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Ancient Rhetoric as a Hermeneutical Tool for the Analysis of Characterization in Narrative Literature

Abstract: This article argues that the conceptualization of the notions of character and characterization in ancient rhetorical treatises can serve as a hermeneutical tool for the analysis of characterization in narrative literature. It offers an analysis of ancient rhetorical *loci* and techniques of character depiction and points out that ancient rhetorical theory discusses direct, metaphorical, and metonymical techniques of characterization. Ultimately, it provides the modern scholar with a paradigm for the analysis of characterization in (ancient) narrative literature.

Keywords: character, *ethos*, (techniques of) characterization, direct and indirect characterization, hermeneutics, narrative, literary composition, metaphor, metonymy, *progymnasmata*

T he background against which this paper is conceived is the widely-held view that ancient rhetoric has pervasively influenced literary composition at least from the first century BC. G. Kennedy describes this phenomenon as an evolution from "primary" to "secondary" rhetoric, postulating a shift from the adoption of rhetorical techniques in speeches for specific (juridical, political, or epideictic) purposes to their adoption in a secondary environment, such as literature, to serve the author's (or a character's) ideological and/or narrative agenda.[1] In Kennedy's own words, ancient rhetoric "shows the tendency of shifting focus from persuasion to narration, from civic to personal contexts, and from speech to

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[1] G. A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill-London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 3.

literature." Whereas Kennedy rightly identifies as the basis of this phenomenon the increasing manifestation of ancient rhetoric as an *ars scribendi* (the so-called "literaturization" of rhetoric), its *result* can equally be described as the "rhetoricalization" of literature.[2]

In line with this insight, this article argues that the conceptualization of the notions of character and characterization in ancient rhetorical treatises can serve as a hermeneutical tool for the analysis of characterization in narrative literature. Drawing mainly (but not exclusively) on imperial Greek rhetorical theory (such as the *progymnasmata*), I propose a paradigm for the analysis of characterization in narrative texts by surveying a number of rhetorical *loci* and techniques of character depiction. The overall structure of this article takes up a point that is of central importance in ancient rhetoric (and, indeed, rhetoric in general), namely the relation between form (technique) and content (meaning). In the first part of this essay, I focus on the *content* of character depiction, that is, on its *loci* (τόποι) as described by ancient rhetoricians. This part deals with the question of *which characteristics* ancient rhetorical theory thematizes as relevant to character depiction. In the second part, the focus shifts to the *form* of characterization: *which techniques* does ancient rhetorical theory address in order to conceptualize the attribution of these characteristics? In short, whereas the question underlying the first part is "what?", the question underlying the second part is "how?"

1. Rhetorical *Loci* of Character Depiction

Broadly speaking, ancient rhetorical theory deals with *loci* for describing persons in two contexts. Firstly, *loci a persona* are discussed in the theory of *argumentatio*. As such, they are addressed, together with *loci a re*, in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Ps.-Cicero's *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Cicero's *De Inventione*, Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, Chirius Fortunatianus' *Ars Rhetorica*, Mathaeus Camariotes' Ἐπιτομὴ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, Sulpitius Victor's *Institutiones oratoriae* and two anonymous treatises called Περὶ ῥητορικῆς and *Excerpta Rhetorica* (the exact references are included in table 1). Secondly, authors

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[2]The rhetorical character of literature from the first century BC onwards is highlighted by an increasing convergence of rhetoric, historiography, poetry, and even philosophy from the imperial age onwards. See A. Cizek, *Imitatio et tractatio. Die literarisch-rhetorischen Grundlagen der Nachahmung in Antike und Mittelalter* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1994), 237.

of *progymnasmata* (such as Theon,[3] Ps.-Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus) and other rhetoricians (such as Quintilian, Menander Rhetor, and an anonymous scholiast on Aphthonius) discuss "headings" (κεφάλαια) relevant to the description of persons in *encomia* (the exact references are included in table 2). They unanimously state that these headings are adopted in a number of other *progymnasmata* as well, such as invective (ψόγος/*vituperatio*) and comparison (σύγκρισις/*comparatio*).[4]

In tables 1 and 2, I give an overview of the various *loci* discussed in both rhetorical corpora. As a comparison of the tables indicates, the authors on epideictic oratory echo the *loci a persona* from *argumentatio* theory in various instances.[5] Both *argumentatio* theory and epideictic theory divide these *loci* into a number of categories. Firstly, the importance of proper names is discussed in both groups.[6] Secondly, the distinction between external and internal *loci*, which goes back to Aristotle,[7] also informs *argumentatio* theory and theory on epideictic oratory alike.[8] Thirdly, external *loci* comprise the same subcategories in both corpora:

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[3]I refer to specific passages in Theon using Spengel's pagination (cf. §5.1: *PRIMARY RHETORICAL TEXTS*), equally adopted by Patillon's more recent edition: M. Patillon (ed.), *Aelius Theon,* Προγυμνάσματα (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997).

[4]On ἐγκώμιον and ψόγος, see Theon, *Prog.* 112.17–18 Sp. II (who treats both exercises in the same section of his handbook: *Prog.* 109.19–112.18 Sp. II); ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 11.28–30 Sp. II. On ἐγκώμιον and σύγκρισις, see Nicol. *Prog.* 60.13–15 and 61.1–5 Felten; Theon, *Prog.* 113.3–25 Sp. II; ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 14.15–15.5 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.* 42.25–9 Sp. II; Cocondrius, Περὶ τρόπων 240 Sp. III.

[5]See also Patillon, *Theon*, cited in n. 3 above, pp. lxxvi-lxxvii, who offers a (limited) comparison of *loci* in Theon, ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* and Cic. *Inv.*

[6]Names take a more prominent place in *argumentatio* theory than in epideictic theory. In *argumentatio* theory, their importance is mentioned by Cic. *Inv.* 24; Victorinus, *Explanationum in Ciceronis rhetoricam libri* 214–20 Halm (*nomen*); Anon. *Tractatus de adtributis personae et negotio sive commentarius in Ciceronis de inventione* 305–07 Halm; Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28; Chirius Fortunatianus 2.1 (102–03 Halm); Mathaeus Camariotes 602 Walz VI (ἐὰν ὡρισμένον ἦ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ κύριον). In epideictic theory, on the other hand, their importance is mentioned only by Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.10.

[7]Arist. *Rh.* 1.5.4 (ἔξω vs. ἐν αὐτῷ). See also Arist. *EN* 1098b; Anaximenes *Rh. Al.* 1422a.7–11; G. A. Kennedy (transl.), *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 50 n. 156. Cizek, *Imitatio et tractatio*, cited in n. 2 above, pp. 298–99, on the other hand, distinguishes between "zeitliche" and "stoffliche Koordinaten." Whereas the first category includes *loci* concerning descent, the second category harbours physical and internal as well as external *loci*.

[8]Within the last group, Theon, *Prog.* 110.2–7 Sp. II (τῶν ἔξωθεν) and ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 11–12 Sp. II (τὰ ἐκτός vs. φύσις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος) explicitly address this distinction.

—social descent (τύχη/*fortuna*, γένος/*genus*), possibly accompanied by the mention of one's parents (γονεῖς, πατέρες/*parentes*), ancestors (πρόγονοι/*maiores*) or other relatives (*affinitas, cognatio,* ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, συγγενεῖς)

—city (πόλις/*civitas*), country (πατρίς/ *patria*), or ethnic provenance (ἔθνος/*natio*)

—intellectual training and education (παιδεία, ἀγωγή, τροφή, ἀνατροφή, μελέτη πολέμων καὶ ὅπλων, *educatio, disciplina, institutio*)

—age (ἡλικία/*aetas*)

—(quantity and quality of) friends (πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, *victus*, φιλία/*amicitia*, φίλοι/*amici*)

—reputation (δόξα/*gloria*)

—honorary positions (ἀρχή, *honos, dignitas*), and the corresponding power (*potestates, potestas, potentia*) and influence (*gratia*)

—wealth (πλοῦτος/*divitiae*, κτήματα, οἰκέται, *pecunia*)

—offspring (εὐτεκνία, πολυτεκνία)

Argumentatio theory and theory on epideictic oratory also present differences in their treatments of character depiction. Firstly, a small number of external *loci* that are mentioned in *argumentatio* theory, are absent from discussions on epideictic oratory. These *loci* include professional activities[9] and details about old age.[10] Conversely, details about one's birth, death, and the period after death are included only by the authors on epideictic oratory.[11] Secondly, the two corpora discuss internal *loci* less symmetrically than external *loci*. The authors on epideictic oratory adopt the Platonic division of internal *loci* into physical qualities on the one hand, and psychic (i.e. intellectual and moral) qualities on the other.[12]

Their overall treatments of *loci*, then, are informed by a Platonic-Aristotelian tripartition (external—physical—psychic).[13] Although

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[9]Quint. *Inst*. 5.10.23–28 (*studia*).

