

## **The ‘Islamisation’ of civic integration programmes**

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Civic integration programmes for migrants and newcomers were first enunciated in 1998 in the Netherlands. As a result the Dutch civic integration policy quickly became a “model for Europe” (Michalowski, 2004). It was a response to the obvious failure of Europe’s policy to create a multicultural society (Joppke, 2007a) where cultural differences are not dominant. However during the last decennium these civic integration programmes were significantly influenced by a wave of ‘islamisation’ and used to confine this influence of Islam on western societies and traditional cultures. In the public opinion resistance grew against the Muslims who were held responsible for the undermining of basic values in western society, such as individualism and secularism, or classic liberties and civic rights (Quayle & Sonn, 2009; Entzinger, 2006, p. 127).

In this article I analyse the reasons for the abovementioned shift and the backgrounds of the reduction that converts nearly all migrants – the old as well as the new - into Muslims. At the same time I want to emphasize the importance of adult education workers to bear this social policy context in mind.

In a first phase I take a look at what precedes the civic integration programmes of the second millennium. What’s the connection between multiculturalism and civic integration? Subsequently I examine the ways in which the strong rules of the civic integration programmes have been made acceptable within the liberal democracies of Western Europe.

To conclude I want to put forward some reasons why the civic integration programmes of today focus on the group of Muslim migrants.

**From multiculturalism to civic integration**

The arrival of Islam in Western Europe is connected with the history of the guest workers at the end of the 1960s. Especially Moroccan and Turkish migrants were then drawn to the Netherlands and Belgium. A massive group of Turks also went to Germany where today their number has grown to approximately 1,8 million. France in turn received a lot of Maghreb from its former colonies and nowadays the Moroccan population consists of almost half a million people just as much as the Algerians (Eurostat, 2009). During this first period only the men came for a limited period of time to fill up the temporary labour shortage. As their stay was supposed to be temporary, no attention was given to any form of integration. They lived isolated, and as a consequence their living patterns remained inconspicuous. It was only after it became clear that these migrants were going to stay for much longer, that many workers brought in their families. This was facilitated by the various Laws on Family Reunion within the respective immigration countries. It was then, at the end of the 1970s, but even more in the 1990s, that the existence of a Muslim community became obvious. By then most Muslims had settled in the impoverished quarters of the 19<sup>th</sup> century city districts. The Arabic language, the typical dress codes, tea-bars and the first mosques were characteristic ingredients of those immigrant neighbourhoods.

Very soon we assumed that this group of people also identified themselves as 'Arabs', and later as 'Muslims'. But 'the' Muslim community as such does not exist (Scheffer, 2007, p. 174). On the contrary, it is an ethnically and religiously diverse group. There is more than just the Turks next to the Moroccans or the Algerians. Moreover each of these communities is in itself highly divided as not everybody originates from the exact same region in the home country. In one and the same city there is not 'one' Turkish, Moroccan or Algerian community, but we can observe various concentrations of people originating from the same region or village in respectively Turkey, Morocco or Algeria. All these groups have very little in common.

## **Separateness**

At the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s a multicultural approach was mainstream in the migration policy of West European countries. The migrants were labelled as ethnic minorities. They were acknowledged as one community separate from the majority. They were approached as minority groups that were in need of selective support in respect to employment, housing, education and health care.

Social and cultural workers promoted equal treatment and encouraged 'emancipation'. In a number of areas they provided institutional arrangements that ran parallel to existing mainstream arrangements in the various countries (Entzinger, 2006, p. 124). On the one hand, the special characteristics of the migrant cultures served to justify such forms of *separateness* that aimed to emphasize the cultural identity of the new communities. They offered opportunities, accommodation and adjusted features to develop their way of life connected to their homeland (Toonen, 2000; Joppke, 2004, pp. 243-245). On the other hand social and cultural workers stimulated equal treatment of the migrant population in society. They promoted an ideological approach which minimized the differences, or, in so far as we were confronted with differences, they urged the need for mutual respect and to try to use elements of other cultures in our daily life to make it symbolically richer. Multiculturalism means that there are no different cultures existing next to each other, but that there is only one culture made up like a patchwork with elements from various 'old' cultures.

