

THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL:

THE CRISIS OF SUBJECTIVITY AND THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHANGE

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by

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Behind every reason for despair, one must  
discover a reason for hope.

(E. Germaine, A Biographical Sketch of Abram Leon,  
in A. Leon, The Jewish Question, New York, 1970, p.19)

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### Dedication

To Cherb

## I N T R O D U C T I O N

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The Frankfurt Institute of Social Research represents an intellectual response to the crisis of Marxian socialism which began in the inter-war period of the twentieth century with the rise of Fascism and Stalinism and the defeat of the European Revolution. The crisis of Marxism can be defined in terms of the problem of the self-emancipation of the working class on an international scale and the status of Marxism as an emancipatory social science. The definition of 'crisis' used in and throughout this study deviates from orthodox Marxism to the extent that it is based not upon a causal teleology but upon a finalistic teleology.(1) In this sense the objective of scientific socialism is attainable through a knowledge of the intellectual and material pre-conditions for a socialist society and the progressive development of the consciousness of this goal by the working class on an international scale.(2) Contrary to the positivistic notion of historical laws, this conception acknowledges the dialectic of human consciousness and objective social conditions. In the last analysis, according to this formulation, it is not the economic base which determines the superstructural practices of a society in a mechanistic fashion, it is rather the historical project of a society's respective social classes, groups, institutions and organisations in the struggle for existence.(3) As Marcuse has written, the 'obsolescence' of Marxism in the era of late capitalism does not invalidate the Marxian

theory; it is something which for an historical and dialectical theory is internally related to the changes in social reality itself.(4) A 'crisis', then, can represent not a necessary decline but a process in which both decline and renewal are inherent potentialities. (5)

The ultimate outcome of any historical range of possibilities depends upon objective and subjective factors in social existence. The problem of the subjective factor in radical social change as conceptualized by the Frankfurt School is the focal point of this study. The social theory of the School arose as a part of intellectual formation which has been described as 'Western Marxism'.(6) This intellectual formation has been widely understood as a response to the major socio-political events of the first half of the twentieth century, the First World War, the Russian Revolutions of 1905, and 1917, the rise of Fascism in central and southern Europe, the decline of the Russian Revolution, and the apparent inability of the working classes in the advanced capitalist states to mobilise and respond to these socio-political events and the threat of the Second World War on an international scale. Thus it is necessary to locate the Frankfurt School within its historical and socio-political context and the intellectual formation of Western Marxism in order to clarify the basis of its theoretical trajectory and thus define the problem of the subjective factor in radical social change in the context of the School's particular response to the crisis of Marxism.

### Western Marxism and Frankfurt School

In the revolutionary period 1917-1923 in Europe, theory and practice met, in the sense that Socialist parties and ideas gained a mass working class following and decisively influenced the course of twentieth century history. In the tide of this upheaval in European history and society, Western Marxism began to emerge.

The general historical and thematic context of Western Marxism has been given its broadest survey and assessment by Perry Anderson. According to Anderson, this historical context is characterized by the isolation and bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian Revolution, the subsequent integration of the working classes of Western Europe after unsuccessful uprisings, and the growth of Fascism in central and southern Europe. As a consequence, Anderson argues, Western Marxism must be viewed as a product of defeat:

The hidden hallmark of Western Marxism as a whole is thus that it is a product of defeat. The failure of the socialist revolution to spread outside Russia, cause and corruption inside Russia, is the common background to the entire theoretical tradition of this period. Its major works were, without exception, produced in situations of political isolation and despair.(7)

However, on the grounds of Anderson's own argument, it can be argued that this picture of Western Marxism as a product of defeat is partial and undialectical. Anderson writes, for example:

Today the full experience of the past fifty years of imperialism remains a central and unavoidable sum still to be reckoned up by the workers' movement. Western Marxism has been an integral part of that history, and no new generation of revolutionary socialists in the imperialist countries can simply ignore it or bypass it. To settle accounts with this

tradition, both learning and breaking from it, is thus one of the preconditions of a local renewal of Marxian theory today. (8)

The question inevitably arises: What is the remaining significance of Western Marxism - and hence the Frankfurt School - if it is a product of defeat? It would be a questionable procedure, as Anderson himself writes, to ignore this intellectual formation in light of the 'local renewal of Marxian theory today'. This, however, implies something of positive value. It is a hallmark of Anderson's rigorous scholarship on the one hand, and theoretical weakness in conceptualizing Western Marxism on the other, that his own interpretation is a variance with the research he assembles. Thus, Anderson's assessment of Western Marxism tends to be interpreted in terms of the break in the theory-praxis nexus and, as an intellectual formation, diverging from the traditional concerns of classical Marxism. The main characteristic of this 'detour' is a concentration on the 'social superstructure' at the expense of political economy. Anderson writes: 'The progressive relinquishment of economic or political structures as the central concerns of theory was accompanied by a basic shift in the whole center of gravity of European Marxism towards philosophy'. (9) Consequently, Anderson continues:

Western Marxism as a whole thus paradoxically inverted the trajectory of Marx's development itself. Where the founder of historical materialism moved progressively from philosophy to politics and then economics, as the central terrain of his thought, the successors of the tradition that emerged after 1920 increasingly turned back from economics and politics to philosophy, abandoning direct engagement with what had been the great concerns of the mature Marx, nearly as completely as

he had abandoned direct pursuit of the discursive issues of his youth.(10)

This position is adopted by a number of important writers, such as Geran Therborn, who makes this the basis of his critique of the Frankfurt School. Therborn writes:

Before attempting a general historical assessment of the Frankfurt School, let us summarize the argument of this article hitherto. The thought of the School has evolved, and marked divergencies between its members have appeared in the years since the War. Nevertheless, there is a persistent underlying structure. This takes the form of a double reduction of science and politics to philosophy.(11)

Again, we are led to question this position which ultimately describes the Frankfurt School's work as a reductionist reversion from 'science and politics to philosophy' (12) because Therborn also reveals the achievement of the Frankfurt School thus:

It has....been able to develop a powerful and well articulated anti-capitalist ideology, and this must be numbered among its achievements. It has helped to capture that dimension of Marx's thought which deals with the qualitative aspects of work and human relations in capitalist society. As one of the School's severest critics, Lucio Colletti has emphasized, neither the Second International nor the Comintern preserved this dimension. The decisive innovator here was Lukacs, but the Frankfurt School played an almost pioneering role, along with Wilhelm Reich, in enriching these ideas by adding a psycho-analytic dimension to them. It has also achieved a series of often brilliant and incisive critiques of bourgeois culture - Adorno's greatest contribution. (13)

On grounds presented by Anderson and Therborn themselves, it can be argued that their positions are partial and internally inconsistent.(14) The question arises: How can the Frankfurt School

be understood in terms of its achievements as well as its flaws? Moreover, in light of its achievements, can the Frankfurt School be conceptualized as a detour from Marxism? By sketching the challenge to Anderson's and Therborn's critique we may introduce the basis of the alternative conceptual framework adopted in this study.

### The Frankfurt School

In a recent paper which attempts to define the lasting contribution of the Frankfurt School, Peter Dews and Peter Osborne argue that an adequate assessment of the School must be based upon an understanding of it as an interdisciplinary project. Their argument casts considerable doubt upon Anderson's and Therborn's position. They write:

from the beginning of Horkheimer's directorship in 1930, until the early 1940s at least, the project of the Frankfurt School was to integrate the results of specialized social sciences into a comprehensive account of the development of contemporary capitalist society. It is within this project that the idea of critique arises. The nature of the project, and the diagnosis of intellectual trends to which it formed a response, are clearly presented by Horkheimer in his Inaugural Lecture of January, 1931. Horkheimer's fundamental aim was both to overcome that explanatory deficiency of the individual social sciences, which resulted from their very specialization (but was masked by a positivistic self-consciousness), and to correct the dogmatism of traditional philosophy by confronting it with the results of empirical research.(15)

The essayist, literary critic, and associate of the Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin, wrote that:

one cannot say that the group...was founded on a specific field...(Rather)...it was based on the idea that the teaching about society can only be developed in the most tightly

integrated connection of disciplines; above all, economics, psychology, history and philosophy.(16)

Additionally, David Held provides a comprehensive description of the main themes in Horkheimer's inaugural address:

Three themes dominate all others in Horkheimer's address. The first, already described, suggests the necessity of re-specifying 'the great philosophical questions' in an interdisciplinary research programme. The second theme, more implicit but made clearer in the later essays, is a call for a rejection of orthodox Marxism and its substitution by a reconstructed understanding of Marx's project. The third emphasized the necessity for a social theory to explicate the set of interconnections (mediations) that make possible the reproduction and transformation of society, economy, culture and consciousness.(17)

According to these, more balanced and informed, definitions, then, the criticism that the social theory of the Frankfurt School is a 'philosophical reduction' of Marxist 'science' is misplaced. In fact, Horkheimer argues not against 'science' as such, contrary to Therborn's assumption, but against the reduction of Marxism to a variant of positivism. Hence Horkheimer could write in regard to the 'material base of society': 'Economism, to which critical theory is often reduced, does not consist in giving too much importance to the economy, but in giving it too narrow a scope.'(18)

Similarly, and common to all the critical theorists, Marcuse's rejection of empiricism (though not empirical research) in One Dimensional Man is made on the grounds that empiricism cannot effectively account for the facts in social analysis.(19)



Hence it can be argued that Therborn's and Anderson's viewpoint cannot provide an adequate basis to define Western Marxism in general and the significance, project, and trajectory of the Frankfurt School, in particular. It tends to leave unchallenged precisely the economic concepts employed by the School, and distorts the real significance of the emphasis of critical theory on the social superstructure. When the interdisciplinary basis of the School's programme is analysed, it is clear that the social function of philosophy as defined by the critical theorists is not grasped by critics who would like to believe that Marx's critique of political economy formerly abolished the concerns of philosophy at the stroke of a pen.

The initial task of this study, then, is to investigate the Frankfurt School's response in social theory to the defeats of the working class in the inter-war years (the primary formative period of the Frankfurt School of critical theory) with regard to the key themes of subjectivity and social change.<sup>(20)</sup> The following chapters attempt to elucidate the 'historical and theoretical significance of the Frankfurt School on the one hand, and the general set of relationships between knowledge, critique and political practice, on the other'<sup>(21)</sup> in terms of the School's project: a contribution towards the reconstruction of Marxism. Hence the role of philosophy is examined in order to understand the import of the various responses of the critical theorists to the reconstruction of Marxism in an era of defeat. Such an approach inevitably involves challenging the assumptions contained in Anderson's and Therborn's assessments and interpretations. Hence

this study will argue, first that the trajectory of the Frankfurt School is best understood as that of a representative tendency of Western Marxism, and secondly that it must be interpreted in terms of the dialectic of hope and despair in its historical and socio-political indices. For Western Marxism is a product of the discrepancy between the most advanced consciousness and necessity for radical social change, and the actual consciousness of the working class. Significantly, it was the grounds provided by the meeting of theory and practice in the revolutionary period 1917-1923 which enabled Lukacs to reconstruct the Marx-Hegel relation and the importance of the dialectic, as well as to challenge the economic determinism prevalent in the dominant interpretation of Marxism of the day.

Thus it will be argued that it is the dialectic between success and defeat which best contextualizes the trajectory of the Frankfurt School and its response to the crisis of subjectivity. Consequently, Phil Slater's focus on the break in the theory-praxis nexus cannot be taken as the decisive pivot around which a critical assessment of the Frankfurt School's response to the problem of subjectivity can be based.(22) On the same grounds, neither is Vincent Geogeghan's otherwise incisive work able to account for the trajectory of (Marcuse's) critical theory in terms of the criteria of 'authentic existence'. This existentialist concept fails to grasp the social, economic, and political factors historically shaping the formation of the Frankfurt School.(23) Moreover, Geogeghan's work is limited insofar as it focuses specifically upon Marcuse's social theory. From another angle, Barry Katz examines Marcuse in terms of

the 'primacy of aesthetics'.(24) Katz provides an interesting intellectual biography of Marcuse but fails to elucidate the specific context of Western Marxism in whose orbit critical theory was formed, nor does he give adequate historical grounding to his analysis. Consequently, the vantage point of aesthetics fails to illuminate the dialectic between hope and despair in the social theory of the Frankfurt School as a whole, let alone come close to assessing its validity.

Although Martin Jay provides a more sociologically comprehensive account of Adorno without losing sight of the dialectic between hope and despair (25), as does Douglas Kellner on Marcuse (26), these studies, along with John Fry's more empirical testing of Marcuse's major economic and social propositions (27), do not extend to an assessment of the major themes of the Frankfurt School as a whole.(28) Paul Connerton's essay (29) provides an intellectual history of the Frankfurt School in terms of the dialectic of enlightenment thesis, but while Connerton traces influences upon the intellectual background of the School, such as Hegel, Kant, Marx, Schopenhauer, Simmel, Weber and Lukacs, he tends to reduce the dialectic of hope and despair to the Enlightenment whose concept of the realization of the human essence the critical theorists rejected as a metaphysical abstraction.(30) Also, while Connerton argues that the School built their concept of critical theory directly upon Lukacs' notion of the proletariat as the subject/object of history, it can be argued that, in fact, the critical theorists either rejected this thesis or maintained severe reservations about it.(31) In this respect too, Connerton's essay neglects the interdisciplinary basis

of the School's research programme as the foundation for the construction of critical theory which went beyond the speculative ideas of the Enlightenment social philosophers.(32) Moreover, Connerton's study neglects the socio-political context of what, arguably, represents the decisive factor in the genesis and development of critical theory, namely the impact of the concrete struggles of the inter-war years. Despite that fact, Connerton has furnished a very insightful survey and discussion of the intellectual background to the School's thought and can by no means be dismissed.

There remains, however, the residue of a philosophical relativism in Connerton's approach which tends to reduce the significance of social thought to the history of ideas. This approach which is rejected in this study for one in which the essential, antagonistic unity between history, political practice, and theory remains of fundamental importance.(33) Finally, Connerton's study also neglects Fromm's contribution to critical theory and thus, by concentrating on intellectual history, remains incomplete and unable to place itself in a position to discuss and effectively address the current debates concerning the significance of critical theory today, although he has made a significant contribution to the analysis of the implications of Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment thesis.

David Held's Introduction to Critical Theory (1980) and Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination (1973) provide by far the most authoritative, comprehensive, and sophisticated assessments of the

Frankfurt School. Held's work accounts for the writings of the critical theorists in terms of their respective similarities and divergencies in relation to a common interdisciplinary project of the reconstruction of European Marxism. Thus Held pays more attention to the socio-historical context of the formation of critical theory in the inter-war period whilst maintaining a sensitivity towards the respective concepts of critical theory developed within the School. However, Held's work is primarily expository and he devotes little space to a discussion of Western Marxism, the influence of Lukacs and Korsch, and he refrains from exploring the inconsistencies of Horkheimer's, Adorno's and Marcuse's relation to Erich Fromm's critique of orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis from the mid 1930s. Moreover, the Frankfurt School's implicit political evaluation of the struggles of the inter-war period is not fully explored in relation to the problem of revolutionary subjectivity, although Held does present a sociological challenge to the notion of the integration of the working class (which is drawn upon in this study), based on the concept of 'pragmatic acquiescence...because few alternatives are seen to the status quo'.(34) As this study attempts to show, these aspects of the formation and development of critical theory have been incompletely addressed and they shed considerable light upon an assessment which attempts to take the discussion forward. For example, the weaknesses in classical Marxism's concept of the individual and the philosophical and cultural dimension and the critical theorists - including Erich Fromm's - interventions in this issue have not received adequate attention. Indeed, it remains a

blind spot which the Frankfurt School made a major contribution towards removing.(35)

Martin Jay's work, on the other hand, includes perhaps the most thorough discussion of the above mentioned aspects of the Frankfurt School. Nonetheless, again, Jay's work is primarily an intellectual history which is concerned with a scholarly and accurate representation of the genesis and development of the Institute for Social Research. In focusing upon the problem of subjectivity and the complex historical and intellectual dialectic between hope and despair in the Frankfurt School, this study is enabled to follow the analysis with a broad, but we hope, thorough analysis of the theoretical roots of these problems and shed light upon the inconsistencies and unresolved contradictions in the work of the critical theorists.

In this respect, the concept of materialism and subjectivity developed by the School is re-examined against the dynamic concept of social consciousness in Marx and Engels' work. The adoption of Freudian psychoanalysis is examined in the light of the previous discussion and the rejection of Erich Fromm's 'humanistic psychoanalysis' as 'neo-Freudian revisionism' is critically assessed from the vantage point of an appreciation of Fromm's concept of critical theory. The so-called 'revisionist controversy' is re-examined in terms of immanent critique as is the need for a theory of the individual. Arguably, the discussion of Fromm's work - a much neglected area of Frankfurt School studies - sheds new light on the problem of a Marxist social and individual psychology and the critique of late capitalist ideology. The concept of reification

is crucial to an understanding of the Frankfurt School's work, and is employed alongside Marx's theory of alienation in order to interrogate some major assumptions of Freudian psychoanalysis (Freudian instinct theory, the Oedipus complex, the death instinct, for example).

### Problems of Definition

It is useful to discuss the terms used in this study because this will shed light on the roots of various interpretations of 'critical theory' and the 'Frankfurt School'. The various interpretations that have arisen can be accounted for in part as a result of three basic factors: 1. the founding of the Institute for Social Research in 1923, 2. the appointment of Horkheimer as Director from 1930 and the Institute's forced emigration to the United States via Geneva in 1934, and 3. the changing position of the major Institute members between the early 1930s when Horkheimer initiated the Institute's research programme and perspective, and the early 1950s when Horkheimer and Adorno returned to post-war Germany.

Hence this study acknowledges the differences between the core critical theorists and analyses the major divergencies between Horkheimer, Adorno, Fromm and Marcuse in terms of the themes and issues under discussion. While these figures are considered the core members of the School, the influence of other members of the Institute are referred to in accordance with the problem under discussion. Nonetheless, it is useful to define the use of these terms more closely for the purpose of clarity in the coming chapters.

This study focuses on the inter-war years and particularly from the period of Horkheimer's directorship and influence in the early 1930s. It is within the general context of the inter-war years that the Institute was established and its interdisciplinary research programme under Horkheimer was formulated in response to the major problems and issues concerning Marxian socialism in this period. First, this was the problem of subjectivity and social change, since the objective prerequisites for a socialist society had been assembled as a result of the development of the intellectual and material culture of advanced capitalism. Second, there was the perceived need to contribute to the reconstruction of Marxism as an emancipatory (i.e., anti-positivistic) social science. Thus, while critical theory does not form a unity, its adherents shared a common programme of research and set of research problems from the 1930s. 'Critical theory' can, therefore, be considered an umbrella term 'for a whole spectrum of positions associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research' as Arato and Gebhardt have indicated.(36) On the question of the key figures of the School,

Held notes:

To the extent that one can legitimately talk of a school, it is only with reference to Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Löwenthal and Pollock - and it is for these five men that I have reserved the term 'Frankfurt School'. When referring to the Institute of Social Research, however, I include all those affiliated to the Institute.(37)

However, curiously absent from Held's definition is Erich Fromm who, as Jay, as well as Roderick and Kellner have noted, made a primary formative contribution to the project of an interdisciplinary



research programme in the field of social psychology in the 1930s. Thus Kellner and Roderick write that in the 1930s the 'distinctive and innovative feature' of critical theory was 'the development of a Marxian social psychology, above all by Erich Fromm'.(38) Although Held discusses Fromm, acknowledging his influence on Horkheimer and Adorno, for example, the discussion of Fromm's contribution to the formation of critical theory tends to be restricted to the framework of the so-called 'revisionist controversy', in short, the dispute between Fromm and his former colleagues concerning the development of a critical psychology and how the relation between Marx and Freud should be conceived.

A major focus of this study of the crisis of subjectivity is the neglected role Fromm played in the development of a critical social psychology and thus to challenge the taken-for-granted position of Fromm's former colleagues. Fromm's work has been too often treated as peripheral to the development of the critical theory of society and while Held devotes sections to the respective concepts of critical theory held by its other major thinkers, he omits a full discussion of Fromm's work due to the restricted definition of the School he uses. Indeed, there exists no thorough assessment of Fromm's complete works in relation to the Frankfurt School or critical theory as a whole.(39)

Martin Jay's The Dialectical Imagination remains the most balanced and accurate account of Fromm's influence upon the formative development of the Frankfurt School and Fromm's concept of critical theory, as developed after his formal resignation in the late 1930s from Institute affairs, although Jay's work was written before major

contributions of Fromm such as The Working Class In Weimar Germany (1984) and The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1975) became available.

However, as mentioned above, subsequent accounts of individual critical theorists or the School as a whole have tended to reduce Fromm's specific contribution to critical theory to the framework imposed by his former colleagues which was tainted with personal animosity and is hardly an objective reference point for the development or creative renewal of Marxism.(40)

Studies subsequent to Jay's do not provide any more analysis of Fromm's works although Kellner continues to acknowledge the influence of Fromm in the areas of social psychology and the analysis of the culture industry:

Fromm's first book in the U.S., Escape from Freedom (1941), applied the culture industry model to a critique of advertising, mass culture, and political manipulations. He called attention to the decline of the individual. These themes were further developed in The Sane Society (1955) where he criticised passive, manipulated leisure activity from the perspective of the theory of the culture industry.(41)

Thus, this study attempts to redress the neglect of Fromm's work in relation to the central focus: the problem of subjectivity and social change. Interestingly, Bottomore points in this directions in his recent The Frankfurt School (1984), but he does not go beyond pointing to Fromm's attempt to base critical theory upon Marxist humanist premises and his rejection of the transhistorical basis of Freudian psychoanalysis which Fromm's associates clung to and defended.(42)

Bottomore rightly points to the historical specificities of the Frankfurt School's thesis of the integration of the working class into capitalist society in terms of the 'experience of American "exceptionalism" - the long absence from American society of a politically organised working class.' (43) However, it is equally to the point that the Frankfurt School's thesis of the integration of the working class was shaped by the European experience, in particular, the defeat of the German Revolution 1918-23 which sealed the fate of the newly formed Soviet Republic in Russia. The experience of American 'exceptionalism' subsequently reinforced the thesis of integration derived from Hilferding's earlier economic propositions on monopoly capitalism. Bottomore's assessment is also marred by his tendency to reject critical theory as a detour from the concerns of classical Marxism. Thus, Bottomore's essay tends to revert to a 'Maginot Marxism' - rejecting critical theory as a deceased 'school of Marxism or sociology' for a return to 'the central concerns of Marx's own theory'.(44) Bottomore's polemic reflects the shortcomings of the viewpoint examined earlier which asserts that critical theory represents a detour or deviation from classical Marxism along with Western Marxism in general. In this undialectical viewpoint critical theory appears as an irrelevance to the future of Marxian socialism in terms of scholarship, political strategy and sociological analysis. Martin Jay has noted that the death of the Frankfurt School and critical theory has been rehearsed by its critics since the early 1970s - Bottomore's rather disappointing essay adds little on that score.(45) It is hoped that this study will make a contribution to showing the contemporary and

continuing relevance of studies in critical theory for the social sciences in general.

### The Reception of Critical Theory of Society

Bottomore's essay is important to the extent that, along with Held's more substantial work (1980), it represents a break in British exceptionalism: the neglect of and relative isolation from developments in twentieth century continental social theory and philosophy. It could be argued that the impression that critical theory is deceased is, at least in part, a product of British isolation in Europe. Indeed, Kellner and Roderick have noted the uneven reception critical theory has received internationally. Their survey shows that, in fact, critical theory is far from deceased and indicates some historical and socio-political conditions which have given rise to the lack of interest in Britain in regard to the problems and issues raised by the Frankfurt School.

While both German and American scholarship is usually favourably disposed toward critical theory, British receptions have been more hostile. There are significant socio-historical reasons for the widely varied receptions of critical theory in Germany and America as opposed to Britain. While Germany and America have been, on the whole, advancing and stabilized sectors of advanced capitalism, Great Britain has experienced a crippling and rapid decline. Since economic crisis in Britain is so acute, and so overwhelming, class struggle and traditional Marxian party politics are much more viable to Britain than to America or Germany. Thus critical theory's models of capitalist stabilization and an integrated working class with no significant social opposition are understandably foreign to British experience and perceptions which frequently see critical theory as irrelevant to their social situation.

(46)

Kellner and Roderick also note the 'more widespread Marxist culture in Britain rooted in the conversion of a layer of British intellectuals to Marxism in the 1930s and a continued Marxist presence in the working class movement, bolstered by extensive turns to Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s'.(47) Moreover,

Britain's long empiricist tradition and relative isolation from philosophical developments on the Continent intensified the British propensity for 'scientific' theory and nurtured contempt for the more 'philosophical' and 'cultural' critical theory.(48)

One might wish to question certain aspects of the above assessment of American, British, and West German socio-political conditions from the vantage point of the 1980s. For example, it would be interesting to know whether Kellner and Roderick would modify their account in the light of the mobilisations of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movement in the 1960s and early 1970s in the United States, and indeed, the revival of the peace movement in the early 1980s.(49) Additionally, the rise to prominence of the Green Party in West German politics, or the campaign waged by the German labour movement for the thirty-five hour week in 1984 as a response to mass unemployment could be mentioned.(50) It could also be argued that since the British mainland resisted invasion and Fascist dictatorship in the inter-war period, it was relatively shielded from the full force of social dislocation and personal displacement in its cultural life, compared with the experience of emigres from continental Europe who were forced to escape to the United States in order to continue to work and to live. The

intellectual migration in this period tended, generally speaking, to find the radicals turning to the United States and the liberals and conservatives to Britain.(51) Consequently, the centres for the development of scholarship on the Frankfurt School remain the United States and West Germany.

It is clear, moreover, that critical theory is far from dead, and to the extent that the problems it sought to address are still a prominent feature of late capitalist society, it has a contribution to be assessed and learnt from.

This study, then, is also an attempt to redress the continued neglect of the Frankfurt School by British scholarship. Hitherto, the twin influences dominant in British Marxism have been influenced by Althusserian structuralism on the one hand, and the activist left on the other. Each camp is mirrored by equally debilitating features and a rejection of critical theory, as Kellner and Roderick have perceptively remarked:

In a situation of intense capitalist crisis, British Marxists took refuge in Science and/or the Proletariat. Science would guarantee the truth of theory and the proletariat would carry through the revolution. Critical theory punctured this dream in its critique of science and of the 'reification of the proletariat'(Marcuse). Critical theory appeared alien, threatening to left-wing orthodoxies and politically pernicious, and therefore it was dismissed as a species of bourgeois idealism.(52)

Geoghegan also notes the dismissal of Marcuse's critical theory (53) as part of the premature rejection of the Frankfurt School, and comments that the neglect of this school of social thought 'does not testify to theoretical sophistication...but, on the contrary,

indicates a fundamental theoretical inadequacy which should be both deplored and, more importantly, overcome.'(54)

Phil Slater (1980) has made an important contribution to rectifying this neglect, along with other British writers such as Held (1980), Fry (1974), Geogeghan (1981) and Bottomore (1984). Slater, however, reduces his assessment of the Frankfurt School to the simplistic notion of the break in the theory-praxis nexus. Consequently, the respective contributions of Horkheimer, Adorno, Fromm and Marcuse are given insufficient attention, and the often profound treatment of problems in Marxian theory tend to be measured against this rather narrow criterion. Moreover, Slater's discussion of Fromm is fundamentally inadequate, tending to cut short a more complete analysis of Fromm's work for the purpose of defending Wilhelm Reich's concept of psychoanalysis in a rather unsubstantiated polemic against the 'revisionist' Fromm.(55)

Summary of Approach: The Problem Defined and Methodological Approach

The main impetus for the growing interest and attention towards the Frankfurt School came as a result of the upheavals of the post Second World War years which served to foster a more coherent challenge to the complacent and entrenched ideologies of the Soviet bureaucracy on the one hand and the capitalist states on the other. This international hegemony maintained by the U.S.S.R. and Western capitalism was challenged by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States in the 1960s, the Prague Spring and the French May-June in 1968, and the industrial unrest in Italy and Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s, culminating in the Portuguese Revolution in 1975. A New Left composed of radicalised youth and intellectuals, disenchanted with the organisations and ideologies of the 'Old Left' (official Communist and Socialist parties), developed out of the post-war revolt and was drawn towards representatives of an alternative vision (of society and politics) to Stalinism and liberal or social democratic reformism. Hence a revival of interest in major figures and tendencies in the inter-war international socialist movement began, and were to become identified as Western Marxism. Among those who were the focus of attention were Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the council communists, Wilhelm Reich, Antonio Gramsci, the International Left Opposition (Leon Trotsky, Victor Serge), Jean Paul Sartre, and the anti-capitalist intelligentsia exiled into the United States, such as the members of the Frankfurt School.(56) As the contradictions of the



post-war economic boom became apparent and the complementary hegemonies of Stalinism and Western capitalism were challenged, the intellectuals of the New Left sought a more coherent theoretical articulation of the emancipatory logic unfolding before their eyes and often with their personal participation. Moreover, the post-war crisis of Stalinism led to a distancing of the Italian and French Communist Parties from the influence of Moscow and many Communist Party intellectuals broke with Stalinist politics as a result of the intervention of the Soviet army in the Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring. These socio-historical events led to the revival of interest in the so-called Western Marxists, as noted above.

In the above discussion we have criticised Therborn and Anderson's definition of Western Marxism, finding in it an ambivalence which produces an inconsistent assessment. Stephen Eric Bronner's discussion, in contrast, reveals the significance of Western Marxism and growth of interest in the Frankfurt School by the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s. Bronner summarized the problem with the above definition of Western Marxism in general and the Frankfurt School in particular. On the one hand, 'Anderson wishes to argue that what defines "western marxism" is its break from the "classical tradition", as seen in its estrangement from political praxis, its emphasis upon cultural matters, its abstruse use of language, as well as its domination by "philosophers"', yet on the other, Therborn and Anderson also show that this 'detour' from the "classical tradition" made significant contributions to the development of the critical analysis of Stalinism and Western

capitalism, as shown above. Bronner argues that the 'great works of marxism have never been simply the product of victory, rather, they have sought to analyse the the real character of victory.'(57)

It can be argued that Bronner suggests a more satisfactory, dialectical concept of Western Marxism which acknowledges the contradiction in the genesis of this intellectual formation rooted in the concrete history and political praxis of international socialism in the inter-war years between hope and despair; and, as mentioned above, this dialectical concept forms the theoretical backdrop of this study:

Thus, marxism, because it is intrinsically tied to a critique of the status quo, cannot make peace with any sort of repression. And, in the period of revolutionary decline, the original spirit of western marxism sought to preserve the emanipatory goals inspired by the Russian Revolution. Once these goals were renounced in praxis by both the Soviet Union and the western social democracies, it was inevitable that the western marxists should become estranged from the immediate political praxis. But this does not exhaust the issue. It is in their attempts to break down the barriers of orthodoxy and to adapt socialist theory to new conditions and new concerns, that the western marxists have contributed to what Ernst Bloch called 'the underground history of the revolution'.

..only within this context can the similarities between the diverse theorists who comprise this tendency be understood.(58)

The approach adopted in this study, then, seeks to overcome the position of sociological reductionism which reduces the Frankfurt School to a deceased variant of Western Marxism and as a detour from classical Marxism, or even more misguidedly, confuses the latter with the right-wing of the German anti-capitalist intelligentsia, as does J.G.Merguior when he writes: ' all in all, the



age of Western Marxism (1920-1970) was just an episode in the long history of an old pathology of Western thought: irrationalism.'(59)

Consequently, this study also attempts to challenge the sociological relativist argument according to which the thought of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia in Germany from the turn of the century is reduced to the decline of the German mandarins.(60)

The dialectic between hope and despair (the period opened by the Russian Revolution and closed by the Moscow Trials, Spanish Civil War, the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939, and the Holocaust) is the major underlying theme in this study on the Frankfurt School and the problem of subjectivity. The method of approach to be employed is based upon immanent critique. The critical analysis pursued in the following chapters attempts to analyse the Frankfurt School's response to the problem of subjectivity in the historical context of the inter-war years and its implications for Marxian social theory.

Thus this study begins in Chapter One by analysing the general historical and theoretical context which gave birth to the Frankfurt School, and attempts to trace the origins of the concept of subjectivity in Marxian theory and practice. Having identified and defined the historical context and major concepts of the Frankfurt School, the following chapters pursue an in-depth examination of these major concepts in relation to the focal point and theme of subjectivity and social change. Hence, Chapter Two examines Lukacs' contribution in relation to the origins and development of critical theory and the integration of Freudian psychoanalysis. Chapter Three analyses the work of Erich Fromm - the social psychologist and

psychoanalyst of the Institute in the 1930s - in relation to the problem of a Marxist social psychology and inconsistencies in the debate concerning the appropriate grounds for a critical analysis of social consciousness. As discussed above, a major omission in the literature on the Frankfurt School is a balanced and comprehensive discussion of the relevance of Fromm's work to a critical theory of late capitalist ideology and social consciousness. Chapter Four engages in a synthesis of the preceding discussion and is subdivided into three sections in order to focus on specific debates, problems and issues in the critical theorists' responses to the crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change in relation to the reconstruction of the project of Marxian socialism.

#### The Concept of Subjectivity

The concept of subjectivity has been adopted rather than 'social consciousness', 'mass psychology', or the notion of 'crisis of leadership of the working class'.<sup>(61)</sup> This is because, while the latter term focuses on the specific aspects of the problem to be analysed, the vantage point of social theory - the purpose of which it is to analyse the general grounds and possibilities of the social and human sciences - facilitates an approach which affords a unified conception of the problem of subjectivity as it is expressed and intersects across the disciplines of sociology, psychology, philosophy, and political economy. This approach of critical social theory on the basis of immanent critique affords a broader and , by the token of transcending the intellectual division

of labour in the social sciences, deeper treatment of the Frankfurt School. It thus hopes to avoid the inadequacies of respective sociological, psychological, philosophical, or economic reductionism. Indeed, it could be further argued that the weaknesses in previous studies have very often been caused by a lack of appreciation of the interdisciplinary foundations of the Frankfurt School's work and the major questions they raised and tried to answer. Even when writing as individuals, critical theorists assume an acquaintance with the studies and results of each other and the work done in related disciplines.

The present study does not claim to be definitive nor exhaustively comprehensive. It does nonetheless attempt to focus on a specific problem and thoroughly explore its ramifications for Marxian theory for the last years of the twentieth century. The object is to treat the problems of critical theory seriously and to relinquish any temptation to employ what has been termed a 'Maginot Marxism' (62), which approaches historical and theoretical problems by avoiding meeting their ambiguities, contradictions, unexpected advances, retreats and concerns, by feigning engaged discussion and analysis, only, ultimately, to return to and defend hitherto arrived at conclusions and presuppositions. It is not the object of this study to enter into a discussion of the Frankfurt School, only to emerge unscathed by the vicissitudes of the historical and political events of the inter-war years and the implications of the questions raised by the School for Marxian theory. Too much is at stake in the closing years of the twentieth century to treat scholarship as a task of disengaged polemics and analysis. And, since the

perspective and methodological approach, adopted in this study, is based upon critical social theory and immanent critique, it is a fundamental assumption that disengaged scholarship is inherently misguided, for - to use Roderick's words - 'without the attempt to not only understand social practice, but to criticise and change it, without the emancipatory practical intention of the theory', the Frankfurt School's 'work would be of little interest or relevance.' Hence its value 'cannot be measured in terms of "pure theory" alone, it must also be measured politically in terms of the practical intention, the theory claims as its own.' (63)

In conclusion, then, this study questions the inevitability of defeat in the struggle for a rational (socialist) society in light of an immanent critique of the Frankfurt School's attempt to restore the subjective dimension to Marxian social science.

CHAPTER ONE  
PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION

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This opening chapter on Philosophy and Revolution lays the theoretical foundations and general line of argument for the study as a whole.

Beginning with an introduction to the concept of critique, the perspective of the Frankfurt School is defined in relation to Marx and Engels' theory of revolutionary subjectivity and its development. The discussion shows that the Frankfurt School's theoretical and general research programme was based upon an attempt to develop the political psychology implicit in Marx and Engels' work. The project of the Frankfurt School is defined throughout the discussion which attempts to place the development of critical theory in its socio-political context. Consequently, it is necessary to place the critical theory of society in the context of the rise of 'Western Marxism' as an intellectual formation with roots in the wave of revolutions in Russia and Central Europe following the First World War, and their decline in the inter-war period with the successful counterrevolution in the U.S.S.R. (1) and the growing spread of Fascism in Central and Southern Europe.(2)

The central themes of this study are refracted through the discussion of the legacy of Western Marxism and the contribution of Frederick Engels in his attempt to defend the materialist conception of history against the reformist tendencies in the German Social

Democratic Party. Lukacs, Korsch, and the Frankfurt School built their critiques of orthodox Marxism and advanced capitalist ideology through a critical response to what they perceived as the major weaknesses in Engels' defence of Marxian socialism.

Only if the socio-political context of this intellectual formation is understood can the trajectory of the Frankfurt School be properly conceptualized, its major strengths and weaknesses identified, and the significance of its contribution to a reconstituted European Marxism (and eventually the break in the theory-praxis overcome) be appreciated. (3)



The Concept Of Critique And Revolutionary Subjectivity

The concept of critique was a product of the Enlightenment: the belief that social reality can and ought to be brought to order by the human power of reason. Reason is the critical instrument of the rational subject who in order to attain the good life must achieve autonomy, freedom, and independence - these being the prerequisites for human happiness.(4) From Kant, '...critique denoted reflection on the conditions of possible knowledge, on the potential abilities of human beings possessing the faculties of knowing, speaking and acting.' (5)

From Hegel, critical theorists adapted the notion of a practice of reflection on those constraints standing in the way of the realization of human freedom, independence and happiness. Thus, it can be argued that critical theory represents a continuity with the critical idealism of the Enlightenment. It was, of course, to Marx and Engels that the Frankfurt School sought justification for the scientific grounding of Enlightenment social philosophy in the forties of the nineteenth century. Hence according to Marcuse, critical theory is predicated on the acceptance of two basic sources: 'By critical theory we mean here social theory....on the basis of dialectical philosophy and the critique of political economy.'(6)

Geoghegan notes that for critical theory Marx's critique of political economy represents 'the authentic method of analysis of a capitalist society' and dialectical philosophy's negative concept of reality with 'inherent criticism of the given' combined to create a

method that 'simultaneously reveals, indicts, and indicates possibilities' for qualitative social change.(7)

The work of Marx and Engels focused on the weaknesses of the prevailing Socialist doctrines of the nineteenth century as well as the critique of political economy.(8) The humanistic materialism of Feuerbach represented, for Marx and Engels, the main plank of opposition in the revolt of the Young Hegelians to the Master's idealist system. As Left Hegelians, Marx and Engels had found in Feuerbach's work the theoretical basis to launch an earthly critique against the existing obstacles to freedom and individual political rights in developing capitalist society. However, Feuerbach's humanistic naturalism was a one-sided critique in the revolt against the Hegelian system: it revealed the individual as a passionate, sensuous being; but conceptualized the latter in terms of the prevalent Enlightenment concept of materialism. In this concept of materialism thought is viewed as a reflection of earthly contingencies.(9) In a specific sense, materialism and idealism were two sides of the same coin. Thus, in his Theses on Feuerbach (1845/6) Marx stresses that Feuerbach had only grasped one side of the problem of answering the question of the relation between social being and thought, existing and potential forms of social consciousness; and finally, the decisive question of understanding how social change is possible. Hence, Marx writes:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism - which, of course does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous

objects, really distinct from the thought objects but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity...he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary', of 'practical-critical' activity.(10)

Hence, for Marx, the individual is defined as a social creature, and in active relation to the environment. In Feuerbach's work the human being's relationship to the world is essentially passive, receptive. From Hegel Marx applied the concept of mediation to show that 'circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances'(11); or: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.'(12) The premises of Marx and Engels' doctrine are based upon an understanding of the individual's social relationship to nature. Human beings 'begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence..'(13) The content, or cultural spirit, of human society is defined by the level of the mode of production, its relationship to nature, and this historical interaction is expressed in the life activity of individuals; in their social practices. Social and natural 'facts' do not exist in complete independence of human definition and mediation, but in relation to human activity. True, nature exists independently of the human will, but 'facts' do not exist independently of human practice, mediation. Their premises, Marx and Engels write:

...are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.(14)

For Marxian socialism, then, human beings can redirect their activity into new forms designed to achieve new goals. Human social action is governed by the life activity of the species (social production, labour), but it is reflexive, mediated by conscious activity, and hence the potential self-constituted activity, praxis; hence: 'The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be perceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.'<sup>(15)</sup>

Revolutionary practice represents 'self-constituted activity', a consciousness of the goal of a Socialist society, and is predicated upon the working class which represents, as a social force, the universal interests of humanity in its quest for emancipation as a class. The economic domination of the bourgeoisie is expressed through the institutions and organisation of civil society and the State as a product of class-rule. Hence, according to Marx and Engels, the historical task of the proletariat must be to constitute itself as a class for itself, and 'to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the State.'<sup>(16)</sup> However, this assumes the necessary political consciousness and organisation of the working class to attain the Socialist goal. Thus Marx and Engels write:

Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is, necessary, an alteration which can take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.<sup>(16)</sup>

The basis of dialectical social theory is the emphasis on creative practice, although under conditions largely encountered as products of past, dead labour.(17) Creative practice can be defined as that activity which has as its goal the enjoyment of things, the satisfaction of human needs and faculties, the rational development of the productive forces in society including the organisation of the labour process itself and participatory control of the political institutions of government. However, Marx and Engels write:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.(18)

Hence, the 'alteration of men on a mass scale' is required, for the production of the communist consciousness, a 'practical movement' which reveals the role of the State and ideology in civil society as a means of political domination of the proletariat practically, through experiential learning, knowledge, in political struggle. The bourgeois State must, Marx and Engels argue, be overthrown for the proletariat to 'assert themselves as individuals'. Bourgeois democracy upholds bourgeois individuality, the rule of Capital as a social power; but systematically denies the self-realization of the individual in the exercise of all his/her powers.(19) Self-change is possible through creative practice: we change ourselves in the process of changing the world. Marx and Engels' concept of human

consciousness is dynamic, combining historically, the objective and subjective factors of social change.

In their new critical social theory Marx and Engels aimed to produce a transformation of the bourgeois social sciences (including philosophy) and supercede the limitations of utopian socialism. Although utopian socialists do not, 'deserve the reproach of having their heads in the clouds, being detached from the social and economic reality of their time and lacking any practical concerns'(20), Marx and Engels attempted to reveal firstly, the human basis for social change in the creative practice and self-activity of the proletariat (as the universal class of bourgeois society), and secondly, that while the utopian socialists 'were lucid critics of bourgeois society, who grasped the main features of its long term evolution and contradictions',(21) they failed to articulate the socialist project on the basis of a systematic social scientific analysis, showing the contradictions of class society and the economic, social and political preconditions of the new society in the intellectual and material foundations of bourgeois society. As Ernest Mandel writes: 'The project of a socialist society was (for utopian socialism -CM) simply counterposed to existing bourgeois society.'(22)

The main weakness of utopian socialism was the potentially authoritarian practice behind the idea of 'emancipating the masses'. Hence, Marx and Engels in The Theses on Feuerbach argued, 'Who educates the educator'? Consequently, the radical thrust and change in Marx and Engels' approach to the socialist project lay in their conception of political practice: the socialist project would depend

upon 'the real movement of self-organisation and self-emancipation of the great masses'.(23)

The Marxist transformation of the great achievements of bourgeois social thought, classical German philosophy (Kant, Hegel), British political economy (Smith, Ricardo) and French sociological historiography (Quesnay, Constant, Guizot), was possible because of the contradictions contained in the social movement of this historical force. Ideas were produced as a result of the bourgeois economic and political social revolutions which unwittingly grasped that the potential of capitalist social relations could not conform to the aspirations and ideals proclaimed by the bourgeois revolution itself.(24) The Enlightenment fell short of its promise of the emancipation of the individual. For Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno in the 1940s the Enlightenment contained the seeds of its own apotheosis which, they argued, were coming to its destructive fruition in the events of the Second World War.(25)

However, for Marx and Engels, the great advances in the social sciences of the bourgeois era layed the grounds for the transformation of bourgeois categories, and the creation of the modern proletariat as a result of industrialisation furnished philosophy with its practical weapon: a universal class whose self-emancipation promised the emancipation of all oppressed social groups and classes. The material basis for a society beyond scarcity was signalled by the first crises of overproduction of the new capitalist economic system. The ideals of the French, American and English Revolutions, epitomised in the Enlightenment optimism for the future of humankind, could be realized, according to the

Marxian standpoint, only through the proletariat assuming political hegemony, transforming the capitalist State and civil society, and establishing a socialist republic. The basis of Marx and Engels' new world view and general strategy for socialism had been established in The German Ideology (1845-6). The evolution of their theoretical position did not occur in a vacuum but in the context of actual developments in industrial capitalist society and its concurrent socio-political convulsions, such as the Revolutions of 1848 (26), the American Civil War (27), and the events of the Paris Commune of 1871 - from which the lesson was drawn that the proletariat could not simply take hold of the existing state apparatus but would have to create its own form of class rule, based on the norms of socialist democracy, for the socialist state to succeed. (28)

In contradistinction to utopian socialism, then, Marx and Engels used the term 'scientific socialism'. However, this doctrine was not advocated in complete opposition to the idealists or utopians: in the Theses on Feuerbach Marx and Engels had objected to idealism and mechanical materialism on the basis that both were incomplete and partial standpoints from which to advance their critical social theory. But it should be recalled that Marx and Engels learned from, took over, and developed many of the ideas contained in utopian socialism. (29) It was, after all, the dialectical transcendence (Aufhebung/30) of idealism and materialism which the Marxian doctrine aimed towards in theory and practice, as discussed above. Thus the critique of political economy aimed to show, specifically, how the capitalist mode of production serves the



historical interests of the dominant class whilst exploiting the labour power of the working class, and how the capitalist mode of production provides the material and cultural basis for a society based upon the rational production, distribution and allocation of material and cultural resources to meet human needs, by revealing the real laws of motion of this mode of production.(31) Hence, by exposing the social process by which a surplus pool of labour and unemployment is created due to the periodic decline in the rate of profit, for the revalorization of capital, Marx armed the labour movement with the fundamentals of the class-based politics of bourgeois society and its supersession.

It is, of course, the evolution of this notion of 'scientific socialism' which needs to be questioned. For those critics of the Frankfurt School who see in critical theory only a 'philosophical' commentary on the failed revolutions of Europe in the 1918-23 period it is often raised as if scientific socialism has nothing at all to do with idealism or philosophy. Thus, Russell Jacoby has written of this viewpoint: 'Scientific Marxism dreams not of a life without anxiety but of master plans and inter-office memos...The gun of science is cocked whenever thought thinks too much.'(32)

The identification of Marxian socialism with political economy or economics as such, is the result, Jacoby argues, of the reification of Marxism itself in the history of socialism in the first half of the twentieth century. Jacoby writes:

It is not coincidental that the few Marxists who swam against the tide of capitalist rationality did not sever all links to conservatism, romanticism, or utopianism; they remained attached to a non-capitalist logic. They include William Morris of the nineteenth century, and Ernst Bloch, Andre

Breton, and the Frankfurt School, of the twentieth century. Their intellectual sources enabled them to see through the mirror of the economy, they were alerted not simply to the falling rate of profit but to the falling rate of intelligence and beauty.(33)

In the forties of the nineteenth century the Young Hegelians had led a revolt against the Hegelian system which, in its apotheosis, came to the position that 'the real is rational' in Hegel's later political philosophy.(34) The Young Hegelians took up and developed the master's critical dialectic and applied it to the question of secularization and the critique of religion, whilst progressing towards an idealist critique of politics and the State.(35) Marx's critique of Hegel's concept of the state(36) is an early example of Marx's radical democratic philosophy in its evolution towards Communism. The State, Marx argues, is not the embodiment of Reason, the universal interests of humankind, liberal theory - the slogan of the French Revolution of 1789, 'liberty, equality and fraternity' - are revealed as historically linked to the ideological interests of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Marx argued, liberty and equality are in social reality unveiled as the liberty and equality between entrepreneurs to pursue the private acquisition and control of wealth, private property in the means of production, distribution and exchange. For Marx, philosophy represents the most advanced consciousness in the bourgeois era, revealing the epoch and its contradictions in thought.

It is at this juncture that the question of 'science' and the use to which this term has been used to describe Socialist ideas must be raised in connection with the history of the labour movement.

Theory and practice are inextricably linked, as the above discussion of the evolution of Marx's thought indicates, but their synchronization are by no means an even process as Karl Korsch has argued in his Marxism and Philosophy (1923). And thus in the parallel which has been drawn between the Young Heglians at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the Hegelian-inspired-Marxism of the 1920s and inter-war period, there can be found the socio-political bases for the emergence of Western Marxism as a movement, and the Frankfurt School as an expression of this movement in particular.(37)

Western Marxism And The Frankfurt School

The parallel which has been made between the Young Hegelians and the rise of Western Marxism in general and the Frankfurt School in particular, is the relation to Hegel and the charge of idealism (38). However, it can be argued that to make such a parallel according to the criterion of idealism is misleading. It is a misplaced criticism in as much that it fails to acknowledge the changed historical, social and political conditions in which Western Marxism arose. And to understand the trajectory of the Frankfurt School it is of fundamental importance to give a sketch of the historical context in which it arose as a part of Western Marxism.

Jacoby, in Dialectic of Defeat (1982) (39) has argued against the thesis of Anderson (Considerations on Western Marxism 1979) that although the central figures in Western Marxism have been philosophers (and not political economists) this is due to specific reasons associated with the European Revolutions following the First World War. If this is forgotten in misplaced comparisons with tendencies in the history of ideas, then the real factors which account for the rise of Western Marxism as a specific intellectual formation are lost sight of. Moreover, later assessments of the Frankfurt School, for example, are likely to be distorted or flawed. Jacoby argues, therefore, that Western Marxism is not an 'unfortunate detour from "classical" Marxism'(40), and nor does he look forward to its extinction as does Lucio Colletti who writes: 'The only way in which Marxism can be revived is if no more books like (my) Marxism and Hegel are published...' (41)

Colletti's inferiority complex as a Marxist intellectual is not matched by Anderson who tends to view Western Marxism as an intellectual sublimation for political defeat, a detour from the classical roots of Marxism in the inter-war period. However, it can be argued that Jacoby over-extends his case to make a valid point. It is argued in this study that in general Western Marxism does in fundamental respects conform to Anderson's assessment - as an ideological tendency it is uneven. The point which must be brought to the fore, however, is that - as Jacoby writes - 'The predominance of philosophical works (in Western Marxism-CM) signified not a retreat but an advance to a re-examination of Marxism.'<sup>(42)</sup>

Hence, it is of decisive importance to understand the context out of which Western Marxism arose in the historical process in order to account accurately for the formation of the Frankfurt School itself, and thus to understand the political significance of the advance to a re-examination of Marxism reflected in the philosophical response of Western Marxism. In order to understand this development it is necessary to define the social and political scene following the First World War in Europe.

'Western Marxism', it must be recalled, is not a 'rigorously geographical term, but refers to a body of thought and practice'<sup>(43)</sup> related to the advanced capitalist states in contradistinction to 'Soviet Marxism' as a body of thought and practice which refers to the Stalinized Marxism of the Third International and Soviet bureaucracy<sup>(44)</sup>. Thus, originating in Central, Southern, and Western Europe, 'Western Marxists' sought to challenge Soviet Marxism which was codifying the Russian revolutionary process as if all socialist

revolutions are fated to tread the same path and using Marxism to rationalise the interests of the ruling bureaucratic stratum in the policy shifts of the Third International from its Moscow centre.(45)

The Western Marxists were never more than a loose collection of individuals and theoretical currents in the 1920s and 1930s who gravitated away from the Stalinized Communist Parties towards the self-management and the council communist movement, and the International Left Opposition.(46) However, their theories and principles were stamped decisively with the consequences of the fact that the West European revolutions were defeated in the 1920s and those of Central and Southern Europe in the inter-war years were crushed. Only the Russian Revolution succeeded and the price paid was high. Isolated and in an economically backward country with a minority of proletarians in a country numerically dominated by the peasantry, the degeneration of the regime following the Civil War was reflected in the suppression of the Left Opposition which led to the expulsion of Leon Trotsky in 1929 from the Soviet Union.(47) The major Western Marxists include Antonio Gramsci of Italy, Lukacs and Korsch from Central Europe, and from the 1930s the Frankfurt School played an essential role in maintaining and developing this current of thought. Although the Western Marxists shifted the emphasis of Marxism from political economy and the state to culture philosophy and art, two points have to be borne in mind: firstly, this shift in emphasis did not lead to the rejection of political economy in the Frankfurt School.(48) Secondly, this shift has to be understood in terms of the political assessment of the failed European Revolution following the First World War. Hence, it is

this factor which is a central theme of this chapter. As will be seen as the discussion unfolds, this fact concerning a change of emphasis rather than an outright rejection or neglect of political economy underlines the political significance of Western Marxism in general and the Frankfurt School from the 1930s in particular. And as mentioned above, related to this question of emphasis is that of political differentiation from Soviet Marxism and the Third International.

The opposition which Western Marxism generated did not revolve around metaphysical differences but implied a somewhat unsystematically presented but internally coherent opposition to the bureaucratised Communist Parties of Europe and the bureaucratic centralism of Soviet State itself. Thus, this tendency marks a phase in the political assessment of the Russian Revolution, and not a merely academic-philosophical sublimation in thought of the defeated European Revolution.

In short, the Frankfurt School, from the inter-war period, played an essential role in maintaining and developing the Western Marxist critical analysis of the failed European Revolution of the 1920s.

Marxist Philosophy After World War One

In Marxism and Philosophy (49) Alex Callinicos argues that Marxist philosophy after the First World War stressed the need to reformulate Marxism not just because of the defeats of the European Revolution but also because of the success of the October Revolution in Russia, 1917. Such a viewpoint indicates that caution needs to be exercised in the assessment of the critical theory of society and Western Marxism in general. The reflection theory of ideas, as the mere sublimation in thought of economic and social processes must be rejected as a suitable criterion for the assessment of social and ideological movements. Callinicos, at any rate, points to the uneven character of Western Marxism in the aftermath of the First World War and the contradictory outcome of the European Revolutionary period in question. Thus, it would be more accurate to argue that the Western Marxists to a considerable extent mediated the success and defeat of the international socialist movement in the inter-war years, but this is far from merely reflecting these defeats as such. The question of to what extent the Frankfurt School acquiesced to the defeats of the inter-war years is, of course, a moot point, and this question will be taken up in subsequent chapters. But what has to be established at this point is that mediation refers to the total socio-political response of the Frankfurt School to the political developments of the inter-war period, which includes this contradictory process of success and defeat. The perspective according to which Western Marxism is viewed as a simple product of



defeat not only prevents understanding of real causes but also blocks recognition of the achievements of Western Marxism.

The bulk of the Second International, the workers' parties of European Social Democracy, had decided to support the First World War, breaking with the principle of internationalism and its pre-war resolutions calling for solidarity in the event of war.(50)

Callinicos writes:

The most important impulse behind the great efflorescence of Marxist philosophy at the end of the First World War was the belief that the October Revolution and the break up of the Second International required a reformulation of the basic principles of historical materialism.'(51)

The Italian Communist Party leader Antonio Gramsci, for example, drew such a conclusion, and it is encapsulated in the article he wrote in 1918 entitled The Revolution against Capital(52). The advent of Western Marxism, then, can not be viewed as a reflection of defeat as such, nor a lone protest against the 'Bolshevisation' of the Third International, or a product of opposition to the bureaucratic stratum which assumed economic and political control of the Soviet Union. Of course, Western Marxists developed such themes in their work and political outlook, but it is important to note the positive impulse behind Western Marxism which precedes these later developments. ' It was the context of an attempt to translate the lessons of October into a new, non-evolutionist Marxism that there occurred the great "return to Hegel" with which the names of Georg Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci, and Karl Lorsch are associated.'(53) Hence,

as Jacoby notes in Dialectic of Defeat(1982), the emergence of Western Marxism was rooted in success as much as defeat.(54)

The lineage of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s can be traced to the works of Lukacs and Korsch in the early 1920s.(55) The Russian Revolution had conferred enormous prestige on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the early Western Marxists such as Lukacs and Korsch worked within a Leninist framework. When both Lukacs and Korsch published their decisive respective works which sought to 'translate the lessons of October into a new non-evolutionist Marxism' they were furnishing, at the political level, the socio-philosophical critique of the Marxism which dominated the Second International. Lukacs and Korsch were loyal Communist Party members; however, leadership bodies of the Third International responded to their work with hostility and eventually Korsch was expelled from the German Communist Party.(56) As the international tide turned against the Russian Revolution, leaving it isolated and the economy decimated following the Civil War of intervention, Lukacs accommodated himself to the dictum of the emerging bureaucratic stratum eventually distancing himself from his earlier views. Their fundamental texts, Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness(57) and Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy can be said to represent the cornerstone, along with Gramsci's writings, of Western Marxism, from their publication in 1923. The 'return to Hegel' meant eventually not just a critique of orthodoxy within the Second International, but also offending the increasingly bureaucratized Third International. The bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian workers' state (58) led to the canonization of Lenin's

theory and practice following his death in 1924. As Arato and Breines have forcefully argued, the reaction to Lukacs' and Korsch's works were sharp and decisive: they were denounced. Reviews of their fundamentally important works described them as 'dangerous':

Late in May 1923, Die Rote Fahne carried Hermann Duncker's compact assault on History and Class Consciousness. Echoing his earlier criticisms of Korsch, he described 'this new book on Marxism' as 'dangerous'. Then, focussing the emergence of Engels as the eminence grise of vulgar Marxism, Duncker's rejected Lukacs' entire investigation into class consciousness as a thinly veiled idealism which could only dilute genuine Marxism.(59)

The charge of idealism, later applied to the Frankfurt School, has been a recurrent criticism of Western Marxists. This criticism reappears in contemporary commentaries and studies and it is instructive to uncover its roots.(60) Arato and Breines have noted that this charge of 'idealism' is connected with the viewpoint according to which Western Marxism is dismissed as 'unscientific', 'philosophical' at the expense of political economy, and have traced its roots to the 'Lukacs Debate' of 1923-4:

The significance of the Lukacs debates brevity and outcome is not difficult to establish; and, as the following delineates, contemporaries too, were not slow in recognizing it. History and Class Consciousness and a few kindred works, such as Karl Korsch's represented theoretical expressions of a European alternative to the emergent soviet ideology. As such, they stood as obstacles to the Bolshevization or Russification of the Communist International.(61)

Thus, Western Marxism is not a euphemism for academic Marxists in the universities of Western Europe but an intellectual response in the international socialist movement of the inter-war period and

later to the October Revolution and the degeneration of the first workers' state amidst generalised retreat and the origins of 'Marxism-Leninism' as an ideology of legitimation. Thus:

The canonization of Lenin, to which Bloch referred, entailed the elevation of Lenin's texts and persona to virtually sacred status, replete with litany and icons, as Isaac Deutscher and other historians have shown. In this process, Lenin's thesis regarding Marxism as an objective, scientific account of the laws of nature and society became absolute dogma, disagreement with which amounted to sacrilege. As a result, Marxism was transformed from a theory of society into what one recent analyst has termed a 'legitimizing science' of the politics of a particular party (the Communist International) and a particular state (the Soviet Union).(62)

Lukacs and Korsch were condemned by Grigory Zinoviev in the course of his opening address to the Third International's Fifth World Congress for 'theoretical revisionism'. Zinoviev exclaimed: 'We cannot tolerate such theoretical revisionism in our Communist International.'(63)

The rationalisation behind Zinoviev's remarks condemning Lukacs consisted in an appeal to Lenin's critique of ultra-leftism, of failure to integrate Marxist politics with activity in the organisations of the labour movement, for example, trades unions(64). Fundamentally, the revolt against orthodox Marxism by the Western Marxists represented a challenge not only to the leadership of the Second International but also to the bureaucratized leadership of the Comintern because this leadership, in turning Marxism into an ideological legitimation science, were on course to the repudiation of the revolutionary foundations of the

new soviet state and the revolutionary intent of the Marxian concepts.(65)

Callinicos argues that the influence on the Western Marxists was less directly that of Hegel than the anti-naturalist revolt at the turn of the century.(66) This involved a reaction to mid-nineteenth century scientific materialism in Germany, the two main neo-Kantian schools in Marburg and Heidelberg, and the existentialist social philosophers. The main characteristics of the Western Marxists can be distinguished in relation to discussion of the anti-naturalist revolt: there was the general tendency of reasserting the primacy of the subject over the material world. Secondly, common to the whole tendency there was a rejection of naturalism: the thesis that the methods of the natural sciences can be extended to the study of social phenomena. Callinicos summarizes the anti-naturalist revolt:

'We have seen how such a belief was involved in the Enlightenment's attempt to set the moral sciences on a firm, empirical basis. By the mid-nineteenth century this had come to mean a reductive physicalism which denied reality to anything but matter and motion.'

Thus instead,

the anti-naturalists insisted that social and cultural phenomena were unique, historically specific experiences unamenable to inclusion in the abstract deductive systems constructed by the natural scientists. Equally, the transcendental subject was reinstated to play the role of constituting social experience. In the social and cultural world, anti-naturalists tended to argue, man confronted his own creations; here the old Hegelian model of knowledge as the identity of subject and object, hopelessly speculative when applied to nature, found its true significance.(67)

This anti-naturalist revolt was thus not a reversion to Young Hegelianism, especially not in the case of the Frankfurt School, such a parallel neglects the mediating historical factors: ideas are never merely repeated but - and the case of the Western Marxists shows this - the historico-political milieu refashions and applies ideas according to the evolving social structure and interaction of class forces and social groups. Hence, Lowy, in his analysis of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia of Germany in the early twentieth century argues that the anti-capitalist dynamic of this intellectual tendency which emerged in the 1920s was rooted in the anti-naturalist concept of subjectivity.(68) Basically, the anti-capitalist intelligentsia involved a right and left wing. The right wing drew upon conservative and reactionary social philosophies in revolt against industrialism as such, and in response to the emerging political organisations of the working class. The left-wing drew from the neo-Kantian schools, the work of Dilthey, Weber, Simmel, Frege, Husserl (the counterparts of this tendency in the rest of Europe: Bergson in France, Croce in Italy, Bradley in England), and, of course, Marx and Engels.

The Western Marxists emerged as the left-wing of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia in Europe through the tumultuous events of the first quarter of the twentieth century.(69)

### Western Marxism And Defeat

In situating the intellectual and political context of the Frankfurt School it has been argued that Western Marxism arose as part of the anti-naturalist revolt in social thought in Europe in the 1920s. Moreover, that the emergence of Western Marxism was marked in particular by a positive political response to the Russian Revolution; the 'revolt against Das Kapital'. What Gramsci meant by his article of this title was a criticism made against the orthodoxy of the Kautskyite leadership of the Second International which tended to advocate a concept of social change shaped by a deterministic and mechanistic interpretation of historical materialism. Gramsci argued that the subjective dimension of revolutionary Marxist politics had been denied for a strategy based on the notion of inevitable laws of history. Rosa Luxemburg in her polemics against reformism ( the concept of socialism based on an evolutionary theory of social change and the accumulation of reforms by utilizing the established State and its democratic machinery) entitled Reform or Revolution had argued that the decisive element in the struggle for socialism is the self-activity of the working class.(70) Through their own activity working class organisations gain from the experience of struggling against the effects of capitalist society and the attempt to set limits on and control the unplanned economy. In this experiential perspective the unity of objective and subjective factors is maintained, and the subjective dynamic of Marx's theory of social change (discussed above) is retained.(71)

However the German October of 1923 marked the end of the revolutionary period which opened with the end of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. Lukacs and Korsch were attacked by the Comintern, the ruling bureaucratic stratum in Russia turned the theory and practice of Lenin into an ideology to legitimate the totalitarian State, and, as discussed above, whilst Western Marxism emerged as the mediated response to success and defeat. The two aspects of Western Marxism, as a theoretical response to both success and defeat, must therefore be understood dialectically. Thus, focussing on either side of the formative process leads to a partial and distorted interpretation. Moreover, this point needs to be borne in mind especially in assessing the Frankfurt School because this tendency in Western Marxism arose specifically in the 1930s, although its theoretical roots lie, as noted above in relation to Lukacs and Korsch's work, in the 1917-23 period, and institutionally, in Frankfurt, 1923.(72)

Lenin died in January 1924. The emerging Soviet bureaucracy gradually became conscious of its own distinctive social interests as the ruling stratum in soviet society and abandoned the international socialist basis of Bolshevik strategy - made explicit in the theory of 'socialism in one country' - and operated a counterrevolutionary foreign policy of 'passive co-existence' in regard to the imperialist countries, executed through the Comintern.(73) The 1920s and 1930s led towards the darkest days of the twentieth century when the concept of 'progress', from the Enlightenment, was called more into question as European civilization plunged into barbarism with the rise of Fascism, the



Spanish Civil War, the Moscow Trials, and the Second World War, culminating in the Holocaust and the use of nuclear weapons in the war in the Pacific.(74) Callinicos has noted the effect of the political downturn from 1923:

For the next two decades, Stalinism and Fascism conspired (sometimes consciously) to extirpate the revolutionary wing of the Communist movement. Within little more than two years Gramsci was in Mussolini's prison, within five Trotsky was in exile, and Lukacs had made his peace with the Comintern apparatus.(75)

In Germany Rosa Luxemburg and her co-worker Leibknecht had been murdered by the counter-revolutionary forces as a result of a premature uprising.(76) The German Social Democratic Party leadership acted to restore order and bowed to the norms of bourgeois legality, playing a complicit role in defeating the German Revolution.

Both Social Democracy and the Stalinist bureaucracy are marked by a social contradiction. In each case the contradiction is rooted in the differing social structures of western capitalism and bureaucratised socialism and the social function these political formations play in their respective conditions: Social Democracy acts as the political wing of the labour movement, representing the latter in the institutional structures of the bourgeois State apparatus and its Parliament. (77) However, committed to the norms of bourgeois legality, Social Democracy limits its actions to campaigning for 'minimum demands'- reform within the boundaries of capitalist society - and thus fails to bridge the gap between minimum and maximum demands, reform and revolution. Social

Democracy is therefore limited to the strategy of 'war of position' having ruled out the use of 'war of manoeuvre', in other words, a frontal challenge to State power, even in the most exceptional circumstances such as the post-First World War revolutionary process. In terms of Marxist political strategy, then working class reformist parties can be described as conservative workers' parties.  
(78)

The Soviet bureaucracy also exhibits a contradictory role in regard to working class: defending the nationalised property relations of post-revolutionary Russia it nonetheless remains counter-revolutionary in its foreign policy for fear of socialist democracy presenting a threat to the privileged position of the bureaucracy itself.(79) With the emergence of Fascism on the heels of the defeated European Revolution, Marxists were attempting to defend the theory and practice of international socialism and the gains of the October Revolution under desperately difficult circumstances. Arato and Breines note the interplay of theory and practice, thus:

Once the embryo of proletarian revolution in Europe (and Russia) had dissolved, Marxism as a theory of praxis was rendered impotent as a practical force. The activity which the theory was to raise to a critical, self-conscious, and self-directing plane was not there to be raised. Rather than fulfill the historic mission ascribed to it by the Marxian theory, Europe's proletariat returned, both by choice and by force, to obedience to the 'laws' of capitalist development. This turn of events was the historical truth which the emergent Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy grasped: the objectivistic and scientific standpoint, not Lukacs' philosophy of praxis, expressed the immediate state of affairs.(80)

In their account of the relation of theory and practice in the period in question Arato and Breines overstate their case, although the point made is basically correct from the viewpoint of a schematic summary of the closing of the post-war revolutionary period in 1923. Limiting their assessment of the origins of Western Marxism by focussing on its emergence through a discussion of the young Lukacs means an inevitably selective interpretation of the political fermentation which took place in the 1920s inside the Soviet Union. The alternatives to Lukacs' route, and political shift, into the Stalinist camp, receives no significant discussion.(81) Consequently the reader of Arato and Breines is left with the questionable impression of the inevitability of Stalinism and Fascism. Although this discussion can not give a detailed picture of the alternative programme for the new Soviet republic offered by the Left Opposition, or the viewpoint of Korsch in Germany(82), it is important to remain aware of alternative historical possibilities, and that this period, consequently, was a mixture of hope (the October Revolution) and despair (the First World War and the failed European revolutions).

Several writers, both participants and social theorists, have noted this mixture of hope and despair, reflecting the spirit of an era which has been partially eclipsed to those born after World War Two. Indeed, this theme of hope and despair, this dialectic historically, is an important formative background to the Frankfurt School and Western Marxism as a whole, as discussed above. The Europe following the First World War was no longer that of its pre-

war years: its innocence had been lost. Arato and Breines note with reference to the cultural scene:

While hardly new, Europe's preoccupation with the whole problem of consciousness and society, as well as with the interplay of hope and despair in an increasingly fractured world, was intensifying dramatically in the early 1920s. The shock and calamity of a world war had placed these and virtually all other matters onto an emergency basis. Lukacs' was only one of several key works to have appeared in 1923, seeking in diverse, even conflicting ways to develop dialectical accounts of human consciousness in its social nexus: Marxism and Philosophy by Lukacs' fellow Communist, Karl Korsch; Martin Buber's I & Thou; and Sigmund Freud's The Ego and The Id. Preceded by a year by T.S. Eliot's cultural grimace The Wasteland and followed by a year by the ecstatic visions of the first Manifesto of Surrealism, these were among the great theoretical expressions of a not so great year for most Europeans. (83)

Summing up, Arato and Breines define another theme of this study, the role of the intellectual in Marxist social theory: 'The issues of consciousness and society, hope and despair, were, moreover, closely bound to that of the intellectual in society and politics, concern with which has likewise been considerably sharpened by the war and the immediate postwar upheavals.' (84)

The intelligentsia of capitalist Europe, in a heightened sensitivity caused by war and revolution, were faced with the moral and political alternatives of their class positions. The social theorist and psycho-analyst Erich Fromm, who, like other core members of the Frankfurt School gravitated to Marxism in the 1920s and originated from upper middle class backgrounds, has also noted the effects of the First World War on the spirit of the era in which Western Marxism took shape:

It is difficult to know to what extent a man born in 1900 can convey his experience to people born after 1914, or after 1929, or after 1945. I selected these dates, of course, intentionally. Anyone who was, like myself, at least fourteen years of age when the First World War broke out, still experienced part of the solid, secure world of the nineteenth century. To be sure, if he was born as a son of a middle-class family with all the necessities and quite a few of the luxuries provided, he experienced a much more comfortable aspect of this pre-war period than if he had been born into a poor family. Yet even for the majority of the population, and especially the working class, the end of the last and the beginning of the present century were a tremendous improvement over the conditions of existence even fifty years earlier, and they were filled with hope for a better future. It is difficult for the generations born after 1914 to appreciate to what extent this war shattered the foundations of Western civilization...What had happened? The belief in continuing progress and peace had been shattered, moral principles which had seemed secure were violated. The unthinkable had happened. Yet hope had not disappeared...the First World War shattered this hope but did not destroy it.(85)

Fromm sketches the main routes through which European civilization counted on survival: the League of Nations, the notion of evolutionary, unilinear, progress of the Social Democratic labour parties in the liberal capitalist states, and the path of the Russian Revolution - international socialism. However, the 1930s can be contrasted with the 1920s in regard to cultural pessimism and despair; midnight in the twentieth century had not yet been reached. It was the Spanish Civil War, the Moscow Trials, and the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939 which finally sealed the hopes of 1917-23 in European society for an entire era.(86) Fromm writes:

The years between 1929 and 1933 shattered what was left of these hopes. The capitalist system showed that it was not capable of preventing unemployment and misery for a large part of the population...the approaching World War was already becoming visible on the horizon. The brutalization which had begun in 1914, which had been followed by the systems of Stalin and Hitler, now came to its full fruition.(87)

Fromm was drawn towards the anti-capitalist intelligentsia in the post-First World War years and the international socialist wing of Social Democracy. In an autobiographical sketch of his intellectual development he notes the personal impact of the war in which he conveys its personal significance:

When the war ended in 1918, I was already a deeply troubled young man who was obsessed by the question of how was war possible, by the wish to understand the irrationality of human mass behaviour, by a passionate desire for peace and international understanding. More, I had become deeply suspicious of all official ideologies and declarations, and filled with the conviction 'of all one must doubt'.(88)

In view of Fromm's remark that it is probably difficult for later generations to appreciate the change from hope to despair in European society following the defeat of the European revolutions and rise of Stalin and then Hitler in the 1930s, it seems useful to include Victor Serge's comments from his memoirs:

I have seen the face of Europe change several times. Before the First World War I knew a buoyant Europe, optimistic, liberal and crudely dominated by money. We reached our twenties as young idealistic workers, and we were angry and desperate, at times, because of the Wall: we could see nothing beyond an eternal bourgeois world, unjust and self-satisfied.(89)

Following the devastation of the First World War, the isolation and degeneration of the Russian Revolution, the rise of Hitler: 'There followed a dream of confused hopes: the Europe of popular Fronts and Moscow Trials seemed convalescent in those very moments when it was doomed.'(90) Serge brings out the confusion springing from

disorientation and lost hopes (prefiguring Herbert Marcuse's writings of the 1960s by some twenty years):

It became increasingly difficult to distinguish between revolution and reaction, between democracy with Fascist trends and Fascism in disguise, between submerged civil war and the rule of democracy, between open civil war and war between states, between intervention and non-intervention, between brands of totalitarianism in opposition but momentarily allied, between the most criminal impostures and the simple truth. This confusion sprang from the impotence of men caught up in the drift towards the cataclysm, and impotence fed in its turn upon confusion. The era of huge collapses followed. It seemed that no human value could survive - only gigantic war machines whose function was to establish slavery.(91)

The fact that Serge so powerfully conveys the confusion and sense of impotence which reinforced each other in the 1930s is linked to his political outlook which shared the basic perspective of the Left Opposition (by the late 1930s the Fourth International).(92) One of the decisive features of this perspective which Serge shared with the Left Opposition was the view that the defeats of the labour movement in the inter-war years would be ultimately partial, and temporary, rather than absolute and permanent. It is the latter impression which Arato and Breines convey in their partial assessment of Western Marxism in The Young Lukacs, discussed above. Serge, for example, goes on to remark that despite the defeats of the international socialist movement, the systems of Stalin and Hitler were foreshadowed with their own demise:

Since I escaped from Europe, other changes have come about. The prestige and effectiveness of the totalitarian Powers have declined. Even their victories seem to foreshadow their future defeat. The horizon begins to clear; the balance sheet is being drawn up...it is the actual technique of the modern world that is breaking brutally with the past and throwing the peoples of entire continents into the necessity for starting

life afresh on new foundations. That these new foundations must be of social justice, of rational organisation, of respect for the individual, of liberty, is for me a wonderfully evident fact which, little by little, is asserting itself beyond the inhumanity of the present time.

Finally, Serge ends with this note of optimism:

The future seems to me to be full of possibilities greater than we have glimpsed throughout the past.(93)

Born in 1890, Serge was of the same generation as the core members of the Frankfurt School, and it is instructive to note the affinity between him and Erich Fromm. Like Fromm, Serge's rational faith (94) springs not just from a long historical perspective and an international socialist outlook, but a deeply rooted commitment to its humanistic basis.(95) This is also a facet of Western Marxism: a commitment to class war but not class hate, to learn from progressive (and not so progressive) bourgeois social thought, to argue for a new moral order and 'thematic universe', for values guided by the norms of liberty and socialist democracy. The critical response towards Stalinism and a revulsion against 'actually existing socialism' is a fundamental expression of Marxist humanism. The Frankfurt School shared with Gramsci the viewpoint according to which Socialism must involve an hegemonic strategy pervading bourgeois society. (96) Indeed, it is instructive to note the significance of Serge and Fromm in regard to the ethos of quietism, hopelessness and impotence, of apathy and anguish, expressed in advanced capitalist states - overshadowed by the threat of nuclear holocaust - since the Second World War.(97)



Fromm's rather more hopeful attitude in regard to the possibilities for radical social change contrasts sharply with his colleagues in the Frankfurt School and this problem of pessimism is discussed in more detail in relation to late capitalist ideology in the final chapter. Suffice to note in relation to Fromm's approach to the possibilities of radical social change that he saw the resurgence of Marxist humanism to be of decisive importance in the formation of a new, hegemonic, radical opposition to state-capitalist and bureaucratic state-societies.(98)

Jacoby has noted the tendency in Western Marxism to utilize the non-capitalist logic of elements in pre-First World War European culture, mentioned above, (99) and Lowy has analysed the sociology of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia in Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism (100), indicating its political delineations and socio-historical trajectory. Indeed, Martin Jay notes the importance of understanding the socio-political and historical background to the Frankfurt School in his work on T.W. Adorno: 'Adorno, despite his Marxist and modernist inclinations, cannot be fully understood without reference to the often regressively oriented anti-capitalism of pre-First World War Germany.'(101) The above discussion concerning the dialectic of hope and despair is particularly acute in the work of Adorno, one of the major figures of the Frankfurt School. The decisive antinomy which is expressed in Adorno's work, and person, is represented in the attempt to 'rescue what remained of value in the romantic critique of modernization' on the one hand, and in Adorno's mandarin sensibility which involved an 'empassioned rejection of concrete political practice, on the other.'(102)

This antinomy will be explored further in a later part of this study. What is important at this juncture is not the social and political significance of this antinomy in the thought of Adorno, but to show the way in which Western Marxists such as the members of the Frankfurt School drew from this anti-capitalist tradition, which, as discussed above, involved a right and left wing.

It is at this point that critics of Western Marxism raise the argument according to which the Frankfurt School is said to represent a theoretical reversion to conservatism and anti-industrial romanticism. Lucio Colletti has argued this point against the Frankfurt School (103), but the charge could be made most forcefully at Adorno - whose intransigence in maintaining a social and political theory (and life-style) in isolation from any form of political practice in relation to the working class and its political parties seemed to allow the accusation of conservative intellectual elitism to stick. Adorno's justification for his principled opposition to political activity is taken up at a later point in this study. Colletti's argument that the Frankfurt School represents a reversion to conservative, anti-industrial romanticism links the use made of romanticism by the Frankfurt School to the decline of the pre-World War One German intellectual community which produced its anti-modernization critique in response to its dislocated status following the rise of monopoly capitalism through the turn of the century.(104)

Such a position, however, tends to reduce the thought of the Frankfurt School to a deterministic concept of class and social status. The point is not that such determinants may not be

relevant, they are, but only in a secondary sense when we recall Lowy's distinction between the right and left-wing of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia and thus acknowledge the way the left wing applied elements of romanticism: the left-wing potential in romantic anti-capitalism, Jay notes,

explains many early Western Marxists like Bloch, Benjamin, Marcuse and even Lukacs himself. Adorno, in fact, consciously struggled to turn the arguments of mandarin cultural despair in an ultimately positive direction. 'Not the least among the tasks confronting thought', he insisted, 'is that of placing all the reactionary arguments against Western culture in the service of progressive enlightenment.'(105)

Adorno's revulsion against advanced industrial society does not result in a simple mandarin conservatism, however. As Jay has effectively shown, Adorno is a complex and contradictory thinker, and the contradictions are as much social and political - rooted in history - as in any individual proclivity: Adorno,

often implicitly drew on the typical mandarin distinction between culture and civilization, but at the same time warned against the fetishistic hypostatization of Kultur as a realm of pure values above society. However much he may have distinguished between high and mass culture, he never forgot that 'all culture shares the guilt of society.' Nor did he allow himself to feel that nostalgia for lost communities (those organic *Gemeinschaften* Ferdinand Tonnies had contrasted to soulless modern *Gesellschaften* or societies) which animated so many of his contemporaries, even if at times he did seem to yearn for the return of the presumably authentic individuals of early bourgeois culture.(106)

Hence, the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School attempted to utilize romantic anti-capitalism 'in the service of progressive enlightenment'(107), turning the cultural despair of the anti-

capitalist intelligentsia in a positive direction, that is, in the service of the self-emancipation of the working class and progressive forces in capitalist society. The question as to whether and to what extent the Frankfurt School succeeded in the attempt to render romantic anti-capitalist thought adequate to the demands of a Marxian critique of capitalist society is a more demanding and complex question. This question is of fundamental importance for this study and will be taken up in the later discussion of the validity and effectiveness of the Frankfurt School's critique of late capitalist ideology. Colletti's argument in regard to the Frankfurt School's alleged anti-scientific proclivity to conservatism and romanticism is, therefore, unconvincing. Colletti is too concerned to defend the scientific orthodoxy of Marxism and thus misses the importance of the dialectic between hope and despair in the Frankfurt School and origins of critical theory of society. Hence, Colletti's accusation that Marcuse's work represents 'petty-bourgeois anarchism', a crime that is extended 'to all those who have taken him seriously'; and hence Jacoby's apt riposte, 'The gun of science is cocked whenever thought thinks too much.' (108) Jacoby's riposte against Colletti is based upon the conviction, drawn from the Frankfurt School, that Marxian socialism can only be developed if freed from the ossified strictures of orthodox Marxism, to be analysed below.

