semantic aspect of *con-figuration*, which I have used interchangeably with type specification in this chapter.

As an interpersonal realizational term which is alternative to prosody and field, I will use the term **scoping**. This term is adapted from McGregor's [1997: 236] notion of scoping,²⁹ which he uses in order to characterize the

²⁹ It should be pointed out that my use of the term scope does not correspond exactly to McGregor's. I use scoping in order to indicate a general interpersonal type of realization. In

interpersonal metafunction in the framework of his Semiotic Grammar. This term is suggested because it ties in well with the semantic characterization of the interpersonal metafunction in terms of *grounding*: by placing an expression in a domain of grounding (such as modality, for example), it is placed within the scope of that domain. I will call the grounding expression a **scoping element**, and the expression which is grounded will be referred to as **scoped element**.

Finally, with regard to the textual metafunction, the situation is more complex. Due to its inherent constitutive role in the syntagm, the enabling nature of the textual metafunction, characterized semantically in terms of instantiation, is realized both through a particulate mode of expression (since the Instantiator is mapped onto an experiential participant role), and a prosodic mode of expression (since the Instantiator is also mapped onto an interpersonal Subject role). Also in its second-order nature in relation to the systems of theme and information, the realizational mode of the textual metafunction is inherently hybrid, pointing to the experiential and interpersonal resources which are further exploited by theme and information.

As we have seen in Chapter 1, in relation to the field–particle–wave motif, the textual metafunction is characterized in terms of a wave pattern, which has also been explained as a culminative-periodic type of pattern. I believe that this only refers to the second-order nature of the metafunction at the level of cohesion (or, alternatively, the level of discourse semantics): textual waves are created through the combination of thematic and information patterns into larger textual wholes, through patterns of lexical cohesion extending over larger stretches of discourse, and through sequences of speech functions. In order to emphasize the semantic motif of cohesion, I will refer to this mode of expression as **linking**. This term is again derived from McGregor's characterization of the textual (in his terms: textural) component of language. The aspects of the textual metafunction which will be most relevant to the discussion of grammatical metaphor in the following chapter, are the semantic function of instantiation and its role in the formation of a syntagm, and the linking mode of expression.

McGregor's model, scoping is only one possible interpersonal relationship, complementary to another type called framing [cf. McGregor 1997: 251ff].

The aim of this chapter is to propose a semiotic-functional definition and an explanation of grammatical metaphor which is fully integrated in the overall model of language which has been presented in this dissertation. As has been announced, what is necessary is a characterization of grammatical metaphor from an internal-structural perspective, in order to complement the macro-semantic perspective which has so far been predominant in systemic-functional studies of grammatical metaphor. The way in which the notion of grammatical metaphor will be incorporated in the semiotic-functional model of language proposed in this dissertation, is by explaining it in terms of the semiotic-functional motifs which have been specified in the previous chapter. As has also been indicated above, a further issue which will be discussed in relation to the notion of grammatical metaphor, is the nature of grammatical categories and the way in which they can be defined.

This chapter consists of three sections. First, the requirements for a semiotic-functional definition of grammatical metaphor will be specified [**Section 1**]. **Section 2** offers a characterization of grammatical metaphor in general. After that, the experiential and interpersonal types of metaphor, and sub-types within these categories, are looked at in more detail [**Sections 3–4**]. Since, as we have seen, it is especially with regard to experiential grammatical metaphor that the notion of grammatical classes/categories is important, a discussion of the formation of grammatical categories will be incorporated in the exploration of experiential grammatical metaphor, which is therefore

more elaborate than the treatment of interpersonal metaphor which will be given in this chapter.

1 Introduction: Towards semiotic-functional definition of grammatical metaphor

A semiotic-functional characterization of grammatical metaphor, in the vein of the type of model which has been presented so far in this dissertation, must satisfy three requirements:

- (1) The semiosis of grammatical metaphor as a type of linguistic sign must be defined and explained in terms of a solidarity between a content-side and an expression-side. In other words, the definition must specify and explain both the semantic import of grammatical metaphor, and the way in which this semantic aspect is realized in syntagmatic/structural patterns in language.
- (2) The definition of grammatical metaphor must be general enough to account for both experiential and interpersonal metaphor – i.e., it has to define what exactly is ‘metaphorical’ in *both* experiential and interpersonal metaphor – and it must provide a schematic basis for explaining the *different* nature of these metafunctional types of metaphor, and particular sub-types within each of the metafunctional components.
- (3) Finally, the characterization of grammatical metaphor must be an integral part of a more general semiotic-functional model of language: it has to recognize the differential nature of ‘grammatical metaphor’ as a linguistic resource in its own right, while it also has to indicate how ‘grammatical metaphor’, as a second-order linguistic phenomenon, builds upon non-metaphorical resources in language.

2 Grammatical metaphor as doubling of semiosis

I propose to define grammatical metaphor as a resource which is based on a **doubling of semiosis**. This ‘doubling’ characterizes metaphor across the different metafunctions, and refers to both the content side and the expression side of metaphor as a linguistic category:

- (1) *Semantically*, the various metafunctional types of grammatical metaphor amplify the basic meaning inherent in each metafunction. In this sense, experiential metaphor involves a **doubling of configuration**; interpersonal metaphor is defined as a **doubling of grounding**.
- (2) On the *structural* level, the semantic doubling effect of metaphor is realized by a restructuring of the typical (non-metaphorical) types of patterning inherent in each metafunction: experiential metaphor is formed by a **doubling of bundling**; interpersonal metaphor is based on a **doubling of scope**.

‘Textual metaphor’ will be defined as a special case of experiential metaphor, although, on an initial level, it can also be regarded as involving a type of doubling, viz. doubling of linking (both semantic and structural). In both the interpersonal and experiential (and hence textual) components, it will further be argued that grammatical metaphor is ‘carried’ by the logico-semantic cryptotypes of projection and expansion.

It will be noted that ‘doubling’ is intrinsically defined, in both its content and expression sides, in relation to the non-metaphorical baseline resources in language: while, on a primary level, grammatical metaphor is recognized as a *distinctive* type of linguistic sign which deserves a separate label, and which should be studied in its own right, on a more abstract level, it is maintained that grammatical metaphor is ultimately based on the *same* kind of semiotic resources which characterize the baseline of language, viz. grounding–scoping in the interpersonal metafunction, and configuration–bundling in the experiential metafunction.

What exactly is meant by ‘doubling’ can be made clear by considering some initial examples of the principal types of grammatical metaphor:

- (1) a. ›*The quick writing of a letter by John*‹ only took five minutes.
- b. ›*Writing a letter*‹ can be done in ten minutes.
- c. ›*John’s quick writing of a letter*‹ only took five minutes.
- d. *He began* ›*dinner preparations*‹.
- e. *Make sure you have enough time for* ›*preparing dinner*‹.

- (2) a. *I think* → *I left the lights on.*
 b. *It can be seen that* → *these industries are not without their difficulties.*
 c. *I would strongly advise you* → *to take a look at it.*
 d. *I have the impression that* → *they don't know.*
 e. *You are obliged* → *to stay in your room after 10pm.*
- (3) *The restructuring of the economy was followed by a major crisis.*




Figure 10-1 · Grammatical metaphor as a doubling of semiosis

In (1), which are examples of experiential metaphor, a participant bundle, such as the one consisting of the building blocks ‘someone + write + something > John + write + a letter’ is reconstrued as a building block which

can enter again, as a participant, in a new bundle: ‘something + take + time > the writing of a letter + take + five minutes’.

In the interpersonal metaphors in (2), a projecting clause such as *I think* has an interpersonal scope over another clause which is in this way assessed, e.g. *I left the lights on* in (2a). The scoping element (*I think*) indicates an extra interpersonal grounding, which in this case is an indication of a modality value having to do with degrees of certainty, for a clause which is already grounded in its own terms, through its own Instantiator and Finite operator (past tense · neutral modality–absolute polarity: positive in (2a)).

Finally, the ‘textual metaphor’ in (3) construes a textual link (of temporal sequence), not between process configurations, but rather within one configuration. This configuration, which thus incorporates two configurations itself, can then be linked to other clauses by means of the non-metaphorical system of CONJUNCTION: for example, *The restructuring of the economy was followed by a general crisis. As a consequence of this, the situation at the company deteriorated.*

The basic doubling effect in each type of metaphor is represented in Figure 10-1. This figure also visualizes the fact that metaphor is essentially an extension of the basic, non-metaphorical resources characteristic of each metafunctional component.

We now turn to a more detailed exploration of the metafunctional types of metaphor, and further sub-types which can be distinguished within each metafunction.

3 Experiential metaphor

As we have seen above [cf. the Introduction and Chapter 7], experiential grammatical metaphor has to do with the formation of a different type of *category* (for example, from a verbal construction to a nominal construction), or, in an alternative conception, the formation of a different type of *unit* (for example, from a clausal construction to a groupal construction). The function of this restructuring, as indicated, is to create a category/unit which can take up a role in a new configuration. In this sense, therefore,

experiential metaphor crucially involves the construction of a different type of *syntagm* (different compared to a non-metaphorical construction) which can then combine with or, in a more restricted sense, which can take up an experiential role within another type of syntagm.

For this reason, I believe that in order to come to a full understanding of the internal structure of experiential metaphor, we have to consider this phenomenon in a larger context of linguistic resources which, in a general sense have to do with the formation of and combination of syntagms and categories. In this abstract context, different types of syntagmatic structure should initially be considered as such, without taking into account the experiential and interpersonal layers of functional structure which can be mapped onto them. This abstract context is twofold: (1) focussing on the *categorial* side, it refers to morphotactics or word formation (especially transcategorization); (2) focussing on the *syntagmatic* side, it refers to what is called, in mainstream linguistics, verb complementation.¹ In SFL, aspects of what is referred to as verb complementation in other frameworks are accounted for in terms of the logical metafunction (TAXIS and LOGICO-SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP, see Figure 10-2). The idea that metaphor should be placed in these two contexts is not new: Matthiessen [1993a: 98ff] places grammatical metaphor in a framework of different types of extensions of the grammatical potential of language, which also include rankshift and transcategorization amongst other types of resources; and Halliday & Matthiessen [1999: 259] again place metaphor in the context of transcategorization and rank shift.




Figure 10-2 · Primary systems in the logical component of language

¹ For comprehensive studies in different types of linguistic schools, see, for example, Karttunen [1971], Grimshaw [1979], Givón [1980, 1990], Ney [1981], Noonan [1985], Ransom [1986], Horigushi [1989].

Figure 10-3 below gives an overview of the typology of primary types of experiential metaphor which will be proposed in this section. In this overview, metaphor is placed within both of the contexts mentioned above: at the top of the diagram, the constructional level indicates types of syntagmatic structures which are relevant in elucidating the category of ‘experiential metaphor’; while at the bottom of the overview, the elemental level indicates types of word formation (based on transcategorization) which will be relevant in the discussion of experiential metaphor. I believe that the continuum which is thus formed, and in which grammatical metaphor forms the central area, can be elucidated by exploring the role of instantiation, or, what has been called in the previous chapter, the central syntagm-forming semantic function in language.

In the discussion of experiential grammatical metaphor, I will thus draw on three major types of frameworks: (1) the systemic-functional treatment of the logical component of language; (2) Coseriu’s theory of word formation; and (3) Langacker’s notion of ‘instantiation’, and his definition of categorial meanings.

3.1 The categorial modi into which the class verb can enter

As we have seen in Chapters 6 and 8, the major types of experiential metaphor can be described, from a macro-semantic perspective, in terms of the following shifts: ‘process’ → ‘thing’ (type I), ‘process’ → ‘quality’ (type II), and ‘quality’ → ‘thing’ (type III).² Figure 10-3 only represents the first two of these types, which will be referred to, focussing on the categorial difference, **nominalization** and **adjectivalization**. We will initially focus on types I and II; as will become clear further on, the nominalization of an adjective can be explained in relation to the parallel type of nominalization of a verb (type II).

² See Chapter 8, p. 439–440 above.

		Particular instantiation extracted/profiled [-1]	Circumstance extracted/profiled [-2]	Non-Instantiator participant/ extracted/ profiled [-3]
Dependent projection	[1f.] Finite	I don't think he will write them a letter.	I asked him when he would write the letter.	He asked me what he should write.
	[1n.] Non-finite	It's advisable (for you) to write them a letter. I asked him to write a letter to the committee.	---	He asked me what to write in his letter.
Embedded projection	[2f.] Finite	That he wrote a letter to the committee surprised her. How strange it is that John wrote a letter to the committee.	That was when John was writing his letter to the committee. The question is when will you write the letter.	I can't imagine what he wrote in his letter. The question is what has he written in his letter.
	[2n.] Non-finite	---	The question is when to write that letter.	The question is what to write in this letter.
A Constructional level I: clausal syntax				
Expanding Head noun = Act				
Dependent expansion [3f.]		I watched John quickly writing a letter. [3f.1]	She came home when John was writing a letter to the committee. [3f.2]	
Embedded expansion + Head noun [4f.]	Finite	---	She arrived the evening when John was writing a letter to the committee. [4f.2]	I haven't read the letter [which/that] John wrote to his uncle. [4f.3]
	[4n.] Non-finite	The act of John quickly writing a letter only took five minutes. [4n.1]	The best time for writing letters is the evening. [4n.2] The best time for you to write the letter is the evening.	The most important letter for you to write is the one to your uncle. [4n.3]
- Head noun [5f.]	Finite	---	The best time is when you have finished the letter. [5f.2]	I haven't read what John wrote to the committee. [5f.3]
[5n.] Non-finite		John planned to write them a letter. [5n.1] John was keen to write them a letter. John was happy to write them a letter. It was foolish of you to write them a letter. It was hard for John to write such a letter. [6.]	John's quickly writing a letter only took five minutes. [5n.1] Writing a letter only takes five minutes. I don't like writing letters. I prefer to write them a letter. The best thing would be for you to write them a letter. It's best for you to write them a letter.	---
				The letter was hard to write. [6.3]
B Constructional level II: groupal syntax				
[7.]		John's quick writing of a letter only took five minutes. [7.1] The quick writing of a letter by John only took five minutes.		
C Elemental level: morphotactics				
[8.]		I admire John's quick letter-writing building, opening, air-conditioning, sightseeing, ... sleepwalking, handwriting, ... coverage, wastage, ... dismissal, refusal, ... amazement, puzzlement, ... exploration, foundation, ...		