This presupposed integration path for migrants was similar to the one that had worked in the past with regards to the religious and ideological 'pillars' in some West-European countries like Belgium and the Netherlands. Therefore, this approach applied to the new migrant population, in order to create separate facilities based upon community identities, was not new (Wintle, 2000; Entzinger, 2006, p. 123; Scheffer, pp. 170-173). After the Second World War the welfare state developed basically in such way that different religious and ideological communities within the society had their own institutional arrangements, such as schools, hospitals, social support agencies, newspapers, trade unions, political parties and even broadcasting organisations for radio and television (Toonen, 2000; Entzinger, 2006, p. 123). Each community or 'pillar', i.e. Catholic, Protestant or liberal, socialist and humanist set up its own institutions. The

role of the state was to establish political structures that guaranteed equality between all pillars. The state unified the different communities through the elites of the various pillars who decided about structural possibilities. The central attitude for all pillars was to respect the others in their authenticity. This means that every community could independently elaborate the emancipation of its own members. The government divided the available means in proponent ways, but remained itself neutral. Within their institutions the communities made their own decisions. They worked for their own party, their own community that was designed within the framework of a separate religious or ideological identity. The society in general was made up of a collection of different pillars, whereas in daily life the communities existed separated from each other.

Since the 1970s the impact of 'pillarization' has decreased spectacularly. Secularisation, individualisation, the rising level of schooling, the restricted role of the nation state and the growing impact of globalization, all have undermined the stability of the former so called closed and established communities. Nonetheless the particular circumstances of migrants gave them specific place within the new society, thereby following the pre-existing model of 'pillarization'. The migrants were subject to living conditions that were incomparable with those of the native majority as their education level was low, they suffered from bad housing conditions as well as a lack of adjusted leadership. All those elements were of the same order as those that had laid the foundations for the emancipation movements after the Second World War. The framework of 'pillarization' had to allow this separate group of migrants the possibility to integrate in the new society in accordance with the norms of their own religious and cultural identity. This accepted form of autonomy gave the native majority the advantage of not having to take great pains over integration. Most people assumed that integration would happen automatically.

Moreover, in the beginning of the 1980s, many believed that the difficulty of dealing with major differences in reference towards migrants, could be simply overcome by conceiving the 'otherness' as a welcome surplus value. It was exactly at that time that the foundation for the development of a multicultural society was established (Joppke, 2007b, p. 4). And it was the model of 'pillarization' that offered the best opportunities

to this purpose. It depended on the freedom of the communities to build bridges of their own account. The migrant communities were able to set up an institutional development that would be parallel to the already existing social institutions. Mutual respect justified a considerable degree of separation. At the same time, social workers developed programmes within the social-cultural sphere in order to create connections between the native and the allochthonous population. The multicoloured dimension of multiculturalism was supposed to be an added value to society as a whole.

However at the start of the 1990s guest workers as well as foreigners in general were increasingly seen as the scapegoats by extreme right-winged movements all over Europe. Initially the model of the multicultural society could still counterbalance the emerging racial contrasts, the climate of intolerance whereby the guest workers themselves were held responsible for the problems related to unemployment, ghettoization and unsafety in the large cities. Yet the model could not hold. At the end of the 1990s it became apparent that the multiculturalism had failed. It was the historian Paul Scheffer in the Netherlands who published in 2000 his controversial article *The Multicultural Tragedy*. The large group of North African migrants lived a life at the edge of the western culture and it didn't look in any way that they were even prepared to change their situation on their own initiative. The emancipation of the migrant community has not managed to obtain the results hoped-for. During the last thirty years the Moroccans, Turks and Algerians were not able to develop into a community of equal value. On the contrary, despite all efforts they remained socially and economically subordinated. Moreover, it appears they could not withstand the pressure of the labour market and the globalized economy. Their lower schooling rates, which particularly involves the second generation, was jointly responsible for the high unemployment figure since the 1980s. Although they were offered various means to develop an specific existence within the West-European society, it didn't produce the expected results. The support to equal treatment had rather confirmed their inequality, despite the ideology of multiculturalism. The model of 'pillarization' had failed.