The complexity of Adorno's work has often been noted, and its apparent incomprehensibility has been criticised by the scientist and philosopher Karl Popper, for example, for 'simply talking trivialities in high sounding language'.(109) In an interview in

1978 Marcuse describes Adorno as 'a genius' while the interviewer, Brian Magee, argues that a fundamental barrier to the dissemination of the thought of the Frankfurt School is precisely the difficulty of its theoretical expression. Adorno, in particular, Magee argues, in 'unreadable'.(110) Although Marcuse defends Adorno by arguing that he is attempting to use dissociation in the style of theoretical expression he adopts in defence of dialectical social theory against the absorbtive powers of the establishment, it can also be viewed as a product of Adorno's conservative, mandarin elitism. However, as indicated above, although Adorno is open to the latter criticism, as are the Frankfurt School thinkers (to a greater and lesser extent) as a whole, it is important to note that Adorno maintained a principled position in justification of his theoretical viewpoint. The case can be made that Adorno's predicament as a Marxian, or at least, socialist theoretician lies in his political interpretation of the inter-war years and his inaccessibility as a thinker is a token of his declining confidence in the very categories he came to adopt and defend as a theoretical position. At any rate, whilst Adorno remains a fascinating theoretician to the extent that his work captures the historical contradiction of the mid-twentieth century with biting irony and critique, few socialist intellectuals have striven to remain as theoretically inaccessible as Adorno. Aside from the argument above, that Adorno's inaccessibility reflected, to a certain extent, his declining confidence in the Marxian theory and the working class to transform late capitalism, it is important to be aware of the components which

make up Adorno's complex perspective, and avoid a partial appraisal which results from a snapshot of a moving target. (111)

Thus , to dismiss Adorno because of one element (romantic anti-capitalism) in his theoretical position, as has been argued, is unconvincing. And, for the same reason, it is unsatisfactory to dismiss Adorno (or other members of the Frankfurt School) because of his mandarin cultural despair or the apparent incomprehensibility of his writing style or theoretical constructions. An accurate assessment of Adorno would thus have to include an awareness of the five components of his thought, as enumerated by Jay:

The force-field of Adorno's intellectual career, as it appears to us now, would thus include the generating energies of Western Marxism, aesthetic modernism, mandarin cultural despair, and Jewish self-identification, as well as the more anticipatory pull of deconstructionism.

Hence Jay argues:

Although at certain moments and in certain moods Adorno may have been attracted more to one of these poles than to another, his work as a whole can best be grasped as an uneasy tension among all of them. It is thus misleading to argue, as have some commentators, that he was really a mandarin pretending to be a Marxist or simply a deconstructionist avant la lettre. (112)

Firstly, then, Adorno's thought can not be reduced, as a whole, to one component - of mandarin cultural despair. Moreover, as discussed above, even this despair is mediated by the Marxist concern to render its pessimism a positive service against the repressive totality of late capitalism. Secondly, it is of decisive importance to recall the situational, personal, and political impact

of Nazi Germany on the Frankfurt School - not in the reductionist sense inspired by sociological relativism, but to explain Adorno's and associates rational obsession with the Nazi terror. This 'obsession' grew in the particular conditions prevailing in post-Second World War Germany following Adorno's (et al) return from exile, in 1953. For Adorno, the post-war Germany to which he returned harboured its Nazi past in an unwillingness to confront its social conscience.(113) Adorno, like others in the Frankfurt School and otherwise with a Jewish heritage, suffered the bereavement, and experienced the guilt of one who had survived the lost and dead:

whether after Auschwitz you can go on living - especially whether one who escaped by accident, one who by rights should have been killed, may go on living. His mere survival calls for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared.(114)

It could be argued that if the de-Nazification of West Germany after the Second World War had been more convincing and effective, than Adorno's obsession would not have been so forcefully propelled into its tragic pessimism. But the Marxist component in Adorno's thought meant that he clearly perceived Fascism in its internal relation to capitalism. Without conflating the two, as some commentators have argued the Frankfurt School did (115) - as if capitalism and democracy are automatically synonymous and Fascism a mere aberration of the mid-twentieth century - Adorno and his colleagues in the Frankfurt School remained convinced that the underlying causes of Fascism remained even if the movement itself had been militarily defeated.(116) As Jay has noted, in the

economic propositions of the Frankfurt School political economists, 'state capitalism' (Pollock), monopolistic capitalism regulated by the State, could co-exist with or without liberal democracy (117), and it was this unexpected outcome of the Second World War which Marcuse described as 'one-dimensional society' (118). The continuation of racism, sexism, realigned militarist blocs, and growing mass unemployment in Western Europe allow little room for the simplistic conflation of capitalism and democracy, as can be seen in the election of neo-Fascist candidates to the European Parliament in the 1980s, or in the liberal assumption that the tension between capitalism and authoritarianism has been overcome. (119) Thus, the perceived continuity between Fascism and 'one-dimensional' post-war capitalist society in the Frankfurt School is less a consequence of their neglect of a comparative institutional and political analysis (which is still a valid criticism on a specific level of analysis) but of their emphasis on late capitalist ideology, culture, and social consciousness; and this emphasis may in fact be their lasting contribution to critical social science, and a positive strength. Therefore, it is important to appreciate these finer points of analysis and differentiation in order to avoid a vulgar dismissal of the Frankfurt School for failing to measure up to a predefined orthodox Marxian standpoint.

Thus, this continuity of the authoritarian content of reactionary ideology in late capitalism cannot be reduced to the criticism that the Frankfurt School simply conflated Fascism and capitalism due to their obsession with the Nazi horror from which they never recovered. This perceived continuity explains the despair



underlying Adorno's famous aphorism: 'To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.'(120) And Horkheimer: 'He who does not wish to speak of capitalism, should also be silent about fascism.'(121) Thus Jay notes that Adorno's melancholy is more than the mere lament of a mandarin intellectual for a pre-capitalist utopia: 'Indeed, the horrors of the death camps confirmed for him the truth of Brecht's bitter claim that the mansion of culture was built on dogshit.'(122) Indeed, in his intellectual biography of Marcuse, Barry Katz notes that Marcuse's pessimism was also fueled by the existence of 'fascist tendencies that co-existed with constitutional democracy' - a deep fear and concern that remained with him for the rest of his life. Katz notes that 'he referred with increasing frequency to Auschwitz'.(123)

Hence, in Western Marxism, the interplay of hope and despair in the inter-war years grasped the tragedy for European civilization of the defeated European Revolution, and the rise of reaction culminating in the Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939, following the success of Franco's forces in Spain. Held aptly notes: 'It was the end of an era and, for all those committed to the struggle against capitalism, a desperate irony.'(124) The element of cultural pessimism in romantic anti-capitalism was given full vent in the Western Marxism of the 1930s and is evidenced graphically in surrealism.(125) Historically and politically, however, the inextricable contagion of tragedy and its corresponding world view gained its momentum from the failure of the labour movement to overcome the ideological hegemony of the capitalist State and civil society and check the forces of reaction in the 1918-23 period.(126)

The failure of the German working class to defend the most politically experienced and organised labour movement, the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and the rise of Stalin and the ruling bureaucratic stratum, the purges and show trials, culminating in the Stalin-Hitler pact, meant a revision or abandonment of Marxism. As Deutscher notes of intellectuals influenced by the Left Opposition, the combined impact of Fascism and Stalinism led to a retreat from Marxist politics: 'the intelligentsia's revulsion against Stalinism was turning into a reaction against Marxism at large and Bolshevism.'<sup>(127)</sup>

This was an uneven tendency amongst the Western Marxists. The most politically active were suppressed, exiled, exhausted, or murdered. Luxemburg and Leibknecht had been murdered in 1919; Lenin died in 1924, Gramsci died in Fascist captivity in 1937; Korsch was exiled and isolated in the United States <sup>(128)</sup>. Serge, Otto Ruhle and Trotsky were exiled in Mexico. Trotsky's murder by an agent of Stalin in 1940 came to symbolize the end of an era which began in the revolutionary socialist movement of the 1870s and erupted in 1917. From the murdered internees of Stalin's Show Trials and Vorkuta prison camps <sup>(129)</sup>, to those who fought and died in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War <sup>(130)</sup>, to those in the prisons and prison camps of Mussolini and Hitler, the hopes which opened in 1917 - and raised in Europe 1918-23 - were being liquidated along with the generations who struggled to realize them. The Left Opposition produced the first systematic analysis and critique of Stalinism and attempted to forestall the success of

Fascism by providing the earliest and most cogent warnings to the German labour movement.(131)

Trotsky, the major thinker of the Left Opposition, did not believe the German working class would fail to rally against the threat of National Socialism (132). The Social Democratic Party leadership argued for moderation and order within the boundaries of bourgeois legality. What the Social Democratic leadership failed to understand, Trotsky argued, was that the forces of the bourgeois State would see Fascism as the lesser evil in relation to the working class taking control of society, and that the Fascist organisations could be relied upon to restore precisely the 'order' which would be necessary for the survival of capitalist society.

On the other hand, the German Communist Party, following the policy of the Comintern (determined by Moscow), continued to portray the Social Democratic party as 'social fascist' blocking any possibility of working class unity and thus paving the way for Hitler's coup in 1933.(133) The Comintern policy refused to recognise any distinction between bourgeois democracy and Fascism and thus confused and disorientated the opposition to totalitarianism. For the Left Opposition Stalin's foreign policy played a counter-revolutionary role in the interests of maintaining the international status-quo. The suppression of the remaining international socialist movement which refused to comply with the policies of the Stálinized Comintern (134), the suppression of the Left Opposition, the liquidation of the Bolshevik Old Guard, the reactionary reversal of progressive domestic policies in the USSR(135), and counter-revolutionary policies abroad (136), led

Trotsky to view Stalinism as, 'the most disgusting inheritance from the old world. It will have to be broken into pieces and burned at a public bonfire before we can speak of socialism without a blush of shame.'(137)

In this period, the Institute for Social Research, formerly based in Frankfurt, relocated in exile at Columbia University, New York, initiated an investigation into the roots of Fascism and the mass psychology of authoritarianism.(138) Material had been brought from Germany , and though incomplete, cast a decisive formative influence over the subsequent work on authoritarianism. This material was based on Erich Fromm's study on The Working Class In Weimar Germany dating from 1929 (139), Studies in Authority & the Family, 1936,(140) and The Authoritarian Personality, 1950, followed as collaborative projects.(141) Unlike the Left Opposition which maintained an analysis and critique of Stalinism and Fascism, the Institute turned to the analysis of Fascism as its most pressing task and, arguably, made its own specific contribution to the Marxian analysis by enlisting social psychology. The problem which emerges is the specific use of social psychology and the role it plays in a Marxist analysis of socio-historical phenomenon. As this study shows, however, the purpose of critical theory was to integrate psychology into Marxism and by no means replace the latter with psychology. To what extent the critical theorists succeeded is to anticipate a more detailed discussion to follow in connection with the analysis of historical materialism and psychoanalysis.

At this juncture a broader survey is required in order to introduce the work of the Frankfurt School in relation to the analysis of Fascism and indicate the specific contribution of the Frankfurt School. It has already been noted that the Left Opposition contributed the first analysis of Fascism in relation to the socio-political genesis of this ideology and mass movement, but the primary purpose of Trotsky's work was to clear a path for drawing the immediate and medium term strategic and organisational conclusions to defeat Fascism and prepare the working class for renewed political struggle. (142) This is not to suggest that the work of the Frankfurt School represents a departure from the basic perspective shared by other Marxists such as the Left Opposition, in fact, it can be argued that the Frankfurt School enlarge and develop this perspective. (143) The Frankfurt School sought to uncover the hidden, unconscious drives and passions which rendered the German working class susceptible to Fascist ideology and propaganda. Fromm's initial work involved a more explicit analysis of the German workers' parties, while later work of the Institute focuses on the family and modes of socialization in the Studies in Authority and the Family to Adorno et al's The Authoritarian Personality which, although part of a collaborative series of studies, received criticism for its alleged psychological reductionism. Jay notes:

The study immediately became an object of enormous controversy, which in part centred on its alleged over-emphasis of the subjective causes of authoritarianism. The Institute's Marxist roots were indeed less apparent in this project than in its earlier work, but a close reading of the sections written by Adorno would have revealed that it had not really abandoned its stress on objective as well as subjective factors.(144)

Here, Jay's defence of the Authoritarian Personality thesis, that the objective factors of authoritarianism were not ignored, rests on the ground that this research must be understood and assessed as part of a collaborative project. This, however, merely shifts the assessment to another level of analysis - to the Frankfurt School's project as a whole, and is dealt with in a later chapter.

Nonetheless, as the 1930s progressed, Adorno and Horkheimer became more attached to orthodox psychoanalysis as a paradigm for a critical social psychology while during the same period, Erich Fromm, who introduced psychoanalytic perspectives into the Institute, was becoming more disenchanted with orthodox Freudian ideas and more influenced by the recent discovery (1932) of Marx's Paris Manuscripts of 1844.(145)

While it is true that the retreat from adherence to Marxist politics was followed by an investigation into authoritarianism utilizing psychoanalytic concepts, it cannot be assumed that this represented a retreat from politics to psychology. The logical flaw in such an argument inevitably raises the objection that a retreat from Marxist politics is not necessarily reflected in socio-psychological analysis as such. However, it can be argued that the success or failure of the socio-psychological analysis depends on the validity of the psychological concepts used within the overall socio-political and economic framework. Hence, at one level, the implication that psychology is necessarily un-Marxist lurks behind the criticism that integrating psychology inevitably means a retreat from a Marxian standpoint. This is to pose the wrong question. The real question which arises is rather more complex: What counts

as a Marxist psychology? What role would a Marxist psychology play in, for example, the analysis of Fascism? The question, once applied to the socio-political realm raises the issue of social consciousness; of subjectivity, and is analysed and discussed in further detail in following chapters. The question of subjectivity cannot be reduced, however, to the problems surrounding the attempt to integrate psychoanalysis into Marxism. This question is reflected in the politics of the Second International and its representative social theory. It is important to grasp the way in which the Western Marxists, and in particular the Frankfurt School, represented a critique of and protest against the social theory of the Second International on the one hand, and the ossification of Marx and Engels' ideas in Soviet Marxism on the other. It will be argued that this is the context in which the concept of subjectivity in critical theory is formulated and, as a result, issued the turn to psychoanalysis. Hence it is important to understand the socio-political context in order to appreciate the theoretical presuppositions behind this specific turn to Freud and psychoanalysis as the basis for a Marxian social psychology.

The Western Marxists, it will be recalled, represented the left-wing of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia in revolutionary Europe.(146) This geo-political movement involved adherents who were involved in the European labour movement; Korsch, Luxemburg, Gramsci, for example, and schools of Marxist thought which, like the Frankfurt School, were formed amidst the defeats of the 1920s and 1930s and were subsequently exiled or removed from direct links with the labour movement.(147) This movement, as discussed above,

was ambivalent. It expressed the need to break with the mechanistic determinism and scientism of the Second International. The impetus for such a break is symbolized in the October revolution. The tide against the orthodoxy of the Second International, creating a renewed interest in Marxism, was epitomized in Gramsci's characterization of the Russian Revolution. In January 1918 Gramsci wrote:

This is the revolution against Marx's Capital..Facts have become ideologies...If the Bolsheviks deny some assertions in Capital they do not deny (Marx's) immanent, life giving ideas..They are living Marx's thought, which does not die, which is the continuation of Italian and German idealistic philosophy which in Marx had become contaminated by positivistic and naturalistic incrustations. This philosophy always regards as the major factor in history not crude economic facts but man, men in society, men who interact with each other, who develop through these contacts...a collective social will, and understand economic facts and judge them or adapt them to their will until their will becomes the motive force of the economy...(148)

This 'revolution against Marx's Capital' was, in actuality, the revolution in theory and practice against a passive waiting for history, of subserviance to 'historical laws', and ultimately, against the assumptions of evolutionary and reformist socialism. This revolt was expressed in the two fundamental works of this period, mentioned above, by Lukacs and Korsch, History and Class Consciousness and Marxism and Philosophy.(149)

The revolt of Western Marxism represented the need to restore the subjective dimension to Marxian theory, politics, and organisation. For to reassert the subjective side of Marxian theory, to restore the concept of subjectivity meant to expose the inherent



conformism and ultimate acquiescence to the status quo underlining the theory and practice of the Second International.(150)

### Dialectical Materialism And German Social Democracy

Callinicos notes that the significance of Marx's 'return to Hegel' in his later work was never systematically discussed in his writings.(151) Fromm (152), Mandel (153), Nicholas (154), and Marcuse (155), have traced the influence of Hegel in Marx's own concept of dialectical social theory in his later writings; in the Grundrisse (1857-58), and Das Kapital (1867), for example, showing that the attempt to divide Marx's work into 'young philosophical' and 'later scientific' periods is unconvincing - although, as Mandel notes, this is not the same as saying Marx did not refine and develop his concepts in his life time.(156) Hence, the philosophical basis of the Marxian dialectic - having been neglected - was left for others to attempt to construct, following Marx's death in 1883.(157) In his study of Marx's Grundrisse, Nicholas makes the point in the following way:

The gradual emergence of the Grundrisse out of obscurity into the consciousness of students and followers of Marx should have a most stimulating influence. The work explodes in many ways the mental set, the static framework of formulae and slogans to which much of Marxism has been reduced after a century of neglect, ninety years of social democracy, eighty years of 'dialectical materialism', and seventy years of revisionism...this work will make it impossible or at least hopelessly frustrating to dichotomize the work of Marx into 'young' and 'old', into 'philosophical' and 'economic' elements.(158)

The Grundrisse marks not only the continued relevance of Hegel to the 'later Marx', the interpenetration and supersession of philosophical concepts and political economy, but also the relevance of Marxian theory to, not only nineteenth, but also twentieth century capitalist society.(159) The mechanistic interpretation of Marx's materialist conception of history was given coinage by the chief theoretician of the Second International, Karl Kautsky. In the Second International, 'dialectical materialism' became the official ideology of Social Democracy, and due to the prestige and influence of the latter, much of the European labour movement too. Under these auspices, Callinicos writes,

the dialectic, conceived as an ontology, an account of the fundamental nature of being, served to justify a version of Marxism in which social change is an organic process whose outcome is determined in advance. 'The capitalist social system has run its course', Kautsky wrote in 1892; 'its dissolution is now only a question of time. Irresistible economic forces lead with the certainty of doom to the shipwreck of capitalist production. The substitution of a new social order for the existing one is no longer desirable, it has become inevitable.'(160)

It would however be misleading to forget that the theoretical turn to evolutionary socialism was related to an objective social process, and which accounts for the ambivalent role of Social Democracy as a political expression of the interests of the working class. Callinicos notes that whilst the Social Democratic Party in Germany struggled against the Anti-Socialist Laws (1879-90), simultaneously arising in the Party and trade unions, 'a full-time apparatus whose raison d'etre was increasingly that of the negotiation of compromise and the avoidance of conflict, and whose concern tended to be that

of preserving the movement intact at the price of avoiding class struggle.'(161)

The element of fatalism evident in the deterministic core of Social Democratic orthodoxy has an ambivalent ideological function. Initially, the belief in the inevitability of socialism played a role in attracting militants, and provided an incentive to remain politically active, despite set-backs; but also, 'served to justify the abstention from any activity which might provoke a direct confrontation between the workers movement and the State.'(162)

This political ambivalence was reflected in Social Democracy's political strategy and programme, evident as early as 1891 when the Erfurt Programme was adopted. Divided into two parts, the programme prefigured the eventual split in German Social Democracy, and its acquiescence to the status quo:

The first, or maximum programme by Kautsky, surveyed the contradictions of capitalism and announced its inevitable collapse, Eduard Bernstein, in the second part, set out the SPD's minimum programme, its immediate demands...History would close the gap between maximum and minimum programmes, bringing about a proletarian revolution by 'natural necessity' (a favourite phrase of Kautsky's).

Hence:

Any attempt to speed up the historical process by extra-parliamentary mass action would, Kautsky argued in 1910 and 1912, when defending the SPD's strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie) against Rosa Luxemburg and Anton Pannekoek, only endanger the gains already made by the workers movement.(163)

The notion of avoiding confrontation with the capitalist State at all costs is open to the criticism, advanced by Rosa Luxemburg (164), that it is based on an overwhelmingly defensive strategy which is premised upon an inaccurate assessment of the capitalist state apparatus. Mandel notes the Marxist view that the bourgeois State is first a 'body of armed men' protecting private property in the means of production.(165) From the Marxian standpoint, a confusion exists in the reformist understanding of the democratic rights of the masses and the historical function of Parliament:

Parliament is not an institution 'imposed' on the bourgeoisie by the struggle of the toiling masses. It is an institution of typically bourgeois origin, originally designed to control the taxes paid by the bourgeoisie. This is why the bourgeoisie traditionally opposed universal suffrage, preferring to restrict the right to elect parliament deputies to the owners of capital. All other institutions of the bourgeois state have the same origin and the same function of protecting the interests of the owners (against semi-feudal absolutism, of course, but also against the dispossessed masses).(166)

Against the reformist 'identification of the democratic rights of the masses with the institutions of the bourgeois state in its parliamentary democratic form', Mandel argues that, in fact, the democratic content of the capitalist state; universal suffrage, freedom of association, to demonstrate, freedom of the press, the right to strike, were 'imposed on a recalcitrant bourgeoisie by the workers movement'.(167) Kautsky's argument, coherently formulated in his debate with Luxemburg in 1910, rejected the so called 'strategy of assault' and counterposed the latter to the 'strategy of attrition'.

According to this strategy, the workers movement, rather than seeking to take the enemy fortress by assault in one fell swoop, thus putting everything at stake and risking all the gains of forty years of partial progress and accumulation of forces, should begin by encircling this fortress and undermining it, compelling the enemy to make repeated and costly sorties resulting in defeats. The workers should divide the enemy and provoke a gradual erosion of his will to fight. The fortress can then be taken at low cost, although not without firing a shot.(168)

At first glance this argument seems irrefutable. However, Mandel argues, historical reality proves more complex and defies such 'reasonable' schemas for social change: 'The Kautskyist strategy failed miserably. It led not to the collapse of the capitalist fortress, but to the collapse of the German workers movement.'(167) In the reformist conception, 'the power of the bourgeoisie is represented as a fortress standing outside the social body properly so called.'(168)

This viewpoint 'is symbolic of a profoundly mechanistic and erroneous view of the relations of bourgeois domination'. Instead, the political power of the bourgeoisie and its apparatus of ideological manipulation is not external to the social body, the middle and working classes, 'but stands in permanent interpenetration with it...' Under these conditions the defensive strategy of attrition, Mandel continues, can be dismantled at precise moments, whenever it threatens the interests of the bourgeoisie, by agencies 'within the very social body that is supposed to be besieging it.'(169)

Moreover, from the Marxian standpoint, the revisionist strategy loses sight of the historical importance of the working class to

create its own state to serve its specific needs. In denying this factor, the necessity for the collective self-emancipation of the working class is lost in the static relationship posed in the reformist conception of party and class. In this conception the party attempts to represent the class as a whole within the institutions of the capitalist state. Consequently, it can be argued that the need to overcome the political and sectional differentiation within the working class utilizing the experiential basis for mass psychological change, the class-struggle, is relinquished.(170)

In order to gain reforms, whilst the bourgeoisie retains economic power, the working class must not be seen to jeopardize parliamentary democracy in extra-parliamentary action. The hegemonic structures of bourgeois society interpenetrate the State and civil society thus making the strategy of attrition a one-sided and mechanistic conception of challenging State power. In the German Social Democratic Party the schism between the Marxist theory and reformist practice, embodied in the notion of the maximum and minimum programme, led to Bernstein's attempt to revise the theory and bring the party in line with its practice. Callinicos notes Bernstein's

attack on 'orthodox' Marxism amounted theoretically to little more than a reversion to 'true' socialism, rejecting as it did the dialectic, historical materialism, the labour theory of value, and indeed the bulk of Capital, and advocating reinstatement of Kantian ethics. Politically, however, the book was dynamite. Bernstein called on the SPD to bring its theory into line with its practice, demanding that German Social Democracy should make up its mind to appear what it is in reality: a democratic socialist party of reform.(171)

The attempt by Bernstein to revise the theoretical basis of the Social Democratic Party sparked off a debate within Germany and then European Socialist parties which gained momentum throughout the First World War, by which time the Second International had split three ways. This split had been latent from 1910 when three wings were evident: a right, left, and centre.

Left and right agreed on little except the need to revise the 'party tactic', which Kautsky and the centre continued to defend. The right, with considerable support from the trade union leadership, increasingly influential within the SPD counsels after 1905, wanted to scrap the maximum programme, drop the party's stance of principled opposition to the Wilhelmine monarchy, and support the German state in its conflicts with the other great powers: August 1914 marked their triumph. The left, and above all Rosa Luxemburg in her 1910 polemic with Kautsky, proposed that the SPD encourage mass strikes in order to force through the party's minimum democratic programme and build up the working class consciousness and organisation necessary to conquer political power. The centre, formerly critical of the right, gravitated towards them. The debate would culminate after the German revolution of 1918 in right-wing SPD ministers presiding over the murder of Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.(172)

The three wings of Social Democracy produced different political and philosophical positions between 1900-14 involving a theoretical critique of the evolutionary socialism and the mechanistic strategy of attrition advanced by Kautsky and Plekhanov. Austro-Marxism, for example, like the Kautskyite centre, sought firmer neo-Kantian foundations for orthodoxy. Attempting to reconcile revolution and reform, left and right, the centre eschewed confrontation with the State. This, Callinicos argues, resulted in 'the destruction of the Austrian workers' movement by the Dolfuss regime in February 1934.'(173) Sympathizing with Bernstein's belief that ethics are

autonomous of classes, the centre could accept Marxism as a scientific theory quite independent of value-judgements.(174)

Ironically, the main Austro-Marxist, Max Adler, accepted neo-Kantianism in the attempt to provide Marxism with adequate philosophical foundations, and thus defend the Marxist science of society against the revisionism of the right - thus distinguishing it markedly from the ethical justification of socialism advanced by Bernstein. In attempting to restore the concept of revolutionary subjectivity, however, the Austro-Marxists reintroduced the concept of the transcendent subject, identifying social relations with forms of consciousness and thus arriving at an idealist concept of subjectivity. (175) The result of this over-compensation, according to greater significance to ideological as opposed to economic and political struggles, suggests the elements prefiguring Western Marxism.(176)



The Revolutionary Wing Of The Second International

Against the economic and gradualist reformism of Bernstein, the scientific materialism of Plekhanov, Kautsky, and the Austro-Marxists, the revolutionary wing of the Second International developed a philosophical and political break re-emphasizing the role of consciousness in the revolutionary process. The orthodox conception of the revolutionary process conceived the class-struggle as expressing historical laws. Under-developed and dependent countries were fated to tread the road of capitalist development before the question of socialism could be on the agenda, regardless of the uneven and combined development of the world economy. (177) However, this unilinear conception of historical development contained an explicit belief in the predominance of historical laws, based on a mechanistic notion of economic development, leading to the inevitability of socialism. Following Marx, Luxemburg stressed the experiential function of the class-struggle as a means of self-education of the working class (178), while Lenin made the question of organisation an important concept in the dialectic between party and class. (179) Callinicos notes,

Lenin's 'practical break' (as Althusser would put it) with evolutionism involved three propositions. First, class struggles do not have an inevitable outcome. There are always alternative paths of historical development. Second, the contradictions which load history in a particular direction are not purely economic: they depend, that is, not only on the relations and forces of production but on the political and ideological relations with which they are bound up. Third, the conditions of social revolution will not arise automatically, as a result of the expansion of the productive forces, but require the active, conscious, and organised intervention of revolutionaries. (180)

In his development and application of Marx's notion of uneven and combined development, Trotsky argued that Plekhanov's and the Menshevik's critical support of the liberal middle-class in Russian development denied the unique combination of economic backwardness and political weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie. In the course of Russian development, Trotsky argued, only the active, guiding role of the politically organised working class, placing themselves at the head of the progressive classes, could carry out the demands of the bourgeois revolution, through the development of a workers' republic.(181) Trotsky stressed the socio-economic relationship that obtained between the advanced capitalist states and Tsarist Russia, and argued that if Russia represented the weakest link in the chain of capitalism, its successful revolution was predicated on its advanced industrial neighbours being able to offer material assistance for development in a post-revolutionary Europe. Luxemburg's concept of the experiential role of the mass struggle as self-educator of the working class, Lenin's concept of the necessity for an active, organising party, and Trotsky's analysis of Russian insertion into the the world economy, formed the theoretical and programmatic basis of the Russian revolution against the evolutionary determinism and reformism in the perspectives governing the theory and practice of Kautsky and Bernstein in Germany, Plekhanov and Kerensky in Russia.

The revolutionary wing of Social Democracy argued that in repressing both the 'political' and 'philosophical' components of Marxism, the vulgar materialist conception of the transition from capitalism to socialism could only lead to political conformism and

passivity; allowing the initiative to flow, in a critical period of class-struggle, into the hands of the ruling class and its repressive forces. The cult of scientific analysis ('scientism') had blunted the critical edge of Marxism by rendering it ossified, abstract, removed from the actual balance of forces engaged in the class-struggle. By forcing the evolutionary ideal onto the logic of the class-struggle, the revolutionary wing argued, the reformists imposed an artificial perspective which minimized the repressive function of the capitalist State to the detriment of the labour movement, and thus advanced a strategy devoid of any strategic initiative. Scientific orthodoxy sought legitimacy in the intellectual universe in a simplistic materialism that reduced the sphere of ideas and consciousness to epiphenomena, mere reflections of objective historical forces. Hence, the revolutionary wing, evoked Marx's Eleventh theses on Feuerbach, of the active role of consciousness in social change. That history is created by humankind even if not under circumstances that are chosen as such. Indeed, if social reality is not the result of creative practice, then the necessary achievement of Socialism as a conscious goal is denied active political mediation. Carl Boggs has noted in this connection: 'Neither a strictly idealist dialectic nor an empiricist social science could comprehend historical movement as the struggle of opposite forces: both therefore involved a 'radical denial of politics'. (182)

Boggs argues that the Western Marxists attempted to restore the philosophical dimension and unity of Marxism that had been undermined by the scientific orthodoxy of the Second International,

'the elements of praxis and totality...reintegrating the active or "subjective" dimension without which the revolutionary process itself could not develop.'(183)

However, Boggs argues that the developments of the Western Marxists were contradictory, fragmentary, and uneven. Aiming at the philosophical unity of Marxism, the political realm had been neglected by the Frankfurt School, and to a lesser extent by Lukacs and Korsch.(184) The restoration of the philosophical unity of Marxism implies a consciousness of creative practice, of political intervention. This approach denies the reflectionist theory of knowledge according to which subjectivity, consciousness, represents a reflex of economic laws executed in historical development - a view which found its way into the work of Engels, Plekhanov, Kautsky, and the Austro-Marxists. The political consequences of this tendency of the Second International, the revolutionary wing argued, led to the acquiescence of the main European Social Democratic parties to the First World War and the destruction of the workers' International. The fetishism of science meant that Marxian theory, 'became an academic project, remote from and even hostile to political practice - part of a materialist paradigm that excluded all "subjectivity", including philosophy, psychology, culture, the role of consciousness, and even creative leadership.'(185)

Consequently, Boggs argues, it was Gramsci's thought which came to express the synthesis between the academic and political activism of the Western Marxists, by uniting in his perspective the political, philosophical, and cultural in his concept of revolutionary totality.(186) However, it can be argued in this regard, that Boggs

draws his account of Gramsci's perspective from the latter's unsystematic thought and writings. Hence, although the main themes of Gramsci's thought are brought into focus with the coherence they deserve, this coherence is nonetheless exaggerated at the expense of the contradictions which prevailed in Gramsci's thought. Thus it may be more accurate to argue that Gramsci's thought represents a contradictory synthesis of the philosophical and political tendencies in Western Marxism.(187) This is evident in the fact that aspects of Gramsci's concept of socialism and democracy was debilitated by the one-party state conception which dominated the theory and practice of the Stalinized Third International. (188) In their refusal to identify too closely with political organisations, the Frankfurt School maintained its explicit commitment to the combination socialism and liberty, defended trenchantly by Horkheimer, Marcuse, Fromm and Adorno, following in the footsteps of Rosa Luxemburg. (189) Until the mid-1930s the Frankfurt School maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Russia, after initial enthusiasm. The initial support gave way to disenchantment as it became clear that the Stalinist bureaucracy was consolidating its totalitarian and terroristic rule. The authoritarian bureaucracy became the subject of criticism for its technocratic notion of economic and social development and its destruction of socialist democracy. Marcuse (190) and Kirchheimer (191) produced detailed social and political analyses of Soviet society, and Friedrich Pollock analysed the Soviet economy.(192)

Kirchheimer, for example, argued that the contradiction in Lenin's ideas between radical democracy and his theory of the revolutionary

party is reproduced in the Soviet state. The Soviets were subordinated to the discipline of the ruling Communist Party. Held notes that,

Kirchheimer recognised that many factors contributed to this state of affairs, but felt that it was (at least in part) a result of 'the natural unfolding of the party structure' and its imposition upon the structure of the state. He shared Rosa Luxemburg's critique of all attempts to impose 'the principle of capitalist factory discipline' on the 'autonomous discipline of the working class'. Although he did not accept her emphasis on the 'supreme importance of spontaneity', he did agree that to crush spontaneity was disastrous. He was extremely critical of the 'primitive purity' and 'autocratic structure' of the Soviet party and state which had 'jeopardized all chances of the development of democratic institutions' within and outside of the party.(193)

The critical theorists defended the concept of creative practice by elaborating Marx and Engels' argument that unlike previous social revolutions, Socialism would represent the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom as the conscious act on the part of the majority of the population: the working class. In the twentieth century the question of the transition from capitalism to socialism has arisen in terms of the self-emancipation of the working class versus revolution by military conquest; for example, the formation of the East European States following the Second World War. (194) It can be argued, then, that critical theory combatted the legitimacy of revolution by conquest and defended the concept of the self-emancipation of the working class for integral socialism, that is, socialist democracy.(195) Marcuse wrote, for example:

There can be no blind necessity in tendencies that terminate in a free and self-conscious society. The negation of

capitalism begins within capitalism itself, but even in the phases that precede revolution there is active the rational spontaneity that will animate the post-revolutionary phases. The revolution depends indeed upon a totality of objective conditions: it requires a certain attained level of material and intellectual culture, a self-conscious and organised working class on an international scale, acute class-struggle. These become revolutionary conditions, however, only if seized upon and directed by a conscious activity that has in mind the socialist goal. Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capitalism to socialism.(196)

Hence: 'The revolution requires the maturity of many forces, but the greatest among them is the subjective factor, namely, the revolutionary class-struggle itself.'(197)

In so arguing, Marcuse is linking the philosophical unity of Marxism to the political critique of reformism and scientism. Phil Slater has summarized the implications of the method contained in Bernstein's notion of evolutionary socialism which forms the basis of reformism:

The basic characteristic of reformism is the absolutization, to all intents and purposes, of reforms. Reform and revolution, a dialectical unity in Marxian theory, are separated; the former is elevated to the means of achieving socialism, thus making the latter not only unnecessary, but an undesirable disturbance.(198)

Reformism, then, represented a theoretical and programmatic departure from the work of Marx and Engels, limiting the labour movement to the boundaries of the bourgeois State and its norms of legality. (199) Bernstein, in attempting to bring the theory of the Social Democratic Party in Germany in line with that organisation's practice, drew from his experience of English Fabian Socialism.

Luxemburg succinctly noted that, 'Bernstein has constructed his theory upon relationships obtaining in England. He sees the world through English spectacles.'<sup>(200)</sup>

Consequently, reformism represented an attack not only on dialectical social theory but also on the categories employed in Marx's critique of repressive and ideological apparatus serving the long-term interests of the possessing class. The retreat from the dialectic totality of the revolutionary process in Marxian socialism to the notion of evolutionary socialism was marked by the turn from dialectical social theory's concern for the totality to the philosophy of empiricism and pragmatism:<sup>(201)</sup>

Revisionist writing and thought, which expressed the growing faith of large socialist groups in a peaceful evolution from capitalism to socialism, attempted to change socialism from a theoretical and practical antithesis to the capitalist system into a parliamentary movement within the system.<sup>(202)</sup>

Consequently, Marcuse argues,

The philosophy and politics of opportunism, represented by this movement, took the form of a struggle against what it termed 'the remnants of Utopianism thinking in Marx'. The result was that revisionism replaced the critical dialectic conception with the conformist attitudes of naturalism. Bowing to the authority of the facts, which indeed justified the hopes of a legal parliamentary opposition, revisionism diverted revolutionary action into the channel of a faith in the 'necessary natural evolution' to socialism.<sup>(203)</sup>

Bernstein's eclectic empiricism delivered the labour movement, against Marx's dialectical social theory, over to the forces of reaction in the First World War and in the German Revolution to the extent to which it encouraged a naive and rather unhistorical



concept of the bourgeois State.(204) As Marcuse indicates(above), naturalism was one important strand of the ascendent propertied classes, a product of revolutionary liberalism. The corollary of naturalism in its neo-positivist corruption in the era of imperialism, however, is determinism and fatalism. The necessity of the working class to make a self-organised, conscious, transition from capitalism to socialism by breaking with the bourgeois State apparatus gave way in Bernstein's perspective to a view of social change in which a natural evolution was to take place inevitably to bring about socialism. Noting this development, Marcuse comments:

The dialectic, in consequence, was termed 'the treacherous element in the Marxian doctrine, the trap that is laid for all consistent thinking'. Bernstein declared that the 'snare' of dialectic consists in its inappropriate 'abstraction from the specific particularities of things'. He defended the matter-of-fact quality of fixed and stable objects as against any notion of their dialectical negation. 'If we wish to comprehend the world, we have to conceive it as a complex of ready-made objects and processes'. This amounted to the revival of common sense as the organon of knowledge.(205)

Thus, if the interpretation of social action is dominated by the hegemony of bourgeois economic, political, and ideological culture, 'common sense' is its very substance the extent to which it reflects the established power structure in society whilst simultaneously obfuscating the mechanisms of domination. The Marxian theory had taken as its object the critical analysis of the totality of capitalist social relations of production, and the institutions of the State as an apparatus of class domination. The critical analysis is essentially linked to the dialectical negation of class society by the collective self-emancipation of the working class and

the goal of socialism. Socialism becomes a material possibility on the basis of the level of technique and productivity developed by capitalist industrialization. Linking the critical analysis of capitalist society to the goal of socialism, the *raison d'être* of Marxism was to dissolve in theory and practice the apparent permanency of the alienated social relations of capitalism, to reveal their inner connections, and by indicating the broad lines of a strategy for working class self-emancipation, cancel the spell of reification of the consciousness of the masses, and thus expose the law like operations of the capitalist economy as objective relations between human actors. However, reification contains a partial truth: it reflects the anarchic character of the competitive process of capital accumulation. Hence, the political significance contained in the Marxian viewpoint of exposing the law-like motion of capitalism which Lukacs, in History and Class Consciousness (1923) applies to monopoly capitalism and underscored from Marx's critique of political economy and the fetishism of commodities.(206) Anticipating the discovery of Marx's analysis of the 'magical' quality of money in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844, first published in 1932 (207), Lukacs shows Marx's humanism lies in his conception of a revolutionary break with the law like conditions governing human history. Bernstein's revision, arguably, served to disarm the labour movement by taking the law like evolution of capitalist society as a given; imputing an unqualified notion of progress to capitalist development, thus denying the necessity of conscious action which Marx had posed as the basic pre-requisite for socialist change.(208)

Moreover, history is not characterised as a unilinear process by Marx, as can be seen in the Preface To The Russian Edition of The Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), written in 1882; Marx and Engels note the possibility of peasant small holdings forming the basis for 'the higher form of Communist ownership of land' if the Russian Revolution is complemented by socialist revolution in Western Europe.(209) For Marx and Engels, history is best defined by the conflict of social classes, not that of peaceful evolution.(210) Reformist revisionism suffers a decisive historical blindness to the question of State power; while the rising middle-class gained economic power within the declining Feudal society and gradually seized political power through the exercise of its economic and cultural hegemony, the working class in capitalist society experience no such advantage (211) in relation to the capture of State power. Bernstein's revision to adjust the theory of the German Social Democratic Party to its reformist practice also committed another historical error, noted above; namely, that of assuming bourgeois democracy to be tantamount to the potential exercise of workers' power through the established institutions of the capitalist State. This assumed that capitalist democracy solves the question of the struggle of interests and power between social classes. The reformism of Bernstein reified the laws which Marx had exposed as a product of social relations:

With the repudiation of the dialectic, the revisionists falsified the nature of the laws that Marx saw ruling society. We recall Marx's view that the natural laws of society gave expression to the blind and irrational processes of capitalist reproduction, and that the socialist revolution was to bring emancipation from these 'laws. In contrast to this, the revisionists argued that the social laws are 'natural' laws

that guarantee the inevitable development towards socialism.(212)

The subversive concept of dialectic in Marxist theory threatens the bourgeois order with its supersession, and thus had to be denied. When thought attempts to transcend class society within the confines of this order, it becomes ideological in that the contradictions of bourgeois society are resolved only in the abstract, and their consciousness is repressed. We are reminded here of Korsch's argument that there can be no going beyond the questions posed by Marx's critique of capitalist society without going beyond the object of this critique, practically.(213) Thus, in his preference for empiricism over Marx's dialectical social theory, Bernstein's reformism led invariably back into previous forms of bourgeois social philosophy which Marx had already criticised as antiquated in the 1840s.(214) As Lukacs has indicated

We are faced with the question of the methodological implications of these so-called facts that are idolised throughout the whole Revisionist literature. To what extent may we look to them to provide guidelines for the actions of the revolutionary proletariat? It goes without saying that all knowledge starts from the facts. The only question is: which of the data of life are relevant to knowledge and in the context of which method? (215)

Lukacs deals with the supposedly more scientific method of empiricism and the appeal to a natural scientific model by the revisionists for the superiority of 'science' over dialectical social theory.

Only in this context which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them

in a totality, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of reality. Conversely, the vulgar materialist, even in the modern guise donned by Bernstein and others, do not go beyond the reproduction of the immediate, simple determinants of social life....They take the facts in abstract isolation, explaining them in terms of abstract laws unrelated to the concrete totality.(216)

And thus,

If this meaning of the dialectical method is obscured, dialectics must inevitably begin to look like a superfluous additive, a mere ornament of Marxist 'sociology' or 'economics'. Even worse, it will appear as an obstacle to the 'sober', 'impartial' study of the 'facts', as an empty construct in whose name Marxism does violence to the facts. This objection to dialectical method has been voiced most clearly and cogently by Bernstein, thanks in part to a 'freedom from bias' unclouded by any philosophical knowledge. However, the very real political method from the 'dialectical snares' of Hegelianism, show clearly where this course leads. They show that it is precisely the dialectic that must be removed if one wishes to found a thorough-going opportunistic theory, a theory of 'evolution' without revolution and of 'natural development' into Socialism without any conflict. (217)

Bernstein's retreat from the critical conception of dialectic to the theory of evolution meant ultimately the subordination of the labour movement to the 'natural laws' governing capitalist society.

Hence, it can be argued that revisionism followed the path of legitimating the collaborative policies which German Social Democracy practiced in its acquiescence to the First World War, and even more explicitly, in the German Revolution following the war. (218) Lukacs' remark quoted above that Bernstein's revisionist argument had been voiced 'clearly' and cogently' in part, at least, because it was made in the spirit of 'freedom from bias' and without the debilitating influence of 'philosophical knowledge', reveals the

true philosophical sources and sociological interpretation of Bernstein's thought: its subordination of thought to the given state of affairs within the framework of capitalist democracy and the established State apparatus and norms of legality. The revision of the dialectic was ultimately made necessary because of the revolutionary implications of this concept in a political movement which limited its practice to the minimum programme of reform within the capitalist State. Thus the rejection of the 'speculative' method, transformed in Marx's materialist conception of history, was no abandonment of utopianism, on the contrary. Stripped of its ideological shell, the revisionist position meant in practice the abandonment of the reality of the class-struggle, and the economic, social, and political convulsions of the capitalist system on an international scale.

It had been Marx's understanding of the contradictory relationship of social classes in capitalist society that produced his dynamic theory of socialist revolution. (219) From the viewpoint of Lukacs the thought which took the place of the critical method in dialectical social theory and underpinned the premises of evolutionary socialism was idealist: the reified laws of motion of capitalist society ended up in the ideological framework of the revisionists as a peaceful evolution of the transition from capitalism to socialism, as if the very appearance of capitalism as something regulated by 'natural laws' were not caused by the actual functioning of the anarchic system of production relations. These production relations, according to Lukacs, take on the appearance of having natural causation precisely to the extent that the means of

production are separated from control by the associated producers with the development of the division of labour and capitalist property relations. (220)

Thus it can be argued that the goal of reformism, namely, a Socialist society, is ultimately compromised to the extent that although the strategy aims to win reforms for the working class from the capitalist State, the extent of the reforms are predicated upon the pre-requisites of capital accumulation being satisfied first. In other words, the limitations of social reform are thrown into sharp relief when there is a decline in the average rate of profit and the economic recession forces the State into conflict with the demands of Social Democracy: it is then that Socialist governments are confronted with the dilemma of facilitating the most beneficial conditions for restoring the rate of profit in order to procure a stable and financially confident economic situation to ensure future reforms. (221)

Engels And The Problem Of Revolutionary Subjectivity(222)

The 'Hegelian revival' that accompanied the disintegration of the orthodox Marxism after the First World War, and the emergence of Western Marxism as a consequence of the failure of the Second International and the success of the Russian Revolution, represented a philosophical and political break with scientism and reformism.(223) Fundamentally, protesting against the acquiescence to bourgeois hegemony of the evolutionary reformism of Bernstein and the 'scientific' materialism of Plekhanov and Kautsky, Western Marxism had uncovered weaknesses in the development of Marx's ideas. Boggs pertinently notes:

Classical Marxism failed adequately to confront, let alone resolve, the problem of revolutionary consciousness. This was to be expected, given its theoretical preoccupation with the mode of production or economic 'base', as the determining factor in historical development. The totality of socialist transformation itself - including the vision of a qualitatively new society that embraces the ultimate goals of political struggle and the subjective foundations of a new world view - was scarcely discussed before Lenin, and even within contemporary Marxism one finds the tendency to reduce 'superstructural' elements to their materialist context.(224)

Moreover, it could be argued that the underdevelopment of Marxism after Marx died in 1883, noted by Rosa Luxemburg in Stagnation and Progress of Marxism (225), fed on the one-sidedness in Marx's own writings: Boggs writes

Marx often appeared to be saying that the oppressive conditions of existence under capitalism would suffice to impel the working class towards full socialist consciousness, with the everyday struggle for survival in class society itself providing the 'school' of revolution. Beyond this vague perspective on the complex issue of how socialist



transformation would occur Marx never went, nor did he ever systematically examine the origins and nature of differing kinds of working class consciousness.

and decisively:

This omission, while understandable in the context of Marx's priorities, opened the door to the materialist vulgarization of Marxism typified by the late Engels and the theorists of the Second International, who saw in the problematic of consciousness nothing but a retrograde bourgeois idealism.(226)

Although, as we shall see, this is a rather over-schematic picture of Engels' position, Boggs does indicate the implications of the weaknesses in the vulgar Marxism of the Second International:

Historically, such theoretical one-dimensionality could only produce the kind of shadow political strategy that was to lead European Socialist movements into one failure after another. Marxism was either hemmed in by the empirical categories, concepts, and methods of scientific theory or restricted to the momentary practicalities of economic struggle, it lacked altogether any real subjective component, any social psychology of revolution, and thus any popular mobilizing power.

With the dismissal of dialectical social theory went the denial of subjectivity, as Boggs has noted:

Such paralysing intellectual deficiency, revealed most clearly during moments of profound crisis, originated out of a crude mechanistic psychology that explained human behaviour primarily as a function of economic needs. It was one of Marx's real contributions to give theoretical meaning to this previously neglected factor, but in the later formulations of Marxism the economic took on the character of totality.(227)

The philosophical intervention of Engels helps explain the later vulgarized formulations of Marxism under the auspices of the Second International. Callinicos usefully summarizes Engels' intervention:

Engels' philosophical intervention was part of his enormous contribution to the theoretical and political formation of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), created by the fusion of the Marxist and Lassallean socialists in 1875. His main philosophical works, Anti-Duhring (1878), Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886), and the posthumously published Dialectics of Nature (1925), were largely intended to wrest the fledgling party from alien ideological influences, and in particular from that of ethical socialism stemming from the 'true socialists', whose concoctions of Fichtean idealism and Feuerbachian humanism Marx and Engels had already attacked in the 1840s. (228)

However, Engels' approach to this confrontation with the ideas and influence of ethical socialism formed the basis of a new dilemma:

Engels sought to do this by presenting the picture of a universe governed by certain objective, generally applicable, scientifically ascertainable laws. Historical materialism, he argued, had discovered the specific version of these laws operative in the realm of human society. (229)

By conflating the laws governing the natural world and those governing the historical development of societies Engels unwittingly helped lay the basis for the neo-positivist revolt against the philosophical unity of Marxism, and thus, with the denial of the subjective factor, the devaluation of philosophy and politics. From Hegel, Engels derived his concept of dialectical materialism as an all embracing science. For Engels, Callinicos notes:

dialectics is conceived as the science of the most general laws of all motion. This implies that its laws must be valid just as much for motion in nature and human history as for the motion of thought. These laws, extracted by Engels from Hegel's Logic

were three in number, the transformation of quantity into quality, and vice versa, the interpenetration of opposites, and the negation of the negation. They were instantiated, Engels believed, by all the major scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century - by Darwin's Origin of Species as well as Marx's Capital.(230)

Callinicos notes the dangers inherent in Engels' reasoning. It is based on the attempt to 'rescue the formal structure of Hegel's dialectic while rejecting his idealism', an approach essentially flawed because 'the method itself is identical to the 'Absolute Idea' and hence has, along with the 'concept of a dialectic of nature'(231), provided the basis for the pseudo-scientific monstrosities of the Stalinist era which have 'interfered with genuine research'.(232) Marx was not completely innocent of this positivistic emphasis either, even if he was generally more cautious and open-ended in his approach than Engels was (233), he drew analogies in his work from chemistry and physics.(234)

What came to be known as dialectical materialism became the official ideology of German Social Democracy, and because of the enormous influence of the German party in the Second International, of much of the European labour movement. Under the auspices of the theoreticians of the Second International, Marxism became a science which conceived social change as an organic process whose outcome is viewed as determined in advance. The Marxism of the Second International had indeed taken on an objectivistic standpoint quite foreign to the basic ontological premises of Marx's dialectical social theory.

However, it was the Hegelian revival of those such as Lukacs and Korsch on the revolutionary wing of Social Democracy which played an important, even decisive, role in the foundations of Western Marxism in general and the work of the Frankfurt School in particular. Lukacs wrote:

The revival of Hegel's dialectics struck a hard blow at the revisionist tradition. Already Bernstein had wished to eliminate everything reminiscent of Hegel's dialectics in the name of 'science'. And nothing was further from the mind of his philosophical opponents, and above all Kautsky, than the wish to undertake the defence of this tradition. For anyone wishing to return to the revolutionary traditions of Marxism the revival of the Hegelian tradition was obligatory. (235)

Firstly, Lukacs notes that the rejection by Bernstein of the dialectic is interwoven with his appeal to 'science'. Secondly, Bernstein's initial opposition within Social Democracy, Karl Kautsky, was unprepared for the defence of the revolutionary kernel of Marxism: the dialectic. Thirdly, that the return to an understanding of the theoretical relation between Hegel and Marx would be decisive for the revival of the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The major weakness of the Marxism of the Second International was its philosophical basis. Lukacs offers a more detailed analysis of the source of the dilemma of the relation between base and superstructure, which led, in the Second International, to political passivity and acquiescence in times of crisis, as exemplified in the events leading up to the First World War.

In his Ontology of Social Being (1978), Lukacs' intention is principally to return to the major themes of philosophy which, from his mature standpoint he believed had been inadequately dealt with

in his youthful History & Class Consciousness (1923). Indeed, Lukacs' Ontology gives important clues to the direction in which a resolution to the philosophical dilemmas of Engels' theoretical legacy, and those posed by the vulgar Marxism of the Second International, lies. The Ontology indicates the source of the problem concerning the positivist element to be found in the later development of Marxian theory, and Engels' contribution to the theoretical foundations of the Second International in particular. Lukacs relates to the attempts by Engels to refute the mechanistic and vulgar interpretation of the genesis of ideologies in society. This vulgar Marxism alluded to Marx's analogy of the 'material base' and 'ideological superstructure' made in his 1859 Contribution To A Critique of Political Economy:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life. (236)

Lukacs clearly shows that Engels himself attempted to prevent the vulgarization of the Marxian theory, but did so without being fully aware of his own role in the dilemma:

Engels had a clear feeling that these vulgarizations were distorting Marxism. In letters that he wrote to important personalities in the workers' movement of the time, we find many indications to the effect that there are interactions between base and superstructure, that it would be pedantry to 'derive' individual historic facts simply from economic

necessity, etc. He was quite right in all these questions, but he still did not always manage to refute these deviations from the Marxian method in a conclusive fashion. In his letters to Joseph Bloch and Franz Mehring, he certainly attempted to provide a theoretical foundation, even with a self-critical edge against his own and Marx's writings. Thus he wrote to Bloch: 'According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimate determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure...also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which amid all the endless host of accidents...the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary.(237)

Lukacs' comments on Engels' dilemma are authoritative; it is as if Engels removes the fluff from his sleeve with one hand and finishes with it on the other:

There is no question but that Engels presents many essential features of this situation correctly, and very nearly decisively corrects many errors of vulgarization. But where he seeks to give his criticism philosophical foundation, I believe he clutches at straw. For the additional opposition of content (economy) and form (superstructure) adequately expresses neither their connection nor their distinction.(238)

The source of Engels' dilemma, Lukacs argues, lies in the philosophical foundation, his ontological conception of social being and human consciousness:

Engels' argument in the Anti-Duhring decisively influenced the later life of the theory. However we regard them, whether we grant them classical status or whether we criticise them, deem them to be incomplete or even flawed, we must still agree that this aspect is nowhere treated in them. That is to say, he contrasts the ways in which concepts are formed on dialectics as opposed to 'metaphysics'; he stresses the fact that in dialectics the definite contours of concepts (and the objects

they represent) are dissolved. Dialectics, he argues, is a continuous process of transition from one definition to another. In consequence a one-sided and rigid causality must be replaced by interaction. But he does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely , the dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process, let alone give it the prominence it deserves. Yet without this factor, dialectics ceases to be revolutionary, despite its attempts (illusory in the last analysis ) to retain 'fluid' concepts...If this central function of the theory is disregarded, the virtues of forming 'fluid' concepts become altogether problematic: a purely 'scientific' matter.(239)

In losing sight of this decisive factor, 'the dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process', Engels' source of ontological validation for the materialist conception of history tended thus to appeal to the influence of the theory of knowledge which formed the basis of nineteenth century natural science.(240)

Engels thus sought the ontological premise in the epistemology of a natural scientific conception of dialectic which had the result of dissolving history into science, human mediation into 'natural laws of social development'.(241) Lukacs argues that the source of Engels' dilemma can be traced to his mistaken application of Hegel(as noted in connection with Callinicos's commentary, above):

It is of the first importance to realize that the method is limited here to the realms of history and society. The misunderstandings that arise from Engels' account of dialectics can in the main be put down to the fact that Engels - following Hegel's mistaken lead - extended the method to apply also to nature.(242)

Walton and Gamble have also noted Engels' conflation of the Marxian method:

'Engels certainly believed that dialectics was a method that could be applied to society and nature equally, and that it offered laws or principles such as the transformation of quantity into quality and the negation of the negation as valid for the study of all phenomena.'(243)

In their study of Engels' Scientific Marxism, Walton and Gamble discern the discrepancy between the thought of Marx and Engels, tracing Engels' viewpoint from his early Outline Of A Critique Of Political Economy (1844) to his works of later life:

His intellectual progress contains much more of a sharp break than does that of Marx. From philosophical criticism - the measuring of existing reality against ethical principles - he transferred to the scientific analysis of capitalism as a natural process, following his collaboration with Marx on the German Ideology. From understanding materialism as an ethical doctrine which proclaimed that all analysis must start from man, and that freedom lay in how the material conditions of life were organised, Engels came to see materialism as the general science of nature and history which uncovered the laws that governed the operation of both. The link between the two is that Engels ultimately understood the materialist conception of history as resting directly on an empirical foundation: in his early writings, the actual material conditions of the workers, in his later work, the dialectical laws that could be observed working in history and nature alike.(244)

Similarly, Lukacs argues, the problem in Engels' work can be described in the development of Marxian theory in the work of Plekhanov - who dominated the Russian Marxist movement intellectually through the turn of the century down to 1914.(245)

Lukacs writes:

Traditional Marxism, however, can not make an end to these opponents. It has given rise to a false dualism of social being and social consciousness, which is based on epistemology, but for that reason ignores the decisive ontological questions. It was Plekhanov, unquestionably the most philosophically



educated theoretician of the pre-Leninist period, who, as far as I know, formulated this theory in the most influential way. He sought to define the relationship of base and superstructure in such a way that the former consisted of the 'state of the productive forces', and the 'economic relations these forces condition'. The socio-political system arose on this base, already as a superstructure. It was only on this base that social consciousness arose, which Plekhanov defined as follows: 'a mentality which is determined in part by the entire socio-political system that has arisen on that foundation.' Ideologies thus reflected 'the properties of that mentality'.(246)

Lukacs comments, pinpointing the continuation of the problematic epistemological basis of Engels' work:

It is not hard to see that Plekhanov was here completely under the influence of the nineteenth century theories of knowledge. These essentially developed from the attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for the achievements of the modern natural sciences. Physics was understandably the decisive model here: on the one hand there was regularly determined being, in which there could be no question of the presence of consciousness, on the other hand the purely epistemic consciousness of the natural sciences...It is only the application of this schema of the epistemological appearance to social being that gives rise to an unsolvable antinomy.(247)

This 'unsolvable antinomy' presented in the positivistic basis of Plekhanov's epistemological assumptions resulted in the 'inability to grasp the crucial mediating links in the dialectic of infrastructure and superstructure which, in the final analysis, determine historical development.'(248) Moreover, Lukacs uncovers the source of confusion which led to the neo-Kantian attempt to supplement the Marxian theory of social being and consciousness:

Marx's successors found themselves in a difficult situation in this respect. Since Marx correctly ascribed economic regularities a similarly general validity to that of natural laws, the idea suggested itself of applying these types of regularity without further concretization or limitation, to

social being in general. This led to a two-fold distortion of the ontological situation. Firstly, and very much against Marx's own conception, social being, and economic reality above all, appeared to be something natural (ultimately a being without consciousness); we saw how at a later stage consciousness in general appeared to Plekhanov as a problem. Marx's theory that the law-like economic results of individual teleological acts (thus acts involving consciousness) possess an objective regularity of their own has nothing in common with theories of this kind.(249)

Hence:

A metaphysical contrast between social being and consciousness is diametrically opposed to Marx's ontology, in which all social being is inseparably linked with consciousness (with alternative projects). Secondly, and this concerns Plekhanov himself less than general vulgar Marxism, there arose a mechanistic and fatalist over-extension of economic necessity itself. This state of affairs is too well known to need detailed criticism here; it should only be pointed out that the neo-Kantians' idea of 'supplementing' Marx is without exception related to these ideas and not to Marx's own positions.(250)

Thus in the Marxian conception, dialectic is understood ontologically in terms of labour as the mediator between nature and society, and thus, historically. The realm of necessity and the realm of freedom coincide, interact; but the fact that in Marx's account of the 'law-like' movement of capitalist society certain regularities are identified objectively (the trade cycle, decline in the rate of profit, boom and slump, etc) the relation between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom are significantly altered. Marx's conception grasps this dialectic precisely because it is historical and thus cancels the ontological status of the laws of motion of capitalist society. This is illustrated in Marx's critique of political economy in which the material basis for a socialist society is identified as a result of the productive relations

established by the capitalist mode of production: the recurrent crises of over-production mark the historical specificity of capitalism as a mode of production - itself producing the negation of scarcity - classically formulated as the contradiction between the forces and relations of production (251) - and thus forming the basis for a transformed, democratically planned society.(252)

The mechanistic, vulgar Marxist, notion of base and superstructure reduced subjectivity to the status of an epiphenomena of the material base of society. The mistaken attempt by Engels and Plekhanov to provide a philosophical foundation to Marxist epistemology lay in the appeal made in their ideas to the modern natural sciences. (253) This laid the basis for the neo-Kantian reintroduction of the transcendental subject, a conception in which ethical considerations are perceived as being autonomous of class interests.(254) This brings the discussion back to Marx's conception of the relations between being and consciousness, and the vulgar interpretation of his base-superstructure analogy of the basis of a mechanistic materialist epistemology.

In defence of Marx, and concurring with Walton and Gamble's analysis of the discrepancy in the theoretical outlook of Marx and Engels, Lukacs has argued that the neo-Kantian idea of supplementing Marx is related to the identification of Marx's position with the 'mechanistic' and 'fatalist over extension of economic necessity itself.'(256) In our later discussion of Marxism and psychology we will see how this problem arises in the case of the philosophical basis of Freudian psychology.(257) Lukacs clearly distinguishes Marx's approach from the vulgar notion of 'dialectical materialism',

and thereby clears the way for a non-reductionist, dialectical conception of subjectivity and the role of creative practice through labour:

When Marx wrote in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness', this has nothing to do with theories of this kind (neo-Kantian-CM). On the one hand, Marx does not counterpose social being to consciousness, but to any consciousness. He does not recognise a specific social consciousness as a separate form. On the other hand, it follows from the first negative assertion that Marx was simply protesting here against idealism on this question, and was simply asserting the ontological priority of social being over consciousness.(258)

Lukacs argues that Marx's conception of the relation between base and superstructure is non-hierarchical. The dialectic between the realm of necessity and realm of freedom (or alienated labour under class society) is closely linked 'with the question of how economic value is related to other, social values.'(259) Moreover, the contingency of social values is expressed in the transformation of nature by social relations. This transformation of the natural into the social is expressed in economic categories in bourgeois society. Under the reification of bourgeois intellectual categories (260) economic values attain ontological priority. (261) Traditionally, philosophers have built theoretical systems upon either the realm of necessity or the realm of freedom. The objective and subjective poles of human being are posed either denying the existence or significance of the opposite pole, or their relation is defined in accordance with one or the other pole.(262) In any event their interrelation is grasped in the Marxian theory in terms of the

metabolic mediation of labour, creative practice, in the dialectic between causality and teleology. Hence, the dialectical social theory of Marx ultimately rejects the 'either - or' standpoint with which philosophy has traditionally presented man.'(263) As Lukacs argues:

The concept of labour is the hinge of my analysis. For labour is not biologically determined. If a lion attacks an antelope, its behaviour is determined by biological needs and by that alone. But if primitive man is confronted with a heap of stones, he must choose between them, by judging which will be most adaptable to use as a tool; he selects between alternatives. The notion of alternatives is basic to the meaning of human labour, which is thus always teleological - it sets an aim, which is the result of a choice. It thus expresses human freedom.(264)

Thus Engels' belief that dialectics could be applied meaningfully to nature must be rejected, along with the idealist notion of an immanent teleology of history. There is, however, 'teleology in all human labour, inextricably inserted into the causality of the physical world.'(265)

In his Ontology Lukacs argues that the dialectic of labour is the direction in which further research will be able to elucidate the 'classical antimony of necessity and freedom.'(266) Contrary to his conflation of mechanistic and dialectical materialism in his defence of Engels and Plekhanov, George Novack defends a paralld argument to that presented in Lukacs Ontology in defence of the capacity of human beings to transform the natural and social world.(267) Moreover, the concept of creative practice upholds the heterogeneity of the Marxist notion of teleology: Novack writes, for example: 'The socialist humanism of the Marxian school teaches that the essence

of humanity is creative practice. This definition flows from its labour theory of human origins and development...that humanity made itself means it is the product of its processes of producing the means of life.'(268)

Hence, in the Marxian conception socialism ultimately implies the replacement of alienated labour with 'unrestricted creative practice'.(269) The heterogeneity of the Marxian notion of teleology, then, means that the concept of labour is defined in accordance with the multifarious capacity of the human being to transform the world, and therefore, labour does not mean the narrow economic reductionist viewpoint which, in fact, concurs with the reified bourgeois intellectual categories in which economic values attain (as mentioned above) ontological priority.(270) Indeed, in the result of the latter conception is passivity and political acquiescence, precisely to the extent that this conception ultimately denies the realm of choice by asserting the hierarchical priority of economic determinism over human control, choice, and thus alternatives. Consequently, subjectivity is denied its role of mediation and assumes a shadowy-parasitic existence. Again, this poses the problem which Erich Fromm picks up in his discussion of the role of subjectivity in the historical process(271), and anticipates the problem of teleology and causality, freedom and necessity, in attempts to construct a Marxist psychology.

At this juncture it can be argued that Lukacs has brought us to the most useful assessment of the failure of Engels to provide the philosophical foundation for the development of Marxism. Moreover that the positivistic development of Marxism lay in the vulgar

philosophical materialism which was used to interpret the Marxian conception of base and superstructure; being and consciousness. Finally, then, that Lukacs' conception of the dialectic of labour furnishes us with the basis for a non-reductionistic evaluation of the Marxist concept of subjectivity, and the assessment of the Frankfurt School's defence of a dialectical conception of the social totality.

Thus it can be argued that Lukacs' Ontology points us in the right direction in order to make an effective intervention in, and contribution to, the debate regarding the validity of a Marxist psychology and the role the latter would play in Marxian theory and practice. Lukacs' discussion of causality and teleology allows, for example, a direct intervention in the question regarding the role of consciousness in Freudian theory and the meaning of materialism in Freud's system.(272)

In showing how the Western Marxists attempted to restore the philosophical unity of Marxism, it is not suggested that this task has been accomplished.

In the next section of this chapter we will consider the Frankfurt School's conception of the continued relevance of Philosophy. This discussion is necessitated in order to lay the basis for the later assessment of the achievement of the Frankfurt School as a representative of Western Marxism.

However, it is important to emphasize at this juncture that the philosophical unity of Marxism over the evolutionary socialism of Bernstein or the scientism of Kautsky, reasserts the grounds for a dynamic conception of subjectivity and creative practice, and thereby implies the subversion of Marxian orthodoxy from within. (273) This dynamic conception of subjectivity was represented in the revolutionary left-wing of the Second International. This movement, inspiring the development of Western Marxism, 'laid much greater stress on the role of consciousness and activity in the revolutionary process'.(274) Consequently, this development forms the basis for the later discussion and evaluation of the Frankfurt School as an intellectual formation articulating decisive aspects of a European Marxism, fragmented and dispersed as a result of the defeats of the labour movement in the inter-war years.

Before turning to the Frankfurt School's response to Marxism and philosophy, it is important to draw out and emphasize the contradiction in Engels' attempt to provide a philosophical foundation to Marxian theory, as discussed above in relation to Lukacs' Ontology. Anthony Giddens notes that the theoretical ambiguities, indeed flaws, in Engels' later writings were used in the Second International to rationalize the reformist strategy of attrition:



Engels' later writings certainly played an important role in offering a basis for the legitimacy of such a transmutation of Marx. But...such an 'interpretation' was also generated by the practical exigencies of the position of the leading European Marxist party in the country of its origin. If the dialectic is deemed to exist in nature, as in Anti-Duhring, the way is clearly laid open to philosophical materialism which removes from the historical scene the role of ideas as the active source of social change: ideology is the 'effect', and material conditions are the 'cause'. This provokes the characteristic problem of philosophical materialism which Marx perceived early on in his career: if ideology is simply passive 'reflection' of material circumstances, then there is no place for the active role of men as creators of social reality. (275)

The reflection theory of knowledge, in which 'ideology is the 'effect' and material conditions the 'cause' of social change, reflected the economic determinism of the reformist strategy. The political challenge to this revision of Marxism was first voiced by Engels himself. (276) In 1890 Engels confessed:

Marx and I are partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize the main principle vis-a-vis our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place, or the opportunity to give their due to the other elements involved in the interaction. (277)

Moreover, the distortion of Engels' texts by the chief theoreticians of German Social Democracy gave credence to the impression that Marx and Engels were advocates of reformist strategy in later life.

Thus Ernest Mandel notes that

few Communist militants today recall - such is the quality of much Marxist education in Western Europe, despite its incontestable diffusion - that the old Social Democratic attempt to make Friedrich Engels an advocate of a legalist strategy at any price was a manipulative fraud...

The text of the preface published by German Social Democracy in 1895 (written by Engels in 1895 for Marx's work Class Struggles in France 1848-1850 -CM) was a version that had

been shortened and censored, supposedly in order to avoid legal prosecution. Bernstein and Kautsky in fact never published the entire Engels manuscripts despite the fact that it was in their possession. It was published for the first time by the Marx-Engels Institute of Moscow in 1930.(278)

Exposing the censorship practiced by the German Social Democratic Party, Mandel restores the revolutionary import of Engels' viewpoint. In fact Engels bitterly opposed the cuts imposed on his writings. Mandel comments:

These excerpts show beyond any doubt that the old Engels, on the eve of his death, in no way ruled out recourse to insurrection and did not at all defend a peaceful, legalist, gradualist, electoralist road to socialism. He remained what he had always been: a genuine revolutionary.(279)

Already in their analysis of the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx and Engels had argued that the course of the struggle demonstrated that

the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing the old state machine; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against itself, and on the other hand, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any moment...(280)

Thus, the 'conquest of the proletariat is impossible without the destruction of the bourgeois State machine.'(281) The destruction of the bourgeois State apparatus is necessitated because this apparatus represents a centralized violent force in a democratic republic as well as in an absolute monarchy. The supersession of bourgeois for socialist democracy, Marx and Engels argue in *The Civil War in*

France 1871, leads to a broadening of the form of democracy and of its content.

It can thus be argued that the flaws in Engels' concept of philosophical materialism in no way implies a conscious revision of his political-strategic viewpoint, as Mandel has demonstrated. This is, of course, an example of the non-correspondence of theory and strategy or philosophy and politics which occurs in a contradictory totality. The use to which Engels' deterministic formulation of base and superstructure were put points to weaknesses in his philosophy, not his complicity in the reformist development of Marxism in the Second International.(282)

### Critical Theory And Philosophy

The discussion of the ambivalent role Engels' later ideas played in the intellectual formation of the Second International brings us to the significance of this problem in the development of Marxian theory in relation to critical theory and the Frankfurt School.

It will be recalled that, for Marx, Hegel's system had brought philosophy to the threshold of its dialectical negation. (283) But what this fundamentally entailed was the transformation of the problems of philosophy - left critically posed but unanswered theoretically and practically by Hegel's system - into the critical social theory envisaged, developed, and applied by Marx and Engels. (284) This means that the activity of philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge would come to an end; but that the question posed by philosophy would ultimately remain within the new social theory until philosophy itself had been realized. (285) Thus Herbert Marcuse writes:

Hegel's system brings to a close the entire epoch in modern philosophy that began with Descartes and had embodied the basic ideas of modern society. Hegel was the last to interpret the world as reason, subjecting nature and history alike to the standards of thought and freedom. At the same time, he recognised the social and political order men had achieved as the basis on which reasons had to be realized. His system brought philosophy to the threshold of its negation and thus constituted the sole link between the old and the new form of critical theory, between philosophy and social theory.

And decisively: ' The whole problem is, however, no longer a philosophohical one, for the self-realization of man now requires the

abolition of the prevailing mode of labour, and philosophy cannot deliver this result.'(286)

For the critical theory of society, the concern for the questions raised by Hegel's system were not simply or partially negated by Marx and Engels' doctrine. More precisely, the Marx-Hegel relationship reveals that the traditional concerns of philosophy represented in Hegel's system, were dialectically transcended (Aufhebung) and thus appropriated upon 'an essentially different order of truth.'(287)

In Philosophy and Critical Theory(288) Marcuse identifies the new relation between being and thought in the Marxian conception:

Once critical theory had recognised the responsibility of economic conditions for the totality of the established world and comprehended the social framework in which reality was organised, philosophy became superfluous as an independent discipline dealing with the structure of reality. Furthermore, problems bearing on the potentialities of man and of reason could now be approached from the standpoint of economics. Philosophy thus appears within the economic concepts of materialist theory, each of which is more than an economic concept of the sort employed by the academic discipline of economics. It is more due to the theory's claim to explain the totality of man and his world in terms of his social being. Yet it would be false on that account to reduce these concepts to philosophical ones. To the contrary, the philosophical contents relevant to the theory are to be deduced from the economic structure. They refer to conditions that, when forgotten, threaten the theory as a whole.(289)

Hence the role of philosophy is dialectically transcended in terms of the critical theory of society:

The interest in philosophy, concern with man, had found its new form in the interest of critical social theory. There is no philosophy alongside and outside this theory. For the philosophical construction of reason is replaced by the creation of a rational society. The philosophical ideals of a better world and of the true Being are incorporated into the

practical aim of struggling mankind, where they take on a human form. (290)

Following Engels' thesis in Ludwig Feuerbach And The End Of Classical German Philosophy 1888, in which it is argued that the 'German working class movement is the inheritor of German classical philosophy'(291), Marcuse argues that the critical philosophical idealism of classical philosophy is realized not in abstraction but only through a practice corresponding to the aims of such a critical theory of society. And thus the question of the relation between being and thought is posed in terms of their essential antagonistic unity, the unity of theory and practice in the practical aims of struggling mankind. Marx's conception of the relation between being and thought is based on the rejection of the mechanistic materialism of the time, as noted earlier, in relation to The German Ideology 1845-46. As Lukacs pointed out earlier in this discussion, Marx's social ontology is eminently historical, it is social being which conditions consciousness and not the narrowly defined influence of 'economic' processes. The implications of this correction of the traditional interpretation of historical materialism leads directly into the heart of critical theory and the challenge to its crude caricature as a simple reversion to philosophy. Thus the discussion indicates the significance and meaning of critical theory as part of the Western Marxist revolt against the petrification of Marxian theory as a critical social theory, and the denial, in neo-positivist interpretations, of the dynamic concept of social consciousness (indicated in the previous discussion of The German

Ideology and the experiential basis of the unity of theory and practice in Marx and Engels' theory of social change).

Thus in appreciating the transformation of Hegel's critical idealism in Marx's materialist conception of history, the Frankfurt School recognised the importance of preserving and appropriating the critical insights of bourgeois intellectual culture, and thus developing the Marxian method in the critical analysis of bourgeois society and its ideology.

We have discussed this by referring to the antinomies taken on board by developments in Marxian theory itself, from Engels, Plekhanov, to the German Social Democrats Bernstein and Kautsky. Alluding to the status of natural scientific methodology, the creative and revolutionary kernel of Marx and Engels' conception of theory and practice was in the case of Engels unwittingly - and in the case of Bernstein more consciously - cancelled. The application of critical theory to philosophy serves as an example of the approach of the Frankfurt School to the attempt to restore the philosophical unity of Marxism.

The critical kernel of philosophy in the bourgeois period was not simply abolished, as we have established . Hence, 'Reason, mind, morality, knowledge, and happiness are not only categories of bourgeois philosophy, but concerns of mankind. As such theory must be preserved, if not derived anew.'(292)

Several fundamental concepts of philosophy were discussed in the Frankfurt School journal (*Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*) and subjected to critical analysis. Identifying the method employed, Marcuse writes:

These were not merely analysed sociologically in order to correlate philosophical dogmas with social loci. Nor were specific philosophical contents 'resolved' into social facts. To the extent that philosophy is more than an ideology, every such attempt must come to nought. When critical theory comes to terms with philosophy, it is interested in the truth content of philosophical concepts and problems. It presupposes that they really contain truth.

Marcuse qualifies and clarifies the Marxist critique and definition of ideology:

...it is certainly true that many philosophical concepts are mere 'foggy ideas' arising out of the domination of existence by an uncontrolled economy and, accordingly, are to be explained precisely by the material conditions of life. But in its historical form philosophy also contains insight into human and objective conditions whose truth points beyond previous society and thus cannot be completely reduced to it. (293)

In his qualification of the Marxist critique of ideology, Marcuse distinguishes the approach of critical theory from Korsch's philosophical historicism (294) and the economic determinism of Plekhanov. Philosophy contains truths which are anticipatory and thus cannot be dissolved into social facts. This anticipatory quality of thought is particularly relevant to the question of theory and practice and their interrelation in history, especially for the problem involving the break in the theory-practice nexus. Max Horkheimer similarly defended the role of philosophy in terms parallel to those expressed by Marcuse above:

The real social function of philosophy lies in its criticism of what is prevalent. That does not mean superficial fault finding with individual ideas or conditions, as though a philosopher were a crank. Nor does it mean that the philosopher complains about this or that isolated condition and suggests remedies. The chief aim of such criticism is to prevent mankind from



losing itself in those ideas and activities which the existing organisation of society instills into its members. (295)

The task of philosophy is the preservation of critical ideas appropriated from their ideological shell and, hence, preserve the link between social consciousness, the demand for human happiness, and the material and intellectual possibilities of the attained level of culture.

