



Renegotiating communal autonomy

Communal land rights and liberal land reform on the Bolivian altiplano.
Carangas, 1860-1930.

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*Nuestro destino siempre partir
Y en el camino vivir...
Mi socio – Savia Andina*

En route in Carangas

Departing... and living along the way... Even though I spent the last years of this research quite sedentary, this is essentially what my research was all about. Over those years, a lot of people have kept me going, encouraging my explorations along the winding roads that lead to Carangas' fascinating history. In the first place I am grateful to the people closest involved in this research. Thanks to my supervisor, Eric Vanhaute, for his unabating enthusiasm and constructive support, and for letting me go "my way"; for being a coach rather than a controller. Cristobal Kay and Philip McMichael were always available for constructive feedback and insightful advice.

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Preface

*En este Carnaval mi tarq'a le dice a la naturaleza,
gracias por darme el alimento,
el vestido y la felicidad de vivir*
Tarqueada song¹

San Miguel, 13 March 2012. Situated on a hill top, the tiny village of San Miguel finds itself quite isolated on the Bolivian high plateau. But today, the *plaza de piedras* (the stone sculptured square), which represents the villagers' proud tribute to the llama and the Tiwanaku culture, is the scenery of ceremony and cheerful celebration. Under the burning sun of the Altiplano, coca leafs are shared, libations are poured to the *pachamama*² – as well as to the “*tata* from above” –; a sheep has been sacrificed and prepared for lunch; a band of drums and *tarq'as* is enthusiastically playing festive music.

Little by little all of the few remaining inhabitants of the hamlet come to join the gathering on the village square. Meanwhile, the indigenous leaders of the community – identifiable by their green poncho – are partaking in a community meeting. The assembly had been summoned by the maximum indigenous leader of the region, *apu mallku* Máximo Reinaga. Don Máximo's visit to San Miguel is part of the yearly *muyta*, a series of community consultations to prepare the general assembly of all communities of the “Native Nation of *Jach'a Karangas*” which he represents. During that assembly, indigenous authorities are to decide on the plan of action for the region designed by the Council of *Jach'a Karangas*. The preparative *muyta* serves to detect and ventilate critical

¹ “*In this Carnival my tarq'a tells Nature, / thanks for giving me food, / clothing and the joy of living*” (Own translation, Rocha Calani 2008, 12). The *tarq'a* is a wooden aerophones of Aymara origin and is typically played during or to announce the harvest season, around Carnival, in the celebration of the Anata and Jallu Pacha (Civallero 2012). The *tarqueada* music counts as the most typical music style in the Carangas region.

² For the sake of simplicity often translated as Mother Earth, *pachamama* is perceived as a living reality that entails both time and space. All living things –including humans– form part of, and enter into daily interaction with, that reality, which requires regular sacrifices in function of the endeavors people plan to undertake or obtain individually or in group (De Munter 2003, 90-2).

regional issues, local concerns and viable development projects. Main challenges are identified in the local livelihoods' vulnerability to frost, floods and drought, the inter- and intra-community conflicts over land rights and plot demarcation, lacking road infrastructure, and the rural exodus of the region's youngest generation.



Figure 1 Opening ceremony to receive the *muyta*. The community of San Miguel, March 2013. (own picture)

The proposals presented by the Council are situated in the field of agricultural production, land-titling, infrastructure and urbanization, but equally well concern the revaluation of native knowledge, the transmission of ancestral customs and the rewriting of their own “national history.” While crops are flooded and villages and their schools are abandoned for the city, a new project of regional reinforcement is surfacing. Underlying to all discussions incited by the *muyta* and the Council’s proposals is the definition and defence of a kind of region-wide program for “national integration,” with the Native Nation of *Jach’a Karangas* as the nation to be integrated. This national project can be reduced to an unilateral inscription in nor a straightforward opposition to Bolivia as nation-state, but draws from a broader discourse in which Bolivia has been redefined as a Plurinational State.

The conception, viability and marketing of this “Nation” are framed by the guarantees provided for the participating communities regarding their self-determination over land and territory and the prospects for llama-based production modes. The basis of this framework is in the central state’s recognition of a legal margin for custom-bound land tenure arrangements and indigenous communal territorial

control and in the llama's durability as the pillar of regional articulation with supra-local exchange circuits. Both achievements are the outcome of historical trajectories of dynamic state-community and state-market interactions that form the central storylines of this dissertation.

The setting of those storylines is the territory of what once was known as the province of Carangas, a vast plain situated on the semi-desert Altiplano (the Central-Andean high plateau), at the Bolivian side of the country's border with actual Northern Chile. The region is a little smaller than Belgium – 26719 km² to be exactly- but situated about 10 times higher, on average 3700 meters above sea level with mountain peaks reaching over 6000 meters. Sparsely inhabited, this is almost exclusively the terrain of indigenous communities whose livelihood conditions and social and territorial organization seems underwent relatively few changes over the centuries.³ While the region's first inhabitants, the Urus, are today reduced to one small remote community, almost the entire population is since pre-colonial times –and today still self-identifies as- Aymara, currently Bolivia's second largest ethnic group. The Carangas people (or "Karankas") constituted an Aymara federation within the Inca Empire and were, in the wake of Spanish conquest and colonization, reorganized into a number of village settlements that were incorporated into the Spanish colonial administration as the *Provincia de los Carangas*. In the Bolivian Republic, provincial unity was maintained until 1951, when it gradually splintered in the face of an administrative fragmentation process. At the turn of the 21st century, however, these communities are reintegrating as the Native Nation of Jach'a Karangas, while the Uru people, for their part, aspire to reconstitute their own "Original Nation".

While the dry climate and sterile soils offer little perspective for agricultural production, peat lands convert the area in a perfect habitat for Andean camelid species. Until today, llamas and alpacas have remained Carangas' most important and most abundant productive asset. The limited importance of cultivation lands explains to an important degree why Carangas has remained historically outside the scope of the expanding hacienda (large land estate) complex. Together, the vital role of pastoralism and the apathy on part of the landlord class towards what was perceived as a backward

³ If we take the example of San Miguel, little seems to have changed. More than thirty years ago, San Miguel was introduced as one of the small villages dotted across the altiplano, marked by "dirt-floored, thatch-roofed, adobe houses, without electricity, running water, or the most rudimentary sanitary facilities and inhabited by poor, illiterate, Aymara-speaking peasant farmers" (Klein and Kelley 1981, 44-5; see also Mc Ewen 1975). San Miguel was still more isolated, with the sole truck route inaccessible during the wet season and with no telephones or newspapers. The approximately 1200 inhabitants, mainly subsistence farmers, grew potatoes, quinoa and beans on small individually owned fields ploughed by oxen and kept chicken, guinea pigs, llama and sheep herds. The village had never been part of hacienda, but had seen the development of a minority of richer peasants that rented their lands for cash or a half share in harvest.

province has contributed to the safeguarding of the collective character of land tenure until today, thereby favouring a remarkably high level of regional autonomy. This impression of continuity has traditionally been explained in terms of isolation and stasis, or been reduced to ecological factors. However, quite on the contrary, this impression conceals a dynamic trajectory in which the people of Karangas appear as people *with* history, whose land tenure structures were maintained due to an attentive positioning in face of the opportunities, insecurities and instabilities emerging in each historical context.

In short, the story of Karangas is the story of how a margin for autonomous communal control is being contested, defended, asserted and reinvented. Not in spite, but precisely because of the safeguarding of that margin, this story tells a lot about participation and interaction rather than isolation or desolation. Beyond the apparent continuity, Karangas' historical trajectory reveals a fascinating terrain of rural resistance and renewal throughout colonial, republican and current 'plurinational' transitions.

Glossary of common terms

altiplano	Andean high plateau
apoderado	community attorney
ayllu	community, local kinship unit
cacique	indigenous leader, head of the marka
(título de) composición	(title granted during) colonial inspection and validation of land titles
comunario	member of the community
contribución, contribuyente	indigenous tax, indigenous taxpayer belonging to the community
corregidor	colonial officer at the head of the corregimiento (provincial district), republican officer at the head of the canton (municipal district)
(Ley de) exvinculación	Alienation (Act)
indio, indígena	Indian, indigenous
(Consejo de Ayllus y Markas de) Jach'a Karangas (COAJK)	(Council of Ayllus and Markas of) Jach'a Karangas (COAJK)
jilaqata	indigenous leader, head of the ayllu
marka	community of a number of ayllus
mestizo	person of mixed race (Spanish and indigenous)
padrón	taxpayer list

Prefectura, Prefecto	departmental administration, head of the department
Revisita (de tierras), revisitador	land inspection, land inspector
sayaña	cultivation plots over which a household pertaining to the community is granted usufruct rights
Sub-Prefectura, Sub-Prefecto	provincial administration, head of the province
tierras de origen	community lands
tributo, tributario	Indigenous head tax, indigenous taxpayer
vecino, vecindario	non-indigenous village resident, community of those residents

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Introduction. The end of the peasant?

Humanity depends on us, and we refuse to disappear
Via Campesina declaration 2008

Omitted links. Tracing the local trajectories of global rural change.

This research is constructed upon a historical analysis of life, its challenges and its achievements in rural communities. Not because rural community life is (becoming) a life of the past, but exactly because of its potential for a sustainable future. At the start of the 21st century, an old question reappears from never been gone: is there a future for peasants? Urbanization, migration, industrialization and related vectors of “modernity” seem to obtrude themselves as the incontestable answer to that question. As processes of globalization intensify, rural areas and local agro-pastoral production regimes experience increasing pressure on their base of existence through the alteration of their access to essential means of production, land and labour. This has nurtured the biggest shift in human organization since the Neolithic Revolution roughly some 10000 years ago. Statistically, 2007 announced the era when for the first time in history, more people live in an urban context than on the countryside. And those people need to be fed by products cultivated by, indeed, the ever smaller part of the world population that continues to live directly from the products of that countryside.

The impact of this historical turning point cannot be underestimated and has nurtured the broader research project of which this dissertation forms a part. Subjecting rural-urban transformations simultaneously to a closer scan and a global

analysis, the projects seeks to interrogate “*The end of peasant societies in an historical and comparative perspective.*”¹ Its premise is that the place and role of peasant societies -often overlapping with the position of indigenous groups- in an ever globalizing world cannot be understood in a singular way. Their response is essentially one of differentiation, generating a multiplicity of work and income strategies that give shape to divergent ways of peasant transformation and land and labour organization. Meanwhile, faith in haughty Green Revolutions is wavering and attention is increasingly drawn both in local initiatives as internationally to the importance of small-scale food production² and principles such as food sovereignty³ in times of agrarian and food crises. Other signs of a durable and re-emerging peasantry are in the resilience and global reach of organizations such as La Via Campesina⁴ as in the continuity and reinvention of communal social structures, despite continuing challenges stemming from political-economic conjunctures and their social and ecologic consequences.

Both at the local and the global level, a “gap” is surfacing between the erosion of rural regions, resources and life, and the long-term persistence of local (and *alter*-globalizing) peasant communities. This gap raises the question of how to explain the simultaneous disappearance of “old” and the emergence of “new” peasant categories and rural spaces. The clue to this simultaneous evaporation and renovation must be searched for in the spread of capitalism and the nation-state and in the way these world-historical developments have fuelled the incorporation of peasantries (Droessler

¹ This is original title of the project coordinated by Eric Vanhaute with funding from the Flanders Research Foundation (FWO). It ran as a subproject (2008-2012) of *Polarizations and upward trends in the world-system (1500-2000)*, under direction of Immanuel Wallerstein and is being published under the all-embracing title “Peasants” (Vanhaute, Cottyn and Wang 2014a). Rather than covering the history of the world peasant population, this project offers a global and comparative analysis of the diversity and parallels of distinct “trajectories of transition” (Vanhaute, Cottyn and Wang 2014b). Departing from a broad global scope (Vanhaute 2008; 2012), four case regions were specified on basis of Eric Vanhaute’s expertise regarding the North Sea Region (O’Grada, Paping and Vanhaute 2007; Vanhaute and Van Molle 2006, 217-48; Blonde , Galand and Vanhaute 2001), John Wang’s research on the Yangtze delta, Sven van Melkebeke’s research on the coffee plantation economy in Central Africa and my own research in the Central Andean Highlands.

² The United Nations General Assembly declared 2014 as the International Year of Family Farming, made possible by numerous local organizations empowered by the World Rural Forum. <http://www.familyfarmingcampaign.net/>

³ Although the concept of “food sovereignty” still remains too vague in order to be translated into solid policy lines, at least it raises clear questions with the idea of food security. The need for a coherent agenda for food sovereignty is advocated by the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC). <http://www.foodsovereignty.org/>

⁴ By attempting to unite diverse struggles of specific rural groups across all continents, the international peasants’ movement La Via Campesina hints at what a “globalization from below” might look like. <http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php>. See also Desmarais 2002; Borras , Edelman and Kay 2008.

2013). The observed gap is a matter of ignorance of -and hence the incapacity to bridge- the lacuna between theoretical projections and daily strategies of peasant survival and revival in a globalizing world (Gidwani 2008, xv), or more broadly, the discrepancy between the pretended logic and the factual operation of capitalism (Mitchell 2002).

To the extent that indications that “*global capitalism is far from being a homogeneous and continuous totality*” (Quijano 2000b, 553-4) are being omitted, global tendencies are being explained regardless of their local (diverging) footprints; the other way around, localized narratives are being told in an artificial vacuum. Exemplary is how the idea that continued globalization announces the end of peasant and indigenous worlds has gained the status of an admitted truth. It is the same dichotomist thinking that leads to the separation of peasant and indigenous societies from an “outside world” which supposedly constitutes an opposite -in terms of non-rural, non-agrarian, non-indigenous or non-modern- world. To the contrary, that world constitutes the broader social contexts within which these communities move.

These “omitted links”, which prevent us from understanding the paradoxical simultaneity of contradiction and complementarity, autonomy and interaction, constitute fertile ground for ground-breaking interdisciplinary research. This dissertation dares to explicitly address those links, yet it does not pretend to “stitch” the detected gap. The questions that guide this research do not seek to iron out the discordances noted between what is thought of as strange and even mismatching worlds (the continuity of customary land right systems) with unambiguous answers. Rather, they aim at a better understanding of the paradoxical nature of capitalist expansion and to give meaning to the asymmetric interrelation of subaltern groups and incorporative power matrixes. More concretely, this research challenges the common misinterpretation that the persistence of small-scale autonomous (often indigenous) social structures is the outcome of continued isolation.

The analytical tools to embark upon this challenge derive from interdisciplinary explorations into the question of rural change which, far from a niche topic, constitutes a rich research vein, explored in a multiplicity of disciplines. From a global perspective, this question is essential to understand how the rise of a capitalist world-system is rooted in the transformation of rural spaces. This basically relates to the question of global (but also local) inequality, with processes of de-agrarianization in the core zones being “subsidized” by the creation and incorporation of peasantries in the periphery. Here is a clear crossover between world and rural (historical and political “development”) studies. By directly addressing rural history’s difficult marriage between the wealth of micro histories and the solidity of macro analysis, this crossover offers fertile ground for a more comprehensive inquiry into the multiple ways in which

small-scale production modes and social systems are being reproduced within wider scales of interaction.⁵ This is exactly the kind of inquiries that shape the third field of my interest, that of Andean ethno-history. Andeanist scholarship has produced a rich image of the region as a spatial marker of incorporation, with “*Andean peoples as fundamentally intertwined with a larger set of economic, political, social, and cultural processes, not as a set of inert peasant communities or cultures to which world-historical forces suddenly arrived*” (Larson 2004, 5-6). In order to contribute to this rich critical-historical research field at the junction of global studies, agrarian or peasant studies and Andean studies, my explorations into Andean peasant subsistence and indigenous “survival” have been subjected to the following set of research questions.

Research questions, research theme and the delineation of a case study.

Central point of discussion is the presumed incompatibility between peripheral localities and peoples and the development of a capitalist world-economy. The observation of how global and regional processes of incorporation and peripheralization shape and are shaped by the constant (re-)production and differentiation of old and new rural spaces and peasant societies urges us to question that presumption. **The premise of the questions formulated throughout this research is that ‘trajectories of rural change’ do not present a story of mere resistance nor passive assimilation, but one of dynamic encounter in which local communities creatively negotiate the terms of their participation and autonomy in the face of the state-building and market integration processes.** Through these negotiations, community- and household-based access to land, labour, goods and knowledge is contested and asserted, nurturing the transformation of rural spaces and livelihoods. In so doing, this encounter “supplies” capitalism’s expansive and incorporative drive with essential yet unstable fuelling links that trigger different paths of re- and de-peasantization.

⁵ An example of efforts to effectively integrate micro-studies into macro-analyses is the consortium for Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area (CORN). This international collaboration platform has produced an expanding Corn Publication Series and a four volume standard work (<http://www.corn.ugent.be/>). The methodological introduction to Part II of this dissertation takes a closer look at their research approach.

The “ultimate” question.

In a nutshell, this premise points to the “ultimate” question of this research: **how does the course of world-systemic expansion give shape to rural “trajectories of transition” and, the other way around, how have these patterns of rural change impacted upon processes of globalization? Did and do these processes of peasant transformation create a more homogeneous world, or do they feed new trends of ?** The hypothesis is that processes of globalization have nurtured a diversity of transformation trajectories and that these diverse local processes essentially “nourish” of the global expansive-contractive course of capitalist developments. **My specific enquiry into this general question and hypothesis particularly addresses the erosion and renewal of autonomous spaces for communal organization: how have these spaces been asserted or enclosed throughout these cycles of contraction and expansion? What are the assets and potentials but also the vulnerabilities of these spaces?**

Before delineating the thematic angle from which this general question will be approached, the first question that must be addressed is how the “fuzziness” of local-global interaction can be disentangled without neutralizing the fuzz. This is indeed a very abstract question that reveals the need for analytical tools that allow for the tackling of local-global entanglements. From my explorations into a diverse literature that deals with the challenge of grasping the interactions of peripheral actors and places with world-historical developments, the notion of “frontier” surfaced and presented itself as the main building block of the analytical framework of this dissertation. From a “frontier perspective”, which will be further expounded in the first part of this dissertation, local-global interactions must be disentangled in the context of a dynamic process of incorporation (the movement of a frontier) which has a spatial repercussion (the formation of a frontier zone). The demarcated research theme specifies the process of frontier “formation”.

Thematic angle: Land rights.

My research addresses the question of rural change and the diverging pathways of peasant societies from the angle of land rights. The justification for that focus is double. “From a world-historical standpoint,” Araghi and Karides state, “*the history of capitalism begins with the transformation of land rights*” (Araghi and Karides 2012, 1). This transformation corresponds to a process of commodification; the assimilation of local patterns to homogeneous “global designs” (Mignolo 2000). Over the last five hundred years, historical capitalism has developed through the commodification of just about everything, especially land rights that allow land to freely circulate within national and

international frameworks. The alteration, elimination and/or imposition of specific land right systems has particularly strong repercussions for the sustainability of peasant and indigenous worlds. Under the pressure for commodification, their semi-autonomous spaces of social organization are squeezed and perturbed in function of the restructuring of social power relations. However, from a local standpoint, it becomes clear that the outcome of these shifting power relations and the implied redistribution of land (rights) differed wildly over time and space.

The question on rural change will thus be concretized along a specific process of commodification: the imposition of standardized land rights. The relevance of that focus stems from the observation that the outcome of what appears to be a global process of land rights commodification is little uniform despite the explicit uniformity of such global designs. Historical research has pointed to be different patterns of change in local land right systems.⁶ In this dissertation the focus will be placed on a particular pattern or trajectory, that of the Andean indigenous communities. While being the object of centuries-long processes of colonial exploitation and post-colonial extractivism, the region demonstrates a remarkable (yet over the centuries increasingly more defied) “margin” for communal land rights. **Why could such rights be preserved in certain regions? How were these rights safeguarded throughout cycles of land rights commodification? What implications did this have on the longer term?**

These questions can only be assessed in regard of concrete aspects that condition customary land right systems in a particular setting for rural livelihood construction. Incorporation pressures interact with local environmental and demographical conditions and provoke changes in the local organization of production and social control as well as in supra-local frameworks for exchange and governance. This dynamic process materializes in a “social production system”. The definition of that framework stems from questions on the particular function that is attributed to land, the conditions under which land is subjected to communal control, what pressures market forces exert on the use of accessibility of land and how land access is regulated by a state apparatus. These questions come to the fore in the second part of this dissertation in which the social production system of the Central Andes is reconstructed. This reconstruction does not simply serve to depict the specific setting of the research in all its glory details, but tests the “conditions for frontier zone formation,” that is, the factors shaping processes of commodification, particularly in relation to communal land control, in the Central-Andean and Bolivian context.

This testing departs from the following **hypotheses**: In regions where pastoralism dominates, communal control over land is stronger. Also, in regions characterized by

⁶ See for instance Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010; Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009; Cole and Ostrom 2012.

grazing lands, land privatization incentives on part of commercial-industrial and landowning actors tend to be lower. At the other hand, subsistence in semi-arid highlands essentially relies on inter-ecological exchange which, in combination with mobile character of pastoralist societies, nurtures pastoralists' simultaneous participation in "overlapping" circuits of barter and commercial exchange, which functions as a "brake" on pastoralists' "full-blown" integration in market spheres. Moreover, where community structures are stronger, the imposition of legal and fiscal state regulations is conditioned by asymmetrical though mutual state-community bonds.⁷ Where the central state's institutional power is less present, there is increasing "elbowroom" for (fiscal, political, juridical, landowning) intermediaries, who –however powerful- inevitably need to negotiate their local position with the community.

This bundle of assumptions on the organization of rural life on the altiplano points to a number of variables which I have classified into a framework centred on the issue of access, both to production means as to decision-making. These factors are: **ecology-infrastructure** (pastoralist production and inter-ecological complementarity), the factor of **demography-ethnicity** (demographic pressures and ethnic boundaries), the impact of **market forces** ((dis)connection and (alternative) forms of mobility and exchange), the **state** (institutional power, territorial control), and **communal agency** (mobilization and intermediation). The interaction between these factors configures the context in which frontiers (processes of commodification) operate. This research focuses on one specific frontier that has challenged the way in which rural life is organized in Carangas: the commodification of land, yet in a tight connection to the commodification of trade networks, and the 'commodification' of national spaces and identities.

Delineating time and space: Situating Bolivia's first land reform.

Peasant and indigenous people's shared experience of peripheralization in the context of the long-term, interconnected and accelerating development of capitalism and (neo)colonialism demonstrates that land rights commodification is not a universal nor rectilinear process but can be phased and zoned. This dissertation zooms in on a particular phase in the historical process of land rights commodification in the Andean rural zone during which the communal autonomy and land rights security of Bolivia's highland communities were extremely challenged. The process that structures the

⁷ This refers to Platt's famous theorem of the state-community reciprocity pact (1982, 20 and 40; see also 4.1). This "pact" was installed by the colonial *tributo* system in which commoners ensured their participation and status in a commons regime by paying an indigenous head tax. Though confining them to an unequal power position, this bond was perceived as a conditional guarantee for their access to a varied land base.

analysed episode is known in Bolivia as *exvinculación*, referring to the Alienation Act of 1874, but in fact emblemizing an enclosure process that targeted indigenous community land. The central story of this research, however, tells more about the enclosure's standstill rather than its advance. This story is situated on the desert-like plains of the Central Andean Highlands; in the province of Carangas, where indigenous communities maintained a "free" (non-usurped) status and to date retain a relatively high degree of autonomous control over collective lands.

The timing of Bolivia's land reform is not accidental. Initiated by the proclamation of a short-lived decree in 1866 and a more mature land reform act in 1874, this process culminated between 1880 and 1930 to eventually enter a new phase through Bolivia's National Revolution of 1952 and the subsequent Agrarian Reform of 1953. The process is framed within what Platt (1987) terms the "*Andean experience of Bolivian liberalism*."⁸ Taking off in the 1870s and weakening with the First World War, this period faded away in the context of post-1929 de-globalization and the political alterations generated by Bolivia's experience in the Chaco War,⁹ to definitively be replaced by a revolutionary (but equally "liberal") period after Bolivia's National Revolution of 1952. The case study realized in the framework of this research starts already in 1860, because of the important antecedents to the 1874 Act, and closes around 1930, leaving a lacuna for the period up to 1952.¹⁰

This episode must be positioned within structural processes, waves and cycles that can be traced back to the 16th century, when a world-economy took shape.¹¹ Bolivian

⁸ Rather than the name of a particular political party, "liberal" refers to a pro free-trade economic ideology, linked to positivist ideology, which also applied to Bolivia's Conservative Party.

⁹ The Chaco war (1932-1935) against Paraguay was provoked but dramatically lost by Bolivia, leaving a deep impact on politics and society and decisively triggering the push for indigenous emancipation.

¹⁰ The decision to close that period in 1930 is debatable and corresponds in the first place to a pragmatic decision in view of the time-consuming archive work and in the second place to the observation of impacting alterations in Bolivian society from 1929 on with the economic crisis of the Great Depression, the political repercussions of the Chaco war and the 1938 formal rehabilitation of "the community". The 1930-1952 period is far from irrelevant regarding rural changes in Bolivia, but a closer assessment of Carangas' post-Chaco and pre-revolutionary changes is left open for future research. Regarding this period, the work of Gotkowitz (2007) and Smale (2010), amongst others, is very valuable for revealing the rural dynamics at play, yet pays very limited attention to "free" communities.

¹¹ This periodization is ordered into three decisive moments, in line with decisive phases of capitalist expansion, starting in the long 16th century with regional incorporations, centred along the mining frontier and triggering a process of (re-)peasantization in function of these centres of capitalist extraction, most famously Potosí. The next transition is situated in the long 19th century, marked by imperialist incorporations implying (re-)peasantization not only in European colonies but also in the post-colonial Andes. Subsequently, the neoliberal incorporations of the late 20th century engendered a (re-)peasantization which is however increasingly more concealed by processes of urbanization.

liberalism emerged in the context of the “second wave” of globalization during this 500 years trajectory, roughly between 1860 and 1930.¹² This is the era in which the world-system witnessed the “*triumph of Liberalism*” (Wallerstein 2011), Latin America’s “second conquest” (Topik and Wells 1997), the Andes its Polanyian “great transformation” (Larson 1995, 29). For indigenous communities it meant “*a worldwide extermination (...) according to the desires aroused by the exportation of European capital, the expansion of railways and of the new communication technologies*” (Regalsky 2003, 7). Here lay the roots of Latin America’s image as the champion in inequality.¹³ At the national level, the now independent Andean republics integrated into the post-French Revolution interstate system, which implied the adoption of “new” principles, including a totally different notion of land property and citizenship. Thus, this “globalization wave” was not a mere matter of increased international trade relations and new economic policies, but went accompanied by a redefinition of the socio-political organization of the country, although still within the confines of an “*oligarchic modernity*” (Larraín 2001, chapters 3 and 4). The function of the agrarian population in the country’s “take-off” was to be defined, involving, among other reforms, a legal-fiscal restructuring of Bolivia’s land tenure system. However, the outcome of that land reform was marked by a differentiated reach, which brings me to the spatial scope of the case research.

In spatial terms, this dissertation takes the posed questions to the altitudes of the Andean highlands, restricting the case focus to the province of Carangas.¹⁴ The

¹² This period is commonly referred to as Latin America’s “first globalization wave” (Bértola 2006), as globalization theories often neglect the previous phase of expansion during the “long 16th century” (Braudel 1996).

¹³ Rather than an attribution acquired in colonial times, this structural feature broke through in the 19th century. Frankema’s comparative analysis (2009) adds to this statement in showing that it was particularly after 1870 that income inequality in the continent started to shift, both in the degree as in the forms of inequality. The discussion over the differentiated economic development of the Americas generally focuses on cultural, institutional and geographical factors, with an emphasis on the colonial origins of Latin-America’s peripherization (Gootenberg and Reygadas 2010). In contrast to the stress on colonially installed rent-seeking mechanisms by new institutional economic history scholars (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2012), recent reassessments (of wages, incomes and prices) emphasize the long 19th century as the breeding ground of Latin-America’s internal inequality and its global peripherality, particularly breaking through with post-1870 liberal reforms (Bértola and Williamson 2006; Prados de la Escosura 2007 and 2009; Coatsworth 2008; Williamson 2009; Prados de la Escosura et al 2010). Hence, while the great divergence debate (Pomeranz 2000) has been chiefly approached from a European-Chinese perspective, Latin-American’s development gap with North-America as with the broader world economy has been revealed as equally instructive to the question of economic inequality in the modern world (Fukuyama 2008).

¹⁴ In order to prevent confusion, I will adopt the name of the province that contained the western part of the actual Oruro Department from colonial times until 1951. Carangas will be treated as a multi-ethnic territory with a plural culture and history of which the Uru population forms an integral part. Instead of referring to Jach’a Carangas, which is claimed by the Aymara population, I will adopt the name of the republican province

specificity of the region where this research took shape lies in its almost exclusive rural and indigenous character and its relative geographical and administrative isolation in a borderland on the altiplano “despite” its high (pastoralist-based) mobility, both in and outside market circuits, and its strategic position on colonial trade routes that connected the Pacific to the mining frontier. In Carangas, an apparent discordance is evidenced in the persistence of collective land rights, transnational mobility and the recuperation of ancestral territorial and institutional autonomy in a broader region that has undergone commodifying pressures for centuries and in a period. However, it cannot be simply assumed that Carangas or other (hacienda-)“free” regions were “overlooked”; rather the different experience of areas that were less (visibly) connected to the most palpable outbursts of this transition should be critically assessed. The parallelism between increasing peripheralization of the Andes as a world region and the encroachment on Andean communities’ autonomy can indeed not be reduced to a one-size-fits-all model.

Here surfaces the previously discussed “gap”. From a distance, this “gap” is simply the outcome of a protracted process of marginalization, which indeed constitutes large part of the story. However, a closer look reveals how the creation of this gap entailed a much more complex process of renegotiation between local communities and their leaders with central state institutions and economic and political intermediaries. The premise to seize this region is that it offers a relevant case to demonstrate that incorporation is not a total transformation but entails multiple “frontiers”. I suggest that the communities of Carangas were not just “overlooked” but actively “extorted” concessions regarding their space for manoeuvre, which is a process of creating “counterspaces”. On basis of that premise, an inquiry of the Carangas experience does not simply seek to fill out the blanks of what *in se* is a very variegated picture, but can contribute to a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the historically, spatially and socially “unevenness” of rural transformations.

Renegotiating autonomous space for communal control: guiding research questions.

The critical question underlying the choice of the specific case study repeats the question formulated regarding land rights commodification in relation to communal land rights: how communal “spaces of manoeuvre” have been reduced, negated and recreated in the face of old and modern enclosures. The above presented premises and

in order to equally integrate the trajectory of the Uru-Chipaya and other -by now disappeared- Uru groups that have inhabited the region and equally shaped its history.

interrogations regarding this query can now be translated into the set of questions that guide the case study on Carangas.

I start from the observation that the measures of the 1874 land reform were never implemented nor did local elite incursions into community lands materialize into a hacienda complex. This leads to a first question: **why and how was the imposed land rights reorganization of customary land systems and the related expansion of the hacienda system kept at bay in Carangas?** In asking that question, it is assumed that these communities and their land systems were not left unthreatened; they were not simply “saved”. Rather, the case of Carangas illustrates that “*where estates [haciendas] were weak, communities organized, and markets limited, communities and cultivators could block liberal projects or channel them toward community goals*” (Tutino 1999, 655 on Jackson 1997). This blocking and channelling hints at a more subtle and more ambiguous process. Therefore, the question is not just why this operation was never implemented in Carangas, but also which tangible and more underground implications this had for further developments in the province.

Consequently, a second question must be assessed: **What were the long-term changes in social power relations**, in terms of control over resources and vulnerability, spatial reorganizations and connectedness, and the strength of community structure? How did the land reform impact upon social inequality and ethnic identity? In the first place, the region as a whole seems to further peripheralize; however what were the causes of this protracted marginalization? Interviews and testimonies by locals about the Carangas’ history usually spend little attention to the region’s “experience of Bolivian liberalism”, instead elaborating on the region’s rich colonial history, when it constituted a vital (transport) link in the Andean (silver) connection to the world economy. The apparent “erasure” of this conflictive period from communal historical consciousness suggests indeed that the region turned into itself. However, as Platt (1982, 170) explains, it is rather through oblivion (either the incapacity or refusal to recognize how these communities sustained commercial circuits) that this idea of remoteness (both in its physical sense as within the “national history”) is actively imposed upon regions such as Carangas. In other words, the impression of isolation and marginalization may not be simply assumed as the outcome of supposed indigenous “helplessness” and as the all-explaining factor but must be critically de-constructed.

In line with the proposed approach to frontier trajectories, the assessment of these two guiding questions departs from a ‘disentanglement’ of land commodifying pressures into four “phases”.¹⁵ The case study starts with the formal and de facto concretization of

¹⁵ In the case of rural incorporation, a frontier process can be depicted as an incorporation trajectory that (1) stems from a “drive” for incorporation (the objective, for instance land commodification); (2) these pressures

the reform, that is, the national legislation of disentailment “on the paper” (how were commodification pressures “translated” into a body of laws?) and the impact of disentailment “on the ground” (to what extent did it alter the spaces and edges of local (rural) livelihoods?). It then particularly looks into the responsiveness of communities in order to secure their access to basic communal resource pools such as land (which repertoires of reaction were developed?) and how this has smoothened, restricted, or halted the incorporation of rural spaces and societies and the effects this had on the sustainability of local communal life (what is the “feedback” generated through this process?).

This reconstruction will be related to the factors of ecology, demography-ethnicity, market, state and communal agency (see “Thematic angle”), pointing to the role of the region’s attractiveness (or not) as a strategic resource frontier, the constellation and interplay of Aymara, Uru and mestizo populations, the strength of the connection to an expanding market sphere, the institutional strength and local presence of the state, and communal organization of representation and resistance. Together, these factors determine the research framework within which the communal renegotiation of the terms of their participation and autonomy as a landowning, taxpaying and representative actor in the Bolivian state-in-formation and its world-economic integration will be assessed.

Far from constituting a neat “incorporation matrix”, this framework presents a complex tangle of frontier processes, which are interlinked by the mechanisms (or “actions”) that bring land rights commodification into operation. These mechanisms relate to processes of legislation (specifically the constitution the Bolivian land system), taxation (specifically the constitution of the fiscal *tributo* system), territorial “unlocking” (forms of infrastructure), elite renovation (specifically the ascent and evaporation of the “vecinos” class in Carangas) and ethnic identity formation (the reconfiguration of ethnic boundaries). Under Bolivian liberalism, this concretized into a push for the allocation of “absolute” private property rights, the implementation of a cadastral fiscal system, the take-off of a transport revolution, the organization of indirect community representation and the dissemination of discursive politics of assimilation. The interweaving of these “actions” with the factors upon which a research framework was constructed and with overlapping frontier processes has resulted in a chapter outline that does not necessarily reflect this framework at a single glance.

have an impact upon the spaces and edges of local rural livelihoods; (3) these local actors respond to those pressures and that impact; (4) this impact and the response entail a “feedback” effect in terms of vulnerability and revitalization. See Part I.

Lines and limits of inquiry.

My endeavour to trace and integrate the presented topics, questions and hypotheses has been restricted by several deliberately imposed and unintended limits. This restriction is partly motivated by the lack or lacking accessibility of relevant sources to properly discuss and integrate certain themes, and partly by intentional choices to confine the scope of this research to a workable research outline. Originally, my research ambition entailed the tracing of three interlinked frontier processes; the commodification of land rights, of trade networks and of national spaces and identities. However, as the research advanced and the processes under study gradually showed themselves from their most complex side, I chose to somehow order them in a hierarchical order. Land thus came to constitute the decisive variable in my analysis, however without ruling out its tight connection to processes of economic-commercial and national integration.

As a result, while the importance of mobility and trade is an unquestionable “pillar” of Carangas’ history, this angle has been integrated rather as a “side-line” of the central line of research. However, this does not mean that it did not receive the required attention throughout my research activities. Particularly Carangas’ Pacific connection triggered my attention and I decided to further elaborate this link, including archival research in Iquique, Arica and Tacna. However, due to restructurings of the dissertation and for the sake of tree conservation, I plan to complete the outcome of that endeavour as separate publications. The topic of mining, which was initially central to my formulation of research questions, moved even further in the background, mainly because of the relatively fewer (sources regarding) mining activities in 19th century Carangas. Another line of inquiry that difficultly comes to the surface is gender, as female voices are relatively difficult to record, both in archival sources as in field work.¹⁶ However, some revealing topics (such as trade and credit; vecino women) indicate that this terrain has potential for a closer assessment. An equally “silenced” group is the Uru population, who are certainly not absent from this research but a detailed inquiry into their history falls beyond the scope of these pages. Their trajectory, in which weak land rights culminate in centuries-long (and still continuing) marginalization, deserves indisputably and urgently further exploration.¹⁷

¹⁶ In contrast, the court of Corque, where I spent possibly most of my archive research time, constitutes today a real women’s bastion, bringing the management of the former province’s key historical documentation into female hands.

¹⁷ Important research has been realized by Pauwels (1983, 186-193, and 1999) and Wachtel (2001).

Although the case research exclusively focuses on a single provincial unit, my assessment of Carangas is framed within a multi-scaled analysis, which may facilitate further comparative research with either other sectors of the Oruro or altiplano region (think of the Poopó province, the Chayanta and LÍpez provinces), and across similar or contrasting areas in Latin-America (think of the Mexican ejido system) and other world regions (think of the similarities with the Tibetan plateau) in terms of ecology, economic integration, and communal autonomy. Also in terms of temporal delimitation, my research attests to the value of a comparative diachronic analysis with former and later land reforms.

Indeed, the source situation was decisive in guiding the course of my research. The fact that most of the consulted archives were produced by jurisdictional and government institutions has contributed to the strong legal-political inclination of the case research, rather than an economic assessment of changes in land access. Moreover, as the methodological section will indicate, my analysis of the land reform has a strong socio-anthropological inclination, given the entanglement with the “Indian question”. These methodological considerations have been included as an addendum in the first part of this dissertation.

Organization of the dissertation

The dissertation is organized into three parts. The first part constructs the global framework, the second situates the setting of the case study in space and time and the last part ties that setting to the global framework by reconstructing the land rights trajectory of the rural communities of Carangas in the context of post-colonial land reform. The introduction to each Part of the chapter includes a more detailed outline of the organization of the chapters.

Part I starts with a brief introduction to how the notion of frontier and how it came to figure centrally in my analytical approach to incorporation. The first chapter concretizes the use of that concept as a “World-Systems Frontier Perspective”, as I have baptized the theoretical framework of this research. In discussing the main inspiration sources for elaborating this perspective, it first comments on the world-systemic origins of this framework, but also its inherent (epistemological) critique to the blind spots of Wallerstein’s “modern” model (1.1). Then, the chapter dissects the building blocks of that framework: the frontier, understood as a fluctuating process of incorporation, and the frontier zone, understood as a contact zone where incorporation is “under

negotiation” (1.2). The question remains how the trajectory of a frontier and the transformation of a specific frontier zone can be reconstructed in space and time, particularly regarding the process of land commodification. Therefore, the second chapter will frame these general theoretical outlines within the entangled fields of peasant studies and Andean ethnohistory. It explains that the incorporation of Andean “peasants” and “indigenous” people is a process of categorization (2.1) in function of hegemonizing states and expanding market spheres, but foremost a process of negotiation over those categories, thereby “thwarting” the binary story of peasant and indigenous survival or disappearance (2.2). It then specifies these incorporation mechanisms and its “feedback effects” in the context of the creation and recreation of global frontiers of land control (2.3). Apart from concluding remarks, this first part finishes with an addendum on the methodological choices and implications in conducting this research.

Part II sketches the spatial and temporal outlines of the setting of the case study, the province of Carangas around 1900. While some readers will be taken to a mysterious world of lama’s and mountains, this part may offer others little more than a Wikipedia-style overview of a familiar terrain. This part is in part rather descriptive, but it forms the elementary foundation for the story I want to tell in Part III. The introduction to this part gives ample attention to the adopted methodological approach, including comments on the use and combination of sources, and specifies the questions that guide the following two chapters. It then takes off with a prologue that provides in an introduction to the Andean landscape, patterns of human settlement and adaptation to this particular environment and the basics of the productive system that materialized. In chapters 3 and 4, the way in which the factors (see “Thematic angle”) determine the access to assets, power and sovereignty is concretized with regards to Carangas. An introduction is given to the case region, including the demographic developments (3.1.1) and the forms of territorial organization (3.1.2) that have shaped its history. Then, the local organization of rural livelihoods is analysed, in terms of labour (3.2.1), livestock (3.2.2) and land (3.2.3). A third section links up to the next chapter, describing how this productive system entangled with broader structures for extraction and exchange (3.3). Chapter four scrutinizes these broader structures, first giving a more detailed chronology of what has been defined as the period of “Bolivian liberalism”, to then dissect the legal-fiscal system for land regulation (4.1), the patterns and practices in the circulation of people and resources (4.2), and the cyclical process of rural elite formation (4.3) that organized life on the Carangas countryside in that period.

In the introduction to Part III, my approach and questions underlying my analysis of the Exvinculación land reform in Carangas. Chapter 5 gives an outline of national developments that preceded (5.1) and backed the take-off of the 1874 Alienation Act (*Ley de Exvinculación*) (5.2) until the eruption of mounting indigenous protest and the ascent of new elite forces in the 1899 federal war (5.3). Chapter 6 takes that development to the

level of the Carangas province, starting with the how the communities dealt with president Melgerajo's land reform decrees (6.1). It then discusses how the last rented valley lands under direct control of several communities of Carangas were confiscated in the course of the land reform process (6.2). Then, the focus is put on the repeated efforts to implement the Revisita and how these pressures fostered the spread of rebellion and internal violence in the 1870s-1890s (6.3). It then scrutinizes how this instigated the emergence of a modest *apoderados generales* movement in Carangas (6.4) and how this mobilization erupted in the 1899 rebellion (6.5). Chapter 7 departs from the post-1899 context and looks into the subsequent evolution and implications of the initiated land reform process in Carangas until around 1930. First assesses the (im)mobility of strategic resource frontiers in the province (7.1) and then moves the focus to the local dynamics provoked by the imminence of the Revisita, both in terms of internal conflict as of communal mobilization (7.2). A third section addresses the question of vecinos intermediation in the management and defence of communal lands (7.3) and closes with a discussion of the changing national discourse regarding vecinos and indigenous peasants in early 20th century Bolivia (7.4).

In the concluding remarks to the entire dissertation, I recapitulate the main insights regarding the trajectory of Bolivia's first land reform in the province of Carangas, formulated as a frontier process, related to the negotiation over processes of incorporation and linking up to long-term effects that nurture a "thwarted" trajectory.

The maps and tables in the Appendixes support the reader's way through this dissertation.

PART I. A frontier perspective.

Introduction to Part I. “*Where the action is*”

While capitalism may be “*a phenomenon that knew no frontiers*” in terms of digestible spaces or societies (Wallerstein 1974, 67), this statement in fact implies that capitalism constantly creates frontiers. Even more, it needs frontiers. Emerging from the dynamic frictions within and at the outer edge of the world-system, frontiers symptomize a systemic difference. These differences are not (necessarily) found “on the brink” of an expansive system, but on both its external boundaries and internal subdivisions. In observing the dialectic of homogenization (the eventual evaporation of systemic differences) and heterogenization (their reproduction), it is not so much the finiteness but the permanence of systemic differences that must be questioned. The presented research addresses the (re)production of frontiers in relation to the question on the inevitable, desirable or tragic vanishing of peasantries and of indigenous groups. Central point of discussion is the presumed incompatibility –the friction– between peripherally located rural groups and the development of a capitalist world-economy. This first part of the dissertation introduces the analytical tools deployed to tackle those questions and presumptions.

Instead of pretending to develop an entirely new approach, the presented theoretical framework builds further on key insights that have emerged in, or in dialogue with, the field of World-Systems Analysis. Thanks to varied contributions by followers, sceptics and opponents of the idea of an expanding world-systemic force, my use of the notion of a world-system is not directly imported from a closed theory patented by Wallerstein. World-Systems Analysis is presented not as the only or the best analytical instrument, but as a valid and ‘malleable’ choice for a theoretical framework that prevent multi-scaled connections of floating somewhere in the air. My approach stays far away from imagined all-powerful organisms and their prescribed histories and rather pursues a comprehensive analysis of local-global interconnectedness.

The most essential steppingstones in the fine-tuning of that approach centre on the concept of frontier as defined by a host of researchers who either explicitly or more loosely relate their work to World-Systems Analysis. My first introduction to these concepts were the alternative readings of world-systems analysis offered by

anthropologist Thomas Hall (Hall 2000; 2012). Following Hall, frontiers are “*where the action is*” and a frontier zone is the spatial dimension of that action; where “the system” enters in interaction with –gets to know, questions, attacks...- forms of organization based on an-other logic in the context of incorporation processes (Hall 2012, 51). The innovation of Hall’s “frontier perspective” is that it explicitly unveils the margins as the pulsating heart of that system. In line and at times in direct collaboration with each other, scholars from various disciplines have appropriated, adapted and elaborated similar insights on frontier “production”. This has resulted in a diverse and fertile “field” of frontier research, situated on the interdisciplinary crossroads of history, anthropology and geography. What binds that field is an understanding of frontier as a creative process through which social, ecological and epistemological change becomes intrinsically entangled in the context of systemic expansion. Noteworthy is that nearly all these frontier-related analyses and applications have emerged from the study of colonial encounters.

Rather than a metaphor for ‘naturally given’ contact, frontiers point to the construction of encounter, to the asymmetrical power relations behind that encounter, and to the agency of both core and peripheral participants in that encounter. Frontier as a construct means that contact is presented in terms of a limit between two different, delineated groups –categorized as “civilized” and “barbaric”- that must be bridged in order to unite both into a settled uniform (hence controllable) social order (Boccaro 2005, 33). In order to eliminate that imagined limit, intercultural contact is remodelled from separation to interrelation. This is where frontiers come into play, conceived as processes which by definition have a start and an end. A frontier process could be defined as the “settling” of things that were first “open”, undecided, under negotiation. In a world-systemic perspective the aim of that settling could be defined as the expansion of the core-based established order, or at least the attempt to transfer and impose (aspects of) that order to peripheral regions. Whereas some may insist on the frontier as “*a force for historical continuity and conservatism*” (Kopytoff 1987, 12) while others stress it as a force of change, the bottom-line is that the frontier provides in a vacuum for the unfolding of social processes

Running counter to linear evocations of frontiers, this settling has a more complex spatial dimension, structured by new limits functional to the creation of a social order whose outlook is still wavering. A frontier zone takes shape where different actors –be they individuals, companies, projects, institutions, etc.- embedded in different decision-making systems come into sustained contact with each other and where there are no common rules of encounter defined (Sassen 2012, 1). In that sense, Saskia Sassen explains that frontier zones have strategic potential as much for the most powerful as for the powerless (*loc. cit.*). The fundamental point of departure regarding frontier zones is that they are connected, mobile, and constantly changing, both in space and in time. As instances of discontinuity, frontier zones are traceable in the trajectories of spatial

integration of old and new frontier zones of the world-system, produced through external incorporation or internal differentiation respectively. Because encounters are never static but intensify or dilute, frontiers and frontier zones have many faces and masks, with accelerations, retreats and standstills. These transformations in shape and content, but also apparent immobility point to the factors of space, history and agency in frontier “production,” revealing frontiers as three-dimensional processes.

Analysing frontier processes is instructive to questions on capitalist expansion. It reveals that this expansive drive operates through dynamic feedback links. This means that commodified social structures do not expand automatically but generate a response, whether anticipated or not, which may alter its course. “To-be-incorporated” groups may for instance forge alliances or carve out of concessions. In spatial terms, the operation and effect of feedback links gives evidence of the creation and defence of autonomous “counter-spaces” (Andolina, Laurie and Radcliffe 2009). Local communities’ achievements in extorting and protecting room for manoeuvre, a margin for communal action, do not merely stem from concrete political demands but from their discursive struggles “to mark out relatively autonomous spheres in which to gain control over the meanings of their lives” (Abercrombie 1998, 10). Rather than reading these spatial patterns as instances of isolation or resistance, they must be interpreted as the lever that converts incorporation into a negotiated process.

A concrete illustration of negotiated incorporation is the “production” of the (rural) Andes as a frontier zone, which is an ongoing process that started with the colonial encounter. That starting point does not constitute a single shock, but a still unfinished process that is continuously reproduced in both the most localized histories as global developments in state formation and market expansion. The centripetal force behind the intertwinement of the Andean rural zone with global incorporation processes is the struggle over the allocation of resources. Access to land, territories and resources generate a discord, where peasant and indigenous peoples appear as initiators rather than mere reactors, moulding the commodification of land and property rights into an “uneven” and intensely negotiated trajectory.

The following two chapters construct the analytical framework to capture and give meaning to incorporation as a negotiated process. In the first chapter, this short introduction to the notion of frontier is further elaborated and situated within the field of world-systems analysis (1.1). It starts with a brief outline of the model that Wallerstein has defined as “the modern world-system” (1.1.1), to then focus on the central elements of “World-Systems Analysis”, the research perspective that has emerged around that model (1.1.2). This presentation also gives attention to epistemological critiques towards the world-system paradigm and how these theories nurture the proposed notion of “frontier” (1.1.3). This first section ends by presenting the concept of frontier as a vital contribution to world-system analysis for allowing a more comprehensive approach to the question of peripheral agency (1.1.4). In the next

section, the building blocks of the presented perspective (1.2). It presents frontiers as fluctuating processes of incorporation that fuel world-systemic expansion and contraction (1.2.1) and explains how these processes create and recreate frontier zones where peoples and places are linked and delinked within commodified production relations (1.2.2). This movement of frontiers and the related formation and disintegration of frontier zones produce a feedback reaction, pointing to the simultaneity of integration and differentiation in the context of world-systemic expansion (1.2.3).

The second chapter, then, concretizes the abstract notion of a frontier zone by zooming in on the historical trajectory of incorporation of the rural Andes thereby explaining key concepts in this research such as peasant, indigenous and community. First, it zooms in on how this trajectory involves a process of categorization (2.1). This is reflected in the definition of a “peasant question” (2.1.1) and an “Indian question” (2.1.2), which run as overlapping leitmotifs throughout the historical processes of state and market integration in the Andes. In the next section, the communal framework (2.2.1) of both resistant and pragmatic peasant and/or indigenous responses to processes of state formation (2.2.2) and world market expansion (2.2.3) is discussed. Lastly, these insights are related to the global process of land and property commodification (2.3.1) and specified by describing the historical construction of an Andean/Bolivian land system (2.3.2). The concluding remarks give a recap of this first theoretical part of the dissertation.

Chapter 1

World-Systems Frontier Analysis

“Truly the world has been opened to the human race”
Juan Luis Vives, 1531¹



Figure 2 World map from the manuscript *The First New Chronicle and Good Government of Guaman Poma de Ayala*. With permission of the Royal Library of Denmark, Copenhagen (Guaman Poma de Ayala 1615/1616, GKS 2232, 4).

¹ Own translation. Cited in Pérez Murillo 2003, 131. Juan Luis Vives (1493-1540) was a Spanish humanist who spent the bigger part of his life in the Southern Netherlands and contributed significantly to the first developments in psychology. In this citation, Vives expresses the impact of the “discovery” of the New World.

To understand the reinforced struggle of indigenous groups in the midst of an ecologically degrading world or the significance of food crises in a highly industrial world that produces ever more food, one needs an appropriate vantage point, that is, a global perspective (Vanhaute 2012). This perspective is not simply about enlarging one's scope, but about detecting multiple scales in processes of social change. This points to the central challenge in writing this research; to "*recreate the lives of real people in their broad historical context, but without reducing the human experience to a mere reflection of deep, long-term historical forces*" (Andrien 2001, 8; see also Marcus 1986). Grand narratives and isolated case studies designed on the assumption of a single scale have been pushed into the margin. Out of the debates over the powerful yet complex repercussion of these global-local entanglements connections in the globalized world of today, world history has emerged as a relatively new but intensely expanding academic field. It is the ever more perceptibility and "accessibility" of global interconnectedness that made world history possible and necessary (Stearns 2000, 1).

According to one of the key authors/actors in the field, Patrick Manning, world history counts "*the story of connections within the global human community*" (Manning 2003, 3).² Rather than prioritizing the global, or any other specific scale, world history insists on its interlocking with smaller and larger scales – knowing to link a tree's smallest atom to the entire ecosystem (see Northrop 2012, 3 on McNeill, 82-4). Despite constituting a very heterogeneous field in terms of thematic, geographical, temporal or methodological preferences, all accounts coincide in their questioning of any assumed delineation of the scope of analysis, under the premise that "[s]cales only get their meaning from interdependency" (Vanhaute 2009, 25; see also Galaty 2011, 8). In that sense, "*global history could, or should, become part of any history*" as has been testified in relation to the field of Latin-American history (Serulnikov and Lluch 2014).

With respect to the particular area of my attention, it should be noted that "*the history of Latin America has been instrumental to the rise of world history*", yet the spatial and temporal representations of Latin America within global narratives seem to be scarred for life by the idea of incongruity (Benton 2004, 423-8; see also Adelman 2004, 400). Indeed, the study of world-historical processes –analysing "*regimes of territorialisation and their permanent renegotiation over time*" (Middell and Naumann 2010)- comprises a double tension; spatial and temporal. In terms of space, the question of how to give relevance to regional historiographies in relation to global(izing) studies constitutes an important

² As approaches and terminologies to address supra-local interactions have proliferated, world history has come to overlap or compete with transnational history, universal history and the like. The increasing awareness of the constitutive role of connections make some for instance speak of "connected histories" (Gruzinski 2001, 86; Subrahmanyam 1997 and 2005). Insights into the intrinsic entanglement of these connections has given birth to the field of *histoire croisée* (Werner and Zimmermann 2006).

battleground in the field of world history (Manning 2003, 166; Middell and Naumann 2010, 156-61). Zooming in a little more, the ways in which very localized trajectories “splinter” global trajectories similarly tends to nurture the idea that “*there is no global history, only local histories*” (Mignolo 2000), although this might be rephrased as the dictate that “*tell the story about the world requires local histories*” (Adelman 2004, 406).³ The temporal challenge to local-global entanglements addresses the question of how to develop an integrated analysis of both the underlying structural patterns and the specific stories “on the ground” (and underground). In assessing the dialectic relation between the scales of key events and of everyday events, continuities, as also Braudel (1980, 172) agreed, may eventually appear more interesting than ruptures.

Within world history and affiliated fields, there is a -nonetheless modest- move to bring the “margins” or “spaces in between” at the centre of analysis. Although (world-)historical inquiry is still dominantly directed towards “core areas” (Clossey and Guyatt 2013), many have endorsed and copied Pierre Vilar’s statement that the frontier is a privileged place to observe the history of the world (Hall 2001; Sahlins 1989, xv; Vilar 1985, 23). However, it must be noted that a view from the margin does not simply equal a bottom-up view or a non-core view. As Das and Poole emphasize, “*the forms of illegibility, partial belonging, and disorder that seem to inhabit the margins of the state constitute its necessary condition as a theoretical and political object,*” converting a “marginal” view into a very “statal” view (Das and Poole 2004, 6).

Accepting the premise that frontiers play a conditional role in world-historical processes, I will propose a “world-systems frontier analysis” to address those processes. The adopted perspective departs from insights into (not the blind assumption of) the workings of what has been formulated by Immanuel Wallerstein as the modern world-system. It is a choice for a viable -not the exclusive, let alone the best- tool to deal with the question of how to integrate the global, the local, and all scales in between. As Hall and Felon state, “*it has developed the analysis of large-scale systems arising from capitalist societal controls and yet can identify micro processes of social change on the level of the community*” (Hall and Felon 2009, 149). The same authors state that

“One of the powerful insights from world-system theory is that the fundamental entity evolving is the system itself and that the evolution of any component of it ... must be understood within the context of system evolution. That is, they are part of feedback processes through which the world-system at any specific time

³ Rather than to withdraw from world history, a more viable answer is in recounting the widening of the world through the history of “very small places”. Wright’s account of such a place that is typically believed to have evolved in isolation from “the” world is becoming a classic answer to the question of local-global entanglements (Wright 2010, 8).

limits the possibilities for its components while simultaneously these components constitute the system” (ibid, 15).

While I do agree on that point, it must be stressed that “the system” is the highest, but not the most fundamental level nor has it agency of its own. The common critique of world-systems analysis being a purely top-down and economical model that lacks dynamics and agency usually disregards that point. It is not because Wallerstein’s model is generally applied to explain developments in or radiating from the core, that World-Systems Analysis is not able to integrate localized and peripheral phenomena.⁴ After all, the clue is in the interaction and interconnection (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 12; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997 and 2006; Vanhaute 2013, 10). Instead of fitting that interaction into pre-designed patterns, world-systems approach offers a “lens” that may or even must be creatively and critically tested and modified by applying unbound interactions to that lens (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 11). In that sense, world-systems analysis may profit from further research and discussion on persisting centrism’s and blind spots.

1.1 From the limits of World-Systems Analysis to the frontiers of the World-System.

1.1.1 The Modern World-System

The World-System perspective, born in the early 1970s, is a child of its time. The concrete ideas that would lead to Wallerstein’s theorizing endeavour originated from the feeling that a cycle came to an end (Williams 2013). From the 1960s on, the first hints at the “limits to growth”, the complicated process of decolonization, the first fissures in U.S. hegemony and the general disillusionment with the post-war promise of progress started to destabilize what Wallerstein has called “*the optimism of the oppressed*” (Wallerstein 2006, 85). This nourished social scientists’ criticism towards classic modernization theories. Around the middle of the 20th century, several fundamental critiques to modernization theory -and to the dominant structures of knowledge in general- were developed by Third World scholars, Marxists and *Annales* historians that would play a constitutive role in the conceptualization of a “world-system” perspective.

⁴ Think of the African roots of Wallerstein’s own intellectual trajectory in designing “his” model (Wallerstein 2012b, 6).

Also Wallerstein's personal experience as an Africanist in the context of colonial collapse, as an academic in a 'university in crisis' and as a young American facing the cultural shock of 1968 strengthened his sense that the dominant paradigm of modernization was inadequate to explain social change (Wallerstein 2012b, 7).

A first source of inspiration was the core-periphery model propagated by the *dependista* school that arose in Latin America around Raúl Prebisch and his ECLA colleagues, also formulated independently by another UN economist, Hans Singer (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). Core-periphery analysis was based on the observation of the inequality between international trade partners. This model was further elaborated in terms of "unequal exchange" or, as coined by Andre Gunder Frank, "*the development of underdevelopment*" (Frank 1966; see also 1979 and with Gills 1993).⁵ Rather than the initial condition of a linear and staged evolution, underdevelopment was defined as the differentiated outcome of a historical expansive process in which subaltern groups have been absorbed through conquest, assimilation, nation-building and internal colonialism, camouflaged by a discourse of "development" (Hall and Felon 2009, 5).

A second input emerged from the challenge to orthodox Marxism. While post-Stalin communists rediscovered Marx' Asiatic mode of production, a debate over the external and internal factors leading to capitalist transition developed among historians. This opened up space for less ideologically constrained versions of world-historical trajectories (Wallerstein 2006, 13-4).

Thirdly, a chief and maybe Wallerstein's most important source of inspiration was Fernand Braudel's insistence on a historical social science that integrates a long-term and large-scale approach.⁶ In order to reveal the commonly neglected underlying multiple time frames, he expanded the short-term *histoire événementielle* with the concept of structural time or *longue durée* comprising the cyclical procedure of medium-term trends (Grosfoguel 1997). Spatially, Braudel proposed the *économie-monde* as the appropriate unit of analysis to operationalize his theory of economic long waves.

In 1974, these sources of inspiration and Wallerstein's own academic trajectory crystalized in a first book of what would become his magnum opus. Arisen out of a theoretical critique among social scientists but with an essentially historical focus, the

⁵ Similar to Frank's move from *dependista* to world systems theory (Kay 2005, 1180; Frank 2011 [1978]), other dependency school theorists would later criticize the underlying dichotomy of dependency theories and "convert" into world system theorists (Amin 1974; Arrighi 1994). Interesting to note is also how the BRICS countries currently challenge this postulation by breaking with dependency "through" capitalism (economic growth), thereby countering the prime claim of the *dependentistas* that capitalism "produces" dependency.

⁶ His first work was on the Mediterranean, which appeared first in 1949 and where he presents three levels of history: the time of the environment, of the long-term, and of events (Braudel 1949). Subsequently he published his most famous work, a three-volume work on material civilization and capitalism (Braudel 1979) and "concluded" his master contribution to history and related fields with his "Afterthoughts" (Braudel 1977).

volumes of *The Modern World-System*⁷ do not simply count the story of a world (let alone “the” world) but also offer an alternative model to explain the origins and evolution of historical capitalism. Their relevance is not so much in providing in the final account of historical capitalism, but in hinting at an instrument to explain the origins, rise and future of historical capitalism as an integrated societal model.

Hopkins and Wallerstein have defined historical capitalism as

“a system of integrated production processes within a singular world-economy based on an axial division of labor, ensconced within an interstate system composed of so-called sovereign states, fueled by the objective of the endless accumulation of capital” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 774).

Wallerstein explains that system as follows. During the long 16th century (1450-1640), a new form of socio-economic organization took shape and expanded cyclically, driven by the need for labour, resources and markets. This organization was bound by a world-economy, and it was capitalist in essence, and as such generated “the modern world-system” (Wallerstein 2006, 23). First, what defines this world-economy as capitalist and makes it to a system is in the first place a division of labour that is shaped and reproduced through goods, labour and capital exchange between differentiated regions and groups. This exchange implies an unequal transfer between core and periphery zones. Wallerstein extended this dual zonation by adding the semi-periphery as a necessary structural element that “*is not an artifice of statistical cutting points, nor is it a residual category*” (Wallerstein 1974, 349). Second, these zones do not share a single political regime as in world-empires, but are tied to multiple political units that constitute a heterogeneous interstate system (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 765). Third, the division of labour and the exchange between its differentiated zones obeys to structural mechanisms that eliminate the limits to the accumulation of capital. This distinguishes this world-system from non-capitalist societal structures in that “*the economic factors operate within an arena larger than that which any political entity can totally control*” (Wallerstein 1974, 348).

According to Wallerstein’s definition, capitalism does not simply emerge where people accumulate capital, but where priority is given to the endless accumulation of capital (Wallerstein 2006, 24). Such a zone only exists since the 16th century in Europe, excluding Russia and the Ottoman empire, and Iberian America. The subsequent evolution of that zone corresponds to long-term cyclical patterns of expansion and contraction that steer the incorporation of new regions and peoples. This is the process

⁷ At this moment the counter indicates four (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989 and 2011).

of pulsation, observed in the secular trends of Kondratieff waves.⁸ It entails the “*physical expansion of its boundaries through the incorporation of new zones*” or enlargement, the “*deepening of the capitalist process via mechanization, commodification, and contraction*” or intensification, and the polarization by a process of constant “corification” and “peripheralization,” expressed in growing gaps (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 774).⁹ Moreover, this process is interposed by “*the constant reproduction of a certain relatively small number of “semiperipheral” states which are located “in the middle” and whose existence forms a necessary part of the operation of capitalist accumulation*” (*ibid*). A concrete and contemporary illustration of the acceleration and ambiguity of this drive for endless accumulation is how the soy frontier’s geographical expansion into the Amazon basin and the related intensification of genetic modification and mechanized labour methods is related to the paradoxical coexistence of global over-production and under-nutrition.

In providing the world-system with the ability to expand where world-empires encounter their limits, historical capitalism has been the only systemic entity so far able to cover the whole planet. This was achieved by the end of the 19th century; the first moment in human history that no multiple historical systems co-existed with the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 2011). As a result, at the entrance of the 21st century, no single individual, economic transaction, political regime or cultural expression remains exempt from even the slightest –although often ambiguous and hardly noticeable– influence of the modern world-system. Confronted with the question how such an extensive structure maintains a minimal degree of cohesion, Wallerstein added (later) the notion of “geoculture”. With this addition he indicates that, apart from economic ties, the system’s functioning is also supported by a framework of “moral

⁸ Pulsation means that world-systems “*expand and contract, or expand more before their expansion proceeds less rapidly*” (Hall 2012, 48; see also Hall 2006). This movement stems from the inherent drive for and limits to systemic expansion, proving the existence of a historical system but simultaneously indicating the level of instability in the functioning of that system (Hall and Felon 2009, 121). The ascent and decline of Dutch, British and U.S. hegemony displays a rhythm of technological and commercial revolutions and how this goes accompanied by the escalation and abating of military struggle and the alternation of institutional dependency and decolonization (Arrighi 1994).

⁹ The transfer of resources to core locations is structured by a social process of polarization, producing the peripheralization of the most vulnerable places and groups. A world-economy, Wallerstein wrote, “*tends to expand the economic and social gaps among its varying areas in the very process of its development*” (Wallerstein 1974, 350). These gaps crystalize around a dichotomist logic that sustains the operation of unequal exchange –both in terms of economic as in terms of knowledge exchange– in the modern world-system (Mitchell 2002; Mignolo 2000). The way in which a region and its people have been pushed into a dependent position through an asymmetrical restructuring of power relations is clearly observable in the Andes. Here, the creation of global connections went hand in hand with the absorption of land, labour and capital resources of by capitalist sectors, converting the region in a bulk goods-producing zone (Moore 2010c) and reducing its population to a segregated and falsely homogeneous “republic” (Thurner 1997, 6).

justifications” (Wallerstein 2006, 75; 2011). Although the underlying idea is evident, his application of the concept is not very convincing as it fails to include the diversity of marginal (that is, without dominant ambitions) cultural and knowledge schemes within and beyond the contours of the system (Mignolo 2000, 41-2; Dussel 2002).

1.1.2 World-Systems Analysis as a lens: a call for creativity

The idea of a world-system emerged from the feeling that a cycle came to its end and found fertile soil in the dissatisfaction with existing models to explain the structural character of that cycle. The above presented outlines of a new model and their embodiment in “The Modern World-System” volumes of founding father Immanuel Wallerstein constitute just one source of nutrition in the development of paradigm of World-Systems Analysis.¹⁰ Out of the dialogue with a diverse group of scholars, further insightful refinements and thought-provoking critiques this became a dynamic and essentially interdisciplinary field.¹¹ As a basic condition for this paradigm to be of any relevance, it must be approached as a lens, that is, a tool that must “be used” and cannot “speak for itself”. More specifically, it concerns a lens that allows for a global, historical, holistic and unidisciplinary approach; it has a spatial scope which is wide and multi-scaled, a time frame which is long and multi-layered, thematic foci which enter in dialogue, and a methodological perspective which crosses assumed disciplinary boundaries. Let us thus briefly discuss the four constitutive elements of that lens’ guidelines.

First of all, “global” refers to the spatial radius of historical capitalism, which is defined by the boundaries of a world; a specific geographical zone that does not necessarily equal the globe. This world forms a coherent and structured unit that develops according to systemic rules; it is a system. The hyphen, then, is placed by Wallerstein in order to indicate that historical capitalism embodies “*not the system of the*

¹⁰ Some critics define this development as the transition from World-Systems Theory to World-Systems Analysis, the latter having emerged as a multi-disciplinary paradigm in response to the detection of the macro and long-term bias of the former (Galaty 2011, 4; see also Schneider 1977 and Kardulias 1999).

¹¹ Among these contributions, there is the work of Terence Hopkins (with Wallerstein, 1982 and 1987), Samir Amin (1974), Giovanni Arrighi (1994), Andre Gunder Frank (1993, 1998), Christopher Chase-Dunn (with Hall 1993, with Babones 2006), Janet Abu Lughod (1989), Thomas D. Hall (1986, 1989, 2000, 2001, 2009 , 2012, 2013), Jason W. Moore (2003, 2008, 2010a, 2010c), Philip McMichael (1990), Wilma Dunaway (1994, 1996, 2003), Peter Taylor (1988, 1991, 1992; with Knox 1995), to name just a few. The Fernand Braudel Center (Binghamton University, since 1976) and its journal, *Review*, as well as the *Journal of World-Systems Research* have provided these authors with a vital platform for the diffusion and fostering of their thoughts and debates, of which most recently crystalized in the *Routledge Handbook of World-Systems Analysis* (Babones and Chase-Dunn 2012).

world, but a system that is a world" (Wallerstein 1987) in contrast to singular world systems (Frank and Gills 1993, 292-6). Departing from the assumption that capitalism, its origins and development can only be studied within the framework of a system, the system is taken as the paradigm or unit (not the object) of analysis. However, this systemic level is indivisibly interlocked and interdependent with other, micro to macro scales (Vanhaute 2009, 25; Galaty 2011). Correspondingly, households, classes, nations, or other "institutions" operating in the world-system acquire analytical meaning in their interaction. Moreover, such an approach opens options for applying World-Systems Analysis from the very local to scales that transcend human interaction, without necessarily challenging what is often perceived as Wallerstein's "prescriptions" of what can and cannot be perceived as a world-system.

Second, world-systems are "historical" in that they have a start, an evolution and an end. This implies the acceptance that globalization is neither a new nor a teleological process but develops in phases of acceleration and contraction without leading to an inevitable outcome to which "there is no alternative." If only one thing is inevitable in World-Systems Analysis, it is that all world-systems at one point will collide with their own limits. These limits are only detectable when recognizing a plurality of time that combines long-term trajectories with cyclical and secular movements. In line with Braudel, Wallerstein starts with the structural level, where he detects *longue durées* of capitalist production, of the inter-state system and of the core-periphery hierarchy which constantly reproduce the features that underpin a specific system. In the medium-run, cycles and secular trends deliver a simultaneous dynamic input in the structural time, resulting in a spiral movement as this input never reappears identically nor has much potential for reversal.

Third, Braudel's *économie-monde* may have influenced the world-system's delineation by economic processes and structures, but the inter-state system, social movements and power-laden discourses and structures of knowledge are essential pillars as well. Hence, World-Systems Analysis is not an exclusively economic model, but presents a holistic scope. Not one thematic pillar, but the interaction between economic, political, social and cultural processes delivers the most essential motive for analysis (Hall 2000; Hornborg, McNeill and Martínez-Allier 2007; Babones and Chase-Dunn 2012).

Finally, World-Systems Analysis entails a critique to the premises and the exaggerated subdivision of the scholarly disciplines as we know them (Wallerstein 1991, 1996). It does not simply claim a multi- or inter-disciplinary approach, but contains the aspirations of a truly unidisciplinary historical social science (see for instance Hall, Kardulias, and Chase-Dunn 2011; Hall and Turchin 2007).

These four aspects must be understood as the mere start rather than the final point to the line of world-systems theorizing. In that respect, resolute relegations of the proposed paradigm to the dustbin of master narratives are usually an indication of the failure to recognize the multiplicity of applications and interpretations within the field

of World-Systems Analysis. On the contrary, a range of scholars continues to approach it as a relevant source of inspiration for further theorization and empirical testing. Broadly accepting the lines set out by Wallerstein, they are determined to make those lines “more workable”, in some way or another appealed by one of Wallerstein’s most valid claims, namely that he does *not* present a theory for the construction of a new grand narrative. As will be further discussed, World-Systems Analysis inherent call for creativity has produced fruitful insights, which takes us from dependency over de-coloniality to the multi-dimensional idea of frontiers.

1.1.3 Dependency, modernity and de-coloniality: Crossing and un-thinking epistemological frontiers

As propagated by Wallerstein, new analytical tools can only be constructed to the extent that old paradigms are being questioned and “unthought” (Wallerstein 1991), nor can they strive or claim to present a “one-size-fit-all” model. Yet, despite or exactly because of World-Systems Analysis’ openness to diverse interpretations and inherent status of “work in progress”, it remains sensitive to latent pitfalls, widespread misunderstandings, preconceptions, controversy and incomplete knowledge. Its broad scope exposes incomplete theorizing on several fronts, yet rather due to the way in which the perspective has been used than by the perspective in itself (Hall and Felon 2009).

On a more fundamental level, if Wallerstein’s statement that “*the story of the emergence of world-systems analysis is embedded in the history of the modern world-system and the structures of knowledge that grew up as part of that system*” (Wallerstein 2006, 1) is further pursued, than World-Systems Analysis prophesizes its own end. Having once emerged from the ashes of previous models, World-Systems Analysis is destined to be modified or replaced itself by changes and shakeups in the system and the underpinning knowledge structures it studies. This implicit undermining of its own foundations relates to a fundamental epistemological critique on which the Argentinian semiotician and anthropologist Walter Mignolo (2000, 2007, 2009, 2011). In his opinion, “*to open the social sciences is a welcome move, but an insufficient one*” because it “*maintains the social sciences in an overarching epistemic totality that parallels the overarching totality of capitalism*” (Mignolo 2002, 76 and 85). As the system expands, Mignolo explains, the local histories of subaltern groups become structured by the single logic of “global designs” envisioned to reinforce the coherence and expansive course of the modern world-system (Mignolo 2000, 43). These designs refer to multiple hegemonic projects, such as Christianity, Western civilization and the global market, that operate both in localities “*that devised and enacted global designs*” as in those that are pushed “*to accommodate*

themselves to global designs” (Mignolo 2000, 21). The result is that “*the world became unthinkable beyond European (and, later, North Atlantic) epistemology*” (Mignolo 2002, 90).

When displaying the evolution of Western modernity thinking on a line of shifting paradigms, the linear perspective of Western modernization theories of Weber fun via Marx to Wallerstein. In Mignolo’s reading, Weber represented the climax of a Eurocentrism that knows no frontiers, Marx propagated a Eurocentrism that explains agency in the margins within a linear framework and Wallerstein deconstructed and differentiated that framework, yet still approaches it from the core (Mignolo 2000, 3). Still, Mignolo does not completely withdraw from the world-systemic framework but makes a call for “de-colonial options” (Mignolo 2011, 295-336; see also Mignolo and Escobar 2009).¹² His appeal emerges from one of the most challenging but also promising future roads for World-Systems Analysis, located at the intersection of dependency theory and postcolonial critique (see also Grosfoguel 2008a, 99-100).¹³ In line with a broader school of de-colonial thinkers that has adopted Mignolo as one of their main spokespersons, I choose to adopt a world-systemic lens as means to uncover how coloniality and modernity are the sides of one and the same coin which we call global capitalism (Pachón Soto 2008, 12; Quijano 2000b, 539-40).¹⁴

Since the 1990s, a global debate has been opened by a heterogeneous collectivity that has defined itself as the *Modernidad/Colonialidad* or Modernity/Coloniality group (Pachón Soto 2008). The foundations of this group have been laid by the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano (1991, with Wallerstein 1992, 2000a, 2000b and 2000c; see also 2012), and the Argentinian-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel (1994, 2001), both counting as major sources of inspiration for Mignolo. They have been joined by a “second generation” including Grosfoguel (1997, 2000, 2008a, 2008b), Edgar Lander (2000) and Catherine Walsh (2007). Note that, as for dependency theory with authors as Frank,

¹² His call propagates an era postcolonial (not post-colonial) epistemology, also defined by closely related concepts of post-developmentalism, post-modernity, post-Eurocentrism or dewesternization.

¹³ While sharing a historical-critical stance towards modernity, imperialism and developmentalism, dependency and postcolonial theories demonstrate “*irreconcilable differences*”, respectively in neglecting how ethnocentric, homogenizing and dichotomist geopolitics structure culture and knowledge, and in neglecting how economic inequality and globalization structure subaltern and localized agency (Kapoor 2002, 653-61). However, exactly because a structuralist and post-structuralist perspective, and a socio-economic and a cultural-political focus constitute each other’s blind spot, these fields can and should be combined.

¹⁴ Latin-America is home to a much ampler and diverse (not exclusive Latin-American) group of critical thinkers, triggered by the colonial encounter and its heterogeneous outcome. Think of the Spaniards José Medina Echeverría (1963) and Eduardo Subirats (1994), the Bolivian Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (1987), the Bulgarian Tzvetan Todorov (1982), and the Peruvian Nelson Manrique (1993) to name just a few.

Cardoso and Faletto, the Latin-American roots of this intellectual school.¹⁵ Emerged as a direct response to the observed lack of a “decolonized” field of Latin America studies, this group subjects Wallerstein’s model to a critical deconstruction, “subalternization” or decolonization.

The Modernity/Coloniality group’s critique to the limits of the assumed totality of Western epistemology is built on the merits of world-systems thinking for adding a spatial dimension to linear Western historiography and for taking the 16th century as a starting point (Mignolo 2000, ix-xi). Yet, it reproaches Wallerstein’s theorizations for being unaware of these limits (Mignolo 2002). This critique is captured by the notion of coloniality, which explicitly “*points to the absences that the narrative of modernity produces*” (Mignolo 2007, xii). First developed by Quijano, the binding factor in their thinking is the “coloniality of power”, which points to the mechanism that enable one group to dominate, exploit and appropriate the political and productive power of a differently identified and elsewhere settled group within the modern world-system (Quijano 1992, 2000c; Mignolo 2000, 17). Although similar, coloniality does not completely equal Wallerstein’s conceptualization of “geoculture” because the latter concept conceives coloniality as separated from modernity.¹⁶ Postcolonial thinking exactly departs from their intimate connection, with underdevelopment proceeding entirely within the confines of capitalist and imperialist “development and coloniality constituting modernity’s darker side.

Coloniality is not to be confused with colonialism, the former persisting when the latter ends (Quijano 2000b). It refers to a knowledge-channelling medium which Mignolo defines as the “*colonial matrix of power*” that was put in place in the course of the 15th to 18th centuries, often metaphorically described with Eurocentrism (Mignolo 2000, 17). Through classification, institutionalization, spatial reorganization and epistemological validation, state apparatuses, university systems, clerical hierarchies and other institutions have labelled people as citizens, indigenous, peasants or any other socio-economically or culturally distinct group that was created in function of domination. This has implied processes of urbanization, road infrastructure, border control and other mechanisms of relocation of these people and is underpinned by a hegemonic discourse, the creation of words that “conceal,” that feign ignorance about the practices they pretend to designate (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010). These processes of

¹⁵ Both Dussel, at his turn strongly influenced by Todorov (1982), and Quijano founded their critique to modernization thinking on the specific role of the Americas in the formation of the world-system’s conditioning structures of knowledge. “*America was constituted as the first space/time of a new model of power of global vocation, and both in this way and by it became the first identity of modernity*” (Quijano 2000b, 533).

¹⁶ “*To understand Quijano’s coloniality of power,*” Mignolo explains, “*it is first necessary to accept coloniality as constitutive of modernity and not just as a derivative of Modernity*” (Mignolo 2002, 81). See also Grosfoguel 2008a, 95.

justification and classification explain how the expansion of the world-system is essentially accompanied by the construction of a dual imaginary, both from the inside as at the outside (Mignolo 2000, 64). In countering the dichotomizing logic underlying the hegemonic projects of the West, the margins, the local narratives, of the modern-world system are uncovered as the providers of new forms of knowledge and responsiveness, which Mignolo calls “border thinking.”¹⁷

Tapping into the local stories of Carangas, which deliver the case study of this dissertation, examples can be found in off-market (barter) exchange practices in Bolivian-Chilean border fairs, the transmission and refashioning of llama meat and weaving production techniques, but also in alternative frameworks for governance such as the Council of the Native Nation of Jach’a Karangas. Less tangibly, ‘Andean’ border thinking is also propagated through the spread of non-developmental paradigms that prioritize *vivir bien* (living well) over living “better”.¹⁸ Another vein of border thinking is in strengthening non-conformist narratives and the silenced non-linear consciousness of past, present and future through creative history writing.¹⁹ Yet, what emerges at the intersection of local histories and global designs –both “on the ground” and “underground”- is not always necessarily an act of resistance against an enemy but also of cooperation and assimilation (Mignolo 2011, 25) or co-management (Ross et al 2010), as well as co-optation and manipulation. In that sense, the question emerges whether this border thinking is still couched by or effectively goes beyond the lines of global designs.

As this epistemological intermezzo reveals, World-System Analysis’ claim to provide an emancipatory protest to modernization theories tends to convert itself into the target of this rethinking. Moreover, Wallerstein arguing that “*World-Systems Analysis is indeed a grand narrative*” (Wallerstein 2006, 21) might only further the conversion of the

¹⁷ “Border thinking, in other words, is, logically, a dichotomous locus of enunciation and, historically, is located at the borders (interiors or exteriors) of the modern/colonial world system” (Mignolo 2000, 85, see also 33, 37 and 45 and Grosfoguel 2008b).

¹⁸ “As long as we do not change the capitalist system for a system based on complementarity, solidarity, and harmony among peoples and nature, the measures we adopt will be palliatives that will have a limited and precarious character. For us, what has failed is the model of “living better” [*vivir mejor*], of unlimited development, of industrialization without borders, of modernity that disregards history, of increasing accumulation of goods at the expense of others and nature. That is why we propose the idea of “living well” [*Vivir Bien*], in harmony with other human beings and with our Mother Earth.” (Evo Morales, November 28, 2008, quoted by the Ministry of Environment and Water, translated and cited by Hindery 2013, 2). See also Henrich and Vasapollo 2011 on the ethics of “*vivir bien*”.

¹⁹ A historical expression of this “alternative” account of history is the illustrated chronicle of Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala written around 1615 and directed to King Philips III. His work covers pre-Inca times, Inca rule, and Spanish conquest, and entails a critique on the Spanish colonial institutions (Adorno 1978; Hamilton 2009). A contemporary example is the work of the THOA or Andean Oral History Workshop (Rivera Cusicanqui and Barragán 1997; Cúneo and Gascó 2014).

perspective's solidest merit into its sore spot. In response to that trap, the presented critique constitutes at once a key attack and a key effort to deal with a recurrent weak point of Wallerstein's model: the invisibility of the periphery.

1.1.4 Frontiers and frontier zones: World-System Analysis' blind spots?

A prevailing frustration with Wallerstein's systemic framework regards its limits *"to tell the history of the concentration of power in particular places without divesting the world's peripheries of agentic capacities"* (Adelman 2004, 407). An important critique regarding this point has been established by Steve Stern, who evaluated Wallerstein's model as too one-dimensional (Stern 1993, 43). Adelman warns that

"the unum may exist but that its logic doesn't explain life in the pluribus. Instead, a world system requires independent local histories that cannot be reduced to a monolithic model. Particular and variegated local developments do not reflect the absence of a working model or its incomplete penetration of its fringes" (Adelman 2004, 406).

The need for more attention to non-economic bottom-up dynamics has been particularly propagated by scholars dedicated to the study of peasants, indigenous and other peripheral groups. However, if subaltern actors are less present in world-system analysis production, it is not because they cannot or should not, but because no one took the plunge to fine-tune the theory (Hall and Felon 2009, 12). The insights distilled from such rare plunges to bring the question of agency in dialogue with the theory foreshadow the idea of "frontier" as world-system analysis' blind spot.

Recapitulating, understanding historical capitalism implies tracking its rhythm and extension, not just tracking the delineation of the system. The key thereto is the division of labour which acts as the unifying axis of the capitalist world-system, defining not simply its temporal and geographical outlines, but more importantly its expansive and contractive pulse. This pulsating flux is evidenced in the mobilization of frontiers and transformation of frontier zones. In the effort to eliminate the differences between incorporated and new regions and peoples, differentiated zones (external, peripheral and core) come to overlap. As a result of overlapping, interaction between these regions and groups becomes inevitable. The arena of this interaction is the "frontier zone". Out of this interaction, feedback links are established that nourish the course of incorporation processes. Thus, our attention is directed not only towards the simultaneous production, transformation and erasure of frontier zones of the world-system, but also to how this world-system and its expansion is produced by these frontier processes. In their elaborations on the multiplicity of (forms of) world-systems, Hall and Chase-Dunn unveiled the emergence of dynamic feedback links from the margins of those systems (Hall and Chase-Dunn 1991; 1997). *"Given that agentic action is*

at its most vigorous in such zones, and given that (sic) world-systemic change stems from border regions,” Galaty states, “we desperately require better models of human behavior in frontiers” (Galaty 2011, 12).

The notion of frontier builds further on a long tradition in “frontier studies.” This tradition started with Frederick Jackson Turner’s American frontier (1920) and, later, Webb’s *Great Frontier* (2003 [1951]) which, after a gradual reorientation of these classics in Western studies, has resulted in several historiographical reconstructions of frontiers settings.²⁰ From political-culturalist approaches, the creation of frontier zones is usually traced back to the first developments in state formation, prior to the emergence of a capitalist system (Hall and Chase-Dunn 1991; Scott 2009; Kopytoff 1987, 12-3). While taken over in economic studies, the focus on frontiers and boundaries as contact markers has also resulted particularly fruitful to anthropological research on identity formation – think about Barth’s ethnic boundaries (Barth 1970). Political and anthropological approaches have given light to field of borderland studies, dealing with either tangible or non-physical, formalized or informal separations and underscoring the paradoxical role of borders as both dividers and connectors.²¹

The contours of what will be defined below as a “world-systems frontier analysis” largely stem from the contributions of “next-generation” world-system analysts demonstrating that the multiple inputs received by core-like entities from marginal zones are constitutive to transitions in the World-System. Although Wallerstein neither denies nor excludes the possibility and potential of peripheral agency, he gives little specifications on this issue, but suggests that the creation of these zones has been constitutive to the modern world-system’s dynamism since it emerged about 500 years ago. Departing from that point and inspired by frontier-related concepts that do not necessarily or even refuse to invoke his model, several world-systems analysts have accurately shifted their to the movement of systemic boundaries and the effects of that movement. This is a shift away from classic core-driven theories of capitalist expansion that tend to fix systemic dynamics, usually stranding in one-sided theorizing.

Three lines of “frontier inspiration” stand out. In the first place, there is Thomas Hall’s very general but true principle that “(f)rontiers are where incorporation takes place” (Hall 2012, 51). Departing from a different academic tradition, Jason Moore reads world-systemic incorporation as an environmental history (Moore 2003), contending that there is a strong parallel between world-systems and earth-systems in that both experience change as initiated from/by frontier zones. In the former, these are

²⁰ Schon and Galaty 2006; see for instance Bartlett and MacKay 1989; Peacock 2009; Pohl et al. 2001; Power and Standen 1999.

²¹ Important contributions have emerged from the field of Latin-American studies, including Baretta and Markoff 1987; Herzog 1992; Weber and Rausch 1994; Baud and Van Schendel 1997, 211-42; Baud 2004, 41-86.

occurring or felt at the edges of human societies while in the latter at the edges of climatological, geological or biological zones (Galaty 2011; see also Hornborg, McNeill and Martínez-Alier 2007). From yet another angle and without using the notion of “frontiers,” Walter Mignolo’s definition of “colonial difference” expands that notion to include a “*conflict of knowledges and structures of power*” that acts both in the centre as at the edge of the modern world-system (Mignolo 2000, 16-7). In his reading, frontiers are the fissures that homogenizing pressures aim to erase by legitimizing what he calls the “colonial difference” and that subaltern groups aim to restore.

Let’s go more deeply into these three lines. What started as a research on the American South-West (Hall 1989), grew out to a fertile research field that aspires to “define the “universe” of frontiers” from “a deep global and historical perspective” (Hall 2013). By frontier, Hall refers to “a region or zone where two or more distinct cultures, societies, ethnic groups, or modes of production come into contact” (Hall 2000, 241). As “incorporated area and peoples experience profound (*sic*) effects from incorporation even when incorporation is relatively weak” (*ibid*), frontiers are not only a zone of contact, but also a zone of interaction and resistance. Whereas Hall, who can be considered as the “godfather” of world-systems frontier theories, seems to use frontiers and frontier zones often as interchangeable.²² As Hall explains, “[f]rom a global perspective, a frontier is a relatively narrow and sharp, but from nearby it is a broad zone with considerable internal spatial and temporal differentiation” (Hall 2000, 240). Here, I make a distinction between the frontier as process and the frontier zone as setting of incorporation. Both are highly mobile, suggesting the possibility of a multi-sited encounter.²³

From a different, but compatible and more concrete angle, the concept of “global commodity frontiers” addresses the same process of incorporation and differentiation. The geographer Jason Moore seizes the diaspora of silver in the wake of the conquest of the Americas to unveil the periphery as a vast and indispensable resource whose extraction (in order to prevent or mitigate relative ecological exhaustion) requires the transformation of land and labour, “*bringing the endless accumulation of capital and the production of nature in dialectical unity*” (Moore 2010b, 59; see also 2010a, no. 1 and 2 and 2010c). His definition of frontiers as strategic containers of exploitable natural resources runs in line with Barbier’s stress on the relative scarcity of those resources as the drive behind world-economic expansion and the consequent agricultural, urban and

²² Where I make a distinction between frontiers (the process) and frontier zones (the space), Hall denominates the former as “incorporation” and the latter as “frontier”, both concepts being “*closely connected, but not identical. Frontiers are concerned with the creation, transformation and elimination of boundary zones. Incorporation is about how new areas and/peoples are absorbed into and resist absorption into the world-system*” (Hall 2012, 51).

²³ Rather than frontier *stricto sensu*, Boccara adopts the notion of frontier “space” or “complex” because it includes its “hinterland” (Boccara 2005).

industrial revolutions (Barbier 2011, 7). In that sense, Moore defines historical capitalism as “a patterned and expansionary matrix of nature-society relations that responded to - and variously enabled and constrained - the gravitational pull of world accumulation” (Moore 2010a, no. 1, 34). This gravitational pull refers to the commodity frontier which gives shape to a particular ecological and economic place; the place to which I will refer as “frontier zone.”²⁴

Where Moore defines (the creation of) nature and capital as the two “material” (ecological, economic) sides of the same coin, Mignolo points to capitalism’s double “rhetorical” face, with modernity as its celebrated side and coloniality as its darker, silenced side (Mignolo 2011, xviii). And where Hall defines frontier zones as the locus of incorporation, Mignolo defines that setting as the workspace of the “coloniality of power.” With these terms, Mignolo mainly refers to epistemological incorporation and differentiation, agreeing with Wallerstein’s “metaphor” to address the historical and spatial dimensions of that process but renouncing that metaphor for being “*perceived and theorized from a perspective inside modernity itself*” rather than from the world-system’s borders (Mignolo 2000, 37). Mignolo contends that expansive powers detect and organize included-excluded differentiations which they portray through discourse as to-be-erased fissures, which he defines as “colonial difference” (Mignolo 2000, 3; see also 2005, xii and 2011). Think about the difference between the people with history and those without history or the “spaces in between” defined by Bhabha and borrowed by Mignolo (2000, 17-8). This production of internal systemic frontiers -the colonial difference “at work”- stems from multiple intercultural encounters, both physically as imaginary, and provokes de-colonial projects and counter-hegemonic voices (Mignolo 2000 and 2011, 2; see also Raj 2010 ; Ross et al 2010).²⁵

As these diverse “frontier contributions” convincingly put forward as one of the most powerful perspectives to rethink and “upgrade” world-systems analysis, they convinced me to neither add an entirely new critique nor abandon the framework altogether. To conclude this long prelude to the detailed dissection of that perspective:

“the study of frontiers illustrates how much can be learned by the study of peripheral regions and peoples and their roles in system change. Indeed, some of these processes may be visible only in peripheral and/or frontier areas. This then

²⁴ Frontier movement is constituted by “*differentiated moments within the geographical expansion of commodity production and exchange*” (Moore 2010a, no. 1, 34). The outcome of this expansive process, that is, the rise of capitalism, “*is best understood through the emergence of a peculiar kind of place, one in which the production of nature (capitalism as world-ecology) and the production of capital (capitalism as world-economy) were two sides of the same coin*” (ibid).

²⁵ A powerful and very personal expression of “border culture” sprouting from the feeling of being trapped between multiple excluding dualities is Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera--The New Mestiza* (Anzaldúa 1999).

becomes a method to explore how it is that actions and changes in peripheral areas (and semiperipheral areas) play important roles in world-system evolution. A key point here is that many if not most of these questions can only be asked from a world-system perspective, even if they must be answered in large part locally” (Hall 2013, 50-1).

1.2 A frontier perspective

1.2.1 The pulse of world-systems: multiple frontiers of incorporation

While capitalist expansion seems to simply increase at an ever accelerating rate, this ostensibly linear trend is essentially underpinned by a pulsating flux. Downward and upward movements in the medium-run are the manifestations of chronic systemic problems (respectively surfacing and being “solved”) in the *longue durée*. Wallerstein calls these chronic problems “asymptotes,” symbolizing “a line which a particular curve cannot reach in a finite space” (Wallerstein 2006, 91). In the modern world-system, these curves map the expansion of commodification, proletarianisation, state formation, mono-/oligopolization, international economic as well as political integration and of inequality. In order to get out of the downward turn of the cycle each time a chronic problem surfaces, the system is recurrently pushed towards reorganizations, either internal or external. These are processes of commensuration that will constantly be repeated, resulting in a pulsating movement towards this set of asymptotes. As these secular trends move closer (without ever reaching) towards the 100% of the curve,²⁶ the system runs into chronic problems as a logical outcome of its own in-built contradictions (Wallerstein 2006, 31). The need to restructure points to an inherent contradiction that, while the externalization of costs via absorption of “spheres” beyond control of the capitalist market economy is vital to the growth of the system, the tendency towards “commodification of everything” eventually undermines the system on the long term.

²⁶ The 100% could be envisioned as a world in which all “things” and social relations are valued in market terms, the entire population is subject to proletarianized labour relations, every spot of the planet is integrated into a nation-state and all production sectors and trade circuits are monopolized. The reason why these asymptotes are unviable is for instance visible in the dialectics of wage labour and “housewifization”, which is inherent to all forms of capitalist production (Smith et. al. 1984, cited in Dunaway 2012, 455), just as other incorporation-externalization interplays.

Internal reorganization may include the relocation of production processes, the start-up of a new production cycle or the redistribution of production rewards within the division of labour. External restructuring stems from the expansion of the geographical zones comprised by the division of labour. Both dimensions of restructuring involve a process of incorporation. As a result, the modern world-system has over time only become more capitalist, by which Hopkins and Wallerstein mean that differences between capitalist and non-capitalist production relations are levelled off, that is, “*the effective transformation of land and labor into commodities, available for contract*” (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1987, 772). Incorporation, the authors state, is “*to make what was external internal, to restructure activities in the zone so that they conformed with and fully participated in the ongoing functioning of the capitalist world-economy,*” hence not only in terms of production (market integration) but also in terms of governance (state-building) (*ibid*, 776). Mitchell explains it as the production of space and society through violent acts of alienation, that is, by converting living realities into capitalist exchange relations and fixing them within a dual logic (Mitchell 2002, 79).

The process moves in two directions, that is, in extensity as in intensity (Robinson 2004, 6-7; see also Carlson 2001). This means that incorporation does not simply equal the geographical widening but also the deepening of capitalist relations. Initially encompassing a Europe-centred system, the need for cheap labour and resources has pushed more and more regions and population groups into the arena of the modern world-system. “Horizontal” expansion subjected social relations of geographical settings that fell outside its reach to the process of commodification, followed by a “vertical” expansion that subjected the social relations of more and more spheres within those (now included) geographical settings to this process of commodification. While the first, external dimension of this movement displays the process of European expansion, the second, internal dimension is often termed “transition to capitalism” (Moore 2010a, 34) and refers to what Frank has called the “underdevelopment of development” (see *supra*) or the growth of gaps (Hall 2012, 47).

In other terms, it is stated that incorporation has a formal and a real dimension (Kaup 2013, 111-2). As the case of Spanish colonization in the Americas demonstrates, a first moment of “nominal” incorporation imposed a serious strain on Latin America’s rural population yet without adjusting their local livelihood strategies. Interestingly, this phase of primitive accumulation generated a dramatic “boomerang” effect on Spain’s long-term transformation from a marginal and fragmented country to an imperial world power. From the late 18th century on, its downgrading into the semi-periphery announced a more “effective” incorporation of its dependent colonies, implying the “real” disintegration of local livelihood strategies (Elliot 2002; Kaup 2013, 111-2; see also Wallerstein 1974, 336).

As Moore explains, “[c]apitalism did not form within Europe and then expand” but, on the contrary, is “inseparable” from the historical trajectory of multiple frontiers (Moore

2010, 37). Rather than a “package deal” of fixed reorganizations, incorporation is a spatially, historically and socially uneven process of enlargement and intensification. Its forms and directions cannot be recorded by the course of a single line, but are evidenced in the simultaneous movement of multiple frontiers of incorporation which not necessarily coincide but strongly interconnect. Spatial unevenness refers to the subdivision of newly incorporated geographical regions into external, peripheral, semi-peripheral or core zones. As the administrative as well as imaginary organization of the Spanish Americas into “conquered” and “unconquered” zones illustrates, this subdivision is internally even more differentiated with the Andean “high civilization” heartland distinguished from the “wild” fringes of colonial rule (Boccaro 2005, 31). Unevenness in time refers to the interference of conjunctures and crises. Also when a frontier may seem static, this is usually the result of dynamic counterforces that temporally balance the incorporation process. As Hall explains, a “*specific frontier often follows a complex path, a trajectory, of incorporation with successive strengthening and weakening phases*” (Hall 2000, 244). This trajectory describes a “dialectical historical process” (Dunaway 1996, 467) that can be studied for specific sites through diachronic comparison (Schon and Galaty 2006). Out of the same concern to capture multi-sited and fluctuating change, McMichael has proposed the method of “incorporated comparison” (McMichael 1990).

Speaking about incorporation relates to the exploration of systemic differences, the markers of ongoing incorporation processes. Located both at the external and internal boundaries of the system, they are traceable in both obvious economic, political and cultural variations as more “fundamental” epistemological differences that are reproduced through material (the expansion of agrarian, mining and commercial frontiers), formal (the expansion of land titles and citizenship) or discursive/symbolical (processes of cultural assimilation) changes. As commodified relations reached into the most diverse parts of the world, the differences between the zones outside and inside the external borders of a world-economic zone have vanished. Yet, not all zones bounded by the division of labour are equally strong integrated in commodity chains and the interstate system due to constant changes in technology (the distance that transport, communication, etc. innovations can cover) and legitimacy (the distance that authority can reach to) (Wallerstein 1974, 338-49). Hence, Wallerstein’s differentiation between core and peripheral zones, and the semi-periphery which acts as a kind of buffer zone.

However, despite adding this intermediary zone, integrating the factor of external resistance and stressing the growing of gaps, this representation still suggests an overly static, state-based and (economically) deterministic process that crystalizes where external zones become peripheral zones and where peripheral zones become core zones, and -although less probable- vice versa. This tends to reduce incorporation to “*the moment in which places become “hooked” into the global economy*”, ignoring the fact that

“places are continually incorporated, disincorporated, and reincorporated into the world-system” (Kaup 2013, 112; see also Wallerstein 1989, 130). In his depiction of incorporation, Wallerstein tends to turn a blind eye to agency sprouting from the room for alternative forms of organization left or created through the constant de- and re-incorporation of people and places (Hall 2012, 51). Thus, the outcome of incorporation processes can only be captured in wider and more mobile figures which we will call “frontier zones.”

1.2.2 Frontiers of incorporation (re)creating frontier zones

History is made through the continuous formation, reorganization and eventual dissolution of frontier zones. This linking or delinking of peoples and places within commodified production relations occurs through the imposition of socioeconomic and legal differences between “not-yet(-fully)-incorporated” and incorporated groups -“*the raw and the cooked*” (Lévi-Strauss 1974)- and the spatial transformations that go together with a region’s upgrading or downgrading within the world-economy (Saey and De Wachter 2004). Think about the “inclusive” demarcation of zones through trade agreements, enfranchisement, the spread of transport infrastructure or the opposite trend through practices of “self-barbarianization” (Scott 2009, x-xi) or “slumification”.²⁷ More schematically, the (re)creation of frontier zones can be envisioned as “fuzzy” zones (Hall 2012, 48) being delineated and classified as “settled” zones (as rich, acculturated or opened up), their shakeup (revolutions and reforms) and their fragmentation (impoverishment, resistance or isolation).

Closer inquiry into the formation and composition of these zones has given additional “texture” to the notion of frontier. Insights into the dialectics through which the process of incorporation and those incorporated shape each other urge for a reconceptualization of incorporation from an in-out mechanism to a more mobile process that operates along a continuum. This continuum “*runs from the complete economic domination of peripheral communities by core states... to very informal interactions between core states and isolated, independent regions*” (Schon and Galaty 2006, 252). As we are speaking about a process, the continuum has two extremities, with a very open start and a very “hooked” end, the moment of effective incorporation. In other words, the continuum runs from a maximum to a minimum of escape options. What follows is an intensification, crumbling or revision but never a fixation of that “hook”.

²⁷ Lindsey, for instance, coins the term “systemic disincorporation” to describe a particular form of spatial inequality and disconnection associated with slum areas in contemporary metropolitan cities (Lindsey 2012, 351).

In Hall's vocabulary (Hall 2000, 241-4), the continuum starts with "external arenas" where incorporation is at its weakest.²⁸ As soon there is any contact, these become "contact peripheries," although this transition is still very susceptible to local changes that may weaken (yet hardly reverse) incorporation. As incorporation processes become stronger, we speak of "marginal peripheries," which in fact cover a wide range of possibilities of coexistence. At the strongest pole of incorporation, these become "full-blown" or "dependent" peripheries, where incorporation becomes a matter of cultural assimilation rather than material adjustment. Although both poles may still benefit further refinement (Hall 2012, 51), the merits of this continuum representation is that it broadens the spectrum indicated by Wallerstein's world-systemic boundaries. It also visualizes the irregular rhythm of incorporation, fluctuating according to the interplay of incorporating forces and counterforces and developing on multiple spatial scales (local, regional, global). As "*all these levels of change interact, simultaneously and recursively, with class, ethnic, gender, economic, and political relations. Seeking a key factor for these processes is a fool's errand*" (Hall 2012, 250).

Frontiers can be thought of as the "fault lines" of incorporation. The waves that shape a frontier between its arrival and disappearance depict a "frontier trajectory." This trajectory becomes tangible through the formation and transformation of frontier zones. Whilst most attention has classically been drawn to moments or places when and where those waves accelerate as with Revolutions or in semi-peripheries, standstills equally count as instances of "frontier volatility." During such moments, frontier zones may appear as stagnated enclaves in a sea of incorporated people and places, suggesting an incapacity to join the wave. However, either way, frontier zones give shape to a very dynamic environment. Standstills are the outcome of intensive and continuous negotiation in an attempt to keep expanding frontiers of incorporation at bay. This contention over the movement of frontiers hints at frictions provoked by the asymmetric power relations that structure frontier zones. These frictions imply the operation of peripheral agency and have a repercussion on frontier trajectories.

1.2.3 Negotiation and feedback links

The settling of a new order for territorial and social control involves the restructuring of dependency relations and has an asymmetric impact that can be noted in processes of peripheralization and hegemonization. However, the dynamics of these processes remain often unrecorded, dissociating the movement of frontiers from much

²⁸ Carlson suggested even a preceding 'preparatory step' which he calls the "zone of ignorance." Carlson 2001, 2002 and 2012 cited in Hall 2012, 49.

interaction between both sides of the imaginary line. In the first theoretical conceptualizations of frontiers, notably Turner's work on the movement of the U.S. western frontier, the concept served to indicate "*the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization*" (Turner 1920 [1893], 34). Agency remained usually reduced to a one-directional transmission of "modernization." This classic interpretation has been profoundly reassessed, revealing frontiers as the locus of both contestation (war, resistance, lawsuits, intolerance, plunder, extraction, sabotage, ecological degradation, segregation) and alliance (biological symbiosis, marriage, economic partnership, political bonds and treaties, celebration, conversion, gifts). This locus is what we call the frontier zone. The increased emphasis on interactions has resulted in a wide spectrum of frontier representations, ranging from sharp lines between political states to the blurry zones shared between different ecological zones and different socio-economically, politically or culturally organized groups.

Several contributions have further explored "agency in/at/on the margin", thereby fine-tuning the presented continuum. This has resulted in a dense frontier terminology which nearly enables one to see the wood for the trees. The list of conceptual gateways into frontier processes started with Aguirre Beltrán's "region of refuge" (1967) and the "interface" of Long (1989). However, most stem from the 1990s, including the "middle ground" of White (1991), the "tribal zone" of Ferguson and Whitehead (1992)²⁹, the "double frontier" (Izko 1992), the "contested ground" of Guy and Sheridan (1998), the "hidden frontiers" of Cole and Wolf (1999) and the "negotiated peripherality" of Kardulias (1999). To expand the list even more, Cline came up with the "contested peripheries" (2000) and Scott with "Zomia" (2009). What many of the investigations that stirred these conceptualizations bear in common is the empirical case study-based evidence they provide on how peripheral groups exploit their marginality as a successful tool to prevent formal incorporation. Sprouting from the attempts to coin the observed "manipulation", the terms ranged above all capture the idea of an "in-between" space.

Regardless of how these intermediate (marginal, frontier, periphery) spaces are termed, all hint at an inconclusive stage in the transforming process of incorporation. They indicate where incorporation is "under negotiation," resulting in either formal agreements such as political borders or more informal pragmatic arrangements (Kardulias 2007, 56). Shifts in these arrangements are an indicator for frontiers becoming more open or more closed and for cross-frontier interactions becoming more incidental or more direct. This demonstrates that groups under incorporation,

²⁹ The explicit use of "tribal" is on purpose, to point out the extreme vagueness of transition zones between state and non-state territories (Hall 2012, 50).

according to the conditions of each moment and place, know to actively participate in these processes or rather to tacitly withdraw through *“the art of not being governed”* (Scott 2009). Numerous contributions have attempted to frame this resistance. Ranging from overt to covert, material or cosmologic, institutionalized to symbolic, group-based or collective strategies, such lists and models should be addressed as a very nuanced continuum.³⁰ Following other prominent world-system thinkers, Hall and Felon stress that (particularly indigenous) resistance movements and globalization fuel each other in a “countercyclical” way, having a spiral course and a timing and methods conversely proportional to the force of world-systemic processes (Hall and Felon 2009, 120).³¹

However, the efficiency and diversity of these resistance skills generally remains off record.³² This lack of attention impedes a comprehensive understanding of how *“even the most localized forms of resistance cannot be understood fully without careful attention to larger systems and global processes”* (ibid, 22). The other way around, it reveals how (which classic theories on capitalist accumulation and labour relations have failed to register) capitalist expansion fuels itself *“by attempting to divert or attach itself to other kinds of energy or logic”* (Gidwani 2008, xix). Thus, despite certain (systemic) constraints, the interaction between core and peripheral peoples is never entirely immune to a certain level of input from different logics and in particular those of history’s subalterns.

“If a profit-centered rationality anchored to a relentless logic of accumulation (...) is upheld as the deus ex machina of capitalism, then it is not clear how to talk about a social formation where that motive is contaminated, consolidated, and continuously interrupted by other logics; where institutional arrangements must work overtime to ensure that circuits of capital accumulation do not come to a grinding halt” (ibid, xxiv).

The contamination and interruption referred to by Gidwani hint at the operation of multiple and complex feedback links in the process of incorporation. Although Wallerstein’s model is punctuated with hints at dynamism and feedback loops, he does not manage to adequately address the implications of the unequal exchange that binds

³⁰ A key contribution to this nuancing has been Scott’s assessment of resistance in its covert or “everyday” disguise, the so-called “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985).

³¹ “When hegemony is weak,” they state, “states cannot afford the resources, the political capital, or the moral standing needed to crush them. When hegemony is strong, the state often has “bigger fish to fry” and finds it not worth the effort to crush the movements; it can occasionally gain moral standing by “tolerating” them or using “kinder, gentler” ways to deter them.” (Hall and Felon 2009, 136).

³² However, there is a current shift observable in the attention given to grassroots and region-wide resistance movements. On the renewed force of these movements in Latin-America and their often successful yet ambivalent dialogue with or extorted concessions from central state powers or multinationals, see for instance Stahler-Sholk et al 2008; Kuecker 2004; Cúneo and Gascó 2013; Zibechi 2012.

the modern world-systems for people who live at, on or even beyond the periphery. In his first theorizations, the input from peripheries and external zone to the world-economy remains reduced to a one way traffic of necessary and less necessary goods. In his first volume, Wallerstein establishes that “[t]he dynamics of forces at the core may lead to an expansionist pressure (as we saw happened in Europe in the fifteenth century). The system expands outward until it reaches the point where the loss is greater than the gain.” (Wallerstein 1974, 338). Movement seems to be driven from the core and its reach is explained in a quite deterministic way. Indeed, as Hall explains, incorporation “is not fully elastic. Sometimes changes engendered by incorporation are difficult or even impossible to reverse” (Hall 2013, 41).³³ However, this does not convert peripheral agents into passive recipients or constituting “devices” of capitalist expansion as is often assumed in classic interpretations of core-periphery hierarchies (Kardulias 2007, 55).

In the context of flux that marks the incorporation of groups or regions into the periphery of an expanding world-system, the dependencies that structured these groups or regions are shaken up and the room for individual agency expands (Galaty 2011, 11). This explains why, as a general rule, changes usually start in frontier zones.³⁴ However, agency emerging from the frontier is not exclusively translated into a reaction of resistance as some authors seem to suggest when describing frontier zones as “battle fields”. Only when incorporation is not perceived as unidirectional, it becomes clear that, at the one hand, incorporating forces generally never aim at complete assimilation and, at the other hand, the reactions of people in the periphery “are clearly not haphazard or irrational resistance to change but rather intelligent, often well-chosen attempts to control and resist the processes of incorporation” (Hall 2000, 259). This strategic positioning gives their resistance a sense of “subversive complicity” (Grosfoguel 1996, cited in Grosfoguel 2008a, 103) in order to enlarge the range of response options. These responses may “boomerang” the resisted impositions, for instance by developing “strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm’s length” by ironically adopting exactly the very notions designed to categorize them as peripheral (Scott 2009, x-xi). “As

³³ As emphasized by postcolonial thinkers, frontier processes entail a dimension of complicity that converts encounter into negotiation that marks the negotiators forever “so that it is impossible to recuperate any identity uncontaminated by it” (Kapoor 2002, 652; see also Bhabha 1994 and Spivak 1988).

³⁴ In Bourdieu’s explanation (1977, 168–169), core-like agents are conditioned by doctrinal ideological bases – termed ‘doxa’ – that support hegemonic structures and that are largely taken for granted, while the ideologies upheld by marginal-like actors operating along frontiers are more open to question and could evolve. Think also about Mignolo’s border thinking (and border gnosis) as a reference to frontiers as places of knowledge production; a production process that points at little crises and forms of resistance within the modern world-system (Mignolo 2000, 88). It is in the production and circulation of alternative concepts, beliefs, myths and forms of knowledge that we find evidence of the operation of subaltern geo-cultures or knowledge systems (Raj 2010; Jalata 2013; Kaup 2013).

frontiers persist,” Hall explains, “*knowledge develops on each side. Each side may use such intentional misunderstanding to manipulate relations*” (Hall 2013, 47). This indicates that peripheral agency’s probably biggest hindrance is in the appropriation, neutralization and silencing by dominant forces.

Situations whereby individuals living on the margins of world-systems set the conditions of their own incorporation -often to their own benefit- can be defined as “negotiated peripherality,”

“the willingness and ability of individuals in peripheries to determine the conditions under which they will engage in trade, ceremonial exchange, intermarriage, adoption of outside religious and political ideologies, etc. with representatives of expanding states” (Kardulias 2007, 55).

Being “*primary venues of negotiation because it is at these critical nodes that there is the greatest potential for two groups to acquire some things that their respective home ranges lack*” (*ibid*, 77), Kardulias reveals the periphery as a “zone of opportunity” where peripheral groups may manage to outline the terms of encounter. For instance, it will be verified how Andean communities, in order to construct and safeguard a “space for manoeuvre,” have obtained official recognition of their customary land tenure regulations through legal action, political alliances and violent conflict. Their mobilizations and achievements demonstrate that “*in cultural interactions, you don’t get what you deserve, you get what you negotiate*” (*ibid*, 78). While the movement of a frontier testifies a peripheral groups’ ability to negotiate over incorporation, “*neither change nor persistence should be assumed but should be determined empirically*” (Hall 2000, 245).

The impact of incorporation pressures is always asymmetrical and never innocent, yet never predictable. This unpredictability stems from the operation of complex feedback loops. This feedback creates an ambivalent dynamic often referred to as “glocalization” and is explained as follows. Frontiers are pushed by core-directed attempts to erase frictions and boundaries within and at the edge of the system, which globally appears as homogenizing pressures for a world with ever less human diversity, but frontiers simultaneously provoke responses to those pressures at those frictions and boundaries, locally appearing in processes of heterogenization. This explains the “*frequent assumption that world, transnational, or general civilizational developments follow internally consistent logics—whether it was the expansion of capitalism (in the singular), liberalism (ditto), or modernity (the same),*” which has “*sometimes made it hard to see that the heterogeneous parts were so different not because they were incompletely part of a whole, but because creating the whole was itself a heteronomous process and thus could not help but yield to diverse parts*” (Adelman 2004, 405).

In other words, the impression that the waves of incorporation proceed towards an elimination of frontiers is constantly countered by the observation of human creativity contesting and (re)creating frontiers. Without pretending to predict the outcome of this

interconnectedness, researching agency of/in/at the periphery tells us not only something about how world-systems have formed and transformed marginal zones, but also how human agents in marginal zones have transformed world-systems. It is this double incorporation-differentiation dynamic of frontier processes, the accompanying (re)creation of room for autonomy, negotiation and resistance and its boomeranging effects which I aim to study.

Chapter 2

Thwarted incorporation: Negotiating labels and land in the Andes.

*Naya saparukiw jiwypaxitaxa nayxarusti, waranqa,
waranqanakaw tukutaw kut'anipxani...*
Tupac Katari (1781)⁵⁵

This chapter applies the abstract notions expounded in chapter 1 to a specific frontier zone, that of the rural Andes, which can be defined as a rural peasant zone. “Rural zone” can be defined as a geographically dispersed frontier zone of the world-system, including both old (external incorporation) and new (internal differentiation) frontier zones where different production modes (industrial-extractive, commercial, agrarian sectors) are in sustained contact with each other. Zones composed by household-based communities that guarantee their subsistence through (yet not exclusively) non-industrial and non-commercial agrarian production forms, that maintain (a degree of) local autonomy over their essential means of production (land, labour, capital and knowledge), and that are subject to (a degree of) supra-local extraction, are peasant zones. Since they came into contact with the modern world-system, the people and places that make up these zones are not and have never been able to escape the pressures for incorporation.

Moreover, this chapter specifies a particular frontier process; that of land rights commodification, which –as any frontier process– can be tracked in the imposition of juridical-administrative regulations that intend to create spaces of control and

⁵⁵ “*You will only kill me, but I will return and I as millions.*” These are the words attributed to Tupac Katari, Aymara leader in the indigenous rebellion of 1781 in Alto Peru, warning the Spanish before they quartered him. Ever since, these words have inspired and spurred indigenous resistance movements (Webber 2010, 269).

classification. Guy and Sheridan explain that incorporation shapes “zones of historical interaction where ... different polities contend (sic) for natural resources and ideological control, including the right to define categories of people and to determine their access to those resources” (Guy and Sheridan 1998, 10). Their geopolitical approach to the dynamics provoked by the expanded reach of hegemonic control links up to economic-ecologic approaches that refer to zones of reorganization in function of the extraction of strategic resources (Barbier 2011). These reorganizations are triggered by the identification of peripheral zones as an indispensable “breathing space” for expansion that needs to be “enclosed,” for instance through the reduction of open to closed common-property land tenure, the conversion of nature into extractable commodities and the moulding of categories of belonging into citizenship.

