

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

“Unnatural and Unexpected Vicissitudes”: British Maritime Enterprise and the
American Civil War, 1856 to 1870.

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of
PhD

in the University of Hull

by

Neil Russell Ashcroft, BA (Hons) History (Sheffield University), MA Historical
Research (Hull University)

May 1999

Contents

| | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| <u>Acknowledgements</u> | 3 |
| <u>List of Tables and Figures</u> | 4-5 |
| <u>Abbreviations and Definitions</u> | 6 |
| <u>Chapter 1. Introduction</u> | 7-26 |
| <u>Chapter 2. Sources and Methods:</u> | 27-55 |
| 2.1 Customs Bills of Entry | (27-47) |
| 2.2 Custom House Ship Registers | (47-50) |
| 2.3 Blockade Runners | (50-53) |
| 2.4 Agents and Shipowners | (53-54) |
| 2.5 Annual Statements of Trade | (54-55) |
| <u>Chapter 3. The Impact of the War:</u> | 56-118 |
| 3.1 The Antebellum Trade | (56-62) |
| 3.2 The Wartime Trade | (62-71) |
| 3.3 The Effectiveness of the Blockade | (71-90) |
| 3.4 The Restored Postwar Trade | (90-94) |
| 3.5 Impact, and British Maritime Enterprise | (94-118) |
| <u>Chapter 4. Commercial Adaptation and Strategy:</u> | 119-228 |
| 4.1 Adaptation in Liverpool | (119-161) |
| 4.2 British Adaptation | (161-173) |
| 4.3 Wartime Shipowners | (173-194) |
| 4.4 Postwar Adaptation and an Overview of Strategy | (194-228) |
| <u>Chapter 5. Commercial Organisation and Networks:</u> | 229-279 |
| 5.1 The Role of the Ship Agent | (229-242) |
| 5.2 Networks of Ownership and Clientage | (242-273) |
| 5.3 Networks and Institutional Integration | (273-279) |
| <u>Conclusion</u> | 280-289 |
| <u>Appendix</u> | 290-297 |
| A. Liverpool Firms that acted as Ship Agents | (290-295) |
| B. British Blockade Runners and their Owners | (295-297) |
| <u>Bibliography</u> | 298-306 |

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor David Richardson, for all his invaluable help and guidance during the course of my researching and writing this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the Economic and Social Research Council, without which the project would have been impossible. Thanks are also due to my brother-in-law, W. J. Hunt, who kindly undertook to proof read this thesis in draft form - any errors that remain in the text are due to my not always following his advice!

List of Tables and Figures

| <u>Tables</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|--|-------------|
| 2.1. Voyages of the <i>Prospero</i> . | 33 |
| 2.2. Cargo Carrying Voyages from London to Bermuda and Nassau. | 40 |
| 2.3. Coverage of Liverpool Sample Months. | 43 |
| 2.4. Case Study Firms. | 46 |
| 2.5. Coverage of Ship Register Search. | 48 |
| | |
| 3.1. Steam Shipping Tonnage Attempting to Run the Blockade. | 74 |
| 3.2. Carrying Capacities of Vessels with Cargoes of Cotton Only. | 80 |
| 3.3. Concentration in Antebellum Liverpool Agenting. | 97 |
| 3.4. Continuity in Antebellum Liverpool Agenting. | 98 |
| 3.5. Case Study Group 1: Antebellum Agents. | 99 |
| | |
| 4.1. Liverpool Bulk Import Commodities. | 120 |
| 4.2. Case Study Group 1: Wartime Adaptation. | 126 |
| 4.3. Concentration in Liverpool Entrepot Trade Agenting. | 135 |
| 4.4. Continuity in Liverpool Entrepot Trade Agenting. | 137 |
| 4.5. Case Study Group 2: Entrepot Trade Agents. | 138 |
| 4.6. Case Study Group 2: Business Outside Southern Trade. | 139 |
| 4.7. Concentration in Wartime Cotton Importation into Liverpool from Entrepots. | 153 |
| 4.8. Continuity in Wartime Cotton Importation into Liverpool from Entrepots. | 155 |
| 4.9. Top Ten Importers of Entrepot Cotton. | 156 |
| 4.10. Registration of Shipping in British Trade with the South, 1861 to 1870. | 163 |
| 4.11. Top Ten Home British Ports of Register in Wartime Entrepot Trade. | 164 |
| 4.12. Tonnage Registered in Continental Europe in Wartime Entrepot Trade. | 165 |
| 4.13. Shipbuilding by Region in British Trade with the South, 1861 to 1870. | 167 |
| 4.14. Top Ten British Ports Building Ships for the Southern Trade, 1861 to 1870. | 169 |
| 4.15. British Ports Building Blockade Runners, 1861 to 1865. | 170 |
| 4.16. Relative Importance of British Ports in The Wartime Entrepot Trade. | 171 |
| 4.17. Top Ten Ship Agents Outside Liverpool in the Wartime Entrepot Trade. | 172 |
| 4.18. Top Six Towns of Residence of Ship Register Sample Owners. | 175 |
| 4.19. Top Twenty Entrepot Trade Shipowners. | 176 |
| 4.20. Top Twenty Liverpool Resident Entrepot Trade Shipowners. | 182 |
| 4.21. British Shipowners and Blockade Running: Success and Failure. | 187 |
| 4.22. Different Places of Residence in British Ownership of Blockade Runners. | 188 |
| 4.23. Liverpool Case Study Group 1: Performance in Post-War Samples. | 196 |
| 4.24. Liverpool Case Study Group 2: Performance in Post-War Samples. | 203 |
| 4.25. Concentration in Post-War Liverpool Agenting. | 214 |
| 4.26. Continuity in Post War Liverpool Agenting. | 215 |
| 4.27. Case Study Group 3: Post-War Agents. | 216 |
| 4.28. Case Study Group 3: Performance from 1856 to 1870. | 217 |
| 4.29. Top Fifteen Liverpool Resident Post-War Shipowners. | 226 |
| | |
| 5.1. How Firms Acting as Liverpool Ship Agents Advertised Themselves. | 230 |
| 5.2 How Case Study Agents Advertised Themselves. | 232 |

Figures

| | |
|---|-----|
| 1.1. The Pattern of Wartime Trade. | 8 |
| 3.1. British Imports of United States Cotton Bales, 1820 to 1860. | 56 |
| 3.2. Origin of Total US Cotton Bales Coming into Liverpool (Percentage). | 58 |
| 3.3. Shipping Tonnage into and out from Liverpool, 1856 to 1860. | 60 |
| 3.4. Percentage of Total Tonnage Departing Liverpool for each Southern Port. | 61 |
| 3.5. British Cotton Imports by Quantity, 1856 to 1870. | 63 |
| 3.6. British Cotton Imports Received from each Region, 1856 to 1870. | 64 |
| 3.7. British Cotton Imports by Market Value, 1856 to 1870. | 66 |
| 3.8. British Cotton Imports by Percentage Market Share, 1856 to 1870. | 68 |
| 3.9. Prices per Pound of British Cotton Imports, 1856 to 1870. | 69 |
| 3.10. British Exports by Shipping Tonnage, 1861 to 1870. | 70 |
| 3.11. Blockade Running and Transatlantic Trade Shipping Tonnage (Percentage) | 75 |
| 3.12. Percentage of British Wartime Cotton Imports Coming from each Entrepot. | 84 |
| 3.13. Running Shipping Tonnage (In and Out). | 87 |
| 3.14. Origin of Total US Cotton Bales Coming into Liverpool (Samples). | 91 |
| 3.15. Destination of Total Tonnage Departing Liverpool (Samples). | 92 |
| 3.16. Shipping Tonnage in Liverpool Trade with the Southern US. | 93 |
| 3.17. Percentage of Order in Liverpool Imports of Southern US Cotton. | 113 |
| 4.1. Shipping Tonnage passing through Liverpool, 1856 to 1870. | 119 |
| 4.2. Liverpool Dock Revenue, 1856 to 1870. | 120 |
| 4.3. Quantity of Liverpool Exports of Cotton Manufactures, 1857 to 1864. | 121 |
| 4.4. Value of Liverpool's Exports of British Goods, 1857 to 1864. | 122 |
| 5.1. Wartime Opportunists: Networks of Ownership and Clientage. | 255 |
| 5.2. John Glynn & Son: Network of Ownership and Clientage. | 264 |

Abbreviations and Definitions

BOE: Customs Bills of Entry

BPP, AST: British Parliamentary Papers, “Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K”.

Cases Database: Microsoft Access 2.0. This contains material relating to case study firms from BOE sample months (January in 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1866, 1868, 1870.). Aggregate findings are referenced to “Cases Database” followed by a more specific account of the sources on which they are based. More detail is available in chapter 2.

Database: Microsoft Access 2.0. Data from three primary sources has been entered: Bills of Entry, Gores and Ship Registers. Aggregate findings are referenced to “Database” followed by a more specific account of the sources on which they are based. Material included is described in general terms in chapter 2.

Gores: Gores Commercial Directory, Wallesey Central Library, Merseyside

HMC: H.M. Customs and Excise.

Lifeline Database: Microsoft Access 2.0. This consists of blockade runners, their runs, and their owners. See chapter 2 for a fuller description.

MMM: Merseyside Maritime Museum, Liverpool.

PRO: Public Record Office.

SR Glasgow: HMC, Merchant Shipping Registers for the Port of Glasgow, MSS, CE/59/11, Strathclyde Regional Archive, Mitchell Library, Glasgow.

SR Hull: HMC, Registers of Shipping for the Port of Hull, MSS, DPC/1, City of Kingston -Upon -Hull Record Office.

SR Liverpool: HMC, Ship Registers for the Port of Liverpool, MSS, C/EX/L/4, MMM.

SR London: HMC, London Register of British Ships, MSS, CUST 130, PRO.

TA London: Transactions, MSS, BT/109, PRO.

TS London: Transcriptions, MSS, BT/108, PRO.

Chapter 1. Introduction

In the half century or so before the American civil war, Anglo-American economic relations have been viewed as sufficiently important to form part of an “Atlantic partnership”. The “great thrusting force” in the growth of both economies was cotton: raw cotton exported from the Southern states to Britain, and British cotton manufactures exported back to the United States.¹ However the civil war had a profound impact upon this cotton trade. So much so that the obituarist of one of the leading antebellum participants in the trade, Francis Boulton, referred to “..unnatural and unexpected vicissitudes in the American trade which crippled his business..”²


This study is about the impact of the war upon British trade with the Southern states that constituted the Confederacy. Whilst it lasted, from April 1861 to April 1865, it did subject the commerce to considerable vicissitudes, from which it did not completely recover in the immediate post-war years. The imposition of a naval blockade on the Confederacy by the Federal government of the North resulted in a sudden and massive trade collapse. By restricting engagement with the Confederate mainland to short-range steamers, the blockade altered the pattern of commerce. From being a direct exchange between Britain and the major cotton ports of the South, the trade became an indirect one, taking place by way of neutral entrepôts. Figure 1.1 illustrates this. Bermuda, Nassau and Havana became offshore bases for blockade running, serviced by sailings to and from Britain. An alternative direct transatlantic trade was developed with Matamoros in Mexico. This route was serviced

¹ F. Thistlethwaite, “Atlantic Partnership”, *The Economic History Review* VII (1954), pp. 1-17.

² *The Liverpool Review*, April 3 1886, Liverpool Record Office, Hf 050 Liv.

predominantly by overland carriage, and to a lesser extent by blockade running, between there and Confederate Texas.

Figure 1.1. The Pattern of Wartime Trade.



Source: Prepared by the author. The routes do not represent actual sea lanes.

In the huge historiography of the civil war, this is the first attempt to examine its effects upon British maritime interests. The focus is upon British trade with the Southern states in the years 1856 to 1870, a period selected to compare the war years with times of normality before and after. The aim is twofold: to analyse how adaptable maritime interests proved to be, and to identify what the salient factors were in the ability to survive, grow and prosper in this period of great change. It is also intended to throw light on what factors drove the development of British maritime business in this hitherto under researched period; a formative one in that it preceded the rise to world dominance of large-scale British shipping enterprise later in the century.

Additionally, this is the first attempt to assess the effectiveness of the Northern blockade by placing Southern wartime trade with Britain in the context of that of the immediate pre- and post-war years.

There are no comparable studies that have set out systematically to examine issues of British maritime adaptation with reference to the vicissitudes of other wars. Nonetheless, some historians have made important contributions in the area with reference to earlier conflicts. Although, unlike the American civil war, these were conflicts in which Britain was directly involved, some parallels can be drawn. A common theme is that war presented potentially fatal risks and challenges to merchant shipping, but that it also presented opportunities to those who responded in appropriate ways.

Ralph Davis has written about British shipping in the context of the numerous wars in which Britain was a combatant in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; wars in which control of world trade was often an important issue. In these, shipowners were challenged by risks of loss at the hands of enemy privateers and warships, as well as by loss of trade arising from the inability to deploy vessels freely. Freight rates tended to increase, but so too did costs such as insurance premiums and crew pay. Naval guarded convoys were developed to protect shipping, but these could bring their own problems: the time it took to muster them led to losses arising from delay; and the

simultaneous arrival in port of numerous vessels carrying the same commodities could create a glut that forced down prices.³

Shipowners were presented with choices on affected routes. They could simply lay ships up, but this was likely to be commercial suicide. They could put up with the difficulties of convoys, or take the risks of operating independently outside them. Another course was to enter their ships into government service as troop or supply transports. This was rewarded by reasonable rates, steady employment and underwritten risks, though obtaining payment from the government could be tough and usually meant delay or discount in payment. Privateering was another option, but risks were high and profitable prizes few and far between.⁴

Adoption of the right strategy was essential. It would be instructive to know what strategies were pursued, and with what degrees of success, by particular enterprises in particular conflicts. Unfortunately this sort of analysis is unavailable before the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, which form the backdrop to Ville's account of the development of the Henleys of London.⁵ Here a similar range of risks and responses to those that have been mentioned were open to shipowners. In this instance, French control of much of Europe's coastline was a barrier to British ships carrying trade on European routes. Overall there was a decline in the volume of British shipping involved in foreign trade, but it increased on some routes. This was true of trade with

³ R. Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (London, 1962), pp. 315-337.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ S. Ville, *English Shipowning during the Industrial Revolution: Michael Henley and Son, London Shipowners, 1770-1830* (Manchester, 1987).

the East and West Indies, and with South America. Difficulties in the Baltic also led to a growth in importing timber from the British North American colonies.⁶ Here is another possible strategy: switching from one trade to another.

This is what Michael Henley & Son did. Before the early 1790s the activities of these London shipowners were largely confined to the coastal coaling trade between the capital and the northeast. In the war period, up to 1815, they responded to short-term vicissitudes by deploying their vessels flexibly into a variety of oceanic trades. They did this by taking a number of the opportunities of war. A move into the hugely expanded government transport service saw their ships employed in areas of conflict all over the world. Some of their ships sailed in protected convoys, whilst a few had licence to sail independently. They were always looking for new openings, such as in the North American timber trade. In this way they kept their vessels employed for most of the war and grew into significant specialist shipowners.⁷

The themes found in this literature, of challenge, opportunity and assessment of risk, resonate with the central findings of this thesis. Generally speaking, British maritime enterprise adapted well to the impact of the civil war. There was no collapse in shipping volume passing through Liverpool - the most affected port - nor was there an abnormal level of business failures. Interests in Liverpool and other ports took opportunities to acquire new business, both in the Confederate trade and in developing

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-13; C. Ernest Fayle, "The Employment of British Shipping" in *The Trade Winds: A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 1793-1815*, ed., C. Northcote Parkinson (London, 1948), pp. 72-86.

⁷ Ville, *English Shipowning*, pp. 8-13, and 52-62.

ones such as importation of American grain and alternative cotton supplies. Nonetheless, some adapted more successfully than others. The key elements in not just surviving, but also growing, emerge as being very similar to those exhibited by Henleys: an entrepreneurial strategy characterised by a willingness to take new opportunities to diversify one's business. Like Henleys, the most successful firms built diverse portfolios and had a prudent attitude to risk; in this case to the risks of blockade running. Those that exposed themselves to too much risk, or did not break out of dependence on one type of trade, tended to decline or cease trading.

After 1815 major war was abnormal in the nineteenth century. The salient factors involved in adapting successfully to wartime conditions may not be the same as those involved in normal peacetime development. Nonetheless, the above findings do have a wider relevance in understanding the peacetime development of maritime enterprise in the period of this study. This is because it is far from being based exclusively on evidence concerning the impact of the war. Periods of peacetime development, before and after the war, have been included for comparison. The blockade only directly affected trade with the Southern United States. Only a minority of twenty-four maritime firms selected as case studies were sufficiently committed to this trade, in the antebellum period, to be forced to adapt. The activities of the case study firms in unaffected trades have also been examined. Also, war was not the only cause for adaptation faced in this period: steam technology made its first appearance in the Southern United States trade and was advancing rapidly in some other trades; newly available limited liability opened possibilities of new forms of organisation beyond the small family based firm.

Little has been written about the development of British maritime enterprise generally in the mid-nineteenth century. Some studies which at least touch on this subject are about single organisations, specialised types of organisation, or the development of particular ports.⁸ The few organisations that have left sufficient business archives on which to base a study are not necessarily representative of the whole. This thesis is based on a study of the activities of a wide range of maritime firms, rather than on the business archives of a few, although the focus is on a smaller group of case studies.

Gordon Boyce has approached the issue of maritime development and growth, based on business archival evidence, but using sources relating to a large sample group of shipowning organisations.⁹ The work's focus is upon the late nineteenth century, for which this sort of evidence is more widespread. In relation to the earlier development of steamship interests he emphasised the importance of co-operative frameworks, or networks, existing outside the formal boundaries of individual organisations. In these, professional entrepreneurs contracted to use their market knowledge on behalf of other network members who owned shipping assets. Trust and reputation arose out of successful repeat contracting in these relationships. This in turn attracted the business of others and enabled networks to grow and access more shipping assets, market skills and information.¹⁰ This thesis identifies the presence of networks of this sort. They

⁸ Single-firm studies include: S. Marriner, *Rathbones of Liverpool, 1845-73* (Liverpool, 1861); J. C. Brown, *A Hundred Years of Merchant Banking. A History of Brown Brothers and Company, Brown Shipley and Company and the Allied Firms* (New York, 1909); F. E. Hyde, *Shipping Enterprise and Management, 1830-193: Harrisons of Liverpool* (Liverpool, 1967). An example of a study of a type of organisation is P. L. Cottrell, "The steamship on the Mersey, 1815-80: investment and ownership" in *Shipping, Trade and Commerce*, eds., P. L. Cottrell and D. H. Aldcroft (Leicester, 1981), pp. 137-163. An example of a study of port development is Hyde, *Liverpool and the Mersey: An economic History of a port, 1700-1970* (Newton Abbot, 1971).

⁹ G.H. Boyce, *Information, mediation and institutional development: The rise of large-scale enterprise in British shipping, 1870-1919* (Manchester, 1995).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-9, and 26-37.

were to be found in structures of shipowning, where maritime professional managing agents often ran things for non-professional owners. Further examples appear in repeat contracting between shipowners and the agents they employed to act for them in ports other than their own. Also, wider networks of mutual connection can be seen in some instances.

However, although an investigation of forms of institutional organisation helps us understand how maritime business was done in this period, it does not explain why some firms were more successful in adapting and growing than others. An attempt to explain performance by reference to the degree to which firms integrated their shipping and agenting business in-house, or relied primarily on external network connections, fails to produce a coherent pattern. There was no special merit in, on the one hand, employing independent agents and owning ships with independent associates, or, on the other, arranging these matters exclusively within a firm. Success and failure can, however, be explained by the degree to which organisations pursued the sort of entrepreneurial strategy of diversification mentioned earlier. Accordingly, strategies of action were the key to successful development of maritime enterprise in this period, rather than forms of institutional organisation.

A central strand of this thesis is an examination of the relationship between shipowners and the agents that acted for their ships, in ports where they did not have their own office. These were network relationships in the principal-agent sense used by Boyce. Others have written about the role of these ship agents, and the importance of what they had to offer to their shipowning clients. They used their connections, and

knowledge of market conditions and movements in ships and goods, on behalf of owners. This was a significant contribution to the ability of owners to switch deployment of their vessels from one trade to another, as circumstances dictated.¹¹

With particular reference to Liverpool, this study will examine what sort of firms acted as ship agents and what range of services they could offer, or arrange, for clients. Their role in facilitating flexible deployment of vessels was especially notable in this period when the war forced many owners to adapt by switching trades.

By looking at the owner-agent relationship one can see why the war impacted adversely on some firms, whilst presenting opportunities to others. Agenting firms tended to have established owning clients and these tended to be of particular types. Profiling their clients can be helpful in understanding the fortunes of particular firms, and in seeing why a change of activity might become desirable. For example, one firm might act predominantly for Americans who owned large ships that were employed in carrying bulk cargoes across the North Atlantic. Another might have a mainly European clientele whose ships were small and generally took more specialist cargoes over inshore waters. Unsurprisingly, ships owned in the Northern United States disappeared from Confederate trade during the war, as did large bulk carriers. This left the former sort of firm, and its clients, looking for alternative business; but it created a vacuum into which the latter sort could direct its client's vessels.

¹¹ E.J. Edward, *Shipbrokers and the Law* (Glasgow, 1957), pp. 1-13; S. Ville, "James Kirton, Shipping Agent" *Mariners Mirror* 67 (1981), pp. 149-162; Hyde, *Liverpool and the Mersey*, pp. 56-59.

Trade changes during the war had deep consequences for some maritime concerns, but also for the Confederacy itself. Examining Britain's trade with the nascent nation against the background of her peacetime trade with the Southern states, leads to a new perspective on the effectiveness of the Union blockade. Immediately before the civil war, and for most of the half century preceding it, raw cotton was the single greatest commodity imported into Britain by value. Between 1854 and 1856 it alone represented around 15 per cent of the total value of British imports. Liverpool was the great receiving port of the commodity and the huge increase in volume, up to the civil war, played a major role in her rise as a commercial port.¹²

The cotton trade was important to the British economy but it was central to that of the Southern United States. Most cotton coming into Britain was grown there; amounting, between 1854 and 1856, to about 82 per cent of the total. Before the war, export of the staple was the key factor in the development of the Southern economy and in the westward expansion of the Southern section of the United States. The economy concentrated upon its production, and was dependent upon earnings from foreign demand to pay for the many goods and services that it required but could not supply. Britain was by far the largest consumer of Southern cotton, importing almost half of its exports. By the time of the civil war, a westward shift in production was reflected

¹² R. Davis, *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade* (Leicester, 1979), pp. 14, 40, and 110-125; C. More, *The Industrial Age: Economy and Society in Britain 1750-1995* (U.K., 2nd edn., 1997), p. 105; D.M Williams, "Liverpool Merchants and the Cotton Trade 1820-1850" in *Liverpool and Merseyside: Essays in the economic and social history of the port and its hinterland*, ed., J.R Harris (Liverpool, 1969), pp. 182-211; Williams, "Bulk Trades and the Development of the Port of Liverpool in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century" in *Liverpool Shipping, Trade & Industry*, ed., V. Burton (Merseyside, 1989), pp. 8-25.

in the primacy of ports on the Gulf of Mexico as centres of export; of these New Orleans was by far the greatest.¹³

British trade with the South was not a one-way traffic. Indeed, northeastern ports of the United States may have been less dominant as entrepôts for Southern imports than the “cotton triangle” model has suggested. This model describes the export trade from Europe to the South as being diverted via ports like New York. Trade flowed from Southern ports to Europe with cotton, from Europe to Northern ports with freight or immigrants, and coastwise from there to the South either with freight or in ballast.¹⁴ This study cannot evaluate the extent to which this was true. It can, however, show that substantial volumes of shipping tonnage carried cargoes direct from Britain to Southern ports in the immediate antebellum period.

In the debate about the effectiveness of the wartime Union blockade two main strands can be discerned. One asserts that it had little effect on the outcome of the struggle. For instance Frank Owsley pointed out that its rate of interceptions in relation to attempts was low. William Still referred to it as “a naval sieve”. Stephen Wise highlighted the large quantities of war supplies that were carried through and emphasised the role these played in sustaining the Confederacy. The second strand accepts much of this but nevertheless argues that the blockade was a significant factor in the Northern victory. James McPherson contrasted the wartime level of trade with

¹³ D.C. North, *The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860* (New York, 1966), pp. 66-77, and 122-134; S. Bruchey, *Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 1790-1860* (U.S.A, 1967), pp. 1-5; L.C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States To 1860* Vol. II (Washington, 1933), pp. 692-696.

¹⁴ R.G Albion, *The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860* (Connecticut, 1961), pp. 95-121; North, *Economic*, pp. 126-128.

that immediately before it, concluding that the blockade had brought about a great reduction. He maintained that this impacted adversely upon the Confederate economy, a view recently supported by David Surdam.¹⁵

Based upon British maritime and trade sources not consulted before in this context, this study supports, and also develops, the second line of argument. There was a sharply contracted level of commerce during the war. The short-lived Confederate embargo on cotton exports - which was intended to induce foreign intervention by creating an artificial shortage - played a part in this, as did declines in production later in the conflict. Yet it is hard to attribute the scale of the reductions to anything but the Union blockade. It retarded the Confederate economy by restricting both the foreign exchange obtained by selling cotton in Britain, and the volume of supplies that could be purchased in return. During the war the South was reduced to being a marginal supplier of the British market, its leading role usurped by competitors.

These results were not achieved by stopping all commerce. Indeed the blockade did not strangle the Confederate trade lifeline to the outside world. A quantitative analysis of blockade-running, linked to the British data, will demonstrate that the blockade enjoyed progressively less success as the conflict wore on. It seems paradoxical that a blockade could be effective whilst also being so porous, but the question of how this

¹⁵ F.L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (2nd rev. ed., Chicago, 1959), pp. 229-267; W.N. Still, Jr., "A Naval Sieve: The Union Blockade in the Civil War," *Naval War College Review* XXXVI (May-June 1983), pp 38-45; S.R. Wise, *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running during the Civil war* (Columbia, SC., 1988); J.M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York, Oxford, 1988), pp. 369-391; David G. Surdam, "Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War" (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 1994).

was so has not been thoroughly addressed. This study does so by examining the hitherto overlooked transatlantic trade routes, shown in the map appearing at the start of this chapter. These will be viewed in conjunction with blockade running, and against the background of trade before and after the war.

This perspective reveals that the real potency of Union maritime strategy was in deterrence rather than in captures. Soon, the large sailing ships that had dominated the trade were discouraged from trying for Confederate ports and only specially built or adapted steamers stood a chance. Their short range forced blockade running into bottlenecks on offshore entrepôts and between such ports and the mainland, while limiting carrying capacity to a fraction of its former volume. Such vessels could only be mustered slowly, mainly from abroad, and this explains why running took a long time to build in volume. Coupled with this was a strategy of neutralising Confederate harbours and thereby forcing trade out of its normal channels, away from ports with easy access to cotton growing hinterlands. This significantly increased transaction costs and provided a strong disincentive to trade.

In arguing this case a new quantification will be set out of the relative importance of the different maritime routes along which the trade ran during the war. The British sources underlying this study improve upon previous estimates. Stephen Wise has produced the most recent, and most comprehensive, account of steamships that attempted to run the blockade. This has been used to provide the basic data in respect of this activity.¹⁶ Many of these ships were procured in Britain and cleared for their

¹⁶ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 233-328.

entrepot bases from British ports. This has enabled data from British port sources - the Bills of Entry - to be linked with Wise's material, and a high degree of corroboration has been found between the two.

In analysing the wartime trade, in comparison with that of peacetime, the Annual Statements of Trade of the UK have been used.¹⁷ These measurements of trade, at port and national level, were annually placed before Parliament. They comprise breakdowns and aggregations in relation to a range of commodities, both in terms of quantity and of market value. From these, a quantification of British raw cotton imports from 1856 to 1870 has been constructed, including a breakdown by region of origin. The Annual Statements are vast reservoirs of statistical information, useful for local and national maritime and trade study, but, to date, few studies have made significant use of them.¹⁸

Being based on statistical aggregations, the limitations of the Annual Statements are reached when more qualitative and detailed information is required. For example they contain nothing about the organisations involved in trade and shipping. However, the main contemporary sources on which this study is based, the Bills of Entry, can be used to fill this gap. They are composed of minutely detailed accounts, on a daily basis, of maritime activity at British ports. The Bills were maritime commercial

¹⁷ *British Parliamentary Papers* (hereafter *BPP*), "Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K.", (hereafter *AST*), 1856 to 1870, Hull University Library.

¹⁸ Examples of those that have are: G. Jackson, *The History and Archaeology of Ports* (Surrey, 1983); Jackson, "The Ports" in *Transport in Victorian Britain*, eds., M. Freeman and D.H. Aldcroft (Manchester, 1988), pp. 218-252; D.J. Starkey, "The Ports, Seaborne Trade and Shipping Industry of South Devon, 1786-1914" in *The New Maritime History of Devon*, eds., M. Duffy et al, Vol. II (Exeter, 1994), pp. 32-47.

newspapers, local editions of which were published by the Customs Benevolent Fund in several major British ports.¹⁹ Publication frequency varied from port to port, from daily to twice weekly. Publication format varied also, but all included similar basic information about shipping movements. On the entry of a vessel into port, the Bill for the day generally stated: the port sailed from and the date of sailing; the name of the vessel, its registered tonnage, port of registration, and whether it was steam or sail powered; the name of the master and the number of crewmen; the agent for the vessel in port; and a breakdown of cargo, together with an indication of to whom each item was consigned. Similar, but somewhat abridged, information appears in respect of each clearance from port.

This study has gathered the above information concerning ship movements between Britain and the entrepots during the war, and the aim has been to build as comprehensive a picture as possible. However, the sheer number of voyages between Britain and the Southern mainland in the years immediately before and after the conflict makes a comprehensive approach impossible. Therefore sampling has been adopted for those years. Various aspects of maritime activity have been analysed from the material gathered. With regard to individual commercial organisations, insufficient relevant business archives remain upon which to base a study which could claim to be widely representative. In this study, evidence of commercial activity, such as that found in the Bills, provides an alternative to a business archive based approach. The

¹⁹ *Customs Bills of Entry* (hereafter "BOE"), 1856-1870, for Bristol, Clyde, Dublin, Hull, Liverpool, London, and Newcastle. The master collection is held at Merseyside Maritime Museum in Liverpool (hereafter "MMM"), although some series are additionally held at local record offices in the ports concerned.

commercial policy of individual organisations is inferred from the business actually done.

The areas of activity appearing in the Bills are the functions of ship agent and of importing merchant. The importance of the former in this study has already been mentioned. The latter does not feature strongly because it is a characteristic of the source that evidence in this area is incomplete; only in wartime cotton importing is it full enough to merit analysis.²⁰ No such problem afflicts ship agenting. Although overall conclusions about the firms that acted as agents in the subject trade will be adduced, a sharper focus is trained upon twenty-four case studies. Those selected are the top ten, by shipping tonnage handled, in trade with the Southern states in each of three periods: antebellum, wartime entrepot, and post-war. (The case study total is twenty-four not thirty because six firms qualify in more than one period). To introduce a comparative dimension, the activities of the case studies in all other trades have been gathered from the same Bills used to reconstruct the Southern trade. A good deal of additional evidence has also been found concerning the case studies, which expands on, and corroborates, the activity profiles emerging from the Bills.

This is the first study to utilise the Bills to analyse organisations involved in this important maritime function. Indeed these sources are very much under-used. David Williams pioneered their use in a series of essays based on material drawn from the Liverpool collection. Concentrating on the first half of the nineteenth century, they

²⁰ This is due to consignment to “order”, the meaning of which is explored in chapter 3.

examine various aspects of the cotton and timber importing trades of the port.²¹ Another work based on Bills concerns Liverpool's coasting trade in the mid-nineteenth century.²² These studies show what can be done with such sources, but are generally confined to single aspects, such as merchanting in one commodity, and to a single port. Now that computer technology can assist in dealing with the mass and variety of information included, one can aim to encompass more. A relational database system has been the principal tool employed in this study to analyse the range of information available. A national dimension has been added by consulting the Bills for all the ports for which collections survive. Although the Liverpool collection looms largest because of the port's dominance in the cotton trade, the collections for Glasgow, Bristol, London and Hull also play a part. This study hopes to highlight the great potential of these sources in the study of maritime history.

Many organisations that acted as ship agents were also shipowners. In order to examine the latter function, and the relationship between the two, the statutory Ship Registers have been consulted. Maintained at port level by local Customs Houses, these recorded standard details of every vessel registered at the port including name, registered tonnage, and type (sail or steam). An indication of place and year of build makes it possible to draw some general conclusions about shipbuilding. More importantly the names, places of residence, shares, and occupations of the initial owners were recorded, followed by a chronological record of subsequent transactions.

²¹ Williams, "The Liverpool Timber Trade" *Business History* VIII (1966), pp. 103-117; Williams, in *Liverpool and Merseyside*, pp. 182-211; Williams, "The Shipping of the North Atlantic Cotton Trade in the Mid-Nineteenth Century" in *Volumes not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World Trades*, eds., D. Alexander and R. Ommer (Newfoundland, 1979), pp. 303-329; Williams, in *Liverpool Shipping*, pp. 8-25.

²² V. Burton, "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade" in *Liverpool Shipping*, pp. 26-67.

These included sales and mortgages, with the parties to each transaction detailed in the same way as the original owners. Changes of ownership on death also appear, and unbroken chains of title can thus be traced. Finally there is a statement of the circumstances surrounding the removal of the vessel from the particular register.

A variety of publications have been based on sampling the register entries of one port in a given period. These tell us a lot about various aspects of local shipping, particularly about patterns of investment in shipowning and the geographical spread, and occupational characteristics, of shipowners.²³ What they lack is a comparative insight into what the shipowners were actually doing: the fact of a ship's registration at a particular port does not tell us anything about its activity. This study adopts a different method by first identifying, from the Bills, vessels that took part in the Southern states trade. Armed with the knowledge of their respective home ports, the appropriate register has then been searched for each vessel. This exercise has been confined to Liverpool, London, Glasgow and Hull, which were the most significant British ports of register in the trade.²⁴ This approach links ownership with trading activity, rather than just with a home port. Conversely it also links participation in the

²³ See for example S.R. Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50" *Maritime History* II (1972), pp. 46-68; Ville, "Shipping in the Port of Newcastle, 1780-1800" *Journal of Transport History* 9 (1988), pp. 60-77; Ville "Patterns of Shipping Investment in the Port of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1750-1850" *Northern History* XXV (1989), pp. 205-221; S. Jones, "Shipowning in Boston, Lincolnshire, 1836-1848" *Mariners Mirror* 65 (1979), pp. 339-349; F. Neal, "Liverpool Shipping in the Early Nineteenth Century" in *Liverpool and Merseyside*, pp. 147-181.

²⁴ H.M Customs and Excise (hereafter "HMC"), Ship Registers for the Port of Liverpool, MSS, C/EX/L/4, (hereafter "SR Liverpool"), MMM; HMC, London Register of British Ships, MSS, CUST 130, (hereafter "SR London"), Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter "PRO"); Transcriptions, MSS, BT/108, (hereafter "TS London"), PRO; Transactions, MSS, BT/109, (hereafter "TA London") PRO; HMC, Merchant Shipping Registers for the Port of Glasgow, MSS, CE/59/11, (hereafter "SR Glasgow"), Strathclyde Regional Archive, Mitchell Library, Glasgow; HMC, Registers of Shipping for the Port of Hull, MSS, DPC/1, (hereafter "SR Hull"), City of Kingston -Upon -Hull Record Office.

Southern trade with shipowning at a national level, rather than just with the port through which the commerce principally flowed.

An important connection between the Bills and the Registers is available in the case of Liverpool firms: that is Gores, the annual Commercial Directory for the Liverpool area.²⁵ Shipowners, except for limited companies, are noted on the Registers as individuals or combinations of individuals; in contrast, the agents noted in the Bills are often firm names, representing business partnerships. Gores, however, lists both individuals and firms, but also links them together. No other studies have been identified that significantly use this valuable source. This study has employed it to connect individuals to their firms, also to establish the longevity of those firms in order to test adaptability. Gores has also been helpful in ascertaining how organisations chose to advertise their business, which throws new light on the sort of firms that acted as ship agents.

Although a variety of other sources has been employed, those mentioned above provide the basis of the findings of this thesis. Individually each is a very rich source of information about maritime and trade activity; taken together they interlock and are mutually complementary and corroborative. This is especially so of the three port sources last mentioned, which have not before been used together. Together they can build a picture of the nature of maritime enterprises and their commercial activities.

²⁵ *Gores Commercial Directory*, (hereafter “Gores”), Wallesey Central Library, Merseyside.

This thesis is divided into four further chapters, followed by a conclusion. Chapter 2 deals with sources and methods in greater detail. Chapter 3 looks at the nature and extent of the impact of the war, both on British participants and on the Confederacy's chances. It seeks to explain why that impact was so profound by assessing the role of the Union naval blockade of the Confederacy. Chapter 4 examines the response of British maritime commercial interests to the Civil War and blockade. The degrees of adaptability exhibited are investigated, as are the relative successes of different strategies pursued. Chapter 5 takes an overview of institutional organisation, and assesses its degree of importance to British maritime commercial development during the period.

Chapter 2. Sources and Methods

This chapter will look in detail at the sources used and the methods employed to search them and analyse the results. In doing so their quality and consistency will be evaluated, their complementary and corroborative nature demonstrated, and the process by which a unified picture is constructed from them explained.

1. Customs Bills of Entry

The material forming the bedrock of this study has been gathered from these contemporary maritime newspapers. Almost complete collections of Bills, for the relevant period of 1856 to 1870, have been consulted in respect of several major British ports. These are: Bristol; Clyde (primarily covering Glasgow, but also including other ports on the river such as Greenock); Hull; Liverpool (including Birkenhead, other Wirral ports and Mersey ports as far up river as Runcorn); London (including vessels entering Southampton); and Tyne. Only volumes for the years 1860, 1863 and 1865 survive for Dublin. Although Bills for South Wales ports such as Cardiff, Swansea and Newport have not survived, some of the region's international coal trade can be reconstructed from existing Bills. This is because some vessels cleared other ports in ballast, bound for transatlantic destinations via South Wales, where they would have taken on coal. Taken together, these sources provide something approaching national coverage; certainly in terms of British oceanic trade, for which the named ports were the principal centres.¹

¹ Hereinafter together "BOE". The master collection formerly held at the Customs library in London is now held at Merseyside Maritime Museum in Liverpool. This collection has been used for the study, supplemented by the following local collections not included in the master set: *Hull BOE*, 1858-1865 at Hull Central Library; *Tyne BOE*, 1861-1865 at Newcastle Central Library; *London 'A' BOE*, 1865 at British Museum Newspaper Library, Colindale. A good guide to the whereabouts and coverage of local collections is E. Carson, "Sources for Maritime History (1): Customs Bills of Entry" *Maritime History* 1 (1971), pp. 176-189.

The publication format varied from port to port. In Liverpool and London two separate editions were published, designated 'A' and 'B'. The sections of Liverpool 'A' which have been searched for this study relate to ships reported inwards, summaries of merchandise entered for export, and ships cleared outwards. Liverpool 'B', containing summaries of imported merchandise and of Customs duties paid, have not been used. By contrast London 'A' contain only ships reported inwards; these include ships entering Bristol, Hull, Liverpool and Southampton in addition to London. These have been relied upon for entries into all of these ports except Liverpool. London 'B' Bills contain much information, however the aspect used for this study has been the sections on ships clearing outwards from the port.

Only one edition was published in respect of the other ports. Again formats differed considerably. Common to all were sections dealing with ships reported inwards and ships cleared outwards. These have been searched for in the Clyde and Tyne Bills. The Bristol and Hull Bills have only been searched for clearances outwards; inward reports having been gleaned from London 'A'. A search of the surviving volumes for Dublin has revealed no relevant sailings, inward or outward. Accordingly this port has been eliminated from the study, along with Southampton, where a search of inward reports has also revealed nothing relevant.

So the main categories of information gleaned from these sources concern ships reported inwards and ships cleared outwards. The following is an example of the former, reported into Liverpool in the Bill for 3rd August 1863:

Prospero, @ Nassau

(June 3), of London, A Taylor, 8m, 164 t, J Glynn & Son, Cbg D

Cotton 137 bls, 82 bgs, 1 hf bg A Collie & Co

108 Order

150 tcs tobacco A Collie & Co.

This tells us that the *Prospero*, a London registered vessel of 164 tons, sailed from Nassau on June 3rd with a crew of eight men. She was a sailing vessel (if the designation ‘Sr’ had appeared after her name she would have been a steamer). Her master was A Taylor, her agent in Liverpool was J Glynn & Son, and she berthed in the Coburg Dock. Her cargo consisted of bales and bags of cotton, and a quantity of tobacco, mostly consigned to the merchants A Collie & Co. Part of the cotton cargo was consigned to ‘Order’. This designation will be discussed in chapter 3, but, in short, it means that the identity of the merchants to whom that section of cargo was consigned is unknown. This is so for large proportions of cotton imports, at times an overwhelming majority, and represents a serious gap in the source in terms of reaching generalised conclusions about import merchanting.

On 31st October 1863 the *Prospero* cleared Liverpool to return to Nassau. This is apparent from the following entry in the Liverpool Bill for that day:

Nassau, Prospero, A Taylor, 8, B, 164

J Glynn & Son.

The same tonnage, crew size, master and agent are shown as when she entered the port. Here the absence of ‘(s)’ after her name, confirms that she was a sail rather than steam vessel. Information about place of registration is confined to the letter ‘B’, indicating British register. The only other distinctions made in this respect on clearance were ‘A’ for American, and ‘F’ for other foreign register. It can be seen that

no details are given of outgoing cargo, nor of consigning merchants. Where a vessel entered or cleared port without any cargo this is shown by the designation 'In Ballast'.

Liverpool Bills do itemise the cargo entered into warehouse for each destination on each day; there are separate lists for foreign and British goods. To give an illustration, on 4th March 1862 the following British goods were entered for export to Bermuda:

19 cs hosiery, 48 cs statny, 7 cs pistols, 35 cs printing materials, 5 bls 17 cs linen & 12 cs cotn thread, 25 pkgs hware, 5 cks sadlery, 2 cs leather, 7 c block tin, 208 coils rope, 143 bls 8 cs woln, 6 cs guns, 24 bdls agricultural implts, 26 bls blankets, 6 cs caps, 14 cs 7 cks surgical insts, 14 cs soap, 5 cs shot, 29 cs 21 cks apothy ware, 86 cs 16 bls cotns, 2 cs 1 trs habdy, 10 bls canvas, 6 coils rope.

This gives a flavour of the range of merchandise, both military and civilian, which was being directed via entrepots to the Confederacy during the war. However, it also illustrates the problems involved in dealing with this kind of data. The source does not indicate which ships carried individual items, nor the identities of exporting merchants. Merchandise quantity is represented in a variety of units of carriage, rather than in absolute and consistent measures of volume or value.² The example represents one entry for one day; transcribing and aggregating all relevant entries for the civil war period would in itself be the work of years. For these reasons no attempt has been made to quantify export commodities. Some of the same problems afflict import merchandise, other than raw cotton. The staple was clearly the main element in the trade from the South to Britain, and accordingly is the only British import commodity to be quantified in this study.

² The abbreviations for units of carriage probably mean the following: 'cs' = cases; 'bls' = bales; 'pkgs' = packages; 'cks' = casks; 'bdls' = bundles. Similarly 'statny' = stationary; 'hware' = hardware, etc.

All the Bills have more or less the same information presented in similar ways, although there are some significant differences. The Hull, Tyne, Bristol and Clyde editions, although inferior in some respects, improved upon Liverpool by itemising each vessel's export cargo. London 'B' took a different approach by valuing goods entered for export instead of expressing them in carriage units. The lack of consistency in these matters reinforces the decision not to embark on a quantification of export commodities.

A deficiency common to the Tyne and Bristol publications is that no indication was given as to whether a vessel was sail or steam. London largely shares this omission; for some reason the supplemental ships loading list in London 'B' is the only part of the port's Bills to make the distinction. Liverpool, Hull and Clyde do differentiate, but in some instances the appropriate designation fails to appear for ships which are subsequently discovered to have been steamers. Part of the process of using these sources is to build up one's knowledge about particular vessels from their repeated appearances in different editions. At least one appearance as steam, for a particular vessel, has generally been taken as decisive. A guiding factor is crew size: as will be seen in chapter 3, steam ships generally had much larger manning levels than sail. Another helpful source of comparison in some instances is Stephen Wise's appendix of steam blockade runners.³ Nonetheless, for a small proportion of vessels, no definite evidence is available to assign them to one type or the other.

³ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 285-328.

A number of other minor problems are evident, of the sort that are likely to afflict any source. Occasionally bits of information are missing. There are a small number of misprints. For some voyages into, or out of Liverpool, two agents are named as alternatives; in these instances the principle has been to always choose the first named for the sake of consistency. Ship identification can present difficulties, for example where all identifying elements for a vessel are in agreement between two Bills, except for registered tonnage. Deciding whether it was the same ship has to be done on a balance of probabilities, taking all circumstances into account. Often the tonnage discrepancy is too small to worry about, or results from an obvious misprint. Where this is not so, the general principle in these cases has been to treat them as different ships, and to assign identification numbers to their names. This has also been done in respect of the many obviously different vessels that shared the same name.

It is important to get identification right where ownership is also being established, otherwise owners get credited with voyages they had no part in. This is less important where the connection is not being made, as in the case of all vessels under an overseas flag (for which no ownership details have been sought). The problem of diverging tonnages for different appearances of apparently the same vessels is only marked in relation to American ships, mostly in the pre-war period. The high degree of consistency between individual editions concerning tonnage of every other nationality, suggests that the problem stems from changing American criteria of calculation, or inconsistent reporting, rather than source error.

One of the great strengths of these sources is their very high level of mutual consistency and corroboration. Many craft are reported in more than one Bill, and a significant number in several. In these cases, their every appearance confirms the basic identifiers of name, type, place of registration and tonnage. Often the same master was in command from voyage to voyage, and his name is also constant from Bill to Bill. Although crew numbers were not the same on every voyage, the sort of numbers particular vessels tended to have is again consistent. In looking at ship movements, it is clear that sequences constructed from several editions are geographically and chronologically credible. Table 2.1 demonstrates this by showing a sequence of voyages of the vessel which has previously been used for the purposes of example, the *Prospero*; she made more journeys that are relevant to this study than any other.

Table 2.1. Voyages of the *Prospero*.

| Cleared From | Clearance Date | Inwards To | Inwards Date | Crew |
|--------------|----------------|------------|--------------|------|
| London | 25/07/62 | Nassau | 30/08/62 | 8 |
| London | 26/11/62 | Nassau | 01/01/63 | 8 |
| Nassau | 09/02/63 | Liverpool | 14/03/63 | 11 |
| Liverpool | 09/04/63 | Nassau | 15/05/63 | 8 |
| Nassau | 03/06/63 | Liverpool | 03/08/63 | 8 |
| Liverpool | 31/10/63 | Nassau | 06/12/63 | 8 |
| Nassau | 11/01/64 | Liverpool | 08/02/64 | 7 |
| Liverpool | 26/02/64 | Nassau | 02/04/64 | 8 |
| Nassau | 09/07/64 | Liverpool | 08/08/64 | 7 |
| Liverpool | 26/09/64 | Nassau | 01/11/64 | 8 |
| Nassau | 01/01/65 | London | 06/02/65 | 7 |

Source: BOE for dates at Liverpool or London shown.⁴

In each of the publications from which Table 2.1 is derived, the master was shown as A. Taylor, the registration as London or British, and in the Liverpool editions the type as sail. Being put together from both London and Liverpool editions, the table demonstrates consistency both within and between each port's Bills. The sequence

⁴ Dates of arrival at Nassau have been estimated on the basis of the average duration of voyages from Nassau to Liverpool (36 days). Dates of departure from Nassau to London have been estimated on the same basis. The latter is necessary because, unlike those of Liverpool, London Bills do not include date of departure from last port

shown is broken only by the absence of a return to London between the first and second voyages. Actually this return is noted on the London Bill for 31st October 1862. The voyage is not included on the database, from which the Table is drawn, because in this instance the *Prospero* carried a cargo of only Bahamian goods. The absence of Confederate merchandise excludes this as a relevant voyage. This leads on to the basic question: what constitutes a 'relevant voyage'?

For the war period the aim has been to build as complete a picture as possible of British trade with the Confederate States. In order to qualify as 'relevant', voyages in this period have to satisfy three criteria: first, that they involved a clearance from port between President Lincoln's declaration of blockade on 16th April 1861, and General Lee's surrender at Appomattox on 9th April 1865; second, that the voyage involved a transatlantic crossing from one 'relevant' port to another; third, that the cargo included goods originating in, or ultimately bound for, the Confederacy. It is the fact that the trade was not direct that complicates matters here.

The method has been to search the Bills for sailings to or from relevant ports of destination or origin. For example Table 2.1 results from journeys to Britain from Nassau, or from Britain to Nassau, being included in the search. Only voyages satisfying all three criteria have been entered on database. Where findings are based on this source they will be referenced 'Database', followed by an indication of the Bills of Entry period covered. Where Bills information is not drawn from the database it will just be referenced 'BOE', again followed by an indication of the period covered. It should be appreciated that it is impossible separately to reference each

daily Bill from which aggregate conclusions have been derived; such findings are often based on hundreds, or even thousands of individual editions.

To return to the 'relevant voyage' criteria, the first should be clear enough. The second, 'relevant port', means all the ports within the territory of the Confederacy, the entrepots through which wartime trade was re-directed, and all the British ports covered by the Bills. Ports within the Confederacy do not include places such as Baltimore in Maryland, normally regarded as 'Southern' but never part of the seceding Confederacy; nor do they include, after the date of their capture, Confederate ports that were taken by Northern forces, such as New Orleans.

It is a straightforward matter to identify which voyages from entrepots to Britain satisfy the third criteria. The presence in cargoes of Confederate goods is the critical factor. Although small amounts of Confederate commodities such as rice, naval stores and tobacco can be seen, cotton is the key item. The countries where the entrepots were situated were not cotton producers.⁵ Together with the absence of British cotton imports from these sources before and after the war, this makes it clear that cotton coming from the entrepots during the war was of Confederate origin.⁶

⁵ W.O. Henderson, *The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 1861-1865* (Manchester, 1934), pp. 35-49.

⁶ *BPP*, *AST*: 1860, pp. 304, and 326; 1861, p. 375; 1865, pp. 265, 296, 340, and 343; 1870, pp. 241, 274, 318, and 321. The entrepots of Matamoros, Havana and Nassau were of course situated in Mexico, Cuba and the Bahamas respectively. The main entrepot of Bermuda was St. Georges. The *AST* summarise overseas national statistics, not those of individual ports. Each annual volume contains a summary for the year in question and the preceding four. The period covered for Mexico and Cuba is 1856 to 1870. The period covered for Bermuda is 1857 to 1870, and for the Bahamas 1861 to 1870. The source does not deal with these islands separately from the other British colonies of the West Indies until 1857 and 1861 respectively.

Accordingly, where cargoes from the entrepots contained the staple, or other distinctively Confederate items, the voyage satisfies the third criterion. All wartime crossings from Matamoros qualify. In fact, before Confederate cotton appeared, there was no exportation from the port to Britain at all. Much of the northeast region of Mexico in which Matamoros is situated is desert. In this period the local economy primarily involved raising cattle for hides, and mining the mineral wealth of the region for base metal. During the war a small minority of vessels did carry some Mexican hides, and base lead and copper, in addition to cotton. But this would not have been worthwhile without the staple. This is evident from the fact that a search of Bills for the fifteen months or so from the beginning of 1860 to the start of the war in April 1861, has located no vessels sailing from Matamoros to Britain.⁷

Most, but not all, wartime voyages from Bermuda and the Bahamas also satisfy the third criteria. A search in this context of the same immediate pre-war period just mentioned, reveals a very small export trade from these islands to London: four journeys from Bermuda, and fifteen from Nassau. The commodities involved were quite distinctive and cannot be confused with Confederate goods. For example the voyage of the *Prospero* to London from Nassau on 31st October 1862, which was excluded from the database, carried a typical Bahamian cargo: bark, mahogany, shells, logwood, grape fruit, shaddocks, coffee, ebony, yellow wood, cedar and sponge. The characteristic Bermudan cargo was arrowroot. These trades were swamped by the lure

⁷ *BOE*, January 1860 to April 1861; Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865); H.F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1963), pp. 107-110.

of Confederate cotton and only a tiny minority of wartime voyages from the Bahamas or Bermuda carried indigenous goods.⁸

Vessels crossing with one type of cargo from Bermuda and Nassau have been included on the database although they carried no Confederate produce: towards the end of the war some sailed to Britain with returned goods. This was merchandise that had been transported to these entrepôts, but had not made it through the blockade to the Confederacy before the routes into the mainland closed. The last wartime voyage of the *Prospero*, shown on Table 2.1 as entering London on 6th February 1865, carried such a cargo. Also around this time, vessels began to return in ballast because cotton was no longer to be had at Bermuda or Nassau.

The entrepôt of Havana, in Spanish run Cuba, was very different to those already mentioned: its significance in British trade was not a temporary wartime gift from the Confederacy. Before the war it was a large exporter to Britain of Cuban produce, mainly sugar and cigars. In the first eight months of 1860 alone, over a hundred vessels sailed into Britain from there. This traffic continued throughout the war and only a minority of wartime voyages from Havana satisfy the third criterion by carrying Confederate cotton. Indeed, of a total of eighty-one qualifying voyages, as many as fifty-two also included significant amounts of Cuban goods in their cargo. Whereas an almost wholly Confederate inward trade is represented on the database from other entrepôts, the position is not so clear cut in relation to Havana. Although only cargoes from the port which included cotton have been counted as relevant, an unquantifiable,

⁸ *BOE*, January 1860 to April 1861; Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865).

but significant, element of that voyage tonnage does not represent Confederate trade. However Havana was by far the least important of the entrepots and, in any event, the Confederate element in its exports will be measured by cotton quantity rather than by shipping tonnage.⁹

When it comes to applying the third criterion to voyages from Britain to the entrepots there are no clearly identifying commodities like cotton. Even if there were, it has already been made clear that the Bills do not tell us what goods were loaded onto which vessels. In general terms this is not a problem because, as we will see, most of the sailings clearing Britain for Bermuda, Nassau and Matamoros were obviously carrying goods bound for the Confederacy. Again, however, the position is very different in relation to Havana. In deciding these matters, any pre-existing traffic to each entrepot must be examined in comparison with that of the war. This can be used to determine how far wartime exports represented the continuation of an existing trade, and how far they represented a new trade in Confederate supply.

We have already seen that Matamoros owed its position as an exporter to its role as an entrepot for the Confederacy. The same was true of its growth as an import market. From at least the beginning of 1860, to the start of the war, no ships left Britain for this Mexican port.¹⁰ Secondary authorities are clear that merchandise subsequently arriving in Matamoros from abroad was making its way in bulk across the Rio Grande to Confederate Texas. This played an important part in supplying the region of the

⁹ *BOE*, January to August 1860; Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865).

¹⁰ *BOE*, January 1860 to April 1861.

Confederacy west of the Mississippi. It should be recognised, however, that a proportion of supplies landed at Matamoros may not have made the river crossing to Texas. For most of the civil war period Mexico was itself enduring a civil war. This arose from 1862 onwards as a result of the French intervention, and subsequent attempt to impose the Hapsburg Maximilian as Emperor. Although the dominant figure in northeastern Mexico, Santiago Vidaurri, largely managed to keep the region out of the conflict until 1864, he may have been accumulating foreign supplies. Similarly some imported goods may have been acquired by national President Benito Juarez following his flight to the northeast in early 1864; or by the French following their take-over of the region later in the year.¹¹ No quantification is possible here; but the point remains that ships would not have gone to Matamoros if it had not become a Confederate channel with the outside world. In the absence of more precise data, all wartime clearances to Matamoros have therefore been regarded as being part of the Confederate trade.

Britain had very little export trade to Bermuda and Nassau prior to the war; a pre-war search shows London as the only port from which vessels set out to these destinations.¹² Given this, all wartime clearances to Bermuda and Nassau from the other British ports have been regarded as fulfilling the third criterion.

¹¹ W. Diamond, "Imports of the Confederate Government from Europe and Mexico" *Journal of Southern History* VI (November 1940), pp. 470-503; R.W. Delaney, "Matamoros, Port for Texas during the Civil War" *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 58 (1955), pp. 473-487; Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 103-133; W.T. Windham, "The Problem of Supply in the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy" *Journal of Southern History* XXVII (May 1961), pp. 149-168; R.C. Tyler, "Santiago Vidaurri and the Confederacy" *The Americas* XXVI (July 1969), pp. 66-76; Tyler, *Santiago Vidaurri and the Southern Confederacy* (Texas, 1973), pp. 98-128; J. Daddysman, *The Matamoros Trade; Confederate Commerce, Diplomacy and Intrigue* (Delaware, 1984).

¹² *BOE*, January 1860 to April 1861.

Table 2.2. Cargo Carrying Voyages from London to Bermuda and Nassau.

| YEAR | TO BERMUDA | | TO NASSAU | |
|------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | NO. OF VOYAGES | VESSEL TONNAGE | NO. OF VOYAGES | VESSEL TONNAGE |
| 1860 | 13 | 2531 | 11 | 1047 |
| 1861 | 11 | 2327 | 12 | 1621 |
| 1862 | 14 | 2602 | 35 | 10157 |
| 1863 | 40 | 11663 | 53 | 10250 |
| 1864 | 45 | 10563 | 45 | 9113 |

Source: BOE, January 1860 to April 1861; Database (BOE, 1861 to 1865).

