

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

Aliens en route:

European transmigration through Britain, 1836-1914

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Hull

by

Nicholas J. Evans

B.A. (Hons) History, University of Leicester

July 2006

Dedicated to my parents Gloria and John Evans

Abstract

This thesis discusses the agencies, transport systems, and infrastructure that enabled more than 3.15 million Europeans to emigrate to the United States, Canada, and South Africa through Britain between 1836 and 1914. Rather than travelling directly from the European mainland, these transmigrants broke their journeys by travelling to Britain where they boarded another vessel that conveyed them across the Atlantic. The control that Britain exerted over both the short-sea and long-haul passenger routes thus involved was as important to British maritime commerce as similar controls over freight or direct long-haul passenger routes to the far-flung corners of the British Empire. However the crucial significance of the transmigrant business to the British merchant marine has been largely overlooked in recent historiography, and it is this lacuna that the present dissertation seeks to redress.

The study is split into three sections. The first part quantifies the patterns of the transmigrant business, answering questions such as: what were the origins of the migrants and what routes did they use to reach Britain? When did they come? Where in Britain did they land, where were they bound, and where did they re-embark? Having charted these issues, the thesis turns in the second section to investigate how the transmigrant business developed and evolved, paying particular attention to the factors that conditioned the market throughout the 78 year period. Finally, the thesis examines the significance of the transmigrant business to British ports serving as conduits for the passenger movement, to the companies involved in transporting the aliens, and to the migrants themselves.

By exploring these issues this thesis has made a significant contribution to migrant and maritime historiography in the following ways. First, it has broadened the chronological and geographical focus of migrancy back from the 1880s to the 1830s and stressed Scandinavian as well as central/East European movements. Second, it has demonstrated how European transmigrants were as important to British shipping companies as were British emigrants seeking to settle in Britain's overseas dominions. Third, immigration to Britain has been incorrectly conceptualised because historians and social commentators fail to take account of the onward movement of aliens arriving in Britain and assume instead that most were permanent settlers. Fourth, the primacy of Britain's maritime links to the United States was more important for the passenger business than has been previously acknowledged.

Finally, this study disproves theories by immigrant historians that centres of alien settlement across Northern Britain arose because they were situated along the transmigrant corridor between the Humber and Mersey. In reality many of the trains carrying transmigrants never passed through the towns and cities where large-scale immigration took place. By combining a mixture of global, national and local studies, and a longer chronology, this thesis offers an important intersection of transport and maritime studies that shows how transmigration has been under appreciated by both maritime and migrants historians alike.

Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	p. i
<i>Contents</i>	p. iii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	p. v
<i>List of Charts</i>	p. vii
<i>List of Tables</i>	p. xi
<i>List of Figures</i>	p. xvii
<i>List of Maps</i>	p. xviii
<i>Abbreviations</i>	p. xix
1. Introduction	p. 1
1.1 The historical context	p. 2
1.2 Migrant historiography	p. 6
1.3 Maritime historiography	p. 12
1.4 The rationale and aims of the thesis	p. 16
2. Sources and methodology	p. 20
2.1 Quantitative sources	p. 20
2.1.1 British Parliamentary Papers	p. 21
2.1.2 British passenger lists	p. 24
2.1.3 British port medical sources	p. 30
2.1.4 Statistics from religious agencies	p. 32
2.1.5 Re-arranging the transmigrant data	p. 35
2.2 Qualitative sources	p. 37
2.2.1 Port-based sources	p. 37
2.2.2 Business archives	p. 40
2.2.2.1 Shipping company archives	p. 40
2.2.2.2 Railway company archives	p. 42
2.2.3 Personal testimony	p. 43
2.3 Conclusion	p. 45
3. Patterns of transmigration	p. 48
3.1 Transoceanic migration	p. 49
3.2 Alien migration to and from Britain	p. 58
3.3 Transmigration through Britain	p. 72
3.3.1 The country of origin	p. 72
3.3.2 The continental ports of origin	p. 76
3.3.3 The British points of entry	p. 80
3.3.4 The British points of exit	p. 85
3.3.5 The countries of destination	p. 90
3.3.6 Religious transmigration	p. 94
3.3.6.1 Scandinavian Mormon transmigration	p. 95
3.3.6.2 East European Jewish transmigration	p. 99
3.4 Conclusion	p. 104

4.	The transmigrant business	p. 108
4.1	The journey across Europe	p. 108
4.2	The journey to Britain	p. 112
4.3	The journey across Britain	p. 120
4.4	The departure from Britain	p. 134
4.5	Conclusion	p. 138
5.	Determinants conditioning the market	p. 140
5.1	Supply and demand	p. 140
5.1.1	Germany	p. 141
5.1.2	Scandinavia	p. 145
5.1.3	Imperial Russia	p. 151
5.2	Official intervention in the trade	p. 158
5.2.1	European intervention	p. 159
5.2.2	British intervention	p. 168
5.2.3	Transoceanic intervention	p. 174
5.3	Conclusion	p. 180
6.	Ports	p. 182
6.1	The development of Britain's ports	p. 183
6.2	The passenger trade	p. 187
6.3	The transmigrant trade and British ports	p. 192
6.3.1	The feeder port	p. 194
6.3.2	The points of re-embarkation	p. 209
6.3.3	The transmigrant trade and the port-city	p. 217
6.4	Conclusion	p. 228
7.	The transmigrant business and British transport companies	p. 232
7.1	The era of growth and expansion (1851-1881)	p. 233
7.1.1	North Sea operations	p. 234
7.1.2	The rail route across Britain	p. 250
7.1.3	Atlantic shipping services	p. 260
7.2	Retaining the business (1882-1914)	p. 271
7.2.1	Competition, contraction and intervention (1882-1898)	p. 273
7.2.2	Co-operation, trade wars and acquisitions (1899-1914)	p. 286
7.3	Conclusion	p. 299
8.	Conclusion	p. 303
	<i>Appendix I</i>	p. 316
	<i>Appendix II</i>	p. 319
	<i>Appendix III</i>	p. 363
	<i>Bibliography</i>	p. 371

Acknowledgements

Numerous people have assisted in the extensive research undertaken for this dissertation. I want first of all to thank the staff of museums, libraries and archives in Britain: in particular, those of the Archives and Special Collections, Brynmor Jones Library at the University of Hull, the Hull City Archives, the Local Studies Department of Hull Central Library, the Local History Unit of Hull College, the Reference Section of Grimsby Central Library, North East Lincolnshire Archives and Special Collections, the Archives of the Merseyside Maritime Museum, the Business Archives at the Glasgow University, Arthur Credland of the Hull Maritime Museum, Hull College's Local History Unit, the National Archives, Kew, the Caird Library and the Brass Foundry at the National Maritime Museum, the Archives and Special Collection at the University of Southampton, the City of Southampton Archives, Brett Harrison of West Yorkshire Archives Service, the staff of the Manchester Jewish Museum, the Jewish Museum, London, the London Metropolitan Archives, the Corporation of the City of London Record Office, the Scottish Jewish Archives Centre (Glasgow), and the Liverpool Record Office.

I have also been able to make extensive use of overseas archives, and in this connection I take pleasure now in acknowledging the assistance of those that have been most helpful including: Jürgen Sielemann of the Hamburg State Archives, of Marian Smith, Senior Historian of the INS service of the United States Government, the archivists and staff of HAPAG-Lloyd in Hamburg, the Amsterdam Jewish Museum, the Kaplan Centre Archives at the University of Cape Town, the Cape Town State Archives, the Institute of Migration in Finland, the Immigration History Research Centre at the University of Minneapolis, and the Archives and Special Collections at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor).

Moreover, this study has been financed by research grants received from numerous institutions including the Sir Philip Reckitt Educational Trust, the Kaplan Centre at the University of Cape Town, the Kaarle Hjalmar Lehtisen Research Award of the Institute of Migration in Finland, a Caird Doctoral Research Fellowship at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, the University of Hull's Maritime Historical Studies Centre and the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. The last of these also provided the loan of a laptop for the early years of my research. Financial assistance was also provided through the help of Dr David J. Starkey who allowed me

to work in the congenial atmosphere of the Maritime Historical Studies Centre between 2000 and 2002, and Nigel Rigby who enabled my continued use of facilities at the National Maritime Museum during and after the conclusion of my Caird Fellowship.

Friends and family have also assisted in a variety of ways throughout the duration of this study. In addition to the usual support and words of wisdom, they have always provided, I am now able to acknowledge with gratitude their help with travel, IT, accommodation, and financial assistance, all of which enabled me to turn my enthusiasm for this subject into a reality. To all of them I am very grateful for making this research possible. Some have assisted more than others, and it is only possible here to name but a few. They include Cath Large, David Scammell, Julie Green, Rob Green, Alison Whiteside, Mark Greene, Nick Ulyatt, Mike Ulyatt, Andre Brannan, Chris Ketchell, Susan Capes, Vivien Grant, Janet Hendry, Debbie Beavis, Ted Gillett, John Graves, Jude Taylor, Dr Kay Thompson, Michaela Barnard, Janine Blumberg, Dr Gemma Romain, Børge Solem, Saul Issroff, Sue Swiggum, Dr Esther Mijers, and Harvey Kaplan.

Finally, academic assistance has also been provided by Dr Angela McCarthy, Dr Sheila Boll, Professor Milton Shain, Dr Anne Kershen, Dr Michael Smale, Dr Marjory Harper, and Professor Tony Kushner. Two individuals more than any others, Professor Aubrey Newman and Dr David Starkey, have supervised this research at different stages in its production. Aubrey Newman provided constant encouragement and the support which fostered my research on aliens *en route*. David J. Starkey gave not only academic guidance, but also opportunities to access the research funds described above. He also had the unenviable task of turning my enthusiasm into serious academic analysis and text. Without the assistance, guidance, and supervision of both of these men, this thesis would never have come to fruition. Despite their words of wisdom and criticism, this work ultimately remains my own, and I hereby take full and sole responsibility for any errors in content or interpretation.

List of Charts

Chart 3.1	The number of migrants making oceanic journeys, 1846-1915	p. 50
Chart 3.2	The destinations of emigrants from Europe (excluding Britain and Ireland), 1889-1913	p. 51
Chart 3.3	The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in the United States, 1836-1914	p. 53
Chart 3.4	The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in Canada, 1900-1914	p. 55
Chart 3.5	The flow of alien passengers from European countries, 1856-1915	p. 57
Chart 3.6	Intra-continental alien population movement to Britain, 1879-1913	p. 59
Chart 3.7	The intra-European passenger market to Britain, 1884-1905	p. 60
Chart 3.8	Inter-continental passenger movement from Britain, 1853-1914	p. 61
Chart 3.9	The number of passengers embarking upon transoceanic voyages from Britain's five leading passenger ports, 1843-1913	p. 62
Chart 3.10	The destination of all passengers who left British ports, 1860-63 and 1871-1913	p. 63
Chart 3.11	The gender profile of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 65
Chart 3.12a	Destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 66
Chart 3.12b	Destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 67
Chart 3.13a	Occupations and destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 69
Chart 3.13b	Occupations and destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 70
Chart 3.14	The number of foreign passengers leaving Britain known to be transmigrants	p. 71

Chart 3.15	The nationality of all transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1836-1859	p. 73
Chart 3.16	The nationality of transmigrants arriving in Britain, 1906-1913	p. 75
Chart 3.17	The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1836-1859	p. 77
Chart 3.18	The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1890-1913	p. 79
Chart 3.19	The ports at which European transmigrants entered Britain, 1836-1913	p. 81
Chart 3.20	The nationality of transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1906-1913	p. 83
Chart 3.21	The British ports at which transmigrants arrived and embarked, 1906-1913	p. 86
Chart 3.22	The nationality of transmigrants who embarked at British ports, 1906-1913	p. 88
Chart 3.23	The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859	p. 91
Chart 3.24	The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1890-1911	p. 92
Chart 3.25	The destination and nationality of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1906-1911	p. 93
Chart 3.26	The nationality of Mormon converts who emigrated to the United States from Britain, 1852-1890	p. 97
Chart 3.27	The ports at which European Mormon transmigrants arrived in Britain <i>en route</i> to Utah, 1852-1890	p. 98
Chart 3.28	The number of Russian, Polish, and Galician transmigrants travelling through the Port of London, 1895-1903	p. 100
Chart 3.29	The overseas destinations of transmigrants staying at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, 1885-1914	p. 102
Chart 3.30	The percentage of immigrants to the United States and Canada who had transmigrated via Britain, 1906-1911	p. 105

Chart 4.1	The ports of arrival used by European transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859	p. 111
Chart 4.2	Annual rates of European transmigration via the port of Hull, 1836-1914	p. 128
Chart 4.3	The decreasing use of sail powered vessels by steerage passengers, 1864-1869	p. 136
Chart 4.4	The length of time involved in transmigrating from European to the United States, 1853-1890	p. 137
Chart 6.1	The number of transmigrants arriving at the port of Grimsby, 1882-1913	p. 198
Chart 6.2	The number of transmigrants and the tonnage of foreign trade tonnage arriving at the port of Hull from North European ports, 1873-1913	p. 202
Chart 6.3	The country of birth of emigration agents facilitating the transmigrant trade at Liverpool in 1881	p. 223
Chart 7.1	Income derived by the Wilson Line from passengers 1911-1914	p. 247
Chart 7.2	The gross earnings the Wilson Line generated through its Swedish operations, 1908-1910	p. 248
Chart 7.3	The value of income the Wilson Line generated through its Norwegian operations, 1908-1910	p. 249
Chart 7.4	The share of the railway traffic, by year, by members of the Humber Conference, 1896-1910	p. 256
Chart 7.5	The overall division of the traffic controlled by the Humber Conference (according to Railway Company), 1896-1910	p. 256
Chart 7.6	Profile of the British passenger trade (by class), 1899-1914	p. 288
Chart 7.7	The division of the westbound transatlantic steerage trade, 1899-1914	p. 289
Chart 7.8	The importance of the foreign passenger (and transmigrant trades) westward-bound Passenger business from Britain, 1901-1913	p. 290

Chart 7.9	The revenues generated by the Anchor Line's steerage passenger trade, 1901-1908	p. 294
Chart 7.10	The number of passengers carried by different British and Scandinavian companies within the Transatlantic Passenger Conference, 1899-1914	p. 296

List of Tables

Table 3.1	Transoceanic migrant journeys, 1846-1915	p. 50
Table 3.2	The destinations of all emigrants from Europe (excluding Britain and Ireland), 1889-1913	p. 52
Table 3.3	The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in the United States, 1836-1914	p. 54
Table 3.4	The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in Canada, 1900-1914	p. 56
Table 3.5	The number of alien passengers sailing from European countries, 1856-1915	p. 58
Table 3.6	Intra-continental alien population movement to Britain, 1879-1913	p. 59
Table 3.7	The intra-European passenger market to Britain, 1884-1905	p. 60
Table 3.8	Inter-continental passenger movement from Britain, 1853-1914	p. 61
Table 3.9	The number of passengers embarking upon transoceanic voyages from Britain's five leading passenger ports, 1843-1913	p. 62
Table 3.10	The destination of all passengers who left British ports, 1860-63 and 1871-1913	p. 64
Table 3.11	The gender profile of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 65
Table 3.12	Number and destinations of adult alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 67
Table 3.13	Occupations and destinations of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 70
Table 3.14	The proportion of foreign passengers leaving Britain known to be transmigrants	p. 71
Table 3.15	The nationality of selected transmigrants arriving at British Ports, 1836-1859	p. 74

Table 3.16	The nationality of transmigrants arriving in Britain, 1906-1913	p. 75
Table 3.17	The European ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1836-1859	p. 77
Table 3.18	The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1890-1913	p. 79
Table 3.19	The ports at which European transmigrants entered Britain, 1836-1913	p. 81
Table 3.20	The nationality of transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1906-1913	p. 84
Table 3.21	The British ports at which transmigrants arrived and embarked, 1906-1913	p. 87
Table 3.22	The nationality of transmigrants who embarked at British ports, 1906-1913	p. 89
Table 3.23	The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859	p. 91
Table 3.24	The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1890-1911	p. 92
Table 3.25	The destination and nationality of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1906-1911	p. 94
Table 3.26	The nationality of Mormon converts who emigrated to the United States from Britain, 1852-1890	p. 97
Table 3.27	The ports at which European Mormon transmigrants arrived in Britain <i>en route</i> to Utah, 1852-1890	p. 99
Table 3.28	The scale of transmigration through London, 1895-1903	p. 101
Table 3.29	The overseas destinations of transmigrants staying at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, 1885-1914	p. 103
Table 3.30	The percentage of immigrants to the United States and Canada who had transmigrated via Britain, 1906-1911	p. 106
Table 4.1	Development of transportation compared with development of emigration in Sweden and certain European countries.	p. 109

Table 4.2	The seasonality of transmigration via the port of Hull, 1869-1871	p. 116
Table 5.1	Financial return made by the Wilson Line of Hull on Swedish emigration bonds deposited with the Swedish Government, 1891-1914	p. 165
Table 5.2	Shipping Companies which gave security for transmigrants under Section 8(1) b of the 1905 Aliens Act	p. 173
Table 6.1	Docks used to land transmigrants at Hull in 1852, 1887/8, and 1913	p. 208
Table 6.2	Dock usage at Liverpool by different passenger liners, 1870-1910	p. 212
Table 6.3	The nationality of emigration agents facilitating the transmigrant trade at Hull in 1881	p. 220
Table 7.1	The transmigrant trade to Hull in 1852	p. 236
Table 7.2	The value (gross earnings) of the transmigrant trade to North Sea shipping companies, 1836-1913	p. 239
Table 7.3	Division of short-sea passenger trade to Britain, 1890-1901	p. 240
Table 7.4	The percentage of income the Wilson Line generated through its Swedish operations, 1908-1910	p. 248
Table 7.5	The percentage of income the Wilson Line generated through its Norwegian operations, 1908-1910	p. 249
Table 7.6	The port of embarkation of foreign and British emigrants transported by railway companies from north eastern ports, 1896-1910	p. 255
Table 7.7	The estimated revenue generated through the movement of transmigrants along the Humber to Mersey rail route, 1850-1913	p. 258
Table 7.8	The number of transmigrants conveyed under the Mormon emigration contract, 1852-1890	p. 264

Table 7.9	The passenger market from Liverpool to New York in 1872	p. 267
Table 7.10	Particulars of specimen vessels belonging to the Cunard fleet, 1840-1907	p. 268
Table 7.11	Breakdown of gross earnings the Anchor Line derived from the Glasgow to New York route, 1899-1905	p. 271
Table 7.12	Proportion of gross earnings the Anchor Line derived from the Glasgow to New York route, 1899-1905	p. 271
Table 7.13	The scale and character of the transmigrant trade to Hull between 1 July 1887 and 30 June 1888	p. 274
Table 7.14	The significance of the British transmigrant business to the British third-class passenger trade, 1899-1913	p. 291
Table 7.15	The number and composition of passengers conveyed by Cunard and the White Star Line (from Liverpool) during the first six months of 1913	p. 292
Table 7.16	The significance of the British transmigrant trade to the British steerage market, 1899-1913	p. 295
Table 7.17	The transmigrant trade to Hull in 1913	p. 299
Appendix 2.1	Data for Chart 3.1. The number of migrants making ocean journeys, 1846-1915	p. 319
Appendix 2.2	Data for Chart 3.2. The destinations of emigrants from Europe (excluding Britain and Ireland), 1889-1913	p. 320
Appendix 2.3	Data for Chart 3.3. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in the United States, 1836-1914	p. 321
Appendix 2.4	Data for Chart 3.4. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in Canada, 1900-1914	p. 323
Appendix 2.5	Data for Chart 3.5. The flow of alien passengers from European countries, 1856-1915	p. 324
Appendix 2.6	Data for Chart 3.6. Intra-continental alien population movement to Britain, 1879-1913	p. 325
Appendix 2.7	Data for Chart 3.7. The intra-European passenger market to Britain, 1884-1905	p. 327

Appendix 2.8	Data for Chart 3.8. Inter-continental passenger movement from Britain, 1853-1914	p. 328
Appendix 2.9	Data for Chart 3.9. The number of passengers embarking upon transoceanic voyages from Britain's five leading passenger ports, 1843-1913	p. 330
Appendix 2.10	Data for Chart 3.10. The destination of all passengers who left British ports, 1860-3 and 1871-1913	p. 332
Appendix 2.11	Data for Chart 3.11. The gender of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 333
Appendix 2.12a	Data for Chart 3.12a. Destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 334
Appendix 2.12b	Data for Chart 3.12b. Destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 335
Appendix 2.13a	Data for Chart 3.13a. Occupations and destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 336
Appendix 2.13b	Data for Chart 3.13b. Occupations and destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911	p. 337
Appendix 2.14	Data for Chart 3.14. The number of foreign passengers leaving Britain known to be transmigrants	p. 338
Appendix 2.15	Data for Chart 3.15. The nationality of all transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1836-1859	p. 339
Appendix 2.16	Data for Chart 3.16. The nationality of transmigrants arriving in Britain, 1906-1913	p. 340
Appendix 2.17	Data for Chart 3.17. The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1836-1859	p. 341
Appendix 2.18	Data for Chart 3.18. The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1890-1913	p. 342
Appendix 2.19	Data for Chart 3.19. The ports at which European transmigrants entered Britain, 1836-1913	p. 343
Appendix 2.20	Data for Chart 3.20. The nationality of transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1906-1913	p. 346

Appendix 2.21	Data for Chart 3.21. The British ports at which transmigrants arrived and embarked, 1906-1913	p. 348
Appendix 2.22	Data for Chart 3.22. The nationality of transmigrants who embarked at British ports, 1906-1913	p. 349
Appendix 2.23	Data for Chart 3.23. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859	p. 351
Appendix 2.24	Data for Chart 3.24. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1890-1911	p. 352
Appendix 2.25	Data for Chart 3.25. The destination and nationality of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1906-1911	p. 353
Appendix 2.26	Data for Chart 3.26. The nationality of Mormon converts who emigrated to the United States from Britain, 1852-1890	p. 354
Appendix 2.27	Data for Chart 3.27. The ports at which European Mormon transmigrants arrived in Britain <i>en route</i> to Utah, 1852-1890	p. 356
Appendix 2.28	Data for Chart 3.28. The number of Russian, Polish, and Galician transmigrants travelling through the Port of London, 1895-1903	p. 358
Appendix 2.29	Data for Chart 3.29. The overseas destinations of transmigrants staying at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, 1885-1914	p. 359
Appendix 2.30	Data for Chart 3.30. The percentage of immigrants to the United States and Canada who had transmigrated via Britain, 1906-1911	p. 360

List of Figures

Figure 4.1	Advertisement (in German) promoting the services of the Minerva Hotel, Hull (circa 1850)	p. 123
Figure 4.2	Harry Lazarus' Lodging House, 32-33 Posterngate, Hull	p. 125
Figure 4.3	Emigrants leaving Liverpool's lodging-houses for the Cunarder Lucania (1895)	p. 152
Figure 7.1	The dynastic and commercial linkages of the Wilson family	p. 245
Figure 7.2	The flow of Swedish emigrants to and from Britain after 1885	p. 279
Appendix 3.1	Multilingual advertisement for the Sloman Line (1841)	p. 363
Appendix 3.2	Larsson Brother Transmigrant Contract Ticket (c.1890)	p. 364
Appendix 3.3	Larsson Brother Transmigrant Contract Ticket – cont. (c.1890)	p. 365
Appendix 3.4	White Star Line Transmigrant Ticket (1914)	p. 366
Appendix 3.5	Indirekt List, Hamburg (1854-1910)	p. 367
Appendix 3.6	List of Aliens (1836-1859, 1867-1869)	p. 368
Appendix 3.7	Customs Bill of Entry, Hull (1840-1914)	p. 369
Appendix 3.8	Board of Trade, Outward-bound Passenger Manifests (1906-1914)	p. 370

List of Maps

- | | | |
|---------|--|--------|
| Map 4.1 | Ports connected with the transmigration of Europeans through Britain | p. 114 |
| Map 4.2 | The various routes taken by Emigrant trains working the transpennine corridor, 1840-1914 | p. 131 |

Abbreviations

BPP	<i>British Parliamentary Papers</i>
BT	Archives of the Board of Trade (held at The National Archives, Kew)
CLRO	Corporation of London Record Office
BJL	Archives and Special Collections, Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull
DFDS	Det Forende Dampskib Selskab
FÅA	Finska Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget
FO	Archives of the Foreign Office (held at The National Archives, Kew)
GCL	Reference Collection, Grimsby Central Library
GCR	Great Central Railway
HAPAG	Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien-Gesellschaft
HCA	Hull City Archives
HO	Archives of the Home Office (held at The National Archives, Kew)
IMM	International Mercantile Marine
INS	US Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Washington DC
LJM	London Jewish Museum
LMA	London Metropolitan Archives
LNWR	London & North Western Railway
LSL	Local Studies Library, Hull Central Library
L&Y	Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway
MJM	Manchester Jewish Museum
MLD	Museum of London in the Docklands
MMM	Merseyside Maritime Museum, Liverpool
MS&L	Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway
NELA	North East Lincolnshire Archives, Grimsby
NER	North Eastern Railway
NDL	Norddeutscher Lloyd
NMM	National Maritime Museum
PJTS	Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter
PLA	Archives of the Port of London Authority (held at the Museum of London in the Docklands)
RAIL	Archives of British Rail (held at The National Archives, Kew)
TAPC	Transatlantic Passenger Conference (copy held at INS)
TNA	The National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office)
TWS	Thomas Wilson, Sons & Company
UCT	Kaplan Centre Archives, University of Cape Town

1. Introduction

The subject of transporting large numbers of passengers across long-haul sea routes has captivated historians, geographers, and economists alike since the late Victorian era. The fascination with the diverse complements of passengers and crew travelling *en masse* aboard so-called ‘floating palaces’ has culminated in the creation of an extensive literature. Most of these works celebrate the grandeur of life on board ship, describe the symbolism to nation-states of possessing their own merchant fleets, or concentrate on the position that the North Atlantic held over oceanic passenger shipping. Yet whilst alluding to the notion that ocean travel necessitated a prior journey by sea, rail, or both sea *and* rail before embarking on a vessel capable of traversing the Atlantic, few have investigated the ‘less glamorous’ aspect of transoceanic travel – the short-sea routes across the Baltic or North Sea to Britain, the Irish Sea to Britain, or the Tasman Sea Australia or New Zealand. Like the migrations that took place around the South Atlantic, Pacific or Indian oceans, transmigration via Britain thereby remains a significant lacuna in the existing literature.¹

This introductory chapter places this thesis within the wider context of mass population flows between 1820, when the first steam-powered passenger ships first began to ply the North Sea, and 1924, when the United States closed her doors to large-scale immigration. It also sets this study within the wider context of existing historiography. It achieves this by describing the differing forms of migration from Britain during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Having established the economic context within which the business of mass migration emerged, it then discusses how historians have portrayed the movement of aliens across the North Sea – the short-sea routes predominantly used by Alien emigrants – and the North Atlantic. Finally it provides the rationale behind a study of indirect European migration through Britain between 1836 and 1914 – and outlines some of the questions this study resolves.

¹ For a discussion of other migrations around the world between 1846 and 1950 see: Adam McKeown, ‘Global Migration, 1846-1940’, *Journal of World History*, Volume XV, Number 2 (2004). p. 1.

1.1 The historical context

Whether bound for long-haul destinations, such as the United States, Canada, Australasia, Africa and Latin America, or travelling on the short-sea routes to Britain, the European settlement of the ‘western world’ during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries followed established principles of economics first laid down by Thomas Malthus in *An Essay on the Principle of Population* published in 1798.² Malthus argued that emigration did not drain a nation’s economic prowess but helped to keep the population spread thinly. A certain degree of emigration, he articulated, was beneficial to both sending and receiving nations. Without it, over-population and immorality would spread; population growth would outstrip the capability of countries to feed their expanding populations. Out-migration to less-populated areas of the world, as further noted by Adam Smith, only served to enrich nations.³ Smith argued that the wealth of a labour force was not of significance. Instead he pointed towards the condition of a population – whether it was ‘advancing, stationary, or [in a] declining condition’. Where a population was not ‘assisted’ by emigration the population would not advance, its economic condition would worsen. Although many have subsequently revised Malthusian and Smithsonian economic theories, the population movements they defined – from the ‘old’ labour markets in Europe to ‘new’ markets overseas – quickly developed during the eighteenth century into large-scale phenomenon. With the cessation of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 peace heralded the resumption of transatlantic migration on a scale previously unimaginable. A survey of immigrant arrivals into what would become the largest labour market – the United States – confirms this. In 1833 the number of aliens arriving in the US from across the world had grown to 56,640; by 1854 this had increased to 427,833; and by 1913 it had peaked at 1,387,318.⁴

Transoceanic migration comprised a multitude of voluntary and coerced forms. The conditions in which the passengers moved varied as greatly as the ethnicities, nationalities, and occupations of those on board. Except for the relatively

² Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (London, 1970). The term European – in this context – excludes Britain and Ireland.

³ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London, 1925).

⁴ Imre Ferenczi & Walter Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume 1: Statistics* (New York, 1929), p. 394.

small number of Huguenots who settled in Britain during the late seventeenth century, most of those who travelled during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not do so voluntarily. They were predominantly bound for long-haul destinations. British and Irish criminals were sent to Australasia and Colonial America; enslaved Africans and Asians were transported to plantations in America and the Caribbean. After Britain abolished the slave trade throughout the British Empire in 1807, the movement of forced migrations was cut drastically. The deficit in population flows was instead replaced by a growing number of voluntary migrations.

As with the shipment of other 'commodities' the market was driven by consumer demand. The land of greatest opportunity drew the lion's share of Europe's excess labour. Not surprisingly all of Europe's leading maritime nations – France, Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands – had all provided passenger shipping to that magnet – America – by 1840. Whether 'pushed' or 'pulled', the business of shipping migrants to the United States followed macro population movements that had for the previous two centuries been dominated by the slave trade. Whilst voluntary migration had less political significance than the slave trade, the economic gravitas it garnered helped under-developed economies by supplying them with an abundance of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labour. Voluntary and coerced population flows predominantly centred upon the North and South Atlantic. Of the 55 million migrants who are estimated to have moved between 1830 and 1930, 35 million (or 64 per cent) did so across oceans.⁵ The North and South Atlantic served as maritime highways connecting areas possessing surplus populations with economies requiring agricultural or industrial development. Many sojourned, but most permanently settled within new labour markets.

As the majority of European nations – Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal – possessed colonial empires – it was of little surprise that most also encouraged surplus labour to settle their dominions. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries this imperial settlement initially centred on the Atlantic. The Dutch settled Surinam; the French, Germans, and British encouraged migration to Africa; the French and British went to North America; and the Spanish and Portuguese ventured to Latin America. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century the leading exponents of Imperialism began to look further east –

⁵ McKeown, 'Global Migration', p. 1.

to Asia and, in particular, to Oceania – and Britain led the way. The ocean crossing of such settlers was as likely to be from the north to the south as from east to west. Whilst the Atlantic provided access to other oceans and seas its significance was less than has often been portrayed. Some migrants reached the colonies as indentured servants – through the promise of colonial functions; others did so as members of the armed services. Yet the scale of such movements was limited. Only with the increased provision of financial assistance towards settling remote, often inhospitable terrain, far removed from the migrants' place of birth, would the importance of the continued settlement of Europe's dominions develop. This sponsored migration largely took place outside of the Atlantic basin. Yet the long-haul movements necessitated financial encouragement. The assistance took the form of land grants, contributions towards the relatively high costs of travel, or fiscal aid to lessen the burden of the initial settlement process. It ensured links were preserved between metropolis and colonial frontier. Britain, as the possessor of the largest Empire, led this settlement process. In total over 5.68 million British and Irish migrants are estimated to have settled parts of Britain's Empire (Canada and Australasia) between 1815 and 1914.⁶ Technological advances aided this by facilitating the easy movement of people within this global labour market. By 1870 steamships had replaced sail on the North Atlantic crossing. It was followed in the ensuing decade by the replacement of sail by steam on vessels bound for Africa, Asia and Oceania.

Whilst conditions around the globe varied, as more industrialising nations reached what Rostow defined as the third stage of economic growth – take-off – 'where agriculture is commercialized, there is a growth in productivity, because that is necessary if the demand emanating from expanding urban centres is to be met ... and new economic groups push the industrial economy to new heights a greater number of countries would become fully functional within a global economy'.⁷ Central to that economic activity was the connection between industrial economies in Europe and those that were emerging in the United States, and to a lesser extent parts of the British Empire and Latin America. Of all forces which encouraged migrants to relocate – economic, social or political – the economic lure of the United States labour market predominated more than any other. The United States was perceived as

⁶ Norman Carrier & James Jeffery, *External Migration: A Survey of the Available Statistics, 1815-1950* (London, 1953), pp. 95-96.

⁷ W.W. Rostow, *The Process of Economic Growth* (Oxford, 1953), p. 17.

the *Golden Medinah*, an Eldorado, and a Zion. It accordingly drew more Europeans than any other destination during the long nineteenth century. As Drew Keeling has commented, this was predominantly because of fiscal reasons – the long-term ‘pull’ of the rapidly expanding US economy, coupled with the ability of migrants to be able to repay the cost of their voyage within 6 weeks of arrival because of the ease of finding work.⁸ Rates of transatlantic movement not surprisingly bore close linkage to the performance of the US economy. During periods of economic growth transatlantic migration grew. In times of economic distress – such as the late-1870s, mid-1880s, early-1890s and late-1900s – they dropped. Economic expansion, whilst cyclical, appealed to those dissatisfied with life in Europe. This was especially evident when economic downturns in Europe were not experienced in the United States. US industry lured workers from Europe.

Rapid industrialisation in parts of Europe during the late nineteenth century also brought increased opportunities for workers within Europe. It lessened the waves of emigrants leaving Germany and France. Elsewhere, industrialisation, noticeably the development of the continental railway network, equipped more Europeans with increased access to ports of embarkation through which they could reach the British, United States, and Canadian labour markets. Whether from agrarian or industrial backgrounds it is perhaps of little surprise that the number of Europeans living outside of Europe grew so drastically, and continually, throughout the nineteenth century. Industrialisation perpetuated the apparent opportunities in the continent throughout the nineteenth century. But the expanding transcontinental railway also provided further opportunities to those from less-industrialised backgrounds. This was demonstrated by the opening of the America’s first transcontinental railroads – the Union Pacific Railroad – in 1869 – and the Canadian Pacific Railroad – in 1890. They facilitated not only easier access to industrial opportunities in cities such as Detroit, Minneapolis, Toronto and Chicago, but also improved access to remote areas across North America that were rich in natural resources. Areas such as the Salt Lake Basin, the Canadian mid-West, and lands either side of the Rockies, protracted the flows of workers traversing the Atlantic. This took place at the same time as other movements to America across the Pacific and Indian Oceans by Asian workers were

⁸ Point made during a presentation by Drew Keeling at an International Conference held at the University of Florence in November 2005.

becoming increasingly restricted because of the perceived problems of the undercutting of minimal wage rates by immigrant workers from Asia. By the 1890s the Atlantic had again established itself as the main trunk route to North America.

That the Atlantic served as a central stage for transoceanic migration during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is reflected in an extensive literature by migrant historians. Few have sought to widen the central stage beyond this arena. Did the providers of ocean transport exercise as much influence upon global migration? How has the subject been represented by migrant and maritime historians? Is there scope for further study? Discussion will now be afforded to the existing migrant and maritime historiography.

1.2 Migrant historiography

Traditionally the transporting of Europe's 'huddled masses' was seen as a preserve of maritime engineers, geographers and political economists. During the 1930s a small number of historians began to examine emigration from an equally small number of European countries. William Carrothers defined British emigration, with particular reference to the development of British Dominions in 1929.⁹ Theodore Blegen produced two monumental works on Norwegian emigration in 1931 and 1940.¹⁰ And statistical and narrative accounts of global patterns of migration were provided by Imre Ferenczi and Walter Willcox in 1929 and 1930.¹¹ They concentrated on specific elements of the trade, the horrors of the travel during the age of sail, or government attempts to settle dominions or regulate the trade. It was not until the late 1950s that the trade became the subject of serious scholarly attention from a continental – rather than an imperial or receiving perspective.

Charlotte Erickson led the way with her *American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885* published in 1957.¹² She sought to clarify the processes by which transatlantic emigration was organised and approached the subject from a

⁹ William Carrothers, *Emigration from the British Isles* (London, 1929).

¹⁰ Theodore Blegen, *Norwegian Migration to America, 1825-1860* (Northfield, Minnesota, 1931); *idem*, *Norwegian Migration to America: the American transition* (Northfield, Minnesota, 1940).

¹¹ Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume 1*; *idem*, *International Migrations: Volume 2: Interpretations* (New York, 1930).

¹² Charlotte Erickson, *American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885* (Cambridge, 1957).

continental perspective. She was followed in 1965 by Philip Taylor with his study of the Mormon Church as an agency of emigration.¹³ The Church's emigrant operation straddled not only Britain and Ireland, the focus of his study, but was a pan-European agency. His central thesis included how and why as well as when and where. By positioning Liverpool at the centre of the trade he demonstrated how those leaving did not just comprise the famine Irish, England's industrious poor, or those cleared of their Scottish crofts, but also those linked by North Sea steamer to Hull, and then a cross-country railway to Liverpool. He followed this work with his broad study of continental emigration in 1971.¹⁴ Whilst Americanist in scope, Erickson and Taylor's works grappled the mechanisms by which migrants moved – as well as how the economic opportunities abroad were promoted. They widened the scope of previous studies and raised the notion that the global economy was so developed that the 'skilled', 'desired', or 'adventurous', could be pushed and pulled in both directions when opportunities arose on either side of the Atlantic.

Erickson and Taylor's approach to US immigrant history opened a new way for migrant scholars – the comparative. They were followed by Scandinavian scholars such as Berit Brattne in 1976, Kristian Hvidt in 1978, and Ingrid Semmingsen in 1978 who re-evaluated migrant history.¹⁵ All adopted differing methodological approaches; their focus remained Scandinavian. They collectively shed enormous light on oceanic migration by discussing the central role of agents as information channels to would-be migrants, and the two-way flows of migrants as transport reduced the transatlantic crossing to less than two weeks. Unlike the interwar studies of Norwegian emigration by Theodore Blegen – who approached the subject from a source, host and integration model – they also discussed the function of information channels – formal and informal – in promoting emigration. Pivotaly, Brattne emphasised those who enquired about emigration and yet did not

¹³ Philip Taylor, *Expectations Westward: The Mormons and the Emigration of their British Converts in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1965).

¹⁴ Philip Taylor, *The Distant Magnet: European Emigration to the USA* (London, 1971).

¹⁵ Berit Brattne, 'The Importance of the Transport Sector for Mass Emigration', in Hans Runblom and H. Norman (eds.), *From Sweden to America: A History of the Migration* (Uppsala, 1976), pp. 176-200; Kristian Hvidt, 'Emigration Agents: The Development of a Business and its Methods', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Volume III (1978), pp. 179-320; Ingrid Semmingsen, *Norway to America: A History of the Migration* (Minneapolis, 2000).

subsequently travel. He redefined the ‘agent’ as a trans-national organisation in which family ties also represented an important bond in an intensely competitive business. Such agents, he argued, linked remote customers with nodal points of embarkation. Further, the state protected fellow nationals *en route* and nurtured prepaid travel with specific companies.

Through such works, Britain’s dominant position as a continental player was acknowledged. The Scandinavian model showed how continental agents enabled shipping companies to harness intra- and not just inter-continental labour flows.¹⁶ The process of transmigration had finally been identified. Yet few sought to develop the study further.

In Britain, the apparent ‘central stage’ for indirect migration, scholars were instead pre-occupied by urban issues affecting domestic affairs. The immigrant ‘ghetto’ was more important than the wider picture. Studies remained immigrant in focus, and virtually ignored transient aliens. Whilst some noted Britain’s role as a longer-term staging post for transatlantic destinations – so-called ‘chain migrants’ – few comprehended the uniqueness of transmigration as a distinct aspect of movement within the period of the Great Migration (1820-1924). Where they did it was assumed to be an entirely Jewish affair. Foremost in these latter works were the studies of the Jewish immigrant experience led by Lloyd Gartner and Vivian Lipman.¹⁷ Only Bernard Gainer’s analysis of the background to the 1905 Aliens Act described the wider diasporic context; that the moves into Britain were of many diasporas and not just a few.¹⁸

The ignorance of feeder – or indirect steamship services – and the focus of studies on concentrated settlement were replicated with the studies of the Irish diaspora. They focussed upon the concentrated settlement of the Irish in parts of Western Britain – rather than describing how many were able to physically move. As with Jewish literature, the Irish historiography sought to emphasise the divisions between migrant and host society, difference not commonality, settlement not the

¹⁶ Brattne, ‘The Importance of the Transport Sector’, pp. 176-200.

¹⁷ Lloyd Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914* (London, 1960); Vivian Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England, 1850-1950* (London, 1954).

¹⁸ Bernard Gainer, *The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905* (London, 1972).

mechanism by which so many arrived, and with involved communication between countries of embarkation and disembarkation. Irish emigration, like Jewish emigration, necessitated a prior seaborne journey across a short-sea route (the Irish Sea) to Liverpool before the transoceanic voyage commenced. Yet as with Jewish migration via Britain the key texts only give passing reference to the journey within seminal studies.¹⁹ Studies of other groups – such as the Germans, Poles, and Italians – remained limited to occasional articles that were localised in focus, regional or marginal to mainstream historical discourse. Migration was seen as old-fashioned; this was especially evident for the transport component of such works.

In the late 1980s this began to change. Firstly Robert Scally and then Frank Neal sought to remedy the lack of work on Irish transmigration via Liverpool.²⁰ Scally focussed upon Irish emigration from Liverpool during the age of sail. He therefore identified how and not just when. This was clarified a year later by Frank Neal's acknowledgement that the hundreds of thousands of Irish who reached ocean transport via Liverpool did so because of the conversion from sail to steam on the short-sea route across the Irish Sea.²¹ The Irish scholars were followed by Aubrey Newman who, from 1987, sought to differentiate between alien transmigrants and alien settlers who came to Britain via London. He approached this through the channel of Jewish philanthropic agencies and advocated the uniqueness of transmigration.²² Yet his focus on London inevitably led to an overlap with the larger phenomenon of Jewish immigration. Whilst it was perhaps expected that he developed Lipman's approach to Jewish migration and philanthropy, the difference with Newman's studies was the introduction of commerce – an agency – linking

¹⁹ Kerby Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles. Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America* (Oxford, 1985); Graham Davis, *The Irish in Britain, 1815-1914* (Dublin, 1991); Enda Delaney, *Demography, States and Society. Irish Migration to Britain, 1921-1971* (Liverpool, 2000); David Fitzpatrick, *Oceans of consolation: personal accounts of Irish migration to Australia* (Cork, 1994); Angela McCarthy, *Irish Migrants in New Zealand, 1840-1937: 'The Desired Haven'* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2005).

²⁰ Robert Scally, 'Liverpool Ships and Irish Emigrants in the Age of Sail', *Journal for Social History*, Volume XVII, Number 1 (Fall, 1983), pp. 5-30; Frank Neal, 'Liverpool, the Irish Steamboat Companies and the Famine Irish', *Immigrants & Minorities*, Volume V (1986), pp. 28-61.

²¹ Frank Neal, 'Liverpool, the Irish Steamboat Companies and the Famine Irish', pp. 28-61.

²² Aubrey Newman & J. Graham Smith, 'The Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter: the development of a database on Jewish migration, 1896-1914', in Richard Bonney (ed.), *University of Leicester. Department of History Occasional Papers Series* (2000).
[<http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/teaching/papers/jewspap.html>.]

philanthropy and port-city. This was especially important as he linked charitable agency with shipping, or port-based operation. He followed ideas first espoused by Riva Krut and Lloyd Gartner.²³ Lloyd Gartner had unusually noted the ‘special importance was the emigrant traffic through England which usually brought migrants from Hamburg across the North Sea to Grimsby, Harwich, or London. Then they crossed to Liverpool for the voyage to America.’²⁴ Unlike Gartner’s North American focus, however, Newman and Krut looked further south. In particular they recognised that the settlement of Jews in South Africa was of great importance to some Atlantic shipping companies - and transmigration was central to this process.

Their work in the 1980s was followed in the 1990s by the comparative lens adopted by Rainer Liedtke to compare immigration into Manchester and Hamburg.²⁵ Although he confused the matter by using the term transmigrants to apply to chain migrants passing through Manchester, he added to our wider understanding of the process of mass migration by discussing the complex attempts by philanthropic organisations in Britain and Germany to encourage migrants not to remain. As with so much of the revisionist work, it focussed upon Jewish migration.

Other Jewish scholars at Glasgow and Southampton respectively took this new approach further. Kenneth Collins started his research into the Jewish transmigration via Glasgow by first discussing Scotland’s numerous Jewish communities.²⁶ His comparative, yet national approach (of Scotland), enabled him to discuss both the points of entry and points of exit used by migrants. Few had ever sought to investigate philanthropic endeavours at the points of entry and exit. He was therefore able to distinguish between those genuinely transmigrant in nature with those intent on remaining in Britain. Like Newman, he described how philanthropic measures

²³ Riva Krut, *Building a Home and a Community: Jews in Johannesburg, 1886-1914* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1985); Lloyd Gartner, ‘Jewish Migrants en Route from Europe to North America: Traditions and Realities’, in *Jewish History*, Volume I, Number 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 49-66, and ‘Notes on the Statistics of Jewish Immigration to England, 1870-1914’, *Jewish Social Studies*, Volume XXII, Number 2 (1960), pp. 97-102.

²⁴ Lloyd Gartner, ‘Jewish Migrants en Route’, p. 50.

²⁵ Rainer Liedtke, *Jewish Welfare in Hamburg and Manchester, c.1850-1914* (Oxford, 1998).

²⁶ Kenneth Collins, *Second City Jewry: The Jews of Glasgow in the Age of Expansion, 1790-1919* (Glasgow, 1990).

were deployed to lessen the burden of Jewish transmigration.²⁷ Collins, with his medical training, also demonstrated the potential for further study by emphasising that such flows often caused medical, as well as political agitation.²⁸ Such medical records – in his case for the port of Glasgow – offered alternative statistics to those presented within official parliamentary reports. Further, if medical records, largely ignored by other historians, offered such potential for Jewish migration, had other sources – at port level – survived that could provide an invaluable insight into a study of the transmigrant business?

Like Collins's study of Glasgow and Scotland, Tony Kushner saw the role of another 'point of exit' – Southampton. He did so through a local, national and international approach. In particular he researched transmigrants stranded in Southampton's Atlantic Park in 1924 when the United States restricted immigration yet further. Unlike other scholars he saw them as early twentieth century refugees.²⁹ By discussing the impact that individual states could have upon the Atlantic basin as a whole, and Britain in particular, he demonstrated how the Atlantic market was conditioned by cognate elements of free movement of aliens. The policies of any given destination – such as the United States – could impact not just prior but also during the process of migration. The relevance of regional approaches in tackling national or international flows – with each taking a differing stance on the subject of alienism – were arguably the new way forward. Collectively they described alternative British transport arteries to the more celebrated transpennine corridor – the railway link between Hull and Grimsby on the east coast of Britain with Liverpool and Glasgow on the west coast.

But how long did the migrants take to reach Britain? Where did they land? How did they reach Atlantic ports connected with transoceanic liners? Who sought to

²⁷ Kenneth Collins, 'Scottish Transmigration and Settlement: Records of the Glasgow Experience', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 49-53.

²⁸ Kenneth Collins, *Be Well: Jewish Immigrant Health and Welfare in Glasgow, 1860-1914* (East Linton, East Lothian, 2002).

²⁹ Tony Kushner, 'Refugees in the Age of Mass Immigration: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the First World War', in Tony Kushner & Katherine Knox, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century* (London, 1999), pp. 19-42; Tony Kushner, 'A Tale of Two Port Jewish Communities: Southampton and Portsmouth Compared', in David Cesarani (ed.), *Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950* (London, 2002), pp. 87-110.

develop and maintain the business? Whilst the alien market was identified by Carrier and Jeffery as being 3.5 million between 1853 and 1914, how many of these were transmigrants?³⁰ For this we have to turn to maritime historians to consider how important transport links between ports and people, oceans with the would-be migrant, were. We then need to discuss how this has been reflected in the existing historiography.

1.3 Maritime historiography

Linking the migrant in Europe with opportunities around the world required a series of technical innovations. These centred upon improved oceanic travel. As Charles Lee noted ‘in the whole history of transport there is probably no single route which has inspired popular imagination, or attracted so much interest, as has the North Atlantic steamship service’.³¹ Yet despite the pivotal importance of transport, not until John Gould’s seminal essays, published in 1978, was the importance of transport to migration streams emphasised.³² Few maritime historians linked the mechanism through which the would-be migrant moved with the process by which nations had their populations reduced or labour supplies replenished.

Francis Hyde and his student Robin Bastin, in 1975 and 1971 respectively, led the way by highlighting the role of Cunard – arguably Europe’s premier transatlantic passenger company – in shipping both British and European migrants.³³ Analysing the work of just one shipping company they followed an approach of what is commonly referred to as the ‘Liverpool School’ of maritime economic and business historians. Hyde’s ‘house history’ and Bastin’s assessment of the development of the Cunard passenger business in late Victorian Britain complimented other histories of shipping companies including those by Sheila Mariner, Peter Davies, Malcolm

³⁰ Carrier & Jeffery, *External Migration*, pp. 90-1.

³¹ Charles Lee, *The Blue Riband – The Romance of the Atlantic Ferry* (London, 1930), p. 3.

³² John Gould, ‘European international emigration, 1815-1914’, *Journal of Economic History*, Volume VIII, Number 3 (1979), pp. 593-677.

³³ Francis Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840-1973: A History of Shipping and Financial Management* (London, 1975); Robin Bastin, ‘Cunard and the Liverpool Emigrant Traffic, 1860-1900’ (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Liverpool, 1971).

Falkus, and further works by Hyde.³⁴ Hyde and Bastin stressed the importance of linking rail and sail technology from a commercial perspective. The measures used by such companies, such as increased speed and size, were not for the benefit of the migrants alone, but were used to develop and maintain their market share of North Atlantic passenger shipping. Innovation was important. But increased speed, carrying capacity, or the opening of new routes, did not ensure profitability. Further, the diffusion of evolved innovations became essential, as did collusion – working within formal agreements – with their leading commercial opponents. If they failed, as occurred with the Guion Line in the late 1880s, steamship operators could become the victim of a highly cyclical and volatile business. Both Hyde and Bastin thereby added to this understanding of emigration of foreigners and domestic migrants from Britain. They saw the British market as North European in scope. The business was volatile in nature, and reliant upon the work of agents, state subsidies and trade agreements to maximise profitability.

Despite the acclaim of such business histories they remained limited. Neither Bastin nor Hyde was followed by further studies – of equal measure – of key players in the business such as White Star, Guion, American, Dominion, Union or Castle. Instead they were followed by a new breed of maritime historians who used the comparative approach to analyse methods used by large-scale British shipping companies. Gordon Boyce's study of the Furness Line, and later large-scale maritime enterprise, would be the most significant work to follow Hyde. Boyce described the complex nature of maritime networks and company organisation, and showed how large-scale shipping concerns were dependent upon both formal and informal networks to further their success.³⁵ This new approach was followed in 2003 by Drew Keeling who compared the approaches taken by the two leading British and equivalent German companies – Cunard, White Star, Hamburg-America, and Norddeutscher Lloyd – to ensure capacity utilisation of the much heralded 'floating palaces' plying the North Atlantic.³⁶ As with migrant historians it would be the

³⁴ Sheila Marriner, *Rathbones of Liverpool, 1845-73* (Liverpool, 1961); Malcolm Falkus, *The Blue Funnel legend: A history of the Ocean Steam Ship Company, 1865-1973* (Basingstoke, 1990); Peter Davies, *The trade makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852-1972* (London, 1973); Francis Hyde, *Blue Funnel: A history of Alfred Holt & Co. of Liverpool, 1865-1914* (Liverpool, 1957); and *Idem*, *Shipping Enterprise and Management, 1830-1939: Harrisons of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1967).

³⁵ Gordon Boyce, *Information, Mediation, and Institutional Development: The Rise of Large-Scale Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919* (Manchester, 1995).

comparative focus of his work, like that of Boyce, which added most significantly to the field. He showed how important particular transport arteries, monopolised by a small number of companies, were to harnessing the European emigrant *in situ*. Profitability was underpinned by capacity optimisation.

Alongside studies of seaborne transport, maritime historians have also provided a series of studies on the significance of particular ports. The passenger trades handled by such entrepôts have always remained of secondary importance in this literature, but the centrality of linking land and sea, or more appropriately land and estuary, have been very evident and provide the sea transport context in which this study of transmigration is set. Foremost in these studies was the work by Gordon Jackson.³⁷ By emphasising, in his studies of Grimsby and Hull, how docks ‘make trade’, he showed how the ‘sensible manner’ in which ports ‘connect[ed] trains and ships’ was pertinent to the emergence of transmigrant shipping in particular.³⁸ Ports, he argued, were not just built, they required associated hubs of the men who possessed the capital and wished to do the trade at, or near, the dockside.³⁹ The work of commercial networks explained why the trade conducted at Hull exceeded that of new railway ports such Grimsby.

Jackson’s studies ran parallel to Hyde’s assessments of Liverpool and the Mersey, Adrian Jarvis’s examination of the commercial difficulties of managing a large dock estate, and Graeme Milne’s study of how merchants and middlemen helped to make Liverpool a leading port.⁴⁰ Unusually for these ‘port histories’, Milne used the subject of British emigration within a sub-section of government contracts to

³⁶ Drew Keeling, in particular ‘The Transportation Revolution and Transatlantic Migration, 1850-1914’, *Economic History*, Volume XIX (1999), pp. 39-74, and ‘Transatlantic Shipping Cartels and Migration between Europe and America, 1880-1914’, in Michael V. Namorato (ed.), *Essays in Economic and Business History*, Volume XVII (1999), pp. 195-213.

³⁷ Foremost in his works was: Gordon Jackson, *Hull in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Economic and Social History* (London, 1972).

³⁸ Gordon Jackson, ‘Do Docks Make Trade?: The Case of the Port of Great Grimsby’, in Lewis Fischer (ed.), *Research in Maritime History No. 2: From Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour of Professor Peter Neville Davies* (St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1992), pp. 16-41; *Idem*, ‘Shipowners and Private Dock Companies: The Case of Hull, 1770-1990’, in L.M. Akveld & J.R. Brujin (eds.), *Shipping Companies and Authorities in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Their Common Interest in the Development of Port Facilities* (Den Haag, 1989), p. 50.

³⁹ Gordon Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports* (Tadworth, Surrey, 1983).

⁴⁰ Adrian Jarvis, *Research in Maritime History No. 26: In Troubled Times: The Port of Liverpool, 1905-1938* (St. John’s, Newfoundland, 2003); Graeme Milne, *Trade and traders in mid-Victorian Liverpool: mercantile business and the making of a world port* (Liverpool, 2000).

discuss how ports such as Liverpool benefited from assisted emigration, but his focus naturally centred on the role of the state (and associated contracts), and not on the role of Liverpool's traders in developing the 'new' European migrant business.⁴¹ Such studies accordingly retained a domestic rather than a continental focus and only served to add to an already well-covered theme.

Maritime historians have therefore approached the subject of European migration from an opposing perspective to migrant historiography. Instead of being US-focussed they have generated a series of national, port-level or individual company studies. The few who have offered an insight into the role of transport and the development of transmigration across northern Britain – Ted Gillett and Gordon Read – have done so from qualitative, and equally limited, approaches.⁴² This lacuna is surprising. First, because they came after the work by Erickson and Taylor; and secondly because Hyde and Robins had stressed the role of Liverpool in the indirect flow of Europeans from Britain; thirdly because in 1993, Odd Lovoll had attempted to set the European stage firmly on the capturing of European migrants around the North Sea by describing how the Danish-owned Thingvalla Line was able to divert those 'who evaded British and German shipping companies'.⁴³ The importance of the North Sea as a conduit for passengers to Britain has received little attention. Where it has, such as Alan Pearsall's descriptive account of the companies and technology that mastered the North Sea and Sarah Palmer's study of the General Steam Navigation Company, the focus has gravitated towards London.⁴⁴ As with migrant historiography few have sought to analyse the passenger market controlled by Britain as a whole, examined how nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century transport

⁴¹ Graeme Milne, *Trade and traders in mid-Victorian Liverpool: mercantile business and the making of a world port*, pp. 188-195.

⁴² Edward Gillett & Kenneth MacMahon, *A History of Hull* (Hull, 1989), pp. 281-2; J. Gordon Read (Comp.), *Through Liverpool to North America, 1830-1907: A selection of Emigrant Narratives* (Liverpool, 1998), and J. Gordon Read, 'Indirect Passage: Jewish Emigrant Experiences on the East Coast-Liverpool route', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 267-282.

⁴³ Odd Lovoll, 'For the People Who are not in a Hurry: The Danish Thingvalla Line and the Transportation of Scandinavian Emigrants', *Journal of American Ethnic History*, Volume XIII (1993), pp. 38-47.

⁴⁴ Alan Pearsall, 'Steam enters the North Sea', in Arne Bang-Anderson, Basil Greenhill & Egil Harald Grude (eds.), *The North Sea: A Highway of Economic and Cultural Exchange Character – History* (Stavanger, 1985), pp. 195-213; Sarah Palmer, 'The Most Indefatigable Activity: The General Steam Navigation Company, 1824-50', *Journal of Transport History*, Volume III (1982), pp. 1-22.

companies developed and maintained the business of alien migrant shipping, or how important such commerce was significant to certain British ports.

1.4 The rationale and aims of the thesis

This study concentrates on how non-British European migrants were persuaded to emigrate through Britain between 1836 and 1914. Rather than discussing the various flows of passengers to or from British ports, it focuses on the movement of third-class aliens who arrived and re-embarked from Britain within 14 days of arrival. Such migrants were termed in Parliamentary correspondence of the time as transmigrants. Whilst many other aliens arrived in Britain as members of crew, or sought to remain in Britain for the short- or longer-term, this thesis specifically discusses the third-class Europeans who transmigrated through Britain in order to correct the gap in the literature discussed above. This study is divided into three parts. The first section profiles the movement of alien transmigrants to and through Britain, before moving on to consider the origins of the business and how it became polarised on particular arteries, and the commercial and official implications of such mass transit migration. The significance of the trade to ports and transport companies who facilitated the movement of millions of European migrants is then examined.

The over-arching aim of the thesis is therefore three-fold. First, it seeks to link the fields of maritime and migrant history. By distinguishing between those featured so heavily in migrant history (immigrants) and those who were nurtured by companies (transmigrants) it will demonstrate the role of transport across Britain rather than just those who landed at British ports. Second, this study aims to shift the focus of current studies away from the North Atlantic as the highway upon which the aliens all flowed. It does so in part by discussing migration to South Atlantic destinations such as South Africa, but it also achieves this by encompassing the North Sea as a central stage within which alien movements were determined. Third, it demonstrates the statistical significance of transmigration – an often forgotten aspect of the process of migration.

The first section sets the statistical context for the study. In particular Chapter two discusses how it is possible to differentiate between aliens *en route* and those not *en route*, and profiles methodologies used to provide quantitative and qualitative evidence that underpins this study. It asks why previous studies have ignored those

who transmigrated and have concentrated on quantifying the waves of immigrants arriving at British ports, or have charted when British workers emigrated to parts of the British Empire. Chapter three presents the findings of this statistical research, demonstrating aspects of the movement. Analysis begins by quantifying the scale and character of the transmigrant flows. How many came? Where did they originate? Which European ports did they sail from? Which British ports facilitated the flows? Did seasonality factor into the phenomenon? Particular aspects of the movement, namely by contrasting the movements of Scandinavian Mormon transmigrants and East European Jewish transmigrants, are also provided to show the changing character of the trade from North European in origin its domination by migrants from Eastern and Central Europe. As will be shown the business continued to evolve from being dominated by German and Dutch migrants during the mid-nineteenth century, to being engulfed by Scandinavian migrants during the second half of nineteenth century, before being over-burdened by the sheer scale of central/East European transmigration during the first two decades of the twentieth century.

As the majority of those who transmigrated through Britain entered at the Humber ports of Hull and Grimsby and re-embarked via Liverpool or Glasgow this study then describes, in Chapter four, the salient features of the business and considers why the trade gravitated towards these main transport arteries across Northern Britain. These transport nodes dominated over 80 per cent of the market, and the business continued to remain focussed on this route. But when did the trade start? Why did it focus upon the Humber to Mersey corridor? What motivated the aliens *en route* to choose to reach continental North America and South Africa via Britain? Having discussed these reasons, Chapter five then charts what motivated the European to transmigrate. Did push and pull theories apply to the patterns of transmigrant flows through Britain? Did factors encouraging Europeans to journey through Britain change as attitudes to alien immigrants intensified? Moreover how was the business policed and did this hinder or benefit the trade? It then contemplates how the trade was policed and whether official intervention into the trade affected the options available to the transmigrant.

Latterly the thesis will analyse the significance of the trade to ports and transport companies that facilitated the movement. It will begin in Chapter 6 by assessing the importance of the business to ports and port-cities. What features of dock-estates developed to cater for the needs of the transmigrant? Where these

unique or amiable for other trades? Did physical development at certain ports explain why the business remained focussed on specific ports? It then develops in Chapter 7 to consider the benefits steamship and railway companies gained through the business. Was it lucrative? Was the business subject to commercial rivalry or collusion? Having analysed the various features of the business then looks at the growing internationalisation of the trade and how Britain's policy of free trade forced British companies to undercut the price of their services so that the indirect route through Britain remained competitive. As will become apparent Britain's policy of free trade was maintained at the same time as Germany and Russia sought to protect the commercial interests of their own merchant fleets – thereby hindering British involvement in the provision of North Sea passenger services to Britain and enabling the German merchant marine lead aspects of the transmigrant trade that Britain had formerly dominated.

In attaining these objectives, the thesis will contribute to the historiography relating to European migration and passenger shipping by demonstrating how the majority of aliens arriving in Britain's east coast ports were not bound to remain in Britain over the short- or longer-term but were instead *en route* to the United States, Canada, and South Africa. They represented a significant part of British passenger shipping and arrived in Britain in possession of a 'through ticket' that facilitated their speedy transit through the country's ports. Unlike alien immigrants, who often travelled on the same steamships, from the same continental ports, transmigrants knew that they would re-embark from a west or south coast port of re-embarkation within a few weeks of arrival. In doing so this study contributes to the discussion of the role of transport within maritime and migration history as a combined entity, and builds upon the existing literature already discussed.

The breadth of this topic necessitates limitations in the scope of this study. Rather than focussing on how technical innovations impacted upon what many have described as a particularly 'volatile' or 'risky' market, it will instead focus on the commercial agreements that proved lucrative to the providers or indirect or feeder services, and to what extent ocean liners emanating from British ports were filled by non-British passengers. Instead of comparing the business with that of non-transmigrant aliens to British ports, British emigrants leaving Britain, or the passenger trade in general, it specifically focuses on the alien *en route*. As is discussed in the conclusion, this thesis is the beginning of a potentially much-wider study. By

establishing the parameters within which the trade emerged and flourished, future studies will be able to build upon areas covered within this thesis to consider other comparable features of the business or the fortunes of the migrants when they reached their desired destination.

2. Sources and methodology

Scholars have traditionally approached mass migration during the long nineteenth century using either qualitative or quantitative lenses; rarely have the two methodologies been successfully brought together. This chapter discusses the various primary and secondary sources pertaining to European transmigration via Britain that have been utilised for this study. Because neither Britain nor the United States developed significant collections of oral testimony for the period concerned, the focus of the first part of this chapter is quantitative, describing the variety of published and archival sources utilised to quantify the scale and patterns of alien transmigration to, through or from Britain. In particular it demonstrates how it was possible to clarify macro population flows to and from Britain by distinguishing foreign transmigrants from other European immigrants, British emigrants, and tourists. Having described these differing quantitative sources, attention is then offered to qualitative sources pertinent to this phenomenon. These have been explored to provide the wider context of this alien passenger market and to explain its significance to ports, transport companies, and migrants. Both approaches, this chapter will demonstrate, enabled the quantification and qualification of how and why so many Europeans sought to migrate indirectly through Britain between 1836 and 1914.

2.1 Quantitative sources

For any study of transmigration through Britain failings within published statistical sources such as Ferenczi and Willcox, Carrier and Jeffery, and Brian Mitchell have rendered it necessary to re-examine statistics first published by the British government between 1853 and 1914.¹ Despite the shortcomings of such published statistical sources, both the Ferenczi and Willcox and Carrier and Jeffery volumes have provided a statistical context within which to ‘place’ transmigrant flows. Data from two tables within the Ferenczi and Willcox statistical tables were gleaned to reflect the gross alien outflows from particular continental ports between 1856 and 1915, and to profile the levels of European immigration into the United States – for

¹ Imre Ferenczi & Walter Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I: Statistics* (New York, 1929); *Idem, International Migrations: Volume II: Interpretations* (New York, 1930); Norman Carrier & James Jeffery, *External Migration: A study of the available statistics, 1815-1950* (London, 1953); Brian Mitchell, *British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge, 1988); *idem, International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1988* (Basingstoke, 1992).

the period between 1836 and 1914 – and for Canada – between 1900 and 1914. Statistics obtained from Carrier and Jeffery’s volume pertained to inter-continental migration from Britain between 1853 and 1913 and added a context to colonial settlement during the period in question. All other statistics, portrayed in Chapter 3, were obtained from British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP), British passenger lists, port-medical sources or those generated by religious agencies.²

2.1.1 British Parliamentary Papers

Official references to alien emigration from Britain were included within the *General Reports of the Colonial and Emigration Commissioners* from 1853.³ Published between 1853 and 1873, the reports summarised the number of foreigners leaving British ports and made occasional references to particular aspects of the trade. When the colonies began to take greater control over their own settlement schemes, powers vested with the Commissioners under the Passenger Acts were transferred to the Board of Trade. This took place in 1873, and the Board of Trade began to publish statistics relating to emigration from the Great Britain and Ireland after 1877.⁴ The Board of Trade’s reports continued to distinguish between English, Welsh, Scottish, Irish, and ‘foreign’ migrants leaving British ports. In addition, after 1877, they also recorded the occupation of those aliens leaving Britain.⁵ Throughout the century the amount of information presented on aliens remained unchanged. Whilst the permanent destination of such emigrants was open to doubt – until a change in the way such information was gathered in April 1912 – the published reports also showed the various destinations of alien migrants. Patterns gleaned from the BPP demonstrated the large-scale nature of foreign migration from Britain and the proportion of Britain’s passenger market that comprised foreign passengers.

As with the out-migration of British workers, the Board of Trade (and its predecessors) retained a far more comprehensive range of statistics on those leaving Britain than those arriving at her ports. Prior to the passing of the 1905 Aliens Act,

² References for these published statistical sources have been detailed in Appendix 1.

³ BPP, *General Reports of the Colonial and Emigration Commissioners* (1852-1873).

⁴ BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1876-1913).

⁵ *Ibid.*

the British government, it can be argued, cared little for the detailed recording of any migrants. Whether tourists, sojourners, or people intent on permanent residence in the Britain, the large numbers of foreigners arriving in the country were only profiled statistically after 1879 – and then only those arriving from non-European ports.

During the 1880s, as larger numbers of Europeans began to settle *en masse* in London, Manchester, Leeds, and Glasgow, contemporary concern about the influence that the alien had upon the economic or moral condition of British cities led to additional statistics being gathered *and* presented alongside those of emigrants and long-haul immigration. Whilst demonstrating the majority of aliens were *en route* the patterns of inward migration – particularly those for London – caused alarm.⁶ By 1888 sufficient public demand necessitated the formation of a *Select Committee on the Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)*. Reporting in 1889, it called for increased monitoring of alien arrivals into Britain. Unlike the statistics for outward-bound aliens, the level of information on aliens arriving at Britain's various points-of-entry after May 1890 was very detailed. The ports used by inward-bound transmigrant aliens were also highlighted, alongside details of the ports and countries whence they had originated in Europe. Also specified was the gender of the aliens, whether those arriving were adults or children, and whether the aliens were intending on remaining in Britain (Aliens not *en route*) or were transmigrants (aliens *en route* to another country). The figures were broken down by month, and port of entry, and published annually as a separate statistical appendix to the Board of Trade's annual reports on emigration and immigration.⁷

After 1890, the reporting of transmigrant arrivals still showed great inconsistency, yet such criticism only really concerned London – where all alien arrivals were classed as immigrants. Not surprisingly the official statistics recording mass immigration into the port of London led to the growth of anti-alien sentiment. This resulted in the 1903 *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration*. Within its five volumes of evidence was a separate statistical appendix noting, alongside patterns of

⁶ Arnold White, 'The Invasion of Pauper Foreigners', *Nineteenth Century Review*, Volume XXIII (January-June 1888), pp. 414-422. The counter argument, using the same statistical evidence, was presented by Stephen Fox, 'The Invasion of Pauper Foreigners', *The Contemporary Review*, Volume LIII (January-June 1888), pp. 855-867.

⁷ See Appendix 1.

immigration and transmigration, attempts to differentiate between alien immigration and transmigration at the port of London.⁸ The legacy of the *Royal Commission*, in the form of the 1905 Aliens Act, saw the introduction of further statistical reports by a purposely-established administration within the Home Office.⁹ The latter act not only improved the accuracy of data collated but also broadened the scale of data retained via a new form to be completed by the masters of vessels carrying aliens to Britain. Between 1906 and 1913 statistical information on all aliens arriving at any British port – and not just those who had previously made returns to the Home Office – were collated. Alongside the Board of Trade’s annual reports of passenger flows into and from Britain were added separate annual and quarterly reports on immigrants and transmigrants under the Aliens Act.¹⁰ As well as detailing patterns of alien migration to Britain, they provided a detailed breakdown of the different types of aliens leaving Britain – breaking down transmigrants by class – second or third – distinguishing between tourists, aliens (non transmigrant), and alien (transmigrant). It also noted Americans in transit and not just Europeans *en route*.

The administration of anti-alien legislation between 1793 and 1914, alongside Orders issued by the Board of Trade, the Home Office, and Aliens Departments, led to the publication of official statistics relating to transmigration – but only within other statistical reports pertaining to alien immigration to Britain or passenger flows from Britain. Like Britain’s alien legislation, such statistics evolved throughout the long nineteenth century. Britain moved from a nation that retained periodic alien restriction in the early nineteenth century to a state equipped with a bureaucracy capable of administering stringent anti-alien legislation by 1906, and official statistics pertaining to transmigration constantly increased. From a passing reference in 1853 to the publication of quarterly reports, by 1906 the business was increasingly quantified like other activities monitored by the Board of Trade. Despite volumes of parliamentary discourse on alien immigration, a select committee in 1889, a *Royal Commission* in 1903, the passing of numerous acts of parliament and the formation of

⁸ BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume III, Appendix, pp. 77-79.

⁹ Jill Pellew, ‘The Home Office and the Aliens Act, 1905’, *The Historical Journal*, Volume XXXII, Number 2 (1989), pp. 639-685.

¹⁰ BPP, *Annual Reports of His Majesty’s Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens* (1906-1913).

a permanent select committee after 1890, concern for data gathering only generated a span of official data during the last decade of the nineteenth century - and it is they that have been profiled in Chapter 3 as a statistical base for this study. In particular it has been possible to chart rates of inward transmigration for the years 1889-1913 and to record outward alien (later transmigrant) flows between 1877 and 1913.

2.1.2 British passenger lists

Aliens were officially documented as arriving in Britain only after 1793 when the country's first Aliens Act was passed.¹¹ Alongside the national set of certificates of arrival for all ports (1836-1852) only alien lists for Hull, covering the earlier period of the first, second and third Aliens acts, 1793-1815, have survived.¹² The latter contained reference to only one transmigrant who arrived in Hull during the period and seeking 'to obtain a passage speedily to America'.¹³ As became apparent throughout the nineteenth century ports recorded alien arrivals varied enormously. The number of aliens transmigrants documented as arriving was irregular. The failure of Britain to record all alien arrivals appeared only to be of concern during times of war.¹⁴ Aliens Acts passed in 1814, 1815, 1816, and 1826 each stipulated the need for customs officials to record the entry of foreigners into Britain.

With the passing of the 1836 Aliens Act the responsibility for the accurate reporting of alien arrivals was transferred from Customs House officials working on behalf of the Aliens Office to the masters in charge of the vessels that conveyed these alien passengers.¹⁵ The act resolved permanently the inconsistency shown in the recording of alien arrivals that had resulted from previous alien legislation, and stipulated:

¹¹ 33 Geo. III c. 4.

¹² HCA, BRE/7, 'Alien Certificates' (1793-1815).

¹³ *Ibid*, 'Alien Certificate dated 24 September 1793'.

¹⁴ Anne Kershen, 'The 1905 Aliens Act', *History Today*, Volume LCV, Number 3 (March 2005), p. 13.

¹⁵ 6 Will. IV c. 11.

The master of every vessel which after the commencement of this Act shall arrive in this realm from foreign parts shall immediately on his arrival declare in writing to the chief officer of the customs at the port of arrival whether there is, to the best of his knowledge, any alien on board his vessel, and whether any alien hath, to his knowledge, landed there from at any place within this realm, and shall in his said declaration specify the number of aliens (if any) on board his vessel, or who have, to his knowledge, landed there from, and their names, rank, occupation, and description, as far as he shall be informed thereof.¹⁶

Despite instructing masters to report alien arrivals (as shown in Appendix 3.6), the actual enforcement of the Act was erratic. The data retained by the Home Office were significant for the period 1848-1855 – but no audit was ever undertaken by the Home Office after 1848. Information retained was never the subject of Parliamentary debate. Despite attempts by numerous Home Secretaries and officials from the Board of Trade to improve the monitoring of alien arrivals at the point of entry into Britain, in 1844, 1848, 1889, and 1903, the accuracy of the data collected on alien migrants' failed to improve. Certain ports such as Liverpool, failed to return a single List of Aliens in the period 1836-1860.¹⁷ The lack of data returned for passengers arriving at Liverpool had been noted in a letter of complaint to the Pilots operating at Liverpool as early as 1832.¹⁸

Where transmigrant arrivals were profiled each port recorded them in a variety of differing ways. Those arriving via the Thames were shown on *Lists of Aliens* as 'emigrants' or 'for America'. They had their name, age, nationality, and occupation recorded. Those travelling as a group were often shown collectively with summaries being provided according to each group ticket purchased. Such detailed information reflected more detailed alien returns shown for all aliens arriving via the Thames. The information at London also included the name of the agent and company responsible for the passengers whilst 'in port'. Unlike at all other ports those for London were pre-printed with a special 'Port of London' pro forma. At other ports

¹⁶ BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume II, Minute 10.

¹⁷ The National Archives (TNA), HO 3/120, 'Return of the Number of Aliens reported to have arrived in England during the year ending 31st December 1844'. The List of Aliens for the period June 1836 to December 1859 failed to include a single certificate for Liverpool. (TNA, HO 3/1-120, 'Aliens Act 1836: Returns and Papers' (1836-1869).)

¹⁸ TNA, HO 5/21, 'Aliens' Entry Books: Correspondence', p. 169.



transients were detailed as ‘*en route*’ to another country.¹⁹ In Hull the transmigrants were grouped together with only a statistical summary being provided on each list. Summaries at ports such as ‘twenty aliens *en route* to America’ were provided on each return. It was therefore not possible to obtain details of the demographic features of the trade. At each port outside of London those returns presented to HM Customs handled transmigrants differently to how they did immigrants. The reasons for this were varied. The business fraternity feared the potentially damaging effects timely data collection (with the risk of vessels missing the high tide needed to arrive in dock) might have caused to passenger shipping; HM Customs stated that the costs involved in allocating staff to undertake detailed data collection outweighed concern over the reliability of data at some ports.²⁰

Hull, because of the scale and regularity of its transmigration trade, never adopted the measures introduced under the 1836 Act because it was felt full implementation interfered with the port’s shipping interests.²¹ As officials reporting to the 1903 *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* noted, when the operation of the 1836 Act was revived in 1890:

Some of the shipping companies, whose business it was to carry large numbers of transmigrants to the Humber and north-eastern ports, made representations of the Customs that it was a very great hardship on them to have to ascertain all the details that were required for the alien lists with regard to the large numbers of persons holding through tickets who were simply passing through the country to emigrate to America. The owners asked whether it would not be sufficient in those cases if they returned a total number instead of names and occupations and nationalities.²²

¹⁹ See (for example) the list of emigrant passengers attached to List of Aliens for the *Batavier* that arriving in London on 28 April 1852. The list noted the arrival of transmigrant passengers from Rotterdam who had their voyage chartered from Germany by Carl Ahlborn of Mainz. (TNA, HO 3/65, ‘Aliens Act 1836: Returns and Papers’ (1852).)

²⁰ BPP, *Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1889), pp. 307-310; Treasury Order 9999-1891, cited in BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume III, p. 76; General Order 22-1894; Board of Trade Order (B.O.) 16,387-1896, cited in BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume III, p. 76; BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume II, Minutes 11-328.

²¹ The first certificate to use this simplified process of recording transmigrants was issued on 26 March 1837. (TNA, HO 3/4, ‘Aliens Act 1836: Returns and Papers’ (1857), *William Darley* arriving at Hull on 30 May 1857.) As officials from the Board of Trade reported to the *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* in 1902 such evasion of the 1836 Aliens Act never had ‘statutory basis’. BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume II, Minute 31.

²² *Ibid*, Minutes 28-31.

The Board of Trade agreed, under the conditions stated, that they would be content with a total number of such persons. The result was that the aliens lists rendered under this Act with regard to the ports where a large number of through passengers come, have since that time contained two sections – a list of names, with other particulars, of persons not holding through tickets, and a total number of those returned as holding through tickets.

Beyond the period 1888 and 1913, few official statistics, concerning transmigration, were presented to Parliament, the source of that data – the master's declaration or List of Aliens – fell into disuse nationally, the documents were still gathered at certain ports.²³ Further, those for period 1 June 1836-30 December 1859 have survived and offered a run of statistical material not available in published sources.

As the documents recorded immigrants as well as transients it was possible to distinguish many of those *en route* from other immigrants. Within the 120 volumes of original certificates were details of more than 4,000 voyages of transients conveyed from mainly German and Dutch ports.²⁴ By using the information extracted on 'aliens *en route*', to 'America', the 'United States', or even 'Australia', it was possible to glean from them statistical information on the shiploads of arrivals, and, in the case of London, occasional demographic information on the early transmigrants who travelled through Britain. Thousands of transmigrants were documented as arriving in Britain via Dover, Dundee, Goole, Grimsby, Hull, Leith, London, Newcastle, Newhaven, Plymouth, Rochester, Southampton, and Sunderland.

It was thus possible to extract patterns of transmigration to Britain from 1836 to 1860. In particular it provided statistical summaries on the number of transients arriving on each ship, per port, per day, per year. It also showed the port from where the vessel had sailed, (for London) the name of agent in the port of entry, the destinations of the migrants, and in some cases the dock, and not just port, of entry. Such statistical information on the port and year of arrival linked with that available from official records for the period 1888-1905, and 1906-1913. It offered a valuable insight into a source ignored by most contemporary commentators, especially for transmigrants. They remedied a significant shortage in data for the period between the passing of the 1836 Aliens Act and the 1888 *Select Committee on the Emigration*

²³ *Ibid*, Minute 26.

²⁴ TNA, HO 3/1-120, 'Aliens Act 1836: Returns and Papers' (1836-1869).

and Immigration (of Foreigners). Their utility, but not survival, had been shown by late Victorian commentators, as Stephen Fox alluded:

These aliens are only *in transitu* they may be dismissed from present consideration, although an interesting point may arise regarding the extent to which they affect the tables published by the Board of Trade that deal with the numbers of foreign emigrants from this country. It will be sufficient to note here that:

In 1885 they amounted to 28,775

In 1886 they amounted to 44,555

In 1887 they amounted to 58,593

After the abolition of this Alien Office the custody of these documents devolved upon the Home Office, and, as the papers in question threatened to become unwieldy in bulk, and appeared to serve no useful purpose, the practice has prevailed of only retaining those filed during the preceding five years. No register is kept of these returns, either in the Customs of Home Office, nor is any abstract made of their contents.²⁵

Also held within the National Archives were the original lists of outward-bound passengers gathered by the Board of Trade's Commercial and Statistical Department between 1890 and 1960 (shown in Appendix 3.8).²⁶ Unlike information presented in the List of Aliens presented by masters of vessels, these archival sources had originally been used to calculate the passenger statistics by the Board of Trade, and published annually by Parliament.²⁷ Despite, as Debbie Beavis has noted, the passenger lists being unwieldy and fragile and there being no useful finding aids, they offered additional information on transients not presented within BPP.²⁸ The varying level of detail offered within them throughout the period 1890-1914 limited their value for the purposes of this study. Sampling for the years 1890-1905 revealed the information presented was quite negligible – unless one was able to link information gleaned in European or US databases with British documents. Lists for the period included the name, age, occupation, age category, marital status, and class of passage

²⁵ Stephen Fox, 'The Invasion of Pauper Foreigners', pp. 862-3.

²⁶ TNA, BT 27/1-856, 'Board of Trade: Commercial and Statistical Department: Outwards Passenger Lists' (1890-1914).

²⁷ Board of Trade, *Board of Trade Journal* (1886-1914).

²⁸ Debbie Beavis, *Who Sailed on the Titanic?* (Hersham, Surrey, 2002), pp. 8-9, 293.

of such foreign aliens. Such information was however already summarised by the Board within its annual reports.

After the passing of the 1905 Aliens Act and 1906 Merchant Shipping Act the level of information contained within the documents improved. This was reflected in, and required for, the more detailed reports under the Aliens Act. The lists identified whether the passengers were 'Alien-Transmigrant' or 'Aliens-Not Transmigrant'. The latter often arrived as immigrants before subsequently re-embarking for transoceanic destinations. Those transporting such migrants via certain British ports after 1906 had to demonstrate that all transmigrants would leave Britain within a limited date of arriving. Under bond they therefore had to prove through documentary evidence compliance with the law. Accordingly passenger lists recorded where, when and how alien passengers had arrived in Britain. Information provided on lists showed where, when, and how they re-migrated from Britain. Occasionally the documents also recorded the date, and even time, of arrival into Britain. However the latter information was inconsistently recorded. After 1 January 1908, the level of information required under the Aliens Act became standardised nationally. New, specially-designed, passenger lists were introduced which recorded not only consistent information on the British- and Irish-born passengers, but also the alien non-transmigrant and alien transmigrant passengers alike. The lists showed (for alien transmigrants) the continental port of embarkation, the British port of entry, the company (or their British agent) responsible for the migrants journey to Britain, and the port of embarkation. Such information was summarised within the Reports of the Aliens Act and via traditional routes such as BPP.

As most of the information reflected in the lists had already been put forward in Parliamentary reports, only those for the period 1906-1914 were sampled. Because of the magnitude of the task of sampling so many unwieldy documents, for the purposes of this study a six-month period was instead selected for closer scrutiny. The period chosen had to be after 1 April 1912 – when the passenger lists recorded the place of eventual destination. The first year in which the improved lists became available, was therefore the first six months of 1913. As Liverpool (discussed under commercial sources) was most relevant, the documents for the port were sampled for a six-month study.²⁹ The results complemented findings of analysis of departures via

²⁹ TNA, BT 27/790-800 (January-June 1913).

the port of Glasgow undertaken during another study based at the University of Aberdeen. The latter revealed far more information was collated by Board of Trade officials on the transmigrants using Glasgow as a transit port than they did for the English ports of London, Southampton, Bristol, and Liverpool.³⁰ For those leaving via the Scottish ports of Glasgow and Greenock, the ethnicity and nationality of the aliens was also recorded between 1908 and 1914.³¹

British passenger lists therefore had varying use for a study into transmigrants arriving and leaving Britain between 1793 and 1914. Whilst they remedied a shortfall in published data for the arrivals into Britain, the outward lists often replicated information already available in BPP. In order to create a complete run of inward-bound transmigrant statistics it was necessary to turn to port medical records to see whether they offer any data for the period between 1860-1887 when official sources did not offer any statistical information.

2.1.3 British port medical sources

Official sources – published and documentary – had yielded statistical information on transmigrant arrivals into Britain for the period 1836-1859 and 1888-1914. This shortfall was partially remedied by locally-gathered statistics presented to Parliament for just two ports – Hull and London for the period between 1 July 1887 and 30 June 1888 – at the time of the *Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)*.³² In the published findings of the *Select Committee* all vessels arriving at Hull or London with immigrants and transmigrants on board were detailed. It demonstrated that port officials were able to produce such information, as suggested by Stephen Fox, when requested. But had other information survived for the three most significant points of entry – Hull, Grimsby, and London – during the period 1 January 1860 and 30 June 1887? To resolve this, and to provide a more

³⁰ For further discussion of the findings see Nicholas J. Evans, 'Commerce, States and Anti-Alienism in the Late-Victorian Age', in Eitan Bar-Yosef & Nadia Valman (eds.), *The 'Jew' in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture: Between the East End and East Africa* (London, Forthcoming).

³¹ TNA, BT 27/ 560-2, 603-6, 645-9, 694-8, 744-6, 786-90, 828-830 (1908-1914).

³² BPP, *Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1889), Appendix, pp. 294-303.

comprehensive run of statistics, a survey of port medical records, first advocated in the transmigrant context by Kenneth Collins, was undertaken.³³

Collins' essay on transmigration through Scotland demonstrated the benefit of using medical records at key nodal points in the migrant trade to glean statistical information on alien flows through Britain. Using this lens revealed a significant, and under-used, collection of statistics gleaned from the List of Aliens, retained and reported at Hull, from at least 1865, and for Grimsby, after 1884. Whilst similar medical sources also survived for London and Southampton, sampling revealed their statistics were obtained from officially published sources – already discussed. Between 1865 and 1888 the information was presented to the Kingston upon Hull Urban Sanitary Authority (later Hull Port Sanitary Authority) on a fortnightly basis.³⁴ After 1888 the arrivals at Hull also included those landing at the port of Goole, as part of the Hull and Goole Port Sanitary Authority. They were presented on a monthly basis.³⁵ At the neighbouring port of Grimsby the information was presented to the Great Grimsby Port Sanitary Authority on an annual basis from 1884.³⁶ A long run of data assembled from these sources dovetailed with that already gleaned for 1836-1860, from the List of Aliens, between 1888-1905 from the BPP, and from 1906-1913 from the annual reports of the enforcement of the Aliens Act. Except for the years 1860-1864 and 1875-1879, in the case of Hull, and 1860-1883, in the case of Grimsby, such data were available. Typically this information was presented in aggregated form. For example, '10,000 transmigrants arrived during the previous year', or '4,000 emigrants *en route* to Liverpool arrived during the past month'. Other data include references to heavy rates of arrival such as in 1882 when 10,000 transmigrants arrived in one weekend. Other data referred to the number of medically unfit migrants arriving at ports of entry.

³³ Kenneth Collins, 'Scottish Transmigration and Settlement: Records of the Glasgow Experience', pp. 49-58.

³⁴ HCA, BHH/1/48-54, 'Minutes of the Kingston upon Hull Urban Sanitary Authority' (1863-1877); TCM 172-180, 'Minutes of the Kingston upon Hull Town Council' (1877-1888).

³⁵ HCA, WHG/1/20-46, 'Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books' (1888-1915).

³⁶ NELA, 1/113/3-7, 'Minutes of the Grimsby Port Sanitary Authority' (1884-1914).

2.1.4 Statistics from religious agencies

Other sources offering quantitative information on transmigration included the records of the Scandinavian Mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) and the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter of London. These added statistical information concerning arrivals at Hull, Grimsby, and London and departures from London, Liverpool, Southampton, or Glasgow.

The activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in proselytising yielded more than 100,000 emigrant converts between 1830 and 1890. Central to the Church's doctrine were the importance of retaining genealogical information and (prior to 1890) the importance of gathering to their Zion – the US state of Utah. All the converts had their emigration arranged centrally via the Church's emigrant headquarters in Liverpool. For foreign converts this necessitated travelling to the United States via Liverpool. As over 24 per cent of the emigrant converts were from Denmark, Sweden and Norway, their archives pertaining to this period of gathering represented one of the earliest – and most complete – sets of documentation for the study of indirect migration via Britain.³⁷ So extensive was the movement that sources concerning the gathering offered a potential insight into transmigration via Britain not available from other sources for the period 1860-1864 and 1875-1879. Further, they covered 1852-1894 and therefore provided comparable port-based statistical evidence not available in official sources and not gleaned by List of Aliens.