As a result, the “breathing space” for people with an alternative or free access to certain resource pools, their room for manoeuvre, has been effectively reduced over time and across the planet. These reorganizations intend “less to make them productive than to ensure that their economic activity was legible, taxable, assessable, and confiscatable or, failing that, to replace it with forms of production that were” (Scott 2009, 5). However, seldom these reorganizations manage to straightforwardly and completely neutralize the manoeuvring capacity of groups that are pushed into a homogeneously envisioned sphere of governance. Paraphrasing Scott, this capacity provides those targeted groups with an art to “hack” the governed space in order to allow (a degree of) self-governance. In the context of the rural (peasant and indigenous) Andes, this self-governance corresponds is constructed in the sphere of the community.

Maintaining a room for manoeuvre nonetheless implies their engagement in daily negotiations with the State and the market, and the local organizational frameworks and power groups that channel these negotiations. It is this combination of interaction and independence, rooted in the ability to carve out concessions but also to reconcile to supra-local control systems, that provides peasant and/or indigenous communities with a “frontier” position from where they can tap into different (more, less or not-incorporated) spheres to advance alternatives. This generates the mentioned feedback reaction. However, the context (and “provocation”) of an expanding inter-state system with ever more elaborated state-based legitimacy claims and an ever more dire need for marketable resources places a growing strain on the contours and autonomy of the Andean “communal room for manoeuvre.”

2.1 *Campesinos* and *indígenas*: Labels of incorporation.

"It is certainly true that rural-dwelling, farming and herding speakers of Aymara and/or Quechua, those whom city people and *vecinos* [non-indigenous villagers] call *indios* or *campesinos*, are the least privileged, most maligned and disfavored sector of Bolivian society, suffering a degree of stigmatization greater than that of the recent migrant from the countryside to city. This helps to account for the fact that, in most of the countryside, there is for such people no unstigmatized term of reference to address." (Abercrombie 1998, 46).

While this research developed, I detected a specific need to reassess labels of indigeneity, peasantry, rurality and “Andeanness” and their stigmatizing/empowering capacity within the context of systemic expansion. In contrast to the Andean conception of reality as divided into “complementary dualisms” or balanced differences that allow “*oppositions [to] co-exist without negation*”, liberal universalist ideas underlying the world-system’s geoculture are oriented towards dividing and labelling reality into dichotomous parts (Mignolo 2007, xvi-xvii; Postero 2006; Andolina, Radcliffe, and Laurie 2009). The act of categorization seems to presuppose the existence of neatly delineable homogeneous groups but in fact constitutes the act of inventing and creating those groups, contributing to the disconnection of societal structures from their historical trajectory.⁵⁶ The historian’s task is thus to reconnect (Gruzinski 2001; Subrahmanyam 1997), to break the moulds imposed through classification and dichotomization. The roots of these conditional mechanisms in the commodification of spaces and peoples lay in modernity; the invention of universalism. Latour has defined the imposition of a nature-culture dichotomy as modernity’s most essential feature (Latour 1993). Once installed that rupture, the substitution of pluralism by an improbable homogeneity was just one step away, allowing for the imposition of “*principles true in every country*”, achievable through capital and superior to deviant principles (Mitchell 2002).

Through the widening and deepening of commodified spaces, the people that make up these spaces have been designated, have asserted and contested particular socio-

⁵⁶ A discrepancy exists between the perception of categories and their markers as abstract or invented products of state intervention versus their conception as concrete and instrumentalizable emanations from social reality, but in either way this “fabrication of difference” relates to colonially inherited mechanisms of control (Lestage and Salazar-Soler 2013). Yet, the act of “positioning” oneself is not unique to the world-system. Aymara people identify themselves for instance as *jaqi* or “the proper people”, and refer to outsiders as *q’ara*. As the citation above indicates, this positioning logically interacts with the way in which non-peripheral groups position themselves in the core and thereto label others as *campesinos* or -in moments of conflict- *indios* and intermediary groups that “invade” the space of social privilege of “stigma” groups (Abercrombie 1998, 46).

economic and ethno-cultural categories of “not-yet-incorporatedness.” Their categorization as “under incorporation” crystallizes in labels of *campesinos*, *indígenas* and *comunarios*, pointing to partly overlapping peasant livelihoods and indigenous identities (Barragán 2000, 143-68). The detected distinctions upon which these labels are constructed have been subjected a process of commodification. This “levelling off” of markers of peripherality targets community-based structures, such as property, exchange and labour relations, and contributes to the convergence of the world of the community with the boundaries of world-systemic institutions/categories.

Thus, classification is functional to the capitalist world-system’s expansive drive and materializes through a process of “racial mapping” and the construction of a legal framework to incorporate new population groups (Mignolo 2000, 53). At the same time, categorization is also an act of homogenization, of blurring and silencing the differences among peripheral groups and their historical trajectories. In the process, distinctive features have been merged under an umbrella stigma of the poor, the marginalized. The colonial encounter stands as a crucial turning point in the creation and amalgamation of overlapping categories of “peripherality.” However, the instrumentalization of these categories works in both ways and fluctuates over time.⁵⁷

In the Andes, this encounter entailed the inclusion of the natives as “vassals” of the Crown and their simultaneous classification into stratified racial groups, producing “*the meltdown of highly differentiated subcultures into one seamless category of “Indian” peasantry*” (Larson 1995, 23). This “meltdown” also left an impact on the categorization of the region, insinuating an idyllic picture of a rural world dominated by a distinctive environment and free from capitalist developments. This picture has served as the model for “Andeanness” or what is termed as *lo andino*. As Bebbington states, “*an initially historicized and hybridizing notion of lo andino thus totters on the brink of essentialism*” rooted in a certain nostalgia for the “truly” and “traditional” Andean as opposite to anything “modern” (Bebbington 2000). If this dissertation would have been restricted to the mere exercise of how to fit in a case region as nicely as possible into an *andino* mould, it would have been an easy exercise given that the Carangas region almost perfectly matches the idealized prototype of the highland community directly imported from a pre-colonial past. Yet, this leaves ethnohistory out of account.

Particularly from the 1980s on, post-colonial critiques have consciously warned for the distorted view on peripheral agency due the act of categorization, triggering a rich vein of ethnohistorical research that has destabilized the assumptions structuring that

⁵⁷ Devés-Valdés terms the positioning of oneself and one’s larger group of belonging in relation to the centre with “peripheral consciousness” (Devés-Valdés 2012, 466 and 469-74).

act. Similar to what elsewhere is called “history from below,” Andean ethnohistory⁵⁸ emerged from historians and anthropologists’ shared attentiveness towards the ways in which Andean social actors coped with and mediated colonial and post-colonial market and state transformations rather than to undergo them. The research agenda that backed this endeavour comprised the study of everyday pursuits of livelihood and everyday forms of resistance.⁵⁹ The outcome was twofold. First, by revealing practices of indigenous market participation without complete assimilation.⁶⁰ This seriously challenged historical determinism on global capitalist forces to restructure colonial hinterlands,⁶¹ however without “*implicitly celebrating Andean commercial ingenuity (the homo economicus of the mountains!) or reifying peasant resistance*” (Larson 1995, 18-20). Second, by revealing “*rural communities as historical constructions, and as the locus of struggle and change*” (ibid, 19) which allowed for the deconstruction of the allegory of “lo andino” (Bonilla 2007).⁶²

These struggles with determinism and agency are provoked by an inherent mechanism of the modern world-system, the act of categorizing. This mechanism lays the foundation for two “old” questions that have set the framework of our understanding of the fate of the peasantry and of native peoples as capitalism widens and deepens. Commonly branded as the peasant question and the Indian question, their formulation and reformulation has a political dimension and “*reflect (sic) the very structure of the society.*”⁶³ Our limited understanding of the indigenous and peasant encounter with the global forces of capitalist expansion stems from the distortion of socio-economic distinctions (peasants as a class) and ethnic distinctions (indigenouness as a cultural identity) into categories of passivity (Mann 2005, 1-27; Sturgis 2006).

In this section, these questions and their entanglement will be further explored in the Andean context, where both question run as overlapping leitmotifs throughout the historical trajectory of Andean communities. The undeniable and very powerful connection between ethnicity and social status in the region reflects a shared and influential experience of the demographically dominant population groups (Albó 2008, 13). Some previous notes must be made to understand this connection. In most basic

⁵⁸ Pioneers of (Andean) ethnohistory are Murra (2002), Pease (1991) and Rostworowski (1988).

⁵⁹ See for instance Grieshaber 1980; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; Platt 1982a; Langer 1989; Albó and Barnadas 1985; Mallon 1983.

⁶⁰ Examples are Rivera Cusicanqui 1978; Spalding 1970; Platt 1987; Glave 1983; Choque Canqui 1991.

⁶¹ See the Stern-Wallerstein debate (Wallerstein 1988).

⁶² To name just a (very) few: Wachtel 1990; Moreno and Salomon 1991; Bonilla 1991; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne and Harris 2006.

⁶³ Barraclough and Domike 1970 [1966], 41-4, cited in Roseberry 1993, 321.

terms, “peasant” is a way to distinguish individuals or a group in terms of their socio-economic organization, “indigenous” is a way to identify an individual or group in terms of their socio-cultural organization. The former group is usually delineated on basis of – and located at the edge of- the contours of the prevailing market sphere, the latter is delineated on basis of –and located at the edge of- the contours of the prevailing ethnic groups (denoted as “civilizations”). While it must be stressed that the labels of peasant and indigenous are indeed not identical and moreover overlap with multiple other (gender, linguistic, national, rural-urban, regional) identities, they both refer to a set of claims that may coincide, but do not necessarily.

Here, a difference must be made between flexible socio-cultural self-identifications and closed statistical-juridical imposed categorizations; in the former they may overlap, the latter they either coincide or contrast.⁶⁴ Either way, they are subject to political appropriations which constantly pressures the imposition of “permitted” (read: controllable) peasant or indigenous identities.⁶⁵ In politically less favourable times, peripheral groups may turn to alternative categories,⁶⁶ but when conditions alter, stigmatized references may be revaluated and adopted as a honorary nickname, which political projects and intermediaries may attempt to instrumentalize.⁶⁷ The bottom-line is that all categorizations are structured by unequal power relations and therefore change according to one’s position in relation to the centre.

⁶⁴ In Bolivia, the agricultural censuses of 1960 and 1984, indigenous and peasant were applied to rural communities as a single juridical category. Anticipating to the agricultural census of 2013, peasant-supporting organizations insisted on the use of differentiated categories.

⁶⁵ The separation and merging of both categories remains subject to recurring political games, also in the processes of Bolivian state-formation. The Bolivian revolutionary state of 1952 “converted” indigeneity into peasantry while its neoliberal version, backed by international institutions, adopted an oblivious stance towards class conflict in the name of “multiculturalism” (Albó 2008, 32). In 2013, the distinction and mixing of these categories generated an escalation of ongoing struggles between the current MAS government and one of the country’s key indigenous movements, the CONAMAQ. Whereas the government party generalizes the overlap, CONAMAQ insists on the impossibility of such overlap. In CONAMAQ’s reading, Bolivia’s new constitution tends to equal “*originario*” with “*campesino*”, denying the difference between those groups that maintain their ancestral form of organization (indigenous) and those that have ‘replaced’ that form with the syndicalist model (peasant). Attempts to nuance both stances in the public debate remain usually silenced as pronouncements get easily stigmatized as either pro or contra any of both stances. See also Erbol, 12.07.2013.

⁶⁶ Exemplary is the insistence of community dwellers on their identity as “merchant” -as happened in the community of Culta, Norte de Posotí (Abercrombie 1998, 46)- or “livestock breeder” -as happens in Turco, Oruro department (own field work 2008-2009).

⁶⁷ This happened with the establishment of peasant unions in the context of the Bolivian land reform of 1953, serving as an instrument to channel peasant claims into clientelist ties (Crabtree and Chaplin 2013, 36-54) or in the rise of paternalistic pro-indigenous movements that provide external spokespersons with a platform to represent indigenous voices (see also Coronado 2009).

In order to make this overlap workable without falling back into essentialist allegories, I will adopt relatively open definitions that allow the integration of several forms and scales of action. Therefore, I prefer to focus on the community as the framework for intersecting peasant and indigenous identities. In the case of Bolivia, Albó and Barrios have defined these frameworks as *comunidades campesino indígenas* or “indigenous peasant communities” (Arteaga 2006, 509), which was later “expanded” to *comunidades indígenas originarias campesinas* and adopted by the Bolivian constitution as a legal category for autonomy (“Constitución Política del Estado” 2009, Art. 32). Apart from this academic-juridical coinage, the Aymara name for these institutions, the *ayllu*, is still in place (and will be used in this dissertation). The members of these formations will be referred to as *comunarios*.

2.1.1 Old and new peasantries (the peasant question)

The most general way to define the peasantry is on basis of a particular production mode; peasants live from the land. However, rather than a neutral archetype of anyone working the land, peasants are defined by specific power relations they maintain with other social groups and states. Peasants are controlled and their resources extracted, yet uphold a certain degree of autonomy over their (family) labour and resource base (Van der Ploeg 2010, 22). More specifically, I follow the definition that peasants are

“members of rural, agricultural households who control the land they work either as tenants or as smallholders. They are organized in family bonds and village communities that meet a large part of their subsistence needs (production, exchange, credit, protection) and they pool different forms of income (from land, labor, and exchange). They are ruled by other social groups that extract a surplus either via rents, via (non-balanced) market transfers, or through control of state power (taxation).” (Vanhaute 2008, 42-4).

Their autonomous strategies for subsistence and protection convert peasantries into reserves of cheap labour, which links them to broader frameworks of production and control (Smith and Wallerstein 1992 in Vanhaute 2008, 40 and 47). Founded in the contested allocation of land and labour, peasantries constitute a social process (Shanin 1987, 6). They are “*the historical outcome of an agrarian labor process which is constantly adjusting to surrounding conditions, be it fluctuations of climate, markets, state exactions, political regimes, as well as technical innovations, demographic trends, and environmental changes*” (Bryceson et al. 2000, 2–3). This adjustment shapes differentiated trajectories moulded by internal reconfigurations, external pressures and articulations with “the outside world” in which land and labour figure as central vectors. Therefore, we should speak about peasantries in the plural, both old and new peasantries as the outcome of the (re)creation of essential (social and ecological) frontiers of the modern world-

system. This implies that “*the role and fate of peasantries in the last few centuries can be understood only in regard to the rise of historical capitalism as an integrated societal model*” (Vanhaute 2008, 52). The other way round, capitalist (labour division’s) expansion is inherently linked to the cycles of reconstruction and marginalization of peasant societies (Vanhaute, Cottyn and Wang 2014a).

Understanding the role of peasantries within broader processes of change is at the heart of what has been framed and reframed as “the peasant question” by Marxist thinkers, modernization theorists, dependency theorists, world-systems analysts, post-colonial theorists, etc. Gidwani lays the origins of the ongoing debate in “*a gap between observed phenomena and the predictions (and embedded political desires) of theory, concerning the prospects of a capitalist transformation of agriculture*” (Gidwani 2008, xv). Within classic Western modernization thinking, this gap is perceived as a wound, converting the peasant question in the challenge of how to suture this wound as a precondition for national development. In Marxist terminology, this equals the capitalist transformation of agriculture through industrialization, which implies processes of depeasantization and polarization (*ibid*, xvi). “Born” at the turn of the 20th century in a Russian context, the debate over that transformation was shaped by a dual economy view, first formulated by Chayanov in 1925, whose vision contrasted with that of Lenin and Kautsky formulated in 1899. The “Chayanov-Lenin debate” could be summarized as the discussion whether agrarian change is determined by respectively internal or external factors of the peasant household (Roseberry 1993, 334) and settled the peasant persistence vs. disappearance thesis as the determinant opposition of the field of peasant studies (Araghi 1995).⁶⁸

In the latter half of the 20th century, Latin America has proven to offer particularly fertile ground for the re-discovery of the topic of agrarian change and its implications for peasant households (Roseberry 1993). It was here that a strong critique to the common assumption of a universal historical scheme based on modern-traditional separations, suggested by the Russian “founding fathers” developed. Departing from enquiries into the feudal or contrariwise capitalist character of the hacienda, dependency theorists reframed the question within a dialectical and mutually reinforcing relationship. Yet, this developmentalist phase of the peasant question continued to adopt a dichotomous framework in which the local (the villagers) and the global (“the structure of society”) appeared to exist disconnected from each other

⁶⁸ One side of that field is occupied by the teleological disappearance thesis in which the expansion of capitalism equals the eventual conversion and hence evaporation of peasant producers into capitalist and proletarianized producers (Lenin and Kautsky). The other side holds to the essentialist permanence thesis in which peasant producers survive as capitalism expands (Chayanov).

(Roseberry 1993, 328-30; Edelman 2005, 337).⁶⁹ From the middle of the 1970s on, a new generation of anthropologists and historians re-discovered the peasantry, taking up the effort to counter difficultly ineradicable reductions of peasant resilience to exceptional eruptions of an otherwise “*inert force - dormant, traditional, or ineffectual*” (Roseberry 1993, 318).⁷⁰ By writing “from below”, they attempted to give more texture to the variety of peasant experiences, preferably as detailed as possible. However, while this generation includes authors whose work still counts as *incontournable*, their writings would eventually become condemned for propagating essentialist, dualistic and linear interpretations, although in a less direct way than the pioneering peasant literature such as Chayanov.

When the exclusive focus on local knowledge was identified as too disproportionate, the lens was redirected once more. In view of the effects of neoliberal globalization as well as the reinforced vitality of peasant resistance, the field of peasant and agrarian studies has witnessed a renewed interest in peasant disappearance and persistence theses over the last two decades (Bernstein 2003 and 2010; Barkin 2004; Johnson 2004; McMichael 2006; Van der Ploeg 2010).⁷¹ Averse from a-historical interpretations of rectilinear subsistence-to-capitalism transformations, the agrarian question has been taken beyond the parameters of its classic reading. As the important contribution compiled by Kay and Akram-Lohdi (2008) testifies, this goes together with an increasing attentiveness towards integrating a global perspective in a less or more balanced way with local narratives, and theoretical with empirical analysis.

Triggered by the rise and globalization of agrarian and food crises, the regained academic attention towards peasantries and their livelihood strategies demonstrates an increasing awareness of the environmental⁷² and the sovereignty⁷³ dimensions of the

⁶⁹ Influential peasant literature of the 1960s-70s include the work of Polanyi 1958; Wolf 1966; Moore 1966; Frank 1969; Stavenhagen 1970; Hobsbawm 1973; Mintz 1974; Kay 1974; Paige 1975; Bartra 1974; Pearse 1975; and Scott 1976.

⁷⁰ Shanin 1987 delivered an essential contribution to the establishment of this generation. Peasant scholars were particularly productive in the Andean region with key publications including Duncan and Rutledge 1977; Martínez-Alier 1977; Custred and Orlove 1980; Mallon 1983; Dandler and Calderón 1984; Figueroa 1984; Albó and Barnadas 1985; and Stern 1987.

⁷¹ Contrary to Hobsbawm’s interpretation (1994), the current that has gained most legitimacy upholds that the complexity of peasants’ “agrarian way of life” (in the sense that its internal family- and community-based labour regulations allow the coexistence of subsistence and commodity production) undermines linear interpretations of the disappearance of such way of life (Johnson 2004; Bryceson 2000). Indeed, “*the campesino of today is usually not the campesino of even 15 years ago*” (Borras, Edelman and Kay 2008, 83), but the impact that agro-food systems undergo due to shifts in the international division of labour is nothing new to that campesino, except for the acceleration and intensification of those shifts (Borras 2009).

⁷² Moore presents “*the Agrarian Question as Ecological Question—whose world-historical import is profoundly intertwined with the others, but whose significance (up to now) has been unevenly appreciated*” (Moore 2008, 57).

agrarian/peasant question and point to their political repercussions.⁷⁴ Urbanization, land grab, the loss of food security and unequal income structures are just some of the high priorities on the world policy agenda that are intimately connected to the peasant question. This revitalisation of the field and its stronger global focus involves a more intensively mobilizing peasantry (McMichael 2008). From the local to transnational scales, peasant movements are asserting the importance of as well as the difficulties for family-based sustainable production modes within an ever more globalising world (Altieri 2002; Altieri and Nicholls 2005; Petras 2005). Movements such as the Via Campesina contest the supposed linear outcome of long-term incorporation.⁷⁵ The declining centrality of rural zones in the modern world-system is just one aspect of a more complex process that involves the production (peasantization), erosion (depeasantization) and recovery (repeasantization) of a peasant lifestyle. These are interdependent processes that closely entangle with processes of de/re-ruralization (transformations in the spatial ordering of agriculture) and de/re-agrarianization (transformations in agricultural production) (Vanhaute 2008).⁷⁶

As the effects of the widening (expansion) and deepening (intensification) of relations of commodification trigger a diversification of peasant livelihood strategies,

⁷³ By posing the classical agrarian question as a “food question”, McMichael reveals the inherent question of sovereignty, thereby inverting its original focus. “*Rather than raising questions about the trajectory of a given narrative, the food sovereignty movement questions the narrative itself*” (McMichael 2008, 218-9).

⁷⁴ Borras 2009; Boutsen 2008; Peemans 2008; De Schutter 2014. See also the contributions in the Symposium on the 2007-2008 World Food Crisis published by Journal of Agrarian Change (Johnston 2010, 69-129).

⁷⁵ Commenting on the international peasant movement Via Campesina, Borras concludes that “*today, perhaps more than ever, what happens in and in relation to the rural world is critical to our understanding of the broader world and the very future of human society*” (Borras 2009, 25). See also <http://viacampesina.org>.

⁷⁶ The break-up of local models for socio-economic organization and cultural-spiritual belonging through state intervention facilitates a process of peripheralizing incorporation, defined as peasantization. The conscious creations of peasantries is particularly obvious in more extractive societies (Vanhaute 2012, 5) as in colonial regimes where collective forms of agricultural labour are replaced by more regulable forms of based on family firms with a more direct access to markets. But also post-colonial land reforms tend to have an agenda oriented at “peasantizing” the rural masses, think of Bolivia’s revolutionary land reform of 1953 (Rivera 1987, 100; Urioste 2001, 11-2). Ecological, technological and infrastructural changes, demographic trends, political-legal impositions and the intervention of new economic players may alter the access to land, labour and/or capital in these reorganized models, thereby undermining of the family basis of small-scale agricultural producers. The consequent process of depeasantization, goes together with deagrarianization as the income pooling strategies of peasant populations become less reliant upon agriculture (Vanhaute 2012, 6). Similarly, de-ruralization, most strongly observed in the reverse side of worldwide urbanization, can be considered as a major world-historical tendency (Mears 1997 cited in Johnson 2004, 60). Simultaneously, we can speak of a repeasantization, pushing non-rural workers to peasant spaces in times of market contraction or the creation of a New Rurality visible in urban-rural linkages, the diversification of rural livelihoods with non-agricultural income sources, political decentralization, etc. (Rosas-Baños 2013; Hecht 2010).

what globally seems to disappear in essence constitutes an essentially uneven and regionally diverse process. The fact that powerful, apparently universal, trends do not automatically nor inevitably proceed towards the vanishing and elimination of existing “to be incorporated”-zones, exposes peasants as “*initiators of change as well as reactors to it, as peoples simultaneously disposed to “adapt” to objective forces beyond their control and to “resist” inroads on hard-won rights and achievements*” (Roseberry 1993, 318). Rather than assessing this combination of autonomy and participation claims in terms of opposition (or even ineptitude to) versus openness to (or even craving for) capitalist incorporation, it attests to a “moral economy” according to which peasants bargain survival guarantees with their “extractors”, through “confrontations in the market-place” which may include rebellion as well as taxation and trade relations (Thompson 1970 and 1991, 259-351; Scott 1976; Edelman 2005). This resilience is key factor in the production of new and deviation of old frontiers of land control.

2.1.2 Indigenous autonomy (the Indian question)

Whereas peasantries are principally defined in socio-economic terms, indigenous peoples are usually defined in terms of a recoverable cultural-political identity. However, indigeneity is in essence a juridical category that forms the basis for the identification, delineation and allocation of individual and collective land, territorial and resource rights to ethno-cultural groups. As an effect of colonial and liberal projects, the arbitrary, flexible, historically and geographically conditional character of indigeneity has been enclosed into taxpayers lists, censuses and other statistical tools as well as into a global political category set against nation-state-bound categories (Canessa 2012; CEPAL 2005; Zagalsky 2009; Albó 2008). Over time, several determinants (residence, language, auto-identification) have served different categorizations, ranging from the most oppressive notion of Indian (*indio; la indiada*),⁷⁷ and apparently more constructive notion of indigenous (*indígena*) or the more recent self-ascription of “originary” (*originario*), insisting on priority connections between group and locality. Yet all these categories are subject to historical reductionism and legal-fiscal uniformization (Barragán 2000, 143-68; Subirats 1994).⁷⁸

⁷⁷ While “indigenous” stems from a positive empowering discourse it may also conceal the discrimination of the *indio*, hence “*one can be comfortably indigenous; one can never be comfortably indian*” (Canessa 2012, 8-9). See also the work of Reinaga (1969).

⁷⁸ This confronts population groups with self-categorization dilemmas, for instance in the context of census operations or the reclamation of certain rights exclusively attributed to certain groups. Examples are the debates in Bolivia and Peru provoked by the entanglement of indigenous (self-)identification with categories

From an exclusive/silencing category, indigeneity underwent only recently a more inclusive/emancipatory redefinition as the legal basis for indigenous claims.⁷⁹ In international law, the UN definition counts as the most accepted classification of indigenous peoples:

“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system” (Cobo 1987).

This “identifixation” started after the Spanish invasion and is informed by a long history of rights attribution in international law. Or rather the other way round, the claim upon indigenous rights constitute the *raison d'être* of international law (Anghie 2007). Exactly because of the civilization discourse designed to justify the world-system's drive for new resources, peoples and places that were to be exploited and subordinated, the colonial encounter and subaltern agency were far from peripheral concerns to the development of international legal frameworks. This worked as follows, “jurists using the conceptual tools of positivism postulated a gap, understood principally in terms of cultural differences, between the civilized European and uncivilized non-European world; having established this gap they then proceeded to devise a series of techniques for bridging this gap, of civilizing the uncivilized” (ibid, 37). In other words, framing means closing (a self-created gap). Here lay the foundations of the Indian question; the attempt to suture this gap by capturing its development within a logical and predictable evolution, as happened with the peasant question. Sprouting from a classic, Turnerian reading of intercultural frontiers in terms of strict boundaries, this attempt has been dominated by the idea of the “vanishing Indian”, founded in a dichotomous model of tightly

of citizenship in the context of census operations (Tamburini 2013) or with the conditions set by (international) legal frameworks to grant indigenous groups specific rights such as consultation –and hence negate that right to differently (self-)identified groups (Rousseau 2012; Anchante 2013a-b).

⁷⁹ Parallel with the reinforcement of peasant movements and resistance, the struggle for indigenous rights has revamped since the 1990s. While indigenous people reinforced their organizations, international players such as the International Labour Organization (the 169 Convention), the UNO (the 2008 declaration) and NGOs “discovered” the indigenous people as a relevant line of approach and developed a “language of global indigeneity” which was again appropriated by indigenous organizations themselves as a lobby strategy (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lucero 2008). This tendency has been particularly visible in Latin-America -not the least in Bolivia (Albó 1991; Quijano 2006)- yet erroneous representation of this indigenous resurgence as “novel” reveals the reproduction of false anachronisms (Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005).

incorporated zones of unilateral assimilation versus distanced zones of stubborn persistence (Boccarda 2005, 20). This has resulted in a perception of indigenous people as “impervious to history,” either due to their “ignorant and malevolent obstinacy” or their “resistance to homogenizing imperialist forces” (Abercrombie 1998, xx).

The uncritical assumption of indigenous survival as a form of enduring/anti-historical primitivism has been cultivated by typologies constructed since the 1950s that pigeonholed the Andean indigenous community in “closed” corporate communities such as the “typical” Andean indigenous community or “open” and more capitalist communities such as haciendas or plantations (Wolf 1955). In the late 1970s, the development of a rich interdisciplinary field started to destabilize such notions out of anthropologists’ “*move towards the region [Latin America] as an effective frame of reference for studies of community formation and linkage with a wider world,*” and the intersected (re-)discovery of the region by historians (Roseberry 1993, 347).⁸⁰ Andean ethnohistory was born out of this intersection, revealing how nearly all indigenous groups (the only exception being “undiscovered” groups of the planet’s remaining rainforests) are open, and often proof to be indispensable, to other sectors of society for the supply of products. In parallel with the development of postcolonial and subaltern studies, the academic engagement with the Indian question has gradually moved towards a more permeable and malleable notion of encounter.⁸¹ Rather than simply reversing the black-white picture of domination and oppression, this picture is revealed as a criss-cross of resistance, acceptance and appropriation reactions. Only when grasping these nuances of interaction it is possible to understand the historical invention, appropriation and re-invention of what it means to be *indigenous*, *indio*, or Aymara, and the associated “long memory” of mobilization and political organization (Rivera 1987; Albó 2008, 14).

By actively cooperating with or averting from state-based and capitalist modes of organization in view of short- or long-term opportunities, the common claim “to exist as separate entities” from the process of globalization is overruled by the indigenous groups themselves (Baud 2009, 24; Lucero 2008). It is this participating while retaining their distinct identities that makes indigenous cultures more authentic rather than inconsistent. Indigenous groups, when organizing against “*the dispossessionary dynamics*

⁸⁰ Antecedents to that move include Wolf 1955, Murra 1975, Rowe 1957; the anthropologists include Orlove 1977 and Smith 1989; the historians include Spalding 1988, Larson 1988, Stern 1982, Mallon 1983.

⁸¹ Guerrero and Platt 2000, 95-113; Boccarda 2005; Mallon 1994. Wachtel’s pioneering reassessment of the colonial encounter from the perspective of “the vanquished” still counts as one of the most elementary contributions to the field of Andean ethnohistory (Wachtel 1968; 1971). The shift his work initiated was carried in Bolivia on under impetus of the subaltern studies, were introduced in the 1990s thanks to people such as Silvia Rivera and Rossana Barragán, whose efforts, backed by academics such as Alison Spedding, Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar or Luis Tapia, made the work of non-Spanish radical thinkers accessible in a country with no tradition of translation.

of agrarian capitalism”, expose an ability to understand the entanglement of macro and micro scales of capitalism instead of reading them as mutually exclusive (Ghosh 2010). Yet this capacity does not neutralize the undeniable discord in their participation. This discord does not stem from a “primordialistic” claim, but is rooted in a holistic understanding of human-nature relations that is reflected in the collective structures that order indigenous life.⁸² The claim to persist as non-state and noncapitalist entities and the challenge of communal organization to privatization and commodification mechanisms entail a fundamental questioning of capitalistic processes that makes indigenous anti-systemic resistance more “real” than other social movements.⁸³ At the other hand, this external and “real” discord does not make internal disharmonies less persistent or real; on the contrary (Izko 1992).

In view of indigenous peoples’ claim to seek assimilation with nor isolation from state and capitalist frameworks, I will determine their position within the world-system - following Kardulias- as a “negotiated incorporation.” This negotiation is oriented towards the safeguarding of a room for self-determination. Key to that self-determination is the right to land and territory.

“The driving force of the history of Indigenous peoples in Latin America is the struggle for territory. This is something that has been difficult for the traditional academy to comprehend. If we examine peoples’ uprisings throughout history – in the colonial era, the liberal moment, currently – they have always been for the defense of territory. For its defense, but also for the drive for territorial sovereignty and self-government” (Gladys Tzul, translated by Cuffe in Hernández 2014).

Land and territory constitute the alpha and omega of the broader Indian question of political, economic and cultural (re)production and sovereignty since that question

⁸² In contrast to nature as culture’s opposite in Western philosophical thinking, indigenous cosmovision sees nature as conditional to culture. In line with this from this nature-culture interrelation, indigenous peoples adopt and reproduce specific organizational structures characterized by (partially or wholly) redistributive economic relations, community-based political and cultural autonomy, symbiotic ecological relations, and reciprocal social networks. Subirats 1994, cited in De Munter 2003, 33-4; Hall and Fenelon 2009, 24-6.

⁸³ Hall and Fenelon (2009) and Mignolo (2011) coincide in categorizing indigenous resistance as a “real” version of what Wallerstein defines as anti-systemic movement. While most forms of resistance seek “*a larger slice of the pie or to tinker with the recipe for the pie,*” indigenous movements tend to “*reject pies in all forms, or try to live outside them,*” which is often erroneously understood as a reactionary determination “*to recapture a golden past*” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 121-2). In so doing, indigenous people position themselves as non-state people not only against individual state projects but the entire Westphalia interstate system (Wilmer 1993, cited in Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). In that sense, “*their practices may be suggestive of alternatives to the current system*” (Hall 2013, 49). Also Mignolo sees a workable alternative in the “communal” and integrates it as the cornerstone of his theory on the “decolonial option” (2011).

reached the (inter)national stage (Mariátegui 1928). Until that moment, that question largely continued to serve as a vehicle for segregation rather than incorporation. This changed under 19th century liberal projects, when “*the Andean republics came to naturalize the Indian problem and turn it into the political and rhetorical center-piece of their varied nation-building projects*” (Larson 2004, 51).

2.2 Safeguarding room for manoeuvre: State integration, market expansion and communal agency.

Central to our understanding of peasants and/or indigenous responses to processes of modernization, state formation and world market expansion is their determination and capacity to simultaneously guarantee their autonomy and participation. The combination of safeguarding (a minimum of) autonomous control over vital resources and secure (a minimum of) involvement in broader structures accounts for a multifaceted, apparently contradictory, but above all alert attitude towards globalization processes. At the one hand, peasants and indigenous resistance is founded in (the defence of) a particular way to regulate access to livelihood resources. At the other hand, their pragmatism to adapt or even assimilate to new/incorporating entities is reflected in the development of market and trade relations as well as in legal-political struggles. Understanding this “negotiated incorporation” is essential to the central interest of this research to understand the relation between the formation of supra-local land rights frameworks and the reproduction of local self-organized communities and their resource management regimes (Ostrom and Schlager 1996, 127).

In its close entanglement with processes of state formation (even those prior to the modern world-system), the question over the integration of the “vanquished” generally gives “*too much agency to the power of the “hegemonizing” state*” (Larson 2004, 9), while giving too few attention to the economic dimension (Langer 2009, 529). Rather, I will present the community/communal as an entry gate to co-existing yet different and independent local histories of subaltern (political, economic, cultural) incorporation. I conceive the community as a framework for agency beyond resistance, regardless of the (politically coloured) debate of whether this agency could/should be defined as peasant and/or indigenous. From a world-systemic perspective and averse from essentialist umbrella categories, the community will be taken as a mobilizing formation for both

self-determination and negotiation within larger, widening and deepening systems.⁸⁴ A focus on the communal character of the organization of rural life –with specific regard to land access– circumvents the trap of approaching land rights in too narrow or exclusive terms.⁸⁵

2.2.1 The communal

In Zibechi’s words, the communal relates to a continuously (re)created “social machine” of political and economic inter-individual and inter-collective links; far from an institutionalized model (Zibechi 2010, 14). In a similar style he and Mignolo, both inspired by the concrete organization of the Bolivian Aymaras and the Zapatistas, this machine is defined as operating by “dispersing” power through rotation, thereby preventing hierarchization and guaranteeing the collective control over individual usufruct and family labour (Mignolo 2011, 320 and 324; see also Patzi 2004). In the Aymara context, this communal system is known as the *ayllu*, formed by a number of extensive families who share real or artificial kinship bonds and occupy a determined space.⁸⁶ Too often, the *ayllu* has served Andeanists or scholars less familiar with the area to sketch an ideal homogeneous and closed self-sufficient mini-society, thereby intentionally or unwittingly promoting a status-quo and celebrating the community as an indicator of “Andeanness” (Nash 2001, 38).⁸⁷ At the other hand, neither should the community sphere be stressed as a locus of inherent contradiction in Andean society (Bonilla 2007, 104). On the contrary, the outlook, functioning and renovation dynamics of the *ayllu* sketch a much more complex picture.

Since the sixteenth century, community formation has become closely entangled with capitalism, while simultaneously continuing to function as the basis for self-

⁸⁴ Within the world-systemic landscape of institutions, amongst which Wallerstein distinguishes markets, firms (represented by capitalist entrepreneurs), states (bound by an inter-state system), households (such as a nuclear groups of rural producers), classes (such as peasants) and status-groups (such as indigenous peoples) (Wallerstein 2006, 24), the community could be addressed as an alternative institution on the level of firms, represented by commoners rather than “entrepreneurs”, from which anti-systemic responses to core-driven processes radiate.

⁸⁵ Richard for instance differentiates between indigenous, peasant and (sub)urban land rights, which seems to suggest that indigenous and peasant rights are by definition rural rights (Richards 2009, 59). Moreover, it risks to mould local land rights systems in a “staged” trajectory, for instance insinuating that the communal regulations upheld in the communities of Carangas relegate the region “still” to an indigenous “stage” and disallow its treatment as a peasant region.

⁸⁶ Chapter three gives more details on the constitution, working and history of the Bolivian *ayllu*.

⁸⁷ See also Salman and Zoomers (2003) and Mayer (2002) on PRATEC (Apffel-Marglin and PRATEC 1998).

determination (Mignolo 2009 and 2011, 295-336). In the process, several constitutive elements of the ayllu have been appropriated and adjusted by central state powers in order to optimize its extractive capacities yet the survival of the ayllu does not merely rely on its functionality to state formation but on a dynamic history of resistance and renovation (Ticona and Albó 1997; De Munter 2003, 14). As a consequence of this continuous reinvention, communal systems are being revamped in the form of political and intellectual projects for an alternative (or reversed) colonization (Patzí 2004; Fernández Osco 2000; Cúneo 2011). Similarly, in more integrated sectors of the world-system, instruments for communal action are gaining ground as an alternative to liberal frameworks, think about the current fashionability of “sharing is the new owning”. A difference must be made, however, between “the communal” and the liberal concept of “the common good” or Marxist concepts of the “commons”. While the latter is a world-systemic conceptual creation, the former is a pre-existing formation that has been gradually caught by the net of those creations, which in many cases (think of the communal structures in Medieval Europe) implied its evaporation (Mignolo 2011, 311).⁸⁸

Political schemes tend to cultivate idealized imaginings of the community that stand far away from its concrete and daily implications. Its functioning as a public medium has a “cost” in that it requires a minimal approval and support by “private” *comunario* households of the intervention of and their participation in reciprocal mechanisms, authoritative bodies and collective action (Mayer 2002, 41). As has been demonstrated by Ostrom (1990), these regulatory structures determine and allocate rights among community members in order to overcome Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968). In that sense, “*common resources and empowered communities are two sides of the same coin*” (De Angelis 2009). To secure communal control over those resources, community leaders also take up a representative role, ascribed or recognized by central state authorities (Custred and Orlove 1980, 48-9). This intermediation has been pushed into clientelist ties in the context of colonial extraction, republican domination, developmentalist programs and populist reform. In the other direction, these leaders knew to manipulate their intermediary position for their own benefit as well. In short, where communal structures have remained in place, we do not find beacons of harmony but complex patterns and internal conflicts that make community life “*complex, conflictive, messy, and contradictory, rather like people's lives anywhere else in this world*” (Canessa 2012, 11).

⁸⁸ Also in the revived debates in the Andes/Bolivia on the ayllu as a political model, “the communal” is often (implicitly) “sold” as a Western-Marxist-communist concept or directly deduced from abstract, homogenizing interpretations of the Andean world and cosmovision. An example is how the discourse of the current Bolivian regime, and particularly its vice-president García Linera, leads to a devaluation of paradigms such as *buen vivir* (*suma qamaña*) or “to live good” – rather than better (Spedding 2013a)

2.2.2 The loopholes and rebound of assimilationist State projects.

The Andean peasant and Indian “problems” refer to a long history of struggle shaped by the interplay of bottom-up (forms of) mobilization and the development of nation-states designed in function of the simultaneous marginalization and incorporation of rural (*indio, campesino*) classes (Quijano 2006; Larson 2004). The dialectic between the “not-yet(-fully)-incorporated” and the incorporated may take us back to the formation of the first states; the moment that announced “*the very last 1 percent of human history*” (Scott 2009, 3). However, a differentiation can be made at the moment the “modern state” comes into play; the only instance to “*bring nonstate spaces and people to heel*” (ibid, 4). Foreshadowed by Westphalia and European colonialism, this is the moment we live since the French Revolution and the “triumph of liberalism” (Wallerstein 2011).

Modern state projects did not truly get off the ground before new elite groups, suspicious of the feudal-like tactics of “old” elite’s capital accumulation, started to push more vehemently for “modernization” in the late 19th century. The pursuit of these projects went accompanied by increasing pressures on land and labour resources, although the processes of dispossession “*heralded by dependency theorists and novelists sympathetic to the indigenous population (...) were not as clear-cut in practice as has often been assumed*” (Baud 2009, 23). Around the turn of the 20th century, these pressures became increasingly more violent and hence acquired more urgency on the political agenda. This announced the shift to an integration policy which included the construction of a “political space”. In its mission to ensure the security and productivity of the periphery, states were confronted with the imperatives of ecology and infrastructure. Over time and specifically in the second half of the 20th century, innovations in “distance-demolishing technologies” such as railroads, roads, telecommunication, information, air traffic etc. have decisively shifted the “*strategic balance of power between self-governing peoples and nation-states*” (Scott 2009, xii). As a result, hardly a single spot or a single person on the planet has remained beyond the reach of such assimilationist state by the end of that century.

Yet, despite its spatial dimension, “*no one has ever seen ‘the state’*” (Nehring and Schui 2007, 9). The state becomes visible through its “*order-making functions,*” which concerns the delineation of spaces and social groups as “ordered” or under control and “disordered” or on the edge of control (Das and Pole 2004). On the fundament of “one people, one nation”, which also implies one language, one culture and one Law, peoples, nations, languages, cultures and laws that are not functional to the State were made invisible. This implies a process of bordering, registration and taxation, infringements justified by the establishment of a “contractual” relation or pact between (sectors of) civil society and the state. At the same time, this concerns a differentiated, asymmetric relation designed to restructure the relation between the people, their resources and the state into a constellation that gives the individual priority over the communal

(Mitchell 2002). A good example of an “ordering” (visibilizing-invisibilizing) mechanism is the taking of (population, cadastral, agricultural...) censuses (Barragán 2011), through which people are counted and subjected to a process of self-identification, properties and productive units are classified and georeferenced, their productive potential being measured etc.⁸⁹

As social relations are (re)negotiated, laws, taxes and borders –markers of ongoing commodification- entail a dynamic that generates a paradoxical effect. Laws and loopholes are two sides of the same coin, producing “*irregular spaces of law*” where plural arrangements continue to defy an imagined legal hegemony (Benton 2009 and 2011).⁹⁰ Parallel to the double role of money,⁹¹ taxes have a material as well as symbolic function, to generate revenue as well as dependency. Borders, while counting as the ultimate symbols of sovereignty, economically translated in customs regimes, are equally bear the hallmark of paradox in that they simultaneously divide and connect.⁹² Jurisdiction, tax collection and customs are simultaneous instances of consolidation and undermining, of attaching to and distantiating from state power and market pressures. This paradoxical character is embodied in the ambivalent role of local state and market representatives. The efficiency of the post-colonial state is dependent upon the strength of its alliance with regional elites, particularly those stationed in the frontier zone (Baud 2004, 57-8). As political functionaries and economic agents, these village elites (both incoming as local) are assigned with the responsibility of enforcing and consolidating the rule of law, fiscal bonds and imaginary (bounded) spaces of belonging. However, these local elites tend to uphold a relatively high level of independence, just as other rivalling/allying institutions (think of the Church) do.

⁸⁹ In that respect, 2012-2013 were very interesting years with the execution of respectively a population and an agricultural census in Bolivia. The official objectives that justified these operations were formulated in terms of institutional capacity, national development and food security but invariably launches debates over the legitimacy of the registered social change and delineations and the consequent allocation of resources. Tinkazos 2012; CEDIB 2012; INE 2013; BIF 27.08.2013.

⁹⁰ Juridical monism, from the *Leyes de Indias* to the *Code Napoleon*, is endorsed as the standard, although a recent and fragile pluralist countermovement can be noted -particularly since 1990s with international and national guarantees for legal pluralism such as the ILO Convention 169. Cases such as Bolivia demonstrate that the imposition of uniform juridical frameworks still forms the exception of history (IIHCE 2012).

⁹¹ Money is never neutral, but “a social relation” that functions as a concrete means of circulation in the form of coinage and as a virtual means of valorization hinting at an underlying behaviour and belief system (Ingham 1996; see also Platt 2008; Harris 1982; Caro 1994, 36-8). Similarly, one could say that taxes correspond to a social relation that extracts surplus and meanwhile incorporates people in an “imagined” community.

⁹² Peoples and places are disconnected by physical barriers, political borders, property boundaries and custom regimes, but these obstacles at the same time stimulate the organization of inter-ecological exchanges, trade agreements, smuggle, migration, and bilateral diplomacy. Baud and van Schendel 1997; see also Torres Cisneros 2004; Perrier Bruslé 2006 and 2007.

The formation of Andean states is particularly indicative of the fact that state-building is nurtured by large ambitions that do not necessarily (and almost never) correspond to equal achievements:

“a colonial state-in-formation maintained an illusion of strength and extensive control through a complex bureaucratic apparatus but exercised that control through individual agents, officers, and governors who contracted their services to the Spanish Crown and who often pursued their own interests and agendas. The state was not so much weak as it was thinly and unevenly distributed” (Roseberry 1993, 348).

This explains the central state’s (growing) anxiety to create more direct and internalized bonds with local populations through military conscription, juridical categories, suffrage and particularly through education (Baud 2004, 62; see also Baud and Parra 2002, 245-51). Yet, as these aspirations go seldom or difficultly accompanied by a real attribution of sovereignty, this remains a very precarious bond, which makes Zavaleta speak of the “apparent State” (Zavaleta 1982).

From a frontier perspective, the expansion of civil rights and the accompanying formation and reformulation of common identities/imaginings can be viewed as a frontier that –like all frontier processes– creates a rebound effect. This frontier corresponds to process of “creating subjects” in function of the state’s internal legitimacy or, in the terms of Anderson, generating an imagined community. The movement of that frontier stems from an instrumentalization of identities, engendering a tension between ethnic identities (diversity) and national identity (homogeneity). Both the granters and the grantees of civil rights and the corresponding “self-identification” categories negotiate the terms of inclusion according to the rhythm of interplaying inclusion/exclusion pressures. Through this negotiation dynamic the imagined centralized community is destabilized by subaltern claims on an “unimagined” participation in that community (Thurner 1997, 20-53). Through this destabilization, concessions are extorted that undercut state ambitions with unexpected side-effects. This points to a double feedback loop, a “rebound” effect that runs in multiple directions.

Let’s start with the conceptualization and imposition of state-based legal framework “*that proclaimed the inclusion of all as the definition of the good society*” (Wallerstein 2006, 60). This goes together with the granting of rights, yet the concession of a particular legal status always comes at a certain cost. With regard to indigenous populations, for instance, it is a thorny question to determine whether legal privileges can be considered a victory or a defeat as it as “*by fighting European civilization on its own turf, indigenous peoples have had to accept some of the premises of that turf*” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). While legal struggle has proven to be an effective strategy to resist incorporation and global capitalism, access to court is conditioned by the legitimacy and representative

power ceded to intermediary actors and overturned through mechanisms that conditions that access to the structures of internal colonialism. Moreover the security of the obtained rights is conditioned by the strength of the rule of law.

Because legal frameworks are subject to flexibility, oblivion and erosion, the production of laws and of its loopholes are two sides of the same coin. The weak control of state institutions over their own imposed legal framework creates opportunities for non-state actors to appropriate, reinterpret and influence or even “counter” the law. Particularly in the context of (post)colonial institutional encounters, the transfer of novel (European-style) regulations to newly acquired territories and subjects was shaped by a high suppleness and openness to local pressures (Benton 2002; 2011). This is particularly notable in the implementation of (Roman Law-based) property rights systems (Serrão 2013). It is in that sense very interesting to note that in current Bolivian land legislation certain parts of the legislation are deliberately left open to communitarian justice systems – a “gap” that points to an interesting history which will be further explored in this dissertation.

Fluctuations in state intervention relate to the way in which a particular territory, its resources and people are identified in relation to the strategic objectives of a state. This explains why in some contexts a state may make a deliberate decision to not to organize the intervention in and integration of a particular group or territory (Boone 2003). However, such decision is also influenced by “*the friction of terrain*” which gives peripheral groups a comparative territorial advantage.⁹³ It may also include more active extortion of certain rights through legal actions or revolutions. At the other hand, the formal obtainment of specific rights and tools (adopted by the central government and inscribed in constitutions) is far from sufficient and requires daily efforts to make them respected and tangible “on the ground”. Moreover, such appropriations by subaltern sectors are often re-appropriated by the state as an act of window-dressing (an “indigenous”- or “peasant”-washing of their agenda). The more successful their challenge to powerful dichotomies, the more subaltern action gets embroiled in political games and internal leadership struggles risking to overpower and delegitimize their resistance.⁹⁴

⁹³ Even though developed from a whole other environment, Scott’s translation of how mountains can serve as a refuge for state-fleeing people into the idea of a friction is quite interesting for the Andean highlands. This friction is to be understood as a historical construct which in one period might provide inhabitants with a comparative advantage, while disadvantaging them in other periods (Scott 2009, xii).

⁹⁴ Again, Bolivia is the scenery of such tension, particularly and increasingly visible in the co-optation and politics of divide and rule that undercut what had been heralded as a solid collaboration between the MAS government and the indigenous movement of Bolivia’s highland communities, CONAMAQ. Achtenberg 2014; Apaza 2014; Sammu 2014.

2.2.3 The “anti-commodity” side of expanding market spheres.

To start with, the idea of an “omnipotent” world-system subjecting a passive and defenceless class of rural (wo)manpower to maximal exploitation makes as little sense as the inverse idea of stubborn off-market producers fending off any form of connection or accommodation to that world market. As much as capitalist penetration into local production settings follows a deviating trajectory, bottom-up response to that interference is not uniform either. In other words, the impact of market expansion into peripheral regions for rural livelihoods is not predictable. Assertions pretending otherwise usually stem from their oblivion towards the capacity of indigenous and peasant groups to combine complementary on- and off-market livelihood strategies and networks. This misunderstanding has concealed or downplayed the fact that market response is one aspect of a more diverse economic responsiveness, in which market access concurs with non-market (barter, smuggle, plunder) activities, to a vision of indigenous/peasant market participation as “resistance to the market” (Platt 1995; Stern 1995).⁹⁵

The importance of overlapping circuits of reciprocity, exchange and trade⁹⁶ gives subsistence and exchange patterns an “extra” dimension which could be defined as the “anti-commodity” side of the organization of production and circulation (IISH 2010). The notion of anti-commodities was born out of efforts to bridge the gap between economic determinism and subaltern perspectives on the role of commodities in world history.⁹⁷ It thereby links up to the critiques against Frank’s argument on the world-system as contained by a singular production mode (2011 [1978]). Quite on the contrary, economic transformations in the periphery attest to the reinforcement of local pre-existing production relations rather than their assimilation to the dominant mode of production in the core, which moreover underpins the political leverage of local producers (Laclau 1971, 21; Jacobsen 1984; Caro 1994, 24).

Although the term remains somewhat unfortunate, “anti” intends to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of subaltern market participation. The suggested

⁹⁵ Gosh detects an example of this trap in Li’s assumption that the “ambiguity” of (self-identified) indigenous people rejecting privatization pressures while others embrace them gives evidence of indigeneity is an attribution of a “liberal subject of political economy” (Ghosh 2010).

⁹⁶ Dominique Temple distinguishes exchange from reciprocity and insists on their opposition (Temple 2003). I also make a distinction between different types of exchange, mainly barter as a form of “off-market” exchange and trade as market exchange.

⁹⁷ See also the debate within the field of commodity chain research (Topik and Wells 1997; Topik, Marichal and Frank 2006; Bair 2008). This also links up to conceptualizations of a “metabolic rift” departing from Marx’ understanding of rural-urban commodity and labour dynamics (Moore 2003; see also Moore 2000; Foster 1999).

dichotomy must in that sense be understood as an allusion to the essentially connected yet obscured “shadow” side of what is usually presented as bulldozing market expansion. Instead of reducing self-sufficiency strategies to a “non-commodity” or purely subsistence economy, it draws attention to (the ability of) combining complementary economic activities that allow marginalized groups to enter and withdraw from the market according to their own terms. “Anti” refers to the way in which local strategies of resource and labour exploitation, and hence of accumulation and resistance, put on a brake in the “gearings” of global commodity chains. The formation and expansion of these chains is in to some extent counterbalanced by the economic resilience of local production modes, founded in a particular logic of production, in particular forms of access to the necessary means thereto and in particular ethno-cultural traits implied in these access strategies.

In the field of Andean ethnohistory, insights into how Andean livelihood strategies simultaneously tap into kin-based and barter reciprocities as well as market relations has yielded alternative concepts such as “ethnic economy” (Harris 1982; Salomon 1985). This line of research has demonstrated that the strength of non-commodified exchange relations does not automatically exclude an active market participation – therefore not rejecting “resistance” altogether.⁹⁸ While indigenous commoners could not halt mercantile interference, they developed strategies that enabled them to satisfy state, Church and community obligations while preventing their straightforward capitulation to market imperatives (Larson 1995, 21; Stern 1995). These everyday forms of resistance designed, employed and defended by “Andeans” included both avoidance (absenteeism, migration and resettlement) as deliberate insertion into market circuits (accumulation, diversification).

Different from the pre-capitalist situation in Europe, production and distribution was organized through political economy in function of inter-ecological complementarity, without interference of markets, tribute institutions, money, merchants, or feudal property relations.⁹⁹ This gave rise to a false duality in which reciprocity and complementarity are contrasted with market relations. However, the early colonial development of an Andean economic space did not equal a simple substitution, but a more complex insertion of pre-colonial reciprocity principles and networks in commercial relations and restructuring of economic spaces. The active participation of Andean peoples in this emerging market sphere from early on has generated

⁹⁸ Bradby 1982; Harris 1982; Platt 1982; Caro 1994; Larson, Harris and Tandeter 1987 and 1995; Langer 1994 and 2004.

⁹⁹ Key is the work of Murra (1985, 3-13), whose notion of “vertical ecological control” will receive more attention in chapter 3.1. See also the recent compilation that offers a comparative view into the economic organization of Pre-Hispanic societies (Hirth et al 2013, particularly Burger and Mayer, Dillehay, Goldstein).

“a central paradox in Andean history (sic) namely, the long term historical resilience and adaptation of indigenous peasant economies, organized around reciprocal norms, in the midst of powerful and evolving commodity markets that swirled around the mining export economy of the southern Andes” (Larson 1995, 8).

Regardless of the strength of their ties to the market economy and their inherent economic responsiveness, many community areas have been unambiguously categorized as subsistence economies (Rivera Cusicanqui and THOA 1992, 42-3). This has nurtured a dichotomous image of separated spheres for non-capitalist or off-market versus capitalist or market exchange, oblivious to the capacity of Andean peoples to “employ” and handily combine several levels, logics, practices and destinations of exchange.

A very clear illustration of the fact that Andean pastoralists are “*not immutably locked in a pastoral “mode of production” but rather as actively negotiating encounters between themselves and the expanding power of capitalist states*” (Chang and Koster 1994, 2; Khazanov 1994; Medinaceli 2005 and 2010) is the strategic participation of highland pastoralists in the supply chains between the Potosí mines and the ports of the Pacific. The exploitation of the *Cerro Rico* (the rich mountain) of Potosí constituted the structuring and regionally-binding force behind Andean incorporation into an emergent world-economy.¹⁰⁰ This process relied essentially on the “activation” of the famous silver (and other commodity) routes by llama caravan mobility. Indigenous farmers and herders, drovers and merchants were present in overlapping circuits of inter-ethnic east-west oriented (valley-highlands) trade and barter, inter-Andean long-distance (north-south) exchange in fairs and import-export trade. This combined participation relies on several “preconditional” assets and skills to optimize or downplay the factors of familiarity (personal contacts and intimacy with a region), technology (transport means and infrastructure) and institutions (economic policy and fiscal regimes, diplomacy and border regimes, price fluctuations and regulation).

In post-independence times, simultaneous participation in market and off-market exchange continued to interconnect small-scale ambulant trade with transnational

¹⁰⁰ Potosí was the epicentre of one of the most powerful “open vein” of the Americas (Galeano 2003), the pumping heart of a regional labour division structured by the silver economy –the economic backbone of the Spanish metropolis- and fuelling numerous provisioning lines towards the Pacific (see also Assadourian 1982; Tandeter 1997). It thereby gave shape to an internal market sphere that spread from current Ecuador to North-Chile as well as to trans-continental market circuits. The wealth in poetic allusions to Potosí metaphorically underscore Assadourian’s ground-breaking contribution in enlightening Potosí “*as the principal motor force of structural change that affected all facets of economic life and social relations throughout the Andes*” (Larson 1995, 15-6; Assadourian 1982, 109-221; 1992; 1994, see also Bonilla 2007, 108; Assadourian, Bonilla, Mitre and Platt 1980).

inter-ecological barter and overseas import-export (Barragán 2011, 90; Langer and Conti 1991, 95). Yet, since the 18th century, the organization internal (South-)Andean trade circuits started to reorient from the Pacific towards Buenos Aires while many camelid-based groups shifted to sheep and cattle herding. Moreover, the wars of independence distorted those circuits which seriously undermined the strength of indigenous communities, although the first half of the 19th century knew a revitalization of the silver and wool economy that allowed for a re-emergence of indigenous market participation, both in export markets (llamas, food, fuel, wool) as in internal markets (fairs) (Larson 1995, 28-9). Throughout that century, economic developments in the Andean region were marked by Great Britain's takeover of the Spanish monopoly and the introduction of railways which gradually restructured the transportation of silver, tin, saltpetre and consumable goods to and from the mines (Contreras 2000, 188–216).

However, as a wide range of economic players are involved, this form of market participation while attaining access to alternative circuits implies continuous renegotiation, in large part triggered by monetary and labour exactions from a tributary state. Fiscal obligations as well as reciprocal community commitments condition local livelihood systems and subject them to the intervention of commercial intermediaries as well as trigger the creation of indigenous trade and investment opportunities (Larson 1995, 28). The development of commercial relations also intensely intersects with (fomenting and at the same time fomented by) cultural-ceremonial practices and social networks that support community structures.¹⁰¹ Over time, the interaction between these diverse (government, merchants, community) actors is marked by a deeper penetrating market sphere, reflected in intensifying commodification pressures that come with increasing monetization and contractization of exchange and labour relations. These effects came with an increasing role for intermediaries. However, Andean communities knew to balance their own demands with the imperatives and opportunities of commercial interaction which explains how they not only survived during Latin-America's economic expansion, but in some cases even thrived (Klein 1993; Platt 1995; Langer 2009). The heterogeneity and overlap of barter, smuggle and commerce networks and the pragmatism with which indigenous groups knew to exploit these nets allowed the established "off-market" exchange routes, destinations and practices to remain operative until well into the second half of the 20th century, constantly adjusting to the opportunities and restrictions of the moment.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ "Festivals and trade went together, for festivals made the personal relations possible that led to common enterprises among community members" (Langer 2009, 542).

¹⁰² Until the 1980s, several Altiplano households still travelled on yearly basis with llama caravans in order to complement local production with maize, cereals, fruits, vegetables and coca leaves. The continuation of long distance barter travels until very recently is evidenced by the studies of West (1981), Molino Rivero (2006),

2.3 Global frontiers of land control.

From a world-historical perspective, “*legitimizing ownership by legal title is a fundamental process of the capitalist world-economy*” and corresponds to possibly “*the single most important change imposed by the modern world-system*” (Wallerstein 2012a, 7). The commodification of land rights figures as a powerful frontier that, as any incorporation process, aims at “settling” a (new) order and thereby links the question of land to several questions at the heart of capitalist development and state formation. This pretended order implies the delineation, endorsement and extension of “*a systematic legal basis for what is called title to the land*” (Wallerstein 2012, 7). The movement of this frontier intersects with other historical frontier developments, such as economic transformations in view of increasing resource competition (Barbier 2011), ecological changes (Moore 2010, 2011) and the social reorganization of peasant livelihoods (Vanhaute 2012). Indeed, the question of land does not just entail economic, but also political, social and cultural questions that link land rights security up to climatological, productivity, inequality, gender, and democracy issues at all levels of human-nature interaction.

From the perspective of rural community-based actors, access to the land equally constitutes “the single most important” variable in the formation and transformation of a sustainable livelihood. Because the use of the land has direct implications for rural communities’ economic incomes through exchange (of products of that land) and because their sovereignty relations are primarily defined by the regulation of access to that land, land constitutes a significant –if not the main– motive to intensive interaction with other sectors of society (Wallerstein 2012, 6). Land is moreover a conditional factor to rural people’s socio-economic and cultural reproduction and self-esteem (ILC 2013). As peasant and/or indigenous claims to land, territory and resources are usually communal rather than individual claims (*ibid*), their control over the land is interdependent with a larger “package” of rights that allow them to secure a margin for territorial, economic, political and legal autonomy as self-organized group. The question of land control is thus basically a question of rights, in the first place the right to self-determination. However, due to the push for the encapsulation of customary land right systems into standardized frameworks for land entitlement, that right is contested and undermined.¹⁰³

Medinaceli (2005) and Bolton (2007) as well as by the oral testimonies of contemporary Carangas people (own field notes 2011-2012; Cottyn 2012c).

¹⁰³ The difference in the meaning given to land between indigenous groups and state- supporting groups is rooted in a more general discrepancy in their visions over how to organize society. This is clearly the case in

2.3.1 The commodification of land rights

Strongly related to particularly European state expansion, the installation of a (new) order to access and use the land has reshuffled the labour, legal and fiscal ties between the people that live from the land (the peasants, whether owning or only occupying the land), people that live from the property of the land (private landholders) and state structures (with rural and non-rural interests). In pretending to make society “legible,” this legal-economic intervention fuels an ideologically coloured, power-attributing and hence highly disputed transition process that pretends to put the future of “civilization” at stake (Scott 1998; Richards 2009, 55-60; Engerman and Metzer 2004, 17; Cole and Ostrom 2012). Time and again, the land question has been reformulated and debated in the context of shifting economic conditions and emergent political ideologies. As a result, the commodification of land (rights) is not implemented as a clear-cut switch but corresponds to a longer history of incorporation that got bogged down in a highly debated, strongly contested and largely frustrated process. The outcome of that process is witnessed in the constant (re)creation of new frontiers of land control, which

“are not sites where ‘development’ and ‘progress’ meet ‘wilderness’ or ‘traditional lands and peoples’. They are sites where authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes” (Peluso and Lund 2011, 668).

In the words of Wallerstein, “*land is fundamentally a political question masked by a legal veneer*” (Wallerstein 2012, 8). The political question is to enforce a minimal degree of loyalty and obtain the necessary revenues to uphold centralized power. Thereto, a homogeneous framework, a property-rights system, needs to be created, provided of legal and fiscal tools such as property deeds and cadastres (Richards 2009, 58). The drivers of this incorporation process are distinguished by Araghi and Karides as the formalization (the granting property deeds), fixation (defining physical and legal property boundaries), rationalization (in function of a standardized production), and privatization (in order to create a land market) of land rights (Araghi and Karides 2012,

Bolivia, where the insistence upon ancestral, communitarian frameworks for ownership and management of the CONAMAQ and CIDOB confederations, representing respectively the highland and lowland indigenous population, challenges the syndicalist peasant logic that has defined the country’s land legislation since the nationalist 1952 Revolution (Alejandro Almaraz, former MAS Vice-Minister of Lands, interviewed in Achtenberg 2014). The demands of indigenous movements today make clear that land is essentially interlinked with other guarantees within a broader societal level: “*Without indigenous autonomy, without communitarian economy, without plural justice and without the titling of the Native Communitarian Lands (TCO) we cannot speak of a Plurinational State*” (David Crispín, spokesmen of the independent branch of the CONAMAQ, Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu, in Achtenberg 2014).

1). These pressures materialize through commodifying land legislation projects, intended to establish an institutional framework for land ownership, use and transaction, thereby redefining the property, production and spiritual relations of rural agents to the land (Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009, 11). Successive land reforms have proven to be a crucial instrument in the expansion and contraction of land rights, envisioned within a (false) straightforward evolution toward the generalization and spread of private property (such as Demsetz 1967).

The veneer, then, is the erroneous equation between private property and “development” on basis of the argument that privatization reduces externalities, transaction costs and the risk of resource overexploitation. The prevailing way of interpreting the land question is indeed to perceive the land as a frontier of capitalist expansion that must be pushed forward, that is, “*that must be cultivated*” (see for instance Clementi 1985, 181-202). Thereto, property rights are designed and allocated with the final objective of converting land into a tradable commodity (Weis 2007, 48-50). This fomenting of a land market must allow the land’s “*mise en valeur*” (Wallerstein 2012; Richards 2009, 55-6; see also Hertel 2010). In order to facilitate these legislation operations, alternative (spiritual, informal, communal, non-European) forms of access have been portrayed in terms of dichotomy and anomaly (Engerman and Metzger 2004). This legalisation and justification process has nurtured a global trend in the incorporation and formalization of customary property relations into dualist and exclusivist frameworks (Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010, 12; RRI 2014).

As states extend and intensify their grip on territories and peoples distant from their urban centre of power, local modes to relate to the land become immersed in state-controlled fiscal and juridical relations. The “state” factor converts property and tenure into a question of legality, illegality and extra-legality with the ultimate goal to eliminate “extra-legal” situations, which implies a legalisation process (Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009, 11-2). This is a state-driven process of incorporation by which customary systems are positioned on a continuum of tenure security (extensive-limited, short-long term, real-perceived, de jure-de facto, etc.) that suggests the superiority of private property arrangements (Lund 2000; Ubink, Hoekema and Assies 2009, 13-5). The construction of a land system thus implies the intervention by state actors in local relations to the land in order to mould and categorize those relations as “legible” and hence extractable relations in function of the strengthening of its state power. In that respect it must be noted that the state itself is a land owner too and may therefore intervene in local occupier-proprietor relations in order to convert both into its tenants with labour and monetary obligations to their landlord (Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010, 367).

However, this trend runs counter to the fact that land systems are usually marked by a coexistence of private, common and public rights. Land systems allocate some juridical control to actual proprietors over tenants, which may include the exaction of labour, species or money transfers in the form of tax, rent, contract or gift, yet this

control may cover manifold combinations between very informal to sound ownership arrangements. Therefore, land tenure must be conceived on a continuum, ranging from open, over limited, to exclusive access (Ostrom and Hess 2007; Ubink and van Rooij 2011). In view of this pluralism, it must be noted that the (globalizing) local struggles of self-organized resource communities are not against individual ownership *an sich*, but question the “absoluteness” of private property arrangements because it negates that land is an intrinsic part of the landscape, something the capitalist logic has however a hard time to cope with (Greer 2013). Failing or refusing to grasp the value and “normality” as well as the effectiveness of such complex systems and the responsiveness of the people managing them has allowed for the imposition of “*principles true in every country*”, achievable through capital and superior to deviant principles (Mitchell 2002, 54-79). This implied the construction of artificial dichotomies that frame communal arrangements for the reproduction and distribution of resources in inalienable/collective versus alienable/private categories. As pluralism is being substituted by an improbable uniformity, (relatively) open systems for resource management have been exposed to commercialization, overuse and degradation (Ostrom and Schlager 1996). Thus, self-organized resource societies defending their collective rights over land and resources do not deny nor attack individual property relations, but confirm “*what many environmental movements are beginning to force capitalists to accept: most resources are partially, if not wholly, “public goods”*” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 7; Bromley 1991; Hanna 1996).

However, this substitution is not enacted in a vacuum, but negotiated between peasants, elite and broker groups, state institutions and the forces of nature. Exactly because land systems, and more specifically property rights regimes, are instrumental to the structuring of social power relations, their evolution is marked by competition between the central state and other public authorities, causing interaction, friction and conflict. In the light of such competition, Hindery describes how indigenous activists “*simultaneously embraced Western law as a tool to consolidate rights, while at the same time working outside of it, whether through direct actions (marches, blockades, strikes) or electoral politics*” (Hindery 2013, 7). This multiplicity of tactics endows the trajectory of land rights commodification a powerful dynamic. Consequently, this trajectory rarely produces a homogeneous outcome or the desired social effects, but nurtures a long history of successive transitions. Indeed, a frontier process, which had its symbolic start in 1492, announcing a very uneven control that took shape “in the process” an “on the ground” (Araghi and Karides 2012; Benton 2009; Serrão 2013).

This colonially initiated transition was reproduced and accelerated under post-colonial regimes, with revolutions and alliances, enclosures and counter-enclosures, important achievements and bitter setbacks for communal and indigenous land rights deviating the story of privatization, displacement and depeasantization from its imaginary linearity. The result is hybridism; the creation of a frontier zone. Classically,

plural land rights systems in which individual and collective access co-exist are perceived as instances of state failure, whereas they rather testify a complex process of persistence and reinvention. Such hybrid, community-based systems are not testimony of an anachronistic remnant desperately searching the way out to “progress”. On the contrary, it is only “*when all else has failed*” that the pluralist principles that sustain these systems are given up. It is the erosion of such systems that reinforces trajectories of marginalization and impoverishment. Abundant but generally overlooked evidence from local cases of resistance against privatization pressures counters the belief that private property entails the promise of long-term balanced social power relations. The abandonment of and local struggle over principles of collective rights and inalienability stems from the inability to secure one’s economic survival and can not necessarily be read as the “disappearance” of peasants or indigenous groups (Ghosh 2010; Johnson 2004).



Figure 3 “European colonists arrive in America to appropriate land.” Cartoon by Chris Madden (licence CartoonStock Ltd.).

The remaining of this dissertation will focus upon a concrete “fissure” -in terms of land control- in the modern world-systemic order, namely a zone where a margin for community-based land and resource management has been secured, not despite but exactly because of close (but negotiated) interaction in formative processes of that order. The focus is placed on the reproduction and defence of a communal room for manoeuvre within the Andean context of a mixed land system, in which collective rights coexist with private land consolidation, cooperative property and State property (Galindo 2007, 85-6). By reconstructing the creation and recreation of such margin, my close-reading will put the statement that communal ownership may pose “*the most*

fundamental challenge to capitalism, (...) because it denies the overarching dominance of private property rights” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 6; Bromley 1991; Hanna et al 1996) to a test.

2.3.2 The formation of a Bolivian land system

The formation of a centralized land system can be conceived as a frontier process in which the allocation of standardized (legible, accountable) land rights figures as a moving frontier. This is no straightforward process, but covers multiple trajectories in terms of regional divergences and local responses. In Western Europe, for instance, the long-term trend depicts a strengthening of peasants rights in turn for the consolidation of a “tax state” in which peasant surpluses were more efficiently extracted, landlord power dismantled and land rights stricter regulated. While the commons disappeared in Europe, community land stands out as a decisive component in the constitution of Andean land systems and the assertion of indigenous territorial demands still plays a major role when those systems are subjected to reform. Their relation to the (much weaker) tax state evolved from a contractual pact with a weak protection, high extraction and strong landlord intermediation of communal land arrangements under colonial rule towards the formal (yet not absolute) dismantlement of such arrangements under republican (late 19th century) rule. Under the (post-)revolutionary regimes of the 20th century, the resulting excesses in land concentration were subjected to a legal counter-enclosure and a mediated restoration of community arrangements.

The survival of communal control systems in the Central Andes despite centuries-long developed linkages to the capitalist world-economy is an example of how Hardin’s theorem (1968) is countered by communal action. Although these are important factors, this exclusion from the tragedy of the commons cannot be straightforwardly explained by the strength of community organization and communal ethic, the isolation from market forces, limited demographic pressures on resources and intra-community redistribution mechanisms (Guillet 1981, 145-6). These aspects are generally reduced to the factor of ecology: Indeed, privatization had a remarkable stronger impact in regions with appropriate ecological conditions for agricultural surplus production. In the first place, the preponderance of Andean pastoralism is a key factor in explaining the persistence of collective land rights arrangement, yet covering complex regional variations between classic open-pool resources to more restricted and differentiated organizations.

However, excessive insistence on the equation between soil poverty with isolation risks to ignore underlying local dynamics of negotiation and confrontation, between local communities and agricultural entrepreneurs, but more importantly between those communities and state powers, and among communities. While unattractive agricultural lands may temper privatization pressures by agricultural entrepreneurs,

the success of customary systems must also be understood as the result of a deliberate state policy of oblivion and non-intervention. In the process of installing a national land legislation framework, the Bolivian state did not simply fail to acquire a comprehensive understanding of internal procedures nor to intervene in indigenous territorial systems (Barragán 2012, 16). What is more, it seems to have made a deliberate choice to “settle” this frontier without completely incorporating communal systems as it allowed (the creation of) room for heterogeneity and manoeuvre, particularly on the part of indigenous communities and their leaders.

This margin of autonomy for communal land administration stems from the communal defence of a colonially installed particular relation to the state. In Spanish America, the preservation of indigenous communities suited the Spanish crown, which installed a paternalistic/segregation model in which indigenous communities were tied to the colonial State through tributary bonds and the purchase of community titles. Tristan Platt has coined this asymmetrical relation as a reciprocity pact (Platt 1982, 1984, 1987).¹⁰⁴ According to this pact, the Spanish Crown guaranteed communal access to land in return for indigenous loyalty, “sealed” with property titles and fiscal obligations and renewed through land inspections. Although the fiscal cornerstone of the pact was a prime mover of indigenous protest, it also entailed key benefits, both for the treasury and the communities. While securing the former of a major source of fiscal revenues, it granted the latter autonomous control over the customary organization of communal tenure, which entailed both individual and hereditary usufruct rights as access to collective lands, either way not-marketable and non-alienable.

Fluctuations in this margin have been classically interpreted in terms of a false community-hacienda duality. This has resulted in a dichotomic model between homogeneous, unambiguously delineated or even a-historical entities in which the community stands for reciprocity, social coherence and continuity, while the hacienda stands for extraction, domination and conflict (Custred and Orlove 1980, 21-2). The former’s origins are traced in the pre-Hispanic organization of kin groups, while the latter’s origins in the Spanish colonial legacy.¹⁰⁵ Both landholding institutions are indeed quite differently organized and elemental to the Andean rural space, yet peasants are not exclusively tied to either of these institutions, but interact in a much

¹⁰⁴ Rivera and THOA rather refer to a “truce” instead of a pact (Rivera 1991, 625).

¹⁰⁵ Insisting on either their Andean or European roots is too simple. Equally important are for instance the impact of the 20th century “rediscovery” of the community by indigenismo intellectuals, revolutionary regimes and development scholars and the current “re-invention” of the hacienda in the form of agro-business companies.

more complex landscape.¹⁰⁶ Instead of thinking in mutually excluding terms, it is more appropriate to break the land system down regionally between a “valley pattern” of semi-tropical, cash-crop production in hands of private units (haciendas and smallholder estancias) oriented towards to market and within the reach urban centres, and an “altiplano pattern” of semi-desert, low-value production organized within communal units weakly primarily oriented towards subsistence and distant from urban centres. Although both production modes were never strictly bound to either region or production unit.

Regarding their historical evolution, communities and haciendas are entangled in a much more complex dialectic relation; Klein speaks of coined as a paradox (Klein 1993, 124-5). While this interrelation is generally depicted as private tenure increasing its “elbow room”, hence pushing indigenous communities beyond the limits of survival, communal tenure did not straightforwardly regress, but recovered and even thrived in times when private estates declined. This held both categories in a more or less controlled balance. As Grieshaber has demonstrated, the regionally varying distribution of rural (indigenous) labour in Bolivia over communities, haciendas and “independent” households was dominated by a growing communal control, until the balance between haciendas and communities broke in the last quarter of the 19th century (Grieshaber 1980).

Before dissecting the briefly presented the larger land system that entailed this “balance” (chapter 4) and zooming further in on the destabilization of that balance in the context of liberal reform, let us take a brief look at the long-term evolution of land administration and commodifying pressures in Bolivia.

Under Inca rule, access to land was subjected to a tributary system in which state intervention in local land administrations was backed by a redistribution logic (Murra 1978). By the time Spanish troops arrived to the Central Andes, the Spanish monarchs already disposed of the *Leyes de Indias*, which defined the juridical foundations for indigenous vassalage to the Crown, in line with its governance and taxation rights granted by the papal bulls (Schwaller 2011, 47). After a first episode in which the Crown indirectly controlled its acquired lands by distributing it as compensation to

¹⁰⁶ Community and hacienda peasant households equally enjoy usufructuary rights on the land they work, but in the latter case the property of that land is in the hands of non-peasants, the individual *hacendado* or an (religious or state) institution (often substituted by intermediary administrators and straw men), who employs *colonos* (tenants) or *peones* (peons) and pays them in the form of (various types of) usufruct rights over plots of land (*ibid*, 48-50). In turn, these peasant households are subject to a more or less fixed set of obligations towards the landlord. However, in contrast to archetypical image of the *hacendado* as the dominant patron, *hacendado-peon* relations are usually marked by a pragmatical intersection with extra-hacienda relations (trade with other elites, surrounding communities, the market).

conquistadores, demographic and fiscal pressures imposed the necessity to subject land access to a regulated property rights system. To that end, several of the tributary mechanisms of the Incas were formerly adopted yet distorted and adjusted to the needs of Spanish imperial governance.

From the 1570s on, the dispersed human settlement into ayllu was concentrated into Spanish-designed village structures and integrated into broader territorial units, of which the proprietary attributions were to be “consolidated” through the purchase of communal land titles. In turn for taxation, extracted in species and labour, the commons were protected through the adjudication of such land titles (this mechanism is examined in detail in 4.1.1). These titles came to serve as a powerful tool for both the central state and the adjudicated communities in the enforcement and contestation of monetary and labour extractions and political and social control. While granting communities with autonomy over their land administration, this policy instigated a shift in control over labour to control over land, evidenced in the expansion of the hacienda (large private estates) complex (Yambert 1980, 64). Collective land rights were quite easily retained in Carangas and similar *altiplano* regions which controlled mainly land of little interest to private landlords and did not count with large mining exploitations and where haciendas hence remained an external phenomenon (Rivière 1982, 71).

While the installed land system survived the collapse of the Spanish colonial empire during the first half century of Bolivian independence, new ideas on property had gained entrance from the late 18th century on and would bring the fundamentals of the reigning land system under untenable pressure. Bolivia’s land question took shape in the context of a wider debate in the region on how to restructure the colonially inherited foundations of state-community relations. The transition towards a “modern” nation was framed as a question of freedom and equality: equal laws, fair taxes, a free market and a civilized society. This society was ideologically founded upon the principle of private property as the basic condition for the free movement of goods and labour.

Because of the incompatibility detected between private and “immobile” corporative property (“property in mortmain”), the way in which this question has been (and is being) played out in the Andes particularly concerns the fate of land in hands of indigenous communities, the *tierras de origen*. Already in early republican times, the landholding position of the Church within the Bolivian land system was subjected to a relatively successful confiscation operation (Langer and Jackson 1990), but the destination of the indigenous community took a longer time in crystalizing. By the end of that century, after a long prologue of inter-elite debates and failed attempts and as competition over land increased, communal landholdings became the target of this disentailment policy, implying the formal denial and progressive replacement of its position within the country’s land system (the subject of Part III). The Bolivian government, aspiring the incorporation of corporative landowning entities into a

homogeneous legal framework for land tenure, radically and one-sidedly terminated the colonially inherited pact.

In the 20th century, then, a nationalist-developmental paradigm found its entrance and eventually broke through with the National Revolution of 1952. A combination of peasant mobilization, syndicalist organization and the “discovery” of the peasants as political subjects led to a reversal of the private land usurpations and servile labour relations on the countryside, at least in the highlands (Stern 1987; Larson 2004; Gotkowitz 2007). The 1953 agrarian reform (usually portrayed as Bolivia’s first land reform) gave indigenous peasants the option between individual and undivided titles, moulding community land tenure patterns into a dual private-collective system. Through national revolutions, constitutional change and land reform, communal arrangements were restored, yet within the boundaries of a state-centred framework. However, the reformed land system failed to halt land fragmentation, extreme poverty, and marginalization, and continues to favour capitalist production (Kay and Urioste 2007; Urioste, Barragán and Colque 2007). In the late 20th century, the adoption of a neo-liberal/multiculturalist paradigm entailed a major innovation in providing indigenous communities with legal tools to guarantee their communal land rights. Under the pluralist paradigm propagated by the current government, this innovation was reinforced by extending indigenous land rights to territorial rights, yet this does not protect communities from the ongoing land grab in Bolivia’s eastern lowlands nor from far-reaching “minifundismo” in the western highlands. Hence, land and land reform are far from disappearing as conflictive issues on the country’s political agenda and touches the sour spot of the extractivist model that continues to shape that agenda.

Throughout this trajectory, the way in which state-centred land rights regulations were put into operation “on the ground” and being (re-)appropriated by customary structures reveals the construction and revision of a national land rights system as a very dynamic and complex process of negotiation and conflict. The outcome of that process in the Bolivian context underscores the strength and resilience of communal systems for land administration in the face of the central state’s growing claim on the land. The concrete implication of that strength is that the Bolivian state has not, and never acquired full knowledge and a complete overview of communal land tenure systems nor did it intervene in internal procedures such as the transfer of land (Barragán 2012, 16). This means that by adjudicating communal land rights, the central state recognizes the tenure of a certain territorial unit, which may have broad dimensions, without determining or registering its internal organization and regularization of land use, tenure and property. This “vacuum” creates an important margin for autonomy that is nevertheless subject to recurrent pressures to conform and must hence constantly be renegotiated.

Concluding remarks. Tools to capture the local in the global.

To the extent that the presented story lives up to the anticipated expectations regarding the tackling of local-global entanglements, the remaining pages of this dissertation contain more than an isolated case study or an overgeneralized grand narrative. Instead of taking the reader straight to the small stories in order to save them from oblivion, this first part of the dissertation situates the empirical reconstruction of these local histories within a theoretical framework. In a nutshell, the adopted analytical approach proposes to trace the local in the global via a “frontier perspective” (chapter 1) and to trace the global in the local from a “community perspective” (chapter 2).

First I have explained the world-systemic dimension of the proposed framework, to then motivate that analytical choice by pointing clarifying the fact that the model of the modern world-system in fact was constructed upon the insight that capitalist expansion needs and creates frontiers (1.1.1). Moreover, I have explained that this is choice that allows for a “creative” approach towards the interaction of global and local processes that goes beyond deterministic and dichotomist notions (1.1.2). Then, formulated largely as a de-colonial critique, I have pointed to the blind spots, the coloniality of that model towards implications of the unequal exchange that binds the World-System for groups who live at, on or even beyond the periphery (1.1.3). I have incorporated this critique in a ‘constructive’ way, by incorporating the insight that expansive systems cannot be understood regardless of the role of agency in/at/on the moving margins of these systems at the centre of the proposed perspective (1.1.4).

Then, I have subjected the notions of frontier and frontier zone as markers of ongoing incorporation processes to a theoretical dissection (1.2). To properly explain the adopted notion of frontiers, the analytical difference as well as interconnection between frontier (the process) and frontier zone (the space) must be made clear. I have defined “frontiers” as the social processes of both incorporation and differentiation which are at work at the external boundaries and the internal subdivisions of the

modern world-system and move according to the rhythm of systemic expansion and contraction (1.2.1). I thereby nullified the idea of frontier as a sterile dividing line between distant worlds and stressed how its historical trajectory and spatial repercussion rather grasp the unevenness and “texture” of core-periphery interaction. Frontier processes transfer the social order of a systemic entity to new territories and peoples, thereby creating and reorganizing spatial settings which I have defined as frontier zones (1.2.2). These are the sites where the change and continuity of a “transferred” social order is negotiated; the locus of systemic difference. I have clarified that these zones provide in a vacuum for the unfolding of social processes, the creation of a new order whose outlook is still open (1.2.3).

The theoretical outline of chapter 1 suggests a particular trajectory that structures the processes of incorporation, composed by four “phases” and pointing to the “feedback potential” of these processes. With regard to rural zones, this process can be de-constructed as follows: the trajectory stems from a “drive” for incorporation, an objective that gains acceptance and is “**implemented**,” resulting in concrete incorporation pressures (1), for instance the design of measures for land privatization. These pressures have an **impact** upon the spaces and edges of local rural livelihoods (2), to which local actors **respond** by deploying diverse strategies (3). The interplay of pressures, effective incorporation effects and local responsiveness generates a “**feedback**” effect that can be assessed in terms of vulnerability and revitalization (4). This structure will also be applied to the case study by disentangling the effects of Bolivia’s first land reform process for rural communities on basis of these four phases.

Chapter 2 departs from the attentiveness towards the risk that the rich variety in subtly differing “frontier” and “frontier zone” concepts can become umbrella terms for *just about everything*. Therefore, chapter 2 has specified how their dynamism is “at work” in a particular context, that of the rural Andes, which can be approached as a peasant frontier zone. By deconstructing the “peasant” and “Indian” question, I have indicated how the power of generalizations, victimizations and dichotomies has moulded the historical experience of the rural communities making up this zone into a binary story of survival or disappearance (2.1). It thereby stressed the intrinsical entanglement of these questions in the Andean context and their intrinsic relation to the “land” question. Then, it was expounded how a reduction of peasants and indigenous peoples to anachronisms of the new millennium mortgages our understanding of how Andean peasant and indigenous groups participate in market and state spheres on basis of self-developed community-based strategies, thereby nurturing a “thwarted” trajectory of incorporation (2.2). Then, it has assessed this “thwarted” dimension regarding a particular frontier process, that of land rights commodification, which is the dominant line of inquiry of this research (2.3.1). I have finally specified this “thwartedness” by giving a historical overview of the construction of an Andean/Bolivian land rights system (2.3.2). Here follows a short recap of the Andean incorporation trajectory

As one of the first external zones incorporated into the emergent world economy, the Andes converted from a disconnected area, politically and economically tied to the Inca Empire, through conquest and colonization into an essential frontier zone of the modern world-system. This is a transition, the creation of a global interconnection that occurred at the junction of state-defined, market-based and community-bound spheres. In relation to processes of state formation and market expansion, the community present itself, not as a kind of open-air museum for folkloric remnants of the past, but as a framework for agency, for participation and counter-action, or what I define as “communal manoeuvring”. In that sense, the community is the locus of possible answers to why and how the “people without history” have negotiated the “terms of participation” as spaces of capitalism and modernity have historically developed. As much as peasant and indigenous resistance is not a blunt rejection of participation in systems driven by a different –commodifying and colonizing- logic as such, their participation is not the unequivocal approval of imposition. Both resistance and openness to incorporation are conditional to the reproduction of a peasant, community-based mode of production and indigenous communal structures.

Less abstractly, a frontier zone is also the organizational structure of daily cultural, political and socio-economic life of the very people whose history is at the centre of this dissertation. Starting with the first designed colonial policies, that structure was profoundly reformed in function of both the survival of the local population as to the extraction of their resources. The territorial, productive and representative reorganization of Andean rural communities was essential to the region’s transition from an external into an internal frontier zone of a capitalist economic system. As a result, systemic differences which first stemmed from the interaction with external variables evolved into internal disparities. While maintaining a relative degree of autonomy, the people making up those communities actively participated within this differentiated constellation, for instance by entering in a legal-fiscal relationship with central state powers and provisioning labour and raw material to the international market. These political bonds and exchange relations tied the region and its people more closely to the pulsating rhythm of the modern world- system but at the same time generated a kind of anti-systemic boomerang reaction. This points to the impetus and capacity for “renegotiation” that emerges from peripheral spaces and societies. By inserting and combining other “logics” of property, belonging, governance and exchange, this renegotiation deviates imposed “global designs,” thereby “thwarting” the binary story of peasant and indigenous survival or disappearance.

Before taking the plunge into this renegotiation process, I make a detour along the source material and the methods of combining field work in the archive and with an “archival approach” to the field that have allowed me to reconstruct that process.

Addendum. Methodological implications.

The story I want to tell derives from multiple small stories, rooted “on the ground” and passed to me via old crumbling papers written or printed about 100 years ago or via long patient talks with the protagonists of those stories or their descendants. Before embarking upon that story, some comments must be made regarding the main sites of relevant source material for this research, the source situation in those sites, and the way I have dealt with the challenges of that situation. A closer analysis of the specific sources that have shaped the narrative of this dissertation will be given in the introduction to Part II.

Traces of 19th century efforts at making society legible, people accountable and the State accessible.

While the 19th century brought the advent of the first serious statistical recording, with the notable contribution of Dalence (1851), this was still a “dark age” when assessing the available sources that capture the rural (and particularly communal) world of pre-revolutionary Bolivia (Guerrero and Platt 2000, 96). After independence there reigned a climate of administrative neglect and the system of imperial record-keeping was destroyed. Even though the 19th century This particularly concerns the visibility of “Indians” in the sources, who can only be found intermittently, cautioning historians for subjecting their analysis to implicit assumptions on poverty and isolation concerning the Andean countryside (Larson 2004, 52). This makes clear that we need appropriate pathways into the rural Andean world, which consist of a focus on legislative relationships that link peasant politics and their “long memory” of mobilization to patterns of authority, tribute and land, a focus on the dialectics of rupture and continuity, and a focus on knowledge/categorizing systems, worldviews and popular culture as a locus of state formation (Larson 2004, 55-7). The exploration of these pathways has made that

“historians of Bolivia have been especially creative in tracing legal and documentary strategies of ayllus and, at a theoretical level, challenging narrow conceptions of what constitutes a literate community” (Larson 2004, 54; see for instance Mamani Condori 1991).

The long tradition of communities’ (and their leaders) interaction with jurisdictional institutions and the fact that “*courts have been an institutional means of commodifying everything; especially land*” (Biolsi 1995) have made juridical archives the main locus of my investigation. It could be stated that these archives entail the traces (in notarial documents, criminal cases, ...) of a frontier-forming battlefield, acting as commodifying arenas while at the same time serving subaltern groups (indigenous, peasants, even in absence of formal rights of representation) in the defence of their (particularly land) claims. For instance, once obtained a title (for Carangas, that moment lays in the 17th century), a community in fact obtained a negotiation tool and an entrance to the legal system. This became a widespread practice in the wake of the land reform, when community leaders travelled long distances to courts, even the Supreme Court in Sucre, in search for old titles to copy them and is evidenced in the register books preserved in the office of the Property Rights. This process implied, however, that courts and notaries were not merely the locus of securing, but also of relinquishing of indigenous rights. In fact, the act of taking land issues to court entails signs of community breakdown, in pointing to underlying problems that have to do with a lack or reduction in resources and the consequent increase of disputes over land and livestock resources.

In Corque, the capital of the former province of Carangas, I revised the historical and semi-historical sections of the *Archivo Judicial* in Corque (AJC) for the years 1860-1930.¹ In

¹ I analysed 27 dossiers, containing a total of about 1622 lawsuits. Up to 1900 (the historical section), dossiers contain all documents made up at the court for a term of half a year to two years, depending on the amount and the thickness of the cases. The dossiers are chronologically ordered and the separate cases are numbered. However, this archive is still not provided of an inventory. Add here the fact that demands for a permission to take pictures were repeatedly denied, the scanning of these cases converted into a monstrous task, even if they covered together but a couple of metres of archive material. Moreover, this small court is not equipped to receive archival researchers, hence half of the judge’s desk became my working area, mostly collecting my findings by hand in note books, except if the single plug was available. However, the friendly receipt of the court personnel has ensured that I keep indelible and good memories of my research stay in Corque. Another difficulty stems from the fire in the court in 1908 (see chapter 7) through which much cases were lost or severely damaged. For the semi-historical section of 1900 to 1950, dossiers are divided between civil and criminal cases and bundled per year. The personnel of the court has taken a modest initiative, however without receiving much support from superior institutions, to inventory these dossiers, which has facilitated a selective reading of the involved cases. Although the pioneering work of Rivière and Pauwels helped me with a starting point, the fact that the numeration has changed over the years while the material conditions and accessibility of the archive has altered very little, there is an important agenda item for fomenting historical research of/in rural regions in in order to disseminate the potential of this archive. Such an initiative has been

the superior court of the Oruro department, I mainly consulted the archive of the office of *Derechos Reales* (ADRO) where properties were registered, for the Carangas from 1894 on.² These Property Rights books record the adjudications and transfers of plots, mines, houses or other real estate, as well as copies of colonial community land titles, as increasingly petitioned by community leaders (see Part III). Previously, these kinds of documents were recorded in the notarial register books at the provincial court in Corque. In the same court of Oruro, I also consulted the Judicial Historical Archive of the departmental court (AHJO), although few cases relate to the province of Carangas. Also in the city of Oruro, the Municipal Library and Archive (ABMO) contains several published reports which were annually made by the departmental authorities (1910, 1913 and 1929) as well as copies of provincial taxpayers lists (1838 and 1852).³ Also, the library holds a collection of early 20th century publications on Bolivia and the Oruro department. The most frustrating archive was without doubt that of the Prefectura, the departmental government (APO), from which little was obtained.⁴

In Sucre, I revised the correspondence between the Ministry of the Interior with the departmental and provincial authorities in the National Archive of Bolivia (ANB). This rich and professional archive also keeps the provincial taxpayer lists; the Revisitas (Rv. in the series *Padrones y Catastros*, 1773-1902), which were made up until 1877 in Carangas (see more details in Part II). I also consulted the Cadastre books (1895-1923), to find that the section on the Oruro department was completely empty. The series of the Ministry

undertaken by the University of La Paz (UMSA) in the provincial court of Poopó, resulting in very valuable research tools (which Eric Langer kindly shared with me), yet this has not found following in the Carangas region so far.

² In the ADRO I consulted 32 “Libros” in the series *Propiedades Provincias* corresponding to the Carangas province, elaborated in 1894, 1903, and then from 1906 on for each year (mainly “property” books, but also some “mortgage and tax” books). Here too, my request for permission to make pictures was refused, while—very ironically— my access to these registers was temporally postponed to allow the personnel to digitalize the registers in order to facilitate their work. Nevertheless, my only access to those registers was still to spend entire afternoons standing up along the shelves, filling my notebooks (here, the use of a laptop was completely impossible).

³ These documents are generally stored in the national archive, but the ABMO has the advantage of free permission to take pictures of these documents.

⁴ I received free access to its accounting section, where I however encountered disordered piles of moulding account books in front of randomly filled shelves that required too much time to allow a proper scanning and analysis. This is a task which I nonetheless undertook, starting by ordering the heavy books in piles per year to then make a sample survey of account books for each five years between 1860 and 1930. However, the results of this endeavour has not offset the efforts. My quest for the section of official correspondence, of which Mendieta (2010) and Smale (2005) have made use, resulted —much to my despair and despite my recurrent lobbying— untraceable, which the current people in charge attributed to recent personnel changes. This obstacle has been partly overcome by acceding to the annual reports and the correspondence kept by “the other end” of the correspondence, in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior.

of the Interior (MI, 1825-1899) gave access to official correspondence with the lower levels of governance.⁵ From the 1890s on, this correspondence is indirectly accessible via the published annual reports submitted by the departmental authorities to the central government and kept by the National Library, accessible in the same institution. I also revised several pamphlets regarding land and financial reform in the René Moreno collection and documents from the Ministry of Agriculture.⁶ Although I started with an economic analysis of the fiscal information in the account books, I decided to restrict my focus to the ministerial reports, in view of the time consuming work in Corque, which received priority.

A specific case of violent anti-land reform rebellion brought me to the library of Costa de la Torre, in La Paz, which contains the judicial gazettes and where I also found several annual department reports.⁷ My particular interest in Carangas' "Pacific connection" brought me to the regional archives of Iquique (ITAR), Arica (AHVD) and Tacna (ART), and the library of CREAM (Centro de Investigación de la Realidad del Norte, Iquique), yet only a small sample of the rich material I found here on cross-border exchange circuits has been included in this dissertation, but has nonetheless served a detailed analysis of those circuits (see chapter 4.2).⁸

Especially in view of the arduous work of processing the judicial documents at Corque, I chose to leave a couple of archive sources out of consideration. As indicated, a comprehensive economic analysis (based on account books) has not been included in this research. Church archives were neglected and the time-consuming analysis of (local) newspapers (for which previous thesis result already had indicated to include very little references to Carangas) was left aside as well.

The archive as field event and the field as archive.

The challenge of conducting archival research on the Carangas region starts with very material concerns. The dispersed location and scarcity of archives with material on 19th-20th century Carangas compels mobility from the researcher, including an inescapable

⁵ I revised the dossiers for every five years (1860-1930) in addition to years which material in other archives had indicated as important.

⁶ The Ministry of Agriculture was however marked by a very strong focus on colonization and cultivation lands, resulting in the main conclusion from this revision that Carangas was almost completely absent in its archived documentation.

⁷ 1918, 1919, 1921, 1923, 1924 and 1927.

⁸ Further research in the national archive of Chile, in Santiago, may add to this analysis, moreover taking into account that this archive also entails documents on the contested period of the Chilean occupation of what before the 1880s still constituted Peruvian territory.

travel to the former capital in the remote village of Corque (it is not a coincidence that little historical research has been conducted on the region). Moreover, addressing the history of a relatively autonomous indigenous region urges not only physical but also interdisciplinary mobility, demanding a conscious exchange between “the academic” and “the field”. The historian is thus forced to look beyond archive catalogues and to incorporate certain anthropological insights and methods. These methodological challenges and objectives are best matched by adopting an ethnohistorical perspective, combining archives with field work.

The archival traces at our disposal served several purposes. First, there is their pure formal function: every state creates tools to count, register and classify. While presented as neutral, these tools serve to make society “legible” (Scott 1998) and make people “accountable” (Bolton 2007) by creating ties between social sectors, the central state and its local representatives which are regularly renewed through taxes, titles, registers etc. This implies the deployment of several mechanisms that allow for a systematic recording and controlling of society, materializing in taxpayers lists, censuses, account books, notary books, maps, technical inspection reports and annual political reports. At the same time, these mechanisms make the state apparatus itself more legible, accountable and accessible, allowing non-state actors or lower ranks in that apparatus to adopt the created tools to use, defend, contest or increase specific rights, as reflected in wills, sale transactions, contracts, lawsuits or official correspondence. However, the local producers of these documents, were usually quite complexly entangled with the indigenous locals they represented, hence making a “reading against the grain”, especially of the most local documents, much more complicated than simply turning the dichotomous top-down domination upside down.

Regarding this complex against-the-grain reading, Abercrombie states that the challenge is not just to “do” ethnohistory but to unmask the “*extraordinary hubris*” of historical and anthropological accounts by “*violating (sic) the disciplinary frontier between ethnography and history*” without discounting their methods (Abercrombie 1998, 10 and 21).

“in the study of the people and relationships of colonial situations, our motives, goals, and discursive strategies are enmeshed in the very kinds of struggles about which we write. As we strive to hear an indigenous voice in documents produced for the state’s archives, we find those very documents to be a discursive frontier, a barrier of miscommunication erected between colonizer and colonized. And as we carry out ethnographic fieldwork to find indigenous meaning worlds, we discover them to be concealed in clandestine spaces” (Abercrombie 1998, xxiv).

Indeed, while archives and field work give important complementary information, this combination does not automatically deliver a “waterproof” reconstruction.⁹ The archival sources as well as the interviews with *carangueños* have a bias which is not removed by uniting both stories. However, there is an important added value in the combination, on the condition that they are not approached as separated fields. Platt has defined this as an approach to “the archive as field event” (Platt 2012). The provincial court in Corque is probably where I came closest to that approach. While revising numerous lawsuits of which most did not make it to the “final round” in writing this dissertation, the mainly trivial data these un-sensational cases contained - from standard notarial formulations to filthy insults, sometimes deadly boring while other times shocking or hilarious- were however pivotal in familiarizing with daily life in 19th century Carangas. Moreover, while reading those cases, I was often struck by the almost literally identical formulation of juridical cases as they were brought before the judge (who I accompanied at the same desk) by local, 21st century comunarios.

Although this field-archive crossover between the four walls of the court still counts as my principal ‘field experience’ and despite the fact that interviews could never give a first-hand testimony of the 19th and early 20th century stories I was looking for, I have dedicated part of my research efforts to field work. Already in 2008-2009 I had regularly visited the village of Turco, where I conducted research on the 1953 land reform. Between 2010 and 2012 I revisited the village as well as several villages, individually (yet with important ‘coaching’ of CEPA) and in company of the leaders and personnel of the COAJK during the annual *muyta* (see also Preface). I attended community meetings, conducted unstructured interviews with community leaders and had long talks with a number of comunarios, particularly the eldest members of the community. While my interviews in the villages of Carangas were mainly focused on the question of land, I also concentrated on the aspect of mobility and exchange, particularly towards the Pacific, which was the dominant focus of my field work in a number of villages in the regions of Arica and Tarapacá (Tarapacá, Camiña, Colchane, Putre, Belén).

These visits resulted however a very time-consuming activity that, despite the very rich information that these visits and interviews directly and indirectly provided, kept me from the archives, to which I eventually gave priority. Moreover, the fact that a proper field work would have required months of Aymara language training (indeed, language still constitutes by biggest handicap, regardless of the fact that most people in

⁹ Abercrombie formulates a gap between the purposes of history and anthropology and their outcome: *"It is my hope that the gap between these accounts (a gap unavoidably narrowed by the fact that both accounts flow from my pen in the final instance) may serve not to undermine but to supplement each one, and perhaps to cast a critical shadow over the interpretive effects that have ensued from the manner in which indigenous cultural forms have been (mis)placed in time by Spaniards and creoles, historians and ethnographers."* (Abercrombie 1998, 124-5).

those villages are proficient in Spanish). A particular aspect of the “field” that captured my interest is the practices of indigenous justice. However, I have been unable to attend indigenous justice sessions or have interviews with the comunarios in charge of this communal institution.

Despite several setbacks in my wannabe-anthropologist efforts, the contact with former community leaders gave access to a processes of communal history writing and record-keeping. An ex-mallku of Corque, don Mario Flores, passed me the dossier the COAJ-K had elaborated, as well as the individual dossier of his community, that had served to obtain the official title of “native community land” (*tierra comunitaria originaria*) in the time he acted as regional indigenous leader (1990).¹⁰ Anastacio Canqui Mollo, also a former community leader, from Turco, provided me even with a more detailed account, materialized in a book project that tells his personal version, as carangueño, as comunario, as turqueño and as llama farmer, of the “roots of Jatun Carangas, today Jach'a Carangas” (Canqui Mollo 2012). His book as well as the history reconstructed in the COAJ-K document can be seen as a product of current revitalization processes, the people without history have started to write their own histories.¹¹

¹⁰ This dossier entails a range of different documents, relating to the history of Carangas, the “rules” that regulate community membership and cadastral maps with community boundaries. These aspects had to prove the “indigeneity” of the region and its communities, which was the first step in the procedure to be recognized as a native community. In fact this document could be seen as a ‘renovation’ of colonial titles and their republican recuperation to assert communal land rights. Similarly, it entails a double function, at the one hand confining and fixing the communities’ territorial organization, its internal regulation and its history, as well as providing the community with a powerful tool to secure that organization, regulation and an “own” history.

¹¹ This is a fascinating ‘new’ source to gain insight in historical trajectories and how they are reproduced in collective historical memory. However, this source requires a critical stance from the researcher: while documentation from official archives needs to be read “against the grain” in order to discover underlying justifying patterns of its producer (often the state or one of its institutions, representatives or ‘sympathizers’), these sources are written from a certain perspective and guided by an underlying objective/motivation (e.g. obtain formal recognition of a specific status and gain access to the resources attached to such status; thus indigenous communities or larger entities need to prove their continuity and hence the legitimacy of their claims). In that sense, these written histories can be read as –an indeed, reflect very much- 19th century nationalist history writing, legitimizing that they always formed a homogeneous and harmonized whole. This comment does not necessarily imply a negative evaluation of such history writing. On the contrary, these histories may function as powerful instruments against dominant hegemonic history writing and to unsettle grand narratives.

PART II. The social agro-pastoral system of the
Central Andes.

Introduction to Part II.

Endowed with a unique combination of ecological factors, the Andes have generated a unique human-nature interrelation. The specific answers formulated by the people that have shaped the Andean landscape and society give credit to their strong adaptive capacities. However, over the long term and particularly since European intervention and the ensuing Columbian exchange, ecological and economic changes have gradually undermined this interrelation and seriously challenged the elasticity of these capacities. Much attention has been drawn to the transition set in motion in the early colonial era, both in terms of its ecological, demographic and cultural destructiveness as in terms of the resilience of local communities to adjust, resist and recover. In the late 19th century, this ongoing transition accelerated under the impetus of an economic revitalization from roughly the 1850s until a period of de-globalization in the wake of the 1929 world economic crisis abated its speed. Fomented by liberal land-privatizing reforms, export-oriented economic policies and a state-building discourse, this period saw the take-off of a new cycle of agrarian enclosure, of (first silver, then tin) mining exploitation and international market integration, and of inter-elite political struggle. Before zooming in on how our specific case region has experienced and responded to these post-colonial incorporation pressures, this second part of the dissertation will sketch a detailed picture of the broader scenery of that case region, its internal composition and the historical setting of the transitions under study.

Methodological approach to Part II

In order to assess the question of how this negotiated peripherality operated in the local-global interaction of Carangas' communities with the wider environment and social context, this interaction will be approached from a multi-layered ecological-ethnohistorical perspective. Reflecting the interdisciplinary ambitions of the presented research, that framework draws quite freely from several methodological approaches in an attempt to make the reconstruction how (Central-Andean rural) *"households compose the broader system, but are also modelled by that system"* (Vanhaute 2008, 41; Dunaway 2012) a feasible goal. It frames rural life in the Central Andean Highlands within the outlines

of a specific social agro-system, within which the household will be understood as a “gateway to the wider world”.

A “peasant” livelihood is essentially based on multiple interactions between organizational units of different size and on a wide array of overlapping mechanisms and circuits for the production, regulation and circulation of goods and services. This hints at a complex intertwining of household formation, inter-household relations, frameworks for collective action and supra-local networks which can be disentangled from a top-down (explaining local livelihoods from the system level) nor a bottom-up (household as entirely “unchained”) perspective. Neither does a matryochka doll-kind of order suit the analysis.¹ Rather, I envision the formation of rural spaces and social structures as a tightly and puzzling interwoven membrane. To make this membrane researchable, I bring the model of (social) Agrarian Systems² into dialogue with the concept of livelihood³ and a good share of methodological input from Andeanist peasant scholarship on household economy theories.⁴ A source of inspiration for this particular

¹ However, the use of “nesting” as a “design principle” for institutions for collective action reflects the idea of Russian dolls. This multi-staged principle dissects commons regimes into multiple decision-making units across several layers in order to demonstrate the simultaneous “robustness” (Ostrom 1990) and subjugation to change (Ensminger 1992).

² Agrarian Systems –amongst which the “French” model of Agrarian Systems Analysis and the “North Sea” model of the Social Agro-System can be distinguished- have been designed as concrete research tools by rural (history) scholars, adept of the Annales school and indebted to the Slicher van Bath tradition. Agrarian Systems Analysis was developed at the National Institute of Agronomy (INA, Paris); *A History of World Agriculture* counts as the main reference book (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). Largely adopting a similar systemic framework, the consortium for Comparative Rural History of the North Sea Area (CORN) places a stronger emphasis on the role of social power (see also footnote in Introduction). Although originally designed departing from quite a different regional setting, the framework of the “social agrosystem” is very instructive for its focus on social relations between lords, peasants, labourers, moneylenders and the state. In doing so, the CORN researchers do not privilege –or even more, pretend to seek a prime mover of- social, productive or technological change rather than to reduce the explanation of long-term change in agricultural efficiency to the relationship of social structure and class conflict. In that sense, CORN is contributing to a reframing of the famous Brenner debate.

³ The Sustainable Livelihood Approach has emerged in the 1990s from the work of (rural) development scholars, particularly British and Dutch (Scoones 2009; De Haan and Zoomers 2005). It presents an optimistic, holistic and actor-oriented response to structural methodologies of the dependentistas, neo-Marxists and the household approach of previous decades (De Haan and Zoomers 2005, 28-9 and 32; see also Chambers and Conway 1992; Ellis 2000; Scoones 2009).

⁴ See the standard yet somewhat outdated publication on land and power in the Andes edited by Custred and Orlove (1980), and particularly Mayer’s economic-anthropological work on the Andean household, *The Articulated Peasant* (2002). The emphasis on the household as the basis of the Andean peasant economy runs in line with the bulk of (Marxist) peasant studies by pioneering scholars and their successors, testing the Chayanov’s standard definition of the peasant household as the “*economic unit of a peasant family that does not employ paid workers*” (Chayanov 1966, 1; Wolf 1966, 2; Mintz 1974; Paige 1975; Kay 1974, to name just a few).

combination of methodologies was found in the “Systemic Approach to Rural Development” that combines three levels of analysis, linking the configuration of livelihood patterns (1) to the heterogeneity of livelihood strategies (2) and to larger structures of long-term economic, governance, environmental and agrarian change (3).⁵

Thus here is my toolbox that will serve my undertaking to assess the historical construction and transformation of rural livelihood patterns in the Central Andes. The point of departure is the livelihood perspective, which promotes a combination of academic debate and practical action, although this is (still) not a very common angle to be taken by historians. Despite recurrent shortcomings, it casts an inspiring and refreshing look on rural development and inequality by framing the daily organization of production and community life –as in Carangas– in “*a complex web of activities and interactions that emphasises the diversity of ways people make a living*” (Scoones 2009, s.p.).

The diversity of “making a living” stems from how specific human (labour power, knowledge, and know-how), “inert” (productive implements and equipment), and “living” (cultivated plants and domestic animals) resources are used and combined within a particular ecological setting (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 47-9). This is how a particular agrarian regime takes shape. Although labelling these regimes remains an artificial act, their conceptualization offers a workable framework to grasp how the intersection of shattered agriculturalist and pastoralist “life zones” of Carangas within the broader “ecoregion” of the altiplano is embedded in a larger agricultural regime (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 51). The “operationalization” of the natural endowments of this ecoregion is fundamentally subject to the structures of social power. While definitely playing an important determining role, these relations are themselves the outcome of the complex interaction between population pressures, political decisions, conflicts, and ideas, but also more engrained belief systems and exchange logics (Thoen 2004).

Scaling down within this social agrosystem to the very local level, the household will be approached as the basic actor in the construction of rural livelihoods, which in the Andes corresponds to the nuclear family. By pooling waged and non-waged incomes,

⁵ Different from my use of this model, SARD (not to be confused with the FAO’s reference to “Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development”) has been designed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in function of development project cycle management. Promoting a holistic perspective to poverty-reducing rural development, SARD presents an analytical instrument that frames individual households within multiple stakeholder interaction and within the broader landscape and history of the rural setting (Witteveen and Ruedin 2008, 2). Instead of pretending to provide in a new methodology, the model “*integrates complementary approaches and methodologies originating from different schools of thought*” (Witteveen and Ruedin 2008, 2). More concretely, it combines Agrarian Systems Analysis with the Sustainable Livelihood Approach and other practical instruments designed by development institutions, such as “outcome mapping” model of the Canadian IDRC.

households are the key to the question why “*the vast majority of the world’s workers have never been fully proletarianized*” (Dunaway 2012, 454; see also Smith and Wallerstein 1992). To understand how this pooling is organized in the Andean context, I adopt Mayer’s emphasis on the links between the household economy and communal institutions (Mayer 2002),⁶ thereby extending Custred and Orlove’s insistence on the household as the decisive mediator between the individual and the global level (1980, 15 and 31-54). Communities must however be approached as historical constructs that are open to broader processes of change as well as inputs from the very local level. Rather than the boundaries of each level, the focus is placed on the connections between households and communities and beyond. These connections become wider and more multifaceted as the focus zooms out.

The link between these scales and frameworks for action is access. The question of livelihood formation does not directly correspond to the availability and quality of assets but relates to concrete subsistence strategies that are formed by social relations and institutions (Zoomers 1999, see also Scoones and Wolmer 2002). These strategies are designed, deployed and influenced by deliberate objectives and unintentional responses, converting the notion of livelihood into a dynamic transformation process. The clue to that process is the question of access, defined by the variables of power and sovereignty (De Haan and Zoomers 2005, 36). The challenge is then in grasping this access by applying the sketched methodological framework to Carangas. Therefore I rely on a bunch of peasant literature produced in and on the region in combination with the available sources for the late 19th-early 20th century period.

Regarding archival sources, I distinguish four main producers of key reconstruction material: the *Revisita* committees, the departmental and provincial state representatives, occasional Commissions, and Court.

A very specific source is the repeatedly executed *Revisita* (land surveys) and its outcome, the *padrones* (taxpayers lists), providing detailed information on the categorization and distribution of rural Indian labour. Far from “innocent” neutral devices, these documents give indirectly access to indigenous voices and the structuring processes underlying rural change.⁷ They serve as a valuable “red thread” to reconstruct

⁶ Centred on the elements of house, field and money, Mayer approaches the household economy in the Andes from different angles, each centralizing a particular aspect of a household, such as kinship bonds, production processes, its boundaries (the black box metaphor), or the rational behaviour of its individual members (the rational choice model) (Mayer 2002, 5).

⁷ On basis of Zagalsky’s discussion of one of the principal and richest entries into the changing organization of life in the ayllus over the centuries, the *visitas* or colonial land inspection, we can distinguish three approaches towards the sources at our disposal. First, there is the positivist stance, adopted in legal and institutional historical research conducted up to the 1970s, which perceived the colonial inspections and their “product”,

qualitative and quantitative demographic developments of Andean communities as well as to assess indigenous demographic strategies and differentiation patterns.⁸ In that sense, this thread gives insight into previous, changing and eroding or reinvented social and political organization of the ayllu and hence provide the historian with multiple links towards other types of sources. To both the State and the communities, they evidence a tributary pact that functioned as a regulator for communitarian land tenure.⁹ Because the ayllus of Carangas managed to keep their lands formally exempt from cadastral operations, we have detailed similar data on internal land distribution at our disposal. As a result, one of the ayllus' greatest achievements constitutes one of the Andeanist's largest heuristic shortcomings.

A more narrative source is the yearly reports submitted by the governors of the province to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹⁰ These departmental governors headed the

the *padrones* or taxpayers lists, as legal mechanisms without going beyond the terms of the initial purpose of their creation. From an ethno-historical perspective, which gained ground from the 1960s on, these sources were uncovered as new, alternative and more transparent entries to indigenous voices of the past that allowed to complement the information derived from chronicles, lawsuits, geographical descriptions etc. A third way was proposed by the semiotic and discursive tendency that emerged in the 1980s, revealing these documents as testimonies of a structuring process, “*a ritualized event that seeks to accommodate the society and the conducts to models furthered by the Crown and the Church*” (Zagalsky 2009; see also Guevara Gil and Salomon 1994). This threefold analysis of a specific colonial source is also applicable to their 19th equivalents century and other “legibilizing” sources. It makes clear that they cannot be approached as neutral socio-economic cross-sections, frozen in time, but must be assessed in light of the historical conjunctures during which they were produced and the traces left by the diverse subjects involved in their production.

⁸ Grieshaber analyzed the Revisitas of the 19th century to corroborate and evaluate the survival of indigenous communities (Grieshaber 1991). For the Carangas region, Rivière has analyzed ten census documents (Rivière 1982, chapter 2). Demographic “strategies” developed, for instance to lower fiscal pressure or enhance one’s fiscal status, are reflected in the proportion of indigenous taxpayers to the entire population and their internal dynamics as specific fiscal categories emerged or assimilated. Gavira has assessed the demographic strategies -reflected of the Carangas communities for the late colonial period (Gavira 2010). The last Revisita for the Carangas province was taken in 1877. From then on, local censuses became the new taxation tool, although information on their execution and results is very limited.