Thus Erich Fromm succinctly summarizes the critical method in his discussion of the development and adaptation of Marx and Freud's ideas: 'The task of critique is not to denounce the ideals, but to show their transformation into ideologies, and challenge the ideology in the name of the betrayed ideal.' (296)

Hence the superficial view that critical theory represents a reversion to 'philosophical idealism' therefore misses the real significance of the project of the Frankfurt School in its attempt to revive the critical spirit of creative Marxism and develop the critique of bourgeois ideological domination. As argued above, this re-examination of Marxism meant, on the one hand, a defence and reassertion of the anti-positivist social ontology of Marx against the vulgar materialism of the chief theoreticians of the Second International and, on the other, the deformation of Marxism into a legitimisation ideology under the auspices of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Politically, reformism and Stalinism suffocated the critical spirit of Marxism and with the separation of theory and practice in the inter-war years Marxism was turned from being a critical social science into a lifeless dogma. Hence the spread of

neo-positivism which pervaded the thought of the socialist movement in Europe was of central concern to the Frankfurt School's re-examination of Marxism. Horkheimer reasserted the historical basis of Marxian materialism and thus reopened the possibility of non-reductionist critical analysis of capitalist society. Following on the heels of Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness 1923, in his studies on Materialism and Metaphysics Horkheimer

set out to rescue materialism from those who saw it simply as an antonym of spiritualism and a denial of non-material existence. True materialism, he argued, did not mean a new type of monistic metaphysics based on the ontological primacy of matter. Here nineteenth century mechanical materialists like Vogt and Haekche had been wrong, as were Marxists who made a fetish of the supposedly 'objective' material world. Equally erroneous was the assumption of the eternal primacy of the economic substructure of society. Both substructure and superstructure interacted at all times although it was true that under capitalism the economic base had a crucial role in this process. What had to be understood, however, was that this condition was only historical and would change with time. (297)

The intervention of the critical theory of society into bourgeois intellectual culture, then, does not mean simply debunking ideologies as if they arise as mere reflections of the economic base of society. By correctly utilizing the method of historical materialism the production of ideologies in capitalist society could instead be revealed as knowledge distorted by specific ruling class interests which obfuscate a real understanding of the existing and potential material and intellectual capacities which could be utilized to liberate the majority of the population from alienated toil and exploitation.

Korsch And Critical Theory

This was the basis of the Frankfurt School's divergence from Karl Korsch's philosophical historicism. For the critical theorists the basic flaw in this approach had been Korsch's dissolving of theory into practice. As we shall see, the critical theorists grasped this problem in Korsch's perspective from a theoretical standpoint but failed to draw out the consequences of their criticism of Korsch for their own evaluation of the political struggles of the international socialist movement in the inter-war years. Korsch showed that the progressive abandonment of dialectics and Hegel by the revisionists was linked to the reification of bourgeois intellectual categories after the bourgeoisie had ceased to act as a revolutionary class in the middle of the nineteenth century. Korsch argued that Hegel's system is the theoretical expression of the revolutionary movement of the bourgeoisie and that the revolutionary movement of the working class is expressed in the Marxian theory of history and society. As the bourgeoisie lost its revolutionary character it sought to defend and develop the elements of Hegel's system which serve to legitimize the existing political regime and class system. Moreover, this theoretical process was expressed in all the chief disciplines embodying bourgeois intellectual categories.(298) Korsch asked what was the relation of Marxism to philosophy given that bourgeois social thought was in the process of eradicating the truth content of its own revolutionary philosophy. Hence, from Korsch the Frankfurt School critical theorists understood that the effort to redeem the

truth content of philosophy was an exercise leading to the latter's abolition via the revolutionary practice of the working class. For the political foundations of Marxism themselves contain, on a transformed basis, the revolutionary demands and fundamental insights of bourgeois revolutionary thought - from British political economy, German Philosophy, and French political thought and practice.(299) Indeed, this was the theoretical expression of the revolutionary and progressive bourgeois world view; and in the Marxian 'synthesis', the theoretical expression of the international basis of the class-struggle and the demands of the working class and its allies.(300) For Korsch the neglect of the State in the Second International was paralleled by the neglect of philosophy. Marxism, Korsch argues, was born in a revolutionary period as a total theory of social change thoroughly permeated with philosophical thought. By the end of the nineteenth century there was a complete rejection of philosophy and the assumption that it had been finally superseded. In the development of Marx and Engels' work Marxism became a series of completely distinct 'sciences'. This was encapsulated in the spread of positivism in the Second International; for example, the influential work of Hilferding as C.J.Arthur writes:

After Marx's death the influence of positivism became strongly felt within the Second International. Science, it was held, is a detached and impartial activity - pure theory with no practical implications. Hilferding in his Finanz Kapital drew out the logical consequences by arguing that the sole aim of Marxism is to discover causal relationships, including those determining the will of classes. But acceptance of the validity of Marxism, including a recognition of the historical necessity of socialism, has no practical import! 'For it is one thing to acknowledge a necessity, and quite another thing to work for that necessity'. If Marxism as science has no practical

implications it follows that socialism requires some other ground for the legitimation of its struggle. This must be ethical in character. Hence a whole tendency of neo-Kantian character emerged which tried to base socialism on Kant's categorical imperative to respect persons.(301)

Korsch challenged this scientism in the Second International arguing that by eradicating dialectical philosophy in its theory the concept of totality gave way to a view in which the State could be imperceptibly changed in a slow evolution towards socialism with the consensus of the bourgeoisie. Social change could be won through the exercise of persuasion and the superiority of ethical considerations made known by the socialist movement to society as a whole. Korsch argued that the question of power cannot be resolved through abstract reasoning or the quality of the ethical considerations involved in one's argumentation alone. Ideologies are expressions of social interests which cannot simply be theoretically superseded - they have to be practically realized. Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy of 1923 represents the original voice of Western Marxism - advancing the politico-philosophical revolt against the scientism and inertia of the Second International. Korsch objects to Lukacs' tendency to reduce Marxism to method in History and Class Consciousness (also of 1923) as formalistic. But for the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, Korsch is less dialectical than Lukacs in his appreciation of the historical foundations of Marxism. In his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy Engels had argued that

with Hegel philosophy comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he summed up its whole development..., and on the other hand, because, even though unconsciously, he

showed us the way out of the labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world.(302)

Goode notes however, that 'he does not explain what is meant by 'positive knowledge', nor does he provide any instance of such knowledge about ideologies.'(303) Korsch's early work more than any other clarified this issue for the revolutionary socialist movement. However, Korsch's insistence on viewing Marxism as a theoretical expression of the revolutionary practice of the working class, that ideology must express the conditions of the potential class-struggle, is contentious. Korsch's own association with the broadest revolutionary working class movement seen in Europe did not validate the theories of this movement. For what did Marxism then express if the working class were no longer revolutionary? The break in the theory-practice nexus in Korsch's perspective is unbridgeable. Consequently, Korsch was to face this question after the defeat of the German Revolution in October 1923. Goode thus argues:

What is to happen in non-revolutionary situations? If Marxism is merely the expression of the general conditions of the actually existing class struggle, does it become non-revolutionary when the working class turns away from the revolutionary struggle? Korsch's argument is then open to the following objection. For him, Marxism as a theory of revolution derives its truth value not from its representation of total social practice nor from the interest of the proletariat within the total system of capitalist society but from the contingent turns of the organised class-struggle. The historical reification of the Marxian theory is even reduced to the immediacy of its contingent practical success. It also loses its anticipatory character. Korsch's reconstruction of the development of Marxism does not give sufficient weight to the anticipatory content of Marxism which occurs thanks to its scientific analysis of society, and which enables it to foresee the conditions under which the class-struggle will take place, and thus anticipate the forms of the emerging class positions,

instead of simply reflecting them after they have formed. When Korsch applied his criterion of practice consistently outside of a revolutionary movement it led him to reject Lenin and finally Marx as a revolutionary guide. (304)

In identifying theory with practice too closely, or too narrowly, Korsch removed the historical foundations of Marxism and the anticipatory function of critical thought. Consequently, the twists and turns of the class-struggle are not comprehended dialectically and the revolutionary consciousness of the working class appears as a phenomenon as either given or absent from the social context. Moreover, the role of the revolutionary socialist intellectual is minimized to that of interpreter, or expression of the crest of a political movement and is rendered redundant in a period when the working class is no longer revolutionary. Korsch's attempted restoration of Marx's ideas on philosophy represents an invaluable historical intervention in the 1920s but remains an incomplete, partial one, quite in character with the uneven response to the historical and political conditions of Western Marxism. The relation of theory to history and the evolution of the labour movement is a complex one which rests upon a conception of political practice. As Goode shows, Korsch's 'failure to understand the nature of ideological struggle' (305) was rooted in his flawed understanding of Lenin's concept of the era of imperialism. Accepting Lenin's conception of imperialism in a transitional epoch of wars and revolutions too literally and without qualification, Korsch could not adapt his perspective to changed political conditions and eventually abandoned his thesis in Marxism and

Philosophy. Expressing his dilemma in isolation in the United States, Korsch wrote indicatively: 'It is useless to discuss the controversial aspects of a theory of society...when such a discussion does not form part of a real social struggle. There must be various possibilities of action for the party, group or class, which the theory in question can relate to.'(306)

Unable to relate theory to practice in a mass movement, isolated and demoralized, Korsch's perspective failed to understand the wider ideological struggle and fell victim of his own philosophical historicism. As a consequence, by 1946 Korsch felt even the discussion of controversial aspects of a theory of society to be futile although his hopes were partially revived by the anti-colonial movements in the 'third world'.(307) Korsch's merit was to have revealed the social basis in the history of Marxism for the political theory of reformism in neo-positivist developments and in the retreat of bourgeois social thought from its former revolutionary positions. The practice of bourgeois society had betrayed the ideals of 1789 to the extent that scientific discoveries of the bourgeoisie, which indicated the basis for a society beyond scarcity, class domination, and inequality, had to be denied or distorted.(308)

Korsch's contact with the German labour movement 'gave his work an immediacy and coherence it often otherwise lacked'(309), and his stress on practice linked to his critique of reformism accounts for the vitality and appeal of his work in the post-war(II) years.

However, the Frankfurt School critical theorists viewed Korsch's philosophical historicism as an error, acknowledging that the



revolutionary socialist intellectual cannot view his/her role as reducible to the intellectual expression of the labour movement or class-struggle. In the early 1930s the Frankfurt School emerged at the beginning of the greatest defeats of the European labour movement - with the crushing of the German labour movement following Hitler's rise to power. The decline of the German Revolution was a completed process by the end of 1933.(310) For Korsch, in 1923, it had only just begun.

Critical Theory And Western Marxism

In attempting to define the role played by the Frankfurt School in the movement of Western Marxism it is useful to situate the School in relation to the chief currents within that movement, in particular, the influence of Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci.

Arato and Gebhardt have argued, in connection with the problem of the reconstruction of historical materialism, that the work of Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci represents the 'first phase' of 'critical Marxism':

The new intellectual cast of mind helped them reconceptualize the political experience; all three theorists drew heavily on the hitherto badly known background of Marxism in German Idealism to work out a theoretical posture adequate to the new historical situation. The new theory was first formulated in terms of a new philosophy, a 'philosophy of praxis' (the term is Gramsci's) the central concepts of which (praxis, alienation, hegemony, reification and mediation) represented Marxian translation of key concepts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and some of their modern followers.(311)

The historical roots of the conception of these Marxists, as with the Frankfurt School, lay in the heritage of German Idealism, the experience of the Russian Revolution and European Revolution in the 1920s, and the new organs of workers' democracy - the soviets, or councils, each had participated in. Arato and Gebhardt in their introductory essays to key selections from the writings of the critical theorists present the Frankfurt School as representing 'the second phase of critical Marxism'(312) in the reconstruction of historical materialism in the inter-war years. To this extent, we may agree that their perspective helps to clarify the significance

of the Frankfurt School project and thus their position within the movement of thought attempting to recreate the alternative route of international socialism, between Social Democratic reformism on the one hand, and Soviet Marxism on the other. Moreover, to rediscover the subjective grounds for revolution from within the Marxian theory of society and social change. But Arato and Gebhardt further assert that the 'critical theory of the Frankfurt School had a chance to surpass its predecessors precisely because of its insights and greater flexibility in two key areas of social theory - political sociology and theory of culture.'(313)

However, such an argument requires severe qualification, and is ultimately untenable. For while there are many grounds upon which to argue with the viewpoint that the Frankfurt School represents a 'second phase of critical Marxism', and indeed significantly deepened the understanding of areas to which the first generation of critical Marxists pointed towards, Arato and Gebhardt severely overstate their case. For while the critical theorists made a significant contribution to deepening our understanding of the role of late capitalist ideology, it is more accurate to acknowledge the underdevelopment of the political sociology within the framework of critical theory. Connerton summarizes the argument that the Frankfurt School lacked a systematic comparative political and historical analysis of political structures and movements:

For the Frankfurt School the fact of Nazism was a definitive experience. Hence it is hardly surprising that they frequently viewed late capitalism through the lens of German fascism, with the result that the specific differences between totalitarianism and organised capitalism tended to collapse into a one-dimensional vision. (314)

Although, as noted earlier in this chapter, Connerton's position tends to neglect the fact that the theory of state capitalism developed by the Frankfurt School ( Pollock to be specific) allowed for democratic and totalitarian variations, this qualification was never developed by a comparative analysis and empirical application to advanced industrial societies. Instead the focus of the Frankfurt School lay elsewhere. At this point the Frankfurt School 'responded by extending ideology-critique into the domain of social psychology'.(315) Hence this raised the question of how and in what way specific social conditions were mediated by the social consciousness of the working class. The problem of the eclipse of revolutionary consciousness on a mass scale prompted the investigation into Authority and the Family in the mid 1930s showing how the family plays a fundamental role in reproducing in the character-structure of the individual a pre-disposition towards authoritarianism. At the same time the Frankfurt School was analysing the effects of the decline of the family as the central agency of socialisation in capitalist society with the rise of the modern State and the growing intervention of the State in civil society on the one hand, and the increasing influence of new capitalist enterprises in the service and tertiary sector of the economy such as the entertainment industry and mass media, on the other.((316).

However, these developments in the 'critical Marxism' of the Frankfurt School do not add up to a sustained development of political sociology in the inter-war period. Too often in their argument Arato and Gebhardt's defence of the Frankfurt School is

marred because they appear unwilling to consider the arguments of critics even from the viewpoint of the development of critical theory itself. In the hands of Arato and Gebhardt critical theory threatens to become a new orthodoxy and the uneven development of the Frankfurt School's thought a-historically canonized. It can also be argued that the break in the theory-praxis nexus can be adopted and internalized as a theoretical principle by groups of intellectuals who wish to rationalise their isolation from the labour movement and alienation from the existing Socialist parties and groups.(317)

Arato and Gebhardt accurately note the problem with Korsch's work '...plagued by an exaggerated historicist relativation of the relationship of theory and practice', and they conclude that Korsch 'contributed little to a new social theory'.(318) While the first statement seems essentially correct in pin-pointing the flaw in Marxism and Philosophy, the second represents a judgement which understates the significance of Korsch's work in the development and application of 'critical Marxism'. Arato and Gebhardt, in line with the critical theory they purport to defend, reveal a lack of appreciation of the political significance of Korsch's ideas.

As Arato and Gebhardt themselves note, Lukacs was forced to publically dissociate himself from History and Class Consciousness, and Korsch was eventually expelled from the German Communist Party for defending the views he expressed in Marxism and Philosophy. Typical of the tendency in the Frankfurt School, Arato and Gebhardt's essays reveal the basic underdevelopment of political sociology and appreciation of the politico-organisational

vicissitudes of the labour movement and class-struggle - which they believe represent the surpassing of Lukacs and Gramsci. According to Arato and Gebhardt: 'Gramsci, who was the most productive of the three in this area, developed a theory of the state, party and modernization more adequate to justify the de facto actions of the new Bolshevik state than to comprehend the new historical realities and possibilities of Western Europe.'(319)

This assertion concerning Gramsci denies his invaluable contribution to the theory of revolutionary subjectivity, the relation between theory and practice, and his political sociology. But it also commits the unjustifiable error of reducing Gramsci's contribution to the status of apologia for the mistakes and problems associated with the Bolshevik regime during the Civil War, the suppression of Soviet democracy, and the terroristic practices of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

Arato and Gebhardt present a position which results in the equation of the Bolshevik tradition with its subsequent degeneration and Stalinist transformation.(320) . Such a schematic viewpoint results, in the assessment of figures such as Korsch and Gramsci, in a reductionism which is as unjust as it is unworthy of the spirit of critical theory. Clearly, Korsch's protest against the Stalinization of the German Communist Party and Gramsci's defence of Marxism as the 'philosophy of praxis' and his attacks on the fatalism and crude determinism prevalent in the Second International, and vulgar materialism of the Comintern, his writings concerning the different socio-political conditions between East and Western Europe, and thus his deepening of the concept of the united front in his analysis of

ideological hegemony combined with his recast conception of the revolutionary party, constitutes a fundamentally important contribution to the development of Marxism in relation to the conditions of advanced capitalism.(321)

Indeed, by arguing that the Frankfurt School surpassed Lukacs and Gramsci in the realm of political sociology and theory of culture, Arato and Gebhardt are advancing a position which tends to place critical theory in opposition to other developments of Western Marxism and thus deny the contextual significance of critical theory altogether. For it can be argued in light of the previous discussion of the genesis of Western Marxism that it is necessary to understand the position of the Frankfurt School in order to appreciate both this tendency's strength and weakness. Indeed, it is precisely the partial character of the Frankfurt School's contribution which necessitates situating this tendency within the wider movement of Western Marxism. The possibility of a new synthesis and transcendence of the Marxism of the inter-war years would, arguably, include Korsch, Lukacs, Gramsci and the Frankfurt School, combined with a heightened consciousness and experience of the international basis of the class-struggle. In short, a condition for the development of Marxian social science is an assessment of the specific contribution of the Western Marxists within an internationalist perspective.

Critical Theory In Perspective

In Gramscian terms, the Frankfurt School attempted to develop the Marxian theory to allow for an analysis of ideological hegemony in late capitalist society. Central to this task would be the emphasis on discovering the cultural practices, institutions, and ideological mechanisms which serve to integrate the working class into an acceptance of the capitalist State and society. It could be argued that the Frankfurt School were thinking along parallel lines to those of Gramsci in the 1930s. It was the subjective factor which remained of decisive importance for the Frankfurt School under the conditions of late capitalism. (322) Indeed, this was the political basis of the work of Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Fromm. Korsch had drawn attention to the question of ideological hegemony by reflecting on the defeat of the German Revolution. Defeat, Korsch argued, was not only due to the absence of effective 'political leadership', but also, 'to absence of ideological preparation'.(323) The link between philosophy and revolution in the work of the Frankfurt School is the attempt to restore the dynamic concept of revolutionary consciousness to Marxian theory. The analysis of institutions, practices, and the intellectual culture of bourgeois society would facilitate an understanding of those obstacles to the development of revolutionary class-consciousness in the working class.



Wilhelm Reich On Vulgar Materialism

Reich and Fromm attempted from the late 1920s to develop a synthesis between the Freudian and Marxian models of the individual in the social process in an effort to uncover and analyse the social psychological mechanisms of ruling class ideological hegemony. Reich expressed the Western Marxist thesis in terms of social psychology, and central to his analysis of the hold of the bourgeoisie on the consciousness of the working class and the success of Fascism was the creation of the authoritarian traits which make up this orientation in the context of the patriarchal family. (324) Reich took the orthodox Marxism of his day to task for the defeat of the German Revolution and the rise of Fascism: concentrating on 'objective laws' and 'economic processes', the 'inevitability of socialism', the 'omission in the propaganda and in the overall conception of socialism' was the subjective factor. Indeed, Reich's book The Mass Psychology Of Fascism reflects the raison d'etre of the anti-naturalist revolt of Western Marxism in a specific, reductionist, fusion with the romantic element in the ideology of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia. He wrote:

It was this very vulgar Marxism that maintained that the economic crisis of 1929-33 was of such magnitude that it would of necessity lead to an ideological Leftist orientation among the stricken masses...

The result was a cleavage between the economic basis, which developed to the Left, and the ideology of broad layers of society, which developed to the Right. This cleavage was overlooked; consequently, no one gave a thought to asking how broad masses living in utter poverty could become nationalistic.(325)

Anticipating themes in Gramsci's political sociology, Reich forcefully argued that ideology is a material force and must be comprehended as part of the total social process. In fact, Reich's thesis forms the basis of the Frankfurt School's turn to an examination of the social superstructure of capitalist society:

The rise of nationalism in all parts of the world offset the failure of the workers' movement in a phase of modern history in which, as the Marxists contended, 'the capitalist mode of production had become economically ripe for explosion'. Added to this was the deeply ingrained remembrance of the failure of the Workers' International at the outbreak of the First World War and the crushing of the revolutionary uprisings outside Russia between 1918 and 1923. They were doubts, in short, which were generated by grave facts, if they were justified, then the basic Marxist conception was false and the workers' movement was in need of a decisive reorientation, provided one still wanted to achieve its goals. If, however, the doubts were not justified, and Marx's basic conception of sociology was correct, then not only was a thorough and extensive analysis of the reason for the continued failure of the workers' movement called for, but also - and this above all - a complete elucidation of the unprecedented mass movement of fascism was also needed. Only from this could a new revolutionary practice result. (326)

This could be described as the project of the Frankfurt School. For Reich, the critical investigation of social consciousness required an analysis of the relationship between ideology and the character-structure of the masses (in this conception the individual is conceived as having specific libidinal drives which, if they are not able to experience a rational outlet, damm up and become susceptible to an irrational release). What was lacking in the Marxist politics of the 1920s and 1930s, Reich argues, was a specific tailoring of demands to meet the needs of the masses; especially the ideologically backward layers of the working class whose mass

psychology acted as a break on the development of class consciousness in the majority. In the absence of an orientation taking this concept into consideration, Reich argued, socialists leave to the dominant ideology and reactionary forces in society the ideological hegemony of the masses. (327)

It was the problem of the subjective factor of revolution which preoccupied the Frankfurt School. Like Reich, Korsch had already drawn attention to this problem in regard to the German Revolution, 1918-23. Defeat, Korsch argued, was not only due to the absence of correct leadership but also the absence of ideological preparation: 'the great chance was never seized because the socio-psychological preconditions for its seizure were lacking. For there was nowhere to be found any decisive belief in the immediate realizability of a socialist economic system...' (328)

Halliday pertinently notes the connection between Korsch and Gramsci: both he and Korsch stress the need for cultural and ideological struggle, areas of analysis taken up by the Frankfurt School. Korsch also underlined the importance of authority relations, the system of norms governing legality and illegality in the capitalist State. The attitude of social classes and groups towards authority formed the basis of the social psychological analysis of authoritarianism and Fascism in the work of the Frankfurt School. (329) In his analysis of authoritarianism, Reich argued that the acquiescence of Social Democrats to Fascism was reflected in the attitude of Social Democracy to the State:

From the standpoint of the psychology of the masses, Social Democracy is based on the conservative structures of its followers...The Social Democrats should have literally swung

their cudgels, in the beginning, at a time when fascism had not yet attained victory. Instead, they held themselves in reserve and used them only against the revolutionary workers. For the masses who were Social Democrats, they had a far more dangerous expedient: conservative ideology in all areas.(330)

Respect for the norms of bourgeois legality by Social Democracy became a fetish which was accrued greater priority than the self-activity and self-defence of the labour movement by the working class parties and organisations. The focus of the Frankfurt School was on the socio-cultural dimension of bourgeois ideology, attempting to provide an empirical basis to their ideas in studies such as Erich Fromm et al The Working Class In Weimar Germany and studies in Authority and the Family from 1929 to 1936. Contrary to the impression created in subsequent years, the early work of the Frankfurt School in particular was formed on the basis of Marxist class analysis and reference to the political parties and organisations involved.(331) Therefore, the idea that the Frankfurt School reduced sociological categories to a psychologistic analysis of Fascism and authoritarianism cannot be sustained. The social psychological concepts were intended to supplement, not replace, the sociological analysis.(332) As Jay has observed, the Frankfurt School's central task had been to re-examine Marxism to account for the failure of the European labour movement to lead a successful socialist revolution and defeat the rise of Fascism.(333) For Marcuse, who had taken an active part in the German Revolution (334), the counter-revolutionary role of Social Democracy was blatantly revealed with that Party leadership's complicit role in the

murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in 1919, and the subsequent crushing of the Revolution.(335)

The fundamental relation between ideology and practice in the political action of the German Social Democratic Party had been revealed as acquiescence to the norms of bourgeois legality and the socio-cultural hegemony of capitalist society.

The revision of the dialectic into unprincipled eclecticism, adherence to the rigid orthodoxy of vulgar Marxist determinism and scientism, and the reduction of the socialist vision to the 'minimum programme' of reforms within the bounds of bourgeois legality showed that reforms had become an end in themselves, unrelated to the socialist goal.(336)

Hence, the result of Social Democracy as a factor in the struggle for social change represented a force which pressed for reforms on the basis of capitalist prosperity but attempted to de-rail the revolutionary development of the working class in periods of acute class-struggle and economic-political crisis. In terms of mass psychology the maximum programme of Social Democracy represents a fictitious goal. And as Reich argued, the disappointment in such a catastrophic failure to defend this goal, let alone attain it in the short-term, led to the collapse of Social Democracy at the 'eleventh hour': the confused and disorientated Social Democrat worker found himself:

disappointed by his own leadership, he followed the line of least resistance...Thus the communist assertion that it was the Social Democrat policies that put fascism in the saddle was correct from a psychological viewpoint. Disappointment in Social Democracy, accompanied by the contradiction between

wretchedness and conservative thinking, must lead to fascism if there are no revolutionary organisations. (337)

Hence, similarly, in 1938 Horkheimer noted the attachment of the Social Democratic Party to the cultural norms of capitalist Germany:

The history of German Social Democracy should warn any 'love of culture'. A critical attitude to the dominant culture would have been the only chance for the preservation of the latter's elements. Instead the picture was largely of a concern to don the bourgeois wisdom of yesterday.(338)

In the critical analysis of bourgeois society the Frankfurt School located the acquiescence of bourgeois culture as an element in the success of Fascism. The Enlightenment itself, argued Horkheimer and Adorno, contained elements of potential appeal to the forces of reaction under the fruition of monopoly capitalism and its economic, political, and ideological crisis. The social function of ideologies change as the role of progressive social classes and groups evolve from revolutionary to conservative forces in the social formation at decisive junctures in history. Hence, in Marcuse's analysis of liberalism and totalitarianism (339), Horkheimer and Adorno's analysis of the interplay between progressive and regressive categories throughout the intellectual and social history of Western civilization, especially since the Enlightenment (340), and Fromm's analysis of the dialectic of freedom and repression in the character structure of the individual in the development of bourgeois society (341), the attempt is made to restore the subjective factor in the social process.

The rise to power of the Nazis in 1933 posed the validity of the Marxian project in full relief. The complicity of the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and the misleadership of the German Communist Party from its Moscow centre meant that the German labour movement was unable to halt the forward march of Hitler: the workers' parties were disunited and paralysed. (342) The initial task under Horkheimer's directorship of the Institute, Katz notes, 'had been to interpret the event of the 1930s: why had the "revolutionary class" been largely reduced to acquiescence or even complicity? How could the potency of mass propaganda and crude ideologies be explained?'(343) Katz's 'intellectual biography' of Marcuse indicates the chief theoretical and research project of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s. However, Katz's interpretation focuses on 'the primacy of aesthetics' in order to grasp the 'praxis of political revolution'. (344) Despite Katz's valuable research into Marcuse's intellectual development it is doubtful whether the 'primacy of aesthetics' is an adequate vantage point from which to form an accurate and useful appreciation of the *raison d'etre* of critical theory.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment thesis argued that an analysis of the inner disunity in bourgeois intellectual categories revealed that the progressive enlightenment of the bourgeoisie, formerly linked to the free market period, was being reduced to its underlying instrumental rationality with the rise of monopoly capitalism and the beginning of the twentieth century. The nodal point of political reaction in the face of a well organised and politicised labour movement, the critical theorists argued, is the defence of

private property and the capitalist market economy: the bourgeoisie were reduced to dispensing with its progressive social, political, and cultural gains in order to preserve the economic foundations of their social power.(345) The conclusion drawn was that the dominant socio-cultural values of the bourgeois civilization shared in the acquiescence to Fascism and authoritarianism. It was this ideological acquiescence which had, ultimately, penetrated the leadership organisations and culture of the labour movement and served to neutralise the possibility of an emergent working class solution to Fascism.(346) Of course, the question concerning the integration of psychological and cultural factors in the Frankfurt School's analysis of Fascism is an important one, and will be taken up more directly in a later chapter. Undoubtedly, their work nonetheless pointed to the enlarged role of the State in the civil society of advanced capitalist society (347), the introduction of 'scientific management' and role of technological rationality as a central component of late capitalist legitimation(348), and thus to the fundamental importance of acknowledging the changed role and conditions of ideological hegemony in late capitalism. That the work of the Frankfurt School too readily generalised from certain structural and terroristic features of National Socialism in Germany, as Connerton has noted (above), should not lead us to neglect the positive contribution of the School to our understanding of late capitalism. Nor, also, should the Frankfurt School's underestimation of the German working class's attachment to the restitution of democracy even though its political leadership was unable to overthrow the Nazi dictatorship once installed in power.



The conditions of the dictatorship and the underestimation by Marxists of the influence of nationalism was such that the majority of working class people were paralysed in defeat.(349) These factors in addition to the Frankfurt School's neglect of comparative historical analysis in their perspective should not detract from their introduction of a necessary corrective to the excessively economistic analysis of Fascism which, as Reich (cited above) argued, neglects the important role of ideological and social psychological factors and is therefore reductionist.(350)

However, the Frankfurt School identified the socio-cultural terrain as a neglected part of the totality, and it could be argued that it is a factor of increasing importance in the era of late capitalism which is marked by the development of the late capitalist State and new forms of ideological legitimation. Indeed, it was these new forms of social control which Marcuse, for example, sought to expose and analyse in One-Dimensional Man.(351) The work of the Frankfurt School can be viewed as a protest not against industrialism but, in fact, mechanical Marxism; it represents a revolt against the integration of Marxism into reformist thought and practices on the one hand, and the legitimation ideology which Soviet Marxism has become, on the other.(352) The Frankfurt School, as with Gramsci (353), recognised the growing complexity of the relationship between the State and civil society under late capitalism and the importance of an adequate conceptual framework for understanding the impact of these changes on the social consciousness of the period. The work of Lukacs and Korsch made a decisive impact upon the formation of critical theory and the

critical analysis of the integration of the Second International into the institutional and ideological structures of advanced capitalist society.

As we have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, the attempt by the Western Marxists in general, and the Frankfurt School in particular, to liberate Marxist categories from mechanistic materialism brought the question of the relation between theory and practice to the fore, challenging the economistic interpretation of the base-superstructure analogy. Marcuse clearly indicated the implications of the reductionist base-superstructure schema and was particularly aware of the political consequences of this interpretation towards the end of his life and is worth quoting in full:

The schema implies a normative notion of the material base as the true reality and a political devaluation of non material forces particularly of the individual consciousness and subconscious and their political function. This function can be either regressive or emancipatory. In both cases, it can become a material force. If historical materialism does not account for this role of subjectivity, it takes on the colouring of vulgar materialism. Ideology becomes mere ideology, in spite of Engels' emphatic qualifications, and a devaluation of the entire realm of subjectivity takes place, a devaluation not only of the subject as ego cogito, the rational subject, but also of inwardness, emotions and imagination. The subjectivity of individuals, their own consciousness and unconscious tends to be dissolved into class consciousness. Thereby, a major prerequisite of revolution is minimized, namely, the fact that the need for radical change must be rooted in the subjectivity of individuals themselves, in their intelligence and their passions, their drives and their goals.(354)

The vulgar Marxist concept of base and superstructure reduced consciousness to a shadow reflection of the 'economic base' of society. The Marxists of the Second International surrendered the

problem of subjectivity to the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie, and the experiential changes in social consciousness required for socialist revolution were denied. Moreover, the confusion and division within the working class caused by the characterisation of the German Social Democrats as 'social fascists' by the Stalinised German Communist Party led to the defeat of the German working class and to the Fascist dictatorship. While it remains true that the Frankfurt School tended to neglect the international political dimension in their conception of the class-struggle, it could be argued that by drawing attention to the previous devaluation of subjectivity a new terrain of socialist theory and strategy is indicated in the perspectives of Western Marxism. (355) In short, the necessary theoretical and practical synthesis and transcendence of Western Marxism is a project for the future. But, arguably, the ground for such a transcendence has been laid, if only partially and fragmentally, in the post-Second World War years (356), and the rich contribution of the Frankfurt School to this process of reconstitution requires elucidation, clarification, and analysis as part of the balance sheet of the past fifty years of imperialism.(357)

This chapter has situated the Frankfurt School as a tendency within Western Marxism, as part of the revolt against the orthodox Marxism of the Second International on the one hand, and Soviet Marxism on the other.(358) Moreover, the anti-naturalist revolt, although part of a wider theoretical movement of the anti-capitalist intelligentsia, was not a simple product of defeat stemming from the inter-war period. It was also a product of the 'voluntarist' denial

of the mechanistic interpretation of social change prevalent in the Marxism of the day as expressed in practice by the success of the October Revolution in 1917.(359) Of course, this is not to suggest any affinity between critical Marxism and Stalinist 'voluntarism' in the sense used by Ronald Aronson in his analysis and critique of forced collectivization and liquidation of the Kulak class and the imposition of rapid industrialization upon a backward economy and reluctant hinterland of private landholders in Russia from the late 1920s.(360) On the contrary, critical Marxism emphasized that 'socialism in one country' ignores the combined and uneven development of the world economy and consequently Stalinist 'voluntarism' reflects a specific, historically rooted, degenerated concept expressing the political interests of the bureaucracy in opposition to the interests of the international workers' movement (361).

This chapter has also shown how socialist reformism sought to adjust the theory of German Social Democracy to its bureaucratized organisation and minimum programme, by drawing from the confusion in the Marxist ranks regarding the problem of conceptualizing the relation between base and superstructure.(362) Lukacs has pointed to Engels' errors in his attempt to provide a philosophical justification of the base-superstructure analogy (363), and the Frankfurt School, following on the heels of Lukacs and Korsch, pointed to the prevalence of vulgar materialism and its concomitant political passivity in the conception of philosophical materialism which dominated the socialist movement.

Despite flaws identified in Engels' attempt to solve the base superstructure problem, his appeal to positivist epistemological assumptions, we established that Engels' theoretical errors did not automatically translate into his strategic conception of the socialist project. (364) The Frankfurt School attempted to reassert the philosophical unity of Marxism as part of the left-wing anti-capitalist intelligentsia following the First World War and the impact of the Russian Revolution. As we have attempted to show, philosophy played a major role in the attempt to reconstitute the Marxian concept of subjectivity in the social process. Chris Harman has noted how, following Marx's death in 1883, the mechanical, determinist view of history and social change came to be regarded as Marxist orthodoxy. However, as Harman notes, it was the decisive influence of Karl Kautsky in the German Social Democratic Party which helped formulate this deterministic interpretation and diffusion of Marxism in the Second International. Thus, in Kautsky's interpretation:

Political and ideological struggle is (then) seen as playing no real role. Human beings are products of their circumstances, and history proceeds completely independently of their will. The outcome of wars, revolutions, philosophical arguments or what not is always determined in advance...The task of revolutionary socialists under modern capitalism was not to cut short this historical process, but simply to reflect its development by carefully building up socialist organisation until capitalism was ready to turn into socialism. (365)

Thus Kautsky's mechanical and determinist view of history reduces socialist strategy to the war of attrition and dissolves the maximum demands of the socialist programme into those which are

obtainable within the capitalist State.(366) As Ernest Mandel has noted, however, the reformist strategy forgets 'that ideological hegemony and coercion complement one another in the exercise of class power, that no state can subsist solely on force or solely on the "consent" of the exploited.'(367)

The Frankfurt School emphasized the active side of the Marxian dialectic and stressed that ideology is not a mere reflection of the economic base of society but contains genuine truth albeit often in distorted ways - and hence can become a material force.(368) Moreover, that the predominance of the base in the interaction of base and superstructure is of an historical character. The socialist 'transformation of society eliminates the original relation of substructure and superstructure. In a rational reality, the labour process should not determine the general existence of men, to the contrary, their needs should determine the labour process.' (369)

Moreover, by acknowledging the active role of ideology in the historical process the Frankfurt School pointed beyond the problem of leadership to the wider question of the necessary transformation of the consciousness of the working class in the process of change itself. That the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie in its institutions and cultural practices, represents obstacles to the necessary transformation of the social and political consciousness of the working class and, following Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, that a change in mass consciousness is a necessary precondition for the process of social transformation. The Frankfurt School's work thus amounts to a greater appreciation of

the role of the social superstructure in social domination, although, as we have noted, it has produced work which tends to be deficient in a comparative analysis of the state in advanced industrial societies.

As discussed, the Frankfurt School's work represents a critique of orthodox Marxism but also Soviet Marxism. Indeed, the influence of Plekhanov can be identified in the Stalinist parties of the late 1920s, as Chris Harman has noted: 'At the hands of Stalin and his "theoreticians" it became an unbendable historical law: development of the forces of production inevitably lead from a "workers' state" to "socialism" and from "socialism" to "communism", regardless of the misery and hardship involved...'(370)

Thus it could be argued that critical theory is important for revealing the inconsistencies of orthodox Marxism in theory and practice, and for defending the combination socialist-democracy against reformism which reduces socialist democracy to reforming the capitalist State on the one hand (371), and Stalinism which dissolves workers' democracy into the dictatorship of the bureaucracy on the other.(372)

The Frankfurt School argued for a critical analysis of the new and changing forms of ideological domination under late capitalism to account for the defeats of the inter-war period and the 'arresting' of the class-consciousness of the working class.

Indeed, for Horkheimer and Adorno in particular, the failure of traditional Marxist critical theory to account for the 'cunning of reason' in twentieth century history not only called for a broader, more adequate theory of social change, class relations, ideology, and the like, that failure necessitated a radical reconsideration of the foundations of critical theory, its

original account of human subjectivity, knowledge, desire, satisfaction, even of the possibility of theory itself.(373)

Indeed we have noted and discussed the problem of the break in the theory-praxis nexus in regard to problems in Korsch's work above, but the possibility of theory itself became problematic for the critical theorists, especially for Horkheimer and Adorno, and this is a theme which will be taken up in a subsequent chapter of this study. In a sense, theory had fallen behind reality, but also, practice had fallen behind the theory.(374) With the success of Fascism in central and southern Europe and the exile of the Frankfurt School to the United States, however, the question remains - were the efforts of the Frankfurt School to render Marxian theory adequate in relation to changed conditions successful? If philosophy was no longer an independent branch of knowledge but contained essential 'truths', what would the role of ideology critique be within a Marxism which reflected the divorce of theory and practice in the labour movement? Was the Frankfurt School's conception of the changed relation between theory and practice and their reformulation of the Marxian project adequate? How would the Frankfurt School 'marry' Marxism and Psychoanalysis in the spirit of their critique of mechanical materialism, and conceptualize the relation between the forms of late capitalist ideology and the power of the working class to break through the reification of consciousness and generate a mass opposition on an international scale? Indeed, would the class-struggle resume its course and lead to a mass socialist consciousness or could the late capitalist State



regulate the economic and social contradictions of the system and thus 'arrest' the development of class-consciousness indefinitely?

The Frankfurt School, as we have seen, identified many of the major questions and areas of analysis to be developed to account for the crisis of Marxism in the inter-war years and since.(375) Whether or to what extent the School's solutions were adequate is the theme of the following chapters. Indeed, even the critical theorists' conception of their own role in this process as Marxist intellectuals must be critically assessed.

In order to assess these questions it is necessary to devote a chapter to a detailed discussion of Lukacs' work History and Class Consciousness, in particular, the concept of reification, which had a profound influence on the formation and trajectory of critical theory and the Frankfurt School. Indeed, the Frankfurt School's response to the major work of the early Lukacs throws into relief the basic themes and formulations of critical theory in response to the crisis of Marxism. Moreover, it is this important work by Lukacs which has to be understood in order to discuss the role Freudian psychoanalysis was to play in the critical analysis of the interplay between ideology and social consciousness in the work of the Frankfurt School.

CHAPTER TWO

LUKACS AND CRITICAL THEORY

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Lukacs' Concept Of Reification: Subject And Class Consciousness

In the preceding chapter we examined the critique of the determinist and positivist interpretation of historical materialism of the Second International and the orthodox Soviet Marxism of the Third International or Comintern. We traced the attempt to ground Marxian theory ontologically in a natural scientific epistemology, showing that the revisionist movement (Bernstein) drew credence from weaknesses in Engels' concept of base and superstructure and their relation. This discussion was situated in the context of the rise of Western Marxism as a response to the success of the Russian Revolution of 1917 on the one hand, and as an expression of the defeat of the European Revolutions in the 1917-23 period following the First World War.

The weaknesses in the Marxian conception of the relationship between base and superstructure led to the underplaying of human consciousness in social change. The argument thus establishes that Western Marxism represents a specific theoretical response to the problem of subjectivity, and, as the last chapter sought to demonstrate, attempted to reinstate the concept of subjectivity in order to account for the central factor which explains the emergence (or absence) of a revolutionary agent in society.

Moreover, if the social superstructure is merely the reflection of the economic base, then the socialist revolution is unlikely to require the active participation of the working class and its allies, but can be achieved through 'objective' contradictions alone: the act of liberation thereby emerges without a conscious subject.

The resolution of this theoretical problem, it has been argued, depends in large measure, upon an appreciation of the Marxian concept of dialectic, for as Lukacs forcefully argued, the category of totality is decisive for Marxian theory because it poses the whole in question, and is politically subversive for revisionism because it poses the relation of base and superstructure in terms of dialectical transcendence. Moreover, human mediation in social change is the decisive element in this dialectic, according to Lukacs.

Thus, such a restoration of the Marxian dialectic in Lukacs' work (1923) immediately exposed the weaknesses of the Kautskyite centre of the Second International and the compromised empiricism of the evolutionary socialism of Bernstein.(1) Clearly, this radically reposed the question of the relation between social being and consciousness; for, according to Lukacs, the relation between science and social and political values were no mere problematic aside; only the Marxian theory and standpoint of the working class facilitated an adequate understanding of the totality and unity of theory and practice.

By conflating the analysis of the relation between history and nature, Engels led the concept of subjectivity into a theoretical cul-de-sac, as Lukacs has indicated. The dialectical laws Hegel

discovered were, according to Engels, the general laws governing nature, history and thought. Lukacs showed that Engels, by trying to justify his epistemology by appealing to the terms of a positivistic model of natural science, had grasped at straw.

The political implications of Engels' position were to come to fruition in the next generation (for whom Engels' philosophic justification of historical materialism, above all, Anti-Duhring, 1877-8, was the orthodoxy) whose ideological leadership consisted of Plekhanov, Kautsky, and Bernstein.(2) The 'natural necessity' of the demise of capitalism and success of socialism came to replace the strategy and struggle to attain this goal in a conscious and articulated manner.(3) The division between theory and practice reflected the integration of Social Democracy into the institutional framework of bourgeois society, and ultimately rested on the conservative attitudes of the bureaucratized trade union movement.(4)

The political crisis of the Second International was embodied in the events beginning with the complicity of the Social Democratic Party deputies' voting for war credits. As Callinicos writes:

It was therefore necessary to think the political crisis in philosophy and to effect the necessary reinterpretation of Marxism which could both capture its critical and scientific character and account for the role which ideological and political factors play in determining whether a crisis can become a revolution.(5)

The revival of interest in Hegel which preoccupied Lenin, Gramsci, Korsch, Lukacs and the Frankfurt School, spelled a break

with the fatalistic determinism of the Second International. They placed

at the centre of their philosophical discussions the question of the relation between consciousness and reality. This question embraced two problems. The first was that of the relation between theory and practice. What were the theoretical conditions inherent in Marxism that would enable it to overcome the hold the bourgeoisie enjoys over the working class through its control over the production and dissemination of ideas? The second was the epistemological problem of the relation between a science and the reality it seeks to explain and the justification of a particular theory's claim to provide a knowledge of reality.(6)

(a) Lukacs' Theory Of Subjectivity And Class Consciousness

For Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness the role of the social theorist is inextricably connected with the realities of class society. The intellectual can not be independent of the antagonisms of class society, and his thought categories are bound to reflect this in one way or another. Historical materialism has no significance outside of the struggles of the proletariat, there is no objective reality independent of the observer which can be passively reflected upon in a neutral way: the theorist is a participant. Accordingly, Marxism's claim to objectivity and truth, like that of all methods of (natural scientific and) social enquiry cannot be abstracted from the practices of particular social interests and classes.(7)

If, as Lukacs argues, the social theorist aligns him/herself with the standpoint of the proletariat then Marxian theory transcends the 'one sidedness' and distortions of other social theories and class ideologies. The structural position of the proletariat in capitalist society means that self-emancipation of the working classes implies the liberation of all dependent classes and oppressed social groups.(8) Accordingly the 'standpoint of the proletariat' is the only basis from which an objective historical grasp of the totality is possible. Moreover, even if (mass) revolutionary working class practice is not an immediate experience or possibility, one is still able to talk of the objective need for and possibility of revolution because its potential is contained objectively, in the social dynamic of the historical process.

(b) Reification: Barrier To Class Consciousness

Lukacs' study of reification is a detailed application of Marx's concept of alienation, applied with reference to Marx's critical analysis of the fetishism of the commodity form in Capital, (and anticipated Marx's studies on alienation and reification in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844) to the social consciousness arising as a product of advanced capitalist social relations of production.

Lukacs drew creatively from Simmel's work on the commodification of culture, and Weber's work on rationalization and bureaucratisation in the process of monopoly capitalism. Drawing from Marx's concept of alienation, in which the objective production relations of capitalist society render the waged labourers, estranged from themselves, the product of their labourpower, from others, and from nature.(9)

Lukacs attempted to show how the appearance of workers' productive activity, in capitalist society, as something alien to them is a process in which the division of labour entails the fragmentation of social consciousness and thus social phenomena takes on the appearance of things, permeating all spheres of life, inhibiting the immediate attempt to cognitively penetrate the totality and thus acting as an obstacle to the rise of class consciousness. ' Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a "phantom objectivity", an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people.'(10)

Reification is not a subjective phenomenon as such, but arises from the social relations of capitalist production.(11) It is the advanced stages of the capitalist exchange process and division of labour which acts as an obstacle to the cognitive penetration of social phenomena.

The social division of labour under advanced capitalist society renders possible detailed control over parts of society, the process of production and nature, at the price of the ability to master the whole. This process is expressed throughout civil society and the state, production and consumption, reproduction of labour and socialization, in politics between 'polity and economy', and is pronounced in the ideological contradictions inherent in bourgeois intellectual culture.(12)

Lukacs' concept of the standpoint of the proletariat as the subject-object of history, reveals however, that the social theorist has the responsibility to indicate that it is precisely the proletariat who have the practical power to potentially shatter the impasse created by advanced capitalism to the emancipation of humanity from war and economic crisis. The struggle to uncover and lay bare the actual workings of capitalist social relations, that the process of reification obfuscates the real class relations of capitalist society, implicates the social theorist in the political task of shattering reified forms of consciousness and thus attempting to bring about the unity of theory and practice in the practical struggle of the oppressed and exploited classes.

By virtue of its objective place in the productive relations of capitalist society and its numerical size, only the proletariat,



through its own self-activity, can attain the cognitive identity of subject and object necessary for the practical resolution of the fundamental roots of alienation, the antagonistic property relations of capitalist society.(13) Moreover, the structural position of the working class brings it necessarily into conflict with the capitalist relations of production, this is the dialectic of labour: the forces and relations of production.(14) And thus into conflict with the organizational norms and authority relations of the state and civil society, impelling the proletariat towards an attempt to understand society as a totality. Trade unions represent the primary response of the labour movement as the basic form of self-defence, embodying a collectivist solution (as against individual arbitration) and the elementary prerequisite for class consciousness, namely, a collective response to the employers and the state.(15)

#### (c) Rationalization And Bureaucratization

The increased specialization of the social division of labour has been accelerated by the development of modes of thought categories subject to monopoly capitalist development, in the words of Weber, in the development of 'occidental reason' (16) of the specialized and formal sciences. In Taylorism (17), time is subjected to increased rationalization and converted into a strict enumeration of empirically standardized performances which 'confront the worker as a fixed and established reality'(18)

Modern capitalism brings to bear the methods of the exact sciences to the production process and thus on the subjection of the mental as well as physical faculties of the worker:

With the modern 'psychological' analyses of the work process (in Taylorism) this rational mechanization extends right into the workers 'soul': even his psychological attributes are separated from his total personality and placed in opposition to it so as to facilitate their integration into specialized rational systems and their reduction to statistically viable concepts.(19)

The rationalization of capitalist production involves the increased standardization and hence calculability and mathematization of the work process, conforming to the increased specialization and fragmentation of the social division of labour: hence, 'The finished article ceases to be the object of the work process. The latter turns into the objective synthesis of rationalized special systems whose unity is determined by pure calculation and which must therefore seem to be arbitrarily connected with each other.'(20)

Production is fragmented, not just singularly (in one factory), but across production units. Thus, for the worker,

Neither objectively nor in his relation to his work does man appear as the authentic master of the process; on the contrary, he is a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical system. He finds it already pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not.(21)

Because the labourers' total personality is compartmentalized in the production process, his consciousness is related to the immediate fragmented tasks (specialization) unrelated to the whole, the

purpose of the work is divided from the specialized function; labour is rendered increasingly contemplative and less actively related to the whole. Subject to mechanization and rationalization, the labourer will 'become less and less active, and more and more contemplative' (22), and the 'basic categories of man's immediate attitude to the world...reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space.'(23)

And thus the labourers' experience of time and space are likewise degraded to the extent that under capitalism the labourers' life is dominated by the need for full time alienated performances.

(d)Atomization

The specialization of the division of labour and Taylorism, the fixed quantification of measured performances and the subjection of the labourer to the rhythm of the fragmented performances in time and space serves to further break down those bonds to the community norms evident when 'production was still organic'.(24)

Turning to what can be described as the socio-psychological effects of reification, Lukacs' work clearly preceded and anticipated the Frankfurt School studies. This passage on atomization compares with Fromm's Escape from Freedom(25)

The atomization of the individual is, then, only the reflex in consciousness of the fact that the 'natural Laws' of capitalist production have been extended to cover every manifestation of life in society; that, for the first time in history, the whole of society is subjected, or tends to be subjected, to a unified economic process, and that the fate of every member of society is determined by unified laws.(26)

However, if reification represents only the unmediated appearance reflection of a total process, then atomization is only an illusion; though it is a 'necessary illusion'.(27)

The all embracing character of reification in Lukacs' studies anticipates Marcuse's One Dimensional Man (28): 'Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully, and more definitely into the consciousness of man.'(29)

#### (e) Means And Ends

The division of labour, and its fragmentation tends to separate, on an enlarged scale, the means from the ends in the process of production; subordinated to the partial rationality of the fragmented performance in an irrational whole, results in the directors of production themselves fetishizing their own activity, furnishing the alienation of thought from effect and the passive relation which inhibits consciousness of intervention. The worker, confronted with his 'individual' performance, the entrepreneur, confronted with a particular mechanical development; the technologist, whose thoughts on the state of science and its profitable application to the productive process, are all united in sharing in the process and effects of alienated labour and, even if the entrepreneur and technologist derive more benefits from these performances and 'suffer more pleasurably', reification pervades the activities of one and all.

(f)Bureaucracy

The analysis of reification is fundamental to understanding the problem of bureaucracy as it is encountered in advanced capitalist society.

'The formal standardization of justice, the state, the civil service, etc., signifies, objectively and factually, a comparable reduction of all social functions to their elements...'(30)

The standardization of the division of labour in the process of capitalist production is a concomitant of the searching tendencies of bureaucratization embodied in the state. With the uneven growth of the concentration and centralization of economic power, and thus the development of monopolistic capitalism, arose the greater need for the state to intervene in, and attempt to regulate, the economy and to arbitrate the effects of monopolization by further interventions in the private sphere(31), the regulation of the family and the labour market.(32)

The alienation of the total personality of the labourer is enlarged under increased standardization and the effects of bureaucracy:

The split between the workers labour power and his personality, its metamorphosis into a thing, an object that he sells on the market is repeated here too. But with the difference that not every mental faculty is suppressed by mechanization, only one faculty (or complex faculties) is detached from the whole personality and placed in opposition to it, becoming a thing, a commodity.(33)

The similarity of Fromm's concept of the 'marketing orientation' to Lukacs' concept of reification is striking here. The need to

'sell one's personality' as an aspect of one's labour power becomes a striking characteristic of the late capitalist labour market and testifies to the further alienation of the labourer's total personality. The effects are violent and dislocating, 'one faculty is detached from the whole personality and placed in opposition to it, becoming a thing, a commodity'. This aspect, the labourer's alienation from himself, entails the experience of himself as a thing; anticipating the degradation of the personality, one's own character traits as a commodity with a certain exchange value. This analysis also anticipates Fromm's conception of the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian character'(34) which arises in the specialized social division of labour.

The specific type of bureaucratic 'conscientiousness' and impartiality, the individual bureaucrats inevitable total subjection to a system of relations between the things to which he is exposed, the idea that it is precisely his 'honour' and his 'sense of responsibility' that exact his total submission, all this points to the fact that the division of labour which is the cause of Taylorism invaded the psyche, here invades the realm of ethics. Far from weakening the reified structure of consciousness this actually strengthens it.(35)

This phenomenon, in which the total personality succumbs mentally and morally in acquiescing to the appropriation of the labour power of the modern worker, is epitomised in the professions. Lukacs, on journalism (and can be extended to all mental labour under capitalism):

This phenomenon can be seen at its most grotesque in journalism. Here it is precisely subjectivity itself, knowledge, temperament and powers of expression that are reduced to an abstract mechanism functioning autonomously and divorced both from the personality and their 'owner' and from the material

and concrete nature of the subject matter in hand. The journalist's 'lack of convictions', the prostitution of his experiences and beliefs is comprehensible only as the apogee of capitalist reification.(36)

(g)The Reification Of Eros

Lukacs follows through the implications of reification in a way which was as revolutionary then as it is today; in terms of following up the implications of reification in social practices and their relation outside the workplace, exploring the multiplicity of its consequences in the alienation of social relations, the Self from others and from nature ( as well as alienation from one's product and the production process in the workplace). The reification of the labourers involves their psychic and physical qualities:' there is no natural form in which human relations can be cast, no way in which man can bring his physical and psychic 'qualities' into play without their being subjected increasingly to this process.'(37)

And as for love:

We need only think of marriage...we can remind ourselves of the way in which Kant, for example, described the situation with the naively, cynical frankness peculiar to great thinkers. 'Sexual community', he says, 'is the reciprocal use made by one person of the sexual organs of another..marriage..is the union of two people of different sexes with a view to the mutual possession of each others sexual attributes for the duration of their lives'.

This rationalisation of the world appears to be complete, it seems to penetrate the very depths of man's physical and psychic nature.(38)

This abstract equality between the exploiter and the exploited as the ideological representation of the unequal exchange between capitalist and worker has led to the degradation of love and the

erotic to the expression of the basest use of the female sex for the gratification of the male.(39)

We shall return to this aspect of reification in later discussion concerning psychoanalytic thought and the Frankfurt School.

#### G)The Reification Of Bourgeois Intellectual Categories

Lukacs enlarges the classical concerns of Social Democracy by tracing, dialectically, the antinomies of bourgeois modes of intellectual labour. Law, for example, and the legal system, 'which serves purely as a means of calculating the effects of actions and rationally imposing modes of action relevant to a particular class'(40), exudes formal equality between the social classes, yet its appeal as a rationale to 'natural justice', 'eternal values', its false ethical and political neutrality veils the class character and injustice of bourgeois law. Bourgeois modes of thought succumb to an intellectual division of labour in which a formalism and relativism tend to produce social theory which is a-historical. Practices and institutions tend to become intractable problems to be explained by generalizing, a-posteriori, present social forms. Lukacs exposes the dialectic of bourgeois thought in its production of specialized knowledge, and its forgetting of its own history and sources:

Our aim here was to locate the point at which there appears in the thought of bourgeois society the double tendency characteristic of its evolution. On the one hand , it acquires increasing control over the details of its social existence, subjecting them to its needs. On the other hand it loses, likewise progressively, the possibility of gaining intellectual control of society as a whole and with that it loses its own qualification for leadership.(41)



And as Marx discovered in his critique of Hegel and the 'dissolving' of the unresolved classical problems of philosophy into the critical theory of society, philosophy represented the advanced consciousness of bourgeois society and bore its contradictions, indicating the limits of its historical rationality. Similarly, political economy degenerated after Smith and Ricardo into an economics that systematically confined itself to utility and prices and thus abstracted from the political economy based on the social relations between human subjects.(42) Following this trend, sociology and political science gradually eliminated from the focus of their concerns the production relations underlying their arbitrarily drawn subject boundaries.

#### (i) The Political Effects On Social Consciousness

The political effects of reification upon the basic classes of bourgeois society entail an objective historical dynamic which involves concepts, comprehending or anticipating what the Frankfurt School contended psychoanalytic thought described at the level of social psychological mechanisms. The petty bourgeois and peasant social consciousness is 'ambiguous' and 'sterile' due to their relation to modern production relations as 'linked with the vestiges of feudal society'.(43)

The social consciousness of the petty-bourgeois class tends to imagine itself 'to be above all class antagonisms'.(44)

The character of the bourgeoisie's consciousness is such that it develops a keen class interest but is barred from developing class consciousness.

Such extensive self-knowledge of itself as a class with specific interests may perhaps be evident, but the implications which would become apparent, in an overall rational historical context, of class consciousness, are more likely to remain highly rationalised or completely repressed: if the bourgeoisie's class consciousness were to become other than unconsciously latent, this class's own self-abolition would be the most rational project with which it would be faced.

The owners and controllers of capital operate in a milieu of competition, the partial rationality of their class-interests become irrational when set in motion in the context of the totality. The advent of 'organized capitalism' does not abrogate the problem inherent in the capitalist social division of labour, since: 'cartels and trusts only shifts the contradiction elsewhere, without, however, eliminating it.'(45)

Here, Lukacs follows Luxemburg's and Lenin's critique of the 'evolutionary socialism' of Bernstein, and the thesis according to which the path upon which the line of development of capitalist society rests with the advent of parliamentary democracy and mass suffrage would be one of greater social harmony and justice; that capitalism equals 'progress'; instead of Social Democracy embodying the ideals of socialist democracy, it desired only to realize the democratic ideals of liberalism within capitalist society, and thus assuming the interventionary role of the State into the relations of civil society as evidence of the ability of institutions of the (capitalist) State to administer and eliminate the economic and social contradictions of the capitalist nation state. This line of

reasoning idealised the increasing intervention of the state which in fact reached into the historical bowels of capitalism and whose propellant was not the benevolence of ruling classes but those of imperialism itself, namely, the need of overseas markets for the enlarged accumulation of capital to check the decline in the rate of profit.(46) With regards to the Frankfurt School's economic thesis: it would appear that in Pollock, whose work on 'state-capitalism' represented the centrally accepted concept amongst the core Institute members (47), it can be detected that the influence of Bernstein's tenet of the long range crisis-free capacity of advanced monopoly capitalism is evident. This notion of 'organised capitalism' lends to international capitalism a certain image of stability which does not in actuality exist.(48) Moreover, the advent of Keynesian policies do not, as Pollock tended to assume (49), mean that the bourgeoisie has attained a class-conscious interest in administering the contradictions of capitalism; on the contrary, the progressive implications of Keynesian policies served in the long term to aggravate as well as regulate the fluctuations of the advanced capitalist economies.(50) And, as usual, the response of the Frankfurt School to such developments in the ranks of the bourgeoisie to the economic crisis of inter-war Europe assumed with dogmatic consistency a picture in which the working class appear as docile and powerless, an atomized rump, passively subject to the coordinated administration of the state apparatus. It did not seem to occur to the adherents of critical theory that the concept of 'organized capitalism', which they embraced, further sealed the eclipse of subjectivity of the proletariat by eliminating what for

Lukacs, Luxemburg and Lenin, formed the linch-pin of the revolutionary Marxist critique of reformist revisionism and class collaboration, namely, the fact that monopoly capitalism preserved the contradiction between the forces and relations of production onto a higher, more devastating, and destructive historical level. This shows how wrong it is to believe that critical theory represents a simple reversion to 'philosophy', reducing 'science' to 'metaphysics'. The weakness of critical theory, especially with regard to class consciousness and the revolutionary subject are in fact decisively embraced within its own economic propositions, a factor overlooked by ignoring the role of philosophy in the reconstitution of the revolutionary essence and practical project of Marxism. The notion, that state planning by the ideologies of the bourgeoisie was gaining currency might in some contradictory ways represent a concession towards the interests of the proletariat went unnoticed by the Frankfurt School. Because their concept of 'organized capitalism' conceded grounds to the economic theses of the reformist school thus obfuscating awareness of class conflict, the active side of this dialectic of labour was ignored to be replaced with an exaggerated focus on the encroachments of the bourgeoisie on civil society in the 'private sphere' of the individual. (51) Hence whatever impositions the working class were able to make tended to be ignored whilst when significant changes in the relation of class forces took place they could not be explained. (52)

(J) Monopoly Capitalism: The Antinomies Of Bourgeois Thought In  
The Age Of Imperialism

The critique of imperialism as internally related to advanced monopoly capitalism by Lenin and Luxemburg showed that the higher historical expression of the fundamental contradictions of capitalism revealed a level of degeneracy introducing new contradictions into the intellectual and material culture: between the available social wealth for the pacification of existence on the one hand, and the inter-imperialist competition, economically and militarily, on the other. Accompanying the latter development the most visible signs of degeneracy included: patriotism, nationalism, chauvinism, and racialist prejudice. The destructiveness of the First World War also contradicted the naive optimism expressed in the abstract notion of moral progress embodied in the evolutionary socialism of Bernstein. Arguably, the strength in Lenin and Luxemburg's position lies in their historically specific analysis of the capitalist mode of production in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Theories which focus on an abstract notion of moral progress or which single out and attribute an independent dynamic to the contradictions of advanced capitalism, such as E.P. Thompson's concept of 'exterminism' (53) as the characteristic 'logic' of the armaments race, concede ground to an a-historical notion of 'technological rationality' (Weber) by ignoring the roots of alienation in the political economy of capitalist society. Thus in his assessment of the higher stage of imperialism, as expressed in the armaments race in the era of late capitalism, Thompson attributes to the armaments race an independent logic

('exterminism') which becomes the apotheosis of reification itself: for in Thompson's analysis, the bourgeoisie is absolved because it too is threatened by the implications of 'exterminism'. However, Lukacs' analysis of reification, heavily informed by Lenin and Luxemburg's theory of imperialism, clarifies the position of the bourgeoisie. According to Lukacs, the bourgeoisie's rulership represents a process in which as a class it experiences the prerequisites for its own actions as 'something external which is subject to objective laws which it can only experience passively.'(54) The bourgeoisie is forced, due to the objective position in which it finds itself, to form a world view, 'a coherent theory of economics, politics, and society '(55), and attempts to extend its hegemony to embrace the whole of society, 'to clarify its own overall interests on every particular issue, while at the same time such a clear awareness becomes fatal when it is extended to the question of the totality.'(56)

But it is precisely the fact that such an awareness becomes fatal, and indeed, increasingly so with the age of imperialism and the present era of late capitalism, which marks the historical limits of the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie; and indicated, moreover, the crisis in the hegemony of its rule.

As the contradictions of bourgeois society grow increasingly acute, the interests of the ruling minority have to appear more and more to be the interests of society as a whole. Consequently, the 'repression' (repression - used here in the technical sense; when a thought or emotion, as awareness, is removed from consciousness, though its cause remains and may express itself in certain

symptoms) increases concomitantly; the bourgeoisie must either: 'consciously ignore insights which become increasingly urgent or else they must suppress their own moral instincts in order to be able to support with a good conscience an economic system that serves only their interests.'(57)

The hegemony of the bourgeoisie is in crisis - even as they affirm it - and this stands as a characteristic of its history as a class: 'from a very early stage the ideological history of the bourgeoisie was nothing but a desperate resistance to every insight into the true nature of the society it had created and thus to a real understanding of its class situation.'(58)

Thus, the concept of 'exterminism' serves well the interests of the dominant class because it colludes in the notion that the bourgeoisie has made its own: the image of being subject to laws out of its control, 'exterminism' thus becomes ideological to the extent that it tends to obfuscate the real, objective class interests which imperialism, and thus the arms race, serves.(59) With regards to the Frankfurt School, it is evident that the ideology of planning as in the term 'organized capitalism', expressed an attempt to veil the fact that the contradictions of capitalism had been transposed to a greater destructiveness of extent and scale, thus the 'planning' element implied that a 'higher' rationality (than naked class interests) had replaced the anarchy of the capitalist system. What Lukacs shows as decisive, over the Frankfurt School and E.P.Thompson, is that this partial concession to the class consciousness of the proletariat (from the 'sanctity' of private property to the notion of 'organised capitalism') represented only

the consciousness on the part of the bourgeoisie, that 'planning' indicates not a leaning towards socialism but fundamentally a preference towards saving the system. Abstracted from the dynamic of class struggle, the Frankfurt School are unable to capture the true irrationalities of advanced capitalism (60) , and with the submergence of the dialectic of labour under the theoretical rubric of 'technological rationality' and 'instrumental reason' (61), the advent of 'planning' is viewed as indicating the perpetuity of the historical rule of the bourgeoisie (62), rather than, as in Lukacs, the loosening up of the internal coherence of ruling class hegemony in which the fundamental contradictions of bourgeois society are preserved and their effects are re-doubled:

With this, the whole existence of the bourgeoisie and its culture is plunged into the most terrible crisis. On the one hand, we find the utter sterility of an ideology divorced from life, of a more or less conscious attempt at forgery. On the other hand, a cynicism no less terribly je June lives on in the world historical irrelevances and nullities of its own existence and concerns itself only with the defence of that existence and with its own naked self-interest.(63)

Thus, for the proletariat, 'the truth is a weapon that brings victory, and the more ruthless, the greater the victory.'(64) That the Frankfurt School, particularly Horkheimer and Adorno, were to turn further towards a more orthodox defence of Freudian psychoanalysis by the end of the 1930s, and distance themselves further from any defence of a revolutionary Marxist perspective, helps to account for their further inability to conceptualize social change and the greater irrationalities of social life under late capitalism despite the fact that Freud was enlisted to precisely



facilitate a deeper grasp of monopoly capitalism's irrationale. Later in this study the roots of Horkheimer and Adorno's theoretical impasse vis-a-vis the potential of the proletariat to act as the 'universal class' are found to lie in their neglect of the dialectic of labour and the historical dynamic of the class struggle. Horkheimer and Adorno maintained a Marxian perspective until the later 1930s, when their perspectives gradually abandoned the centrality of the concept of the potential collective self-emancipation of the proletariat: the pessimism of Freud's cultural speculations and the Weberian notion of 'technological rationality' replaced the Marxian rational faith (65) in the human potential in class society to emancipate itself and the rest of humanity in the process. While critical theory attempted to add a theory of culture and integrate psychological categories into historical materialism, their perspective tended to ignore politics(66), and this is reflected in the neglect their work shows for Lukacs' insightful discussion of the role of Social Democracy.

#### (k)The Role Of Social Democracy

For Lukacs, the fundamental concession that Social Democracy makes to bourgeois society is conceding to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie by being incapable of squarely facing the issues raised in socio-political conflict from the standpoint of the class-struggle and independent self-activity of the proletariat.

When the vulgar Marxists detach themselves from this central point of view, ie, from the point where a proletarian class consciousness arises, they thereby place themselves on the level of the consciousness of the bourgeoisie. And that the bourgeoisie fighting on its own ground will prove superior to

the proletariat both economically and ideologically can come as a surprise only to a vulgar Marxist.(67)

Thus, in such a position, the Social Democracy radically disarms the proletariat and appears ideologically bankrupt to deal with a multitude of concrete political, economic and social issues, in which at the same time the bourgeoisie excels: 'For quite apart from the real forces at its disposal, it is self-evident that the bourgeoisie fighting on its own ground will be both more experienced and more expert.'(68)

Lukacs' argument has lost none of its relevance for today. It is particularly relevant to the recent fortunes of European Social Democracy, the fact that policies of its parliamentary right and centre have notoriously formed party policy when in government (despite conference decisions on policy), and while in opposition the Party's socialist image is cultivated and a left-reformism gains hegemony within the Party.(69) The domination of the right and centre in the British Labour Party, its social democratic wing in particular, prevailed with social democratic policies throughout the post-war boom years and the increasing electoral erosion of the Party's public support - especially amongst the working class - can be attributed to the ideological collaboration of the right wing with the interests of the bourgeoisie. These insights of Lukacs' work form the decisive backdrop for a Marxist analysis of the political acquiescence of European Social Democracy in the era of late capitalism.

(1) Class Consciousness

Class consciousness represents the historical role of the working class made conscious. It arises when the immediate separation of the economic from the political is broken and unified into a total view which embraces the prevailing form of working class struggle (trade-union militancy which represents a basic collectivist response) with the final goal of socialist democracy, concretely indicating the progressive steps in consciousness and tactics which direct the action of the working class beyond the confines of capitalist society. Lukacs argues, moreover, that 'class consciousness is identical with neither the psychological consciousness of individual members of the proletariat, nor with the (mass psychological) consciousness of the proletariat as a whole, but is, on the contrary, the sense become conscious of the historical role of the class.'<sup>(70)</sup>

It is important to recognize here that Lukacs is over-concerned to repudiate the empirical, given, consciousness of the working class as the final invalidation of the Marxian project that he leaves little or no room to explain the process by which the given consciousness of the working class develops class consciousness and is drawn to revolutionary socialist politics. On this point, also, the Frankfurt School followed Lukacs in failing to account for the process by which class consciousness may arise in specific historical conjunctures. For Lukacs' conception, which was internalised by critical theory, remains abstract:

'As long as this consciousness is lacking, the crisis remains permanent, it goes back to its starting point, repeats the cycle

until after infinite suffering and terrible detours the school of history completes the education of the proletariat and confers upon it the leadership of mankind.' (71)

The struggle of the working class finally breaks the spell of reification with the flowering of workers' councils and the foundations of socialist democracy : 'The workers' council spells the political and economic defeat of reification.' (72)

Moreover, it signifies also the dialectical negation of the struggle that the working class has to wage against the influence of bourgeois hegemony within its own ranks 'against the devastating effects of the capitalist system upon its class consciousness.' (73)

Critical Theory And The Limitations Of History And Class

Consciousness

Despite Lukacs' masterly defence of revolutionary Marxism and creative application of Marx's concept of alienation and commodity fetishism to the conditions of advanced capitalism, he did not succeed in his rebuttal of the orthodoxy deriving from Engels.(74) Lukacs invoked, in reply to the mechanistic determinism of the Second International, the category of the subject to solve the issue concerning the dialectical interplay of subject/object in history and thus the necessity to break the mesmerizing rhythm of reification and for the proletariat to consciously grasp its agency, intervene in and transform class society. But the weaknesses of Lukacs' position are significant: due to its uneven development the working class as a whole is unlikely to spontaneously reach the class consciousness necessary for its ascent to power. Lukacs advances as a solution to this problem, the necessity of the revolutionary party. The actual, empirical consciousness of the proletariat is described by Lukacs as not embodying class-consciousness, and identification of the latter with the concrete psychology of the proletariat is ascribed as tending towards opportunism, and empiricism: 'it hopes to reduce the class consciousness of the proletariat to the level of the psychologically given...'(75) 'in a word, opportunism mistakes the actual, psychological state of consciousness of proletarians for the class consciousness of the proletariat.'(76)

As Callinicos writes: 'The necessity for a revolutionary party derives from this fact...The party represents this imputed class consciousness of the proletariat, transcending the contingent failures of the class to arrive at full consciousness.'<sup>(77)</sup>

False consciousness and class consciousness are juxtaposed rather than dialectically related.<sup>(78)</sup> Thus, if by

relating consciousness to the whole of society it becomes possible to infer the thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular situation if they were able to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of society. That is to say, it would be possible to infer the thoughts and feelings appropriate to their objective situation.<sup>(79)</sup>

Thus: 'class consciousness consists in fact of the appropriate and rational reactions imputed to a particular typical position in the process of production.'<sup>(80)</sup>

And this is the juxtaposition: 'This analysis establishes right from the start the distance that separates class consciousness from the empirically given, and the psychologically describable and explicable ideas which men form about their situation in life.'<sup>(81)</sup>

Hence the 'bridge' between the existing and the 'imputed' class consciousness of the proletariat becomes the revolutionary party, the problem of rising from existing to imputed consciousness is not explained, but is contemplatively stated as necessary. Lukacs tends to lapse into voluntarism by focusing on the ideological struggle as the decisive factor in bringing about class consciousness, thus abstracting 'from the conditions under which the proletariat can seize power and from the necessity for the proletariat to smash the bourgeois state apparatus and replace it with a regime of workers'

councils'.(82) It is not the class consciousness of the proletariat but its objective position in the productive process as producer of surplus value which is the decisive factor for the development of a 'socially cohesive and united class...'(83) Thus:

Lukacs' analysis, when it comes to the question of how the working class breaks with bourgeois ideology and develops its own class consciousness, is very poor. To treat the revolutionary party as the reflex of the class consciousness of the proletariat is to do two things. Firstly, it is to evade the real problems that Lenin, Trotsky and Gramsci grappled with - the problem of building a party that combines a scientific analysis of capitalism with real roots in the working class, and of winning to the side of that party a majority of the working class and of the other oppressed section whose interests lie in the direction of proletarian revolution - to evade, that is, the problem of hegemony. Secondly, it is to provide the theoretical basis for an ultra-leftism that sees the action of the vanguard in terms of what the class ought to think, rather than adapting its tactics to what the class actually does think in order to intervene to transform the consciousness of the class in the direction of revolutionary Marxism.(84)

Lukacs' strength lay in his emphasis on the subjective demonstrated in the defence of the concept of the self-emancipation of the working class (85): his contemplative stance failed to pin-point the process through which this could become possible.(86) The centrality of the dialectic of labour was missing from Lukacs' analysis, which meant ultimately that: 'all prospects of advancing to decisive questions like the relation of theory to practice and subject and object are frustrated from the outset.' (87).

Finally, because of the weaknesses in Lukacs' conception of the role of the revolutionary party and its relationship to the imputed class consciousness of the working class and specifically, because of his insufficient attention to the concrete process by which the

working class attains class consciousness, the conquest of political power and socialist democracy, his conception leaves itself vulnerable. The criticism is that it contains in embryo an unfortunate apologetic germ for the one-party state and the practice of turning into a virtue the erosion of the rights and liberties of the opposition parties in the soviets during and after the exigencies of the Civil War following the Russian Revolution.

For if the party represents, nay embodies, the 'appropriate' and 'rational' imputed class-consciousness of the proletariat (Lukacs appears to be asserting Lenin's What is To Be Done thesis of the need to bring political consciousness to the working class from without due to the assumption that the working class is unlikely to be able to go beyond trade union consciousness), the weaknesses in Lukacs' conception also imply an elitist concept of leadership that Rosa Luxemburg, in her polemics with Lenin, argued implies an infallibility on the part of the revolutionary party, betrayed in the placing of the revolutionary party outside the working class rather than conceiving it as being organically part of the latter. (88)



(a) The Dialectic Of Labour: Lukacs And The Frankfurt School

The theoretical basis of Lukacs' ultra-leftism was taken on board by the Frankfurt School. Their either/or reading of the possibility of class consciousness tended to vacillate between it being either apparent or completely absent. Lukacs' disregard for the dialectic of labour tended to result in the neglect of the mediating link between subject and object and thus the element of dialectical negation of the proletariat's ascribed consciousness to class consciousness in the process of class struggle. This missing element led to an equation of alienation with objectification - a fundamental dilemma afflicting the contemplative application by the Frankfurt School of Lukacs' concept of reification.(89) The class struggle is spiritualized away into the concept of praxis in Lukacs' work because of the narrowing down of the basic category of labour as mediation of the interaction between society and nature. Lukacs later wrote:

It is self evident that this means the disappearance of the ontological objectivity of nature upon which this process of change is based. But it also means the disappearance of the interaction between labour as seen from a genuinely materialist standpoint and the evolution of the men who labour.'(90)

Walton and Gamble pertinently note on this point: 'It is not that (Lukacs-CM) did not consider that society and nature are mediated by praxis, but rather that praxis as a concept does not concretely grasp the special characteristic of the human species'. As he (Lukacs-CM) states: 'What I failed to realize however was that in

the absence of a basis in real praxis, in labour as its original form and model, the over-extension of the concept of praxis would lead to its opposite: a relapse into idealist contemplation'.(91)

This problem pierces directly to the heart of critical theory and its basic incapacity to ultimately provide the philosophical and political concepts to account for the problem of class-consciousness and reification. And, by turning to Freud to furnish their concept of revolutionary subjectivity, critical theorists conceived labour as governed by the pleasure principle as opposed to Marx and Engels' conception of labour as the specifically human capacity to objectify oneself, one's total personality (as Lukacs rightly points out in History and Class Consciousness) as a teleological project - in and against nature - transforming the latter and oneself in this historical relationship.(92)

Thus Walton and Gamble argue that the unity in Marx's work consists of the continued centrality of the 'ontological category of labour' (93), and Marx's 'rejection of any teleological existence outside labour, ie, human praxis'.(94) This fundamental conception thus facilitates the comprehension of how something can be determined and determining.(95) Thus: 'Marx was the first thinker to overcome the philosophical opposition between causality and teleology, by grounding his analysis in the dialectics of labour.'(96)

Having defined the basic problems which arose from Lukacs' early work, History and Class Consciousness, it has been necessary to follow these problems to their treatment as proposed by Lukacs from

his 1967 Preface to his Ontology of Social Being. It has been suggested that we can proceed to discuss the theoretical foundations of the Frankfurt School and begin to pin-point how their conception of revolutionary class consciousness and subjectivity were flawed in relation to Lukacs' argument with regard to History and Class Consciousness's failure to appreciate an all rounded understanding of Marx's ontology (dialectic) of labour. For critical theory's solution to the dilemmas of Lukacs' early work devolved upon an ultimately frustrated attempt to recover the fragments of subjectivity and self-consciousness of the proletariat with the application of Lukacs' original notion of reification and praxis to psychoanalysis. But since in critical theory the dialectical relation between reification and objectification was blurred by the absence of a concrete grasp of the special characteristic of the human species, not just that the relation between society and nature are defined by praxis, but of concrete labour as the historical mediation between society and nature, an accurate conception of the process of social change was made impossible. As Walton and Gamble have pertinently noted in criticism of the Frankfurt School and its attempt to resolve the problem of the relation between social being and consciousness in response to the failure and degeneration of the Second and Third Internationals:

For an apparent but unstated assumption of much so called 'critical theory' is that Marx lacked concepts which (even if correctly applied) could adequately account for a radical change in social reality. Indeed what much of this theorising comes down to is the search for concepts usable within a Marxist framework but allowing one to deal more ably with the mediations between subject and object.(97)

And decisively, the problem of the mediation between subject and object turns on the question of how the idea of mediation is itself contextualised:

This would be unobjectionable if these conceptual 'developments' were consistent with Marx's dialectics of labour, but all too frequently such developments depend upon unacknowledged breaks. At its worst and most open it can lead to Marxists of the calibre of Herbert Marcuse to openly attempt his ludicrous synthesis of Freud and Marx in a manner that does an injustice to both. It is precisely because Marx's categories are dependent upon his special ontological view of man that they cannot be properly assimilated into alternative theories which have contrary ontological assumptions.(98)

#### (b) Psychoanalysis

It was the attempt to define the interplay between subject and object and grasp their mediations in culture and ideology which led the Frankfurt School to attempt what Walton and Gamble have defined as the reconciliation of the irreconcilable. The political impulse behind the attempt to integrate Freudianism with Marxism was, of course, to explain why the working class could not achieve Lukacs' 'imputed' class consciousness and define the psychological mechanisms through which bourgeois ideology averted the spontaneous gravitation of the working class towards class politics. Hence, the Frankfurt School's investigations into areas of the totality such as the culture industry, the changing structure of ideology in advanced capitalism, the changing structure of the family, the decline of the individual and the personal realm, authoritarianism and the impact of technological ideology.(99) But the Frankfurt School rejected Lukacs' need for the revolutionary party as the embodiment of the imputed class consciousness of the proletariat: with the advent of

Stalinism, the Frankfurt School drew back from the weaknesses inherent in this position; truth could not be rigidly defined and laid down by an infallible instrument of the historical process. The Frankfurt School never fully embraced Luxemburg's or any other notion, of appropriate organisational concepts to articulate the need for leadership to offset the uneven development of class consciousness.(100) Following Lukacs, the Frankfurt School defined the decisive political struggle as being fought out at the level of consciousness (101): the conception of the imputed class consciousness of the proletariat is posited outside of the existing consciousness of the working class and it's failure to attain class consciousness is investigated with the use of psychological categories. Lukacs has provided the rationale for this procedure in History and Class Consciousness

It would be possible to infer the thoughts and feelings appropriate to their objective situation. The number of such situations is not unlimited in any society. However, much detailed researches are able to refine social typologies there will be a number of clearly distinguished basic types whose characteristics are determined by the types of position available in the process of production.(102)

The Frankfurt School attempted to analyse the existing psychological characteristics of the proletariat to pin-point the way bourgeois ideology inhibited class consciousness from developing. Thus, the investigation of the consciousness of social groups in terms of social typologies (ideal types) that attempt to account for 'basic character structure' in which the influence of hegemony is maintained in areas of the totality such as had been neglected -

those outside the alienation of the work place. Rather than starting from the latent class consciousness of the proletariat and raising it through praxis to revolutionary consciousness, the Frankfurt School believed that this could be remedied by pinpointing the obstacles to class consciousness as conditioned by bourgeois ideology through unexplored mediations of the totality, and thus through the concept of reification.