Figure 10-3 · Primary types of experiential metaphors placed in a larger framework of complementation and word formation

The semiosis of grammatical metaphor

Instantiator extracted > Instantiator profiled > active [·4a]	Instantiator extracted > Instantiator profiled > passive [·4p]	Instantiator extracted > Instantiation profiled > active [·5a]	Instantiator extracted > Instantiation profiled > passive [·5p]
They asked me who wrote the text.	I asked him who was offended by the letter.		
I can't imagine who will write the letter. [2f·4a]	I can't imagine who was offended by the text. [2f·4p]		
The problem is who will write the letter.	The question is who was offended by the letter.		
=		While John was quickly writing a letter [3f·2] he suddenly realized he still had to call his sister.	
The letter which offended many people was the one written by John. [4f·4a]	The letter which was written by John offended many people. [4f·4p]		
The letter offending many people was the one written by John. [4n·4a]	The letter written by John offended many people. [4n·4p]		
The best person to write the letter is John.	The most important letter to be written (by you) is the one to the committee.		
So that's what offended so many people. [5f·4a]	He apologized to whoever was offended by the letter. [5f·4p]	Writing the letter, John suddenly realized he still had to call his sister. [5n·5a]	Offended by the text, they left the meeting. [5n·5p]
		With John still writing his letter, we couldn't leave on time.	
You were foolish/a fool to write such a letter to the committee. [6·4a]			
		The offending text [7·5a]	The offended people [7·5p]
baker, reminder, ... songwriter, wood-pecker, ... applicant, inhabitant, participant, ... [8·4a]	employee, trustee, ... [8·4p]	easy-going, everlasting, ... The offensive text attractive, productive, elusive, ... acceptable, reasonable, ... careful, shameful, doubtful, ... careless, shameless, doubtless, ... sleepy, shaky, weepy, ... [8·5a]	black-haired, short-sighted, ... far-fetched, well-meant, ... [8·5p]

Type I and type II metaphors thus refer to resources by which a verbal lexeme (in the sense of *grammatical class*, as explained in Chapter 8)³ does not occur in a verbal syntagm (a verbal group, or a clause, which has a verbal group as head), but rather, in a nominal or adjectival syntagm. As a starting point for discussing grammatical metaphor, it is therefore useful to consider the general formal schemata, and the meanings which are encoded by these formal schemata, through which a lexeme of the class ‘verb’ can occur in a nominal or adjectival syntagm, and thus can get the categorial meaning of ‘noun’ or ‘adjective’. In order to do so, we will return to Langacker’s theory of clausal heads, or the *types* which form the most central core on which the further formation of a clause (type specification–instantiation–grounding) is built.

3.1.1 Verbal formal schemata and their meanings

I Verbal root forms and basic verbal schemata

As we have seen in the previous chapter,⁴ Langacker distinguishes between three kinds of verbal types, which consist of a content verb and a pair of auxiliary items (an auxiliary and a suffix): (1) the perfective *have* + verb + *-en* (*have written*), the progressive *be* + verb + *-ing* (*be writing*), and the passive *be* + verb + *-en* (*be written*). It is useful to recapitulate Langacker’s explanation of these clausal heads. The verb stem as such, for example *write*, as a type, inherently points to the domain of instantiation in which possible instances of the process designated can be anchored, viz. the domain of time. It is therefore basically a processual expression. However, the suffixes *-ing* and *-en* turn the processual head into an atemporal relation: *writing* and *written* are inherently atemporal. The role of the auxiliary verbs then is to turn the atemporal relations indicated by *writing* and *written* into a processual expression again, i.e. an expression which can be grounded in the domain of time: *be writing*, *have written*, *be written* can be instantiated and grounded, as in, for example:

³ Cf. p. 468 above.

⁴ Cf. p. 504 above.

- (4) a. *John will be writing letters the whole afternoon.*
 b. *John has written a letter to the committee.*
 c. *The letter was written by John.*

Langacker’s view that *be V-en*, *be V-ing* and *have V-en* are the central types of verbal types is based on the fact that the passive, progressive and perfective auxiliaries (in that order) are the three types of which are closest to the verbal head in English,⁵ a fact which has been recognized, as Langacker [1991: 197] indicates, since Chomsky’s [1957] well-known analysis of the ordering of auxiliaries. However, I will reinterpret this scheme of the basic forms of verbal lexemes on a more abstract level, disregarding the ‘outer’ pattern of *have V-en*, and instead introducing what I will describe as a more central pattern, viz. *to V*.

The basic change I wish to introduce to Langacker’s scheme is regard as the most central, processual patterns (i.e. basic verbal patterns which can be grounded), *be V-en*, *be V-ing* and the bare verb stem *V*. Each of these patterns has an atemporal alternative, but whereas for *be V-en* and *be V-ing* this alternative is formed by omitting the auxiliary, in the case of *V*, the atemporal alternative is formed by adding *to*: *to write*. These processual and atemporal basic verb forms are summarized in Table 10-1. The atemporal forms will henceforth be called **root forms**. The atemporal patterns and the basic processual forms, which indicate the first layer of auxiliaries which is possible will be referred to as **basic formal schemata** for a verbal lexeme.

Atemporal form	to V	V-ing	V-ed
	to take	taking	taken
Processual form	V	be V-ing	be V-ed
	take	be taking	be taken

Table 10-1 · Basic formal schemata of a verbal lexeme:
 Atemporal and processual patterns

The scheme proposed in Table 10-1 has three advantages over that presented by Langacker:

⁵ Cf. also Figure 10-4, which will be introduced below.

- (1) It indicates more types of parallelisms, by incorporating the verb stem itself as one of the patterns, among the basic *be V-en* and *be V-ing*, which on the one hand are processual and thus can be grounded, and which on the other hand can be encoded as atemporal relations.
- (2) It accounts for the occurrence of verbal lexemes based on the *to V* root form as well: this form occurs both in verbal constructions (*be going to V*, *have to V*), and in nominalizations (as shown in Figure 10-3 above).
- (3) It places *have V-en* on a par with *be going to V*, which both occur on the same layer in the layered structure of auxiliaries in general, and which are both auxiliary constructions based on a process of subjectification (as we have seen in Chapter 9).⁶
- (4) Concomitant to (3), the scheme proposed here regards *be V-ing* and *be V-ed* as the most central types of patterns (although *V-ed* is more central than *V-ing*, a feature which we will return to below), which are both based on schematic *be* indicating a relationship.

Before we can look at the different types of grammatical categories (and hence the syntagms) which can be formed on the basis of these formal schemata, it is necessary to consider the meaning of the atemporalizing elements (suffixes *-ing* and *-ed*, and *to*), and the meaning of the auxiliary *be* in the processual schemata.

II The inherent meaning of verbal root forms as atemporalizing elements

For the meaning of *-ing*, we can take recourse to Langacker's analysis, since the *be V-ing* schema (the only schema in which *-ing* occurs) is retained from Langacker's description. This description can be supplemented with Halliday's view of non-finite verb forms, which we will also draw on further on in relation to the *to* of *to V*. Langacker explains the progressive in general in terms of an intuitive explanation which is common in linguistics, i.e. in terms of an 'internal perspective' on an event, or the conception of an event as holistic or unitary [Langacker 1991: 208]. The basic meaning of the *be V-ing* pattern as a whole is therefore to render a processual expression *imperfective* or progressive. The suffix *-ing* as such thus indicates an atemporal

⁶ Cf. p. 507 for *be going to V* and p. 509 for *have V-en*.

progressive relationship. This meaning can be described in general as a ‘state in progress’.

This meaning of *-ing* can be further specified by contrasting it to that of *to* of *to V*. The *to* of *to V* can be described as indicating a potential or a virtual process, and therefore has a general ‘irrealis’ meaning [Halliday 1994/1985: 241]. In contrast to this, *-ing* in general appears as indicating a ‘realis’ meaning. Therefore, I will say that *-ing* has a realis meaning viewed from an internal perspective.

This meaning also contrasts to *-ed*, which also has a ‘realis’ meaning, but indicates a different type of viewpoint. I would argue the meaning of *-ed*, defined at a highly schematic level in order to account for both the basic formal schema of the passive *be V-ed*, and the formation of the perfective *have V-ed*, can be described as indicating a ‘resultant state’, or even more schematically, indicating a ‘terminal viewpoint’ on a process.⁷ The meaning of a ‘terminal viewpoint’ or a viewpoint focussing on the result of a process is inherent in both the passive (which in addition focusses on one participant with regard to whom the process has a certain effect), and in the perfective (which has the additional temporal meaning of a ‘current relevance’). The inherent meanings of the three atemporalizing elements are summarized in Table 10-2.

Atemporal form	V-ed	V-ing	to V
	taken	taking	to take
Basic aspect	Realis		Irrealis
Viewpoint	Terminal viewpoint	Internal viewpoint	

Table 10-2 · Semantics of verbal root forms: Inherent meaning

⁷ The meaning which is here attributed to *-ed* in general is based on Langacker’s descriptions of the passive on the one hand, and on the type of meaning commonly attributed to the perfective (as ‘current relevance’) on the other hand. The expression ‘terminal viewpoint’, which Langacker uses, is due to DeLancey [1981]. As Langacker explains, passives occur in three types of constructions. (1) Formed on intransitive verbs, the passive indicates an internal change of state (as in *His jaw was rather **swollen***). (2) With certain types of transitives (which are not specified), the passive indicates a change of state in general (as in *A tornado left the town totally **devastated***). (3) The most schematic type of meaning which is expressed by the passive in general, is a ‘terminal viewpoint’ [Langacker 1991: 202–203].

In characterizing the verbal root forms *V-ing*, *V-ed* and *to V*, so far we have focussed on the inherent (aspectual) meaning of the forms. There is one further aspect which is also indicated in Langacker's theory, but which I would like to emphasize; this emphasis will lead to a different interpretation of the verbal root forms in relation to the notion of 'instantiation'.

III The meaning of verbal formal schemata: Schematic instantiation

In Langacker's view,⁸ any type specification inherently contains an indication of the domain in which potential occurrences can be anchored or grounded. In the case of verbal type specifications, as we have seen, this domain is time. I believe that, because of this inherent indication of a 'potential' anchoring in time, verbal type specification inherently also indicate an instantiation. This instantiation is not the actual, quantified instantiation which is referred to by the term 'instantiation' as it has so far been used in the previous chapter: it is a more abstract, schematic type of instantiation. In the case of *to V* this schematic instance is further specified as a *potential* instance of a process. Since passive *V-ed* inherently implies a terminal viewpoint on a process, it is presupposed that a process has taken place. Therefore, I would argue that passive *V-ed* indicates a *presupposed* instance. *V-ing* is the most neutral root form in this respect, and I will characterize its meaning in no more specific terms than the overall meaning indicated above: that of a *schematic* instance in general. These meanings will become clearer further below, when we consider cases where the verbal root forms occur as such, forming syntagms which have these forms as their heads (as is the case in certain types of experiential metaphors).

The domain of instantiation is not the only aspect of instantiation which is incorporated in a type specification. There are two ways in which an Instantiator is inherently implied by a type specification. First, it can be argued that *V-ing* and the passive *V-ed* are inherently relational, in that they point to an Instantiator. Within the *V-ing* form, a schematic indication is included of an Instantiator who brings about the *V-ing*. With the passive *V-ed*, this implication of an Instantiator is even stronger, since here, the

⁸ Cf. Chapter 9, p. 504 above.

terminal viewpoint which is indicated by the form *V-ed* inherently applies to an Instantiator who is effected by the process, i.e. the Instantiator who is *V-ed*. The relational meaning of both *V-ing* and the passive *V-ed* is explicitly indicated by the auxiliaries with which they combine in order to form a schematic verbal head: *be V-ing* and *be V-ed*. The implication of an Instantiator in both *V-ing* and *V-ed* precisely lies in the fact that their relational nature is based on a schematic relationship of predication, which may be rendered explicit as *be*: as we have seen in Chapter 9, a predication always inherently points to a Predication focus (i.e. an Instantiator).

The situation is different with regard to *to V*. Although *to*, again, is inherently relational, there is implication of a relationship of predication which indicates a relation to an Instantiator. Rather than being based on a schematic type of predication (which can be rendered explicit as *be*), the relational nature of *to V* is rooted in the prepositional meaning of *to*, from which the particle *to* in *to V* is ultimately derived [cf. Los 1999: 66]. As will see below in exploring experiential grammatical metaphor, because of the general nature of its relational meaning, *to V* is not inherently related to an Instantiator, as is the case with *V-ing* and *V-ed*, but rather, can attach to any element of a structural type specification (including participants encoded as Instantiator, non-Instantiator participants, and circumstances).

There is a second way in which a verbal type specification inherently points to a potential Instantiator. This has been discussed in Chapter 9 when we explored the enabling role of the Instantiator in the creation of a syntagm. There, it was argued that a type specification is also inherently a predication, and that a predication intrinsically contains an anchor point for an Instantiator (the role which I have referred to as Predication focus).⁹ This is thus a feature of the content verb head of the root forms *V-ing*, *V-ed*, *to V*, rather than of the atemporalizing elements.

The ‘instantiational’ meanings which are indicated by verbal formal schemata (verbal type specifications) are summarized in Table 10-3. It can be seen that *V-ed* has the strongest implication of an Instantiator, due to its inherent meaning of a ‘terminal viewpoint’ attached to a particular participant, while

⁹ Cf. p. 528 above.

to V indicates only a weak implication of an Instantiator, which is not inherent in the atemporalizing element to itself, but rather in the lexical verb head, which has this same feature in each type of formal schema.

Atemporal form	V-ed	V-ing	to V
	taken	taking	to take
Implication of domain of instantiation	Presupposed instance	Schematic instance	Potential instance
Relational meaning to Instantiator	Strong, based on terminal viewpoint attached to one participant	Neutral	No relation to <i>Instantiator</i> implied
Implication of Predication focus	All forms point to a Predication focus, due to the lexical verb head		

Table 10-3 · Semantics of verbal formal schemata: Instantiational meaning

3.1.2 *The categorial modi into which verbal root forms enter and the formation of syntagms*

Having looked that the basic meaning which is expressed by three basic verbal schemata – passive *V-ed*, progressive *V-ing* and *to V* – we can now turn to the types of categorial modi into which these root forms enter, and hence the syntagms which are formed on the basis of different types of verbal schemata. Figure 10-4 gives an overview.

The central area in Figure 10-4 indicates the different types of verbal schemata which are possible, while the bottom and top areas show ways in which these formal schemata can occur in different categorial modes. Let us first focus on the central area. Here we find the basic formal schemata mentioned above, viz. *take*, *be taken* and *be taking*, complemented by a further possibility indicating that the progressive *be V-ing* can encompass the passive *be V-ed*, viz. *be being taken*. These different patterns indicate different kinds of verbal types.




Figure 10-4 · Verbal root forms, verbal formal patterns and their syntagmatic potential

The basic verbal types indicated in the lower circle in Figure 10-4 can be further specified by adding more auxiliaries which have a larger scope. Such further auxiliaries are of two kinds. First, there are the auxiliaries expressing secondary tense: *have V-en* and *be going to V*. As we have seen in Chapter 9, both of these types of patterns are based on a process of subjectification. Figure 10-4 shows that they are similar in scope: *have V-en* can encompass *be going to V* (the top right circle) or vice versa (the top left circle). Another possibility for further specification of the basic types indicated in the bottom circle, is a specification of phase, indicated in auxiliaries such as *try to V*, *manage to V*, and *try V-ing*, *manage V-ing*, and so on. These can apply to the two innermost layers of the auxiliary system, i.e. bare V and passive *be V-ed*.¹⁰

The various types of formal schemata indicated in the middle area in Figure 10-4 merely represent verbal types, which are not instantiated in any type of categorial modus or type of syntagm. There are two possibilities for such an instantiation. When the formal schemata are combined with a *grounding* expression, they form a verbal syntagm and hence a clausal unit:

- (5) a. The letter **has been taken** to the post office this morning.
 b. John said he **was going to take** the 5pm train.