The microfilmed copies of the original passenger lists of the Scandinavian Mission were also available for examination via the Church's modern-day Family History Library.³⁸ The latter source provided details of passengers and ships used to convey groups of Scandinavian converts from Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish ports. All of those 80 vessels sailing from Scandinavia between 1872 and 1890 arrived at the port of Hull. The creation of a database on this material enabled the linkage of differing records. The core statistics were extracted from a list of 136 voyages. The microfilm of the Scandinavian Mission included details of 80 vessels sailing between

³⁷ Fred Woods & Nicholas Evans, 'Latter-day Saint Scandinavian Migration through Hull, England, 1852-1894', *BYU Studies*, Volume XLI, Number 4 (2002), pp. 75, 80.

³⁸ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, 1999); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Family History Library, Film Number 0040994, 'Scandinavian LDS Emigration Records' (1874-1894).

1872 and 1890. But details of additional voyages of European ‘Saints’, starting in 1852, were also gleaned from published sources.³⁹ Finally, first hand evidence from so-called company accounts (written accounts of each group that sailed from Europe) yielded information on further voyages. The value of this combined list showed some 80 sailings. The evidence gathered was then checked against other port records, such as the List of Aliens, Customs Bills of Entry, and local newspaper articles, to validate the arrival of Mormon emigrants.⁴⁰

These additional data, such as the docks used within ports, movements of foreign emigrants between Hull and Grimsby, the ownership details of the vessels used to convey the migrants, along with the day of arrival, were collated and the information was added to data obtained from published sources regarding the arrival of Mormon emigrants at Grimsby, Newcastle, London and Leith (for the period 1852-1890). The resulting database was then interrogated to generate statistical trends used throughout the study. As the Church documented each aspect of the converts’ journey from Europe to Britain, from Britain to the US, and then from the US port of entry to Utah, their archives enabled the investigation each part of a transmigrants journey to the United States. This was especially important when trying to calculate the length of time needed to gather (or emigrate) directly from continental Europe as opposed to the indirect option via Britain. The importance of the indirect option – for speed and price – became apparent through the statistics gleaned from these sources. Yet their wider significance proved central to the study of transport as the central mechanism by which so many Europeans reached transoceanic destinations in as quick a time as possible.

Port-based statistics were of use not only for the study of Mormon emigration, nor for just transmigrant arrivals at Hull and Grimsby. Jewish historiography, in particular comments made by Stephen Fox, essays by Lloyd Gartner and Aubrey Newman, and detailed analyses by Riva Krut and Caroline Barker, have all demonstrated the utility of port-based studies in understanding Jewish migration. In particular they have questioned the public trustworthiness of official statistics –

³⁹ Conway Sonne, *Saints on the Seas: A Maritime History of Mormon Migration, 1830-1890* (Salt Lake City, 1983); Andrew Jenson, *History of the Scandinavian Mission* (Salt Lake City, 1927).

⁴⁰ LSL, Customs Bills of Entry (1852-1890); HCA, Customs Bills of Entry (1852-1857).

especially in the case of London.⁴¹ For this study sources discussed by the aforementioned were re-examined. In particular, the annual reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter and the subsequent re-reporting of the shelter's activities within BPP offered a range of statistics pertaining to Jewish transmigration via the port of London.⁴² These were of particular importance as official statistics connected with transmigration through London failed adequately to distinguish between immigration and transmigration in officially published statistics for the period 1879-1905.⁴³

The activities of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter were reported within BPP from 1889 and annually from 1891.⁴⁴ As described by Newman and Barker, they were an important aspect of demonstrating to the British establishment that Anglo-Jewry was using philanthropy to direct, diffuse, or re-settle the large swathes of East European Jews shown in official statistics as arriving in Britain via the port of London. Yet such data were only provided until 1905 when the passing of the Aliens Act required the presentation of detailed statistical evidence on all matters of immigration, public and charitable benevolence, and the rejection of undesirable aliens. Thereafter the source of the information presented were the Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter. As the Annual Reports ran along the financial year (starting on 1 November each year until the following October) the information was converted into the standard calendar format. Gaps were still evident for certain periods. Yet they showed, as Barker had discussed, the flows of migrants via the Shelter. Unlike Barker's study, which was focussed upon the flow of migrants to South Africa, the information on other destinations was also collated. This was of

⁴¹ Fox, 'The Invasion of Pauper Foreigners', pp. 855-867; Gartner, 'Notes on the Statistics of Jewish Immigration to England, 1870-1914', pp. 97-102; Aubrey Newman, 'Directed Migration: The Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, 1885-1914', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil, *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 175-186; Riva Krut, *Building a Home and a Community: Jews in Johannesburg, 1886-1914*; Caroline Barker, *Jewish Migration to South Africa and the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, London, 1880-1914* (Unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, University of Leicester, 1998), p. 76.

⁴² LMA, 'Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter: Annual Reports' (1886-1915); LJM, 'Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter: Annual Reports' (1900-1915).

⁴³ Alien passengers arriving in London between 1879 and 1888 were listed in BPP, *Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1889), p. 35.

⁴⁴ BPP, *Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1888), p. 312-3; BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1890-1905).

special importance to see the earlier geographic lure of the United States over South Africa and the numbers of transmigrants destined for Latin America.

2.1.5 Re-arranging the transmigrant data

Having gathered statistical information presented in various sources it was possible to illustrate graphically and to discuss statistically patterns of European migration via Britain for the period 1836-1913. Whilst gaps in the data showing arrivals via the port of Hull were still apparent for the years 1861-1865 and 1875-1879 these have been left – without trying to estimate the numbers missing. This decision was taken because of the difficulties in ascertaining such flows in abnormal migrant periods to the United States – the former at the time of the US Civil War and the latter during an acute period of economic crisis in the US economy. Such factors could have reduced normal rates of emigration to the United States – and thus of transmigration via Britain – and any projected patterns may prove erratic. The statistical data required some form of re-arranging in order to present the data in a logical manner. For ease of reading it was decided to present the statistical information in quinquennial blocks. Those ports that played only occasional or exceptional roles in the business have been included within the ‘Other’ column or grouped with nearby ports for the years before 1906. Thus ‘other’ ports (pre-1906) included Grangemouth, Dundee, Southampton, Plymouth, Newcastle, and Newhaven. Not all data were available for 1914 due to the outbreak of the First World War. Information on the European ports from where the transmigrants had originated also required considerable re-arrangement – due to the differing array of sources from where the information was obtained. For purposes of standardisation (in line with post-1906 patterns) all European ports of origin were placed within regional groups. Thus, the number of aliens arriving in Britain from Hamburg, Bremen, Bremerhaven, and Danzig was grouped into the collection label ‘German’; all of the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish ports were given the label ‘Scandinavian’; those from Courland and Russia were grouped into ‘Russian’, etc.. Only the Finnish ports remained separately identified – again, in accordance with post 1906 labels. Statistics on the nationality of the European transmigrants were standardised into the labels used by the US Immigration Commission.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ As reproduced in Imre Ferenczi & Walter Willcox (eds.), *International Migrations: Volume I: Statistics*.

To enable comparison with other sources the Canadian and US data were combined to form a statistical series for North America as a continental destination for various European nationals. The statistical data gathered from BPP were grouped into those ethnic groups shown in the US Immigrant Commission. Thus the separate data for Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish migrants or places have been grouped as Scandinavian. Finnish and Polish places and migrants have also been grouped under the Russian label. Similar published data for Canada were obtained for the period 1896-1914 from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada.⁴⁶ Other published data pertaining to colonial and non-US ports were obtained via consular reports and subsequently republished via the BPP.⁴⁷

For the period 1906-1913 statistical patterns were often grouped together as a block. Data for the period 1906-1913 also included US citizens – showing that many visited Europe and travelled on transmigrant tickets. Those who had not become US citizens were not distinguishable and thus were listed as nationals according to their place of birth. A degree of caution therefore needs to be used with such findings as it does with all data presented before 1 April 1912. The destinations of transmigrants in the pre-1912 era were shown for general purposes only. In the earlier period, 1836-1859, destinations gathered from the List of Aliens were perhaps over simplified. Ambiguous descriptions such as ‘*en route to America*’ were taken (unless shown) to be the United States. Where the label America/Australia is used the split destination reflected the original certificate. Data on the destinations of transmigrants were not presented in BPP after 1912. As so little statistical evidence survived it has been presented in annual sets of data. The sharp rise in the number of transmigrants destined for Canada might have been explained by the more accurate information gathered after the 1905 Aliens Act. But one cannot be certain of this as more funding became available for the European (and not just British) settlement of British North America in the same period.

⁴⁶ The Ships List, <http://www.theshipslist.com/Forms/canadastats.htm>.

⁴⁷ BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*.

2.2 Qualitative sources

Throughout the 79 year period for which statistical evidence showed so many Europeans as transmigrating through Britain, only one report was published by the British parliament into the finer detail of the trade. Although subsequent parliamentary investigations such as the 1903 *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* and the 1888 *Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* made reference to transients, the 14 pages of *Reports by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull*, published in 1882, remained the only official study produced.⁴⁸ To contextualise the quantitative sources already described, qualitative sources beyond the use of the 1882 Report were sought to widen the scope of this study beyond a purely statistical base. Because of their extent only those official, commercial, and personal testimony, used within this study will be discussed. They have been approached from three perspectives to demonstrate the significance of the trade to: the ports which handled the trade, the businesses which provided such transport, and those who migrated.

2.2.1 Port-based sources

The important qualitative information obtained from the 1882 Reports on Hull were supplemented by the miscellaneous notes gathered to prepare the report were sourced.⁴⁹ The function of ports as facilitators of mass migration was then detailed within the source. To broaden the evidence presented in 1882 other sources – namely census enumerators’ returns, port medical records, dock company archives, Customs Bills of Entry (shown in Appendix 3.7) – were utilised.

Because of the organisation of the trade around arrival on a Sunday evening – for a Wednesday departure, or Wednesday arrival for a Saturday departure – the decennial Census, always enumerated on a Sunday evening, had limited scope for use within this study.⁵⁰ This was first highlighted by the 1881 Census. The enumerators’ returns provided an overview of the role of various agents within and without British

⁴⁸ BPP, *Reports by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882).

⁴⁹ TNA, MT 9/291 (1882).

⁵⁰ Glass & Taylor, *Population and Emigration*, p. 33.

ports. Its CD-ROM was searched using a different viewer to that normally provided with the electronic software.⁵¹ This provided additional search options such as the 'neighbour' function which made it possible to search Britain for references within the transcribed census enumerators' returns to 'Jew', 'Emigrant', 'Migrant', 'Alien', 'Immigrant', 'Emigrant Agent' and 'Translator'. The findings were entered into a Microsoft Access relational database which made it possible to gather and organise findings according to nationality of agents, nationality by ship and port or group according to an area of interest – namely Hull, Grimsby, Liverpool and Glasgow. Such information obtained for 1881 was supplemented by microfilmed copies of the 1841, 1851, 1861, 1871, 1891, and 1901 Census held in Hull, Grimsby, London and Glasgow. These detailed the various locations, individuals and occupation groups engaged in the trade at port level.

The archives of the Port Medical Officers of Health were also examined. They collectively provided an insight into the evolution of what Krista Maglen has defined as 'the British system of port quarantine' during the nineteenth century at Hull, Goole, Grimsby, London, Glasgow, and Southampton.⁵² In the case of London, Glasgow, Southampton, and Grimsby such information was gleaned from the annual or bi-annual reports of the Port Sanitary Authorities covering the period 1872-1914.⁵³ At Hull, where transients had a longer history of introducing disease, the statistics were reported on a fortnightly basis within the Board of Health, between 1865 and 1872, Town Council Minutes, between 1872 and 1884, and the Port Sanitary Authority of Hull and Hull between 1884 and 1914.⁵⁴ At London, an additional

⁵¹ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Family History Resource File-Viewer 3.0* (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1999); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *1881 British Census CD-ROM* (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1998). The 1881 Census CD-Rom was originally supplied with Viewer 2.0.

⁵² Krista Maglen, 'The First Line of Defence': British Quarantine and the Port Sanitary Authorities in the Nineteenth Century', *Social History of Medicine*, Volume XV, Issue 3 (2002), pp. 413-428.

⁵³ CLRO, 'Port Sanitary Reports', 565B (1873-1922); The Mitchell Library, 'Report on the Operations of the Sanitary Department', E1/34/1-6 (1896-1914), 'Report on the Operations of the Sanitary Department', D-TC 23 (1902-1903); Southampton City Archives, 'Annual Reports of the Urban Medical Officer of Health and the Port Medical Officer of Health, SC/H.1/1-35 (1874-1914); NELA, 'Minutes of the Grimsby Port Sanitary Authority', 1/113/3-7 (1884-1914).

⁵⁴ HCA, BHH/1/48-54, 'Kingston upon Hull Local Board of Health and Urban Sanitary Authority – Proceedings of the Sanitary Committee (1853-1877); TCM/172-181, 'Kingston upon Hull Town Council: Sanitary Committee' (1877-1888); WHG/1/20-46, 'Hull & Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books (Volumes 1-46)' (1888-1914).

source, the survey in 1893 into port-based solutions to the 1892 cholera epidemic at Hamburg was also utilised.⁵⁵ Such medical reports provided evidence of how passengers were handled upon entry into Britain – especially during times of epidemics – arrangements at such ports for the speedy processing of those *en route*, and the importance of port-based facilities such as lodging houses, transport and dock facilities.

Because of the significant utility of these medical records less attention was given to the numerous bodies that owned or managed particular ports or harbours – such as the Hull Dock Company, Hull & Barnsley Railway, Merseyside Harbour Dock Board, and Grimsby Dock – than might otherwise have been necessary. A commercial insight into port operations was also provided by a survey of the business archives held by the Port of London Authority at the Museum of London in the Docklands.⁵⁶ At Hull the use of particular docks by shipping companies was also investigated for the arrival of Mormon transmigrants (1852-1894) and three other ‘snapshots’ for years in which a full list of vessels entering the port (carrying passengers) was available. These included the calendar years 1854, 1 July 1886-30 June 1887, and 1913. The model for such snapshots was provided by Taylor in his *Distant Magnet* – which sampled 1854, 1888, and 1907.⁵⁷ The sources for this information included the List of Aliens presented by the masters of all in-coming vessels carrying aliens, the *Select Committee on the Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)*, and the *Daybook* of the Jewish Society for the Protection of Girls and Women (Hull Branch).⁵⁸ The dock information was provided by cross referencing to the Customs Bills of Entry.⁵⁹ All of the information was inserted into a Microsoft Access relational database for analysis and interrogation.

⁵⁵ CLRO, 565B, ‘Special report on the measures taken to prevent the introduction of Cholera into the Port of London’ (25 August 1892).

⁵⁶ MLD, PLA ‘St. Katherine’s Dock Company’ (1829-1902); PLA ‘East & West India Docks Company’ (1829-1902).

⁵⁷ Taylor, *The Distant Magnet*, pp. 33, 61, 63.

⁵⁸ TNA, HO 3/64-67, Aliens Act 1836: Returns and Papers’ (1852); BPP, *Report of the Select Committee on the Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1888); Hull Hebrew Community Archives, ‘Jewish Association for the Protection of Women & Girls – Daybook’ (1910-1914).

⁵⁹ LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1850-1898).

2.2.2 Business archives

Like many of the states the transmigrants travelled through, those companies who provided transport often failed to retain records connected with their passengers. The lack of such documentation is perhaps not surprising as the number of passengers such companies handled, and in some instances continued to deal with, could be enormous. The Cunard and Hamburg-America Lines exemplified this. Although retaining substantial collections relating to their overall corporate activities, little information on micro, day-to-day, activities remains. The 'lost heritage' included lists of their passengers – as well as other documentation such as victualling expenses, portage charges, or the expenses incurred in employing translators. Information that has survived concerned the trade, macro business trends, and information on the mechanisms (ships, trains, and trade agreements) which formed an integral part in the development and maintenance of the trade. Because of the breadth of this topic, it has been divided into three sub-sections, namely: shipping companies, railway companies, and travel agencies.

2.2.2.1 Shipping company archives

As with the retention of passenger records, the business archives which have survived represent only a small fraction of the original business correspondence that would have been generated through the activities of companies such as Cunard, White Star, Guion, or the Wilson Line. Though the Wilson Line had a Passenger Department, little has survived from this. The majority of what remains is now deposited within the Ellerman Wilson Line collection at the University of Hull's Brynmor Jones Library. This collection mainly relates to property, business transactions, financial reports, and the profits and losses such activities generated.

Whilst the Profit and Loss Accounts, available for the period 1891-1914, provided information of the profitability of the company they also, relevant in this context, detailed the value of Swedish and Norwegian emigrant bonds.⁶⁰ Yet it was the detailed financial reports, between 1904 and 1914, that provided important information on the role of foreign-born agents, in particular the Wilson Line of

⁶⁰ Archives and Special Collection, Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull (hereafter BJJL), DEW2/3/37, 'Manuscript Accounts' (1891-1904); DEW2/3/38-48, 'Financial Statements' (1904-1914).

Gothenburg, in developing and maintaining the company's share of the North European migrant business.⁶¹ The role of individual vessels, plying competing passenger routes such as that from Gothenburg to the Humber, the route from Northern Norwegian ports to Hull, or the Baltic ports to Hull or London, were provided in more detailed financial reports available.⁶² Those specifically detailing the emigrants from the passenger business generally were only available for the short period 1908-1911.⁶³

The latter financial records distinguished income derived from the migrant shipping as opposed to the passenger trade generally or the diverse trading activities of the company in general. The financial records were interrogated to obtain a snapshot of the activities of a feeder line during the first decade of the twentieth century. Income was broken down to distinguish the scale of the trade, class of passenger on the outward and homeward voyages, and earnings by ship, routes, or ports. Because they provided information on the results of individual vessels, and differing routes, the most important transmigrant routes were identified.

Crucially these financial records also highlighted investments, or Swedish emigration bonds, the Wilson Line (and other feeder lines) had to deposit with the Swedish Government in order to run emigrant ships. These bonds, indemnified Atlantic companies that the Wilson Line represented from any financial responsibility consequent upon loss of life. In addition to detailing the level of investments the Wilson Line made in Swedish companies they also showed the network of foreign agents, or Agents General, employed in Sweden by transatlantic shipping companies.⁶⁴ Apart from the Wilson Line, the market share held by different North Sea companies providing services to Hull was calculated for the same 'snapshot' years 1854, 1886/7, and 1913. This information was obtained from the database compiled for the dock database (described already) with the ownership of vessels being provided by reference to *Lloyd's Register*.⁶⁵

⁶¹ BJL, DEW2/3/38-48, 'Financial Statements' (1904-1914).

⁶² BJL, DEW2/3/96-104, 'Detailed Financial Statements and Reports' (1906-1914).

⁶³ BJL, DEW2/3/98-101, 'Detailed Financial Statements and Reports' (1908-1911).

⁶⁴ BJL, DEW2/39/2, 'Emigrant Agents Securities' (1889-1911).

⁶⁵ NMM, *Lloyd's Register of Shipping* (1854-1913).

To provide a continental-wide perspective the records of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference (hereafter TAPC) were interrogated for patterns of transoceanic travel.⁶⁶ Whilst returns for sampled individual years survived at the University of Åbo archives, and other statistical information gleaned from the Anchor Line's archives at the University of Glasgow, the only run of reports available are those held in the Historians Office of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service in Washington.⁶⁷ The reports only showed the number of passengers conveyed in each class from specific European ports to North American destinations (the United States and Canada) – and not the difference by nationality, ethnicity, emigrants or transmigrants. It is of little surprise that economists have used copies held within a congressional investigation to analyse the trade covering the years 1899-1911.⁶⁸ The information was of great value, despite not being broken down into foreign and domestic emigrants. Data from the reports for the years 1899-1914 provided a clear understanding of the role played by British companies within mass transatlantic migration – excluding migration to parts of the southern hemisphere.

2.2.2.2 Railway company archives

The sheer number of passengers carried by railway companies meant that only a few companies retained any significant collections. The most notable of these belonged to the North Eastern Railway (hereafter NER). As with the North Atlantic steamships, the trade was controlled by an agency. Unlike the TAPC the Humber Conference was administered by the NER. Statistics extracted from the Humber Conference yielded valuable quantitative and qualitative information.⁶⁹ Data obtained from this source were arranged by year, by company, and in aggregate form demonstrating the importance of the rail link between the north eastern ports of entry – Newcastle, West

⁶⁶ US Immigration & Naturalisation Service (hereafter INS), 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1917). [Copies supplied by INS Senior Historian Marian Smith.]

⁶⁷ University of Glasgow Archives Service, *Ibid*; University of Åbo, Finland Steamship Company Archives, 'North Atlantic Passenger Conference: Return of Third Class Passengers Forwarded from Finland for the Year 1913' (1913); INS, Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1917).

⁶⁸ George Deltas, Rich Sicotte & Peter Tomczak, 'American Shipping Cartels in the Pre-World War I Era', *Research in Economic History*, Volume XIX (1999), pp. 1-38.

⁶⁹ TNA, RAIL 527/1167-8, 'North Eastern Railway Company: Passenger Traffic Statements including Holiday, Emigrant and Fish Traffic etc.' (1890-1910).

Hartlepool, and Hull – and the British ports of embarkation – Liverpool, Glasgow, Southampton, and London. The data were arranged annually on a port by port basis. This indicated the role of ports, operators and railway companies.

Other records provided a longer context as the records included the minutes of each meeting held to discuss the operation and management of the agency.⁷⁰ Between 1851 and 1910 the collections detailed every aspect of the business from the use of language on board railway carriages to the specimen tickets used to distinguish the trade from domestic passengers. This was particularly evident in collections of the London and North Western Railway which showed close cooperation with the Inman Line.⁷¹ Such qualitative records added a wider context to the emergence and division of the transmigrant corridor from the North Eastern Ports of Goole, Hull, West Hartlepool, and Newcastle to the emigrant ports of Liverpool, Glasgow, London, and Southampton.

2.2.3 Personal testimony

Personal testimony was also sampled in order to add to a qualitative dimension to the published version of events provided in parliamentary accounts, contemporary newspapers, or coroner's records (for the Port of Hull).⁷² Those collections included the archives of the Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City; the Family History Library of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City; the University of Michigan Archives, Ann Harbour; the Immigration History Research Centre, Minneapolis; and the Minnesota Historical Library, St. Paul.⁷³ From these it was possible to locate examples of differing European nationals – Danes, Swedes,

⁷⁰ TNA, RAIL 318/1-11, 'Humber Conference Minutes' (1853-1904).

⁷¹ TNA, RAIL 236/629, 'Great Northern Railway Company: Correspondence, notices of sailings and specimen tickets and fares for emigrant traffic on boats of Messrs. Inmans & Co...' (1867-1870).

⁷² HCA, CQB, 'Quarter Sessions Minutes' (1850-1899).

⁷³ Minnesota Historical Library, William Durbin, *The Journal of Otto Peltonen: A Finnish Immigrant* (New York, 2000); A. Knoph, *Beiledning for Emigranter til Amerika forfaavidt angaar Befordring pr. Dampskib ove Hull og Liverpool til New York og videre indgjennern Landet pr. Fernbane* (Christiania, 1869); Carl Mostrom, *Some impressions from my journey to America and also from the first period of my residence there* (Unpublished manuscript, 1912); Ferdinand Nelson, *The Journey from Sweden to America* (Unpublished manuscript, 1903); Edwin Peterson Papers, P2520 (1897-1919); Rush City State Bank Archives, P117, 'Agent's records of five prepaid steerage certificates issued at Rush City, Minnesota, 1882-1884'; Swedish Immigrant Letters, 1884-1892, P1800, 'Robert Engdahl & Co., Land & Emigration Agents' (1886).

Norwegians, Germans, Austrian-Hungarians, and Russians – who left diaries, letters or autobiographies discussing their journeys. Often these had been translated, or were written retrospectively in English once a migrant had developed a sufficient command of English. They were therefore available and in an accessible format.

Methodological approaches of using personal testimony have been detailed by David Fitzpatrick, Angela McCarthy, and Marjory Harper.⁷⁴ The information gleaned from personal testimony was quite limited. Noted exceptions included evidence from coroners' inquests and criminal cases heard at Hull's Police Courts, between 1850 and 1899; testimony on Liverpool in 1903; the memoir of Abraham Mundy, warden of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, written in 1922; and the published accounts contained within Lily Setterdahls's study of *Minnesota Swedes*.⁷⁵ Apart from Gordon Read, few within the field have sought to publish accounts or piece together information on foreign emigrants' experiences whilst travelling through Britain.⁷⁶ Certain accounts, such as that by Freddie Rands, a member of the Jewish community of Hull, also exemplified the difficulties of using evidence presented by second-generation immigrants.⁷⁷ Instead only the few surviving first-hand accounts written by migrants', or those who came into contact with the transients at the time, have been utilised.

The only accessible collection of first-hand accounts was made available by the publication of the *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM.⁷⁸ The *Mormon Immigration Index* contained qualitative materials of 1,000 accounts of the companies

⁷⁴ David Fitzpatrick, *Oceans of consolation: personal accounts of Irish migration to Australia* (Cork, 1994); Angela McCarthy, *'For Spirit and Adventure': Personal Narratives of Irish and Scottish Migration, 1921-1965* (Manchester, *Forthcoming*); Marjory Harper, 'Probing the Pioneer Questionnaires: British Settlement in Saskatchewan, 1887-1914', *Saskatchewan History*, Volume LII, Number 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 28-46.

⁷⁵ HCA, CQB/238/292-5; CQB/250/212-3; CQB/351/165; DPM/1/121; NMM, XX(112024.1), 'Thomas Henry Ismay and Joseph Bruce Ismay: Transcripts' (1837-1937); LJM, Abraham Mundy, *Some Reminiscences of the Shelter's Activities for the Last Quarter of a Century* (1922); Lilly Setterdahl, *Minnesota Swedes: The Emigration of Trolle Ljungby To Goodhule County, 1855-1912* (East Moline, Illinois: 1996).

⁷⁶ Read, *Through Liverpool to North America*; *idem*, 'Indirect Passage: Jewish Emigrant Experiences', pp. 267-282.

⁷⁷ LSL, *Hull Times*, 29 December 1972, p. 4, 'When Hull was used by Jews as a gateway to their freedom'.

⁷⁸ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, 1999).

of emigrants travelling under the auspices of the Church's European Mission – specifically the British, Scandinavian, German and Swiss Missions. These included references to migration via Hull, Grimsby, Newcastle and London. As a collective entity they made it possible to examine different aspects of the journey to, through, and from Britain to be pieced together. Whilst generating quantitative figures – discussed already – the testimony, from a qualitative perspective, also represented the experiences of thousands of transmigrants who travelled via Hull, Grimsby, Liverpool and Glasgow. However the CD-ROM highlighted the importance of technological improvements in the reduction of the journey time required to reach North American destinations using the transmigrant route. As the vessels conveying the passengers were also noted it was further possible to show the docks at which the passengers landed – showing how port development caused the point of landing to change between 1852 and 1892.

Finally oral history gathered by historians at the University of Cape Town (and now held within its Kaplan Centre Archives) was sampled.⁷⁹ This material was searched for references to formal and less formal information channels, references to the experiences of travel, and the role of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter of London in encouraging transmigration to South Africa. Oral history in Britain, Canada and the United States relating to this pre-1914 period has been a neglected aspect of migrant history. Apart from references to transmigrants within the studies by Bill Williams, of Manchester's Jewish immigrant community, and by Ben Braber, of Glasgow's Jewish community, little remains. In the case of the latter two collections only a single interview in each instance highlighted relevant materials.⁸⁰

2.3 Conclusion

The dearth of a single set of passenger lists has often led historians to ignore Britain's role as a transit nation for millions of Europeans *en route* to the US, Canada and South Africa. Even if such documents had survived, and if it has been possible to enter all details of passengers from Europe, to transatlantic destinations, through

⁷⁹ UCT, BC 949, 'Kaplan Centre Oral History Interviews'.

⁸⁰ MJM, J218, 'Interview between Bill Williams and Mr William Shalyt' (1975). Scottish Jewish Archives Centre, AUD.OHP0006, 'Interview between Ben Braber and Mr. Reuben Cohen' (1988).

Britain, as David Fitzpatrick concluded, could all of the differing data have been linked. Would it add to or hinder scholarship?⁸¹ Whilst historians of the migration of 90,000 Latter-day Saints (or Mormons) believe this is possible, record linkage between different sources of inward and outward bound records often highlighted abnormalities between the information gathered in continental Europe, with that available in Britain, or that obtained in transoceanic countries. For example, we can never know when Charlotte Erickson stated that 30 million migrated to the United States between 1830 and 1914 whether 30 million people left once, if 10 million people migrated on three separate occasions, or how many more migrants were not counted upon arrival in the United States. We do not know whether those whose destination was stated as America entered via Canadian ports, US ports, or via land America's land borders.⁸² Instead we can merely deduce that differing regions within Europe sourced varying amounts of migrants who journeyed via Britain. They account for the growth of the foreign-born population appearing in the US, Canadian and South African censuses. Significantly they did not all 'stop off in Britain as they thought they had landed at Ellis Island'.⁸³ Crucially the market was sizeable.

The magnitude of the business, like that involved with the emigration of Britain's native-born population, was too great for the retention of a continued set of passenger lists. As with Bremen and Bremerhaven, contemporary statisticians often destroyed records shortly after they had been produced.⁸⁴ Where any run of archives has survived this has been because the information contained within the source was of wider contemporary use – often to port or port medical authorities rather than Britain's Aliens (later Home) Office.

It is of little surprise that a significant source of information for the study of transmigration was the British Parliamentary Papers. Only with further data gleaned

⁸¹ Concluding comments made by David Fitzpatrick at 'Europeans on the Move, 1830-1960: Sources, Representations and Methodologies', International Conference held at the University of Aberdeen, 29-30 April 2004.

⁸² Charlotte Erickson, 'Jewish People in the Atlantic Migration, 1850-1914', in Aubrey Newman and Stephen Massil (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), p. 1.

⁸³ Point made by Fiona Frank during a paper at a symposium entitled 'Jewish Settlement, Development and Identities in Scotland, 1879-2004' held at the Scottish Jewish Archives Centre in October 2004.

⁸⁴ Antonius Holtmann, 'Emigration and Family Research: Traces of Everyday Life Recorded in Historical Migration Sources', in Jürgen Sielemann, Rainer Hering and Ulf Bollman (eds.), *Overseas Emigration and Family Research* (Bergenfield, New Jersey, 2003), p. 5.

from the archives of Britain's Port Sanitary Authorities, HM Customs, and the archives of the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade, did the full story emerge. Such bureaucracies were founded by Acts of Parliament and not charged with recording indirect migration *per se*. Instead they were attempts by those based in Britain's ports to monitor port health, maritime commerce, or seaborne passenger trends.

Qualitative or quantitative sources have thereby created a complete picture of the emigrant journey from start to finish. Available data has been arranged to enable comparison between transmigration data and immigrant statistics for those nations to where they were destined. In doing so it distinguishes transmigrants from the immigrant movements to Britain and rates of direct emigration from continental ports. Qualitative interpretation, from the business archives of those transport companies who profited from the trade, has further facilitated the periods where information obtained from dock and customs records provided detailed 'snap shots' of the business. The statistical findings of such work enabled the computation of patterns shown in the following chapter to fit within a wider transatlantic arena. In doing so it seeks to bring the focus of transmigration back to Britain, and not the distant magnets to which they were subsequently bound, or from those from where they originated.

3. Patterns of transmigration

Statistical information on the scale and spatial patterns of alien migration to, through, and from Britain, evolved constantly throughout the long nineteenth century. As discussed in the previous chapter, the ability to quantify the scale and spatial patterns of transmigration throughout the nineteenth century has previously eluded scholars because statistical summaries of officially collated returns pertaining to transmigration had not been provided (nor published) by the government departments charged with monitoring population flows to or from British ports. Those who have discussed features of the phenomenon have instead used data made available through British Parliamentary Papers. In each instance they analysed only certain aspects of alien population flows during the last decade of the nineteenth century or the first decade of the twentieth century.¹ Others, discussing alien population movements during the early twentieth century, have also utilised the detailed statistics made available under the 1905 Aliens Act.²

This chapter profiles the patterns of transmigration through Britain between the passing of the 1836 Aliens Act and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. It achieves this by presenting both the global and the British contexts within which indirect migration through Britain played a part. It then charts the flows of European transmigrants through Britain – showing the European ports at which they embarked, when and where they arrived in Britain, where and when they re-embarked from Britain, and the countries to which they were bound. Throughout, it demonstrates the statistical significance of indirect migration via Britain. In doing so the chapter seeks to validate claims within existing literature that the trade centred on the Humber to Mersey cross-country rail route. By discussing previously unknown, or under-utilised, statistical patterns, these analyses add to current historiography and enable the comparison of

¹ Aubrey Newman, 'The Union Castle Line and Emigration from Eastern Europe to South Africa', in Richard Bonney (ed.), *University of Leicester, Department of History Occasional Papers Series* (2000), <http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/teaching/papers/newman2.htm>; Barker, *Jewish Migration to South Africa*, p. 76; Lloyd Gartner, 'Jewish Migrants En Route', p. 50.

² Jill Pellew, 'The Home Office and the Aliens Act, 1905', pp. 639-685.

information gathered on alien migration through Britain with that collected in the countries where the migrants either originated or were eventually destined.


3.1 Transoceanic Migration

Transmigration through Britain was part of a global phenomenon of transoceanic migrations to and through differing regions of the world during the nineteenth century. Using Adam McKeown's statistics for the period 1846-1915, as shown in Chart 3.1, we see that whilst transatlantic migration was numerically the most significant flow, other movements around the Indian and Pacific Oceans were also of major proportions. Growth in these migrant flows was particularly evident in the periods 1846-1851, 1881-1885, and 1896-1910. Whilst rates of North Asian migration fluctuated enormously and that from Southeast Asia grew steadily, the flow across the Atlantic continued to gather momentum at a greater rate.

Transatlantic migration represented nearly half of all known transoceanic migrations between 1846 and 1915. It accounted for 44.4 million or 48 per cent of the 92.4 million migrants detailed in Table 3.1. As noted within British Parliamentary Papers, during the era between 1890 and 1910, most Europeans were bound for transatlantic destinations. This flow was especially evident between 'old Europe' – Belgium, Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Switzerland – and the United States. Transatlantic migration peaked at 7.9 million in the period 1906-1910. During this era the United States received approximately 4.5 million European immigrants, or 57 per cent of the transatlantic movements profiled by McKeown.³

³ McKeown's data was based upon figures first made available by Ferenczi & Willcox in *International Migrations, Volume I*, pp. 435-437.

Chart 3.1. The number of migrants making oceanic journeys, 1846-1915



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.1. Transoceanic migrant journeys, 1846-1915

Region	Number of migrants	%
North Asian Migration	19,313,000	20.89
Southeast Asian Migration	28,713,000	31.06
Transatlantic Migration	44,410,000	48.04
Total	92,436,000	100.00


Source: Adam McKeown, 'Global Migration, 1846-1940', p. 165.

During the late nineteenth century, as larger numbers of emigrants began to leave Central and Eastern Europe, transatlantic migration increased further. As shown in Chart 3.2, the dominant flow remained concentrated on the Atlantic and in particular migrant flows to North Atlantic destinations. The United States drew the majority of European emigrants – 7.7 million or 65 per cent – between 1889 and 1913 according to figures made available through British consular staff.⁴ Many of those emanating from the

⁴ BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1889-1913).

Iberian peninsular, and via Mediterranean ports, migrated to South Atlantic destinations – 10.99 per cent to Argentina and 11.51 per cent to Brazil. European migration to Latin America, like that of British and Irish migrants to parts of the British Empire, was however always dwarfed by the Europe-wide propensity to settle in continental North America. Accordingly, statistics reveal the continent lured 71.93 per cent of all the Europeans, of whom 7.7 million went to the United States, 516,000 to the United States or Canada, and 319,000 to Canada.⁵

Chart 3.2. The destinations of emigrants from Europe (excluding Britain and Ireland), 1889-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

⁵ Data excludes migrants leaving Britain and Ireland, France, Russia and Poland. Some of the official returns upon which these patterns were based failed to distinguish between those bound for America with those destined for Canada – hence the data for those going to the ‘United States or Canada’.

Table 3.2. The destinations of all emigrants from Europe (excluding Britain and Ireland), 1889-1913

Destination	Number	%
Africa	386,437	3.24
Argentina	1,311,176	10.99
Australia & New Zealand	24,233	0.20
Brazil	1,374,085	11.51
Canada	319,053	2.67
United States/Canada	516,086	4.32
United States	7,749,160	64.94
Other countries	253,150	2.12
Total	11,933,380	100.00


Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1913)*.

European immigration to the United States fluctuated from 239,000, between 1836 and 1839, to 4.5 million, between 1905 and 1909. Drops in the rate of immigration experienced between 1860 and 1864, particularly the disruption to passenger services and the United States, were explained by the politically dislocating effects of the US Civil War and an unwillingness to be compelled to serve in the Union Army. Economic downturns in America further explained why fewer Europeans settled in the United States between 1875-1879 and 1895-1899'. In direct contrast, periods of economic buoyancy in the United States, and particularly the continued industrial expansion, such as that experienced between 1850-1854, 1880-1884, and 1900-1904, accounted for the unprecedented growth in migration. Features of this periodic growth can be seen between 1845-1849 and 1850-1854 when the trade increased by 183 per cent; between 1875-1879 and 1880-1884 when growth was 387 per cent; and between 1895-1899 and 1900-1904 when it still reached 236 per cent.

In total more than 28.7 million Europeans were recorded as arriving in the United States between 1836 and 1914. Statistical patterns of this phenomenon show that it was dominated by British and Irish migration. As shown in Table 3.3, more than 7,927,310 or 27.59 per cent of all US immigrants were of British or Irish origin. Other sizeable migrant groups included Germans, who accounted for 5,428,697 or 18.89 per cent of

immigrants; Austrian-Hungarians, who represented 4,042,377 or 14.07 per cent; Italians who comprised 3,973,818 or 13.83 per cent; Russians and Poles who accounted for 3,391,548 or 11.80 per cent. Of these, the latter three groups arrived in significant numbers during the high waves of immigration in the late nineteenth century. The sustained high levels of immigration from Britain and Ireland explained why even the significant levels of late nineteenth century migration from Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and Poland did not supplant Britain's position as the greatest source of the United States' immigrant population. Of the immigrants from other parts of Europe, those from Germany featured prominently between 1836 and 1894, Italians were significant between 1890 and 1914, and sizeable influxes from Russia and Austria-Hungary occurred between 1900 and 1914.

Chart 3.3. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in the United States, 1836-1914



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.3. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in the United States, 1836-1914

Nationality	Number	%
Austrian-Hungarians	4,042,377	14.07
Belgians	126,811	0.44
British & Irish	7,927,310	27.59
Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbs & Montenegrins	142,247	0.50
Dutch	202,386	0.70
French	478,856	1.67
German	5,428,697	18.89
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	429,522	1.49
Italians	3,973,818	13.83
Norwegians, Swedes, Danes & Icelanders	2,074,827	7.22
Russians & Poles	3,391,548	11.80
Spanish & Portuguese	266,476	0.93
Swiss	246,759	0.86
Other Europeans	4,518	0.02
Total	28,736,152	100.00


Source: Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I*, pp. 408-439.

European migration to Canada, by contrast, was more difficult to determine as immigrant statistics from the period were not collated before 1900. Whilst Ferenczi and Willcox included data that were gathered for the combined immigration of German and Norwegian immigrants for the years for 1846-1873, the origins of Canada's European immigrants were only visible in detail after 1900.⁶ Between 1900 and 1914, immigration to Canada represented only 15 per cent of the volume entering neighbouring America. It grew sizeably throughout the period, as shown in Chart 3.4, when more than 1.8 million Europeans immigrated to the country. During the period 1910-1914, there was exponential growth in comparison with immigration to the United States so that European immigration to Canada grew from 332,617 between 1900-1904, to 576,376, between 1905-1909, and peaked at 909,708 between 1910-1914. This represented a growth of 274 per cent for the period 1900-1914 compared with that of only 146 per cent for the United States.

⁶ Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I*, p. 360.

Despite the historic links between France and the Canadian province of Quebec, French immigration was statistically insignificant. Instead, Britain’s links with the country justified patterns of European settlement between 1900 and 1914. British and Irish immigration to Canada represented 1.1 million immigrants or 61 per cent of all European immigration to Canada. Of the remaining 39 per cent, only those 219,406 or 12 per cent from Russia-Poland and 192,850 or 11 per cent from Austria-Hungary were of statistical significance.

Chart 3.4. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in Canada, 1900-1914



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.4. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in Canada, 1900-1914

Nationality	Number	%
Austrian-Hungarians	192,850	10.60
Belgians	14661	0.81
British & Irish	1,116,352	61.38
Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbians & Montenegrins	23,510	1.29
Dutch	9,002	0.49
French	23,768	1.31
Germans	36,299	2.00
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	8,954	0.49
Italians	112,730	6.20
Norwegians, Swedes, Danes & Icelanders	55,731	3.06
Russian, Poles, Finns & Hebrews	219,406	12.06
Spanish & Portuguese	2,136	0.12
Swiss	2,232	0.12
Other Europeans	1,070	0.06
Total	1,818,701	100.00

Source: Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I*, pp. 364-365.


As well as the millions who arrived in Canadian ports *en route* to the United States and visa versa, millions of migrants used other European countries as transit stations in order to reach transoceanic destinations.⁷ As Ferenczi and Willcox have recorded, shown in Table 3.5, at least 14.6 million aliens travelled via other transit countries in order to reach transatlantic destinations between 1856 and 1915. This trade centred on Belgian, British, Dutch, French, or German ports. Whilst many of those portrayed by Ferenczi and Willcox were not migrants (but were tourists) the scale of the alien transit market is particularly apparent. If the known rates of immigration into Canada and the United States (shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4) are combined, representing some 30.5 million immigrants, then the transit element of the market represented some 49.9 per cent of the migrant business. Even with non-migrant aliens deducted from the figure of 14.6 million, the importance of transit countries is still very evident. The indirect flow of aliens through the five European countries detailed, as Chart 3.5 demonstrates, grew from 139,147 in the period 1856-1860, to more than 1.55 million

⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 358, 363.

passengers between 1886 and 1890, before peaking at 2.86 million between 1906 and 1910.

Like patterns of immigration into continental North America, the flow of aliens in transit – so-called transmigrants – peaked in the period 1906-1910. Excluding the data for French ports (not available after 1890), the main transit nations were Britain and Germany. Whilst British ports had a major role in the indirect flow of alien passengers throughout the period, Germany’s position grew during the late nineteenth century. In the late 1880s it finally eclipsed Britain and became the dominant alien passenger-carrying nation. Between 1856 and 1915 Germany controlled 40.9 per cent of the alien transit market. Britain came a close second with 36 per cent of the trade. Whilst other countries were also of significance, the two countries together controlled more than 11.2 million alien passengers or 76.9 per cent of the market.

Chart 3.5. The flow of alien passengers from European countries, 1856-1915



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.5. The number of alien passengers sailing from European countries, 1856-1915

Country	Total	%
Belgium ⁽¹⁾	1,261,433	8.64
British Isles	5,265,746	36.07
France	1,037,761	7.11
Germany ⁽⁴⁾	5,974,395	40.92
Netherlands ⁽⁶⁾	1,060,744	7.27
Total	14,600,079	100.00


Source: Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I*, p. 348. Figures excluded data for Belgium (1856-1885 and 1914-1915), the Netherlands (1856-1866), and France (1901-1915).

For further elaboration on the patterns gleaned from Ferenczi and Willcox we have to turn to British Parliamentary Papers and other British sources in order to quantify features of these flows between 1836 and 1914. As will now be explained, the flow of transmigrants through Britain was a constant feature of the British passenger market.

3.2 Alien migration to and from Britain

The British alien market was a large-scale operation and functioned alongside an equally sizeable domestic passenger market. Aliens were transported on both long-haul and short-sea routes to and from Britain. The scale of Britain's share of European migration set her apart from most of her rival maritime economies. Those traversing the North Sea and English Channel included immigrants, transmigrants, tourists, and seafarers. As shown in Table 3.6, of all alien movements to Britain, those by transmigrants were noticeably the largest. The trade in transmigrants increased from 62,901 transmigrants or 67 per cent of the alien flows in 1890 to 172,438 or 81 per cent of the trade in 1910. In total the business represented some 2.3 million people, or 63 per cent of all aliens recorded in officially published statistics as arriving in Britain between 1879 and 1913. As with other transoceanic migrations, alien movements to Britain were highly cyclical. Highs of 1890-1892 and 1900-1907 were followed by lulls between 1893-1899 and 1908-1910. Such fluctuations, like the peak year of 1907, replicated similar migrant movements centring in the United States and Canada.

Chart 3.6. Intra-continental alien population movement to Britain, 1879-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.


Table 3.6. Intra-continental alien population movement to Britain, 1879-1913

Type of alien	Number	%
Immigrants	1,079,029	29.47
Crew	274,277	7.49
Transmigrants	2,307,897	63.04
Total	3,661,203	100.00

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*; BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

The trade in alien passengers, as detailed in Chart 3.7, included other non-British migrants. The overall flows of alien passengers were relatively constant and grew throughout the late nineteenth century. Less cyclical than the migrant business in general, the number of foreign passengers (migrants and non-migrants) increased from 123,000 per year or 26 per cent of the trade in 1884, to 236,000 or 42 per cent in 1904. The foreign element of the trade accounted for the movement of 1.17 million passengers.

Chart 3.7. The intra-European passenger market to Britain, 1884-1905



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.7. The intra-European passenger market to Britain, 1884-1905


Type of passenger	Number	%
British & Irish	2,249,768	65.75
Alien	1,172,088	34.25
Total	3,421,856	100.00

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1884-1905)*.

The movement of aliens on the short-sea routes to Britain was only one feature of the British alien market. Of greater importance were those who embarked from British ports on transoceanic or long-haul voyages. They included migrants, tourists, and seafarers travelling in first-, second-, and third-class berths respectively. The foreign passengers, as shown in Table 3.8, represented a constant feature of inter-continental passenger shipping. Unlike the movement of aliens to Britain, that in conveying foreigners from Britain was cyclical. The trade increased from 31,459 or nine per cent of the market in 1853 to 239,040 or 38 per cent in 1907. The foreign component of the

trade averaged at 28 per cent of all known inter-continental passenger movements from Britain between 1853 and 1914. In total 5.3 million foreigners travelled from Britain out of a total of 19.1 million people who left on transoceanic journeys.

Chart 3.8. Inter-continental passenger movement from Britain, 1853-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.8. Inter-continental passenger movement from Britain, 1853-1913


Type of passenger	Number	%
British & Irish	13,391,227	69.92
Alien	5,323,875	27.80
Not distinguished	438,448	2.29
Total	19,153,550	100.00

Source: Carrier & Jeffery, *External Migration*, pp. 90-91.

The greatest proportion of those leaving British and Irish ports did so via only a handful of British ports. As shown in Chart 3.9 and Table 3.9, Liverpool handled the majority of British, Irish, and foreign passengers leaving British ports for transoceanic destinations between 1843 and 1913. Her domination over British passenger shipping

dwarfed all other ports combined and her lead was evident throughout the period despite heavy domestic competition from other ports such as Glasgow, Southampton, London, and Plymouth. In total Liverpool despatched more than 10.1 million or 68 per cent of all those passengers carried from Britain's leading ports.

Chart 3.9. The number of passengers embarking upon transoceanic voyages from Britain's five leading passenger ports, 1843-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.


Table 3.9. The number of passengers embarking upon transoceanic voyages from Britain's five leading passenger ports, 1843-1913

Port	Number	%
Glasgow	1,395,695	9.41
Liverpool	10,120,912	68.24
London	1,629,944	10.99
Plymouth	417,173	2.81
Southampton	1,266,723	8.54
Total	14,830,447	100.00

Source: BPP, *General Reports of the Colonial and Emigration Commissioners* (1843-1872); BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1876-1913).

A closer examination of the alien passengers leaving British ports, illustrated in Table 3.10, revealed that most were bound for the United States. Not unsurprisingly the flow mirrored those of domestic passengers during the period 1860-1913. Most foreign passengers, 4.5 million or 94 per cent, travelled to the United States and Canada. A smaller number, 270,977 or six per cent, were bound along colonial routes to Australasia and other foreign destinations. Of the 8,147,322 people who left British ports between 1871 and 1899, as shown in Table 3.10, only 27 per cent (2.2 million) were foreign. Those bound for the United States represented 82 per cent of all foreign passengers. This compared with rates of British and Irish migration, of which only 66 per cent were headed for the United States. The remainder of the foreign passenger trade included 256,009, or 12 per cent, who went to Canada, 110,348, or five per cent, who were bound for other destinations, and 23,248, or one per cent, who sailed for Australasia.

Chart 3.10. The destination of all passengers who left British ports, 1860-3 and 1871-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.10. The destination of all passengers who left British ports, 1860-3 and 1871-1913


Type of passenger	Australasia	%	Canada	%	United States	%	Other destinations	%	Total	%
British	1,398,919	13	2,097,296	20	5,802,034	55	1,278,376	12	10,576,625	68
Foreigners	32,345	1	682,514	14	3,827,159	80	238,632	5	4,780,650	31
Not distinguished	8,927	4	30,513	12	83,893	33	131,642	52	254,975	2
Total	1,440,191	9	2,810,323	18	9,713,086	62	1,648,650	11	15,612,250	100

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1876-1913)*.

Note: Figures were not collated between 1 July 1863 and 31 December 1870.

Distinction between alien passengers and actual alien emigrants was possible for flows after 1877. Although the data did not distinguish between alien transmigrants and aliens who travelled through Britain in stages before re-emigrating, as shown in Chart 3.11 and Table 3.11, a larger proportion of the alien emigrants were males. Relative gender parity was only evident during lulls in the level of emigration, such as that between 1877-1879, 1883-1886, 1894-1898, and in 1908. In total 3.6 million alien emigrants were profiled in official statistics as leaving Britain between 1877 and 1911. Male emigration during this period represented 66 per cent of all adult alien emigrants, compared with an average of 34 per cent of all adult aliens who were females.

Chart 3.11. The gender profile of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.11. The gender profile of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911


Gender	Number	%
Male	2,384,335	66.10
Female	1,223,038	33.90
Total	3,607,373	100.00

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

Periods of exceptional alien migration from Britain were significantly bolstered by migration to the United States. As shown in Charts 3.12a and 3.12b, patterns of alien emigration from Britain conformed to long established associations between the lure of particular regions, especially the United States, during either economic depressions in Europe or periods of buoyancy abroad. The United States lured 2.79 million alien immigrants, Canada 458,000, and other foreign destinations attracted 304,000 between 1877 and 1911. The scale of migration to the United States accounted for 77 per cent of all alien emigration from Britain. The flow was very cyclical. Peaks were evident for


both male and female emigration between 1880-1882 and from 1903-1907. Those to Canada, Australasia, South Africa, and all other places were relatively constant and numerically less significant. Collectively they only accounted for 24 per cent of all adult male emigration and 19 per cent of all adult female emigrants.

Chart 3.12a. Destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Chart 3.12b. Destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.12. Number and destinations of adult alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911


Destination	Number of men	% of men	Number of women	% of women	Total number	Total %
United States	1,802,050	64.54	989,957	35.46	2,792,007	77.40
Canada	322,421	70.38	135,692	29.62	458,113	12.70
Australasia	13,065	69.72	5,674	30.28	18,739	0.52
South Africa	22,985	67.25	11,195	32.75	34,180	0.95
All other places	223,814	73.54	80,520	26.46	304,334	8.44
Total	2,384,335	66.10	1,223,038	33.90	3,607,373	100.00

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

Adult aliens leaving Britain were predominantly unskilled males (labourers) or married women (shown here as no stated occupation). As clarified in Charts 3.13a and


3.13b, whilst large numbers of female domestics, totalling 278,834, were amongst the 1.2 million women who left Britain, and in certain years a number of skilled workers such as dressmakers and other trades were amongst their ranks, females did not generally represent a very skilled migrant workforce. A larger proportion, amounting to 30 per cent, of their 2.38 million male counterparts came from skilled backgrounds (agriculture, commerce, the professions, or skilled occupations). The rates of skilled male emigration were particularly apparent in the late nineteenth century. They peaked, as with emigration to the United States generally, in 1907 when more than 227,414 adult aliens embarked from Britain. Salient features of the occupation profiles of adult male alien emigration record that the number of labourers grew from 40 per cent in 1877, to 83 per cent in 1882, before dropping to 39 per cent in 1911. Those in skilled trades started at 18 per cent in 1877 and peaked in 1898 at 29 per cent. Those in commerce and professions increased constantly, but only accounted for eight per cent of adult male aliens. The 1.2 million female emigrants included a growth of 'no stated occupation' and a steady increase in the number of domestics and other service positions. Other service positions grew from 823 or 14 per cent in 1877 to peak at 21,829 or 30 per cent in 1910. The number of dressmakers developed after 1899, yet even then only represented 1.5 per cent of all female trades.

Chart 3.13a. Occupations and destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Chart 3.13b. Occupations and destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.


Table 3.13. Occupations and destinations of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911

Gender	Occupation	Number of alien emigrants	%
Males	Agriculture	140,621	5.90
Males	Commercial & professional	196,714	8.25
Males	Skilled	386,563	16.21
Males	Labourers	1,299,804	54.51
Males	Miscellaneous or not stated	360,633	15.13
Total males	All male occupations	2,384,335	100.00
Females	Domestic & other service	278,834	22.80
Females	Dressmaker & other trades	18,541	1.52
Females	Teachers, clerks & professions	6,702	0.55
Females	No stated occupation	918,961	75.14
Total females	All female occupations	1,223,038	100.00
Total	Total adult emigrant aliens	3,607,373	100.00

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

The period between 1888 and 1913, as already shown, was the peak era for foreign passenger flows from Britain. As detailed in Charts 3.14a and 3.14b the foreign passenger market accounted for 3.6 million alien passengers. The number of transmigrants leaving British ports represented the bulk of this business. In total 64 per cent of the foreign passengers leaving Britain were transmigrants, compared with 63 per cent of the alien flows to Britain; by contrast transmigration only represented 34 per cent of all passengers to Britain, and 28 per cent of all passengers leaving Britain.

Chart 3.14. The number of foreign passengers leaving Britain known to be transmigrants



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.14. The proportion of foreign passengers leaving Britain known to be transmigrants

Trade	Number	%
Transmigrants arriving at British ports	2,307,897	64
Foreign passengers leaving Britain	3,601,150	100

Source: Carrier & Jeffery, *External Migration*, pp. 90-91; BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*; BPP, *Annual Report of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

The charts profiling occupations of aliens leaving Britain demonstrated the importance of Britain as a stepping stone for Europeans to reach the United States, the far reaches of the British Empire, and more remote nations connected through Britain's merchant marine. Those who traversed Britain *en route* to the overseas destinations were overwhelmingly male, and relatively unskilled; they were often accompanied by their unskilled partners, but most appear to have been single males. Those women who were listed with occupations were of servile status – mainly domestics. Rates of alien passenger movements closely correlated with salient features of mass transatlantic migration described by previous historians such as Ferenczi and Willcox, and regardless of sex centred firmly on the North Atlantic.

3.3 Transmigration through Britain


As a closer examination of the European and British alien markets revealed, the lion's share of the business comprised European transmigrants who arrived in Britain *en route* to transoceanic, particularly North Atlantic, destinations. The number of transients arriving at Britain's points of entry closely mirrored those leaving her points of exit. The difference was explained by other foreign passengers – migrants, tourists, travellers and commercial agents – who travelled alongside transmigrants on the same ships, along the same routes, and often to the same transoceanic destinations. But what was the nationality of those who were recorded as journeying through Britain *en route* for transoceanic destinations? Where did they arrive from? Where did they land? Which ports did they use to re-embark? And for where were they finally bound? Such questions will be discussed by a closer examination of statistics pertaining to European transmigration through Britain.

3.3.1 The country of origin

The European transmigrants who arrived in Britain between 1836 and 1914 fell into three distinctive national groups; those from Germany, who predominantly entered between 1845 and 1859; those from Scandinavia, who arrived *en masse* between 1865 and 1910; and those from Eastern Europe, whose numbers only rose to significant levels during the 1890s, before peaking at 436,532 between 1906 and 1913. The nationality of

transmigrants arriving in Britain during the nineteenth century was provided along with other information on alien passengers within lists of aliens collated by HM Customs.⁸ Yet the migrants' nationality was not always recorded. When nationality was detailed, most of the aliens were described as German, as shown in Chart 3.15 and Table 3.15. Rates of German transmigration grew from 1,133, between 1836-1839, to 16,624, for the period 1845-1849, before peaking at 25,514, between 1850-1854. Though some periods offered more detailed information on the nationality of transmigrants, such as between 1845-1849 when 70 per cent of those arriving had their nationality listed, in general the majority of transmigrants arriving in Britain were given general descriptions such as 'aliens *en route* for America'.

Chart 3.15. The nationality of all transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1836-1859



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

⁸ See Appendix 3.6.

Table 3.15. The nationality of selected transmigrants arriving at British Ports, 1836-1859


Nationality	Number	%
Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	21	0.04
Belgians	39	0.08
Dutch	643	1.28
French	204	0.41
Germans	48,086	95.80
Italians	112	0.22
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	629	1.25
Russians & Poles	305	0.61
Swiss	155	0.31
Total (*)	50,194	100.00

Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120.

Between 1860 and 1905 information on the nationality of transmigrants was never presented in official reports. With the passing of the 1905 Aliens Act this changed.⁹ Data presented in the annual returns made to Parliament between 1 January 1906 and 31 December 1911, and shown in Chart 3.16, demonstrated that transmigration was dominated by Baltic (Russian, Polish, and Finnish) and Scandinavian (Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish) transmigrants. These two groups represented 745,167, or 73 per cent, of all the transmigrants who passed through Britain during this period. The Baltic transmigrants represented the numerically most significant feature of the trade, 436,532 passengers, or 43 per cent of all transmigrants, followed by the Scandinavians, 308,635 passengers or 30 per cent, and then the Austrian-Hungarians and Bohemians, who numbered 113,895, or 11 per cent. German transmigration, significant in the mid-nineteenth century had by this stage declined and only represented 13,436 passengers or one per cent of the trade. As post-Aliens Act returns included details of all passengers travelling on transmigrant tickets, and not just those emigrating for the first time, the information provided also included return migrants (who had become US citizens) and second-generation immigrants (who were born in the United States). They were noted as travelling through Britain on transmigrant tickets, and represented 4.5 per cent of the trade.

⁹ BPP, *Regulations, & c., Made By The Secretary Of State For The Home Department With Regard To The Administration Of The Aliens Act, 1905*, p. 21.

Chart 3.16. The nationality of transmigrants arriving in Britain, 1906-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.16. The nationality of transmigrants arriving in Britain, 1906-1913

Nationality	Number	%
Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	113,868	11.22
Belgians	18,784	1.85
Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	9,669	0.95
Dutch	9,165	0.90
French	2,117	0.21
Germans	13,426	1.32
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	14,087	1.39
Italians	14,996	1.48
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	304,113	29.95
Russians & Poles	436,495	42.99
Spanish & Portuguese	7,814	0.77
Swiss	2,888	0.28
United States nationals	46,246	4.56
Other Europeans	21,587	2.13
Total	1,015,255	100.00

Source: BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.


3.3.2 The continental ports of origin

Information on the ports from where migrants' travelling to Britain embarked was retained between 1836-1914.¹⁰ For the period 1836-1859, the majority of the transmigrants travelled from Dutch, German, and Belgian ports. Of the 148,717 transmigrants who arrived in Britain, as shown in Chart 3.17, the majority, 96,040 or 65 per cent, sailed from the Dutch ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Others, 44,434 or 30 per cent, sailed from the German ports of Hamburg and Bremen, and 5,639 or four per cent from the Belgian ports of Antwerp and Ostend. The main transmigrant route from Europe during the mid-nineteenth century entailed travelling across Europe, before sailing to Britain from a handful of North Sea ports. The concentration of the trade around Dutch ports, 96,000 or 64.55 per cent of all voyages, was explained by the use of larger ports as entrepôts with inland navigations. Larger numbers of transmigrants arrived at Dutch ports from inland towns and cities such as Mannheim and Frankfurt (both situated on the Rhine) than emigrated from Holland. Though not every vessel arriving from a Dutch port stated that their passengers had commenced their journey from an inland port, many of those arriving in London between 1852-1855 had this additional information noted on pre-prepared lists of passengers attached to List of Aliens.¹¹ The information stated the destination of the predominantly German emigrants was the United States – via the route from Southern Germany to Holland, Holland to Britain, and then to the United States.

¹⁰ Data contained within certificates for the period 1867-1869 has been excluded as only 75 Lists of Aliens were returned between 1 January 1860 and 31 January 1869. More reliable data was reported by the sanitary officers of Hull Town Council.

¹¹ TNA, HO 3/64-81 (1852-1855).

Chart 3.17. The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1836-1859



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.17. The European ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1836-1859

Nationality	Number	%
Belgian	5,639	3.79
Dutch	96,040	64.55
French	1,005	0.68
German	44,434	29.86
Russian	78	0.05
Scandinavian	1,489	1.00
Other ports	110	0.07
Total	148,795	100.00

Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120. The data was only available between 1 June 1836-31 December 1859.


By the closing decades of the nineteenth century the business had completely changed. Rather than embarking through the historic centres of the passenger trade at Hamburg, Bremen, or Rotterdam, the aliens increasingly sailed to Britain via local

harbours. Firstly, large numbers of transmigrants began to arrive from Scandinavian ports (Gothenburg, Oslo, Bergen, Esbjerg and Trondheim) which emerged during the mid-1860s as important sources of Scandinavian transmigrants. They were joined during the 1890s by even larger numbers of East European transmigrants who sailed to Britain from Russian ports (such as Libau and Riga) and Finnish ports (such as Hangö, Helsingfors, and Åbo) as shown in Chart 3.18. The majority of transmigrants arriving during the late nineteenth century therefore arrived from ports not mentioned in mid-nineteenth century returns. In particular, ports such as Libau, Åbo, and Hangö became important points of European embarkation.

The majority of those arriving in Britain between 1890-1913, 1,033,766 or 47 per cent, embarked from Scandinavian ports. They were followed by those from Finnish ports, 275,678 or 13 per cent, Germany, with 247,259 or 11 per cent, and Russian ports, 211,625 or 10 per cent. Patterns remained constant except for the 7,501 Spanish and Portuguese transmigrants who arrived in Liverpool direct from ports on the Iberian Peninsula. They were only recorded as arriving in Britain after Liverpool was forced to make returns to Parliament on transient arrivals.¹² The more detailed nationwide gathering of statistics at British ports in the wake of 1905 Aliens Act, and in particular the creation of specific guidelines on the labelling of migrants as Alien Transmigrants or Alien Non-Transmigrants also explained the rise in the number of transmigrants who were recorded as entering Britain via the port of London. The number of transmigrants arriving was 368,305, between 1890-1894, before declining to just 193,989, between 1895-1899. After this lull, the scale of transmigration grew to 471,747, between 1900-1904, before peaking at 535,156, between 1905-1909, then declining to 406,835, between 1909-1913.

¹² BPP, *Regulations, & c., Made By The Secretary Of State For The Home Department With Regard To The Administration Of The Aliens Act, 1905*, p. 1.

Chart 3.18. The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1890-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.18. The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1890-1913

Port	Number	%
Belgian	130,039	5.94
Dutch	124,484	5.69
Finnish	275,678	12.60
French	145,580	6.65
German	247,259	11.30
Russian	211,625	9.67
Scandinavian	1,033,766	47.25
Spanish & Portuguese	7,501	0.34
Other European ports	11,922	0.54
Total	2,187,854	100.00


Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*; BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

3.3.3 The British points of entry

The majority of European transmigrants entered Britain via the Humber ports of Hull and Grimsby. From 1850 onwards, Hull received more transmigrants than any other British port. For most of the period she handled a greater share of the trade than every other British port combined. Except for the periods 1860-1864 and 1875-1879 when data was not retained, as shown in Chart 3.19, the level of transmigration throughout Britain continued to increase throughout the long nineteenth century. This sustained growth was partially explained by the increasing monitoring of alien arrivals at ports other than Hull. This was apparent at Grimsby after 1884, Leith, the Tyne ports and West Hartlepool after 1890, Harwich after 1900, and Southampton, Liverpool and London after 1905. Hull, as shown in Table 3.19 received 2,009,326 or 63.75 per cent of the trade as compared with Grimsby, the next port in terms of scale, with only 494,392 or 15.69 per cent. Transmigration through Hull grew, from a periodic total of 3,115 between 1836-1839, to 628,938 between 1905-1909. The only decline in the number of transmigrants arriving in Britain occurred between 1895-1899, when globally the scale of emigration or immigration declined. The drop in the number of transmigrant arrivals between 1910-1913 was explained by data for only four instead of five years being reported. The latter deficit was due to the declaration of war on 4 August 1914.¹³

¹³ No annual alien or passenger returns were published by Britain for 1914.

Chart 3.19. The ports at which European transmigrants entered Britain, 1836-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.


Table 3.19. The ports at which European transmigrants entered Britain, 1836-1913

Port	Number	%
Goole	10,502	0.33
Grimsby	494,392	15.69
Harwich	118,500	3.76
Hull	2,009,326	63.75
Leith	80,886	2.57
Liverpool	7,459	0.24
London	122,213	3.88
Southampton	123,471	3.92
Tyne ports	74,238	2.36
West Hartlepool	25,680	0.81
Other ports	85,234	2.70
Total	3,151,901	100.00

Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120; HCA, TCM/174-180, WHG/1/20-46; NELA, 11/1; BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*; BPP, *Annual Report of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, as Chart 3.20 highlights, each British point of entry handled specific groups of nationals. Of 436,532 Russian and Polish transmigrants (including Finns, Poles, Russians and Jews) who entered Britain between 1906-1911 most arrived via Hull (298,202 or 68 per cent), Grimsby (72,090 or 17 per cent) and London (50,630 or 12 per cent). The Scandinavians (including Danes, Swedes and Norwegians) arrived via Hull (138,392 or 45 per cent), Grimsby (62,795 or 20 per cent), Harwich (61,405 or 20 per cent) and the Tyne ports (43,265 or 14 per cent). The only other sizeable group of nationals, the Austrian-Hungarians (including Austrians, Hungarians and Galicians), arrived via Southampton (69,264 or 61 per cent), with others arriving via the traditional transmigrant centres of Grimsby (24,391 or 21 per cent), Hull (10,002 or nine per cent), Leith (3,606 or three per cent) and Harwich (3,586 or three per cent). Those arriving from the Iberian Peninsula (8,060 or 95 per cent of the Spanish and Portuguese transmigrants) sailed directly into Liverpool unlike the 46,454 Americans who travelled through the ports of Hull (17,687 or 38 per cent), Grimsby (11,020 or 24 per cent), Harwich (10,093 or 22 per cent) and the Tyne (4,972 or 11 per cent). Southampton especially attracted most of the small number of transients recorded as arriving from Greece, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and Iberian Peninsular.

Chart 3.20. The nationality of transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1906-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.20. The nationality of transmigrants (%) arriving at British ports, 1906-1913

Nationality	Cardiff	Dover	Fishguard	Grangemouth	Grimsby	Harwich	Hull	Leith	Liverpool	London	Newhaven	Plymouth	Southampton	Tyne ports	Total
Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	0	0	0	1	21	3	9	3	0	1	0	0	61	0	100
Belgians	0	2	0	0	12	82	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	100
Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	0	1	0	0	24	5	7	3	0	4	0	0	56	0	100
Dutch	0	0	0	0	6	10	44	2	0	37	0	0	1	0	100
French	0	3	0	0	12	33	0	1	0	1	3	0	47	0	100
Germans	0	2	0	1	37	32	9	4	0	5	0	0	8	0	100
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	0	0	0	0	7	3	2	1	0	1	1	0	86	0	100
Italians	0	0	0	1	10	3	0	6	0	2	0	0	77	0	100
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	0	0	0	0	21	20	46	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	100
Russians & Poles	0	0	0	0	17	1	68	1	0	12	0	0	2	0	100
Spanish & Portuguese	0	1	0	0	3	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	89	0	100
Swiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	95	0	0	0	5	0	100
United States nationals	0	0	0	0	24	22	38	0	0	1	0	0	4	10	100
Other Europeans	0	0	0	1	23	3	8	9	0	5	0	0	50	0	100
Total	0	0	0	0	19	10	47	1	1	6	0	0	12	4	100

Source: BPP, *Annual Report of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

Despite the emergence of other points of entry between 1860 and 1888, Hull and Grimsby were able to maintain their significant roles as conduits for transmigration throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whilst London saw a sharp decline in the role it played in mass migration during the same period, Scandinavian transmigrants who arrived via the Humber helped to maintain the level of transmigration

via northern Britain. As larger numbers of Austrian-Hungarians began to transmigrate through Britain during the first decade of the twentieth century, the southern ports of London, and particularly Southampton, developed greater roles in facilitating indirect migration. All such points of entry were, by the beginning of the twentieth century, only a few hours rail ride from the main port of departure – Liverpool.

3.3.4 The British points of exit


Liverpool had acted as the main gateway to transatlantic emigrant travel since the early nineteenth century. After September 1839 transmigrants arriving at east coast ports are known to have supplemented this domestic passenger trade. Most passengers were described as being bound for ‘New York via Liverpool’. Throughout the mid-nineteenth century the List of Aliens regularly detailed the westward route transmigrants took. These predominantly included arrival via Hull, London or Grimsby, departure via Liverpool, and then the journey to the United States via New York. Liverpool served as the main point of departure at the same time as New York emerged as the main point of entry into North America. Despite the short-term function of London as a transmigrant centre between 1845-1854, the Hull to Liverpool route became firmly established as the central route along which the majority of North European transmigrants travelled.

As demonstrated in Chart 3.21, Liverpool, Glasgow, London and Southampton dominated the outpouring of transmigrants between 1906-1913 just as Hull, London, Grimsby and Leith did with transmigrants’ arrivals. Although newer points of embarkation, Dover and Bristol, developed in the first decade of the twentieth century, the majority of transients, 762,096 or 75 per cent, continued to embark from Liverpool. The Mersey port was followed by London and Southampton, who handled 167,149 transmigrants or 17 per cent, and Glasgow, 76,085 or eight per cent. Dover and Bristol, by contrast, only respectively accounted for 11,777 and 8,030 transmigrants respectively.

Of the 1,015,255 transmigrants that travelled through Britain between 1906-1913, as shown in Table 3.21, around 389,025 or 51 per cent left Liverpool having arrived at the port via Hull. A further 162,728 or 21 per cent of Liverpool’s transients had arrived via Grimsby, 80,532 or 11 per cent via Harwich, and 56,331 or seven per cent via Southampton. Those who sailed from Glasgow had arrived largely via Hull, 37,504 or 49

per cent, Grimsby, 14,978 or 20 per cent, or Leith, 11,981 or 16 per cent. The majority of transmigrants followed the northern route through the Humber, Tyne or Firth of Forth, before sailing from the Mersey or Clyde. Even some of those arriving via central or southern ports made the cross country journey to northern ports before re-embarking with other transients. Of the 167,149 transmigrants who embarked from the two southern ports of London and Southampton, 64,881 or 39 per cent had arrived via Southampton, 43,336 or 26 per cent via Hull, 25,363 or 15 per cent via London, and 16,671 or 10 per cent via Harwich.

Chart 3.21. The British ports at which transmigrants arrived and embarked, 1906-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.


Table 3.21. The British ports at which transmigrants arrived and embarked, 1906-1913

Period	Bristol	Dover	Glasgow	Liverpool	London & Southampton	Other ports	Total
Cardiff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Dover	8.82	0.85	0.00	0.06	0.18	1.68	0.14
Fishguard	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Grangemouth	0.00	0.00	4.74	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.40
Grimsby	2.37	0.00	19.69	21.35	6.05	73.74	18.55
Harwich	33.69	0.00	3.74	10.57	9.95	4.19	10.12
Hull	26.21	29.14	49.29	51.05	25.87	7.82	46.52
Leith	0.00	0.00	15.75	0.04	0.03	0.00	1.21
Liverpool	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.94	0.20	0.00	0.74
London	21.93	68.82	0.63	3.81	15.14	5.59	5.66
Newhaven	0.56	0.00	0.08	0.05	0.81	0.00	0.18
Plymouth	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Southampton	0.36	1.19	2.28	7.39	38.95	6.98	12.15
Tyne ports	6.05	0.00	3.80	4.70	2.78	0.00	4.32
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

As Chart 3.22 and Table 3.22 show, the scale and nationality of transmigration through Britain's ports fell into very clear patterns. The Russians and Poles departed via Liverpool, Glasgow, London and Southampton; the Norwegians, Swedes and Danes left via Liverpool, Glasgow, London and Southampton; the Austrians, Hungarians and Bohemians departed via Liverpool, London and Southampton, Glasgow and Bristol. Of the smaller groups of nationals, the Germans left via London and Southampton, the Belgians and French mainly through Liverpool, and the Italians embarked via London and Southampton. After 1906, patterns of transmigrant departure also included the Bulgarians, Greeks and Spaniards. Of the latter, 20,013 or 63 per cent journeyed out of Liverpool, with 9,272 or 29 per cent using London or Southampton.

Chart 3.22. The nationality of transmigrants who embarked at British ports, 1906-1913



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.22. The nationality of transmigrants (%) who embarked at British ports, 1906-1913

Nationality	Bristol	Dover	Glasgow	Liverpool	London & Southampton	Other ports	Total
Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	11.98	0.00	14.81	7.80	25.19	2.79	11.22
Belgians	19.00	0.26	1.36	1.88	1.13	0.28	1.85
Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	5.16	0.00	1.07	0.74	1.65	0.00	0.95
Dutch	3.29	0.00	0.78	0.83	1.18	0.56	0.90
French	0.68	0.09	0.12	0.19	0.30	0.00	0.21
Germans	2.54	0.00	1.78	1.09	2.11	2.51	1.32
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	1.30	0.09	0.75	0.96	3.63	0.28	1.39
Italians	2.55	0.00	2.14	0.41	5.97	0.00	1.48
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	17.61	0.00	15.10	33.95	19.24	75.42	29.95
Russians & Poles	34.51	99.06	53.81	44.10	33.14	11.17	42.99
Spanish & Portuguese	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.92	0.25	0.00	0.77
Swiss	0.21	0.00	0.05	0.08	1.31	0.00	0.28
United States nationals	1.08	0.51	1.82	5.09	3.57	6.98	4.56
Other Europeans	0.09	0.00	5.90	1.95	1.32	0.00	23.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

The British ports through which transmigrants travelled reflected both their geographic proximity to the ports from where the migrants' had embarked on the European mainland and their closeness to the British ports from where they re-embarked. The transient movement across Britain throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflected this, with ports that offered the shortest, and thus quickest, route to traverse Britain dominating the business. Though London and Southampton emerged as ports that facilitated transmigration to North and South Atlantic destinations, Liverpool's


migrant activity reflected the fact that the majority of aliens *en route* were travelling to one destination – continental North America, and in particular the United States.

3.3.5 The countries of destination

Of the 149,545 transmigrants who arrived in British ports between 1836-1859, as profiled in Chart 3.23, at least 87,429 or 58 per cent were recorded as being *en route* to continental North America. Whether labelled as being bound for America, the United States, or North America, it was evident that the continent drew the majority of European transmigrants.¹⁴ Though this figure appears relatively low, compared with those patterns evident in Chart 3.24 where nearly all transmigrants were bound for the United States, the figure takes into account the fact that many of those arriving in Britain did not have their eventual destination recorded when they landed at an east-coast port of entry. Of those whose destinations were noted between 1836-1859, 87,429 transmigrants, or 58 per cent, were destined for America, 765 were heading to America or Australia, and 478 to Australia.

¹⁴ Excludes those described in the Aliens List as being *en route* to 'America and Australia'.

Chart 3.23. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.23. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859


Destination	Number	%
America	87,429	58.46
America & Australia	765	0.51
Australia	478	0.32
Destination not stated	60,873	40.71
Total	149,545	100.00

Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120.

After 1890, when more detailed data collection pertaining to European migration to and from Britain were available, the destinations of transmigrants passing through Britain were again retained and published. Between 1890-1911, as shown in Chart 3.24, at least 1,777,178 or 91 per cent of all transmigrants, gave the United States as the their eventual destination. Even though others had, by 1891, been recorded as journeying to other countries they only accounted for eight per cent of trade. Of those bound for non-US destinations 131,934 or seven per cent were destined to Canada, 29,751 or two per

cent to South Africa, and 13,891 or one per cent to South America. The lure of just one country saw all the transmigrants arriving in 1890, and even 68 per cent of those travelling as late as 1911, as being drawn to that country. The continued momentum of transoceanic migration to the United States therefore dwarfed all other patterns of transmigration.

Chart 3.24. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1890-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.


Table 3.24. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1890-1911

Destination	Number	%
Canada	131,934	6.74
South Africa	29,751	1.52
South America	13,891	0.71
United States	1,777,178	90.75
Other	5,529	0.28
Total	1,958,283	100.00

Source: BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*. Data excludes those bound to leave in the next calendar year.

Between 1906 and 1911, further information made available under the 1905 Aliens Act included the nationality of the transmigrants. They showed, as projected in Chart 3.25, that 239,876 or 76 per cent of all Russian and Polish transmigrants were bound for the United States. A further 57,996 or 18 per cent were destined for Canada, 10,946 or three per cent to South America, and 5,888 or two per cent to South Africa. Similar proportional splits were recorded for the number and destination of Scandinavian transmigrants. Of these, 193,501 or 80 per cent were destined for the United States, and 47,200 or 20 per cent for Canada. Of the other smaller groups of transmigrants, the largest was that of Austrian-Hungarians. More than 67,030 or 89 per cent of them were destined for the United States, and 7,229 or nine per cent to Canada. Regardless of where the diverse range of European transmigrants had emanated they were all overwhelmingly bound for the same destination.

Chart 3.25. The destination and nationality of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1906-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.25. The destination and nationality of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1906-1911

Destination	Number	%
Canada	131,934	17.69
South Africa	8,523	1.14
South America	13,891	1.86
United States	591,071	79.24
Other destinations	464	0.06
Total	745,883	100.00

Source: BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act* (1906-1911).

3.3.6 Religious transmigration

Religion was a significant factor when determining statistical patterns of transmigration through Britain. Although the religious beliefs of migrants were never recorded within official statistics, unlike their US counterparts (after 1899), Mennonites, Jews, and Mormons can all be identified as transmigrating through Britain during the period 1836-1914.¹⁵ Despite their scale, the transmigration of both religious groups was never reported within statistical evidence collated by the Board of Trade. Instead, only qualitative references were provided on the Mormon system of emigration and the non-transmigrant movement of Jews into Britain.¹⁶ Patterns of religious transmigration do however remedy shortfalls in statistical profiles of transmigration available from other sources for 1860-1864 and 1874-1879 (via Hull) and for 1885-1914 (via London). By taking a closer examination of both groups valuable quantitative data for understanding comparable transmigration becomes apparent. Whilst the outflow of 170 transmigrant Mennonite families (approximately 900 people) along the Odessa to Hamburg then to Hull, Liverpool and finally New York route in 1874 was statistically insignificant, the scale of two other religious groups who transmigrated along this route offers a valuable

¹⁵ Mormon transmigration through Hull was discussed in Woods & Evans, 'Latter-day Saint Migration through Hull', pp. 75-102. References to Mennonite migration are provided by Read, *Through Liverpool to North America*, p. 27, and Royden K. Loewen, *Family, Church and Market: A Mennonite Community in the Old Worlds and the New Worlds, 1850-1930* (Illinois, 2003), pp. 69, 75.

¹⁶ Exceptions included references to Jews included in BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903); BPP, *Select Committee on the Immigration and Emigration (of Foreigners)* (1889). References to the Mormon system of emigration were provided within BPP, *First Report from the Select Committee on Emigrant ships with Minutes of Evidence Taken Before Them* (1854), pp. 108-117, Minutes 4982-5203.

insight into the statistical profile of European transmigrants generally. The transmigration of Scandinavian Mormons between 1852-1890, followed by East European Jews between 1885-1914, greatly influence statistical patterns for Britain. In particular Mormon transients influenced rates of transmigration to the United States via Hull and Liverpool, and Jewish transients were significant when discussing transmigration to South Africa via London and Southampton.

3.3.6.1 Scandinavian Mormon transmigration

The systematic gathering of converts to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (more commonly known as the Mormons) began in 1840. The subsequent emigration of significant numbers of the Church's Scandinavian and German-speaking converts between 1852 and 1890 is arguably the best documented movement of any European transmigrant group through Britain, religious or otherwise, during the period 1836-1914.

After the first Mormon missionaries arrived in Denmark in 1850, the conversion of Scandinavians and those living in Germany and Switzerland led to the need to organise the emigrant journeys of European converts to Utah. Responsibility for this lay with the Church's European Mission in Liverpool. The centralisation of this systematic gathering gravitated around Liverpool and New York – the world's two leading centres for European migration. As the number of converts – and thus potential transmigrants – grew, the Church developed Scandinavian and German Missions that were responsible for the hundreds (later thousands) of converts who wished to gather with their co-religionists in the United States. After 1847, such converts were encouraged to settle in the Mormon Zion – Utah in western America. The systematic gathering of German and Scandinavian Mormon transmigrants along a centralised and orderly manner ensured they were grouped into companies ranging between 75 and 567 at a time.


As shown in Chart 3.26, the number of European Mormon transmigrants leaving Britain ranged from 325 in 1852 to 1,335 in 1883. Of the three largest groups of European Mormon missions emigrating from Britain, Scandinavian Mormon transmigrants represented a growing proportion of all those sailing to the United States from Liverpool. The first Mormon Scandinavian transmigrants sailed to Britain in 1852. In the first year of transmigrating 325, or 42 per cent, of the Mormon emigrants who left

Europe were Scandinavian. Between 1852-1890 more than 48,284 or 64 per cent of Mormon emigrants who left the British Isles were British, 23,049 or 31 per cent Scandinavian, and 3,599 or five per cent German-speaking. In total the non-British component of the European convert emigration represented 36 per cent of all European Mormon emigrants. If the 3,327 Mormons who sailed directly to United States ports from Hamburg in 1862, 1865, and 1866, the 110 who sailed from Le Havre in 1862, and the 26 who sailed from Amsterdam in 1889, are excluded then the data shows how the gathering of European Mormon converts included 26,648 Mormon transmigrants.¹⁷ Though the proportion of European transmigrants who were Mormon was small – 2,005 out of 27,846 non-Mormons – or seven per cent of the transmigrants passing through Britain between 1855 and 1859 were Mormon. Using data shown in both Charts 3.8 and 3.26 we can deduce that during the slump in emigration during the time of the US Civil War Mormon transmigrants represented seven per cent of all foreign passengers leaving Britain in 1860, 10 per cent in 1861, 16 per cent in 1863, and four per cent in 1864.¹⁸ In contrast, during the late 1870s slump in the US economy they represented three per cent of all foreign passenger movements in 1875, two per cent in 1876, three per cent in 1877, two per cent in 1878, and one per cent in 1879.

¹⁷ Sonne, *Saints on the Seas*, pp. 152-153, 158.

¹⁸ Foreign Mormon emigrants left direct from continental ports in 1862, 1865 and 1866.

Chart 3.26. The nationality of Mormon converts who emigrated to the United States from Britain, 1852-1890



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

Table 3.26. The nationality of Mormon converts who emigrated to the United States from Britain, 1852-1890


Nationality	Number	%
British	48,284	64.44
German	3,599	4.80
Scandinavian	23,049	30.76
Total	74,932	100.00

Source: *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM; LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1852-1890); GCL, *Grimsby Newspapers* (1854-1879).

As shown in Chart 3.27, Mormon transmigration between 1852-1890 centred upon the transmigrant route used by emigrating Germans (and later Scandinavians) through Grimsby and Hull. When the first group of just nineteen Saints arrived in Britain in 1852 they did so via Hamburg and London. After then all of the transmigrants arrived via the Humber, with Grimsby sharing the number of transmigrants with the port of Hull

for the period 1855-1864, after which all of the transmigrants entered via Hull.¹⁹ Annual rates of Mormon transmigration ranged from 75 in 1858 to 1,243 in 1863, but normally fell between 301 in 1853 and 1,061 in 1872. Whilst the profile of Mormon transmigrants was atypical to that of other transients, they did follow the dominant flow of migrants along the transpennine corridor between the Humber and Mersey. Mormon transmigrants thereby followed a Scandinavian model of gathering, or transmigrating, from North European ports, to Liverpool, via Hull or Grimsby.

Chart 3.27. The ports at which European Mormon transmigrants arrived in Britain *en route* to Utah, 1852-1890



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

¹⁹ With the exception of just four transmigrants who arrived via Newcastle in 1881.

Table 3.27. The ports at which European Mormon transmigrants arrived in Britain *en route* to Utah, 1852-1890

Port	Number of transmigrants	%
London	9	0.04
Hull	19,861	86.20
Grimsby	3,175	13.80
Newcastle	4	0.02
Total	23,049	100.00

Source: *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM; LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1852-1890); GCL, *Grimsby Newspapers* (1854-1879).

3.3.6.2 East European Jewish transmigration


Unlike Mormon transmigration, patterns of Jewish transmigration did not reflect the dominant statistical profiles of Jewish emigration in general. Neither did they reflect patterns of non-Jewish emigration from Europe. Although of less importance than the Humber, the Thames lured a significant number of transients between 1859-1905. As discussed within the previous chapter, official statistics (until 1905) misrepresented these as immigrants. Although the 1903 *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* included statistical profiles of alien transmigration through the port of London, as shown in Table 3.27, the figures were not reproduced in official statistics, nor within contemporary discourse in periodicals such as the *Contemporary Review* or *Pall Mall Magazine*.²⁰

Sources investigating Jewish immigration into London, both official and those of philanthropic agencies, thereby offer a valuable insight into rates of transmigration via London not available in official sources. If the rates of Jewish transmigration, as shown in Table 3.28, are used as a base upon which to quantify patterns of transmigration through London then at least 20 per cent of the immigrants recorded in official returns were transmigrants. The surviving annual reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter offer further statistical information on patterns considered here. Figures gleaned from the 1903 *Royal Commission* and annual reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter

²⁰ For an example of the anti-immigration literature published around the time of the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration see 'Some Types of Russian Aliens. Drawn from the life in the East End of London', *English Illustrated Magazine* (1905), Number 33, p. 585.

demonstrate that transmigration through London was far higher than had often been described. Jewish transmigration through Britain between 1880 and 1914 comprised mainly East European Russian and Polish Jews. That the majority of the inmates were Jewish enables a comparison between Jewish transmigration via London between 1885-1914 with those of Mormon transmigration via the Humber-Mersey route between 1852-1890.²¹

Chart 3.28. The number of Russian, Polish, and Galician transmigrants travelling through the Port of London, 1895-1903



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

²¹ Non-Jews were permitted to use the shelter – as indicated through the occasional use of the prefix ‘Ch.’ in the Shelter’s Registers. Usually the inmates were of the Jewish faith. See, for example, LMA, LMA/4184/02/01/001/06, *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter* (1901-2), p. 3.

Table 3.28. The scale of transmigration through London, 1895-1903

Year	Number of immigrants reported as arriving at London in British Parliamentary Papers	Number of transmigrants detailed as arriving at London in the 1903 Royal Commission on Alien Immigration	% of immigrants arriving at London who were transmigrants
1895	13,413	1,489	11.10
1896	17,108	2,324	13.58
1897	19,696	2,983	15.15
1898	21,161	3,024	14.29
1899	24,589	3,437	13.98
1900	30,593	4,680	15.30
1901	27,070	5,331	19.69
1902	33,046	4,694	14.20
1903	36,374	8,353	22.96
Total	223,050	36,315	16.28


Source: BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume III, pp. 76-78 and BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1895-1903). The figures from the *Royal Commission* only included transmigrants arriving from the ports of Hamburg, Bremen and Rotterdam, between 1895 and 1903, and for Libau, 1897 to 1903.