For a long time the migrants issue was believed to dissolve gradually and automatically, but the failure of multiculturalism opened the eyes of many policy makers: suddenly it

was established that in reality Western Europe had sheltered migrants in an atmosphere of hostility, for as long as three decades. All of a sudden migration policy was elevated to a high priority, and immigrant integration has shifted from a marginal issue to one of the central challenges of the European Union. Drastic interventions were thought to be needed.

Until then an important aspect of the multicultural integration model implied that the entire responsibility of this matter was in the hands the receiving nation state. To some extent the guest workers were considered a kind of victims as a consequence of western economic interests. They had to leave their familiar environment behind in order to start over completely in a foreign continent. It is this consciousness of guilt that was embedded in the multicultural model and that deprived migrants of all responsibility. The equilibrium became one side balanced.

This balance is particularly important for finding of failure in multiculturalism. A sudden shift of emphasis appeared: the guest workers were no longer the welcome 'guests', but they had moved from foreign countries to the west because they had voluntarily chosen to do so. In these circumstances they could no longer automatically lay claim on equal citizenship, unless they really deserved it, unless they could prove their ability to full membership. As a result of this total turnaround opposed to the former period, the full responsibility was now entirely given to these very migrants. The 'hospitable' society only needed to give the migrants access, as far as those complied with the legal (values and) norms.

### **Institutional integration**

The above turnabout was established by the setting up of the Civic Integration Programmes in the Netherlands in 1998 (Joppke, 2007a, p. 249). This Dutch model was soon used as a clear-cut example for the rest of Europe. First 'old' and 'new' migrants became forced to attend language classes, as speaking the native language of the host society was required as this was indispensable in order to find a job in the regular labour market. The multicultural approach had brought about the isolation of minorities instead of integration in the mainstream society. In the Netherlands civic integration was the

answer to the obvious failure of multicultural policy in a country that had been, for a long time, at the top of European tolerance norm and of antidiscrimination. The Dutch migrant policy shifted from a focus of distance and respect to promoting the immigrants' social participation *by means of institutional integration*. The obligatory character of civil integration was justified to inhemce the socioeconomic integration of immigrants and their offspring. Immigration policy started focussing on the availability of jobs. This was a striking turnabout in the integration policy. Migrants were no longer offered chances in a non engaging manner, instead they became 'obliged'.

### **Assimilation**

The neoliberal dominance of the free market determines the principles of the social politics (Joppke, 2007b, pp. 14-16). The old migrants, but even more empathically the newcomers, do not meet the demands and wishes of the labour market. North-African migrants of the first generation, and even those of the second generation, remain unskilled and display high rates of unemployment. From a neoliberal point of view potential workers are worth just as much as they can achieve and that is why their abilities are limited in the labour market. At the same time the pressure of the populist extreme right-wing politicians has even increased. They oppose the presence of migrants and set the nation against the Muslims who they hold responsible for undermining of the western culture. The immigration politics have intensified the control on illegal immigration. Migrant neighbourhoods have become increasingly a target towards security and criminality. The migration within the framework of family reunification has particularly turned into a topic of discussion. Moreover, the large majority of newcomers are still asylum seekers, especially those who apply for a reunification of the family. Turkish, Moroccan and Algerian people massively search for a wedding partner in their country of origin.

Migrants are now entirely responsible for their own integration; they have to make the effort themselves as well as supplying proof that they can be equal citizens. To follow language courses was the first step. The pressure on migrants has become so intensive that nowadays these very migrants have to register for the integration courses and are

even held responsible for the payment of those courses. In particular, the acquisition of the host country's values and norms and a thorough insight into the daily living habits, became fixed parts of the civic integration programme (Carrera, 2006, p. 11; Joppke, 2007b, p. 2). Immigrants who fail the tests are withheld permanent settlement permission. To renew their residence permits they need to pass the integration tests. This shaped the integration process in the direction of migration control and constituted a new vision on migration that brought *assimilation* into focus. The ability to integrate is the new standard or in other words, a lack of integration is taken as an acceptable ground to refuse admission as well as residence (Carrera, 2006, p. 6). Joppke considers the extreme turnaround in the Netherlands as reflected by the fact that '*applicants for family reunification are required now to take an integration test at a Dutch embassy abroad in order to be granted a temporary residence permit*' (Joppke, 2007a, p. 250; Entzinger, 2006, p. 130)<sup>1</sup>.