The second possibility is where the formal schemata are atemporalized by the addition of *to*, or by the deletion of their temporalizing auxiliaries, i.e. by being restructured into the verbal root forms *V-ing*, *V-ed* and *to V*. This type of construal is represented in the bottom section of Figure 10-4. This is precisely the type of construal which lies at the basis of experiential grammatical metaphor: a lexeme of the grammatical class 'verb' occurs in a nominal or an adjectival categorial modus, rather than a verbal one, which is the default type of category, providing the means by which the verbal head can be grounded. When occurring in a nominal or adjectival modus, the verbal head forms are not grounded in the domain of time; on the contrary, they are *atemporalized*. In this way their general meaning is not a grounded process, but rather an atemporal relation.

¹⁰ Cf. *He tried not to be swept away by the waves.*

Figure 10-4 indicates the basic possibilities for construing an atemporal relation of a verbal head. Both *V-ing* and *to V* form the basis for the formation of a nominal category, while *V-ing* and *V-ed* lie at the basis of an adjectival category (we will turn to *to V* below). These patterns can be explained in terms of the inherent types of meanings expressed by the verbal root forms [cf. Section I, §2 above]. Since the passive *V-ed* incorporates a very strong implication of an Instantiator, the only type of categorial modus which it enters into is adjectival: an adjective always occurs in combination with a noun to which it is applied, either in a predicative or an attributive construal. This pattern is found in four types of adjectival constructions in Figure 10-3:¹¹

- (6) [4n•4p]
- a. *The letter ›**written** by John› offended many people.*
 - b. *The people ›**offended** by the letter› immediately left the meeting.*
- (7) [5n•5p]
- a. *›**Offended** by the letter›, they left the meeting.*
 - b. *›**Encouraged** by the school report›, Jane decided to apply to Cambridge University.*
- (8) [7•5p]
- a. *The ›**offended**› people left the meeting.*
 - b. *Could you sent us a ›**written**› confirmation that you received the money?*
- (9) [8•5p]
- a. *A **black-haired**, tall man entered the room.*
 - b. *She is extremely **short-sighted**.*

The *V-ing* atemporal form is more versatile, since its basic meaning is to indicate a schematic instantiation. Hence, it occurs in both an adjectival and a nominal type of construction. The adjectival construction formed on *-ing* is the active alternative to the *-ed* adjectivalization illustrated above:

¹¹ The internal differences between types of adjectivalization will be further discussed below.

(10) [4n•4a]

- a. *The letter ›**offending**‹ many people in the committee was written by John.*
- b. *The man ›**writing**‹ letters is John.*

(11) [5n•5a]

- a. *›**Writing** the letter‹, John suddenly realized he still had to call his sister.*
- b. *›Not **knowing** how to answer that question‹, John kept silent.*
- c. *With ›John still **writing** his letter‹, we couldn't leave on time.*

(12) [7•5a]

- a. *The ›**offending**‹ text had been written by John.*
- b. *This has been a century of ›rapidly **changing**‹ technological evolutions.*

(13) [8•5a]

- a. *He's a friendly, **easy-going** type of person.*
- b. *Our window looked out on the **everlasting** snows the Swiss Alps.*

Nominalizations based on the atemporalizing *-ing* form include four major types which, as we will see below, are parallel to the sets of four types construals mentioned above for adjectivalization on *-ed* and *-ing*:

(14) [4n•1]

- a. *The act of ›John quickly **writing** a letter‹ only took five minutes.*
- b. *The process of ›the moon **moving** in between the sun and the earth so that that sun disappears from view‹ is called a solar eclipse.*

(15) [5n•1]

- a. *›John's quickly **writing** a letter to the committee‹ only took five minutes.*
- b. *›**Writing** a letter‹ only takes five minutes.*
- c. *›I don't like **writing** letters‹.*

(16) [7•1]

- a. *›John's quick **writing** of a letter‹ only took five minutes.*
- b. *›The quick **writing** of a letter by John‹ only took five minutes.*

(17) [8•1]

- a. *I admire John's quick **letter-writing**.*
- b. *But I don't like his **handwriting**.*

Finally, we turn to the atemporalizing form *to V*. Just like *V-ing*, *to V*, which in general refers to a potential instantiation of an event, occurs in nominal constructions:

(18) [5n•1]

- a. *I prefer ›**to write** them a letter‹.*
- b. *The best thing would be ›**to write** them a letter‹.*
- c. *It's best ›for you **to write** them a letter‹.*
- d. *It was foolish of you ›**to write** them a letter‹.*
- e. *It was hard for John ›**to write** them a letter‹.*

We have seen above [Section I, §3] that *to V* differs from *V-ing* and *V-ed* in that it does not encode a relation to an Instantiator in the same sense as *V-ing* and *V-ed* do, although an Instantiator is always implied through the lexical head itself. This has to do with the fact that, although it also basically indicates a relation, this relation is not of a predicative type (implying a Predication focus) as is the case with *V-ing* and *V-ed*, but rather, it is rooted in the more general original sense of *to* as a preposition or a mini-process. This feature of *to V* has two consequences. First, a syntagm formed on *to V* can serve as a modification of a noun in different ways, indicating different types of relationships between the *to V* syntagm and the noun: this noun may be the Instantiator of the process designated in the *to V* syntagm, either in an active or passive construction (cf. (21) and (22)); it may be a non-Instantiator participant (cf. (23)); or it may indicate a circumstantial meaning (cf. (24)):

(19) [4n•4a]

*The best person ›**to write** the letter‹ is John.*

(20) [4n•4p]

*The most important letter ›**to be written** (by you)‹ is the one to the committee.*

(21) [4n•3]

*The most important letter ›(for you) **to write**‹ is the one to the committee.*

(22) [4n•2]

*The best time ›(for you) **to write** the letter‹ is the evening.*

A second consequence is that, although in all these examples the *to-V* syntagm modifies the noun to which it is linked, it cannot be regarded as an adjectival type of construction, as is the case with both *V-ing* and *V-ed*.

In this section we have looked at the different types of categorial modi into which the three verbal formal schemata can enter, and hence, which types of syntagms are formed on this basis. Two further features of the formation of the syntagms illustrated in this section should be pointed out. The first feature concerns the form of the verbal schemata on which syntagms are built. The examples given in this section in order to illustrate the basic types of patterns all involve the the *basic* formal schemata represented in the lower circle in Figure 10-4. However, it is important to note that the atemporalizing elements *-ing*, *-ed* and *to* can be applied to any type of verbal formal schema indicated in the middle area in Figure 10-14. Hence, nominalizations and adjectivalizations can also be formed on the basis of more complex formal schemata, which are built on further types of auxiliaries. The following examples, which exemplify types of syntagm formations chosen at random from the sixteen types illustrated in this section, demonstrate this further possibility:

(23) [5n•5a]

*With ›John still **having** to write a letter to the committee‹, we couldn't leave on time.*

(24) [4n•4p]

- a. *The letter ›**having** been written by John‹.*
- b. *The only person ›**going to** be offended by the letter‹ is the secretary.*

(25) [4n•4a]

- a. *The first person* ›**have** written a letter to the committee‹ is John.
- b. *The only person* ›**going to** write a letter to the committee‹ is John.

The second general characteristic of the various types of syntagms looked at in this section is semantic, and has to do with the ‘instantiational’ meaning of the formations. In this respect, it is important to note that each of the constructions dealt with above indicate instantiations, not type specifications as such. These instantiations, however, are different from the actual, grounded instantiations of events which are encoded in verbal syntagms (i.e. in independent, full clausal structures), in that they indicate a *schematic* instantiation, not a particular (actual) instantiation which is grounded in time. For syntagms based on *to* V and V-*ed*, this schematic instantiation has been further described as a potential instantiation and a presupposed instantiation, respectively. The meaning of a ‘schematic instantiation’ does not only refer to a the notion of instantiation as such, but also to an implication of an Instantiator. In this sense, it is important to note that each of the types of syntagms looked at in this section incorporates an implication of an Instantiator. In the case of adjectivalizations, this Instantiator is made explicit by being construed outside the adjectival syntagm. This can be done in at least four ways, as shown in the following examples:

(26) Instantiator of adjectivalization as Head of expansion:

- a. **The letter** ›offending many members of the committee‹.
- b. **The letter** ›written by John‹.

(27) Instantiator of adjectivalization as Instantiator of the clause in which the adjectivalization functions as secondary predicate:

- a. ›Not knowing how to react to this question‹, **John** remained silent.
- b. ›Offended by the text‹, **they** left the meeting.

(28) General predicative use of adjectivalization: Instantiator of adjectivalization as Carrier in relational process

- a. **They** were ›very much disappointed by the results‹.
- b. **His ankle** was ›swollen‹.

- (29) General attributive use of adjectivalization: Instantiator as noun which is modified by adjectivalization
- a. *the ›offended‹ **people***
 - b. *the ›offending‹ **text***

In the case of nominalizations, there are two possibilities: an actual Instantiator can be incorporated in the nominalized syntagm (as in (30)), or a potential Instantiator can be implied by the nominalization (as in (31)):

- (30) Incorporation of Instantiator
- a. *›**John's** writing of a letter‹ only took five minutes.*
 - b. *The act of ›**John** writing a letter‹ only took five minutes.*
 - c. *›The quick writing of a letter **by John**‹ only took five minutes.*
- (31) Implication of a potential Instantiator
- a. *›Writing a letter‹ only takes five minutes.*
 - b. *I don't like ›writing letters‹.*

The general difference between an adjectivalization and a nominalization of a verbal lexeme can be explained in terms of the facet of instantiation which is highlighted in each of these types: nominalization highlights the instantiation as such, whereas adjectivalization highlights the relation to an implied Instantiator. Nominalizations which do not incorporate an explicit encoding of an actual Instantiator indicate a **representative instance** of a process: for example, ›*writing a letter*‹ in (31a) above refers to any act of writing a letter, i.e. the expression is representative of any instance of writing a letter. Nominalizations of this type therefore pertain to the *structural plane* of instantiation, which we have considered in Chapter 9 above. Nominalizations which incorporate an explicit encoding of an actual Instantiator, as in (30) above, are constructions which pertain to a plane of instantiation which is intermediate between the actual and structural planes: they are not actual instantiations, in that there is no specific location in time. However, as we have seen in Chapter 9, a location in time can also be explicitly construed through experiential means. While the temporal location in terms of temporal finiteness is by definition excluded from nominalizations, since they are formed on the basis of the atemporalizing forms *-ing* and *to*, the

possibility of explicitly construing a meaning of time through experiential means is also available for nominalizations, as shown in (32):

(32) ›John's writing of a letter **yesterday**‹ only took five minutes.

Such a type of nominalization does refer to an actual instance (of a particular person writing a letter at a specific point in time), although this instance is still different from the instance expressed in a full independent clause (*John wrote a letter yesterday*), in that it is not grounded in terms of temporal finiteness. The general meaning of a 'schematic instance', by which nominalizations on *-ing* have been defined above, can now be further specified. This schematic instance can be of three types: (1) it may indicate a *representative* instance of a process, i.e. an instance on the structural plane of instantiation, as in (31); (2) in contrast to this, it may indicate an *actual* instance which is constructed (i.e. grammatically) schematically but which is further specified through lexical means; (3) or it may indicate a type of instantiation which is *intermediate* between these types, i.e. an instantiation which pertains to a level which is in between an actual and structural plane of instantiation, as in (30).

With these general meanings and formal patterns of adjectivalization and nominalization in mind, we can now have a closer look at the overview of types of constructions presented in Figure 10-4 [cf. pp. 542–543 above].

3.2 Types of experiential metaphor

The framework of grammatical metaphor presented in Figure 10-4 is organized in terms of two primary dimensions, indicated horizontally and vertically. On the vertical dimension, a basic distinction is made between the constructional and elemental levels of lexicogrammar which have been specified in Chapter 8.¹² The constructional level is subdivided, in terms of syntagmatic units, into a level dealing with clausal constructions (based on projection on the one hand, and expansion on the other hand) (Constructional level I), and groupal constructions (Constructional level II).

¹² Cf. pp. 485–486 above.

As shown in Figure 10-4, the prototypical types of experiential metaphor occur in the middle area (vertically) (nominalizations [5n•1] and [7.1], adjectivalizations [5n•5a], [5n•5p], [7•5a] and [7•5b]). Within this group as a whole, the distinction between [5n•] and [7] refers to a clausal versus groupal syntax by which the nominalized or adjectivalized syntagm is internally organized. In constructions of the type [5n•], which have an internal clausal syntax, the experiential transitivity roles, except the role which is mapped onto the Instantiator, are encoded in a similar way as in an independent clausal syntagm. In groupal constructions (marked as [7•]), in contrast, the experiential roles are encoded in terms of the syntax which characterizes the nominal group (or alternatively, adjectival group), i.e. complements are introduced by prepositions, in the same sense as Qualifiers are encoded in a default nominal group with a nominal lexeme as Head; or Circumstantials (e.g. of manner) are introduced in the nominalization as adjectives, in the same way as Epithets are encoded in the nominal group. Importantly, even in the groupal constructions, the internal transitivity relationships indicated by the verbal lexeme retain their meaning. The difference between the clausal and groupal types of constructions is illustrated in the following examples (for nominalization):¹³

(33) [5n•1] Clausal construction:

- a. *John's quickly writing a letter surprised me.*
- b. *I prefer to write them a letter.*
- c. *I don't like writing letters.*

¹³ As shown in Figure 10-3, the prototypical type of nominalization as a type of experiential grammatical metaphor ([5n•1] and [7•1]) can become a constituent in a wide range of types of constructions (including especially mental and relational processes). In this context, it should be noted that when the 'environment' into which a nominalization enters expresses meanings such as causality or sequence (in time), the overall construction which is built up in this way can be regarded as a textual type of metaphor. It is in this sense that, as noted above, textual metaphor is in fact a special type of experiential metaphor; more precisely, it is experiential metaphor entering into environments which construe textual meanings. This 'environment' may be a preposition expressing causality or sequence (*After the restructuring of the economy/because of the restructuring of the economy, there was a major crisis*), or it may be noun with a similar meaning (*The result of the restructuring of the economy was a major crisis*), or it may be a circumstantial relational process (*The restructuring of the economy was followed by a major crisis*).

(34) [7•1] Groupal construction:

- a. ›*John's quick writing of a letter*‹ only took five minutes.
- b. ›*The quick writing of a letter by John*‹ only took five minutes.

On the vertical dimension, the area of prototypical kinds of experiential metaphor is surrounded by two areas of other types of resources which shade into non-metaphorical grammar. Towards the bottom, experiential metaphor is related to various types of processes of word formation, which we will return to below (morphotactics, constructions marked as [8•]). Towards the top, experiential metaphor is related to logical resources, viz. expansion and projection. Adapting a term introduced by Derewianka [1995: 111]¹⁴ I will define certain types of expansion which indicate a syntagm which can lie at the basis of a further metaphorical type of construction, as **proto-metaphorical**. Examples of proto-metaphorical constructions are found at the level of [4n/f•], in the following types of patterns:

(35) [4n•f]

The act of ›*John quickly writing a letter*‹ only took five minutes.