(c) Jacoby: Social Amnesia

The history of the integration of psychoanalysis and Marxism has been traced by Russell Jacoby. Jacoby follows Korsch to the effect that the decisive achilles heel of Marxism was the analysis of the subjective factor. It had been this subjective factor - of the failed European revolution which became the prescription for the integration of psychoanalysis. But for Jacoby and the Frankfurt School, Lukacs and Korsch discussed the reification of the consciousness of the proletariat on non-psychological grounds. For Korsch: 'the "belief" in the practicability of socialism... is derived from the "backwardness" of socialist theory vis-a-vis all the problems of the practical realization of socialism.'(103) Thus for Jacoby, Lukacs and Korsch adhere to a non-psychological conception of subjectivity and consequently: 'the psychic dimension is lost or, at least, dilated in its translation into theoretical questions on the practical content of socialism.'(104) Even worse, according to Jacoby, Lukacs only acknowledged the psychic factor or 'dimension' only to dismiss it'.(105) For Lukacs, as stated above, the psychic dimension is the source of revisionism and opportunism. Psychology

denotes the immediacy of consciousness, an unmediated subjectivity, and it is the source of Social Democratic reformist revisionism. For critical theory, then, Lukacs' 'fetish of the party' follows from his neglect of the subjective moment; it is the contradiction between history and psychology, Jacoby argues, which requires investigation.

(d) The Eclipse Of The Subject And The Integration Of  
Psychoanalysis

Jacoby admits that left psychoanalysis arose out of the collapse of German Social Democracy following the outbreak of the First World War. (106) The 'subjective, human and philosophical content of Marxism' (107) was missing but, in their contemplative concept of reification, critical theory ends up burying the possibilities of class consciousness by theoretically confirming the eclipse of subjectivity at the same time that they affirm the need to enlist psychoanalysis to rekindle it. 'Marxism, at least since Lukacs and Korsch, explores subjectivity, but a (revolutionary) subject that does not appear. Hence the theory of subjectivity is also a theory of bourgeois society that eradicated the subject.' (108) Critical theory's undialectical analysis ends up reducing the individual to bourgeois society; precisely the reductionism which on the one hand makes impossible social change; 'a subjectless subject', and on the other hand, reduces revolutionary consciousness to a fatalistic determinism emanating from the 'individuals' insertion into society. Jacoby writes, somehow escaping the total effects of reification himself, 'Today there is no subjectivity', (109) the individual is left 'numb and dumb'. Jacoby, following Adorno, Horkheimer and

Marcuse, psychologises the failure of the subject to intervene in social reality in order to change it by enlisting Marcuse's Freudo-thermidor notion which suggests an instinctual thermidor prohibiting the fruition of the successful revolutionary moment and which acts 'regardless of the prematurity and inequality of the forces'.(110) Clearly this account reduces the causes of the failed European revolution to a transhistorical notion of instincts: a conception which militates against any possibility of qualitative social change.

#### (e) Social Amnesia - A Critique Of Conformist Psychology

Jacoby's thesis pivots upon a defence of the use of orthodox Freudian instinct theory in critical theory, launched against the incursions of the 'neo-Freudian' school and the existential-phenomenological post-Freudian school of psychology as symptoms themselves of the eclipse of subjectivity. And moreover, Jacoby argues, the neo-Freudian and post-Freudian schools ideologically celebrate this eclipse of subjectivity precisely in their rejection of Freud's most 'provocative hypotheses': his metapsychology and instinct theory. Jacoby's sweeping critique of 'conformist psychology' epitomises the corner in which critical theory contrived to land itself. Consequently, the use to which psychoanalysis is put condemns as bourgeois the existing consciousness of the proletariat far more effectively and crudely than Lenin ever did in his What is to be Done thesis. For critical theory, Jacoby argues, 'To accept subjectivity as it exists today, or better, as it does not exist today, is implicitly to accept the social order that mutilates it.'(111)



(f)Critical Theory And The Use Of Freudian Psychology

For critical theory, as exemplified by Marcuse's Eros and Civilisation, the quest is to defend and retain Freudian instinct theory, as the revolutionary under-belly of a Marxist psychology.

What will be argued here, however, is that the intervention of Marxian socialism into psychoanalytic thought is required. Psychoanalysis is not just another speculative social philosophy as Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno tend to treat Freud, but its validity must be approached by a critical analysis of its theoretical relation to historical-empirical problems concerning the psychic health and happiness of the individual in class society. The intervention of Marxian socialism into psychoanalytic thought means critically appropriating the latter's clinical-empirical basis and thus the concepts themselves, by exposing their theoretical ideological caste.

Following Lukacs' later argument concerning the role of labour as mediating the interplay between subject and object, it is clear that by arguing the grounds for the importance of psychoanalysis lie in the instinct theory (because it is argued, only libido ultimately escapes the effects of reification), the Frankfurt School grasped at a conception which ultimately posits sexuality as being outside of society and, inevitably, history too. Critical theory's appeal to a natural substratum for its social psychology (epitomised in Eros and Civilization) taken from Freud, is rooted in the antinomies of bourgeois materialist philosophy. Lukacs notes that the approaching bourgeois society appears natural in comparison and by the side of the disorder of Feudalism and Absolutism:

...here we can see that 'nature' has been heavily marked by the revolutionary struggle of the bourgeoisie: the 'ordered', calculable, formal and abstract character of the approaching bourgeois society of feudalism and absolutism. At the same time, if one thinks of Rousseau, there are echoes of a quite different meaning wholly incompatible with this one. It concentrates increasingly on the feeling that social institutions (reification) strip man of his essence and that the more culture and civilization (i.e. capitalism and reification) take possession of him, the less able he is to be a human being. And with a reversal of meanings that never becomes apparent, nature becomes the repository of all these inner tendencies opposing the growth of mechanisation, dehumanisation and reification.

Nature thereby acquires the meaning of what has grown organically, what was not created by man, in contrast to the artificial structures of human civilization.(112)

Similarly, Fromm notes that in Freud's Civilization and its Discontents, 'there is no hope for any fundamental improvement of society, since no social order can transcend the necessary and unavoidable conflict between the claims of human nature and happiness on the one side, and claims of society and civilization on the other.'(113) The Freudian ontology is defended aggressively by Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, and Jacoby's polemic against the neo-Freudian (and post-Freudian existential schools) is based on Adorno and Marcuse's critique of the 'cultural school' of psychoanalysis. Jacoby admits in Social Amnesia that the critical theory critique of neo-Freudian revisionism merely followed Freud's polemic against Adler; but Jacoby does not stop to question the problems inherent in Freud's attack on Adler's theories, thus Jacoby's argument tends to repeat the rather uncritical position adopted by Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse in their embracing of Freud's position. Hence, it can be argued that Jacoby thus repeats many of the mistakes of these thinkers in his rather sweeping

indictment of Adler, Fromm, and the existentialists, as representing 'conformist' psychology. That Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno were to defend a more orthodox version of Freud's theories can at least in part be accredited to the unresolved dilemma perpetuated in their sweeping adoption of Lukacs' concept of reification, without the crucial concept of the dialectic of labour. Thus the instinct theory is for the critical theorist the ultimate justification for Marxism in a one-dimensional universe of possibilities. Posited outside of history, sexuality represents a part of the human being which lies beyond complete integration (114) into 'civilization'(class society). The Freudian ontology becomes 'the material base under the material base' (115), but without which, 'the whole edifice would collapse'(116). Hence the almost indiscriminate lumping together of those psychologists who rejected Freud's libido theory as 'revisionists' or 'conformists'.(117) Even recent attempts by Marxists such as Phil Slater in The Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School attempts to derive a Marxist psychology through accepting the notion laboured by the Frankfurt School that Freud's psychoanalysis is the only psychology compatible with Marxian social theory because psychoanalysis claims to be a materialist science. Slater asserts this position with a quote from Marcuse (Slater 1977,p95) based on Fromm's 1932 paper entitled The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology. In his attempt to make the case for a revision of the Frankfurt School's interpretation of Freud by way of returning to Wilhelm Reich's early Left-Freudian position representatively expressed in the 1933 work The Mass Psychology of Fascism, Slater takes as given the position

of the Frankfurt School and the early Fromm without any consideration of the so-called neo-Freudian 'revisionist' school and thus Fromm's later crucial rejection of libido theory, decisively, from his 1941 work Escape from Freedom. Because, even the early Fromm rejected Reich's 'out Freuding of Freud' (which Freud himself found untenable, as well as Marcuse, it might be added) in his overextension of the libido theory. Slater dismisses Fromm's criticism that Reich's theory is 'seriously limited by his usual physio-logistic overestimation of the 'sexual factor'. Slater comments: 'Clearly, Fromm understands nothing of Reich's theory'(118). Judging from the absence of a discussion of Fromm's later break with libido theory and a greater reliance on a radical interpretation of Marx's concept of alienation for a Marxist psychology(119), it seems clear that, in fact, Slater has overlooked evidence which detracts from his fascination with Reich - as if his mind had been made up before he put pen to paper. Slater correctly states that one must not reproduce a 'maginot marxism' by rejecting the problem of a Marxist psychology with the bathwater of critical theory, arguing that what

is thus called for is a careful appropriation of the Institute's analyses, in such a way as to establish whether the eclecticism of 'critical theory of society' is in fact not due to the attempt to reconcile depth-psychology and historical materialism, but to the failure to integrate the former without undermining the latter.(120)

Slater's answer is thus a reversion to Reich on the grounds that the latter's work contains a more thorough-going Marxist critique of Freud. Here Slater is on the right tracks, but his argument

terminates in the rather non-thorough-going critique of Freud's anthropological speculations which Reich himself had already offered up in a series of papers (121), and which the Frankfurt School, with the exception of Marcuse (who specifically defended Freud's 'most speculative hypotheses' at least for their 'symbolic value', 122) also broadly accepted. (123)

Thus Slater's argument that a Marxist psychology must go beyond critical theory by adopting Reich's critique of Freud's later metapsychology and anthropological speculations such as the primal horde, the reified ethnocentric (patriarchal) notion of the Oedipus complex, and in particular the death instinct (a product of Freud's growing cultural pessimism, built around the notion of 'sublimation', following World War One), is ultimately to reduce the problem, which I repeat, is being carried in the correct direction, to positions already established by Left Freudianism. For Slater, despite the supposed superiority of Reich's solution (Slater, 1977, p104) is not prepared to submit the basic physiological premises of the libido theory which Reich champions, to a thorough historical materialist critique, or, indeed, engage Fromm in an intelligent discussion as to why the latter did. On the grounds of the arguments we have established concerning the importance to critical theory the libido theory played in shoring up the Frankfurt School's neglect of the dialectic of labour as the crucial mediation in the materialist concept of theory and praxis, it may be argued that Slater's reversion to Reich is basically misconceived, and ultimately flawed. The 'advance' Slater proposes on critical theory reduces the problem of a Marxist psychology to positions already established

and defended. Slater's merit is to have emphasized the significance of critical psychology for the emergence of the New Left in the 1960s, and thus the reinvigoration of Marx's concept of alienation in application to the condition of generalized economic and social crisis in the era of late capitalism. But most importantly, Slater takes up the original *raison d'être* for attempting to integrate psychoanalysis with Marxism and thus illuminates the problem which the early Fromm and Wilhelm Reich attempted to grapple with and has since been lost sight of because of the (justified) debate over the ontological status of Freud's instinct theory. That is, the attempt to counter the neo-Kantian idealist position to which Bernstein alluded and which had as a consequence the tendency to reduce historical materialism to an 'economic psychology', and Kautsky's attempt to defend historical materialism by rejecting 'the psychologistic interpretation. But...goes on to supplement historical materialism with a purely idealist psychology, by assuming there is a pristine "social drive".'(124)

Thus, as Slater comments on Fromm's early work to find points of convergence between psychoanalysis and historical materialism:

Fromm's programmatic first essay bore the obvious title 'The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology'. It did not fail to quote the relevant admission by Engels of a gap in historical materialism. Fromm then proceeded to show how the attempts to fill this gap had, due to the complete ignorance as to the mechanisms of the psyche, produced a 'purely idealistic psychology', smuggling in a disguised 'innate moral principle'. Therefore, a depth-psychological component was not only compatible with Marxism, but necessary to it, if idealist appendages to concrete analyses were to be forestalled.(125)

This argument is fundamental, and Slater has preserved it in his discussion of the Frankfurt School even though his own solution is insufficient, i.e., a return to Wilhelm Reich. At this juncture it would be useful to summarize the political and historical significance of this issue.

The attempt to investigate social psychology from a Marxist perspective was part of the attempt to recast the traditional concern and orientation of determinist-positivistic orthodox Marxism, and thus reassess the relation of social being and consciousness. The reduction of the superstructure to the economic infrastructure of society resulted in the inability to comprehend ideology as a social force. Moreover, vulgar Marxism,

...does everything in its power not to comprehend the structure and dynamics of ideology; it brushes it aside as 'psychology', which is not supposed to be 'Marxistic', and leaves the handling of the subjective factor, the so-called 'psychic life' in history, to the metaphysical idealism of political reaction, to the gentiles and Rosenbergs, who make 'mind' and 'soul' solely responsible for the progress of history and, strange to say, have enormous success with this thesis. The neglect of this aspect of sociology is something Marx himself criticised in the materialism of the eighteenth century. To the vulgar Marxist, psychology is a metaphysical system pure and simple, and he draws no distinction whatever between the metaphysical character of reactionary psychology and the basic elements of psychology, which were furnished by revolutionary psychological research and which it is our task to develop. (126)

What is decisive about this critique of vulgar Marxism, characterised by the economic determinism and political fatalism of the Second International (and is as equally relevant today), remain the implications for political practice:

The vulgar Marxist simply negates, instead of offering constructive criticism and feels himself to be a 'materialist'

when he rejects facts such as 'drive', 'need' or 'inner process', as being 'idealistic'. The result is that he gets into serious difficulties and meets with one failure after another, for he is continually forced to employ practical psychology in political practice, is forced to speak of the 'needs of the masses', 'revolutionary consciousness', 'the will to strike', etc.(127)

In a memorable passage in which Reich has firmly in mind the failure of the German Left to unite to stop Fascism, he spells out the acquiescence of vulgar Marxism to bourgeois ideological hegemony:

The more the vulgar Marxist tries to gainsay psychology, the more he finds himself practising metaphysical psychologism and worse, insipid Coueism. For example, he will try to explain a historical situation on the basis of a 'Hitler psychosis', or console the masses and persuade them not to lose faith in Marxism. Despite everything, he asserts, headway is being made, the revolution will not be subdued, etc. He sinks to the point finally of pumping illusionary courage into the people, without in reality saying anything essential about the situation, without having comprehended what has happened.(128)

The alternativism inherent in the dialectical approach of Marx, and which Rosa Luxemburg made her own in the conditions of imperialist Europe in the first quarter of the twentieth century, in the formula 'socialism or barbarism' is also basic to Reich's and the Frankfurt School's notion of political psychology in opposition to the positivism of the failed Second and degenerated Third Internationals. It is that if the forces of progress do not relate to the actual conditions of the consciousness of the proletariat in its totality rather than merely in a falsely abstracted 'economic existence', then the forces of reaction will.



Moreover, that the majority of the proletariat are already imbued with the hegemony of the bourgeoisie economically, socially, culturally and ideologically, in such important social relations as the family and the church. To ignore social relations beyond the workplace therefore is to concede the first battle to the forces of conservatism and reaction without a fight. As Reich noted:

Narrow conservative life exercises a continuous influence, penetrates every facet of everyday life: whereas factory work and revolutionary leaflets have only a brief effect. Thus, it was a grave mistake to cater to the conservative tendencies in the workers...Reactionary fascism was much more expert at this.'(129)

Reich's argument involved a revolutionary attempt to apply Marx's dialectic conception of subject and object to the political problems of the German Labour movement in the late 1920s and early 1930s. As Engels conceded, the gap in historical materialism was how ideology became a material force. For Reich and critical theory, 'Character-analytical psychology fills this gap by revealing the process in man's psychic life, which is determined by the conditions of existence. By so doing, it puts its finger on the "subjective factor", which the vulgar Marxist had failed to comprehend.'(130)

However, what Reich conceived of as the solution was, as has been argued concerning the libido theory above, no more than a partial step in the right direction. And Slater's work does not complete the journey to a Marxist psychology by showing that Reich's break with Freud's concept of death instinct (Slater, 1977, p111) to

recover the critical implications of the 'super-ego' concept is more definitive than the critical theorists'.

Valuable though Slater's argument is in directing our attention to the fact that the Frankfurt School at no place submitted Freud's overall work to a comprehensive critique from a Marxist standpoint, and consequently took on much of Freud's pessimistic metapsychological speculations which helped imbue critical theory with the acquiescent resignation with which they are so well known (the title of Gillian Rose's book on Adorno well captures it, The Melancholy Science, London, Macmillan 1978) it is a weakness, that Slater conveniently overlooks, in Reich's own vulgar, or reductionistic, psychology that renders Slater's argument in question.

Reich explains Freud's main discoveries concerning the nature of the psychic life of the individual and with the Frankfurt School defends the libido theory as the revolutionary core of Freud's work. The four basic discoveries of Freud are listed by Reich as:

1. Consciousness is only a small part of the psychic life; it itself is governed by psychic processes that take place unconsciously...
2. Freud's second great discovery was that even the small child develops a lively sexuality, which has nothing to do with procreation;
3. The third great discovery was that childhood sexuality, of which what is most crucial is the child-parent relationship ('the Oedipus complex') is a part, usually repressed out of fear of punishment for sexual acts and thought (basically a 'fear of castration'); the child's sexual activity is blocked and extinguished from memory.
- 4...that, far from being of divine origin, man's moral code was derived from the educational measures used by the parents...At bottom, those educational measures opposed to childhood sexuality are most effective.(131)

What is immediately significant in Reich's acceptance of Freud's discoveries vis-a-vis Marxist social theory is his uncritical enumeration of psychoanalysis's 'truths'. As with the Frankfurt School, Reich accepts the basic interpretation which Freud himself laboured in his clinical evidence and practice. Slater overlooks the ideological flaw in Freud and Reich which is also a taken for granted component taken on board and defended by critical theory. As Reich enumerates the revolutionary discoveries of Freud he passes over what Freud himself described as 'our mythology'(132) namely, the libido theory, thus Reich wrote: 'The analytic dissection of psychic processes further proved that sexuality or rather its energy, the libido, which is of the body, is the prime motor of psychic life.'(133)

Reich convincingly shows the decisive contribution a Marxist psychology can make to a non-reductionist conception of social consciousness and political practice. But in his own attempt to develop such an approach he reduces the possibilities of a Marxist psychology to the limitations of Freud's libido theory and thus narrows down the sphere of attention to the reductionist prism of sexuality. Consequently, the attempt to provide the grounds for an effective critique of the reification of consciousness in social relations, thus going beyond the confines of economic reductionism, is internally circumscribed by the ahistorical naturalism which underpins Freud's materialism.

Thus, when the analysis is developed to include a consideration of the effects of reification of class consciousness, the structure of Reich's theory effectively side tracks socialist politics from

examining social structure, the dialectic of labour as the crucial mediating factor between subject and object, and thus away from history and into physiology - or rather, a biological vitalism of the Freudian stamp.(134) The consequence of this process in Reich's thinking is a highly distorted vision of human motivation(135) on the one hand, and an incapacity to appreciate the decisive socio-historical factors in the process of social change on the other. In this respect Reich's understanding of the relationship between sexuality and social change was a good deal too simple and its political implications quite naive: a liberalisation of sexual mores does not automatically bring forth hitherto repressed 'revolutionary characters'. This illustrates the social and political consequences of Reich's reductionism. Thus Norman O'Neill is correct when he points out that in order to provide a solution to the problem in Freudian psychology of the contradiction between civilization and repression Marcuse is forced to invent the empirically untenable notion of 'self-sublimation' as an alternative to Reich's sexual primitivism (136) and his later outright mysticism (137). However the problem is not only that of empirical validation but also of theoretical inconsistency because it can be argued that the Frankfurt School's acceptance of the libido theory indicates a failure to apply the School's philosophical reconstitution of Marxism to a critique of the mechanistic materialist premises of Freudian psychology. Hence the problems involved in the integration of psychoanalysis into Marxism must be understood theoretically and empirically. Thus Katz notes that the School neglected the critical analysis of the foundations of psychoanalysis (138).

Marcuse, who did most to try to 'marry' the ontologies of Marx and Freud, ignored the doubts and reservations expressed in Fromm's earlier studies in the *Zeitschrift* (139) which were informed by psychoanalytic practice and a more thorough-going historical and cross-cultural perspective. Marcuse's approach to Freud was, then, 'not so much to criticize the errors or shortcomings of Freud's thought as to establish its place within the development of Western rationality and to indicate those of its possibilities which Freud had either neglected or denied.'(140) However, what was the decisive factor of Marcuse's partial approach to Freud has been described by Geogeghan. It must be understood, he writes:

that Marcuse accepted without question the validity of Freud's clinical findings, and granted them a scientific status which is on par with that of Marx's findings in *Capital*; he made no attempt to analyse the clinical work of Freud from a historical materialist standpoint. Marcuse was intent on shaking our faith in some of the social conclusions Freud drew from his findings yet expected us to take on trust that these findings were valid.(141)

The discussion in this chapter has shown the importance of Lukacs' concept of reification for critical theory. Along with Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy (see chpt 1), Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness (both appeared in 1923) forms the theoretical and political backdrop to the Frankfurt School's approach to the reconstitution of European Marxism. Moreover, it has also been shown that the Frankfurt School adopted an eclectic approach to the work of Korsch and Lukacs, although this was not necessarily a debilitating factor in the development of Marxian socialism (as has been discussed). However, we have detected several important

factors which serve to explain the conceptual difficulties critical theory has faced.

Lukacs' defence of the revolutionary kernel of Marxism against the evolutionary socialism of Bernstein has been described in the previous chapter. Lukacs' reconstitution of the concept of totality, the importance of dialectic, and the critique of fatalism and technological determinism by applying the concept of reification to the fragmentation of bourgeois social thought revealed the atrophy which had set in to bourgeois intellectual categories. The pervasive effect of reification, the experience of social action and things as beyond the control of society, could be overcome through praxis. The collective action of the proletariat as the historical subject would lead to the development of the proletariat from a class 'in itself' to a class 'for itself'. The essential 'motor' in this process for Lukacs is the Leninist Party. At this point Lukacs and the Frankfurt School part company. The importance of the totality is taken on board, and, with certain modifications (see the later discussion of Adorno, for example) the concept of reification, but the critical theorists were extremely dubious as to the value of a Leninist Party. The Frankfurt School's response to the question of how socialist intellectuals should relate to the labour movement, the relationship of theory and practice, and the crisis of Marxism, is discussed in a later chapter for which the current discussion prepares us. Suffice to note at this juncture the importance of Lukacs' influence, and that the theoretical weaknesses of Lukacs' voluntarist perspective in History and Class Consciousness were also taken on board by critical theory and this explains the turn to

orthodox psychoanalysis as a specific response to the problems posed by Lukacs (142), though it is hoped that further discussion will show that the alternative laid down by Marxists and critical theorists - psychoanalysis minus the revolutionary organisation or the revolutionary organisation minus the insights of psychoanalysis - is mistaken.

The question arises, then, of the role of social psychology in a Marxism which seeks to become hegemonic. Before that question can be discussed, however, it is first necessary to acknowledge the contribution of Erich Fromm to the resolution of this problem.

The problems inherent in the Frankfurt School's use of Freudian ideas, its partial historical analysis situating Freud's thought in terms of the dialectic of enlightenment while avoiding the question of the validity of Freud's empirical work, were not taken on board uncritically by Erich Fromm. Fromm adopted a more sociological approach which sought to rescue the rational kernel of Freud's psychology on a historical materialist basis. Fromm's approach serves as a corrective to the Frankfurt School's other central representatives on the question of the validity of Freud's empirical findings. Hence it is important to discuss Fromm's contribution in greater detail to establish how the critique of reductionist Marxism was not applied to psychoanalysis by Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, in the attempt to develop a Marxist psychology. Consequently, it will be possible to show, through an understanding of Fromm's social psychology, that in their use of the instinct theory to extricate Marxism from the dilemmas posed by Lukacs' concept of reification, the Frankfurt School was clutching at straw.

As we shall see, the mechanistic materialism of Freud's psychoanalysis served to foreclose rather than open the possibility of a non-reductionist conception of social consciousness and political practice.



CHAPTER THREE

ERICH FROMM AND MARXIST PSYCHOLOGY

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Erich Fromm's work made an important contribution to the formation and character of critical theory. It is important to examine and discuss Fromm's influence on the formation of critical theory, and assess Fromm's break with the Institute for Social Research in the late 1930s, and thus the nature of the dispute with his associates concerning the relation of Freudian theory and practice to an adequate conception of the critical theory of society.

Fromm's former associates in the Institute (dispersed during the Second World War, cf. Martin Jay, 1973) criticised the work he produced after he left the Institute as 'neo-Freudian revisionism', and it is interesting to note that the overwhelming tendency in the literature on the Frankfurt School follows this characterization thus tending to affirm the impression created (by Adorno and Marcuse) that Fromm's post 1939 work marked a break between the critical, revolutionary, early Fromm, and the later, 'conformist-revisionist' Fromm.

The argument, advanced in the so-called 'revisionist controversy' by Fromm's former associates (and later supporters of Adorno's position) however, is open to a number of criticisms, and since they have been neglected in the literature (1), they deserve detailed attention here. Firstly, not least because attention to this controversy serves to demonstrate the fundamental antinomies in the

development of critical theory itself especially with regard to the critique of mechanistic materialism and its adoption in the form of Freud's materialistic premises. Secondly, because it reveals Fromm's sustained attempt to defend and extend the dynamic Marxist concept of social consciousness in his development of ideology critique in the realm of social psychology.

Thus, much of the literature, following the line set down by Adorno and Marcuse (2), tends to ignore the important continuity in Fromm's Institute work with his post-Institute work (i.e. from the end of the 1930s). It can thus be argued that the necessary task of distinguishing Fromm's work from neo-Freudian revisionism on the one hand, and from the work of his former Institute associates on the other, has not received adequate attention. Moreover, in the assessment of Fromm there are few unbiased accounts of the evolution of his work, as noted above. Thus, the argument which follows is based upon a thorough re-examination which casts a critical eye on the 'orthodoxy' which has rather uncritically followed Adorno and Marcuse's interpretation. (Hence the term 'line' used above in describing the supporters of the taken-for-granted interpretation of Fromm's work.)

Arguably, the conservative appeal of Freud's mechanistic materialism has found an echo in the philosophical fatalism and sense of resignation expressed in the work of certain American and European writers which influenced Adorno and Marcuse.(3) This has been combined with a tendency to nostalgically revert to instinctivistic psychologies; on the one hand Freud's, on the other Reich's, whilst overlooking the contradiction between their

physiological-reductionist libido theory (4) and the concept of subjectivity in historical materialism. The early Reich, it might be noted, saw an identity between psychoanalysis and Engels' 'dialectic of nature': for Reich, psychoanalysis is a dialectical science.(5) What Reich forgot was the fact that Freud's hydraulic model of human motivation precluded the possibility of social change even though it expresses the bourgeois antinomy in regard to the need for change (health and happiness of the individual) even as it's theoretical framework denied this historical possibility ('civilization' is the result of repression).(6)

It should be borne in mind that, apart from Horkheimer's early statements criticising Freud's concept of 'death instinct' for the 'resignation it implied' (7), it was in fact only Fromm who contributed any systematic critique of Freudian theory and practice in the Institute from the vantage point of Marx's concept of materialism. In his sympathetic intellectual biography of Marcuse, Katz notes, for example: 'Apart from several important studies contributed by Fromm to the Institute's Zeitschrift, psychoanalytic theory did not itself become the object of critical investigation.'(8)

It might be assumed that Marcuse rectified this deficiency with the writing of Eros and Civilization in the 1950s. Katz writes:

The central point in Marcuse's general position was that Freud had revealed the inherent conflicts of the instincts - with one another and with the constraints of the external world - but by failing adequately to distinguish between the biological and the historical, he had defused an explosive theory.(9)

Hence Katz continues, '...that suggested to him (Marcuse - CM) the most far-reaching social and political critique.'<sup>(10)</sup> However, for the purpose of our argument here, it is important also to note the flaws which can be detected in Marcuse's important work; Katz also notes that ,

Marcuse's overall purpose was not so much to criticize the errors or shortcomings of Freud's thought as to establish its place within the development of Western rationality and to indicate those of its possibilities which Freud had either neglected or denied. <sup>(11)</sup>

Interestingly, Jay also concurs on the point that Freudian orthodoxy was received relatively uncritically by Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse:

Whatever the cause of Fromm's departure (from the Institute - CM) his work became anathema to his former colleagues in the 1940s. After his break, the Institute did not spend much time in its publications discussing the theoretical problems of psychoanalysis.<sup>(12)</sup>

That Freud's work was subject to the dialectic of enlightenment - 'the historico-philosophical process described by Horkheimer and Adorno by which liberation from irrationality becomes a new form of domination'<sup>(13)</sup> due to the inherent material limitations of bourgeois civilization; so much - Fromm would have agreed.<sup>(14)</sup> But, what is in question, Fromm argues, is what is historically obsolescent and what is ideologically relevant to the critique of bourgeois civilization itself in Freudian theory and practice. As we identified in chapter one the Frankfurt School was influenced by the romantic component of the anti-capitalist German intelligentsia

(Lowy). The appeal of the essentially tragic quality of Freud's thought, as we shall see in discussing the post Second World War revival of Freudianism and the criticism of Fromm, was linked to Adorno's entry into the Institute in the late 1930s and the Frankfurt School's cognizance of the defeats of the labour movement in the inter-war years; as Jay notes: 'It was no accident that increased pessimism about the possibility of revolution went hand in hand with an intensified appreciation of Freud's relevance.'<sup>(15)</sup>

Again, according to Jay, in Marcuse's case, the connection between defeats in the class-struggle and the turn from a socio-political to a socio-psychological explanation per-se is even more explicit:

It was not, however, until the disturbing implications of the Spanish Civil War and the Moscow trials that Marcuse began to read Freud seriously. A growing dissatisfaction with Marxism, even in its Hegelianized form, led him, as it had Horkheimer and Adorno, to examine the psychological obstacles in the path of meaningful social change.'<sup>(16)</sup>

In contrast to Adorno and Horkheimer, however, Marcuse's position maintained a defence of the 'utopian dimension of his radicalism'<sup>(17)</sup>, albeit tied to the vicissitudes of Eros and Thanatos - Freud's 'life and death instincts'.

The fact that Marcuse ignored the empirical basis of Freudian concepts is no simple exclusion, Fromm argues.<sup>(18)</sup> Geoghegan also notes Marcuse's uncritical acceptance of Freud's clinical work.<sup>(19)</sup> It is symptomatic of Marcuse's attempt to defend Freud's speculative metapsychology and instinct theory as holding revolutionary implications. It is argued in this study that Marcuse and Adorno's neglect of the empirical basis of psychoanalysis serves to obfuscate

a thorough going Marxian critique of Freudian categories; and, moreover, even lends itself to a conservatism which in practice actively denies the possibilities for qualitative change and distorts an accurate assessment of the nature of the defeats of the labour movement which have taken place.

#### Hausdorff On The Freudian Revival

In his study on Erich Fromm (20), Hausdorff has noted the appeal of conservatism in the social philosophy of Freudian concepts. The melancholy despair of American intellectuals such as T. S. Eliot (The Wasteland) was also symptomatic of the post-Second World War milieu which Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, now dispersed in the U.S.A., were subject to. This has been characterized as an 'end of ideology' ethos (21). This is expressed in Marcuse's 1954 Supplementary Epilogue to his 1941 Reason and Revolution (22).

Hausdorff notes Floyd Matson's description of this influence of the 'cold war' mood on American intellectual life in The Broken Image, 'The impulse to action became sicklied over with the recognition of complexity and ambiguity, and the cataleptic stance of brooding withdrawal once more came into fashion.'(23)

Freud's social and cultural pessimism of the 1920s and 1930s had deepened and contributed to the cultural ethos of resignation and despair. It was a Left pessimism as opposed to a Right Cold War pessimism. Hausdorff writes:

Freud had opened the decade (1920s) with a tentative theory of the 'death instinct', and he closed it with Civilization and Its Discontents. Fittingly, the Cold War years witnessed, as

Matson says, 'a wholehearted resuscitation of the "right side" of psychoanalysis' with an emphasis on instinctual fatalism.

Moreover:

One of the first and most forthright of these 'Neo-Instinctivists' (as Fromm and others have called them) was Herbert Marcuse, whose Eros and Civilization appeared in 1955.(24)

Marcuse's Eros and Civilization thus shared a part in this 'neo-instinctivist' revival:

Marcuse's position actually represented only one branch of the 'hard-line' psychoanalytic revival of the Cold War years. Any attempt to sort out the various categories is probably an impossible task, but several scholars have suggested that Marcuse together with Norman O'Brown, Paul Goodman, Norman Mailer, and others, have more or less transmogrified Freud into the 'holy sexuality' of Wilhelm Reich.

Consequently,

The new lay apostles of orthodoxy gave short shrift to the 'Neo-Freudians', and here, of course, they stood shoulder to shoulder with psychoanalysts who remained relatively strict Freudians.(25)

For example, literary critic of neo-Freudianism, Stanley Hyman celebrated the fact that Freud, 'showed us that human life was nasty, brutish and short...He produced a climate of opinion in which tragedy could again flourish.' (My emphasis - CM) (26)

Hausdorff poinantly remarks on Stanley:

There probably is a measure of literary truth in this observation. The revisionists refuse to believe that people are irrevocably locked in libidinal conflicts, that every man

is foredoomed to despair by the simple fact that civilization exists, or that every woman must sob her life out in the agony of penis envy. (27)

For example, one may note Marcuse's agreement with Freud in contrast to Fromm's humanistic definition of love in his Epilogue to Eros and Civilization:

Fromm writes: 'Genuine love is rooted in productiveness and may properly be called, therefore, "productive love". Its essence is the same whether the mother's love for the child, our love for man, or the erotic love between two individuals.... certain basic elements may be said to be characteristic of all forms of productive love. These are care, responsibility, respect and knowledge.'

Marcuse then comments:

Compare with this ideological formulation Freud's analysis of the instinctual ground and underground of love, of the long and painful process in which sexuality with all its polymorphous perversity is tamed and inhibited until it ultimately becomes susceptible to fusion with tenderness and affection - a fusion which remains precarious and never quite overcomes its destructive elements. Compare with Fromm's sermon on love Freud's almost incidental remarks in 'The Most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life'...

Marcuse continues,

According to Freud, love, in our culture, can and must be practiced as 'aim inhibited sexuality', with all the taboos and constraints placed upon it by a monogamic-patriarchal society. Beyond its legitimate manifestations, love is destructive and by no means conducive to productiveness and constructive work. (My emphasis - CM) (28)

Contrary to the neo-instinctivist conservatism of Marcuse, Fromm indicates the implications of the circular reasoning of the Freudian



position (which views culture as the result of repression and vice-versa) on the psychoanalytic theory of love:

For Freud, love was basically a sexual phenomenon...The experience of brotherly love is, for Freud, an outcome of sexual desire, but with the sexual instinct being transformed into an impulse with 'inhibited aim'...As far as the feeling of fusion, of oneness (oceanic feeling), which is the essence of mystical experience and the root of the most intense sense of union with one other person or with one's fellow men, is concerned, it was interpreted by Freud as a pathological phenomena, as a regression to a state of an early 'limitless narcissism'. It is only one step further that for Freud love is in itself an irrational phenomenon. The difference between irrational love, and love as an expression of the mature personality does not exist for him. He pointed out in a paper on transference love that transference love is essentially not different from the 'normal' phenomenon of love. Falling in love always verges on the abnormal, is always accompanied by blindness to reality, compulsiveness, and is a transference from love objects of childhood. Love as a rational phenomenon, as the crowning achievement of maturity, was, to Freud, no subject matter for investigation, since it had no real existence. (My emphasis -CM) (29)

Hence, Fromm's argument that for Freud love had no real existence, explains why Marcuse says that Freud's remarks on love are 'almost incidental'(see above). Moreover, Marcuse was politically isolated in the 1950s(30), and as well as writing in the climate of the neo-instinctivist revival, his wife, Sophie Marcuse, died of cancer. These factors may help provide a back-drop to understanding Marcuse's rather caustic despair in the 1950s - his 'nihilist humanism'. Indeed, Fromm's argument that Marcuse mis-reads Freud, attributing to the latter a position which he did not hold - the possibility contained in his works of different 'reality principles', thus allowing for the eventuality of a 'non-repressive' civilization - indicates a recurrent problem in Marcuse's treatment of Freud.(31)

From the above discussion of Marcuse's agreement with Freud's concept of love, however, we have shown the influence of the conservative neo-instinctivist revival on Marcuse, and the appeal of 'the tragic quality' in Freud's thought to Marcuse's social theory. Indeed, it is explicit in Marcuse's adoption of Freud's 'nirvana principle' - 'life is a detour to death'. Contrary to this position, Fromm, following Marx and Alfred Adler, sees the principle governing human psychology as that of 'overcoming' and the development of the 'total personality'.

#### Fromm's Early Influence On Critical Theory

After studying Sociology and Social Psychology at Heidelberg, Frankfurt and Munich, Fromm trained at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. Along with Wilhelm Reich, Fromm became a foremost pioneer in the attempt to unite Freudian concepts with Marxian social theory, from the late 1920s. By 1927, Fromm was a practicing analyst (32), and it was his clinical experience which contributed, along with the anthropological studies of Malinowski, Bachofen and Morgan, and the discovery of the early 'humanistic' works of Marx - such as the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 - to the later modification of his psychoanalytic perspective from the late 1930s. Significantly, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, who defended against Fromm a more orthodox interpretation of psychoanalysis as the 1930s progressed, lacked clinical experience, and more importantly, an interest in re-examining analytic practice. Already by 1931, Fromm's differences with orthodox Freudianism were being expressed. Jay notes, for example, that Fromm's early article Psychoanalysis

and Politics caused controversy in Psychoanalytic circles of the day.(33)

Fromm's first extensive study, The Development of the Dogma of Christ appeared in 1931. In this major essay, Fromm attempted to demonstrate the use of psychoanalytic concepts in a socio-historical context to identify and account for the antagonistic mediation between individual and society in the development of Christology. It is in this study that Fromm outlines his application of psychoanalytic categories to ideology-critique in relation to socio-historical analysis. It could be argued that it is precisely Fromm's grasp of socio-historical factors which ranks his work above that of Reich and eventually led Fromm to develop a more socially oriented perspective even in regard to his therapeutic practice. In a review of The Dogma of Christ by Burkenau, it was expressed that this was 'the first concrete example of the integration of Freud and Marx.'(34)

Thus, preceding his membership of the Institute for Social Research, Fromm was pioneering the approach which was to become the hallmark of the critical theory of society formulated by the Frankfurt School in the 1930s.(35)

However, as indicated above, from the beginning of his work with the Institute in the early 1930s, Fromm started to delineate what he found of lasting value in Freud's work for the formation of an adequate Marxist social psychology. Later, it was the development of his criticisms of Freud in the late 1930s which estranged Fromm from his Institute associates.(36)

Jay notes, however, Fromm's Institute associates' initial enthusiasm for his first contributions to the Zeitschrift (the Institute's Journal):

Horkheimer and the others had been in general agreement with Fromm's initial contributions to the Zeitschrift, even agreeing with his first criticisms of Freud. In fact, Fromm remembers Karen Horney and Horkheimer were on friendly terms during their first few years as emigres in New York. Moreover, the Institute had embraced Fromm's hopes for the merger of psychoanalysis and Marxism. In an article entitled 'History and Psychology' in the first issue of the Institute's new journal, Horkheimer had argued for the urgency of a psychological supplement to Marxist theory. The motivation of men in contemporary society, he contended, must be understood as both 'ideological' in Marx's sense, and psychological. The more society becomes rational, to be sure, the less both these conceptual approaches will be needed to make sense of social reality. But for the present, psychological explanation is needed to understand the staying power of social forms after the objective necessity had passed. This must be an individual psychology, Horkheimer agreed with Fromm.(37)

For example, during the early thirties, Horkheimer also expressed criticisms of the 'death instinct', and as late as 1936, in Egoism and the Movement for Emancipation Horkheimer 'attacked the resignation it (the death instinct - CM) implied...By missing the historical component of oppression, Freud had absolutized the status quo and became resigned to the necessity of a permanent elite to keep the destructive masses down.'(38)

In a series of programmatic essays in the Institute's Zeitschrift, Fromm discussed his proposals for the marriage of psychoanalysis and Marxism, and outlined his major criticisms of Freudian theory and practice. By the late 1930s Fromm had rejected the death instinct, the speculative metapsychology (including Freud's conjectural ontogenetic and phylogenetic hypotheses, i.e. the primal

horde), providing a fundamentally recast interpretation of Freud's clinical work, for example the Oedipus Complex, based on an historical and interpersonal perspective.(39) It was Fromm's rejection of the instinct theory and above mentioned metapsychology which his Institute associates were determined to defend as the prospects for successful socialist revolutions in Europe seemed to further recede as the 1930s progressed.

As the isolation and bureaucratization of the Russian Revolution led to the Moscow Trials and Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939, and the spread of Fascism in Central and Southern Europe led to the defeat of the working class in the Spanish Civil War, the question of the crisis of the political consciousness of the working class assumed even greater importance.

Fromm's work thus represented the Institute's early attempts to incorporate Freudian theory into a revitalized Marxism in an attempt to provide the conceptual tools to understand the defeats of the labour movement in the inter-war period. An essential component of the approach to this problem was to be the inclusion of a Marxist psychology.(40)

#### Fromm's Early Considerations Of Sexual Repression

Fromm considered, along with Wilhelm Reich (41), that the basis of the subjugation of the oppressed and exploited in class society, of deference to authority, submissiveness and guilt, are inculcated in and through the patriarchal family with its concomitant sexual repression. The irrational force of the libido (unconscious sexual drives located in the various erogenous zones of the infant's body -

in Freud's stages theory of socialization), it was argued, must be understood in order to account for the ability of the ruling classes in society to engineer consent. The 'libidinal structure of society' could be enlisted as an analytical tool to make a critical analysis of the pervasive effect of ideology, in regard to the capitalist State and civil society, in the family, penal and education systems, for example.(42) In an early exploration of this concept of social control, the Frankfurt School sought to unravel the success of bourgeois ideology by utilizing psychological categories. The cornerstone of Western Marxism was the recognition of the social superstructure in the social process and its proper place in the assessment of social change. Thus, in his application of psychoanalytic concepts to Marxism, Fromm must be acknowledged for his pioneering work in the formation of critical theory. In his early essays in the Zeitschrift, Fromm made an introductory attempt to explain how ideological hegemony could be maintained in bourgeois society, given the inherent economic, social and political contradictions of that society, with the use of an analytic social psychology. Fromm wrote:

Consider first a relatively stable social constellation. What holds people together? To be sure, it is the external power apparatus (police, law, courts, army, etc.) that keeps society from coming apart at the seams. To be sure, it is rational and egoistic interests that contribute to structural stability. But neither the external power apparatus nor rational interests would suffice to guarantee the functioning of the society, if the libidinal strivings of the people were not involved. They serve as the 'cement', as it were, without which the society would not hold together, and which contributes to the production of important social ideologies in every cultural sphere.(43)

In making the case for the psychoanalytic contribution to a Marxist analysis of social control, Fromm is attempting to furnish the basis for an understanding of the role of ideology in the prevalent forms of social domination in class society. Like the early Wilhelm Reich and the Italian Communist Party leader Antonio Gramsci was to write, Fromm argued that the class-struggle can not be reduced to the effects of the economic base of society. In Fromm's work there is the tacitly formulated argument that class-struggle politics must be applied across the base of civil society to effectively combat the pervasive influence of bourgeois ideology on the social consciousness of the working class. Again, the influence of Lukacs' concept of totality in History and Class Consciousness is evident in the development of Fromm's work. The social existence of the masses must be understood in terms of its totality: hence, to understand the way in which bourgeois ideology exists as a set of interlocking mechanisms throughout the authority structure of State and civil society, Fromm argued that an analytic social psychology would be indispensable for comprehending the 'character-structure' - the relatively permanent structure of the individual's motivations, according to their economic, class and status position in society. Fromm thus considered the explanation of the apparent permanence of the ruled and rulers in class society as the outcome of ideological hegemony - and argued that analytic social psychology explains how ideologies work concretely:

Indeed, minority rule is a historical fact, but what factors allowed this dependent relationship to become stabilized? First, of course, it was the use of physical force and the availability of these physical means to certain groups. But there was another important factor at work: the libidinal ties

- anxiety, love, trust - which filled the souls of the majority in their relationships with the ruling class. Now this psychic attitude is not the product of whim or accident. It is the expression of peoples' libidinal adaption to the conditions of life imposed by economic necessity. So long as these conditions necessitate minority rule over the majority, the libido adapts itself to this economic structure and serves as one of the factors that lend stability to the class relationship.(44)

Fromm's attempt to sketch the application of an analytic social psychology to a Marxist analysis of social control indicates the significance of the Frankfurt School's pioneering work in regard to the concept of ideological hegemony. A problem which arises from the above passages is that while the attempt is made to account for social consciousness as the mediating factor between base and superstructure, the theory (psychoanalysis) adopted itself reduces consciousness to a reductionistic materialism: consciousness is the result of the conflict between id, ego, and super-ego; moreover, the ego is the symptom of id and super-ego. Thus, as we shall see, psychoanalysis tends to reduce the ego to a causal process rooted in the chemo-physiological processes of the human body.(45) Consequently, the Self disappears and the possibility of the self-emancipation of the proletariat. This is what makes the 'revisionist controversy' of renewed interest and significance in the assessment of a Marxist psychology and the contribution of Erich Fromm to the critical theory of society: Moreover, discussion of this question also usefully throws into relief the problems in the trajectory of the Frankfurt School as a whole, as we shall see later in this study.



### The Basis Of The Revisionist Controversy

In the introduction to this chapter a brief indication was given of the significance of the Frankfurt School's defence of a more orthodox interpretation of Freudian theory and practice in the 1930s while Fromm took a more critical stance, finally leaving the Institute in 1939.

The basis of the 'revisionist controversy' lies in three points. Firstly, through clinical experience (46), the production of anthropological data (47) which contradicted the universality of Freud's findings and the publication of Marx's early work, Fromm found that orthodox psychoanalysis was inadequate.(48) Secondly, the pivot around which Fromm's former colleagues formulated their theoretical opposition to the inter-personal, or 'cultural school' of those such as Fromm and Horney, was that Fromm's revision of Freudian theory and therapy ignored the role of sexuality (49) because Fromm had come to reject Freudian instinct theory as 'ideological baggage'.(50) This, however, is an incorrect formulation. Thirdly, by labelling Fromm a 'neo-Freudian revisionist', Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse indiscriminately joined Fromm's theoretical developments with other detractors from Freud who shared with Fromm a growing receptivity to the findings of social anthropologists and consequent rejection of libido theory. This meant systematically neglecting precisely the differences between Fromm's critical theory and other neo-Freudian thinkers such as Karen Horney and H.S. Sullivan.(51)

Marcuse, for example, explicitly neglects this crucial point in order to indict Fromm as a 'revisionist' (in the derogatory sense of

the term) in his Epilogue to Eros and Civilization.(52) Jacoby, defending the neo-instinctivist position of Marcuse, draws the analogy of neo-Freudian revisionism with that of Bernstein's revision in the history of the German Social Democratic Party (53); but by linking the defence of instinct theory analogously with Lukacs' defence of Marxism against Bernstein's rejection of the dialectic, he confuses the issue. In fact, he reduces it to the assumption that Freudian theory is itself dialectical by virtue of the mechanistic dualism (between life and death instincts) in psychoanalysis.(54)

However, the question is not resolved by simple analogy and impressionistic argumentation. The question of the content of Fromm's revision of psychoanalysis is, of course, decisive, but when reviewing this dispute it is evident that the reasoning of the neo-instinctivists is questionable. Jacoby - following Marcuse's 'Epilogue' (cf. note 52) - correlates loss of instinct theory with 'loss' of Fromm's revolutionary position as expressed in the latter's early essays concerning the radical implications of sexual liberation. Hence, by identifying instinct theory with critical theory, Jacoby makes a 'guilt by association' indictment of Fromm - along with the other cultural 'revisionist' psychoanalysts. Fromm himself refutes the charge by clarifying his position vis-a-vis Horney and Sullivan in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis:

Although Horney, Sullivan and I are usually classified together as a 'culturalist' or 'Neo-Freudian' school, this classification hardly seems justified. In spite of the fact that we were friends, worked together, and had certain views in common - particularly a critical attitude towards libido theory - the differences between us were greater than the similarities, especially in the 'cultural viewpoint'. Horney and Sullivan

thought of cultural patterns in the traditional anthropological sense, while my approach was based upon an analysis of the economic, political, and psychological forces that form the basis of society.(55)

Indeed, Hausdorff notes the misleading use of terms in the 'revisionist controversy' and argues that these differences between the 'Neo-Freudians' became more decisive in later years.(56) Clearly, Marcuse's criticism of Fromm's revised psychoanalysis is misplaced. He bases his argument on essential statements on the role of the libido theory in explaining the psychological mechanisms of social control in Fromm's 1932 paper The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology (57) in which it was assumed that Freudian libido theory revealed the revolutionary potential of human sexuality in class society. Marcuse mistakenly assumed that Fromm's later critique of the libido theory was tantamount to abandoning his original call for a critical Marxist psychology. Thus Marcuse writes that the ,

critical sociological function of psychoanalysis derives from the fundamental role of sexuality as a 'productive force', the libidinal claims propel progress towards freedom and universal gratification of human needs beyond the patricentric acquisitive stage. Conversely, the weakening of the psychoanalytic conception, and especially the theory of sexuality, must lead to a weakening of the sociological critique of psychoanalysis.(58)

Marcuse argues a logical construction which is ingenious but theoretically and empirically flawed. This is clear when Marcuse goes on to comment on the implications for therapeutic practice after stating that he would refrain from entering into the

therapeutic field because of lack of clinical knowledge.(59) Therapy becomes, as a consequence of rejecting the instinct theory and metapsychology, a course in resignation and adjustment of the psyche to the status-quo. This explains Jacoby's rather sweeping indictment of every school of psychotherapy which deviates from orthodox Freudianism as inevitably 'conformist'.(60) Consequently, Freud is presented as the revolutionary who was unjustly deserted by his 'disciples', unstintingly defending orthodoxy against the detractors who finally conformed to bourgeois society. It is a peculiar irony that Freud should be presented in such a misleading way by adherents of a school of Western Marxism which sought to develop a critical analysis of original bourgeois thinkers. Returning to the above point concerning 'therapy as resignation': it could be argued that Marcuse's point has some relevance to the subjectivist tendency in the existential school of psychiatry and psychotherapy where the objective considerations of social problems are often lost sight of (61), but the point cannot be convincingly made in the case of Erich Fromm's work.(62)

Let us take two initial examples to support the argument laid out above. We have noted Fromm's differences with Karen Horney and H.S. Sullivan above, and may also indicate that for Fromm, Sullivan's theory reflected the 'marketing personality' of late capitalism:

Sullivan took the fact that the alienated person lacks a feeling of selfhood and experiences himself in terms of a response to the expectation of others, as part of human nature, just as Freud had taken the competitiveness characteristic of the beginning of the century as a natural phenomenon.(63)

For Fromm, the marketing personality reflects the change from earlier to late capitalism (large corporations and mass-consumer society). Whereas in an earlier period the capitalist norm would be to save and invest, late capitalism is fueled by State incentives, planning, international marketing and division of labour, and credit for the consumer. The marketing orientation means that the individual measures him/herself against the values of the commodity market, thus depersonalizing oneself and adopting a conformist identity: as a consequence personal worth is lost to a labyrinth of market utility.

Fromm's criticism of H.S. Sullivan's concept of personality is enough to show that a much more sophisticated critical theory is operative in Fromm's perspective than the one credited to him by Marcuse.

Secondly - and this further illustrates the main point above, concerning theoretical interpretation of Fromm by Marcuse - we noted the way Fromm is mistakenly grouped with the other so-called revisionists indiscriminately, and the legitimate differences are neglected. Additionally, it can be argued that in order to establish his indictment, Marcuse misquotes Fromm:

To the revisionist, the brute fact of societal repression has transformed itself into a 'moral problem' as it has done in the conformist philosophy of all ages. And as the clinical fact of neurosis becomes, 'in the last analysis, a symptom of moral failure', the 'psychoanalytic cure of the soul' becomes education in the attainment of a 'religious' attitude.(64)

Fromm's full statement reads:

To consider evaluations only as so many rationalizations of unconscious, irrational desires - although they can be that too - narrows down and distorts our picture of the total personality. Neurosis itself is, in the last analysis, a symptom of moral failure (although 'adjustment' is by no means a symptom of moral achievement). (65)

Marcuse omits the second half of Fromm's sentence because it does not accord with his argument. In fact, it raises an issue which has to be understood in terms of the project of the Frankfurt School and the formation of critical theory itself. Namely, the critique of positivism and the recognition of the significance of human values, political choices, and thus social projects in understanding the motion of class society and the interaction of its various classes, status groups and communities. Marcuse's materialism, siding with psychoanalytic orthodoxy, views the question of 'human values', 'ethical choices', 'moral problems', as merely 'ideological': according to Freudian psychology such phenomenon are but sublimates of the libido. Such questions are viewed as irrelevant or at best secondary to the underlying physio-chemical 'drives' of the human organism. Here, then, we may recognize Fromm's contribution to developing a critical psychology in an area much neglected and misunderstood by Marxian thought; applying critical theory to an area which Marcuse's materialism would reduce to biological drives:

It may be surprising to many readers to find a psychoanalyst dealing with problems of ethics and, particularly, taking the position that psychology must not only debunk false ethical judgements but can, beyond that, be the basis for building objective and valid norms of conduct. This position is in contrast to the trend prevailing in modern psychology which emphasizes 'adjustment' rather than 'goodness' and is on the side of ethical relativism. My experience as a practicing psychoanalyst has confirmed my conviction that problems of

ethics can not be omitted from the study of personality, either theoretically or therapeutically.

Fromm continues:

The value judgements we make determine our actions, and upon their validity rests our mental health and happiness.

Consequently:

In many instances a neurotic symptom is the specific expression of moral conflict, and the success of the therapeutic effort depends on the understanding and solution of the person's moral problem.(66)

First, let us note the distinction Fromm draws between the successful cure of the individual and 'adjustment' to the status quo in his theory and therapy as a psychoanalyst. There is in fact, contra Marcuse, little evidence of 'conformism' in Fromm's revised psychoanalysis. Moreover, the cultural approach means the recognition of the role of values in neurosis which in the work of Fromm and Horney represent an explicit attack on the norms and values of late capitalist culture and society in general.(67) In therapeutic terms problems can not be reduced to the genetic-causal 'conditioning' of childhood: future tasks and decisions, difficult situational choices, all imply that a person's individual project is rooted in a social nexus and thus a specific social milieu. To this extent, Fromm's analysis has the benefit of bringing the social critique into sharper focus, not blurring it as Marcuse claims. Moreover, Fromm makes a contribution to therapeutic practice in the

process.(68) Thus Marcuse's criticism, misquoting from the complete sentence, concerning neurosis as a moral problem, fails to recognize the development of critical theory in psychotherapy and critical analysis of ethics in Fromm's work Man for Himself. (69)

Moreover, Marcuse is incorrect to argue that Fromm, by recognizing that problems of ethics can not be omitted from the study of personality, is introducing the case for a 'religious attitude' as a substitute for critical analysis (see Marcuse, above). Fromm's recognition of the part values play in the mental health of the individual seems congruent with any socialist outlook, and especially with the 'cultural viewpoint' of the 'Neo-Freudians'. Indeed, Fromm is deviating from psychoanalytic orthodoxy on this issue, but from the standpoint (established in chapter one) of Marxian socialism concerning the dynamic concept of social consciousness as formulated by Marx and Engels in their early writings, it would appear that Fromm's revision of psychoanalysis brings it in accord with the historical and social concept of humanity, thus in opposition to Freud's a-historical physiologic materialism. Hence, arguably, to use psychoanalysis in the critical analysis of values and value judgements on the basis of Marxist humanism is, again, to sharpen the sociological critique of ideology and not to weaken it as Marcuse contends. In parenthesis it might be added that Fromm has contributed to a non-reductionist discussion of religion from a Marxist humanist position which has received insufficient attention. It is beyond the scope of this study to focus on it in detail (70), but it is important to note the hostile opposition to Fromm's holistic approach to psychology in



Marcuse's critique as an expression of orthodox Freudian materialism - hardly congruent with the Marxian outlook.

This point - concerning Marcuse's acceptance of the Freudian materialistic outlook - is evidenced further when we inquire further into the reason why Marcuse believed that the instinct theory represents the revolutionary potential of Freud's theory. As noted above, Marcuse refers in his critique of the 'Neo-Freudians' to the writings of the early Fromm who, in fact, originally broached the idea of the radical potential of human sexuality in the struggle for a rational society. Fromm originally wrote:

Sexuality offers one of the most elementary and powerful opportunities for satisfaction and happiness. If it were permitted to the full extent required for the productive development of the human personality, rather than limited by the need to maintain control over the masses, the fulfillment of this important opportunity for happiness would necessarily lead to intensified demands for satisfaction and happiness in other areas of life. Since the satisfaction of these demands would have to be achieved through material means, these demands of themselves would lead to the break up of the existing order. (71)

In the above argument Fromm was making the same assumptions as Wilhelm Reich, the other central figure in the attempt to 'marry' Marxism and psychoanalysis in the late 1920s and 1930s, discussed in the final part of chapter two.

What Marcuse and others forget is that Fromm went on to develop a critical theory of social consciousness which attempted to base a revised psychoanalysis more directly on Marx's theory of alienation, and thus to dialectically transcend the rational kernel of

psychoanalysis from the confines of its ideological shell.(72) And as we shall see, rather than 'neglect' sexuality (as Marcuse would claim), he actually dealt with the latter in its proper, ie. social, context. On this point, Jay notes that: 'Because he spoke of sexuality, Horkheimer thought Freud was more of a real materialist than Fromm.'(73) Ironically though, Horkheimer forgets his earlier commitment in his 1933 essay Materialism and Metaphysics to critical theory's rejection of mechanistic materialism. Jay notes:

In one of his most important essays in the Zeitschrift, 'Materialism and Metaphysics', he set out to rescue materialism from those who saw it simply as an antonym of spiritualism and a denial on non-material existence. True materialism, he argued, did not mean a new type of monistic metaphysics based on the ontological primacy of matter. Here nineteenth century mechanical materialists like Vogt and Haeckel had been wrong, as were Marxists who made a fetish of the supposedly 'objective' material world.(74)

Consequently, it is ironic that it is Fromm who most surely follows the essence of critical theory in revising psychoanalysis when he rejects the framework in which Freud's insights are couched, although he does not reject the analysis of sexuality as such, as we shall discuss further below. Fromm writes,

Eventually, Freud was largely influenced in his thinking by the type of thinking prevalent in the nineteenth century. One believed that the substratum of all mental phenomena was to be found in physiological phenomena; hence love, hate, ambition, jealousy, were explained by Freud as so many outcomes of the sexual instinct. He did not see that the basic reality lies in the totality of human existence, first of all in the human situation common to all men, and secondly, in the practice of life determined by the specific structure of society.(75)

Thus it can be argued that it is Fromm who continues with the original position of critical theory, defending Marx's historical materialism against bourgeois materialism. Marx and Engels, it will be recalled, specifically distinguished their new approach from bourgeois materialism in The German Ideology (1845/6), as discussed in chapter one. Noting this, Fromm writes in Marx's Concept of Man:

Marx made the difference between historical materialism and contemporary materialism very clear in his theses on Feuerbach: 'The chief defect of all materialism up to now (including Feuerbach's ) is that the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses, is understood only in the form of the object or contemplation (Anschauung), but not as sensuous human activity, as practice, not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism - which of course does not know real sensuous activity as such.(76)

Thus, in contrast to Freud, Fromm notes of Marx's historical materialism:

Marx actually took a firm position against a philosophical materialism which was current among many of the most progressive thinkers ( especially natural scientists) of his time. This materialism claimed that 'the' substratum of all mental and spiritual phenomena was to be found in matter and all material processes. In its most vulgar and superficial form, this type of materialism taught that feelings and ideas are sufficiently explained as results of chemical bodily processes, and 'thought is to the brain what urine is to the kidneys'.(77)

And more specifically of the influence of this viewpoint on Freud:

Freud was a student of Brücke, a physiologist who was one of the most distinguished representatives of mechanistic materialism, especially in its German form. This type of materialism was based on the principle that all psychic phenomena have their roots in certain physiological processes

and that they can be sufficiently explained and understood if one knows these roots.(78)

It has been necessary to emphasize this point in order to throw into relief the consistency of Fromm's position in contrast to the viewpoint of his former colleagues in the Institute.

From the above we can see that Fromm's revision of psychoanalysis is in opposition to the bourgeois materialism in which Freud had couched his insights. The argument that Marcuse advanced according to which Fromm's work led to idealism and a religious attitude, can be seen as mistaken. Marcuse's adherence to Freudian orthodoxy has made it impossible for him to accurately assess the import of Fromm's work (79), and it is a sign of the quality of social theory today that the Marcusean position is repeated in contemporary literature, without a reconsideration of Fromm's position and the evidence against the neo-instinctivists.(80)

Let us now consider the question of sexuality in Fromm's work; an issue which the neo-instinctivist Marcuse argues is missing from the work of the 'revisionists'. It is important to acknowledge from the above discussion that Marcuse is labouring a misunderstanding of the significance of Fromm's critical psychology, as shown above. Thus, it is not that Fromm rejects the importance of sexuality, but that he deprives the Freudian of its centrality in the explanation of human behaviour through a dynamic understanding of human drives and passions. In the book which heralded his new approach The Fear of Freedom, Fromm clarified his position in contradistinction to the orthodox Freudian point of view:

Contrary to Freud's viewpoint, the analysis offered in this book is based on the assumption that the key problem of psychology is that of the specific kind of relatedness of the individual towards the world and not that of the satisfaction or frustration of this or that instinctual need per-se; furthermore, on the assumption that the relationship between man and society is not a static one.(81)

Thus, Fromm argues, humanity creates itself in and through history and the individual determines and is determined by the social process:

Although there are certain needs, such as hunger, thirst, sex, which are common to man, those drives which make for the differences in men's characters, like love or hatred, the lust for power and the yearning for submission, the enjoyment of sensuous pleasure and the fear of it, are all products of the social process.(82)

In this conception, Fromm is following Marx's concept of human drives and passions and Alfred Adler's holistic critique of Freud's mechanistic dualism which further accords with Marx's historical and social perspective.(83)

It is interesting to ask why Marcuse and his associates defended Freud so vehemently against the 'cultural school' of psychoanalysis. One reason may have been their neglect of Marx's psychological insights, as may be evidenced in Adorno's remarks concerning the methodological problems of utilizing psychoanalysis in social research:

The latter (Karl Marx - CM) did not have a 'superficial psychology'. He had no psychology at all, and for good theoretical reasons. The world Marx scrutinized is ruled by the law of value, not by men's souls. Today, men are still the objects or the functionaries of the societal process. To explain the world by means of the psychology of its victims

already presupposes an abstraction from the basic objective mechanisms to which men are subject.(84)

Here, Adorno presents an exaggerated view of the weaknesses of Marx's understanding of psychology, and an overly deterministic picture of the concept of humanity in Marxian social science. Adorno's argument thus neglects the active component in the dialectic mediation between humanity and nature. Fromm, however, shows that Marx had a much more 'elaborate' psychology than previously assumed and devotes a whole essay to this neglected aspect of Marx's writings in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis (85).

In order to illustrate the above points more forcefully, let us now turn to a more detailed discussion of Marx's dynamic concept of social consciousness in relation to the present argument.

### Marx's Dynamic Psychological Premises

In chapter one it was important to clarify Marx and Engels' definition of social consciousness against the prevalent materialism of the period in which they were writing. The discussion at this juncture necessarily raises this problem against the background of the attempt to provide a Marxist psychology by the critical theory of society.

In his 1859 Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy Marx argues that human consciousness is socially determined: 'It is not consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.'(86)

As Fromm notes, against vulgar interpretations of Marx's (with those neo-instinctivists such as Marcuse in mind who would see a simple union between Freudian instinct theory and Marx's materialism) position.

It should be noted that for Marx science itself and all powers inherent in man are part of the productive forces which interact with forces of nature. Even as far as the influence of ideas on human evolution is concerned, Marx was by no means oblivious to their power as the popular interpretation of his work makes it appear. His argument is not against ideas, but against ideas which were not rooted in the human and social reality, which were not, to use Hegel's term, 'a real possibility'.(87)

The dialectic in Marx's conception is a historical and social one which accounts for 'human nature' in terms of human beings' social relationship to nature. It is not a dialectic between opposing instincts within the individual. As we shall argue, such a view of

human individuation merely reifies certain socio-historical conditions as if they express the 'essence' of the human condition. Thus while social being determines the consciousness of the individual, Marx also produced a sophisticated concept of human nature. In understanding this concept the student must begin to grapple with the subtle 'many sidedness' of Marx's dialectical thinking and be sure not to view it from only one particular angle - as have the neo-instinctivists such as, for example, Marcuse. Thus, in contrast to a sociological relativism (88) according to which the content of human nature changes as it is conditioned by historical forces or changes in culture, 'Marx started out with the idea that man qua man is a recognizable and ascertainable entity; that man can be defined as man not only biologically, anatomically and physiologically, but also psychologically.'(89) In a more specific definition Marx distinguished between constant drives and relative appetites in his theory of human psychology. Fromm writes:

In line with this distinction between a general human nature and the specific expression of human nature in each culture, Marx distinguishes, ...two types of human drives and appetites: the constant or fixed ones, such as hunger and the sexual urge, which are an integral part of human nature, and which can be changed only in their form and the direction they take in various cultures, and the 'relative' appetites, which are not an integral part of human nature, but which 'owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication.'(90)

These 'relative appetites' represent the adaption of the individual to the dominant mode of production and reproduction also within a specific social formation. However, these 'appetites' are based not on 'instincts' but on the need for 'character rooted passions': in



short, character replaces instincts in the determination of human behaviour, thus the 'relative appetites' are based on definable human needs.(91) In fact, it is this concept of 'human needs' which underlies Marx's theory of alienation, and, as we shall see, surpasses the mechanistic concept of motivation of the neo-instinctivists in Fromm's development of this concept. Returning to the discussion concerning Marx's supposed neglect of individual psychology (see Adorno, above), Fromm notes that 'Marx is supposed not to have been much concerned with the individual man, his drives and his character, but only with the laws of evolution'.(92) But, Fromm argues, what led to the neglect of Marx's contribution to social psychology has been the fact that Marx's insights were not presented in a systematic form, vulgar misinterpretation of Marx as being concerned with economic phenomena which obscured his contribution, and finally, his 'dynamic psychology came too early to find sufficient attention.'(93) For Marx, then; 'The need for self-realization in man is the root of the specifically human dynamism' (94) and such realization is achievable through the development of the individual's total personality in interaction with others and nature. This means understanding that the total personality is emphasized for Marx in its self-realization primarily through relatedness. Thus, the development of specifically human needs and faculties can not be reduced to the sexual drive or be seen as derivatives from the latter. Indeed, as Fromm indicates, Marx speaks of the fragmentation of a partial drive as alienation.(95)

### Alienation

In his theory of alienation, Marx describes what Fromm has termed 'the pathology of normalcy' - 'the crippledness of the statistically normal man, the loss of himself, the loss of his human substance' and thus contributes to the 'basis for a new and original concept of neurosis' (96) - or critical social psychology.

Alienated passions are thus passions, 'which are satisfied as ends in themselves, without satisfying the whole human being - that is, which are separated from all other passions and hence oppose the individual as an alien power.'(97)

Thus Marcuse's defence of Freud's subsumption of human motivation under one drive, sex, (and later the sex or life instinct and death instinct) would have been rejected by Marx as an essentially reductionist bourgeois concept, denying the individual's potential self-realization in and through social relatedness. As we shall see, the Freudian concept in fact banishes the Self except as the plaything of conflicting psychic forces as Viktor Frankl has noted:

Psychoanalysis not only adopted objectivity - it succumbed to it. Objectivity eventually led to objectivation, or reification. That is, it made the human person into an object, the human being into a thing. Psychoanalysis regards the patient as ruled by 'mechanisms', and it conceives of the therapist as the one who knows how to handle these mechanisms. He is the one who knows the technique, by which disturbed mechanisms may be repaired.

And as Frankl comments:

Only an homme machine, I would say, is in need of a médecin technicien.(98)

Thus, it could be argued that by concentrating on sexuality at the expense of a holistic view of human drives and needs, psychoanalysis is a theory which inherently deflects attention from social conditions which in fact serve to reinforce neurosis and act to prevent the self-realization of the individual. Indeed, commenting on the inability of Freudianism to consider the possibility of non-alienated social relations, Fromm writes: 'In an instinctivistic psychology like Freud's, where normalcy and health are the result of the satisfaction, precisely, of one instinct, the sexual, such a consideration would have no place.'<99)

#### Fromm on the Meaning of Sexual Repression

Having shown that Marx conceived of a holistic theory of human motivation, how does Fromm deal with the original idea which he formulated concerning the radical potential of sexuality? We recall that it was this concept which Marcuse argues Fromm abandons and with it his commitment to a critical psychology. We have shown above how Marcuse's argument is not tenable, but it is necessary to indicate more clearly the implications of Fromm's revised perspective to reveal the extent of Marcuse's failure to understand Fromm's work.

For Fromm, then, it is not the fact that Freud overemphasized the importance of sexuality in human relationships, but that he failed to 'understand sex deeply enough.'<100) This is quite different to rejecting or ignoring the role of sexuality, as Fromm's critics have claimed.(101) For Fromm, Freud's 'hydraulic model' of human drives (102) is based on the concept of scarcity, which assumes 'that all

human strivings for lust result from the need to rid oneself from unpleasurable tensions, rather than that lust is a phenomenon of abundance aiming at a greater intensity and depth of experience.'(103) Thus, Fromm argues:

Sexual attraction between the sexes is only partly motivated by the need for removal of tension, it is mainly the need for union with the other sexual pole. In fact, erotic attraction is by no means only expressed in sexual attraction. There is masculinity and femininity in character as well as in sexual function.(104)

Sexual desire is not merely a physical appetite, or the relief of painful tension, thus even in a context of scarcity sexual desire, 'can be stimulated by the anxiety of loneliness, by the wish to conquer or be conquered, by vanity, by the wish to hurt and even to destroy, as much as it can be stimulated by love.'(105)

#### The Real Significance Of Sexual Repression

For Fromm, the real significance of sexual repression lies in social control. By misunderstanding the relation between individual and society, Freud had failed to see the full significance of his work.(106) The social function of sexual repression, Fromm argues, is to break the will and spontaneity of the individual. The tendency to grow is suppressed and restricted in the process of socialisation of the individual:

What is restricted is the free, spontaneous expression of the infant, the child's, the adolescent's and eventually the adult's will, their thirst for knowledge and truth, their wish for affection. The growing person is forced to give up most of his/her autonomous, genuine desires and interests, and his or her own will, and to adopt a will and desires and feelings that are not autonomous but superimposed by the social patterns of

thought and feeling. Society, and the family as its psychosocial agent, has to solve a difficult problem: How to break a person's will without his being aware of it? (107)

Fromm notes in To Have or To Be (107) that sexuality represents a powerful influence in the attraction between the sexes, and in expressing independence from parental authority and is thus tackled even harder by socialisation than most other significant drives. However, contrary to his earlier view concerning the radical potential of the sexual drive (quoted above), Fromm provides a socially-rooted conception of this process: 'The effort made to suppress sex would be difficult to understand if it were for the sake of sex as such. Not sex, however, but the breaking of the human will is the reason for vilifying sex.' (108)

Social taboos specific to Western bourgeois society ensure the use of emotional inducement which fosters a rebellion on the part of the child that leads not to greater freedom, but tends to be displaced into a guilt complex.(109)

Fromm then indicates the way out of the emotional trap laid in the process of socialization in patricentric acquisitive society: 'Only the achievement of inner independence is conducive to freedom as an attempt to restore one's freedom. Indeed, tabus create sexual obsessiveness and perversions, but sexual obsessiveness and perversions do not create freedom.'(110)

But why break the will? What are the socio-economic roots of social control? Fromm's critical analysis reveals the expression of ideological hegemony in the authority relations of patricentric-capitalist society:

The having mode of existence, the attitude centred around property and profit, necessarily produces the desire - indeed the need - for power. To control other living human beings we need to use power to break their resistance. To maintain control over private property we need to use power to protect it from those who would take it from us. (111)

However, it should be borne in mind that Fromm's holistic approach emphasizes that while sexual repression is important for social control, sexual repression is one among other drives and passions which are distorted, crippled, and adapted to the authoritarian structure of bourgeois society. Fromm's approach is important for showing that the basis of social control lies not in sexual repression per-se, but in the blocking and suppression of the spontaneous Self.(112)

But, concentration on the sex drive as in orthodox psychoanalysis and the use of Freudianism by Marcuse and his associates leads not to the discovery of a 'revolutionary Freud' but to the integration of psychoanalysis as a once critical-minded theory into bourgeois society. Fromm provides a radical alternative to the Marcusean viewpoint which is rarely acknowledged or encountered in the literature on critical theory, and in so doing, he sums up the historical limits of Freud's system thus:

Freud's discovery was potentially revolutionary because it could have led people to open their eyes to the reality of the structure of the society they live in and hence to the wish to change it in accordance with the interests and desires of the vast majority. But while Freud's thought had such revolutionary potential, its wide acceptance did not lead to manifestations of this potential. While the main attitude of his colleagues and the public was a thrust against the views on sex, which violated certain taboos of the nineteenth century European middle-class, his discovery of the unconscious had no revolutionary consequences. This is not actually surprising. To demand directly or indirectly greater tolerance towards sex

was essentially in the line of other liberal causes, such as greater tolerance for criminals and more liberal attitudes towards children, and so forth. The concentration on sex actually deflected from the criticism of society and hence had in fact partly a politically reactionary function. If the incapacity to solve one's sexual problems was at the bottom of the general malaise, there was no need for a critical examination of the economic, social and political factors that stood in the way of the full growth of the individual. (113)

Hence, psychoanalysis, locked in the ideological straight jacket of the libido theory, lent itself to psychologising the very radicalism Marcuse and his associates ironically sought to defend. As a result, Fromm indicates:

political radicalism could be understood as a sign of neurosis because, for Freud and most of his students, the liberal bourgeois was the paradigm of the healthy man. One tried to explain radicalism of the left or of the right as outcomes of neurotic processes, as for instance the Oedipus complex, and prima facie a political belief which was not that of the liberal middle class was suspected of being 'neurotic'. (114)

Fromm indicates the 'time bound' ideological shell of Freud's theory here in relation to Freud's model of the healthy male. The taboos of Victorian society are uncovered in Freud's work and their contradictions in the psychic lives of his patients are traced with an acute analytical mind. But because of the libido theory, Freud's discoveries had a limited application. Fromm, noting the changes in social structure, writes:

The consumer society did away with many of the Victorian taboos (not because of the influence of psychoanalysis but for reasons inherent in its structure). To discover one's incestuous wishes, 'castration fear', 'penis envy', was no longer upsetting. But to discover repressed character traits such as narcissism, sadism, omnipotence, submission, alienation, indifference, the unconscious betrayal of one's integrity, the illusory nature of one's concept of reality, to discover all

this about oneself, in the social fabric, in the leaders one follows - this indeed is 'social dynamite'. Freud only dealt with an instinctual id, that was quite satisfactory at a time when he did not see any other way to explain human passions except in terms of instincts. But what was revolutionary then is conventional today.(115)

In line with Alfred Adler's Individual Psychology, Fromm does not reject the importance of sex in the human character, but understands it in the context of the social structure and individual character structure(116), and their interrelation.

#### Marx, Fromm, And The Dialectic Of Labour

We have noted above that Marx developed his approach beyond that of naturalistic bourgeois materialism (Feuerbach) in The German Ideology (1845/6). For Marx, subjectivity can not be reduced to the substratum of physiologic processes, but must be understood in the context of the total life process - and thus an historical and social context. In contrast, the problem of social change in Freud's system is reduced to the contradiction between increased development of civilization at the expense of increased neurosis and repression (117), a rather static and ahistorical conception (118). Freud's mechanistic materialism converts humanity into a passive object of overwhelmingly material forces, hence culture is viewed as the result of 'sublimation': the renunciation of specific drives (pleasure principle) and the redirection of the ungratified impulse into 'socially acceptable' channels. Unlike Freud's model of the human psyche, which he later defined in terms of 'id, ego, and superego', Marx recognized subjectivity as determined by social being. Fromm



argues that Freud's model of human motivation can be understood in socio-historical terms:

In still another aspect Freud thought as a child of his time. He was a member of a class-society in which a small minority monopolised most of the riches and defended its supremacy by the use of power and thought control over those it ruled. Freud, taking this type of society for granted, constructed a model of man's mind along the same lines. The 'id', symbolizing the individual masses, had to be controlled by the 'ego', the rational elite. If Freud could have imagined a classless and free society he would have dispensed with the 'ego' and 'id' as universal categories of the human mind.(119)

Thus, when one takes an historical and social viewpoint, Freud's categories reveal their historical conditioning . In the Marxian concept of subjectivity, then, the Self is created and self-created through labour/praxis - human behaviour is goal-orientated:

Marx's discovery that the labour process consists of the materializations of goal projections (concretizations of the imagination) not only resolves the philosophical problem of causality and teleology (origins and goals, means and ends are inseparably linked) but also constitutes the basis for formulation of all applications of Marxist theory....in Marxism....the labour process demarcates human behaviour from instinctive animal behaviour.(120)

It is the teleological element in the labour process which distinguishes human activity from animal behaviour. Indeed, in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844, Marx states:

conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal activity. It is just because of this that he is a species being. Or it is only because he is a species being that he is a Conscious Being, ie., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. Estranged labour reverses this relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, his essential being, a mere means to his existence. (121)

Hence, in defining Marx's teleological concept of human labour/praxis, it can be argued that Freud's concept of sublimation, this crucial concept of the diversion of sexual drives which for Marcuse has to be rescued (by 'historicizing' Freud's concept of 'reality principle'), in fact represents in inverted form the reification of the individual's ego and will.