The pre-existing and wartime levels of export trade from London are compared in Table 2.2. The Table shows a small, and fairly constant, amount of shipping bound for Nassau between 1860 and 1861. There was, however, a huge increase in 1862, and this much higher level continued in 1863 and 1864. Blockade running from Nassau to the mainland got under-way from the beginning of 1862 onwards.¹³ The surge at the beginning of 1862 must represent Confederate supplies going to the entrepot. Accordingly all clearances from London to Nassau from the beginning of 1862 onwards have been regarded as being part of Confederate trade.

The Table shows a similar position in relation to Bermuda, except that the large increase in trade occurred later, from the start of 1863 onwards. There were a few runs from Bermuda to the mainland in 1862, but it did not become a running base in earnest until the beginning of 1863.¹⁴ Therefore all London clearances to Bermuda have been counted as being part of Confederate trade from the start of 1863 onwards. These decisions, though logical, are a little arbitrary. This is unavoidable in the absence of data about the ultimate destinations of specific cargoes. Counting all

¹³ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 233-284.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

clearances to these entrepots, from the dates indicated, also inevitably means inclusion of a non-Confederate trade element: the normal supply of the communities of Bermuda and Nassau themselves. There is no way of telling these elements apart. This actually makes little difference overall, given that the pre-existing trade was very small compared to all wartime clearances to these entrepots from Britain.

Attempts to apply the third criteria of the 'relevant voyage' definition break down when it comes to looking at voyages from Britain to Havana. There were around eighty journeys on this route in the first eight months of 1860 alone; they continued to be numerous throughout the war.¹⁵ There is no way of telling which vessels carried goods for Cuba, and which carried goods to be shipped through the blockade from Havana to the Confederacy. In these circumstances no voyages have been entered on the database in this respect. The exclusion weakens the study only marginally because Havana was by far the least important of the entrepots.

This study aims to place the war in the wider context of pre and postwar trade with the Southern United States. The mountain of relevant data contained in the Bills of Entry means that an examination of the wider context from this source inevitably involves a sampling approach. An idea of the size of the mountain appears from the fact that around 1,700 wartime voyages have qualified as relevant and have been entered onto the database. Sampling needs to be digestible, and so it has been limited to three months before and three months after the war. In order to look at the degree of continuity or change, from year to year, these have not been concentrated into one

¹⁵ *BOE*, 1860 to 1865.

year. Instead they have been spread over six pre- and six postwar years, and placed in every other year. The month of January has been selected and so this month has been used in 1856, 1858 and 1860; and in 1866, 1868 and 1870. For reasons to be explained shortly the samples have been confined to the Liverpool Bills.

By the late 1850s the season for cotton arriving at Southern ports to be shipped peaked between October and April.¹⁶ With voyages from there taking, on average, between a month, and a month and a half, cotton was arriving in Britain in bulk by January. Liverpool was overwhelmingly dominant as British port of receipt. Between 1856 and 1860 she never imported less than 94 per cent of total British imports of US cotton bales, with the figure being 97 per cent in 1856 and 1860.¹⁷ Between 1866 and 1870 Liverpool never imported less than 92 per cent of total British cotton imports by weight.¹⁸ None of the other British ports appearing in this study imported anything from the Southern United States on a scale which could compare with the Liverpool cotton trade. In the whole of 1860 there were only thirty voyages from those states to London, twenty-three to Glasgow and sixteen to Bristol. Most entries into Glasgow carried cotton, but the amount transported was negligible in comparison with Liverpool. The main items coming into London and Bristol were tobacco and naval stores.¹⁹

¹⁶ Gray, *Southern Agriculture*, pp. 714-715.

¹⁷ Williams, in *Volumes not Values*, pp. 303-329; T Ellison, *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain* (London, 1886), Table No. 1. This finding has been calculated from comparing Williams annual figures for receipts of US cotton bales at Liverpool with Ellison's figures for receipts into Britain as a whole.

¹⁸ *BPP*, AST; 1866, pp. 114-121; 1867, pp. 112-119; 1868, pp. 112-119; 1869, pp. 112-119; 1870, pp. 104-111. For the postwar period, statistics for US cotton bales arriving in Liverpool, comparable with the pre-war figures, are not available. Accordingly, for this period, Liverpool's share of total British cotton imports by weight has been calculated from AST data; the source does not indicate where cotton arriving at particular ports was shipped from and so a calculation of Liverpool's share of the US total cannot be made.

¹⁹ *BOE*, 1860.

Exportation to the South from these ports was also small scale compared to Liverpool. In 1860 thirty-three cargoes went from Bristol to the South, almost all of railway iron. The sixteen clearances to the South from London in that year were mostly going via coal ports, and there were ten clearances in the year from Glasgow.²⁰ A search of the Bills for the sample months has revealed no more than a handful of relevant voyages in any given month in relation to ports other than Liverpool.²¹ In these circumstances sampling has been confined to Liverpool. Before and after the war this was the only market that really counted in trade with the Southern United States.

Table 2.3. Coverage of Liverpool Sample Months.

| YEAR | NO. OF VOYAGES | | | COTTON BALES IMPORTED | |
|---------------|----------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| | IN | OUT | TOTAL | NO. | % OF ANNUAL TOTAL |
| 1856 | 61 | 57 | 118 | 168795 | 9.6 |
| 1858 | 41 | 39 | 80 | 106703 | 5.7 |
| 1860 | 112 | 82 | 194 | 315002 | 12.2 |
| 1866 | 44 | 36 | 80 | 82422 | 7.1 |
| 1868 | 56 | 42 | 98 | 129708 | 10.2 |
| 1870 | 61 | 25 | 86 | 140097 | 8.4 |
| TOTALS | 375 | 281 | 656 | 942727 | - |

Source: Database (BOE, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1866, 1868 and 1870).²²

The magnitude of the trade passing through Liverpool can be seen from the figures presented in respect of each sample month in Table 2.3. All relevant voyages have been entered onto the database; here these voyages are simply those between Liverpool and the relevant Southern ports defined earlier. The numbers of voyages in each month dwarf the figures for the whole year of 1860 that have been presented for

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ BOE, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1866, 1868 and 1870.

²² The percentage of annual total figures have been calculated from the British annual imports figures given in Ellison, *Cotton Trade*, Table No. 1.

other ports. Even so it can be observed that these months still only cover a fraction of annual British cotton imports from the United States. Nevertheless, each sample includes a very substantial amount of trading activity and there is no reason to doubt that this activity was broadly representative. It will be seen that strong continuities can be observed, not only between the sample months themselves, but also between findings based on them and trends identified in secondary literature; this indicates the representative nature of the samples.

Sampling of the Bills has included two further elements. First, all merchandise entered for export to the South in the sample months has been identified with a view to commenting upon the sort of goods involved. Second, a number of firms have been selected as case studies, and their activities in other trades in the sample months searched for. This allows the important issue of how diversified their activities were at different periods to be addressed.

It is impossible to base this exercise upon those involved in merchanting. The problem of consignment to 'Order', which was mentioned earlier, is a considerable one. In the pre- and postwar samples over 80 per cent of cotton was consigned in this way, and therefore the identities of those importing only around 20 percent of the total are known.²³ Even if this were not so, differing measures of quantity in other trades and a lack of indication as to value, would be sufficient discouragement. There is no consistent yardstick with which to compare the levels of these activities. But two consistent and comprehensive measures are available to gauge the activities of firms

²³ Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, and 1870).

that acted as ship agents: numbers of voyages agented and volume of shipping tonnage handled. Broadly speaking an agent's function was to look after the interests of his shipowning clients' vessels whilst they were in his port. Consequently a focus upon firms that acted in this capacity enables relationships between them and shipowners to be explored; the exploration forms an important part of this study.

All of the Liverpool firms that have been traced as acting as ship agents in the subject trade are listed in Appendix A. The firms chosen as case studies are listed in Table 2.4. They are the top ten, by shipping tonnage handled, in each of the three periods shown in Table 2.4: pre-war (Group 1); wartime entrepot (Group 2); and post-war (Group 3).²⁴ The exercise is restricted to Liverpool firms because, as stated earlier, pre and post-war samples have only been gathered in respect of that port; it is necessary to have these periods as points of comparison to wartime activity to assess continuity and change. The six case studies of Group 1 indicated by an asterisk in Table 2.4 appear again in Groups 2 or 3; these duplications reduce the number of case studies to twenty-four. The significance of these groups in the Southern trade is established by a look at the proportions of total shipping tonnage, falling into this study, that they handled. On this criterion case study market share was between forty and fifty percent in each period.

It should be pointed out that Group 1 was not entirely selected on the basis of activity in the pre-war samples. In the first few months of the war, between April and early August 1861, about 145 vessels left Southern ports to sail direct to Liverpool. As we

²⁴ A slight diversion from this principle in relation to the postwar period is explained in chapter 4.

shall see this ended abruptly when the blockade came into force; it was a brief continuation of the antebellum pattern before the blockade changed things. On this basis, these sailings have been included in the antebellum data from which Group 1 emerges as the top ten. In fact, a selection based solely on the pre-war samples would still include seven of the ten members of the group. A fuller discussion of this matter appears in chapter 3.

Table 2.4. Case Study Firms.

| Ship Agents |
|---|
| Group 1. Antebellum Samples. 44.9 % of tonnage handled by: |
| Boult English & Brandon * |
| Taylor Tipper & Co * |
| James Browne & Co * |
| Fraser Trenholm & Co * |
| Duncan & Kendall (Duncan & Shaw) * |
| Miller & Mosman |
| Pilkington Bros |
| Warren & Thayer |
| Train & Co |
| Rankin Gilmour & Co * |
| Group 2. Wartime Entrepot Trade. 42.4 % of tonnage handled by: |
| Fraser Trenholm & Co |
| John Glynn & Son |
| Melchor George Klingender & Co |
| Leech Harrison & Forwood |
| John Thomas Nickels |
| De Jersey & Co |
| Bahr Behrend & Co |
| Henry Lafone |
| Longton & Longrigg |
| Beach Root & Co |
| Group 3. Postwar Samples. 49.8 % of tonnage handled by: |
| Taylor Tipper & Co |
| James Browne & Co |
| Boult English & Brandon |
| John Starr de Wolf & Co |
| William Henry Haynes |
| British & American Steam Navigation Co Ltd |
| West India & Pacific Steamship Co Ltd |
| Rankin Gilmour & Co |
| Duncan & Shaw (Duncan & Kendall) |
| Thomas & James Harrison |

Source: Database (BOE: January 1856, 1858, 1860; April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868, 1870).

Having selected the case studies, each sample month was searched to find the business they were doing in other trades. To also have some idea of how diversified they were during the war, the months of January in 1862, 1863 and 1864 have also been searched. These results have been entered onto a second database and this will be referred to as 'Cases Database'. Of course the sample periods, selected in relation to the Southern cotton trade, do not necessarily coincide with seasonal peaks in any other; it is unlikely that any single month would do so. These samples do, however, encompass a good deal of activity in a variety of trades and so enable a number of conclusions to be drawn about the diversity of the agenting activities of case study firms.

2. Custom House Ship Registers.

Ship Registers have been used mainly to identify owners of vessels active in the subject trade. Four local collections have been consulted: those of Liverpool, London, Glasgow and Hull. Broadly speaking the search has covered the volumes kept for the years 1855 to 1870. An important London volume, that for 1864, is missing. To fill the gap, the relevant Board of Trade transcriptions of register entries and also of subsequent transactions, have been consulted. These were sent from local customs houses to the Chief Registrar of Shipping.²⁵ The four ports have been chosen by using voyage tonnage as the nearest to an absolute measure of importance. Voyages made by ships of these registers accounted together for sixty per cent of total voyage tonnage

²⁵ HMC Ship Registers for the Port of Liverpool, MSS, C/EX/L/4, MMM, Liverpool (SR Liverpool); HMC London Register of British Ships, MSS, CUST 130, PRO (SR London); Transcriptions, MSS, BT/108/11 (London 1864), PRO (TS London); Transactions, MSS, BT/109 (London 1864), PRO (TA London); HMC Merchant Shipping Registers for the Port of Glasgow, MSS, CE/59/11, Strathclyde Regional Archive, Mitchell Library, Glasgow (SR Glasgow); HMC Registers of Shipping for the Port of Hull, MSS, DPC/1, City of Kingston -Upon -Hull Record Office (SR Hull). Hereafter collectively ("SR").

included on the database and made by British, and British colonial, registered ships.

By this yardstick they were the top four British ports.

In order to trace ships deployed in the Southern trade, each collection has been approached with a list of vessels of relevant register, compiled from the Bills. Where the key identifiers of name, registered tonnage, and type (sail or steam), tie up with the listed detail, then that ship has been traced. Appropriate information has then been transcribed covering the period of each vessel's activity in the Southern trade, and this has been entered onto the database. As with the Bills it should be appreciated that some aggregate conclusions are based on too many register entries for each to be referenced separately. Where this is so it will be stated that the finding is drawn from the database, followed by an indication that it is based on register material.

Table 2.5. Coverage of Ship Register Search.

| 1 | REGISTER | LIVERPOOL | LONDON | GLASGOW | HULL | TOTALS |
|---|--------------------------------------|-----------|--------|---------|-------|--------|
| 2 | PERCENTAGE OF BRITISH VOYAGE TONNAGE | 41.2 % | 13% | 4.2% | 1.6% | 60% |
| 3 | NO. OF SHIPS REGISTERED | 279 | 135 | 54 | 9 | 477 |
| 4 | NO. OF SHIPS TRACED | 236 | 125 | 46 | 8 | 415 |
| 5 | PERCENTAGE OF SHIPS TRACED | 84.6% | 92.6% | 85.2% | 88.9% | 87% |
| 6 | PERCENTAGE OF VOYAGE TONNAGE TRACED | 83.8% | 92.7% | 77% | 78.9% | 85.2% |

Source: Database (BOE; SR).

Table 2.5 deals with the success of the exercise in tracing target vessels. Line 1 identifies the registers searched. Line 2 shows the percentage of total British registered voyage tonnage entered on the database, for which ships of each register were responsible. Line 3 shows how many ships were involved and line 4 indicates how many have been traced. One can see that 415 have been traced out of a target number

of 477; an 87 percent success rate, as appears from line 5. Line 6 represents this as a percentage of target tonnage (85 percent). To view it another way, the traced ships accounted for around half of all the British registered tonnage that has been entered on database.

This exercise demonstrates the mutually corroborative nature of the ship registers and the Bills of Entry. Although, in a small number of instances, registered tonnage does not precisely conform between the sources, the key ship identifying factors are mostly consistent. To once again take the *Prospero* as an illustration, her register entry confirms that she was a 164 ton sail vessel registered in London. The entry also tells us that she was a schooner, built at Wivenhoe in Essex in 1841, and that at this time she had nine co-owners. Ownership is expressed in 64ths and four of the investors held eight 64ths each, four seven each, and one held four. All the investors were London residents, seven were described as merchants and two as master mariners. This gives us further corroboration in that one of latter, Abraham Taylor, appears on each of the relevant Bills of Entry as the ship's master.²⁶ What the registers tell us about ownership, and the accuracy of the information therein, is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

The Bills and Registers also corroborate each other in geographical and chronological terms. To give an illustration, her register entry tells us that the steamer *Florie* was built on the Clyde in 1863, and that she was registered at Glasgow on 14th December

²⁶ SR London, 53/240/58 (*Prospero*).

of that year.²⁷ The relevant Bill tells us that she cleared Glasgow bound for Bermuda three days later on 17th December. The basic identifying factors, that she was a 215 ton steam vessel registered at Glasgow and named *Florie*, also tie up between the sources.

Different register entries for the same ship also corroborate each other. For instance the *Hansa* was registered at London on 25th May 1863, and the relevant entry tells us that her original owner sold her to a London shipowner, Maurice Grant, on 11th October 1864 and that she was registered anew at London on that date, following alterations. The new entry is dated 11th October 1864; it names Maurice Grant as the owner and indicates a change of tonnage, on alteration, from 257 tons to 345. The other identifying details, that she was a steamer with paddle wheels and schooner rig, built in Glasgow in 1858, remain the same.²⁸

3. Blockade Runners.

As mentioned in chapter 1, Stephen Wise has produced the most recent attempt to comprehensively record steam blockade runners and to detail their runs.²⁹ His material is based upon American primary sources. But many of these vessels were procured in Britain and set out from there for their operational bases, and so the departure is noted in Bills of Entry. Many were also British owned, and that is recorded in the Ship Registers. The runners that were listed by Wise, and that also appear in the British sources, have been identified. In this way, the information in the Bills concerning stated voyage destination is corroborated. However, Wise did not go far in quantifying

²⁷ SR Glasgow, 20/130/63 (*Florie*).

²⁸ SR London, 56/200/63 and 56/209/63; TS London 395/64. (*Hansa*).

²⁹ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 233-328.

running. In order to improve on this, and also to see how much of the activity was carried out by ships owned by British interests, relevant data from all three sources has been entered onto a further database: "Lifeline Database".

It is apparent from this database that 257 of the steamers enumerated by Wise actually made attempts on the blockade, as opposed to just being intended for the purpose. Almost exactly half (128), have been seen heading for base from British ports. Ownership of 92 of these has been traced in the registers and these are listed, together with their owners, in Appendix B. Therefore, a little over a third of all runners were British owned on departure from home port. This must be taken as a minimum number because ownership of all vessels procured in Britain has not been found. Also it is clear that an indeterminate further number left Britain initially bound for destinations other than the entrepots, and so they have not been looked for in searches of the Bills. Furthermore, some were sold by British owners on arrival at entrepot.

To demonstrate the interrelation between Wise's material and that from British sources, two steamships that have already been mentioned can be used as examples: the *Florie* and the *Hansa*. The British source identifiers of the *Florie*, that she was a steamer, built on the Clyde in 1863, and registered at 215 tons, are the same in Wise. The Bill for 17th December 1863 shows her leaving Glasgow bound for Bermuda. Wise shows her subsequently operating from Bermuda between February and October 1864, when she ran aground. The register entry confirms that she was lost while attempting to run the blockade in 1864.³⁰

³⁰ Wise, *Lifeline*, p.300; SR Glasgow, 20/130/63 (*Florie*)

In the case of the *Hansa*, Wise again confirms some basic details, that she was a steam vessel built in Glasgow in 1858, registered at 257 tons. The relevant London Bill shows her clearing for Nassau on 19th June 1863. Wise shows her subsequently operating between Nassau and the mainland from August 1863 to 12th March 1864, at which date she was back in Nassau. A Bill then places her as arriving back in London from Nassau on 30th April 1864, and another shows her sailing again for Bermuda on 15th October 1864. Wise indicates that she arrived in Bermuda in December 1864 and resumed her running career, the last run leaving her in Nassau in early March 1865. The London Bill for 13th April 1865 then shows her arriving back in London, from Nassau. Wise says that she survived the war and the Register entry confirms this; she was sold to foreigners on 19th July 1865.³¹

In some cases it has not been so easy to identify positively vessels listed by Wise as being the same as those in the British sources. This is because his identifying detail is sometimes scanty, crucially often not including registered tonnage. Here, identification has been made on a balance of probabilities, particularly by matching up the chronology and geography of vessel movements. In a small number of cases Wise's registered tonnage figure does not agree precisely with that appearing in the British sources. In these instances, and where he has no figure, the amount appearing in the latter has been entered onto the Lifeline Database. In spite of this, registered tonnage is still unknown for about thirty percent of runners. In these cases, the mean of all runs where tonnage is known (278 tons), has been entered onto the Lifeline

³¹ Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 303; *BOE* for the dates mentioned; SR London, 56/200/63 and 56/209/63, TA London 395/64 (*Hansa*).

Database as an estimate. An indication of how this affects quantitative calculations of running can be found in chapter 3.

4. Agents and Shipowners.

Gores Commercial Directory for the Liverpool area provides more information about agenting firms and shipowners, and also establishes a vital connection between the two.³² A fuller evaluation is made in chapter 4, but Gores does seem to have been near comprehensive in its listings. This has made it possible to use Gores to examine the longevity of agenting firms. By tracing them over several annual volumes it can be seen how many survived the war. The source also has the firms' self-advertisements, which are instructive as to the sort of business they did and how they saw themselves; Appendix A has been partly prepared from these. Gores is not as comprehensive when dealing with private individuals as with firms. Nevertheless, many shipowners have been located there and, when they were also partners in a firm, the source importantly tells us so and indicates which one. The centrality of Liverpool interests in this story explains why only directories for this port have been used.

To illustrate some of these points, case study firm John Glynn & Son acted as Liverpool agent for the *Prospero*. They were advertised as merchants & shipbrokers & shipowners. They traded both before and after the war, being listed in 1860 and 1867. The partners were Dashper Edward Glynn, Edward Dashper Glynn and Walter Glynn, and all three had shares in ships which have been traced on the Registers. All vessels in which the Glynnns had an interest as individuals were agented by the firm when in

³² *Gores Commercial Directory*, Wallesey Central Library, Merseyside (hereafter "Gores").

Liverpool.³³ By contrast another case study firm, Pilkington Brothers, who were listed in 1860 as being merchants with D. and J. Pilkington as partners, had vanished by 1867. The firm's activities as agents recorded on the database ceased sometime during the war.³⁴

Another source which has been used to find out more about agents and shipowners relates to the small number of limited companies which appear in this study. Company liquidation files have been consulted, mainly to find out who was involved in them and in what capacity, and when and why these companies ceased to trade. Files have been found for all five companies that fall into this study either as agents or owners, or as both. Three were Liverpool incorporations: the West India and Pacific Steam Ship Company; the Liverpool, Western and Spanish American Steam Packet Company; and the British and American Steam Navigation Company. Two were incorporated in London: the European Trading Company and the Mercantile Trading Company.³⁵

5. Annual Statements of Trade.

Whilst the Bills of Entry tell us about shipping movements in very fine detail, the Annual Statements record overall statistics at port and nation level. Recourse has been had to this source to supply annual measurements of trade and shipping in areas where the Bills have not been consulted. Principally, they have been used to reconstruct Britain's world-wide cotton imports from 1856 to 1870. Each Statement gives annual totals, in both quantity and British market value, for cotton imported into Britain from each source country. From these one can calculate price. Over fifty different sources

³³ Gores, 1860 p. 102, 1867 p. 160; Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865; SR 1855 to 1870).

³⁴ Gores, 1860 p.207; Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860 and 1861 to 1865).

³⁵ Company Liquidations, BT/31, PRO.

supplied the market at one time or another during the period. In these circumstances, it would be too complicated to supply all the page references, and so aggregate findings of this kind will simply be referenced to the appropriate annual volumes.³⁶


³⁶ *BPP*, AST, 1856 to 1870, Hull University Library.

Chapter 3. The Impact of the War

1. The Antebellum Trade.

British importation of raw cotton from the United States had its origins in the last decade of the eighteenth century. Following the invention in 1793 of the cotton gin, which enabled cotton to be cleaned of seeds in preparation for market, the Southern United States swiftly became mass producers of the staple. They rapidly overtook older areas of supply, primarily Brazil, the British West Indies, the Mediterranean and India, as the principal source for the British market. This had been accomplished by 1820, and a huge growth in the trade continued for the next forty years.¹

Figure 3.1



Source: For British imports, Ellison, *The Cotton Trade*, Table No. 1; for imports into Liverpool, Williams in *Volumes not Values*, Table 1 at p. 306.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the sustained growth in the trade over the period and the enormous volume which it came to represent. Around 300,000 bales were carried in

¹ Ellison, *The Cotton Trade*, pp. 80-91; M.B. Hammond, *The Cotton Industry* (New York, 1897), pp. 3-33.

1820 but this had multiplied over eight times to a little over 2.5 million in 1860. The Figure also shows that Liverpool was overwhelmingly the main port of receipt. Over the period as a whole, 93 percent of US cotton came into Liverpool, and over the last four years, from 1857 to 1860, the annual average was 95 percent.

The United States supplied the majority of British cotton imports in the period covered by Figure 3.1: 72 per cent overall, and the same in the immediate antebellum years of 1857 to 1860.² Actually, given the greater average weight of the American bale than that of its competitors, the US was more dominant in terms of weight, supplying 77 percent between 1857 and 1860. Liverpool's pre-eminence as receiving port was not confined to US cotton. Between 1857 and 1860, 95 per cent of all British cotton imports by weight were brought into Liverpool.³

The growth of bulk trades, particularly American cotton, was very significant in the rise of the port of Liverpool in the antebellum period. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the port's commerce diversified world-wide, but it remained centred on the transatlantic bulk trades in cotton and, to a lesser extent, in timber from the British North American colonies. The continuing importance of American cotton to the maritime economy of the port as a whole is indicated by the fact that, between 1853 and 1855, almost half of the shipping tonnage entering the port from overseas came from the United States, and the cargoes were predominantly of cotton. This was by far the single most important overseas trade of the port. The reason for Liverpool's


² Calculated from Ellison, *Cotton Trade*, Table No. 1.

³ *BPP*, AST, 1857 to 1860. Breakdowns by port are not available in this source until 1857.

primacy was, of course, its proximity to the cotton manufacturing districts of south Lancashire - especially those around Manchester.⁴

Between 1820 and 1860 Southern cotton production shifted westward, away from the eastern seaboard towards the Mississippi valley. This led to the relative decline of eastern ports such as Charleston and Savannah as exporters, and the rise of those on the Gulf of Mexico, especially New Orleans and Mobile.⁵ Figure 3.2 demonstrates that Gulf ports had assumed a leading role by the immediate antebellum period and that New Orleans had become by far the greatest cotton port.

Figure 3.2



Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858, and 1860).⁶

Although Figure 3.2 is based on monthly samples, the general picture is supported by David Williams' figures for the period 1853 to 1855. The only significant difference is

⁴ Williams, in *Liverpool Shipping*, pp. 25.

⁵ Williams, in *Volumes not Values*, pp. 307-308; Gray, *Southern Agriculture*, p. 696.

⁶ The BOE samples have been employed here in the absence of annual figures from the AST. Unfortunately the latter does not distinguish individual source ports in this period. The total number of imported bales on which the Figure is based is almost 600,000.

that Williams reverses the relative positions of Charleston and Savannah. Both, however, place imports from the Gulf ports as constituting around three-quarters of the total. This contrasts with a little under half in 1830 to 1832. In making calculations based on Williams' figures, cotton coming from New York has been subtracted. There appears to have been an upward trend for Southern cotton to be diverted via New York prior to export, arising out of the development of coastal packet services. About ten percent arrived in Britain by this route between 1830 and 1832, rising to around fourteen percent between 1853 and 1855. But this still represented a small part of the whole.⁷


In the "cotton triangle" model, New York, (and to a lesser extent other northern ports), have been viewed as entrepots for Southern imports of overseas goods. In the model, Southern supplies from Europe were diverted via New York, with many ships sailing along three sides of a triangle. First, cotton was loaded at a Southern port and carried to Europe. The ship then re-crossed to New York with general freight or immigrants, before sailing coastwise to a Southern port, with freight or in ballast, to again load with cotton. New York was able to corner Southern trade because of its pre-eminent position in American trade, commerce and finance generally; because of the law which stipulated that coastwise shipping had to be American; and because ships would be assured of more cargo on the westward voyage by going to New York rather than to a Southern port. The coastal packet services played an important part in these arrangements.⁸

⁷ Williams, in *Volumes not Values*, pp. 307-308.

⁸ Albion, *New York*, pp. 95-121; North, *Economic*, pp. 126-127.

It is outside the scope of this study to comment on the proportion of shipping that followed the triangular route, or on the proportion of the South's overseas supplies that arrived via New York. However, the picture emerging from antebellum samples is of a genuinely two-way exchange between Liverpool and the South. This suggests that, by the late 1850s, New York was far less dominant as an entrepot for Southern goods than the model indicates.

Figure 3.3.




Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860).⁹

Figure 3.3 shows a fairly even balance between shipping tonnage clearing Liverpool to sail direct to the South and tonnage going the other way. Although the amount coming into the port was the greater of the two, it was not so by much, accounting for 51.8 percent of the combined total in the 1856 sample, and 50.3 percent in that of 1858. Inward tonnage formed a larger proportion of the 1860 sample at 57.3 percent, but this was a peak year for cotton imports; outward tonnage also showed a significant increase at the same time.

⁹ As with Figure 3.2, BOE samples have been used in the absence of annual totals from the AST, which do not distinguish between the Northern and Southern US in terms of shipping tonnage until 1861.

The outward tonnage represented in Figure 3.3 was cargo carrying; the small number of vessels that set out in ballast have been excluded from the calculation. An examination of goods entered for export at Liverpool, in the sample months, reveals entries for Southern destinations on most days. An enormous variety of merchandise is in evidence. This includes foreign items, most of which were beverages such as brandy, wine, spirits, tea and coffee. Large quantities of bulk British commodities appear, for example, salt, coal and bottled beer. British agricultural produce is represented: items such as hams, bacon, potatoes and seed. All sorts of British manufactures are also listed. Included amongst these are clothing and textile items such as linen, haberdashery, cottons, hosiery and worsteds; also manufactured metal goods such as railway, bar, hoop, rod and sheet iron, plus tin plates, sheathing copper and steel; and miscellaneous manufactures such as earthenware, chemicals, nails, needles and chain.¹⁰ Figure 3.4 shows the relative importance of the Southern ports as destinations for this merchandise.

Figure 3.4



Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860).

¹⁰ BOE, January 1856, 1858 and 1860.


Figure 3.4 has a very similar configuration to that of Figure 3.2, which showed the relative importance of each Southern port as a cotton source: the inward and outward sides of the trade followed more or less the same pattern. Figure 3.4 again illustrates the pre-eminence of Gulf ports, to which 72 percent of the tonnage was bound. Again New Orleans was in the leading position, with 53 percent heading there.

Clearly the Southern states, and the maritime economy of Liverpool, had a great deal to lose by the disruption of the trade. This was so not just in terms of cotton, but also in terms of the large volume of direct exportation from Liverpool to the South that we have seen - a volume greater than has generally been supposed. By the late 1850s, the commerce was concentrated between Liverpool and the Mississippi region, and turned on an axis between Liverpool and New Orleans.

2. The Wartime Trade.

This section will look at the impact of the war, on both Liverpool and the Southern states which formed the Confederacy, by comparing the wartime trade with that of the antebellum period, and with that taking place immediately after the war. The alteration of the pattern of trade from a direct one to an indirect one has been outlined in chapter 1 and illustrated there in Figure 1. When the Confederate commerce flowing along these indirect entrepot routes is viewed with a wider perspective it becomes plain that the war had a dramatic effect on the exchange in both directions, in terms of both volume and value. Figure 3.5 demonstrates this in relation to cotton quantity.

Figure 3.5



Source: BPP, AST, 1856-1870. ¹¹


Figure 3.5 emphasises that American cotton dominated the British market before the war, but during it dropped to being only a small minority of the total. The Figure shows the termination of direct importation from the South during the war, and the fact that indirect wartime imports of Confederate cotton, through the entrepots, were dwarfed by pre- and postwar direct levels. In visualising the scale of this wartime collapse it helps to view the areas on the Figure occupied by the US and the entrepots as one continuous series representing Southern cotton. Actually the total quantity imported through the entrepots during the four war years (a little under 2 million cwts.), was less than one fifth of the US total for the peak single year of 1860 alone (around 10 million cwts.).

¹¹ The AST show cotton imports in cwts. rather than in bales. The former is a more accurate measure of quantity than the bale, for which there was no standard weight. Average bale weights varied considerably, particularly between different source countries and over time; US bales tended to weigh more than those elsewhere and the antebellum trend was for an increasing average. Accordingly the AST measure has been used here. Because the AST also measure value, a direct comparison can be made between quantity and value which facilitates calculation of price. For discussion of size and weight in relation to the bale see J.A. Mann, *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain* (London, 1968), p.51.

Figure 3.5 shows a marked diminution in overall British cotton imports during the war years; for instance, the total for 1862 was well under half of that for 1860. The existence of depression and distress during the war in the cotton manufacturing districts of Lancashire has been well documented. Over-production, both of the raw staple in the South and of cotton manufactures in Lancashire, played a part in initially causing the depression. However by 1862 a genuine shortage had arisen and this “cotton famine” prolonged the industrial crisis through the war.¹²

This shortage encouraged the growth of imports from alternative sources of supply that can be seen in Figure 3.5. Although these sources went some way towards making up the deficiency, overall volume did not return to pre-war levels until the restoration of direct supply from America manifested itself in 1866. Figure 3.6 shows that during the war India took over as the principal source of British supply.

Figure 3.6



Source: BPP, AST, 1856 to 1870.

¹² Henderson, *Lancashire Cotton*, pp. 11, 35, and 52-115; Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 134-153.

Over fifty different countries and colonies world-wide were producers of alternative supply during the war, and for clarity these have been consolidated into regions for Figure 3.6. In this Figure, "Others" are mainly producers in Europe and the West Indies; Mediterranean primarily means Egypt; South America is mainly Brazil; and cotton coming from the entrepots is included in the US series. Liverpool retained her position as the principal receiving port for the reduced overall total, although there was a small shift away from her during the war. Her share dropped from the 95 percent of 1857 to 1860, to 88 percent between 1862 and 1864; most of the remaining 12 percent came into London.¹³

It can be observed from Figures 3.5 and 3.6 that the United States rapidly recovered after the war as a bulk supplier of the British market. However the recovery was only partial and it was some time before she restored her pre-war ascendancy. In 1870 she supplied over half of the market for the first time since the beginning of the war. This was followed by a steady increase in market share during the 1870s until it averaged over 70 percent in the last few years of the decade.¹⁴


Although total import volume fell sharply during the war, Figure 3.7 illustrates that total British market value actually increased sharply at the same time. In terms of quantity, total imports for 1864 amounted to a little under two-thirds of those of 1860; they were, however, worth more than double those of 1860. The shortage of the staple was having its effect in terms of greatly increased British prices for cotton from all

¹³ *BPP*, AST, 1856 to 1870.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1870 to 1879.

sources. After the war, supply was quickly restored to close to the 1860 level, and this was followed by a sharp drop in value as normality returned to the market. The subsequent postwar value curve can broadly be seen to represent a continuation of the pre-war trend of gently increasing value.

Figure 3.7



Source: BPP, AST, 1856 to 1870.

The wartime alterations in supply that have been discussed so far have been observed before, in general terms.¹⁵ What has not been fully appreciated are the implications of those trends for the Confederacy in terms of value. It derived little benefit from the enormous wartime increase in the value of its own main export commodity shown in Figure 3.7. Instead, the lion's share was taken by its world-wide competitors as these alternative sources of supply moved into the gap in the market. Of course they were able to benefit precisely because of the collapse in Southern supply. Although the price of Southern cotton increased several times over during the war, this did not go

¹⁵ Henderson, *Lancashire Cotton*; Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 134-153. Henderson discusses the development of alternative sources of supply in some detail at pp. 35-49.

far in offsetting the diminution in quantity. The whole value of Southern cotton coming from the entrepots in the war years, at around £20 million, was only around two thirds of its value for the single year of 1860, of about £30 million. This represents an enormous loss of potential foreign exchange for the Confederacy.


Recently, David Surdam has pointed out this effect in relation to the revenue earned by Confederate cotton as a whole.¹⁶ Surdam takes this further by arguing that the South had a price-setting power at the outset of the war arising from its domination of world production of raw cotton. If the South had been free to do so, Surdam argues, it could have used this to free up manpower for military purposes by reducing the cotton crop by one-third; far from reducing revenue from pre-war levels this would have increased it. Instead the loss of cotton revenue had adverse effects upon the Confederate economy and its ability to make war. He concludes that the neutralisation of the South's pre-war domination was the most important effect of Northern maritime supremacy.

It is debatable whether, even if it had the will to do so, the Confederacy could have manipulated export volumes and market prices in the way that Surdam asserts. However, he is correct to remind us that the South suffered a severe revenue loss from the blockade of its ports. Figure 3.7 shows that alternative sources earned about £150 million in the British market in the years 1862 to 1864. An un-blockaded Confederacy could have earned at least that sum; an amount about seven and a half times its actual wartime earnings in the British market.

¹⁶ Surdam, *Northern Naval Superiority*, pp. 1-94.

Southern domination of production for the British market at the onset of the war is highlighted again in Figure 3.8. This Figure also illustrates an advantage the South held throughout the period: its cotton consistently commanded a premium in the British market in relation to other sources as a whole. This is evident from the fact that the value of Southern cotton always had a greater proportional share of the market than its quantity. This was because the produce of its main competitor, India, was regarded as being of inferior quality. Additionally, during the war, no adequate substitute could be found for the middling staple cotton which formed the bulk of British imports from the South.¹⁷

Figure 3.8



Source: BPP, AST, 1856 to 1870.¹⁸


Southern cotton did not command a premium over all its competitors throughout the period. Figure 3.9 demonstrates that, before the war, sources other than India - mainly

¹⁷ W. O. Henderson, *Lancashire Cotton*, pp. 35-51.

¹⁸ For the purposes of continuity, Confederate cotton coming out of the entrepots is included in the US series in this Figure.

Brazil and Egypt - attracted a slightly higher price than the Southern product, and these sources were on a par with it in price in the late 1860s. However, Figure 3.9 shows that the wartime scarcity of Southern cotton resulted in it attracting the highest prices during the war. Although India was by far the most important competitor as a bulk supplier, Figure 3.9 shows that Indian cotton was consistently priced much lower than that of any other producing region.

Figure 3.9




Source: BPP, AST, 1856 to 1870.¹⁹

Regardless of whether supply could have been controlled to maximise revenue, it is clear that, with these advantages, an unimpeded Confederacy could have generated vastly more British revenue than it did, in spite of war-related production loss. This could have formed a basis for the stable currency and economy that the Confederacy lacked. Shortages of both military and civilian goods could have been avoided by a

¹⁹ Confederate cotton coming through the entrepôts is again included in the US series. Prices in pre-decimal pennies (d) per pound (lb.) - the contemporary unit of sale - have been calculated by converting cwts. into lbs. at 112 lbs per cwt., and pounds sterling (£) to old pennies (d) by multiplying by 240; the latter has then been divided by the former in each case and rounded to the nearest penny.

combination of overseas purchasing power and the ability to ship the purchased goods freely to home ports. But the Confederacy was not unimpeded, and, just as cotton exports to Britain collapsed during the war, so too did the importation of supplies from Britain.

Figure 3.10



Source: Series 1 - BPP, AST, 1861-1870; Series 2 - Database (BOE 1861-1865).²⁰

Figure 3.10, showing only cargo carrying tonnage, demonstrates that the volume of tonnage clearing for the entrepots was dwarfed by the pre and postwar volume clearing direct for the South. Total wartime tonnage to the entrepots (about 174 thousand tons) amounted to only about 80 per cent of the direct total for just the half year or so of 1861 before the blockade was established (around 213 thousand tons). The much reduced volume of wartime exports bound for the Confederacy is further

²⁰ The Southern States series is derived from the AST, which only distinguish between tonnage clearing Britain for Northern and Southern ports of the USA from 1861 onwards. It is likely that this distinction in the source includes Baltimore in Maryland, regarded as a Southern state but in fact remaining in the Union; this would explain the residual tonnage shown as going direct to the South during the war. The Entrepot series is derived from the BOE database. This is because port specific data are needed in this connection which are provided by the BOE but not by the AST. This series does not include tonnage clearing for the entrepot of Havana for reasons explained in chapter 2. Figures for tonnage clearing London have been adjusted as also explained in chapter 2.

put in perspective when compared with the pre-war samples, represented earlier at Figure 3.3. The average tonnage clearing for Southern destinations in those pre-war months (about 56 thousand), was actually larger than the annual average clearing for the entrepots for the three war years of 1862 to 1864 (about 53 thousand). In previous writers' concentration upon the supplies which did get to the Confederacy through the blockade, the massive wartime collapse of this side of the trade, relative to ante and postbellum volume, has not been observed.

3. The Effectiveness of the Blockade.

What caused the scale of the collapse in trade between Britain and the South during the war years? In the first year or so of the war, the Confederacy's own de facto embargo on the export of raw cotton was a factor in the near discontinuation of trade with Britain in this period. From spring 1862 onwards, however, this policy was ended following a recognition of the failure of its objective, which was to force European intervention by causing industrial distress.²¹ If the embargo was the decisive restraining factor on trade, a surge of Southern supply might be expected to follow its relaxation. This was especially so given the acute shortage of cotton in the British market in 1862. Instead we have seen that the trade was tiny in that year; the soaring price of the Southern cotton that was received indicates that this was not due to any lack of demand. The short-lived embargo cannot explain why the 1861-2 crop - apparently one of the heaviest yet - ²² failed to arrive in 1862, nor to subsequently make itself felt in resumed large scale British imports. In any event there was never an

²¹ Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 24-42.

²² C.P. Roland, *Confederacy* (Chicago, 1960), pp. 101-102

embargo on importing British goods; embargo cannot explain the collapse that we have seen in this side of the trade.

Although accurate figures for wartime production are not available, clearly a large amount of production was lost through war related disruption, Union capture of cotton growing areas, and an agricultural shift away from cotton towards foodstuff production to meet shortages. However, the evidence indicates that much more cotton was available during the war than was getting to market.²³ Figure 3.5 has shown that, in the half year of 1865 after the end of the blockade, almost twice as much cotton came out direct as was exported through entrepots in peak war year of 1864: around 1.2 million cwts. to around 0.65 million. Most of the 1865 half year was out of the cotton marketing season. The normal pattern was for new crop cotton to arrive in Britain in quantity right at the end of a calendar year.²⁴ This suggests that much of the 1865 post-blockade exports to Britain constituted cotton available, but not marketed, during the war. The rapid comparative post-war recovery of the quantity of British imports of Southern cotton, seen in Figure 3.5, suggests that the capacity to produce on a large scale had not been lost.

Although embargo and loss of production played a part, it will be argued here that Union maritime supremacy was the principal factor in the wartime trade collapse. An enormous amount has been written about the blockade, its degree of effectiveness, and about blockade running. Some of this literature has been referred to in the

²³ F.A. Shannon, *The Farmer's Last Frontier. Agriculture, 1860-1897* (U.S.A, 1963), pp. 77-78.

²⁴ Gray, *Southern Agriculture*, pp. 714-715.

Introduction. The issue of whether or not the blockade was an effective instrument of Northern policy has often been addressed by asking how porous it was. Following Owsley, several historians have observed that the Northern success rate in intercepting blockade running vessels was not very high, and that large quantities of merchandise managed to get in and out of the mainland.²⁵ This approach views blockade running in isolation. We have seen, however, how unsuccessful the enterprise looks when compared with normal peacetime trade. Because it does not make this sort of comparison, the “porous blockade” approach misses the fact that the blockade did not have to be watertight to be effective; it damaged Confederate overseas commerce by deterrence, and by distorting it out of its natural patterns.

Before developing this explanation of how the blockade worked, we will first look at its success rate to establish that it was indeed fairly porous in its efforts to intercept the ships that tried it. Stephen Wise has published the most comprehensive detail of steamship blockade runs to date.²⁶ Although the material is limited to steamers, it is clear that these vessels dominated blockade running. Wise did not go far in quantifying the material and in order to develop his contribution it has been entered onto the “Lifeline database” which is explained in Chapter 2. Table 3.1 uses shipping tonnage as the nearest absolute measure available of trade volume, and covers runs both into and out from the Confederate mainland.

²⁵ See for example: Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 229-267; F.E. Vandiver, *Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda* (Texas, 1947), p. xli; M.W. Price, “Ships that tested the Blockade of the Carolina Ports, 1861-1865” *American Neptune* (July, 1948), pp. 196-241; Still, *Naval War College Review*, pp. 38-45; and Wise, *Lifeline*.

²⁶ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 233-328.

Table 3.1. Steam Shipping Tonnage Attempting to Run the Blockade: Success and Failure.

| YEAR | SET OUT | FAILED | % FAIL | ARRIVED | % ARRIVED |
|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1861 | 2520 | 0 | 0 | 2520 | 100 |
| 1862 | 41773 | 9574 | 23 | 32199 | 77 |
| 1863 | 130671 | 20156 | 15 | 110515 | 85 |
| 1864 | 142414 | 15489 | 11 | 126925 | 89 |
| 1865 | 17554 | 2580 | 15 | 14974 | 85 |
| TOTALS | 334932 | 47799 | 14 | 287133 | 86 |

Source: Lifeline database.²⁷


Table 3.1 shows that although the tonnage being captured, destroyed, or failing to reach its destination for some other reason increased in absolute terms from 1862 to 1863, it subsequently declined as the war progressed. Nor was the blockade becoming more effective in relative terms year on year. The comparatively high interception rate of 1862 declined in each of the subsequent two years. From 1862 onwards the trend was for more vessels to try the blockade and for a greater proportion of them to be successful. Overall, 86 percent of the tonnage leaving port managed to reach its destination. It is apparent that the blockade did not succeed in preventing the Confederacy from maintaining a lifeline of trade with the outside world. The overall success rate is actually almost identical when looked at in terms of numbers of voyages rather than tonnage: out of 1204 attempts 1022, or 85 percent, succeeded in running the blockade.

The Figures in section 2 of this Chapter have demonstrated a trend for more cotton to reach the British market, and more tonnage to set out for the entrepots, as the war progressed. In Table 3.1 we see the reflection of this trend: more tonnage got through

²⁷ About one-fifth of attempts were made by ships whose registered tonnage has been estimated at 278 tons, being the mean for all other attempts.

the blockade as the war progressed. Figure 3.11 confirms the increase in volume over time and highlights the link between the transatlantic trade (between Britain and the entrepots) and blockade running (between the entrepots and the mainland). These were of course two sides of the same coin, except in the case of the Matamoros route where overland carriage substituted for blockade running.

Figure 3.11



Source: Lifeline database - Series 1; Database (BOE; 1861 to 1865) - Series 2.²⁸

The percentages of total blockade running shipping tonnage, and total transatlantic tonnage respectively, that fell within each wartime annual period can be observed in Figure 3.11. Both increased in volume year on year. Blockade running peaked a little earlier than the transatlantic trade. The explanation for this is that the latter series includes the direct Matamoros trade which was continuing to accelerate in volume right up to the end of the war. By contrast the main running routes into and out of Wilmington and Charleston were closed early in 1865 as a result of Union action.

²⁸ Tonnage clearing Britain for Havana is not included in Series 2 for the reasons explained in chapter 2; as argued there its inclusion would make little difference to the Figure.

Far from strangling the Confederate lifeline of trade, the Union navy did not prevent it increasing as each year of the war passed. Nonetheless, Union maritime strategy did secure the results outlined in the preceding section of this chapter. We will now explore how this was achieved.

The chronology of the blockade's imposition indicates that it was this, rather than the somewhat later Confederate embargo policy, that discouraged international shipowners from participation. The blockade was not intended to take immediate effect upon its declaration on 19 April 1861. Instead, separate notice was given by squadrons at each Southern port, followed by fifteen day periods of grace to allow neutral ships to leave.²⁹ In fact the initial declaration was alone sufficient to end the previously lively direct export trade from Britain to Southern ports. This virtually ceased for the duration of the war once the news was received in Britain.³⁰

Following the declaration, a large number of vessels continued to leave Southern ports bound for Britain. However, the last of these clearances coincided with the expiry of the respective periods of grace given at each port. The notice given at Charleston, Savannah and Mobile on 28th May 1861 expired on 12th June; the last clearance from Mobile was on 30th May, the last from Charleston on 31st May, and the last from Savannah on 8th June. Notice given at New Orleans on 31st May expired on 15th June; the last clearance was on 14th June, just one day before expiry. These coincidences indicate that the declared existence of the blockade was enough to cut

²⁹ Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 25.

³⁰ Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865).

direct Confederate maritime links with the outside world. Subsequently, whilst the war lasted, only a handful of ships sailed direct from mainland destinations to Britain. Cessation of mainland sailings had already happened before the embargo was gradually put in place in the summer and fall of 1861.³¹

However short of being a physical reality the blockade may have been at the outset, its declared existence had fundamentally altered things. Having put an end to direct trade, it forced wartime commerce into the indirect pattern through entrepots. These provided a neutral destination for ships clearing Britain and so, on the face of it, there was no justification for their interception. As the investment tightened, fast manoeuvrable steam ships of light draft became the only ones with a reasonable chance of passing the squadrons concentrated outside mainland ports. Situated within about three days steam of the mainland, Nassau, Bermuda and Havana provided safe havens and bases for runners. The proximity of these to the mainland meant that the steamers only had to carry enough coal fuel for short trips, thus leaving more room for cargo. Cargoes were transhipped at the entrepots and a two-sided trade arose carried by different types of vessels: between the entrepots and the mainland on the one hand, and between the entrepots and Britain on the other.³²

A preoccupation with the romance of blockade running has obscured the equally essential role of transatlantic routes in providing a connection to British markets. This included keeping the bases supplied with steam coal for runners. In this period South

³¹ Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 25; Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865); Roland, *Confederacy*, pp. 101-102.

³² J.R. Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers* (New York, 1886), pp. 26-45, and 155; Vandiver, *Confederate Blockade*, p. XV; and Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 58.

Wales was a major exporter of the fuel, and in fact exported little else.³³ Many ships cleared other British ports, in ballast, bound for Bermuda or Nassau via Cardiff, Swansea or Newport, in order to load-up. Carrying enough coal for a round trip from the mainland would have seriously reduced cargo space on the runners; keeping the bases stocked was therefore a crucial element in maximising their cargo-carrying efficiency. About 20,000 tons of shipping - around eleven per cent of all tonnage bound from Britain for Bermuda and Nassau - was carrying only South Welsh coal for bunkering. More British coal was bunkered from stocks at Liverpool, London and Bristol, as evidenced by the frequent appearance of the fuel as an item entered for export to entrepots. For reasons explained in chapter 2, no quantification of export items has been attempted, but this aspect of bunkering was certainly substantial.³⁴

Whilst being the mainstay of transatlantic routes, large bulk carrying sail vessels were excluded, by deterrence, from direct access to the Confederate mainland. This was a major factor in the diminution of wartime trade because sail was the most effective form of bulk carriage.³⁵ This is clear from its overwhelming predominance on transatlantic routes throughout the period. In those of the pre-war period, carriage was exclusively by sail. In the post-war samples sail made up around 90 percent of tonnage engaged. On all wartime transatlantic routes, about 81 percent of the cargo carrying tonnage was sail. Many steam blockade runners were procured in Britain and crossed the Atlantic in order to reach their bases. If these are excluded, to leave only vessels

³³ M.J. Daunton, *Coal Metropolis: Cardiff, 1870-1914* (Leicester, 1977), pp. 4-8, and pp. 39-41; S. Palmer, "The British Coal Export Trade, 1850-1913," in *Volumes not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World Trades*, eds., D Alexander and R Ommer, (Newfoundland, 1979), pp. 336.

³⁴ Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865); *BOE*, 1861 to 1865.

³⁵ A point observed but not developed by Roland in *Confederacy*, p. 137.

which did not attempt to run the blockade, then the transatlantic trade would have been 87 per cent sail. Steam was making its first appearance in the trade, but wind power still predominated.³⁶

In this period sail technology was continuing to evolve and sail was able to retain its economic superiority on long distance voyages. Steamers were becoming competitive for use in local or restricted sea areas, where frequent coal bunkering was available. Steam, however, was not yet the match of sail on the long haul, primarily because the space required for coal much reduced that available for cargo. The technological developments that achieved the economies in fuel consumption that enabled the steamship to reverse this position lay in the future.³⁷ An average Atlantic crossing took at least one month and presented no opportunity to take on coal. These were just the sort of routes on which sail was still supreme.³⁸

Steamships also had higher running costs, both in terms of fuel and manning levels. These vessels represented a hybrid technology, being still also rigged. Those undertaking ocean passages may have overcome the fuel economy problems by, in effect, acting as sail ships for parts of a voyage. The need for crew expert in handling sail, in addition to those required as engineers and stokers, led to much higher levels of manning on the steamship. In the wartime transatlantic trade, they averaged just under twice the manning levels of sail: fourteen tons per man as against twenty-six.³⁹

³⁶ Database (*BOE*: January 1856, 1858 and 1860; 1861 to 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

³⁷ G.S. Graham, "The Ascendancy of The Sailing Ship, 1850-85," *Economic History Review* IX (1956-57), pp. 74-88.

³⁸ Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865).

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Sail did play a subsidiary part in blockade running. A calculation based on Stephen Wise's figures indicates that it transported around seventeen per cent of cotton bales that came out of the mainland.⁴⁰ It seems that these were mostly very small vessels, and they deposited their cargoes at entrepots rather than attempting the ocean crossing. Carrying capacity was limited not only by the substantial exclusion of sail itself from mainland access, but also by the complete exclusion of the large ships which were normal for the trade. Economy of cargo space mattered a lot in a trade involving the carriage of a bulky item like raw cotton, but sheer size mattered more.

Table 3.2 demonstrates both that size was important in achieving economies of scale and that sail, using bales per ton as a crude measure, was a more efficient carrier than steam, assuming a fully loaded vessel.

Table 3.2. Carrying Capacities of Vessels with Cargoes of Cotton Only

| TYPE | AVE TONNAGE | AVE BALES | AVE BALES PER TON |
|----------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------|
| PRE-WAR SAIL | 968 | 2943 | 3 |
| POST-WAR SAIL | 838 | 2369 | 2.8 |
| WARTIME SAIL | 282 | 546 | 1.9 |
| STEAM (1856 TO 1870) | ABOVE 680 | - | 1.8 |
| " | 680 | 1216 | 1.8 |
| " | BELOW 680 | - | 1.5 |
| " | BELOW 400 | - | 1.3 |
| STEAM RUNNERS | 278 | 361 | 1.3 |

Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; 1861 to 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Lifeline database (for steam runners).

We can see in Table 3.2 that, before and after the war, the trade was indeed dominated by large sailing ships and that these held substantially more bales per ton than any other type of vessel. Sail vessels carrying cotton from the entrepots to Britain in the wartime period were much smaller on average, and these had a lower bales to ton

⁴⁰ Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 221.

ratio. Not as low, however, as steam. Table 3.2 shows that size mattered here also. Steamers below an average tonnage of 680 were less efficient than those above it. The Table also shows the average tonnage for steam blockade runners, 278 tons, and estimates that they may have had a similar bales per ton ratio as the steamships below 400 tons in the transatlantic steam sample.

Denial of direct mainland access to large sail ships was crucial, not just in terms of cargo efficiency and therefore shipping costs, but also in terms of sheer carrying ability. In the antebellum period, a typical mainland clearance would have been a sail vessel of nearly one thousand tons, hauling about three thousand bales direct to market. On the basis of the above estimate for steam runners of 1.3 bales per ton, a typical blockade runner would have transported perhaps only about 360 bales as far as an entrepot where they had to be transhipped. Therefore a typical antebellum sail ship probably stowed over eight times the cargo of the wartime blockade runner. In the light of this contraction in capacity it is unsurprising that wartime trade volume fell to such low levels.

In Table 3.2 we have seen that vessels in the wartime transatlantic trade were of a low average tonnage. The most likely explanation for this is that cotton was simply not available at the entrepots at any one time in the sort of quantities that would justify the use of a large vessel. Similarly, goods were not getting into the mainland in sufficient bulk to justify being transported to entrepots in large vessels. In the pre-war trade from Britain to mainland destinations, the average vessel tonnage was about 960. During the war, goods were carried to the entrepots in vessels averaging only about 290

tons.⁴¹ It would not have been in shippers' interests to have large vessels waiting at entrepots for full loads, or to have large unsold cargoes waiting for carriage to the mainland.

Even with transatlantic commerce at this much reduced level, the blockade running side of the enterprise was failing to keep up. From late in 1864, vessels began to return to Britain, from Nassau and Bermuda, either in ballast or loaded with returned goods. Around four percent of tonnage arriving in Britain from there in 1864 did so, and this increased to thirty-four percent in 1865. Some of this set off after the closure, early in 1865, of routes into the mainland ports of Wilmington and Charleston. However, it appears that blockade runners were failing, at least from late 1864 onwards, to bring out enough cotton to fill the available transports. The volume of shipping carrying returned goods suggests that there may, for some time, have been a backlog of supplies failing to get through to the mainland.⁴²

Peacetime trade was hauled by an enormous fleet of large sailing ships, but blockade running volume was limited mainly to the carrying capacity of a small, highly specialised steam fleet. This could not even keep up with the massively reduced volume of transatlantic trade, never mind replicate peacetime volume. Viewed one way, the blockade running steamer was an effective expedient; viewed another, it was part of a bottleneck enforced by the blockade. Much of this fleet was slowly procured

⁴¹ Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; 1861 to 1865).

⁴² Database (*BOE*, 1864 to 1865).

overseas, at considerable cost of scarce foreign exchange both to private and public Confederate interests.

Earlier we saw that blockade running grew more successful, both in absolute and relative terms, as the war progressed. This was partly a consequence of the time that it took to assemble the running fleet. At least fifty percent of all runners were procured in Britain, and together they made at least sixty percent of all attempted runs. The majority of these did not set out for base until 1864, which was very late on in the war.⁴³ The South did not have the right sort of vessels and the blockade made foreign procurement necessary. Therefore, it must take the credit for the length of time it took the enterprise to build up volume towards its 1864 peak. To put the argument another way, the blockade was responsible for the failure to reach 1864 volumes at a much earlier stage. The slow build up can perhaps also be explained by the blockade severing long-standing commercial connections between Britain and mainland ports. It took time to build new connections on new routes.

A direct transatlantic passage was established through Matamoros in Mexico, and this played a larger role in Confederate cotton exportation than has generally been supposed. After the expiry of the blockade periods of grace, an aggregate total of around 400,000 Confederate bales were received into Britain.⁴⁴ Wise arrives at about the same figure, although Hammond, whose calculations have been used in several subsequent sources, makes about the same total just for the years 1862 to 1864.


⁴³ Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865); Lifeline database.

⁴⁴ Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865). This figure only includes cotton carried in vessels setting off before General Lee's surrender on 9th April 1865.