⁹ It is in these documents that peasants may find their name and hence an official indication of their fiscal status as member of community or tenant of a hacienda. Therefore, the *padrones* were frequently requested by 19th century Bolivians as a legal source for the distribution of land among communities or individual (ex-)commoners. Still today, these documents function to proof land property; in 2009, for instance, a case from 1920 on land invasion and farm destruction was requested by the nephew of the original plaintiff (AJC, *Penales*, 1920, no. 4). The Revisita -the administrative tool to set and update these taxpayers lists- figured as the “bone of contention” between the state and the communities, particularly when deployed to implement land and fiscal reforms. In Part III we will see how in the context of the late 19th century land legislation, the usual distrust towards this fiscal intervention escalated and converted the Revisita in the symbol of the liberal antagonism.

¹⁰ The official correspondence between provincial, departmental and ministerial authorities is filed in the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the Archivo Nacional de Bolivia in Sucre (ANB) and, from 1896 on, published in

Prefectura, which constitutes the link between the functionaries at the provincial and cantonal level and the central government. The information provided by occasional recording operations, commissioned by the central government, provides quite similar information. In the same category, the Bacarreza report of 1910¹¹ and the Lima report of 1921¹² deserve special attention. Addressing the central state powers, both documents offer the most detailed descriptions on life in Carangas in all its aspects, including its relation to the rest of the country and the neighbouring country of Chile, as well as detected challenges to and opportunities for “development.” The census of 1900 can also be categorized under these operations, however recorded in a more statistical Revisita-style. To gain an idea of the personal pathways behind those statistical data, the juridical apparatus offers a rich vein of archival material. Apart from the insight gained into personal relations and conflicts in civil and criminal court cases, notary books, including testaments, inventories, and memoranda of association, constitute an excellent entry into household formation, economic activities and accumulation trajectories and the strength of local elites.¹³ Wills made-up by people explicitly identifying themselves as indigenous are particularly interesting and could be viewed as “frontier documents.”¹⁴

As stated in the introduction to this dissertation, the image that emerges from a close analysis of these sources is much less essentialist and depicts a society in movement. They entail more layers than the detailed snapshot information on the organization and continuity of communal landholdings. Yet, while these entrances reflect different levels of ayllu-state interaction and dimensions of state and indigenous voices, each of them is

the form of annual reports by the Prefect of the Oruro department, consultable in the National Library in Sucre and the Municipal Library in Oruro. (for the other chapters: see also the regional archives in Chile).

¹¹ His report has been entirely reproduced, provided with an insightful introduction, in Pauwels 2006, 337-403.

¹² The only version I found of Lima’s report, published as *Etnografía de la Provincia de Carangas. Su importancia para el Bolivia. Reformas sociales e institucionales*, is located in the library of the Department of Anthropology of the University of Oruro (Lima 1921).

¹³ Inventories cover a wider range of property “pools” (unclaimed or stolen goods, shop contents) than wills but provide no extra information on how the documented estate was formed. Similar insight into the products and merchants that made their way to/through Carangas is provided by juridical documents relating to the depositors upon whom merchants relied, particularly when their activities or warehouses became the object of theft and accusations of theft. The memoranda of commercial (trade and/or mining) enterprises as well as their contracts and litigations testify the forging of corporate partnerships and credit relations among individual and cooperating business (wo)men in the province.

¹⁴ The indigenous adoption of a Spanish practice evidences that indigenous people did not refuse Spanish influences nor did they unambiguously assimilate them (Lopez, Mancini and Nacht 2009, 12; Kellogg and Restall 1998; see also Cline 1984 and 1998, 13-33; Eire 1995; del Rio 1997; Rojas Rabiela 1999; Roncancio Vargas 2008). Wills are made according to a particular structure, procedures and symbolism imported from Spanish notarial culture and Catholicism (Nowack 2006).

state-created. Both the potential and the risk entailed in these reports is that they are direct products of the political-administrative ambitions (and shortcomings) of the time. In relation to statistical livelihood-reconstruction sources, it must be noted that censuses (increasingly available as a result of a growing role attributed to statistics in governmental planning but also part of notarial documentation) must be approached with precaution, not only because of manipulations by those who count but also because of the distrust on the part of the counted. Thus, we need complementary sources that give a closer entry to indigenous “voices”. The communities themselves dispose of their own archive, kept, conserved by their indigenous authorities.¹⁵ Also ethnographic studies produced over the last fifty years on the region or similar and/or broader regions that may be based on these diverse archival sources must be taken into account,¹⁶ in addition to my own field work notes.

Questions and structure of Part II

The questions underlying the following two chapters of the dissertation seek to analyse the historical process through which Carangas was incorporated into an expanding market system and a developing nation-state, both at the regional level as an agro-pastoralist production zone and at the household level as community-bound production units. This reconstruction is informative to the exploration into the conditions for frontier zone formation in late 19th century Bolivia in this specific rural setting.

Most basically, an assessment of these questions starts with reconstructing what rural livelihoods look like in Carangas and how the organization of these livelihoods has changed when supra-local frameworks for resource management and sovereignty were restructured. This reconstruction is based on the factors of (1) ecology, (2) demography, (3) production processes and (4) market relations (chapter three),¹⁷ in addition to the factors of (5) state regulation and (6) communal agency (chapter four). Accordingly, a set of sub-questions can be formulated. Chapter 3 is structured by the questions: (1)

¹⁵ Platt is one of the few having gained access to the archive of the “moiety” (*parcialidad*) and the ayllu of the community where he conducted his field work (Platt 2012). My efforts to access such sources were probably too limited, however I did have the chance of reading the personal version of Carangas’ history of don Anastasio, a pastoralist from Turco, who approaches his native region in the light of the recent reunion of all Aymara markas (Canqui Mollo 2012).

¹⁶ Mainly Rivière 1982, Pauwels 1983, and the publications of Ayllu Sartañani (1992, 1995) but also West (1981) on Pampa Aullagas and Caro (1985) on Ulla Ulla provide in insightful analyses.

¹⁷ These four factors correspond to the CORN classification of rural production (Van Bavel and Hoyle 2010, 2-5) and run more or less in line with the research factors established in the Introduction of this dissertation, with the important absence of state regulation (5) and communal agency (6).

which limits and which comparative advantages did the altiplano present, what function was attributed to these natural endowments, did these endowments and their function change over time? (2) What has been impact of demographic peaks and downfalls on land-labour relations, particularly in terms of access to land, peasants' bargaining position and their consequent tenant status? (3) What has been the impact of changes in consumption needs/demands on the organization of productive activities in terms of labour intensity, productivity and responsiveness? Chapter 4 puts more emphasis on the factors of the state, the market and their local representatives. It starts with (slightly altering the factor order) asking (5) which actors claimed land and labour, on what basis, and in what kind of land tenure and labour relations this crystalized. How did the central state intervene in this organization and how did this mould the relation rural dwellers to the state and the representation of their collective demands? It then assesses (4) what the impact of developing market structures and the accompanying infiltration of new transport modes has been on the access to land and the organization of productive and complementary (agricultural and non-agricultural, commercial and off-market) activities. Eventually, (6) it queries what conditions this state and market penetration shaped for political and commercial intermediation and elite formation and which impact this had on communal agency. Who are these local elites, what were their origins and why did they eventually "evaporate"?

In accordance with these questions, the following structure will be followed. A prologue introduces the geo-climate setting of the processes under analysis, the South-Central Andes. The best way to highlight the impressive plurality of this landscape is through a west-to-east oriented cross-section. Departing from that broad overview, the patterns of human settlement, the principles of verticality and complementarity underlying human adaptation to this dense patchwork of diverse ecologies and the productive system engendered by this co-evolution are briefly discussed.

The first chapter, then, starts with an overview of the long-term environmental, demographic and territorial-administrative evolutions in Carangas. Subsequently, the organization of rural livelihoods around 1900 on this highland plain will be assessed, departing from livestock, more particularly the llama, as the main resource that "drives" an Andean pastoralist household's developmental cycle. This vital asset influences the strategic choices regarding the accumulation and transfer of assets, the distribution of tasks and labour force, land use and settlement and the increase of their wealth and status. This development cycle will be described in terms of the tasks a household complies with (division of labour), the formation, acquisition and securing of its property (mainly livestock), and its use and tenure of land at the household and community level. The third section gives a summarizing sketch of an analysis and reconstruction (however too extensive to be entirely included here) of the destinations, circuits and products that link up as Carangas' households brought their products, their labour and particularly their llamas into circulation.

While chapter 3 scrutinizes micro-relations and household-level strategies, chapter 4 gives more attention to the macro (and meso) framework. It assesses how local livelihoods and social networks for production and consumption were linked to and shaped by broader frameworks of regulation and collective action. First it dissects extensively what has been defined as a mutual state-community pact. The second section looks at the effects of an expanding market sphere and how this intervened in local livelihood strategies. The last section assesses the intermediary function claimed by local elite groups.

Prologue: A world of complementarities.

How to capture the vastness and enormous variety of the Andean landscape on paper? An even harder task, how to render account of the adaptive skills developed by the Andean population that enabled them to circumvent the improbabilities of subsistence in the Andes? For those readers (still) unfamiliar with its (literally!) breath-taking grandeur, the subsequent section provides in an introduction to the South-Central Andean sub-region and how vegetative, animal and human life is articulated on this elevated plateau in close interaction with its adjacent ecoregions.

A cross section of the Andes: A(n off-)road trip.

Covering the entire western part of the South-American continent, the Andes are geographically constituted by parallel north to south oriented volcanic mountain chains or *cordilleras*, originating from the tectonic encounter between the oceanic Nazca plate and the continental South American plate. Extending from the current Colombian-Venezuelan border to the most southern tip of Chile, these chains form the planet's longest mountain range above sea level with a length of about 9000 km. The area upon which this research focuses is situated within the central part of this range, climatologically differentiated from the tropical Northern Andes and the humid and cold Southern Andes. Spanning from contemporary Southern Ecuador to Northern Chile and Argentina, the dry and extreme Central Andes border the seismic Pacific coast to the West and vanish into the subtropical valleys and lowlands towards the East. As the Andes are geologically relatively young and little affected by erosion, the *cordilleras* that separate the ocean from the Amazon are hard to traverse. Yet it is exactly the interconnectedness between diverse ecological settings that range along this west to east division that stands out as the formative factor in Andean livelihoods.

The mountain slopes are split up by altitudinal zonation into different belts or ecoregions, regardless of their location within the tropical latitudes. Across these belts, a very dense patchwork of so-called "ecological niches" composed by a specific set of climatological, geological, vegetative and wildlife features. The ecoregion that stands at

the centre of this dissertation is known as the *altiplano*, a plain only surpassed by the Tibetan highland as the planet's highest continental plateau (Lamb and Hoke 1997). Just northwards of lake Titicaca, the Andean mountain range splits into the *Cordillera Real* (western ridge) and the *Cordillera Oriental* (eastern ridge), engendering a high altitude basin with a width of 350–400 km to then merge again about 1800 km further south (Allmendinger, Jordan, Kay and Isacks 1997). This vast plain is the heart of the South-Central Andes, a sub-region within the widest belt of the Andes and corresponding to the western part of contemporary Southern Peru, Bolivia and Northern Argentina and to North-Chile. The following transection aims to visualize and stress the complementarity and interrelation of the altiplano with adjacent and distant zones of the wider South-Central Andean environment.




Figure 4 Topographical cross-section of Bolivia (Klein 2011, 3).

The cross section starts in the Southern Pacific ocean, which formed the key entry to this part of the world since the first European who set foot in the Andes, until intercontinental airplanes took over. It was the Prussian scientist Alexander von Humboldt who during his travels, known as “*the scientific discovery of the New World*” (1799-1804), explained the phenomenon that creates at the shores of this ocean the world's most productive marine ecosystem (Helferich 2004, xvi). The Humboldt Current Large Marine Ecosystem is produced by a cold ocean current that flows north-westwards along the western shores of the Americas' Southern cone towards the equator (Thiel et al 2007). With intervals of about five years, unusual warming provoked by the climate pattern known as El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) distorts the current, thereby leaving a serious and at times devastating impact on its extensive influence zone (Davis 2001, 17).




Figure 5 Saltpetre plant “Buen Retiro” in the *pampa* nearby Pozo Almonte, 1915 (Colectivo LER 2007 [1915]).

The remarkably rich source of marine life offshore, attracting an abundant quantity of seabirds that leave thick layers of guano on the coastal islands, contrasts with the desert landscape ashore, generated by the permanent anticyclone (Cunill Grau 1999, 98; Mann 2011, 212-20). Along the Pacific Ocean, an almost absolute aridity reigns over a narrow coastal strip of only some 100 km width, stretching from the driest place on earth, the Atacama Desert in current North Chile, to Southern Ecuador. However, dryness does not necessarily equal scarcity. Apart from guano, the dry *pampa* counts with another fertilizing source in the form of enormous nitrate or saltpetre reserves which would provide Peru, Bolivia and particularly Chile –after it won a war over the access to these reserves- with enormous fortunes in the late 19th – early 20th century (Cunill Grau 1999, 100-2).

Moving inland, the rainless coastal belt switches over to the Andean headlands (*precordillera*), cut through by fertile and undulated fissures (*quebradas*), to then quickly incline towards the snowy peaks of the Andes. Compared to the eastern flank of the Andes, the western ridge is remarkably drier and harder to traverse with peaks of over 6000 metres covered by eternal snow. With average elevations situated between 3000 to 4000 m above sea level, the *altiplano* interconnects both mountain chains.

Walled by the Andean mountains, this tableland forms an endoreic basin, which means that precipitation and waterways have no exit to external water bodies but through evaporation and seepage. Within this inland drainage system the scarce surface water remains contained by interconnected lakes, swamps and sub-basins. Water is concentrated into what is known as the “aquatic axis”, starting to the north with the Azangaro river that runs into the world’s highest navigable lake, Titicaca, which is constituent to a larger basin that goes by the same name and connects southwards via

the Desaguadero river to the Poopó basin, formed by the Poopó lake, and via the Lacajahuira river to the Coipasa basin. More south, the Coipasa salt flat with the same name, the small brother of the world's largest salt crust, the *salar* of Uyuni stretching over approximately 10000 km² more southwards (Risacher and Fritz 2009, 125). The ecoregion of this climatologically semi-arid area has been identified as the *puna*, characterized by wet and dry grassland and scrubland vegetation (Riveros Salcedo 2001).



Figure 6 Corn field in the valley of Camiña (Chile) in the *precordillera* (own picture, January 2012).

The area houses a range of plants and wildlife that are hunted, gathered, fished, raised or cultivated. For all the innovation heralded by the Columbian exchange, the potato and camelid species still count as the “pillars” of the local diet and the highland productive system. Despite its elevation above vegetation level and restrictions of aridity and frost, microclimates scattered over the area offer farming opportunities for a wealth of potato varieties, as well as root crops and grains such as the quinoa plant, which were originally domesticated in the Titicaca lake area. Peat lands, known as *bofedales*, naturally high soil salinity and several native grasses (particularly the *ichu* plant that serves as pasturage and counters soil erosion) generate excellent grazing conditions for South-American camelids. Despite their decreasing number and increasing exploitation, these animals continue to play a central role in Andean rural

livelihood formation.¹ Around the lakes and rivers (Titicaca, Poopó, Lauca river), fish, water birds and totora (reed mace, a sedge variety and natural decontaminant) count as important resources (Cunill Grau 1999, 129). The salt lakes provide in a highly demanded consumption product and means of exchange (Huarachi and Iquize 2003). In contrast to its current bare outlook, big parts of the *altiplano* were originally covered with *queñua* trees and tola and yareta plants.² Equally threatened with disappearance are many of the wildlife species such as flamencos, foxes, armadillos (*quirquinchos*), chinchillas and viscachas, eagles and ostriches. Last but not least, the volcanic subsoil probably foresees in the altiplano's most valuable resource; at least for those who know to get hold of the underground's extraordinary mineral and metal reserves.



Figure 7 Llamas grazing during the rainy season on a *bofedal* nearby Isluga, Chile, at the western side of the Cordillera Real (own picture, January 2012).

Continuing our transection to the east, the Andes gently loose height into humid and outstandingly fertile intermountain valleys. Descending from the *altiplano*, mountain slopes can be subdivided into several vertically layered cultivation niches which have become extraordinarily important for world agriculture, evidenced in the amount and prominence of the plants that were to be domesticated here (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 190). At an altitude of about 4000 m, pasture zones make way for the cultivation of tubers and indigenous cereals. A subsequent limit is crossed at an altitude of 3500 m, introducing the maize production zone which foresees in staple products, flour and the alcoholic *chicha* drink (Guillet 1981, 141). Further eastwards, a lower sub-tropical zone

¹ While the llama and the alpaca count as the sole large herd mammals of the western hemisphere to be domesticated, which occurred probably around 5000 to 3000 BC, the vicuña and the guanaco have continued grazing in the wild (Mengoni 2008).

² Over 90% of the *queñua* population has been exterminated by colonial mining and post-colonial carbon production (Purcell et al 2004) while tola and yareta have become less abundant due to their consumption as vegetative fuels (Cunill Grau 1999, 130; Blanco 1904, 18).

dominated by the sub-tropical ecoregion of the *yungas* (approximately between 600 and 3000 m above sea level) takes over the scenery. Advancing even further east, the undulating transition zone announces rainforests and savannah lands. To the north, the South-Central Andes border the vast Amazon basin, which southwards become humid grassland plains (*Llanos de Moxos*) and end in the arid pampas of the *Gran Chaco* (Sanabria 2007, 32-5).



Figure 8 An agro-ecological community in the grasslands of the South-West Amazon basin (own picture, Beni department, December 2008).

Human settlement.

Across this Central Andean landscape, the altiplano (particularly its eastern side around the Titicaca lake) historically counts as a core zone of human activity in the Andes, a place it is only very recently giving up to the lower areas (Klein 2011, 1 and 6). The development of a real agricultural system in the region started around 1000 B.C. and was situated on the Andean valleys and the Pacific coast, where human presence and first settlements can be traced back to approximately 8000 years B.C. and 2000 B.C. respectively (Stanish 2002, 1-3; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 192). Despite the constraints of the barren soil, the severe climate and the implications of elevation, these nuclei developed into complex societies comprising a remarkably dense population that maintained strong links to the valleys and the coast. When Pizarro and his men reached

these altitudes, the altiplano was mainly inhabited by Aymara speaking “nations” or federations which also included different language groups represented by the population today known as the Urus (Sandoval et al 2013). Today a minor and highly marginalized ethnic group, the Urus were in fact the first inhabitants of the area and settled –as their name of “men of the water” (*jasuni*) reflects- along the aquatic axis (Wachtel 1986). The Aymara only arrived later, occupying the area permanently at least by the time of the Tiwanaku horizon (Platt et al 2006, 26). Up to today, this ethnolinguistic group dominates altiplano population patterns.



Figure 9 Oruro, an urban island on the altiplano (picture Mathias Monbaliu, October 2011).

Overall, European immigration remained very limited in what for these newcomers presented an uninhabitable environment. The result is that the Andean highlands display a segregated society, with an almost exclusive indigenous countryside while whites and mestizos constituted the dominant minority in the cities and mining centres (Grieshaber 1980, 260-1). A more hybrid constellation structured the eastern valley region, where the optimal productive properties functioned as a major pool of attraction for human settlement, yet intensely connected to the highland areas. The higher stratum of this zone, which is home to Quechua speaking groups, had become the “cradle” of high pre-Inca and Inca cultures and was also the preferred setting for most incomers from the Old World. Further east, human population remained for long time reduced to the seminomadic settlement of hunting and gathering groups until major technological and infrastructural breakthroughs of the last fifty years pushed the agrarian frontier into the humid lowlands (Klein 2011, 1-3). This caused a historical shift in settlement patterns with Bolivia’s lowlands currently housing (nearly) the majority of the country’s population.³ At the western side of the cordillera, a similar pattern is observable as urban areas and particularly ports on the coast are absorbing an ever larger share of the hinterland population.

³ The national census executed in November 2012 caused quite some controversy when provisional results in January 2013 indicated Santa Cruz (for the first time) as the country’s largest city, to then be corrected a couple of months later, returning that honour to La Paz (Erbol 23.01.2013; INE 2013).

Ecological adaptation and Andean cosmivision.

Facing very diverse obstacles to exploit the resources of their direct environment, Andean communities developed specific land tenure and resource management patterns that give credit to a durable human-nature co-evolution (de Blas et al 2000, 17-21; Cunill Grau 1999, 89-150). Similar to other mountain regions, such as the Himalaya or the Alps, human settlement and production patterns were ingeniously adapted in order to match starkly contrasting zones located very closely together with each other.⁴ Examples of how human intervention knew to convert factors of apparent inhospitality into strengths are the acclimatization of selected plants and animals to the *puna* environment, terrace farming, the chewing of coca leaves to relieve altitude sickness and fatigue,⁵ and storage techniques by dry-freezing potatoes, known as *chuño* (Mann 2011, 202; Sammells 2010, 101-25), and llama jerky meat known as *charque*. Essentially to their subsistence, this in situ adaptation was combined with intense contacts with other environmental zones (Cunill Grau 1999, 124-40). Without falling into the trap of absolute ecological determinism, “*the thrust is that humanly created zonation is as important as ecological zonation in the Andean system*” (Bebbington and Turner 1987). As a result from this adaptive capacity, the first Spanish to reach in the described environment encountered “*a far more urban, more populated, and more technologically advanced region than generally assumed; and the Indians, rather than living in static harmony with nature, radically engineered the landscape*” (Mann 2006).

As Rodas defines, altiplano people combine two ways of ordering and relating to this territory, a fixed mode, “practiced” for land allocation, and a mobile mode, performed through pastoralism (Rodas 2013, 47-8 and 84). The key word to grasp this extraordinary human achievement is complementarity. Still counting as one of the most elemental ethnohistorical breakthroughs in Andean studies (Guillet 1981, 142), John Murra has coined this notion as the “*vertical control of a maximum of ecological niches*” (Murra 1967, 384-6; 1972). In his ground-breaking work, Murra defines how this resource management and governance strategy was developed under early Andean processes of state-formation. Discontinuous territories were successfully interlinked through the distribution of people into colony communities over complementary ecological niches in the *puna*, valleys and coast. Further elaboration of this vertical archipelago model has provided in “*a dramatic demonstration of the continuing distinctiveness and viability of the Andean adaptive repertory,*” not only under Inca rule but also of how

⁴ Rhoades and Thompson 1975; Guillet 1983; Orlove and Guillet 1985 cited in Mayer 2002, 16.

⁵ However, coca leaves only became a generalized commodity under colonial rule, when limited cultivation and use imposed by the Inca gave way to massive consumption (Cunill Grau 1999, 72-4).

“many contemporary peasant communities solved the subsistence problem through a variety of kin-based strategies, as local peasantries tried to diversify agricultural and pastoral production in different ecological niches (...) and to coordinate communal work efforts.”⁶

However, in an attempt to go beyond the notion of verticality, some authors have suggested “ecological complementarity” as a preferable term (Bebbington and Turner 1987). Particularly scholars of Andean pastoralist societies have stressed the co-existence of a horizontal mobility and exchange model next to direct vertical control as equally important pillars of ecological adaptation (Platt 1975, 33; Mayer 1970; Fonseca 1972; Browmann 1991; Medinaceli 2010). This horizontal dimension is addressed by Murra with the notion of reciprocity, as an alternative strategy to the –in pre-colonial times absent- market system (West 1981, 5-6). Indeed, reciprocity is a key word too, but should, in line with Temple’s definition, be distinguished from exchange.⁷ This is the point where Browmann (amongst others) goes beyond Murra in insisting on a model of parallel structures for the acquisition of livelihood assets between agriculturalists and pastoralists, the latter connecting to the former through a system of regional exchange that transcends the exclusive dependence on kin ties.⁸ Thus, in addition to direct community-based exploitation of multiple niches, local livelihood construction relied on indirect access to complementary resources that circulated through long-distance inter-ecological barter networks on a puna-valley-coast axis. Over the centuries, both models have continued to complement each other while increasingly entangling with expanding market spheres of capitalist exchange (as will be discussed in chapter 4).

Ecological adaptation also generates –and is generated by- ethical conducts and religious-spiritual views (Cunill Grau 1999, 18-21). These conducts and views constitute an “Andean cosmovision”, which reflects the presumption that “*life is an integrated, functional, cyclical entity encompassing all beings and all events that they experience and learn about*” (Rodriguez and Quispe 2009, 35). This all-encompassing “life” is a guiding principle in the thinking and doing of the Aymara, referred to as *pachamama*. Its “simple” translation as Mother Earth (the planet or nature) corresponds to a more “sophisticated” Time-Space concept that stands for the harmonizing linkage of

⁶ Larson 1995, 13. See also Lehman ed. 1982; Masuda et al ed. 1985; Mayer 1985, 76-7.

⁷ See also footnote no. 96 in chapter 2 on Temple (2003).

⁸ Medinaceli 2005, 466. See also Browmann 1991; Browmann and Kuznar and Sedlmeyer in Barnard and Wendrich 2008, 160-73 and 557-83.

temporal and spatial relations between all forms of life.⁹ This cosmovision is internally balanced by “complementary opposites”, expressed at the family as well as at the collective level in the symbolic complementary in husband-wife union known as *chachawarmi*. In respect of this assumed internal balance, community authority is always exercised by a married couple together.¹⁰ *Pachamama* entails a reciprocal bond according to which cultivating the land or herding animals means taking care of the earth, which will be given back by nature.

If life is integrated, the spiritual and everyday interrelation with nature is perceived as a constant dialogue among living creatures, the elements and divinities rather than the exertion of human dominion over “the Creation”. This is evidenced in the designation of sacred places called *huacas* dedicated to the sun, the moon, mountains, trees, ancestors, temples, thumbs, etc.¹¹ In fact, anything has the capacity of possessing sacral properties. This openness explains how the arrival of the Catholic Spanish and the destruction and/or supplanting of tangible expressions of religiously symbolic sites or objects were responded by an amplification and syncretization rather than an erosion of the Andean religious-spiritual horizon (Andrien 2001, 153-92; Griffiths 2007; Arnold and Espejo 2008; Brosseder 2014).

This amplified religious-spiritual horizon is the ordering principle behind the organization of life- and livelihood-forming events, giving shape and meaning to the rituals that connect sowing to harvesting and birth to death. Those events are harmonized within an annual agro-productive calendar and a synchronic religious-ceremonial cycle. In order to obtain a good harvest, a good herd etc., celebrations dedicated to mythical ancestors are organized at the family level the whole year long and on certain moments in the productive calendar at the collective level (Rivière 1982, 240-1). Coca leaves, alcohol and livestock, particularly llamas (both its full-grown and foetus version),¹² forms an elemental part in all rituals related to the personal

⁹ Over the last century, and particularly in the decades after the National Revolution of 1952, there was a growing feeling of loss of this balance and of the tight connection between past, present and future in organizing community life, which locals expressed as “pachamama gets angry” (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 11).

¹⁰ However, in spite of an egalitarian balance in the private family sphere, equal gender participation at the supra-household level is but a symbolic statement (Harris 1987). See also Platt 1986 and Harris 1978 cited in Mayer 2002, 12.

¹¹ *Huacas* (*wak'as*) refer to the male and female deities of the local pantheon, of which all community members consider themselves descendants. They are designated a symbolic location in the surroundings of the community's centre and the cultivation lands which then comes to represent the connection point between the community's members, its history and its real and mythical space (Rivière 1982, 54 and 240).

¹² Due to its multi-functionality, the sacred character attributed to the llama and its ritual use should not surprise. Given its extraordinary prominence, the llama is the subject of several myths, folktales and superstition, metaphors, songs and dances (Lopez 2003, 38).

development of pastoralists as well as to the wellbeing of the entire community. The provision of these ceremonial ingredients absorbs an important share of a household's expenses.

The limits and opportunities of the altiplano. The constitution of an agro-pastoral system.

In the “*struggle against geography*” (Mann 2011, 203), South-Central Andean post-Neolithic production modes have developed into an archetypal mountain system that has been preserved ever since on the high Andean grasslands. Rather than a system of slash-and-burn cultivation, it took the form of a “*system of pastoral animal breeding,*” complemented by irrigation systems that developed after 1500 BC (Bowman, Fritz and Watson 2009; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 22). Pastoralism is primarily based on the exploitation of domestic Andean camelids, which have constituted the main asset of local Aymara livelihoods for over a millennium (Graffam 1992, 888; see also Browmann 1974; Custred 1977). Due to the factor of aridity, which reduces the relevance of farming, llamas and alpacas are particularly important in the southern part of this eco-region (Medinaceli 2005, 466). Yet, the ensuing productive system comprises both pastoralists and agriculturalists; the former occupying the elevated plains where soil sterility impedes cultivation, while the latter encounter favourable conditions in the scattered microclimates and the Titicaca basin. This simultaneity of extensive pastoralism and raised field agriculture has marked the South-Central Andean productive system already since pre-Inca times (Graffam 1992). As for farming, irrigated and regularly fertilized terrace cultivation allows the exploitation of a mountain in its entirety including above vegetation levels. Consequently, highland agriculture, particularly in the lands around the Lake Titicaca, came to play a regionally decisive nutritive role; “*as if Europe had to support itself by farming the Alps*” (Mann 2011, 201).

After 1531, this Central Andean ecological-productive framework was submitted to a filtering process of intentionally and accidentally introduced material elements, commonly known as the Columbian Exchange (Crosby 2003).¹³ In the wake of conquest

¹³ In the other direction, the impact of the Columbian exchange has been at least as significant. Although the Andean highlands might seem the least expected place, it was here that Europe found a product that would result to be indispensable in the constellation of the “agro-industrial complex” and the overcoming of famine (Mann 2011). Initially, the potato was half-heartedly accepted or, to say it with the sharp pen of Galeano, “arrived very recommended by the Indians, so that Europe gave it to the pigs, the prisoners and the dying” (own translation, Galeano 1990, 71-2). Eventually, the Andean potato and its cultivation techniques came to play its protagonist role in the Columbian exchange with such fervour that “*the effects of this transformation were so striking that any general history of Europe without an entry in its index for S. tuberosum should be ignored*”

and early colonial encounter, gradual accommodations to these introductions merged with native goods and practices, crystallizing into an extended hybrid production and settlement complex that underwent relatively little change ever since (Gade 1992, 473-4). Selection and adoption in the rural highlands was mainly conditioned by the ecological constraints and prior domestication and technological developments found by the first European colonizers and facilitated by the population drop in the aftermath of their arrival. In terms of implements and equipment, a “*simplified version of the Spanish inventory of rural material life*” was adopted, without Andean technological and organizational developments being displaced (Gade 1992, 473).




Figure 10 Cross-section of the cultivation and animal herding systems in the Andes during the Inca era (figure 5.2 in Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 197).

Resulting from the appropriation of a whole range of Old World floras, faunas and technologies, production modes on the *altiplano* developed towards “*an extensive pastoral adaptation based on the indigenous llama and alpaca, as well as livestock of European origin, including sheep, goats, and cattle*” (Guillet 1981, 141). Still, Old World introductions were not able to significantly alter the agro-pastoral production modes of the *altiplano*. While livestock figures as an important player in the Columbian exchange, these immigrants were no match for the perfectly acclimatized Andean camelids (Mayer 2002, 16).¹⁴ Only

(Mann 2011, 197-212). Maize and the sweet potato left a similar impact in China. Other New-to-Old World transfers include cacao, tobacco, tomatoes and manioc.

¹⁴ In addition to Andean camelids’ environmental adaptation to the highland climate, these animals are selective in grazing, without consuming the roots of forage plants nor damaging the field thanks to the cushions on their feet (Lopez 2003, 37). Moreover, their transport capacity explains why the wheel -little practical in the mountainous environment- did not figure among Andean technological knowledge.

sheep were somehow capable of slightly altering the pre-Hispanic outlines of *altiplano* pastoralism. Not of any use as beasts of burden, but an easily vendible and transported source of meat, hide wool and cheese, it successfully integrated in the camelid-based herding system of the *altiplano*. While “*sheep was the single European introduction most valuable to native people,*” pigs and chicken were also adopted by highland peasants yet to a lesser extent (Gade 1992, 467-8). Nowadays superseded by motorized vehicles, mules, donkeys and horses have played a historically important role as means of transportation. In contrast, neither goats nor cattle ever found major entrance on the *altiplano*.¹⁵

Regarding agricultural crops, few Columbian Exchange participants have got a chance to integrate, given the factor of altitude. Exceptions are the onion, garlic and oregano. At the other hand, several native root crops and small tubers marginalized in face of Old World introductions (Gade 1992, 465-7). In more fertile parts of the Andes, several exotic species were successfully adopted and caused small alterations in native nutritional patterns, as did the tropical fruits brought from the *yungas*, but foremost the cereals (wheat and barley) cultivated in the higher valleys.¹⁶ Other potential introductions lingered (the example of grapevine) or failed (the case of olives) to find reception (Gade 1992, 465-7).

¹⁵ Because the great advantage of both animals, dairy products, is absent in the *altiplano* diet, and because the labour input from cattle on the field requires high investment in mountainous and sterile areas, the contribution of goats and cows to highland production and consumption remains limited (Gade 1992, 468; Lopez 2003, 38-9).

¹⁶ Of considerable importance to global commodity chains, but less relevant for the *altiplano* diet and livelihoods, was the integration of sugarcane with native plants such as coca and tobacco in the plantation system of the tropical lower valleys (Gade 1992, 465-6).

Chapter 3

The llama as the pillar of rural livelihoods in Carangas.



*Con tu caminar ligero
vas trazando mi camino,
pronto encontrarás el tuyo,
quirquincho del arenal.
Tu historia es la que escribes
de llareta y altiplano,
tus huellas son las palabras
que se pierden en la arena.*

Quirquinchito charanguito – Savia Andina¹

“Let’s protect the Quirquincho” (Own picture, Oruro, September 2010; Brigada Negotrópica).

The people of Oruro may bear the epithet of “quirquinchos”, the armadillos that swarm the desert-like environment, but it is the llama that has always and remains playing a leading (though shifting) role in organizing life on the altiplano. The way in which llamas define local production and trade patterns in Carangas gives this agrarian zone a strong pastoralist character. Accordingly, the framework for life and livelihood in this setting will be defined as an agro-pastoral system. This means that the prevalence of Andean pastoralism has particular implications for the local organization of community

¹ “With your light walk / you are plotting my way, / soon you will find yours, / quirquincho of the sand flat. / Your history is the one you write / of yareta and altiplano, / your footprints are the words / that get lost in the sand.” The song tells the sad story of a large number of this (now legally protected though still endangered) animal: to end as the sound box of the charango, the typical Andean small guitar (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zIHXnPpJQWk>).

life, land administration, production and labour and for the development of exchange relations and sovereignty relations. The premise is that, due to their high mobility, particularly their transport competences and collective land management, pastoralist zones and households maintain a specific relation to the market competition as to the state. However, “pastoralism” is to be used as a flexible category that shifts over time and in space. In line with Khazanov’s insights on the interrelation between pastoralist societies and the “outside world” (Khazanov 1994) and Medinaceli’s application of these insights to pre- and early-colonial Carangas (2010), the development of rural livelihood strategies in Carangas should however be understood on a continuum between pastoralism/mobility and agriculture/sedentarism rather than reduced to a singular or “non-peasant” production mode.

3.1 Carangas, an introduction.

The region to which I will refer as Carangas originally comprised a very diverse landscape that reached across its western, apparently insurmountable border towards the Pacific. However, over the last five centuries this territory was gradually reduced to its highland core, cut from its discontinuous valley lands to the east and the west (see 1.2.2 and chapter 6). This heartland core is entirely situated on the elevated altiplano, comprised by (counter-clockwise) the *Cordillera Real*, the Coipasa salt flat, the Poopó lake and a less definable natural border to the north. Together, this territory covers 26719 km², comparable to the size of Rwanda or Haiti.² In demographic terms, however, the area is very sparsely inhabited, with no major centre of population but dispersed villages and farms, which is to large extent to be ascribed to the region’s ecological features.

² In geo-referential terms, this zone is contained between irregular parallel latitudinal lines roughly at 18°00’ to 19°50’ south and between the 67°00’ and 69°00’ meridians West from Greenwich. In his geographic dictionary for the Oruro department, Blanco situated Carangas between 17°35’ South 29°30’ West to 17°47’ South 67°40’ West, from where it runs southwards towards the southern tip of the Poopó lake (without providing in an exact location because of insufficient agreement on the exact division between locals) and then westwards until 19°40’ South 68°45’ West, then northwards along the *cordillera occidental* (Blanco 2006 [1904], 17-8). The provincial inspector Bacarreza speaks in 1910 of the parallels 17°39’ to 17°41’ in the North and 19°10’ to 19°25’ in the South and between the (Greenwich-referenced) meridians 68°15’ to 69°16’ in the West and 67°30’ to 67°02’ in the East (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 352). According to Bacarreza, the province’s surface corresponded to 21690,77 km², until the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Chili redrew the border and reduced the territory to 21240,11 km² (ibid).

With minimum altitudes of 3600 m above sea level, the vast open plain offers a cold, windy and salubrious climate. The panoramic view is interrupted at several points by mountains, most of them extinct volcanoes along the cordillera, including Bolivia's highest mountain Sajama (6222 m) and others further southwards, all endowed with a strong symbolic role transmitted through legends and *huaca* veneration.³ The volcanic underground explains the abundance of thermal springs, lava fields and borax deposits (particularly Chilcaya⁴) and of mineral resources which are mainly concentrated in the mountains close to the current village of Turco and the Mejillones province. Scarce surface water is contained only by the (disappearing!) Coipasa Lake, where the Lauca River that rises in the cordillera discharges, and smaller lagoons and a multitude of minor streams and brooklets scattered over the territory.



Figure 11 Vicuña crossing *ichu* grassland at the Huayñacota lake at the foot of the Sajama mountain (own picture, Sajama National Park, October 2008).

At first sight, the semi-desert outlook, the constant wind and the oxygen poor air seem all but welcoming. Annual precipitation remains between 200 and 600 mm per year (SEDES 2005, 9; Vera 2000) and occurs in ever shorter periods and in more extreme conditions due to climate change (Andersen 2009). Temperatures fluctuate between ice-cold nights and hot days with an average annual temperature of 7°C (Genin 1995). During winter, night temperature drops far under zero, but at daytime intense solar

³ Apart from Sajama, the cordillera presents from north to south the Guallatire, the Payachata and Quimsachata twins, el Capitan and the Tata Sabaya mountain.

⁴ Chillcaya is situated in Suriri, in ayllu Collana of the vice-canton Sabaya, but after the War of the Pacific passed to Chile. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1909, no. 5 (b). See also 1911 ("Libro de Hipotecas"), no. 2. and 1913, no. 7.

radiation is only tempered by altitude and crude winds arriving from the Pacific. In contrast to the open winter skies, summer is known as the wet season (December-March), including storms and hail, which turn into snowfall in the mountainous parts. These challenging conditions convert human adaptation and livelihood sustainability in a remarkable tour de force that will be explored in the following pages of this chapter.



Figure 12 A panorama of the central part of Carangas, with a view on the village of Belén de Choquecota (own picture, March 2012).

3.1.1 “Hundreds of kilometres ... without finding traces of a living soul”: Demographics.⁵

When the first Spanish crossed the Carangas territory (probably the troops of Diego De Almagro in 1545), the population in Carangas could be estimated at 36000 people,

⁵ This section is restricted to a summary of overall demographic developments, with a specific focus on the long 19th century. For an overview of the fluctuations in Carangas’ demographic constellation, population counts and colonial and republican land inspections (*Revisitas*) are indispensable. This overview is based on Gilles Rivière’s analysis of these sources for the Sabaya community (1982, chapter 2) and on 20th century census records and demographic studies. All years in this overview refer to census years. Chapter 4 will subject these data to a deeper analysis in terms of fiscal-legal differentiations among the Carangas people under Bolivian liberalism. The Annex includes graphs depicting the demographic evolution in the Carangas region between 1500 and 2000 and a comparative table of population numbers at the departmental (Oruro) and provincial (Carangas) level under Bolivian rule.

resulting in a density of 1,3 persons/km².⁶ It is however only by 1573, when an administrative inspection was organized, that we dispose of proper demographic data on the Carangas population. According to that counting, Carangas was populated with 28692 inhabitants, which presents a smaller –though still dramatic- post-conquest drop than experienced in the valleys, where the demographic decline reached in some places to 75% (Sanchez Albornoz 1974, 45-7; Rivière 1982, 57). Only in 1683, Carangas was subjected to second census operation, the *revisita* of viceroy Duque de la Palata (Rivière 1982, 65). This survey offers a more detailed picture, yet a dramatic picture. In the course of the preceding century, the total population had declined with 71%, including the near or total disintegration of certain *ayllus* and the near or total disconnection of a considerable part of the native population with their home communities (Rivière 1982, 65, 69 and 82). The effects of epidemics, violence and migration left Carangas with not more than 8382 inhabitants.⁷

Within the Central-South Andes, the region that covers the actual department of Oruro was subject to the largest demographical drop from which it would not recover before the middle of the 20th century. Up to the 1785-‘87 census, the Carangas population nearly doubled, reaching up to 15414 inhabitants (Rivière 1982, 90). In the following decades, demographic growth lost strength and constancy. After a significant increase up to 1796 (15563 inhabitants), the population declined again until 1804 (14650 inhabitants) due to wide-spread and serious droughts around the turn of the century. Subsequently, population numbers started rising again, yet the wars of independence seriously thwarted that evolution.

At the eve of Bolivian independence, Carangas had experienced a major demographic increase, counting with 14927 inhabitants in 1838 (Rivière 1982, 90). Growth continued over the first half of the 19th century, reaching a population number of 15571 in 1847 and 17252 in 1852.⁸ In the 1850s, however, several epidemics such as typhoid, typhus

⁶ This is a rather rough calculation in view of the lack of information for the period of Spanish conquest (1532-1575). To overcome this difficulty, Rivière bases his estimation on a combination of data provided by a counting executed in 1574, after about 40 years of Spanish presence, and data for the ecologically similar Chucuito region in the Titicaca area, where the population declined with 25% between 1530 and 1567 (Wachtel 1971, chapter 2; Rivière 1982, 63). Overall, the Central Andes contained an estimated 2026108 to 2933670 inhabitants, according to Shea’s projections for 1520, on the presumption that population decline during conquest was not that much larger than during the first recorded period at the turn of the 17th century (Denevan 1976, 153).

⁷ In early colonial administrative terms, this corresponds to Carangas and the neighbouring Paria province in relation to the 10 central and southern provinces of Upper Peru.

⁸ These numbers are based on the *Revisita* documents analysed by Rivière (Rivière 1982, 102-3) and consulted in the municipal archive of Oruro. ABMO, no. 426, *Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas, 1852*.

and yellow fever, in addition to the effects of (labour) migration towards the Peruvian valleys put a strain on that growth (Rivière 1982, 99-101).⁹ Yet, over the following years, the population reached its peak, augmenting from 17343 (1860) over 18339 (1864) to 19474 inhabitants in 1867.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the pest epidemics and famine of the next decade undercut this increase, with numbers falling to 18762 (1871) and 18537 inhabitants (1877).¹¹ After 1877, no complete land inspection was executed in Carangas and new demographical data were only collected in 1900 when Bolivia's first national census was executed. The 18811 registered inhabitants (Bolivia 1902, vol. I) suggest a stagnation, although partly stems from underreporting and other manipulations in the census operation (Pauwels 1983, 230).

Throughout the 20th century, the population of Carangas knew an enormous increase, with a rise of 45% over the course of the first half of that century. In 1910, no less than 27202 inhabitants were counted (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 366), which is a much higher number than the 1900 census and the 21820 people estimated in 1920 (Lima 1921, 5). Yet, because of the rigorousness of Bacarreza's report, his deviating number may be closer to reality; the dips in the curve (see annex) are probably on account of the errata of prior and posterior surveyors. By 1950, when the next national census was executed, 41534 inhabitants were counted in Carangas (Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos 1951; Rivière 1982, 108).

While the registered increase is in line with the overall growth in Bolivia for the past fifty years, in the following decades Carangas demographic evolution started to diverge from the larger picture. Here, migration and urbanization come in the picture.¹² The changes brought (or indirectly fomented) by the National Revolution of 1952 triggered a country-wide massive rural exodus, demonstrating a general shift towards the lowland area.¹³ While population numbers at the departmental and national level got an unprecedented boost, Carangas saw its population falling with 13% (Rivière 1982, 108).

⁹ Epidemics in Carangas were reported for 1849-52 and 1855. Grieshaber 1980, 268-9 and ABMO, no. 426, *Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas*, 1852.

¹⁰ ANB, Rv, no. 225, 226 and 227. "Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas." 1860, 1864 and 1867.


¹¹ ANB, Rv, no. 228 and 229. "Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas." 1871, front page, and 1877, front page.

¹² Urbanization got its first boost with the arrival of the Spanish, first in 1545 with the foundation of Paria by Diego De Almagro, to the east of Carangas (Rivière 1982, 15), followed by the founding of Oruro in 1606. Yet, it is only in the 1950s that urbanization really broke through on the altiplano. Migration –as will be discussed with more detail in chapter 4.1.3.– was also nothing new to Andean rural life, but no change had been able to unlock the countryside as the infrastructural improvements of the second half of the 20th century did.

¹³ This demographic shift towards lower areas has been observed for the entire Latin American continent. It had started in the late 19th century, producing a decline in highland population from 61% in 1870 to 44% in 1930 (Bértola and Williamson 2006, 28). After 1950, this trend would only intensify.

According to the census of 1976, Carangas, which by then had fragmented into multiple –still entirely rural- provinces, comprised 47512 inhabitants (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 1977). At the regional level, this census represents a turning point, as for the first time, more people within the department of Oruro to which the Carangas region belongs lived in an urban area (see table).

Table 1 The Rural-Urban divide in Bolivia and in the department of Oruro, 1950-2000.



Carangas is at the weaker pole of an out-migrating dynamic. This disequilibrium would further intensify in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, which must be related to the backlash of the severe droughts and the general crisis that hit Bolivia in the 1980s. This extraordinary situation that undercut all prospects for a future life on the countryside probably explains the kink in the rural-urban relation around 1992, after which rural-urban migration pressures again lowered (yet not disappeared). While the 1992 census counted only 35194 people in the administrative units previously corresponding to the Carangas province,¹⁴ by 2001 this number had increased up to 49267, product of a growth rate of 4,18% for the 1992-2001 period (INE 2001; INE Oruro 2002). These people made up the bunch of the department’s rural population, which by then only represented 37,6% and found themselves ever more lonely in an almost deserted countryside.¹⁵ Projections for 2011, suggesting a population of 70627 inhabitants in Carangas (INE 2001; INE Oruro 2002, 4), seriously underestimated this process. The recent 2012 census points to a demographic stagnation on the countryside

¹⁴ Division Política Administrativa de la República del Bolivia 1995, cited in COAJK 2001, 13.

¹⁵ At the departmental level, population density is 9 inhabitants per square kilometer, but within the surroundings of the departmental capital that number reaches almost 50 and only 3,9 in the rural zones (INE 2013; Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 35).

with a growth of only +0,5% over the last decade (2001-2012), while urban centres continued strongly growing at a rate of +2,5%.¹⁶

Although Carangas never counted with more inhabitants than today, the toll of over half a century of strong rural-urban migration leaves the ever fewer people choosing to continue their lives in Carangas with an uncertain future. This was not very different over hundred years ago. A clarifying comment was left 1867, when it was stated that

“the immediacy of the Peruvian Coasts stimulates the emigration of the Carangueña youth with the daily wages they pay very well there, and (...) alcohol which is brought in large quantities from the mentioned Coasts causes the death of an infinity of taxpayers through religious or domestic consumption of excessive liquor, leaving infinite widows and orphans numbers in the registers. These two notorious causes produce the effect that in Carangas the population does not augment in a discernible way.”¹⁷

With the importance of out-migration in mind, the stability in the population's gender balance is quite remarkable. The proportion between male and female dwellers hardly altered over the last 150 years, with a minor “peak” at the time of the above citation. While early colonial sources seem to point to gender imbalances at the village level, this did not necessarily imply a real absence of men, but rather their integration into new social categories that were not registered in (fiscally motivated) census operations or the employment of disappearance strategies to escape labour and tribute obligations (with large role to be ascribed to their wives or mothers) (Saignes 1995). By the same token, when gender groups are balanced, this neither implies a static society but rather an underlying divestment process of labour surpluses through migration of sons and young couples. For those years that could be documented, this appears to have been the case. Since Bolivian independence, the gender balance in Carangas demonstrates a remarkable stability, fluctuating between 47,9% to 53,6% male presence (see table). Migration and mortality appear as important factors, with women outnumbering men in times of high labour out-migration, as during the 1860s or the late 20th century, and reverse proportions in the late 1870s, when epidemics may have particularly hit the female population. Today, the equilibrium seems to remain more or less in place with a slight male preponderance, particularly among -22 age groups (INE Oruro 2002, 11-2). The effect of migration on population structures is particularly

¹⁶ According to the latest census, 67,3% of Bolivia's inhabitants lives in urban areas, an increase of 4,9% compared to 2001 produced by a growth rate over five times higher than on the countryside, leaving a rural population of only 32,7%. Montero, 06.01.2014; La Razón, 11.01.2014.

¹⁷ Own translation. ANB, Rv, no. 227, “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1867, f. 197.

notable in terms of generational shifts, with more than 50% of the Oruro department's rural share being younger than 22 (INE Oruro 2002, 11-2).

Table 2 Gender balance in Carangas since Bolivian independence (irregular snapshots).¹⁸



Although urbanization and migration have dramatically altered the picture of the countryside, Carangas still counts as a “100%” rural and almost entirely indigenous region. Not any of its districts is or can be classified as urban and there are hardly people who do not manage one of the region's native languages.¹⁹ Yet “rural” and “indigenous” imply strong connections to urban worlds and a fundamentally pluri-cultural environment. While Aymara pastoralists and agriculturists coexist with Uru or “Chullpa” groups of hunters, fishers and gatherers within Carangas, most rural migrants maintain strong ties to their home community as *residentes*. Apart from the municipalities of Chipaya and Carangas, still 91,6% of the inhabitants of the other

¹⁸ 19th century fiscal surveys might overestimate male presence as assumed categories such as “taxpayers” (*contribuyentes*) often, particularly in times of crises, were taken up by women. For the 20th century, no detailed data for Carangas are available, but overall numbers for the Oruro department's rural population in 1976 and 1992 point to a female majority. Sources: ABMO, no. 426, *Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas*, 1852; ANB, Rv., no. 225-229. INE Oruro 2002, 3-4.

¹⁹ Today, over 70% of the population of the departmental rural area is multilingual, speaking Spanish in combination with a native language; 13,7% is monolingual without speaking Spanish, while only 12,1% only speaks Spanish (INE Oruro 2002, 30).

municipalities auto-identified themselves as Aymara anno 2001.²⁰ While the Aymara have quite successfully maintained their culture and are currently even reinforcing their position within Bolivia's pluri-national state, the story of the Uru is absolutely dramatic. In the 16th century, these "men of the water" still represented one quarter of the Andean highland population (22% in Carangas in 1574), but today they are reduced to approximately 2000 people divided into 4 or 5 isolated groups. Due to strong historical processes of aymarization and marginalization, the small village of Chipaya, where bad detrimental living conditions remain unparalleled in the wider region, is all what remains in Carangas of its original inhabitants.²¹



Figure 13 Typical Uru dwelling in the village of Chipaya, 1920s.²²

While today we dispose of quite specific tools and detailed data to gain insight in the living conditions in Carangas, lacking data make a reconstruction of demographic indicators a much harder task for the period of our interest.²³ At the turn of the 20th

²⁰ While the Chipaya are Uru, a curious case is the municipality of Carangas where the majority identifies her/himself with not any ethnic identity. According to Gilberto Pauwels this former mining district still seeks to be considered as Spanish. SEDES 2007, 16 and personal communication with Gilberto Pauwels.

²¹ Wachtel 1978, 1154; 2001, 15-6. See also de la Barra et al 2012; Pauwels 1999.

²² Photographed in the early 20th century by Arthur Posnansky, a pioneering researcher of what he called the "until that time completely unknown tribe of the 'Chipaya'" (Posnansky 1924, 88; digitalization by the ANB).

²³ While the living conditions for one third of all households in the department can be classified as good and for half of the houses as regular, 35% of the households within the Carangas region is burdened with bad living conditions (SEDES 2005, 18-9). A quick scan of the region's demographic indicators today reveals that life is relatively short, vulnerable and likely to finish in an urban setting, either in nearby or further away departmental capitals or across national and continental borders (SEDES 2005; INE Oruro 2002). At the

century, the province's sparse population was distributed over the territory into over 5000 households made up by nuclear families of on average 5 members (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 366; Mayer 2002).²⁴ Through native forms of communal organization, these units link up to small hamlets and provincial towns dispersed over the territory and ordered into municipalities.²⁵ Most of these households lived in extremely harsh living conditions, reflected in the long lists of misery-related adjectives adopted by contemporaries to introduce the region.²⁶ A hint at these "miserable" or "sad" social circumstances is given in a monograph on Carangas written in 1921 where the author emphasizes child mortality as one of the region's major problems apart from its disconnectedness (Lima 1921, 197).²⁷ From the 1920s on, preoccupation over the effects of alcoholism, epidemics and lacking public infrastructure incited a more systematic collection of data on birth rates, mortality and health and the establishment of a sanitary commission in Carangas, although the planned statistical and medical actions only reached a part of the Carangas population (Arce 1923, 36-8 and 1924, 22-4; Calderón 1927, 41; Fajardo 1931, 20).²⁸

departmental level, the birth rate for 2012 is estimated at 22,74/1000, the total fertility rate at 2,94 children per mother and the death rate at 8,98/1000. Once born and "survived" the high infant mortality rate (46,01 per 1000 live births), a child born in 2012 within the Oruro department is not likely to reach an age over 64 (projections on basis of INE 2001). In 2001, only 21% of the households was connected to the electricity network and hardly 32% had access to drinking water while the majority still relies on wells, waterwheels, rivers or ditches (SEDES 2005, 21 and 23). In every sector of the region, over 70% of the households does not dispose of basic sanitary infrastructure (bath room, toilet or latrine), in several places even reaching over 99%. See INE 2001 (<http://www.ine.gob.bo>).

²⁴ The number of households can be deduced from taxpayers' lists in which each taxpayer represents a head of household (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 375). Anno 2001, Carangas counted 24119 households units, each comprising only 3 members on average (INE 2001).

²⁵ A more detailed description of this administrative division is given in 3.1.2.

²⁶ The province was generally introduced in ways similar to the description given by the Prefect of Oruro his annual report of 1898 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs: "*Carangas, is a vast territory inhabited in its totality by the indigenous race which is still conserved there in a semi-savage state and in some districts even in complete savageness*" (Aramayu 1898, 3).

²⁷ Although based on rumours, the practices he mentions of indigenous parents asphyxiating their own children remind of the desperate early-colonial practices of "vital reluctance" in which indigenous mothers consciously assassinated their own children to spare them from all the misery to come (Pérez Murillo 2003, 208-10). Child mortality was indeed a persistent problem, it was the indigenous population group that most strongly declined in the course of the 19th century as they were more vulnerable to epidemics, but also to under-enumeration (Grieshaber 1980, 266-7).

²⁸ After a gradually increasing pressure for means to combat epidemics such as in the countryside (Ascarrunz 1918, 25 and 1918-1919, 15; Tejada 1921, 21-2), a commission was assigned to Carangas. In 1931, the Prefect of Oruro reported a severe typhoid fever and pertussis epidemic in Carangas (Fajardo 1931, 42). In addition, flue, tuberculosis, mumps and varicella were indicated as the most common diseases, but also dysentery, measles,

Important long-term factors in the erosion of sustainable livelihood construction are ecological vulnerability and infrastructural disconnectedness. Indeed, “[t]he Province of Carangas quite broad in its extension is very deserted because of lacking cultivation terrains, as in its majority it is formed by rugged mountains and immense sand flats.”²⁹ Natural disasters in the form of frost and hailstorms and sporadic droughts, hail and floods constitute an important threat for agrarian-based households which are already subject to water scarcity and the effects of soil erosion, degradation and desertification.³⁰ As will be clarified further on, the key underlying process to this vulnerability, yet only visible from a long-term perspective, is the communities’ loss of their direct access to ecologically complementary regions. Infrastructure in itself figures among the local population’s strongest demands today, although “[t]he lack of roads (...) only represented isolation in the Andes in the second half of the twentieth century, when transportation in Bolivia shifted from mules to motorized transport” (Canessa 2012, 11).

At the other hand, the factors of ecology and infrastructure provided the local population with certain comparative advantages in that the lack of interest by outsiders in these rather unfertile terrains and the region’s inaccessibility to “modern” transport abated population pressures and competition over resources. While this resulted in limited commercial potential of local agrarian production, it enabled the communities to secure a relatively strong autonomous control over land and (caravan) exchange routes. This was key to the upholding a minimal level of household livelihood sustainability³¹ and the reproduction of ethnic boundaries. Yet, these livelihoods and boundaries were not free from changes as the region experienced increasing state-driven and market-oriented pressures to “people” this strategic borderland (today mostly famous for the illegal exportation of drugs and importation of unregistered cars, *autos chutos*) and bring the resources of this “empty” land in circulation.³² Despite these aspirations, the first impression of Carangas is still one of “[h]undreds of kilometres (...) travelled, without finding traces of a living soul.”³³ One of the most intriguing processes of change is rather internal, one of reconfiguring ethnic boundaries. As the remaining

fevers, typhus, encephalitis, meningitis and diphtheria were frequent causes of (child) mortality (Fajardo 1931, 18-21).

²⁹ Own translation. ANB, Rv, no. 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877, front page.

³⁰ These are currently intensifying in the context of climate change (Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 102-3).

³¹ As Klein states, “the more secure the land claims and the larger the land resources, the larger were the family sizes, the fewer the number of widows, and the more balanced the sexual division of the population” (Klein 1993, 165).

³² La Patria, 6.9.2011.

³³ Own translation. Fajardo 1931, 41.

chapters of this dissertation will explore, this is related to the delineation and alteration of social categories in which the labour and fiscal relations among dwellers and newcomers of the region were structured.

3.1.2 (Re/de)territorialisation and community (re)creation.

Although the way in which territory is being “produced” (Lefebvre 1974), “inhabited” (Paul-Lévy y Segaud 1983) and “practised” (De Certeau 1984) in Carangas seems to have remained quite stable over time, this administrative “ordering” of the population has undergone considerable pressures. The consequent re-ordering of space and power is marked, as will be discussed with more detail throughout the following, by the co-existence of two different, increasingly coordinating logics of territorial control. An “Andean” logic, based on territorial discontinuity and inter-ecological complementarity, can be distinguished from a “European” one, based on fixed borders and homogeneous territories. Through the Andean-European encounter and consequent spatial reorganizations and collective negotiations, both systems of territorial organization have come to intersect and accommodate, resulting in a fluctuating balance of power that clearly tips over to the “European” side. At a supra-local level, the collision of both logics has generated a long-term “amputation” process that has gradually reduced Carangas’ circumscription to what is now the western half of the Oruro department in Bolivia. Internally, centuries-long subordination to state-imposed functionaries did not simply replace communal structures but led to a complex intertwinement of both ordering logics.

While autochthonous territorial units and their corresponding authorities have remained in place as the most local building blocks of the rural landscape, this does not correspond to a direct import from an immanent pre-Hispanic past, but stems from a continuous reinvention of that past and coordination with state-imposed subdivisions. As a result, the community has come to function as an important unit of state/national integration and citizenship, rather than (exclusively) as its adversary. Although the indigenous communities we encounter today on the rather desolate high plain generally serve to evoke “typical” Andean images detached from any colonial or post-colonial intrusion, the physical and political delineation of these entities has no pre-Hispanic origins (Mayer 2002, 35). On the contrary, Andean community organization is a creation of early colonial administrative reform, after which it remained remarkably stable. As Lehmann summarizes, the Andean “community” (*la comunidad*) connotes

“not a place nor is it necessarily a group of people living in close proximity, let alone solidarity. It is an institution of land tenure which regulates access of individuals to land. It is also a creation of the state, recreated over centuries by the Inca, the Spanish, and the modernizing governments” (Lehmann 1983, 22).

The “community” refers to a multi-layered framework for group formation, task distribution and territorial control. The organizational axis behind this framework is land, attributing communal leaders of each level with the vital tasks of usufruct rights distribution and the collection of usufruct contributions among all members. At the most local level, nuclear households cluster around one or more patronymics in a shared site of residence, referred to by the Spanish term of *estancias*, also known as *comunidad* or ranch (as in Shanin’s “farm”). Varying according to ecological conditions, one *estancia* may comprise tens up to hundreds of persons, ranging from fifteen up to about hundred houses (Rivière 1982, 238). Acting as both a social space and a material space, *estancias* represent the lowest level of community integration. Internal cohesion is created and reproduced respectively through shared mythical ancestry, shared access to land and the rotating responsibility to organize the corresponding ceremonies (as *pasantes*).³⁴



Fig. 25. Los caciques de Totorá (orientación antropológica según la convención de Frankfort). Se nota un tipo muy distinto al de los Chipayas y Collas.



Fig. 26. Caciques de «Totorá», un pueblo 10 leguas al este de Jivique adonde se hallan las ruinas de fig. 22 y 23. El dibujo estrellado del fondo es obra textil de las mujeres de Totorá.

Figure 14 The *caciques* of Totorá Marka with their authority attributes, the poncho and the ceremonial staff, 1920s.³⁵

At their turn, *estancias* group together in *ayllus*, which embody a more institutionalized degree of group formation. The *ayllu* corresponds to what most people

³⁴ Goodale and Sky 2000, 9; Rivière 1982, 54 and 232-42; Guillet 1978 cited in Mayer 2002, 40; Custred 1980, 43-8.

³⁵ Early 20th century photograph by Posnansky, who was not averse of racial theories such as the “anthropological orientation according to the convention of Frankfort” (Posnansky 1924, 101; digitalization by ANB).

understand as the Andean *comunidad* or community, although these remain very superficial translations of this complex quechua-aymara term. Decision-making, ceremonial-political representation but also the organization of productive processes in the ayllu are community responsibilities that are distributed among its members via the appointment of a group of people to formulate and enforce rules, the summoning of general assemblies and the organization of public tasks (Mayer 2002, 40). Leadership at the ayllu level is a rotating office with the annual election of a couple, the *jilaqata* or *awatiri* (man) and the *mama t'alla* (wife). Their responsibilities include land administration, customary jurisdiction, political representation and tax collection.

At a higher level, *ayllus* interconnect via what can be most easily imagined as the village level or the “urban” space of the community, the *marka*.³⁶ This nexus for ceremonial and administrative life among several *ayllus* is headed by the *mallku de marka* and the *mallku de consejo* (although the denomination of these terms may vary), respectively the *marka*’s internal (towards the *ayllus*) and external (towards state institutions) representatives. In colonial and republican times, until the National Revolution of 1952, these representatives were called “Cacique” and “Cacique Segundo.”³⁷ At the regional level, indigenous territorial and political control is being reclaimed (since 1987) by the *Western Council of Ayllus Jach’a Karangas*, echoing the long term memory of mayor political units of the “suyu” (the ethnic federation or nation) and represented by two *apu mallkus*. The double function of the *mallku* and *apu mallku* corresponds to the hierarchic division of *marka* and *suyu* spaces into an upper and lower *parcialidad* (faction) or *mitad* (half), respectively referred to as (*h*)*aransaya* and *urinsaya* (with changing denominations).³⁸

Apart from its practical administrative or economic function, the community also gives shape to a ceremonial and mythical space. Through rituals, legends and celebrations for the local divinities and the patron saint of each community, this space is symbolically reproduced. All these ceremonial and regulatory duties are incorporated in the range of community tasks through what is known as the *fiesta-cargo* system. This is a cumulative system in which *fiesta* stands for the important moments of the ceremonial cycle (any festivity and public celebrations of a patron saint in particular) and *cargo* for an annual office and implied financial burdens (ranging from the organization and sponsoring a local deity’s or patron saint’s celebration to taking up the internal and external political representation of the community). Each member is


³⁶ The *marka* corresponds to the territory of all its component *ayllus*, with its symbolic centre located in the village of this larger community. Each *ayllu* occupied its own space in the urban centre of the community, at least until the urban reform of 1954 (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 55-6).

³⁷ After 1952, the “Cacique Segundo” was renamed “alcalde mayor” (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 72).

³⁸ Rivière 1982, 189 and 219-22; see also Bouysse-Cassagne 1978; Medinaceli 2009, 349-51.

initiated into this cycle, initiated as youngster with small tasks such as *postillón* (post-boy) or the *mayordomo*, in charge of Church service, and his assistant, the *alférez*, assigned with the organization of a religious festivity at the *ayllu* level (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 68). Other (higher) responsibilities (up to the *apu mallku*) in this cycle required members to be married; the other way round, all married all couples (i.e. “fully established” households) are supposed to, step-by-step, traverse a “road” or *thaqi* in which they take up ever more important and costlier responsibilities.

Figure 15 Hierarchy of indigenous authorities in Carangas.



The fiesta-cargo principle demonstrates that the community is a stratified space that does not automatically neutralize socio-economic differences nor is it free from external interference. Internally, it functioned essentially and simultaneously as a mechanism of control, social mobility and impoverishment. For instance, while the organization of yearly festivities offers the opportunity to expand and fortify intra-community networks, it also prevents people “in charge” of continuing their agropastoral or commercial activities. In order, full integration in the community implied an investment of time and capital, in turn for an increased prestige (and hence higher and costlier cargo). This explains why elites are not antagonistic to community coherence, “on the contrary, they benefit directly from it” (Mayer 2002, 39), reflected in mutual power

and credit among rich and poor, full, half and non-community members. While consolidating the bonds of individual members to their community, many of these tasks corresponded to deliberate creations of the colonial and republican state apparatus as an essential means to unite the sparse population of a remote area. In effect, these “ambiguous” offices enabled local church and state officials to control the indigenous population (Rivière 1982, chapter 8). The following gives a brief overview of how dynamics of elite, state and Church intervention have shaped a long trajectory of community creation, transformation and reinvention in Carangas (which will be scrutinized regarding the long 19th century in the remaining chapters).

When the first Spaniards set foot on the altiplano, the population of Carangas lived distributed over 147 dispersed hamlets, each counting with 140 to 252 inhabitants (Rivière 1982, 57). Today referred to as *estancias*, these “small communities” were the site of residence of extensive families, usually located close to the most fertile lands of the area. Under Inca control (1450-1530), these nuclei were grouped into basic units of land tenure, the *ayllu*, each corresponding to a local endogamous kin group and headed by a mediating ethnic leader, the *kuraka*.³⁹ Integrated in “larger communities” headed by caciques,⁴⁰ they were organized within four sub-zones, Colquemarka-Samancha, Choquecota-Sabaya, Totora and Andamarca-Orinoca which formed together the *suyu* or “nation” of the Carangas (Qaranqas, Karankas) (Pauwels 1983, 77).⁴¹ According to the thesis of Gilles Rivière and of Gilberto Pauwels, also formulated by Durston and Hidalgo, and supported by local oral history evidence, the political and territorial centre of this *suyu* was located in the settlement of Jatun Carangas (Hatuncaranga), close to the current village of Guallatire in Chile until the eruption of the Guallatire volcano in the late 16th century.⁴²

³⁹ See also Collier, Rosaldi and Wirth 1982; Andrien 2001.

⁴⁰ The Spanish adopted the Caribbean name of caciques to refer to the local community authorities.

⁴¹ Together with eleven other “señoríos”, Carangas formed the Collasuyu, which can be seen as the Aymara (although not homogeneously) branch of the Inca empire. The origins of the Carangas people, probably arriving from the north, and boundaries of their territory remain a matter of debate (Medinaceli 2009, 344-5). While Gilberto Pauwels posits that this Aymara federation was an Inca creation, resulting from the typical forced-migration (*mitimae*) strategy of the Incas to discipline rebellious groups, Rivière suggests they arrived earlier (Pauwels 1983, 70-1, 2006, 343-4 and personal communication; Rivière 1982, 15-6; Michel 2000; Medinaceli 2010, 95). In any case, sub-provincial structures definitely stem from a local logic that precedes Inca incorporation.

⁴² Hatun means “Great” in quechua and today reappears in its Aymara version, Jach’a, in the name of the Indigenous Council of Carangas (COAJK). This centre probably integrated as a third parcialidad. Rivière 1982, 21-2; Pauwels 1983, 82-92; Durston and Hidalgo 1997 cited in Ruz, Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 24-5; Medinaceli 2009, 349; Lima 2012.




Figure 16 Inter-ecological mobility and exchange patterns of the Qaranqa people.⁴³

It is clear is that the pre-Hispanic delineation of Carangas reached further than the boundaries of its altiplano communities, although there is still little knowledge and hence much debate on the exact boundaries of that territory (Rivière 1982, 19-24; Pauwels 1983, 91; Hidalgo and Durston 2004, 471-534; Ruz, Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 24-25). Carangas circumscribed a discontinuous but interconnected, east-to-west structured territory that was directly controlled through political ties and by sending out colonists to occupy and cultivate the distant terrains and indirectly through llama caravans to barter agrarian products which the altiplano cannot give. Under Inca dominion, this discontinuity was reinforced by allocating complementary cultivation lands to highland communities.⁴⁴ The lands off the altiplano stretched over different ecological niches in actual Bolivian, Chilean and Peruvian territories.⁴⁵ There is a division observable

⁴³ Source: Lima Tórrez 2012, 53, based on Harris 1987.

⁴⁴ Examples are the corn producing lands of Illaurco, Chulla, Colchacollo and Anocaraire in the valleys of Cochabamba, which had been obtained through the land reform of Inca Huayna Capac (Wachtel 1981, 49-52 cited in Medinaceli 2006, 512; *ibid*, 360-6 and 470; Larson 1998, 39). Also the lands in Arequipa had originally been assigned by the Inca (Pauwels 1983, 116).

⁴⁵ Clockwise, these territories were situated in Quime (today in the Inquisivi province of the La Paz department) to the north-east, in valley communities such as Quillacollo or Cliza (located in the actual Cochabamba department) to the east, in valley communities such as Liquinas (currently in the Chuquisaca department) to the southeast, and to the west in the canyons of Chiapa and Camiña in the Tarapacá region, the Azapa and Lluta valleys in Arica and even in the Arequipa region in actual Peru. Both Pauwels (1983) and Rivière (1982, 21-2) discovered in Sevilla that the Caranga also had lands at the coast where they cultivated coca and corn. The Cochabamba and Arequipa territories had been allocated to the Carangas by the Inca (Bouysse-Cassagne 1978 cited by Pauwels 1983, 72-3). The Chuquisaca, La Paz and current Chilean areas were

between the western communities of Carangas controlling the lands towards the Pacific (internally differentiated between the northern communities accessing lands in the actual Arica region, while southern communities such as Sabaya had land in the Tarapacá region of actual Chile) and the eastern communities maintaining control over lands in the eastern valleys.⁴⁶

After the first chaotic period of conquest, the indigenous population was brought indirectly under control of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru, established in 1542, through the *encomienda* system. Different from a landholding, *encomiendas* corresponded to a specific division of indigenous people over which a conquistador, as reward for delivered services, was granted right to collect and receive a portion of their taxes and labour in turn for their protection and evangelization (Andrien 2001, 44).⁴⁷ In order to enhance its direct control, the Spanish Crown sought to replace the communities' ties to the *encomenderos* by integrating Carangas as a *corregimiento* (provincial unit), headed by a tax collecting *corregidores de indios*, under the *Audiencia de Charcas* (Barnadas 1973, 426-7 and 514-5).⁴⁸ Under the Bourbon reforms, *Charcas* was replaced to the in 1776 newly erected viceroyalty of Río de la Plata.

It is however in the aftermath of the resettlement program introduced under viceroy Toledo, from the 1570 on, that the pre-conquest community organization underwent its most thorough transformation.⁴⁹ Hamlets were concentrated into Spanish-style villages, called *reducciones de Indios*, under local control of the traditional chiefs, the *caciques*.⁵⁰ While the Spanish reused pre-existing power centres to affirm their importance, this reorganization replaced “traditional” societal bonds and implied a demarcation of boundary markers (*mojones*) between the villages and *ayllus*. This triggered a whole series of inter-community litigations over land, which sometimes led to definite

also mentioned in several interviews with locals from the current Carangas communities as well as in registered documents of the COAJK (2001).

⁴⁶ However, this was not a strict division, with for instance Turco controlling lands to the east. Often, this was based on co-ownership with other groups, such as the lands controlled in Cochabamba shared with the Quillacas, Asanaques and Aullagas. Pauwels 1983, 92; Medinaceli 2006, 362-5; 2010, 98-9.

⁴⁷ In 1538, the Caranga were assigned by viceroy Toledo to G. de Luna and F. de Isasaga, in 1540 joined by F. de Retamoso and in 1548 again distributed under several *encomenderos* (Pauwels 1983, 112; Medinaceli 2009, 353-7).

⁴⁸ The *Audiencia de Charcas* was the jurisdictional circumscription of “Upper Peru,” roughly corresponding to actual Bolivia, established in 1563 (Andrien 2001, 48).

⁴⁹ See Rivière 1982, 149; Gade 1991; Klein 2011, 40-42.

⁵⁰ Probably, the Spanish-appointed authorities were recruited from the *kuraka* lineages, which is indicated by the ‘patronymic’ Willka which was generally used until the beginning of the 18th century to indicate the *cacique*, as is also evidenced by the oral tradition on Pedro Martín Kapurata Condor Villca, lord of Sabaya, and other Condor Willka’s in the region (Rivière 1982, 51).

annexations by larger neighbouring regions of Tarapacá, Pacajes, Paria (Rivière 1982, 65). These *reducciones* were integrated into broader administrative units, the *repartimientos*, which at their turn formed provincial units, the *corregimientos*. While unavoidably distorting community life, the *reducciones* policy were in fact intended to guarantee the survival of the community, for the sake of an optimal evangelization and labour and tax extraction, however allocating community life to a racially segregated sphere.⁵¹

In the “Provincia de Carangas,” people were “reduced” into eight “principal” rural towns, Corque, Choquecota, Huayllamarca, Totora, Curahuara, Turco, Huachacalla and Andamarca, controlling each over 1000 and up to 7000 inhabitants, and two secondary villages, Sabaya and Orinoca (Rivière 1982, 58-9; Pauwels 1983, 122-4 and 162). Moreover, this constellation was integrated within an economic extractivist superstructure, with the establishment of the Royal Treasury (*Caja Real*) in 1652 in the mining district of Espíritu Santo de Carangas.⁵² Overall, the *reducciones* policy was one of the most unsettling steps as it was a formative step in the creation of the indigenous communities that we know today (Mumford 2012). It caused a gradual shift in ayllu formation towards a “territorialized” configuration and a redefinition of its fiscal ties to central state powers, which are both essential factors in explaining why and how Carangas’ village order and internal ayllu subdivision has largely been preserved until today.⁵³

At the supra-regional level, early-colonial restructurings cut off altiplano communities from their ecologically different and non-contiguous territories, condemning them to an inconclusive “*search of lost space*” (Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne and Harris 2006, 487-540). By containing these communities within the political-administrative boundaries of a coherent province, the population’s inter-ecological

⁵¹ Based on the thesis of the *dos repúblicas*, Indians were kept in the rural villages and the “outsiders”, which remained limited in number due to restricted trans-continental migration, in urban areas although there was a “*merging of pre-Colombian village self-government with the Spanish-imposed city council [which] nevertheless helped the Indians survive in the countryside*” (Hoberman 1996, 247).

⁵² The establishment of the *Caja Real* was motivated by Carangas’ strategic location on the royal road (*el camino real*) to Arica and its nearness to that important port (the mining site is located in the actual province of Mejillones, on the border with Chile). The objective of this office was to prevent extracted minerals from being exported via Arica without paying the due taxes, but contraband was nonetheless a constant problem. In the late 18th century, in the wake of the Bourbon reforms, fraud, bankruptcy and decline caused its closure and the loss over the mineral production in Tarapacá with the liberty of silver production registration in 1767 and the opening of a Royal Treasury in Arica. See Gavira 1999, 2008, 2010 and 2011.

⁵³ According to Rivière, what changed was not so much a physical restructuring but rather a reorientation of the interrelation between administrative centres and estancias towards the exploitation of the latter in function of the former which afterwards remained remarkably stable (Rivière 1982, 59). See also Gade and Escobar 1982; Gade 1991; Ayllu Sartañani 1992 and 1994; Choque Capuma 2004; Assies 2006, footnote 8. This fiscal dimension receives ampler treatment in chapter 4.

mobility and its direct control over complementary territories was seriously restricted and forced people into the market sphere to obtain the food they needed.⁵⁴ This was a slow divorce, initiated by the purchase of land titles.⁵⁵ While direct control was lost, first over lands in Arica, and subsequently in Arequipa,⁵⁶ various valley people probably maintained fiscal and political ties to the altiplano communities.⁵⁷ Subsequently, at the start of the 18th century, litigation processes between the governors of Carangas and Arica over their mutual western border would complete the rupture of vertical control between the western valleys and the puna (Rivière 1982, 25).⁵⁸ Some communities even maintained effective land rights over private estates in the eastern valleys, but those

⁵⁴ Medinaceli states that the strain on (pre-colonial) mobility, reflected in the spatial dispersal and fluidity of organization patterns, was already imposed under the Incas with measures seeking to discipline the Urus and Caranga population (Medinaceli 2006, 232).

⁵⁵ The *composición* policy will be assessed in chapter 4.

⁵⁶ Due to their distance from the altiplano metropolis, corn producing lands and mitimaes (dispatched commoners who worked distant cultivation lands) belonging to Carangas on the coast (Arica region) were most easily repartitioned among *encomenderos* of Arequipa by the Spanish. AR, Cochabamba, 1540, 353v. and Bouysse-Cassagne 1978, 1068, cited in Rivière 1982, 20; Pauwels 1983, 91 and 116-7; COAJK 2001.

⁵⁷ Control over most of the lands in Cochabamba was confirmed through auction purchase from the colonial authorities (Medinaceli 2006, 362-5, 470 and 512).

⁵⁸ The limits settled with the *repartimiento* of Lluta in 1578 foreshadowed the actual western (international) border of Carangas with the Arica y Parinacota region in Northern Chile (Durston e Hidalgo 1997, cited in Ruz, Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 25). In his work on the corregimiento of Arica, Vicente Dagnino refers to a document of 1578, starting with the most southern border stone in the summit of the Coipasa mountain, where four corregimientos connected (Arica, Lipez, Paria and Carangas), followed by a long string of (completely erroneously ordered) border places including the swamps of Pisiga, Tres Cruces (which has a border stone on each side of the border), the Capurata mountain, Caraguano, Parajalla, the Capitán mountain, the lake of Surire, Chilcaya, the Quimsachata mountain, until the Sajama mountain, where Carangas encounters the Pacajes corregimiento, in addition to a series of other place names that seem to have disappeared from the map by now (Dagnino 1909, 26). Several documents on the Arica border were reproduced in the early 18th century in the context of an accusation of the governor of Arica for having invaded lands in Pachica, Esquiña and Guallatire that were claimed by Turco. The plaintiff presented several documents from the 17th century that affirmed Turco's rights over these lands, where since Toledo "not any Spaniard had sowed or lived" (Saavedra B., "Límites de Lipez y Carangas con la provincia de Tarapacá" Informe del Director de la Oficina de Límites. La Paz, 13 de octubre de 1902. Recompilation in Blanco 2006 [1904], XXXIII-XLIX). A couple of years later, also Sabaya, bordering the Tarapacá region, would request a demarcation because of incursions (ibid). A couple of decades later, the transfer of the *Audiencia de Charcas* to the newly created viceroyalty of Río de la Plata in 1776 generated a legal dispute between the *Audiencia de Lima* and the *Audiencia de Buenos Aires* over the Tarapacá border as the silver extracted in Tarapacá was now to be deposited in the royal coffers of Carangas. At that time (1780), the Charcas administration still claimed jurisdictional power over Guallatire, Pachica, Esquiña, Timar and Belén, on basis of colonial documents that even extended its dominion "until close to the coast" (ibid).

claims would be definitively defeated by late 19th century liberal policies.⁵⁹ Despite this clear enclosure on the Andean plateau, a remarkable continuity can be observed in altiplano-valley connections in the form of long-distance exchange contacts. Frequent inter-ecological travels and exchange were organized into the second half of the 20th century, mitigating the effects of territorial amputation.



Figure 17 “Jardin Caranguitos.” The name of this day nursery in Camiña refers to a local folkloric dance which still reflects the century-long interrelation between both sides of the Cordillera Real (own picture, January 2012).

Through the abolition of the viceroalties and the installation of the Bolivian Republic, the French system of departments, provinces and cantons was adopted. Carangas came to constitute the largest province of the Oruro department, covering its entire western section. Across the international border, which Bolivia shared until 1883 with Peru and was in 1904 officially resettled with Chile, the territory adjoined the regions of Tarapacá and Arica. To the north, Carangas was delimited by the interdepartmental border with the Pacajes and Sicasica provinces of the La Paz department, to the east by the Cercado province that includes the city of Oruro and to the south-east by the Paria province, which was in 1903 subdivided into the Poopó and Avaroa provinces (Ascarrunz 1905, 4), all three of the Oruro department, and to the south it bordered the Lípez province of the Potosí department.

At the head of the province, a sub-Prefect residing in the provincial capital of Corque and depending directly from the Prefect in the departmental capital Oruro, represented the central State. The province was subdivided into eight cantons and seven vice-cantons, each headed by a *corregidor* with authority over the entire canton and was assisted by two judges (*jueces parroquiales*), a councillor and *alcaldes*. There was a

⁵⁹ See Rivière 1982, 20-5; Pauwels 1983, 89-92 and 151; Durston and Hidalgo 1997 cited in Ruz, Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 25; further details in chapter 6.

separate office for the governance of the village (the urban centre), assigned to the municipal agent. The cantons coincided with the level of the marka, indicated as the *comunidad*, and hence contained a number of ayllus. The *caciques* (marka)⁶⁰ and *jilaqatas* (ayllus) were obliged complete obedience and free services to the corregidor (this would remain so until the mid-20th century), who nevertheless was “almost always rated lower in authority and prestige to the cacique (Mallcu), who, by nature of traditional authority that was vested in him by the indigenous, exerts greater influence and dominance over them” (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006,, 372). In addition, all commoners were bound to the execution of tasks, included in the fiesta-cargo system as mentioned above continued.

In the late 19th century, slightly later than other Andean countries, Bolivia witnessed several frustrated attempts to formally abolish the community as such. Influenced by the emphasis posed on private property by Enlightenment and liberalist ideas, the community became viewed as an obstacle to the indigenous population’s integration as citizens, independent economic actors and private landholders into “modern” society (Yambert 1980, 65). While a large share of Bolivia’s highland communities were absorbed by the hacienda system, the ayllus of Carangas entered the 20th century “free”, demonstrating a higher level of self-determination and a lower level of inequality, although with a clear tendency towards concentration of power in mestizo and male hands (McEwen 1975, 413).

The National Revolution of 1952 constitutes a next key transition in the historical trajectory of Bolivia’s rural communities, nurtured by radical pro-indigenous social thinking that had emerged in the previous decades.⁶¹ Yet, in contrast to what happened in the largest part of Bolivia’s countryside after the National Revolution of 1952, the “free” communities of the Carangas province and their collective decision mechanisms underwent relatively little change. The imposed syndicalist model did not find entrance and despite the crippled power of the caciques in favour of the corregidor, indigenous authority sustained a relative level of continuity. However, changes in the official territorial order of the Republic instigated a disturbing process.

From the middle of the 20th century on, a double process took place. With the split up of Carangas, which until 1951 continued constituting Oruro’s largest province, the idea

⁶⁰ In the wake of the Andean indigenous rebellion of 1780-’81, the colonial caciques lost their privileges and under Bolívar, the cacicazgo institution was abolished as a whole (see also Choque Canquí 1991), allowing for the appropriation of its tax collection attributions and its accompanying privileges by the corregidores and their assistants. Yet internally, the mallku or cacique maintained its legitimacy in Carangas.

⁶¹ The *indigenismo* movement, with intellectuals such as the Peruvian Mariátegui, stressed the strength and elementary economic function of the community, thereby suggesting parallels between socialist organization and the *ayllu* structure (see Yambert 1980, 69-70). Although paternalistic in principle, this current was key in placing “the community” (again) at the top of the political agenda.

of Carangas as a cohesive administrative unit was definitively displaced as a thing of the past.⁶² The multiplication of provinces and municipal sections⁶³ resulted in a fragmentation into the provinces of Carangas, Nor Carangas, Sud Carangas, Titora, Sajama, Litoral, Sabaya and Mejillones. Internally, these provinces comprise today a total of nineteen hierarchically ordered municipal sections (the former cantons) headed by a mayor, while the corregidores only exercise a ceremonial function at the village level.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the breakthrough of trade, schooling and roads on the countryside triggered the temporal and permanent influx of residents from the estancias to the village and the temporal or permanent exodus of villagers to principal towns, mainly Oruro (Rivière 1982, 118). Rural villages gained dynamism, functioning as permanent residence for state officials, schoolgoing kids and shop keepers, and as temporal attraction pools for estancia-members during ceremonies, fairs or community meetings.

In contrast to this disintegration, indigenous leadership started to gradually reinstall its legitimacy. Similar to other Andean countries, the Bolivian National Revolution of 1952 and the Popular Participation Act of 1994 –in conjunction with other initiatives of government agencies, foreign development-oriented NGOs or religious groups and the input from scholars, particularly anthropologists– pushed for a community-supportive decentralization, which simultaneously provoked a closer attachment to the central State. This restored the legitimacy of the mallkus in Carangas, and even their supra-marka collaboration to reclaim the region’s historical unity. Referring to the native pre-Hispanic federations that originally overextended the colonially and post-colonially imposed provincial, departmental and international boundaries, the *suyu* of Carangas became subject to a reintegration initiative by the Aymara leadership which was institutionalized in the form of the *Consejo Occidental de Ayllus “Jach’a Karangas”* (COAJK)

⁶² The division of the province was not a new idea (Tejada 1921, 24-5; Calderón 1927, 32-9). Pauwels 1983, 150-1; Arteaga 2006, 522.

⁶³ This process is referred to as *cantonización* (and its equivalent, *provincialización*), which had already started in previous decades (Fajardo 1931, 41). This was a discontinuous process due to dictatorial regimes in the 1960s-80s. Its outcome was the (partial) conversion and fragmentation and of ayllus into cantonal units, while others maintained their ayllu structure (Ayllu Sartañani 1994, 56-61).

⁶⁴ The introduction of municipal councils as administrative instruments in the late 19th century defined the entire province of Carangas as one municipality. The “municipalization” of the country was a decentralization measure implemented through the Law of Popular Participation of 1994. This introduced the administrative entity of the municipal council or *alcaldía* which absorbed the official power of the corregidor while simultaneously re-establishing the representative power of the mallku at the *marka* level. Both exercise their function in relative coordination. (Quite remarkably, the recuperated organization into *markas* rather than the current official administrative order better reflects the ancient colonial division.)

or the Western Council of *Ayllus* of Jach'a Karangas.⁶⁵ Through an intense debate over decentralization, *interculturalidad* and autonomy, new formats for indigenous self-governance were integrated more coherently into the official territorial order of the country (Galindo et al 2007). Since the adoption of the new Constitution of 2009, municipalities, regions and indigenous territories can obtain the status of Original Indigenous Peasant Autonomy (*autonomía indígena originaria campesina*).⁶⁶ Still, this is far from a harmonious process, as the secession of some communities and the forgotten struggle of the Uru population testifies.⁶⁷

At the entrance of the 21st century, the communities of Karangas seem to stay behind as dismembered archipelago fragments, high and desolate on the barren *altiplano*. However, despite migration, ecological degradation and enduring poverty, the *ayllus* of Karangas -fragmented into, to date, 111 *ayllus*, grouped into twelve *markas* (TCO COAJK)- still provide in a workable (though delicate) framework for settlement and tenure, village life and local authority as well as for extraction and collective action. Not just its “skeleton” but also its content is still in place. Eroded, transformed and complexly

⁶⁵ In 1987, the authorities of all *markas* of the area held a historic meeting, which formed the start of the region's reintegration as the *suyu* or nation of Jach'a Karangas or Great Karangas - initially referred to by its *quechua* version “Jatun Karangas”. Until that time, the continuation of customs and traditions that were “clandestinely” reproduced received a new impetus and led to the establishment of a concrete framework, baptized as “Jach'a Karangas”, for the restitution of original *ayllu* structures. This reunification formalized by the Supreme Resolution of September 20th, 1990. Its reinstatement is founded in the recovery of indigenous territorial rights fomented by the Convenio 169 of the ILO (ratified by Bolivia in 1991) and the 1990 “March for dignity and territory” which enforced the adoption of the TCO status as inalienable, indivisible, irreversible, collective, unconfiscatable and imprescriptible land units in the new land legislation (ley 1715 or INRA law, 1996). The concrete establishment of the COAJK has its roots in syndicalist and developmentalist initiatives in the Oruro department during the 1980s, which explains its bureaucratic and technocratic character, revealing its “artificial” creation (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 75). Jach'a Karangas functioned as the “cultural arm” of the Federación de Trabajadores Campesino de Oruro, which encouraged the organization of *cabildos* of indigenous leaders, but even more decisive was the intervention of the Programa de Autodesarrollo Campesino (PAC), a State program for rural development with financial support from the European Economic Community.). (Izko 1992, 105; Ayllu Sartañani 1995, 270; COAJC 2011; Sanjines 2005, 35-7; Canqui Mollo 2012.

⁶⁶ Some indigenous communities may choose not to adopt this specific privileged legal status, as did Curahuara de Karangas, which as only municipality in 2009 refused to adopt the status of *Autonomía Indígena Originaria Campesina* (FAM 2010, 5, cited in Rodas 2013, 13-4). By 2011, the only administrative entities been granted this status in Karangas were Totora and Chipaya (Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011). Of the eleven other municipalities in Bolivia who did carry out the procedure, Totora Marka was the first to have its autonomous status declared constitutional (Fundación Tierra 06.02.2014).

⁶⁷ Since 2012, the border provinces Sabaya, Huachacalla and Mejillones are seeking to secede and form their own autonomous indigenous federation. Moreover, the Council -as does the umbrella organization CONAMAQ- feels increasingly thwarted or provoked by regional syndicalist counterparts. The Uru Chipaya, for their part, do not participate in this process, although they form an important however ignored part of Karangas' history.

overlapping with state-administrative subdivisions, yet still stronger than researchers in the 1970s and 1980s would have expected. “[A]nd not, as is often expressed, a declining left-over of traditional backward rural systems or an empty shell of colonialism that should be abolished” (Mayer 2002, 35-7), nor can it be reduced to an imposed developmentist instrument (Yambert 1980, 63). The recuperation and performance of an indigenous spatial logic and the transformation of territorial control in terms of mobility, land appropriation and livestock management is an ongoing and dynamic process (Rodas 2013).

3.2 The livelihood strategies of pastoralist households

This sub-chapter concerns a further examination of the ways in which local families and communities organize their subsistence within the described environment and socio-productive system, zooming in on the specific time frame of this research, 1860-1930. Around 1900, peasant livelihoods in Carangas were marked by a semi-sedentary pastoralist lifestyle. The acquisition, use and reproduction of means of production and the satisfaction of consumption needs was organized in the first place at the household level and through inter-family reciprocity ties in function of family subsistence. Property, production and exchange was to large extent structured by communal access regulations, highly reliant on interregional exchange relations and intervened by external and intermediary extractive actors, integrated and interacting within a broader social agro-pastoral system.

Within the Andean agro-pastoral system, the household constitutes the basic institution of social and economic organization (Custred and Orlove 1980, 23; Bolton and Mayer 1977; Deere 1982; Mayer 2002). In most cases, the Andean peasant household can be delineated by the members of a nuclear family, including the husband and wife and their children, summing up to an average of five members.⁶⁸ Provided a certain level of elasticity and adaptability, nuclear domestic units based in a common site of residence pool labour, land and capital resources to secure their production, consumption, reproduction, decision-making, socialization, welfare and safety. However, despite the apparent autonomy of Andean households, their subsistence and reproduction can only

⁶⁸ These constructs are however more complex than simple equivalents of “the family”. In some cases, additional associates such as siblings, aged parents or adopted children may complete this set (Custred and Orlove 1980, 37).

be ensured by their embeddedness in larger corporate groups (Custred and Orlove 1980, 34; Mayer 2002, 35-42). The combination of various forms of household labour is very flexible as there are no syndicalist or feudal structures that fix their work schedule (West 1981, 42). Yet, this does not downplay the role of regulative arrangements establishing links towards the wider social setting, in the first place the community. Even more, “*the capacity to act collectively is the most outstanding characteristic of Andean households,*” making household boundaries secondary to community-bound household interdependence (Mayer 2002, 35).

Households are the site where particular livelihood strategies are selected and designed in function of daily subsistence needs (foodstuff), fiscal duties (money), reciprocal obligations towards the community (time and capital, for instance to organize a public celebration), occasional spending (funerals, weddings, etc.) or crisis management (reserves in times of bad harvest). Based on her research of how peasants in the Southern Bolivian Andes build up a living in the aftermath of the severe drought of the 1980s, Zoomers identified accumulation, consolidation, compensation and security as four (flexible) “stages” of livelihood formation (Zoomers 1999; De Haan and Zoomers 2005, 39-40). This differentiation of strategies can equally be applied to the arrangements made by Carangas households in the studied framework and registered in court archive.

Accumulation refers to a long-term quantitative strategy to achieve a minimum manoeuvring space necessary for upward social mobility. This strategy is at stake when households, usually rich pastoralists or merchants, request title to (more) land, migrate completely or partially to places with more labour opportunities, or recruit (poor) herders to take care of their livestock.⁶⁹ Consolidation aims at the short-term stabilization and qualitative improvement of the accumulated assets, for instance by investing surplus livestock to obtain motorized vehicles (Rivière 1982, 302-3). In crisis situations, abrupt or structural shortage is sought to overcome through compensation strategies. This refers to multiple forms of credit relations such as families contracting a loan from relatives or powerful moneylenders, assigning the care and education of their children to other families,⁷⁰ or calling in other forms of (kinship-based) social security. They may barter, sell off their capital or even go begging.⁷¹ When such strategies come into play, a household finds itself in a downward spiral of social mobility. A line of strategies particularly pertinent to high altitude environments are long-term security

⁶⁹ AJC, *Civiles*, 1903, no. 3; 1904, no. 3; 1906, no. 3, f. 12v-15v.

⁷⁰ Examples are AJC, *Civiles*, 1905, no.3, fs. 3v.-6.

⁷¹ In times of crisis, such as during the drought of 1905, the margin of survival of indigenous households in Carangas was squeezed to such extent that many had to ‘include’ begging into their daily strategies. AJC, *Civiles*, 1905, no. 4, f. 9.

tactics developed to withstand the ecological challenges such as the diversification of agricultural and non-agricultural products and labour, sharecropping and storing (De Haan and Zoomers 2005, 40).

In broad outlines, rural livelihoods in Carangas highly rely on security strategies but with an underlying regional specialization pattern that runs parallel with ecological variations between a very dry zone in the South and West, a less dry central zone and a more fertile area with micro-climates in the North-East. This has generated a differentiation between respectively llama herding, sheep herding and agricultural households. The fish and water bird resources, particularly in and around the Coipasa lake, where the Uru Chipaya reside, converts this ethnic group into a third –often ignored– category of production modes based on fishing and hunting-gathering. In addition, and close to the mentioned lake, saline sediments are responsible for the integration of salt extraction into local livelihood patterns. Yet overall, the most constant and reliable option in terms of risks and flexibility in this entire region was offered by pastoralism, even though, compared to agriculture, it might appear as an illogical strategic decision in terms of energy input and profits (Mayer 2002, 17). Thus, despite slight alterations in the exact constitution of livelihoods according to ecological variations, in Carangas “*the principal industry is animal husbandry and therein consists its wealth*” (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 394), specifying this husbandry as llama pastoralism (and not intensive cattle breeding). According to Khazanov’s approach, economic activities in a pastoralist society implies are a) in mainly (but not exclusively) herding, b) performed at an extensive scale, c) inevitably combined with periodical mobility to obtain complimentary means, and d) oriented to subsistence rather than accumulation demands, although this last point has is becoming ever less influential (Khazanov 1994, xxxii).

However, the significance of pastoralism to understand daily life in Carangas exceeds its economic implications; it goes together with a specific lifestyle, worldview, cultural and ethical code and it has repercussions on the role of pastoralist groups within wider social contexts.⁷² Within (Central) Andean studies, there exists extensive literature that

⁷² Still following Khazanov, these pastoralist livelihoods are structured by a) weak specialization (because it limits independence), b) economic but also cultural and ideological interaction with sedentary societies, which function as a criterion for comparison, imitation and refusal, c) limited political centralization, d) weak ties to urban life, e) combined communal (pastures) and familiar (livestock) property, f) strong kinship ties, g) a segmented social organization with collective and mutual self-preservation mechanisms, h) the existence of and “license” by an “outside world” and i) a significant yet negated social and political influence on the sedentary world (Khazanov 1994, xxxi).

give more history and texture to this specific role of pastoralists in Andean society.⁷³ In contrast to typical representation of pastoralist societies as isolated, little innovative and static, camelid-based communities, as those encountered in Carangas, have successfully linked up to regional commodity markets and in the ways they remained out of the scope of land privatization processes (Larson 1995, 27-8; Medinaceli 2010).

Table 3 Central components of the social agro-system that structures rural livelihoods in Carangas around 1900.

Soil and environment	Poor soil, few arable lands, rich grazing lands.
Property relations and power relations <i>diversity of rural agents: peasants, communities and elite groups</i>	Agrarian land under communal tenure, which includes collective and individual rights. Variations from 40 to 100 ha land/household. ⁷⁴
Size of holdings and labour input	(Ever more fragmented) small cultivation plots per household and collectively held extensive open pasture fields; labour extensive exploitation, primarily provided by the own household.
Labour relations <i>free and unfree, intra-household and external, on and off land, family development cycle</i>	Mainly intra-household, on-land, and free labour relations; additional obligatory services to the community, the government and the local elites.
and income strategies <i>market access, access to credit, extraction, risk/diversification</i>	Annual rather than frequent provisioning of consumption goods, based on a combination of reciprocity, barter and trade.
Agricultural technology <i>mixed or specialized, intensive or extensive, collective or individual, traditional or innovative</i>	Extensive use of traditional technology, shared use of utensils between relatives.
Interregional and/or inter-systemic links	Vital importance of long-distance

⁷³ For a detailed analysis of the different “waves” in this literature and their principal representatives, see Medinaceli’s assessment of historical, archaeological and anthropological research on Andean pastoralism (Medinaceli 2010, 25-54).

⁷⁴ On basis of a case study in Turco, a large community provided with excellent llama grazing lands, one household is estimated to occupy approximately 300 ha, which may vary from 40 up to 1000 ha (HAM Turco 2007).

migration, diffusion, supra-regional power
and market structures

exchange relations (caravan trade) that
combine off market (barter for own
subsistence) and (world) market (mainly
contracted as transporters, e.g. silver and
wool export economy) circuits.

3.2.1 Labour division and social networks

Regarding the inner working of a household, this “black box” (Mayer 2002) can be described on basis of the development cycle through which it evolves and reproduces itself. In the case of the Andes, this cycle generally starts each time a couple marries (Custred and Orlove 1980, 37; Mayer 2002, 7). Spouses reside as a separate family unit in the husband’s parental place of residence (the *estancia*), although the break between women and their parents is never complete either (Rivière 1982, 270).⁷⁵ At marriage, both partners bring in resources acquired from their former household which now become co-ownership, except for livestock.⁷⁶ These resources are multiplied or acquired through different forms of transfers such as inheritance, partition, exchange or purchase resources or the allocation of usufruct rights. Over the course of this cycle, relational networks are extended and fortified in function of labour or credit inputs, particularly through fictional kinship (see *infra*).

The optimum point in a household’s labour capacity is the moment a senior domestic unit is able to control the labour of several married children and their wives/husbands (Caro 1994, 27). When a household hits its minimal capacity, several cooperation mechanisms come into play in order to attain the necessary amount of labour force (compensation strategies). When children are born, their labour is inserted into the cycle according to age and sex, in turn for the gradual transfer of the household’s resources and rights through repartition and inheritance. Once these children marry, a new cycle (or at least a next stage), overlapping with the previous cycle, starts. At this point, the household subdivides and distributes its resources. When the parents who

⁷⁵ Habitation patterns follow patrilocal principles, which means that after marriage a wife will follow her husband to his *estancia*. An *estancia* is usually an exogamic unit, which implies a taboo on marriage between equal patronymics, and often between different patronymics, within a single *estancia* (Rivière 1982, 238). Although marriage across community boundaries has become more common in the course of the 20th century, Rivière found that most marriages in the 1970s were still intra-ayllu, based on a case study in Sabaya for the 1771-1974 years (*ibid*, 246).

⁷⁶ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1925, no. 10.

initially started the cycle at marriage retire and are assisted by their children, the cycle is “reverted” (Custred and Orlove 1980, 38).

In Carangas, herding and cultivation tasks require a limited labour force that is generally met by the owner of the land, his wife and children, except in those parts where agriculture is more important (Rivière 1982, 271). In function of domestic activities, a household adopts an internal gender- and age-based complementary division of tasks. As male and female camelids are separated, a household usually needs labour for two herds (West 1981, 59). Here, children come in the picture, starting to take up herding responsibilities at the age of five or six (Caro 1994, 27; Rivière 1982, 71). Regarding gender, this division “is so interdependent that it is a rare adult who does not rely on the labour of the opposite sex to survive” (West 1981, 108). While men function as the producers, including work on the fields -although women might help during harvest-construction work and tool making, women are the allocators of the household, which includes managing the herd, the harvest yields and the necessary sales and purchases, as well as spinning and cooking (Mayer 2002, 11).⁷⁷ Labour migration is generally male, while women will stay behind and take care of the children and the daily household activities.⁷⁸

The organization of labour tasks follows a productive calendar. Major moments in the production cycle of the llama include earmarking, called *k’illpha* in Aymara, mating, calving, dipping (insecticide wash) and shaving, which are reinforced by rituals, collective ceremonies and (inter)communitarian festivals.⁷⁹ These are organized during the rainy season (December-March), constituting the busiest time of the year for pastoralists. By the end of the wet season, while female llamas are going with young

⁷⁷ Spinning is an activity incessantly performed, particularly by women while pasturing, although the skill is equally acquired by girls and boys and can be combined by virtually any other activity (Murra 1975, 149 and Flores 1977, 142, both cited in Lopez 2003, 30). Weaving is marked by a specific gender division of tasks, with some types confected by women while other applications, such as slings, sacks, ropes etc., are made by men (*ibid*, 31).

⁷⁸ Deere’s research demonstrates that the more rural Andean households are integrated in capitalist production relations (which is overall rather low in Carangas), the more the gender balance in intrahousehold labour relations comes under strain (Deere and León 2001, 2003).

⁷⁹ A good example is the *k’illpha*, which usually takes place between Christmas and the end of February, often before or on Carnival. During this event, the livestock –camelids, but similarly applied to sheep and cattle- are paid tribute by perforating their ear tips in special forms and decorating them with multi-coloured earrings. The accompanying ceremony includes an offering (*la mesa*), the scenting of the herd and corrals, the sacrifice of a llama and shedding of its blood in all directions towards the *huacas* and *uywiris* (protector spirits) and the *pachamama*, alcohol libations (*ch’allas*), coca chewing (*akulliku*) and the performance of chants. Through such rituals, the herd is protected from illness and predators, and its multiplication is secured by particular protector spirits, called *illas*, which are represented by small stone animal figures guarded in small pits in the corral. West 1981, 62; Abercrombie 1998, 366; López 2003, 18-25; Layme 12.02.2013. AJC, 1888, no. 2066, f.5v.

during eight to nine months of gestation, a household's energy shifts to other tasks. Harvest takes place in April-May, around Easter. From September to December the subsequent agrarian cycle is prepared by working and sowing the land. Until the last quarter of the 20th century, those dry months, from approximately May to December, were used to travel with large caravans of male llamas to and from regional fairs and other regions where complementary products to those of the *altiplano* were offered (López 2003, 20 and 28). The structuring power of this productive calendar has implications for the availability of surplus labour for other sectors of the economy. Agriculturalists-pastoralists may for instance place their bets on offering (his) labour to the mines, but the other way around mining companies' labour demands were dependent from seasonality and low labour discipline (Langer 1997; Platt 1995).

Throughout its development cycle, the household creates, extends and maintains various forms of formal and informal interaction with other households through trade partnerships, credit arrangements, labour cooperation and friendships. A lot of productive tasks (harvest, sheering livestock etc.) and infrastructural means (canals, irrigation, roads etc.) simply cannot be achieved by a sole household. Another key reason to bring these relations into operation was for comunarios to their settle debts. Most of these strategies are based on reciprocity and the manipulation of kinship relations and constitute a vital network to access the necessary subsistence means that operated in parallel -but "*neither conservative nor isolationist*"- from the marketplace (Caro 1994, 39).

Cooperation was organized at several levels. Consumption, trade and barter are organized among biological kin, within the boundaries of a single nuclear family (Custred and Orlove 1980, 40). Labour relations extend to the level of the extensive family but generally do not surpass these boundaries (Rivière 1982, 270-1). The next level, of ritual kinship, is of crucial importance in order to gain access to assets that result inaccessible within the own social unit (*ibid*, 278). Fictive ties to nonrelatives are primarily created through *compadrazgo* (co-parenthood), which facilitates the integration of both parties into each other's social networks.⁸⁰ Far from converting ritual kin into equals, the established bond served often as a credit source for money,

⁸⁰ A *compadre* or *comadre* (the spiritual father or mother) are expected to act as a social guide and economic promoter for their *ajado* or *ajada* (their spiritual son or daughter), but this relation often decays into a patron-client relationship. An interesting point made by Lehmann is that, in contrast to classic interpretations that tend to equal an organization of production on basis of nuclear family labour with a peasant (non- or pre-capitalist) economy, various case-studies point to the importance of ritual kinship rather than tight family networks for economic systems based on non-capitalist production. Rivière noted that *compadrazgo* was usually employed as a strategy for livelihood diversification by establishing alliances with complementary producers that offered commercial or barter opportunities. Lambert 1977, 22 cited in Mayer 2002, 11; Custred and Orlove 1980, 229; Rivière 1982, 278-9; Lehmann 1983, 11-2.

livestock or silver objects when disposing of insufficient means to comply with community duties, taxes, and ceremonial costs.⁸¹

Now we move to reciprocity mechanisms that are not necessarily confined to kinship bonds. The *ayni* is a social duty in which one offers help that is supposed to be returned on a later non-specified moment in at least the same quantity (De Munter 2003, 176 and 186; Temple 2003). It stands for a reciprocal labour exchange on a short or long term that is compensated with food, coca leaves and *chicha* and an equal amount of labour time and recruitment (Custred and Orlove 1980, 35-6). A similar relationship is called *mink'a*, established among a number of people (for instance to pasture herds together) and may be compensated with a feast, goods or cash (Custred and Orlove 1980, 41; Lopez 2003, 43-4). The importance of such long-term reciprocal ties stems from the scarcity of cash; principally invoked during harvest time.⁸²

In between reciprocal and non-reciprocal systems, there is a whole range of labour exchange arrangements that lay outside the kinship-based labour-pooling model. These mechanisms seldom involved money remuneration.⁸³ A typical kinship-creating labour strategy is for poor young men to pasture the herd, often for several years, of the household by which they wish to become accepted as son-in-law or godson.⁸⁴ When peasants are lacking production assets such as sowing seed or labour time and without means to pay a peon, they may establish a kind of deal denominated *al partir*, in which a plot of land is shared with another peasant in turn for providing him with the needed input.⁸⁵ Contracting usually occurs between impoverished young men or couples and households with insufficient members to pasture (or caravan with) their herds and has increasingly contributed to asymmetrical dependence relations and the decline of pastoralism over the 20th century (West 1981, 60). This form of servitude is usually rewarded with daily shelter and subsistence items as well as a yearling sheep or llama per year or half of the young born during the contract duration (Lopez 2003, 43; Caro

⁸¹ AJC, 1873, no. 1284, fs.14v; 1875, no. 1422; 1883, no. 1775; 1892, no. 2190; 1893, no. 2240; 1896, no. 2330.

⁸² When a comunario was mistreated for not having complied with *ayni* tasks, the judge, rather than protect the injured, concluded the accused was in default and sentenced him to a fee. AJC, 1880, no. 1634, f.3.

⁸³ Some cases involving money are registered, however. AJC, 1871, no. 1224, fs.2-2v and 1873, no. 1276.

⁸⁴ Details on the conditions and services to be fulfilled in order to become accepted as legitimate son-in-law are given in AJC, 1871, no. 1224, fs.2-2v.; 1873, no. 1292.

⁸⁵ This system is equally applied in livestock management, where a pastoralist migrates as a seasonal worker to a rich pastoralist, generally in Chile, in order to obtain livestock he cannot afford to buy; the arrangement being made is that the contracted pastoralist receives half of the young born during his service (Rivière 1982, 274). Today, the same practice is resorted to in the wider region to access land to grow quinoa which is currently booming on the world market (personal communication with Gilberto Pauwels, March 2014).

1994).⁸⁶ Moving further on the reciprocity to non-reciprocal labour continuum, *peonaje* is a mechanism of acquiring additional labour input by paying a worker in species (Rivière 1982, 273). This strategy is generally relied upon by more wealthy households and/or with insufficient time to cultivate their lands themselves due to duties outside the community time to complete such as transporters, merchants or *comunarios* executing a community function.

3.2.2 Capital: Livestock property.

Even though local livelihoods are subject to historical fluctuations and fundamentally dependent from a combination of complementary activities, the vital role attributed to livestock and more specifically Andean camelids surfaces as a constant throughout Carangas' entire territory and history (Medinaceli 2010, 99). However, their exact significance in size and value is hard to reconstruct, as agro-pastoralist censuses are unlikely to give a correct depiction of herd sizes, if they can be executed at all. *Comunarios* are reluctant to reveal details on the exact size of their herd and, rather than to number their animals, they inventory their herd on basis of a rough estimation (Rivière 1982, 275; see also Bolton 2007).⁸⁷ Still, reports, surveys and notary documents offer insight into the importance of livestock property in the *altiplano* peasant economy.

In 1910, a provincial inspector Zenón Bacarreza counted 483909 animals, held in property by the approximately 27000 inhabitants, divided in little over 5000 households. Camelids counted for nearly 57% of the total livestock, of which over 80% were llamas. Sheep represented 37%, and only secondary 5% asses, mules and horses, hardly 1% cattle and some 1857 pigs, of which 85% was in Uru Chipaya hands who kept the animals (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 341). About ten years later, Lima's update of this inventory demonstrated barely any variation in distribution, except for a slight reduction of llamas in favour of the alpaca population and an increase in the mule population (Lima 1921, 45; see table in Appendix 5). A livestock count in 1929 registered almost 10000 animals more than in 1910, an increase almost entirely absorbed by the horse and pig population which were three to four times higher in number, leaving a

⁸⁶ In one lawsuit, a herder who had pastured over 8 years the livestock of a fellow pastoralist of the same ayllu in Corque complained not to have received the due "salary" of 3 female llamas and 9 lambs or sheep. AJC, 1880, no. 1634, f. 1-1v.

⁸⁷ In their perception, the counting of their animals separates the animals from their reproductive group, hence "neutralizes" the coherence and undermines the reproductive potential of the herd, which explains the distrust of Andean pastoralists towards such fiscal interventions (Urton 1997, 103-4, cited in Bolton 2007, 11). This distrust also explains why attempts at introducing new methods for livestock breeding failed (Pauwels 1983, 266).

hardly altered distribution among other animals (González 1929, 214). Throughout the 20th century, these proportions seem to have undergone little or no alteration, the only difference being the depreciated importance of mules, which has been absorbed by Andean camelids thanks to enlarged commercialization options and the introduction of motorized vehicles.⁸⁸ Today, the entire Oruro department counts with almost 1,4 million domesticated camelids (of which about three quarters llamas), representing about 60 to 70% of the entire livestock, compared to 30-40% sheep and less than 1% cattle.⁸⁹

The llama, a European traveller stated in 1914, “*is to the Indian what the reindeer is to the Lapp,*” in short, everything (Walle 1914, 379). The llama has been providing Andean peasants with meat for calories, coat for textile applications which also provided in a marketable surplus, bones and leather for construction material, fat for medical use or candles, dung for fertilizer and heat and its carrying capacity for transportation (Graffam 1992, 888; Browman, Fritz and Watson 2009). Strikingly, dairy products do not figure in this wide range of applications (Gade 2000, 102-17), nor does its use as draught animal (Mann 2011, 203). However, stirred by the booming international wool market, outsiders’ and governmental attention was at that time particularly drawn to the more delicate alpacas, which share many of the llama’s practical sources but have been particularly appreciated for its fibre (Custred 1977, 65; Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 399-401; Walle 1914, 381). Sheep too were principally kept for their wool. Apart from wool livestock, the large number of asses grazing Carangas’ vast plains, particularly in Turco and Corque where Bacarreza counted respectively about 4000 and 7000 animals was also stressed at the time.⁹⁰ These pack animals were also commercialized in adjacent provinces or in the famous livestock fair of Huari. Mules and horses served for trade and individual transport, cows for livestock export to the coast as well as for domestic agricultural use, and pigs for lard that was traded across the border.

The distribution of the region’s animal stock indicates llama abundance over the entire territory, while other animals were more susceptible to specific local grazing conditions. Among pastoralist households, only those residing in the north-eastern districts such as Llanquera tend to keep more sheep than camelids. Alpacas were very unevenly distributed, conditioned by altitude and the presence of *bofedales* to the

⁸⁸ A recent study of herd structures was executed by the FAO in the community of Turco (Rodríguez and Quispe, FAO 2009). In 2005, law no. 3157 granted Curahuara de Carangas and Turco, which together compose the province of Sajama, the title of “Bolivian Capital of South-American Capital Camelid Husbandry” (*Capital Boliviana de la Ganadería Camélida Sudamericana*) (Rodríguez Veltze 2005).

⁸⁹ Hence, camelids easily outnumber the human population, counting with a little less than 400000 inhabitants. Based on UNEPCA 1999 cited in FAO 2007, 33; Rodríguez and Quispe, FAO 2009, 38; INE Oruro 2002.

⁹⁰ Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 357; see also the account of Paul Walle, an English visitor in Bolivia in 1914, who seems to have largely copied Bacarreza’s report; Walle 1914, 381-2.

(north-)west.⁹¹ Donkeys grazed in the central plains of Carangas, small troops of mules and horses were found more eastwards as well as in the *bofedales* close to the north-western border, and cows in the northern mountains. Only in the case of the Uru population, pigs were also important, which were hence exclusively found in the swamps around the Coipasa lake were *tatora* and grass roots abounded (Pauwels 1983, 186; Morales 1910, 99).⁹² In broad outlines, there was a distinction between a more camelid-adapted environment in the higher and dryer west and a more appropriate area for herds based on imported species, amongst which sheep and donkeys best adapted.⁹³




Figure 18 Announcement of the first “festival of the llama and crafts” in Turco, “Bolivian capital of camelid breeding law n° 3157”. Organized by the Association of Centres for Camelid Improvement in Turco (ACEMCAT) and the indigenous authorities. Turco, 21-22 December 2007. (own picture, November 2008)

The enthusiasm with which contemporary visitors of the province commented on the abundant herds contrasted starkly with their criticism about the management of

⁹¹ See the sample of livestock properties in annex. It is mainly one rich pastoralist of Sajama, with over 284 alpacas in his possession, who distorts the analysis. AJC, *Civiles*, 1915, no. 21.