(36) [4f•4a]

The letter ›*offending many people in the committee*‹ was written by *John*.

(37) [4f•4p]

The letter ›*written by John*‹ offended many people.

The reason why these and not other types of expansions are regarded as proto-metaphorical will be specified below, when we also consider the second, horizontal dimension of differentiation.

¹⁴ Derewianka [1995: 111] introduces the term protometaphor to refer to both transcategorization and rankshift. In the way in which I am using the term here, it refers to a type of construction which can potentially lie at the basis of a further, metaphorical type of construction. Since this is not the case with transcategorizations, I only regard a number of types of expansions (which will be specified in more detailed terms below) as protometaphorical.

Other types of constructions occurring in the peripheries of the general map laid out in Figure 10-4 are finite embedded constructions, of the type indicated in the following example:

(38) *The question is ›what you will write in the letter‹.*

Such finite embedded constructions can be regarded as **quasi-metaphorical**. On the one hand, they are instances of experiential metaphor in a general sense, because they make it possible for a whole process configuration to enter into a new configuration again. To the extent that they function as nominal groups in a clausal syntagm, such constructions are nominalizations. On the other hand, they are not prototypical instances of grammatical metaphor, in that the original process configuration is not rebundled: it occurs, as a whole clausal syntagm without internal structural change, within another syntagm. Quasi-metaphorical constructions (which are indicated in dark grey outlined boxes in Figure 10-14) can be of various types:

(39) [2f•1]

- a. *›That he wrote a letter to the committee‹ surprised her.*
- b. *How strange it is ›that John wrote a letter to the committee‹.*

(40) [2f•3]

- a. *I can't imagine ›what he wrote in his letter‹.*
- b. *The question is ›what did he write in his letter‹.*

(41) [2f•4a]

- a. *I can't imagine ›who will write the letter‹.*
- b. *The problem is ›who will write the letter‹.*

(42) [2f•4p]

- a. *I can't imagine ›who was offended by the letter‹.*
- b. *The question is ›who was offended by the letter‹.*

(43) [5f•3]

I haven't read ›what John wrote to the committee‹.

(44) [5f•4a]

So that's ›what offended so many people‹.

(45) [5f•4p]

He apologized to whoever was offended by the letter.

Beyond proto-metaphorical and quasi-metaphorical constructions, Figure 10-4 also incorporates a number of constructions which make use of the same logico-semantic and tactic resources of language, but which are non-metaphorical. These are, on the one hand, dependent projections (indicated as [1f/p•]) and dependent expansions (indicated as [3f•]). These cannot be regarded as instances of experiential metaphor, because the syntagms which are encoded as dependent in these constructions by definition do not take experiential roles in the overall structure of a clausal syntagm; rather, they are *linked* to that syntagm through the logical relationship of taxis.

Let us now consider the horizontal dimension of Figure 10-4. This dimension indicates the various types of ‘instantiational’ meanings carried by the different constructions, and in this way incorporates the discussion of the formation of syntagms and categorial modi, as presented in Section 3.1.1 above, into the typology of grammatical metaphor which is proposed. More specifically, along the horizontal dimension, a differentiation is made according to which aspect of an original bundle is extracted from it and which aspect is highlighted in the formation of a new bundle. The constructions which lie at the basis of the prototypical kinds of experiential metaphor are to be found at the outer extremes of the horizontal dimension, viz. in the types indicated as [•1] and [•5a/p]. Constructions marked as [•1] in general refer to expressions in which an instantiation as such is foregrounded, and hence indicates the meaning of the metaphorical syntagm as indicating a schematic instantiation in general. As can be seen in Figure 10-4, this type includes the prototypical nominalization (as in *I don’t like writing letters*). This type of pattern is also found on the elemental level of language, as can be seen in various types of word-formation:¹⁵

¹⁵ In terms of the distinctions made in Chapter 8 [cf. p. 484 above], these patterns are formed on the basis of categorial morphemes. The morphemes which are at stake here, can be further specified as a categorial type of morpheme which incorporates an abstract reference to an ‘instantiation’ of an event. Because of the central role of instantiation in the formation of a syntagm in general, this type of word-formation can be termed **syntagmatic-**

- (46) a. *building, opening, ...*
 b. *sleepwalking, handwriting, ...*
 c. *coverage, wastage, ...*
 d. *dismissal, refusal, ...*
 e. *amazement, puzzlement, ...*
 f. *exploration, foundation, ...*

Constructions marked as [$\bullet 5a/p$] and [$\bullet 4a/b$] (where a/p refers to the active/passive distinction) indicate types of syntagms which are formed on the basis of an extraction of the Instantiator of an original process bundle. The central construction which is involved here is indicated in [$4n\bullet 4a$] and [$4n\bullet 4p$]:

- (47) [$4n\bullet 4a$] Extraction of Instantiator: active voice
The letter › *offending many people in the committee*.
- (48) [$4n\bullet 4p$] Extraction of Instantiator: passive voice
The letter › *written by John* › *offended many people*.

This type of construction lies at the basis of two distinct types of restructurings, one of which is a prototypical kind of experiential metaphor: either the *Instantiator* can further be foregrounded, or the abstract *relationship* to an Instantiator (i.e. the relationship of a predication to a Predication focus). The foregrounding of the Instantiator makes possible to two alternative types of constructions, one at the constructional level, and one at the elemental level. At the constructional level, the Instantiator is foregrounded in the following types of pseudo-metaphors:

- (49) [$5f\bullet 4a$]
So that's › *what offended so many people*.
- (50) [$5f\bullet 4p$]
He apologized to › *whoever was offended by the letter*.

categorial formation. Because the morphemes only indicate a syntagmatic-categorial meaning, they can be termed **syntagmatic-categorial morphemes**.

At the elemental level, the Instantiator is foregrounded in word-formation patterns such as the following:¹⁶

(51) [8•4n] Foregrounding of active Instantiator:

- a. *baker, reminder, ...*
- b. *songwriter, wood-pecker, ...*
- c. *applicant, inhabitant, participant, ...*

(52) [8•4p] Foregrounding of passive Instantiator:

employee, trustee, nominee, ...

The second type of restructuring which is based on the extraction of an Instantiator, is the prototypical kind of experiential metaphor termed adjectivalization. Here, it is not the Instantiator which is foregrounded in the metaphorical syntagm, but rather, a schematic relation of instantiation (predication):

(53) [5n•5a] Adjectivalization: active voice:

- a. *›Writing the letter‹, John suddenly realized he still had to call his sister.*
- b. *With ›John still writing his letter‹, we couldn't leave on time.*

(54) [5n•5p] Adjectivalization: passive voice:

›Offended by the letter‹, they left the meeting.

Whereas the expressions exemplified in (53) and (54) indicate the foregrounding of a relationship to an Instantiator at the constructional level, this type of pattern is also to be found on the elemental level of language, as shown in the following types of word-formation:

¹⁶ In contrast to the pattern of word-formation termed syntagmatic-categorial formation, the pattern which is exemplified here does more than indicate a meaning which pertains to 'instantiation': the nominalizations in (48) and (49) incorporate the functional role of Instantiator as such (e.g. a *songwriter* is 'someone who writes songs', a *wood-pecker* is 'a bird which pecks wood, and so on). Therefore, the pattern of word-formation which is at stake here can be termed, in constradistinction to syntagmatic-categorial formation, **functional-categorial formation**. The morphemes which are involved here incorporate a reference to a particular functional role, and can therefore be termed **functional-categorial morphemes**.

(55) [8•5a] Foregrounding of relation to Instantiator: active

- a. *easy-going, everlasting, ...*
- b. *attractive, productive, elusive, ...*
- c. *acceptable, reasonable, ...*
- d. *careful, doubtful, shameful, ...*
- e. *careless, doubtless, shameless, ...*
- f. *sleepy, shaky, weepy, ...*

(56) [8•5p] Foregrounding of relation to Instantiator: passive

- a. *black-haired, short-sighted, ...*
- b. *far-fetched, well-meant, ...*

Besides the types indicated in [1•], [4•] and [5•], there is an intermediate area where a restructuring is based, not on the extraction of a general instantiation-meaning, or of an Instantiator, but of two alternative elements of an original bundle. In the constructions marked as [2•], a circumstantial meaning is extracted from an original process bundle, which lies at the basis of the formation of syntagms in which a circumstantial meaning is foregrounded, for example:

(57) [4f•2]

She arrived the evening [[when John was writing the letter to the committee]].

(58) [5f•2]

The best time is [[when you have finished the letter]].

In constructions marked as [3•], the element which is extracted from the original process bundle is a non-Instantiator participant (i.e. a participant role which is not mapped onto the role of Instantiator). This can be seen, for example, in the following two types of constructions which are parallel to the patterns exemplified in (57)–(58) above:

(59) [4f•3]

I haven't read the letter [[(which/that) John has written to the committee]].

(60) [5f•3]

I haven't read [[what John wrote to the committee]].

These two types of constructions do not constitute a basis for a further restructuring which is metaphorical, because the aspect which is extracted from the original process bundle does not have a general meaning which pertains to instantiation.

In this section, we have looked that the way in which two central types of experiential grammatical metaphor are located in relation to a range of different types of resources in language, in two dimensions. On the horizontal dimension, grammatical metaphor has been related to various patterns based on the logico-semantic relationships of projection and expansion on the one hand, and different types of word-formation on the other hand. On the vertical dimension, four general types of restructuring have been specified, two of which lie at the basis of experiential metaphor: an extraction and foregrounding of 'instantiation' as such [1•], an extraction of an Instantiator and a foregrounding of an abstract relationship to this Instantiator [5•], an extraction and foregrounding of the Instantiator [5•], and an extraction and foregrounding of an element which does not pertain to instantiation (a circumstantial [2•] or participant [3•] element).

4 Interpersonal metaphor

In this section we will focus on the general nature of the basic types of interpersonal metaphor, i.e. metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality, and especially the different organization of the areas of proposals and propositions with regard to grammatical metaphor. Figure 10-5 presents a framework for exploring general types of interpersonal grammatical metaphor.

Propositions
Negotiation of information

Proposals
Negotiation of goods-&-services

Offer:
physical-material action
Command:
imperative mood

**Proposals:
baseline**

1

physical-material
negotiation

semiotic-discursive
negotiation

declarative mood
interrogative mood

Mood element

Instantiator + number
+ primary tense

modal operator:
modalization

modal operator:
modulation

mood Adjuncts:
certainly | *possibly*
probably

occurrence time

**Propositions:
baseline**

occurrence value

2

occurrence time

**Proposals:
metaphors of mood**

occurrence value

3

4 **Propositions & proposals:
metaphors of modality**

validity, evidentiality

desirability

She convinces me that
She assures me that
She told me that
She informed me that
She confessed to me that
She showed me that
She demonstrated to me that

I'm sure that
I'm certain that

I'm convinced that
I'm assured that
I'm told that
I've been informed that
I was shown that

I think that
I hold that
I believe that
I assume that
I'd say that
I claim that
I hear that
I've seen that

**mental
verbal**

He thinks that

I order that
I suggest that
I insist that
I command that
I recommend that
I propose
I advise
I urge

**mental
verbal**

He orders that

I'm required
I'm obliged
I'm forced
I'm willing
I'm pleased to

She orders me to
She advises me to
She urges me to
She requires me to
She asks me to

I'm bound to
I'm compelled to
I'm eager to
I'm willing to
I'm prepared to
I'm pleased to




Figure 10-5 · A framework for exploring interpersonal grammatical metaphor

Let us start with the area of propositions. In this area, there is a simple opposition between a baseline construal of modal meanings and a metaphorical one, embodied in metaphors of modality. The baseline construal of modality [cf. area 2 in Figure 10-5], as indicated above [cf. Section 1] refers to an encoding of modal meanings within the Mood element (i.e. especially through modal operators and modal adjuncts). We have seen that these expressions of modality which are part of the Mood element ground the proposition in the speaker-now-context by indicating the way in which the speaker evaluates the *occurrence value* of the event which is designated in the proposition: modal expressions encode different types of occurrence values which are intermediate between a straight positive (polarity: ‘yes’, occurrence value: at least one) and a straight negative (polarity, ‘no’, occurrence value: nil).

Metaphors of modality [cf. area 4 of Figure 10-5] differ from this type of baseline construal of modality, in that a modal meaning is construed outside the Mood element of the proposition which is assessed, and hence, outside the structure of this proposition as a whole: a modal meaning is expressed in a ‘separate element’ which can be described, structurally, as having scope over the proposition which is assessed, and semantically, as providing an extra, secondary grounding for that proposition. In this sense, because the proposition under evaluation does retain its own type of baseline grounding, the separate element indicates a doubling of grounding and a doubling of scope. The type of grounding which is encoded in extra scoping elements is a further specification of the occurrence value of the proposition in terms of the speaker’s evaluation of the validity of the proposition, or the evidence the speaker has for asserting or denying something. Therefore, I will say that extra scoping elements grounding propositions encode a grounding in terms of *validity or evidentiality*. As shown in Figure 10-5, extra scoping elements can be of various types, ranging from a mental/verbal construal to a relational construal.¹⁷

¹⁷ As a proposal for further research, I would suggest that the internal variation within the area of metaphors of modality (both of modalization, i.e. pertaining to propositions, and of modulation, pertaining to proposals) can be further elucidated in terms of two interacting dimensions: (1) different degrees of subjectivity, and (2) different planes of instantiation [cf. Chapter 9, p. 502]. *Different degrees of subjectivity* can be assigned to the variation between

In the area of proposals, the situation is somewhat more complex, in that here, there is a basic variation between a baseline construal, and two types of metaphorical construals: metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality. The higher degree of complexity involved in the construal of proposals, which lies at the basis of the greater variability found in this area vis-à-vis the area of propositions, lies in the inherent multi-modal nature of proposals – a feature which has been emphasized by Thibault [1995: 78ff, cf. also Thibault & Van Leeuwen 1996]. Evidently, just any type of linguistic meaning is shaped by and in itself shapes reality; in Chapter 5, this general interaction between language and reality has been specified in terms of a relationship of macro-stratification. However, with regard to the area of proposals, reality

constructions such as: *I argue* → *It is argued that* → *It is arguable*, or *It appears to me that* → *It appears* → *It is apparent*. In each of these series of expressions, the first example indicates a fully objective construal, which can be seen in two features: (1) the speaker is explicitly construed as the Agent of a mental or verbal process, and (2) a ‘kind of potency’ assigned to this Agent, i.e. it is the Senser or Sayer who, as the projecting Agent, creates the proposition which is expressed in the projected clause. The last examples in the series indicate a subjective construal, in that the assessment on the part of the speaker is implicit, but is inherently presupposed: what is arguable, is arguable to the speaker; what is apparent, is apparent to the speaker. The passive constructions represent intermediate types of construals, which can be interpreted in two ways. (1) They can be interpreted in an objective sense, where a particular Sayer or Senser is presupposed, as in *In the book it is argued that Caesar was ambitious*, where the author of the book is assumed as Agent of the projection. (2) Passive projections can also be interpreted in a more general sense, in which they get a generic reading: *It is assumed that ...*, meaning ‘it is assumed in general, by everyone’. Since the speaker is included in ‘everyone’, or ‘in general’, this is a partially subjective type of construal, or a construal which indicates a first degree of subjectification.