The number of transmigrants staying at the Shelter grew from 117, for the last two months of 1885, to 5,922 in 1905. The destination of the majority of transient inmates, as shown in Chart 3.29, was Africa, whilst others went to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South America, and the United States. Between 1885-1914, of the 36,350 transmigrants that stayed at the Shelter, 22,018 or 61 per cent stated Africa as their eventual destination; 7,969 or 22 per cent were destined for the US, 2,474 or seven per cent for South America; and 2,133 or six per cent for Canada.²² The documented movement of so many Jewish transmigrants to South Africa was thus a unique feature of Jewish transmigration from Europe often ignored within existing historiography. As Caroline Barker noted, those heading to South Africa represented between 13 and 37 per cent of all alien migrants heading to the Cape during the period 1893 and 1913. They also formed a substantial proportion of the Russian and Polish transmigrants travelling

²² Excludes those who were sold tickets for South Atlantic destinations by the Shelter and who appeared only in the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter Shipping Registers. LMA, LMA/4184/03/04, *Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter Shipping Registers*.

through London.²³ South Africa attracted between 29 and 93 per cent of Jewish transmigrant inmates of the Shelter. The continued pull to South Africa was maintained even during the dislocation of the Boer War of 1899-1902.

Chart 3.29. The overseas destinations of transmigrants staying at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, 1885-1914



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

²³ Barker, *Jewish Migration to South Africa*, p. 76.

Table 3.29. The overseas destinations of transmigrants staying at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, 1885-1914

Destination	Number	%
Africa	22,018	60.57
Australia & New Zealand	838	2.31
Canada	2,133	5.87
Other countries	918	2.53
South America	2,474	6.81
United States	7,969	21.92
Total	36,350	100.00

Source: LJM, *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter*; LMA, LMA/4184/02/01/001/01-07 and 002/01-06, *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter*; BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*; BPP, *Select Committee on Immigration and Emigration (of Foreigners) (1889)*.

Jewish transmigrant data, coupled with statistical information extracted from Jewish philanthropic agencies, therefore offers alternative statistical projections to those evident for Scandinavian Mormon transmigration. They contrast with information gleaned from port medical records, or immigrant data presented within British Parliamentary Papers. Surviving statistical evidence demonstrates that around one-fifth of London's immigrants, arriving between 1885-1905, were transmigrants. Yet other non-Jewish transmigrants arriving via London were also not distinguishable from immigrant data presented within British Parliamentary Papers. They included the Scandinavian transmigrants transported by the Thule line from Gothenburg to London, as well as Jewish transmigrants travelling to London from Belgian, French, or other European ports.

Patterns of religious transmigration through Britain offer valuable statistical information on migrant flows via two of Britain's leading estuaries – the Thames and the Humber. Whilst those of Mormons reflected the Scandinavian transmigrant flows, those of Jewish transmigrants typified Eastern European transmigration. The latter showed that whilst the United States and Canada drew large numbers of transmigrants who arrived in Britain, South Africa was also a distinct, and important, destination for many East Europeans migrating in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The latter phenomenon, like the flows of migrants through Northern Britain, is ignored by North


American and British migrant scholars. They add to patterns presented within official sources and confirm the statistical significance of transmigration through Britain – as opposed to the more frequently discussed profiles of alien immigration to Britain, or domestic exodus from Britain.

3.4 Conclusion

Statistical profiles of transmigrant data reveal that indirect migration through Britain was a large-scale feature of migrant and passenger flows to and from Britain. The business represented at least 3.15 million passengers between 1836-1914, with most of the alien passengers arriving between 1888-1913. During the latter period at least 39 per cent of the 5.9 million alien passengers who embarked from British ports were transmigrants and had re-embarked from Britain within a short period of their arrival. The trade focussed upon entry at the Humber ports of Hull and Grimsby, a journey across Britain on the transpennine railway, before re-embarkation from the Mersey port of Liverpool. Whilst other ports of entry and exit emerged during the long nineteenth century it was this transpennine route that lured millions of third-class Scandinavian, and later East European transmigrants, to Britain *en route* for the United States, Canada, and to a lesser extent South Africa.

The statistical importance of the so-called indirect option – transmigration – can be judged by a closer examination of transmigrant activity for the period between 1906-1911. During this six-year period a plethora of reliable and very detailed statistics on the patterns of transmigration are available. Patterns evident within them compare with equally detailed information on the European origins of immigrants to Canada and the United States, already detailed earlier in this chapter. As shown in Chart 3.30, at least 83 per cent of all those who migrated from Sweden, Denmark and Norway to both North American countries, used the indirect route via Britain. Of other groups that transmigrated during the same period, the indirect route via Britain accounted for 11,212 or 30 per cent of Belgians, 297,872 or four per cent of Russians, Poles and Finns, 5,476 or 12 per cent of Dutch, 2,433 or 11 per cent of Swiss, 74,259 or five per cent of Austrian-Hungarians, and 8,872 or four per cent of Germans.

Chart 3.30. The percentage of immigrants to the United States and Canada who had transmigrated via Britain, 1906-1911



Note: Source information and data to accompany this chart are available in Appendix 2.2.

The proportion of nationals who made the decision to use the transmigrant route through Britain was dominated by adult males at a ratio of 2:1. The origin of the European transmigrants journeying through Britain was predominantly German up to 1860, then Scandinavian between 1865-1914, and Russian (Finns, Poles, and Jews) between 1885-1914. Whilst accurate and far-ranging statistical analysis of transmigration through Britain was only officially provided between 1906-1911, we can see that 11 per cent of those arriving in Canada and the United States did so having transmigrated through Britain with 689,081 out of the 6,108,926 using the indirect route.

Table 3.30. The percentage of immigrants to the United States and Canada who had transmigrated via Britain, 1906-1911

Nationality	Immigrants to North America	Number of transmigrants via Britain	% of US immigrants who had transmigrated via Britain
Austrian-Hungarians	1,393,582	74,259	5.33
Belgians	41,440	11,212	27.06
Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	89,934	4,855	5.40
Dutch	45,960	5,476	11.91
French	69,034	1,317	1.91
Germans	221,079	8,872	4.01
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	236,735	9,609	4.06
Italians	1,353,610	7,839	0.58
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	290,292	240,701	82.92
Russians	1,338,794	297,872	22.25
Spaniards & Portuguese	71,850	4,128	5.75
Swiss	22,205	2,433	10.96
Total	5,174,515	668,573	12.92

Source: BPP, *Annual Report of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1911)*; Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I*, pp. 364-5, 408-439. Figures exclude those included within 'Other European' data for the US, Canada or Britain, British and Irish immigrants and US nationals transmigrating through Britain.

The outbreak of the First World War brought a premature end to patterns of European migration that had evolved since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The way official statistics presented such trends also came to an abrupt end. Reports for 1914 were never published due to the combined effects of the passing of the Defence of the Realm Act in 1914. The priorities of the wartime administration lay elsewhere – in defending Britain from a military invasion, and supporting the flood of some 250,000 Belgian refugees who arrived in London in the aftermath of the declaration of war. How the trade in transporting so many transmigrants via Britain evolved will now be discussed. As will become very apparent, commercial and geographic conditions were

just as important as the methods deployed by British officials in recording aliens *en route* when explaining the scale and spatial patterns of transmigration through Britain.

4. The transmigrant business

Transmigration through Britain necessitated a series of journeys on both land and at sea. Collectively they formed an important aspect of the passenger trade – and represented at least 3.15 million passengers or 54 per cent of the 5.9 million aliens who left Britain between 1836 and 1914. Each element of the journey offered differing transport companies potentially large-scale returns on their original investments. During key trading periods this could be particularly large. The more passengers paid, the quicker they reached their eventual destination. Yet it would only be with the development of affordable steamship travel across both the short-haul routes to Britain and long-haul routes from Britain that the trade grew to the scale evident after 1870 – when most of the 3.15 million transmigrants travelled. This chapter discusses how the business of transmigration developed into an important sector of the British passenger market, and how the emergence of transport nodes on the east and west coasts of Britain served as the main routes along which so many Europeans travelled. Such arteries would distinguish particular ports from their British and European rivals and help the business to develop throughout the nineteenth century until it peaked in 1907, and represented over 10 per cent of all those arriving in continental North America.

4.1 The journey across Europe

The majority of early transmigrants sailed from a port situated in their native country. The business benefited local transporters. The business was compounded by the length of time needed to reach a port of departure, the infrequency of the vessels plying transoceanic routes, and the long duration taken to complete transoceanic journeys. To reach a port of departure required a series of journeys on foot, by horse-drawn cart, or by small coastal steamer. Inter-continental travel in these years was a long, drawn-out affair hampered by poor connections at each stage in the journey west and by the limited capabilities of sail and early steam-powered vessels to convey large numbers of passengers at any given time.

With the emergence of railway travel across Britain and throughout Europe during the mid-nineteenth century the length of time needed to reach a continental port of embarkation was significantly reduced. The early railway network was supported by

canal boats and steam packets on inland and short-sea routes. Europeans became increasingly mobile as transport systems emerged that were capable of conveying large numbers of passengers on a regular basis. Such developments were a function of industrialisation – the need to move large quantities of raw materials, finished goods, and manufactured wares to and from the manufacturing and industrial heartlands of Europe. Industrial expansion necessitated the development of reliable and effective transport systems. Such improvements also facilitated the movement of passengers across Britain and northern Europe. Britain led the way, followed by France, Germany, and later Scandinavia. As shown in Table 4.1 this expansion fuelled emigration.

Table 4.1. Development of transportation compared with development of emigration in Sweden and certain European countries.

	1840	1840	1850	1850	1860	1860	1870	1870	1880	1880	1890	1890	1900	1900
Country	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
England	1,348	0	10,653	596	16,787	608	24,999	394	28,584	300	32,297	442	35,186	150
Germany	549	0	6,044	173	11,633	250	19,575	246	33,838	162	42,869	280	51,391	69
France	497	0	3,083	+31	9,528	+8	17,931	+24	26,189	+29	36,895	+42	42,827	+98
Belgium	336	0	854	+120	1,729	153	2,997	112	4,120	29	5,263	21	6,345	13
Sweden	0	0	0	12	522	74	1,708	368	5,906	316	8,018	743	11,320	365
Italy	8	0	427	0	1,800	0	6,134	88	8,715	97	12,907	288	15,787	455
Russia	26	0	601	0	1,589	0	11,243	66	23,857	32	30,757	89	48,107	156


A = Kilometres of railroads. B = Mean annual loss in population per 100,000 inhabitants during preceding decade. (Source: John Lindberg, *The Background of Swedish Emigration to the United States: An Economic and Sociological Study in the Dynamics of Migration* (Minneapolis, 1930), p. 14.)

Through the expansion of the railway network across northern Europe, emigrants from Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, and Holland increasingly reached a port of departure within a matter of hours not days. Rather than sailing from a local port such as Hull or Aberdeen, British emigrants gradually travelled across Britain to one of the emerging centres of the passenger trade at Glasgow, Liverpool, or London where they could obtain cheaper and quicker passages on scheduled weekly vessels. In Europe, trading entrepôts such as Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, Le Havre, and Rotterdam witnessed unprecedented increases in the number of people travelling through their harbours. Convenience and decreasing travel costs favoured those ports served by both cross-country railways and transoceanic passenger services. The emigrant business

became increasingly concentrated upon a small number of rapidly expanding port-cities. Liverpool emerged as the leading emigrant port for Britain; Bremen, and her new port Bremerhaven, dominated emigration from Germany; Le Havre served as the entrepôt for French migrants; and Antwerp and Rotterdam secured pivotal functions for emigrants from Belgium and Holland respectively. Shipping services gravitated towards those leading port-cities equipped with the maritime infrastructures capable of sustaining commercial expansion.

The number of emigrants leaving Germany via such transport systems rose dramatically throughout the 1840s. During the same period Hamburg, equipped with improved port and transport infrastructure, proved as capable as her Weser counterpart (Bremen) to handle a growing proportion of the emigrant business. But despite the expansion of port facilities, the German merchant marine proved incapable of handling the vast number of migrants wishing to leave Germany as demand for travel outstripped supply. Faced with limited domestic transatlantic shipping services many Germans instead travelled to non-German ports in order to reach transoceanic destinations. Most of the emigrants travelled via the continental ports of Amsterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre, or Rotterdam. Others, as shown in Chart 4.1, increasingly travelled via Britain in order to access British ports served with transoceanic passenger travel. Of the 156,000 transmigrants who travelled through Britain between 1836 and 1860, the majority were Germans. Most, such as those arriving in Britain from Rotterdam and Amsterdam, had trekked to ports on the Rhine, sailed downstream to a Dutch port, and then changed vessel to reach Hull or London by steamship. Britain, unlike many of her leading European counterparts, was capable of shipping larger numbers of European transmigrants, in addition to the hundreds of thousands of British and Irish emigrants who already embarked via her ports each year, because of the difference between the huge import trade to Britain from America and the small scale of exports on the return journey. Unlike other European nations, the surplus space on the outward voyage was used to supply domestic demand for transatlantic travel and still leave sufficient space to expand as the trade necessitated.

Chart 4.1. The ports of arrival used by European transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859



Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120.

The transformation of Britain's passenger market through railway expansion occurred at the same time as the demands for mass emigration from Ireland, precipitated by the Potato Famine, increased the demand for increased passenger services. Irish emigrants, like their British counterparts, used the services of just one port – Liverpool. British and Irish emigration necessitated either a short-sea journey, or, in the case of the Irish, a short railway journey to Liverpool. This domestic demand provided leading port-cities such as Liverpool, and to a lesser extent London and Glasgow, with the port infrastructure capable of meeting the needs of transoceanic passenger shipping. Throughout the 1830s and 1840s they would also facilitate large-scale transmigration. As the domestic market lessened during the early 1850s, predominantly because of a stabilisation in British and Irish agriculture, demand to leave Europe intensified (as discussed in Chapter 5). Ports such as Liverpool and London became increasingly reliant upon foreign emigrants using British ports to sustain the growth. The business in conveying foreign emigrants across both the short-sea and transoceanic routes increased

rapidly. It changed the nature of British passenger operations from being that of solely domestic exporter to that of continental transporter. By 1851 Liverpool had emerged as the largest emigration port in Europe. As Gordon Read noted:

By 1851 Liverpool was Europe's premier emigration port for North America. She sent 455 ships to New York carrying 159,840 passengers. In comparison, that year Le Havre dispatched 31,859 people in 124 ships, while Bremen handled 132 ships, which carried 19,431 persons. All other European ports handled less human freight.¹

The railway network continued to extend throughout the nineteenth century to larger parts of continental Europe. It brought significant improvements in the availability and speed of trans-continental travel and this facilitated the supply of transmigrants to Britain. Whilst differing gauges in railway tracks often hampered the easy movement of passengers across borders, and political influences when deciding particular routes caused problems for speed in parts of Central Europe, the linkage of the European hinterland with ports providing passenger services to Hull, Grimsby, London, and Leith facilitated Britain's share of transoceanic shipping.²

4.2 The journey to Britain

Most Europeans commenced their transmigrant journey with rail travel to one of the European ports of departure used by German emigrants from where they could secure passage on a steamer on the short-sea route to Britain. Those leaving Scandinavia were offered alternative journeys on a steamer along the Kattegat or Baltic before crossing the North Sea to Britain. The latter sailed from Copenhagen, Gothenburg, Hangö, Malmö, Oslo, Bergen, or Trondheim to the North Sea ports of Grimsby, Hull, and Newcastle. All were *en route* to Glasgow, Liverpool, or London. The services across Europe had become so developed by the end of the nineteenth century that contemporary travel guides, such as those published by Bradshaw, could provide a detailed breakdown for the length of each aspect of the journey. Improvements in navigations and harbours, such as

¹ Read, *Through Liverpool*, p. 1.


² David Turnock, 'Railway Development in Eastern Europe as a Context for Migration Study', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 293-312.

the development of the Winter Harbour at Libau, the creation of the landing stage at Hangö, or the opening of the Kiel Canal, all helped to facilitate access for passengers. Those landing in Britain from the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Slavic countries came predominantly from Åbo, Hangö, Libau, Riga, and Danzig. Finally, in the first decade of the twentieth century, transmigrants also began to arrive from Mediterranean countries via Le Havre and Antwerp, or on direct steamers arriving in Britain from Mediterranean and Iberian ports. Companies providing rail or steam travel advertised their services in a number of different languages. The crux of the transmigrant business remained the easy conveyance of would-be emigrants to British ports.

The successful expansion of the business therefore centred on a successful seaborne crossing to Britain. From the early 1820s passenger services to Britain were always provided by steam propelled ships. Whether traversing the North Sea or English Channel, 'Huller' vessels, as the steamers to British ports became known, were a frequent feature of the short-sea passenger services to Britain.³ Daily crossings were provided across the English Channel by British steamship companies and European railway companies. The journey between Calais, Ostend, or St. Malo, and Dover, Folkestone, and Margate lasted hours rather than weeks.

³ Ernst Heike, *Robert M. Sloman Junior* (Hamburg, 1968).

Map 4.1. Ports connected with the transmigration of Europeans through Britain



Note: Vessels sailing from Glasgow called into Movable to collect Irish emigrants. Those embarking from Liverpool called into Queenstown or Greenock *en route* to North Atlantic destinations. Ships leaving London bound for South Africa and Australasia often called into Plymouth (later Southampton) before sailing to destinations in the southern hemisphere.

Though early steamships often struggled on the North Sea crossing, they were a more reliable form of transport than their sail-powered counterparts.⁴ Often carrying the

⁴ Alan Pearsall, 'Steam enters the North Sea', in Anne Bang-Anderson, Basil Greenhill & Egil Harald Grude (eds.), *The North Sea: A Highway of Economic and Cultural Exchange Character – History* (Stavanger, 1985), pp. 195-213; Palmer, 'The Most Indefatigable Activity'; Ambrose Greenway, *A Century of North Sea Passenger Steamers* (London, 1986); Jenson, *History of the Scandinavian Mission*, pp. 70-71, 97-98.

Royal Mail, first- and second-class passengers, and later perishable produce, speed and reliability were essential to the development and maintenance of the business. The use of steam on the North Sea crossing shortened the overall length of time needed to complete an emigrant journey; seaborne travel had become more reliable as services ran to scheduled timetables. The journey from Scandinavian or German ports averaged at between two and three days, that from the Baltic ports took between five and six days, whilst the journey from Hamburg had been reduced to just 32 hours. Those embarking from Norway departed Oslo on a Friday evening and reached Hull on a Sunday evening or Monday morning; those from Sweden sailed from Gothenburg on a Thursday evening and arrived in Hull around the same time as their Norwegian counterparts. Vessels from Baltic ports often called into Copenhagen *en route*. After 1892 they increasingly sailed direct to Britain from Hangö, Åbo, or Libau. They embarked on a Saturday evening, and arrived in Hull on a Wednesday evening or Thursday morning, and in London on a Friday morning.⁵ The scheduling of each service on a permanent basis ensured that passengers, goods, or mail arrived promptly. The business became more reliable throughout the late nineteenth century as technology eradicated any difficulties in the use of paddle steamers half a century earlier.

As well as the concentrated arrival of transmigrants on specific days of the week, the majority invariably travelled during what became known as the emigrant season.⁶ As Table 4.2 demonstrates, in certain years this could lead to too much of the business being handled in one particular month. The business focussed upon arrival in Britain during the months of April, May, and June. The spring months represented 64 per cent of the trade between 1869 and 1870; whilst by 1871 it was beginning to show signs that it was more

⁵ BJL, DEW/6/32-3, 'Logbooks of SS *Romeo, Oslo, Lorne, Novo, Kolpino, and Jaffa*' (1906-1912); NMM, *Lloyd's List & Shipping Gazette* (1871-1914); LSL, Customs Bills of Entry (1836-1899); MMM, Customs Bills of Entry (1840-1914).

⁶ Contemporary newspapers commented on the start of the emigrant season each year. For example see *Hull Advertiser*, 21 April 1848, p. 5; *Hull Advertiser*, 19 April 1850, p. 5; *Hull News*, 3 April 1852, p. 6; *Great Grimsby Gazette*, 14 April 1854, p. 4.

evenly spread and only accounted for 41 per cent. During periods of exceptional trade, such as 1882, as many as 10,000 migrants arrived in Hull during a single weekend.⁷

Table 4.2. The seasonality of transmigration via the port of Hull, 1869-1871

Year of arrival	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
1869	126	265	1,458	5,274	10,614	5,195	2,207	1,612	2,820	2,108	1,210	168
1870	164	205	2,780	8,412	10,138	6,109	2,605	2,324	2,526	1,615	1,253	525
1871	571	868	1,170	3,025	5,192	3,138	3,140	3,490	2,413	1,962	1,478	838

Source: HCA, BHH/1/50, p. 200, BHH/1/50, p. 357, BHH/1/51, p.401.

Travel was often confined to these months because of the freezing up of the Baltic navigation between November and March each year. This restricted seaborne travel from Russia, Poland and Finland, and limited that from Sweden and Norway. Concentration in the trade also reflected the earlier length of time required to cross the Atlantic (under the age of sail) which necessitated a migrants' departure as soon as the winter had ended in order to reach their destination and secure work before the subsequent autumn. As Ole Rynning noted:

The best time to leave Norway ... is so early in the spring as to be able to reach the place of settlement by midsummer or shortly after that time. In that way something can be raised even the first year; namely, buckwheat, which is planted in the last days of June; turnips, which are planted in the latter part of July; and potatoes. It is very unfortunate to go too late in the year to gather fodder for one or two cows and build a house for the winter.⁸

The vessels used on the short-sea crossings varied according to the route. Steamers increased in size from under 200 tons in the 1820s to 1,500-2,000 tons in the

⁷ BPP, *Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882).

⁸ Cited in Blegen, *Norwegian Migration to America: The American Transition*, p. 5.

1880s.⁹ Their ability to transport larger numbers of passengers in a quick and reliable manner arose because of the increased changeable space allocated in the ‘tween deck – for passengers or cargo as demand dictated.¹⁰ The better class of ship plied the Scandinavian route between Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and Hull, Grimsby, or Newcastle.¹¹ Such vessels had permanent first-, second-, and third-class berths, in addition to a limited cargo space within the hold.¹² Though the volume of the trade sometimes necessitated the use of poorer quality vessels, even these were of a relative standard of quality.¹³ A similar good standard of vessel was also used by companies operating on the short-sea routes from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France.¹⁴ They sailed to Grimsby, Harwich, London, Newhaven, Dover, and Southampton.¹⁵ Such vessels did not offer accommodation targeted purely for the transmigrant trade, but instead accommodated their needs through existing third-class accommodation. Transmigrants arriving from Baltic ports, by contrast, travelled between Riga, Libau, and Danzig to Hull or London and were offered a more primitive mode of transport in terms of comfort and space.¹⁶ Though the vessels used on this route were often of a similar size to those used on the North Sea routes, their third-class

⁹ John Harrower, *Wilson Line* (Gravesend, 1998).

¹⁰ The varying use of ‘tween deck berths are recorded in surviving logbooks of the Wilson Line. (See BJL, ‘Logbooks of the *Romeo, Oslo, Lorne, Jaffa, Kolpino* and *Novo*’ (1906-1912). DEW 6/32-3.)

¹¹ BJL, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co., Limited, *Wilson Line of Steamers: Handbook of Royal Mail Passengers & Cargo Services: Season 1893* (Hull, 1893), DEW/8/1; *Ibid, Wilson Line of Steamers: Particulars of the Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services* (Hull, 1907), DEW/8/4; *Ibid, Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services 1911* (Hull, 1911), DEW/8/6.

¹² BJL, *Ships’ Registry Books, No 1-3* (1860-1917), DEW/10/1-3.

¹³ BPP, *Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882), pp. 5-6.

¹⁴ NMM, *Lloyd’s Register of Shipping* (1836-1914).

¹⁵ Ambrose Greenway, *A Century of North Sea Passenger Steamers* (Shepperton, Surrey, 1986).

¹⁶ For a description of the journey see Albert Kinross, ‘At Sea with the Alien Immigrant’, *Pall Mall Magazine*, Volume XXXIV (September-December, 1904), pp. 126-132; BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume II, p. 208, minute 6176 (Evidence of Mr Hermann Landau).

accommodation was poorly equipped, the decks had limited ventilation, they were often overcrowded, and their berths were uncomfortable.¹⁷

The quality of the North Sea crossing thus varied according to the vessel provided by the operator and the length of journey. Transmigrants benefited from quicker, cheaper, and high quality travel because of the intense competition between shipping operators on the cross Channel and short-sea routes.¹⁸ But for those leaving Scandinavia or the Baltic, cost and not convenience ensured that thousands continued to choose the transmigrant route so long as it remained cheap. As Mr. Thomas Gray reported to the Board of Trade in July 1882:

The rate of fare for the whole voyage, from Gothenburg or Christiania to the United States, is low, and that it will be doing but poor service to these emigrants if by extra requirements on the part of the Board of Trade, the cost of their passage to the United States is raised.¹⁹

The business was dominated throughout the mid-to late-nineteenth century by British lines such as the Wilson Line of Hull, the Leith, Hull, and Hamburg Steam Packet Company of Leith and Hull, and the ships owned by the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company (hereafter MS&L) of Grimsby.²⁰ The Wilson Line provided important services between Sweden and Norway to Hull. The routes between Hamburg and Leith were provided by the Leith, Hull, and Hamburg Steam Packet Company and those between Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Grimsby were maintained by the MS&L. The trade to Britain was supplemented by new routes opened by foreign competitors. Companies such as Det Forende Dampskib Selskab (DFDS) developed the trade between Libau and Hull or London, and between Esbjerg and Grimsby or Harwich; the Finska Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget (FÅA) developed direct

¹⁷ HCA, *Kingston upon Hull Local Board of Health Authority - Proceedings of the Sanitary Committee*, BHH/1/49, p. 94.

¹⁸ BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume II, p. 569, minutes 16285-16286 (Evidence of Mr Hermann Landau); *New York Times*, 30 October 1902, p. 9, 'Canadian Gateway for Rejected Immigrants'.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 7.

²⁰ See Table 7.13; also Greenway, *A Century of North Sea Passenger Steamers*.

sailings to Hull from Åbo and Hangö; the Bergen Line supplied passenger services between Bergen and Newcastle; the Batavier Line continued services between the Dutch ports and London; and the route between Bremen and London or Hull was run by Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL) – later the Argo Line.²¹

Like other aspects of seaborne commerce the movement of transmigrants to Britain was maintained by a plethora of British and European companies.²² Whilst a few operators such as the Wilson Line and DFDS, dominated the business, smaller companies such as the East Asiatic Steamship Company, Bergen Line, and Batavier lines continued to divert flows of Europeans through their services.²³ All supplied European third-class passengers to British points of entry from where they had to make a subsequent journey across Britain to a British point of re-embarkation. Whilst the business continued to evolve, its focus remained centred on the needs of companies providing Atlantic transport. Scheduled journey times to Britain appear to have been geared towards the subsequent re-embarkation of passengers on emigrant ships leaving Liverpool on a Tuesday, Wednesday, or Saturday, Glasgow on a Thursday or Saturday, London on Thursday or Friday, and Southampton on a Friday or Saturday.²⁴

²¹ Greenway, *A Century of North Sea Passenger Steamers*; Peter Davies, *John Sutcliffe & Son. A History of the Company, 1862-1987* (Grimsby, 1987); C.K. Hansen Company, *Hansen Through a Century* (Copenhagen, 1956); Edwin Dreschel, *Norddeutscher Lloyd Bremen, 1857-1970* (Vancouver, 1994); Thure Malmberg & Arnold Neumann, *The White Ships* (Helsinki, 1971); Norman Middlemiss, *Fred Olsen/Bergen Line* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 1990); Soren Thorsoe, *DFDS 1866-1991: Ship Development through 125 Years: From Paddle Steamer to Ro/Ro Ship* (Copenhagen, 1991).

²² LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1840-1899) and MMM, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1901-1914) demonstrate the various companies involved in shipping goods and passengers to Hull and Grimsby. For references to the division of the westbound North Atlantic passenger traffic generally, during the period in question, see Derek Aldcroft, 'The Merchant Marine', in Derek Aldcroft (ed.), *The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914* (London, 1968), pp. 356-7.

²³ See (for example) the ships that conveyed Jewish transmigrants between European ports and the British ports of Hull, Grimsby, Harwich and London between 1896 and 1914. (Source: University of Leicester, Department of History, Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter Database.) See also Table 7.17 for details of transmigrant arrivals at the Port of Hull in 1913.

²⁴ *The Times Digital Archive, 1785-1985*, 'Shipping Advertisements' (1836-1914). [http://web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/0/1/1/purl=rc6_TTDA?sw_aep=unihull]

4.3 The journey across Britain

Having traversed the North Sea or English Channel, European transmigrants had access to a large number of vessels conveying passengers to an even greater number of transoceanic destinations than were available to them in continental ports.²⁵ Prior to 1855 the re-embarkation process by sea sometimes took place within the port at which the transmigrant had arrived. Single port migration was particularly evident at London.²⁶ However with the arrival of the cross-country railway the process of transmigration evolved into two distinctive forms – depending upon whether the migrants arrived via a southern or northern port. Those entering Britain via southern ports such as London or Southampton continued to use a single port of arrival and departure. Entry via a north eastern port involved re-embarking on train to another port located on the west or south coast. The facilities and transport systems facilitating both flows varied enormously.

Disembarkation at London, after the passing of the 1793 Aliens Act, typically took place at one of the landing stages for foreign passengers approved by the Home Secretary – enabling steamers to avoid unnecessary delays at Gravesend.²⁷ These comprised the Customs House Wharf, Greenwich, Woolwich, Blackwall or Deptford, and (later) St. Katharine's Steam Packet Landing Stage, Blackwall, or Irongate Stairs.²⁸ Whilst some companies also disembarked passengers within dock – such as at Millwall Dock, or the East or West India Docks – most discharged their passengers within the River Thames.²⁹ The transmigrant then had a choice of making a train journey to the

²⁵ NMM, Ephemera Collections of British and European Shipping Companies.

²⁶ TNA, HO 3/1-120. It was also apparent at Newcastle during the early 1880s. (Information kindly provided by Dr Adrian Osler and based upon evidence gleaned from Newcastle newspapers.)

²⁷ TNA, HO 5/20, 'Aliens Entry Books: Correspondence' (1815-1827), pp. 332, 334, 342-346.

²⁸ *Ibid*; see also the conveyance directories for the port of London contained within Kelly's commercial directories of London (1830-1914).

²⁹ For discussion of the disembarkation of aliens see the bi-annual reports of the Port of London Sanitary Authority (CLRO, 'Port Sanitary Reports, 565B (1873-1914); and ditto, 'Special report on the measures taken to prevent the introduction of cholera into the Port of London (25 August 1892)'). Alternatively, surviving logbooks - such as those of the *Romeo* (belonging to the Wilson Line) - describe the landing of passengers at London between 1906 and 1912. (Source: BJL, 'Logbooks of the *Romeo*, *Oslo*, *Lorne*, *Jaffa*, *Kolpino* and *Novo*' (1906-1912), DEW 6/32-3.)

southern ports of Southampton or Plymouth via the Southern Railway's Waterloo terminus; making a train journey to the northern ports of Liverpool or Glasgow via the London and North Western Railway's (hereafter LNWR) Euston station; or remaining in London whilst awaiting the departure of a vessel from London. Whilst the expense of the rail travel was often provided within the overall cost of the Atlantic voyage, a so-called inclusive package, the latter necessitated a temporary stay in a lodging-house in the East End of London, or for those bound for New Zealand at the New Zealand Government's emigrant depot at Blackwall which was opened in 1873.³⁰ The route via London proved particularly popular for those heading to the Cape Province.³¹ Most of those transmigrating through London were Jewish and often stayed at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, opened in 1885, before sailing from the East or West India Docks, or making the short rail journey to Southampton's docks.³² The proportion of the trade conducted by London was statistically insignificant after 1855.³³ The majority of the business was instead handled by northern ports that were in closer proximity to Liverpool.

Vessels disembarking transmigrants at Goole, Grimsby, Harwich, Hull, Leith, Newcastle, or West Hartlepool landed their passengers in a variety of ways. Unlike in London, where different dock companies managed varying port facilities, at the Northern points of entry single companies, dock or railway businesses, owned and managed port operations. At Hull, operated by a single dock company (until 1885), passengers disembarked at the Humber Dock Basin, Victoria Dock Pier, or were landed by use of tender at the Corporation Pier.³⁴ Whilst the use of pontoons, floating landing stages, or

³⁰ CLRO, 'Port Sanitary Reports', 565B, 1873 - Period 2, p. 11; ditto, 1895 - Appendix to Period 2 'Immigrants and Transmigrants', pp. 63-73.

³¹ Aubrey Newman, *University of Leicester Department of History Occasional Papers*, 'The Union Castle Line and Emigration from Eastern Europe to South Africa' (Leicester, 2000). [<http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/teaching/papers/newman2.htm>.]

³² Ditto. The Castle Company's use of particular docks was commented upon in BPP, *Report of the Royal Commission on the Port of London* (1902), p. 515.

³³ Chart 4.1.

³⁴ HCA, *Kingston upon Hull Local Board of Health Authority - Proceedings of the Sanitary Committee*, BHH/1/49, pp. 28-30; Frederick Hale (ed.), *Danes in North America* (Seattle, 1984), p. 13; see also the various personal accounts of Mormon emigrants landing at Hull in the *Mormon Immigration Index*.

sheltered havens was common at ports operated by railway companies – such as Harwich or Newhaven – enclosed docks at Hull, Goole, Grimsby, West Hartlepool and Leith obviated the need for the use of such tenders or landing stages.³⁵ Enclosed deep-water docks, such as those at Hull’s Albert Dock (opened in 1869), were still only accessible during a high tide, but once inside the confines of the dock estate they enabled vessels more time to disembark their passengers.³⁶

Even at major centres of the trade such as Hull neither rail nor dock company operators developed facilities exclusively for the transmigrant traffic. The providers of both shipping and port services were instead eager to discharge responsibility for their transmigrants as soon as possible after a migrants’ arrival. Unlike first- and second-class passengers, who were encouraged to use port-based hotels managed by the shipping lines, port operators, or dock companies, shipping lines all sought to transport aliens away from their harbours as quickly as possible.³⁷ This was particularly apparent for shipping companies whose responsibility for the passengers ceased upon their arrival at the point of entry.³⁸ As one Danish emigrant, who regretted booking passage on the Inman Line (via Hull), noted, ‘Because the big ship could not sail directly to the pier, our baggage was taken in one smaller ship while we were transported on another into Hull.’³⁹ The integration of rail and steamer services was a long drawn-out process involving numerous parties with vested commercial interests. Before it could be achieved specially printed literature (in German), as shown in Figure 4.1, were produced to entice the alien to use the services of particular companies. Like with similar multi-lingual advertisements produced in Europe and in overseas immigrant newspapers, those with knowledge of the

³⁵ Gordon Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, pp. 92-6, 126-128.

³⁶ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 126.

³⁷ For examples of how transport companies sought to entice first- and second-class passengers to use approved hotels see the timetable for the Great Eastern Railway’s timetable for continental journeys in 1908-1909. (Source: University of Leicester Library, Great Eastern Railway, Great Eastern Railway time tables and steamboat services, October 1st, 1908 - February 28th, 1909).

³⁸ HCA, ‘Letter from Charles Maples, Hull, Emigration Agent, to C.S. Todd’ (1871), BHH/108/322.

³⁹ Hale, *Danes in North America*, p. 13. His vessel had embarked from Copenhagen in April 1882 and arrived at Hull three days later.

trade were keen to promote both easy access upon arrival and the subsequent access to the transpennine railway.⁴⁰

Figure 4.1. Advertisement (in German) promoting the services of the Minerva Hotel, Hull (circa 1850)



Source: Minerva Public House, Hull.

Those unable to secure speedy passage to Liverpool or Glasgow inevitably had to stay in short-term accommodation provided by port-based lodging-house keepers. Such lodgings came at a price not included in the cost of the indirect ticket, and were not of the best quality.⁴¹ As with most other aspects of transport in the Victorian era the more one paid the better the standard of comfort provided. For the transmigrant – travelling on the most affordable ticket – this often included the stay at an overcrowded lodging-house ill-

⁴⁰ See Appendix 3.1. Other advertisements, printed in overseas immigrant newspapers and promoting the transmigrant services of British steamship companies included: the *Amerikan Sanomat*; *Amerikan Suomalainen Lehti* and *Svenska Monitören*.

⁴¹ BPP, *Reports by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882), pp. 11-12.

equipped to deal with the intense demands of the seasonality of the trade. The sanitary inspector visiting lodging-houses in Hull in April 1882 reported a case where:

The common lodging house [was] overcrowded to a serious extent, there being over 300 Emigrants sleeping in the house besides a number of lodgers that frequent the house. This house is registered to accommodate 73 lodgers.⁴²

Such overnight accommodation centred on specific areas of the port. In Hull these centred on the Posterngate and Nile Street areas, as demonstrated in Figure 4.2. Harry Lazarus, a native of Germany, provided overnight lodgings for migrants and mariners. At the time of the 1881 Census over 19 Swedish and Finnish transmigrants were resident in his lodging-house – situated within close proximity to the docks where transmigrants disembarked.⁴³ As noted within court correspondence this could often lead to difficulties during busy trading periods.⁴⁴ The solution remedied by the companies involved with the business, after the 1870s, was for the steamship company to provide overnight accommodation aboard ship without victualling until the time of the departure of the train that would convey the emigrants to Liverpool or Glasgow.

⁴² HCA, TCM 174, 'Minutes of the Kingston upon Hull Town Council' (1882), p. 437.

⁴³ *1881 British Census* CD-ROM.

Figure 4.2. Harry Lazarus' Lodging House, 32-33 Posterngate, Hull



Source: Author's collection (2001).⁴⁵

Between the arrival of the passengers and the departure of their emigrant train, local approved agents and their nearby emigrant lodging houses, such as that run by Harry Lazarus, catered for their feeding. Such was the scale of the business that by the early 1860s each Liverpool and Glasgow-based Atlantic operator employed the services of a lodging-house keeper to feed their customers whilst awaiting the rail journey west. The only time the majority of transmigrants neared a lodging-house was to be fed by one of the four English-speaking German operators at Hull who were paid by Atlantic lines to

⁴⁴ HCA, DPM 1/121, 'Court Case against John Brodie, Lodging-house Keeper' (1882).

feed the transmigrants prior to the departure of the train to Liverpool.⁴⁶ At Grimsby the need for the use of separate lodgings was eradicated by the integration of sail and rail services by 1854. Passengers disembarked immediately upon arrival and were taken to a former dockside railway station converted into an Emigrant Shelter. The facility helped the port to develop its share of the trade and even attracted some of those who had initially landed at the nearby port of Hull. The latter were conveyed from Hull to Grimsby on the Humber packets. As a Grimsby newspaper noted at the time:

The Railway Company are doing all in their power to encourage the trade here, they are converting the Passengers' Station, on the Eastside of the New Dock, into an Emigrant's Home, for the use of Emigrants that may arrive and have to stay all night in Grimsby, which will be fitted up with every convenience for their accommodation, *free of charge*. We have no doubt the liberality of the Company, with the superior accommodation and dispatch they receive at the place, will be the means of making this not only a *first-class* port, but that it will draw the greatest part of this trade to Grimsby⁴⁷

At other railway facilities, such as Waterloo and Euston railway stations in London, separate emigrant dining rooms were also provided.⁴⁸ They were very similar to those provided by railway operators for third-class rail passengers with additional features peculiar to the trade – such as extra luggage rooms, space allocated for the use of agents representing transatlantic lines, and a larger number of washing and toilet facilities than was provided for normal third-class passengers.⁴⁹ The increased frequency of vessels sailing out of the Mersey, the Clyde, and the Solent by the late nineteenth century negated the need for temporary lodgings at the port of arrival. Priority, as with Euston's

⁴⁶ BPP, *Reports by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882), p. 12.

⁴⁷ GCL, *Great Grimsby Gazette*, 14 April 1854, p. 4.

⁴⁸ TNA, 'London and North Western Railway Company: Euston: New Offices for Station Master, Emigrants' Dining Room and Bar Assistants' Room' (1912-1913), RAIL 410/1016.

⁴⁹ The Emigrant Dining Room at Euston is shown on a plan of the station in *Railway Magazine*. (See *Railway Magazine*, 'The most famous railway station in the world: its traffic and associations'. *Railway Magazine*, Volume XVII, Number 203 (1905), p. 364.

emigrant dining area, and equivalent facilities at Liverpool, would instead be upon the successful rail link between the point of entry and the port of re-embarkation.⁵⁰

The emergence of ports engaged in the trade centred primarily on their integration with the cross-country railway. The rail link between Hull and Liverpool was achieved in 1840 – with the Waterworks Street terminus acting as Hull’s main transport terminus.⁵¹ However the depot was essentially for freight, and not in a desirable area. An alternative line and terminus were instead developed by the Great Northern Railway (the same railway company) throughout the 1840s. This opened in May 1851 and provided more refined terminus facilities – combined with a new route that avoided the western docks. South of the River Humber the rail link had reached New Holland (connected with Hull by steam packet) by 1848. This was extended, by the opening of the MS&L, in 1851. Primarily for the speedy transit of fish landed at the port, the company purposely sought to compete with Hull’s passenger operations. A further rail link between Goole and Liverpool, run by the L&Y, opened in 1848, but Goole never developed a significant role in the business after Grimsby had emerged as a more accessible point of entry just a few years later. After ranking as Britain’s third largest point of entry during the early 1850s, Goole declined in importance until the twentieth century – leaving Hull and Grimsby the lion’s share of the business.

The transpennine rail link brought the Humber and Mersey within several hours of each other. The length of time needed to traverse the route varied according to the route taken, the operator providing the train, and whether the service was non-stop or collected passengers on its way to Liverpool. Rasmus Nielsen recorded in his journal that the 144-mile overnight journey from Hull to Liverpool took 7 hours in January 1854.⁵² By 1903 further transport developments had reduced this to between 3 hours and 57 minutes to 4 hours and 3 minutes.⁵³ Improvements to the cross-country rail service in

⁵⁰ Colin Reed, *Gateway to the West. A History of Riverside Station Liverpool. MD & HB - LNWR* (Winchester, 1992), pp. 1-3.


⁵¹ Gillett & MacMahon, *A History of Hull*, p. 303.

⁵² *Mormon Immigration Index*, ‘Diary of Rasmus Nielsen’.

⁵³ Darlington Railway Centre & Museum, Ken Hoole Collection, K.H. 1124, ‘North Eastern Railway: Shipping Interests’ (1890-1980).

1871, 1881, 1885, 1893 and 1907 helped to facilitate larger numbers of transmigrants travelling through Britain. It also perpetuated the Humber's position as Britain's pre-eminent point of entry as shown in Chart 4.2; such rail links increased the level of transmigrants arriving at Hull. It grew from 748 in 1850, to 4,605 in 1851 following the opening of Paragon Railway Station in May 1851, and continued to rise until it peaked at 100,000 in 1907 as additional facilities were developed at the town's railway and dock sites.

Chart 4.2. Annual rates of European transmigration via the port of Hull, 1836-1914



Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120; HCA, BHH/1/49-53, TCM/174-180, WHG/1/20-46; BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1890-1905).

From the point of arrival until the time they reached Liverpool, Glasgow or Southampton, the transmigrant was provided with both food and accommodation in a warm and clean shelter. Transport companies further facilitated the development of the business by providing multilingual signs and employing foreign-speaking staff to cater

for the needs of their passengers.⁵⁴ Both rail and shipping operators also hired the use of German, Scandinavian and later Russian speaking immigrants to act as emigration agents in the feeding and facilitating of European transmigrants passing through British ports of arrival and departure.⁵⁵ The use of agents in ports, hostels, on boats and in trains, enabled the transmigrant trade to develop so rapidly.⁵⁶ However the standard of service provided at different ports and by rival operators varied as with other aspects of the business. In smaller transmigrant centres, such as Leith, Newcastle, or West Hartlepool, the need for agents was obviated by the close working of scheduling sailings and subsequent railway aspects of transmigrant journeys and the limited scale of operations – a weekly rather than a daily operation.⁵⁷ In the larger transmigrant ports of arrival (Hull, Grimsby, Harwich, London and Southampton) full- or part-time positions arose that catered for the frequent arrival of shiploads of transmigrants.⁵⁸ Many agents, such as those of the MS&L (operating transmigrant rail services between Grimsby and Liverpool), were paid to travel with the aliens until they reached the port of re-embarkation.⁵⁹ Others merely guided the seaborne arrivals to the train to the next stage of the journey. Agents thus provided the final linkage between inward and outward migration. They remedied abuses within the trade that had left the aliens exposed to unscrupulous crimps who preyed on

⁵⁴ The role of stewardesses on both the North Sea and North Atlantic was increasingly important as single women and women with children travelled overseas for even short periods. For examples of the multi-lingual tickets produced for those traversing the transpennine rail route see: TNA RAIL 236/629, 'Great Northern Railway Company: Correspondence, Notices of Sailings and Specimen Tickets and Fares for Emigrant Traffic on Boats of Messrs. Inman & Co., and the Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia Steam Ship Co. (1867-1870).

⁵⁵ *1881 British Census CD-ROM*.

⁵⁶ References to commercial agents based in Hull and Grimsby helping Mormon transmigrants as they arrived in Britain, provide a clear example of this. See (for example) the Diary of Jesse Nathaniel Smith and the Reminiscences and Journal of Hans Jorgensen (*Mormon Immigration Index CD-Rom*).

⁵⁷ See, for example, the limited numbers of transmigrants sailing from Hamburg to West Hartlepool and Leith between 1880 and 1910. (Source: Staatsarchiv, Hamburg, 'Listen Den Indirekten Auswanderer', VIII/B/1/Film Numbers 13157-13174 (1854-1910).)

⁵⁸ Miscellaneous documents concerning the career of Paul Julius Drasdo, emigration agent at Hull between 1881 and 1933, kindly provided by his great grandson, David Dradson; LSL, Trade and commercial directories of Hull (1830-1914); see also references to Isaac Freeman and Edward Cragg in the Census enumerators returns for Grimsby, 1861-1901.

⁵⁹ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-Rom*.

the vulnerable foreigners whilst waiting in some of Britain's busiest ports for the next stage in the journey westward.⁶⁰

The transpennine rail route was controlled by a small number of companies who had often been integral to the early development of the east coast points of entry. The connection of ports and their rail links varied enormously. At Hull, developed by the Hull Dock Company, a rail link was provided by the York and North Midland Railway (later North Eastern Railway).⁶¹ The two companies monopolised the westward journey from Hull until 1885 when the Hull and Barnsley Railway Company opened an alternative combined dock and rail link.⁶² Nearby Grimsby was controlled by the MS&L; the north eastern ports of West Hartlepool and Newcastle were under the control of the North Eastern Railway (NER); the L&Y controlled Goole. Three companies, the NER, the MS&L and the L&Y, therefore dominated the rail link (prior to 1885) between the Humber and the Tyne. Their grip over the rail links were cemented by their ownership of three, later all, of the north eastern points of entry. The control by a few transport companies of the east coast was mirrored by an equally dominant influence of the LNWR over rail travel between the Mersey and the Clyde. Such monopolies did not provide passengers with improved facilities. The railway stock used to convey passengers across Britain did not have toilet facilities until the twentieth century. Instead 'comfort breaks' were factored into the rail journey at quieter stations.⁶³ As shown in Map 4.2 the route a transmigrant took to reach Liverpool could vary considerably. During the journey all carriages were locked to ensure passengers did not disembark prematurely at stations the trains travelled through.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Evidence of Herman Landau to Major General Sir Charles Warren, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 24 July 1887, cited in David Englander (ed.), *A Documentary History of Jewish Immigrants in Britain, 1840-1920* (Leicester, 1994), pp. 19-21.


⁶¹ Gillett & MacMahon, *A History of Hull*, p. 303.

⁶² Jackson, *Ports*, p. 126.

⁶³ Darlington Railway Centre & Museum, Ken Hoole Collection, 'North Eastern Railway: Shipping Interests, KH. 1124 (1890-1980).

⁶⁴ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-Rom*, 'Diary of Frederick Zaugg (May 1884). The locking of carriages adds further credence to my argument that immigrant communities emerging in Leeds and Manchester were not linked to transmigrant flows across Britain during the Victorian period.

Map 4.2. The various routes taken by Emigrant trains working the transpennine corridor, 1840-1914¹



- Key**
- Cheshire Lines Committee (Great Central, Great Northern and Midland) (C.L.C)
 - Great Central (formerly Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire) (G.C.)
 - Great Northern (G.N.)
 - Hull and Barnsley (H. & B.)
 - London & North Western (L. & N.W.)
 - Lancashire & Yorkshire (L. & Y.)
 - Midland (Mid.)
 - North Eastern (N.E.)
 - Swinton & Knottingley (Midland and North Eastern) (S. & K.)

¹ Based on W. Phillip Connolly, *British Railways, Pre-Grouping, Atlas and Gazetteer* (Shepperton, Surrey, 1976), pp. 21-4.

Upon arrival at the port of departure, railway and steamship operators needed to ensure that the migrants were not exposed to the influences of crimps, thieves, and rival operators. Prior to the emergence of Southampton as a key player in the transmigrant business after 1892, the majority of European transmigrants departed Britain through Liverpool or Glasgow.⁶⁵ As with British emigrants, European transmigrants arriving at Liverpool's Lime Street Station invariably required the services of port-based lodging-houses whilst awaiting the departure of ocean liners.⁶⁶ Arrival at any port necessitated the collection of passengers' belongings from the luggage wagon, followed by the journey to either the boat or an emigrant lodging-house.⁶⁷ Facilities at all railway stations were kept to a minimum – as the price dictated. Such services, often run in cooperation with a particular Atlantic shipping line, were initially not provided within the cost of a transmigrant ticket.⁶⁸ As with Hull, the lodging-houses were situated in particular areas of the port. In Liverpool these were situated in Paradise Street, Duke Street, or St. George's Square area; at Glasgow they were close to the Broomielaw landing stage from where a tender would convey them to their ocean-bound ship; and at Southampton the council gave permission in 1894 for the opening of the Atlantic hostel, a facility run by Mr. Dolling, to facilitate the needs of third-class emigrants.⁶⁹

Unlike facilities provided at the point of entry, transmigrants continued to need the services of port-based emigrant lodgings throughout the nineteenth century. Mrs. Harcourt's Emigrant Hotel in Liverpool was visibly geared towards foreign passengers as advertised on its exterior by the foreign spelling of the name Gothenburg.⁷⁰ On the

⁶⁵ Chart 3.9.

⁶⁶ Taylor, *The Distant Magnet*, p. 152. The diverse nationalities of those staying at Liverpool's lodging houses are highlighted in the various census between 1851 and 1901. See, for example, the *1881 Census CD-Rom*.

⁶⁷ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-Rom*, 'Diary of Thomas Sleight' (August 1886).

⁶⁸ The difference between the services of different steamship operators was highlighted in *BPP*, 'Reports received by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board relating to the transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull' (1882), p. 9. In the latter instance all Liverpool-based steamship companies - except for the Guion Line - catered for the catering needs of transmigrants at Hull within the price of their ticket.

⁶⁹ *1881 Census CD-Rom*; Southampton City Archives, 'Emigrants' Home. Calculations of materials for the above in 1894, D/LBI/15'.

morning of departure the transmigrants and their luggage were carried to the awaiting vessel on horse-drawn wagonettes like the one owned by Cunard and reproduced in Figure 4.3.⁷¹

Figure 4.3. Emigrants leaving Liverpool's lodging-houses for the Cunarder *Lucania* (1895)



Source: Taylor, *The Distant Magnet*, op. p.152.

In Liverpool Atlantic vessels were moored at berths within her extensive network of enclosed docks managed by the Merseyside Dock and Harbour Board until the day of embarkation. As the century progressed and vessels increased in size and width as the century progressed, deeper docks were required. The facilities typically centred on

⁷⁰ Image from the collections of the University of Liverpool's Archives & Special Collections, Cunard Archives. Display at the MMM's exhibition 'From Liverpool to New York: The Only Way to Go' (August 2005).

⁷¹ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-Rom*, 'Autobiography of James Ririe' (1853).

Langton Dock for Cunard, Waterloo Dock for White Star, Alexandra Dock for Inman, or the Sandon (and later Alexandra) Dock for Guion.⁷² They opened into the River Mersey, a tidal estuary like the Thames and Humber, but passengers arriving close to the point of embarkation could also board the great liners via tender, or by the purpose-built landing stage. In Glasgow the Anchor Line based its operations around Yorkhill Quay – which was reached by use of a tender from the Broomielaw landing stage. The latter was situated within the heart of the City and close to the main railway stations. It often obviated the need for port-based lodgings, so long as vessels arriving at east coast ports could be scheduled to arrive around the time vessels sailing from the Clyde were ready to embark. Alternatively passengers could board their vessel, again by use of tender, at Greenock – a far deeper navigation and linked to Glasgow by the Glasgow, Paisley and Greenock Railway which opened in 1841. A similar process took place at Southampton; the main advantage of the latter port being that its four high tides per day facilitated greater ocean liner access and that the landing stage was purposely situated at the end of the direct rail link to London. As with points of entry, specially-built facilities – pontoons, landing stages and enclosed docks – facilitated the transmigrants' departure from Britain. Those involved with the trade were able to utilise other migrant and passenger facilities when developing the transmigrant business.

4.4 The departure from Britain

The departure from Britain was predominantly aboard sailing ships throughout the period 1836 to 1870. Even though Inman had developed third-class berths on the steam-propelled *City of Glasgow* in 1850, most transmigrants could not afford to use such vessels and few of Inman's rivals converted to steam propulsion quickly. Whilst vessels such as the *Savannah* and *Royal William* provided transatlantic steamship travel as early as 1819 and 1833, it would only be with Brunel's *Great Western*, launched in 1838, that regular transatlantic passages were completed under steam.⁷³ Even then, such services were restricted to first-class passengers. Despite operators such as Edward Collins

⁷² MMM, *Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry* (1840-1914).


⁷³ Lee, *The Blue Riband*, pp. 6, 8, 19.

finding that it was uneconomic to base their transatlantic operations entirely on transporting first-class clientele, third-class passenger travel was limited. Until the late 1860s, transmigrants were prevented from travelling in such faster vessels by their limited economic means.

The shipping provided for the Atlantic crossing was supplied, prior to the United States Civil War (1861-1865), predominantly by vessels registered in the United States; those to other transoceanic countries were provided by British owned vessels. William Inman, a British operator, represented a shift in the transmigrant business that became more apparent after the end of the US Civil War. British operators on all legs of the route increasingly owned the passenger ships conveying aliens out of Liverpool. As shown in Chart 4.3, these were increasingly steam propelled ships, following the lead of Inman's *City of Glasgow*. He was followed by Guion, Cunard, and then White Star. By 1870 few passengers were conveyed by sail. At the same time the US merchant marine had been replaced by predominantly British companies who recognised the benefits of providing affordable steerage travel on steam-powered vessels. The costs associated with oceanic travel dropped significantly as steam replaced sail powered vessels. Prices for transatlantic third-class berths dropped from between £5 5s and £6 6s in 1864 to just £2 in 1894.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ BPP, *Twenty-fourth General Report of the Emigration Commissioners* (1864), p. 16; BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom in the year 1894* (1895), p. 12.

Chart 4.3. The decreasing use of sail powered vessels by steerage passengers, 1864-1869




Source: Friedrich Kapp, *Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration of the State of New York* (New York, 1870), p. 241.

The quicker journey experienced on the North Atlantic crossing was followed by the gradual development of steamship travel on other oceanic voyages. Steam had replaced sail on all South Atlantic voyages by the mid-1880s – facilitating alternative transmigrant routes to Southern Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Australasia. For transmigrants such innovations significantly reduced the time taken to migrate from Northern Europe to various transoceanic destinations. The overall length of time involved in gathering Scandinavian Mormon emigrants to and from Liverpool, as shown in Chart 4.4, replicated the changing state of transmigration for other European nationals. The transmigrant journey averaged between 60 and 88 days during the early 1850s. By the 1870s this had been reduced to an average of 18 days.⁷⁵ Improvements in particular features of the journey had seen the European leg almost eradicated, the period of time traversing the North Sea falling from 20 days in 1852 to 3 days in 1860, the stay in

⁷⁵ Chart 4.4.

Britain being reduced from a few weeks to less than 7 days, and the Atlantic journey declining from 50 days to around 11 days by 1870. Such patterns would not have been confined to Mormon transmigration as exemplified by the timings agreed in later tickets (shown in Appendix 3.4).

Chart 4.4. The length of time involved in transmigrating from European to the United States, 1853-1890



Source: *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, 1999); LDS Family History Library, *Scandinavian LDS Emigration Records*, film number 025696 (1872–1890); Sonne, *Saints on the Seas*; Jenson, *History of the Scandinavian Mission*; LSL, Customs Bills of Entry (1852-1890); HCA, Customs Bills of Entry, WB/432-699 (1852-1857); GCL, Grimsby newspapers (1852-1890). All of the Scandinavian Mormon emigrants transmigrated through Britain except for those travelling in 1862, 1865 and 1866 who sailed via German ports.

Speedy transit through Britain helped to British companies to maintain their involvement in an increasingly competitive, and globalised, market. After 1907, though the levels of total European emigration declined, the transmigrant experienced a fully

integrated service throughout Britain and Europe.⁷⁶ The train journey across Britain had been reduced to around four hours.⁷⁷ Europeans travelling through Britain also choose to travel via Southampton as much as Liverpool or Glasgow as operators formerly working from Liverpool – White Star – developed Southampton as an alternative centre for the transmigrant trade.⁷⁸ By 1907 even the third-class transmigrant travelling through Britain experienced a level of comfort previously only enjoyed by the better class of passenger. Such travel was not without cost – but such expenditure had to be borne by British firms in order to maintain the share of European migration that they had enjoyed since 1850 when the first transmigrants began to travel in any great number through Britain.

4.5 Conclusion

The transmigrant trade evolved out of the need of poor German emigrants to travel in an affordable and quick manner. Market forces drove the business in the 1840s as much as on the eve of the First World War. By the late 1860s the trade had emerged as an important source of income for both the providers of transmigrant shipping and rail transport. The trade focussed upon the successful working of three functions – shipping, railway and agency. Transmigration evolved constantly as Europe's trans-continental transport systems evolved. To keep abreast of the market forces transport companies had constantly to maintain the quickest and later the most integrated transport system. Such improvements in speed were matched only by the increased demands placed upon them by larger numbers of people wanting to emigrate from Europe. As the scale of transmigration grew, the number of shipping, railway and emigration agents facilitating such movements declined. The large sums of capital needed to fund such transport systems, coupled with the effects of trade agreements, saw the trade monopolised by a few key operators. The route from Gothenburg to the Humber, the Humber ports to

⁷⁶ Colin Reed, Colin Reed, *Gateway to the West. A History of Riverside Station Liverpool. MD & HB - LNWR* (Winchester, 1992), pp. 1-3; *Hull Daily News*, 13 July 1908, p. 4, 'New Development. Hull the Leading Fruit Market'; *Hull Daily Mail*, 13 July 1908, p. 4, 'Holland at Hand. New Service to the Netherlands. Hull As Deep-Water Port'.

⁷⁷ Darlington Railway Centre & Museum, Ken Hoole Collection, K.H. 1124, 'North Eastern Railway: Shipping Interests' (1890-1980). According to Hoole the journey between Hull and Liverpool, in 1903, lasted between 3 hours and 57 minutes and 4 hours and 3 minutes.

Liverpool, and then Liverpool to New York, enabled millions of Scandinavians to reach continental North America. Thousands of others would be encouraged to migrate via Libau to Hull or London, and then either to North America via Liverpool or South Africa via Southampton. The three arteries formed the dominant part of the trade as British companies faced commercial rivalry from their European counterparts. The forces that conditioned the trade – in Europe, in Britain, and in the transoceanic countries to which the migrants were bound – all determined the fortunes of the business. Such factors, as well as those pushing or pulling European transmigrants, will now be discussed.

⁷⁸ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 102.

5. Determinants conditioning the market

As Europe evolved industrially, a multitude of demands were placed upon those living within her cognate states. Social, economic, and political factors all compounded the impoverished existence of her working classes. Exposure to such conditions in both periodic and geographic concentrations encouraged mass migration. At such times, rates of emigration grew to such macro proportions that many Europeans travelled to Britain in order to secure speedy passage to opportunities manifest in North America. In other periods, they came because British shipping companies were able to undercut the price of transoceanic travel – thereby enabling even the most impoverished to reach new opportunities abroad.

This chapter addresses the reasons why Germans, Scandinavians, and those emanating from Imperial Russia used the indirect emigration route via Britain. Having detailed the factors conditioning emigration generally and transmigration specifically, it then addresses the reasons which lured migrants to particular transoceanic destinations. Acute population pressures perpetuated the supply of transmigrant operations via Britain throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite heavy competition from rival companies operating out of continental ports the transmigrant business flourished – to the benefit of Britain’s merchant marine. Having discussed what demographers commonly refer to as push and pull factors the chapter concludes by describing how European, British, and transoceanic states intervened in the business. As will become evident, such factors conditioned and determined many of the salient features of the market, affecting rates of indirect migration via British ports more than has previously been acknowledged within the current literature.

5.1 Supply and demand

With waves of transoceanic migration centring firmly on the Atlantic, merchant fleets plying the routes between Europe and a plethora of overseas destinations collectively reduced some of the population pressures that social, political, and economic upheavals sweeping Europe had. The potato famine in Ireland, crofter clearances in Scotland, and agricultural (and later industrial) depressions in England provided shipping operators working out of British ports with sufficient demand to develop scheduled passenger

services. Acute socio-economic dislocation in Britain and Ireland thereby laid the foundations for the emerging transmigrant market. As population pressures swept across continental Europe the response of merchant fleets providing passenger services from British ports determined the continued growth of the trade through Britain.¹ By the late 1840s services established for domestic demand were increasingly meeting the needs of European passengers seeking to migrate to transoceanic destinations. Innovation, evolution, and adaptation within the trade facilitated the unabated growth in demand for indirect migration. The adaptation of the trade was most significantly felt by the demands placed upon it by those leaving firstly Germany, secondly Scandinavia, and finally by Imperial Russia. In the words of Brinley Thomas, ‘the Atlantic community could be described in terms of two frontiers – the ever-widening frontier of surplus population in the Old World and the moving frontier, of economic opportunity in the New’.² Connecting the two would be an emerging transport network that was both accessible and affordable to an increasingly mobile Europe public.

5.1.1 Germany

German emigration, a constant feature of nineteenth century population flows, reached new heights early in the nineteenth century. Like those leaving Britain and Ireland, the emigrants leaving Germany joined a sizeable foreign-born community already established overseas. Mass emigration from Germany occurred for a combination of reasons: the diffusion of information promoted opportunities abroad; potato blight having devastating effect in 1846 and 1847; a failed social revolution which left land workers significantly economically disadvantaged in 1848; and Europe’s expanding railway network facilitating both internal and external mobility. Collectively these factors increased the rate of German emigration to unprecedented highs in 1845, 1847, and 1854. Only when it reached the levels evident between the latter two peaks did the rate of emigration exceed the capabilities of German, French, and Dutch merchant fleets to meet customer demand. Despite Germany’s merchant fleet responding to the surge by

¹ Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, 1954), p. 224.

² *Ibid.*

increasing the regularity of their operations, commissioning more vessels, and fitting out ships to maximise the number of steerage passengers they could hold, the fleets failed to supply sufficient shipping tonnage to meet demand. Delays in the construction of new ships – coupled with the loss of existing vessels in quick succession during the 1850s – meant that other maritime nations siphoned off a significant slice of the German emigrant market.

Those leaving Southeast and Southwest Germany, particularly the states of Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, and Saxony, came from agricultural backgrounds. Most were described as small farm owners and farm workers. The regions were particularly affected by the social and economic unrest following a failed attempt to revolutionise inheritance and land-owning rights during 1848. The revolution had been brought about by the potato blight that swept the country during the previous year. Most, however, as Theodore Hamerow noted, were ‘escaping poverty and famine, not the executioner or the jailer’.³ For politically and socially-driven migrants, cost was a central determinant when emigration agents approached them promoting their services.⁴ Taking the indirect route via Britain was both a cheaper and quicker form of emigration. Limited access to the expanding German railway network further determined why so many agrarian workers sailed via Britain rather than using direct emigrant routes from Bremen and Hamburg. The route via Britain was particularly influential when German emigration was at its height. Britain carried the surplus trade that companies operating out of Le Havre, Antwerp, Bremen, and Hamburg could not provide. The availability of transmigrant shipping was therefore an important pull factor when determining patterns of German emigration.

Transmigration from southern Germany typically comprised small groups rather than individuals.⁵ Agents working throughout Southern Germany ensured such migrants

³ Theodore Hamerow, *Reformation, Revolution, Reaction* (Princeton, 1966), p. 82.

⁴ Wolfgang Köllman & Peter Marschalck, ‘German Emigration to the United States’, in Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn, *Perspectives in American History* (Cambridge, 1973), Volume VII, p. 503.

⁵ TNA, HO 3/1-120, ‘Aliens Act 1836: Returns and Papers’ (1836-1869). See the details of passengers included in the List of Aliens for passengers arriving on the *Batavier*.

already possessed tickets to reach transoceanic destinations before they even arrived at a European port of embarkation. The agents worked for British-based companies, led by Barings of London, and provided a far more integrated level of service than many of their continental rivals. By equipping passengers with a single ticket – providing all of the migrants’ travel needs from Frankfurt to Rotterdam, Rotterdam to London, and thence London to New York – they persuaded more than 40,000 transmigrants to travel via Britain during the four-year period 1852-1855. The organisation and integration of travel ensured that their stay in Frankfurt, Rotterdam, and London was kept to a minimum. Agents representing British companies pro-actively widened the frontiers of the British emigrant business by shifting the point of sale from the port-city to the migrants’ home.

Those leaving central and northern Germany, by contrast, mainly comprised mechanics and tradesmen, or ‘background[s] where trades combined with agriculture’. They mainly emanated from urban areas in Posen, Mecklenburg, Hanover, and Schleswig-Holstein.⁶ Unlike their southern counterparts, they took advantage of the expanding cross-country railway network to advance their economic opportunities by relocating abroad. Improved transport networks centred on linking the hinterland of northern Germany with her expanding port-cities – Hamburg and Bremen.⁷ As a report for the British Emigration Commissioners, noted ‘the emigrants despatched from Hamburg were chiefly natives of Northern and Central Germany. Prussia [in 1858] sent out 8,253 emigrants, Mecklenburg 2,502, Denmark and the Danish Duchies 1,910, Saxony and the Saxon Duchies 755, Hanover 770, the two Hesses 1,104, & c.’⁸ The push factors encouraging their movement were predominantly economic – transport apparent from industrial expansion and the emergence of proto-industrial skills enabling migrants from one region of industrialising Europe to relocate to an equivalent region in America.

Because steamers operating the routes to Britain ran on a scheduled basis, the North German transmigrants could embark on a train to Hamburg or Bremen just prior to the departure of feeder vessels to Britain. Improved transport on both land and sea thus

⁶ Walter Kamphoefner, Wolfgang Helbich, & Ulrike Sommer (eds.), *News from the Land of Freedom – German Immigrants Write Home* (London, 1991), p. 7.

⁷ BPP, *Seventeenth General Report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners*, p. 167.

⁸ BPP, *Nineteenth General Report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners*, p. 116.

obviated the costs associated with a stay in port-based lodgings. Like their agricultural counterparts who travelled via Frankfurt, Rotterdam, and London, they travelled on a single prepaid ticket. Word of mouth, letters home, and improvements in the American transport network had facilitated the settlement of the America's mid-west and eastern seaboard. Gold-seekers arriving during the 1849 Californian Gold Rush further inspired German settlement along the west coast of America. Unlike German agricultural migrants, the German travelling from northern Germany settled new areas in of mid-west and western America – especially around Wisconsin.

As economic conditions in northern Germany improved, particularly with the industrial expansion of the Ruhr, demand for transmigrant travel lessened. At the same time the country to which they were bound showed signs of economic uncertainty. Factors precipitating emigration therefore lessened as the development of America's agriculture expansion along her mid-eastern seaboard, and mid-west states such as Wisconsin, Missouri, and Texas, reached its zenith. During the late 1850s after a decade of heavy German emigration, and thus transmigration, the flows began to decline. As a contemporary report lamented:

The cause of the great falling off in the emigration from Germany during the last year cannot at present be assigned with certainty. The strict precautions taken by the United States government to prevent pauper emigrants proceeding into the interior have no doubt tended to check the influx into that country, and the German States have always rather discouraged emigration than otherwise. Still, in a year like 1858, succeeding as it did the monetary crisis of December 1857, which had the effect of paralyzing trade and throwing great numbers of workmen out of employment, it might have been expected that the extent of emigration would have been rather above than below that of average years. Possibly the receipt of unfavourable reports from America, describing the injurious effects of the commercial crisis in that country, has rather frightened the class of people in Germany by whom emigration is chiefly resorted to.⁹

By 1858 those leaving Germany's leading emigrant port – Bremen – made the journey by steam. The conversion of travel from sail to steam reduced the Atlantic crossing between Germany and New York from 40.5 days to 15 days and 15 hours. The expansion and development of the country's merchant marine further reduced the

⁹ BPP, *Nineteenth General Report of the Colonial Land & Emigration Commissioners*, p. 115.

necessity for indirect migration.¹⁰ The rate of emigration came to an abrupt halt with the outbreak of the American Civil War as the political state of the country negated any lustre it once had. With the end of the war in 1864 the trade again resumed. As German ports provided direct steamship services to the United States, those continuing to arrive in Britain only did so because of one factor – cost. British companies constantly undercut the price of the service provided by their German rivals. This factor sustained a flow of Germans using British transmigrant passenger services during the late 1860s, 1870s, and early 1880s. It would also be used to encourage those from other parts of Europe to follow the German example and to emigrate via Britain.

5.1.2 Scandinavia

As famine, the root cause of both the Irish and German migrant flows through Britain, spread across Europe, emigrants from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland began to emigrate *en masse*. Scandinavian emigration was predominantly economically inspired, and demand to leave Nordic Europe intensified during the second half of the nineteenth century. Only a small proportion of Scandinavian emigrants reached North America via the limited services of Swedish and Norwegian sailing ships. Instead, her working-class men, women, and children had no choice but to emigrate via German or British ports. Whilst the route via Germany was important, and direct services from Denmark commenced in 1879, both German and Scandinavian shipping companies failed to encroach upon the dominant position that Britain established on travel from Scandinavia by the end of the US Civil War.¹¹ Even transport from Iceland, the European country geographically closest to continental North America, still necessitated the use of the indirect route through Britain.¹² Collectively the region became a major component of the British passenger market from the 1860s until the outbreak of the First World War.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 116-7.

¹¹ Lovoll, 'For the People who are not in a Hurry', p. 38.

¹² Helgi Skúli Kjartansson, 'Emigrant fares and emigration from Iceland to North America, 1874-1893', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, Volume XXVIII, Number 1 (1980), pp. 53-71.

Passengers were both pushed by conditions at home and lured by widely-promoted opportunities abroad.

Those leaving came predominantly from backgrounds in agriculture, mining, or forestry occupations. The encouragement to leave was brought about by massive population increase. As with other people-exporting nations of the time, this was particularly manifest during periods of harvest failure. Such pressures were particularly evident across large parts of Scandinavia in 1866, 1867, and 1868, and they precipitated the first wave of mass migration in the mid-1860s. Economic conditions deteriorated alongside rapid population increase caused by decreasing death rates coupled with a growth in birth rates. More mouths lived off declining yields from smaller acres of land. Agriculture was in crisis, as Ljungmark summarised:

The population increase created a growing group of non-landowners in the rural areas, an agricultural proletariat of farm-hands, crofters, and others. There just hadn't been enough land. At the same time, the landowners' lot were reduced because of the splitting of the homesteads due to inheritance, sale, etc. For the non-landowners, whose situation was worsened because of the low agricultural wages, and for the small farmers with unprofitable farms, there was actually only one way to solve the problem: leave the rural area.¹³

Whilst some sought alternative employment by moving from agricultural districts to urban settlements, rapid urbanisation did not resolve the difficulties facing Scandinavians. Like their British and German counterparts, internal migration only provided limited economic opportunities. Whilst many moved in stages – from the countryside to the town, before subsequently re-migrating abroad – invariably, as the famine engulfed most of Scandinavia, the only choice available to them was to emigrate.

The widespread demand for transoceanic travel opened up new opportunities for the providers of shipping as well as for those seeking to be conveyed. As Charlotte Erickson described:

¹³ Lars Ljungmark, *For Sale – Minnesota: Organized Promotion of Scandinavian Immigration 1866-1873* (Stockholm, 1971), p. 5.

Before 1864, steamship companies did not advertise in the rural press of Sweden. They depended largely upon emigrant companies and private individuals to bring them business. But by 1867, their advertisements began to appear regularly and in large quantities in Swedish and Norwegian newspapers. By 1870, six different lines were competing for the Scandinavian traffic.¹⁴

As each pressure surfaced, different companies and the agents representing them developed aggressive advertising campaigns as they vied for a share of the market. Each Nordic region witnessed similar conditions to those apparent in Sweden. In Norway population increase was mirrored by the decreasing opportunities possible from an even smaller area of agricultural land. The mountainous terrain of Norway offered farmers little room for agricultural expansion. Only a small part of the country could be cultivated, and a significant proportion of that was forest. Faced with the meagre opportunities offered by fishing, mining, or the timber industries, they joined their Swedish counterparts and migrated to the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada. 'American fever' swept Scandinavia. As Qualey noted: 'The drain upon [the] population was so great that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century Norway retained only forty-six per cent of its natural increase – less than one-half'.¹⁵ She proportionally lost more people than any other European nation during the period of the Great Migration. Yet population growth was not abated. The continued push of population pressures sustained emigration flows. As the supply of migrant shipping was dominated by British companies, and in particular by the Wilson Line of Hull, it sustained rates of transmigration via Britain along the latter company's routes from Trondheim, Oslo, Bergen, Gothenburg, and Malmo to Hull.

Factors compelling Scandinavians to migrate were not only restricted to purely economic concerns. Religion, especially growing religious dissent from the Lutheran Church, and a requirement for the performance of military service, furthered demand for emigration. The outflow reached phenomenal proportions in 1872, 1882, and 1902.¹⁶ Although emigration was discouraged by the state church, thousands of converts continued to seek religious toleration by emigrating. Accounts of the suffering to which

¹⁴ Erickson, *American Industry and the European Immigrant*, pp. 77-78.

¹⁵ Carlton Qualey, *Norwegian Settlement in the United States* (New York, 1970), p. 4.

¹⁶ Blegen, *Norwegian Migration to America, 1825-1860*, pp. 158-9.

nonconformists were exposed – including physically violent attacks in the instance of Quakers and Mormons – helped them to resolve the often complex decision to seek a new life abroad. Such actions were encouraged both by members of their faith who had already emigrated and by those who came to Scandinavia to proselytise their American faiths. This was particularly apparent with the introduction of Mormonism to Scandinavia in 1851.¹⁷ Unlike the celebrated embarkation of the sloop *Restauration* in 1825 – carrying religious dissenters from Norway to North America – the religiously inspired emigrants, like their other counterparts, reached their American Zion via Britain.¹⁸

For the 23,049 Scandinavian Mormons who transmigrated to America's west between 1852 and 1890, the theocracy, later the state of Utah, offered virgin territory in an under-populated region of America.¹⁹ There they were free both to practise their religion and to establish a Mormon-American life – alongside one hundred thousand members of their Church who also converted and emigrated. Despite the disadvantages associated with the handcart trails needed to reach the American west (before the opening of the transcontinental railway in 1869), Scandinavian Mormon emigrants lived and practised their faith in a state established and dominated by their theological mantra. Religiously inspired migration was typically directed from one area of Europe to one region of America. Danish Mormon transmigrants thus represented ten per cent of all those living in Utah. Towns such as Manti were established by the arrival in Utah of 290 Danish transmigrants who had previously landed as a single group in Hull before travelling to Liverpool, St. Louis, and then Salt Lake City. Upon arrival in Salt Lake City, they were directed by the Church's leader to establish a new settlement in Manti.²⁰ Mormon converts were assisted by language lessons prior to emigrating, access to loans

¹⁷ Woods & Evans, 'Latter-day Saint Scandinavian Migration through Hull', pp. 78-79.

¹⁸ Semmingsen, *Norway to America*, pp. 10-19, 32-36.

¹⁹ Lindberg, *The Background of Swedish Emigration*, p. 43.

²⁰ 290 of the 293 transmigrants arriving in such on board the *Lion* which arrived at Hull in December 1852 founded Manti (in southern Utah) when they arrived in Utah nearly a year later. (Source: *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM*.)

for the cost of their travel under the Church's Perpetual Emigrating Fund, and guidance from Church Elders or Missionaries who shepherded the converts' journey from start to finish. As the Mormon emigrant system was centralised around Liverpool, it necessitated transmigration through Britain and helped to maintain an important flow of Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian transmigrants along the Humber to Mersey migrant route. Religion thus served as both a push and pull factor. It furthered the escalating rates of Scandinavian transmigration through Britain and partially negated the impact of both the US Civil War and economic crises.

America offered far more than just religious freedom. Such pull factors were widely promoted after 1862 by various individuals, companies, and political bodies. Companies, such as the Quincy Mining Company, sent agents to encourage skilled workers to move to the Franklin, Pewabic, Houghton, and Hancock mines at Michigan in 1864.²¹ Despite costs favouring the direct option they had to accept that the indirect option, when demand for emigrant services generally was too great. In an example shown in a letter dated 16 September 1864, the decision to send emigrant miners via the Inman Line's services from Liverpool was made for predominantly fiscal reasons: 'Forty young Swedes to be sent from Hamburg to Liverpool as it is cheaper 'just at this moment'. They also go faster and get to N[ew] Y[ork] sooner than to wait for the next steamer from Hamburg'.²² Contract labour, common throughout the 1870s and 1880s, permitted migrants to work off the costs associated with their travel upon arrival in the United States – allowing even the most impoverished to reach the land of opportunity. As the indirect route via Britain was cheaper, such contracts favoured this path. The availability and affordability of travel therefore presented one of the most enduring pull factors to impoverished Scandinavians.

Selling the opportunities of life in America became an important push factor following the passing of the Homestead Act of 1862. The Act provided 160 acres of free farmland to settlers. For those from Scandinavia, equipped with the skills but not the opportunities, it became a significant factor that heralded unprecedented waves of

²¹ University of Michigan, Bentley Historical Library, 'Office of the Quincy Mining Company, Benjamin Tefft Letter book' (1864).

²² *Ibid*, 'Letter from Henry Tefft to Charles Emery of the Mining Company'.

Scandinavian emigration. Federal agencies, specific states, particular industries, and U.S. railway companies turned the propaganda campaign into a specialised industry. At its heart lay the ability of workers in Scandinavia to reach land in America's northern interior states – Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Kansas, Nebraska, and in particular Minnesota. Connecting the two were transport companies; their foci remained cemented on the route via Britain. In addition, emerging urban settlements in America also provided urban and industrial opportunities for thousands of Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes. The correlation between the rate of Scandinavian emigration and rising opportunities in America went hand in hand.²³ As with emigration from Scotland, the outflow from Norway remained high even when they had both reached a degree of industrialisation.²⁴

The increased use of the steamer on the Atlantic crossing only fuelled the numbers using the indirect route. It was furthered by American railway companies formulating agreements to use the specific services of differing British steamship companies. This perpetuated demand for the indirect route beyond the services of their German rivals. Decreasing travel times across the Atlantic were also assisted by the continued expansion of the domestic railway system in both Europe and America. This was particularly apparent for those leaving Eastern Sweden (and neighbouring Finland) who took steamship travel to Stockholm from where they travelled overland on train to the emigrant port of Gothenburg. As Lindberg noted, Sweden's railway construction began relatively late, it was not until the 1860s that this expansion brought benefits in terms of reduced travel costs for migrants living remotely from ports.²⁵ Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Scandinavia's rates of emigration were thereby conditioned by the availability of transport, as much as the lure of the economic opportunities or population pressures apparent in Scandinavia. Such responses were

²³ Dorothy Thomas, *Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements, 1750-1933* (New York, 1941); Harry Jerome, *Migration and the Business Cycle* (New York, 1926), p. 26.

²⁴ Richard Easterlin, 'Influences on European Overseas Emigration before World War I', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Volume XI (1961), pp. 334-5.

²⁵ Lindberg, *The Background of Swedish Emigration*, p. 15.

mirrored by those beginning to leave via the Baltic during the 1880s as the Malthusian Devil continued to sweep east.

5.1.3 Imperial Russia

When population pressures intensified during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, those living within Imperial Russia also decided to emigrate *en masse*. They did so for a more diverse range of economic, social, and political reasons than their European counterparts. However, those living within Russia were also provided with less opportunity to emigrate directly than anywhere else in Europe. Passenger services via the Baltic remained controlled by British, Danish, Dutch, Belgian, or German merchant fleets, and despite the commencement of direct steamship services by the Russian American Line and Russian Volunteer Fleet (both in 1906), emigrant operations remained focussed on transmigration in order to reach most transoceanic destinations.²⁶ Collectively they represented the second largest source of transmigrant nationals arriving in Britain between 1880 and 1914.

Those transmigrating through Britain came from different parts of Imperial Russia – yet all lived under the rule of one of Europe’s last remaining absolutist monarchies. Before 1892 Finns crossed the border into Sweden or sailed along the short sea route to Stockholm before traversing Sweden on railway. From there they secured passage to Britain on the services developed for Scandinavian transmigration. After 1892, the FÅA commenced scheduled feeder services direct to Hull from Hangö and Åbo, providing Finns with weekly steamer travel to Hull. For those leaving the Duchy of Courland, the Pale of Settlement, or Russia itself, they had a choice of crossing the border into Germany and Austria-Hungary before using the transcontinental railway to access North Sea ports or travelling from a Baltic port. The migrant flows via the Baltic were diverted between two routes in particular: via Libau, Riga, Danzig, and Königsberg to Hamburg, Antwerp, Bremen, Copenhagen, or Rotterdam; or else via Libau, Riga, Hangö, and Åbo to the British ports of London and Hull. Upon arrival in Britain the Russians made the cross country train journey to Atlantic ports facilitating transoceanic services.

²⁶ Noel Bonsor, *North Atlantic Seaway: Volume III* (St. Brelade, Cambridge, 1979), pp. 1346-1357.

Access to such services was significantly improved following the development of rail links such as that between Romny (in the southern half of the Pale of Settlement) and Libau (in Courland). Rail links facilitated internal mobility and enabled migrants to reach key transport arteries with a degree of ease first evident for other Europeans half a century earlier. The transport artery through the Pale of settlement connected key areas of concentrated urban settlement such as Minsk, Vilna, Kiev, and Kovno. Such centres were nodal points on the domestic railway network connecting east and west, north and south. In May 1892 following the expulsion of Jews from Libau, the Baltic was used to facilitate the ‘emigration of a collected number of those unfortunate Jews, who have been forced to leave Libau’.²⁷ When the German port of Hamburg was closed to emigration in 1892, because of the cholera epidemic in Hamburg, Libau emerged as a rival point of European embarkation for transmigration – with shipbrokers forwarding emigrants indirectly via the continental ports of Bremen, Rotterdam, Antwerp, London, and Hull.²⁸ As the port’s navigation did not freeze during the winter, unlike Riga and the Finnish ports, the port-city quickly emerged during the 1890s as Russia’s main transmigrant port. It was assisted by the extensive state-sponsored development of the port – after it became the home to the Russian Baltic Naval fleet.²⁹ Transport links within Russia, across continental Europe, and via the ports of Türku and Libau served as important determinants in explaining transmigration from the region. Large-scale transmigration was particularly apparent from the Ostrobothnia, Vaasa, and Oulu provinces in the Duchy of Finland, from Libau and Riga in the Duchy of Courland, from the Kovno, Minsk, and Vilna Gubernia (provinces) in the Pale of Settlement, and the Volga region of Russia. Exceptional flows, such as those evident in 1880, 1893, 1896, 1902, and 1910 all reflected the access impoverished Russians had to improved transport networks combined with economic considerations.

²⁷ TNA, FO 400/16, ‘Letter books from British Consulate (Libau)’ (1890-1907), Letter from British Vice Consulate (Libau) to the British Consul (Riga) on 6 May 1893.

²⁸ *Ibid*, Letter from British Vice-Consulate (Libau) to the British Consul (Riga) – Emigration of Alien Jews on 25 July 1893.

²⁹ *Ibid*, Letter from British Vice Consulate (Libau) to the British Consul (Riga) – The New Commercial Harbour & Naval Port on 27 July 1893.

The motives for transmigrating via Britain mirrored those of their counterparts who emigrated from Baltic and continental ports. Unlike other Russians, mobility for Jews was heavily restricted under Tsarist rule. After 1882 they were compelled to live within an area of western Russia/eastern Poland known as the Pale of Settlement and could not – as with Finns and other ethnic groups – move to areas from where large-scale migration had already taken place.³⁰ Internal mobility for the Jewish diaspora would not lessen the burden of rapid population growth apparent during the second half of the nineteenth century. As most Jews lived in urban areas and were confined to live within a specified region, their standard of life gradually deteriorated. They were prevented from entering certain professions and only achieved complete social, religious, and economic freedom by emigrating. Western countries therefore acted as economic, social and political magnets to the Jews of the Pale throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Worsening economic conditions pushed Russia's Jews to leave *en masse*.

The Jews were joined by Poles, Slavs, Finns, and other Russians. Rates of Jewish transmigration reflected wider Russian patterns. They were joined by German agricultural migrants who had migrated to the Volga region in southern Russia under the reign of Empress Catherine the Great. They also used the port of Libau to access the transmigrant route to Britain. As the British Vice-Consul in Libau, writing to the British Consul General in Riga, noted in 1893:

Out of the 4,000 emigrants – probably 7 to 800 have been German Colonists from the Volga districts who have owing to the bad harvests of the past 2 or 3 years – suffered considerably – and all are now reduced to such straits that they are obliged to wander to fresh fields and pastures new. These people by reason of their long residence in Russia have almost completely lost their nationality and have little knowledge of their fatherland. It is not to be supposed that the whole number of circa 3000 Jews who have emigrated came from the town of Libau – alone – propaganda have been made in the Interior – and large numbers of Jews have come from all parts to avail of cheap fares to America.³¹

³⁰ Reino Kero, *Migration from Finland to North America in the Years between the United States Civil War and the First World War* (Türku, 1974), pp. 62-3.

³¹ TNA, FO 400/16, 'Letter books from British Consulate (Libau)' (1890-1907), Letter No. 21 from Charles Hill to William Wagstaff – Emigration of Alien Jews on 25 July 1893.

The transport systems equipped all Russians, regardless of religion, with the opportunity to emigrate. Rates of Baltic transmigration reflected the performance of the US economy and demonstrated the underlying importance of economics and not just persecution as the determinant for mass migration. Rates of Russian transmigration were conditioned by both access to the overland route to Britain via Germany, and after 1893 by improved access on ships sailing from Libau, Hangö, Riga, Helsingfors, and Åbo.

Yet availability of transport did not necessarily perpetuate continued demand. Instead improved communications about economic opportunities around the world, by fellow Russians who had already migrated conditioned the exodus. Letters home were as significant in determining rates of emigration as propaganda promulgated by emigration agents. Transmigration, like direct emigration, ultimately remained a personal factor.³² As Colin Holmes described, ‘the decision to emigrate, to leave Russian Poland, even as part of a chain exodus from a village or a town, was ultimately a personal matter ... a compound of emotions, calculations and individual circumstances’.³³ An additionally important tool, the publication of Yiddish or Finnish language newspapers in Russia and abroad, containing articles on travelling, perpetuated this demand.³⁴ Russian emigration took place within a global economy. The side effects of this globalisation would be the rapid diffusion of information about opportunities for workers to transfer their skills overseas. Whilst the United States drew the majority of Russian transmigrants, alternative economic magnets within the wider Atlantic basin, apparent during the mid-1890s and late-1900s, also lured emigrants via Britain.

The transmigrant route to South Africa (via London or Southampton) demonstrated the widening of the Atlantic routes by British shipping companies, thus

³² Kamphoefner, et al, *News from the Land of Freedom*.

³³ Colin Holmes, *John Bull's Island. Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971* (Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 27-28.