⁹² Only a single will in the sample included 30 pigs. AJC, 1861, no. 844.

⁹³ Wills of *comunarios* in the most fertile (north-)eastern area such as Llanquera and San Miguel demonstrate a greater reliance upon sheep, supplemented with cows, asses and mules, rather than llamas. AJC, *Civiles*, respectively 1901, no. 9 and 1909, no. 8. In contrast, herds in the western communities (Turco, Curahuara, Sabaya etc.) were dominated by camelids, thanks to the *bofedales*. Conditions for donkey and mule breeding were limited as was firmly stated in 1864, when the *comunarios* of Sabaya and Huachacalla refused to put their livestock at the disposal of the national army simply because they did not possess animals suitable (strong enough) for this service. AJC, 1864, no. 964 and 968.

these herds. People such as Bacarreza and Lima identified wool livestock as a potential resource frontier, but saw local pastoralist methods and knowledge as obstacles of primitivism and negligence to the “scientific preparation” of the region’s “industrialization” (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 396; Lima 1921, 46). They designed programs with model farms designed to mitigate the decimating effect of epidemics and foment livestock multiplication and genetic regeneration but ignorant towards the centuries-long developed expertise of these pastoralists in managing their herds⁹⁴ and would eventually all fail (Pauwels 1983, 266; Lima 1921, 46-9).⁹⁵ Today, this developmentalist push that converts llamas in mere products seems to have found an entry, yet with gradually more attention to local methods and demands (Rodas 2013, 87-92; Healy 2001). Over the last decades and strongly incentivized by NGO intervention, several cooperatives and other initiatives have been established in the region to foment the production and commercialization of llama meat, in the form of the freeze-dried *charque*.

The pastoralists of Carangas perceive camelids as “*their most valuable possession and only livelihood*”.⁹⁶ Notwithstanding the risk of epidemics,⁹⁷ livestock is a secure capital, grows constantly, requires less intensive labour than agriculture, and is an easily transferable property. Pastoralists compare their herd with “money in the bank,” a capital asset that needs to be managed with care.⁹⁸ Moreover, Andean livestock had an additional value for its employability and profitability as transport means, which gave households access to barter contacts for primary provisions and commercial caravan trade, and became the llama’s historically most valued function. For merchants or non-

⁹⁴ This close interrelation is for instance reflected in the numerous terms that differentiate llamas on basis of sex and age, function and color. AJC, *Penales*, 1911, no. 12.

⁹⁵ In fact, this ‘proto-industry’ is exclusively concentrated in Carangas, mainly in the actual provinces of Sajama (including Curahuara and Turco, both in possession of the title of “camelid capital”), Carangas and Sabaya (Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 69). Although there is large potential, commercialization has not come to full development due to transport, sanitary and other quality-guaranteeing aspects.

⁹⁶ In Turco, one of Carangas’ most prominent llama-producing communities, a recent FAO inquiry found 94% of all producers liable to that evaluation of their capital (Rodríguez and Quispe, FAO 2009, 43). This counters Terry West’s statement in the early 1980s that by the second half of the 20th century, it was no longer true that “*the ownership of vast herds of animals was the major determinate of wealth and prestige in the township.*” (West 1981, 56).

⁹⁷ Llamas and alpacas are not free from any threat derived from disease and parasites. Particularly *sarna* (scab), but also *cenurosis* (parasite illness) and foot rot cause preoccupation to pastoralists, particularly during the dry season (AJC, 1897, no. 2372).

⁹⁸ Terry West gives the testimony of a pastoralist, stating that “*too many withdrawals will so severely deplete the herd that natural reproduction will be inadequate to compensate for over consumption*” (West 1981, 81-2).

pastoralists households, other livestock was more important; non-Andean pack animals (mules, asses, horses) for the former and cattle for the latter.

Archival evidence, particularly notarial wills and inventories, constitute a rich source to reconstruct the size of herds, their internal constellation and their significance in relation to the main income-generating activities (pastoralism or commerce) and the broader set of production assets acquired and managed by an average Carangas household.⁹⁹ Wills follow a precise structure in which the first and most completely described asset of *caranguño* pastoralists was livestock property, starting with female llamas and their offspring, followed by male (pack) llamas, then sheep and asses, and concluded with mules, cattle and horses. An analysis of 43 wills and inventories for the period 1860-1925¹⁰⁰ comprises an animal stock dominated by llamas and sheep. Individual herds restricted to this wool livestock are likely to correspond to an indigenous commoners' household, identified as "pastoralist" (27). To the extent that other animals are included, in particular more pack animals (male llamas, mules and asses) and horses, the herd owner is likely to be more inclined towards trade activities and was hence identified as pastoralist-merchant (4), in case of holding rights to community land, or merchants, when it concerned white-mestizo village residents (9). Of course this categorization remains speculation based on incomplete data and concealing mutual overlaps but it gives an insight into the composition of this pastoralist society.

Though a rather arbitrary reconstruction, the general picture runs in line with Bacarreza's observations and more recent ethnographic studies of pastoralist communities in the broader region. These establish 50 llamas as a culturally established lower limit for a herd size (Caro 1994, 27); a limit which seems to prevail up to today.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ However, they seldom mention the exact value of herds, although a combination of sources suggests that prices for llamas underwent little change. Generally it is stated that the weight of the semestral indigenous head tax equalled the price of a mature llama, which fluctuated indeed around 4 to 5 pesos (the head tax was set on 9 pesos and 1 real yearly (2 semesters) for "full" community members, see 4.1).

¹⁰⁰ This sample unavoidably relies only on those estates registered in the notary books, which were probably more recurrent at by richer people, more inclined to revoke a will. Hence it offers but a tiny and little representative image, yet still a useful exercise. The overall animal stock per analysed indicates an average of 73 female llamas (including their young), 20 male llamas, 10 alpacas, 47 sheep, 10 asses, 1 mule, 2 cows, 1 horse and 1 pig per pastoralist or merchant household. Of course, these following averages must be broken up into regional varied clusters, with particularly alpacas and pigs concentrated in few hands. See appendix 6.

¹⁰¹ Today, the 50 limit-rule seems to prevail as pastoralist producers in the Oruro Department possess on average 52 camelids, both llamas and alpacas (data from SEDAG-ORURO 2006 in Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 67; see also West 1981, 77). In areas where pastoralism is solidest, this number is even higher, for instance in the Mejillones province (Todos Santos, La Rivera, Carangas), where the average is set on 209 animals (UNEP/CA 1999, 89; Medinaceli 2010, 103-4). In Turco, locals such as don Anastasio estimate that virtually no one possesses less than 50 animals, although some may just barely reach that level,

In economic terms, this quantity is critical to the viability of a pastoralist livelihood and allows a pastoralist a comfortable position. Archive evidence suggests that this limit was even higher in Carangas, especially if no other animals were included in their livestock base. At the other hand, there was a discrepancy between poor families falling under the limit, while others were able to build up an impressive herd. As Bacarreza wrote, “*there is no indigenous family that does not possess even five specimen, as there are many that count with troops of up to 1000 heads*” (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 401). Regardless of evolutions in the exact lower limit, it becomes clear that the inequality existing in Bacarreza’s time has further developed, creating a widening distribution gap.¹⁰²

Wills are more than static snapshots, but give insight into how an estate was build up, serving hence as excellent sources for a regressive reconstruction of what could be called a household’s “accumulation trajectory.” This trajectory of obtaining and reproducing capital is in the first place activated by the designation and assignation of animals, which occurs on key moments of a pastoralist’s life. What follows may seem a simple sequence, but as several inheritance cases demonstrate, often constellates into a complex “pedigree.” It is therefore crucial to both parents and children, husbands and wives to meticulously keep record of the constitution of their herd; from whom they received, bought or inherited, how the herd “multiplied”, how many animals had served to finance community tasks, to whom they farmed out animals, etc.¹⁰³

While wills will generally trace this trajectory back to marriage, the formation of an own herd is a lifetime-long process that starts for boys and girls alike at a very young age. Somewhere between 2 and 9, a child receives its first “gift animal” during the yearly earmarking ceremony, the *k’illpha* (West 1981, 61). In that way, gift animals foresee in a form of gender-equal social security (activated when parents decease or in cases of divorce) and creates a first sense of ownership and affection towards the llama, encouraging children to take up pastoralist tasks (Lopez 2003, 21). Inheritance and dowry might increase this first stock. Luck is also a crucial factor and reflects the individual dimension of wealth (West 1981, 71-2). Although in daily practice, the flock size of the total household prevails over the individual property of each member, gift

but most own between 100 and 150 llamas, in some cases even going to 200 animals. Many of them also keep sheep and only those with access to *bofedales* have also alpaca. Interview don Anastacio Canqui Mollo, Turco, 25.3.2012.

¹⁰² Recent data demonstrate that all pastoralist producers in the Oruro department, 79% count as small producers, owning less an average of only 34 animals and with a yearly income of 131 US dollar, 17% represents small intermediate groups, owning between 90 and 210 animals and an average income of 389 to 740 US dollars per year, and just 4% are large producers, on average owning 315 animals and earning 1213 US dollar annually. The first group possesses 43% of all camelids, while 22% of all camelids are in hands of the latter group (based on SEDAG-ORURO 2006 in Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Oruro 2011, 68).

¹⁰³ Examples of such descriptions are AJC, 1861, no. 847, fs.11v-13v and *Civiles*, 1908, no. 8.

and dowry animals and their offspring remain one's exclusive property, also after marriage unites two separately created stocks.¹⁰⁴ Throughout this sequence of herd formation, a wide range of strategies to increase one's livestock property are called into play. Animals can be obtained through purchase, swap,¹⁰⁵ or registration of unclaimed livestock,¹⁰⁶ in turn for labour,¹⁰⁷ on basis of claims as will executor or through the settlement of credit and debt relations. Less lawful tactics form an essential aspect of this sequence, with abundant cases of illegitimate declarations of "vacant" livestock,¹⁰⁸ animal theft,¹⁰⁹ and authority abuse.¹¹⁰

Wills, but also lawsuits and (rare) contracts, give moreover insight into the settling of credit relations, although they remain generally a hard to trace relation. Debts were usually stated in money, but often settled in the form of a livestock transfer.¹¹¹ Often this monetary or other transaction corresponded to the refund of obtained money from transported and traded goods to the contracting merchant and the possessions that mortgaged this deal. These relations forged an interdependence among comunarios and

¹⁰⁴ Even after marrying or when joining their children's household, husbands and wives continued to treat their livestock as personal property rather than a collective household asset. In wills, it was usually clearly indicated which animals they had brought to the marriage, how many were added during the marriage. AJC 1869, no. 1058 and *Civiles*, 1910, no. 5.

¹⁰⁵ AJC, 1861, no. 852.

¹⁰⁶ Examples of the numerous cases in which animals were (falsely) claimed to have no owner, or a deceased owner with no heir, are AJC, 1877, no. 1524; no. 1553; 1878, no. 1564. In 1927 (circular of 25 June), stipulations were set regarding the auction sale of stolen and unclaimed goods (Calderón 1927, 196).

¹⁰⁷ When possessing no or too few animals to make a living, poor pastoralists might obtain livestock in turn for extending herding or other services. Examples are AJC, 1880, no. 1634; 1882, no. 1687, f.4 and 1883, no. 2240.

¹⁰⁸ A typical case where this "alternative way" to appropriate livestock was recorded, was when a peasant claimed his cows had arbitrarily been declared as strayed (*mostrenco*) and put under supervision of someone else, usually a powerful villager such as the corregidor. AJC, 1868, no. 1040 and no. 1048(b).

¹⁰⁹ Rustling (*abigeato*) can be seen as a very common strategy in livestock-based agrarian societies that serves to increase one's position or to restore a more equal balance (see Orlove 1980, 179-94). A small sample of examples was researched, with most cases concerning only a couple of animals, but in other occasions it could include entire herds. AJC, 1878, no. 1595b; 1888, no. 2095; 1894, no. 2272 and no. 2276; 1900, no. 2425; *Civiles*, 1901, no. 3 and *Penales*, 1906, no. 1.

¹¹⁰ A frequent abuse was when corregidores, in this case of Totorá, were accused of coerced extraction of animals. AJC, 1877, no. 1525.

¹¹¹ Wills included a regular section on credit relations, stating the money, livestock or goods one still owed or others owed to her/him. One example is that of a comunario who was ordered to transfer a part of his herd to a fellow pastoralist to whom he still owed money, a transfer that counted "as proof the arrangements and payment of the pending debts around the mutual wills and the greatest harmony." AJC, *Penales*, 1910, no. 6.

very often with individual and cooperating business (wo)men¹¹² which could entail a complex tangle in which companies often functioned as a node in the web of creditors and debtors in the province. While it is not always possible to precisely reconstruct this tangle, most documented credit relations give evidence of how comunarios were incorporated in this node in the capacity of contracted and indebted transporters. Whether among merchants, between merchants and indigenous llameros, or among llameros, most of these contracts concerned the acquirement of pack animals or cargo (the loss thereof motivating the registration of these agreements in the sources).¹¹³

Apart from its economic value, camelid property also functions as a sign of social prestige. While the amount of animals owned determines the income rate of a household internally, it also fortifies the social status of a household within the community.¹¹⁴ Given that any communal ceremony is unthinkable without the presence (and sacrifice) of a llama, owning a minimal number of llamas is a requisite to participate in the fiesta-cargo system. As a consequence, signs of a shrinking animal stock may in fact point to an increasing social (and political) position within the community.¹¹⁵ Thus, livestock property in notary documents do not straightforwardly reflect the socio-economic position of a household, but must be related to overall patrimony information and the importance of non-herding activities.¹¹⁶

3.2.3 Land use and tenure

Even Lima –who at some points in his description tends to extol the region as the most valuable of the whole continent- had to admit the productive limits of Carangas’ soil (Lima 1921, 67-8). Apart from those spots where pools, springs and summer rains offer irrigation options, the largest share of the soil is so sterile it hardly produces enough to

¹¹² However, few of the bonds among comunarios or granted by merchants are registered in the archives. Some indications are AJC, 1869, no. 1083; 1893, no. 2259; *Civiles*, 1901, no. 8; 1907, no. 23; 1915, no. 15.

¹¹³ Given the transnational character of trade and transport, a considerable share of these debts had an international dimension. AJC, 1871-1874, no. 1224, f. 21v; 1876, no. 1494, f. 2; 1888, no. 2097, f. 21 and f. 23.

¹¹⁴ This connotation was reinforced by the importance given to wealth in Andean society under Inca rule, including both economic as social and cultural capital. Owners of relatively large herds being called *qamiri* (“rich” in Aymara) and those with an insufficiently large herd to organize community festivals are called *wajchas* (“orphans” in Aymara). Lopez 2003, 25.

¹¹⁵ AJC, 1866, no. 962, f.9v-10v.

¹¹⁶ The poor-average-rich distinction made in the table in Appendix 6 is based on a more complete picture of the assets managed by a household (indicated in wills or inventories) controlled by a proprietor or household. Thus, someone categorized in the table as poor may possess more animals than a rich merchant, who hardly possesses any animals but is abundantly supplied of real estate and commodity stocks.

sustain a household's auto-consumption, leaving land almost exclusively to livestock herding (Blanco 2006 [1904], 18; Lopez 2003, 12). While the slightly more fertile soil and the protection by mountains chains in the north-east of the province (including Corque, Huayllamarca, Chuquichambi, San Miguel and Llanquera) favoured small-scale agriculture, cultivation in the more occidental cantons (Turco, Curahuara and Huachacalla, but also in Andamarca) was only reported in places covered by the mountains (Bacarreza 1910, 394; Lima 1921, 42). However, mountain torrents, *bofedales*, lakes, rivers, and the salubrious climate shaped excellent grazing conditions in the latter districts, particularly in the north-west.



Figure 19 The most fertile soils are located in the north-east of Carangas. These are terraced cultivation plots in the outskirts of the village of San Miguel (own picture, March 2012).

Around 1910, most household labour was dedicated to agricultural subsistence production, mainly the cultivation of potatoes and barley and a minor quantity (especially in the micro-climate zones of Llanquera, Chuquichambi and Huayllamarca) of quinoa, beans, cereals, alfalfa,¹¹⁷ and some vegetables (Bacarreza 1910, 394; Lima 1921, 189). Together, these products constituted the basic consumption pattern, dominated by the potato.¹¹⁸ Livestock production was of course key too, providing in meat, but also in

¹¹⁷ The production of alfalfa points to the presence of mules, donkeys and horses.

¹¹⁸ According to West's reconstruction of rural consumption in the Oruro countryside in 1977 (West 1981, 117), an average nuclear family of 6 consumers needed 10 *quintales* of fresh potatoes, which were the year round

a transport means.¹¹⁹ This transport was vital as most cereals, fruits and vegetables had to be obtained from the valleys. Thus, the maintenance of inter-community exchange contacts across ecological divides was key to altiplano livelihood construction (see 3.3).

In response to ecological factors such as frost, rain or hail that hamper agriculture, altiplano households employ a dispersed settlement and land use strategy. While pastoralism relies on the rotational use of vast grazing spaces, agriculture is based on sectorial fallowing and crop rotation, both requiring a well-organized communal control (Guillet 1981, 143-4). The core site of residence and operation is the *estancia*, or the ranch, which is usually established on an advantageous location, such as close to a *bofedal* or near other *estancias*. The best cultivation land is usually comprised by the terrains of the *estancia*. In addition, each household accesses scattered small plots on a short distance and a number of outlying, mainly grazing fields, provided with temporary dwellings (Llanque 1995 cited in Rodríguez and Quispe 2009, 35). This way, a varied agricultural production, including several kinds of crops or several variations of one crop, is achieved and combined with pastoralist activities (Rivière 1982, 256).

In contrast to the maize zone where irrigation is crucial, the altiplano's climatological constraints enforces a system of sectorial fallowing (more land is left fallow than cultivated) and crop rotation, mainly between potatoes, native tubers and cereals (Guillet 1981, 143-4). At the foot of the hills until their cultivation limit at 3800 m, quinoa and tola are grown (Rivière 1982, 234-5). Higher on the mountain slope, potatoes are cultivated until about 4100 m, with the highest zone reserved for *chuño* potatoes. Higher up, when even pasturage becomes impossible, yareta and queñua are collected (*ibid*). This management of multiple ecological niches converts mountain slopes into a dense collage of cultivation plots or *canchones*, fenced by stone walls in order to prevent herds from invading (*ibid*, 261; see also Goodale and Sky 2000), and organized into different terraces. Due to the altiplano character of the soil, these terrains usually remain uncultivated for a couple of decades.

Livestock management in Carangas is based on an open field system for Andean camelids which need much space to thrive; hence pasture land constitutes an abundantly needed resource. According to Bacarreza, Carangas was provided with more than 40000 ha herding land and artesian wells of which a vast part was left unused (Pauwels 2006, 398). Bacarreza was clearly pushing for a more intensive land use, ignoring the system of rotational use of communal grazing lands in order to prevent over-grazing (West 1981, 59; Rodríguez and Quispe 2009, 37). These long-(and still-

stored in underground silos, and 3 to 4 *quintales* of *chuño* between 2 harvests, which makes 1 arroba of fresh potatoes per week.

¹¹⁹ With the breakthrough of trucks, transporters and traders shifted to a new means of capital formation, reducing the importance of livestock (for caravan mobility) and hence the reliance upon grazing lands.

)standing practices of “free pasturing,” without the use of stables, allow a pastoralist household to manage an ample workspace.



Figure 20 An estancia with corrals keeping a llama herd together, along the road between Chuquichambi and Choquecota (own picture, March 2012).

The constitution of a herd starts with selecting the animals on basis of age and sex; from then on the males and the females with offspring are perpetually kept apart for the sake of genetic control (West 1981, 59; López 2003, 14). An internal equilibrium is sought of one male for every ten female llamas,¹²⁰ keeping all additional male llamas as pack animals for caravan trade while female llamas served the herd reproduction and for meat (Molino 2006, 112). Familial flocks graze continuously on other pastures, however always within the same fixed area and according to a defined logic. In an order from most to least selective forage consumers, cows are the first to enter a meadow, followed by llamas and then by sheep to “finish” the pasture (Lopez 2003, 37). Cows are herded separately by men, often left unwatched in the highest areas for several days (*ibid*, 36). Male llamas may also be left alone for several days on outlying pastures in the highest zones (over 4200 m). Female llamas, however, are kept lower (approximately 3700 to 4200 m), often together with sheep (Custred 1977, 68-86). The latter are herded closer to the pastoralist dwelling by women but also children and youngsters. The animals are spurred with whistles and a sling, which serve to guard them against

¹²⁰ The analysed data in Appendix 6 suggest however an equilibrium of one male to four females.

predators such as foxes, pumas and condors, but also against other herds or stray llamas (López 2003, 16-8). At night they are locked in corrals constructed around the estancia.

This way of putting altiplano land to adequate use is bound by a tenure system in which the community, as has been alluded to, constitutes the axial space of regulation. In the following, a brief assessment is given of how the most vital means of ensuring a household's subsistence and wealth is accessed in Carangas. Of course, this system is fundamentally shaped by and embedded in a state-managed land system, but that broader picture will be scrutinized in chapter 4. Land tenure on the altiplano is marked by a strong coordinated control of the *ayllu* over the distribution of land among its members. In pasture zones such as Carangas, communal land administration is exerted in its most "complete" form, based on indivisible use rights, while highland agriculture zones, dominated by tuber cultivation, is administered also communally but with divisible use rights, in contrast to the lower irrigation production zones (maize and tuber), where private property defines the local land tenure system (Guillet 1981, 142-3; Urioste, Barragán and Colque 2007, 79).

The way in which property was regulated within the community in 1910 was explained by Bacarreza as follows:

"the property of the land is maintained communally by aillos [ayllus], distributed in ainocas [aynuqa], and no one of the co-proprietors can extend its cultivations at will. The aillos are divided into 10 or more ainocas, destined one for each year, in a way that the community must sow in one single ainoca, leaving the others for the pasturing of their livestock. This system of rotation that is applied in the cultivation lands restricts the area to which agriculture could extend" (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 394).

His comment reflects how contemporaries understood cultivation, private property and "progress" as entangled frontiers whose standstill, as in Carangas, was undesirable. Yet this evaluation was short-sighted regarding the ecological aptness of this system and its internal complexity. In Carangas, the lion's share of all the land was and still is indeed held as indivisible property, yet tenure entails varying degrees of collective ownership. Rather than an all-encompassing control over the land, each household combines access to dispersed plots of pasture, cultivation, and fallow land, preferably of a varied as possible quality. This heterogeneity of production options guarantees a diversified production in a fragile environment and endorses the principle of complementarity, which until the amputation of Carangas' valley lands was upheld on a much vaster scale. Quite different from pre-designed theoretical and exclusive models in which collectivist overrule individualist principle such as communism, this communal land administration comprises several types of tenure that flexibly co-exist and may change according to context and changing state and market imperatives.

In concrete, all land within the territorial reach of an *ayllu* is divided into four, interlinked categories, allowing households to control different ecological levels (see figure 21). Closest (but not identical) to private property are the individual inalienable usufruct rights corresponding to the nuclear family. These rights endow each household with a *sayaña*, which contains several cultivation fields, differently located within the territory of the *estancia*.¹²¹ The counterpart of these privately used lands is the *saraqqa*, which are communal terrains over which the extensive “family” of one *estancia* holds collective usufruct rights. These terrains comprise a geographically discontinuous territory, including fallow, water, pasture and wood lands dispersed over the *ayllu* to which the respective *estancia* belongs, sometimes at several days walking distance (Rivière 1982, 237). More outlying from the permanent settlements and much larger in extent are the *qallpa*,¹²² for cultivation, and the *aynuqa*, used as pasture or in fallow. These are communal lands, administered at either the *estancia* or *ayllu* level by distributing temporal, collective non-adjudicated usufruct rights to member households (Galindo 2007, 85-6) and often lay fallow, functioning as a reserve for future internal redistributions. *Sayañas* are found everywhere, on the slopes, in the bofedal and spread over the plain. Communal cultivation lands are usually located on the highland plains at about 3700 m altitude, either non-irrigated or with bofedales for female llamas and young and provided with permanent dwellings and corrals. A little higher, between 4200 and 4300 m, *aynuka* grazing lands are used for the (male) herd.

For households incorporated into a community, access to land is fundamentally determined by its membership of the *ayllu* (Custred and Orlove 1980, 21; Rivière 1982, 269). The social control over the size, use and distribution of the communally held lands and the allotment of individually cultivated lands to all members of the *ayllu* is entrusted with the *jilaqatas* (Urioste, Barragán and Colque 2007, 79). In order to be granted *sayaña* land rights and obtain the associated status of *sayañero*, but also to usufruct collective lands, households are demanded to make a yearly contribution (which shifted over time from labour and agricultural yields to money) to the community and take up their responsibilities in the fiesta-cargo cycle (yet exempt from this contribution while executing a higher cargo). Under Spanish influence, a patrilineal inheritance system was imposed upon the *sayaña* allocation, with the *sayañero* status and associated lands passed from father to son (Rivera and Platt 1978).

¹²¹ Rivière adds that the verb *sayaña* means “get up, stand up” or –more broadly– the place where a person “raises; builds” his space. According to Bertonio’s Aymara dictionary, the verb entails the meaning of “delimiting, establishing the limits of a property” (Bertonio I.N.E.L. 1979, 95, cited in Rivière 1982, 258). Naming the *sayaña* is a way of formalizing the *estancia*’s territorial rights and the chosen name often refers to a place on its edges because the act of naming gives legal value to the boundaries.

¹²² However, equally as *saraqqa*, the term *qallpa* is hardly mentioned in local sources or testimonies.




Figure 21 Altitudinal varied land use. Adaptation from Rivière 1982, 234.

While these rules are still in place and no individual or institutional proprietor but the community and its member households have exerted ownership over these lands, arrogations or effective interventions by non-members, usually tied to the local elite, and state powers are not uncommon. As a result, the way in which someone is affiliated to a particular *ayllu* has included various positions. The most formative step in shaping this formal bond to the land was the incorporation and monetization of the internal “contract” between *sayañeros* and their communal authorities by the state apparatus; establishing a mutual state-community pact (Platt 1982, 100). By guaranteeing the protection of collective land rights in return for taxation, community land became an important revenue source and loyalty lever. The colonial origins and republican defiance of that pact is subject to chapter 4.

Apart from distributing land among all members, collecting the contribution from those members and negotiating the community’s land rights with the central state, community authorities are entrusted with the supervision of how rights are exerted and the mediation of conflicts over those rights. As the existence of individual and collective rights within the *ayllu* in combination with fluid land boundaries provokes frequent dispute between households, estancias and *ayllus*, this is not a minor task. Cases on disputed property rights, trespassed boundaries and violently invaded land abound in the analysed court archive. Land boundaries were usually indicated by stones (“mojones”) representative for imaginary, fluid lines and could hence be easily moved (see also Goodale and Sky 2000). Most commonly, the collective use of grazing lands adjacent to cultivation plots often leads to accusations of land invasion into private plots, while the plaintiffs are blamed of attempting to establish de facto ownership over

communal land (West 1981, 88-9).¹²³ The inherent mobility of Carangas households –and hence their absence from the land– was equally seized to appropriate land.¹²⁴ However, the Uru population has fallen most strongly victim of this kind of disputes and usurpations, under the pretext that they were “people of the water”. Some state that it was the arrival of the aymara that imposed the “dominance” of strict land regulations upon the Uru system and pushed them into a marginal position. While it is indeed foremost the water, the lake, that is essential to Uru livelihood and culture, this does nevertheless not downplay the fact that land is vital to their existence too.¹²⁵

Inter-community and inter-household competition over land, its use, its boundaries and its access and transfer rights has become increasingly interspersed by competition with “outside” (non-community) actors.¹²⁶ This has resulted in the creation of several privatized “enclaves” within the Carangas territory. The only marketable private lands are comprised by the “urban areas” of the rural towns¹²⁷ and the subsoil, which could be

¹²³ A typical case occurred in Turco in 1908, when a couple of pastoralists was accused of usurping land in Cotasi, locted on the international border. The pastoralists, who were mestizo merchants simultaneously holding a sayañero status, asserted their usufruct rights of the disputed *bofedales* on the argument that these pasture lands were for common use. AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 18. Similarly, struggles ensued when the communal use over salt was restricted (7.1.1). Struggles over land are indeed a recurrent topic in this research and were a key line of inquiry during my archival research, resulting in an ample file of land intrusions triggered by the trespassing of boundaries and claimed ownership rights.

¹²⁴ A common motivator for land usurpation was the frequent and sometimes protracted absence, particularly of trading and bartering comunarios, but also of those who went working in the mines or haciendas, and from the early 20th century on, the young men who left to fulfil their military conscription. Another case is that of a comunario defending the lands of his sister against dispossession while she was absent for years in Peru; not knowing whether she is still alive or not. AJC, 1868, no. 1038.

¹²⁵ To insist on their status as “people of the water” is in fact a false excuse to ignore their basic rights and still seems to recur as an argument, reflected in their current precarious access to land.

¹²⁶ In 1827 a land dispute over a mining terrain developed. José Villegas, miner in La Rivera, accuses comunarios from ayllu Sacari and La Rivera of intrusion into the grazing lands pertaining to the mining concession he bought in La Rivera. According to Villegas, these lands were originally from Sacari but since they were granted to the azogueros in order to graze their livestock, the comunarios of La Rivera only maintained rights to community lands. The comunarios never intruded the azogueros’ properties in the last 200 years, but now they took advantage of the abandonment of the mining plants. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1920, no. 1.

¹²⁷ The lands of the village, the “urban centre” of the canton, were private and hence subject to purchase transactions. Sales of urban plots usually comprised houses, shops or rooms on or at the plaza of a village, in most cases Corque. These sales are usually registered in the notary books. AJC, 847, fs. 3, 4-6, 11v; 956, f.6-7v; 962, f. 6-7v; 1028; 1069; 1159, f. 1-3; 1919, fs. 26; 2112, fs. 3v-11, 35v, 43v-47v; 2151, fs. 22v y 24v; 2281; 2410, f.3 and 12v. Another category of marketable land were the commercial districts, such as Tambo Cosapa, of which the land rights were sold and consolidated in the 17th century and ever since remained in private (merchant) hands. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 40.

subject to mining concessions.¹²⁸ While figuring as equivalents of private estates, they remained but enclaves, while vast parts of the Andean countryside were absorbed into the hacienda system in the course of the last five centuries.¹²⁹ On the contrary, several communities of Carangas continued to possess “private” enclaves in other territories, which they rented as estates (see 3.1.2. and chapter 6). Launched in the late 19th century and particularly targeting communal fallows (categorizing the communities non-cultivated “reserves” as “residual” land), the strongest attempt to eradicate communal tenure successfully deprived them from those estates, but failed to make any progress within the province. However, there are some remarkable cases registered of effective sales and transfers of *sayañas*, although it is not always clear when the indication of a monetary value of a certain plot also went accompanied by an effective sale transaction.¹³⁰

While individualization pressures have not brought the community down as primary landowning institution nor altered the inalienability of land, communal land rights security –which entails virtually all land in Carangas- has been seriously debilitated. The 20th century brought important achievements for collective land rights security, but meanwhile various risks related to land use and land access undermine the persistence of this “Andean” pastoralist production system (Lopez 2003, 10; see also Grau and Aide 2008). Ecological degradation and demographic pressures create a problem of over-pasturing, causing soil erosion and the disappearance of certain forage plants, and contributing to the abandonment of certain customs and practices, particularly the long fallow periods (Lopez 2003, 45-6; Preston et al 2003).¹³¹ Meanwhile, the gradual integration of *sayaña* rights by individual households as part of a family land patrimony

¹²⁸ The subsoil was however clearly separated from the cultivable soil, hence the overlap of mining concessions and community lands does not seem to have played strongly as a motive to conflict.

¹²⁹ As the safety and size of a herd is essentially based on the input of extra labour force and the availability of abundant grazing lands, hacendados did not easily sideline the pastoralists and their communal land system (Caro 1994, 33).

¹³⁰ A *sayaña* of 5000 m², for example, was valued at 100 Bolivianos, but his “owner” assured it was transferred for free, so to prevent disputes with others. In 1930, a *sayaña* including several fields, an estancia, and a house in the village of Chuquichambi was sold at 200 bs. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1930, no. 6. Another *sayaña* transfer, in which a “new” *sayañero* took over the land of a “fiscally retired” commoner, went obligatorily accompanied by resuming the implied community duties, but also the costs of the commoner’s funeral expenses. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1930, no. 5.

¹³¹ This ecological pressure on the land also has a negative backlash on capital (livestock property). According to locals, cultivation was less important before the middle of the 20th century because pasture was still abundant, allowing the management of much vaster llama herds, with an average of 200 to 300 llamas and extremes of over 500 animals in addition to lesser numbers of sheep and a small number of mules (West 1981, 58).

has fomented inheritance practices, which are applied through the masculine line.¹³² As a result of demographic growth, inheritance has accelerated the fragmentation and differentiation of land, particularly since the middle of the 20th century.¹³³ As a consequence of the previous points, rural exodus and land abandonment constitute a third major threat to the continuation of well-functioning communal system.

3.3 Pastoralists in motion: a complex exchange chain.

A vast territory with potential, but remote and uncontainable. This combination of regional opportunities and limits generated an extremely mobile rural zone. Carangas' mobility was in the first place driven by ecological factors, by the complementarity of the Andean zoned landscape and the mobilizing capacity of the llama that facilitated the development of vital exchange contacts. While marked by a subsistence economy, household livelihoods in Carangas were essentially reliant upon complementary income sources and production activities. Moreover, the entanglement of Carangas' rural livelihoods with broader structures of production and circulation relied on its historically strategic location, not only within barter circuits that provided the altiplano with an indirect access to valley and coastal products, but also as a vital commercial passageway between the mines and valleys of the interior and the ports of the Pacific. The simultaneous participation in inter-ecological exchange networks and in an expanding market economy triggered the interregional circulation of agricultural surplus production, commodities, pack animals and people. Carangas thus developed into a pastoralist-trading economic region where long-distance caravan mobility constituted an essential strategy of rural livelihood diversification.

While Carangas production system is marked by limited surplus (and cash is only searched for when needed) and visits to "the market" are hence sporadic,¹³⁴ exchange

¹³² An example is a case in 1901 in Llanquera, where two brothers had shared a small plot of 70 to 100 ha, but when their sons grew up (cousins) they decided to divide the terrain in order to both having property documents for the land they occupied. The procedure required them to travel to the court in Corque, assign a lawyer, present evidence, assign experts and witnesses etc. *AJC, Civiles*, 1901, no. 10.

¹³³ The resulting unequal subdivision of plots activates several compensation strategies to overcome land shortage, such as the offering of labour in turn for usufruct rights and migration. Moreover, it has produced a "stabilization" of the allotment of cultivable land in the communities (Rivière 1982, 239 and 251).

¹³⁴ Even in the 1970s, when a regional market complex had extended deeper into the countryside, an average household frequented the market only a couple of times a year (West 1981, 203). Regular market visits is only

and trade were important, relating the comunarios of Carangas to a tangle of economic circuits which were however occasionally “activated”, mainly during annual travels. The active participation of the comunarios of Carangas in this tangle of cantered around the households’ offer of potatoes, livestock products, salt, charcoal and labour and their demand for agricultural products, exotic products and money. The “activation” of this offer-demand dynamic followed particular rhythms that coordinate with the sequences of an “ethnic calendar” (Platt 1995; Harris 1982 and 1987).¹³⁵ Limited by the climatological underpinnings of this calendar, long-distance travels for barter were always undertaken during the dry season, after the harvest, sometimes leaving already in late March, until late November.¹³⁶

In function of local consumption and socio-economic household reproduction, pastoralists annually left the altiplano to exchange their surplus production for what their direct environment could not produce and to obtain complementary income sources to secure a minimal margin of survival and to pay the indigenous head tax.¹³⁷ Subsistence means they found in the first place in the valleys and the coast with “fixed” barter contacts¹³⁸ and secondary through the urban market place. Money was provided by cities, ports and mines in demand for their agricultural products, their labour and their transportation service. Second, these pastoralists also connected to principal industrial centres, cities and ports and hence the wider world through commercial ties.

observed with commercial intermediaries who bring locally produced raw materials to the lower levels of the global market economy and, the other way around, brings the global market economy to the realm of the canton.

¹³⁵ Within the Andean agro-pastoral system, productive activities are repeated and the means of production thereto are renewed through self-supply, self-consumption or purchase (Mazoyer and Roudart 2006, 49), thereby displaying an annually recurring pattern. I propose a multi-layered calendar, structured as follows: an climatological-productive cycle (following the seasons) constitutes the first layer of this “ethnic calendar”, superposed by a ritual-political cycle (structured by ceremonies and cargos) and an extraction-exchange cycle (following the organization of fairs, tax payment, and annual travels).

¹³⁶ According to oral testimonies and contemporary as well as recent observers, caravan mobility for grains, fruits and vegetables was highest around Easter and in the months of April to June and reaches its climax around San Juan (24th of June), when the end of the harvest is celebrated (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 187; West 1981, 164). During these months, between harvest and the next sowing, the land nor the livestock needed much attention, so men and some of the children could leave their estancia for several months while women took care of the herds.

¹³⁷ The jilaqata of ayllu Pachacama, in the canton of Totorá, stated in 1862 that his comunarios were absent because “*they find themselves in the valleys because of the scarcity of provisions produced this year they have gone searching [the means] to support the necessities of their growing families as well as of the contribucion indigenal*”. Own translation. AJC, 1862, 873, f. 3.

¹³⁸ Usually households established a stable reciprocity relation with a particular household or community which was “cemented” and annually reactivated with gifts and sometimes through compadrazgo bonds (West 1981, 171).

Either on their own account or contracted by merchants, they traded and transported their own surplus products, such as wool, and obtained “exotic” products for personal use but more likely for further commercialization.¹³⁹ A third form of participating in supra-local circuits was in providing one of the main means of transportation that connected these regional circuits, the llama, converting themselves into one of the pillars of the transport sector, the caravan driver.¹⁴⁰ Fourth, rural households did not only set products and animals in movement, but also their own work force in search for additional income sources, not only as transporters but also through temporal or definitive labour migration in the mining or agricultural sector.

What they transported were mainly altiplano treasures, with a particular role for salt¹⁴¹ and wool livestock (see also 7.1). Salt and wool livestock, and its derived products were in constant demand in both market and off market circuits, while metals and minerals, charcoal and skins were subject to specific conjunctures. In addition to typical altiplano products, they also transported products that had been obtained in the valleys of the Bolivian interior further westwards to commercial markets, principally the cities, but also in the mining districts, and foremost the saltpetre districts at the Pacific coast (this trade was of course not the exclusive terrain of the Carangas province).¹⁴²

On their way home, the caravans carried mainly cereals from the valleys in sufficient quantities for their personal consumption during the year. Corn had always been a key element in the Andean diet and was obtained raw for rituals or cooking, roasted (*tostado*) for direct consumption or as flour, specifically “white” flour, known as “*harina primera*” or “*harina de Chile*”, or to brew *chicha*, known as *harina de muco*. From colonial times on, wheat, and in addition cavi (dried oca) and barely, became important too. Another important valley product was coca, produced in the eastern valleys. In addition

¹³⁹ Coca leaves played a particular role, transported towards the coast in quantities that “*continue to be considerable, taking into account that there are two to three million Bolivians living in the saltpeter offices for whom this article is of primary necessity*” as was commented in Tarapacá in 1882. AIT, vol.2, *Informe del Subdelegado de La Noria al Jefe Político de Tarapacá respecto a medidas administrativas a adoptar para el buen orden administrativo*, La Noria 19/1/1882, fol.121, cited in Castro 2004, chapter 4.

¹⁴⁰ Transporters either operated independently but increasingly relied upon contracts established with white-mestizo merchants. This will be briefly discussed in 4.2.

¹⁴¹ Salt exploitation was particularly important in Sabya, near the Coipasa salt lake, as well as in Andamarca, which extracted this vital product from from Pampa Aullagas and Quitaquita, to then commercialize in the valleys (Lima 1921, 188-9).

¹⁴² This transport of so-called *productos nacionales* diversified the range of products offered by these caravans, including salt, wool (alpaca, llama, sheep), meat, vicuña and chinchilla skins, wool livestock, cattle and mules, forage, charcoal, textiles and cloths, ropes, barley, potatoes, sulphur from the altiplano, and flour, *chicha* and tobacco, lime and coca from the eastern valleys. AIT, vol.2, *Informe del Subdelegado de La Noria al Jefe Político de Tarapacá respecto a medidas administrativas a adoptar para el buen orden administrativo*, La Noria 19/1/1882, fol.121, cited in Castro 2004, chapter 4, s.p.

they brought (dried) fruits (with a special importance of quince for being distributed when the tribute was collected), vegetables, wine, mainly from Codpa, herbs such as oregano, cheese, ají and alfalfa back to their home communities.¹⁴³



Figure 22 Public stage depicting the agricultural potential of Camiña, Chile, which was one of the principal barter destinations of Carangas' western communities (own picture, January 2012).

While strategic resources were exported, even more was imported. The inflow of goods, in the first place storage commodities, next to overseas products, sugar and alcohol, clearly and continually exceeded the export trade. Also in this direction of the chain, transporters and traders of Carangas took up an active –illegal or not- role. Among the commercial products entering Carangas, alcohol played a dominant role, either as beer, wine or liquor. Logically, this was also the most smuggled import product. Since the 1940s its importation and consumption has only accelerated. Saltpetre equally entered Bolivia largely through smuggle, but passed principally through regions south of Carangas. Other key imported goods were flour, soap, rice, household goods and construction material, canned food (from the warehouses in the villages and saltpetre mines¹⁴⁴), ironmongery and arms (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2009; Lima 1921).¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Based on interview with don Celestino, don Sabino, don Eduardo, don Agapito and other elderly comunarios of Turco, Turco, 25.3.2012. West 1981, 161; Rivière 1982, 291-2; Castro 2004, s.p.

¹⁴⁴ ITAR, vol. 824, *Subdelegaciones*, 1911, “Informe sobre contrabando”, Tarapacá 6.4.1911, f. 98-98v; vol. 17, *Intendencia de Tarapacá* 1917, “Reclamo al cónsul de Bolivia en Iquique por maltrato de comerciantes bolivianos indígenas”, Pica 11.3.1917, sin fol.; vol.17, *Intendencia de Tarapacá* 1917, “Oficio del subdelegado dando cuenta de la detención de comerciantes indígenas bolivianos”, Pica 5.3.1917, sin fol.; vol.17, *Intendencia de Tarapacá* 1917, “Informe del prefecto interino sobre el ingreso de comerciantes bolivianos por Pica”, Iquique 12.3.1917, sin fol.

Thus, bringing surplus resources into circulation occurred on the junction of barter and commercial exchange. Barter was practiced at a more limited scale than commerce, within which one must distinguish between wholesale and retail trade. Still, considerable volumes of primary products, particularly salt and corn, were exchanged off the market in order to survive until the next harvest. In the context of booming markets and a vigorous demand for primary products in cities and mining centres, often literally located in the middle of a desert, the size of this caravan trade acquired even larger proportions. In 1928, as a customs officer of Iquique even stated that indigenous traders on their way home “fill more than ten times what they bring.”¹⁴⁶ This statement is in line with the data provided by Bacarreza in 1910, which demonstrate that the level of products entering Carangas was higher than exportation because imported products, including bartered products, were usually further commercialized in the interior of Bolivia (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 386-7).

Yet, it remains hard to calculate and compare the value of these exchange circuits because “no price series exist as yet for the Bolivian internal market during the nineteenth century, far less any series for those prices actually paid to different ethnic groups for their respective products” and non-monetary exchange remained an important but difficult to measure practice (Platt 1995, 285). As commented by Bacarreza, a large share of the exportation of Bolivian products via Carangas, especially of wool, did not enter the statistics as it was conducted “personally” by the indigenous population that lived on the border (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 386-7). There were no data on traffic across the Carangas border and even statistics for the Antofagasta-Oruro railroad line, which counted unequivocally for the lion’s share of all imported and exported goods in the department of Oruro, remained incomplete (Ascarrunz 1905, 25).¹⁴⁷ However, some estimations have been made by contemporaries, hints are found in lawsuits or notarial documents and comparisons can be made (although with caution) with data from ethnographic field work in the late 20th century. Yet, these data produce contradicting results.¹⁴⁸ According to don Agapito, barter was advantageous until the point where one

¹⁴⁵ Also very insightful are the inventories of the shops or entire estates left by the merchant women doña Aguirre and Elisa Malavia. Respectively AJC, *Civiles*, 1906, no. 3, f. 12v-15v and 1907, no. 8; and *Penales*, 1908, no. 8, f.4-7v and *Civiles*, 1910, no. 18.

¹⁴⁶ AITRI, vol.25, Solicitudes 1927, *Petición para reponer empleado de Aduana en la Subdelegación de Tarapacá*, Iquique 11/7/1928, sin fol. cited in Castro 2004, chapter 4.

¹⁴⁷ Regarding “regular” trade, the Prefect of Oruro had to admit in 1904 that “the tables and numbers about exportation and importation are deficient because they entail no secure and precise data or details on the importations that are made from Iquique, Pisagua, Arica and other ports of the Pacific via our extensive border with Chile; and which continue to compose a fair share.” Own translation, Ascarrunz 1905, 25.

¹⁴⁸ While West concluded that salaried jobs, agricultural migrant workers earning about 2500 pesos in only 50 days, resulted much more profitable than barter, drovers obtaining only 600 pounds of corn, worth 1440

quintal of llama fibre which previously could be exchanged for 10 quintales of fruits and vegetables only equalled one quintal of foodstuff.¹⁴⁹ Prior to the introduction of motorized vehicles, this was the point, according to this comunario, where barter was definitively replaced by monetary exchange, although they continued to barter at border fairs.¹⁵⁰

Table 4 Weights and loads (Bolivia, 19th-20th century)

1 libra		460 grams	
1 arroba	@	11,5 kg	25 libras
1 (hundredweight)	quintal qq	46 kg	4 arrobas
1 llama load ¹⁵¹		+/- 3 arroba	
1 mule load		1 quintal	
1 truck		7 tons	180 llamas

While the circulation of local surplus production was structured by regional specialization and “traditional” practices, the circulation of market products has incentivized by individual interests and the international market situation. However, despite the constructed division in exchange circuits, the level of overlap between local and transnational, between commercial and traditional (market and off-market), legal and illegal trade must be stressed. As well as the overlap between labour and trade circuits. This overlap creates a “complex exchange chain” (Rivière 1982, 300). Rivière refers with “complexity” particularly to the way in which individual households pooled market (monetary) and off-market (barter) forms of exchange. A successful pooling of these circuits was vital in achieving sustainable livelihoods and relied essentially on these households’ expertise in both the management of non-capitalist exchange

pesos, through 58 days of (harsh) working in 1977 (West 1981, 178), Molino stated that that such salaries (2500 pesos) in agriculture were only obtained after 6 months of labour, equalling the value of the corn that could be obtained in one travel of only 3 months (Molino 2006, 116). Market conditions probably did not change that much between both calculations.

¹⁴⁹ Between barterers, the exchange rates were more or less stable and were always determined in mutual agreement based on measured units which are based on volume and not on weight (West 1981, 146-7 and 160). There was room for negotiation as well as fluctuations due to yearly due to climatological conditions. However, this flexibility and agreement has gradually been replaced by adopting other forms of measurement such as the hand-held scales which you see at every market stand nowadays.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Agapito, Turco, 25.3.2012.

¹⁵¹ A load, or *carga*, was a unit of mass, varying with locality and the commodity weighed, for instance for potatoes this was around 46 kg. For products such as coca, chili pepper, honey or wine, other measures were used (Ovando 1985, 51).

mechanisms as the responsiveness towards product price fluctuations on different markets.

Rivière argues that the activation of overlapping circuits produced an extreme socio-economic differentiation among these rural households that could never have occurred in a system where only traditional exchange exists (Rivière 1982, 312). This differentiation has been incentivized by historical processes that altered the way in which different forms of access to and exchange of resources were combined. While the mobility and the exchange in itself continued to exist despite the diversification of the range of resources that was moved and exchanged in and particularly via Carangas, the maintenance of this “complex” exchange chain came under pressure. As will be and is discussed in several parts of this dissertation, the basic connections that provided Andean rural livelihoods’ access to a dense network in the valleys were amputated over the long term, starting under the early-colonial land reforms. Throughout colonial times, this access was further restricted by the coercive extraction of labour and agricultural surplus as well as the forced sale of commodities. Under republic rule, the reorganization of fiscal and border regimes and transport and infrastructural changes entailed important challenges to the continuation of longstanding indigenous exchange practices and networks. In short, livelihood construction in Carangas and its transformations cannot be understood regardless from processes of state integration and market expansion and the implied interference of local elites. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 4

The communities of Carangas under Bolivian liberalism: Land, mobility and local elites.

*Cambia lo superficial
cambia también lo profundo
cambia el modo de pensar
cambia todo en este mundo*
Todo cambia – Mercedes Sosa¹

Introduction. The breakthrough of Bolivian liberalism.

This chapter explores the institutions, actors and strategies that structured communal life on the Bolivian countryside in the late 19th century. The reconstruction of how highland communities were politically and economically entangled to broader scales of social power is linked to the progressive movement of several frontiers of incorporation into the countryside in the context of “the breakthrough of Bolivian liberalism”. The period of “Bolivian liberalism” does not necessarily point to the name of the then governing political party (the Liberals would only occupy the government after 1900), but to the regime’s liberal ideological orientation towards free trade and French Revolution ideals on property (Platt 1982, 1984).

¹ *What is superficial changes / what is profound changes / the way of thinking changes / everything in this world changes.*

Rather than a “rupture,” the ascent of liberalism in the Andes should be understood within this longer time frame. As Irurozqui states, the rupture and antagonism of late 19th liberalism tends to be overemphasized, thereby denying important continuities with preceding periods and the constructive input of indigenous communal entities apart from their resistance (Irurozqui 2005, 15). Its development figures in a much longer transition from colonial to republican rule that can be traced back to approximately 1780, the time of the great Andean indigenous rebellions, and culminated around 1880 (Langer 2004; see also Larson 1998). It must also be understood in a broader spatial frame, that of Latin America’s export age, roughly comprised by the 1870-1930 period.

This “breakthrough” period entailed a contradictory process of conflict and continuity,² pointing to a fundamental development: the constellation of a state structure. It points to a state-in-formation pressured to strengthen its external legitimacy by opening up its resources to the world market and its internal legitimacy by integrating its population and their resources within a manageable framework. Departing from the belief that society can be scientific-technically planned, policies were designed to impose uniformity and to fix the outlines for property and power. While this is certainly a contested process, the observation of a more concerted political scene demonstrates that the Bolivian state infrastructure had accumulated a critical level of power to set a (capitalist) transition “in motion”, however not strong enough to define its final outcome. This transition came with standardized schemes designed to facilitate intervention, thereby altered the nature of laws, taxes, borders and representatives. As this transition had concrete repercussions on the allocation of access rights, the functioning of markets and the question of sovereignty, indigenous communities were forced into a renegotiation over their legal-fiscal bonds to the state, their access to supra-local exchange circuits, and the local representation of these political and economic structures in the region. As a result of this renegotiation, “liberal” impositions were pragmatically and forcefully distorted in function of local needs although often then co-opted/re-appropriated by local leaders.

In the remainder of this introduction, a broad outline of the chronology of this transition will be given; the chronology of the emergence of Bolivian liberalism, starting

² Despite the frequent turbulence, this period was in fact characterized by a remarkable stability, indicating a gradual political maturation (Klein 2011, 154). The oscillations in the “liberal” discourse towards the indigenous population between “paternal patience” and “racist cries” indicates nervousness that stems from the state’s eagerness to fully integrate in the “modern” international state system (Platt 1982, 99). There is also an economic contradictory element in Bolivia perseverance throughout the 19th and early 20th century in its “modern nation-state” project despite its enduring difficulties to overcome fiscal limits (Irurozqui 1999, 721-2).

shortly after the middle of the 19th century. In the course of the following half century, strengthening market structures and monopolies, together with declining transport costs, created the conditions for the extension of resource frontiers, although on the Bolivian altiplano this was foremost a case of (the Potosí) frontier “deepening” (Bértola and Williamson 2006, 23). As Bolivian economic circuits were closer tied to the imperatives of the world market, the country’s “mercantilist” phase and the protectionist policies that had come with independence came to a close.³ In political terms, a transition phase followed and would break through by the end of the century, resting on a restructuring of a regional power axis (*ejemonía*) of Bolivia’s western departments (Barragán 2009, 79; see also Barragán 2002).

Although the Bolivian treasury -burdened by high military expenditures and an easily evaded inconsistent fiscal system- had still not overcome the deficit that continued to thwart reformist ambitions since independence (Klein 2011, 119 and 122), booming silver, guano and nitrate production announced that the time had come to make an end to the balkanization “*of the de facto customs union under colonial rule*” (Bértola and Williamson 2006, 30; see also Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp 2000). The immediate trigger for this reorientation was the recovery of Bolivia’s extractive economy, based on silver,⁴ guano⁵ and nitrate,⁶ and favoured by international and regional market conditions and technological mining and transport innovations. The emergence of a pro-free trade class, based in the new silver mining and commercial elites of the Cochabamba and the La Paz areas and foreign investors, gradually pushed to win political terrain in order to set fiscally favourable conditions for the accumulation and

³ The newly independent Latin-American countries stuck to high tariffs, not at all to back off foreign capital but mainly because of (short-run) revenue needs, which explains the seemingly paradoxical adoption of an explicit free trade discourse (Topik, Marichal and Frank 2006, 5). In Bolivia, the dominance of mercantilist policies ended with the Belzú regime (1848-1855) (Klein 2011, 126-7).

⁴ The silver economy revitalized first very slowly, until it started to boom in the 1850s. Although mining had been declining since the late 18th century, and -after a short recovery- ever stronger due to the wars of independence, silver coins and bars remained in place as the country’s major export commodity until well into the second half of the 19th century, even demonstrating a short flicker in mining production around 1838-’42 (Platt 1997; 2008). Still, Dalence counted in 1846 about 10000 abandoned mines in the country, two thirds of them (including those of Carangas) flooded silver mines (Klein 2009, 120).

⁵ Coastal guano reserves were being exploited since the 1840s (Mann 2011, 212-20).

⁶ The saltpetre cycle started in the 1830s, boomed from the 1860s on to reach its climax in the first years of the 20th century. Shortly after, the exploitation entered into decline due to the 1914 and the 1920 crises and the German introduction of artificial fertilizers; in 1930 came to a definitive end. The crisis of the saltpeter industry brought all countries closely linked to its production food scarcity and unemployment, with the Bolivian interior witnessing a massive influx of repatriated workers, while in Chile the Chuquibambilla copper mine took the nitrate mines’ recruiting role over. Tejada 1921, 23; Fajardo 1931, 60; Smale 2010, 68-76; ISTAR, vol. 916, *Varios oficios*, 1914, fs. 272-3, 275-6, 305, 341.

safeguarding of their capital (Klein 2011, 123-32).⁷ While constituting “*the epitomization of antiliberalism*” (Gotkowitz 2007, 19), it was Melgarejo (1864-1871) who decided to free the export of silver, undermining the state’s minting monopoly in turn for entrepreneurial support.⁸

A true resource rush was taking off, bringing the country’s internal structures as its external boundaries under strain. As generous Melgarejo was towards the country’s new economic elites and foreign capitalists, as offensive Bolivia’s most reviled dictator was towards indigenous communities and their land claims (wait and see in chapter 5). Regarding national territorial claims, he signed a border treaty with Chile (1866) that expanded the latter’s sovereign control up to the 24th parallel, setting an important precedent to the eventual loss of strategic saltpetre possessions in Bolivia’s coastal lands (Klein 2011, 134 and 140-1).⁹ As with the Brazilian border adjustment of 1868, the territorial concessions made by the Melgarejo regime were all framed within a broader effort to eliminate the protectionist trade measures installed under previous governments (Klein 2011, 135).

After Melgarejo’s overthrow and the short return to civilian rule (1870), his heavily contested confiscation program against communal property was put temporally on hold, yet his liberalization policy was expanded. In 1871, the circulation of the debased coins emitted since 1829 was ended, which converted silver from monetary device into a global commodity and, as the state gave up its monopoly over mineral production and price-fixing, “completed” Melgarejo’s monetary policy (Mitre 1982, 36-40). With the fiscal reform of 1872 revenue distribution was decentralized by the creation of departmental and municipal treasuries next to the national treasury, which only after 1930 would obtain again a larger centralized control (Barragán 2009, 109 and 205). While silver production demonstrated an extraordinary increase, its price now being set by

⁷ Chapter 5 (5.1.2) discusses the inter-elite debate on monetary, fiscal and land reform that ensued in the 1860s.

⁸ In 1826, Sucre established various Minerals Purchasing Banks (*Banco de Rescate*) which had the monopoly over silver minting (Mitre 1982, 45-55). The pro-free trade stance of the capitalist class started to challenge these protectionist foundations of the state’s monopoly over mining production and price-fixing, which would remain in place until 1873 (Ovando 1985, 80; Mitre 1982, 43-5). The reason why the state stuck to that monopoly, regardless of the massive contraband it provoked, was its dependence from indigenous contributions, which until the middle of the century represented 40% of the total national income. By undermining the minting monopoly, Melgarejo undercut his own government’s control over silver production and price setting, but meanwhile earning the support of the powerful miners (Klein 2011, 137).

⁹ Guano as well as nitrate exploitation heightened international tensions between Chile, Peru and Bolivia over their access to the Pacific coast. During the 1870s, Anglo-Chilean capitalist financial power based on guano and saltpeter attempted to push Chile into its sphere of influence while converting Bolivia into an intermediary country (with the dominant Bolivian classes as police agents controlling the indigenous peoples) in order to counter Peru’s monopoly over the saltpeter industry and export (Ovando 1985, 289).

the market, and the take-off of the “railroad era” backed by English capital, foreign capital increasingly found its way to Bolivia’s rich mineral and other extractable deposits. As the consequent increase in national incomes from mining and rubber resources, together with the decentralization of indigenous tax collection, invalidated the government’s fiscal dependence upon the indigenous population and set the conditions for the 1874 Alienation Act that proclaimed the elimination of the community as a legal freeholder institute.¹⁰

However, Bolivia’s national treasury collapsed in the late 1870s, creating a very volatile fiscal climate that further nurtured international tensions over saltpetre reserves at the coast. When the imposition of a new tax on nitrate exportation by Bolivia was seized by Chile as an unbearable provocation, the ongoing trilateral manoeuvring between Chile, Bolivia and Peru escalated in the War of the Pacific (Klein 2011, 141-2). The conflict lasted for Bolivia from the occupation of Antofagasta (14 February 1879) until the battle of Tacna (26 May 1880), while for Peru the conflict continued two more years. The conflict would permanently redraw international relations in the region, a trauma still haunting the country.¹¹ But most importantly, the war gave a final push to an underway economic transition. This produced a sweeping political transformation, largely debated and defined by Bolivia’s new (and old) mining elites, endowed with a political commitment in order to secure their economic activities in a reduced national market. This manifested itself in the simultaneity of the country’s loss of its only access to the sea with the growing land base of the landlord class as the Alienation Act was brought into operation.

In the turbulence following the war, a political party system emerged from the old caudillo structure’s ashes, based on the coexistence of the Conservative and the Liberal party. From 1880 until 1899, Conservatives controlled the government, initiating a period of civilian oligarchic rule. While the major point of discordance between both parties was their stance towards the Chilean question, with the conservative camp putting commercial and political interests before a confrontation, both shared in fact a liberal ideological orientation, indicating that their stance cannot simply be reduced to their namesakes elsewhere (Langer and Jackson 1990, 15-6).

Growing regional economic discrepancies and party politics, in fact a hotchpotch of overlapping ideologies started to converge and challenged the balance of political power. Backed by the increasing dominance of tin mining over silver mining and the

¹⁰ Mining and rubber revenues increased from 4% to 31% between 1871 and 1880 (Grieshaber 1977, 291-3).

¹¹ These border changes still distort Chilean-Bolivian relations up to today. In 1975, Pinochet and Banzer reinstated diplomatic relations by signing the Agreement of Charaña, including the offering of a maritime exit which was however refused by Peru, leading to the break off of the restored relations in 1978. In 1997, the Chile-Bolivia Border Committee (DIFROL) was established.

parallel influx of foreign capital(ists), Liberal opposition was based in the north, particularly in La Paz, where thriving tin miners pushed for a modernization and federalization of the state structure.¹² Elites who stuck to a unitary state around the Sucre capital were economically tied to the silver producing south, but saw their position eroding as silver was gradually taken over by tin. Thus the economic and political transition underway was backed by a shift in regional power dynamics among the altiplano and valley departments,¹³ which would contribute to the replacement of the dominant north-south axis (19th century) by an east-west dialectic (second half 20th century) (Barragán 2009, 79).

The breakpoint in this conflictive transition is situated in the federal war of 1899, when the struggle between federalists or unitarist factions over the most appropriate administrative structure for the country was fought out. The Liberal party seized the debate to challenge the Conservative government and forged an alliance with the indigenous Aymara leadership, promising them the abolition of the community land sales.¹⁴ When the Aymara mobilization broke with the Liberal leadership, the war evolved into what became known as the “Great Rebellion” which was severely repressed by their former allies. Once in power, Bolivia’s first Liberal government quickly appeared to bring “*an oligarchy even more recalcitrant than before*” (Mendieta 2010, 316).

Under Liberal rule, Bolivia experienced major border changes (Chile, Brazil), a boom in infrastructure and particularly railway construction, and increasing political turmoil. Different from the direct involvement of the silver elites under Conservative rule, the tin magnates of the 20th century showed less interest in intensive political participation and left Liberal rule to non-mining elites. However, apart from moving the seat of the country’s executive and legislative powers from Sucre to La Paz, little federalist change followed. Through the adoption of a changing discourse about the indigenous and rural mestizo population, the Liberals handily provided themselves with an excuse to abandon the initial purpose of the country’s decentralization and the ideological foundations of an anti-conservative revolution (Irurozqui 1994;Mendieta 2010, 316). Paradoxically, the Liberals “owed” their victory essentially to their pre-1899

¹² The Liberal party had been formally formed in 1883 under guidance of Eliodoro Camacho.

¹³ The departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba dominated the country, containing together over 80% of the country’s population.

¹⁴ The Liberal-Aymara alliance had a long pre-history. Its constitution must be understood in the context of the 1874, 1880 and 1883 land legislation and took shape particularly after the 1888 elections (Irurozqui 2005, 289-91). From the perspective of indigenous rebellion, 1899 stands out as one of the most “sensational” and widespread outbursts of communal insurrection in republican Bolivia. However, its origins and manifestation but must be assessed in terms of both confrontation and alliance, linking up to a much longer history of indigenous resistance (Condarco 2011 [1964]; Mendieta 2010; see also chapters 5 and 6).

commitment to indigenous demands to halt hacienda expansion and restore communal property, but “consumed” their victory after 1899 in the form of accelerated hacienda encroachment and criminalization of indigenous protest. The “*ideological bankruptcy of Bolivian liberalism*” exemplifies how liberalism and other imported European notions that were eagerly copied by Latin-American elite groups, whether liberal or not, were freely reinterpreted in function of local realities and pragmatic (short-term) goals (Langer and Jackson 1990, 26). It allowed the Liberals to remain in power until 1920, when a new elite-subaltern pact, between the seceded Republican Party with the proletarian class (Irurozqui 1994, 23).

The turn of the 20th century brought changes that revealed the vulnerability of the maintained “monoculture” (Bértola and Williamson 2006, 34). While tin exports boomed until the Great Depression, allowing Bolivia to absorb one quarter of the total world tin production (Contreras 1990), every fluctuation on the world market had a direct impact on (particularly Oruro’s) regional mining economy and urbanization.¹⁵ Meanwhile, in the 1910s, the political landscape splintered and the urban working class started to organize into labour unions (Klein 2011, 163-4). Particularly from the 1920s on, increasing rural (indigenous) agitation added oil to the fire (Rivera 1987). Through legal action and violent confrontation, a new cycle of indigenous uprising was launched, attacking the old exploitative order and meanwhile pressuring for education and civil rights.

By 1930, the rural landscape had seriously altered. While rural-urban proportions had undergone little change, the “free” commoners had lost their fairly stable (pre-1880) position to the increasing group of peons and landless peasants. Meanwhile, the Chaco war (1932-1935) decisively triggered the demands for indigenous emancipation, making indigenous inclusion as first-class citizens in return for their “service” to the *Patria* an irrefutable argument.¹⁶ Nurtured by a paternalistic indigenism current, the

¹⁵ Bolivia’s exposure to falling world market prices caused a decline in trade, including tin exports, and industrial inactivity in Oruro. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, first observations of an upcoming crisis were made, although Oruro still counted with increasing revenues (Ascarrunz 1909, 3), which became more alarming in the following decades (Tejada 1921, 47; Fajardo 1931) and moreover affected the social stability of the country (Lemaitre 1916, 7). The Prefect commented that due to this economic and demographic downturn, “thousands of arms” were leaving the mining sector hence constraining the fiscal incomes for the state, with the important exception of the *contribucion territorial* (Ascarrunz 1909, 67-70). Also reports from Tacna, an important trade pole in the wider Andean economic space, give testimony of declining commercial activities (AHVD, *Fondo de la Intendencia de Tacna y Gobernación de Arica*, vol. 17, f.81-82v, 12.4.1893).

¹⁶ The Chaco war was fought out against Paraguay, initiated in a desperate attempt to tackle internal political turmoil to which later the argument of securing control over (supposed) oil reserves was added (Klein 2011, 175). The loss of the war intensified the debate on state transformation/modernization and simultaneously

government's harsh criminalization would gradually make way for a form of exculpation, searching for national unity (Gotkowitz 2007, 101-130). With the economic downturn following the Great Depression, also in the haciendas, and the general crisis after the Chaco disaster, the oligarchic order started fading and made way for populist projects of the 1930s and 1940s, including the 1945 Indigenous Congress and the pro-indigenous decrees of the Villaroel regime (ibid, 164-232). This was the formative prelude towards the 1952 National Revolution.

In the following three sections of this chapter, the structures upon which Bolivian liberalism acted and through which its effects reverberated in the countryside will be analysed by assessing how community-based land regulations entangled with state-driven land legislation (4.1), how patterns of inter-community mobility and exchange entangle with capitalist commodity and labour markets (4.2), and how the local configuration of social power relations and ethnic boundaries entangled with cycles of elite formation (4.3). Each of these entanglements and their interdependence is marked by the particular locale of the story: a community-based society with ancestral claims on its territory occupying a borderland area within the confines of a state-in-formation. This chapter aims to situate these land rights-conditioning structures (the national land system, the organization of the market sphere, and the local representation of state and market actors) in relation to that specific locale and to the changing economic and political climate.

4.1 No commons without *tributo*: Dissecting the State-community pact.

The formation, modification and defence of a margin for autonomous land administration as upheld in Carangas is embedded in a particular, asymmetric relation to a tributary state. That relation must be traced back to the aftermath of the Spanish conquest, and situated within the long history of the formation of an Andean/Bolivian land system. Throughout that trajectory, the modalities and subtleties of state-community bonds came to determine the parameters for communal land control. When late 19th century governments revised those bonds and enacted a new land legislation that ignored the legal-fiscal principles underpinning the state-community relation, this

represented the indigenous population – for the first time – as a “participation-capable” and “nation-contributing” factor, although as cannon fodder in the first place.

was answered by intense indigenous protest. Before going over to a more detailed discussion of 19th century reinterpretations of the reciprocal state-community pact and how this revision forced communities to renegotiate the terms of participation in the republican state (Part III), this section gives an overview of the formative components and mechanisms of that framework. Property titles, taxes and inspections were the elements that defined indigenous communities' landowning, taxpaying and representing attributions and integrated them as "legible" units within a centralized land system.

4.1.1 *Título, tributo* and *Revisita*: Adjudication, taxation, and registration.

In chapter 2 we referred to the act of categorization as an essential differentiation mechanism for a state apparatus to "*incorporate [a group] in the dominant socio-economic structure while maintaining its exclusion*" (Rivière 1982, 6). This is exactly what happened with the original population of the Latin-American continent under Spanish colonization: their classification as "indios" went accompanied by the gradual imposition of a juridical-fiscal order that established the terms interaction between differently classified sectors of society and with the state powers, and the modalities to accede and administer resources. As Ovando states it, the classification of the indigenous population into several taxpaying groups was at the heart of Bolivia's 19th century land question (Ovando 1985, 38).

This differentiating process started after the first chaotic episode of conquest, when the indigenous population, whose interaction with broader society was mediated by communal affiliations and whose resource base was subject to communal regulations, was forced into a contractual relationship with the State, in which land titles, known as *títulos de composición*, served as the "contract". The Spanish Crown granted (read: sold) these titles to indigenous corporative groups, including the right to communal land tenure without state interference state in the internal management of land use and property. These terms and modalities were squarely framed within an asymmetrical but vital relationship between the ayllus and Spanish Crown. The mutual reliance on this kind of contractual relationship has been coined by Tristan Platt as a reciprocity pact that originated in colonial land (and hence tax) policies (Platt 1982, 1984, 1987; see also Albornoz, cited by Langer 2009, 537). The pact was sealed by a fiscal obligation, the *tributo* or the indigenous head tax as well as the accomplishing of free services. In return for the communities' fiscal contributions, the State granted and protected communal land rights. Keeping this pact in place implied the repeated execution of record-keeping operations, known as the *Revisitas*. After independence, this arrangement would continue to regulate the relations between the indigenous population and the "pact-making" State (Barragán 2002).

At the same time, this tributary pact was “incorporated” at the heart of community organization. Access to community land and to the community hierarchy determined by one’s fiscal status as “contribuyente” (taxpayer) and the corresponding punctual payment of a head tax. Moreover, the corresponding responsibility of land distribution and tax collection converted community leaders into powerful intermediaries. In the eyes of the Indians, the maintenance of tributary ties became a guarantee for the viability of native land tenure systems (Langer 1989, 4). In several places of the Andean highlands, this internalization implied the extension of principles of reciprocity and redistribution, defined by Murra as the Andean ideals that supported Inca imperial coherence, into community-State relations (Platt 1982); a reciprocal bond that also regulated usufruct and authority relations among hacienda Indians (Grieshaber 1989). However, this virtual pact also resettled the conditions for community membership, which became a fiscal category, defined by the state and produced through *Revisita* operations. The 19th century classification of the population into accountable categories implied that anyone who registered as “indigenous taxpayer” and complied with the due obligations, gained legitimate access to community lands, which rural mestizos effectively did (see also Ovando 1985, 46). Fiscal status and ethnic or social status could perfectly contrast and converted “indigenous” in a flexibly manageable category, although ultimately sanctioned by one’s compliance with communal duties.

In the late 19th century, communal land tenure security was seriously undermined by a newly enacted land policy and the corresponding deployment of fiscal instruments to “commodify” the communal ownership of land in Bolivia. Such frank and one-sided denial of the state-community pact triggered a region-wide *ayllu* reaction aiming at the restoration of the pact. The way in which this renegotiation materialized in Carangas, how the reform process was as a result getting “bogged down” in litigation and conflict and how the communities of Carangas escaped this privatization movement forms the storyline of Part III of this dissertation. The *tributo* and *título* functioned as key instruments and the *Revisita* as a key locus in this (re)negotiation of community-State relations. These underpinning elements of the state-community contractual relation played a central role in both short-term and long-term, individual and collective strategies adopted to resist, adapt to and overcome challenges to the allocation of communal resources and the political representation of communal interests. Registration in the taxpayers lists served to justify commoners’ land claims (their registered name or of their ancestor confirms their right to community lands), or the escape from that registration could serve to evade the implied tax duties.

Título: The property deed

The granting of property deeds would take off under viceroy Toledo who replaced the *encomienda* system by a *composición* policy. This titling operation started with the land

inspection by *visitador* Luis López, the bishop of Quito in the 1590s, but the communities of Carangas would obtain their property documents only with the next *visita*.¹⁷ Over the centuries, these titles have been repeatedly copied, a practice that intensified in the context of the liberal land reform process, when they were filed in the Property Rights registry books (Archive of Property Rights in Oruro, ADRO). There are traces of the visit of Francisco de Saavedra y Ulloa, who would have been commissioned to Carangas in 1569-70.¹⁸ Yet, the oldest colonial titles refer to inspector José de la Vega Alvarado to whom the Carangas communities paid the sum of 1000 *pesos fuertes* (Pauwels 1983, 150).¹⁹ Although he conducted his survey in the 1640s, it is interesting to note that most of the titles are antedated to 1543 and 1545 due to later manipulations in order to give more weight to the deeds (Pauwels 1983, 130 and 2006, 374). This *visita* was repeated in 1720-1721, when Domingo Atocha y la Reynaga examined and confirmed the communities' property entitlements.²⁰

Abercrombie gives a detailed description of the documents granted through those survey operations:

“lists boundary markers, called (in colonial Perú as in sixteenth-century Castile) *mojones*, and describe the ritual circumambulation of the border by land judges and the hereditary native lords of Asanaqi, who stake their legal claim to territory through this act and subsequently take legal “possession” by yanking up plants and throwing stones and clods of earth. All such acts are duly recorded by the notary who accompanies the entourage, describing performative acts as well as the particular characteristics of each *mojón*. The land title resulting from this

¹⁷ On these first colonial *visitas* in Alto Peru (with particular emphasis on the Cochabamba region), see Gordillo 1987, 206.

¹⁸ Colonial documents, recuperated in the early 20th century at the Property Rights office of Oruro make notion of *visitador* Saavedra, appointed under Toledo. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 13. See also Platt, Bouysson-Cassagne, and Harris 2006, 655; Presta 2005, 601.

¹⁹ The most complete copy of the *visita* executed by José de la Vega Alvarado dated the property adjudication on 1543 and recorded purchases in the following order, first in Totorá –indicated as capital of the province– on October 22nd, Choquecota on November 1st, Corque on November 15th, Huachacalla on November 25th, Huailamarca on December 1st, Curahuara on December 15th, Turco on December 28th 1545 and Andamarca in the first day of the next year. The title enumerated the terrains and boundaries of the community, in every case stressing the inclusion of both puna and valley lands, and concluding the purchase with a ceremonial act on main square of the community, rolling on the ground, tearing herbs and throwing rocks and other signs of possession. AHJO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá.” fs. 1-16; ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1918, no. 6, f. 12.

²⁰ There is also a reference to 1563, when *visitador* Juan Bravo del Rivero would have arrived to Carangas, erroneously reporting this *visita* as commissioned by Atocha y la Reynaga (ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1918, no. 11). Other references to the 1720 *visita* were found in 1918, no. 1 and 10; 1924, no. 15 and no. 23 and 1928, no. 28.

recorded ritual is meant for the archive, creating an “archival memory” by which a rote, word-for-word and act-for-act recollection of the territory and its possession can be later reconstituted. Such mojones and possession ceremonies derive from Castilian society, where, before the ready availability of paper and the rise of archival culture, these ritual acts were once a Castilian technique for engraving these legal transactions in the unwritten archive of social memory. At each boundary marker, the judge reads out a copy of the sequence thus far constituted in the presence of cross-border neighbors, who might be expected to protest. When they do no, general consent to the mojón’s position is recorded on the copy” (Abercrombie 1998, 9).²¹

The described practices remained in operation in Bolivia until into the 20th century. The documents themselves and their copies continued to be of strategic value long after their composition in order to back communal land claims with evidence. The departmental registration books, where all land properties for each of its provinces are recorded, as well as the historical archive of the Court of Oruro include several copies of these purchased *composición* titles which were validated upon request of the communities and their attorneys. These documents often contain errors, although this did not nullify their function as property rights evidence.²²

However, while posterior serving as important instruments to assert communal demands, this first titling operation in fact fuelled the very processes underlying later struggles for the defence and recovery of collective rights. As the *composición* allowed Spanish(-descending) landowners to convert the occupation of the most interesting lands into legitimate titles, it produced a simultaneous enclosure movement of community lands (Platt 1975, 38, cited in Rivière 1982, 25). As a result, Carangas was gradually dismembered of its discontinuous territories in ecologically complementary regions that reached as far as the Pacific and the eastern valleys (see 3.1.2). Thus the regularization (formalization) of the colonial land tenure system provoked and legalized the expropriation of indigenous community lands and in that sense can be seen as a first land reform. Some communities managed to maintain control over their archipelago lands, but as late colonial documents testify, lands in the CBB and Sucre valleys were no

²¹ The same formulations are repeated in every document concerning the adjudication of land to communities (the entire ayllu) or individual comunarios (their *sayaña*).

²² Those documents pretending to duplicate the oldest property deeds usually refer to 1543 or 1545 as the year of title purchase. However, this transaction took place approximately one century later. A concrete example is the copy of the colonial boundary marking between Sabaya and Huachacalla, referring to an improbable land inspection in 1504, commissioned by Francisco, “viceroy de Toledo,” under king “Carlos Felipe de Castillo” (1918, no. 9). Other copies referred to Domingo Atocha y la Reinoso and José de la Vega Alvarado as one single person (1924, no. 15) or antedated the *visita* as far as 1504 (1924, no. 24). ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*.

longer cultivated by their ‘own’ people (*mitimaes* pertaining to Carangas), but by Spanish renters (*arrendatarios*) who paid a certain amount of money to the communities.²³ This renting practice was possibly a result of the demographic decline caused by the obligatory labour services and related high mortality rate among the indigenous population (Rivière 1982, 36-7).

In the late 19th century, this “rented” control over distant lands was seized as an argument to absorb those lands as state property (see chapter 6). This privatization operation was part of the mentioned liberal land reform project that envisioned the replacement of all *repartimiento* lands by private titles. However, highland communities and their leaders knew to extort the vital concession that the possession of *títulos de composición* guaranteed a community’s exemption from land partition. This is where a title’s contractual role came into play. With the land reform of 1953 the communal ownership for those lands possessing colonial titles was consolidated with “undivided titles” (*título proindiviso*). Subsequently, the constitutional reforms of 1994 and 2009 redefined this communal land status as “original community land” (*Tierra Comunitarias de Origen* or TCO) and “indigenous original peasant territory” (*Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino* or TIOC) respectively.²⁴

A title creates a link to the centralized jurisdictional and decision-making system in the sense that it gives comunarios access to court and forces them to uphold an active relationship with the executive and jurisdictional powers in order to secure this achievement. Land was thus a very most common reason for comunarios to come into contact with court. Litigation over land belonged to the order of the day. The sub-Prefect of Carangas in 1921 understood the problem as follows:

“of all the numerous cantons of Carangas, there is not one that not finds itself entangled in some or various monumental lawsuits with its neighbour” ... “the initial point [of those suits] is of extreme insignificance, it concerns undoubtedly not more than an overstepping of their respective lands, what could have been dispelled with care, easily, but it happened that this care never has been imposed by no administrative authority and even less judicially, in the sense of avoiding this ruinous litigation through an amicable and rational arrangement” (Lima 1921, 111).

An assessment of the almost endless series of land dispossession throughout the researched time frame reveals a recurring pattern. Most of these cases are conflicts over *sayaña*, community, cantonal or even inter-departmental boundaries that were violated

²³ This was for instance the case in “la Chulla”, a terrain in hands of the community of Totora. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 47, fs. 334-377v. See also Rivière 1982, 36-7 and Pauwels 1983, 152.

²⁴ A more detailed assessment of the role of these post-1952 changes in Carangas is given in Cottyn (2012a).

through active or passive incursions.²⁵ These were the provocations that took comunarios and their leaders to court, either through written or oral litigation. In case of collective claims, comunarios had to appoint an *apoderado* to denounce the dispossession and defend their land rights before court (see chapter 5). Also individual plaintiffs relied on *apoderados*, usually members of the mestizo village elite. An investigation followed, involving multiple actors who at times seized the conflict in function of their own interests and complicated its solution.²⁶ When the land dispute had caused damage or casualties, a compensation was established. In protracted conflicts over land and boundaries, the verdict was to demarcate the territory.²⁷ This could be done symbolically,²⁸ but was most commonly done through a formal delineation (*deslinde* or *amojonamiento*).²⁹ *Deslindes* were intended to harmonize neighbour relations over the long-term, yet sometimes they were to no avail as disputes escalated and converted into “an interminable war about lands.”³⁰

²⁵ Sometimes it concerned “passive” trespasses by letting their livestock enter the plots, others were more active, individually or in groups of 10 up to 50 or –exceptionally– even hundred(s). Invasions were often “covert” operations taking profit of the absence of the *sayaña* holders, but in the context of overt conflicts it came to violent encounters, occasionally with (fire) arms, while the *sayañeros* were working the land or during days of celebration. Sowed lands were left destroyed, harvestable fields uprooted or tilled, harvest or property on that plot stolen or plundered and livestock killed. Some examples are AJC, 1867, no. 1002; 1869, no. 1074, no. 1090 and no. 1108.

²⁶ The damage or the value of the lost/damaged properties had to be measured, described and estimated, which was executed by appointed experts (*peritos*), a function usually performed by the village elite. The plaintiffs, accused and witnesses were interviewed. In many cases, inter-comunario litigations escalated as both parties had to call in additional witnesses, their entire family and social network, which was not always conducive to a quick and peaceful solution of the conflict. An example is AJC, *Civiles*, 1914, no. 1.

²⁷ The *peritos* in a sense absorbed the role of the elderly, whose testimonies were originally the guideline for the execution of divisions and demarcations. An example is the 1786 land division between the *ayllus* of the Urinsaya part of Totorá. ADRO, ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas* 1924, no. 2.

²⁸ The inter-departmental dispute over the Coipasa hill (Tunupa) between Sabaya (Carangas province), Salinas de Garci-Mendoza (Paria province) and Tahua (Lípez province, Potosí department) was “closed” by the building of a chapel in the contested terrain to prevent further “advances” and dispossession by the comunarios of Sabaya. However, the latter continued insisting on a formal demarcation as the only legitimate ground for property rights. AJC, 1869, no. 1074.

²⁹ This juridical procedure usually implied a certain cost, hence all comunarios were expected to contribute with a small amount of money. See for instance AJC, 1874, no. 1332. This could also lead to abuses as in 1878, when the corregidor of Choquecota, Francisco Molina, seized the occasion of a petitioned delineation between two *ayllus* of his jurisdiction to charge each of them 15 pesos however without executing a division nor delineation. The corregidor, for his part, stated that it concerned a voluntary donation. AJC, 1878, no. 1596.

³⁰ This happened with the interdepartmental dispute between Huallamarca and Pacajes. AJC, 1869, no. 1185; 1874, no. 1335.

Tributo: The head tax

To secure communal land rights, communities had to renew their contract relation with the state on a regular basis. This was organized through the installation of an extractive system that had two components, a head tax, known as the *tributo*, and labour service, known as the *mita*.³¹ The *tributo indigenal* was to be paid by the head of every household that belonged to an indigenous community. In formal terms, these *tributarios* comprised all men between 18 and 50 years old belonging to the community, although women and older or even younger man also figure in the tax registers. The *mita* was a corvée recruitment of mineworkers to work in Potosí.³² All adult males of the community had to fulfil this service, but few of these *mitayos* came back (Pauwels 1983, 123-5; Bakewell 1985; Tandeter 1997). While the *mita* would eventually not survive the transition to independence, the head tax was maintained (though briefly abolished). The decree of July 7th 1838 defined the indigenous population as “*the persons that pay the single head tax, denominated by the Spanish as tributo, their parents, wives and children.*”³³ On top of this half-yearly payment, commoners were to comply with several offices.³⁴

Among the indigenous population, a fiscal differentiation process ensued from inter-rural migration dynamics. The colonial imposition of monetary and labour extractions triggered the exodus of numerous *tributarios* and *mitayos* attempting to escape their status. This generated a new, minor class of “rural poor”, classified as *forasteros* (foreigners) with an inferior socio-fiscal status, that is, weaker land rights but also lower tax duties (Cornblit in Flores Galindo 1977, 177; Stern 1995, 87) The stay-behinds were classified as *originarios* (originals),³⁵ enjoying full communal land rights, but facing a dramatically increasing tax burden as their numbers were thinned out by epidemics and migration, which prompted even more people to migrate and offer their labour force to landlords or miners. As Cook summarizes Sánchez Albornoz’ pioneering analysis on the *tributo* in Alto Peru (Sanchez Albornoz 1978), “*squeezed between the exactions of*

³¹ The *mita* was not only paid in human labour, but also in animal labour. Particularly the comunarios of Carangas, representing a region famous for its llama wealth, were subject to a quota of llamas which they were obliged to carry with them to serve as beasts of burden in Potosí. In 1802 the quota was set on 5 llamas for each *mitayo*. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 2.

³² In one copy of the first visita, José de la Vega Alvarado explicitly grants the *composición* title to the *mitayos* in Potosí (of Carangas and Porco). ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 55.

³³ Own translation. Ovando 1985, 46.

³⁴ In 1908, a jilaqata stated that for their land rights, they paid the territorial tax, and services to God and the State, including the delivery of 2 *alferados*, 2 *mayordomos*, 2 *altareros*, a *postillón*, an *irasiri*, a *mitani* for the priest, a *semanero*, a *monamento* and a *paccihaque*. AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 26.

³⁵ The *originarios* are the commoners registered during the first repartimientos and their patrilinear descendants.

corregidores, curacas, miners, hacendados, and parish priests, the best hope of the Indian was often flight" (Cook 1979, 727). However, this flight did not equal an absolute rupture with that home community. While *forastero* mobility demonstrates that the weight of the tax and mita obligations were out of proportion with the reward (which is the retaining of full ayllu membership and thus of full communal land rights), this *originario* "flight" was neither a desperate form of anti-colonial resistance nor a symptom of community disintegration and homogenization of the rural landscape. Rather, these escape tactics were a form of adaptation to altered access conditions to land and resources, their management and their circulation (Medinaceli 2006, 492; Saignes 1995).

This differentiation process concerns a major transition in Andean rural power relations as it imposes a fundamental inequality upon the distribution of land rights. With the development of the hacienda system, which absorbed large part of these migrants, the colonial-republican *tributo* system came to include multiple *tributario* types, including the communitarian categories of the *originarios*, the *forasteros* or *agregados* (with or without land),³⁶ and the Urus and the hacienda categories of *yanaconas*³⁷ and *forasteros* (Griehaber 1980, 267). The *yanaconas*, the Urus, the vagabonds and the indigenous population in most of the Atacama province enjoyed a special fiscal status, in case of the Urus because of their extreme poverty (Ovando 1985, 37). Black slaves as well as the *indios changos* living in the port of Cobija were exempt from tributary obligations (*ibid*). Yet in Carangas, the differentiation remained very weak, mainly concentrated between the Aymara *originarios* and Urus, and with a very low number of *forasteros*, which puts the region in a "marginal" to historical agrarian transformations since the (colonial) onset of these changes (Zulawski 1985, 161).

Known as *tributarios* or *contribuyentes*, all indigenous rural dwellers were registered in the respective fiscal categories in a taxpayers list (*padroncillo*) kept by the responsible collectors, the *corregidores* and *alcaldes* in each village (Ovando Sanz 1985, 33). The

³⁶ Among *forasteros* there were some differences as well, some still paying the tribute as *originarios* of their home community, others paying tribute in their new residence and others not paying anything. In the taxpayer lists, we find *forasters* "with" and "without" land. In the case that "newcomers" were accepted by the community, they integrated as *originarios* and occupied the *tierras de origen* and were annotated in the taxpayers lists as "forasteros with lands". When those newcomers were only allowed to cultivate the *tierras sobrantes* or lands in "excess" of the community they adopted the status of *agregados* and were registered as *forasteros* (or *agregados*) "without lands", which and integrated in the community as part of a human resource pool to "tap" tax and service input from (however at a lower rate). On top of the *tierras de origen* and *tierras sobrantes*, there were the lands for collective (*originario* and *agregado*) use. Rivière 1982, 73 and Platt 1982, 52-3.

³⁷ There was a difference between *yanaconas* of the Royal Crown or of the Republic and *yanaconas de chacras*, all corresponding to unfree labourers or peons, controlled either by the state or by private landlords respectively.

number of people on these lists and their differentiated status established the tax burden per community. This burden was to be contributed on half-yearly basis, in two “tercios” or semesters.³⁸ The *tercio de San Juan* (St. John the Baptist) was collected in June; the *tercio de Navidad* (Christmas) in December. However, in order to deal with permanent revenue shortages provoked by excessive military and bureaucratic expenses, it was common to collect the tax with anticipation, which tended to provoke fierce resistance by the highland communities.³⁹ As proof of their loyalty, *contribuyentes* received an official document, a ticket distributed by the tax collectors each time they paid the contribution, which could be used as evidence in the context of land disputes or *sayaña* adjudication.⁴⁰

AILLOS	CANTON	PROVINCIA	IMPUESTO
Alpaca	Totora	Parangarazo	140.00
Ballana	"	"	135.00
Paro	"	"	335.00
Pachucama	"	"	242.00
Suro	"	"	114.55
TOTAL BS.			972.55

Oruro 13 de agosto de 1930

ALCALDE DEL TERCIO: [Signature]
SECRETARIO: [Signature]

Figure 23 Typewritten tax receipt, canton Totora, 1930.⁴¹

³⁸ When a contribuyente is not able to pay the quota, he is ordered to compensate this deficiency by fulfilling services to the community, which in practice meant to the local authorities. For instance, in 1873 an originario had to serve the priest as mitani, which was actually a women’s task. AJC, 1874, no. 1332.

³⁹ Irurozqui writes that this practice was installed under José de Ballivián's government (1841-'47), turning the indigenous population into strong opponents of this president and his successors José Miguel de Velasco (1848) and Manuel Isidoro Belzu (1848-'55) (Irurozqui 1999, 717). In one instance, *tributarios* protested because the anticipated collection of the contribution of “el tercio de San Juan” had left them with “ni un centavo”. AJC, 1864, no. 964 and 968.

⁴⁰ AJC, 1860, no. 835; 1877, no. 1549; *Civiles*, 1908, no. 13.

⁴¹ In the 20th century, the deposit of the cantonal collectors to the departmental treasury was registered and confirmed with typewritten receipts. Receipt of the payment of 972,55 bolivianos by the collecting alcalde of the Aransaya faction of the canton Totora for the *contribución territorial* of the second semester of 1930. APO, *Libros de contabilidad*, 1930, “Tesoro Departamental de Oruro”, loose papers, 13.08.1930.

The *jilaqatas* collected the total sum of tributo revenues of their ayllu and were responsible for its submission to the official accountable for depositing the money to the National Treasury.⁴² In case the established quota was not reached, the collector was responsible to add the missing money out of his own pocket.⁴³ Of the entire collected tax, a certain percentage of the revenue was destined to the official collectors (governors, corregidores, jilaqatas, alcaldes, caciques etc.) and another, higher, percentage was lost through fraud, for instance by collecting too much tribute, without registering in the *padroncillo*, or from tax-exempt population groups (ibid, 47).⁴⁴

The individual fiscal obligation of rural producers reflected the strength of their land rights, ranging from full access to community lands to no rights, however without telling anything about the size or soil quality of the land the taxpayer acceded. Indeed, it reflected a person's position within the community and not a person's property or income. The allocation of a portion of land to a new *contribuyente* was a communitarian responsibility that was to be legitimated by the central state. The most common way to allocate land was when the usufructuary of a piece of land reached the age of 50 and replaced by either his son (classified as *próximo*) or an *originario* without land, or when a comunario without land or *contribuyentes* with a deficient land base or eager to extend it petitioned for land that lay fallow or unoccupied.

In cases of land shortage, when there was no *sayaña* to pass from father to son, people searched for solutions and petitioned the adjudication of (supposedly) vacant

⁴² In colonial times, this tax collection, as well as the recruitment of mitayos, was a function of the kuraka (cacique). From 1855 on, the provincial responsibility of depositing the tributo was assigned to the *Colector de la Contribución Indigenal* (Ovando 1985, 70-1), although the local sources give witness of a wide range of denominations of that function. In the transition to the new cadastral system envisioned by the reform of 1874, the office of *cacique licitador* was created, who deposited the collected tax in the departmental treasury (Rivière 1982, 105).

⁴³ In order to fulfill their duty as *tributo* collectors, the jilaqatas sometimes had to borrow money from others (relatives), for instance two comunarios from Turco borrowed each other money (up to 150 pesos) when one of both was appointed as jilaqata. *AJC, Civiles*, 1905, no. 2.

⁴⁴ When in 1916, the Prefectura decided to suppress the 1% premium for *alcaldes cobradores* (collectors at the village level), the concerned functionaries complained heavily against the loss of their compensation of “*the personal work of those who with all honesty and compliance came from a long distance to pay their quotas in the Departmental Treasury;*” a job in which no other functionary, neither the sub-prefects, intervened (Lemaitre 1916, 56-7). According to the Prefect, this suppression undoubtedly complicates the collection of the tax because the rural collectors will not make the same surveying effort without receiving compensation nor pay their transportation costs out of one's own pocket (ibid). In 1927, the Prefect demanded departmental exemption from the system of “*licitación*”, which was the appointment of individual head tax collectors, because it did not give satisfactory results and was heavily resisted by all communities of the department because of abuses, this system (Calderón 1927, 50-1). He proposed to stick to the 1874 and 1890 stipulations which indicate the sub-Prefects and corregidores as collectors, although in Carangas three indigenous persons with a 5% premium were assigned to the task (ibid).

land.⁴⁵ Alternative ways to access the *originario* status and obtain sayaña lands was through marriage⁴⁶ or through transfer of the sayaña of absentee relatives.⁴⁷ The other way round, if there was land but no secure replacer, for instance when a contribuyente remained absent for a long time⁴⁸ or when there were no children,⁴⁹ “alternative” transfers were organized, with wives or minor sons taking over the status of contribuyente. Several manipulations to enter the register, such as minors or women registered as *tributario*, were noticed by the fiscal functionaries.⁵⁰ Important for a notable process described further in this dissertation, this also included the creation of a group of “mestizos inscribed as indigenous *originarios*” or as *forasteros* (Ovando 1985, 45). What happened was that, as tributary pressures rose over the 19th century, the definition of contribuyente gained flexibility, including various strategies to secure their land rights (Grieshaber 1980, 255).⁵¹ This “playing” with fiscal categories was not a new strategy but gained importance in response to growing demographic and/or fiscal pressures.

There are several cases of comunarios petitioning the adjudication of a “vacant” sayaña because they were paying the originario tribute yet did not access (enough) land that enabled them to pay that tax. Sayaña adjudication was first requested to the state

⁴⁵ In one case, an originario declared not to possess a sayaña because he did not know his natural father and petitions the adjudication of a “vacant” sayaña. In another case, a comunario of Totora who only acceded to the land of his brother petitioned the adjudication of a vacant sayaña now that his son is soon to be included in the padrón. Respectively AJC, 1871, no. 1196 and 1875, no. 1423. In 1832, a comunario in Totora accused of land theft protested that he had three male taxpaying children to provide with land (ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 3). Not seldom, a comunario attempted to get a sayaña adjudicated by petitioning for a piece of available land that afterwards did not seem to be vacant at all, for instance: AJC, 1868, no. 1041; 1870, no. 1158.

⁴⁶ Example of a marriage of non-contribuyentes with someone holding inheritance rights over sayañas are AJC, *Civiles*, 1909, no. 11. See also Ovando 1985, 34.

⁴⁷ AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 25.

⁴⁸ Rafael Condori was replaced by his son while he was living in the valleys; meanwhile his brother would have seized the opportunity to deprive him from his contribuyente status and his plot of land. AJC, *Civiles*, 1901, no. 5.

⁴⁹ A couple of comunarios who remained childless, passed their contribuyente status to an adopted child, the son of his niece. AJC, *Civiles*, 1911, no. 1. Another case was when the mother of a contribuyente took over that status: AJC, *Civiles*, 1914, no. 32.

⁵⁰ AJC, 1867, f. 197.

⁵¹ For instance, in the 1871 Revisita, a comunario of the ayllu Coro in the canton of Corque was able to pass from Uru to originario. Coro was predominantly inhabited by Urus and counted only with 7 originario taxpayers. ANB, Rv, no. 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 46. In 1870, a domestic in service of a governmental functionary in the village of Corque (the servant could have been an (adopted) family member) was inscribed into the Revisita as originario, replacing a deceased taxpayer whose sayaña had since remained “headless”. AJC, 1870, no. 1150.

authorities (the Sub-Prefect of the province) who had to legitimate the petition, to then be executed by the Corregidor after verification with the caciques and jilaqatas to prevent conflicts or forms of excessive accumulation. The adjudication of abandoned terrains in most cases provoked disputes as the terrain seldom resulted to be without usufructuary. In the years comprised by the case study of this research (1860-1930), adjudication petitions (including the creation of new *contribuyentes*) are frequent, yet over time, this diminished as demographic pressures aggravated land fragmentation and practical arrangements emerged to overcome the limit on the number of *contribuyentes*.⁵² In the 20th century, however, the mechanism to distribute land generated a fragmentation of plots as a result of demographic growth. If there was no land to partition and adjudicate, the *próximo* or petitioner became a *contribuyente* without lands or families sought other ways to make sure their children will have a piece of land by the time they become taxpayer.

Petitions for *sayaña* adjudication seem to reflect the wording of a loyalty oath, first taken through *sayaña* petitioning and then renewed regularly through the *tributo* payment. In the eyes of the indigenous population, tribute payment was a matter of citizenship which gave them certain attributions (Irurozqui 1999, 713). Loyalty to the state was thus conditional as the tribute payment created expectations and gave them a strong lever to indigenous people in securing their land access. The interplay and constant strain on expectations and commitments is reflected in the procedures and formulations to ‘enter in’ and ‘confirm’ the contractual relation with the state or the occasions in which either party ‘abuses’ or ‘fools’ that contract. First of all, loyalty had to be openly declared when petitioning *sayaña* adjudication or other appeals to the state authorities.⁵³ In every appeal to the state, petitioners underlined the precision and steadfastness of their contribution to the treasury,⁵⁴ and of their service to the community, the Church and the State.⁵⁵ The other way round, they stressed the vital exigency in that compliance with these loyalty demands was only possible when granted the solicited property, because it “*provides in the necessities of life, to satisfy the*

⁵² For the *estancias* in Sabaya studied by Rivière, there has not been any new *sayaña* ‘adjudication’ since the last agrarian census of 1950 (Rivière 1982, 269). From then on, other mechanisms such as the rotational payment of the contribution between the official *contribuyente/sayañero* (who owns the land title/adjudication document) and his relatives were relied on to foresee the growing number of *comunarios* with access to community land.

⁵³ This humbleness was often emphasized to the extreme, as by the *jilaqata* of *ayllu Parco* in Huailamarca daring to submit a request to the Prefect “*though it is too difficult to believe, that an imbecilic indio justifiably, dares to address the Supreme Government*”. AJC, 1864, no. 960.

⁵⁴ One of many examples is AJC, 1876, no. 1482.

⁵⁵ AJC, *Civiles*, 1914, no. 32 and 33.

*indigenous contribution,*⁵⁶ and “fulfil the services and other obligations to which we as indigenous are bound.”⁵⁷

The state’s ability to levy the head tax determined its financial limits, the governmental “elbow room”. Although its taxation system also included other fiscal obligations towards the comunarios, including proportional taxes on production,⁵⁸ the road tax or *prestación vial* (levied by the national and departmental treasury),⁵⁹ the *plazaje* tax on ambulant sale (provincial treasury)⁶⁰ and the *sisá* or tax on foodstuff (municipal treasuries).⁶¹ However, the indigenous head tax was the most indispensable source in creating that room. The fiscal role of the Carangas communities was crucial to the (particularly departmental) treasury, which at its turn determined those communities’ room for manoeuvre. While addressing the province commonly as a marginalized corner with little potential, the central state powers could not deny the fiscal potential and loyalty of its population. In that respect, Carangas gives credit to Ovando’s statement, that the richest provinces in terms of their fiscal contribution were at the same time the poorest in terms of their own economic development (Ovando 1985, 134).

In the first place, the indigenous head tax payment in itself was of vital importance to the state’s solvency. No other fiscal revenue could compete with the tributo’s

⁵⁶ Andamarca. AJC, 1867, no. 1003.

⁵⁷ AJC, 1870, 1139.

⁵⁸ Apart from the head tax, indigenous community members – as did all non-indigenous in the country- also contributed with a share of their production in species, however not to the National Treasury, but to the Church. The *diezmos* (tithes) were the most “notorious” of these proportional taxes and corresponded to a tenth of one’s agricultural production, while the *primicias* were levied on the first harvest (about a fifth of the *diezmo*), the *veintenas* on wool livestock and the *huasiveintena* on smaller animals, together providing in 10% of the national budget (Ovando 1985, 51-2). In the 1860s-70s, the *diezmos* brought about 5740 pesos in the departmental treasury of Oruro of which about 2400 pesos were collected in the Carangas province, each community contributing with about 300 to 400 pesos, less than a tenth of what they paid as head tax (calculated on basis of rough data from the Archivo de la Prefectura de Oruro, APO, *Libros de contabilidad*, 1860, “Documentos duplicados”, document no. 79, and 1870, “Libro de cuentas”, f. 19). In 1910, Bacarreza recorded a yearly yield of the decimal tax on livestock of 5000 bolivianos in Carangas (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 380). Although the tithe system (*diezmos*, *primicias*, *veintenas* and other ecclesiastic taxes) was eventually abolished in 1924, several complaints by indigenous comunarios give evidence of the continuing exaction of this contribution in the Carangas province (González Flores 1929, 32-3).

⁵⁹ In the transition to independence, the *mita* had disappeared, but the road tax (*prestación vial*) continued to subject the comunarios to an annual labour service, which in the first decades of the 20th century was gradually transformed into a monetary contribution for road maintenance.

⁶⁰ The *plazaje* fluctuated from 5 to maximum 26 bolivianos yearly per sale location, which were the cantons of the province (Bacarreza 1910, 380).

⁶¹ The *sisá* included for instance the taks on flour, yielding 260 bolivianos yearly in the province (Bacarreza 1910, 380).

indispensability to the National Treasury, at least until the 1860s (Sánchez Albornoz 1978; Grieshaber 1977; Platt 1986; Abendroth 1991). In colonial times, mining and commerce revenues were more important to the Treasury than tribute incomes. Due to the independence wars, its impact on international trade and the downturn of the mining sector (flooded mines!), this changed after independence, when the tribute became the government's prime income source, only to be altered from the late 1850s on (Klein 1993, 113). During this period, the vassalage entailed in the colonially inherited pact provided the State with a crucial legal basis for tax extraction. While all other revenues extracted from internal and external circuits were in decline, the growing rural population –and hence of taxpayers– was the tower of strength of the national Treasury (Klein 2011, 112). However, if by 1860 the *tributo* dwarfed any other income source, this dominance started to erode in the following years. Platt has argued that the pact continued, but at a sub-national level, hence indicating the major condition for communitarian structures to be respected (see Appendix 7).

From 1872 on, a “financial decentralization” installed departmental and municipal treasuries in parallel to the national treasury, which made the national treasury increasingly reliant upon exportation revenues, announcing the shift from a tribute-based to a mining-based central state budgeting (Barragán 2009, 105). In the first decades of the republic, tribute incomes made up 40% to 50 % of the entire state budget. From the middle of the 19th century up to 1880, its share gradually eroded as an effect of increasing mining revenues and fluctuated between 20% and 30% of all national incomes (see Appendix 7). Once the tax became a departmental income source in 1880, the *contribución territorial* came to play an important role in determining the departmental budget, until about the 1930s (Barragán 2009, 108; Barragán and Pérez 2007), while other income-making activities –particularly mining– served the national treasury.⁶² While the territorial contribution constituted the department's “*principal and most profitable income*”, collected with regularity and at times even produced a surplus (Ascarrunz 1909, 66), overall departmental revenues were stagnant since the 1880s because increasing trade and mining yields had become destined to municipal and national treasuries respectively.⁶³ The *contribución* remained one of the most guaranteed departmental

⁶² According to data for the first 4 months of 1898, the head tax made up 79,5% of all departmental income sources, although this might be a distorted picture (Aramayu 1898, xxiii). In the 1910 to 1930 decades, *contribución* revenues counted for 32 up to 44% of all departmental incomes. Indicative is also the data on the collection of a “compensatory” payment in 1866, in the context of Melgarejo's first land reform attempt (see chapter 6), which demonstrates that the entire departmental budget was dependent from head tax revenue (although this was at that time still a national income source).

⁶³ The implication was that the departmental budget became increasingly reliant upon national injections, especially to cover police expenses (Sanjines 1906, 19–20). Moreover, in the context of the early 20th century

incomes, but the departmental treasury built up a deficit, mainly due to inaccurate head tax collection, although this seems to be handled with by 1930.⁶⁴

As one of the three, and later four, provinces comprising only around 20% of the department's entire population, Carangas accounted for 39% (1898) up to 42% (1920) in the constitution of those revenues, with an annual contribution fluctuating around 36000 to 38000 bolivianos.⁶⁵ This was the only revenue received by the departmental treasury from that province (Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 106), and its input underwent no change as long as the modification of its *padrón* remained forthcoming due to anti-Revisita protest (Lemaitre 1916, 56). It is interesting to note the contrast between the province's resistant reputation because of withholding the land inspection to update of the taxpayers lists and the respect it gained as a very docile province, being the most excellent of all in punctually and completely fulfilling their fiscal compliance (Ascarrunz 1918, 29 and 1919, 38-9). This contrast can only be understood in light of the stake the communities had in securing the continuation of the "old" state-community pact.

Despite the radical land reform of the late 19th century and the substitution of the *tributo* by a *contribución territorial*, the head tax system underwent little change in those areas where communal land tenure persisted. Over time, the tax lost in importance and, as land property fragmented, so did the "contribuyente" status, particularly in the eyes of the government. The differentiation that existed before, between the *originario*, *agregado* and Uru quota and land rights, remained intact in Carangas (at least until 1975), but the abolition of this distinction had become obsolete already before as most communities, as in Sabaya, exclusively counted with *originarios* (Rivière 1982, 254). About one century after the indigenous taxation was decentralized (1880), the *tributo* was officially abolished, although in Carangas the payment was adjusted to an internal "contract" with its collection serving as a community fund for collective realizations such as the building of schools, church renovation or road works.⁶⁶ Thus, while the

economic downturn, increased the departmental treasury's came to rely even more strongly upon the indigenous communities (Ascarrunz 1909, 67-70).

⁶⁴ See following Prefectural reports: Ascarrunz 1918, anexo 2; Arce 1923, 44; Ibañez 1924, 27; Calderón 1927, 49-50; Fajardo 1931, 80.

⁶⁵ There are however some problems and insecurities with these data as it is not always clear if the estimated revenue annotated in annual Prefect reports corresponds to the tax of one semester or a complete year. Often, an amount between 73000 and 75000 bolivianos is annotated, while in other years half of that amount, around 36000 bolivianos. Taking Barragán's note on the fact that *contribución* revenues made up about 60% of all departmental incomes (Barragán 2009, 108), and taking into account that budget calculations in prefectural reports often included (expected) incomes for one and a half years, it must be concluded that Carangas' annual contribution based on the head tax fluctuated around 36000 to 38000 bs. See appendix 7.

⁶⁶ Rivière 1982, 106; Regalsky and Quisbert 2008, 178-9; and own field work notes.

status of *contribuyente* is blurring, the category of *sayañero* (still based on the payment of a community contribution and the participation in the fiesta-cargo system) continues to form the basis for group identity and access to land in Carangas.⁶⁷

Revisita: The land inspection

In order to calculate the expected tax revenues for its Treasury, the colonial state had to gain an idea of the number of its “vassals”; taxation implies registration. Thereto, visits to all communities were to be organized and regularly repeated to count the proportion of *contribuyentes* in each community and set the according tax quota. The organization of the first *Visita General* in the Viceroyalty of Peru, in 1549, marks the moment that the Spanish Crown became more interested in curbing the power of the *encomenderos* in order to secure and enhance its royal revenues (Zagalsky 2009, s.p). Once implemented under Spanish colonial rule, these (repeated) land inspections, known as *visitas* and *revisitas*, would -after a short interval of frustrated attempts to implement Bolívar’s liberal decrees- remain operative throughout the 19th century until the government started in 1880 with the implementation of the disentailment reform. The most important change was that under republican rule, particularly by the Revisita regulations set by Andrés de Santa Cruz’s government in 1831, the organization of the land inspections was reoriented towards exclusively tributary objectives (Ovando 1985, 32-3; Irurozqui 1999, 711).

In the first place, the *padrones* allowed the administration to gain an idea of its expected revenues. In fact, the national (and later, departmental) treasury was extremely dependent upon the incomes of the indigenous head tax (see “Tributo” and Appendix 7). From the point of view of the indigenous population, registration in the *padrón* had clear advantages, most evidently the access to community lands, but also the exemption from military service as established by the circular of 28 June 1838 (Irurozqui 1999, 712). But the land survey interventions did much more than register “dry” quantitative data on the indigenous population, their resources and fiscal potential. They were dramatic events driven by a political agenda to detect and eliminate disorders and impose territorial order, thereby renewing the fiscal and sovereign link between the communities and a (wannabe) omnipresent state (Zagalsky 2009; Gil and Salomon 1994, 8-10). They served to “fixate” local realities, which especially in the case of the *Visita* of La Palata can be taken quite literally, attempting to map and halt taxpayer migration (the *forastero* phenomenon), thereby converting the *Visita* documents into a key entry to patterns of indigenous mobility (Medinaceli 2006, 490; see also 4.1.2). Moreover, in the event of a land survey, state-community tensions found

⁶⁷ Interview with Máximo Reinaga, head of the Jach’a Karangas Council, March 2012.

their most tangible public manifestation, enacted with an eye for drama. In view of its implicit (land rights) guarantees and (capital and labour) extractions, comunarios found themselves captured between acceptance (and even insistence) and rejection towards land survey interventions. The general distrust and frequent protest against Revisita intervention indicate how *comunarios* understood too well “*the relation between information-gathering and external control, taxation and regulation*” (Bolton 2007, 12). Because of these tensions, the surveys were often accomplished “*lightly and without the calm and quietude that are indispensable to its success.*”⁶⁸

In terms of formal modalities, Revisita commissions were formed by provincial governors, assisted by an *apoderado fiscal* (public representative) and a number of secretaries, who were instructed to collect detailed data on the amount, names, civil state, age, sex, and fiscal status of all indigenous people living in their jurisdiction (Ovando 1985, 32-3).⁶⁹ This commission crossed the entire province, visiting each village where they executed the survey with collaboration of the local authorities, which usually took them up to two months.⁷⁰ In November 1869, local authorities in Choquecota reported that on the first of October of that year all commissioners had started up the execution of the census and cadastre, “*working from sunrise to sunset except in the moments of lunch and of dinner*”.⁷¹ Between the field work and the eventual publication of the padrón could pass over half a year.⁷² These functionaries, often with one commissioner for each canton, were usually recruited among local mestizo villagers (sometimes even pastoralists), who often hardly disposed of the necessary requirements to execute the job, such as reading and writing skills, or simply did not fulfil their duty, which explains the frequency of illegal exactions and other abuses.⁷³ Indeed, for these

⁶⁸ Own translation. Apoderado Fiscal Antonio Monroy commenting in 1871 about the execution of the previous Revisita of 1867 in the Carangas province, although Monroy was accused by his successor in 1877 of the same carelessness. ABN, Rv, 1871, parte I, f.1v. and 1877, f.0.

⁶⁹ In line with art. 41 of the decree of 28 February 1831 and the Revisita regulation of 1836, the government appointed the *governador* and an *apoderado fiscal* to execute the Revisita, although several denominations were used to indicate the Revisita officers. Platt notes that in the 1837 Revisita, padrones were made up according to ayllu affiliation (receiving the data from the kuraka), but from 1843 on, the padrones were made up on basis of canton affiliation which conceals the fact that ayllu were spread over multiple (puna and valley) cantons (Platt 1982, 47).

⁷⁰ For instance, the survey of all cantons in order to elaborate the padrón of 1838 was carried out between April and June 1838. ABMO, no. 391, *Padron general de contribuyentes de la provincia de Carangas*, 1838.

⁷¹ AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3v.

⁷² With regard to the execution of Carangas' last Revisita, it took the land inspector from November 1877, when the survey “in the field” had been concluded, to May 1878 to finish the final Padrón. ABN, Rv, 1877, f.0.

⁷³ AJC, 1870, no. 1183, f.6v. A similar abuse had been noted during the execution of the Revisita in Choquecota. AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3v.

functionaries their assignment was an opportunity for making extra revenue, something all levels of government were aware and repeatedly reminded of though indifferent to.⁷⁴

Roughly every five years, the field survey was repeated, announced by a Supreme Order that informed all taxpayers about the day they should appear with their entire family before the provincial governor. Priests were asked to dispose all data from the baptism, marriage, and funeral books (but these data are very incomplete) and the *corregidores* and *alcaldes* had to stand by with the *padroncillos*. The information collected through the Revisita was brought together in a *padrón* or *matrícula*, a taxpayers list that could take another half or almost entire year to elaborate.⁷⁵ While the *padroncillo* was made up at the community level to facilitate the half-yearly tax collection by local authorities, the *padrón* covered an entire province and served the state administration in establishing the *tributo* quota (and during colonial times, the *mita* quota) for each ayllu. In 19th century Carangas, the padrones listed all ayllus, grouped per canton and vice-canton and ordered according to *repartimiento*, starting with the provincial capital of Corque. The population per ayllu was divided first of all into three fiscal categories. The *originarios* or “full” community members with land (Carangas did not count with “*originarios* without land”) paid 9 pesos 1 real a year and used to present themselves as “*contribuyente de primera clase*”.⁷⁶ “Rootless” people⁷⁷ or foreigners were “added” as *agregados* or *forasteros*, categorized as either “with land” or “without land” and paid 7 pesos. The Uru population paid only 3 pesos because of “*their low condition, and for not possessing repartimiento terrains, rather subject to two lakes.*”⁷⁸

Each *contribuyente* was registered together with the other members of his (or her) family, all with name, family name and age, starting with the family of the *cacique* and the *jilaqata*. Together with the *alcaldes ordinaries*, the verger (*sacristan*), the precentor (*cantor*), the postilions⁷⁹ or other comunarios fulfilling a community responsibility, they

⁷⁴ ANB, Rv, 227. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1867, f.197-197v.; AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3v.; AJC, 1870, no. 1183, f.6v-9v.

⁷⁵ While “field work” for the Padrón of 1852 was executed during that same year, the register was only finished by July 1853. The apoderado fiscal attributed this delay to the suspension of the operations as established by the supreme decree of 17 July 1852, the absenteeism of the Gobernador who stayed for over five months in the border and the exactitude with which the registration books had been elaborated. The Revisita of 1864 was executed in the course of February-March 1864, but the elaboration of the lists was not finished before January 1865. ABMO, no. 426, *Libro de matricula de la provincia de Carangas*, f.215-215v. ANB, Rv., 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864.

⁷⁶ AJC, 1871, no. 1196.

⁷⁷ ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, fs. 216.

⁷⁸ AJC, 1871, no. 1246.