Also in Germany there is the obligation to integrate by means of language courses. In France many Algerians have the advantage of already speaking the French language. Therefore the civic integration policy there is less dominated by the acquisition of the native language. On the other hand the "Republican citizenship" which in France is considered as part of an 'assimilation model', has always had an explicit binding character (Mieri & Sala Pala, 2009, p. 385). Only after 2003 the *Loi Sarkozy* introduced drastic restrictions of the access to legal permanent residence and the then-year residence card. Even those persons who want to enter and live in France via the process of family reunification are now subject to these very restrictions (Joppke, 2007a, p. 252).

### **Civic integration and liberal democracy**

Christian Joppke analyses the duality in the migration policy that has been developed since the 2000's as a reaction to the failure of the multicultural model.

It has been generally accepted that the shift of the responsibility towards the migrants, the switch of camps, can be attributed to the rising of the extreme right-wings in

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<sup>1</sup> Following the example of the Netherlands, also the Belgian embassies and consulates will put information packages in all the major migration countries at the disposal of all those who wish to prepare themselves for migration to and integration into Flanders. (De Standaard 12/02/2010).



Europe. Joppke on the other hand points to two opposite ways to integration that belong to the mantra of the austere neo-liberalism that frames economic globalisation (Carrera, 2006, p. 12; Joppke, 2007a, p. 248). Civic integration on the one hand enforces migrants to fit into the new society, and antidiscrimination on the other hand forces specific rules upon the host society according to which migrants ought to be offered social security. The antidiscrimination laws that were executed in the 2000's in several European countries, form the compensating contribution of the host societies. They counterbalance the civic integration programmes that are the responsibility of the migrants.

According to Joppke the emergent gestalt of contemporary European immigrant integration in the 2000's is a peculiar coexistence of civic integration and antidiscrimination policies (Joppke, 2007a, p. 247). They are complementary as not only the migrants but also the receiving societies must change in the process of immigration.

This dual task of civic integration and antidiscrimination reflects a confluence of two opposite sites of liberalism where on the one hand equality for all means that newcomers can freely integrate into the host society (antidiscrimination) and on the other hand a liberalism of power and discipline, with individual citizens not being dependent on the welfare state (Joppke, 2007b, p. 16). Therefore, in the globalized economy, migrants have to take on the responsibility to release their self-producing and self-regulating capacities as an alternative to the redistribution and public welfare. Within this strict neoliberal free market economy, social exclusion does not spring from moral grounds, but is the result of a body of thought linked to the market economy that in a competitive sense wishes to make use of its full potential. That is why ethnic minorities, and Islamic dissenters in particular, must firmly assimilate as to keep the costs resulting from the protection of our welfare state to an absolute minimum (Joppke, 2007a, p. 269).

Yet the civic integration programmes in the various countries of the European Union did not generate assimilation. Discrimination still exists, not in the least towards second generation migrants that are put at a disadvantage through their ethnicity or race. The

European Union ordered the different member states to make every direct or indirect form of discrimination in terms of employment, education, social protection and health care, from 2003 punishable by law.

It is obvious that the antidiscrimination laws, how complementary to the civic integration programmes they might seem, are in reality antipodal to civic integration. The civic integration policy, as it existed at the beginning of the 2000's, thwarted the model of group bonding, of the community, by putting the power and the ability of the individual to the foreground. Civic integration policy was the opposite of "pillarization-times". Antidiscrimination laws reaffirm the existence of groups of people that are distinguished from others solely on ethnic grounds.

The positive action that promotes diversity in the employed workforce is a logical consequence of the EU Race Directive (Joppke, 2007a, p. 259). This intervention wants to offer equal opportunities to all sections of the population by – under specific circumstances -allowing priorities to people from allochtonous groups. Obviously the controversial diversity policy approaches people primarily as members of a group. Its very relationship is the most important characteristic of the individual members. Various countries of the EU having already taken antidiscrimination measures long before the EU Race Directive was introduced, points to the fact that the ambivalence was never far-off. In the last decade the focus of migrant policies shifted from the group to the individual, from the ethnic community to the individual employee, from authentic culture to integrated citizenship, from humanistic communitarism to liberal individualism (Entzinger, 2006, p. 125). This shift, these strict rules linked with civic integration need to be compensated by antidiscrimination laws.