³⁴ Paola Sannino, *Wondering and wandering Jews: Images, myth and reality about the modern Western World as reflected in the Yiddish literature and press of late Imperial Russia* (Unpublished Ph.D., University of Belfast, 2004).

enabling transmigrants to opportunities in alternative destinations.³⁵ Whilst America, and then Canada, remained the most popular destinations, transmigration to South Africa became an important additional feature of the trade.³⁶ Unlike transatlantic migration across the North Atlantic it did not take place via continental ports.³⁷ Instead continental ports such as Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, Antwerp, or Libau facilitated indirect flows to London or Hull.³⁸ The features of Russian transmigration were therefore two-fold – predominantly via northern British ports to the United States or Canada, or via southern British ports to South Africa. Like the 18,436 immigrants from ‘Northern Europe’ who settled in Australia between 1860-1891, and 3,000 Germans and 3,500 Scandinavians who arrived in New Zealand between 1871 and 1892, many arrived having transmigrated through Britain where they secured passage on scheduled steamers linking Britain and her Empire.³⁹ British companies developed demand, and maintained supply, of travel to a range of economies situated in the southern hemisphere.⁴⁰

Improved opportunities therefore attracted Russian transmigrants provided with information on economic opportunities via newspapers, agents, or family.⁴¹ The speed of communication heralded closer correlation between opportunities arising in the west and

³⁵ Aubrey Newman, ‘The Union Castle Line and Emigration from Eastern Europe to South Africa’, in Richard Bonney (ed.), University of Leicester, Department of History Occasional Paper Series (2000). [<http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/teaching/papers/newman2.html>].

³⁶ Chart 3.24.

³⁷ Hamburg Emigration Database, [http://www.linktoyourroots.hamburg.de/index/1,2709,JGdlbz0zJG9rPTE5MTA1JHVrPSQ_00.html].

³⁸ Staatsarchiv, Hamburg, ‘Listen Den Indirekten Auswanderer’, VIII/B/1/Film Numbers 13157-13174 (1854-1910); see (for example) the ships that conveyed Jewish transmigrants between European ports and the British ports of Hull, Grimsby, Harwich and London between 1896 and 1914 who were bound for ‘Africa’. (Source: University of Leicester, Department of History, Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter Database.)

³⁹ William Borrie, *Immigration to New Zealand, 1854-1938* (Canberra, 1991), p. 91; Olavi Koivukangas & Charles Westin (eds.), *Scandinavian and European Migration to Australia and New Zealand* (Türku, 1999), pp. 32-38.

⁴⁰ See, for instance, the numerous opportunities promoted by companies such as Thomas Cook who had agents throughout Britain, Europe and transatlantic destinations and promoted the services of differing agents to a variety of transoceanic destinations. (Source: NMM, Ephemera Collections, ‘Cook’s Guides’.)

⁴¹ Kaplan Centre Archives, University of Cape Town, ‘Kaplan Centre Interviews’, BC 949 – especially the evidence provided by Mrs Esther Wilkin.

related increases in transmigrant flows. Some Russians travelled on single tickets; others obtained these at the European point of embarkation.⁴² A further factor in this transmigrant group was the benefits improved communication brought for migrants living in politically charged regions. Here, prepaid travel on a single ticket purchased in the land of opportunity, enabled those living in Russia to leave without the intervention of the country's secret police.⁴³ Therefore travel advice – directing the migrant to collect tickets once they had commenced their travels – encouraged transmigration for would-be Russian emigrants.⁴⁴ Agents based outside of the country of domicile further facilitated mass migration.⁴⁵

The transmigrants emanating from the Baltic also included many who had suffered from political oppression and violence.⁴⁶ Slavs, Russians, Poles, Jews, and Finns all suffered political restrictions under the Tsarist monarchy. As popular protest demanding greater political freedoms became more widespread, the political pressures to emigrate intensified.⁴⁷ It was the degree of politically-motivated violence exacted on the Jews of Russia (referred to as pogroms) which dominated later historiography, contemporary media coverage, and popular memory.⁴⁸ Rates of state-sponsored persecution inflated rates of Russian transmigration through Britain. As correspondence from the Liverpool Commission of the Mansion House Relief Fund noted in 1882,

⁴² Principally at the offices of steamship companies – such as Knie Faulk of Libau.

⁴³ John Klier has found four volumes of material gathered by Imperial Russia's secret police within the former KGB archives in Russia. (Source: private correspondence with John Klier in 2001.)

⁴⁴ Inevitably this also led to problems for those who had been conned into purchasing travel only as far as London. See, for example, the correspondence of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter of London regarding unscrupulous European agents. (Source: Committee of the Jews' Temporary Shelter, 'Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter – Letter book' (1906.))

⁴⁵ Knie Faulk, one of Russia's main emigration agencies, had offices within Russia, at the port of Libau and also Liverpool. Atlantic shipping companies also had Europe-wide networks of agents to facilitate the migrant at each stage in their journey. (Source: NMM, Ephemera Collections, 'Cook's Guides'.)

⁴⁶ TNA FO 400/16, 'Letter books from British Consulate (Libau)' (1890-1907), Letter from the British Vice-Consul in Libau to the HM Consul, Riga – Emigration of Aliens on 1 January 1892.

⁴⁷ Edward Judge, *Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of Pogrom* (New York, 1992).

⁴⁸ The Russian term meant organized massacre.

following the widespread outbreaks of pogroms in Odessa, Kiev, Elizavetgrad, Konotop, Nyezhin, Smyela, Ananayev, and Pereyaslav, the Baltic outflow predominantly arrived in Grimsby and West Hartlepool via Hamburg.⁴⁹ The Regulations on Passports were issued in 1890, which permitted only Jews whose families were registered in the census of 1835 to remain in the Baltic ports of Libau and Riga, also encouraged many to emigrate.⁵⁰ Not unsurprisingly they fled via their own harbours, or were forcibly moved to the Pale of Settlement. Further waves in 1902, 1905, 1906 and particularly the Kishinev pogrom of 1903, took place in the northern half of the Pale of Settlement – closer to the Baltic port of Libau.⁵¹ However, rates of emigration did not always correlate to periods of intensified migration. As Klier noted:

The year 1881 may have been a starting point, but there is no real correlation between pogroms, legislative restrictions and anything like a mass movement. Much is made of the terrible Kishinev pogrom of 1903, but probably a greater impetus was provided by the call-up of military reserves which accompanied the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 (and which provoked a sizeable out-migration by groups such as the so-called ‘Volga Germans’). Emigration continued to swell during the revolutionary years 1904-06, especially when the Counter Revolution acquired a distinctly anti-Semitic hue.⁵²

Whilst the fear of violence may have underpinned such flows, agrarian pressures and the fear of military service encouraged both Jews and non-Jews alike to leave. Fear of political aggression in Russia brought politics to the forefront of factors sending Russian transmigrants to the West.

The impact of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ thereby conditioned the scale and nature of the transmigrant business in 1836 and was still very evident in 1914. Each wave of transmigrants witnessed a corresponding supply of transport facilities and services

⁴⁹ MMM, Emigrant Files DX/607, ‘Persecution of the Jews in Russia – Mansion House Relief Fund (Liverpool Commission)’ (Liverpool 1882), p. 3; *The Times*, ‘Jews in Russia’, 25 May 1881, p. 12.

⁵⁰ TNA, FO 400/16, ‘Letter books from British Consulate (Libau)’ (1890-1907), Letter from the British Vice-Consul in Libau to the HM Consul, Riga – Emigration of Aliens on 1 January 1892.

⁵¹ Martin Gilbert, *The Dent Atlas of Jewish History* (London, 1985), p. 75.

⁵² John Klier, ‘Emigration Mania in Late-Imperial Russia: Legend and Reality’, in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil, *Patterns of Migration* (London, 1996), p. 22.

capable of moving greater swathes of Europeans westward. As the indirect route through Britain surfaced as an alternative travel option to each ethnic and national group of Europeans, transport agencies and their representatives supplied the migrant with travel advice or assistance. They did so to ensure the passengers gathered at one of the four centres of Britain's emigrant passenger operations – Glasgow, Liverpool, London, and Southampton. They used single tickets, often prepaid by relatives who had already migrated. Transport assisted family or kinship reunification as well as providing the impoverished with the possibilities of economic betterment. The lure of the United States continued to draw most European transmigrants. During periods of US economic weakness, parts of Britain's Empire and other foreign countries also lured emigrants to their shores. The process of migration was, however, determined by intervention as much as by the market. Such official regulation, as will now be discussed, grew throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

5.2 Official intervention in the trade

Except for periods of warfare or pandemics of disease, the mass movement of transmigrants never came under the influence of more than national law before or after an individual commenced their journey. The business of transmigration was less prone to the forces of state intervention than either direct emigration or immigration because of the circuitous route taken by such passengers. The movement of migrants via a third nation circumvented many of the national controls introduced during the period 1836-1914 to remedy abuses within the trade. State intervention, where it did occur, was only apparent during the second half of the nineteenth century when the west became increasingly alarmed, and in some instances overburdened, by the effects of unlimited immigration. To comprehend how such measures affected the process of transmigration through Britain, it is thus essential to examine how policies of both 'source' and 'magnet' nations intervened in the business, as well as to show how Britain regulated this particular aspect of maritime commerce.

5.2.1 European intervention

European states in northern, eastern, and central Europe, as the ‘sources’ of Britain’s transmigrant business, reacted in a variety of ways to the exodus of their populations. Prior to departure most migrants had to secure some form of permit, passport, or visa that enabled them to leave their homeland. Exceptions were always evident. Working one’s passage obviated the need for travel documentation and the expense of the journey to Britain. Others crossed political boundaries illegally, having bribed border police. Moreover, 2,903 Rumanian *fussgeyer* worked and walked their way across Europe in 1899 to flee the persecution evident in their home country.⁵³ For most men, and especially women and children, permission to leave a state legally was a long, drawn-out, and costly affair. The laws introduced (and proposed) by various European states during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries conditioned the business of direct and indirect emigration from Europe. Between 1885 and 1910, Scandinavia, followed by Germany, and then Russia, sought only to minimise the abuses associated with the transmigrant trade. Where possible they also diverted such passengers through the services of their own merchant fleets. Whilst Norway and Sweden did not have a protectionist stance on this issue, Britain’s imperial rivals – Germany and Russia – directly intervened in the ‘British trade’ in transmigration for commercial rather than those for the safety of emigrants.

German emigrants came under separate regulations depending on where they had originated. Whilst Prussia had introduced legislation controlling aspects of emigration in 1850, followed by Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Hesse, Saxony, and Hamburg, it was only when legislative bodies controlled port activity that the effects upon the trade were apparent.⁵⁴ Only Prussia commanded sufficient influence to enforce country-wide legislation. Even then the historic privileges enjoyed by the Hansa towns – Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck – gave the main port-cities control over their own affairs. The

⁵³ Gartner, *The Jewish Immigrant in England*, p. 47. Of these 903 arrived in Britain via London and used the services of the Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter. (Source: LJM, Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter, *Fifteenth Annual Report, 1899-1900* (1900), pp. 4-5.)

⁵⁴ Hvidt, *Flight to America*, p. 24.

Bremen Laws of 1832 and 1834 addressed abuses within the trade, and brought great commercial benefit to Bremen – probably because of the investment she had directed towards the construction of a separate port-facility (Bremerhaven) in 1827.⁵⁵ The indirect trade via Hamburg failed to emerge before 1845 because of perceived high costs involved with the Atlantic. As Walker described, ‘early in the century, all groups of *auswanderer* were forbidden to enter [Hamburg]’.⁵⁶ Once the link between Hamburg-Hull-Liverpool emerged, it was, he argued, ‘even harder to control than the direct shipment would have been’.⁵⁷ Although Hamburg eventually introduced legislation comparable to that of Bremen, it was only because the trade from its hinterland was too great for the port to ignore. Policies in Germany, because of the regional nature of politics, meant that rules governing the place of emigration differed from rules apparent in the ports from where her subjects embarked. Political forces thereby conditioned the flows throughout the mid- to late-nineteenth century.

Only when Germany had been unified by Bismarck in 1871 did the Imperial German Government intervene in the trade of European emigration. Unlike previous legislation, which indirectly affected the business, Bismarck’s aggressive, Prussian-led policies targeted *auslander* (foreigners) who migrated via Germany. The measures aimed to defend her commercial interests rather than protecting those passing through Germany. The concerns arose out of contemporary fears about the immigration of hundreds of thousands of *Öst Juden* (East European Jews) each year. Anti-alien sentiment became especially virulent after cholera brought the trade of Hamburg to a virtual standstill in 1892. Russian Jews were widely accused of introducing the pestilence, and links between Jews and the introduction of disease spread.⁵⁸ Even though a great proportion of the trade subsequently sailed to Britain – *en route* to transatlantic destinations provided

⁵⁵ Lars Scholl, ‘New York’s German Suburb: The Creation of the Port of Bremerhaven, 1827-1918’, in Lewis Fischer & Adrian Jarvis, *Research in Maritime History No. 16: Harbours and Havens: Essays in Port History in Honour of Gordon Jackson* (St. Johns, Newfoundland, 1999), pp. 191-211.

⁵⁶ Mack Walker, *Germany and the Emigration, 1816-1885* (Cambridge, 1964), pp. 88-9.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 90.

⁵⁸ CLRO, 565B, ‘Port Sanitary Reports – Special Report on the measures taken to prevent the introduction of cholera into the Port of London’ (1892); *The Times*, 31 August 1892, p. 3, ‘The Cholera’; *The Times*, 17 September 1892, p. 8, ‘The Shadow of The Great Death’.

from Hamburg and Bremen – the business was still considered to be beneficial to the German merchant marine. In particular, it was championed by Albert Ballin, head of the Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG) passenger department from 1886 (and the company's Director General between 1899 until 1918). Such freedom from official intervention came to a dramatic halt in 1892 when cholera not only brought human misery to Hamburg but cost her leading shipping company – HAPAG – over 500,000 marks in lost revenue.⁵⁹ Tentative regulations introduced on 6 May 1892 restricted migrant flows across the German border. A further circular of 8 October 1893 read:

Russian emigrants are prohibited from entering the Prussian monarchy, unless they possess a lawful passport, a ticket to America, and a sufficient sum of money to secure their transportation to their destination in America. Persons over ten years of age must show 400 marks, younger persons 100 marks. The persons, however, who have steamship tickets for one of the German lines are not required to produce any cash.⁶⁰

The Kaiser was keen for the resumption in trade as soon as was commercially possible. But the Prussian-led government imposed conditions in retaliation to the attempts by British and Danish companies to direct flows of transmigrants via Libau – therefore bypassing Germany altogether – during the time Hamburg was closed to emigration.

The German government forced NDL and HAPAG to provide (at their own costs) a network of ten principal control stations along the German-Russian border. An eleventh station in Berlin, centralising the movement of passengers from the principal stations to the Ruhleben railway station, was also constructed. Augmented by other control stations situated on either side of the German-Russian border they inspected the flows of migrants and ensured they did not remain in Germany.⁶¹ The measures

⁵⁹ Hapag-Lloyd AG, 'Jahresbereich der Hamburg-Amerikanischen Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft in Hamburg für die am 1892 stattfindende orderntliche General-Versammlung der Actionaire' (1893), p. 1.

⁶⁰ *Pressisches Ministerialblatt für innere Verwaltung*, 1893, p. 247. Cited in E. Alexander Goldenweiser, 'Laws Regulating the Migration of Russians through Germany', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Volume XXI, Number 3 (May 1897), p. 489.

⁶¹ Zosa Szajkowski, 'Sufferings of Jewish Emigrants to America in Transit through Germany', pp. 106-108. According to Szajkowski the principal stations were located at Bajohren, Eydtkunen, Illowo, Insterburg, Myslowice, Ostrowo, Ottlotschin, Posen, Prostken, and Tilsit.

protected German commerce on two fronts: firstly they checked the medical condition of aliens at the point of entry into Germany; secondly, they forced foreign emigrants arriving at its border to purchase transoceanic travel via German shipping lines. As Goldenweiser said, they were 'treated literally as prisoners of the transportation companies. The trains conveying them to Hamburg or Bremen are escorted by police, and the compartments locked when the train stops at the stations'.⁶² The cholera incident had threatened the long-term expansion of Hamburg's HAPAG because of the financial hazards which unmonitored mass migration presented. Yet the legislation introduced also controlled transit migration through Germany. Though many transmigrants continued to arrive in Britain from German ports, the flow of transmigrants arriving in Britain from German ports was markedly less.

In June 1897 a second piece of legislation, the German Emigration Act, went even further.⁶³ After 1 April 1898 it ensured all emigrants leaving Germany did so aboard German vessels. The only exception to the law was the services of the MS&L on the Hamburg to Grimsby route. The flows via Britain were restricted to key routes – including those via Hull, Grimsby, and London. Vessels conveying transmigrants from Hamburg and Bremen only carried aliens *en route* for ships sailing from Liverpool or Southampton – snubbing the port of Glasgow. As well as centralising the trade on key transit centres, the only British companies granted commercial concessions to transport emigrants from the latter ports were White Star, Cunard, and American.⁶⁴ The law stipulated that passengers were only to be conveyed to Hull or London via the Argo Line, or to Grimsby with the Great Central Railway (GCR). Crucially for the British companies, the transmigrant route to South Africa, controlled by the Union Line and Castle Line, and the Leith, Hull & Hamburg Steam Packet Company to Canada via Hamburg, Leith, and Glasgow – were not included.⁶⁵ Permission to convey alien

⁶² Goldenweiser, 'Laws Regulating the Migration of Russians Through Germany', pp. 490-1.

⁶³ German Emigration Act of 1897, Article 2.

⁶⁴ TNA, FO 64/1489 (1898), 'List of Authorised Emigration Companies and Agents under the Emigration Law of June 9, 1897'.

⁶⁵ NMM, CMC/1/2, 'Castle Mail Packets Company Limited – Council Minute Book', 25 March 1889.

emigrants to Africa was instead awarded to six German lines – NDL, HAPAG, the Wenzel Line, B. Lüdel, Theodor Inchor, and Friedrich Missler.⁶⁶ They were free to collect passengers not only from German ports but any along the route south – including the British port of Southampton.

The law did not mask its ambitions. The German merchant marine had been bolstered by imperial intervention. Complaints by the Castle Line were rejected as they had not been made in the German language. When they were repeated in German they were again dismissed. Germany had used her geographically advantageous position to promote direct emigration from Germany. She protected her commercial interests through the law – unlike Britain, the United States, and Scandinavia who all legislated to protect those who sailed from their ports – as we shall now examine.

Those leaving Norway, Sweden, and Denmark had little opportunity to emigrate directly to the United States and Canada – except for those carried on board the services of the Thingvalla Line. Legislation introduced in Norway (in 1863 and 1867), Denmark (in 1868), and Sweden (in 1869) policed the rights of Scandinavians throughout their ocean voyage. Yet they failed to remedy problems associated with Scandinavian indirect migration – namely protecting those in transit before commenced their transatlantic voyage. The conditions imposed under Scandinavian law only applied to companies conveying emigrants to countries outside Europe. As the majority of those emigrating to the United States and Canada first had to journey via Britain it left them exposed – despite frequent complaints within the Scandinavian press.

In 1885 this policy changed when Swedish law compelled those engaged in shipping Scandinavian emigrants across the North Sea to purchase emigrant bonds to protect emigrants on both the short-sea and long-haul aspects of their journey. The bonds forced the Wilson Line of Hull, which shipped emigrants between Scandinavia and Britain, to purchase 26,000 kronor of Swedish Emigrant Bonds before they were permitted to continue shipping transmigrants.⁶⁷ The British line, like its counterpart the Larsson's emigrant agency, who controlled emigration through other Swedish ports (and

⁶⁶ TNA, FO 64/1489, 'Licenses for Emigrant Ships' (1898).

⁶⁷ BJL, DEW2/39/2, 'Emigrant Agents Securities' (1889-1911).

had to pay 30,000 kronor), forced their Atlantic patrons to sign letters indemnifying them from any losses associated with the emigration of passengers across the Atlantic on an annual basis.⁶⁸ Between 1885 and 1897 Atlantic lines such as Cunard, White Star, Guion, Allan, American, and Dominion each signed documentation releasing the Swedish emigration ‘agent’ from responsibility for the Swedish transmigrants once they had arrived in Britain. The imposition of such measures was resented and yet they also prevented competitors from entering the trade on a seasonal basis – because of the financial commitment in applying for a bond. In doing so the law helped to maintain the supply of transmigrants arriving in Britain whilst elsewhere European shipping companies were opening up many new direct routes from ports such as Trieste, Fiume, Marseilles, and Genoa – further reducing the flow of transmigrants via Britain.

The new emigrant laws in 1885 provided an opportunity for the Wilson Line to consolidate their position as the main carriers of Swedes, but only to stem the challenge of small-scale opposition. Swedish law not only protected Swedish emigration but also Finns and Norwegians embarking via Gothenburg. To the migrants advantage it ensured the cost of the feeder service remained fixed. To the Wilson Line it guaranteed income. This not only maintained the Wilson Line monopoly on passengers but crucially safeguarded the Wilson Line’s lucrative freight earnings. Though other companies shipped freight, and some transported passengers, none could afford the regularity and capacity offered by the Wilson fleet on the Sweden to Britain or Sweden to North American routes. The bonds also made Cunard, White Star, National Line, Allan and Guion lines, who all carried a great share of the Scandinavian market across the Atlantic, reliant upon the Wilson Line to supply all of their passengers from Sweden. Further, although the Swedish Government Bonds effectively gave the Wilson Line a monopoly on the market, only the Thule Line maintained a trade in indirect migrants to London on a fortnightly basis. Only the Larsson’s acquired the expensive bonds required under Swedish Law. They yielded returns from their ‘government bonds’. As shown in Table 5.1 such income represented an investment opportunity.

⁶⁸ Liverpool City Record Office, MD 214, ‘Letter from E.F. Larsson to Messrs. Guion & Co., Liverpool’ (1 July 1885).

Table 5.1. Financial return made by the Wilson Line of Hull on Swedish emigration bonds deposited with the Swedish Government, 1891-1914

Revenue	Value
Income from Atlantic Lines	£2,592
Income from interest on bonds	£24,885
Profit on share sales	£8,382
Gross return on investment	£35,859
Less depreciation on investment	£10,000
Net income from investment	£25,859
Annual rate of return based on net result	£1,077
Annual percentage rate of return on investment	4%

Source: B JL, DEW2/3/37 (1891-1904); DEW2/3/39-41 (1905-1907); DEW2/3/97-103 (1908-1914).

By contrast, emigration from the Baltic States of Finland, Russia, and Poland was unaffected by specific legislation protecting the transmigrant. Instead the business was compounded by the heavy policing of all aspects of the emigration process. Policies controlling the issuing of permits and passports required for emigration posed a serious hindrance to their movement. For young men, and their more adventurous female counterparts, the illegal border crossing enabled them to travel to a European port from where embarkation did not require identity papers. For transmigrants leaving the key Baltic ports of Hangö, Åbo, Riga, or Libau such papers were required – as described in an article by Albert Kinross featuring in the *Pall Mall Magazine* published in 1904.⁶⁹ As these mercantile fleets were foreign and carried emigrants overseas, Russia did not see the need to intervene.

When Russia proposed her own Russian emigration law in 1910, the liberal policing of migrant commerce looked certain to change.⁷⁰ The new law would have affected the trade in all Russian subjects who sailed from ports within the Russian Empire in third class, required all agents to be Russian nationals, a deposit of 50,000 roubles to

⁶⁹ Albert Kinross, 'At Sea with the Alien Immigrant', *Pall Mall Magazine*, Volume XXXIV (September-December, 1904), pp. 126-132; B JL, DEW 8/1, *Wilson Line of Steamers: Handbook of Royal Mail Passenger and Cargo Services: Season 1893* (Hull, 1893), p. 16.

⁷⁰ University of Åbo Archives & Special Collections, Finnish Steamship Company, 'Copy of II E 7997 – Translation from the Russian Emigration Bill' (1910).

be paid as security, the right to transport emigrants from Russian ports was to be controlled by the Minister of Commerce and the Minister of the Interior, and all agents and sub-agents had to be registered. Like Germany, Imperial Russia sought to divert the income from the business towards vessels registered under the Russian flag and to limit the trade to 'approved Russians'. Licenses were to be controlled by government ministers, and Jews were certainly deemed unsuitable to control any aspect of the business. As Oswald Sanderson, Managing Director of the Wilson Line, noted in a letter to the Secretary of the North Atlantic Passenger Conference, the proposed law highlighted significant weaknesses for British companies in the Baltic: 'It is a pity Freyberg [their principal agent in Russia] is of Jewish extraction, it will make negotiations with the Russians in high circles more difficult'.⁷¹ Their fears were further expressed in correspondence between Oswald Sanderson and his brother Harold Sanderson – the Managing Director of the White Star Line:

Undertaking to guarantee Karlsberg's license in all circumstances is far too reaching a stipulation. I would not agree to this when Karlsberg suggested it in the agreement with Forende. What the question really is, is to put perhaps all the steamers under the Russian Flag, and the worst of this, in the name of the Agents. In this way we shall be entirely in their hands, and with the knowledge we have acquired of these Agents through a number of years, we would absolutely not appreciate this position. It would not be in our favour if we co-operated in such a way with a Russian Jewish Firm. Further such a pro-forma transference of tonnage i.e. capital to people which you dare not absolutely rely upon involved always a big risk, and it is difficult to guard against their utilising the laws of the country against you.⁷²

Whether this was the reason for Wilson's 'dispensing with [the services] of Karlsberg, Spiro & Co.' on 4 March 1909 cannot be ascertained.⁷³ But the British companies, knowing their Jewish agents could not adequately protect the company's interests, sought new agents.

⁷¹ B JL, DEW 4/10, 'Old Papers: Notes taken from O(swald) S(anderson's) correspondence (1900-1926), Letter from Oswald Sanderson to Mr. Smyth on 8 February 1910.

⁷² *Ibid*, Letter from Oswald Sanderson to Harold Sanderson on 7 June 1909.

⁷³ *Ibid*, Letter between Oswald Sanderson and Arthur Wilson – Arrangements re. Russian Emigrants to be carried by Wilson dated 4 March 1909, dispensing with Karlsberg, Spiro & Co..

As well as protecting the migrant by guaranteeing the validity of tickets issued under the law and ensuring that the rights of migrants were protected throughout their journey, it also (under clause 23) stipulated ‘the sale of railway tickets to Emigrants to a foreign port is forbidden, as is also the sale of tickets for a journey from this port’.⁷⁴ Perhaps Russia realised others were profiting from the emigrant trade.⁷⁵ Whilst practising state-sponsored anti-Semitism, she did not discourage emigration, provided military service had been fulfilled. After 1910 she evidently sought to profit from the often politically motivated mass migration of her Jewish (and other) subjects. Yet as *The Times* lamented in an article on the subject in 1914, ‘An Emigration Bounty Bill which affects the interests of British Transatlantic lines is again about to be introduced in the Duma. Russian shipping lines are unable to cope with the emigrant traffic. Clandestine emigration is, therefore, on the increase’.⁷⁶ The act was still awaiting approval from the Duma when the First World War broke out.⁷⁷ Unusually British and Danish companies made changes and concessions regarding both their passenger and freight operations before an act had gained Russian parliamentary approval.⁷⁸ As the act was never passed neither the Wilson Line nor DFDS had to make further commercial concessions.

With the expansion of such fleets, third-class passengers represented a vital component whether they had originated from within their own borders or not. Protectionism not only forced British companies to purchase high value bonds as insurance against any losses, but also to divert a greater share of the business into the

⁷⁴ University of Åbo Archives & Special Collections, Finnish Steamship Company, ‘Copy of II E 7997 – Translation from the Russian Emigration Bill’ (1910) – Clause 23.

⁷⁵ Nicholas Evans, ‘The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914’, *Jewish Culture and History*, Volume VII, Numbers 1-2 (Summer/Autumn 2004), pp. 202-7.

⁷⁶ *The Times*, 14 March 1914, p. 7, ‘Russian Emigration’.

⁷⁷ Email correspondence with Dr Vadim Kukshkin (20 March 2006). Information based upon his PhD, ‘Peasants on the Move: Early Twentieth-Century Labour Migration from Russia’s Eastern Frontier to Canada’ (Unpublished Ph.D., Carleton University, 2004), Chapter 3.

⁷⁸ BJL, DEW 4/10, ‘Old Papers: Notes taken from O(swald) S(Anderson’s) correspondence (1900-1926).

hands of European merchant fleets.⁷⁹ Having embarked, the passenger to Britain faced the growing impositions of the British state.

5.2.2 British intervention

Britain's policies regulating the migrant business were essentially Atlantic based. As the scale of British emigration dwarfed that of transmigration, the seven Passenger Acts introduced between 1842 and 1855 improved the conditions for which all passengers embarking from British ports were exposed. During the period 1836 to 1914, such acts were geared towards removing the vices and corrupt business practices associated with the emigrant trade generally. The licensing of emigrant runners, emigrant agents, and passenger brokers; the improved allocation of space per passenger; and the provision of onboard medical assistance, female stewards, and adequate provision of life boats were all part of an attempt at improving the basic standards of the industry. In a period of *laissez-faire* politics, such intervention often only came after the abuses of the business were highlighted by medical practitioners, the police, or through published accounts of emigration. Britain's policy contrasted with that of Germany and Russia; foremost in her mind was the preservation of the dominant role the country had been able to achieve in the transatlantic passenger trade after the demise of the US merchant fleet during the US Civil War. Emigration legislation during the long Nineteenth Century focussed upon revisions to the Merchant Shipping Acts and in particular regulations laid down under the 1894 and 1906 Acts.⁸⁰

Both British and foreign shipowners took advantage of the fact that vessels conveying passengers for 'less than 5 days' did not come under either the British or US Passenger Acts of the 1840s and 1850s. The so-called 'feeder vessels' that plied the short sea routes to Britain remained immune from Britain's interventionist policy on the Atlantic. It left the trade, and particularly her passengers, open to the abuses normally associated with the 'coffin ships' traversing the Atlantic in the 1840s. Overcrowding, inadequate ventilation, and poor sanitary provision, were vices frequently reported to

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ 1894 Merchant Shipping Act (57 & 58 Vict., c. 60); 1906 Merchant Shipping Act (6 Edw. 7, c. 48).

officials policing Britain's points of entry. Local more than central government was left to police the business through the passing of local bylaws and local amendments to national legislation.⁸¹

The diffusion of responsibility to local authorities, via the Local Government Board, was especially evident with the flow of transmigrants arriving at the ports of Hull and London. As the Hull Sanitary Committee heard in 1866, the non-interventionist policy was evident by the self-regulatory nature of the business:

I went on board the 'Hero' before the passengers were landed; I think there would be about 100. The privy arrangements were most disgusting, and a great nuisance; the excrement running down and sticking to the outside of the ship lying close to the quay. I called the attention of the Mate to the nuisance, who said he could not prevent it. When the 'Hero' got to her berth in the Railway Dock, I again went on board, and called the Captain's attention to the disgusting nuisance, the sight of which was calculated to produce sickness, and the stench from which was dreadful. I was told that this batch of Emigrants will remain in Hull until Friday.⁸²

When the ratepayers of Hull petitioned the Local Government Board to investigate the movement of Scandinavian emigrants through the port in 1882, the ensuing report only concluded that 'to interfere too greatly with the business may increase the cost of the North Sea crossing, thus hindering and not benefiting the very passengers the investigation was designed to assist'. By intervening in the trade too greatly the government feared the diversion of traffic via German or Scandinavian ports. It was left to the shipowner, in this instance the Wilson Line, to reduce the negative aspects of the trade. The self-regulatory policy appeared to work, so far as British fleets were concerned. Conditions on board the vessels of the Wilson Line, in particular, were frequently called into question, the owners invited to offer their explanation to the local magistrates' courts, and then the problems were remedied.⁸³

⁸¹ The 1848 Public Health Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 63) was introduced to Hull by Provisional Order in 1851; 1854 Kingston upon Hull Improvement Act (17 & 18 Vict., c. 101).

⁸² HCA, BHH/1/49, 'Minutes of the Kingston upon Hull Urban Sanitary Authority' (1866), p. 125.

⁸³ HCA, TCM 174, 'Minutes of the Kingston upon Hull Town Council', pp. 156, 166; HCA, WHG/1/28, 'Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books', p. 95; WHG/1/34, 'Hull and Goole

As the flow of transmigrants on foreign-owned vessels increased towards the end of the nineteenth century, the need for central government to intervene intensified. Action at a local level was not sufficient to curb the abuses and risks associated with the trade, especially for those arriving in Britain from Russian ports under the Danish flag.⁸⁴ One of the worst features of the latter trade was the shipment of people and goods alongside the movement of livestock, and in particular ponies bound for the Yorkshire coal mines. A revision of the Merchant Shipping Act in 1894 attempted to alleviate the movement of horses in the same part of the cargo hold as third class emigrants, and it aimed at legally restricting the shipowner from ‘over filling’ their ‘cattle ships’ used to convey passengers. Under the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act:

[No cattle] shall be carried below any deck on which emigrants are carried, nor in any adjoining compartments unless separated by watertight bulkheads, and in vessels of less than 500 tons not more than two head of large cattle shall be carried, and in larger vessels one head of large cattle for every additional 200 tons.⁸⁵

As demonstrated through the numerous prosecutions, again made at a local level in the London Magistrates Court, the masters of Danish vessels frequently flouted this part of the British Act. In Hull and London letters of complaint were legally served on the masters of the Danish-owned vessels that continued to flout the legislation.⁸⁶ Denmark and Russia, despite representations via their consular services, did not seek to intervene. The issue of Danish-registered feeder lines was only finally resolved after evidence heard during the 1903 *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* was reprinted in *The Times*.⁸⁷

Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, p. 117; WHG/1/36, ‘Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, pp. 99, 116.

⁸⁴ HCA, WHG/1/27, ‘Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, p. 35, WHG/1/28, ‘Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, p. 95, WHG/1/29, ‘Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, pp. 79-80, WHG/1/30, ‘Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, pp. 78, 108, WHG/1/33, ‘Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, pp. 145-6, WHG/1/34, ‘Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books’, pp. 34, 62, 79.

⁸⁵ CLRO, ‘Port Sanitary Reports’, 565b (1902), p. 32.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 12-16.

⁸⁷ *The Times*, 14 October 1903, p. 12, ‘Alien Immigration – Port Sanitation’.

The constant high standards of the Merchant Shipping and Passenger Acts, enforced through the inspectors of the Board of Trade, were resented by British companies who saw such measures as a hindrance to the competitive well-being of port and maritime commerce. An article in the *Journal of Commerce* celebrating the highest ever volume of passenger trade via the port of Liverpool in 1904 stated such concerns accordingly:

One of the thoughts which come uppermost in reading these large figures is the enormous responsibility which is undertaken by our great shipping lines in conveying this large number of people over the ocean. ... British steamship lines are not alone in this really good, and often thankless, work. The owners of foreign liners and their officials have to be equally energetic and restless in looking after the safety and comfort of the great crowd of emigrants who patronise their vessels. But the British passenger lines have abundance of reason to be dissatisfied with the unfair conditions which are imposed on them by the Board of Trade, for differential treatment which allows German ships, even when they call at ports in this country, to carry 30 per cent per ton more passengers than British ships, has surely only to be pointed out to be condemned. ... The shipping companies have to tolerate such people, and allow them to have their say, but we would suggest that in some cases a partial cure at least for these universal growlers would be a dose of emigration statistics.⁸⁸

The complexities of the inspection of foreign registered vessels – not an issue for freight movements on the short-sea routes – thus impeded the implementation of British law on some ships. Whilst Britain had reduced similar vices on the Atlantic crossing nearly a century earlier, the issue with regard to the European crossing was only resolved under the 1906 Merchant Shipping Act. The 1906 Act not only included all foreign steamships as passenger steamers (as defined under the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act), but also stipulated that all cabin and steerage passengers should not be carried ‘on more than one deck below the water line’ and that the master of every ship carrying passengers to or from Britain had to return detailed information on passengers.⁸⁹ The law forced foreign fleets providing both short sea passenger services (such as DFDS, FÅA, or the Argo Line) and those conveying passengers on long-haul routes (such as HAPAG and

⁸⁸ Read, *Through Liverpool to North America*, p. 4.

⁸⁹ 1906 Merchant Shipping Act (6 Edw. 7, c. 48), Part II – Sections 13 & 16, Part V – Section 76.

NDL), to meet British standards. By 1906 Britain policed all vessels conveying migrants to or from Britain.

The changes that came into force were not only a result of the 1906 Merchant Shipping Act, but also part of the 1905 Aliens Act – a legal response to the popular anti-alienism which had surfaced during the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The issue of whether an alien *en route* to another country via Britain could settle, temporarily or permanently in the country, had caused continual alarm in certain quarters of Britain since the 1880s. In the East End of London, where the impact of unrestricted immigration was most manifest, politicians sought tighter legislation to ensure aliens arriving in Britain were genuinely transmigrants. The threat which the *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* may have had was seen by some, inside and outside of Parliament, as going too far. As Charles Emanuel told the 1903 *Royal Commission*, immigration policies should not hamper the transmigrant aspect of migrant shipping:

I point to the advantage this stream has been to the shipping industry of this country. I refer not to the bringing here of intended settlers (a traffic in the hands of foreign companies), but to the carrying on to their ultimate destination of those who are travelling elsewhere through England ... taking an average fare to be £4, this means an annual receipt of £360,000 from foreigners alone. If this huge traffic is compared with the number annually found to remain here, it will be found to be the proportion of 15 to 1.⁹⁰

Though not desiring to hinder what was seen as a legitimate aspect of the passenger business (i.e. transmigration), they had to ensure that the ultimate destination of European migrants arriving in Britain was overseas and not urban Britain. This was resolved by the third reading of the Aliens Act (in May 1905) in which the legal responsibility for the alien being genuinely transmigrant was placed upon the company that conveyed him or her to Britain.

The majority of aliens arriving in Britain were now all seen to be transmigrant in nature, as was finally reflected in the statistics retained at Britain's ports after 1906. Bonds ensured shipping companies complied with the legislation. The *First Report into the Administration of the Aliens Act* duly noted 13 companies had given security for the

⁹⁰ BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume II, Minutes of Evidence, p. 3, Minute 16632.

movement of transmigrants from the ports of Glasgow, Liverpool, London, Queenstown, and Southampton – as detailed in Table 5.2.⁹¹

Table 5.2. Shipping Companies which gave security for transmigrants under Section 8(1) b of the 1905 Aliens Act.

Company	Ports of departure from United Kingdom
Allan line	Liverpool, Glasgow, and London
Anchor Line (Henderson Brothers)	Glasgow
Anderson and Anderson (Orient Royal Mail)	London
Canadian Pacific Railway Company	Liverpool
Cunard Line	Liverpool
Dominion Line	Liverpool
Donaldson Line	Glasgow
International Navigation Company (American Line)	Liverpool and Southampton
London and South Western Railway Company	Southampton
Oceanic Steam Navigation Company (White Star Line)	Liverpool, London, and Queenstown
Pacific Steam Navigation Company	Liverpool
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company	Southampton
Union Castle Line	London and Southampton

Source: BPP, *Regulations, & c., Made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department with Regard to the Administration of the Aliens Act, 1905* (1906), Part I- Appendix IV, p. 40.

As with distant magnets, the ability to restrict seaborne entry was, by 1914, an aspect of political life which most of the countries to which Europe's migrants were intent on settling had sought to control themselves. Britain's policy of liberalism and free trade had enabled the transmigrant trade both to develop and flourish through the 78 year period following the 1836 Aliens Act. Whilst European states had shown interventionist or nationalist policies, Britain merely ensured most of the aliens arriving at her shores were genuinely transient. Yet the further difficulties of policing the transmigrant

⁹¹ BPP, *Regulations, & c., Made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department with Regard to the Administration of the Aliens Act, 1905* (1906), Part I- Appendix IV, p. 40, 'List of SHIPPING COMPANIES who have given SECURITY for TRANSMIGRANTS under Section 8(1) b of the ALIENS ACT'.

business were also remedied successfully by the intervention from the places where the aliens were bound – the United States, Canada, South Africa, and Oceania.

5.2.3 Transoceanic intervention

The countries to which waves of European immigrants were bound responded in a variety of ways to the transmigrant route via Britain. Most initially encouraged settlement as a means to industrialise, cultivate their territories, or to develop the extraction of their natural resources. As with the responses made by European nations to the exodus of Europe's migrants, so the legislation introduced by those nations to which transmigrants were headed varied. Though the Scandinavian, German, French, and British immigrants were welcome, those beginning to arrive in the late nineteenth century from eastern and southern Europe – Italians, Austrian-Hungarians, Slavs, and Russians – were not. This distinction had become very apparent by the opening decade of the twentieth century as technology and competition had reduced the cost and time needed to complete transoceanic journeys. Such factors facilitated even the poorest alien's one-way voyage. Yet except for Latin America, most destinations had made the decision by the outbreak of the First World War to limit the right of settlement to certain 'desirable' Europeans – namely white, skilled artisans, who had a basic level of literacy and sufficient money to prevent them becoming a burden at the point of entry.

The United States, as the destination for the majority of Europe's emigrants in terms of scale and longevity, had the greatest impact upon the flow of immigrants – direct or indirect. Her policy of receiving unlimited numbers of immigrants prior to 1891 drew even the most financially destitute. New methods were also adopted in policing America's borders – including those *en route* to other countries via her ports. Like those of Britain, they were subsequently adopted (in a revised form) by Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Russia, and Italy. Through such legislation America shielded her immigrants from the abuses associated with the businesses. Despite the passing of acts encouraging immigration first and foremost, she enshrined in law the rights of migrant passengers. Each step in America's agricultural and industrial expansion was, however, marked by contradictions and retractions on the policies which affected the expanding labour force. Her liberal attitude to mass immigration changed rapidly throughout the

mid- to late-nineteenth century as the migration from 'old' Europe was supplanted by that from 'new' Europe (principally central and eastern Europe). Changing attitudes at popular and political levels showed increased vigilance as to whom was deemed suitable. Erickson summed up the confusion, and changing attitudes, to US immigration policy generally:

The movement for the contract labor laws themselves marked the beginning of confused and unrealistic thinking about immigration on the part of the American labor movement. The shift in argument from a practical to a racialist basis which took place during the fight for the Foran Act marked the virtual end of the practical and critical discussions of the immigration question which had been so frequent in the infant labor movement of the previous twenty years. The prejudices which were called in to aid the movement against contract labor, to obtain a limited end, later dominated the views of American labor leadership on the immigration question. If the American labor movement had continued on a broader basis than it in fact did after 1885, perhaps the more constructive policy of regulating immigration according to the nation's needs might have gained stronger support. But such suppositions are both logically and historically unsound. Instead, the American labor movement allowed itself to share the nation's hysterical fears of certain foreigners as causing the problems of American industrial society and has never remodeled or reformed its views on immigration.⁹²

The response to such public and official 'hysteria' was the move from regulation to restriction. Racial overtones evident in some of America's earliest immigrant policies targeted aliens outside the focus of this study – Asians, and in particular the Chinese.⁹³ Prior to 1891 the transmigrant route via Britain was only affected by the increased surveillance of immigration and the improved conditions on board ship.⁹⁴ Concerns about the immigration of the undesirable – criminals, paupers, subversives, and those judged 'immoral' – grew within the decade following the Chinese Exclusion Act and led

⁹² Erickson, *American Industry and the European Immigrant*, p. 186.

⁹³ The Chinese-Exclusion Law of 1882 (22 Stat. L).

⁹⁴ Edward Hutchinson, *Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965* (Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 21-2, 39, 61, 44-6, 106, 114.

to the 1891 Immigration Act which stipulated those who were considered undesirable and which provided criteria by which this could be ascertained.⁹⁵

The legislation affected transmigrant shipping companies because it included a clause to return immediately, those rejected, at the expense of the vessel's owner or agents. If a vessel's return was delayed, the rejected aliens were to be maintained on the owner's account. This requirement particularly aimed at 'persons suffering from loathsome or dangerous contagious disease', passed the responsibility, coupled with the necessary costs, from the state or passenger to the transport company.⁹⁶ With perceived risks increasing due to the conveyance of ever poorer aliens from central and Eastern Europe, including many via Britain, the companies providing such services were compelled to increase their vigilance at the British quayside. This was particularly important to companies working out of British ports because of the growing numbers of Imperial Russia and central European aliens transmigrating through Britain. Such conditions, affecting those in transit, were cemented in the US Immigration Act of 1903 which made it unlawful to transport diseased aliens, when such illness 'might have been detected by means of a competent medical examination', and fined transport companies \$100 per alien.⁹⁷ Increased use of onshore medics along with ships' surgeons helped to halt uncontrolled mass migration.

The regulations also impacted on the British Government in so far as those emigrating indirectly via Britain were to be returned to the port from which they had embarked. Thus, these regulations created both political and financial difficulties for Britain because the rejected aliens who reached Britain still suffering from 'reportable disease' had to be medically isolated and given treatment in Britain. As most transatlantic vessels called into Irish ports, such as Merville and Queenstown *en route* to Glasgow and Liverpool respectively, medical isolation should have taken place there. Nevertheless, diseased aliens received medical assistance only once they had arrived in Glasgow or Liverpool. Regardless of where they disembarked in Britain, their precarious

⁹⁵ Immigration Act of 3 March 1891 (26 Stat. 504).

⁹⁶ Hutchinson, *Legislative History of American Immigration Policy*, p. 417.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 417.

medical conditions placed an additional financial burden on an already over-stretched port-sanitary service.

The rejected alien could also technically settle in Britain after having been rejected as unsuitable by the United States. As the 1910 inquiry into the provision of an immigration reception centre at the port of London noted, it was virtually impossible to return the unwanted aliens to their countries of origin because most had arrived via European ports which were not willing to accept aliens deemed undesirable by the United States and Britain.⁹⁸ As transmigrants were often rejected for being poor (thus, likely to become a public charge) they rarely possessed the funds required to purchase travel to their countries of ultimate origin. Rejected aliens therefore required financial assistance to return to their native homelands.⁹⁹ Whilst Jewish philanthropic agencies often provided this support, many rejected transmigrants actually ended up settling in Britain (even after the 1905 Aliens Act) because of a lack of funds.¹⁰⁰ The 1891 US law thereby created a legal loophole in British immigrant legislation after the introduction of the 1905 Aliens Act. Moreover, often aliens sought the right of asylum prior to re-embarking for Europe and were sometimes eligible to settle in Britain – often a better prospect than returning to their place of origin.¹⁰¹

Finally, the role of US Consular staff in inspecting those destined for the United States also became a further form of official intervention and sometimes prevented the alien actually leaving Britain – often on medical grounds.¹⁰² But the role of European-based consular staff enforced the advanced checking of transmigrants by shipping companies. Increased vigilance on the part of the Atlantic shipping company and US

⁹⁸ BPP, *Report of the Departmental Committee on the Establishment of a Receiving-House for Alien Immigrants at the Port of London (1911)*, Volume I.

⁹⁹ Collins, *Be Well: Jewish Immigrant Health and Welfare in Glasgow, 1860-1914*, pp. 84-66, 97-112.

¹⁰⁰ LJM, *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter*; LMA, *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter*, LMA/4184/02/01/001/01-07 and 002/01-06 (1885-1914).

¹⁰¹ TNA HO 45/10341/139774, 'Aliens: Russian Transmigrants Rejected by U.S.A. - Treatment in U.K. (1906).

¹⁰² Collins, *Be Well*, pp. 84-66, 97-114.

consular staff therefore tightened medical inspections at the point of embarkation.¹⁰³ For transmigrants this invariably took place at a quayside in Liverpool, Southampton, London, or Glasgow.

Those who wished to settle in the United States could, however, circumvent American legislation by accessing the country via Canadian ports.¹⁰⁴ Though the Canadian ports were subject to medical inspection, both before disembarkation commenced and upon arrival, they did not impose the same level of draconian restrictions as her neighbour.¹⁰⁵ British companies dominated the routes to Canadian ports, and the route via Britain and then Canada provided transmigrants suspected of violating US immigrant policy with an important alternative way of accessing the US – in the long term.¹⁰⁶ Those who cleared the Canadian ports were able to journey across the US border via land or river ports – thus reaching places that they might not have accessed via her heavily-policed Atlantic ports. It was a loophole that caused concern for the US Government as late as 1924.¹⁰⁷

Despite being part of one Empire, such loopholes encouraged those self-governing territories to which European transmigrants were bound – Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand – to introduce their own acts at limiting immigration. Natal (in 1896), Australia (in 1901), the Cape Government (in 1902), Canada (in 1906), and New Zealand (in 1908) all restricted the entry of non-British migrants.¹⁰⁸ Yet such

¹⁰³ It helped also helps to explain the appearance of the annotation ‘No Foreigners Except Scandinavians Carried Third Class From Liverpool’ on a poster produced by Canadian Pacific in 1910. (Source: NMM, Ephemera - Canadian Pacific, ‘Canadian Pacific - Liverpool to Quebec and Montreal’.)

¹⁰⁴ Nicholas Evans and Marjory Harper, ‘Socio-economic dislocation and interwar emigration to Canada and the USA: A Scottish snapshot’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XXXIV, Number 4 (December 2006).

¹⁰⁵ *The Times*, 18 September 1907, p. 6, ‘Some Aspects of Canadian Life. I: Immigration’.

¹⁰⁶ The passenger routes to Canada were dominated by Canadian Pacific, Allan and Anchor Lines. Whilst other steamship companies occasionally called into Canadian ports these three lines dominated the routes.

¹⁰⁷ *The Times*, 4 July 1924, ‘U.S. Immigration Confusion’.

¹⁰⁸ Nicholas Evans, ‘Commerce, States and Anti-Alienism: Balancing Britain’s Interests in the Late-Victorian Age’, in Eitan Bar-Yosef & Nadia Valman (eds.), *The ‘Jew’ in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture: Between the East End and East Africa* (London, Forthcoming).

legislation only restricted non-white immigrants.¹⁰⁹ At each stage in the process they all noted the distinction between the immigration of British nationals and those of European origin. Attitudes to race were summed up within a subsequent dispatch of the Governor of the Cape Province to the Foreign Office in 1902: 'the Cape Government evidently wish that no difficulty should be placed in the way of the immigration into the Colony of a certain class viz: - British working men, clerks and shepherds, for whom there is great demand'.¹¹⁰ On the issue of Imperial immigration, the empire had no single coherent policy, and this was particularly evident for the movement of transmigrants.

Direct intervention in the trade, and especially the refusal to accept undesirable aliens, by the Colonies, often necessitated the return of unsuitable aliens to Britain.¹¹¹ As with America's unwanted, Britain was compelled to accept undesirable immigrants – even though many would have been rejected as immigrants to Britain after the passing of her own 1905 Aliens Act. The lack of an imperial immigration policy thereby created further tensions between Britain and her Dominions throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹¹² Evidence suggests that so far as the Foreign and Colonial Offices were concerned, British trade should continue to prosper regardless of colonial domestic policies. Yet despite the desire of the British Foreign Office not to hinder this aspect of British trade, as with Britain's own immigration policy, by the eve of the First World War, movement to Canada, South Africa, and Australasia had all become restricted by the intervention of states in the west and south alike. The trade in transmigrants continued unabated, but the burden of such separate legislation fell upon those who prospered from the traffic - the transoceanic steamship company. The fiscal burden borne by Atlantic companies however represented only a small proportion of their

¹⁰⁹ Jeremy Martens, 'A transnational history of immigration restriction: Natal and New South Wales, 1896–97', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XXXIV, Number 3 (September 2006), pp. 323-344.

¹¹⁰ Cape Town State Archives, PMO 84, 'Prime Minister's Office', Letter from Governor of Cape Province to Foreign Office on 6 June 1902.

¹¹¹ BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1889-1913).

¹¹² Evans, 'Commerce, States and Anti-Alienism: Balancing Britain's Interests in the Late-Victorian Age'; Borrie, *Immigration to New Zealand, 1854-1938*, p. 91.

operations.¹¹³ The trade, reliant on ever-larger liners, required increasing numbers of third-class passengers to maintain the profitability of their operations.¹¹⁴ The laws introduced on both sides of the Atlantic to limit the movement of the undesirable inadvertently served as a factor that helped Britain to sustain the level of transmigration through her ports – thus benefiting the business.

5.3 Conclusion

As the revolution in transport, at sea and on land, opened the European mainland to the possibility of permanently settling elsewhere, demand to emigrate outstripped the supply of trains and vessels capable of conveying transmigrants to various transoceanic destinations. Britain, the main exporter of migrants to the United States and parts of the British Empire, facilitated the need of poor Europeans to emigrants by providing them with the affordable indirect transoceanic travel, via Hull, Grimsby, and London from where they re-embarked from the ports of London, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Southampton. Transmigration necessitated a series of journeys. Yet to Europe's poor, for whom time was less important than cost, the indirect option enabled them to reach many destinations at a more affordable price. As competition from European companies intensified, so British operators met the needs of continental emigrants by integrating the various transport systems needed to reach the United States, Canada, South Africa, and Australasia. Integration reduced the abuses to which the emigrants had been exposed in the mid-nineteenth century. As the source of transmigration through Britain changed from the North Sea to the Baltic areas, so the risks associated with the trade changed. Many of those now arriving at a European port of departure or British point of entry were perceived as undesirable.

Western magnets, such as Britain, the United States, Canada, South Africa, and Australia reacted by introducing legislation aimed at restricting immigration. The lands of the free became the lands of selectivity. The desire to leave was challenged by the

¹¹³ Collins demonstrates the significance of such policies, in the context of emigration from the port of Glasgow, in *Be Well*, p. 112.

¹¹⁴ Table 7.10.

demands of the regulator. Britain continued to facilitate ever-larger numbers of transmigrants, yet effectively halted immigration. In the words of Anne Kershen, Britain had ‘closed her door’.¹¹⁵ The United States first restricted the Chinese, before categorizing immigrants according to race and ethnicity in 1898. The British Empire reacted similarly, desiring the addition to its labour market of ‘suitable settlers’ and not just any alien. By the eve of the First World War, the flow of emigrants from Europe had become both regulated and controlled. Some of these measures protected the alien, others the maritime industry of rival European countries. As nationality and ethnicity became more closely defined, the Anglo-Saxon settlements to which European transmigrants journeyed increasingly sought only those considered capable of rapid assimilation and of economic importance. Regardless of the route on which they happened to have travelled, few pieces of legislation directly benefited the passenger. Some, such as the German Emigration Act of 1898, even gave German ports a distinct commercial advantage over their British rivals. As the 1892 cholera epidemic demonstrated the hazards associated with the trade could hamper port-cities situated along the main transmigrant arteries. Such dangers threatened to bring all aspects of seaborne commerce to a halt. Ports normally associated with mercantile dominance – Liverpool, London, or even Hamburg – could be brought to a standstill by the hazards associated with the trade in transmigrants. It is the impact of the trade, and its significance to Britain’s ports, that will now be discussed.

¹¹⁵ Anne Kershen, ‘The 1905 Aliens Act’, p. 13.

6. Ports

In the early nineteenth century British ports enjoyed a period of unprecedented growth and physical expansion. Central to this progression was the heavy investment made by dock companies, coupled with advances in engineering and the development of the country's railway network. Such determinants enabled Britain's ports to expand. Whilst the scale of port construction throughout the country was rapid, it was the development of six key players – London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull, Newcastle, and Cardiff – that most significantly furthered Britain's maritime expansion. These multi-purpose entrepôts were joined by packet ports, developed by railway companies, such as Grimsby, Goole, Harwich, Newhaven and Southampton, and smaller ports, such as Leith and Aberdeen. Collectively they aided the sustained growth of the country's domestic and foreign trade. Whether they evolved around existing harbours or were developed from scratch, all benefited from the ease with which vessels carrying goods or passengers flowed through their harbours. Together with the world's largest merchant fleet, the British merchant marine, they helped advance Britain's economic development.¹

This chapter seeks to add to current literature by discussing the value of ports to the transmigrant business. It achieves this by firstly placing the trade within the context of the development of Britain's ports generally and then the passenger trade specifically. Having established the milieu within which the transmigrant business functioned, it then illustrates how her harbours facilitated the trade at both the point of entry and points of exit, showing how it in turn helped the commercial hubs of maritime activity to sustain continued expansion throughout the long nineteenth century. Finally, it concludes by demonstrating the wider significance – economic, social, and political – of the trade to Britain's port-cities. As will become apparent, not all features of the trade were positive. Yet even in such cases, the by-products of conflicts led to the longer-term development of transmigrant shipping whilst bringing about a virtual halt to other aspects of alien shipping.

¹ Sarah Palmer, 'The British Shipping Industry 1850-1914', in Lewis Fischer & Gerald Panting (eds.), *Change and adaptation in maritime history: the North Atlantic fleets in the nineteenth century: proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Atlantic Canada Shipping Project* (St. John's, Newfoundland, 1982), p. 90.

6.1 The development of Britain's ports

The nineteenth century heralded (according to Gordon Jackson) one of the greatest periods in the history of British ports.² Technical innovation, alongside the dredging of navigations, erection of landing stages, and the creation of deep-water harbours all furthered the expansion of maritime enterprise. They enabled merchants and shipowners to centre their activities on particular nodes of maritime trade – ports. The ports for their part continued to deploy investment in infrastructure that overcame many of the geographic constraints which had previously impeded the expansion of port commerce. Foremost in this activity were dock companies such as the Hull Dock Company and London's various dock companies, and publicly-owned trusts such as Mersey Dock and Harbour Board and Clyde Navigation Trust.

The largest entrepôts comprised multi-trade dock estates were equipped with a number of differing dock facilities. They were reliant upon the combination of coastal, short-sea and long-haul trading links to sustain their expansion. Unlike London, Britain's leading centre of maritime trade, which saw the emergence of several dock companies to rival each other at any one time, port development in the 'provinces' was achieved by a single operator in each maritime centre. They acquired, or nurtured, particular aspects of foreign trade based on their geographically-advantageous locations. As Gordon Jackson summarised: 'London was the pivot of world trade; Liverpool the hub of the Atlantic; Glasgow the 'Second City of the Empire'; Hull the industrial gateway to Europe; and Newcastle and Cardiff were colliers supreme'.³ Dock development went hand in hand with the expansion of British import and export trades.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, both Hull and Liverpool, as the eventual centres of the transmigrant trade, had shown marked rates of physical expansion. Such growth proved essential to both feeder port and Atlantic port alike. At Hull the expansion of trade generally had led to the provision of six docks (excluding the Ferry-Boat Dock) by 1854. The dock estate, sustained by the significant growth in the tonnage handled at the port, continued to develop both east and west. Her Albert Dock opened in 1869, St.

² Gordon Jackson, 'The Ports', in Michael Freeman & Derek Aldcroft (eds.), *Transport in Victorian Britain* (Manchester, 1988), p. 218.

³ *Ditto*.

Andrews Dock in 1883, and William Wright dock in 1885.⁴ In 1885 commerce was sufficient to warrant the opening of the Alexandra Dock by a second Dock Company – a trait of dock provision only previously evident at London. The continued expansion at Hull, Britain’s third port was similar to the rising fortunes of Liverpool, Britain’s second largest port. By 1834 Liverpool had 18 docks and basins and saw her expansion reach its zenith by the mid-nineteenth century. Further development, made possible on the crest of sustained commercial advancement, was instead focussed on the redevelopment of the dock estate rather than swelling along already overcrowded estuary basins. As Adrian Jarvis noted, the expansion of facilities was quantitative before 1850 – providing sufficient space for differing trades – and qualitative afterwards – providing specialist warehousing, machinery, or equipment.⁵ Only once this expansion had been achieved would a degree of specialisation occur. Each development of the passenger trade at ports on the east coast ports mirrored similar developments at Liverpool and Glasgow. Whether catering for fish, cotton, coal, or passengers as the nineteenth century progressed, Britain’s dock estates became larger, the number of enclosed docks grew significantly, and deep-water facilities – mirroring the expansion of the average steam propelled vessel – became a must.

Alongside the rapid evolution of the dock estate, on-shore operations witnessed a similar period of intense investment and development. Transport networks, centring on the expansion of the railway network, enhanced the commercial opportunities dock development presented. As Jack Simmons noted: ‘the railway had two outstanding duties to the towns it served: to promote their trade and industry and make them more satisfactory places to live in’.⁶ Whilst the latter might not have been applicable to ports, the rail link did help urban centres equipped with docks to emerge as major port-cities. By 1851 all of Britain’s leading ports were linked to the emerging railway network. The

⁴ Gillett & MacMahon, *A History of Hull*, pp. 223, 227, 295, 309; Keith Allison (ed.), *The Victoria History of the Counties of England: A History of the County of York, East Riding: Volume I* (London, 1969), p. 187.

⁵ Jarvis, *In Troubled Times: The Port of Liverpool*, p. 126.

⁶ Jack Simmons, ‘The Power of the Railway’, in Harold Dyson & Michael Wolff, *The Victorian City: Images and Reality: Volume I* (London, 1973), p. 293.

ports commanding a leading share of port commerce by the beginning of the nineteenth century were also connected to some of Britain's leading inland regions by the Rivers Mersey, Thames, Humber, Forth, Severn, and Clyde as well as overseas. Infrastructure and improved transport links to the hinterland built upon these natural resources.

For the operators of ports, diversification was essential in obviating the adverse effects of seasonality or cyclical downturns in specific commodities. Yet port investment rarely kept pace with the needs of the shipping community. The constraints imposed upon dock companies by steam navigation compounded the difficulties of overcrowding at Britain's ports yet further. Excluding the fire hazards associated with the trade especially following the explosion of one of the earliest steam-powered vessels, the *Caledonia* at Hull in 1816, steamers were far wider, and required both deeper depths of water and an even larger area of water in which to turn around. As the century progressed the commercial advantages to businessmen that steam navigation presented – greater speed and the regularity of services – were offset by the inaccessibility or delays caused by entering or leaving Britain's ports. The high capital costs associated with steam shipping and the scheduling of services necessitated a quick turn around upon arrival in ports in order to maximise the number of sailings achievable in any given year. This was especially evident with companies awarded the Royal Mail contracts.⁷ Existing port facilities proved inadequate to the needs of the expansion of the steam shipping fraternity. At ports engaged in steam-shipping owners frequently complained, publicly and privately, about the hindrance of limited port provision for steamships.

The problem facing the owners of Britain's ports was not just initial start-up costs associated with dock development but the often crippling costs of maintaining a leading dock estate. Domestic competition, i.e. the threat of a leading shipowner moving his fleet to a rival port, was constantly feared by existing dock operators. Southampton, a promising port during the mid-nineteenth century, was virtually moth-balled when the P&O moved its operations to London's Victoria Dock in 1873.⁸ Until the transfer of the American Line from London to Southampton in 1893, the future of the London and

⁷ NMM, GSN/12/1-2, 'General Steamship Navigation Company, Royal Mail Contracts' (1824-1913); BJL, DEW 11/8, 'Letter regarding the Swedish Royal Mail and an additional service to Norway' (1870).

⁸ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 136.

South Western Railways dock looked bleak. Similarly when the White Star, one of the leading Liverpool-based companies for the second half of the nineteenth century, moved some of her passenger operations to Southampton in 1907, it looked like it would threaten the supremacy of Liverpool as the leading Atlantic port. Even the Wilson Line, constantly referred to by the common phrase of the time ‘Wilsons are Hull, Hull is Wilson’s’, diverted some of their operations to the rival port of Grimsby in 1892. Return on investment, as crucial to dock owner, port operator, or capital investor alike, was therefore a risky affair. Meeting customer demand whilst keeping the charges for such services competitive helped some dock companies, such as the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board, become heavily burdened, and others, such as some of London’s dock companies, facing financial collapse.⁹

Successful ports continued to evolve and merchant networks gravitated towards these expanding transport arteries. Networks of like-minded individuals, middle-men, brokers, and agents, coupled with the growing influence of banks, aided the growth of port-cities of considerable stature which sustained the rapidly expanding urban populations of their hinterlands. Maritime trade became polarised on key regions. At leading ports shipowners and their agents profited from the trans-shipment of commodities ranging from sugar, cotton, agriculture, machinery, and of course people. As Grindon noted:

[Liverpool’s] function is not to make, but to transfer. Nearly every bale or box of merchandise that enters the town is purely *en route*. Here it comes that Liverpool gathers up coin even when times are ‘bad’. Whether the owner of the merchandise eventually loses or gains, Liverpool has to be paid the expenses of the passing through.¹⁰

Port commerce benefited from urbanisation which provided an available supply of casual dock workers and navvies for the construction of docks.

In addition to the merchants, agents, and crew working in port-cities such as Liverpool, the trade sustained networks of dependent professions. As Richard Lawton demonstrated for Liverpool, more than one-fifth of all men over the age of 20 were

⁹ Jarvis, *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Leo Grindon, *Lancashire: Brief Historical and Descriptive Notes* (London, 1892), pp. 54-55.

employed in ocean and inland transport or dock work by the 1871 census.¹¹ The British port, or more accurately port-city, therefore provided opportunities for all strata of society. Ports did not grow wealthy on harbours or rail links alone. The significance of ports lay in the gravitational pull or critical mass of ancillary and associated trades or hubs. As Milne notes: 'Liverpool's ability to maintain a broad prosperity in this era, particularly in contrast to some of its manufacturing neighbours elsewhere in north-west England, stands as testimony to the efforts of its trading community'.¹² To continue to expand and maintain facilities the development of trade was essential. The trade in passengers therefore presented the providers of port-based facilities with the potential to profit from freight as well as passengers, unlike many packet ports whose operations centred on the movement of people alone.

6.2 The passenger trade

The significance of the passenger trade to British ports varied enormously. The most noticeable were the Hull Dock Company at Hull, the St. Katherine's Dock Company and the East and West India Dock Company at London, the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board at Liverpool, and the Clyde Navigation Trust at Glasgow. Each responded to the pressing needs of the passenger trade in a medley of ways.

At London, Britain's largest freight port, the Custom House Wharf had been designated as a landing stage for the disembarkation of steam packet passengers as early as 1822.¹³ Yet despite encouraging use of the Pool of London (the area near to the St. Katherine's Dock around the Tower of London), access for early passenger steamers to landing stages was often difficult. Though London was an important passenger terminus, until the Tilbury Dock (at the mouth of the Thames) was opened in 1885, the trade was significantly impeded by the volume of trade handled at the port generally.¹⁴ This caused

¹¹ Richard Lawton, 'The Components of Demographic Change in a Rapidly Growing Port-City: The Case of Liverpool in the Nineteenth Century', in Richard Lawton & Robert Lee (eds.), *Population and Society in Western European Port-Cities c.1650-1939* (Liverpool, 2002), p. 106.

¹² Milne, *Trade and trades in mid-Victorian Liverpool*, p. 219.

¹³ TNA, HO 5/20, 'Aliens Entry Books: Correspondence' (1815-1827), pp. 332.

difficulties for the running of scheduled passenger services in particular. Even when the steam packet business led to the development of facilities above and beyond a simple landing stage – in particular the automated luggage-handling facility open in 1845 – passenger access to wharfs was still difficult.¹⁵ The passenger trade brought little additional income to dock companies because whilst freight ships could be moored alongside one another, passenger steamers required their own space and adequate space to manoeuvre.¹⁶

Passenger operations at the Humber ports were significantly easier. This was primarily as the Humber estuary was far less congested. The Hull Dock Company responded to the demands of steam passenger shipping by providing the Humber Dock Steam Packet Wharf which opened in 1829.¹⁷ Despite the difficulties of silting up, it remained the main landing stage at Hull until the opening of the Railway Dock (in 1846) and the Victoria Dock (in 1850).¹⁸ Each of the latter facilities offered either improved access or warehousing facilities but never both. Thus, the Railway Dock provided a link from the Humber Dock to the railway, whilst the Victoria Dock catered for steamships yet was far removed from the then railway network (until a rail link was added in 1854).¹⁹

However, the limited returns and perceived dangers of early steamship technology impeded investment by many dock companies during the mid-nineteenth century.²⁰ It is perhaps of little wonder that many of the new port operators who combined rail and steam shipping services were railway companies.²¹ They recognised the importance of

¹⁴ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of the Ports*, p. 123.

¹⁵ *Illustrated London News*, 25 October 1845, p. 260, 'New Foreign Baggage Warehouse, St. Katherine's Docks'.

¹⁶ PLA, PLA 120, 'St. Katherine's Dock: Dock Committee Minutes' (1844), p. 354.

¹⁷ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, pp. 70-1.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 76.

¹⁹ Gillett & MacMahon, *A History of Hull*, p. 306.

²⁰ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 76; PLA, PLA 120, 'St. Katherine's Dock: Dock Committee Minutes' (1844), p. 354.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 89.

linking port and rail networks and invested heavily, as apparent at Grimsby, in the development of specialised facilities for the landing of fish and the export of coal.²² They saw the sea as an extension of their expanding railway networks and authority – an opportunity to encroach upon the lucrative business of passenger shipping enjoyed by dock-run ports. Ports such as Grimsby, Harwich, Goole, and Southampton were developed by railway companies, who always saw passenger operations as a major component of their operations. However, whilst mustering sufficient capital to fund integrated rail and dock services, they did not create ports equipped with the people who ‘made business’.²³

Unlike at Hull, Liverpool, or London where dockside agents, merchants, and middlemen arranged for the sale of commodities, ports such as Grimsby could not simply survive by poaching other ports’ trade.²⁴ The passenger business on the Humber, like other aspects of trade, continued to be dominated by the port of Hull, more than that of nearby Grimsby and Goole, because it suited the majority of merchants who traded in the high-value or specialist goods conveyed alongside passengers.²⁵ Though Grimsby developed a leading role in the fish industry, the majority of passengers arriving via the Humber continued to do so via Hull.²⁶ The services provided by packet ports provided were far from elaborate; single commodities were not capable of eroding the primacy of dock-run ports. Attempts such as the development, in 1852, of a dockside passenger terminal at Grimsby failed within two years of it being opened because the customer base could not sustain the market.²⁷ At other ports developed by railway companies, such as Southampton, which was developed by the London and Southern Railway Company’s Dock Company, they only succeeded in diverting trade established by rival ports,

²² Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, pp. 90-2.

²³ Jackson, ‘Do Docks Make Trade?’; *Idem*, *The History and Archaeology of the Ports*, p. 91.

²⁴ Ditto.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 92.

²⁶ Chart 3.19.

²⁷ *Illustrated London News*, 25 October 1845, p. 260, ‘New Foreign Baggage Warehouse, St. Katherine’s Docks’.

Plymouth.²⁸ By subjugating themselves to the short-term needs of companies, rather than encouraging the creation of commercial hubs of people who generated trade, they saw heavy investment make only limited returns.

The relationship between ports and passengers only reached a degree of maturity when competition increased significantly in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. It signalled the death of older passenger ports and docks not capable of raising sufficient capital to invest in improved facilities geared towards the large ocean liners. London led the way in the reinvention of her passenger facilities with the opening in 1886 of the Tilbury Dock at the mouth of the Thames, which was fitted with deep-water harbour and rail connection to the heart of London. It removed the problems of passengers disembarking passengers downriver, yet such investment often overstretched financially-struggling dock companies. In the early 1890s improvements at Liverpool finally achieved the integration of rail and sail based operations seen on the continent. Passengers were transported on rail from Hull or London all the way to the landing stage – rather than embarking a mile away at the main railway terminus.²⁹ The re-construction of the Princes Landing Stage at Liverpool was completed in 1895 – two years after the London and North Western Railway had begun boat services from London – and the Riverside Railway Station began served as the terminus for boat trains.³⁰ There were demands to construct equivalent provisions at Hull, but the complaints fell on deaf ears.

Hull's Riverside Quay, which offered daily services to the near continent, took a further 13 years to complete.³¹ When the integrated rail and sail services on the Mersey, Humber, and Thames were finally achieved, they still lagged behind Southampton, Dover and Bristol. Instead of embarking from London, were offered free railway connections from more prestigious ports – normally Southampton or Liverpool. The boat train

²⁸ See Chart 3.9.

²⁹ N. Fraser, 'A Short Biographical Sketch of the Liverpool-Hull Passenger Services', *Railway Observer* (January 1961), pp. 25-6.

³⁰ G.P. Neele, *Railway Reminiscences* (London, 1904), p. 190.

³¹ *Hull Daily News*, 13 July 1908, p. 4, 'New Development. Hull the Leading Fruit Market'; *Hull Daily Mail*, 13 July 1908, p. 4, 'Holland at Hand. New Service to the Netherlands. Hull As Deep-Water Port'.

became a feature of the British maritime commerce – with the discerning passenger being able to leave at the more comfortable time of 10.30 am and arrive in the port of embarkation shortly before departure. Boat trains enabled the port of Southampton in particular, as an out-port for London trade, to eclipse London yet further. Southampton was geographically favoured by four high tides per day, and after 1893 and 1907 they benefited from the support of railway companies to generate a return on their investment. As Jackson described, the port had the fastest growing trade of any major port between 1890-1894 and 1910-1913.³²

Britain's share of the passenger trade thus brought great dividends to those supporting the movement of people to, through, and from Britain. The onboard needs of the discerning passenger's every whim sustained a network of companies in Britain's major maritime centres. Belfast, Glasgow, and Newcastle all benefited from the passenger trade as much as docks at Liverpool, Southampton, and London because of shipbuilding. Yet whilst the scale of port investment for first-class passengers was impressive and the number of ancillary support staff, such as laundry services, important, the facilities for third-class passengers was equally significant. It brought a further element of passenger port commerce – albeit less glamorous and at significantly reduced levels of investment – to Britain's ports: the emigrant market.

The trade in emigrants generated revenue through dock dues and the commercial interests of companies using port facilities. Whilst the British Government had provided a purpose-built depot for state-sponsored emigrants leaving for the British colonies at Liverpool, and the New Zealand Government converted a former dockside warehouse at Brunswick Wharf in London for the need of emigrants travelling to New Zealand via London, the emigrant trade did not generally demand capitally-intensive investment as the first-class had. Nor did it derive significant returns on expenditure at dock-level. Instead its importance was achieved through the multiplicity of port operations, as evident at Liverpool:

³² Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 118.

The great diversity of the port's trade was another comforting factor, because over the long term it was extremely unusual for a variety of trades to suffer bad years together; indeed, in some cases it is arguable that a bad year in one trade could cause a good year in another. The extreme example is that when the potato import trade had a bad year, the emigrant trade might well have a good one, as happened notoriously at the time of the Irish Potato Famine, but a mini-slump in 1907-1908 sufficed to cause a brief upturn in the number of emigrants.³³

The passenger trade served as a potentially lucrative commodity through which ports and their operators gained both wealth and prestige. But the constantly changing demands of the business far out-weighed the returns offered by other trades such as the heavy bulk, high-value, or fresh produce markets. Whilst the connection between ports and people had nurtured port-commerce and thus created commercial hubs of like-minded people who furthered the evolution of British trade, the scale of early twentieth-century ocean liner shipping rendered them a costly feature of dock operations. Britain's leading passenger liners of the Edwardian Age, such as the *Mauretania*, *Lusitania*, or even the ill-fated *Titanic*, were seen as 'Queen[s] of the Sea'.³⁴ Newspapers such as *The Times* lamented in editorials and articles at the time they represented the commercial prowess of the British Merchant Marine. Yet such 'epoch-making experiments', 'worked out in an Imperial spirit', bore heavily upon Britain's ports.³⁵ The sheer expansion in their scale – width, breadth or depth – necessitated the continued expansion of dock facilities to cater for their very specific needs.

6.3 The transmigrant trade and British ports

Whilst no port evolved solely for the transmigrant trade, many dock companies and railway operators invested in both cultivating and sustaining their roles in this aspect of the emigrant business. Often seen as being the poorest class of emigrant, transmigrants

³³ Jarvis, *Ibid*, p. 32.

³⁴ *The Times*, 21 September 1906, p. 4, 'Launch of Liners – The Mauretania'; , 25 October 1907, p. 11, 'Editorial – The Mauretania'; *The Times*, 14 September 1907, p. 5, 'The Lusitania's Voyage – A Record Passage'; *The Times*, 11 April 1912, p. 13, 'Largest Vessel Afloat – Maiden Voyage of the Titanic'.

³⁵ *The Times*, 21 September 1906, p. 4, 'Launch of Liners – The Mauretania'; , 25 October 1907, p. 11, 'Editorial – The Mauretania'; *The Times*, 14 September 1907, p. 5, 'The Lusitania's Voyage – A Record Passage'; *The Times*, 11 April 1912, p. 13, 'Largest Vessel Afloat – Maiden Voyage of the Titanic'.

typically departed Britain within hours or days of their arrival.³⁶ Port infrastructure, in particular the development of good rail links and deep-water dock facilities, were therefore essential in facilitating the speedy transit of aliens through Britain's leading passenger ports and ensuring they remained transient. But despite emerging because of their geographically advantageous positions, ports enjoying a share of the European emigrant business did not fully integrate their transport and steam shipping services until the last decade of the nineteenth century or the first decade of the twentieth.³⁷ The provision of integrated travel did not always lead to the growth of trade as was all too apparent at Grimsby where, as Jackson alluded to, dock charges for the same commodities were significantly cheaper.³⁸

In periods of high transmigrant activity such as 1851-1854, 1866-1872, 1888-1891, and 1905-1907, ports such as Goole, Grimsby, and Hull enjoyed significant growth in the number of transmigrants using their docks.³⁹ This provided a return on the low level of investment allocated to the trade. Yet as with other aspects of passenger shipping the trade was still cyclical and thus highly risky. During downturns in the trade, such as 1855-1863 or 1873-1879, ports generally had to rely on the income from handling other commodities in order to secure their financial well-being.⁴⁰ The ports handling the majority of the transmigrant trade established a broad customer profile upon which to base their operations.⁴¹ The transmigrant trade in itself did not make the port, but was rather a by-product of associated trade for those ports situated along the Humber to

³⁶ Chart 4.4.

³⁷ G.P. Neele, *Railway Reminiscences* (London, 1904), p. 190; R. Bell, *Twenty-five years of the North Eastern Railway, 1898-1922* (1951), pp. 36-37; Nicholas Evans, 'Indirect Passage from Europe: Transmigration via the UK, 1836-1914', *Journal for Maritime Research* (Greenwich, 2001).

³⁸ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 91.

³⁹ Chart 3.19.

⁴⁰ Jarvis, *Ibid*, p. 32; *Ibid*; LSL, *Custom Bills of Entry* (1840-1899); MMM, *Custom Bills of Entry* (1900-1914).

⁴¹ For information on the varied trades handled by the differing ports see David Starkey, *et al*, *Shipping Movements in the Ports of the United Kingdom, 1871-1913: A Statistical Profile* (Exeter, 1999); for information on the commodities shipped alongside passengers, or during recessions in the trade, see *Customs Bills of Entry* (the national set being held at the Merseyside Maritime Museum).

Mersey, Forth to Clyde, or Thames to Solent corridors. The transmigrant business thus acted as an ‘insurance policy’ against declines in one of the major staples of ports – coal, timber, cotton, or fresh provisions. In its own right it was relatively insignificant. This was demonstrated by the decline of the earnings of the Hull Dock Company from £232,000 in 1884 to 191,000 in 1890 – at a time when the number of transmigrants using the port rose dramatically.⁴² The benefit of the transmigrant trade was instead explained by the indirect benefits associated with the business and the ‘added value’ that this aspect of passenger shipping brought to the docks, ports, and port-cities that supported it. As with the companies providing such transport, the significance of the business varied depending on whether it was seen from the perspective of the feeder port, Atlantic port, or port-city generally. Therefore, these three aspects of the trade are treated here in turn.

6.3.1 The feeder port

The central aspect of Britain’s share of the European transmigrant trade was the arrival of non-English speaking passengers at Britain’s points of entry. A century before mass cross-channel travel became a staple element of the short-sea Channel ports, east-coast ports such as Goole, Grimsby, Harwich, Hull, Leith, Newcastle, and West Hartlepool handled thousands of transmigrant arrivals each year.⁴³ Each feeder port fulfilled different functions, but all served as conduits to larger people-exporting Atlantic ports. At the major feeder ports – Hull and Grimsby in particular – the alien was also provided with shore-based food and refreshments because the North Sea shipowner only catered for their culinary needs as far as the journey to Britain.⁴⁴ Whilst other ports exported emigrants, and many supported differing volumes of immigrants, the through-movement of third-class transmigrants – and invariably their feeding – necessitated the evolution of

⁴² Gillett & MacMahon, *A History of Hull*, p. 403.

⁴³ Chart 3.19.

⁴⁴ Hull City Archives, TCM 174, p. 166, ‘Letter from the Wilson Line’; TNA, ‘Emigrants: Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through Hull, and arrangements for their feeding and lodging there’, MT 9/291 (1882-1887).

port infrastructure and personnel that facilitated for the specific needs of weekly or bi-weekly arrivals of transmigrant passengers.⁴⁵

As has already been described in Chapter 4, at the activity of Britain's feeder ports, the transmigrant trade was arranged to specific days of the week. These coincided with periods when the docks were less busy, and also when the trains needed to convey the aliens onto the next stage of their journey were not employed elsewhere – such as weekend excursion traffic to a nearby seaside resort. Like the movement of other commodities, at either the point of entry or exit, the business appeared to have been organised to the benefit of the dock-operator and transport company. For their services, dock companies such as the East & West India Dock Company's Tilbury Landing Stage charged shipping companies at least 1 shilling and 11 pence (or 23 pence) to disembark each third-class passenger.⁴⁶ Based on the scale of transmigration through Britain (described in Chapter 3), this charge generated at least £275,625 for dock companies between 1836 and 1914.⁴⁷ Such income was used to fund further dock development that in turn helped to perpetuate the trade.

Port developments geared towards the needs of the steamships – upon which transmigrants arrived – was typified by Goole, a port developed by the L&Y, with its 210 x 58 feet dock, for the needs of the widest steam packet when she opened in 1838.⁴⁸ The deep-water facility guaranteed vessels could manoeuvre easily and that access was not dependent upon the tide. Constructed at the end of the shortest direct rail link between the Humber and the Mersey, she also helped transmigrant passengers to disembark from their steamship and traverse Britain with both ease and speed.⁴⁹ But despite a short-lived spell in the 1840s and 1850s, the number of transmigrants, and the number of operators

⁴⁵ See the numerous references to the arrival of Mormon transmigrants at the ports of Hull and Grimsby. (*Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM*)

⁴⁶ MLD, 'Minute Book of the East & West India Dock Company', pp. 81-82 (1885). Additional charges were also imposed for large volumes of luggage.

⁴⁷ MLD, 'Minute Book of the East & West India Dock Company', pp. 81-82 (1885).

⁴⁸ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 76.

⁴⁹ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 76.

providing such services via the port, was limited.⁵⁰ Similarly, when the MS&L developed a first-class passenger station next to the company's Grimsby dock in 1852, it looked like a secure venture and replicated the earlier attempts by the L&Y's port at Goole. The Grimsby dockside railway station was linked, like Goole, directly to Liverpool and other key urban centres such as Sheffield, Lincoln, Leicester, Nottingham, Manchester, and Birmingham.⁵¹ Yet it failed to attract the number of first-class passengers it sought. By 1854 it had re-branded its operations from first- to third-class and shifted the focus of its role from the exporter of travellers to importer of transmigrants the investment in dock infrastructure appeared to offer great potential.⁵² Even then, such integrated services did not guarantee the development of the trade.⁵³ Grimsby failed to develop the share of the transmigrant business enjoyed at nearby Hull. Further, it could not, as Jackson noted for other aspects of trade, merely siphon off the commerce handled by other Humber ports.⁵⁴ So why was this? What attributes made a successful feeder port?

The failure of ports which had successfully integrated transport and steam-shiping services lay in the fact that they were not developed by ports supporting merchant communities, but rather by companies wishing to divert what was seen as an easily transferable aspect of commodity shipping from the port of Hull.⁵⁵ Supporting Jackson's theories on Grimsby's short-comings, the Grimsby Emigrant Waiting Room – providing overnight accommodation and facilities to feed passengers – was years ahead of its continental rivals – such as HAPAG's emigrant village at Veddel. They mirrored facilities seen at Brunswick wharf in London and the official emigration depot at Birkenhead. Yet the services only met the needs of the passengers and railway

⁵⁰ TNA, HO 3/1-120 (1836-1869).

⁵¹ Grimsby Commercial Directories (1852-1914).

⁵² *Great Grimsby Gazette*, 14 April 1854, p. 4; Grimsby Reference Library, 'Files - Grimsby Emigrant Shelter'; Leon and Daphne Gerlis, *The Story of the Grimsby Jewish Community* (Hull, 1986), pp. 7, 10-11.

⁵³ Chart 3.19; TNA, HO 3/1-120 (1836-1869).

⁵⁴ Jackson, 'Do Docks make Trade', pp. 17-41.

⁵⁵ Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, p. 92.

companies providing the transport.⁵⁶ They did not necessarily meet the needs of the merchant community. The nature of transmigrant services – the carriage of third-class passengers alongside high value or finished goods – meant that goods had to be re-shipped to manufacturers elsewhere. With Grimsby, transmigration offered a chance for the dock company to turn a loss-making attempt to acquire first-class passengers into an alternative way of sustaining regular income from a nearby competitor (the Port of Hull). Having failed to develop the first-class business, how could the dock company be certain of developing a share of the transmigrant business?

Though Grimsby's share of the trade grew, it had stabilised by the mid-1880s. Such early growth was directly attributable to the connections between the port's agent, John Sutcliffe, and German-based agents, as suggested by Davies.⁵⁷ However, the link between Grimsby's growing role in the transmigrant trade was far more than the work of one man and his overseas contacts. Another major factor was the transfer of some of the Wilson Line's Gothenburg trade to Grimsby in 1892. Such a move was not voluntary; the Wilson Line had to make the strategic move (splitting some of its passenger operations between Hull and Grimsby), in an attempt to reduce the threat of the Great Central Railway extending their steamship passenger services to Gothenburg. Only by using such strategies did the trade grow to a level offering anything close to a reasonable return on the initial investment.⁵⁸ The port secured a position as a large-scale feeder port because of one merchant based in the town and another based at nearby Hull. She achieved her status as the second most important feeder port in Britain only after 1898, when again the transmigrant trade experienced unprecedented growth. The position of Grimsby in the transmigrant business was therefore brought about not as a result of port infrastructure, nor to the work of her leading agent John Sutcliffe, as Davies claimed. Instead her increased status came under the terms of the 1897 German Emigration Act. Whilst John Sutcliffe was important to Grimsby's participation in the trade, as shown in Chart 6.1, it was two other forces – the decision by the Wilson Line to divert some of


⁵⁶ *Great Grimsby Gazette*, 14 April 1854, p. 4.

⁵⁷ Peter Davies, *John Sutcliffe & Son. A History of the Company, 1862-1987* (Grimsby, 1987), p. 34.

⁵⁸ Jackson, 'Do Docks Make Trade?', p. 29.

their feeder services from Hull and the intervention of the Imperial Chancery in the German emigration trade – restricting the number of British ports through which transmigrants arriving from Hamburg (as discussed in Chapter 5) – which ‘made’ the fortunes of the port’s transmigrant operations.

Chart 6.1. The number of transmigrants arriving at the port of Grimsby, 1882-1913



Source: NELA, 11/1 (1884-1890); BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1877-1905); BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act* (1906-1913).

However not all strategies aimed at increasing trade were successful. When the Great Central Railway asked the Wilson Line to provide a fortnightly steamer service between Sweden and Grimsby using the *Orlando* in 1909, the shipping line responded that they would have lost £200 per voyage for complying with such a demand. As the Wilson Line’s Managing Director, Oswald Sanderson, stated:

Owing to pressure you (Great Central Railway) have put on us, we have tried running the 'Orlando' on a weekly turn and have lost about £200 a week. We have asked Captain Barwick to make some rebates in the Dock Dues ... can you give us a substantial subsidy towards running this Trade at the time the Canals are frozen ... £100 a week towards the Loss and we will go on until the end of March, if not we must stop the service.⁵⁹

The relationship between shipping company and port operator was, therefore, very complex. Sir Sam Fray responded to the request with the concession:

We shall be willing to forego all dock dues on the steamer and wharfage charges on the general cargo but exception must be made in the case of coal – we have never under any circumstances waived the coal staith dues.⁶⁰

Though agreeing to waive charges on passenger operations it was the impact of a dock at operational, and commercial levels – to all commodities carried by feeder vessels – that determined the use of a port from transmigrant trade.