Surdam arrived at a slightly higher number for these years.⁴⁵ These estimates were probably a little inflated by their inclusion of wartime re-exports from Northern US ports to Britain. In any event the differences are not great.

The Annual Statements of Trade express quantity in hundredweights for each calendar year. To reconcile this with the numbers of bales aggregated from Bills of Entry, the aggregate totals from each for the three complete years of 1862 to 1864 have been compared. This results in an average weight per bale for those years of about 452 pounds, representing a wartime fall in average export bale weight from about 467 pounds before the war, calculated from Hammond's figures for 1860.⁴⁶

Figure 3.12



Source: Database (BOE, 1861 to 1865).

Figure 3.12 illustrates the relative importance of each entrepot as a source for the total of around 400,000 bales. As has traditionally been thought, Nassau was the most

⁴⁵ Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 221; Hammond, *The Cotton Industry*, p. 261; Surdam, *Northern*, pp. 30-31.

⁴⁶ Database (BOE, 1862 to 1864); BPP, AST, 1862 to 1864; Hammond, *The Cotton Industry*, Appendix 1. Comparison between the two primary sources is made on the British standard basis of 112 pounds per hundredweight.

important source. However, the Mexican route - almost entirely through Matamoros, with a small amount through Tampico - was greater than Bermuda and Havana and almost on a par with Nassau. A tiny amount came out direct from mainland ports. The traditional underestimate of the Mexican route is exemplified by Bradlee's assertion that not more than 5 percent came out this way, and Wise's estimate of 12 percent. More recently Daddysman estimated the proportion at 20 percent of total Confederate exports.⁴⁷

Clearly, Mexico was an important channel for Confederate cotton, but its remoteness explains why this largely unimpeded transatlantic passage was severely limited in comparison with peacetime trade. Matamoros was 300 miles from nearest railhead in Texas. This meant that bulky cotton had to be transported by wagon on difficult and dangerous overland trails. The town itself had no harbour facilities and so cotton had to be loaded onto ocean going vessels by lighter at the mouth of the Rio Grande. There were additional costs, such as the tariffs levied by the Mexican authorities.⁴⁸ As with the running bases, the low average tonnage of vessels engaged on this passage indicates that cotton was not available in sufficient quantities to justify deploying large vessels.

Badly situated to export cotton, Matamoros was a great deal worse placed to be a centre for importation of war materials. The main theatres of war were way over to the

⁴⁷ Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 221; Bradlee, *Blockade*, pp. 59-60; Daddysman, *The Matamoros Trade*, pp. 160-161.


⁴⁸ Delaney, *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, pp. 473-487; Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 103-133; Tyler, *The Americas*, pp. 66-76; Tyler, *Santiago Vidaurri*, pp. 98-128; Daddysman, *The Matamoros Trade*, pp. 107-150.

east, and the Atlantic entrepôts were plainly much better situated to supply Confederate armies. After the closure of the Mississippi in mid 1863, the Trans-Mississippi department was cut off from the rest of the Confederacy and thus marginalised for the remainder of the struggle. The relative unimportance of Mexico in this respect is demonstrated by the fact that tonnage carrying supplies from Britain to Matamoros amounted to no more than a fifth of the wartime transatlantic total.⁴⁹ In view of the civil war in Mexico it is also likely that a proportion of these did not reach the Confederacy.

The failure of Mexico to offer an effective substitute for normal peacetime commerce with the Southern mainland exemplifies another way in which the existence of the blockade acted to limit Confederate trade: it distorted cotton exportation out of its natural patterns and thus immeasurably increased the difficulties and transaction costs involved in marketing the staple. The natural pattern was centred on ports with easy communication access to the main centres of cotton production. In the first section of this chapter, it has been pointed out that the centre of production was in the Mississippi valley, where Southern ports on the Gulf of Mexico were the natural outlet. In that section, attention has also been drawn to the position of New Orleans as by far the leading cotton port. Figure 3.13 shows that the wartime configuration of trade between the mainland and the entrepôts was pushed into a very different orientation.

⁴⁹ Database (*BOE*, 1861 to 1865). The calculation does not include tonnage clearing Britain for Havana for reasons explained in Chapter 2.

Figure 3.13.



Source: Lifeline database.

The blockade was part of a wider Union maritime strategy which also included the capture or disablement of Confederate port facilities. In this, it had a good deal of success. New Orleans, the premier export and commercial centre of the South, was captured in April 1862, and thus eliminated as a Confederate conduit. Mobile was too closely blockaded to be of use for much of the war, and the capture of the forts guarding its approaches in August 1864 closed the port. Savannah had its entrances closed by the capture of Fort Pulaski in April 1862. Action against several other ports further reduced Confederate options.⁵⁰ Thus the top three cotton ports shown earlier in Figure 3.2 played little or no part in wartime trade.

In the literature concerning this subject, it is often asserted that the blockade was an impossible undertaking because it involved patrolling thousands of miles of coastline. This ignores the fact that shifting bulk commodities requires harbour facilities and communications with the producing interior. Union action left the Confederacy with

⁵⁰ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp 63, 80, 83, 170-174, and 179-181.

few ports that fell into this category. Figure 3.13 shows that Wilmington, N C, was by far the principal mainland centre for blockade running. Although it was well situated to supply General Lee's army, it was not a natural choice for cotton exportation given that it lay on the northeastern extreme of the cotton production belt. Its geographical unsuitability is underlined by the absence of British cotton imports from there before and after the war. Charleston was a more natural choice, but was ill placed to make up for the loss of capacity in the Gulf. Union action disabled Charleston harbour from mid-September 1863 to March 1864, and caused the closure of both Charleston and Wilmington in early 1865.

In Figure 3.12 we saw the relative importance of Matamoros as a wartime cotton channel. This port, however, was also far from being an ideal choice for the purpose due to its remoteness from production. Union maritime strategy had forced Confederate cotton exportation far away from its natural centres. The two principal exporting mainland ports, Wilmington and Matamoros, were situated on opposite extremes of the cotton belt, with Matamoros being far outside it. Before the war around 76 percent of Britain imports set off from Gulf ports, but this was reversed to a wartime pattern where the majority, 55 per cent, came from the eastern seaboard.

These distortions resulted in bulky cotton being hauled overland many hundreds of miles away from its natural outlets; northeast to Wilmington and Charleston, and southwest to Mexico. The inadequate Confederate transport system, particularly its railways, were already overstretched by the demands of war without this additional burden. Transport costs must have increased substantially and there were extra costs

such as the tariffs on goods passing through Mexico. The inflated prices commanded by cotton abroad were not available at mainland outlets.⁵¹ Taken together these factors must have been a powerful disincentive to planters to market their commodity. In any event, given the burdens of war, the transportation system was probably physically incapable of getting more cotton to the outlets. In these circumstances it is little wonder that wartime exports were so slight. The fact that most blockade runs were successful was not indicative of the overall impact of the blockade.

What if there had been no Union maritime supremacy, and that supremacy had not been applied in a strategy of neutralising Confederate ports and blockading those remaining open? Trade would not have been constricted in the ways which have been described. The massive nature of the contraction, in comparison with ante- and postbellum volume, speaks for itself as a manifestation of the achievements of the strategy. Continuation of unimpeded overseas commerce would have presented the Confederacy with a number of opportunities which may, or may not, have been taken. An immeasurably stronger economy could have been built upon foreign earnings. A stable currency and an absence of shortages, especially those affecting the morale of the civilian population, could have provided the Confederacy with a stronger foundation as a nation. Foreign purchasing power could have been translated into much greater military strength. Wartime trade could have been much more than just a tenuous lifeline, it could have provided a sound economic basis for the whole

⁵¹ Wise, *Lifeline*, p167. The government brought massive shipments of cotton from Mississippi, Alabama and West Georgia by rail to Charleston and Wilmington thus tying up and wearing out valuable railroad space. For the inadequacies of Confederate internal communications, both rail and road, see for example Roland, *Confederacy*, p. 138 and Wise, *Lifeline* p. 181. For prices at Southern ports not exceeding antebellum levels see Surdam, *Northern*, p.7.

Confederate war effort. In a very real sense, then, the disruption of maritime commerce was a key factor in the eventual defeat of the Confederate cause.

4. The Restored Postwar Trade.


That the wartime pattern involved an enforced distortion of trade out of its natural channels is underlined by what happened after the war ended in 1865: things rapidly returned to a similar pattern to that of the immediate antebellum period. After the war the entrepôts ceased to be channels for British trade with the Southern states and direct transatlantic contact was resumed.

The wartime transformation of British trade with Bermuda and the Bahamas proved to be temporary. For example, British imports from Bermuda were worth an average of only about £7,500 in the years 1857 to 1861; this jumped to about £80,000 in 1862, £820,000 in 1863 and almost £2 million in 1864. Between 1866 and 1870 the annual average slumped back to only around £17,000. The same basic picture, of low value antebellum trade increasing exponentially during the war before diminishing again to insignificance after it, was repeated in the case of the Bahamas.⁵² Comparable values are not available in relation to Matamoros and Havana, but we have seen in Figures 3.5 and 3.7 that all the entrepôts disappeared as sources of cotton for the British market after the war.

Figure 3.14 compares the pre- and postwar patterns of cotton importation, by placing together the respective percentage shares of each Southern port for the two periods. The data for the earlier period first appeared in Figure 3.2.

⁵² *BPP*, AST: 1861, pp. 375; 1865, pp. 340, and 343; 1870, pp. 318, and 321.

Figure 3.14.



Source: Database ((BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860 (Series 1); January 1866, 1868 and 1870 (Series 2)).


After the war, New Orleans again became the single most important source of supply, although with a significantly reduced share. Mobile lost second place to Savannah, but, at the same time increased its share. Overall the Gulf ports recovered their pre-war supremacy. It was rather less complete than it had been: 65 percent as opposed to 76 percent. This was, however, a reversal of the wartime position when the Gulf region had dropped to 45 percent.

These points are made to emphasise the unnatural nature of the pattern into which things had been forced in the war. The principal outlets of Wilmington and Matamoros ceased to be used because they were unsuitable to handle a resumed high volume trade. Savannah, which played no part during the war, became the second most important exporter afterwards. In Figure 3.14, the share of Charleston was static

at a relatively low 11 percent before and after the war. Much lower than her 23 percent share of blockade running tonnage to be observed in Figure 3.13.

Like that of the antebellum period, the restored post-war trade was a two-way affair. Figure 3.15 enables a comparison to be made of the relative importance of each Southern port as a destination for cargo carrying tonnage in the two periods. The data for the earlier period first appeared in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.15.




Source: Database ((BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860 (Series 1); January 1866, 1868 and 1870 (Series 2)).

The two series are very similar. As a destination for exports, New Orleans more nearly recovered its pre-war position than it did as a cotton exporter. In this respect Gulf ports as a whole did recover their earlier dominance: 72 percent of the tonnage set out for there both before and after the war. The general points made concerning the preceding Figure are again relevant here: the natural channels for Southern importation were not through Matamoros, Wilmington, or to any great degree through

Charleston; instead they were through ports that were largely neutralised during the war.

The sort of goods that were entered for export from Liverpool to the South after the war were broadly the same as before it, as profiled in the first section of this Chapter.⁵³ However, the post-war export trade, at least in the sample months, was smaller than it had been. This can be seen in Figure 3.16.

Figure 3.16.



Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1866, 1868 and 1870).

For ease of comparison Figure 3.16 incorporates the pre-war data given in Figure 3.3. The generally lower volume of post-war inward tonnage is unsurprising given that the American cotton trade had only partially recovered in the late 1860s. Clearly the volume of export tonnage had dropped too. We saw earlier that exports represented around 48 percent of combined tonnage in 1856, 50 percent in 1858, and 43 percent in 1860. Export and import tonnage appear to have remained fairly evenly matched in

⁵³ BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870.

1866 and 1868, with exports accounting for 45 percent in the former and 42 percent in the latter; however, the export proportion declined to 29 percent in 1870.

Liverpool recovered some of the slight wartime slippage in its dominance as receiving port for British cotton imports: 92 percent of total volume arrived there between 1866 and 1870, as opposed to 88 percent between 1862 and 1864, and 95 percent in the immediate pre-war period.⁵⁴ There was a substantial return to the axis between Liverpool and the Mississippi valley, and particularly between Liverpool and New Orleans. Just as the blockade had severed direct trade during the war and forced a readjustment, its termination severed the entrepot trade. Although much lesser than that of 1861, the severance of 1865 impacted again upon British maritime interests.

5. Impact, and British Maritime Enterprise.

We have seen the radical change that the war brought upon a trade which had hitherto experienced over half a century of enormous, and largely uninterrupted, expansion. Existing routes were closed and commerce diverted through new ones. There was a massive contraction in scale, affecting not only cotton imports but also an almost equal export trade. Although cotton prices soared this did not go far in making up for the contraction in volume. It has been argued here that these events seriously affected the Confederacy's chances of survival; equally they affected the fortunes of a range of British maritime interests.

The interests with the most to lose were Liverpool ones. In view of the value of Southern trade to the maritime economy of the port as a whole, its contraction could

⁵⁴ *BPP*, *AST*, 1857 to 1870.

have been disastrous. A very large number of enterprises must have depended to some degree on the revenues generated. There were all sorts of dockside and shipping concerns such as ship chandlers, sailmakers, shipowners, ship agents, shipbuilders and shipbrokers. There were all those involved in merchanting, broking and forwarding exports and imports. There were firms dealing in marine insurance. This study is, however, concerned with those operating in only a few of these areas. We will look mainly at Liverpool firms acting as ship agents, and to a lesser extent at those importing cotton. This section will end with a look at British involvement generally, in terms of shipowning and shipbuilding. Before doing so, it is appropriate to give a general outline of the main maritime functions.

Shipowners earned revenue by way of charges for the freight of goods in their vessels. Merchants dealt in goods, either on their own account or on commission. Shipbrokers, acting either for owners or merchants, were in the business of matching ships to cargoes; they negotiated on behalf of their clients to buy or sell the services of a vessel and were remunerated by commission. For ship agents, the client was the shipowner. The agent represented his client at ports where the client had no office. He would do whatever was necessary to look after the client's vessel and protect its interests when it was in port. In practice, maritime functions were not mutually exclusive and many firms combined them and acted in different capacities in different transactions.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ R.H. Thornton, *British Shipping* (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 123-138; E.W. Zimmermann, *Ocean Shipping* (New York, 1923), pp. 428-429; J.H. Todd, *The Shipping World* (London, 1929), pp. 127-128.

The Managing Director of Bahr Behrend & Co Ltd, a firm of Liverpool ship agents which appears later as a case study and is still trading today, has described ship agency as having two basic roles. Firstly, as “Looking after the requirements of the ship when it visits a UK Port - payment of port dues, light house dues, arranging towage, ships husbandry etc. etc.”. Second, as “Finding cargo to fill the ship with”. The first role would normally be remunerated by a fee reflecting the size of the ship and the work done, and the second by a commission on the freight booked.⁵⁶ In assessing the impact of the war upon firms that acted in this capacity in the Southern trade, we need to begin by examining the extent to which they were dependent on it for their livelihoods. The first question to ask in this connection is, to what degree was this business concentrated into a few hands, or alternatively, spread out amongst many?

In Table 3.3, shipping tonnage handled has been used as a measure of market share, rather than number of vessels handled; both types of remuneration described above were based, directly or indirectly, on vessel size and carrying capacity. The period of April to June 1861 has been included here in addition to the usual antebellum sample months. It has been explained in chapter 2 that, in this period after the start of the war but before the blockade came into operation, direct sailings to Liverpool continued. This can properly be regarded as a pre-war sample because it took place before the fundamental impact of the war was felt. Although its inclusion does not result in like being strictly compared with like, it is contended that this is valid and helpful; it is, after all, a sample of exactly the same trade - albeit at a different time of year. When

⁵⁶ Letter dated 8th April 1998 from G. S. Wright, Managing Director of Bahr Behrend & Co Ltd, to the author.

we look shortly at continuity, the sample will be seen as indicative of whether firms took part in the trade all year round.

Table 3.3. Concentration in Antebellum Liverpool Agenting.

| PERIOD | JAN 1856 | JAN 1858 | JAN 1860 | APR-JULY 1861 | OVERALL |
|--------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|---------------|---------|
| TONNAGE HANDLED | 111668 | 73362 | 184016 | 122717 | 491763 |
| NUMBER OF VESSELS HANDLED | 118 | 80 | 194 | 144 | 536 |
| NUMBER OF FIRMS PARTICIPATING | 54 | 42 | 74 | 75 | 158 |
| PERCENTAGE OF TONNAGE HANDLED: | | | | | |
| BY TOP THREE | 32.1 % | 39.5 % | 28.5 % | 16.6 % | 26 % |
| BY TOP FOUR | 38.1 % | 43.4 % | 34 % | 21.3 % | 29.7 % |
| BY TOP TEN | 57.2 % | 63.1 % | 51.6 % | 43.1 % | 44.9 % |

Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April - July 1861).

There are two conventions for measuring concentration in an industry. Both use some measure of market importance in order to group the participants into a league; one then takes the total for the top three and the other for the top four. In the first test a total below 33 percent for the top three means an “unconcentrated” industry. In the second test a total for the top four below 25 percent is regarded as unconcentrated, whilst a total between there and 49 percent is regarded as “moderately concentrated”. In Table 3.3, tonnage handled is used as a good measure of market importance. Taking the overall percentages, the first test points to an unconcentrated industry, whilst the second indicates the lower end of the moderately concentrated range. In these circumstances it is reasonable to regard the industry as unconcentrated. This has been characterised as meaning that the industry has a large number of participants, ease of entry and an essentially competitive nature because no one firm, or small group of firms, is in a position to control the market.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ R. Lloyd-Jones and M. J. Lewis, *Manchester and the Age of the Factory* (Britain, 1988), pp. 163-165.

A competitively fluid market is suggested here by the large number of participants and by the fact that the concentration percentages differ quite a lot from period to period. Nonetheless, to assess the potential impact of the loss of the market, a different view is needed. The percentages in Figure 3.3 show that, in each period, there was a group of firms that did significant business in the trade; not enough to enable them to control the market, but enough to represent a core business for them. Given this, the next question concerns continuity of involvement: were those that were doing most business the same from one period to the next?

Table 3.4. Continuity in Antebellum Liverpool Agenting

| PERIODS OF PARTICIPATION | ONE | TWO | THREE | FOUR | TOTALS |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| NUMBER OF FIRMS | 103 | 31 | 16 | 8 | 158 |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FIRMS | 65.2 % | 19.6 % | 10.1 % | 5.1 % | 100 % |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TONNAGE HANDLED | 24.4 % | 20 % | 20.9 % | 34.7 % | 100 % |

Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 58 and 60; April - July 1861).

The periods in this Table refer to the four antebellum samples of Table 3.3. Table 3.4 identifies how many interests were active in just one of the these, in two, and so on. We can see that business was most concentrated amongst a relatively small group whose members tended to be the same from one period to the next. Only twenty-four firms did business in at least three periods and, although these represented only fifteen percent of total firms, they together handled well over half of the total tonnage. In marked contrast, the bulk of firms only did business in one period, and together handled only about a quarter of the tonnage. There was an intermediate group whose involvement was moderate.

In other words there was a fairly small number of businesses whose participation was sufficiently regular and substantial for it to be reasonable to suppose that they had a lot to lose from the disruption of the Southern trade. Beyond them was a pool of work, shared amongst a shifting population of occasional participants - emphasised by the fact that over half of the total firms (53 percent) have been identified as handling only one vessel in all the antebellum samples. The scale of the antebellum trade meant that this pool was of great importance to the port's economy as a whole, but it is not within the scope of this study to assess its importance to the individual participants. The study can, however, go some way towards assessing how dependant upon this trade - as a core business - some of the leading participants were.

Table 3.5. Case Study Group 1: Antebellum Agents.

| Agents Name | No. of vessels | Tonnage | % of Tonnage |
|--|-----------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Boult English & Brandon (Focke & Boult) (4) | 64 | 66781 | 13.6 |
| Taylor Tipper & Co (Jacot Taylor & Tipper) (4) | 33 | 33321 | 6.8 |
| James Browne & Co (4) | 29 | 27377 | 5.6 |
| Fraser Trenholm & Co (4) | 19 | 18126 | 3.7 |
| Duncan & Kendall (2) | 17 | 14564 | 3.0 |
| Miller & Mosman (Miller Houghton & Co) (3) | 13 | 13421 | 2.7 |
| Pilkington Bros (3) | 13 | 13187 | 2.7 |
| Warren & Thayer (3) | 10 | 11583 | 2.4 |
| Train & Co (1) | 8 | 11235 | 2.3 |
| Rankin Gilmour & Co (3) | 10 | 10515 | 2.1 |

Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April to July 1861).

Table 3.5 lists the top ten ship agents, in the four periods taken together, in descending order of market share. The numbers appearing in brackets after the names indicate the number of periods in which each firm did business. The columns show how many vessels each firm handled, how much tonnage that represented, and what percentage of total tonnage each was responsible for. These firms are case studies of those whose antebellum involvement was significant and regular. Their participation was certainly significant: in terms of percentage of total tonnage handled they together accounted for almost 50 percent in the 1856 sample, 42 percent in 1858, 46 percent in 1860, and

40 percent in 1861; overall the figure was about 45 percent. Their involvement was also on the whole regular. Looking at Table 3.5 it can be seen that eight of these firms appeared in three or more periods, and that four appeared in all four.

It must be borne in mind that the samples cover just one month of a season of cotton importation which continued for around seven months from the start of a year to around the end of July. In fact sailings carried on at some level throughout the year.⁵⁸ Therefore, on an annual basis, this must have been a considerable business for the leading firms. Nine of the ten case studies were also in the top ten for the mid-year sample of 1861, indicating that the group participated on a season-wide basis.

An obituary of Francis Boulton, senior partner of Boulton English & Brandon, is suggestive of the magnitude of this business: the writer describes the firm, which was the leading agent in all four sample periods, as being “..at the time of the American War..one of the most important business houses connected with the port of Liverpool.”⁵⁹ The firm adopted this name sometime in 1855 when Francis Boulton, who had been trading under the style Focke & Boulton, joined with Charles John English and Thomas Brandon, who had been trading as English & Brandon.⁶⁰ The handling of one vessel, credited to Focke & Boulton in early January 1856, has been added to the collective total on the basis that Boulton English and Brandon was a continuation of this business.

⁵⁸ Williams, in *Volumes not Values*, p. 316.

⁵⁹ *The Liverpool Review*, April 3, 1886. Liverpool Record Office.

⁶⁰ *Gores*; 1855 pp. 82, 90, 219, and 240; 1860 pp. 36, 38, and 85.

Boult English & Brandon did not only handle sailings to and from the American South, but do appear to have been American specialists. Samples taken to test route diversity show them also regularly handling sailings between Liverpool and New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. There is no evidence to suggest that they were active more than occasionally on any other route. Two voyages to Trieste, one to Sydney, and one each from Rotterdam, Bremerhaven and St. John, New Brunswick are the only others identified. Ships sailing between Liverpool and the American South formed the core of the firm's agenting business, exceeding tonnage handled on all other routes nearly fourfold.⁶¹

Most of the Table 3.5 firms conform to the same basic pattern: a broad American specialisation dominated by a Southern orientated core business. Taylor Tipper & Co were also in the top ten in all four periods. This was a continuation of Jacot Taylor & Tipper, which changed its name sometime in the late 1850s when William Jacot retired and the existing partners, William Tipper and George Taylor, were joined by Thomas James Taylor.⁶² In addition to its Southern business the firm has been identified as acting for several vessels journeying to or from New York and Boston, but only two sailings on non-American routes (one bound for Hong Kong and one for Havana). Again the tonnage that the firm handled on routes with the American South exceeded that on all others by a large margin; in this instance being over three times as great.⁶³

⁶¹ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860).

⁶² *Gores*; 1855 pp. 354, 654, and 669; 1860 pp. 252, 253, and 258.

⁶³ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860).

The same pattern of specialisation applied to James Browne & Co, a firm also in the top ten in all four relevant periods. James Browne himself appears to have been the sole partner during this antebellum period.⁶⁴ His organisation dealt with a lot of voyages to Baltimore and Philadelphia, punctuated by the occasional oddity: one to Trieste and one from Cardenas. The business here was a little more balanced, but involvement in trade with the American South was still twice that in all others.⁶⁵

Miller & Mosman and Pilkington Brothers did business in three of the four periods, only failing to participate in the 1858 sample when, as shown in Table 3.3, there was a good deal less work to go around. The former firm was listed as Miller Houghton & Co in 1856 when Peter M. Miller was in partnership with John Miller. By 1860 Peter Miller was in partnership with William Mosman and trading as Miller & Mosman.⁶⁶ This firm's Southern business was over twice as large as its other business, which has been identified only as handling one voyage to New York, two to St. John, New Brunswick, and one from Rangoon. The Pilkington Brothers were Daniel and John,⁶⁷ and their Southern trade work exceeded their other activities by over four and a half times. None of these amounted to any kind of regular alternative, consisting only of handling one sailing each to New York, Philadelphia, Havana and Cardenas.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ *Gores*; 1855 p. 102; 1860 p. 43.

⁶⁵ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860).

⁶⁶ *Gores*; 1855 p. 474; 1860 pp. 182, and 188.

⁶⁷ *Gores*, 1860, p. 208.

⁶⁸ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860).

Another partnership which appears in three of the four periods was Warren & Thayer, although it may be that this should be regarded as a continuation of Train and Co, an organisation listed in 1856 only. In 1834 a Bostonian, Enoch Train, established the White Diamond line of sailing packets between Boston and Liverpool. In 1848 he set up Train & Co in Liverpool to act as the line's agents, and by the mid 1850s that office was managed by two of his Bostonian associates, George Warren and Frederick William Thayer. Train's shipowning activities were hit hard by the financial crisis of 1856 to 1857, resulting in his retirement and partial disposal of the White Diamond fleet. The remaining ships were taken over by Warren & Thayer, and in 1861 they transferred them to British register, and their Liverpool office became the headquarters of the line.⁶⁹

These two organisations have not been treated as a continuing entity because, whatever the arrangements in Boston may have been, no evidence has been found that either Warren or Thayer were actually partners in the Liverpool agency of Train & Co. George Warren is listed in 1855 with no firm affiliation, and Frederick Thayer is not listed at all. Sometime between early 1856 and 1858 they went into partnership as Warren & Thayer, and Train & Co disappeared in the same period.⁷⁰ In January 1856 Train's dominant business was not, in fact, the Boston sailings, but the Southern trade - which was one and a half times greater. Warren & Thayer's subsequent enterprise on the Boston route fairly evenly matched their Southern agency work.⁷¹

⁶⁹ A.J. Henderson, "Eleven Decades of Maritime Service", *Sea Breezes* Vol. 9 (Jan-June 1950), pp. 350-369.

⁷⁰ *Gores*; 1855 pp. 673, and 693; 1860, pp. 254, and 268.

⁷¹ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860).

Duncan and Kendall were latecomers, establishing a share in the Southern agency market only in 1860 and 1861. The partnership emerged sometime between 1855 and 1860 and consisted of Charles C. Duncan and William Rathbone Duncan (there is no sign of a Kendall).⁷² They appear to have been particularly heavily committed to the Southern trade, with only one voyage outside it identified as having been agented by them.⁷³

Fraser Trenholm & Co were also heavily committed. They participated in all four of the antebellum periods, but no sign has been found of them dealing with ships on any other route. The same is true of Rankin Gilmour & Co, who handled tonnage on Southern routes in all the periods except 1858. More will be said about these two presently in the context of their distinctive connections; suffice it to say here that other evidence confirms that Fraser Trenholm & Co were not involved in anything else, whilst Rankin Gilmour & Co had offices in other British ports and were active in other trades.⁷⁴

Looking at these case studies generally a picture emerges of a group which was, at least in terms of agenting work, essentially committed to the Southern trade as a core business, and who were consequently highly vulnerable to its disruption. To the extent that they diversified, it was largely into handling vessels on other American routes, but this went nowhere near to matching the volume of the core business. They were also

⁷² *Gores*, 1860, p. 79.

⁷³ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

vulnerable to disruption of American trade because of the nature of their international commercial contacts, which were also largely with the United States.

Most of these organisations were essentially agents of American registered shipping, although the sources do not enable identification of specific American ports or owners to be made. This dependence was generally the case in trade with the South and in other trades. Train and Co and Pilkington Brothers have been identified as dealing only with American vessels. James Browne & Co and Warren & Thayer handled only one vessel registered outside the United States each; Taylor Tipper & Co only two; Duncan & Kendall only three; and Fraser Trenholm & Co only four. In these cases American shipping formed all, or the great majority, of their clientage. Boulton English & Brandon handled eight vessels registered outside the US, but this still represented less than ten percent of their sampled agency work. It seems that this firm had established clients in Bremen, as they handled a ship of this register inwards from Rotterdam and another from Bremerhaven, in addition to a Bremen ship in the Southern trade.⁷⁵

The reliance of the leading players upon American clients is unsurprising in view of the dominant position of American shipping in the trade with the Southern states. American ships accounted for 70 percent of tonnage in this trade in the four pre-blockade periods taken together. In the three January samples of 1856, 1858 and 1860 the proportion was a good deal higher, at 84 percent. The beginning of an American exodus is evident in the samples of April to July 1861, after the war started but before

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

the blockade came into force. Here, US registered shipping dropped to 30 percent of tonnage passing through Liverpool. Subsequently shipping of this register virtually disappeared, amounting to only one percent of Southern trade tonnage passing through British ports for the remainder of the war.⁷⁶ This can easily be explained by the fact that the American ships had been owned almost entirely in the Northern states.⁷⁷

The antebellum dominance of Northern-owned ships rendered most of the agents involved in the trade vulnerable, to some degree, to this kind of disruption. Not all of the participants, however, were specialists in American shipping. Miller & Mosman, for instance, handled only two American registered vessels in the samples, the rest being of British, or British colonial, register. Whilst we cannot be specific about some of the latter vessels, most were registered at St John, New Brunswick, in British North America; accordingly this firm's main shipowning clientele was probably based there. Rankin Gilmour & Co handled only British tonnage in the samples, registered mainly at Glasgow and Liverpool. This firm was actually its own shipowning client: of the ten voyages that they handled - shown at Table 3.5 - seven were made by vessels owned by partners of the firm.⁷⁸

We have seen the extent of specialisation amongst these firms in terms of both trades and shipowning clientele. Were they also specialists in terms of acting only as agents? This study can go some way towards answering this, with the qualification that there is no way of knowing whether firms were involved in business activities outside the

⁷⁶ Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865).

⁷⁷ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 7-29.

⁷⁸ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860). Further detail of Rankin Gilmour's vessels can be found in chapter 5.

maritime ones studied. Rankin Gilmour & Co was the only one of these case study firms which has been found to also own British ships that participated in the Southern trade in the pre-blockade period; as mentioned above, most of the vessels that they handled were their own. Of course the investigation has been confined to British shipowning and it is possible that other firms had interests in American tonnage, like Train & Co and Warren & Thayer in the White Diamond line. British and American registers were the only ones that counted in the four pre-blockade sample periods. British, or British colonial register, accounted for a little over a quarter of the tonnage passing through Liverpool in the Southern trade.⁷⁹

On the evidence available, then, most of the antebellum case study firms were not owning ships as well as acting as agents in this period. Were they involved in the business of merchanting imports and exports? We know nothing about exporters, and unfortunately the high proportion of cotton imported as “Order”, as mentioned in chapter 2, means that the identities are known of merchants importing only a little under a quarter of the cotton bales. It is impossible to draw definite conclusions from this evidence. All that can be said is that the list of known importers would suggest that most of the case study firms were not significant importers. Only five of the antebellum ten appear on the list of known importers (which contains 165 names). Of these, Miller & Mosman and Boulton English & Brandon had negligible amounts consigned to them: 55 and 15 bales respectively. James Browne & Co were

⁷⁹ Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April to July 1861).

consignees of 1172 bales, which represented a mere tenth of one percent of total imports.⁸⁰

Rankin Gilmour & Co and Fraser Trenholm & Co, however, were both in the top ten of known importers. Although this represents only one percent of the total in each case, it might be taken to suggest that they also took part in importation of the unknown three quarters; other evidence indicates that this was the case. Rankin Gilmour & Co was the Liverpool office of a long standing international organisation of interlocking partnerships. At Liverpool the partners were Robert Rankin senior and Robert junior. At Glasgow they traded as Pollock Gilmour & Co, where Allan Gilmour was the principal resident partner. In London they were Gilmour Rankin Strang & Co with William Strang as resident partner. They had several offices in the British North American colonies that traded in Canadian timber. They also had establishments in New Orleans (as Hoghton Rankin & Co) and Mobile (as Pollock Hoghton & Co). These bought cotton in bulk for shipment to Liverpool on behalf of the firm and a large clientele of Liverpool merchants.⁸¹

Rankin Gilmour's connections with New Orleans and Mobile are apparent from the fact that all of the vessels for which they acted as Liverpool agent had either cleared from these ports or were bound for them. This sort of port specialisation was not evident amongst most of the other antebellum case studies, who tended to handle ships sailing on most or all of the major Southern routes. Although they undoubtedly

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ J. Rankin, *A History of our Firm* (Liverpool, 1921), pp. 1-26, and 147-158; Rankin Gilmour & Co Accounts Book, 1867-73, MSS , DX/726, MMM; *Gores*, 1860 p. 215; *Post Office London Directory*, 1864, p. 1032.

had port connections, their principal links were probably with their shipowning clients, rather than with merchanting offices abroad. Apart from Rankin Gilmour, the only other exception to this was Fraser Trenholm & Co.⁸²

Fraser Trenholm was the Liverpool office of an international partnership based in Charleston, SC., as John Fraser & Co - there was also a branch in New York City. The senior partner, George A. Trenholm, was resident in the Charleston office which bought cotton for shipment to Liverpool. In 1855 the resident partner in Liverpool was Edward Trenholm, who was replaced at some point between then and 1860 by Charles K. Prioleau. The Charleston/ Liverpool relationship is shown by the preponderance in the firm's agenting business of vessels sailing this route.⁸³

Having commercial associations in specific Southern ports rendered firms like these particularly vulnerable to the redirection of wartime trade through entrepôts. Rankin Gilmour & Co were forced to close their offices in New Orleans and Mobile in 1862. After the blockade came into force there is no sign of them importing a single bale of cotton for the remainder of the war. The ground is more solid when talking about merchanting in the wartime period because the relative positions of "order" and known importing reverse; "order" fell to a quarter of the total and the known element increased to three-quarters. Fraser Trenholm adapted, and played a very large part in

⁸² Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April to July 1861).

⁸³ M.W. Price, "Blockade Running as a Business in South Carolina" *American Neptune* Vol. IX (January 1949), pp. 31-62; *Gores*, 1855, p. 674, 1860, p. 212; Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April to July 1861).

wartime importing, however, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, the firm had particular links with the Confederacy which made this possible.⁸⁴

All of the nine case study firms still trading on the eve of the blockade were highly exposed to the disruption of the Southern trade that the war brought about. Apart perhaps for Warren & Thayer and Rankin Gilmour, they had not diversified significantly into other trades. Miller & Mosman and Rankin Gilmour excepted, they were dependant upon shipowning clients based in the Northern States. Rankin Gilmour and Warren & Thayer were again exceptional in owning and operating their own vessels, but the former firm had an added exposure in the form of Southern merchanting offices, an exposure shared by Fraser Trenholm. The case studies appear to have been predominantly specialist ship agents.

Perhaps the earlier collapse of Train & Co should have provided some warning about over-exposure. All of these firms, except for Fraser Trenholm, lost their core business during the war; seven of the other eight were completely inactive in the trade from the introduction of the blockade to the end of the conflict. This impact was not confined to the case studies. A total of 108 firms, which together had handled three-quarters of the tonnage in the four pre-blockade samples, did not act for a single vessel in the trade to the end of the war.⁸⁵ The obvious factors behind this can be identified as the disappearance of their American shipping clients, the redundancy of existing mainland connections, and the severe contraction in market volume. Of course, some firms may

⁸⁴ Rankin, *History*, pp. 147-149; Database (*BOE*; July 1861 to July 1865).

⁸⁵ Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865).

have decided to sit the war out, for moral or commercial reasons, rather than being forced out.

Rankin Gilmour was not the only cotton importing firm to have links with the South that became redundant during the war. Brown Shipley & Co had a long standing presence in the trade and several branch or agency houses in the Northern and Southern states. During the war, all their offices in Charleston, Savannah, Mobile and New Orleans closed down. They were the top importing firm by volume in the pre-blockade samples (although this represented only a little over one percent of the total, and we do not know who imported over three-quarters). During the war, when we know much more about importing, there is no sign of them handling more than a negligible amount of cotton.⁸⁶

Rathbone Brothers & Co, who had also been prominent cotton importers for a long time, also disappeared from the wartime scene. Links with their New York agency became redundant, and those with their Southern correspondents were severed. For many Liverpool importers, like the Rathbones, their principal transatlantic connections in the trade were not with the South directly, but with New York or other Northern ports. New York, in particular, played a large part in the financial and credit arrangements of the trade, and its severance from the South must have meant an end to participation for many.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Brown, *Brown Brothers*, pp. 255-277; Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865).


⁸⁷ Marriner, *Rathbones*, pp. 1-15; N.S. Buck, *The Development of the Organisation of Anglo-American Trade, 1800-1850* (Yale, 1925), pp. 85-89; Albion, *New York*, pp. 95-121.

It is likely that the disappearance of antebellum importing concerns from the wartime trade was widespread. But this cannot, however, be assessed in the same way as with ship agents. Only knowing who imported about one-quarter of cotton in the pre-blockade samples makes similar analysis of concentration, continuity, and the degree of involvement of individual firms unreliable. We can say that 124 concerns, that imported at least some cotton in the pre-blockade samples, handled none of the three-quarters imported during the war where consignees are known. Forty firms that have been identified as importing in both periods were not collectively responsible for much of the wartime total; excluding Fraser Trenholm, who were active in both periods and were massive wartime importers, their collective share was only about ten percent. For what they are worth these findings do support the notion that there was a widespread exodus from the trade under the impact of war.⁸⁸

While it lasted, the war also changed the way that the transatlantic cotton trade was conducted; the nature of this change revolved around what happened to “order” during the war, what “order” meant, and what the implications of this may have been. The portion of imports for which the identities of the importers is unknown (“order”), was a little over three-quarters in the pre-blockade samples (78 percent), but fell to one-quarter subsequently in the war. However, it returned to 78 percent in the postwar samples from 1866 to 1870. Figure 3.17 illustrates these changes in more detail.

⁸⁸ Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April 1861 to 1865).

Figure 3.17.



Source: Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

It can be observed that the very high proportion of “order” in the pre-war samples had already dropped significantly during the April to July period of 1861, which was after the war had started but before the blockade came into force. Thereafter, in the entrepot trade, it fell to below 20 percent before climbing a little, year on year, for the remainder of the war. After the war, “order” soon returned to the pre-war level of over 80 percent.

In his study of Liverpool cotton merchanting in the first half of the nineteenth century, David Williams found that “order” was under 20 percent between 1820 and 1839, but subsequently rose rapidly to around 60 percent by 1850. Clearly Figure 3.17 represents the continuation of the trend of many years. His study covered all Liverpool’s cotton imports rather than those from just the Southern states, but given the domination of

Southern cotton, the upward trend must be taken to apply that trade. Williams suggested that “order” usually meant that the goods were not consigned to anyone in particular, and he speculated that its increase may have been due to the sale of “cotton afloat”, facilitated by the ability of the new Atlantic steam packets to transmit information ahead of the staple itself.⁸⁹

Because the Bills of Entry have been so little used, the issue of what “order” meant has not been explored any further since Williams’ work. There is a legal explanation of the term which fits the known facts very well, and takes Williams’ proposition that the goods were not consigned to anyone in particular somewhat further. It was the duty of the shipowner to ensure that goods carried in his vessels were delivered to the persons to whom he was contracted to deliver them. Those persons were either the consignees named in the Bill of Lading (the itinerary of cargo), or the consignees named by someone whom the Bill of Lading empowered to make an “order or assignment”. In other words, for some goods the identities of the consignees appear on the face of the Bill of Lading, whilst for others they do not.⁹⁰ This would explain why the Bills of Entry, the cargo detail of which was almost certainly transcribed from the Bills of Lading, name some consignees but designate other goods as consigned to “order”.

“Order”, therefore, was not about placing an order for goods but about someone being in a position to direct to whom they should be delivered. These “delivery orders”

⁸⁹ Williams, in *Liverpool and Merseyside*, p. 186.

⁹⁰ *Carvers Carriage by Sea*, ed. J.S. Henderson (London, 7th edn., 1925), pp. 661-669.

could take two forms: a “special endorsement” on the Bill of Lading empowering a named firm, or an “endorsement in blank” simply signed by the shipper of the goods.⁹¹ The decision in the case of *Lickbarrow v. Mason* in 1794 makes the operation of these devices somewhat clearer. The case concerned an endorsement in blank, and it was found that goods were effectively transferred by a combination of an endorsement for delivery “to order or assigns”, signed by the shipper, and the physical transmission of the Bill to the transferee, with the intention of transferring the underlying goods. In these circumstances the transferee was then empowered to fill out the Bill by ordering that the goods should be delivered either to themselves or some other party or parties.⁹²

Consideration of why most transatlantic cotton trading was conducted in this manner by the 1850s requires some speculation. A possible explanation relates to the development of transatlantic commercial connections over time, in a long standing market. Instead of trade being conducted at arms length between mere correspondents on either side of the Atlantic, firms established a presence in both markets. We have seen that Rankin Gilmour, Fraser Trenholm, Brown Shipley and the Rathbones had done this by having allied, or branch, offices either in Southern ports or New York. These offices might be part of a single transatlantic organisation; alternatively they might be separate agencies that, nonetheless, were appointed on a permanent basis to look after their associates’ interests. Norman Buck found evidence that these sort of American connections were not uncommon and that, by 1850, probably the majority

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Lickbarrow v. Mason* (1794), in *English Reports* vol. 101, pp. 380-382.

of cotton was imported into Liverpool on account of British merchants, having already been purchased for them in the US; this does indicate a presence in both markets.⁹³

In these arrangements, American offices would not simply consign cotton across the Atlantic at arms length, but would ship the commodity in bulk for their associated Liverpool office to deal with on their mutual behalf. No doubt the British office would seek to sell the cargo rapidly, and might have already made sales prior to its arrival. In these circumstances, a mechanism was required which gave a Liverpool office legal title to pass on to buyers, and the ability to order delivery to those buyers. Bills of Lading with "special" or "blank" endorsements would fill the need. If the Bill was endorsed in blank, then title would be passed by the document being physically handed over to the Liverpool office, probably by the master on behalf of the shipowner.

Endorsement in blank would also be a useful device to cover chains of transactions in a more complicated market. Legal title could be passed through a series of transactions simply by handing over a Bill of Lading endorsed in this way, with the last party in the chain empowered to order delivery of the actual goods. This sort of document would be a flexible way of transferring title without physically transferring goods, and would be especially useful in the case of sales of "cotton afloat" mentioned earlier. These transactions in futures developed initially - before the laying of the first transatlantic cable in 1866 - out of the ability of mail steamers to transmit information and samples to market before the cotton itself arrived. It is unlikely, however, that

⁹³ Buck, *Anglo-American Trade*, pp. 37-45, and 85-89.

futures played a major part in the growth of “order”. It appears that this sort of trading did not really take off in the Liverpool market until the effects of the civil war caused a wave of speculation in cotton after 1861, and Figure 3.17 has shown that “order” was actually much reduced in these war years.⁹⁴

The facts shown in Figure 3.17 would fit a conclusion that “order” went with the kind of transatlantic connections previously outlined, and that their wartime redundancy caused a collapse in this kind of business. The normal structure of mutual connections became inoperative, and trade reverted to an older arms-length system of correspondents and consignment. During the war, new connections were established with the entrepots which gradually led “order” business to revive. After the war, mainland connections were re-established, enabling “order” to swiftly return to the pre-war level. These conclusions are essentially speculative but do offer a credible interpretation of the available evidence.

Finally, in this chapter, we will turn briefly to two areas of maritime enterprise in which antebellum British interests had little to lose: those of shipowning and shipbuilding. As has already been made clear, British shipowners were unsuccessful in acquiring market share in the Southern trade in relation to their American competitors. American registered vessels held an 84 percent share of voyage tonnage in comparison to the British 15 percent in the pre-war samples. If tonnage registered in the British North American colonies is excluded, the British share falls to 12 percent. Liverpool was the only British port which alone had anything approaching a significant

⁹⁴ S. Dumbell, “The Origin of Cotton Futures” *Economic History* Vol. 1 (1926-29), pp. 259-267.

involvement, at 42 percent of the British total, but this was only 5 percent of the whole; a surprisingly low figure considering that this was the port's principal trade.⁹⁵

The picture looks worse in relation to shipbuilding, where no vessels built in British yards have been identified as taking part in the trade in the antebellum samples. It must be said that the evidence on which this is based is thin. This study has only identified where 36 percent of British registered shipping tonnage in the Southern trade samples was built, and this only amounts to four percent of the whole. It seems unlikely, however, that British build was important in the American fleet if it fails to appear amongst this sample of British registered vessels. Of the identified tonnage, about three-quarters was built in the British North American colonies and one-quarter in the New England state of Maine.⁹⁶ The antebellum lack of success of British enterprise in shipowning and shipbuilding contrasts with its heavy commitment, and therefore vulnerability, to the impact of the war in other areas. The point emphasises that, as well as presenting challenges, war can also offer opportunities.

⁹⁵ Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860).


⁹⁶ Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860; *SR*, 1855 to 1860).

Chapter 4. Commercial Adaptation and Strategy.

1. Adaptation in Liverpool

The only British port that was threatened by the developments covered in the preceding chapter was Liverpool; for other ports the war was primarily about taking opportunities, but for Liverpool it presented a real challenge. We have seen that importing American cotton was her single most important overseas trade in the half century or so before the war and this suffered a massive contraction during it. The port also had a sizeable export trade to the Southern states which also greatly diminished in wartime. Yet Liverpool's maritime economy did not collapse during the war.

Figure 4.1.




Source: Liverpool Dock Board Figures.¹

Figure 4.1 shows that the tonnage handled by the port did not decline during the war years, indeed, slightly more passed through than in the late 1850s. Figure 4.2 shows this reflected in terms of dock revenue.

¹ MDHB collection, Dock revenue statements (1856 to 1870), MSS, MMM. The author is indebted to Dr Graeme J. Milne who provided these figures from his own unpublished research.

Figure 4.2.



Source: Liverpool Dock Board Figures.²

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that the port's economy held-up during the war and that both tonnage and revenue showed a marked increase in the late 1860s, when the Southern trade revived, in comparison with the pre-war period. Clearly, alternatives to the Southern trade were rapidly developed. Chapter 3 outlined the emergence of alternative sources of cotton supply. An examination of several other bulk import commodities also reveals wartime increases over the late 1850s.

Table 4.1. Liverpool Bulk Import Commodities: Increase in Volume in the Years 1861 to 1864 in Comparison to the Years 1857 to 1860.

| COMMODITY | INCREASE | COMMODITY | INCREASE |
|------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| WHEAT/CORN | 3.06 | TIMBER | 1.23 |
| COCOA | 1.91 | SUGAR | 1.2 |
| FLOUR | 1.51 | SPIRITS | 1.14 |
| WINE | 1.5 | TOBACCO | (0.98) |
| RICE | 1.34 | COFFEE | (0.91) |
| WOOL | 1.26 | | |


Source: BPP, AST, 1857 to 1864.

² *Ibid.*

Table 4.1 compares aggregate import volume for four pre-war years, from 1857 to 1860, with aggregate volume for four wartime years of 1861 to 1864. All of the commodities show increases, except for tobacco and coffee which fell slightly in volume. The greatest growth was in wheat, where wartime imports were over three times the volume they had been in the pre-war years. Because the source expresses the volume of these commodities in a variety of different units, and not at all in value, it is impossible to assess their relative contributions in making up for the cotton deficiency; clearly, however, that deficiency was made up and these commodities played a part.

Given the cotton famine, and the depression in the Lancashire cotton manufacturing industry, it is unsurprising that the volume of exports of cotton manufactures fell during the war, as shown in Figure 4.3.


Figure 4.3.



Source: BPP, AST, 1857 to 1864.

However, the decline was not catastrophic, and the overall value of Liverpool's exports did not plunge during the war. Figure 4.4 demonstrates this. It also shows that the value of cotton manufactures remained a large proportion of the value of all the port's exports of British goods: 41 percent in the period 1857 to 1860 and also between 1861 and 1864.

Figure 4.4.



Source: BPP, AST, 1857 to 1864.

The maritime economy of the port of Liverpool was able to adapt and to compensate for the collapse of its greatest trade. Francis Hyde observed the levelling-off in the upward trend of the volume of shipping tonnage using the port in the civil war years between 1862 and 1865. But, taking a broad view of Liverpool's trade between 1850 and 1913, Hyde also observed a vast increase in imports and exports, and in the volume of shipping using the port; also a heavy investment in port infrastructure to handle the increases.³ This thesis is not, however, primarily concerned with the fortunes of the port as a whole but with those of specific groups operating within it.

³ Hyde, *Liverpool and the Mersey*, pp. 96-100.

The figures for the port show that opportunities to adapt and thrive were there, but do not shed light on whether individual concerns rose to the challenge or how they set about doing so. How successful were ship agents in adapting to the termination of the direct trade with the Southern mainland? Did changed circumstances result in widespread business failure? In order to test this, all of the agents appearing in this study have been searched for in Gores Liverpool Directory - for the immediate pre-war year of 1860, and for the postwar year of 1867 - to see if they survived the period. Periods of listing have been compared to periods of known activity in the Southern trade. This is to enable comment to be made on the fate of groups of firms participating in different periods. It is also to test for consistency between the sources, particularly to assess how comprehensive Gores was, because the validity of the exercise is of course dependent on this.⁴

The evidence points to the listings in Gores being comprehensive, or very nearly so. With a handful of exceptions, a listing for a firm coincides with its periods of known activity. Conversely, where firms are not listed, their activities had already ceased or not yet commenced. For example 127, or 80 percent, of the 158 firms active in the pre-blockade samples are listed in 1860. Of those not appearing, twenty-one were active prior to 1860 only, which is consistent with them having ceased trading by that year. Amongst these were Train & Co, a case study firm mentioned in chapter 3. They are listed in 1855 but not 1860, and we know that they went out of business before the later date. Similarly, the ten remaining firms who do not appear in the 1860 volume

⁴ Database: (*Gores* (1860, 1867); *BOE* (January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

did not start acting as agents until 1861. By 1867 seven of them are listed; the other three handled no tonnage in this study after 1866 and therefore had probably ceased to trade before the 1867 volume was prepared.⁵

Emerging from this exercise is a picture of considerable consistency between the two chosen years, and no suggestion of an abnormal rate of business failure amongst firms active in the pre-blockade samples and still trading in 1860. Of these, one hundred firms out of 127, or slightly under 80 percent, survived to 1867. This means that only 27 concerns, or a little over 20 percent, disappeared in the interim. This can be compared with the shorter period from 1856 to 1860, during which the similar number of 21 firms disappeared; a lower, but not greatly different, disappearance rate of about fourteen percent. Of course, it must be borne in mind that we only have samples for the earlier period, as compared to a nearly full picture for the wartime entrepot trade. It is likely that more firms were involved and more disappeared in the former period.⁶

Of course, business failure is only one possible reason for a firm to disappear. Some firms may have been reconstituted under different names; some may have closed due to retirement; some may have been only temporary branch offices of larger concerns based elsewhere. We can, however, conclude that there was no general collapse in this sector under wartime pressures. Indeed the years between 1860 and 1867 appear to have been fertile ones for the emergence of new organisations. A total of 78 firms, active in the Southern trade, were established in that period. This compares with only

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

eleven known new establishments between 1867 and 1870; although, again, it must be remembered that these findings are based on samples only of agenting activity between 1867 and 1870.⁷

There must have been a perception that new opportunities existed during the war, because about two-thirds of the 78 firms emerging between 1860 and 1867 were established in the war years. Not all made it through the period; 28 out of the 78 do not appear in Gores either in 1860 or 1867 and seem to have had short lives between those years. However, the remaining 50 firms were listed as trading in 1867; a replacement of almost double the number that did not survive from 1860 to 1867.⁸

These findings indicate that, far from being a period of contraction where many established firms were being squeezed out, the war was a time of opportunities for both established and new participants. One direct result of contraction might be organisations being forced to merge, but there is no evidence of this taking place in the period. The impression of continuity is emphasised when comparing those trading in 1860 with those trading in 1867, including in the exercise all of the listed firms appearing in this study as agents: 232 firms were listed in 1860, of whom 191, or about 82 percent, were still listed in 1867.⁹

A widespread ability to switch activities must lie behind these survival figures. This is especially so when one considers the finding mentioned in chapter 3 that 108 firms,

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

who between them handled three-quarters of the tonnage in the pre-blockade samples, had no involvement in the wartime entrepot trade. Most must have developed adequate substitute business. The need to adapt in this way would have been greatest amongst those with the heaviest antebellum commitment, making them potentially the least likely to survive the war. Table 3.4 showed that a group of 24 firms had together handled a majority of vessel tonnage. Actually, only four of these were amongst the 27 firms, mentioned above, who were active in 1860 but failed to survive to 1867. The latter group of 27 only handled a little under 15 per cent of vessel tonnage in the pre-blockade samples, and so the failure of the group as a whole to survive cannot have been primarily due to wartime loss of Southern trade business. Accordingly, most of the firms with the greatest antebellum involvement managed to adapt and survive.¹⁰

Table 4.2. Case Study Group 1: Wartime Adaptation.

| FIRM | A | B | C | D | E |
|---|---------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------|
| Taylor Tipper & Co | 28220 | 9190 | 37410 [40] | 30557 [31] | 82 % |
| George Warren & Co (Warren & Thayer) | 6180 | 5602 | 11782 [10] | 8958 [10] | 76 % |
| Duncan & Kendall | 10154 | 964 | 11118 [13] | 8020 [9] | 72 % |
| James Browne & Co | 22933 | 10339 | 33272 [37] | 15006 [15] | 45 % |
| Rankin Gilmour & Co | 3780 | - | 3780 [4] | 1717 [3] | 45 % |
| Miller & Mosman | 6806 | 3305 | 10111 [12] | 3925 [4] | 39 % |
| Boult English & Brandon | 59754 | 15355 | 75109 [76] | 27032 [31] | 36 % |
| Pilkington Bros. | 9883 | 2072 | 11955 [14] | 587 [2] | 5 % |
| TOTALS | 147710 | 46827 | 194537 [206] | 95802 [105] | 49% |

Source: Database, (BOE January 1856, 1858, 1860); Cases Database (BOE January 1856, 1858, 1860 and January 1862, 1863 1864).

A. Vessel tonnage handled in trade with the Southern States in January 1856, 1858 and 1860.

B. Vessel tonnage handled on other routes in January 1856, 1858 and 1860.

C. Aggregate total of **A** and **B**. Total number of voyages represented appearing in brackets.

D. Vessel tonnage handled in trade on routes other than with the Confederacy in January 1862, 1863 and 1864. Total number of voyages represented appearing in brackets.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

E. Tonnage appearing in **D** shown as a percentage of tonnage appearing in **C**.

To illustrate how firms with large antebellum involvement in the Southern trade adapted, and with what degree of success, we will turn to examining the wartime fortunes of the antebellum case study group, established in Table 3.5. Table 4.2, compiled from three pre-war January samples and three wartime samples of the same month, is intended to compare these firms' agenting activities in the two periods. A comparison of columns **A** and **B** demonstrates the point made in chapter 3 that, on the evidence of these samples, the group's antebellum activity was dominated by trade with the Southern states, which constituted its core business. That core business was lost during the war; of the Table 4.2 firms only Warren & Thayer handled any vessels in the wartime entrepot trade, amounting to only 1.5 percent of the total tonnage for that period. As was the position before the war, most of the group did not play any part in merchanting or shipowning in the wartime Confederate trade. Fraser Trenholm are absent from the Table because, uniquely amongst the group, they were in the wartime top ten as well as the antebellum one. Accordingly, it is appropriate to deal with them as part of the wartime case study firms (Group 2). Train and Co are also absent because, as established in chapter 3, they had ceased to trade prior to the war.¹¹

Looking at Table 4.2, a comparison of Column **D** with Column **B** shows that all these firms, with the exception of Pilkington Brothers, were able to adapt during the war by increasing their involvement in trade on other routes to compensate for the loss of their Southern business. However, none of them were able to fully replace the lost

¹¹ Database (*BOE*, April 1861 to July 1865).

business; column E shows that all experienced a decline in total tonnage handled in the wartime sample months by comparison with those of the antebellum period. Overall they were only handling around half the tonnage that they had dealt with before the war. Some were more successful than others. For example, Taylor Tipper came near to making up their deficiency, whilst Boulton English and Brandon - by far the most important pre-war firm - suffered an enormous decline.

Most adapted sufficiently to enable them to survive the war; six of the eight Table 4.2 firms were still trading in 1867.¹² Amongst these, Warren and Thayer changed their name to George Warren and Co sometime between the beginning of the war and mid-1863. By 1867 F. W. Thayer had ceased to be a partner but the business was continued by George Warren together with the White Diamond line of ships, which began to be known as the Warren line. During the war, the firm continued, as far as trade with the Northern states was concerned, to only handle ships sailing to or from Boston. Several of these were registered in Liverpool and were probably their own White Diamond vessels, following the change of flag to Liverpool mentioned in chapter 3.¹³

Miller and Mosman and Pilkington Brothers failed to survive to 1867. It can be seen in Table 4.2 that they were the least successful in adapting - apart from Boulton English and Brandon whose decline nevertheless still left them with a good deal of business. We cannot be certain that these two firms' disappearance was caused by an inability to adapt; it must be remembered that these conclusions are based on samples, and also

¹² *Gores*; 1867, pp. 56, 67, 123, 231, 389, and 413.