⁷⁹ ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f. 213v.

were not liable to tax.⁸⁰ While holding office, they were included in the category of reserved (*reservados*), just as all *contribuyentes* that had reached the age of 50 and were permanently replaced by a new *contribuyente* to whom they passed their land rights and according tax duties. Absentee *contribuyentes* (*ausentes*) were equally exempted. Other categories registered in the *padrón* were the married women (*casadas*) and widows (*viudas*), the male sons (between 13 and 18 years old) who were next in line to become *contribuyente* (*próximos*), the non-married daughters older than 13 (*solteras*), and the kids under 13 (*niños* and *niñas*), none of them liable to tax payment.⁸¹

In short, while responding essentially to fiscal incentives, the *padrones* tell us more than mere fiscal information and are a crucial entry to the rural dynamics of 19th century Bolivia. The fluctuations registered by the *padrones* depict (directly as well as indirectly) the evolution of the indigenous population and of one of the state's most important fiscal source, the dynamics of family formation and demographic strategies, and the interaction between and differentiation of ethnic, social and fiscal categories, down to the most local level, as will be demonstrated in 4.1.2 (Ovando 1985, 134-44; Grieshaber 1980).

An examination of republican Revisitas demonstrates a stability of the numerical and hence fiscal importance of the indigenous population at least until the latter quarter of the 19th century (1838-1877) (Barragán 2012, 23). Grieshaber's work provides in a very detailed analysis of the *padrones* for all provinces subject to the Revisita (La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba departments) during that century.⁸² Throughout this period, there was an overall population decline, producing a drop of 17% among the indigenous population due to epidemics, drought and famine. However, this decline had a regionally differentiated effect on indigenous communities, which were surviving and even reviving in the altiplano departments, particularly in the Oruro department, while those in the Cochabamba valleys deteriorated (see table). According to Grieshaber this outcome is determined primarily by ecological and demographical factors; not that much by their relation to the hacienda complex (Grieshaber 1980, 223).

⁸⁰ Also service as postilion in the Tambo of Pongovillque exempted comunarios from tax payment (each year another canton delivers six postilions).

⁸¹ According to Ovando, the *matricula* included these 9 columns, while the *Padrón General* only registered the *tributarios*, *proximos* and *casadas*, although there were many regional variations (Ovando 1985, 34).

⁸² Note that Revisita data are not always trustworthy, particularly the numbers for the Chuquisaca department are nonreliable.

Table 5 Demographic evolution of Bolivia's indigenous population and indigenous tributaries between 1838 and 1877.




Table 6 Absolute and proportional demographic growth of indigenous population and indigenous *tributarios* per department between 1838 and 1877 (based on Appendix I in Grieshaber 1980, 263-5).

	Chuquisaca	Cochabamba	La Paz	Oruro	Potosí	BOLIVIA
total 1838	19970	47780	247611	65525	109230	490116
<i>tributarios</i> 1838	5083	11163	63047	14217	30802	124312
<i>trib</i> -total proportion	25,5%	23,4%	25,5%	21,7%	28,2%	25,4%
total 1877	15865	29780	188642	74629	97550	406466
<i>tributarios</i> 1877	5287	6900	74198	20015	36857	143357
<i>trib</i> -total proportion	33,3%	23,2%	39,3%	26,8%	37,8%	35,3%
Total 1838-1877	-4105	-18000	-58969	+9104	-11680	-83650
<i>tributarios</i> 1838-1877	+204	-4263	+11151	+5798	+6055	+19045
% total 1838-1877	-20,6%	-37,7%	-23,8%	+13,9%	-10,7%	-17,1%
% <i>tributarios</i> 1838-1877	+4,0%	-38,2%	+17,7%	+40,8%	19,7%	+15,3%

Table 7 Distribution of the indigenous population over the departments of Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro and Potosí in 1838, 1858 and 1877 (based on Appendix I in Grieshaber 1980, 263-5).





Table 8 Changes in the distribution of the indigenous population in the departments of Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro and Potosí in 1838, 1858 and 1877 (based on Appendix I in Grieshaber 1980, 263-5).



The overall decline of the indigenous population, which concerned particularly the non-tributary population as women and children were most vulnerable to epidemics, produced a rise in the indigenous tax burden. Throughout the 19th century, the taxpaying population continued growing, however at differentiated rates, with a very strong increase in La Paz, whereas the Cochabamba department saw the number of its *tributarios* slightly declining (Klein 1993, 121-4). While the originario class recovered, partially due to the abolition of the *mita*, it was the forastero class that expanded most spectacularly. While forasteros are classically associated with haciendas, a larger and growing share of them lived in communities, where they even acceded to land, hence the category of forasteros with land (Barragán 2012, 23). In explaining this forastero increase, Klein suggests a conscious policy on part of the originarios to “close (sic) off access to their status in an attempt to keep themselves competitive and to increase their supply of cheap labor” in the face of growing market pressures (Klein 1993, 128-132). The result was an emergent gap between community *tributarios* (+24%, up to 107759 in 1877) and hacienda *tributarios* (-4%, up to 34110 in 1877) (Grieshaber 1980, 233-6). Particularly in regions with no or few haciendas, such as Carangas and the Potosí provinces of Lipez and Chichas, the communities managed to keep the share of *tributarios* to the overall indigenous population very low, partially thanks to a general population increase (ibid, 254).

As Grieshaber explains, the rising tax burden was in the interest of the treasury, yet not organized by the government. Paradoxically, the taxpayers increase seems to result from the land control strategies of the proper *tributarios* (and their replacers), who tried to uphold the number of tributarios (hence people with legitimate access to community land) in the face of mortality threats (ibid, 257). This ability to protect communitarian land rights and administrative structures was particularly manifest in altiplano pasture zones (ibid, 258), yet with the formal abolition of the community and land sale operations *originario* resilience was seriously undercut, instigating an originario out-migration in search for labour (Klein 1993, 129-30). From the 1880s on, the trend of ayllus growing faster than haciendas was reversed. This shift came accompanied by a redefinition of the Revisita in itself.

With the tax reform (implementation *contribución territorial*), the function of the Revisita changed from a mere administrative planning tool to an active reform tool. From 1868 on and even more from the 1880s on, a general Revisita was perceived and employed as a required nearly military intervention in function of the generalization of individual property, that is, to liquidate the community system and permit its usurpation (Ovando 1985, 297). However, due to state incapacity to implement the Revisita and counter the resistance it provoked, the creation of a homogeneous national culture based on direct loyalty without community intermediation remained in many altiplano provinces theory (see Part III).

4.1.2 The *contribuyentes* of Carangas

The taxpayer's lists or *padrones* made up during stand as an inevitable and probably the most detailed entrance to the evolution of the land question in the Andes. Because of the strategic value of this legal mechanism, for the state apparatus, for the communities themselves and for the researcher, the following will look into the origins and evolution of the Revisita, with a focus on the 19th century, and assess Revisita results for Carangas as a source into the region's history.

On basis of the *padrones*, Carangas' demographic-fiscal story as well as its relation with the central state over the centuries can be reconstructed (Rivière 1982, chapter 2; see also Iño 2012 for Turco). That story was not written before the 1570s and would only be provided with more complete data about a century later. In the decades directly after Spanish arrival there was little impetus to gain a detailed overview of the local population and its resources. While a first general survey had been organized in 1549, Carangas was visited only in 1573-4 under the Toledo regime, when the province had already undergone its major post-conquest border changes (ibid, 63). The 28692 counted inhabitants, including a still quite large Uru population, corresponded in fiscal terms to 6254 *tributarios* meaning that each tributario represented (a family of) about 5 persons (ibid). In the first century after conquest the proportion of taxpayers decreased radically due to the spread of epidemics, violent encounters and, most of all, the dramatic out-migration by contribuyentes who gave up the ties with their taxpaying and mita-providing home communities. Hence, the tax burden upon comunarios who survived and stayed in the community rose.

Meanwhile, a floating mass remained out of the government's reach. In order to incorporate these fugitives into a new fiscal category of *forasteros*, a next *Revisita* was commanded in 1683 by duke de la Palata, viceroy of Peru in 1681-89 (ibid, 66).⁸³ This minority group lacked direct access to production assets in their new community and were hence dependent from the *originario* class, but were in return favoured by a lower fiscal burden (ibid, 88). The influx of this new fiscal segment as well as the post-conquest population drop was a serious drain on Carangas' human resources, evidenced in rising taxation pressures. With 2580 *tributarios* representing no more than 8382 inhabitants, 1 out of 3 became subject to the payment of the indigenous head tax.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the movement of a new fiscal class of *forasteros* brought a new dynamic into the stratification of community life. However, as climatological conditions impeded

⁸³ General comments and bibliography on the Visita de La Palata, see Medinaceli 2010, 321-2.

⁸⁴ Revisita del Duque de la Palata, AGN, Buenos Aires, BA, sala 13, 18, 44, see also Wachtel 1978, 1154-1155 and Sanchez-Albornoz 1973, 30, cited in Rivière 1982, 65.

profitable agriculture in Carangas, the province could not compete with the pull factors of the attractive fertile valleys on *forasteros*. The immigration of this mobile labour force in Carangas remained limited to 13% in the period between Toledo's and la Palata's *revisita*;⁸⁵ unable to camouflage the concurring real demographic decline of migrating or deceased *originarios* (-63%)⁸⁶ as happened elsewhere (ibid, 68). *Forasteros* were mainly employed in the province's rich mines,⁸⁷ while 1137 *originarios* had left as *ausentes*, most of them working in long-connected places (mines, haciendas, valley communities) and hence easily tracked in order to ensure tribute payments (ibid, 73). If they managed to get off the radar (usually converted into *forasteros* elsewhere) for over 10 years, they lost their *originario* ascriptions (ibid, 77-81).

After another century approximately, in the wake of the indigenous rebellion of 1780-81, the *revisita* operation was executed for a third time (1785-7), but less detailed, and would from now on be repeated on a more regular basis. The pretention of the 1785-87 census was to guarantee an egalitarian redistribution of lands among *comunarios*, restrain land usurpation and renew the taxpayer lists (Ovando 1985, 33). In Carangas, the *Revisita* gave evidence of 15414 inhabitants, while the reserve of taxpayers had only increased to the number of 2623, resulting in a proportion of only 1 *contribuyente* to almost 6 persons (Rivière 1982, 90). *Originarios* represented 80,20%, which is largely explained by their strong (and in some places exclusive) reliance on pastoralism.⁸⁸ Overlooking the colonial censuses, the high absenteeism among *originarios* is noteworthy and stems from the importance of long-distance trade, barter and transport or labour migration to haciendas or mines, either temporal or permanent.

⁸⁵ Moreover, a third of them moved within the same province, although some arrived from remarkably far-away regions such as Cochabamba, La Paz, the Titicaca area, Cuzco and even Santiago de Chile (Rivière 1982, 71). Yanacona influx was simply non-existent.

⁸⁶ This decline was even stronger in the most western *repartimiento* of Coquiqota-Sabaya, which Rivière ascribes to environmental factors, that is, its strategic position on llama caravan routes and its mineral reserves. Moreover, Rivière notes that its close location to the *mitimae* valleys near the Pacific might have provided locals with a refuge zone free from fiscal obligations and abundant with arable lands (Rivière 1982, 70). Also the mines within the province offered a fiscal refuge for part of the *originario* population. In Turco, for instance, half of the *forasteros* came from within the same *repartimiento* (AGI, *revisita de la Palata* cited in Rivière 1982, 70).


⁸⁷ The 1683 census counted 135 *forasteros* and only 46 *originarios* working in Carangas' key mineral reserves located in the Ingenio de Concepcion de Guallatire, currently at the Chilean side of the border, and the mines of La Rivera, Carangas and Todos Santos, currently in the Mejillones province (Sanchez-Albornoz 1978, 152, cited in Rivière 1982, 70).

⁸⁸ In Carangas, *comunarios* would even have held differentiated ranks according to the size of their herd; they were classified into higher or lower fiscal categories "not because they possess lands but because they have a major portion of [camelid] livestock." AGN, "Sobre la *Revisita del Partido de Carangas* (1786)" XIII, 18-5-5, cited by Santamaria 1977, 259, cited in Rivière 1982, 96.

The most notable void in the registers is the nonappearance of haciendas and hence hacienda workers, the *yanaconas*; together with its southern neighbour Lipez (Potosí department) Carangas stood out as the sole hacienda-free province of the entire country.⁸⁹ Also *forastero* presence remained low, due to the abundance of land, the importance of livestock herding and the limited influx of new people (ibid, 97). In the last decades before independence, the province's total population increased considerably, while its taxpaying share shrunk to only 17%, reflecting the effects of colonial *mita* and taxation extraction and the consequent absenteeism, and of the late colonial rebellion (ibid, 90-1).

Over the following century, between 1787 and 1901, the main trend in the *revisitas* is opposite to the 18th century evolution, with a slowing down and destabilization of overall demographic growth in contrast to a solid increase in *tributarios* (ibid, 99). Between 1838 and 1877, the last executed Revisita, the proportion of taxpayers to the overall indigenous population in the province rose from 19,3% to 27,4%.

Table 9 Total indigenous population and indigenous taxpayers in Carangas, 1838-1877 (own elaboration on basis of Revisitas).



The following assessment of the republican Revisitas will mainly focus on the second half of the 19th century. After the population had significantly risen in the 1787-1796

⁸⁹ Regarding Carangas, it was declared that of the yanacona “specie” “there is not any indian in the entire [province] nor less haciendas to which they can be assigned”. ANB, 1762-1774, no. 1162, 289r., cited in Rivière 1982, 70.

period, wide-spread and serious droughts produced an overall decline during 1796-1804 to then increase again until approximately 1858 (ibid, 99). Particularly in the second half of the century, the population (as did the taxpayer share) fell back due to epidemics and labour migration (ibid, 99-101). In 1852, the Revisita commissioner pointed to the mortality effects of the 1849 epidemic, as evidenced in the Church books and by local testimonies, and stressed “*the constant absence of the Indios without livestock property because the larger part is sterile territory*” to the Huantajaya mine, the Chacarilla mine or in Camiña, Peru.⁹⁰ Although the 1858-1860 epidemics were probably much harsher, the following *revisitas* of 1860 and 1867 give the highest population numbers for Carangas in the 19th century. In 1864, the sub-Prefect of the province attributed the low taxpayers’ increase (2%, while the overall population had risen with 5%) to the abuses and defects of the previous Revisita.⁹¹ At the other hand, 75 new names were included into the register, equivalent to a yearly revenue increase of 474.4 pesos.⁹² By 1867, the increase of *tributarios* (over 7% in 3 years) was noticed as remarkable, given the proportional increase of *reservados*, the significant level of migration to the Peruvian coast, and the frequent death of *tributarios* because of alcohol abuse.⁹³

The next decade points again to a decline due to a pest epidemics and famine, although it started with an increase in taxpayer numbers.⁹⁴ The 1871 *padrón* indicates several cases of contribuyentes switching to other categories, often from *agregados* to *originarios*,⁹⁵ which means extra revenue, or abandoning their contribuyente status,⁹⁶ or passing to other ayllus.⁹⁷ Previous padrones do not include such explicit annotations, although this swapping of categories and ayllus was certainly not a new practice. It is however hard to assess whether this ‘switching game’ concerned an increased reliance upon a typical income strategy. The epidemic of 1872 had an exacerbating effect on the

⁹⁰ ABMO, no. 426, Libro de Matricula de la provincia de Carangas, 1852, f.215-215v.

⁹¹ ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f. 212.

⁹² This group included comunarios from age 8 up to 62 years old and all fiscal categories, most of them replacing deceased or retired contribuyentes. ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, fs. 216-217v.

⁹³ ANB, Rv, 227. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1867, f.197.

⁹⁴ There were ninety four more *contribuyentes* counted, while 105 deceased *contribuyentes* had been replaced by new taxpayers (ANB, Rv, Carangas, 1871, parte I, f.1v).


⁹⁵ An example is ANB, Rv, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 29, ayllu Cala.

⁹⁶ In ayllu Collana of the canton Totorá, Mariano Mamani, 19 years old, exits the list. ANB, Rv, 228 and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871.

⁹⁷ In Huailamarca, for instance, a contribuyente passes from ayllu Jacha Urinsaya to ayllu Jisca Urinsaya. ANB, Rv, 228 and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 73.

high absenteeism produced by (labour) migration.⁹⁸ Still, in 1877 the Revisita commissioner was quite positive in observing that the “infinity” of deceased and *ausente* taxpayers and a number of 489 *reservados* had been replaced, thereby producing an increase of 364 contribuyentes, adding up to an annual tax income of 45183 pesos 7 reales.⁹⁹ However, the functionary detected irregularities between the totals of the provincial *padrón* and the cantonal *padroncillos*, possibly due to errors, rush and indifference of his predecessors, which had caused the Departmental Treasury a considerable loss of revenues over the last 6 years (42008 pesos 2 reales had been collected instead of 42220 pesos).¹⁰⁰

Table 10 Distribution of fiscal categories in Carangas, 1838-1877.



In 1877, the last Revisita was executed in Carangas, closing the counts on an overall population increase of only 19,5% and a *tributarios* rise of 47% compared to the Revisita of 1838. Among the taxpayers, variations in *originario*, *agregado* or *forastero* and *uru* proportions remained remarkably stable throughout that period, even more when not

⁹⁸ It was commented that “[t]he epidemics of the year 1872 had manifested itself in the cantons of Curahuara, Turco and Andamarca and decimated these villages, depriving the State from many tributaries” ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877, front page.

⁹⁹ ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877.

¹⁰⁰ ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877.

including the 1838 Revisita which demonstrates strong disparities with the following censuses. Although the *originarios* never dipped under the 66% it lost a minor share to the *forastero* taxpayers that slightly increased until 1871, to decrease again with 1 percent by the last Revisita. Meanwhile, the uru *tributarios*, while increasing in absolute numbers, never deviated from the 3%.

However, this picture entails a lot of internal difference (see tables below), with half of the communities remaining or becoming almost entirely dominated by the *originarios* (85% up to 100% in Choquecota, Turco, Totorá and Curahuara) whereas Andamarca and Corque counted with hardly 50% or even less of them. Regarding the latter two cantons, the other 50% was almost entirely represented by *forasteros* or *agregados*. Everywhere, except in Andamarca and Huallamarca, the share of this fiscal category declined. In Turco, this decline was most striking, with a drop from 8,4% in 1852 (even 22% in 1838, but this is probably an exaggeration) to only 1,1% in 1877.¹⁰¹ In the cantons of Huachacalla, Huallamarca, Choquecota and Totorá, their proportional presence varied from 30%, 25%, 12% to 10% respectively. Curahuara never counted with even 5% of *agregados* or *forasteros* and their presence even completely disappeared by 1877¹⁰², nor did this canton ever include a single Uru family. By the start of the 19th century, the Uru population had been reduced to the cantons of Andamarca, Corque, Huachacalla and Turco. Over course of the century, their presence increased, including Urus converting into *originarios*.¹⁰³ The increase is most remarkable in Huachacalla, after a transfer of Uru lands with Turco, which also explains the drop in the uru population of the latter canton (see 6.5). In the vice-canton of Orinoca (Andamarca), an “estancia Micayani” was registered, however not as *ayllu* and exclusively inhabited by *agregados* suggesting a “private” enclave in the province which however seems to have an *ayllu* roots and probably disappeared by the beginning of the 20th century.¹⁰⁴

Since the formal abolition of the indigenous tribute, proclaimed by the new land legislation of 1874 and implemented from 1880 on, no *revisita* has been undertaken in Carangas. The implication is that subsequent demographic and fiscal data are no longer

¹⁰¹ In the *ayllu* of Collana, for instance, all remaining *agregados*, 25 persons amongst which 5 *tributarios*, passed to the *originario* status. ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877.

¹⁰² ANB, Rv, 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1877.

¹⁰³ This can be observed in the *ayllu* of Coro (canton Corque), where in 1871 Inosencio Machaca, a 22 year old contribuyente, passed from Urus into the *originario* class. ANB, Rv, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871.

¹⁰⁴ In the 1838 padrón, Micayani was still part of *ayllu* Collana. According to the Revisita of 1864, estancia Micayani was inhabited by 14 persons, all belonging to the *agregados* class, represented by 6 –amongst which 2 absentee- contribuyentes. By 1910, the estancia was not mentioned in Bacarreza’s extensive report and had probably disintegrated. ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, fs. 187-187v. Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006.

provided by province-encompassing *padrones*, but by national censuses, which are less focused on the land question. At the one hand, there is an impoverishment of data in that there is no further data on *originario*, *agregado* and *uru* differentiations nor are the given data reliable. The 1900 national census, in particular, provided incomplete and manipulated data. At the other hand, the census gave information on the non-indigenous population and on other categorizations (rural-urban, professions) that were not included in the Revisitas. The next national census was not taken before 1950, counting 41534 inhabitants in the province, which is a rise of 45%, in line with the overall growth in Bolivia over the first half of the 20th century (Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos 1951; Rivière 1982, 108). This increase can be broken down into local data on basis of local surveys called *empadronamientos* which were organized at the village level, probably executed in the context of the new tax system implemented after the 1874 land reform.¹⁰⁵ However, I have not been able to trace these local surveys.

Other entries into the information that was previously provided by the Revisitas are the sub-prefectural accounts included in the annual report of the Prefect to the Minister of the Interior and the monographs of Zenón Bacarreza (1910) and Eduardo Lima (1921). Their comments can be linked to trends observed in the Revisitas, pointing to processes that play a formative role in the questions at the centre of the following chapters. Where the Revisitas point to the dominance of the *originarios* in the province -in several places representing (almost) the entire indigenous population- non-Revisita documents indicate a dominance of the indigenous population as such, with the community of Sabaya counting even exclusively “local indigenous” people without a single mestizo inhabitant (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006). Moreover, the hegemony of the *originario* indigenous population even increased through processes of fiscal integration and ethnic assimilation.

At the one hand, more and more Uru people attempted to erase the cultural distinctions with their Aymara neighbours. This was a logical strategy to counter the discrimination of their group, evidenced in the recurrent cases of dispossession. Their weak fiscal status and the label of “people of the water” –hence with no need for (community) land- made them very vulnerable to land invasions and demolitions by “indigenous people [who] see us in ultimate poverty and without the means to resist them”.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ In the first years of the 20th century, “empadronamientos” were elaborated in several cantons. According to an informant, they stopped paying the tributo with this operation and switched to the territorial tax (Rivière 1982, 257-8).

¹⁰⁶ AJC, 1862, no. 868, f. 1. Particularly the Chipayas in the Huachacalla canton were exposed to repeated denial of their land rights. AJC, 1862, no. 868 and no. 884; 1864, no. 919, no. 927 and no. 942; 1867, no.997; 1868, no. 1053; 1870, no. 1173; 1871, no. 1246; 1875, no. 1404, no. 1440 and no. 1476; 1880, no. 1631; 1888, no. 2084; 1897, no. 2369; *Penales*, 1913, no. 32.

At the other hand, a part of the mestizo population, which was already very scarce in the entire province, was incorporated into the taxpayers' lists. Indeed, the *originarios*, *agregados* and *forasteros* of Carangas included so-called *vecinos-contribuyentes*. *Vecinos*, as will be explained further on in this chapter, were the non-indigenous villagers who represented the provincial elites. In many communities, these mestizos managed to get registered in the *padrones* and hence actively combined their citizen status with that of indigenous *tributario*. The regulation of 28 February 1831 stated with that “*regarding the other casts, the padrones will be arranged by tradition, having recourse to their property status of not satisfying the contribution; except if they accede repartimiento community lands in which case they will be inscribed as originarios*” (Ovando 1985, 37). Thus, the apparent contradiction of mestizos and white people enjoying usufruct rights over community lands and securing that position only by paying the indigenous head tax did not imply an ethnic or social conflict; in fact, everybody could be indigenous (Ministerio Protector de Indigenas 1837, in Ovando 1985, 46). Non-indigenous accepted the status of “indio” and the comunarios accepted their “integration” as long as they complied with all implied obligations. Yet, it was a remarkable trend that intertwined with processes of social change and that was noticed with concern by the national authorities. In 1889, for instance, the sub-prefect commented that there were cantons such as Huachacalla and Andamarca where all *vecinos*, even the corregidor, were *tributarios* and hence only interested in working their landed property, which prevents them from becoming appropriate “national” citizens (Atristáin in Aramayo 1898, Anexo, xvi). This overlap of non-indigenous elites obtaining an indigenous fiscal status constitutes an important phenomenon to understand Carangas' land reform experience.

Another remarkable evolution was the increase in the number of absentee *contribuyentes* throughout the 19th century. At the national level, the increase of *contribuyentes* that found themselves outside the community at the time of the census and were consequently registered as *ausentes* was particularly high in the Cochabamba department (from 6% to 24%), while in Oruro their number more than doubled from 2,4% up to 5,5% (Grieshaber 1980, 259-60). In Carangas, the increase was less spectacular, first slightly from 4,6% to 5% (1838-1852), then dropping in the aftermath of the epidemics to 2,3% (1858), to finally augment up to 6,1% (1871, no data for 1877), but their share was already relatively high, reflecting the population's mobile character. The *revisita* functionaries made abundant mention of barter travels and labour migration, which were essential complementary subsistence activities to counter the limits of the sterile altiplano lands.¹⁰⁷ For instance, in 1871, it was commented that

¹⁰⁷ ABMO, no. 426, “Libro de matricula de la provincia de Carangas”, f.215; ABN, Revisitas, Carangas, 1867 (also mentioned in Rivière 1982, 102); 1877, portada.

“the special quality of the mentioned Province bordering Tarapacá and the Coast of Peru provokes that when less registered indigenous live in absence embarking upon the Saltpetre plants or other places in search for work, with which motive they are included in the padrón as absentees.”¹⁰⁸

This absenteeism was in fact even higher as it was partly camouflaged by women and minors integrating in the *padrón* as *contribuyentes*, which was not a legalized but, in order to uphold tax revenues, a tolerated practice.

As a way of conclusion, Grieshaber has rightfully stated that “[l]ands were not abandoned, but passed on to the rightful heir. Despite population decline, social discipline was maintained and the government legitimized the process. In essence, the increase in tributaries on the altiplano reflected the Indians’ ability to cope with epidemic disease and retain their communal organization” (Grieshaber 1980, 257, cited in Rivière 1982, 104). This adaptation to a changing context was not an exceptional measure but corresponds to a constant strategy which was however increasingly challenged with the onset of the country’s first land reform.

4.2 No commons without mobility and exchange: Andean pastoralist market participation.

Now having explored the legal-fiscal bonds that conditioned a communal system for land administration and tied it to a central state apparatus, this section zooms in on how the maintenance of that system entangled with a particular engagement with market structures. While the state-community pact put a strain on rural livelihood strategies, it also entailed important guarantees for the reliance of those strategies upon communal resource pools. At the other hand, the operation of that pact led to the amputation of the access to vital complementary resource pools in distant territories. As has been stressed before, the management of altiplano lands as commons instead of private estates and the access to different ecological lands are two essential preconditions for rural livelihood sustainability in an environment endowed with hardly cultivable lands. Thus, while at the one hand the strength of communal structures “at home” was to be defended in the face of state-building processes, it was key to safeguard inter-ecological mobility and exchange patterns in the face of an

¹⁰⁸ ANB, Rv, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, parte I, f. 1v.

expanding market sphere. The implications of the reorientation in Bolivia's late 19th century economy for rural livelihoods in Carangas must thus be assessed in view of their access to complementary resources.

4.2.1 A longer trajectory of peripheralization and indigenous responsiveness.

As has been discussed in chapter 2 (2.2.3), a strong communal system does not contradict or impede strong market participation. On the contrary, the comunarios of Carangas were drawn into economic circuits that nurtured an emergent world-economy since early colonial market developments, yet not by unambiguously responding to labour commodification pressures. The insertion of pre-Hispanic exchange and mobility patterns, based on principles of ecological verticality, into this developing market sphere evidence a strategic adaptation that allowed (home) communities to preserve their distant land possessions despite the imposed outlines for (and logic of) spatial organization. With regard to Carangas, this skilfulness was most strongly manifested in the transport sector, based on their llama resource base and proficiency in inter-ecological caravan mobility (Medinaceli 2006, 514). Caravan transport and trade activities converted the Carangas people and their llamas in vital world-economic connectors; no doubt the Spanish Crown would have given one of its kingdoms for a llama (caravan).

However, the region would come to lose its colonial strategic position. Due to the technological inability to solve the flooding of the mines and the indigenous insurgency of 1781, most mines in the province were abandoned and the prominence of the mining district of Carangas, deprived from its Royal Treasury in 1803, eroded (Gavira 2011).¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, the late colonial rise of a white- and mestizo-dominated commercial market, represented by the hacendados and non-indigenous merchants, and the substitution of the Pacific by the Atlantic (Buenos Aires) as the commercial gateway for overseas trade contributed to the gradual push of South-Central-Andean indigenous traders and transporters to the margins of the Andean economic space (Larson 1995, 25-6). An increased level of surplus extraction and obstructing market intervention

¹⁰⁹ Symptomatic for this protracted marginalization is the fact that the once so important mining district of Espiritu Santo de Carangas and the refineries of Totos Santos and La Rivera now constitute about the most marginalized remote corners of the region, distant from important transport and trade networks. In 1921, Lima reported that the village of Carangas had the outlook of a large town, yet found itself in almost complete decadence, with the signs of its colonial culmination -when it even counted for a while as the provincial capital- left in ruins (Lima 1921, 192).

(Tandeter 1991, 70-1 and 1995; Langer 2004)¹¹⁰ as well as the region's shifting connectedness to interregional trade routes forced the pastoralists of Carangas to adjust their community-based peasant economy. Indigenous households came to rely more heavily on auto-controlled exchange relations and communal auto-consumption (Jacobsen 1993), although their share in (inter)regional trade probably remained relatively important and contributed to the recuperation and adaptation of the colonial internal market to the post-independence situation.

However, (the indigenous element in) the adaptive potential of the early republican economy is overshadowed by the peripheralizing impact of the export boom upon the Andean economic space later that century (Bonilla 2007, 109; Langer 2004 and 2009). According to Platt, it was the adoption of an export-oriented political economy from the 1870s on, nurtured by an intensive debate between pro-protectionists and pro-free traders, that has suffocated this potential, which he defines as "indigenous mercantilism" (2010, 53). Langer (2009) and Klein (1993, 166) rather define Andean peasants as free traders par excellence, who were in fact in favour of an open economy. The fact that quite a number of communities, particularly pastoralists, not only knew to survive but even to thrive throughout the first half-century of republican rule can indeed only be understood in light of their active importing and exporting, either legally or illegally, trade and transport activities, challenging the stereotypical idea of closed subsistence-based communities.

Still, this pro-free argument does not invalidate Platt's statement as under Bolivian liberalism the terms of participation for highland peasants would drastically change (Larson 2004, 226). The opening-up of the national economy to the world market went together with the advance of railroads, the boom in saltpetre and metal extraction, hacienda expansion and border tensions. This put a massive strain on the communal hold over resources, strangling the ayllu economy and effectively dismantling a great number of communities. Indeed, the deterioration of the ayllu economy was a key condition for pushing through the liberal land reform (Platt 1982, 35). New commercial monopolies pushed indigenous market participation into a secondary position or simply displaced from the restructuring Andean economic space (Langer 2009, 548). This

¹¹⁰ Symptomatic for the late colonial political climate was the *repartimiento de mercancías*, a mechanism for coercive trade that enabled *corregidores* to intervene in indigenous trade and consumption patterns. Whereas this practice had remained illegal but tolerated until 1750, it was officially allowed and generalized in the context of the Bourbon reforms of the second half of the 18th century and widespread corruption (Rivière 1982, 85). The involuntary purchase of expensive products which were of no use to indigenous community peasants increased the compulsion for indigenous people to obtain monetary resources, while providing Spanish administrators with extra revenue and lowering the Crown's bureaucratic expenses (Langer 2004). This reviled mechanism constituted a key motivator in the outburst of the Andean rebellion of 1780-81.

progressive marginalization of indigenous groups and their “subaltern” labour forms from the market can be seen as an act of “*symbolic and real violence*” by the new Liberal elites, in a tight alliance with international capital (Platt 1997, 55-6). The increasing taxation and non-reimbursed labour exploitation under the oligarchic regime added to the pressures that subjected commoners to the imperatives of the world market and state intervention. However, the fact that several ayllus “survived”, yet impoverished, indicates that the indigenous ability to respond to changing market conditions was not completely eliminated (Klein 1993, 120). This means that, in view of the increasing pressure of urban, mining and infrastructure demands for labour, land and food, the internal functioning of these communities must have changed.

4.2.2 Andean forms of mobility and exchange as a hedge to marginalization.

In the case of Carangas, its “survival” and the change adjustment of economic strategies has a great deal to do with the weak reverberation of urban, mining and infrastructure pressures. Still, booming markets in the broader region could never have thrived nor survived without the active participation of indigenous rural producers, caravan drovers and traders. The other way around, commodity markets foresaw in an additional income, a price for their wool or a salaried job as carriers. However, they did participate in a restricted ‘secondary’ position as access to these booming markets was “regulated” by the command of ‘primary’ actors (trading companies and their intermediaries) as well as by transport (dis)advantages, the abundance or lack of strategic resources and economic policy measures. At the other hand, the continuity in pre-existing inter-community barter relations provided the communities with a vital complementary livelihood source, making them less dependent upon commodity trade. In addition, the coercive factor of direct hacendado relations was absent in Carangas. As a result, the often anecdotal and usually little explicit details on trade activities in the province in reports by contemporaries, memoranda of association, inventories and litigations initiated by local trading companies in Carangas suggest a weaker link between local surplus production and the sketched commercial wool hierarchy.

The lack of transport infrastructure and technological innovation produced the loss of the region’s strategic position as a trade passage and mining district, reducing the comunarios’ access to interregional economic circuits as well as the local presence of the state, but meanwhile enabling them to safeguard the complementary exchange strategies of the community economy. Their marginality to economic expansion made the comunarios of Carangas relatively more reliant upon their inter-ecological (transnational) off-market networks for the circulation of complementary resources and mitigated the implications of the region’s infrastructural disconnectedness from

markets. However, this reorientation implied an increasing segregation of the overlapping (market and off market) circuits in which indigenous transporters and traders participated.

From the combination of the province's protracted marginalization and Andes' accelerated market integration the hypothesis can be formulated that the communities' inter-ecological network, which was in essence a cross-border network, functioned as a "negotiated" hedge to shrinking margins of peasant survival. This hedge was to large extent facilitated by the state's incapacity to control the border, yet this power vacuum implied that this hedge had to be "negotiated" with local commercial elites. This hypothesis forms the basis for a detailed analysis of how patterns of mobility and exchange changed under Bolivian liberalism. However, as my extensive elaboration of these patterns evolved towards a second dissertation, I decided to limit this section to a wrap-up of the most important findings.¹¹¹

First of all, these findings need to be placed within a longer time frame that of Carangas' protracted peripheralization. From a macro-economic perspective, Carangas shifted from a vital silver trade passageway to a rather marginal provider of the star players on the world market. Still, Carangas' entry to the regional and world (including labour) markets was mainly an international one. From Carangas' perspective, Tacna and Arica became the most important destinations and somewhat exclusive urban markets to be reckoned with.¹¹² Oruro, La Paz and Iquique had alternative or stronger ties to each other and to other hinterlands. Thus, the province found itself squeezed between Arica's strong links to La Paz and Pacajes and Tarapacá's link to Bolivia's southern departments and Argentina.

Its stronghold was the international border, along which trade houses and small mining operations were strategically established, connected to warehouses in the most important villages to store the products arriving from the Pacific ports. Given Arica and Tacna's preponderance, this chiefly concerns Carangas' north-western border, while

¹¹¹ However, large part of this reconstruction did find its way to this text, and was particularly important for sections 3.3, 4.2 and 7.1. The intention is to publish the findings of this economic analysis in separate publications.

¹¹² In colonial times, Arica was one of the most important Latin-American ports, the exit point for extracted silver and the entrance point for quicksilver and European commodities. After the war of the Spanish succession (1701-14), it even became the largest port of the South-American west coast (Dagnino 1909, 63). Also for Tacna, the silver route was crucial, already since the first exploitations under the colonial regime. Oruro, which at that time was developing fastly into a cosmopolitan city (Mendieta 2006), and secondary La Paz figured as the entrance gate to the markets of the Bolivian interior as well as Bolivia's booming tin production. However, these cities are hardly mentioned in sources that give account of Carangas' connection to regional markets. Even more remarkable is Potosí's absence, which still was an obvious attraction pole in the 1860s, but then seems to have waned completely, at least for the Carangas region.

little references can be found relating to the Sabaya-Huachacalla area that connected with Tarapacá. Via these routes, raw material producers in the rural communities were connected to international trade houses and to the vagaries of the world market. In 1910, Bacarreza counted 18 trading companies in Carangas which were all located close to the border crossing of Tambo Quemado (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 385). Also from other contemporary documents it appears that most -if not all- trading companies and depositories were established in localities close to the northern border of Carangas with the Arica province rather than in Corque or other villages close to the city of Oruro.¹¹³

The importance and maintenance of this Pacific connection has of course a much longer, pre-Hispanic roots, but must also be related to the paradoxical effect of the introduction (or not) of technological innovations in the province. With the breakthrough of the transport revolution the factor of infrastructure and transportation only gained in importance, particularly the introduction of the railway (1889) lowered prices and fomented the commercialization of raw materials as well as the import of manufactured goods.¹¹⁴ The Andean's physical unlocking reinforced the asymmetric balance of raw materials for manufactured goods. The consolidation of this shift was partially instigated by post-(Pacific)war geopolitical dynamics (Oporto 2007, 159). However, for Carangas it mainly reinforced its disconnection, as the railroad

¹¹³ Main trading villages were Curahuara de Carangas, Turco and Sajama. But the tambos on interregional and transnational routes counted as preferable localities for the establishment of trading companies. Although smaller trading posts existed at other points of these routes as well, the border exerted a dominant attraction with establishments in Tambo-Quemado, Cosapa, Changamoco or Titiri. From these strategic points, the vecinos controlled and monopolized the incoming and outflowing trade of the province, their eyes clearly focused on the Pacific. AJC, 1864, no. 962, fs. 4-5v; 1871, no. 1208, no. 1224, fs. 17-8; 1874, no. 1367; 1878, no. 5; 1890, no. 2160; 1892, no. 2191 and 1915, civiles, no. 45. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 40; 1923, no. 9, 10, 11 and 16; 1924, no. 15; 1925, no. 3 and 4.

¹¹⁴ Reports and statistic data from the first years of the 20th century on the increasing customs revenues from import and export taxes levied on Antofagasta-Oruro railroad transport give evidence of Oruro's ascendance as a commercial growth pole, counting with a considerable number of important trade houses (Ascarrunz 1905, 15; Mendieta 2006). Peru, accounting for almost the totality of alcohol importation, and increasingly Chile, were the main places from where imported goods entered the country via Oruro (Ascarrunz 1905, 25-30 and Sanjines 1905-6, 20). As for Chile, it was reported that the railroad connection, the territorial advance and the bilateral treaties had "*our territory practically converted in a free market for products and manufactures of that country*" while Bolivian exports to Chile remain extremely slight (Ascarrunz 1905, 26). Export revenues derived mainly and increasingly from tin and rubber. Also silver, although demonstrating a decreasing export rate, as well as copper and silver coins were important exportation products. Main export destinations for the Oruro economy were England (56,5%) and Germany (35,8%), and to lesser degree Chile (7,6%) and France (0,02%) (ibid, 25-9).

network circumvented the province¹¹⁵ and as motorized innovations displaced the role of llama travels.¹¹⁶ With a deficient road network and disconnected from the railroad expansion, Carangas suffered clearly from a regional comparative disadvantage. Until the second half of the 20th century, the province of Carangas lacked a permanent road connection to any outside urban or industrial centre. Despite elite pressures, plans for regional (road) integration between the Tarapacá and Arica region failed to gain governmental support.¹¹⁷

However, the effect of physical (UN)locking had a very double dynamic in Carangas. While lacking infrastructure immobilized the exploitation and expansion of potential resource frontiers, disconnection created extra freedom for (cross-border) mobility beyond governmental control and provided indigenous transporters, connoisseurs of all the “hidden” (and for modern transport impassable) roads with a comparative advantage. Somehow, a ‘vacuum’ for alternative routes and transport means was safeguarded, sustaining the maintenance of barter and caravan trade. But foremost smuggle and contraband counted as the most opted “complementary” activity, yet logically also the least visible. Previous to the “real” breakthrough of the province’s unlocking from the 1940s on, triggered by new modes of transport and progressively eroding the advantages of llama caravan trade, the “complex” combination of market and off-market exchange thus remained vigorous. The importance of the Pacific connection still lives on today, both in the region’s infamous smuggle reputation as in

¹¹⁵ A clear effect of the railroad’s introduction upon Carangas’ economic activities is noted in the declining circulation of silver across its roads. While the commodity continued to play part of its previously predominant role in the constitution of interregional trade routes throughout the 1860s and 1870s, there was less reported on the trade and transportation of silver and other metals and minerals through Carangas in later decades. A key factor, here, is the Oruro-Antofagasta line that entered in operation.

¹¹⁶ Although llama caravans trade upheld a comparative advantage locally, the transport revolution gradually eroded the long-standing and strong foothold in the transport sector upon which these societies rested. Those who profited from this revolution, were the ones able to acquire new transport means, which required their disposal of a sufficiently large start capital, that is, a large enough herd and the ability to increase their herd. Herd expansion enabled llameros to multiply their barter and trade profits. From the 1940s on, these profits allowed successful llameros to purchase motorized vehicles, which multiplied their incomes. However, they remained dependent from their access to transitable roads (West 1981; Rivière 1982, chapter 6).

¹¹⁷ The role of regions within the national economy was determined in function of its contribution to those revenues, which increasingly came from mining (and export), providing the eastern part of the Oruro department with a privileged treatment while the department’s western part was ignored. As a result, most regional industrial elites supported the railroad connection via Uyuni to Antofagasta and were indifferent towards a modern Iquique-Oruro highway connection despite regional lobbying at both sides of the border (González 2011a, 80-1). ANB, MI, 1885, tomo 225, no. 44, *Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro*. See also the map in the geographical appendix no. 1, indicating the proposed routes for the regional integration of Tarapacá (1864-1937) and note the clear ignorance towards Carangas’ southwestern connection to the Andean headlands via Colchane (Castro 2004, chapter 4, s.p.).

the memories and evocations of the nearness of the ocean and its economic function (see figures).




Figure 6 Left: fresco in the church of Sabaya depicting a bustling port with a railroad and (Andean) mountains in the background (own picture, Sabaya, March 2012).

Figure 7 Right: mural in Sajama depicting a llama at the shores of the Pacific (own picture, Sajama, October 2008).

However, the picture was not that rosy for community. The access to complementary products and income sources was increasingly complicated. This has to do with spatial reorganizations and the role of economic intermediaries. As is being discussed in other parts of this dissertation (3.1.2 and 6.2), the communities of Carangas were being deprived from their direct control over valley lands as their rented estates were confiscated, the end of a long enclosure process. Meanwhile, Carangas was being remodelled into a borderland. This had concrete repercussions on its economic activities, as the international border, with Peru and later Chile, was located at the intersection of market and off-market as well as legal and illegal circuits, converting all economic actors in the region, from small wool producers to big traders and border patrols into accomplices of contraband.

Related to the (attempted) expansion of land, labour and trade markets, governmental attention was increasingly drawn to the international border, particularly after the War of the Pacific and the subsequent 1904 border treaty with Chile. The influence of both the new and distrusted neighbour and the large-scale smuggle resulted uncontrollable (González 1929, 31; Castro 2011). Not only was the border attributed with the function of income source (through taxation), but also of legitimacy source (national integration). However, central state efforts at implementing the border as a barrier were counteracted by local responses converting the border into

permeable membrane.¹¹⁸ This is, in short, the “border paradox” at work in Carangas, facilitated by Carangas’ close relationship with the adjacent areas that stretched until the Pacific and the absence of roads or railways or any proper state infrastructure. This paradox was not only the locus of contestation between locals and central state powers, but also of an asymmetric reconfiguration of local power relations. The power vacuum left by the state on its borders provided cross-border economic players with an advantage, but this resulted in hierarchic constellation with trade houses, through their local agents, blocking market access for llamereros, reducing them to raw material producers and contracted transporters, excluding them as traders.

Time to take a look at Carangas’ merchant class. The success of their trade companies in Carangas relied on the exploitation of three regional strategic factors: the (pre-)colonial inherited routes that connected the Bolivian interior with the Pacific, the region’s resources (the soil’s rich mineral reserves and the favourable habitat for wool livestock), and the international border. Their activities sustained an asymmetric labour division that was instigated by the boom in saltpetre and tin extraction and the export of raw material in general. The role of Carangas’ communities in that division was mainly that of transporter, with the international wool market, the import trade of overseas products and high salt demand on the Chilean side structuring market mobility in the region, rather than the mining sector itself.

Elaborating further on the force of the wool market, a commodity chain can be detected that connects livestock producing comunarios to white-mestizo merchants in Carangas’ economic circuits. During the wool cycle which ran roughly from 1880 to 1930, local wool producers of Carangas became more tightly connected to a regional hierarchic trade structure, dominated by British trade houses.¹¹⁹ Today the llamereros of Carangas -still exporting and trading wool- recall the times “*when wool still had a good price*”.¹²⁰ The province counted as one of the country’s principal wool industry regions and became an important raw material provider of the developing world wool market.¹²¹ In line with Deborah Caro’s case study on the border community of Ulla Ulla, situated

¹¹⁸ This was nothing unique, but corresponded with the general state of Bolivia’s borders at the time (see also Démelas 1992).

¹¹⁹ From 1835 on, the cycle slowly primed with the introduction of an industrial loom appropriate for alpaca fibre and the subsequent establishment of European wool firms in Arequipa (Caro 1994, 29; Orlove 1977). Once this import-export link between the Central Andean wool market and Great Britain’s hegemony was created, the increasing demand from foreign and Peruvian export houses expanded and stratified this circuit, shaping a specific global commodity chain.

¹²⁰ Interview with don Celestino, don Sabino, don Eduardo, don Agapito and other elderly comunarios of Turco, Turco, 25.3.2012.

¹²¹ Other important wool producing districts were, LÍpez (which was divided into North and South LÍpez in 1917), Pacajes, Ingavi, Camacho, Muñecas and Caupolicán (Lima 1921, 49). See also chapter 7.

north from La Paz, the way in which Aymara herding communities were incorporated into the wool-exporting complex can be reconstructed (see Appendix 9).¹²² At the lower gears of this chain, the local household provided in the wool, mostly purchased “alive”. Once the wool was extracted, pastoralists continued to participate in this commodity chain as (contracted) caravan drovers (*arrieros*) or as depositors,¹²³ who connected to a network of petty purchasers. The latter brought the wool to wholesale agents who represented the international trade houses in wool-producing zones and from there supplied urban-based firms and merchants, usually trading with Great Britain.

This kind of octopus-commercial network that reached into remote corners of the province equally absorbed other locally produced commodities such as salt, pelts or charcoal. Parallel to wool livestock, these products circulated in market and off market circuits and their commercialization, transport and the smuggle was closely linked to the saltpetre industry, which constituted the structuring factor behind booming markets across the border.¹²⁴ Meanwhile, their “free” exploitation became increasingly contained by changing land (privatization) legislation, processes of proletarianization and the proliferation of truck transport (see 7.1). Through these processes, pastoralists were increasingly pushed out of the market circuit by intermediary merchants.

Notarial documents on the establishment of trading companies and lawsuits where commercial interests or concluded contracts were defended give an image of the people that made up the province’s merchant class, the companies they managed and the relations they developed with local households. In 1900, 286 “merchants”, partly foreigners, were registered in the province (Blanco, 2006 [1904]: LXXXII). This was a heterogeneous group in terms of gender,¹²⁵ ethnicity, class and nationality.¹²⁶ Elite

¹²² Based on Caro 1985 and 1994, 23-41.

¹²³ The obtained goods of ambulant traders dealing with other business affairs were guarded in storehouses before transporting everything to their employer. *AJC, Civiles*, 1902, no. 1; *Penales*, 1903, no. 14; *Civiles*, 1906, no. 3, f. 12v-15v.

¹²⁴ The labour and consumables provisioning hinterland of Tarapacá’s *oficinas salitreras* (saltpetre plants) reached until Cochabamba. Its cycle ran more or less in line with other booming sectors. *ITAR*, vol. 25, *Solicitudes*, 1927, “Oficio informando petición de agricultor de Coscaya para comerciar en las oficinas salitreras”, Iquique 1.3.1928, f. 147-147v. Lima 1921, 49; Castro 2004.

¹²⁵ Commerce in Carangas was all but a men’s world. Both indigenous shopkeepers as woman from the *vecindario* actively participated in Carangas’ commercial business. About the indigenous trade women very little is known except for sporadic traces (*AJC*, 1871, no. 1208). The women with direct contact to the bigger trade houses are more visible, particularly when they left a will or their shops were inventorized after their death. Eloisa Renfel managed a trade house in Changamoco and contracted transporters from other communities of the province (*AJC*, 1891, no. 2163). Other examples are Virginia Romana ran a trade business in Curahuara de Carangas and was an active money lenders (*AJC, Civiles*, 1901, no. 8) or Angélica Aguirre, a single trade woman residing in Toledo with ties to members of the Carangas *vecindario* (*AJC, Civiles*, 1906, no. 3, f. 12v-15v and 1907, no. 8), and Elisa Malavia, representative of the international trade house Casa Harrison y

formation and capital accumulation was no exclusive mestizo phenomenon but developed within communities as households able to differentiate their activities saw their incomes disproportionately increasing. Only those comunarios provided with start capital, that is, livestock property that was large enough to employ part of the herd in highland-valley transportation, could acquire a sufficient level of accumulation to participate in rural, urban and mining markets and in large-scale contraband activities, hence further increasing their economic power. Thereto, they competed and cooperated with other merchants, often establishing joint businesses. The most powerful merchants and trade partnerships established in Carangas were those that knew to combine several activities, with the most common option of combining retail or wholesale commerce –export of wool, import of alcohol and the internal provision of charcoal- with mining operations.¹²⁷ The transportation of their products was generally outsourced by contracting llameros as arrieros.¹²⁸

While these economic intermediaries clearly represented the richest segment of the province's population, still they occupied a marginal position within the interregional and transnational market sphere. The strongest entrepreneurs that were fully integrated in the broader scene exploited the province from a distance (as did big hacendados with their estates). By contrast, the merchants with a stronger foot in the village economy compensated their marginal position by consolidating their local power base with extra incomes derived from smuggle activities, the execution of governmental positions, including customs offices, and the opportunistic exploitation of these political positions. For the construction and maintenance of their client network these middlemen (often “middle women”) were highly reliant on the careful

Bötiger in Oruro (AJC, *Penales*, 1908, no. 8, f.4-7v and *Civiles*, 1910, no. 18), who both left an impressive inventory of merchandise and accumulated fortune.

¹²⁶ Next to provincial trade agent, there were urban merchants from Oruro or other nearby Bolivian, Peruvian or Chilean cities active on *caranguño* soil, next to foreigners from several European countries or the U.S.

¹²⁷ An example is the tin smeltery in Changamoco exploited jointly between the foreign merchants Lyons, Jefferson and Ortega and vecinos of the village of Turco (AJC, 1871, no. 1208). Another case is the trade company “López e Iraola de Tambo-Quemado” which aimed at “*encompassing the purchase of alpaca wools and the exploitation of a sulphur vein in the Caporata hill*” (AJC, 1892, no. 2191). The commercial partners, both powerful vecinos (and for some time corregidor) in respectively Turco and Curahuara, already collaborated since the 1860s but in 1892 expanded their business with the purchase of the trade company of Tambo Quemado.

¹²⁸ Within these contracted relationships, the arriero –indigenous llama herders- did the transport, his boss or contractor was responsible for the cargo costs. Usually arriero contracts are untraceable because they were made orally, except in some lucky occasions. Some examples are AJC, 1871, no. 1224, f. 4-7; 1875, no. 1425; 1886, no. 1906; 1891, no. 2163; 1895, no. 2286; *Penales*, 1906, no. 25, f.2. ART, *Serie Corte de Apelaciones*. Sub serie Causas Civiles. Legajo I, Cuaderno no. 27, 24.11.1880. In rare cases we find contracts made up among comunarios which could afterwards be used as proof for outstanding debts. AJC, 1871, no. 1224, f. 7; *Civiles*, 1913, no. 2.

manipulation of kinship and residence ties in order to secure their access to local natural resources and labour. Even though purchasers and sellers might create fictive kinship ties, comunario-merchant interaction was usually based on mutual distrust rather than reciprocity.¹²⁹ The implications of the ambiguity in local merchant's accumulation tactics should be further assessed and brings us to the "vecinos" of Carangas, in the next section of this chapter.

Not despite, but exactly because of their close ties to the comunarios and their resources, the vecinos contributed –even as marginal players on the world market– to the displacement of highland-valley reciprocity within what constituted a complex system in which barter and commercial exchange co-existed. The way in which commercialization gradually pushed rural households as secondary players into a homogeneous system has been coined by Temple as *economicidio*. This refers to the undermining of a people's ability to simultaneously create reciprocity relations and enter the market by changing the terms of interaction (Temple 1989, 2003). The imposed segregation between "traditional" and "modern" exchange went hand in hand with processes of stratification and monopolization, reflected in the consolidation of the vecinos class.

Still, the pastoralist households of Carangas remained rather marginal to the effects of that process, as they employed their "alternative" forms of mobility and exchange as a hedge to counter the market disadvantage of their disconnectedness. This is where we detect an "anti-commodity" side, yet the case of Andean transporters demonstrates that this side was far from "anti" but searched for complementarity. This dimension is essential to grasp how in the same way that some "spaces" of the market are not accessible for pastoralists, some "pastoralist" spaces are not (made) "accessible" for the market, reflecting one aspect of the unequal impact of market expansion (see also Mayer 1999). However, this hedge has been neutralized in the second half of the 20th century, when infrastructure innovations broke through. As the previously bartered products started to "come to them", moreover via much faster transport means, barter exchange rates decreases, leaving caravan trade to the poorest pastoralists (West 1981; Rivière 1982, 292-7).

¹²⁹ Because Andean economies operate according to an inter-ecological logic of circulation, in which products circulate "primarily within the group, transported by the producers or consumers themselves," the "typical indigenous traders of the central and southern Andes were and are not intermediaries" (Harris 1995, 305). Interesting is Harris' quotation of Bertonio, who in his Aymara dictionary of 1612 defines the "Indian style of trader" as "he who travels to other areas to acquire food," in opposition to "our sort of trader" (Bertonio 1985 [1612], cited in Harris 1995, 305). *Vocabulario de la lengua aymara* La Paz).

4.3 No commons without inroads: local elite intermediation.

Both the ayllus' legal-fiscal bonds to the state as their trade links to the broader economic space conditioned the margin for communal land control. Hence, the late 19th century changes in those connections forced them to renegotiate the terms of participation and autonomy within expanding state and market spheres. In this renegotiation, the *vecinos* (residents) surface as unavoidable yet ambivalent intermediaries, having consolidated their position as rural mestizo elite at the nexus between the ayllus and the state and between the ayllus and the market. Paradoxically, the strategies they developed to claim that position implied their gradual absorption into the community sphere, destabilizing the false image of two opposite (community-“outside”) worlds. Indeed, “*there are not two, but three participants in the process of exploitation*” (Wallerstein 2004, 293).

As will be further discussed in Part III, the strategies deployed on part of the commoners to fight the new land legislation, the outcome of their resistance and the reconfigurations in state-community relations cannot be understood regardless of the role played by the rural mestizos (Platt 1987, 283; Irurozqui 1993; Mendieta 2006 and 2010). Though originally inaccessible for the *vecinos* (for not pertaining to the community), the lands of the ayllu came to play a particular role in the way these elites sought to strengthen their local exploitation base. Given the observation that “community lands remained in hands of the community” in Carangas, this encroachment is hardly visible and (therefore) highly interesting. Even though it concerns a very small group, their broker role attributed them a two-faced streak, which deserves closer attention.¹³⁰ In order to fathom the ambiguity of *vecino* intervention in Carangas' land rights trajectory, this section will look into the origins and composition of these provincial elites and the margin they controlled to organize and optimize their livelihoods in Carangas. This will demonstrate the subtle *vecino* interferences in communal networks and will challenge the image of a uniform and closed hegemonic elite group.

4.3.1 Who are the *vecinos*?

First of all, what does “*vecino*” exactly denote? The meaning and the use of the term has been very different according to time and place across the Spanish speaking world. In

¹³⁰ This was also the topic of an earlier paper (Cottyn 2012b).

colonial Hispano-America, *vecino* was imported from 16th century Spain as a strict legal category of citizen to then shift into a more less formal title that alluded to one's public image and belonging to a particular community (Herzog 2003, 43-4). *Ciudadanía* (citizenship) was a status exclusively attributed to the fully vested (Spanish) town citizens who enjoyed the greatest degree of privilege (Abercrombie 1998, 46).

However, by the late colonial decades, the effects of an increasing differentiation process between commoners and their leaders, created an overlap between the indigenous elites and mestizo strata which hence could integrate into the "indio" strata and the accompanying communal authority system (Platt 1982, 29). Meanwhile, as a result of late colonial measures, the category of *vecino* was extended to a larger number of people. These measures were nurtured by growing aspirations to strengthen the administration's local presence on the countryside and, in view of the indigenous rebellion of 1780-'81, to undermine the power of the caciques. Thereto, the Spanish citizens forged an alliance with the mestizo population, against the ayllu (Platt 1982, 15-8). Concretely, the cacique was replaced by the corregidor as head of the province, reducing the cacique's area of operations to the most local level, where he had to share his attributions with the *alcaldes*, Spanish officers dispatched to execute this newly created judicial function. This was a major change compared to the colonially imposed principle that the *pueblos de indios* were prohibited terrain for non-indigenous people, except for the priest.

From the late 18th century on, thus, the rural villages became the scenery of new white and mestizo residents who integrated in the *vecino* class (Abercrombie 1998, 304-5). Conditional to their position, these newcomers had to negotiate their integration with the old cacique class, instigating a process of elite renovation. This forced the caciques to renegotiate their local power base, seeking to keep a balance between the defence of the people they represented and the safeguarding of their own authority in face of the newcomers' arrogations (Pauwels 1983, 178-83). Thus, as the *vecino* class expanded, a sort of ethnogenesis process developed in which the caciques at times exposed themselves deliberately to the Spanish world and its privileges, producing a growing gap between the indigenous commoners and a mixt rural elite (ibid, 184). In its strict sense, the qualification of *vecino* only corresponded to those members of the elite who executed a state or Church office, but it was also used more broadly to refer to all mestizo and white inhabitants of a rural village. Also its "neutral" meaning of "resident," regardless of one's status within that residence, continued to be used. In this dissertation, however, the use of *vecino* applies to the broad status category of the rural elite.

Who, then, where the *vecinos* of Carangas? Why and from where did they arrive to this region? The presence of these local elites must be linked to the economic trajectory of the province, and more particularly its mining history (Gavira 2011). The first permanent white and mestizo presence in Carangas, yet (apart from the priests) outside

the *pueblos de indios*,¹³¹ can be traced back to the early 17th century, when entrepreneurs settled in the mining district of Espiritu Santo de Carangas (Gavira 2010, 79). In the wake of the late colonial decline of the Potosí silver economy, most of them left the province as most mines were abandoned because of technological deficiencies and indigenous insurrections (Pauwels 2006, 332, 342 and 361). However, several families decided to stay and settled in the villages, continuing to exploit the region's mineral resources and the proximity of the ports of the Pacific and moreover attracted by the administrative job creation. Examples of "outsiders" seeking permanent anchoring in the province during that time are the Juan Crysóstomo López, Felix Blanco and Narciso Arias, "pioneers" of *vecino* families that would come to dominate public life in Turco.¹³² Dominant indigenous families that descended from the pre-Hispanic *kuraka* families, such as the Mamavillca, Chuquichambi and Layme, integrated into the *vecino* class.¹³³

The central state authorities applauded the settling of mestizos in the villages as the advent of a rural avant-garde. These intermediaries were attributed with the responsibility of stability, the column that would facilitate and permit the necessary level of local extraction and assimilation for the central state to optimize its institutional power.¹³⁴ Initially, they were also welcomed by the community members, convinced that their reading and writing capacities would bring progress to the countryside (Pauwels 1983, 179, 204). However, this enthusiasm would soon dampen in view of the gradual absorption by these new residents of all political and commercial power in the province.

¹³¹ In the 1720s, harms committed by *vecinos* to the indigenous population of the village of Huallamarca were reported to the court of Corque. The complaint concerned among others the usurpation of land. It was stated that "*in the villages of the Indians there live no Spaniards, negroes, mestizos or mulattoes,*" despite the fact that the Spaniards might have bought lands there. It was added that Spanish intervention in the *reducciones* was prohibited and caused troubles. AJC, 1721-2, no. 6, f. 1, cited in Pauwels 1983, 212.

¹³² The Spaniard Juan Crysóstomo established in Espiritu Santo de Carangas in the last decades of the 18th century until he moved with his son José Eugenio to the village of Choquecota to eventually settle down in Turco where he tried to gain control over the community lands. Due to their dominant presence in Turco, the López family was later remembered as the first *vecinos* arriving to Turco, yet also the Blanco and Arias settled in Turco around that time. AJC, Legajo 1 (1679-1796), 1787-1835, no. 144; Legajo 2 (1792-1809), 1798, no. 44 and 1808; Legajo 6 (1831-1832), 1832, no. 17, cited in Pauwels 1983, 212. The trajectory of the López has been assessed with more detail, in large part on basis of the work of Gilberto Pauwels (1983) and will reappear, illustrating the experience of Carangas' *vecinos* throughout this section and particularly in 7.3.2.

¹³³ Some of the most common family names still found in the 19th century *Revisitas* are Mamani, Villca, Choque, Chambi, Layme.

¹³⁴ This can be linked to theories about *mestizaje* as central nation-forming principle in 20th century Latin-America. Lorandi 2005; Telles and Garcia 2013.

4.3.2 Political and economic consolidation

The 19th century *vecindario* of Carangas was constituted by the non-indigenous families who had settled in the rural villages for a couple of generations and had intermingled with the ex-cacique families, and was further expanded by newly arriving Bolivian citizens and foreigners. Concentrated in the urban centre of the community while commoners occupied dispersed dwellings, the *vecinos* organized themselves in a separate world, distinguishing themselves from the community in religion, clothing, food and drinking preferences (Pauwels 1983, 225-36). The walls around that world were kept up through endogamous marriages, although this apparent closed community was crisscrossed by illegitimate relations with non-vecinos. Each village of the province was dominated by a small number of principal families whose names the people of Carangas still recall today.¹³⁵ Although these *vecinos* hardly represented 4% of the population of the province in 1910 (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 365), their presence redraws to a certain extent the autonomous position of the Carangas communities. In fact, the *vecindario* has been proposed as a kind of “multipersonal” hacendado (Platt 1982, 16; Irurozqui 1999, 717, footnote 26).

Their presence and strength varied according to local conditions. Corque was logically perceived as the centre of *vecinos* power, for constituting the capital of the province. According to the census of 1900, Corque was indeed the “whitest” place of the province (Blanco 2006 [1904], LXX). However, Bacarreza (1910, cited in Pauwels 2006, 365) –who’s counting seems more reliable– signals a major concentration of white-mestizo in Sajama, Carangas, Totorá, Chuquichambi, Curahuara, Turco, Cosapa, and the village of Carangas.¹³⁶ Bacarreza contended that the only villages in the province with the “required social conditions” for such function were Curahuara and Turco, where a couple of merchant families from other departments and from Peru resided (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 362). Rather than trade, Totorá’s elites based their power on the fertility of the soil, converting the village into what, among all places in Carangas, probably counted as the hacienda-like regime.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Also Eduardo Lima, in writing his report on the province in 1921, could easily point to the principal families of each canton (Lima 1921, 194).

¹³⁶ In contrast, Rivière sustains that Sabaya was free of any mestizo or other non-indigenous group exploiting the community lands (Rivière 1982, 222), although power relations in the village were of course not free from real inter-comunario differentiation.

¹³⁷ In 1921 a strong *vecindario* next to a “sad” indigenous population was reported, evoking the image of a sort of big estate (Lima 1921, 190). According to documents of 1700, recopiled in 1924, Spanish presence had been strong in this district, particularly in Tatasapana, burdening the ayllus of Totorá with frequent intrusions into their community lands and driving commoners away to other villages or the valleys. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 6.

The monopolistic position of the *vecinos* was based on a tactical combination of their political and their economic power. This combination allowed for their exponential accumulation trajectory and consolidation as inescapable mediators. This trajectory was “initiated” by the incomes of their administrative job and/or their commercial activities. The (exponential) accumulation of these inputs, then, was based on an increased access to exploitable local resources which they obtained by means of subtle dependence relations with the commoners and more brutal inroads on their livelihood assets.

In comparison to commoners who could also rely on their access to community land, finding additional income sources was a vital condition for the settlement of the *vecinos*. Under republican rule, the central state reinforced their residence and local power by attributing them the exclusive responsibility of representing the state’s interests, as well as those of the Church, at the provincial and village level (Pauwels 1983, 42 and 218-20). Thus, the *vecino* families divided all state and religious offices among their own members, clearing the way for a monopolistic political, juridical, educational and ecclesiastic control over community life.¹³⁸ While peopling the most local levels of the state administration and its jurisdiction, they also claimed the function of community attorney to defend local demands before that same state. This double stance before the community provided them with legal and extra-legal accesses to community and household resources and surplus labour. Most information we have on these tactics is from accusations of authority abuse by the local population, fellow (rival) *vecinos*, and governmental commissioners inspecting the province.

In the first place, the village elite depended heavily on the free labour force of the commoners. The independent republican rule, the colonial *mita* regime was no longer maintained, but *corvée* continued to be extracted at the local level through the *fiesta-cargo* system which was extended with multiple personal obligations (which would persist until even after the National Revolution of 1952, despite their suppression under the Villaroel government at the Indigenous Congress of 1945).¹³⁹ Postilions, *mayordomos* and other auxiliary *cargos* assisted the *vecinos* in the execution of their public offices while domestic workers, herders and handymen simplified their private activities. Apart from their free labour, this also required material contributions such as fire wood, food

¹³⁸ In Turco, for instance, the position of *corregidor* was from 1860 to 1892 in hands of Juan López and four of his sons without interruption. During the same episode, his sons also occupied several times the office of judge and of all official functions registered since independence until 1860, half of the terms of office were fulfilled by members of the López family (Pauwels 1983, 702-8).

¹³⁹ The extensive complaints expressed by the originarios of Huachacalla against Nicolás Rafael in 1810 gives an idea of the comprehensiveness and weight of this extractive system. ACES, “Razón de los derechos obencionales y fiestas que se celebran en cada año en la iglesia parroquial de Juachacalla.” 1810.

and money. The exaggerated reliance upon this unpaid labour continually defied the limit between tolerated duties and unacceptable exactions. This resulted in an increasing number of complaints about outright vecino abuses such as by “*Velasco who in ill-fated times came to settle in the village of Totora and who has become obsessed with living from the sweat of the unhappy Indian, falsely accusing them, with the calculated purpose of extracting his money and livestock in order not to live without troubles.*”¹⁴⁰

However, in taking the vecinos’ illegitimate exactions and usurpations to court, the comunarios were confronted with another apparatus which the local vecindario had put to its service. In fact, the juridical framework had been imposed at their service by central state powers. Eduardo Lima observed in 1921 how the way in which the judicial power was organized at the cantonal level (the *jueces parroquiales*), by the *ad honorem* employment of incompetent villagers, mostly illiterate (and therefore needing an assistant who also needed remuneration), fomented corruption (Lima 1921, 104-5). Demanding their indigenous “clients” to pay them with livestock, labour and money, these local judges converted their function into a direct revenue source, “a sort of complement to their material interests.”¹⁴¹

Not only from within, but also as “clients”, the vecinos knew to manipulate the juridical instruments created by that apparatus. “*In the position of strongest and of white origin,*” vecinos either unjustly accused “ignorant Indians” or misleadingly claimed to act as their representatives before court, in order to seize their possessions. One vecino was accused of “*at the one hand, continuously making arrangements with the indigenous class, figuring himself as attorney and also as authority, receiving money or livestock, in order to make the opposing party lose the case: in the second place, he intervenes in livestock property whose owner died, and collects money or other species without informing his superiors.*”¹⁴² This latter strategy of claiming property as vacant, regardless of the concerned goods or livestock effectively had a rightful owner or not.¹⁴³ A very “popular” way to gain closer access to others’ property was to act as executor (*albacea*), a privileged position often fraudulently obtained and equally exploited.¹⁴⁴ By adopting the juridical figure of community

¹⁴⁰ Own translation. AJC, *Penales*, 1912, no. 23. Also the López were subject to similar complaints, with Gregorio López being accused in 1893 of stealing 64 llamas, he argued that he was merely following orders of his superiors (amongst whom his brother). AJC, 1893, no. 2257.

¹⁴¹ “*It is with very rare exception, that citizens of scarce skills to efficiently execute these offices, which converts them into a secure medium for unworthy speculation, of which the Indian becomes the victim, who in any reclamation he formulates before these authorities, is sucked up in an exaggerated and despicable way.*” Own translation. Lima 1921, 104.

¹⁴² AJC, *Penales*, 1905, no. 17.

¹⁴³ Referring back to the López family, Juan de la Cruz was accused by his brothers-in-law of having appropriated his wife’s property after her death. AJC, 1886, no. 1920 and 1888, no. 2031.

¹⁴⁴ The corregidor of Choquecota, Francisco Molina, was in 1878 accused of having himself made appointed as albacea through fraud. AJC, 1878, no. 1596. Moving again to the López, Juan de la Cruz and his brothers Gregorio

attorney (*apoderado*), vecinos tended to even further let their socio-economic position even further depend on the community sphere.

Not only did the vecinos manipulate their lucrative broker role in the extension of the state's administrative and juridical tentacles into the countryside, but knew to make a living from a parallel middlemen position in the communities' connection to broader economic spheres. As the number of political offices and their remuneration was limited, their engagement in trade and extractive activities was a necessary complement in their accumulation trajectory or sometimes their full-time occupation.¹⁴⁵ By taking advantage of the province's mineral reserves and of the simultaneity of a high cross-border mobility with a precarious state capacity to control and tax this mobility, the vecinos constituted part and parcel of "*a new layer of commercial intermediaries*" (Larson 2004, 223). They consolidated their economic power base by establishing or representing trade houses in border settlements, halting posts or in the villages, by exploiting small mines, or by occupying an office in customs and other governmental functions.

These are the people managing the trade companies that connected Carangas to the world market (4.2.). However, within the province's heterogeneous merchant class, a differentiation can be made between a white group closer attached to the urban and world market and generally with foreign roots,¹⁴⁶ and a mestizo group closer attached to the village life and integrated in the provincial vecindario. Gregorio López is a good example of how the vecinos actively contributed to the connection of the province to transnational commercial circuits through the establishment of companies and trade partnerships.¹⁴⁷ Guillermo Pfeng, merchant with German roots and vecino in Curahuara

and Guillermo managed to be named "albacea" of several comunarios in Turco and accordingly claiming part of their inheritance. AJC, 1861, no. 847, fs. 9-11; 1870, no. 1176 and 1871, no. 1201 and no. 1224, fs. 14-17; 1879, no. 1611, f. 3v; 1886, no. 1919, fs. 1-5.

¹⁴⁵ A clear example of a vecino who built his fortunes on basis of his economic activities is don Eufasio Ortega, son of miner and azoguero Manuel Santiago Ortega and Marta Trujillo, married to doña Braulia López. His will is the best indication of the kind of activities he developed (his inheritance include shops, houses and "typical" vecino livestock such as donkeys, horses, cows, sheep and only a little bit of llamas, pointing to trade activities, but also *sayaña* rights which point to cultivation, probably for forage). It also indicates the multi-sidedness of these activities (in Turco, Todos Santos, La Rivera, Carangas, Corque) and with whom he entered into trade (debts pending from other vecinos). AJC, *Civiles*, 1904, no. 3.

¹⁴⁶ An illustration of the settlement and activities of the former group is the trade company in Changamoco that was run by Tomas Lyons, a U.S. merchant, Juan Jefferson, a British merchant based at Arica, and Juan Ortega, a Spanish merchant appointed as chair of the company. Their business consisted of the exploitation of a warehouse for all sorts of merchandise and of a mining plant for the smelting of tin. AJC, 1871, no. 1208.

¹⁴⁷ Gregorio López did not directly depend upon any international trade house but performed quite similar activities to the "foreign" merchant element in the province. One of his enterprises was the "trading company López and Iraola of Tambo-Quemado" which he had bought with another merchant in 1892 to trade alpaca

de Carangas, was an in-between case, holding a foot in both the “international” as the vecino world.¹⁴⁸

Throughout their “accumulation trajectory,” vecinos put their political authority at the service of their economic strength, and the other way around, preferably by occupying strategic administrative and trade positions at the same time. This mutual reinforcement of political and economic interests was sustained by a complex of accumulation tactics.¹⁴⁹ But for many vecinos, social community networks, formed around the fiesta-cargo system but also through *compadrazgo* bonds, also were incorporated into their “field of activity,” hence giving them access to a key instrument in the acquisition and distribution of material and symbolical credit among the members of the community. Their insertion into social networks of the communities went hand in hand with an increased level of exploitation from (and hence resistance

wool and extract sulphur nearby Turco. He also established a trade company with José Maria Loayza, a miner from Corocoro, and other powerful vecinos of Carangas, including his father Juan de la Cruz and Maximino Zubieta, to import and export liquor, wool and livestock between Oruro and the Pacific. Moreover, he exploited the trade house “López and brothers” in Titiri, close to the international border. AJC, 1865, no. 962, fs. 4-5v; 1873, n° 1224, f. 17 and 1892, no. 2191.

¹⁴⁸ Although Guillermo was based at the city of Oruro, the marriage between Guillermina Pfeng –probably his sister- and the corregidor of Curahuara, Gregorio Iraola, may be an indication of the local rooting of Pfeng. AJC, 1877, no. 1534. Guillermo Pfeng was a very active merchant, yet this brought him at times in conflict with other commercial enterprises of the region. While controlling several warehouses on and nearby Carangas’ northwestern border crossing in Tambo-Quemado and frequently crossing the southwestern border check point in Pichagas with overseas importation products, he also headed a mining company in Yarvicolla, Turco, and represented *Blondel i Compañía*, a major trade house of Oruro with its principal basis in Tacna, South Peru. AJC, 1869, no. 1083 and no. 1124; 1871, no. 1194; 1873, no. 1248, fs. 19-22v. APO, *Libros de contabilidad*, 1880, “Libro de aduanas”. AJHO, 178-2, 1870, no. 50.

¹⁴⁹ Again gratefully recurring to the fascinating case of the López family, this complex entailed the combination of licit incomes from their political and juridical offices, their commercial activities and their agro-livestock properties (mainly livestock and forage cultivation in function of their trade activities) with sale transactions and matrimonial strategies, as well as with illicit revenues derived from juridical manipulations, fraud and usurpations, often “under pretext” of their official range of duties. This allowed Juan López to amass a patrimony that included at his death in 1883 several houses, sold and inherited, and terrains in Turco, furniture, gold and silver objects, and an animal stock of 400 sheep, 200 donkeys, 40 llamas with their young, 10 cows and 20 horses. Moreover, his marriage with his first wife had brought in additional assets, which were then increased under joint household management. The total value of his patrimony was estimated at a couple of thousand pesos, but part of that sum was squandered in loans and charity works. In 1887, his illegitimate son Juan de la Cruz leaving “substantial properties”, valued at 11000 to 20000 pesos and comprising the property of the trade post and mining enterprise at Titiri, result of an even greater accumulation than realized by his father. Large part of his possessions, including houses, farms, livestock, money and gold objects, were obtained matrilineally. Critical to add, both Juan and his son enjoyed hereditary usufruct rights over *sayaña* land (an apparent incongruity in vecino wills that will be explored below). AJC, 1883, no. 1713; 1894, no. 2281; 1886, no. 1920; 1887, no. 1992 and 1888, no. 2031. See also Pauwels 1983, 212-27; Cottyn 2012b.

by) the local population and with a further “alienation” from (and hence opposition by) the national elites. However, it also implied their relative impoverishment in pure material terms, stemming from their deliberate participation in community dynamics.¹⁵⁰ Another inbuilt constraint of vecino accumulation strategies was the fact that their dominance over village life and the region’s economic assets generated inter-elite competition.¹⁵¹ There was indeed a remarkably high number of inter-vecino disputes, going from rather innocent defamations to cases where “*almost the entire vecindario of Llanquera is involved in the crime of several murders.*”¹⁵²

4.3.3 The “reversion” of the vecinos.

The vecino monopolization of the link between the community and the government endowed them with a double-edged mission. As agents of nationalization, civilization and evangelization they represented the central state and church powers, while simultaneously acting as the local representatives of the community’s interests before the legislative and executive powers. The combination of their broker role yet marginal to the ‘national scene’ with their quest for a maximal profit rate converted them into exploiters while meanwhile being exploited (Zibechi 2012, 196).

However, both poles of this doubleness were ambiguous in itself. Towards the government, they simultaneously acted as defenders of central state (and treasury) interests and as abusers of those interests, through daily corruption and smuggle. Towards the community, their exploitation went hand in hand with a certain form of interdependence, in order to secure an access as unrestricted as possible to the region’s economic resources. The strategies deployed by vecinos to pragmatically intrude in communitarian social networks went as far as taking up a formal indigenous identity by registering in the commoners’ taxpayers lists. For the sake of their consolidation, provincial merchants created political and social/kinship relations and shared their

¹⁵⁰ As will be further illustrated in later chapter, the López family made intensive “use” of the community sphere (even as commoners themselves), but as participation in these networks required considerable investments of time and capital, in return for a higher social status within the community, the renowned Juan López, just as many rich *caranqueños*, ended his life relatively impoverished. AJC, 1883, no. 1713.

¹⁵¹ The fact that sharing such a small world provided with limited resources unavoidably created conflicts is colourfully illustrated in the criminal record of “the famous indigenous” Gregorio López –as he was called by a fellow vecino who accused him of having subtracted property from commoners. During the 1880s, Gregorio was incessantly sued for slander, offences, mistreatment and injuries against other vecinos, including a murder attempt against his own brother Guillermo because of a due loan. AJC, 1877, no. 1542; 1883, no.1741 and no.1744; 1885, no. 1860, no. 1874; 1886, no. 1952 and no. 1896.

¹⁵² AJC, *Penales*, 1905, no. 2.

complicity in smuggle practices with pastoralists, thereby pushing the vecinos further into the “world” of the comunarios. The result was their anchoring in the community, not only as formal representatives but in several cases also as proper indigenous *comunarios*, which at its turn had important implications for its relation with the state and the national elites. The “anchoring” of the vecinos and the implications this had for the potential safeguarding of a margin for communal land control begs for further inquiry in order to properly understand the ambiguous vecinos intervention in the unrolling of the land reform process in Carangas.


The clue to this ambiguity must be searched in the double identity adopted by a considerable part of the vecinos. By combining different documentation on individual vecinos, it can be revealed how several villagers knew to complement their non-indigenous privileges with the advantages of communal land access. A very obvious/striking case is the already mentioned Gregorio López. As will be more reconstructed with more details in chapter 7.3.2, he descended from Spanish lineage which only a couple of generations before integrated in the vecindario of Carangas. His commercial and political activities, indicated above, show that he clearly upheld his vecinos status, but at the same time he was registered in the padrón of ayllu Collana, in Turco and his name repeatedly appears in petitions for *sayaña* adjudication, justified by his *originario* status. Gregorio’s case shows how vecinos consciously adopted mechanisms to flexibly move between two –supposedly mutually excluding- worlds in function of the opportunities that arose.¹⁵³

Apart from fascinating individual cases, statistical sources also point to this overlap. In 1910, Bacarreza noted that while the vecinos population had been incessantly growing over the last century, the number of mestizos in the province had started to reduce. According to his calculations, they still counted for about one third of the province’s population in 1835, to only represent 1,55% by 1910 (Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 343). In the shorter interval between the national census of 1900 and Bacarreza’s survey there is a considerable reduction in mestizo-white presence (from 13% to 2%) in contrast to an absolute increase of the indigenous population, from 15696 to 26779 (Blanco 2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV; Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 365-6; Pauwels 1983, 232-5).

Table 11 The proportion in indigenous and mestizo-white presence in Carangas, 1835-1910.

¹⁵³ His case is further scrutinized in relation to the entire López family in 7.3.2 and forms the central storyline of a previous article (Cottyn 2012b).

Indigenous and mestizo-white population in Carangas, 1835-1910.




Although the reliability of the numbers presented in the 1900 census and by Bacarreza's report is disputable (a high vecinos population allowed a village to claim a 'higher' economic and cultural status), this graph clearly points to a shifting balance in ethnic relations. Because of the statistical manipulations, it is difficult to make waterproof statements about this alteration, but comments by contemporaries were all unanimous in stressing low white-mestizo presence.¹⁵⁴ However, different categories were at play, which make it difficult to establish the exact number of vecinos. At the other hand an analysis of these different forms of categorization exactly point to the emerging overlap of which the case of Gregorio López testifies. Vecinos were categorized in racial-ethnic terms as white-mestizo, representing 418 (1,55%) in habitants in 1910 (Bacarreza 1910 cited in Pauwels 2006, 350-403). In fiscal terms, the vecinos were considered as "urban without land" (contrary to the *sayañeros* who were "rural with land"), of which only 317 were counted (1,17%) in 1910. In contrast, Bacarreza counted 983 "civilians" (3,61%), inhabitants with electoral rights.¹⁵⁵ When

¹⁵⁴ The sub-prefect of Carangas commented in 1898 that among his subjects "everybody is indigenous, only 1% of mestizo race and 0.5% of Spanish race." This argument was used to explain the impossibility of collecting fines in his province (Own translation. Aramayu 1898, Anexo, xii-xiii). In the national census 1900, in contrast, white-mestizo presence tended to be overemphasized, indicating a number of 2416, which was almost entirely a concentrated in Corque (2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV). In 1910 one year later, Bacarreza (under-)reported no more than 418 whites and mestizos (Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 365-6).

¹⁵⁵ One year before, 1138 people with civil rights were counted (Ascarrunz 1909, 103). In 1927, only 765 "civilians" were counted in the province (Calderón 1927, 11), but two years later official lists registered 1081 civilians (Gonzalez Flores, 34).

putting these numbers together, an overlap surfaces, indicating that a relatively large share of the minor elite population was, despite of belonging to a non-indigenous ethnic group, identified as indigenous and/or having access to community lands while at the same time enjoying civil rights.

Table 12 Population division of the Carangas province according to land access and ethnicity, 1910 (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006).



What we observe is a more complex phenomenon that resulted to be quite widespread among the *vecinos*. In view of the strong communal hold over the land, *vecinos* developed other strategies to get a grip on the land. For that purpose, they were prepared to “humble” themselves and adopt the status of indigenous *contribuyente*, including its fiscal obligations. This implied a confusing and intensifying interaction with and within the community that generated a new class of “*vecinos-originarios*” (Mendieta 2006, 778), which I will define more broadly as “*vecino-comunarios*”. Over time, these so-called “*vecino-comunarios*” who obtained a foot in both “worlds” became deeper entrenchment in communal affairs.

This phenomenon corresponds to a slow, subtle absorption process that defies clear-cut dichotomist interpretations of Bolivia’s rural society. Contemporary national elites, however, interpreted the simultaneous adoption of different ethnic and social statuses by the people entrusted with the “nationalization” of the province as an assimilation process that went in the “opposite” direction of how Bolivia’s future rural classes were envisioned. In 1910, Bacarreza commented that

“the mestizo race which, during colonialism was numerous, has considerably decreased since the depopulation of the mines of Carangas, and tends to disappear because of the emigrations and the consequent process of reversion to the primitive race; phenomenon which is observed almost daily in the marriages.”¹⁵⁶

The comments by contemporaries about this reversion refer to an intermediary phase in a longer process of integration. In that sense, the *vecino-comunarios* give testimony of an evolution that started superficially but gradually gave way to a more fundamental ethnic absorption process. In fact, we find the *vecino-comunarios* on the turning point where the consolidation of their elite position culminated in their incorporation into the local community. In search for additional revenue sources, several *vecinos* attempted at complementing their urban and mineral landholdings with agrarian lands,¹⁵⁷ which were in communal hands, and effectively gained control over most cultivable terrain by the late 19th century (Pauwels 1983, 216 and 222-4). In effect, the maintenance of their power position came to involve manoeuvres to gain access to non-alienable property, which involved an “alternative” encroachment of community lands. However, effective occupation of community land was impossible despite the registration as *contribuyente* and the consent of the community given the prevalence of *comunarios* over *vecinos* and their concerns regarding this additional demographic pressure on the land (Mendieta 2006, 776-7). Hence, this land usurpation went hand in hand with a process of “contribuyentization” and a pragmatic extension of *vecino* networks into the community sphere. By acquiring a double identity, they simultaneously enjoyed all the privileges provided by their *vecino* status as the access to community land provided by their *sayañero* status.¹⁵⁸

This subtle process of land appropriation by (initially) non-community sectors is a known yet understudied phenomenon that entails a clue to the specific land rights trajectory of community areas such as Carangas. The implied forging of social and fiscal bonds to the state and the community as *contribuyentes* conferred the *vecinos* a stake in preventing the state from intervening in the regulation of community land and hence

¹⁵⁶ Own translation, emphasis is mine. Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 364.

¹⁵⁷ *Vecinos* were active in the land market in urban plots, which counted as private property, as well as in mining concessions, as has been discussed above (7.1).

¹⁵⁸ This double identity can be detected by linking different archival sources such as wills, inventories, *sayaña* adjudications and the *padrones*. In the case of Antonino Morales, the inventory of his possessions and his share in copper mining point to his wealth and *vecino* status, but at the same time he was registered as *contribuyente* “of several *ayllus*” and had passed as *alférez*. *AJC, Civiles*, 1916, no. 13, 14 and 28. As the López family will demonstrate further on, the names of government officers and mestizo merchants can also be traced back in the *Revisita* records. Also wills can give an indication as with Eufrasio Ortega, a rich *vecino* from the vice-canton of Carangas whose will included a *sayaña*. *AJC, Civiles*, 1904, no. 3.

avoid the sale of their (usurped) lands through auction. While at the one hand “compensating” Carangas’ “freedom” from an established hacendado class, the particular usurpation strategies of the *vecino* class nurtured their gradual erosion and mitigated the ‘rupture’ of the 1952 National Revolution and the 1953 anti-hacienda uprising. This particular dimension of Carangas’ experience of the land reform will receive more attention in 7.3.2.

To conclude Part II

This second part of the dissertation has assessed the incorporation of Carangas and of its constituting communities and households as a rural sub-zone of a regional production system which has been defined as the Central-Andean social agro-pastoralist system. More specifically, it has assessed how the integration of this production system within broader frameworks and processes for governance and exchange increasingly subjected those households and communities to pressures to assimilate to homogeneous frameworks for access management and decision-making. This reconstruction has allowed me to specify central factors in the formation and transformation of production, exchange and regulation in Carangas. These specified factors will enable me to scrutinize the impact of changing land legislation for the comunarios of Carangas.

In **ecological** terms, 19th century Carangas presented excellent conditions for llama-based pastoralism, which continues to constitute the “pillar” of rural livelihood construction, while offering limited strategic resources with potential to rouse land purchase and other extractive incentives on part of private landlords. In **demographic-ethnic** terms, the region was predominantly “indigenous” which goes together with a particular fiscal and legal status and left governmental representation over the region to a very small mestizo-white elite group. The region’s ‘exclusion’ from the ongoing transport revolution and the pastoralists’ alternative accesses to circuits for resources and labour hindered commercial and industrial entrepreneurs in channelling its extractable resources to the world **market**, whose forces are a third factor. While lack of communication and institutional infrastructure also undercut the **state’s institutional power** and its grip on the region, it constrained the comunarios’ fiscal potential to colonially inherited asymmetrical relation and was in return forced to commit itself to the protection of their collective land rights. While conditioned by that fiscal relation, **communal agency** tapped into long-standing structures and mechanisms for communal regulation, which were secured by a negotiated margin for autonomy, which was however locally interfered by the ambiguous intermediation of a minor yet powerful elite group.

PART III. Keeping enclosure at bay.

Introduction to Part III.

A fluctuating law with a differentiated reach.

Rather than a quick and clear-cut division surgery, Bolivia's first land reform law launched a long, conflictive and fluctuating legislation and implementation process. In the words of Barragán, *exvinculación* cannot be reduced to a single act or coherent policy line but presents a long process that has a formal and an operative dimension (Barragán 2012, 25). While its formal dimension is reflected in the way ideological debates were "translated to the paper" in the form of decrees, its operative dimension is reflected in how these decrees were "translated on the ground". Most interestingly, Barragán demonstrates how this first dimension, which is most strongly transmitted through the sources at our disposal, is oriented towards the destruction and replacement of the old (colonial) order, while its second, less obvious dimension ironically reflects a continuity of the old order through the "flooring" of the envisioned new (liberal) order (Barragán 2012).

The success of this "flooring" can only be understood in the light of prevailing economic incentives and constraints that overruled the law's ideological justifications, inter-elite struggle, and of the communal defence of collective land rights. "On the paper", the translation of the aggressive discourse in which communitarian land administration equalled colonialism and land privatization progress into laws and taxes was hampered and modified due to the State's fiscal bonds and indigenous pressures. "On the ground", its implementation was hindered by the State's bureaucratic incapacity, its reach checked by (often violent) communal resistance and its results coloured by regional variations in the power relations that structured the countryside.

The bottom line of the reform was that indigenous and dominant groups entered a single land market, falsely assuming that they were equal partners. The reality –and the irony– was that the reform provided the landlord class with a favourable legal tool, materializing in a massive expansion of the hacienda between 1880 and 1930, rather than a strong smallholder class (Klein 1993). This is particularly true for the broader La Paz region, where enclosure manifested itself in its most dramatic way as well as in the

Cochabamba valleys, which depicts however a stronger “peasant road”. Both regions have generally attracted most attention in the research on Bolivia’s liberal reforms in relation to the country’s rural population, which explains why the idea of the hacienda’s omnipresence on the pre-revolutionary Bolivian countryside is so strong. The dominant line of inquiry that backs this idea is the question to what extent the liberal land reform measures enabled the hacienda complex to offset the share of indigenous communities and to what extent the latter managed to endure as Bolivia was increasingly caught in in the world market’s net.

My approach to Bolivia’s land question, however, goes beyond the dual community-hacienda question and the exaggerated emphasis on the (peri-urban) La Paz region and the Cochabamba region, seeking to revalue the differentiated experiences of less visible areas and players.⁴⁶⁰ From altiplano herding communities over valley sharecroppers to Amazonian groups, there were different implementation trajectories with different economic incentives at play, resulting in a very “uneven” transformation of rural Bolivia (Irurozqui 1999, 708-9; Jackson 1997).

“Clearly we cannot reduce local and regional variations of indigenous-state relations to one seamless “Andean experience of liberalism” – whether it be construed as massive ayllu divestiture and “ethnocide” under liberalism, resurgent ethnic movements of communal defense, or peasant family strategies of land acquisition” (Larson 2004, 226).

A notable instance of “unevenness” has crystalized in the vast highland zones that played no direct role in the 1880-1930 enclosure movement, apparently located beyond the reach of the *exvinculación* law. Carangas and its southern neighbour Lipez, which covered the west of the Potosí department, appear together as the sole hacienda-free provinces of the country’s established departments (excluding the eastern lowlands) during the pre-revolutionary republican period (Rivière 1982, 99). Here, the aspired transition got bogged down in endless delay. Remarkably, the particular experience seems to constitute unexploited terrain; a void that should not be excused by the absence of hacienda dynamics nor by the difficult source situation.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁶⁰ An example of exaggerated emphasis on La Paz region is Choque’s statement that Jesús de Machaca was the only marka surviving out of the hacienda system in the pre-1953 period (Choque Canqui 2008).

⁴⁶¹ Even though the department is the scenery of the quite dramatic experience in the community of Peñas (see 5.3), there is little literature that directly and exhaustively addresses the effects of the 1874 law in the Oruro. However, important publications with regard to this period and region (or related regions) include Rivière 1982; Platt 1982; Pauwels 1983; Ayllu Sartañani 1992 and 1994; Sanjines 2005; Urioste, Barragán and Colque 2007; Mendieta 2010.

Exclusively entailing altiplano lands, concrete steps towards the *exvinculación* of community lands never materialized *within* these provinces, but did dismember it from the distant valley lands rented by a number of communities, for becoming classified as “residual,” excess land. As a consequence, these provinces presented from the “outside” a picture of insulated communities, cut off from their ecologically complementary land property and hence from the incomes its rent produced. This constraint on the communities’ land base diversity reinforced their disconnectedness from the wider (agricultural) world. In the “home communities”, practically all land remained under *ayllu* control, apart from mining concessions and the private plots in the rural towns, and the *contribuyente* population remained exempt from cadastral registration and taxation. This observation that no community lands were divided or sold further strengthens the idea of an enclave, an isolated island. Yet, the image derived from an “inside,” close assessment of what happened at the very local level is much more dynamic and interconnected (though not “in the eye of the storm”) situation.

Questions and hypotheses

Recurring to the guiding questions of the case study, this third part of the dissertation seeks to gain insight into how *exvinculación* was kept at bay in Carangas and which repercussions this particular experience had on the organization of rural life on the longer term.

In line with the proposed dissection of frontier processes into different dynamic phases, the first question includes following sub-questions:

In search for the incorporation purpose behind the land reform, this enquiry starts with assessing the objective of the law and its scope. What were the ideas driving legislators? How did they envision and plan the implementation of the law and what tools were developed thereto? Did the proclaimed stipulations alter over time? It then assesses the local impact of that incorporative drive and the “reach” of the law’s impact. How was the law ‘brought’ to the region/people? Which implications did the law have on the existing relation between the central state and its subjects? Which effect did the law install upon that relation? What were the obstacles in implementing the law?

The impact of the law must be related to the responsiveness of local actors to the objective of the law and the pressures it effectively exerted in order to assess how the law was negotiated. How was the law received? What were the arguments/motives for protest or acceptance? When (in which context) was decided to go over to the offensive? How did legal action take shape? Why/When did protest erupt in violent uprising and when did spontaneous action evolve into more organized strategies? What were the tools, the leaders and the targets of this responsiveness? What were the demands and what were the successes of opponents to the law?

The fourth aspect of this incorporation “trajectory”, then, concerns its so-called “feedback” effect, that is, very broadly, how new dynamics were “inserted” into the land reform process that “deviated” its course.

My assessment of these questions is nurtured by a set of hypotheses that beg to be “tested”. With regard to the purpose of the law, Barragán’s suggestion of a fluctuating law is key. With this fluctuation she points to the oscillations in its implementation, but also to the deviation of its content, converting the abolishing law into a titling and taxing law (Barragán 2012, 26). This points already to a feedback loop in the land reform process that altered its ambition. Regarding the reach of the law, Boone’s argument must be taken into account, maintaining that the state sometimes makes a deliberate decision to not incorporate particular territories or their people (Boone 2003). In that respect, the case of Carangas seems to support the statement that property rights regimes emerge and are consolidated where they there are strategic resources to be controlled (Cole and Ostrom 2012, see Clay and Wright, and McDowell). Another factor that may have influenced such state decision is the state’s fiscal bonds to the people upon which the new legislation was imposed, where Platt’s emphasis on the key role of the state-community pact comes into play.

In relation to the responsiveness inscribed in incorporation processes, and despite powerful external factors that kept Carangas marginal to the land reform process, I maintain the hypothesis that the communities of Carangas were not simply “overlooked” but actively “fought” themselves out of the “scope” of the law. Historical research on communal resistance against *exvinculación* has emphasized the role of formal land titles as a crucial tool to “halt” the law (Larson 2004, 53-4). This was a strategy that essentially implied the intermediation of indigenous leaders, but also indigenous alliances with non-indigenous elites, which –as Mendieta criticizes- have mainly been evaluated in rather dichotomous terms (Mendieta 2010). The role of these titles and these leaders and their relation to “external” representatives remains hitherto very vague for Carangas and begs for a serious examination.

Fourth, there is the feedback effect. On basis of his case study in Chayanta, which despite different geographical and economic conditions depicts a quite similar situation as Carangas, Platt argues that the relocation of the head tax collection to the departmental apparatus implied that in regions where the *tributo* system persisted notwithstanding the *exvinculación* law, the virtual pact between the state and these taxpaying communities was “renovated” at the sub-national level (Platt 1982, 134-5). This implied that communities knew to limit the infringement of the mediating role of their indigenous leaders as of their fiscal position. However, Platt also points to the effect of the central state’s withdrawal from the law (as an effect of Barragán’s argument) moved its “abolishing” purpose into the hands of the local elites (Platt 1982, 145-7). His findings urge for a closer analysis of the intertwined relations between comunarios, local elite groups and central state institutions.

A key entry into this tangle of questions and hypotheses is the land inspection that was imposed as the conditional step towards the implementation of land reform, the *Revisita General*. My assessment of the land reform's repercussions upon the historical trajectory of the communities of Carangas departs from a "close-reading" of the implementation of this fiscal-legal operation, or rather, of its "perpetual imminence". This intervention constituted an instance of "real and symbolic violence" enacted by the agents of Bolivian liberalism and provides in a rich entry into more complex processes of (re)negotiation as its enactment came with fiscal changes, legal strategies, conflict and violence, political representation and socio-ethnic categorization.

The extensive set of questions and hypothesis related to my first guiding question already hints at possible answers on the second question, which interrogates the effect of the local dynamics unchained by the advance (or retreat) of the reform process on long-term social changes such as peasant differentiation, stress and marginalization. The same question must be posed regarding reconfiguration of ethnic boundaries. Pauwels (1983) description of the phenomenon of the *vecino-comunarios*, local non-indigenous elites who however obtained access to community lands, forms the starting point of a further examination of social and ethnic reconfigurations, but also of the triangular relation between state powers, *comunarios* and village elites. The question of how the land reform process related to a particular social-ethnic group must also be asked regarding a much more omitted from the historiography, the Uru population. While in the early 19th century still inhabiting various districts of the province, Uru presence was by the early 20th century reduced to a single tiny village. How did the process of land reform relate to their marginalization?

Structure of Part III

Chapter 5 gives an outline of national developments that preceded the land reform, describing the first but failed land reform attempts under the first presidents of the independent republic (5.1.1), focusing on the inter-elite debate driving the conceptualization of the law (5.1.2), discussing the confiscation decree of 1866 (5.1.3) and pointing to the measures taken after his defeat (5.1.4). The second section dissects the take-off of the 1874 Alienation Act (*Ley de Exvinculación*), stipulating its content and objective (5.2.1) and the tools designed to implement the law (5.2.2). It then assesses the reach and impact of the law (5.2.3) and the communal response to the law (5.2.4). It closes with the eruption of mounting indigenous protest and the ascent of new elite forces in the 1899 federal war (5.3).

Chapter 6 takes the unrolled development to the level of the Carangas province, starting with the how the communities dealt with president Melgerajo's land reform decrees (6.1). It then discusses how the last rented valley lands under direct control of

several communities of Carangas were confiscated in the course of the land reform process (6.2). Then, the focus is put on the repeated efforts to implement the Revisita and how these pressures fostered the spread of rebellion and internal violence in the 1870s-1890s (6.3). It then scrutinizes how this instigated the emergence of a modest *apoderados generales* movement in Carangas (6.4) and how this mobilization erupted in the 1899 rebellion (6.5).

Chapter 7 departs from the post-1899 context and looks into the subsequent evolution and implications of the initiated land reform process in Carangas until around 1930. It first assesses the (im)mobility of strategic resource frontiers in the province (7.1). Then, it moves on to the local dynamics provoked by the imminence of the Revisita, reflected in inter-ayllu conflict (7.2.1) as well as in the deployment of a threefold resistance strategy under indigenous leadership (7.2.2). A third section addresses the ambiguity of vecinos intervention in communal land management and the anti-Revisita protest (7.3) and closes with a discussion of the changing national discourse regarding vecinos and indigenous peasants in early 20th century Bolivia (7.4).

Chapter 5

Exvincular: delinking the community from land and power.

Melgarejo
Bolivia muere en sus paredes
como una flor enrarecida:
se encaraman en sus monturas
los generales derrotados
y rompen cielos a pistolazos.
Máscara de Melgarejo,
bestia borracha, espumarajo
de minerales traicionados,
barba de infamia, barba horrenda
sobre los montes rencorosos,
barba arrastrada en el delirio,
barba cargada de coágulos,
barba hallada en las pesadillas
de la gangrena, barba errante
galopada por los potreros,
amancebada en los salones,
mientras el indio y su carga cruzan
la última sábana de oxígeno
trotando por los corredores
desangrados de la pobreza.
Pablo Neruda⁴⁶²

⁴⁶² Pablo Neruda 2005, 192. English version: “Bolivia dies within its walls / like a rare flower: / defeated generals ride high in their saddles / and blast the skies with pistol shots. / Mask of Melgarejo, / besotted beast, filthy scum / of betrayed minerals, / beard of infamy, horrendous beard / above the embittered mountains / beard dragged in delirium, / beard filled with bloodclots, / beard discovered in gangrenous / nightmares, roving beard / galloping in the pastures, / cohabiting in the parlors, / while the Indian and his burden traverse / the last sheet of oxygen, / trotting through the bled / corridors of poverty.” Neruda 2011, 157-8.

Adopted as the formal name for Bolivia's first land reform proclaimed in 1874, *exvinculación* alludes to a liberation effect which the law pretended to create. Its objective was to free the country from its dual landownership by replacing communal property rights by individual and alienable land titles. This would release collectively held lands to the free market and liberate the indigenous population from the discrimination imposed by the differentiated head tax system and non-remunerated labour exactions (Klein 1993, 115-7). The term is a small variation on *desvincular*, which can be literally translated as de-linking or liberating from a connection. *Desvinculación* relates to, but does not equal, *desamortización*, which is the most common term used in 19th century Latin America to denominate the legislation enacted to privatize, divide and commodify land. Both terms refer to the legal operation of disentailment, the elimination of restrictions to the free circulation of land by freeing property, particularly corporative held rural properties (both ecclesiastic as profane), from entail.⁴⁶³ In the case of *exvinculación*, this liberalization was “legally” translated into an operation to make all lands occupied by the “class of originarios, forasteros, agregados or whatever other denomination” alienable.⁴⁶⁴

This kind of legal confiscation processes took off in Mexico with a first batch of reform laws proclaimed in the 1850s,⁴⁶⁵ but its roots correspond to a much longer history that must be traced back to Spanish Bourbon despotism. Out of the late 18th century dialogue between liberal and conservative notions on the economic function of property, a changing perception on land distilled (Barragán 2012; Irurozqui 1999; Langer and Jackson 1990). The impact of this changing notion was that the importance and methods of measuring the value of land changed, allowing for its commodification. This road towards productivity and agrarian development required a strong land tenure security for agricultural producers which was believed to be unattainable under the conditions of communal tenure. Thus, for the sake of the free movement of goods and capital, the undivided and inalienable character of collective land rights was to be eliminated through disentailment, while the subsoil was made state property.

In fact, the implementation of this altered notion implied devaluation as qualitatively appraised features, hard to disentangle and pigeon-hole into an “legible” matrix, were omitted from the calculation. In Bolivia, this reassessment had far-reaching implications for the position of indigenous communities, the *ayllus*. Not only did it undermine the functioning of communal land systems by removing its underpinning principles of

⁴⁶³ Whereas *desamortizar* replaces the former landowners by the state, which sells these lands as national goods to individuals, *desvincular* leaves the land in possession of the owners and their first-borns as free goods (Barragán 2012, 25).

⁴⁶⁴ “Ley de 5 de octubre de 1874.” Sección 1a, Article 1.

⁴⁶⁵ The most important of these measures was the *Ley lerdo* of June 25th 1856 (de la Torre Rangel 2013, 81).

inalienability or non-transferability, but it implied “*deep cultural incursions into the most intimate corners of communal life*” (Larson 2004, 226). The loss of the community’s legitimacy as landowning, taxpaying and representative institution triggered a renegotiation of state-community relations.⁴⁶⁶ The “feedback” effect of this renegotiation was that anti-community aggressions unleashed a range of grassroots resistance, rebellion, consciousness and memory mechanisms, converting the Bolivian liberalism paradoxically into the moment when the community simultaneously confronted its strongest attack and received a major stimulus to its political agency (Gotkowitz 2007, 18; Barragán 2012, 25). Accounting for the vigour of communal pressures in the Bolivian context, the “surplus” value of land, which was more strongly eradicated in the European context, has hence continued (although distorted) to play a part in the altering national land legislation in Bolivia.

In short, the law under study must be approached as a long process rather than “single act”, taking into account the antecedents to the legislation project as well as the multifaceted agency of the indigenous population that actively contributed to the twists and turns in that project. In order to situate the repercussions for and contributions by the communities of Carangas as this process developed, the present chapter assesses the antecedents to the enactment of the *exvinculación* law, discusses its purpose and stipulations, its methods of implementation and its short-term outcome at the national level, up to the point where communal protest and inter-elite struggle merged in the federal war of 1899.

5.1 Antecedents to the *exvinculación* process.

Although a substantial shift in Bolivia’s land policy towards community lands would not occur before the 1860s, the origins of that shift must be traced back to late 18th century ideas. In order to foster the circulation of goods and capital, to raise fiscal revenues and to eliminate rooted hierarchies, it was asserted that property was to be “mobilized”

⁴⁶⁶ Legislators insisted on the pact’s discriminatory postulation as it imposed a differential tax that was defined by caste instead of income, provided *originarios* with a privileged status and impeded the assimilation of indigenous commoners as Bolivian citizens. The communities themselves, however, defended another form of citizenship, based on collective instead of individual rights, and insisted on their particular “indigenous” relationship to the state and its fiscal underpinning (Rivière 1982, 107; Platt 1982). Their argument was that privatization would neutralize the incentive (the defence of collective rights) to pay the head tax and hence deprive the treasury from indispensable revenue.

through partition or amortization (see Campomanes 1765 and Jovellanos 1794, cited in Barragán 2012, 17-20). Ensuing debates, triggered by new ideas on civilization and nation-building, gave shape to a different concept of land property and the formulation of “dead hands” (mortmain), which gained major entrance under influence of the French Revolution (Rose 1984; Jones 1991). However, the roots of these concepts and the tools to implement them, such as the cadastre, thus precede the French Revolution (De Reu s.d., 1-5; Touzery 2002 and 2007), nor are they strictly European. Once circulating, the eventual materialization of new ideas on property and their application to collectively held land lingered for a long time. Throughout the first decades of Bolivian independence, intensive inter-elite debates developed around the issue of land, hinting at a slow crystallization of liberal “peasantization” plans and their translation into a body of laws.

5.1.1 First disentailment attempts.

Concrete disentailment measures were first taken under Spanish Bourbon rule in Nueva España (largely coinciding with what is now México).⁴⁶⁷ Subsequently, the property debate was brought up at the Cortes de Cádiz, which came to function as the main forum for the diffusion of liberal ideas.⁴⁶⁸ In this Andalusian port, the besieged anti-Napoleon Spanish government held its first national assembly (1810-1814) and produced a constitution (1812) that would serve as a liberal blueprint for the soon independent Latin American states. Here, Spanish-American relations were intensively discussed and the foundations for future land tenure reorganizations in the entire Spanish American region were formed (Rodríguez 2005). An important privatization tendency was inscribed into these foundations, including the proposal of substituting the indigenous head tax by a general, single and direct tax. While the cadastral system found its entrance, changes to the colonial *Leyes de Indias* eventually proved taboo and the Spanish king Fernando VII decided in 1815 to simply rename the *tributo* as *contribución* (Irurozqui 1999, 709; Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 189-90). In turn for their contribution, the indigenous population was granted citizenship, yet receiving a “special treatment”

⁴⁶⁷ Under the incentive of bankruptcy, legal disentailment measures were for the first time enacted by Spain's Illustrated ministers of the Bourbon regime in the viceroyalty of New Spain (Langer and Jackson 1990, 11). Here, a Royal Decree was enacted in 1804 as part of the Bourbon reforms, ordering the expropriation of real estate of ecclesiastic corporations. As this measure directly and indirectly affected about all productive sectors, major protest was bound to follow. See also García Ugarte 2005.

⁴⁶⁸ Barragán suggests the possibility that the materialization of new notions on land property into concrete policy lines regarding indigenous communal tenure first originated in Mexico, to than, via Cádiz, be generalized in the continent through Bolívar's decrees (Barragán 2012, 22).

because of their attributed minority of age. Presented as a violation of the right on property and stimuli for capital accumulation, the *mita* also figured in these discussions, and was eventually abolished (Calderón Vega 2010, 142-3, cited by Barragán 2012, 21).

Once gained independence, the first effective disentailment initiatives taken by Latin-American governments principally targeted Church lands. This confiscatory operation was denominated as *desamortización* (Bodinier, Congost, and Luna 2009). Regarding Bolivia, Langer and Jackson are among the few researchers explicitly addressing the understudied issue of Church land expropriation (Langer and Jackson 1990). They indicate that the confiscation of Church lands was executed largely during the first decades after independence and particularly affected the properties of regular male orders. In contrast to what happened in various other Latin-American countries, particularly in Mexico, the young Bolivian state was relatively effective in neutralizing future conflicts over Church land, at least until the Liberal Party took power at the turn of the 20th century.⁴⁶⁹

Disentailment ideas also entailed important consequences for the indigenous population, particularly regarding their role as economic actors and fiscal subjects. However, while privatization plans for Church or community lands equally stemmed from liberal ideology, the materialization of these plans differed significantly in design, implementation and outcome for either form of property (ibid, 9). In contrast to Church properties, the indigenous community had a much firmer footing in the Bolivian countryside. As in the wider Andean area, the application of new ideas on why and how to address the land issue in these corporative landholding institutions was postponed until the second half of that century, Bolivia being the last to join (Larson 2004). This second phase of disentailment was to take a much more conflictive and protracted course.

Already in the first years of Bolivia's republican history, several steps were taken to develop a concrete policy towards community lands, but their implementation resulted unsuccessful. In July 1825, Bolívar, the *libertador* who became the first president of the country that was named after him, expanded "his" Peruvian decrees to Bolivia in order to convert the usufruct rights of indigenous commoners into a full title to community lands, hence establishing these lands as private property (Aylwin 2002, 31).⁴⁷⁰ The

⁴⁶⁹ The authors contend that this relative success can be attributed to president Sucre's limited affinity to the country he was ruling and the weak position of the decimated anti-liberal elites and clerics after the wars of independence (Langer and Jackson 1990, 10-6).

⁴⁷⁰ The decrees of Trujillo (8 April 1824) and Cuzco (4 July 1825), issued by Bolívar, abolished the *cacicazgo* but without these indigenous chiefs losing their title of "citizens worthy of consideration" and their lands, prohibited personal and un-contracted services by the indigenous, and ordered a distribution of community lands in favour of the landless (Irurozqui 1999, 709; Barragán 2012, 22).

decrees aimed to integrate community-bound producers as nation-bound smallholder peasants, which required the “solution” of the question of land rights security. They specified that lands originally obtained through *repartimiento* remained inalienable until 1850, while the remaining lands which were not occupied under a previously granted legitimate title (through auction, *composición* or adjudication) were confined to “possession at will” (*posesión precaria*), which means that they fell under the ultimate landownership of the State (Irurozqui 1999, 709-10). Determined to install a new and more egalitarian fiscal system, Bolívar also foresaw the replacement of the indigenous *tributo* by a general tax (however without clarifying the implications for *tributarios*’ landownership), but the survey operation to implement the reform was never executed (*ibid*).

Breaking with the colonial agrarian policy resulted unrealistic due to a number of factors such as the resistance of conservative elites, urban elites and indigenous elites, the bureaucratic incapacity to implement the reform, and the irrelevance of insisting on an anti-Spanish reform (as Bolivia was already independent) (Ovando 1985, 24-27). The key obstacle, however, is to be found in the Treasury’s dependence upon indigenous tribute revenues and hence the indispensability of differentiated fiscal categories (Assies 2009, 296). The reciprocity pact -although permanently marked by troubled relations with the State and elite groups- proved irreplaceable. The aspired *tributo* abolition would bring indigenous *contribuyentes* and the mestizo-white population on equal terms, hence the measure was received with protest by all sectors, each for their own reasons (Lofstrom 1983, 333-55).

As the protest of different social sectors merged, Bolívar’s land policy was taken down after only seven months. With the law of 20 September 1826, his successor, president Sucre, suspended Bolívar’s decrees and reclassified communal land tenure again as precarious (usufruct) possession (Ovando 1985, 27-8). This implied the restoration of the indigenous *tributo*, which followed in July 1827, confirming the intrinsic fiscal character of the indigenous community and reinforcing the National Treasury’s dependence on indigenous tax payments (Irurozqui 1999, 711). According to Ovando, this legislative reform was in fact a public credit operation to secure the government’s solvency, but which meanwhile took a first step towards the occupation of community lands (Ovando 1985, 31). Still, it concerned a weak reorientation of the old tributary structures installed by the colonial agrarian policy, rather than what Antezana describes as an amplification and correction of Bolívar’s “ultraliberal” policy (Antezana 2006, 66-7).

The measures taken under president Andrés de Santa Cruz (1829-1839) in 1831 installed a status-quo in Bolivia’s land policy that lay the basis for the land sales policy that found entrance from the 1860s on (Platt 1987, 293). The status-quo resulted from the difficulties to balance the large ambitions of the regime with the constraints provoked by international tensions and widespread indigenous protest and created

some breathing room for communal landholding groups. The imposed measures included the recognition of the community as a collective landowning entity capable of initiating juridical procedures, however via indirect attorney (*apoderado*) representation.⁴⁷¹ In 1838, escalating military expenses due to a Chilean-Peruvian-Bolivian confrontation⁴⁷² pressured the government to prohibit the purchase of community lands in order to secure the inflow of indigenous head tax revenues (Irurozqui 1999, 714). To even increase the number of indigenous tributaries, the tributary class was opened up to mestizos, elderly, women and children and lands were distributed among the landless (*ibid*). Overall, the measures taken under Santa Cruz, particularly the restoration of the *tributo*, had an appeasing effect on the countryside and the country as a whole (Ovando 1985, 50).

To the degree that the debate over the revision of land property rights evolved towards a broader and harder debate about the country's economic prospects, the maintenance of that status quo would make way for the abolition of communal tenure systems (Langer and Jackson 1990, 10). In the 1840s, a discourse emerged that pushed for a redefinition of community lands ownership no longer as indigenous but proper to the state (Irurozqui 1999, 715). This ideological shift, fomented by liberal and landlord-promulgated ideas to abolish the indigenous *tributo*, became first clear under president Ballivián (1841-1847). With the circular of 14 December 1842, the state let community lands out on long lease to the indigenous tributaries, who saw their status reduced to leasehold tenants (*ibid*).⁴⁷³ This is known as the emphyteusis regime (*enfiteusis*) which subjects community lands to the eminent domain of the state, with the latter -as exclusive landowner- lending usufruct rights over cultivation lands in return for taxes (Ovando 1985, 55). As land property became the exclusive terrain of the state, the state itself and its legal instruments were appropriated by elite groups anxious to ensure their power base -and hence their land base.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷¹ The law of 28 September 1831 declared the indigenous taxpayers individual owners of those land which they had occupied "pacifically" for at least 10 years (Irurozqui 1999, 711). Recognized as individual proprietors, *contribuyentes* could petition their demands individually, but as stated by the Supreme Order of 7 February 1834, corporate interests were to be defended by *apoderados* as courts were not to accept collective claims by indigenous communities (*ibid*).

⁴⁷² In 1836, Santa Cruz brought Bolivia together with the fleeting states of North and South Peru under a single confederation, although the return to the colonial Peruvian viceroyalty was short-lived as the war with Chile, Argentina and disloyal Peruvians resulted in its dissolution in 1839 (Rojas and Berdichesky 2009).