Labour represents, according to the Marxian schema, the fundamental aspect of the dialectic mediation between humanity and nature, it is essentially an historical ontology, the struggle for existence through the social production and re-production of human existence. Thus, 'Labour is the factor which mediates between man and nature, labour is man's effort to regulate his metabolism with nature. Labour is the expression of human life and through labour man's relationship to nature is changed, hence through labour man changes himself'.(122)

The discussion has prepared us for a closer investigation of the argument presented concerning the reification of the Self in the Freudian system. It is important to present this analysis because it serves to indicate an alternative Marxian psychology which, based on Marx's social ontology, challenges the neo-instinctivism of Marcuse's attempted marriage of psychoanalysis and Marxism.

### Freud And Marx's Concept Of Alienation

If Freud's system describes 'symbolically' (123) the psychic structure of the majority of individuals in capitalist society at the turn of the twentieth century, the authority relations behind which lies the threat of physical violence, we are obliged to offer an alternative perspective based on the premises of Marx's social ontology, indicated above.

Following Fromm's approach, outlined above, of attempting to define the rational kernel in Freud's system in contrast to its ideological shell, and that of Georg Lukacs' in our analysis of Engels' philosophical justification of historical materialism in chapter one, we can proceed with a critique of Freud's theory and practice, and in so doing, throw into relief the basis for an adequate understanding of psychology in the social process. In so doing, we can also reveal the antinomies of Freud's thought, rooted in bourgeois intellectual categories, showing their historical indices, whilst indicating their reified historical structure.

We have established that for Marx the individual realizes her/himself through labour/praxis. Unlike the instinctual life of insects or lower primates, the human species creates after having erected a plan in the person's imagination; human behaviour is goal-orientated.(124) Now, the non-Freudian implications follow from the role of labour and Marx's concept of alienation(125), not regulation of the human organism as a result of the contradiction between the pleasure principle and reality principle, sex versus ego instincts, or later, life versus death instincts in a mechanistic conception, but the individual's psycho-somatic (mind and body) experience is

defined by the individual's social relationship to nature, as it is mediated by socially necessary labour.(126) Marx argues that it is through labour that the individual appropriates, ' Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants'(127) and in the labour process changes his own nature. Marx develops this viewpoint, from the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 to Capital[1867].

(128) In analysing Freud's reified concept of the individual, we must recall the attempt to derive a Freudian reading of Marx - an interpretation which, as this discussion attempts to show, is invalid. For example, in the German Ideology [1845/6], Marx and Engels apparently lend support to the notion of drives defended by Marcuse as the Freudian concept of sublimation. Marx and Engels wrote, for example:

We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to materialist premises.(129)

This passage must be understood on the basis of Marx's concept of historical materialism, of the mediation of subjectivity in and through objective social and material conditions which are, in turn, historically conditioned by the development of the productive forces of society. But for Marx, social consciousness is governed by the general grounds of social relations and not the atomistic instinctualism of Freud's materialism. This is borne out by Marx and Engels' concept of ideology and false consciousness: 'Ideology is a process accompanied by the so called thinker consciously, it is

true, but with false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remains unknown to him, otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process.' (130) But it is social consciousness not the individual's instinctual drives which have engendered this result. It is arguably class-society and an historically specific form of social domination which produces the distorting lens of specific ideologies, cultural norms. This process is set in motion by the subjection of humanity to nature and thus the productive forces of society are in turn experienced as a consequence of 'natural', 'inexorable', forces, beyond human control. Indeed, it could be argued that as a component of the total personality the sex drive is subjected to this historical process and social dynamic - hence Freud's concept of human drives at a particular historical conjuncture. Engels writes: 'Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces. Because it is a process of thought he derives its form as well as its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors.'(131)

In short, individual character structure is rooted in social culture, passed on by previous generations, and modified by one's own generation's labour. Marx, as already stated, rejected the passive, crude materialism which reduces human activity to the level of animal drives and instincts, and advanced an historical and socio-economic interpretation of ideology and human motivation, on the basis of a distinction between 'fixed' ('organic'- Fromm) drives which can be altered only in the form and direction they take, and 'relative' appetites based on what Fromm has called (and empirically demonstrated as ) 'character-rooted passions'.(132) Unrestricted by

the attempt to historicize Freud's concepts on the basis of their mechanistic materialist premises (as opposed to Marcuse's theoretically flawed tour-de-force, Eros and Civilization) (133), the antinomies of Freud's system can be thrown into relief.

For Marx and Engels, ideology is not, then, a product of the sublimation or reaction formation of sexual drives. By the notion of 'ideological reflex', Marx and Engels are referring instead to estranged passions and organic drives, alienated characteristics of human needs and faculties.(134) The human 'reflex' appears as the sublimation of material interests due to the partial rationality and overall irrationality of capitalist social relations, alienating the individual from his/her potential self-realization. This 'reflex' is, then, a reflex in the sense of being unconsidered, uncognitized, norms and transmitted from the past by means of culture. In this sense, Fromm has described this 'reflex' as the 'social unconscious' (135) because it is the result of the historically conditioned subordination of human needs and faculties to the specific stage of development of the productive forces of society. And thus, since human passions are restricted under the conditions of 'patricentric-acquisitive society', the expression of human needs is often reduced to the level of animal drives because their specifically human qualities are denied by the cultivation of what Marx describes as depraved and alienated passions.(136)

Hence for Freud, affection among individuals in 'civilization' is necessarily 'aim-inhibited' (its 'real aim' of selfish gratification is 'sublimated' to make civilization possible). However, it can be argued, that because sexuality is based on the craving for affection

in a society of competitive and possessive individualism, it becomes a neurotic compulsion (137), and is thus experienced as a 'drive', an alienated passion. Since it is experienced as a 'drive', it is represented in thought as an irrational desire. That sexuality should be so experienced in capitalist society is, according to Marxian psychology, then, hardly surprising. Moreover, as Fromm has noted, compulsive sexuality (Don Juanism) is often indicative of a compensation for the inability to maintain 'any close and responsible relationship' (138) and is certainly not due to 'excessive libido'. The notion of sublimation is, then, a reification of human needs and passions; the latter are reduced in the Freudian conception to physiological impulses which rule over the individual.

Marx accounts for this reification of human needs and passions in his concept and analysis of the Fetishism of Commodities and the Magical Quality of Money (139). For Marx, the individual in bourgeois society is separated from the need to develop her/his total personality, the intellectual, sensuous, and emotional Self. (140)

The attempt to dissect the Self analytically in terms of id, ego, and superego is an historical construct pertaining to class society. It is however, descriptive of the reified personality: the latter is split, and the need for unity (141) expresses the active human need to overcome the effects of reification. Thus Marcuse writes:

In all these cases alienation appears as divorcing the individual from the social, the natural from the self-conscious. By contraposition it follows that in a non-alienated human relation individual and social, natural and self-conscious must belong together - and form a complex unity. (142)

While Marcuse, basing his analysis on Freud's premises, attempts to derive the possibility of a non-alienated society through the notion of 'self-sublimation' (143), logically, the result of self-sublimation would be the complete internalization of the super-ego, crushing the ego - in order to self-regulate the required level of repression concomitant to the development of civilization. The result would be to reduce the individual to an automaton, as Jay writes: 'The goal of complete and immediate gratification that Marcuse sought would make the individual into a system of easily manipulated desires and stimulations, as in Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World".'<144)

For Marx and Engels, social consciousness is not a reflection of the economic base of society via the ideological superstructure. As discussed in chapter one, individual consciousness is determined by and in turn determines the social structure. Marx's social ontology of being includes causality and teleology (Lukacs) (145). Indeed, arguably, it is the social relations of production which constitute the 'material foundations of society', as Marx wrote in his Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy of 1859. (146) Thus labour, which mediates between humanity and nature, historically expresses itself in class society in context of the 'realm of necessity' - it is not free, self-determined labour, but 'socially necessary labour'. In industrial capitalist society, with the separation of the producers from the means of production (147), alienation reaches its internal limits because capitalist society assembles the intellectual and material culture which represents the pre-condition for ending alienation, namely, socialism.(148) It does not follow from Marx's analysis of alienated labour that history is



subjectless, as the Althusserian school has argued. (149) Humanity produces the conditions for its existence but in the 'realm of necessity' and not (yet) in the 'realm of freedom'. (150)

Alienated labour thus conditions humanity's experience of sensuous, emotional, and intellectual experiences and capacities. The individual's organically rooted drives are historically conditioned in terms of the form and direction they take, the person's imagination, will and intellect are conditioned by the specifically historical context of the social structure of a given society. In capitalist society, the individual is alienated not only in 'estranged labour', its general social form, but from the person's fellow workers and the community, from nature, and from his/her Self.

It is thus social being which determines individual consciousness and not instinctual drives (contra Freud). The latter notion could only represent an abstraction from history, a reconstruction of human motivation from the effects of the reified and fragmented sexual drive. Consequently, Marx's concept of false consciousness is based not on the notion of repression of libidinal strivings, as in Freud, but on the notion that the social structure 'blocks' the individual from becoming aware of specific facts or experiences. (151) Thus, if for Marx,

the history of mankind is a history of the increasing development of man, and at the same time of increasing alienation. His concept of socialism is the emancipation from alienation, the return of man to himself, his self-realization (152)

then Freud's concept of sublimation, as a repressive moment in the realm of necessity, would be abolished in the development of the society of associated producers. In short, humanity's essential powers would no longer be determined by alienated labour. In a society which has overcome scarcity and the basic anxiety which this gives rise to, the individual could begin to know his/herself as a 'determining' being in society. As Fromm has noted: 'Free (or spontaneous) acts are always phenomena of abundance. Freud's psychology is a psychology of want.' (153)

According to Marx, then, 'human nature' unfolds through the development of the forces and relations of production, indeed, the human species constitutes an active element in the forces of production.(154) This unfolding 'essence', Marx argues, is historical but corresponds to a definite psychic structure or to needs, as defined above, as 'organic drives' and 'character-rooted passions' (borrowing Fromm's terminology).

Moreover, humanity's social being conforms to forms of consciousness which are specific to a given historical period, or stage of social evolution. Norman O'Neill has argued that these forms of consciousness are governed by 'normative frameworks' and it 'is through the lexicon of these frameworks that individuals creatively select, translate and interpret their lives.'(155) In this sociological application of the Marxian theory of humanity's social being, O'Neill emphasizes the causal and teleological structure of human motivation, incorporating the active role of social consciousness in his conception of the social process.

Thus, from the standpoint of historical materialism, Freud's conception of civilization as the result of sublimation, and the division of the psyche into id, ego, and super-ego reveals a profound insight into the alienated character-structure prevalent in the era of patricentric capitalist society, but it is a fundamentally reified conception. Firstly, in the way that it generalizes from empirical data based on middle-class patients' life-styles in Victorian Europe, and secondly, in that it represents a partial 'snap-shot' of an on-going historical process and thus presents an ossified, distorted concept of human drives and passions.(156)

Thus, Fromm wrote:

Like the so-called basic instincts of man which earlier psychologists accepted, Freud's conception of human nature was essentially a reflection of the most important drives to be seen in modern man. For Freud, the individual of his culture represented 'man', and those passions and anxieties that are characteristic for man in modern society were looked upon as eternal forces rooted in the biological constitution of man....

And more specifically:

The field of human relations in Freud's sense is similar to the market - it is an exchange of satisfaction of biologically given needs, in which the relationship to other individuals is always a means to an end but never an end in itself.(157)

Hence, what is 'human nature' for Freud, i.e., sexuality per se, is in fact an expression of anxiety in the form of a neurotic compulsion which is a culturally patterned phenomenon of modern capitalist society. Under the alienated conditions of mass society, it is no surprise that the need for union with one's fellows or the opposite

sex becomes distorted and assumes the expression of a fragmented, partial sexual drive. In light of the above interpretation of the Marxist theory of alienation in application to the debate in critical theory concerning an adequate Marxist psychology, it could be argued that Marcuse's concept of repressive de-sublimation - despite the use of Freudian concepts which do not adequately account for the phenomenon they describe for reasons discussed above - contains an insight into the way human sexuality is taken up by the marketeers of late capitalism and turned into a saleable commodity.(158)

#### The Appeal Of Freud

For the neo-instinctivist left who believe in the necessity to develop a Marxian psychology, the appeal of Freud has, as discussed, remained the fact that his psychology appealed to materialist premises.(159) For Fromm, the decisive historical significance of Freud's work is represented in the latter's theory of resistance, transference, and the dynamic concept of character. (160) For the revolutionary socialists who turned to psychoanalysis to supplement Marxian theory and broaden the understanding of the social psychological mechanisms of social control in capitalist society, Freud's work exposed the contradictions inherent in the bourgeois individual, between the development of rationality on the one hand, and the substantive reification of the emotional life of the individual on the other. In this sense, Freud's work helped expose the fraudulent nature of capitalist civilization in the imperialist era, and the dominant drives and passions it reproduced, but he did so without fully realizing the implications of his own work.

Freud's work is important not because he discovered the unconscious (which was known prior to psychoanalysis), but in the analysis of unconscious processes empirically, for example, The Interpretation of Dreams.(161)

Arguably, Freud's work revealed, through observation and reasoned analysis, that unconscious and irrational forces influence aspects of human behaviour, factors which had been neglected by modern rationalism.(162) Moreover, Fromm argues that by showing that the renunciation and restraint induced by bourgeois civilization is responsible for psychic and somatic symptoms of a neurotic nature, Freud partially transcended the instinctivistic mould in which his insights were framed. Paradoxically, by extending the concept of libido and opening the door to environmental influences on the personality, Freud went beyond the traditional instinct theory: '...Freud's "instinctivism" was very different from traditional instinctivism, and in fact was the beginning of overcoming it.' (163)

Though it is important to note Freud's liberal-reformist inclination, it is inaccurate to characterize him as a 'revolutionary', as previously discussed (above).(164) Also, in parenthesis, it is important to note that the Freudian image of life as a repetition of the past is understood by Fromm to represent a description of the neurotic - whilst the healthy individual is relatively unburdened by the past.(165)

Thus it is important to corroborate Fromm's argument which shows how Freud's libido theory and patricentric assumptions narrowed the focus of his social critique, for example, in the Oedipus complex

and in his theory of infant seduction as a cause of neurosis which was later reversed putting the emphasis on the child's supposed oedipal desires projected into dreams, 'wish fulfillments'.(166)

#### Fromm's Critique Of Freud's Empirical Work

In his critique of Marcuse's adherence to Freudian instinct theory as the cornerstone of the critical analysis of ideology in late capitalist society, Fromm argues that Marcuse's misunderstanding of Freudian concepts is also the result of his neglect of the empirical bases of psychoanalysis. Fromm asks, for example:

Could it be that Marcuse shares the popular misconception that 'pleasure principle' refers to the hedonistic norm that the aim of life is pleasure, and 'reality principle' to be the social norm that man's striving should be directed towards work and duty? Freud, of course, meant nothing of the kind; to him the reality principle was 'a modification' of the pleasure principle, not its opponent.(167)

Fromm objects to Marcuse's attempt to historicize Freud's instinct theory as too simplistic, and mechanical. (168) Marcuse admits at one point that he is particularly concerned with the 'symbolic value' of Freud's speculative metapsychology (169), and at another that he neglects the clinical basis of Freud's ideas.(170) But, following Richard Wollheim and also Fromm's admonition that Freud's theory and therapeutic practice can not be separated (171) so arbitrarily, it can be argued that Marcuse's treatment of Freud's ideas is methodologically inconsistent.

The conception of different reality principles (Marcuse proposes the term 'performance principle' to designate the reality principle regulating capitalist society), while formally historicizing Freud's instinct theory, remains fundamentally incompatible with the theoretical basis of psychoanalysis. Thus, Fromm argues that Freud's concept of reality principle,

is something quite different from the norms of a given social structure: one society may censor sexual strivings and fantasies rigidly, hence the reality principle will tend to protect the person from self-damage by making him repress such fantasies. Another society may do quite the opposite, and hence the reality principle could have no reason to mobilize sexual repression. The 'reality principle', in Freud's sense, is the same in both cases, what is different is the social structure and what I have called the 'social character' in a given culture or class....(Accordingly, what is repressed depends on the system of the social character, not on different 'reality principles'.)(172)

Thus, Fromm correctly argues that, by attempting to defend Freud's instinct theory as the revolutionary kernel of psychoanalysis, Marcuse has clutched at straw. A Marxist psychology must be rooted in the analysis of the interrelation between the social character and the historical process and not get bogged down in metapsychological speculations at the expense of sociological data.(173) By limiting himself to the 'philosophy of psychoanalysis', Marcuse is, Fromm argues, presenting a distortion of psychoanalytic ideas to meet the problem of a Marxist understanding of individual psychology in late capitalist society. Thus, Fromm writes of Marcuse:

He claims that his work 'moves exclusively in the field of theory, and keeps outside of the technical discipline which psychoanalysis has become'. This is a bewildering statement.

It implies that psychoanalysis started as a theoretical system and later became a 'technical discipline', the fact is, of course, that Freud's metapsychology was based on his clinical investigations.(174)

That Marcuse's approach to psychoanalysis is methodologically flawed can be illustrated in reference to Marx's method. Ernest Mandel has, for example, noted that,

It would not be difficult to prove that Marx himself, at any rate, categorically and resolutely rejected this quasi-total rift between theoretical analysis and empirical data. For the real implication of this separation is a significant retreat from the materialist dialectic to the dialectic of idealism.(175)

Similarly, O'Neill criticizes the Frankfurt School's attempt to marry Freudian and Marxian concepts philosophically. However, it can be argued that the incisiveness of O'Neill's criticism is much reduced to the extent that he adopts an Althusserian argument, which tends to reject critical theory as 'unscientific' in order to indicate problems in the Marx-Freud synthesis. Thus, there is a contradiction apparent in O'Neill's critique in as much that he then appeals to philosophical premises to argue that the inherent incompatibility of psychoanalysis and Marxism is due to their respective ontologies.(176)

Fromm himself provides a somewhat more balanced viewpoint which accords social philosophy a role in relation to an historically demonstrable basis, it is not a philosophy of psychoanalysis which Fromm is objecting to as such, but one in which the theoretical analysis stands, so to speak, on all fours, without the basis of a systematic empirical investigation. Hence Fromm writes:



To make a separation between philosophy and analytic theory on one hand, and psychoanalytic clinical data, on the other, is untenable in a science whose concepts and theories cannot be understood without reference to the clinical phenomena from which they were developed. To construct a 'philosophy of psychoanalysis' which ignores its empirical basis must necessarily lead to serious errors in the understanding of the theory.(177)

The result of this weakness in Marcuse's treatment of Freud has been regarded as symptomatic of critical theory - the inability to bridge the theory-praxis nexus.(178)

Fromm substantiates his theoretical revision of psychoanalysis by applying Marx's empirically demonstrable approach to a critique of Freud's empirical evidence. Here, we select some representative examples from Fromm's writings to illustrate the argument.(179)

Initially, it is important to note the class bias of Freud's clinical investigations. Fromm writes:

Freud, in search of the roots of psychic disturbances, had to look for a physiological substrate for the drives, to find this in sexuality was an ideal solution, since it corresponded both to the requirements of mechanist materialist thought and to certain clinical findings in patients of his time and social class.(180)

The majority of participants in the leadership of the psychoanalytic movement were drawn from the urban intellectual middle-class, as were their patients.(181) The ideological prism through which these analysts interpreted their clinical data was, Fromm argues, imbued with the prejudices and world-view of their historical period and social class. On this point Jacoby correctly objects to the vulgar environmentalist critique according to which Freud's ideas can be

reduced to the milieu of the Viennese, middle-class intelligentsia.(182) Jacoby interestingly indicates that Freud himself had already encountered this criticism.(183) Arguably, Jacoby is correct to object to the historical relativism inherent in such a criticism.(184) Nonetheless, although Freud's ideas are not reducible to the organisation and values of Central European bourgeois society of his time, Jacoby forgets that dialectical analysis must consider the way in which the historical period and social environment of the psychoanalytic movement existed as a prism (185), limiting and distorting Freud's potentially revolutionary theory. Worse, Jacoby generalizes the objection to vulgar historicism indiscriminately against all who depart from loyalty to Freudian instinct theory, conflating the respective standpoints of 'cultural anthropologists, neo-Freudians, and theoreticians of women's liberation'.(186)

### The Oedipus Complex

For Freud the unresolved Oedipus complex is the source of neurosis. In Freud's theory of sexuality and socialization the little boy develops an intense sexual attachment to his mother, the child's first 'love object' after birth. Hostility develops between the little boy and the father as a consequence of this sexual antagonism and hence, according to Freud, the father becomes the child's rival. The intensity of the little boy's attachment to the mother leads the little boy to feel threatened by the father-rival. What Freud observed in this relationship is the 'intensity of the attachment of the little boy to his mother or mother figure'. (187)

The human infant is particularly dependent upon the mother, being nourished by her, protected by, and emotionally consoled by her. The mother gives life and can also forfeit the life of the infant by abandoning her motherly role and functions.

In the Oedipus complex, the attachment to and dependence on the mother-figure is an attachment to a state of helplessness experienced as a child, but one in which protection and love are given unconditionally by the mother and the child has no responsibility to bear. Fromm notes that considering the general vulnerability of the adult in class society, the prevalence and intensity of such a yearning to return to a state of mother-centred helplessness is hardly surprising.(188)

But for Fromm, Freud's concept of the essentially sexual nature of the (regressive or fixative) attachment was not an adequate interpretation. To be sure, sexual attachment can be a cause, but, Fromm argues, the Oedipus complex and the phenomenon of sexual attachment more generally arises as a symptom rather than cause of the child's paradisiacal existence.(189) Fromm writes:

Freud overlooked the well known fact that sexual desires per se are not characterized by great stability. Even the most intense sexual relationship, if it is without affection and strong emotional ties, the most important being love, is rather short-lived and if one gives it six months, one is probably being liberal...

Thus:

To assume that men should be bound to their mothers because of the intensity of a sexual bond that had its origin twenty or thirty or fifty years earlier is nothing short of absurd

considering that many are not bound to their wives after even three years of a sexually satisfactory marriage.(190)

Freud's concentration on the sexual factor led him to neglect the socio-historical character of the attachment to the mother, and rivalry and hatred of the father, and ends by attributing universal meaning to this feature of socialization characteristic of patricentric capitalist society. Subject to the father's will, and historically rooted in the property ties of patricentric society, in order to be heir (or be regarded as 'worthy' and 'successful'), the son has to please, submit, and obey his father. Fromm argues that Freud failed to see this as a conflict rooted in the authority relations of patricentric-acquisitive society and its concomitant authority relations rather than the more narrow and reductionist interpretation of sexual attachment and rivalry.

Freud's data on childhood sexuality has been critically reassessed by Erich Fromm according to the historical and sociological evidence assembled by Engel's work on The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (191), Malinowski's Sex and Repression in Savage Society (192), and Briffault's The Mother: A Study of the Origins of Sentiments and Institutions (193). As O'Neill has noted of the influence of such work on Fromm: 'Love, and altruistic feelings generally - far from being based on sexuality as Freud supposed - were henceforth viewed as being derived from the maternal sentiments generated by the extended period of human pregnancy and child care.(194) In relation to Freud's anthropological speculations in support of his theory of sexuality

and the formation of the family, Fromm's 'revisionism' is based on a systematic appreciation of the evidence available from neurophysiology, paleontology, and anthropology (195), and in the light of which, Freud's speculations appear, as Way writes 'more like a fabulous Just-So story than as a serious scientific work'.(196) While this is not the place to explore Freud's anthropological speculations (the above discussion has indicated the weaknesses in Freud's theory making an exhaustive critique of his anthropological speculations unnecessary), the point has been raised, and must be borne in mind, that whilst Marcuse refrained from a scrutiny of Freud's empirical work and defended the instinct theory, Fromm engages with modern empirical findings in his effort to revise psychoanalysis and render it adequate for Marxian social science. Thus, having prepared the discussion thus far, we can illustrate the argument by reviewing Fromm's examination of Freud's 'Case of Little Hans'.(197) This is a useful example because this case 'seemed to Freud to prove the pathogenic role of the Oedipus complex'.(198)

For Freud, the case of Little Hans shows all the symptoms to prove the pathogenic role of the Oedipus complex. Little Hans took great pleasure at being in bed with his mother, going to the bathroom with her, and seeing his father as a rival, even to the point of expressing a death wish against his father.(199) Fromm writes:

For Freud, Hans's phobias were a consequence of his libidinal incestuous desire for his mother, exacerbated by his little sister's birth - the event that caused him to be exiled from the parental bedroom and brought about the decrease of maternal attentions.(200)

Hans's fear of castration and wish for his father's death, Freud argues, is symbolically expressed in the little boy's fear of being bitten by a horse, and the fear of seeing a fallen horse represents a symbolic death wish against his father resulting in the striving to avoid horses - as a manifestation of his phobia. Reviewing the clinical data, Fromm questions Freud's interpretation, noting significant inconsistencies: he asks, 'are Hans's parents truly as positive as Freud claims they are in their behaviour towards the child?' (201) Freud states that Hans would be allowed to grow up and express himself without intimidation, without bullying or ridiculing the child. Fromm writes: 'Freud, ever the sincere thinker, always offers us undistorted data and gives us sufficient material to demonstrate that his assessment of the parents' attitude is not correct.'(202)

Thus Fromm demonstrates from Freud's own data that the mother explicitly threatens Hans with the threat of castration - 'If you do that (touch his penis with his hand), I shall send for Dr.A. to cut off your widdler...' (203), and the mother threatens to abandon the child. (204)

Secondly, the child, relying on the parents for truth, is subject to lies as a part of the parents 'educational strategy'. The child cannot defend itself against an untruth, and young children, Fromm argues, are rarely as naive as parents mistakenly believe. Little Hans is not to be convinced that the stork brings babies. Freud himself notes how Hans recalled the arrival of his sister Hanna, noticing the mother's pregnant stomach. Similarly, Hans probably doubts his mother's sincerity when she affirms the idea. She also

has a penis like Hans's father. Hans answers mockingly that his mother's penis is as large as that of the horse.(205) Why did Freud assume the parents to have avoided intimidation in their educational method, especially since the evidence points in another direction? Fromm argues that the explanation for Freud's 'blind spot' is revealed in his attitude to bourgeois society:

He wanted to reduce and soften the degree of severity in educational methods, but he did not go so far as to criticize the basis of bourgeois society: the principle of force and threat.(206)

#### On The Seduction Theory

A similar example is to be found in Freud's seduction theory. Originally, Freud believed the childhood traumas children experienced, and later recounted as adult patients, were directly the result of adult and incestuous molestations. In his modified theory however, Freud reverses his earlier explanation:

Freud finally arrived at the conclusion that these traumas generally have no basis in fact but are, rather, manifestations of the incestuous and aggressive fantasies of the child.

Fromm astutely comments:

In our opinion, the emphasis given to the incestuous desires of the child is, up to a point, a defense of the parent, who are thus absolved of their incestuous fantasies and the actions that are known to occur.(207)

Indeed, by placing the onus of seduction onto the child, Freud retreated from his earlier defense of the interests of the child

(for, even if the child actively encouraged seduction, the responsibility for this unbeneficial experience lies with the adult) to one of acquiescence with the status-quo. However, contrary to Freud's interpretation of his clinical data, little Hans's mother actively plays the part of seducer, and the child's fear of castration is based not 'on "very slight illusions" as Freud states' (208), but on explicit threats. And, contrary to Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex, which implies the threat of castration comes from the father, the only threat in this example derives from the mother: 'His mother not only terrorizes him with castration, but also tells him that she will abandon him.'(209) Thus Fromm writes of little Hans:

His fear of his mother is also manifested by another symptom. 'In the big bath I'm afraid of falling in.' Father:'But Mummy bathes you in it. Are you afraid of Mummy dropping you in the water?' Hans:'I'm afraid of her letting go and my head going in.'(210)

Freud's own data shows that Hans's anxieties are caused not by the father, but by the mother. Moreover, Fromm argues that, contrary to Freud's thinking (with his patricentric bias), clinical observation amply proves that 'the most intense and pathogenic fears are indeed related to the mother, by comparison, the dread of the father is relatively insignificant.'(211)

Hence, while Fromm accepts it is undoubtedly the case that a five or six year old child may have sexual interests and may sometimes 'desire' the mother, he argues that although Freud believed the child's incestuous desires to be endogenous, it is doubtful whether



the child's sexual desire is as intense and exclusive as Freud believed; it is more likely to be the result of active seduction on the mother's part than the wishfulfillment of the child.(212) Fromm shows, for example, that despite Freud's interpretation, little Hans's mother wanted the child in bed with her and to take him with her to the bathroom. Moreover, little Hans's desire is not exclusive to his mother. Hans wishes to sleep with Mariedl, preferring Mariedl's company to his mother.(213) The implication is that Hans's attachment to his mother is not sufficiently intense or exclusive as to warrant hatred of his father, or fear of him. This does not discount the fixation, only the idea that sexuality is the source of the explanation of the phobia. The ties to the mother are profound, the emotional bond going deeper than the term 'pregenital fixation' conveys.(214) Thus, Fromm argues that little Hans's phobia is best explained on the basis of the latter's fear of his mother rather than of his father. Summarizing his interpretation, Fromm writes:

We suggest that the elements that enter into the phobia are as follows: as Hans is already attached to the mother, his terror increases with the threats of castration and first confrontation with death, before the emergence of his phobia, little Hans witnessed a funeral in Gmunden. Later, he saw a fallen horse and believed it to be dead. The first encounter with death is a very serious event in a child's life, and it can produce additional anguish in an already sensitive child, owing to the fear of castration. It may therefore be concluded that the fear of the horse has two origins:(1) the fear of the mother, due to her castration threats, and (2) the fear of death. To avoid both fears, Hans develops the phobia, which protects him from seeing horses and from experiencing both types of anxiety.(215)

Concluding his analysis, Fromm argues that Freud's interpretation of the data is coloured by his world view and thus is partial:

'it seems that Freud, influenced by his bias in favour of parental authority and male superiority, interpreted the clinical material in a one-sided way, and failed to account for a number of data which contradicts his interpretation.'(216)

### Fromm And Adler

In his re-examination of psychoanalysis, Fromm's approach is enriched by his sociological background, providing a wider and more integrated perspective of the historical and social context of psychoanalytic theory and practice.(217) Moreover, Fromm's interdisciplinary studies enabled him to transcend the narrow psychologistic outlook of the clinical orientation of orthodox psychoanalysis, thus enriching individual psychology with the larger economic, social and political context in which psychological processes operate.(218)

It is useful to compare the approach of Erich Fromm with the School of Individual Psychology founded by Alfred Adler because the discussion of Individual Psychology helps clarify the debate concerning the 'revisionist controversy'(219), Fromm's contribution to a Marxist psychology, and the basis of a non-reductionist concept of social consciousness.(220)

It was Alfred Adler who, breaking with Freud in 1911, developed the foundations for a socially orientated, non-instinctivistic psychology(221), which simultaneously transcends behaviourism and environmentalism in psychology.(222) Adler stresses that the individual is primarily a social being (223) and does not, as Freud assumes, relate to others merely to satisfy instinctual drives.(224)

Importantly, Adler laid the scientific foundations for a psychology which corroborates Marx's social ontology, overcoming the one-sided causal basis of materialism on the one hand, and teleological basis of idealism on the other. Hence, it is of decisive significance that Alfred Adler's Individual Psychology empirically corroborates our discussion in chapter one concerning the ontological foundations of Marx's theory of social consciousness, and Lukacs' critique of Engels' attempt to provide a response to vulgar materialism in defence of the materialist conception of history. This argument will be illustrated below in connection with the 'revisionist controversy'.

What immediately comes to light in the 'revisionist controversy' concerning Fromm and his former colleagues in the Institute for Social Research and the radical potential of psychoanalysis, is that the whole debate is a repetition, at another level, of the rejection of Individual Psychology by Freud and his circle in the first decade of this century in Vienna. It is this rather dogmatic framework which is adopted by Marcuse and later writers who have developed and extended Marcuse's critique of 'neo-Freudian Revisionism'.(225) One should, however, be aware of the reason why Marcuse was led to adopt such a framework for his critique of Erich Fromm and other writers who abandoned Freud's instinct theory, such as Karen Horney.(226) The answer to this question has been explained in the final section of chapter two in relation to the inconsistency in critical theory with regard to the critique of vulgar materialism on the one hand, but a failure to extend and follow through the conclusions of that critique in the case of the mechanistic

materialism which underlies Freud's theory of psychoanalysis on the other. Douglas Kellner has concurred in his recent (and probably the most comprehensive) study Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (227) with John Fry's Marcuse- Dilemma and Liberation (228) that Marcuse's purpose in attempting to historicize Freudian instinct theory is to use psychoanalysis to prove that, although the individual may be easily subject to the overwhelming influence of social control, an instinctual dynamic for freedom provides the final subterranean hope for revolution against late capitalism. Marcuse's motivation, then, for turning to psychoanalysis in order to furnish conceptually the possibility of revolution, turns on his estimation of the class-struggles in Europe in the twentieth century. And since this study attempts to show that Freudian instinct theory is incompatible with a Marxist psychology, the last part of it questions the assumptions concerning the defeats of the labour movement in Europe which prompted Marcuse's ingenious attempt to invigorate Marxism even though his efforts are scientifically dubious. In dealing with this issue it might also be noted that while Kellner gives a particularly balanced analysis of Marcuse's adoption of instinct theory, he offers, nonetheless, a rather uncritical description of the outcome of Marcuse's theoretical synthesis arguing that the instinct theory 'helps Marcuse to explain why revolutions have often failed'.(229) As this study attempts to show, Kellner's point is not sustainable. Marcuse's neo-instinctivism in application to the class-struggle and the defeats of the labour movement in the twentieth century has as much scientific validity as Freud's anthropological speculations: they

support ideas by analogy rather than social scientific analysis. Moreover, as O'Neill has shown in his study of working class authoritarianism;

Like Freudian psychology itself, Freudo-Marxism became atomised - concerned with isolated individuals who had internalised elements of a common culture, and not integrated individuals who shared specific forms of social relations, and were subjected to specific forms of social control.(230)

The following chapter takes up this point in regard to an accurate assessment of the class-struggles of the inter-war years - the experience which, in Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Adorno's estimation certainly justified their interpretation of Freudian theory.

Returning to the question of Fromm and Adler and the use of Freud's criticisms of Adler's Individual Psychology in the evaluation of psychoanalysis from the Marxian standpoint, we can note that the neo-instinctivist Freudian Left, such as Marcuse, misunderstand Fromm's work by conflating him with Adler, and fail to understand both theorists. Adler is misunderstood on two scores. Firstly, he is rejected for being an 'ego' psychologist 'and thus' an idealist. Secondly, and following from the first point, that his Individual Psychology is 'conformist'. Firstly, Adler's psychology is based on a non-reductionist concept of materialism, a theory based on biology which did not fail to describe the mind and body as a unity, but did so in such a way that the Self is conceived as 'conditioned' but not determined by organic deficiencies or environmental influences.(231) It is the human character which compensates for organic defects, the existential weakness of the human being in

comparison with her/his environment and other animals which gives rise to culture.(232) What the individual does, how s/he compensates for these 'weaknesses', Adler argues, depends upon the 'life-style', the private goals and self-image of the individual.(233) Thus, as O'Neill has argued (234), Adler's psychology dove-tails with Marx's social ontology where humanity is understood as 'determined yet determining' in the social process.

In Adler's psychology, however, the conflict between human interests and needs and societal demands is under-developed, and in this lies the basic substance of a critique of Adler's system. However, this has nothing to do with Adler's rejection of Freud's instinct theory despite Marcuse and Jacoby's admonition. Although, as Lewis Way notes (235), Adler did not confuse psychic health with conformism to bourgeois society, because Adler intended to develop a pedagogical theory suited for mass-dissemination, he neglected to develop a social theory which systematically included an economic and class analysis, and his psychology - when extended to the sociological level - appears to advocate 'co-operation' and 'communal interest' in 'society' at the expense of exposing those economic, social, and political factors which act and interact in a way to prevent the emergence of a society implied in Adler's psychology, one based on equality, co-operation and 'communal interest' (Gemeinschaftsgefühl).(236) On this basis, the charge advocated by Marcuse that Adlerian psychology is susceptible to a lapse into subjectivism has an element of substance to it, but again, it is not due to the failure of Adler to accept instinct theory. According to the argument advanced in accordance with the analysis thus far, it

can be argued that the problem presented to us by Adler's psychology is not a question of adducing an instinct theory, but of re-emphasizing the concept of mediation which acknowledges the interaction of objective and subjective factors in the social process. Adler's theory of character allows for an understanding of the 'causal -teleological dynamic' contained in Marx's social ontology in application to psychology.

Moreover, the significance of Adler's Individual Psychology for Fromm's work is that Adler provided the foundations for a socially orientated explanation of the psychic dynamic in authoritarianism and thus, a theoretical and empirical alternative to the neo-instinctivism of Marcuse and associates, and the cultural pessimism contained in Freudian theory.(237) As mentioned above in connection with Fromm, Adler's approach does not neglect the importance of sexuality in human behaviour, but understands the latter from the viewpoint of the individual as a social being. Moreover, Adler's psychology broadens and opens up individual psychology to social psychology by showing that the basis of social relations can be understood in terms of the individual's interaction in work, friendship, love and intimacy.(238) As Mairer has written:

The discoveries of Individual Psychology do not contradict those of psychoanalysis in general, as to the existence of sexual complications in all forms of psychic ill-health. They decidedly confirm the importance of a sound and normal love-life, which however, is the result of a progressive individual power in social usefulness. Individual Psychology is not an escape from Freud's gloomy diagnosis of the modern soul. It rather increases the terror of our predicament, for it shows a deeper danger in man than his sensuality. The dragon is still more fearful than the slime. If Freud has exposed the beast in man, it is Adler who has revealed the devil.(239)

Mairet reveals the grounds for an effective rebuttal of Marcuse and Left neo-instinctivists' criticisms of the 'neo-Freudian' Erich Fromm. Thus, seen in light of Mairet's argument, Fromm's revision of psychoanalysis turns out to be exactly the opposite of what Marcuse and associates claimed it to be, i.e., a weakening of the critique of bourgeois civilization found in psychoanalysis on account of the instinct theory. Instead of 'weakening' psychoanalysis, Fromm's work represents, arguably, a Marxian development of the *raison d'etre* of the Frankfurt School itself. Fromm's critique, developed in The Sane Society (a study ignored by the neo-instinctivists) (240), applies his revised 'humanistic psychoanalysis' in the context of Marx's theory of alienation to a critique of late capitalism. Fromm's critique thus shows that while instinctivist theories lend themselves to rationalizations of a society which perpetuates economic, military and social destructiveness (241), humanistic psychoanalysis 'shows a deeper danger in man than his sensuality' - in the social structure of capitalist society and the social character it engenders.(242)

This is illustrated in Fromm's theory of human destructiveness in contrast to Freud's instinctivistic theory. According to Fromm, the two fundamental passions of human existence are biophilia and necrophilia, life against death in the psychological rather than physiological sense; the rationality of humanity's organic drives expresses the tendency to grow and to live.(243) Human destructiveness can be understood as the outcome of un-lived life and interpersonal relatedness,



in the unbearableness of individual powerlessness and isolation. I can escape the feeling of my own powerlessness in comparison with the world outside myself by destroying it...The destruction of the world is the last, almost desperate attempt to save myself from being crushed by it.(244)

Thus, Fromm's theory differs from Freud's to the extent to which Freud views the craving for death and destruction as 'fundamental and ineradicable a part of man, as the striving for life', and from others such as Konrad Lorenz who, Fromm writes, argue, 'although from a different theoretical standpoint (vis-a-vis Freud - CM), that man's aggressiveness is innate and can hardly be controlled' (245), by distinguishing

between entirely different kinds of aggressiveness: reactive aggressiveness, in the service of life and as a defence against real - or alleged - threats to vital interest; sadism, the wish for omnipotence and complete control over human beings; destructiveness, the hate against life itself, and the wish to destroy it.(246)

Fundamentally, then, Freud's instinct theory leads to a view in which the aim of life is death. Freud's 'nirvana principle' implies that the human organism strives to reduce tension and excitation, a theory which rests - as Fromm points out in his critique of Freud's instinct theory - on false scientific evidence, and the logical conclusion of which is, that the striving for self-destruction must be built into the human organism (death instinct). Thus, according to Freud, civilization without war and exploitation is unthinkable.(247) Fromm's analysis, however, points, like Adler's psychology, to the social structure of a given society and the system of the 'social character' and this raises another, political

and sociological, set of questions (such as that of 'ideological hegemony', to be discussed). To summarize Fromm's alternative viewpoint:

The most fundamental problem, I believe, is the opposition between the love of life (biophilia) and the love of death (necrophilia), not as two parallel biological tendencies, but as alternatives: biophilia as the biologically normal love of life, and necrophilia as its pathological perversion, the love of and affinity to death.(248)

As we shall see, Fromm's humanistic psychoanalysis fortifies and develops our understanding - and critique - of the alienation of humankind in late capitalist society.

### Technological Fetishism

In examining Fromm's contribution to critical theory, it is useful to show how his 'humanistic psychoanalysis' sheds light on the critical analysis of late capitalist ideology.

With the development of twentieth century monopoly capitalism, the penetration of the exchange principle into all spheres of economic, social and political life, the subordination of the individual to large scale bureaucratic organisations - both public and private - the individual experiences a growing sense of aloneness and powerlessness, Fromm argues.(249) Noting the connection between necrophilia and the 'worship of technique', Fromm applies the concept of reification (Lukacs) and fetishism of commodities (Marx) to the analysis of the advanced stages of technological rationality - the ideology of late capitalism (as a

consequence of the third technological revolution and the socio-political response to the latter in the post-war years).(250)

An interest in people, nature, living structures is increasingly replaced with 'increasing attraction of mechanical, non-alive artifacts'.(251) Men take an inordinate interest in, and are often more thoughtful and tender towards their gadgets, Hi-Fi, cars and appliances (in which 'life without a car seems to some more intolerable than life without a woman'(252)) than their wives, Video machines which simulate enormous nuclear destruction on an electronic screen at the touch of a button, become popular 'games'.(253) The attitudes and simulated war games of late capitalist technology are almost exclusively 'spin-offs' from the late capitalist industrial-military complex.(254) Fromm notes:

The fusion of technique and destructiveness was not yet visible in the First World War. There was little destruction by planes, and the tank was only a further evolution of traditional weapons. The Second World War brought about a decisive change: the use of the airplane for mass killing. The men dropping the bombs were hardly aware that they were killing or burning to death thousands of human beings in a few minutes. The aircrews were a team; one man piloted the plane, another navigated it, another dropped the bombs. They were not concerned with killing and were hardly aware of an enemy. They were concerned with the proper handling of their complicated machine along the lines laid down in meticulously organised plans. That as the result of their acts many thousands, and sometimes over a hundred thousand people would be killed, burnt, and maimed was of course known to them cerebrally, but hardly comprehended affectively; it was, paradoxical as this may sound, none of their concern. It is probably for this reason that they - or at least most of them - did not feel guilty for acts that belong to the most horrible a human being can perform.(255)

Organised according to the extremely specialized division of labour, the separation of functions, a hierarchical and undemocratic

managerial structure, in late capitalism individuals lose their individual sense of responsibility and collective sense of conscience. The ideology of technological rationality and its concomitant operationalism (256), that thought is identical to its function within the division of labour in society, becomes the dominant ideology and advanced form of reification under late capitalism: 'Modern aerial warfare destruction follows the principle of modern technical production, in which both the worker and the engineer are completely alienated from the product of their work'.(257)

Whether at Dresden, Hiroshima, or 'devastating the land and people of Vietnam', the soldier, technician and strategist's task 'is only to serve his machine properly'.(258)

#### Authoritarianism And Technological Fetishism

In the advanced capitalist states, Fromm argues, people suffer less from absolute poverty as from being a 'cog in a large machine', of being overwhelmed by large private and public organisations, experiencing the world as something which 'happens to' the person: life becomes empty and loses its meaning (259). The height of authoritarian terror, Fromm argues, found its expression in National Socialism which drew out the logical consequences of the principle of technological rationalism:

Even the mass murder of the Jews by the Nazis was organised like a production process, although the mass killing in the gas chambers did not require a high degree of technical sophistication. At the end of the process the victims were selected in accordance with the criterion of their capability for doing useful work...

The victims were 'processed' methodically, efficiently; the executioners did not have to see the agony; they participated in the economic-political programme of the Führer, but were one step removed from direct and immediate killing with their own hands...

Once this process has been fully established, there is no limit to destructiveness because nobody destroys: one only serves the machine for programmed - hence, apparently rational - purposes. (260)

Nazism represents a period in the development of monopoly capitalism characterized by political reaction and drastic economic instability. With the stabilization of Western Capitalism in the post-war years and the development of corporate capitalism characterized by the concentration and centralization of economic power in the hands of multi-national corporations, Fromm argues that a new phenomenon has evolved: a socially patterned pathogenic degeneration of the marketing character, namely, the 'cybernetic orientation'. While the marketing character predominantly views his/her identity in terms of a commodity-package of talents and skills to be sold on the job market, 'Cybernetic man is so alienated that he experiences his body only as an instrument for success.' This character orientation marks a distinct pathogenic phenomenon in contrast to the average, socially patterned alienation experienced by those subordinated to the organisational requisites of the large private and public organisations in late capitalism:

This new type of man, after all, is not interested in feces or corpses; in fact, he is so phobic towards corpses that he makes them look more alive than the person when living. (This does not seem to be a reaction formation, but rather a part of the whole orientation that denies natural, not man-made reality.) But he does something much more drastic. He turns his interest away from life, persons, nature, ideas - in short from everything that is alive; he transforms all life into

things, including himself and the manifestations of his human faculties of reason, seeing, hearing, tasting, loving. Sexuality becomes a technical skill (the 'love machine'), feelings are flattened and sometimes substituted for sentimentality; joy, the expression of intense aliveness is replaced by 'fun' or excitement; and whatever love and tenderness man has is directed towards machines and gadgets. (261)

Thus:

The world becomes a sum of lifeless artifacts; from synthetic food to synthetic organs, the whole man becomes part of the total machinery that he controls and is simultaneously controlled by. He has no plan, no goal for life, except doing what the logic of technique determines him to do...

The world of life has become a world of 'no-life', persons have become 'non-persons', a world of death. Death is no longer symbolically expressed by unpleasant smelling feces or corpses. Its symbols are now clean, shining machines; men are not attracted to smelly toilets, but to structures of aluminium and glass.

But the reality behind this antiseptic facade becomes increasingly visible. Man, in the name of progress, is transforming the world into a stinking and poisonous place (and this is not symbolic). He pollutes the air, the water, the soil, the animals - and himself. He is doing this to a degree that has made it doubtful whether the earth will still be livable within a hundred years from now. (262)

The ideology of late capitalism pervades the reified social relations, penetrating into the cultural sphere, and reflecting the extent of alienation peculiar to the period. The social psychological affect is represented by a sense of powerlessness and consequently, a benign indifference to the fate of society as a whole, or the physical environment upon which it rests. Fromm concludes his study of human destructiveness by arguing that a society based on a rational principle of human organisation - putting human interests above the principle of production for private profit and competition - are possible 'if the political and

psychological road blocks are removed'.(263) The social structure of late capitalism, then, provides the most fertile soil for malignant forms of aggression and destructiveness. As discussed above, Fromm cites changes in the post-war period relating to the third technological revolution to explain the cerebrally oriented character-structure whose emotional-affective relatedness to his/her actions has withered, and become inactive. However, by revealing the connection between the social structure and social character of capitalist society, Fromm shows that the character-rooted passions can change with a corresponding change in the social structure, as mentioned above.

The malignant forms of aggression, on the other hand - sadism and necrophilia - are not innate; hence, they can be substantially reduced when the socio-economic conditions are replaced by conditions that are favourable to the full development of man's genuine needs and capacities; to the development of human self-activity and man's creative power as its own end. Exploitation and manipulation produce boredom and triviality; they cripple man, and all factors that make man into a psychic cripple turn him also into a sadist or a destroyer.(264)

Fromm's social psychology, being a critical social theory, goes on to make a socio-political critique of late capitalist society in The Sane Society. In this study, Fromm argues that the alienation of humankind under late capitalism produces the socially-patterned 'pathology of normalcy' (described above), and thus the notion of 'adjustment' in psychiatry and psychology is value-loaden; it assumes that the optimum in mental health is obtainable by conforming to the norms and values of late capitalist social structure. Fromm argues that there is a 'third way' between

technocratic late capitalism and totalitarian Communism (Stalinism) namely, 'Communitarian Socialism'.(265) Fromm's concept of 'communitarian socialism' stresses the totality of qualitative social change, its economic, social, cultural, and psychological elements. Moreover, that the psychological factor - much neglected in Marxism - is an important element in the authority relations of late capitalism, hence the relation between the personal and the political. Here, Fromm is replying to Marcuse's objectivism:

To be sure, there are severe limitations to personal development determined by the social structure. But those alleged radicals who counsel that no change is possible or even desirable within present-day society, use their revolutionary ideology as an excuse for their personal resistance to inner change.(266)

In analysing the characterological changes which have taken place in relation to changes in the social structure, in The Sane Society, and being aware of the dynamic quality of social consciousness, Fromm argues, that personal inertia is not an excuse for resisting individual change. Moreover, Fromm's approach helps clarify the motivation involved in revolutionary politics, and he makes a distinction between the rebel and genuine revolutionary to illustrate his argument: '...a revolutionary in a characterological sense is not characterized only by the wish to overthrow the old order, unless he is motivated by love of life and freedom, he is a destructive rebel.'(267)

It is important to recall at this point that the question of values is intrinsic to the critical theory of society and the fact-



value problem can not be separated in the human sciences, as Fromm's work makes particularly clear.

The revolutionary character is, then, the antithesis of the authoritarian character; the latter is the typical rebel, defying one set of authorities only to submit to another to fulfill his/her sado-masochistic strivings.(268) In relating the character structure to the social structure, Fromm goes on to distinguish between 'rational authority' and 'irrational authority'.(269) 'Authority' refers to a social relation in which 'one person looks upon another as somebody superior to him'. 'Authoritarianism' is based upon irrational authority - a relationship of exploitation and oppression inhibiting and suppressing individual growth, freedom and happiness. Thus, it is only when the irrational authority of late capitalism is replaced, Fromm argues, with rational authority - a society in which the exploitation of labour is replaced by a democratically controlled communally owned means of production - that the social soil for authoritarianism can be overcome. Fromm's critical analysis of the social character represents a decisive contribution to the critical theory of society, and has a potential which has yet to be fully explored with regard to, for example, the social movements for equality between the sexes and ethnic groups.

We can now turn to a more detailed review of the discussion on Fromm's contribution to the critical theory of society.

On Fromm's Contribution To The Critical Theory Of Society

The above investigation shows that Fromm's contribution to the formation and project of critical theory has been neglected, or reduced to his original influence with regard to his introducing psychoanalytic social psychology to the Institute for Social Research. Moreover, Fromm's development of critical psychology is lost sight of because of the general tendency to uncritically follow Marcuse's characterization of Fromm's post-Institute work as 'conformist' and 'revisionist'.

Arguably, the use of these labels have been less than useful in the attempt to gain an accurate understanding of Fromm's work and contribution to the critical theory of society. Worse, it can be argued that Marcuse's indiscriminate grouping of all 'neo-Freudians' as 'conformist' has led not only to confusion but also the erection of an orthodoxy in critical theory, by which detractors can be rejected at least as much for deviating from 'the line' as for unsound argumentation. This represents a dangerous tendency which runs counter to the critical spirit of Marxian social theory. This is not to say that there is nothing of value in, for example, Jacoby's extension of Marcuse's critique of 'neo-Freudian revisionism' to a critical analysis of the idealist tendency running through much existential-phenomenological psychology of the post-war years. However, as the argument presented here shows, Jacoby's critical insights are the result of his understanding of Lukacs, and not the inexorable logic of the instinct theory.(270) Our discussion of Erich Fromm's critical theory shows that he did not

relinquish the attempt to integrate analytic social psychology into Marxian social science.

In fact, a real understanding of Fromm reveals that his theoretical supersession of orthodox psychoanalysis was motivated by the need to develop a social psychology on the basis of anthropological evidence which had put the universality of Freud's decisive propositions in severe doubt (the Oedipus complex, inferiority of women, death instinct, etc.), and the newly emerging work of the 'early Marx' which facilitated a deeper understanding, and appreciation of his theory of alienation. In their continuing loyalty to Marcuse's orthodox use of psychoanalytic instinct theory, writers such as Robert Bock and Stephen Frosh neglect the empirical evidence which Fromm assembles, to refute the instinct theory in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. Indeed, by ignoring evidence to the contrary, these writers are doing social theory a disservice, and worse, by their uncritical reproduction of Freudian instinctivism, they provide pivotal foundations for an essentialism which has conservative and reactionary implications.(271) Moreover, as Fromm points out(272), such an essentialist standpoint, as that contained in the concept of the death instinct, also serves the function of personal inertia when the opportunity to act against, for example, the armament race, is passed over. The neo-instinctivist orthodoxy in writers influenced by Marcuse's critical theory forget that Fromm's commitment to developing analytic social psychology and the critique of late capitalist ideology and domination was an on-going process, forming a unity of purpose from his papers in the Institute's Zeitschrift in the early 1930s to the

works of his middle and mature years, such as The Fear of Freedom (1941), Man for Himself (1949), The Sane Society (1956), Beyond the Chains of Illusion (1962), The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973) and Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought (1980). The works of his mature years are rarely discussed by critics, and when they are, they are merely tacked on as references to a foregone conclusion. Even those writers who, like Phil Slater, adopt the critique of Freud's later metapsychological speculation which the early Wilhelm Reich advanced, and thus point critical theory in a direction beyond instinctivism without transcending it, are prone to neglect Fromm's later writings which contain more detailed empirical documentation of his development of psychoanalytic social psychology. (273)

Fromm's supersession of psychoanalysis in his critical, humanistic social psychology, has the advantage of a comparative historical basis. This has been demonstrated in regard to the naturalistic fallacy contained in Freudian instinctivism. The drives and passions of the alienated individual, as has been shown above, express a compulsive sexuality - conditioned by the anxiety, sense of powerlessness and aloneness, of late capitalist culture. The Freudian image of the individual is an account of the reduction of human experience to a person's animal functions; of course, the stripping of sexuality of its human qualities and its reduction to merely an animal function of reproduction or the release of anxiety is a facet of alienation in capitalist society (274), while Freudian theory takes this alienation as given. Thus, by rooting his conception in Marx's dynamic psychological premises, Fromm provides

the basis for a critical social psychology which, based on historical materialism, avoids the naturalistic fallacy of Freud's mechanistic materialism. Consequently, the Self, in Fromm's work, emerges to self-consciousness in history and thus, as agent: determined, yet determining, capable of self-change, and acting and reacting back against the social structure, to modify the latter, and, at certain historical moments, radically reconstruct the social structure.

The tragic view of the world contained in the neo-instinctivist perspectives of Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer, the pessimism of these social theorists, represents a personal intransigence on the one hand, and a political failure of vision on the other. While sexual neuroticism (Marcuse's 'repressive de-sublimation') is significant in so far that it is a culturally-patterned phenomenon linked with sophisticated marketing strategies of the late capitalist social superstructure and the alienation of the consumer (275), it is not a case in which the power structure of late capitalism directly and subliminally determines human thought and behaviour by manipulating the libidinal drives of the individual. The Left-instinctivists find themselves in a theoretical and political impasse because of the over-determined image of the individual which is prescribed by their mechanistic materialist premises. By definition, the hydraulic-mechanistic materialist model of human motivation which the Left-instinctivists uphold is incapable of radical reconstruction; a strictly quantified energy model marked the limitations of personal and social change. The ego is merely a victim of the struggle between id and super-ego,

and thus wholly determined. In Fromm's perspective the Self can not be reduced to biological drives or environmental conditioning (as in psychoanalysis and behaviourist psychology respectively). Fromm's perspective allows for depth psychology but also height psychology: what Abraham Maslow has termed 'deficit motivation' and 'growth motivation' respectively (276) - in short, the possibility of the radical re-organisation/integration of the total personality, and thus motivation based on active interest in one's own growth and the interests of others as an integral facet of one's own self-actualization.

Sexual repression, as shown above, is not ignored by Fromm as his critics have claimed, but is merely placed in its proper context: as one aspect of the individual's total personality. Humankind, Fromm shows, is not condemned to repeat and suffer childhood traumata into adulthood anymore than history is doomed to repetition. Through self-constituted activity (praxis), through collective self-emancipation, the veil of reification can be broken and the awareness of common interests between people can be forged. (277) The meaning of sexual repression has to be understood in the context of the affect of alienation on the character-structure of the individual as a whole; as one important means of blocking, and distorting, the individual's sensuous, emotional and intellectual development. The dissection of the Self into id, ego, and super-ego, reflects the reification of the human personality under advanced capitalist society. (278) Marx's dynamic psychological premises, developed in Fromm's critical social psychology, begin with the individual as a social being whose drives

and passions can be understood only in historical context, pointing to the foundations of bourgeois society, its social structure, as the source of individual and socially patterned neurosis: 'the pathology of normalcy' (Fromm), and thus away from the reductionist psychologism of Freudian theory.

Similarly, a dialectical understanding of Freud's work, his insights and their time-bound caste (279), require an appreciation of humankind's capacity for psychological change in the process of changing the world. Indeed, under circumstances inherited from past generations, certain limitations are placed on human development. But inherent in human nature is the dynamic quality of being determined and yet determining the conditions of existence through the capacity for collaborative labour. Humankind's conscious, goal-oriented behaviour means that it is not bound to repeat the past, but overcome time-bound obstacles by passing on the lessons of experience from one generation to the next, by the further development and refinement of technique. Thus, it can be argued that it is in Fromm's social psychology that Marx's overcoming of the causality of mechanistic materialism is best expressed. Human behaviour is not driven by ineradicable biological drives, it is not 'pushed' by drives so much as 'pulled' by goals. Marx's concept of human motivation is teleological.

Hence, only through the development of what Fromm has called biophilia (love of life) can individuals free themselves from the effects of their childhoods (280), and *mutatis mutandis*. only through a biophilous orientation can a rational hatred of injustice, exploitation and oppression be reached by those progressive forces

in society (the working class and its allies) and the hegemony of late capitalist ideology be undermined. Fromm's concept of social consciousness thus envisages a dynamic historical dimension that is missing from the perspectives of the neo-instinctivist Left.

#### Fromm As A Neo-Adlerian

In summarizing our discussion of Fromm's contribution to the critical theory of society, the question arises whether the use of the term 'neo-Freudian' is less accurate in understanding the development of Fromm's thought than the use of the term 'neo-Adlerian'. 'Neo-Freudians' have been described as sharing positions associated with Alfred Adler's critique of psychoanalysis and his own school of Individual Psychology:

Their position may be briefly described as stressing social relations rather than biological factors, the self rather than the id and the super-ego, the striving for self-actualization rather than the sex instinct, and the present situation rather than early experiences. (281)

Fromm shares with what might be broadly termed the 'inter-personal' approach of Karen Horney and H.S. Sullivan, the rejection of the instinct theory and metapsychological speculations of orthodox psychoanalysis concurring with the Adlerian school. However, as discussed above, Fromm's critical theory is informed by Marx's theory of alienation and thus a more thorough understanding of the impact of capitalist production relations on the social structure and social character - a decisive difference which, as Fromm notes, is often overlooked. (282) Thus, in relation to the Adlerian school.



it is clear from the above quote that Fromm's humanist psychoanalysis shares many points of agreement with the Adlerian perspective and therapeutic technique. However, Fromm (and Horney) retained important aspects of Freudian technique (although he dispensed with the traditional use of the couch in therapy) and based his analytic theory on a more sophisticated conception of the analytic process, including important psychoanalytic concepts such as transference, than is found in the Adlerian technique. However, it can be argued that Fromm and Horney take up the Adlerian system and enrich it with their experience as practising analysts based on an interpersonal approach to neurosis (283) on the one hand, and a broader appreciation of cultural influences and their role in the development of the individual's identity than the Adlerians on the other. (284) Most importantly in considering the influence of Alfred Adler on Erich Fromm's social psychology is the decisive importance of Marx's theory of alienation in Fromm's work. Thus, the appropriate critique of Adlerian psychology is not (as the neo-instinctivist Left contend) that Individual Psychology dispenses with the libido theory, but that despite referring to the needs of the total personality in work, friendship, and love/intimacy, its social vision falls tendentially upon a psychologistic view of personality.

Indeed, O'Neill has traced the influence and the mutuality between Marx's concept of the individual as a social animal and Adler's interpersonal approach to human psychology, but it is instructive to note that in the formation of Individual Psychology, Adler was influenced by Marx's 'sociology' but hardly touched by Marx's

'economics' and political thought - as Carl Furtmüller has indicated in his biographical essay on Adler.(285) Consequently, despite his emphasis on equality and the concept of 'communal interest' as something to be struggled towards as the rational ideal of humanity, Adler's psychology can be viewed as tending towards subjectivising individual problems by neglecting their socio-economic roots(286); though it must be emphasized that this should be understood as an unintended consequence of a theoretical flaw in Adler's social theory. Thus Lewis Way has noted in a remarkably balanced exposition:

A psychology that teaches adaption to society while overlooking this question of mutuality may perhaps fail to win the entire confidence of some patients. Because the spirit of the age sees inner development as a matter of less consequence than outward adaption, and inclines towards the extravert's view of life, rather than to the introvert's, such a psychology will always be popular, but it will have its stubborn critics. To do justice to the problems raised by these critics no doubt requires an extension of thinking into the sphere of social psychology.

Thus, Way argues, changes in society are required to complement the necessity of individual change; in short, social change must not be confused with individual therapy.

If the aim of therapy is the reconciliation between the individual and his society, then this reconciliation must be effected ultimately from both sides. We shall need not only, as Adler says, more cooperative individuals, but a society better fitted to fulfil the needs of the human being.(287)

Way indicates the limitations of Adlerian psychology but points out that the resolution of these limitations lies not in a return to the

instinct theory, as the instinctivist Left would argue, but in 'an extension of thinking into the sphere of social psychology' and, arguably, in a social theory which allows for a political praxis, the aim of which is to render the social structure 'better fitted to fulfil the needs of the human being'. Thus, it can be argued that Fromm develops Adler's psychological premises in his 'Humanistic Psychoanalysis'. Hence, Fromm's work may be understood more accurately as an attempt to marry Adler's premises with Marx's theory of alienation in order to provide a critical social psychology of late capitalist ideology and domination. Thus, it could be argued that, in providing an alternative to the instinctivism and psychologism (288) of the psychoanalytic school, Fromm's critical theory allows for an analysis with greater explanatory power for understanding the individual in the social process (289), and thus, in application to the major questions and problems the Frankfurt School posed for itself in analysing the fate of the European labour movement in the inter-war years, and its situation following the Second World War.

Fromm's major contribution remains his analysis of authoritarianism and its effect on the social consciousness of the (German) working class, to which the discussion now turns.

Authoritarianism And Ideological Hegemony

The landmark in social science established by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford, namely the 'Authoritarian Personality' thesis is the best known study on socio-psychology associated with the Frankfurt School and critical theory.(290) This is not the place to embark upon a full discussion of this comprehensive, collaborative and monumental study (291), but to indicate that the methodology and theoretical underpinnings of the study owe much to the early work of Erich Fromm, in particular, his contribution to Authority and the Family (292) and his study of the Weimar Working Class. Moreover, Martin Jay notes, in a discussion of The Authoritarian Personality, the criticism that the study departs from the tenets of critical theory and tends towards psychologistic conclusions.(293) In contrast, Fromm's study of the Weimar Working Class combines a closer integration of psychological and sociological perspectives in connection with the socio-political context of the period under study. Further, in contrast to The Authoritarian Personality thesis, Fromm employed psychoanalytic technique in analysing the answers to the questionnaires distributed to workers 'the way a psychoanalyst listens to the associations of the patient. Certain key words or current patterns of expression were interpreted as clues to the underlying psychological reality beneath the manifest content of the answers.'(294) In his study The Weimar Working Class, which commenced in 1929, Fromm's team distributed 3,300 questionnaires to recipients and by the end of 1931 were able to analyse 1,100 returned.(295) The questionnaire with 271 items sought to investigate the discrepancy between avowed

beliefs and personality traits (296) by eliciting the respondents views and attitudes on 'the education of children, the rationalization of industry, the possibility of avoiding a new war, and the locus of real power in the state'.(297) Fromm concluded that primarily what was lacking in the opposition to Hitler's rise to power was, firstly, the unity of the working class, and secondly, correct leadership:

Although the Left had the political loyalty and votes of the great majority of workers, it had by and large not succeeded in changing the personality structure of its adherents in such a way that they could be relied upon in critical situations. On the other hand, a further 25% of Social Democrats and Communists were in broad though less firm agreement with their party and showed no signs of any personality traits which would have contradicted their left-wing approach. They could be counted on as reliable, but not as fervent supporters. In view of this we are left with an ambiguous picture: on the one hand, the actual strength of the left-wing parties appears to have been less than one might have supposed at first glance, if one looked at the numbers. On the other hand, there was nevertheless a hard core of highly reliable fighters which should have been large enough to pull the less militant along in certain circumstances, i.e., if a capable leadership and correct evaluation of the political position had been at hand. (298)

Fromm makes it clear that while authoritarianism is a typical trait of the petit-bourgeoisie, it is not typical of the working class.(299) Fromm's socio-political analysis of Fascism parallels that of Leon Trotsky's in many essential aspects.(300) In particular, on the decisive issue and importance of political leadership, mentioned above. But Fromm sought to lay bare the ideological mechanisms and their impact on the labour movement and show how this contributed to preventing the necessary cohesion of the working class in the struggle against Fascism.

The question of a 'correct political evaluation' and of leadership in the German labour movement in the struggle against Fascism was also dependent upon resisting the policy of the Comintern, dictated by the Moscow centre, of instructing the German Communist Party to oppose the Social Democrats as 'social fascists'.(301) Fromm notes:

One must also not forget that 20% of the supporters of the workers parties expressed, in their opinions and feelings, a clearly authoritarian tendency. Only 5% were consistently authoritarian, 15% displayed this attitude rather ambiguously. Beyond this, 19% of Social Democrats and Communists tended towards the rebellious-authoritarian position with clear contradictions between R-(radical-CM) and A-(authoritarian-CM) replies. 5% of the Left had a compromise orientated attitude, and 16% in all came into the neutral syndrome category.(302)

In appreciating Fromm's research it is important, especially when evaluating the political implications of his analysis, to note the international context of the struggle against Fascism in Germany. The advanced degeneration of the German Communist Party resulted from centralist and bureaucratised control from the Moscow centre of the Comintern, which led to the Bolshevisation of the European Communist Parties and the subordination of the lower to the higher organisational structures.(303) Arguably, under such conditions the degree of authoritarianism measured in the far left by Fromm would be more marked than would have otherwise been the case. A major criticism of Fromm's study The Weimar Working Class, then, is that his results were insufficiently placed in their international context; the problem of incorrect leadership, of course, has to be understood as intrinsically related to the bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian Revolution and the way in which the policies of the

Comintern were eventually to be adapted to the socio-political imperatives of defending 'socialism in one country' as a priority over and above the objective need for the working class to attain a hegemonic position in the political struggle in any particular country.(304) Nonetheless, Fromm's study, it should be noted, does not allow for a pessimistic view concerning the capacity of the working class to resist authoritarianism. The decline in influence of Stalinism and bureaucratic centralism in Communist Parties in Europe indicates, it could be argued, a growing anti-bureaucratic consciousness in the working class (305), and this tendency has its expression in the state bureaucratic societies of Eastern Europe in the revolts in Germany 1953, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and the attempt of the independent trades union Solidarnosc to democratise the State in Poland in 1980-81.(306)

The Frankfurt School, as this study has shown, sought to defend the combination socialism-liberty as intrinsic not only to the concept of a socialist society itself, but, decisively, also in terms of the methods used to obtain the ends. Similarly, Fromm's analysis of authoritarianism reminds us, that the contradiction between socialist democracy and the attempt to defend the soviet ruling caste (and doctrinal orthodoxy) can not be reconciled (307) and thus, that the commitment to socialist democracy is a minimum prerequisite for theory and practice if the socialist cause is to become an international mass movement.(308)

Summary And Conclusion: Erich Fromm's Contribution to the Development of the Critical Theory of Society

It has been argued that Marcuse's criticism of Fromm as a 'revisionist' neo-Freudian is misplaced. Rather than abandon his earlier radicalism, Fromm based his social psychology on Marx's theory of alienation and anthropological data which questioned and challenged the patriarchal bias of orthodox Freudian psychology.(309) Thus, what is neglected in the works of Bocock and Slater (310) is the fact that Fromm attempts to derive the radical potential of psychoanalysis to more effectively deal with the critique of late capitalist ideology by going beyond Freud's mechanistic materialism and instinct theory.

Marx and Engels had recognised the social psychological basis of revolutionary change when they wrote in The German Ideology that the alteration of the consciousness of the working class is a necessary pre-condition for the success of socialist revolution.(311) Moreover, they recognised the limitations of passive and reflective theories of social change, emphasizing the experiential basis for altering the social character of the majority of the proletariat: namely, an alteration of social consciousness which takes place through a combination of praxis, and a leadership which has a correct assessment of the political forces in motion. Marx and Engels argue that revolution is necessary not only for political reasons 'the ruling class cannot be removed in any other way', but also for reasons pertaining to mass psychology: revolutionary practice is, they argue, of decisive importance for the



proletariat to purge itself, through experience, of the attitudes drives and passions, which prevent them from being able to exercise participatory democratic control of the means of production and the major institutions of the new society.(312)

However, Fromm argues that Marx and Engels never gave explicit and detailed attention to the human basis for developing socialist politics in this direction.(313) Fromm's point is decisive: How can the working class exercise social and political hegemony in advanced capitalist society? Fromm's critical social psychology thus attempts to develop Marxian categories in order to obtain a fuller understanding of the social character of the respective social classes in capitalist society and the effect of late capitalist ideology on this mediating factor of social consciousness. Only by developing a programme reflecting the transcendent needs and passions of the working class as a whole, across the base of civil society, could the effects of reification be overcome; thus restoring to socialism the image of a qualitative alternative to capitalist society - not merely in terms of production, distribution and consumption, but primarily (in the advanced capitalist states, at least) in terms of the radical change in the quality of relationships, the humanization of social relations, and the passification of the struggle for existence in relation to the natural environment.(314)

As Jean-Paul Sartre remarks in his Search for a Method, alienation is not an experience limited to the social relations at work, or confined to industrial workers. (315) For critical theory the concept of totality is decisive for our understanding of the

underlying sources of conflict in late capitalist society, and in understanding the process of transition between capitalism and socialism. Fromm's attempt to take psychoanalysis out of the straight jacket of the instinct theory represents, therefore, a development of critical theory to the extent to which Fromm shows our understanding of the necessary change in the social character (for social change) is rooted in the total personality and Marx's concept of revolutionary practice. Unburdened by the instinct theory, critical theory is released to address the revolutionary subject, the needs and passions of the concrete, living individual, in his/her social context, totality: work, social relations, love and intimacy - without reducing the living subject to instincts, environment, or the separate spheres of work, friendship, and love. Freudian theory, despite the attempt to defend the 'revolutionary kernel' of psychoanalysis (instinct theory) by Marcuse and his associates, could not avoid the effect of a mechanistic materialism which reduces the subject to an epiphenomenon of instinctual drives and their interaction, or modification, in relation to the need for self-preservation.

Indeed, it could be further argued that psychoanalysis is based on a model of the alienated individual which it reifies; consequently, this 'pathology of normalcy', as Fromm has termed it (316), is taken for granted and universalised ahistorically. It is, for Freud, a tremendous sacrifice in the gratification of instinctual drives on the part of the individual which allows for civilization or culture. A transformation of the structure of the psyche is ruled out, motivation based on altruistic feelings is an

impossibility, or a fraud, in Freud's conception. It is thus no wonder that socialism appears as a naive and utopian dream from the viewpoint of psychoanalysis. As we have shown in the above discussion, Marcuse's concept of self-sublimation is logically inconsistent with Freud's psychology and only shifts the problem into another corner. The crux of the issue is a social psychology which allows for both the depth psychology of psychoanalysis and the height psychology of the healthy individual. Fromm's concept of 'spontaneity', Adler's notion of 'communal interest', and Maslow's theory of 'self-actualization' allow for the possibility that human behaviour can be motivated by altruism and self-realization through social relatedness.(317)

Psychoanalysis not only adopted objectivity - it succumbed to it. Objectivity eventually led to objectivation, or reification. That is, it made the human person into an object, the human being into a thing. Psychoanalysis regards the patient as ruled by 'mechanisms', and it conceives of the therapist as the one who knows how to handle these mechanisms. He is the one who knows the technique by which disturbed mechanisms may be repaired.(318)

Viktor E. Frankl's perceptive criticism, above, raises the argument that psychoanalysis reduces the human subject to the status of a thing, in theory and therapy. Psychoanalysis has to be understood historically not only as an attempt to rescue subjectivity, but also as part of the categories of thought which helped eclipse subjectivity. To this extent, psychoanalysis succumbed to instrumental reason and the reification of subjectivity in the twentieth century. And of decisive importance for Marxian socialism

is the self-emancipation of the working class: psychoanalysis cannot conceptualize the possibility of a self-constituted practice, the goal of which is to transform the social structure and replace it with social relations which provide a more rational basis for the satisfaction of human needs and passions.

Fromm's critical social psychology indicates a theory of social change based on a strategy which is consistent with his analysis of the social character and late capitalist ideology. Orthodox Marxism, lacking a theoretically consistent social psychology, fails, Fromm argues, to grasp the social and individual factors which serve to cultivate and reinforce the proclivity amongst specific social classes and groups towards reactionary ideologies and political movements. Although they provided a theory of ideology, Marx and Engels failed to appreciate the greater weight that ideology would play in the domination of the underlying classes by the bourgeoisie as capitalist society developed into the twentieth century. Thus Fromm argues that there exists a tendency in the work of Marx and Engels to underrate the importance of irrational forces in society.

The famous statement at the end of the Communist Manifesto that the workers 'have nothing to lose but their chains', contains a profound psychological error. With their chains they have also to lose all those irrational needs and satisfactions which were originated while they were wearing the chains. In this respect, Marx and Engels never transcended the naive rationalism of the 18th century. (319)

This comment by Fromm is not intended to suggest that Marx and Engels did not provide the basis for understanding irrational

social forces. However, it does mean that Marxian socialism requires development and it has been argued that Fromm has made an underrated contribution to such a necessary development of Marxian thought in his critical social psychology. Restoring the dynamic concept of social consciousness which Marx and Engels formulated in The German Ideology (320), Fromm's social psychology broadens our understanding of the effects of alienation and the reification of the total personality in late capitalist society. Consequently, it provides a framework through which alienation may be understood in terms of its mass psychological effect across the base of civil society: work, friendship and intimacy. Moreover, as a result of this holistic and teleological conception of the Self, our understanding of the socially patterned proclivity towards reactionary ideologies (anti-semitism, racism, sexism, homophobia) and movements (Fascism, authoritarianism, etc.) amongst specific social classes and groups, in specific socio-historical conditions, is deepened. As a consequence, the capacity to combat or neutralize the influence of these reactionary ideologies is theoretically and strategically enlarged.

By showing the primacy of the individual's embeddedness in the ensemble of social relations, Fromm's work does not reduce the problem of prejudice to the notion of an in-built component of personality. (321) Hence, the reference group of the individual and the normative framework of the community, as Norman O'Neill argues in his Fascism and the Working Class (322), is the proper conceptual perspective from which to interpret and understand authoritarianism. (323)

It is important to note, however, that despite the deficiency in Marx and Engels' work with regard to accounting for irrational social phenomenon comprehensively, the historical materialist premises they established have been developed to a certain extent in application to the analysis of Fascism in the work of Leon Trotsky. Mandel notes, for example:

Like a few other Marxist writers (e.g. Bloch and Kurt Tucholsky), Trotsky understood the non-correspondence of socio-economic and ideological forms - that is to say, the fact that irrational ideas, moods and yearnings of great force had survived from pre-capitalist times in large parts of bourgeois society (especially amongst the middle classes threatened with pauperization but also among sections of the bourgeoisie itself, declassé intellectuals, and even backward layers of the working classes.(324)

Interestingly, we find here a parallel between Fromm's and Trotsky's analysis of irrational social phenomena in terms of their specific historical and social dynamic. Like Fromm in The Fear of Freedom (1941), Trotsky

drew the following social and political conclusion: under conditions of growing stress, of increasingly unbearable socio-economic class contradictions, significant sectors of the middle classes and the other above mentioned social layers - human dust, as Trotsky aptly characterised them - could become amalgamated into a powerful mass movement, mesmerized by a charismatic leader, armed by sectors of the capitalist class and its state apparatus, and used as a battering ram to crush the labour movement through bloody terror and intimidation.(325)

In his analysis of Fascism (1941) Fromm's social psychology deepens our understanding of the social psychological dynamics of this ideology and mass movement. In addition to economic - the

expansionist aims of German Imperialism - and political factors - 'the conquest of the state by one political party backed by industrialists and Junkers' (326) - in the explanation of Fascism, Fromm stresses that his analysis is concerned with 'the character structure to whom it appealed, and the psychological characteristics of the ideology that made it such an effective instrument with regard to those very people.'(327) Moreover, the 'psychological factor', in Fromm's analysis, has to be understood as being 'moulded by socio-economic factors.'(328)

Fundamentally, Fromm's analysis reveals the role of the authoritarian character in the class basis of the National Socialist movement - the lower middle class - and the economic and political conditions which were favourable to the hegemonic domination of , and Nazi rise to, State power. Fromm writes that,

Hitler's ideas are more or less identical with the ideology of the Nazi party. This ideology results from his personality which, with its inferiority feeling, hatred against life, ascetism, and envy of those who enjoy life, is the soil of sado-masochistic strivings; it was addressed to people who, on account of their similar character structure, felt attracted and excited by these teachings and became ardent followers of the man who expressed what they felt. But it was not only the Nazi ideology that satisfied the lower middle class; the political practice realized what the ideology promised. A hierarchy was created in which everyone has somebody above him to submit to and somebody beneath him to feel power over; the man at the top, the leader, has Fate, History, Nature above him as the power in which to submerge himself. Thus the Nazi ideology and practice satisfies the desires springing from the character structure of one part of the population and gives direction and orientation to those who , though not enjoying domination and submission, were resigned and had given up faith in life, in their own decisions, in everything.(329)

Writing in 1941, Fromm's insight into the dynamic nature of social consciousness allowed the conclusion that the functions of an authoritarian ideology and practice, 'are not a solution that leads to happiness or growth of personality. They leave unchallenged the conditions that necessitate the neurotic solution.'(330)

In short:

The dynamism of man's nature is an important factor that tends to seek for more satisfactory solutions if there is a possibility of attaining them.... the authoritarian systems cannot do away with the basic conditions that make for the quest for freedom; neither can they exterminate the quest for freedom that springs from these conditions.(331)

Fromm's social psychological analysis , based on socio-economic and political data on the Fascist ideology, movement, and accession to power in Germany in 1933, explains the totality of Nazi ideology - its terroristic, economic, political, and hegemonic function in the break up and fragmentation of the labour movement and opposition parties. Secondly, the major social psychological contradiction inherent in the Nazi regime: the thwarting and suppression of individual growth and happiness - individuation - which indicated, for Fromm, that the regime could not last indefinitely. Nonetheless, terroristic social control apart, it is important to note that Fascism was militarily defeated and the hegemonic role of Nazi ideology, combined with the repressive state apparatus, must be acknowledged and understood as an important factor in the stability and endurance of the regime.