[10]Arist. *Rh*. 1.5.15 (εὐγηρία).

[11]Ps.-Hermog. (ἃ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν συνέπεσεν ἄξια θαύματος); Nicol. (ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως); Men. Rh. (τὸ περὶ τῆς γενέσεως); Theon (εὐθανασία, αἱ μετὰ θάνατον).

[12]Pl. *Grg*. 447c, *Lg*. 697b.2–6, *Phlb*. 48d-e. See also G. Achard (ed.), *Ps.-Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989), 95 n. 41; Patillon, *Theon*, cited in n. 3 above, p. lxxvii; Cizek, *Imitatio et tractatio*, cited in n. 2 above, pp. 298–99. Theon (τοῦ σώματος/τὰ <ἀγαθά> περὶ σῶμα vs. ψυχικὰ ἀγαθά/τὰ ἀγαθὰ … περὶ ψυχῆς τε καὶ ἦθος), ps.-Hermogenes (φύσις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος … περὶ σώματος … περὶ ψυχῆς), Quint. *Inst*. 3.7.10–17 (*corpus … animus*), and Men. Rh. (ἡ φύσις … ἡ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς) insert this division into their discussions of epideictic oratory.

[13]Unlike the other *progymnasmata* authors, Nicol. *Prog*. 50.8–10 Felten rejects this tripartition. Correspondingly, he discusses neither physical or psychic qualities, but only external qualities and actions.

argumentatio theory also addresses physical and psychic internal *loci* (as the overview of internal *loci* in table 1 points out), only Aristotle adopts the Platonic-Aristotelian tripartition as a structuring principle.[14] The third difference concerns *loci* that are not included in this tripartition. Whereas guidelines on the construction of an *encomium* single out one's actions[15] (and, sporadically, speech)[16] as relevant to characterization, invention theory addresses not only action[17] and speech,[18] but also emotion[19] and appearance.[20]

One agrees that *loci a persona* in invention theory found their way into prosopographical and biographical literature after having been taken up in theories on praise.[21] This transition is exemplified by Theon's discussion of character (πρόσωπον)[22] as one of the six constituents (στοιχεῖα) of narrative (διήγημα). In it, he consecutively addresses γένος, φύσις, ἀγωγή, διάθεσις, ἡλικία, τύχη, προαίρεσις, πρᾶξις, λόγος, θάνατος, and τὰ μετὰ θάνατον,[23] all of which correspond to the *loci* dealt with by guidelines on encomiastic rhetoric (the numbers refer to the corresponding *loci* in table 2):

—Γένος (1.1), ἀγωγή (1.3), ἡλικία (1.5), τύχη (1.1), θάνατος (1.12) and τὰ μετὰ θάνατον (1.13) are external *loci*.

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[14] Arist. (τὰ ἐν σώματι … τὰ περὶ ψυχήν).

[15] Theon (πράξεις); ps.-Hermogenes (πράξεις, ἐπιτηδεύματα); Aphth. (πράξεις); Nicol. (τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένα); Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.10–17 (*res gestae, factorum dictorumque*); Men. Rh. (ἐπιτηδεύματα); Anon. Σχόλια εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου προγυμνάσματα (ἐπιτήδευμα).

[16] Only in Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.10.7 (*factorum dictorumque*).

[17] Cic. *Inv.* 24–25 mentions *victus* ("way of life"), *habitus* ("nature", "character", which comprises qualities achieved by *industria* or diligence; e.g. *perceptio virtutis aut artis alicuius*, "a comprehension of virtue or an art"), *studium* (which here refers to mental activity: *animi*) and *consilia* (which refers to well-considered action: *aliquid faciendi aut non faciendi excogitata ratio*). See also Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28 (*acta*) and Chirius Fortunatianus (*consuetudo domestica*).

[18] Cic. (*orationes*); Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28 (*dicta*); Chirius Fortunatianus (*oratio*).

[19] Cic. (*affectiones*); Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28 (*temporarium animi motus*); Chirius Fortunatianus (*adfectus*).

[20] Chirius Fortunatianus (*vultus, habitus, incessus*).

[21] According to H. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study* (trans. M. T. Bliss, A. Jansen, and D. A. Orton; ed. D. A. Orton and R. D. Anderson) (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 1998), §376, the *encomium* represents an intermediary phase in the evolution from the adoption of these *loci* in primary rhetoric to their adoption in secondary rhetoric: "The connecting link is the epideictic praise of persons."

[22] Ancient rhetorical treatises do not distinguish between non-fictional and fictional πρόσωπα (between persons and literary characters, that is). The term πρόσωπον can refer to both.

[23] Theon, *Prog.* 78.24–26 Sp. II.

—Φύσις (2) can refer to psychic and physical characteristics (cf. φύσις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος).[24]

—Πράξεις (3)

—Λόγος (4)

—Προαίρεσις and διάθεσις (emotional condition) manifest themselves both in speech and in action.

Not all rhetorical *loci* discussed in this overview are related to character in the same way. Whereas the internal *loci* directly address inner characteristics, *loci* such as actions, speech, emotions, and appearance and many of the external *loci* (such as education, friends, etc.) relate to a person's character in an indirect way. In the following paragraph, which discusses the ways in which the attribution of characteristics is conceived in ancient rhetorical theory, I discuss this distinction in detail.

2. TECHNIQUES OF CHARACTERIZATION

How does ancient rhetorical theory conceptualize the attribution of characteristics? Like many rhetorical phenomena, characterization was universal in real life and literature alike before it was described (and, later, prescribed) in rhetoric.[25] My account of techniques of characterization discussed in rhetorical treatises suggests two points. Firstly, I argue that ancient rhetoric discusses direct and indirect techniques of characterization. Whereas direct characterization *explicitly* attributes characteristics, indirect characterization leaves characteristics *implicit* and merely provides attributes from which they can (and should) be inferred. Secondly, ancient rhetorical theory discusses two different types of indirect characterization, depending on the tropical relation between the person under discussion and the attribute. This relation can be metaphorical or metonymical.[26] In itself, the distinction between metaphor and metonymy goes back,

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[24]Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 11–12 Sp. II.

[25]For a similar thought on ancient rhetorical theory about the paradigm, see K. Demoen, "A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms: The Rhetorical Exemplum in Ancient and Imperial Greek Theory," *Rhetorica* 15.2 (1997): 125–58 (pp. 126–27).

[26]For similar distinctions in modern literary theory between direct and indirect characterization on the one hand, and metonymical and metaphorical techniques of characterization on the other, see L. Herman and B. Vervaeck, *Handbook of Narrative Analysis* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005) (orig. *Vertelduivels. Handboek verhaalanalyse* (Antwerpen, Brussel, Nijmegen: Vantilt and VUB Press, 2001)), 67–69.

of course, to ancient rhetorical theory, where both concepts are de-
fined as tropes[27] and explicitly opposed to each other.[28] Applied to
(indirect) characterization, the traditional distinction between these
tropes[29] entails that a characteristic is replaced by an attribute relating
to it either by similarity (metaphorical characterization) or contiguity
(metonymical characterization).

To be sure, ancient rhetoricians themselves do not explicitly ad-
dress the differences between direct and indirect characterization,
nor do they explicitly distinguish metonymical from metaphorical
characterization. However, they do discuss a number of specific
techniques of characterization that can all be classified accordingly.
Generally speaking, metaphorical characterization is established by a
comparison (σύγκρισις/*comparatio*; παραβολή/*parabole*) or a paradigm
(παράδειγμα/*exemplum*). Both techniques align a person (*comparan-
dum*) with a *comparans* on the basis of a certain resemblance (*tertium
comparationis*).[30] Metonymical characterization, on the other hand,
draws upon a relation of contiguity between the characterized per-
son and the characterizing attribute. Ancient rhetorical theory distin-
guishes six such attributes: emotion, membership of a specific group,
action, speech, appearance, and setting.

As I pointed out in the previous paragraph, most of the metony-
mical techniques (emotion, membership of a specific group, action,
speech, and appearance) are discussed by invention theory and/or
epideictic theory as *loci* of characterization. Underlying this is the
awareness that these *loci* characterize persons because they metony-
mically relate to their character. In what follows, I will point out that

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[27] See Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §§558–64 and
§§565–71.

[28] See, for example, Cic. *Or.* 92: *res consequens* vs. *similitudo*.

[29] As the *brevitas*-form of comparison (Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*,
cited in n. 21 above, §§558 and 846), metaphor replaces a term (*verbum proprium*)
by another term on the basis of similarity. Metonymy, on the other hand, replaces a
verbum proprium by a term contiguously related to it (see, for example, ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad
Her.* 4.32.43: *ab rebus propinquis et finitimis*, "from objects closely akin or associated").
As Demoen, "A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms," cited in n. 25 above, p.
144, points out, the traditional relationship between comparison and metaphor has
been questioned by contemporary metaphor-theories.