So how did a successful feeder port develop a share of the trade without investing heavily in facilities? And how could they develop returns on capital investment elsewhere within the dock estate by encouraging use by operators providing transmigrant services? In a nutshell dock companies needed to provide services for other aspects of the trades associated with the age of steam which could also be utilised for transmigrant operations. To be successful they had to be used by a number of shipping companies – with particular berths being allocated for the scheduled use of operators. The Hull Dock Company typified the successful working model for a feeder port that emerged out of the facilities it afforded for other aspects of the steam shipping trades. The port garnered the lion's share of the feeder business because of three features in particular: the provision of numerous enclosed docks; the creation of a large and diverse dock estate situated on an inland navigation less congested than the Thames; and the availability of rail services for both goods and passengers. The rail facilities for passengers did not necessarily have to be at the quayside. Those peculiar to Hull such as the enclosed Steam Packet Wharf at the Humber Dock (opened in 1829) helped in the early days of the emergence of the

⁵⁹ B JL, DEW 4/10, 'Letter from Oswald Sanderson to Sir Sam Fray – Grimsby/Gothenburg Service' (9 February 1909).

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 'Letter from Sir Sam Fray to Oswald Sanderson' (10 August 1909).

business. By 1854 it had emerged as the handler of the majority of transmigrant arrivals to Britain.⁶¹

Hull's feeder services were never fully integrated and proved that the transmigrant trade was not dependent on such port infrastructure. The sensible manner in which trains and ships were connected at Hull, as described by Jackson, only appeared pertinent to freight and not to the passenger.⁶² This was especially apparent with Finnish passengers disembarking at Hull's Victoria Dock (situated on the eastern edge of the city). Dock companies knew integrating shipping and rail services could be expensive, especially, as in the case of Hull, when such rail linkage followed the creation of docks. Passengers at Hull had to disembark on at least two occasions – firstly to receive food and refreshments provided by local emigration agents or lodging-house keepers, and secondly to traverse the one mile route between the docks and Hull's main passenger terminus, the Paragon Railway station.⁶³ For those arriving from Baltic ports via the Victoria Dock travelling across the city could be even more protracted.⁶⁴ The transmigrants' luggage, often substantial, also had to be conveyed separately once the passengers' goods had been checked by HM Customs.⁶⁵ The cost of such local transport services was factored into the price of transmigrant travel – typically one shilling (12 d) per adult passenger.⁶⁶ The needs of the passenger were not paramount. As one passenger recalled:

⁶¹ Chart 3.19.

⁶² Jackson, 'Shipowners and Private Dock Companies', p. 50.

⁶³ Minnesota Historical Society, A. Knoph, *Beiledning for Emigranter til Amerika, forfaavidt angaar Befordring pr. Dampskib over Hull og Liverpool til New York og videre indgjennem Landet pr. Fernbane* (Christiania, 1869); Carl Mostrom, *Some impressions from my journey to America and also from the first period of my residence there* (unpublished manuscript, 1912).

⁶⁴ This is recalled by Freddie Rands in an interview in the *Hull Times* in 1978. (*Hull Times*, 29 December 1972, p. 4, 'When Hull was used by Jews as a gateway to their freedom'.)

⁶⁵ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM* ('A.L. Skanchy Emigration Company Journal', 1889).

⁶⁶ B.J.L., DEW 4/10.

As we and our luggage had already been examined by the control, we were taken to the railway station at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Our luggage remained on board, and was to come on the next train. We were not satisfied with this arrangement; but wanted to take our things with us. We began to quarrel with the agents; but had to yield to force and leave Hull without our luggage. I did not see anything of Hull beyond the streets through which we went to reach the railway station.⁶⁷

This constant feature, of protracted travel, differentiated the transmigrant trade from other aspects of the passenger market and replicated similar services provided for British emigrant operations whose transport was often disjointed.⁶⁸ The providers of such travel knew their clientele were drawn to the indirect option because it was affordable.⁶⁹ They were using a less-glamorous system of emigrating; the lack of transport integration was part of the business – as it was for early emigrants leaving the European port such as Glückstadt, Kiel, Altona or Hamburg where the railway terminus and landing stages were often miles apart.⁷⁰ The services provided at Hull served the needs of the Dock Company and the ports merchant community. Rather than providing port-side waiting rooms, as were available at Grimsby, the Hull Dock Company prioritised warehouse space for goods traffic. So long as the Dock Company continued to meet the demands of freight operators using the port, trade grew. Transmigrant traffic continued to grow, in line with the increased tonnage of freight handled by the port, because merchants – rather than passengers – were drawn to the port. When the trade in transmigrants declined, the Dock Company could rely on other trades, as shown in Chart 6.2.

⁶⁷ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM* ('Diary of Hans Hoth', 1854).

⁶⁸ Demarcation according to class was best evident on the Boat Trains from London to Southampton. Upper class clientele (as shown in the shipping advertisements for *The Times* could depart London up to 2 hours later than their third-class migrant counterparts. The disjointed nature of mid-Victorian emigrant travel was apparent through diaries of British emigrants. (See the 'Letter on Andrew Govan' in the *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM* as an example of the difficulties of working class emigrants.)

⁶⁹ BPP, *Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882).

⁷⁰ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM*. The General Voyage Notes for the *Cavour* (in 1866) recalled it took three 'in order to bring luggage their luggage [from the landing stage] to the railway station'.

Chart 6.2. The number of transmigrants and the tonnage of foreign trade tonnage arriving at the port of Hull from North European ports, 1873-1913



Source: See Chart 4.2; David Starkey, *et al.* (eds.), *Shipping Movements in the Ports of the United Kingdom, 1871-1913: A Statistical Profile* (Exeter, 1999), pp. 18-19. Note: excludes figures for 1876.

As vessels carrying transmigrants (feeder vessels) continued to increase in size throughout the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s the Hull Dock Company met the demands of its customers, but certainly never exceeded them. The costs and length of time needed to construct further dock facilities or to redevelop existing facilities often rendered them unsuitable before they had even opened. This was epitomised with the opening of Hull's Albert Dock in 1869 after a period of some six years. The new dock, 'the largest in the Empire', did not divert trade from other docks or ports because its riverside entrance was not wide enough for the rapidly expanding feeder vessels which had grown from 203 x 27 x 16 feet to 260 x 32 x 19 in the decade between the launching of the *Pacific* and the *Oder* (in 1860) and the *Rollo* and the *Orlando* (in 1870).⁷¹ Whilst the Albert Dock was partially inadequate, the Railway and Victoria Docks still proved sufficient for the needs

⁷¹ Arthur Credland, *Iron and Steel Shipbuilding on the Humber: Earles of Hull, 1853-1932* (Hull, 1982), pp. 47-48.

of shipowners, for at least a decade. Despite the owners of Hull's merchant fleets becoming increasingly disgruntled by the poor response to their needs generally, improved passenger facilities for the transmigrant trade were never deemed necessary. None of the schemes proposed during the second half of the nineteenth century sought to integrate rail and steamship operations – the real difference between Hull and her rival ports at Goole and Grimsby. The reasons for this lay in the fact that the two aspects of port commerce – rail and dock facilities – were not (prior to 1893) managed by the same company.

The port of Hull's share of the transmigrant trade continued to grow despite the failure of the Dock Company to provide integrated services. The escalating conflict between the needs of shipowners and of the dock companies was described in evidence presented within the *Reports by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* in 1882.⁷² Despite parliamentary interest in the apparently poor state of Hull's facilities, the Hull Dock Company ignored appeals by the shipping fraternity to provide an integrated rail service at the Albert Dock, leaving the Wilson Line in particular especially embittered. They led to growing calls within the wider merchant community to break the Hull Dock Company's monopoly over port facilities. This was further compounded by the monopoly of the North Eastern Railway over rail freight services. The 1882 enquiry gave this campaign added impetus in the media. The response by the North Eastern Railway and the Hull Dock Company was that existing services were sufficient.

The new integrated dock and rail service advocated by shipping companies around the time of the 1882 enquiry was, however, provided in the form of the Alexandra Dock just three years later. As part of the Hull, Barnsley, and West Riding Junction Railway and Dock Act of 1880, the opening of the Alexandra Dock was heralded through the Hull business community as a huge success – particularly as it resolved the

⁷² TNA MT 9/291, 'Emigrants: Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through Hull, and arrangements for their feeding and lodging there' (1882-1887); BPP, *Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882).

complications associated with the transmigrant traffic transported through Hull's main railway terminus each week.⁷³ As the *Eastern Morning News* commented:

Between the Corporation's western reservation and the Dock there is a passenger station. Great and well-grounded complaints have been made as to the disgraceful manner in which emigrants arriving in Hull per steamer are forced to herd together without the slightest attempt at decent accommodation. To provide for a larger body of emigrants the station will be fitted up with all necessary conveniences, so that immediately they land from the steamers at the Alexandra Dock they will be able to find comfortable quarters close to hand.⁷⁴

However, the proposals by the Dock Company to provide 'decent accommodation' appear only to have been submitted as an after-thought in February 1885.⁷⁵ For the transmigrant trade, the use of the Alexandra Dock was a short-lived wonder. Upon opening the dock in July 1885, the Wilson Line began to transfer some of its inward-bound vessels to it, but mainly cargo vessels (particularly the large vessels such as the *Buffalo*, *Colorado*, or *Apollo*).⁷⁶ The routes such vessels plied had nothing to do with the passenger trade. Instead alien passengers, particularly transmigrants, only used the new 'decent accommodation' provided alongside the new dock facility for a short term. Evidence from the new combined Dock and Railway Company's accounts reveal that demand for the integrated system was never high.⁷⁷ Less than one-third of transmigrants arriving at Hull used the port in 1888, less than one-quarter in 1889 and less than one-twentieth in 1890.⁷⁸ Further, they did not even inflate the number of passengers using the port – the increases in the transmigrant trade generally being

⁷³ 1880 (43 & 44 Vict.) c.199

⁷⁴ *Eastern Morning News*, 20 May 1885, p. 3, 'THE NEW DOCK AT HULL'.

⁷⁵ HCA, DPD/11/6/6, 'Hull & Barnsley – Plans and elevations and sections for passenger station', (1885).

⁷⁶ The *Buffalo*'s dimensions were 385 x 43 x 27 feet. : John Harrower, *Wilson Line* (Gravesend, 1998), p. 63.

⁷⁷ TNA, RAIL 312/86, 'Hull & Barnsley Railway: Monthly Passenger and Parcels Traffic for all Stations' (1885-1891).

⁷⁸ Figures based on TNA, RAIL 312/86, 'Hull & Barnsley Railway: Monthly Passenger and Parcels Traffic for all Stations' (1885-1891) and compared with HCA, WHG/1/18-22 (1888-1891).

attributable to increased opportunities abroad (namely in the United States) that induced all-time peaks in British emigration and not just highs in European transmigration.⁷⁹

The reality of the much-celebrated new passenger facility was that difficulties associated without an integrated transport system for the transmigrant trade were used by the business fraternity to bring about change that benefited other non-passenger operations – namely the improved movement of cattle and timber imports and the export of coal.⁸⁰ It freed the supply route from the Yorkshire coalfields to the port of Hull by breaking the monopoly which the North Easter Railway held over rail access to Hull and the similar monopoly enjoyed by the dock facilities of the Hull Dock Company. The exorbitant rates charged by the Hull Dock Company were forced down, as were those by the North Eastern Railway. This benefited the export of coal, and the supply of coal for steamers using the port. The opening of a new dock and rail link thus demonstrated the power of vested interests within the shipping fraternity of ports such as Hull. By controlling trades including transmigrants, they dictated what they desired in other regions of port activity – namely the lowering of freight charges and improved dock facilities for cargo handling. Passenger use of the ‘express service’ of the Hull and Barnsley Dock was quickly diverted to the company’s Canon Street Terminus – some 1.75 miles north-west of the Alexandra Dock and irrelevant to the needs of the transmigrant passenger.⁸¹ The suffering of transmigrant passengers was instead used as a brokering tool for shipowners.

At feeder ports, transmigration featured heavily but continually failed to necessitate the deployment of capital investment. Six years after the opening of the Alexandra Dock, the Wilson Line had returned all of its feeder-line services to the space it had first leased at Hull’s Albert Dock in 1884 and which it had continued to use throughout its use of Alexandra Dock.⁸² The Albert Dock was better situated to the

⁷⁹ Marjory Harper & Nicholas Evans, ‘Socio-economic dislocation and interwar emigration to Canada and the USA: A Scottish snapshot’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XXXIV, Number 4 (December 2006), pp. 529-552.

⁸⁰ HCL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1885-1898); MMM, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1899-1914).

⁸¹ Joseph Franks & H.E.C. Newham, *The Port of Hull and its facilities* (Hull, 1907), p. 22.

⁸² BJL, DEW 4/10.

westward-bound trade as the operator was provided with a wide purposefully-assigned berth for the larger feeder vessels of the Wilson Line. It was also only ten minutes walk from Hull's Paragon Railway Stations, equipped with direct rail links to Liverpool, rather than diverting passengers using the Alexandra Dock around the town before joining the rail route to Liverpool.⁸³ The only addition to Hull's dock estate attributable to transmigration during the nineteenth century was the construction of a wooden waiting room with toilets at the Island Wharf (situated on the left hand side of the Humber Dock) and leased by the Wilson Line between 1901 and 1913.⁸⁴ It was far from other feeder ports, but that did not concern the merchant community.

So why did Britain's leading feeder port not require integrated railway services like those seen at the Great Eastern Railway's Parkstone Quay Terminus (opened in 1883) or those provided by the London Dock Company's Tilbury Landing Stage (opened in 1886)? The answer lay with the scale of operations and the fact that the trade was of low-value for low fare-paying customers. Even at ports such as West Hartlepool, managed by the North Eastern Railway, the railway company did not link rail and shipping services for such passengers. In that instance, they erected a protective wall for newly-arrived passengers in 1882, before later converting an '(old) armoury and drill hall which they used as a waiting room'.⁸⁵ At Newcastle no facilities were apparent and yet the trade grew. Whilst the levels of operations at the north eastern port were not on the same scale as at Hull, they still met the needs of the shipping line. At Hull so many railway carriages were required for the movement of transmigrants arriving on the two days of the week that the facility would have been too large to generate a return on investment for a dock company. It was only after 1892, when the nearly bankrupt Hull

⁸³ LSL, 'The Trade of Hull and the Humber Ports – Review and Statistical Record for 1907' (Hull, 1907), p. 25.

⁸⁴ BJL, DEW2/4/56, 'Waiting Room and Lavatories on Island Wharf' (1901-1909).

⁸⁵ Steve Robbins, 'Emigrants and Refugees in West Hartlepool', Port Cities UK (www.portcities.hartlepool.org.uk) based on articles in the *Hartlepool Mail* (April-May 1881) and the *South Durham and Cleveland Mercury* (29 April 1882).

Dock Company was taken over by the main railway company, the North Eastern Railway, that a riverside promenade was again discussed.⁸⁶

Integration at Hull only acquired a more financially secure footing when two out of three elements of operations – the ownership of the dock and the railway network – were in the hands of one company, namely the North Eastern Railway. As the facilities developed, services to a standard already provided for transmigrant operations at Goole and Grimsby were achieved. It succeeded in increasing the number of passenger steamers not only because of improved facilities but also because the Hull and Netherlands Steamship Company increased its twice-weekly services to a daily service. To sustain such traffic the port required a sufficiently integrated transport system to entice both domestic tourist passengers from London and other regions and also the transmigrant passengers arriving at Hull. Though focussed for the easy embarkation and disembarkation of the more ‘discerning clientele’, such transportation integration also brought immediate benefits for passenger, shipping company, and dock-owner alike. It achieved this by broadening the profile of transmigrant arrivals from two days per week to six. This made daily boat services from Hull, predominantly of first-class passengers, more profitable to operate. Transmigrant operations supplemented first-class services. The shipping company also benefited financially by one penny per passenger as the cost of portage had already been inserted onto the price of transmigrant tickets before the riverside station had opened.⁸⁷

The benefit of integrated rail and shipping services depended however on the deep-water access via the River Humber and not just an improved rail link.⁸⁸ Using information obtained from the *Customs Bills of Entry*, as shown in Table 6.1, we see that over time use of the older docks (the Humber Dock, the Railway Dock and Princes Dock) lessened as newer dock facilities (the Albert Dock, Riverside Quay, and Island Wharf), with direct access from the River Humber, gained a greater share of the transmigrant

⁸⁶ BJL, DEW 4/10 (undated note). The letter described negotiations for the development of a Riverside Promenade were first mooted between 1892 and 1894.

⁸⁷ BJL, DEW 6/1, ‘Passenger Ledger ‘Rail Fares Account’ (3 April 1915).

⁸⁸ Franks & Newham, *The Port of Hull*, p. 27.

trade. Within a few years of opening the Riverside Quay was used to disembark just under 50 per cent of all transmigrant arrivals.⁸⁹

Table 6.1. Docks used to land transmigrants at Hull in 1852, 1887/8, and 1913

Dock	Number of vessels (1852)	Number of transmigrants (1852)	Number of vessels (1887/8)	Number of transmigrants (1887/8)	Number of vessels (1913)	Number of transmigrants (1913)
Albert	n/a	n/a	42	12,063	42	11,886
Alexandra	n/a	n/a	52	28,677	0	0
Humber Dock	205	12,175	72	4,033	1	99
Island Wharf	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	24	723
Junction	78	2,578	0	0	0	0
Princes	1	53	59	1,760	23	915
Queens Dock	1	0	0	0	0	0
Railway Dock	1	6	146	18,105	0	0
River Hull	1	8	0	0	1	205
Riverside Quay	1	6	n/a	n/a	348	20,784
Victoria	n/a	n/a	0	0	27	5,956
William Wright	n/a	n/a	0	0	39	1,152
Not stated	3	58	0	0	1	69
Total	291	14,884	371	64,638	506	41,789

Source: Details of vessels and the number of transmigrants on board were gleaned from three sources: TNA, HO 3/64-67 (1852); BPP, *Report from the Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1888), pp. 307-311; Hull Hebrew Community Archives, 'Jewish Association for the Protection of Women and Girls – Daybook' (1910-1914), pp. 36-224. The dock used within by each vessel was gleaned from: LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1852, 1887 and 1888); Hull Hebrew Community Archives, *Ibid.*

Although the volume of the transmigrant trade was important to Britain's feeder ports, the value of the business to dock companies did not warrant the need for the construction of integrated transport systems. Not until cruise travel to Scandinavia brought the daily boat trains to Hull's Riverside Quay during the Edwardian Age would the Humber's leading port develop services seen at Goole and Grimsby half a century

⁸⁹ Hull Hebrew Community Archives, Jewish Association for the Protection of Women & Girls – Day Book (1910-1914).

earlier. The needs of shipping companies and not of port operators explained why Hull's share of the business grew – even though the services provided at other ports were often far better. The freight carried alongside the transmigrants explained why, as late as 1913, more than half of Hull's transmigrants disembarked at docks. Despite their best efforts to divert Hull's share of the transmigrant business, few ports met the multiple demands of the companies providing transmigrant shipping. Except at Grimsby, a port given unique commercial benefits through overseas legislation (which also reduced transmigrant operations to Leith and Southampton from Hamburg), the railway operators participating in dock services could not encroach upon Hull's trade.

6.3.2 The points of re-embarkation

The transmigrants' arrival in the port of re-embarkation – Liverpool, Glasgow, and Southampton – mirrored experiences evident at the point of entry. More often than not shipping lines arranged for passengers to arrive in the ports of re-embarkation as near as possible to the time of departure. This was not solely designed for the interest of passengers; it also ensured the limited use of dockside lodgings provided by transoceanic shipping lines.⁹⁰ In Liverpool transmigrants had to disembark from their train at the Central or Lime Street railway terminus before being taken to the landing stage by horse-drawn cart, with their luggage conveyed separately.⁹¹ Unlike at the point of entry, where nearly all transmigrants disembarked in an enclosed dock, the thousands of transmigrants leaving Britain each week re-embarked via the use of a steam-powered tender or purpose-built landing stage.⁹² As with organised arrivals at an east coast port, the trade centred on key days of the week.⁹³ Pressures evident on dock companies at Hull, Goole, and

⁹⁰ Mitchell Library, D-TC 23 (1902-3), Corporation of Glasgow, 'Thirty-fifth Annual Report on the Operations of the Sanitary Department of the City of Glasgow for the year ending 31st December 1904', p. 13. The reports stated that the Allan Line's Emigrants' House was only fully occupied on average of one evening per week, and empty, on average, at least 3 nights a week.

⁹¹ *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM* ('Diaries of Justin Chancy Wixom', 1866).

⁹² Based on analysis of Mormon arrivals at Hull (described in the *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM*) and the places where vessels disembarked cargo according to the *Customs Bills of Entry* for Hull (1854-1894).

⁹³ MMM, *Custom Bills of Entry* (1836-1914).

Grimsby were also apparent at Liverpool, Glasgow, London, and Southampton. Demand for deep-water docking facilities, wider dock entrances, improved loading equipment, and a quick turn-around of an ocean vessel all compounded the pressures borne by dock companies.⁹⁴ Of foremost importance to the trade was Liverpool which handled the majority of all passengers, both British emigrants, and foreign transmigrants.⁹⁵

Following London, Liverpool erected a purpose-built landing stage in 1876 from which passengers of all classes gained access to passenger liners.⁹⁶ Whilst it might be seen as a response to the needs of the port, it invariably freed-up over-crowded dock estates. Like the Thames, the Mersey itself was often gridlocked at key trading periods and the landing stage created a distinct barrier between the freight operations of a transmigrant-carrying vessel and the process of re-embarking passengers upon arrival from a feeder port.⁹⁷ Because of the scale of operations at docks serving the Atlantic trades, the number of tugs, wharves, pilots, and other linked operations created a virtual industry of support networks centring on the passengers' every need.⁹⁸ Such services were borne by the dock operator which charged for them via dock dues calculated according to the class of passenger and the scale of luggage they carried with them.⁹⁹ As vessels continued to increase in size investment was increasingly targeted at meeting the needs of the ocean liner.¹⁰⁰ Such services were as pivotal to first-class operations on

⁹⁴ Jarvis, *Ibid*, pp. 21-2.

⁹⁵ Chart 3.9.

⁹⁶ *The Times*, 20 April 1876, p. 10.

⁹⁷ First-hand accounts describe how migrants arriving in Liverpool (after 1876) were often taken straight to the ocean liner upon arrival at the city's Lime Street or Central Stations. See (for example) *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM* (Compilation of General Voyage Notes of the *Wisconsin*, June 1885).

⁹⁸ Jarvis, *Ibid*, p. 22.

⁹⁹ See (for example) the charges of the Port of London Authority. (MLD, PLA 507, *Minute book of the East & West India Dock Company*, pp. 81-2, 'Letter to the General Steamship Navigation Company' (1887).)

¹⁰⁰ Jarvis, *Ibid*, pp. 33-4.

board an ocean liner as they were for third-class passengers.¹⁰¹ As shipping companies provided more extensive services, so port-based replenishment became more specialised. This necessitated greater allocation of space for berthing and access to specialised loading equipment – ranging from coaling facilities to cranes and more porters.¹⁰² Coupled with the additional functions of dry-docking and ship maintenance, the operations provided at Atlantic docks facilitating the transmigrant trade mirrored those at the point of entry – except for the fact that everything was often far larger.¹⁰³

The docks at Liverpool, for example, had to accommodate the substantial growth of ships plying the route between Liverpool and New York. Those of the Cunard Line, to take just one company, grew from the *Britannia* (launched in 1840) measuring 207 x 34 x 22 feet, to the *Umbria* (launched in 1884) measuring 501 x 57 x 38 feet, to the *Aquitania* (launched in 1914) measuring 868 x 97 x 49 feet.¹⁰⁴ Upon the conversion to steam of all passenger fleets leaving the port by 1870 the dimensions of craft continued to grow.¹⁰⁵ The pressing demands of ocean travel – of which transmigrants were increasingly one of the most numerically important elements – heavily-burdened the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board.¹⁰⁶ It had to continue to provide ever-larger docking facilities to replenish and sustain the ocean liner.¹⁰⁷ As Table 6.2 clearly demonstrates, most companies shipping transmigrant passengers from Liverpool moved to new docks as the dock estate was improved. They did not show a degree of loyalty after heavy investment in improving the port's facilities had taken place.¹⁰⁸ Excluding the Beaver, National, and

¹⁰¹ MLD, PLA, London and St. Katharine Docks Company – Court of Directors Minute Book 3.1, (Letter dated 30 March 1885 to the Superintendent West India Docks from A. Maxwell Todd).

¹⁰² Ditto; and London and St. Katharine Docks Company – Court of Directors Minute Book 3.1 (Letter from JC Weisman to The Superintendent); PLA 514 - II 'Meeting of the Tilbury Dock Committee', pp. 202-3.

¹⁰³ Jarvis, *Ibid*, pp. 21-2.

¹⁰⁴ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, pp. 326-333.

¹⁰⁵ Chart 4.3.

¹⁰⁶ Jarvis, *Ibid*, pp. 30-2

¹⁰⁷ Colin Reed, *Gateway to the West: A History of the Riverside Station, Liverpool: MD & HB-LNWR* (Chorleywood, Hertfordshire, 1992), p.4

¹⁰⁸ Especially evident with the abandonment of Liverpool by the Inman Line in 1892.

Guion lines, we can see the continued flow of shipping companies to the newest and most expensive dock facilities demanded by such customers.

Table 6.2. Dock usage at Liverpool by different passenger liners, 1870-1910

Company	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910
Allan	Princes/Wellington	Wellington	Alexandra	Alexandra	Canada
American	Huskisson	Huskisson	Langton	Langton	Huskisson
Beaver	Bramley-Moore	Waterloo	Alexandra	Hornby	N/A
Cunard	Huskisson	Huskisson	Alexandra	Canada	Huskisson
Guion	Sandon	Sandon	Alexandra	Ceased trading	Ceased trading
Inman	Huskisson	Waterloo	Alexandra	Moved to Southampton	Moved to Southampton
Leyland	N/A	Huskisson	Alexandra	Huskisson	Huskisson
National	Bramley-Moore	Huskisson	Alexandra	Langton	Freight only
Warren	Queens/Stanley	Waterloo	Alexandra	Alexandra	Alexandra
White Star	Bramley-Moore	Alfred/Waterloo	Alexandra	Canada	Canada

Source: MMM, *Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry* (1865-1914). This source was sampled for the first week of May each year – the height of the transmigrant season.

Such developments were not cheap. Constant improvements features of the dock estates furnishing the Atlantic trades were a burden to dock companies yet they were also essential. The Mersey Dock and Harbour Board's debts grew from increased from £14.4 to £23.9 million between 1870 and 1900.¹⁰⁹ White Star's move of some passenger operations in 1907 to Southampton presented the realised and growing dangers facing British port operators. It was a pressure not confined to Liverpool. Other ports engaged in shipping transmigrants out of Britain, namely Glasgow, London, and Southampton, were all approached by ocean liner companies demanding improved facilities – even though they did not always appear commercially viable. The pressing needs in London were evident when in 1908 the Port of London Authority (PLA) was created. Operators had realised services at the port were out of date compared with her British and European rivals. As the first meeting of the newly-formed PLA stated:

¹⁰⁹ Jarvis, *Ibid*, p. 31.

Twenty years ago the largest ship afloat had a length of 550 feet. As recently as 1902 when the Royal Commission reported, they referred to the fact that the biggest ship afloat at the time, the “Oceanic” with a length of 686 feet, was capable of entering Tilbury Dock. What do we find today? That the leviathan of the moment, the “Mauretania”, 760 feet in length, could not enter Tilbury. ... The dominant factor in the prosperity of a port is the accommodation and facilities that it affords. We know full well that rival ports, not merely on the Continent (the attention of the public is often directed to what is happening in Hamburg, Antwerp and Rotterdam, as if they were the only ports), but in this country also by the wise expenditure of capital have been enabled to keep abreast of the requirements of the day.¹¹⁰

Meeting customer demand was not always financially rewarding. As the PLA further noted at a meeting of its Dock and Warehousing Committee in 1911:

The Committee report that they have had under consideration an application from Messrs. Ismay, Imrie & Co. for additional accommodation for the White Star Line at Tilbury Dock. The berth on the south side of the main dock about to be vacated by Messrs. William Christie & Co. is available, but in order to meet the requirements of the White Star Line it would be necessary to extend the dock wall, erect a shed, provide cranes and a railway track at an estimated cost of £52,000. It is estimated that the annual receipts derived from the accommodation would be £10,500, on the basis of 18 entries of vessels of 10,000 tons net register, including dues, transporting, and rent of quay and shed space at the rate of 3s. per square yard.

Though the meagre return on investment appeared to negate any benefit associated with such expenditure, they had to try and catch up with other ports – especially Southampton, Dover, and even Bristol.¹¹¹ The numbers of transmigrants leaving the port of London was only sustained because of the routes to South Africa and Australasia. London’s services to New York were diverted to Southampton in 1893. Bristol and Dover further diverted London’s flows when they began to emerge as transmigrant ports in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Compounding the difficulties of meeting the customer’s demand for improved dock services, especially when such needs could be met by rival port operators, were the difficulties associated with the docks not being developed by railway companies, as

¹¹⁰ MLD, PLA, Minutes of Proceedings, Volume I (16 March 1909).

¹¹¹ See Chart 3.21.

evident at Hull. One of the most pressing needs of the dock was linking the rail and shipping elements of their ports. When the PLA proposed the extension and further development of its Tilbury landing stage in 1911, in an attempt to improve passenger use, protracted negotiations with the Midland Railway delayed these developments until after the First World War. The difficulties experienced by the PLA mirrored similar conflicts of interest for most of Britain's Atlantic ports, with the notable exception of the London and South Western Railway's Southampton where rail and shipping services were provided by the same company. Complications and vested interests between the dock company and railway operator thereby compounded the evolution of integrated transport systems. As with Hull, such systems were an essential feature for the conduit of first-class boat train passengers and not third-class transmigrants. Interests on the composition of the dock board further complicated matters. A change in the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board in 1893 brought about a marked change in the fortunes of Liverpool's passenger companies. The dredging of the Mersey during the 1890s and the extension of the railway to the quayside in 1894 were examples of the change in direction at boardroom level. Yet the changes only served to negate the impact of inter-port rivalry with the rapidly emerging port of Southampton.

The re-development of Southampton, a port which had been previously eclipsed by London in 1884 but which then re-emerged following expensive re-development in the early 1890s, demonstrated that ports could regain their share of the domestic and foreign passenger market if sufficient deep-water conditions were available. Diverting the trade in transmigrants was a fundamental facet of passenger operations. Like Dover, and to a lesser extent the port of Bristol, ports benefited from foreign liners wishing to re-coal before they commenced their Atlantic crossing. After foreign fleets, such as HAPAG, added call-in stops to Southampton during the late-1880s this added significantly to the number of transmigrants using the port.¹¹² Yet the port also developed particular infrastructure – including improved docking facilities and quayside railway connections – to foster the use by such liners.

¹¹² *The Times*, 4 April 1889, p. 2, 'Shipping'. The service started with the launch of the *Augusta Victoria* who sailed from Southampton on Friday 10 May 1889.

The status quo of ports was further challenged by JP Morgan's International Merchant Marine which posed a real threat to British ports upon his acquisition of various British and European passenger companies in 1902.¹¹³ Morgan not only encouraged the move of some of White Star's operations from Liverpool, but also promoted the continental migrant flows via Antwerp – thus circumventing the need for European emigrants to use British ports.¹¹⁴ The rise of other continental ports such as Cherbourg, le Havre, and Fiume and Trieste further compounded the intense competition faced by British ports as transmigrants were able to embark on a British liner at a European port, removing the need for a prior seaborne journey to Britain.¹¹⁵ As Philip Taylor described 'It might, indeed, be a local train ride like one from a Midland town to Liverpool'.¹¹⁶ Steamship operators were not just single vessels but whole lines, and the industry was too competitive for any loyalty. As Jarvis has argued, port operators such as the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, feared when White Star started to develop operations outside of Liverpool – in particular those from Southampton – that the whole fleet (and thus support business) might move as well.¹¹⁷ In particular they feared the loss of the biggest and deepest ships 'which provided much of [a] port's bread and butter'.¹¹⁸

Inter-port rivalry reached its zenith in the second decade of the twentieth century as newer ports such as Dover and Bristol 'opened' as conduits for transoceanic passenger shipping.¹¹⁹ Central to this competition was the traffic bound to the United States and in particular the transmigrants travelling through European ports reached new heights. Using figures for just 1910, we see that the number of foreign passengers using Liverpool

¹¹³ Robin Gardiner, *The History of the White Star Line* (Hersham, Surrey, 2001), pp. 122-3.

¹¹⁴ The number of third-class passengers travelling with White Star, via Southampton to New York, rose from 11,715 in 1907, to 10,121 in 1908, 20,115 in 1909, 17,364 in 1910, 12,335 in 1911, 12,465 in 1912, before peaking at 23,035 in 1913. (Source: INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1907-1913).)

¹¹⁵ INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1917).

¹¹⁶ Taylor, *The Distant Magnet*, p. 149.

¹¹⁷ Jarvis, *Ibid*, p. 36

¹¹⁸ Ditto.

¹¹⁹ See Chart 3.21. Transmigrants began using Dover in 1905 and Bristol in 1899. (Source: INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1917).)

was 133,057; Southampton 40,180; Glasgow 7,955; and London 3,455.¹²⁰ Yet the trade represented 66 per cent of all Liverpool's passenger trade, 76 per cent of Southampton, 24 of Glasgow, and 86 per cent of the trade from London.¹²¹ The foreign passenger market, in particular the shipping third-class emigrants to the United States, thus constituted the crux of the third-class passenger trade handled by Britain's ports. Whilst domestic demand was high, that of foreign passengers was even greater.¹²² Successful port operations proved pivotal to maintaining this share – especially as (after 1901) the European transmigrant customer was bombarded with glossy illustrations promoting alternative port facilities such as HAPAG's state of the art emigrant village at Veddel complete with every feature from synagogue to secure isolation.¹²³

By the eve of the First World War, British companies also collected foreign emigrants from numerous European ports equipped with Atlantic passenger services.¹²⁴ Overseas companies developing their pan-European operations further conditioned this internationalism.¹²⁵ Ports became secondary in importance to the overall operation of transmigrant services as foreign companies collected passengers from many British ports and British companies had to call into former rival European ports in order to collect additional third-class European passengers.¹²⁶ It was a far cry from their halcyon days in the mid-nineteenth century when ports such as Liverpool conveyed the majority of British and Irish emigrants and cabin passengers, and then courted the development of the

¹²⁰ BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables relation to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (London, 1910), p. 6.

¹²¹ Based on data shown in Chart 3.09.

¹²² Chart 3.08.

¹²³ Jörg Berlin & Matthias Schmoock, *Auswandererhafen Hamburg* (Hamburg, 2000), pp. 28-35, 62-66.

¹²⁴ INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1917).

¹²⁵ Ditto; *The Times* (Shipping Advertisements, 1880-1914); NMM, *Cooks Ocean Sailing List* (London, 1915), pp. 14-58).

¹²⁶ INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1917). See also the growing number of agents listed by transoceanic steamship companies in their printed promotional literature. See example: NMM, Union Steam Ship Company, *South African Gold & Diamond Fields and Cape of Good Hope, Natal & East African Royal Mail Service* (Southampton, c. 1895), pp. 54-60.

transmigrant business via feeder ports such as Hull, Goole, and Grimsby.¹²⁷ As Southampton became not only the facilitator of transmigrant operations via her own harbour, but also of the flow from other feeder ports, ports such as Hull ensured rail services south were as integrated as those west. The southward shift of transmigrant and other passenger operations progressed markedly throughout the last decade of the nineteenth and first two decades of the twentieth century. The flows north of the Humber came to an abrupt halt. Meeting the needs of shipping companies was pivotal to this success – whether they were first-, second-, or third-class passengers. It was, as will now be demonstrated, the wider significance of the transmigrant trade to Britain’s port-cities that underpinned the decision by many dock and transport companies to provide what, on the surface, appeared financially unjustifiable expenditure. The hidden value of the trade to port-cities – not accountable on any balance sheet – brought important ‘added value’ to Britain’s leading maritime centres.

6.3.3 The transmigrant trade and the Port-City

Evidence presented in 1851 on Irish emigration via the port of Liverpool by S. Walcott, secretary to the Emigration Commissioners, calculated that each steerage passenger was worth 10 shillings (120 pence) in extra provisions to the local economy.¹²⁸ Using evidence on the number of foreign passengers leaving Britain between 1853 and 1913 – i.e. 5,323,875 – and reducing this figure by the same scale as Walcott (86 per cent) – to account for the difference in victualling charges for adults, children, and infants – the victualling of the alien passenger trade totalled approximately £2,291,416.¹²⁹ Further calculations presented by Walcott estimated the cost of maintenance in the Atlantic port at 10 shillings per passenger, or a further £2,291,416. The combined value of the foreign passenger trade for provisions and maintenance to British Atlantic ports was £4,582,832.

¹²⁷ Chart 3.09; Read, *Through Liverpool*, p. 1.

¹²⁸ BPP, *Twelfth General Report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners* (1852), p. 84, ‘Appendix No. 5 – Statement of the Estimated Amounts paid by *Irish* emigrants for *Steerage* passages, &c. to the United States and British North America in 1851’.

¹²⁹ See Chart 3.14 and Table 3.14. Children were classed as half adult fares and needed less food per head. This calculation therefore factors in Walcott’s calculation that the value of the trade represented 86 per cent of the number of passengers travelling.

If only the figures for alien passengers known to have been transmigrants are used (3.15 million) this value remains significant – £2,709,000.¹³⁰ Further revenues, generated on the victualling for the North Sea journey, and presented at the time of the 1882 Parliamentary investigation into transmigration stated that, on average, victualling was worth two shillings and six pence (30 pence) per passenger. Such values represent minimal levels, yet it added a potential £338,625 to the value of victualling which the port derived from the trade. Whether the vessels berthed in their home ports or were just visitors, all required replenishment. Both figures combined (those for points of entry and exit) totalled £3,047,625 and demonstrated the importance of the transmigrant trade to ports. Whilst such figures demonstrated the direct benefits of transmigration to Britain's port-cities, other associated aspects of the trade added to the wider function of port-cities.

Integrated transport systems which benefited passenger trade along the transpennine corridor also helped freight imports and exports as the ports of Hull and Liverpool both adequately demonstrate. Such services typified the evolution of ports and their immediate hinterlands, as Hoyle defined as the shift from primitive port-city to expanding port-city.¹³¹ The movement of goods through maritime entrepôts also attracted, or was sustained, by the interconnected formation of merchant networks situated close to the docks where transmigrants also arrived. At feeder ports other trades included iron ore, fruit, fish, timber, and coal. The movement of transmigrants along cross-country rail routes mirrored that of other components of commodity shipping. But this trade was not for the discerning passenger. The dual function of shipping passengers and commodities alongside each other occurred regularly. Vessels arriving at Hull's Victoria Dock from Baltic ports invariably carried timber and horses for the Yorkshire coal mines. Those from Scandinavian ports carried finished goods, hemp, and iron ore. Each transmigrant route saw imports of goods carried alongside the passengers flourish.

¹³⁰ Figure based on Table 3.14.

¹³¹ Brian Hoyle, 'Fields on Tension: Development Dynamics at the Port-City Interface', in David Cesarani (ed.), *Port Jews. Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950* (London, 2002), p. 17

Yet in order to gauge the wider significance of the transmigrant trade to British ports, one needs to assess the impact that commodity shipping had beyond the harbour wall or in this instance dock gates. As Robert Lee argued:

even when there is a conscious attempt to reaffirm the importance of the links between ports and their wider economic and social communities, there is a continuing failure to articulate a sufficiently focussed agenda or to appreciate the complex inter-linkages between maritime and urban history. ... Maritime historians in particular have seldom succeeded in integrating studies of port activities relating to shipping and trade within a broader urban context.¹³²

By using a narrower lens – transmigration – through which to view a particular facet of the passenger trade, we can see how the trade affected the port-cities around which it gravitated, and the wider hinterlands of port-cities who benefited from such transport inter-changes.

The movement of goods alongside the trade further the growth in the number of overseas consuls, agents, and businessmen. Merchants such as John Good & Sons aided the growth of imports linked to passenger routes. They were part of a European-wide network of families acting as middlemen and organising at port-level the movement of specialised commodities alongside passengers. At a lower level but facilitating the needs of transmigrants were other immigrants who provided port-based lodgings. These small and overcrowded hovels offered basic accommodation to tired travellers. Generally one-man businesses, they profited from the migrants' need for shelter between their arrival and the train journey across Britain, or else before settling in one of the provincial communities. Such lodging-houses also fed the hungry traveller in batches of around 80 migrants at a time. Lodging-house owners were typified by men such as Paul Julius Drasdo and Harry Lazarus, each of whom established local agencies in the port of Hull.

According to the 1881 Census, as shown in Table 6.3, many foreign-born agents catered for the needs of the aliens *en route*, especially in providing help with their poor knowledge of English. Paul Julius Drasdo, an immigrant from Berlin in 1880, married the daughter of one of Hull's emigration agents (John W. Fett of Germany), and with the

¹³² Robert Lee, 'Configuring the City: In-Migration, Labour Supply and Port Development in Nineteenth-Century Europe', *International Journal of Maritime History*, Volume XVII, Number 1 (2005), p. 92.

passing of the Aliens Act, 1905, he had become Hull's leading emigration agent. The Home Office also appointed him Hull's official Immigration Officer. In this role he met (for a fee) every vessel bringing aliens to Hull and arranged transport for those who had not already paid for onward rail travel. He spoke several languages, including German, Yiddish, and Russian, and he helped the immigrants during their medical inspections and on disembarkation. Similar services were provided at other points of entry.

Table 6.3: The nationality of emigration agents facilitating the transmigrant trade at Hull in 1881

Occupation	Country of birth
Emigration Agent	England
Emigration Agent	England
Emigration Agent	Germany
Emigration Agent	Germany
Lodging House Keeper	Germany
Emigrants Baggage Master	Netherlands
Clerk – Emigration Agents Office	England
Immigration Clerk (unemployed)	England

Source: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *1881 British Census and National Index, England, Scotland, Wales, Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and Royal Navy* CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1998).

In railway ports such as Grimsby the services of a full-time warden and his wife catered for the needs of the alien upon arrival. Unlike Hull-based agents they shepherded the transmigrant from arrival all the way to Liverpool. It prevented the abuses associated with crimping at London where ‘crimps of the worst type ... took charge of the emigrants ... to conduct them with their baggage ... to undesirable lodging houses’.¹³³ At London fears of crimping and the dangers of women and girls being tricked into entering the White Slave Trade led to a charity, the Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter, being given responsibility – following an agreement with the Port of London Sanitary Committee in 1892 – to meet every boatload of aliens arriving via the Thames whether or not the passengers were Jewish.¹³⁴ The task was formidable. In the twelve month period

¹³³ LJM, Abraham Mundy, *Some Reminiscences of the Shelter's Activities for the last Quarter of a Century* (London, 1922), p. 11-12.

between 1 November 1907 and 31 October 1908 representatives of the Shelter met, according to their annual reports, over 934 boats carrying 19,558 passengers.¹³⁵ Despite the name the organisation it met and assisted every alien arriving. Of the 19,558 passengers already described 14,801 (or 76 per cent) were Christians.¹³⁶ Such was the importance of the Shelter and its sister organisation the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women that it sought to legitimise the appearance of their British-born dockside agents by purchasing a green and gold uniform – with an official badge of the Society on his collar.¹³⁷ To facilitate the needs of their foreign born clients they were also taught to speak German Jewish (Yiddish).¹³⁸

At British points of re-embarkation systems providing for the temporary needs of transmigrants between the arrival of the emigrant train and the departure of the ocean liner also emerged. Lodging-house keepers such as Joseph Jackson, an emigration agent of Earle Street in Liverpool, were well equipped for the role, having himself previously emigrated to the United States via Liverpool.¹³⁹ Born in Denmark, he married a German, migrated to the United States before returning to Britain and becoming a naturalised British subject in Liverpool.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, Austrian-born Charles Neurkloff, 48, a hotel manager at 39 Paradise Street, settled in Britain with his Austrian-born wife.¹⁴¹ They employed a German porter, a Liverpudlian domestic, an Irish cook, and other servants

¹³⁴ CLRO, 565B, 'Port Sanitary Reports: 1894 – Period 1' (1 June 1894).

¹³⁵ LMA, 'Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter - 1907/8', p. 5.

¹³⁶ Ditto.

¹³⁷ University of Southampton Archives & Special Collections, 'Society for the Protection of Women and Girls – Joint Committee: General Minutes', p. 5.)

¹³⁸ The joint committee of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter and the Jewish Association for the Protection of Women and Girls paid for their agent – Steinhouse – to receive lessons in 'German Jewish' and tested his language skills during meetings of the committee. (Source: University of Southampton Archives & Special Collections, 'Society for the Protection of Women and Girls – Joint Committee: General Minutes', pp. 87, 103.)

¹³⁹ *1881 British Census CD-ROM* (found using the Neighbour Search function and searching for the term 'emigrant + agent + Liverpool').

¹⁴⁰ Ditto.

¹⁴¹ Ditto.

from the Isle of Man, Hampshire, and Ireland to cater for the needs of their 93 Polish, 73 Swedish, 11 German, 8 Norwegian, and 4 Danish transmigrant customers staying at their lodging-house on Census night 1881.¹⁴² Other emigrant ‘hotels’ were run by British or Irish-born people and employed Swedes, Poles, Danes, or Germans as translators and interpreters – reflecting the diverse composition of the British transoceanic passenger market.¹⁴³ As Chart 6.3 demonstrates, the Irish played a major part in the Liverpool trade, followed by their English and German counterparts. Those born outside of Britain represented 66 per cent of those listed as ‘emigration agents’. As detailed within *Gore’s Commercial Directories of Liverpool* for the period 1840-1914, unlike at Hamburg and Bremen, British steamship companies never built their own migrant accommodation facilities.¹⁴⁴ At Liverpool three properties were used for the temporary requirements of the White Star’s passengers during the period 1870-1914.¹⁴⁵ Other companies followed this trend and included Mrs. Harcourt’s lodging house used by Cunard’s passengers at Liverpool and the Allan Line’s Emigrants’ Home (situated at 60 Clyde Place, Glasgow).¹⁴⁶ All were of a similar scale and function; their location reflected their close proximity to the landing stages from where the transmigrants were transported to transoceanic liners.

¹⁴² Ditto.


¹⁴³ Ditto.

¹⁴⁴ They were sampled decennially from 1840-1910 and the additional use of 1914.

¹⁴⁵ *Gore’s Commercial Directories of Liverpool* (1870-1914).

¹⁴⁶ An image of Cunard’s hotel was included within the exhibition ‘Liverpool to New York’ held at the MMM in 2004; yet it could not be traced within *Gore’s Commercial Directories of Liverpool*. The Allan Line’s Emigrant Home was located using the Post Office, *Directory of Glasgow 1908-9* (Glasgow, 1908), p. 800. The scale of the building was highlighted in contemporary maps of Clyde Place. (Source: The Mitchell Library.)

Chart 6.3: The country of birth of emigration agents facilitating the transmigrant trade at Liverpool in 1881



Source: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *1881 British Census and National Index, England, Scotland, Wales, Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and Royal Navy CD-ROM* (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1998).

The business was multi-faceted and the role of the foreign-born in the development of this aspect of the British market was therefore essential. Having developed commercial networks with British companies engaged in the shipment of passenger, freight, and goods, many followed the pattern of changing from ships' captains to shipowners, importers, and finally to emigration agents. Others arrived as immigrants themselves and established lodging-houses at feeder-ports, or else they secured roles as translators, clerks, commercial agents, or even baggage handlers. The interplay between the trade and the port therefore brought multi-level benefits. Such middlemen were fundamental to the development of the trade and were to be found at each stage in the transmigrants' journey westward. The business benefited different strata of middlemen. The sight of the foreign-born at such ports was impressive. It did not cause contemporary alarm, unlike anti-alien sentiment evident in London and Leeds –

where foreign labourers were seen as under-cutting local labour rates and establishing visible alien enclaves. Their presence in key maritime centres such as Hull, Grimsby, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Southampton was instead welcomed and seen as contributing to the vitality of port-operations. As one observer (Joseph Fletcher) noted in 1899, at Hull's points of entry:

There is always a crowd of heterogeneous human elements. Here one sees almost every type of the European family, together with men from the far-off corners of the earth. A Lincolnshire shepherd rubs shoulders with a swarthy Lascar; fair-haired Swedes lounge against the railings beyond which a party of emigrant Russian Jews, greasy and unkempt, are keeping strict watch over a few miserable belongings; Danes, Germans, Spaniards, Italians chatter and gabble in their own tongues to the accompaniment of the louder voices of Yorkshire or Lincolnshire folk who have come into Hull to market. Along the streets leading from the Humber side towards the centre of the town a similarly mixed crowd is always moving.¹⁴⁷

Connecting men of commerce, port-based agents, and immigrant lodging-house keepers were connections such as membership of overseas churches, fraternal organisation, and *landsmanshaft*. Hull's German Lutheran Church was one of many. Situated alongside it on Hull's Osborne Street were a number of synagogues, and churches of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. They catered not only for newly-arrived migrants, but immigrants who had established themselves within the business fraternity. Emigration agent Johann Fett attended the Norwegian Church and his son-in-law was Paul Julius Drasdo, a regular at the German Lutheran Church. In addition they both joined the local lodge of the freemasons, as did many of Hull's leading merchants and shipowners. Those who succeeded in the transmigrant trade were thus well connected within their commercial districts. Yet their operations were often short-lived affairs. Lazarus, Drasdo's counterpart, never moved his business when the trade shifted from the Humber and Railway Docks to the Albert Dock. Drasdo did; his agency and reputation enabled the business to pass to the next generation upon his death in 1933.

The port-city was therefore an arena of opportunity for both foreigners and merchants trading in the movement of foreigners. They used their skills to the benefit of

¹⁴⁷ Joseph Fletcher, *A Picturesque History of Yorkshire: Volume I* (London, 1901), p. 44.

British commerce. Contrary to theories of port-Jews put forward by Sorkin and Dubin, this phenomenon was not applicable only to Jews. For whilst anti-alienists succeeded in gaining sufficient popular and parliamentary support to bring about the 1903 *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration*, which in turn led to the 1905 Aliens Act, few objected to aliens who brought commercial opportunities. In this way it is arguable that a port-alien stereotype – with international commercial and fraternal links – added to the vibrancy of port commerce. When Hull’s Albert Dock was opened by the Prince and Princess of Wales in 1869, no anti-alien sentiment was expressed. Indeed when representatives of Hull’s Danish community were presented to the royal couple, it was heralded with pride by *The Times*.¹⁴⁸ Further, no one objected when Paul Julius Drasdo became Hull’s first official immigration agent in 1906, nor when he earlier applied to become a British citizen in 1896.¹⁴⁹ Successful immigrants, such as John Reeves Ellerman, the son of Johann Ellerman (who landed at Hull in 1850, and was Hanover’s honorary Consul and a member of the Lutheran church), instead distinguished port-cities from urban centres or seats of government by their cosmopolitan stance.¹⁵⁰ The difference between the anti-alienism expressed towards the sweated labour of Victorian Leeds may instead be attributed to class distinctions. Those benefiting maritime commerce in any way were also perceived to be helping the expansion of port commerce.

A less celebrated feature associated the fluid movement of aliens *en masse* through Britain’s ports were the dangers of sanitation for both town and port. It had always been a key concern for port-based officials. By 1825, officials had begun to recognise that pestilence other than plague and yellow fever – covered under the 1800 Quarantine Act – posed threats to British commerce.¹⁵¹ Under the 1825 Quarantine Act responsibility for isolation rested with Customs officials.¹⁵² This lack of central

¹⁴⁸ *The Times*, 22 July 1869, p. 9, ‘The Prince and Princess of Wales at Hull’.

¹⁴⁹ TNA, HO 144/387/B20362 (1896), ‘Naturalisation file of Paul Julius Drasdo of Hull’.

¹⁵⁰ William Rubenstein, ‘ELLERMAN, Sir John Reeves’, in H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison (eds.), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Volume XII* (Oxford, 2004), p. 137.

¹⁵¹ Maglen, ‘The First Line of Defence’, pp. 413-428.

¹⁵² 1825 Geo. III. c.78.

intervention caused particular headaches for the trade in migrants. *Laissez-faire* politics hindered Britain's ability to handle the threat of cholera, which was not a quarantinable disease. In September 1848 the steamboat trade between Hull and Hamburg had been blamed for the introduction to Britain of the second and most fatal pandemic of Asiatic cholera which swept across Europe in the nineteenth century.¹⁵³ It caused the deaths of 53,000 people in England and Wales – 1,860 or two per cent of the town's population died in Hull.¹⁵⁴ But it was later found that diseased Germans had actually introduced the disease to Britain via the port of Leith in 1848.¹⁵⁵ Evidence presented in 1892 stated: 'In the third pandemic, 1846-63, the first appearance in Great Britain was during October, 1848, at Hull, whence it had been brought by a vessel from Hamburg, and extended over the whole country before the end of that year'.¹⁵⁶ The trade caused panic and alarm. The justification for such finger pointing at Hull by the Mayor of London is a little ironic considering that the *Report of the General Board of Health on the Epidemic Cholera of 1848 & 1849* stated 'the cases of cholera that occurred in London, it should be observed, were the first, as far as it is known, that appeared in Great Britain, being two or three months earlier than the first case reported in the port of Hull'.¹⁵⁷ But the devastation of the 1848 pandemic led to the permanent association of the stranger and disease.

The solutions to medical dangers were still addressed locally, and Hull led the way in developments in port-based sanitation. Innovations associated with the trade led to her authorities advising other British and foreign ports on sanitation. Yet the trade was left un-policed. Transmigrants were free to wonder around the streets of Hull and thus continued to pose a threat. This is particularly surprising when, as shown in a report by the Inspector of Nuisances on 18 June 1866:

¹⁵³ Margaret Pelling, *Cholera, Fever and English Medicine, 1825-1865* (Oxford, 1978), p. 2.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*; George Patrick, *A Plague on You, Sir! A Community's Road to Health* (Hull, 1981), p. 44.

¹⁵⁵ BPP, *Report of the General Board of Health of the Epidemic Cholera of 1848 & 1849* (1850), p. 8.

¹⁵⁶ CLRO, 565B, 'Special report on the measures taken to prevent the introduction of Cholera into the Port of London' (25 August 1892).

¹⁵⁷ BPP, *Report of the General Board of Health on the Epidemic Cholera of 1848 & 1849* (London, 1850), p. 14.

The owners of the New York steamers refused to take on board at Liverpool [200 emigrants from Gothenburg who had arrived 4 days earlier than their steamer was due to leave Liverpool] if they went near a lodging house there, but if they remained in Hull up to nearly the time of the steamers sailing and then went direct from Hull by railway to the vessel they would receive them on board, because Hull was in so much more healthy a condition than Liverpool.¹⁵⁸

A large rise in the instance of scarlet fever in 1881, virulent in Hull during the year, was blamed on the foreigner emigrants passing through the town.¹⁵⁹ Perhaps recalling the prevalence of disease in ‘different inns and lodging-houses’ frequented by Germans during the 1848/1849 cholera epidemic, it became a major political concern when a local doctor and 213 rate-payers of the town signed a memorial and despatched it to the Local Government Board urging action.¹⁶⁰ Although such illnesses were not introduced by the activities of the port, sufficient popular political agitation necessitated the visitation of inspectors of the Local Government Board.¹⁶¹ Its findings stated the Port Sanitary Officials – employed since 1872 to separate urban and port sanitary affairs – were doing a sufficient job at preventing the introduction of disease and that the emigrants were healthy.

The hazards the Humber ports collectively posed led to the creation in 1884 of a new authority – the Hull and Goole Port Sanitary Authority – with powers over both Hull and Goole.¹⁶² Increased concern for matters concerning port-commerce widened the sphere of isolation. Such fears led to floating hospitals at large transmigrant ports such as Southampton, Hull, London, and even in smaller ports such as Goole.¹⁶³ By the time of

¹⁵⁸ HCA, BHH/1/49, p. 94.

¹⁵⁹ Patrick, *A Plague on You, Sir!*, pp. 71-73; Gillett & MacMahon, *A History of Hull*, p. 281.

¹⁶⁰ BPP, *Appendix to the Report of the General Board of Health on the Epidemic Cholera of 1848 & 1849 – Report by Dr. Sutherland* (London, 1850), p. 9.

¹⁶¹ BPP, *Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882).

¹⁶² Grimsby being absent as she was far closer to the mouth of the Humber.

¹⁶³ CLRO, Misc. MSS/337/2, ‘Cholera Precautions: Returns of information from the Port Sanitary Authorities in response to questionnaire, with covering letter that accompanied the questionnaire’ (1893).

the 1892 Hamburg cholera epidemic, measures introduced in the previous two decades were already in place to deal with the commercial and medical hazards associated with the trade in transmigrants. Whilst cholera brought the commerce of the great German city to a complete standstill, those with established trading links to the port introduced increased vigilance. It brought the risks associated with the flow of transmigrants to the forefront of ports such as Hull, Grimsby, and London. In the case of Grimsby, a port heavily dependent upon the flow of transmigrants from Hamburg, the effects were particularly alarming. The quarterly report of the port's Port Sanitary Inspector observed: 'At this meeting it was unanimously resolved that the Local Government Board be earnestly desired to use any powers they may possess to prevent emigrants from cholera infected places coming to Grimsby and other English ports'.¹⁶⁴ Alien transmigrants thereby brought commercial benefits and medical dangers to Britain's ports and their hinterlands. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century such risks lessened as port sanitary authorities sought to isolate the transmigrant from the ports through which they passed – at least during times of epidemic disease. Ports continued to benefit from the movement of the stranger – whether they remained for a day, week, year, or longer.

6.4 Conclusion

The business of transmigration, like that of passenger travel generally, became more specialised throughout the nineteenth century as key arteries and transport companies exercised greater influence over the ports they worked from. Ports able to survive the cyclical nature of the business of shipping poor emigrants had to offer services to other trades than just the passenger market. The transmigrant trade, like the export of heavy engineering or specialised machinery, was a particular aspect of a much wider market. Unlike the movement of machinery or bulk cargoes it did not necessitate the investment in specialist port infrastructure. Instead, the trade was a by-product of other general trades and only had particular importance during periods of large-scale movement – as apparent in 1872, 1882, 1889, 1902 and 1907. Diversification into other trades was essential and was typified by the port of Grimsby which depended upon fish first, then

¹⁶⁴ NELA, 1/113/4, 'Minutes of the Urban Sanitary Authority – Quarterly Report of the Port Sanitary Inspector' (26 August 1892).

goods second, and finally passengers. At larger ports such as Hull greater diversification saw some passengers carried alongside timber, others with morning goods, whilst most travelled with iron ore.

The complex system of moving goods and passengers alongside one another meant different port-based solutions per customer – a degree of specialisation. Transport integration along the route from Europe to the United States was only achieved along the key transmigrant corridor in 1908. Ships became floating trains linking terminus to terminus and conveying the passengers and their luggage with a degree of ease unimaginable even a decade earlier. The development of the trunk routes, through which millions easily flowed, facilitated port expansion generally and maintained Britain's leading status nationally. Feeder ports such as Hull, Grimsby, Goole, Leith, and Harwich all increased the overall volume of the passenger trade through Britain's ocean terminals at Liverpool, Glasgow, London, and Southampton. Had it not been for the transmigrant trade, then Hamburg and Bremen may have eclipsed Britain's share in the European passenger trade far earlier than they did. Port-based operations could have seen less development as the return on capital expenditure was reduced, and the British determination to dominate ocean travel would have been severely weakened as the profitability of operations from British ports lessened.

Most crucially of all, Britain's role in transmigration reduced the commercial opportunities of her European rivals as the trading arena became dominated by those ports that had emerged by the mid-nineteenth century as key players because of their geographically advantageous locations. Ports continually adapted to meet their overseas customers' needs. As shown by the eclipse of Southampton in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, and then of Liverpool in the second decade of the twentieth century, they could easily be supplanted by better services offered in other British or, increasingly, European ports. The business enabled port operators to provide improved facilities that aided the transmigrant. Yet as John Bramley-Moore, Chairman of the Mersey Dock and Harbour Board once commented, 'it was impossible to operate docks at a profit'.¹⁶⁵

The by-product of the trade, like so many aspects of port-commerce, was that Hull and Liverpool witnessed rapid urban and port expansion. The downside of dry

¹⁶⁵ Cited in Jarvis, *Ibid*, p. 28.

docks, graving docks, shipwrights, and support industries, in the words of Hyde, was that the port-city was ‘ugly’.¹⁶⁶ The profits of such trade were channelled into symbols of civic pride – demonstrated by Liverpool’s museums, grandiose piazzas, and public institutions. As with late twentieth century travel, the unequivocal level of service leading ‘brands’ – in this instance ports such as Liverpool and (later Southampton) – had to meet their customers’ every expectation. Features aimed at the finer clientele during the era of mass transmigration also enhanced the perceived reputation of their services to third-class emigrants. The importance of such prestige was demonstrated by their global reputations decades after their demise. Such conditions were also important to the providers of transport services to, through, and from Britain – the shipping and railway companies and their agents – who collectively ensured the third-class alien remained genuinely transient.

This chapter has used methodologies deployed by Jackson in his study of the archaeology of British ports to examine the impact of one trade on numerous British ports. Using the chronological spectrum 1836 to 1914, it has gone beyond the narrow studies of individual ports to assess the impact of one aspect of the passenger trade – transmigration – at a number of ports. In doing so this research has confirmed theories first purported by Jackson that docks do not make trade. Whilst showing that the passenger trade *per se* was not directly significant to a dock company’s well-being, by ‘looking beyond the dock wall’, to coin the phrase of Lee, it has demonstrated the wider benefits to maritime hinterlands of the mass migrant business. Not all associated aspects of the transmigrant trade were welcomed. Periodic outbreaks of disease raised concern amongst the population of port-cities about the strangers passing their cities. The economic benefits were hardly significant enough to allay such fears: ratepayers were not concerned about the number of people employed in the port of Hull when they sought a parliamentary investigation into the business of Scandinavian transmigrants passing through Hull. But did all ports situated along the trunk route between the Humber and the Mersey benefit, directly and indirectly, through the movement of aliens *en route* just

¹⁶⁶ Francis Hyde, *Liverpool and the Mersey: The Development of a Port, 1700-1970* (Newton Abbot, 1971), p. 70.

as other ocean terminals did from the first-class passengers passing through their harbours?

7. The transmigrant business and British transport companies

British shipping underwent rapid transformation during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as steam technology revolutionised the industry. Shipowners operating out of British ports had to combat the growing threat of foreign competition. Shipping companies needed to formulate new strategies for survival. This was acutely apparent because the small-scale operator was being gradually eclipsed by the liner company – a large-scale business in which surplus tonnage could be allocated to the passenger trade on a seasonal or casual basis. Maintaining such liner businesses, as Gordon Boyce described, were ‘contours of internal and external channels that facilitated contracts designed to sustain the growth of British shipping’.¹ Survival in this competitive field necessitated the formation of networks, co-operative frameworks, but above all else new approaches and entrepreneurial vigour. Such strategies, combined with aggressive acquisition policies and trade agreements, were essential to meet and (where possible) beat incursions into the trade by overseas competition.

This chapter considers the significance of transmigration to three areas of British transport trade – the short-sea shipping company (or feeder line), the cross-country railway, and the transoceanic shipping line – focusing, in turn, on earlier and later chronological periods. These analyses first chart the rise of transmigration as a crucial factor in the businesses of all three modes of transport between 1851 and 1881, a period of rapid commercial expansion during which the trade came to be dominated by a few key players. The focus then shifts to the period 1882 to 1914, an era dominated by foreign competition, and here the chapter considers policies and practices developed by the British transport companies to retain their advantageous positions. Moreover, the actions of companies involved in the latter period can be further subdivided. First, between 1882 and 1898, British companies were fully occupied in their attempts to meet the challenges of foreign competition and political intervention. In the latter half of this period, between 1899 and 1914, the businesses engaged in widespread formal co-operation, on the one hand, and on the other, in open, hostile trade wars.

¹ Boyce, *Information, Mediation and Institutional Development*, p. 2.

In discussing these latter periods the changing nature of the business and the bearing that official intervention had upon the trade in transmigrants becomes very apparent. In achieving this, the chapter adds to current literature by demonstrating the success of early protectionist strategies deployed within the transmigrant trade. Decades before the Transatlantic Passenger Conference (1899) and associated pooling agreements or cartels came to dominate the transoceanic passenger business, monopolies on land geared towards transmigration, coupled with informal business networks, enabled British companies to develop the commercial impetus that British ports, discussed within the preceding chapter, geographically offered. They were part of what Sturmeý described as conditions of supremacy which enabled British shipping to continue to master global shipping.² Later, as this position was challenged on a number of fronts, British companies were able to retain their advantageous positions within the wider market and achieve sustained growth in the business until the outbreak of the First World War.

7.1 The era of growth and expansion (1851-1881)

As the rate of Irish emigration declined during the early 1850s, so naturally did the income received by shipping companies working out of British ports for the Atlantic passenger trades. For example, in 1853, 220,462 passengers sailed from Liverpool; by 1860 this number had slumped to 83,774.³ The drop coincided with a decline in the number of colonial settlers leaving Birkenhead's British Emigration Depot. Faced with surplus capacity on their North Atlantic operations, shipping companies turned their attentions to the foreign passengers arriving in Liverpool from Hull, Goole, and Grimsby to lessen the impact of the decline. The conveyance of third-class European emigrants along the Humber to Mersey corridor thus ensured the long-term success of British shipping concerns and enabled Britain to remain the gateway to North America and Liverpool, Europe's premier passenger port. The transmigrant trade represented an important source of income for transport companies that had once relied heavily upon Irish emigrant traffic. Underpinning the expansion of the transmigrant trade was the need to increase the returns on transport operations that had already received capital

² Stanley Sturmeý, *British Shipping and World Competition* (London, 1962), pp. 12-15.

³ Chart 3.9.

investment. Central to this strategy was the continued growth and expansion of transmigrant operations on each stage of the migrant's journey: the North Sea crossing, the rail route across Britain, and the re-embarkation aboard Atlantic shipping services from ports such as Liverpool, Glasgow, London, and later Southampton.

7.1.1 North Sea operations

Although the passenger trade could be lucrative, it was also a cyclical business in which shipping lines periodically ran under-capacity. As Francis Hyde noted, 'it should not be assumed from [the attraction of so many operators] into the trade that it was either an easy or highly profitable source for the employment of ships'.⁴ On the short-sea routes to Britain, shipowners had been quick to recognise the commercial advantages of converting to steam, and transmigrant operations were a by-product of this technological innovation. But this tactic alone was not sufficient to generate the returns needed to satisfy operators who had invested large sums of capital in early steamship technology. Companies had to generate revenue from a number of different trades in addition to passengers. Some did so through securing subsidies to carry mail; yet such contracts often stipulated that mail operations were not hindered by the overloading vessels with bulk cargoes.⁵ The subsidies were not sufficient to maintain the overall success of shipping operations. Instead, North Sea steamship shipping companies chose to derive income from a combination of trades: the passenger trade and bulk cargo or, more frequently, through the carriage of passengers, mail, and high-value/low-bulk cargo.

Merchants who possessed mail contracts, such as Thomas Wilson, who had held an annual subsidy of £5,000 since being granted the first Swedish and Norwegian Royal Mail contract in 1840, were not always active in the passenger business.⁶ Indeed, it was not until 1850 that the conditions of the contract were sufficient for the running of scheduled services along the route. Between 1836 and 1859, the Wilson Line only

⁴ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 59.

⁵ NMM, GSN/12/1, 'General Steamship Navigation Company, Royal Mail Contracts' (1824-1913), Letter to the General Steam Navigation Company from the General Post Office dated 9 September 1834 – Clause 4.

⁶ Harrower, *Wilson Line*, p. 7.

carried transmigrants on board vessels arriving from Gothenburg. According to Aliens Lists, these totalled only 641 transmigrants on a mere five voyages.⁷ Demand proved insufficient for the diversification of this fleet to cater for the specific needs of the business – namely the allocation of fixed berths aboard steamers carrying the royal mail. Instead, it prioritised on the shipment of high-value commodities and first-class passengers alongside their mail operations.⁸

As British companies such as William Inman developed steerage berths on their transatlantic steamship services, demand from third-class passengers to move through Britain intensified. The early streams of transmigrants concentrated on the routes between the North Sea ports of Rotterdam, Bremen, and Hamburg and the British east coast ports of Hull and London. As shown in Table 7.1, the firms involved in the trade, such as W.H.H. Hutchinson, W. & C.L. Ringrose, and Brownlow, Pearson & Co., typically operated a weekly service and carried an average of 51 transmigrants per voyage. Despite the success of the Baring Brothers (through its London-based agents Phillips and Graves) in diverting more than 44,803 transmigrants through London (representing 30 per cent of the British transmigrant trade between 1836 and 1859), the business gravitated towards the Humber.⁹ With the emergence of the primacy of Liverpool as Europe's leading emigrant port, the Hamburg or Rotterdam to Humber routes, and subsequent Humber to Mersey rail route, represented the quickest route for European emigrants. Therefore most of the steamship shipping companies working these routes provided transmigrant services. Not unsurprisingly, most of these were centred in Hull, as shown in the following table:

⁷ TNA, HO 3/1-119. Those carrying transmigrants arrived in 1854 and 1856. Charles Henry Wilson dated the company's involvement to 1852 according to a letter appearing in *The Times*, 8 August 1882, p. 8.

⁸ University of Glasgow Archives, UGD 255/4/17/3/8-9, 'Letter from Thomas Wilson, Hull to Thomas Barclay' (5 June 1851).

⁹ TNA, HO 3/1-119 (1836-1859).

Table 7.1. The transmigrant trade to Hull in 1852

Broker	Home port	Number of voyages	Number of transmigrants	Average number of transmigrants per vessel
Brownlow, Pearson & Co.	Hull	67	3,054	46
Gee & Co.	Hull	24	562	23
H. Roberts & Co.	Hull	1	8	8
J. Sanderson & Co.	Hull	5	123	25
Philippsthal & Co.	Not known	1	1	1
T.W. Peters	Bremen	81	2,867	35
W. & C.L. Ringrose	Hull	53	2,552	48
W.H.H. Hutchinson	Hull	56	5,686	102
Not known	Not known	1	25	25
Total		289	14,878	51

Source: TNA, HO 3/64-67 (1852); LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1852); NMM, *Lloyd's Register of Shipping* (London, 1853).

The Hull-based Wilson Line, plying the route between Gothenburg and Hull, was well-placed to benefit from this surge in the passenger business. During the 1850s it commissioned more ships capable of transporting larger numbers of transmigrants, and demonstrated a change in policy geared towards developing the emigrant route from Scandinavia. The launch of the Wilson Line's *Argo* and *Pacific* in 1860 heralded an era of expansion in the company's Scandinavia to Humber (and Mersey) transmigrant services. Unlike earlier vessels run, owned, or managed by other transmigrant carriers, the fleet of the Wilson Line was fitted specifically with flexible passenger accommodation capable of accommodating several hundred passengers on a single voyage. The *Argo* held a passenger certificate for 298 and the *Pacific* held one for 339.¹⁰ During the 1860s, the company's fleet of transmigrant-carrying vessels continued to expand in size and scale. The *Orlando* and *Rollo* (both launched in 1870) were capable of transporting up to 500 transmigrants in a single voyage. Crucially, during depressions in the passenger trade, such vessels used the space allocated to flexible berths for the carriage of freight on long-haul freight routes – epitomised by the *Orlando* working the Gothenburg to Hull transmigrant route after her launch in 1869 and then being transferred

¹⁰ Harrower, *Wilson Line*, p. 36.

to the Hull to Bombay route in Autumn 1871.¹¹ By 1870, the company had a fleet of screw-propelled vessels suited to the trade – large flexible space for bulk freight or large numbers of third-class passengers as demand necessitated. Such feeder vessels were capable of optimising conditions unique to the business; during the emigrant season they plied the short sea routes between Scandinavian ports and the Humber ports, and in less busy migrant periods they were diverted to alternative freight routes.

When the Swedish and Norwegian Royal Mail contract was renewed in 1870, the Wilson Line began to call into Oslo alongside their weekly Scandinavia to Hull mail operations.¹² In addition to the income derived through freight, the company was heavily subsidised to provide regular steamship conveyance between Britain's leading transmigrant port of entry and Scandinavia's two largest emigrant entrepôts – Oslo and Gothenburg. Transporting steerage passengers across the North Sea enabled the shipowner to increase the returns he made on the operation of his vessels without jeopardising the conditions of the mail contract or hindering his ability to convey cargo for regular customers. It was this multi-faceted business strategy – mail contracts, limited first-class berths, and a large 'tween deck for use by third-class passengers or freight – which enabled British companies to delay the incursion of foreign companies into the trade – as illustrated by the demise of Det Søndesfjeldske Dampskibsselskab in 1866.¹³

Though steerage passengers paid far less than the first or second-class travellers, the scale of the traffic generated significant income for North Sea operators. As a Parliamentary report into the business in 1882 noted:

The cost to the emigrant of that section of the passage which is between Gothenburg or Christiania and Hull, and which is more especially under review at the present moment, is exactly £1. 2s. 6d., of which £1 goes to the shipowner for conveyance, and 2s. 6d. goes to the master of the ship for food.¹⁴

¹¹ Arthur Credland & Michael Thompson, *The Wilson Line of Hull, 1831-1981: The Rise and Fall of an Empire* (Cherry Burton, East Yorkshire, 1994), p. 8.

¹² B JL, DEW/11/8, 'Agreement between T[homas] W[ilson,] S[ons &] C[ompany] and the Swedish Post Office' (1870).

¹³ Credland & Thompson, *The Wilson Line of Hull*, p. 7.

¹⁴ BPP, *Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882), p. 7.

On calculation, with 3.15 million transmigrants paying this rate, the gross earnings of the trade between 1836 and 1914 were at least £3.15 million. In addition, shipowners gained a further £393,000 from victualling – as demonstrated in Table 7.2 below. By contrast, if the mail subsidy for the Swedish and Norwegian mail service had continued at 1840 levels (of £5,000 per year), it would have represented some £390,000 – the equivalent of 30 pence for every transmigrant conveyed to Hull.¹⁵ This income was of greater importance to the overall development of the business. Ringrose and Hutchinson on the Dutch to Hull route, MS&L on the Hamburg to Grimsby route, the Currie Line on the Hamburg to Leith route, and the Wilson Line on the Gothenburg and Oslo to Hull route, all consolidated their position on rival transmigrant routes.

¹⁵ John Ashton, *Lives and Livelihoods in Little London: The Story of the British in Gothenburg, 1621-2001* (Savedalen, 2003), p. 141.

Table 7.2. The value (gross earnings) of the transmigrant trade to North Sea shipping companies, 1836-1913

Period of arrival	Number of transmigrants	Money paid to shipowner for conveyance (£)	Money paid to the ship's master for food (£)	Total value of tickets sold to transmigrants (£)
1836-1839	3,115	3,115	387	3,502
1840-1844	408	408	51	459
1845-1849	24,120	24,120	3,015	27,135
1850-1854	94,159	94,159	11,769	105,928
1855-1859	27,483	27,483	3,435	30,918
1860-1864	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1865-1869	124,052	124,052	15,506	139,558
1870-1874	175,533	175,533	21,941	197,474
1875-1879	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1880-1884	201,701	201,701	25,212	226,913
1885-1889	309,180	309,180	38,647	347,827
1890-1894	374,346	374,346	46,793	421,139
1895-1899	199,018	199,018	24,877	223,895
1900-1904	493,217	493,217	61,652	554,869
1905-1909	628,938	628,938	78,617	707,555
1910-1913	496,631	496,631	62,078	558,709
Total	3,151,901	3,151,901	393,987	3,545,888

Source: See Table 3.19; BPP, *Reports by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882), p. 7.¹⁶

The trade fuelled the growth of tonnage and other aspects of overall liner business. Waves of concentrated transmigration such as those between 1851-1854, 1868-1872, and 1880-1882, sustained further expansion of shipping services tailored to the trade. Companies such as the Wilson Line and the MS&L invested heavily in the expansion of their fleets, specifically in terms of their overall tonnage.¹⁷ The growth in tonnage mirrored similar increases in the number of ports to which the feeder lines provided passenger services. Focus on the near continental ports of Gothenburg, Oslo, Hamburg, Bremen, Copenhagen, Rotterdam, and Antwerp during the 1840s and 1850s

¹⁶ The value of the trade is calculated on figures presented to Parliament in 1882 and is not indicative of the sums paid for shorter or longer routes. All figures have been rounded down to the nearest pound.

¹⁷ Harrower, *Wilson Line*; Arthur Credland & Richard Greenwood, *Bailey and Leetham* (Preston, 2002); Davies, *John Sutcliffe & Son*.

had spread to more distant ports, such as Trondheim and Bergen, by the late-1860s, and even reached remote ports such as Reykjavik, by the 1870s. The constant broadening of the frontiers of the trade facilitated the development of the business.

The expansionist policies of shipping companies reduced the risks of becoming over-reliant on a single trunk route. The mail routes – Gothenburg, Oslo, Bremen, or Hamburg to Hull, and further south, from Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, or Antwerp to London – remained central to the transmigrant business. But though the Wilson Line of Hull dominated the Scandinavian routes, the movement of transmigrants along other routes was divided between British and European passenger and railway companies, which all competed for a share of a potentially lucrative market. Figures are only available for the period between 1890 and 1901, reproduced in Table 7.3, and these reveal how the carriage of all passengers (and not just transmigrants) was shared between shipping companies, British railway companies, and foreign mail packet lines. Collectively they all enjoyed sustained growth during the second half of the nineteenth century as large-scale emigration from Germany was supplanted by that from Sweden and Norway.

Table 7.3. Division of short-sea passenger trade to Britain, 1890-1901

Business	Number of passengers	Share of business (%)
Principal passenger shipping companies	1,869,413	29.18
Belgian State mail packets	654,917	10.22
Railway companies	3,881,752	60.59
Total	6,406,082	100.00

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1890-1901).

Faced with the competition from railway companies, which undercut the fares charged by steamship companies for third-class transmigrants, it is perhaps difficult to comprehend how steamship companies were able to retain large shares of the flow of transmigrants along particular North Sea routes. However, although railway-run companies conveyed passengers on feeder routes for a cheaper rate of passage, such price-cutting hit the profitability of services – particularly during lulls in the passenger

trade. Unlike the older shipping companies, railway-run shipping companies had to use land-based operations to offset losses on short-sea routes. The latter only maintained limited freight services and instead prioritised on passenger operations. Conversely, shipping companies such as Bailey and Leatham, the Currie Line (of Leith) and WC Ringrose focussed on freight. Generally, operators controlling particular routes by the 1880s were safe in the knowledge that rival British firms were unable to sustain the undercutting of the rates offered by businesses owned or managed by railways – like they were on routes monopolised by the mail-subsidised Wilson Line. The price of a transmigrant ticket between Scandinavia and Hull at £1 2s 6d created a threshold for the commercial viability of rival operations and prevented other companies from competing on a long-term basis. Of those who successfully competed in opening new transmigrant routes to Britain – the Anchor Line on the route between Reykjavik and Glasgow, and the Thule Line on the route from Gothenburg to Hull – the Anchor Line perpetuated a regular supply of passengers on the route between Iceland and Glasgow where fares were higher, and the Thule Line had to purchase John West Wilson’s rights over the less-profitable, and small scale, Gothenburg to London service.¹⁸

The virtual monopoly that the Wilson Line established over certain aspects of the European emigrant market proved central to the company’s overall passenger operations. Between 1911 and 1914 (when surviving evidence is available) the number of emigrants carried on the company’s steamers represented between 60 and 71 per cent of all passengers. The dominance the company had over key transmigrant arteries reflected the skill of Victorian entrepreneurs in recognising and establishing control over lucrative sectors of the business. They achieved this through a series of strategies. Firstly, the shipowners broadened their commercial outlook by placing elder sons or trusted kinfolk overseas; within a decade of Thomas Wilson establishing his own firm he had sent two of his eldest sons to gain the final part of their education in Sweden.¹⁹ The close connections between one of the sons – John West Wilson, based in Gothenburg from 1842 – and the Hull headquarters of the parent firm followed this tradition. It ensured

¹⁸ Kjartansson, ‘Emigrant fares’, pp. 53-71; Greenway, *A Century of North Sea Passenger Steamers*, p. 119.

¹⁹ Ashton, *Lives and Livelihoods in Little London*, p. 141.

favourable trading relations were established during the age of sail and it continued, and gathered momentum, during the age of steam. Secondly, as with other successful men of the time, the overseas representatives of the firm acquired foreign citizenship; John West Wilson followed this trend by gaining Swedish nationality within a year of arriving.²⁰ This ingratiated their entrance into local business networks and helped them to gain the interpersonal and linguistic skills that furthered their commercial machinations. Thirdly, the overseas branch traded as independent commercial concerns to the parent company; when John West Wilson died in 1889, he had amassed a personal fortune of more than £500,000 based on the success of his own company, John West Wilson & Co., built on two commodities in particular – iron ore and transmigrants.²¹ Dynastic connections, combined with being in the right place at the right time, thereby allowed the Wilson Line to develop and maintain its hold over the transmigrant trade through successive generations. Whilst different companies commanding shares of other transmigrant routes in 1852 still did so a generation later, only the Wilson Line had significantly expanded its share of the transmigrants business.

The success of the Wilson Line transmigrant operations appeared to have aided overall corporate strength as many of the most profitable ships (often those whose depreciation had been written off because of their longevity) – such as the *Romeo*, *Hero* or *Angelo*.²² Kith and kin were equally essential to the development and maintenance of the transmigrant trade as they had been with other trades at Hull during the eighteenth century.²³ The successful use of Agents General – literally, leading agents in charge of all trade for a given area – proved a crucial aspect of this growth and helps to account for the commissions such men earned as being some of the largest paid out by the Wilson Line.²⁴ Men such as John West Wilson in Gothenburg and H. Heitmann in Oslo

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 141.

²¹ Harrower, *Wilson Line*, p. 8.

²² B JL, DEW2/3/38-48, 'Financial Statements' (1904-1914).

²³ Gordon Jackson, *Hull in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Economic and Social History* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 120-129. Interestingly, nearly all of the chief ports from where the transmigrants embarked for Hull were also important during the eighteenth century. (Jackson, *Ibid*, p. 448.)

²⁴ Based on surviving figures for the period 1904-1914. (Source: B JL, DEW2/3/38-48, 'Financial Statements' (1904-1914).)

managed the capacity utilisation of homeward-bound voyages of all ships and this left the parent company to manage outward operations from the home port.²⁵ This strategy enabled the allocation of space on board steamers to be optimised on both outward and homeward legs of a steamers journey and led to continued success on key trading routes.²⁶ Supply of transmigrant services was thus controlled by the Agents General as they were part of the homeward operation of vessel's journey. The demand for such feeder services was also in the control of overseas agents – in particular demand was generated by the agents of Atlantic shipping concerns.²⁷ Inter-firm connectivity between the Agents-General of the feeder line and those of the Atlantic liner determined the successful working of feeder (and thus) ocean liner. The strategy of the Wilson Line – as the business connecting both commercial agencies – was to further freight operations alongside the development of the passenger trade by Agents General of Atlantic companies. To cement the two aspects of the feeder trades income from the mail contract augmented income yet further.²⁸ Given the benefits it is of little surprise that key shipping routes operated throughout the year and often on a bi-weekly schedule.²⁹

²⁵ The detailed Financial Statements for the Wilson Line demonstrate the difference in earnings on both aspects of a vessels voyage. See, for example B JL, DEW2/3/96-104, 'Detailed Financial Statements and Reports' (1906-1914). Surviving promotional literature produced by the company (for the seasons 1893, 1907 and 1911) clearly states that the '' (Source: B JL, DEW 8/1, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Limited, *Wilson Line of Steamers: Handbook of Royal Mail Passengers & Cargo Services: Season 1893* (Hull, 1893); DEW 8/4, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Limited, *Wilson Line of Steamers; Particulars of the Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services* (Hull, 1907); DEW 8/6, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Limited, *Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services: 1911* (Hull, 1911).)

²⁶ The financial records of the Wilson Line also enable the identification of the routes upon which the greatest revenues were generated.

²⁷ Berit Brattne, *Bröderna Larsson*.

²⁸ B JL, DEW/11/8, 'Agreement between T[homas] W[ilson] S[ons &] C[ompany] and the Swedish Post Office (1870)'.

²⁹ B JL, DEW2/3/96-104, 'Detailed Financial Statements and Reports' (1906-1914). During the mid- to late-Victorian period it was more common for two steamers of the Wilson Line to sail at the same time. (Source: Vessels carrying Mormon transmigrants to Hull appearing in the *Mormon Immigration Index CD-ROM* and LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1840-1899).) During the twentieth century it was more common for vessels of the fleet to arrive alternately on a Sunday or Wednesday evening. (Source: MMM, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1900-1914).)

Large-scale shipping companies, such as the Wilson Line, and the transoceanic companies they transported transmigrants on their behalf, relied heavily for their expansion upon a variety of agents controlling differing routes and information channels about the shifting population flows.³⁰ As Boyce described, such formal and informal networks ‘supported the rise of [both] medium-sized and giant maritime enterprises’.³¹ This was as true for the carriage of freight as it was for passengers. Whilst the space on a general vessel could be used for passengers or freight as the century progressed the permanent allocation of berths for third-class transmigrants necessitated the closer working between the owners of feeder vessels, their Agents General, and the Atlantic operator wishing to transport the transmigrant across the Atlantic.³² All those engaged in this intra and inter-continental business co-depended upon one another. For the Wilson Line, as shown in Figure 7.1 below, the dynastic and commercial linkages established through marriage appeared to have equipped them further with a degree of insider knowledge and trust. Profits derived through the general trade were retained within the wider family unit and confirmed Boyce’s ideas that ‘co-operation depended on each party taking a long-view of their economic relationship’.³³ Of those shown in Figure 7.1, no fewer than seven members of the family – two through birth and five by marriage – appear to have been well-placed to further the transmigrant trade (excluding the founder and his two youngest sons).


³⁰ See (for example) BJL, DEW2/3/96-104, ‘Detailed Financial Statements and Reports’ (1906-1914), and also the full list of their overseas agents promoted in their promotion literature (DEW 8/6, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Limited, *Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services: 1911* (Hull, 1911)).

³¹ Boyce, *Information*, pp. 3-4.

³² For the flexible use of vessels used to carry transmigrants see the logbooks of William Colbeck for the period 1906-1912. (BJL, DEW/6/32-3, ‘Logbooks of the *Romeo, Oslo, Lorne, Jaffa, Kolpino* and *Novo* (1906-1912).) Plans of the Wilson Line’s feeder vessels can be examined in the registration documents for their fleet. (BJL, DEW/10/1-3, ‘Ships’ Registry Books (1860-1917)’.)

³³ Ditto.

Figure 7.1. The dynastic and commercial linkages of the Wilson Family



¹ Also served as a director of the North Eastern Railway Company and the Hull Dock Company.

² Was sent by his father to live in Sweden with his younger brother John West Wilson. He returned to Hull to take control of a wine business from his mother's brother.

³ He worked as the London-based agent for the Wilson Line, the Thule Line and DFDS.

⁴ Mary's aunt was married to Thomas Ringrose – part of a Hull-based shipping dynasty who in 1894 formed the Hull & Netherlands Steam Navigation Company.

⁵ Richard was born in Hull, before moving to Liverpool where he established his own company who also acted as agents for the Wilson Line.


⁶ Harold was the agent of the Wilson Line, head of the family run Sanderson Line, before being appointed as Deputy Managing Director of the White Star Line in 1899.

⁷ Oswald started his career at the Wilson Line (in Hull) before joining the White Star Line where he rose to become their Manager at New York.

Fragmentary correspondence between Oswald and Harold Sanderson adds credence to such assertions.³⁴ It demonstrates how Harold and Oswald Sanderson privately briefed each other on negotiations regarding the transmigrant trade. It can therefore justifiably be argued that such informal links helped the furthering of mutual areas of interest along the Gothenburg to Hull, Gothenburg to London, Liverpool to New York, and New York to Chicago transport routes. Whilst the passenger trade generally was volatile and that of emigrants was particularly precarious, it did not appear to bear heavily on the bottom line profitability of liner trades for periods for which data has survived. Instead, as shown in Chart 7.1, the income derived from the transmigrant trade during, and generated through successive generations of mutual working, helped to reduce the fixed costs associated with running such operations; during peak periods capacity utilisation bolstered overall profitability. Flexible berths in the cargo hold, and sufficient weekly demand, maintained utilisation of space on board.