¹³ *BOE*, April 1861 to July 1865; *Gores*, 1860 p. 268, 1867 p. 413; Henderson, *Sea Breezes*, pp. 350-359; Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864).

that firms can cease trading for reasons other than business failure. Miller and Mosman were still active in 1866 and so did survive the war, but they are absent from the 1867 directory both as individuals and as a firm. Similarly there is no evidence of Pilkington Brothers being active after 1866 and the firm is not listed in 1867; only Daniel Pilkington is listed in that year, but as an individual rather than as a partner in a business.¹⁴

The wartime business (Column **D**) developed by the firms shown in Table 4.2 to make up for the loss of the Southern trade, did not represent a radical departure. Looking at them as a group this business essentially represented a continuation and expansion of their pre-war activities on routes other than those with the South (Column **B**). On the whole this meant continuing to handle large ocean going sailing ships carrying bulk cargoes. The principal difference was that, instead of cotton, many of these vessels were carrying the increased volume of grain products (wheat, corn and flour) coming into Liverpool and shown in Table 4.1. This involved expanding their existing participation in trade routes between Liverpool and the Northern states, and also meant sticking mainly to a Northern United states shipowning clientele.

During the war the average vessel size handled by the Table 4.2 firms was about 912 tons; very close to their pre-war average on all routes of about 990 tons. Both before and during the conflict they stuck to sail; the samples reveal only one steam ship voyage handled by any of these firms throughout the period. Prior to the war 77 percent of the tonnage they handled, on routes other than those with the Southern

¹⁴ *Gores*, 1867 p. 319.

states, was sailing to or from Northern US ports; during the war this rose slightly to 79 percent. On these routes their pre-war activities mainly consisted of handling tonnage clearing for Northern destinations - 83 percent of the total - rather than tonnage coming from them; during the war tonnage handled was evenly balanced between the two.¹⁵

This shift, amongst the Table 4.2 Group, towards handling vessels carrying cargoes of Northern produce, was marked by the presence of grain products. Throughout the pre-war samples only two vessels carrying significant amounts of Northern grain were handled by the group. This compares with a wartime figure of 33 such vessels out of a total of 41 incoming to Liverpool from the North that were handled by the group. Other Northern foodstuffs were present in significant quantities in 12 of these cargoes, and timber in 11. Sixty percent of this tonnage came from New York, with the remainder coming from Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland and San Francisco.¹⁶

British importation of Northern grain had been increasing through the late 1840s and the 1850s. Various factors were involved, such as growth in the British population, the development of Northern grain producing areas and improvement in Northern internal communications. The need to find alternative business to compensate for the loss of Southern cotton was a strong factor in the wartime grain boom; this was true of the

¹⁵ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Liverpool importing firm of Rathbones, mentioned in chapter 3, who greatly increased their business in this commodity during the war.¹⁷

In the wartime activities of the Table 4.2 group there was a shift away from the near exclusive pre-war reliance on American shipowning clients, but these remained overwhelmingly dominant; 90 percent of vessel tonnage on all Table 4.2 firm routes was American owned in the pre-war samples and this dropped to 70 percent in the wartime samples. The difference was mostly made up of a growth in British, and British North American, owned tonnage.¹⁸

It is not known who took the initiative in switching from Southern cotton to Northern grain in the relationship between Liverpool agent and American shipowning client. The extent to which the case study firms were acting for the same American clients as before the war, or for newly secured ones, is also unclear. It is, however, likely that the wartime shift in their business simply reflected the alternative employment that Northern owners were finding for their vessels, having been forced out of the Southern trade by the war. Northern owners were obviously well placed to take advantage of increased British demand for Northern produce, although Liverpool agents may have played a part in terms of providing intelligence about the Liverpool market.

¹⁷ Marriner, *Rathbones*, pp. 17-20.

¹⁸ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864); Database (*BOE*, 1856, 1858 and 1860).

We have been looking at the Table 4.2 firms as a group and the foregoing observations do apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to most of them. Only two members of the group were exceptional in having wartime business not centred upon the Northern US but upon the British North American colonies. Three of the four voyages which Miller and Mosman handled in the samples came from St. John, New Brunswick, carrying timber, and the other cleared for there. Three of the four vessels were registered at St. John and the fourth may have been; we only know that she had some British register. In this, the firm was modestly expanding its antebellum connections with St. John. Rankin Gilmour's wartime business was also with British North America. This represented a continuation of their contacts with these colonies and of the timber importing business mentioned in chapter 3.¹⁹

Table 4.1 demonstrated that the volume of timber imports into Liverpool increased during the war. A handful of vessels carrying timber from the North American colonies was also handled by George Warren and Co, Taylor Tipper and James Browne. No other trades stand out as significant wartime alternative activities for the Table 4.2 group. There is little evidence of involvement in alternative sources of cotton supply; Boulton, English and Brandon handled one vessel carrying cotton from Bombay, and they and Warren & Co handled one clearance each to Calcutta.²⁰

Interestingly, three Group 1 firms continued their antebellum involvement in trade with New Orleans, after the port's capture by Northern forces in early 1862. This

¹⁹ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

traffic carried little cotton; wooden staves, rosin, hides and tobacco were prominent amongst numerous items imported into Liverpool. The trade was not of great volume, amounting to only nineteen sailings through the remainder of the war, most of which were from New Orleans to Liverpool. Boulton, English and Brandon, and James Browne and Co handled three sailings each, and Duncan and Kendall a further two. In this enterprise the latter two firms' shipowning clients were American and this no doubt reflected a Southern trade in which Northern owners could legitimately engage. The sailings handled by Boulton, English and Brandon, however, were all made by a vessel named *Antoinette* which was registered in Hanover.²¹

There was a small wartime diversification amongst the group as a whole towards British and British North American shipowning clients. Boulton, English and Brandon were alone in developing a significant continental European clientele. This is evident in relation to the *Antoinette* mentioned above. Chapter 3 noted that the firm acted in a small way for clients in Bremen before the war. In the wartime samples they handled four vessels of this register, together with two Scandinavian ships registered in Denmark and Norway respectively. All of these sailed on Northern US, rather than European routes; there is no sign in the wartime samples of the firm continuing to handle vessels on the European routes evident before the war.²²

In spite of these exceptions, Group 1's wartime adaptation to the loss of the Southern trade was clearly not characterised by any great degree of diversification, but instead

²¹ *BOE*, April 1862 to May 1865.

²² Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864).

by the development of existing activities and contacts. In contrast, most of the firms that moved into the wartime entrepot trade with the Confederacy were taking on something new. Out of 191 firms that acted as agents in the entrepot trade, 141 had not done so in the pre-blockade Southern trade samples, and therefore appear to have been new to the trade; together they handled 57 percent of entrepot trade tonnage. The other 43 percent represented an expansion of the role of 50 firms who acted in both periods (their pre-blockade share having been one-quarter - firms that together handled the other three-quarters were not active in the entrepot trade).²³

To say that 50 firms, that acted in both periods, expanded their participation from 25 to 43 percent gives a misleading impression of the role of these firms as a whole. Actually, the increase was due to the activities of a handful of firms. Taking the tonnage handled by just the top two of these - Fraser Trenholm, and John Glynn & Son - out of both sides of the equation leaves 48 firms handling 21 percent of tonnage pre-blockade and 26 percent post-blockade; a modest increase. Most handled less than one percent in both periods. Therefore most of these firms did not significantly increase their participation between the two periods and most were peripheral players in both.²⁴

The point being made here is that there was a substantial turnover in personnel after the blockade. Although the entrepot trade was still with the South it meant new indirect routes, new contacts at the entrepots, and new shipowners following the

²³ Database, (*BOE* January 1856, 1858 and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

disappearance of the previously dominant American registered tonnage. In effect this amounted to a new trade with new opportunities for ship agents, shipowners and merchants. Amongst agents these opportunities were taken by the 141 new participants, and the handful of significant continuing participants, referred to above. We will now look at all the agents active in the wartime entrepot trade to examine several issues, primarily those of concentration and continuity.

Table 4.3. Concentration in Liverpool Entrepot Trade Agenting.

| PERIOD | 1861- 62 | 1863 | 1864 | 1865 | OVERALL |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| TONNAGE HANDLED | 49515 | 101348 | 144542 | 66993 | 362398 |
| NUMBER OF VOYAGES HANDLED | 130 | 325 | 495 | 202 | 1152 |
| NUMBER OF FIRMS PARTICIPATING | 59 | 91 | 121 | 80 | 191 |
| PERCENTAGE OF TONNAGE HANDLED: | | | | | |
| BY TOP THREE | 41.4 % | 23.1 % | 20.2% | 16.5 % | 22.1 % |
| BY TOP FOUR | 44.7 % | 29.1 % | 24.7 % | 21.4 % | 25.6 % |
| BY TOP TEN | 61.7 % | 50.5 % | 42.9 % | 40 % | 42.5 % |

Source: Database (BOE; August 1861 to July 1865).

In Table 4.3, because very few sailings fell into the portion of 1861 after the blockade, this period has been amalgamated with 1862. This Table can be compared directly with Table 3.3 in chapter 3. A number of points arise from the comparison. It is noticeable that substantially less vessel tonnage was engaged in the whole of the entrepot trade, lasting nearly four years, than was engaged in the antebellum sample periods; there were, however, over twice as many voyages in the former than in the latter. This emphasises the points made in chapter 3 that the wartime trade was a much contracted one and that large bulk carrying vessels largely disappeared from it; average vessel size dropped from around 920 tons to around 315. Obviously, unlike

the group 1 case studies of Table 4.2, their successors were not specialists in the large bulk carrying vessel.

Applying the top three and top four tests of market concentration discussed in chapter 3, the entrepot trade, like that of the pre-blockade samples, emerges as “unconcentrated”. Indeed on all three criteria set out in Table 3.3 the market here is, overall, less concentrated than in the pre-blockade samples. Although Table 4.3 shows higher concentration in the nascent trade of the first period, when volume was low, concentration diminished sharply in each subsequent period as volume increased. The number of participants also tended to increase, and reached a greater total than it had pre-blockade: 191 to 158.

In chapter 3 it was explained that an “unconcentrated” market has been seen as having a large number of participants, ease of entry and an essentially competitive, rather than controlled, nature. That this description applies more to the entrepot trade than to its precursor is unsurprising given that it represented a new pattern of trade and that most of the previous participants had vacated the field. It was open to anyone entrepreneurial enough to switch energy and resources into it. Chapter 3 also explained that “unconcentrated” does not preclude the existence of a group whose involvement was sufficiently significant and continuous for it to represent important business for them. Table 4.4 shows that such a group did emerge in the entrepot trade.

Table 4.4. Continuity in Liverpool Entrepot Trade Agenting.

| PERIODS OF PARTICIPATION | ONE | TWO | THREE | FOUR | TOTALS |
|-------------------------------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| NUMBER OF FIRMS | 100 | 41 | 31 | 19 | 191 |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FIRMS | 52.4 % | 21.5 % | 16.2 % | 9.9 % | 100 % |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TONNAGE HANDLED | 13.7 % | 16.6 % | 28.1 % | 41.6 % | 100 % |

Source: Database (BOE; August 1861 to July 1865).

The periods of participation in Table 4.4 refer to the four periods of Table 4.3. Comparing this with Table 3.4, reveals that a good deal more firms had a regular commitment, and that together they handled a greater proportion of tonnage, than their pre-blockade equivalents. Fifty firms appear in at least three periods, handling almost 70 percent of the tonnage; as opposed to the equivalent figures in the pre-blockade period of 24 handling 55 percent. Running parallel to lesser concentration, then, was a greater number of firms having a significant and regular involvement. This widespread entry into the entrepot trade points to considerable entrepreneurial opportunism in this sector of Liverpool's maritime economy.

In order to focus upon some of the agents who were important in the wartime entrepot trade we will now turn to the second case study group, being the top-ten wartime participants by volume of tonnage handled. These are listed in descending order of importance in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5. Case Study Group 2: Entrepot Trade Agents.

| Agent | Tonnage | No. of Vessels | % of Tonnage |
|------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|
| Fraser Trenholm & Co (4) | 37841 | 78 | 10.4 |
| John Glynn & Son (3) | 22220 | 118 | 6.1 |
| Melchor George Klingender & Co (4) | 20309 | 37 | 5.6 |
| Leech Harrison & Forwood (4) | 12614 | 32 | 3.5 |
| John Thomas Nickels (4) | 12409 | 39 | 3.4 |
| De Jersey & Co (3) | 12177 | 16 | 3.4 |
| Bahr Behrend & Co (4) | 11799 | 46 | 3.3 |
| Henry Lafone (3) | 9428 | 19 | 2.6 |
| Longton & Longrigg (4) | 8242 | 37 | 2.3 |
| Beach Root & Co (2) | 6760 | 24 | 1.9 |
| Totals | 153799 | 446 | 42.5 |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).

The number of periods in which each firm participated in the trade are indicated in brackets after their names. It can be seen that only Beach Root and Co were not in the group taking part in at least three periods, established in Table 4.4. Collectively, group 2 handled a large slice of the shipping - 42.5 percent of total tonnage. Their importance was spread throughout the war: together they handled 44.1 percent of tonnage in the 1861 to 1862 period, 46.6 percent in 1863, 43 percent in 1864 and 34.4 percent in 1865. Group 2 exemplifies the turnover of personnel after the blockade previously discussed; only Fraser Trenholm were important antebellum participants, having the 3.7 percent share shown in Table 3.5. Leech Harrison, Bahr Behrend and Glynn were the only others with any pre-blockade involvement, but this was small: 0.9, 0.3 and 0.1 percent respectively. This case study group can be seen as entrepreneurial opportunists - most jumped into the wartime trade as a new line.

When earlier discussing the degree of diversity in the activities of case study group 1, it has been possible to - on the whole - view them together as a group. This is because of the strong similarities in their activities. The same approach cannot be taken with group 2, whose patterns of activity were very different from each other. Five of the ten

group 2 members can be viewed together, but only in the sense that they all had strong established portfolios of other business before the war. This business, outside the Southern trade, is detailed in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6. Case Study Group 2: Antebellum and Wartime Business Outside Southern Trade.

| FIRM | A | B | C | D |
|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------|
| BAHR BEHREND & CO | 12360 [50] | 22365 [68] | 34725 [118] | 1.8 |
| JOHN GLYNN & SON | 5521 [52] | 8935 [70] | 14456 [122] | 1.6 |
| LONGTON & LONGRIGG | 7503 [29] | 4830 [17] | 12333 [46] | 0.6 |
| JOHN THOMAS NICKELS | 2933 [8] | 4105 [11] | 7038 [19] | 1.4 |
| LEECH HARRISON & FORWOOD | 1819 [4] | 3713 [7] | 5532 [11] | 2.0 |
| TOTALS | 30136 [143] | 43948 [173] | 74084 [316] | 1.5 |

Source: Cases Database (BOE, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, and 1864).

A. Tonnage handled in antebellum samples (January 1856, 1858 and 1860). Number of vessels in brackets.

B. Tonnage handled in wartime samples (January 1862, 1863 and 1864). Number of vessels in brackets.

C. Totals of A and B.

D. Increase or decrease in tonnage handled in wartime samples as opposed to antebellum samples.

No significant agenting activities outside the Southern trade have been found in the sample periods for the other five members of group 2. The thing that stands out about the Table 4.6 firms is that, not only did they take the opportunities of war by moving heavily into the Confederate trade as shown in Table 4.5, but that during the war all but one of them increased an already substantial antebellum business on other routes. Only Longton and Longrigg were doing less business on other routes during the war than before it. Overall, the group was doing half as much business again, on other routes, during the war as they were doing before it. It must be remembered that Table 4.6 is based on monthly samples and therefore, if the patterns held good throughout the year, a very considerable volume of business was involved. Taking their Table 4.5

and Table 4.6 performances together (which have not been represented together because one is based on a continuous four year period, whilst the other is based on samples) the five firms of Table 4.6 substantially increased their business during the war.

Comparing Table 4.2, on the one hand, with Table 4.6, on the other, it is apparent that the two sets of firms were relying on different styles of business. On the whole, group 1 was handling a relatively small number of large vessels, whilst group 2 was handling a relatively large number of small vessels. We have seen the much lower average vessel tonnage in the wartime Confederate trade as opposed to its precursor. In the other routes represented at Table 4.6 the average was even lower: 234 tons compared to 315 in the Confederate trade. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know which business style was more profitable and therefore the groups cannot be compared in those terms. On the cruder measures that are available - those of business volume - the Table 4.6 firms clearly improved their positions during the war, while the Table 4.2 firms fell back.

Beyond these general points we need to look at the activities of the Table 4.6 firms individually in order to examine the different patterns of their business portfolios outside the Confederate trade; also to link these with their involvements in the Confederate trade. The portfolios of the five Table 4.6 firms can be described as diverse in contrast to those of group 1. Each had its own individual pattern of diversity. We will look first at Bahr Behrend and Co, which had been founded by a Dane (Lorentz Hansen) in the 1790s. By the late 1850s and early 1860s the senior

partners were Charles Lewis Bahr and David Behrend, and the junior partners were George Bahr and George Behrend.²⁵

The striking thing about this firm's Table 4.6 activities is their diversity both in terms of the routes plied by the ships they handled, and in terms of their portfolio of shipowning clients; this contrasts strongly with the group 1 firms. Table 4.5 shows that the firm handled 46 voyages in the four years of the Confederate trade, whilst Table 4.6 indicates that they handled 118 voyages on other routes in just the six monthly samples. The conclusion can be drawn that the Confederate trade was not a mainstay of the firm's business in the early 1860s; it was just a new line added to an already diverse and extensive portfolio.

The central feature of the portfolio was Spanish trade, which accounted for about 40 percent of the 118 voyages shown in Table 4.6. All of the ships handled by the firm in this trade (where place of register is known) were Spanish, apart from two British. The rest are identified only as "foreign", but it is likely that most of these were Spanish too. The majority of the voyages, about 60 percent, were made by steamers. Most of the vessels would have been owned by the Serra line. This was a Bilbao registered company, the principal shareholders being the Serra y Font family of Barcelona; but Bahr Behrend themselves held a minority share. The line ran a regular steam service

²⁵ A. Behrend, *Portrait of a Family Firm: Bahr Behrend & Co, 1793-1945* (Liverpool, 1970), pp .1-18; G. Chandler, *Liverpool Shipping. A Short History* (London, 1960), pp. 82-83; *Gores*, 1855 pp 42, and 60, 1860 pp. 21, and 27.

every week or ten days between Liverpool and the Spanish ports of Cadiz, Malaga, Valencia and Barcelona.²⁶

The Spanish trade was the firm's mainstay. Arthur Behrend commented that "...throughout the whole of the second half of the nineteenth century the Serra line brought the firm a stability and prosperity..".²⁷ But this formed only a minority part of the business as a whole. The firm acted as agents for vessels trading with Northern Europe (28 voyages), the Mediterranean and Black seas (20), South and Central America (16), Australia, India and Africa (5), and North America (3). In Northern Europe, French, Belgian and North German ports feature strongly, with Danish, Swedish and Dutch ports evident to a lesser extent. In the Mediterranean, destinations ranged from Gibraltar to Constantinople, and beyond to Black sea ports such as Galatz. The principal South American trade was with Brazil, but the firm also handled vessels trading with Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela. Before the war the firm had also handled three voyages in the Southern trade samples.²⁸

Diverse routes were echoed in a diverse shipowning client base. Twenty of the vessels handled are known to have been registered in North Germany, mostly in Prussian ports and Hamburg. Eighteen were of known Spanish register and the firm also had an established British clientele (17 vessels). Of the remainder, 7 were Dutch, and the rest were spread between Denmark, Belgium, France, Austria and Norway. Forty-seven

²⁶ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, and 1864); Behrend, *Portrait*, pp. 18-20.

²⁷ Behrend, *Portrait*, p.18.

²⁸ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860, April to July 1861).

ships are known only as “foreign”, and these can be added to the firm’s international clientage, although the national group to which they belonged cannot be identified.²⁹ Clearly the principal clients were based in Northern Europe, Spain and Britain. In acting as Liverpool agent for foreign shipowning clients, and therefore also for ships which probably had foreign crews and masters, language must have been of great importance. A significant part of what the firm had to offer to its foreign clients must have been command of languages, in particular those of Spain, Germany and Scandinavia; it has already been mentioned that the firm’s founder was Danish.

Knowing the nature of Bahr Behrend’s foreign connections is helpful in understanding why they were able to move into the Confederate entrepot trade. It is noticeable that virtually all of the ships that they handled in that trade (41 out of 46), were sailing on the routes between Liverpool and the Spanish speaking entrepots of Matamoros and Havana; most (38) were on the Matamoros route. The pattern of ownership here mirrored that of the firm’s clientele in the other trades; eleven were North German, 9 Spanish, 9 British and the rest mostly Scandinavian or Dutch.³⁰

As with the trade switches of group 1, highlighted earlier, we do not know whether the initiative for moving into a new trade lay with Liverpool agent or shipowning client. However, Bahr Behrend’s Spanish connections, coupled with Liverpool market knowledge, may have put them in a stronger position of intelligence and contacts than their British and European clients, and thus enabled them to advise on entering ships

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865).

into the entrepot trade. In these circumstances, it is more likely that the firm played an active role in these decisions than that the group 1 case studies assumed such a role in the shift by Northern US shipowners into Northern US grain.

On the evidence of the Confederate trade, Bahr Behrend did not combine significant merchanting with its agenting; the tiny total of 1846 cotton bales was consigned to them in the entrepot trade. Nor is there any sign of the firm itself owning any British registered ships in the trade, although it must be remembered that they were part shareholders in the Serra line and some of the line's vessels may have been involved. Although most of the vessels handled by the firm were sail, they dealt with an increasing amount of steam tonnage as the period went on. Almost a quarter of the ships that they handled in Table 4.6 were steam and almost all of them were in the Spanish trade, probably being owned by the Serra line.³¹

John Glynn and Son also had a diverse portfolio in terms of routes and clients, but this manifested itself in different ways to that of Bahr Behrend. The Glynn family had been established as gentry in Cornwall for several hundred years before John Glynn moved from there to Liverpool in 1811 and founded the firm. He was able to persuade West Country shipping interests to retain the firm as Liverpool agent, and from this base established it as a shipowner as well as agent. John died in 1847 and was succeeded by his son Edward Dashper Glynn, who was sole partner in 1855. By 1860

³¹ *Ibid.*; Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, and 1864).

Edward Dashper had taken his own sons, Dashper and Walter, into partnership with him.³²

The Glynns specialised in very small vessels, all of which were sail. Low average tonnage is apparent from the fact that both in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 the firm led in terms of numbers of vessels handled, but was second in terms of aggregate tonnage. It can be seen from these two Tables that they took on a considerable business in the Confederate trade, but that other activities remained of principal importance. They handled more vessels in the six monthly samples of Table 4.6 than they handled in the four years of Confederate trade shown in Table 4.5.³³

Like Bahr Behrend, the Glynns had a core business that was the mainstay of their activities. A little over half (70 out of 122), of the Table 4.6 vessels that they handled were sailing to or from Saint Michael Island; most outward sailings were in ballast whilst return voyages carried oranges. Although a little unclear, the most likely location of the island is in the Azores off the coast of West Africa.³⁴ Second to this was a Mediterranean fruit trade (34 voyages), involving sailings to and from ports all around the basin. Italian, Spanish and British colonial ports were most in evidence, with Palermo and Gibraltar the places appearing most often. Eight voyages involved South and Central America; most noticeably, wartime voyages carrying cotton from the Brazilian ports of Para and Pernambuco. The Glynns also handled six voyages

³² B.G. Orchard, *Liverpool's Legion of Honour* (Birkenhead, 1893), pp. 332; C. Jones, *Pioneer Ship Owners* (Liverpool, 1938), pp. 35-49; Chandler, *Liverpool Shipping*, pp. 89-94; Gores, 1855 p. 264, 1860 p. 102.

³³ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, and 1864); Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865).

³⁴ *The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World* (Columbia, Forth edn., 1956), p. 1700.

involving West Indian Islands, and a handful of others involving Madeira, Holland and India.³⁵

Glynn & Son had pioneered the fruit and general cargo trade between Liverpool and the Mediterranean, and had established important links there, particularly in Italy. However, expansion into other trades was characteristic of the firm throughout most of the nineteenth century. It had become a major shipowner in its own right in the Mediterranean and other trades. Many of its ships were captained by West Countrymen, known as its “Seagulls”, and the practice of giving its ships names starting with Z gave it the nickname of the “Z line”.³⁶

In the wartime Confederate trade the Glynn's were also significant shipowners. This aspect of their participation will be returned to later in this chapter. There is further sign of diversity in their activities as agents in the Confederate trade, in that they agented vessels sailing to or from all four of the main entrepots; although it must be said that most (97 out of 118) involved Nassau. Of the remaining voyages, 13 were on the Bermuda route, 7 on the Matamoros route and one on that of Havana. There is no sign of diversification into merchanting as not a single cotton bale was consigned to them throughout the war.³⁷

The firm's greater orientation towards the Atlantic entrepot routes reflects the greater orientation of British owned shipping generally towards those routes, rather than

³⁵ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864).

³⁶ Jones, *Pioneer*, pp. 35-49; Chandler, *Liverpool Shipping*, pp. 89-94.

³⁷ Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865).

towards the Spanish speaking entrepots of the Gulf. This is particularly relevant here because, taking all the Glynn agented voyages of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 together, all but one featured British registered ships. They did not have Bahr Behrend's international diversity of client base, but they did have a wide range in a purely British sense. Out of a total of 240 voyages, 62 we only know as made by ships of "British" register. For the rest specific register detail is available and 25 different British ports are represented. Glynn & Co obviously had clients all over the country. The West Country connection was still strong, with 36 voyages made by vessels registered in Dartmouth, 11 in Plymouth, 5 in Penzance, 4 in Bristol, 3 each in Falmouth and St. Ives, 2 in Exeter and one in Fowey. The firm had also built large client bases in Liverpool (42 voyages by ships of that register) and London (27). Other notable places of register were Faversham (9 voyages), Jersey and Scilly with 6 each, and Ipswich with 5.³⁸

The fact that so many Glynn clients moved ships into the Confederate trade suggests that the firm itself played an active role in advising this course; the commitment of tonnage of their own to the trade would point to the same conclusion. The same applies to Longton & Longrigg, who also had a diverse, but almost exclusively British, shipowning clientele. They handled ships registered in at least 18 different British ports in their combined Table 4.5 and 4.6 business, with Liverpool and London standing out amongst these. Like the Glynnns, they committed some shipping tonnage of their own to the entrepot trade, although to a much lesser extent. Also like the

³⁸ *Ibid.*; Cases Database (BOE, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864).

Glynns they were sail specialists and there is no sign of them importing any Confederate cotton.³⁹

Longton & Longrigg differed, however, in the pattern of their agenting activities. In their Table 4.6 business, West Indian islands feature most with 17 voyages, followed by a variety of Central and South American ports with 13 voyages, and then Africa with 6 voyages and India with 3. This firm was orientated towards oceanic trade rather than to the closer ports favoured by the Glynns, but the portfolio was still diverse in its own way. In the Confederate trade the vessels they handled were more evenly spread between the entrepots than was the case with either Bahr Behrend or Glynn & Son, with 14 sailing the Nassau route, 11 on the Matamoros route, 10 on the Bermuda route and 1 on the Havana route.⁴⁰

As was the case with both Bahr Behrend and Glynn & Son, it looks like Longton & Longrigg took on a substantial sideline in the entrepot trade whilst their other routes remained of greater importance. The firm had become known as Longton & Longrigg sometime between 1855 and 1858 when John Longton - previously trading as John Longton & Co - went into partnership with Thomas Longrigg.⁴¹ Leech Harrison & Co, on the other hand, was a long-standing establishment, which Thomas Brittain Forwood joined in 1826 as an apprentice. By our period he was senior partner, and the

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*; Gores, 1855 p. 423, 1860 p. 162.

firm was styled Leech Harrison & Forwood. By 1860 he had taken his eldest son, Arthur Bower Forwood, into partnership with him.⁴²

More will be said about this firm later in connection with shipowning and cotton importing, both areas in which it was prominent in the entrepot trade. This prominence, together with a comparison between the firm's performances shown at Tables 4.5 and 4.6, suggests that its move into the entrepot trade was of greater significance to its business than that of any other Table 4.6 firm. The evidence to hand concerning how much the firm had diversified into other trades is a little thin: the diversity samples have picked up a total of only 11 voyages. On the basis of this evidence we can, however, argue that these activities were diverse, spread out as they were amongst handling ships on Caribbean, Mediterranean, Indian and South American routes.⁴³

Leech Harrison had handled five vessels in the Southern trade samples before the war, accounting for about one percent of the total tonnage in the pre-blockade samples. Table 4.5 shows that their proportionate involvement in the wartime trade was greater. This was mainly on sailings between Liverpool, and Nassau and Matamoros, but also included a few each on the Havana and Tampico routes. Before the war their shipowning clients in the Southern trade had been American. Taking their Table 4.5 and 4.6 activities together, British register dominated, with a variety of British ports involved. Various European countries were also represented. Interestingly nine of the

⁴² Gores, 1855 p. 242, 1860 p. 92; Orchard, *Liverpool's Legion*, pp. 304-309.

⁴³ Cases Database (BOE, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863 and 1864).

32 vessels that they handled in the entrepot trade were registered in the Bahamas, which became a flag of convenience for some during the war. The firm was also moving into handling steam: 14 out of the 43 total voyages that they handled, shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, were made by steamers.⁴⁴

The evidence available concerning John Thomas Nickels, a sole trader,⁴⁵ does not suggest as great a diversity as seen with other members of the Table 4.6 group. Instead, he largely specialised in handling Spanish ships, and sailings to and from Spanish speaking destinations. Actually Nickels' Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 activities were strongly linked because, before the war, he was already a specialist in the Cuban trade, and the wartime role of Havana as an entrepot served to swell this existing business. It is apparent that, during the war, both Nickels and his predominantly Spanish shipowning clients were simply beneficiaries of a temporary increase in a trade in which they were already engaged; the cause being the presence of Confederate cotton in Havana.

Taking Nickels' activities shown on both Tables 4.5 and 4.6 together, the Cuban trade accounted for 46 voyages that he handled, out of 58. Outward journeys handled, taking place both before and during the war, cleared for either one of the Cuban ports of Cardenas, Havana, Matanzas, or Santiago de Cuba. However, return voyages handled, all of which took place during the war, came exclusively from Havana carrying Confederate cotton. Nickel's shipowning clients were largely Spanish: 36

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 58, and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865).

⁴⁵ *Gores*; 1855 p. 503; 1860 p. 194.

vessels out of 58 are known to be of this register, with another 8 - only known as “foreign” - likely to also have been so. He also had British clients (11 vessels handled), and some American (3). Nickels was diversifying into handling steamships. Although none of the vessels he dealt with in the entrepot trade were steam, three on Mediterranean routes were. Apart from a couple of sailings on the Nassau route, the only other journeys where Nickels acted as agent were between Liverpool and the Spanish language ports of Matamoros, Manilla in the Philippines, and Bilbao.⁴⁶

In summary, the five case study firms of Table 4.6 took the opportunities presented by war to add another string to their bow; all had pre-existing business portfolios that continued, and that most managed to increase, at the same time. In this way they were adding to already diverse activities. These diversities manifested themselves - to a greater or lesser extent in the individual instances - in terms of routes, commodities, shipowning clients, moving into owning their own ships, and, in three cases, diversification into steam. We have also speculated that entry into the Confederate trade did not simply reflect the activities of their shipowning clients but involved some initiative on the part of these Liverpool agents.

For the other five case studies of Table 4.5 the diversity samples have revealed no other activities. The fortunes of these, with the exception of De Jersey, appear to have been more closely bound up with the wartime trade. For M. G. Klingender & Co, Henry Lafone and Beach Root & Co, their agenting activities were closely related to

⁴⁶ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1863, and 1864); Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865).

their own shipowning in the wartime trade. Accordingly it is more meaningful to focus on these later in this chapter, in the context of shipowning. Fraser Trenholm were uniquely entangled in the fortunes of the Confederacy, particularly as cotton importing merchants, and De Jersey were also prominent in this aspect of the trade. These two will be returned to shortly.

Turning now to cotton importing, chapter 3 argued that the severance of mainland connections during the war probably led to the widespread disappearance of pre-war importers from the wartime scene. It was also pointed out, however, that we can be definite about the importers of only about twenty-two percent of imported Southern cotton, in the antebellum samples, because of the large incidence of “order”. The point was also made that the evidence is much stronger for the wartime entrepot trade, when the “order” proportion fell sharply, and, as a result, we can be definite concerning the importers of about three-quarters of the total.

Comparing the two periods is not, therefore, comparing like with like. However, the evidence available indicates that, as in agenting, there was a large influx of new participants taking up the opportunities presented by the re-direction of Southern trade through entrepots. At least 231 firms and individuals fall into this category, apparently being new to Southern cotton importing in the entrepot period; together they took about 45 percent of that period’s total bale imports. Conversely, only 40 firms are known to have imported before and after the blockade. Fraser Trenholm were one of these and if their exceptionally large role is subtracted, we are left with only with 39 firms known to have not been forced out by the war. Their role was not great in either

period: they imported only about 9 percent in the former and about 11 percent in the latter. Unfortunately, it is not apparent how those who were forced out by the war adapted. Knowing who imported three-quarters of the total, although not perfect, does however enable us to undertake the kind of analysis of wartime merchanting that the thin evidence of the pre-blockade period could not support; with the qualification throughout that one-quarter of the evidence is missing due to “order”.⁴⁷

Table 4.7. Concentration in Wartime Cotton Importation into Liverpool from Entrepots.

| PERIOD | 1861- 62 | 1863 | 1864 | 1865 | OVERALL |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|
| COTTON BALES (TOTAL) | 32160 | 115813 | 157381 | 92119 | 397473 |
| COTTON BALES (WITHOUT ORDER) | 26413 | 89150 | 114923 | 65008 | 295494 |
| NUMBER OF NAMES PARTICIPATING | 30 | 111 | 158 | 108 | 271 |
| PERCENTAGE OF BALES HANDLED: | | | | | |
| BY TOP THREE | 50.8 % | 33.7 % | 25.3% | 22.6 % | 27.3 % |
| BY TOP FOUR | 55.5 % | 36.9 % | 30 % | 26.5 % | 30.7 % |
| BY TOP TEN | 72 % | 52.5 % | 45.2 % | 40.3 % | 46.4 % |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).⁴⁸

Applying the two tests of concentration explained in chapter 3 results in the overall distribution shown in Table 4.7 being “unconcentrated” in the top three test, and at the low end of “moderately concentrated” in the top four test. This suggests a basically unconcentrated distribution characterised, as mentioned before, by an essentially competitive market with a large number of participants and ease of entry. Contemporary points of comparison are lacking here. David Williams studied concentration in Liverpool cotton importing in the first half of the nineteenth century,

⁴⁷ Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858, and 1860; April 1861 to July 1865).

⁴⁸ The imports of late 1861 were so small that they have been incorporated, in Table 4.7, with those of 1862. The percentages shown are percentages of the whole with no adjustment having been made for “order”; percentages of imports net of “order” would distort the figures upwards.

but the last year which his figures cover is 1839; he noted a trend towards greater concentration between 1820 and 1839.⁴⁹ It would be helpful to have the kind of immediate ante-, and post-bellum analysis that the high proportion of “order” makes impossible. The extent to which the wartime distribution differed from the prevalent trends of the time could then be seen. In the absence of this analysis we must be content to observe that the overall Table 4.7 figures show a much greater degree of concentration than that found by Williams. His figures for 1820, 1830 and 1839 reveal a much lower concentration than any of the Table 4.7 tests. For instance, his top ten firms together only imported 24, 33 and 36 percent respectively in his three sample years. On this basis, the wartime period appears to conform to a continuing upward trend. If we compare Table 4.7 with the agenting equivalents (Tables 3.3 and 4.3) then a similar, but slightly greater, degree of concentration can be observed in merchanting.

When discussing Table 4.3 it was pointed out that concentration was highest in the incipient entrepot trade of 1861 to 1862, when trade volume was low. The same is true here, but much more so; on all three tests shown in Table 4.7, concentration fell very sharply, year on year, as volume increased. At the same time, the number of participants increased sharply year on year. The conclusion can be drawn that there was a widespread scramble to acquire a share in the market, however small; this resulted in only just under 300,000 bales being imported by over 270 different names.

Chapter 3 established that, during the war, a combination arose of an acute scarcity of Southern cotton and an increased premium being attached to that cotton, because of its

⁴⁹ Williams, in *Liverpool and Merseyside*, pp. 182-209.

perceived high quality. It was also mentioned that the civil war period was marked by a surge of speculation in cotton. Prices went through considerable short term fluctuations on which there was a great deal of gambling.⁵⁰ Against this background there must have been a potential for worthwhile profits to be made on even very small quantities. Out of the total of 271 names noted in Table 4.7, only 42 imported more than one thousand bales each; over half (154) took less than 100 each, and over a quarter (72) less than 10 bales each. The references to “names” rather than “firms” is deliberate: clearly many importers were private individuals having a private flutter. Amongst these were 37 ship masters, to each of whom a few bales were consigned from their vessel’s cargo.

Table 4.8. Continuity in Wartime Cotton Importation into Liverpool from Entrepots.

| PERIODS OF PARTICIPATION | ONE | TWO | THREE | FOUR | TOTALS |
|-----------------------------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| NUMBER OF NAMES | 192 | 37 | 27 | 15 | 271 |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NAMES | 71 % | 14 % | 10 % | 5 % | 100 % |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BALES HANDLED | 7 % | 5 % | 22 % | 41 % | 75 % |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).⁵¹

The existence of a very large number of small time importers is again highlighted when we look at continuity in Table 4.8; 85 percent of the names imported in only one or two periods, and together they only traded 12 percent of the total. Only 15 percent imported in three or more periods, but together they accounted for 63 percent.

⁵⁰ Henderson, *Cotton Famine*, pp. 15, and 122-123.

⁵¹ The four periods are those of 1861 to 1862, 1863, 1864 and 1865. As in Table 4.7, the percentages given are of the whole without any adjustment made for “order”. This explains why the total bales percentage only adds up to 75 percent, which is the slice of importing for which we know the identity of the importers.

Actually, both Tables 4.7 and 4.8 paint a somewhat exaggerated picture of the extent of involvement of this latter group as a whole. In fact, Fraser Trenholm and Co were way ahead of the rest, alone importing almost one-fifth of the entire wartime total. This firm was by far the top importer in each of the periods covered by Table 4.8. It handled 40 percent of the 1861 to 1862 total, 26 percent in 1863, 14 percent in 1864 and 11 percent in 1865. Although the firm's share fell proportionately over the periods, it displayed considerable opportunism in taking such a large share of a contracted market; an opportunism reflected at the other end of the market by the host of small-scale dealers. Fraser Trenholm were one of a small group that established a significant and regular market share. The top ten participants, by bales imported, are listed in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9. Top Ten Importers of Entrepot Cotton.

| Merchants | Cotton Bales | Percentage |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Fraser Trenholm & Co (4) | 75680 | 19.0 |
| Frederick Huth & Co (4) | 19325 | 4.9 |
| De Jersey & Co (4) | 13669.5 | 3.4 |
| Francisco De Lizardi & Co (4) | 13482 | 3.4 |
| Alexander Collie & Co (3) | 13080 | 3.3 |
| Edward Lawrence & Co (3) | 13063.5 | 3.3 |
| J.M Calder (3) | 10202 | 2.6 |
| W Droege & Co (4) | 9976 | 2.5 |
| Alexander Duranty & Co (3) | 8204.5 | 2.1 |
| Leech Harrison & Forwood (4) | 7522 | 1.9 |
| Totals | 184204.5 | 46.4 |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).⁵²

It can be observed from the figures appearing in parenthesis after the names that all of these firms imported in at least three periods. Together they traded about 46 percent of the entrepot cotton and their collective involvement was strong in all four periods: 60 percent in 1861 to 1862, 52 percent in 1863, 45 percent in 1864 and 38 percent in 1865. The declining curve of their collective share reflects the increasing level of

⁵² Again, the percentages shown are of the whole, with no adjustment for "order".

competition, year on year, noted in the discussion of Table 4.7. Edward Lawrence and Co and J.M Calder had particular wartime involvements that we will return to. It can be seen that Leech Harrison, who were members of the Table 4.6 case study group, combined cotton merchanting with their other wartime activities.

Alexander Collie & Co were London based merchants of whom the Liverpool office was a branch.⁵³ The Liverpool offices of Huth, De Jersey and De Lizardi were also branches; these three were long-standing international merchant banks. Huth and De Lizardi were based in London but had other offices abroad. De Jersey were part of a multifaceted international business that was based in Manchester; at its centre was Baron Ludwig Knoop of Bremen.⁵⁴ It is unlikely that the wartime importation of a few thousand bales of cotton by their Liverpool offices was a matter of any great moment to these firms. These offices would have just taken the short term opportunities of war to extend their enterprise into Southern cotton.

By contrast, Fraser Trenholm had a heavy commitment to the Confederacy. Tables 4.5 and 4.9 have shown that they were both the leading agents and the leading merchants of the entrepot trade. We mentioned in chapter 3 that Fraser Trenholm was a branch office of John Fraser and Co, based in Charleston, and that the resident partner in Liverpool was Charles Kuhn Prioleau. From the outset Fraser and Co had a close relationship with the Confederate government. Indeed the senior partner, George A.

⁵³ Lester, *Confederate Finance*, p. 233.

⁵⁴ S. Chapman, *The Rise of Merchant Banking* (Britain, 1984), pp. 11, 13, 39, 44, 75, 91, and 144-146; R. W. Hidy, "The Organisation and Functions of the Anglo-American Merchant Bankers, 1815-1860", *Journal of Economic History* Vol. 1 (1941), pp. 53-66.

Trenholm, became Confederate Treasury Secretary in 1864. Throughout the war, on both sides of the Atlantic, they were very active in the whole business of blockade running; on the government's account and on their own. Fraser Trenholm acted as European banker to the Confederacy and were involved in all sorts of areas of its European efforts, including obtaining ships and supplies in Europe. They also received government cotton shipped to them for sale on commission. It is probable that most of the cotton consigned to the firm was that of the Confederate government, and that it was these consignments that made it the leading importer. It appears that this firm's commitment to the Confederacy was not balanced by any other enterprise, and therefore its fortunes became tied up with the Confederate cause.⁵⁵

Trading through the entrepots involved establishing new networks of commercial connection. A brokerage firm, Henry Adderley and Co, became Nassau agents for the Confederate government, handling their shipping transactions through the port. Fraser and Co sent their own agent, J.B Lafitte, who handled the firm's private shipments through the port, whilst Adderley handled those on government account. Adderley was also employed as Nassau agent by The Importing and Exporting Company of South Carolina who consigned their cotton to J.M Calder in Liverpool (see Table 4.9).⁵⁶ Later in the war when Bermuda became a major entrepot, a local merchant, John Tory Bourne, became agent for the government and for a variety of British merchants, including Fraser Trenholm, Alexander Collie and Edward Lawrence.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Price, "Blockade Running", *American Neptune*, pp. 31-62; Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 49, 63, 64-65, and 147.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 95-96; Vandiver, *Confederate Blockade*, pp. 36-70.

In Matamoros the Confederate government played a much smaller part in importing and exporting, which was dominated by a group of local firms.⁵⁸ This was probably also true of Havana, because the government's agent in Liverpool, Fraser Trenholm, did not have cotton consigned to them from either of these entrepots. Looking at the pattern of cotton importation, we can infer that individual Liverpool importers developed connections with specific merchants in specific entrepots, like those of Fraser Trenholm through Nassau. This inference can be drawn from the fact that about 90 percent of the importers, collectively handling about 60 percent of the cotton (eliminating "order") were essentially receiving from one of the entrepots only. For example, 96 percent of the cotton consigned to Fraser Trenholm came through Nassau, whilst De Jersey's consignments came solely from Matamoros. Although only importing 3.4 percent of the whole, De Jersey had about 10 percent of the cotton which came out of Matamoros consigned to them. These areas of specialisation were reflected in the firms' agenting: all of the voyages handled by De Jersey were on the Matamoros route, and most of those handled by Fraser Trenholm were on the Nassau route. Fraser Trenholm also dealt with ships sailing on Bermudan and mainland routes, but none on those routes with ports in the Gulf of Mexico.⁵⁹

A minority of about 10 percent of firms imported from two entrepots, rather than just one, and together they traded about 40 percent of Confederate cotton where the consignees are known (without "order"). Again, it can be inferred that specific port connections were involved. All the members of this group either imported just from

⁵⁸ Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 118; Tyler, *The Americas*, pp. 66-76; Tyler, *Santiago Vidaurri*, pp. 98-128; Daddysman, *the Matamoros Trade*, pp. 107-150.

⁵⁹ Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865).

the Atlantic entrepots (Bermuda and Nassau), or just from those in the Gulf of Mexico (Matamoros and Havana). It is unsurprising that there would have been overlap between connections in the two Atlantic British colonies; equally so in the two Spanish speaking Gulf ports. For example De Lizardi and Huth both received from Havana and Matamoros, but not from Bermuda or Nassau. Conversely Collie traded in cotton from Bermuda and Nassau, but not from either Gulf entrepot.⁶⁰

New merchanting connections, then, were established with the entrepots. However, as argued towards the end of chapter 3, the collapse in the proportion of “order” during the war probably indicates that these were predominantly in the nature of correspondent and consignee, rather than Liverpool firms setting up their own new foreign establishments. In this way these merchanting firms, on the whole, adapted to the altered wartime pattern of trade without entering into long term commitments to a trade pattern that was never likely to outlast the war.

In sharp contrast, the extent of Fraser Trenholm’s commitment to the Confederacy meant that this firm did not itself long outlast the war. The Confederacy collapsed owing it considerable sums and leaving it open to legal action from British merchants and from the United States Federal government. It was the attempts of the latter to recover former Confederate assets held by Fraser Trenholm that forced the firm into bankruptcy in 1867. Fraser and Co in Charleston met the same fate in 1872 when attempts to extricate themselves from wartime liabilities finally failed.⁶¹ Fraser

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 222-224.

Trenholm's position in the entrepot trade differed markedly from that of the Table 4.6 case study group and from that of De Jersey: the latter's involvement represented a further broadening of already diverse activities, whilst Fraser Trenholm gambled on the success of just one.

2. British Adaptation.

In his study of Britain in the eighteen fifties and sixties, Geoffrey Best described these as “..years of unchallenged British ascendancy over the family of nations in commerce and manufactures..”. He went on to describe a period of free trade and rising prices in which British wealth was increasing rapidly, and by far exceeded that of its nearest competitors. Within the period there were peaks and troughs, but the war years fell into a period of boom between 1861 and 1866.⁶² During this time Britain enjoyed a “..remarkable and sustained growth of trade..”.⁶³ It is within this context that maritime interests in the port of Liverpool, and other British ports, adapted to the challenges and opportunities, of the American war.

During the war a great opportunity was created by a sharp decline in the American mercantile marine and in the American shipbuilding industry. These sectors had played an important part in building American economic strength and were at the height of their success by the 1850s. In that decade the United States was challenging Britain for dominance in the North Atlantic and other transoceanic trades. During the war, however, a small fleet of Confederate commerce raiders captured or destroyed a large part of the American mercantile marine and forced a larger part to be sold or

⁶² G. Best, *Mid-Victorian Britain. 1851-1875* (Britain, 1971), pp. 19-23.

⁶³ S.G. Checkland, *The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815-1885* (London, 1964), pp. 22-23.

transferred to foreign flags in efforts to avoid the raiders. The result was a sharp fall in the proportion of America's overseas trade that was carried by domestic tonnage, from two-thirds in 1860 to 30 percent in 1866. This was only the start of a sustained decline which continued up to the eve of the first world war, when only two percent of vessels engaged in world oceanic trade were of American register.⁶⁴

The long term factors involved in the decline need not concern us here; what is significant is that the opportunity presented was taken by the British shipping industry. In 1860, British registered tonnage amounted to about 4.7 million tons whereas US tonnage amounted to about 2.5 million tons; by 1870 British tonnage had risen to about 5.7 million whereas US tonnage had fallen to about 1.5 million. The falling away of the US challenge was a factor in Britain's ability to maintain a dominance in world shipping from the 1850s up to the eve of the first world war; about a third of world shipping tonnage was British throughout this period. Discussing this dominance, Sarah Palmer concluded that the failure of other nations, such as the United States, to mount sustained challenges led to British supremacy continuing by default.⁶⁵ Another way to look at this might be that British shipping interests took opportunities that others did not.

The decline of American shipping, and the corresponding rise of that of Britain, was very marked in the Southern trade. Table 4.10 demonstrates the altered relative

⁶⁴ Henderson, *Cotton Famine*, p.10; J.J. Safford, "The Decline of the American Merchant Marine, 1850-1914: An Historiographic Appraisal" in *Change and Adaption in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. L. R. Fischer and G. E. Panting, (Newfoundland, 1985), pp. 53-85.

⁶⁵ S. Palmer, "The British Shipping Industry, 1850-1914" in *Change and Adaptation*, pp. 89-114.

positions by reference to the wartime entrepot trade and the restored post-war direct trade.

Table 4.10. Registration of Shipping by Region in British Trade with the South 1861 to 1870.

| Region | 61-65 t | 61-65 n | 61-65 % | 66-70 t | 66-70 n | 66-70 % |
|----------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|------------|-------------|
| Britain | 378843 | 1230 | 82.4 | 101953 | 130 | 47.2 |
| Other European | 62356 | 236 | 13.6 | 5187 | 10 | 2.4 |
| America | 5354 | 14 | 1.2 | 102287 | 109 | 47.3 |
| Foreign | 5100 | 25 | 1.1 | 5063 | 13 | 2.3 |
| Unknown | 2846 | 8 | 0.6 | 1365 | 1 | 0.6 |
| Confederate | 2656 | 9 | 0.6 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Latin America | 2422 | 8 | 0.5 | 295 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Totals | 459577 | 1530 | 100% | 216150 | 264 | 100% |

Source: Database (BOE; August 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

In Table 4.10, the first three columns of figures break registration down by tonnage engaged (t), number of voyages (n), and percentage of total tonnage (%), in respect of the wartime entrepot trade. The next three columns do the same in respect of the post-war sample months.⁶⁶ At the end of chapter 3 we established the relative balance in the antebellum samples as being overwhelmingly in America’s favour: 84 percent to Britain’s 15 percent. Table 4.10 shows that American tonnage nearly vanished during the war, whilst British jumped to 82 percent. Of course, there were particular reasons why Northern shipowners avoided this trade during the war; nonetheless Table 4.10 demonstrates that the British advance was sustained to a significant degree after it. In this latter period, on the evidence of the samples, the two national fleets drew level in percentage shares of total tonnage. The American ships were clearly larger on average, because in terms of numbers of voyages Britain had drawn ahead.

⁶⁶ In the first section of this Chapter we dealt only with shipping passing through Liverpool, whereas the wartime columns of Table 4.10 cover tonnage passing through all the British ports included in this study. The post-war columns again deal only with tonnage passing through Liverpool. See chapter 2 for an explanation of this approach. The British region appearing in Table 4.10 includes British colonial register.

It was mainly home ports in the British Isles, rather than ports in distant colonies, that took advantage of the absence of American shipping from the entrepot trade. Ninety-four percent of the British tonnage was registered at home ports, with 3.7 percent taking a flag of convenience in Bermuda or Nassau, and 2.3 percent registered in British North America. Shipowners in at least 61 different British home ports entered the entrepot trade and Table 4.11 details the participation of the top ten ports.

Table 4.11. Top Ten Home British Ports of Register in Wartime Entrepot Trade.

| Port | Tonnage | Number of Voyages | % Of Tonnage | % Of Total Tonnage |
|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Liverpool | 150753 | 367 | 42.3 | 32.8 |
| London | 67832 | 227 | 19.1 | 14.8 |
| Glasgow | 11689 | 47 | 3.3 | 2.5 |
| Aberystwith | 8512 | 48 | 2.4 | 1.9 |
| Hull | 8256 | 14 | 2.3 | 1.8 |
| Dartmouth | 8245 | 50 | 2.3 | 1.8 |
| Newcastle | 7002 | 10 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| Bristol | 5257 | 18 | 1.5 | 1.1 |
| Sunderland | 4576 | 11 | 1.3 | 1.0 |
| Plymouth | 4531 | 26 | 1.3 | 1.0 |
| Totals | 276653 | 818 | 77.8% | 60.2% |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).

In Table 4.11, the respective shares are represented first as a percentage of the British home ports total, and second as a percentage of the overall wartime total. Of the 22 percent of the home British total not represented in Table 4.11, a further 51 ports shared 14 percent, and the remaining 8 percent is only known as “British”. In chapter 3 it was mentioned that Liverpool was the only home port making a significant showing in the antebellum samples, with even that representing only 5 percent of the total tonnage. During the war, however, almost one-third of total tonnage was registered at Liverpool. Shipowners in London also entered the trade to a striking degree. Although shipowning communities in these two ports were clearly most active, these findings show that owners from all over Britain grasped at least a small share of the new opportunity. The post-war samples indicate that this was, however,

confined to the war. In these, only twelve British home ports were represented, and Liverpool registered shipowners increased their dominance to 60 percent. The novelty of the wartime trade obviously broke down barriers to entry, but that kind of flux ceased to exist when things returned to normality after the war.⁶⁷

Looking back at Table 4.10, it can be observed that shipowners in continental European ports also entered the entrepot trade in force; although the post-war samples indicate that they were unable to sustain their penetration in the restored direct trade after the war. Table 4.10 shows about 14 percent of wartime tonnage registered in continental European ports. The true figure was probably a little higher, at around 15 percent, because the category known only as “foreign” is likely to have been mostly European registered. We can see from Table 4.12 that about half of the European tonnage engaged in the entrepot trade was of Spanish register.

Table 4.12. Tonnage Registered in Continental Europe in British Wartime Entrepot Trade.

| Country | Tonnage | Number of Voyages | % Of Tonnage | % Of Total Tonnage |
|---------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Spain | 31374 | 95 | 50.3 | 6.8 |
| Germany | 11785 | 48 | 18.9 | 2.6 |
| Denmark | 4336 | 33 | 7.0 | 0.9 |
| France | 3437 | 13 | 5.5 | 0.7 |
| Norway | 3154 | 11 | 5.1 | 0.7 |
| Holland | 3010 | 18 | 4.8 | 0.7 |
| Italy | 2587 | 10 | 4.1 | 0.6 |
| Russia | 1966 | 6 | 3.2 | 0.4 |
| Sweden | 707 | 2 | 1.1 | 0.2 |
| Totals | 62356 | 236 | 100% | 13.6% |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).

Table 4.12 lists percentage shares, both of the European tonnage total and of the overall tonnage total. Actually, trade with the British Atlantic entrepots was almost exclusively carried by British ships, and European vessels only made progress in the

⁶⁷ Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

Spanish speaking Gulf entrepots. On these passages European registered tonnage was as high as 36 percent, whereas it was only 3 percent on those between Britain and the Atlantic entrepots.

The penetration of Spanish shipping was obviously a large part of the reason for the wartime progress made in the Gulf by European owners as a whole. In chapter 2 we saw a considerable ongoing trade between Britain and Spanish Cuba that was separate from the wartime position of Havana as a Confederate entrepot. The section of that trade intruding into this study - due to the presence of Confederate cotton in cargoes from Havana - was dominated by ships of Spanish register; they accounted for about 60 percent of the tonnage engaged. These vessels were also important on the Matamoros route, accounting there for about 10 percent of the tonnage engaged.

In chapter 3 it was asserted that, in the antebellum period, British shipyards were even less successful in building the ships that carried the Southern trade than British interests were in owning them. Table 4.10 has demonstrated that the war marked a turning point for British shipowners in terms of their penetration into the Southern trade, and in Table 4.13 it can be observed that the same was true for British shipbuilders.

Table 4.13. Shipbuilding by Region in British Trade with the South 1861 to 1870.

| Region | Pre 1861t | Pre 1861n | Pre 1861% | 61-70t | 61-70n | 61-70% |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|
| Britain | 75929 | 251 | 38.9 | 67411 | 179 | 88.1 |
| America | 83525 | 128 | 42.8 | 1400 | 4 | 1.8 |
| Canada | 32628 | 52 | 16.7 | 7679 | 21 | 10.0 |
| Europe | 2393 | 7 | 1.2 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Australia | 527 | 1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Totals | 195002 | 439 | 100% | 76490 | 204 | 100% |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865, January 1866, 1868 and 1870; S.R, 1855 to 1870).

Table 4.13 covers all the voyages, for which the relevant information is to hand, that took place in the wartime entrepot trade and the post war samples.⁶⁸ The first three columns of figures deal with the vessels built before 1861. They show aggregate voyage tonnage, numbers of voyages and percentage shares of total voyage tonnage, originating in the respective regions. The next three columns do the same for vessels built after 1861. Of course, aggregate voyage tonnage is not the same as individual ships built: a ship is constructed only once, whereas some of the vessels making up the Table 4.13 figures made more than one voyage in the trade. Aggregate voyage tonnage is, however, used to provide a useful guide to the relative presence, in the trade as a whole, of ships coming from the different regions.

It was mentioned earlier that not a single ship built in a British yard has been located in the antebellum samples. Table 4.13 shows that, of the voyage tonnage for which vessels built before 1861 were responsible, British and American constructors were fairly evenly matched, with British North American constructors (Canada) having a

⁶⁸ Voyage detail comes from *BOE* whilst build detail comes from *S.R.* In terms of coverage the Table represents those vessels that have been traced on the registers for Liverpool, London, Glasgow and Hull.; these represent about 57 percent of British registered voyage tonnage, and 40 percent of total voyage tonnage, for the period.

significant share. As we know, British shipowners had a much greater presence in the trade after 1861, and this accounts for the appearance of a large number of British constructions. But where vessels had been built before 1861, a large part of the British fleet was still of American origin. The situation shown in Table 4.13 for vessels built after 1861 is very different: American constructions had almost completely disappeared, Canadian ones had declined, and vessels from British yards predominated.