[30] *Comparans* and *comparandum* can be explicitly connected by a linking term
("like," "as"). See Demoen, "A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms," cited in n.
25 above, pp. 126–27 and 144, who offers a model for the analysis of paradigms in
literary texts based upon ancient rhetorical theory. See also K. Demoen, *Pagan and
Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen. A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics* (Turnhout:
Brepols, 1996), 35–51.

ancient rhetoric also theorizes the other types of characterization and discusses specific techniques for each of them.

2.1 Identification

Name-giving or identification is regarded as a technique of characterization by ancient rhetoricians. This is suggested, firstly, by the presence of a person's proper name as a *locus* in invention and epideictic theories.[31] Furthermore, Aurelius Augustinus singles out one's proper name and *qualitas* as the *significantia* of a person.[32] The anonymous author of *Excerpta rhetorica* echoes this distinction.[33]

Conversely, the rhetorical trope of *antonomasia* (that is, the substitution of a proper name by a word or paraphrase)[34] can be equally relevant to characterization. Ps.-Cicero (*Rh. ad Her.* 4.31.42), for example, highlights its characterizing potential by defining it (*pronominatio*) as "*quae sicuti cognomine quodam extraneo demonstrat id quod suo nomine non potest appellari*". An anonymous treatise on tropes corroborates this view, explicitly defining characterization (αὐτὸν χαρακτηρίζειν πειρώμεθα) as one of the functions of *antonomasia* (next to the trope's practical aim of avoiding homonymy when referring to two persons of the same name).[35]

2.2 Direct Attribution of Characteristics

Although the Greek term χαρακτηρισμός mostly refers to a description of one's physical features (cf. *infra*, E.2), it is also well-attested as referring to *psychic* characteristics.[36] Rutilius Lupus, for

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[31]Cf. tables 1 and 2.

[32]Aurelius Augustinus §8, 141 Halm. He clarifies the concept of *qualitas* with examples: *dives et pauper, imperator*.

[33]Anon. *Excerpta rhetorica* 586 Halm (*persona constat duobus modis, nomine et qualitate*).

[34]See Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §580, for an overview of ancient definitions of *antonomasia*. *Antonomasia* is explicitly referred to as a trope by Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.29–30; Trypho, *Trop.* 204 Sp. III; Anon. Περὶ ποιητικῶν τρόπων 213 Sp. III; Greg. Cor. *Trop.* 223 Sp. III; Anon. *Trop.* 227 Sp. III; Cocondrius, Περὶ τρόπων 234 Sp. III; Choerob. Περὶ τρόπων ποιητικῶν 250 Sp. III.

[35]Anon. Περὶ τρόπων 213 Sp. III.

[36]Whereas in Latin treatises Cizek, *Imitatio et tractatio*, cited in n. 2 above, §1.1.1.3, observes a distinction between *effictio* (description of physical characteristics; *corporis forma*) and *notatio* (description of inner characteristics; *hominis natura*), the Greek term χαρακτηρισμός encompasses both aspects.

example, sees χαρακτηρισμός as the attribution of *moral* character-istics ("*aut vitia aut virtutes*"), and compares this type of charac-terization to a painter's attribution of colours to figures.[37] Polybius Sardianus, for his part, explicitly defines this term as the depiction of psychic qualities (ὑποτύπωσις ἰδιώματος ψυχῆς). As an example, he adduces a passage from Homer (*Il.* 11.653–54) where Patroclus characterizes Achilles.[38] His discussion illuminates two aspects of χαρακτηρισμός. Firstly, it highlights the importance of vividness—a stylistic and rhetorical quality commonly referred to as ἐνάργεια. As a synonym of διατύπωσις/*evidentia*, the term ὑποτύπωσις implies such vividness.[39] Its importance in character depiction is also documented by Ps.-Cicero, who comments that *notatio* (synonym of ἠθοποιία, cf. *infra*, D.1.1) places one's character "before the eyes" (*totam enim nat-uram cuiuspiam ponunt ante oculos*).[40] Secondly, Sardianus' example points out that χαρακτηρισμός does not exclusively refer to *direct* characterization (δεινὸς ἀνήρ), but also to *indirect* characterization (Pa-troclus interprets Achilles' *words*: "τάχα κεν καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιόῳτο"). Χαρακτηρισμός, then, implies, but is not limited to, direct attribu-tion of characteristics. Ps.-Cicero even regards *notatio* primarily as denoting indirect characterization. This is not only suggested by his theoretical reflections on *notatio* ("*natura certis describitur* signis," "*de-scribunt* quid consentaneum sit … *naturae*"), but also by an exam-ple pointing out that *notatio* is characterization through sketching one's reactions (*Rh. ad Her.* 4.63–64). One technique referred to by Ps.-Cicero is speech (e.g. "*nonne vobis videtur dicere,*" 4.63). There-fore, Sardianus' and Ps.-Cicero's discussions suggest that χαρακ-τηρισμός/*notatio* refers to a vivid depiction of *ethos* through direct and indirect techniques.

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[37] Rutil. *Schemata lexeos* 2.7 Halm (*Quem ad modum pictor coloribus figuras describit*).

[38] Plb. Rh. Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ 108–9 Sp. III (εὖ δὲ σὺ οἶσθα, γεραιὲ διοτρεφὲς, οἷον ἐκεῖνος // δεινὸς ἀνήρ· τάχα κεν καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιόῳτο, "You know well, old man, nurtured by Zeus, of what sort this terrible man is. Quickly would he blame even one who is blameless").

[39] See, for example, Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.40: *ab aliis* ὑποτύπωσις *dicitur proposita quaedam forma rerum ita expressa verbis, ut cerni potius videatur quam audiri* ("others call *hypotypôsis* a representation of objects expressed with words in such a way that they seem to be seen rather than heard"). See also Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §818, who rightly states that the term χαρακτηρισμός refers to the use of *evidentia*/διατύπωσις for "the characterization … of individuals by means of personal description as well as depiction of their behavior."

[40] Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.65.

2.3 Indirect Attribution of Characteristics:
Metaphorical Techniques (Comparison, Paradigm)

In rhetorical treatises, the concept of comparison is discussed on two different levels. As a *progymnasma*, firstly, σύγκρισις/*comparatio* is defined as a comparison between two persons (προσώπων) or objects (πραγμάτων).[41] Since it compares relevant *loci* of two persons/objects to each other,[42] a fully developed *comparatio* takes the form of a series of comparisons of *loci*. Shorter, more punctual, comparisons, on the other hand, are dealt with in discussions on style (λέξις) by rhetoricians from the third and fourth centuries AD. Most of them adopt ὁμοίωσις as an umbrella term for different subtypes, such as παραβολή, εἰκών and παράδειγμα.[43] The semantic ranges of and hierarchical relations between these terms differ from treatise to treatise.[44] For my present purpose, it suffices to highlight the ancient distinction between assimilation of a person with *something* else on the one hand (i.e. an object, an animal, etc.) (παραβολή/*parabole*) and with *someone* else on the other (i.e. a mythological, historical, literary person/character) (παράδειγμα/*exemplum*). This definition is endorsed by Apsines, who divides possible *comparantia* into inanimate objects (ἀψύχων) and animals (ζῴων ἀλόγων) on the one hand, and persons (προσώπων) on the other.[45] Admittedly, this is only one of the occurring definitions.[46]

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[41]See Theon, *Prog.* 112.20–23 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.* 42.21–22 Sp. II.

[42]These are the same *loci* as in the *encomium* (cf. table 2 and *supra*, 1).

[43]See, for example, Plb. Rh. Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ 106 Sp. III; Beda 618 Halm.

[44]Cocondrius, Περὶ τρόπων 239 Sp. III, for example, distinguishes six subtypes of *homoeosis* (παραβολή, εἰκών, εἰκονογραφία, χαρακτηρισμός, εἰδωλοποιία and παράδειγμα). Iulius Rufinianus *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis liber* §22–23, 44 Halm, on the other hand, divides *homoeosis* into παράδειγμα and παραβολή, the latter of which he further subdivides into εἰκών, ὅμοιον and ἐπαγωγή. For details, see Demoen, "A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms," cited in n. 25 above, pp. 138–39.

[45]Aps. *Rh.* 372–73 Sp. I: Παραβολὴ παραδείγματος τούτῳ διαφέρει, ὅτι ἡ μὲν παραβολὴ ἀπ᾽ ἀψύχων ἢ ζῴων ἀλόγων λαμβάνεται... τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα ἐκ γεγονότων ἤδη λαμβάνεται προσώπων ("A *parabole* differs from a *paradeigma* in that it adopts (as *comparantia*, that is) inanimate objects or unreasoning animals, whereas *paradeigmata* adopt real people").

[46]See Demoen, "A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms," cited in n. 25 above, p. 139 n. 49. Another definition of the distinction between παράδειγμα and παραβολή can be found in Minuc. Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων 418–19 Sp. I.