³⁴ BJL, DEW 4/10, Note from Oswald Sanderson to Harold Sanderson, 'Terms of Atlantic Lines' (undated); Oswald Sanderson to Harold Sanderson, 'Stettin' (26 September 1908); Letter from Arthur Wilson to Harold Sanderson, 'The agreement Atlantic Lines have come to with the Danes in connection with the Passenger Pool' (4 November 1908); Letter from Oswald Sanderson to Harold Sanderson, [re Russian Jew Agents] (28 November 1908); *Ditto* (7 December 1908); *Ditto* (9 December 1909); Letter from Oswald Sanderson to Harold Sanderson, 'Emigrants Trade' (17 June 1909); Letter from Harold Sanderson to Oswald Sanderson, [Reply to previous letter] (19 June 1909); Letter from Harold Sanderson to Oswald Sanderson, [Collusion over Russian Business] (Undated).

Chart 7.1. Income derived by the Wilson Line from passengers 1911-1914




Source: B JL, DEW2/3/99-102 (1911-1914).

The income companies derived from the transmigrant trade contrasted on both the outward and homeward voyages as it did between differing routes. Information derived from the Wilson Line's corporate archives demonstrates that even between the Swedish and Norwegian trades the proportion of gross earnings generated from the passenger trades varied considerably. As shown in Chart 7.2 and Table 7.4, the company generated between one-quarter and one-third of voyage credit balances on its Swedish operations through passengers (of whom the majority were transmigrants). When broken-down into the difference between outward and homeward voyage results, between one-quarter and one-third of all gross income was derived from passage money. The results, only available for the later period 1908-1910, suggest that the income from outward and homeward voyages had a relative equilibrium. Slightly more money was earned through freight and passengers on the homeward journey. By contrast, on the Norwegian trades, profiled in Chart 7.3 and Table 7.5, more passenger money was derived from the homeward voyages, but the overall success of the voyages remained centred on the value of freight carried from Hull on outward operations. The importance of the outward journey's income was therefore only partially offset by earnings derived from the

emigrant trade on the homeward voyage. Whilst other long-haul trades, such as the Hull to New York or Hull to India routes provided greater revenue, on short-haul operations the business of feeder services centred on the transmigrant trades between the Humber and Scandinavian ports and underpinned year-on-year growth.

Chart 7.2. The gross earnings the Wilson Line generated through its Swedish operations, 1908-1910




Source: B JL, DEW2/3/99-102 (1908-1910).

Table 7.4. The percentage of income the Wilson Line generated through its Swedish operations, 1908-1910

Aspects of trade	1908	1909	1910
Earnings from passengers	26	28	30
Earnings from freight	74	72	70
Homeward earnings from passengers	25	33	35
Homeward earnings from freight	75	67	65
Passenger earnings on homeward voyages	49	69	71
Passenger earnings on outward voyages	51	31	29

Source: B JL, DEW2/3/99-102 (1908-1910).

Chart 7.3. The value of income the Wilson Line generated through its Norwegian operations, 1908-1910



Source: BJL, DEW2/3/99-102 (1908-1910).

Table 7.5. The percentage of income the Wilson Line generated through its Norwegian operations, 1908-1910

Aspects of trade	1908	1909	1910
Earnings from passengers	21	20	21
Earnings from freight	79	80	79
Homeward earnings from passengers	22	24	26
Homeward earnings from freight	78	76	74
Passenger earnings on homeward voyages	51	59	62
Passenger earnings on outward voyages	49	41	38

Source: BJL, DEW2/3/99-102 (1908-1910).

The primacy of the Scandinavian transmigrant route emerged during an era of expansion. Growth, in terms of fleet size and overall tonnage allocated to the trades, reflected this. Commissioning larger fleets, and plying a greater number of routes, provided for continued growth for shipping companies generally, and the liner operator specifically. The business was particularly important to the liner trades as the economies

of scale associated with the trade developed: fewer companies shipped larger numbers of transmigrants on fewer journeys. Whilst smaller operators, such as the Ringrose, Bailey & Leetham, and WHH Hutchinsons, retained lesser roles in the short-sea routes to Britain, the larger operators, epitomised by the Wilson Line, were able to utilise the formal and informal networks identified by Boyce as central to the development of large-scale Victorian liner shipping. Early participation in the trade enabled them to carve out an important niche within the emerging mass transmigrant market. Within one generation, the trade appeared to have helped the Wilson Line to derive significant returns from just one facet of their shipping operations. Central to this success were the services on the Gothenburg to Hull routes which medical evidence has shown often ran at full capacity during the emigrant season. Whilst the latter's long-haul enterprises – namely the expansion into the Indian trades following the opening of the Suez Canal and the Hull to New York trades – were of greater importance, the major transmigrant arteries they dominated helped to bolster the European side of their operations and the passenger aspect of the company's trade generally. The importance of a few key routes to a limited number of transport companies was replicated as the aliens *en route* traversed Britain on train.

7.1.2 The rail route across Britain

Whilst the railway network had reached Hull by 1840, it was the opening of a purpose-built passenger terminus, the Paragon Station, which heralded the emergence of a cross-country rail link capable of conveying third-class European passengers to transoceanic shipping companies based at Britain's west coast ports.³⁵ The successful co-ordination of transmigrant journeys from the port of entry to the port of re-embarkation necessitated the development not only of adequate cross-country railway travel, but also the availability of spare railway carriages, locomotives, and personnel. But how important were railway companies in the development and maintenance of the transmigrant trade? And what significance did transpennine railway companies attach to the movement of so many transmigrants in their fourth-class railway services?

³⁵ Charts 3.21 and 3.22; Tables 3.21 and 3.22.

Having overcome the geological and technological difficulties of establishing a cross-country rail route between the Humber and Mersey ports, transpennine railway companies exacted recompense through their monopoly over rail travel. This stranglehold gave such companies an advantage over companies involved in other aspects of the transmigrant trade. It also ensured port to port services for transmigrants were maintained once a passenger terminus had been provided at each respective side of the country. The railway company's income was derived through the successful working of stations, track, and railway stock. Whilst the latter served as barriers to other competition on the transpennine railway route – at least until 1885 – rail links were exceptionally expensive undertakings and the companies faced a struggle to recoup the substantial capital outlay required to establish rail links across northern Britain. On top of initial capital outlay, numerous railway accidents on the tracks generally, as Jack Simmons noted, 'caused the companies financial losses that might be serious, both from the destruction of their equipment and from the compensation payable to the sufferers and their families'.³⁶ Whilst the returns made from the excursion traffic were relatively insignificant 'the companies could not afford to neglect it'.³⁷

For most aspects of rail business, companies carried passengers on a two-way journey. This was as applicable for daily commuter routes as it was with weekend excursion traffic or people journeying to inland markets. However, with transmigrant operations, the carriages used to convey passengers nearly invariably returned empty. This was a feature of the business borne solely by railway companies. Unlike their steamship counterparts – where additional freight supplemented both the outward and homeward voyages – the railway stock used on the transpennine rail routes could not be used for alternative freight and the carriages returning each still incurred fuel and staff costs. To guarantee the successful working of a potentially loss-making trade therefore necessitated a degree of protection to safeguard the railway companies from the incursions of rival companies and to make the trade financially viable.

The successful working of the cross country rail route was essential as when completed, only the Lancashire and Yorkshire had achieved a rail link that straddled the

³⁶ Simmons, *The Victorian Railway*, p. 279.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p. 278.

full distance between the Humber ports and the Mersey. The remaining four only established regional domination – the NER controlled east of the Pennines, and the London and North Western ran the area to the west. To transport passengers all the way therefore required cooperation between rival firms. Within two years of Hull's Paragon Station opening, the five companies plying the transpennine rail link established one of the earliest trade cartels specifically to safeguard the cross-country rail services on the Humber to Mersey corridor. This agreement centred on operations ranging from freight to fish. Pivotality it also contained clauses to ensure the successful working of all of the respective railway company's lines.

The Humber Conference, as the cartel became known, included the L&Y, LNWR, NER, MS&L, and Midland; and it was signed in 1853.³⁸ It prevented individual members from entering into separate arrangements with different shipping companies for the carriage of passengers or freight, and collectively it safeguarded the Humber to Mersey route from the threat of further incursions by new railway companies or the development of an alternative cross-country transmigrant corridor. Whilst small numbers of transmigrants were later conveyed along the Leith to Glasgow, London to Bristol, or London to Southampton routes, the primacy of the Humber to Mersey corridor took place in the very early stages of the rail link becoming established. By reducing the threat of competition, the Conference extended its grip to stipulate port – and not just rail – services associated with the transmigrant business.³⁹ Under the deal the NER was allocated 60 per cent of goods traffic and the MS&L just 40 per cent. The strategy was necessary, as the diffusion of steamships spread.

Through this early form of collusion within the trade, the railway companies lowered the price of the journey from the Humber ports to Liverpool from 10s 9d for regular (non-migrant) fourth-class passengers to 6s for foreign transmigrants.⁴⁰ This

³⁸ TNA, RAIL/318/1, 'Humber Conference: Agreement' (1853).

³⁹ TNA, RAIL 527/568, 'North Eastern Railway: Agreements with Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire, London & North Western and Lancashire and Yorkshire Railways for developing traffic at Hull and Grimsby' (1865-1870). The contract was signed on 2 January 1865 and then renewed on 1 February 1870.

⁴⁰ TNA, RAIL 318/1, 'Humber Conference: Minutes'.

assisted early steamship companies which sought to offer a degree of transport integration at an affordable, or competitive, price. Yet the monopoly did not always favour the shipowner. When the Conference was approached for the favourable rates on the carriage of transmigrants to be extended from the Humber ports to West Hartlepool in 1855 the Conference rejected it – even though the North Eastern had a commercial interest in the latter port.⁴¹ The refusal mirrored repeated rebuttals to shipowners such as William Inman to reduce the cost of the transpennine railway journey or the approach by the Great Eastern Railway to be admitted as a member of the Conference in 1867.⁴² Only when the Wilson Line faced competition along the Leith route in 1868 by the Anchor Line did the Humber Conference concede reductions.⁴³ As Simmons concluded, the structure of railway fares varied greatly according to each particular trade:

Looking at the railways' structure of fares closely, we can see that in the Victorian age they came to provide not for three classes but for eight: mail, express, Pullman, first, second, third, Parliamentary, and workmen's. The British railways were not acting in these matters on any sociological principles. They were pragmatists; in their own frequently-heard phrase, 'charging what the traffic would bear'.⁴⁴

As with the monopoly on the North Sea, the mutual working of transpennine railway services helped to lower the price of a transmigrant fare to the lowest possible threshold and enabled Atlantic lines to undercut rival emigrant fares. Cooperation on the transmigrant rail services thereby helped the British transmigrant route to retain its competitive allure.

The income generated by this traffic was maximised by the movement of migrants during off-peak periods. During the 1850s and 1860s this centred on evening/overnight

⁴¹ *Ibid*, Item Number 271.

⁴² *Ibid*, Item Numbers 1633, 1655, 1791 (Inman) and 2683 (Great Eastern Railway).

⁴³ *Ibid*, Item number 3480.

⁴⁴ Simmons, *The Victorian Railway*, pp. 359-364.

travel.⁴⁵ By the 1870s it was typically placed after the commuter traffic at 9am on a Monday morning.⁴⁶ It was a tradition also used overseas:

On the Continent, where the service was much less frequent than in Britain, the timetable was arranged with a view to spreading the load as evenly as possible. That objective could be reached partly by encouraging third-class passengers to make their journeys overnight. At the turn of the century the usual practice of the French companies was to provide one day train from Paris taking third-class passengers to each distant city of importance and three overnight – some so slow that they occupied a large slice of the following day as well.⁴⁷

The control over the trade enjoyed by the founding companies led to its successful working, the lion's share, as with non-migrant passengers, being retained by the NER and LNWR. As shown in Map 4.2, the majority of transmigrants were transported along the rail lines of the NER and then the LNWR. Alternative routes included the use of the MS&L and the Cheshire Lines Committee (a joint operation by the Midland, Great Northern and GCR) or the L&Y. Such agreements, twenty years before widespread collusion in the steerage trade at sea, preserved the powerful position established by the five railway operators. Crucially, they also prevented competition between each member of the agreement. As shown in Table 7.6, the monopoly was extended to the carriage of British emigrants along the same route, often on the same trains. It sustained the profitability of rail operations on key days associated with the trade – initially Monday (returning on a Tuesday), and later Thursday (returning on the Friday). Railway stock was then used during the weekend on excursion routes to nearby resorts.

⁴⁵ *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM, 'Reminiscences and Journal of Hans Jorgenson' (1868).

⁴⁶ Minnesota Historical Society, 'A. Knoph, *Beiledning for Emigranter til Amerika, forfaavidt angaar Befordring pr. Dampskib over Hull og Liverpool til New York og videre indgjennem Landet pr. Fernbane* (Christiania, 1869)', p. 11; *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM; Ken Hoole Collection, 'North Eastern Railway: Shipping Interests, K.H. 1124' (1890-1980).

⁴⁷ Simmons, *The Victorian Railway*, p. 361.


Table 7.6. The port of embarkation of foreign and British emigrants transported by railway companies from north eastern ports, 1896-1910

Year	Foreign	British
Liverpool	636,652	16,397
London	3,699	28,991
Glasgow	40,976	1,289
Southampton	42,500	1,061
Plymouth	0	27
Hull	0	3
Grimsby	0	18
Other	159	119
Total	723,986	47,905

Source: TNA, RAIL 527/1178-9 (1896-1910). The statistics for British passengers were originally all stated as 'English'. They have been taken as British.


Though the number of passengers carried during the period was not reported in published annual reports, the NER's statistical accounts of the trade – alongside that of excursion traffic and fish, for the period 1896-1910 – revealed the benefits of the sizeable, yet significant, trade. As shown in Charts 7.4 and 7.5, of the 723,986 foreign emigrants and 47,905 British emigrants, the LNWR gained the greatest share of the westward operation (44 per cent), followed by the Great Central (26 per cent), and the Lancashire and Yorkshire (18 per cent). The monopoly, unlike other agreements on seaborne aspects of the transmigrant trade, survived until the outbreak of the First World War.

Chart 7.4. The share of the railway traffic, by year, by members of the Humber Conference, 1896-1910



Source: TNA, RAIL 527/1178-9 (1896-1910). Cheshire Lines Committee included the Midland, Great Northern and Great Central railways.

Chart 7.5. The overall division of the traffic controlled by the Humber Conference (according to Railway Company), 1896-1910



Source: TNA, RAIL 527/1178-9 (1896-1910).

Arrangements for each transmigrant train journey fluctuated according to demand. The routes a train would take required advanced planning because of the number of carriages and the working of two locomotives for each ‘emigrant train’. Unlike other rail operations, they were absent from printed timetables – demonstrating the undulation of the trade throughout the year and season. Typically, each train consisted of thirteen carriages for passengers and four carriages for luggage. All in all, it was a major enterprise. Whilst the European transmigrant only represented a small part of each railway company’s passenger trade, the trade maximised the use of existing fourth-class rail stock, personnel, and track during the ‘working week’. A train operating successfully during the summer months transported Scandinavian migrants on a Monday, returned with east-bound passengers on the Tuesday, made the trip west with Baltic passengers on a Thursday, before returning to Hull by Friday evening in time to transport third-class excursion passengers on Saturday and Sunday. Income derived from the transmigrant rail journeys is estimated, as shown in Table 7.07, to have contributed £670,553 to railway revenues from working the transpennine routes of the Humber Conference between 1850 and 1913. Unlike domestic passenger rail travel, the market experienced constant growth throughout the period.⁴⁸ Protectionism impacted above and beyond the normal carriage of freight and served to increase financial returns on start-up capital without the need to meet increasing levels of customer expectation.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 317.

Table 7.7. The estimated revenue generated through the movement of transmigrants along the Humber to Mersey rail route, 1850-1913

Period	Number of transmigrants	Estimated revenue from traffic (£)
1850-1854	64,995	19,498
1855-1859	18,328	5,498
1860-1864	N/A	N/A
1865-1869	124,052	41,350
1870-1874	175,533	57,048
1875-1879	N/A	N/A
1880-1884	201,701	65,552
1885-1889	309,180	77,295
1890-1894	308,473	77,118
1895-1899	158,531	39,632
1900-1904	402,817	100,704
1905-1909	443,866	110,966
1910-1913	303,482	75,870
Total	2,510,958	670,553

Source: TNA, RAIL 318/1-11, 'Reports of the Humber Conference' (1853-1904). Figures include arrivals via the Humber ports and are based on the assumption that all the transmigrants went to Liverpool. Rail revenue for 1850-1852 and 1905-1913 estimated. The number of transmigrants is taken from Chart 3.19. All values are based on the price of a fourth-class emigrant fare of 6s (1853-1868), 7s 6d (1868), 6s 6d (1869-1884), and 5s (1884-1904). All figures have been rounded down to the nearest pound.

Between 1851 and 1885, collusion on rail links aided a period of sustained growth along the transpennine corridor to the detriment of other potential routes. The period also heralded the beginning of the steady encroachment of some British railway companies into a business that had previously been the preserve of a small group of steam packet operators. Those who invested heavily in transpennine railway development astutely recognised the potential of providing passenger services along the rail routes required for the shipment of coal, iron ore, and other goods produced in the industrial heartlands of Britain. Though the rail routes between London and Southampton and Plymouth were important for the speedy conveyance of the Royal Mail and first-class passengers, the business of shipping emigrants, especially aliens, was a bulk commodity. Cost, and not speed, was the key determinant in the fostering of rail as the transport connection between the point of entry and the point of exit.

For the railway operator, collusion over the shipment of transmigrant passengers in fourth-class carriages thereby offered opportunities to increase their revenues through the conveyance of such aliens on their ships, by the dock and ports dues charged on the landing of passengers at ports owned by railway companies, and along the rail tracks from the point of arrival to the port of departure. Of all the cross-country rail routes to be developed during the period, those between Hull, Grimsby, Goole, and Liverpool were to be the most important in the through-movement of more than 2.5 million or 80 per cent of the entire business during the period in question. Whilst each company varied in the way it maximised the income to be sourced through the business, the rail operator remained a key component of the trade between 1836 and 1914.

The benefits of the security of the Humber Conference also provided members with the long-term confidence to invest in the development of infrastructure peculiar to the trade. At Hull, where one company provided all rail services (compared with Liverpool's four rival companies), this confidence manifested itself in the form of Britain's only purpose-built transmigrant rail facility. The NER's Emigrant Waiting Room at Hull's Paragon Railway Station – built in 1871 and doubled in size in 1882 when trade continued to grow – was a testament of how collusion brought benefits to both passengers and the transport company.⁴⁹ The former gained toilets, washing facilities, and waiting rooms designed to cater for them whilst awaiting the embarkation to Liverpool or Glasgow. The facility was also equipped with offices for emigration agents and one of the longest purpose-built railway platforms outside of London. For the latter, the stability of the Humber Conference brought the concentration of the trade along the Humber to Mersey corridor. As with other aspects of passenger and freight services, the railway company required this era of stability to generate a return on its investment and reduce the burden entailed through the construction of expensive cross-country railway services during the 1830s and 1840s. The level of protection railway companies enjoyed must have viewed with jealousy by Atlantic shipping companies.

⁴⁹ HCA, TAB 15/OBL/M/2585 (1871), 'North Eastern Railway Company – Emigrant Waiting Room, Anlaby Road' (1871); TAB/16/OBL/M/6328, 'North Eastern Railway Company – Waiting Rooms, Anlaby Road' (1882).

7.1.3 Atlantic shipping services

For the British merchant marine, her dominance over the carriage of passengers was more important than for the shipping of any other country. Nowhere else was this more apparent than for those companies plying transatlantic routes. Whilst a large part of the demand for transoceanic travel arose because of Britain's commitment to the settlement of the British Empire, the foreign passenger trade had grown by the 1850s to represent an important niche within the British passenger market.⁵⁰ Central to the expansion of British shipping companies was the supply of domestic and foreign passengers. This latter was underpinned by the establishment of reliable feeder vessels and equally efficient cross-country railways capable of transporting large numbers of Europeans to and across Britain. With such infrastructure in place by the mid-nineteenth century large numbers of foreign emigrants sailing from Liverpool, Glasgow, and London bolstered the sizeable domestic trade in migrants and passengers alike – one of the four conditions of supremacy that Sturmeay attributed as being pivotal to the exponential lead the British shipping industry enjoyed more than all other merchant fleets combined.⁵¹

British shipping companies working out of Liverpool, Glasgow, and London were quick to recognise this new aspect of the passenger market.⁵² Alongside the nurturing of the transmigrant trade from Britain they also recognised, far earlier than many of their European counterparts, the potential that steam propulsion provided for conveying third-class emigrants across the North Atlantic.⁵³ In 1858, William Inman pioneered the affordable steamship technology for all classes of passenger. This British-led innovation quickly evolved into a mainstay of the trade by 1870.⁵⁴ Alongside Cunard (in 1840), Inman (in 1858), Guion (in 1866), White Star (in 1869), and American (in 1872) British

⁵⁰ Chart 3.8.

⁵¹ Sturmeay, *British Shipping*, pp. 16-17, 19

⁵² TNA, HO 3/1-120; Thirteenth General Report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners (1853), pp. 43-4.

⁵³ Marcus Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration 1607-1860* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941), p. 292. It was one of the main reasons for continental shipping lines to lose the Mormon emigrant contract in the late 1860s. (See Nicholas J. Evans & Fred E. Woods, 'Latter-day Saint Scandinavian Migration through Hull, England, 1852-1894', *BYU Studies*, Volume XLI, Number 4 (2002), p. 84.)

⁵⁴ Chart 4.3.

steamship companies converted their fleets to steam propulsion and provided ever-larger space aboard for the carriage third-class passengers.⁵⁵ The crux of the North Atlantic trade was not the discerning passenger, carried aboard the vessels of the Collins Line or Cunard (pre-1860), but in the constant supply of large numbers of third-class emigrants.⁵⁶ During the upheaval of the US Civil War, British companies such as Inman, Cunard, Guion and White Star Lines appear to have furthered this commercial impetus on North Atlantic routes by taking advantage of the paralysis evident in the US merchant marine by expanding the frequency of sailings and passenger-carrying capabilities of liners plying the Liverpool-North American passenger routes.⁵⁷ Pivotaly they expanded their operations at Atlantic ports by looking east to Europe for more non-British passengers.⁵⁸

In widening their customer base, the operators of transatlantic travel spread their options beyond the cabin-class or domestic markets. As the *Thirtieth Report of the Emigration Commissioners* noted, whilst ‘the real emigration from the United Kingdom has been rapidly falling off ... its apparent magnitude has been kept up by the great increase in the number Foreigners who now emigrate through the United Kingdom’.⁵⁹ British shipowners did not depend solely on demand to migrate within the British Empire, but instead harnessed a market incorporating wider spheres of influence in Europe and developing a command over shipping to a multitude of transoceanic destinations.⁶⁰ Whilst the Irish famine had shown the potential for the success of

⁵⁵ For the increased proportion of passenger space allocated for third-class passengers see Table 7.10. Information on the conversion of shipping fleets from sail to steam was gleaned from *Lloyd’s Register of Shipping* and Hyde, *Cunard*, pp. 56-7.

⁵⁶ Sloan, E.W., ‘The First (and Very Secret) International Steamship Cartel, 1850-1856’, in David J. Starkey & Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Research in Maritime History No. 14: Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries Since 1850* (St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1998), pp. 29-52. The significance of the third-class market was still apparent in the twentieth century. (See: INS, ‘Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference’ (1899-1917).)

⁵⁷ Based on the owners of vessels carrying passengers between Liverpool and North American Ports appearing in the *Liverpool Customs Bills of Entry* between 1850 and 1875. (Source: MMM, *Customs Bills of Entry: Liverpool* (1850-1875). See also, Hyde, *Cunard*, pp. 59, 60-1; Boyce, *Information, mediation and institutional development*, p. 16.

⁵⁸ Erickson, *American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885*.

⁵⁹ BPP, *Thirtieth General Report of the Emigration Commissioners* (1869), p. 1.

⁶⁰ *The Times* - Shipping Advertisements (1855-1880).

emigrant operations, in order to retain a competitive lead they had constantly to look beyond domestic sources of third-class emigrants – Ireland in particular – and even beyond the Atlantic basin, in order to sustain their longer-term dominance of transatlantic shipping.⁶¹

Once feeder rail and shipping services had become more closely connected, Atlantic operators developed working relationships with the owners of feeder vessels and the railway companies of the Humber Conference.⁶² This enabled a degree of cooperation amongst transport companies with the emigrant trade as was already evident for the movement of other trades such as the emerging trawling industry.⁶³ It ensured transmigration via Britain remained as convenient for the would-be European emigrant as those journeying via continental ports.⁶⁴ Transmigrants choosing to migrate via Britain were increasingly capable of travelling on pre-purchased, integrated travel.⁶⁵ The trade grew throughout the 1860s as a way British-based Atlantic shipping companies advanced the number of passengers they carried.⁶⁶ Alongside the mass marketing of their services, in a variety of European languages, they used the services of their own agents based in Hull and Grimsby to shepherd customers from the point of entry in Britain to the point of re-embarkation.⁶⁷ Like feeder companies working the North Sea they employed the services of continental-based agencies to promote their transmigrant services.⁶⁸ The connection of Atlantic shipping company with European agencies specialising in the

⁶¹ Hyde, *Cunard*, p. 61; Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration*, p. 292.

⁶² Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration*, pp. 194-195; TNA, RAIL/318/1, 'Humber Conference: Agreement' (1853); TNA, RAIL 527/568, 'North Eastern Railway: Agreements with Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire, London & North Western and Lancashire and Yorkshire Railways for developing traffic at Hull and Grimsby' (1865-1870).

⁶³ Robb Robsinon, *Trawling: The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fishery* (Exeter, 1996), pp. 27-8.

⁶⁴ Taylor, *Distant Magnet*, p. 148. For the numbers using continental ports see Table 3.5.

⁶⁵ Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration*, p. 194.

⁶⁶ Fragmentary examples of the increase numbers of transmigrants handled by British feeder lines can be seen in TNA, HO 3/120 (1860-1869).

⁶⁷ Ditto.

⁶⁸ Taylor, *Distant Magnet*, p. 148; Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration*, pp. 194-195; Hyde, *Cunard*, pp. 76-79.

movement of people followed the successful utilisation, established by Barings Brothers in the 1840s, of bolstering its London- and Liverpool-centred passenger operations with foreign nationals.⁶⁹

The model for transmigrant services established by Barings – employing an agency on the continent (Carl Ahlborn), and an agency in Britain (Phillipps and Graves) – established a template for other transmigrant agencies that followed.⁷⁰ A religiously-motivated agency – the Mormon Church – based in Liverpool, also used this system to transport more than 24,000 converts from Europe to America.⁷¹ Organised transmigration represented ‘big business’. Shipping companies keen to improve the returns they made on their Atlantic operations recognised the importance of the passenger trade as opposed to income from freight or mail. As shown in Table 7.8, of the 22,000 Mormon transmigrants leaving between 1852 and 1890, more than 71 per cent sailed with just one company – the Guion Line.⁷² Transmigration was essential to agency, shipowner, and customer alike.

⁶⁹ Transmigrants arriving in Britain and using the services of Barings - via London and Liverpool - are documented in TNA, HO 3/64-81 (1852-1855); Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration*, pp. 190-194

⁷⁰ Evidence apparent within TNA, HO 3/64-81 (1852-1855); other agencies were described by Brattne (Brattne, *Bröderna Larsson*).

⁷¹ Chart 3.26 and Table 3.26.

⁷² Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, 1999); NMM, *Lloyds Register of Shipping* (1852-1890).

Table 7.8. The number of transmigrants conveyed under the Mormon emigration contract, 1852-1890

Owner of Atlantic ship	Number of transmigrants	Share of business (%)
Cunard	108	0.48
Guion Line	16,020	71.67
Harrison	297	1.33
Inman	85	0.38
Mills & Co.	251	1.12
Multiple owners	449	2.01
Owen & Son	536	2.40
Rathbone Brothers & Co.	369	1.65
Multiple owners	449	2.01
Train & Co. (American owned)	18	0.08
Tapscott & Co.	2,366	10.59
Taylor & Co.	1,266	5.66
Wilson & Co. (of Liverpool)	301	1.35
Not known	286	1.28
Total	22,352	100.00

Source: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, 1999); NMM, *Lloyds Register of Shipping* (1852-1890).

Centring on trust, the creation of pan-European business networks, and their successful working, enhanced the already expanding influence of predominantly Liverpool-based shipping lines. Companies such as White Star, Cunard, Guion, American, Dominion, and Inman followed the lead of Barings via London and the Mormon Church via Liverpool in formulating their own inter- and intra-continental agencies. By 1870, all had established formal associations with large-scale continental agencies. A few trans-European networks of emigration agents increasingly dominated the market just as a handful of shipping companies dominated passenger shipping from London, Liverpool, and Glasgow. Whilst London had been important as a conduit for transmigrants during the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s, Liverpool emerged as the centre of the transmigrant outpouring from Britain. Only the Allan and Anchor Lines provided alternatives for migrants (via Glasgow). Rather than shifting the centre of the passenger trade away from that of domestic passenger operations it enhanced existing Mersey-based operations.

The use of agents by British-based companies focussed on leading centres of continental trade – namely Oslo, Gothenburg, Copenhagen, Hamburg and Bremen.

Whilst individual agents were important, it was the emergence of large-scale pan-European agencies such as the Larsson Brothers, operating through a family network with representatives in Gothenburg, Malmö, Stockholm and Liverpool, that emerged as an influential factor in the continued growth of the transmigrant trade.⁷³ The overseas agency evolved during the 1860s, but augmented during the 1870s into a pivotal feature of the shipping business. They acquired knowledge and sub-business networks that passed down from generation to generation, and proved as influential in overseas countries as the British equivalent, Thomas Cook, was in developing organised travel across the world.⁷⁴ Yet as with other aspects of the shipping industry, fewer people came to control ever-larger markets. Crucially for British shipping companies they led to the rapid development of transmigration through Britain.

Whatever their description, the agents fulfilled a number of differing but equally important functions. Most had their own experience of migration ranging from moving to a leaving nearby counties, or more frequently through their own experience of transatlantic travel. This personal knowledge equipped them with the power to both inform and profit. The Larssons, like many of their European counterparts, had all emigrated overseas during the 1860s before returning to their native Europe in the 1870s to profiting from the experience.⁷⁵ One of the largest transmigrant agencies – the Mormon Church – used American converts of non-British origin to proselytise their religion to would-be converts in their country of origin. Richard Cortis, one-time emigration agent at Hull, by contrast, relocated to Chicago before eventually heading White Star's New York-based operations.⁷⁶ All such agents, and agencies, recognised the benefits of working with liner-sized feeder companies, on the North Sea and North

⁷³ So successful were the family that they even wrote to each other in English so as to prevent anyone reading their correspondence. Olaf Thorn, 'Glimpses from the Activities of a Swedish Emigrant Agent', *The Swedish Pioneer Historical Society*, Volume X, Number 1 (1959); Brattne, *Bröderna Larsson*.

⁷⁴ Lynne Withey, *Grand Tours and Cook's Tours: A History of Leisure Travel, 1750-1915* (London, 1998).

⁷⁵ Brattne, *Bröderna Larsson*, p. 272. Four out of five of the brothers had emigrated; see: *1881 British Census* CD-ROM entries for Charles Maples (emigration agent at Hull), Simon Heilbron (emigration agent at Liverpool), Thomas Bewley (emigration agent at London), and Walter Peace (emigration agent at Huddersfield) all demonstrate this trend.

⁷⁶ Cortis's services were advertised within Hull commercial directories during the 1860s and 1870s. Hyde refers to him in correspondence from 1885. (See Hyde, *Cunard*, p. 352 – footnote 64.)

Atlantic, to generate large and regular commissions. Whilst many worked for more than one British company, they did not work for rival Scandinavian or, later, German companies. Their work advanced the centrality of the Humber to Mersey corridor and Britain became part of the main trunk route for transmigrants.

Whilst Anchor, Allan, and the Thompson Line provided services at ports other than Liverpool, the mainstay of the business gravitated on the Europe to Hull, Hull to Liverpool, and Liverpool to New York transport artery. It helped the companies based in Liverpool to advance in size and scale. As the market became internationalised, and many of the American competitors failed to survive the effects of the 1860s, or the conversion from sail to steam, the passenger trade was concentrated into the control of just a handful of companies. Their names were promoted in literature – unlike those of the feeder companies – and it led to brands becoming an increasingly important aspect of the trade. Integrated transport systems, a key feature of the transmigrant business, were also essential if the purchasers of prepaid tickets were to continue to favour the transmigrant option. Reliability, loyalty and integrity of their ‘man on the spot’ were also paramount. As detailed in Table 7.9, by 1872 Inman’s early commercial lead at Liverpool still dominated the industry, commanding nearly one-third of all passengers. The other four – Cunard, Guion, National and White Star – held between 14 and 19 per cent of the passenger trade. Whilst Cunard’s operations were off-set by a larger share of the premium, first-class market, most were capable of providing a weekly or bi-weekly service because of the large numbers of foreign emigrants sailing from British ports.

Table 7.9. The passenger market from Liverpool to New York in 1872

Shipping line	Number of ships plying route	Number of trips	Number of cabin passengers	Number of steerage passengers	Total number of passengers	Share of market (%)
Cunard	10	83	8,324	24,075	32,399	19
Inman	12	81	3,012	51,044	54,056	32
National	9	52	2,429	30,041	32,470	19
Guion	8	51	1,282	24,100	25,382	15
White Star	6	42	3,337	19,403	22,740	14
Total	45	309	18,384	148,663	167,047	100

Source: INS, 'Annual Report of the Commissioners of Emigration of the New York, for the year ending December 31, 1872'.

Such commercial activity was initially dependent on the low cost or quicker speed British shipping companies offered. Yet as competition from European competitors intensified, the transmigrant passenger benefited as firms courted even the third-class clientele by offering them free food and transport whilst *en route* and journeying through Britain.⁷⁷ Lodgings, of a relatively good standard, were also provided for each group of transmigrants at the port of embarkation in Europe, the point of arrival in Britain, or the point of re-embarkation for transoceanic destinations. As evidence to the United States Immigration Commission later noted, at Liverpool these were organised on a military manner:

On our way [to the hotel] we were divided again as to nationality, for the companies named [White Star, Dominion, and Cunard to] try as far as possible to keep each nationality under one roof, or at least in one part of the hotel, thus avoiding unnecessary difficulties. ... The Cunard Hotel system is a village by itself in the centre of Liverpool, and consists of several buildings, holding over 2,000 guests if need be. In those hotels second as well as third-class passengers may remain until their steamer departs, entirely free of charge. ... There are two dining rooms, one with a seating capacity of about 500, one with 200. The meals are wholesome. A printed menu was found in several conspicuous places. The Hebrews who stay in a separate hotel get kosher cooked meals.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Minnesota Historical Society, 'A. Knoph, *Beiledning for Emigranter til Amerika, forfaavidt angaar Befordring pr. Dampskib over Hull og Liverpool til New York og videre indgjennem Landet pr. Fernbane* (Christiania, 1869)', p. 10.

⁷⁸ Reports of the Immigration Commission, *Emigration Conditions in Europe* (Washington, 1911), pp. 85-86.

The handful of Atlantic liners to have emerged by the 1880s therefore recognised in the transmigrant trade the opportunity not only to derive the revenues to fund the expansion of their fleets, but also the means by which to achieve capacity optimisation on ever-larger vessels that they were commissioning for the Atlantic passenger trade. As shown in Table 7.10, Cunard, the leader of the companies by mid-century, was capable of transporting significantly larger number of passengers (of all classes) by the early 1870s than it had been a generation earlier. Whilst vessels such as *Gallia* (launched in 1879) achieved capacity by the arrival of three average-sized feeder vessels in the 1870s, the far-larger *Umbria* (launched in 1884) was reliant on the arrival of just a single feeder vessel by 1884. The success of the transmigrant trade centred on the ease with which the migrants travelled across Britain, and the increased capabilities of the Wilson Line to fill the third-class passenger space aboard rapidly expanding ocean liners. The successful working of the trade during the emigrant season offset poorer results during the remainder of the year.

Table 7.10. Particulars of specimen vessels belonging to the Cunard fleet, 1840-1907

Feature	<i>Britannia</i> (1840)	<i>Persia</i> (1856)	<i>Gallia</i> (1879)	<i>Umbria</i> (1884)	<i>Campania</i> (1893)	<i>Lusitania</i> (1907)
Coal needed to reach New York (tons)	570	1,400	836	1,900	2,900	5,000
Cargo carried (tons)	224	750	1,700	1,000	1,620	1,500
Passengers	115	250	320	1,255	1,700	2,350
Indicated horsepower	710	3,600	5,000	14,500	30,000	68,000
Steam pressure (lb)	9	33	75	110	165	200
Coal per Indicated horsepower	5.1	3.8	75	110	165	200
Speed (knots)	8.5	18.1	15.5	19	22	25

Source: Glasgow University Archives, UGD 255 /1/2/8, 'Confidential report on the profits of the Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd, 1900-1911'.

The growth of a single feeder fleet of liner-sized proportions enabled Britain's leading five Atlantic operations to grow exponentially throughout the 1860s, 1870s and

1880s. Not only were third-class transmigrants subsidising the labour intensity of first-class operations, they also minimised the fixed costs of fuel, crew, ship maintenance and vessel depreciation. Whilst the vessels were capable of carrying larger numbers of third-class passengers, domestic demand from British emigrants did not keep pace with the expansion of vessels physically. Although British emigration experienced peaks in the 1840s, 1850s, and 1880s and remained relatively constant, the transmigrant supply was continually expanding; peaks in German transmigration in the 1850s, were followed in peaks in Swedish transmigration in the 1860s, Norwegian transmigration in the 1880s, Finnish transmigration in the 1890s. To the Atlantic lines in particular, the value of transmigration made a significant difference. In addition to feeder services, Atlantic operators also developed, as shown in Tables 7.11 and 7.12, eastward-bound passenger trade and equally important freight operations. Such diversification was essential to compensate for off-peak periods and cyclical downturns in the trade.

Sustained growth in the demand for North Atlantic passenger services during the transition from sail to steam shipping enabled transport companies engaged in the migrant business to provide good returns on their investment throughout the mid- to late-1860s, early 1870s, and early 1880s as demand continued to outstrip supply. Growth in transoceanic passenger travel had been fuelled by the expansion of transmigration along the Humber to Mersey corridor.⁷⁹ The trade had also given British companies what Sturmeý defined as a further condition of supremacy – alongside the lack of British competition laws, Britain’s ‘establishment advantages’, the ability of British shipping companies to replace older tonnage with newer, more efficient vessels, and Britain’s leading industrial strength – that had aided the enviable growth of the British shipping industry.⁸⁰ Concentrating around a handful of Atlantic liner-sized companies, a small number of railway companies, and increasingly polarised on one liner-sized feeder company, the businesses providing transmigrant services during the mid- to late-nineteenth century appeared to have gained significantly from the sustained levels of emigration from Scandinavia in particular.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Hyde, *Cunard*, pp. 58-9.

⁸⁰ Sturmeý, *British Shipping*, pp. 12-15.

As newer markets developed in the east – namely by the opening up of Eastern and Central Europe to mass emigration through the expansion of the continental railway network – German and British shipping companies began to divert their attentions from the Scandinavian market to Russia, Poland, and Austria-Hungary.⁸² As with the Scandinavian market, this initially focussed upon the recruitment of continental agents.⁸³ Yet over time policies aimed at retaining the Scandinavian business, and not expanding the newer markets, were to prove essential in retaining the business, as geographic advantages that had once favoured British companies increasingly favoured Britain's competitors.⁸⁴ Protecting the established trades over opportunities in Eastern and Central Europe came at a price; whilst retaining the Scandinavian business the new markets offered further growth to Britain's leading rivals – HAPAG and NDL. The latter's influence over transmigrant flows via British ports grew rapidly during the last few decades of the nineteenth century as they encouraged many of the would-be transmigrants from eastern and central Europe to emigrate directly via Hamburg and Bremen.⁸⁵ Although the handful of British companies dominating the transatlantic market were able to retain or expand the numbers using their services, they had increasingly to share that market with German companies and their share of the overall business initially stagnated – and then declined – in relative terms.⁸⁶

⁸¹ The statistical significance of the Scandinavian traffic is demonstrated in both fragmentary passenger lists from the period (TNA, HO 3/120) and also parliamentary evidence (BPP, *Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board Relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull* (1882); BPP, *Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1889), pp. 307-310.

⁸² David Turnock, 'Railway Development in Eastern Europe as a Context for Migration Study', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.) *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 293-312; Hyde, *Cunard*, pp. 98-100.

⁸³ Hyde, *Cunard*, p. 77.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p. 99.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 99-100.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 100. See also INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1917).

Table 7.11. Breakdown of gross earnings the Anchor Line derived from the Glasgow to New York route, 1899-1905

Year	Freight outward (£)	Passage money outward (£)	Freight homeward (£)	Passage money homeward (£)	Total money (£)
1899	27,217	66,617	70,440	43,593	207,867
1900	30,307	91,342	105,937	64,529	292,115
1901	33,426	86,911	58,694	52,308	231,339
1902	41,974	105,963	68,786	58,594	275,317
1903	32,004	124,938	75,471	73,395	305,808
1904	27,186	117,900	59,878	60,101	265,065
1905	39,872	173,467	81,368	99,206	393,913

Source: Glasgow University Archives, UGD 255 /1/2/8, 'Confidential report on the profits of the Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd, 1900-1911'.

Table 7.12. Proportion of gross earnings the Anchor Line derived from the Glasgow to New York route, 1899-1905

Year	Proportion of voyage results from freight outward (%)	Proportion of voyage results from passage money outward (%)	Proportion of voyage results from freight homeward (%)	Proportion of voyage results from passage money homeward (%)	Total (%)
1899	13	32	34	21	100
1900	10	31	36	22	100
1901	14	38	25	23	100
1902	15	38	25	21	100
1903	10	41	25	24	100
1904	10	44	23	23	100
1905	10	44	21	25	100

Source: Glasgow University Archives, UGD 255 /1/2/8, 'Confidential report on the profits of the Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd, 1900-1911'.

7.2 Retaining the business (1882-1914)

During this era of expansion, which came to an abrupt end in 1882, few foreign fleets, after the demise of the US merchant fleets during the US Civil War, had posed any significant challenge to the dominant influence of the British shipping industry. The British command over merchant shipping globally was still powerful twenty years later.

However in one key area of shipping – the passenger trades – the might of British companies had slowly reached its zenith. The alien passenger, and in particular the transmigrant flows through Britain, had represented one-third of this traffic.⁸⁷ Singularly the business made the difference between good returns on investment and the kind of successful capacity utilisation that enabled those involved to expand. The handful of British companies engaged in the business after 1882 not only enjoyed significant establishment advantages over their counterparts, but they had crucially already developed close working relationships with their British rivals. The ‘united front’ turned them into a formidable opposition.⁸⁸ But this would, by the 1890s, prove insufficient to combat the commercial ambitions of increasingly powerful foreign shipping lines such as HAPAG, NDL, the Holland-America Line, and the Red Star Line.

British companies during the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century faced intense foreign competition of a degree they were not used to. After monopolising the transatlantic passenger trade for nearly two decades, as Hyde alluded, ‘the virtual overcrowding of the North Atlantic by so many companies and by so much tonnage could only sustain profitable operation under conditions of increasing trade’.⁸⁹ The maritime sector, according to Greenhill, had become a part of a globalised shipping industry; the British market – whether of freight or passengers – was now but part of a much wider and more competitive and globalised industry.⁹⁰ This was particularly apparent with the emigrant business. As the centre of that trade shifted from Northern and Western Europe to Central and Eastern Europe during the late-1870s, and especially the early 1880s, the British realm of influence, and crucially the room for further expansion, changed dramatically. Whilst Scandinavian transmigration, increasingly referred to as the ‘British trade’, retained its importance to the longer term

⁸⁷ Chart 3.7.

⁸⁸ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 94.

⁸⁹ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 92.

⁹⁰ Robert G. Greenhill, ‘Competition or Co-operation in the Global Shipping Industry: The Origins and Impact of the Conference System for British Shipowners before 1914’, in David Starkey & Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Research in Maritime History No. 14: Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries Since 1850* (St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1998), pp. 53-80.

success of British-based North Atlantic operations, British and European companies began to look further east for the potential expansion of their increasingly emigrant-centred passenger operations. The transmigrant trade gained greater credence to the longer-term commercial well-being of large scale passenger lines.

The market was focussed upon the overland route through Germany, Holland, and Belgium posed obvious difficulties for British companies. The foreign fleets which British shipping companies had previously easily supplanted now began to dominate the supply of East European transmigrants. Opportunities for British shipping companies were further hindered by the growth of foreign merchant fleets based in German, Dutch, or Belgian ports into formidable concerns. Unlike in Britain, where, according to Hyde, shipowners had shown collusion 'based on trust', Britain's European rivals were neither liked nor trusted. A new era required new solutions; Britain's apparent command over passenger shipping was challenged; such foreign competition helped cause the demise of many companies which had previously been at the forefront in the development of the trade.

7.2.1 Competition, contraction and intervention (1882-1898)

By the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the nature of transmigrant shipping had changed completely. Like shore-based industry, economies of scale had grown and the business favoured the larger scale enterprise. As shown by Table 7.13, the Wilson Line had emerged as the leading North Sea feeder-line, handling nearly 92 per cent of the trade arriving at Hull. Its operations centred on Hull, but it was not restricted to the Humber. The company represented a significant force nationally. No other liner-sized company was involved in transporting transmigrants within Europe and the scale of the line's operations differentiated it from other companies still involved in the business. Vessels of the fleet, as shown in the twelve-month period between 1 July 1887 and 30 June 1888, arrived at Hull at a rate of five per week and carried an average of 232 passengers per voyage. During trading highs such as 1881 no fewer than 1,600 transmigrants arrived during a single week – most aboard the vessels of the Wilson Line.⁹¹

⁹¹ HCA, TCM 174 (1882), p. 154; Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates: Third series*, Volume CCLXX (London, 1882), p. 1235.

Table 7.13. The scale and character of the transmigrant trade to Hull between 1 July 1887 and 30 June 1888

Shipping line	Home port	Number of voyages	Number of transmigrants	Average number of transmigrants per vessel
Thule Line	Gothenburg	1	1	1
Bailey & Leetham	Hull	34	1,828	54
C.M. Lofthouse	Hull	8	452	57
H.J. Perlbach	Hamburg	49	3,074	63
Wilson Line	Hull	256	59,283	232
Total		348	64,638	186

Source: BPP, *Report of the Select Committee on the Emigration and Immigration (of Foreigners)* (1888), pp. 307-310; LSL, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1887-1888); NMM, *Lloyds Register of Shipping* (London, 1888).

The strength of this business generated sufficient capital to commission vessels geared at optimising the conditions of the market - such as the *Rollo* (launched in 1870), the *Romeo* (launched in 1885) and the *Eskimo* (launched in 1910).⁹² The typical feeder vessel of the fleet grew from 1400 gross tons in 1870 to 2300 gross tons by 1890.⁹³ The tonnage of each vessel had not just increased, newly built ships offered improvements to all passenger quarters.⁹⁴ This advantageous position enabled British companies such as the Wilson Line to retain its importance within the northern European emigrant market generally and in particular to combat the threat of further competition. To consolidate their mercantile strength they acquired smaller companies, such as Brownlow, Marsdin & Company in 1878, and larger rivals such as Bailey and Leetham – who were the agents in Hull and London for DFDS – in 1903.⁹⁵ In comparison, whilst smaller companies such as the Leith, Hull & Hamburg Steam Packet Company began transporting transmigrants between Hamburg and Leith, the West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Company plied the

⁹² B JL, DEW/10/1-3, 'Ships' Registry Books (1860-1917)'.

⁹³ Arthur Credland, *The Wilson Line of Hull 1831-1981* (Cherry Burton, East Yorkshire).

⁹⁴ B JL, DEW 8/1, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Limited, *Wilson Line of Steamers: Handbook of Royal Mail Passengers & Cargo Services: Season 1893* (Hull, 1893); DEW 8/4, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Limited, *Wilson Line of Steamers; Particulars of the Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services* (Hull, 1907); DEW 8/6, Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co. Limited, *Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services: 1911* (Hull, 1911).

⁹⁵ Credland, *Wilson Line*, pp. 10, 12-13.

Hamburg to West Hartlepool route, and the MS&L consolidated their position on the Hamburg to Grimsby route, they remained single port operators.⁹⁶ The scale and breadth of the Wilson Line's influence continually out-shone that of all other lines combined throughout the period.⁹⁷ Central to the success of British lines in the transmigrant trade was the retention of Agents-General in each continental port.⁹⁸

As British companies sought to improve their passenger services through the construction of new vessels, or the re-fitting of existing vessels, they also recouped revenue through the sale of older and obsolete vessels to rival European steamship companies.⁹⁹ It enabled foreign-owned fleets to undergo considerable expansion during the second half of the nineteenth century as they broadened their ambitions from local or domestic trades, to the potentially more lucrative North Sea operations – including transporting transmigrants along new routes – such as Esbjerg to Harwich, Libau to Hull, or Hångö to Hull.¹⁰⁰ Such ambitions mirrored growing national pride within cognate parts of Scandinavia, and the availability of affordable shipping tonnage aided the growth of smaller companies that had previously worked inland navigations.¹⁰¹ Lines such as DFDS and Thingvalla of Denmark, Thule and Stettin-Lloyd of Sweden, Det Bergenske Dampkibs Selskab (The Bergen Line) and Fred Olsen of Norway, and the Finska Ångfartygs Aktiebolaget (FÅA) of Finland were in turn bolstered by the availability of cheaper obsolete vessels capable of plying the North Sea short sea passenger routes.¹⁰² The latter, especially by the late 1890s, like their German counterparts HAPAG and

⁹⁶ Greenway, *A Century of North Sea Passenger Steamers*, pp. 35-47, 75, 79-82.

⁹⁷ Staatsarchiv, Hamburg, Listen Den Indirekten Auswanderer VIII / B / 1 / Film Numbers 13157-13174 (1854-1910).

⁹⁸ James Taylor, *Ellermans: A Wealth of Shipping* (London, 1976), pp. 250-251.

⁹⁹ See (for example) the original owners of vessels belonging to DFDS. (Source: Søren Thorsøe, *DFDS 1866-1991: Ship Development through 125 years – from Paddle Steamer to Ro/Ro Ship* (Copenhagen, 1991).)

¹⁰⁰ Greenway, *Ibid*, pp. 112-118; Malmberg & Neumann, *The White Ships*, pp. 5-30; Nicholas Evans, 'The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914', *Jewish Culture and History*, Volume VII, Numbers 1-2 (Summer/Autumn 2004), pp.197-214.

¹⁰¹ Malmberg & Neumann, *The White Ships*; Søren Thorsøe, *DFDS 1866-1991*.

¹⁰² Greenway, *Ibid*, pp. 112-118, 127-134, 136-142, 119-125; Malmberg & Neumann p. 7.

NDL, helped to further erode the previously enviable command British companies had over feeder services.¹⁰³

Year by year, foreign steamship owners began to expand their role in feeder services to Britain and other continental ports. DFDS began to ship transmigrants on the route between Esbjerg and Harwich, the FÅA between Åbo or Hangö and Hull, the Bergen Line (in conjunction with P.G. Halvorsen) between Bergen, Stavanger and Newcastle, Fred Olsen between Oslo and Grangemouth, and the Argo Line between Bremen and Hull or London.¹⁰⁴ Whilst only the Thingvalla Line sought – upon expansion – to open up a direct emigrant operation – in competition with Britain’s feeder lines – the others only reduced the role of British companies as the providers of transmigrant passenger services in European waters.¹⁰⁵ The process was gradual, but route by route, each operator attacked in a piecemeal manner.¹⁰⁶ Whilst they possessed less cutting-edge tonnage and were unable to supplant the reputation of British short-sea steamship companies and their prestige services, they were able to encroach upon the less discerning demands of the transmigrant passenger.¹⁰⁷

Prior to 1892, British companies were still able to sustain the supply of transmigrants. This helped transoceanic steamship operators because it occurred at the same time as British emigration witnessed a strong resurgence.¹⁰⁸ The combined impact

¹⁰³ Hull Hebrew Community, ‘Society for the Protection of Women and Girls – Daybook’, pp. 36-224; NMM, *Lloyd’s Register of Shipping* (London, 1913).

¹⁰⁴ Greenway, *Ibid*, pp. 106-111-125, 127-142; Malmberg & Neumann, pp. 5-30; Nicholas Evans, ‘The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914’, pp. 197-214.

¹⁰⁵ Odd Lovoll, ‘For the People Who are not in a Hurry: The Danish Thingvalla Line and the Transportation of Scandinavian Emigrants’, *Journal of American Ethnic History*, Volume XIII (1993), pp. 38-47.

¹⁰⁶ This process is best shown by the list of steamship companies and operators recorded in the conveyance directories for the ports of Hull, Leith and London between 1836 and 1914. (Source: Various commercial directories – published by different companies – for the period in question.)

¹⁰⁷ For a description of the poor conditions third-class transmigrants were exposed to see: Nicholas Evans, ‘The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914’, p. 208; and Nicholas Evans, ‘Commerce, States and Anti-Alienism: Balancing Britain’s Interests in the Late-Victorian Age’, in Eitan Bar-Yosef & Nadia Valman (eds.), *The ‘Jew’ in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture: Between the East End and East Africa* (London, Forthcoming).

¹⁰⁸ Charts 3.03 and 3.04.


of domestic and transmigrant operations continued to represent growth for feeder companies and Atlantic liner shipowners alike.¹⁰⁹ They recognised that no matter how interested rival ‘smaller fleets’ appeared on diverting the short-sea passenger flows few could build vessels as large as the Wilson fleet. During the 1880s, the Wilson Line on the North Sea and six key liner companies on the Atlantic were therefore able to challenge European competitors. There was, however, one company that presented more of a challenge. This intervention was targeted on the supply of Scandinavian transmigrants to Britain. In 1884, Sir Christopher Furness, owner of Furness-Withy, sought to intervene in the two most lucrative trades of – by then – Britain’s largest feeder line – the Wilson Line. Firstly, he threatened the Scandinavian transmigrant market between the Humber and the Mersey. Secondly, he sought to divert some of the burgeoning American trade between Hull and Newcastle and New York. He did this by diverting the Scandinavian transmigrant supply to America via Newcastle and providing a regular freight route from the north east to America. The Wilson Line responded by establishing the Wilson-Furness Line, a company in which both companies invested equally and provided only freight and first-class passenger services between the north eastern ports and Boston and New York. Furness had used the combined threat of challenging the Wilsons on freight and transmigrants in order to enter the potentially lucrative North American freight trade. As shown in Figure 7.2, the Wilson Line was able to retain her leading control over the supply of transmigrants by providing feeder services for every major Atlantic line based in Britain. However the response of the Wilson Line to the threat of Furness-Withy demonstrated a shift in the way it handled competition. Whilst previously it had fought off commercial aggression by entering short-lived freight wars or reducing the price of transmigrant services, it now sought settlement via trade agreements or mergers. As Arthur Wilson wrote 24 years later:

¹⁰⁹ Chart 3.07.

Are you aware we rescued the Trade in 1884 from a direct line to and from Sweden which Sir Chris[topher] Furness had organised with three steamers 'Stockholm' 'Gothenburg' and 'Lincoln City' [?] We bought the 'Lincoln City' and made advances on the two others and thus stopped the direct line – this was done by us alone as the Liverpool people declined to assist us financially or in any other way. You will remember the 'Lincoln' City whose name we altered to the 'Chicago' running from New York to Newcastle ... I may add part of the Agreement with Furness bound us to run from Newcastle to New York with the result already mentioned (trade lost us a lot of money and we had to abandon it).¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ B JL, DEW 4/10, 'Letter from Arthur Wilson to Harold A. Sanderson: RE Atlantic Lines' (4 November 1908). See Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.2. The flow of Swedish emigrants to and from Britain after 1885



Source: BJL, DEW2, 'Emigrant Agents Securities' (1889-1911).

¹¹¹ The Thule Line's London agent was W.E. Bott – bother-in-law of Charles Henry Wilson and Arthur Wilson (owners of the Wilson Line).

Maintaining Britain's dominant position on the North Atlantic – via feeder services – became more problematic during the 1880s as the threat of domestic and small-scale foreign competition intensified once NDL and HAPAG had emerged as successful operators on both an intra- and inter-continental basis. The monopoly Britain had enjoyed over European transmigrant trade began to be eroded rapidly. Profiting from sustained surges of direct emigration from Hamburg and Bremen, and bolstered by Scandinavia (via the eastern route along the Kattegat and then Kiel), and especially through the escalating numbers arriving via Germany's border with Russia, the two German lines grew exponentially as the two great titans of the North Atlantic. They were aided in their challenge of British supremacy by the growth of Red Star and Holland America. Each rival did not impede Britain's control over domestic emigration but instead limited the number of transmigrants using British ports as a stepping stone to North America. Whilst the Red Star and Holland America Lines retained a domestic focus, the German lines developed more ambitious plans. Sustained expansion in the transmigrant industry awakened their eyes to challenging Britain's lead yet further. Initially, they commissioned vessels such as HAPAG's 4,247 ton *Hammonia* (built in 1881) or NDL's 4,510 ton *Elbe* (launched in 1881) that equalled vessels launched by British ocean liner companies. But later they began building far larger vessels, such as HAPAG's 16,502 ton *Deutschland* (launched in 1900) and NDL's 14,349 ton *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* (launched in 1897), that led the way forward for other Atlantic operators, won the Blue Riband, and helped to undermine the strength that British shipping companies had previously held over European emigration; the strategy worked. By 1891 the NDL and HAPAG respectively controlled 15.3 per cent and 17.0 per cent of the Westbound North Atlantic steerage traffic; this contrasted with White Star's 7.9 per cent and Cunard's 6.1 per cent.¹¹²

Whilst NDL followed a policy of maintaining both feeder services to Britain and transatlantic services direct from Europe until 1897, HAPAG changed its policy in 1886 following the appointment of Albert Ballin, a successful Hamburg shipowner. Ballin had been brought into the fold of the HAPAG a year previously as the new head of the company's passenger department. Previously a shipowner in his own right he

¹¹² Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 100.

represented a new breed of professional managers tasked with overhauling the fortunes of the transoceanic passenger market. Within a year of his appointment HAPAG challenged the British Lines by circumventing what the Wilson Line had only just re-secured from the Furness threat – the transmigrant flow from Gothenburg. To achieve this it purchased the poorly performing direct emigrant services of the Stettin-Lloyd (founded in 1878). Pivotaly it circumvented part of British main transmigrant supply at source. Following the strategy of the Furness attack the new route challenged British commercial interests on two fronts: freight and passengers. The war was quickly resolved. Yet the Wilson Line had been forced to concede all but six per cent of the emigrant flow from German ports on the proviso that the Scandinavian trade was left to them.¹¹³ The strength of German shipping had compelled British companies to concede potential growth in transmigration from central and eastern Europe (via Germany) – to retain the monopoly of Scandinavian transmigration.

The new rapprochement over the North Sea trades worked alongside growing collusion between contending continental liners. Europe's third-class emigrant market, in which the transmigrant trade through Britain featured prominently, had been transformed from a predominantly British concern to a more continental-wide sphere of the passenger trade. It heralded a new era of international agreements enhanced through formal agreements on freight *and* passengers. However before the effects were seen the entire trade came to a virtual halt with the outbreak of cholera at the nerve centre of transmigrant and transatlantic passenger shipping – Hamburg. When cholera broke out in the port in August 1892 it was the second greatest European entrepôt for transmigrants to Britain after Gothenburg.¹¹⁴ The damaging effects that the declaration of Hamburg as an infected port had upon trade delayed public acknowledgement of Asiatic cholera – the most lethal strain of the cholera bacilli – for several weeks. According to Richard Evans, the medics 'lacked the experience to identify the bacilli', yet 'pressures on medical men in Hamburg to avoid such a diagnosis, with all the damage to trade implied by quarantine

¹¹³ *Ibid*, p. 107.

¹¹⁴ BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom – Part II* (1893-4, CII.1). According to this report 28,904 Aliens *en route* to America, or other Places out of the United Kingdom arrived from Gothenburg during 1892, by contrast 28,280 arrived from Hamburg.

measures that would inevitably follow, were ... very strong'.¹¹⁵ This officially sanctioned concealment inevitably led to catastrophe. The trade in transmigrants to and through Germany, and thus Britain, collapsed. Despite the slashing of transatlantic passenger fares in 1893 by Liverpool-based companies to as little as £2 10 shillings the disease spelled commercial disaster for all involved:

The HAPAG recorded 'very heavy losses' because of the epidemic: profits complained the company's annual report, were 'down by millions'. Half a million Marks had to be paid back for unused 'prepaid' tickets alone. 'Almost every merchant', indeed, as the Chamber of Commerce was forced to report in December, 'has to a greater or lesser degree suffered effective losses, which in many cases still cannot be calculated.' Dividends were slashed, sometimes by as much as half, to reflect the steep fall in profits occasion by the epidemic. It was, as the Chamber of Commerce reported, 'a terrible year'.¹¹⁶

Cunard, as dependent on the transmigrant flow as ever before, returned substantial losses for the financial years 1893-1894 as fewer migrants travelled in either direction; prepaid tickets had also to be refunded.¹¹⁷ Having only just entered into a new era of trans-continental cooperation, the epidemic caused a volte face on collusion as each company sought to recoup lost earnings. Central to this strategy were the potential transmigrant operations presented to companies struggling to cover even their fixed costs. British and Danish shipping companies, working to sustain levels of feeder services to Britain, used the cessation of migration via Hamburg to their advantage by opening up a new transmigrant route – that via the Baltic port of Libau.¹¹⁸ The number of both immigrants and transmigrants arriving via Libau grew from 429 in 1893 to 4,706 in 1894.¹¹⁹ The new route had always been an important freight route. However it suddenly presented an increasingly fruitful way for British and Danish companies to avoid the border controls that had been introduced for migrants passing the German

¹¹⁵ Richard Evans, *Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830-1910* (Oxford, 1987), p. 384.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 377-8.

¹¹⁷ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 149.

¹¹⁸ TNA, FO 400/16, 'Letter from the British Vice Consul (C. Hill) at Libau to the British Consul General at Riga (Wagstaff)' (18 November 1893).

¹¹⁹ Evans, 'The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914', p. 206.

border in the wake of the outbreak of cholera. The new route proved insufficient to prevent casualties amongst British companies which had been over-reliant on the transmigrant trade to sustain the profitability of their operations.

The Guion Line, which had held the coveted Mormon Contract since 1869, and had transported more than 16,020 Mormon transmigrants, went bankrupt within two years of the cholera being declared.¹²⁰ The reduction of transmigrants took place alongside a change in Mormon theology on the spirit of gathering – Mormons were now able to build their Zion anywhere in the world, obviating the need to emigrate. It also came three years after the Perpetual Emigrating Fund (which had assisted even the poorest of Mormons to emigrate) had also ceased.¹²¹ The demise in Mormon transmigration and cholera also took place at the same time as an economic slump in North America further affected migration generally. Within 10 years of the founder dying and unable to sustain commercial operations by drumming up additional British emigration, a leading line which had held the coveted Blue Riband for six years went bankrupt in 1894.¹²² It proved a precedent for other companies engaged in the transmigrant trade: the halcyon days of growth in transmigration had ended. Competition on the Atlantic had intensified, and lines possessing surplus tonnage or the most prestigious liners afloat no longer presented the commercial strength they once had.

Contraction in the trade was nothing new. The Inman Line, a market leader and pioneer in the emigrant trade since the 1850s, had also experienced commercial weakness in the decade preceding the cholera epidemic – during another slump in mass migration. It had gone into voluntary liquidation in 1886, again within five years of the founder dying.¹²³ Unlike with the Guion bankruptcy, the company had been acquired by the American-owned International Navigation Company. The latter had already acquired the financially-struggling American Line, and also the Red Star Line. They typified a change in the later Victorian age in which entrepreneurial, European-owned, shipping companies

¹²⁰ Evans & Woods, 'Latter-day Saint Scandinavian Migration through Hull', p. 85.

¹²¹ Sonne, *Saints on the Seas*, pp. 144-5.

¹²² Lee, *The Blue Riband*, pp. 232-3.

¹²³ TNA, BT 31/3741/23322, 'Record of Dissolved Companies: Inman and International Steamship Company' (1886).

struggled to succeed once their founders died or approached retirement. In the case of the Red Star, American, and Inman Lines, they were all re-formed as the American Line (later the International Mercantile Marine). Financial misjudgement in commissioning faster, and not more-profitable operations, and an over-reliance on the supply of third-class passengers (of which the foreign emigrants were a major element) often overstretched even the largest commercial line. In 1893 the surviving elements of the Inman Line (then part of the American Line) agreed to move the base of its operations to Antwerp (with Southampton being the first port of call). Cunard and White Star paid them £30,000 per year to ensure an overcrowded Liverpool did not cause any further casualties.¹²⁴ The 1880s and 1890s had seen the demise of some of the world's leading passenger shipping companies. Crucially, Southampton had been opened up to challenge the previous supremacy of the Humber to Mersey transmigrant corridor. The transmigrant business began to experience rapid evolution in which operations via Britain were pulled southwards to further European-based shipping interests.

Compounding the difficulties from the 1890s trade recession increased commercial aggression by German companies which had suffered significant hardship during the cholera and ensuing slump in the passenger trade during the early 1890s. In particular, German lines sought to challenge new Baltic routes that by-passed Germany entirely. The route via Libau had helped British companies in particular by facilitating the opening of an alternative transmigrant route via London or Southampton to South Africa. Although traditionally up to four times the price of the North American route, the Southern African economy was expanding and the price of the fare dropped to £12 for the entire journey from Europe (compared with £4 10 s. to New York or Philadelphia).¹²⁵ The number of transmigrants travelling through Britain *en route* for South Africa grew from 3,061 in 1893 to 11,246 in 1896 at the same time as that to North America reached all-time ebb.¹²⁶ Whilst many went via London, and, as Newman and Barker have described, stayed at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, others went direct to

¹²⁴ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 102.

¹²⁵ TNA, FO 400/16, 'Letter from the British Vice Consulate (Hill) at Libau to the British Consul General at Riga (Wagstaff)' (10 January 1895).

¹²⁶ Barker, *Jewish Migration to South Africa*, p. 76.

Southampton.¹²⁷ The Union and Castle Lines used their own feeder operations to help fill their vessels bound for the southern hemisphere – routes dominated by Britain. Crucially for British shipping companies, those *en route* to South Africa were exempt from the Transatlantic Passenger Conferences *and* sought to migrate out of the traditional transmigrant season. Transmigration had become important to a greater number of British ports throughout the year.

Despite the depressed state of the European passenger market, a surge in emigration from Central Europe helped gross profits at HAPAG to grow from £300,000 in 1895 to 750,000 by 1898, and more than £1,250,000 by 1900.¹²⁸ These furthered the expansion of HAPAG and NDL as they sought to expand into other freight and passenger operations across the South and North Atlantic. In 1897, NDL sold its North Sea operations to the Argo Line and heralded the abandonment of the North Sea to feeder companies. Short-term measures on the German border had furthered German interests by compelling would-be transmigrants to purchase transatlantic travel on German Lines. Yet despite Sturmeys' assertions that the German lines continued to use the border stations to monopolise the transmigration trade via Germany, such monopolisation via these control stations was short-lived.¹²⁹ German protectionism was instead enshrined in a new German Emigration Act, passed in 1897. The Act, already described in Chapter 5, heralded a new era in protectionism by the German state and cut off the right of British companies to ship transmigrants from German ports to London, Southampton, Leith and West Hartlepool.¹³⁰ Those conveyed to Hull or London had to be carried aboard feeder vessels owned by the Argo Line. Whilst transmigrants still arrived in Britain they did so under the terms of the German Imperial Chancery. Only the vessels of MS&L – plying the important route between Hamburg and Grimsby – remained unaffected as HAPAG acted as its agent in Hamburg.

¹²⁷ See Chart 3.29. Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 'Listen Den Indirekten Auswanderer VIII/B/1/Film Numbers 13157-13174' (1854-1910). The latter-source demonstrates the large number of transmigrants arriving at Southampton.

¹²⁸ TNA, FO 881/9311, 'Report on the Activity of the Hamburg-American Packet Company' (1908), p. 2.

¹²⁹ Sturmeys, *British Shipping*, pp. 16-17, 19.

¹³⁰ TNA, FO 64/1489 (1898), 'List of Authorised Emigration Companies and Agents under the Emigration Law of June 9, 1897'.

Interventionism had ended the British monopoly over transmigrants on most of the main trunk routes from Europe. Ultimately, Germany was not deluded into thinking she could retain the business. Instead, she used her powerful position to force cooperation across Europe – with NDL and Hamburg America retaining the greatest share of the business. Between 1882 and 1898 was the peak of the British involvement in the short-sea third-class European steerage market. Whilst levels of transmigration to Britain increased, the British share of the overall market continued to be depleted. Official intervention had coalesced with the growing commercial strength of Britain's European rivals. They had not only challenged the primacy of the Humber to Mersey route – as the main trunk route for European emigrants – but had enabled foreign companies to call into British ports in order to collect additional passengers who would have previously have been carried on British vessels, and enforced concessions by British companies on both freight and feeder services.

As with other aspects of the steam shipping trade, Britain retained domination over her colonial routes, but she increasingly shared the long-haul trade routes with European competitors, and faced virtual annihilation on the short-sea trades. As applicable to freight as transmigrants; only the Wilson Line – a liner-sized company – retained any influence on the short-sea transmigrant business. It was above and beyond the normal players because it astutely clung to its prized cow – the Scandinavian market. Foreign forces had challenged what had previously been a profitable element of British passenger shipping. Rather than competing, the only opportunity for British companies was to foster closer cooperation with their rivals, to acquire British rivals, or merge with them, and, as evident between 1905-1905, enter hazardous price wars to retain concessions to a greater share of a market increasingly controlled by the Transatlantic Passenger Conference.

7.2.2 Co-operation, trade wars and acquisitions (1899-1914)

Whilst aspects of the passenger trade had been part of secretive trade agreements since 1850, and they had been apparent, according to Hyde, amongst British ship owners during the 1870s, they developed during the first two decades of the twentieth century


more formidable and less-secretive determinants of the trade.¹³¹ As Aldcroft and Dyos have shown, ‘by 1913 there were some 12 separate agreements covering 30 companies controlled in the Atlantic passenger traffic’.¹³² Whilst conditioning many features of the passenger market generally, they were specifically important in the steerage trade – and thus to the transmigrant business.

Unlike in the previous century, liner companies working from British ports conceded that they had to protect the profitability of their North Atlantic operations through membership of the North Atlantic Passenger Conference. The sharing of certain aspects of the European migrant business gained greater gravitas after 1899 following a decade of intense competition, and diminishing returns on third-class passenger trades. British contraction within the transmigrant business had reached its ebb in the 1890s; the demise of the Guion, Inman, and American lines served as important reminders of the dangers associated with the trade during recessions. Although the British trade in westbound second-class passengers tripled from 37,217 in 1899 to 163,219 in 1913, as shown in Chart 7.6, the growth in cabin passengers did little to offset the limited growth in the steerage trade compared with that of the continental lines. The Atlantic passenger business was still dominated by westward bound third-class passengers; only within the safety of formal pooling agreements involving all eight leading passenger liner companies could the British Merchant Marine retain its share of the steerage business. Transmigration was more significant to British shipowners than ever before.

¹³¹ Edward Sloan, ‘The First (and Very Secret) International Steamship Cartel, 1850-1856’, in David J. Starkey & Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Research in Maritime History No. 14: Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries Since 1850* (St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1998), p. 39.

¹³² Harold Dyos & Derek Aldcroft, ‘The organization and profits of British shipping’, in Harold J. Dyos and D.H. Aldcroft, *British Transport. An economic survey from the seventeenth century to the twentieth* (Leicester, 1969), p. 273.


Chart 7.6. Profile of the British passenger trade (by class), 1899-1914



Source: INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1914).

As shown by Chart 7.7, the 'British market' no longer dominated the westbound steerage trade. Instead, whilst British companies bolstered their revenues by developing the Mediterranean trade (alongside those operations provided by German and Italian lines), they had to maintain the profitability of the British trade – their core business – through trade and pooling agreements. Protecting the nexus of their corporate business helped the British trade grew from 115,818 in 1899 to a peak of 387,324 in 1907. The transmigrant routes to New York, Boston, and Philadelphia represented the bulk of this trade. Whilst the British share dropped to third place in 1908-1909, the market was able to weather such depressions as was evident between 1904 and 1905 when the share of the British lines grew as that of other lines declined.

Chart 7.7. The division of the westbound transatlantic steerage trade, 1899-1914




Source: INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1914).

The overall importance of the foreign passenger market to the British trade, as shown in Chart 7.8, continued to gather momentum. By 1901, for companies plying the North Atlantic route from Britain to the United States the trade in foreign passengers had eclipsed that of British and Irish passengers combined. Like the emigrants carried from Hamburg between 1897 and 1901, the majority, 266,392 of the 318,960 emigrants (or 84 per cent), were foreign-born.¹³³ Transmigrant flows via Britain, including those arriving via the Humber to Mersey route, and new routes developed by foreign feeder lines such as via Harwich, Leith, Newhaven, Southampton, and London, helped to bolster the returns companies made on the business. Companies such as Cunard saw its net operating profits grow from £77,000 in 1898, to £107,000 in 1899, and peaked at £342,000 in 1900.¹³⁴ The benefits of co-operation amongst the leading European firms appeared to work.

¹³³ *The Scotsman*, 4 July 1902, p. 7.

¹³⁴ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 149.

Chart 7.8. The importance of the foreign passenger (and transmigrant trades) westward-bound Passenger business from Britain, 1901-1913



Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1901-1913)*; BPP, *Annual Reports of HM Inspector under the Aliens Act (1906-1913)*.

During the first two decades of the Twentieth Century, the scale of the transmigrant trade continued to reach new heights. As profiled in Table 7.14, the business grew from 49,947 in 1899 to 172,438 in 1907: a three-fold increase. That of westward-bound third-class passengers swelled from 388,911 in 1899 to 1,386,307: or a four-fold increase. The business of all classes had grown, but transmigration still represented between 11-16 per cent of all westward bound third-class passengers, and 6-13 per cent of all third-class passengers travelling in both directions. Between 1899 and 1913, the importance of the transmigrant trade to overall transatlantic passenger trade was reduced from 10 per cent of all third-class passengers in 1899 to 8 per cent in 1913. On the westward routes the trade dropped from 13 per cent of all westbound third-class traffic in 1899 to 11 per cent by 1913. Yet despite individual companies, such as Cunard, maintaining their position within the wider market, the overall trade in transmigrants dropped steadily.

Table 7.14. The significance of the British transmigrant business to the British third-class passenger trade, 1899-1913

Year	Number of westward-bound third-class passengers crossing the Atlantic	Number of third-class passengers crossing the North Atlantic	Number of transmigrants entering Britain	Proportion of transmigrants entering Britain as a % of all westward-bound third-class passengers	Proportion of transmigrants entering Britain as a % of all third-class passengers crossing the Atlantic
1899	388,911	507,123	49,947	13	10
1900	507,755	741,144	71,682	14	10
1901	549,526	692,203	79,140	14	11
1902	763,730	942,289	118,478	16	13
1903	894,926	1,149,146	124,591	14	11
1904	767,880	1,142,143	99,278	13	9
1905	1,010,346	1,256,826	108,408	11	9
1906	1,231,146	1,572,514	169,798	14	11
1907	1,386,307	1,947,222	172,438	12	9
1908	422,709	1,084,633	61,648	15	6
1909	955,660	1,246,753	118,421	12	9
1910	1,068,261	1,451,620	140,353	13	10
1911	785,765	1,301,256	90,433	12	7
1912	1,071,816	1,549,483	113,642	11	7
1913	1,405,649	1,878,430	153,634	11	8

Source: INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1913).

Within the British Market therefore, the importance of transmigrants was maintained. As shown in Table 7.15 the number of transmigrants represented around one-third of all westbound passengers, one-fifth of all traffic (in both directions), and just less than one-half of the British market's westbound steerage market. On particular routes, such as that between Liverpool and New York, alien passengers comprised 68 per cent of all passengers carried by Cunard and 67 per cent of all passengers carried by White Star. Transmigrants formed the bulk of this trade. Whilst 'house histories' of companies such as Cunard have demonstrated the success of companies such as Cunard in maintaining their share of the third-class westbound steerage market, they have not identified that the domestic emigrant market from British ports was decreasing rapidly,

nor that the customer base upon which companies revenues were bolstered was European rather than British.

Table 7.15. The number and composition of passengers conveyed by Cunard and the White Star Line (from Liverpool) during the first six months of 1913

Type of Passenger	Cunard	%	White Star	%
British Passengers	10,698	33	7,218	33
Transmigrants	16,924	52	12,759	59
Alien non-transmigrants	5,096	16	1,773	8
Total	32,718	100	21,750	100

Source: TNA, BT 27/790-800 (January-June 1913).

But how did companies operating from Britain sustain levels of transmigration when Sturmeys conditions of supremacy had lessened? And in particular, how could they achieve this when, according to Ferenczi and Willcox, the market upon which the business centred was in decline?¹³⁵ The answer was that the transmigrant supply to Britain was significantly augmented by the expansion of British companies into the Eastern and Central European trades, areas outside of their 'agreed' area of influence under the terms of the 1892 agreement. Whilst this encroachment was steady, in 1904 it turned into a new policy as freight wars were used to broker for remaining British companies a greater slice of the market. The new aggression was led by Cunard. The emigration contract awarded by the Austrian-Hungarian government had given Cunard vital financial support in challenging overseas competition. But the new trade in Europeans went via Mediterranean ports, and not Britain. Cunard's influence was further enhanced by a British Admiralty Loan for twenty years worth £5.2 million (at a rate of 5 per cent) to build nine 'fast ships'.¹³⁶

The capital and contractual security enabled Cunard to enter a costly price war in 1904 to re-negotiate a better share of the third-class steerage market. To achieve this, Cunard lowered the price of its steerage ticket below agreed thresholds; transmigration

¹³⁵ According to Ferenczi & Willcox Danish and Norwegian emigration peaked in 1882, Swedish emigration climaxed in 1887, and Finnish emigration declined after 1902. Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I*, pp., 667, 748, 757, 779.

¹³⁶ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 142.


soared. Yet it was a costly and risky strategy; trade wars could not sustain profitability. Crucially, whilst the Atlantic proportion of the through ticket dropped the cost of the North Sea journey did not. Whilst the extra trade bolstered feeder line profitability the price war had a dramatic impact on Cunard's profitability. The net operating figures of Cunard became in 1904 a net operating loss of £78,000 after a net profit the previous year of £84,000.¹³⁷ The war further affected the revenues generated by other companies as they sought to compete with Cunard. Those from the Anchor Line's steerage trade, shown in Chart 7.9., dropped substantially for the duration of the conflict.

This war increased the levels of transmigration through Britain and the proportion of foreign passengers carried on British liners. It led to Cunard securing the status of 'most favoured British Company' and a greater proportion of the westbound steerage business.¹³⁸ The status protected Cunard from further attack by NDL and HAPAG. Its influence within the wider trade had again been secured at a time when British influence in the trade had continued to diminish as other 'British brands' were bought out by John Pierpont Morgan. The 'most favoured status' was therefore necessary; it secured closer working between three leading companies outside of the International Mercantile Marine (IMM) – HAPAG, NDL, and Cunard. The market had changed rapidly. The German lines did not wish to compete with Cunard over transmigration through Britain when facing the combined commercial aggression of the IMM.

¹³⁷ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic*, p. 149.

¹³⁸ MMM, SAS/3/1/4, 'Miscellaneous notes on the Hungarian Emigration Traffic' (1904).

Chart 7.9. The revenues generated by the Anchor Line's steerage passenger trade, 1901-1908



Source: Glasgow University Archives, UGD 255 /1/2/8, 'Confidential report on the profits of the Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd, 1901-1908'.

Encroachments by foreign companies into the transmigrant trade not only centred on German companies: after nearly four decades of British influence, the founding of the Norwegian-American in 1910 and the takeover of the Scandinavian American Line by DFDS in 1898 challenged Britain's role in transporting transmigrants to *and* from Scandinavia. In the instance of the latter – the transition of DFDS from being a feeder company providing short-sea transmigrant services to a transatlantic line challenging British feeder *and* transatlantic companies – the competition came from within the British 'sphere of influence'. They mirrored similar attempts between 1903-1904 by HAPAG, NDL, and the Skandia Line to encroach upon the Finnish market under the guise of the Nord Steamship Company.¹³⁹ Yet despite entering price wars they were unable to beat the monopolies held by the companies which comprised the British market between 1894

¹³⁹ Kero, *Migration from Finland*, p. 154.

and 1914.¹⁴⁰ The Norwegian American and Scandinavian American Lines failed to gain dominance over either market. No doubt the latter was aided by the infamous loss of the SS *Norge* in 1904.¹⁴¹

Table 7.16. The significance of the British transmigrant trade to the British steerage market, 1899-1913

Year	Number of transmigrants	Trade as a proportion (%) of total westbound British passenger traffic	Trade as a proportion (%) of total traffic (both ways)	Transmigrant trade as a proportion (%) of total westbound steerage	Transmigrant trade as a proportion (%) of the total Atlantic steerage
1899	49,947	26	16	43	30
1900	71,682	29	19	47	34
1901	79,140	33	22	53	39
1902	118,478	38	27	55	43
1903	124,591	34	24	49	37
1904	99,278	25	17	34	24
1905	108,408	27	19	40	31
1906	169,798	34	25	48	38
1907	172,438	30	21	43	32
1908	61,648	20	10	37	18
1909	118,421	29	20	48	34
1910	140,353	27	19	43	31
1911	90,433	19	12	33	21
1912	113,642	23	15	38	25
1913	153,634	27	18	43	29

Source: INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1914).


Elsewhere, the balance of power on the North Atlantic, which significantly factored into the function of transmigrant flows, had changed with the acquisition in 1902 by John Pierpont Morgan of Furness Leyland & Co., Red Star Line, Atlantic Transport Line, Dominion Line, American Line, and White Star Line. The combined force – the IMM – signalled a change in the shipping world on two fronts. Firstly, it provided some of the leading shipping companies with the injection of capital. Secondly, it changed the

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 152-159.

¹⁴¹ Sebak, *Titanic's Predecessor*.

focus and composition of membership of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference. Crucially, for the transmigrant trade, it threatened to reduce the need of feeder vessels on much of the passenger trades. The era of mergers necessitated the strengthening of the only feeder line which had liner status – the Wilson Line. The central importance of the transmigrant operations became very evident as the Wilson Line purchased its main Hull-based rival – Bailey and Leetham in 1903. Crucially the Bailey and Leetham acquisition strengthened her position on the Baltic.

Chart 7.10. The number of passengers carried by different British and Scandinavian companies within the Transatlantic Passenger Conference, 1899-1914



Source: INS, 'Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference' (1899-1914).

British companies no longer dominated the transmigrant business. Further, there was now no room for expansion. As Palmer suggested for the condition of the British shipping industry generally during the second half of the nineteenth century, 'it was the failure of Britain's main rivals – Germany, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries – to challenge British shipping ... rather than British success in thwarting

competition, that is significant'.¹⁴² However, whilst this statement accurately portrayed merchant shipping general, in passenger shipping the foreign competition challenged the commercial lead Britain enjoyed over passenger trades far earlier than in other sectors. The position of British companies was further compounded by the Russian Government awarding its own subsidies, along with public encouragement to support financially the development of the country's own merchant fleet, the Russian Volunteer fleet.

Russia slowly, but confidently, competed with British, Danish and German fleets in merchant shipping. Nowhere was this more apparent than in controlling passenger shipping from Russian Baltic ports; protectionism worked.¹⁴³ However it came at a great cost to British companies. The largest potential new source of transmigrants for Britain – Imperial Russia – was being challenged not only by Germany and Denmark, but also by Russia herself. In the *Libau Zeitung* in 1906 the opening up of a direct steam connection between Libau and New York was heralded as a way of 'reducing the number of emigrants via England'.¹⁴⁴ Throughout the period 1907 to 1914 the proportion of emigrants sailing from Russian ports under the Russian flag continued to rise. From 56 per cent of all emigrants in 1907 the proportion grew to more than 78 per cent by 1914. As Tudorianu has shown, by the eve of the First World War foreign companies (British, Danish and German) only controlled 22 per cent of the Russian emigrant trade.¹⁴⁵

Hindering the business yet further, companies on the North Sea had no choice but to enter trade agreements to bolster what remained of the feeder routes to Britain. It led to more permanent divisions of trade. As demonstrated by Starkey and Gorski, companies such as the Wilson Line formed new shipping companies co-owned by railway companies.¹⁴⁶ Others plying the Atlantic, as described by Porter, merged their

¹⁴² Palmer, 'The British Shipping Industry, 1850-1914', p. 89.

¹⁴³ Bonsor, *North Atlantic Seaway: Volume III*, p. 1346.

¹⁴⁴ Cited in TNA, FO 400/16, 'Letter from the British Vice Consul at Libau (Hill) to the British Consul General at Riga (Woodhouse)' (19 May 1906).

¹⁴⁵ Nikolai Tudorianu, *Ocherki rossiiskoi trudovoi emigratsii imperializma (v Germaniiu, Skaninavsie strany I SShA)* (Kishinev 1986), p. 160. The contents of the table were kindly translated by Professor Paul Dukes.

¹⁴⁶ David Starkey & Richard Gorski, "'Our Little Company.'" The Wilsons and North Eastern Railway Shipping Company Limited, 1906-1935', in Lewis Fischer & Adrian Jarvis (eds.), *Research in*

complete operations to form new companies – as seen with the merger of the Union and Castle shipping companies in 1900 – to consolidate their positions.¹⁴⁷ In addition, the complete buy-out of operations by venture capitalists, ‘men who had never shown any interest in shipping until late in life’ – such as Sir John Reeves Ellerman – saw companies such as White Star merged into conglomerates working alongside their former trading rivals.¹⁴⁸ Even for the largest concerns it was left for many to secure one’s interests through trade agreements or protectionism.

Throughout the period 1899-1914 therefore, the British merchant marine faced a sustained barrage of commercial forces that challenged the transmigrant operator. Unlike in the earlier period, between 1851 and 1881, when gentlemen’s agreements were sufficient to assure the growth of trade, each specific feature of the business between 1882 and 1914 was eventually included within precisely framed legal agreements. Pooling agreements and rebate systems worked alongside powers of attorney to foreign representatives *outside* of the family or business network. New challenges forced new unions unimaginable a generation earlier. The business had become governed by legal conditions and compounded by intense competition.

As shown in Table 7.17, whilst new players, such as the Wilson & North Eastern Railway Shipping Company, DFDS, and Lancashire and Yorkshire carried many transmigrant passengers, the trade per vessel – its scale – was less significant. Large-scale transmigrant shipping by the eve of the First World War was still dominated by the Wilson Line on its Gothenburg and Norwegian routes to Hull or Grimsby and by the FÅA on the Hangö or Åbo to Hull routes. Only the latter companies continued to transport *en masse* – retaining economies of scale favourable to the macro-economics of transoceanic shipping. Yet the overall profitability of operations, and especially any room for expansion, had been severely curtailed by the entrance of foreign fleets on often a seasonal basis.

Maritime History: No. 16: Harbours and Havens: Essays in Port History in Honour of Gordon Jackson (St. Johns, Newfoundland, 1999), pp. 63-88.

¹⁴⁷ Andrew Porter, *Victorian Shipping, Business and Imperial Policy: Donald Currie, the Castle Line and Southern Africa* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1986).

¹⁴⁸ Rubenstein, ‘ELLERMAN, Sir John Reeves’, p. 137.