⁴⁷³ The circular declared that "*the lands possessed by the originarios are property of the State, and [the originarios] should be considered but as a kind of enfiteutas [leaseholders] who pay a certain amount to the direct landlord for its usufruct.*" Own translation. Antezana 1993, 56.

⁴⁷⁴ Although the Bolivian state seemed yet not sufficiently strong to operationalize Ballivián's policy, provincial authorities effectively profited from the enacted measures. The head (*Gobernador*) of each province,

Ballivián's presidency provided the later land reform with a crucial antecedent, paving the way for the process that was to be called *exvinculación* (Platt 1987, 293). However, direct attacks to indigenous land property were temporarily pushed into the background under his successors; land right security for indigenous community members seemed to improve (Irurozqui 1999, 717). The return to more equilibrated State-community interactions is reflected in the supreme order of 27 August 1858 which guaranteed communal land properties and respected the land adjudications held by indigenous tributaries (ibid, 719).⁴⁷⁵ Not only the formulation of the agrarian question in José María Dalence's standard statistical work *Bosquejo Estadístico de Bolivia* (1851) manifests the general acceptance of the "emphyteutic regime" (Ovando 1985, 69), but also commoners themselves seem to have been familiar with their emphyteutic status.⁴⁷⁶

An attempt to go beyond this "emphyteutic regime" in 1861 by ordering the elaboration of cadastres of all properties was aborted by landlord resistance out of indignation to be treated as indigenous taxpayers subjected to a *Revisita* (ibid, 77-9).⁴⁷⁷ In 1863, a proposal by the Achá government to divide community lands into individual plots failed before finding general acceptance and one year later the exemption of measurement and estimation operations for lands in indigenous hands was confirmed (ibid, 121; Irurozqui 1999, 725). Despite this exemption, the seeds for the end of the preserved equilibrium (imposed by Santa Cruz) were being planted. Growing urban food demands helped to shape a new climate that allowed for the treasury's "liberation" from its head tax dependence. This would open the road for an economic reorganization and the physical unlocking of the countryside, announcing a new cycle in the expansion of large estates that would fully develop from the 1880s on. This announcement was underpinned by a reinforcement of anti-corporatist ideas on land and property. The urban elites, who now had generated funds for rural investment and demonstrated a

for instance, was entitled with the allocation of vacant lands and the resolution of land grabbing and border disputes at the community level and in 1843, a new *Revisita* was announced in order to gain an idea of the amount of –now state-owned– "residual lands" that could be sold to private landowners (Ovando 1985, 54-60).

⁴⁷⁵ Emphyteutic lease and the declaration of indigenous lands (in particular, wastelands which had to rest) as "vacant" (*tierras residuales*) is a general practice enacted in (post-)colonial regimes, for instance observable in North-American reserves and Portuguese India (AGTER and ILC 2009, 9-10; Serrão and Santos 2013).

⁴⁷⁶ In a dispute over the property of a *sayaña* in 1861, for instance, a plaintiff brought in the argument that the land rights of all contribuyentes concern access rights to terrains of the state, in order to charge the accused intruder of incursion of state possessions. *AJC*, 1861, no. 856, f. 2v.

⁴⁷⁷ Local sources also give testimony of how *comunarios'* precarious land ownership was locally understood and employed. In a lawsuit over the disputed rights over a *sayaña*, one of the parties brings in the argument of all *sayañas* belonging to the property of the State property and hence accuses his opponent of intruding "state possessions". *AJC*, 1861, no. 856.

growing interest in commercial agriculture, were hence provided with the ideological foundations for the effective seizure of community lands.

5.1.2 Disagreeing elites: money, property, and taxes in a transforming economy.

In the 1860s, a transition that would undermine the virtual state-community pact was prepared. Dominant voices pushing for the consolidation of land seizure operations and imperatives of the reactivating mining economy shaped a favourable climate for the deployment of a capitalist sector and the development of convenient ideological underpinnings. In parallel with a discussion over the country's financial foundations and constraints, an intense debate ensued among old and new landlord factions on the fate of indigenous communal land tenure. The political turmoil and economic reformism of this decade announced the time of Bolivia's liberal reforms in which monetary and fiscal reorganizations closely entangled with the designing of a confiscation operation, to be first implemented by president Melgarejo in 1866.

Addressing first the monetary debate, Bolivia's double monetary policy lay at the core of the problem (Platt 2008 and 2010; Mitre 1981). It was not so much the simultaneous coinage of a weak coin for internal circulation and a strong one functioning as a commodity for external trade that formed the problem (this was a common practice in several countries), but the fact that both Bolivian coins, each with their intrinsic value, were open to trade circuits that left the country. The perverse effect of this parallel circuit of monetary circulation, in which the debased coin increasingly played a leading part, was that it allowed foreign commercial interests to prevail over national interests (Platt 2010, 49; Jacobsen 1993, 160). Money manipulation burdened Bolivia with a stagnating economy and undermined its international trade position. Contemporaries such as Benedicto Medinaceli, one of the leading voices in the debate, contended that the reduced monetary standard of the weak coin since Santa Cruz had encouraged external markets to withdraw the coin from internal circulation and produced a relative price-rise in imported consumption goods rather than to foment Bolivia's national market (Medinaceli 1863, 3; see also Santivañez 1862 and Vargas 1863). As the debate developed, the transition from an octal monetary system to a metric decimal system gained ground.⁴⁷⁸ In 1863, a bill of the Achá government proposed the replacement of the strong *peso* by the silver *boliviano* of 100 *centavos*, which

⁴⁷⁸ After a failed monetary reform in 1830, president Belzú had proposed a financial reform in 1849 that would reduce the weight and size of coins, but left the octal monetary system intact (Medinaceli 1863, 4-7).

was eventually implemented as the national monetary unit under the Melgarejo regime in 1869, but remained based on the silver standard until 1895.⁴⁷⁹

Together with a monetary reform, the need for a fiscal reform was planted. Until at least the 1860s, the task of filling the Treasury was in the first place accomplished by the indigenous head tax, covering 36% of the national budget. This explains why the State remained all that time supportive to the communities' territorial claims rather than displaying an aggressive attack towards them (Rodríguez 1991 and Langer 1991, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 715). However, there was an increasing need for additional fiscal revenues as the number of indigenous tributaries had been in decline since the reinstatement of the *tributo* system in 1827 (Grieshaber 1980; Irurozqui 1999, 714). This need became even more pressing by the late 1850s, when the epidemics of 1855 and the consequent loss of numerous taxpayers as well as the weak Bolivian currency brought the government's financial state of affairs into a general economic crisis (Ovando 1985, 73-4; Irurozqui 1999, 719). The state's deteriorating solvency and the marginalization of large sectors of the rural society that were left without monetary means of circulation encouraged a revision of Bolivia's colonially inherited fiscal framework.⁴⁸⁰ Meanwhile, booming silver, guano and nitrate production produced a shift the constellation of the national budget in which the mining sector increasingly figured as a secure income source, while the relative importance of the head tax declined. In 1872, a fiscal reform eventually allocated the head tax incomes to the departmental treasuries, yielding the fiscal potential of the indigenous population to the sub-national level.

The newly implemented monetary and fiscal policy entailed important consequences for the indigenous population and the security of their land rights. To the degree that the mining boom opened new revenue sources, the argument that indigenous *tributarios* needed sufficient and ecologically diverse land in order to pay the head tax lost ground. This argument supported the political ascendance of the new elite group of capitalist entrepreneurs and produced a divergence in Bolivia's land debate from its initial course. While the previous decades were dominated by questions over the indigenous population's landowner status, which had given emergence to the emphyteusis thesis with the indigenous commoners as the State's land leasers, the questions now focused on the societal model to organize the rural indigenous population (Irurozqui 1999, 719-720). The proposed answers to these questions reflected political ideas on how to ensure the country's future as a morally "civilized" and economically "prosperous" nation.

⁴⁷⁹ "Ley de 29 de junio de 1863" and "Ley de 26 de noviembre de 1895." Sucre, 1895. Klein 2011, 136; see also Rojas 1977 [1916].

⁴⁸⁰ Until into the 1850s, the maintained fiscal policy continued to reflect its colonial character, for instance in Bustillo's ultraconservative, unsuccessful *tributo* reform of 1850 that pushed for fiscal exemption of landless community members, or in the practice of provincial and anticipated *tributo* collection (Ovando 1985, 69-72).

Around these ideas, an intense inter-elite debate crystalized that would set the stage for the eventual formulation of a land reform act one decade later.

The proposals that were formulated, circulated and discussed by the dominant (mainly economist) voices that partook in the debate concerned the conversion of indigenous land tenure. Among the different destinations for community lands was their sale to private landlords (which required their temporary conversion into individual property as had been advanced by the Trujillo decree of 1824), their division into marketable plots with individual ownership, or their incorporation as directly marketable state property.⁴⁸¹ These options evolved towards an antagonism between two models, pushing for the conversion of indigenous commoners into either tenants or smallholders. The tenant proposal suggested a labour strategy, speculating that the incorporation of indigenous tributaries in the body of hacienda workers would assimilate community-bound Indians with national interests, while the smallholder stance advocated a juridical and cultural strategy through the individualization of collective land property (ibid, 721). The former strategy corresponds to the classic option of the landlords, while the latter to the capitalist option of the land buyers. Geographically, the former stance was most strongly supported by “old” style landowners, established in the north of the country, while the latter was maintained by a new emerging landowner class emerging based in the southern departments of the country (Langer and Jackson 1990, 20-1).

The regional divergence among elite groups can be related to the different ways in which the peasantries of the respective departments were organized and linked to the market sphere. In the southern departments, peasants were less tied to communal organization patterns. In Cochabamba, they actively participated in the dynamic grain market and in the Potosí and Sucre departments there economic activities were strongly tied to the regional (booming) mining and urban economy. In the La Paz area, by contrast, the rural products that entered the market arrived from freeholding Aymara corporations which dominated the northern part of the altiplano as well as the central Oruro region which is generally omitted from this discussion. Elite groups with a land base in the former region displayed a rather pro-smallholder stance, while those

⁴⁸¹ An outline of the ideas that nurtured the two phases (1861 and 1863) of the debate is given in Antezana 2006, 130-9; Irurozqui 1999, 720; Langer 1991, 64-69; Ovando 1985, 81-121; Peralta and Irurozqui 1992 and Rodríguez 1991, 186. Among the most influential pamphlets figure those of Melchor Urquidi, *Bases para la reforma de la hacienda y de la contabilidad pública de Bolivia*, Cochabamba, 1861, Jorge Mallo, *Aplicación económica cambiando el sistema rentístico de la república conforme a las costumbres modernas*. Sucre, 1861, Miguel María de Aguirre, *Apuntes Financieros para Bolivia*, Cochabamba, 1863, and José Vicente Dorado, *Proyectos de repartición de tierras y venta de ellas entre los indígenas*. Sucre, 1864.

holding lands (or eager to appropriate lands) in the peri-urban La Paz area envisioned a hacienda expansion, fuelled by ex-commoner peonage (ibid).

The ongoing debate was driven by the search for the most efficient method to make the community disappear as a corporate unit. What both strategies had in common was their agreement over the abolition of the communities and the state's ownership over residual lands as the appropriate solution for the country's economic challenges (Irurozqui 1999; Ovando 1985, 120). The remaining question was: what would happen with the indigenous population? As several legal measures were suggested to address this question, the ongoing regionally divided inter-elite dialogue was kept alive.

5.1.3 Melgarejo: The 1866 decree.

By the mid-1860s, Bolivia's capitalist classes found patronage in general Mariano Melgarejo who provided them with the "most adequate" regime (1864-1871) to optimize and legalize their economic interests. Still counting as the country's most polemical president so far (Arguedas 1929; Iriarte 1986; Neruda 2011, 157-8; Jacobs 2012), Melgarejo seized the economic boom to allow his decadence and political thoughtlessness full reign, consequently burdening his government with urgent financial problems and the country with debilitated territorial borders (Klein 2011, 132-7). Most importantly, his government re-launched early-republican liberal plans to privatize community lands, materializing in the first serious attack on the free communities in Bolivia's independent history. After a 1863 decree to distribute individual plots and sell "residual" lands had been cancelled (Irurozqui 1999, 274-5), the search for more appropriate profitable options pushed the Melgarejo government, facing a treasury that was to be filled, to promulgate in 1866 a land reform decree that favoured the "classic" landlord strategy to open up the communities' land base.

The (in)famous decree of 20 March 1866 is emblematic for the triumph of economic liberalization, confirming the political ascent of the country's silver-exporting capitalists, yet was still driven by feudal-like motives. Indeed, if Melgarejo's regime can be acknowledged as the breakthrough of liberal policies, his anti-corporative decree endorsed the "classic" landlord proposal rather than the capitalist, smallholder model (Langer and Jackson 1991, 20-1). Still, this radical but short-lived prologue to the disentailment act of 1874 would play a decisive role in the subsequent evolution of the community land debate through which the capitalist strategy eventually would gain official acceptance. In fact, the eventual putting into practice of longstanding liberal ideas on land had more to do with financial incentives than with ideological arguments; as had been the case with Santa Cruz and Ballivián (ibid, 28). As the regime's military expenses were skyrocketing, the country's increasing internal public debt limited the policy options for Melgarejo and his legislators to an extreme (ibid, 21). Meanwhile, the

government was receiving more from mining investments and export than from the indigenous tax (Klein 1993, 113-5). It was in the first place the government's pressing revenue shortage and its relief from *tributo* dependence that determined Melgarejo's land policy, regardless of all pro-hacienda and pro-smallholder arguments.

By declaring the state as exclusive proprietor of all lands, Ballivián's emphyteusis regime was taken one step further. According to the policy line pursued by Melgarejo's functionaries, lands had to be consolidated by unifying the usufruct rights with the direct rights over land. By combining both rights, there came an end to the leasehold status (*enfiteusis*) of communal tributaries. In order to organize this titling operation, the state attributed itself the exclusive competence to grant usufruct and full property rights and moreover created an extra revenue source by demanding a monetary recompense for each title to be consolidated (Ovando 1985, 122-3). The indigenous population were to claim their land titles and pay a fee of 25 to 100 pesos for their consolidation within the established term of 60 days. If no payment was made within 60 days, their lands became accessible to individual buyers through public auction (Irurozqui 1999, 725). If no buyers were interested in the community lands, the commoners could continue to occupy their lands as renters, implying rental taxation to the new owner of those lands, the state. Thus, the only way for *tributarios* to protect their community lands was to pay for property rights which they in fact always had possessed! The many indigenous communities to which this arrangement constituted an insurmountable capital barrier saw their community lands subjected to blunt purchase and sale transactions (ibid; Ovando 1985, 169). In other words, the legal measures concerned an ironic consolidation operation designed as an intermediary step towards the creation of a free market for consolidated lands.

In 1868, the classic landholding class managed to employ its majority in the *Asamblea Constituyente* to confirm the Melgarejo decree with the law of 28 September, stating in its first article that "*the lands possessed by the indigenous race and known until now under the name of Community lands, are declared property of the State.*"⁴⁸² The law gave practical details on the execution of the confiscation program. It ordered the deployment of *Juntas revisadoras* (survey committees) commissioned with the demarcation of community lands, the elaboration of (a sort of cadastral) land maps and estimation of purchase or rent prices, and the revision of the sale contracts originating in the 1866 decree.⁴⁸³

⁴⁸² "Ley de 28 de Septiembre de 1868." Article 1. See also Irurozqui 1999, 725; Ovando 1985, 145-67.

⁴⁸³ Inspection commissions were formed in the capital of each department, including a juridical and an ecclesiastic functionary and the solicitors of the district court. The attributions of these commissions are to examine all community land sale and consolidation documents that have been verified between March 1866 and the promulgation of the 1868 law and to approve the legal and annul the erroneous contracts. "Ley de 28 de Septiembre de 1868." Article 20 and 21.

Commoners who had effectively consolidated their land rights according to the 1866 decree would be declared proprietors with usufruct and direct rights over their lands, while land sales made on basis of the 1866 decree were legalized.⁴⁸⁴ Included in the law was a compensation arrangement which was of particular interest to the Carangas communities, as will be discussed in chapter 6.

Melgarejo's modifications to Bolivia's land legislation were underpinned by a fiscal reform. Initially, the indigenous *contribución* remained in place but, as property moved to the state, the fiscal implication was that the head tax was to be converted from a contribution for land property into a rent for land tenure (Klein 1993, 115). In 1868, measures were taken to replace the *tributo* system by a tax system that reflected an individual, direct and statistical orientation.⁴⁸⁵ This switch required the execution of a general *Revisita*, which in many regions nevertheless was a long time coming –or was never to come. As a result, a dual collection system emerged in which the *tributo* (at that time still the state's most lucrative rent) and other obligations continued to be exacted in *Revisita*-free areas, while the new territorial tax started to be collected where the *Revisita* had been organized (Irurozqui 1999, 731; Ovando 1985, 153-6). As a growing group of communities managed to prevent the sale of their lands, thereby consolidating themselves as landowners with “full” fiscal responsibilities, the state sought for an alternative way to free itself from any compensatory respect towards communitarian property rights and declared, later in 1868, these communities exempt from paying a contributions and other services that had previously guaranteed these rights (Ovando 1985, 157).

Although the measures taken by his government were of short duration, this episode fundamentally altered not just the outlook of agrarian legislation but also the country's (rural) society as a whole (Irurozqui 1999, 708; Salazar de la Torre 2013). Melgarejo's brutal confiscation policy has ever since been remembered in usually strong evocations of sadism, tyranny, tragedy and resistance. However, the immediate effect of his agrarian policy is disputable as the main ambitions of the decree remained frustrated even before the whole operation was being restored. The target of creating extra income was only partially fulfilled; the public auction operation yielded much lower

⁴⁸⁴ “Ley de 28 de Septiembre de 1868.” Article 26 and Article 18.

⁴⁸⁵ A resolution of October 1868 imposed a land tax of 0,3% for rural properties and 0,1% for urban properties, and a personal tax, according to which all men between 21 to 25 years paid 2 bolivianos annually. *Originarios* continued to enjoy an exceptional fiscal status of 4 bolivianos annually and exemption from “process costs” for official procedures. Taxes on production, such as *diezmos*, *primicias* or *veintenas* were abolished, yet their replacement by a cadastral system was not pushed through before the 20th century. Irurozqui 1999, 725; Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 208; Ovando 1985, 154.

revenues than expected.⁴⁸⁶ The target of community land conversion was tempered by a superficial transformation and hacienda expansion and undercut by strong regional differences as well as violent counteractions on part of the indigenous communities (Ovando 1985, 169). The La Paz area received the heftiest “auction blows” and hence the heftiest counter-reactions.⁴⁸⁷ The Cochabamba area witnessed a fragmentation of its land structure, however rather produced by internal fragmentation of large estates than through legal dispossession (Rodríguez, Jackson 1990 and Rivera Pizarro 1992, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 726).

In some –generally understudied– areas, the enacted measures seemed to have had no impact or resulted at least little effective. The department of Oruro, where only three communities had been subjected to public auction, clearly belongs to that last category (Ruiz and Irurozqui 2000, 88; Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 209). The indigenous fiscal and insurrectionary counterweight of the department’s rural districts is key to understand the limited reach of the decree. As the case of the Carangas province will demonstrate in the next chapter, communities managed to block off the impact of the measures. However, the fact that this went at the cost of communal mobilization and a fiscal arrangement demonstrates that the new legislation did unchain important local dynamics in the province.

5.1.4 The 1871 debate.

1866 would result still too early for a “capitalist transition” of the Bolivian rural landscape. Premature market conditions and financial constraints of the institutions appointed to implement the land legislation prevented Melgarejo’s decree to work as it was intended to. Moreover, the radicalness of the reform sparked widespread

⁴⁸⁶ In 1870, the Ministry of Finance stated that the lands of 325 communities had been sold by auction, yielding 867000 bolivianos, in contrast to an estimated revenue of 1205370 bolivianos (Ruiz and Irurozqui 2000, 88; Sanchez Albornoz 1978, 209). There are indirect indications of a high level of illegal land sales, manipulated land surveys, contested adjudications and other arbitrary operations that partially served to solve public debts (Irurozqui 1999, 725-6; Ovando 1985, 158). Interesting to note is that many of the lands sales in this episode corresponded to soldiers, government employees and favourites, in addition to well-off indigenous purchasers who saw their chance to expand their land base beyond communitarian constraints (Langer 1991, 72, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 726). This latter group may correspond to mestizo villagers who had integrated in the community of *contribuyentes*.

⁴⁸⁷ Several haciendas in the La Paz area formed, which had been formed with purchased lands, were invaded by its previous indigenous occupiers, often violently and far beyond the capacity or will of state authorities to stop them (Langer y Jackson 1990, 22).

resistance.⁴⁸⁸ Meanwhile, pamphlets of white elitist hand started circulating, opposing the confiscatory operation. The particularly violent indigenous protest from the attacked communities in combination with strong opposition by large elite factions of private landowners demonstrate that his plans came ahead of time (Klein 2009, 137). The economic transformations conditional to the reform had still not attained enough strength to convince a part of the national elites large enough to force a more substantial enclosure operation through. This inter-elite discrepancy allowed for a merger of “old” elite and indigenous interest. Their shared resentment towards Melgarejo’s dictatorship and against the new economic elites burst into a revolution in November 1870, led by Agustín Morales and Casimiro Corral (Mendieta 2010; Irurozqui 2001). With the dictator’s defeat, his decree perished as well. However, also this achievement would soon appear to be an illusion.

The anti-Melgarejo victory and the temporary and exceptional return of a civilian government under president Morales was based on an alliance between the established landowner class and indigenous communities, mainly Aymaras from the La Paz department (Ovando 1985, 168). This seemed an illogical construction given the fact that the political project of the established landowner class came to rest on the population group whose power they actually feared the most. However, from a broader time perspective such elite-community alliances were not that exceptional and this particular coalition created an important precedent to the 1899 revolution as will be discussed below.

Exemption or not, the comunarios of Carangas did actively participate in the revolution. Although a lack of data on the department’s participation in the revolution has been notified (Mendieta 2008, 388), evidence has been found in the correspondence between the Prefect of Oruro to his superiors, informing “*about the indigenous who took part in the revolution and whose intervention must cease, with the splendid triumph obtained the 15th of the current [month, January], over the vandalism of Melgarejo and his devastating troops.*”⁴⁸⁹ That month, a contingent with coronels of Melgarejo’s army, arriving from Tacna, had been taken by surprise in Curahuara de Carangas. In February, different public acts followed in all villages of the Carangas province during which the *vecindario* proclaimed their honour to president Morales.⁴⁹⁰ Melgarejo himself made it across the border, escaping via Chile to Lima, where he was eventually murdered in November 1871 (Terán 1980).

⁴⁸⁸ Klein states that the reaction from the peasants upon the proclamation of the decree was slow, eventually leading to major revolts in 1869 and 1870 in Tiquina, Guaycho and Ancoraymes (Klein 1993, 116).

⁴⁸⁹ ANB, MI, 1871, tomo 195, no 96. *Provincias*, Letter 4 January 1871.

⁴⁹⁰ ANB, MI, 1871, tomo 194, no 81. *Oruro dept*, Letters 28 January 1871 and 27 February 1871.

The law of 31 July 1871 declared the land sales executed under the Melgarejo government invalid, stating that

“the indigenous commoners are proprietors of the original and community terrains, by this virtue all sales, adjudications and expropriations of any class that may have been applied to these lands under the reign of don Mariano Melgarejo remain annulled as infringements on the right to property”.⁴⁹¹

Thus, indigenous tributaries recuperated their previous land rights as well as their fiscal and other obligations. However, this apparent pro-community policy was mainly built upon pragmatic promises. Melgarejo’s adversaries realized that the promise of ayllu recuperation was the only way to mobilize indigenous support in their attempt at overthrowing the regime (Langer and Jackson 1990, 22). As a consequence, this restoration would be as short-lived as the decrees it aborted. In fact, landlord-community relations were quite soon brought back to the order of the day.⁴⁹² Moreover, the 1871 restoration included an indemnification procedure for land buyers whose land acquisitions were cancelled by the anti-Melgarejo regulations. This indemnification would be financed with big European loans which the Bolivian State secured with the projected revenues from silver export and particularly guano exploitation in the Bolivian littoral, which through the Chilean occupation would become beyond its reach (Ovando 1985, 262).

Despite the violent dethronement of Melgarejo, the liberal transition that had been set in motion under his government was extended rather than reversed. The following years would bring an intermezzo during which the agrarian question and the related civilization question were brought back on the political agenda. During the Constitutional Convention of 1871, the revived inter-elite debate reached another culmination moment, nurtured by a number of simultaneously published pamphlets (Ovando 1985, 175-206; Irurozqui 1999, 727-9).⁴⁹³ Opinions differed regarding the (in)alienability of community lands, the (im)productivity of those lands and the

⁴⁹¹ Own translation. “Ley de 31 de Julio de 1871.” Article 1.

⁴⁹² In the La Paz region, where auctions had produced the highest number of land sales and hence the uprising had been strongest, many community lands were successfully restored, whereas more southwards weaker or absent mobilization favoured the pro-Melgarejo elite factions. Ovando 1985, 170; Klein 1988, 45-63; Langer 1991, 70-75; Langer and Jackson 1990, 9-32 and Grieshaber 1991, 113-143, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 279 and *ibid*, 271-2; Barragán 2012, 25.

⁴⁹³ The debate started with the simultaneous publication of the leaflet of Santiváñez and Zambrana and was first steered from Cochabamba to then move to La Paz. Amongst the most important pamphlets, included in the Colección René Moreno of the National Library of Bolivia (BNB), are José María Santiváñez “Reivindicacion de los terrenos de comunidad”; Zambrana “Dos palabras sobre la venta de tierras realengas a la Nacion, a la Soberana Asamblea y al Supremo Gobierno”; Bernardino Sanjinés; Avelino Aramayo *Apuntes sobre el Congreso de 1870*. Sucre, Tipografía del Progreso, 1871.

(in)justice of all obligations tied to those lands and its products, but all agreed on the necessary disappearance of the community in order to create a free land market. As in previous decades, the question was not so much on which goal to achieve but on how to achieve it. This question relates essentially to the question of labour (Langer and Jackson 1990, 20-1). The debate brought up once more was what would substitute the community: the hacienda or the smallholder farm.

According to one current, propagated in the north of the country and particularly by José Vicente Dorado, ensuring indigenous commoners' contribution to the country's economic progress required their "protection" from the market by absorbing them as peons (*colonos*) in the hacienda system (Dorado 1864). He considered their conversion into capitalist producers impossible. These arguments envisioned a paternalist strategy, supported by the established landlord camp, and had prevailed all that time, even under Melgarejo. An assimilation strategy, backed by dominant elite groups in the southern departments of Cochabamba, Potosí and Sucre, challenged this stance. They upheld that the way towards economic progress was in converting indigenous commoners into capitalist farmers by abolishing the *tributo* and granting property rights, which implied the division of community lands in order to incentivize their participation in the market. Despite this antagonism, Ovando states that in the aftermath of Melgarejo the classic landowner class started to embrace the new elites' capitalist arguments, while the latter in fact supported the old elites' feudal logic (Ovando 1985, 222-3). After all, the shared fear of both groups for an indigenous revolt was bigger than the shared hostility between anti-Melgarejo elites and indigenous communities towards land sale operations. As the debate evolved and elite interests merged, pro-usurpation arguments gained ground.

With the new constitution of October 1871, the inter-elite dispute came to a conclusion. The small steps taken in the following years all reflect a convergence of old and new elite interests in acquiring indigenous lands. Whilst the land sale operations under Melgarejo were being annulled, disentailment plans were clearly trickling through, advocating for Bolivia's liberation from colonial anachronisms such as the community, but also of the hacienda. A truce over land disputes among indigenous as well as between non-indigenous and indigenous land occupiers was enforced in order to gain time to formulate a coherent policy for the break-up of community lands that would make commoners "real proprietors" of their lands (*ibid*, 263-7). In 1872, several *desvinculación* measures were taken to "unlock" property in mortmain (Barragán 2012,

25; Irurozqui 1999, 727).⁴⁹⁴ With the fiscal reform of that same year, the collection of the indigenous *tributo* became a departmental attribution (Sánchez Albornoz 1978). Now the state-community “contract” was neutralized at the national level and the inter-elite struggle abated, the conditions were set for a powerful elite-indigenous conflict.

5.2 The take-off of the *exvinculación* process (1874-1899).

5.2.1 The *Exvinculación* Act of 1874.

Only a couple of years after the annulation of community land sales in 1871, a new law announced one of the most tumultuous episodes in Bolivia’s republican history. Under the second Frías government (1874–’76), regional interest groups came to an agreement over the appropriate solution for the country’s land question. Among the multiple law projects that had been circulating, the bill of the Chuquisaqueños, who represented the capitalist stance in the land debate, won general acceptance. It was only when this emerging entrepreneurial class had accumulated enough capital to incentivize investments in rural lands that their land reform proposals could work out. Still, the smallholder-tenant debate which in the preceding decade(s) had set the stage for the eventual land reform project would continue to revive as the *exvinculación* process developed, particularly in the context of critical legislatorial debates as again during the 1880 National Convention.

The act was promulgated on 5 October 1874 with the name of *Ley de Exvinculación* (the Alienation Law). Hoping to avoid violent reactions by the indigenous masses, the law replaced the Melgarejo decree with a gradual, more cautiously formulated reform. The difference between both rules was that this time only the “vacant” community lands became state property, while the rest of the land, both collectively and individual, remained with the *contribuyentes*, although in the form of absolute, individual and alienable property (Klein 1993, 116). With their proposal, the landowners’ faction of the southern departments staked on a capitalist transformation of the rural producers which would automatically ensue from the individualization of their control over the land (Ovando 1985, 120; Langer and Jackson 1990, 20-1; Irurozqui 1999). In that sense,

⁴⁹⁴ The 1871-’72 regulations also determined the access to salt reserves, either in their liquid or solid form. These stipulations were later confirmed by the 1879 law and brought concrete changes and conflicts in Carangas regarding the exploitation of these strategic resources, which will be discussed in chapter 7.

the law was promoted as a tool to foment a process of “peasantization.” This would come at the cost of the community’s tenure, fiscal and representative attributions. The intermediary communal link between individual producers and the centralized state apparatus and the market had to be cut, implying a negation of the reciprocal state-community pact.

According to the specifications of the law, every family was to be made private owner of the terrain it exclusively worked. Thereto, collective property titles were to be replaced by new individual titles that corresponded each to a *sayaña* that was effectively cultivated (Ovando 1985, 277-9). Contribuyentes would thus become the rightful proprietor of the *sayaña* they occupied. This also applied to non-indigenous villagers who had been registered as *contribuyente* in case they had enjoyed access to community lands for at least fifteen years, otherwise they had to buy lands from the state (*ibid.*). If an inter-indigenous conflict existed over the terrain in question, the juridical procedure had to be closed. If it concerned an interethnic dispute (between indigenous and non-indigenous occupiers), then the procedure continued. Either way, a resolution could only be found in the adjudication of individual titles, there was no corporative option (*ibid.*, 279).

As in other Andean countries, the government developed a particular interest in so-called *tierras sobrantes* or “excessive lands” which came to play a central role in the enactments of community subdivision plans. This applied to collectively used lands, lands that lay fallow, were kept as reserve by the community, or were located in distant archipelagos as well as the lands usurped by non-indigenous proprietors. The 1874 law classified these residual lands as “vacant” and declared them property of the state. The official argument was that these commonly held or usurped lands exceeded the minimal amount of land conditional to the subsistence of the people who lived from that land (Langer and Jackson 1990, 24). In the eyes of the state, these residual lands represented first of all wastelands that were to be brought into the productive cycle and secondly represented a welcome revenue source for the national treasury as they were easily marketable through auction operations (Larson 2004, 216).

As collective claims on community land were no longer accepted, the community was stripped of its corporative means of representation (Irurozqui 1999, 731-2). It became forbidden to “*take the name of community or ayllu, nor take charge of them before any authority.*”⁴⁹⁵ The implication was that communities were forced to rely on attorneys,

⁴⁹⁵ It was article 7 of the 1874 law that made the figure of the *apoderado* necessary: “*Once the property titles have been granted, the law no longer recognizes communities. No individual or gathering of individuals can take the name of community or ayllu, nor take charge of them before any authority. The indigenous will negotiate themselves or by means of an *apoderado* in all their enterprises, considered legally of age, or they will be represented, as minors of age, according to the civil requirements of each case.*” Own translation. “Ley de 5 de Octubre de 1874.” Ovando 1985, 279.

called *apoderados*, while their autonomy in terms of land control was invaded by the deployment of land inspection commissions. This seriously undermined the role of community leaders as mediating actors in the connections of indigenous peasants to the juridical system, political authorities and the land market, which was to the advantage of opportunistic local elites. At the other hand, these restrictions gave rise to what is known as the *apoderado* movement (see below, 5.2.3). The National Convention of 1938 would legally restore the community's formal abolition, but it was only with the National Revolution that this legal recovery would be reinforced with a broader package of emancipatory measures.

The fiscal implication was that the head tax lost much of its leverage in the contractual relation between the communities and the central state. The *contribuyentes'* monetary and labour contributions did no longer guarantee the protection of their collective land claims. Moreover, from a liberal point of view, the differential tax status as well as the compulsory personal services represented discriminatory colonial legacies from which they were to be liberated. Therefore, the disentailment operation required a simultaneous transition to a cadastral system based on a universal property tax (a rental tax defined by the size of each privatized plot). As an intermediate step towards this new fiscal regime, a "territorial contribution" was instituted, which –since the head tax had ceased to exist at the national level due to the 1872 fiscal reform– was allocated to the departmental treasury by the newly created office of *caciques licitadores*, who adopted the previous task of the *jilaqatas* (Rivière 1982, 105). However, the implementation of this decentralized collection would only follow after the modification of the law in 1880 (see below).

5.2.2 Delinking instruments: La Revisita General of 1881.

Even with a reform law formally proclaimed, the welcoming prospect of indigenous taxes and the "*specter of a caste war*" delayed the implementation of the country's new land policy (Langer and Jackson 1990, 20). In a first moment, the law of 1874 achieved its objective only in some regions, particularly the Tarija and Cochabamba departments (Rodríguez 1991, 135, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 732; Ovando 1985, 286-8). It would take a military interference before the government would go over to a generalized application of the reform. The War of the Pacific shaped decisive economic incentives and was seized by the country's national elites to push their ultimate land reform plans through. Pressured by the urgent need for extra income source, the new Assembly of 1880 finally proceeded to measures to put the law into practice (Irurozqui 1999, 732; Barragán 2012, 25-6). Moreover, the Chilean occupation of Bolivia's coastal lands in early 1879 had deprived the government from the money that was foreseen to compensate in 1871 annulled land sales. This motivated indemnification petitioners to seek compensation

through land reform interventions that would allow them to usurp community lands, which according to Ovando explains the elite's inclination towards domestic power interests rather than to back off Chile's aggression (Ovando 1985, 290 and 306).

The context of the ongoing War of the Pacific sparked once more the lively debate over the destination of the indigenous population. From a liberal-republican stance, only “*independent peasants, linked to the market, producer and consumer*” could contribute to a civil modern nation-state (despite the general fear that “independent” might equal “beyond the state's reach”) (Irurozqui 1999, 733). In June of that year, Ladislao Cabrera, one of the country's war heroes, stated that

“the lands belonging to the *originarios* constituted a considerable part of the territory of the Republic. To place their possessions in circulation, place them in hands of intelligent and capitalist proprietors, was the attempt of the 1874 legislation; and if that ley was put into practice, a considerable increase in public goods and agricultural receipts would be achieved.”⁴⁹⁶

Despite the general fear that indigenous smallholders might appropriate their independence –unprotected by a paternal hacendado– to move beyond the State's reach, this was the road that was eventually indicated by the National Convention of 1880 and adopted by the government of president Campero (1880-‘84). On the 1st of October followed the law that ratified the disentailment act of 1874, annulling the measures taken by the previous Daza government (1876-‘79) which had restored the land sales prohibition and the anti-Melgarejo policy of 1871 (Ley de 1 de octubre de 1880; Irurozqui 1999, 732).

Regarding the parallel fiscal reform instituted in 1874, the 1880 law created a property tax that substituted the ‘old’ *tributo* and tithe system. From now on, an *impuesto predial rústico* and *impuesto predial urbano* (respectively a rural and an urban property tax) was charged, corresponding to about 8% of the annual return (in profits or in rents) of respectively rural and urban real property. However, *ayllus* that did not possess themselves privatized lands (such as the estates some of them rented) were exempt from the new tax (Klein 1993, 135-6). In the latter case, they paid from now on a “territorial contribution” (Irurozqui 1999, 735-6; Ovando 1985, 293-300 and 322), which was a change of names rather than a substantial alteration of the commoners' fiscal ties to the state. Indeed, in several departments as in Oruro, this substitution of the indigenous *tributo* did not alter the importance of the tax revenue for its treasury

⁴⁹⁶ Own translation. Cabrera, Ladislao. “Memoria presentada a la Convención Nacional de 1880 por el Secretario de Estado Ladislao Cabrero”, La Paz, 7 de junio de 1880, 18-9; cited in Irurozqui 1999, 735.

(Sanchez-Albornoz 1978, Bonifaz 1953, Flores Moncayo 1953 and Gorvera 1926, cited in Rivière 1982, 106).

Regardless of its name, the fiscal burden of the tax increased as both the “transitory” and new tax were collected in decimally ordered bolivianos, implying an increase of 25% in comparison with the peso currency that corresponds to an octal system.⁴⁹⁷ However, as this caused major protest, the government decided in 1882 to switch back to the collection in pesos, declaring the *contribuyentes* exempt from personal taxes and military conscription (Platt 1982, 78). In 1886, under pressures of non-abating indigenous insurrection, it was decreed that the *contribución* would continue to be collected in pesos as long as the procedure to switch to the new fiscal system (the *Revisita*) was “in progress” (ibid, 79). In 1911, the territorial contribution was once more modified (footnote 81 in Irurozqui 1999, 735-6) and while other modifications would follow, would remain in place until into the second half of the 20th centuries in the “free” ayllus (see 4.1.1).

The conversion to a property tax required new fiscal tools and practices, designed on basis of a cadastre (defined by James Scott as “a geometric representation of the borders or frontiers between parcels of land”) that would allow the state to trace the connection between landowners and their property (Richards 2009, 57). As the Prefect of Oruro would later explain, this reform implied three operations which he estimated to be executed simultaneously in the course of one or two years (González 1929, 211-2). In preparation, a meticulous census was to be elaborated in order to replace the old padrones. This census would deliver details regarding the subdivision, extension and usufructuaries of the *sayañas*, in order to define how ayllu lands could be divided. The following step was then their effective privatization, the *exvinculación*, allotting each “ex-comunario” an individual plot that eventually could be incorporated into the cadastre. Shortly after the law of October 1880, guidelines for the execution of this survey operation, baptized as the *Revisita General* (general land inspection), were defined, in line with the stipulations of the 1874 law.⁴⁹⁸ Different from the previous regular *Revisitas*, the exact confines of the terrain of each proprietor in the surveyed territorial units had to be established (Platt 1982, 74). However, the lack of technical and financial government support to execute this operation as well as distrust and fierce opposition to such intervention would convert the *Revisita* in a protracted and in some

⁴⁹⁷ The collection of the tax in the new currency of boliviano, which corresponded to the strong coin (10 reales) instead of the weak peso (8 reales or 80 centavos of 1 boliviano) in which the tax was previously collected. As the nominal quota of the tax did not alter, its relative burden increased (Platt 1982, 76; Irurozqui 1993, 14).

⁴⁹⁸ The organization of the *Revisita* was regulated by article 11 of the 1874 law. The following description of the *Revisita* regulations is based on Ovando 1985, 279-300; Klein 1993, 135-6 and Irurozqui 1999, 735.

regions never concluded or even started, assessment operation. In 1883, the communities who held a colonial land title would even be formally exempted from the *Revisita* operations (see below).

At the departmental level, *mesas Revisoras* (survey committees) were formed and dispatched to all provinces to inspect the terrain, grant property titles and define the corresponding tax quota in each canton. These committees consisted of a *revisor*, the sub-Prefect, a secretary, a land surveyor, all recruited among the provincial population, and the priest from the village from where they operated. Upon their arrival, the sub-prefect of the province ordered the attendance of the *jilaqatas* of all *ayllus*, together with the indigenous people they represented, in order to arrange the payment of the land titles resting on the *tierras de origen* (communal lands).⁴⁹⁹ They subjected the terrain to a measurement, distribution and valuation operation by walking and demarcating the territorial limits of the community lands. The regulation of the 1st of December 1880 ordered that, within a term of only one year, community land had to be divided as individual property among the owners who held undivided (*proindiviso*) rights to the land, which went accompanied by the exaction of elevated consolidation payments. Beneficiaries –the *comunarios* who received an individual title– were to pay 5 to 10 bolivianos. Their entitlement to a *sayaña* had to be consolidated with a legal property document that bore the name of that *sayaña*. When division resulted impossible, these lands had to be purchased with the proceeds from the sale distributed among the owners. Lands that lacked a property titles would be transferred to the State and subjected to sale or renting. In that sense, the *Revisitas* gave continuity to the land sales operation initiated under Melgarejo.

The *Revisita* board was also the main instrument to prepare the elaboration of a cadastre to which all non-communal land property, either of smallholders or hacendados, were subjected. The commission was in charge of making up the taxpayer list of those people liable to the new tax and to fix the quota of the new tax system.⁵⁰⁰ In order to implement the announced property tax, information on the ownership,

⁴⁹⁹ See for instance the description of the arrival of the *Revisor* in Corque in the *Gazeta judicial*. CDLT, *Gazeta judicial*, 1895-1896, no. 5, 12-3. Oruro, 18 June 1896.

⁵⁰⁰ The taxpayers and corresponding quota were recorded in three books, one where individual titleholders were registered, in substitution of the *Padrón de Contribuyentes*, another where “residual lands” (now state-owned) were inventoried and a third one where “separated” lands from the communities, such as halting posts, parishes and villages were listed. Previously landless beneficiaries who now had to pay annually 2 bolivianos in addition to the new tax were registered in an additional book. Because of their indigence, Urus and Afro-descendants were exempt from taxation. Peasants who became incorporated as *colonos* on a hacienda were freed from all personal services to political, military and religious functionaries but now paid those services to the *hacendado*. However, for other peasants this service obligation remained in place, although no tax was to be paid during service.

production and value of all estates had to be united in a systematic register, a task that was completed by 1882, at least for some regions comprising profitable cultivation land, such as the coca (and coffee) producing Yunga valleys (Klein 1993, 135-6).

However, the implementation of the cadastre as a national tax system remained too great an ambition for the Bolivian state. The law of 25 November 1887 was a new attempt to replace the tithe system by the *impuesto predial*, but was eventually again postponed until 1894, when a new tax on annual production was implemented, yet only in the department of Tarija (Platt 1982, 90). The law of 20 January 1900 even restored the *diezmos* (tithes) and *primicias* (first fruits) were restored in the provinces, followed by a transition period in which an “intermediary” tax was levied before definitively switching to the cadastre.⁵⁰¹ Still, a huge part of the countryside fell outside the scope of the cadastral measures. In regions where land remained out of private hands, *ayllu contribuyentes* continued paying the head tax, until receipt of their land title. In the Oruro department, most rural lands corresponded to such regions and were hence omitted from the cadastral books, but also the department’s privately held estates remained un(der)recorded. In the cadastral registers of the National Archive of Bolivia, the Oruro department appears with empty pages.⁵⁰² Even the pre-cadastral procedures of the Revisita did not get off the ground in many districts and particularly those of Carangas. The question which will be addressed in chapters 6 and 7 is not just why this did not happen, but also which tangible and more concealed implications this had for further developments in the province.

5.2.3 The regionally differentiated reach of the law.

When the implementation of the law eventually took off, in the 1880s, Bolivia witnessed an unprecedented land tenure intervention which indigenous resistance could no longer retard. The result was a sweeping dispossession process that indelibly marked life in the highlands and valleys for the next centuries to come (Ovando 1985, 300-6; Klein 1991, 52). Land intrusions, either through purchase or fraud, would continue into the middle of the 20th century and subsequently “transferred” to the eastern lowlands of the country. Numerous “free” communities were converted into “captive” communities within the boundaries of a hacienda or into dismembered islands in a sea of individual farmers (Rivera Cusicanqui and THOA 1992, 45). With their land, these communities lost their labour force as well. Between 1880 and 1930, indigenous

⁵⁰¹ In Norte Potosi, the cadastre was created in 1903-1910 (Platt 1982, 117).

⁵⁰² ANB, Serie Padrones y Catastros, 1773-1902. Departamento Oruro.

communities saw their land and labour basis shrinking from half to nearly a third of the lands and of the country's rural population (Klein 2009, 147).

Grieshaber has demonstrated that, at least until 1877, communities maintained and even expanded their control over indigenous land and labour, comprising over half the Bolivian indigenous labour force in each department, while haciendas lost indigenous labour force (Grieshaber 1980, 236). Since Bolivia became independent, rural society was marked by a distribution of land control in a more or less balanced way between corporative entities -the Church and the indigenous communities- and private estates - the hacienda- next to a smaller portion of smallholders. The rural indigenous population corresponded to three categories, those living in communities, those living in the haciendas and a minority of "independent" indigenous villagers (ibid, 225). The first group was the largest, representing 70% (1838) to 75% (1877) of all indigenous taxpayers, while the second group hacienda tributaries counted for 29% (1838) to 24% (1877) and the last group hardly represented less than 2% (ibid, table 4 and 5). However, after 1877, the "controlled" balance between haciendas and communities, installed under colonial regime, was broken.

Whereas in 1846 still over 63 percent of Bolivia's indigenous population lived in free-holding communities, that figure was by the end of the century reduced to 27 percent (Thiesenhusen 1995, 53). On a longer term, the number of free-holding communities declined from 11000 in 1847 to only 3779 by 1950 (Lavaud 1991, 173). Meanwhile, the number of haciendas increased from about 300 to 4000 during the last four decades of the nineteenth century (Cárdenas 1988, 510).

Still, this was far from a uniform experience, but a process marked by a strong regional differentiation. In the Southern departments of Cochabamba, Potosí and Sucre, there were in fact few communities left at the start of the reform's implementation. Together with strong resistance and lacking purchase incentives, this resulted in a quite low rate of community land conversion (Langer and Jackson 1990, 23). Particularly in the Cochabamba area, there was a remarkably high level of land fragmentation, but this was in part produced by internal fragmentation of large estates rather than through dispossession (Irurozqui 1999, 726). Here emerged a large group of middle to rich peasants who saw their accumulation potential deadlocked by communitarian constraints and opted for a "smallholder road" out of their commoner's life, "squeezing" the landlord class from below (Larson 1998, 313). According to Rodríguez, the effect of the *exvinculación* process in the Cochabamba area helped to "*unchain accumulated craving for and tendencies towards a universally desired peasantization*" (Rodríguez 1991, 192-9, cited in Irurozqui 1999, 730).

In the La Paz department, by contrast, the subdivision and transfer of community lands produced acceleration in the expansion of the hacienda system rather than a proliferation of individual farmers. Particularly the region of the Titicaca Lake, the city of La Paz and the western valleys witnessed the heftiest wave of land sales. What

happened here was that the *exvinculación* replaced the protection which *comunarios* had enjoyed in the national state-community pact by the dynamics of the (land) market, where they were played off individually against the private interests of a much more powerful landlord class. As an effect, this “release” of *comunarios* on the market fed the growing class of *colonos* or hacienda tenants instead of reinforcing the emergence of a smallholder class as the 1874 had pretended to achieve (Irurozqui 1999, 732; Ovando 1985, 278). The result was that the department saw its communal land base decreasing from 879 to 281 ayllus (an annual rate of -1,2%) and the number of haciendas increased from 1625 to 8507 (an annual growth of 1,8 %) in the 1846-1941 period; a process concentrated in the highland area and in the 1880-1920 decades.⁵⁰³ Most of the time this conversion happened through “stepwise” community land sales: first peasants would sell one of their *sayañas*, often at very low prices, which curbed their access to the market and hence to complementary income sources, which then forced them to gradually sell their other *sayañas* as well (Klein 1993, 157).

An important factor in this hacienda expansion was the developing communication infrastructure which incited estates that formerly had remained disconnected from domestic and export food markets to search for commercially exploitable lands. Booming railway construction, tin mining and speculation markets caused a rise in land prices, as well as in fraud and coercion, creating a very active land market in the La Paz area (Langer and Jackson 1990, 23). As usurped estates were used as collateral to obtain bank loans, this hacienda expansion was also related to the expansion of the banking system (Klein 1993, 155-6). As Klein explains, the low risk of land investments and the rise in food prices in the La Paz area made that “*the incentive to reduce the initial cost factor even further by using government troops to seize lands from "rebellious" Indians was an irresistible temptation that led to a massive assault on Indian land ownership*” (ibid, 118). This expanding landlord class conveniently relied upon social Darwinism to justify this land grab (Langer and Jackson 1990, 24). At the other hand, it was exactly where enclosure was most dramatically experienced that resistance and the development of a grassroots movement was strongest, reflected in the “*impressive (...) amount of land these now “illegal” communities still retained into the modern period*” (Klein 1993, 162). The departments’ communities that did survive hacienda encroachment would take up a predominant political role.

Further south on the *altiplano*, several areas remained out of the scope of the hacienda system. Here, the new land legislation did serve local elites to expand their resource base (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 85). However, the factors of distance, soil fertility

⁵⁰³ “The change in the number of ayllus and haciendas in the department of La Paz, 1846 and 1941.” Klein 1993, 119, based on Demélas 1980, 163.

and demography tempered the risk for indigenous communities of becoming “captive” to enclosure pressures was low. Given the lack of infrastructure innovations kept several areas disconnected from urban market (demands), the lack of cultivation lands impeded the sprouting of economic incentives and the preponderance of a community-bound indigenous population, such pressures were less strongly felt and hence more easily/successfully countered. Recurrent indigenous insurgence, reinforced by a local mestizo-indigenous anti-*Revisita* alliance, enabled communities in regions such as Chayanta, northern Potosí, as well as Carangas to keep the *exvinculación* of their lands at bay (Platt 1987).

To complete the diversity of late 19th century rural Bolivia, the focus must be moved further eastwards to the Amazon basin and the Chaco pampa. These lowlands were treated as *terra nullius*, in function of the deployment of an extractive economy based on forest resources exploitation such as quinine and rubber in the north and an expanding colonization frontier fuelled by cattle farming in the south of the country (Assies 2009, 297). Rather than haciendas oriented towards commercial agriculture, this region saw the emergence of rubber estates in the Beni and cattle farms in the Chaco. The dispersed indigenous population of these areas had the choice of either their incorporation through debt peonage or their retreat into marginal regions (Assies 2009, 297; Gamarra 2007; Guiteras 2011; Servicio Alemán de Cooperación Social Técnica – DED 2008, 6).

Still, despite this diversity, the renewed efforts at privatization presented themselves in the first place in terms of conflict, equally for enclosed as for free communities, and only secondly as (an attempted) liberal transformation (Langer and Jackson 1997, 171-92). The overall outcome was the conversion of the Bolivian countryside into a differentiated conflictive arena that would nurture the development of inventive communal responses.

5.2.4 The law and the communities: Loopholes and rebellion.

Against the background of a varied rural landscape, freeholding communities in all regions –whether surviving or dismantled– witnessed an erosion of their social safety net. At the same time, this increased vulnerability incited a strong and coordinated reaction which, considering the reduced margin for communal action, was quite successful in defending key indigenous demands and developing decisive representative skills. This reaction points to the factors of state incapacity and indigenous agency. The reform and the specifications of its execution challenged the government far beyond its bureaucratic capacities. While the ambitions of the state were undercut by its own weakness, its limited reach was further stressed and “exploited” by indigenous lobbying and confrontation manoeuvres. Thereto, they relied to great extent upon the mobilizing

potential of communal structures, inter-community coordination, and an indigenous - not so surprising yet ambiguous- alliance with rural elites. This multifaceted manoeuvring materialized in “*legal loopholes through which indigenous communities could evade or contest the new tax and land policies*” (Larson 2004, 220).

The drastic policy was taken as an unacceptable provocation by the indigenous communities who saw their key margin for autonomy being dismantled. However, indigenous resistance and disobedience did not correspond to a “simple” opposition reaction, but entailed various forms and strategies of collective representation. In response to the limits and gaps created by the developing land legislation, this multifaceted indigenous agency converted the reform process into a complex interplay of state, community, and intermediary actors. In function of possible allies, available tools and intolerable offenses, indigenous groups consciously deployed a broad repertoire of negotiation tactics. Through intimidations as well as collaboration, they continuously lobbied for and “extorted” concrete concessions. Not only did this keep taxes uncollected and land sales unexecuted “on the ground,” but it even led to the inscription of legal changes and exemptions “on the paper.” Communal lobbying and mobilization was thus an important factor in delaying the implementation of the division of communal lands and the elaboration of a cadastre. Even more, by imposing obstructions to and creating “escape options,” the original objectives of the legislation were refuted and enervated. Thus, by detecting, creating and forcing “loopholes” into the legislation, indigenous agency not only slowed down but fundamentally altered the course and the intended effect of the reform process (Barragán 2012).

To the extent that the foundations for corporative representation were undermined, indigenous groups found themselves in a “juridical limbo”. Legal actions attempting to break out of this limbo only nurtured the general conviction that the indigenous population was to be kept as isolated as possible from the national public scenery, quite in contrast to the law’s promotion as a tool to open up citizenship. Paradoxically, these are precisely the actions that stress the indigenous capacity and openness to active participation rather than their stubborn resistance to anything “modern” or “western” (Irurozqui 1999, 239-40). As the community went “underground,” the indigenous population became increasingly reliant upon alternative spokespersons to access anything close to civil rights. Stimulated by the puzzling range of liberal acts, as well as by the continuous inter- and intra-community land clashes and lawsuits, a grassroots movement of particularly Aymara leaders emerged (Larson 2004, 227). In its first phase, this movement was known as the *apoderados generales* (Ticona 2003; Mendieta 2006, 762-3). Fully developing in the 1880s, its first realization can actually be traced back to the 1871 alliance with Morales, which was a formative experience for the later Liberal-Indian alliance. In a second phase, from the 1899 rupture running up to the National Revolution of 1952, indigenous leadership was coordinated at the national level by the movement of so-called *caciques apoderados* (see chapter 7).

While inciting rebellions, this grassroots movement was also very active in court. Thereto, they tapped into the accumulated experience with legal language and mechanisms by community leaders over the preceding decades and centuries. In building up their argument and designing their legal strategies, the (envisioned) official legal framework was submitted to a customary juridical reading which resulted in a new, communitarian-based language that allowed these negotiators to enter in dialogue with the principal agents of the fiscal-legal reform implementation.⁵⁰⁴ Through bottom-up pressures and regionally coordinated reactions, these *apoderados* managed to make use of detected “gaps” in the legislation process. Barragán and Soliz lucidly define these lacuna as “*the times of justice*” in which community leaders appear as active negotiators in the process of closing the distance between the law (the paper) and its implementation (the field).⁵⁰⁵

As an outcome of that dialogue, a margin for pluralism was created in the national legislation that allowed for the continuation of communal land tenure. However, this achievement was not a one-sided victory as the negotiators’ strategy to enter the domain of European law codes required a certain degree of accommodation to the premises of that domain (see also Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). For instance, in order to access the country’s juridical infrastructure where the colonial land titles of their communities were registered, they often relied upon mestizo lawyers and representatives who they appointed to recover, copy and authenticate these colonial documents, which had become the vital basis of their communal land claims (see the 1883 law below). This collaboration thus helped them strengthening their legal “armament” but meanwhile had a noxious effect upon communal representation structures and their secure hold on colonial documents (Rivera 1991, 607).

The stipulation that collective claims could no longer be defended as community, the role of formal representatives became crucial. The function of *apoderado* was in principle an indigenous attribution, but as communitarian land claims were on the rise, comunarios, either individually or collectively, assigned the defence of their land rights to literate mestizos and white residents of the rural districts. Thus, while the created power vacuum opened possibilities for the extension of a network of community leaders, it also allowed opportunist non-indigenous actors to interfere in land

⁵⁰⁴ For a fascinating insight “from within” on the construction of a movement and how it cultivated an own “communal literacy” to read, interpret and respond to an imposed “language of contention”: Condori and Ticona 1992; Choque and Mamani 2003; Choque 2005; Choque and Quispe 2010; Ticona 2011; Cúneo y Gascó 2014.

⁵⁰⁵ Their argument is based on particularly one juridical file (Archivo de La Paz) that comprises documents that can be traced back to the composiciones procedure in the colonial era to the Chaco War (Barragán and Soliz 2011).

arbitration (Irurozqui 1999, 717, footnote 26). Village authorities, hacendados, local economic potentates or lawyers consequently entered in an ambiguous indigenous-mestizo alliance, which gave them greater legitimation for “paternalist” extraction of the comunarios they pretended to defend but drifted them apart from the national elites. The elites that governed them at either the national or local level did not form a homogeneous block; an advantage which the indigenous leaders were conscious of. In fact, the personal interests of these mestizos often very intimately matched with those of the communities, particularly in the case of the *vecino-comunarios* who had obtained formal access to the community lands and were hence induced to enter in an anti-Revisita coalition.

Out of this dynamic dialogue between state institutions, community representatives and elite groups with diverse land rights interests, the newly implemented juridical system became interspersed by several -either deliberately or unintentionally created- fissures that provided communities with a margin for communal land property. Already in 1880, the Revisita operation was temporally postponed due to the clashes it provoked and bureaucratic limitations. One year later, a resolution defined that, when the *Revisita* commissioners encountered too much resistance against individual land titles, the land had to be allocated with collective *proindiviso* (undivided) property titles (Bonifaz 1953, 315, cited in Barragán 2012, 26). Upon request of comunarios of the Paria province, the country’s legislative body acknowledged that the 1874 law had not taken the leverage of the *composición* titles and the related *tributo* payments into consideration and adopted on 21 October 1882 a resolution that exempted communities in possession of these colonial land titles from the *Revisita* operation (Bonifaz 1953, 335 cited in Barragán 2012, 26). The resolution was probably adopted without realizing that its stipulations applied to numerous ayllus of at least five departments which disposed of colonial *composición* titles and hence imposed serious limits upon the reach of the 1881 *Revisita* proclamation (Rivera 1991, 605).

When the resolution was promulgated on 23 November 1883 as the *proindiviso* law, a vital loophole for communal survival was created.

“the community lands [*terrenos de origen*] consolidated in the colonial period through *composición* certificates granted by the land inspectors, are property of their owners, remaining consequently excluded from the *Revisita* settled by the laws of October 5th 1874 and October 1st 1880,”⁵⁰⁶

This declaration unlocked extra room of manoeuvre to assert indivisible land claims. Members of an indigenous community were given the option to freely choose or come

⁵⁰⁶ Own translation. Ley de 23 de noviembre de 1883.

to a consensus on whether they preferred either undivided or subdivided possession of the land before proceeding to the *exvinculación* operation (Bonifaz 1953, 386 and 395, cited in Barragán 2012, 26).

By exempting all communities able to prove the legitimacy of their communal properties from undergoing the *Revisita* intervention and instead recognizing their collective property rights, the land reform project received a major blow. It also had a decisive impact on the strategies adopted by the communities to defend their land claims. The importance attributed to validated colonial property titles unleashed a rush on the juridical archives (Rivera 1991, 606). Meanwhile, persistent indigenous demands and uprisings pressured the state to continue to accept their contributions as a guarantee that neither the state nor private proprietors would absorb the community's landowning attributions by respectively selling consolidated land titles or purchasing community land (Platt 1982, 79-100; Grieshaber 1991, 117-9; Klein 1991, 52). Particularly in the La Paz region, where anti-corporative pressures were strongest felt, communal leaders launched "*innumerable judicial actions that demonstrate the indigenous resistance to prevent that their contributions to the State would imply that the latter again assumes its tutelary function and defends them against individual buyers*" (Irurozqui 1999, 736).⁵⁰⁷ In this region, *comunarios* remained most compelled to purchase their individual plots, despite the extortion of the *proindiviso* law of 1883 (Klein 1993).

Thus, as communal manoeuvring crystalized in achievements that somehow alleviated their vulnerability, indigenous pressures, particularly by Aymara highland communities, would not cease (Larson 2004, 220-1). As a result of their continued counteractions, the *Revisita* operation was suspended once more between 1884 and 1886. By the late 1880s, it became clear that a lacking bureaucratic-military supervision over the titling, assessment and sale procedure impeded the execution of the *Revisita* process and the idea to postpone the substitution of the *tributo* system until the primary objectives of a land subdivision and land market had been realized won ground (Irurozqui 1999, 737). Meanwhile, however, the violent reactions provoked by the initiated reform process had grown out of hand and merged with economic and political pressures for elite renovation.

⁵⁰⁷ These actions resulted successful to some extent as these communities managed to enforce a reduction in monetary extraction (see the suspension of the switch to bolivianos in the tax collection). Still, sale operations continued to affect particularly the lands around the Titicaca lake, in the western intermountain valleys and connected to La Paz' urban market (ibid).

5.3 From a convenient alliance to a dangerous pact: The Great Rebellion of 1899.

By the end of the century, the combination of a thriving mining export economy, new land legislation and the political consolidation of new power groups had put a serious strain on communal land rights security. Offended by the aggression of the ongoing land grab, the bondage of the hacienda labour regime, and the excesses of *vecino* intervention in the villages, belligerency among highland –particularly Aymara- communities was gradually forced up. During the last decades of the 19th century, Liberals started to see options in the rising indigenous hostility to form a strategic anti-governmental front (Larson 2004, 229-31; Mendieta 2010; Condarco 2011 [1964]). In their determination to bring the conservative government down, they placed their bet on an expansion of existing clientelist ties to the indigenous population with a broader Liberal-Indian coalition. Their overture towards the indigenous leadership was guaranteed by the advocacy of community land restitution. Yet, what seemed to both a convenient deal – Liberal support against the *exvinculación* in turn for massive indigenous mobilization- would eventually result a dangerous pact. And moreover a very complex pact, when observing the local dynamics through which *vecinos* and *comunarios* tended to be gradually driven into each other's arms (as will be further discussed in the following chapters).

In 1896, a partnership was sealed between the Liberal Party leader, Colonel José Manuel Pando, and the influential Aymara leader Pablo Zárate “*el temible*” Willka “*against the scandalously official candidacy of sir Alonso*”, the president and leader of the Conservatives.⁵⁰⁸ The alliance was grounded on pre-existing networks of community leaders, which were strongest in La Paz and Oruro. Whereas the Liberals built their claims on and prospects for the future of Bolivia in very similar terms as the political party they attacked (or the other way round: the conservatives had in fact started up the liberal reform program), the indigenous leaders built on strong and long-standing traditions in territorial and political self-rule. While it is clear that none of both parties saw this as a natural alliance, historians differ on the degree to which indigenous participation in the revolution gives evidence of their autonomy or rather their subjugation to Liberal manipulations and internal struggles. Scholars such as Platt resolutely reject analyses that attribute indigenous mobilization to top-down

⁵⁰⁸ These are the words of José Valerio Aldunate, a resident of Oruro who later acted as agent for several miners and big traders in the province, and played a leading role in the revolution. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1903, no. 4, 1907, no. 6 and 1910, no. 12. Portal 1896, 13.

manipulation (1987, 281 and 314). There is a debate over the autonomy of indigenous action. While Condarco emphasizes Willka's leading role as military *caudillo* (2011 [1964]), Rivera and the THOA adopt a bottom-up view to the cross-regional network of community leaders (1991). Mendieta's work is an attempt to formulate a middle course in these debates (Mendieta 2010).

Liberals and "Indians" departed from a differing orientation, but their projects were both internally heterogeneous. The Liberal party went to war against a political and narrowly identified enemy, the opposite party, in order to take over the government. The mobilization of Zárate Willka as commander-in-chief of the indigenous insurgents targeted Bolivia's oligarchic social order and its ethical underpinnings as a whole. According to Condarco, the majority of Bolivia's peasant population supported the revolution not simply out of liberal or anti-conservative affinities, but to back the federalist (anti-centralist) cause as a way to secure increased self-determination (Condarco 2011 [1964], 409-10). Moreover, Condarco explains that in the context of the war ideological motivations and interpretations of "liberalism" and "federalism" in relation to the socio-economic and political organization of the communities conflicted, not only between the national elites and the indigenous population but also among the latter (*ibid*, 408). The indigenous interpretations of their role in this joint struggle and the final purpose their mobilization varied among the insurgents themselves. In view of the bloody excesses that occurred in Oruro's provinces in "the shadows of the war" (see 6.5), particularly the communities of Carangas and Paria seemed to understand the political conflict in more extreme interethnic terms, backed by a project of an "exclusive" indigenous nation under Zárate Willka's presidency (Pauwels 1983, 244; Condarco 2011 [1964], 260).

The coalition entered in full operation through the revolution of La Paz of December 1898, which was the start of the Federal War of 1899 that lasted until the decisive battle on in April (Condarco 2011 [1964]). However, in the course of the war, an indigenous "schism" emerged as the community of Umala (Aroma province, La Paz) denied Zárate's leadership, upon which Pando recruited the community in his plans to bring Zárate and his 'liberation plans' down. Despite Pando's discourse on the role envisioned for indigenous troops in the conflict, the dependence of the Liberal army upon indigenous support went further than that of cannon fodder, but served to intimidate and harass Alonso's army with their demographic majority, their swing -and even some fire arms (*ibid*, 332). Pando counted on about 6000 men from Caracollo, led by Zárate, and some 10000 men from Carangas and Umala, split from Zárate. The deciding battle was fought at Crucero de Paria on the 10th of April 1899 with Willkas' troops functioning as vanguard, covering (and thus facilitating the surprise attack by) Pando and the Umala troop (*ibid*, 344).



Figure 24 The gathering of indigenous troops in Oruro, 1899 (adaptation of Condarco 2011 [1964], 467)

Meanwhile, however, as revolutionary troops had been advancing, the Liberal staff became increasingly worried about independent acts and excesses on behalf of indigenous groups (ibid, 307-8). The massacre of a liberal battalion in Mohoza, north from Carangas in the province of Pacajes (La Paz), in the last days of February, sparked the fear for a “war of races” (ibid, 262-72; Mendieta 2010, 193-238). On 28 March, Zárate Willka remitted a proclamation in an attempt to clarify his position as the revolution developed, insisting on the mutual respect between the white, *vecino* and indigenous population “*because we are of the same blood and children of Bolivia*” (Condarco 2011 [1964], 313).

In the aftermath of the revolutionaries’ victory against the “alonsistas”, the instant indigenous “consumption” of the Liberal promises regarding their *tierras de origen* by invading and plundering the hacienda estates poured oil on the fire (ibid, 378). The installation of an independent indigenous government in Peñas, west from Carangas in the Paria province, in April caused a turning point in the coalition as it left an indelible mark of Zárate Willka’s ideological agenda, although no proof exists on his formal instructions regarding the proclamation of this autonomous indigenous state (ibid, 363-80; Mendieta 2010, 193-238). With Zárate Willka turned away from Pando, rumours spread that he and his troops were to attack the cities of La Paz and Oruro. As the terror for an imminent interethnic war inflamed, all indigenous leaders were imprisoned (Mendieta 2010, 191). 1899 thus constituted a temporal culmination point in a longer

history of inter-ethnic alliances and conflicts and a breaking point in a medium-term political transition process that would accelerate the initiated land reform process, yet without bringing that process to its conclusion, on the contrary.

Chapter 6

Exvinculación in Carangas: Land reform dynamics “on the ground”.

*Nos quieren quitar la tierra para que no tenga suelo
nuestro paso. Nos quieren quitar la historia para que en
el olvido se muera nuestra palabra.*

Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos¹

At the level of the Oruro department, communal manoeuvring kept the intervention of *Revisita* functionaries in their intra-community land use and property arrangements to large extent at bay. In fiscal terms, this implied the persistence of the old tax system, based on the 1831 legislation, and its collection mode. Even though several communities joined the ranks of the *colono* class, the *exvinculación* law would not find entrance before entering the 20th century (Aramayo 1898, 27). A superficial change from the *tributo indígena* to the *contribución territorial* was implemented and the private estates surrounding the city of Oruro in the Cercado province were registered in the rural cadastre, but the law would never find generalized implementation in the department. Hence, the allocation of property and power to the relatively well-surviving communal entities of the department, including all communities of the Carangas province, continued to be regulated by the logic of state-community reciprocity. Key to this “survival” was how communities brought the factors of taxation and representation into play as they (re)negotiated their position within the restructuring political and

¹ Fragment from the “Cuarta declaración de la selva Lacandona,” 1st of January 1996. Subcomandante Marcos et al. 2011, chapter 15. In English: “They want to take the land so that our feet have nothing to stand on. They want to take our history so that we and our word will be forgotten and die.” in “Fourth Declaration of the Lacondon Jungle (excerpt)” Subcomandante Marcos et al. 2011, 80.

economic outlines of the country. These negotiations went together with the forging of inter-community and inter-class/ethnic bonds and/or their breakdown into juridical and violent clashes.

The question that guides the present chapter is why and how *Revisita* intervention was prevented from taking off in the province. As concrete protest against “the state” was principally directed against the *Revisita*, for constituting the conditional step towards the implementation of *exvinculación*, enquiries into this regulatory mechanism serve as a quite well documented entry into the local dynamics provoked by the land reform. The dispatch of *revisitadores* commissions to the province was not uncommon to the communities nor was the distrust and (violent) antagonist reactions towards these fiscal interventions a novelty. However, this time this state intervention was no longer justified by a renovation of state-community reciprocal relations, but by a project to exactly eliminate that particular relation. Instead of confirming the *contribuyentes*’ access to communal lands, it intended to divide them from those lands. Strategies to boycott the *Revisita* plans included both attacked the reform process “on the paper”, through legal action, as well as “on the ground”, through organized rebellion, through everyday violence and widespread, coordinated insurgence; all equally stirring the existing fear for an indigenous uprising.

In the following, different responses by Carangas’ communities and local state representatives to the announcement, entrance and undermining of the *Revisita* operation will be discussed along a chronological overview, starting with the “prologue” to the eventual land reform. Immediately after the proclamation of the 1874 law, the announcements of a *Revisita* were answered by fierce protest which would culminate in the rupture of the 1899 Great Rebellion. However, a reconstruction of the way in which the *Revisita* intervention was blocked yields a more complex picture than mere dichotomous/superficial reactions. When linking *Revisita*-related documentation to the larger pool of simultaneously produced archive material, we gain access to less visible processes that give insight into the functioning and reorganization of fiscal bonds, the deployment of multiple “lines of attack,” and the interests and intervention of intermediaries. The nearly countless number of lawsuits on land dispossession and consequent demarcation procedures archived in the provincial court in Corque demonstrate that the mounting tensions over the imminent *Revisita* went hand in hand with an overall increase in land inroads and local disputes. In chapter 7, this chronology will be extended into the 20th century.

6.1 Carangas, Melgarejo and the *compensativo*.

With regard to the effect of Melgarejo's decree in Carangas, "*it was said that the communities of the region were so powerful that they could consolidate their lands with regard to the exigencies of the tyrant*" (Mendieta 2008, 388). Already the very same year of its proclamation, the new legislation provoked reactions and mobilization in the province. The first reactions regarded lobby work on the terms and weight of a compensation the communities eventually all agreed upon to pay in return for their exemption from the decree. When the department nonetheless went over to the organization of the *Revisita*, in line with the decree, rebellious reactions followed. As no community lands in the Carangas province were being sold through auction nor being consolidated as prescribed by the 1866 decree, it seems as the communities managed to "neutralize" the confiscation threat already before Melgarejo's defeat and the subsequent annulment of his decree. Yet this achievement implied a financial transaction to the departmental treasury, which was settled through lobby work and rebellious manoeuvres coordinated between the leaders of several communities and *vecino* allies.

As Eric Langer comments, "*We do not have much information on the effects of these laws in the region around Oruro; it appears they had the greatest effects further north, around La Paz. There are hints, however, that the Oruro communities purchased their own lands, thus depriving them of the capital that they had used for commerce*" (Langer 2009, 547). He refers to Grieshaber, who first hinted at a payment, however without document proof of such arrangement (Grieshaber 1977, 199). During my archival research at the National Archive of Bolivia in Sucre, I found evidence of this "purchase" in a conversation between the Prefect of the Oruro Department and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In a prefectural report of 1867, the head of the department stated that in most communities of the Oruro department, including the entire Carangas province, a *compensativo* or "compensation" of 4 to 5 pesos was being collected from all *contribuyentes*, retired taxpayers (*reservados*) and widows with access to community lands.² This contribution was levied "*in virtue of the special grace granted by the Supreme Government in order that these Indians remain exempt from the effects of the decree*".³ In return for an amount slightly lower than the annual head tax burden, the valuation of community lands, which was ordered by Melgarejo's decree as a preparatory measure to the confiscation of the land, would not be applied. In the Paria province, a differentiated quota was established for districts

² ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 2 April 1867.

³ Own translation. ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 2 April 1867.

inhabited by “*overly poor Indians*” and communities possessing mainly grazing lands.⁴ In those communities, only 4 pesos per person would be exacted, while elsewhere the payment was five or six pesos, depending on the quality and quantity of the land.⁵

The *compensativo* arrangement is explicitly adopted and described in the law of 28 September 1868. The concerning section states that

“the contracts verified (sic) by the Executive with the name of *compensables* [persons qualified for compensation], do not bring in anything else but the rent of the lands for five years, leaving of course the indigenous compensators from this date on exempt from the payment of the territorial contribution and other obligations.”⁶

This purchase did however not free the *comunarios* from the State’s ultimate possession over all community lands, so that the compensated lands were to be repurchased or otherwise subjected to public auction after a term of five years (Klein 2011, 136). However, this does not say anything about the exemption of a *Revisita* operation or about the establishing of the payable “rent”. There is indeed very little known about the application of the *compensativo*; I even did not find it explicitly mentioned by name nor regarding its application in a specific district in any of the consulted historiographical works on Bolivia’s 19th century land legislation. In the following, I attempt to gain a more detailed picture of the coming about and the implications this remarkable arrangement on basis of the case of Carangas. I rely on the information provided in the Prefect’s correspondence to the Ministry and on the traces of this arrangement found in judicial documents filed at the provincial court of Corque.

For the earliest references to a financial deal in return for legal exemption between the government and the communities of Carangas we must go back to spring 1866 (around October).⁷ That year, the corregidor of the canton of Turco, Juan López, informed the Intendente of the province that the caciques of Andamarca and Huachacalla had requested the caciques of Turco to disobey a circular that contained governmental dispositions about the land rights of the community of Orinoca.⁸ The

⁴ This exception was endorsed under governmental permission by the Supreme Authorizations of 8 and 17 May 1867. A lower quota was levied in the communities of the cantons of Poopó (except for the Peñas community), Challacollo, Toledo, Pampa Aullagas, Salinas (de Garci-Mendoza), (Santiago de) Quillacas and Culta. Landless indians did not pay any compensation. ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 17 May 1867 and 13 May 1867).

⁵ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 23 May 1867).

⁶ Own translation. “Ley de 28 de septiembre de 1868.” Article 25.

⁷ AJC, 1866, no. 985.

⁸ AJC, 1866, no. 985, f.1-2v.

latter would have been conceded the entitlement of the terrains it possessed to which the adjacent community of Andamarca had reacted by claiming the same rights. It is not clear why the community would have obtained this exemption, although the fact that the canton of Orinoca –as exception in the province- comprised the estancia Micayani, which was no *ayllu* but a form of private estate, might play a role.⁹ At the other hand, the insistence on the annulment of the *compensativo* exaction is not mentioned in the accounting information of the Prefect that same year.¹⁰

Local authorities contended that the protesting community leaders incorrectly interpreted the measure as an offence instead of appreciating the intended valuation of the province's terrains.¹¹ They saw in Andamarca's request an implicit warning for an indigenous revolt and went over to an investigation of the detected insubordination. They started with questioning Antonio Zubieta, merchant and corregidor of Andamarca, about the tentative of 'his' caciques to start up a revolt. According to Zubieta, the community leaders were petitioning a lower compensation quota in order not to pay 4 or 5 pesos, and had thereto prepared a more favourable bill.¹² The inter-communal manoeuvring thus addressed the payment of the *compensativo*. Interestingly, Zubieta himself had been asked by the cacique of Andamarca to transcribe the bill, which they had received from Orinoca, in order to pass a copy to the community leaders of Huachacalla.¹³ In October of 1866, the corregidor and a delegation of commoners had travelled to Corque and afterwards to the salt lake of Quitaquita to meet with community leaders. In the following months, Andamarca formulated objections against the exaction of an obligatory tax of 4 or 5 pesos from each *contribuyente*, because it was an "unknown measure" which moreover had been abolished in other places, implicitly referring to Orinoca.

Despite communitarian protest, the department went over to the collection of the compensation in the Carangas province, executed by the commissioned land surveyor Antonio Vargas on basis of the data from the *padrones*. Between October 1866 and March 1867, Vargas collected 17333 pesos 5 reales, which is slightly less than the 19446 pesos 4½ reales the province contributed on half-yearly basis in the form of the indigenous

⁹ According to the Revisita of 1864, estancia Micayani was inhabited by 14 persons, all belonging to the *agregados* class, represented by 6 –amongst which 2 absentee- *contribuyentes*. ANB, Rv, 226 and 227. "Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas." 1864, fs. 187-187v.

¹⁰ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 2 April 1867.

¹¹ AJC, 1866, no. 985, f. 21v.

¹² AJC, 1866, no. 985, f.13v-14.

¹³ AJC, 1866, no. 985, f.15v-16v.

head tax.¹⁴ Unfortunately, the record of his recovery commission does not mention the location (canton, ayllu, estancia) of every collection (see table in Appendix 10). By that time, compensation incomes were still expected from the Paria province. Yet, even at this intermediary stage, the *compensativo* collection had already produced more than the purchase of community lands in the entire department, which by March 1867 had only yielded 15663 pesos 6 reales.¹⁵

From the point of view of the department, the *compensativo* provided in a quite profitable yet once-only revenue source. The Prefect stated that these incomes corresponded to a new fiscal branch that was created out of necessity because the departmental treasury had not disposed of a single peso to pay its public services since October 1866.¹⁶ The collected sum of 17333 pesos 3 reales had been used to cover all the expenses of the Prefectura since October 1866 until the end of March 1867, including salaries, military equipment, military and police service, loans, road construction, transport costs, accommodation, etc.¹⁷ Since the moment the departmental administration had finished the indigenous tax revenues, the departmental treasury relied upon private loans to relieve, at least temporally, itself from bankruptcy.¹⁸ As this money was not just a welcoming bonus but a vital survival measure for the Prefectura that was entirely consumed by the departmental treasury, the *compensativo* rather seems to correspond to an opportunistic measure that sprouted from departmental needs that later on was authorized by “special grace” of the central government and still later incorporated into a proper law. In fact, by the time governmental sanctions followed regarding the compensation, the departmental treasury had already effectively received and largely expended the compensation from the Carangas province.

Returning to Langer, while the *compensativo* proved indispensable to the department, how damaging was it to the Carangas comunarios? While the *tributo* already imposed a considerable burden upon the comunarios, that year they paid about 45% to 70% of their annual tax duty extra. While on the long-term, the Carangas communities managed to preserve their community lands from confiscation, they got little in return in the short

¹⁴ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*; ANB, Rv, no. 227. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.”, 1867, f.195.

¹⁵ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 28 May 1867.

¹⁶ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 28 May 1867.

¹⁷ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 28 May 1867, 2nd attached letter.

¹⁸ In a letter that same year, the representative of the trade house of Blondel (one of the most powerful trade houses of Oruro with its principal basis in Tacna), describes how his company repeatedly was approached by the Prefect to “rescue” his treasury with loans, in turn for which Blondel requested opportunistic compensations (such as the right to extract silver etc). ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 28 May 1867.

run, because once having paid the *compensativo* the Revisita arrived anyways. The *compensativo* was indeed much more important to the State, who cashed an advantageous fiscal deal, than that it was a motivation for the communities of Carangas, which cashed a false promise of legal exemption.

Notwithstanding the assurances of the compensation deal, a Revisita commission was sent to the province in 1869 as commanded by the law of 1868. Not surprisingly, the news on the survey commission was far from cordially received as it inflamed feelings of insecurity. In Tacahua, in the community of Llanquera,¹⁹ the intervention of the Revisita officials “to sell the terrains and then organize the partition of the children of the commoners” was taken as an intolerable provocation.²⁰ Denouncing that “on account of the census they tried to seize and separate them from their children,” the comunarios went over to a violent rebellion.²¹ In their judgement, the commission was determined to divide their children and livestock. Although this understanding of the Revisita operation does not correspond with the letter of the law or the plans of the government, the fact that this connotation was made, indicates how deep the anti-Revisita distrust was rooted in the communities. This contention was not merely motive to an ad hoc physical confrontation, but provoked a more sustained resistance that went together with gatherings, preparations and the diffusion of letters among community representatives.

Once informed about the organization of the census, the Tacahua comunarios prepared their reaction through long nightly meetings until “the chicha we were drinking was finished.”²² By the day the corregidor had summoned all comunarios to present them in his house to execute the census they had decided to oppose the census and cadastre operation in accordance with the Toledo comunarios.²³ To support their claim and their planned murder on the corregidor and the commissioners, they reproduced documents,

¹⁹ It concerns the comunarios of ayllu Sullca-Tunca in Tacahua, which since 1961 figures as an annex (appendix) to the canton of Bella Vista, which today is an independent canton from Llanquera in the province of Nor Carangas (“Ley de 28 Noviembre 1961”). Within the native territorial organization of Jach’a Carangas, Bella Vista has the status of marka, comprising only one ayllu, which is the ayllu in question of Sullcatunca (COAJ-K 2001, 24).

²⁰ Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f. 14v.

²¹ Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f. 5.

²² The juridical file ends with stating that the Tacahua insurgents acted in a state of drunkenness. The contrast between the initial presentation of the Tacahua comunarios as rebellious peasants eager to “cut the throat” of government officials who are eventually reduced to drunken and subsequently arrested agitators incapable of halting the Revisita operation undermines the apparent/original impression of a coordinated uprising. Portraying rebelling comunarios or villagers as drunkards is a recurring pattern (in similar lawsuits), and seems -in most cases- rather a tactic by the denouncing party to delegitimize the accused party. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f. 17 and f. 54v.

²³ AJC, 1869, no. 1100, fs. 16 and 11v.

received from Toledo, that contained “*the laws that encouraged them to cut the throats of the (...) authorities to avoid the distribution which they had to make of their children.*”²⁴ In order to finance their communal actions, a capitation was levied among the comunarios, although some stated this common practice was not realized because there was no leader of the uprising.²⁵ In the aftermath of the rebellion, several insurgents had been imprisoned as a preventive measure in order to facilitate the proceedings of the Revisita.²⁶

In other districts of the province, the Revisita operation would not pass unnoticed either, although no major revolt materialized. In the canton of Choquecota, the *revisitador* was being accused of illegally extracting one to two reales from each contribuyente in ayllu Jilanaca, which preoccupied the authorities as “*such attitude gave the indiada cause to confirm the false rumours diffused by demagogues to set up a revolt in the entire Republic.*”²⁷ In Turco, the *alcalde parroquial* commissioned with the census and cadastre operation in his canton, was also accused of illegally collecting one to four reales. Similar to the Choquecota case, he was blamed of sweeping up the community in the political turmoil the country was currently living, thereby “*embarrassing the honour of the government in an infamous way.*”²⁸

While the Revisita may not have brought about the implementation of Melgarejo’s envisioned transformation of Carangas communal land base, it did contribute to a heightening of internal judicial struggles over land. In the aftermath of the execution of the Revisita, a remarkable high number of “voluntary delineations” demands and/or executions ensued at the intercommunity level. Such operations often provoked or were interpreted as inter-ayllu usurpations and therefore often extended the dispute rather than ending it.²⁹ These legal interventions and their conflictivity hint at the growing sensitivity for existing inequalities between ayllus, estancias and families regarding their access to land. In the canton of Huachacalla, for instance, boundary delineation in 1870 between one ayllu and its considerably smaller neighbour impelled the smallest of both parties to defy the examining magistrate of the province in an

²⁴ Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f. 4v-5, fs. 9-9v and f. 54v.

²⁵ AJC, 1869, no. 1100, fs. 5 and 39.

²⁶ According to the detainees’ declarations their imprisonment occurred without the right to defense or prior judgment which “*in the 19th century would be a scandal and an extraordinary phenomenon*”. Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1100, f.25.

²⁷ Own translation. AJC, 1869, no. 1115, f. 3.

²⁸ Own translation. AJC, 1870, no. 1183, f.1.

²⁹ In the notary inventory of 1870, for example, there is an abundance of archived civil files on terrains, as well as plot delineations, legal protection of property. See also AJC, Legajos 22 (1869-69), 23 (1869-70) and 24 (1870-72).

attempt to curb further strengthening of the other, larger ayllu.³⁰ The inter-ayllu inequality that was motive to the delineation between ayllus Coro and Puma in the Corque canton did not so much correspond to a difference in population size but to fiscal discrepancy between the Uru and originario class that secured the latter of a much stronger land rights status.³¹

Although the dispersed information gives an incomplete picture of the organization and success of the resistance, it is clear that the arrival of a *Revisita* commission in 1869 could not be prevented, not by paying the *compensativo* or through rebellion. What is nonetheless important to notice is how the anti-decree and anti-*Revisita* initiatives on part of the comunarios were consciously framed within a legal strategy. Their resistance was not an ad hoc battle, but involved the circulation of letters, nightly meetings, travels, etc. This way of entering in dialogue with the state and its agents had its price, in terms of “lobby investments” and financial-legal commitments. A more ambiguous concession the comunarios were making in order to keep new land regulations at bay was their alliance with certain *vecinos*. The preparation and coordination of their protest, both in 1866 as in 1869, was a matter of collaboration between comunarios, their leaders and powerful members of the *vecindario*. While those *vecinos* involved in charge of the *Revisita* execution and other state interventions were accused of abuse, others were approached for support and several of them would actively support the communal cause, although without neutralizing the risk of their intermediation.

Despite the negative effects of the compensation payment, the distrusted *Revisita* operation, the mounting inter-community land disputes and rebellion, the communities of Carangas would remain confiscation-proof on the longer term. The compensation payment may not have played a major factor –or rather a misleading factor– in this achievement, but its obtainment and the “communal manoeuvring” it provoked already hints at future developments. The strategies that were later adopted in the face of the liberal reorganization Bolivia’s land system would recur to this payment as an argument to hold off the execution of the *Revisita* and division of their community lands and link up to what was seen as a joint vecino-comunario disobedience of the new land regulations.

³⁰ It concerns the ayllus Capi and Camacha, the latter being more than doubled in population by the former. AJC, 1870, no. 1157 and 1870, no. 1174. See also ANB, Rv, 228 and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, 167v.

³¹ Both ayllus counted with a more or less equal number of inhabitants, but those of the former belonged for about 90% to the Uru class while the latter was about 75% originario. AJC, 1871, no. 1263. See also ANB, Rv, 228 and 229. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1871, f. 46.

6.2 Inter-ecological amputation.

While the communities of Carangas managed to commute the threat of community land confiscation into a fiscal contribution, a simultaneous attack was launched towards those communities still possessing ecologically complementary lands in other provinces and departments. Masked by the achievement of community land exemption, the altiplano communities underwent serious threats regarding their discontinuous territorial control. The distant lands located in the western (now Peruvian/Chilean) valleys had already been lost under the colonial *repartimiento* policy. This inter-ecological rupture was reinforced by the imposition of national borders in the 19th century. The lands possessed towards the east, generally in hands of Carangas' eastern communities, underwent a similar squeeze, particularly in the context of the late colonial (pre-)independence rebellions and wars which interrupted the communication between the altiplano and the valleys (Pauwels 1983, 152). By the late 19th century, however, a couple of communities still rented estates to private leaseholders. In the context of Melgarejo's new land legislation, these estates were targeted as a potential income source and hence became subject to confiscation threats which gradually amputated the province from its last grain of complementary land property. In 1867, the Prefect of Oruro made the following argument:

“there are several Communities in this Department which by donation or similar arrangement, have estates in property which, unable to hold these themselves, lease them to individuals, from which they take petty advantage and perhaps many times none, because V.G. [Your Governor] knows well how easy it is to outwit the interests of the indigenous class, for their ignorance and lack of protection.”³²

While it was assumed that there were many of these cases, the Prefectura had no complete information on the exact number and names of the estates. The Prefect proposed the purchase of these estates through public auction and the transfer of its revenues to the public treasury as a means to resolve the renters' abuse and fraud against the communities as well as to alleviate the treasury from its recurrent problems. In turn, the indigenous head tax burden would be lowered as a way of compensating the loss of the rent the communities concerned currently received under the assumption that a lower tax was more beneficial to them than rent revenues. He added that there was a real risk of revolt given the fact that comunarios were often “incapable” to

³² ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 13 April 1867.

understand the benefit of this arrangement, which they possibly had to be made understood by force. Indeed, in the following decades, communal altiplano control over more fertile ecological zones was effectively lost. The declaration of these lands as “vacant” resulted in an enclosure at the supra-provincial level, reinforcing Carangas’ land-locked situation.

One of the cases mentioned by the Prefect in 1867 was the community of Choquecota, which held the “Hacienda Caranguillas” in property in the canton of Pocpo, situated in the Yamparaez province near the city of Sucre (Chuquisaca department).³³ By 1871, when liberal land reforms were “on their way” to reorganize the Bolivian land system, the estate was still rented.³⁴ That year, a contract was signed between Choquecota and Carlos Saavedra, a carpenter “of Hispano-american quality” who resided in the city of Sucre, for three years during which the former would receive an annual rent of 160 pesos. In 1873, this case reappeared in the notary books kept in the court of Corque.³⁵ In April, the lease contract of the hacienda in Pocpo was verified by the Corregidor, caciques and jilaqatas of the canton of Choquicota, with permission of the sub-prefect, in favour of Carlos Saavedra. The contract was settled on 200 pesos per year for a term of five forced years and two voluntary years, starting the 1st of July, and with an advance for one year received, and Saavedra was instructed to actively preserve and assure the integrity of the terrain against introductions and usurpations by neighbours. It was only in 1883 that the estate was formally declared “vacant”.³⁶ In order to prevent the estate from being lost, the community appointed Marcelino Vazquez as their non-indigenous representative to defend their rights in the further procurement and administration of the estate. From the following silence in the sources, as no further mention is made to the Caranguillas estate, it becomes clear that the hacienda was eventually lost, however without disposing over any details.

Also in the Pocpo canton, the comunarios of Orinoca and of ayllu Collana of Andamarca presented in the late 19th century their claims on lands in the valley of Santiago de Quitarge, where they had been cultivating corn, potatoes and cereals since colonial times.³⁷ In 1898, they regained the formal possession over these lands, demanding the abandonment of the valley by local population groups of neighbouring

³³ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. *Prefectura Oruro*, 13 April 1867.

³⁴ AJC, 1871, no. 1199 (notary register), fs. 1-3.

³⁵ AJC, 1873, no. 1284, fs. 4v-5v.

³⁶ AJC, 1883, no. 1710.

³⁷ The comunarios of Andamarca and Orinoca had thereto paid 500 pesos fuertes as well as their regular labour service in the Potosí mines to the Spanish Crown. They shared these lands with the Quillacas. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 35, fs.167r-183r. Rivière 1982, 39; Medinaceli 2010, 99.

provinces.³⁸ As in the case of the Caranguillas estate, there is no further information on the destination of these lands.

Another community with claims over valley lands was Totorá, which held a hacienda called “La Chulla”, situated in Quillacollo, in the Valle Grande of Cochabamba, in common with the comunarios of Quillacas (of the Paria province in the same department).³⁹ In the early 1920s, the community initiated a legal campaign, visiting all urban centres to recuperate their property by means of provincial representatives, but their protest would avail them nothing.⁴⁰ The same community also possessed an estate named Pisaqueri in the canton of Paria of the Cercado province, situated northeast from the city of Oruro. In 1906, the estate was sold and Belisario Ampuero, famous vecino of the province, was appointed to represent the interests of the comunarios in the accomplishment of the purchase.⁴¹

The community of Corque also seemed to possess a private estate, denominated “Tuero”, but it remains unclear where the estate was located.⁴² The estate was rented to José Miguel Mostajo according to a personal arrangement without any inheritance rights, which his heirs in 1913 denied and were hence accused of land usurpation.⁴³ There is no further reference to what happened with the estate.

From a court case of 1871, it appears that the comunarios of Carangas –although no further specification is given- owned terrains in the ravine of Tabo oco in the vice-canton of Urmiri, situated north-east from Pazña in the eastern part of the Oruro department. That year, the sub-Prefect of Carangas acted as judicial depositor to lease

³⁸ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 35, f. 178.

³⁹ Together with other communities of Carangas, Totorá had obtained legal ownership over these lands in the late 16th century in return for a contribution in money and mita labour, but nearly lost those rights in the late 18th century due to accusations of participation in the 1780 rebellion. The rebellious events of 1780-1 had impeded them to visit the hacienda and recollect its products, but the community leaders managed to obtain legal guarantees to travel to their valley possessions, successfully claimed that the priests of Quillacollo had neglected the estate’s maintenance and regained the lands. Subsequently, these lands were rented to Spaniards. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 47, fs. 334-377v. See also Archivo Municipal de Cochabamba (AMC), Expedientes Coloniales de Cochabamba (ECC), vol.25, “Causa ejecutiva seguida por Diego de Verga protector de los naturales en nombre de los indios caciques carangas, quillacas, uruquillas que residen en Colcapirhua, contra los indios de Capinota por las tierras de Chulla”, cited in Medinaceli 2010, 308; Rivière 1982, 30-5; Pauwels 1983, 152 and 163.

⁴⁰ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 47, fs. 376-377v.

⁴¹ AJC, *Civiles*, 1906, no. 2, f. 8-9v.

⁴² There is a place called Tuero Tuero in the Potosí department, situated south from the city of Sucre on the border with the Chuquisaca department.

⁴³ AJC, *Civiles*, 1913, no. 3.

those lands to don Matías Reinaga at a rent of 20 pesos for a term as long as the juridical procedure of replevin for the concerning terrains would take.⁴⁴

The late 19th century “completion” of the amputation process initiated with the early colonial land reforms demonstrates how the liberal reforms in fact reproduced the logic of the *composición* policy. Under that policy, based on the purchase of land property titles to the Crown, only a fraction of the altiplano ayllus had been able to secure their direct control over complementary archipelago lands, however in a “rented” form. Now, this renting principle was seized by the republican regime (arguing that the renting of lands evidenced their “residual,” excess character) to bring this seclusion to a conclusion. This further exacerbated the discrepancy between a territorial logic open to flexible discontinuity in function of ecological complementarity and a territorial logic promoting fixed delineations of homogeneous terrains, inciting a process of ethnic and territorial fragmentation (Saignes 1991 and Abercrombie 1991, cited by Ruz , Díaz and Fuentes 2011, 24). Still, this amputation did not correspond to an abrupt elimination of interregional links, but would take several decades to eventually crystalize. Meanwhile, as the province was being blocked-in, internal strains on communal land access deteriorated, yet without materializing in their effective enclosure.

6.3 The Revisita came knocking at the door...

Before Melgarjo proclaimed his decree, the execution of the Revisita seemed to provoke little (explicit) protest.⁴⁵ Since their colonial creation, these land survey commissions had been confronted with significant distrust on part of the community population, but their work was nonetheless viewed as an acceptable intervention that guaranteed the maintenance of the established order. In the context of the liberal reforms, however, the Revisita became perceived as an intolerable provocation. This time, the field operation did not concern a mere registration of plots and *contribuyentes*, but constituted the first step towards the subdivision of corporative lands in order to grant indigenous commoners “full” property rights and impose a new tax. The 1866 decree started to fuel the common anti-*Revisita* suspicion and provoked serious

⁴⁴ This could suggest that these lands had been confiscated under Melgarjo, and now, under Morales, were again “liberated”. AJC, 1871, no. 1199, f. 4.

⁴⁵ See for instance ABMO, no. 426, *Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas*, 1852, f. 215 and ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f.212.

frictions. After 1874 (even though the implementation of the newly adopted law would take until the next decade), tensions escalated and would convert the *Revisita* in the bone of contention between the community and State representatives. But also inter- and intra-community relations were affected by deteriorating communal access and property security, resulting in an upsurge of local land disputes. Moreover, the announcement of the new land policy came shortly after the pest epidemics of 1872 in which a high number of *contribuyentes* lost their life.⁴⁶

During the 1870s, the department still managed to implement provincial land inspections conform the 'old style'. However, the prospect of a land division operation motivated *comunarios* to take precautions to secure their land rights, aware that

“very soon the repartition of the community terrains must take place, strictly subjected to the law of October 29th of last year [5th of October, 1874], which bans any question, in order to assert my right before the committee.”⁴⁷

In the Uru 'enclave' Chipaya, the *alcalde cobrador* (head tax collector) petitioned in 1876 judicial intervention in order to stop his people from quarrelling amongst themselves about land issues and “*save the good harmony until the formalization of the land division.*”⁴⁸ Anxiety, reflected in comunario reliance upon formal juridical procedures and turbulence regarding land rights, was growing. Still, the 1877 *Revisita* was executed without major problems in the Carangas communities, but would never be repeated afterward.

The situation particularly inflamed once the government started with translating the law from the paper to the field in the 1880s. While Carangas remained peripheral to the enacted enclosure operation and the accompanying hacienda expansion, the imminent arrival of a commission consigned not merely to inspect but to alter local land structures caused major nervousness. Warnings by local functionaries about an upcoming revolt increased. Opposition was not so much directed against encroaching landlords, but targeted the territorial intrusion by the *Revisita* commissions. As in other rural zones, particularly controlled by Aymara communities, here too, nightly meetings to coordinate their resistance, open threats to the *Revisita* commissions and a “*massive paper campaign*” provoked a rising panic in the countryside (Larson 2004, 220-1).

⁴⁶ ABNB, *Revisitas*, Carangas 1877, portada/f.0. See also chapter 4.1.2.

⁴⁷ Own translation. AJC, 1875, no. 1421. This is an example of a *comunario* of ayllu Sullca Salle, in the canton of Turco, who in 1875 reclaimed the documents saved in the provincial court that confirmed his antecedents and legal ownership over his sayaña. Similar petitions were also made by entire ayllus, such as Llanquera and Sullca-Tunca, both pertaining to Huailamarca, which registered the demarcation of their boundaries as inspected in 1848 in 1876. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias*, Carangas, 1928, no. 11.

⁴⁸ AJC, 1876, no. 1476.

In October 1884, soldiers had to contain a revolt in opposition to the 1874 law in the village of Corque. Leaders of several *ayllus* had marched to Sucre with representative power and money obtained from their *comunarios* in order to petition the suspension of the *Revisita*. Moreover, the insurgents would have openly incited all *comunarios* to disobey the orders of the *Revisita de tierras* and rumours circulated about plans to destroy the *Revisita* books.⁴⁹ That same year, a departmental commissioner was confronted with an insurrection by some 60 to 100 men and women in Totora. He had been appointed by the Prefectura of the department to execute the delimitation, measurement and adjudication of peat bogs (probably *bofedales* which were excellent grazing land) which the *comunarios* considered community land for which they paid taxes to Felipe Teare.⁵⁰ Armed with slings and stones, they violently opposed what they interpreted as an attempt to “steal” their possessions. The commissioner indicated Luis Lujan and Marcelino Vásquez, two powerful residents of the province, as “defenders” of the indigenous insurgents of ayllu Sapana, adding a fierce critique towards “*the moral laxity and the corruption of some bad vecinos of this capital [Corque] who exploit the rusticity and innocence of the indigenous caste.*”⁵¹ Mendieta and Condarco link this revolt to the attacks that led to the murder on the *vecino* José Guarachi in 1884 as reported by the *revisitadores* of the region, although Condarco mistakenly identifies this as the revolt in which *revisitador* Delfín Arce was murdered in Corque, which occurred 10 years later (Condarco 1982, 48, cited in Mendieta 2008, 388-9).

In December 1885, the Prefect of Oruro was informed about rebelling communities in the Paria province and a larger indigenous uprising was said to be expected soon.⁵² Although Carangas was not mentioned in this warning, things were not much calmer there. The province witnessed open attacks by the local population to the sub-prefect, José Manuel Delgado,⁵³ and two attempted murders,⁵⁴ although little details are given on the executors and their motives. In 1887, land dispute erupted between two *ayllus* of

⁴⁹ AJC, 1884, no 1805.

⁵⁰ A legal testimony registered in 1922 indicates that the community lands were effectively returned to Totora. Five years later, the *comunarios* of Totora registered their community land boundaries with Curahuara and Huachacalla as granted during the *visita* under Francisco de Toledo and in 1712. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 13 and 1928, no. 9).

⁵¹ AJC, 1884, no. 1814, f. 1.

⁵² ANB, MI, 1885, tomo 225, no. 44. *Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro*, 30 December 1885.

⁵³ AJC 1885, no. 1911.

⁵⁴ AJC 1885, no. 1879 and no. 1909.

Turco and an adjacent ayllu of the Choquecota canton in which the Turco comunarios invaded the lands of Choquecota.⁵⁵

After the revolts of 1884, it took several years before land surveyors attempted to revisit the province. By 1893, *Mesas Revisoras* had been formed for each province of the Oruro department, apart from some vacant secondary offices.⁵⁶ Because this news heightened indigenous hostility to an alarming degree, the sub-prefect, Eliodoro Mier, demanded military reinforcement. After his first request of June 1893 had remained unanswered, a second request was launched in the days preceding the patron saint's celebrations, which -as does any festivity- goes accompanied by a drinking binge lasting for days where the least provocation can inflame the populace. He commented on the constant disobedience by anti-governmental elements, warned for the indigenous and mestizo hostility towards the announced *Visita de tierras* and reported that the caciques and jilaqatas were preparing an appeal of opposition in Corque to present before the Prefectura.⁵⁷ As the Prefect of Oruro reported to the Ministry that same year, a swift accomplishment of the Revisita seemed unrealistic and armed reinforcement was necessary in order to “prevent the case that the operation of the revisitas would originate in many places, and especially in the province of Carangas, disorders and indigenous uprising.”⁵⁸

The next inspector embarking upon the province to conduct the land survey would not survive his mission. During the first days of May 1894, *revisor* Delfín Arce had arrived at the provincial capital. Shortly after, a major indigenous uprising arose that ended with the brutal murder of the commissioner and his son Ricardo.⁵⁹ The sub-prefect of Carangas, Luis Lujan, who was afterwards suspected of having instigated the rebellion, attributed the insurrection to an order that compelled the comunarios to contribute 10 bolivianos each in return for the land titles that had been surveyed in Corque in 1885 by the same Dr. Arce.⁶⁰ Due to the *revisor*'s insistence on their

⁵⁵ Guillermo López, member of the “famous” vecino family in Turco (see chapter 4.3) was appointed as the *apoderado* of the comunarios of Turco. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1923, no. 12.

⁵⁶ ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79. *Oruro dept.*, 19 June 1893, f.12-13.

⁵⁷ Indicative for the agitation that could be expected, the sub-prefect adds that during last Corpus Christi celebrations (Good Friday), the *alcaldes* had been “cruelly” victimized, “without any other motive than to be *alcaldes*.” ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79. *Oruro dept.*, 6 June 1893.

⁵⁸ ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79. *Oruro dept.*, 19 June 1893, fs. 11-2. See also Mendieta 2008, 389.

⁵⁹ The judicial investigation that followed their assassination reconstructed the development of the insurrection in detail, which can be checked out in the Legal Gazette. CDLT, *Gazeta judicial*, 1895-1896, no. 5, 12-20. *Oruro*, 18 June 1896.

⁶⁰ Afterwards, Luis Lujan was not only sued by Arce's wife for not having prevented the murder, but also by the cacique of Corque regarding several murdered indigenous comunarios. Eventually, Lujan was released as the appeal by Arce's wife was revoked and the lawsuit for which cacique had collected about 500 pesos among all commoners of Corque was not started up, with the cacique being accused of appropriating the acquired

obedience to a “*measure considered by the comunarios as an odious exaction,*” he became the target of comunario protest.⁶¹

The direct provocation of the revolt was the imprisonment of the *jilaqata* of one of Corque’s principal ayllus for having expressed his aversion against the insinuated payment. When a group of about 300 indigenous *comunarios* managed to liberate him, they clashed with soldiers based in Corque leaving five deceased *comunarios*. In a reaction, the insurgents encircled the village overnight, made watch fires in the immediate hills and blew their *pututus* (horns). Meanwhile, their number grew to more or less 1000. Despite the authorities’ requests to retreat and cede their purposes and mediation by commissions of notable villagers, the insurgents attacked the village, armed with stones, slings and guns, and set the government building on fire. As Arce understood his precarious situation, he tried to escape the besieged village together with his son, but they were chased until the outer limits of the community where they were overtaken, tortured and murdered by “*the multitude of cannibals, thirsty for blood,*” as the clerk recorded in the Judicial Gazette.⁶²

Only in late 1895, steps were taken to restore the public order in Carangas.⁶³ As the population was being pacified, the Prefect of Oruro drew again attention to the indispensability for the province of implementing the *Revisita*. In contrast to the Cercado and Paria provinces where the *Mesas Revisitadores* had been started up without – according to the Prefect- encountering indigenous resistance, the process was still paralyzed in Carangas since the *Juez Revisor*’s resignation in November 1894.⁶⁴ The following years, the departmental authorities observed with fright how rebellion spread over the broader highland region, particularly in the La Paz department (Klein 1993,

funds to his own benefit. AJC, 1895, no. 2302; ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53. *Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro*, 25 October 1895; CDLT, *Gazeta judicial*, 1895-1896, no. 5, 12-20. See also Mendieta 2008, 389.

⁶¹ ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53. *Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro*, f.2v-3

⁶² The dossier continued, in the words of the clerk: the murderers crowded with savage roars and in the middle of an infernal screaming, hit the victims with sticks, axes and picks. Their cruelty was such that the physical drinking of the blood of these martyrs did not suffice and they continued beating the cadavers while giving them the most unjust and rude functions, they exposed them naked to tease and mockery and eventually they decapitated them. Afterwards, six comunarios were identified as participating authors of these crimes and sentenced to death although some could draw lots for an alternative punishment because of mitigating circumstances (lack of education, friendship with the insurgents, cooperate with the investigation and having no criminal record). The *jilaqatas* of the ayllu to which the principal “promoters” of the revolt and other witnesses confessed that the insurrection was premeditated. Some of them were accused of siege and fire of the government building and imprisoned. Two accused vecinos, Marcelino Vazquez and Isaac Luna, were absolved. CDLT, *Gazeta Judicial*, 1895-1896, no. 5, 13-4.

⁶³ ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53, *Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro*, 15 Octubre 1895. CDLT, *Gazeta Judicial*, 1895-1896, no. 5, 13-4.

⁶⁴ ANB, MI, 1895-1896, tomo 286, no. 53. *Prefectura y comand. Gral. de Oruro*, July 1895, f.12.

117). In Oruro as well, rumours about a general indigenous uprising swelled to an alarming degree and in 1896 the Prefect requested armed reinforcement for both Paria and Carangas in order to bring a halt to inter-community invasions and indigenous counter-pressures that thwarted the *Revisita* (Portal 1896, 3). One year later, the head of the Department informed that the execution of the *Revisita* still remained uncompleted in each of its provinces due to indigenous distrust and resistance, deficient armed support and corruption.⁶⁵ Moreover, the *revisitadores* assigned in 1896 to the Carangas province suspected *vecino* interference in this resistance, commenting that a local government authority would have arranged an agreement with his indigenous subjects to obstruct their assignment.⁶⁶ That same year, 11 inhabitants of Huachacalla would have attempted to kill 4 *vecinos*.⁶⁷

In order to force and foster the continuation of the *Revisita* and hence to get rid of the old tributary system, the Prefect pleaded for a reconciliation of the new financial system with

“the ignorance and natural distrust of the native who generally is victim of injustices committed by the functionaries who do not enjoy a salary and search the remuneration of their work in the rights assigned to the operations they are charged with”.⁶⁸

In July of 1897, the indigenous population of Carangas would have refused to deliver personal services as a means of resisting the *Revisita* operations, to which the state authorities reacted with a form of quite absurd- blackmail, threatening to start up the *Revisita* if they did not pay their due services.⁶⁹

As the department was unable to formulate a sound response towards continuous communal anti-*Revisita* manoeuvring, the solvency problems of the departmental treasury increased by the day. The declining tax revenues caused growing uneasiness with the departmental administration. As the Prefect warned in 1897, head tax incomes had decreased to a critical level in spite of the growing population liable to the *tributo* because taxpayers lists had not been updated in 23 years.⁷⁰ As long as no tax quota adjustment was being made, registered *tributarios* continued dying or moving out

⁶⁵ ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. *Informe Prefecto*, fs. 16v-17.

⁶⁶ APO, 1896-1898, libro 62, cited by Mendieta 2008, 389.

⁶⁷ AJC, *Penales*, 1903, no. 7.

⁶⁸ Own translation. ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. *Informe Prefecto*, fs. 16v-17.

⁶⁹ APO, 1896-1898, libro 62, cited in Mendieta 2008, 389.

⁷⁰ The Prefect refers to the 1874 law, overlooking the execution of the *Revisita* of 1877. ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. *Informe Prefecto*, fs. 17.

without being replaced by the new generation of taxpayers.⁷¹ In 1898, the Prefect lamented that, while other departments were making extra revenues, Oruro was still tied to the old, “*defective and illegal*” indigenous head tax with, moreover, a large part of the due taxpayers remaining off the radar (Aramayu 1898, 25-6; see also Mendieta 2008, 389). According to his estimates, in comparison to the last *padrón*, at least one fourth of the registered inhabitants would have died whereas their total would have doubled. Although a *Revisitador* had been assigned to Carangas and had received an anticipation on his remuneration of 600 bolivianos, he had not initiated his job (Aramayu 1898, 26). Given that the *Revisita* remained pending, the Prefect suggested the organization of an alternative indigenous census to include new taxpayers and take unregistered community land usufructuaries in Carangas, Paria and el Cercado out of illegitimacy, but his proposal remained without avail (*ibid*, 27).

Regardless of *Revisita* démarches, internal frictions over land were meanwhile remarkably increasing. From the late 1870s on, the provincial court registered a mounting number of inter- and intra-community conflicts relating to theft and (disputed) denouncements of “vacant property” (unclaimed inheritance or ownerless goods, particularly livestock), violations of communal property (either in individually or collectively held terrains) as well as abundant accusations of authority abuses, most of them labelled as *despojo* or dispossession.⁷² Although these countless instances of *sayaña* intrusions often had no direct connection to the new land legislation, the taking to court of these inter-community struggles is a sign of heightening tensions over land rights security due to increasing pressures upon resources. These pressures were also – though limited- provoked by the tension between mining concessions with communal property.⁷³

While most of these cases concern minor incursions, usually rather swiftly dealt with, some evolved into protracted, violent and expanding confrontations involving tens and even hundreds of armed *comunarios*, at times assisted by local *vecinos*. A concrete example is the rivalry over land boundaries between ayllus of Totora and Huailamarca which led to a series of violent and widening clashes, (temporally) culminating in 1898

⁷¹ ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. *Informe Prefecto*, fs. 17-8.

⁷² AJC, Legajos 29 to 39, covering the years 1877 up to 1891.

⁷³ An interesting case is the conflict in the mining district of Carangas, where Manuel Santiago Ortega, a mestizo miner and quicksilver trader (*azoguero*) residing in La Rivera, was accused of land intrusion under the pretext of disposing of a legal mining concession. The comunarios of the neighbouring community of Todos Santos appointed Manuel Sempertegui as their apoderado to defend their *terrenos de repartimiento* against this usurpation. It was stated that mining concessions do not include pasture and cultivation rights. AJC, 1873, no. 1293. In Andamarca, the miner Bernardo Rodríguez was accused of -amongst other things- having sold lands belonging to the community, but he argued that he was only exploring potential mining sites and offering mines for sale in Andamarca. AJC, 1876, no. 1478.

with Huallamarca's attack on Totorá, where they "*did not leave one stone on another*" (ibid, 4).⁷⁴ Throughout the 1890 decade, the recurrence of such violent outbreaks only increased. Serious and long battles were fought out between ayllus,⁷⁵ but also at the inter-cantonal and –provincial level.⁷⁶ Often, these clashes were embedded in longer, fierce inter-ayllu conflict over lands and boundaries.⁷⁷ The closing of such conflicts implied the execution of formal land inspections,⁷⁸ a procedure that was progressively applied throughout the following decades and would stimulate even more *comunarios* and their representatives to frequent the juridical institutions as the procedure required the presentation of all relating property documents (see chapter 7).

In 1893, the sub-Prefect indicated inter-communal land intrusions, across provincial and departmental boundaries, as a primary incentive that urged and justified Revisita intervention, lamenting that

“the indigenous mass [is] inclined against the revisita, despite having clarified that it is the mode to obtain the replacement of the deceased and absent taxpayers and of those who have lost their lands because their neighbours from Pacajes, Joya and Toledo have violently taken them.”⁷⁹

The continuous violence motivated his successor's recommendation in 1898 to "*demarcate the lands of the contiguous cantons; cause and origin of frequent turmoil and crimes*" (own translation, Atristáin in Aramayu 1898, Anexo, xv). He was still quite confident in

⁷⁴ The ayllu of Totorá had a long history of internal land conflict which re-erupted in the 1870s. In 1881, this belligerency spilled over to other communities as a result of a land boundary conflict between the *comunarios* of ayllu Lupi (Totorá) and those of ayllu Jisca-Urinsaya of the Huallamarca canton. The dispute grew into a major confrontation involving about 500 people, according to some testimonies, with *comunarios* from Llanquera, San Miguel, Chuquichambi, Corque and Curahuara de Pacajes actively supporting Huallamarca. Five years later, another violent invasion followed, in which houses were destroyed and hundreds of animals stolen, good for very dense lawsuit files. AJC, 1875, no. 1437, 1440 and 1457; 1881, no. 1659, no. 1667 and 1670; 1886, no. 1901, no. 1912, no. 1930 and no. 1950; 1887, no. 1964 and no. 1974.

⁷⁵ Inter-communitarian strife and battle erupted in Sabaya as well as in Llanquera, each time violent invasions involving over 50 armed *comunarios*. AJC, 1898, respectively no. 2384 and no. 2407. Among the ayllus of Totorá the quarrels and violence over land were even more stern and would continue to preoccupy authorities into the 20th century. AJC, 1893, no. 2224, no. 2225 and no. 2226; 1895, no. 2303.

⁷⁶ In 1890, a four days fight took place between the cantons of Turco and Choquecota, including the participation of hundreds of armed *comunarios* as well as *vecinos*. In 1893, a similar incident occurred between Toledo, of the Paria province, and Llanquera. AJC, 1890, no. 2144; 1893, no. 2218.

⁷⁷ Such was the case with the violent inter-ayllu invasions in Huachacalla, between ayllus Tũaña and Collana, in January 1896. AJC, 1896, no. 2324 and 1907, penal, no. 6. See 6.5.1 on further developments.

⁷⁸ This happened for instance in 1892 between ayllus Mitma and Tunca in Huallamarca to settle a dispute over boundary markers. AJC, 1892, no. 2209.

⁷⁹ Own translation. ANB, MI, 1893, tomo 272, no. 79, Oruro dept., 6 June 1893.

the eventual support of the indigenous population, assuring his superiors of his special efforts during cantonal visits to “*make the comunarios understand the profits and prosperities the Revisita would bring them*” so that “*once educated*” they will be willing to undergo the Revisita (own translation, *ibid*, xi). However, the envisioned direct role to be played by the Revisita in such delineation and ‘fixing’ plans, and the advancing of such plans at all, failed to materialize. Meanwhile, however, the imminence of an external assessment motivated several *sayañeros* and ayllus to dive into the juridical archives in order to find legal evidence of their property rights.