Fromm's Political Project

On the grounds of the above discussion it can be argued that Fromm's social psychology shows that the basis of challenging the hegemony of the dominant class in capitalist society requires a political perspective which integrates revolutionary theory and practice on all fronts of the class-struggle - economic, political, ideological, and social psychological (332) - into a coherent strategy and organising effort.(333)

In his own way, Fromm went furthest amongst the critical theorists in defining the political project of an alternative society. In The Sane Society (1955), Fromm argues that integral social change can only take place when each necessary component of the process of transition between capitalism and socialism is taken into account and integrated into the overall framework of socialist theory and practice.

In his concept of social change, Fromm is much influenced (as discussed above) by the revolutionary humanism of Marx (334) and thus the attempt to defend Marxian socialism from Stalinism on the one hand, and social democratic reformism, on the other (335): the former, Fromm argues, reduces historical materialism to an ideology used to legitimize the domination of State and society by the bureaucratic ruling stratum in the U.S.S.R., and the latter has adjusted the goals of socialism to be attained within the existing capitalist State and institutions, thus serving to reconcile socialist theory and practice with the prevailing economic, social, and political structure of late capitalism.

It can be argued, then, that Fromm's political project for social change complements his psychological theory concerning the 'total personality' - as developed through his application of Marx's theory of alienation to neo-Freudian theory and practice. In an analysis which in many aspects parallels themes in the work of Gramsci, Fromm emphasizes the standpoint of the totality in conceptualizing social change:

While the early nineteenth century was still prone to see the causes of all evil in the lack of political freedom, and especially in universal suffrage, the socialists, and especially the Marxists, stressed the significance of economic factors. They believed that the alienation of man resulted from his role as an object of exploitation and use. Thinkers like Tolstoy and Burckhardt on the other hand, stressed the spiritual and moral impoverishment as the cause of Western man's decay; Freud believed that modern man's trouble was the over-repression of his instinctual drives and the resulting neurotic manifestations. But any explanation which analyzes one sector to the exclusion of others is unbalanced, and thus wrong. The socio-economic, spiritual and psychological explanation looks at the social phenomena from different aspects, and the very task of theoretical analysis is to see how these different aspects are inter-related, and how they interact.

Thus:

What holds true for the causes holds, of course, true for the remedies by which modern man's defect can be cured. If I believe that 'the' cause of illness is economic, or spiritual, or psychological, I necessarily believe that remedying 'the' cause leads to sanity. On the other hand, if I see how the various aspects are inter-related, I shall arrive at the conclusion that sanity and mental health can be attained only by the sphere of industrial and political organisation, of spiritual and philosophical orientation, of character structure, and of cultural activities.

Hence:

concentration of effort in any of these spheres, to the exclusion or neglect of others, is destructive of all change.(336)

The focal point of Fromm's perspective is the emancipation and self-realization of the individual, though rather than use the term 'individualism' it is more accurate to describe Fromm's Marxist-humanist perspective as, to use Victor Serge's term, 'personalist': in short, class-struggle should not mean class hate, or the notion that the individual is the object of history (the end justifies the means) and is inevitably subordinated to it; but that the goal of socialist theory and practice is the emancipation of the individual from class society, and the opportunity for an all rounded development of the personality in an environment which has cooperation rather than competition as its organisational principle.(337)

Man is a unity; his thinking, feeling, and his practice of life are inseparably connected. He cannot be free in his thought when he is not free emotionally; and he cannot be free emotionally if he is dependent and unfree in his practice of life, in his economic and social relations.(338)

Interestingly, Fromm pioneers the 'politics of the personal', connecting the individual's thought, emotion, and responsibility, with the economic, social, and political relations of social existence; ideas which have been taken up and developed by the international socialist movement in the 1960s and 1970s in the U.S.A and Europe.(339)

However, while Fromm stresses the importance of the concept of totality in his theory of social change, it can be argued that in

his later years his ideas tended to be couched in terms of a humanism abstracted from the concrete political conditions of late capitalist society, and the situation of the labour movement. Thus, George Novack criticises the tendency in Fromm's work to revert to utopian schemes instead of addressing the theoretical and strategic problems of the labour movement and its various political parties, in other words, for substituting an analysis of the balance of class forces in capitalist society for an undifferentiated, abstract humanism, addressed to all 'progressive forces in society'.(340) While Novack criticises a tendency general to the critical theorists in their later years (341), namely, the tendency to address 'emancipatory social forces in society' rather than the working class (342), he mistakenly conflates Fromm's argument concerning the necessity of the radical change in the totality of social relations with ethical reformism as such. (343) Arguably, this is to misunderstand the relevance of Fromm's theory to the development of a reconstituted, dialectical (many sided), Marxian understanding of social consciousness and radical social change.

The endeavour to undermine late capitalist hegemony across the base of civil society is the strategic lesson contained in Fromm's contribution to the theory and practice of the critical theory of society. The changing of social consciousness, and the psychic structure necessary for the democratic functioning of the new social order in the process of transition (between capitalism and socialism), is the product of a counter-hegemonic project which includes a new value-system and the reorganisation of the social relations of production based on human need and democratic planning

rather than competition and production for private acquisition of social wealth.(344)

Finally, that socialist revolution must be understood as a process of transition, not a single event, or sequence of events, that the changing of social consciousness is an inseparable component of structural change in the process of transition, and that these factors cannot be conceptualized as distinct phenomena without doing damage, theoretically and practically, to the human basis - and hence the *raison d'etre* - of socialist change.

This chapter has attempted to redress the neglect of Erich Fromm's contribution to the critical theory of society by showing the continuity between the project of the Institute for Social Research and the development of Fromm's critical social psychology. This investigation has thrown into relief the development of critical theory in Fromm's work in terms of the necessary conceptual framework for a critical analysis of social consciousness, the prevalent forms the latter takes in late capitalist culture, and the critique of late capitalist ideology in relation to how social change can be conceptualized.

However, certain questions arise from the above investigation into Fromm's work which require discussion.

First, the objection may be raised that Fromm's concept of social change as a process is ambivalent, and implies a reversion to social democratic reformism according to which the state, as an arbitrator between conflicting social interests, plays a fundamentally peaceful role in augmenting a gradual evolution to a socialist society.

Secondly, it could be argued that Fromm's perspective can be criticised for concentrating on the changing of social consciousness, and thus neglects a materialist analysis of late capitalist economy and social and political institutions.

However, the above viewpoints are essentially based on substantial, though incomplete, interpretations of the work of individual critical theorists on the one hand, and a partial understanding of the project of the Frankfurt School in which the differing individual critical theorists' work is rooted, on the other.

The first viewpoint forgets that the influence of Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness runs through the project of the critical theorists. Consequently, the concept of totality closely informs the concept of social change in the work of the critical theorists, and specifically, in the work of Erich Fromm, and this concept remains decisive. For Lukacs, and Fromm, the importance of the concept of totality is that the transformation of society must be conceptualized in terms of an understanding of the underlying social relations of production, and that socialism implies a qualitative transformation of social relations and thus the transvaluation of values. It could be argued, then, that such a perspective does not automatically devolve upon a reformist political practice - on the contrary (although, as noted above, Fromm's increasingly schematic blueprints for radical change relied less on an analysis of the existing labour movement and its representative political parties and more on an assessment of the representatives of radical humanism in an attempt to restore to the conception of socialist

change the moral and ethical basis of socialist politics which Fromm felt were lacking as a by-product of social democratic revisionism's acquiescence to the materialistic spirit of capitalist society - 'consumerism', for example). Conceptualizing the transition to socialism, then, but to acknowledge the historical realities of social change and to recognize that socialist advance requires a number of components which are irreducible to each other: the increasing unwillingness of the underlying classes of capitalist society to be ruled in the same way, the increasing inability of the dominant class to be able to rule in the same way, an economic or political crisis in the institutions of capitalist society, an effective leadership of the working class party, or parties, and a hegemonic strategy and socio-political project capable of effectively projecting the feasibility and necessity of the socialist goal, and uniting a substantial majority of the working class and its allies behind the cultural, social, and political campaigns initiated.(345)

The second criticism concerning the emphasis on the critique of social consciousness is a criticism which, as noted above, is directed against critical theory as a school of Western Marxism. But, it cannot be seriously argued that Fromm neglects the concept of labour, or that of praxis, as Walton and Gamble argue vis-a-vis Marcuse, and generalise to critical theory as a whole.(346) Walton and Gamble's criticism contains an accurate assessment of the emphasis contained in the work of the critical theorists but fails to understand this emphasis in terms of the trajectory of the Frankfurt School and its political-theoretical project. The historical, political, and theoretical context is decisive for

properly assessing the validity and relevance of the Frankfurt School to the critique of late capitalist society today. The apparent reversion to a neo-Hegelian standpoint by the critical theorists cannot be understood merely in terms of the break in the theory-praxis nexus: the victory of Fascism, the bureaucratisation and isolation of the Soviet Union, in the inter-war years. As this study has demonstrated, understood in the wider context of the political-theoretical project of the Frankfurt School, the emphasis on the changing of social consciousness and the critique of late capitalist ideology is based on the attempt to develop and apply Marx and Engels' analysis in The German Ideology concerning the active role of social consciousness as a necessary precondition for socialism because the socialist revolution is the first qualitative transformation of society which requires the conscious pursuit and establishment of the socialist goal.(347) As this study argues, this emphasis is to be understood not as a deviation from Marx's materialism, but as a development of the dialectical method in relation to its mature object: late capitalism. Moreover, if socialism as a conscious project is emphasized, it strengthens the connection between socialism and liberty. The conscious participation of the working class and its allies in the construction of socialism, directly implies the radical participatory democracy which Marx and Engels envisaged as the self-emancipation of the working class, and the planning of human and natural resources for the benefit of human need by the associated producers.

Thus, we have attempted to clarify these decisive points in relation to Erich Fromm's contribution to critical social theory and



prepared the ground for a discussion of the role of critical theory as ideology critique, the respective responses of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse to the role of Marxism in the twentieth century, the role of the socialist intellectual in the transition between capitalism and socialism, and finally, an assessment of the general response of the Frankfurt School to conceptualizing the problem of the crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL THEORY AND THE CRITIQUE OF LATE CAPITALIST IDEOLOGY

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To give an adequate account of the flaws of critical theory in its attempt to reconstitute Marxian theory and the subjective dimension it has been argued that critique must focus on the validity of critical theory as Marxian social theory. In this study the attempt has been made to go beyond the vulgar materialist position according to which philosophical concerns can be reduced to 'scientific sociology' by establishing that philosophical concerns are not abolished by the advent of Marxian social theory (though they may be neglected) but rather philosophy as an independent realm of knowledge comes to its historical transcendence and is preserved by the concerns of the critical theory of society. The argument is underpinned by an attempt to develop an immanent critique of critical theory based upon criteria suggesting how and why critical theorists depart from the philosophy of praxis in the development of their work.

In this chapter, therefore, Adorno and Horkheimer's shift in the later 1930s from the defence of the pivotal point of Marxian theory, namely, the concept of the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class, is analysed. Their speculative justification for the shift theoretically coincided with a move towards the integration into their work of Weber's technological rationality thesis, supplemented by the Institute's

interpretation of Hilferding's concept of 'organised capitalism' developed by their major political economist, Frederick Pollock, in his essays on 'state-capitalism' (1).

It is important to note the theoretical differences on the questions raised in this chapter between Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm, and Marcuse, though it may be observed that Marcuse was influenced decisively by major tenets in the thought of Horkheimer and Adorno. Marcuse and Fromm, however, remain sensitive to the need to develop any disparate possibilities under late capitalism to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Thus after One Dimensional Man, for example, (published in 1964) Marcuse began to modify his perspective to account for the actions of 'minoritarian groups' and their potential role as catalysts in counteracting reification, by projecting in theory and practice the possibilities for radical social change.

But in investigating critical theory's abandonment of the defence of the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class, it is argued that it became ideological in two main senses. First, it tended to replace the notion of the contradiction between the forces and relations of production with the notion of 'instrumental reason', thus reinforcing the thesis according to which the working class has been permanently integrated into bourgeois society, and neglecting the historically contingent character of such 'integration' and inadequately locating its source and historical limitations. Secondly, as a result of their neglect of the dialectic of labour

and thus of the possibilities of praxis under late capitalism, revolt is viewed, particularly by Horkheimer and Adorno, as virtually futile. This viewpoint, it is argued, is profoundly mistaken, and ultimately reinforces the ideological hegemony of late capitalism. This chapter seeks to uncover this theoretical shift from Marxian premises vis-a-vis the possibilities for radical social change to Weberian and Freudian influenced models of history and social action; and subsequently, to show where the work of the critical theorists is flawed and also where it made a contribution to the critique of late capitalist domination.

In critically analysing this shift in critical theory it is necessary to challenge the neo-fatalist conclusions concerning the possibilities for radical social change drawn by the Frankfurt School. This will be done by investigating the theoretical sources of the movement in the critical theorists' thought; and finally, by critically assessing the political analysis of the labour movement in the inter-war years which lies implicitly at the heart of the Frankfurt School's pessimism.

Critical Theory And The Philosophy Of Praxis

The Role of Marxism in Philosophy

This section presents a discussion of the basic flaws in the Frankfurt School's attempt to reconstitute the Marxian project on the basis of reintroducing a theory of subjectivity into the critique of late capitalism. As has been previously noted, the Frankfurt School was aware of the weakness of Engels' reversion to a positivistic epistemology which, despite Engels' own protestations (2), was utilized by the intellectual representatives of the Second International to legitimate the revision of historical materialism and the reformist orientation of the German Social Democratic Party (3).

This discussion, it may be noted, does not seek to pursue an interesting flight into the history of ideas, nor a reduction of ideas to historical movements which may be viewed as upholding them; but remains instead an attempt to understand the relation between theory and practice and the quality of theory and the form practice takes in their dialectical interrelation.

Firstly, at issue is what kind of response to the failure and deformation of the Second and Third Internationals theoretically accounts for, and goes beyond the limitations of these movements in theory and practice in a way that is capable of accounting for defeat. Involved in this is the question of restoring subjectivity to Marxian theory whilst avoiding the pitfalls of Weber's thesis of disenchantment and occidental rationality, and Freud's instinct theory and cultural pessimism. This raises the Frankfurt School's

attempt to provide an account of the mediating factor of social consciousness in the dialectical conception of the social totality, avoiding a reduction of subjectivity to the economistic notion according to which changes in the social superstructure result from the unfolding 'economic laws' of history (4). This problem has, for example, been spirited away by the Althusserian school of neo-Marxism which, in recent years, has contrived to go beyond critical theory by arguing that the latter is marked by a 'retreat from science to philosophy', and thus 'a retreat from politics to psychology' and is confined to 'moral indignation'. Further, that critical theory 'rejects all forms of scientific discourse' (5).

David Held has dealt authoritatively with the inconsistencies of these criticisms (6). What is necessary to draw out for the discussion are the roots of this confusion for the purpose of clarifying the arguments advanced in this chapter. This is because such criticisms serve merely to inhibit an accurate understanding of the character of critical theory on the one hand, and obfuscate the logical grounds for overcoming the flaws in critical theory on the other. The basic confusion emanates from the criteria employed to decide the status of critical theory as Marxian social theory (7). The Althusserian school's critique of critical theory has its theoretical roots in neo-Stalinist theoretical and organisational categories. And, as Held effectively demonstrates, it was precisely the pretension to 'scientific orthodoxy' which the Frankfurt School identified as a crucial aspect of the failure of the Third International that the Althusserian argument resurrects against critical theory.

Held argues against the view that, for example, critical theory represents 'a double reduction of science and politics to philosophy'

(8). On the Althusserian viewpoint, Held notes:

The above portrayal of critical theory is for the most part inaccurate and misleading... For critical theory developed, in part, as a critique of precisely that kind of view (the Althusserian notion of Marxism 'as science'- CM) which claimed to have fully captured these phenomena. The debate over what constitutes Marxism, the essential structures of society, the nature of scientific enquiry, etc is inseparable from the genesis of critical theory itself. (9)

Held argues that the 'scientistic' critique of critical theory was insufficiently researched, lacking a thorough acquaintance with the work of the Frankfurt School, and the phases through which their different perspectives and interpretations developed

(10). Held summarizes the argument thus:

the accusation of 'idealism' (against critical theory-CM) rests, as has been pointed out in one recent reply to Anderson, on the unsubstantiated assumption that the influence of idealism was completely negative. The Frankfurt School's and Habermas's concern with idealism (and with a variety of other traditions of social thought and philosophy) was not motivated by a retreat to non-Marxist thinking but by an ambition to revitalize Marxism.

Moreover:

As Marx had turned to Hegel for a method that can be a 'scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen', and for ideas that would bring to life 'hitherto existing materialism', so the critical theorists looked to Hegel for similar reasons.

And thus decisively:

They were faced with an orthodoxy in Marxism (established by the Third International in particular) that reduced the Marxian project to an ideology that could legitimate Stalinism, a science that could steer an all powerful state, and a body of ideas that ran directly contrary to the revolutionary, emancipatory and fundamentally democratic dimensions of Marx's programme. At a theoretical level the reduction of Marxism to dialectical materialism trivialized the significance of human agency, and, at a political level, justified the exclusion of the mass of the people from active participation in the decisions that affect their lives.

Thus, Held argues:

As Marx indicated in the Thesis on Feuerbach, idealism restores insight into the 'active side' of materialism. The retrieval of precisely this aspect of materialism - the interplay between sensuous human activity and nature, between human subjectivity and second nature - enabled the critical theorists, at various stages in their careers, to restore to the centre of Marxism some of the most radical and subversive elements of Marx's work. (11)

These notable achievements of critical theory, it can thus be argued, are worth defending and developing, and have a direct significance with regard to the revitalization of Marxian social theory which has been given added impetus with the crisis and decline in the influence of Stalinism over the international labour movement (12). The interest generated in the Frankfurt School and the renaissance of Marxist humanism has been made possible by, and has contributed to, the crisis of Stalinism in the post war years.

Thus, the attempt to create an adequate understanding of social consciousness by rejecting philosophy for a scientific Marxist sociology as if only a positivistic social scientific theory is adequate to the task of social inquiry and materialistic critique of capitalist society is mistaken, because it forgets that Marx's



critique of philosophy was dialectical and not formalistic. That is to say, philosophy is viewed by Marx as 'abolished' historically as an independent sphere of knowledge, but it comes to devolve upon the internal relation between social theory and historical reality (13). But philosophical problems remain as questions of critical social theory and thus philosophy cannot be abolished without being realized (14). Thus the question of reconstituting Marxism to render it conceptually adequate to the investigation of reification under late capitalism cannot dodge the questions which Georg Lukacs and Karl Korsch reflected upon and the Frankfurt School responded to from the early 1930s against a backdrop of the failed European Revolution, Stalinism, and Fascism (15). The problem, then, is the evaluation of the Frankfurt School's contribution to reconstituting and elaborating a Marxist account of subjectivity. Our task is to assess critical theory's contribution to the Marxist tradition and thus its status as an adequate advance upon orthodox Marxism. Reviewing the argument in this study it will be recalled that the evaluation of critical theory advanced involves two factors already discussed. First, Fromm's critique of Freudian instinct theory for an adequate understanding of social consciousness. Second, the evaluation of critical theory involves sensitivity towards the phases and differences between the critical theorists. Hence the question arises: What criteria do we adopt to evaluate the status of the contribution of the critical theorists?

Arguably, the criteria offered by critical theory is insufficient. It rests, as we have seen, upon a contemplative conception of theory and practice, and upon an insufficiently differentiated use of

Lukacs' concept of reification which led to theoretical and empirical errors. The Frankfurt School compounded the Lukacsian problem of the rise of the proletariat to class-consciousness, by adding to it psychoanalytic categories to account for the proletariat's 'irrational' responses to objective social conditions. The theoretical weakness of the Frankfurt School's model of social change was greater because, unlike Lukacs, the historical role of the Leninist party was rejected, and the centrality of class-struggle displaced by a greater emphasis upon socio-psychological factors inhibiting the development of class-consciousness regardless of the severity of class-conflict.

Peter Binns has pointed to the essential component in Marxian theory by which it attains status as an emancipatory human science. It must, he writes be 'understood as explaining the conditions and circumstances under which the self-emancipation of the working class is both possible and necessary.' Thus, 'Lukacs at least understood that the role of Marxism in philosophy (and mutatis mutandis for social theory - CM) was to conceptualize and defend the notion of the collective self-emancipation of the working class, even if the way he did it is open to criticism.'<sup>(16)</sup>

Binns draws to our attention Lukacs' criterion which is flexible enough so as to avoid reductionism but is dialectical in that the validity of the theory is integrally related to the project of the self-emancipation of the proletariat. Lukacs' theory is, therefore, mediated by praxis. Even if, as Binns notes, Lukacs' conception fails to avoid the criticism of voluntarism because it neglects the centrality of the Marxian concept of labour for an emphasis on the

effects of reification, nonetheless, the decisive point remains that Lukacs' defence of the intervention of Marxism into social theory and philosophy leads into history and the dilemmas of class-struggle and not out of the latter.

#### Horkheimer's concept of critical theory

When we examine the differences between the critical theorists it becomes clear that Horkheimer's position, for example, initially follows Lukacs' argument as developed in History and Class Consciousness. Held quotes Horkheimer and summarizes his position:

In the context of capitalist social relations, the needs of the whole community as well as those of the individual are distorted and denied. The era of large economic combines and the culture industry simply reinforces these trends. Therefore, the political task is to liberate the individual from the conditions of individualism. (possessive individualism - CM) 'The overcoming of this contradiction, not the repression of individual interests, is the task which...is to be solved only through a definite change in the relations of production, the foundation of the whole society'.

Held continues:

This task is represented by Horkheimer as the struggle to realize the standpoint ('interests', 'needs') of 'most of society's members'. In a number of aphorisms in 'Dämmerung', in 'Remarks on science and crisis' (1932) and in 'The dispute over rationalism in contemporary philosophy' (1934), Horkheimer implied that this standpoint is the standpoint of the 'progressive social forces' who have become progressive by virtue of their position in the productive progress. Theory must conform to the 'mental (geistigen) and materialistic situation...of a particular social class' - the proletariat.(17)

Thus as Held further states:

For the young Horkheimer, the important thing about the proletariat is that it is developing needs which cannot be satisfied by capitalism's rigid distribution of scarce values - needs which, if adequately articulated, can be fulfilled only through the realization of capitalism's promise of 'justice, equality and freedom'. Hence if those needs are transformed into militant class-consciousness, they can become the basis for the actualization of the universalistic principles on which capitalism was founded.(18)

The early Horkheimer aligned himself, in his concept of a critical theory of society, with the universal interests of the proletariat, as does Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness. The self-emancipation of the working class is central to the thought of the early Horkheimer. However, Horkheimer, over a decade after History and Class Consciousness was written - and thus with Stalinism in the ascendant - draws back from Lukacs' Leninist solution to the uneven development of class consciousness and penetration of reification into all areas of intellectual and material culture. Horkheimer was forced to confront in his work the growing divorce of theory and practice, and consequently the increased abstractness of the notion of a rational society as the determinate negation of capitalist society. As Held notes of Horkheimer:

The notion of what constitutes a 'rational society' is (like Adorno's notion of unfulfilled possibilities) underdeveloped. On Horkheimer's view this is inevitable: the truths to be drawn out are primarily negations. Yet the unpacking, concretization and elaboration of the idea of a rational society seems of central importance if it is to become something more than an abstract standard accessible only to isolated theorists.(19)

It can thus be argued that Horkheimer cannot avoid the same elitist implications which Lukacs draws, and merely exchanges

Lukacs' Leninist Party for the isolated intellectual. Held notes: 'How are we to differentiate what Horkheimer held to be immanent and potential from those who claim to represent an alternative view - the party, intellectuals, other critical theorists?'(20) With the impact of the experience of intellectuals such as Korsch and Lukacs on their thought, the critical theorists undertook a tripartite conception of intellectual, party, and masses:

The transcendence of the gap and the tension between parties, and the superceding of the theoretical limitations of both, depended, Horkheimer argued, on the overcoming of the conditions that divided the working class. What could be done to aid this process? How could the theorist intervene? (21)

It may first be noted that it is apparent that the problem of theory and practice remained an important problem for critical theorists in the development of their work. The question of the role of the socialist intellectual in relation to the self-emancipation of the working class has always remained one of the most contentious issues. To its credit the Frankfurt School attempted at least to confront the issue, which was of crucial practical as well as theoretical importance in the 1930s.

Horkheimer's response to the dilemmas of the socialist intellectual are discussed in his Traditional and Critical Theory (22). In this essay Horkheimer broaches the idea of a tripartite division of labour between the critical theorist, advanced elements of the working class, and those drawn to the latter in the class as a whole. In this conception, the theorist has an important role, whose insertion in this dialectical relationship aids the

fermentation of class consciousness and a counter-hegemony. Considering the impression, which is often given of the Frankfurt School, according to which the critical theorists were content to remain intellectual mandarins (23) remote from the working class, it is worth quoting Horkheimer in full to clarify his position.

If, however, the theoretician and his specific object are seen as informing a dynamic unity with the oppressed class, so that his presentation of societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force within it to stimulate change, then his real function emerges. The course of the conflict between the advanced sectors of the class and the individuals who speak out the truth concerning it, as well as of the conflict between the most advanced sectors with their theoreticians and the rest of the class, is to be understood as a process of interactions in which awareness comes to flower along with its liberating but also aggressive forces which incite while also requiring discipline. The sharpness of the conflict shows in the ever present possibility of tension between the theoretician and the class which his thinking is to serve.(24)

The position of Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto (25) from which Horkheimer's conception was perhaps inspired, springs to mind when Horkheimer describes the intellectual strategy of the critical theorist. Horkheimer continues,

This truth becomes clearly evident in the person of the theoretician; he exercises an aggressive critique not only against the conscious defenders of the status quo but also against distracting, conformist, or utopian tendencies within his own household.(26)

Horkheimer also attacks Mannheim's conception of the intelligentsia arguing that his analysis is subject to an undifferentiated relativism in which, 'detachment from all classes is an essential mark of the intelligentsia.'(27)

Hence criticism of the supposed neutrality and feigned detachment of the intelligentsia is part of the critical theorist's role. Again, Marx and Engels' description of a part of the bourgeois intelligentsia coming over to the side of the proletariat with the development of class polarization is brought to mind.

Finally, in times when the class struggle hears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole. (28)

However, the events of the inter-war years demoralised Horkheimer (and Adorno) and cut off the critical theorists from a possible relationship with the working class.

The combined impact of the decline and Stalinization of the Russian Revolution, failure of the European Revolution, and especially the rise of Fascism, compounded to bring about a shift in Horkheimer's work, with the intellectual influence of Weber and Freud, by the beginning of the Second World War:

Until the late 1930s Horkheimer still felt that the thought of critical intellectuals could be a stimulating, active factor in the development of political struggles. Critical theory could help to promote a 'self-conscious and organized working class' by fostering a debate between theoreticians, the advanced elements of the class, and those in need of greater awareness about social contradictions. This debate, he held, must unfold as a process of interaction in which growing consciousness develops into a liberating and practical force. However, already in *Dämmerung*, his writings reflected a pessimism about

the success of any such intervention. The 'night of humanity' was threatening.(29)

Consequently, as the 1930s progressed, Horkheimer argued

..for a rejection of orthodox Marxism and its substitution by a reconstructed understanding of Marx's project...

that

...emphasizes the necessity for social theory to explicate the set of interconnections (mediations) that make possible the reproduction and transformation of society, economy, culture and consciousness.(30)

However, it can be argued that Horkheimer's conception, adequate as far as it goes, nonetheless, loses the centrality of the collective self-emancipation of the working class from his perspective:

With the late 1930s Horkheimer became more and more disillusioned about the potential development of the working class. Although he still stressed that the standpoint critical theory makes its own, is conditioned by the productive process and the position of the proletariat, he emphasized, increasingly, that this position can be less and less associated with the practice of the working class..(31)

The Second World War marks the collapse of Horkheimer's defence of the centrality of the collective self-emancipation of the working class and its objective possibility. Thus Held noted: 'It is hard to recognize Horkheimer's original programme for a critique of ideology in his later works.'(32)

The discontinuity in Horkheimer's work, as discussed above, is replicated in the work of Adorno even though Adorno expresses this



discontinuity differently.(33) While in places Adorno's perspective overlaps with Horkheimer's (they grew closer towards the end of the 1930s in their views on the question of the possibility of radical social change (34)) his notion of critical theory is less ambiguous on the question of the possibility of the collective self-emancipation of the working class.(35)

#### Adorno's Negative Dialectics

According to Held, ' Horkheimer's early position was closer to the Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness than Adorno could have ever found acceptable.'(36) Adorno placed in question the possibility of the collective self-emancipation of the working class and consequently recast the relation of theory to practice. In the absence of radical social change and thus the possibility of any significant radicalization of working class social consciousness, theory would, in Adorno's appreciation, have to remain loyal to the remaining objective necessity for a rational society in a new way. If the conditions for the collective self-emancipation of the working class no longer prevailed, Adorno reasoned that the question of revolutionary leadership seemed voluntaristic and irrelevant.

If practice deviated from theory, the theory would have to acknowledge actual historical conditions of the proletariat in its structure. The dialectical character of Marxian theory demanded such a revision; an authentic critical theory could not remain unchanged with time. But if the proletariat could no longer be considered the potential revolutionary class as Marx and Engels had envisaged, theory would have to register this actuality by remaining

negative and thus anticipatory. In this concept of 'immanent critique', however, Adorno came to enshrine the existing divorce of theory and practice by making theoretical critique into an independent practice unto itself.(37) Arguably, Adorno was providing less of an independent moment of criticism on the part of the intellectual committed to the self-emancipation of the proletariat than perhaps a rationalization for the isolation and impotence of the socialist intellectual in the later 1930s. If the latter point is correct, Adorno's concept of 'negative dialectic' would thus appear to succumb to the effects of late capitalist reification in its inability to formulate concepts which locate where needs remain unsatisfied under capitalist society and the extent to which the transformation of working class social consciousness is expressed in the organizations and parties of the labour movement.(38)

Thus, in Adorno's work, the divorce of theory and practice and the loss of the centrality of the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class, is turned into a theoretical point of departure and mourned. Always a creative School, defeat and Adorno's theory of 'negative dialectics' inspired Marcuse's concept of 'remembrance' (39) in which, for example, 'sorrow' becomes a dialectical concept linking potentialities expressed in the past with hope for their realization in a more favourable future.(40)

Instead of the criterion of historical rationality as embodied in the proletariat as the potential creator of a rational society (Lukacs) through self-constituted activity (praxis), Adorno's concept of truth, 'rested' upon a particular type of dialectical

criticism'.(41) Freed from the necessity to relate theory to the vicissitudes of the class struggle as manifested in history, Adorno's concept of 'immanent criticism' ultimately revolves around an axis of what might be described as an undifferentiated theoretical anarchism: propounding unremittingly the critique of the multiplicity of bourgeois forms of domination in intellectual and material culture, whilst devolving on an 'imaginary witness'.(42) Adorno makes the legitimate point that the conception of a future socialist collective can have a repressive ideological function. The Marxist humanist notion of the totality as a normative goal implies a unified image which reduces the particular to the whole, the individual to the existing state of affairs. For Adorno, as with Marcuse (43), socialist democracy implies 'not an affirmative but rather a critical category...A liberated mankind would by no means be a totality.'(44) While upholding the combination socialism-liberty, Adorno's negative dialectics eventually bases itself upon the bourgeois individual and his neo-anarchism prevails. Thus, as Jay shows, Adorno's concept of reification differs from Marcuse's and Lukacs' usage of the term.

Although at times in his own work an apparently Lukacsian usage did appear, reification for Adorno was not equivalent to the alienated objectification of subjectivity, the reduction of a fluid process into a dead thing. Instead, and here Adorno's debt to Nietzsche on the origin of exchange was particularly evident, reification, when he used it in a pejorative sense, meant the suppression of heterogeneity in the name of identity. (45)

Adorno's concept of reification owes more to Nietzsche than to Marx's critique of commodity fetishism from which Lukacs originally

drew in History and Class Consciousness. Hence the source of Adorno's tragic view of the world in nineteenth century romanticism from which the intellectual mandarins of early twentieth century Germany drew in their anti-capitalist revolt.(46) But as argued above (47), the anti-capitalist revolt lingers uneasily between remembrance for a nostalgic past and its possible redemption in an utopian future.(48) The sublation of reification for Adorno is not so much the collective self-emancipation of the working class but, 'rather the restoration of difference and non-identity to the proper place in the non-hierarchical constellation of subjective and objective forces he called peace.'(49) Adorno's concept of reification is, then, a negative attack on the standardized homogeneity of the mass society, hence for Adorno 'the whole is false'. Adorno's fight against a philosophy of identity and totalistic thinking however, was not reactionary. Based upon a political anarchism, its aim was to restore agency to the subject(50), even if Adorno's concept of critical theory failed to go beyond the notion of theory as resistance. (51) In his critique and exposition of the critical theory of Herbert Marcuse, Schoolman notes the significance of the loss of the revolutionary subject, and indeed, of subjectivity itself, for critical theory as a whole.(52) In the Dialectic of Enlightenment Horkheimer and Adorno wrote:

It is not the portrayal of reality as hell on earth but the slick challenge to break out of it that is suspect. If there is anyone today to whom we can pass the responsibilities for the message, we bequeath it not to the 'masses', and not to the individual (who is powerless), but to an imaginary witness - lest it perish with us.(53)

Schoolman pertinently comments:

The whole of advanced industrial society is untrue, but the closed circle of ideological meaning that defines its boundaries includes neither individuals who could grasp the meaning of such an assertion nor concepts that would make the assertion possible. Critical theory, its knowledge of the society and of its alternatives, becomes the property of an imaginary witness, of an individual who no longer exists. The imaginary witness, however, is the mournful and melancholy legacy of a critical spirit born from the horrors of fascism. (54)

The revolutionary class has been eclipsed, and, according to Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, the mass society of late capitalism has made the individual or the possibility of individuality virtually impossible. As Held states of Adorno:

For him history did not indicate that a revolutionary working class movement was likely to materialize in the future. Yet if he and indeed Horkheimer are to avoid the charge of utopianism, then the nature of the 'not yet' - the emancipatory potential - must be analyzed, while a subject of possible emancipation must be identified. In my view too little attention is paid to these concerns and to how one might address them.

Thus Adorno's position weakens the theoretical grounds of critique,

Held continues:

While Adorno refused, for good reason, to offer a static, ahistorical vision of 'utopia' - of unfulfilled possibilities - he did not give the 'utopian moment' sufficiently precise content. Without such precision, the force of critique is weakened. The diffuse nature of the utopian moment implies diffuse criticism; for the 'not yet' remains an unspecified 'wishful image'. (55)

That Horkheimer and Adorno gradually developed an affinity for turning theory itself into practice per-se, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, for example, in which Weber's concept of disenchantment and Freud's cultural pessimism tend to triumph over Marx's dialectical optimism should come as no surprise. As Martin Jay in The Dialectical Imagination (1973) has written, Horkheimer and Adorno's thought is marked by a gradual turn from the notion of class-struggle to the philosophy of history:

The clearest expression of this change was the Institute's replacement of class conflict, that foundation stone of any truly Marxist theory, with a new motor of history. The focus was now on the larger conflict between man and nature both without and within, a conflict whose origins went back to before capitalism and whose continuation, indeed intensification, appeared likely after capitalism would end.(56)

Thus, although Horkheimer and Adorno were sincerely opposed to capitalist society and continued to contribute many fertile insights to the Marxist tradition, they eventually retreated from a defence of the concept of the potential collective self-emancipation of the proletariat. The point at issue is not that between the activist versus the viewpoint of the theoretician, as Phil Slater tends to argue by taking issue with the break in the theory-praxis nexus in his assessment of the Frankfurt School(57), but of the incisiveness of, and claims to, theoretical precision itself. Not just to orientate theory to praxis as if theory exists outside of praxis, but to view theory as a moment in the totality which is integrally related to praxis.

In Sartrean terms perhaps Horkheimer and Adorno could be criticized for 'bad faith' in as much that, as socialist theorists, their social theory remained isolated from the actual vicissitudes of the class-struggle, or was insufficiently related to its historical development. Even a cursory glance at the mass sit down strikes and rise of trade unionism in the United States, the unemployed workers struggles in Britain, and the Spanish revolution and Civil War 1936-7 (to name only three countries), reveals that their work lost the interplay between theory and history and thus the capacity to make an accurate, balanced, socio-political assessment of the meaning of the inter-war years for the labour movement and the prospects for international socialism. Of decisive importance in the inter-war period, with the consolidation of Stalinism in the Soviet Union (and the notion of 'Socialism in One Country'), was the defence of the international context of the class-struggle. Adorno's 'negative dialectics' turns this estrangement of theory from history into a principle of theory itself: perhaps an expression on Adorno's part of his own resignation projected onto the proletariat who themselves have no choice but to continually struggle to survive, and episodically, challenge the institutions and norms of legality of bourgeois society; as Held has noted with regard to the resignation expressed in Adorno's theory: 'If history has any unity, it is that given by suffering.'<sup>(58)</sup>

Thus, ultimately for Adorno, history is not the product of the interplay of class-struggle, but 'suffering'. Granted, suffering is an element, perhaps the larger element periodically, but suffering is only a moment of existence, not its totality. Thus it will be

recalled that, for Marx, struggle represented in itself a form of collective transcendence and exteriorization.(59) Adorno's attitude, in contrast, tends toward the viewpoint that objectification equals reification. To the extent that Adorno's concept of dialectic remains purely negative, it can be argued that it tends to neglect the positive aspects of class struggle, and thus, by default, tends to identify objectification with reification, and in the process, internalizes its self-confessed estrangement of theory and history. Arguably this represents bad faith because commitment is conceived as terminating with theory, passively contemplating the assumed demise of the revolutionary potential of the working class, and moreover, any form of active resistance.(60)

Hence, increasingly detached from any organic connection (if only theoretically conceived), with the working class and its political parties, the critical theorist is no longer able to discern the subject and agent of radical social change. The working class is not only 'no guarantee of correct knowledge'(61) due to its apparent inability to become 'a social force' due to 'the differentiation of social structure'(62), but it has also lost its revolutionary potential as a social class altogether. The integration of the working class is viewed by Horkheimer and Adorno as a completed process. The critical theorist hence becomes the theoretical consciousness of negation. It remains for the self-activity of the working class to revive the dialectical interaction between critical theorist, advanced elements, and class, and become positive. But with the Second World War and the failure of the post-war revolutionary process, the critical theorist, according to Horkheimer



and Adorno, is reduced to impotence. This may indeed be the condition reflected in the position of the radicalized intelligentsia in the immediate post-war years in the United States. But, as mentioned above, what is at stake is the theoretical resistance offerable by the critical theorist, for, on its own grounds, theory has to respond to and anticipate the conditions of the working class in regard to the possibilities for the creation of a socialist society.(63)

However, assuming the character of the defeats of the inter-war years to have been complete on the one hand, and the integration of the working class in the post-war years to be permanent on the other, the isolated critical theorist is reduced to making an undifferentiated appeal for a pre-figurative enlightenment through the perspective of an abstracted humanistic viewpoint. Wellmer, quoting Horkheimer and Adorno summarizes their position following their post-war Dialectic of Enlightenment thesis:

Critical theory therefore remains the pioneer and conscience of a revolutionary, transforming praxis. But the future subjects of that praxis are no longer to be discerned so simply: the possibility of their existing is dependent solely on the 'intransigence of theory in regard to the lack of consciousness which allows society to adopt an inflexible pattern of thought'. With a resignation born of the experience of insanity systematized, the authors of The Dialectic of Enlightenment come finally to the question of the very possibility of enlightenment: 'If it is possible today to speak to anyone (in this regard), then we pass on the responsibility not to the so-called masses, and not to the individual (who is powerless), but to an imaginary witness - lest it disappear with us entirely.'(64)

Later, Marcuse expressed the same argument in One Dimensional Man:

'On theoretical and empirical grounds, the dialectical concept pronounces its own hopelessness. The human reality is its history and, in it, contradictions do not explode by themselves.'<sup>(65)</sup>

However, the critical theorist's 'resignation born of the experience of insanity systematized' needs to be understood in its historical and human dimensions. As Aronson has eloquently shown, the affect of the Holocaust on the Jewish psyche cannot be underestimated.<sup>(66)</sup> While there is no evidence of the critical theorists being influenced by Zionism, there is an ethnic connection which evidently influences their work individually and collectively.<sup>(67)</sup> Although only half-Jewish, it is perhaps Adorno who expresses the grief and guilt of the survivor most eloquently and disturbingly. He wrote:

Whether after Auschwitz you can go on living - especially whether one who escaped by accident, one who by rights should have been killed, may go on living. His mere survival calls for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was spared.<sup>(68)</sup>

The horror of the extermination camps resonates through critical theory, and rightly so. In being the repository of the conscience of the working class as a revolutionary subject, critical theory thus performs a political function: by preserving the memory of this horror of the twentieth century it serves to inoculate post-war capitalism against complete forgetting and complacency. The hopelessness Adorno expresses is perhaps the adequate and only expression of the historical terminus of events leading to the Second World War and the Holocaust.<sup>(69)</sup> Simultaneously, the human

dimension acknowledges the horror but resists succumbing to the hopelessness it invokes. Aronson notes: 'Frankl points out, hope for the future, a sense that "our sacrifice did have meaning" were among the very conditions for the survival in the Nazi camps.'<sup>(70)</sup>

Adorno's resignation is understandable to the extent that it captures the depth of the experience of abandonment <sup>(71)</sup> and madness of the extermination camps.<sup>(72)</sup> However, Adorno focuses on defeat. What he forgets is the existential attitude of resistance, as Aronson defines 'hope'.<sup>(73)</sup> In this human sense, then, Adorno's resignation remains premature.

The significance of this discussion can be illustrated by examining Bruno Bettelheim's reflections on the experience of Fascism. Bettelheim has argued that the experience of Fascism needs to be remembered and understood by future generations after those who lived through the Second World War have died. <sup>(74)</sup> Indeed, it should be noted that the horrors of the extermination camps of Nazi Germany and the extent of human destructiveness unleashed by the Second World War are difficult for reason to grasp, and need to be understood in terms of the irrational dynamic of monopoly capitalist society.<sup>(75)</sup> In his psycho-social study of the extermination camps Bettelheim argues, the lesson of the Frank family is that despite the horror of Fascism and persecution, facing reality is the first step to resistance and freedom.<sup>(76)</sup> He argues that the Franks attempted to continue their family life as usual and denied the reality of the Nazi threat posed to them.

All the Franks wanted was to go on with life as nearly as possible in the usual fashion. Little Anne, too, wanted only to go on with life as usual, and nobody can blame her. But hers

was certainly not a necessary fate, much less a heroic one; it was a senseless fate. The Franks could have faced the facts and survived, as did many Jews living in Holland.(77)

Further: 'The universal success of the Diary of Anne Frank suggests how much the tendency to deny is still with us, while her story itself demonstrates how such denial can hasten our own destruction.'(78) Adding this proviso, Bettelheim concurs with critical theory that all 'reification is a forgetting'.(79)

It is an onerous task to take apart such a humane and moving story, arousing so much compassion for gentle Anne Frank. But I believe that its world-wide acclaim cannot be explained unless we recognise our wish to forget the gas chambers and to glorify attitudes of extreme privation, of continuing to hold on to our attitudes as usual even in a holocaust.(80)

As Bettelheim's study shows, those with an active hope in the future, especially the politicised prisoners, stood a better chance of survival. Resistance, no matter how hopeless, serves human dignity and this acts in service of self-preservation. Commitment, resistance, in short, human values, define the boundaries of hopelessness and the possibilities of action. This existential posture is evident in the work of Bettelheim and Frankl.(81) Amongst the critical theorists it can be found in Fromm and Marcuse.(82) However, although Fromm and Marcuse made important contributions to the revival of an international socialist consciousness in the post-war years(83), it can be argued that Horkheimer and Adorno's resignation also expresses an attitude of passivity.(84) Their faith in the working class was readdressed to 'emancipatory social forces' and then to the 'imaginary witness' - in

short to the individual within the radicalized intelligentsia. Critical theory, for Horkheimer and Adorno, ends as a parody of their own intellectual relationship. While such a condition reflects a real historical experience for intellectuals, for example (85), it can be argued that Horkheimer and Adorno internalized the effects of the accumulation of defeats which led to the Second World War and the extermination camps. While their resignation is historically understandable, on the human and the political levels it is clearly deficient. Even on the human level, of existential commitment to resist oppressive social conditions whatever the chances of liberation - for example the Warsaw Ghetto uprising (86) - one looks to Horkheimer and Adorno's work in vain. On the political level more generally no resistance is possible without a challenge to bourgeois hegemony in terms of an articulated political project and strategy for social change. In this regard, Jay notes:

Although he paid lipservice to the importance of praxis and was certainly no friend of the productionist bias of orthodox Marxism - indeed, Marx himself, according to Adorno, had wanted to turn the world into a 'giant workhouse' - he nonetheless was so fearful of the instrumentalization of theory that he had little of real interest to say about politics. There was, in fact, no sustained discussion of the public sphere, bourgeois democracy, the state or political organization in his work. Although he implicitly drew on the arguments of other Institute members who did treat these issues, his own interests clearly lay elsewhere. Nor was there any reverence for the political as the realm of freedom that one finds in others of his generation like Hanna Arendt, who was to be so influential on Habermas. Although Adorno staunchly rejected the accusation that he was an apolitical aesthete, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this was what many of his German critics liked to call a 'political deficit' in his theory.

For although Adorno's interests were 'culture, society and the human psyche',

when Adorno spoke of power, it was almost always in terms of a pervasive and diffuse domination that transcended any identifiable political realm.(87)

In his depoliticised social theory, Adorno's thought is more a reflection of the atomisation of consciousness than a critique of the latter. Thus his concept of power brings to mind Orwell's description of the fatalistic attitude of a worker reduced to a passive role in capitalist society. Adorno's attitude towards the possibilities of resistance parallels the omnipotent view of bourgeois domination Orwell describes so well in The Road To Wigan Pier (88), for example.

Indeed, these are decisive criticisms of Adorno's theory and amount, as discussed above, to more than a political deficit, but also - on humanistic grounds - bad faith.(89) Bettelheim's study has been discussed because he shows that human attitudes and values play a decisive role in the survival of the extermination camps and to show that his examples of resistance throw into relief the character of Adorno's political and moral paralysis and theoretical passivity. While Adorno harps on despair, Bettelheim - a victim of Nazi persecution itself - emphasizes resistance in the face of an almost hopeless situation - the extermination camp.(90) Adorno's position, as discussed above, reminds one of atonement, and while it cannot be dismissed for the reasons already discussed above - it must be considered as ultimately a personal response - it must also be viewed as deficient from the standpoint of Marxist humanism.(91)

## Marxism And Tragedy

For Bettelheim and the Frankfurt School the extermination camps represent the logical extreme of commodity fetishism.(92) Fromm has noted the new possibilities of destructiveness created by the 'evolution of traditional weapons'.(93) For example, the division of labour within the bomber aeroplane and the technical separation of the experience of cause and effect reduces the experience of mass killing to a passive affect and thus to a reduction of guilt.(94) In short: 'Modern aerial warfare destruction follows the principle of modern technical production, in which both the worker and the engineer are completely alienated from the product of their work.'(95) Moreover, the organisation of the mass extermination camps followed the same principle (of commodity fetishism):

At one end of the process the victims were selected in accordance with the criterion of their capability for doing useful work. Those who did not fall into this category were led into the chambers and told that it was for a hygienic purpose; the gas was let in; clothes and other useful objects such as hair, gold teeth, were removed from bodies, sorted out and 'recycled', and the corpses were burned. The victims were 'processed' methodically, efficiently; the executioners did not see the agony; they participated in the economic-political programme of the Führer, but were one step removed from direct and immediate killing with their own hands.(96)

Indeed, the Frankfurt School has indicated the extension of reification in the analysis of instrumental reason.(97) The horrors of the Second World War are incontestable. Mandel, in a recent study, writes:

The overall picture of the ideology prevalent during World War II is thus sombre indeed. Internationalist or even simply humanist consciousness were at a historical low point - so much so that many thought that an irreversible slide towards

barbarism had already set in, Orwell's 1984 being the prototype of such premonition.(98)

However, given the critical assessment of Adorno's theory in this study, it is necessary to question his and Horkheimer's attitude towards the defeats which led to the Second World War and the Holocaust.

Adorno, as discussed, ended by retreating from the defence of the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class. The 'imaginary witness' reflected 'the only locus of possible opposition to the status quo' or, as argued here, the position of the isolated intellectual; or as Jay writes: 'the autonomous male individual produced by the bourgeois family'.(99) The tragic quality of Adorno's work is shown in his inability to articulate an alternative political resistance in which the Marxist intellectual can participate in late capitalist society. Adorno's intransigence hinges on defeat which ever way his thought turns. He was unable to demonstrate another form of intransigence, one rooted not only in a rational faith in humankind's potential but also an understanding of the heterogeneous possibilities of social action at a number of levels which Trotsky expresses in regard to 'unfinished social processes' in, for example, his analysis of the social character of post-revolutionary Russia.(100) Indeed, Trotsky's analysis would have shocked Adorno, for it finishes by arguing that a genuinely dialectical analysis must ultimately serve as a 'basis for action'.(101) Adorno's failure to understand the origins and effects of the post-war long wave of expansion of the capitalist



economy on the consciousness of the underlying population underlies the inability of his theory to assess historical trends and their limitations. Moreover, Adorno's theory treats the defeats of the working class as a completed process. What Adorno, therefore, forgets, is that the Second World War and the extermination camps were not inevitable. As Mandel writes, one must be aware of a long causal chain of events which led to the Holocaust, and it is worth quoting in full:

When we say that the germ of the Holocaust is to be found in colonialism's and imperialism's extreme racism, we do not mean that the germ inevitably and automatically produces the disease in its worst form. For that eventuality, racist madness has to be combined with the deadly partial rationality of the modern industrial system. Its efficiency must be supported by a servile civil service, by a consistent disregard of individual critical judgement as basically 'subversive' (Befehl ist Befehl), by thousands of passive executive agents (in fact: passive accomplices of crime), by the conquest of power by desperado-type political personnel of a specific bourgeoisie and that class's readiness to let them exercise political power, by a frenzy of a va banque aggression unleashed, not only by these desperados, but also by significant sectors of big business itself; by cynical realpolitik leading to the worst blackmail and systematic state terrorism (Goering, Hitler and co. threatening to eradicate successively, Prague, Rotterdam, London, Coventry - 'wir werden ihre Städte ausradieren!'; something which became credible only if such threats were occasionally implemented), by the gradual implementation of that state terrorism unleashing an implacable logic of its own; by a fetid substratum of unconscious guilt and shame, which had to be rationalised in spite (or better: in function) of monstrous crimes. The Holocaust only comes at the end of this long causal chain. But it can and must be explained through it. Indeed, those who understood the chain were able to foresee it.(102)

As a result of Adorno's abandonment of the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class his theory was taken into a cul-de-sac. Blind to the 'genuinely dynamic impulses in our

society' (103) Adorno's thought, cut adrift from the class in whose interests it had been moored, increasingly reflected the fragmented consciousness which critical theory originally aimed to dissolve.(104) Thus Susan Buck-Morss writes:

The real issue is whether Adorno's attempt at a revolution within philosophy, modelled self-consciously after Schoenberg, in fact succumbed to the same fate, whether his principle of anti-system itself became a system...when the method of negative dialectics becomes total, philosophy threatened to come to a standstill as well, and the New Left of the 1960s not unjustly criticised Adorno for taking Critical Theory into a dead end.(105)

Indeed, Adorno's critical theory is more reminiscent of a neo-anarchist social philosophy in terms of its anti-system stance. His negative dialectics represents a protest against the decline of the individual in mass society, and is an activity designed to restore the subject as agent. In this somewhat restricted definition of the potential and role of theory in the mid twentieth century we have come a long way from the more assertive optimism of Lukacs' and Korsch's Marxism. Nonetheless, critical theory cannot be understood except against the background of Lukacs and Korsch, as shown in previous chapters. Moreover, against the historical events of the period leading to the catastrophe of the Second World War and the Holocaust, we have shown that there are no grounds for any naive optimism.(106) Again, it is important to remember this crucial point when critically assessing Adorno's theory. As discussed in relation to Bettelheim's work, and the concept of remembrance in critical theory itself (107), any simplistic dismissal of Adorno is an expression of profound amnesia or ignorance of the historical

dimension of his work. It would express, to paraphrase Bettelheim, the attitude of wanting to 'carry on as usual' and would convey a supreme disregard for the fact that , as Aronson argues,

After all, for so long, and in so many ways, Hitler won. He did destroy six million Jews and pitched the world into a war in which forty million died. Central Europe is effectively judenrein today.

And the victims of Stalinism?

Existing Soviet life hardly redeems the victims of Stalin: the moment of de-Stalinization has given way to a politically, socially, and economically arrested society of which cynicism and corruption are the dominant features as well as the political props.(108)

Jay also makes a similar point:

But in a century when every revolution has in some sense been betrayed, when virtually all attempts at cultural subversion have been neutralized, and when the threat of nuclear Aufhebung of the dialectic of enlightenment continues unchecked, it is difficult to summon the self-confidence to call his melancholy unwarranted.(109)

There are no grounds for unwarranted optimism. But, as discussed above, on historical ground, Adorno's melancholy is justified. Indeed, a sense of atonement is a genuine and perhaps necessary process for those who are the survivors. For those who were not even born to experience the Second World War critical theory is important for the contribution it makes toward remembrance, and exists as memory, conscience, and as a challenge to the 'business as usual' consciousness of late capitalism. However, bereavement can

also be suppressed anger and the will to go on living as a token of a survivor's resistance. It is, as argued above in reference to Bettelheim and Frankl, both victims of the extermination camps who lived to make sense of their survival, this attitude of resistance which Adorno's theory lacks. Adorno's melancholy should not, therefore, be a signal of defeat period, but the inspiration for a broader, less naive, Marxist humanism.(110) A Marxism which does not devalue the subjective, inwardness, conscience, and personal resistance in all its myriad forms, but in fact appeals to individual needs and sensibilities in a counter-hegemonic project.(111) What this study questions then, is the adequacy of Adorno's theory as Marxist theory, and if it can be shown that the premises which account for his resignation in regard to the potential self-emancipation of the working class (112) are mistaken, then a Marxist humanist position remains valid, and while we cannot afford optimism, we can afford hope.(113) As Susan Buck-Morss (quoted above) shows, Adorno's theory was caught in its own self-contradiction of protest and impotence (114) at the end. His elitist disregard for political praxis, his marked indifference or unwillingness to promote action feeds the despair of being powerless to change the existing state of affairs, even though, as argued in chapter one, Adorno had intended to 'turn the arguments of mandarin cultural despair in an ultimately positive direction.'(115)

Before we turn to a critical re-examination of the premises behind critical theory's resignation in regard to the centrality of the self-emancipation of the working class in Marxian theory, it might also be noted that Jay's guarded defence of Adorno's

melancholy neglects the impact critical theory might have for future praxis. Thus Fromm's criticism of Marcuse in this context applies also to Adorno: 'To express the decay of a society in literature and art and to analyse it scientifically is valid enough, but it is the opposite of revolutionary if the artist or writer shares in, and glorifies the morbidity of a society he wants to change.'(116)

Thus when Adorno says 'nothing but despair can save us' (117), we are confronted with a bewildering statement. In the light of our previous discussion it could be argued that here Adorno is making the case for the importance of remembrance and its political function of preventing Fascism from emerging again. In his atonement Adorno is expressing 'Never Again! '. But it must be added in view of the need for a perspective of commitment and resistance, Adorno's notion of remembrance cannot be a complete and therefore adequate response to tragedy. As Peter Sedgwick has written:

But the trouble with despair is that it insists on spreading. The hopeless person is not content to drown alone, but must pull others in too: their hope is a threat to his or her bleakness, their vital movement a denial of the frozen fixed state which he or she has elected. In particular, intellectuals without hope are necessarily driven to generalise their own condition by means of a theory which attacks the theories of the hopeful.(118)

As Fromm notes for the theorist whose despair shares in the morbidity of the society he or she wants to change, there are reactionary, or at least, counter-productive, implications for future praxis. And as Sedgwick notes, despair tends to be contagious, when the germ that is required is resistance and praxis.

Hence, in order to critically re-examine the Frankfurt School's pessimism and present an alternative interpretation of the defeats of the inter-war years from a Marxist humanist perspective, it is necessary to place the analysis in the wider context of the Frankfurt School's analysis of imperialism. Then, the discussion must also re-examine, in the light of our analysis presented thus far, the implications of the 'technological rationality' thesis in regard to the way in which critical theorists conceptualized the problem of the reification of the working class.

From The Philosophy Of Praxis To Technological Rationality And  
The Eclipse Of The Revolutionary Subject

Late Capitalism and the Integration of the Proletariat

It has been argued in this study that a more comprehensive appreciation of the significance and weaknesses of critical theory can be obtained by recognizing the economic propositions which in fact guided the Frankfurt School, rather than by reducing critical theory to philosophy. It will be recalled that Pollock's work on political economy, particularly his essays on 'state-capitalism', formed an important basis underlying the social theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse. But the economic and political basis for the social theory of the Frankfurt School, and which contextualized Pollock's concept of state-capitalism, is broader. It emerges from the Frankfurt School's critical evaluation of orthodox Marxism as represented by the revolutionary wing of the Second International, specifically Lenin's economic-political assessment of imperialism and the chances of international socialist revolution following World War One. It is often forgotten in commentaries on the Frankfurt School that their assessment of the wave of international socialism following World War One, and its defeat in Central Europe and its degeneration in Soviet Russia, is of decisive importance for their theoretical development, forming a back drop with decisive historical influence. Marcuse formulates a position to explain the socio-economic background for the failure of international socialism, and Lenin's interpretation of events in

particular. It is significant that Marcuse draws upon sociological studies by Hilferding and by Kautsky.

Following the failure of the German Revolution of 1918-23 especially, Marcuse notes that the Soviet leadership recognized that 'the revolutionary potential of the industrial working class seemed to recede throughout the advanced capitalist world.' He continues:

We therefore take as a starting point Lenin's analysis of the situation of the proletariat at the imperialist stage. Significant in this interpretation is the underestimation of the economic and political potentialities of capitalism, and of the change in the position of the proletariat. In fact the refusal to draw the theoretical consequences from the new situation characterizes the entire development of Leninism and is one of the chief reasons for the gap between theory and practice in Soviet Marxism. For, while Lenin from the beginning of his activity reoriented the revolutionary strategy of his party in accordance with the new situation, his theoretical conception did not follow suit. Lenin's retention of the classical notion of the revolutionary proletariat, sustained with the help of the theory of the labour bureaucracy and the avante-garde, revealed its inadequacy from the beginning. Even prior to the First World War it became clear that the 'collaborationist' part of the proletariat was quantitatively and qualitatively different from a small upper stratum that had been corrupted by monopoly capital, and that the Social Democratic Party and trade union bureaucracy were more than 'traitors' - rather their policy reflected pretty exactly the economic and social condition of the majority of the organized working classes in the advanced industrial countries. And indeed, Lenin's strategy of the revolutionary avante-garde pointed to a conception of the proletariat which went far beyond a mere reformulation of the classical Marxian concept; his struggle against 'economism' and the doctrine of spontaneous mass action, his dictum that class consciousness has to be brought upon the proletariat 'from without', anticipate the later factual transformation of the proletariat from the subject to an object of the revolutionary process. (119)

What is clear from Marcuse's argument is the idea that Lenin failed to appreciate the changed socio-economic situation of the proletariat to the extent to which broader sections of the working



class beyond the labour bureaucracy had been integrated into the hegemonic hierarchies of advanced capitalist society. Marcuse continues:

Lenin aimed beyond the exigencies of the specific Russian situation, at a general international development of Marxism, which in turn reflected the trend of large sections of organized labour towards 'class cooperation'. As this trend increased, it threatened to vitiate the notion of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject on which the whole Marxist strategy depended. Lenin's formulations intended to save Marxian orthodoxy from the reformist onslaught, but they soon became part of a conception that no longer assumed the historical coincidence between the proletariat and progress which the notion of the 'labour aristocracy' still retained. The groundwork was laid for the development of the Leninist party where the true interest and the true consciousness of the proletariat were lodged in a group different from the majority of the proletariat. The centralistic organization, which was first justified by and applied to the 'immaturity' of backward conditions, was to become the general principle of strategy on an international scale.

Thus:

The construction of the Leninist party (or party leadership) as the real representative of the proletariat could not bridge the gap between the new strategy and the old theoretical conception. Lenin's theory of the avant-garde acknowledged in fact what it denied in theory, namely, that a fundamental change had occurred in the objective and subjective conditions for the revolution.

Marcuse then turns to the work of Rudolf Hilferding who had written an interpretation of these changes in the capitalist system in 1910:

He pointed out that, under the leadership of finance capital, the entire national economy would be mobilized for expansion, and that this expansion, through the collusion of giant monopolistic and semi-monopolistic enterprises, would tend towards large scale international integration, economic as well as political. On this new intercontinental market, production and distribution would be to a great extent controlled and regimented by a cartel of the most powerful capitalist

interests. In the huge dominion of such a 'general cartel', the contradictions of the capitalist system could be greatly controlled, profits for the ruling groups secured, and a high level of wages for labour within the dominion sustained - at the expense of the intensified exploitation of markets and populations outside the dominion. Hilferding thought that such international capitalist planning would require the abolition of democratic liberalism in the economy as well as in the political and ideological sphere; individualism and humanism would be replaced by an aggressive militarist nationalism and authoritarianism.

It is significant to note at this juncture that Marcuse and other critical theorists viewed the totalitarian tendencies of late capitalism, of militarism, the permanent war economy, and the replacement of humanism and individualism with nationalism and authoritarianism before the rise of Fascism: in fact, from imperialism and the advanced stages of the development of monopoly capitalism. According to Marcuse these tendencies were also identified and discussed by Karl Kautsky 'in his concept of "ultra-imperialism"'. Marcuse completes his sociological explanation of the integration of the labouring classes, and it is worth quoting in full.

These developments were presented only as tendencies the realization of which for any length of time was doubted by Hilferding as well as Kautsky. Nor did these writers draw the full conclusions concerning the changing class situation of the proletariat. But the economic and political conditions had been outlined under which the capitalist world could be stabilized and hierarchically integrated - conditions which in Marxian theory appeared as utopian unless the actual forces which would supercede the contradictions and conflicts among the imperialist powers developed. Once they materialized, an economic basis for integration could indeed emerge. It did emerge, very gradually and with many regressions and breaks, under the impact of World Wars, atomic productivity, and the growth of Communist power. These events altered the structure of capitalism as defined by Marx and created the basis of a new economic and political organization of the Western world. This basis came to be utilized effectively only after the

Second World War. From then on, the conflicting competitive interests among the Western nations were gradually integrated and superseded by the fundamental East-West conflict, and an intercontinental political economy took shape - in extent much smaller than the former free world market, but susceptible to a planned regulation of that blind 'anarchy' in which Marxism saw the root of capitalist contradictions. At the same time, the labouring classes were split on an international scale into (to use Tynbee's terms) an internal and external proletariat, the latter consisting of those (urban and rural) proletariat, and semi-proletarian classes, outside and inside the area of effective reconstruction, which did not benefit from it by higher wages, better living conditions, or greater political influence.

Here, Marcuse draws out the international context of the results of the imperialist reorganization of advanced capitalism on the basis of Hilferding's Finanzkapital, later to be theoretically elaborated in Pollock's concept of state-capitalism, with the additional influence of the success of Fascism on the Frankfurt School's conception.

Finally, does Marcuse believe such integration of the labouring classes as a result of the stabilization of inter-imperialist competition and post-war expansionism, to be permanent? In Soviet Marxism he argues that the material basis for such long term integration of the proletariat has been established:

Marxian theory explained the rising standard of living, which lay at the economic roots of the immunization process, in terms of the growing productivity of labour, the effective organization of the industrial workers, which counteracted the pressure on the wage level, and in terms of monopolistic surplus profits in the most advanced capitalist areas. According to Marxism, none of these factors could neutralize for any length of time the inherent contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. The benefits for the working class were expected to be wiped out periodically by wars and crises since there was no basis for long-range international capitalist consolidation. This interpretation did not provide for the possibility (soon to become a fact) that such an international basis would materialize. (120)

This thesis of the integration of the labouring classes under late capitalism became the economic and social premise explored to the limits of its inherent logic in Marcuse's next work, One Dimensional Man. But it is important to note that in the Foreword to his Negations: Essays In Critical Theory, four years after One Dimensional Man appeared, Marcuse stresses instead the internal contradictions of late capitalism:

To experiment and play with the apparatus is at present the monopoly of those who work for the preservation and expansion of the status quo. Perhaps this monopoly can be broken only by catastrophe. Catastrophe, however, appears not only in the constant menace of atomic war, in play with annihilation, but also in the social logic of technology, in play with ever-growing productivity, which falls into ever-clearer contradiction to the system in which it is caught. Nothing justifies the assumption that the new form of the classic contradiction can be manipulated permanently.(121)

Even though this study takes issue with the Frankfurt School's adherence to the validity of the concept of 'organized capitalism', the point here has been to indicate the economic and social presuppositions of critical theory's critique of Lenin's conception of the economic and political effects of imperialism and monopoly capitalism on the social consciousness of the working class. Indeed, whether one takes issue with the Frankfurt School's concept of 'organized capitalism' or not, and this study does, the argument devolves back again and again upon the problem of how social consciousness, particularly of the working class may be radicalized in the process of, and to augment, social change. Thus Marcuse, in the conclusion of his foreword to Negations, writes 'More than before, breaking through the administered consciousness is a

precondition of liberation.'(122)

The problem of social consciousness and radical social change is again one of the reification of the consciousness of the proletariat:

But if the abstract character of the refusal is the result of total reification, then the concrete ground for refusal must still exist, for reification is an illusion. By the same token, the unification of opposites in the medium of technological rationality must be, in all its reality, an illusory unification, which eliminates neither the contradiction, between the growing productivity and its repressive use, nor the vital need for solving the contradiction.(123)

Following the influence of Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness, the critical theorists were drawn to the work of Max Weber for an empirical assessment of the trend towards bureaucracy and statization in advanced capitalist society. The critique of reification which Lukacs advanced formed the often unacknowledged theoretical backdrop to the Frankfurt School's critique of late capitalism, as discussed in chapters one and two.

As the 1930s progressed, as discussed above, the core critical theorists shelved indefinitely any belief in the revolutionary potential of the working class. Horkheimer and Adorno, in particular, tended to replace their class-struggle perspective with a neo-Weberian theory of history. Weber's concept of the process of rationalisation, while originally adapted by Lukacs in his critique of the advanced reification of the capitalist social relations, began to be viewed in works such as Dialectic of Enlightenment as the cause, in itself, of reification.(124)

Despite occasional references to class conflict in their writings (125), it seems fair to argue that with Dialectic of Enlightenment

the break in Horkheimer and Adorno's work from its neo-Lukacsian position of defending the potential self-emancipation of the working class of the early 1930s was decisive. The awareness of the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, the importance of class-struggle, was no longer a consistent or central element in their work. And arguably, as a corollary, the reified conception of Weber's notion of occidental reason figured more prominently in their critique of alienation and social consciousness under late capitalism. Although Held notes that for

..the Frankfurt School theorists, the rise of instrumental reason, the rationalisation of the world, is not per-se to blame for the chaotic, frightening and evil aspects of technological civilization...it is the mode in which the process of rationalisation is itself organised that accounts for the 'irrationality' of this rationalisation.(126)

Wellmer has noted that,

Horkheimer and Adorno detach the criticism of exchange rationality from its fundamental exposition in terms of labour value in the criticism of political economy, and translate it into a criticism of instrumental reason: the criticism of instrumental reason replaces the criticism of political economy in terms of trends, and the criticism of political economy becomes a criticism of technical civilization.(127)

What Held [1980] neglects is the crucial role of the working class in Marxian theory. Roderick is more aware of the importance of the centrality of the potential self-emancipation of the working class in Marxian theory and the implications of the absence of this concept in the later work of the critical theorists.(128) Wellmer is, therefore, registering this thematic shift in the work of

Horkheimer and Adorno which pivots on the substitution of a Marxian for a neo-Weberian conception of history. Thus Horkheimer and Adorno write:

By emphasizing the 'heart of gold', society admits the suffering it has created: everyone knows that he is now helpless in the system, and ideology has to take this into account. Far from concealing suffering under the cloak of impoverished fellowship, the culture industry takes pride in looking it in the face like a man, however great the strain on self-control. The pathos of composure justifies the world which makes it necessary. That is life - very hard, but just because of that so wonderful and so healthy. This lie does not shrink from tragedy. Mass culture deals with it, in the same way as centralized society does not abolish the suffering of its members but records and plans it.(129)

Thus, the Dialectic of Enlightenment thesis acknowledges Weber's argument that, 'the emergence of instrumental reason must be traced to ideas and modes of life which existed prior to the development of industrial capitalism'.(130) And moreover, 'the decline of critical thought is also furthered by the incorporation of the opposition.'(131)

Thus, with the incorporation of the opposition, the process of rationalization and disenchantment has brought to virtual liquidation the possibility of qualitative social change and thus a radical transformation of social consciousness towards the socialist goal. Reification becomes total: the proletariat are pictured as passively subject to the process and demands of technological rationality, and even find themselves and attain the satisfaction of (distorted) needs in the process of subjecting themselves to the demands of late capitalist society.(132)

Roderick argues that the pivotal point in critical theory is the question of social rationality:

Fundamental to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School is an articulation of the concept of social rationality as both historically embodied and objective, and yet capable of self-transcendence (that is, capable of overcoming its own limitations). The development of the Frankfurt School goes from an attempt to articulate such a concept towards a despair over its very possibility.(133)

Hence the dialectic between the critique of orthodox Marxism on the one hand, and acquiescence to the revisionist thesis according to which the capitalist state has succeeded in controlling the contradictions of the market economy (and thus integrating the working class) on the other. However the challenge posed to Marxism by Weber's analysis of industrialization and occidental reason is seen as being of decisive importance by Roderick for the Frankfurt School.(134) Roderick notes the decisive elements of Weber's work which had an important impact on the Western Marxists:

Weber's concept of rationalization attempted to comprehend a whole series of tendencies related to technological and scientific progress in their effects on the institutional and cultural structure of traditional society. Among these effects were the progress of industrialization, the urbanization of social life, the increase in the areas of social life subject to rational decision procedures such as private law, economic activities, and bureaucratic control, the bureaucratization of administration and the expansion of bureaucratic authority, the radical devaluation of tradition and the destruction of traditional forms of life, the rise of cultural secularization and the consequent 'disenchantment' of the world.(135)

Furthermore: 'Weber distinguished "formal" rationality (the degree to which action is oriented by rationally calculable rules) and



"substantive" rationality (the application of rational calculation to further definite goals or values).'(136)

The relationship between the two forms of rationality spelled capitalist rationalization in productivity and efficiency on the one hand, while traditional norms and values were being destroyed, on the other.

For Weber, the process of rationalization is irreversible, leading to a 'loss of freedom (Freiheitsverlust) and a loss of meaning (Sinnverlust)''(137), resulting in the increased burden of meaninglessness on the shoulders of the modern individual. This thesis is particularly important in Fromm's classic The Fear of Freedom, in which the modern individual, unable to go forward to positive freedom and socialism, reverts to escape through culturally patterned mechanisms of automaton conformity or authoritarianism. For Weber, 'Collective social life becomes a rationalized hierarchical apparatus of experts, limited in their skills and trained to obey. Modern man was "fated" to live in an "iron cage"'. Moreover, '...a socialist revolution could not overcome the process of rationalization. Instead, in Weber's view, it would only accelerate it, especially through the extension of bureaucratic control to the economy.'(138)

For Lukacs, Weber's concept of rationalization represented a development of reification by which, 'concrete social relations took on the appearance of a "second nature" - hence rationalization appeared as a "nature-like process" beyond human control.'(139)

Rationalization represented an extension of the commodity form in capitalist society as a result of the increasing need for the

state to intervene in and regulate the capitalist economy and civil society as a whole. Thus for Lukacs, Weber's pessimism was unjustified - the crisis of capitalism would bring with it the 'objective possibility' of overcoming reification and a chance to break out of the 'iron cage'.(140) But while Lukacs acknowledged the centrality of the working class as a necessary component for breaking out of 'the iron cage', the Frankfurt School came to call 'for a fundamental rethinking of Marx's social theory, and, in particular, his concept of social rationality'.(141)

Roderick notes the early neo-Lukacsian position of the Frankfurt School in contrast to its later abandonment under the influence of the Dialectic of Enlightenment thesis:

By the 1940s, this formulation of the theory, which depended upon a positive and substantive concept of a historically developing social rationality drawing on both Marx and the philosophical tradition, was abandoned. The failures of the labour movement, Fascism and Stalinism, and the post-war stabilization of capitalism lessened the Frankfurt School's confidence that the forces of production still contained an explosive force for liberation. The subsequent advance of instrumental reason in the administered societies of East and West called Marx's theory of history into even deeper question.

Consequently:

The Frankfurt School's position shifted, under the influence of Adorno, from the attempt to articulate a positive concept of reason and Horkheimer's method of immanent critique towards Adorno's very different method.(142)

In the absence of the revolutionary self-activity of the working class, the Frankfurt School turned, Roderick argues, towards an emphasis on immanent critique.

Immanent criticism requires no 'foundation', it recognises that it must work with historically and socially rooted concepts, and yet it can proceed to criticise a given period and a given society for failure to do justice to its own concepts, to live up to its own values. The method does not involve a pure historical relativism because the potentials in the concepts still depend upon objective historical developments to be realized.(143)

Despite its loss of the working class as the subject and agent of social revolution, the Frankfurt School initially remained loyal to its Marxist trajectory expressed in its 'implicit reliance on a Marxist theory of history.'(144) Hence, the critique of instrumental reason, linking rationalization with Lukacs' concept of reification, the critical theorists sought to develop a critique of late capitalist society.(145) Roderick notes, however, that following the Second World War, the shift to the pessimistic conclusions of Weber's concept of occidental reason is evident:

The critique of instrumental reason is carried out to this extreme consequence in Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment. Instrumental reason is no longer identified with a particular class, society or historical period. The analysis of rationalization moves from a socio-historically specific to a global level, applying not only to historically situated agents but to the human species in general. Here the critique of instrumental reason and the rationalization of social life expands into a critique of the very structure of Western reason.(146)

Thus while Weber,

had distinguished between the social process of rationalization and modern cultural rationalism per se...Horkheimer, Adorno and (to a lesser extent) Marcuse increasingly tended to identify both as an expression of the very structure of Western reason itself. At this final stage critique becomes total and entirely negative. It marks the Frankfurt School's abandonment of their last vestiges of faith in Marx's theory of history and

social rationality in the face of the 'totally administered society'.(147)

Before turning to a further discussion and critique of Horkheimer and Adorno's position in Dialectic of Enlightenment in which they acquiesce to the pessimism of Weber's concept of occidental reason, it is necessary to qualify Roderick's inclusion of Marcuse in Horkheimer and Adorno's conflation of rationalization with occidental reason as such. Roderick himself admits that Marcuse, though influenced heavily by the Dialectic of Enlightenment thesis, maintained a closer adherence to a neo-Lukacsian position concerning the critique of Weber. In his essay Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber, Marcuse subjects Weber's 'connection between industrialization, capitalism, and national self-preservation' to a thorough critique. (148)

Fundamentally, Marcuse himself does not conflate occidental reason with domination as such. (149) 'For Marcuse, what Weber called "rationalization" realizes, in Habermas's words, "not rationality as such, but rather, in the name of rationality, a specific form of unacknowledged domination".'(150) It is important to grasp, however, that the critique of instrumental reason in Marcuse's hands yields more significant results. The ideological character of technological rationality is unacknowledged because, 'the forces of production fuelled by scientific and technological progress becomes the basic and crucial legitimation of the social system.'(151)

Hence, the permanent technological revolution of late capitalism, fuelled by the permanent arms economy (152), serves to develop and reinforce the ideology of technical adjustment of the system and therefore the process of legitimation. Thus, the critique of technological rationality exposes the new forms of domination corresponding to late capitalism as a distinct and new development of the monopoly stage of capitalist society. Hence for Marcuse, 'human liberation can only be conceived as a radical break with "one-dimensional thought".'(153) Marcuse wrote for example:

Indeed, in the most highly developed areas of contemporary society, the transplantation of social into individual needs is so effective that the difference between them seems to be purely theoretical. Can one really distinguish between the mass media as instruments of information and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and indoctrination? Between the automobiles as nuisance and convenience? Between the horrors and the comforts of functional architecture? Between the work for national defence and the work for corporate gain? Between the private pleasure and the commercial and political unity involved in increasing the birth rate?

We are confronted with one of the most vexing aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the rational character of its irrationality. Its productivity and efficiency, its capacity to increase and spread comforts, to turn waste into need, and destruction into construction, the extent to which this civilization transforms the object world into an extension of man's mind and body makes the very notion of alienation questionable. The people recognize themselves in their commodities they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced.(154)

Theory And Practice 1.

Indeed, with the impact of reification upon the social consciousness of broader layers of the labouring classes and their integration into the hegemonic hierarchies of late capitalist institutions and ideology, the image of socialism as a qualitative alternative to capitalism becomes questionable; hence the appeal of Weber's concept of rationalization. For Marcuse, social consciousness has been depoliticised by these integrative tendencies, but revolution remains an objective necessity (155), and critical theory devolves upon the problem of the subjective factor. Marcuse makes this point explicitly in Five Lectures.

I consider the reevaluation and determination of the subjective factor to be one of the most decisive necessities of the present situation. The more we emphasize that the material, technical, and scientific productive forces for a free society are in existence, the more we are charged with liberating the consciousness of these realizable possibilities. For the indoctrination of consciousness against these possibilities is the characteristic situation and the subjective factor in existing society. I consider the development of consciousness, work on the development of consciousness, if you like, this idealistic deviation, to be in fact one of the chief tasks of materialism today, of revolutionary materialism. And if I give such emphasis to needs and wants, it is meant in the sense of what you call the subjective factor.