Table 7.17. The transmigrant trade to Hull in 1913

Shipping company	Home port	Number of voyages	Number of transmigrants	Average number of transmigrants per vessel
Argo Line	Bremen	123	3,926	32
DFDS	Copenhagen	22	8,261	376
FÅA	Åbo	33	8,075	245
Helmsing & Grimm	Libau	4	1,448	362
Hull & Netherlands S.S. Co.	Hull	202	8,576	42
Lancashire & Yorkshire	Goole	40	6,118	153
Russian North-West S.S. Co.	Libau	28	11,586	414
Wilson Line	Hull	48	5,760	120
Wilsons & North Eastern Railway S.S. Co.	Hull	5	70	14
Not Known	Not known	1	15	15
Unaccounted	N/A	N/A	12,816	N/A
Total		506	66,651	132

Source: Hull Hebrew Community, 'Society for the Protection of Women and Girls – Daybook', pp. 36-224; MMM, *Customs Bills of Entry* (1913); NMM, *Lloyd's Register of Shipping* (London, 1913).¹⁴⁹

7.3 Conclusion

The transmigrant trade through Britain was important to British companies engaged in transporting freight and passengers for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was a constant feature of the trade: at certain times each year it dominated the day-to-day operation of available tonnage. Despite seasonality, it was managed to suit the needs of the transport company and bolstered income from other seasonal trades such as those of first-class tourists, potato crops, or citrus fruit trades. On key routes such as that between Gothenburg and Hull and Liverpool to New York it represented nearly one-quarter of all income. Secondly, it served as an important brokering tool during an era of intense commercial rivalry amongst increasingly professionally-managed shipping concerns. Despite the commercial machinations of foreign rivals, Britain was still able to retain its

¹⁴⁹ The Wilson Line's archives reveal that they transported 27,194 transmigrants in the calendar year 1913. However this figure included those transported to Hull and Grimsby. The arrival of the *Magic* (belonging to the Belfast Steamship Company) was taken as a vessel chartered by the Hull & Netherlands Steamship Company.

dominance over Scandinavian emigration; a lucrative trade for all concerned. The trade's over-arching importance was that it helped to sustain the profitability of feeder vessels owned by companies epitomised by the Wilson Line; enhanced the returns on the working of fourth-class railway stock running across Britain; and filled the third-class berths aboard vessels belonging to the far-larger operations of Atlantic shipping companies Cunard and White Star on their North Atlantic crossings for nearly 49 years.

During this period under consideration, the staple of Scandinavian transmigrant trade generated significant financial returns. Such revenue was in addition to that derived through the carriage of mail and freight. Whilst other routes were important, it was the emigrant corridor between Gothenburg and Oslo, and then Hull and Liverpool in particular along which the lion's share of the trade flowed. The scale of this trade made the routes lucrative to the transport companies involved. Although, in the absence of corporate archives for the duration of this study, the wider significance of the transmigrant trade is arguably difficult to ascertain, the British transport companies engaged in the trade along these routes all flourished. Despite depreciation, the longevity of some operations enabled such companies to generate a good return on the capital originally deployed in the trade and to combat the incursions by other companies into the trade. Finally, the trade in transmigrants brought great prestige to both feeder and Atlantic operations, as the mainstay of their profits – the steerage trade – was increasingly sustained by foreign passengers. The trade helped to off set the fixed costs associated with carrying more prestigious first-class passengers.

Despite the imperial machinations of Germany and later Russia, the continued role British companies exercised in the business demonstrated the significant force that British shipping continued to represent from the outbreak of the US Civil War to the outbreak of the First World War. Income enabled British companies to establish a reputation beyond the domestic passenger market, and to broaden the customer base upon which some of the World's premier passenger lines were dependent. The retention of the trade in the face of significant overseas competition reaffirms theories concerning the British shipping industry. Sturmeys 'conditions of supremacy' perpetuated the industry in the mid-nineteenth century as they did on the eve of the First World War. Having established commercial supremacy following the demise of the American merchant

maritime, the remainder of the period under consideration saw British companies responding to particular pressures to retain the lead they enjoyed over rival fleets.¹⁵⁰

As Boyce demonstrated, supremacy for the large-scale shipping company was only achievable through a series of networks, formal and informal, and diversification. Yet retention of core aspects of the business, invariably the most profitable routes, came at a price. British companies during the late nineteenth century entered the negotiating room with rival continental lines knowing they would never relinquish their trump card – transmigration – on the Scandinavian-Humber and Mersey-New York route. The powers in retaining this monopoly, based on informal information channels, showed the sheer determination of British companies to retain control of what they perceived as their ‘legitimate trade’ – transmigration.¹⁵¹ Elsewhere, they conceded crucial aspects of the trade to appease foreign aggression. Yet appeasement in the passenger industry as a whole never engendered stability for long.

Whilst Keeling and Deltas, *et al*, have proven that British and German liner companies operated cartels to achieve capacity utilisation on the Atlantic passenger trades, like house historians such as Hyde, they have not defined the composition of that passenger trade.¹⁵² In particular, they have not demonstrated, as shown within this chapter, the reliance that liner shipping companies, in Britain or Germany, had on the supply of foreign third-class passengers through their shares to bolster large-scale domestic out-migration. This chapter thereby adds to the current literature by demonstrating how transmigrants were pivotal in filling the third-class berths of vessels belonging to HAPAG or NDL, as they were to Cunard, White Star, Anchor, Allan, Dominion, or Union-Castle. Further, it demonstrates how theories regarding the dominant position Germany established over her borders with Russia rarely acknowledged that such barriers to British involvement were included within Transatlantic Passenger Conference agreements which stipulated the German lines ‘will

¹⁵⁰ Sturmeay, *British Shipping*, p. 12.

¹⁵¹ The phrase ‘our legitimate transmigrant trade’ was used within correspondence of Oswald Sanderson, Managing Director of the Wilson Line, to the Chairman and co-owner of the Line (Charles Henry Wilson) on 26 May 1905. (BJL, DEW 4/10.)

¹⁵² Keeling, ‘The Transportation Revolution’, pp. 39-74, and ‘Transatlantic Shipping Cartels’, pp. 195-213; G. Deltas, R. Sicotte & P. Tomczak, ‘American Shipping Cartels in the Pre-World War I Era’, *Research in Economic History*, Volume XIX (1999), pp. 1-38.

use their efforts to arrange that the passengers of non-German Lines may pass the Silesian, Saxon, and Russian frontiers'.¹⁵³

Instead, the chapter proves that the existing literature over-emphasises the temporary measures introduced as a response to cholera. Protectionism by Germany was not established by reaction to cholera, but was instead established through the German Emigration Act of 1897 – something entirely different – even if linked – to the longer-term growth of the German merchant marine. Ultimately, whilst the latter act gave Germany her own ‘condition of supremacy’ it recognised, and in part protected, the ‘British trade’ (transmigration) whilst reducing the commercial advantage of other foreign fleets – such as Holland-America, Red Star, and Scandinavian-American Line. Collusion between Britain and Germany, the two dominant mercantile powers, thereby recognised Britain’s legitimate rights, whilst preventing overt commercial aggression towards British maritime interests. In particular, house histories of the 1960s and 1970s failed to recognise the benefit companies such as Cunard enjoyed by being Germany’s ‘most favoured ally’. Central to such collusion was the benefit indirect migration continued to represent to British *and* German companies. Competition had benefits for passengers. Trade wars in particular ensured liner companies offered a degree of service at an affordable price to fill their ever-expanding ships and trains.

¹⁵³ NMM, Allan Line, *Atlantic Conference: Minutes and Byelaws* (18 November 1911), p. 28.

8. Conclusion

In October 1919, a report in the *Board of Trade Journal* stated that:

The powerful German shipping system has broken down, and there is no chance of its recovering for some considerable time. There will probably be great traffic to and from Central Europe, and the newly-created States in Eastern Europe and as these States have no merchant shipping of their own, and Germany cannot supply them with any, this valuable carrying trade is open to the first 'comer. America is, of course, making a strong bid for it, and Germany is inclined to assist her, while the Dutch and Scandinavians oppose her. It might be disadvantageous for Germany if America or the former neutral countries obtained the entire control of Central European shipping, while it would benefit her in the end if the British were to secure this traffic, on the assumption that England would let Germany have a fair share of this trade. The assertion is made that the chief of the Hamburg Emigration Board is anxious that the German emigration traffic should be carried on by British lines.¹

The aftermath of the First World War, as described in the article excerpted above, saw not only the end of Germany's political expansionist policies but also the temporary demise of what seemed an impregnable influence in European merchant shipping – the German Merchant Marine. In the decades leading up to the military conflict two German steamship companies – HAPAG and NDL – had been at the forefront of her merchant marine; nowhere else was this mercantile supremacy more apparent than in their command over westward-bound passengers across the North Atlantic.²

That the chief of the Hamburg Emigration Board, the second largest continental entrepôt for this pre-First World War traffic, should have advocated the relinquishing of Germany's control over European emigration to Britain, as shown above, is surprising.³ This is especially so when it is considered, as portrayed within the literature, that Britain was Germany's leading commercial rival in the passenger trade.⁴ The passage quoted above makes for interesting reading, and raises numerous

¹ *The Board of Trade Journal*, 2 October 1919, p. 418.

² TNA, FO 881/9311, 'Report on the Activity of the Hamburg-American Packet Company' (1908).

³ Only Bremen handled more emigrants. (Source: Cees Zevenbergen, *Toen zij wit Rotterdam vertrokken - Emigratie via Rotterdam Door De Eeuwen Heen* (Zwolle, 1991), p. 51.)

⁴ Sturmeij, *British Shipping*, p. 17; Boyce, *Information, mediation and institutional development*, p. 21.

questions. One would think that the German authorities would surely have preferred a smaller merchant fleet – one which could have been bought out once German shipping interests had replaced lost tonnage – to take temporary control over Germany's emigrant shipping interests. Why would such an influential figure in the German emigration business wish the short-term future of the country's two leading shipping fleets to be placed under the protection of British companies? Why, after Germany and Britain, had numerous occasions in the previous two decades, waged costly price wars on the very business then in question, would someone in authority now consider it wise to 'hand over' the business to their commercial enemy?

Perhaps the quote was 'just talk', the sort of well-placed voice of support that the *Board of Trade Journal* thought would bolster its readers' hopes. After all, the war had exacted heavy casualties upon Britain's merchant marine during, and immediately following it.⁵ However, with hindsight, perhaps the opinion was sensible given that Albert Ballin, the man responsible for the meteoric rise of HAPAG (and thus Hamburg) to dominate the westbound flow of emigrants across the North Atlantic, was dead – having committed suicide upon hearing the news that the war had ended and Germany defeated.⁶ Maybe the comment reflected what many insiders in the industry suddenly realised – namely, that Germany's once mighty position over passenger shipping was more vulnerable than many would have thought. The response came once part of Germany's merchant fleet had been sunk during the First World War and the remainder had been given to Britain as part of war reparations.⁷ Whatever the motive, it was obvious that in the heavily competitive business of mass migration, leading German authorities considered it better to trust British companies than to see the emergence of new and unknown rivals.

Evidence that has survived appears to show that Britain and Germany cooperated before and after the First World War for the mutual working of one of the most profitable, if also volatile, aspects of the maritime trades – the European

⁵ *The Times*, 29 October 1918, p. 4, 'British Shipping. Losses to be Retrieved. Competition After the War'; Sturmeay, pp. 36-7.

⁶ *The Times*, 11 November 1918, p. 7, 'Herr Ballin Dead. Confidant of the Kaiser'.

⁷ Sturmeay, pp. 45-6.

emigrant trade.⁸ The desire that Britain might act as caretaker for the German merchant shipping interests was but one instance from a long period of collusion between Britain and Germany that has not previously been acknowledged. Once shares of the transatlantic passenger market had been agreed and prices fixed accordingly, both sides enjoyed, despite periodic disagreements, an understanding as great as the more noted degree of collusion between Dutch, Belgian, and German lines following the signature of the first TAPC in 1892.⁹ On certain aspects of emigrant shipping, the two countries enjoyed greater cooperation than has previously been acknowledged.

Agreements between these two great maritime nations did not concentrate on domestic out-migration. Instead they agreed control over the third-class alien emigrant who sought to leave Europe via Hamburg, Bremen, London, Southampton, Liverpool, or Glasgow.¹⁰ As discussed in Chapter 6, these ports had emerged during the mid-nineteenth century as major emigrant ports. The passenger who increasingly proved pivotal to shipping lines and port-cities alike was the alien *en route* – referred to at the time as the transmigrant.

During the decades leading up to the outbreak of the First World War, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and finally Russia had all encroached upon the westbound passenger routes from Europe to North America.¹¹ These routes were arteries along which over 30 million Europeans had migrated in the previous century.¹² Germany was not the only big player in the business; it had acrimoniously shared such routes with Britain, and to a lesser extent other European maritime nations, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries, since the middle of the nineteenth century.¹³ The uneasy relations between

⁸ The best example being the inclusion of British companies under the 1897 German Emigration Act. (TNA, FO 64/1489 (1898), ‘List of Authorised Emigration Companies and Agents under the Emigration Law of June 9, 1897’.)

⁹ Hyde, *Cunard*, p. 106.

¹⁰ TNA, FO 64/1489 (1898), ‘List of Authorised Emigration Companies and Agents under the Emigration Law of June 9, 1897’.

¹¹ INS, ‘Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference’ (1899-1917).

¹² Charts 3.3 and 3.4.

¹³ Chart 3.5.

British and German passenger steamship companies over which would enjoy the greatest share of the steerage market had regularly caused them to enter costly commercial warfare and ensuing price-slashing.¹⁴ Yet the dramatic slashing of the cost of North Atlantic travel, such as was evident in the mid-1890s and during 1904, as discussed in Chapter 7, caused significant damage to the transatlantic shipping lines financial well-being.¹⁵

Whilst previous studies have acknowledged the existence of foreign migrants as a source for the expansion of British and German merchant shipping on the North Atlantic routes, few have ever sought to quantify or qualify the centrality of this aspect of passenger business to either country's merchant marines.¹⁶ Unlike recent studies on Britain's migrant past that have investigated the aliens *en route* to South Africa via London or Southampton, or those transmigrating across the Leith to Glasgow rail route, this study has examined the alien passengers who arrived in Britain possessing pre-purchased travel through some of Europe's leading passenger entrepôts.¹⁷ That such transmigrants were contractually guaranteed to re-embark from Britain within 14 days of arrival has continually been ignored. The literature has instead viewed the phenomenon from two different geographic perspectives – either focusing on Southern England, and in particular the axis between London and Southampton, or else on transmigration through Scotland.¹⁸ The centrality of the Humber to Mersey corridor has been overlooked except for passing reference within general works by Hyde and Taylor.¹⁹ As such, the alien *en route*, as discussed within Chapter 1, has been inferred as a 'chain migrant', intent on remaining in Britain for as

¹⁴ Keeling, 'Transatlantic Shipping Cartels and Migration between Europe and America, 1880-1914', p. 199.

¹⁵ Chart 7.9; Hyde, *Cunard*, p. 149.

¹⁶ Recent examples being: Keeling, 'The Transportation Revolution', pp. 39-74, and 'Transatlantic Shipping Cartels', pp. 195-213; G. Deltas, R. Sicotte & P. Tomczak, 'American Shipping Cartels in the Pre-World War I Era', pp. 1-38.

¹⁷ Collins, 'Scottish Transmigration and Settlement: Records of the Glasgow Experience'; Kushner, 'A Tale of Two Port Jewish Communities: Southampton and Portsmouth Compared'; Newman & Smith, 'The Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter: the development of a database on Jewish migration, 1896-1914'.

¹⁸ Ditto.

¹⁹ Taylor, *The Distant Magnet*, p. 109; Hyde, pp. 58-9.

long as possible before re-migrating after a stay much longer than 14 days, instead of being genuinely transient. Such omissions have been resolved within this thesis by highlighting in Chapter 3 the difference between alien immigration and transmigration, and by providing copies of documentary evidence of how transmigrants were distinguishable from other alien movements (as shown in Appendix 3).

This purpose of this thesis was to re-define the movement of aliens through Britain between 1836 and 1914 by demonstrating that a large proportion of this influx was transitory in nature. By bringing together academic approaches gleaned from maritime and migrant historiography, it has been shown how the majority of aliens arriving in Britain were transmigrants or aliens *en route*. Predominantly, these individuals arrived at the Humber ports of Hull and Grimsby; from where they travelled to Liverpool, Glasgow, and later Southampton, and thence to the United States, Canada, and to a lesser extent South Africa. Instead of being heavily reliant for their subsequent re-migration upon the meagre assistance handed out by philanthropic agencies, the poor foreign strangers arrived possessing a ticket for their subsequent transoceanic journey. They required little assistance whilst in Britain because the price of their ticket included provisions whilst in transit.²⁰ Although current literature overplays the Jewish presence and the role of philanthropy, the reality was far different.²¹ The majority of transmigrants arriving in Britain between 1836 and 1914 were not Jewish, but Christian. Their nationality was not Russian or Polish, but overwhelmingly Scandinavian. The Jewish ‘flood’ of transit aliens into Britain during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century was not a dominant force statistically, but rather it was part of a much larger sphere of alien movements – the business of transporting foreign migrants via British ports *en masse*. Instead of arriving via London most landed at northern ports.

²⁰ Minnesota Historical Society, ‘A. Knoph, *Beiledning for Emigranter til Amerika, forfaavidt angaar Befordring pr. Dampskib over Hull og Liverpool til New York og videre indgjennem Landet pr. Fernbane* (Christiania, 1869)’, p. 11.

²¹ See (for example): the number of transmigrants passing through northern Britain that Collins assumed were Jewish (Collins, *Be Well!*, p. 18); the significant burden Newman and Smith assumed Jewish transmigrants posed to Britain’s Jewish communities (Newman & Smith, ‘The Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter: the development of a database on Jewish migration, 1896-1914’; the popular misunderstanding between immigrants, chain migrants and people possessing transmigrant tickets as discussed by Liedtke (Liedtke, *Jewish Welfare in Hamburg and Manchester, c.1850-1914*).

Thus, instead of looking at the narrower chronological period of large-scale British migrant history between 1880 and 1914, this study has chosen to set the business within the wider time-frame between the passing of the 1836 Aliens Act and the outbreak of the First World War. By establishing the phenomenon within this longer time-span, it quickly becomes clear that there was nothing ‘strange’ about the transmigrant. The indirect flow of transmigrants was a business that arose not because of the formation of philanthropic agencies across Britain but by the decisions of profit-motivated British-based companies, led foremost by the Wilson Line (of Hull), the North Eastern Railway Company, and the Inman Line (of Liverpool), during the mid-nineteenth century, to work together to arrange organised migration on a single ‘through ticket’. Half a century before Jewish immigrants began to arrive in Britain’s leading ports, British shipowners had established a system of through migration that remained the mainstay of the British share of the North Atlantic passenger trade until America closed her doors to mass immigration in the 1921 and 1924 Reedham-Johnston Acts.²²

The European transmigrant – an alien arriving in a port outside of his or her country of birth to secure transoceanic travel within 14 days of arrival – represented big business to transatlantic shipowners.²³ From its origins in the mid 1830s, it rapidly evolved into the mainstay of the passenger business.²⁴ The trade was enjoyed by British, German, Dutch, Belgian, and French companies; but Germany and Britain would quickly dominate the trade, and Britain (until at least the 1880s) monopolised the traffic. The business suited the commercial interests of British shipping companies that had expanded in size and scale based upon the great domestic passenger trade in emigrants – in particular that to the United States and British Dominions. Ocean liners leaving British ports sought to carry as many third-class or steerage passengers as they could to offset the fixed expenses entailed in operating such large-scale facilities which often ran under-capacity.²⁵ Moreover, the income

²² See Nicholas Evans, ‘The Emigration of Skilled Male Workers from Clydeside during the Interwar Period’, *International Journal of Maritime History*, Volume XVIII, Number 1 (June 2006), p. 267 (footnote 32).

²³ Table 7.7.

²⁴ Table 7.15.

from transporting third-class passengers also helped to offset expenditure such as staff, laundry and victualling – costs associated with catering for decadent tastes of the first-class passenger. Achieving capacity utilisation within their more profitable third-class services – or passengers who did not demand such luxury – was therefore necessary; the transmigrant trade enabled British companies to aid overall corporate growth by acquiring profits during peak trading years that could offset the difficulties of operating during periodic lulls in the trade.

The transmigrants arrived in Britain from a plethora of continental ports. British shipowners were also responsible for such short-sea passenger movements and companies such as the Wilson Line of Hull and MS&L transported large numbers of transmigrants from continental to British ports in order to bolster the revenue already generated through the carriage of mail, domestic emigrants, and cargo. Until the 1860s the trade was predominantly of German and Dutch migrants; it was followed by a growth in the number of Scandinavians during the 1860s and until the 1900s; latterly, it comprised aliens originating mainly from Central and Eastern Europe between the 1880s and the outbreak of the First World War. The companies gaining from this trade were not restricted to the operators of North Atlantic services, for those transporting passengers to other transoceanic such as South Africa and Latin America also profited from the trade.²⁶ Profits were thus enjoyed by the providers of North Sea steamships – or feeder lines – which transported migrants to Britain, the transoceanic passenger liners, and a small number of railway companies – known as members of the Humber Conference – that provided cross-country railway services linking the point of entry and the point of re-embarkation.

Transoceanic operators had the most to gain from the trade. British shipping companies such as Cunard, White Star, Guion, Inman, American, Dominion, Anchor, and Allan all nurtured the expansion of the trade. The business was of great significance with at least one-third of all transatlantic voyages being made up of foreign-born passengers. Indeed, the business was sufficiently important for British companies to employ the services of European-based agents in an attempt to procure a

²⁵ The varying numbers of passengers carried aboard each transoceanic liner (broken down by company, vessel, date of arrival in North American ports, and class) are detailed in the *Reports of the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Movement, 1899-1917* (Source: INS.)

²⁶ Chart 3.10; LMA, 'Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter: Shipping Register' (1905-1947).

greater share of the continental traffic.²⁷ Britain led the race for sustaining and increasing the number of foreign steerage passengers carried from her ports between 1836 and the mid-1880s; in this respect Germany took half a century to catch up with Britain. The significance of the transmigrant business to transport companies was evident at each stage in the migrants' journey west.

Even though surviving evidence is somewhat fragmentary, it is clear that on the route between Gothenburg and the Humber the transmigrant trade represented one quarter of gross earnings from passengers for the Wilson Line.²⁸ In the first six months of 1913 more than sixty per cent of Cunard and White Star's Liverpool-New York services were filled with transmigrants.²⁹ Particular routes therefore came to dominate the trade. The commercial responses by transport companies enabled the business to develop. The Wilson Line's feeder vessels grew to a scale where the arrival of a single feeder vessel could fill the steerage capacity of a transatlantic liner.³⁰ Similarly the special emigrant trains running between the Humber ports and Liverpool carried up to 17 carriages of passengers on a single journey.³¹ Ultimately, the trade enabled Liverpool-based companies to commission ever larger ocean liners capable of transporting up to 2,000 passengers on a single voyage.³²

Not unsurprisingly the scale of the business made it as important to the port-cities through which the transmigrants flowed as it was to the shipping companies which transported the aliens. Contrary to the widely discussed alien immigrant 'flooding Britain's ports' during the late nineteenth century, such aliens *en route* were not resented.³³ The trade centred on ports that were historically and geographically

²⁷ Hyde, *Cunard*, p. 77.

²⁸ Table 7.4.

²⁹ Table 7.15.

³⁰ For example the SS *York* (built in 1907) could carry 1,484 third-class passengers on a single journey. (Source: Credland, *Wilson Line*, p. 65.) Only 8 westbound voyages for Cunard (between Liverpool and New York during 1907) carried more than 1,484 passengers (the maximum being 2,176). (Source: INS, *Reports of the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Movement, 1907*, pp. 20-1).

³¹ Indirect Passage from Europe: Transmigration via the UK, 1836-1914', *Journal for Maritime Research* (Greenwich, 2001).

³² INS, 'Reports of the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Movement' (1899-1917); Duncan Haws, *Merchant Fleets: Cunard Line* (Burwash, Surrey, 1987).

³³ Joseph Fletcher, *A Picturesque History of Yorkshire: Volume I* (London, 1901), p. 44. For an example of an account showing the anti-alien sentiment expressed towards immigrants – as opposed

important, such as Hull, and not just the newer ‘railway ports’ developed during the nineteenth century, such as Grimsby and Goole; this fact thus confirms theories first put forward by Jackson on the development of the Humber ports.³⁴ Whilst the newer ports garnered an important share of the business, the long-established commercial hubs of merchants and their agents at Hull caused the majority of the business to gravitate toward that port, ultimately to the detriment of all others.³⁵ Helping them in their functions were a network of associated business and individuals – translators, lodging-house keepers, victuallers, shipbuilders, money exchangers, and foreign-born members of staff – all of whom all profited from the transmigrant aspects of port commerce.³⁶ In seeking to quantify the scale and character of transmigration through Britain, therefore, we have been able to gauge the ramifications this large-scale industry to transport companies (as shown in Chapter 7) and ports (as shown in Chapter 6), and, of course, to the migrants themselves.

Using a plethora of officially generated statistics – both published and unpublished – it has been possible, for the first time, to demonstrate that the majority of the aliens arriving in Britain were in fact destined for the transatlantic destinations.³⁷ The poor emigrants used British ports as conduits to reach the world’s fastest growing industrial economy – the United States – and in the development of two of the three largest countries in the British Empire – Canada and South Africa. The flow was of aliens comprised predominantly of male migrants, unskilled, but in their economic prime.³⁸ The majority were from Scandinavia – and in particular Sweden and Norway. For them the indirect route through Britain remained cheap, safe, and reliable. Throughout the period under consideration the profile of the alien *en route* began to change, but the reasons or significance of the transmigrant route

to transmigrants – see Arnold White, ‘The Invasion of Pauper Foreigners’, *Nineteenth Century Review*, Volume XXIII (January-June 1888), pp. 414-422.

³⁴ Jackson, ‘Do Docks make Trade’, pp. 17-41.

³⁵ Chart 4.2.

³⁶ Table 6.3.

³⁷ Appendix 1.

³⁸ Charts 3.11 and 3.12.

remained the same – it was often 10 per cent cheaper to migrate via Britain than to sail direct from a continental port.³⁹

Whilst the transmigrant remained predominantly Scandinavian, during the 1880s larger swathes of aliens began to arrive from Central and Eastern Europe, and in particular from Russia. They chose to transmigrate through Britain because it enabled them to avoid being subjected to intense medical scrutiny (and possible rejection) at one of 11 emigrant control stations erected along Germany's eastern border with Russia – a response to the financial catastrophe caused by the 1892 cholera epidemic.⁴⁰ Whilst German steamship lines encouraged transmigration via Hamburg, by erecting the emigrant village of Veddel to cater for the needs of foreign emigrants, the facility also acted as a further barrier impeding travel for less-healthy emigrants rather than offering medical assistance.⁴¹ Transmigration through Britain therefore continued to offer the poorest European migrant with the opportunity to reach as far as Britain where they could receive medical assistance before recommencing their journey westward.

Whilst Britain sought to restrict alien immigration following the passing of the 1905 Aliens Act, transmigrant flows via Britain remained largely unaffected.⁴² The rate of indirect migration actually increased in the wake of the anti-immigrant legislation, at the same time as the rights of those *en route* were enshrined in legal bonds and bi-lingual agreements to ensure those *en route* were not swindled into purchasing inferior services. Despite complaints about the ordeals of the aliens who travelled through British ports, Britain successfully lured over 85 percent of all Scandinavians through her harbours during the 78 year period in question.⁴³ To Scandinavians, and to a lesser extent those emanating from the Baltic ports of Libau, Hangö, and Åbo, transmigration through Britain remained the predominant way by which they reached North America for just short of a century of mass migration.

³⁹ *Glasgow Herald*, 5 February 1853; BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume II, p. 569, minutes 16285-16286 (Evidence of Mr Hermann Landau).

⁴⁰ Berlin & Schmooock, *Auswandererhafen Hamburg*, p. 26; Zosa Szajkowski, 'Sufferings of Jewish Emigrants to America in Transit through Germany', pp. 106-108.

⁴¹ Berlin & Schmooock, *Auswandererhafen Hamburg*, p. 47.

⁴² Chart 3.6.

⁴³ Chart 3.30.

Despite the centrality of the indirect route it has – until now – remained a significant gap within both migrant and maritime history that this study has filled.

As with any study the degree of scrutiny and analysis possible within the given word limit prevents more detailed discussion of aspects of the subject raised whilst researching this study. Most glaringly apparent would have been a greater discussion of what happened to the aliens who remained in Britain or who subsequently re-migrated within a few years of their arrival. Whilst some were inevitably here for a generation or so, others remained less than 10 years.⁴⁴ They helped to explain the difference between the gross rates of immigration to Britain and the smaller rise in the foreign-born population of Britain between censuses. Similarly, many aliens arrived alongside the transmigrants on immigrant tickets.⁴⁵ What reasons determined whether the alien chose to settle in Britain as opposed to those who chose to travel through Britain? Further, the outward-bound passenger lists for British ports – and the port of Hamburg (see Appendix 3.5) – contained demographic and commercial information on the transmigrant aliens conveyed by particular companies to equally diverse destinations.⁴⁶ What would be shown by an analysis of such information, soon to become available electronically via the internet? Such aspects of the associated business could significantly add to our understanding of European emigration during the long nineteenth century – a subject so often ignored because it has been felt, or perhaps because of a false perception, that everything has already been written.

As the pioneering work of Drew Keeling is also demonstrating, the era of the Great Migration, and in particular the application of computational methods to the study, is offering more potential than ever before for the re-writing of migrant and maritime history during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴⁷ This study

⁴⁴ The number of aliens who sailed from Southampton after living in London for longer than 14 days was quite significant during the period 1899-1924. (Source: <http://www.ellisisland.org> - using the Stephen Morse one-step search engine - <http://www.jewishgen.org/databases/EIDB/ellisjw.html>.) Transcripts of oral history interviews by the Kaplan Centre at the University of Cape Town also reveal the lifestories of many migrants who traversed Britain in stages who ended up living in South Africa. (Source: Kaplan Centre Oral History Interviews, BC 949.)

⁴⁵ See (for example) the interview between Bill Williams and Mr William Shalyt in 1975. (Source: Manchester Jewish Museum, J218, William Shalyt Interview (1975).)

⁴⁶ Staatsarchiv, Hamburg, Listen Den Indirekten Auswanderer VIII / B / 1 / Film Numbers 13157-13174 (1854-1910).

inevitably raises as many questions as it does resolve. In particular it highlights areas for possible future research on the complex business of mass migration and the transporting of such migrants, a subject that still retains a great deal of interest because of its modern resonance. As finding aids and online databases develop, it will be increasingly possible to chart the geographic origins of migrants travelling on the indirect option compared with those using alternative routes. With the guidance of those who can manipulate online databases, as seen by Stephen Morse with his tools for using the *Ellis Island Database*, it will be possible to profile the precise reasons – kith, kin, commerce or geography – why Britain pulled transmigrants to the greatest magnet – the United States.⁴⁸ It will also be possible to show how much money transmigrants carried with them, compared with those using the direct option.⁴⁹ It will be possible further to assess whether those using the indirect or direct routes had their journey paid for them, and to where (within America) the alien was bound.⁵⁰

Only when detailed analysis of the geographic and demographic features of the mass phenomenon are more clearly understood will we be able to gauge whether push or pull factors or the emergence of transport was more successful in attracting an informed European public. In the meantime further studies are still required of the business of shipping migrants utilising the corporate archives of DFDS (in Århus), the archives of John West Wilson & Company (at the Gothenburg State Archives), and the Jewish Colonisation Society (at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem).⁵¹ Comparative analysis of the popular and philanthropic responses to transmigrants passing through Britain with those travelling through Belgium, Holland, France, Belgium and Denmark, might also offer a further understanding of how the alien in

⁴⁷ Keeling, 'Transatlantic Shipping Cartels and Migration between Europe and America, 1880-1914', *Ibid*, 'The Transportation Revolution'.

⁴⁸ Ellis Island Database, <http://www.ellisland.org>; The Stephen Morse 'Blue Form', <http://www.jewishgen.org/databases/EIDB/ellisjw.html>; Hamburg Emigration Database, <http://www.linktoyourroots.hamburg.de>.

⁴⁹ Information contained within the online passenger lists of immigrants arriving at the Port of New York and accessible via the Ellis Island website.

⁵⁰ Ditto.

⁵¹ Danish State Archives, 'Archives of DFDS' (1866-1991); Landsarkivet i Göteborg, Göteborg, 'Wilson Line Financial Statements' (1881-1914); Central Archives of the Jewish People, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel Archives of the Jewish Colonisation Association (n.d.).

transit was perceived compared to the more celebrated alien immigrant – clearly two entirely separate, yet linked, types of alien of which this study is just the beginning.

Appendix 1

Published statistics relating to passenger movements to the United Kingdom are contained in three series of British Parliamentary Papers (BPP): the *General Reports of the Colonial and Emigration Commissioners* (1842-1872); the *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1877-1913); and the *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens* (1906-1913). The *Reports* relating to the 1842-1899 period have been reprinted by the Irish University Press (IUP, 1968-71). In the table below, the BPP references are presented according to the year covered by the report, the original year of publication, the volume number and the number of the first page of each report. The 'CH Microfiche' column provides the microfiche reference number in the Chadwyck-Healey series of BPP, while the fourth column refers to the IUP volume in which each respective report appears.

General Reports of the Colonial and Emigration Commissioners

Year	BPP Reference	CH Microfiche	IUP Volume
1842	1842, XXV.55	46.171	Emigration 10
1843	1843, XXIX.15	47.209	Emigration 10
1844	1844, XXXI.11	48.253	Emigration 10
1845	1845, XXVII.151	49.202	Emigration 10
1846	1846, XXIV.1	50.215	Emigration 10
1847	1847, XXXIII.131	51.247-248	Emigration 10
1848	1847-48, XXVI.1	52.243	Emigration 10
1849	1849, XXII.1	53.181-182	Emigration 11
1850	1850, XXIII.55	54.180-181	Emigration 11
1851	1851, XXII.333	55.207-208	Emigration 11
1852	1852, XVIII.161	56.154-157	Emigration 11
1853	1852-53, XL.65	57.268-270	Emigration 12
1854	1854, XXVIII.1	58.239-241	Emigration 12
1855	1854-55, XVII.1	59.136-138	Emigration 12
1856	1856, XXIV.325	60.181-183	Emigration 13
1857	1857, XVI (II).33	62.125-126	Emigration 13
1858	1857-58, XXIV.401	63.216-218	Emigration 13
1859	1859, XIV (II).159	65.105-108	Emigration 14
1860	1860, XXIX.1	66.214-216	Emigration 14
1861	1861, XXII.1	67.191-192	Emigration 14
1862	1862, XXII.1	68.137-139	Emigration 15
1863	1863, XV.247	69.106-108	Emigration 15
1864	1864, XVI.477	70.117-120	Emigration 15
1865	1865, XVIII.383	71.131-135	Emigration 16
1866	1866, XVII.359	72.127-129	Emigration 16
1867	1867, XIX.121	73.152-153	Emigration 17
1868	1867-68, XVII.787	74.134-135	Emigration 17
1869	1868-69, XVII.119	75.131-133	Emigration 17

1870	1870, XVII.111	76.142-144	Emigration 17
1871	1871, XX.335	77.172-174	Emigration 18
1872	1872, XVII.639	78.135-137	Emigration 18
1873	1873, XVIII.295	79.143-146	Emigration 18

Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom

Year	Reference	Microfiche	IUP Volume
1877	1877, LXXXV.621	83.673-674	Emigration 25
1878	1878-79, LXXV.681	85.580-581	Emigration 25
1879	1880, LXXVI.961	86.599-600	Emigration 25
1880	1881, XCIV.679	87.826-827	Emigration 25
1881	1882, LXXIV.249	88.617	Emigration 25
1882	1883, LXXVI.953	89.635-636	Emigration 26
1883	1884, LXXXV.467	90.731-732	Emigration 26
1884	1884-5, LXXXV.165	91.689	Emigration 26
1885	1886, LXXI.161	92.550	Emigration 26
1886	1887, LXXXIX.191	93.716-717	Emigration 26
1887	1888, CVII.43	94.870	Emigration 26
1888	1889, LXXXIV.51	95.664	Emigration 27
1889	1890, LXXIX.717	96.671	Emigration 27
1890	1890-91, LCII.1	97.796	Emigration 27
1891	1892, LXXXVIII.607	98.750	Emigration 27
1892	1893-94, CII.1	99.913	Emigration 27
1893	1893-94, LXXI.13	99.624	Emigration 27
1894	1895, CVII.1	101.901	Emigration 28
1895	1896, XCIII.1	102.818	Emigration 28
1896	1897, XCIX.1	103.899	Emigration 28
1897	1898, CIII.1	104.868	Emigration 28
1898	1899, CVII.1	105.976	Emigration 28
1899	1900, CII.1	106.933	Emigration 28
1900	1901, LXXXVIII.605	107.802	
1901	1902, CXVI, Pt 2, 1	108.1055	
1902	1903, LXXXII.743	109.741	
1903	1904, CVI.1	110.995	
1904	1905, XCVIII.1	111.902	
1905	1906, CXXXIV.191	112.1292	
1906	1907, XCVII.385	113.934	
1907	1908, CXXII.195	114.1342	
1908	1909, CIII.125	115.1010	
1909	1910, CIX.435	116.1062	
1910	1911, LX.657	117.572	
1911	1912-13, LX.633	118.554	

1912	1913, LV.865	119.505
1913	1914, LXIX.941	120.690

Annual Reports of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens

Year	Reference	Microfiche
1906	1907, LXVI.767	113.624
1907	1908, LXXXVII.941	114.958
1908	1909, IX.913	115.79
1909	1910, IX.1	116.743
1910	1911, X.1	117.90
1911	1912-13, XIII.1	118.111
1912	1913, XVI.355	119.143
1913	1914, XIV.1	120.121

Appendix 2

The data contained within the tables profiled below form the statistical basis for charts contained within Chapter 3.

2.1: Data for Chart 3.1. The number of migrants making ocean journeys, 1846-1915

Period	North Asian migration	Southeast Asian migration	Transatlantic migration
1846-1850	110,000	349,000	1,280,000
1851-1855	130,000	495,000	1,710,000
1856-1860	160,000	779,000	1,000,000
1861-1865	420,000	939,000	1,120,000
1866-1870	530,000	1,120,000	1,730,000
1871-1875	625,000	1,547,000	1,860,000
1876-1880	2,175,000	1,981,000	1,420,000
1881-1885	905,000	2,264,000	3,840,000
1886-1890	835,000	2,480,000	3,660,000
1891-1895	1,053,000	3,388,000	3,210,000
1896-1900	1,650,000	3,126,000	2,610,000
1901-1905	2,270,000	2,864,000	5,340,000
1906-1910	4,880,000	3,313,000	7,950,000
1911-1915	3,570,000	4,068,000	7,680,000
Total	19,313,000	28,713,000	44,410,000

Source: McKeown, 'Global Migration, 1846-1940', p. 165.

2.2: Data for Chart 3.2. The destinations of emigrants from Europe (excluding Britain and Ireland), 1889-1913

Nationality	Africa	Argentina	Australia & New Zealand	Brazil	Canada	United States/Canada	United States	Other countries	Total
Austro-Hungarians	139	57,551	3,786	50,781	174,443	0	2,970,275	0	3,256,975
Belgians	2,231	0	138	0	0	29,144	0	5,049	36,562
Danes	882	0	1,548	0	8,104	0	143,250	7,346	161,130
Dutch	377	0	0	0	0	34,018	0	3,384	37,779
Germans	9,231	13,186	5,922	23,732	19,242	0	965,795	23,864	1,060,972
Italians	132,454	1,025,286	10,421	709,620	95,322	190,422	2,945,557	209,439	5,318,521
Norwegians	925	0	400	0	15,920	0	323,254	320	340,819
Portuguese	22,274	0	0	499,348	0	90,041	0	0	611,663
Spanish	216,510	207,119	0	86,963	0	0	9	0	510,601
Swedes	859	79	1,250	2,498	4,714	172,461	334,795	2,549	519,205
Swiss & other Europeans	555	7,955	768	1,143	1,308	0	66,225	1,199	79,153
Total	386,437	1,311,176	24,233	1,374,085	319,053	516,086	7,749,160	253,150	11,933,380

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1913)*.

Notes: 1 = Statistics are based upon information supplied to British consul staff by the respective countries.

2 = For those entries where the value is stated as 0 this may be for a variety of reasons, but essentially reflects that no data was available.

3 = No statistical information was available for France.

4 = Statistics for Belgium (and the Netherlands) are for post 1894.

5 = Statistics for Portugal, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Switzerland are for the period after 1895.

2.3: Data for Chart 3.3. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in the United States, 1836-1914

Period	Austro-Hungarians	Belgians	British & Irish	Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbs & Montenegrins	Dutch	French	German	Greeks & Turks (in Europe)
1836-1839	0	15	136,709	0	725	20,390	77,158	41
1840-1844	0	452	245,293	0	1,115	22,430	100,897	35
1845-1849	0	3,544	629,424	0	6,509	51,870	284,897	27
1850-1854	0	1,441	1,048,554	0	4,889	60,357	654,251	67
1855-1859	0	4,324	426,254	0	6,233	21,421	321,821	59
1860-1864	477	1,065	409,585	0	2,190	14,395	204,119	63
1865-1869	2,898	4,720	550,789	0	6,197	21,544	519,615	115
1870-1874	29,684	4,507	739,811	0	10,223	40,906	578,850	268
1875-1879	30,443	2,484	260,928	0	4,044	30,995	172,919	260
1880-1884	138,548	7,455	765,403	421	30,901	23,974	920,215	679
1885-1889	176,239	11,283	719,558	5,421	21,814	24,219	524,966	2,508
1890-1894	299,236	14,767	470,181	2,203	23,692	24,734	457,894	7,442
1895-1899	233,823	4,875	264,282	4,657	5,657	10,882	121,178	8,837
1900-1904	783,393	12,778	296,499	41,909	15,282	22,990	154,928	49,950
1905-1909	1,217,983	24,651	518,100	50,064	27,181	44,745	173,794	157,308
1910-1914	1,129,653	28,450	445,940	37,572	35,734	43,004	161,195	201,863
Total	4,042,377	126,811	7,927,310	142,247	202,386	478,856	5,428,697	429,522

Table continued on next page.

2.3: Data for Chart 3.3. (cont.)

Period	Italians	Norwegians, Swedes, Danes & Icelanders	Russians, Poles & Finns	Spanish & Portuguese	Swiss	Other Europeans	Total
1836-1839	321	1,364	262	1,146	1,558	33	239,722
1840-1844	574	4,134	304	970	3,126	75	379,405
1845-1849	902	8,926	321	1,142	1,693	4	989,259
1850-1854	3,047	15,751	405	4,430	14,241	2	1,807,435
1855-1859	5,596	9,678	1,105	5,664	10,182	2	812,339
1860-1864	3,543	10,320	963	3,712	4,649	4	655,085
1865-1869	6,810	86,170	2,593	5,337	16,475	5	1,223,268
1870-1874	26,320	136,108	15,843	8,528	15,194	36	1,606,278
1875-1879	19,976	71,893	30,350	10,983	10,018	654	645,947
1880-1884	108,216	377,287	68,581	8,772	50,430	813	2,501,695
1885-1889	159,444	294,496	157,027	10,409	30,721	257	2,138,362
1890-1894	304,811	268,115	343,544	22,753	28,339	121	2,267,832
1895-1899	298,950	122,613	214,341	12,125	8,681	30	1,310,931
1900-1904	838,424	262,166	564,625	37,736	14,703	62	3,095,445
1905-1909	1,092,051	226,042	936,676	52,236	17,838	311	4,538,980
1910-1914	1,104,833	179,764	1,054,608	80,533	18,911	2,109	4,524,169
Total	3,973,818	2,074,827	3,391,548	266,476	246,759	4,518	28,736,152

Source: Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume 1*, pp. 408-439.

Notes: 1 = The figures for 1843 are for the nine months ending 30 September.

2 = All years are not based on calendar years. (The reporting year ended 30 June.)

2.4: Data for Chart 3.4. The nationality of all European immigrants arriving in Canada, 1900-1914

Nationality	Austro-Hungarians	Belgians	British & Irish	Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbs & Montenegrins	Dutch	French	German	Greeks & Turks (in Europe)
1900-1904	48,570	2,312	186,594	2,096	733	5,005	9,663	1,170
1905-1909	56,146	4,708	375,460	5,917	3,231	9,190	8,949	3,503
1910-1914	88,134	7,641	554,298	15,497	5,038	9,573	17,687	4,281
Total	192,850	14,661	1,116,352	23,510	9,002	23,768	36,299	8,954

Nationality	Italians	Norwegians, Swedes, Danes & Icelanders	Russians, Poles & Finns	Spanish & Portuguese	Swiss	Other Europeans	Total
1900-1904	19,827	17,970	38,102	38	398	139	332,617
1905-1909	35,631	16,092	56,336	190	819	204	576,376
1910-1914	57,272	21,669	124,968	1,908	1,015	727	909,708
Total	112,730	55,731	219,406	2,136	2,232	1,070	1,818,701

Source: Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume 1*, pp. 364-365.

Notes: 1 = Period of arrival was not based on calendar years.

2 = The immigration year 1906/7 included only the 9 months ending 31 March 1907.

3 = Turks include only Armenians.

2.5: Data for Chart 3.5. The flow of alien passengers from European countries, 1856-1915

Period	Belgium (1)	British Isles	France	Germany (3)	Netherlands (4)	Total
1856-1860	NA	35,636	81,965	21,546	NA	139,147
1861-1865	NA	60,324	59,443	31,691	NA	151,458
1866-1870	NA	223,988	119,980	113,368	7,554 (5)	457,336
1871-1875	NA	274,279	157,881	149,513	7,174	581,673
1876-1880	NA	228,419	133,296	148,874	17,519	510,589
1881-1885	NA	459,186	207,540	318,087	69,055	984,813
1886-1890	145,622	494,153	277,656	574,481	64,416	1,491,912
1891-1895	151,494	464,599	NA	593,614	113,108	1,209,707
1896-1900	111,698	414,240	NA	534,802	84,756	1,060,740
1901-1905	270,546	842,960	NA	1,160,168	228,678	2,273,674
1906-1910	346,507	998,022	NA	1,290,359	232,277	2,634,888
1911-1915	235,566(2)	769,940	NA	1,037,892	236,207	2,043,398
Total	1,261,433	5,265,746	1,037,761	5,974,395	1,060,744	14,600,079

Source: Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations: Volume I*, p. 348.

Notes: 1 = (1) direct emigration via Antwerp.

2 = (2) included only the years 1911-13.

3 = (3) up to 1870 the data included departures through the ports of Hamburg and Bremen only. After 1870 it included all 'German' ports.

4 = (4) up to 1881 the data included migration through Rotterdam only.

5 = (5) data only available for the years 1867-70.

6 = N/A denotes years for which the information is not available in the source.

2.6: Data for Chart 3.6. Intra-continental alien population movement to Britain, 1879-1913

Year	Immigrants	Crew	Transmigrants	Total number of aliens
1879	10,778	N/A	N/A	10,778
1880	14,262	N/A	N/A	14,262
1881	17,210	N/A	N/A	17,210
1882	15,546	N/A	N/A	15,546
1883	12,606	N/A	N/A	12,606
1884	12,150	N/A	N/A	12,150
1885	11,329	N/A	N/A	11,329
1886	9,049	N/A	N/A	9,049
1887	9,155	N/A	N/A	9,155
1888	11,102	N/A	62,901	74,003
1889	24,149	N/A	55,532	79,681
1890	24,109	5,790	60,966	90,865
1891	28,270	9,797	98,705	136,772
1892	23,591	10,349	93,801	127,741
1893	31,056	9,760	79,518	120,334
1894	28,682	9,821	35,512	74,015
1895	30,528	9,894	44,637	85,059
1896	35,448	10,461	40,036	85,945
1897	38,851	10,762	32,221	81,834
1898	40,785	12,299	32,177	85,261
1899	50,884	13,362	49,947	114,193
1900	62,505	14,950	71,682	149,137
1901	55,464	15,146	79,140	149,750
1902	66,471	15,062	118,478	200,011
1903	69,168	13,432	124,591	207,191
1904	82,845	12,863	99,278	194,986
1905	74,386	13,793	108,408	196,587
1906	38,527	11,165	169,798	219,490
1907	27,541	12,001	172,438	211,980
1908	21,776	10,235	61,648	93,659
1909	20,471	8,806	118,421	147,698
1910	19,143	9,345	140,353	168,841
1911	18,556	11,325	90,433	120,314
1912	19,820	11,227	113,642	144,689
1913	22,816	12,632	153,634	189,082
Total	1,079,029	274,277	2,307,897	3,661,203

Sources: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1905)*.

BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens (1906-1913)*.

Continued on next page.

2.6: Data for Chart 3.6 (cont.)

BPP, *Report of the Select Committee on the Immigration and Emigration
(of Foreigners)* (1888).

- Notes: 1 = N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in BPP.
2 = The immigrant statistics are for London only (prior to 1890).
3 = The *Select Committee* noted in its report that between 1 January and 19
June 1888 4,465 aliens arrived at London (of which 1,743 were Jewish).
During the same period 41,976 aliens *en route* for America landed at Hull.

2.7: Data for Chart 3.7. The intra-European passenger market to Britain, 1884-1905

Year	British & Irish passengers	Foreign passengers	Total
1884	91,356	32,007	123,363
1885	85,468	27,006	112,474
1886	80,018	28,474	108,492
1887	85,475	32,008	117,483
1888	94,133	33,895	128,028
1889	103,070	43,122	146,192
1890	109,470	44,663	154,133
1891	103,037	47,197	150,234
1892	97,780	44,663	142,443
1893	102,119	37,634	139,753
1894	118,309	66,129	184,438
1895	109,418	64,803	174,221
1896	101,742	56,509	158,251
1897	95,221	57,994	153,215
1898	91,248	46,362	137,610
1899	100,246	59,576	159,822
1900	97,637	74,681	172,318
1901	99,699	60,736	160,435
1902	104,115	62,159	166,274
1903	112,914	82,390	195,304
1904	144,581	92,172	236,753
1905	122,712	77,908	200,620
Total	2,249,768	1,172,088	3,421,856

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1884-1905)*.

Note: Data was not available after 1905 Aliens Act.

2.8: Data for Chart 3.8. Inter-continental passenger movement from Britain, 1853-1914

Year	British & Irish passengers	Foreign passengers	Not distinguished	Total
1853	278,129	31,459	20,349	329,937
1854	267,047	37,704	18,678	323,429
1855	150,023	10,554	16,230	176,807
1856	148,284	9,474	18,796	176,554
1857	181,051	12,624	19,200	212,875
1858	95,067	4,560	14,345	113,972
1859	97,063	4,442	18,927	120,432
1860	95,989	4,536	27,944	128,469
1861	65,197	3,619	22,954	91,770
1862	97,763	3,311	20,140	121,214
1863	192,864	7,833	23,061	223,758
1864	187,081	16,942	4,877	208,900
1865	174,891	28,619	6,291	209,801
1866	170,053	26,691	8,138	204,882
1867	156,982	31,193	7,778	195,953
1868	138,187	51,956	6,182	196,325
1869	186,300	65,752	5,975	258,027
1870	202,511	48,396	6,033	256,940
1871	192,751	53,246	6,438	252,435
1872	210,494	79,023	5,696	295,213
1873	228,345	72,198	10,069	310,612
1874	197,272	38,465	5,277	241,014
1875	140,675	31,347	1,787	173,809
1876	109,469	25,584	3,169	138,222
1877	95,195	21,289	3,487	119,971
1878	112,902	31,697	3,064	147,663
1879	164,274	49,480	3,409	217,163
1880	227,542	100,369	4,383	332,294
1881	243,002	144,381	5,131	392,514
1882	279,366	130,029	3,893	413,288
1883	320,118	73,260	3,779	397,157
1884	242,179	57,733	3,989	303,901
1885	207,644	53,783	2,958	264,385
1886	232,900	94,370	3,531	330,801
1887	281,487	108,572	6,435	396,494
1888	279,928	113,230	5,336	398,494
1889	253,795	83,466	5,380	342,641
1890	218,116	94,515	3,349	315,980
1891	218,507	112,275	3,761	334,543
1892	210,042	107,351	4,004	321,397

Continued on next page.

2.8: Data for Chart 3.8. (cont.)

Year	British & Irish passengers	Foreign passengers	Not distinguished	Total
1893	208,814	95,123	3,696	307,633
1894	156,030	67,032	3,765	226,827
1895	185,181	82,818	3,773	271,772
1896	161,925	76,015	4,012	241,952
1897	146,460	62,932	3,888	213,280
1898	140,644	60,551	3,976	205,171
1899	146,362	90,020	4,314	240,696
1900	168,825	124,722	5,014	298,561
1901	171,715	124,354	6,506	302,575
1902	205,662	174,291	6,826	386,779
1903	259,950	181,539	7,517	449,006
1904	271,435	174,354	8,088	453,877
1905	262,077	188,422	9,163	459,662
1906	325,137	229,142	3,458	557,737
1907	395,680	239,040	229	634,949
1908	263,199	123,212	0	386,411
1909	288,761	185,617	0	474,378
1910	397,848	221,011	0	618,859
1911	454,527	168,898	0	623,425
1912	467,666	189,169	0	656,835
1913	469,640	232,051	0	701,691
1914	293,204	158,234	0	451,438
Total	13,391,227	5,323,875	438,448	19,153,550

Source: Carrier & Jeffrey, *External Migration*, pp. 90-91.

Note: Data shown here as 'Not distinguished' did not originally feature in the evidence presented by Carrier & Jeffrey. The figure was calculated by deducting the other two sets of data from their total column.

2.9: Data for Chart 3.9. The number of passengers embarking upon transoceanic voyages from Britain's five leading passenger ports, 1843-1913

Year	Glasgow	Liverpool	London	Plymouth	Southampton
1843	6,411	29,496	2,956	1,004	N/A
1844	3,563	44,427	2,303	518	759
1845	3,435	58,686	2,390	795	1,017
1846	2,823	75,211	6,737	2,521	692
1847	7,586	132,459	12,951	5,044	169
1848	10,035	131,132	32,738	8,505	218
1849	14,905	153,902	36,553	15,883	340
1850	14,411	174,188	25,250	8,208	818
1851	15,115	206,015	31,267	11,147	414
1852	13,797	192,672	20,203	1,706	298
1853	14,148	220,462	32,974	9,387	12,046
1854	11,000	215,268	33,901	16,417	14,303
1855	6,068	119,108	18,893	11,059	10,462
1856	4,992	127,558	19,191	8,898	7,333
1857	6,178	155,647	21,766	11,860	7,684
1858	4,194	81,326	13,900	4,930	2,479
1859	4,323	80,855	16,010	4,124	4,441
1860	3,660	83,774	11,798	4,315	2,187
1861	3,085	55,010	13,656	2,606	1,724
1862	8,046	64,314	20,375	5,737	2,816
1863	7,890	137,799	25,466	7,800	3,948
1864	10,409	125,445	24,420	7,483	5,081
1865	15,280	121,109	22,087	8,080	3,731
1866	12,849	123,414	16,734	4,775	N/A
1867	11,072	115,707	11,783	4,081	N/A
1868	12,460	129,369	12,045	2,971	N/A
1869	21,077	172,734	15,672	4,751	N/A
1870	23,781	163,169	19,195	4,916	N/A
1871	23,039	166,166	14,618	3,603	N/A
1872	23,192	195,776	22,002	3,457	N/A
1873	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1874	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1875	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1876	12,767	66,446	23,311	12,206	9,747
1877	10,007	54,975	20,168	15,855	7,757
1878	13,985	71,092	25,725	15,389	7,612
1879	20,531	117,917	32,263	15,854	8,852
1880	29,090	183,582	38,369	10,346	9,293
1881	42,136	228,872	44,617	11,213	12,216
1882	49,097	234,232	39,150	11,178	19,559
1883	41,632	189,443	43,458	38,911	5,974

Continued on next page.

2.9: Data for Chart 3.9. (cont.)

Year	Glasgow	Liverpool	London	Plymouth	Southampton
1884	26,483	163,402	39,727	18,313	5,621
1885	23,427	145,270	36,895	10,889	6,292
1886	33,122	191,491	42,791	11,345	7,678
1887	44,021	237,999	38,279	7,008	9,117
1888	43,838	240,566	38,591	5,224	11,845
1889	28,023	197,855	38,755	4,941	19,616
1890	25,438	190,785	31,480	3,791	18,340
1891	30,212	206,418	29,140	2,591	18,553
1892	27,348	200,786	25,927	1,942	21,282
1893	28,577	167,468	25,169	1,271	41,563
1894	13,358	106,147	20,837	1,292	52,045
1895	17,524	117,196	22,275	1,829	67,253
1896	12,730	98,279	24,832	1,685	69,020
1897	10,147	87,414	24,752	1,580	60,059
1898	9,273	98,900	23,335	1,263	44,034
1899	11,144	118,552	23,329	1,296	49,662
1900	15,913	149,854	26,236	2,558	64,998
1901	14,902	167,452	25,010	1,961	58,829
1902	19,962	214,113	26,978	2,513	87,030
1903	27,426	265,918	24,972	3,213	88,695
1904	29,796	274,584	23,552	1,678	72,296
1905	38,853	277,536	26,635	1,619	68,031
1906	56,223	352,818	31,215	2,429	66,232
1907	69,685	385,797	38,796	2,518	82,423
1908	29,321	212,155	43,418	2,641	60,690
1909	41,908	253,400	50,123	2,250	80,521
1910	65,188	336,088	67,427	1,305	87,735
1911	64,658	312,027	94,046	1,900	85,226
1912	29,355	153,809	37,747	23,525	50,795
1913	74,077	347,541	100,262	2,284	113,720
Total	1,266,723	10,120,912	1,629,944	417,173	1,395,695

Sources: BPP, *General Reports of the Colonial and Emigration Commissioners* (1843-1872).

BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1877-1913).

Note: N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in BPP.

2.10: Data for Chart 3.10. The destination of all passengers who left British ports, 1860-3 and 1871-1913

Type of passenger	Australasia	Canada	United States	Other destinations	Total
British & Irish	1,398,919	2,097,296	5,802,034	1,278,376	10,576,625
Foreign	32,345	682,514	3,827,159	238,632	4,780,650
Not distinguished	8,927	30,513	83,893	131,642	254,975
Total	1,440,191	2,810,323	9,713,086	1,648,650	15,612,250

Sources: BPP, *General Reports of the Colonial and Emigration Commissioners* (1860-1872).

BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1877-1913).

Notes: 1 = Data not available in BPP between 1 July 1863 and 31 December 1870.
2 = Most of those 'Not distinguished' were cabin passengers.

2.11: Data for Chart 3.11. The gender of alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911

Year	Male	Female	Total
1877	11,650	5,895	17,545
1878	17,948	8,157	26,105
1879	29,320	11,378	40,698
1880	56,669	23,732	80,401
1881	78,240	33,637	111,877
1882	72,384	30,832	103,216
1883	38,805	19,167	57,972
1884	31,730	14,969	46,699
1885	28,725	15,067	43,792
1886	53,008	25,562	78,570
1887	63,304	28,660	91,964
1888	64,548	30,799	95,347
1889	44,588	24,860	69,448
1890	50,936	27,772	78,708
1891	59,815	32,452	92,267
1892	57,581	30,951	88,532
1893	53,900	26,031	79,931
1894	34,265	21,980	56,245
1895	44,516	27,450	71,966
1896	43,517	24,990	68,507
1897	32,625	23,343	55,968
1898	32,388	20,967	53,355
1899	49,115	30,136	79,251
1900	69,660	39,885	109,545
1901	70,794	38,417	109,211
1902	103,264	48,664	151,928
1903	120,343	52,246	172,589
1904	107,750	53,286	161,036
1905	111,463	59,157	170,620
1906	132,932	70,800	203,732
1907	157,208	70,206	227,414
1908	73,214	50,187	123,401
1909	121,641	62,251	183,892
1910	151,485	73,057	224,542
1911	115,004	66,095	181,099
Total	2,384,335	1,223,038	3,607,373

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

Note: Data was not available after 1911.

2.12a: Data for Chart 3.12a. Destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911

Year	United States	Canada	Australasia	South Africa	All other places	Total
1877	9,146	716	645	N/A	1,143	11,650
1878	14,626	1,470	499	N/A	1,353	17,948
1879	24,786	2,420	829	N/A	1,285	29,320
1880	49,926	4,748	888	N/A	1,107	56,669
1881	70,035	5,814	737	N/A	1,654	78,240
1882	63,278	6,625	671	N/A	1,810	72,384
1883	32,559	4,270	774	N/A	1,202	38,805
1884	26,790	2,896	810	N/A	1,234	31,730
1885	25,080	1,530	621	N/A	1,494	28,725
1886	48,376	2,603	511	N/A	1,518	53,008
1887	54,747	6,723	437	N/A	1,397	63,304
1888	53,926	8,439	334	N/A	1,849	64,548
1889	37,153	4,938	287	N/A	2,210	44,588
1890	43,739	4,652	207	N/A	2,338	50,936
1891	51,004	6,110	221	N/A	2,480	59,815
1892	46,366	9,591	144	N/A	1,480	57,581
1893	35,927	14,604	104	N/A	3,265	53,900
1894	27,750	2,739	139	N/A	3,637	34,265
1895	35,954	2,689	142	N/A	5,731	44,516
1896	29,731	3,733	216	N/A	9,837	43,517
1897	22,973	3,329	172	N/A	6,151	32,625
1898	22,166	5,333	185	N/A	4,704	32,388
1899	35,320	9,398	513	N/A	3,884	49,115
1900	46,927	17,746	566	N/A	4,421	69,660
1901	49,656	16,473	254	N/A	4,411	70,794
1902	71,725	24,768	179	N/A	6,592	103,264
1903	75,189	23,263	117	8,053	13,721	120,343
1904	81,692	12,481	173	2,832	10,572	107,750
1905	85,352	14,119	216	2,661	9,115	111,463
1906	106,020	14,585	159	1,692	10,476	132,932
1907	117,267	20,552	158	1,089	18,142	157,208
1908	49,881	7,025	196	1,129	14,983	73,214
1909	87,482	16,761	334	1,357	15,707	121,641
1910	101,080	23,885	293	2,030	24,197	151,485
1911	68,421	15,393	334	2,142	28,714	115,004
Total	1,802,050	322,421	13,065	22,985	223,814	2,384,335

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

Notes: 1 = Data was not available after 1911.

2 = N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in BPP.

2.12b: Data for Chart 3.12b. Destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911

Year	United States	Canada	Australasia	South Africa	All other places	Total
1877	4,657	428	160	N/A	650	5,895
1878	6,628	739	144	N/A	646	8,157
1879	9,516	1,042	219	N/A	601	11,378
1880	20,929	1,976	225	N/A	602	23,732
1881	30,330	2,271	337	N/A	699	33,637
1882	26,484	3,199	341	N/A	808	30,832
1883	15,550	2,572	466	N/A	579	19,167
1884	12,491	1,564	438	N/A	476	14,969
1885	13,267	771	332	N/A	697	15,067
1886	23,218	1,469	262	N/A	613	25,562
1887	24,705	3,079	280	N/A	596	28,660
1888	26,774	3,076	151	N/A	798	30,799
1889	21,391	2,476	147	N/A	846	24,860
1890	24,320	2,421	113	N/A	918	27,772
1891	28,148	3,141	129	N/A	1,034	32,452
1892	25,373	4,608	63	N/A	907	30,951
1893	19,190	5,579	59	N/A	1,203	26,031
1894	19,213	1,554	50	N/A	1,163	21,980
1895	24,351	1,579	51	N/A	1,469	27,450
1896	20,595	2,004	94	N/A	2,297	24,990
1897	19,156	1,937	86	N/A	2,164	23,343
1898	16,272	2,481	81	N/A	2,133	20,967
1899	24,229	4,124	164	N/A	1,619	30,136
1900	31,083	7,017	164	N/A	1,621	39,885
1901	31,097	5,257	99	N/A	1,964	38,417
1902	38,328	7,799	97	N/A	2,440	48,664
1903	37,391	8,190	49	2,700	3,916	52,246
1904	42,908	4,881	87	1,625	3,785	53,286
1905	47,424	6,115	92	1,429	4,097	59,157
1906	58,912	6,678	64	1,087	4,059	70,800
1907	56,048	7,752	83	786	5,537	70,206
1908	39,596	3,981	93	768	5,749	50,187
1909	48,319	6,403	183	809	6,537	62,251
1910	54,507	9,504	154	917	7,975	73,057
1911	47,557	8,025	117	1,074	9,322	66,095
Total	989,957	135,692	5,674	11,195	80,520	1,223,038

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

Notes: 1 = Data was not available after 1911.

2 = N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in BPP.

2.13a: Data for Chart 3.13a. Occupations and destinations of male alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911

Year	Agriculture	Commercial & professional	Skilled	Labourers	Miscellaneous or not stated	Total
1877	1,728	1,750	2,047	4,660	1,465	11,650
1878	2,581	2,570	3,254	7,627	1,916	17,948
1879	3,182	2,246	5,776	16,170	1,946	29,320
1880	6,149	2,542	9,679	35,172	3,127	56,669
1881	3,541	1,461	7,426	61,260	4,552	78,240
1882	2,339	1,277	5,547	59,869	3,352	72,384
1883	2,877	1,038	2,473	30,293	2,124	38,805
1884	2,047	1,141	2,705	23,743	2,094	31,730
1885	2,463	1,613	2,337	16,657	5,655	28,725
1886	5,133	4,056	10,294	28,771	4,754	53,008
1887	5,514	2,934	15,012	35,945	3,899	63,304
1888	5,200	3,646	13,017	38,100	4,585	64,548
1889	2,414	2,714	9,503	25,154	4,803	44,588
1890	1,983	2,642	7,098	32,886	6,327	50,936
1891	1,831	2,561	6,922	41,942	6,559	59,815
1892	2,808	1,826	5,730	39,628	7,589	57,581
1893	1,944	2,695	8,286	35,484	5,491	53,900
1894	1,473	4,357	5,657	13,869	8,909	34,265
1895	2,026	5,511	6,720	19,751	10,508	44,516
1896	2,036	6,205	8,396	17,617	9,263	43,517
1897	2,021	5,103	5,904	11,897	7,700	32,625
1898	1,482	4,183	7,652	11,932	7,139	32,388
1899	2,307	5,676	10,858	20,499	9,775	49,115
1900	4,898	8,372	13,936	28,318	14,136	69,660
1901	3,912	7,061	20,203	28,023	11,595	70,794
1902	6,343	8,638	20,070	55,554	12,659	103,264
1903	8,281	9,879	24,868	60,309	17,006	120,343
1904	4,942	9,151	21,950	55,758	15,949	107,750
1905	10,874	9,085	16,704	56,157	18,643	111,463
1906	8,920	9,266	19,902	77,049	17,795	132,932
1907	7,255	10,179	25,001	92,252	22,521	157,208
1908	3,084	10,444	11,990	26,440	21,256	73,214
1909	6,209	12,379	13,344	65,178	24,531	121,641
1910	6,552	15,343	17,991	80,998	30,601	151,485
1911	4,272	17,170	18,311	44,842	30,409	115,004
Total	140,621	196,714	386,563	1,299,804	360,633	2,384,335

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

Notes: 1 = Occupations provided within BPP between 1877 and 1902 have been grouped into post-1903 occupation categories to maintain consistency.

2 = Data was not available after 1911.

2.13b: Data for Chart 3.13b. Occupations and destinations of female alien emigrants leaving Britain, 1877-1911

Year	Domestic & other service	Dressmaker & other trades	Teachers, clerks & professions	No stated occupation	Total
1877	823	54	21	4,997	5,895
1878	1,142	75	11	6,929	8,157
1879	1,825	124	16	9,413	11,378
1880	1,967	73	19	21,673	23,732
1881	1,984	70	8	31,575	33,637
1882	2,494	266	9	28,063	30,832
1883	3,830	191	6	15,140	19,167
1884	3,163	116	9	11,681	14,969
1885	3,463	161	11	11,432	15,067
1886	5,184	195	14	20,169	25,562
1887	7,114	258	11	21,277	28,660
1888	6,889	217	12	23,681	30,799
1889	5,820	139	10	18,891	24,860
1890	5,634	266	12	21,860	27,772
1891	6,312	242	21	25,877	32,452
1892	5,309	196	28	25,418	30,951
1893	5,187	262	32	20,550	26,031
1894	2,686	303	47	18,944	21,980
1895	5,069	380	36	21,965	27,450
1896	5,204	253	46	19,487	24,990
1897	4,994	320	32	17,997	23,343
1898	4,293	316	33	16,325	20,967
1899	7,646	498	50	21,942	30,136
1900	9,268	716	51	29,850	39,885
1901	9,670	807	139	27,801	38,417
1902	12,438	946	82	35,198	48,664
1903	14,795	1,204	575	35,672	52,246
1904	12,496	1,581	511	38,698	53,286
1905	13,549	1,380	402	43,826	59,157
1906	19,923	1,479	416	48,982	70,800
1907	19,658	1,327	424	48,797	70,206
1908	11,607	875	541	37,164	50,187
1909	17,463	882	881	43,025	62,251
1910	21,829	1,177	1,168	48,883	73,057
1911	18,106	1,192	1,018	45,779	66,095
Total	278,834	18,541	6,702	918,961	1,223,038

Source: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1877-1911)*.

Notes: 1 = Occupations provided within BPP between 1877 and 1902 have been grouped into post-1903 occupation categories to maintain consistency.
2 = Data was not available after 1911.

2.14: Data for Chart 3.14. The number of foreign passengers leaving Britain known to be transmigrants

Year	Number of foreign passengers leaving British ports	Number of transmigrants arriving at British ports	Percentage
1888	113,230	62,901	55.55
1889	83,466	55,532	66.53
1890	94,515	60,966	64.50
1891	112,275	98,705	87.91
1892	107,351	93,801	87.38
1893	95,123	79,518	83.59
1894	67,032	35,512	52.98
1895	82,818	44,637	53.90
1896	76,015	40,036	52.67
1897	62,932	32,221	51.20
1898	60,551	32,177	53.14
1899	90,020	49,947	55.48
1900	124,722	71,682	57.47
1901	124,354	79,140	63.64
1902	174,291	118,478	67.98
1903	181,539	124,591	68.63
1904	174,354	99,278	56.94
1905	188,422	108,408	57.53
1906	229,142	169,798	74.10
1907	239,040	172,438	72.14
1908	123,212	61,648	50.03
1909	185,617	118,421	63.80
1910	221,011	140,353	63.50
1911	168,898	90,433	53.54
1912	189,169	113,642	60.07
1913	232,051	153,634	66.21
Total	3,601,150	2,307,897	64.09

Sources: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1889-1905).

BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens* (1906-1913).

Note: Data in BPP for the period 1888 to 30 April 1890 was only available for the ports of London and Hull.

2.15: Data for Chart 3.15. The nationality of all transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1836-1859

Period	Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	Belgians	Dutch	French	Germans	Italians	Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	Russians & Poles	Swiss	Not specified	Total
1836-1839	0	0	0	0	1,133	0	25	0	0	2,069	3,227
1840-1844	0	0	0	0	205	0	0	7	0	206	418
1845-1849	0	0	23	3	16,624	38	20	136	119	6,933	23,896
1850-1854	21	38	610	191	25,514	0	307	162	0	67,207	94,050
1855-1859	0	1	10	10	4,610	74	277	0	36	22,828	27,846
Total	21	39	643	204	48,086	112	629	305	155	99,243	149,437

Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120.

2.16: Data for Chart 3.16. The nationality of transmigrants arriving in Britain, 1906-1913

Nationality	Number	Percentage
Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	113,868	11.22
Belgians	18,784	1.85
Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	9,669	0.95
Dutch	9,165	0.90
French	2,117	0.21
Germans	13,426	1.32
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	14,087	1.39
Italians	14,996	1.48
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	304,113	29.95
Russians & Poles	436,495	42.99
Spanish & Portuguese	7,814	0.77
Swiss	2,888	0.28
United States Nationals	46,246	4.56
Other Europeans	21,587	2.13
Total	1,015,255	100.00

Source: BPP, *Annual Reports of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens* (1906-1913).

Note: The nationality of transmigrants was only provided under the more detailed reports published in the wake of the 1905 Aliens Act.

2.17: Data for Data for Chart 3.17. The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1836-1859

Period	Belgian	Dutch	French	German	Russian	Scandinavian	Other ports	Total
1836-1839	45	282	1	2,880	2	0	0	3,210
1840-1844	22	75	0	314	0	0	0	411
1845-1849	1,532	20,459	52	1,684	56	142	54	23,979
1850-1854	2,413	61,448	430	28,305	8	801	56	93,461
1855-1859	1,627	13,776	522	11,251	12	546	0	27,734
Total	5,639	96,040	1,005	44,434	78	1,489	110	148,795

Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120.

Note: Excludes those whose port of embarkation (in continental Europe) was not stated on the alien lists.

2.18: Data for Chart 3.18. The ports from which transmigrants travelling through Britain embarked, 1890-1913

Period	Belgian	Dutch	Finnish	French	German	Russian	Scandinavian	Spanish & Portuguese	Other European ports	Total
1890-1894	8,844	17,205	6,632	1,349	104,339	N/A	224,069	N/A	6,064	368,502
1895-1899	2,346	8,928	27,685	4,086	19,862	5,029	129,317	N/A	1,765	199,018
1900-1904	33,107	55,825	73,660	11,741	18,946	21,422	275,537	N/A	2,931	493,169
1905-1909	53,321	28,273	106,871	57,447	52,528	95,378	233,706	2,011	999	630,534
1910-1913	32,421	14,253	60,830	70,957	51,584	89,796	171,137	5,490	163	496,631
Total	130,039	124,484	275,678	145,580	247,259	211,625	1,033,766	7,501	11,922	2,187,854

Sources: BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*.

BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens (1906-1913)*.

Note: N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in BPP.

2.19: Data for Chart 3.19. The ports at which European transmigrants entered Britain, 1836-1913

Period	Goole	Grimsby	Harwich	Hull	Leith	Liverpool
1836-1839	0	0	0	2,221	0	0
1840-1844	0	0	0	307	0	0
1845-1849	0	0	0	734	1,000	0
1850-1854	10,078	1,033	0	53,884	306	0
1855-1859	424	31	0	17,873	0	0
1860-1864	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1865-1869	N/A	N/A	N/A	124,052	N/A	N/A
1870-1874	N/A	N/A	N/A	175,533	N/A	N/A
1875-1879	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1880-1884	N/A	3,769	N/A	197,932	N/A	N/A
1885-1889	N/A	37,829	N/A	271,351	N/A	N/A
1890-1894	N/A	71,168	N/A	237,305	36,192	N/A
1895-1899	N/A	48,516	N/A	110,015	8,685	N/A
1900-1904	N/A	120,208	15,349	282,609	14,876	N/A
1905-1909	N/A	123,608	44,079	320,258	13,883	1,990
1910-1913	N/A	88,230	59,072	215,252	5,944	5,469
Total	10,502	494,392	118,500	2,009,326	80,886	7,459

Chart continued on next page.

2.19: Data for Chart 3.19. (cont.)

Period	London	Southampton	Tyne ports	West Hartlepool	Other ports (*)	Total
1836-1839	250	0	597	0	47	3,115
1840-1844	101	0	0	0	0	408
1845-1849	21,804	42	0	0	540	24,120
1850-1854	28,309	228	0	0	321	94,159
1855-1859	8,671	418	0	0	66	27,483
1860-1864	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1865-1869	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	124,052
1870-1874	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	175,533
1875-1879	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1880-1884	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	201,701
1885-1889	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	309,180
1890-1894	531	N/A	717	20,671	7,762	374,346
1895-1899	896	N/A	6,406	5,000	19,500	199,018
1900-1904	2,046	N/A	18,913	9	39,207	493,217
1905-1909	32,139	52,230	24,728	N/A	16,023	628,938
1910-1913	27,466	70,553	22,877	N/A	1,768	496,631
Total	122,213	123,471	74,238	25,680	85,234	3,151,901

Continued on next page.

2.19: Data for Chart 3.19. (cont.)

Sources: TNA, HO 3/1-120.

HCA, TCM/174-180; WHG/1/20-46.

NELA, 11/1.

BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom (1890-1905)*.

BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens (1906-1913)*.

Notes: 1 = The figures for Dover have been included in the 'Other ports' column. These include 45 landing between 1836-1839, 320 between 1845 and 1849, 234 between 1850 and 1854, and 10 between 1855 and 1859.

2 = The figures for Leith include arrivals at Grangemouth after 1860.

3 = 'Other ports' for 1890-1894 included 1 for Newhaven

4 = 'Other ports' for 1895-1899 included 31 for Newhaven

5 = 'Other ports' for 1900-1904 152 for Newhaven

6 = 'Other ports' for 1905-1909 included 7 that arrived at Cardiff, 17 via Dover, and 113 via Newhaven.

7 = 'Other ports' for 1909-1914 included 1,448 transmigrants that arrived via Dover and 320 via Newhaven.

8 = Figures for 1914 are missing due to Parliamentary reporting of alien migration being interrupted by the declaration of war.

9 = Figures for Hull for the periods 1865-1869, 1870-1874, 1880-1884 and 1885-1889 are based upon statistics in Port Sanitary Records for the Port of Hull.

10 = Figures for Grimsby for the years 1882-1890 are based upon medical records for the port.

11 = Arrivals at Goole (after 1890) were automatically classed as arrivals at the Port of Hull.

12 = N/A denotes years for which statistical evidence was not available in any source.

2.20: Data for Chart 3.20. The nationality of transmigrants arriving at British ports, 1906-1913

Port	Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	Belgians	Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	Dutch	French	Germans	Greeks & Turks (in Europe)
Cardiff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dover	240	362	54	7	54	273	32
Fishguard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grangemouth	1,169	40	20	44	1	171	6
Grimsby	24,391	2,296	2,287	543	244	5,023	948
Harwich	3,586	15,377	519	895	694	4,360	361
Hull	10,002	10	657	4,066	7	1,274	243
Leith	3,606	515	294	180	25	487	94
Liverpool	5	2	4	8	6	30	41
London	1,532	25	372	3,346	15	707	89
Newhaven	71	3	20	0	67	5	122
Plymouth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Southampton	69,264	154	5,442	76	1,003	1,083	12,150
Tyne ports	2	0	0	0	1	13	1
Total	113,868	18,784	9,669	9,165	2,117	13,426	14,087

Chart continued on next page.

2.20: Data for Chart 3.20 (cont.)

Port	Italians	Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	Russians & Poles	Spanish & Portuguese	Swiss	United States nationals	Other Europeans	Total
Cardiff	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	7
Dover	35	3	323	20	1	41	2	1,447
Fishguard	0	0	0	0	0	3		3
Grangemouth	93	1,130	1,058	0	0	60	247	4,039
Grimsby	1,541	62,795	72,090	83	3	11,020	5,026	188,290
Harwich	513	61,405	4,037	177	24	10,093	726	102,767
Hull	56	138,392	298,202	12	2	17,687	1,731	472,341
Leith	932	1,401	2,744	12	0	85	1,927	12,302
Liverpool	55	11	129	1	7,402	205	23	7,922
London	257	131	50,630	10	3	254	1,125	58,496
Newhaven	11	0	63	1	0	29	17	409
Plymouth	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	12
Southampton	11,503	28	6,919	2,571	372	2,060	10,753	123,378
Tyne ports	0	38,817	300	1	0	4,697	10	43,842
Total	14,996	304,113	436,495	2,888	7,814	46,246	21,587	1,015,255

Source: BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens* (1906-1913).

Note: Data includes those intending to travel the following year.

2.21: Data for Chart 3.21. The British ports at which transmigrants arrived and embarked, 1906-1913

Port	Bristol	Dover	Glasgow	Liverpool	London & Southampton	Other ports	Total
Cardiff	0	0	0	7	0	0	7
Dover	708	10	1	426	296	6	1,447
Fishguard	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Grangemouth	0	0	3,607	365	67	0	4,039
Grimsby	190	0	14,978	162,728	10,130	264	188,290
Harwich	2,705	0	2,844	80,532	16,671	15	102,767
Hull	2,105	343	37,504	389,025	43,336	28	472,341
Leith	0	0	11,981	279	42	0	12,302
Liverpool	1	0	0	7,185	331	0	7,517
London	1,761	810	479	29,061	25,363	20	57,494
Newhaven	45	0	63	349	1,359	0	1,816
Plymouth	0	0	0	1	11	0	12
Southampton	29	14	1,738	56,331	65,241	25	123,378
Tyne ports	486	0	2,890	35,807	4,659	0	43,842
Total	8,030	1,177	76,085	762,096	167,509	358	1,015,255

Source: BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens* (1906-1913).

Note: Figures included those who intended to travel from Britain during the following calendar year. (i.e. the first two weeks of the following year.)

2.22: Data for Chart 3.22. The nationality of transmigrants who embarked at British ports, 1906-1913

Port	Austrians, Hungarians & Bohemians	Belgians	Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	Dutch	French	Germans	Greeks & Turks (in Europe)
Bristol	962	1,526	414	264	55	204	104
Dover	0	3	0	0	1	0	1
Glasgow	11,270	1,033	814	591	95	1,357	569
Liverpool	59,432	14,327	5,670	6,339	1,459	8,314	7,326
London & Southampton	42,194	1,894	2,771	1,969	507	3,542	6,086
Other ports	10	1	0	2	0	9	1
Total	113,868	18,784	9,669	9,165	2,117	13,426	14,087

Port	Italians	Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	Russians & Poles	Spanish & Portuguese	Swiss	United States nationals	Other Europeans	Total
Bristol	205	1,414	2,771	0	17	87	7	8,030
Dover	0	0	1,164	0	0	6	0	1,175
Glasgow	1,630	11,492	40,945	382	39	1,381	4,487	76,085
Liverpool	3,158	258,708	336,070	7,017	633	38,767	14,876	762,096
London & Southampton	10,003	32,229	55,505	415	2,199	5,980	2,217	167,511
Other ports	0	270	40	0	0	25	0	358
Total	14,996	304,113	436,495	7,814	2,888	46,246	21,587	1,015,255

Source: BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens (1906-1913)*.

Continued on next page.

2.22: Data for Chart 3.22. (Cont.)

Notes: 1 = Data includes those who arrived and departed that year and not those already resident in Britain over a longer period of time.

2 = The grouping of data for London and Southampton was determined by original evidence presented within BPP.

2.23: Data for Chart 3.23. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1836-1859

Year	America	America & Australia	Australia	Destination not stated	Total
1836	0	0	0	11	11
1837	63	0	0	730	793
1838	168	0	0	359	527
1839	424	0	0	1,472	1,896
1840	79	0	0	267	346
1841	0	0	0	7	7
1842	0	0	0	2	2
1843	0	0	0	22	22
1844	0	0	0	34	34
1845	79	0	0	0	79
1846	2,074	0	0	3,000	5,074
1847	317	0	0	7,295	7,612
1848	1,425	0	100	4,783	6,308
1849	3,171	0	170	1,541	4,882
1850	1,008	0	2	165	1,175
1851	5,792	0	0	3,867	9,659
1852	20,770	0	7	9,424	30,201
1853	15,574	382	50	9,380	25,386
1854	19,120	29	3	8,630	27,782
1855	5,279	71	120	2,314	7,784
1856	3,704	0	12	3,129	6,845
1857	4,625	0	7	3,166	7,798
1858	2,120	25	5	611	2,761
1859	1,637	258	2	664	2,561
Total	87,429	765	478	60,873	149,545

Source: TNA, HO 3/1-120.

Note: America includes the terms America, USA, United States and North America.

2.24: Data for Chart 3.24. The destination of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1890-1911

Year	Canada	South Africa	South America	United States	Other destinations	Total
1890	N/A	0	N/A	47,027	0	47,027
1891	N/A	12	N/A	98,587	106	98,705
1892	N/A	16	N/A	93,679	106	93,801
1893	N/A	208	N/A	79,106	624	79,938
1894	N/A	567	N/A	36,752	369	37,688
1895	N/A	1,543	N/A	45,010	158	46,711
1896	N/A	3,120	N/A	39,765	112	42,997
1897	N/A	1,671	N/A	33,071	155	34,897
1898	N/A	1,162	N/A	33,110	241	34,513
1899	N/A	1,056	N/A	51,076	704	52,836
1900	N/A	649	N/A	74,453	552	75,654
1901	N/A	1,182	N/A	81,400	437	83,019
1902	N/A	2,614	N/A	123,568	279	126,461
1903	N/A	4,484	N/A	129,460	386	134,330
1904	N/A	1,601	N/A	105,156	218	106,975
1905	N/A	1,343	N/A	114,887	618	116,848
1906	19,471	1,434	3,689	142,518	54	167,166
1907	22,824	872	2,460	144,702	55	170,913
1908	10,192	1,038	1,736	48,520	77	61,563
1909	21,433	1,333	2,554	92,537	78	117,935
1910	32,920	1,964	1,786	102,505	125	139,300
1911	25,094	1,882	1,666	60,289	75	89,006
Total	131,934	29,751	13,891	1,777,178	5,529	1,958,283

Source: BPP, *Annual Reports of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens (1906-1913)*.

- Notes: 1 = N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in BPP.
 2 = Those journeying to Canada were no doubt assumed as travelling to America.
 3 = From 1898 the statistics and destinations of those travelling through Britain were also confirmed by British consuls.
 4 = Data excludes those transmigrants arriving in Britain and bound to a foreign destination during the following year.
 5 = Data not available after 1911.

2.25: Data for Chart 3.25. The destination and nationality of transmigrants travelling through Britain, 1906-1911

Nationality	Canada	South Africa	South America	United States	Other destinations	Total
Austrians & Hungarians	7,229	93	473	67,030	2	74,827
Belgians	4,164	219	207	7,048	16	11,654
Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	1,823	8	13	3,032	0	4,876
Dutch	3,066	598	52	2,410	20	6,146
French	417	96	74	900	26	1,513
Germans	2,138	594	1,085	6,734	16	10,567
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	1,068	42	32	8,541	40	9,723
Italians	835	245	148	7,004	5	8,237
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	47,200	444	548	193,501	274	241,967
Russians	57,996	5,888	10,946	239,876	35	314,741
Spanish & Portuguese	9	4	27	4,119	15	4,174
Swiss	122	54	35	2,311	0	2,522
United States nationals	2,796	219	92	31,128	13	34,248
Others Europeans	3,071	19	159	17,437	2	20,688
Total	131,934	8,523	13,891	591,071	464	745,883

Source: BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens* (1906-1911).

Notes: 1 = Destinations of transmigrants are not detailed in BPP after 1911.

2 = Excludes those destined to their native towns, those whose destination was not specified, and those remained in Britain.

2.26: Data for Chart 3.26. The nationality of Mormon converts who emigrated to the United States from Britain, 1852-1890

Year	British	German	Scandinavian	Total
1852	455	0	325	780
1853	2,283	19	301	2,603
1854	2,024	54	649	2,727
1855	3,669	29	437	4,135
1856	3,809	20	161	3,990
1857	1,363	51	822	2,236
1858	103	0	75	178
1859	399	55	355	809
1860	865	158	301	1,324
1861	1,500	89	369	1,958
1862	1,813	110	N/A	1,923
1863	2,321	54	1,243	3,618
1864	1,780	106	753	2,639
1865	1,208	17	N/A	1,225
1866	1,918	44	N/A	1,962
1867	210	2	290	502
1868	2,338	43	806	3,187
1869	1,660	69	567	2,296
1870	464	86	367	917
1871	811	78	628	1,517
1872	525	80	1,061	1,666
1873	1,335	149	1,053	2,537
1874	926	155	917	1,998
1875	642	57	829	1,528
1876	584	108	542	1,234
1877	720	130	682	1,532
1878	967	175	776	1,918
1879	945	112	457	1,514
1880	890	118	767	1,775
1881	1,275	121	915	2,311
1882	1,465	192	1,106	2,763
1883	1,210	291	1,044	2,545
1884	910	185	808	1,903
1885	793	185	666	1,644
1886	774	95	661	1,530
1887	1,267	50	553	1,870
1888	821	44	536	1,401
1889	743	101	619	1,463
1890	499	167	608	1,274
Total	48,284	3,599	23,049	74,932

Continued on next page.

2.26: Data for Chart 3.26 (cont.)

Sources: *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM.
LSL, HM Customs *Bills of Entry* (1852-1890).
GCL, Grimsby Newspapers (1854-1879).

Note: N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in British sources or via accessible published sources. Difficulties with the sources, in particular the failure to record the nationality of those embarking from German ports in 1862, 1865 and 1866, prevents their inclusion within statistics presented here. The figures do not include the 3,327 emigrants that sailed direct to the United States from Hamburg, nor 110 that sailed direct from Le Havre.