6.4 The launching of a “paper war”.

The reform-minded and export-oriented climate converted secure land property in a sought after and hence disputed asset. With the Revisita unabatedly knocking at the door, contribuyentes were roused to regulate their *sayaña* tenure. In order to block off intrusions by contesting neighbours or imminent inspections and demarcations, *contribuyentes* petitioned the registration of the adjudication of their *sayaña* or other documents that would proof their ownership.⁸⁰ Still, apart from individual interests, ayllus and *markas* in search for collective land rights security started to reclaim documents that would proof their legitimate titles. At the office of Property Rights, installed in the departmental court of Oruro, representatives of these communities requested the enrolment of validated testimonies in the registers.⁸¹

As a result of the obtained guarantees for indigenous communities as confirmed by the 1883 *proindiviso* law, old documents concerning land inspections, demarcations and land litigation verdicts, but foremost the colonial *composición* titles, became vital sources of land right security. This rush on the archives mobilized an army of attorneys traveling up and down the departmental and national courts to reclaim their legitimate

⁸⁰ In view of a petitioned land division between litigating parties, a comunario of ayllu Mitma requested the registration of the 16th century purchase of *repartimiento* lands made to the Spanish Crown by the cacique of that time, of whom the applicant claimed to be great-grandchild. Similar individual requests were made in that decade by contribuyentes of Huallamarca and Coipasa, seeking to guarantee the tenure of their *sayaña*. AJC, 1898, no. 2379. AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá.” fs. 47-8. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 45, fs. 323-4v.

⁸¹ The records of this office, kept in the Archivo de los Derechos Reales (ADRO), comprise registrations colonial *composición* titles, the adjudication of *sayaña* lands obtained through transfer, will or legal sentence, the demarcation and concession of land as sentenced through land dispute litigation. The original documents that were registered derived from the Supreme Court in Sucre or from the provincial court in Corque.

titles and a battery of clerks transcribing and copying colonial documents, thereby raking over old land disputes. This emerging “paper war” is the background of the development of (however modest) movement of *apoderados generales* in Carangas.

The petitions made by attorneys in name of a particular ayllu or several ones, or even the entire province attempted to recuperate their *composición* titles. In an appeal to the provincial Revisor in 1897, a head tax collector from Corque stated that the communities of Carangas no longer possessed the originals of these colonial documents.⁸² Since they had presented their land titles to the former, ill-fated Revisor Delfín Arce and sub-Prefect Luis Lujan in 1894, they would have fallen into the hands of the Revisita committee. The collector’s appeal forms part of an extensive file archived at the Supreme Departmental Court of Oruro containing a sequence of community requests throughout the 1890s.⁸³ In dialogue with the records of the register books of Property Rights at the same court, this sequence reflects the chronological development of a provincial *apoderado generales*, which for Carangas remains a hitherto unidentified movement.⁸⁴

The chronology starts in 1891, three years before the *revisor* accused of having deprived them from the original *composición* documents arrived to the province. That year, the cacique of Huachacalla, Andres Nicolas Rafael, petitioned the registration of the inspection and *composición* documents administered by *Revisor* Domingo Atocha y La Reinaga in the early 18th century (see 4.1.1) in order to prove the property rights of his community “*since time immemorial and the conquest of the Kingdom that was founded.*”⁸⁵ In 1894, Mariano Laime, resident in the province, requested the legalization of the *composición* documents for the communities of the province, as obtained through purchase from royal representative and land surveyor José de la Vega Alvarado, before the Supreme Court in Sucre.⁸⁶ In the following two years, Turco⁸⁷ and Huachacalla⁸⁸

⁸² AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” f. 20.

⁸³ All requests comprised in this file were petitioned before the Supreme National Court in Sucre between 1894 and 1898.

⁸⁴ As with the juridical file (AJHO), the register books (ADRO) in fact contain indirect marks of the concerned requests. The requests found in the former source concern copies of appeals originally presented before the Supreme National Court or departmental authorities while the requests in the latter case were found in registration requests of the 1910s and 1920s. Possibly, the archive of the Supreme Court of Justice, kept in the National Archive of Bolivia, contains documents which would further complete this chronology, but unfortunately this has remained beyond the scope of this research.

⁸⁵ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1918, no. 1.

⁸⁶ AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totora.” fs. 1-16.

⁸⁷ The documents were requested in 1895. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 13.

⁸⁸ The documents were requested in 1896. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 20.

registered the same documents granted under Toledo. The comunarios of Choquecota requested in 1897 the archiving of an extensive file over the division of adjacent lands between Choquecota and Turco which had fought out fierce struggles over these boundaries in the late 18th and early 19th century.⁸⁹ The same year, a representative of ayllu Mitma, Luis Rocha, demanded the registration of all documents relating to the inter-ayllu struggle in Huailamarca, going back to the late 18th century.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the *jilaqatas* of Quitaquita and Ayocota (canton Corque), represented by Francisco Parrado, requested the accreditation of the 16th century *composición* documents, adding that:

“in order to organize the Revisita of community lands in the province, it is necessary to state that in the dictatorial administration of Melgarejo the obligation to consolidate the property of our territories of which we are and were owners and lords since colonial times was imposed upon us, because of the right of first occupation as aborigines as of the onerous title of the *composición* with the Spanish Crown, which our ancestors obtained through oblation of thousand pesos in each canton.”⁹¹

Moreover, they linked the *composición* to the *compensativo* they had paid thirty years earlier and demanded the certification of the amount of money they had deposited for the sake of the consolidation of their lands to the fiscal commissioner Antonio Vargas. Their appeal was responded and the same year, the departmental treasury administrator formally confirmed the payment of 15663 pesos 6 reales, reduced to 12531 bolivianos, however not by the requesting ayllus but by the province as a whole, as a form of compensation in order to remain exempt from the 1866 legislation.⁹²

Subsequently appears the letter by the mentioned head tax collector from Corque addressed to the Revisitador of Carangas in which he petitions for Revisita exemption in view of the certified *compensativo* payment, the *composición* titles and the numerous legal

⁸⁹ Originally, both communities formed a single administrative district. In early colonial times, they fell under the same *doctrina*, which was a Spanish-imposed administrative unit for recently converted Indians, before the establishment of parishes (*Diccionario de la lengua española*, 2001). In later colonial times, however, a violent dispute developed between a powerful turqueño and three ayllus of Choquecota over the rights over a particular estancia. In the first decades after independence, both communities continued quarrelling over the legitimate basis of colonial *composición* documents for a formal demarcation and the legacy of mutual land intrusions. AJHO, 202-1, 1897, no. SR, “Causa por venta de terrenos en Chaquicota”.

⁹⁰ This registration includes copies of documents from 1779, 1787, 1830 and 1844. This conflict has been mentioned before (6.3). ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 14.

⁹¹ AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá.” f. 18.

⁹² AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá.” fs. 18v-19.

guarantees (particularly the 1882 resolution, see 5.2.3) that recognize this exception.⁹³ He warns that if no appropriate resolution will be declared, similar conflicts as during previous *Revisita* interventions, provoked by the denial of justified community demands, can be expected. At the other hand, the collector stresses that the *Revisita* is not unwanted per se; in some cases even quite the contrary. In view of the extensive land seizure by neighbouring communities, the northern cantons of the province are eager to have their lands inspected in the hope to recover their properties. In December 1897, the Prefect of the Oruro department, Andres Aramayo, responded to the collector's request by announcing the return of a *Revisitador* to verify the legitimacy of the presented land titles and their conformity with the stipulations of the 1882 resolution so as to decide whether the lands in question are subject the *Revisita* or not.⁹⁴

In his following prefectural report, the Prefect informed the Ministry of the Interior to have appointed Froilán Rivero as *Revisitador* but he had nevertheless not started and neither would start his assignment (Aramayo 1898, 26). In a reaction, a group of *apoderados generales* of several communities of the province appeared in May 1898 before the departmental judicial authorities.⁹⁵ The commission included following representatives: Hilario Cáseres of the community of Corque, Melchor Marca of Totorá and Curahuara, Juan Nicolás of Huachacalla, cacique Manuel Manueto of Huailamarca, cacique Juan Tangari of Andamarca, and cacique Tomás Colque of Choquecota.⁹⁶ In anticipation to the pending *Revisita*, they conferred special representative power to don Juan Lascano, thereby repealing the power previously attributed to José María Laime, to defend their rights and interests relative to their claims upon *Revisita* exemption.⁹⁷ Their newly appointed *apoderado general* was consigned to “*present writings, test, revoke, appeal*” before the Supreme Government, and if necessary before the Congress, until achieving a final and favourable resolution regardless of the required number of legal

⁹³ AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá.” fs. 20-20v.

⁹⁴ AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá.” f. 21.

⁹⁵ AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, “Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá.” f. 74.

⁹⁶ The first three substituted the caciques of their respective communities. No reference is made to the communities of Curahuara and Turco. Mendieta's identification of Manuel Alanoca, Pedro Alderete y Melchor Marca as the *apoderados* of Carangas (Mendieta 2008, 388) links up to this list, at least when it comes to Melchor Marca. I have not been able to trace solid evidence in the local archives on the person of Alderete and Alanoca or their link with the 1899 rebellion.

⁹⁷ Laime is possibly related –or perhaps even is intended to relate to- Mariano Laime, who in 1894 had requested the land titles of all communities.

actions.⁹⁸ Here, we see that the apoderados were not mobilizing to strengthen the communities' land claims through mechanisms inscribed in the imposed land legislation (and its "loopholes"), but also to address the legislative body in order to topple that legislation.

Counting as his first action as *apoderado general*, Lascano petitioned still in 1898 the formalization of the documents of the land inspection in the province of 1545.⁹⁹ In the same period (1895-1899) the validating and archiving of these *composición* documents had been individually requested by several communities.¹⁰⁰ The difference with Lascano was that he acted as single attorney appointed by all communities to solicit and obtain the formal declaration of the exemption of their community lands from the Revisita. Their claim was justified by their possession of their lands as legitimate owners, by the *composición* and sale transaction with the Spanish Crown and its repeated confirmation with the colonial land inspectors, and moreover by the purchase verified under the administration of Melgarejo.¹⁰¹ Lascano refers to a long range of laws and resolutions, including the laws of 31 July 1871 which cancelled the land sales executed under Melgarejo and the proindiviso law of 23 November 1883 and amending resolutions to the *exvinculación* laws of 5 (sic) October 1874 and 1 October 1880, demanding that all communities of the Carangas province would be included in these regulations.¹⁰² Subsequently it is stated that both the land tenure and the taxpayer status of the "aboriginals" of Carangas are currently being undermined, as the preservation of their land rights is perturbed by summary trials, while their fiscal rights are negated by the

⁹⁸ Because the comunarios do not possess any writing skills, the testimony is undersigned by two vecinos, Joaquin Daza and Socrates Arteaga. AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, "Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá." f. 74v.

⁹⁹ These documents are included in the registration documents of the purchase of a mining concession in Negrillos effectuated in 1922. The next year, he petitioned a testimony of the *composición* operation in Andamarca as executed by Atocha's predecessor José de la Vega Alvarado. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 45, fs. 304-332v. and 1918, no. 6, see also no. 12 and 1929, no. 47.

¹⁰⁰ Cáseres and Marca, for instance, as representatives of Corque, Totorá and Curahuara (in the May 1898 commission) petitioned a certified copy of the *composición* titles their ancestors had obtained from José de la Vega Alvarado. In 1899, the *composición* documents granted by José de la Vega Alvarado were petitioned by the community of Turco. AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, "Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Totorá." f. 21v-46v and 49-50v. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 28.

¹⁰¹ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, partida 45, fs. 325v-326.

¹⁰² The *apoderado* mentions the supreme resolutions of 21 (sic) October 1882, 15 and 22 February, 10 and 13 April and 5 and 18 June 1883, the 1874 and 1880 laws, as well as the supreme decree of 24 December 1874 and 1 December 1880 and the supreme resolution of 13 October 1894. See also chapter 5 on the 1871, 1874 and 1880 laws. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, partida 45, fs. 326v-327.

jurisdiction of the Revisor.¹⁰³ This urges for preparatory actions in anticipation to the execution of the Revisita.

The file closes with the observation of Esteban Vargas, also in the position of general attorney of the eight cantons, that the Revisita is against the law and despises the land titles of the communities, which can be taken as an act of defiance to the government. Explicitly addressing the president, he rhetorically asks whether “*the communities of the province of Carangas will be subjected to the Revisita operations? Not at all because they are protected by the law.*”¹⁰⁴

A vecino-comunario alliance.

The anti-Revisita support of Vargas and Lascano, both powerful non-indigenous residents of the province, hints at the operating of a vecino-comunario coalition that transcended supposedly cemented social and ethnic divisions. Over the last years, such alliance formations were repeatedly alluded to by government representatives at the provincial and departmental level. In the annual report of 1898, these allegations were clearly expressed, asserting that Delfín Arce had not been able to bring the Revisita to a good end due to such vecino-community collaborations (Atristaín, in Aramayu 1898, xi). By that time, swelling rural unrest was becoming more visible as community pressures upon the government crystalized into a formal nation-wide political alliance with the Liberal party (see 5.3). Also in Carangas, the movement of *apoderados generales* had become more identifiable to the degree that representatives and their actions were recorded by the juridical authorities (see Appendix 11).¹⁰⁵

Now, who exactly were these *apoderados*? More precisely, what was the basis of the power, the legitimacy and the motivation they acted upon? Most of the mentioned representatives belonged to powerful families, such as the Vargas in Corque¹⁰⁶ or were influential –yet therefore also contested– individuals, such as Juan de la Cruz Arias¹⁰⁷ and

¹⁰³ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, partida 45, fs. 327v.

¹⁰⁴ Statement made in 1898. Subsequently, Vargas cites the literal stipulations of the law of 23 November 1883. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, partida 45, fs. 328-329.

¹⁰⁵ The list gives all identified names of people who took up the function of “apoderado” between 1870 and 1930 in Carangas to defend comunarios or defend their plaintiffs in relation to land rights. However, it is not always possible to define whether the cases in which the *apoderados* appeared corresponded to communal or inter-individual issues.

¹⁰⁶ AJC, *Penales*, 1900, no. 3.

¹⁰⁷ As magistrate for Mines, Juan de la Cruz Arias supervised the registration of mining concessions, while as public notary in Carangas he regulated the transfer of real estate in the province and even came to represent

Luis Lujan.¹⁰⁸ The case of Lascano offers a good demonstration of the ambiguity of these representatives. Juan Lascano was a white merchant, citizen registered in the city of Oruro,¹⁰⁹ who had acquired a very powerful position in the province thanks to the lucrative exploitation of public offices and commercial relations. In the mid-1870s, he was corregidor in the provincial capital Corque.¹¹⁰ In the same period, he acted as auctioneer of the taxes on alcohol consumption in the province, which gave him influence over regional merchants and trade houses and local indigenous transporters.¹¹¹ In 1874, a comunaria in Corque accused her corregidor of having violently dispossessed her of her *sayaña*, asserting that –as “*everybody knows*”– Lascano never possessed a piece of sowing field.¹¹² In her words, he would have sarcastically explained that he simply

“felt like [seizing her land] and had a hunger for avarices; and for the same reason no one could make him interrupt and retrocede of his works and enterprises; besides that he did not esteem the laws, because the time had come to eat his fill.”¹¹³

When relating this brief insight into Lascano’s position in the province to his role of community attorney it becomes clear that he had strong political and economic power base, his legitimacy was contested and he had a motive to halt the *Revisita*.¹¹⁴ Regarding the first point, his influence explains why community leaders would approach him with their requests. Second, his knowledge of and respect for the law, upon which he pretended to act as *apoderado* (see his references to several decrees), was undermined by

the entire province as Sub-Prefect. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1903, no. 1-6, 1906, no. 1. APO, *Libros de contabilidad*, 1860, “Libro de tomas de razón”, s.f. and 1880, “Libro de diario”, f. 400.

¹⁰⁸ Luis Lujan was Judge in Carangas in the 1880s and executed the office of sub-Prefect around 1893-’95, but was severely accused of having incited an indigenous rebellion as well as held responsible for attacks on the comunarios in Corque. APO, *Libros de contabilidad*, 1881, “Libro de Diario”, f. 403. AJC, 1895, no. 2302. See also the Delfín Arce case (6.3).

¹⁰⁹ AJC, 1875, no. 1420.

¹¹⁰ AJC, 1874, no. 1355.

¹¹¹ In 1874, he had placed a bid on that function through a deal with the municipal auctioneer of Carangas over the collection of alcohol taxes. A conflict emerged with Rey, Días and Company, an alcohol-importing trade house in Tambo Quemado, which would one year later “purchase” the exemption from those taxes. He also sub-leased the collection of the alcohol tax to local collectors. AJC, 1875, no. 1224, fs. 22-3, no. 1367 and no. 1420.

¹¹² AJC, 1874, no. 1355.

¹¹³ Own translation. AJC, 1874, no. 1355.

¹¹⁴ A similar case is that of Manuel Sempértégui, a much sought-after *apoderado* and powerful *vecino* with *sayaña* claims. AJC, 1864, no. 950.

latent hostility towards his person. This distrust makes clear that his influence was acquired through dubious practices. Most importantly, this disputed legitimacy stemmed from the simultaneity of relying upon a vecino status as non-indigenous state representative while claiming a contribuyente status as indigenous sayañero. However, his claims on that sayaña are not backed by legitimate access rights to community lands, which explains why the execution of a land inspection was not in his interest. In chapter 7, we will further inquire this overlap of interests.

Together with the opportunistic manipulation of inter-community struggles over land and boundaries and of indigenous efforts to represent and assert their communal rights before the central authorities, insecure vecino occupation of community land constitutes the clue to vecino involvement in Carangas' land issue. The case of Lascano gives a first insight into this embroilment but the motives and tactics behind anti-Revisita vecino manoeuvres and its profound implications on communal life requires a more elaborate analysis. What was the foundation of a shared vecino-comunario interest in halting the exvinculación process? Comunarios' appeals to the residents of the province with ties to the country's political and juridical institutions to defend their individual or communitarian land interests were in the first place based on the legitimacy they derived from their political and economic power base. The role of community attorney before the government or lawyer of litigating communities allowed them to opportunistically enlarge this power base through divide and rule tactics of quarrelling ayllus, thereby tightening their grip on the comunarios' mobilizing force. But there was also a more intrinsic factor at play that explains committed vecino backing of indigenous efforts to stop the Revisita. As several vecinos had obtained access to community land through a range of –authorized and corrupt- tactics, the defence of communal land rights became the struggle for their own land interests.

In the first place, the new land legislation triggered inter-communitarian incursions in Carangas, rather than the emergence or growth of a land usurping hacendado class. The approaching of a general Revisita only intensified this internal land-related disputes and the comunarios' recurrence to the official juridical system. Literate villagers with a minimal knowledge of that system knew to take advantage of the demand for lawyers and defenders and were increasingly suspected of manipulating inter-community struggles. Especially local authorities, and even the *revisitadores* themselves, were accused of “countless exactions and abuses” to maximize the profitability of their public offices at the expense of the “ignorant” indigenous population.¹¹⁵ An extra drive behind this embroilment were the clashes among the vecinos themselves. Competing political and economic interests ensued in recurrent

¹¹⁵ ANB, MI, 1897, tomo 297, no. 75. Informe Prefecto, fs. 16v-7. See also Aramayu 1898.

inter-personal and family feuds that further fuelled the conflict and violence in the province. Luis Lujan, for instance, was quite a contested figure who lived at odds with Meliton Delgado,¹¹⁶ including in the context of community struggle in which both acted as representatives of opponent parties,¹¹⁷ while he found a ‘partner in crime’ in vecino Marcelino Vazquez.¹¹⁸ As will be demonstrated, the latent conflict among vecino families re-emerged with even more strength in the aftermath of the 1899 events, while criticism by government agents towards this counteracting role of the provincial vecindario bolstered.

However, the counteracting role by non-indigenous rural elites went further than exploiting the insecurity and distress of the comunarios but was partially based on exactly the same cause of insecurity; the fear for state intervention in communal land distribution. In the course of the 19th century, several vecinos had gained access to one or more sayañas, yet not always in a legitimate way. In response to the usurpation of community land by unregistered inhabitants, which according to the Prefect of Oruro, Andrés Aramayu, was a wide-spread practice in all three provinces, Prefect launched in 1898 the proposal of implementing an alternative census (Aramayu 1898, 27). This proposal was presented as a provisional measure to increase departmental revenues as new contribuyentes would be included into the registers, thereby rectifying the unlawfulness that reigned in the department’s rural districts. The sub-Prefect, Fructuoso Atristaín, explained that there were *vecinos* who occupied sayañas without being registered as *contribuyentes*, in order to maintain that situation, misinformed the indigenous population with the purpose of reinforcing anti-*Revisita* protest (Atristaín, in Aramayu 1898, Anexo, xi). He stated that there were cantons where all vecinos, even the corregidor, belong to the “tributario” class and hence only interested in working their landed property (ibid, xvi).

These vecinos-converted-into-tributarios, to whom I will further refer as “vecino-comunarios”, were a thorn in the flesh of the government and its land commodification plans. According to Atristaín, who particularly referred to Corque and probably alluded to Lascano and Vargas, it was due to this category of individuals to whom the *Revisita* is inconvenient that Delfín Arce had not been able to bring the *Revisita* to a good end

¹¹⁶ Lujan was married to Petrona Delgado, but this family tie did not hold both vecinos from their continuous quarrels. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1894, no. 2, f. 2. AJC, 1886, no. 1882 and no. 1930 and 1889, no. 2112.

¹¹⁷ In the violent conflict between Totorá and Huallamarca in 1886, Lujan defended the former community, while Delgado represented the latter. AJC, 1886, no. 1901, no. 1912, no. 1930 and no. 1950; 1887, no. 1964 and no. 1974.

¹¹⁸ In 1886, they were accused of having attacked the sub-Prefect of Carangas. Lujan had been earlier linked to a murder attempt against the sub-Prefect of Carangas. AJC, 1886, no. 1913 and no. 1879 respectively.

(ibid). Thus, while the execution of Revisita was obstructed by indigenous resistance, that obstruction –and all the disorder it caused– was more and more blamed on the vecino-apoderados and the vecinos-comunarios. Moreover, the sub-prefect warned that this assimilation prevented the incorporation of the provincial vecindario as “Nacionales” (ibid, xvi). He particularly stressed the situation in the cantons of Huachacalla and Andamarca, where indeed “formal” mestizo and white presence was low.¹¹⁹ Even the capital Corque –the most “national” place of the province– only counted with 60 members of the *Guardia Nacional* and hardly half of them were reported to attend the Sunday gatherings of the guard because all of them are on leave for travelling as commerce was their foremost activity. To foment the enthusiasm among this minority group, the sub-prefect suggests the appointment of an examining magistrate of the guard to train all local guards in the cantons.

What happened was that, gradually, the indigenous and mestizo inhabitants of the Bolivian countryside were driven into each other’s arms. This became particularly visible in the 1890s, before bursting into a bloody civil war (Platt 1987, 311). According to Platt, the overruling of class solidarity by the creation of ethnic bonds suggests that lacking state support forced mestizos into a position where negotiation and conciliation with the ayllus was inevitable (ibid, 306). They became involved in their struggle for secure community land rights, and offered legal and physical support to their claims. In return, the comunarios were inclined to adopt a more tolerant stance towards their land occupancy of community lands. However, vecino abuses and consequent crippled livelihood prospects remained a major motivator of discontent. The central state got increasingly irritated by what was defined as an “illegal usurpation” by vecino-comunarios and the “crookedness” of vecino-apoderados. More and more, the vecinos were indicated as the culprits of rural unrest and indigenous defiance instead of the vanguards of national integration. Meanwhile, the passive victimhood attributed to indigenous existence was replaced by a frightening image of barbaric savageness. As becomes clear in the official discourse adopted after the 1899 events, the government’s preoccupation over the incorporation of its rural subjects was dramatically stirred, provoking a growing discrepancy between the national and provincial elites and a reorientation in state-community relations.

¹¹⁹ According to the national census of 1900, Huachacalla and Andamarca had indeed the lowest presence of non-indigenous inhabitants, both proportionally as in absolute numbers, of all cantons (Blanco 2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV).

6.5 Carangas during the Federal War.

In the context of the pact sealed between the Liberal Party and Zárate Willka, an indigenous army was formed. The mobilized peasants joined the Liberals in battle and swore allegiance to both Pando and the indigenous general staff led by Zárate Willka (Condarco 2011 [1964], 296). The integration of the troops from Carangas into Zárate Willka's broader indigenous army was possibly consigned to Manuel Mita Willka, assisted by Cruz Mamani (although Condarco states that this is the name adopted by the press of La Paz when referring to the former, namely the "second Willka"¹²⁰), while the Cochabamba and Paria regions were commanded by Feliciano Willka, or the third Willka (ibid, 256). From beginning February 1899 on, the populations surrounding the city of Oruro started to harass the governmental army (ibid, 236). That month, indigenous troops also began to mobilize in Carangas with the primary task of interrupting the international communication, specifically towards the Pacific (ibid, 247-8). While the people from Pazña demolished the railways in order to disconnect and distract the constitutional troops, the people from Paria and Carangas were preparing the siege of the city of Oruro from the cardinal points.¹²¹ In March, the indigenous revolutionaries of Carangas crossed the Desaguadero river and headed in increasing number to Alonso's headquarters (ibid, 278).

Meanwhile, however, it became clear that indigenous participation in the conflict was not undivided. In Huachacalla, particularly, the comunarios of the ayllus of Capi and Tuaña sided with the "Alonsos" while the ayllus of Collana and Camacha supported the revolution.¹²² When they started struggling, the latter ayllus acquired the support of a group of over 300 "rebels" from Turco, who, headed by Ramón Willca and Santiago García, invaded Capi and Tuaña on the 22nd of February. Once the turqueños had returned to their community that same day, the attacked ayllus declared themselves *alonsistas*, provoking a second attack. This time, the Tuaña and Capi inhabitants were brought to surrender and were forced to engage themselves on oath to the revolution.¹²³

¹²⁰ The proclamation of Caracollo, circulated in 1899 by Zárate (letter dated on 28.3.1899), is signed by Manuel Mita Villca as "El 2° General" (Condarco 2011 [1964], 313).

¹²¹ "Gumerindo N. To Juan Manuel Virreira, Oruro, February 11th 1899." Letter published in *El Comercio*, March 2nd 1899, 3, cited in Condarco 2011 [1964], 237.

¹²² The ayllus of Huachacalla had a longer history of inter-communitarian struggle. *AJC*, 1861, no. 848 and 849; 1870, no. 1157 and 1174; 1896, no. 2324. See also *AJC*, *Civiles*, 1902, no. 4; 1903, no. 2, fs. 1v-3; *Penales*, 1907, no. 6.

¹²³ *AJC*, *Penales*, 1903, no. 3. See also Pauwels 1983, 244-5; Mendieta 2008, 389-390.



Figure 25 Mobilized indigenous community and its leader (adaptation from Condarco 2011 [1964], 451).¹²⁴

On the 17th of March 1899, the province's indigenous population met in Corque and declared their support for Pando and Willka by swearing a federal oath before the corregidor of the provincial capital Corque (ibid, 280). Now that they had explicitly adhered to the liberal cause, the *comunarios* of Corque and Huachacalla started to appoint their corregidores through direct vote (ibid, 410). According to Condarco, this was perfectly in line with the indigenous interpretation of federalization plans, which, from their point of view, implied the freedom to choose their own Corregidor instead of having him appointed by the central authorities (ibid). However, a communication of 26 March from Manuel Nina to Pando casted doubt on Carangas' loyalty to the Liberals (ibid, 408). Three days later, a letter by the military commander of Llanquera, Miguel Zorilla, informed that the indigenous "army" of Carangas had turned their position against the liberals (ibid). Whether this warning was correct or not and was received by Pando or not, the latter assured during the last days of March that "*with regard to those of*

¹²⁴ The indigenous leader in the middle could be Manuel Mita Willka, one of Zárate's auxiliaries, who would have been consigned with the military command over the *comunarios* of Carangas.

Carangas, You will see in the documents that I send by mail, that these, in agreement with the los vecindarios [local residents], have proclaimed a neatly federal revolution."¹²⁵

Pando's plans to attack Oruro crystalized in late March, early April. His telegraphic correspondence with the Council to coordinate the attack on Oruro gives insight into the role attributed by the liberal forces to the Carangas communities, which were grouped with the seceded Umala troops, as a form of indigenous counterweight. The first of April, Pando wrote that

"The 8th [of April] they will encircle Oruro, the Indians of Umala and Carangas, in a considerable number: which I judge pass over ten thousand, apart from those from Caracollo. -/ These Indian armies will permit me to hide the movements of the federal army, over the terrain of Oruro, -without permitting Alonso to know where we are located."¹²⁶

Thus, the mobilized indigenous masses and the *vecindario* of Carangas were to come into action the 8th of April. The Carangas troops assumingly participated in the deciding battle of the 10th of April, although little or no reference is traceable.¹²⁷

In the shadows of the Great Rebellion.

In the shadow of the war, there were several incidents in which local interethnic but also inter-indigenous hostility collapsed. In 1904, a plaintiff questioned about the above mentioned Turco-Huachacalla conflict stated that

"the Indians of almost the entire Republic, with the famous Pablo Zarate Villca as their racial leader, also started a rebellion against the legitimate government of sir Alonso, ignorant of his authority and consequently supporting the revolution of La Paz, although in an exaggerated way. Nobody denies that in all places where the Indians participated, they have committed the most atrocious offenses in the

¹²⁵ Fragment of a telegraphic session between Pando and the Junta, La Paz-Sicasica, s.p., probably 31 March 1899, cited in Condarco 2011 [1964], 331.

¹²⁶ Telegraphic session, between Pando and the Junta, La Paz-Sicasica, s.p., 1 April 1899, cited in Condarco 2011 [1964], 332.

¹²⁷ At least it is known that Manuel Mita Willka was there (Condarco 2011 [1964], 344), although it is not clear if he (still) executed the leadership over Carangas. According to Condarco, given their adopted antagonism and the different interpretations of "federal" between the Liberal and the indigenous revolutionaries, Pando's confidence in their unanimous collaboration was quite too optimistic (ibid, 332). In effect, Pando could only truly count with the forces of Umala, maximum a couple of thousands of rather loosely united indigenous people. See also communication between Montes and Pando, Oruro, 18 April 1899 in Téllez 1924, 94, cited in ibid, 333-4.

criminal History of Bolivia, as the slaughters in Mohoza, Ayoayo, Peñas, Carangas, etc. The villages which have distinguished themselves most by acts of true savageness in the province to which we unfortunately belong are Totorá, Curahuara, Choquicota, Turco and part of Huachacalla.”¹²⁸

In a reaction to the materialization of such charges, the “rebellious” Indians literally set the Court in Corque on fire in 1908.¹²⁹ As a result of the fire, a lot of information on the indigenous participation in the revolution in Carangas has probably been lost, including “*the mentioned dossier about the fire occurred in the Juzgado de Instrucción the night of 13 September of the year [1908] has totally disappeared.*”¹³⁰ Despite lacking sources, the strong reverberation of the “Great Rebellion” in the province is unquestionable. In 1921, the then sub-prefect of Carangas, Eduardo Lima, commented that “*the sad events in the revolution of 1898 have not been wiped out from memory. Likewise, some parcialidades of the canton of Corque share in this horrific racial degeneration*” (Lima 1921, 8). He also referred to Choquecota, where “*the bloody memory of the horrific crimes that its inhabitants committed in its surroundings in the last revolution of 98*” still vibrate (ibid, 190-1).¹³¹

Accusations brought to the provincial Court in the aftermath of the Great Rebellion asserted that the “Indians” of Carangas used the situation to avenge their oppression by the *vecino* class (Pauwels 1983, 244-5). In several villages, mestizo residents became the target of murder and plunder during the months of February and March. A merchant in Totorá, Nicasio Pérez, was robbed by comunarios of ayllu Lupi.¹³² In Corque, several *vecinos* would not survive the plunder. In the aftermath of the federal war, Pantaleón Arias blamed comunarios of ayllu Jilanaca of the vice-canton of Chuquichambi of having seized the triumph of the liberal revolution as a mere pretext to murder Tiburcio Rejel and his brother Laurencio.¹³³ According to the insurgents, the ill-fated *vecinos* would have opposed the revolutionary flag and aggressed the indigenous revolutionaries, but Arias countered that the only purpose that drove the insurgents was to exterminate “the white race”.¹³⁴ Around the same days, a *vecino* of Corque, Idelfonso Vargas, would

¹²⁸ Own translation. AJC, *Penales*, 1904, juicios penales, no. 11, f.1v-2.

¹²⁹ In 1909, the sub-prefect of Carangas commented that the Court was moved to the property of César Vásquez since the building had burnt down (Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 104).

¹³⁰ AJC, *Civiles*, 1909, no. 17.

¹³¹ This rebellious fact seems to have a strong historical precedent, as Lima recalls the demolition of the former village of Choquicota on order of the viceroy of Peru after the comunarios had massacred the Spanish residing in the village (Choquicota was rebuilt in 1774 with the name of “ciudad de Cáceres”).

¹³² February 1899. AJC, *Penales*, 1906, no. 28, f. 1.

¹³³ The murder occurred in mid-March 1899. AJC, 1900, no. 2434.

¹³⁴ AJC, 1900, no. 2434.

have been murdered and plundered by comunarios from Chuquichambi as well.¹³⁵ Another Vargas of Corque, or maybe his son, was later accused of having instigated the uprising among the comunarios, which he refuted for having been sacked him during the rebellion and since then lives in enmity with the province's indigenous population.¹³⁶

However, the Federal War and the ensuing Great Rebellion was far from a clear-cut non-indigenous vs. indigenous affair but was interrupted by aggressions among the indigenous population. Condarco gives the example of the extermination of a comunario family by fellow comunarios.¹³⁷ The above mentioned clash between a group of "Alonsos" and "Pandos" in Huachacalla with interference by rebels from Turco even more clearly indicates that indigenous insurgence was not free of contradictions and at times collapsed into inter-indigenous violence. In the context of that conflict, Toribio Flores, merchant from Huachacalla and leader of the insurgents in Turco, publically assassinated Pedro Flores, a "disobedient" *comunario* from Huachacalla, in April 1899.¹³⁸

Once the "alonsistas" had been brought to surrender and the order of the day restored, a settlement followed between the communities to compensate the damage caused by the Turco revolutionaries. In the first years of the following century, both communities reached an agreement over Turco's compensation to Huachacalla, the former represented by Juan de Dios Cruz Quispe, Jorge G. de Alvaro and Andres Portillo¹³⁹ and the latter by caciques Manuel Mamani and Manuel Zubieta.¹⁴⁰ Turco was liable to a transaction of 2000 bolivianos (the value of 500 hundredweights of uprooted sweet potatoes) within a term of one and a half year and mortgaged with their lands,

¹³⁵ AJC, *Penales*, 1900, juicios penales, no. 3, fs. 1-2.

¹³⁶ AJC, *Penales*, 1906, juicios penales, no. 33.

¹³⁷ In Zorilla's mentioned letter to colonel Pando, the assassination of the Warachi family of Ancocala in the canton of Llanquera in late March is reported (Condarco 2011 [1964], 408). However, in a file of the provincial court which apparently concerns the same case (referring to Guarachi, a common indigenous name, also written as Huarachi), confusion rises over Warachi's death, with the plaintiff stating he was burned alive and his children killed in 1905, while the accused state he was shot in 1893, "*long time before the last revolution.*" AJC, *Penales*, 1912, no. 23.

¹³⁸ In the years preceding and following the revolution, Toribio and his brothers would also have assaulted and threatened several inhabitants and merchants in Turco and surroundings, although this was denied by the accused. AJC, *Penales*, 1904, no. 11. See also "Protocolización de obrados a favor de los comunarios de Huachacalla" on 15 July 1904. AJC, *Civiles*, 1904, no. 1.

¹³⁹ Mentioned in ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1906, no. 4 and 1910, no. 2.

¹⁴⁰ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1903, no. 7, fs. 7v-8.

goods and livestock and a 4% monthly increase in case of overdue payment.¹⁴¹ Meanwhile, the conflict had further developed and had come to centre upon the small turqueño enclave within Huachacalla territory.¹⁴² It concerned the lands inhabited by the Chillagua, a seriously reduced 'remnant' of Turco's Uru population, commonly referred to by their mocking name of "Capillos" (Pauwels 1999, 76).

According to the agreement between the litigating caciques, eventually confirmed in 1904, Turco paid 1080 bolivianos (the value of a herd of 108 llamas) and ceded the legitimate ownership over the *anexo* of Santa Barbara de Capillas, to Huachacalla.¹⁴³ As this transaction announced the eventual disappearance of this vulnerable Uru group (Pauwels 1999), it demonstrates that the merger of land disputes, local elite factions and national political disorder converted inter-community fights such as the Huachacalla-Turco clash into substantial changeovers with a critical and long-term impact on land rights security and ethnic configurations.

¹⁴¹ The compensation was not completed before 1903. The document that registers the transaction in 1903 include 2000 bolivianos for the damaged potato fields and the restitution of silverwork that belonged to Huachacalla. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1903, no. 7, fs. 7v-8 and 1906, no. 4.

¹⁴² The Capillo had earlier pertained to the jurisdiction of Choquecota. Pauwels 1999, 72. AJC, *Penales*, 1903, no. 3, f. 13.

¹⁴³ The concession was set on the 1st of January but would eventually take place on 6 June 1904. This implied that from now on, the Huachacalla comunarios had to pay the half-yearly contribution to the caciques of Turco in order to maintain those lands. Huachacalla incorporated the territory of the Chillagua as the *anexo* of Rosapata, yet its inhabitants, the Capillo, moved to Yarvichambi, on the border between both litigating communities. The ayllus Tũaña y Capi divided the obtained lands among each other in 1908 and a formal property adjudication followed in September 1910. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1910, no. 2; 1911, no. 1 and no. 3. Pauwels 1999, 77. See also Pauwels 1983, 245.

Chapter 7

From delinking to unlocking, 1899-1953.

*Para que nos nombrarán
nos negamos el nombre
para que nos mirarán
nos tapamos el rostro
apostamos el presente
para tener futuro
y para vivir... morimos*
(Subcomandante Marcos)
Mural in the village Turco.
Own picture, 2008.¹



¹ “In order to be mentioned / we refuse our name / in order to be seen / we cover our faces / we gamble the present / in order to have future / and to live... we die.” Own translation. Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, leader of the Zapatista National Liberation Army. Wall painting by the Casa de la niñez y juventud libres y creativos sin fronteras. Escuela de Futbol TURCO (House of the free and creative children and youngsters without borders. Football school TURCO).

Intro. Ayllus, vecinos and the state, and the intensified quest for land in early 20th century Bolivia.

The indigenous participation in the conflict that had brought the Liberals to power deeply influenced the (negative) perception by other sectors of society of the indigenous population, but also of the mestizos that locally governed them. Particularly after the local excesses of interethnic violence, the portrayal of indigenous poor passive victims converted into that of savage murderers, while mestizos lost their legitimacy as rural heralds of modernity. This change of discourse served the Liberals to revise their initial promises, arguing that a federalization of the country was unviable due to indigenous “savageness” and local mestizo exploitation of “ignorant Indians”. The “Liberal betrayal” was most obvious regarding the question of land. In contrast to their commitment to protect the “free” communities, the expropriation policy against corporative entities as initiated under previous conservative administrations was protracted and even accelerated.² Once the Liberals had eliminated Zárate Willka and disarmed the indigenous insurgents, they revoked the ban on land sales (Klein 1993, 117), thereby putting residual community lands (*tierras sobrantes*) to service of local land-accumulating elites (Langer and Jackson 1990,25).

By the 1920s, the richest lands on the altiplano were in hacienda hands, while the surviving free comunarios had been pushed into marginal lands (Klein 1993, 135). Up to 1952 and 1953, when the National Revolution and subsequent Agrarian Reform universalized suffrage and expanded rural schooling, the tenacity of Bolivia’s indigenous/land question continued to constrain indigenous access to citizenship to a fixed set of requisites imposed since 1839, the trinity of *tributo*, property and literacy.³ While indigenous mobilization increasingly pushed for substantial changes on these three points, the indigenous taxation, now based on the *contribución territorial*, remained in place, collectively held lands were attacked and access to schooling hardly got ahead. It must however be noted that several communities managed to keep their lands free from reform interventions until after 1953, accounting for a diversified dynamic in the progression and counteraction of the protracted land reform process. In relatively

² The new Liberal government also changed its position towards the Church, proclaiming a true secular state. This went accompanied by a new attack on ecclesiastic properties, which particularly targeted the Franciscan missions in the eastern lowlands, although much less pronounced than in other Latin-American states at that time (Langer and Jackson 1990, 17-9). At the village level, this laicization was reflected in struggles, particularly between the *vecinos* and the priests. See for instance AJC, *Penales*, 1913, no. 12 and 15.

³ The government of Santa Cruz (1829-1839) suspended Bolívar’s decrees, thereby prohibiting restoring the role of the indigenous *tributo*. Irurozqui 1999, 738-40.

“free” regions, insurrectionary arguments and objectives were differently formulated, defending the *tributo* against reformist attempts to introduce a new fiscal regime. Where communities were strongest, departmental treasuries remaining to large degree dependent upon the old *tributo* collection (footnote 81 in Irurozqui 1999, 735-6).

The context of this aggressive stance towards collective control over land was Bolivia’s ever more intimate and hence vulnerable subjection to the imperatives of the world market, stirring the rush on resources. Not only land, but all the exploitable resources it comprised, including salt, livestock, and minerals, were identified as resource frontiers to be made accessible. In the first section of this chapter, it will be assessed how attempts to mobilize such frontiers in the Carangas territory were little successful. However, as particularly the “immovability” of the *exvinculación* process in the province demonstrates, this perceived immobility in fact implied a lot of movement and counteraction. However, the ways in which these frontiers were kept immobile is only scarcely and indirectly visible in the traces left of the comunarios’ interaction with the juridical system.

The fact that the Revisita operation and cadastre elaboration remained unfinished hints at the revival of collective mobilization, despite the decapitation of the pre-1899 indigenous movement. In the first decades of the 20th century, the movement of *caciques-apoderados* launched a new cycle of rebellion that anticipated the end of the old order. One of their principal objectives was the recovery of usurped community lands in correspondence to their colonial *composición* titles. However, the imminent threat of the reformist process and the general increase of insecurity gave rise to internal land conflicts and litigation, which at their turn counteracted the government’s Revisita plans. Thus, the communal rush on the archives dissected in the second section of this chapter was both a matter of securing “individualistic” interests in view of a growing inter-comunario rivalry as of collective action to secure communal interests against non-communal competitors, symptomizing a heightened alertness towards both inter-family, inter-community and indigenous-vecino inequality. The starker aggressions against comunarios’ land base triggered a threefold resistance strategy, brought into practice through the *caciques apoderados* movement and erupting into the indigenous rebellions of the 1920s which, similar to the 1899 effect led to a reorientation in state-community relations.

The third section looks into the trajectories of vecino “conversion” in search for clues to why and how vecinos had a shared interest in indigenous efforts to halt the *Revisita*. This shared interest and the consequent ambiguous position of the vecinos in Carangas strengthened the state in its conviction that the vecinos were the “sting” to be taken out. Thus, their power had to be circumvented, which implied an increasing state penetration on the countryside, seeking to “reconcile” its relation with the indigenous population.

The 1899 events had provoked a growing discrepancy between the national and provincial elites that, nurtured by the emerging indigenista movement, would gradually shift towards an integration discourse. With the adoption of a more inclusive stance, accusations for indigenous belligerency came to rest with the exaggerated exploitation by provincial elites (Mendieta 2010, 315). This reorientation in state-community relations aimed at the neutralization of the Indian question, which would eventually, with the National Revolution of 1952, lead to the “peasantization” of the rural indigenous population. Simultaneously, indigenous demands gradually oriented towards education as a precondition for a (legal) fight with equal arms as well as a tool in the renewal and expansion of a nation-wide network of indigenous leadership (Mendieta 2010, 287-9). The last section of this chapter will assess this gradual shift until around 1930, at the eve of the Chaco war that would give a decisive push to Bolivia’s (rural) mobilizing potential to bring the country’s oligarchic land structure down.

7.1 Resource frontiers in Carangas.

At the entrance of the 20th century, entrepreneurial appetite for land was far from being satisfied. In the context of vigorous extractive industries, a booming export and the related development of vital railway connections, there was a growing demand for resources, including communal lands, and hence rising land prices. Archival evidence demonstrates that the pursuit for, speculations over and hence the contentiousness of the access to resources intensified in Carangas as well. As the Prefect of Oruro expressed before his superiors in 1916:

“The agricultural, livestock and mining wealth of these Provinces [Carangas, Abaroa and LÍpez] must call (...) our attention, to ensure that this wealth results in the national interest, instigating private profit”⁴

Five years later, sub-Prefect Lima -not averse of some exaggeration- described the province as a “virgin terrain” for the country’s aspired industrialization.

“this province continues in a rosy and preponderant situation; the fabulous treasuries guarded by the interior of its mountains and its altiplano, they only wait to be moved and uncovered by the vigorous effort of man. Carangas is

⁴ Own translation. Lemaitre 1916, 59.

without doubt an ample terrain most prepared for industry, whose importance until today has not received due appreciation.”⁵

If only national or foreign capitals would find an entrance to this weakly integrated area, core processes of capitalist production could do their job and industrialization would probably follow (Lima 1921, 54). As “motors of progress” to foment this industrialization, the sub-prefect pointed to wool livestock breeding and its derivatives, but also hunting, mainly of the chinchilla and vicuña was seen as an integral part of “*the industrial phases of Carangas*” (ibid, 51). Also salt and charcoal had some potential to convert Carangas into a strategic operating base for provincial merchants and industrialists. Although most of the land itself, controlled by the communities, was kept outside the land market, the restriction of the “free” exploitation of resource frontiers offering exportable products implied augmented pressures on community land. In 1927, increasing property attacks, usually by hacendados, corregidores and alcaldes, were reported in the entire department, but while in all provinces the balance between community and hacienda land control was toppled by these aggressions to the advantage of the latter, not a single private estate was counted in Carangas community (Calderón 1927, 15-6).⁶

7.1.1 Immobile frontiers?

The quest for the expansion of commodity frontiers had an impact on the margins for local livelihood construction as it increased the susceptibility of communal property rights to a renewed attack by private landowners and governmental intervention. Gradually, the access to strategic resources was contained by changing land (privatization) legislation, processes of proletarianization and the proliferation of truck transport.⁷ Meanwhile, coercion, loans and other financial pressing tactics, false attorneys and declarations of non-*revisitado* lands as “wasteland” pushed the level of usurpation and agitation in the highland communities to an unprecedented degree (Rivera 1991, 604). However, while such anti-communal aggressions succeeded in

⁵ Own translation. Lima 1921, 63.

⁶ The Cercado province counted with 5 ayllus and 102 estates, the Poopó province with 22 ayllus and 75 estates, the Avaroa province with 58 ayllus and 72 estates, and the Carangas province with 90 ayllus and no estates.

⁷ Although there are few clear indications, labour migration and proletarianization became more important factors in the control of rural households over their land. An example is a comunario employed as colono on a hacienda outside the province transferred his sayaña in San Miguel to his brother-in-law. AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 25.

creating a very active land market in the La Paz department, where two thirds of hacienda land changed owner in a term of only ten years (Klein 1993, 143), commodifying pressures did not develop that straightforward in Carangas.

While the government was advised by provincial commissioners about appropriate, pro-privatization measures to optimize and regulate the exploitation of these reserves, the state sought to increase its control over and benefit from these developing sectors by subjecting the detected resource frontiers to a tax regime. As the indicated sectors all related to cross-border trade, this did not only imply the elaboration of a fiscal apparatus but also the imposition of an effective border control. In the following, the resource frontiers detected in Carangas and their development are briefly assessed.

Salt

Regarding salt, Bacarreza wrote in 1910 that the

“indigenous communities (sic) in charge of the exploitation of these salt flats, during the months of April and May, transport large bulks of this article of primary necessity, to the valleys of Cochabamba (...) its commercial exchange is appreciated in a considerable sum.”⁸

Until that year, any community could extract salt in return for a tax paid to the community that occupied (the shores of) the exploited salt lake with its benefits destined to the coffers of the community.⁹ As it was later explained by the comunarios,

“since colonial times the exploitation of this substance has been open to autochthonous indigenous exploitation, as a free industry, handed over to common or own use, according to the customs and traditions, while the State has appropriated itself [since 1871-1872] of formations of the mentioned substance only when appearing in veins and located in wasteland or unexploited terrains of the public or private domain.”¹⁰

In 1917, a new law proclaimed that

⁸ Own translation. Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 356.

⁹ This was the community at the marka level (parallel to the canton). One of these communities was Sabaya. Rivière refers for instance to a document of 1817 ordering all villages to pay one real, which was later increased to two, for ten carguilla of salt (one carguilla weighs 46 kilos) in order to reconstruct the church of Sabaya (Rivière 1982, 307).

¹⁰ Own translation. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1916, no. 8, fs. 12-12v.

“the salt flats in current exploitation cannot be adjudicated and will continue to be exploited according to the customs and traditions of each locality, while the law continues to recognize the established rights.”¹¹

Nevertheless, the salt lakes in Carangas were subdivided and ceded (in the condition of aynoqa) to the estancias located along the salt lake (in Villa Vitalina, Cumujo and Coipasa) and hence the access to salt became monopolized. This would only increase the existing polemic over salt resources.¹² In 1915, a salt concession was made to three urban residents of Oruro. Facundo Rojas, apoderado of ayllu Cumujo, protested that the land legislation of 1871-’72 had stated that salt was only marketable in its solid form, hence the state could not adjudicate its deposits (its original substance is liquid) as private mineral concessions.¹³ He linked his argument specifically to the new land legislation, claiming that this adjudication contradicted the protection that legislation pretended to give:

“the different community land laws have come to protect the indigenous class in the exercise of the right to property of its lands, being it evident and known that the indigenous tributaries of the Departments of La Paz, Oruro and Potosí live of the exploitation of the salt flats located within the limits of their properties, that the adjudication of this substance in those conditions deprives the indicated indigenous race of the necessary means to its subsistence, dispossessing it from a right acquired since time immemorial.”¹⁴

Motivated by demographic pressures, the case was closed by allocating exclusive exploitation rights over a specific sector of the lake to each estancia. Whereas surrounding communities previously came to extract the salt needed for their barter exchanges, they now had to purchase it. For the estancias attributed with salt concessions, the exploitation of salt became more and more absorbed by competition and struggle, particularly against estancia Coipasa which received the most central part of the salt lake where salt was sufficiently dense to extract and commercialize in blocks,

¹¹ Own translation. “Ley de 22 de noviembre de 1917.” Art. 1.

¹² Disputes between Sabaya, particularly Cumujo, with neighbouring departments and with Peru over the Coipasa flat and similar inter-ayllu litigation in Andamarca (Turuna, Guanapa, Collana and Parcomarca) over salt extraction in Rosapata (the Tayo-cota salt lake) had been nurturing the controversy over the tenure status of salt flats. AJC 1862, no.892; 1868, no. 1040b and 1869, no. 1057.

¹³ He refers more specifically to the laws of 25 June 1871 and 8 December 1872. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1916, no. 8 and no. 9, fs. 10-14, and 1958, f. 267 r., no. 4. See also Rivière 1982, 308-9.

¹⁴ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1916, no. 8, fs. 12-12v.

which was the best quality.¹⁵ The concentration of salt property rights increased the production and accumulation prospects for the beneficiary comunarios, but implied an intensification of peon exploitation as salt producers generally relied on other, often very poor communities such as Chipaya to fulfil the hard work. Meanwhile, ayllus further away from the lake were deprived from community incomes previously derived from the tax.¹⁶ Moreover, the official negation of the collective status of salt exploitation put a strain on the barter capacity of pastoralists as they became increasingly dependent upon monetary circuits to access a key barter product. Hence, the execution of caravan barter trade became conditioned by access to commercial transactions and seasonal labour (Molino 2006, 109).

Wool livestock

The trade in wool livestock had a strong and international dynamic, fuelled by the demands from the Tarapacá saltpetre districts (Lima 1921, 49). Although (post-1880) Chilean archival material suggests that the urban and industrial markets on the Pacific were in first place provided by south-Peru and more southern departments of Bolivia and by Argentina,¹⁷ Carangas was an important livestock centre too. In view of this potential, concrete proposals were launched to foment and modernize agriculture in the province. The most concrete programme was elaborated by Zenón Bacarreza who, inspired by the Argentinian ranches, suggested the establishment of model farms for camelid production; a project that nonetheless failed because the indigenous communities perceived it as another fiscal trap (Pauwels 2006, 341). Some ten years later, Eduardo Lima criticized (even accused) the government's lack of attention towards the economic potential of Carangas's livestock wealth and even warned that its export, legally but most of all illegally, paved the way for its complete disappearance in the province (Lima 1921, 49). Just as Bacarreza had done, he recommended initiatives to prevent epidemics, improve production methods and yields and the organization of expositions and competitions (ibid, 41-9).

Linked to these agronomic proposals, Lima commented on a "nascent development" of another link further up the global commodity chain of the wool industry. His enthusiasm was roused by the observation of the indigenous population's proficiency in

¹⁵ Later in the 20th century, Coipasa established a cooperative that monopolized the salt extraction and whose members saw the strong demand on the national market for salt translated into continuous individual accumulation. An indication is that Coipasa was the first or one of the first villages of Carangas to dispose of a permanently working electricity generator and drinking water system and a high number of trucks, 1 for every 22 inhabitants (Rivière 1982, 309).

¹⁶ This paragraph is based on Rivière 1982, 309.

¹⁷ See chapter 4.2 and Castro 2004, chapter 4, s.p.

the production of ponchos, cloths, blankets and shawls, which were woven by hand and with primitive looms from llama, alpaca, sheep or vicuña wool and decorated with abstract and figurative designs. He detected in the manufacturing of textile fabrics the first steps towards Bolivia's industrialization (ibid, 50). However, different from the commercialization of wool and livestock, no marketing chain can be reconstructed and no data were found on the outsourcing of weaving by non-rural agents to support an "industrious revolution"-hypothesis.¹⁸ Neither was there a development in the technology and scale of production.¹⁹

Mining

The country's highest estimated motor for industrialization and economic growth was and still is attributed to the mining sector. As Oruro figured as a vital artery in Bolivia's ascendance on the world tin market, the department witnessed the development of a relentless market for mining concessions. However, this activity was chiefly concentrated in the eastern part of the department. Nevertheless, Carangas was provided with abundant mineral resources,²⁰ converting the province the home of numerous mining concessions.²¹ Yet, while mining exploitation in the provinces of

¹⁸ As has been discussed in chapter 4. See also De Vries' ideas on the "industrious revolution" (1994).

¹⁹ Currently we may observe something as an industrious revolution, with an increasing role of cooperatives, particularly of llama meat producers. It would take until the 1980s, under stimulus of European cooperation organizations, that a transition in the regional livestock sector really took off (Canqui Mollo 2012; and interview with Canqui Mollo). In more recent years, this development has been further reinforced by projects such as the "Plan maestro de ganadería" (Rodas 2013) which pretend to recuperate ancient practices or remodel them in function of "sustainable development." Today, several communities, such as the principal llama producing sectors of Turco and Curahuara, are equipped with a communal slaughter house, transferring the site of production from the household oriented towards family consumption to the cooperative oriented to the commercialization of meat, which can nowadays be bought in all supermarkets of the country. However, this accommodation of local production activities to the market and "development" tends to erode longstanding practices and human-animal-nature relationships (Rodas 2013). Regarding the textile industry, the local population still employs primitive looms to produce all kinds of fabrics which they sell in urban or border markets, mainly destined to the tourist sector. To optimize the regional expertise in textile production, several cooperatives have been established such as in Titiri.

²⁰ Principal metals and minerals include silver, tin, copper, borax and sulphur. Other locally exploited natural resources are salt, cinnabar, borium, antimony, platinum, pumice, plaster, china clay, peat fields, thermal springs, tola and yareta (Lima 1921, 63-4).

²¹ Lima counted 57 registered silver and copper mine concessions in the province (Lima 1921, 56). Many of these concessions corresponded rather to speculation operations, as can be concluded from the swift sale and purchase operations of the same set of mining territories in the ADRO books (*Propiedades Provincias, Carangas, 1903-1930*). Also annual prefectural reports of the time give hardly any attention to the mineral exploitations in the province. The fact that my quest for company documents, which would give evidence of effective exploitation, resulted in just a couple of reports on the Turuquiri and Choquelimpie mines, passed to me by

Cercado, Poopó and Avaroa was booming, the incessant sale and purchase of mining properties in Carangas among local and foreign capitalists still left several rich reserves untouched and few of the registered concessions were brought in operation. Bacarreza stated that none of the province's rich veins were effectively exploited (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 391) and ten years later, Lima added that apart from the exploitation in Yarvicoya, Turco, by the French industrialist Mauricio Mollard, all mines had been abandoned, which moreover risked to give free room to untrustworthy neighbouring nations (Lima 1921, 57 and 65). This may also explain why so little traces are found of the impact of the ongoing mining rush on local communities. All concessions registered in the Property Rights books explicitly locate the petitioned property on community land, which was conform the legal separation between the soil (in communal hands) and the subsoil (in private hands) and seemed seldom to provoke conflicts. As few of these mines were effectively exploited, there was apparently limited motive for conflict.

While Bacarreza attributed this inertia to lacking technology, Lima referred to the unavailability of permanent and trustworthy wage labourers and entrepreneurial disinterest (Lima 1921, 57). The key factor, however, was infrastructure. The lack of passable highways between the city of Oruro and the mines of Turco and other cantons threw a spanner into the works of several entrepreneurs. A concrete example were the plans of the company of Hoschild, one of the three principal tin barons in early 20th century Bolivia, with Rodas and other industrialists to start up mining operations in Carangas and had thereto several petitions pending for the exploitation of lead and silver.²² To overcome the infrastructure problem, Hoschild sought in 1929 governmental support for his project to construct an "*international road for automóviles that serves for the exportation of metals towards the Pacific in more advantageous and convenient conditions than those offered by the route of Antofagasta*" (González 1929, 74). This would also foment the active commerce between the province and the Chilean population at the border and the *prestación vial*, which was still paid in labour, made the plan viable (ibid, 63). Nevertheless, Hoschild's initiative did not get off the ground.

Skins

Apart from domesticated livestock, Carangas' wildlife was also a source for a lucrative international trade. In the markets on the Pacific, hunted chinchilla and vicuña pelts

Gilberto Pauwels, who almost accidentally found them in an archive in Tarija, evidences the limited weight of the mining sector in Carangas, at least in comparison to the vigorously exploitation in the east of the department.

²² ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1920, no. 28.

were sold at elevated prices,²³ providing dealers with fortunes of even 100.000 bolivianos (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 359). This skin trade as well as the commercialization of ostriches, flamencos, foxes and *tujos* (a highland hare) was monopolized by a small group of hunters living close to or across the international border, where the population of these animals was most dense.²⁴ Despite the legal prohibition, the communities' opposition and warnings for their imminent extinction, the "reckless" hunting of particularly chinchillas and vicuñas continued (ibid). Ten years after provincial inspector Bacarreza had advised the government to declare the sites where chinchillas persisted State property (ibid), Lima remarked that:

"it would be more opportune that the government would cede the exploitation of this fruitful industry in the capacity of leaser to any private company, so that the latter, protecting its own interests takes care that these animals not to become extinct" by employing guards (Lima 1921, 52).

Once more, the provincial commissioners' recommendations were not followed by any concrete action by the government.

Charcoal

From the late 19th century up to the middle of the next century, queñua wood and charcoal became a lucrative product on the Bolivian national market. Charcoal had been produced for a long time, particularly in the western part of the province, but demands from urban and tin mining centres²⁵ increased its commercialization, converting charcoal from a subsistence asset into a source of (fast) accumulation.²⁶ It also seems to have constituted a revenue source for the departmental treasury.²⁷

A successful charcoal company was based at the tambo of Titiri, where Juan de la Cruz López, vecino of the nearby village of Turco, and Pedro Dupleich, a French

²³ Prices for blue chinchilla skins reached up to 300 bolivianos for a dozen and for white chinchilla up to 100 bolivianos per dozen in the market of Tacna (Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 359).

²⁴ AITRI, vol.19, Subdelegados 1906, *Oficio del Inspector de Mocha al Subdelegado de Tarapacá*, Mocha enero 1906, sin fol., cited in Castro 2004. Morales 1913, 12; Lima 1921, 53.

²⁵ In contrast to the marketing of most other goods, not the Pacific but the mines of the Bolivian interior, mainly in the Oruro and Norte de Potosí area, were the main sites of charcoal trading. Bacarreza also referred to charcoal purchase to the mines of Corocoro, Chacarilla (south of Pica, Chile) and the city of Oruro (Bacarreza 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 357).

²⁶ West describes a similar process with *t'ola* (sage brush) which was particularly fuelled by firewood demands in the tin mines from the 1930s to the 1960s-'70s. The commercialization by Pampa Aullagas pastoralists fuelled local entrepreneurship, truck introduction and merchant/elite formation (West 1981, 144).

²⁷ In 1880, the Sub-Prefect of Carangas deposited 294,40 bolivianos to the national treasury for the renting of the forests of Larancagua in Turco. APO, *Libros de contabilidad*, 1880, "Libro de diario", f. 404, 1.02.1881.

entrepreneur, exploited charcoal to distribute to the mines.²⁸ Both comunarios and provincial merchants thrived on the commodity;²⁹ yet while “*the entire indigenous population of the western part of Carangas favoured its economy [with charcoal],*” it was “*exploited (sic) under direction of some national industrialists*” (Lima 1921, 53).³⁰ Charcoal continued to constitute a principal local industry until the middle of the century; in 1953 the tailing of queñua trees would have been prohibited (Rivière 1982, 302-3).

Community land

As the Prefect of Oruro complained, little agricultural progress was made in his department because it comprised the majority of the country’s least interesting agrarian lands and due to the regional strength of the livestock sector (Sanjines 1906, 31-2). Moreover, the majority of these lands were in hands of the community, which kept the inalienability of *terrenos de origen* in place as one of the main obstacles to commodifying pressures, particularly in the Carangas province. The non-marketability of land was most explicitly expressed in cases where community lands were exposed to “sale transactions,” as in 1908 in the context of inter-ayllu litigation in Totora.³¹ When the judge sentenced the sale of a piece of land to resolve the dispute, comunarios heavily protested that *tierras de repartimiento* were unsaleable state property, claiming that a number of forty contribuyentes had access to the sayaña in question. Jilaqatas and caciques started to authenticate their colonial *composición* titles and inventoried their money and labour contributions to the Church and the state to prevent the loss of community land. The judge eventually followed their argumentation and invalidated the transfer, concluding that:

²⁸ In the 1870s, they rented the hill of Laramcagua from the caciques and jilaqata of Turco for the sum of 300 pesos where they grubbed up and fired queñua trees. In the 1880s, Dupleich expanded his charcoal business to Changamoco (canton Cosapa), where he bought a trade enterprise provided with 70 tons of charcoal to be traded to the Atocha mine in the Potosí department. In 1889, he petitioned and was adjudicated full property rights over the establishment. His son acquired all the rights on the establishment from his siblings and sold the company in the 1920s to another merchant, José D. Arando, for 2700 bolivianos. AJC, 1878, no. 5 and 1890, no. 2160. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1923, no. 9, 10, 11 and 16; 1925, no. 3 and 4. See also Pauwels 1983, 226.

²⁹ Comunarios themselves were also active in the charcoal trade for their own account, transporting and depositing amounts of over 3 tons of charcoal. AJC, *Civiles*, 1914, no. 15.

³⁰ Examples of indigenous transporters contracted by mestizo (salt) traders: AJC, *Civiles*, 1904, no. 5 and 1915, *civiles*, no. 14.

³¹ As a means of settling a debt of 1515 bolivianos, a comunario of ayllu Lerco voluntarily ceded a sayaña to ayllu Aparu. This land transaction was motive to a murder. AJC, *Penales*, 1908, no. 3 and no. 26.

“it has been determined by supreme resolutions that the communities of Carangas are non-examinable [*irrevisitables*] and non-transferable because of the purchase or *composición* by the *comunarios* with the Spanish Crown.”³²

Despite this clear nullification of this sale, some lands were effectively sold through “division and partition” procedures of community lands.³³ Yet in most cases, the adjudication of these *sayañas* to new proprietors, who consequently took over of the *contribución* obligation, seem to correspond to a transfer or consolidation operation without necessarily implying an effective monetary purchase.³⁴ This suggests rather an ‘underground’ or ‘virtual’ market for community lands. While data is too fractional to firmly avow a true privatization process, it makes clear that community land was more and more perceived as an asset one disposed individually of and could hence be transferred as a form of credit.³⁵ How limited the number of such “sales”, several cases point to a subtle but impactful process of land usurpation which I label as “*contribuyentización*” (see also 7.3). In one case, the transfer even clearly went ‘in the other direction’, as a group of merchants ceded their private lands in the village of Sabaya to the community.³⁶ Other community lands subjected to sale included the distant properties which some communities had managed retain into the 20th century.³⁷ Cut off from these “residual” lands, the residual lands within the altiplano communities became an increasing focus of attention that required Revisita intervention.

³² Own translation. AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 26.

³³ An example is the transfer of the terrains in Lerco-occo, seem to have effectively been privatized. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1910, no.1.

³⁴ Despite the adoption of a ‘market language’, most cases probably corresponded to normal *sayaña* transfers. Whether money involved or not, a transfer usually included the valuation of the *sayaña*, with recorded prices ranging from 100 to 2000 bolivianos, and could include several fields, an estancia, and a house. In one such transfer, a terrain of 5000 m² was valued at only 100 bolivianos and ceded “for free”, according to the transferor to prevent discussion. In another case the valuation and purchase was part of the adjudication procedure petitioned by the *sayañero* of the concerned plot. In the case of Eulogio Valdéz, a merchant from Huachacalla, this “sale” was the result of a lawsuit he won. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1908, no. 1; 1909, no. 5; 1926, no. 20; 1929, no. 53, no. 57 and no. 58; 1930, no. 6.

³⁵ There is the example of two *comunarios* wanting to execute a *sayaña* transfer as a way of paying a debt of 151 bolivianos, but the terrain is claimed by a member of the local *vecindario*. AJC, *Civiles*, 1903, no. 1.

³⁶ The property rights over these lands were adjudicated to three *comunarios* of ayllu Capsaya. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1913, no. 1.

³⁷ In 1906, the *comunarios* of Totora appointed Belisario Ampuero as their representative to defend interest in the sale of the estate of Pisaquero, situated in canton Paria of the Cercado province. AJC, *Civiles*, 1906, no. 2, f. 8-9v.

7.1.2 An illegible society: the ever imminent Revisita.

In order to upkeep the economic boost, anything that could hinder the search for land and resources was to be eliminated. As repeatedly stressed by provincial and departmental authorities, a Revisita operation would reveal the immense amount of fallow lands that could be allocated for agrarian, mining or industrial purposes. In 1909, the Prefect of Oruro explained that as lands remained excluded from all land property transactions, the indigenous population of his department could impossibly transcend “*the condition of helots*” (Ascarrunz 1909, 89).³⁸ He stated that the execution of a Revisita in all (now) four provinces of the department was “*the only way for the State to claim terrains that are wielded by diverse communities without any title and without aspiration for progress.*”³⁹ Particularly regarding the Carangas province, the Revisita was detected as an urgent matter in order to

“produce a big step in the national progress, increase fiscal rents, avoid the bloodbath provoked by each community conflict, make known to each what is his or belongs to him, and allow the State to claim terrains in hands of the indigenous population without any legal ground and terrains that might be available, either to be allocated to diverse concessionaries or to serve the creation of agricultural or livestock farms.”⁴⁰

Another reason for implementing the Revisita and the cadastral system was the hindering effect of relentless inter-community conflict over land boundaries (see 7.2.1). Lima observed in 1921 that most disputes brought to court by *apoderados* originate in an overstepping of territorial borders and therefore considered a demarcation more than urgent (Lima 1921, 115-6). He launches a proposal in which such operation would be executed by the sub-prefect and an assisting engineer in charge of elaborating topographical maps while the communities would be responsible of constructing the boundary marks. Moreover, he argued, this topographical intervention would at once settle inter-communitarian land disputes and prevent abusive *vecino-apoderados* from intervening in those conflicts.⁴¹ In 1929 it was repeated by the Prefect of Oruro that inter-community clashes and their often bloody termination, particularly in Carangas, could only be prevented by including all properties in the cadastre (González 1929, 15).

³⁸ Helot was a status for serfs in ancient Sparta and refers here to a class of outcasts.

³⁹ Own translation. Ascarrunz 1909, 64.

⁴⁰ Own translation. Ascarrunz 1909, 89-90.

⁴¹ The remedy of professional maps anticipates the demands that emerged in the wake of the 1953 reform, but never properly executed (Cottyn 2012a).

While the demanded structural interventions remained forthcoming in all of Carangas' communities, small-scale censuses were organized at the community level in order to replace the previous *matrículas*. These so-called *empadronamientos* would be the first registers made up in line with the 1874 legislation, executed in the first years of the 20th century.⁴² Unfortunately, we are left with only sporadic data on this survey operation apart from oral accounts of a census completed in 1902 in Sabaya,⁴³ and the reference to “*the New Census that took place in the month of April of 1903*” by a comunario of ayllu Guanapa, Andamarca, in 1910.⁴⁴ The operation seems to have produced new contribuyentes, as was the case with the comunario in Andamarca who received a vacant piece of land,⁴⁵ but the comunarios of Sabaya dealt with this effective intervention ‘in their own way’. According to the interviewees, one day the elderly were ordered to declare the names of their *sayaña* in order to replace the head tax which they continued to pay by a territorial tax (Rivière 1982, 257-8).⁴⁶ However, once stated specific *sayaña* names upon which the surveyors left satisfied, the comunarios just kept cultivating where and how they pleased regardless of the land they had indicated, while paying the new tax. Although more complex transitions are probably omitted from this account, Rivière seizes this case to underscore the discrepancy in the government’s idea of an individual right of property and the comunarios’ vision on a shared right of access (ibid).

The unviability of the Revisita was driving the successive sub-prefects of Carangas to despair, in contrast to the highest levels of the state administration who seemed to take a rather indifferent stance towards the province, which were an additional source of frustration for the sub-prefects.⁴⁷ Given their annoyance with the success of indigenous

⁴² References to the “New Empadronamiento” by comunarios in Corque and Turco, both presenting an “Empadronamiento certificate” obtained through that operation (although it is not clear when) to confirm their *sayaña* property rights, suggest a link with the law of 1882, which established the Revisita exception for communities with a *composición* title, as well as to the financial law of 1901, although without specifications. *AJC, Civiles*, 1912, no. 2 and 1914, no. 32.

⁴³ Locals informed Gilles Rivière during his field work about this census and others that followed in 1920 and 1940 (Rivière 1982, 106 and 254).

⁴⁴ *AJC, Civiles*, 1910, no. 14.

⁴⁵ *AJC, Civiles*, 1910, no. 14.

⁴⁶ In Sabaya, the documents granted during the mentioned census were called “*camachos*” (ibid, 254), which may indicate that the operation was executed under supervision of Martirian Camacho, then sub-Prefect of the Carangas. *AJC, Penales*, 1904, no. 4.

⁴⁷ Platt, however, explains that in Chayanta rather the other way around, the revisitadores felt insufficient support from the sub-prefects (1982, 86). As the mentioned case of Delfín Arce (6.3) demonstrates, tensions between the sub-Prefect and the revisitador also played their part in Carangas. Since Arce, however, the situation was simply that no revisitador was entering the province.

anti-Revisita resistance, they found themselves between two “walls”, unable to effectively attract

“the industrialists who try to acquire fallow terrains, whose petitions are resisted by the suspicious and distrustful indigenous who cannot see in the immediacies of their lands people of distinct race and customs without pitting all sorts of difficulties to maintain their natural apathy.”⁴⁸

In order to get the *exvinculación* process off the ground, local state representatives requested a modification of the *proindiviso* act of 1883, which was detected as a key obstruction to their efforts. As discussed before, communal action had “extorted” this law and related regulations, providing freeholding communities with a powerful “loophole” which also individual comunarios knew to invoke when asserting their land claims.⁴⁹ In the words of Prefect Ascarrunz, the concession of fallow lands was completely impeded because such communal privileges were being abused to extremes, involving the mobilization of hundreds of communities against any attempt to distribute lands, not to speak of the numerous inter- and intra-community conflicts which further exacerbated the disturbance of the public order (Ascarrunz 1909, 89). The indigenous population was thus far from apathetic, yet in a much more ingenious way than governmental authorities dared to admit. Moreover, as the central state gave up the fight (by ceding the 1883 and other concessions), the comunarios directed their efforts more and more to the local level of encroachment (Platt 1982, 145-7).

Thus, despite persistent pressure, no *Revisita General* was undertaken nor did the cadastral system make headway. In 1910, the head of the province explained that while one part of the *comunarios* was convinced of the *Revisita*’s intervention as a tool to guarantee their property rights, another part stubbornly resisted this, referring to the guarantees provided in the 1883 law (Morales 1910, 66). In Totora this led that same year even to an anti-*Revisita* (and at once, anti-vecino) rebellion. Bacarreza explained that anti-*Revisita* protest was triggered by inter-communitarian land inequality with smaller communities hoping that *Revisita* intervention would help them keeping stronger neighbours at bay and the latter mobilizing to keep the *Revisita* out.⁵⁰ In 1916, the Prefect of Oruro suggested to appoint a *Cadastral Rectifier* and a *Revisita Judge* in order to execute the decreed surveys, which had been paralyzed for years (Lemaitre 1916, 58). Since the first of June 1905, a *Cadastral Office* came into operation in the Oruro

⁴⁸ Own translation. No details given on those measures. Ascarrunz 1909, 64.

⁴⁹ *Comunarios* in Corque and Sabaya requested the consolidation of their land rights conform the law of 1882. *AJC, Civiles*, 1914, no. 2.

⁵⁰ Bacarreza, 1910 in Pauwels 2006, 376. A similar comment had been made by the sub-prefect in 1893, see 6.3.

department in order to replace the old *diezmo* system by a rural territorial tax (Sanjines 1906, 21-2), but made no progress whatsoever in the Carangas province.⁵¹ As a result, the established nominal entry for the *contribución territorial* in the departmental budget had meanwhile been accumulating, while no increase in the real incomes was produced because the *padrón* had not been updated for the Avaroa and Carangas provinces (Lemaitre 1916, 56-8).⁵²

Similar to other regions where the new territorial (cadastral) tax system found no entrance, the solvency of Oruro's treasury continued to rely heavily on head tax revenues, with Carangas counting as an undeniable loyal fiscal client. In 1909, the *contribución territorial* still counted as "*the principal and most profitable income*" of the Departmental Treasury, good for 94424,94 bolivianos collected with regularity and even a producing a surplus (Ascarrunz 1909, 66). Carangas' share in this collection, which was its exclusive fiscal contribution to the department, covered 38,2 %.⁵³ In 1913, the Prefect of Oruro contentedly commented that Carangas was for now the only province with no debts to the Treasury, thanks to its punctually delivered *contribución territorial*.⁵⁴ In 1921, Carangas continued to be mentioned as "the most punctual" province of the department when it came to paying the indigenous head tax (Lima 1921, 182).⁵⁵

⁵¹ The Cercado province was the first area to undergo the cadastral procedure, generating substantially higher incomes than under the previous fiscal system. By 1909, the cadastral tax yielded satisfactory results despite the conflicts, petitions and unwillingness to pay by the proprietors, yet still limited to the mentioned province (Ascarrunz 1909, 67 and 85-6). By 1913, efforts to introduce the cadastral system in the Poopó province had started, however without any valuable result (Morales 1913, 25-6). All those years, nothing was reported on the Carangas province. In 1916 the Prefect of Oruro commented that the situation remained unaltered (Lemaitre 1916, 58).

⁵² In spite of the law of 13 November 1914, which ordered the continuation of the cadastral operations, the income entry for cadastral taxes was suppressed in the departmental budget in 1916, subjecting the "proprietors" of Carangas to a continued payment of the territorial tax. In concrete, this meant that proprietors included in the cadastre paid a lower property tax which in Oruro only applied only to those in the Cercado province, where the cadastral operations were had been concluded. Elsewhere, the property tax maintained its increased rate of 10% on the profits of rural estates in addition to the inflated interests and prescribed surcharges of the 1894 legislation. Even with the cadastral operation only partially imposed, the 1914 law caused a 50% drop in departmental fiscal revenues. "Ley de 2 de enero de 1894."

⁵³ The sub-Prefect reported to have submitted 18025,95 bs to the departmental treasury for the first semester of the year (Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 106). The province's annual contribution can thus be estimated at 36051,9 bs.

⁵⁴ The communities of Carangas had deposited 36376,94 bs or 38,6% of the departmental territorial contribution revenues (Morales 1913, 12 and 70).

⁵⁵ In 1920, the province counted with some 21820 inhabitants and subsidizes the departmental treasury on yearly basis with 37481,1 bs or 42,1 % of the departmental *contribución* revenues (Lima 1921, 182). See also chapter 4.1.2 and Appendix 7.

Moreover, while no general, province-wide *Revisita* would be organized for the entire period up to the National Revolution, the communities not only claimed an indisputable fiscal position, but also managed to keep the collection of the head tax outside governmental intervention.⁵⁶ Governmental authorities attempted to undermine this autonomy by suppressing the premium attributed to tax collectors,⁵⁷ yet no structural changes were undertaken. In 1929, it was repeated that the *Revisita de tierras* according to the law of 1874, which would make community lands “*exvinculado*” and integrate them into the absolute ownership of the originarios, had still not been executed, allowing for the persistence of the old “deficient” situation in Carangas in which the sub-Prefect indicates and registers the replacers of deceased originarios.⁵⁸ Neither had the *contribución territorial*, paid by all “indigenous proprietors” of the department as instructed by the 1874, 1880 and 1911 stipulations, been replaced by the cadastral tax (Gonzalez 1929, 32-3).

By keeping the *Revisita* and cadastral system at bay, the communities defended their fiscal status, which was a key aspect in safeguarding their margin for “communal manoeuvring”. Despite this margin, the push for resource frontier expansion and the consequent reinforced (though frustrated) insistence upon *Revisita* and cadastral surveying impacted life in the communities of Carangas. In the following section, the contraction and expansion of this room for manoeuvre will be further discussed, pointing to the contribuyentes’ vulnerability to asymmetrical power relations, expressed in both inter-household and inter-community conflict, as well as to their resistance strategies, which did not abate and linked up to a political movement.

⁵⁶ As a way of comparison, the province of Chayanta in the Potosí department was equally praised for its punctuality and still supplied the departmental treasury with one fifth of its revenues up to 1930 (Platt 1987, 318).

⁵⁷ The *alcaldes cobradores*, recruited among the provincial inhabitants, had right to a 1% premium for collecting the head tax. The abolition of this right in 1916 provoked countless complaints and was suspected of complicating the tax collection. Lemaitre 1916, 56-7.

⁵⁸ This statement is included in a judicial sentence of 1929 concerning the adjudication of a *sayaña* to the children of Agustín Fernández, a powerful *comunario* from Sabaya. That year, the departmental decree of 30 July 1927 which confirmed the exemption of non-*exvinculado* communities from cadastral operations and the cadastral tax and was adopted as supreme resolution (13 June 1929). ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 16. González 1929, 138 and 209-12.

7.2 Combat and court: signs of increasing vulnerability and coordinated counteraction.

This section approaches the effects from increased pressures on land from two angles. First, court cases regarding disputed land rights that appeared before the provincial court of Corque and registered property documents at the Property Rights office in Oruro indicate a high level of inter- and intra-ayllu conflict over land. The (increasingly less and weaker) remaining “free” commoners were exposed to increasing competition, often leading to desperate reactions, both criminal and legal, to secure their clutch at their own piece of land. In the eyes of the state, these “convulsions” were a basic motive and barrier to the implementation of the Revisita. Second, a coordinated collective ayllu response developed simultaneously through court, through legislative action and through revolt. “*When the indigenous do not recur to combat,*” the state concluded “*they recur to their demand for demarcation.*”⁵⁹ Either way, the communities were perceived as obstructing elements, but this obstruction was in fact based on a tactic employment of the “rule of law” enacted that same state. Communal leaders developed a complex strategy, within, beyond and on the “boundaries” of the law. Both inter-ayllu as joint-ayllu struggles were pursued via the same juridical-archival practices through court as well as in ‘battle’. Moreover, by means of collective representatives, communities even directly pressured the Parliament to harmonize the legal framework with their demands.

7.2.1 Inter-comunario land disputes.

After 1899, things may seem to return to the order of the day, but the *exvinculación* process had established a general climate of conflict. In 1906, the Prefect of Oruro reassured his superiors that while his department has known little disturbance since the end of the revolts, “*there is no shortage of turmoil provoked by discrepancies between comunarios and colonos of private properties.*”⁶⁰ While this discrepancy was little relevant to Carangas, life was equally troubled by land conflicts, both between the indigenous and mestizo population as among and within the ayllus. The “*current and constant collisions that occur between indigenous commoners over their land possession*” became the norm.⁶¹ A

⁵⁹ Own translation, ministerial circular of 1920, cited in Rivera 1991, 639.

⁶⁰ Own translation. Sanjines 1906, 2.

⁶¹ Own translation. Prefectural report. Lemaitre 1916, 7.

screening of the archived lawsuits in court of Corque display a high amount of violations against communal property of either particular or groups of comunarios, which kept existing or launched new protracted histories of inter-ayllu violence and litigation.

These conflicts were nothing new in se, but they tended to become more violent throughout the first half of the 20th century.⁶² Such disputes commonly started as minor incursions among neighbours or even within families,⁶³ but at times could escalate into inter-cantonal and even inter-provincial or inter-departmental clashes,⁶⁴ with boundary incursions occurring at all levels. Particularly in the north-east of the province, conflicts over land were most frequent. On these fertile, hence desired soils, the ayllus of Totorá⁶⁵ as well as of Huailamarca⁶⁶ attained a strong reputation of intra-community belligerence, but also in, with and among neighbouring communities of the Carangas' greenest corner a lively history of violence and litigation was upheld.⁶⁷ At the other side

⁶² Corque, for instance, would have been witness of “*the most bloody events executed by the indigenous population of Chuquichambi, Chuquicota and of its own jurisdiction*” (Lima 1921, 185).

⁶³ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 20. AJC, *Penales*, 1907 no. 11.

⁶⁴ In 1910, the sub-prefect urged the Prefect to consider the pressing need for an interdepartmental delimitation with the department of La Paz in order to stop the continuous intrusions by the comunarios of Llanquera, Chuquichambi, Huailamarca and Totorá and those of the Pacajes province (Ullona and Callapa) into Curahuara de Carangas (Careaga in Morales 1910, 71). Also Sabaya was involved in a complex litigation process with adjacent ayllus pertaining to other provinces and departments regarding their rights over the Coipasa mountain. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1909, no. 3 and 4; 1924, no. 25.

⁶⁵ As has been mentioned in previous chapters, land disputes had been recurrent in the previous decades between ayllus Lerco, Aparu and Guaraguara. In the 20th century, struggles over boundary markers and territorial rights continued to erupt. Particularly the Anconi family felt the need to secure its property rights over their sayañas, resulting in a series of petitions to register republican and colonial documents that supported their land claims. Also within these ayllus and with or among other ayllus, land-related violence regularly revived. AJC, *Penales*, 1903, no. 1 and no. 7; 1904, no. 3; 1907, no. 2 and 11; 1908, no. 13; 1910, no. 7 and 13. AJC, *Civiles*, 1904, no. 5; 1910, no. 1 and 2; 1911, no. 3; 1915, no. 29; 1916, no. 31. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1927, no. 26-30; see also 1910, no. 1; 1924, no. 3; 1925, no. 12 and 15; 1928, no. 27.

⁶⁶ In Huailamarca, comunarios were embroiled in disputes amongst themselves and with their neighbours. AJC, *Penales*, 1901, 15; 1902, 12; 1905, no. 8; 1906, no. 13-14; 1907, no. 1, 13. AJC, *Civiles*, 1906, no. 12, 13; 1907, 1, 3; 1908, no. 4, 19; 1910, no. 25.

⁶⁷ Also in other north-eastern districts of Carangas, inter-ayllu clashes frequently erupted. In August 1906, civilian and police forces were called out after “*an enormous bonfire and twenty Indians with their pututus*” walking from Llanquera in the direction of San Miguel and defying the locals to combat had been observed, only days after other incidents had been reported between comunarios both localities. Two years later, another invasion followed. The conflict related to the governmental demand that the comunarios of San Miguel, pertaining to the Corque canton, would deliver services to the authorities of Llanquera, which they probably denied. AJC, *Penales*, 1906, no. 12, f. 1; 1908, no. 4, 5. See on Llanquera also AJC, *Civiles*, 1901, no. 6, 10; 1910, no. 6, 11, 24, 26, 35; AJC, *Penales*, 1902, no. 6. In later years, the comunarios of San Miguel repeatedly

of the province, Sabaya and Huachacalla were also hotbeds of rural unrest.⁶⁸ Together with a rising number of violations of land property, numerous reports were made on illegitimate seizures of other resources, mostly livestock, and a remarkably high number of assassinations or attempts to murder was recorded. This contributed to a generalized climate of conflict, alarming the central authorities and non-communal rural dwellers of the province becoming a place where “*the knife reigns over the law.*”⁶⁹

Yet, this perceived lawlessness was exactly a key motivator behind a closer interaction between the comunarios and the jurisdictional apparatus. The archives of these institutions are not only testimony of the incessant clashes among the rural population, but moreover tell us something more of the way individual comunarios and collective communities dealt with these conflicts. Land and boundary conflicts are a principal ‘vein’ in this mine of juridical proceedings. Such conflicts, either between individuals or entire communities, were usually settled, either voluntary or sentenced, through boundary inspections, land partitions and demarcations and possibly transfers of communal land, which were then confirmed through the adjudication of property rights to (one of) the litigating parties. Once these procedures were documented, they attained the status of legal proof and at their turn might re-appear in later documents to serve as evidence in later litigation or demands to the government. The rising insecurity produced by the competition over land thus drove people to the legal authorities to consolidate their land rights by authenticating all documents that proved their legitimate (and centuries-long) possession over (disputed) land. This explains the frequent reference to old (colonial and republican) judicial documents and petition for the validation and registration of transcriptions of these documents by the descendants of once (and often still) litigating parties in search of legal security.⁷⁰

invaded adjacent cultivation fields of Chuquichambi, sometimes mobilizing the entire community. AJC, *Civiles*, 1909, no. 30; 1910, no. 13; AJC, *Penales*, 1912, no. 25.

⁶⁸ In Sabaya, a longer violent history erupted once more after an invasion by comunarios of ayllu Sacari in 1907, leading to an official allocation of the possession in 1908. In 1914, a delineation between ayllus Collana, Canasa and Sacari was executed, based on old judicial documents. AJC, *Civiles*, 1907, no. 9; 1908, no. 1; 1914, no. 2 and ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1914, no. 4. See also AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 29 and 1909, no. 2. Note that the ADRO includes a significant number of cases relating to Sabaya, particularly in the course of 1913-1918. In the neighbouring community of Huachacalla, too, longstanding inter-ayllu antagonisms escalated again. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1914, no. 2 and 3; AJC, *Civiles*, 1902, no. 3, 4; 1905, no. 5; 1910, no. 12; AJC, *Penales*, 1902, no. 16; 1907, no. 6.

⁶⁹ A comment by the priest of Turco about his village in 1907. AJC, *Civiles*, 1907, no. 6.

⁷⁰ The Property Rights registers (ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias*) is to large extent composed by a series of copied land titles and juridical resolutions over land rights and boundary allocation that can be traced back to the first *visitas* of the 16th century. These copies were submitted for verification in order to count as proof of the property over a *sayaña* or the rights of an entire community. Several comunarios of Huailamarca requested the registration of lawsuits dating from 1779 up to 1892 (1924, no. 10, no. 12 and no. 14 and 1926, no. 1). Other

Colonial and more recent documents regarding land divisions, boundary inspections, juridical verdicts and *sayaña* adjudications were registered for the sake of collective interests,⁷¹ at times re-registering the documents obtained by the *caciques-generales* a couple of decades before.⁷² Yet, also individual *contribuyentes* recurred to the Property Rights office (or the court personnel in Corque) to obtain and register the documented evidence for the property rights they enjoyed over community lands.⁷³ These petitions logically concerned cultivation plots as collectively used could not be adjudicated to individual *contribuyentes*.⁷⁴ In case the provided documents were not considered sufficiently strong enough, others could easily oppose the adjudication of the concerned *sayaña*.⁷⁵ While it remains hard to define where the divide and the overlap rests between individualistic and collective struggles, it seems that many of the petitions were driven by competitive inter-ayllu interests, in view of intrusive neighbouring ayllus or out of personal gain. In contrast to the preceding peak in land rights registrations (1898-'99), when requests culminated in a clear collective demand for *Revisita* exemption supported by all communities of the province, this time there are less indications of how and how strongly these appeals managed to transcend competing ayllu or individual agendas. This observation might point to a fragmentation

requests regarding old documentation were made by *comunarios* or their *apoderdos* representing litigating parties of Choquecota and Turco (1923, no. 12 and 1928, no. 14), San Miguel (1924, no. 23), Andamarca and Huachacalla (1929, no. 17), different ayllus in Sabaya (1926, no. 29; 1928, no. 6 and 1929, no. 21) and Llanquera (1929, no. 8 and 50).

⁷¹ Collective demands have been registered for the ayllu of Corque, Sabaya, Andamarca, Huachacalla, Huaillamarca, Choquecota, Totorá, Turco, Chuquichambi (NO?!), either for one particular, several or all ayllus of the community (*marka*). Remarkably, no such collective request was found relating to Curahuara. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1911, no. 2 and 5-6; 1918, no. 4 and no. 9-12; 1920, no. 1-2; 1922, no. 39; 1924, no. 2-6, 13, 15, 24-25; 1925, no. 10, 14, 21; 1926, no. 18-19, 27, 30; 1927, no. 7, 9, 12-13; 1928, no. 5-6, 8-11 and 28; 1929, no. 10, 13-15, 22, 28, 41-43, 44, 47, 51; 1930, no. 8-12, 16, 17c, 18-20 and 34.

⁷² ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1918, no. 6 and 1929, no. 11 and no. 13-15.

⁷³ In order to consolidate the individual tenure rights over a particular *sayaña*, *contribuyentes* recurred to the departmental Property Rights office to register the records of previous *sayaña* adjudications or transfers, or certificates of regular *contribución* payment, which sometimes involved the registration of colonial documents. Often these property rights had been (recently or long time ago) allocated through juridical sentences extorted in the context of land disputes. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1913, no. 3-5; 1913 ("Libro de Anotaciones"), no. 1; 1915, no. 2; 1916, no. 10; 1917, no. 9 and 10; 1918, no. 3, 7 and 8; 1920, no. 29 and 31; 1921, no. 4; 1923, no. 13 and 14; 1924, no. 11, 17-19 and 26-28; 1925, no. 5-6 and 13; 1926, no. 2, 4, 8-10, 13-17, 21-23, 25 and 28; 1927, no. 2-5, 8-11, 15-19, 22-24, 26-27 and 30; 1928, no. 2, 5, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 23-27; 1929, no. 1-4, 6-8, 16, 23-24b, 26, 27, 29-39, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54 and 56-58; 1930, no. 4, 5, 7b, 12, 13, 15, 17b, 23-28, 30, 32, 33 and 35.

⁷⁴ Hence, accusations of intrusion in grazing lands made little sense. AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 18; 1910, no. 8.

⁷⁵ See for instance AJC, *Civiles*, 1909, no. 11 and 1910, no. 14.

of the indigenous leadership, supporting a hypothesis of regional introversion in which ayllus were too occupied in saving their own hide. This will be further assessed below.

The ongoing land conflicts, of which but an indicative sample is given account of, and their tenacity demonstrate a growing problem of “*an inequality that oughtn’t to be*”⁷⁶ regarding commoners’ access to basic resources. This insecurity reflects the effects of mounting demographic pressures and growing competition over resources. While hacendado pressures on land were abating from the 1920s on (Klein 1993, 133-59), the remaining free communities needed all their energy to prevent powerful neighbours from attacking their land boundaries. Thus, even though Carangas did not experience a real hacienda threat, its inhabitants found themselves in an insecure environment of “*bloody conflicts, which are continuously provoked among the indigenous people competing for land.*”⁷⁷ The central administration’s capacity to contain these inter- and intra-community conflicts remained as deficient as before, let alone its intention and means to neutralize the very cause of these conflicts. As a result, provincial authorities and the departmental police force were repeatedly called out to suppress violent clashes over property rights between comunarios of adjacent terrains or to prevent disputes from escalating, yet without producing a structural change in the situation (González 1929, 15).

The very cause of the conflicts is founded in the entwined problems of vagueness, insecurity and inequality regarding land access, property and limits. Inter-ayllu conflicts affected boundaries, not necessarily because they might lead to border changes, but for encouraging the fixation of what previously corresponded to more fluid demarcations.⁷⁸ Because of the intensifying competition over land, communities

⁷⁶ This is the testimony of a comunario wrapped in an inter-household dispute over the little livestock they possess. AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 8.

⁷⁷ Own translation. Careaga in Ascarrunz 1909, 103.

⁷⁸ With the intention of protecting comunarios or entire communities against further usurpations or to compensate the damage caused by land disputes, the juridical archives were nourished with detailed accounts of the revised or confirmed boundaries, increasingly registered after 1922. The following list shows that the procedures, mainly recorded in the Property Rights registers, covered nearly all communities of the province, affecting the internal boundaries of Sabaya, Totorá, Orinoca, Llanquera, Huachacalla and Huailamarca (see respectively ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1925, no. 9 (delineation of 1914); 1918, no. 2; 1929, no. 9 (delineation of 1920); 1922, no. 46; 1907, no. 1 and 1918, no. 5; 1924, no. 16 and 1930, no. 22 and no. 31), the inter-cantonal boundaries of San Miguel with Chuquichambi and Choquecota (ADRO, 1924, no. 23), between Totorá and Curahuara (ADRO, 1929, no. 25), and Huailamarca and its neighbours (AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 15; 1909, no. 32; ADRO, 1928, no. 7; 1928, no. 22; 1929, no. 19), the inter-provincial boundaries between Corque and Toledo, Poopó province (ADRO, 1922, no. 41) and between ayllu Cumujo (Sabaya) and Salinas de Garcimendoza, Avaroa province (ADRO, 1924, no. 25), and the boundaries of an estancia on the Coipasa mountain on the inter-departmental border between Sabaya and the neighbouring canton of Llica, Potosí department

became more aware of their territorial limits and hence more open to the “modern” idea that land overlap was problematic. While this led to communal support for a demarcation that would recognize their community boundaries in force since ‘time immemorial’, they retained their distrust towards the state-imposed Revisita, well aware that this would not be executed according to their norms and interests.⁷⁹

But the real problem behind boundary disputes was one of inequality, with small communities in a weak position against usurpations by stronger neighbours. As Lima explained, some cantons enjoying favourable plots and pasture lands while others live on unproductive terrains (Lima 1921, 182). In line with all local government functionaries, he seized the observed inequality to stress the injustice of the still operative fiscal system in which either category was subject to the same territorial tax quota and to push for the implementation of fiscal and land reform plans. At the interpersonal level, these “*variations in wealth between ayllus were also matched by an increasing internal stratification among the Indian peasants themselves*” (Klein 1993, 163). Intrusive players knew to exploit this discrepancy between weak and strong communities and comunarios to the advantage of their land base, applying the simple weight of numbers⁸⁰ but also their purchase power and political power.⁸¹ More subtle tactics were also applied, seizing the absence of contribuyentes to deprive them of their land.⁸² Land access inequality had at times extreme consequences with (groups of) comunarios

(ADRO, 1909, no. 3-4). Only in one case, regarding the division of ayllu Parco and Collana (Huailamarca), such petition includes a drawn map. AJC, *Civiles*, 1910, no. 30.

⁷⁹ See the discussion on the Revisita demand of the caciques-apoderados in 7.2.2. In fact, until the implementation of the 1953 land reform, there was no clear overview of ayllu boundaries. Limits were indicated in situ by *mojones* (boundary markers) which were often moveable objects or disputed indications. To consolidate, amend or obtain a detailed account of these boundaries, comunarios had to travel to the centralized juridical institutions, where this information was not systemized but documented in the (often conflicting) accounts of copied colonial property titles.

⁸⁰ The recurrent clashes between ayllu Sacari and Canasa (Sabaya), for instance, included large-scale invasions, where it should be noted that ayllu Canasa comprised about one fourth more comunarios than Sacari (at least according to the last counting in 1877). See also footnote 210.

⁸¹ In Huailamarca a powerful Totorá resident was accused for frequent attempts of land usurpation which he afterwards tried to resolve with a sale transaction to a comunario. Similarly, the cacique of Llanquera arranged a deal in which he would pay a contribuyente half of his *contribución* in order to cultivate part of his land, but eventually, the cacique was denied the adjudication over the terrain. AJC, *Civiles*, 1910, no. 11, and no. 7 and 26 respectivley.

⁸² These absentees had either migrated (temporally) “*in search of work for their subsistence*” or, especially from 1916 on, were *contribuyentes* or *próximos* conscripted into the army. AJC, *Civiles*, 1908, no. 13 and 1910, no. 14.

deciding to abandon their original community affiliation and/or to integrate in another (stronger) community.⁸³

The most extreme and coercive case of ayllu erosion due to a land conflict was that of the Uru. Because of the variations in fiscal status, their land rights were very weakly secured which had burdened them with a long history of land aggressions⁸⁴ resulting in their gradual “disappearance”, most clearly evidenced in Turco’s concession of Capillu lands to Huachacalla (see 6.5). The long-term consequence of the extremely precarious land access of the Uru was (and still is) evidenced in deteriorating livelihood conditions and a process of aymarization, which current efforts to counter historical processes of territorial and cultural fragmentation.⁸⁵

As for the vecinos, the combination of their disposal over strong “usurpation tools” with a lack of a legal title to community land had a very double outcome in which the securing of their power position not resulted in straightforward usurpation but went hand in hand with their intervention in communal struggles. In the following it will be explained how the struggle over community land in Carangas gave light to (supra-local) legislative as well as insurgent resistance in which inter-ethnic alliances played an important role. Subsequently, the reconfigurations in ethnic relations and land rights underlying to this alliance will be analysed by linking vecino intervention in these initiatives to their integration in the contribuyente class.

⁸³ Two orphanage brothers (hence probably in precarious land access) pertaining to the vice-canton of Carangas switched to ayllu Collana (Sabaya) and were adjudicated sayaña lands. Their integration demand was motivated by the offences of the authorities and fellow comunarios of their ayllu. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1911, no. 3 and 4; AJC, *Civiles*, 1910, no. 22. Also in Sabaya, ayllu Sacari decided in 1909 through referendum to voluntary transfer their *contribución* obligation (however without abandoning their affiliation to Sacari) to Todos Santos, which was elevated to the status of vice-canton (“Ley de 6 de noviembre de 1911”). In view of this new administrative division, the community lands of Todos Santos, Sacari and Canasa were demarcated and adjudicated to protect them against future intrusions, particularly by La Rivera (vice-canton Carangas) and ayllu Cumujo (Sabaya). ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1911, no. 1 and 1917, no. 4.

⁸⁴ While the Uru population in all other cantons had “disappeared” by the entrance of the 20th century, the two ayllus of the Chipaya of the Huachacalla canton survived despite continuous attacks by the Aymaras of ayllu Collana. AJC, *Penales*, 1902, no. 16.

⁸⁵ The divided Uru population of Chipaya, as those living on the shores of the Poopó lake, is increasingly pressuring the government for stronger territorial rights in order to guarantee the continuity of their specific culture and lifestyle as one of the oldest population groups of the entire Andes and counter their historical discrimination. Over the centuries, land has become increasingly important for “the men of the water,” as hunting, gathering and fishing have become less and less viable. Their access to basic resources is progressively reducing because ‘new’ land appearing due to the shrinking of the lake is categorized as state property (instead of being attributed to the Uru population in compensation for their historical losses). Lara 2014.

7.2.2 A diversified strategy of collective struggle.

In the following, I will dissect three lines of communal land defence that were developed under the cacique-apoderado movement – one “within”, one “on” and one “out” of the imposed limits of the law. I will link the scarce source material on collective struggle and community spokespersons in Carangas to insights derived from the general literature on the caciques-apoderados.⁸⁶ My findings of communal action in the Carangas region during the 1900-1930 period are structured by what I discern as a threefold resistance strategy. Once again, the decision to close that period in 1930 is debatable and corresponds in the first place to a pragmatic decision in view of the time-consuming archive work and in the second place to the impact of various nation-wide changes in the course of the following decade.

Calling the law into play: in search for traces of the caciques-apoderados movement in Carangas .

Despite the setback produced through the Liberal victory and the decapitation of the *apoderado* movement, the indigenous leadership revived gradually and particularly in the 1910s, when concrete advances were made in re-uniting all communities in one struggle. By 1913, a network had been formed including 96 indigenous “caciques-apoderados”, recognized as such by the local communities they represented.⁸⁷ Their appellation refers to the adopted strategy of combined external-internal representation in which non-communitarian legal attorneys (*apoderados*) and the colonial authority of the *cacique* (despite the abolition of this function in 1825) were simultaneously involved (Rivera 1991, 607-8).

This multi-provincial and –departmental assortment of community leaders conjointly organized a legal and legislative strategy. The viability of their demands was based in the colonial land titles which the communities had obtained from the Spanish Crown and thus touched upon the system of checks and balances that regulated the state-community pact as imposed in colonial times. The decrees relating to the 1883 act were deployed as one of their most important weapons to defend communal land rights. Thanks to that law, ‘free’ communities could remain exempt from the survey operation

⁸⁶ This literature mainly focuses on the public action in the La Paz region, or the Cochabamba region. Rivera 1991; Soria Choque 1992; Condori and Ticona 1992; Ticona 2011; Choque and Mamani 2003; Choque 2005; Gotkowitz 2007; Choque and Quispe 2010.

⁸⁷ Among these leaders, 46 represented communities of the La Paz department, 20 of Oruro, 14 of Potosí and 16 of Cochabamba (Choque and Quisbert 2010, 27). Assembled under the leadership of Martín Vasquez, a comunario from Curahuara de Pacajes (La Paz department), several “indigenous congresses” were organized from 1914 on (Rivera 1991, 606 and 608).

and the cadastral tax system as the *composición* titles were recognized as equivalent to the land titles granted through the *Revisita General*. However, it was not enough to simply “have” these documents; they had to be authenticated and ratified in order to function as effective legal instruments. Thus, community leaders adopted the registration of *composición* titles, often indirectly via recuperated colonial and more recent documents, as one of their basic tasks.⁸⁸ This required preparation, starting with community leaders travelling to Sucre and sometimes even to Lima, on foot, often in company of transporters.⁸⁹ The following testimony clarifies how those documents were then brought into circulation:

“I copied for all: the original was only one, which was in hands of Santos Marka T’ula.⁹⁰ Not all caciques used originals, they simply used the copies, in order to get to know [the documents]. And some, who did not have [copies], limited themselves to the use of circulars. Other *alcaldes* came from all communities in order to obtain copies. He explained what the titles said and gave them only copies, which were dispatched by the *alcaldes* to the different *estancias*. The originals were handed to no one. That is just how it was.”⁹¹

The search for and composition of a legal file as complete as possible thus went hand in hand with a globalization of what had started with individual demands. As the network spread, it brought several isolated struggles together, comprising by 1919 “*the four hundred villages that compose the entire republic*.”⁹²

Also leaders from the western part of Oruro formed part of this movement, but nowhere do names appear of caciques-*apoderados* in Carangas.⁹³ However, the intensifying rivalry over land, discussed above, and the consequent rise in juridical procedures initiated by or against communities offers an indirect entry to the

⁸⁸ In the 1910s and particularly the 1920s, the ADRO demonstrates a remarkable increase in requests to protect community land, with a peak in 1924 (ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924). In 1927, the annual report of the Prefect even dedicated a special section to these requests (Calderón 1927, 15-6).

⁸⁹ Community leaders also performed rituals to protect and “purify” those documents (Rivera 1991, 638-9).

⁹⁰ Santos Marka T’ula was one of the most powerful *caciques-apoderados* of the early 20th century and leader of the 1921 rebellion in Jesús de Machaca (Condori and Ticona 1992).

⁹¹ Own translation, Placido Jacinto of the community of Junt’u, interviewed by THOA, cited and translated from Aymara in Rivera 1991, 621.

⁹² Own translation. Petition of the *caciques-apoderados* of 12 August 1919. ALP, EP, 1929, f. 33. Cited in Rivera 1991, 621-2.

⁹³ Among the known names, the most important *caciques-apoderados* were Santos Marka T’ula, Francisco Tancara, Faustino Llanqui, Mateo Alfaro, Francisco Imaña, Dionisio Paxsipati and Rufino Willka. Powerful *apoderados* without cacique status were Eduardo Leandro Nina Quispe and Prudencio F. Callisaya. No one of these leaders has a connection to the Carangas region. Rivera 1991, 608; Choque and Quisbert 2010, 28.

organization of communal representation in the province. On basis of the Property Rights books deposited at the Supreme Departmental Court of Oruro and the archives of the court in Corque, a long list of representatives appeared (see Appendix 11). Their intervention was in the first place triggered by the (re-)eruption of inter-ayllu land disputes. They were sent out to get the juridical evidence authenticated in order to turn the resolution of the conflict to the community's advantage. Interestingly, these juridical moves were also oriented towards the recuperation of their private estates in the valleys.⁹⁴ But apoderados were not only called in for strict land issues. Comunarios appointed apoderados to litigate against abusive mestizos, often state functionaries,⁹⁵ or to defend their claims against intolerable fiscal exactions, particularly the tax on alpaca wool.⁹⁶

Despite the silences and biases in the data on the presence and actions of community representatives in Carangas, the high interference of members of the local vecindario is undeniable. This is to large part explained by the legal restrictions to community representation. Moreover, despite the explicit critique towards the leaders of the late 19th century mobilization for having consorted with (corrupt) mestizo lawyers, the caciques-apoderado movement was equally dependent upon the input of legal experts in order to pursue their legal actions. However, in the case of Carangas, the ambiguous role of "vecino-comunarios" who had a clear personal stake in the regulation of communal land property, make it often hard to assess whether these attorneys defended individual or collective ayllu interests and if he (indeed, no she's) figured as an "external" lawyers or as contribuyente of the ayllu he represented. At the one hand, the particular attention for and allegations against manipulative vecino-apoderados by government representatives and the absence of clearly identified indigenous leaders in both archival and oral sources further reinforces the idea of a co-opted community

⁹⁴ Rivera also makes this link, commenting on petitions made in Oruro, yet not including the communities of Carangas (Rivera 1991, 633-4). As commented before (chapter 6.2), Orinoca and Andamarca as well as Totora persisted until the 1920s in their efforts to maintain control over their distant properties. The former communities appointed Pantaleón Arias to represent their rights over the lands in Santiago de Quitarge in the valleys of the Chuquisaca department. The latter sent representatives to several cities to obtain and assert the property documents regarding the Hacienda Chulla in the Valle Central of Cochabamba. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 35 and no. 47 respectively.

⁹⁵ An example is the appointment of Antonio Soto Vargas, vecino and school director in Corque, to represent the charges brought by the Corque comunarios before the Prefectura, the national government and "if necessary before the Legislative Chamber" against sub-Prefect coronel Juan Bautista Lazarte for abusive impositions upon the comunario population. AJC, *Civiles*, 1906, no. 2, f. 2-3 and Penales, 1907, loose papers.

⁹⁶ In 1905, the ayllus of Turco and Corque commissioned representatives to initiate a lawsuit to get the tax on alpaca wool eliminated, demanding that "the state would take into account our deplorable mendicancy to which the indigenous race of this Province is subjected because of the drought." AJC, *Civiles*, 1905, no. 3, f. 6.

representation. Their intervention as well as comunario rivalry might have contributed to the fact that no inter-ayllu merger of (collective) requests materialized (as in 1899); at least no explicit traces were found of a single Carangas leadership. At the other hand, this co-optation was backed by more complex motives and power relations than a dichotomous comunario-vecino relation.

Calling the law into question: A legislative line of attack.

Because of the gaps created by differences in juridical logics and the tricks and corruption of (non-indigenous) intermediaries, the administrative procedures are just one aspect of a more diversified resistance strategy. The creation and dissemination of legal evidence was thus more than a mere copy-paste operation, accommodating indigenous demands to the reigning legal framework. Rather, regulations and archival discoveries were consciously selected and interpreted in line with, and inscribed into, an alternative plural framework (Rivera 1991, 625; Platt 1982). This framework was founded in the colonial outlines of a state-community pact, shaped by a constant dialogue between an indigenous reading and the confines of “the official law” and oriented towards the creation of spaces for (self-)governance. As the continuation and negation of the “pact” became more and more a matter of local negotiation, the target of communal action came to lay with the vecinos and hacendados (Platt 1982, 145-7).

The principal claim of the indigenous leadership was the recuperation and recognition of the legitimacy of communal land boundaries and communal authorities which they had maintained since colonial times. In order to check the ongoing wave of land usurpations, the pre-*exvinculación* situation had to be restored (Rivera 1991, 620). Most concretely, they demanded the execution of a “general administrative demarcation” of community lands.⁹⁷ In 1919, several individual (inter-)ayllu, cantonal and -provincial demarcation petitions culminated in a *Revisita* petition by caciques-apoderados of the five departments before the Chamber of Deputies. However, their petition did not allude to the *Revisita General* announced in 1881, but to a general revision of communal property boundaries and their restoration to the pre-1881 and even pre-Melgarejo situation, before the very first community land sale. As Rivera has demonstrated, this request is important not only for concerning a conjoint supra-local initiative, and its diffusion to other sectors of society via the press, but also for explicitly addressing the national executive powers instead of the provincial ordinary jurisdiction.

⁹⁷ Other concrete demands were the implementation of the proclaimed elimination of the *postillonaje* (domestic service) and other coerced labour services and the abolition of the *contribución territorial* for *composición* communities (Rivera 1991, 612-3). While *postillonaje* was abolished for the taxpaying indigenous population, efforts to introduce the cadastral system intensified, entailing vital threats for community lands.

Rather than the resolution of a concrete technical-juridical problem, this collective demand aimed at the restoration of general state-indigenous relations.⁹⁸ At a lower level, the above discussed individual comunario or ayllu requests for property protection in fact pursued the same tactic and objective.⁹⁹

Although I did not find evidence of Carangas direct contribution to this demand, similar legislative petitions were launched in the Oruro department, aiming at enlarging the margin for communal autonomy. Thereto, the legal loopholes created by the non-intervention guarantees established in the 1883 law were strategically employed. This legislative line of attack puzzled the governmental authorities. In 1928, the prefect of Oruro very explicitly expressed his confusion, particularly triggered by Carangas' active involvement. He stated that while comunario resistance against the Revisita remained insuperable,

“nevertheless, in previous years those same comunarios have petitioned the Parliament to pronounce a special law that stipulates the prosecution of the revisita operations, above all in the province of Carangas, as elsewhere in the other altiplano departments.”¹⁰⁰

At the one hand, his confusion was roused by the contradictory attitude of the comunarios who previously had impeded any intervention of revisitadores and commanded the abolition of the imposed laws in order to return to “*the Incaic system of the communal property*” while also simultaneously demanding to respect the imposed legislation.¹⁰¹ At the other hand, he pointed to the risk that the effective replacement of

⁹⁸ Refusing to entrust the resolution of land disputes to the reigning jurisdictional apparatus, they demanded a legislative innovation to settle boundary conflicts. In doing so, the caciques-apoderados not only consciously circumvented the categorical counteraction of their communal interests by hacendado and other elite interference, but explicitly insisted on the need for a clear jurisdiction. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the caciques incessantly submitted the same demands to the Chamber of Deputies, regardless of its repeated rejection. As communal entities did not longer possess of collective representative power, the petition was considered as an individual demand and hence referred to the provincial courts as the indicated authority for the execution of land demarcations (Rivera 1991).

⁹⁹ In 1927, it was noted that more and more of these authentication requests were not formulated against an effective property attack, but often anticipated possible inroads, which made those requests however illegitimate because not corresponding to the jurisdiction of the provincial court functionaries. In a reaction to this high number of (often unlawful) procedures, the government issued two supreme resolutions (3 June 1912 and 8 January 1916) to regulate the intervention of administrative functionaries (Calderón 1927, 15-6).

¹⁰⁰ Own translation. González 1929, 211.

¹⁰¹ He refers to the “bloody events” of 20 and 25 years before (although he probably means 1893 and 1899 instead of 1903 and 1908) which had led to respectively the departure and the murder of the revisitador. The laws they sometimes repealed and other times supported included the 1874, 1881, 1883 and 1888 laws (González 1929, 211).

the head tax by a rental tax would subject the ex-comunarios to fraud and coercion by stronger landowners and hence facilitate their deprivation of land.¹⁰²

Part of the confusion lays in the collaboration with non-indigenous apoderados. The manipulations of external actors strengthened the indigenous leaders in their suspicion towards mestizo intervention but in some cases made them more receptive to some aspects of the *exvinculación* law. The “liberal” insistence on “absolute” property rights in the 1919 arguments (and similar demands) demonstrates that this interference indeed had its price and suggests an emerging consent with the 1874 law.¹⁰³ This is particularly observable in regions where commodifying pressures were strongest exposed and the *tributo* came to be perceived as a burden (Rivera 1991, 615-7). In contrast, in less exposed regions where the intermediary cacique level was still operative, such as Carangas and Norte de Potosí (Platt 1982), the underlying state-community pact remained the baseline of resistance. Distrust and opposition of fiscal change remained fierce, particularly against any attempt to introduce the cadastral system. After “innumerable” appeals and rebellious intimidations, the communities of Oruro even managed to extort the formal exemption from cadastral operations by strategically exploiting the vacuums in the law.¹⁰⁴

By the end of the 1920s, indigenous tactics and alliances had amplified and their demands clearly radicalized,

“The indigenous people of Toledo and part of the Carangas Province, incited by a certain José Tordoya, tried to collect funds to acquire a printing press which, under the leadership of the Workers’ Federation of this city, will be devoted to divulge ideas that in short consist of the “land devolution to the Indian”, “handing over the mines to the State”, “suppression of all taxes”.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² To ensure that the transfer from communal to individual property occurred without adverse mestizo intervention, a detailed register was needed in the first place. Second, each province needed a particular approach instead of imposing one uniform procedure and, third, extra legislative measures were required to bend indigenous insurgence into sympathy. González 1929, 211-2.

¹⁰³ The 1919 demand which was elaborated in collaboration with their *apoderado* Saavedra, a powerful lawyer who would become president in 1921-‘25. The argument was that the 1874 law would eliminate the indigenous *tributo*, but completely ignored its formal abolition of the community as such (Rivera 1991, 615).

¹⁰⁴ In 1927, the distribution of forms among the jilaqatas to collect all data regarding the name, proprietor, extension, boundaries, ayllu affiliation, canton etc of each (to-be-)exvinculated plots almost collapsed into a wide-spread rebellion as comunarios suspected a seizure and taxation of their land, labour and livestock (Calderón 1927, 74). With regard to the cadastre exemption obtained, the Prefect stressed that the communities were not explicitly excluded nor included in the relevant 1880 law, thus clearly pointing to a void in the law of which the communities knew to take advantage (ibid, 76).