2.4 Indirect Attribution of Characteristics:
Metonymical Techniques

A. Emotions (πάθη)   The traditional psychological distinction in ancient ethics and rhetoric between *ethos* (permanent characteristics) and *pathos* (emotions, temporary feelings which are more easily influenced than *ethos*)[47] informs the definition of "ethical" and "pathetical" *ethopoeia* (ἠθοποιία ἠθική and ἠθοποιία παθητική)[48] in the *progymnasmata* and is well-attested in other rhetorical theory as well.[49] That emotions are considered to be indications of character is also suggested by their presence as *loci a persona* in invention theory.[50]

B. Membership of a specific group   The characterizing potential of one's membership of a specific group is apparent from a number of external *loci* discussed in invention and epideictic theories. They can be subdivided into three categories, each of which relates to membership of a particular group in society:
1. the macro-social group (ἔθνος / *natio*, πατρίς / *patria*, and possibly πόλις / *civitas*)
2. the micro-social group (εὐγένεια, τύχη / *fortuna*, γένος / *genus*, γονεῖς, πατέρες / *parentes*, πρόγονοι / *maiores*, συγγενεῖς, ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι / *affinitas*, *cognatio*, πλοῦτος, κτήματα / *divitiae*, *pecunia*, οἰκέται, δόξα / *gloria*, etc.)
3. the educative-intellectual peer group (παιδεία, ἀγωγή / *educatio*, etc.)

C. Action   As tables 1 and 2 point out, actions (πράξεις) are one of the few *loci* that are mentioned by almost all authors in invention and *encomium* theories alike. The principle underlying metonymical characterization through action is explicitly discussed as early as

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[47]On *pathos*' openness to external influences, see Arist. *Rh.* 2.1.8.

[48]This distinction is discussed by, among others, Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 9.28–36 Sp. II and Aphth. *Prog.* 45.5–14 Sp. II. On *ethopoeia* in general, cf. *infra*, D.1.

[49]Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.9 acknowledges the distinction between *ethos* and *pathos* (even though he rejects it in favor of a distinction that adopts the intensity of emotions as its primary criterium). See also Ps.-Cassiodorus, *Liber de rhetorica* 501 and 503 Halm; Anonymus Seguerianus, Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου 6.1–7; Iulius Victor, *Ars rhetorica* 439 Halm.

[50]See, among others, Cic. *Inv.* 24–25; Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28; Chirius Fortunatianus 2.1, 102–03 Halm (cf. table 1).

Aristotle. In his *Poetics*, he observes that in tragedy (which he defines as a representation of actions or μίμησις πράξεων) the actions of characters (τινῶν πραττόντων, πράξεις, τοὺς πράττοντας) indicate qualities (ποιούς τινας) regarding their character (ἦθος) and disposition (διάνοια).[51] Moreover, he explicitly refers to action (πρᾶξις) and speech (λόγος) as techniques of characterization (ἦθος).[52]

The *progymnasmata* handbooks echo the notion that action is an indication of character. Theon, for example, argues that a comparison between persons (σύγκρισις προσώπων) can be regarded as a comparison between things (σύγκρισις πραγμάτων) because comparing persons essentially comes down to comparing their actions (τὰς πράξεις).[53]

As a specific form of the representation of action, an anecdote relating a particular action (χρεία πρακτική) is also presented as an indication of character in ancient rhetoric. For practical reasons, I will discuss this type of *chreia* together with the verbal anecdote or χρεία λογική (that is, an anecdote relating a person's words) (cf. *infra*, D.3).

D. Speech

D.1 Ἠθοποιία In rhetorical treatises, the term ἠθοποιία appears in four different meanings.[54]

(1) In its broadest sense, ἠθοποιία refers to the construction (ποιία) of *ethos* in general (direct or indirect characterization through action or speech). In this sense, it appears as a synonym of *notatio* and

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[51] Arist. *Po.* 1449b.35–1450a.7.

[52] Arist. *Po.* 1454a.17–19.

[53] Theon, *Prog.* 112.23–26 Sp. II.

[54] G. Ventrella, "L'etopea nella definizione degli antichi retori," in E. Amato and J. Schamp (eds.), ἨΘΟΠΟΙΙΑ. *La représentation de caractères entre fiction scolaire et réalité vivante à l'époque impériale et tardive.* Cardo / 3. Études et Textes pour l'Identité Culturelle de l'Antiquité Tardive (Salerno: Helios Editrice, 2005), 179–212, lists the references to all texts from the imperial and Byzantine periods that offer a definition of ἠθοποιία. For earlier rhetorical theory on ἠθοποιία, he refers to H. M. Hagen, *Èthopoiia. Zur Geschichte eines Rhetorischen Begriff* (Diss. Erlangen, 1966). In my view, scholars have not yet grasped the full range of different meanings of the term. R. D. Anderson, *Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms Connected to Methods of Argumentation, Figures and Tropes from Anaximenes to Quintilian* (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 60–61, for example, does not distinguish between meanings 2a and 2b. T. O. Sloane (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 263, on the other hand, only points to meanings 2a and 2b. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §§820–26 and §§1131–32 and B. Schouler, "L'éthopée chez Libanios ou l'évasion esthétique," in Amato and Schamp (eds.), ἨΘΟΠΟΙΙΑ, 79–92, broadly distinguish between meanings 2a and 3.

χαρακτηρισμός in Ps.-Cicero.[55] Quintilian also adopts the term in this sense, defining it as (informative) *mimesis* of *ethos* (*mos*)[56] through action and speech ("*et in factis et in dictis*").[57]

(2.a) Secondly, *ethopoeia* refers to a rhetorical figure of thought (σχῆμα τῆς διανοίας / *figura sententiae*) in which the orator / author represents the words of another person / character in direct speech.[58] As an emotive figure, *ethopoeia* is one of the techniques adopted to express fictitious emotions.[59] In this sense, it is defined as one of the six types of *metathesis* (*transmutatio*) by Phoebammon, who thus emphasizes its ability of transposing (μεθίστησιν) an utterance to the level of another speaker.[60]

(2.b) I regard the term's third meaning as a special case of its second meaning. The term also refers to an orator's ability to depict *himself* in his speech as good and trustworthy.[61] In this sense, Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to ἠθοποιία in Lysias' speeches as an ἀρετή.[62]

(3) Fourthly, *ethopoeia* refers to the *progymnasma* that trains students to speak "in character" of a (possibly fictitious)[63] person.[64] The

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[55]Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* §5.

[56]*Mos* appears as the Latin equivalent of (1) the Aristotelian rhetorical concept of *ethos* as a technical proof (see Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §32 and §257.2a and Quint. *Inst.* 2.15.34), (2) the character of the speaker of an *ethopoeia* (see Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §820, §822.7 and §823.1), and (3) the character of characters in drama (see Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §1187 and §1226).

[57]Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.58. See also Cic. *Or.* 3.204.

[58]See, among others, Alex. *Fig.* 21 Sp. III; Zonae. *Fig.* 162 Sp. III; Anon. Περὶ τῶν σχημάτων τοῦ λόγου 177 Sp. III.

[59]See Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §808. Thought figures oriented towards the matter (as opposed to those oriented towards the audience), include, next to emotive figures, semantic figures; see Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, §§781–807.

[60]Phoeb. *Fig.* 52 Sp. III. See also Georgius Plethon, Συντομὴ περί τινων μερῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς 574 Walz VI (ἠθοποιία as a thought figure κατὰ μετάθεσιν).

[61]In other words, it refers to the orator's ability to construct *ethos* as a technical proof (as distinct from *logos* and *pathos*) in the Aristotelian rhetorical sense of the word.

[62]D.H. *Lys.* 8.2. See also Hagen, *Èthopoiia*, cited in n. 54 above, pp. 37–39. For a similar judgment about Lysias, see Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.51. Rutil. *Schemata lexeos* 1.21, 12 Halm offers two examples of *ethopoeia* in this sense (one from Lysias and one from Demosthenes).

[63]See Aphth. *Prog.* 44.24 Sp. II: πλαττομένη δὲ ... τὸ ἦθος.

[64]On *ethopoeia* as exercise, see Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §1131–32, §1137.2.

term appears in this sense in the *progymnasmata* handbooks[65] and in various other rhetorical treatises.[66] Elsewhere, the term προσω-ποποιία / *prosopopoeia* refers to this exercise.[67] The Latin equivalent is, among other names, *sermocinatio*.[68]

The most self-evident function of *ethopoeia* is, by definition, characterization. The *progymnasmata* authors explicitly mention this func-

[65]See Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.7–8 Sp. II; Nicol. *Prog.* 64.1–3 Felten.