Hence, Marcuse continues:

One of the tasks is to lay bare and liberate the type of man who wants revolution, who must have revolution because otherwise he will fall apart. (156)

The objection raised by Walton and Gamble according to which critical theory lapses into a neo-Hegelian idealism on account of

its emphasis upon the changing of social consciousness makes a valid criticism up to a point; that is, in pin-pointing the dilemma of the break in the theory-praxis nexus.(157) But, and this point is decisive, what remains important is the problem of ideology, reification, and the radical changing of social consciousness. Despite its flaws, which are discussed in this study, it is to this point that critical theory returns again and again, and is the reason for critical theory's continued relevance to the problem of social change and the radicalization of social consciousness. Although Herbert Marcuse maintained the most consistent attempt throughout his work to relate theory and practice, and in which there are thus 'stronger continuities in his political thinking than there are in the political thought of Horkheimer and Adorno'(158), apart from his masterly presentation of the critical Marxian defence of Hegel and Marx in Reason and Revolution, his work tended to share Horkheimer's and Adorno's pessimistic acquiescence to the effects of technological rationality on the isolated socialist intellectual up to and including One Dimensional Man. (159)

With the advent of the Civil Rights Movement campaigning for civil liberties and democratic rights for Blacks in the southern states, and the growing rebellion of youth culminating in the Paris and Prague spring in 1968, Marcuse attempted to revise his ideas. Arguably, the success of One Dimensional Man has been due to the latter's anticipation of the catalyzing role of groups such as students, unemployed youth, immigrant youth, and black and brown minorities. Now Marcuse engaged in an analysis of these social movements identifying their progressive elements and encouraging

their anti-capitalist dynamic with the intention of radicalizing broader layers, and simultaneously criticizing, neutralizing, or redirecting elements of the youth rebellion away from reactionary tendencies and forms.

As an indication of Marcuse's attempt to creatively reapply Marxism to the problem of radicalizing social consciousness, reactivating transcendent needs in a non-revolutionary period, his writings of the 1960s and 1970s are perhaps his most important attempts to clarify the role of critical theorists as intellectuals committed to the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class and its allies in their attempt to intervene in social reality and concretize a specific practice appropriate to the socialist intellectual. Held pertinently notes:

Marcuse was one of the few who sought to create anew a relation between theory and practice in the post-war years. It was his direct concern with developing a critique of capitalism and with the theory and politics of transition that made him a central intellectual figure in the 1960s and early 1970s.(160)

Marcuse's insight was, as mentioned above, that the radical socialist opposition to late capitalist society would have to stress the more utopian possibilities for a qualitatively different society and, as opposed to the integrated reformist working class parties, stress the idea of socialism as a qualitatively new mode of existence. Here, Marcuse is drawing from Marx's discussion in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 of a total transvaluation of values and of the person's relatedness to others and the world. Marcuse wrote:

I recall briefly the principal conception of the Manuscripts. Marx speaks of the 'complete emancipation of all human senses



and qualities' as the feature of socialism: only this emancipation is the 'transcendence of private property.' This means the emergence of a new type of man, different from the human subject of class society in his very nature, in his physiology: 'the senses of the social man are other than those of the non-social man.'

'Emancipation of the senses' implies that the senses become 'practical' in the reconstruction of society, that they generate new (socialist) rationality, freed from that of exploitation. The emancipated senses would repel the instrumentalist rationality of capitalism while preserving and developing its achievements.(161)

Marcuse links Marx's discussion of the total emancipation of human senses and qualities to the practical struggle against the reification of social consciousness under the ideological hegemony of late capitalism. In terms of the reformist integration of the working class and the problem this presents for the reactivation of class-consciousness, and more than that, of a consciousness towards the awareness of the necessity for human emancipation from the alienated, instrumentalist rationality of late capitalist society, Marcuse focused on the moral-erotic rebellion of youth, sexuality, art, and philosophy. Corresponding to the post-war 'long-wave' expansion of late capitalism (162), Marcuse envisages the possibility that a future socialist revolution would of necessity be world historical (international) and total in character (particularly in the imperialist countries); this is the theme of the new sensibility, the need for qualitatively new forms of social and human relationships. The spokespeople for the new sensibility turn out to be, in Marcuse's words, 'not traditional politicians but rather such suspect figures as poets, writers, and intellectuals...a real nightmare for old Marxists.'(163)

The truth of the new sensibility, for Marcuse, is rooted in his use of Freud's concept of life-instinct(s). Marx's concept of human senses and qualities, drawn from the Paris Manuscripts(1844), is reinterpreted in terms of Marcuse's Freudo-Marxian vocabulary. It is important to recall at this juncture the divergence between Marx and Marcuse; for Marx the total emancipation of all human needs and faculties points towards a conception of the total personality. Marcuse, by adopting a Freudian terminology, reduces the scope and application of the concept of unfulfilled and transcendent needs in the analysis of late capitalist ideological hegemony and the role of oppositional groups. Consequently, by reducing the scope and possibilities inherent in oppositional groups expressing transcendent needs to those predefined by the limitations of the Freudian model of human consciousness (164), Marcuse's analysis misses the dialectical link between uneven developments of social consciousness and the possibility of developing an awareness of transitional politics within the mass organizations and parties of the working class. Morton Schoolman accurately accounts for Marcuse's contribution to a conception in which social consciousness amongst, in particular, the working class is completely reified and any radical potential is paralyzed in terms of Marcuse's pre-interpretation of Freudian psychoanalytic concepts using the technological rationality thesis.(165) But Schoolman fails to discuss the neo-Freudian concept of total personality as advanced by Erich Fromm and developed as a more comprehensive concept of character structure, and one in which Marx's concept of man is preserved for a correspondingly more comprehensive critique of

alienation and the reification of social consciousness under late capitalism. (166) Because Fromm's conception does not reduce social consciousness to the narrow confines of Freud's instinct theory, it allows for a greater appreciation of the role of social consciousness in the social process and allows for the possibility of self-emancipation. Consequently it does not preclude the possibility of defining a counter-hegemonic strategy upon broader terms than those assumed by Marcuse. Marcuse's analysis does, however, go some way in indicating possible areas of intervention for the critical theorists in the social movements emerging in the 1960s and 1970s.

In his emphasis upon the 'subjective factor of revolution', Marcuse is concerned to revise Marxian theory to the extent to which it has fallen behind its object: 'A theory which has not caught up with the practice of capitalism cannot possibly guide the practice aiming at the abolition of capitalism.'<sup>(167)</sup>

Thus, to reactivate transcendent needs which have been hitherto repressed by relative affluence and ideological integration, Marcuse argues that the radical left should argue, not 'socialism or barbarism', but rather 'utopia or catastrophe'. Marcuse's insight here is often overlooked because of the manner of his formulation of the problem: it is arguable that people will want to risk their present security only if they feel as well as believe that socialism would represent a qualitatively better mode of existence. In other words, because reformist ideology underemphasizes (when it emphasizes it at all) the qualitative break between capitalism and socialism, it functions on one level as a conservative ideological

force. The level to which this becomes apparent would appear, from the experience of the French May-June events of 1968, to be when the mass action of the working class reaches an unpredictably high level.

Marcuse, in keeping with his approach of investigating negations in prevailing intellectual and material culture, draws attention to youth's cultural subversion of the closed, policed, universe of discourse and action. Authority is debunked, 'the aura of legitimate authority suggested by the term "police" is shattered by substituting the term "pig".'<sup>(168)</sup> The 'drop out' rejecting the 'consumer society', the 'drug trip' involving the phantasy of a beautiful world beyond the conflict ridden ego, evoking the need for a 'revolution in perception'.<sup>(169)</sup> The Hippies and the music of youth captured, for Marcuse, the moral-erotic rebellion, in lyrics and rhythm reminiscent of the surrealist movement following the First World War.<sup>(170)</sup>

Thus it is worth noting in this regard that Marcuse's work represents a fundamental attack on the Marxism of - 'seriousness and grim resolve...class discipline, the statistics of injustice..lust for retribution.'

A Marxism in which: 'To speak of the ecstasies of life in such a sombre environment is to risk folly.'

And against the Marxism which declares: 'Here where all men trudge, none may dance. Dancing is...for later.'<sup>(171)</sup> For Marcuse the cultural revolution precedes socialist revolution and represents a decisive factor in generating the latter.

The notion of the working class's lack of receptivity towards mass action and social change was dispelled by the May-June events in France during 1968. Geogeghan argues that Marcuse's reaction concealed perhaps an element of surprise: 'The unbelievable had happened - a mass protest against the given.'<sup>(172)</sup> The effect on Marcuse intellectually and personally was considerable. Practice had after all shown the first real sign in the post-war years of responding to the theory. With the renaissance of the revolutionary spirit which had re-emerged in Hungary in 1956, East Germany 1953, and with the rebirth of workers councils as the embryonic organs of socialist democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it seemed that anything was possible.<sup>(173)</sup> It seemed, for Marcuse, that the hope with which One Dimensional Man ended, that 'the most advanced consciousness of humanity, and its most exploited force' <sup>(174)</sup> would meet up again and become a historical force capable of revolutionary social change. Marx might be joined with Andre Breton and Fourier in the festival of the oppressed and exploited. Marcuse's personal response is demonstrated in a speech made in December 1968:

We cannot wait and shall not wait. I certainly cannot wait. And not only because of my age. I don't think we have to wait. And even I, I don't have any choice. Because I literally couldn't stand it any longer if nothing would change. Even I am suffocating.<sup>(175)</sup>

An estimated ten million workers produced the largest General Strike in the history of the labour movement in the heady days of France 1968. And, just for a few historical moments, total liberation was invoked amongst the students and young workers of the urban

centres. The militancy of the students acted as an example to organized labour, stemming from a campaign for educational reform to a revolt among broader layers of the labouring classes against austerity policies.(176) But spontaneity alone proved insufficient. Rank and file trade unionists by and large remained wedded to the integrative apparatus of the labour bureaucracy, and in the absence of an alternative organizational coordination between the students, radical left of the day, and trade unions, the movement was isolated by the tactics of the union bureaucracy and the repressive state apparatus. Marcuse recognized the problem and by the early 1970s attempted to draw the lessons of the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s. After An Essay On Liberation, which celebrated the new found spontaneity of the rebellion of youth we can detect a new emphasis towards the necessity for organization. In Counter Revolution And Revolt Marcuse wrote: 'Do one's thing, yes, but the time has come to learn that not anything will do. No obscenity or madness can shock a society which has made a booming business with obscenity and institutionalized madness..' (177) Elements of the radical left after 1968 argued that the organizational form for the spontaneous rank and file, with their unofficial strikes, is the Leninist concept of the revolutionary party. But Marcuse rejected such a strategy as insufficiently adaptable to the new historical situation. For Marcuse, the rebellion of 1968 had shown that the revolution would have to draw its breadth and depth ultimately from the new sensibility. This would mean a cultural revolution in which the libertarian basis of the New Left would have to be reflected in the organizational forms to be adopted.

Marcuse emphasized the need for decentralized catalyst groups as the appropriate expression of the requirements of the radical left in the era of late capitalism.

Again, radically recasting the approach of One Dimensional Man, Marcuse submitted two theses in an important paper entitled The Movement in a New Era of Repression. Firstly, that the close of the twentieth century may well bring the first world historical revolution. Secondly, that with the growing economic and social crisis of late capitalism which not even 'organized' capitalism could halt, with the decline in the rate of profit, technological unemployment, the international ruling classes, especially in the USA, would increasingly turn to repressive measures such as encroachments upon civil liberties and the rights of labour to organize effectively in self-defence.(178) A 'preventive counter-revolution', to use Marcuse's term, is taking place which, unchecked, could lead to a correspondingly higher form of domination. The incisiveness of Marcuse's insights reveal, with the benefit of hindsight, the premature nature of his dismissal. To be sure, the contemporary offensive in Europe and the United States against the rights of labour began in the late 1960s and has assumed increasingly severe proportions as the general crisis has deepened.(179)

However, at this juncture in his writings the weaknesses of Marcuse's social theory become apparent with greater force: he resurrects the strategy of the popular front as the initial tactic. Calling for the suspension of ideological differences to build up the numerical strength of the New Left, Marcuse unwittingly concedes

the dilution of the New Left's politics - precisely the controversial goals and strategies which Marcuse had heralded as the qualitative break. If, as Marcuse also notes, only through struggles can the correct theory and praxis be tested (180), then this would mean arguing against the popular front, and instead, arguing for the united front wherein the left as a whole could work together on common objectives whilst retaining ideological differences in order to debate and find the better strategy, politics.

Marcuse argues that the role of the (socialist) intellectual is to aid the development of radical enlightenment as a prelude to mass political action.(181) The criticism of Marcuse's concept of theory and practice from the left is that it presents a rather passive role for the socialist intellectual. On the other hand, it can be argued, that the role of the socialist intellectual is to educate, stimulate, and be a catalyst and thereby avoid the possibility of substitutionalism, of imposing one's theoretical understanding of the class-struggle.

Again, Horkheimer's conception of a tripartite division, between intellectual, advanced section of the working class and the masses, is brought to mind.(182) Arguably, in Horkheimer's conception, the role of the intellectual is passive in one aspect in particular. In the Gramscian conception, for example (183), the role of the intellectual is to 'educate, agitate, and organize', and it is precisely this component, the question with regard to organization, which is deficient in Marcuse's conception. For, although in Counterrevolution and Revolt Marcuse argues for organization as opposed to the disorganization of the New Left and against its



rampant anti-intellectualism, it is in fact the validity of his proposals for organization which are at stake. The idea of 'catalyst groups', to be specific, goes little further than reflecting a truism, that is, it reflects one prevailing form in which critical theorists have disseminated their ideas and, if at all, put them into the framework of a political practice. But here is the crux of the issue: What political practice is prescribed except one which relates to the cultural revolution and 'transcendent needs'? In other words, there is no real political practice which can reflect the general political strategy. Moreover, while Marcuse's politics are underdeveloped, his notion of progressive enlightenment implies a certain constraint on the part of the intellectual. The question of broadening the organizational vehicle for social change to include the working class is effectively eradicated. Marcuse's conception does not provide any possibility for intellectuals to go beyond their own alienated division of labour. Indeed, the division of labour is reinforced in Marcuse's concept of organization, and despite Marcuse's commitment to the norms of socialist democracy, it contains an elitist conception of the intellectual's role. Gramsci's conception of the organic intellectual on the other hand, attempts to overcome the division of labour in the socialist organization by integrating the intellectual into a more integrated participatory role.

Thus, in Marcuse's schema, the intellectual is not a participant in the organizational structures of a working class party, which is in one sense an advantage. It affords an independence to thought which is a necessity if one is faced with bureaucratically

centralised organizations. On the other hand, the assumption that bureaucratic centralism is an inevitable corollary of working class organizations and political parties, is profoundly ahistorical. It assigns a permanence to the specific historico-political manifestations of Stalinism and thus fails to understand and combat them. The fundamental question of a well-functioning socialist party which is both revolutionary and democratic is by-passed and the terrain of mass political parties is left to the orthodoxies of reformism and neo-Stalinism.

Although Marcuse did not confront the wider issues of organization and political programme, this was perhaps due to the specific political conditions and weaknesses in critical theory which found its counter-part in the American working class, the absence, for example, of a working class party of reform based on the labour movement. Although Marcuse did most to reunite theory and practice in a way which reflected the needs and orientation of the New Left (184), his ideas were based on Horkheimer's conception of the role of critical theorist as catalyst, and this reflects the partial character of their concept of a political strategy. It is partial because it is based on a) the notion of cultural revolution as a precursor to social revolution, thus ignoring their dialectical interrelation (185), b) assumes that the intellectual must remain 'independent' of political parties, taking the Stalinization of the Communist Parties for granted and thus, as argued above, the representative form of organization and structure.

Despite its partiality, it does point in the direction of actively changing social consciousness and goes beyond Adorno's negative

dialectics and Horkheimer's later political quietism.(186) Marcuse's concept of theory and practice, points to the need for an approach in which the cultural revolution plays an essential role within a unified theory of radical social change such that Fromm has expressed, and has been previously discussed.(187) Marcuse stresses the essential 'transvaluation of values' (188) but it is Fromm who gives a more comprehensive analysis of the project of radical social change in terms of the totality of social relations without forgetting the economy, which Marcuse tends to under-emphasize. In Europe there exist more extensive opportunities for socialist intellectuals to relate to, and participate in, parties and organizations of the working class and hence the peculiarities of critical theory can perhaps too readily be dismissed as conditioned by the experience of the United States. This seems, as noted above, only partially the case, reinforcing a conception of theory and practice which originates in the 1930s. Nonetheless, it can be argued that there exists a mass audience for working class parties in Europe and space for the participation of socialist intellectuals within the labour movement.(189) However, it could be argued that to accomplish this, critical theorists would need to establish a closer involvement with the labour movement than is implied in the tripartite conception of intellectuals, working class parties, and masses, which guided the Frankfurt School's conception of theory and practice.

## Theory and Practice 2.

As argued above, the influence of orthodox Freudian concepts reinforced the political underdevelopment of critical theory. This was not because of the undesirability of developing a Marxist social psychology but because of the inadequacy of the theoretical tools employed. Thus, in a recent article which devotes space to a discussion of the Frankfurt School, Mandel writes:

In the 1930s the Frankfurt School, led by Horkheimer, made a major attempt at developing a social psychology from a synthesis of the ideas of Marx and Freud. The ultimate failure of this ambitious reconstruction stemmed less from the interrogation of Freud than mechanical appropriation of Marxism. The role of unconscious drives in human social behaviour, after all, had been emphasized by Engels a half century before, even if he had been in no position to delve into their precise nature. Trotsky, for his part, had been sympathetic to the efforts of depth psychology to theorize their origin and dynamics. The real weakness of the Frankfurt School's project was its inability to grasp the crucial mediating links in the dialectic of infrastructure and superstructure which, in the final analysis, determine historical development. Individual passions and unconscious drives, however determinant of personality, cannot directly shape social transformations involving millions of human beings.

Instead,

They can only create potentials or dispositions for such developments. At the same time, however, they most likely create dispositions for quite different, if not contrary, developments. What line of development or action will actually be undertaken cannot be predicted by analysis of these unconscious drives themselves. Rather, real historical outcomes depend on concrete socio-political struggles which intertwine not only unconscious but conscious processes, ideas, strategies and material constraints quite as much, or more, than 'spontaneous' ideologies and unconscious dispositions. (190)

Mandel indicates the weaknesses of the Authoritarian Personality thesis (191) by indicating the primacy of the social structure and socio-political struggles over individual psychology:

For example, in the Frankfurt School's famous analysis of the success of Hitlerism the central theme is the supposed ubiquity of authoritarian structures in German society. But how can this 'social psychological' (we would rather say 'socio-individual') analysis account for such facts as the ability of the same German working class which failed to strike against Hitler in 1933 to have succeeded little more than a decade before, in 1920, in launching the most successful general strike in history against the von Kapp-von Luttwitz putsch? Surely their education had not been less authoritarian, nor their sexual frustrations less pronounced, in the decades preceding 1920 than in the years before 1933!(192)

Indeed, from this it can be argued that the instinctualism of psychoanalysis clearly denies the goal-orientated possibilities of social groups. For Freud most of the individual's personality can be understood in terms of his/her past. Mandel's criticism of orthodox psychoanalysis runs parallel with the 'neo-Freudian' Erich Fromm and Karen Horney, who wrote in a chapter on the Oedipus complex: 'Later attitudes to others, then, are not repetitions of infantile ones but emanate from the character structure, the basis of which is laid in childhood.'(193)

Ironically, by not following through the critique of bourgeois materialism with a rigorous critique of Freud's instinct theory, the neo-instinctivists in the Frankfurt School adopted a theory which stressed a tragic determinism which militated against the dynamic concept of subjectivity in Marxian socialism. Mandel continues:

Paradoxically again, these attempts to reduce the decisive weight of social forces in determining history really understate the role of ideas and personalities much more than

does classical historical materialism. Marxists understand better that, despite the instinctual or infantilized aspects of the human psyche, people can grasp the exigencies of their historical situation and act in ways largely congruent with their objective interests. Only when this dimension of rational volition is admitted into the complex parallelogram of historical causation can we understand how individuals with particular talents or dispositions can come into their own.(194)

However, Mandel does not dismiss the idea of, or the need for, Marxist social psychology. Instead, he argues along parallel lines to those established by Erich Fromm (195) (and applied in a modified way recently by Norman O'Neill (196)) for a non-reductionist understanding of the 'mediating links' between the infrastructure and superstructure of bourgeois society. He writes:

To understand why such desperado mentality became characteristic of certain layers of German society between 1918 and 1933, and why it ultimately gained the endorsement of the ruling classes, it is first necessary to grasp the role of collective 'mental structures' which mediate between material interests of social forces (classes and major fractions of classes) and the ways in which they consciously interpret these interests. Social psychology must be a necessary instance in the Marxist explanation of the historical process and it must elucidate how specific mentalities take hold in a given social group, even when they express a 'false consciousness' that distorts or misconstrues 'objective' interests.(197)

The importance of Erich Fromm's work in this regard, especially in The Fear of Freedom (1960) and The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1975), is decisive. Yet, it was precisely Fromm's critique and rejection of orthodox Freudian categories which led his former colleagues in the Institute for Social Research to dismiss his work as 'revisionist'.

The effects of orthodox psychoanalysis in the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse was to reduce the problem of socio-political struggles - and the question of ideological hegemony - to a socio-individual psychological interpretation of the inter-war years, the student revolts of the 1960s and the counter-culture it gave rise to.

But the wider question (of which the student movement was but a component) of the anti-bureaucratic revolution in Czechoslovakia and the French General Strike of 1968 were at best only superficially dealt with by Marcuse (or dismissed by Adorno and Horkheimer).(198) For these events raised broader political problems the complexities of which critical theory was not prepared. Consequently, the politics of transition from capitalism to socialism remain at best embryonic in critical theory, and at worst, neglected.(199)

We have traced Horkheimer and Adorno's break with the concept, and centrality of the revolutionary potential of the working class, indicating the economic propositions which underlie the notion of the integration of the working class in the perspectives of the critical theorists. Secondly, we have distinguished Marcuse's attempt to reunify theory and practice in the 1960s and 1970s from Horkheimer and Adorno's political acquiescence, and indicated the weaknesses in Marcuse's concept of theory and practice.

Since the work of Erich Fromm has featured decisively in this study it is important to indicate at this juncture that Fromm's concept of theory and practice has not received adequate attention in the literature on critical theory. In chapter three we have shown that the concept of totality plays a decisive role in Fromm's

approach to social and political change. Fromm interrogates orthodox psychoanalysis with the theoretical tools of Marxian socialism, in particular, Marx's theory of alienation plays the central part in Fromm's 'humanistic psychoanalysis'. In his social psychology this is reflected in his concept of the total personality, and politically, in insisting on the necessity for change in the economic, political, social and psychological areas of life for genuine social change to be possible. Fromm's approach to social change is holistic. However, Fromm also became more active as a socialist in his later years, joining the American Socialist Party in the early 1960s.(200) Thus, it was Fromm and Marcuse who remained intellectually and personally committed to the unity of theory and practice out of the major critical theorists.

The potential self-emancipation of the working class was still a stimulus to the thought of Fromm and Marcuse - but as potential. The effects of reification led Fromm to criticize Marx and Engels for neglecting the social-psychological cement to the ideological hegemony of the ruling classes of late capitalism. The extent to which Marxists neglect the social psychology of social change, Fromm argued, they would remain naive rationalists.(201) The dynamic concept of social consciousness in Marx does however acknowledge the experiential component of social change, as described in chapter one. Thus, as Fromm has shown (202), Marx did have a sophisticated, if unsystematic, understanding of the human psychology involved in social change. What Marx lacked, Fromm argues, was the theoretical concepts which have largely been developed since the genesis of psychoanalysis. Fromm's work is



important for revealing more comprehensively the dynamic concept of social consciousness in Marxian socialism and for providing a theoretical framework which, as argued previously, reveals the necessity for a broader basis to socialist strategies.

It is important to indicate briefly the significance of Fromm's concept of theory and practice: Fromm's critical social psychology, it has been argued, empirically demonstrates that the basis for the changing of consciousness results from participation in that activity and process. Although it can be argued that to the extent that the working class became less central to the strategies in critical theory, Fromm became more influenced by the moral and ethical imperatives of Marxian socialism (203), it has to be emphasized that for both Fromm and Marcuse the effort to regenerate the humanistic basis of Marxian socialism did not mean replacing the working class with other social groups as agencies for social change. On the contrary. But it continues to be relevant to recognize that Fromm and Marcuse are criticizing the economic notion according to which only the industrial working class is considered. Fromm and Marcuse therefore recognize that while the industrial working class continues to occupy a position of strategic importance in late capitalism, the uneven hold of reification over the working class as a whole makes other groups equally important as detonators of class-consciousness and anti-capitalist struggles: namely students, the womens' liberation movement, and the movements representing ethnic groups and minorities in the advanced capitalist states, for example.

This leads us to the final point in this section in regard to the criteria adopted when assessing the concept of theory and practice in critical theory. In this study we have subjected the Frankfurt School to imminent critique: the original trajectory of the Frankfurt School was defined in terms of its complex socio-historical context and standpoint of Marxian socialism adopted by the critical theorists. The principal axis around which the Frankfurt School broached its reconstruction of the Marxian project was the Marxist position regarding the potential self-emancipation of the working class as central to the transformation of capitalist society. This axis of critical theory has, when tracing the trajectory of the School and the effects of the struggles of the inter-war period on the thought of its central figures, thrown into relief the strengths and weaknesses of critical theory and the eventual inability of Horkheimer and Adorno to make an accurate and sober balance sheet of the inter-war period. For Horkheimer and Adorno the post-World War Two years sealed the defeat of the labour movement in the advanced capitalist states which began with the rise of Fascism. For Adorno, negative dialectics became the vehicle for a constant political anarchism which betrayed a conservatism in his pronouncements in cultural sociology.(204) For Fromm and Marcuse, at least, the personal effort involved in the attempt to reunify theory and practice, despite the obstacles confronting such a task, were justified. Indeed, Fromm and Marcuse openly criticised the inertia of intellectuals who refused to act on their knowledge.

Held notes the criticism of the Frankfurt School according to which the School eschewed any commitment to the unity of theory

and practice.(205) We have shown in this study that such an assertion needs to be treated with caution. It is not accurate as a description of the theoretical basis of the Institute or its research programme, nor is it applicable to all members of the Institute, or at all moments of their lives. One is forced to explain the changes in position in the work of its major thinkers as this study has attempted, and indicate that in their later years Fromm and Marcuse actually became politically active. Moreover, as Held notes, there is a tacit assertion in the criticism that a commitment to Leninist or Trotskyist politics is in all essentials and instances an adequate response to 'practical concerns'. Since this represents an often unstated assumption of much of the criticism of critical theory with regard to the concept of theory and practice, it is important to openly assess it. Held clarifies the Frankfurt School's misunderstood position and by so doing poses the relevant question. Held argues that the neglect of the concerns of Leninist or Trotskyist politics was no 'oversight or a rejection of the importance of practical concerns.' On the contrary, it expresses an 'hostility to Leninist forms of organization as the mode of political intervention and as an explicit and urgent attempt to uncover and expose the factors which currently made positive claims about the possibility of revolutionary change in the West appear a mere fantasy.'(206) Held is probably overstating his case as far as Marcuse is concerned, since it is clear that he most explicitly sided with the hopes contained in the student struggles of 1968 and expressed more powerfully in the largest French General Strike of the same year.(207)

However, by clearing the ground Held is providing a genuine service in helping to pose the real issue at stake, and one which the far left (it could be argued) has not been adequately receptive to, namely the question of the relevance and adequacy of Leninist politics and forms of organization. The question as to the relevance of Leninist politics has been reasserted on the British left since the Paris and Prague events of 1968.(208) Perhaps critical theory thus contributes to the question of theory and practice more directly than has hitherto been assumed. For critical theorists it is clear that the rejection of Leninist forms of organization was because, 'it was thought they reproduced a chronic division of labour, bureaucracy, and authoritarian leadership'.(209) Of course, we can detect an affinity between the critical theorists and Rosa Luxemburg's criticisms of the Bolsheviks here. Luxemburg wrote:

The social-democratic movement is the first in the history of class societies which reckons, in all its phases and through its entire course, on the organization and the direct, independent action of the masses. Because of this, social democracy creates an organizational type that is entirely different from those common to earlier revolutionary movements, such as those of the Jacobins and the adherents of Blanqui...For this reason social-democratic centralism cannot be based on the mechanical subordination and blind obedience of the party membership to the leading party centre. For this reason the democratic movement cannot allow the erection of an air-tight partition between the class-conscious nucleus of the proletariat already in the party and its immediate popular environment, the non-party sections of the proletariat.(210)

For Luxemburg and the Frankfurt School, Lenin did not appreciate the distinction between Jacobin and social democratic forms of organization (NB: the term 'social democracy' in its classical

meaning relates to the Marxist inspired German Labour Party - the SPD). The vision of a tripartite organization of intellectuals, working class parties and the masses in critical theory was formulated against the rigorous party discipline of Leninism, which, by the time critical theory was being broached, (the 1930s) had degenerated into the ultra-bureaucratic centralism of Stalin's regime.(211) The need to protect the basis of intellectual freedom became a central tenet of the Frankfurt School's criticism of Leninism. It could be argued that the critical theorists confused Leninism with Stalinism. However, it is clear that their rejection of the Leninist form of organization did not depend on the degeneration of the Russian Revolution. Even today, representatives of Trotskyism such as Ernest Mandel argue that political errors committed by the Bolsheviks aided the formation of a repressive one-party state. Mandel writes:

One can go on at great length - as many analysts, from Souvarine to Deutscher, have done - about how Stalin's victory was historically inevitable or about tactical errors committed by Trotsky. But it is much more important to recognize how a whole series of political and institutional errors committed by the Bolshevik party aided the process of integration of party and state apparatuses and their simultaneous bureaucratization, so that the party became sociologically incapable of acting as a brake on this process.(212)

There is, then, a debate as to which political and institutional policies of the Bolsheviks favoured the degeneration of the Soviet Republic into a totalitarian one-party state. While it may be accepted that Bolshevism was not inherently inclined towards establishing a state bureaucratic society (213) and Stalinism

represents the Thermidor of the revolution (214), it can be argued that the following political and institutional errors aided the process of degeneration:

1. the ban on factions inside the party,
2. the introduction of the single party practice,
3. the failure to understand the organic links between Soviet power, collective ownership and the need for 'primitive socialist accumulation'(i.e. for competition with the private sector of the economy.

In short,

the suppression of proletarian democracy encouraged the bureaucratization that Lenin wanted above all to avoid.(215)

In the light of the above factors in the degeneration of the Russian Revolution, the tripartite conception of intellectuals, workers parties and the masses to which critical theory appealed (216) is understandable. Intellectual freedom (from Stalinist dictat) was at a high premium. For millions of workers in the inter-war years Russia represented hope, a chance of an alternative to capitalism working at least somewhere. Moreover, it was easy for the Stalinized Communist International to depict detractors as siding with 'the counter-revolution'.(217) Hence the Left Opposition, led by Leon Trotsky, were castigated in the Stalinist press as 'agents of imperialism', 'Trotskyist-fascists', etc. (218)

However, aside from Marcuse's Soviet Marxism [1971], the Frankfurt School's major figures presented no systematic analysis of the Russian Revolution and its degeneration. Nonetheless, Marcuse analyses the subversion of Marxian theory by Soviet (Stalinized)

Marxism transforming the former into an ideology of legitimation for the interests of the bureaucratic ruling stratum in Soviet society. Secondly, and fundamentally, Marcuse indicates the theoretical changes made by Lenin to a new sociological situation. Leninism is thus viewed as a particular response to the integration of the proletariat into bourgeois society as a result of imperialism. Marcuse writes:

We suggested above that the characteristic features of emerging Leninism, i.e., the shift in the revolutionary agent from the class-conscious proletariat to the centralized part as the avant-garde of the proletariat and the emphasis on the role of the peasantry as ally of the proletariat, developed under the impact of the sustained strength of capitalism at the 'imperialist stage'. The conception which was initially aimed at the 'immaturity' of the Russian Proletariat became a principle of international strategy in the face of the continued reformist attitude of the 'mature' proletariat in the advanced industrial countries. To counteract the integration of a large sector of organized labour into the capitalist system, the 'subjective factor' of revolutionary strategy is monopolized by the Party, which assumes the character of a professional revolutionary organization directing the proletariat. (219)

Indeed, this is precisely the criticism of Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness made by critical theory. And this conception of the sociological affects of imperialism on the social consciousness of the working classes acts as a plank in critical theory's rejection of Leninist organization. In as much as Leninism is a symptom of the integration of the proletariat for critical theory, it makes little sense in viewing this form of political organization as the solution to revolutionary change. For critical theory, then, Leninism represents a contradictory phenomenon. On the one hand it proclaims the actuality of revolutionary change, it provides

elements of Marxist propaganda and education for the proletariat, but it is susceptible to authoritarian leadership, and is unable to prevent the bureaucratization of a post-revolutionary society. In the preceding section we have discussed the flaws in Marcuse's economic propositions concerning the ability of imperialism to integrate the proletariat into bourgeois society. The conception Marcuse presents is highly schematic and overdrawn. The partial integration of the working class into bourgeois society as the result of ideological hegemony is most likely during periods of relative affluence and stability in the regime. However, this integration is only partial, and as the proletariat matures politically and continues to grow in absolute terms throughout the world, it could be argued that the essential features of integration described by Marcuse will be gradually eroded. We take up this point in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

Having said that the major figures of the Frankfurt School made no systematic analysis of the decline of the Russian Revolution it would not be accurate to leave the impression that apart from Marcuse the other exponents of critical theory were ambivalent on this fundamental issue. Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Fromm all held a common position in relation to their disappointment with the Russian Revolution. While Marcuse, in Soviet Marxism analyses the state bureaucratic society which Russia became as a new social formation with a ruling stratum he was hesitant to use the term 'ruling class'. Fromm, on the other hand, describes the new social formation as 'state-capitalist'.(220)



These designations aside, it is clear that the critical theorists shared a disdain for Soviet Marxism as the legitimation-ideology of the political counter-revolution in the Soviet Union.

More specifically, with regard to the question of Leninist politics and organization, it is interesting to note Kirchheimer's more sophisticated critique of Leninism. Held writes,

In a number of essays published in the early 1930s in *Die Gesellschaft* (the theoretical organ of the SPD), Kirchheimer, while defending the need for organization and an activist, interventionist stance, criticized Lenin's notion of the party and the state. Unlike Horkheimer he developed a more detailed appraisal of Lenin's (and by implication Stalin's) theory and practice. In his 'Marxism, Dictatorship and the Organization of the Proletariat' [1933], Kirchheimer pointed to a tension in Lenin's doctrine of the state (as expounded in 'State and Revolution') and his theory of the party (articulated in 'What is to be Done?'). The former, he argued, is concerned with 'primitive democracy' - altering the structure of society, electing officials, dismantling the regular army, etc. - while the latter defends hierarchy, professionalism and planning. Clearly, the form of the Soviet state progressively approximated that of the party. The powers of the Soviets were not developed: discipline was maintained in the face of existing mass consciousness. Kirchheimer recognized that many factors contributed to this state of affairs, but felt that it was (at least in part) a result of 'the natural unfolding of the party structure' and its imposition upon the structure of the state. He shared Rosa Luxemburg's critique of all attempts to impose the 'principle of capitalist factory discipline' on the 'autonomous discipline of the working class'. Although he did not accept her emphasis on the 'supreme importance of spontaneity', he did agree that to crush spontaneity was disastrous. (221)

We can conclude this discussion by indicating how inadequate it is to dismiss critical theory on the grounds that it rejects Leninist or Trotskyist politics. The point remains: How can the Marxian left learn from the questions raised (and as we have shown they are genuine questions) by critical theory vis-a-vis the

relation between theory and practice? The study of critical theory, and a more serious consideration of the norms of socialist democracy are required of the Marxian left in order for a dialogue to be established. The Frankfurt School represents a challenge to those on the left influenced by Lenin and Trotsky. In a sense, it is nothing new for the Marxian left to be reminded of the necessary combination socialism-democracy. To this extent, this so-called 'detour' of Western Marxism has kept alive the themes and issues which animated Rosa Luxemburg's fraternal criticisms of the Bolsheviks' political and institutional errors.(222) Thus as Held has noted:

Although it is true that the critical theorists did not produce a sustained political theory, they did stand in the tradition of those who maintain the unity of socialism and liberty and who argue that the aims of a rational society must be embedded in the means used to establish that society.(223)

These issues of organization, democracy, and participation, socialism and liberty which the critical theory of society addresses in its approaches to the concept of theory and practice remain wholly relevant to the left today. The far-left cannot afford to treat the problem of theory and practice as a debate which was closed by the practices of the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s, or by Trotsky and the Left Opposition in the 1930s. Rosa Luxemburg couched her criticisms of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution in a clear awareness of the historical, economic and social problems which would act to suffocate the young revolution at birth. Luxemburg writes,

Dealing as we are with the very first experiment in proletarian dictatorship in world history (and one taking place at that under the harshest conceivable conditions, in the midst of the worldwide conflagration and chaos of the imperialist mass slaughter, caught in the coils of the most reactionary military power in Europe, and accompanied by the completest failure on the part of the international working class), it would be a crazy idea to think that every last thing done or left undone in such an experiment with the dictatorship of the proletariat under such abnormal conditions represented the very pinnacle of perfection.(224)

Hence the questions raised by critical theory vis-a-vis the concept of theory and practice remain fundamentally important today.

Moreover, critical theory has contributed to an understanding of the changed structures of the late capitalist state and society which classical Leninist/Trotskyist politics cannot afford to ignore.

Far from reflecting a distance from practical political problems, their (the critical theorists' - CM) interest in theory and critique was directly related to an ambition to analyse new forms of domination, undermine ideology, enhance awareness of the material conditions of life circumstances, and to aid the creation of radical political movements.(225)

While it can be conceded that critical theory failed to articulate a coherent political theory and strategy for social change, it can be argued that its concepts have nonetheless contributed to the development and articulation of such radical alternatives. In short, by rejecting the fatalism and determinism of the theory and practice of the Second International and Soviet Marxism, critical theory did more than maintain the link between socialism and liberty and keep alive Luxemburg's alternative viewpoint. Their work arguably helped provide the grounds for a wider conception of political struggle.

With the changes in the social structure of capitalism from its period of classical imperialism to the post World War Two era of late capitalism (226), critical theory contributed to the critical analysis of new forms of social control, and thereby enlarged our understanding of the 'terms of reference of the political'. Thus Held writes: 'One of the significant achievements of critical theory is, in my view, to have shown that there are many ways of contributing to the project of human emancipation and that the terms of reference of the political are wider than is often thought.'(227)

To sum up: Held indicates the possibilities for investigation critical theory has opened up.

The Frankfurt School's criticisms of contemporary culture, authoritarianism, bureaucracy and so on were intended to help foster independent thinking and the struggle for emancipation. They directed attention to the effects of domination not only in production but in the family, the environment and other areas of life. Consequently, their work transformed the concept of the political; it directed attention to issues such as the division of labour, sexism, ecological problems as well as the central question of ownership and control. This has crucial potential significance which was recognized by sections of the New Left in the 1960s. In short, critical theory took Marxism into a new range of areas.(228)

Despite the flawed attempt to marry the mechanistic materialist instinct theory with Marxism in a necessary social psychology, we have shown that the critical theory of society has made a serious contribution in the way it has addressed the concept of theory and practice in the era of late capitalism. Having conceded many of the criticisms with regard to its theoretical development and research programme, critical theory contributes to the creative renewal of Marxian socialism and its humanistic basis.(229) Indeed, through

the 'expansion of the domain of political reflection' critical theory has 'opened many dimensions of life to critical social analysis and active intervention'.(230) The growing recognition in importance of the peace movement, womens' liberation movement, Green and ecology politics in Western Europe, and the issue of racism and representation of black and brown ethnic groups and minorities in Europe in the 1980s testifies to the breadth of the new opposition to the capitalist and state bureaucratic societies on issues which affect the majority of the population. In short, critical theory points towards an hegemonic project for the advancement of socialism, but only if the left grasp new opportunities and takes seriously the responses to the new forms of exploitation and domination which late capitalism has assembled as a product of its industrial capacity to use, misuse and abuse the social and natural resources at its disposal.

Arguably, this discussion on the concept of theory and practice in critical theory reveals that the complexities and subtlety of the issues and approach of the Frankfurt School to this question cannot be allowed to obscure the crucial contribution critical theory has in fact made.

We have traced Horkheimer and Adorno's break with the concept and centrality of the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class, investigating the economic propositions which underlie the notion of the integration of the working class in the work of the critical theorists.

Second, we have distinguished Marcuse's attempt to reunify theory and practice in the 1960s and 1970s and Fromm's later membership

of the American Socialist Party from Horkheimer and Adorno's political acquiescence whilst indicating the strengths and weaknesses in their treatment of the concept of theory and practice. Moreover, it has been argued that Adorno's radicalism is formulated in such a way as to be an obstacle to active resistance to the existing state of affairs; its very intransigence repels a naive activism on the one hand, but its caustic and equally naive pessimism ends by devaluing any active intervention in the social, cultural, or political terrain outside of the study. In his response to the defeats of the labour movement in the inter-war years, the Second World War and the Holocaust, Adorno fails to provide an adequate theory of tragedy. This concept of tragedy has been used because it represents an ultimate criteria for assessing the midnight of the twentieth century and the ability of critical theory to confront the lessons of defeat. Adorno's response registers the events leading up to the catastrophe of the Second World War. It is a measure of the depth of defeat and the failure of the working class to respond on an international scale to the crisis of advanced capitalist society and no reader can pass over Adorno's work without being profoundly disturbed by the plight of the victims of this catastrophe and the weaknesses in our attempts to come to terms with and overcome the legacy of this catastrophe. And yet, as this study has tried to demonstrate, the social psychological basis of Marx's theory of alienation reveals a broader basis for understanding the class struggle and social consciousness and this is emphasized in Fromm's Marxist humanism, as previously discussed. Hence, despite the fact that Adorno sets out to recapture

subjectivity in its various fragmented and reified forms in bourgeois society, he ironically forgets the importance of praxis in shattering reification and the existential affirmation of individuality and human values even in the face of defeat and overwhelming odds. The Warsaw Ghetto, the French Resistance, the Italian and Yugoslav partisans, the attempts to assassinate Hitler, and many other courageous attempts to resist Fascism tend to be overlooked by Adorno's theory.

While Horkheimer and Adorno lost hope in the meaning of resistance, Marcuse and Fromm maintained an implicit defence of the collective self-emancipation of the working class and this fortified their work and has given it a lasting resonance in regard to the possibilities for praxis in the future. While not succumbing to a naive optimism, Marcuse and Fromm demonstrate again and again that to throw the towel in is to concede defeat and to acquiesce to late capitalist ideology.

In the next section we present a critique of the concept of technological rationality and the Frankfurt School's assessment of the defeats of the inter-war years which led to the Second World War.(231) We have attempted to reveal the flaws in the concept of imperialism employed by critical theory (the economic propositions of 'organized capitalism'), and in the next section we challenge the political assessment of the inter-war years which is implicit in critical theory. It is argued that the critical theorists' misplaced assessment of the 'integration of the working class' can also be traced to their mistaken understanding of the nature of imperialism in socio-political terms. Thus if it can be shown that the

Frankfurt School's assessment of the inter-war years is incorrect, then it can be argued that the potential for the critical theory of society in the era of late capitalism has been underestimated by not only certain detractors and critics, but perhaps also by the major figures of the Frankfurt School itself. The grounds for hope, then, may lie in more than a renewed activism, as Aronson writes (232), but also in a restored unity of theory and practice.



Critical Assessment Of The Frankfurt School On Late Capitalist Ideology

Technological Rationality

Along with the economic propositions of critical theory, examined in the previous section, the thesis of technological rationality and its concomitant, 'instrumental reason' (as developed by Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment), formed the background to the Frankfurt School's understanding of reification in late capitalist society. As previously argued, because Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse insufficiently liberated their conceptual framework from the reified caste of Freudian instinct theory, their analysis of social consciousness lost the dynamic quality of psychoanalysis and assumed a virtually behaviourist perspective. As Marcuse was to write in One Dimensional Man the critical basis of thought as opposition to, or transcendence of, social reality, is obliterated under late capitalism. The social system tends to be viewed by Marcuse and associates in the Frankfurt School as a vast machine coordinating and administering its various mechanisms to serve its 'programme' which is perfectly anonymous. It would seem that the reification the critical theorists describe as 'advanced industrial society' is a rather accurate reflection of Parsonian sociology (233) as much as a critique of late capitalism. Consequently the fate of the individual in late capitalist society is all but wholly determined and the overwhelming apparatus of society gently, and sometimes violently, steers the individual into a quiescent 'happy consciousness'. (234) And, with the 'containment' of

the working class and oppositional thought in general, the Frankfurt School rendered itself defenceless against the pessimism of Weber's thesis of disenchantment of the world.

However, it can be argued that the international events of the post-war years (the Hungarian Revolution 1956, the Prague Spring and French General Strike 1968, the war in Vietnam, Portugal 1975, and Poland 1980-81 ) brought into relief the cul de sac in which critical theory found itself when practice began to respond in a positive way to the economic, social, and political contradictions of late capitalism and the state bureaucratic societies with the development of anti-capitalist and anti-bureaucratic solutions being posed within mass movements of protest. As Mandel writes:

The dead end in which the Frankfurt School contrived to land itself (and in which Herbert Marcuse also found himself before the French May) was a direct consequence of its thesis that the 'integrated' working class is ultimately incapable of socialist consciousness and action.(235)

It is the purpose of this final section to examine the impact of the technological rationality thesis on the Frankfurt School and identify the abandonment of the centrality of the working class as a consequence of the School's assessment of the inter-war years as a result of their interpretation of imperialism. Therefore Mandel's Late Capitalism serves as an important reference because it provides a more adequate analysis of the technological rationality thesis by locating the roots of 'instrumental reason' without, however, succumbing to their effects. Mandel notes many of the decisive features of late capitalism first discussed in detail by the

Frankfurt School in their attempt to reconstitute the project of historical materialism and render it conceptually adequate to maintain an effective critique of late capitalist intellectual and material culture. Tendencies central to the analysis included the growth of monopoly capitalism and the increased intervention of the state into all layers of civil society. On the ideology of 'organized capitalism' Mandel writes, concurring with Lukacs:

Just as the triumphal march of ascendant capitalism was accompanied by a spreading conviction of the omnipotence and beneficence of competition, so the rearguard action of declining capitalism is accompanied by a generalized proclamation of the advantages of organization.(236)

The repressive character of late capitalism is in line with its objective crisis which Lukacs noted in History and Class Consciousness as signifying the growing internal contradictions indicative of capitalist ideology under monopoly capitalism. Mandel writes:

The most obvious expression of this 'belief in organization' is the late capitalist ideal of a 'regimented society', in which everyone has (and keeps) his place, while visible (and invisible) regulators ensure the steady and continuous growth of the economy, divide the benefits of this growth more or less 'evenly' among all the social classes, and buffer more and more sectors of the economic and social system from the repercussions of a 'pure' market economy. The 'robustly individualistic industrial pioneer' is replaced by the 'team of experts', and 'financial grants' by anonymous boards of directors (in symbiosis with bureaucratic functionaries, or sometimes even with trade union leaders).

But decisively, that the :

Belief in the omnipotence of technology is the specific form of bourgeois ideology in late capitalism. This ideology proclaims

the ability of the existing social order gradually to eliminate all chance of crisis, to find a 'technical' solution to all its contradictions, to integrate rebellious social classes and to avoid political explosions.(237)

Mandel usefully sets out the basic propositions of the technological rationality thesis, and in locating its fundamental flaws concisely pin-points the dilemmas of the Frankfurt School, its concept of 'organized capitalism', and the implications of a dialectical theory of late capitalist ideology for a critique of late capitalist intellectual and material culture. It is worth quoting in full:

Although there are many versions of this ideology, the following theses itemized by Kofler are common to most, if not all, the proponents of 'technological rationality':

1. Scientific and technical development has condensed into an autonomous power of invincible force.

2. Traditional views of the world, man and history which form "value systems" beyond the realms of functional thought and action, are repressed as meaning less or no longer play any significant role in the public consciousness. This process of "de-ideologization" is a result of technological rationalization, foreseen by Weber in his paradigm of the "disenchantment of the world".

3. The existing social system cannot be challenged because of its technical rationalization; emergent problems can only be solved by specialist functional treatment; the masses therefore willingly assent to the existing order.

4. The progressive satisfaction of needs by the technological mechanisms of production and consumption increases popular consent to incorporation and subordination.

5. Traditional class rule has given way to the anonymous rule of technology, or at least a bureaucratic state that is neutral between groups or classes and is organized on technical principles; the party politics becomes superficial shadow boxing, a thesis especially stressed by Schelsky.'(238)

Thus, despite the argument that reification is an illusion (though not purely subjective, it is a socially necessary illusion constituted by objective historical social relations) (239) the above noted

theses of technological rationality are basic contentions in the Frankfurt School's thesis which proclaims the irrevocable integration of the labouring classes into the institutional structure of bourgeois state and civil society. Points 4 and 5 above in particular could be taken as the paradigm for Marcuse's propositions concerning One Dimensional Man, as well as for Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment.

Mandel notes in connection with the ideology of organization endemic to late capitalism, as a result of the fact that 'bourgeois society cannot survive without the regulative function of the state', the corollary tendency of the 'industrialization of superstructural activities': 'organized along industrial lines, they produce for the market and aim at maximization of profit. Pop-art, television films and the record industry are in this respect typical phenomena of late capitalist culture.'(240)

It will be recalled that the 'industrialization of popular culture' is the focal point of Horkheimer's and Adorno's critique of late capitalism in Dialectic of Enlightenment (241). But while describing the changed economic, and socio-cultural conditions which prevail under late capitalism, Mandel does not succumb to the conclusions of Weber's disenchantment thesis. The social roots of reification must be accounted for and exposed in terms of the partial rationality of the irrational totality of the late capitalist system.(242) Mandel notes the powerful indictment and accuracy of description contained in Marcuse's One Dimensional Man thesis:

To the captive individual, whose entire life is subordinated to the laws of the market - not only (as in the 19th century) in the sphere of production, but also in the sphere of

consumption, recreation, culture, art, education, and personal relations, it appears impossible to break out of the social prison. 'Everyday experience' reinforces and internalizes the neo-fatalist ideology of the immutable nature of the late capitalist social order. All that is left is the dream of escape - through sex and drugs, which in their turn are promptly industrialized. The fate of the one-dimensional man seems to be wholly predetermined.(243)

Mandel identifies the dilemma in Marcuse's work precisely. One has only to think of the use to which Marcuse puts the concept of 'introjection' in One Dimensional Man: it becomes an almost behaviourist description of the ability of the established power structure to invoke voluntary subordination on the part of the individual. Marcuse wrote, for example:

Impelled in the striving to extend the field of erotic gratification, libido becomes less 'polymorphous', less capable of eroticism beyond localized sexuality, and the latter is intensified...The organism is thus being preconditioned for the spontaneous acceptance of what is offered.(244)

But, argues Mandel, the tendencies described by Marcuse as eradicating critical social consciousness by virtue of the technical coordination of late capitalism's contradictions are inaccurate at the level of description and explanation.

In reality, however, late capitalism is not a completely organized society at all. It is merely a hybrid and bastardized combination of organization and anarchy. Exchange value and capitalist competition have in no way been abolished. The economy is in no sense based on planned production of use values for the needs of mankind. The quest for profit and the valorization of capital remain the motor of the whole economic process, with all the unresolved contradictions which they inexorably generate.(245)

Moreover, the thesis of technological rationality has obvious ideological connotations when it purports to describe a social process whilst veiling private vested interests. Mandel reveals the use to which such ideology is put under late capitalism: 'Its objective function is simply to convince the victims of alienated labour that it is senseless to rebel against it. It is thus naturally unable to explain periodic new flare-ups of rebellion except by psychological commonplace.'(246)

On this point it is difficult to resist the judgement that Horkheimer and Adorno, in particular, acquiesced in the ethos of hopeless resignation and thus added to rather than subtracted from the efficacy of the notion that it is 'senseless to rebel against the system'. Marcuse's references to the 'ridiculed actions of protest' in One Dimensional Man come particularly close to partaking in the despair and resignation of late capitalist culture, particularly in the way Marcuse and associates neglect the implications of the contradictions of late capitalism in their notion of 'organized capitalism' according to which class conflict and objective economic antagonisms are effectively administered by the state.

Mandel writes of the ideological character of the technological rationality thesis:

The ideology of 'technological rationalism' can be exposed as a mystification which conceals social reality and its contradictions, at four successive levels. Firstly, it represents a typical example of reification as Kofler has commented. All bourgeois and many self-styled Marxist theorists of the omnipotence of technology elevate it into a mechanism completely independent of all human objectives and decisions, which proceeds independently of class structure and class rule in the automatic manner of a natural law. The

distinction between natural and human history, essential to historical materialism, in effect disappears.(247)

Mandel notes that social consciousness is thus reduced to a reflection pattern of technological processes by adherents of the technological rationalism thesis; and returns to the active concept of social consciousness to show the reified, ideological, basis of this thesis. The capitalist economic system may be anarchic but human action underlies its operation, and to the extent that it does, reification is an illusion. For example the pollution of the biosphere, is 'not due to any "technical necessity" but to harmful technological decisions determined by private interests - harmful from the standpoint of the interests of humanity...' and that ,

Class interests and the economic laws of development of the existing social order (including the laws of competition, the sum of whose 'accidents' produces the strongest competitor at any particular point in time in a particular market) govern basic technological decisions today.(248)

Mandel cites as another example the alienated forms of urban development since the industrial revolution as a result of the distorting effects of capitalist social relations prevailing over land ownership and property relations. The deformation of town planning due to its subordination to the imperatives of ' "growth sectors" of private industry....(high rise blocks, dormitory cities, and so on).' (249) Moreover, the particular use to which Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse put Weberian and Freudian categories is insufficiently critical:

Secondly, the ideology of 'technical rationality' is incomplete



and therefore internally incoherent. It completely fails to account for the spread of irrationalism, and the regression to superstition, mysticism and misanthropy which accompany the alleged victory of 'technological rationality' in late capitalism.(250)

Thus, Mandel uncovers the ideological content of critical theory's cultural pessimism (as exemplified in Dialectic of Enlightenment):

The contradiction between the increased skill and culture of the mass of the working class on the one hand, and the petrified hierarchical structure of command in the factory, economy and state on the other, generates a pragmatic and apologetic ideology which combines idealization of 'experts' with scepticism towards 'education' and 'culture'. This ideology replaces the naive faith in the perfectibility of man, characteristic of the rising bourgeoisie of the 18th and 19th centuries, with a 'certainty' of the incorrigibly evil and aggressive 'nature' of man. Crude neo-Darwinism (Lorenz), profound cultural and civilizational pessimism and fundamental misanthropy serve as auxiliary supports of the ideology of 'technological rationality' in its overall justification of the existing social order.(251)

Thus, it could be argued that the adherence by critical theorists to Freudian instinct theory, and with Marcuse, Freud's later instinct theory of life and death instincts, in particular, is another example of the unwitting acquiescence to the effective ethos of hopelessness and the paralysis of social consciousness by 'technological rationality' (reification).

Mandel's comments on a facet of late capitalist ideology which drew Adorno's and Horkheimer's attention in the 1940s is similarly relevant to this discussion, and in Mandel's treatment Horkheimer and Adorno's insights are not denied but redeemed from their cultural pessimism:

Despite the contemporary adulation of the exact sciences, the aura of experts and the cult of space travel, irrationalism has continued to flourish in different forms since the Second World War. Suggestively it has now spread on a wide scale to the Anglo-Saxon countries, which before the Second World War were still largely dominated by bourgeois rationalist pragmatism. 'Lower' ideological phenomena, such as the vast extension of commercial astrology, fortune telling, and narcotism should be viewed in the same light.(252)

For Mandel, the irrationality of late capitalism is not reducible, on the level of individual needs and faculties, to libido, or Freud's concept of life instinct(s).(253) Late capitalism expresses the simultaneous undermining of late capitalist ideology by virtue of the latter's economic, social and cultural, contradictions; a factor the Frankfurt School lost sight of with their adherence to the technological rationality theses: the industrialization of the superstructure ensures that the contradictions are generalized and multiplied rather than neutralized.

However, despite the problems of reification and objectification in the Frankfurt School's perspective, it is to their credit that their work anticipated and advanced many fertile insights into the changing complexities of late capitalism. Interestingly vis-a-vis the Frankfurt School, Mandel also relates the alienation of late capitalism to the degradation of socio-psychological life :

Late capitalist social structure and ideology further inculcate compulsive striving for success and mechanical submission to 'technological authority', which generate frequent neurotic stress. Such modes of behaviour, with their elimination of critical thought or conscience, and their training towards blind conformity and obedience, potentially create perilous preconditions for semi-fascist acceptance of inhuman orders, for reasons of convenience or habit.'(254)

Mandel concurs here with important pioneering work into authoritarianism by Erich Fromm, as a member of the Institute for Social Research in the 1930s, and especially in his 1941 work Escape from Freedom. As discussed in this study, Fromm abandoned the libido theory for an interpersonal conception of 'humanistic psychoanalysis' based upon Marx's concept of man as a 'total personality'.

The significance of what Fromm calls the 'pathology of normalcy' (255) lies in the application of Marx's theory of alienation to psychoanalysis and social relations under late capitalism, as George Novack, writing on the connection between mental health and alienation, has noted:

Fromm borrows the concept of alienation from Marx's early writings as the central tool in his analysis of what is wrong with the sterile and standardized acquisitive society of the twentieth century and the main characteristic it produces in people. He makes many astute observations on the ways in which capitalism mangles human personalities.(256)

In Marcuse's work the increased neurotic stress produced by the contradiction between the tremendous development of social wealth on the one hand, and its wasteful and destructive use on the other, is explained in terms of Freudian instinct theory: increased neurotic stress is thus accounted for in terms of the concept of 'surplus repression', according to which neurotic stress is a measure of repression surplus to the basic requirements of civilization.(257)

But the Frankfurt School's perspective tended to mystify the possibilities for terminating the reification of the psyche, since for critical theory subjectivity had all but been obliterated. In

the context of a working class conceived as integrated into the structures of the late capitalist state and civil society, the impact of technological rationality assumed the proportions of an all pervasive reification. However, as we have shown, the assumption of the all pervading effectiveness of instrumental rationality on the social consciousness of the labouring classes was based upon the economic propositions accepted by the Frankfurt School, under the concept of 'organized capitalism'. If the veil of reification was to be lifted, the Frankfurt School failed to subject the political economy of late capitalism to a critique which pierced through the veil of reification and located the contradictions of late capitalism in that between the forces and relations of production, albeit at a higher stage, 'the ideology of "technological rationality" mystifies the reality of late capitalism by claiming that the system is capable of overcoming all the fundamental socio-economic contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.'(258)

Despite the fact that it was precisely the neo-Lukacsian Marxism of the Frankfurt School which attempted to bring the concept of alienation back to the fore of the critical theory of society, it was their mistaken economic analysis and modified usage of Lukacs' concept of reification which led the Frankfurt School to retreat from the most radical and far reaching aspects of this concept. Mandel notes the limitations of reification; man is a self-actualizing being whose social consciousness is underlined by a fundamental contradiction in the social structure:

In fact, the alleged 'integration' of the working class into late capitalist society inevitably encountered an insuperable barrier - the inability of capital to 'integrate' the worker as

producer at his place of work and to provide him with creative rather than alienated labour as a means of 'self-realization'. Events in Europe and outside it since the French revolt of May 1968 have amply demonstrated this thesis.(259)

Moreover, the generalized economic, social and ideological crisis of late capitalism has spread the severity of the effects of alienation to all social relations and classes on a greatly enlarged scale.

But as Mandel has noted of Adorno, the role critical theory has played has not always escaped ideological use and abuse due to its tendency to quietism and scholastic abhorrence of praxis:

When thinkers sincerely and profoundly hostile to capitalism proclaim the impotence of the proletariat in the imperialist countries to challenge the existing social order, their own tragic misjudgement makes them unwitting cogs in the vast ideological machine constructed by the ruling class to achieve the vital objective of convincing the working class that it is helpless to change society. The source of this 'misjudgement' lies less in the 'successes' of late capitalism than in disappointment with the bureaucratic degeneration of the first victorious socialist revolutions and in mistaken estimates of the conjunctural and transient character of the decline of proletarian class consciousness.(260)

The mistake of the Frankfurt School was in an incorrect understanding of the character of the inter-war years. Secondly, their despair serves to reinforce the feeling of powerlessness prevalent under late capitalism. Hence:

It was a tragic misreading of the facts when Adorno wrote: 'The pseudo-revolutionary gesture is the complement of the technical military impossibility of a spontaneous revolution, pointed out years ago by Jürgen von Kempster. Against those who control the bomb, barricades are ridiculous; one therefore plays at barricades, and the masters temporarily let the players have their way.' Adorno failed to understand that 'military technology' cannot be applied independently of living people engaged in social activity. In the final analysis Auschwitz and Hiroshima were not products of technology but of

relationships of social forces - in other words, they were the (provisional) terminus of the great historical defeats of the international proletariat after 1917. After the end of the Second World War annihilation so total in form and vast in scale ceased to be possible for an entire historical epoch. The Vietnamese War has shown that it is not 'military technology' but the growing resistance of the American population to the war which has set limits to the type of weapons that the 'masters' can deploy. Simultaneously, the barricades at which French students allegedly 'played' in May 1968 unleashed a mass strike of 10 million workers, employees and technicians, and proved in its turn that, given a certain political and social balance of class forces, the use of murderous means of repression becomes impossible or inoperative on the streets. To assert, after these experiences, that mass resistance or rebellion by the ruled can only occur because of the temporary tolerance of the rulers is not merely to absolutize the power of the latter unhistorically: it objectively aids them to convince the ruled of their powerlessness and hence of the futility of radical revolt. It is this conviction - rather than weapons of mass destruction - which is today the most effective instrument of domination commanded by capital.(261)

#### Lowy on the 'Actuality of Revolution': Political Assessment of the Inter-War Years

Mandel indicates the central flaw in the Frankfurt School's assessment of the political struggles of the inter-war years in relation to the discussion on the technological rationality thesis. The lack of an adequate political sociology informed by a comparative approach and historical perspective led Adorno and Horkheimer in particular to commit such errors of judgement. Even Fromm's sociological and social-psychological analysis of Fascism neglected the disastrous effects of the Comintern's (Third International) policy of the second period on the fate of the German Labour movement prior to 1933.(262)

In his Sociology of the Anti-Capitalist Intelligentsia, Michael Lowy provides the necessary historical and sociological analysis of the anti-capitalist intellectual in Germany for an understanding of the Frankfurt School's political weaknesses which are proportionate to its strengths. Thus it is necessary to recall briefly the context in which the Frankfurt School derived (introduced and discussed in chapter one). Hence to understand the intellectual influences of the Frankfurt School one has to understand the revolt of the pre-1914 anti-capitalist intelligentsia in German society.

The social situation and the life-style of intellectuals in German society was bound to the pre-capitalist sectors, the petit bourgeoisie in particular.(263) German romanticism was an ideology which articulated the distress of the traditional petit-bourgeoisie which was threatened materially and spiritually by the development of monopoly capitalist society.(264) Lowy notes:

In romantic ideology, opposition to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Code is combined with an anti-capitalist rejection of the bourgeois social universe, of economic liberalism and even industrialization.

Hence:

Faced with the development of capitalism, which progressively reduces man to an abstract, calculable quantity and establishes a rigorously quantitative system of reasoning, romanticism passionately defended the concrete, qualitative and intuitive forms of living and thinking, and the personal and concrete human relations which still lived on amongst the pre-capitalist layers (peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, nobility).(265)

In a specifically historical sense, then, aspects of (particularly) Horkheimer and Adorno's social thought have much in common with what Marx called 'feudal socialism' and the other variant of mid-nineteenth century neo-romanticism, 'true socialism' which 'was the politico-ideological expression of the pre-capitalist petty bourgeoisie.'(266) But Lowy notes,

Marx's socialism had nothing in common, either socially or ideologically, with anti-capitalist romanticism. Its roots lay in a quite different section of the petty-bourgeoisie - the Jacobin, enlightened, revolutionary-democratic, anti-feudal and 'francophile' section, whose brilliant literary representative was Heinrich Heine, an intransigent enemy of romanticism.(267)

Also of importance is Nietzsche's attitude to capitalism combined with the backward looking character of his criticism (268) ('The romantic critique of capitalist civilization is at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy'(269)) and the parallel between the conclusions of Adorno's negative dialectics and the despair inherent in Nietzsche's critique are striking. As Lowy notes of the young Lukacs, and applies mutatis mutandis to the Frankfurt School (and especially Horkheimer and Adorno), 'what drove Lukacs to despair was the stability and immutability of the capitalist society he hated - a society in which it was impossible to realize the absolute, idealist aesthetic-philosophical values to which he was so deeply attached.'(270)

And moreover, having abandoned the proletariat as the agency for social change, Horkheimer and Adorno fell back into the messianism of romantic anti-capitalism - again, as Lowy notes of the young Lukacs:



The conflict between authentic values and the inauthentic (capitalist) world was tragically insoluble, for Lukacs could see no social force capable of changing the world and making those values a reality. The conflict therefore assumed the eternal, ahistorical, unchangeable character of metaphysics - hence the title of Lukacs' essay 'The Metaphysics of Tragedy'.(271)

Indeed, the conflict assumed an external, ahistorical, unchangeable character in Horkheimer and Adorno's thought in the post-World War Two years in their regression to a romantic left-wing anti-capitalist position.

The notion of the stability of the bourgeois world, however, as we have discussed above, was a tragic misjudgement on the part of the Frankfurt School, and ultimately this is a political judgement. However, before turning to this question directly, we must conclude the contextualisation of the Frankfurt School's socio-historical and intellectual milieu. Lowy notes, that the 'tragic consciousness' of the German anti-capitalist intelligentsia cannot be reduced to the decline of the German intellectual mandarin ( in the reductionist sociological approach) (272), as a specific social layer. It also contains a genuine criticism of developments in advancing capitalist society. Lowy writes:

More generally, this 'tragic consciousness' appeared among the romantic anti-capitalist German intelligentsia as a whole and especially among academic sociologists. We have already pointed to the tragic aspects of Tonnies' thought, and the deep pessimism about society which marked Max Weber and Simmel's problematic of 'the tragedy of culture'. To these we could add Scheler's view of history as a continual decline of values, and the theme of cultural decadence taken up by such diverse authors as Alfred Weber, Werner Sombart, and Oswald Spengler.(273)

As Weber wrote summarizing this tragic world view:

They [intellectuals] look distrustfully upon the abolition of traditional conditions of the community and upon the annihilation of all the innumerable ethical and esthetic values which cling to these traditions. They doubt if the domination of capital would give better, more lasting guarantee, to personal liberty and the development of intellectual, esthetic, and social culture they represent.... Thus, it happens nowadays in the civilized countries....that the representatives of the highest interests of culture turn their eyes back, and, with deep antipathy, [stand] opposed to the inevitable development of capitalism.....(274)

Lowy usefully summarizes the reasons for the tragic world view of the German anti-capitalist intelligentsia:

The tragic view of the world held by writers, sociologists, and other German intellectuals around the turn of the century was itself the product of two combined phenomena: a) the opposition, varying in intensity, between their ethico-cultural and socio-political values and the ruthless spurt of industrial monopoly capitalism in Germany, and b) despair of ever being able to contain or halt this process, which they saw as an irreversible 'fatality'.(275)

Adorno's statement that 'only despair can save us' thus has its roots in the anti-capitalist romantic tradition, a position to which Adorno and Horkheimer regressed intellectually with the 'integration' of the proletariat in the inter-war period.(276)

Having contextualized the Frankfurt School against the background of the German anti-capitalist intelligentsia and indicated the social roots of the tragic view of the world to which Horkheimer and Adorno acquiesced, it is necessary to indicate the political source of the Frankfurt School's error of judgement with regard to the complete integration of the working class and the apparent

impossibility of changing the balance of social class forces in the favour of the working class and its allies.

Again, it is useful to contrast the Frankfurt School with Lukacs' political evolution because it throws into relief the flaws in the Frankfurt School's political judgement. In his 1924 work Lenin (277), Lukacs accounts for the relevance of Lenin's theoretical and programmatic legacy in terms of the actuality of the revolution. Lowy accounts for Lukacs' right turn of 1926 (to Stalin) due to Lukacs' mistaken understanding of this concept. There exists an ambiguity in the concept of the actuality of the revolution, writes Lowy: 'At times the actuality of the revolution refers to a historical period of revolutionary struggles, at others to a revolutionary situation characterized by the 'collapse of the old framework of society'. Thus:

If Leninism were the theory of the actuality of the revolution in the second sense, then it would cease to be realistic in a situation of capitalist stability such as Lukacs refused to envisage in 1924. Thus, Lukacs seems to restrict the validity of Leninism to a situation of revolutionary crisis, or to one in which revolution is imminent.(278)

Hence, with the stabilization of capitalism after the initial revolutionary wave following the First World War, Lukacs drew the conclusion that international socialism was no longer on the agenda and Stalin's notion of 'socialism in one country' was theoretically correct.(279) With no imminent collapse of the capitalist order and stabilization on the ascendent, Leninism appeared as no longer 'actual', and subsequently the Left Opposition in Russia appeared as 'ultra-left' and Stalin's policies a more flexible strategy.(280)

Lukacs' misunderstanding of the actuality of revolution can be traced to his ahistorical interpretation of Lenin's concept of imperialism. For as we shall see, Lukacs' right turn of 1926 and political alignment with Stalin, was complemented by Korsch's and the Frankfurt School's left-turn in the 1920s following the isolation of the Russian Revolution and rise of the Stalinist bureaucracy.(281) As discussed in chapter one, Korsch's stress on 'practice' met a response in the situation and activity of the working class in the early 1920s, and seemed to validate Lenin's concept of imperialism: the opening of the era of wars and revolutions commencing with the rise of monopoly capitalism and the First World War. But as Goode shows, Korsch grasped Lenin's concept, as did Lukacs, in a heavily literal way. Trotsky, Goode shows, introduced this notion of imperialism as 'the era of wars and revolutions', but qualified its historical basis:

A recognition of the fact that the war and October opened an epoch of world revolution does not mean, of course, that at every given moment we have an immediately revolutionary situation.... The epoch of world revolution will have its periods of rise and fall.(282)

Korsch's concept of theory and practice ended by reducing Marxism to the immediacy of its contingent practical success. Such a position disarmed the ultra-left theoretically (despite its principled defence of socialism as the self-activity and revolutionary democracy of the working class) because the Stalinist bureaucracy was 'successful' albeit in gaining political control of

the state apparatus and generating ideological distortions of Marxism as well as pursuing disastrous domestic and foreign policies.(283)

The Frankfurt School, as discussed in chapter one, rejected Korsch's reduction of Marxism to the expression of the general conditions of the actually existing class struggle and maintained the anticipatory character of Marxist theory. As Marcuse put it:

The concrete conditions for realizing the truth may vary, but the truth remains the same and theory remains its ultimate guardian. Theory will preserve the truth even if revolutionary practice deviates from its proper path. Practice follows the truth, not vice-versa.(284)

But the Frankfurt School followed Lukacs and Korsch in misunderstanding Lenin's concept of imperialism, failing to cognize Trotsky's qualification that the crisis of imperialism asserts itself in terms of the law of uneven and combined development.(285) Whilst Lukacs turned to the right in 1926 and conformed, Korsch and the Left Opposition were expelled from the Third International and eventually persecuted (286), leading to the physical liquidation of the Bolshevik old guard.(287)

The political complexion of the Frankfurt School, at least Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, is reminiscent of the political leftism in the 1920s such as the council communist tendency of the astronomist and philosopher Pannekoek and the poet Gorter.(288) The review Kommunismus, organ of the Communist International for countries of Southeast Europe 'gave its support to German "semi-leftists" (Fischer, Maslow, et al.) but also to such genuinely ultra-

left figures as Pannekoek and Roland Holst'.(289) However, the principle direction of the review was in the hands of Hungarian Communists exiled in Vienna, including Béla Kún, and 'Lukacs and his "disciples"'.(290) Lowy indicates that the existence of the review and its deviation from the official line of the Comintern shows the latter was far from monolithic in the early period of the Soviet regime.

In his 1967 Preface to History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs describes Kommunismus and by so doing reminds us of the political stance of the Frankfurt School. Lowy notes: 'At the time, he says, he was in favour of "a total break with every institution and mode of life stemming from the bourgeois world"'. Like the Frankfurt School later, Lukacs' romantic anti-capitalism informed his concept of imperialism and revolutionary practice.

His thought was still characterized, although in milder form, by that sharp opposition between the authentic and the corrupt which dominated his earlier ethical rigorism. Only now it involved not a a priori rejection of any compromise, but aversion, hostility, and resistance to the participation of revolutionaries in bourgeois institutions.(291)

'The uncertainty of the epoch', as Held writes, 'is reflected in the earliest writings of the Institute members.' The early work of the critical theorists reflected 'a non-dogmatic critical theory of society'.(292) Horkheimer's collection of aphorisms and essays, 'Dämmerung' (dawn and decline) written between 1926 and 1931, expressed the 'alternativism' inherent in the imperialist era of, as Rosa Luxemburg termed it, socialism or barbarism. Horkheimer's ambivalence concerning the outcome of the 1920s was replaced by

disappointment and disenchantment by the mid-1930s with the consolidation of Stalinism in Russia and Fascism in Germany.

The Frankfurt School defended the combination socialism-democracy but drew the incorrect conclusion that the revolutionary epoch which opened with the Russian Revolution had definitively closed by the late 1920s and certainly by the early 1930s. However, as has been argued, the Frankfurt School followed Lukacs' interpretation of the 'actuality of revolution', drawing the same conclusion in regard to the stability of capitalism, but from a position of non-aligned, political leftism. Such a position blocked the possibility of an understanding of the temporary character of the stabilization of capitalism and thus enforced a blindness to the revolutionary possibilities of combatting Stalinism and Fascism.(293) Moreover, the Frankfurt School's 'political leftism' reflected the provincialism of the ultra-left German council communist tendency, and failure to draw the necessary political conclusions regarding the differences in institutions and development of working class political parties between Russia and Western Europe.

The council communists, for example, rejected participation in the trade unions and in Parliament. Rather than recognise the greater complexity of the State and civil society in Western Europe as Trotsky and Gramsci had (in Trotsky's thesis of 'permanent revolution' Russia represented the weakest link in the chain of capitalist hegemony) (294), and integrating this insight into their strategy, the council communists drew the conclusion that bourgeois democracy is historically outmoded and could be immediately by-

passed by 'alternative' trade unions and workers councils. The 'provincialism' of the political leftists, what Lenin described as 'left-wing communism' (295), lay in their inability to draw the correct conclusions regarding the concrete, uneven, unfolding of the revolutionary process: namely, the importance of overcoming the political weakness of the German far-left with regard to the hegemony of the labour bureaucracy, and the capitalist institutions and State over the working class. The Frankfurt School grasped the problem of hegemony in terms of political psychology, but failed to insert this concept into the wider political framework of a counter-hegemonic strategy on the one hand, and an accurate assessment of the defeats of the inter-war years in terms of the character of the epoch of imperialism on the other. Thus it is necessary to discuss these specifically political weaknesses, alongside the analysis of the origins of the German anti-capitalist intelligentsia discussed earlier, in order to provide a more complete discussion of the Frankfurt School's disenchantment with the revolutionary potential of the working class and final acquiescence to the conclusions of Weber's technological rationality thesis.

Thus it can be argued that, had the Frankfurt School conceived their project as part of the struggle of the working class more organically, rather than as contemplative thinkers outside of the class-struggle, they may not have been so ready to succumb and reproduce the unwarranted resignation which plagued their work and, as Mandel accurately points out, serves well the ethos of passive hopelessness and acquiescence, which is the chief endemic effect of



late capitalist ideological hegemony. Thus Mandel writes:

Philosophers who fall prey to the fetishism of technology, and overestimate the ability of late capitalism to achieve the integration of the masses, typically forget the fundamental contradiction between use-value and exchange-value by which capitalism is riven, when they seek to prove the hopelessness of popular resistance to the existing social order. (296)

The critical theorists thus definitely shared this common failure - to pursue the contradictions of capitalist society to their ultimate source. Thus, that even in non-revolutionary periods, social consciousness is constituted as a dynamic, active force, which even if not moved to demand qualitative social change, certainly is involved in a collective struggle with the ruling class's interests over the distribution of social resources and wealth. This dynamic was in many respects lost to the critical theorists because their work failed to appreciate that the chief historical contradictions of classical imperialism had in fact been preserved and enlarged upon a new and more dangerous historical level, despite the temporary defeats in the inter-war period and the partial integration of the working class.

Moreover, as Mandel shows above, this new historical relation between the basic classes of late capitalist society could only be adequately assessed and critically understood by exposing the accompanying ideology of 'technological rationality' as a fundamental component of late capitalist ideological hegemony; and thus expose its political expression in the reformist programmes and social policies of working class political parties.

The Frankfurt School collapsed the contradiction between the forces and relations of production in the era of late capitalism from the vantage point of Pollock's concept of state-capitalism, thus tending to lose sight of the dynamic quality of social consciousness. Thus the Frankfurt School's work tended to cut short the effectiveness of their critique of late capitalism before reaching the source of the social contradictions. They thus reinforced the impression given by technological rationality itself, namely that the basic contradictions of capitalist society may be indefinitely contained by the effective technological coordination of state and civil society to integrate the social consciousness of the labouring classes. Thus Mandel notes:

This brings us to the fourth and most important level at which the ideology of 'technological rationality' can be shown to be a mystification. The notion of capitalist rationality developed by Lukacs, following Weber, is in fact a contradictory combination of partial rationality and overall irrationality. For the pressure towards exact calculation and quantification of economic processes, generated by the universalization of commodity production, comes up against the insuperable barrier of capitalist private ownership, competition and the resultant impossibility of exactly determining the socially necessary quantities of labour actually contained in the commodities produced.(297)

The concept of reification adapted by the Frankfurt School lost sight of the fact that advanced capitalist rationality is thus 'a contradictory combination of partial rationality and overall irrationality'. To be sure, the limits of the capitalist state to intervene in and administer the contradictions of the economic system leaves the Frankfurt School's notion of an endlessly 'imploding' capitalism devoid of rigorous analytical precision and

historical accuracy. The planning of private commodity production takes place in no more an organized way than the coordination of the psyche with the requirements of monopoly capital:

This contradiction finds expression in the fact that the micro-economic measures taken by entrepreneurs on the basis of 'rational calculations' inevitably lead to macro-economic consequences which conflict with them. Every investment boom leads to over-capacity and over-production. Any acceleration in the accumulation of capital ultimately leads to the devalorization of capital.(298)

In recognising that the contradictions of late capitalism were inadequately conceptualized and understood by critical theorists, it seems fair to assert that the Frankfurt School tended, as they moved further from a class-struggle analysis and a dynamic concept of social consciousness, towards 'absolutizing the notion of "economic rationality" derived from Weber.' With their undialectical neglect of the material analysis by which the labouring classes move from latent to manifest class-consciousness, the Frankfurt School tended to postulate 'universally valid rules of "rational behaviour" abstracted from the concrete structure of economy and society.'(299)

The pre-interpretation of Freudian categories in terms of the technological rationality thesis tended to reduce human behaviour to a shadow pattern of the economic infrastructure: ironically, critical theory reproduces the economic determinism of Hilferding in its political psychology. The necessary integration into their analysis of the basic contradiction between the partial rationality and overall irrationality of late capitalism and thus the 'contradiction between the maximum valorization of capital and the optimum self-

realization of men and women'(300)is lost. Moreover, the exploration of this contradiction sustained and intensified under late capitalism, is reduced to reified psychological categories which deny the goal oriented, teleological dimension of human praxis. Therefore, the technological rationality thesis precludes the possibility of a Marxist psychology because, according to critical theory, the individual is pre-conditioned to respond in specific ways to societal stimuli.(301)

Thus it can be argued that Marcuse, Horkheimer, and Adorno placed Marxism in an impasse. Praxis is the only chance to shatter the reified theoretical structure - but the structure precludes this possibility of praxis: a vicious circle results and the impotence of the critique pronounces itself in mournful eloquence.(302) However, as shown above, when the actuality of mass social movements did emerge in the years following the Second World War Adorno and Horkheimer had become unable to recognize their social and political significance. That Fromm and Marcuse were able to respond more positively was, as has been argued, a token of their continued loyalty to the importance of resistance and the potential self-emancipation of the working class, and a continued (if sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit) defence of this concept in their work, even when this took the form of searching for ways to dereify social consciousness and stimulate groups in society which, it was hoped, could become a catalyst for the working class and its allies as a whole.