Different planes of instantiation can be brought up in order to explain the variation between constructions such as the following: *I argued* → *I argue* → *One could argue that* → *It may be argued that*. The first example indicates an actual instantiation of the process *argue*, which is linked to a specific Instantiator (*I*) and which is grounded in time. *I argue*, in contrast to this, represents a first type of structural instantiation, when *argue* is interpreted, not as indicating present tense, but as indicating a general predisposition, rather than an actual event of arguing in the present. The two further types of constructions in the series indicate generic types of construals, which are thus more structural than actual in Langacker’s sense. In *One could argue that*, a generic meaning is created through the pronoun *one*. In addition, this type of construction does not refer to an actual instantiation of a process of arguing, but rather a potential one, as indicated in the modal operator *could*. The last construction in the series indicates a fully structural type of instantiation, or what Langacker calls a ‘representative instance’ of a process of arguing.

In a further exploration of different sub-types of metaphors of modality, the interaction between degrees of subjectivity (which pertains to grounding), and different planes of instantiation (which pertains to instantiation) should be further looked into.

itself becomes a medium for the expression of an offer or a command. Thibault [1995: 78ff] refers to negotiation carried by the language medium as “semiotic-discursive negotiation”, and he calls negotiaton carried by reality itself as a medium “physical-material negotiation”. In the case of proposals, the interaction between the language medium and the medium of reality itself is an intrinsic aspect of the interpersonal meaning which is under negotiation, namely, an offer or a command. What is crucial in the expression of proposals, is that the semiotic-discursive negotiation is intrinsically linked with, and for its success, depends upon a physical-material negotiation: a command and an offer are effective when something is ‘done’, in the physical-material sense. The role of the physical-material medium in the construal of proposals is in fact implied in Halliday’s general characterization of proposals as involving an exchange of ‘goods-&-services’.

Let us now consider the various ways in which proposals can be construed in order to see which role multi-modality plays in baseline and metaphorical types of constructions. The area of commands construed by the imperative mood can be taken as a starting point. What is typical of imperatives, as opposed to indicatives, is the absence of a Mood element. However, this absence only pertains to the purely linguistic level, or the semiotic-discursive level: an Instantiator, and also a certain type of Finiteness (to be further specified below) of the process which is designated are in fact presupposed to be ‘realized’ non-linguistically, at the level of the physical-material negotiation. In other words, an Instantiator and a type of Finiteness are presupposed to be carried by reality itself as a medium. Furthermore, these two aspects are recoverable from the speech situation itself: the presupposed Instantiator of an imperative is one of the interlocutors (in the most typical case¹⁸ it is ‘you’), and the Finiteness which is implied points to some time which is situated in the near future vis-à-vis the time of speaking. In this vein the physical-material manifestation of an Instantiator and a type of Finiteness is a type of grounding. This feature of imperatives has been emphasized by Davidse [1991/1999] as well as by Thibault [1995].

¹⁸ That is, when imperative is interpreted in the more restricted sense as jussive: in a jussive imperative, the mood person is ‘you’. In other types of ‘imperative’ (more broadly conceived of), the Instantiator or mood person can be ‘I’ (jussive: *Let me open the door for you*) or ‘you and me’ (suggestive: *Let’s have a look at it*) [cf. Matthiessen 1993a: 423ff].

As we have seen in Chapter 7, Halliday [1994/1985: 363] defines the imperative as the most 'congruent' type of realization of commands. This means that the baseline construction of a command is characterized by the absence of a linguistic Mood element, or by the 'realization' of a Mood element or a grounding element in extra-linguistic reality. The baseline type of realization of an offer is even more radically dependent on by the medium of physical-material negotiation: the most basic realization of an offer is the accomplishment of the offer itself in the physical-material world. At the most general interpersonal-structural level, carrying out an offer is parallel to construing an imperative command: both constructions are characterized by the absence of a linguistic Mood element.

Having defined the baseline type of construction for proposals, we can now turn to metaphorical constructions, which, as indicated above, are of two types: metaphors of mood and metaphors of modality. Both of these types of metaphors are based on the general characteristic of interpersonal metaphor: they are based on a doubling of grounding (semantically) or a doubling of scope (structurally). As can be seen in Figure 10-5, metaphors of modality in the area of proposals are completely parallel to the same type of metaphor in the area of propositions, and they display the same inherent variation. However, while modality metaphors construing propositions provide a secondary grounding in terms of evidentiality or validity assessed by the speaker, the domain in which proposals are metaphorically grounded has to do with desirability on the part of the speaker: modality metaphors construing proposals indicate various degrees to which the speaker desires (or does not desire) that a particular event be accomplished in the near future.

Metaphors of mood represent a type of interpersonal metaphor which is only available for the expression of proposals, although, importantly, the construction types on which these metaphors are based are not unique to the area of expressing proposals. Indeed, as shown in Figure 10-5 above, the parallel types of constructions used to express propositions indicate the baseline type of construal of propositions. The constructions which are involved here are the indicative type of mood (comprising declarative and interrogative sub-types), modal operators of modulation, and modal Adjuncts. These types of constructions, used to express proposals, are metaphorical vis-à-vis the baseline type of construction of proposals, in that

they are based on an explicit, linguistic Mood element: the indicative type of mood is characterized by the presence of a Subject and Finite (i.e. the basic prerequisites for constructing a Mood element), while modal operators and Adjuncts are further grounding expressions which are part of the Mood element.

- (61) a. *Could you ↗ open the window please?*
 b. *You should ↗ go now.*

Hence, the reason why indicative expressions used to construe proposals are to be regarded as metaphorical constructions, lies precisely in the presence of a Mood element, which is the characteristic feature which sets off indicative from imperative in the system of MOOD. In the case of proposals, this Mood element indicates a *secondary* type of grounding, in that the proposal as such (*open the window, go now* in the examples above) is already grounded in terms of a physical-material negotiation: because these expressions construe proposals, a grounding in physical-material reality is inherently presupposed.

Parallel types of constructions which are used to construe propositions are not metaphorical. This has to do with the general nature of propositions as negotiations of *information*, rather than goods-&-services: the negotiation of information is inherently a discursive-semiotic type of negotiation which is carried by the linguistic medium as such (i.e. which does not depend on a concomitant physical-material negotiation in order to be 'effective'). It is in this sense that the Mood element, as a discursive-semiotic (or inherently linguistic) grounding element, indicates the *basic* type of grounding of propositions and is therefore by definition non-metaphorical with regard to the expression of propositions.

A final area in Figure 10-5 which we have not considered so far is the area (indicated as 5 in Figure 10-5) of various types of attitudinal reactions to propositions, as in the following examples:

- (62) a. *It impresses me [[that John has written a letter to the committee]].*
 b. *It's regrettable [[that the letter was offensive to many members of the committee]].*

As Figure 10-5 shows, in this area again we find a variation between different types of constructions, ranging from mental to relational, which is similar to the variation involved in metaphors of modality. However, this parallelism only pertains to a superficial level, focussing on lexical elements which, in a general sense, can be used in assessing propositions and proposals. What is more important in view of a characterization of grammatical metaphor is the constructional relationship between the assessment, and the proposition or proposal which is being assessed. On this level, there is a major difference between expressions of attitudinal reaction and metaphors of modality. In metaphors of modality, the relationship between the assessment and the proposition or proposal which is assessed is one of *hypotactic projection*.¹⁹ It is precisely on the basis of this type of relationship that the assessing element can function as a grounding element, i.e. that it can impose a secondary grounding on the projected element. In the area of attitudinal reactions, there is no such relationship. The proposition or proposal which is being assessed is construed as a participant within the overall configuration: it is either a Phenomenon in a mental process (cf. (63)) or a Carrier in a attributive relational process (cf. (64)):²⁰

¹⁹ It will be noted that in characterizing metaphors of modality in general as being based on the relationship of *hypotactic projection*, I am taking Halliday's viewpoint on interpersonal metaphors [cf. Chapter 8, p. 454–455 above, and also Chapter 7, p. 401]. An alternative viewpoint would be to regard *hypotaxis*, as such (whether projecting or expanding), as the basis of metaphors of modality, i.e. to consider a hypotactic relationship between one element and a proposition or proposal, as the major prerequisite for a construction type which can function as a secondary grounding element. In this viewpoint, relational types of constructions (Such as *It is obvious → that John has already left*) are not interpreted as being based on projection, but rather on expansion. This viewpoint ties in with Halliday's [1994/1985: 329] general characterization of relational processes in terms of three types of expansion (intensive processes as based on elaboration, possessive processes as based on extension, and circumstantial processes as based on enhancement).

The question which of these two aspects – the *tactic* kind of relationship of hypotaxis, or the *logico-semantic* kind of relationship of projection – lies at the basis of interpersonal metaphoricity as a doubling of grounding needs to be further investigated.

²⁰ The situation within the area of what I call attitudinal reaction is in fact much more complex than is suggested here. Constructions such as *I'm amazed that John has written a letter to the committee* indicate that the assessed element is not a participant in the prototypical sense of the term, since as a true participant, the Phenomenon in a passive construction of the please-type (*I was pleased by the present*) should normally be introduced by *by* (as is the case with Agent in passive clauses in general; compare: *The letter was*

- (63) a. *It amazes me* [[that John has written a letter to the committee]].
b. *I don't like it* [[that John has written a letter to the committee]].
- (64) a. *It's amazing* [[that John has written a letter to the committee]].
b. *It's regrettable* [[that John has written a letter to the committee]].

*written **by** John*). This is a more general feature of mental processes of the please-type expressing an emotive reaction, since even were the Phenomenon is not an embedded proposition or proposal, in a passive construction it is not necessarily introduced by *by*: *I was pleased **with** (/by) the present, She was surprised **at** (/by) the result, She was scared **of** (/by) the snake*.

Furthermore, the borderline between metaphors of modality and expressions of attitudinal reaction is not easy to draw, especially in relational constructions (e.g. *It is obvious that Caesar was ambitious*), but also mental ones (e.g. *I fear that John has already sent his letter*). The distinctions and perhaps overlaps between interpersonal metaphor and attitudinal reaction should be further explored in a more comprehensive study, which takes into account the notion of factivity (since, in the view on metaphor which is taken here, when propositions are embedded as facts in nominal groups, there is no longer a chance to have a metaphorical construal: in such cases, what is being construed is an emotive reaction to the embedded proposition or proposal).

References

References

ASP, Elissa

- 1992 Natural language and human semiosis: A socio-cognitive account of metaphor. Unpublished PhD dissertation. York University, Toronto.

BARTHES, Roland

- 1957 *Mythologies*. Paris: Seuil.
1967 /1953. *Writing Degree Zero*. London: Cape. Translated from the French original by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith: *Le Degré Zéro de l'Écriture*, Paris: Seuil, 1953.

BATESON, Gregory

- 1972 *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballantine.

BAZELL, C.E.

- 1953 *Linguistic Form*. Istanbul: Istanbul Press.

BEARDSLEY, Monroe C.

- 1958 *Aesthetics*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

BERRY, Margaret

- 1975 *Introduction to Systemic Linguistics. Volume 1: Structures and Systems*. London: Batsford.
1977 *Introduction to Systemic Linguistics. Volume 2: Levels and Links*. London: Batsford.
1981 Systemic linguistics and discourse analysis: A multi-layered approach to exchange structure. In: COULTHARD, M.C. & MONTGOMERY, M. (eds.) *Studies in Discourse Analysis*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 120–145.

BIBER, Douglas & FINIGAN, Edward

- 1988 Adverbial stance types in English. *Discourse Processes* 11: 1–34.
1989 Styles of stance in English: Lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. *Text* [Special issue: OCHS, Elinor (ed.) *The Pragmatics of Affect*] 9: 93–124.

BICKERTON, Derek

- 1980 /1969. Prolegomena to a linguistic theory of metaphor. In: CHING, Marvin K.; HALEY, Michael C. & LUNSFORD, Ronald F. (eds.) *Linguistic Perspectives on Literature*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 43-62.

BLOOMFIELD, Leonard

- 1933 *Language*. New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

References

- BOLINGER, Dwight L.
1961 Syntactic blends and other matters. *Language* 37: 366–381.
- BREND, Ruth M. (ed.)
1972 *Kenneth L. Pike Selected Writings. To commemorate the 60th birthday of Kenneth Lee Pike*. The Hague: Mouton.
- BRUGMAN, Claudia
1990 What is the Invariance Hypothesis ?. *Cognitive Linguistics* 1: 257-266.
- BUTLER, Christopher S.
1990 Functional grammar and systemic functional grammar: A preliminary comparison. *Working Papers on Functional Grammar* 39.
1991 Criteria for adequacy in functional grammars, with particular reference to systemic functional grammar. *Network* 17: 61–69.
1996a On the concept of an interpersonal metafunction in English. In: BERRY, Margaret; BUTLER, Christopher S.; FAWCETT, Robin P. & HUANG, Guowen (eds.) *Meaning and Choice in Language: Studies for Michael Halliday*. Vol. 2: Grammatical Structure: A Functional Interpretation. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 151–181.
1996b Layering in functional grammars: A comparative study. In: DEVRIENDT, Betty; Louis GOOSSENS, Louis & VAN DER AUWERA, Johan (eds.) *Complex Structures. A Functionalist Perspective*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 1–27.
- BUTT, David; Rhondda FAHEY; Susan FEEZ; Sue PINKS & Collin YALLOP
2000 /1994. *Using Functional Grammar. An Explorer's Guide*. Sydney: National Centre for English Language Teaching and Research, Macquarie University. Second edition.
- BUYSSCHAERT, Joost
1982 *Criteria for the Classification of English Adverbials*. Brussels: Koninklijke Academie.
- CHOMSKY, Noam
1957 *Syntactic Structures*. The Hague: Mouton.
- CLÉIRIGH, Chris
1998 A selectionist model of the genesis of phonic texture. Systemic phonology and universal darwinism. PhD dissertation, University of Sydney.
- CLORAN, Carmel
1994 *Rhetorical Units and Decontextualisation: An Enquiry into some Relations of Context, Meaning and Grammar*. (Monographs in Systemic Linguistics, 6.) Nottingham: University of Nottingham.
- CONRAD, Susan & BIBER, Douglas
2000 Adverbial marking of stance in speech and writing. In: HUNSTON, Susan & THOMPSON, Geoff (eds.) *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*. Oxford: Oxford UP. 56–73.
- COSERIU, Eugenio
1969 *Einführung in die Strukturelle Linguistik*. Vorlesung gehalten im Winter-Semester 1967/68 an der Universität Tübingen. Tübingen: Narr.