2.27: Data for Chart 3.27. The ports at which European Mormon transmigrants arrived in Britain *en route* to Utah, 1852-1890

Year	Grimsby	Hull	London	Newcastle	Total
1852	0	316	9	0	325
1853	0	301	0	0	301
1854	0	649	0	0	649
1855	437	0	0	0	437
1856	161	0	0	0	161
1857	822	0	0	0	822
1858	0	75	0	0	75
1859	355	0	0	0	355
1860	301	0	0	0	301
1861	169	200	0	0	369
1862	0	0	0	0	0
1863	730	513	0	0	1,243
1864	200	553	0	0	753
1865	0	0	0	0	0
1866	0	0	0	0	0
1867	0	290	0	0	290
1868	0	806	0	0	806
1869	0	567	0	0	567
1870	0	367	0	0	367
1871	0	628	0	0	628
1872	0	1,061	0	0	1,061
1873	0	1,053	0	0	1,053
1874	0	917	0	0	917
1875	0	829	0	0	829
1876	0	542	0	0	542
1877	0	682	0	0	682
1878	0	776	0	0	776
1879	0	457	0	0	457
1880	0	767	0	0	767
1881	0	911	0	4	915
1882	0	1,106	0	0	1,106
1883	0	1,044	0	0	1,044
1884	0	808	0	0	808
1885	0	666	0	0	666
1886	0	661	0	0	661
1887	0	553	0	0	553
1888	0	536	0	0	536
1889	0	619	0	0	619
1890	0	608	0	0	608
Total	3,175	19,861	9	4	23,049

Continued on next page.

2.27: Data for Chart 3.27 (cont.)

Sources: *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM.
LSL, HM Customs *Bills of Entry* (1852-1890).
GCL, Grimsby Newspapers (1854-1879).

Note: N/A denotes years for which the information was not available in British sources or via accessible published sources. Difficulties with the sources, in particular the failure to record the nationality of those embarking from German ports in 1862, 1865 and 1866, prevents their inclusion within statistics presented here. The figures do not include the 3,327 emigrants that sailed direct to the United States from Hamburg, nor 110 that sailed direct from Le Havre.

2.28: Data for Chart 3.28. The number of Russian, Polish, and Galician transmigrants travelling through the Port of London, 1895-1903

Year	Number of transmigrants noted arriving at London in British Parliamentary Papers	Number of transmigrants reported as staying at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter	Number of transmigrants noted as arriving at London in the 1903 Royal Commission on Alien Immigration
1895	141	1,822	1,489
1896	338	2,578	2,324
1897	77	1,095	2,983
1898	334	1,065	3,024
1899	6	1,169	3,437
1900	5	1,179	4,680
1901	4	1,259	5,331
1902	14	2,247	4,694
1903	18	3,081	8,353
Total	937	15,495	36,315

Sources: BPP, *Royal Commission on Alien Immigration* (1903), Volume III, pp. 76-78.

LMA, *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter* (1895-1903).

BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1896-1904).

Notes: 1 = Figures from *the Royal Commission* included arrivals from the ports of Hamburg, Bremen and Rotterdam (1895-1903) and Libau (1897-1903) only.

2 = Figures from the *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter* included only those destined for foreign countries.

2.29: Data for Chart 3.29. The overseas destinations of transmigrants staying at the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, 1885-1914

Year	Africa	Australia & New Zealand	Canada	Other countries	South America	United States	Total
1885 ⁽²⁾	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
1886	0	0	0	5	0	28	33
1887	0	0	0	17	0	117	134
1888	0	0	0	22	0	261	283
1889	0	0	0	18	0	96	114
1890	0	0	0	15	0	103	118
1891	0	63	58	294	24	532	971
1892	39	262	190	131	159	288	1,069
1893	525	165	402	85	252	351	1,780
1894	476	59	108	31	84	288	1,046
1895	1,221	32	13	56	14	486	1,822
1896	2,142	59	46	63	44	224	2,578
1897	1,028	0	1	10	0	56	1,095
1898	831	0	0	2	0	232	1,065
1899	1,036	0	0	1	0	132	1,169
1900	666	0	307	8	0	198	1,179
1901	1,118	0	0	3	0	138	1,259
1902	2,155	0	0	3	0	89	2,247
1903	2,969	0	0	2	0	110	3,081
1904	1,051	0	27	13	0	1,236	2,327
1905 ⁽²⁾	780	0	28	7	40	1,578	2,433
1906 ⁽³⁾	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1907 ⁽²⁾	96	0	464	3	1	37	601
1908 ⁽²⁾	581	0	175	17	84	40	897
1909 ⁽²⁾	163	78	0	1	86	0	328
1910	1,326	107	108	32	706	1,196	3,475
1911	1,144	0	19	17	678	24	1,882
1912	1,122	10	12	11	73	31	1,259
1913	1,088	3	170	33	229	85	1,608
1914	461	0	5	17	0	12	495
Total	22,018	838	2,133	918	2,474	7,969	36,350

Sources: LJM, *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter* (1885-1914).
LMA, *Annual Reports of the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter* (1885-1914).
BPP, *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1890-1905).
BPP, *Report of the Select Committee on the Immigration and Emigration (of Foreigners)* (1888).

Notes: 1 = Excludes those destined to their native towns, those whose destination was not specified, and those remained in Britain.
2 = ⁽²⁾ denotes that the statistics were only available for part of the year.
3 = ⁽³⁾ data for 1906 is not available (hence N/A).

2.30: Data for Chart 3.30. The percentage of immigrants to the United States and Canada who had transmigrated via Britain, 1906-1911

Nationality	Number of transmigrants who went from Britain to the United States	Percentage of United States immigrants who had transmigrated via Britain	Number of immigrants to the United States	Number of transmigrants who went from Britain to Canada	Percentage of Canadian immigrants who had transmigrated via Britain	Number of immigrants to Canada	Number of transmigrants who went from Britain to the United States & Canada	Number of immigrants to Continental North America	Percentage of immigrants to continental North America who had transmigrated through Britain
Austro-Hungarians	67,030	4.93	1,360,084	7,229	21.58	33,498	74,259	1,393,582	5.33
Belgians	7,048	23.14	30,462	4,164	37.93	10,978	11,212	41,440	27.06
Bulgarians, Rumanians & Serbians	3,032	5.26	57,683	1,823	5.65	32,251	4,855	89,934	5.40
Dutch	2,410	6.32	38,119	3,066	39.10	7,841	5,476	45,960	11.91
French	900	1.80	49,982	417	2.19	19,052	1,317	69,034	1.91
Germans	6,734	3.43	196,564	2,138	8.72	24,515	8,872	221,079	4.01
Greeks & Turks (in Europe)	8,541	3.76	227,208	1,068	11.21	9,527	9,609	236,735	4.06
Italians	7,004	0.55	1,268,991	835	0.99	84,619	7,839	1,353,610	0.58

Continued on next page.

2.30: Data for Chart 3.30. (Cont.)

Nationality	Number of transmigrants who went from Britain to the United States	Percentage of United States immigrants who had transmigrated via Britain	Number of immigrants to the United States	Number of transmigrants who went from Britain to Canada	Percentage of Canadian immigrants who had transmigrated via Britain	Number of immigrants to Canada	Number of transmigrants who went from Britain to the United States & Canada	Number of immigrants to Continental North America	Percentage of immigrants to continental North America who had transmigrated through Britain
Norwegians, Swedes & Danes	193,501	75.60	255,969	47,200	137.52	34,323	240,701	290,292	82.92
Russians, Poles & Hebrews	239,876	21.86	1,097,292	57,996	24.01	241,502	297,872	1,338,794	22.25
Spanish & Portuguese	4,119	5.90	69,757	9	0.43	2,093	4,128	71,850	5.75
Swiss	2,311	11.24	20,560	122	7.42	1,645	2,433	22,205	10.96
Other Europeans	17,437	2111.02	826	3,071	0.33	933,585	20,508	934,411	2.19
Total	559,943	11.98	4,673,497	129,138	9.00	1,435,429	689,081	6,108,926	11.28

Source: BPP, *Annual Report of His Majesty's Inspector, with Statement as to the Expulsion of Aliens (1906-1911)*.

Ferenczi & Willcox, *International Migrations, Volume I*, pp. 364-5, 408-439. Continued on next page.

2.30: Data for Chart 3.30 (cont.)

Notes: 1 = UK figures based upon those arriving in the UK between 1906 and 1911 and stating their destination as the USA or Canada.

2 = Figures exclude Jews and Hebrews – who were included under Russians (along with Poles).

3 = Finns were included as Russians.

4 = Groups were collectively grouped according to the British system of presenting data.

5 = The data for Canadian and US immigration figures were obtained from Ferenczi and Willcox.

6 = The 31,138 Americans who passed through Britain have been excluded from the totals of immigrants.

7 = Data excludes 20,508 other nationalities who transmigrated via Britain to North America and 1,896 other nationals who arrived from Europe

8 = Data excludes British and Irish migrants.

3.3 Larsson Brother Transmigrant Contract Ticket – Cont. (c.1890)

Dublett-Kontrakt. N:o

UTVANDRARE-KONTRAKT emellan

utvandringsagenten **E. F. Larsson**, Stockholm, och nedanstående utvandrare:

Utvandrarnes namn	Alder	Senaste vistelseort

Passagerarepriset är beräknadt från Göteborg till

för	fullvuxna	à Kr.	Kr.
"	under 12 år à	"	"
"	d:o 5 år à	"	"
"	d:o 1 år à	"	"

Kr.

afgår betalda handpenningar enligt
 qvitto N:o Kr.

Den 189..... betalt Kr.

Att afresa från Göteborg den 189.....

Kassafört den 189.....

Antal kolly	N:o	Värde	
		Kr.	öre

Kontrollant med riksställningar **TILL LANDET I VÄSTER**

Source: Merseyside Maritime Museum, *Ibid.*

Second cabin
Hvita Stjerna-Linien.
Helsingborg - Amerika.

Utvandrarekontrakt n:r 2296

emellan
CARL ERIKSSON i Göteborg, af kongl. kommerskollegium antagen utvandrareagent samt nedan antecknade utvandrare.

Jag **CARL ERIKSSON**, förbinder mig härigenom att, på sätt här nedan närmare anförda, från Helsingborg till **NEW YORK** i Nordamerika befordra nedan antecknade utvandrare emot en redan erlagd och härmed kvitterad betalning af kronor **270** - deruti jemväl äro inberäknade de vid landstigning i Amerika möjligen förekommande afgifter af allmän beskaffenhet.

Resan sker från Helsingborg den **21 APRIL 1914** med ångfartyg eller ångfärja och järnväg 3dje klass först till Köpenhamn i Danmark, derifrån inom 24 timmar efter slutad tullexpedition med ångfartyg å mellandäcksplats till Hull eller annan hamn på östkusten i England eller med järnväg å 3dje klass till Esbjerg i Danmark, derifrån inom 24 timmar efter ankomsten dit med ångfartyg å mellandäcksplats till Harwich eller annan hamn på östkusten i England, och derifrån inom 24 timmar efter slutad tullexpedition med järnväg å 3dje klass till **LONDON** i England, och derifrån inom 12 dagar efter utvandrarens ankomst dit med oceanångfartyg å mellandäcksplats omedelbart till **NEW YORK**. Derifrån befordras utvandraren genast efter slutad tullexpedition och öfriga formaliteter med järnväg å 3dje klass till

För ofvannämnda afgift erhåller utvandraren jemväl god och tillräcklig kost och vård från Helsingborg samt logis under uppehållen å mellanstationerna, allt till landstigningsplatsen i Amerika. Dessutom befordras och värdas ända fram till bestämmelseorten **1 koffert** resgods fritt till 200 kubikdecimeters utrymme å ångfartyg och till 65 kilos vikt å järnväg åt utvandrare öfver 12 år, men endast till hälften så stor myckenhet åt barn mellan 1 och 12 år under resan till landstigningsplatsen i Amerika och åt barn mellan 5 och 12 år å de amerikanska järnvägarna. Inlet resgods befordras fritt å de amerikanska järnvägarna för barn under 5 år, eller någotstades för barn under 1 år.

Å det resgodset, som utvandraren icke sjelf har om hand, utgörande **1 kofly** och mått med nr. **254**, erhåller han kontraktmärke, i Helsingborg af mig för resan till landstigningsplatsen i Amerika och der genom min försorg af vederbörande järnvägsbolag för återstående resan.

Skulle utvandraren icke varit återlämnande af kontraktmärket utbekomma resgodset, är han berättigad till ersättning, som utbetalas, om godset förkommit före landstigningen i Amerika, af mig genom mitt ombud der till belopp af högst femtio kronor, om utvandraren är öfver 12 år, och högst 25 kronor, om han är mellan 1 och 12 år, men, om godset förkommit under resan i Amerika, af vederbörande järnvägsbolag enligt amerikansk lag, dock lemnas ingen ersättning för effekterna om skada eller förlust försakas genom järnvägs- eller sjöolycka.

Anser sig utvandraren eja anseendigt till klagan däröfver, att han icke ännu fått den rätt och de förmåner, som på grund af detta kontrakt bort honom tillkomma, skall han för erhållande af den godtgörelse, hvar till fög må förefinnas, skyndsamt göra anmälan hos närmaste svenske konsul.

Skulle utvandraren vid ankomsten till Nordamerika af vederbörande myndighet derstädes förbjudas att dit invandra, och kan det icke ådagaläggas, att detta förbud är föranlett af förhållanden, som inträffat först efter det detta kontrakt upprättats, förbinder jag mig härigenom att återgålda utvandrarens betalning för bofröan samt att på min bekostnad ombesörja hans återresa till Helsingborg tillika med hans underhåll till dess han dit återkommer samt befordras och värds af hans medförda resgods.

Härjeuete förbinder jag mig, att, om sådant från utvandrarens sida påkallas, låta alla tvister om tydingen af detta kontrakt och utvandrarens rätt till ersättning afgöras af fem gude män, af hvilka utvandraren utsätter två, jag, eller, i fall af tvist, kongl. maj:ts befallningshafvande i Malmöhus län i Sverige två, samt utnämnda myndighet den femte.

Antages **Edwin Peterson**

Gudkännes såsom upprättadt i öfverensslämmelse med kgl. förordn. d. 4 juni 1884 och kgl. kungör. d. 28 sept. 1893; betygar Helsingborg i poliskammaren d. **18/4 1914**

UTVANDRARENS

Namn och yrke eller titel.	Ålder.	Hemortshagens namn och -län.
<i>Edwin Peterson</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>Amerika</i>
		

Helsingborg den **18 April 1914**

Carl Eriksson.
genom *Edwin Peterson*

Edwin Peterson

Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Swedish Immigrant Letters (1884-1892), P1800, 'Robert Engdahl & Co., Land & Emigration Agents' (1886). By 1914 the rights of passengers had become enshrined in carefully worded written agreements. Details such as the precise length of time the migrant remained in transit were clearly defined, as shown in the document above. The company, the White Star Line, stated here that the passenger would remain in Britain for only 13 days. Changes such as represented here heralded the arrival of a degree of integrated travel for steerage passengers (soon to be known as tourist class) such as had been enjoyed by upper class clientele.

3.5 Indirekt List, Hamburg (1854-1910)

No 136

Verzeichniss

der Personen, welche zur Auswanderung nach *N. York* von *Glasgow*,
 durch Indirektschiffe ausgeht sind, und auf dem Haupt Schiffe *Breslau* Capitän *Brasow*
 unter *W. J. L.* Flotte nach *Leith* befehlet werden.
 Abgang des Schiffes am *5. Juli* 18*55*

Nr.	Name		Geschlecht		Alter	Bürgerlicher Wohnort	In welche resp. in der Provinz	Bürgerlicher Stand oder Beruf	Ziel der Auswanderung (bei und Land zu angeben)	Zahl der Per- sonen	Davon sind:			
	1.	2.	3.	4.							5.	6.	7.	8.
1	Thurmann	Thurmann	1	50	Preussen	Preussen	Arbeiter	Land am Ende	/	/	/	/	/	
2	a	Rachel	1	46	d	d	Fräulein		/	/	/	/	/	/
3	d	Parach	1	28	d	d	Kinder		/	/	/	/	/	/
4	d	Habmann	1	16	d	d			/	/	/	/	/	/
5	d	Hymann	1	14	d	d			/	/	/	/	/	/
6	d	Rosa	1	17	d	d			/	/	/	/	/	/
7	d	Abraham	1	11	d	d			/	/	/	/	/	/
8	Meiners	Friede	1	55	Preussen	Preussen	Fräulein		/	/	/	/	/	
9	d	Ulrich	1	7	d	d	Kinder		/	/	/	/	/	
10	d	Rafice	1	4	d	d	Kinder		/	/	/	/	/	
11	Advoikat	Lina	1	20	Leinisch	d	Arbeiter		/	/	/	/	/	
12	Thinger	Karol	1	18	d	d	d		/	/	/	/	/	
13	d	Leib	1	16	d	d	d		/	/	/	/	/	
14	Bichner	Heide	1	22	Leinisch	d	Fräulein		/	/	/	/	/	
15	Chim	Rosa	1	18	Leinisch	Ungarn	Fräulein		/	/	/	/	/	
16	Marocovsky	Kajetan	1	49	Leinisch	Preussen	Arbeiter	/	/	/	/	/		
17	Schlagse	Karol	1	17	Leinisch	Preussen	Fräulein	/	/	/	/	/		
18	Birnberg	Ulrich	1	27	Preussen	Preussen	Arbeiter	/	/	/	/	/		
19	Wiesel	Salomon	1	59	Leinisch	Preussen	Lehrer	/	/	/	/	/		
20	Cherica	Salomon	1	40	Leinisch	Ungarn	Arbeiter	/	/	/	/	/		
21	Stanzel	Erasmus	1	26	Leinisch	Preussen	d	/	/	/	/	/		
22	Levy	Ernst	1	16	Leinisch	Preussen	Lehrer	/	/	/	/	/		
23	Levinson	Karl	1	25	Leinisch	Preussen	Arbeiter	/	/	/	/	/		
24	Schulzinger	Karol	1	25	Leinisch	Preussen	d	/	/	/	/	/		
25	Thornstein	Karol	1	21	Leinisch	d	d	/	/	/	/	/		
26	Fried	Berhard	1	39	N. York	N. York	Lehrer	/	/	/	/	/		
27	d	Lina	1	33	d	d	Fräulein	/	/	/	/	/		
28	d	Karol	1	11	d	d	Kinder	/	/	/	/	/		
29	d	Rosa	1	7	d	d		/	/	/	/	/		
30	d	Hella	1	3	d	d		/	/	/	/	/		
31	d	Isella	1	12	d	d		/	/	/	/	/		
32	Wohl	Lina	1	35	Leinisch	Preussen	Lehrer	/	/	/	/	/		
			20 12							32 17 4 1				

Parade für die Indirekte Beförderung

Source: Hamburg State Archives, Film Number S.13169. European ports, including Gothenburg, Trondheim, Hamburg (shown above), and Bremen all used passenger lists to monitor both direct and indirect (Indirekt) streams of migrants leaving their ports. Lists for Hamburg provide information on the diverse nationalities of transmigrants (described here as “indirect passengers”) as they sailed for Britain from Germany. Information recorded included the demographic features of the transmigrants and their eventual destination (including the British ports through which they travelled).

3.6 List of Aliens (1836-1859, 1867-1869)

A LIST OF ALIENS.

I, the undersigned, being Master of the *Steamer*
 Ship or Vessel named the *Hansa* bound from
Copenhagen to the Port of *Hull*
 do, in compliance with the Provisions of an Act of Parliament, passed in the 6th William IV.
 Cap. 11, hereby declare, that the following is a full and true Account, to the best of my know-
 ledge, of all Aliens who are now on board my said Ship or Vessel, or have landed herefrom in
 this Realm, with their Names, Rank, Occupation, and Description.

No.	Christian and Surnames Prenoms et Noms	Quality Profession	Country Pays
	<i>623 Emigrants from Copenhagen bound for New York via way of Hull & Liverpool</i>		
		<i>H. Brown</i>	


To the Chief Officer of the Customs
 at the Port of *Hull* Dated this *16* day of *June* 186*8*

ACT 6 WILLIAM IV. CAP. 11, SECT. 2.—
 "The Master of every Vessel which shall arrive from Foreign Parts, shall immediately, on his arrival, declare in
 writing to the Chief Officer of the Customs whether there is, to the best of his knowledge, any Alien on board his
 Vessel, and whether any Alien hath, to his knowledge, landed therefrom at any other place; and shall in his said
 Declaration specify the number of Aliens (if any) on board his Vessel, or who have, to his knowledge, landed there-
 from, and their Names, Rank, Occupation, and Description, as far as he shall be informed thereof; and if the Master of
 any such Vessel shall refuse or neglect to make such Declaration, or shall make a false Declaration, he shall for every
 such offence forfeit the sum of Twenty Pounds; and the further sum of Ten Pounds for each Alien who shall have been
 on board at the time of the arrival of such Vessel, or who shall have, to his knowledge, landed therefrom, whom such
 Master shall wilfully have refused or neglected to declare; and in case such Master shall neglect or refuse forthwith to
 pay such penalty, it shall be lawful for any Officer of the Customs to detain such Vessel until the same shall be paid."

Source: TNA, HO 3/120. The List of Aliens or Masters' Declaration were printed by the British government, completed by the Masters of vessels conveying aliens into British ports, and subsequently collected by officers of HM Customs. They were the source of data used by the Aliens Office (later Home Office and then Board of Trade) to produce *Reports and Statistical Tables Relating to Emigration and Immigration of the United Kingdom* (1877-1913). Those for the earlier period between 1836 and 1859 have survived and were used in this study to profile statistically patterns of European transmigration through Britain before the British Government began to publish such information. Invariably such Lists summarised voyage details of early feeder vessels, providing information such as the European port of origin, the vessels name, its date of arrival in Britain, and the number of transmigrants onboard each steamer.

3.7 Customs Bill of Entry, Hull (1840-1914)

Hull Bill



of Entry,

AND DAILY SHIPPING LIST.

294. 134206
1846 1148570

The Hull Bills of Entry are published under the authority of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Customs, and printed and sold under the direction of the CONTROLLER OF HER MAJESTY'S STAMENET OFFICE, by **THOMAS GRASSAM, 161 & 162, HIGH-STREET, HULL.** TO WHOM ALL SUBSCRIPTIONS, ETC., SHOULD BE PAID.

In addition to the information published Daily, the FRIDAY'S Number contains the List of Vessels Outwards, Goods Exported, Goods Imported from the Warehouse, and the Corn Returns of the Week; a Return of Cotton Exports Monthly; and a General Return of Imports Quarterly.

Subscription £2 PER ANNUM IN ADVANCE
POST-TOWN SUBSCRIBERS POSTAGE ADDITIONAL.

FRIDAY, JULY 15, 1892.

No. 3268

Money has to be taken to avoid mistakes in the Hull Bill of Entry, but it is compiled under considerable pressure and the Commissioners of Customs cannot hold themselves responsible for the consequences of any accidental error.

ADVERTISEMENTS for Publication in this List will be received at 161 & 162, High Street, at the charges named in the following scale, viz—
Three insertions.
Six Lines and under 2 6
Seven Lines and under Nine 3 6
Nine Lines and under Twelve 5 0
Six insertions.
Six Lines and under 4 6
Seven Lines and under Nine 5 6
Nine Lines and under Twelve 7 6
Advertisements for Three, Six, and Twelve Months, as per agreement.

Ships Reported Inwards.
JULY 14

MINISTER TANK (no) of Fishing, @ FLESHING, Rotterdam, 11 251, 15 men—Alex D Zealand S S Co	do
18 bla 23 ce coals, 37 cks 10 pks 1 ce rollers	do
4 ce ironware, 1 ce woodware, 1000 pks macgarine	do
31 bla 3ab, 80 tons lead, 900 lbs sugar, 2 ce tins	do
1 ce boots, 25 ce matches, 34 bla straw, 7 ce clothes	do
2 ce effects, 20 bla 1 ce paper, 5 ce hardware	do
1 bl 4 bla 4 bla 3aa, 2 bla 4 ce wools, 5 ce coin yarn	do
12 ce bottles, 11 ce pansies, 2 bla bags, 3 bla steel	do
2 bla shoddy, 12 bla handbags, 3 ce wine, 1 ck oil	do
8 pks machinery, 1 ce glassware, 315 girders	do
20 ce window glass, 20 bla pks, 1 ce battery	do

HEMEN (no) of Germany, @ GPORTO, Bruckmann, Massey & Sawyer	White & Bone
G 812, 17 men—AD	B & J Shaw
800 ce onions, 24 ce apples	do
1 ce oranges, 1 ce pears, 2555 ce onions	do
118 ce apples	do
66 ce onions	do
1842 730 pks m' shoe in tr	Order
HELEN of Nykjøbing, @ WESTERVIK, Nielsen, D	Haugensen Wait & Co
153 & men—Alex D	do
1726 pks hats 4796 pks pt peps	do
REGALONA (no) of Dundee, @ MONTREAL, Stocks,	Brews Atkinson & Co
B 1234, 37 men—AD	do
11262 ce wool, 17918 ce wheat	do
EUROPEAN (no) of Hull, @ AMSTERDAM, Amerson,	W & C L Ringrose
15 441, 34 men—AD	do
117 cks boots, 6 pks hardware, 18 bla coat butter	do
77 bla hats, 12 pks leather, 26 bla macgarine	do
2 bla muslin, 1 board saw	do
250 shovels	Becking & Co
200 do, 25 ce milk	Paps & Co
30 cks oil	Hendell Spence & Co
2000 lbs 250 ce 325 lbs sugar, 135 pks rice, 92 bla mats,	do
22 ce pms copal, 2 pms crows, 5 bla forks, 1 box	do
lyons, 28 pks shoes, 16 bla rags, 28 slaughtered calves,	do
1 ce meat, 71 pks fruit, 16 caskets, 2 sundries ships	do
Order	do
UHANIA (no) of Helmsingera, @ HELSINGFORS &	J Good & Bone
Hango, Humberg, R 649, 37 men—VD	do
@ Helmsingera—	do
1400 bla paper, 60 cks butter, 359 lbs bottles	do
218 bla wood pulp, 20 bla shavings	do
279 bla paper	Furley & Co
9004 bla 20000 pks high squares	Order
@ Hango—	do
678 cks butter, 8 bla bacon	do
29 do	do
Order	do
CALYPTHO (no) of Hull, @ LEIGHFORD, Gussell Mar-	do

Corn, peas 4297 cwt	Wright Bros & Co	Montreal
2556	R C Ouston & Son	do
—wheat, 2500	Berkell Sperling & Co	Bombay
14000	R Procter Son & Co	do
4000	F Gregory & Co	Kurrachee
—Indian, 15084	F B Grotzian & Co	Odessa
5400	R Muckle & Sons	do
3290	R C Ouston & Son	do
Cheese, .7	Paps & Co	Amsterdam
8	do	Helsingen
58	W & C L Ringrose	do
9	do	Amsterdam
22	do	Rotterdam
Chemicals, 61 cks	do	do
10 pks	Leffhous & Salmer	do
Coin metal, 16 ce	Rudolfsen & Son	do
5 bla 16	Zealand S S Co	Flushing
Drugs, 1 pkg	Wilson Bone & Co Ltd	Ganon
2	do	Marseilles
Dynamite, 6 cks	W & C L Ringrose	Rotterdam
9 pks	Geo Lawson & Sons	do
6	Hutchinson & Son	do
29	Zealand S S Co	Flushing
Earthenware, 40 cwt	do	do
8	J Pye-Smith & Co	Rotterdam
Farmacoccus sube, 2 ce	Wilson Bone & Co Ltd	Ganon
11 pks	do	Marseilles
489	W & C L Ringrose	Helsingen
11 pks	do	do
Prus, 24	White & Bone	Operta
136	Bacon & Robinson	Rotterdam
50	B & J Shaw	Valencia
28	Tudman Bros	Amsterdam
11	do	Helsingen
Fish, 157 cwt	W & C L Ringrose	do
6	do	do
24	Zealand S S Co	Flushing

Source: Hull Local Studies Library (and Merseyside Maritime Museum). Customs Bills of Entry were published six days per week at the main British ports between 1840 and (for the purposes of this study) at least 1914. They enabled merchants to see the commodities being shipped to and from British ports and provide a valuable source of information on the arrival of feeder vessels and other commodities shipped alongside such passengers. Further, they profiled the particular docks used by each steamship company upon arrival in port and the date of arrival/departure. Piecing together documentary sources containing this information – such as the Aliens Lists, Daybook of the Jewish Society for the Protection of Women and Girls, the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter of London, or occasional Parliamentary Reports into the Transmigrant trade – has provided a valuable insight into associated features of transmigrant arrivals and departures from Hull (shown above), Grimsby, London and Liverpool.

Bibliography

i. Manuscript Sources

(a) Overseas Archives

Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Office of the Quincy Mining Company, Benjamin Tefft Letter Book (1864)

Parsons, Carl Berger: Reminiscences, Box 5693 (1931)

Cape Town State Archives, Cape Town, South Africa
Prime Ministers Office, PMO/81-85 (1901-1902)

Central Archives of the Jewish People, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
Archives of the Jewish Colonisation Association (n.d.)

Danish State Archives, Århus, Denmark
Archives of DFDS (1866-1991)

Family History Library, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, USA
Scandinavian Mission, Film Number 0040994 (1872-1894)

Hapag-Lloyd AG, Hamburg, Germany
Jahresbericht der Hamburg-Amerikanischen Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft in Hamburg für die am stattfindende ordentliche General-Versammlung der Actionaire (1893-1914)

Bericht nebst Anlagen zur neununddreissigsten ordentlichen General-Versammlung des
NORDDEUTSCHEN LLOYD am 30 April 1896

Bericht nebst Anlagen zur einundvierzigsten ordentlichen General-Versammlung des
NORDDEUTSCHEN LLOYD am 25 April 1898

Immigration History Research Centre, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA
David Howard Ihme, *The Ihme Family of Finland, Germany and the United States of America* (1981)

Alan Kraut (ed.), *Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Series A: Subject Correspondence Files. Part 4: European Investigations, 1898-1936* (Metesda, Maryland, 1995)

Vienna Maki: *Correspondence file* (c. 1950)

Deborah Nikkari, *Ethnic Identity: The Story of a Finnish Immigrant Family* (1976)

Immigration & Naturalisation Service (Historian's Office), Washington DC, USA
Reports of the Transatlantic Passenger Conference (1899-1917)

Institute of Migration, Türku, Finland
SS *Urania*, 'Photograph of emigrants for Hull' 0376/USA (1893)

Postcard 'Hull-The Humber' sent by Finnish emigrant Anna Kirjavainen from Hull
(3 May 1908)

KS Valokuva/USA, ARK No. 16/1994, 'Postcard to Finland from emigrant travelling via the
'Atlantic Park Hostel, Southampton' (franked Eastleigh, 1932)

Kaplan Centre, University of Cape Town, South Africa
Kaplan Centre Interviews: BC 949

Landsarkivet i Göteborg, Göteborg, Sweden
Wilson Line Financial Statements (1881-1914)

Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, USA
William Durbin, *The Journal of Otto Peltonen: A Finnish Immigrant* (New York, 2000)

A. Knoph, *Beiledning for Emigranter til Amerika, forfaavidt angaar Befordring pr. Dampskib
over Hull og Liverpool til New York og videre indgjennem Landet pr. Fernbane*
(Christiania, 1869)

Carl Mostrom, *Some impressions from my journey to America and also from the first period
of my residence there* (unpublished manuscript, 1912)

Ferdinand Nelson, *The Journey from Sweden to America* (unpublished manuscript, 1903)

Edwin Peterson Papers, P2520 (1897-1919)

Rush City State Bank Archives, P117, 'Agent's records of five prepaid steerage certificates
issued at Rush City, Minnesota, 1882-1884'

Swedish Immigrant Letters, 1884-1892, P1800, 'Robert Engdahl & Co., Land & Emigration
Agents' (1886)

South African Jewish Museum, Cape Town, South Africa
Miscellaneous Third-class Passenger Tickets (1910-1926)

Staatsarchiv, Hamburg, Germany
Listen Den Indirekten Auswanderer VIII / B / 1 / Film Numbers 13157-13174 (1854-1910)

University of Åbo Archives and Special Collections, Türku, Finland
Finnish Steamship Company, 'Copy of II E 7997 – Translation from the Russian Emigration
Bill' (1910)

(b) British Archives
Archives and Special Collections, Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull
Ellerman Wilson Line
Letter Book (of Oswald Sanderson) (1897-1899), DEW/4/9

Old Papers: Notes taken from O(swald) S(Anderson's) correspondence (1900-1926).
DEW/4/10

Logbooks of the *Romeo, Oslo, Lorne, Jaffa, Kolpino* and *Novo* (1906-1912), DEW 6/32-3

Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co., Limited, *Wilson Line of Steamers: Handbook of Royal Mail Passengers & Cargo Services: Season 1893* (Hull, 1893), DEW/8/1

Thomas Wilson, Sons & Company Limited, *Wilson Line of Steamers: Particulars of the Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services* (Hull, 1907), DEW/8/4

Thomas Wilson, Sons & Company Limited, *Royal Mail Passenger & Cargo Services: 1911* (Hull, 1911), DEW/8/6

Ships' Registry Books (1860-1917), DEW/10/1-3.

Agreement between T.W.S.C. and the Swedish Post Office (1870), DEW/11/8

Agreement between the Wilson Brothers and the Hull Dock Company for the Accommodation of Vessels Engaged in the Gothenburg Trade (1884), DEW/11/84

Agreement to Lease part of the North Side of the Railway Dock from the Hull Dock Company (1865), DEW/11/134

Directors' Minute Book (1891-1912), DEW2/2/1

Private Ledger of the Wilson Line, DEW2/3/1

Manuscript Accounts (1891-1904), DEW2/3/37

Financial Statements (1904-1914), DEW2/3/38-48

Detailed Financial Statements and Reports (1906-1914), DEW2/3/96-104

Detailed Financial Statements and Reports (1908-1911), DEW2/3/98-101

Contract concerning traffic between St. Petersburg, Reval, Riga, Windau, Libau & New York – between the Russian East Asiatic Company, TWS & Det Forende (1908), DEW2/4/20

Contract concerning traffic between St. Petersburg, Reval, Riga, Windau, Libau & New York (between Russian East Asiatic Company, TWS & Co. Ltd. and Det Forende) (1908), DEW2/4/20

Waiting Room and Lavatories on Island Wharf (1901-1909), DEW2/4/56

Room No. 10 Riverside Quay (1907), DEW2/4/61

Agreement between Thomas Wilson, Sons & Company, Limited and Mr. Fred Olsen, DEW2/9/26b

Emigrant Agents Securities (1889-1911), DEW 2/39/2

Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull
Board of Trade Journal (1886-1914)

Corporation of London Record Office

Cholera Precautions: Returns of information from the Port Sanitary Authorities in response to questionnaire, with covering letter that accompanied the questionnaire, Misc. MSS/337/2 (1893)

Cholera Precautions 1893: Report of Conference of Port Medical Officers, held on 17 December 1892; Draft Report of Committee of same Conference on Disinfection, Hospitals & C.; Report of the proceedings at the Conference of Sanitary Authorities, Misc. MSS/337/3 (17 February 1893)

Port Sanitary Reports, 565B (1873-1914)

Special report on the measures taken to prevent the introduction of cholera into the Port of London (25 August 1892)

Hull City Archives

Immigration

Court Case against Frederick William Grippenstroek, a transmigrant for theft, CQB/238/292-295 (1851)

Court Case against John Brodie, Lodging-house keeper of Hull for overcrowding of registered lodging house (1882), DPM/1/121

Hull Hebrew School, Register of Children, TED/2/55 (1897-1945)

Sanitation

Kingston upon Hull Local Board of Health and Urban Sanitary Authority – Minutes, BHH/1/1-7 (1851-1876)

Kingston upon Hull Local Board of Health and Urban Sanitary Authority – Proceedings of the Sanitary Committee, BHH/1/45-54 (1853-1876)

Kingston upon Hull Local Board of Health and Urban Sanitary Authority – Correspondence: General Inward Letterbooks, BHH/2/89-112 (1851-1875)

Kingston upon Hull Local Board of Health and Urban Sanitary Authority – Correspondence: General Outward Letterbooks, BHH/2/113-125 (1851-1875)

Kingston upon Hull Town Council: Sanitary Committee, TCM 172-181 (1877-1889)

Hull and Goole Sanitary Authority – Minute Books (Volumes 1-46), WHG/1/20-46 (1888-1915)

Letter by the Sanitary Committee to Mr. Maples, the Emigration Agent, and to Messrs. Wilson, the owners of the 'Plato', the expense impropriety and danger of conveying Emigrants suffering from infectious or contagious disease, BHH/121 490 1869 L (12 May 1869)

Letter to C. Maples, emigration agent, Hull from C.S. Todd, BHH/121 489 1869 L
(13 May 1869)

Letter by the Sanitary Committee to the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway
requesting the speedy transit of emigrants during the Cholera scare,
BHH/122 643 1871 L (26 August 1871)

Letter to Charles Maples, esq., Humber Dock Street, regarding the speedy transit of
emigrants, BHH/122/644 (1871)

Letter from Charles Maples, Hull, Emigration Agent to C.S. Todd, BHH/108/322 (1871)

Letter to C.S. Todd from the North Eastern Railway Passenger Department, BHH/108/323
(1871)

Letter from Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Company, BHH/108/331 (1871)

Letter from C.S. Todd to Messrs. Brownlow, Lumsden and Co., regarding the behaviour of
licensed porters, BHH/123/650 (1873)

Letter to Thomas Wilson & Sons, from C. Todd, regarding the charging of licensed porters
for poor conduct, BHH/123/635 (1873)

Railways and Docks

North Eastern Railway Company – Emigrant Waiting Room, Anlaby Road,
TAB 15/OBL/M/2585 (1871)

North Eastern Railway Company – Waiting Rooms, Anlaby Road, TAB 16/OBL/M/6328
(1882)

Hull & Barnsley Railway – Plans and elevations and sections for passenger station,
DPD/11/6/6 (1885)

Hull Hebrew Community Archives

Jewish Association for the Protection of Women & Girls – Day Book (1910-1914)

Ken Hoole Collection, Darlington Railway Centre & Museum, Darlington

North Eastern Railway: Shipping Interests, KH. 1124 (1890-1980)

Liverpool City Record Office

Trade and commercial directories of Liverpool (1830-1914)

Letter from E.F. Larsson to Messrs. Guion & Co., Liverpool, MD 214 (1885)

Local Studies Library, Hull Central Library

Trade and commercial directories of Hull (1830-1914)

The Trade of Hull and the Humber Ports – Review and Statistical Record (Hull, 1907)

London Jewish Museum

Abraham Mundy, *Some Reminiscences of the Shelter's Activities for the Last Quarter of a Century* (1922)

London Metropolitan Archives

Common Lodging House Register, LCC/MIN (1906)

Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter: *Shipping Register* (1905-1947)

Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, *Annual Reports, 1885-1915* (London, 1886-1915)

Manchester Jewish Museum

Ticket for the Hamburg-America Line, MJM706 (4 June 1903)

Interview between Bill Williams and Mr William Shalyt, J218 (1975)

Merseyside Maritime Museum

Emigrant Files – Persecution of the Jews in Russia – Mansion House Relief Fund (Liverpool Commission)', DX/607 (1882)

Unused emigrant through ticket issued by E.F. Larsson, covering the passage from Gothenburg to Hull, rail journey to Liverpool, and steerage passage on a Guion Line steamer to New York, DX/1693 (c.1890)

Miscellaneous notes on the Hungarian Emigration Traffic, SAS/3/1/4 (1904)

Mitchell Library, Glasgow

Report on the Operations of Sanitary Department, E1/34/1-6 (1896-1914)

Report on the Operations of Sanitary Department, D-TC 23 (1902-1903)

Museum of London in the Docklands

East & West India Dock Company

Minute Book (1885)

Port of London Authority

Dock and Warehouse Committee (1909-1914)

General Purposes Committee (1909-1914)

Minutes of Proceedings (1909)

St. Katherine's Dock Company

Minutes (1846)

National Archives, Kew

Board of Trade

Outwards Passenger Manifests, BT 27/1-856 (1890-1914)

Record of Dissolved Companies: Inman and International Steamship Company, BT 31/3741/23322 (1886)

Home Office

Aliens Act 1836: 'List of Aliens', HO 3/1-120 (1836-1869)

Aliens' Entry books: Correspondence, HO 5/20 (1815-1827)

Home Office and Aliens Office: Out letters, HO 5/21 (1827-1848)

Aliens: Russian Transmigrants Rejected by U.S.A. – Treatment in U.K, HO 45/10341/139774 (1906)

Aliens: Accommodation for Transmigrants in London: London County Council Action, HO 45/10336/138914 (1906-7)

Nationality and Naturalisation: Paul Julius Drasdo, HO 144/387/B20362 (1896)

Foreign Office

War in South Africa: Permits for South Africa, FO 2/966 (August 1902)

Licenses for Emigrant Ships, FO 64/1489 (1898)

Letter books from British Consulate (Libau), FO 400/16 (1890-1907)

Report on the Activity of the Hamburg-American Packet Company, FO 881/9311(1908)

Metropolitan Police

Aliens (immigration of destitutes): Metropolitan Police reports on immigration into London at the end of the nineteenth century, MEPO 2/260 (1887-1904)

Ministry of Transport

Emigrants: Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through Hull, and arrangements for their feeding and lodging there, MT 9/291 (1882-1887)

Railways

Great Northern Railway Company: Correspondence, Notices of Sailings and Specimen Tickets and Fares for Emigrant Traffic on Boats of Messrs. Inman & Co., and the Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia Steam Ship Co., RAIL 236/629 (1867-1870)

Hull and Barnsley Railway Company: Monthly Passenger and Parcels Traffic for all Stations, RAIL 312/86, (1885-1891)

Humber Conference: Reports, Minutes and Agreements (1853-1904), RAIL 318/1-11

London and North Western Railway Company: Euston: New Offices for Station Master, Emigrants' Dining Room and Bar Assistants' Room, RAIL 410/1016 (1912-1913)

North Eastern Railway: Agreements with Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire, London & North Western and Lancashire and Yorkshire Railways for developing traffic at Hull and Grimsby, RAIL 527/568 (1865-1870)

North Eastern Railway: Passenger Traffic Statements Including Holiday, Emigrant and Fish Traffic etc., RAIL 527/1178 (1902-1910)

North Eastern Railway: Passenger Traffic Statements Including Details of Emigrant Traffic etc., RAIL 527/1179 (1896-1900)

North Eastern Railway: Minutes of Meeting of Joint Emigrant Committee, RAIL 527/1366 (1896)

North Eastern Railway: Working of North Eastern Bogie Stock over the Metropolitan Widened Lines: Vehicles provided for Emigrant Traffic for Southampton, RAIL 527/1842 (1910-1911)

National Maritime Museum

Lloyd's Register of Shipping (1836-1914)

Allan Line, *Atlantic Conference: Minutes and Byelaws* (18 November 1911)

Castle Mail Packets Company

Castle Mail Packets Company Limited, Council Meetings Minute Books, CMC/1/1-2 (1881-1900)

Castle Mail Packets Company Limited, General Meetings Minute Book, CMC/2/1 (1881-1900)

General Steamship Navigation Company

General Steamship Navigation Company Limited, Minutes of the Board, GSN/1/1-42 (1824-1913)

General Steamship Navigation Company, Royal Mail Contracts, GSN/12/1-2 (1824-1913)

White Star Line

Thomas Henry Ismay and Joseph Bruce Ismay, 'Transcripts', XX (112024.1) (1837-1937)

Union Steam Ship Company

Union Steam Ship Company Limited, Agenda for Directors' Committee Meetings, UNS/1/1-4 (1890-1900)

Union-Castle Mail Steamship Company

Union Castle Mail Steamship Company Limited, Agreements and Contracts, UCM/7/1 (1912-26)

Union Castle Mail Steamship Company Limited, Annual General Meeting Minute Book, UCM/2/1 (1901-1939)

Union Castle Mail Steamship Company Limited, Council/Directors' Minute Books, UCM/1/1-2 (1900-1918)

North East Lincolnshire Archives

Minutes of the Grimsby Port Sanitary Authority, 1/113/3-7 (1884-1914)

Scottish Jewish Archives Centre

Oral History Interviews (1988)

Southampton City Archives

Annual Reports of the Urban Medical Officer of Health and the Port Medical Officer of Health, SC/H.1/1-35 (1874-1914)

Emigrants' Home. Calculations of materials for the above in 1894, D/LBI/15 (1894)

University of Glasgow Archives Service

Anchor Line Limited

Confidential report on the profits of the Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Limited, UGD 255 /1/2/8 (1900-1911)

Leith, Hull and Hamburg Steam Packet Company

Letters to Thomas Barclay from Thomas Wilson regarding the operation of vessels to and from the port of Hull, UGD 255/4/17/3/8-9 (1850-1851)

Currie Line Limited

Emigrant fares supplied to the Currie of Leith by the Caledonian Railway Company, UGD 255/5/7/1 (1879-1889)

Alexander Currie's Papers

Letter from William MacIver to Donald Currie, UGD 255/5/14/1/51 (1854)

Memoir by James Currie on the development of the business, UGD 255/5/14/5/11 (c.1900)

University of Leicester - Department of History

Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter Database

University of Leicester - Library

University of Leicester Library, Great Eastern Railway, Great Eastern Railway time tables and steamboat services, October 1st, 1908 - February 28th, 1909

University of Southampton Library – Special Collections

Jewish Association for the Protection of Women, Girls and Children

Minutes of the General Committee and Council (1885-1933)

Minutes of the Gentleman's Committee (1890-1925)

(c) Private Collections

Committee of the Jews' Temporary Shelter

Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, Letter book (1906)

David Drasdo

Miscellaneous documents concerning Paul Julius Drasdo (1881-1933)

Mrs Sue Cohen

Miscellaneous correspondence from the Rev. H.M. Bendas, Rabbi of the Hull Hebrew Synagogue, Hull (1897-1903)

David Jacobs

Miscellaneous shipping advertisements by the White Star Line promoting kosher services (c. 1886)

Minerva Public House, Hull

Shipping advertisements (in German and English) promoting the services of I. Hurst former Captain of the SS *Lion* (c. 1851)

(d) Newspapers

Amerikan Sanomat (1880-1914)

Amerikan Suomalainen Lehti (1880-1890)

Customs Bills of Entry (1840-1914)

Eastern Morning News

Glasgow Herald

The Graphic (11 March 1882)

Grimsby Free Press

Great Grimsby Gazette

Grimsby Guardian

Grimsby Independent

Grimsby & North Lincolnshire Advertiser

Hull Advertiser

Hull Times

Hull News

Hull Daily Mail

The Scotsman

Svenska Monitören

ii. British Parliamentary Papers

Bills

Bill to Amend the Law Relating to the Carriage of Passengers by Sea (1854-55, V. 115)

Bill to Consolidate Enactments Relating to Merchant Shipping (1894, VI.409)

1906 Merchant Shipping Act (6 Edw. 7, c. 48)

Bill for Promoting the Public Health (1847-48, V. 589)

Bill to Amend the Aliens Act, 1905 (1906, I.127)

Bill to Amend the Public Health Act, 1875, in relation to Ships and Port Sanitary Authorities (1884-85, IV.699)

Bill to Amend the Public Health Act with respect to the Powers of Port Sanitary Authorities (1896, VI.273)

Bill to for Consolidating and Amending all the laws on public health and local government for England and Wales, exclusive of the metropolis (1872, IV.361)

Bill for the Well-Ordering of Common Lodging Houses (1851, III.123)

Bill for Consolidating and Amending the Acts Relating to public health in England (1875, V.239)

Merchant Shipping Acts Amendment No. 2 (1906, IV.141)

Bill to Provide for the improvement and better administration of the Port of London, and for purposes incidental thereto (1908, IV.691)

Reports, Returns, and Memoranda

Report of the General Board on Health of the Epidemic Cholera of 1848 & 1849 (1850, XXI.3)

Copy of the Reports of the Local Government Board Inspectors on the Working of the Public Health Act, 1872 (1875, XL.693)

Report of the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, with Evidence and Appendix, Volumes 1-4 (1903, IX.1)

Reports received by the Board of Trade and Local Government Board relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull (1882, LXII.87)

Return of Emigration Officers and Medical Inspectors at Ports in the United Kingdom (1854, XLVI.1)

Memorandum Immigration of Foreigners into United Kingdom, with Appendix containing Statistical Tables (1887, LXXXIX.223)

Report of the Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners): Reports, Minutes of Evidence (1888, XI.419)

Report of the Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners): Reports, Minutes of Evidence (1889, X.265)

Communication to J. Burnett and D. Schloss, directing them to inquire into Immigration of Foreigners into United States (1893-94, LXXII.293)

Reports on the Volume and Effects of Immigration from Eastern Europe into the United Kingdom (1894, LXVIII.341)

Dr. T. Thomson's Report to the Local Government Board on Methods adopted at certain Ports for dealing with Alien Immigrants (1896, LXVII.729)

Report of the Royal Commission on the Port of London (1902, XLIII.1)

Report of the Departmental Committee on the Establishment of a Receiving-House for Alien Immigrants at the Port of London: Volume I, Report and Appendix (1911, X.87)

Report of the Departmental Committee on the Establishment of a Receiving-House for Alien Immigrants at the Port of London: Volume II, Evidence (1911, X.99)

Parliamentary Debates

Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates: Third series*, Volume CCLXX (London, 1882)

iii. Secondary Sources

Books

Anderson, S.C., Maness, R.E. & Black, S.E., *Passport to Paradise: The Copenhagen "Mormon" Passenger Lists* 2 Volumes (West Jordan, Utah, 2000)

Ashton, J.R., *Lives and Livelihoods in Little London: The Story of the British in Gothenburg 1621-2001* (Svedalen, Sweden, 2003)

Attwood, G.M., *The Wilsons of Tranby Croft* (Cherry Burton, East Yorkshire, 1988)

Baines, D., *Emigration from Europe, 1815-1930* (Basingstoke, 1991)

Beavis, D., *Who Sailed on the Titanic?* (Hersham, Surrey, 2002)

Bell, R., *Twenty-five years of the North Eastern Railway, 1898-1922* (1951)

Bellamy, J.M., *The Trade and Shipping of Nineteenth Century Hull* (York, 1971)

Bennett, M.T., *American immigration policies: a history* (Washington, 1963)

Berger, D. (ed.), *The Legacy of Jewish Migration 1881 and its Impact* (New York, 1983)

Berlin, J. & Schmoock, M., *Auswandererhafen Hamburg* (Hamburg, 2000)

Blegen, T.C., *Norwegian Migration to America: the American transition* (Northfield, Minnesota, 1940)

_____ *Norwegian Migration to America, 1825-1860* (Northfield, Minnesota, 1931)

Bonsor, N.R.P., *North Atlantic Seaway: Volume III* (Jersey, 1979)

Borrie, W.D., *Immigration to New Zealand, 1854-1938* (Canberra, 1991)

Boyce, G., *Information, Mediation and Institutional Development: The Rise of Large-Scale Enterprise in British Shipping, 1870-1919* (Manchester, 1995)

- Brattne, B., *Bröderna Larsson. En studie I svensk emigrantagentverksamhet under 1880-talet* (Uppsala, Sweden, 1973)
- Carrier, N.H. & Jeffery, J.R., *External Migration: A Study of the Available Statistics, 1815-1950* (London, 1953)
- Carrothers, W.A., *Emigration from the British Isles* (London, 1929)
- Cesarani, D. (ed.), *Port Jews. Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950* (London, 2002)
- Cesarani, D. & Romain, G. (eds.), *Jews and Port Cities, 1590-1990 – Commerce, Community and Cosmopolitanism* (London, 2006)
- Collins, K.E., *Be Well: Jewish Immigrant Health and Welfare in Glasgow, 1860-1914* (East Linton, East Lothian, 2002)
- _____ *Second City Jewry: The Jews of Glasgow in the Age of Expansion, 1790-1919* (Glasgow, 1990)
- Conolly, W.P., *British Railways, Pre-Grouping, Atlas and Gazetteer* (Shepperton, Surrey, 1976), pp. 21-4.
- Credland, A.G., *Iron and Steel Shipbuilding on the Humber: Earles of Hull, 1853-1932* (Hull, 1982)
- Credland, A.G. & Greenwood, R., *Bailey and Leetham* (Preston, 2002)
- Credland, A.G. & Thompson, M., *The Wilson Line of Hull, 1831-1981: The Rise and Fall of an Empire* (Cherry Burton, East Yorkshire, 1994)
- Davies, P.N., *John Sutcliffe & Son. A History of the Company, 1862-1987* (Grimsby, 1987)
- _____ *The trade makers: Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852-1972* (London, 1973)
- Davis, G., *The Irish in Britain, 1815-1914* (Dublin 1991)
- Delaney, E., *Demography, States and Society. Irish Migration to Britain, 1921-1971* (Liverpool, 2000)
- Department of National Heritage, *Revised List of Buildings of Special Architectural or Historic Interest City of Kingston upon Hull* (London, 1994)
- Dingley, F.L., *European Emigration during the Year Ending October 1st, 1890* (Washington, 1890)
- Drechsel, E., *Norddeutscher Lloyd Bremen 1857-1970* (Vancouver, 1994)
- Dubin, L.C., *The Port Jews of Habsburg Trieste* (Stanford, California, 1999)

- Englander, D. (ed.), *A Documentary History of Jewish Immigrants in Britain, 1840-1920* (Leicester, 1994)
- Erickson, C., *Leaving England: Essays on British Emigration in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1994)
- _____ *Invisible Immigrants: The Adaptation of English and Scottish Immigrants in Nineteenth Century America* (London, 1972)
- _____ *American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885* (Cambridge, 1957)
- Evans, R.J., *Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830-1910* (Oxford, 1987)
- Evans-Gordon, W., *The Alien Immigrant* (London, 1903)
- Falkus, M., *The Blue Funnel legend: A history of the Ocean Steam Ship Company, 1865-1973* (Basingstoke, 1990)
- Fayle, C.E., *The War and the Shipping Industry* (London, 1927)
- Ferenczi, I. & Willcox, W.F. (eds.), *International Migrations: Volume I: Statistics* (New York, 1929)
- _____ Ferenczi, I. & Willcox, W.F. (eds.), *International Migrations: Volume II: Interpretations* (New York, 1930)
- Finland Steamship Company, *Finska Angfartygs Aktiebolaget, 1883-1958* (Helsingfors, 1958)
- Fitzpatrick, D., *Oceans of consolation: personal accounts of Irish migration to Australia* (Cork, 1994)
- Fletcher, J.S., *A Picturesque History of Yorkshire* (London, 1901)
- Fox, S., *The Ocean Railway. Isambard Kingdom Brunel, Samuel Cunard and the Revolutionary World of the Great Atlantic Steamships* (London, 2003)
- Franks, J. & Newham, H. E. C., *The Port of Hull and its Facilities* (Hull, 1907)
- Gainer, B., *The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905* (London, 1972)
- Gardiner, R., *The History of the White Star Line* (Hersham, Surrey, 2001)
- Garrard, J.A., *The English and Immigration, 1880-1910* (London, 1971)
- Gartner, L.P., *The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914* (London, 1960)
- Gerlis, L. & D., *The Story of the Grimsby Jewish Community* (Hull, 1986)
- Gilbert, M., *The Dent Atlas of Jewish History* (London, 1985)

- Gillett, E. & MacMahon, K.A., *A History of Hull* (Hull, 1989)
- Glass, D.V. & Taylor, P.A.M., *Population and Emigration* (Dublin, 1976)
- Glazier, I. & Rosa, L. de, *Migration across Time and Nations: Population Mobility in Historical Contexts, 1830-1910* (New York, 1986)
- Grindon, L., *Lancashire: Brief Historical and Descriptive Notes* (London, 1892), pp. 54-55.
- Greenway, A., *A Century of North Sea Passenger Steamers* (Shepperton, Surrey, 1986)
- Hale, F., *Danes in North America* (Seattle, 1984)
- Hansen, C.K. Company, *C.K. Hansen Through a Century* (Copenhagen, 1956)
- Hansen, M.L., *The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860: A History of the Continuing Settlement of the United States* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1941)
- Harper, M., *Emigration from North East Scotland* (Aberdeen, 1988)
- Harrower, J., *Wilson Line* (Gravesend, 1998)
- Haws, D., *Merchant Fleets: The Ships of the Union, Castle and Union-Castle, Allan and Canadian Pacific Lines* (Cambridge, 1979)
- _____ Duncan Haws, *Merchant Fleets: Cunard Line* (Burwash, Surrey, 1987).
- Heike, E., *Robert M. Sloman Junior* (Hamburg, 1968)
- Hutchinson, E.P., *Legislative History of American Immigration Policy* (Philadelphia, 1981)
- Hvidt, K., *Flight to America: The Social Background of 300,000 Danish Emigrants* (New York, 1975)
- Hyde, F.E., *Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840-1973: A History of Shipping and Financial Management* (London, 1975)
- _____ *Liverpool and the Mersey: The Development of a Port, 1700-1970* (Newton Abbot, 1971)
- _____ *Blue Funnel: A history of Alfred Holt & Co. of Liverpool, 1865-1914* (Liverpool, 1957)
- _____ *Shipping Enterprise and Management, 1830-1939: Harrisons of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1967)
- Irving, R.J., *The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1914: An Economic History* (Leicester, 1976)

- Jackson, G., *The History and Archaeology of Ports* (Tadworth, Surrey, 1983)
- _____ *Hull in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Economic and Social History*
(London, 1972)
- Jarvis, A., *Research in Maritime History No. 26: In Troubled Times: The Port of Liverpool, 1905-1938* (St. John's, Newfoundland, 2003)
- Jenson, A., *History of the Scandinavian Mission, 1850-1941* (Salt Lake City, 1927)
- Jerome, H., *Migration and the Business Cycle* (New York, 1926)
- Judge, E.H., *Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of Pogrom* (New York, 1992)
- Kamphoefner, W.D., Helbich, W. & Sommer, U. (eds.), *News from the Land of Freedom – German Immigrants Write Home* (London, 1991)
- Kapp, F., *Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration of the State of New York* (New York, 1870)
- Kero, R., *Migration from Finland to North America in the Years between the United States Civil War and the First World War* (Turkü, 1974)
- Kershaw, R., *Emigrants and Expats: A Guide to Sources on U.K. Emigration and Residents Overseas* (Kew, 2002)
- Kershaw, R. & Pearsall, M., *Immigrants and Aliens: A Guide to Sources on UK Immigration and Citizenship* (Kew, 2000)
- Kershen, A.J., *United the Tailors: Trade Unionism among the Tailoring Workers of London and Leeds, 1870-1939* (London, 1995)
- Knowles, V., *Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-1990* (Toronto, 1992)
- Koivukangas, O. & Westin, C. (eds.), *Scandinavian and European Migration to Australia and New Zealand* (Türku, 1999)
- Kushner, T. & Knox, K., *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National, and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century* (London, 1999)
- Kuznets, S. & Rubin, E., *Immigration and the Foreign Born* (New York, 1954)
- Lee, C.E., *The Blue Riband: The Romance of the Atlantic Ferry* (London, 1930)
- Liedtke, R., *Jewish Welfare in Hamburg and Manchester, c.1850-1914* (Oxford, 1998)
- Lindberg, J.S., *The Background of Swedish Emigration to the United States: An Economic And Sociological Study in the Dynamics of Migration* (Minneapolis, 1930)

- Lipman, V.D., *Social History of the Jews in England, 1850-1950* (London, 1954)
- Littler, D. (ed.), *Research in Maritime History Number 17: Guide to the Records of Merseyside Maritime Museum, Volume II* (St. John's, 1999)
- Ljungmark, L., *Den Stora Utvandringen: Svensk Emigration til USA, 1840-1925* (Sweden, 1965)
- _____ *For Sale – Minnesota: Organized Promotion of Scandinavian Immigration 1866-1873* (Stockholm, 1971)
- Loewen, R.K., *Family, Church and Market: A Mennonite Community in the Old Worlds and the New Worlds, 1850-1930* (Illinois, 2003)
- Maginnis, A.J., *The Atlantic Ferry: Its Ships, Men and Working* (London, 1892)
- Malmberg, T. & Neumann, A., *The White Ships* (Helsinki, 1971)
- Malthus, T.R., *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (London, 1970)
- Marriner, S., *Rathbones of Liverpool, 1845-73* (Liverpool, 1961)
- McCarthy, A.H., 'For Spirit and Adventure': *Personal Narratives of Irish and Scottish Migration, 1921-1965* (Manchester, Forthcoming)
- McCarthy, A.H., *Irish Migrants in New Zealand, 1840-1937: 'The Desired Haven'* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2005)
- Middlemiss, N.L., *Fred Olsen/Bergen Line* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 1990)
- Miller, K.A., *Emigrants and Exiles. Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America* (Oxford, 1985)
- Milne, G.J., *Trade and traders in mid-Victorian Liverpool: Mercantile business and the Making of a world port* (Liverpool, 2000)
- Mitchell, B.R., *British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge, 1988)
- Mountfield, S., *Western Gateway: A History of Mersey Docks and Harbour Board* (Liverpool, 1965)
- Mulder, W., *Homeward to Zion: The Mormon Migration from Scandinavia* (Minnesota, 1957)
- Neele, G.P., *Railway Reminiscences* (London, 1904)
- Newman, A., *Migration and Settlement* (London, 1970)
- Newman, A. & Massil, S.W. (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996)

- Osland, B., *A Long Pull from Stavanger: The Reminiscences of a Norwegian Immigrant* (Minnesota, 1945)
- Patrick, G., *A Plague On You, Sir!* (Hull, 1978)
- Pelling, M., *Cholera Fever and English Medicine, 1825-1865* (Oxford, 1978)
- Piore, M.J., *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies* (Cambridge, 1979)
- Porter, A., *Victorian Shipping, Business and Imperial Policy: Donald Currie, the Castle Line and Southern Africa* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1986)
- Qualey, C.C., *Norwegian Settlement in the United States* (New York, 1970)
- Read, J.G., *Through Liverpool to North America, 1830-1907: A Selection of Emigrant Narratives* (Liverpool, 1998)
- Read, J.G. & Stammers, M. (comp.), *Research in Maritime History Number 8: Guide to the Records of the Merseyside Maritime Museum: Volume I* (St. John's, 1995)
- Reed, C., Colin Reed, *Gateway to the West. A History of Riverside Station Liverpool. MD & HB - LNWR* (Winchester, 1992), pp. 1-3.
- Robinson, R., *Trawling: The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fishery* (Exeter, 1996).
- Rostow, W.W., *The Process of Economic Growth* (Oxford, 1953)
- Runbolm, H. & Norman, H. (eds.), *From Sweden to America: A History of the Migration* (Minneapolis, 1976)
- Sebak, P.K., *Titanic's Predecessor: The S/S Norge Disaster of 1904* (Laksevaag, Norway, 2004)
- Semmingsen, I., *Norway to America: A History of the Migration* (Minneapolis, 2000)
- Setterdahl, L., *Minnesota Swedes: The Emigration of Trolle Ljungby to Goodhule County, 1855-1912* (East Moline, Illinois, 1996)
- Simmons, J., *The Victorian Railway* (London, 1991)
- Sinnema, D. (ed.), *The First Dutch Settlement in Alberta. Letters from the Pioneer Years 1903-14* (Calgary, 2005)
- Smith, A., *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London, 1925)
- Sonne, C.B., *Saints on the Seas: A Maritime History of Mormon Migration, 1830-1890* (Salt Lake City, 1983)
- Starkey, D.J., Gorski, R., Milward, S. & Pawlyn, T. (eds.), *Shipping Movements in the Ports of the United Kingdom, 1871-1913: A Statistical Profile* (Exeter, 1999)

- Sturmey, S., *British Shipping and World Competition* (London, 1962)
- Taylor, J., *Ellermans: A Wealth of Shipping* (London, 1976)
- Taylor, P.A.M., *The Distant Magnet: European Emigration to the USA* (London, 1971)
- _____, *Expectations Westward: The Mormons and the Emigration of their British Converts in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1965)
- Temple-Patterson, A., *Southampton: A Biography* (Southampton, 1975)
- Thomas, B., *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, 1954)
- Thomas, D.S., *Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements, 1750-1933* (New York, 1941)
- Thorsoe, S., *DFDS 1866-1991: Ship Development through 125 Years: From Paddle Steamer to RO/RO Ship* (Copenhagen, 1991)
- Tudorianu, N.L., *Ocherki rossiiskoi trudovoi emigratsii perioda imperializma* (Kishinev, 1986)
- United States Senate Select Committee, *Sickness and Mortality on Board Emigrant Ships* (Washington, 1854)
- University of Liverpool Centre for Continuing Education, *Regional Perspectives on Emigration from the British Isles* (Liverpool, 1996)
- Walker, M., *Germany and the Emigration, 1816-1885* (Cambridge, 1964)
- Withey, L., *Grand Tours and Cook's Tours: A History of Leisure Travel, 1750-1915* (London, 1998).
- Zevenbergen, C., *Toen zij wit Rotterdam vertrokken - Emigratie via Rotterdam Door De Eeuwen Heen* (Zwolle, 1991)

Articles

- Aldcroft, D.H., 'The Depression in British Shipping, 1901-1911', *Journal of Transport History*, Volume VII (1965), pp. 14-23.
- _____, 'The Merchant Marine', in Derek Aldcroft, *The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914* (London, 1968), pp. 326-363.
- Arnold, A.J., 'Privacy of Concealment? The Accounting Practices of Liner Shipping Companies, 1914-1924', *International Journal of Maritime History*, Volume VIII, Number 1 (1996), pp. 43-57.

- Aronson, M., 'The Attitudes of Russian Officials in the 1880s toward Jewish Assimilation and Emigration', *Slavic Review*, Volume XXXIV, Number 1 (1975), pp. 1-18.
- Arrington, L.J. & Bitton, D., 'Immigration and Diversity', in Leonard Arrington & David Bitton, *The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints* (New York, 1979), pp. 127-144.
- Atkenson, D.H., 'Irish Migration to North America, 1800-1920', in Andy Bielenberg (ed.), *The Irish Diaspora* (Harlow, Essex, 2000), pp. 111-138.
- Babcock, F.L., 'The Great Migration', in Franklin Babcock, *Spanning the Atlantic* (New York, 1931), pp. 107-123.
- Bade, K.J., 'German Emigration to the United States and Continental Immigration to Germany in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries', *Central European History*, Volume XIII (1980), pp. 348-377.
- Baines, D., 'European emigration, 1815-1930: looking at the emigration decision again', *Economic History Review*, Volume XLVII, Number 3 (1994), pp. 525-544.
- Beavis, D., 'British Passenger Lists', *Shemot*, Volume VII, Number 2 (1999), pp. 4-7.
- Bellamy, J.M., 'A Hull Shipbuilding Firm: The History of C. & W. Earle and Earle's Shipbuilding and Engineering Company Limited', *Business History*, Volume I, Number 1 (1963), pp. 27-47.
- Brattne, B., 'The Importance of the Transport Sector for Mass Emigration', in Harald Runblom & Hans Norman (eds.), *From Sweden to America: A History of the Migration* (Uppsala, 1976), pp. 176-200.
- Brayshaw, M., 'The Emigration Trade in Nineteenth-Century Devon', in Michael Duffy *et al.* (eds.), *The New Maritime History of Devon: Volume II* (London, 1994), pp. 108-118.
- Broeze, F., 'Shipping policy and Social-Darwinism: Albert Ballin and the *Weltpolitik* of the Hamburg-America Line 1886-1914', *The Mariner's Mirror*, Volume LXXIX (1993), pp. 419-434.
- Campbell, J., 'Beyond the Pale: Jewish Immigration and the South African Left', in Milton Shain & Richard Mendelsohn (eds.), *Memories, Realities and Dreams – Aspects of the South African Jewish Experience* (Cape Town, 2000), pp. 96-162.
- Chmelar, J., 'Austrian Emigration 1900-1914', in Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn (eds.), *Perspectives in American History*, Volume VII (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 275-378.
- Clark, J.J. & Clark, M.T., 'The International Mercantile Marine Company: A Financial Analysis', *The American Neptune*, Volume LVII (1997), pp. 29-49.
- Clemensson, P., 'Letters from Emigrants in the Archive of Broderna Larsson & Co.', *Swedish American Genealogist*, Number 2 (1999), pp. 162-166.

- Cohn, R.L., 'Transatlantic U.S. Passenger Travel at the Dawn of the Steamship Era', *International Journal of Maritime History*, Volume IV, Number 1 (1992), pp. 43-64.
- Collins, K.E., 'Scottish Transmigration and Settlement: Records of the Glasgow Experience', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 49-58.
- Cooke, G., 'Harry Leach MRCP (1836-1879): Control of Scurvy in the British Mercantile Marine, and First Port Medical Officer for the City of London', *Journal of Medical Biography*, Volume VIII (2000), pp. 133-139.
- Cottrell, P.L., 'The Steamship on the Mersey, 1815-80. Investment and Ownership', in Philip Cottrell & Derek Aldcroft (eds.), *Shipping, Trade and Commerce: Essays in Memory of Ralph Davies* (Leicester, 1981), pp. 137-163.
- Deltas, G., Sicotte, R. & Tomczak, P., 'American Shipping Cartels in the Pre-World War I Era', *Research in Economic History*, Volume XIX (1999), pp. 1-38.
- Dickens, C., 'Bound for the Great Salt Lake', in Charles Dickens, *The Uncommercial Traveller* (London, 1861), pp. 96-103.
- Dovring, F., 'European Reactions to the Homestead Act', *Journal of Economic History* Volume XXII, Number 4 (1962), pp. 461-472.
- Dow, G., 'Great Central – Fay Sets the Pace, 1900-1922', *Marine Review, 1900-1914*, Volume III (1965), pp. 259-277.
- Duckham, B.F., 'Railway Steamship Enterprise: The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway's East Coast Fleet 1904-1914', *Business History*, Volume X, Number 1 (1968), pp. 44-57.
- Dyos, H.J. & Aldcroft, D.H., 'The organization and profits of British shipping', in H. J. Dyos & D.H. Aldcroft, *British Transport. An economic survey from the seventeenth century to the twentieth* (Leicester, 1969), p. 273.
- Easterlin, R., 'Influences on European Overseas Emigration before World War I', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Volume XI (1961), pp. 331-351.
- Erickson, C., 'Jewish People in the Atlantic Migration, 1850-1914', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 1-20.
- _____, 'The Uses of Passenger Lists for the Study of British and Irish Emigration', in Ira Glazier & Luigi De Rosa (eds.), *Migration across Time and Nations* (London, 1986), pp. 318-335.
- Erickson, C. & Nilsson, F., 'The Impact of Push and Pull', *Nordic Emigration* (1969), pp. 26-41.

Evans, N.J., 'Indirect Passage from Europe: Transmigration via the UK, 1836-1914', *Journal for Maritime Research* (Greenwich, 2001).

_____ 'Commerce, States and Anti-Alienism: Balancing Britain's Interests in the Late-Victorian Age', in Eitan Bar-Yosef & Nadia Valman (eds.), *The 'Jew' in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Culture: Between the East End and East Africa* (London, Forthcoming).

_____ 'The Port Jews of Libau, 1880-1914', *Jewish Culture and History*, Volume VII, Numbers 1-2 (Summer/Autumn 2004), pp. 197-214.

_____ 'The Emigration of Skilled Male Workers from Clydeside during the Interwar Period', *International Journal of Maritime History*, Volume XVIII, Number 1 (June 2006), pp. 255-280.

Evans, N.J. & Woods, F.E., 'Latter-day Saint Scandinavian Migration through Hull, England, 1852-1894', *BYU Studies*, Volume XLI, Number 4 (2002), pp. 75-102.

Feldman, D., 'The Importance of Being English: Jewish Immigration and the Decay of Liberal England', in David Feldman & Gareth Stedman Jones, *Metropolis London: Histories and Representations since 1800* (London, 1989), pp. 56-84.

Fox, S., 'The Invasion of Pauper Foreigners', *The Contemporary Review*, Volume LIII (January-June 1888), pp. 855-867.

Fraser, N., 'A Short Biographical Sketch of the Liverpool-Hull Passenger Services', *Railway Observer* (January 1961), pp. 25-6.

Gartner, L.P., 'Jewish Migrants en route from Europe to North America: Traditions and Realities', *Jewish History*, Volume I, Number 2 (1986), pp. 49-66.

_____ 'Notes on the Statistics of Jewish Immigration to England, 1870-1914', *Jewish Social Studies*, Volume XXII, Number 2 (1960), pp. 97-102.

Greenhill, R.G., 'Competition or Co-operation in the Global Shipping Industry: The Origins and Impact of the Conference System for British Shipowners before 1914', in David J. Starkey & Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Research in Maritime History No. 14: Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries Since 1850* (St. John's, Newfoundland, 1998), pp. 53-80.

Goldenweiser, E. A., 'Laws Regulating the Migration of Russians through Germany', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Volume XXI, Number 3 (May 1897), pp. 488-491.

Gould, J.D., 'European international emigration 1815-1914', *Journal of European Economic History*, Volume VIII, Number 3 (1979), pp. 593-677.

Guillet, E.C., "'Purification" at Grosse Isle', in Edwin Guillet, *The Great Migration: The Atlantic Crossing by Sailing Ship, 1770-1860* (Toronto, 1971), pp. 145-154.

- Harcourt, F., 'British Oceanic Mail Contracts in the Age of Steam, 1838-1914', *The Journal of Transport History*, Volume IX, Number 1 (1988), pp. 1-18.
- Harper, M., 'Probing the Pioneer Questionnaires: British Settlement in Saskatchewan, 1887-1914', *Saskatchewan History*, Volume LII, Number 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 28-46.
- Harper, M., & Evans, N., 'Socio-economic dislocation and interwar emigration to Canada and the USA: A Scottish snapshot', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XXXIV, Number 4 (December 2006), pp. 529-552.
- Harris, D.F., 'The Role of Shropshire Local Shipping Agent in Encouraging Emigration to Canada, c.1890-1914', *The Local Historian*, Volume XXX, Number 4 (2000), pp. 239-259.
- Hengsbach, V.A., "'Station of those tired of Europe". *Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte Berlins*', Volume LXX (1974), pp. 420-429.
- Hoyle, B., 'Fields on Tension: Development Dynamics at the Port-City Interface', in David Cesarani (ed.), *Port Jews. Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950* (London, 2002), pp. 12-30
- Hvidt, K., 'Emigration Agents: The Development of a Business and its Methods', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, Volume III (1978), pp. 179-320.
- Jackson, G., 'The Ports', in Michael Freeman & Derek Aldcroft (eds.) *Transport in Victorian Britain* (Manchester, 1988), pp. 218-252.
- _____ 'Shipowners and Private Dock Companies: The Case of Hull, 1770-1970', in Leo Akveld & Jacobus Bruijn (eds.), *Shipping Companies and Authorities in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Their Common Interest in the Development of Port Facilities* (Den Haag, 1989), pp. 47-59.
- _____ 'Do Docks make Trade? The Case of the port of Great Grimsby', in Lewis Fischer (ed.), *Research in Maritime History Number 2: From Wheel House to Counting House: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour of Professor Peter Neville Davies* (St. John's Newfoundland, 1992), pp. 17-41.
- _____ 'Port Competition on the Humber: Docks, Railways and Steamships in the Nineteenth Century', in Hull College of Higher Education, *Ports and Resorts in the Regions* (Hull, 1980), pp. 45-58.
- Johnson, H., 'The Emigrants', in Howard Johnson, *The Cunard Story* (London, 1987), pp. 45-60.
- Kahan, A., 'Economic Opportunities and Some Pilgrims' Progress: Jewish Immigrants from Eastern Europe in the US, 1890-1914', *Journal of Economic History*, Volume XXXVIII (1978), pp. 235-251.
- Kaplan, H., 'Passage to America Though Scotland', *Avotaynu*, Volume V, Number 4 (1989), pp. 7-8.

- Keeling, D., 'The Transportation Revolution and Transatlantic Migration, 1850-1914', *Economic History*, Volume XIX (1999), pp. 39-74.
- _____, 'Transatlantic Shipping Cartels and Migration between Europe and America, 1880-1914', in Michael Namorato (ed.), *Essays in Economic and Business History*, Volume XVII (1999), pp. 195-213.
- Kenwood, A.G., 'Port Investment in England and Wales, 1851-1913', *Yorkshire Bulletin on Economics & Social Research*, Volume XVII, Number 2 (1965), pp. 156-167.
- Kershen, A.J., 'Alien Immigration', in Stephen Massil, *The Jewish Year Book: An Annual Record of Matters Jewish, 5657 (1896-1897): A Centenary Facsimile of the First Jewish Year Book* (London, 1996), pp. 212-225.
- _____, 'The 1905 Aliens Act', *History Today*, Volume LCV, Number 3 (March 2005), pp. 13-19.
- Kinross, A., 'At Sea with the Alien Immigrant', *The Pall Mall Magazine*, Volume XXXIV (September-December, 1904), pp. 126-132.
- Kjartansson, H. S., 'Emigrant fares and emigration from Iceland to North America, 1874-1893', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, Volume XXVIII, Number 1 (1980), pp. 53-71.
- Klier, J., 'Emigration Mania in Late-Imperial Russia: Legend and Reality', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.), *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 21-30.
- Köllmann, W. & Marschalck, P., 'German Emigration to the United States', in Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn (eds.), *Perspectives in American History*, Volume VII (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 499-554.
- Kushner, T., 'A Tale of Two Port Jewish Communities: Southampton and Portsmouth Compared', in David Cesarani (ed.), *Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950* (London, 2002), pp. 87-110.
- _____, 'From Atlantic Hotel to Atlantic Park: Anglo-America, Port Jews and the Invisible Transmigrant', in David Cesarani & Gemma Romain (eds.), *Jews and Port Cities, 1590-1990 – Commerce, Community and Cosmopolitanism* (London, 2006), pp. 197-214.
- Kuznets, S., 'Immigration of Russian Jews to the United States: Background and Structure', in Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn (eds.), *Perspectives in American History*, Volume IX (1975), pp. 35-124.
- Lawton, R., 'The Components of Demographic Change in a Rapidly Growing Port-City: The Case of Liverpool in the Nineteenth Century', in Richard Lawton & Robert Lee (eds.), *Population and Society in Western European Port Cities c.1650-1939* (Liverpool, 2002), pp. 91-123.

- Lee, R., 'Configuring the City: In-Migration, Labour Supply and Port Development in Nineteenth-Century Europe', *International Journal of Maritime History*, Volume XVII, Number 1 (2005), pp. 91-122.
- Lovoll, O.S., 'For the People who are not in a Hurry: The Danish Thingvalla Line and the Transportation of Scandinavian Emigrants', *Journal of American Ethnic History*, Volume XIII (1993), pp. 38-47.
- Mäenpää, S., 'Comfort and guidance for female passengers. The origins of women's employment on British Passenger Liners 1850-1914', *Journal for Maritime Research* (November 2004).
- Maglen, K., "'The First Line of Defence': British Quarantine and the Port Sanitary Authorities in the Nineteenth Century", *Social History of Medicine*, Volume XV, Issue 3 (2002), pp. 413-428
- Martens, J., 'A transnational history of immigration restriction: Natal and New South Wales, 1896-97', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Volume XXXIV, Number 3 (September 2006), pp. 323-344.
- Maxtone-Graham, J., 'Emigration to New York', in John Maxtone-Graham, *Crossing & Cruising: From the Golden Era of Ocean Liners to the Luxury Cruise Ships of Today* (New York, 1992), pp. 1-32.
- McCarthy, A., 'Personal Accounts of Leaving Scotland, 1921-1954', *Scottish Historical Review*, Volume VXXXIII, Number II, Issue 216 (October 2004), pp. 196-215.
- McCormick, W.W. & Franks, C.M., 'A Self-Generating Model of Long-Swings for the American Economy, 1860-1940', *The Journal of Economic History*, Volume XX, Number 2 (1971), pp. 295-343.
- McKeown, A., 'Global Migration, 1846-1940', *Journal of World History*, Volume XV, Number 2 (2004).
- Nadell, P.S., 'The Journey to America by Steam: The Jews of Eastern Europe in Transition', *American Jewish History*, Volume LXXI, pp. 269-284.
- _____, 'United States Steerage Legislation: The Protection of the Emigrants en route to America', *Immigrants & Minorities*, Volume V (1981), pp. 62-72.
- Neal, F., 'Liverpool, the Irish Steamboat Companies and the Famine Irish', *Immigrants & Minorities*, Volume V (1986), pp. 28-61.
- Palmer, S.R., 'The British Shipping Industry 1850-1914', in Lewis Fischer & Gerald Panting, *Change and Adaptation in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century* (St. Johns, 1985), pp. 89-114.
- _____, 'The Most Indefatigable Activity: The General Steam Navigation Company, 1824-50', *Journal of Transport History*, Volume III (1982), pp. 1-22.

- Pearsall, A., 'Steam enters the North Sea', in Arne Bang-Anderson, Basil Greenhill & Egil Harald Grude (eds.), *The North Sea: A Highway of Economic and Cultural Exchange Character – History* (Stavanger, 1985), pp. 195-213.
- Pellew, J., 'The Home Office and the Aliens Act, 1905', *The Historical Journal*, Volume XXXII, Number 2 (1989), pp. 639-685.
- Piercy, F.H., 'Foreign Emigration Passing Through Liverpool', in Fawn Brodie & Frederick Piercy (eds.), *Route from Liverpool to Great Salt Lake Valley* (Harvard, 1962), pp. 38-45.
- Railway Magazine, 'The most famous railway station in the world: its traffic and associations', *Railway Magazine*, Volume XVII, Number 203 (1905), p. 364.
- Read, J.G., 'Indirect Passage: Jewish Emigrant Experiences on the East Coast-Liverpool Route', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.) *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 267-282.
- Rubenstein, W., 'ELLERMAN, Sir John Reeves', in Henry Matthew & Brian Harrison (eds.), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Volume XII* (Oxford, 2004), pp. 137-141.
- Sarna, J., 'The Myth of "No Return": Jewish Return Migration to Eastern Europe, 1881-1914', *American Jewish History*, Volume LXXI (1981), pp. 256-268.
- Scally, R., 'Liverpool Ships and Irish Emigrants in the Age of Sail', *Journal for Social History*, Volume XVII, Number 1 (Fall, 1983), pp. 5-30.
- Scholl, L.U., 'New York's German Suburb: The Creation of the Port of Bremerhaven, 1827-1918', in Lewis Fischer & Adrian Jarvis (eds.) *Research in Maritime History No.16: Harbours and Havens: Essays in Port History in Honour of Gordon Jackson* (St. Johns, Newfoundland, 1999), pp. 191-211.
- Semmingsen, I.G., 'Norwegian Emigration to America during the Nineteenth Century', *Norwegian-American Studies and Records*, Volume XI (1940), pp. 66-85.
- Shlomowitz, R. & McDonald, J., 'Babies at Risk on Immigrant Voyages to Australia in the Nineteenth Century', *Economic History Review*, Volume XLIV, No.1 (1991), pp. 86-101.
- Simmons, J., 'The Power of the Railway', in Harold Dyos & Michael Wolff, *The Victorian City: Images and Reality: Volume I* (London, 1973), pp. 277-310.
- Sims, G.R., 'Sweated London', in George Sims (ed.) *Living London: Its work and its Play: Its Humour and its Pathos: Its Sights and its Scenes* (London, 1901), pp. 7-75.
- Sloan, E.W., 'The First (and Very Secret) International Steamship Cartel, 1850-1856', in David J. Starkey & Gelina Harlaftis (eds.), *Research in Maritime History No. 14: Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries Since 1850* (St. John's, Newfoundland, 1998), pp. 29-52.

- Sorkin, D., 'The Port Jew: Notes Toward a Social Type', *Journal of Jewish Studies*, Volume L, Number 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 87-97.
- Starkey, D.J., 'Ownership Structures in the British Shipping Industry: The Case of Hull, 1820-1916', *International Journal of Maritime History*, Volume VIII, Number 2 (1996), pp. 71-95.
- Starkey, D.J. & Gorski, R., "'Our Little Company:': The Wilsons and North Eastern Railway Shipping Company Limited, 1906-1935', in Lewis Fischer & Adrian Jarvis (eds.), *Research in Maritime History: No. 16: Harbours and Havens: Essays in Port History in Honour of Gordon Jackson* (St. Johns, 1999), pp. 63-88.
- Szajkowski, Z., 'The European attitude to Eastern European Jewish Immigration (1881-1893)', *Publications of American Jewish Historical Society*, Volume XLI (1951), pp. 105-116.
- _____ 'Sufferings of Jewish Emigrants to America in Transit through Germany', *Jewish Social Studies*, Volume XXXIX (1997), pp. 106-107
- Thorn, O., 'Glimpses from the Activities of a Swedish Emigrant Agent', *Swedish Pioneer Historical Society*, Volume X, Number 1 (1959), pp. 3-24.
- Tomaske, J.A., 'The Determinants of Inter-Country Differences in European Emigration, 1881-1900', *Journal of European Economic History*, Volume VIII (1979-80), pp. 850-853.
- Turnock, D., 'Railway Development in Eastern Europe as a Context for Migration Study', in Aubrey Newman & Stephen Massil (eds.) *Patterns of Migration, 1850-1914* (London, 1996), pp. 293-312.
- White, A., 'The Invasion of Pauper Foreigners', *Nineteenth Century Review*, Volume XXIII (January-June 1888), pp. 414-422.
- Woods, F.E., 'East to West through North and South: Mormon Immigration during the Civil War', *Brigham Young University Studies*, Volume XXXIX, Number 1 (2000), pp. 7-29.
- Ph.D. Theses**
- Bellamy, J.M., *Some Aspects of the Economy of Hull in the Nineteenth Century, with Special Reference to Business History* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Hull, 1966)
- Krut, R.M., *Building a Home and a Community: Jews in Johannesburg, 1886-1914* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1985)
- Nadell, P.S., *The Journey to America by Steam: The Jews of Eastern Europe in Transition* (Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1982)

Sannino, P., *Wondering and wandering Jews: Images, myth and reality about the modern Western World as reflected in the Yiddish literature and press of late Imperial Russia* (Unpublished Ph.D., University of Belfast, 2004)

Masters Theses

Barker, C.L., *Jewish Migration to South Africa and the Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter, London, 1880-1914* (Unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, University of Leicester, 1998)

Bastin, R., *Cunard and the Liverpool Emigrant Traffic, 1860-1900* (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Liverpool, 1971)

Electronic sources

<http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/teaching/papers/newman1.htm>

Newman, A., 'Trains and Shelters and Ships', in R. Bonney (ed.), University of Leicester, Department of History Occasional Papers Series (2000). [Accessed 1 January 2004]

<http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/teaching/papers/newman2.htm>

Newman, A., 'The Union Castle Line and Emigration from Eastern Europe to South Africa', in R. Bonney (ed.), University of Leicester, Department of History Occasional Papers Series (2000). [Accessed 1 January 2004]

<http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/teaching/papers/jewspap.html>

Newman, A & Smith, J.G., 'The Poor Jews' Temporary Shelter: the development of a database on Jewish migration, 1896-1914', in R. Bonney (ed.), University of Leicester, Department of History Occasional Papers Series (2000). [Accessed 1 January 2004]

<http://www.ellisland.org>

Ellis Island database [Accessed 1 August 2004]

<http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1--35-3-167,00.html>.

Ellis Island Database: A Labor-intensive Gift from The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints [Accessed 1 August 2004]

<http://www.nytimes.com>

The *New York Times* online [Accessed 1 September 2005]

http://www.linktoyourroots.hamburg.de/index/1,2709,JGdlbz0zJG9rPTE5MTA1JHVrPSQ_00.html

Hamburg Emigration Database [Accessed 1 August 2005]

<http://dictionary.oed.com>

Oxford English Dictionary [Accessed 1 August 2005]

<http://www.portcities.hartlepool.org.uk>

Port Cities UK, Steve Robbins, 'Emigrants and Refugees in West Hartlepool'
[Accessed 1 March 2006]

<http://www.jewishgen.org/databases/EIDB/ellisjw.html>

Stephen Morse one-step web pages [Accessed 1 August 2004]

http://web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/0/1/1/purl=rc6_TTDA?sw_aep=unihull

The Times Digital Archive, 1785-1985 [Accessed 20 March 2003]

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Mormon Immigration Index* CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1999)

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *Family History Resource File-Viewer 3.0* (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1999)

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, *1881 British Census and National Index, England, Scotland, Wales, Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and Royal Navy*: CD-ROM (Salt Lake City, Utah, 1998)