A striking characteristic of craft built in British yards after 1861 was that they were mainly steam powered: this was so of ninety percent of the post 1861 British built tonnage shown in Table 4.13. Indeed, about 45 percent of the British tonnage built before 1861 was already steam. In contrast, none of the Table 4.13 American built tonnage, and only a negligible proportion of shipping built in British North America, fell into this category. Table 4.13 over-emphasises the steam element of British construction because of the inclusion of many blockade runners. Nevertheless, part of the success of British shipbuilders in the period can be attributed to their move away from the large oceanic sailing ship towards the new technology of steam. In Table 4.13, a comparison of the British and American ratios of tonnage to numbers of voyages, reveals that the Americans were building much larger vessels on average.⁶⁹ American yards continued to turn out mainly large wooden sailing ships and competed successfully in this sector for a short while after the war. However, British yards switched to construction of iron or steel hulled sailing ships, in addition to steamers,

⁶⁹ Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865, January 1866, 1868 and 1870; S.R 1855 to 1870).

and from the mid-1870s onwards the cost advantage was increasingly with this type of construction.⁷⁰

Shipbuilding yards in at least 33 different British places shared in the success of supplying to Southern trade shipowners between 1861 and 1870. After consolidation of yards on the Clyde (“Glasgow”), yards on the Thames at London (“London”), and yards on the Mersey (“Liverpool”), nineteen ports were involved. The top ten are shown in Table 4.14.

Table 4.14. Top Ten British Ports Building Ships for the Southern Trade, 1861 to 1870.

| Port | Tonnage | No. Of Ships | Percentage Of Tonnage |
|------------------|---------|--------------|-----------------------|
| Glasgow | 16632 | 57 | 33.6 |
| London | 7865 | 21 | 15.9 |
| West Hartlepool | 5860 | 6 | 11.8 |
| Liverpool | 5323 | 20 | 10.7 |
| Hull | 3101 | 5 | 6.3 |
| Sunderland | 2154 | 4 | 4.3 |
| Stockton on Tees | 2137 | 4 | 4.3 |
| Middlesborough | 1818 | 4 | 3.7 |
| Preston | 1760 | 3 | 3.6 |
| Sussex Ports | 791 | 3 | 1.6 |
| Totals | 47441 | 127 | 95.8 % |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865, January 1866, 1868 and 1870; S.R. 1855 to 1870).

Table 4.14 represents individual vessels built, rather than aggregate voyage tonnage, and this explains why the tonnage and number of ships totals are lower than in the comparable columns of Table 4.13. We can see that shipbuilding was an area where Liverpool, though important, was not dominant; the leading centres were Glasgow and

⁷⁰ Safford, in *Change and Adaption*, p. 55.

London, although Liverpool was almost on a par with the latter in terms of number of vessels built. Many of these were blockade runners, and Table 4.15 shows where those launched after 1861 were built. Appendix B can be consulted for details of blockade runners identified as having been procured in Britain.

Table 4.15. British Ports Building Blockade Runners, 1861 to 1865.

| Port | Tonnage | No. Of Ships | Percentage Of Tonnage |
|------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| Glasgow | 10779 | 42 | 45.4 |
| London | 5220 | 17 | 22.0 |
| Liverpool | 3322 | 12 | 14.0 |
| Hull | 1665 | 3 | 7.0 |
| West Hartlepool | 1181 | 2 | 5.0 |
| Stockton on Tess | 716 | 1 | 3.0 |
| Preston | 360 | 1 | 1.5 |
| Northfleet | 305 | 1 | 1.3 |
| Middlesborough | 171 | 1 | 0.7 |
| Totals | 23719 | 80 | 100 % |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865; S.R 1861 to 1865); Lifeline Database.

The war created a market for steam vessels of the type necessary to run the blockade. British shipbuilders, who were already adapting to steam construction before the war, were in a position to supply it. One can see from Table 4.15 that Glasgow and London were again the main centres of construction.

Having looked at the relative roles of British ports in relation to shipowning and shipbuilding, we can now examine their relative positions as markets for Confederate staples, and as markets for goods bound for the Confederacy. Table 4.16 does this by measuring the volume of shipping tonnage passing through each of them. The six ports appearing in Table 4.16 are those for which entries and clearances are known from study of their respective Bills of Entry. This table itemises aggregate voyage tonnage and numbers of vessels clearing and entering each port (“Outwards” and

“Inwards” respectively); percentages of total outward and inward tonnages are given, and the results from both categories are consolidated as “Totals”.

Table 4.16. Relative Importance of British Ports in The Wartime Entrepot Trade.

| Port | Outwards | | | Inwards | | | Totals | | |
|---------------|---------------|------------|-------------|---------------|------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Tonnage | No. | % | Tonnage | No. | % | Tonnage | No. | % |
| LIVERPOOL | 132995 | 415 | 60.2 | 229403 | 737 | 96.1 | 362398 | 1152 | 78.9 |
| LONDON | 60616 | 253 | 27.4 | 7613 | 30 | 3.2 | 68229 | 283 | 14.8 |
| GLASGOW | 16571 | 67 | 7.5 | 1394 | 3 | 0.6 | 17965 | 70 | 3.9 |
| BRISTOL | 6944 | 14 | 3.1 | 181 | 1 | 0.1 | 7125 | 15 | 1.6 |
| HULL | 2924 | 7 | 1.3 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 | 2924 | 7 | 0.6 |
| NEWCASTLE | 936 | 3 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0.0 | 936 | 3 | 0.2 |
| Totals | 220986 | 759 | 100% | 238591 | 771 | 100% | 459577 | 1530 | 100% |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).

Liverpool had by far the greatest involvement, with almost 80 percent of total shipping tonnage passing through it. The port’s dominance in terms of inward tonnage was almost complete, and this reflects its position as the British port of cotton receipt. However, its pre-eminence for tonnage bound outwards to the Confederacy was less marked; other ports had parts to play here. The shares of Bristol, Hull and Newcastle were negligible, but significant volumes of outward tonnage did clear from London and Glasgow. The greater part of the outward figures for Glasgow represent the blockade runners - seen being built there in Table 4.15 - leaving for their entrepot bases. Many of these actually cleared in ballast, and so Glasgow was not as noticeable as a departure point for Confederate bound cargoes as the Table suggests. Although runners were also built in London, Table 4.16 shows that this port additionally emerged as a major market for Confederate bound goods, alongside Liverpool. The latter had dominated Southern trade before the war, but London interests took the

opportunities presented by Confederate wartime requirements to establish a market share, whilst it lasted.

In ports other than Liverpool, almost 100 further firms acted as ship agents in the entrepot trade. Over half (53) were based in London. The capital's position as the second port in Table 4.16 is reflected in eight of its firms appearing in the top ten for ports other than Liverpool, shown in Table 4.17.

Table 4.17. Top Ten Ship Agents At Ports Other than Liverpool in the Wartime Entrepot Trade.

| Agent | Port | Tonnage | No. Of Voyages | % (1) | % (2) |
|----------------------------|---------|--------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| Joshua Worley | London | 11236 | 66 | 11.6 | 2.4 |
| Tatham & Co | London | 10425 | 52 | 10.7 | 2.3 |
| Spyer & Haywood | London | 4491 | 11 | 4.6 | 1.0 |
| Stringer Pembroke & Co | London | 4234 | 14 | 4.4 | 0.9 |
| Charles W & Wentworth Gray | London | 3156 | 17 | 3.2 | 0.7 |
| Davison Bros. & Co | London | 2732 | 17 | 2.8 | 0.6 |
| J Wilkie | Glasgow | 2667 | 13 | 2.7 | 0.6 |
| J.J Bennett & Wake | London | 2498 | 8 | 2.6 | 0.5 |
| T Scrutton | London | 2435 | 9 | 2.5 | 0.5 |
| R Pearse | Bristol | 2001 | 3 | 2.1 | 0.4 |
| Totals | - | 45875 | 210 | 47.2 % | 9.9 % |

Source: (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865).⁷¹

It can be seen from percentage column (1) in Table 4.17 that the top ten collectively handled nearly half of the shipping tonnage concerned. But their overall position is put in perspective by percentage column (2), which shows them handling only about 10 percent of the overall total. We will encounter some of these firms again during the course of this study. They are listed here to reinforce the point being made in this section, that British maritime adaptability and opportunism during the war was not confined to interests in Liverpool. Finally, in this context, it is worth reiterating two points made in chapter 3: coal bunkering from ports in South Wales for blockade

⁷¹ It can be calculated from Table 4.16 that total tonnage passing through ports other than Liverpool was 97179 and the total voyage number was 378.

runners, and the search for alternative sources of cotton supply, are also evidence of British maritime adaptability during the war.

3. Wartime Shipowners.

Table 4.11, and the discussion surrounding it, has demonstrated the geographical diversity of British wartime shipowning in terms of ports of register. When the focus is sharpened, to look at the same question in terms of shipowners on individual registers, a greater underlying degree of geographical diversity is revealed. Chapter 2 described how the registers of Liverpool, London, Glasgow and Hull have been searched for ships active in the trade. This has resulted in ships being traced that were responsible for 92 percent of the wartime voyage tonnage that is known to have been registered at these ports. This constitutes 58 percent of the total for British registered ships and 48 percent of total wartime tonnage.⁷²

Sarah Palmer identified a problem with studies that sample ship register entries in isolation from the activities of those ships: registers record vessels “belonging” to a particular port, which is not the same as vessels using that port.⁷³ Nor is it the same as vessels being occupied in a particular trade or trades. In this study the linkage of activity (Bills of Entry), with ownership (Ship registers), improves on random samples of ownership on a particular register by quantifying ownership in one trade: in this case the wartime entrepot trade.

⁷² Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865; *S.R.*, 1855 to 1865). Total wartime voyage tonnage was 459577, and the equivalent totals for British and target ports were 378843 and 238530 respectively. Traced tonnage amounts to 219255; of this tonnage Liverpool registered ships were responsible for 62.5 percent (137013 tons), London ships for 29.4 percent (64362 tons), Glasgow ships for 4.7 percent (10293 tons) and Hull ships for 3.4 percent (7587 tons).

⁷³ Palmer, *Maritime History*, p. 47.

Many ships were co-owned, and ownership was expressed in terms of 64th shares. In order to make the link that has just been mentioned, co-ownerships need to be “deconstructed” so that we are just left with individual owners. To do this, each individual is credited with a pro-rata share of the tonnage (in proportion to his 64th share) of each voyage made by a vessel in which he had a stake. Sole owners are, of course, credited with all the tonnage of voyages made by their ships. To give a brief illustration, the *Lady of the Lake* made two voyages whilst owned by one of our case studies, M.G. Klingender, as to 48/64ths; one H. E. Chapman owned the other 16/64th. This sailing barque was registered at 492 tons, therefore for each of the two voyages Klingender is credited with 369 tons and Chapman with 123.⁷⁴ This reduction forms the basic building block of aggregate conclusions concerning ownership in this study.

Returning to the theme of geographical diversity which opened this section, most owners traced on the London and Liverpool registers were local residents. This was true of those owning 83 and 81 percent respectively of voyage tonnage. In both cases the results are remarkably similar to those arrived at in studies of these registers for earlier parts of the century. In a study of London registers for three sample years between 1824 and 1848, residents of the capital were found to own between 82 and 86 percent of ships sampled. A similar survey relating to Liverpool between 1815 and 1835 found the percentage share of local residents varied between 74 and 86 percent.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ S.R Liverpool 85/419/63; *BOE Liverpool* for 22/10/64 and 14/12/64.

⁷⁵ Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865; S.R, 1855 to 1865); Palmer, *Maritime History*, p. 53-55; Neal, in *Liverpool and Merseyside*, pp. 163-164.

Hull residents were responsible for the somewhat smaller proportion of locally registered voyage tonnage of 73 percent. Glasgow was out of step in that its equivalent proportion was only 27 percent. This is likely to have been a wartime aberration. Many blockade runners must have acquired a Glasgow register as a matter of convenience purely because they had been built on the Clyde, rather than because their owners were based there.⁷⁶

Taken together, the four registers reveal that foreign involvement was negligible at only a little over one percent of the sample. No less than 60 different places of residence were represented in the British Isles. The range is considerable: owners based all over Britain and Ireland had at least some small involvement in the entrepot trade. It must be said, however, that only a handful of towns were individually significant. Only six were places of residence for owners whose collective participation exceeded one percent, and together these were responsible for about 90 percent of sample voyage tonnage. These are listed in Table 4.18. Although their overall contribution was slight, residents of Manchester and Runcorn were responsible for more voyage tonnage than residents of the sampled towns of Hull and Glasgow .

Table 4.18. Top Six Towns of Residence of Ship Register Sample Owners.

| Town | Tonnage | Percentage Of Sample Tonnage |
|---------------|---------------|------------------------------|
| Liverpool | 118696 | 54.1 |
| London | 57721 | 26.3 |
| Manchester | 8439 | 3.8 |
| Runcorn | 5693 | 2.6 |
| Hull | 5593 | 2.6 |
| Glasgow | 2809 | 1.3 |
| Totals | 198951 | 91 % |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865; S.R, 1855 to 1865).

⁷⁶ Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865; S.R, 1855 to 1865).

Table 4.19. Sample Ship Registers: Top Twenty Entrepot Trade Shipowners

| Ship Owner | Residence | Tonnage | No. | % (1) | % (2) |
|--|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Melchor George Klingender | Liverpool | 17829.5 | 35 | 8.1 | 4.7 |
| Richard George Bushby | Liverpool | 7809.0 | 14 | 3.6 | 2.1 |
| Andrew Malcomson | Liverpool | 7709.0 | 9 | 3.5 | 2.0 |
| John Alfred Marsh | Liverpool | 5435.0 | 5 | 2.5 | 1.4 |
| John and Thomas Johnson* | Runcorn | 5286.0 | 6 | 2.4 | 1.4 |
| Henry Lafone | Liverpool | 5282.0 | 15 | 2.4 | 1.4 |
| John Richardson Armstrong, Henry Gerard* | Liverpool | 5036.0 | 4 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
| West India & Pacific Steam Ship Co Ltd | Liverpool | 4342.0 | 6 | 2.0 | 1.1 |
| Matthew Isaac Wilson | Liverpool | 3640.8 | 7 | 1.7 | 1.0 |
| Charles Rudd Tatham | London | 3587.3 | 21 | 1.6 | 0.9 |
| Zachariah Charles Pearson | London | 3554.0 | 7 | 1.6 | 0.9 |
| Charles Julius Gerhard Knoop | Manchester | 3189.0 | 5 | 1.5 | 0.8 |
| John Newton Beach | Liverpool | 2825.8 | 9 | 1.3 | 0.7 |
| Thomas Stirling Begbie | London | 2584.0 | 6 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| Francis Muir | London | 2473.0 | 9 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| Robert John Rickarby | Liverpool | 2422.0 | 8 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| George Bowness Carr, John William Hoare* | London | 2195.0 | 3 | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| William Bailey | Hull | 2185.0 | 6 | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| Thomas Norton | London | 2175.0 | 7 | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| Edward Pembroke | London | 2147.6 | 13 | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| Totals | - | 91707 | 195 | 42 % | 24 % |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865; S.R, 1855 to 1865).

Table 4.19 shows the top twenty, rather than just the top ten, in order to include some of the prominent owners resident outside Liverpool. The Table shows their respective towns of residence, the voyage tonnage owned by each, and the number of voyages in which each had a share. Percentage column (1) shows their proportional shares of the register sample tonnage, whilst column (2) shows the same in terms of the British registered total. Together, these owners were responsible for 42 percent of the former and 24 percent of the latter.

Owners marked with an asterisk in Table 4.19 can be seen to actually be two individuals instead of one. In these instances, the people concerned owned each of a given number of 64th shares jointly, thus rendering those shares indivisible. Therefore they have not been divided in the calculations leading to Table 4.19. The nature and implications of this form of ownership will be explored in the context of institutional

structures in chapter 5. Including each of the individuals making up these “joint ownerships”, around 430 separate names appear on the full list of which Table 4.19 represents the head.

A much larger number of owners would actually have been involved in the entrepot trade; after all only four British port registers have been consulted. If local residents predominated on the un-sampled registers, as they did on those sampled, then a search of them must reveal a host of new names to add to the list underlying Table 4.19. The presence of large numbers of participants made for a low degree of market concentration. In terms of proportional shares of British registered tonnage in the entrepot trade - percentage column (2) in Table 4.19 - the top ten only had a share of about 17 percent; much lower than the results of the tests of concentration that were applied earlier to agents and merchants. Therefore, shipowning in the entrepot trade looks highly competitive with involvement spread out very widely. It must, however, be remembered that this conclusion is arrived at without aggregating the shares of individuals according to any criteria of mutual connection, an exercise undertaken later.

Table 4.19 contains two of the group 2 case studies introduced at Table 4.5: Melchor George Klingender and Henry Lafone. Both were wartime opportunists in different ways. Lafone’s opportunism manifested itself primarily in connection with blockade running, and so we will address him as part of that discussion, towards the end of this section. Klingender, however, can be seen in Table 4.19 as having been by far the leading shipowner in the wartime trade between Britain and the entrepots.

Before the war Klingender had been in partnership with his brother William, trading as Klingender Brothers. The firm was one of the top 30 known Liverpool cotton importing concerns in 1850, but its involvement in our antebellum samples of the Southern trade - as ship agent and cotton consignee - was tiny and confined to 1856. The diversity samples have not uncovered any activities of the firm in other trades, and it may well be that it was dormant by the mid and late 1850s. In any event, sometime between 1855 and 1860 the brothers parted company and Melchor set up as a sole trader, styled as M.G. Klingender and Co. In 1860 this firm advertised itself as “Merchants and agents for steamers via Galway to St. Johns and U.S” - although, again, the diversity samples have not picked up any activities of the firm in any trades other than the Confederate one.⁷⁷

Apart from a vessel named *Perthshire* that was briefly owned by Melchor and William between July 1857 and February 1858, we have no evidence of Melchor owning ships prior to the war. However, during it, he acquired shares in fourteen vessels which he deployed in the entrepot trade. One, the *Enterprize*, was held on the London register, whilst the others were registered at Liverpool.⁷⁸ Most were engaged specifically in the Confederate trade: a study of the chronology indicates that they would have had little time to occupy themselves elsewhere. Most made round trips between Liverpool and either Bermuda or Nassau, and some, such as the *Annandale*, the *Ella*, and the

⁷⁷ Williams, in *Liverpool and Merseyside*, p. 209; Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860); Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, 1860, 1862, 1864 and 1865); *Gores*, 1855 p. 394, 1860 p. 151.

⁷⁸ S.R Liverpool; *Ada* 86/181/64; *Admiral* 86/97/64; *Annandale* 83/208/60; *Bonita* 84/237/62; *Coquette* 85/409/63; *Ella* 84/328/61; *Essex* 86/98/64; *Georgina McCaw* 86/160/64; *Gladiator* 84/161/62; *Lady of the Lake* 85/419/63; *Mary Francis* 85/306/62; *Montgomery* 83/110/60; *Peep o Day* 85/337/62; *Perthshire* 81/159/57. S.R London; *Enterprize* 56/10/63.

Montgomery made several of these consecutively. Most were sail vessels and these last three were bulk carriers, being registered at quite large tonnages for the entrepot trade: 789, 887 and 725 tons respectively.⁷⁹

M.G. Klingender & Co's activities as a ship agent, seen in Table 4.5, often consisted of handling Melchor's own ships when they put into Liverpool. His activities as a shipowner, however, had two additional dimensions: he seems to have acted as a dealer in ships by buying and selling them, and he dipped his toe into blockade running. Klingender's wartime career featured a large turnover of the vessels in his ownership, some of which he held for short periods only. The fleet was established from June 1862 onwards and he bought four vessels in that year. We do not know where the investment capital came from; of all his vessels, only the first-bought - the *Gladiator* - was mortgaged. Capital for subsequent purchases must have come, at least in part, from sales. In 1863 he sold five and bought six, and in the following year he sold two and bought four. As the entrepot trade came to an end in March 1865, Klingender sold four of his remaining ships. One was lost during the year and in August 1865 he sold the last ship of the fleet.⁸⁰

Klingender seems to have had a cautious attitude to blockade running, and his endeavours in this respect were not entirely successful. He owned the *Gladiator* when she made a successful round trip between Nassau and Wilmington in June and July 1863. However, when he bought the purpose-built runner, the *Coquette*, from her

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*; Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Clydeside builders in October 1863, he owned her only during her trip out to Bermuda. On arrival, she was sold to the Confederate navy, and subsequently made twelve successful blockade runs without capture. Whatever profit he made on her sale, her subsequent success may have been galling. Klingender's only other running enterprise was a disaster: his *Georgina McCaw* was captured in June 1864 by the Federal navy, on her first attempt to run through the blockade, from Nassau.⁸¹

It is impossible to draw-up a profit and loss account for these activities. Whatever the financial consequences, Klingender seems to have largely taken the benefits, and borne the risks, alone. Only three ships in the fleet were not held in his sole name: the *Admiral* and the *Essex* were owned as to 32/64ths each with a Liverpool merchant called Peter Joseph Schenter; 16/64ths of the *Lady of the Lake*, mentioned earlier, were owned by a London merchant named Horace Edward Chapman, with Melchor holding 48/64ths.⁸²

Earlier, Klingender was characterised as a wartime opportunist, and the facts of his wartime career can be seen to justify the conclusion. His post-war career is somewhat enigmatic, featuring a number of changes of direction. By 1867, M. G. Klingender and Co had gone, and Melchor was a partner of the cotton broking firm of Klingender, Penn and Co. The very next year he was trading as Klingender and Co, advertised as merchants. In 1870 he had no listing and in 1880 appears simply as a private individual with no trade and no firm. Melchor died near Liverpool of diabetes and

⁸¹ *Ibid.*; *Wise Lifeline*, pp. 294, 302, and 303.

⁸² S.R Liverpool; *Admiral* 86/97/64; *Essex* 86/98/64; *Lady of the Lake* 85/419/63.

bronchitis in 1881, aged 58, and his death certificate presents no occupation but simply describes him as a “gentleman”. Intriguingly, no grant of probate or administration was ever made; one possible, but speculative, explanation for this would be that his estate was too small to require a grant.⁸³

Table 4.19 dealt with shipowners as individuals. Sole traders such as Klingender provide a straightforward link between shipowning and ship agenting firms: he was sole partner of M. G. Klingender and Co. However, a neat match between the partners of a given firm and the co-owners of a given ship cannot always be made. The partners of John Glynn & Son, for example, owned ships in a variety of different combinations with each other, and with other individuals. Even with Klingender we have seen this to a certain extent, in that he co-owned a few ships with other people who were not partners in his ship agenting business. These institutional issues will be examined in greater detail in chapter 5. For the time being, we can simply aggregate together the voyage tonnage of known partners of given firms, calculated in the same way explained at Table 4.19. This is in order to arrive at a quantification of the relative importance of their respective firms in wartime shipowning. Table 4.20 does this in respect of Liverpool resident owners. For example, in the instance of Glynn & Son, Edward, Dashper, and Walter Glynn are known to have been partners in the firm. Therefore, in Table 4.20, their individual voyage tonnages are aggregated and credited to the firm; the shares of individuals outside the firm, with whom they co-owned ships, are not included in this total.

⁸³ *Gores*, 1867 p. 239, 1868 p. 250, 1880 p. 364; Death Certificate, date of death 6/2/1881.

Table 4.20. Sample Ship Registers: Top Twenty Liverpool Resident Entrepot Trade Shipowners, Grouped by Firm.

| Ship Owners | Firm | Tonnage | No. | % (1) | % (2) |
|--|---------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Melchor George Klingender | M. G. Klingender & Co* | 17830 | 35 | 15 | 4.7 |
| Andrew & William Greer Malcomson | J & D Malcomson & Co | 8180 | 12 | 6.9 | 2.2 |
| Richard George Bushby | Willink & Bushby | 7809 | 14 | 6.6 | 2.1 |
| John Alfred Marsh | J. A. Marsh | 5435 | 5 | 4.6 | 1.4 |
| Henry Lafone | H Lafone* | 5282 | 15 | 4.5 | 1.4 |
| John Richardson Armstrong & Henry Gerard | Armstrong & Gerard | 5036 | 4 | 4.2 | 1.3 |
| West India & Pacific Steam Ship Co. Ltd | WI & PSS Co Ltd | 4342 | 6 | 3.7 | 1.1 |
| John Newton Beach & John Norris Sleddon | Beach Root & Co* | 4339 | 14 | 3.7 | 1.1 |
| Matthew Isaac Wilson | M. I. Wilson | 3641 | 7 | 3.1 | 1.0 |
| Edward & John Toulmin Lawrence | E. Lawrence & Co | 2524 | 9 | 2.1 | 0.7 |
| Robert John Rickarby | R. J. Rickarby | 2422 | 8 | 2.0 | 0.6 |
| Edwin Haigh | T. Haigh & Co | 2146 | 3 | 1.8 | 0.6 |
| Charles Kuhn Prioleau | Fraser Trenholm & Co* | 1956 | 7 | 1.6 | 0.5 |
| Thomas Brittain, Arthur Bower Forwood | Leech Harrison & Forwood* | 1933 | 4 | 1.6 | 0.5 |
| Edward D., Dashper E. & Walter Glynn | J. Glynn & Son* | 1865 | 19 | 1.6 | 0.5 |
| Charles Edward Dixon | C. E. Dixon | 1706 | 2 | 1.4 | 0.5 |
| William James, Henry & David Fernie | Fernie Bros. & Co | 1451 | 1 | 1.2 | 0.4 |
| British & American Steam Navigation Co Ltd | B & A SN Co Ltd | 1451 | 1 | 1.2 | 0.4 |
| George Martin | G. Martin | 1398 | 3 | 1.2 | 0.4 |
| Andrew Leighton & Charles Russell | A. Leighton Russell & Co | 1356 | 4 | 1.1 | 0.4 |
| Totals | - | 82102 | 173 | 69% | 22% |

Source: Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865; S.R, 1855 to 1865; Gores 1860 and 1867).

Gores Liverpool Directory is the only source of its type that has been found to identify the firms in which individuals were partners. In most instances this link is uncomplicated. For instance, as mentioned above, there is no reason to distinguish between Klingender as an individual and him as sole partner of his firm. Difficulties arise in a minority of cases where individuals may have owned ships entirely separately from the business of their firm. Arthur Forwood of Leech Harrison seems to have done so. Again, a fuller discussion of these issues appears in chapter 5. For the moment, Table 4.20 is intended to establish that the voyage tonnage shown can be attributed to the owners shown, and that they were partners of the respective firms indicated. Numbers of voyages are shown, and tonnage is represented as a percentage of the Liverpool residents total (1), and of the British registered total (2).⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Total (1) is 118,696 tons as appears from Table 4.18. Total (2) is 378,843 tons as appears from Table 4.10.

The firms listed in Table 4.20 have all been identified in Gores as trading entities except for Armstrong and Gerard. They are one of the “joint ownership” groups mentioned in the discussion following Table 4.19. In effect they formed a shipowning partnership, although they are not listed in Gores as such. No listing has been found for Henry Gerard, but John Armstrong later joined Charles Prioleau as a partner in Fraser Trenholm.⁸⁵

The full list underlying Table 4.20 identifies partners of 64 different firms, together owning 84 percent of (1) and about a quarter of (2). The Table lists the top twenty in order to demonstrate the roles in wartime shipowning of partners in a number of the case study firms. Apart from Fraser Trenholm, who are also part of group 2, only Miller and Mosman from group 1 (antebellum case studies) appear on the full list on which Table 4.20 is based; the tonnage accredited to the latter firm is negligible. Earlier observations that group 1 as a whole did not participate in the entrepot trade are again borne out here in relation to shipowning. By contrast, group 2 (wartime case studies) are strongly represented. Eight of the ten group 2 firms listed in Table 4.5 appear on the full Table 4.20 list. Six are marked on the Table itself with an asterisk and two more - J.T Nickels, and Longton & Longrigg - also appear in the full list. Together, group 2 firm partners owned 29 percent of the Liverpool resident total (1) and 9 percent of the British registered total (2). In Table 4.20, Klingender appears again as by far the leading wartime shipowner.

⁸⁵ *Gores*, 1867 p. 28.

No evidence has been found of wartime shipowning by partners of Bahr Behrend, and this makes them unique amongst group 2. Another member of the group, De Jersey & Co, seem to have been wartime shipowners. The Manchester shipowner Charles Knoop, named in Table 4.19, was almost certainly a relative of Baron Knoop, whom we have met before, and as such a part of the Manchester based De Jersey concern. The fact that De Jersey acted as Charles' Liverpool ship agent strongly supports the idea.⁸⁶ The two limited companies named in Table 4.20 are members of case study group 3 whom we will introduce during the fourth section of this Chapter.

It is appropriate to postpone a more detailed look at the shipowning of most of the case studies to chapter 5, where institutional organisation and networks of ownership and clientage can provide the focus. Meanwhile, it is worth taking a closer look at one of the group 2 case studies, appearing in Table 4.20, that has not yet been discussed. Like Fraser Trenholm and Klingender, Beach Root & Co fit into the category of wartime opportunists. Although John Sleddon is listed as a "gentleman" in 1860, Beach Root did not become active until late 1863, and by 1867 Sleddon and John Beach were the partners. They were latecomers to the entrepot trade, acquiring a fleet of seven vessels mostly in late 1864. After a short initial period of Sleddon owning some of these, Beach became sole-owner of most; only *Sunnyside* and *Western Belle* were co-owned, with Edward James Lomnitz of Manchester holding a minority 16/64ths of each. As with Klingender, the source of the investment capital is not known, and none of these vessels was mortgaged. Their sailing chronology indicates

⁸⁶ Database (*BOE*, August 1861 to July 1865).

that they were almost exclusively operated in the Confederate trade, and all were sold fairly promptly after the war's end.⁸⁷

The bulk of Beach Root's activities as ship agent - shown in Table 4.5 - involved handling their own ships at Liverpool. They were also just outside the top ten of wartime cotton consignees of Table 4.9, importing about 6,500 bales - or about 1.6 percent of the entrepot total, from late 1863 to April 1865. Our post-war samples show no activity in the restored Southern direct trade, and our diversity samples have not picked up any activities in other trades. The firm's period of existence was short. By 1870 Beach was trading alone, advertised as a merchant.⁸⁸

It is apparent that Beach planned to move into blockade running. He bought the newly built steamers *Dream* and *Secret* at the end of 1864. Both were purpose built for running the blockade, and both steamed to Nassau to start operations, arriving in January 1865. By this time running was reaching its end, and neither vessel actually made an attempt on the blockade. Beach appears to have had little value out of these purchases. We do not know what became of the *Dream* prior to her sale in 1866, but the *Secret* seems to have laid-up at Halifax, Nova Scotia, until her sale in early 1866.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Gores, 1860 p. 239, 1867 p. 42; Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865); S.R Liverpool, *Architect* 84/223/62 and 86/5/65, *Dream* 86/496/64, *Kitty Jones* 86/81/64 and 86/6/65, *Mary* 86/469/64, *Secret* 86/478/64, *Sunnyside* 86/421/64, *Western Belle* 86/136/64.

⁸⁸ Database (BOE, August 1861 to July 1865, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Cases Database (BOE, January 1862, 1863, 1864, 1866, 1868, and 1870); Gores 1870 p. 43.

⁸⁹ S.R Liverpool, *Dream* 86/496/64, *Secret* 86/478/64; BOE Liverpool, 22/11/64 and 10/12/64; Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 296, and 320.

A profit and loss account for these activities cannot be made. However, the evidence indicates that Beach Root & Co was formed as a vehicle for involvement in the Confederate trade and for exploiting its opportunities, and that the firm did not long outlast it. Wartime opportunism generally was most evident in the high risk activity of owning blockade running vessels. This chapter has stressed a widespread British maritime willingness to take the opportunities of war. In shipowning this has been demonstrated by a host of people from all over Britain entering the trade with the entrepôts. In contrast, although British shipowners did have a substantial stake in blockade running, the number of individuals involved was actually very small. No doubt a number of factors explain this general abstinence, not least the capital demands of investing in specially built or adapted steamers. However, perhaps we can recognise here the limits of opportunism, in that it was tempered with prudence; most British shipowners were prepared to leave the risks of blockade running to others.

Table 4.21 deals with the successes and failures of those British interests who did participate. Column A shows how many runners each listed owner held; B shows how many attempts those ships made; C shows how many of those were successful; and D shows how many failed through the capture of the runner, or its loss for any other reason. In order to present this information as a sort of league table, the owners are listed in descending order of numbers of successes. Each owner's ratio of successes to attempts appears at E, with their proportional share of total successes shown at F.

Table 4.21. British Shipowners and Blockade Running: Success and Failure.

| Ship Owners | Residence | A | B | C | D | E% | F% |
|--|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|-------------|
| Francis Muir | London | 8 | 64 | 56 | 8 | 88 | 17.5 |
| Edward James Lomnitz | Manchester | 4 | 38 | 34 | 4 | 89 | 10.6 |
| Edward and John Toulmin Lawrence | Liverpool | 6 | 32 | 30 | 2 | 94 | 9.4 |
| Edgar Pinchback Stringer, Edward Pembroke | London | 5 | 28 | 25 | 3 | 89 | 7.8 |
| James Cameron | London | 4 | 24 | 22 | 2 | 92 | 6.9 |
| Henry Lafone | Liverpool | 7 | 23 | 16 | 7 | 70 | 5.3 |
| Campbell George, Henry W. R. Collis | London | 1 | 15 | 15 | 0 | 100 | 4.7 |
| Mercantile Trading Company Ltd | London | 2 | 12 | 10 | 2 | 83 | 3.1 |
| Donald Macgregor | Glasgow | 4 | 11 | 10 | 1 | 91 | 3.1 |
| Thomas Stirling Begbie | London | 2 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 82 | 2.8 |
| Donald Macgregor | London | 1 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 100 | 2.8 |
| Charles Wigg | Liverpool | 1 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 100 | 2.5 |
| George Wigg | Liverpool | 2 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 89 | 2.5 |
| William Boyle | London | 3 | 10 | 8 | 2 | 80 | 2.5 |
| George Sutherland | London | 1 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 100 | 2.2 |
| Richard Wright | Liverpool | 1 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 88 | 2.2 |
| James Carlin | Antrim | 1 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 100 | 1.9 |
| David McNutt | Glasgow | 1 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 100 | 1.3 |
| Charles Kuhn Prioleau | Liverpool | 1 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 100 | 1.3 |
| European Trading Company Ltd | London | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 75 | 0.9 |
| Maurice Grant | London | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 100 | 0.6 |
| Richard Phillips | Liverpool | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 50 | 0.6 |
| William Whitworth | Manchester | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 100 | 0.6 |
| Richard George Bushby | Liverpool | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 100 | 0.6 |
| James Archibald Ker Wilson | Liverpool | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 67 | 0.6 |
| Alexander Duranty | Liverpool | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 67 | 0.6 |
| Arthur Bower Forwood, James Dorrington | Liverpool | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 50 | 0.6 |
| Melchor George Klingender | Liverpool | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 67 | 0.6 |
| Alexander Watson, David McNutt | Glasgow | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 67 | 0.6 |
| John Harbottle | London | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 100 | 0.3 |
| Samuel Henry Bigland | Snaresbrook | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 33 | 0.3 |
| Thomas Joseph Dobson | Hull | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 0.3 |
| James Carlin, Peter Denny, James Galbraith | Dumbarton | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 100 | 0.3 |
| John Fleming | London | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 100 | 0.3 |
| Josiah Jones the younger | Liverpool | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 100 | 0.3 |
| Matthew Isaac Wilson | Liverpool | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 0.3 |
| Neil Matheson | Glasgow | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 100 | 0.3 |
| Sir Samuel Norton Pelo | London | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 0.3 |
| William Thompson Mann | Liverpool | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 100 | 0.3 |
| Edwin Haigh | Liverpool | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Edwin Lister Golborne | Tranmere | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| William Joshua Grazebrook | Liverpool | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Peter Denny | Dumbarton | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| William Richards | London | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| George Samuel Sanderson | Liverpool | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Robert James Brown, Matthew Isaac Wilson | London | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Zachariah Charles Pearson | London | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Thomas Johnson | Runcorn | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Totals | - | 92 | 379 | 319 | 60 | 84% | 100% |

Source: S. R 1855 to 1865; Lifeline Database (Wise, Lifeline, pp. 233-328).⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Table 4.21 has been prepared by matching runners and their runs, as detailed by Wise, with owners and periods of ownership appearing from the S.R. The Table is not comprehensive but it is contended that the bulk of British involvement is represented. That involvement can be quantified as being at least one-third of all runners. See Appendix B for details of the vessels themselves. For illustrative clarity numbers of ships and voyages have been considered more appropriate here than voyage tonnage.

The first thing to point out about Table 4.21 is that the large number voyages covered were made by ships owned by only 48 individuals or small groups of individuals; the latter grouped by co-ownership of ships, or partnership together in a firm. In addition, over half of the successes were concentrated in the hands of the top five. This is in marked contrast to the patterns of low concentration and wide participation in the entrepot trade previously seen in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. Similarly, these owners were based in a very small number of locations; again this differs noticeably from the wide geographical spread in the entrepot trade underlying Tables 4.11 and 4.18.

Table 4.22. Relative Importance of Different Places of Residence in British Ownership of Blockade Runners.

| Residence | A | B | C | D | E% | F% |
|------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|
| London | 39 | 195 | 169 | 26 | 87 | 53.0 |
| Liverpool | 33 | 110 | 88 | 22 | 80 | 27.6 |
| Manchester | 5 | 40 | 36 | 4 | 90 | 11.3 |
| Glasgow | 7 | 19 | 17 | 2 | 89 | 5.3 |
| Antrim | 1 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 100 | 1.9 |
| Snaresbrook | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 33 | 0.3 |
| Hull | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 0.3 |
| Dumbarton | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 0.3 |
| Tranmere | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Runcorn | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Totals | 92 | 379 | 319 | 60 | 84 % | 100 % |

Source: S. R 1855 to 1865; Lifeline Database (Wise, Lifeline, pp. 233-328).⁹¹

Table 4.22 follows the same labelling format as Table 4.21. We can see that Table 4.22 shows only ten resident towns for blockade running owners, and that owners responsible for 80 percent of the successful runs were concentrated in London and Liverpool. The dominance of London interests here, rather than those of Liverpool, is perhaps unexpected. These findings serve to emphasise that only a very small and narrowly based group of British interests were involved in blockade running

⁹¹ Although only the S.R for Liverpool, London, Glasgow and Hull have been searched, it is clear from identifications in the *BOE* that most British registered runners were held on these registers.

ownership; this seems to have been less a matter of fierce competition than of who was prepared to do it at all.

The risks must have been high. This is not so apparent if we look at Table 4.21 from the point of view of the overall success rate of 84 percent; as established in chapter 3 the blockade was quite porous in this respect. The risks for the participants become clearer when the number of ships (A) is compared with the number of losses (D) and it is seen that almost two-thirds of the ships engaged were eventually lost or captured. Even the most successful Table 4.21 owners, Francis Muir and Edward Lomnitz, eventually lost all their ships. The earlier discussion of shipbuilding highlighted that many of these vessels were newly built, and it is clear that they represented the latest word in emergent steam technology. It follows that capital investment requirements must have been greater than average. It is unlikely that running was a risk that could be economically insured for, and accordingly each ship lost probably represented a straight capital write-off of both vessel and cargo.

Unfortunately the extent to which successful runs obviated such losses is not known, nor do we have enough information to comment on overall British fortunes in these activities. However, in the instances that follow, where there is some evidence concerning the fortunes of Table 4.21 owners, blockade running does not look like a passport to prosperity. Zachariah Pearson's failures in 1862 pushed his firm into bankruptcy and it is clear from the Table that for the last nine owners listed, like Pearson, their excursions represented pure loss.⁹² As mentioned earlier, Fraser

⁹² Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 71.

Trenholm - represented on the Table by Charles Prioleau - collapsed after the war. Edward Lawrence and Co - represented by Edward and John Lawrence - appear from the figures to have had a successful operation. Unfortunately, according to Thomas Taylor who managed their activities in Nassau, the winding-up of their affairs there at the closure of mainland routes was disastrous. This was because their remaining vessels, for which there was now little demand, had to be sold off at huge losses. Overall, neither Taylor, nor his employers, made fortunes out of the war.⁹³

It is remarkable that Table 4.21 reveals so little spread of ownership, and therefore so little spread of risk. Indeed, about three-quarters of the ships were owned by single individuals. The two limited companies shown look like they were formed specifically to spread the risks of owning runners amongst a wider group of shareholders. The Mercantile Trading Co was incorporated in June 1863 and The European Trading Co in April 1864. Their wartime activities did not, however, lead them to prosper: the former was put into liquidation in 1867 on the petition of a banking creditor, and the latter resolved on a voluntary winding-up in July 1865.⁹⁴

If the above instances were representative, then the British shipowning community as a whole was wise to confine itself to the entrepot trade. Another way in which a few British interests took the opportunities presented by Confederate trade, without taking the risks, was by dealing in blockade running vessels. Taking advantage of the market in these ships, some owners bought them in Britain and held them only as far as their

⁹³ T.E. Taylor, *Running The Blockade* (London, 1896), pp. 163-164.

⁹⁴ BT 31/793/494C and 31/940/1219C, PRO.

entrepot base whereupon they were sold - mostly to Confederate interests and government agencies. Only a few were involved in this. To give an example, Alfred Lamb of London bought the newly built *Syren* in late 1863 and, soon after her arrival at Nassau, she was sold to the Charleston Importing and Exporting Company. Lamb may have regretted the sale as she went on to be the most successful runner of all by completing 34 runs.⁹⁵

A prudent disinclination to take undue risks can be seen amongst the group 2 wartime case study firms. Table 4.20 outlined the extent of their participation in entrepot trade shipowning, but they are poorly represented in the blockade running of Table 4.21. The wartime opportunists Klingender, and Prioleau of Fraser Trenholm, were small scale participants. Another opportunist, John Beach, planned to participate but got there too late. Leech Harrison and Forwood were marginally involved through Arthur Forwood. The only member of group 2 who was a significant Table 4.21 operator was the remaining case study of this group whom we have not yet discussed: Henry Lafone.

Heavily committed to the most risky aspect of the trade, Lafone was certainly the most opportunistic and daring of the group 2 case studies. He can also, however, be added to the earlier list of interests who do not appear to have prospered from owning blockade runners. Lafone was descended from French Huguenots who moved to England in the early eighteenth century. The family background was not a maritime one. Before the war Henry was a partner in the family tanning business in Liverpool -

⁹⁵ S.R London, 56/326/63; Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 323.

Samuel Lafone and Co. The onset of the war seems to have induced him to abandon tanning and by 1862 he described himself as a merchant.⁹⁶

Between July 1862 and December 1864 he acquired - in Glasgow, Liverpool and London - a fleet of seven mostly newly built steamers with which he tried the blockade.⁹⁷ We can see from Table 4.21 that, although sixteen successful runs were made, all of these ships were eventually lost, and the overall success rate of attempts was below average at 70 percent. Lafone bought two further steamers towards the end of 1864 which were designed to run, but did not actually do so. He sold these two survivors in 1865.⁹⁸ Lafone also made a business out of the dealing in runners that has been mentioned. Four vessels fall into this category, most notably the famous runners *Let Her B* and *Let Her Rip*. He sold these to a Confederate concern, the Chicora Importing and Exporting Company, who operated them as the *Chicora* and the *Wando* respectively.⁹⁹

As usual, a financial balance sheet for this enterprise cannot be formulated; but we are at an advantage in this instance in that there is clear evidence that Henry ran into severe financial troubles fairly soon after the end of the war. On 23rd August 1866 two shipwrights filed a creditors petition in bankruptcy against him. It looks like he reached an arrangement with his creditors, because these proceedings did not result in

⁹⁶ S. Lindsay, "Lafone: A Remarkable Family" (Liverpool, 1989), unpublished typescript, LRO, Hq 929.2 LAF, pp. 4-5, and 39-40; *Gores*, 1855 p. 397, 1860 p. 152, 1864 p. 187.

⁹⁷ S.R London, *Sun Beam* 52/13/58. S.R Glasgow; *Florie* 20/130/63, *Lilian* 21/49/64, *Mary Bowers* 21/75/64, *Emma Henry* 21/128/64. S.R Liverpool; *Greyhound* 86/529/63, *Little Ada* 86/9/64.

⁹⁸ S.R Liverpool, *Mary* 86/308/64; S.R Glasgow, *Susan Beirne* 21/144/64; Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 322.

⁹⁹ S.R Glasgow; *Mary Anne* 20/58/63, *Laurel* 20/111/63. S.R Liverpool; *Let Her B* 86/128/64, *Let Her Rip* 86/213/64; Wise, *Lifeline*, pp. 308, and 311.

an adjudication of bankruptcy. However this was not an isolated difficulty. Mortgagees of the only two ships which Henry held onto after the war - the sailing ship *Storm King* and the steamer *Gambia* - foreclosed and took possession of them. We know this because both were sold by their mortgagees in 1868, although they may have taken possession sometime earlier. It is not known whether these problems arose directly out of Henry's wartime business, but it can be said with some certainty that that business did not provide him with financial security.¹⁰⁰

Although Lafone continued to be listed as a merchant up to 1870, he does not appear again in this study in the post-war period, and his career as a shipowner and agent does not seem to have outlasted the war. In the late 1860s he became Managing Director of the Commercial Sample Company in Liverpool, but in the early 1870s he returned to maritime enterprise to become Managing Director of the Butler's Wharf Company in London. Under his direction the company developed a large warehouse complex on the Thames in the south east of the capital. On his death in 1917 Lafone's net estate was sworn at almost £70,000 which, at 1917 value, must have made him a very rich man. Although his wartime endeavours may have been imprudent, they did show great entrepreneurial spirit; this, and his subsequent career, justifies putting Henry Lafone forward as a salient example of the adaptability that we have been talking about in this chapter.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Bankruptcy B/6/122, Country District General Docket Book, April 65 - Feb. 67 No. 3, PRO; S.R Liverpool, *Storm King* 85/502/63, *Gambia* 87/128/65.

¹⁰¹ *Gores*, 1867 p. 240, 1870 p. 268; Lindsey, Lafone, pp. 39-40; Probate, 17th August 1917.

4. Post-War Adaptation and an Overview of Strategy.

Chapter 3 established that the entrepot trade ended with the war. Subsequently, the commerce largely returned to the pre-war pattern, with the restoration of direct trade and the restoration of the central axis between Liverpool and the Mississippi valley. But it was also pointed out that, in comparison with the late 1850s, this commerce was a contracted one and that some years passed before it began to match pre-war volume.

This transition was marked by the same kind of substantial turnover of participating Liverpool ship agents observed after the blockade came into force. About 150 firms, between them handling about three-quarters of entrepot tonnage, make no appearance in the post-war samples. Only 40 firms, handling the remaining quarter, were active in both periods; their collective share of the post-war samples increased only slightly to about 28 percent. The remaining post-war 72 percent was handled by 60 firms who had taken no part in entrepot agenting. It is very striking that there was a much greater continuity between those who were important as agents before the war and after it, than there was between either period and that of the war itself. Forty firms, active both before and after the war, handled 55 percent of pre-blockade sample tonnage, rising to 65 percent of post-war sample tonnage. Seventeen of these took no part in the entrepot trade, but collectively handled 40 percent of the pre-war tonnage and 47 percent of the postwar tonnage. In other words, the return of the trade to its pre-war pattern was echoed in the return of its principal pre-war participants to leading positions.¹⁰²

¹⁰² Database ((*BOE*; January 1856, 1858, 1860 and April to July 1861 (pre-blockade samples); August 1861 to July 1865 (entrepot trade); January 1866, 1868 and 1870 (post-war samples))

These findings enable us to view the entrepot trade as an aberration. The blockade created a temporary vacuum caused by the absence of the American shipowning clients of the major Liverpool agents. This gave rise to the free-for-all for British and European shipowners that has been seen. In its train came the involvement of an enormous number of agents who had not taken part before. Barriers to entry arising from the equilibrium of the previous long-standing trade had gone, and this meant that the entrepot trade was less concentrated than its predecessor, and became more competitive as trade volume increased. After the war, however, antebellum patterns reasserted themselves, not least the partial return of the American shipowner, which made it possible for several firms to regain their positions of importance.

Notable amongst these were six of the top ten antebellum agenting firms (case study group 1), five of whom had played no part in the entrepot trade, but nonetheless returned to the top ten, by tonnage handled, after the war. These six together handled about 34 percent of pre-blockade sample tonnage and 35 percent of post-war sample tonnage.¹⁰³ In Table 4.2, and the discussion following it, we have demonstrated that, although they did succeed in developing alternative business, the group 1 firms actually suffered a considerable overall loss of business volume during the war. Table 4.23 details their post-war business and compares its volume with the previous relevant figures of Table 4.2.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

Table 4.23. Liverpool Ship Agents Case Study Group 1: Performance in Post-War Samples.

| FIRM | A | | B | | C | | D | E |
|-------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Rankin Gilmour & Co | 5624 | 5 | 2698 | 4 | 8322 | 9 | 4.8 | 2.2 |
| James Browne & Co | 20239 | 19 | 13320 | 16 | 33559 | 35 | 2.3 | 1.0 |
| Taylor Tipper & Co | 23927 | 25 | 11524 | 10 | 35451 | 35 | 1.2 | 0.9 |
| George Warren & Co | 1941 | 3 | 6974 | 5 | 8915 | 8 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| Miller & Mosman | 0 | 0 | 5416 | 5 | 5416 | 5 | 1.4 | 0.5 |
| Duncan & Shaw | 5100 | 7 | 823 | 2 | 5923 | 9 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Boult English & Brandon | 18090 | 18 | 18000 | 21 | 36090 | 39 | 1.3 | 0.5 |
| Pilkington Bros. | 0 | 0 | 358 | 1 | 358 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Totals | 74921 | 77 | 59113 | 64 | 134034 | 141 | 1.4 | 0.7 |

Source: Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Cases Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Table 4.2.

A. Tonnage and numbers of voyages handled in Postwar Southern trade samples (1866 to 1870).

B. Tonnage and numbers of voyages handled in Postwar other trade samples (1866 to 1870).

C. Totals of **A** and **B**.

D. Proportion that **C** tonnage represents of wartime business appearing in Table 4.2.

E. Proportion that **C** tonnage represents of pre-war business appearing in Table 4.2.

Column A shows that, with two exceptions, these firms returned to handling tonnage in the Southern trade. Table 4.2 has shown the exceptions - Miller & Mosman and Pilkington Brothers - adapting poorly during the war, and we have seen that by 1867 they were no longer trading. Looking at column D, it is apparent that renewed activity in the Southern trade boosted the performances of most of the others from their wartime low; this more than compensated for the comparative decline in activities in other trades (column B) from the wartime volumes seen in Table 4.2. Great adaptability was exhibited by the six firms that managed to survive the lean times of the war, and stage a come-back in more favourable conditions.

However, we are now in a position to take an overview of group 1's performance from 1856 to 1870, and see that its members do not emerge so well from this perspective:

most survived but did not grow. Column E shows that only Rankin Gilmour were doing more business after the war than before it; the rest ranged from doing about the same as before, to doing a great deal less. Coupled with their wartime reverses, this perspective makes the group look stagnant at best, and in long-term decline at worst. The leading antebellum firm, Boulton English and Brandon, stands out particularly in terms of an absolute decline in tonnage handled over the period: this fell from 75,000 tons in the antebellum samples to 27,000 in the wartime samples; and recovered only as far as 36,000 in those of the postbellum period.

The failures to grow and develop arose out of an essentially conservative and reactive business strategy. As previously seen, most members of the group were specialists: specialists as agents; and specialists in handling large sailing ships, mostly of American ownership, which carried bulk cargoes on North Atlantic routes. This must have looked solid enough in the 1850s when their core business, the Southern cotton trade, seemed to be on an ever upward trajectory, but it exposed these firms to the disruption of the war. We have seen that they responded by adhering to the same specialisms, with just a shift of emphasis towards North American grain. This was a reactive response because it merely followed the alternative business being developed by their American shipowning clients. After the war they followed those clients back into the Southern trade; but the climate of the late 1860s was less favourable to their type of operation than that of the 1850s. The Southern cotton trade had contracted, and a comparison of columns A in Tables 4.2 and 4.23 shows that the group was handling a much lower absolute volume of Southern trade tonnage after the war than before it. Probably more detrimental to their fortunes was the sustained wartime shift towards

British shipowners, and the long-term post-war decline of American shipowning, that was highlighted earlier.

In the post-war samples, the business of all of the Table 4.23 firms, with the exceptions of Rankin Gilmour, and Warren, continued to be dominated by tonnage of American register: 64 percent for Boulton English & Brandon; 80 percent for Browne, and Taylor Tipper; and 100 percent for Duncan and Shaw. This dependency exposed them to continuing American mercantile decline just as, pre-war, it had exposed them to American trade disruption. These last four mentioned firms fit most firmly into the strategically reactive pattern that has been described - apart from Miller and Mosman and Pilkington whose pursuit of such a strategy led them out of business. After the war these four continued to handle just the large sailing ship and, in their activities on routes other than those with the South, continued to specialise in Northern US destinations. Although we have some evidence of small scale post-war shipowning by Taylor Tipper, we have none, throughout our period, indicating that any of the other three diversified into that area.¹⁰⁴

A strategy of diversification in the 1850s, when the possibility of war was there to be seen, could at least have softened the impact; continued adherence to the same specialist strategy in the late 1860s and beyond led to long-term decline. It is noticeable that none of the four firms recently mentioned went on to become large-scale shipping enterprises. Indeed, Taylor Tipper and Duncan and Shaw, and all their

¹⁰⁴ Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

respective partners, disappear from the commercial directory between 1870 and 1880.¹⁰⁵ Towards the end of the 1860s James Browne was joined in partnership by Peter A. Browne, and this firm must subsequently have addressed its problems because it continued to exist until at least 1912.¹⁰⁶

The steepest decline was that of the leading antebellum player, Boulton English & Brandon. The nature of this firm's specialisation is confirmed by their advertisement, reproduced in 1867 and 1870, which describes them as handling lines of vessels for New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans, San Francisco and Galveston.¹⁰⁷ Between 1870 and 1880 the firm was renamed Francis Boulton & Co, after its senior partner, although the three partners mentioned earlier remained exactly the same. To survive, the firm was forced to adapt its business: by 1912 they were advertised as shipbrokers and freight agents for the Illinois Central Railroad Co; by 1946, the last entry we have for them, they were simply advertised as shipbrokers & forwarding agents.¹⁰⁸

Francis Boulton himself died in 1886. He was a Unitarian and a Liberal, and was active in public affairs throughout his career. First in the anti-corn law agitation, then as part of the movement against the Navigation Laws, and later as one of the founders of the Financial Reform Association. He was also at one time a member of Liverpool's Dock

¹⁰⁵ *Gores*; 1867 pp. 123, 362 and 389, 1870 pp. 139 and 437, 1880 (searched for relevant names). Duncan and Shaw was the continuation of Duncan and Kendall; sometime in 1866 the firm changed its name when Thomas R. Shaw joined the existing partners Charles C. Duncan and William Rathbone Duncan.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*; 1867 p. 67, 1870 p. 72, 1880 p. 94, 1890 p. 114, 1912 p. 858.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*; 1867 p. 56, 1870 p. 60.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*; 1880 p. 77, 83 and 94, 1912 p. 834, 1946 p. 956.

Board. These facts are not just interesting in themselves but are also relevant to the decline of his firm. Writing only a few years after Boulton's death, Orchard described him as latterly spending so much time on his other concerns that "...his own business interests were left to juniors, and partners, clerks and clients alike were found fretting and worried by his absence.". This neglect must have been a factor in the firm's strategic drift after 1861. It is clear from his obituary that, by the time of his death, the glory days of Boulton, English and Brandon were long over; a circumstance which the writer put down to "...unnatural and unexpected vicissitudes in the American trade which crippled his business..". On his death, Boulton's net estate was sworn at only £2000, a surprisingly low figure considering he had spent a lifetime in business.¹⁰⁹

As mentioned earlier, Rankin Gilmour and Warren & Co did not share the dependence on American clients of the other Table 4.23 firms. In a number of ways these two did not conform to the pattern of business strategy inferred for group 1 as a whole. Towards the end of chapter 3, Rankin Gilmour was described as the Liverpool office of a national and international concern. The firm's business outside the Southern trade was not with the Northern US, but with British North America. In the post-war samples, all its shipowning clients were British or from the British American colonies; we will see later that the firm was actually its own client in shipowning. In these ways, the firm's strategy featured much more initiative and diversification than the others of Table 4.23. In that Table it was the most successful firm in increasing its business volume after the war. Rankin Gilmour did not go into a decline, but instead enlarged

¹⁰⁹ Orchard, *Liverpool's Legion*, pp. 184-186; *The Liverpool Review*, April 3 1886, LRO, Hf 050 Liv; Letters of Administration with the Will, 12th May 1886.

the scale of its shipowning in the remainder of the century, as the “Saint Line”. The firm became incorporated, and continued to operate up to the second world war.¹¹⁰

We established earlier that George Warren and Co owned the Warren line of vessels operating between Liverpool and Boston, and that these had been placed under the British flag. Warren would have been their own clients in respect of a chunk of the 40 percent of their post-war sample tonnage which was of British register. Their clients were still 60 percent American by vessel tonnage, but they appear to have been moving away from this clientage after the war. Although Table 4.23 shows them only maintaining pre and post-war business volume after the war, they clearly had a more diverse operation than most of the others. Actually, the line became very successful in the remainder of the nineteenth century. Warren ships transported huge herds of American cattle over the Atlantic, as well as vast amounts of cotton and foodstuffs; both passengers and cargo were carried in the other direction. Just before the first world war, Warren became part of the larger Furness Withy shipping group and, as part of that group, was later amalgamated into Johnston Warren Lines Limited, a company which still existed in 1970.¹¹¹

The other side of the coin of the post-war turnover in agenting personnel, was that most of the firms active in the wartime trade were displaced from the restored Southern trade; at the start of this section it was indicated that this applied to 150

¹¹⁰ Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Potted history of Rankin Gilmour & Co prepared by MMM.