[66]See, for example, Aquila Romanus §4 Halm (*certis quibusdam personis verba accommodate adfingimus*; synonym: *moralis confictio*); Ps.-Rufinianus, *De schem. dian.* §13, 62 Halm (*alienorum affectuum qualiumlibet dictorumque imitatio*; synonym: *figuratio, expressio*); Anonymus, *Schemata Dianoeas* 72 Halm (*data locutio certae personae*); Alex. *Fig.* 21–22 Sp. III (ὅταν ὑπάρχοντα πρόσωπα τιθέντες λόγους τινὰς αὐτοῖς περιτιθῶμεν); Tib. *Fig.* 63 Sp. III (τῶν ἐπιτιμήσεων . . . ὡς ὑφ' ἑτέρων προσώπων γινομένας εἰσάγωμεν); Phoeb. *Fig.* 52 Sp. III (ὑφεστηκὸς ὑποτίθεται πρόσωπον); Isid. *Orig.* 2.14 and 2.21.32 (*ethopoeia*); Emporius, *De ethopoeia, de loco communi, de demonstrativa et de deliberativa materia* 561 Halm (*ethopoeia*). Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §822.1, incorrectly includes Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.58 and Rutil. 1.21, 12 Halm in this list. As I pointed out above (Cf. D.1.1), *ethopoeia* has a broader meaning in Quintilian's passage (see also Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §824.3, where ἠθοποιία as used in Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.58 is internally inconsistently defined as a "borderline case"). As I also pointed out above (n. 62), Rutilius Lupus' interpretation of *ethopoeia* corresponds to meaning 2b.

[67]Theon, *Prog.* 115.11–118.5 Sp. II; Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.29 (προσωποποιία), 3.8.49 and 6.1.25 (*prosopopoeia*); Zonaeus, *Fig.* 162 Sp. III; Anon. Περὶ τῶν σχημάτων τοῦ λόγου 177 Sp. III. In the latter two authors, ἠθοποιία is used as an umbrella term for what progymnasmatic theory separately labels as προσωποποιία (personification or the attribution of speech to an object or abstract concept; see Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.9–12 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.* 45.1–5 Sp. II; Nicol. *Prog.* 64.20–65.4 Felten) and εἰδωλοποιία (the attribution of speech to a deceased person; see Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.14–15 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.*44.28–45.1 Sp. II). Priscianus' *Praeexercitamina* 45 Passalacqua gives *conformatio* and *simulacri factio* as Latin equivalents of προσωποποιία and εἰδωλοποιία respectively. Both Rutilius Lupus 2.26 Halm and Aquila Romanus 1.3 Halm adopt προσωποποιία as an umbrella term referring to what progymnasmatic theory separately labels as προσωποποιία and εἰδωλοποιία.

[68]See Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §820, for definitions. Lausberg (§822) also offers an overview of the other Latin terms referring to *ethopoeia* (*moralis confictio—figuratio—expressio—allocutio—sermones hominum assimulati*). I should point out that *imitatio morum alienorum* and μίμησις in Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.58 refer to the first, broad meaning of *ethopoeia* (like the term ἠθοποιία itself in this passage; cf. *supra*, meaning 1). Thus, Lausberg's claim that they are synonyms of *sermocinatio*, which refers to the second meaning of ἠθοποιία, is incorrect. Likewise, Cizek, *Imitatio et tractatio*, cited in n. 2 above, pp. 136–41, incorrectly suggests that *ethopoeia* in Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* is a synonym of *sermocinatio* and *conformatio*. Whereas *ethopoeia* is a synonym of *notatio* (*Rh. ad Her.* 4.63; cf. *supra*, meaning 1), *sermocinatio* corresponds to the second, narrow, meaning of ἠθοποιία (4.65). *Conformatio*, finally, is an umbrella term referring to both *prosopopoeia* and *eidolopoeia* (4.66).

tion in their definitions of this school exercise.[69] This function is also highlighted at other places,[70] and some (Latin) authors specifically focus on the importance of *ethopoeia* for *moral* characterization.[71]

*D.2 Maxim (*γνώμη / *sententia)*   A maxim, or *gnome*, is an implicit indication of the character of the person who uses it in his / her speech. As Aristotle suggests, the use of *gnomai* makes speech ἠθικός (ἠθικοὺς ... ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους) because it reveals the moral disposition (προαίρεσις) of the speaker.[72] Likewise, Nicolaus emphasizes the moral dimension of gnomic utterance when claiming that "a maxim always teaches either the choice of good or avoidance of evil" (ἡ ... γνώμη πάντως αἵρεσιν ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ εἰσηγεῖται φυγήν).[73] Quintilian also acknowledges the "ethical" potential of maxims when arguing that *sententiae* are capable of commending a speaker to an audience.[74]

*D.3 Verbal anecdote (*χρεία λογική)   Together with *ethopoeia*, the (verbal and actional) *chreia* is the only *progymnasma* that by definition implies metonymical characterization. Being a brief saying (χρεία λογική) or action (χρεία πρακτική) attributed to a person,[75] it characterizes this person through speech or action. The verbal *chreia*'s close relation to the maxim (παράκειται δὲ αὐτῇ γνώμη) highlights its characterizing function.[76] Theon defines a verbal *chreia* as a contextualized *gnome* by indicating that "every brief maxim attributed to a person

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[69]See Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 15.7 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.* 44.21 Sp. II (μίμησις ἤθους); Nicol. *Prog.* 64.1–3 Felten (λόγος ... ἦθος ἢ πάθος ἐμφαίνων ἢ καὶ συναμφότερα); Priscianus, *Praeexercitamina* 45 Passalacqua (*imitatio sermonis ad mores*); Emporius, *De ethopoeia, de loco communi, de demonstrativa et de deliberativa materia* 561–62 Halm.

[70]For example, Isid. *Orig.* 2.14.

[71]Aquila Romanus §4 Halm, for example, highlights a character's words as indications of either badness or dignity (*vel ad improbitatem earum demonstrandam vel ad dignitatem*). See also Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.65 (*sermones ad dignitatem adcommodatos*); Ps.-Rufinianus *De Schem. dian.* §13, 62 Halm, who foregrounds reprimand (*non sine reprehensione*) as a characteristic of *ethopoeia*.

[72]Arist. *Rh.* 1395b16. As is pointed out by F. Woerther, "La λέξις ἠθική (style éthique) dans le livre III de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote. Les emplois d'ἠθικός dans le corpus aristotélicien," *Rhetorica* 23.1 (2005): 1–36 (pp. 22–23), the term ἠθικός in this instance refers to what is capable of *representing ethos*.

[73]Nicol. *Prog.* 464.5–6 Sp. III.

[74]Quint. 8.5.32 (*sententia ... dicentem commendat*).

[75]For definitions of *chreia*, see Theon, *Prog.* 60.16–19 and 96.19–22 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.* 23 Sp. II; Nicol. *Prog.* 19.7–9 Felten; Priscianus, *Praeexercitamina* 35 Passalacqua.

[76]Theon, *Prog.* 96.21 Sp. II.

creates a *chreia*."[77] This alignment of a verbal *chreia* with a *gnome* implies that, like a *gnome*, a *chreia* makes speech *ethikos*. Moreover, Theon's quotation highlights a crucial difference between *gnomai* and *chreiai*, which further highlights the *chreia*'s ability to depict character: whereas a maxim is indefinite, formulating a general truth[78] without being attributed to a specific person,[79] a *chreia* is definite because it is attributed to a specific person in a specific context.

E. Appearance

E.1 Guidelines from Physiognomy Ancient physiognomical theory provides a set of instruments geared towards the inference of a person's character from physical characteristics.[80] Already the first extant treatise on physiognomy, ps.-Aristotle's *Physiognomonica* (3rd cent. BC), distinguishes between invariable and variable physical features. It postulates that physiognomy is concerned with inferring one's permanent (μόνιμον) characteristics. Since variable physical features are no indications of *ethos*, only invariable physical features are said to constitute the object of physiognomy *stricto sensu*.[81] And yet, a number of arguments suggest that, in fact, variable features do play a role in physiognomical conceptualization of character. Two of these arguments are provided by Ps.-Aristotle himself. Firstly, he offers a list of physical "places" that provide material for physiognomical inference.[82] By including in this list, among other things, the movements (τῶν κινήσεων), the features as appearing in the face (τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου ἐμφαινομένων) and the voice (τῆς φωνῆς), he identifies body language as a possible *locus* for inference. Secondly, he points out that, even if variable features are no direct indications of *ethos*, they are indications of one's temporary

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[77]Theon, *Prog.* 96.22–23 Sp. II (πᾶσα γὰρ γνώμη σύντομος εἰς πρόσωπον ἀναφερομένη χρείαν ποιεῖ). Hence, Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §1117, defines *chreia* as a "finitely embedded *sententia*." Strictly speaking, both definitions encompass only the verbal *chreia*.

[78]On the general character of maxims, see Arist. *Rh.* 1394a.2 (καθόλου); Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 7.12–14 Sp. II (καθολικῇ); Aphth. *Prog.* 25.8–9 Sp. II (κεφαλαιώδης); Nicol. *Prog.* 25.2 Felten (καθολική).