Hospitality is inherent to the European tradition; particularly the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have since long built up a reputation of tolerance and hospitality towards strangers. For example, in the Netherlands, but also in Belgium, simultaneously a Commission of Equal Treatment and a Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism were founded in 1994 and 1993, to promote equal opportunities and to fight any type of exclusion, restriction or preferential treatment based on legally stipulated criteria. The Republican identity model of France on the other hand excludes ethnic and racial discrimination. But the very reason of its being harder to recognise real

discrimination in an atmosphere of denial. In the same sense very little ethnic immigrants are employed in the public sector which by definition is neutral and equal for all. In France the battle against discrimination is curbed by the traditional taboo on ethnic and racial categorization (Joppke, 2007a, p. 263).

### **Integration policy towards islamisation**

#### **The pillarization model has failed**

The measures that are taken today to promote the integration of migrants do not allow any possibility for the recognition of the cultural identity of Turks, Moroccans and Algerians. Initially they were stimulated to integrate into the new society starting from their own cultural background; now they are given the responsibility to make themselves familiar with the French, the Belgian, the Dutch, the German or the British culture. Not even the contemporary diversity policy doesn't offer them the opportunity towards self-affirming in a cultural sense (Husband, 2007).

The migrants have to initiate loyalty to respect and observe the values and norms of the new society. In the past they developed various institutional structures as result of their own cultural background, made possible by the model of pillarization. This has presently lost its entire meaning. Eventually their institutional participation structures could no longer overcome the major problems of ghettoization, unemployment and low schooling rates (Entzinger, 2006, p. 135).

The "pillarization concept" had failed mainly because the basic conditions were by no means comparable to those of the traditional pillars from the postwar period. First of all the position from which the migrant communities had to build up their institutions could not be compared to those of the opposing majority. Castles and Miller (2003, 44) have already stated that multiculturalism only stands a chance in a society where the diverse cultural communities have an equal loyalty towards that society. Yet this is not the case for the migrants who are still attached to their country of origin. Moreover the pillars are only productive when they can compete on more or less equal power base. It's clear that the migrant community was not able to cope with the native majority.

But it is equally important that the differences between the divergent communities are not too wide. Scheffer quotes that a shared history, a shared language and even some cultural equalities are necessary to bridge the actual existing differences (Scheffer, 2007, pp. 173-176; Entzinger, 2006, p. 137). Institutional separateness allowing respect for cultural diversity, actually veiled ethnocentrism and indifference. On the contrary even, institutional separateness excluded migrant groups from what really matters in society.

### **A return to segregation**

In the last thirty years the integration policy in Western Europe vis-à-vis the Maghreb countries has adopted conflicting twist. Particularly the turnaround from multiculturalism to civic integration where the responsibility has shifted from one party to the other, can be spectacular. The focus on Islam now is the last step (Quayle & Sonn, 2009, p. 11).

A number of international factors, such as the economic globalization and its effect on employment, the steady advancement of European integration process, the repeated actions of Muslim fundamentalism and the steady expansion of the immigration wave, all have nourished feelings of fear, threat and insecurity across Western Europe (Scheffer, 2007, p. 174; Wouters, 1998).

The construction of Islam as a public issue in Western European countries (Mieri & Sala Pala, 2009) makes us believe in the clash of the civilisations myth.

It is the wave of Islamic terroristic acts since the events of 11 September 2001, i.e. the bomb explosions in three Madrid train stations in 2004, the attacks on 7 July 2005 in London and the Western answer of 'The war on terror' that has brought about an inaccessible gap between the West and the Arabic world as well as between migrants with an Islamic background and their host country. From that time on we have been constructing an image of the Muslims as the "Others" (Quayle & Sonn, 2009; Žižek, 2002) who are responsible for the 'clash of civilizations'. Slavoy Žižek however rejects this notion of the clash of civilisation. According to him we can rather note clashes *within* each civilisation, related to global capitalism. The Muslim 'fundamentalists' not

only target the excessive freedom of Western consumption and immoral social life; they likewise attack the corrupt 'traditionalist' regimes in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and elsewhere. All those regimes are clearly related to the 'playground' of global economic interests. *'Instead of endless analyses of how Islamic 'fundamentalism' is intolerant towards our liberal societies, and other 'clash-of-civilisation' topics, we would refocus our attention on the economic background to the conflict — the clash of economic interests'* (Žižek, 2002, 42)<sup>2</sup>.