¹¹¹ Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Henderson, *Sea Breezes*, pp. 350-369; Gores, 1970 p. 941.

Liverpool agents, who between them had handled three-quarters of wartime tonnage. This can be seen to have resulted from the squeezing-out of their shipowning clients. We have seen that the wartime trade was carried in vessels of low average tonnage. After the war, the greatly increased volume of the trade meant that these were, on the whole, displaced by much larger vessels, many of American ownership. The large ship and the American client was the specialisation of a particular type of firm, such as the group 1 case studies. As will be seen, when we come to group 3, the large ship and the British client was the preserve of a different type of firm again.

Being squeezed out after the war does not seem to have been disastrous for most. Of the 150 firms mentioned above, three-quarters were still in business in 1867 - although, of course, this means that a quarter were not. Firms newly formed between 1860 and 1867 were disproportionately represented amongst those who had ceased trading (for whatever reason) by 1867. Of 105 firms who were already established in 1860, only 13 percent failed to make it to 1867. On the other hand, of the remaining 45 that were established in the interim, 56 percent did not carry through to 1867. We can draw the general conclusion from this that those that had an already established business were just adding another string to their bow in the entrepot trade, and were therefore better placed to cope with its removal than new creations.¹¹²

The top ten wartime agents in Liverpool have been listed at Table 4.5 as case study group 2. These businesses were affected by the ending of the war in that, on the evidence of the samples, all of them except two failed to carry their involvement into

¹¹² Database (*Gores*, 1860 and 1867).

the post-war trade. Table 4.24 examines the post-war performance of the five members of this group for whom activities in other trades have been located, and compares it with their antebellum and wartime performances shown in Table 4.6.

Table 4.24. Liverpool Ship Agents Case Study Group 2: Performance in Postwar Samples.

| FIRM | A | | B | | C | | D | E |
|--------------------------|-------------|----------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|----------|------------|
| LEECH HARRISON & FORWOOD | 3630 | 5 | 324 | 1 | 3954 | 6 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
| BAHR BEHREND & CO | 428 | 2 | 22663 | 56 | 23091 | 58 | 1.0 | 1.9 |
| JOHN GLYNN & SON | 0 | 0 | 10509 | 72 | 10509 | 72 | 1.2 | 1.9 |
| JOHN THOMAS NICKELS | 0 | 0 | 3597 | 12 | 3597 | 12 | 0.9 | 1.2 |
| LONGTON & LONGRIGG | 0 | 0 | 2911 | 15 | 2911 | 15 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| TOTALS | 4058 | 7 | 40004 | 156 | 44062 | 163 | 1 | 1.5 |

Source: Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Cases Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Table 4.6.

A. Tonnage and numbers of voyages handled in Postwar Southern trade samples (1866 to 1870).

B. Tonnage and numbers of voyages handled in Postwar other trade samples (1866 to 1870).

C. Totals of A and B.

D. Proportion that C tonnage represents of wartime business appearing in Table 4.6.

E. Proportion that C tonnage represents of pre-war business appearing in Table 4.6.

It can be observed that only Leech Harrison maintained a significant place in the post-war Southern trade, whilst Bahr Behrend maintained only a toe-hold (column A). Column D shows that, after the war, the group as a whole was doing about the same volume of business as they had during it (excluding the entrepot trade).¹¹³ This suggests that the immediate post-war period was not a time of growth for them, especially in view of the lost entrepot trade. However, a more favourable impression emerges from the same sort of overview of the period from 1856 to 1870 that was taken in relation to the group 1 firms of Table 4.23. Column E of Table 4.24 shows all

¹¹³ The entrepot trade is not shown on the Table because, representing as it does a continuous four year period, it is not directly comparable to these January samples.

of the firms, except for Longton & Longrigg, handling a greater volume of business after the war than before it; three of them around twice as much. In-between they had seized the opportunities of the entrepot trade to take on significant new business. This was so in terms of the agenting shown at Table 4.5. It was also the case, for all of these firms apart from Bahr Behrend, in terms of the shipowning appearing in Table 4.20 and the subsequent discussion. Leech Harrison was also a top ten wartime cotton importer as shown in Table 4.9.

On the whole, these firms handled the sort of small vessels that were inappropriate for the restored Southern trade: a division of the first total of Table 4.24's column C by the second gives an average of only 270 tons per vessel. Accordingly, when the entrepot trade ended, most had to fall back on their other business - but they had taken the chance to exploit a completely new trade while it was there. This exemplifies the strong contrast between this group's strategy and the approach which has been ascribed to most of the group 1 firms. Following Table 4.6, we portrayed the members of group 2 that are currently under discussion as having diverse operations in a number of different, and highly individual, ways. It was also argued that they were likely to have taken some initiative in the move of their British and European shipowning clients into the entrepot trade. Speaking generally, it can be inferred that their strategy was active and entrepreneurial, and was one that sought opportunities to diversify in order to avoid over-dependence on one activity or client base. Most of them continued to seek opportunities and to grow their businesses as the century progressed.

In Table 4.24, Leech Harrison and Forwood appear as Southern trade specialists after the war. The Forwoods had not, however, abandoned a strategy of diversification; quite the reverse. During the war they took an important step in this direction by moving into corporate organisation in the form of founding the West India and Pacific Steam Ship Company Limited. After the retirement of his father Thomas, in 1862, Arthur Bower Forwood became the family's prime mover. He was a shareholding subscriber, and for many years first managing director, of the company, which was set up in November 1863. His brother William Bower Forwood was also a shareholding subscriber. Early in 1864, the company took over the ships and business of the Liverpool, Western and Spanish-American Steam Packet Company Limited, which had been set up in 1863. At the same time it also took over the ships and business of Alfred Holt and his associates, who had operated a line between Liverpool, and the West Indies and North, Central and South America.¹¹⁴

The West India and Pacific was in the top ten as agent in the post-bellum Southern trade samples, and was the leading shipowner in that trade; but its activities were not confined to this. We will explore these matters in a later discussion of the company as part of case study group 3. What we need to note now is that it was part of a diverse Forwood operation, which experienced greater overall growth in the period than looking solely at Leech Harrison would suggest. In the immediate post-war period, the company appears to have been the main vehicle for the family's diversification, but Leech Harrison itself was to diversify and grow. It remained a family partnership and was to add offices in London and New York to that in Liverpool. From the early

¹¹⁴ BT 31 849/790C and 796/511C, PRO; Orchard, *Liverpool's Legion*, p. 305.

1870s onwards Leech Harrison's operations included owning and operating a steamship line between Liverpool and London, and ports in Morocco, Madeira and the Canary Islands. This operation, and the firm itself, remained in existence until it was taken over by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company in 1908.¹¹⁵

In the late nineteenth century the Forwoods advanced their importance, not just in the commercial sphere but also as men of public affairs. Arthur Forwood became a prominent Conservative but, unlike Francis Boulton, he did not neglect his business in favour of public matters. He was to serve a term as Mayor of Liverpool and later was elected M.P. for Ormskirk, north of the city. His prominence as a shipowner was recognised by his appointment as Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty in Lord Salisbury's administration of 1886 to 1892, and he subsequently became a Privy Councillor. His brother William was also to serve as Mayor, and his contributions in numerous areas of local public life led to his Knighthood in 1883.¹¹⁶

Earlier on a portrait was painted of the diversity, extent and growth of Bahr Behrend's activities from 1856 to 1865. Although Table 4.24 indicates that they were largely unable to carry their entrepot trade penetration into the restored direct trade, we have seen that the former was not the mainstay of their operation. The diverse character of their activities remained in the post-war period. Handling the vessels of the Serra Line trading with Spanish ports - now exclusively steam - continued to be their single most

¹¹⁵ Gores, 1867 p. 298, 1870 p. 275, 1880 p. 377, 1890 p. 467; Orchard, *Liverpool's Legion*, p. 305; J. Smith-Hughes, "Forgotten Fleets: Forwoods of Liverpool and London" *Sea Breezes* 42 (Jan-June 1968), pp. 150-153.

¹¹⁶ Orchard, *Liverpool's Legion*, pp. 304-309.

important enterprise, but this continued to be balanced by other routes, which formed the majority of their agenting. Amongst these, Mediterranean and Black sea routes were the most frequent, followed by those with South and Central America, and Northern Europe. Alongside a substantial British element, the shipowning clientele retained its majority European flavour and variety. The earlier trend towards their diversification into handling steam vessels continued: 40 percent of vessels in the post-war samples were steam powered as opposed to one-quarter in the earlier period. These were increasingly deployed not just on the Serra Line, but also in other Mediterranean and Black sea trades.¹¹⁷

Although they were minority shareholders of the Serra Line, one area into which the firm did not diversify was that of directly owning ships. Despite never doing so they continued to act successfully for a variety of British and international shipowning clients. The firm survived an internal rift in 1898, which resulted in the loss of the Serra Line agency. In the early twentieth century they recovered by growing the freight side of the business; forwarding offices were opened in Bradford for textiles, and in London for tobacco. The latter office became important in developing new liner agencies. The coming and going of these agencies and the continuing development of freight forwarding has enabled the firm - Bahr Behrend and Co Limited since 1958 - to survive as an independent Liverpool shipping agent to this day. The international diversity in routes and clients that has been highlighted is reflected today on a much wider scale.¹¹⁸ Despite not becoming shipowners - an omission which probably

¹¹⁷ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 68 and 1870).

¹¹⁸ Bahr Behrend & Co Ltd, *Over Two Centuries of Service to Shipowners, Exporters and Importers*, (Liverpool, an in house firm publication).

retarded growth in the late nineteenth century when the opportunities were great - the firm has successfully pursued a consistent long-term strategy for independent survival.

The activities of John Glynn and Son can also be characterised as diverse. Their activities in the entrepot trade, though considerable, were a temporary addition to the larger continuing business that they did in other trades. In the post-war samples (represented in Table 4.24) the fruit trade with St. Michaels continued to account for about half of the voyages that they handled. As had been the case between 1856 and 1865, Mediterranean routes were^{the} second most frequent, followed by routes with Central and South America, and the West Indies. A few vessels sailing in African, Canadian and Atlantic island trades were also handled. The Glynnns continued to have a predominantly British shipowning clientele, drawn from ports all over Britain, but with the West Country still strongly represented. One important aspect of the firm's operation had not developed from the earlier period though: they were still owning and handling only sailing vessels.¹¹⁹

The point has already been made that, for reasons of fuel economy - and therefore cargo efficiency - the steamship of the day was not yet the match of sail over long distances. Steam technology was, however, improving. At the end of the 1860s the more efficient compound engine was perfected, and developments in metallurgy led to stronger boilers that could withstand higher pressures. The result was much reduced coal consumption, and consequently greater cargo space. Various other factors were involved in the growing competitiveness of steam. The opening of the Suez Canal in

¹¹⁹ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

1869 slashed distances to the east and also those between coaling stations. The canal proved unsuitable for sail and enabled steamers to compete on these routes. Organisational developments such as marine telegraphs and the rise of liner companies - bringing with them scheduled services and formal freight rate structures fixed by conference - were increasingly to favour steam. The arrival of the larger steamer created economies of scale. It has been estimated that, for bulk cargo, steam was competitive by the end of the civil war in European and Mediterranean trades; the same was true for North Atlantic grain and Suez-carried Bombay trade by 1870. Successively, steam then drew level in Southern US trade by 1875, in Calcutta-via-Suez trade by 1880, and in trade with the Western US by 1895.¹²⁰

Cleaving to sail-owning clients was another way in which the strategy of most of the group 1 case studies was going to require adjustment. The need to embrace steam, however, was more urgent for firms like the Glynnns, whose business centred around just the sort of restricted-sea trades in which steam was competitive by the late 1860s. But Edward Dashper Glynn maintained an old prejudice that steam injured the flavour of fruit cargo; as a result he missed opportunities and was late in starting the transition.¹²¹ Actually, Liverpool shipowners in general lagged behind those of other British ports in this respect, and sail continued to be used for the longest distance trades, such as that with Australia, up to the first world war. Nonetheless, Liverpool

¹²⁰ Graham, *Economic History Review*, pp. 74-88; C. Knick Harley, "Aspects of the Economics of Shipping, 1850-1913" in *Change and Adaptation*, eds. Fischer and Panting, pp. 169-186.

¹²¹ Jones, *Pioneer Ship Owners*, p 38.

owners did wake up to steam eventually and by 1880 the port's steam fleet had caught up.¹²²

The Glynnns began seriously to accommodate steam following the death of Edward Dashper Glynn in 1874, when his sons, Dashper Edward and Walter, took charge of the business. By continuing to pursue a strategy of diversification, the firm grew through the remainder of the century to become a major shipping enterprise, both as a shipowner and as a ship agent. They reorganised their own "Z" Line to the Mediterranean as the Atlantic and Eastern Steamship Company. They also developed a steam line between Liverpool and Cuba, via north Spanish ports. This was known as the Arrotegui Line and the ships were held under the Spanish flag. Two important steamship line agencies were also acquired: the Chesapeake and Ohio Steamship Co of London, which ran a service between Liverpool and Newport News in Virginia; also that of Furness, later Furness Withy & Co Ltd, operating between Liverpool and Southern US ports. Additionally, the firm acted for a number of smaller steamship companies, several of whom were clients because of the old West Country connection.¹²³

Like the Forwoods, the Glynn brothers were active and entrepreneurial as individuals as well as businessmen; both became public figures. Walter left the firm in 1893 to become Managing Director of the Leyland Line, an important shipping concern newly incorporated following the recent death of Frederick Leyland. He was also active on

¹²² Hyde, *Liverpool and the Mersey*, pp. 95-96; Cottrell, in *Shipping, Trade and Commerce*, p. 137.

¹²³ Jones, *Pioneer Ship Owners*, pp. 35-49.

the Dock Board and in various other commercial, trade and public bodies. Dashper was known as a philanthropist, particularly for his work as Chairman of the Liverpool Shipwreck and Humane Society, and was a director of several companies. After Dashper died in 1918 the business was sold to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, and the family connection ended. The name continued, however, and John Glynn & Son Ltd was still involved in Mediterranean trade at least up to 1960, and was still listed in 1970 as a Liverpool shipbroking firm.¹²⁴

Not all the case studies of Table 4.24 made a long-term success out of a diversifying strategy. Although Longton & Longrigg had handled vessels for diverse British clients, plying diverse routes, and had taken opportunities in the entrepot trade, Table 4.24 clearly shows them in post-war decline. In fact, the two men had parted company by 1867 when they were trading separately as John Longton & Co, and Thomas Longrigg & Co. Their activities have been aggregated in Table 4.24 for continuity. Both firms were still trading in 1870, but both had disappeared by 1880.¹²⁵

Although the remaining Table 4.24 firm, J. T. Nickels, continued until at least 1912 there is little information about its fortunes. Its business in the post-war samples, like that between 1855 and 1865, does not look very diverse. All the voyages handled in the later period involved Spanish ports - mostly Cuban - and the client base continued to be predominantly Spanish. All the post-war vessels handled were sail. Although we have seen some small evidence of shipowning following Table 4.20, there is nothing

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*; Orchard, *Liverpool's Legion*, p. 332; Chandler, *Liverpool Shipping*, pp. 89-95; Gores, 1970 p. 928.

¹²⁵ Gores, 1867 p. 254, 1870 p. 285.

to indicate that the firm grew into a shipowner of consequence. Probably, it remained a small scale agent, reliant on certain clients. In 1880 it was advertised as agent for “..the Spanish West India line of steamers.”, and in 1912 for “..Hamburg-American and Hamburg South-American lines for South Brazil ports.”¹²⁶

We will now take an overview of the strategies of the remaining group 2 case studies, listed in Table 4.5, who do not appear in Table 4.24; they are absent, of course, because the post-war samples have not picked up any business done in the period. In De Jersey’s case this is because dealing in cotton was probably the main role of the Liverpool office. Table 4.9 has shown De Jersey as significant importers of Confederate cotton, and the firm is known to have acted as agent for Knoop vessels when in port. As indicated earlier, De Jersey was the Liverpool office of Baron Knoop’s international merchant banking concern, based in Manchester. Chapman has described Ludwig Knoop as an exceptional entrepreneur, who built up a huge business between 1840 and his death in 1894, based on building and equipping over 120 cotton mills in Russia. Cotton supply was attended to by the office in Liverpool, and others in Bombay and New York; the latter having branches at the major Southern cotton ports. There was also an associated office in London. The war must have affected this operation, although nothing is known about Knoop’s specific response. Before the end of the century De Jersey’s capital had reached £1 million and it was incorporated in 1914 with capital of £1.25m.¹²⁷ Knoop’s strategy can certainly be seen as active and

¹²⁶ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); *Gores*, 1867 p. 298, 1870 p. 335, 1880 p. 471, 1890 p. 581, 1912 p. 1398.

¹²⁷ Chapman, *Merchant Banking*, pp. 144-146.

entrepreneurial, as well as being more diverse than any of the others. The Liverpool office was to remain open until at least 1912.¹²⁸

The other four group 2 case studies have been characterised in this study as wartime opportunists. In the instances of Henry Lafone and Beach Root and Co this is because their involvement in maritime enterprise began during the war, and arose in order to exploit the opportunities that the entrepot trade presented. Melchor Klingender was much the same, except that he had taken some part in the antebellum trade. Fraser Trenholm & Co were active in the antebellum trade, but became very prominent in the entrepot trade due to their particular Confederate connections.

Although active and entrepreneurial, all four pursued strategies that were anything but diverse. Fraser Trenholm gambled all on the success of the Confederacy, and the loss of the gamble pushed them out of business. Henry Lafone gambled all on high risk blockade running, and this brought him to the brink of bankruptcy. Commitment to this risky enterprise was not a strategy generally followed by British shipowners, and the available evidence indicates that those who did follow it failed to prosper from it. Neither Melchor Klingender, nor Beach Root & Co, seem to have built lasting businesses out of their exclusive involvement in the entrepot trade. On the evidence of our case studies so far, the development of a diversity of commitments looks like an important component in a successful strategy.

¹²⁸ *Gores*; 1867 p. 112; 1870 p. 125; 1880 p. 172; 1890 p. 212; 1912 p. 965.

Before introducing our last case study group and seeing how they fit into the strategic overview, we need briefly to examine the pattern of post-war agenting in Liverpool to compare it with that of the antebellum and entrepot periods. Table 4.25 addresses the issue of concentration.

Table 4.25. Concentration in Post-War Liverpool Agenting.

| PERIOD | Jan 1866 | Jan 1868 | Jan 1870 | OVERALL |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| TONNAGE HANDLED | 59509 | 84417 | 72224 | 216150 |
| NUMBER OF VOYAGES HANDLED | 80 | 98 | 86 | 264 |
| NUMBER OF FIRMS PARTICIPATING | 44 | 43 | 48 | 100 |
| PERCENTAGE OF TONNAGE HANDLED: | | | | |
| BY TOP THREE | 31.2% | 31.5 % | 31.4% | 28.9 % |
| BY TOP FOUR | 38.9 % | 39.2 % | 35.4 % | 33.5 % |
| BY TOP TEN | 65 % | 61.8 % | 54.1 % | 49.8 % |

Source: Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

This Table compares with Table 4.3 and Table 3.3. Although only three periods are covered here, in contrast to the four of the earlier Tables, the comparison is still worthwhile. The post-war return of the large ship is clearly seen, with overall tonnage divided by number of voyages giving an average of about 820 tons per vessel. Overall concentration is appreciably greater than in the entrepot period of Table 4.3 - there we saw concentration drop sharply, on all measures, as the war progressed, and we saw a much larger total of participants.

Earlier, the entrepot trade was described as an aberration. Therefore, in order to pick out the trend over the study period, a comparison with the pre-blockade disposition of Table 3.3 is more relevant. This exercise reveals a slightly greater concentration in the later period on all measures. If, however, we ignore the pre-blockade April to July

1861 sample - when, following the onset of the war, concentration levels were much lower than they had been - then concentration does not look much greater after the war. Indeed the post-war market still emerges as “unconcentrated” in our tests. There had been no movement towards domination of the market by a few, and it remained essentially competitive. The post-war situation differed only in that concentration did not fluctuate so much from period to period as it had done, and in that there was a smaller number of participants.

Degree of concentration was another way in which the postbellum trade simply picked up - after the aberration of the entrepot period - where the antebellum trade had left off. As usual, when we look at continuity, we find that a large proportion of total voyage tonnage was handled by a small number of regular participants; the overwhelming majority were occasional participants only. This is demonstrated in Table 4.26 where the periods referred to are those of the three post-war samples.

Table 4.26. Continuity in Post War Liverpool Agenting.

| PERIODS OF PARTICIPATION | ONE | TWO | THREE | TOTALS |
|-------------------------------------|------------|------------|--------------|---------------|
| NUMBER OF FIRMS | 73 | 19 | 8 | 100 |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FIRMS | 73 % | 19 % | 8 % | 100 % |
| PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TONNAGE HANDLED | 38 % | 20 % | 42 % | 100 % |

Source: Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

Direct comparison with the antebellum equivalent figures, presented in Table 3.4, is more difficult here because of the difference in number of periods covered. However, one can simply compare the figures for those operating in all periods of the respective

Tables (column four in Table 3.4 and column three in Table 4.26). Again this does not reveal a great change from one to the other. The main purpose of looking at continuity is to establish that only a small number of firms were regular and significant participants. Having done so we can now introduce case study group 3 as representatives of those participants in the post-war trade.

Table 4.27. Case Study Group 3: Post-War Agents.

| Agent | No. of Voyages | Tonnage | % of Tonnage |
|---|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| Taylor Tipper & Co (3) * | 25 | 23927 | 11.1 |
| James Browne & Co (3) * | 19 | 20239 | 9.4 |
| Boult English & Brandon (3) * | 18 | 18090 | 8.4 |
| John Starr De Wolf & Co (3) | 13 | 9948 | 4.6 |
| William Henry Haynes (3) | 8 | 7064 | 3.3 |
| British & American Steam Navigation Co. Ltd (1) | 5 | 6563 | 3.0 |
| West India & Pacific Steam Ship Co. Ltd (3) | 5 | 5694 | 2.6 |
| Rankin Gilmour & Co. (2)* | 5 | 5624 | 2.6 |
| Duncan & Shaw (3) * | 7 | 5100 | 2.4 |
| Thomas & James Harrison (2) | 7 | 4545 | 2.1 |
| Totals | 112 | 106794 | 49.4 |

Source: Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

These firms together handled nearly half of the voyage tonnage caught by the post-war samples. They were also collectively important in all three sample periods: they handled 46 percent of the 1866 total; 57 percent of that of 1868; and 44 percent of that of 1870. An indication appears, in brackets after their names, of the number of periods in which each participated; we can see that seven of the ten were present in all three periods. There has been small departure here from the usual principle of choosing the top ten by tonnage as case studies. R.L. Gillchrest & Co, who would have been included at the foot of Table 4.27 on this basis, have been replaced by Harrisons - the next firm on the list. This has been done because little is known about the former firm, and their involvement was confined to 1866 only, whereas much is known about the latter; this makes them a more illuminating case study choice.

The five firms of case study group 1, who returned to the Southern trade after their absence in the entrepot period, are highlighted in Table 4.27 by asterisks. Their post-war fortunes have already been explored in Table 4.23 and the subsequent discussion. The fortunes of the other five members of group 3, in terms of business volume handled over the entire period of this study, appear in Table 4.28.

Table 4.28. Case Study Group 3: Performance from 1856 to 1870.

Part A. Trades other than Southern and Entrepot:

| Firm | 56-60 | | 62-64 | | 66-70 | |
|------------------------|-------|----|-------|----|-------|----|
| W. I. & P.S.S. Co Ltd. | - | - | - | - | 21938 | 19 |
| T & J Harrison | 5583 | 15 | 3214 | 7 | 14447 | 22 |
| J. S. De Wolf & Co | 4793 | 9 | 16991 | 22 | 5403 | 10 |
| W. H. Haynes | - | - | 2364 | 3 | 3982 | 5 |
| B. & A. S. N. Co Ltd | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Totals | 10376 | 24 | 22569 | 32 | 45770 | 56 |

Part B. Southern and Entrepot Trades:

| Firm | 56-60 | | 61-65 | | 66-70 | |
|------------------------|-------|---|-------|----|-------|----|
| W. I. & P.S.S. Co Ltd. | - | - | 4342 | 6 | 5694 | 5 |
| T & J Harrison | 1558 | 2 | 1036 | 2 | 4545 | 7 |
| J. S. De Wolf & Co | 2650 | 4 | 6290 | 13 | 9948 | 13 |
| W. H. Haynes | 819 | 1 | - | - | 7064 | 8 |
| B. & A. S. N. Co Ltd | - | - | - | - | 6563 | 5 |
| Totals | 5027 | 7 | 11668 | 21 | 33814 | 38 |

Part C. Totals of A and B:

| Firm | 56-60 | | 61-65 | | 66-70 | |
|------------------------|-------|----|-------|----|-------|----|
| W. I. & P.S.S. Co Ltd. | 0 | 0 | 4342 | 6 | 27632 | 24 |
| T & J Harrison | 7141 | 17 | 4250 | 9 | 18992 | 29 |
| J. S. De Wolf & Co | 7443 | 13 | 23281 | 35 | 15351 | 23 |
| W. H. Haynes | 819 | 1 | 2364 | 3 | 11046 | 13 |
| B. & A. S. N. Co Ltd | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6563 | 5 |
| Totals | 15403 | 31 | 34237 | 53 | 79584 | 94 |

Source: A; Cases Database (BOE; January 1856, 1858, and 1860; January 1862, 1863 and 1864; January 1866, 1868 and 1870). B; Database (BOE, January 1856, 1858 and 1860; July 1861 to 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

Table 4.28 shows the volume of tonnage that each firm handled in each period, followed by the number of voyages that that tonnage represented. The 61-65 column

of Part B is not strictly comparable with the other columns, because it covers all four years of the entrepot trade rather than sample months; it is included here in order to demonstrate the involvement of some of these firms in the entrepot trade. What emerges very clearly from the Table is that, looking at the group as a whole, this was a period of tremendous growth in business volume. Each part of the Table shows enormous increases from one period to the next. Overall, the group was handling over five times the volume of business after the war than was the case before it. Unlike the other members of group 3, these firms had diverse interests: it can be observed that involvement in Southern and entrepot trade (Part B) was a minority element in the overall picture. This is more apparent when one notices that the group was doing more business in other trades in the three wartime monthly samples (62-64 in Part A) than in the entrepot trade in its entire four year duration (61-65 in Part B).

The specific applicability of these general comments to individual firms will be addressed shortly. Meanwhile, we can broadly place these Table 4.28 businesses into the category of those pursuing an active and entrepreneurial strategy. Their willingness to diversify by taking new opportunities and challenges manifested itself in several ways: diversity of trades; significant moves into shipowning; pioneering of steam; and adoption of new corporate forms. Although none of these firms had the diverse client base of Bahr Behrend or the Glynnys, equally none were dependant on a declining American clientele, as were most of the other members of group 3. With the exception of the short-lived British and American Steam Navigation Co, all of these firms achieved significant growth in this period and beyond, by the pursuit of the sort of strategy highlighted.

Three of the Table 4.28 organisations pioneered steam in the immediate post-war Southern trade: the West India and Pacific, the Harrisons, and the British and American. Actually, these three together handled a majority, about 70 percent, of steam tonnage engaged in the post-war samples; only five other firms handled any steam tonnage at all. We will see at Table 4.29, that the three were owning these steam vessels as well as agenting them. In fact, all of the steam tonnage was British owned; this was another way in which American owners were losing ground.¹²⁹ Two of the three organisations recently mentioned were also pioneering another new development, that of corporate limited liability. Effective general limited liability had recently become available following the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856.¹³⁰

Sail was still supreme on Southern routes after the war, accounting for about 90 percent of tonnage engaged. But the deployment of steam in the trade had its origins during the war, mainly in the form of blockade runners moving to their bases. If steam was not yet competitive in the trade how were the pioneers able to make it pay? The formation by the Forwoods of the West India and Pacific Steam Ship Company Limited, at the end of 1863, has been touched on earlier. Its Southern trade operations began in July 1864. Various elements in the company's operation can be identified as playing a part in their successful use of steam ships in the Southern trade.

¹²⁹ Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

¹³⁰ H.A. Shannon, "The First Five Thousand Limited Companies and their Duration" *Economic History* 2 (1930-33), pp. 396-424.

The company ran their services with the assistance of subsidised British government mail contracts.¹³¹ Albion saw the possession of these as an important factor in the rise to pre-war prominence in some North Atlantic trades of British steam lines, such as Cunard and Inman. Having a speed advantage over sail, the steamship could be first to bring news from Europe. Not being dependent upon the winds, steamships could be run to fixed advertised schedules. Speed and regularity attracted paying passengers and high value/low bulk freight, both of which mitigated the problems of fuel economy by being less demanding on space.¹³²

Spreading their services around a variety of ports was a way in which the West India Company maximised the advantages of operating a subsidised steam line. Actually, the company's activities shown in Parts A and B of Table 4.28 represented two sides of the same coin. All their vessels were steam powered, and all called at several West Indies and Caribbean ports. During the war, stops were also made at Havana or Bermuda to pick up Confederate cotton; after it, some vessels stopped off to load cotton at Galveston, New Orleans or Mobile. A comparison of Parts A and B of Table 4.28 shows that during the war all company vessels picked up Southern cotton - presumably due to its inflated value in Liverpool - whereas, after it, only about a fifth of voyages included a Southern mainland stop for cotton.

In other words, the carriage of high bulk/low value cotton was a small part of a diverse operation that included a variety of commodities of different types. To give an

¹³¹ Cottrell, in *Shipping, Trade and Commerce*, p.151.

¹³² Albion, *New York*, pp. 312-334.

example, the appropriately named *Caribbean* returned to Liverpool in January 1868 having picked up cargo at six different ports: Curacao in the Dutch West Indies; Santa Martha, Colon and Carthagena in Columbia; Jamaica in the British West Indies; and Port-au-Prince in Haiti. Around thirty different and various commodities had been stowed, including some West Indian cotton; but in this instance a stop had not been made for the Southern staple.¹³³ Earlier we referred to steam stowage space problems being mitigated to some extent by the economies of scale of the large vessel: the *Caribbean* was registered at 1316 tons and, looking at Table 4.28, one can calculate that West India Co vessels averaged over 1000 tons each. Table 4.28 shows the company growing rapidly at the end of our period. It continued to do so up to its amalgamation into Frederick Leyland & Co. Ltd. in 1900, following which it was voluntarily wound-up. Leylands paid £1m for the company.¹³⁴

On the other hand, the British and American Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. appears to have been unable to make a steam line between Liverpool and New Orleans pay. There is no evidence of it holding a mail contract and, although its ships were large, there was no diversity of destinations or commodities; return cargoes were dominated by cotton. The Company was formed in January 1864, and reformed in May 1865. It was registered at the office of Fernie Brothers, later Henry Fernie & Son, whose partners - William, Henry and David Fernie - were subscribing shareholders. Its business (shown in Table 4.28) was confined to January 1866, and by May of that year

¹³³ *BOE Liverpool*, 25th January 1868.

¹³⁴ BT 31 849/790C, PRO; Hyde, *Shipping Enterprise*, pp. 27-33.

it had resolved not to continue because of its liabilities. Later in the year a court order for a voluntary winding-up was issued on the petition of the Alliance Bank Limited.¹³⁵

The story of the other case study firm that pioneered steam in the Southern trade, Thomas and James Harrison, has been told by Francis Hyde.¹³⁶ Throughout its long history the firm's strategy has very much been an active and entrepreneurial one, with diversification of interests being a central objective. We have mostly been inferring this sort of strategy from action: here there is archival support for its conscious pursuit. Thomas and James had been partners in Samuel Brown Son & Co, later George Brown & Harrison, and on the death of George Brown in 1853 the firm became T & J Harrison. The enterprise owned its own ships, which were engaged in a small scale European coastal trade. This mainly involved carriage of coal to Charente in France and return cargoes of wine and brandy from Charente, Oporto, Cadiz and Lisbon.¹³⁷

In the period of this study, the firm made two important decisions: to begin to use steam ships, and to broaden out from localised coastal trade into oceanic enterprise. After the civil war they established a steam line between Liverpool and New Orleans. In the 1860s they also began a trade with India and the Far East, in which they were amongst the first to take advantage of the opening of the Suez canal by switching to steam. A trade with Central and South America, primarily Mexico and Brazil, was

¹³⁵ Database (*BOE*, January 1866, 1868 and 1870); *Gores*, 1860 p. 89, 1867 p.140; BT 31 876/898C and 1108/2160C, PRO.

¹³⁶ Hyde, *Shipping Enterprise*.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-18.

also established in the 1860s. At the same time the European trade was expanded. All of these endeavours were to grow significantly through the remainder of the century, and the firm became a shipping concern of some magnitude.¹³⁸

The tremendous growth in Harrison's business volume in the immediate post-war period can be seen in Table 4.28. It can also be seen that, although there was expansion in the Southern trade, it was greatest in other trades. Amongst these, the number of sailings involving South American, French, Spanish, and Mediterranean ports, were fairly evenly matched. There was also a scattering of African sailings. Most of the Spanish and Mediterranean voyages were made by steam ships, as were about a third of those involving France and South America. The Southern trade was carried by sail until 1866, whereupon it became all steam. It seems that Harrisons were able to make a New Orleans steam line pay where ^{the} British and ^{Company} American had failed. This is probably because they undertook it as one small element fitting into a wider shipping enterprise, rather than on its own. The African and Indian voyages were initially all sail.¹³⁹ That is until January 1870 when the steamer *Fire Queen* cleared Liverpool for Bombay via Suez. This was the first Harrison ship to use the canal, and apparently only the 27th transit through it.¹⁴⁰

In 1884 the fleet became corporately owned as the Charente Steam Ship Company Ltd., whilst the firm of T. & J. Harrison continued to act as managers. The firm has

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-62.

¹³⁹ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860; January 1862, 1863 and 1864; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860; July 1861 to 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

¹⁴⁰ *BOE Liverpool*, 13th January 1870; Hyde, *Shipping Enterprise*, p.37.

continued to progress through the vicissitudes of the twentieth century - most recently adapting to containerisation - and remain in existence as T.& J. Harrison Ltd.¹⁴¹ Intriguingly they are anachronistically listed in the Liverpool telephone book as “Steamship owners”.

Not so long-lived were the two remaining case studies of Table 4.28: J. S. De Wolf & Co and W. H. Haynes. De Wolf was formed in Liverpool in 1840 by two brothers from Halifax, Nova Scotia - John Starr and James Ratchford De Wolf. A look at Table 4.28 shows that their business in the Southern trade made up the lesser part of their activities until after the war, when it shifted to a majority position. Actually, De Wolf had been one of the most important agents in the entrepot trade, missing inclusion as a group 2 case study by only one place. Nonetheless, the Southern trade was only one part of a diverse set of activities, although North Atlantic routes predominated. In these, voyages to or from Halifax, Montreal and St. John were most frequent, demonstrating the firm’s Canadian connections. They also handled a number of Northern United States, Mediterranean, and Central and South American sailings.¹⁴²

Although they were moving into shipowning (shown later in Table 4.29) De Wolf appear to have still been acting predominantly as agents for others. About 65 percent of the voyages they handled in Table 4.28 were made by ships owned by British clients, mostly based in Liverpool. The remaining 35 percent were based in British

¹⁴¹ Hyde, *Shipping Enterprise*, pp. 20, and 167-178; A.G. Collingwood, “From Brigs to Containers” *Sea Breezes* 51 (Jan-June 1977), pp. 297-322.

¹⁴² Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860; January 1862, 1863 and 1864; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860; July 1861 to 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); E. A. Woods, *Liverpool Fleet Lists*, vol. 1, Typescript, L.R.O, Hq 337.5 Woo, p. 107.

North America - mostly in Windsor, Nova Scotia; continuing Canadian connections are again evident here. In our period, the firm had not moved into steam; all voyages that they handled, but one, were made by sail ships. It appears that De Wolf did expand and diversify further as the century progressed, without growing into large-scale shipowners. We know that they subsequently acquired more ships and continued to run the "Liverpool" Line of Australian Packets that they had established in the Australian gold rush days of the early 1850s. After 1893 known as Charles E. De Wolf & Co, the firm later began to sell its ships off. After the last of these, *Englehorn*, went missing in 1914, the firm was wound-up.¹⁴³

William Henry Haynes was similar to De Wolf in handling only sail vessels. Again, as shown in Table 4.29, he had incorporated shipowning into his activities. It is unclear, however, whether he held shares in all the ships he agented, or whether he was also acting as agent for others. Certainly, he owned shares in all the ships for which we have ownership detail. All the vessels he dealt with were of British register, mostly Liverpool. Diversity of routes is apparent from Table 4.28 in that, overall, his activities were evenly spread between the Southern trade and others, although the balance shifted towards the former in the post-war period. Voyages handled in other trades were divided evenly between South America and India. Unfortunately, we know little else about Haynes and the subsequent fortunes of his business, except that it was established by 1855, and ceased to exist sometime in the 1880s.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Ibid.; Gores, 1870 p. 125, 1880 p.172, 1890 p. 213, 1912 p. 966; D. Hollett, *Fast Passage to Australia* (London, 1986), pp. 7-10.

¹⁴⁴ Cases Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858, and 1860; January 1862, 1863 and 1864; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Database (*BOE*, January 1856, 1858 and 1860; July 1861 to 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); Gores, 1855 p. 307, 1860 p. 117, 1867 p. 185, 1870 p. 207, 1880 p. 283.

The importance of the Table 4.28 case studies as post-war shipowners appears from Table 4.29. As in Table 4.20, the voyage tonnage of individual owners, known to be partners of particular firms, has been aggregated together to represent the roles of those firms; as before the exercise is confined to Liverpool residents.

Table 4.29. Sample Ship Registers: Top Fifteen Liverpool Resident Post-War Shipowners, Grouped by Firm.

| Ship Owners | Firm | Tonnage | No. | %(1) | %(2) |
|---|---------------------|--------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| WI & PSS Co Ltd | WI & PSS Co Ltd * | 5694 | 5 | 10.1 | 5.6 |
| B & A SN Co Ltd | B & A SN Co Ltd * | 5634 | 4 | 10.0 | 5.5 |
| Robert Rankin. Alan Gilmour. William Strang | Rankin Gilmour & Co | 5624 | 5 | 10.0 | 5.5 |
| Thomas & James Harrison | T & J Harrison * | 4292 | 7 | 7.6 | 4.2 |
| John Starr & James Ratchford De Wolf | J S De Wolf & Co * | 2045 | 3 | 3.6 | 2.0 |
| James Baines. Thomas Mackay | J Baines & Co | 1553 | 2 | 2.8 | 1.5 |
| Charles Walford Kellock | Curry Kellock & Co | 1282 | 1 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
| Alexander Grainger Linn | A G Linn | 1277 | 1 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
| James Hainsworth | J Hainsworth | 1270 | 1 | 2.3 | 1.2 |
| David & John Ritchie | Ritchie Bros. & Co | 1174 | 2 | 2.1 | 1.2 |
| William Inman | W Inman | 1150 | 1 | 2.0 | 1.1 |
| Alexander & Joseph Taylor | A Taylor & Co | 1149 | 1 | 2.0 | 1.1 |
| George Taylor. William Tipper | Taylor Tipper & Co | 1064 | 3 | 1.9 | 1.0 |
| Henry Lafone | H Lafone | 929 | 1 | 1.7 | 0.9 |
| William Henry Haynes | W H Haynes * | 904 | 6 | 1.6 | 0.9 |
| Totals | - | 35041 | 43 | 62% | 34% |

Source: Database (BOE, January 1866, 1868 and 1870; S.R, 1855 to 1870; Gores 1860 and 1867).

Table 4.29 shows the owners, the firms they belonged to, the aggregate voyage tonnage and the number of voyages involved. Percentage column (1) expresses tonnage as a percentage of the register sample total; column (2) as a percentage of British registered sample voyage tonnage.¹⁴⁵ The group 3 case studies of Table 4.28 are highlighted by asterisk, and it can be seen that four are in the top five, and that the other is at the foot of the Table. The West India Co owned all of the post-war ships that they acted as agent for; the British and American owned all but one; the Harrison partners had shares in all, although minority shares were also held by non-partners; Haynes had shares in all vessels where ownership is known (six out of eight), but his

¹⁴⁵ The totals are 56168 and 101953 tons respectively.

tonnage share is small because his shareholdings were small. Exceptionally, De Wolf partners owned only a minority of the vessels they agented (3 out of 13). These institutional matters will be addressed in more detail in chapter 5. The point here is that these organisations were moving towards shipowning as an integral part of their business.

The same could not be said of the other group 3 agents: those also in group 1 that returned to the trade after the war. They are mostly absent from Table 4.29 as shipowners. Here was another respect in which they had not diversified. The only notable exception is Rankin Gilmour, which also owned all of the ships for which it acted as agents. Incidentally, we should mention that Alan Gilmour and William Strang were not actually Liverpool residents but, as alluded to earlier, the firm's resident partners in Glasgow and London respectively. The only other representative of group 1 firms to appear in Table 4.29 is Taylor Tipper, a firm which is known to have had shares in only 3 out of the 25 voyages that it agented in Table 4.27. This again highlights the conservative nature of the strategy adopted by these firms.

This Chapter has demonstrated that the active pursuit of a strategy of diversification in our period was an important factor in the ability of some case studies not only to survive, but also to grow; and to lay the foundations for sustained growth. It is noticeable that all of the case study organisations that achieved these things, with the particular exception of Bahr Behrend, had diversified significantly into shipowning. The flexible nature of the ship as an economic unit can particularly be seen in tramping operations, where it can be deployed into any trade it is fit to carry. Of

course, owning a shipping line brings its own inflexibilities, such as the commitment to running scheduled services, and to maintaining some form of establishment at both ends of the line. All the same, owning ships gives greater strategic flexibility in changing times than being a specialist agent - the latter being dependent for business on the vagaries of trade bringing their clients' ships to their port. Having been so prominent in the Southern trade at the beginning of the period of this study, the large-volume specialist agent was rapidly receding in significance by its end.

Chapter 5. Commercial Organisation and Networks.

What was the nature of a maritime commercial landscape that was able to adapt to radically changing circumstances as seen in Chapter 4? To examine this question, this chapter will take an overview of the ship agents involved through the period of this study - primarily those of Liverpool. In doing so, we will explore in more detail the relationship of clientage between agents and shipowners, and also assess the importance of institutional arrangements and networks of shipowning and clientage. Firstly, we will take a closer look at Liverpool agents as a whole, to see what sort of firms they were and what they had to offer their shipowning clients.

1. The Role of the Ship Agent.

Almost 350 different individuals and firms, drawn from the Bills of Entry, appear in this study as having acted at least once as ship agents in Liverpool; they are listed in Appendix A. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that they all saw themselves as being exclusively, or even primarily, ship agents. The first thing that emerges from a study of how they advertised themselves is a great diversity of services and combinations thereof - many boasted several. Almost 70 different functions and different combinations of functions have been revealed by examining their advertisements in Gores Liverpool Directory. This exercise is based on the volumes for 1860, 1864 and 1867. Where firms are listed in 1860, the entry for that year has been used; otherwise, the 1867, or failing that, the 1864, entry has been used. In this way, advertisements have been found for 84 percent of these concerns. To make some sense of the variety of functions, these have been consolidated into ten categories and the results are presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. How Firms Acting as Liverpool Ship Agents Advertised Themselves.

Part A. Advertisements including the following functions:

| Function | No. Of Firms | % Of Total | Tonnage Handled | % Of Total |
|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Merchant | 178 | 61 % | 811337 | 83 % |
| Ship Broker | 85 | 29 % | 334588 | 34 % |
| Agent | 34 | 12 % | 174786 | 18 % |
| Ship Owner | 26 | 9 % | 102680 | 10 % |
| Insurance Services | 32 | 11 % | 51571 | 5 % |
| Dealer | 26 | 9 % | 35537 | 4 % |
| Ship Provisions | 17 | 6 % | 22976 | 2 % |
| Limited Company | 3 | 1 % | 17586 | 2 % |
| Freight Forwarding | 4 | 1 % | 4779 | 0 % |
| Master Mariner | 2 | 1 % | 1065 | 0 % |

Part B. Advertisements solely of the following functions:

| Function | No. Of Firms | % Of Total | Tonnage Handled | % Of Total |
|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Merchant | 115 | 40 % | 412949 | 42 % |
| Ship Broker | 27 | 9 % | 50492 | 5 % |
| Agent | 1 | 0 % | 142 | 0 % |
| Ship Owner | 2 | 1 % | 2001 | 0 % |
| Insurance Services | 0 | 0 % | 0 | 0 % |
| Dealer | 20 | 7 % | 28565 | 3 % |
| Ship Provisions | 15 | 5 % | 21330 | 2 % |
| Limited Company | 3 | 1 % | 17586 | 2 % |
| Freight Forwarding | 1 | 0 % | 3353 | 0 % |
| Master Mariner | 2 | 1 % | 1065 | 0 % |
| Totals | 186 | 64 % | 537483 | 55 % |

Source: Database ((Firms - BOE; January 1856, 1858 and 1860, April 1861 to July 1865, January 1866, 1868 and 1870) (Advertisements - Gores; 1860, 1864, 1867)).

Part A shows how many firms included each service in their advertisements, followed by the percentage of total firms that they represented. To weight this with involvement in the Southern trade, tonnage handled by the firms in each category is also shown, followed by the percentage of the whole that that represented.¹ Part B does the same,

¹ The percentages are of total firms for whom advertisements have been found, and the tonnage that they handled, respectively. Advertisements have been found for 84 percent of Liverpool agents falling into this study (291 firms out of 347). Those 291 together handled 92 percent of shipping tonnage in the Liverpool - Southern trade that has been fallen into this study (981,647 tons out of a total of 1,070,311 tons).

except it deals with firms who only advertised one function. Given the duplications arising from functional combinations, overall totals for Part A would be meaningless, and are therefore not shown. Totals are shown for Part B, and we can see there that well over half of the firms advertised only a single function. These single-function firms were less prominent in activity in the Southern trade, handling a little over half of the tonnage.

This finding is misleading because a great majority of the single-function firms advertised themselves as “merchants”, which is likely to have been a general term indicating involvement “in trade” rather than in one specific activity. There is no reason to believe that the term necessarily meant merchanting in the sense of buying and selling goods. It could equally cover trading as a ship agent for instance; we know that all these firms acted as such, therefore if they did deal in commodities then doing so was not their sole activity. Viewed this way, the designation of “merchant” is too vague to be helpful. Probably it disguised a variety of different activities and therefore probably most firms did not just do one thing.

Although all the Table 5.1 firms acted as ship agents, less than one-fifth of the tonnage was handled by firms including this service in their advertisements; only one firm held itself out as solely being an agent. This, and the vagaries of “merchant”, alerts us to the danger of drawing conclusions based on general self-descriptions rather than on actual activity. The case study firms exemplify this. Although all these firms were volume ship agents, only four specifically mentioned the fact out of the

twenty-three for whom advertisements appear in the volumes consulted. The variety of descriptions covered appears in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 How Case Study Agents Advertised Themselves.

| Agent | Trade |
|--|--|
| British & American Steam Navigation Co Ltd | Limited Company |
| Bahr Behrend & Co | Ship Broker |
| Beach Root & Co | Merchant |
| Boult English & Brandon | Merchant & Ship Broker & Commission Agents |
| James Browne & Co | Merchant |
| De Jersey & Co | Merchant |
| Duncan & Shaw | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Fraser Trenholm & Co | Merchant |
| John Glynn & Son | Merchant & Ship Broker & Ship Owner |
| Thomas & James Harrison | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| William Henry Haynes | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Melchor George Klingender & Co | Merchant & Steam Ship Agent |
| Henry Lafone | Merchant |
| Leech Harrison & Forwood | Merchant & Steam Ship Agent |
| Longton & Longrigg | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Miller & Mosman | Merchant |
| John Thomas Nickels | Merchant & Ship Broker & Insurance Agent |
| Pilkington Bros | Merchant |
| Rankin Gilmour & Co | Merchant |
| Taylor Tipper & Co | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| George Warren & Co | Merchant & Steam Ship Agent |
| West India & Pacific Steam Ship Co Ltd | Limited Company |
| John Starr De Wolf & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |

Source: Database (Gores; 1860, 1864 and 1867).

Eight Table 5.2 firms appear solely as merchants, and only the limited companies (for whom no functional advertisement appears), and Bahr Behrend, do not include the designation. This is in spite of the finding in Chapter 4, based on Table 4.9, that evidence is available for only a few of these firms being volume cotton importers. Of course, cotton importing on their part may be hidden by consignment to “order”, and they may have imported or exported other goods. However, subject to these qualifications, this evidence supports a view of “merchant” as being indicative of generally being in business rather than as specifically dealing in goods. James Browne & Co are a good example of these inconsistencies: they have already been shown to have been a very large-volume agent and probably a negligible importer, yet their entry calls them merchants and fails to mention agenting. Similarly, three firms in

Table 5.2 refer to shipowning, but several other known shipowners, such as Harrisons, Klingender, and Rankin Gilmour, do not mention it in their advertisements. A comparison with known activity, then, exposes aspects of these notices as being idiosyncratic rather than strictly accurate.

Nevertheless, this evidence does have something to offer: the specificity of many entries suggests that they should be taken at face value. Foremost amongst these is the occupation of shipbroker. Referring back to Table 5.1 we can see that, although few firms described themselves solely in this way, about a third of the tonnage was handled by firms that at least included the description. Eight Table 5.2 concerns mention shipbroking. This is an important maritime occupation, touched on briefly in chapter 3 concerning the brokers role in matching ships to cargo.

Actually, shipbroking has historically been a much broader occupation, including several maritime services; Edward wrote in detail about these in 1957 and it is probable that the fundamentals were unaltered from a century earlier.² Having defined shipbrokers as essentially maritime agents, he went on to identify a number of areas of that agency. Chartering business, that is to say the matching of ships to cargo, was a central feature. In this, the broker generally acted for the shipowner and the charterer in negotiating the charter party - a contract between the two for the carriage of the charterer's goods in the owner's vessel. Brokers were remunerated by way of a percentage commission related to the owner's freight charges under the contract. Edward also identified the functions of the ship agent outlined in chapter 3 as being

² E.J. Edward, *Shipbrokers and the Law* (Glasgow, 1957).

part of shipbroking: acting for owners without an office in the broker's port they attended to customs and dock formalities, ship provisioning, payment of disbursements and other husbandry needs of the ship. As "loading brokers" they dealt with the other aspect of ship agency mentioned in chapter 3: again, acting for the owner, they would advertise and canvas for outward cargo, book it, and arrange for its loading.³

This provides some explanation for the relative infrequency of "agent" in the advertisements: many would have regarded it as being only one aspect of their advertised shipbroking business. Only fifteen firms included both designations and only one of these, Boulton English & Brandon, handled large volumes of tonnage. Some duplications arise in Part A of Table 5.1 because firms that called themselves both shipbrokers and agents are added into both categories. After consolidating these, we are left with 42 percent of the sample tonnage being handled by firms calling themselves shipbrokers and/or agents. Probably these two designations were interchangeable; taken together they make for a substantial occupational category. Given their involvement in ship agenting, it is likely that many firms that described themselves simply as merchants were also essentially shipbrokers in a broad sense. This could be defined generally as providing in-port maritime agency services to ship owners and shippers of goods alike.

Given the close relation between the functions, it is likely that firms would often act not only as loading brokers in arranging their shipowning clients' outward cargo, but

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-13.

also as brokers in negotiating the charter party with the shipper of the goods (the charterer). In such transactions the shipbroker might also act for the charterer as “shipping and forwarding agent”. In this context, he would book cargo space for the charterer and arrange for the receipt, or onward transmission, of goods on his behalf.⁴ We can see from Table 5.1 that a handful of firms described themselves as forwarders; probably many more acted in this capacity but, again, regarded it as part of the business of shipbroking. Clearly shipbroking in a broad sense could involve acting in a number of different capacities for different types of client; sometimes during the course of the same transaction; sometimes including acting for oneself as client owner or shipper; possibly also acting exclusively for oneself in an entirely in-house transaction.

Also under the shipbroking umbrella, Edward identified three further types of maritime service: booking passengers; acting as agents and/or brokers for the sale and purchase of ships; and acting as ship managers. The latter involved taking all the decisions necessary on an owner’s behalf in the management of his ship and its movements.⁵ From Table 5.1 we can add some more types of maritime business in which some of these firms engaged, although they were separate from shipbroking itself. A minority were involved in the provision of insurance services, but none exclusively so. Descriptions appearing here include, insurance agent or broker, underwriter’s agent and marine insurance agent. Another vital ancillary service to shipping, engaged in by a small number of Table 5.1 firms, was provisioning. Most

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

involved in this advertised it as their sole business, and probably acted as ship agents only as a sideline. This impression is suggested by contrasting the percentage of firms advertising this business, with their much lower percentage of tonnage handled. Within this category a number of specialisations appear: chain and anchor manufacturers, provision merchants, ship chandlers, rope and sailmakers, and ship store dealers.

Another Table 5.1 category where a variety of different types of business is evident is that of dealer, a heading that has been applied to firms advertising dealing, or broking, in particular commodities. Like provisioners, most advertised this as their sole business and, for the same reason, probably only acted as ship agents as a sideline. Within this area fall brokers for the sale of ships, cotton or timber; merchants in timber, coal, iron, tobacco or oils and colours; a ship valuer, and a timber measurer. A tenth of the Table 5.1 tonnage was handled by firms announcing themselves as shipowners, most of whom did not hold that out as their sole business.

What emerges from the foregoing is that the firms under discussion carried on a variety of different types of business, and between them offered a range of important maritime services. Individual firms may have acted just as ship agents, or acted additionally within a wider scope of shipbroking; they may have directly supplied other services such as insurance or provisioning. In terms of what they had to offer to clients who had no Liverpool office, their local market connections would have been as important as how many services they provided themselves. They were in a position

to instruct others to perform whatever services were needed by the client that they did not themselves provide, and to pay for them as disbursements on his behalf.

A more abstract commodity needed by shipowners without their own local establishment is market knowledge. Edward points out that it is the shipbroker's business to be very well informed about market conditions and the movements of ships and goods; particularly in relation to tramping operations where the need to keep the ship continuously employed requires a cargo to be booked outward for an area where a suitable replacement can be found.⁶ Publications like the Bills of Entry would play a role in providing such information, as would communication with local, national and international contacts. Looking at things from the point of view of the British owner using agents at distant ports in the nineteenth century, Boyce has stressed that an agent's value depended on his contacts and market knowledge. The emergence of a long-standing relationship would depend on mutual trust developing out of a successful series of transactions.⁷ This applies equally to the relationship between a foreign owner, or one in say London or Dartmouth, and the agent he instructs to handle his ships in Liverpool.

Simon Ville has identified the provision of market intelligence, and acting as an intermediary with local connections, as vital parts of what an agent in Shields had to offer a London client in the early nineteenth century. James Kirton was retained as local agent for shipowners Michael Henley and Son for about twenty-five years before

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁷ Boyce, *Information*, pp. 28-29.

the mid 1820s. The Henleys were in the coal trade, and Kirton's spot market knowledge and presence was particularly important in view of wartime oscillations in the trade. Ville describes Kirton as acting in all aspects of Henley's business. In handling their ships in Shields he acted for them in relation to their building, repairing, buying and selling, and loading; he also acted as overseer for their masters. Where the Henleys were just the shipper and not the shipowner, Kirton would arrange the chartering of vessels. In all this Kirton often made important decisions on their behalf and extended credit to them by paying their disbursements. The arrangements were reciprocal as Henleys acted in the same way for Kirton's own vessels when they were in London.⁸

Although not fitting directly into the subject trade of this thesis, the Kirton-Henley connection can be seen as a worthwhile illustration of how this kind of relationship worked in the nineteenth century. Ville argues that, as trading methods became more sophisticated but communication remained slow and unreliable, it made sense for most shipowners to rely on a network of agents in the ports visited by their ships.⁹ We can see an inherent flexibility in these arrangements: decision-making by local agents could facilitate the sort of switching of ships from one trade to another, in response to changing circumstances, that we have seen in chapter 4. We saw in that chapter that the ability to switch trades was an important one in adapting to change.

⁸ Simon Ville, "James Kirton, Shipping Agent" *Mariners Mirror* Vol. 67 (1981), pp. 149-162.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

For shipowners who were not maritime professionals, all decision-making concerning the ship's operation would have required delegation. A little earlier it was mentioned that acting as managing agent for vessels can be seen as part of shipbroking in a broad sense. In the second section of this chapter it will be seen that non-professional owners tended to combine in ownership with professionals, to whom the management of the vessel could be entrusted. Where this was not the case it is probable that a professional agent would be retained, in the ship's home port, to act in this way. This leads on to a question which has been addressed by some maritime historians in relation to earlier periods: to what extent were ships owned by maritime professionals as opposed to people whose main occupations lay elsewhere?