¹⁰⁵ Own translation. Fajardo 1931, 44.

While these ideas clearly foreshadow the National Revolution of 1952, governmental powers were convinced that the snowballing legal and political communal initiatives could only have a trivial outcome. However, their insistence upon the established juridical system as the only viable way for the communities, indigenous leaders stressed that struggle was their only viable response towards that system (Rivera 1991, 639). In order to “floor” that system, they questioned who and what was included in the imposed legislation and under what conditions and, as discussed in the lines above, presented their own interpretation, implicitly alluding to an alternative, plural legal framework. Rivera suggests that the community leaders insisted on a gap between the “civilized” legislation (of the liberal regime) and their “own” legislation (of colonial times, which respects the state-community pact) (Rivera 1991). In so doing, community leaders forced the state to subject the land reform process to an intensive negotiation, pragmatically recurring to the existing laws to use them to their own advantage while consciously pushing for a redrawing of those laws. Yet, the pursuit of this strategy was something of walking a tightrope between conformability and insubordination to the law. It was a small step to the open denial those laws through revolt.

Calling the law to a halt: Rebellion.

In the aftermath of the Great Rebellion of 1899, the repressive reaction of the state paused the development of a strong united indigenous leadership. Yet, this did not quite convert the countryside into a place of peace and submission (Flores 1984). In 1910, the Prefect of Oruro reminded his superiors “*that the inhabitants of Carangas are traditionally inclined towards uprising.*”¹⁰⁶ Two years before, comunarios had set court of Corque on fire in a reaction to the accumulating lawsuits initiated against their “rebellious” anti-vecino acts in the context of the federal war.¹⁰⁷ However, rather than corresponding to an impulsive reaction, such revolts and reliance upon indigenous justice practices were generally embedded in a broader strategy to defend their land rights. Most local insurrections in the department occurred in hacienda regions, and were more and more restricted to that region as the obtained guarantees for communities kept them out of the scope of hacienda expansion.¹⁰⁸ In Carangas, violent eruptions were not so much

¹⁰⁶ Own translation. Morales 1910, 63.

¹⁰⁷ AJC, *Civiles*, 1909, no. 17. See also Pauwels (1983, 244), who dates the fire in 1904. However all documents at the archive up to 1909 are partially burnt and the files for 1908 and previous years are remarkably thin.

¹⁰⁸ See for prefectural reports on violent clashes among colonos and between colonos and comunarios (Arce 1924, 11). The single indication of a similar hacienda-related insurgency in Carangas was when comunarios of Llanquera destroyed an estate owned by an Oruro resident, after which she decided to cede part of her property to the comunarios to prevent worse. AJC, *Penales*, 1907, no.21.

triggered by usurping landlords as by the imminence of the Revisita. This becomes most visible in the rebellion of 1910 in Totora. That year, one of the community's caciques warned the provincial authorities that the comunarios of ayllu Tatasapana and Guaraguara were mobilizing and had, armed with clubs and blowing *pututus*, obliged the corregidor to demarcate and divide the lands of their neighbouring, competitor ayllu Aimarani.¹⁰⁹ But it concerned more than an isolated inter-ayllu issue.

“their rebellious attitude contaminated (sic) the entire *indiada* of Carangas with a bad example; as nowadays the leaders [gives 24 names] are crossing all villages of the Province collecting money under the name of *ramas* in order to resist the *revisita de tierras* and stirring up the indigenous population to a general uprising as they create consent that the Revisita will produce the distribution of lands, families and livestock among the whites.”¹¹⁰

The reason why this community leader reported his own people has to do with his personal friendship and spiritual kinship ties to several of those “whites”. His fear that this revolt constituted his sentence of death underscores how action and reaction towards land reform plans entangled with complex indigenous-nonindigenous networks. Such entanglements even became more complex in the course of the next decade as the rural-communal movement for land increasingly overlapped with political strife and urban-proletarian mobilization. Party politics came to constitute one of the main triggers for agitation, with elections converted into instances of dissidence and fraud, even in the distant province of Carangas.¹¹¹ Although slower emerging, the organization of labour unions nurtured a cross-fertilization of tactics, demands and discourse with the indigenous communities (Fajardo 1931, 44).¹¹² Strengthened by new

¹⁰⁹ As previously discussed, the ayllu of Totora were constantly involved in internal strife. AJC, Penales, 1910, no. 7.

¹¹⁰ The *casique cobrador* of the *parcialidad* Urinsaya of Totora informed the Prefect of Oruro about the mobilization, which originated in a “typical” plunder invasion during Carnival in the ayllu under his supervision. AJC, Penales, 1910, no. 7, f. 2-2v.

¹¹¹ Official correspondence from the local to the central levels of authority dedicated more attention to ideological quarrels and party loyalty. In 1906, the opposition candidate of the Liberals, Frederico Ballón, and his electoral agents were reported for rousing an indigenous insurrection in order to vitiate the elections. Some comunarios took advantage of the tense electoral situation to resist the payment of the *contribución territorial*, but the readiness of a police force prevented major turmoil and a Republican takeover (Sanjines 1906, 4). Two years later, the municipal elections were cancelled and postponed in the Carangas province due to electoral fraud in Corque (Ascarrunz 1909, 6, 16-7 and 103). See also Ibañez 1923, 2-4; Calderón 1927, 4 and 9.

¹¹² In the 1920s, when unionist strife intensified, Corque was used as a center of isolation and detention of union leaders (Smale 2010, 137). Smale describes the case of the transportation of arrested union leaders of the Salvadora Mining Company of Patiño in Uncía in the aftermath of what is remembered as Bolivia's first

alliances but confronted with a revived anti-community attack and a panicking state, the cacique-apoderados radicalized their activities and reoriented their strategy towards an enforcement of the colonial indigenous-state pact, averse from any compromise with the ongoing hacienda expansion (Rivera 1991, 609-10). In 1920-1921, their hope to restore the colonial pact eroded and the violent struggle was re-launched.

In the context of increasing mobilization, particularly among the Aymara population, at the national level and the Republicans' defiance of the Liberal government, an indigenous insurrection materialized in Curahuara on 21 July 1920, only one week after the Republican Party had taken over government. Spreading rumours about the imminent partition of livestock, Raimundo Marca and Leonardo Vilca, the principal initiators of the uprising, arrived from La Paz and Oruro with the order that

“there had to be a slaughter of the vecinos; there was an order of the Authority of La Paz to kill the alonsistas and those who did not participate risked the same fate as well as their livestock.”¹¹³

Particularly Juan Eloy Altamirano, corregidor of the canton and of liberal stamp, was targeted, nor were his comunario godchildren to be informed about the order, while the lives of his (republican) vecino enemies had to be spared.¹¹⁴ The insurgents, led by one of the “spared” vecinos, took the hills around the village, blowing horns and burning bonfires. They held an indigenous “parliament” and gathered with over 200 insurgents from Totora and Callapa (Pacajes province) to then descend and force the terrorized vecinos out of the village. However, the insurrection failed as the corregidor was advised in time and managed to persuade the divided protestors with promises of guarantees and a reward as well as through military intervention. Only three days later, a similar insurrection took place in Totora although the apoderado of the comunarios denied the assembling and armament of the indigenous population and their aligning with the republicans nor liberals despite the cheering by pro-republican comunarios who had arrived from another ayllu.¹¹⁵

The next year, rural unrest reached a climax in the anti-vecino attack of March 12 and the indigenous slaughter on 14 March in Jesús de Machaca, one of the few

massacre of industrial workers in 1923 (see also Rivera 1987, 143-58). The government thought of using Corque as a center for long-term detention of union leaders.

¹¹³ This is what one comunario of Curahuara overheard. *AJC*, Penales, 1920, no. 785.

¹¹⁴ Rogelio Imaña, Gerardo Campos and Paulino Valdéz were to be spared. The latter led the insurgents together with a jilaqata while the first betrayed his plans to the corregidor. One comunario declared to have been protected by his kinship ties to several vecinos and equally protected their houses. *AJC*, Penales, 1920, no. 785.

¹¹⁵ *AJC*, Penales, 1920, Sin no.

communities in La Paz that maintained its “free” status up to the 1953 agrarian reform (Choque and Ticona 1996; see also Choque 2008). Similar to the events of the year before in Carangas, insurgency was triggered by the constant abuses by the mestizo population, particularly the corregidor, and played out on the cleavage between liberal and republican affiliation with some ayllus explicitly deciding not to participate. In contrast to the turmoil in Curahuara and Totora, the rebellion, involving over 4000 mobilized comunarios, effectively subjected the corregidor and other despised vecinos to communitarian justice, answered by brutal suppression. As insurgency spread to other provinces and departments, the rebellion became also a national political issue.

Despite a law in 1925 which prohibited the sale of community land (“Ley de 8 de enero de 1925”; Platt 1982, 144), the government’s reaction to this “*incurable maltreatment: the revolutionary mania, which detains the triumphal advance of our institutions*”¹¹⁶ was in severing its discourse, denying the comunarios’ demand for land recovery,¹¹⁷ increased militarization and litigation against the caciques-apoderados.¹¹⁸ By 1926, the government prohibited all indigenous gatherings in order to prevent the bloody inter-indigenous clashes that keep them from their agricultural work.¹¹⁹ However, the next year, another major revolt occurred in Chayanta in the Potosí department (Platt 1982, chapter 4; Hylton 2003). Meanwhile in Carangas, community lands were threatened with invasion by the indigenous population of Toledo and it was reported that comunarios from various cantons in Carangas as well as in Poopó were preparing an insurrection against the cadastral operation which was however prevented through armed force (Calderón 1927, 12-3). Struggles would continue until the constitution of 1938 which restored the legitimacy of the corporative character of the indigenous communities.¹²⁰ As with previous achievements, this gave a boost to the communal struggle for secure collective land rights and materialized, particularly in the

¹¹⁶ Own translation. Ibañez 1923, 3.

¹¹⁷ “As a result of the revolution of July 12th, the indigenous population of the altiplano believed that they would be return them their lands; but I do not understand on what this belief is found, even more if the indigenous population of the altiplano have all their lands and still their large cultivation estates.” Own translation, Convención Nacional, 1921, vol. III, 25-IV-1921, fs. 31-50, cited in Rivera 1991, 647-8.

¹¹⁸ The attacked rural elites declared that the caciques-apoderados who led the revolts did not belong to the indigenous “race” and rather exploited their subjects in order to obtain and certify, but also falsify, colonial documents from Sucre, presenting themselves as direct (hence illegitimate) community representatives before the Supreme Court and instigating rebellion (Rivera 1991, 646-7).

¹¹⁹ Decree issued on 23 November 1926 (Calderón 1927, 14).

¹²⁰ “The State recognizes and guarantees the legal existence of the indigenous communities.” Own translation, article 165 of the political constitution of Bolivia of October 30, 1938, Busch 1938 in Lexivox. See also Choque and Ticona 2010, 29.

post-Chaco context, in new forms of collaboration with national politicians, culminating in the 1953 Agrarian Reform (Rivera 1991, 642; Gotkowitz 2007).

7.3 The ambiguity of the vecinos.

Platt indicates the 1920 rebellions as a sign that the mestizos came to side with the “national” elites, by incorporating into the cadastre, hence the mestizo-indigenous anti-Revisita resistance was broken (Platt 1982, 145-7). However, whereas local rural elites such as corregidores, hacendados, etc. are generally identified as the spearhead of the anti-community attacks, this counts foremost when and where state modernization, market development and railways reach the rural districts (Medinaceli 1987, cited in Rivera 1991, 644). While in Carangas, local insurrection also had a clear anti-vecino agenda, an important part of the vecino population somehow “dissolve” in that dichotomous picture as they incorporated into the padrones, that is, as contribuyente. Bacarreza hinted at this increasing overlap by referring to the “disappearance” of the vecinos as they reversed into comunarios

However, as a class of “vecino-comunarios,” rather than a hacendado class developed, the insecurity caused by the Exvinculación law, even without being implemented, fostered the consolidation of local elite groups as well (Ayllu Sartañani 1992, 85). While vecino-comunarios gave more backing to the contribuyente reservoir supporting the ayllu’s fiscal-legal bonds to the departmental treasury, the political organization of rural life came more strongly in mestizo hands. Still, in the eyes of the state, the vecinos were identified as the culprit of indigenous rebellion and more particularly the impasse in the land reform process. In the following, the interference of the vecinos in the discussed resistance to the land reform, the interests behind their participation and the outcome of their immersion will be analysed and illustrated.

7.3.1 “*This new kind of tinterillos, apoderados and consejeros.*” Sights were turned to the culprits.

When Bacarreza in 1910 drew attention to the prevalence of incursions between neighbouring communities in the province, he particularly warned for the exploitation of these conflicts by *abogados tinterillos* or “crooked” lawyers (Bacarreza 1910, in Pauwels 2006, 373). Some ten years later, the Sub-Prefect of Carangas repeated how the juridical framework was manipulated by this “*race of loafers who innocently pretend to occult themselves under the name of defenders or protectors*” (Lima 1921, 110-2). Instead of

attempting to solve the infinite series of intra-community disputes, Lima explained, vecinos had found an interest in (manipulating) the numerous land disputes in the province. As no authority in de province ever gave attention to these –mostly minor– disputes, their initially easy and peaceful resolution has become ever more improbable and rather fostered the escalation of conflicts and violence.

“The violations successively provoked between the litigating indigenous groups, whose actions seem unexpected and unforeseen, have been prepared in advance with great care by a new species of *tinterillos* [pen-pushers], *apoderados* [attorneys] and *consejeros* [counselors] that swarm in the villages of Carangas, instigating (sic) another series of criminal acts.”¹²¹

There are few details as to why and how indigenous communities lend their support to provincials of influence, but only the fact that such relations existed and that these politicians at times even served as a community's spokesperson redraws the classic image of a State-building process free from indigenous participation (Irurozqui 1999, 717). Contrary to the general discourse of national elites, the intervention of vecino-apoderados did not simply stem from the passive subjugation of vulnerable comunarios to the mestizo search for short-term gains. At the one hand, the caciques-apoderados movement disposed of its own writers with enough knowledge of Spanish and the methods of editing formal petitions (Condori and Ticona 1992). At the other hand, the communities gradually got the vecinos “at their side”. While indigenous self-government continued to be thwarted by obstacles of language and literacy of which “tinterillos” etc. knew to take advantage and by the firm persistence of inter-ethnic segregation and asymmetrical power relations, the consistence, autonomy and strategic coordination of indigenous resistant agency cannot be played down to a superficial understanding of mestizo-indigenous interactions (Platt 1987, 314).

Local vecinos not only intervened as legal advisors and spokespersons in function of purely mestizo interests, but actively contributed to anti-Revisita resistance.¹²² At the one hand, there were the apoderados with no ‘strings attached’ to indigenous claims and even upholding a corrupt and exploitative reputation, who base their representation on their powerful position and connections to the executive and judicial

¹²¹ He continues that these protracted litigations “*favour in the first place all these unqualified lawyers for its slow development, and also favour the qualified lawyers in the successive courts on a larger scale, while harmful and disastrous only for the fighting indigenous communities, whose individual and collective economy will suffer more intensively the longer the original litigation and the more numerous the criminal ramifications that are being detached, succeeded and attached.*” Own translation. Lima 1921, 111-2.

¹²² The list of apoderados (Appendix 11) constitutes one big tangle of powerful and competing vecino families. However, for many apoderados we dispose of insufficient data to speculate on, let alone reconstruct, their background and motives.

powers.¹²³ In order to register communal property documents, communities called upon mestizo lawyers to whom they had no particular or intimate bond but who could give them access to court.¹²⁴ At the other hand, the relation of many apoderados with the comunarios they represented transcended the ‘norm’ that regulated vecino-comunario/mestizo-indigenous bonds. Some were even very explicitly identified as “protectors” (*defensores*) of the indigenous population.¹²⁵ Vecino-apoderado alignment with the communities was thus backed by diverse motives and tactics in which blunt domination and divide and rule manipulations intertwined with more subtle dependency bonds. This brought them in an ambiguous position that explains how these people came to defend the very people from whose submission and resources they lived.

The tighter their integration in communal networks, the more beneficial became apoderado mediation and the more controversial their position towards the central state. Apart from short-term profits, vecinos were motivated to represent a communal cause by their political and economic stake in local claims due to their own administrative and commercial activities.¹²⁶ In a growing number of cases, this communal cause was internalized as very sayañeros themselves. Some of these families inverted their energy in enlarging and securing their own land rights without assuming

¹²³ A clear example is Pantaleón Arias, citizen based in the city of Oruro and functioning as Intendente in Carangas, who was repeatedly accused by comunarios for abuses yet very powerful and hence appointed by several communities to defend their land rights. Orinoca and Andamarca, for instance, entrusted the recuperation of their estate in Santiago de Quitarge to him and Turco wanted him to register its *composición* titles. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1922, no. 35; 1929, no. 13-15. See also AJC, Penales, 1920, no. 816. Also Casiano Montealegre and his son Zenobio, citizens and private landowners residing in different cantons, acted as apoderado of several communities without displaying close attachment to the comunarios’ world. AJC, *Civiles*, 1914, no. 31; 1916, no. 31.

¹²⁴ Victor Manuel Bariantos and Emilio Zuñiga are examples of lawyers who were both (separately) approached by several ayllus (in Totorá, Turco, Sabaya, Choquecota, Andamarca, Corque, Huailamarca and Chuquichambi) to authenticate and register the adjudication of individual sayañas or *composición* titles in the Property Rights office in the late 1920s. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1925, no. 20; 1926, no. 2, 20, 22; 1927, no. 21; 1929, no. 16, 41-43, 47-49, 54-55; 1930, no. 4, 7b, 7c, 11-16, 17c, 18.

¹²⁵ Examples are Daniel Barriga, who “defended” ayllu Sacari (Sabaya) in 1903 against ayllu Canasa, “protected” by Juan de la Cruz Arias. More remarkable is Eloy Altamirano, who in 1920 would become the target of an indigenous revolt as corregidor of Curahuara, but in 1913 was indicated and auto-identified as “apoderado of the Indians.” ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1903, no. 6; AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 3; *Civiles*, 1909, no. 15 and 1910, no. 10.

¹²⁶ Vecinos occupying an administrative function could increase (or at least feign) the legitimacy of their local power base when being appointed as apoderado; a form of clientelism that is observed or was attributed to several political officers. Commercial motives were also a reason to take up an apoderado function, as did merchant Ramon Funez, who probably had particular interests in the tambo of Cosapa when representing the communal land property claims of the comunarios of Cosapa. AJC, *Civiles*, 1907, no. 23 and 1910, no. 27.

an active apoderado role, as was the case with the Fernández in Sabaya,¹²⁷ the Vargas in Corque¹²⁸ or the Ortega's in Turco (Pauwels 1983, 217). But several took up a stronger commitment in representing the comunarios of the canton where they resided and where they were registered as *contribuyentes* themselves. In chapter 6, the case of Juan Lascano was already discussed.¹²⁹ Another typical case is Pedro Flores, a merchant, proprietor and resident of the city of Oruro who executed the office of corregidor in Sabaya, where he simultaneously was registered as originario in ayllu Sacari.¹³⁰ Similarly, in ayllu Tũaña, Andres Portillo, Juan de la Cruz Quispe and Toribio Flores were known as merchants pertaining to the village elite yet also registered as comunarios.¹³¹ All three were involved in communal actions, as apoderado for their community and even as rebellion leaders.¹³² Other examples are the Rojas in Sabaya,¹³³ the Rocha family

¹²⁷ They were merchants, sayañeros and powerful residents in Sabaya, but apart from Manuel Felix, the members of this family do not seem to take an active apoderado role. Rather, they focused on their own personal commercial and estate interests through wills, transfers, dispossession, etc. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1913, no. 1, 2; 1914, no. 4; 1915, no. 2, 1916, no. 10, 1917, no. 11, 1924, no. 11, 1928, no. 19, 1929, no. 16, 1930, no. 29. See also AJC, 1875, no. 1464; *Civiles*, 1914, no. 2.

¹²⁸ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 1; AJC, Penales, 1900 no. 3; 1906, no. 10 and 33; *Civiles*, 1912 no. 2; 1913, no. 2; 1914, no. 13; 1916, no. 28.

¹²⁹ Lascano was again appointed as apoderado in 1918, but this time restricted to the separate ayllus of Cosapa, Andamarca and Huacillamarca. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1918, no. 10-12.

¹³⁰ His name appears as apoderado of his community in the litigation over their boundaries with other ayllus, at times coinciding with departmental and international divides. To prevent confusion, he is not the same Pedro Flores who was assassinated in the 1899 by Turco insurgents. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1909, no. 2 and 3-4; 1911, no. 1 and 6; 1918, no. 4. See also AJC, Penales, 1904, no. 4.

¹³¹ Portillo even obtained the post of corregidor around 1915. AJC, Penales, 1905, no. 14. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1915, no. 2 and 1916, no. 10.

¹³² The name of Quispe had already appeared in 1898, together with Lascano as apoderado general in an appeal for Revisita exemption. After the violent clashes of 1899 and after an umpteenth inter-ayllu clash, Quispe defended Tũaña's rights to compensation from Turco and from ayllu Collana to restore the mutual relationship. In 1926, both Portillo and Flores were, separately, appointed to procure colonial property documents; the former in name of Huachacalla and the latter as representative of Sabaya and Huachacalla. AJHO, 210-1, 1899, no. 67, "Repartición de tierras. Provincia Carangas. Pueblo de Tatora." fs. 20-20v. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1903, no. 7; 1906, no. 4; 1914, no. 2 and 3; 1926, no. 18, 19, 27 and 30. AJC, Penales, 1907, no. 6.

¹³³ Facundo Rojas represented ayllu Cumujo and ayllu Sacari in the defense of their land property, Manuel Rojas was apoderado of comunarios in Pisiga (ayllu Cumujo) and Nicario Rojas was appointed as one of Sabaya's apoderados regarding the revision of community boundaries. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1909, no. 7; 1916, no. 8 and 9; 1917, no. 4; 1928, no. 6. See also AJC, *Civiles*, 1914, no. 31. This family was registered in the 19th century padrones, in ayllus Sacari and Cumujo. ANB, Rv, 229. "Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.", 1877, fs. 147-9.

in Huacachacalla,¹³⁴ and the López¹³⁵ in Turco. The case of the Condori's in Huachacalla¹³⁶ -clearly a native name- points to the mixed Spanish and cacique descent.

Vecino co-optation of local struggles was motivated by the combination of a political-economic status as vecino as their social-fiscal status as comunario. Interestingly, many of the vecinos who acted as apoderado or even as rebellion leaders in the first decades of the 20th century tapped into the 1899 events, in which strong intra- and inter-ethnic alliances and rivalries were rooted.¹³⁷ As rivalry and assault were rife among the mestizo population, inter-family feuds constituted an important factor in their 'complicity' with indigenous mobilization.¹³⁸ At the other hand, local elite groups handily made use of inter-ayllu struggles. While using the apoderado status to consolidate and legitimize their own power base, vecinos accused rivals upholding that status of refutable clientelism.¹³⁹ This involvement in community affairs and the sour inter-vecino relations redraws the image of clear-cut segregation. In that sense, the case of the apoderados adds to the argument that vecino-comunario relations were much more

¹³⁴ Zacarias Rocha was apoderado of ayllu Mitma after intrusion by ayllu Tunca in 1892. The family themselves also became subject to land usurpation in the 1910s. In the 1877 Revisita, only three Rocha's, including Zacarias, were registered as tributarios (ayllu Parco). ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 14 and 1928, 3-5. ANB, Rv, 229. "Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.", 1877, fs. 62v-63v.

¹³⁵ See also references in 4.3, 6.1, 6.3 and in this chapter.

¹³⁶ The family was involved in a land sale in 1898 and later, Domingo Condori was apoderado of ayllu Camacha. The Condori's appear in the 1877 Revisita in ayllus Collana, Capi and Camacha of Huachacalla. AJC, 1898, no. 2379; ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1924, no. 4. ANB, Rv, 229. "Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.", 1877, fs. 133v-4, 137v, 139v-40.

¹³⁷ Many vecino-apoderados were directly affected by the events of the Great Rebellion, which is again illustrated by Portillo, Quispe and Flores' apoderado role. Andres Portillo and Juan de Dios Cruz Quispe were main actors in the 1899 conflict between Huachacalla and Turco, where they clashed with Toribio Flores, who led the Turco insurgents in 1899 against the 'alonsos' of Huachacalla. Portillo and Quispe accused Toribio Flores as responsible for the assassination of Pedro Flores and clashed with him in other inter-community encounters. AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 3; 1904, no. 11 and 1905, no. 14. See also ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1906 and 1910. Other examples are Pantaleón Arias, whose brother was murdered by insurgent comunarios (AJC, 1900, no. 2434) and Esteban Vargas, who since 1899 lived at odds with the indigenous population of Carangas whereas in 1898 he still fiercely supported the communities' claims (see 6.4). This change of hearts probably has to do with the assault on the properties and lives of other Vargas during the rebellion. AJC, Penales, 1900, no. 3; 1906, no. 10 and 33.

¹³⁸ The case of Quispe, Portillo and Flores is exemplary. Portillo and Quispe lived at odds with Flores; a sustained rivalry that can be traced back to the 1899 clash between "alonsos" and "pandos" in Huachacalla and was rooted in the contested property rights over terrains in Huachacalla. AJC, Penales, 1903, no. 3; 1904, no. 11 and 1905, no. 14. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1905, no. 14; 1907, no. 6.

¹³⁹ That indigenous mobilization served inter-vecino rivalry is demonstrated in the dispute between Juan Eloy Altamirano, alpaca wool trader in Curahuara, and Ricardo Montalvo, at that time corregidor of Curahuara, who would have instructed a group of comunarios to attack the former. Both accused each other of aggressing the comunarios in order to extort indigenous support for their representative power. AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 3.

complex and interwoven with longer histories of resistance and intimate (kinship) ties. This is also illustrated by the testimony of Enrique Rafael, who as cacique of Totora speaks from a non-vecino, usually omitted perspective. It was because of his *compadrazgo* and friendship bonds with some “whites” of the village that the authorities were informed about an imminent indigenous anti-Revisita and anti-white uprising in his community.¹⁴⁰ This demonstrates that mestizo-indigenous entanglements were much more durable yet ambiguous than provisional *apoderado* nomination.

7.3.2 “We are from Indian tributary lineage.” The “humbling” of the vecinos.

As can be attested for many powerful vecino families, the management of a double identity was no exception among Carangas’ villages (4.3). Powerful and segregated, the vecinos remained nonetheless a marginal group unable to compete with the strong community organization. As an effect, they gradually adopted the community membership themselves. This transformation stems from a long trajectory shaped by the combination of legal and illegal strategies gain and expand one’s access to communal resources, including land.

The most sincere and personal way to integrate in the commoners’ world was through marriage, to which Bacarreza alluded, but also the forging of symbolic kinship ties was beneficial in the accumulation of wealth at the expense of the community. As *compadre* (godfather), vecinos established intimate contacts with the comunario population, which at times was rewarded by the appointment *albacea* (executor) and hence by a privileged access to their inheritance, which may include *sayañas*.¹⁴¹ A more formal method was to acquire a *sayaña* by replacing retired or deceased contributors,¹⁴² to convert alienable land into *sayaña* land,¹⁴³ or –although strictly

¹⁴⁰ His ‘sabotage’ probably influenced the later conflict between his ayllu and one of the rebelling ayllus. AJC, Penales, 1910, no. 7; Civiles, 1916, no. 31. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1911, no. 2; 1913, no. 3 and 1925, no. 9.

¹⁴¹ Luis Lujan and his wife Petrona Delgado, for example, acted as *compadres* of a poor pastoralist widow who possessed just a couple of animals. When she dies, her possessions are transferred to her spiritual parents who she had appointed as her unique *albaceas* and heirs. AJC, 1893, no. 2240.

¹⁴² Belisario Ampuero was a citizen residing in Totora with *sayaña* rights in ayllu Sapana and had acted as *apoderado* of Totora in the sale of their estate in Pisaqueri. In a dispute between two comunarios over a *sayaña*, Ampuero claimed the land as his property which he had obtained in 1913 through the voluntary transfer by a comunario whom he from then on replaced as contributor. From then on, Ampuero started paying the territorial contribution but there rose protest against his rights over those lands. AJC, *Penales*, 1906,

illegal- to simply purchase the *sayaña*.¹⁴⁴ However, it was not always clear whether these transfers involved an effective monetary sale transaction and whether communal governance and fiscal duties over the concerned resources were respected.¹⁴⁵ Despite this confusion, *vecinos* were certainly not too embarrassed to manipulate their access to the juridical and administrative system in order to put their relationships with the *comunarios* to work more effectively, and in so doing managed to circumvent communitarian obstacles.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, the emergence of a *vecino-comunario* class cannot be told without a sizeable amount of fraud, authority abuse and blatant usurpation.¹⁴⁷

Although there is little evidence of the *apoderado* role assumed by the previously presented López family, their history is a good illustration of how several “conversion

no. 2, fs. 8-9v; *Civiles*, 1903, no. 1; 1915, no. 25; 1916, no. 35. A similar case happened in Totorá between the *comunario* Fermín Mamani and the *vecino* Avelino Campos, when the latter replaced the former as absolute owner of his *sayaña*, hence starting to pay *contribución*. *AJC, Civiles*, 1916, no. 24. Interestingly, both Ampuero and Campos never use the denomination “contribuyente”, “indígena” or “originario” as other ‘*vecino-comunarios*’ did.

¹⁴³ In Sabaya, three merchants ceded their private village lands to the community and petitioned their adjudication as community land. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1913, no. 1 and 2; 1928, no. 19.

¹⁴⁴ Whereas *sayañas* were not marketable, several *vecinos*, such as the members of the Canaviri family in Chuquichambi, effectively purchased *sayaña* lands. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 57 and 1930, no. 6 and 7b.

¹⁴⁵ An indication is Eulogio Valdéz’ relation to his claimed *sayaña*. Valdéz was a merchant from Huachacalla who acquired a piece of community land after winning a lawsuit against a fellow villager. The land had a value of 502 bs, which may correspond to a due payment of the defendant. However, later he was accused of having appropriated *sayaña* land on basis of his friendship with the *corregidor* and without paying taxes for any *sayaña*. *AJC, Penales*, 1906, no. 14 and ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1908, no. 1 and no. 26. Also Victoriano Ala claimed to be *contribuyente* (ayllu Sullcavi, Corque) but was nevertheless accused of seizing community land without paying the head tax or delivering the due services of every *contribuyente*. *AJC, Civiles*, 1910, no. 2. See also ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1909, no. 5.

¹⁴⁶ According to the *comunarios* of Corque, Belisario Bernal belonged to “the white race” and hence never possessed a single inch of community land. However, when accused having seized an *agregado*’s *sayaña* under pretext of acting under orders of the authorities of Corque, the judge eventually absolved Bernal. A couple of years later, the *comunarios* of one of Corque’s ayllu even appointed him as *apoderado* to defend their territorial rights against ayllu Cupiaza. *AJC, Civiles*, 1910, no. 39 and 1914, no. 9.

¹⁴⁷ Such accusations were also flying among the *vecinos* themselves. An earlier incident occurred in 1873 between Manuel Santiago Ortega, a miner active in La Rivera, and Manuel Viza, representative of Todos Santos. The latter community had accused Ortega of usurping community lands to which he responded by condemning Viza of expanding his immense lands at the border with Peru. Viza might have rightly accessed these lands, as his name appears in the *padrón* of 1871, paying an annual head tax of 7 pesos, but interestingly, Viza clearly pertained to the mestizo merchant class and was registered as citizen, which were probably important factors in obtaining his large land base. Ortega’s strategy of stressing Viza’s indigenous status to undermine his position is turned around by Viza, stressing the fact that Ortega cultivates community lands for which he does not pay *tributo*. *AJC*, 1873, no. 1293. ANB, *Rv*, 228. “Matricula y Comprobantes de la Provincia de Carangas.”, 1871, f. 165.

mechanisms” were brought into play and the repercussions they had over the longer term. In the course of the studied period, this powerful clan of vecinos became in fully integrated as comunarios of ayllu Collana in Turco. Noteworthy to mention, this integration coincides with the consolidation of their political and economic power, which was a very violent process of both inter-vecino rivalry as vecino-comunario exploitation, as discussed in chapter 4.3. The trajectory of the López was certainly not an isolated phenomenon in the region, but probably the most documentable case for one single family.

Their comunario roots must be traced back to their first claims over community land. By the beginning of the 19th century, the López possessed grazing lands called “Pampa López” on the border between Turco and Sabaya. However, despite several manoeuvres, Juan Crystósomo, first member of the family to settle in Turco, never get hold of formal property rights over those lands.¹⁴⁸ In contrast, his son Juan López managed to obtain legitimate access to sayaña lands in ayllu Collana by the middle of the century, although the exact procedure of his inclusion remains unclear.¹⁴⁹ Over the following decades, Juan’s sons were included into the originario class of the same ayllu as well, but in different ways. Being registered as próximo, Gregorio only had to wait until he turned 18 and his father reached the age of *reservado* to then automatically acquire the status of *contribuyente originario*.¹⁵⁰ Juan de la Cruz, however, appears separately in the list of originarios for being an illegitimate child.¹⁵¹ As “Spanish, adoptive son of Juan López and Juana Iquiqi” he had to gain sayaña access by his own means, which he probably did via the marriage with his wife Dominga Canqui, a mestiza descendent of a colonial cacique family and hence usufructing community lands.¹⁵² Their younger brother Guillermo was only included by the last Revisita effectuated in Carangas, in 1877, but both he and Gregorio were surprisingly enlisted in ayllu Sullca-salli, also in Turco, while their father and illegitimate brother remained registered in Collana.¹⁵³

Once included in the Revisita, both brothers directed their efforts to the expansion of their land base. In 1867, Gregorio requested the adjudication of vacant sayaña land

¹⁴⁸ AJC, Legajo 1 (1679-1796), 1787-1835, no. 144, cited by Pauwels 1983, 212-3.

¹⁴⁹ In the *padrones* of 1838, the family is still excluded from the Revisita but by 1852, Juan López and his wife Juana Iquisi appear as *originarios con tierras* in ayllu Collana. ABMO, no. 391, *Padron general de contribuyentes de la provincia de Carangas*, 1838 and no. 426, *Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas*, 1852, f. 136v.

¹⁵⁰ ANB, Rv, 225. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1860, no. 226, f. 125v. and 1864, no.227, f. 128v.

¹⁵¹ ANB, Rv, 225. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1860, no. 226, f. 126.

¹⁵² AJC, 1886, no. 1920. See also Pauwels 1983, 223.

¹⁵³ ANB, Rv, 226. “Matricula de la Provincia de Carangas.” 1864, f. 117v, 123v and 124v.

“because my parents belong to the contribuyente caste I find myself registered as originario in the mentioned ayllu of Collana; and as up to now I do not possess a small plot of land for farming or the grazing of my few livestock.”¹⁵⁴

One year later, both Gregorio and Juan de la Cruz petitioned the sub-Prefect once more for vacant land in order to enable them to pay the annual head tax.¹⁵⁵ The remarkable thing is that Juan de la Cruz at that time executed the office of corregidor in Turco.¹⁵⁶ It was exactly this capacity to switch between both spheres according to the opportunities of the moment that was their most vital asset in maintaining and consolidating their wealth and legitimacy. Particularly Gregorio López resulted quite skilled in that sense, presenting himself before the state as “*first class taxpayer*” [*originario*] when defending his own acquired sayañas,¹⁵⁷ and as “citizen” when defending his commercial¹⁵⁸ or executor¹⁵⁹ interests. However, while Gregorio apparently managed to combine these identities without too much protest –except from the usual slander among vecinos– his brother Celestino’s claims over sayaña land in ayllu Jila Pumiri (Turco) did rouse vehement comunario opposition. In response to the comunarios’ disapproval of his “contribuyentización”, he objected that

“me and my brothers, we are from indigenous tributary lineage, the proof is that my very own brothers pay the indigenous tribute and me too I have paid already two years.”¹⁶⁰

Despite his protest, he was expelled from the sayaña and the ayllu because

“as his roots do not belong to the indigenous and tributary race nor is he registered in any [taxpayers-] list of our canton, he has no right nor option to the repartimiento terrains [or to] become proprietor for being strong and brother of the corregidor.”¹⁶¹

Celestino was certainly not the only vecino facing similar objections. It demonstrates that the vecinos, incarnation of the exploitation of the free indigenous communities and

¹⁵⁴ AJC, 1867, no. 993, “Documentos de posesión de la sayaña de Guaño Oco pertenecientes al indígena Gregorio Lopez.”

¹⁵⁵ AJC, 1868, no. 1026 and no. 1042.

¹⁵⁶ AJC, 1868, no. 1042.

¹⁵⁷ AJC, 1870, no. 1139.

¹⁵⁸ AJC, 1871, no. 1201.

¹⁵⁹ AJC, 1871, no. 1224.

¹⁶⁰ AJC, 1887, no. 1996.

¹⁶¹ AJC, 1888, no. 2055. That year, his brother Guillermo López was corregidor in Turco (Pauwels 1983, 224).

simultaneously members of that same community, found themselves in a very paradoxical condition. Efforts to access a wider fan of economic resources had to be supported by an extension of their social networks into the community sphere which forced them to constantly and attentively move between two “worlds”. Constrained in this condition of negotiated interdependence with the comunarios, their overtures towards the community gave way to what Pauwels terms a process of “indianization” (Pauwels 1983, 213). Bacarreza seems to support this thesis by observing that

“the mestizo (...) accommodates to his [the indigenous] social environment in that he, systematically, takes care of eliminating the distinct factors of his race or to assimilate to his narrow and egoistic habits.”¹⁶²

In effect, the process of “contribuyentización” reinforced the disappearance of the vecinos, which had started with the abandonment of the mines in late colonial times. As a result, this produced a decline in the registration of white-mestizos and “urban” people “without land”, which was particularly noted by the start of the 20th century, while the number of “civilians” remained high and indigenous population numbers rose, pointing to a small but important overlap (see 4.3). As several functionaries in previous years had already hinted at (see chapter 6), this overlap had implications for the (non-)advance of the exvinculación process. To the extent that community lands were added to their fortune, whether through legal channels or not, the execution of the *Revisita General* became an undesirable intrusion of their interests.

While their formal registration as contribuyente did not impede the preservation of their privileges, this consequential conflict of interests fostered the full vecino integration in the community. Their intrusions and alliances demonstrate their willingness to abandon their (self-)assumed racial superiority. Later, the comunarios would recall that “*the vecinos have swallowed their pride*”.¹⁶³ In a sense, the imbrication of the vecinos with the community mitigated the segregation between those two “worlds” and consequently impeded the outbreak of a violent conflict as occurred in the hacienda regions in anticipation to and during the declaration of the Agrarian Reform. While the vecinos played an equivalent role to the hacendados, their strategic response to the local land question did not result in their expulsion but in their “fusion” with the community. As the remaining vecino families converted into an integral part of the

¹⁶² Own translation. Bacarreza 1910, cited in Pauwels 2006, 373.

¹⁶³ Testimony of a comunario in Turco during a workshop with the Third Age Association of Turco. Turco, 23.11.2008.

community,¹⁶⁴ a cycle of elite formation initiated decades before came to a close, allowing room for new emerging elites, “*el nuevo vecindario*”.¹⁶⁵

In the eyes of the central state, this gradual absorption by the Aymara comunarios, which they termed as assimilation, undermined the function the vecinos had been attributed as guardians of “modernity” and pacifiers indigenous insurgency. In the official discourse, the *vecinos* came to be perceived as the very cause of regional backwardness and communal insubordination – read: their excessive extortion and the way in which they “disappeared” hypothecated the prospects for national incorporation of the “savage” Indians (Mendieta 2010, 240-256).

7.4 Assimilating “barbaric” indigenous, circumventing “idle” vecinos.

While the vecinos upheld an evident monopoly at the provincial lever, they never came to fulfil the “assimilating” role attributed to them by the republican state. On the contrary, their interests gradually interwove with those of the community. The state’s inability to get a grip on this ambiguous local vecino-comunario interaction led to a reorientation in state-community relations. White elites with no personal bonds to the provinces detected in the “disappearance” of the vecinos an assimilation process in the “wrong” direction. The “reversion” of white-mestizo presence mentioned by Bacarreza had been predicted more radically in 1885 by a Chilean visitor of the province on basis of the unalterable and strategic indigenous anchoring within the economic structure of the country.

“I believe that two races in opposition; the inferior always tends to disappear: this is the law of nature, the law of Darwin; but when these two races tend to match instead of destroying each other, it is evident that the superior will find itself in the situation, if it is minor in number, of adopting the language, the customs and

¹⁶⁴ In effect, the descendants of the López family still reside in Turco yet not anymore as vecinos. Personal communication with Gilberto Pauwels (26.7.2012) and field work in Turco (2008-2012).

¹⁶⁵ Despite this opening, the division between comunarios and vecinos was only very slowly torn down, which explains why the same names continued to dominate the local policital posts until into the 1970s (Pauwels 1983, 706-8). Meanwhile, a new village elite was emerging, taking over the vecino monopoly over petty trade and transport (the arrival of trucks and busses). Pauwels 1983, Rivière 1982, West 1981. See also Llanque 2011, Tassi 2012 and Spedding 2013 on the formation of Aymara elites.

the nature of the inferior race. Or it extinguishes in struggle, or it prevails if that struggle does not exist: I believe this is the dilemma that time will prove in the elevated plateaus of Bolivia.”¹⁶⁶

He pleaded for a nationwide counteraction to this tendency, but the editors of the Bulletin who published this travel account at that time still defended the Bolivian pro-white immigration policy in which “enlightened” state representatives would definitely break the local indigenous prevalence (Pauwels 1983, 234). In post-1899 Bolivia, however, the Liberal government adapted that discourse, fundamentally repudiating its former alliance with the indigenous leadership. The indigenous population, particularly the Aymara, was no longer portrayed as a passive victim of colonially rooted injustice but became “savages” that had dragged the entire nation into a “war of races” (Mendieta 2010, 239-78). However, “*once understood that the Indians were savage beings mistreated by the actions of local powers,*” Mendieta concludes, “*they started to redeem them in the sense that the true culprits of what happened were the members of the provincial elites and local authorities,*”¹⁶⁷ both for their abuse of as –paradoxically– for their intimacy with the comunarios. The post-1899 stress on indigenous savageness was nothing new as such, but the very cause of this indigenous danger was no longer detected with the indigenous themselves. Instead of disciplining the indigenous population, it was argued, the vecinos had mortgaged the hopes for national progress.

Particularly the local authorities –in the first place the corregidores,¹⁶⁸ but also the clergy¹⁶⁹– were targeted, for passively neglecting the region and its population’s advancement and even actively instigating unrest among the comunarios. Already in 1896, the Prefect of Oruro commented on

“the state of barbarism in which our Indians find themselves, despite living between civilized people. Therefore it must be questioned why the priests and the municipal councils do not focus all their action and energies to establish schools and regenerate the new rising generation of indigenous people?”¹⁷⁰

Lima added that these state representatives, “*performing in the centres of major native population, are with honourable exceptions the most pernicious elements that suck them* [the

¹⁶⁶ Own translation. Orrego Cortez, A. “Viaje a Carangas” in: *Boletín de la Oficina Nacional de Estadística*, 8 (1912), no. 73-76, 11, cited in Pauwels 1983, 234.

¹⁶⁷ Own translation. Mendieta 2010, 277.

¹⁶⁸ See for instance the Prefect’s critique in 1923 (Ibañez 1923, 23-4)

¹⁶⁹ See for instance AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 15.

¹⁷⁰ Own translation. Portal 1896, 4.

native population] *up and degrade them, fomenting their demoralization*”¹⁷¹ The angle of the vecino problem was in the double perception of their role by both the central state and the indigenous communities. While their intermediation was felt as an indispensable representation channel, or was imposed as such by legal impositions, it was at the same time distrusted and perceived as contra-productive. Gradually, state-community relations started to reorient towards a more direct interaction, encouraging the mestizos to detach from inter-ethnic associations. Despite the critique, the government nonetheless continued to stake at the white avant-garde, entrusted with the regeneration of the province remains dominant.¹⁷² However, by installing a breach between the “dangerous” comunarios and their allies, political party leaders in fact brought in the Trojan Horse that pushed for a national rather than a non-indigenous hegemony (Platt 1982, 1987), as the 1952 National Revolution would make clear.

Guardian of the nation? Opening up the province, fencing off the border.

Over the first decades of the 20th century, the central government pretended to assume a more active role in ‘civilizing’ the indigenous -and particularly rebellious- population and in incorporating peripheral -and particularly borderland- areas. In order to foment regional progress, resource frontiers were to be opened up, cross-border influences blocked off and mestizo-indigenous entanglements neutralized. This demanded a more complete knowledge of the province’s properties. This information was provided at the national level by the execution of a national census in 1900¹⁷³ and at the provincial level by the elaboration of the Bacarreza report¹⁷⁴ and Lima’s ethnography.¹⁷⁵ These detailed studies were envisioned to form the basis for concrete state initiatives to establish a more structural and profitable link between the local and the national level. Parallel with the proposals and measures to develop local production systems (7.1), a range of

¹⁷¹ Own translation. Lima 1921, 7.

¹⁷² While not denying that Carangas had always been known as a “dreadful province”, Lima thought observing clear indications of a rosy patriotic future. The signs thereof are in the establishment of (by then) 10 patriotic associations (most founded in 1919) with a total of 312 members. their activities include football or shooting clubs, but also take up engineering projects etc. Lima 1921, 206-9.

¹⁷³ Blanco 2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV. However, it must be noted that the data of this census are less complete and liable than those presented by Bacarreza.

¹⁷⁴ In 1910, the Ministry of Colonization and Agriculture had commissioned Zenón Bacarreza to conduct an inspection in order to determine the prospects for regional progress of the Carangas province (1910, cited in Pauwels 2006, 350-403).

¹⁷⁵ Parallel to Eduardo Lima’s appointment as sub-prefect in order to execute a detailed investigation, the central government ordered similar “borderland” inspections in the the Caupolicán, Muñecas and Camacho provinces, inspired by Lima’s previous report on the Ulla Ulla area (Lima 1921, Preface).

initiatives were taken to create a more “legible” society. This implied that the achievement of a more direct access to the province’s exploitable resources had to go accompanied by a campaign to gain access to the hearts and minds of the province’s population. As the Prefect in 1916 explained, state presence had to be enhanced in order to guarantee the sovereignty of the Nation-State.

“Not only economic motives should influence our increased attention to that region of our border, but also considerations of nationalization of the inhabitants of those remote districts, which, intimately linked to the peoples of the Republic of Chile for reasons of commerce and frequent neighbourhood relations, have no affection for their fatherland.”¹⁷⁶

The central government’s efforts to strengthen and secure its grip on the border region were framed in an assimilationist state-building project, triggered to important extent by the repercussions of the War of the Pacific and the indigenous revolt of 1899 and constant threats to its territorial and emotional integrity. As the Prefect of Oruro claimed in 1931, “*given the conquering spirit of our international neighbour. The neglect of this region cannot subsist for more time, in order not to regret what we now deplore, having abandoned the Chaco region.*”¹⁷⁷ Moreover, this preoccupation was linked to the widening gap in the internal spatial organization of the nation, as observed between booming city of Oruro and the department’s immobile -“close to death”- provinces.¹⁷⁸ As this internal distance seemed inversely proportional to the strength of its international connections, the Prefect insisted on the instilment of “*a strong and compact national sentiment*” (Tejada 1921, 63). This preoccupation with patriotism particularly regarded the indigenous population whose indigence and “ignorance” was believed to hinder its constructive role in the Nation. Such paternalistic stance was rooted in the assumption that the corporative principles and rights underpinning the ayllu and the inequality ingrained in the tributo system undermined the indigenous potential for nation-building.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Own translation. Lemaitre 1916, 59.

¹⁷⁷ Own translation. Fajardo 1931, 41. In 1928, a bloody dispute had taken place on the Bolivian-Paraguayan border, the territory known as the “Great Chaco”. In the following years, tensions increased and eventually almost the entire territory was lost through the Chaco War of 1932-1935 (Klein 2011, 168).

¹⁷⁸ In 1921, sub-prefect Lima emphasized this discrepancy to warn for an excessive centralization that overlooks the needs and potential of the provinces, as to criticize a further de-regionalization that would allow the political and economic intervention of “foreign elements” (Lima 1921, 1-3). That same year, the Prefect commented that “*In Carangas, there exists a certain element that tries to influence the population and to secure sympathies for our neighbouring republic of the West.*” (Tejada 1921, 63).

¹⁷⁹ As Irurozqui explains, the state’s incapacity to eliminate those principles in function of a homogenized nation, and its consequent dependence on the indigenous differential fiscal status and other mechanisms that

Accordingly, the state entrusted itself (and its local representatives) with mediating the indigenous access to citizenship via the implementation of adequate tools of assimilation such as military conscription or taxes, but in the first place schooling.

With the installation of a representative system, education came to figure as a crucial state unification and civilization tool. Bolivia needed literate subjects in order to foster the progress of the nation (Brienen 2005, 324-5), particularly in border regions, where schools were conceived of as institutions to train children in fencing off the nation.¹⁸⁰ However, the central state was repeatedly reminded of the difficulties in this extensive and remote province because of the Chilean influence in the alphabetization of the population.¹⁸¹ Similarly, military conscription figured as a prominent assimilation instrument to apply to the indigenous population.¹⁸² But also this institution resulted difficult to introduce in Carangas, with several youngsters trying to escape their duty by immigrating to the saltpetre offices of Iquique (Morales 1910, 65). Another line of action was the dispatching of public health commissions to the provinces to halt the spread of infectious diseases.¹⁸³ In order to ‘attach’ the countryside more closely to the centres of powers, the state underwent an administrative and juridical fragmentations in order to increase its local juridical¹⁸⁴ and political-military presence.¹⁸⁵ Ideas started to be expressed regarding the division of the province (Calderón 1927, 39) and some of the

impeded the peasantization and privatization of the comunarios, reinforced the state’s tutorship over public indigenous affairs (Irurozqui 1999, 738-40).

¹⁸⁰ Today, the same line of reasoning is followed at the border of the Pando department, as noticed by Perrier (2013, 14).

¹⁸¹ The Prefect of Oruro expressed in 1909 that “*the constant power of economy and labour provides in almost all cantons municipal schools destined to turn the indigenous race of Carangas into an element of national progress.*” (Own translation, Ascarrunz 1909, 17). In 1916, it was stated the the indigenous inhabitants “*have no notion at all of civil education, because the School has not arrived there, and, rather many of them educate their children in the neighbouring Republic*” (Lemaitre 1916, 59), later confirmed by the Prefect’s warning that they were offered free education in Chilean schools (Arce 1924, 44). While schools were established in several village centres, these were hardly accessed by non-vecino children as they were living in the distant estancias. Moreover, the Arica region offered apparently more easily reachable schools in Azapa, Codpa, Poconchile, Socoroma, Belén and Putre (AHVD, *Fondo de la Intendencia de Tacna y Gobernación de Arica*, vol. 336, 23.11.1923).

¹⁸² President Evo Morales himself admits that it was exactly in the garrison that he learned to defend the Fatherland (Stefanoni 2010, 7; cited in Perrier Bruslé 2013, 21).

¹⁸³ This happened particularly from the 1920s on, for instance in the context of a typhoid outbreak (Ibañez 1923, 37).

¹⁸⁴ In 1901, the office of “Rural Judges” was created with police and fast jurisdiction attributions. “Ley de 22 de noviembre de 1901.”

¹⁸⁵ Lemaitre 1916, 59.

smaller administrative units such as Sabaya, Todos Santos and Chuquichambi achieved an elevation of their status.¹⁸⁶

Despite governmental ambitions, Carangas did not cast off its peripheral character, reflected in the absence of urban, agrarian or industrial productive centres, which only intensified provincial authorities' desperate complaint over governmental indifference toward this forgotten region and its problems. Of the several 'development' plans launched in those decades, hardly any was ever implemented. The lack of "*steady means of communication*" due to the government's shortage of resources resulted as the greatest hindrance to govern the territory and include it in the "legible" society.¹⁸⁷ The distance created by deficient infrastructure and the 'escape routes' offered by the desolate landscape converted Carangas in an open border and undermined its attachment to the national judicial, educational, fiscal, etc. system.¹⁸⁸ Another source of frustration was the distrust, resistance and evasion on part of the local population wary of hidden fiscal agendas.¹⁸⁹ Instead of actively resisting, the border allowed the local population -not only smugglers or labour migrants, but also tax evaders, deserters or criminal fugitives- to easily "escape" outside the government's reach.

¹⁸⁶ In 1911, Sabaya, vice-canton in Huachacalla, was elevated to an independent canton ("Ley de 25 de enero de 1911."). Todos Santos, a community of 22 contribuyentes, switched its status of parochial annex (*anexo*) of the vice-canton of Carangas for that of vice-canton of Sabaya (AJC, *Civiles*, 1914, no. 31). In 1914, Chuquichambi achieved the administrative level of canton (ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 18).

¹⁸⁷ The Prefect affirmed this to "*constitute a real impediment for the sub prefectural administration to control the entire Province, added thereto the lack of mobility, to be able to move from one point to another.*" (Own translation. Fajardo 1931, 41).

¹⁸⁸ In 1898, the Prefect of Oruro pressured for a permanent patrol force, not only to survey the border, but also to enforce the judicial decisions, achieve the effective collection of the road provision tax and implement rural education (Aramayo 1898, 3 and 27-8). In 1909, the provincial representative made an argument for the construction of a telegraphic connection between the province and the town of Oruro "*in order to avoid that these regions, serve as comfortable way for all the criminals and fugitive prisoners who want to fool the course of justice. The major part of the criminals take that road [through Carangas, from Oruro to Chile]. Several of them present themselves before the indigenous with such cynicism making them accept that they are national engineers, commissioned by the Prefecture etc. (sic), demanding their services. In that way they make their travel in all comfort to the coast, without being bothered*" (Report by the sub-prefect of Carangas. Annex in Ascarrunz 1909, 107). Also indicted comunarios argued that if they were really guilty they could have easily escaped to Chile (AJC, *Penales*, 1920, no. 797).

¹⁸⁹ A concrete example of how many of the governmental projects failed to gain the support is Bacarreza's mission in 1910. Although successful in delivering his report, his arrival to Curahuara had roused an indigenous revolt and his programme to establish model farms for camelid production made no headway because the comunarios were suspicious on the possible fiscal implications of the plans. Also in 1928, for instance, the planned rural census had failed due to suspicion of a camouflaged Revisita operation. AJC, *Penales*, 1913, no. 3. González 1929, 211; Pauwels 2006, 341.

However, it would take until the National Revolution of 1952 that the expansion of rural schooling and the universal suffrage managed to break through the walls that protected longstanding political and economic vecino monopolies (Carter 1964, 94-5; Pauwels 1983, 307). The fact that national inclusion remained an ambition far beyond the state's capacity (and predisposition) cannot be merely interpreted from the perspective of its (lack of) economic means to implement required initiatives. Even though the integration mechanisms and their implementation were still in a very immature stage, indigenous openness to assimilation to the Spanish-speaking-white-mestizo world entailed an embryonic, unexpected "boomerang" effect of governmental overtures. However, signs of such openness were generally downplayed by stressing the indigenous' criminal inclination and infancy out of fear for an active indigenous leadership on the public political scenery and the persisting belief in their racial inferiority. From the community's perspective, the imposition, and even active lobbying for access to the state and its effective appropriation did not imply a one-sided assimilation, but was paradoxically brought into play to keep the state at a distance.

In or outside the shadows of the state? The "boomerang" effect of state-indigenous overtures.

Although indigenous response to these initiatives was to important extent marked by reluctance and suspicion, the state seemed -little by little- to win ground. The governmental concern over indigenous 'civilization' was increasingly met by indigenous pressures for inclusion. indigenous themselves found connections to the state, thereby "subscribing" to the aspired uniformization of the state apparatus and the imagined community it pretended to contain. The impression of a rapprochement was boosted by the discourse circulated by the indigenismo movement that pretended to voice the needs of powerless Indians while silencing (yet not nullifying) the power of indigenous resistance and leadership. It was triumphantly stated that "*the indigenous population of the provinces of the Department aspire their incorporation into the civilized life, enjoying the rights that our laws awards to all people without social class distinction.*"¹⁹⁰ However, as with the apoderados, these self-proclaimed pro-Indio white and mestizo spokespersons vowed "*stark binary discourses of race and space that tried to secure the racial and political order in a dramatically changing society*" (Baud 2009, 23).

Thus, the suggestion of a straightforward merger of top-down and bottom-up demands is misleading. As national elites were busy discussing the possibility and

¹⁹⁰ It was further reported that "*several indigenous people have informed the Prefectura about their will to organize indigenous associations in order to safeguard their interests and improve their current culture*" and that a pro-Indio Liga was being formed. Own translation. Calderón 1927, 14-5.

desirability of including the indigenous population as citizens, the latter were actively constructing their own citizenship and –as demonstrated in the Liberals’ ascendance after 1899- helping those elites in power (Brienen 2005, 344). What happened was that the indigenous population knew to convert state-imposed assimilationist policies, envisioned by the central state as conditioned by the abolition of ‘anti-modernity’ institutions of the ayllu and the *tributo* into political leverage to exactly support such communal structures (Mendieta 2010, 280-9; Brienen 2005, 327).

Such appropriation was in the first place the case with education. While in former decades still reported as rejected by the local population,¹⁹¹ primary schooling became an explicit local demand which the Bolivian State apparently did not manage to meet. Alphabetization was an essential requisite in the granting of civil rights and, as the government and the communities both drove at, would neutralize the intervention of distrusted non-indigenous attorneys (Rivera 1991, 638). Yet it were exactly non-state initiatives by local elites that would provide in what the state claimed to monopolize.¹⁹²

The same tension surfaces regarding conscription. While evasion of military duties was rife during the first years, the indigenous population eventually entered the army.¹⁹³ Their compliance was rebounded by the claim for a corresponding inclusion as first-class citizens; an argument that became undeniable after the Chaco war. Moreover, their consequent familiarity with fire arms and war techniques would serve them in intimidatingly underpinning that claim.

“Absolute” property rights (in the sense of validated by the central state, both for community and private lands) can be classified in the same range of “tokens of citizenship” that pushed comunarios’ struggle for communal and indigenous survival within the sphere of the state. Pressured by the heightened stress on commoners’ land rights security, local courts were filled with comunario petitions for formal adjudications, *sayaña* transfers, ayllu demarcations and property title registrations which at their turn served to defend the tenure of land in comunario hands. The entanglement of land rights and civil status is illustrated in how the comunarios of

¹⁹¹ In 1898, obligatory instruction for the rural population was found unfeasible as state schools “*to date have not been established, because those indigenous are completely reluctant to the civilization and persistently refuse to send their minor children to a campus.*” Own translation. Aramayo 1898, 3.

¹⁹² Here, Brienen points to an interesting parallel in both education and other, particularly agrarian, reforms. On both lines, the result was quite different from what the republican regimes had aimed at, with hacienda expansion dwarfing individual proprietorship and ‘autonomous’ schools outnumbering ‘civilizing’ state-controlled schools (Brienen 2005, 344).

¹⁹³ In contrast to preceding years, 1913 witnessed the registration of a striking number of conscripts, including –to the surprise of the governmental authorities- predominantly youngsters of indigenous origin from the Carangas province (Morales 1913, 51-2).

Chuquichambi interpret their land rights security “trajectory” in terms of a road towards citizenship:

“Since the time of colonialism we have been known first of all as the *anexo* [sub-parish] of Choquicota, with all obligations inherent to the service of the governors of those times, as there were the payment of the tax, to the crown of Spain, delivery of personal services to the authorities and the worst of all was, then, the peregrination to the City of Potosí, in quality of *mitayo* and give our life in the mines of that City, all just to keep the land that had been distributed by the different Spanish authorities in our power. Afterwards, when we already entered the Republic, services were equally imposed on us in more or less human ways, but always approaching us as real outcasts, until we have been declared masters and proprietors of our lands by the law of October fifth of thousand eight hundred eighty four and its regulations of December 20th of the same year [*proindiviso* concessions], and thanks to these protecting laws we currently enjoy all rights and guarantees which correspond to all citizens of the Republic.”¹⁹⁴

The “culmination” of this trajectory and the simultaneous advancement towards the central state was in the community’s achievement of a higher status within the country’s administrative division, which came together with schooling, drinking water and embellished public spaces.¹⁹⁵ While bottom-up demands for an increased administrative status may seem less controversial, they foreshadow the effective disintegration of the province and a thorough process of “cantonization” in the second half of the 20th century which, as the case of Todos Santos and Chuquichambi demonstrate, had serious repercussions on community cohesion.¹⁹⁶

The idea of a boomerang is founded in the paradox that while institutions as the school and the army at the one hand effectively immersed indigenous peasants in the

¹⁹⁴ Letter to the Sub-Prefect, July 28th 1929. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 18, f. 110v.

¹⁹⁵ ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 18.

¹⁹⁶ As the literature on the changes on the Bolivian countryside of the second half of the 20th century points out, the competition for a more independent access to the central administration fuelled inter-community conflict and the erosion of communal structures. In Todos Santos, a comunario petitioned the sub-Prefect in 1913 to remove Andres Visa and his son (*próximo*) from his *sayaña* as they refused -“*advised by some bad men*”- to move from the vice-canton of Carangas to the jurisdiction of Sabaya. If remaining with Carangas, Visa lost their rights on his *sayaña* because he did no longer pay *contribución* to the community of Todos Santos. According to the plaintiff, it concerns an extensive plot of land that could be ceded to two newly registered *contribuyentes* in Todos Santos, which moreover would mean an increase in taxpayers for the Treasury. AJC, Penales, 1913, no. 33. In 1929, Chuquichambi requested the Sub-Prefect for a formal recognition and dissemination of their administrative status as other cantons continue to approach them as “*ayllu*”. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1929, no. 18.

Spanish speaking world, they also provided the indigenous population with useful “arms”. Acquired literacy and military skills allowed them to mould their struggle for secure communal rights and emancipation into a struggle on equal terms. The following testimony of a community leader in the aftermath of the Jesús de Machaca revolt of 1921 clarifies the drive behind this indigenous strategy to fight the state with its own weapons:

“for crimes we did not even think of, they imprison and chase us relentlessly. That is, the inflexibility of the laws only exists when petitioned by our enemies. This inequality has its origins in having legislated identically for the whites as for the Indians. We can read nor do we know the language in which the legislation of the fatherland is written, and nonetheless we need to abide by her”¹⁹⁷

As particularly court constituted an important battle ground for that struggle, the reinforcement of the caciques-apoderados movement in the 1920s went hand in hand with increasing indigenous pressures for rural school expansion schooling. But by achieving a closer access to government institutions and the laws that ruled them (as well as the treasury that depleted them), indigenous-state relations were subject to a commodification process. This double dynamic is recalled by the caveat that “*by fighting European civilization on its own turf, indigenous peoples have had to accept some of the premises of that turf*” (Hall and Fenelon 2009, 10). Reading this assertion the other way round, the suggested boomerang effect also implies that assimilation tools can be appropriated to develop “*strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm’s length*” (Scott 2009). Thus, the tension between great state ambitions and discourse versus limited resources and capacity allowed for an expansion of the “room for manoeuvre” for communal action. Through the achievements obtained in 1952-’53, the ambiguous outcome of “emancipation-as-incorporation” policies, mechanisms and pressures and the consequent tension between inclusion and distance in quite autonomous regions such as Carangas would become even clearer.

¹⁹⁷ Own translation, ALP, EP, 1923, cited in Rivera 1991, 648-9.

Concluding remarks to Part III. How communal struggle cut the ground from under the law's feet.

Explanations on Carangas' "exclusion from" *exvinculación* usually stop with pointing to the lack of privatization incentives due to ecological and demographic factors and the role of external pressures that remained beyond the control of indigenous communities. However, the presented case study evidences that the vital role of pastoralism and the apathy and absence on part of the (white and mestizo) landlord class has indeed contributed to the safeguarding of a remarkably high level of regional autonomy, which has favoured the persistence (and strengthening) of communal land rights. However, a close reading of the dynamics generated by the announcement and arrival of the Revisita demonstrates that exemption did not stem from mere oblivion towards remote grazing lands, but implied the active mobilization of the Carangas population to keep things that way.

First, I have demonstrated in chapter 5 that the ambition of the law, defined in its first "phase", was set on an anti-corporatist reorganization based on the principal of individual private property in function of a capitalist transition of the country. However, whilst this purpose and the consequent reform process would eventually determine the outlook of Bolivia's land tenure system and its further evolution, the law's implementation did not correspond to its purpose. Financial incentives/constraints played an elementary role in the ambitions, timing and implementation of Bolivia's first land reform. This factor relates to the treasury's limits, inter-elite struggle and fiscal bonds to the indigenous population, which curbed the capacity of the state to proclaim and implement the law. This created a legislature that was easily "floored" with loopholes and political elite-indigenous alliances.

Thus, the land reform process converted into a process of delay and incomplete execution. Chapters 6 and 7 illustrate the limited scope of the law with the case of the Carangas province, demonstrating a tacit –though temporal- retreat on part of an illiquid and bureaucratically weak state in view of a territory's uninviting ecological resources and its fiscal bonds to that territory's people. However, these chapters also

demonstrate an increased level of violence and competition, indirectly triggered by the land reform. The pushes for state-organized land intervention triggered protest and at times violent uprisings against the *exvinculación*'s agents. Meanwhile, "typical" boundary disputes proliferated and quite frequently erupted into violent inter- and intra-ayllu clashes, creating a highly conflictive climate that exacerbated as village elites seized their monopoly position to encroach on community lands and that resulted particularly dramatic for the Uru population (of Turco). On a broader scale, the land reform completed the amputation process that since early colonial times had cut the altiplano communities off from their valley lands. While the push to open up strategic resource frontiers within the province made no headway mainly due to the absence of modern transport infrastructure, an enclosure operation can be noted, regarding what we could call Carangas' "salt frontier".

The growing insecurity over land rights provoked a "rush on the archive", in search for legal documents that asserted comunarios' hold over their *sayaña* in view of competing or intruding fellow comunarios. However, in critical moments, requests driven by competitive benefits but were overruled by collective interests through inter-community collaboration, backed by an inter-community network of community representatives which in Carangas left its first traces in the late 1890s, forming the organizational basis of the indigenous mobilization of 1899. This indigenous leadership adopted a threefold strategy, a diversified response based on a combination of lawful, law-making and unlawful tactics. In other words, they made use of the official legal framework, they lobbied to adapt that framework and they openly defied that framework. This 'legal-legislative-illegal' strategy was deployed at several 'fronts' simultaneously, in courts where land titles were registered, in demands towards the national executive power to challenge the law itself, and in violent rebellion. However, compared to the 1899 unified community response, and although Carangas kept its rebellious reputation alive, there is hardly any indication that this potential went together with the formation of a unified *apoderado* movement throughout the 1910s-20s, although 'individual' community revolts in the 1920s were connected to rebellious mobilizations outside the province.

It is clear that many questions still remained to be answered regarding communal mobilization in Carangas. What is clear, however, is that, in order to represent communal interests before the state, this mobilization was dependent upon support from other sectors of society which –at first sight– had little to gain from a strong community. Alliances between indigenous and non-indigenous groups and individuals are reflected in the modifications that have been made to the legislation over the decades and in the military cooperation between the Liberals and the indigenous leadership during the Federal War of 1899. At the more local level, there was an important degree of *vecinos-comunario* collaboration, founded on a common interest in halting the *Revisita*. These shared interests and manipulations explain the involvement

of local non-indigenous elites in the networks of indigenous (anti-Revisita) representation. By looking into the power base, legitimacy and motivation they acted upon, my modest attempt to reconstruct the role of vecinos-apoderados reveals that they acted upon either opportunistic or more intimate community interests, a relatively strong political and economic power base, and a contested legitimacy.

The result of this complex mobilization pattern was that the new legislation was inserted with “loopholes”, contributing the eventual ‘retreat’ of the central state. As it gave up the fight, the process was appropriated by local power groups, but weaker than in Platt’s terms, as an effect of the process of vecinos-comunario conversion. This fomented the state’s growing critique towards the latter. While the execution of Revisita was obstructed by indigenous resistance, that obstruction –and all the disorder it caused- was more and more blamed on the vecino-apoderados and the vecinos-comunarios: The central state got increasingly irritated by what was defined as an “illegal usurpation” by vecino-comunarios and the “crookedness” of vecino-apoderados. Meanwhile, the adoption of an inclusion policy on part of the central state and the overtures on part of the communities made way for a gradual “reconciliation” that, instead of ‘neatly’ giving way to indigenous assimilation (that is, “evaporation”), it would “boomerang” back in the form of reinforced (yet ambiguous and vulnerable) indigenous emancipation over the decades to come.

Conclusions. A thwart frontier zone? The (re)creation of autonomous spaces for communal control.

Soy,
soy lo que dejaron,
soy toda la sobra de lo que se robaron.
Un pueblo escondido en la cima,
mi piel es de cuero por eso aguanta cualquier clima.
Soy una fábrica de humo,
mano de obra campesina para tu consumo
Latinoamérica – Calle 13¹

Oruro, 15 February 2012. About two thousand people, all members of the nine markas of the Native Council of Jach'a Karangas (COAJK), arriving from their estancias and villages, or from their urban dwellings which has replaced or come to complement their (former) rural residence, are stirring the streets of the city of Oruro with the sounds and dances of the *tarqueada*, which evoke their rich pastoralist culture and history. It is the time of the *Jallu Pacha*, when the communities celebrate the “fertilization” of the Pachamama, announcing the harvest season. Since several years, this ancestral celebration is brought to the city, mobilizing all communities in a long procession and ritual offerings that unite all communities on a main ritual site, the *Condor Mallku*, in the heart of the city.

The enthusing energy of their dancing, playing, singing and drinking made it to the cover of this dissertation. However this cultural manifestation represents more than an innocent cheerful folkloric event. The vigorous taking of the city streets can be seen as a sign of recuperated pride as well as of the increasing urban-rural interlinkages that

¹ *I am / I am what they left, / I am all what's left of what they stole / A village hidden on the summit, / my skin is made of leather that is why it endures any climate. / I am a smoke factory, / peasant labour for your consumption.*

structure communal life. It is a way of “claiming” their place in an increasingly faster restructuring world. It is a way of renegotiating participation in that world, yet without simply adopting the cultural or other standards that such participation seems to require.



Figure 26 The head of the Jallu Pacha procession, here passing through the main street of the city of Oruro. The bottom of the banner reads: “Towards indigenous originario autonomy” (Own picture, Oruro, February 2012).

The tension between securing communal autonomy by consenting with nationally imposed margins for that autonomy, and between accommodating to changing economic impulses and conditions for livelihood production without giving up the “pillars” of that system has recurrently challenged the adaptive capacity of communities and inserted dynamics of differentiation, elite formation and discrimination. While migration and economic integration have established ever stronger bonds to urban spaces of production and exchange. Llamas, now in the form of dry-frozen charque meat, are given a new function in interregional commercial circuits, reflecting comunarios’ ability to combine locally adapted production modes with changing market conditions. Although llama meat commercialization has an significant differentiation dimension, it sustains the importance of llamas and hence the need for grazing lands. Most lands in the now fragmented and re-claimed Carangas territory continue indeed to be accessed through the framework of the community. Yet, the concessions obtained to secure this communal control throughout the cycles of land rights redefinition have not saved them from demographic, ecological and extractive pressures on that land, nor neutralized the effects of protracted powerful processes of inter-ethnic (including inter-indigenous) discrimination and marginalization (the Uru claims seem to be pushed out the renegotiation renewal).

This concluding part of the dissertation does not aim to closely analyse the current revival of communal renegotiation in the face of changing state structures and an expanding market sphere, but seizes this powerful process to point to the underlying implications of that renegotiation. These implications point to the doubleness/unevenness of incorporation processes that sustains longstanding and

constantly renovated patterns of fragility and inequality in the region's history; patterns that have come to the surface throughout this dissertation. In other words, the assessment of a particular instance of "communal autonomy renegotiation" presented over the past pages can be instructive to understand ongoing processes of rural transformations and indigenous revitalization. The results of this research and the insights into how world-systemic processes and local dynamics of rural change interweave, thwart and fuel each other and the double effects they have upon the room for communal manoeuvring will be subjected to a recap.

This final review is structured along central concepts that have enabled me to capture this dynamic entanglement. First of all it points to the communities' double drive (and capacity) to participate and meanwhile secure a margin for communal modes of production and governance, which converts rural Andean incorporation zone into a negotiated 'frontier' process. Second, this double drive underlays my interpretation of the dynamics and long-term effects triggered by processes of land reform in terms of a renegotiation process; a process that involves active community participation but that equally comes at a cost. Third, the outcome of this process is related to the inherent paradoxes of world-systemic expansion.

Negotiated incorporation.

A frontier perspective enables to counter the dichotomist idea of the community versus "the system" and instead reveals how communal agency taps from the overlap of multiple spheres. By applying that perspective to the incorporation trajectory of the rural Andes, the outcome of colonial encounter and its postcolonial reproduction is unmasked as a process of negotiated incorporation in which pre-existing community structures and imported forms of organizations co-existed neither in black-white separation nor in a grey blend. Incorporation materialized in hybrid and negotiated, yet asymmetric power relations, reflected in the deepening dependence and hence increased vulnerability of Andean spaces and societies. Since early colonial times, Andean rural households have been increasingly drawn into the capitalist sphere of production and governance. This implied the identification of their spatial and social structures of organization as to-be-incorporated, and led to increasing peripheralization.

It has been demonstrated that Carangas is an intrinsic part of that periphery, but that this peripherality entailed an important margin for autonomy, founded on comunarios' capacity to simultaneously engage in overlapping exchange circuits and on to uphold a reciprocal yet asymmetrical political-symbolic pact with a consolidating state. These are the mechanisms that enable them to 'trespass' presumed economic, political and cultural boundaries and provide in the clue to what has been defined as negotiated

peripherality, that is, the ability of peripheral actors to set their terms of participation and autonomy within broader frameworks for regulation, exchange and representation. Access to land, also communally controlled land, was conditioned by a national system for land regulation that determines the comunarios' fiscal and legal bonds to the state. However, access to land in the Andes is also essentially a matter of inter-ecological complementarity, hence not only dependent upon legal-fiscal guarantees to maintain customary land regulations "at home," but also on the freedom to move and exchange resources across market/off-market divides. Moreover, access to land is a matter of self-determination, requiring an accredited access to the state and its institutions to defend and represent local demands and civil rights. In the late 19th century, these interrelated mechanisms became the object of a threefold policy shift enacted by the Bolivian government. The Bolivian regime opted for the privatization of collective lands, the adoption of pro-export economic policies and the containment of indigenous identities through a mix of inclusion and marginalization.

Land access under negotiation the state. The formation, modification and defines of a margin for autonomous land administration as upheld in Carangas is embedded in a particular, asymmetric relation to a tributary state. That relation was created in the aftermath of the Spanish conquest, where the start of a land commodification trajectory and of the formation of an Andean/Bolivian land system can be detected. Property titles, taxes and inspections were the elements that defined indigenous communities' landholding attributions and integrated them as landholding, taxpaying and representative units within a centralized land system were hence determinant in setting the parameters for communal land control. The late 19th century governments revised those bonds and enacted a new land legislation that ignored the legal-fiscal principles and subtleties underpinning this state-community bond, which was answered by intense indigenous protest. Thus, the 19th century reinterpretations of the reciprocal state-community pact forced communities to renegotiate the terms of participation in the republican state.

Tied to community structures and intermediaries, the pastoralists of Carangas became increasingly linked to -hence structured by- larger spaces of production, consumption, circulation and regulation. Most households participated in that link as providers of minerals and wool (livestock) and as a labour reservoir for the transport sector, including their livestock as an activated labour class. While converting them in vital 'connectors' between local resources and distant markets, this transporter role also provided in a hedge against both 'full-blown' incorporation in those markets as well as against the effects of their marginalization from those markets when their connector role was displaced by new interregional transportation means and routes. This hedge refers to the way in which pastoralists households secured their access to complementary subsistence means through inter-ecological barter travels. This Andean pastoralist mode of mobility and exchange provided in a mechanism to maintain that

access despite the confiscation of complementary territories which they previously directly controlled. In the context of a protracted regional marginalization process, the Andean pastoralist ability to “activate” complementary circuits in order to secure a minimal margin for household income-pooling was constrained by petty bourgeois merchants who hierarchized the access of indigenous barterers, traders and transporters to overlapping zones of circulation.

In order to convert the countryside into “governable”, that is “uniformized”, terrain, government pressures to curb the autonomous sphere and the representative attributions of communities and their leaders increased. This created space for the settlement and monopolization of power by a new elite group, the *vecinos*. However, their minority position in a hacienda-immune region compelled them to develop more complex, political, economic, personal and inter-ethnic bonds to the indigenous population. An assessment of the ‘accumulation trajectory’ of the *vecinos* has demonstrated that the constitution of this minor yet powerful sector is backed by a much longer chronology that traces the Spanish roots of nowadays “humbled” indigenous tributaries. It has demonstrated that their consolidation as locally very powerful (yet nationally marginal) elites motivated them to transcend the segregation of *comunario* and *vecinos* worlds, however without completely giving up their monopolistic position. The effects of that gradual shift became particularly visible from the late 19th century on, after *vecinos* presence in the province had reached its culmination. This double identity generated an ambiguous effect in that their registration as indigenous taxpayers camouflaged a process of community land usurpation that meanwhile supported *vecino* collaboration in the active anti-land reform protest. As this collaboration supported the efforts to secure a margin for communal land control without state intervention, the ascendance of the *vecinos* cannot be straightforwardly related to the erosion of communal land tenure structures. However, their anchoring was informed by a deliberate tactic to expand their resource base, motivating them to integrate in the community sphere, yet without abandoning their economic and political monopolistic position.

Communal land control, liberal land reform and the ‘cost’ of renegotiation.

The case study of this research presents a close-up analysis of enclosure pressures and counter-pressures provoked by the “settling” of an internal juridical/fiscal frontier in the context of post-independence capitalist state-building in the high Andes. In frontier terms, land rights commodification progresses as communal rights are encapsulated within a standardized legal framework. My case study however provides empirical evidence of how this frontier movement is thwarted as communities manage to keep

their customary land system in place in the face of an anti-community land reform. In view of the dominant role of external factors such as ecology, market connectedness and state power, my assessment interrogates what the room for renegotiation over the implementation of that reform and in what way that room was 'seized by the comunarios of Carangas.

The described trajectory suggests a tacit –though temporal- retreat on part of an illiquid and bureaucratically weak state in view of a territory's uninviting ecological resources and its fiscal bonds to that territory's people. However, my close-reading of this retreat unmask in the first place what seems an external decision, regardless of any responsiveness of the Carangas communities, as an extorted withdrawal, forcing the state into a coordinated renegotiation. The push to "settle" a (new) (land tenure) order got bogged down in a highly debated, strongly contested and largely frustrated incorporation process. In the second place, it unmask this renegotiation from what seems a sharp line between commoners determined to keep any non-communal intervention out versus a state and private landholders determined to open new resource frontiers as a rather puzzling tangle of interwoven community-elite-state relations. By disentangling those relations and their implications, I have come to assert that the 'exemption' of the communities of Carangas from the land reform and the related enclosure movement cannot be simply assumed, but involved an active renegotiation process. In other words, the impression of a stagnated enclave in a sea of incorporated people and places conceals a more dynamic picture; that of an (internal) frontier zone where local communities manage to exploit their marginality as a tool to keep expanding frontiers of incorporation 'at bay'.

However, the efforts of forcing state actors into a renegotiation over the enacted law and its broader implications came at a cost. While the guarantee for communal land control was safeguarded, the comunarios' "space of manoeuvre" was seriously challenged. As the land reform came knocking at the door, rebellion spread and internal violence increased. Thus, this renegotiation may have unlocked vital breathing room, often concreted in legal concessions, but it could not halt the increasing pressures on resources, thereby nurturing inter-comunario competition and conflict, the interference of local power groups and the marginalization of powerless groups.

The strong link between communal anti-land reform resistance strategies and inter-community inequality demonstrate that communal land rights security and hence the communities' relative margin of subsistence was undercut by internal asymmetric power relations. This indicates that the imminence of incorporative forces, whether eventually thwarted or not, reinforces local competition over resources and hence reinforced the local negotiation over frontier movement. Moreover, the decisive role of shared interests between indigenous demands and pragmatic rural elites in deviating the direction of the process points to a puzzling reconfiguration process of ethnic boundaries, marked by reinforced Aymarization, nurtured by the "evaporation" of

mestizos and the discrimination of the Urus. In assessing the largely unrecorded - though not isolated- story of how the emergence of a vecinos-comunario class both strengthened communal resistance as it encroached on their land base, a hypothesis can be posited on the powerful links between (and hence a plea for explicit attention to) the movement of (global) “resource frontiers”, and the implied spatial reorganizations, and the reconfiguration of (local) ethnic boundaries, and the underlying social power struggles.

Thwarted frontier processes and margins for communal autonomy.

The fact that, up to date, the Bolivian state still counts with an incomplete understanding of communal land tenure systems and cannot rely on any proper experience in intervening in internal procedures, such as the transfer of land, is an outcome of this renegotiation process and explains to an important degree the continuing complexity of this legalization process. In fact, it was not so much the idea of private ownership (as the Bolivian land question has sometimes been interpreted) as the new policy’s underestimation of the complexity and vitality of the ayllu’s land controlling system that lays at the basis of Bolivia’s first land reform thwarted trajectory. Current renegotiations by indigenous organizations and communities over the revision and “communal reorientation” of Bolivia’s land system indicates that this “thwartedness” is most likely to be renovated rather than neutralized.

The thwarting of commodification processes points to the feedback loops inscribed in the world-systemic expansive course. This feedback has been detected in the trajectory of the land reform in the way communal action knew to “floor” the endorsed legislation. Comunarios and their leaders embarked upon a renegotiation process along different lines of “attack”, justified by their insistence on the reciprocity of fiscal bonds with the state and reinforced by the creation of alliances with other sectors of society. The result was the creation and exploitation of several “loopholes” in the legislation, which contributed to the “hedging” of the land reform process.

When linking this renegotiation process to the “ultimate” question of this research, how the diversity in trajectories of rural change has “nourished” the course of world-systemic expansion, communal agency emerges as an unavoidable factor in answering that question in relation to the incorporation trajectory of the Andean rural zone. The erosion and renewal of autonomous spaces (or frameworks) for communal control has - sometimes deliberately, other times involuntarily- fuelled the course of capitalist expansion, yet not in an unambiguous way.

They operate as channels for complex feedback processes. The enclosure of these spaces has opened new resource frontiers, but meanwhile triggered a negotiation process that has resulted in the renewal of these spaces. This process has a double

geographical dimension. While global processes push for the creation of controllable spaces for accumulation, renaming indigenous territories as *terra nullius*, local pressures actively create pluralist spaces which allow the preservation and reinvention of indigenous territories as alternative geographies. This discord points to the dialectics of homogenizing (fixation, formalization, privatization) and heterogenizing (recuperation, reinvention) pressures.

Yet, the strategies deployed to obtain guarantees for communal autonomy and the implication of obtaining these guarantees point to the vulnerability of communal autonomy, reflected in processes of accommodation (to standardized supra-local frameworks which concedes these guarantees), of social differentiation and elite renovation (that mediate the negotiation process, including powerful external actors while excluding powerless community members), of territorial reconfigurations (as these autonomous spaces urge for a delineation and internal organization), and of ethnic reconfiguration (as the assertion of those spaces reinforces the imaginaries of belonging). While these subtle processes may sustain the impression of a homogenizing world, they simultaneously add texture to that world, reinforced by the constant assertion and reinvention of alternative spaces for and modes of production, exchange and regulations. Thus, in creating and reinforcing spaces for autonomy, communal “renegotiation” highlights and adds to the paradoxical nature of the rise of a capitalist world-system. In that sense, the resilience of *comunarios* and of their modes to organize rural life is not the sign of a last convulsion, but a trigger for pluralization, ensuring the continuous recreation of alternative spaces for social (counter-)action.

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Copy of "Expediente N° TCO-0403-0001." Submitted by the community leaders of COAJ-K to the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Unidad de Coordinación de Tierras Comunitarias de Origen. La Paz, 2001. (copy in possession of M. Flores)

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Interviews and field work

This is a small sample of the conducted field work, including the most important interviews, in chronological order.

Alejandro Gómez, Turco, 13 October and 15 November 2008.

Association of the elderly, Turco, 23 November 2008. (Workshop).

Dr. Soria, INRA officer, La Paz, 5 March 2009.

Máximo Reinaga, head of the Jach'a Karangas Council, March 2012.

Dr. Acapa Calle, INRA officer, Curahuara de Carangas, 10 March 2012.

Mario Flores, Corque, 4 April 2012.

Sabino Acevedo, Turco, 25 March 2012.

Muyta, several villages in the Jach'a Karangas territory, March 2012. (a series of community consultations to prepare the general assembly of all member communities of the Western Council of Ayllus of Jach'a Karangas).

Village and community assemblies, Turco, 3 and 16 November 2008.

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
Appendix 1: A cartographic first aid kit.

The following maps are indispensable tools in visualizing and explaining the following story. They will help readers unfamiliar with the world of the *carangueros* to navigate through the Andes, Bolivia, the Oruro countryside and the regions of Arica-Parinacota and Tarapacá in nowadays Chile. In the chapters of the dissertation, specific maps will be included to illustrate the respective themes.

Ecoregions of the Andes (WWF, Global 200 ecoregions map and legend)




The Oruro department, 1929 (annex in annual Prefect report, González 1929)




The Carangas region (own elaboration, GIS)




The nation of the Qaranqa (Carangas people) around the middle of the 16th century.
 (elaboration by Ximena Medinaceli, on basis of Rivière, in Medinaceli 2006, 267).



1882 map of the Bolivian tableland (Reconstruction of the map elaborated by Minchin, a rich miner. Minchin 1882, 673-6).




Proposed routes for the regional integration of Tarapacá (1864-1937). (Source: “Las rutas de la integración” in Castro 2005, chapter 4, s.p.)



Appendix 2: Demographic evolution in the Carangas region, 1500-2000.

Based on the Revisitas (ANB, *Rv*), Rivière 1982, chapter 2, INE Oruro 2002.



Appendix 3: Administrative divisions of the Carangas territory (pre-Hispanic to 1951).

PRE-HISPANIC suyu Karangas		COLONY corregimiento of Karangas	REPUBLIC Province of Karangas		
parcialidad sub-zone		(principal) village	no. canton / vice-canton (v) / anexo (a)	parcialidad	ayllu
Orqosuyu	Colquemarca-Samancha	Corque	1 San Juan de Corque	Uravi	Mallconaca, Puma Ayocota, Tanga Sullcavi, Catasa, Quitaquita, Collana Coro (from exclusive to including Urus)
				Samancha	Caracollo, Cala, Cupiasa, Collana Camata Hueco (Uru) Mallconaca
Umasuyu	Choquecota-Sabaya	Choquecota	Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion de 2 Choquecota	Urinsaya	Lerco, Julo, Saijasi, Jilanaca
				Aransaya	Chapita, Mitma, Sullcamallcu Mallconaca
Totora	Huayllamarca		3 Santiago de Huailamarca	Aransaya	(Sullcatunca) Parco,
				Hacha-Urinsaya	Tunkajaque, Mitma Urinsaya, Jisca-Urinsaya Llanquera (1838 Revisita:
			San Sebastian de Chuquichambi (v)		Collana (Pumiri) Jilanaca
			San Francisco de Llanquera		

		(v)		Llanquera y Casilla) Sullcatunca (since 1852 Revisita) (Pampa)parco (since 1860 Revisita)
	Totora	4	San Pedro de Totora	Aransaya Aparu, Collana, Parco, Pachacama, Lerco Urinsaya Guaraguara, Aymarani, Tatasapana, Lupi
	Curahuara	5	Santiago de Curahuara	Aransaya Collana, Macho Collana / Mallconaca, (Sullca-uta) Chipana, Taipi(hoco) Collana, Sullca-uta (since 1852 Revisita), Sullca(tunca) Urinsaya Jila-uta Manasaya Sullca-uta Manasaya Jila-uta Choquemarca Taipi-Uta Choquemarca Sullca-Uta Choquemarca Sajama (1910) Sajama (1910)
			Sajama (1910: v)	
	Turco	6	San Pedro de Turco	Aransaya Collana, Jacha Salli, Sullca- Salli (since 1860 Revisita) Chilligua-Salli (Uru) Urinsaya Pumiri, Jilanaca Cosapa Cosapa
			Cosapa (a)	
Choquecota- Sabaya	Huachacalla	7	Santiago de Huachacalla	Aransaya Collana, Tuaña

				Urinsaya	Capi, Camacha Manasaya, Aransaya (Uru) Collana, Canasa, Sacari, Cumujo Todosantos (<i>mineral refinery</i>) Carangas (<i>mining district</i>) San Juan de La Rivera (<i>mineral refinery</i>)
	Sabaya		Santa Ana de Chipaya (a) San Salvador de Sabaya (v) Espiritu Santo de Carangas (v)		
Orqosuyu	<u>Andamarca</u>	8	Santiago de Andamarca	Aransaya	Collana Pintaro (since 1860 Revisita), Collana (Belén) (Pampa)parco (marca)
Andamarca-Orinoca	Orinoca		San Francisco de Orinoca (v)	Urinsaya	Guanapa, Yuruma/Turuna Collana Micayani (<i>estancia</i> ; until 1840s incl. in Collana; disintegrated by 1910) Jinchura Habana (Uru, disintegrated by 1910) Calavillca

Appendix 4: Categorization of the population. National census 1900.¹

¹ Blanco 2006 [1904], LXVI-LXXXV.

	total	M	F		rural		urban		white				mestizo				indigenous				black	
				%		%		%	M	F	total	%	M	F	total	%	M	F	total	%	M	F
CARANGAS	18811	9464	9208	49,0%	17217	91,5	1594	8,5	458	352	810	4,3%	842	764	1606	8,5%	8178	7518	15696	83,44	0	1
Corque	4629	2253	2237	48,3%	4373	94,5	256	5,5	388	285	673	14,5%	566	545	1111	24,0%	1450	1308	2758	59,58	0	1
Choquecota	1200	597	603	50,3%	959	79,9	241	20,1	0	0	0	0,0%	26	22	48	4,0%	540	550	1090	90,83		
Chuquichambi	490	237	253	51,6%	490	100	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0	0	0,0%	220	240	460	93,88		
Huailamarca	698	428	270	38,7%	444	63,6	254	36,4	2	0	2	0,3%	20	33	53	7,6%	368	221	589	84,38		
Llanquera	745	368	377	50,6%	745	100	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	112	18	130	17,4%	533	333	866	116,2		
Tотора	2231	1155	1076	48,2%	2231	100	0	0	6	3	9	0,4%	38	42	80	3,6%	1049	968	2017	90,41		
Turco	1267	657	610	48,1%	946	74,7	322	25,3	16	16	32	2,5%	17	12	29	2,3%	592	552	1144	90,29		
Cosapa	173	99	74	42,8%	173	100	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	3	2	5	2,9%	91	68	159	91,91		
Curahuara	1504	702	802	53,3%	1192	79,3	312	20,7	23	27	50	3,3%	46	75	121	8,0%	597	645	1242	82,58		
Sajama	227	118	109	48,0%	227	100	0	0	14	12	26	11,5%	4	6	10	4,4%	94	81	175	77,09		
Huachacalla	1574	769	805	51,1%	1365	86,7	209	13,3	0	0	0	0,0%	3	3	6	0,4%	717	726	1443	91,68		
Andamarca	2351	1225	1126	47,9	2351	100	0	0	4	3	7	0,3%	6	4	10	0,4%	1127	1057	2184	92,9		
Orinoca	1722	856	866	50,3	1722	100	0	0	5	6	11	0,6%	1	2	3	0,2%	800	769	1569	91,11		

Appendix 5: Livestock in Carangas 1910-1921.

Sources: Bacarreza 396-403; Lima 1921, 45; González Flores 1929, 214.

	1910		1921		1929		Principal location
	Amount	% of total	Amount	% of total	Amount	% of total	
llamas	225957	46,7%	166629	41,5%	257560	44,3%	Everywhere, chiefly Curahuara, Totora, Turco, Andamarca
alpacas	48163	10,0%	53784	13,4%	57560	9,9%	Curahuara, Sajama, Totora, Turco
sheep	178854	37,0%	151572	37,7%	212543	36,6%	Corque, Choquecota, Totora, Turco
asses	21903	4,5%	19162	4,8%	25225	4,3%	Corque, Turco, Sabaya, Huachacalla, Andamarca
horses	2499	0,5%	2876	0,7%	12978	2,2%	Curahuara, Sajama, Turco, Totora, Corque
mules	155	0,0%	1253	0,3%	(incl. in horses)		Dispersed; Corque, Huachacalla, Sabaya
cows	4500	0,9%	4589	1,1%	5580	1,0%	Totora, Curahuara, Totora, Turco
pigs	1857	0,4%	1522	0,4%	9413	1,6%	Chipaya
goats	21	0,0%	233	0,1%	unknown		Dispersed
Total	483909	100%	401620	100%	580859	100%	

Appendix 6: Livestock property and status

Based on wills and inventories in the archive of Corque (AJC) and Derechos Reales in Oruro (ADRO).

no.	year	sex	canton	status	profession	female llamas and lambs	male llamas	alpacas	sheep and lambs	asses	mules	cattle	horses	pigs
1	1861	f	Corque	rich	p.	60	20	0	0	80	0	0	0	0
2	1861	m	Corque	rich	p.	22	30	0	100	43	1	7	1	30
3	1861	f	Sabaya	average	p.	48	10	0	22	0	0	0	0	0
4	1861		/	poor	p.	6	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	1861	m	Totora	rich	p.	60	0	10	10	2	0	5	4	0
6	1862	f	Huachacalla	poor	p.	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	1862	f	Turco	rich	p.	460	0	0	200	0	0	0	0	0
8	1864	m	Huailamarca	rich	m.	0	0	0	180	0	4	0	0	0
9	1866	m	/	rich	p.	60	50	0	50	2	1	3	0	0
10	1867	m	Corque	poor	p.	0	7	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
11	1870	m	Changamoco	average	p.	70	25	0	100	8	0	2	0	0

12	1873	m	Corque	rich	p.	151	50	41	52	0	0	0	1	0
13	1875	m	Corque	poor	p.	31	0	0	40	6	0	0	0	0
14	1875	m	Sabaya	rich	m	100	100	0	0	50	0	0	0	0
15	1888	m	/	poor	p.	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	1888	m	/	rich	m.	55	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0
17	1889	m	Turco	rich	m.	300	130	0	0	80	0	1	10	0
18	1889		Andamarca	average	p-m	58	27	0	0	0	10	0	0	0
19	1897		/	average	p.	53	0	10	32	0	0	0	0	0
20	1898		Andamarca	average	p.	62	31	0	32	0	0	0	0	0
21	1901		Llanquera	average	p.	40	0	0	150	9	1	0	0	0
22	1901		/	average	p.	66	10	0	33	3	0	0	0	0
23	1903	m	Choquecota	rich	p.	160	50	7	30	8	2	12	0	0
24	1904	m	Choquecota	rich	m.	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
25	1904	m	Carangas	rich	m.	24	8	0	70	15	21	35	11	0
26	1906		Corque	average	p.	33	20	0	6	0	0	1	0	0
27	1907	m	San Miguel	average	p.	30	0	0	30	4	0	2	0	0
28	1908	f	Huailamarca	rich	m.	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0
29	1909		San Miguel	average	p.	17	0	0	90	0	6	4	2	0
30	1910	m	Sabaya	rich	m.	4	0	42	0	0	7	0	8	0
31	1910		Corque	poor	p.	8	7	0	9	3	0	0	0	0
32	1911	m	Choquecota	rich	p-m	88	59	0	72	0	0	0	0	0
33	1914	m	Corque	rich	p.	52	30	0	14	0	2	0	0	0
34	1914	m	Corque	rich	p-m	146	29	0	5	48	0	0	0	0
35	1915	m	Llanquera	average	p-m	14	0	0	198	5	0	0	0	0
36	1915	m	Turco	average	p.	155	43	0	59	8	0	0	5	0
37	1915	m	Sajama	rich	p.	202	40	284	100	0	0	0	1	0
38	1916	m	/	average	p-m	122	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
39	1923	m	/	average	p.	55	10	0	40	0	0	0	0	0
40	1925	f	Huailamarca	poor	p.	19	0	0	48		1	7	0	0

AVERAGE			73	20	10	47	10	1	2	1	1
	6 poor	27 pastoralists (p)									
	14 average	4 pastoralist-merchants (p-m)									
	19 rich	9 merchants (m)									

Appendix 7: Reconstruction of annual head tax revenues.

This table relates the revenue from Carangas to the national and departmental head tax revenues, 1827-1930.¹

¹ There are however some problems and insecurities with these data as it is not always clear if the estimated revenue corresponds to the tax of one semester or a complete year. Often, an amount between 73000 and 75000 bolivianos is annotated, while in other years half of that amount, around 36000 bolivianos. The grey cells indicate the amounts for which it is not clear whether the amount corresponds to revenue of one year or of one year and a half year (3 semesters). Taking Barragán's note on the fact that *contribución* revenues made up about 60% of all departmental incomes (Barragán 2009, 108), and taking into account that budget calculations in prefectural reports often included (expected) incomes for one and a half years, it must be concluded that Carangas' annual contribution based on the head tax fluctuated around 36000 to 38000 bs. The sources for these numbers are: ABN, *Rv*, no. 225-229; ABMO, no. 426, *Libro de matricula, padrón general de la provincia de Carangas*, 1852. APO, *Libros de contabilidad*. 1860, "Libro mayor", f. 6; 1899, "Libro mayor", f. 39; 1900, "Cuentas Corrientes", fs. 7-11. Aramayú 1898, xxiii; Ascarrunz 1909, 106 and 212; Bacarreza 2010 in Pauwels 2006; Morales 1913, 12 and 70; Lemaitre 1916; Ascarrunz 1919, xxx; Lima 1920, 182; Tejada 1921; Calderón 1927, 50; González 1929, 115-6; Rivière 1982, 102-3.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	head tax revenue submitted by Carangas	total head tax received by nat. treasury	proportion Carangas (1) to nat. head tax revenue (2)	total head tax received by dept. treasury	proportion Carangas (1) to dept. head tax revenue (4)	proportion nat. head tax revenues (2) to overall nat. revenues	proportion dept. head tax revenues (4) to overall dept. revenues
	<i>absolute value</i>	<i>absolute value</i>	%	<i>absolute value</i>	%	%	%
<i>Paid in pesos to the national treasury²</i>							
1827		618115				41%	
1830		717920				47%	
1838	24031,5	759695	3,2%			(40-50%)	
1840		745237				45%	
1849		637474				33%	
1852	29733,2	664156	4,5%			30%	
1859	24113,7						
1860	35612,5	650000	5,5%			37%	
1864	36151,7	835658	4,3%			38%	
1867	38893,1	425557	9,1%			17%	
1869		305444				8%	
1871	42008,2	339779	12,4%			20%	
1877	45183,7						
1880		723995				25%	
<i>Paid in bolivianos, now collected by the departmental treasury</i>							
1898	36147,1			46012,8 ³	39,3%		79,5%
1899				98977,58			
1900	18679,68			97205,78	19,2%		
1909	36051,9			94424,9	38,2%		
1910	73158,8			94318,94	77,6%		
1913	72753,88			94320,94	77,1%		32,1%
1915				98931			43,6%
1918				92303			43,1%
1920	37481,1			88985,65	42,1%		
1922				88985,6			

² Note that the amounts in pesos are written with in a decimal style, while the peso corresponds to an octal system, 1 peso being divided into 8 reales. Thus the numbers after the “,” indicate the amount of reales received/deposited. I did not recalculate the amounts to a decimal system.

³ This amount corresponds to one semester, the period of January-April, while the amount registered for the Carangas province gives account of 2 semesters (Aramayu 1898, xxiii).

1923				88985,6			39,7%
1926				89985,6			40,7%
1929				89511,6			
1930				41269			

Appendix 8: Indigenous fiscal categories,
distribution among the eight cantons of the
Carangas province, 1838-1877.


	1838		1852		1860		1864		1867		1871		1877	
Andamarca														
originarios	294	60,6%	332	51,6%	465	51,6%	474	52,8%	502	50,5%	571	49,8%	634	51,2%
agregados	188	38,8%	307	47,7%	432	47,9%	419	46,7%	486	48,9%	568	49,6%	596	48,1%
urus	3	0,6%	4	0,6%	4	0,4%	4	0,4%	6	0,6%	7	0,6%	8	0,6%
Choquecota														
originarios	170	89,0%	216	86,7%	272	85,8%	262	85,3%	303	87,8%	329	87,5%	362	87,4%
agregados	21	11,0%	33	13,3%	45	14,2%	45	14,7%	42	12,2%	47	12,5%	52	12,6%
urus	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%
Corque														
originarios	295	47,5%	328	40,9%	416	43,9%	429	42,6%	468	43,2%	493	44,1%	538	45,3%
agregados	299	48,1%	425	53,1%	484	51,1%	526	52,3%	562	51,9%	564	50,5%	589	49,6%
urus	27	4,3%	48	6,0%	47	5,0%	51	5,1%	53	4,9%	60	5,4%	60	5,1%
Curahuara														
originarios	320	100,0%	365	95,5%	372	97,4%	370	99,5%	384	99,7%	408	99,8%	428	100,0%
agregados	0	0,0%	17	4,5%	10	2,6%	2	0,5%	1	0,3%	1	0,2%	0	0,0%
urus	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%
Huachacalla														
originarios	261	60,6%	291	60,9%	328	56,8%	326	55,6%	337	55,6%	356	57,4%	375	58,7%
agregados	127	29,5%	131	27,4%	186	32,2%	189	32,3%	193	31,8%	189	30,5%	187	29,3%
urus	43	10,0%	56	11,7%	63	10,9%	71	12,1%	76	12,5%	75	12,1%	77	12,1%
Huailamarca														
originarios	233	76,9%	286	75,7%	317	76,4%	321	77,2%	342	74,7%	386	73,9%	421	73,3%
agregados	70	23,1%	92	24,3%	98	23,6%	95	22,8%	116	25,3%	136	26,1%	153	26,7%

urus	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%
Totora														
originarios	224	90,7%	294	87,2%	323	90,0%	342	91,9%	378	92,0%	417	91,4%	457	91,8%
agregados	23	9,3%	43	12,8%	36	10,0%	30	8,1%	33	8,0%	39	8,6%	41	8,2%
urus	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%	0	0,0%
Turco														
originarios	200	70,9%	282	87,6%	360	90,9%	371	90,9%	383	91,6%	394	92,7%	440	96,3%
agregados	62	22,0%	27	8,4%	23	5,8%	26	6,4%	23	5,5%	19	4,5%	5	1,1%
urus	20	7,1%	13	4,0%	13	3,3%	11	2,7%	12	2,9%	12	2,8%	12	2,6%
CARANGAS														
Total														
originarios	1997	69,3%	2394	66,7%	2853	66,4%	2895	66,3%	3097	65,9%	3354	66,1%	3655	67,2%
Total														
agregados	790	27,4%	1075	29,9%	1314	30,6%	1332	30,5%	1456	31,0%	1563	30,8%	1623	29,9%
Total urus	93	3,2%	121	3,4%	127	3,0%	137	3,1%	147	3,1%	154	3,0%	157	2,9%

Appendix 9: Carangas and the hierarchic world wool market, 1880-1930.

At the start of this chain, price quotations from Europe (1) were transmitted to the firms and merchants based in big commercial cities who organized the export (2). These firms guaranteed their position by speculating on and manipulating wool price and stock fluctuations (Caro 1994, 30). Next in line were the wholesale agents who represented the international trade houses in wool-producing zones (3). They were provided by a network of petty purchasers (4a) who met small-scale pastoralist producers on weekly rural markets (5) or obtained the wool from local retail buyers who frequented the pastoralist estancias of the most remote areas (6). Another provision line skipped the purchasers and the rural markets but went via the hacendados (4b) who sold wool directly to trade agents of the Arequipa firms, and hence constituted hindering competitors for the provincial merchants. A particular dynamic is added to this chain by the supply demands of the saltpeter industry (*).

(adapted from Caro 1994, 23-41).



Appendix 10: List of *compensativo* revenues collected in the Carangas province (1866-1867).¹

Revenues	Date	Description	Amount
	18.10.1866	by A Vargas, imposed at the expense of the compensation	400 \$
	31.10.1866	“ “ “ “ “	100 \$
	31.12.1866	“ “ “ “ “	100 \$
	09.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos” coins	650 \$
	09.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “	234 \$ 4 rs.
	13.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos”	327 \$
	13.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “	1567 \$ 4 rs.
	18.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos”	417 \$
	18.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “	1283 \$
	20.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “	200 \$
	20.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “	215 \$ 4 rs.
	26.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “ in “Melgarejos”	690 \$
	26.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “	1386 \$ 2 rs.
	26.01.1867	“ “ “ “ “	147 \$
	04.02.1867	“ “ “ “ “	455 \$
	08.02.1867	“ “ “ “ “	1147 \$
	18.02.1867	“ “ “ “ “	300 \$
	19.02.1867	“ “ “ “ “	1700 \$
	19.03.1867	“ “ “ “ “	4024 \$ 4 rs.
	19.03.1867	Remuneration of Vargas for the payments to the leaders and official of the border of Carangas for salaries to the sub-Prefect Pantaleon Romano,	2510 \$ 3 rs.

¹ ANB, MI, 1867, tomo 188, no. 56. Prefectura Oruro, 2 April 1867, 2nd attached letter.

*Intendent and other employees of the province and
the claimants of Vargas and his assistant of the
recovery commission*

*There is a reduction of 521 pesos, that is 25% (a - 521 \$
quarter) of the amount paid in "Melgarejos" (2084)*

TOTAL

17333 \$ 3 rs.

Appendix 11: List of identified apoderados in Carangas, 1870-1930.²

<i>Name</i>	<i>Represented community</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Appeal</i>
Juan de la Cruz Arias	ayllu Collana, Chuquichambi	1870	Representation in boundary demarcation with Pumiri Jilanaca
	ayllu Canasa, Sabaya (defensor)	1903	Represents comunarios in dispute over the course of river Sabaya
Domingo C. Zubieta	ayllu Pumiri Jilanaca, Chuquichambi	1870	Representation in boundary (river) demarcation with Collana
Manuel Sempértegui	Todos Santos	1873	Representation in dispute against miner Manuel Santiago Ortega
Marcelino Vazquez	Choquecota	1883	Representation of interests in possession hacienda Caranguillas
	ayllu Sapana, Totora	1884	Leads revolt against demarcation
Luis Lujan	ayllu Sapana, Totora	1884	Leads revolt against demarcation
	Jisca-Urinsaya, Huaillamarca	1886	Representation in dispute with Totora
Meliton Delgado	ayllu Lupi, Totora	1886	Representation in dispute with Huaillamarca
	ayllu Aparu, Totora	1925	Representation comunario in inter-ayllu dispute
Guillermo López	Turco	1887	Land dispute with Choquecota
Andres Nicolas	cacique Huachacalla	1891	Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1720
Rafael		1918 ³	(visita Domingo Atocha y La Reinaga)
Zacarias Rocha		1892	Represents ayllu in demarcation and adjudication with ayllu Tunca
Luis Rocha	ayllu Mitma, Huaillamarca	1897	Petitions colonial and republican

² On basis of documents from the AJC, AHJO and ADRO archives. The list gives all identified names of people who took up the function of “apoderado” between 1870 and 1930 in Carangas to defend comunarios or defend their plaintiffs in relation to land rights. However, it is not always possible to define whether the cases in which the apoderados appeared corresponded to communal or inter-individual issues.

³ In 1918, the registered titles of 1981 were requested once more. ADRO, *Propiedades Provincias, Carangas*, 1918, no. 1.

	(apoderado)		demarcation and adjudication documents
Mariano/José Maria Laime ⁴	Carangas province (<i>apoderado general</i>)	1894	Requests <i>composición</i> titles visita José de la Vega Alvarado
Francisco Parrado	ayllus Quitaquita and Ayocota, Corque	1897	Requests <i>composición</i> titles visita José de la Vega Alvarado
Hilario Cáseres	Corque	1898	Appointment Juan Lascano as <i>apoderado general</i>
Melchor Marca ⁵	Totora and Curahuara	1898	Appointment Juan Lascano as <i>apoderado general</i>
Juan Nicolas	Huachacalla	1898	Appointment Juan Lascano as <i>apoderado general</i>
Manuel Manuelo ⁶	Huailamarca (cacique)	1898	Appointment Juan Lascano as <i>apoderado general</i>
Juan Tangari	Andamarca (cacique)	1898	Appointment Juan Lascano as <i>apoderado general</i>
Tomas Colque	Choquecota (cacique)	1898	Appointment Juan Lascano as <i>apoderado general</i>
Juan Lascano	Carangas province (<i>apoderado general</i>)	1898	Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1640s (visita José de la Vega Alvarado) Petitions Revisita exemption
	Cosapa, Turco	1918	Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1720
	Huailamarca	1918	Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1563
	Andamarca	1918	Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1543
Esteban Vargas	Carangas province (<i>apoderado general</i>)	1898	Petitions Revisita exemption
Juan de Dios Cruz	ayllu Tuaña,	1898	Petitions Revisita exemption
Quispe	Huachacalla (caciques-apoderado)	1899	Leads insurgents against Turco
		1900-1906	Representative in compensation by Turco
		1914	Representative in compensation by ayllu Collana (Huachacalla)

⁴ José Maria Laime, who was being replaced in 1898 by Juan Lascano as representative of all communities of the province, probably refers to Mariano Laime (or the other way round), who in 1894 performed that role when requesting the registration of *composición* titles.

⁵ He is mentioned by Mendieta as one of the *apoderados-generales* of Carangas in the mobilization period running up to the 1899 rebellion (Mendieta 2008,388).

⁶ This might refer to Manuel Alanoca, whom Mendieta mentions as one of the *apoderados-generales* of Carangas in the mobilization period running up to the 1899 rebellion (Mendieta 2008,388).

Andres Portillo	Huachacalla (cacique-apoderado)	1899	Leads insurgents against Turco
		1904	Representative in transaction “Capillos” terrain by Turco
		1926	Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1543 (visita José de la Vega Alvarado)
Toribio Flores	Turco Sabaya and Huachacalla	1899	Leads Turco insurgents
		1926	Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1651 and 1593 (visita José de la Vega Alvarado)
Daniel Barriga	ayllu Sacari, Sabaya (defensor)	1903	Represents comunarios in dispute over the course of river Sabaya
Juan Bautista Camacho	Curahuara de Carangas	1905	Accused of abusing the indigenous population as apoderado
Juan Mollo Domingo Marca	ayllus of Turco	1905	Representation in lawsuit against the government about the tax on alpaca wool
Antonio Soto Várgas	Corque (apoderado)	1906	Accuses sub-Prefect Lazarte of abuses
Belisario Ampuero	Totora (apoderado)	1906	Representative in sale estate Pisaqueri
Pedro Flores	ayllu Sacari, Sabaya (apoderado)	1909- 1911	Registration adjudication particular sayañas; demarcation and transaction with Llica; integration in Todos Santos; registration <i>composición</i> titles
Manuel Rojas		1909	Represents Pisiga (ayllu Cumujo) in sayaña adjudication
Facundo Rojas	Sabaya (apoderados)	1916	Represents ayllu Cumujo in salt concession adjudication
		1928	Registration verdicts land division ayllu Sacari
Nicario Rojas		1917	Petitions demarcation
Ramon Funez	Cosapa, Turco (apoderado)	1910	Requests consolidation land rights
Hermenigildo Verasqui	vice-canton Carangas (apoderado)	1911	Demands boundary inspection ayllu Canasa
Fermin Colque	ayllu Collana, Sabaya	1911	Registration of integration Carangas contribuyentes
Enrique Rafael	ayllu Aimarani, Totora (apoderado)	1911	Requests republican land title documents
		1916	Represents comunarios in land dispute against ayllu Guaraguara

		1925	Requests (with jilaqata Julian Rafael) demarcation documents
Faustino Mollo	ayllu Jisca-Urinsaya, Huailamarca (apoderado)	1912	Represents one of the litigating parties in intra-ayllu land dispute
Juan Eloy Altamirano	Curahuara de Carangas (apoderado)	1909	Represents comunarios in inter-ayllu land dispute
		1913	“Apoderado de la indiada”
Ricardo Montalvo	Curahuara de Carangas (Corregidor)	1913	Accused of leading indigenous attack against Altamirano
Raimundo Marca	Curahuara de Carangas	1913	Instigated the rebellion
Leonardo Villca	Curahuara de Carangas	1913	Instigated the rebellion
Paulino Valdéz	Curahuara de Carangas	1913	Leads rebellion
Cupercino Cruz	Curahuara de Carangas (jilaqata)	1913	Indicated as rebellion leader
Vicente Huarachi Marcelino Paxsi Mariano Cruz Eusebio Cruz P. Chuquichambi C. Condori Felipe Mamani Geronimo Colque Ramon Chuquichambi José Maria Apata Pedro Chura Benito Mamani Remigio Bautista Romualdo Cruz Raimundo Guarachi	Curahuara de Carangas	1913	Indicated as rebellion leader/participant
Avelino Campos Tomas Anconi Angelo Ala	ayllu Guaraguara, Totorá (apoderados)	1914	Represent comunarios in land dispute with ayllu Aimarani
Belisario Bernal	ayllu Cala, Corque (apoderado)	1914	Represents comunarios in land dispute with ayllu Cupiáza
Manuel Felix Fernandez	Sabaya	1914	Requests inter-ayllu demarcation and adjudication
Casiano Montealegre	ayllu Canasa, Sabaya (apoderado)	1914	Requests sayaña demarcation, registers delineation documents

	Sabaya and Todos Santos (apoderado)	1914	Represents ayllus before government
José L. Mamani	Todos Santos (apoderado)	1914	Represents comunarios in lawsuit to evict ex-contribuyente
Zenobio Montealegre ⁷	ayllu Guaraguara, Totorá (apoderado) Andamarca	1917 1920	Represents comunarios in lawsuit against Aimarani Apoderado of rebellion community leader Aurelio Villca
Gabriel Villca	Andamarca	1918	Registration petition Lascano 1899
Luciano Villca	ayllu Canasa, Sabaya La Rivera	1918 1920	Registration <i>composición</i> title 1504 Registration verdict dispute 1827
Sergio Sierra	Totorá (apoderado)	1920	Represents the community against accusation of rebellion
Luciano Quispe	Andamarca (apoderado general)	1920	Indicated as leader of invasion Huachacalla
Aurelio Villca	Andamarca (apoderado general)	1920	Indicated as leader of invasion Huachacalla
Pantaleón Arias	Orinoca and Andamarca (apoderado) Turco (apoderado)	1922 1929	Requests 1898 documents restitution lands in Chuquisaca Requests <i>composición</i> titles 1543, 1692, 1720.
Domingo Condori	Ayllu Camacha, Huachacalla (apoderado)	1924	Requests registration <i>composición</i> titles (granted under Toledo)
Daniel Aguilar	Cosapa (apoderado)	1924	Requests registration <i>composición</i> titles (granted under Toledo)
Victor Manuel Barientos	Totorá and Turco (lawyer)	1925- 1930	Registration of particular sayaña adjudications
Emilio Zuñiga	Several cantons (lawyer)	1926- 1930	Registration of particular sayaña adjudications; <i>composición</i> titles
E. Chambi Villcaraña	ayllu Tatasapana, Totorá	1927	Registration land titles 1843

⁷ Zenobio is the son of Casiano Montealegre.