Yet the myth is very much alive. In the 2000's the Islam has been accused as the power undermining western values and norms. The danger was not simply external. This became apparent: for instance, in November 2004 when in the Netherlands Mohammed Bouyeri, a Muslim born in Amsterdam, killed the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh. The dangers of Islam were already present within the Western societies. In addition a stereotype image of all newcomers being Muslims arose from the fact that many North African migrants indeed do search a wedding partner in their country of origin. Migrants from outside Europe are invariably thought to be Turks, Algerians or Moroccans.

The *actual* impact of Islam on contemporary Western societies is nonetheless very limited. Nowadays Muslims make up the ideal scapegoats. In a neoliberal world that ought to eliminate each form of 'otherness', a phantasmatic fixation on one single image of the enemy is very alluring. It stimulates the social cohesion. It invokes the imaginary values and sentiments that provide the vital humanistic dynamic which renders a meaningful civil society viable. (Husband, 2007).

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<sup>2</sup> The very claim of protecting democracy and human rights must legitimate international interventions. Though in such a deep conflict there is only one party who can claim to be humanitarian, the other one is the personification of the devil. This latter party are the terrorists. In 2002, after 9/11, the Americans started their 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan. At that time, a seven-year-old American girl whose father was a pilot fighting in Afghanistan, wrote him a letter. She said *"...although she loved her father very much, she was ready to let him die, to sacrifice him for her country"*. When President Bush quoted these lines, they were perceived as a 'normal' outburst of American patriotism, according to Žižek. But as a kind of experiment, he reverses this simple story and asks us to imagine an Arabic Muslim girl pathetically reciting into the camera the same words about her father fighting for the Taliban. It is clear what our reaction would be: morbid Muslim fundamentalism that doesn't stop even at the cruel manipulation and exploitation of children. (See: Žižek, S., *Welcome to the desert of the real*, Verso, London/New-York 2002, 43-44)

Civic integration policy has turned into an assimilation policy. The migrants need to acquire the living habits and the values as well as the norms of the European societies. This is not spontaneously attributed to Islam. Civic integration means ‘the denial of the strong Islamic influence’<sup>3</sup>. This repressive integration policy has nonetheless a contradictural effect. The actual crumbled migrant community is being forced to recognise or identify with a closed community united by common religion. Against their will they are only being stimulated to create their own world, their own consultative structures, their own media and educational institutions. The unspoken temptation is hidden towards the religious leaders, such as the imams, to hold their rear rank under control (Scheffer, 2007, p. 170). The North African migrants are thus again an ‘entity’ that, in spite of the enforced assimilation, keeps on being separated from the native majority<sup>4</sup>. In other words, the separation of the 1970s and 1980s never disappeared.

### **The success of the integration process**

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<sup>3</sup> In October 2009 the Flemish minister for Integration announced that imams, and the highest authority of Islamic religion in Belgium, the Muslim Executive, would be involved in his civic integration policy. According to the minister ‘*we cannot deny the prominent role of Islam in the integration processes, although the debate on civic integration should not be narrowed down to a simple debate about Islam*’. (De Standaard 27 October 2009)

<sup>4</sup> Only recently a referendum was voted in Switzerland on the permissibility of minarets, a problem by which the Islam was called out to be a national problem, where in reality this was not the case at all. On 29 November 2009, 57.5 percent of the Suisse population voted for a constitutional ban on the construction of new minarets. Of those who were in favour of the ban 60 percent belonged to the Roman Catholic part of the population. They all feared ‘fundamentalism’ and the ‘advancing islamization’ of Switzerland.

Switzerland has four mosques with a minaret. Of the near eight million inhabitants, 350.000 are Muslim, mostly Europeans from Bosnia and Kosovo. Only 13 percent of them participates on a regular basis in the Friday Prayers. So the actual impact of Islam on the Suisse society is extremely small.