References

- 1970 <1969> *Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Eine Übersicht.* Teil I: Von der Antike bis Leibniz. (Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, 11.) Tübingen: Narr.
- 1972 *Die Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Eine Übersicht.* Teil II: Von Leibniz bis Rousseau. (Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, 28.) Tübingen: Narr.
- 1973 <1966> *Probleme der strukturellen Semantik.* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, 40.) Vorlesung gehalten im Wintersemester 1965/66 an der Universität Tübingen. Autorisierte und bearbeitete Nachschrift von Dieter Kastovsky. Tübingen: Narr.
- 1975a *Sprachtheorie und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. 5 Studien.* (Internationale Bibliothek für allgemeine Linguistik, 2.) München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
- 1975b /1952. System, Norm und Rede. In: COSERIU, Eugenio. 1975a. 11–101. Original: *Sistema, norma y habla.* Montevideo. 1952.
- 1975c /1954. Form und Substanz bei den Sprachlauten. In: COSERIU, Eugenio. 1975a. 102–206. Original: *Forma y sustancia en los sonidos del lenguaje.* Montevideo. 1954.
- 1975c /1957. Logizismus und Antilogizismus in der Grammatik. In: COSERIU, Eugenio. 1975a. 210–233. Original: *Logicismo und antilogicismo en la gramática.* In: *Revista Nacional* 189 (1957): 456–473.
- 1987a *Formen und Funktionen. Studien zur Grammatik* (Konzepte der Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft, 33.) (Edited by Uwe Petersen.) Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- 1987b /1973. Semantik und Grammatik. In: COSERIU, Eugenio. 1987a. 85–95.
- 1987c Bedeutung, Bezeichnung und sprachliche Kategorien. Lauri Seppänen zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. In: COSERIU, Eugenio. 1987a. 177–198.
- 1988 *Einführung in die Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft.* (Uni-Taschenbücher, 1327.) München: Finck.
- 1992 <1955> Zum Problem der Wortarten (“partes orationis”). In: SCHAEDEER, Burkhard & KNOBLOCH, Clemens (eds.) *Wortarten: Beiträge zur Geschichte eines grammatischen Problems.* (Reihe Germanistische Linguistik, 133.) Tübingen: Niemeyer. 366–386. Original: “Sobre las categorías verbales (‘partes de la oración’)”. Chapter II in: *Teoría lingüística del nombre propio* (1955, unpublished). Previously published as:
 · 1973. “Sobre las categorías verbales (‘partes de la oración’)”. *Revista de lingüística aplicada* (Concepción/Chile) 10: 7–25.
 · 1978. “Sobre las categorías verbales (‘partes de la oración’)”. In: COSERIU, Eugenio, *Gramática, semántica, universales. Estudios de lingüística funcional.* (Biblioteca Románica Hispánica, Estudios y ensayos, 280.) Madrid: Gredos. 15–49.
 · 1987. “Zum Problem der Wortarten (“partes orationis”)”. In: COSERIU, Eugenio. 1987a.
- CROFT, William
- 1991 *Syntactic Categories and Grammatical Relations.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

References

DANEŠ, František

- 1964 A three-level approach to syntax. *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 1: 225–240.

DAVIDSE, Kristin

- 1987 M.A.K. Halliday's functional grammar and the Prague School. In: DIRVEN, René & FRIED, Vilém (eds.) *Functionalism in Linguistics*. (Linguistic and Literary Studies in Eastern Europe, 20.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. 39–79.
- 1991 Categories of experiential grammar. PhD dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Published: cf. Davidse 1999.
- 1992a A semiotic approach to relational clauses. *Occasional Papers in Systemic Linguistics* 6: 99–131.
- 1992b Transitivity/ergativity: The Janus-headed grammar of actions and events. In: DAVIES, Martin & RAVELLI, Louise (eds.) *Advances in Systemic Linguistics: Recent Theory and Practice*. London: Pinter. 105–135.
- 1996a Ditransitivity and possession. In: HASAN, Ruqaiya; CLORAN, Carmel & BUTT, David (eds.) *Functional Descriptions: Theory in Practice*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 85–144.
- 1996b Turning grammar on itself: Identifying clauses in linguistic discourse. In: BERRY, Margaret; BUTLER, Christopher; FAWCETT, Robin & HUANG, Guowen (eds.) *Meaning and Form: Functional Interpretations*. (Meaning and Choice in Language: Studies for Michael Halliday, Vol. 3; Advances in Discourse Processes, LVII.) Norwood: Ablex. 367–393.
- 1996c Functional dimensions of the dative in English. In: VAN BELLE, William & VAN LANGENDONCK, Willy (eds.) *The Dative. Vol. 1: Descriptive Studies*. (Case and Grammatical Relations across Languages, 2.) Amsterdam: Philadelphia. 289–338.
- 1997 The Subject-Object versus the Agent-Patient asymmetry. In: *Leuven Contributions in Linguistics and Philology* 86: 413–431.
- 1998a Agnates, verb classes and the meaning of construals. The case of ditransitivity in English. *Leuvense Bijdragen* 87: 281–313.
- 1998b The Dative as participant role versus the Indirect Object. On the need to distinguish two layers of organization. In: VAN LANGENDONCK, Willy & VAN BELLE, William (eds.) *The Dative. Vol. 2: Theoretical and Contrastive Studies*. (Case and Grammatical Relations across Languages, 3.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. 143–184.
- 1999 <1991> *Categories of Experiential Grammar*. (Monographs in Systemic Linguistics, 11.) Nottingham: Department of English and Media Studies, Nottingham Trent University.
- 2000 Semiotic and possessive models in relational clauses: Thinking with grammar about grammar. *Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses* 40: 13–35.

DAVIDSE, Kristin & GEYSKENS, Sara

- 1998 Have you walked the dog yet? The ergative causativization of intransitives. *Word* 49: 155–180.

References

DAVIES, Eirian

- 1967 Some notes on English clause types. *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1967: 1–31.
- 1979 *The Semantics of Syntax. Mood and Condition in English*. London: Croom Helm.

DELANCEY, Scott

- 1981 An interpretation of split ergativity and related phenomena. *Language* 57: 626–657.

DELEDALLE, G.

- 1987 *Charles S. Peirce, phénoménologue et sémioticien*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

DEREWIANKA, Beverly

- 1995 Language development in the transition from childhood to adolescence: The role of grammatical metaphor. PhD dissertation, Department of English and Linguistics, Macquarie University.

DIK, Simon; HENGEVELD, Kees; VESTER, Elseline & VET, Co

- 1990 The hierarchical structure of the clause and the typology of adverbial satellites. In: NUYTS, Jan; BOLKESTEIN, Machtelt A. & VET, Co (eds.) *Layers and Levels of Representation in Language Theory: A Functional View*. (Pragmatics & Beyond, 13.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. 25–70.

DOWNING, Angela & LOCKE, Philip

- 1992 *A University Course in English Grammar*. (English Language Teaching Series.) New York: Prentice Hall.

EGGINS, Suzanne

- 1994 *An Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics*. London: Pinter.

ELLIS, Geoffrey

- 1966 On contextual meaning. In: BAZELL, C.E.; CATFORD, J.C.; HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & ROBINS, R.H. (eds.) *In Memory of J.R. Firth*. (Longmans Linguistics Library.) London: Longmans. 79–95.

FAUCONNIER, Gilles & TURNER, Mark

- 1996 Blending as a central process of grammar. In: GOLDBERG, Adele (ed.) *Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language*. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. 113–130.
- 1998 Conceptual integration networks. *Cognitive Science* 22: 133–188.

FAWCETT, Robin P.

- 1980 *Cognitive Linguistics and Social Interaction: Towards and Integrated Model of a Systemic Functional Grammar and the Other Components of a Communicating Mind*. Heidelberg: Groos.
- 2001 *A Theory of Syntax for Systemic Functional Linguistics*. (CILT, 206.) Amsterdam: Benjamins.

FIRBAS, Jan

- 1966 Non-thematic subjects in contemporary English. *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 2: 239–256.

References

- FIRTH, John Rupert
- 1934 The word 'phoneme'. *Maître phonétique* 46: 44–46.
- 1957 The technique of semantics. In: *Papers in Linguistics 1934–1951*. London: Oxford UP. 7–33.
- 1968 /1957. A synopsis of linguistic theory. In: PALMER, Frank R. (ed.) *Selected Papers of J.R. Firth 1952–1959*. London: Longman. 168–205.
- FOLEY, William A. & VAN VALIN, Robert D. Jr.
- 1984 *Functional Syntax and Universal Grammar*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- GIVÓN, Talmy
- 1980 The binding hierarchy and the typology of complements. *Studies in Language* 4: 333–377.
- 1990 Verbal complements. Chapter 13 in: *Syntax. A Functional-Typological Introduction*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- GLEASON, Henry Allan, Jr.
- 1964 The organization of language: A stratificational view. In: STUART, C.I.J.M. (ed.) (1964). 75–95.
- 1965² *Linguistics and English Grammar*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 2nd edition. 1st edition: 1963.
- GOETHALS, Patrick
- 1999 The conduit metaphor and the analysis of meaning: Peircean semiotics, cognitive grammar and systemic functional grammar. Paper presented at the 11th Euro-International Systemic-Functional Workshop, University of Gent, 14–17 July 1999.
- GREENBAUM, Sidney
- 1969 *Studies in English Adverbial Usage*. London: Longman;
- GREGORY, Michael
- 1967 Aspects of varieties differentiation. *Journal of Linguistics* 3: 177–274.
- GRIMSHAW, Jane
- 1979 Complement selection and the lexicon. *Linguistic Inquiry* 10: 279–326.
- HALLIDAY, M.A.K.
- 1961 Categories of a theory of syntax. *Word* 17: 241–292.
Reprinted in the Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in Language and Linguistics: Language, 36.
- 1963 Class in relation to the axes of chain and choice in language. *Linguistics* 2: 5–15.
An extract is reprinted in KRESS, Gunther (ed.) (1976). 84–87.
- 1964 Syntax and the consumer. In: STUART, C.I.J.M. (ed.) (1964). 11–24.
- 1966a Lexis as a linguistic level. In: BAZELL, C.E.; CATFORD, J.C. & HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (eds.) *In Memory of J.R. Firth*. London: Longman. 148–162.
- 1966b Some notes on deep grammar. *Journal of Linguistics* 2: 57–67.
- 1966c The concept of rank: A reply. *Journal of Linguistics* 2: 110–118.
- 1967a Notes on transitivity and theme in English: Part I. *Journal of Linguistics* 3: 37–81.

References

- 1967b Notes on transitivity and theme in English: Part II. *Journal of Linguistics* 3: 177–274.
- 1968 Notes on transitivity and theme in English: Part III. *Journal of Linguistics* 4: 179–215.
- 1969 Options and functions in the English clause. *Brno Studies in English* 8: 81–88.
Reprinted, 1972, in: HOUSEHOLDER, Fred W. (ed.) *Syntactic Theory. Vol. 1: Structuralist*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 248–257.
Reprinted, 1981, in: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & MARTIN, J.R. (eds.) *Readings in Systemic Linguistics*. London: Batsford. 138–145.
- 1970 Functional diversity in language, as seen from a consideration of modality and mood in English. *Foundations of Language* 6: 322–361.
Reprinted, 1976, in: KRESS, Gunther (ed.) (1976). 189–213.
- 1973a *Explorations in the Functions of Language*. (Explorations in Language study.) London: Arnold.
- 1973b /1969. Relevant models of language. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1973a). 9–21.
First published in *Educational Review* (1969).
- 1973c /1971. Language in a social perspective. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1973a). 48–71.
First published in *Educational Review* (1971).
- 1973d /1972. Towards a sociological semantics. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1973a). 72–102.
First published in *Working Papers and Prepublications* (series C, 14.) (1972) Centro Internazionale di Semiotica e di Linguistica, Università di Urbino.
- 1973e The functional basis of language. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1973a). 22–47.
- 1975 *Learning How to Mean. Explorations in the Development of Language*. (Explorations in Language Study.) London: Arnold.
- 1976a /1956. Grammatical categories in modern Chinese: An early sketch of the theory. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.), 36–51. Extract from “Grammatical categories in modern Chinese”, *Transactions of the Philological Society* 1956: 180–202.
- 1976b [written 1964]. English system networks. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.), 101–135.
- 1976c /1969. A brief sketch of systemic grammar. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.), 3–6.
Extract from “Systemic grammar” (1969). In: *La Grammatica; La Lessicologia*. (Atti del I e del II Convegno di Studi, Società di Linguistica Italiana.) Rome: Bulzoni.
- 1976d [written 1969] Types of process. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.), 101–135.
- 1976e /1973. The form of a functional grammar. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.), 7–25.
- 1976f Functions and universals in language. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.), 26–31.
- 1976g /1967. Theme and information in the English clause. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.), 174–188.
Extract from “Some aspects of the thematic organization of the English clause”. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation.
- 1977 Text as semantic choice in social context. In: VAN DIJK, T. & PETÖFI, J.S. (eds.) (1977) *Grammars and Descriptions*. (Research in Text Theory.) Berlin: De Gruyter. 176–225.
Republished, 1978, as “The sociosemantic nature of discourse”, in: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1978a). 128–153.

References

- 1978a *Language as Social Semiotic. The social interpretation of language and meaning.* London: Arnold.
- 1978b /1974. A social-functional approach to language. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1978a). 36–58.
Excerpt from a discussion with Herman Paret, which first appeared in: PARRET, Herman (1974) *Discussing Language.* The Hague: Mouton.
- 1978c Antilanguages. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1978a). 164–182.
- 1978d Language as social semiotic. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1978a). 108–126.
- 1978e Language in urban society. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1978a), 154–163.
- 1978f An interpretation of the functional relationship between language and social structure. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1978a). 183–192.
- 1979 Modes of meaning and modes of expression: Types of grammatical structure, and their determination by different semantic functions. In: ALLERTON, D.J.; CARNEY, Edward & HOLDCROFT, David (eds.) *Function and Context in Linguistic Analysis: A Festschrift for William Haas.* Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 57–79.
- 1981a Introduction. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & MARTIN, J.R. (eds.) *Readings in Systemic Linguistics.* London: Batsford. 13–16.
- 1981b Types of structure. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & MARTIN, J.R. (eds.) *Readings in Systemic Linguistics.* London: Batsford. 29–41.
- 1981c Text semantics and clause grammar: Some patterns of realization. In: COPELAND, J.E. & DAVIS, P.W. (eds.) *Seventh Lacus Forum.* Columbia: Hornbeam Press. 31–59.
- 1984 Language as code and language as behaviour: A systemic-functional interpretation of the nature and ontogenesis of dialogue. In: FAWCETT, Robin P.; HALLIDAY, M.A.K., LAMB, Sydney M. & MAKKAJ, Adam (eds.) *The Semiotics of Culture and Language.* Vol. 1: Language as Social Semiotic. (Open Linguistics Series.) London: Pinter. 3–35.
- 1985a *Introduction to Functional Grammar.* London: Arnold.
- 1985b Systemic background. In: BENSON, James D. & GREAVES, William S. (eds.) *Systemic Perspectives on Discourse.* Vol. 1. (Advances in Discourse Processes, 15.) Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 1–15.
- 1987 Language and the order of nature. In: FABB, Nigel; ATTRIDGE, Derek; DURANT, Alan & MACCABE, Colin (eds.) *The Linguistics of Writing. Arguments between Language and Literature.* Manchester: Manchester UP. 135–154.
- 1988a On the ineffability of grammatical categories. In: BENSON, James D.; CUMMINGS, Michael J. & GREAVES, William S. (eds.) *Linguistics in a Systemic Perspective.* Amsterdam: Benjamins. 27–51.
- 1988b On the language of physical science. In: GHADESSY, Mohsen (ed.) *Registers of Written English. Situational Factors and Linguistic Factors.* London: Pinter. 162–178.
- 1991 Towards probabilistic interpretations. In: VENTOLA, Eija (ed.) *Functional and Systemic Linguistics: Approaches and Uses.* (Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs, 55.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 39–61.
- 1992a Systemic grammar and the concept of a “science of language”. *Network*, 19: 55–64.