[79]A *gnome* is uttered ἀπροσώπως. See Theon, *Prog.* 96.25–27 Sp. II (εἰς πρόσωπον . . . τὴν δὲ γνώμην οὐ πάντως); Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 3.19–21 Sp. II (ἄνευ προσώπου); Aphth. *Prog.* 10.8.9–10 Sp. II (ἀπροσώπως); Anon. Σχόλια εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου προγυμνάσματα 590 Walz II (μετὰ προσώπων . . . τὴν δὲ γνώμης χωρίς).

[80]All extant physiognomical treatises are edited by R. Förster, *Scriptores physiognomonici graeci et latini*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1893).

[81]Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 806a.7–12.

[82]Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 806a.26–33.

(μὴ μένοντος) condition or *pathos*. This condition can, in turn, be an indication of *ethos*. As an example, he adduces blushing (τὸ πρόσωπον ἐπιφοινίσσον), which he defines as an indication of shame (τὸ πάθος . . . τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις). He then points out that this feature, if becoming recurrent ("blushing often"), is an indication of shyness (that is, the permanent characteristic or *ethos* of inclination towards shame: αἰσχυντηλοί).[83]

The third argument pointing to the importance of body language in physiognomical inference is offered by the social relevance of physiognomical practice. As has been pointed out repeatedly, physiognomical skills were powerful tools for an individual to function successfully in his political and social environment.[84] Aulus Gellius, for example, emphasizes the importance of body language (*de oris et vultus ingenio deque totius corporis filo atque habitu*) when relating how Pythagoras submitted his pupils to physiognomical screening (ἐφυσιογνωμόνει).[85] M. Gleason aptly defines the society of the imperial period as a "face-to-face society"[86] and "a forest of eyes—a world in which the scrutiny of one's fellow man was not an idle pastime but an essential survival skill."[87] Because of the absence of clear borders between public and private life, all behavior was part of a strategic self-presentation of the individual to safeguard his reputation as a member of the intellectual and political elite.[88] Observing carefully the words, the movements, the actions, and the appearance of others and being observed by others were social realities of primary importance. In this social context, physiognomy provided civilians with guidelines and techniques to decipher a man's behavior on the one hand, and to mold efficiently their own conduct and reactions on the other. It is evident that physiognomy, like rhetoric, played a role in a larger strategy of self-performance, in which *variable* physical features (of which the totality can be re-

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[83] Ps.-Arist. *Phgn.* 812a.30–33.

[84] See M. W. Gleason, *Making Men. Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 55–81; T. van Houdt, "De taal van het lichaam. Fysiognomiek en retoriek in de Romeinse keizertijd," *Kleio* 29 (2000): 50–65 (pp. 57–59).

[85] Aulus Gellius 1.9.

[86] Gleason, *Making Men*, cited in n. 84 above, p. 55 and "The Semiotics of Gender: Physiognomy and Self-Fashioning in the Second Century C.E.," in: D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler, and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.), *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 389–416 (p. 389).

[87] Gleason, "The Semiotics of Gender," cited in n. 86 above, p. 389.

[88] See also van Houdt, "De taal van het lichaam," cited in n. 84 above, p. 58.

ferred to with the overall term "body-language") were highly sig-
nificant. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, along with in-
variable physiognomical references, instances of body-language will
have struck ancient readers of narrative texts as potential indices of
character.

E.2 Ecphrasis (ἔκφρασις / evidentia)   The *progymnasmata* authors
explicitly include persons (πρόσωπα) as possible objects of *ecphra-
sis*.[89] In fact, ancient rhetoric harbours a number of more or less
synonymous terms referring to the vivid description of persons
(or objects). Whereas E. Evans lists a limited number of common
ancient rhetorical terms as physiognomically relevant concepts,[90]
Lausberg offers a more extended list of terms referring to (physi-
cal, and therefore physiognomically relevant) description (ἔκφρασις,
διατύπωσις, ὑποτύπωσις, ἐνάργεια, and *evidentia*).[91] In my view, *demon-
stratio*, χαρακτηρισμός, and εἰκονισμός should be added to this list.
Demonstratio, firstly, is used by Ps.-Cicero as a synonym of ἐνάργεια,
ὑποτύπωσις, *evidentia*, *repraesentatio*, and *sub oculos subiectio*.[92] The term
χαρακτηρισμός, secondly, refers to the description of a person's phys-
ical features in, among others, Ps.-Cicero, Trypho, and Cocondrius.[93]
It is, in other words, a synonym of what *progymnasmata* authors call
ἔκφρασις προσώπων. Trypho and Cocondrius, for example, illustrate
its meaning with a verse from Homer that Theon (*Prog*. 118.11–14 Sp.
II) and Aphthonius (*Prog*. 46.20 Sp. II) adduce to illustrate their def-

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[89]See Theon, *Prog.* 118.8–9 Sp. II; Ps.-Hermog. *Prog.* 16.12–14 Sp. II; Aphth. *Prog.*
46.16–17 Sp. II. See also Patillon, *Theon*, cited in n. 3 above, p. xl.

[90]E.C. Evans, "Roman Descriptions of Personal Appearance in History and
Biography," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 46 (1935): 43–84 (pp. 43–45).

[91]For ancient rhetoricians discussing ἔκφρασις, διατύπωσις, ὑποτύπωσις, ἐνάργεια,
and *evidentia*, see Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §810.
On διατύπωσις, see also Aquila Romanus 1.13.

[92]Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.68 (*Demonstratio est cum ita uerbis res exprimitur ut geri
negotium et res ante oculos esse uideatur*).

[93]Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 4.63 (*Effictio est cum exprimitur atque effingitur uerbis corporis
cuiuspiam forma, quoad satis sit ad intellegendum*; synonyms are χαρακτηρισμός and
εἰκονισμός); Trypho, *Trop.* 201 Sp. III (Χαρακτηρισμός ἐστι λόγος τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
ἰδιωμάτων ἀπαγγελτικός); Cocondrius, Περὶ τρόπων 241 Sp. III (Χαρακτηρισμός ἐστιν,
ὅταν ὁ τύπος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σώματος περιγράφηται); Anon. *Schemata dianoeas* 72
Halm (*Videtis illum subcrispo capillo, nigrum*; synonyms are *discriptio* and *descriptio*);
Anon. *Carmen de figuris vel schematibus* 69 Halm; Isidorus *Libellus de arte rhetorica* 521
Halm (*Characterismus est descriptio figurae alicuius expressa, ut: 'Omnia Mercurio similis
vocemque coloremque et crines flavos et membra decora iuventa'*). See also Cizek, *Imitatio
et tractatio*, cited in n. 2 above, §1.1.1.3, on *notatio* and *effictio*.

initions of ἔκφρασις προσώπων.[94] Εἰκονισμός,[95] thirdly, is defined by Polybius Sardianus as the description of physical features (σώματος ἰδίως ἀπόδοσις).[96] The appearance of the same Homeric example as in Trypho's and Cocondrius' discussions of χαρακτηρισμός indicates that Sardianus identifies εἰκονισμός with what Trypho and Cocondrius call χαρακτηρισμός, and with what the *progymnasmata* authors call ἔκφρασις.[97] A second example adduced by Sardianus is taken from the Iliadic passage describing Thersites (*Il*. 2.217) and equally corresponds to an example illustrating ἔκφρασις in the *progymnasmata*.[98]

F. Setting   Time and space are two of the basic components of narrative in ancient rhetorical theory. According to Theon, the time (χρόνος) and place (τόπος) in which an action is set are two of the six constitutive elements (στοιχεῖα) of narrative (διήγημα), which is the *progymnasma* preparing for the narrative section of a judicial speech.[99] Correspondingly, Quintilian provides guidelines for the credible representation of places and time (*loca, tempora*) in the narration of a speech.[100]

The importance of setting for characterization is only touched upon occasionally in ancient rhetorical theory. The importance of temporal setting is not even dealt with at all. A good example of

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[94]Hom. *Od*. 19.246 (γυρὸς ἐν ὤμοισιν, μελανόχροος οὐλοκάρηνος).

[95]Although already mentioned by Evans, "Roman Descriptions of Personal Appearance," cited in n. 90 above, pp. 43–45, εἰκονισμός does not appear in Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above.

[96]Plb. Rh. Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ 108.10 Sp. III. Although ὑποτύπωσις is often used as a synonym of ἔκφρασις and διατύπωσις, Polybius Sardianus distinguishes between εἰκονισμός and ὑποτύπωσις (which he defines as the description not of a real person, but of a personification; 108.17–20 Sp. III).

[97]Plb. Rh. Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ 108.12 Sp. III. Sen. *Ep*. 95.65–69 also regards χαρακτηρισμός and εἰκονισμός as synonyms. See also E. C. Evans, "Physiognomics in the Ancient World," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 59.5 (1969): 5–101 (p. 28).