Comparison of stated occupations appearing on ship register entries with known activity, and with the equivalent information contained in the directories, indicates that the former source is a good deal less reliable than the latter in this respect. We have seen that the category of merchant is too vague to be helpful and that it certainly cannot be taken necessarily to mean a specifically commercial occupation rather than a maritime one. We have also seen that the category of shipowner is unreliable; more so in relation to the registers, where anyone appearing therein is by definition a shipowner, without that necessarily being their sole or main occupation. About three-quarters of the Southern trade voyage tonnage falling into this study was owned by people who appear on the registers as merchants or shipowners. Only a quarter was owned by people whose given occupations are specific enough to be taken at face value. We know that many partners of firms that acted as ship agents owned ships, yet

the prominent trades that we have seen associated with those firms, such as agent, shipbroker, provisioner, and insurance trader, hardly appear on the registers at all.¹⁰

This means that one can be confident about the occupational profile of only a quarter of the register sample. These problems can be illustrated by reference to some of the case study firms of Table 5.2 whose partners owned ships. In only one such instance does a specifically maritime occupation, apart from shipowner, appear on the register: Longton & Longrigg described themselves as shipbrokers. Partners of nine Table 5.2 firms who owned ships appear on the register simply as merchants; this obscures the fact that all acted as volume ship agents, and five of their firms included the designation of agent or shipbroker in their directory advertisement. For example, Glynn partners are noted on register entries as merchants without any reference to the firm's stated occupation of shipbroker and owner. Harrison partners are sometimes described as merchants and sometimes as shipowners, but the firm's advertised occupation of shipbroker does not appear. John Nickels is noted on the register as just a shipowner, without any reference to his advertised shipbroking or insurance agency business.¹¹

Previous studies of occupational profile, based on London and Liverpool registers, have recognised that difficulties exist with some categories. These surveys focused on the first half of the nineteenth century, and it may be that the designations were more

¹⁰ Database (S.R 1855 to 1870). See Table 2.5 for details of the coverage of the ship register sample. Register occupational detail is known for about half of the British registered voyage tonnage falling into this study. This constitutes about 85 percent of the Southern trade voyage tonnage falling into this study and registered at the sampled ports of Liverpool, London, Glasgow or Hull. "Merchants" owned about 54 percent of the tonnage and "shipowners" about 20 percent.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

useful then. However, they did not test them against activity or directory entries. This must throw doubt upon findings which classify all “merchants” as being primarily involved in commerce and industry, and all “shipowners” as being primarily maritime professionals.¹² In these circumstances such studies cannot really be used as points of comparison.

Knowing what many shipowners actually did, rather than what they said they did, does help us to arrive at a more meaningful occupational analysis than just the use of register categories can provide. This exercise covers owners on the Liverpool register only, because only there have individual shipowners been identified as being partners in trading firms. It is reasonable to regard all shipowning individuals, who were partners in firms known to have acted as ship agents, as maritime professionals. On this basis 60 percent of this study’s Liverpool registered tonnage was owned by such individuals. This includes tonnage owned by limited companies that acted as agents. A further 7 percent was owned by people who appear on the register as having specifically maritime occupations, but who have not been linked to any agenting firm. These were mostly ancillary occupations such as master mariners, shipbuilders, ship chandlers and sailmakers. Twelve percent of the tonnage was owned by people whose registered occupations were demonstratively non-maritime. These include 30 different designations such as, gentleman, gentlewoman, spinster or widow; manufacturers; shopkeepers and dealers in particular commodities; and surgeons, doctors, schoolmasters, engineers and other professionals.¹³

¹² Palmer, *Maritime History*, pp. 54 - 60; Neal, in *Liverpool and Merseyside*, pp. 158 - 164.

¹³ Database ((BOE; Liverpool samples 1856 to 1870, for agents) (Gores; 1860, 1864 and 1867, to identify partners) (S.R Liverpool, 1855 to 1870, for owners and occupations)). Table 2.5 shows that

The conclusion can be drawn that at least 67 percent of relevant tonnage was owned by those who were in maritime occupations, and at least 12 percent was owned by those who were not. This leaves about a fifth of the relevant tonnage being owned by those only known as “merchants” or “shipowners”. If this element is excluded, and the findings are expressed as percentages of the known four-fifths, then maritime occupations account for 85 percent and others for 15 percent. Either way, it does look like Liverpool shipowning in the Southern trade was dominated by maritime professionals.

2. Networks of Ownership and Clientage.

It should be clear from much of what has been said already that most Liverpool interests, acting as ship agents, were either sole traders or small partnerships. Some partnerships were based on one family, such as Glynn or Forward, and some were based on an alliance of two or more families, such as Bahr Behrend or Taylor Tipper. In the absence of widespread archival evidence it is possible only to speculate on the sort of arrangements that commonly governed such organisations. If they operated as partnerships do today, then it is likely that assets were generally those of the business, as an entity, rather than personal chattels of individual partners. Probably, each partner owned a fractional share in the underlying equity - the market value of the business as a whole - and was entitled to share in the same proportion of profits. These matters, and what would happen on the death, retirement or replacement of individuals, would probably be covered by some form of governing document such as a partnership deed. This is indicated by the fact that changes of personnel in some firms occurred without

owners have been traced for 84 percent of sampled Liverpool registered voyage tonnage in the Southern trade. Of that tonnage about 72 percent was owned by “merchants” (61 percent) or “shipowners” (10.5 percent).

the dissolution of the partnerships. It is difficult to see how they could operate effectively, and continue through changes of personnel, without this sort of method of dealing with the variety of assets involved. These would range from tangibles such as office premises and equipment, to intangibles such as “goodwill”, arising from reputation and the possession of an established client base.

On the other hand, shipowning involved one type of asset only, and many ships that were co-owned were not held by partnerships in the above sense. Two forms of co-ownership are apparent from the registers: “joint” and “common”. The former describes individual 64th shares held jointly in a way similar to partnership in the above sense; the latter characterises those held by single individuals in a looser combination which can be described as a syndicate. These forms have not been fully understood by historians who have looked at the registers. Boyce asserted that co-owners in 64ths were “deemed tenants-in-common”.¹⁴ Although the concept of “common” ownership that he went on to outline is valid, the terminology is incorrect because “tenancies” apply only to interests in land.¹⁵ More importantly, he did not describe the “joint” ownership that also existed. Both Jarvis and Palmer mentioned this form but did not fully work through the implications of the differences between the two.¹⁶

¹⁴ Boyce, *Information*, p.27.

¹⁵ R. H. Holland, *Partnership Law and Accounts* (London, 3rd edn., 1946), pp. 6-7.

¹⁶ R. C. Jarvis, “Fractional Shareholding in British Merchant Ships with Special Reference to the 64ths” *Mariners Mirror* Vol. 45 (1959), pp. 301-319; Palmer, *Maritime History*, pp. 49-50.

These historians have correctly explained common ownership as meaning that each owner was free to sell or mortgage his block of 64ths without reference to the others. On his death, the holding passed into his estate for his executors to sell, or transfer to his heirs. To give an illustration, five individuals held blocks of 64ths in the brig *Sulina*: one held 8/64ths, two had 12/64ths each, and two 16/64ths each. One of them, Jonathan Caddy, died in April 1862. Probate was granted to his executors, who included his widow and solicitor, and his share - being 8/64ths - was then registered in their names and passed into his estate to be held for his heirs.¹⁷

In legal terms, common ownership such as this does not constitute a partnership.¹⁸ Sixty-fourths were being held here as the personal chattels of individuals rather than as continuing assets of a business. One part-owner had no formal control over the other parts, and no formal control over whom his co-owners were to be. Through sale, mortgage, bankruptcy or inheritance, part shares could devolve to people with whom he had no other association. In this respect common ownership bears more similarity to shareholding in a limited company than to a true partnership.¹⁹ A useful analogy might be to think in terms of the horse racing syndicate, to which common ownership also applies: capital is raised from a variety of people who are not necessarily connected by family or business ties and who are not necessarily turf professionals. They entrust the actual management of the syndicate to owners who are professionals; just as some shipowners would entrust it to managing agents.

¹⁷ S.R Liverpool; 83/10/61.

¹⁸ *Chorley & Giles Shipping Law* (London, 1947), p.4 - 6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Joint owners, on the other hand, jointly held all of a given number of 64th shares. Legally, however, each 64th remained undivided and therefore could not be sold or mortgaged without the acquiescence of all its joint owners.²⁰ Another consequence of indivisibility was that, on the death of an owner, his interest did not pass into his estate for his heirs, but instead devolved, by “survivorship”, to the remaining co-owners. Some illustrations would be useful here. Before his death in June 1870, Robert Rankin held all of the 64th shares in the *Adept* and the *Advance*, on the Glasgow register, jointly with Alan Gilmour - his Glasgow partner in Rankin Gilmour & Co. On his death, these interests passed to Gilmour by survivorship and he subsequently disposed of both ships as sole owner.²¹ Similarly, John S. De Wolf jointly held all the 64ths of the *Tiger* with his De Wolf & Co partner James R. De Wolf, who became sole owner by survivorship on John’s death in 1874. Another De Wolf ship demonstrates that joint ownership could also apply to shares of less than 64/64ths and could co-exist with common ownership: the De Wolfs jointly owned 48/64ths in the *Charleston*, whilst the remaining 16/64ths were solely owned by one Daniel Burns.²² In this case, the De Wolfs held their shares jointly, but together were in a position of common ownership with Burns in relation to the ship as a whole.

It will become clear during the course of this section that joint ownership was often selected by people who, like Rankin and Gilmour or the De Wolfs, were already business partners. It can be inferred that this legal form was designed to integrate shipowning interests into a business as part of its continuing assets. Joint ownership

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ S.R Glasgow; *Adept*, 17/100/55, *Advance* 17/10/56.

²² S.R Liverpool; *Tiger*, 89/224/68, *Charleston*, 88/233/67.

achieved this by preventing independent alienation, even on death. Thus, such interests belonged to a business rather than being chattels of individual partners. This is illustrated in the above examples by the fact that, after the deaths of their respective co-owners, both Gilmour and De Wolf disposed of their interests to further joint combinations of their own business partners. These transactions look like internal reorganisations rather than arms-length sales.

In the absence of widespread documentation it is possible only to speculate about the sort of internal arrangements that commonly governed partnership assets and equitable shares. However, given that joint shares passed by survivorship on death, a need can be seen for an additional mechanism to be created to compensate the deceased's heirs for the interest not passing into his estate. This could be achieved by the joint owners declaring that they held the 64ths as trustees for themselves as equitable owners. The trust could provide that, on death, a given share in the underlying equity - the market value of the interest - would pass into the deceased's estate in lieu of legal ownership of the 64ths themselves. Joint ownership, coupled with trust arrangements, would have the additional advantage of escaping the obvious difficulties of division of the 64ths system: the trust could stipulate the proportions in which equity was held, which could be whatever proportions one chose. Those proportions might well be the same as those in which partners shared the equity of the business as a whole, and which would reflect their respective capital contributions. It is possible that some sole owners of 64ths held them as trustees for partners or others; one person could be nominated to act in this way. Some joint owners could have held 64ths as trustees for all of their business partners. Consequently the equitable interests, and net operating

profits or losses, would pass into the partnership books, to be dealt with in accordance with the sort of governing deed, or other arrangement, mentioned at the start of this section.

Such devices would not be apparent from the register entries because equitable interests - those arising under trusts - were debarred by statute from being noted there.²³ In our earlier example of common ownership, Jonathan Caddy's 8/64ths share in the *Sulina* was registered to his executors as joint owners after his death. In this, they were acting as trustees of his will, and the underlying equitable interests of the will beneficiaries do not appear on the register. This sort of system, like the modern land register, is designed to facilitate transactions by being proof of the legal title of those registered, such as the Caddy executors, and therefore of those with whom a purchaser can conclusively deal. Broadly speaking, underlying equitable arrangements - such as the interests of Caddy's heirs - are not the concern of someone entering a transaction with a registered owner.

We do not know how common it was for interests in ships to be held on trust for equitable beneficiaries, but it is clear from the above that partnerships may well have employed trust devices to deal with ship equity as part of their business as a whole. There is also the possibility that individual owners of 64ths may have acted as trustees or nominees for more complex groupings. Ship registers could therefore conceal much more complexity in terms of ownership and capitalisation patterns than is apparent on the surface; not out of any sinister desire to conceal, but simply from legal practicality.

²³ *Chorley & Giles Shipping Law*, p.6.

In any event, joint ownership of 64ths can be seen as signifying true partnership in the sense of representing continuing business assets. Here, shipowning is regarded as an integrated business, or as an integral part of a wider maritime business, rather than as a sideline. A ship owned in this way could be bought, sold or mortgaged, and deployed, as part of the strategy of the business as a whole, instead of just to serve the short term profit demands of her owners. Conversely, confining shipowning to immediate associates in this way might result in an inadequate capital base. Investors from outside immediate business and family circles might wish to keep their 64ths as personal property, instead of being bound into a wider shipping enterprise. The syndicate nature of common ownership could thus be useful for accommodating wider investment, but at the cost of loss of control of part shares.

After 1855, the vehicle of the limited company could accommodate both of these perhaps conflicting objectives. On the one hand, all assets are those of a continuing business and can be managed in accordance with overall strategy; on the other, wide investment participation is possible through shareholdings which remain the owners personal property. Of course there is also the benefit of limited liability. In spite of this, there was no rush in the Southern trade of our period to abandon traditional forms in favour of corporate ones. Only six percent of all the voyage tonnage falling into this study, where ownership has been traced, was owned by companies. Most of this was held by only two organisations: the West India and Pacific and the British and American.²⁴

²⁴ Database ((BOE, 1856 to 1870 samples) (S.R 1855 to 1870)). See Table 2.5 for coverage of the ownership exercise.

One obvious explanation for this is that traditional structures continued to be generally regarded as adequate in this period. Subject to the qualification that ownership was probably more dispersed than it seems, it does not look like older forms were becoming difficult to manage as a result of multiple ownership. Actually, ships responsible for over half of relevant voyage tonnage (51 percent), were wholly owned by single individuals. Ships responsible for a further 12 percent were wholly owned jointly; almost all such groups contained just two or three members. The remaining 37 percent represented ships commonly owned. But here a majority of combinations were of three or less individuals or joint groups; only 10 percent of overall relevant tonnage had more than three such owners. With these commonly owned ships, joint groups were very much a minority element, accounting for only five percent of overall tonnage. Steam was a spur to corporate ownership: all of the tonnage held by companies was in this category; but this represented only 16 percent of overall steam tonnage, with almost half (47 percent) still being owned by single individuals.²⁵

Having discussed these forms of ownership in general terms, we can now explore them further by focusing upon particular arrangements, mainly those adopted by the case study organisations. A range of different structures are evident. At one end were integrated concerns that fully owned all the ships in which they had an interest, always acted as Liverpool agent for those ships, and only acted as agent for their own vessels. At the other extreme were organisations that show no evidence of shipowning, and that appear dependent upon external shipowning clients for their business. In-between, a variety of different arrangements were adopted. In the third section of this chapter

²⁵ *Ibid.*

this theme will be taken further by an examination of how important institutional arrangements were as a factor in business survival and growth in the period.

Meanwhile, the following discussion will also develop several other themes concerning the relationship between maritime businesses and shipowning. It is inherent throughout much of this thesis that many ship agents maintained established networks of shipowning clients; we will show that shipowners did tend to retain a particular agent in a particular port. The role of managing agents has been mentioned and it will be seen that co-ownerships tended to include maritime professionals whose firms acted as agent, and almost certainly also as manager, for the vessel. A point that follows from this will also be illustrated: firms tended to act as home port agent for ships which they owned, or in which they had an interest. It will also become clear that, in some instances, wider networks of reciprocal commercial connections can be identified.

We have seen that many of the case study firms of group 1 - that is the top ten agents by volume in the antebellum Southern trade samples - do not appear to have been shipowners, at least not on the British registers consulted. They acted mainly for overseas, particularly American, shipowning clients, the identities of whom we do not know. In view of their continuities of involvement with ships of particular nationalities, it would be surprising if each did not have a portfolio of specific clients for whom they acted repeatedly; but without further information we cannot be sure of this. All that can be said about the relationship of these businesses to shipowning is that it appears to have been exclusively one of agent and client. These comments

apply to James Browne & Co; Boulton English & Brandon; Duncan & Shaw; Miller & Mossman; and Pilkington Bros.

Much the same is true of Taylor Tipper & Co (also of group 1) except that partners of the firm have been traced as having interests in a sailing ship named *Ivanhoe*. Here is an example of maritime business partners owning shares jointly: George Taylor and William Tipper of the firm held 32/64ths in this way on acquisition in June 1868. They looked outside their own partnership for additional capitalisation: 16/64ths were owned by a Montreal merchant named John Gordon Mackenzie; 8/64ths were owned by Thomas Redish Bower, a partner in the Liverpool firm of J. B. Livesay, general merchants;²⁶ and 8/64ths were owned jointly by Samuel Cearns and Aaron Brown. The latter were partners in the Liverpool wine merchanting firm of Cearns & Brown.²⁷ This illustrates that it was not just maritime firms that held shipping interests as business assets.²⁸

Taylor Tipper & Co agented the *Ivanhoe* on her Liverpool appearances. It is likely that, as the only maritime professional owners, the firm also acted as managing agent for the vessel. This is a good example of a network of ownership with a maritime firm at its centre. Taylor Tipper later extended the network by way of two transactions made on the same day in December 1869, which bear the characteristics of internal reorganisation. By these, eight of their 64ths were transferred to the joint ownership of Taylor and a Liverpool "merchant" named Thomas Banks; a further eight were

²⁶ Gores, 1867 p. 57.

²⁷ Gores, 1860, pp. 41, and 52.

²⁸ S.R Liverpool, 89/106/68 (*Ivanhoe*).

transferred to the joint ownership of Tipper and William Leigh Clare, a partner in the cotton broking business of William Clare & Sons.²⁹ Quite possibly, Taylor and Tipper were acting respectively as nominees for their business in these arrangements, to which some kind of trust probably applied. This can be seen as a way of raising further capital from investors outside the business, whilst retaining some measure of control over the assets involved.

Two other members of case study group 1, Train & Co and George Warren & Co, did own the ships of their own Liverpool/Boston White Diamond line. This study has, however, only investigated the registers for ships operating in the Southern trade. Accordingly, we do not know the patterns of ownership involved, but we can say that they acted both as Liverpool agent for their own ships and for those of others. One client stands out as providing evidence for the earlier contention that owners tended to retain a given agent in a given port. A Liverpool shipbroker named John Alfred Marsh, mentioned previously as an entrepot trade shipowner in Table 4.19, owned the sailing barque *Herbert*. She shuttled between Liverpool and Matamoros between late 1863 and early 1865, and, on each of her five appearances in Liverpool, Warren & Co acted as her agent. There is no evidence that Marsh instructed any Liverpool agent other than Warren.³⁰

A highly integrated relationship between shipowning and agenting existed in the case of Rankin Gilmour & Co. All their Southern trade ships traced on the Glasgow

²⁹ *Ibid*; Gores, 1860 p. 55.

³⁰ Gores, 1860 p. 176; Database (*BOE*, July 1863 to February 1865); S.R Liverpool, 84/184/61 (*Herbert*)

register were held jointly by Liverpool partner Robert Rankin senior and Glasgow partner Alan Gilmour.³¹ Those traced on the Liverpool register were held solely by Rankin.³² Those held on the London register were held solely by London partner William Strang.³³ These coincidences suggest that they were acting as nominees for the business as a whole in relation to ships listed on their local register. Earlier, mention was made of Glasgow ships passing by survivorship to Gilmour on Rankin's death in 1870. Two of the firm's ships traced in this study were still held in 1874, both on the Glasgow register. In that year a reorganisation was effected: Gilmour transferred both the *Adept* and the *Advance* into the joint ownership of Liverpool partners Robert Rankin junior and John Rankin, and London partner William Strang. These do not look like arms-length transactions, and again suggest partners appearing on the register as nominees for the business as a whole.

All but one of the Rankin Gilmour & Co ships appear in this study as having visited Liverpool at least once; on every visit the firm acted as agent. The only recorded London visit of Strang's *Eliza Mary* was in July 1861, when the London office, Gilmour & Co, acted as agent. There is no evidence of the firm acting as agent for any vessels that were not its own, although they have been recorded as acting once each for three other vessels where ownership has not been traced. The evidence indicates that this firm integrated their maritime business in-house: they owned all the ships for which they acted as agents, and they did not act for ships that they did not own.³⁴

³¹ S.R Glasgow; *Adept* 17/100/55, *Advance* 17/10/56, *Ailsa* 17/8/56, *Arthur* 17/1/56, *Illustrious* 17/68/57.

³² S.R Liverpool; *Eleanor* 81/31/57, *Trenton* 83/55/60, *Henry Cooke* BT 108/40/55.


³³ S.R London; *Eliza Mary* 52/36/57, *Zetland* 52/335/56.

³⁴ Database (*BOE*; January 1856, 1858, and 1860, April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870).

The only member of case study group 1 that has not yet been touched upon in the present context is Fraser Trenholm & Co. They were, of course, also the leading member of group 2 - the top ten agents by volume in the wartime entrepot trade - and it is appropriate to deal with them as part of the discussion of that group. Chapter 4 characterised four members of this group as wartime opportunists. To some extent their activities have been found to have been interconnected. Figure 5.1 represents their activities and identifies the interconnections. A glance at this Figure reveals that Fraser Trenholm, Klingender, and Lafone fit into the wider picture shown more clearly than Beach Root, whose presence is peripheral. It can also be seen that Edward Lawrence & Co, another important entrepot trade firm, has been found to fit into this picture to some extent.

It is not intended to assert that those appearing in Figure 5.1 were linked into a common enterprise. It is, however, intended to show that in some cases they had mutual commercial connections, and that sometimes those connections were with each other. The Figure arranges various shipowners and agents around the core group of Liverpool firms. The lines link shipowners to the agents that they instructed to act for their ships; the arrows point to the agent. Agency is used in two senses here: mainly to denote the particular function of ship agent; sometimes to denote the function of attorney appointed to act in relation to sales of ships. Sometimes the linkages also include mutual co-ownership of vessels; where this is the case arrows appear at both ends of the linkage line. These matters should become clearer as, following the Figure, we discuss the relationships shown.

Figure 5.1. Wartime Opportunists: Networks of Ownership and Clientage.



Source: Database ((BOE, April 1861 to July 1865 - for ship agenting) (S.R, 1855 to 1870 - for shipowning) (Gores, 1860, 1864 and 1867 - for linkages between individual owners and firms).

Nearest to the centre of the Figure 5.1 network was Fraser Trenholm & Co; more particularly the office's managing partner, Charles Kuhn Prioleau. The firm's Confederate connections and major role in the whole business of Confederate export and supply have been outlined in chapter 4. Prioleau has been traced as owning three vessels that between them sailed to or from Liverpool in the entrepot trade six times between late 1863 and early 1865.³⁵ Fraser Trenholm acted as Liverpool agent for each voyage. Although the firm's activities were integrated in-house from this point of view, its substantial wartime agency business consisted mostly of acting for other shipowning clients. A number of these instructed Fraser Trenholm to act only once, and so a pattern of repeat business cannot be established; but several employed the

³⁵ S.R Liverpool; *Albert* 84/318/61, *Helen* 84/5/62, *Owl* 86/325/64.

firm's services repeatedly, and have not been traced in this study as having employed any other Liverpool agent.

Amongst these was Richard George Bushby, who can be seen in Figure 5.1 on the top right hand side, and who emerged as a major entrepot trade shipowner in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. Fraser Trenholm acted as Liverpool agent for all 14 of his ships' voyages shown in those Tables. These were made between January 1862 and Bushby's death in September 1863, by six vessels in his ownership.³⁶ Bushby, who incidentally was Vice Consul for the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, was a partner with Jacob Willink in the Liverpool firm of Willink & Bushby.³⁷ This firm advertised itself as merchants and insurance agents, and it acted as Liverpool agent for vessels owned by others in the entrepot trade. This demonstrates that not all partners in maritime firms integrated their shipowning into the business: Bushby kept his own shipowning enterprise separate from the wider business that he carried on with Willink.

Another regular Fraser Trenholm client was the Liverpool shipowning partnership of Armstrong and Gerard that has been listed in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. Fraser Trenholm acted as Liverpool agent for seven wartime voyages made by their ships, before and after the establishment of the blockade.³⁸ There is no sign of them employing any other agent, and John Armstrong later joined Prioleau as a Fraser Trenholm partner. Liverpool shipbuilders Jones Quiggin & Co also employed Fraser Trenholm as agents

³⁶ S.R Liverpool; *Albert* 84/318/61, *Economist* 84/327/61, *Ella* 84/328/61, *Fanny Lewis* 84/39/62, *Helen* 84/5/62, *Julie Usher* 84/77/62.

³⁷ *Gores*, 1860 pp. 45, and 279.

³⁸ S.R Liverpool; *Eliza Bonsall* 83/44/61, *Gondar* 83/25/61, *Susan G Owens* 83/2/61.

for the outward voyages of three blockade running steamers that they had built in 1864. The *Badger* and the *Fox* were held by Josiah Jones the younger, and the *Hope* by William Quiggin; both partners of the shipbuilding firm.³⁹ Again, there is no trace of them instructing any other Liverpool agent.

Jones Quiggin & Co were in the business of building ships, not of operating blockade runners; they made use of Fraser Trenholm's foreign connections to sell these vessels soon after their arrivals at entrepot. We encountered John B. Lafitte in chapter 4 as the Nassau agent of Fraser Trenholm's Charleston parent office, John Fraser & Co. All three Jones Quiggin steamers departed Liverpool with certificates of sale that empowered Lafitte to arrange for their sale at any port outside the U.K within six months. He was expected to raise at least £20,000 each on the *Badger* and *Fox*, and at least £40,000 on the *Hope*. We do not know what prices he secured but can say that sales were quickly made.⁴⁰

Fraser Trenholm may have played a broking role in these transactions, and it is likely that they also acted in this way in relation to the disposal of the fleet of their client, Richard Bushby. The steamships *Economist* and *Julie Usher* were both sold in 1862 on certificates of sale given to Fraser Trenholm connections: the former certificate was given to George A. Trenholm and Theodore D. Wagner of Fraser & Co in Charleston; the latter to Trenholm, Wagner and also Lafitte.⁴¹ When Bushby died on

³⁹ S.R Liverpool, *Badger* 86/132/64, *Fox* 86/170/64, *Hope* 86/259/64; *Gores*, 1860 pp. 142, and 214.

⁴⁰ S.R Liverpool; *Badger* 86/132/64, *Fox* 86/170/64, *Hope* 86/259/64.

⁴¹ S.R Liverpool; *Economist* 84/327/61, *Julie Usher* 84/77/62.

25 September 1863, Prioleau himself purchased two ships from the estate.⁴² This is an example of ships being owned as personal chattels, not as business assets: Bushby's partner, Jacob Willink, acted as his Executor, but was holding the vessels as a trustee for the heirs, not for the business. A further ship was bought from the estate by M.G. Klingender, who can be seen in Figure 5.1 to have also had Fraser Trenholm links.⁴³

One such link was that Klingender and Fraser Trenholm had a mutual client in Edwin Haigh of cotton brokers T. Haigh & Co.⁴⁴ Both acted as Liverpool agents for his ships: Fraser Trenholm once each for the *Bermuda* and the *Bahama*, and Klingender once for the *Bahama*. Haigh must have also been in contact with Fraser Trenholm's foreign connections because the *Bermuda* cleared Liverpool with a certificate empowering Trenholm in Charleston to sell on his behalf, although no sale took place.⁴⁵ Klingender was also briefly connected with Haigh in common ownership of the sailing barque *Lady of the Lake*. He sold a part share to Haigh and his cotton broking partners, Reginald Haigh and Alexander E. Ramsey, in March 1865, although she was lost a few months later. There was also a purely arms-length connection: Klingender sold the *Montgomery* to Haigh in December 1864, and the *Annandale* jointly to Haigh and his partners in March 1865.⁴⁶

Figure 5.1 shows that Klingender was also connected more directly to Fraser Trenholm. His steamer *Gladiator* was mortgaged jointly to Prioleau and one of his

⁴² S.R Liverpool; *Albert* 84/318/61, *Helen* 84/5/62.

⁴³ S. R Liverpool; *Ella* 84/328/61.

⁴⁴ *Gores*, 1860 p. 110.

⁴⁵ S.R Liverpool; *Bahama* 84/47/62, *Bermuda* 84/166/61.

⁴⁶ S.R Liverpool; *Annandale* 83/208/60, *Lady of the Lake* 85/419/63, *Montgomery* 83/110/60.

American partners, James T. Welsman. The sum of £13,000 - plus interest at 5 percent per annum - was secured, and a week after the mortgage was discharged in November 1863 the vessel was sold to Prioleau.⁴⁷ Presumably Fraser Trenholm's charge on the vessel explains the fact that it was they, and not M.G. Klingender & Co, that acted as Liverpool agent on three of the five transatlantic voyages she has been traced as making in 1862 and 1863. One of those voyages was handled by another Fraser Trenholm contact, Henry Lafone, and Klingender & Co only acted as agent on one of this vessel's appearances in Liverpool. Additionally, Fraser Trenholm acted once as Liverpool agent for Klingender's *Bonita*.

These instances were exceptional because Klingender & Co generally acted as agent for ships in which Klingender himself had an interest. The firm did so for all 29 other Liverpool voyage appearances that we have traced for his vessels. Conversely, Haigh's *Bahama* is the only known instance of the firm acting for a vessel in which Klingender himself did not have an interest - although the firm did handle several vessels the ownership of which has not been traced. Chapter 4 described how, to a small degree, Klingender owned ships in common with Peter Schenter and Horace Chapman, who were not his business partners. These relationships are represented in Figure 5.1. Taking all these matters into consideration, the Klingender operation can be seen as having been fairly integrated in terms of the relationship between shipowning and ship agenting; certainly much more so than that of Fraser Trenholm, which mostly handled the vessels of others.

⁴⁷ S. R. Liverpool, *Gladiator* 84/161/62.

The Lafone operation was different again from that of both Fraser Trenholm and Klingender & Co. Lafone was sole registered owner of his vessels, but had some form of shipowning partnership with the Importing and Exporting Company of Georgia. On the register he must have been acting as trustee for this partnership. The firm of H. Lafone handled most Liverpool appearances of his vessels. However, Fraser Trenholm was employed on the outward journeys of the runners *Let Her B* and *Let Her Rip*, prior to their sales mentioned in chapter 4. Both cleared Liverpool with certificates of sale given to Archibald Johnston of Charleston.⁴⁸ He was president of the Importing and Exporting Company of South Carolina to which the steamers were sold, and one of the partners in John Fraser & Co was a backer of the company.⁴⁹ It may be that Fraser Trenholm acted as agent because they were broking these sales through their own contacts.

The firm of H. Lafone acted for the vessels of several external clients in addition to its own. In fact, a little over two thirds of the ships the firm handled were owned by others. A pattern of repeat business is evident in relation to Carr & Hoare and Charles Edward Dixon; both of whom can be seen on the left hand side of Figure 5.1. The former appeared in Table 4.19 and the latter in Table 4.20. In 1864 Lafone was agent for two Liverpool calls made by the steamer *Powerful*, and one by the steamer *Mavrocordatos*: both were owned jointly by George Bowness Carr and John William Hoare of Fenchurch Street in London.⁵⁰ Lafone also handled both voyages, made in

⁴⁸ S.R Liverpool; *Let Her B* 86/128/64, *Let Her Rip* 86/213/64.

⁴⁹ Wise, *Lifeline*, p. 115.

⁵⁰ S.R London; *Mavrocordatos* 56/317/63, *Powerful* 56/359/63.

the same year, of Dixon's steamer *Melitia*.⁵¹ Neither owner has been traced in this study as employing any other Liverpool agent.

Edward Lawrence & Co generally acted as agent for their own ships in Liverpool but on two occasions during the war they entrusted this to Lafone. This was true of the clearances from Liverpool of the *Despatch* and the *Night Hawk*, both owned by Lawrence & Co partners. Lawrence & Co has been mentioned several times before in this study as an important participant in the entrepot trade, whether as cotton importers in Table 4.9, as entrepot trade shipowners in Table 4.20, or as one of the most prominent British owners of blockade runners in Table 4.21. They also register in 24th place as entrepot trade agents in the list underlying Table 4.5, handling around one percent of total voyage tonnage. This firm is the employer that Thomas Taylor, who is shown as their Nassau agent in Figure 5.1, was too coy to name in his famous memoirs.⁵² The firm's activities in other trades have not been sampled and therefore it cannot definitely be placed in the wartime opportunist group. But its degree of commitment, particularly to blockade running, suggests that its fortunes were closely tied to those of the Confederacy at this time.

The firm's partners were John Toulmin Lawrence and Edward Lawrence and all its ships, that have been traced, were either owned solely by John or jointly owned between them.⁵³ It is not apparent why they used Lafone as agent for the clearances

⁵¹ S. R Liverpool; *Melitia* 85/471/63.

⁵² Taylor, *Running*, p. 1.

⁵³ Gores, 1860 p. 154; S.R Liverpool, *Astoria* 84/123/62, *Despatch* 84/132/62, *Night Hawk* 86/355/64, *Wild Dayrell* 85/450/63; S.R Glasgow, *Stormy Petrel* 21/105/64, *Wild Rover* 21/93/64, *Will o' the Wisp* 20/116/63.

mentioned above, but plainly the two firms had mutual connections. Both sold steamers left over after the war through certificates of sale given to John Moore Glover of Rio de Janeiro.⁵⁴ It can be seen from Figure 5.1 that both retained the Glasgow agent J. Wilkie, listed as a wartime agent in Table 4.17, to act for their ships in that port. Wilkie handled two Lawrence ships, *Stormy Petrel* and *Will o' the Wisp*, as they left Glasgow for their blockade running bases. At least four of the six Lafone ships that did the same were also handled by Wilkie. These were *Florie*, *Lilian*, *Mary Bowers* and *Emma Henry*. It is not known who acted for the other two, *Mary Anne* and *Susan Beirne*, but it is likely that it was Wilkie.

An occasional client of Lafone, Manchester shipowner Edward James Lomnitz, also instructed Wilkie to handle at least one of his three blockade runners that cleared for base from Glasgow; another was handled by a different firm and the agent is unknown in the case of the third.⁵⁵ Lomnitz was one of the most successful British blockade running owners (see Table 4.21) and his place in the Figure 5.1 scheme can be seen in the top left hand corner. His fourth runner cleared Liverpool for base in October 1863, and Lafone acted as agent in this instance.⁵⁶ After this Lomnitz began his association with Beach Root & Co in Liverpool, discussed in the context of that firm's activities in chapter 4. In May and November 1864, respectively, he acquired 16/64ths each in the Beach Root sailing barques *Western Belle* and *Sunnyside*.⁵⁷ Beach Root handled the clearance of Lomnitz's steamer *Georgia Belle* from Liverpool in December 1864;

⁵⁴ S.R Glasgow, *Susan Beirne* 21/144/64, *Wild Rover* 21/93/64.

⁵⁵ S.R Glasgow, *Beatrice* 21/76/64, *Julia* 21/136/63, *Spunkie* 20/59/63.

⁵⁶ S.R Liverpool, *Lucy* 85/412/63.

⁵⁷ S.R Liverpool, *Western Belle* 86/136/64, *Sunnyside* 86/421/64.

a vessel intended for blockade running but which never did so. She was transferred to the joint ownership of Lomnitz and Beach in early April 1865 and it is possible that Lomnitz became a partner in the firm at some stage.⁵⁸

Beach Root & Co is the last case study firm of Figure 5.1 the institutional arrangements of which have not yet been discussed. The firm acted as agent for all seven of its own vessels, as described in chapter 4, when they were in Liverpool. The only exception was for one voyage of the *Architect* in October 1863, which was probably before the firm had entered the agenting business. Beach Root only handled two vessels in which its partners did not have an interest. There was the clearance of Lomnitz's *Georgia Belle* already mentioned, and the arrival of a sailing barque owned by William Wallace Bruce of Liverpool in August 1864.⁵⁹ The scarcity of external lines of connection radiating around Beach Root in Figure 5.1 illustrates that the firm had the highest degree of in-house integration of maritime activities amongst the case studies of this group.


A different network can be seen in Figure 5.2 to centre around John Glynn & Son, also members of the case study group of the leading agents of the wartime entrepot trade. Whereas Figure 5.1 illustrated a mainly Liverpool nexus, Figure 5.2 also includes patterns of connection with London interests. In Figure 5.2, London agents are shown in the central box, and mutual shipowning clients appear on the left. The

⁵⁸ S.R Liverpool, *Georgia Belle* 86/523/64.

⁵⁹ S.R Liverpool, *Hamilton* 85/205/63.

Glynn's shipowning associates appear on the right, where arrows at both ends of the linkage lines indicate connection through ownership.

Figure 5.2. John Glynn & Son: Network of Ownership and Clientage.



Source: Database ((BOE, April 1861 to July 1865 - for ship agenting) (S.R, 1855 to 1870 - for shipowning) (Gores, 1860, 1864 and 1867 - for linkages between individual owners and firms).

It can be observed that Glynn's shipowning arrangements were more complex than most encountered so far. Of eight ships where a Glynn interest has been traced, none had exactly the same configuration of ownership. Common, rather than joint, arrangements were the rule even where the firm's partners were themselves involved. Only two vessels were entirely owned by Glynn partners: senior partner Edward Dashper Glynn was sole owner of the *Chance*; he also held half of the *Zegri*, with his sons Dashper Edward and Walter owning a quarter each. The Glynn interest in four other vessels amounted to only half. Edward Dashper had that half in the *Zigzag*, the *Zygia* and the *Zampa*. The Glynn stake in the *Zoroga* was split as to one quarter for

Edward Dashper and one-eighth for each of his sons. It is not hard to see why the firm acquired the “Z line” nickname mentioned in chapter 4. The firm also had a majority stake of 40/64ths in the *Zitella* and a minority interest of 21/64ths in the *Mary Garland*, both being registered to Edward Dashper.⁶⁰

It is not clear whether the partners were acting as nominees for the business or holding 64ths as purely personal chattels, although the irregularity of their arrangements and the absence of joint ownership would perhaps indicate the latter. This business was, however, integrated to the extent that the firm acted as Liverpool agent for every known appearance in the port of these vessels; almost certainly it also acted as ship manager. It can be seen on the right hand side of Figure 5.2 that Glynn partners combined in shipowning syndicates with a number of individuals who were not their business partners. Some they employed as master mariners. Several resided outside Liverpool, including the West Country; a connection alluded to in chapter 4. Each syndicate was unique to each vessel, dispositions that strike one as constituting an ad hoc patchwork of relations within and outside the firm.

The half share in the *Zigzag* not owned by the Glynnns was divided between John Brooking (16), John Johnston (8), Joseph Woodall (4), and Anthony Jones (4). The latter three appear again in respect of the *Zampa*, where this time they held an eighth each; the other eighth not held by the Glynnns was owned by William John Priest. Both Priest and Brooking were master mariners, though not of the vessels in which they had

⁶⁰ S.R Liverpool: *Chance* 85/181/63, *Mary Garland* 85/356/62, *Zampa* 85/88/63, *Zegri* 83/41/60, *Zigzag* 82/159/58, *Zitella* 85/300/63, *Zoroga* 86/445/64, *Zygia* 84/227/62.

shares. Thomas Richard Fox was, however, master of the *Zoroga* in which he held 12/64ths; the other non-Glynn shares in her belonged to Johnston (4), and Edward Crosfield (16). Fox resided at Plymouth and the non-Glynn half of the *Zygia* belonged to another West Countryman, John Brokenshaw of Fowey. A Southwest connection can also be seen in relation to the *Mary Garland*, where the minority Glynn holding was supplemented by 21/64ths belonging to James Garland, a Cardigan mine owner, and 21/64ths owned by Robert James of Newlyn, the vessel's master. Finally, the Glynn's majority share in the *Zitella* was completed by 16/64ths owned by Crosfield and 8/64ths owned by her master, Francis H. Priest of Greenwich.⁶¹

Of these individuals, only Brokenshaw has been traced as having an interest in any other vessel. He owned the brig *Christina Carnall* for which Glynn & Son acted as Liverpool agent on two occasions.⁶² The bulk of Glynn's agenting business did consist of acting for clients' ships as opposed to their own, and this brings us to the London connections mentioned earlier. Charles Rudd Tatham, who must have been a partner in the London firm of Tatham & Co appearing in Figure 5.2, held interests in a number of vessels on the London register that were active in the entrepot trade.⁶³ Glynn acted as agent on six out of nine recorded occasions when Tatham vessels were in Liverpool; Tatham & Co acted all thirteen times that they were in London. Tatham & Co has been previously noted at Table 4.17 as one of the leading London agents in the entrepot trade. Although their clients are not strictly relevant to the

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² S.R Liverpool, *Christina Carnall* 83/158/60.

⁶³ S.R London, *Aurora* 56/338/63, *Harkaway* 52/16/58, *Kate* 52/286/56, *Nancy Dawson* 51/286/55, *Queen of the Clippers* 56/78/63, *Quiver* 52/277/57; T.S London, *Elizabeth Tatham* 108/5/64.

Glynn nexus, a few for whom they acted regularly can be seen in the bottom left hand corner of Figure 5.2. Of these, Francis Muir merits a particular mention because he has been shown in Table 4.21 as the most important British owner of blockade runners.⁶⁴ Tatham & Co handled all eight of his runners as they cleared London, bound for their base in Nassau.

Referring back to Table 4.17, Joshua Worley, the other London firm shown in Figure 5.2, was the leading London agent in the entrepot trade. Both Worley and Glynn acted for the various mutual London clients that owned the vessels listed in the top left hand box shown in the Figure. For example, the small sailing schooners *Emulous* and *Prospero* made a number of round trips in 1862 between London and Nassau, for which Worley acted as London agent. In early 1863, these schooners switched from returning to the capital with Bahamian goods, and instead made for Liverpool with Confederate cotton. The Glynnns subsequently handled ten out of twelve wartime Liverpool entries or clearances that they made. Although otherwise owned by different individuals, a London master mariner, Joseph Blyth, held minority 64ths in both schooners. Being the only clearly maritime professional owner, apart from the vessel's own masters, Blyth probably acted as ship manager. Possibly, Worley recommended to Blyth that he employ Glynn & Son to act in Liverpool. Similar stories to those of the *Emulous* and *Prospero* apply to the other vessels listed in the relevant Figure 5.2

⁶⁴ S.R London, *Ceres* 56/410/63, *Dee* 56/330/63, *Don* 56/254/63, *Hansa* 56/200/63, *Hebe* 56/172/63, *Venus* 56/135/63, *Vesta* 56/478/63; T.S London, *Annie* 108/12/64.

box. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Worley and Glynn had some form of relationship that included mutual recommendations.⁶⁵

More unequivocally reciprocal were the relations between another group 2 case study firm, De Jersey & Co, and Bailey & Leetham of Hull. In chapter 4, we located De Jersey within the wider international concern of Baron Ludwig Knoop, and speculated that Manchester cotton manufacturer Charles J. G. Knoop was also part of that concern. De Jersey handled all four traced wartime appearances in Liverpool of Charles Knoop's sail ship *Theodor Knoop*. Bailey & Leetham handled the clearance of Knoop's paddle steamer *Prince of Wales* from Hull to Matamoros in May 1863. To complete the circle, De Jersey acted for all five traced wartime appearances in Liverpool of vessels owned by William Bailey and William Leetham of Hull. These were made by the steamers *Cossack* and *Labuan*, both involved in the Matamoros trade.⁶⁶

It seems that De Jersey combined acting as Liverpool agent for the vessels of in-house owners with doing so for external clients. So did Longton & Longrigg, but here the balance was strongly tilted towards the latter. Although ownership of several vessels that Longton & Longrigg handled has been traced, patterns of repeat business for the same clients do not emerge. For instance, the firm acted for the first entry into Liverpool of the *Prospero*, but her subsequent departure, and further wartime

⁶⁵ S.R London, *Celia* 52/167/57, *Ellen Rose* 54/126/61, *Emulous* 53/6/59, *Lightning* 56/381/63, *Lottery* 53/146/58, *Prospero* 53/240/58; S.R Liverpool *Cynthia* 83/156/59.

⁶⁶ Database (BOE, April 1861 to July 1865); S.R Liverpool, *Theodore Knoop* 84/268/61; S.R Hull, *Cossack* 15/43/58, *Labuan* 16/20/61, *Prince of Wales* 16/23/63.

Liverpool business, was taken by the Glynnys. Failure to secure an established clientele may explain Longton & Longrigg's decline and disappearance in our period, in spite of the diversity of its strategy described in Chapter 4. The only evident pattern of repeat business was in handling ships in which the firm itself had an interest. This provides another example of joint ownership within a maritime business: partners John Longton and Thomas Longrigg jointly owned all of the *Byron* and also held 10/64ths in the *Liverpool* in the same way. The *Liverpool* also furnishes another example of capital raised outside the business being organised on a common, rather than joint, basis. Indeed the remaining 54/64ths were divided between seven individuals. Three of these were Longrigg family members, whilst the others were respectively a doctor, a gentleman, a watch manufacturer and a merchant. We can assume that the firm acted as managing agent for the *Liverpool*.⁶⁷

We know that Bahr Behrend & Co did not directly own its own ships. Instead it acted exclusively for clients, mostly foreign. J.T. Nickels mostly acted for overseas clients also, although a Liverpool registered sailing barque named *Jane* has been traced in the ownership of Nickels himself. Nickels' firm acted as Liverpool agent on both her traced appearances in the port. The final case study firm of group 2, Leech Harrison & Forwood, also did most of its business for clients. Repeat business is apparent in the case of a client named Thomas Gilgan who was resident at Matamoros during the war. The firm handled his sail brigantine *Flora* on all three of her known Liverpool appearances.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Database (BOE, April 1861 to July 1865); S.R Liverpool, *Byron* 85/448/63, *Liverpool* 83/176/60.

⁶⁸ Database (BOE, April 1861 to July 1865); S.R Liverpool, *Jane* 85/310/63, *Flora* 85/245/63.

Leech Harrison was an exception to the rule that firms tended to act as home-port agent for ships in which partners had interests. Senior partner Arthur Bower Forwood jointly owned the blockade runners *Adela* and *Scotia* with a Manchester merchant named James Dorrington. This enterprise seems to have been entirely separate from the firm because these steamers' clearances from Liverpool to Nassau were handled instead by agents James Moore and W.W. Slater, respectively. The sailing ship *Southerner* looks more like a firm enterprise: a majority 36/64th share was jointly owned by Arthur and his father, Thomas Brittain. However, only one of two traced Liverpool voyages for the vessel was handled by Leech Harrison, Slater again acting for the other. We saw in Chapter 4 that Leech Harrison was only one vehicle for the Forwood's maritime ambitions. Clearly the family's overall shipowning enterprise transcended any particular institution.⁶⁹

The other Forwood vehicle was the West India and Pacific Steam Ship Co Ltd, one of case study group 3 - the leading agents in the post-war Southern trade. In contrast to Leech Harrison, the company's known maritime activities were completely integrated in-house: it fully owned all vessels in which it had an interest; it always acted as Liverpool agent for them; and it did not act as such for anyone else.⁷⁰ Broadly, the same was true of the British and American Steam Navigation Co Ltd. The company fully owned both of its known steamers, and handled each of their Liverpool appearances except for a single entry into the port in October 1863, handled by the

⁶⁹ Database (BOE, April 1861 to July 1865); S.R Liverpool, *Adela* 84/135/62, *Scotia* 84/125/62, *Southerner* 84/20/62.

⁷⁰ Database (BOE, April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); S.R Liverpool, *Askalon* 84/228/61, *Australian* 88/228/67, *Crusader* 87/202/65, *Dorian* 85/102/63, *Hayti* 85/421/63, *Plantagenet* 83/122/59, *St Thomas* 87/140/65, *Talisman* 86/5/64, *West Indian* 87/318/65.

company founders, Fernie Bros & Co. This was probably before arrangements had been made for the company itself to act in this way. Similarly, only one instance has been found of it acting as agent for anyone else. In January 1866 it handled the Liverpool clearance of Lafone's *Gambia*. But by this time the steamer probably belonged to the overall concern following foreclosure of Lafone's mortgage by the Fernie brothers.⁷¹

The five firms of case study group 3 that also feature in group 1 have already been discussed in this context of institutional organisation. These were Taylor Tipper, Boulton English & Brandon, J. Browne & Co, Rankin Gilmour and Duncan & Shaw. Two of the three remaining case studies of group 3 were similar to the two limited companies in the group, in that they mostly acted as agents only for ships in which partners had an interest. However, both of these, W.H. Haynes and T & J Harrison, differed in that their partners owned ships in syndicate with individuals who were not partners in the core maritime business. Like Glynn & Son, William Henry Haynes had interests in ships with a variety of other individuals. Again, like the Glynn's, no two of these vessels had the same combination of ownership.

Haynes had a minority interest in six sailing ships that have been traced in this study. In 64ths, he had four in the *Rosalie*, six in the *Belgravia*, twelve each in the *Preston* and the *Leamington*, sixteen in the *John Mayall*, and twenty-four in the *Roscoe*. The firm of W.H. Haynes acted as agent for each of their known Liverpool voyages except

⁷¹ Database (*BOE*, April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); S.R Liverpool, *Florida* 84/150/62, *Gambia* 87/128/65; T.S London, *Bolivian* BT/108/450/64.

one. But Haynes was not the largest single owner of any of these vessels. Thomas Langton Birley, Arthur Leyland Birley and Charles Birley of Kirkham in Lancashire, jointly owned shares in all six. They were the single largest owners of the *Belgravia* (32/64ths) and of the *Roscoe* and the *Leamington* (28/64ths). The largest share in the *Rosalie* (44/64ths) and in the aptly named *John Mayall* (32/64ths), belonged to a cotton manufacturer of Mossley in Lancashire named John Mayall. He also had a 16/64th interest in the *Belgravia*. To these, and a number of other individuals with lesser holdings in these ships, maritime business was a sideline; one that they were prepared to entrust to Haynes, the professional maritime member of each syndicate.⁷²

Thomas and James Harrison also owned some ships in syndicate with individuals who were not their partners. Unlike Haynes, however, they dominated these syndicates, which were largely made up of people from their immediate circle. The steamers *Fire Queen* and *Alice* were solely owned by Thomas Harrison. Between them, the Harrisons had majority parts of the steamers *Pantheon* and *Chrysolite*: 22/64ths to Thomas and 20/64ths to James in each case. Thomas also owned half the steamer *Alhambra*. In the syndicates, things tended to remain within a closed circle. Minority ownership of the *Pantheon*, the *Chrysolite* and - after a reorganisation in December 1868 - the *Fire Queen*, was split amongst intimates: family members Edward Hodgson Harrison and John Harrison; firm bookkeeper John William Hughes; and Charente based associate Richard Williamson. Only the *Alhambra*, in which a

⁷² Database (*BOE*, April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); S.R Liverpool, *Belgravia* 83/66/61, *John Mayall* 84/181/61, *Leamington* 85/95/63, *Preston* 84/8/62, *Rosalie* 83/149/60, *Roscoe* 83/203/60.

Liverpool merchant named Daniel James was half owner, was shared with someone who appears to have been outside the circle.⁷³

The absence of joint ownership and of a single consistent form of ownership might suggest that Harrison ships belonged to their individual owners as personal chattels rather than as assets of the business as a whole. Having said that, there does appear to have been a fairly high degree of in-house integration, in that firm partners did own most of these shipping assets. The firm of T & J Harrison acted as Liverpool agent each time a Harrison ship was in port and acted only a few times for ships in which it did not have an interest. J. S. De Wolf & Co also always acted as Liverpool agent for De Wolf vessels, but most of its agency work was for external clients. We saw earlier that the De Wolf partners jointly owned the *Tiger* and a majority share in the *Charleston*. The latter was shared in syndicate with Daniel Burns. Burns was also a client of the firm, his *Hamilton Gray* being handled by De Wolf on the occasions that she put into Liverpool.⁷⁴

3. Networks and Institutional Integration.

One pattern that does emerge from the foregoing discussion is the prevalence of network connections of one sort or another. Earlier, we noted Ville's suggestion that it was important for shipowners to have networks of agents in the various ports visited by their ships. More recently, Boyce has highlighted the importance of networks in the development of British shipping enterprise. In his analysis of institutional

⁷³ S.R Liverpool, *Alhambra* 88/214/66, *Alice* 88/240/66, *Chrysolite* 88/132/67, *Fire Queen* 87/73/66, *Pantheon* 88/81/67.

⁷⁴ Database (BOE, April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868 and 1870); S.R Liverpool, *Charleston* 88/233/67, *Hamilton Gray* 81/52/58, *Tiger* 89/224/68.

development, Boyce emphasised principal-agent relationships. He identified networks as co-operative frameworks existing beyond the boundaries of particular firms, as opposed to hierarchical arrangements existing within them. In networks, those who possessed commercial information contracted with those who possessed shipping assets, in order to exploit opportunities. This can be seen in the position of the maritime professional managing agent acting on behalf of non-professional owners. Out of repeat contracting came mutual trust and reputation for dependability. Reputation helped some individuals to the centre of networks and, in turn, attracted the business of others. In this way, networks could grow outwards from the home port to access more shipping assets, market skills and information. Later, institutional forms of large-scale enterprise arose out of such networks.⁷⁵

Boyce was concerned mainly with shipowning enterprise, whereas this study focuses upon ship agents. Nonetheless, the relationship between shipowners and their agents in particular ports was a principal-agent relationship in the sense used by Boyce, and many agents were also shipowners. The essential elements of Boyce's networks can be perceived in this study. We have seen what an agent could offer to shipowners in ports where they did not have an office. This included shipbroking, market knowledge, familiarity with foreign languages, and access to contacts both within and beyond the port. We have identified the agent's role in having market knowledge - and the ability to act on it in booking cargo for well chosen outward destinations - as important in the ability of owners to switch from one trade to another in response to changing circumstances. In view of the distance of vessels from home-port managers,

⁷⁵ Boyce, *Information*, pp. 1-9, and 26-37.

this would be of particular consequence in the relationships with established foreign shipowning clients that have earlier been inferred to exist for some case study firms.

We have seen patterns of repeat contracting between British owners and agents, and also professional managing agents acting for networks of owners. These suggest the existence of network relations arising from trust. We have seen the existence of wider networks of ownership and mutual connection, particularly in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Here reputation and mutual recommendation can be inferred. We have seen the importance of central figures in networks, such as Charles Prioleau of Fraser Trenholm, the Glynn partners, or Arthur Forwood. Accordingly, network relationships appear as an important part of the way business was done in this period, allowing Liverpool maritime enterprise to adapt to the impact of the civil war and take new opportunities.

General perception of the existence of networks does not, however, explain the success or failure of particular firms. An attempt to link the individual institutional arrangements of the case studies with their individual performance, in terms of survival and growth, in our period fails to produce a coherent or consistent pattern. The degree to which they relied upon external network connections, or alternatively integrated their business in-house, does not seem to have been a critical determinant of performance. This can be demonstrated with reference to the institutional structures

described in the second section of this chapter, and to the pattern of firm performances described in chapter 4.⁷⁶

It should be clear from the preceding section of this chapter that there was anything but uniformity in the institutional arrangements adopted by the case studies. Some were sole traders, some partnerships and some limited companies. Some owned all their own ships and handled only them, while at the other extreme some owned no ships and acted only as agents for clients. In-between, numerous idiosyncratic arrangements pertained. There were combinations of in-house owning and acting for clients. There were sole ownerships, or patterns involving different firm partners and other individuals. Some vessels were held in corporate ownership. Sometimes vessels were held as business assets in joint ownership; sometimes as personal chattels in common ownership; sometimes in combinations thereof.

At one end of the institutional range were firms dependent exclusively upon external network connections. They did not own ships and so relied for agenting business on the patronage of clients. Amongst these were two firms that failed to survive our period, namely Miller & Mossman and Pilkington Bros. Also represented in this group were firms like Boulton English & Brandon and James Browne & Co, identified as being in long term decline after the onset of the civil war. This might be taken to suggest that exclusive reliance on external clients was bad policy, but Bahr Behrend & Co did

⁷⁶ It should be pointed out that this exercise only encompasses what has been traced in this study and is confined to the activities of shipowning and ship agenting. The exercise is also largely confined to British structures: in most instances it is not known whether foreign establishments or agencies were maintained; nor the degree to which ships of foreign register may have been held by case study partners or by members of their organisations. It is also in the nature of this study that performance has been assessed by measures of volume of business done and periods of survival, rather than profit and loss.

the same and managed to expand its business in the period. Where weakness occurred, it stemmed from failing to broaden the client base beyond a declining stock of American owners, rather than from relying on clients per se; although these firms all perhaps missed opportunities in failing to diversify into shipowning. At the other end of the range were fully integrated organisations, but this, again, was no guide to success or failure. Rankin Gilmour emerged successfully from the period, as did the West India and Pacific, whereas the British and American company went into liquidation.

Some firms combined acting for clients with their own shipowning interests. Of these, the ones that have been characterised as successful in our period did so to greatly varying degrees, and exhibited a variety of ownership structures. For example, there was no uniformity in the shipowning arrangements of either the Glynn's or Haynes, beyond the fact that partners owned vessels in common with varied networks of individuals from outside the organisations. Haynes himself always had a minority stake. Glynn partners tended to own at least half of a given vessel, but they probably held these interests as personal chattels rather than as business assets.

The same appears to have been true of T. & J. Harrison, although partners tended to dominate their syndicates, which were composed of people within their immediate circle. By contrast, the holdings of De Wolf partners belonged to them jointly as business assets, but they also combined in syndicate with a client of the firm. Unlike these firms, Leech Harrison & Forwood did not tend to handle vessels in which partners had an interest; the latter's shipowning seems to have been largely separate

from the firm. Leech Harrison partners owned one interest jointly, but in syndicate with non-partners. On his own, Arthur Forwood owned vessels jointly with an individual from outside the firm. Of the remaining successful firms in this category, the ownership arrangements applying to the Warren line are unknown, but the ships of De Jersey and J. T. Nickels appear to have been held entirely in-house by partners.