References

- 1992b How do you mean? In: DAVIES, Martin & RAVELLI, Louise (eds.) *Advances in Systemic Linguistics. Recent Theory and Practice*. London: Pinter. 20–35.
- 1994 /1985. *Introduction to Functional Grammar*. 2nd revised edition. London: Arnold.
- 1996 On grammar and grammatics. In: HASAN, Ruqaiya; CLORAN, Carmel & BUTT, David G. (eds.) *Functional Descriptions. Theory in Practice*. (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, 121.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1–38.
- 1998a Linguistics as metaphor. In: SIMON-VANDENBERGEN, Anne-Marie; DAVIDSE, Kristin & NOËL, Dirk (eds.) *Reconnecting Language. Morphology and Syntax in Functional Perspectives*. (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory, 154.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. 3–27.
- 1998b Things and relations. Regrammaticising experience as technical knowledge. In: MARTIN, J.R. & VEEL, Robert (eds.) *Reading Science. Critical and Functional Perspectives on Discourses of Science*. London: Routledge. 185–235.
- 1999 The grammatical construction of scientific knowledge: The framing of the English clause. In: ROSSINI FAVRETTI, Rema; SANDRI, Giorgio & SCAZZIERI, Roberto (eds.) *Incommensurability and Translation. Kuhnian Perspectives on Scientific Communication and Theory Change*. Cheltenham: Elgar. 85–116.
- HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & FAWCETT, Robin P.
- 1987 Introduction. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & FAWCETT, Robin P. (eds.) *New Developments in Systemic Linguistics*. Vol. 1: Theory and Description. (Open Linguistics Series.) London: Pinter. 1–13.
- HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & HASAN, Ruqaiya
- 1976 *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman.
- HALLIDAY, M.A.K.; KRESS, Gunther; HASAN, Ruqaiya & MARTIN, J.R.
- 1992a Interview with M.A.K. Halliday, May 1986: Part I. *Social Semiotics* 2.1: 176–195.
- 1992b Interview with M.A.K. Halliday, May 1986: Part II. *Social Semiotics* 2.2: 58–69.
- HALLIDAY, M.A.K.; MCINTOSH, A. & STREVENS, P.
- 1964 *The Linguistic Sciences and Language Teaching*. London: Longman.
- HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & MARTIN, J.R.
- 1993a *Writing Science. Literacy and Discursive Power*. (Critical Perspectives on Literacy and Education.) London: Falmer.
- 1993b The model. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & MARTIN, J.R., 1993a: 22–50.
- 1998 General orientation. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & MARTIN, J.R. (eds.) *Writing Science: Literacy and Discursive Power*. (Critical Perspectives on Literacy.) London: Falmer. 2–21.
- HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & MATTHIESSEN, Christian M.I.M.
- 1999 *Construing Experience Through Meaning. A Language-Based Approach to Cognition*. (Open Linguistics Series.) London: Cassell/Continuum.
- HARRIS, Zellig S.
- 1951 *Methods in Structural Linguistics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

References

HASAN, Ruqaiya

- 1987 The grammarian's dream: Lexis as most delicate grammar. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & FAWCETT, R. (eds.) *New Developments in Systemic Linguistics*. Volume 1: Theory and Description. London: Pinter. 184–212.
- 1996 Semantic networks: A tool for the analysis of meaning. In: CLORAN, Carmel; BUTT, David & WILLIAMS, Geoffrey (eds.) *Ways of Saying: Ways of Meaning*. (Open Linguistics Series.) London: Cassell. 104–131.

HAWKES, Terence

- 1977 *Structuralism and Semiotics*. London: Routledge.

HILL, A.A.

- 1958 *An Introduction to Linguistic Structures. From Sound to Sentence in English*. New York.

HEADLAND, T.M.; PIKE, K.L. & HARRIS, M.

- 1990 *Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate*. (Frontiers in Anthropology, 7.) London: Sage.

HJELMSLEV, Louis

- 1963 /1943. *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. Translation by Francis J. Whitfield from the Danish original: *Omkring sprogteoriens grundlæggelse*, Copenhagen, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1943.
- 1959 /1954. La stratification du langage. In: *Essais linguistiques*. Copenhagen: Nordisk Sprog- og Kulturverlag. 44–76.
First appeared, 1954, in *Word* 10: 163–188.

HOCKETT, Charles F.

- 1955 *A Manual of Phonology*. (International Journal of American Linguistics: Memoir 11.).
- 1958 *A Course in Modern Linguistics*. New York: Macmillan.

HORIGUSHI, Ikiko

- 1989 Complementation. In: DIRVEN, René & GEIGER, Richard A. (eds.) *A User's Grammar of English: Word, Sentence, Text, Interaction*. Vol. 2: The Structure of Sentences. Frankfurt: Lang. 474–517.

HORROCKS, R.

- 1976 Metaphor in competence and performance. *Papers in Linguistics* 9: 149-160.

HOYE, Leo

- 1997 *Adverbs and Modality in English*. (English Language Series.) London: Longman.

HUDDLESTON, Rodney

- 1965 Rank and depth. *Language* 41: 574–586.

IEDEMA, Rick; FEEZ, Susan & WHITE, Peter R.R.

- 1994 *Media Literacy*. Sydney: Disadvantaged Schools Program, NSW Department of School Education.

References

JAKOBSON, Roman

- 1966 Henry Sweet's path towards phonemics. In: BAZELL, C.E.; CATFORD, J.C. & HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (eds.) *In Memory of J.R. Firth*. London: Longman. 242–254.

JOHANNSSON, Stig

- 1993 'Sweetly obvious': Some aspects of adverb-adjective combinations in present-day English. In: HOEY, Michael (ed.) *Data, Description and Discourse: Papers on the English Language in Honour of John McH. Sinclair*. London: Harper Collins. 39–49.

JOHNSON, Mark

- 1987 *The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 1992 Philosophical implications of cognitive semantics. *Cognitive Linguistics* 3: 345–366.

JONES, Daniel

- 1936 *An Outline of English Phonetics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

KARTTUNEN, Lauri

- 1971 The Logic of English Predicate Complement Constructions. Indiana Linguistics Club Report.

KATZ, Jerrold & FODOR, Jerry

- 1963 The Structure of a Semantic Theory. *Language* 23: 174–218.
Reprinted, 1964, in: FODOR, J. & KATZ, J. (eds.) *The Structure of Language: Readings in a Philosophy of Language*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

KITTAY, Eva F.

- 1992 Semantic fields and the individuation of content. In: LEHRER, Adrienne & KITTAY, Eva F. (eds.) *Frames, Fields, and Contrasts*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

KLEIN, Ernest

- 1971 *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

KRESS, Gunther

- 1976 Introduction to Section two: Theory. In: KRESS, Gunther (ed.) *Halliday: System and Function in Language*. London: Oxford UP. 33–35.

KURYLOWICZ, Jerzy

- 1960 /1949. La notion de l'isomorphisme. *Esquisses linguistiques*. Wrocław/Krakow: Polska Akademia Nauk. 16–26.
Originally published, 1949, in: *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 5 (Special issue: *Recherches structurales. Interventions dans le débat glossématique, publiées à l'occasion du cinquantenaire de M. Louis Hjelmslev*): 48–61.

LABOV, William

- 1969 Contraction, deletion, and inherent variation of the English copula. *Language* 45: 715–762.

References

LAKOFF, George

- 1973 Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 2: 458–508.
- 1987 *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 1990 The Invariance Hypothesis: Is abstract reason based on image-schemas?. *Cognitive Linguistics* 1: 39-74.

LAKOFF, George & JOHNSON, Mark

- 1980a *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 1980b The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. *Cognitive Science* 4: 195-208.

LAMB, Sydney

- 1964 On alternation, transformation, realization, and stratification. In: STUART, C.I.J.M. (ed.) (1964). 105–122.
- 1966 Epilegomena to a theory of language. *Romance Philology* 19: 531–573.

LANGACKER, Ronald W.

- 1987a *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*. Vol. 1: Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford UP.
- 1987b Nouns and verbs. *Language* 63: 53–94.
- 1990 Subjectification. *Cognitive Linguistics* 1: 5–38.
- 1991 *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*. Vol. 2: Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford UP.
- 1999 Losing control: Grammaticization, subjectification and transparency. In: BLANK, Andreas & KOCH, Peter (eds.) *Historical Semantics and Cognition*. (Cognitive Linguistics Research, 13.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 147–175.

LEE, Penny

- 1996 *The Whorf Theory Complex: A Critical Reconstruction*. (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science. Series III, Studies in the History of the Language Sciences, 81.) Amsterdam: Benjamins.

LE GUERN, Michel

- 1973 *Sémantique de la métaphore et de la métonymie*. Paris: Larousse.

LEHRER, Adrienne & LEHRER, Keith

- 1995 Fields, networks and vectors. In: PALMER, Frank (ed.) *Grammar and Meaning. Essays in Honour of Sir John Lyons*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 26–47.

LEMKE, Jay L.

- n.d. The topology of genre: Text structures and text types. Unpublished paper. [Cited here as quoted in Martin, J.R. & Matthiessen, Christian, 1991].
- 1984 Action, context and meaning. In: Jay L. LEMKE, *Semiotics and Education*. (Monographs, Working Papers and Prepublications of the Toronto Semiotic Circle, 2.) Toronto: Victoria University. 23–62.
- 1995 *Textual Politics. Discourse and Social Dynamics*. (Critical Perspectives on Literacy and Education.) London: Taylor & Francis.

References

- 1998 Topological semiosis and the evolution of meaning. Paper presented at the Conference of the Washington Evolutionary Systems Society, May 1998.
→ academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/education/jlemke/webs/wess/index.htm [accessed 11/6/99]
- 1999 Opening up closure: Semiotics across scales. Paper read at the conference on “Closure: Emergent organization and their dynamics”, University of Gent, May 1999.
→ academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/education/jlemke/papers/gent.html [accessed 11/6/99]
- LÉVI-STRAUSS, Claude
- 1966 *The Savage Mind*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Translation of French original: *La pensée sauvage*, Paris: Plon, 1962.
- LEVIN, Samuel R.
- 1977 *The Semantics of Metaphor*. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP.
- LOCKWOOD, David G. (ed.)
- 1972 *Introduction to Stratificational Linguistics*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- LOEWENBERG, Ina
- 1975 Identifying metaphors. *Foundations of Language* 11: 315-338.
- LOS, Bettelou
- 1999 *Infinitival Complementation in Old and Middle English*. (LOT Series.) The Hague: Thesus.
- LOUW, William
- 2000 Contextual prosodic theory: Bringing semantic prosodies to life. In: HEFFER, C. & SAUNTSTON, M. (eds.) *Words in Context: A Tribute to John Sinclair*. Birmingham: Birmingham University.
- LYONS, John
- 1963 *Structural Semantics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 1966 Firth’s theory of meaning. In: BAZELL, C.E.; CATFORD, J.C.; HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & ROBINS, R.H. (eds.) *In Memory of J.R. Firth*. London: Longmans. 288–302.
- 1977 *Semantics*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- 1981 *Language, Meaning and Context*. Bungay: Fontana.
- MARTIN, J.R.
- 1983 CONJUNCTION: The logic of English text. In: PETÖFI, J.S. & SOEZER, E. (eds.) *Micro and Macro Connexity of Discourse*. Hamburg: Buske. 1–72.
- 1985 Process and text: Two aspects of human semiosis. In: BENSON, James & GREAVES, William (eds.) *Systemic Perspectives on Discourse*. Vol. 1. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 248–274.
- 1987 The meaning of features in systemic linguistics. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & FAWCETT, Robin (eds.) *New Developments in Systemic Linguistics*. Vol. 1: *Theory and Description*. (Open Linguistics Series.) London: Pinter. 14–40.
- 1988 Hypotactic recursive systems in English: Toward a functional interpretation. In: BENSON, James D. & GREAVES, William S. (eds.) *Systemic Functional Approaches to Discourse*. (Advances in Discourse Processes, 26.) Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 240–270.

References

- 1992a Macro-proposals: Meaning by degree. In: MANN, William C. & THOMPSON, Sandra (eds.) *Discourse Description. Diverse Linguistic Analyses of a Fund-Raising Text*. (Pragmatics & Beyond, NS 16.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. 359–395.
- 1992b *English Text. System and Structure*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- 1995a Interpersonal meaning, persuasion and public discourse: Packing semiotic punch. *Australian Journal of Linguistics* 15: 33–67.
- 1995b Reading positions/positioning readers: JUDGEMENT in English. *Prospect: A Journal of Australian TESOL* 10: 27–37.
- 1996 Evaluating disruption: Symbolising theme in junior secondary narrative. In: HASAN, Ruqaiya & WILLIAMS, Geoff (eds.) *Literacy in Society*. (Applied Linguistics and Language Study.) London: Longman. 124–171.
- 1997 Analysing genre: Functional parameters. In: CHRISTIE, Frances & MARTIN, James R. (eds.) *Genres and Institutions*. London: Cassell. 3–39.
- 1999 Grace: The logogenesis of freedom. *Discourse Studies* 1: 29–56.
- 2000a Factoring out exchange. In: COULTHARD, Malcolm; COTTERILL, Janet & ROCK, Frances (eds.) *Dialogue Analysis VII: Working with Dialogue*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- 2000b Beyond exchange: APPRAISAL systems in English. In: HUNSTON, Susan & THOMPSON, Geoff (eds.) *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*. Oxford: Oxford UP. 142–175.
- MARTIN, J.R. & MATTHIESSEN, Christian M.I.M.
- 1991 Systemic typology and topology. In: CHRISTIE, Frances (ed.) *Literacy in Social Processes*. Northern Territory University, Darwin: Centre for Studies in Language and Education. 345–383.
- MARTIN, J.R.; MATTHIESSEN, Christian M.I.M. & PAINTER, Clare
- 1997 *Working with Functional Grammar*. London: Arnold.
- MARTINET, André
- 1942-45 Au sujet des “Fondements de la Théorie linguistique” de Louis Hjelmslev. *Bulletin de la Société Linguistique de Paris* 42: 19–42.
- 1949a *Phonology as Functional Phonetics*. London: Oxford UP.
- 1949b La double articulation linguistique. *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 5 (Special issue: *Recherches structurales. Interventions dans le débat glossématique, publiées à l’occasion du cinquantenaire de M. Louis Hjelmslev*): 30–37.
- 1962 *A Functional View of Language*. London: Clarendon.
- 1964 *Elements of General Linguistics*. London: Faber.
- 1977 Some basic principles of functional linguistics. *La Linguistique* 13: 7–14.
- 1997 Une relecture de Hjelmslev. In: ZINA, Alessandro (ed.) *Hjelmslev aujourd’hui*. (Semiotics and Cognitive Studies, 5.) Turnhout: Brepols. 55–63.
- MATTHEWS, Peter H.
- 2001 *A Short History of Structuralism*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

References

MATTHEWS, R.