[98]Plb . Rh. Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ 108.14 Sp. III (φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ᾽ἕτερον πόδα). The same example appears in Theon, *Prog*. 118.11–14 Sp. II (next to an example taken from *Od*. 19.246) and Ps.-Hermog. *Prog*. 16.16 Sp. II. Nicol. *Prog*. 68.16 Felten, for his part, only *mentions* Thersites as the possible object of an *ecphrasis* of πρόσωπα.

[99]Theon, *Prog*. 78.17–21 Sp. II. The other four components are person (τὸ πρόσωπον), action (τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ προσώπου), manner (ὁ τρόπος τῆς πράξεως) and cause (ἡ αἰτία).

[100]Quint. *Inst*. 4.2.52. See Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, cited in n. 21 above, §328.

occasional attention being paid to spatial setting as an indication of character is found in Demetrius' *De elocutione*. When discussing the "elegant style" (γλαφυρὸς λόγος), Demetrius singles out speech as the most important technique characterizing the Cyclops in Homer. He suggests that the Cyclops' terrible (δεινόν) character is better illustrated by his words than by action (the eating of Odysseus' companions) or setting (the door and the stick depicted in the Homeric passage).[101] While highlighting the importance of speech, Demetrius does acknowledge the fact that setting, like action, is at least a potentially significant indication of character, even if the characterizing potential of speech may be higher.

2.5 Overview

The various techniques of characterization, then, addressed by ancient rhetorical theory can be summarized as follows:

1. Identification
2. Direct characterization (χαρακτηρισμός)
3. Indirect characterization
    3.1 Metaphorical characterization
        —comparison (σύγκρισις, παραβολή)
        —paradigm (παράδειγμα)
    3.2 Metonymical characterization
        —Emotions (πάθη)
        —Membership of a specific group (macro-social,
            micro-social, educative-intellectual)
        —Action (πράξεις, χρεία πρακτική)
        —Speech (ἠθοποιία, γνώμη, χρεία λογική)
        —Appearance (guidelines from physiognomy: invariable
            and variable physical characteristics; ἔκφρασις)
        —Setting

3. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have paid attention to both the content and form of character construction in ancient rhetorical theory. I have argued that the conceptualization of character and characterization

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[101]Demetr. *Eloc.* §130 (οὐ γὰρ οὕτως αὐτὸν ἐνέφηνεν δεινὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν δύο δειπνῇ ἑταίρους, οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ θυρεοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ῥοπάλου, ὡς ἐκ τούτου τοῦ ἀστεϊσμοῦ).

in ancient rhetorical treatises can serve as a hermeneutical tool for the analysis of characterization in narrative literature. My analysis of *loci* involved in character construction (in invention and epideictic theory; see tables 1 and 2) and of different rhetorical techniques of characterization provides the modern scholar with a paradigm for the analysis of characterization in (ancient) narrative literature that distinguishes between direct, metaphorical, and metonymical forms of characterization.[102]

4. Ancient Sources

4.1 Primary Rhetorical Texts

The Greek texts have been studied in the editions by C. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 9 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1832–1836); L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1853–1856) (Sp.); and in more recent editions when possible. The Latin texts have been studied in C. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1863) and in more recent editions when possible.

Alexander Rhetor, Περὶ σχημάτων (*Fig.*), ed. Sp. III 9–40.
Anaximenes, Τέχνη ῥητορική (Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, *Rh. Al.*), ed. P. Chiron (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002).
Anon., *Carmen de figuris vel schematibus*, ed. Halm 63–70.
Anon., *Excerpta rhetorica*, ed. Halm 585–89.
Anon., Περὶ ποιητικῶν τρόπων, ed. Sp. III 207–14.
Anon., Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, ed. Sp. I 321–24.
Anon., Περὶ τρόπων (*Trop.*), ed. Sp. III 227–29.
Anon., Περὶ τῶν σχημάτων τοῦ λόγου, ed. Sp. III 173–88.
Anon., *Schemata Dianoeas*, ed. Halm 71–77.
Anon., Σχόλια εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου προγυμνάσματα, ed. Walz II 565–684.
Anon., *Tractatus de adtributis personae et negotio sive commentarius in Ciceronis de inventione*, ed. Halm 305–10.
Anon. Seguerianus, Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου, ed. M. R. Dilts and G. A. Kennedy (Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1997).
Aphthonius Sophistes, Προγυμνάσματα (*Prog.*), ed. Sp. II 21–56.
Apsines, Τέχνη ῥητορική (*Rh.*), ed. Sp. I 329–414.

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Aquila Romanus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis liber*, ed. Halm 22–37.

Aristotle, Τέχνη ῥητορική (*Rh.*), ed. R. Kassel (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1976).

Aurelius Augustinus, *De rhetorica liber*, ed. Halm 135–51.

Beda Venerabilis, *Liber de schematibus et tropis*, ed. Halm 607–18.

Mathaeus Camariotes, Ἐπιτομὴ τῆς ῥητορική, ed. Walz VI 599–644.

Ps.-Cassiodorius, *Liber de rhetorica*, ed. Halm 495–504.

Chirius Fortunatianus, *Artis rhetoricae libri III*, ed. Halm 79–134.

Georgius Choeroboscus, Περὶ τρόπων ποιητικῶν (*Rh.*), ed. Sp. III 244–56.

Cicero, *Orator (Or.)*, ed. H. M. Hubbell (London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).

Cicero, *De inventione* (*Inv.*), ed. G. Achard (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1994).

Ps.-Cicero, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (*Rh. ad Her.*), ed. G. Achard (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989).

Cocondrius, Περὶ τρόπων, ed. Sp. III 230–43.

Emporius, *De ethopoeia. Praeceptum loci communis. Praeceptum demonstrativae materiae. Praeceptum deliberativae*, ed. Halm 561–74.

Gregorius Corinthius, Περὶ τρόπων (*Trop.*), ed. Sp. III 215–26.

Ps.-Hermogenes, Προγυμνάσματα (*Prog.*), ed. Sp. II 1–18.

Isidorus, *Etymologarum sive Originum* (*Orig.*), ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911).

Isidorus, *Libellus de arte rhetorica*, ed. Halm 505–22.

Menander Rhetor, Περὶ ἐπιδειχτιχῶν, ed. Sp. III 329–446.

Minucianus, Περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων, ed. Sp. I 415–24.

Nicolaus, Προγυμνάσματα (*Prog.*), ed. J. Felten (Leipzig: Teubner, 1913).

Phoebammon, Σχόλια περὶ σχημάτων ῥητορικήν (*Fig.*), ed. Sp. III 41–56.

Georgius Plethon, Συντομὴ περί τινων μερῶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ed. Walz VI 544–98.

Polybius Sardianus (Plb. Rh.), Περὶ σχηματισμοῦ, ed. Sp. III 105–09.

Priscianus, *Praeexercitamina*, ed. M. Passalacqua (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1987).

Iulius Rufinianus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis liber*, ed. Halm 38–47.

Ps.-Iulius Rufinianus, *De schematis dianoeas*, ed. Halm 59–62.

Rutilius Lupus, *Schemata lexeos*, ed. Halm 3–21.

Tiberius Rhetor, Περὶ τῶν παρὰ Δημοσθένει σχημάτων (*Fig.*), ed. Sp. III 57–82.

Aelius Theon, Προγυμνάσματα (*Prog.*), ed. M. Patillon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997).

Trypho, Περὶ τρόπων (*Trop.*), ed. Sp. III 189–206.

Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* (*Inst.*), ed. J. Henderson, 5 vols. (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Iulius Victor, *Ars rhetorica*, ed. Halm 371–448.

Sulpitius Victor, *Institutiones oratoriae*, ed. Halm 311–52.

Fabius Laurentius Victorinus, *Explanationum in rhetoricam M. Tullii Ciceronis libri duo*, ed. Halm 153–304.

Zonaeus, Περὶ σχημάτων τῶν κατὰ λόγον (*Fig.*), ed. Sp. III 161–70.

4.2 Non-Rhetorical Primary Texts

R. G. Bury (ed.), *Plato. Laws*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1961[4] (1926)).

R. Förster (ed.), *Scriptores physiognomonici graeci et latini*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1893).

H. N. Fowler and W. R. M. Lamb (eds.), *Plato. Statesman. Philebus. Ion* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1962[5] (1925)).

R. M. Gummere (ed.), *Seneca. Epistles 93–124*, vol. III (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1953[3] (1925)).

S. Halliwell (ed. and transl.), *Aristotle. Poetics* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1995).

W. S. Hett (ed.), *Aristotle. Minor Works* (London and Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1955).

W. R. M. Lamb (ed.), *Plato. Lysis. Symposium. Gorgias* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1961[6] (1925)).

J. C. Rolfe (ed.), *Aulus Gellius. Attic Nights*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1998[6] (1927)).

S. Usher (ed.), *Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Critical Essays, I* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1974).