Firms that also combined acting for clients with their own shipowning interests, but which were not successful in expanding their business over the period, exhibited a similar variety of ownership dispositions. Again, they mixed acting for their own vessels with acting for the vessels of clients to widely differing degrees. Amongst these, the partners of Taylor Tipper were at the centre of an ownership network, in syndicate with several individuals from outside the firm. Unusually, they combined joint ownership between themselves with a degree of joint ownership with others. They dominated their syndicate, whereas the partners of Longton & Longrigg jointly held only a minority interest in one vessel in syndicate with several others, although they jointly owned all of another vessel.

In the same broadly unsuccessful category were the wartime opportunist firms of Figure 5.1, amongst whom mutual network connections have been pointed out. Lafone solely owned his ships, but would appear to have been acting to some extent as a nominee for a Confederate company. Klingender solely owned several vessels, but elsewhere combined in syndicate with individuals from outside his firm. Prioleau solely owned Fraser Trenholm vessels but was at the centre of a broad network of

clientage and connection. Beach Root's activities were fairly integrated in-house, but partners were also in syndicate with an outside element.

The lack of any overriding pattern should be clear from the foregoing discussion. It seems, therefore, that in this period at least, the institutional structures that some historians have recently emphasised as factors shaping the success or failure of maritime business were perhaps less important than one might assume. Although networks of relations beyond firm boundaries were widespread, their degree of presence does not appear to explain why some prospered at the same time as others declined or collapsed. For this, as chapter 4 has emphasised, we need to look more at the commercial strategies adopted rather than at institutional arrangements. This may be because, in this period of mainly small family businesses prior to the emergence of large-scale steam enterprise, organisational issues had not yet made themselves a central concern.

Conclusion

During the American civil war maritime commerce between Britain and the Southern states was highly disrupted. This commerce had been expanding for well over half a century and had long reached considerable proportions. Based upon the export of Southern raw cotton to the centres of British cotton goods manufacture in Lancashire, it had been a vital force in the growth of both economies. From at least the late 1850s, it appears to have constituted much more of a two-way exchange than the “cotton triangle” model has given it credit for, with a miscellany of produce and manufactures carried from Britain to Southern ports. By the eve of the war, the increasing primacy of the Mississippi valley in cotton production had elevated New Orleans to a position as the principal exporting centre, and the trade turned on an axis between there and Liverpool.

The extent of wartime disruption has not been appreciated by many historians of the conflict. Nor have many appreciated the ways in which the Northern blockade was the main cause of that disruption. Union naval action discouraged owners of large sailing ships, the standard vessels of the day for transporting bulk goods across the North Atlantic, from visiting Confederate ports. Soon, only purpose built or adapted steamers could hope to do so, and their short-range meant they had to operate from off-shore bases where goods had to be transhipped. Small in size, restricted in capacity, and only slowly mustered - mainly from abroad - they could only shift a small fraction of the merchandise normally involved. Furthermore, by seizing or disabling many Confederate harbours, most vitally New Orleans itself, the Union navy

forced the commerce out of its customary geographical orientation around Mississippi valley outlets towards much less suitable points. The physical difficulties and transaction costs of exporting cotton were thereby enormously increased. Thus, even where special steamers were not required, as on the Mexican overland route, comparatively little of the staple reached market.

In these ways, Union maritime supremacy was effective even though the blockade itself was actually quite permeable in relation to vessels equipped to try it. Although overseas trade links were maintained, and played an important part in keeping the Confederacy alive, these were a pale shadow of what they could have been. Deprived of vast potential foreign earnings, the South was denied what could have been the foundation of a strong currency and economy, and the means to ensure that shortages of military and civilian supplies did not arise. Whilst the Confederacy initially contributed itself through the failed policy of embargo, this outcome must primarily be credited to Union maritime supremacy, which therefore played a real part in the eventual defeat of the South.

In spite of the magnitude of the wartime trade collapse - the "vicissitudes" of our title - the evidence indicates that British maritime enterprise adapted successfully and emerged into the postwar period stronger than before. The most affected port, Liverpool, did not lose its leadership in cotton imports, for which world-wide alternative sources were accessed. Although not matching antebellum volume, these went a long way towards making-up the shortfall. With this, and a boom in importation of other bulk commodities such as North American timber and grain, the

maritime economy of Liverpool did not collapse. Nor did the port's sector of firms acting as ship agents, even those most vulnerable to Southern trade disruption. Actually, the war years seem to have been perceived as ones of opportunity, judging from the rate of creation of new enterprises in this sector.

Maritime adaptation was not confined to Liverpool. Northern United States shipowners, who exercised a near monopoly in carrying antebellum Southern commerce, were absent from the entrepot trade. This created an opportunity that British shipowners were by far the most successful in exploiting; numerous interests from all over Britain deployed ships into the trade. Although continental European owners were also present, particularly those of Spain on routes with the Spanish-speaking entrepots, those of Britain predominated. Indeed, the war marked a permanent shift in the relative positions of British and American shipping in the Southern trade: although a good deal of American tonnage returned afterwards, British owners had drawn level. Actually, US shipping was badly hit by the war and was entering a long period of decline, from which British interests again benefited.

A turning point had also been reached in shipbuilding. Before the war, North American-built timber sailing ships were the order of the day. During it, a large part of the demand for steamers to run the blockade was satisfied by British yards on the Clyde, Thames and Mersey. Subsequently, the cost advantage swung towards steamers and iron hulled sailing ships built in Britain, and away from American timber constructions. Continuing technological improvements led to the increasing adoption

of steam on long as well as short-haul voyages, and this was also to favour these developments.

Although British owners accounted for a majority of blockade runs, only a comparatively small number of individuals were prepared to take the risks; the blockade was porous but, nonetheless, most vessels trying it were eventually lost. From the limited evidence available, it would appear that those who did indulge failed to emerge with great profits. Instead, several found themselves in financial difficulties. Others took advantage of the demand for runners from public and private Confederate interests by dealing in them, and most British shipowners prudently avoided direct involvement. Advantage was also taken of the wartime need for steam coal to be bunkered at entrepôts and this market was supplied from several British ports, most notably those of South Wales. Additionally, the port of London carved out a position as a wartime market for Confederate-bound supplies.

The general picture, then, is not one of British maritime interests suffering badly from the disruptions of war, but of them adapting and taking new opportunities. However, with the benefit of the focus on case studies adopted in this thesis, it is plain that some Liverpool concerns adapted more successfully than others. Several leading agenting firms of the antebellum period suffered because of over-dependence for their business on the Southern trade, and on the American shipowners whose vessels carried it. Perhaps the “vicissitudes” endured by men like Francis Boulton should not have been so “unexpected”. Failure to diversify sufficiently in the run-up to the war left little to fall back on when the core Southern business was lost. Most survived the crisis, but did so

in a reactive manner: on the whole they stayed with Northern clients, handling their much reduced wartime business with Liverpool in trades such as American grain. Although their clients' return to Southern trade after the war facilitated a return for them also, it was into a different climate. It took many years for the trade to regain antebellum volume. More crucially, the recovery of American shipowners was only partial, and even that was not to last. The adherence to a conservative strategy by firms like Boulton English & Brandon and James Browne & Co meant that the onset of war marked the beginning of a decline. Others, like Taylor Tipper and Duncan & Shaw, were not to remain in business for long.

Firms that merchanted Southern cotton were also hit. Some that had a presence on both sides of the Atlantic, like Brown Shipley or Rankin Gilmour, were forced to close their American operations for the duration. Severance of such connections appears to have resulted in a widespread return to an older form of trading through the entrepôts, based on correspondents and consignees rather than on one side of a transatlantic operation buying and shipping on behalf of another. Shortage, coupled with surging and fluctuating prices, led to speculation and a scramble amongst many to import Confederate cotton, however little the quantity. After the war trading systems quickly assumed the pre-war pattern again, suggesting that links were soon restored, although this study is not in a position to comment on the adaptability exhibited by most individual importing concerns.

For most of the leading agents of the entrepot trade, the conflict represented an opportunity not a threat. Long-established operations such as Bahr Behrend or Glynn

& Son already had a diverse shipowning clientage, and handled vessels plying a variety of routes in many trades. The wartime disappearance of American shipowners and the sudden suitability in a contracted trade of the small vessels owned by their clients gave them an entry. Probably, they were active in advising clients to participate, and in booking outward cargoes for their vessels that would take them to entrepots where Confederate cotton was to be had. The Spanish element in the clientage of firms like Bahr Behrend and Nickels makes it easy to see why they began handling vessels in trade with Spanish-speaking Gulf entrepots. Although firms like these could not carry their involvement into the post-war trade, when it again became the preserve of the large ship, they had taken the chance to increase business while it was there. Pursuit of an opportunistic strategy of diversification allowed concerns like Glynn & Son, Bahr Behrend and Leech Harrison to expand their business over the period of this study and to lay foundations for continued growth.

It seems that for long-term success, opportunism needed to be combined with diversification. Fraser Trenholm, Klingender, Lafone and Beech Root all took the opportunities of war, but over-commitment to Confederate trade resulted in failure to maintain lasting businesses. In contrast, some leading organisations in the postwar Southern trade, like the West India and Pacific Company and T & J Harrison, participated in it as part of diverse portfolios of activity and went on to build large shipping enterprises. The British and American Company did not, and went into liquidation. Increasingly, diversification included owning shipping assets rather than just agenting them, and also embracing the rising technology of steam.

The relative fortunes of the West India and Pacific Steamship Co and the British and American Steam Navigation Co exemplify the impossibility of simply relying on institutional forms to explain success or failure amongst the case studies. Both were limited liability incorporations that integrated their agenting and owning in-house, but the former succeeded whilst the latter failed. A wide range of institutional arrangements has been seen amongst the case studies, both between business partners and between them and external associates. But, as with the two instances just cited, particular structures cannot be seen to have determined whether concerns prospered or declined and disappeared. In this era of essentially small-scale organisations, however, the adoption of an appropriate business strategy has been seen to have been a key factor in these matters.

Of course, there are limitations in a case study approach. Although the chosen firms together handled not far short of half of the shipping tonnage passing through Liverpool and covered by this study, this does exclude firms dealing with over half. Throughout all our sample periods, a fairly small number of concerns had substantial and regular commitments to Southern trade business, but the market pattern remained unconcentrated. This indicates a competitive situation, not dominated by a few participants, into which there was ease of access. There was always a large pool of occasional players. Close to 350 names are listed in Appendix A as having handled at least one vessel in the trade, whereas this study has focused upon twenty-four of them. This begs some questions: how did the other three-hundred or so make-up their livelihoods, and what strategies and organisational forms did they adopt?

Looking at how they advertised themselves goes some way to offering an answer, **although** the high incidence of vague terms such as “merchant” or “shipowner” does **not help**. It is likely that a minority were essentially providers of ancillary services, **such as** insurance or provisioning. Others would have been mainly “merchants” in the **sense** of dealing in goods of one sort or another. The largest single occupational group **can** be seen as maritime agents in the broadest terms, principally describing **themselves** as shipbrokers; a designation covering a range of services to shipping. A **survey** examining the activities of all firms across all trades, perhaps based on a series of annual samples, could take understanding of the business portfolios of the host of occasional Southern trade agents somewhat further. Were there similar patterns of **concentration** and continuity in other trades? Was specialisation or diversification the **rule**? How much business did a firm need in order to survive?

The last question leads on to another limitation inherent in the approach taken here, and one that is harder to remedy. In a study concentrating mainly upon activity, it has **not been possible** to assess the actual profitability of business done. Instead, inferences **have been drawn** based on business volume, the longevity of organisations and other supporting material where available. Moreover, strategy has largely been inferred from action. Business archival research could very much add to understanding here, **but insufficient material** has survived from the period on which to build a representative study. Archives do exist for prominent houses like the Harrisons, but a **search** at Liverpool Record Office and Merseyside Maritime Museum has revealed little for other firms listed in Appendix A. A more concerted national enquiry would **perhaps locate** more. Another study might seek to build a fuller picture of interests

outside Liverpool, notably the profitability and connections of London-based blockade running owners, and also allow us to test some of the speculations made in chapter 5 about how firms organised their shipowning.

The widespread existence of networks of ownership and clientage has been highlighted in this thesis. The relationship of principal and agent, between shipowner and ship agent, has been seen as particularly important in enabling vessels to be deployed flexibly in response to market changes. Local knowledge and connections must have been an essential component of agency services when an owner's vessel was in a port far from home managers. In particular, outward cargo needed to be booked for a destination where further cargo was available if a ship was to remain in continuous employ. However, whether the functions of principal and agent were integrated in-house, or independent operators relied on for the latter, has not emerged as being important in business survival and growth. Instead, the role of strategy has been highlighted.

In arriving at this conclusion, we can only really be sure about British relationships. An international dimension would be a useful addition here. An assumption has often been made in this study that some firms acted in British ports for specific international shipowning clients, who were independent of them. Identifying owners of foreign ships, especially those of America, might test this. The issue of whether British firms, such as our case studies, owned ships on foreign registers or maintained foreign establishments is an important one. For instance, when their ships were in overseas ports, did British owners employ independent local agents or did they use in-house

branch offices of their own? To put it another way, were international connections internally integrated within organisations, or were they in the nature of external networks? Answers to such questions might help us to assess the significance of institutional factors as influences on the success or failure of firms, within their business strategies as a whole.

Appendix

Appendix A. Liverpool Firms that acted as Ship Agents.

All the firms traced in the Bills of Entry as having acted as ship agents in Liverpool, in the trade with the American South, are listed here in alphabetical order by first listed surname (341 in total). A trade description is included for all firms for which an entry has been found in Gores.

| Firm | Trade Description |
|--|--|
| Alen & Anderson | |
| Allen & Edwards | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| John Ambler | Ship Broker |
| Nicholas Willam Andrew | Ship Broker |
| Angel & Co | Ship Owner & Ship Broker & Insurance Agent |
| British & American Steam Navigation Co Ltd | Limited Company |
| Bahr Behrend & Co | Ship Broker |
| James Baines & Co | Merchant |
| Baker Barron & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker & Coal Mer |
| Samuel Baker | Ship Broker |
| W Barber | |
| Barclay Ferguson & Co | Commission Merchant |
| Baring Bros & Co | Merchant |
| John H Barry | Merchant |
| Edward Bates | Merchant |
| Beach Root & Co | Merchant |
| George Bell | Ship Broker |
| T.F Bennett & Co | Merchant |
| Holland T Birkett | Ship Owner & Merchant |
| Blessig Braun & Co | Merchant |
| Robert Lewin Bolton | Merchant |
| C.H Boshier | |
| Boult English & Brandon | Merchant & Ship Broker & Commission Agents |
| Bowman Grinnell & Co | |
| Bowman Tetley & Co | Merchant |
| Boyd Edwards & Co | Merchant |
| Boyes Marx & Co | Merchant |
| J Brebner & Son | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Broad Baker & Turner | Ship Agent & Insurance Agent |
| Brown Shipley & Co | Merchant |
| James Browne & Co | Merchant |
| Browne Van Santen & Co | Ship Broker |
| R Burn & Co | Commission Merchant & Ship Broker & Insurance Brok |
| Andrew Ewing Byrne & Co | Merchant |
| John M Calder | Cotton Broker |
| G Campbell & Co | Commission Merchant |
| Camus Tuzzo & Co | Ship Broker & Commission Merchant |
| David Cannon Sons & Co | Merchant |
| Cargill & Co | Ship Broker |
| Thomas Fortescue Carter | Ship Chandler |
| John W Cater & Co | Merchant |
| Chapple Dutton & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner & Agents |
| Henry Krebs Claypole & Co | Merchant |
| Alexander Coghill & Co | Ship Broker |
| Cole & Jones | Ship Broker & Commission Agent |
| J.E Cole | |
| Collie Westhead & Co | Merchant |
| William Coltart Son & Co | Ship Owner & Rope & Sailmaker & Ship Chandler |
| Conaway & Shepherd | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker & Commission Agents |
| Cotesworth Lyne & Co | Merchant & Ship Broker & Ship Owner |
| Cowel & Bryce | |

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Cox Bros | Broker |
| Henry Cram & Co | Ship Broker |
| William G Crenshaw & Co | Commission Merchant |
| Anthony Cumming | Merchant |
| Cunard Wilson & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker & Ship Valuers |
| Cunningham & Shaw | Ship Broker & Commission Agent |
| Richard A Curd & Co | Commission Merchant & Cotton Factors |
| Currie Newton & Co | Ship Store Dealer |
| Curry Kellock & Co | Broker for sale of Ships |
| Robert Curwen | Merchant |
| Darbyshire McKinnell & Co | Merchant |
| Dart Bros | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| William Hughes Daunt & Co | Iron Merchant & Ship Owner |
| David William Davies & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Joseph Day jun & Co | Ship Broker |
| M.A De Gondra | |
| De Jersey & Co | Merchant |
| Francisco De Lizardi & Co | Merchant |
| Philip Henry Dean & Co | Merchant |
| Dixon & Wynne | Merchant |
| Charles C Douglas | Merchant & Marine Insurance Agent |
| Drake Kleinwort & Cohen | Merchant |
| Ernest Dronke | Agent |
| Duncan & Kendall | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Dunkerley & Steinmann | Commission Agents & Forwarding Agents |
| Alexander Duranty & Co | Merchant |
| Edward Eccles | Cotton Broker |
| Eddowes Bros & Co | Provision Merchant |
| Archibald Edmiston & Co | Merchant |
| Edwards Stott & Co | |
| Albert F Eggers & Co | Merchant |
| R.S Ely | |
| Farnworth & Jardine | Timber Measurer & Timber Broker |
| Henry Fernie & Son | Ship Owner |
| Fernie Bros & Co | Merchant |
| Fielden Bros | Merchant |
| Finlay Campbell & Co | Merchant |
| W.H Fisher & Co | |
| George Hamilton Fletcher & Co | Ship Broker |
| Fletcher & Parr | Ship Broker & Steam Ship Agent |
| Fowler Bros | Provision Merchant |
| Foyn Boulton & Co | |
| Matthias Foyne | Ship Broker |
| Fraser Trenholm & Co | Merchant |
| Batholomew French & Son | Ship Owner |
| Thomas Frost | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Samuel Gardiner & Son | Ship Store Dealer |
| Garnock Bibby & Co | Ropemakers & Ship Chandlers & Sailmakers |
| William Geves & Co | Ship Store Dealer |
| Gholson Walker & Co | |
| Duncan Gibb | Merchant |
| Gibbs Bright & Co | Merchant |
| Andrew Gibson & Co | Ship Store Dealer & Ship Chandler |
| R.L Gillchrest & Co | |
| Gillchrest & Patten | |
| Gillchrest Smith & Co | American Ship Broker |
| John Kerton Gilliat & Co | Merchant |
| Glen & Anderson | Merchant |
| Glen & Wild | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| John Glynn & Son | Merchant & Ship Broker & Ship Owner |
| John Gordon & Co | Ship Broker & Agent |
| James Graham & Co | Merchant |
| Grainger Bristow & Johnson | Commission Merchant & Steam Packet Agent |
| Samuel Robert Graves | Merchant & Ship Owner & Underwriters Agent |

| | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Charles W & Wentworth Gray | Merchant |
| William Joshua Grazebrook | Commission Merchant & Insurance Agent |
| George Green Son & Co | Merchant |
| Greenshields & Co | Merchant |
| Caleb Grimshaw & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Walter & Richard Grindlay | Ship Broker & Insurance Agents |
| Robert M Grinnell | Merchant |
| Gulon & Co | Merchant |
| James Hainsworth | Merchant |
| Jorgen Chris Hansen | Unknown |
| Hargrove Fergusson & Co | Ship Owner & Merchant |
| Harrison Robinson & Co | |
| Thomas & James Harrison | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Hatton & Cookson | Merchant |
| J Hawes & Co | |
| Hawkes Albizuri & Co | |
| William Henry Haynes | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Hennings & Gosling | Merchant |
| James Hewitt & Co | Commission Merchant |
| Charles Hill & Son | Merchant |
| Holderness & Chilton | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Francis Hollins | Cotton Broker |
| Henry Ribton Hoskins | Merchant & Commission Agent |
| William Houghton Sons & Co | Merchant |
| Robert Hutchison | Merchant |
| Frederick Huth & Co | Commission Merchant |
| Imrie & Tomlinson | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| William Inman | Merchant & Steam Ship Agent |
| John Ireland | Commission Merchant |
| Isaac Low & Co | Merchant |
| Thomas Henry Ismay & Co | Ship Broker & Commission Merchant |
| James Jackson & Co | Merchant |
| W Jackson Sons & Co | Carrier |
| C.A Jansen | |
| John Jardine & Son | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| T Johnson & Co | |
| John & Thomas Johnson | Merchant |
| Thomas C Jones & Co | Ship Chandler |
| Jones Songey & Co | |
| Thomas C Jones | Ship Chandler & Sailmaker |
| Joseph & Perkins | |
| Thomas Joynson & Co | Cotton Broker |
| John & Moses Joynson | Cotton Broker |
| Peter Joynson jun | Cotton Broker |
| George Briscoe Kerferd & Co | Merchant |
| Thomas King & Son | Ship Chandler & Sailmaker |
| Melchor George Klingender & Co | Merchant & Steam Ship Agent |
| Klingender Bros | |
| William Klingender | Merchant |
| Henry Lafone | Merchant |
| Laird Fletcher & Co | Ship Broker & Steam Ship Agent |
| Lamport & Holt | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Edward Lawrence & Co | Merchant |
| Peter Le Maistre & Co | Ship Broker & Commission Agent |
| Leech Harrison & Forwood | Merchant & Steam Ship Agent |
| Andrew Leighton Russell & Co | Ship Broker |
| Augustus Henry Lemonius & Co | Merchant |
| George B Lennard | Ship Broker |
| William Lindsay & Co | Merchant & Commission Agent |
| Thomas Litler | Coal Merchant |
| T&H Littledale & Co | Cotton Broker |
| Liverpool Steam Tug Co Ltd | Limited Company |
| George Pierce Lock | Oil Mer & Colour Mer |
| Longton & Longrigg | Ship Broker & Merchant |

| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Loram & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| T Loran | |
| Alson Lovett | Master Mariner |
| Thomas Main & Co | Ship Store Dealer |
| James Malcolm | Merchant |
| Joseph & David Malcomson & Co | Merchant |
| Manger de Voogd & Co | Ship Broker |
| Manger Haurowitz & Co | Ship Broker |
| John Alfred Marsh | Ship Broker |
| George Martin | Merchant |
| Marwood Godwin & Co | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| W Mason | Merchant |
| W.A&G Maxwell & Co | Merchant |
| McDowell & Hallidays | Commission Merchant |
| Alex R McPherson & Co | Commission Merchant |
| William J & Frederick Meacock | Merchant & Agent |
| John Meek | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Melhuish & De la Rue | Merchant |
| Mellor Cunningham & Powell | Cotton Broker |
| Melly Forget & Co | Merchant |
| Melly Romilly & Co | |
| Miller & Mosman | Merchant |
| Milligan Evans & Co | Merchant & Insurance Agent |
| Miners & Co | Ship Broker & Commission Agent |
| Molyneux Taylor & Co | Broker |
| Montgomery Fox & Co | Ship Store Dealer |
| Charles Moore | Merchant |
| James Moore | Commission Agent & Insurance Agent |
| Moos & Co | Ship Broker |
| Moos & Hansen | |
| Moran Galloway & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Robert Morrow Son & Co | Merchant |
| Mors Le Blanch & Co | Ship Broker & Commission Agent |
| Morton Sparke | |
| James Moss & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Robert A Munn & Co | Ship Broker |
| Nelson Ismay & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Richard Nicholson & Son | Ship Agent & Insurance Agent |
| John Thomas Nickels | Merchant & Ship Broker & Insurance Agent |
| William Nicol | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Hermann Henry Noltenius | Commission Merchant & Underwriters Agent |
| Nuttall Mors & Co | Merchant & Commission Agent |
| Olano Larrinaga & Co | Provision Merchant & Ship Chandler |
| R.W Osborne | |
| George P Oxley & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| John Stewart Oxley & Co | Tobacco Merchant |
| Paris & Co | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Partridge & Co | Ship Broker & Commission Merchant |
| Patterson McCully & Co | Ship Owner & Commission Merchant |
| Pattinson Eccles & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Patton jun & Co | |
| Patton Vickers & Co | |
| Samuel & William Pearce & Co | Ship Broker |
| Richard Peniston | Merchant |
| Peniston Westhead & Co | |
| S.W Peters | |
| Pilkington Bros | Merchant |
| Pilkington D | Merchant |
| William Pirrie & Co | Commission Merchant |
| Joseph Pope & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Marcelline C Pothonier & Co | Ship Broker & Steam Ship Agent |
| Victor Poutz | Merchant |
| Frederick H Powell & Co | Ship Broker & Steam Ship Agent |
| Prichard Walker & Co | |

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| William Quayle | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Radford & Major | Ship Broker & Agent |
| A Ramage & Co | |
| Rankin Gilmour & Co | Merchant |
| Rathbone Bros & Co | Merchant |
| Richards Mills & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Richardson Bros & Co | |
| Richardson Spence & Co | Merchant |
| Robert John Rickarby | Merchant |
| Ritchie Bros & Co | Timber Merchant |
| J Robinson | Cotton Dealer & Broker |
| J.T Robinson | |
| W Robinson | |
| Rodewald & Co | Merchant |
| William H Ross & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| Ross Skolfield & Miller | |
| Roxburgh & Crighton | |
| Henry Vittoria Rudd | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Ryland Bros | Cotton Broker |
| William Sager & Sons | Commission Merchant |
| Edward Sager | Merchant |
| Satterfield Fox & Co | Ship Broker & Ship Owner |
| John P Schilizzi & Co | Merchant |
| Schofield & Blackburn | Cotton Broker |
| John Henry Schroeder & Co | Merchant |
| Leo Schuster Bros & Co | Merchant |
| James Scott | Commission Merchant & Insurance Agent |
| Thomas & David P Sellar | Merchant & Agent |
| Seymour Peacock & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Randall H Sherlock & Co | Customs Agent & Forwarding Agent |
| Robert Shinn | Merchant |
| Shute & Hamilton | Ship Broker & Insurance Agents |
| W.W Slater | |
| Henry Smith & Co | Ship Broker & Commission Agent |
| George Thomas Soley | Master Mariner |
| Solvyns Bros | Merchant |
| Songey Bradley & Cooper | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| J Stanley | |
| William Stewart & Co | Iron Merchant & Chain & Anchor Manufacturers |
| Andrew Stewart | Commission Merchant |
| Stewart Tipton & Co | |
| Stitt Conbrough & Co | Merchant |
| Stoddart Bros | Ship Broker |
| Stolterfoht Sons & Co | Merchant |
| Strong Reid & Co | Ship Broker |
| Stuart & Warry | Merchant |
| Suter McNeilledge & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| P Sutherland | Commission Merchant & Timber Agents |
| John Swire & Sons | Merchant |
| William Tapscott & Co | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Tapscott Fish & Co | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Charles R Taylor & Son | Merchant |
| Taylor Alexander & Co | Merchant |
| Taylor Tipper & Co | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Tetley & Eggers | |
| William Thomas & Co | Merchant |
| R.L Thomas | |
| Thorburn Brs & Co | Merchant |
| Thorburn Healey & Co | |
| Joseph Thorburn | Commission Merchant |
| Philip D Toosey | Ship Broker |
| W Tousey | Broker |
| Train & Co | |
| H.S Van Santen & Co | Ship Broker |

| | |
|--|--|
| S Vaughan & Co | |
| Vaughan Bros & Co | |
| Vining Killey & Co | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| Wade & Robson | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Richard Wainwright | Merchant |
| Wakefield Nash & Co | Merchant |
| Richard B Walker & Co | Commission Merchant & Ship Agent & Insurance Agent |
| William H Walker & Co | Ship Broker & Insurance Broker |
| Warner & Baston | |
| Warren & Thayer | Ship Broker & Merchant |
| George Waterbury & Co | Sailmakers & Ship Chandlers & Ship Store Dealers |
| Caleb D Watson & Co | Ship Broker |
| Watson & Hill | |
| Stephen Watson | Merchant |
| W.C Watts & Co | Merchant |
| White & Co | |
| W White | |
| West India & Pacific Steam Ship Co Ltd | Limited Company |
| Wichelhaus & Busch | Merchant |
| Widdicombe & Bell | Ship Broker |
| A Wigdahl | |
| Willink & Bushby | Merchant & Insurance Agent |
| H.T Wilson & Chambers | Merchant |
| Fisher Wilson & Co | Ship Broker & Steam Ship Agent |
| James Hamilton Wilson & Co | Merchant |
| C&H Wilson | Merchant |
| J Wilson | |
| M.J Wilson | |
| John Starr de Wolf & Co | Merchant & Ship Owner |
| James Marke Wood | Merchant |
| Alexander Henry Wylie | Merchant |
| George Young jun | Comm, Forwarding & Insurance Agent & Ins Broker |
| Zizinia Bros | Merchant |
| Emanuel Zwischenbart & Co | Merchant |

Source: Database ((BOE: January 1856, 1858, 1860; April 1861 to July 1865; January 1866, 1868, 1870 - for agents) (Gores, 1860, 1864, 1867 - for trade descriptions)).

Appendix B. British Blockade Runners and their Owners.

This appendix lists all vessels identified as having made at least one attempt on the blockade while in the ownership of British interests. The appendix has been prepared from the "Lifeline Database", and the sources used, and the process by which the database has been constructed, is explained in section 3 of chapter 2 (pp. 50-53). Table 4.21 (p. 187) is drawn from the same source and can be read in conjunction with this appendix. A total of 92 ships are listed here, although this includes two listings for the *Hansa* ([a] and [b]) which was altered, and changed ownership, between runs. Where two vessels have the same name, they have been allocated a number in parenthesis. Tonnage, place of register, and ship register reference, are also shown.

| Ship Name | Owner | Reference | Tonnage | Registration |
|---------------------|--|-----------|---------|--------------|
| <i>Adela</i> | Arthur Bower Forwood. James Dorrington | 84/135/62 | 175 | Liverpool |
| <i>Agnes E. Fry</i> | James Cameron | BT/292/64 | 372 | London |
| <i>Anglia</i> | Alexander Duranty | 84/133/62 | 201 | Liverpool |
| <i>Annie</i> | Francis Muir | BT/12/64 | 263 | London |
| <i>Armstrong</i> | James Cameron | 21/101/64 | 214 | Glasgow |
| <i>Atalanta</i> | George Sutherland | BT/128/64 | 253 | London |
| <i>Badger</i> | Josiah Jones the younger | 86/132/64 | 232 | Liverpool |
| <i>Beatrice</i> | Edward James Lomnitz | 21/76/64 | 199 | Glasgow |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------|--|-----------|-----|-----------|
| <i>Bermuda</i> | Edwin Haigh | 84/166/61 | 716 | Liverpool |
| <i>Caledonia</i> | David McNutt. Alexander Watson | 17/25/56 | 115 | Glasgow |
| <i>Caroline</i> | James Carlin | 21/120/64 | 403 | Glasgow |
| <i>Ceres</i> | Francis Muir | 56/410/63 | 270 | London |
| <i>Charlotte</i> | Edgar Pinchback Stringer. Edward Pembroke | BT/327/64 | 403 | London |
| <i>City of Petersburg</i> | George Campbell. H.W.Radcliffe | 56/414/63 | 426 | London |
| <i>Condor</i> | Donald Macgregor | 21/98/64 | 283 | Glasgow |
| <i>Cronstadt</i> | Thomas Joseph Dobson | 16/27/63 | 231 | Hull |
| <i>Dee</i> | Francis Muir | 56/330/63 | 215 | London |
| <i>Deer</i> | Richard Phillips | 86/471/64 | 300 | Liverpool |
| <i>Despatch</i> | Lawrence: Edward, John Toulmin | 84/132/62 | 294 | Liverpool |
| <i>Diamond</i> | William Richards | 20/63/63 | 95 | Glasgow |
| <i>Dolphin</i> | William Joshua Grazebrook | 85/363/62 | 129 | Liverpool |
| <i>Don</i> | Francis Muir | 56/254/63 | 244 | London |
| <i>Eagle</i> | George Wigg | 17/29/56 | 76 | Glasgow |
| <i>Economist</i> | Richard George Bushby | 84/327/61 | 388 | Liverpool |
| <i>Edith</i> | Donald Macgregor | BT/86/64 | 239 | London |
| <i>Emma</i> | Thomas Stirling Begbie | 56/404/62 | 191 | London |
| <i>Emma Henry</i> | Henry Lafone | 21/128/64 | 242 | Glasgow |
| <i>Falcon</i> | Donald Macgregor | 21/71/64 | 285 | Glasgow |
| <i>Flamingo</i> | Donald Macgregor | 21/81/64 | 283 | Glasgow |
| <i>Flora (1)</i> | Edward Pembroke | 56/363/62 | 190 | London |
| <i>Flora (2)</i> | Mercantile Trading Company Ltd | 56/271/63 | 359 | London |
| <i>Florie</i> | Henry Lafone | 20/130/63 | 215 | Glasgow |
| <i>Georgiana</i> | Thomas Johnson | 85/12/63 | 407 | Liverpool |
| <i>Georgina McCaw</i> | Melchor George Klingender | 86/160/64 | 373 | Liverpool |
| <i>Gertrude</i> | Thomas Stirling Begbie | 56/16/63 | 191 | London |
| <i>Gladiator</i> | Melchor George Klingender | 84/161/62 | 467 | Liverpool |
| <i>Granite City</i> | Edward Pembroke | 56/403/62 | 327 | London |
| <i>Greyhound</i> | Henry Lafone | 86/529/63 | 290 | Liverpool |
| <i>Hansa [a]</i> | Francis Muir | 56/200/63 | 257 | London |
| <i>Hansa [b]</i> | Maurice Grant | BT/395/64 | 345 | London |
| <i>Hebe</i> | Francis Muir | 56/172/63 | 340 | London |
| <i>Hero</i> | William Whitworth | 84/100/62 | 764 | Liverpool |
| <i>Imogene</i> | James Carlin. Peter Denny. James Galbraith | 22/13/65 | 397 | Glasgow |
| <i>Index</i> | Edgar Pinchback Stringer. Edward Pembroke | 56/472/63 | 362 | London |
| <i>Ivanhoe</i> | William Boyle | BT/182/64 | 173 | London |
| <i>Julia</i> | Edward James Lomnitz | 21/136/63 | 117 | Glasgow |
| <i>Juno</i> | Neil Matheson | 19/42/60 | 83 | Glasgow |
| <i>Jupiter (1)</i> | Samuel Henry Bigland | 17/48/56 | 81 | Glasgow |
| <i>Jupiter (2)</i> | Robert James Brown. M.I Wilson | 52/80/57 | 91 | London |
| <i>Lilian</i> | Henry Lafone | 21/49/64 | 246 | Glasgow |
| <i>Little Ada</i> | Henry Lafone | 86/9/64 | 94 | Liverpool |
| <i>Lloyds</i> | John Fleming | 55/102/62 | 743 | London |
| <i>Lodona</i> | Zachariah Charles Pearson | 16/23/62 | 573 | Hull |
| <i>Lucy</i> | Edward James Lomnitz | 85/412/63 | 192 | Liverpool |
| <i>Lynx</i> | Richard Wright | 86/154/64 | 233 | Liverpool |
| <i>Mail</i> | Samuel Henry Bigland | 19/87/60 | 99 | Glasgow |
| <i>Mary Anne</i> | Charles Wigg | 20/58/63 | 150 | Glasgow |
| <i>Mary Bowers</i> | Henry Lafone | 21/75/64 | 220 | Glasgow |
| <i>Mary Celestia</i> | James Cameron | BT/164/64 | 207 | London |
| <i>Modern Greece</i> | Zachariah Charles Pearson | 53/206/59 | 512 | London |
| <i>Night Hawk</i> | Edward Lawrence | 86/355/64 | 360 | Liverpool |
| <i>Norseman</i> | Sir Samuel Norton Pelo | 55/92/62 | 58 | London |
| <i>North Heath</i> | William Boyle | BT/32/64 | 343 | London |
| <i>Owl</i> | Charles Kuhn Prioleau | 86/325/64 | 330 | Liverpool |
| <i>Patras</i> | Zachariah Charles Pearson | 54/245/59 | 179 | London |
| <i>Pelican</i> | John Harbottle | BT/424/64 | 328 | London |
| <i>Pevensey</i> | Edgar Pinchback Stringer. Edward Pembroke | BT/88/64 | 455 | London |
| <i>Phantom</i> | William Thompson Mann | 85/193/63 | 209 | Liverpool |
| <i>Presto</i> | Mercantile Trading Company Ltd | 56/426/63 | 164 | London |
| <i>Ptarmigan</i> | Donald Macgregor | 21/87/64 | 283 | Glasgow |
| <i>Rattlesnake</i> | Edwin Lister Golborne | BT/480/64 | 259 | London |
| <i>Rothsay Castle</i> | David McNutt | 19/33/61 | 84 | Glasgow |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------|--|-----------|-----|-----------|
| <i>Rouen</i> | Peter Denny | 21/39/64 | 165 | Glasgow |
| <i>Scotia</i> | Arthur Bower Forwood. James.Dorrington | 84/125/62 | 202 | Liverpool |
| <i>Spunkie</i> | Edward James Lomnitz | 20/59/63 | 80 | Glasgow |
| <i>Stag</i> | Phillips Richard | 86/440/64 | 299 | Liverpool |
| <i>Stormy Petrel</i> | John Toulmin Lawrence | 21/105/64 | 220 | Glasgow |
| <i>SunBeam</i> | Henry Lafone | 52/13/58 | 205 | London |
| <i>Talisman</i> | William Boyle | BT/304/64 | 173 | London |
| <i>Thistle (1)</i> | George Wigg | 19/63/59 | 206 | Glasgow |
| <i>Thistle (2)</i> | James Archibald Ker Wilson | 20/65/63 | 305 | Glasgow |
| <i>Tristram Shandy</i> | Matthew Isaac Wilson | 86/77/64 | 211 | Liverpool |
| <i>Tubal Cain</i> | George Samuel Sanderson | 83/215/60 | 194 | Liverpool |
| <i>Venus</i> | Francis Muir | 56/135/63 | 365 | London |
| <i>Vesta</i> | Francis Muir | 56/478/63 | 262 | London |
| <i>Virgin</i> | European Trading Company Limited | BT/197/64 | 291 | London |
| <i>Virginia</i> | James Cameron | BT/306/64 | 455 | London |
| <i>Vixen</i> | European Trading Company Limited | BT/384/64 | 305 | London |
| <i>Vulture</i> | European Trading Company Limited | BT/380/64 | 335 | London |
| <i>Wild Dayrell</i> | Edward Lawrence | 85/450/63 | 212 | Liverpool |
| <i>Wild Rover</i> | John Toulmin Lawrence | 21/93/64 | 246 | Glasgow |
| <i>Will o' the Wisp</i> | John Toulmin Lawrence | 20/116/63 | 117 | Glasgow |

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. MANUSCRIPTS

1.1 H.M. Customs and Excise Ship Registers for the Port of Liverpool

(National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside: Merseyside Maritime Museum Archive).

C/EX/L/4/80 (1855-56)

C/EX/L/4/81 (1856-58)

C/EX/L/4/82 (1858-59)

C/EX/L/4/83 (1859-61)

C/EX/L/4/84 (1861-62)

C/EX/L/4/85 (1862-63)

C/EX/L/4/86 (1863-65)

C/EX/L/4/87 (1865-66)

C/EX/L/4/88 (1866-67)

C/EX/L/4/89 (1867-70)

Liverpool Customs Registers List and Index

1.2 H.M. Customs and Excise London Register of British Ships

(Public Record Office, Kew)

Cust 130/51 (1855-56)

Cust 130/52 (1856-58)

Cust 130/53 (1858-59)

Cust 130/54 (1859-61)

Cust 130/55 (1861-62)

Cust 130/56 (1862-63)

1.3 Board of Trade Transcriptions and Transactions to Chief Registrar of Shipping (London)

(Public Record Office, Kew)

Transcriptions BT 108/11 (1864-65)

Transactions BT 109/84 (1864)

Transactions BT 109/87 (1864)

Transactions BT 109/88 (1865)

Transactions BT 109/90 (1865)

Transactions BT 109/92 (1865)

1.4 H.M. Customs and Excise Merchant Shipping Registers for the Port of Glasgow

(Strathclyde Regional Archive, Glasgow)

CE/59/11/17 (1855-57)

CE/59/11/18 (1857-59)

CE/59/11/19 (1859-61)

CE/59/11/20 (1861-63)

CE/59/11/21 (1863-65)

CE/59/11/22 (1865)

1.5 H.M Customs and Excise Registers of Shipping for the Port of Hull

(Hull Record Office)

DPC/1/14 (1855-58)

DPC/1/15 (1858-61)

DPC/1/16 (1861-63)

DPC/1/17 (1863-65)

1.6 Board of Trade Company Liquidations

(Public Record Office, Kew)

BT/31/876/898c British and American Steam Navigation Company Limited

BT/31/1108/2160c British and American Steam Navigation Company Limited
(second incorporation)

BT/31/940/1219c European Trading Company Limited

BT/31/796/511c Liverpool, Western and Spanish-American Steam Packet Company
Limited

BT/31/793/494c Mercantile Trading Company Limited

BT/31/849/790c West India and Pacific Steam Ship Company Limited

1.7 Other Manuscript Sources

Bankruptcy B/6/122, Country District General Docket Book, April 65 - Feb. 67 No. 3,
PRO.

Death Certificate of Melchor George Klingender (date of death 6/2/1881).

Letters of Administration with the Will of Francis Boulton, 12th May 1886.

Mersey Dock and Harbour Board collection, Dock revenue statements (1856 to 1870),
MMM. The author is indebted to Dr Graeme J. Milne who provided figures from his
own unpublished research on these sources.

Probate of the Will of Henry Lafone, 17th August 1917.

Rankin Gilmour & Co Accounts Book, 1867-73, MSS , DX/726, MMM

2. PRINTED SOURCES

2.1 Newspapers (Customs Bills of Entry)

(National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside, Merseyside Maritime Museum
Archive. Except: * - British Museum Newspaper Library, Colindale; ** - Hull Central
Library; *** - Newcastle Central Library).

Bristol (1858)

Bristol (1860)

Bristol (1861)

Bristol (1862)

Bristol (1863)

Bristol (1864)

Bristol (1865)

Bristol (1866)

Bristol (1868)

Clyde (1858)

Clyde (1860)
Clyde (1861)
Clyde (1862)
Clyde (1863)
Clyde (1864)
Clyde (1865)
Clyde (1866)
Clyde (1868)
Dublin (1860)
Dublin (1863)
Dublin (1865)
Hull (1861)**
Hull (1862)**
Hull (1863)**
Hull (1864)**
Hull (1865)**
Liverpool 'A' (1856)
Liverpool 'A' (1858)
Liverpool 'A' (1860)
Liverpool 'A' (1861)
Liverpool 'A' (1862)
Liverpool 'A' (1863)
Liverpool 'A' (1864)
Liverpool 'A' (1865)
Liverpool 'A' (1866)
Liverpool 'A' (1868)
Liverpool 'A' (1870)
London 'A' (1858)
London 'A' (1860)
London 'A' (1861)
London 'A' (1862)
London 'A' (1863)
London 'A' (1864)
London 'A' (1865)*
London 'A' (1866)
London 'A' (1868)
London 'B' (1856)
London 'B' (1860)
London 'B' (1861)
London 'B' (1862)
London 'B' (1863)
London 'B' (1864)
London 'B' (1865)
London 'B' (1866)
London 'B' (1868)
Tyne (1861)***
Tyne (1862)***
Tyne 1863)***

Tyne (1864)***

Tyne (1865)***

2.2 Periodicals (Gores Commercial Directory)

(Wallesey Central Library, Merseyside)

Gores (1855)

Gores (1860)

Gores (1867)

Gores (1870)

Gores (1880)

Gores (1890)

Gores (1912)

Gores (1946)

2.3 British Parliamentary Papers

(Hull University Library)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1856)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1857)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1858)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1859)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1860)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1861)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1862)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1863)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1864)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1865)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1866)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1867)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1868)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1869)

Annual Statements of Trade of the U.K (1870)

2.4 Diaries and Memoirs

Bulloch, J.D., *The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, or, How the Confederate Cruisers were Equipped*, 2 vols, (London, 2nd edn, 1959).

Hoole, W.S. (ed), *Confederate Foreign Agent: The European Dairy of Major E.S Anderson*, (Alabama, 1976).

Huse, C., *The Supplies for the Confederate Army: How they were Obtained in Europe and how Paid for*, (Boston, 1904).

Taylor, T.E., *Running the Blockade: A Personal Narrative of Adventure, Risks, and Escapes During the American Civil War*, (London, 2nd edn, 1896).

Watson, W., *The Adventures of a Blockade Runner, or, Trade in Time of War*, (London, 1892).

2.5 Other Printed Sources

The Liverpool Review, April 3 1886, Liverpool Record Office, Hf 050 Liv.

Post Office London Directory, 1864.

Vandier, F.E. (ed), *Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda, 1861-1865: Letters and Cargo Manifests*, (Texas, 1947).

SECONDARY SOURCES

1. BOOKS

- Albion R.G., *The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860*, (Connecticut, 1961).
- Behrend A., *Portrait of a Family Firm: Bahr Behrend & Co, 1793-1945*, (Liverpool, 1970).
- Best G., *Mid-Victorian Britain, 1851-1875*, (Britain, 1971).
- Boyce G.H., *Information, mediation and institutional development: The rise of large-scale enterprise in British shipping, 1870-1919*, (Manchester, 1995).
- Bradlee F.B.C., *Blockade Running During the Civil War*, (Massachusetts, 1925).
- Brown J.C., *A Hundred Years of Merchant Banking. A History of Brown Brothers and Company, Brown Shipley and Company and the Allied Firms*, (New York, 1909).
- Bruchey S., *Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy: 1790-1860*, (U.S.A, 1967).
- Buck, N.S., *The Development of the Organisation of Anglo-American Trade, 1800-1850*, (Yale, reprint, 1969).
- Chandler, G., *Liverpool Shipping: A Short History*, (London, 1960).
- Chapman S., *The Rise of Merchant Banking*, (Britain, 1984).
- Checkland S.G., *The Rise of Industrial Society in England, 1815-1885*, (London, 1964).
- Cline H.F., *The United States and Mexico*, (New York, 1963).
- Daddysman J., *The Matamoros Trade; Confederate Commerce, Diplomacy and Intrigue*, (Delaware, 1984).
- Daunton M.J., *Coal Metropolis: Cardiff, 1870-1914*, (Leicester, 1977).
- Davis R., *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade*, (Leicester, 1979).
- Davis R., *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, (London, 1962).
- Edward E.J., *Shipbrokers and the Law*, (Glasgow, 1957).
- Ellison, M., *Support for Secession: Lancashire and the American Civil War*, (Chicago, 1972).
- Ellison, T., *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain: Including a History of the Liverpool Cotton Market and of the Liverpool Cotton Brokers Association*, (London, 1886).
- Gibson Martin, W.A., *Century of Liverpool's Commerce: A History of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, 1850-1950*, (Liverpool, 1950).
- Gray L.C., *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*, Volume II (Washington, 1933).
- Hammond M.B., *The Cotton Industry*, (New York, 1897).
- Henderson W.O., *The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 1861-1865*, (Manchester, 1934).
- Holland R. H., *Partnership Law and Accounts*, (London, 3rd edn., 1946).
- Hollett D., *Fast Passage to Australia*, (London, 1986).
- Hyde, F.E., *Liverpool and the Mersey: An Economic History of a Port, 1700-1970*, (Newton Abbot, 1971).
- Hyde F.E., *Shipping Enterprise and Management, 1830-1939. Harrisons of Liverpool*, (Liverpool, 1967).

- Jackson G., *The History and Archaeology of Ports*, (Surrey, 1983).
- Jones C., *Pioneer Ship Owners*, (Liverpool, 1938).
- Lester, R.I., *Confederate Finance and Purchasing in Great Britain*, (Virginia, 1975).
- Lloyd-Jones R. and Lewis M. J., *Manchester and the Age of the Factory* (Britain, 1988).
- McPherson J.M., *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, (New York, Oxford, 1988).
- Mann, J.A., *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain*, (London, new impression, 1968).
- Marriner S., *Rathbones of Liverpool, 1845-73*, (Liverpool, 1861).
- More C., *The Industrial Age: Economy and Society in Britain 1750-1995*, (U.K, 2nd edn, 1997).
- North, D.C., *The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860*, (New York, 1966).
- Orchard B.G., *Liverpool's Legion of Honour*, (Birkenhead, 1893).
- Owsley, F.L., *King Cotton Diplomacy*, (Chicago, 2nd edn., revised, 1959).
- Powell, L.H., *History of the Liverpool Steamship Owners Association, 1858-1958*, (Liverpool, 1958).
- Rankin J., *A History of our Firm*, (Liverpool, 1921).
- Robinson, C.M., *Shark of the Confederacy: The Story of the CSS Alabama*, (London, 1995).
- Roland C.P., *The Confederacy*, (Chicago, 1960).
- Shannon F.A., *The Farmer's Last Frontier. Agriculture, 1860-1897*, (U.S.A, 1963).
- Shingleton, R., *High Seas Confederate: The Life and Times of John Newland Maffitt*, (South Carolina, 1994).
- Soley J.R., *The Blockade and the Cruisers*, (New York, 1886).
- Thornton, R.H., *British Shipping*, (Cambridge, 2nd edn, 1959).
- Todd, J.A. ed., *The Shipping World*, (London, 1929).
- Tyler R.C., *Santiago Vidaurri and the Southern Confederacy*, (Texas, 1973).
- Ville S., *English Shipowning during the Industrial Revolution. Michael Henley and Son, London Shipowners 1770-1830*, (Manchester, 1987).
- Wise, S.R., *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War*, (South Carolina, 1988).
- Zimmermann, E.W., *Ocean Shipping*, (New York, 1923).

2 ARTICLES AND ESSAYS

- Burton V., "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade" in *Liverpool Shipping, Trade & Industry*, ed. V. Burton, (Merseyside, 1989), pp. 26-67.
- Carson E., "Sources for Maritime History (1): Customs Bills of Entry", *Maritime History*, 1 (1971), pp.176-189.
- Collingwood A.G., "From Brigs to Containers", *Sea Breezes*, 51 (Jan-June 1977), pp. 297-322.
- Cottrell P. L., "The steamship on the Mersey, 1815-80 investment and ownership" in *Shipping, Trade and Commerce*, eds. P. L. Cottrell and D. H. Aldcroft, (Leicester, 1981). pp. 137-163.
- Delaney R.W., "Matamoros, Port for Texas during the Civil War.", *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 58 (1955), pp. 473-487.

- Diamond W., "Imports of the Confederate Government from Europe and Mexico," *Journal of Southern History*, V1 (November 1940), pp. 470-503.
- Dumbell S., "The Origin of Cotton Futures" *Economic History*, Vol. 1 (1926-29), pp. 259-267.
- Fayle C. Ernest "The Employment of British Shipping" in *The Trade Winds. A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 1793-1815*, ed. C. Northcote Parkinson (London, 1948), pp. 72-86
- Graham G.S., "The Ascendancy of The Sailing Ship, 1850-85," *Economic History Review*, IX (1956-57), pp. 74-88.
- Henderson A. J., "Eleven Decades of Maritime Service", *Sea Breezes*, Vol. 9 (Jan-June 1950), pp. 350-369.
- Henderson, W.O., "The American Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool", *Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire*, 85 (1935), pp.84-92.
- Hidy, R.W., "The organisation and Functions of Anglo-American Merchant Bankers, 1815-1860", *Journal of Economic History*, 1 (1941), pp.53-66.
- Hopcroft, G.E., "Liverpool and the Blockade Runners", *Mersey*, 5 (1929), pp.248-250.
- Jackson G., "The Ports" in *Transport in Victorian Britain*, eds. M. Freeman and D.H. Aldcroft, (Manchester, 1988), pp. 218-252.
- Jarvis, R.C., "Fractional Shareholding in British Merchant Ships with Special Reference to the 64ths", *Mariner's Mirror*, 45 (1959), pp.301-319.
- Jones S., 'Shipowning in Boston, Lincolnshire, 1836-1848', *Mariners Mirror*, 65 (1979), pp. 339-349.
- Knick Harley C., "Aspects of the Economics of Shipping, 1850-1913" in *Change and Adaptation in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting, (Newfoundland, 1985), pp. 169-186.
- Lester, R.I., "The Procurement of Confederate Blockade Runners and other Vessels in Great Britain During the American Civil War", *Mariners Mirror*, 61 (1975), pp.255-270.
- Lester, R.I., "Construction and Purchase of Confederate Cruisers in Great Britain During the American Civil War", *Mariners Mirror*, 63 (1977), pp.71-92.
- Neal F., 'Liverpool Shipping in the Early Nineteenth Century' in *Liverpool and Merseyside: Essays in the Economic and Social History of the Port and its Hinterland*, ed. J. R. Harris, (Liverpool, 1969), pp. 147-181.
- Palmer S.R., "The British Shipping Industry, 1850-1914" in *Change and Adaptation in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting, (Newfoundland, 1985), pp. 89-114.
- Palmer S.R., "The British Coal Export Trade, 1850-1913," in *Volumes not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World Trades*, eds., D Alexander and R Ommer, (Newfoundland, 1979).
- Palmer S.R., 'Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50', *Maritime History*, II (1972), pp. 46-68.
- Pelzer, J.D., "Liverpool and the American Civil War", *History Today*, (1990), pp.47-53.
- Price M.W., "Blockade Running as a Business in South Carolina", *American Neptune* Vol. IX (January 1949), pp. 31-62.
- Price M.W., "Ships that tested the Blockade of the Carolina Ports, 1861-1865," *American Neptune*, (July 1948), pp.196-241.

- Safford J.J., "The Decline of the American Merchant Marine, 1850-1914: An Historiographic Appraisal", in *Change and Adaption in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century*, eds. L.R. Fischer and G.E. Panting, (Newfoundland, 1985), pp. 53-85.
- Shannon, H.A., "The First Five Thousand Limited Companies and their Duration", *Economic History*, 2 (1930-33), pp.396-424.
- Smith-Hughes J., "Forgotten Fleets: Forwoods of Liverpool and London", *Sea Breezes* 42 (Jan-June 1968), pp. 150-153.
- Starkey D.J., "The Ports, Seaborne Trade and Shipping Industry of South Devon, 1786-1914" in *The New Maritime History of Devon*, Vol. II, eds. M. Duffy et al, (Exeter, 1994), pp. 32-47.
- Still W.N., "A Naval Sieve: The Union Blockade in the Civil War," *Naval War College Review*, XXXVI (May-June 1983), pp.38-45.
- Thistlethwaite F., "Atlantic Partnership", *The Economic History Review*, VII, (1954), pp. 1-17.
- Tyler R.C., "Santiago Vidaurri and the Confederacy," *The Americas*, XXVI (July 1969), pp. 66-76.
- Ville S, "James Kirton, Shipping Agent", *Mariners Mirror*, Vol. 67 (1981), pp. 149-162.
- Ville S, "Shipping in the Port of Newcastle, 1780-1800", *Journal of Transport History*, 9 (1988), pp. 60-77.
- Ville S, 'Patterns of Shipping Investment in the Port of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1750-1850', *Northern History*, XXV (1989), pp. 205-221.
- Wardle A.C., "Mersey Built Blockade Runners of the American Civil War", *Mariners Mirror*, 28 (1942), pp.179-188.
- Williams D.M., "Merchanting in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Liverpool Timber Trade", *Business History*, 8 (1966), pp.103-121.
- Williams D.M, "Liverpool Merchants and the Cotton Trade 1820-1850" in *Liverpool and Merseyside: Essays in the economic and social history of the port and its hinterland*, ed. J.R Harris, (Liverpool, 1969), pp. 182-211.
- Williams D.M, "Bulk Trades and the Development of the Port of Liverpool in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century" in *Liverpool Shipping, Trade & Industry*, ed. V. Burton, (Merseyside, 1989), pp. 8-25.
- Williams D.M., "The Shipping of the North Atlantic Cotton Trade in the Mid-Nineteenth Century", in *Volumes not Values: Canadian Sailing Ships and World Trades*, eds. D. Alexander and R. Ommer, (Newfoundland, 1979), pp. 303-329.
- Windham W.T., "The Problem of Supply in the Trans-Mississippi Confederacy," *Journal of Southern History*, XXVII (May 1961), pp. 149-168.

3. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

- Lindsay S., "Lafone: A Remarkable Family" (Liverpool, 1989), unpublished typescript, LRO, Hq 929.2 LAF.
- Potted history of Rankin Gilmour & Co, prepared by MMM.
- Surdam D.G., "Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War" (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 1994).
- Woods E. A., *Liverpool Fleet Lists*, Vol. 1, Typescript , L.R.O, Hq 337.5 Woo.

4 REFERENCE WORKS

Carvers Carriage by Sea, ed. J.S. Henderson, (London, 7th edn., 1925).

Chorley & Giles Shipping Law, (London, 1947).

Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World, (Columbia, Forth edn., 1956).

Dictionary of Nautical Words and Terms, ed. C.W.T.Layton, (Glasgow, 4th edn. revised, 1994).

5. OTHER PRINTED SOURCES

Bahr Behrend & Co Ltd, *Over Two Centuries of Service to Shipowners, Exporters and Importers*, (Liverpool, an in house firm publication).

Lickbarrow v. Mason (1794), in *English Reports* vol. 101, pp. 380-382.