- 1980 /1971. Concerning a 'linguistic theory' of metaphor. In: CHING, Marvin K., HALEY, Michael C. and LUNSFORD, Ronald F. (eds.) *Linguistic Perspectives on Literature*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 76-90.
First appeared, 1971, in: *Foundations of Language* 7: 413-425.

MATTHIESSEN, Christian M.I.M.

- 1988 Representational issues in systemic functional grammar. In: BENSON, James D. & GREAVES, William S. (eds.) *Systemic Functional Approaches to Discourse*. (Advances in Discourse Processes, 26.) Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 136-175.
- 1990 Metafunctional complementarity and resonance. Mimeo, University of Sydney, Department of Linguistics.
- 1992 Interpreting the textual metafunction. In: DAVIES, Martin & RAVELLI, Louise (eds.) *Advances in Systemic Linguistics. Recent Theory and Practice*. London: Pinter. 37-81.
- 1993a *Lexicogrammatical Cartography: English Systems*. (Textbook Series in the Language Sciences.) Tokyo: International Sciences Publishers.
- 1993b Instantial systems and logogenesis. Paper presented at the Third Chinese Systemic-functional Symposium, Hangzhou, 17-20 June 1993.
- 1998 Construing processes of consciousness: From the commonsense model to the uncommonsense model of cognitive science. In: MARTIN, J.R. & VEEL, Robert (eds.) *Reading Science. Critical and Functional Perspectives on Discourses of Science*. London: Routledge. 327-356.

MATTHIESSEN, Christian & M.A.K. HALLIDAY

- in prep. Systemic functional grammar: A first step into the theory.

MCCAWLEY, James

- 1988 *The Syntactic Phenomena of English*. Chicago: Chicago UP.

MCGREGOR, William B.

- 1997 *Semiotic Grammar*. Oxford: Clarendon.

MELROSE, Robin

- 1995 The seduction of abduction: Peirce' theory of signs and indeterminacy in language. *Journal of Pragmatics* 23: 493-507.

MILLS, Anne

- 1992 Eerste-taalverwerving. In: APPEL, René; Heleen BOS; Jane COERTS; Simon DIK; Anne MILLS; Pieter MUYSKEN; Ron PRINS; Rob SCHOONEN and Norval SMITH. *Inleiding Algemene Taalwetenschap*. Dordrecht: ICG Publications. 201-212.

MITCHELL, T.F.

- 1966 Some English phrasal types. In: BAZELL, C.E.; CATFORD, J.C.; HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & ROBINS, R.H. (eds.) *In Memory of J.R. Firth*. (Longmans Linguistics Library.) London: Longmans. 335-358.

MIYAHARA, Fumio

- 1981 Root modality and the potency of the agent: Toward a systematic organization of root modality. *Studies in English Language and Literature* 31: 65-76.

References

- MORLEY, David
1985 *An Introduction to Systemic Grammar*. London: Macmillan.
- NEWMAYER, Frederick J.
1998 *Language Form and Language Function*. (Language, Speech, and Communication.) Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.
- NEY, James W.
1981 The verbal complements in English. Chapter 4 in: *Semantic Structures for the Syntax of Complements and Auxiliaries in English*. (Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 171.) The Hague: Mouton.
- NIDA, Eugene A.
1960 *A Synopsis of English Syntax*. The Hague: Mouton.
- NOONAN, Michael
1985 Complementation. In: SHOPEN, Timothy (ed.) *Language Typology and Syntactic Description*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 42–140.
- NÖTH, Winfried
1985 *Handbuch der Semiotik*. Stuttgart: Metzler.
- NUYTS, Jan
2000 Tensions between discourse structure and conceptual semantics: The syntax of epistemic modal expressions. *Studies in Language* 24: 105–135.
2001 Remarks on layering. *Revista Canaria de Estudios Ingleses* 42 (Special issue on “Challenges and developments in Functional Grammar”).
- PALMER, Frank R.
1964 ‘Sequence’ and ‘order’. In: STUART, C.I.J.M. (ed.) (1964). 123–133.
1986 *Mood and Modality*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- PAUWELS, Paul & SIMON-VANDENBERGEN, Anne-Marie
1995 Body parts in linguistic action: Underlying schemata and value judgements. In: GOOSSENS, Louis; PAUWELS, Paul; RUDZKA-OSTYN, Brygida; SIMON-VANDENBERGEN, Anne-Marie & VANPARYS, Johan, *By Word of Mouth*. *Studies on Meaning Extensions in Linguistic Action*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 35–69.
- PIAGET, Jean
1976 *La psychologie de l'intelligence*. Paris: Gallimard.
- PIKE, Kenneth L.
1954 *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior*. Glendale: Summer Institute of Linguistics.
1972 /1955. Meaning and hypostatsis. In: BREND, Ruth M. (ed.) *Kenneth L. Pike. Selected Writings*. The Hague: Mouton. 100–105.
First published, 1955, in: *Monograph* (The Institute of Language and Linguistics, Georgetown University) 8: 134–141.

References

- 1972 /1959. Language as particle, wave, and field. In: BREND, Ruth M. (ed.) (1972) 128–143.
First published in: *The Texas Quarterly* 2 (1959): 37–54.
- 1972 /1960. Nucleation. In: BREND, Ruth M. (ed.) (1972): 144–150.
First published in: *The Modern Language Journal* 44 (1960): 291–295.
- POLDAUF, Ivan
- 1964 The third syntactical plan. *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 4: 241–255.
- PORZIG, W.
- 1934 Wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen. *Beiträge zur deutschen Sprache und Literatur* 58: 70–97.
- PRAKASAM, V.
- 1987 Aspects of word phonology. In: HALLIDAY, M.A.K. & FAWCETT, Robin P. (eds.) *New Developments in Systemic Linguistics*. Vol. 1: Theory and Description. (Open Linguistics Series.) London: Pinter. 272–287.
- PRICE, J.T.
- 1974 Linguistic competence and metaphorical use. *Foundations of Language* 10: 253–256.
- QUIRK, Randolph; GREENBAUM, Sidney; LEECH, Geoffrey & SVARTVIK, Jan
- 1985 *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
- RANSOM, Evelyn N.
- 1986 *Complementation: Its Meanings and Forms*. (Typological Studies in Language, 10.) Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- RAVELLI, Louise J.
- 1985 Metaphor, mode and complexity: An exploration of co-varying patterns. BA Dissertation, University of Sydney.
- 1988 Grammatical metaphor: An initial analysis. In: STEINER, Erich H. & VELTMAN, Robert (eds.) *Pragmatics, Discourse and Text. Some Systemically-oriented Approaches*. London: Pinter. 133–147.
- 1999 *Metaphor, Mode and Complexity: An Exploration of Co-varying Patterns*. (Monographs in Systemic Linguistics, 12.) Nottingham: Department of English and Media Studies, Nottingham Trent University.
- REDDY, Michael J.
- 1980 /1969. A semantic approach to metaphor. In: CHING, Marvin K.L.; HALEY, Michael & LUNSFORD, Ronald F. (eds.) *Linguistic Perspectives on Literature*. London: Routledge.
First published, 1969, in: *Chicago Linguistic Society* 5: 210–251.
- RICŒUR, Paul
- 1994² /1975. *The Rule of Metaphor. Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*. London: Routledge. Translated by R. Czerny, K. McLaughlin & J. Costello from the French original: *La métaphore vive*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975. Second edition. [First English edition: 1978]

References

ROACH, Peter

- 1991² /1983. *English Phonetics and Phonology. A Practical Course*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Second edition.

ROBINS, Robert H.

- 1964 *General Linguistics. An Introductory Survey*. London: Longman.

ROSCH, Eleanor

- 1971 On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories. In: MOORE, Timothy E. (ed.) *Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language*. New York: Academic Press.
- 1978 Principles of categorization. In: ROSCH, Eleanor & LLOYD, Barbara B. (eds.) *Cognition and Categorization*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

ROSS, John R.

- 1973 Nouniness. In: FUJIMURA, O. (ed.) *Three Dimensions of Linguistic Theory*. Tokyo: TEC Company. 137–258.
- 1975 Clausematiness. In: KEENAN, Edward L. (ed.) *Formal Semantics of Natural Language*. London: Cambridge UP. 422–475.
- 1987 Islands and syntactic prototypes. *Chicago Linguistic Society* 23: 309–320.
- 1995 Defective noun phrases. *Chicago Linguistic Society* 31: 398–440.

RUDZKA-OSTYN, Brygida

- 1988 Semantic extensions into the domain of verbal communication. In: RUDZKA-OSTYN, Brygida (ed.) *Topics in Cognitive Linguistics*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 507–553.

SANDERS, Robert

- 1973 Aspects of figurative language. *Linguistics* 96: 56-100.

SAUSSURE, Ferdinand DE

- 1879 *Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues into-européennes*. Leipzig: Teubner.

SIMMS, Karl

- 1997 Indexicality and the social semiotic. In: SIMMS, Karl (ed.) *Language and the Subject*. (Critical Studies, 9.) Amsterdam: Rodopi. 75–85.

SIMON-VANDENBERGEN, Anne-Marie

- 1984 On the decline of dynamic *may*. *Studia Neophilologica* 55: 143–145.
- 1993 Value judgment in the metaphorization of linguistic action. In: GEIGER, Richard A. & RUDZKA-OSTYN, Brygida (eds.) *Conceptualizations and Mental Processing in Language*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 331–367.
- 1995 Assessing linguistic behaviour – A study of value judgements. In: GOOSSENS, Louis; PAUWELS, Paul; RUDZKA-OSTYN, Brygida; SIMON-VANDENBERGEN, Anne-Marie & VANPARYS, Johan, *By Word of Mouth. Studies on Meaning Extensions in Linguistic Action*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 71–124.

References

- SPENCER, J.W. & GREGORY, M.J.
1964 An approach to the study of style. In: ENKVIST, N.E.; SPENCER, J.W. & GREGORY, M.J. (eds.) *Linguistics and Style*. London: Oxford UP.
- STREVENS, P.D.
1964 Varieties of English. *English Studies* 46: 1–10.
- STUART, C.I.J.M. (ed.)
1964 *Report on the Fifteenth Annual (First International) Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Studies*. (Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics, 17.) Washington: Georgetown UP.
- SVOBODA, A.
1968 The hierarchy of communicative units and fields as illustrated by English attributive constructions. *Brno Studies in English* 7: 49–102.
- SWEET, Henry
1877 *A Handbook of Phonetics Including a Popular Exposition of the Principles of Spelling Reform*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- SWEETSER, Eve
1990 *From Etymology to Pragmatics. Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
1999 Compositionality and blending: Composition in a cognitively realistic framework. In: JANSSEN, Theo & REDEKER, Gisela (eds.) *Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope and Methodology*. (Cognitive Linguistics Research, 15.) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 129–162.
- TAVERNIERS, Miriam
2001 *Metaphor and Metaphorology. A Selective Genealogy of Philosophical and Linguistic Conceptions of Metaphor from Aristotle to the 1980s*. (Studia Germanica Gandensia Libri, 1.) Gent: Academia Press.
- TEICH, Elke
1995 A proposal for dependency in systemic functional grammar: Metasemiosis in computational systemic functional linguistics. PhD dissertation, Universität des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken.
- THIBAUT, Paul J.
1987 An interview with Michael Halliday. In: STEELE, Robert & THREADGOLD, Terry (eds.) *Language Topics: Essays in Honour of Michael Halliday*. Volume 2. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
1995 Mood and the ecosocial dynamics of semiotic exchange. In: HASAN, Ruqaiya & FRIES, Peter H. (eds.) *On Subject and Theme. A Discourse Functional Perspective*. (CILT, 118.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. 51–89.
1997 *Re-reading Saussure. The Dynamics of Signs in Social Life*. London: Routledge.
- THIBAUT, Paul J. & VAN LEEUWEN, Theo
1996 Grammar, society, and the speech act: Renewing the connections. *Journal of Pragmatics* 25: 561–585.

References

- THOMPSON, Geoff
 1996 *Introducing Functional Grammar*. London: Arnold.
- TORR, Jane & SIMPSON, Alyson
 forthcoming. The emergence of grammatical metaphor: Literacy oriented expressions in everyday speech of young children. In: SIMON-VANDENBERGEN, Anne-Marie; TAVERNIERS, Miriam & RAVELLI, Louise (eds.) *Metaphor in Systemic-Functional Perspectives*. (CILT Series.) Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- TRIER, J.
 1931 Das sprachliche Feld. Eine Auseinandersetzung. *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 10: 428–449.
- TRUBETZKOY, Nikolaj S.
 1935 *Anleitung zu phonologischen Beschreibungen*. (Lautbibliothek der deutschen Mundarten, 2.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 2nd edition 1958.
 1939 *Grundzüge der Phonologie*. (Travaux Linguistiques de Prague, 7.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
 English translation, 1969: *Principles of Phonology*. Translated by C.A.M. Baltaxe. Berkely: University of California Press.
- TUCKER, Gordon
 1998 *The Lexicogrammar of Adjectives. A Systemic Functional Approach to Lexis*. (Functional Descriptions of Language.) London: Cassell.
- VAN VALIN, Robert D. Jr.
 1990 Layered syntax in Role and Reference Grammar. In: NUYTS, Jan; BOLKESTEIN, Machteld & VET, Co (eds.) *Layers and Levels of Representation in Language Theory: A Functional View*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 193–231.
- VERSTRAETE, Jean-Christophe
 1998 A semiotic model for the description of levels in conjunction: External, internal-modal and internal-speech functional. *Functions of Language* 5: 179–211.
- VAN WIJK, N.
 1939 La délimitation des domaines de la phonologie et de la phonétique. In: BLANCQUAERT, E. & PÉE, W. (eds.) *Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Phonetic Sciences*. Gent: Universiteit Gent.
- WHITE, Peter
 1998 Telling media tales: The news story as rhetoric. PhD dissertation, University of Sydney.
 1999 Beyond interpersonal metaphors of Mood: Modelling the discourse semantics of evaluation and subjectivity. Paper presented at the 11th Euro-International Systemic-Functional Workshop, University of Gent, 14–17 July 1999.
 2000 Dialogue and inter-subjectivity: Reinterpreting the semantics of modality and hedging. In: COULTHARD, Malcolm; COTTERILL, Janet & ROCK, Frances (eds.) *Dialogue Analysis VII: Working with Dialogue*. Tübingen: Niemeyer. 67–80.

References

WHORF, Benjamin Lee

- 1940 Letter to Ruth Boyd Mason. 1 April 1940. Whorf 1979. Series 1. Correspondence 1925–1954. Microfilm reel 1, frame 1033. (As quoted in Lee 1996).

WILLEMS, Klaas

- 1994 *Sprache, Sprachreflexion und Erkenntniskritik. Versuch einer transzendentalphänomenologischen Klärung der Bedeutungsfrage.* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, 391.) Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
- 1997 *Kasus, grammatische Bedeutung und kognitive Linguistik. Ein Beitrag zur allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft.* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik, 427.) Tübingen: Gunter Narr.