5. APPENDICES

5.1 Table 1:

Loci relevant to the description of persons in ancient invention theory[103]

Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 3.10	Cic. *Inv.* 24–25	Arist. *Rh.* 1.5.4	Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28	Chirius Fortunatianus 2.1 (= 102–03 Halm)	Mathaeus Camariotes 602 Walz VI
NAME	nomen		nomen	nomen	ἐὰν ὡρισμένον ᾖ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ κύριον
1. EXT.		ἔξω			
1.1 genus, civitas	1.1 fortuna, genus, patria, natio, affinitas, cognatio	1.1 εὐγένεια	1.1 fortuna, genus, natio, patria	1.1 fortuna genus vel cognatio (nobilis / ignobilis, patria, natio	ἐὰν ἔχωσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς τὰ πρός τι (see also 1.6)
—	—	—	—	—	—
1.3 educatio			1.3 educatio et disciplina	1.3 institutio vel educatio (quem ad modum institutus et eruditus)	
			1.4 studia	1.4 ars vel studium (medicus / orator)	
			1.5 aetas	1.5 aetas (senex / puer)	

[103]For clarity's sake, I have chosen not to include all relevant authors in table 1. Other treatises offering similar overviews are Sulpitius Victor, *Institutiones oratoriae* 326 Halm (*genus—natura—aetas—disciplina—fortuna—studia—nomen—ante facta—habitus*), Anon. Περὶ ῥητορικῆς 322 Sp. I (εἰς εὕρεσιν τὸ διαβλέπειν τὰ συνυπάρχοντα τοῖς προσώποις καὶ πράγμασι, τύχας, τέχνας, ἡλικίας, γένη, πλούτους, τρόπους, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα) and Anon. *Excerpta Rhetorica* 589 Halm (*personarum accidentia spectanda sunt, quae sunt decem: genus—sexus—aetas—instructio—ars—officium—mores—affectus—nomen—dignitas*).

1.6 amicitia	1.6 amici	1.6 πολυφιλία χρηστοφιλία	1.6 amici	1.6 victus (quibus amicis)	1.6 ἐὰν ἔχωσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς τὰ πρός τι
1.7 gloria					
1.8 potestates, dignitas	1.8 potestas, dignitas, honos		1.8 condicio	1.8 dignitas (vir fortis, magistratus) condicio (servus / addictus) condicio alia, quae ad liberos spectat (nupta / vidua)	1.8 τὰ ἁπλᾶ προσηγορικά (στρατηγός / ῥήτωρ)
1.9 divitiae	1.9 pecunia	1.9 πλοῦτος			
		1.10 εὐτεκνία πολυτεκνία			
		1.11 εὐγηρία			
—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—
et quae huiusmodi sunt	cetera similia				
2. INT.		2. ἐν αὐτῷ			
2.1.1 valetudo 2.1.2 vires 2.1.3 velocitas	2.1 ab natura data corpori 2.1.1 valetudo 2.1.2 vires 2.1.3 velocitas	2.1 τὰ ἐν σώματι	2.1 qualitas corporis, habitus corporis 2.1.4 sexus	2.1 corpus (validus / longus) 2.1.1 morbo debilitas 2.1.4 sexus	

5.1 Table 1: *continued*

Ps.-Cic. *Rh. ad Her.* 3.10	Cic. *Inv.* 24–25	Arist. *Rh.* 1.5.4	Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.23–28	Chirius Fortunatianus 2.1 (= 102–03 Halm)	Mathaeus Camariotes 602 Walz VI
2.2.1 prudentia 2.2.2 modestia 2.2.3 fortitudo 2.2.4 iustitia	2.2 ab natura data animo 2.2.1 prudentia 2.2.2 temperantia 2.2.3 fortitudo 2.2.4 iustitia	2.2 τὰ περὶ ψυχήν	2.2 animi natura 2.2.1 avaritia 2.2.2 misericordia 2.2.3 iracundia 2.2.4 crudelitas 2.2.5 severitas	2.2 mores (frugi luxuriosus)	2.2 τὰ διαβεβλημένα (ἄσωτοι, μοιχοί, κόλακες), τὰ ἠθικά (γεωργοί, λιχνοί)
3. ACTION.	3.1 victus 3.2 habitus 3.3 studium 3.4 consilia 3.5 facta 3.6 casus		acta	3.1 consuetudo domestica	3. τὰ κατὰ συμπλοκὴν προσώπου καὶ πράγματος
4. SPEECH.	orationes		dicta	oratio (gravis / seditiosa)	
5. EMOTION.	affectiones		temporarium animi motus	adfectus (laetitia / ira), adfectio (equorum, armorum, canum)	
6. APPEARANCE.				6.1 vultus (laetus / tristis) 6.2 habitus (nitidus / sordidus / obscurus) 6.3 incessus (citus / tardus)	

5.2 Table 2:

Loci relevant to the description of persons in theoretical guidelines on the reconstruction of invective or praise (ψόγος / ἐγκώμιον)

Theon 109–12 Sp. II	Ps.-Hermog. 11–2 Sp. II	Aphth. 35–6 Sp. II	Nicol. 50–51 Felten	Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.10–17	Men.Rh. 368–77 Sp. III	Anon. *Scholia on Aphth.* 609 Walz II
NAME				nomen		
1. EXT.						
1. τῶν ἔξωθεν	1. τὰ ἐκτός[104]					
1.1 εὐγένεια πόλις ἔθνος	1.1 <u>τύχη</u> πόλις ἔθνος	1.1 γένος πατρίς	1.1 γένος πόλις	fortuna patria	πατρίς, πόλις, ἔθνος	1.1 γένος πατρίς
πολίτεια γονεῖς ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι	γένος, συγγενεῖς	ἔθνος	ἔθνος	parentes maiores	γένος συγγενεῖς	ἔθνος
		πατέρες πρόγονοι	πρόγονοι			πατέρες πρόγονοι
	1.2 ἃ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν συνέπεσεν ἄξια θαύματος		1.2 ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως		1.2 τὸ περὶ τῆς γενέσεως	
	1.3 τροφή ἀγωγή	1.3 ἀνατροφή	1.3 ἐκ τῆς ἀνατροφῆς	1.3 disciplina	1.3 ἀνατροφή μελέτη πολέμων καὶ ὅπλων	1.3 ἀνατροφή
		1.3.1 τέχνη				1.3.1 τέχνη
		1.3.2 νόμοι				1.3.2 νόμοι
1.4 παιδεία						
			1.5 ἡλικία			

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[104]Only the underlined *loci* are explicitly called "external" by ps.-Hermogenes.

5.2 Table 2: *continued*

Theon 109–12 Sp. II	Ps.-Her- mog. 11–2 Sp. II	Aphth. 35–6 Sp. II	Nicol. 50–51 Felten	Quint. *Inst*. 3.7.10–17	Men.Rh. 368–77 Sp. III	Anon. *Scholia on Aphth.* 609 Walz II
1.6 φιλία	1.6 <u>φίλοι</u>					
1.7 δόξα						
1.8 ἀρχή						
1.9 πλοῦ- τος	1.9 <u>κτή- ματα οἰκέται</u>			divitiae potentia gratia		
1.10 εὐτε- κνία						
—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1.12 εὐθα- νασία						
1.13 αἱ μετὰ θάνατον						
	καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα					
2. INT.	2. φύσις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος					
2.1 τοῦ σώματος (/ τὰ <ἀγαθά> περὶ σῶμα)	2.1 περὶ σώματος			2.1 corpus	2.1 ἡ φύσις	
2.1.1 ὑγεία						
2.1.2 ἰσχύς	2.1.2 ῥώμη					
	2.1.3 τάχος					
2.1.4 κάλλος	2.1.4 κάλλος					
2.1.5 εὐαισθη- σία						

	2.2 ψυχικὰ ἀγαθά (/ τὰ ἀγαθά ... περὶ ψυχῆς τε καὶ ἦθος)	2.2 περὶ ψυχῆς			2.2 animus	2.2 ἡ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς	
	2.2.1 φρόνησις	2.2.1 φρόνησις					
	2.2.2 σωφροσύνη 2.2.3 ἀνδρεία 2.2.4 δικαιοσύνη 2.2.5 ὁσιότης 2.2.6 ἐλευθηριότης 2.2.7 μεγαλοφροσύνη				2.2.2 temperantia 2.2.3 virtus 2.2.4 iustitia		
3. ACTION	3. πράξεις	3. πράξεις ἐπιτηδεύματα	3. πράξεις 3.1 εἰς ψυχήν 3.2 εἰς σῶμα 3.3 εἰς τύχην ἐπιτηδεύματα	3. τὰ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένα	3. res gestae	3. ἐπιτηδεύματα	3. ἐπιτήδευμα
4. SPEECH					dicta		
5. EMOTION	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. APPEARANCE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—