The short sightedness of the Suisse has caused upheaval all over Europe. It is nonetheless very plausible that this badly thought-out decision would not have been different from what the result would have been if a referendum was held in other parts of Europe. As if in Europe the tolerance towards Islam has reached its limits. That is why so many people take offence against the construction of mosques with minarets, as these entail the visible signs of ‘otherness’. The minaret disturbs the well-known townscape of churches and cathedrals. As in the debates on the headscarf in France and elsewhere in Europe, the minarets are believed to be symbols or signs of an ‘ever advancing’ Islam.

The outlined history of the migration from the Maghreb countries in the last thirty years reflects a succession of failures, which shows that we are now at the point where we started from. Moreover, particularly the migrants from the second generation who are opposed to an adequate integration. More pronounced than their parents they defend an identity that initiates from their culture and religion. They enhance their Islamic roots in order to elevate themselves from the majority. They display Islamic religion as an unbridgeable gap from Western culture. They are tied up in this tradition where the wearing of a headscarf is considered as very important.

What all integration models of the last decennia have in common is that they built bridges between the migrants and the native majority. Although the integration has not been considered successful, this does not mean that the second and third generation of migrants from the Maghreb countries are further removed from the European societies in the same way as their parents or grandparents. All these youngsters grew up in a Western culture which differs completely from the daily experiences in Morocco, Algeria and Turkey. Now they are as familiar with the Western society as are the native majorities.

In their variety they are decreasingly homogenous and increasingly resemble the native majority. Paradoxically the pressure on the migrants as a group is rising.

Their marginal social position (unemployed, low education rate, poor housing,...), which has remained unchanged through years and generations, is the very spot from where they commence the resistance to enforced integration. In a certain way that sort of resistance might be *constitutive* for the emancipation process that all subordinated cultures need to go through vis-à-vis the dominant west. When they offer resistance, they do so because of the familiarity with the all-embracing power position of the well-known Western culture. They fight a battle, if necessary by being deliberately obstructive, in order to obtain eventually a fulfilling place in that world in which they grew up. They succeed in denying the evidence that they are Belgian, Dutch, etc. Those young 'migrants', educated in Europe, identify with an Arab-Islamic culture in protesting against western culture, is the exact opposite of what is expected in terms of integration, but it is probably an important step within the process of emancipation.

They use the roots of their ancestors, the Islam, to manifest successfully themselves. As a consequence our attention should shift from the so-called 'integration problem' to the 'civil or social problem of an integrated society'.

### **Conclusion**

Through the migration history of the past thirty years, the integration process has shifted from separateness into institutional integration, eventually to achieve assimilation (Entzinger, 2006, p. 16). Though all forms of integration in the past can be reduced to the same one-way traffic: migrants are strangers who need to adapt. Should this fail, they are left with the sole alternative of exclusion. Against this obstruction migrants have no story. They are a powerless party that have to simply accept what has been offered to them in generosity (Lorenz, 2006). Immigrants and natives are not equally confronted.

It is important to be aware that the scientific definition of the migration policy problem is also subject to a moralistic language use as well. Scholars too are guided by the dominant ideological discourse of policy makers (Husband, 2007; Mieri & Sala Pala, 2009). Walter Lorenz and many others have stressed the huge influence of contemporary neo-liberalism, in the same way as in social work practice (Lorenz, 2005). *'The core principles of neo-liberalism are 'less state, more market, more individual responsibility'*. This neoliberal thought is manifested in the civic integration programmes for old and new migrants. These repressive integration programmes fight an ideological battle with Islam.

Social workers and civic integration practitioners need to be aware of the fact that the key to integration lies in the direction of context, sensitivity, application, and fulsome communication – the basic principles of good practices with all clients (Graham, Bradshaw & Trew, 2010, pp. 548-549). The focus on Islam as a binding factor for large groups of migrants is misleading. The fact that they are still conceived as such, brings individuals who feel disowned and misunderstood in the efforts produced to become a participant in the new society.



Social workers should not focus on the Muslim community as such. Enough problems are existing with particular and individual migrants who have nothing to do with the Islam. For Tariq Ramadan there are three central pillars: citizenship, identity and *sense of belonging*. Citizenship is what people share who live in the same area. The identity is partly influenced by the cultural (and religious) background. But social work can contribute a lot to the so-called *sense of belonging* and create the awareness to citizens that they belong and can fully participate in society (Ramadan, 2010, 68-70).

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