In this context, Fromm's later emphasis on Marxist humanism can be understood as an attempt to demonstrate the total effects of

alienation and that the great norms and values of bourgeois civilization - its progressive social achievements (democracy, individuality, for example) - could be realized only on the basis of socialist democracy. On this point Fromm and Marcuse concur that the struggle for socialism involves the transvaluation of values. Socialism must become hegemonic by assuming a leading moral discourse for the future of society, and to this extent it is a revolutionary force.(303)

#### On the contradictions of late capitalism

It is valuable to note several additional examples of the 'contradictory nature of the "process of ideological integration"' of late capitalism (304) in order to show that late capitalist society not only sustains the classical contradictions of capitalism on a new level, but can not meet the basic requirements of human self-realization rationally, despite the potential available social wealth which capitalist society has assembled in the twentieth century.

Firstly, the threat to the biosphere posed by the exigencies of late capitalist industrial technique and organization. Mandel notes:

A very recent example of the contradictory nature of the 'process of ideological integration' is furnished by the rapidly increasing awareness of dangers to the environment in the imperialist countries. From the standpoint of the production of commodities and of value this development can undoubtedly open up new markets for the late capitalist economy: a whole 'ecology industry' is now in the process of emerging. But merely to perceive this immediate aspect of the problem, without also seeing that systematic explanation of the threat to the environment, as an effect of the capitalist mode of production itself which cannot be overcome within it, can be a powerful weapon against capitalism (not just in the sphere of 'abstract theory' but also as a 'stimulus to action' and mass

mobilizations), is to be blind to the complexity of the social crisis of late capitalism.(305)

This aspect of the social crisis of late capitalism has been noted by Marcuse in Counter Revolution and Revolt (London, 1972) as an important element in the total quality of the rebellion against the alienated social relations of late capitalist society. The oppressive conditions of the natural and social environment as a result of the destructive, abusive and wasteful character of late capitalist productivity has stimulated the development of new social movements such as the Green movement.(306) The alienation of man from the environment of which man is a part, (and is thus alienated from himself) becomes part of a potential counter-hegemonic demand. The basis of a politics emerges, based on Marx's theory of alienation, able to transcend a narrow economism because the effects of alienation and an alternative radical politics are not limited to the narrow though important confines of the work-place. Mandel draws attention in his analysis of ideology in the era of late capitalism to the 'transcendent needs' created on the basis of the sustained economic growth of the post-war years and the latter's decline punctuated by the economic social, and cultural contradictions which have been generalized due to the extension of technical rationality - the industrialization of the social superstructure. Mandel usefully throws into relief the implications of the contradictions of late capitalism for social consciousness which were incompletely grasped by the Frankfurt School.

The ideologies of technical fetishism by definition cannot confront the growing overall irrationality of late capitalism.

The hybrid combination of market anarchy and state interventionism typical of it tends, indeed, to erode some of the main foundations of traditional bourgeois ideology, without replacing them with any groundwork of comparative strength.(307)

For example in the essential aspects of ensuring continued state rule by the bourgeoisie, the norms of bourgeois legality are decisive for cementing consent. Mandel notes how bourgeois society made the formal economic exchange of quantities of labour power 'the centrepiece of its whole legal system.' As a result:

Political and cultural conceptions derived from the formal equality of the contract affected every domain of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology. Relations regulated by economic contracts between private commodity owners were also combined with earlier status bound relations derived from pre-capitalist class societies (from feudal or asiatic modes of production). The ideologies of the latter were based on the principle of 'special rights' for special groups of people rather than that of formal equality. Imperialist colonialism characteristically juxtaposed 'purely' capitalist commodity relations and pre-capitalist master-servant relations: a notorious example was the transformation of Protestant doctrines by the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk of South Africa into an entire ideology of the 'special rights' for whites, in keeping with the material system of exploitation ensured by Apartheid. In late capitalism, the scale of intervention of the bourgeois State and monopolies in economic life renders the formal equality of commodity owners increasingly hollow. 'Special rights' for special groups of possessors thus acquire legal status, secured by contracts or tolerated in practice. The system of state subsidies and guarantees of profit assume the appearance of formal and partial analogy to the welfare measures won through struggle by the working class. The legal norms which were traditionally characteristic of bourgeois society have thus gradually been inverted. Whereas the average capitalist in the 19th century respected the law as a matter of course, in the interests of orderly peace and quiet and his own business, the average capitalist of the 20th century lives more and more on the margin of the law, if not in actual contravention of it...The sheer quantitative increase in the number of legal regulations in the economy has rendered this evolution virtually inevitable.(308)

Another pertinent example (which illustrates the analysis Lukacs gave in History and Class Consciousness of the antinomies of bourgeois thought): the capitalist class is increasingly forced, in order to rationalize the heightening contradictions of capitalism, to distort and even completely obfuscate the true laws of motion underlying the overall irrationality of the capitalist mode of production. For example, taxation:

The hypertrophy of the late capitalist state today leads to a heavy tax burden on the individual citizen (the individual commodity owner) for whom the category of 'gross income' loses any practical significance. What capitalists or capitalist firms pay out in taxes cannot be directly accumulated as capital by them, even if a substantial part of the states fiscal income 'ultimately' flows back to them in form of contracts or subsidies, thus giving them back more than they had to give.(309)

Hence: 'Tax avoidance and tax evasion become fine arts for capitalist companies.'(310) This economic practice, it is relevant to note, is internalized and appropriated intellectually into the academic division of labour: 'Academic economists henceforward take the "right" of fiscal evasion for granted: learned treatises on public finances repeatedly argue that excessive rates of direct tax evasion are counter-productive because they are neutralized by more or less automatic increases in tax evasion.'(311)

The specific relation between the state and civil society in late capitalism has not assumed the model of 'state-capitalism' advanced by Pollock, the major political economist of the Frankfurt School. Pollock's thesis of 'state-capitalism' asserted that the advanced capitalist state is capable, as a result of the progressive



fusion of economy and polity (as a tendential characteristic of advanced monopoly capitalism) of raising the contradictions of the capitalist system to the level of an organized, regimented, administered civil society in accordance with the imperatives of capitalist hegemony, and that the immediate, foreseeable choice would exist only between democratic and totalitarian state-capitalist societies.(312) It might be noted, moreover, that the tendency for the economy and polity to fuse under advanced capitalism, is represented as an undifferentiated historical tendency, preventing an analysis of comparative social structure and collapsing differences in the political superstructures of capitalist states. Here it is not so much the experience of Fascism, which has disoriented the Frankfurt School, as the concept of occidental rationality derived from Weber.(313) As this study has argued, the notion of 'organised' capitalism as an economic and social system which has effectively resolved its internal contradictions is untenable. Despite having the benefit of identifying aspects of advanced monopoly capitalism which led to a prolonged stabilization with the permanent arms economies following the Second World War, and investigating some of the tendential sociological implications of the political economy of late capitalism for the social structure, the theoretical emphasis on the fusion of polity and economy neglected the fact that the capitalist State remains a focal point for the contradictions of this society which state intervention does not eradicate. Indeed, the capitalist State, despite its integrative and coercive role, remains a focal point for class conflict over the allocation of resources and the distribution of social wealth, as the

history of the labour movement in Europe in the post-war years testifies.(314) Lacking a comparative historical approach, the Frankfurt School forgot the significance of the international context of class conflict and the relevance of this dimension in assessing the potential self-emancipation of the working class. The Frankfurt School tended to emphasize the integrative capacity of the late capitalist State and civil society forgetting that with the breakdown and partial negation of traditional capitalist ideology, instrumental reason does not replace the traditional forms with any comparable strength.

This is because, as Mandel has shown, the success of the traditional capitalist ideology lay in its ability to draw on the status bound relations of pre-capitalist society.(315) The special rights of possessor groups in the twentieth century are increasingly sanctioned by the norms of formal legality which, in turn, are rendered increasingly rationalized by economic considerations. Thus these possessor groups risk losing status in the perceptions of the working class when, for example, the welfare state is cut back but the State guarantees profits for the military-industrial complex, or provides preferential tax concessions to facilitate renewed capital accumulation for big business.(316) Thus, the Frankfurt School's neglect of the socio-economic contradictions of late capitalism account for the failure of critical theory to advance an effective theoretical and empirical analysis of the relation of class forces in late capitalism and the dereification of social consciousness in relation to a coherent strategy for radical social change. It is important, however, to be conscious of the strengths of critical

theory as well as its weaknesses. Indeed, it has been a theme of this study that a dialectical assessment must pursue both sides of the Frankfurt School's trajectory of progress and defeat as established in chapter one.

Thus as this study has argued, it is not enough to fall back upon an assessment of the Frankfurt School which reduces the latter to the romantic anti-capitalist intelligentsia as if the critical theorists could be understood in terms of a morose lament for a pre-industrial Europe, or similarly, view the Frankfurt School and Western Marxism as 'all in all...just an episode in the long history of western thought: irrationalism' as does J.G.Merquior.(317) Even Marxist writers, while avoiding Merquior's reductionism, tend to succumb to a 'maginot Marxism' which assesses the Frankfurt School simply in terms of a defence of a previous theory and practice, in short, to positions already established and defended. In this camp fall those who would argue that the Frankfurt School's pessimism concerning the revolutionary potential of the working class must be mistaken because capitalism is fundamentally unchanged in the post-Second World War years. Imperialism is still neo-Imperialism, and thus, mutatis mutandis, the revolutionary potential of the working class is untarnished. Indeed it could be argued that there exist two positions, the above 'activist' position, and that of the 'theoretician' according to which the Frankfurt School - along with other Western Marxists - has left the Marxist fold by replacing 'science' for 'philosophy'. The latter position has already given us cause for discussion but it would seem necessary to answer the first 'activist' position because it serves to clarify

the specific contribution the Frankfurt School has made, and continues to make, to the critique of late capitalism from a Marxist perspective, and the argument which has evolved throughout this study. For while it has been argued that the Frankfurt School's economic analysis of imperialism is mistaken we would not wish to imply that the specific changes in the character of capitalist society which the Frankfurt School has identified are not in fact real and operative. Indeed it has been a contention of this study that the Frankfurt School has in fact made a real contribution to our understanding of the new forms of social control and the character of late capitalist ideology.

Thus it can be argued that the Frankfurt School are a useful corrective to the 'Leninist' position which attempts to inform a political practice for the last quarter of the twentieth century from the vantage point of Russia in 1917. Moreover, it is testimony to the relevance of the Frankfurt School to the remaining years of the twentieth century that it has helped theory to go beyond 'maginot' positions and attempt to address the major changes in the development of monopoly capitalist society. As we have shown, however, the Frankfurt School blocked the development of their own insights, but it is important to draw out the main areas identified and which inform the analysis and critique of late capitalism. We can draw from the creative work of Ernest Mandel in order to identify such major characteristic changes in the era of late capitalism which the Frankfurt School anticipated in their work because Mandel has produced the most in depth and comprehensive

analysis of changes in the political economy of capitalism since the Second World War.(318)

In his chapter 'The Expansion of the Services Sector, the "Consumer Society" and the Realization of Surplus Value' (319) Mandel analyzes the major areas of change which the Frankfurt School anticipated. In opposition to the Frankfurt School's (or more specifically Horkheimer and Adorno's) notion of 'organized' capitalism which we have criticised, Mandel indicates the changes within the context of a new development of the contradiction between the forces and relations of late capitalist production. Hence Mandel's work brings into greater focus the contradictory character of the political economy of monopoly capitalism in contrast to the Frankfurt School's mistaken notion of the continued rationalisation and indefinite adjustment of the internal contradictions of the capitalist system.

Far from representing a 'post-industrial society', late capitalism thus constitutes generalized universal industrialization for the first time in history. Mechanization, standardization, over-specialization and parcellization of labour, which in the past determined only the realm of commodity production in actual industry, now penetrate into all sectors of social life... The 'profitability' of universities, music academies and museums starts to be calculated in the same way as that of brick works or screw factories.(320)

This 'generalized universal industrialization' in the 'spheres of circulation, services and reproduction...lead to an increase in ..the mass of surplus value.'(321)

Mandel notes factors in the 'consumer society' which in fact constitute the major themes of the Frankfurt School:

- a) the decline of the share of pure means of subsistence in the real wages of the working class,
- b) the increasing displacement of the proletarian family as a unit of production, and the tendency for it to be displaced even as a unit of consumption. The growing market for pre-cooked meals, tinned foods, ready made clothes and vacuum cleaners, etc., corresponds to the rapid decline of the production of immediate use-values within the family previously cared for by the worker's wife, mother and daughter, i.e., heating, cleaning, washing, and so on;
- c) the cultural achievements of the proletariat won by the ascent and struggle of the modern working class (books, papers, self-education, sport, organization, and so on) lose those features of voluntary self-activity and autonomy from the processes of capitalist commodity production and circulation, which defined them in the period of classical imperialism and became drawn into capitalist production and circulation to an increasing extent, i.e., books holidays, recreation;
- d) the direct economic compulsion to purchase certain additional commodities and services - to be distinguished from indirect socially manipulative compulsions such as, for example, advertising. Thus it is no longer economically possible today for the average wage-earner to go to work on foot, not to enrol in a health insurance scheme, etc. (while excessive development of urban conurbations and the corresponding increase in time spent commuting between home and work tends to make time-saving consumer goods a necessity);
- e) the differentiation of consumption or the extension of the commodities consumed as a result of social pressures (advertisements, conformity). A significant proportion of such commodities can be regarded as largely useless (kitsch in the living room), if not damaging to health (cigarettes).(322)

The romantic element in the critical theorists' anti-capitalist critique was enlisted (as discussed in chapter one) to deepen and broaden the analysis of late capitalist forms of domination. However, it is clear that the critique lapsed into liberal melancholy subsequent to the abandonment of the centrality of the working class as the subject and agent of social change. This is particularly evident in some of the nostalgia for liberal as opposed to monopolistic capitalism expressed by Adorno and Horkheimer. In

today's society, Horkheimer wrote, 'Everyone is always busy. The time is gone when a sick person would listen for the hoof beat of the horse that pulled the doctor's cart through the still streets in the late evening.'(323)

Since this romantic element has been misunderstood (see chapter one) as pertaining to pre-scientific socialist utopian rejection of industrialism per se, it is worth clarifying the meaning of the 'romantic' element in critical theory in relation to their critique of new forms of domination. We have seen that the anti-capitalist German intelligentsia revolted against mass society and monopoly capitalism. For the left wing of that intellectual formation, however, the image of liberation from alienated social relations could be enhanced by the indictment of bourgeois society from a socialist standpoint. The creation of false needs by vested interests in the 'consumer society' leads to the alienation of the individual in the private sphere which is gradually commercialized. The potential for the 'pacification of social existence' (324) is denied its implementation for the industrialization of the social superstructure and the one-sided development of needs. Thus, as Mandel writes, what is required is a critique not of the extension of needs under late capitalism, but of the commercialization and dehumanization of consumption. In the work of the critical theorists this distinction is sometimes blurred due to the overextended application of the concept of reification and the use of Freud's deterministic psychology. Hence Mandel writes:

For socialists, rejection of capitalist 'consumer society' can therefore never imply rejection of the extension and differentiation of needs as a whole, or any return

to the primitive natural state of these needs, their aim is necessarily the development of a 'rich individuality' for the whole of mankind. In this rational Marxist sense, rejection of capitalist 'consumer society' can only mean rejection of all those forms of consumption and of production which continue to restrict man's development, making it narrow and one-sided.

Thus:

This rational rejection seeks to reverse the relationship between the production of goods and human labour, which is determined by the commodity form under capitalism, so that henceforth the main goal of economic activity is not the maximum production of things and the maximum private profit for each individual unit of production (factory or company) but the optimum self-activity of the individual.(325)

Of course , with their use of Freuds mechanistic instinct theory, the increased satisfaction of needs under the consumer society is interpreted in terms of the integration thesis, and contradicting his later appeal to Marx's Grundrisse [1857/8] (326) (vis-a-vis the extension of needs under late capitalism and their one-sided satisfaction), Marcuse adopts the idea of the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat as a pre-condition for the return of revolutionary subjectivity.(327)

Finally, in seeking to show the hopelessness of popular resistance to the existing social order, the critical theorists overestimate the ability of late capitalism to integrate the masses via consumerism. Hence Mandel writes:

They make a great stir out of the fact that capital succeeds in converting 'everything' into a commodity, including revolutionary Marxist literature. It is understandably true that publishers 'insensitive' to the specific use-value of their commodities saw the chance of good business in the growing interest of a wide range of Marxist literature. Whoever deems this phenomenon an 'integration' of Marxism into the 'world of



commodities', however, refuses to see that the bourgeois social order and the individual consumer by no means have a 'value-free' or 'neutral' attitude to the specific use-value of 'Marxist literature'. Mass distribution of Marxist literature - even via the market - ultimately means the mass formation (or heightening) of anti-capitalist consciousness. Ideological production that becomes a commodity in this way threatens to lose its objective function of consolidating the capitalist mode of production, because of the nature of the use-value sold.(328)

Thus, while the Frankfurt School identified many important and new features of social control and ideology in late capitalism, their over-harmonious and exaggerated view of the capacity of this system's ability to absorb conflict meant that their insights remained underdeveloped and partial. In the example last cited, Mandel questions the assumption expressed in, for example, Marcuse's One Dimensional Man, that the publishing of critical theory itself testifies to the strength of the system, its powers of integration. As Mandel comments, it is precisely here that the Frankfurt School lost sight of the potential relationship they might have consciously formed with new layers of radicalized youth and intellectuals in the post-war years in the attempt to foster an anti-capitalist consciousness which the mass dissemination of radical and "alternative" literature tends to procure. Hence it could be argued that while the Frankfurt School made an important contribution to the understanding of late capitalism and reconstituting the Marxist project against the backdrop of orthodox "scientific" Marxism on the one hand, and Soviet Marxism on the other, their work - especially in that of Horkheimer and Adorno - tended to absolutize ahistorically the power of the ruling class in capitalist society

and submit to the conclusions of Weber's reified concept of technological rationality and occidental reason as Roderick notes:

Weber had distinguished between the social process of rationalization and modern cultural rationalism per se. Under their increasingly pessimistic (or realistic) premises, Horkheimer, Adorno, and (to a lesser extent) Marcuse increasingly tended to identify both as an expression of the very structure of Western reason itself. At this final stage, critique becomes total and entirely negative. It marks the Frankfurt School's abandonment of their last vestiges of faith in Marx's theory of history and social rationality in the face of the 'totally administered society'.(329)

The progressive replacement of the concept of social struggle between conflicting class interests and the centrality of the potential collective self-emancipation of the working class in critical theory with the concept of 'instrumental reason', unwittingly contributed to the 'most effective instrument of domination commanded by capital.'(330); namely, the fatalistic ethos of acquiescence which deems all revolt, all possibilities for the development of class consciousness and organisation of the working class on an international scale as ultimately futile and an empty, hopeless gesture of a romantic past which has been overcome by the inexorable imperatives of technical adjustment and rationalisation of the social system.(331)

This chapter has analysed the roots of critical theory's mistaken notion of 'organised' capitalism in terms of its economic propositions concerning the character of the imperialist period, and has discussed the political confusion in the critical theorist's assessment of the inter-war years by tracing their perspective to a mistaken, ultra-left interpretation of Lenin's concept of

imperialism. The purpose of our analysis must now aim towards a final synthesis of the discussion in this chapter in an assessment of the character and role of ideology in late capitalism in the light of our analysis of the project of the Frankfurt critical theorists as a school of Western Marxism.

#### Ideology In The Era Of Late Capitalism:

Initially, it is important to recall the discussion concerning the political roots of the Frankfurt School's mistaken assessment of the inter-war years as marked by complete defeat. In the previous section we noted Lowy's discussion of "the actuality of revolution" as a decisive component of Lenin's concept of imperialism in connection with Lukacs, Korsch, and the critical theorist's responses to the defeat of the European Revolution in the 1920s and the crisis of Marxism. In their respective responses, it was argued, these theorists tended to confuse the notion of the actuality of revolution with its continuous probability, while for Lenin and Trotsky imperialism, as a concept expressing the capitalist epoch of war and revolutions, asserts itself in terms of the law of uneven and combined development.(332) As a result of their mistaken interpretation of the Marxist concept of imperialism the Frankfurt School misread the events of the inter-war years and this misjudgement of the class struggle led them towards abandoning the centrality of the potential self-emancipation of the working class and Marx's theory of history and social rationality.

Thus in discussing the Frankfurt School's political response to the defeats of the inter-war years it is also instructive to consider Anderson's contribution towards an understanding of this problem. Writing on Lukacs, Anderson writes:

This fusion - confusion - between the theoretical concepts of historical epoch and historical conjuncture allowed Lukacs to ignore the whole problem of the concrete preconditions for a revolutionary situation by abstractly affirming the revolutionary character of the time itself. (333)

The ultra-left, Anderson continues, went on to argue, on this basis, for the 'Teilaktion' or 'partial' armed action against the capitalist state'(334). The disappointment of the Frankfurt School has to be understood against the background of the specific political mistakes and lost opportunities of the German revolutionary left. Anderson provides a lucid discussion of this period and has made a major contribution to its evaluation and assessment of the inter-war years which is instructive for the present discussion. For the political mistakes and lost opportunities of the German revolutionary left were, arguably, entirely avoidable and there was no inevitability in the series of events which led to the success of Hitler and Stalin. An examination of the German revolutionary left is important, then , for showing that a major dimension lost to the perspective of the Frankfurt School was the historical and political, in common with Western Marxism generally, despite the fact that the School represents a protest against the reification of praxis. It is essential to grasp the significance of this dimension for an understanding of the Frankfurt School's mistaken assessment of the

inter-war years and abandonment of the centrality of the working class in the defence of the critical theory of society.

The concept of the "actuality of revolution" was misunderstood by the far Left, as mentioned above. In their perspective it was understood to mean that revolution would be an immediate possibility for the foreseeable future. This was a grave mistake. This viewpoint formed the grounds for a perpetual offensive strategy against the capitalist State. The disaster of March 1921 in Germany spelled the consequences of such inflexible strategies initiated without the majority support of the working class.

Lenin and Trotsky condemned this "Teilaktion" and emphasized instead the necessity to win over the working class of Western Europe before any attempt to attain power. After its Third World Congress, the Comintern condemned the "theory of offensive" (frontal confrontation with the State) advocated by the German Communist Party - the "war of manoeuvre". After the successful "war of manoeuvre" in Russia in 1917 the strategy proposed for the West was the "war of position" - the united front. 'The strategic objective of the United Front was to win over the masses in the West to revolutionary Marxism, by patient organisation and skilful agitation for working class unity in action.'(335) The political specificities of the West as opposed to the Eastern front of the revolution cannot be dealt with in detail here.(336) The point in establishing this strategic difference throws into relief the theoretical misapplication of Lenin's concept of the imperialist epoch of "wars and revolutions" and indicates the primacy of politics in the era of imperialism. Moreover, that the Frankfurt

School's neglect of political structures as a result in part of their misunderstanding of the uneven development of the revolutionary process and consequent reduction of the question of hegemony to political psychology, led to a failure to grasp the revolt against economic determinism and historical fatalism in the realm of politics.(337) The retreat from politics was not a uniform phenomenon within Western Marxism, but it was rampant amongst those affected by political leftism such as the Frankfurt School, and marks the partial character of the Western Marxist's defence of the October Revolution against orthodox Marxism.

In this regard, the Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental reason, as the dominant form of late capitalist ideology, facilitates the insight which helps explain the continued preponderance of reformism and its hold over the working class political parties in the post-war years.(338) The fetishism of technology and technical manipulation of people and things (339), as an extension of commodity fetishism into the age of late capitalism, fuelled by the third technological revolution (340) and permanent arms economy (341), forms the basis of the reification of the proletariat and the continuing success of reformism in the post-war years. (342)

However, in the political realm the continued success of reformism and the notion of the technical adjustment of the economic system via state intervention and Keynesian demand management policies (343), points to the wider framework of legitimacy; namely the liberal democratic institutions and political process which the Frankfurt School failed to adequately identify or analyze for reasons discussed above.(344) Hence Anderson argues that the

engineering of consent is not to be found solely in the success of instrumental reason: the role of bourgeois democracy and liberal democratic institutions are the decisive factors, Anderson argues, in ensuring ideological hegemony.

However, it can be argued that the contradiction here is more apparent than real. The technological rationality of late capitalism, rooted in the third technological revolution and permanent arms economy (345), is utilized by the Social Democratic parties to renew their programmes and ideological platform, according to which reform of the capitalist state is viewed as possible by technical adjustment, and by virtue of the growing importance of the state's role in late capitalist civil society. (346)

The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that the political leftism of the Frankfurt School was rooted in a strategic misunderstanding of the "actuality of revolution" (Lenin's concept of imperialism). With the temporary restabilization of capitalism in the 1920s, Lukacs conformed to Stalin's notion of "socialism in one country", while Korsch and the Frankfurt School eventually abandoned any hope in the revolutionary potential of the working class.

The pessimistic conclusions of the "technological rationality" thesis were acquiesced to and consequently Weber's concept of "disenchantment" came to the fore in Horkheimer and Adorno's post-World War Two thought (in particular) and dovetailed with the 'tragic view of the world' held by the pre1914 anti-capitalist German intelligentsia. This served to reinforce, as Mandel has convincingly shown, the 'ethos of resignation' which facilitates the success of instrumental reason in reifying social

consciousness(347), rendering the idea of political opposition and activity as ultimately futile.(348)

Thus it has been argued that the Frankfurt School drew an incorrect assessment of the demise of the proletariat (349) and the extent of its integration in the post Second World War years, and that the acquiescence to neo-fatalism would have been prevented by an understanding of the primacy of politics and a correct understanding of the uneven development of the revolutionary process. Moreover, that the capitalist State is an arena of the class struggle, and the political institutions, parties and practices of bourgeois democracy also need to be submitted to systematic critical analysis from the vantage point of the critical theory of society.

That the Frankfurt School failed to draw these conclusions from its own partial investigative successes is not the decisive problem.(350) It could be argued that the School's problem was the emphasis of its research project; namely, the exclusion of historical and comparative social and political structures and the interrelation between the two. The inter-disciplinary research programme of the Frankfurt School failed to produce a reconstitution of Marxian socialism and, by the late 1940s, its members were dispersed, and its project fragmented.

Nonetheless, the work of each individual critical theorist has made a lasting contribution to the Marxist tradition, each from the vantage point of his own concept of critical theory and sphere of expertise. Their work has shed considerable light on the processes perpetuating the ideological hegemony of late capitalist society and



has helped to broaden the sphere of the political, to include questions hitherto neglected or insufficiently addressed by orthodox Marxism; namely, questions the "new social movements" have taken up in the post-war years involving pollution and the ecological system; the peace and womens' liberation movements, and the movements against racism in, for example, the United States and South Africa. Indeed, the crucial factor which has come to light in recent years has been the international breadth of these social movements and the anti-capitalist dimension common to them all, whilst attracting broad cross sections of the population and mobilising mass demonstrations. Arguably, the opportunities for critical theorists to relate their work from whatever their sphere of expertise, are greater today than before the inter-war years. The social rights gained by the working classes in Western Europe and in the United States represent powerful incentives for radicalized intellectuals to become active in the mass organisations of the working class and attempt to relate theory to practice and vice-versa.

The decisive problem which this study highlights is whether the Left can overcome the legacy of the failed European Revolution of the 1920s in theory and practice. Arguably, this study has shown that Western Marxism in general, and the Frankfurt School in particular, has a significant role to play in contributing to the resolution of the "crisis of Marxism" (351) and overcoming the fragmentation of the international socialist movement. In particular, the latter must draw the lessons of the strengths and weaknesses of the Frankfurt School and Western Marxism, appropriating their insights into the social superstructure,

specifically (but not exclusively), if the international socialist movement is to produce a serious challenge to the structures and institutions of late capitalist society on an international scale in the last years of the twentieth century.

## C O N C L U S I O N

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'It is in their attempts to break down the barriers of orthodoxy and adapt socialist theory to new conditions and new concerns, that the western marxists have contributed to what Ernst Bloch called "the underground history of the revolution."'(1)

The crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change is the underground history of the European Revolution of 1917-23. Its final signal in the inter-war years came with the defeat of the Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War in the years preceding the Second World War. The defeats of progressive social forces in the inter-war years, leading to the catastrophe of the Second World War and the Holocaust, brought the original Western Marxists into a socio-political terrain involving new developments and unexpected setbacks in the struggle for a rational society (socialism). Stalinism and Fascism blocked the route to socialist democracy on an international scale.

In the dialectic of hope and despair the Second World War can be understood as representing the great terminus of accumulated defeats of the working class internationally in the inter-war period.(2) For the Frankfurt School the Second World War was not only the lowest point humanity had reached at the height of technical progress, the sheer technological efficiency of the destructiveness it unleashed seemed to foreclose any impetus for optimism.(3) Hope and despair, progress and reaction, became increasingly intertwined

and at times impossible to distinguish in the succession of events.(4) For Horkheimer and Adorno this was the dialectic of Enlightenment, the apotheosis of Western rationality dominating and consuming its own progress in an orgy of regression leading to barbarism. Midnight in the twentieth century became, for Horkheimer and Adorno at least, the eclipse of reason itself. Unimpressed by the emancipatory logic unfolding in desynchronized waves of revolt in the state bureaucratic societies and advanced capitalist states in the post-Second World War years (5) Horkheimer and Adorno were unable to reverse the decline in the promise of new social horizons which their thought once pioneered. Increasingly split between their previous commitment to the self-emancipation of the working class and radical social change and their current compromise with Cold War rhetoric and liberal-reformist ideology (6), Horkheimer and Adorno ended their careers by living the contradiction inherent in the social milieu of the European anti-capitalist intelligentsia in which their ideas, and persons, were rooted.(7)

For Marcuse and Fromm the tasks of the socialist intellectual in the era of late capitalism were analysed, discussed, and critical theory as ideology critique was further developed and applied in relation to its changing object: the 'mature' social relations of late monopoly capitalism.

The Frankfurt School, it has been argued here, expresses a tendency of Western Marxism and has to be analysed in this context. The notion that Western Marxism and thus the Frankfurt School, were a simple product of defeat has been shown to be mistaken and ultimately dismissive of the complex interplay between theory,

politics, and history. For the events in the inter-war years did not 'give rise to' the Frankfurt School as if thought were merely a reflection of historical events. The critique of orthodox Marxism must be applied to the sociology of the Frankfurt School: in other words, thought is not an 'affect' propelled by historical laws. The examination of the role of philosophy in the restoration of the subjective factor in ideology critique and the analysis of social change - and hence the reconstruction of the Marxian project - has shown that the Frankfurt School's major contribution to such a reconstruction was in restoring the dynamic concept of subjectivity as pioneered by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology [1845/46]. In this dynamic concept of subjectivity, thought is no longer a mere product of material or environmental circumstances but a cognitive capacity involving imagination, anticipation, memory, as well as critical reflection (people and objects are changeable within a social context in which the observer is a passive or active participant). The essential trajectory of the Frankfurt School involved an attempt to address the crisis of the subjective factor of social change by intervening in a range of intellectual concerns (ideology critique) and issues. The fundamental paradigm involved a defence of the potential self-emancipation of the working class to establish socialist democracy on an international scale. As Roderick notes:

Within the capitalist mode of production, Marx located the proletariat as that embodiment of social rationality capable of concretely overcoming the irrationalities of capitalist production. Ironically, the proletariat was given the role of realising the highest values expressed by 'bourgeois' philosophy, namely reason as freedom, truth and meaning.(8)

The crisis of subjectivity has been traced (in chapter one) to the theoretical challenge of evolutionary socialism (Bernstein) on the one hand, and problems in Engels' defence of revolutionary Marxism on the other. It has been argued that critical Marxism (as opposed to Soviet Marxism or socialist reformism) helped overcome this problem in Engels' work by rejecting such mechanistic distinctions as the base/superstructure model and utilizing the holistic concept of the social totality.(9) Moreover, Lukacs' ontology has been drawn upon to locate the source of Engels' inadequate defence, analyse the socio-political implications of this theoretical dilemma in the international socialist movement, and define the concept of materialism employed by the Frankfurt School. The theoretical problems defined in chapter one formed the basis of the following chapters. The concept of subjectivity has been defined and discussed in chapter two in relation to Lukacs' major work History and Class Consciousness. The fundamental problem of reification as defined by Lukacs was adopted by the critical theorists and incorporated into their own concepts of critical theory. The solution of the revolutionary party as a necessary catalyst for developing the class consciousness of the working class was, however, rejected by the critical theorists. Leninist models of organisation were rejected for their hierarchical division of labour and authoritarian tendency to substitute itself for the self-activity of the class it intended to liberate. The problem lay not in the most brilliant leadership (though the necessity for some forms of organisation and leadership was not denied) but most decisively in the wider problem of subjectivity. To this end and as a response

shared by Western Marxism as a whole, concepts were sought to analyse and understand this problem.

The response, pioneered by Erich Fromm and shared by the School as a whole, was the integration into Marxism of psychology and a theory of the individual. By investigating the major and, as discussed, neglected contribution of Erich Fromm (the social psychologist and psychoanalyst of the Institute in its formative years under Horkheimer) to the critical theory of society the inconsistent contradictions in the School's adoption of Freudian psychoanalysis have been uncovered and analysed in their proper context: the theoretical response to the crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change. The basis of this analysis takes the form of the divergent interpretations on the part of Fromm and his (former) associates in the Institute concerning the theoretical relationship between Marx and Freud. The results of this study should make some impression in interested quarters. The analysis in chapters one and two show that a non-reductionist concept of the relationship between base and superstructure in Marxian theory depends upon a dynamic concept of subjectivity. Ironically, Fromm's so-called 'revisionism' and 'neo-Freudianism' applies the notion of the social totality, established earlier as an important event in critical Marxism's (Lukacs, Korsch, Luxemburg) overcoming of the reflection theory of mechanistic materialism. Fromm was the only critical theorist, therefore, to confront Freudian psychoanalysis with the philosophical advance which had been established in the development and elucidation of Marxian theory in the defence of (Engels and) revolutionary Marxism. In this interpretation, Fromm's

major contribution to the development of critical theory is acknowledged and recognized. In this study only a few major aspects of Fromm's critical theory have been explored in relation to the underlying theme of subjectivity and social change. Nonetheless, where appropriate, Fromm's contribution to several decisive issues and problems has been included, analysed and explored in order to demonstrate his relevance to the critique of late capitalist domination.

It is evident that the so-called 'revisionist controversy' (Fromm's being labelled 'neo-Freudian') represents an obstacle to a fresh understanding of the Frankfurt School in relation to new issues, concerns, and problems given rise to by late capitalism. This 'debate' has, in fact, degenerated into a crude polemic which has obfuscated the central and persistent underlying issue - the need to develop adequate concepts with which to advance the critical analysis of new forms of domination in late capitalism. While much that passes for Marxism today merely rehearses well worn debates between antagonists long buried in history, critical Marxism attempts to refine and apply the concepts of critique to a changed and changing universe of conditions and discourse. This is not to suggest that history is unimportant but that living, creative, Marxism must constantly be engaged in the interplay between theory and history in relation to present and future problems and issues. The crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change are contemporary problems and theory has fallen behind its object. This study is an attempt to contribute to the need for a reconstructed Marxism. It is concerned with the past to the extent to which it is concerned with the future. It is preparatory rather than



anticipatory. An essential component of this study has been to show how Fromm's critical theory reveals the inconsistency in the responses of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse to the development of a Marxist social psychology and theory of the individual. The critique of orthodox Marxism - which Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse so forcefully maintained in the effort to reconstitute the subjective basis of the theory is not applied to Freudian psychoanalysis by them and consequently their work vacillates between incompatible social ontologies, as a host of observers and critics have pointed out.(10)

However to reject psychoanalysis at this juncture would be a false and premature move, as has been shown. A careful analysis of Fromm's work shows its ability to transcend the instinct versus environment dichotomy on the one hand, and retain an historical and comparative sociological approach to human drives and passions on the other. The superiority of Fromm's work to that of Wilhelm Reich is due to the latter's inability to transcend the physiological reductionism of Freudian instinct theory and this is made clear in the present study. Reich's flight into the mystical realm of the libido theory as an attempt to escape the reactionary implications of Freud's 'anthropological' speculations (concerning the origins of repression in psychic activity) and his tragic conception (of the limitations of the pacification) of human existence as embodied in the notion of 'death instinct', is ultimately flawed. Fromm, however, offers a dialectical critique of Freud on the basis of Marx's theory of alienation (as well as contemporary anthropological data and the influence of Lukacs' concept of reification). On the grounds of this

theory, Fromm incorporates and transcends the narrow instinctivism of Freudian psychoanalysis, furnishes new concepts in the critical analysis of social and individual consciousness, and facilitates a development and application of the humanistic premises contained in Marxian theory in order to provide a normative basis for theoretical analysis and social critique. Freudian psychoanalysis tends to deny the importance of human values, reducing them to sublimated determinants of the sexual drive.(11) Thus for Marcuse, for example, Fromm's revised psychoanalysis was simply 'surface' psychology and inherently 'ideological'.(12) At this juncture it may be observed that Marcuse not only unwittingly contradicts the critical opposition of critical theory towards mechanistic materialism in psychology and the theory of the individual, he robs Marxism of a normative humanism with which to analyse and criticize the intellectual and material culture of late capitalism. Consequently, Marcuse's notion of the 'transvaluation of values' (13) as part of a prefigurative strategy for social change is lacking an adequate theoretical foundation. The significance of the 'neo-Freudian' break with orthodox psychoanalysis has been analysed in a paper by Walter T. James who writes:

Most of all Horney and Fromm are indebted to Adler for his keen awareness of the reality of the influence of the total environment upon personality. Freud's persistent adherence to a biological etiology made any real 'social' psychology an impossibility except on the grounds of sexual symbolism...Certain of Adler's conclusions are indispensable parts of the social psychologies of Horney and Fromm.(14)

Indeed, the analysis presented in this study reveals an hitherto unrecognized aspect of Fromm's work in the literature on the Frankfurt School. By breaking with Freudian psychoanalysis, Fromm was reasserting the need for the restoration of the Self over Freud's reified conception of id, ego and superego in psychology. As Ansbacher and Ansbacher have penetratingly demonstrated in regard to Adler and this applies also to Fromm:

In this connection, Allport is 'inclined to believe history will declare that psychoanalysis marked an inter-regnum in psychology between the time when it lost its soul, shortly after the Franco-Prussian War, and the time when it found it again, shortly after World War Two.' If this was true, then Adler was one of the voices in the wilderness of pre-World War One days crying that the self or the soul must remain the focal point if psychology is to provide satisfactory explanations.(15)

Hence it can be argued that the 'neo-Freudian' controversy is more accurately read in the context of the 'controversy of the psychology with a soul against a psychology, where the soul or self was eclipsed.' This crucial insight helps throw into relief the significance of Fromm's revision of psychoanalysis upon the grounds of Marx's theory of alienation. Hence, this study applied Fromm's concepts in an attempt to demonstrate the dereification of Freudian categories pertaining to the structure of the psyche on the one hand, and the empirical basis of the fundamental concepts of infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex on the other. The implications of Fromm's concept of critical theory are further illustrated in showing the relevance of his analysis and critique of authoritarian capitalism and state socialism, and in the application

of his mature work on human aggression and destructiveness in relation to the impact of technological rationality on late capitalist ideology and social practices.

The characterological analysis of late capitalism reveals the low-grade schizophrenic split between thought and effect which pervades social practices and facilitates the coordination of tasks - especially involving warfare - within a highly specialized technological division of labour.(16) The 'automaton personality' becomes, under late capitalism, not so much proto-fascist as 'cybernetic': the individuality of the person is whittled down in the effort to conform to the norms of the social system and emotions become redundant as the cerebral orientation becomes ascendent. Consequently, the threat of nuclear holocaust, the pollution of the biosphere, the creation of mass unemployment through ever more efficient over-production of goods and services is met not with anger, horror, the incentive of survival and therefore the need to act, but a passive indifference on the part of perhaps the majority of the population. Fromm's contribution to the social psychological critique of late capitalism shown in this study to be neglected and underestimated is here restored to prominent place in the examination of the Frankfurt School. Indeed, it could be argued, as Fromm has done, that the 'field of dynamic social psychology...is full of intellectual excitement, precisely because it is only at its beginning.'(17)

'Humanistic psychoanalysis'(18), Fromm's revised approach, cannot, however, be reduced to Adlerian psychology for reasons discussed in this study. Basing this critical revision of Freudian

psychoanalysis on Marx's theory of alienation, the anthropological studies of Bachofen, Malinowski, Morgan, and Margaret Mead, and drawing upon an extensive range of human sciences in studies such as The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness [1975], Fromm's social psychology contains a more sophisticated theory of human needs in terms of their economic, political and socio-historical context. As Lewis Way has written, Adler's psychology was limited by its neglect of concepts which could provide a wider understanding of the socio-economic structure of society - and thus the context in which individual psychological findings can be properly understood. The criticism of conformism aimed against those theorists such as Adler, Horney and Fromm, who rejected Freudian instinct theory is misplaced. The crux of the issue is not instinctivism of either the Right or the Left in psychoanalysis, but in appreciating the relationship between individual and society in an historical context of alienation. Hence Way writes: 'To do justice to the problems raised by these critics (of Adler-CM) no doubt requires more than a psychology of the individual can accomplish, it requires an extension of thinking into the sphere of social psychology.'(19)

This is precisely where Fromm's contribution intersects with economic, political and sociological theory. In short, Fromm's social psychology represents a major contribution to the analysis of the crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change in late capitalist society. As stressed in the introduction to this study, a sensitivity towards the interdisciplinary basis of the Frankfurt School and the multi-disciplinary context of the individual critical theorists' work, is of fundamental importance for an assessment of

the contribution of this school of Western Marxism. This has also been demonstrated in regard to the major economic propositions and analysis of the Frankfurt School. The concept of 'organized' or 'state-capitalism' - as with the theory of instrumental reason and technological rationalisation - contributes many fertile insights into the social totality of late capitalism. The theory of state capitalism is an interpretation of the technological rationality thesis in relation to modern political economy (principally the Soviet system of centralized economic planning and Keynesian 'demand management' economics) and the ability of the late capitalist State to intervene in and attempt to regulate civil society. The exaggerated impression of 'administrative coordination' of civil society by the State in Pollock's concept of state capitalism is, to be sure, highly conditioned by the experience of the Nazi state between 1933-1945. However, Pollock's analysis (evidence of which can be found in Marcuse's One Dimensional Man) also included the overlooked prospect of liberal-democratic state-capitalism.(20) This was, in fact, precisely what Marcuse has in mind in his One Dimensional Man[1964]. Indeed, the insight here is that the Marxian theory has tended to under-estimate the flexibility of the capitalist State in terms of its capacity to react to new social conditions and crises, and mobilise the underlying population in the defence of its continuity. Although underresearched, and often lacking a comparative historical component (21), the work of the Frankfurt School on these issues has successfully pointed to fundamental weaknesses in the Marxian

theory of the State which need to be further addressed and, more importantly , overcome.

The role of the State in the integration of the working class is, as has been argued, exaggerated in critical theory. While a partial integration of the working class is evident, the main thrust of the School's work points to a need for an analysis which goes beyond that which is limited to 'the crisis of leadership'. The critique of late capitalism presented by the Frankfurt School failed because of its tendency to underestimate the contradictions within the political economy of late capitalism on the one hand, and its abandonment of the working class as the central agency of social change on the other. Whilst tending to fall back on an abstract appeal addressed to (in the case of Horkheimer and Adorno) an 'imaginary witness' or (in the case of Fromm and Marcuse) 'progressive forces in society', it was mainly Fromm and Marcuse who maintained an interest in and dialogue with those involved in strategies for social change and a belief in, not only its necessity, but its possibility. Reification, arguably, cannot be reduced to the question of 'correct leadership': it is a problem in its own right. The question of leadership is, evidently, part of the wider problem of an adequate counter-hegemonic strategy.(22) Though they did not seem aware of Gramsci's ideas, the notion of a counter-hegemonic strategy is implied in their argument for a holistic strategy linked to the needs of the 'total personality' (Fromm) and the development of 'transcendent needs' for 'qualitative social change' (Marcuse). As argued, the Frankfurt School correctly pointed to the new forms of

domination under late capitalism but their analysis was flawed by their inadequate political economy and overdetermined assessment of the integration of the working class (and hence an underestimation of the possibilities for social change).

In this analysis the concept of subjectivity has served as a unifying category for analysing the major problems concerning the crisis of Marxism across the intellectual division of labour. Thus this study has shown that the central concept of the self-emancipation of the working class represents the linch-pin of critical theory as an emancipatory social science.(23) Hence, once this linch-pin was lost, in the case of Horkheimer and Adorno especially, it has been shown that their social theory became vulnerable to the resignation and ethos of acquiescence contained in the cultural pessimism of Freud and Weber.

Indeed, this factor is connected to the Frankfurt School's weaknesses in political analysis which, as we have seen, are couched in the terms of the early work of Lukacs and Korsch. The era of imperialism ('world revolution') tended to be viewed as a unilinear process rather than one which is subject to the vicissitudes of a range of socio-economic and political factors - and is markedly uneven. Consequently, a one-sided balance sheet of the defeats of the labour movement tended to be drawn and the conclusion of complete, rather than partial (and perhaps temporary) integration of the working class was adopted. The mis-reading of the inter-war years and the implications of this period for Marxism is based, also, upon a decisive factor underlying this disappointment with the process of radical social change: this is a fundamentally a-



political conception of social change which pervades Western Marxism as a whole. The under-valuation of the role of politics in social change is perhaps the greatest paradox in the Frankfurt School's response to the crisis of subjectivity and the reconstitution of the Marxian project. However, this is not to suggest that the Frankfurt School has neglected the realm of the political or has not, in certain aspects, extended it. While the criticism offered here has pointed to the counter-revolutionary role of German Social Democracy and Soviet Marxism (24) in the international and domestic arena, the Frankfurt School has sought to explain the lack of response to political initiatives based on an international socialist perspective. The problem of social change, as Fromm's analysis has shown, cannot be reduced to any single factor in the social totality. The areas of social relations, work, and love/intimacy across the base of civil society, constitutes the arena of needs in which strategies for social change must be based. The problem of technological rationality and liberal democracy in late capitalist ideology and social structures cannot, as argued, be mechanistically separated in critical social analysis. This points to a problem in the method of immanent criticism which, as Roderick argues, helps explain the basic flaws of the Frankfurt School in relation to the crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change.

First, the thesis of the 'disappearance of the proletariat as a revolutionary force' has left these critical Marxists with no actual embodiment of social rationality to be empowered by their internal criticism. Second, the thesis that capitalist legitimation no longer requires appeal to social ideals (norms and values), but only to a technologically secured rise in

material well-being, left these critical Marxists with no effective internal values to which to appeal critically.(25)

The position Roderick advances here is rather sweeping and cannot be so easily applied to Fromm and Marcuse. Nonetheless, let us acknowledge this insight in relation to a fundamental discussion herein concerning Marxism and Tragedy.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment thesis of Horkheimer and Adorno effectively disarmed the attempt to come to terms with and effectively combat the ethos of defeat and resignation which pervades the intellectual and material culture of late capitalist society. Horkheimer and Adorno collapse into resignation and despair. The horror of the terroristic and oppressive regimes of Stalinism and Fascism is responded to with understandable feelings of guilt of the survivor (in the context of the Holocaust) and of atonement. As this study has shown, the inability of Horkheimer and Adorno to acknowledge and develop a concept of resistance as the pre-condition for an authentic personal, intellectual, and political response to such inhuman conditions is striking. It has been argued that their inability to furnish such a response lies in the absence of a coherent humanistic socialist response to defeat in the face of terroristic dictatorship. Moreover, the humanistic premises of such a response were barred to Horkheimer and Adorno with their adoption of the framework of Freudian psychoanalysis and the technological rationality thesis. A detailed discussion of the basis of a normative humanism is beyond the scope of this study, but the foundations of such an approach have been laid by Erich Fromm's

critical theory.(26) Moreover, it can be argued that the unifying thematic goal of a counter-hegemonic strategy would be its ability to express the superiority of a socialist democracy in terms not only of a more rational production and distribution of the social product, but also in terms of respect for and development of the individual, and hence in terms of a qualitatively higher moral order of society. In short, the benefits of bourgeois civilization would not be levelled down, but developed, built on, and even transcended. The ethical component of socialist humanism is represented, therefore, in the common roots of human suffering and overcoming the obstacles to the pacification of existence - the fulfillment and optimum realization of the individual. Thus, the limitations of immanent criticism cannot be attributed to the critical theorists as a whole. Again, the fact that Fromm rejected Freudian instinct theory facilitates a concept of critical theory which is not bound by the implications of the disappearance of a revolutionary proletariat and, moreover, furnishes an approach which explicitly recognizes the role of human values in critical analysis and social change without reducing the latter to materialistic determinants (instincts, etc.). As this study has shown, this was because Fromm applied the critique of orthodox Marxism to orthodox Freudianism and hence made a dialectical critique of the mechanistic materialist view of social consciousness. Fromm writes:

Indeed, we have a rich heritage which waits for its realization. But in contrast to the men of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who had an unflinching belief in the continuity of progress, we visualize the possibility that, instead of progress, we may create barbarism or our total destruction. The alternative of socialism or barbarism has become frighteningly real today, when the forces working

towards barbarism seem to be stronger than those working against it. But it is not the 'socialism' of managerial totalitarianism which will save the world from barbarism. It is the renaissance of humanism, the emergence of a new West which employs its new technical powers for the sake of man, rather than using man for the sake of things; it is a new society in which the norms of man's unfolding governs the economy, rather than the social and political process being governed by blind and anarchic economic interests.(27)

In its attempt to reconstitute the project of Marxian theory the Frankfurt School has reinstated the dynamic concept of subjectivity, updating and furnishing it with the latest developments in the social sciences which Marx and Engels in some respects anticipated but could not develop.(28) Although the writers of the School lacked an understanding of the desynchronised and combined and uneven character of the process of social change in the era of imperialism, they have made a fundamental contribution to the critique of late capitalist domination and hence the Marxist tradition. As Held notes, the Frankfurt School stands 'in the tradition of those who maintain the unity of socialism and liberty and ....argue that the aims of a rational society must be embedded in the means to establish that society.'(29)

That the School offends the sensibilities of Soviet Marxism on the one hand and Social Democracy on the other should come as no surprise. For the unity of socialism and liberty in the critical theory of society informs a dialectical critique of the social totality including contemporary culture, authoritarianism, and bureaucracy. The work of the School aimed to foster independent thinking and sought to extend the concept of critique to ideologies, institutions and practices in the social superstructure

of society in order to direct attention to the 'chains of illusion' (30) as well as those rooted in production. Consequently, as Held notes, the Frankfurt School has extended the analysis of the extent and effects of domination from the question of ownership and control to hitherto under-examined and neglected spheres such as the biosphere, sexual politics, and the quality of human life under socialism.(31) In short, by re-establishing the link between Marxian theory, the quality of life, and the self-realization of the individual in solidarity with others under socialism, the Frankfurt School has made a unique and valuable contribution to the movement for socialist democracy and international socialism.

Of course, there are problems with many - if not all - of the above enumerated developments made by critical theory in its contribution to the reconstruction of the Marxian project (there is no intention here to imply that these have been solved). One cannot be disappointed with the fact that the Frankfurt School's contribution does not represent the development of a completed system or solution to the crisis of subjectivity and the reconstruction of the Marxist project. No theory or action alone can do that. The desynchronisation and combined and uneven development of the process of radical social change since the 1917-23 period (32) indicates that the development of Marxism is subject to the same dislocated process. The fact that Marxism or critical theory is not a completed system allows for growth, refinement, and creative renewal. This study is merely a contribution to that renewal and creative development which is needed as we proceed into the final decade of the twentieth century and begin to glimpse its

beyond. The notion of 'desynchronisation' is suggested merely to indicate the social and historical context in which theory is developed, applied, and new developments are examined and anticipated. Within this context - which is ultimately a socio-political context - the Frankfurt School continues to provoke and inspire discussion and contributions towards the reconstruction of the Marxian project: the unity of theory and practice on an international scale.

Thus this study has attempted to show the continued relevance of this School of Western Marxism in terms of its contribution to solving the crisis of subjectivity and the problem of social change, and as an important guide in the struggle for a humanist renaissance of Marxian socialism which, it has been argued, forms the essential dimension of this solution.(33)

FOOTNOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

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1. L. Way, Adler's Place in Psychology, (London, 1950)  
'If, argues the causalist, there is conflict, it must be the result of two forces coming into opposition, and the task of science is to trace back the sequence of events responsible for this collision. I have already argued the case for finalism, and I need not enter the matter again here. It need only be said, by way of reminder, that a purposive explanation does not, of course, ignore origins but interprets them in the light of what they achieve rather than the achievement as the mechanical result of the origins.' p.241
2. E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, (London, 1968) chapter 17
3. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1972) p.14
4. cf. H. Marcuse, 'The Obsolescence of Marxism', in N.Lobkowitz ed., Marx and the Western World, (Indiana University, 1967)
5. cf. D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (London, 1984)  
cf. also Kellner's essay, 'Herbert Marcuse's Reconstruction of Marxism', in, R. Pippin, A. Feenberg, C. P. Webel, eds., Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, (London, 1989). Kellner usefully emphasises that the concept of 'crisis' does not automatically mean cataclysmic collapse of the social system. As in medical terminology, a crisis can mean a process of decline or strengthening. See Kellner, (1989), p.183
6. P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, (London, 1979)  
cf. also D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, Horkheimer to Habermas, (London, 1980), p.13
7. P. Anderson, (London, 1979) p.42
8. *ibid.*, p.94
9. *ibid.*, p.49
10. *ibid.*, p.52
11. G. Therborn, 'The Frankfurt School', in, Western Marxism: A Critical Reader, edited by New Left Review, (London, 1983) p.119
12. Therborn, *ibid.* p.118. A position shared by N. O'Neill in Fascism and the Working Class, (Southall, 1932)
13. Therborn, (London, 1983), p.119

14. R. Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat, (Mass. 1982)
15. P. Dewes and P. Osborne, 'The Frankfurt School and the Problem of Critique: A Reply to McCarney', in Radical Philosophy, (Spring, 1987) p.3
16. W. Benjamin, quoted in Held, Introduction to Critical Theory (1980) p.32
17. Held, (1980) p.33
18. M. Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, (New York, 1972) p.249
19. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (1974)
20. M. Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in P. Connerton, ed., Critical Sociology, (Harmondsworth, 1976) and cf. H. Marcuse, 'Philosophy and Critical Theory' in H. Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, (Boston, 1969)
21. I am borrowing Dewes' and Osborne's words. Dewes and Osborne in Radical Philosophy, (Spring, 1987) p.2
22. P. Slater, The Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1980)
23. V. Geoghegan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (London, 1981)
24. B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, (London, 1982) p.12
25. M. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984)
26. D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (1984)
27. J. Fry, Marcuse: Dilemma and Liberation, (Sussex, 1974)
28. cf. D. Kellner and R. Roderick, 'Recent Literature on Critical Theory', in New German Critique 23, (Spring/Summer 1981, Boston) p.155
29. P. Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment, (Cambridge, 1980)
30. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt, eds., The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (New York, 1978) pp.371-79
31. 'Each of the critical theorists maintained that although all knowledge is historically conditioned, truth claims can be rationally adjudicated independently of immediate social (e.g. class) interests. They defended the possibility of an independent moment of criticism.' Held, (1980) p.15



32. Arato and Gebhardt, eds., (New York, 1978) p.380
33. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) pp.19-20
34. Held, (1980) p.369
35. Kellner, in Pippin et. al. eds., (1988) p.172
36. Arato and Gebhardt, eds., (1978) p.xi
37. Held, (1980) pp. 14-15
38. D. Kellner and R. Roderick, 'Recent Literature on Critical Theory', in NGC 22, (1981) p.143
39. We refer to the 'second generation' of neo-critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas (Social Theorist), Albrecht Wellmer (Philosopher), Claus Offe (Political Sociologist) and Klaus Eder (Anthropologist) only in reference to contemporary developments in this field. The study restricts itself to the formation of the Frankfurt School and thus focuses upon the decisive impact of the inter-war years. For recent analyses of Habermas, the central figure in the second generation of neo-critical theorists, cf. Held, (1980) and Roderick, (1986)
40. For example cf. R. Bocoock, Freud and Modern Society, (London, 1981)
41. D. Kellner, 'Critical Theory and the Culture Industries: A Reassessment', Telos No.62, (Winter, 1984-85) p.200
42. H. Marcuse, 'Critique of Neo-Freudian Revisionism', in Eros and Civilization, (Boston, 1966)
43. T. Bottomore, The Frankfurt School, (London, 1984) p.75
44. *ibid.*, p.76
45. M. Jay, 'Some Recent Developments in Critical Theory', in Berkeley Journal of Sociology, vol.XVII, 1973-74, p.27
46. Kellner and Roderick, 'Recent Literature on Critical Theory', in NGC 22, (1981) p.158
47. *ibid.*, p.158
48. *ibid.*, p.158
49. cf. R. Aronson, The Dialectic of Disaster: A Preface to War, (London, 1983) chapter 3
50. cf. S. Engert, 'How Red are the Greens?' in International New Series, No.7, (November/December, 1986) and P. Bartelheimer,

'The Crucial Battle for the 35-Hour Week', in International Viewpoint, No. 53, (May, 21st, 1986)

51. P. Anderson, 'Components of the National Culture'. in A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn, eds., Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action, (London, 1969) p.231
52. Kellner and Roderick, (1983) p.159
53. Geogeghan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (1981) pp.1-2
54. *ibid.*, pp.103-4
55. Slater, Origins and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (1980)
56. cf. G. Lukacs: Record of a Life, Istvan Eörsi, ed., (London, 1983); P. Goode, Karl Korsch: A Study in Western Marxism, (London, 1979); E. Ettinger, Rosa Luxemburg: A Life, (London, 1987); S. E. Bronner, Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary for Our Times, (New York, 1987); D.A. Smart ed. and Introduction, Pannekoek and Gorter's Marxism, (London, 1987); Wilhelm Reich, Sex-Pol Essays 1929-34, ed., L. Baxandall, Introduction by Bertell Ollman, (New York, 1966) C. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, (London, 1976); P. Frank, The Fourth International, (London, 1979) V. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, (London, 1984); M. Poster, Sartre's Marxism, (London, 1979); D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1980).  
For an overview of the impact of the 1960s and 1970s, cf. Tariq Ali, 1968 and After, (London, 1978) and C. Harman, The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After, (London, 1988)
57. S.E. Bronner, Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary For Our Times, (1987) p.97
58. *ibid.*, p.97
59. J.G. Merquior, Western Marxism, (London, 1986) p.201
60. cf. M. Jay's discussion of this argument in The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) and , Adorno, (London, 1984) p.17; cf. also F. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 1890-1933, (Cambridge, Mass, 1969)
61. cf. N. O'Neill, (1982) and W. Reich (1979); L. Trotsky, The Transitional Programme, with introductory essays by J. Hansen and G. Novack, (New York, 1977)
62. M. Kidron, cited in. M. Shaw, 'Back to the Maginot Line: Harman's New Gramsci' in International Socialism, New Series No.1, (July 1978)

63. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory,  
(London, 1986) pp.3-4  
cf. also, Jean-Paul Sartre, What Is Literature?, (London, 1967)

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

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1. cf. Tariq Ali, ed. The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on Twentieth Century World Politics, ( London, 1984)
2. W. Abendroth, A Short History of the European Working Class, ( London, 1972), cf. chapters 5 and 6
3. cf. P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, (London, 1979)
4. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) p.174
5. P. Connerton, Introduction to Critical Sociology, (London, 1976), p. 19
6. H. Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, (Boston USA, 1969), p.282
7. V. Geogeghan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse, ( London, 1981), pp.21-22
8. F. Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, (Progress, Moscow, 1954)
9. D. McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (London, 1980)
10. Karl Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, Edited and introduced by C.J.Arthur, Second Edition, (1974), p.121
11. *ibid.*, p.59
12. *ibid.*, p.123
13. *ibid.*, p.42
14. *ibid.*, p.48
15. *ibid.*, p.121
16. *ibid.*, p.95
17. G. Novack, Humanism and Socialism, (New York, 1973), chapter 3.
18. Marx and Engels, ed.C.J.Arthur, (1974), p.64
19. A. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (Oxford, 1985), p.39

20. E. Mandel, The Place of Marxism in History, (Amsterdam, 1986), p.17
21. *ibid.*, p.17
22. *ibid.*, p.17
23. *ibid.*, p.18
24. G. Novack, Democracy and Revolution, ( New York, 1971)
25. T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London 1979)
26. Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France 1848 to 1850, (Progress , Moscow, 1952).
27. R. Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom From 1776 until Today, ( London 1975).
28. Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, (Progress, Moscow, 1977). Leon Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism, (London, 1975, Chapter V).
29. Mandel. (Amsterdam, 1986), p.17.
30. Aufhebung - "the simultaneous ending of a form and the preservation of its 'truth' at a higher level". V. Geogeghan, (1981), p.16.
31. E. Mandel, The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, ( New York, 1971), Chapter.2.
32. R. Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat. (1982). p.35.
33. *ibid.*, p.33.
34. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, (London 1977).
35. D. McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. (London, 1980).
36. D. McLellan, Marx before Marxism, (London, 1980), Chapter 5.
37. P. Connerton ed. (London 1976). p.21.
38. T. Bottomore, The Frankfurt School, (London, 1984), p.17.
39. Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat , (1982).
40. *ibid.*, p.6.

41. Lucio Colletti, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 33.
42. *ibid.*, p.6.
43. *ibid.*, p.9.
44. H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis. (London, 1971).
45. D. Hallas, The Comintern, (London, 1995).
46. P. Slater, Origin and Significance of The Frankfurt School. (London 1980), Chapter 3.
47. R. Segal, The Tragedy of Leon Trotsky, ( London, 1993).
48. cf. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: from Horkheimer to Habermas, (London 1980), Chapter 2.
49. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (1985)
50. W. Abendroth, (1972), see also: J. Joll, The Second International. (London, 1955)
51. Callinicos, (1985), p.70
52. Antonio Gramsci, 'La Rivoluzione contro il "Capitale". Avanti!' (5 January 1918), quoted in J. Joll, Gramsci. (Glasgow, 1977), p.34
53. Callinicos, (1985), p.71
54. Jacoby, (1982),
55. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory. (1980), p.20
56. cf. F. Halliday's 'An Introduction' to, K. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, [1923], ( London, 1970)
57. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness. (London 1971,)
58. cf. P. Bellis, Marxism and the U.S.S.R.: The Theory of Proletarian Dictatorship and the Marxist Analysis of Soviet Society, (London, 1979)
59. A. Arato and P. Breines, The Young Lukacs and the Origins of Western Marxism, (London, 1979), p.176
60. cf. N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class. (Southall, 1982)
61. Arato and Breines, (1979), p.177
62. *ibid.*, p.181

63. *ibid.*, p.180
64. *ibid.*, p.180
65. Hallas, The Comintern. (London, 1985)
66. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (Oxford, 1985)
67. *ibid.*, p.71-2
68. M. Lowy, Georg Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, (London, 1979)
69. Lowy, (1979), chapter 1.
70. Rosa Luxemburg, 'Reform or Revolution', in M. Waters, ed. Rosa Luxemburg Speaks. (New York, 1970), also cf. S.E. Bronner, Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary for Our Times, (New York, 1987), and N. Geras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, (London, 1983)
71. T. Cliff, Rosa Luxemburg, (London, 1980), p.35
72. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1980)
73. E. Mandel, 'Peaceful Coexistence and World Revolution', in Revolution and Class Struggle, ed. R. Blackburn, (Glasgow, 1977)  
cf.also, Hallas, (1985)
74. On the concept of "progress" cf. Novack, (1980)
75. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy (1985)
76. C. Harman, The Lost Revolution, (London, 1982), pp.284-302
77. E. Mandel, Introduction to Marxism, (London, 1982), chapter 9.
78. J. Molyneux, Marxism and the Party, (London, 1978), chapters 1 and 2.
79. E. Mandel, 'What is the Bureaucracy?' in Tariq Ali ed., The Stalinist Legacy: Its Impact on Twentieth Century World Politics, (London, 1984)
80. Arato and Breines, (1979), p.180
81. *ibid.*, p.190. Acknowledgement of Trotsky's struggle against the emerging bureaucracy from 1923 is made, cf. p.168
82. P. Goode, Karl Korsch: A Study in Western Marxism, (London, 1979,

83. Arato and Breines, (1979), pp.165-66
84. *ibid.*, pp.165-66
85. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud, (Abacus edition, 1980), pp.152-55
86. In the post Second World War years socialists have analysed the 'crisis tendencies' of late capitalism, which have become more pronounced in the 1980s, from a number of theoretical angles; cf. the work of Michael Kidron, Ernest Mandel, Chris Harman, Claus Offe, Jürgen Habermas, for example.
87. Fromm, (Abacus,1980), p.155
88. *ibid.*, p.8
89. V. Serge, Memoire of a Revolutionary, (London, 1984), pp.380-82
90. *ibid.*
91. *ibid.*
92. P. Frank, The Fourth International: The Long March of the Trotskyists, (London, 1979)
93. V. Serge, (London, 1984), pp.380-82
94. "'Rational faith"... is based on the clear awareness of all relevant data, and not, like "irrational faith", an illusion based on our desires.' E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975), p.493
95. Fromm's socialist humanistic position has been described as reformist by G. Novack in Humanism and Socialism, (New York, 1973), p.112 ; although it is interesting to note that he has also been noted for holding Trotskyite views by W. Bonss; cf. 'Critical Theory and Empirical Research', in Erich Fromm, The Working Class in Weimar Germany: A Psychological and Sociological Study, (Leamington Spa, 1984), p.32 ;  
It is clear, however, that Fromm took a critical view, in line with his Institute colleagues of earlier years, of both reformism and Stalinism and was closest, perhaps, to the outlook of Rosa Luxemburg whom he approvingly quotes in, Fromm, (London , 1980) and Fromm, ( New York, 1975)
96. C. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, (London,1976), p.123
97. For an analysis of the prevalent lack of will to act cf. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1975); and E.



- Fromm [on automaton conformity] The Fear of Freedom, (London, 1960), chapter V
98. E. Fromm, (London, 1980), chapter X, pp.133-40
99. cf. Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat (1982)
100. Lowy, Georg Lukacs (London, 1979)
101. M. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984), p. 17
102. *ibid.*, p. 17
103. L. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, (New York, 1972)
104. Lowy, (1979); see also F. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarin: the German Academic Community 1890-1932, (Cambridge, Mass., 1969)
105. M. Jay, (London, 1984), p. 18
106. *ibid.*, p. 18
107. *ibid.*, p. 18
108. Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat (1982), p. 35
109. Karl Popper, quoted in M. Jay, (London, 1984), p. 12
110. Brian Magee, interview with Marcuse, Men of Ideas, (BBC, London, 1978), p. 72
111. cf. M. Jay, (London 1984), Introduction
112. *ibid.*, p. 22
113. *ibid.*, p. 19 . For Fromm's sceptical view of the 'New Germany' cf. Fromm (London, 1980), pp. 20-3
114. T.W. Adorno, quoted in M. Jay, (London 1984), pp. 19-21
115. cf. P. Connerton, Introduction to Critical Sociology, (London, 1976)
116. Interview with Marcuse, Brian Magee, (London, 1978), p. 63
117. Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950, (Boston, 1973), chapter 5.
118. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1972)
119. cf. The Politics of Thatcherism, eds. S. Hall and M. Jacques, (London, 1983)

120. M. Jay,, (London,1984), p.19
121. Horkheimer in Jay, (1973), p.156
122. M. Jay, (London 1984), p.19
123. B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, (London, 1982), p.213
124. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory (London, 1980), p.19
125. F. Rosemont, Andre Breton and the First Principles of Surrealism, (London,1978)
126. C. Harman, The Lost Revolution, (London,1982), pp.303-7
127. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929-1940, (London, 1979), pp.430-5
128. Lukacs writes: 'When Korsch left the German Party he cut himself off from socialism.' Georg Lukacs, Record of a Life, ed. Istvan Eörsi, (London, 1983), p.173 ; also cf. F. Halliday , 'An Introduction', in K. Korsch Marxism and Philosophy, (London, 1970)
129. "M.B", 'The Trotskyists in the Vorkuta Prison Camps' in The Stalinist Legacy, ed. Tariq Ali, (London, 1984), chapter 9
130. For a classic account of this struggle see, F. Morrow, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain, (New York, 1974)
131. I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, (London, 1979), pp.128-144
132. *ibid.*,
133. *ibid.*, p.135
134. cf. V. Serge, (London,1984); Tariq Ali, ed. (London,1984); see also V.Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, (New York, Second Edition ,1973)
135. L. Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, (New York. 1980), chapter VII
136. For the case of Spain, cf., F. Morrow, (New York, 1974)
137. L. Trotsky, quoted in C. Hampton, Socialism in a Crippled World, (London, 1981) p.89
138. The unrivalled history of the Institute remains, M. Jay, (Boston, 1973)

139. E. Fromm, The Working Class in Weimar Germany (Leamington Spa, 1984)
140. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston, 1973), chapter 4.
141. M. Jay, Adorno (London, 1984), chapter 3.
142. cf. Recent studies on Trotsky's political thought: D. Hallas, Trotsky's Marxism, (London, 1979) and E. Mandel, Trotsky: A Study in the Dynamic of his Thought, (London, 1979)
143. cf. E. Mandel's discussion of Trotsky's awareness of 'the non-correspondence of socio-economic and ideological forms', in Mandel, (London, 1979), p.89
144. M. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984), p.40
145. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston, 1973), chapter 3.
146. M. Lowy, Georg Lukacs, (London, 1979)
147. P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, (London, 1979)
148. Antonio Gramsci, quoted in J. Joll, Gramsci, ( Glasgow, 1977) p.34
149. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (London, 1971); Korsch, (London, 1970)
150. R.Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat, (London, 1982)
151. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (Oxford, 1985), p.61
152. E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (New York, 1982), chapter 5.
153. E. Mandel, The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, (New York, 1971), chapter 10.
154. M. Nicholaus, 'The Unknown Marx', in R. Blackburn ed. Ideology and Social Science, ( Glasgow, 1978)
155. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, (London, 1977)
156. E. Mandel The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, (New York, 1971)

157. For a balanced and informed account of Marx's life and thought, see D. McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought. (St.Albans, 1976)
158. M. Nicholaus, in R. Blackburn ed. Ideology and Social Science (Glasgow, 1979), p.331
159. cf. *ibid.*, p.332 ; and E. Mandel, Introduction to Karl Marx. Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, vol.1, transl. B. Fowkes, (London, 1976)
160. K. Kautsky, quoted in Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (Oxford, 1985), pp.62-3
161. *ibid.*, p.64
162. *ibid.*, p.64
163. *ibid.*, p.64
164. R.Luxemburg, in M.A. Waters ed. Rosa Luxemburg Speaks (New York, 1970); and see S.E. Bronner, Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary for Our Times (New York, 1987), chapter 4 .
165. E. Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, (London, 1979), pp.154-8
166. *ibid.*, p.159
167. *ibid.*, p.159
168. *ibid.*, p.191
167. *ibid.*, p.191
168. *ibid.*, p.192
169. *ibid.*, p.192
170. Mandel, Introduction to Marxism (London, 1982), chapter 14 and 15.
171. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (Oxford, 1985), p.65
172. *ibid.*, p.66
173. *ibid.*, p.66
174. See for example Hiferding's remarks in his Finance Capital. 'To recognize the validity of Marxism', says Hilferding, 'does not at all mean to make value-judgements, much less to point out a line of practical action. It is one thing

- to recognize a necessity, and quite another to put oneself at the service of that necessity.'
- Colletti notes: 'Socio-economic development is seen as a process unfolding before the observer and the scientist like the movement of the stars'.
- L. Colletti, 'Marxism: Science or Revolution?', in R. Blackburn ed. Revolution and Class Struggle (Glasgow, 1977)
175. Callinicos, (Oxford, 1985), p.67
176. *ibid.*, p.67
177. For a discussion of the concept of 'uneven and combined development' see, G. Novack, Understanding History, Marxist Essays, (Third Edition, New York, 1980)
178. T. Cliff, Rosa Luxemburg, (London, 1980), p.35
179. Callinicos, (Oxford, 1985), p.69  
cf. also, E. Mandel, 'The Leninist Theory of Organisation', in R. Blackburn ed. Revolution and Class Struggle (Glasgow, 1977)
180. Callinicos, (Oxford, 1985), p.68
181. Mandel, Trotsky, A Study in the Dynamic of His Thought, (London, 1979)
182. C. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, (London, 1976), p.23
183. *ibid.*, p.21
184. *ibid.*, p.20
185. *ibid.*, p.24
186. *ibid.*, p.12
187. P. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', in New Left Review, No.100;  
cf., J. Merrington, 'Theory and Practice in Gramsci's Marxism', in Western Marxism: A Critical Reader, (Verso, 1983)  
For a recent critical assessment of Gramsci, cf., L. Maitan, 'Antonio Gramsci's Revolutionary Marxism', in International Marxist Review, Vol. 2, No.3, (Summer 1987)
188. P. Anderson, in New Left Review, No.100  
For discussion of recent developments in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev cf., F. Halliday 'Moscow on the Move', and M. Johnstone 'Glasnost and After', in Marxism Today, (November 1987); and E. Mandel, 'The Significance of Gorbachev', in International Marxist Review, Vol.2, No.4, (Winter 1987)

189. S.E. Bronner, Rosa Luxemburg. (New York, 1987);  
For a recent biographical discussion of Luxemburg cf. E. Ettinger, Rosa Luxemburg: A Life. (London, 1987)
190. H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis. (London, 1971)
191. O. Kirchheimer, 'Marxism, Dictatorship and the Organisation of the Proletariat' (1933), quoted in Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1980), p.47
192. F. Pollock, 'Experiments in Economic Planning in the Soviet Union 1917-1927', discussed in M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston, 1973), p.19
193. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory (London, 1980), pp.47-8
194. Deutscher writes: 'Bolshevism had risen on the crest of a genuine revolution; towards its end the Bolsheviks began to spread revolution by conquest...When the next cycle of revolution was set in motion by the Second World War, it started where the first cycle had ended - revolution by conquest.' I. Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, (London, 1979), p.517  
For an analysis of the nature of the regimes of East Europe, cf. Bellis, (London, 1979) and C. Harman, Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe, (London, 1974); and cf. R. Medvedev, Let History Judge. The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism, (Nottingham, 1976)
195. For a discussion of the Marxist concept of socialist democracy (in contradistinction to its Stalinized perversion) cf. R. Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy. (Nottingham, 1976); Tariq Ali, 1968 and After: Inside the Revolution, (Colchester, 1978); A. Artous and D. Bensaid, 'Marxist Strategy in Western Europe', in International Marxist Review, (Winter, 1987); and N. Geras, (London, 1983), chapter IV.
196. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (London, 1977), pp.318-19
197. *ibid.*, pp.318-19
198. P. Slater, The Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1977/1980), p.75
199. For a useful overview of this discussion cf. D. McLellan, Marxism After Marx, Second edition, (London, 1980), chapter 2 and 3.
200. Rosa Luxemburg, quoted in D. McLellan, (London, 1980), p.23

201. G.S. Jones. 'History: The Poverty of Empiricism'. in R. Blackburn ed. Ideology and Social Science (Glasgow, 1978), chapter 6.
202. H. Marcuse, (London, 1977), p.398
203. *ibid.*, pp.398-9
204. Rosa Luxemburg prophetically revealed the dangers inherent in the reformist strategy - a strategy which argued that the bourgeois State would be peacefully transformed without the threat of 'Caesarism'.  
cf. Cliff, Rosa Luxemburg (London, 1980), p.22; and N. Geras, (London, 1983), chapter I.
205. H. Marcuse, (London, 1977), p.399
206. Nicholaus, in R. Blackburn ed. (Glasgow, 1978)
207. cf. H. Marcuse, 'Foundations of Historical Materialism', in Studies in Critical Philosophy, (Boston, 1972)
208. The Frankfurt School made a decisive contribution to the debate which descredited the mechanistic concept of historical development but also progression, stagnation and regression in the use to which the intellectual and material culture is put. cf. T.W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London, 1979); and also G. Novack, 'Progress: Reality or Illusion', in G. Novack, Humanism and Socialism, (New York, 1973)
209. K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party [1848]. Preface to the Russian edition of 1882, (Peking, 1975), p.6 . Also Marx's reply to Mikhailovsky, a leading Russian Populist theoretician of the 1870s, who Marx writes . 'absolutely must metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophical theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself...'quoted in D. McLellan, Marx, (Glasgow, 1975), pp.45-8
210. Marx and Engels, [1848], (Peking, 1975), 'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.' p.32
211. E. Mandel, The Marxist Theory of the State, (New York, 1969). Also, cf. George Novack Democracy and Revolution (New York, 1971)
212. H. Marcuse, (London, 1977), pp.399-400
213. K. Korsch, (London, 1970)

214. Marx and Engels, [1845/6], ed. C.J. Arthur, The German Ideology, (London, 1974)
215. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (London, 1971) p.5
216. *ibid.*, p.8-9
217. *ibid.*, p.4-5
218. C. Harman, The Lost Revolution, (London, 1982)
219. Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Peking, 1975).
220. G. Lukacs, (London, 1971) chapter 4
221. D. Coates, Labour in Power? A Study of the Labour Government 1974-1979, (London, 1980)
222. For a defence of Engels, see, G. Novack, Polemics in Marxist Philosophy, (New York, 1978).  
cf. E. Abrahamovici's criticism of Novack's tendency to 'incriminate theoretical positions' by attacking 'erroneous political stands', in *ibid.*, Novack, (1978), pp.134-8
223. P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, (London, 1979). Anderson's rather schematic survey tends to view the left-wing anti-capitalist intelligentsia, radicalized by the First World War, in the light of the defeats of the inter-war years. While there is a large degree of substance in Anderson's important work, the argument presented here stresses the continuity and disparity between those Western Marxists radicalized by the war but cut off from revolutionary praxis, for a variety of reasons, and those, such as Korsch, Gramsci, Luxemburg, and Trotsky, for example, who were direct participants and organizers in the upheavals of the time. Importantly, Anderson notes the heritage of Trotsky which 'provides one of the central elements' for the renaissance of International Socialism. cf. p.100-1
224. C. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, (London, 1976), p.55
225. Rosa Luxemburg, 'Stagnation and Progress in Marxism', in Marxism and Art: Essays, Classic and Contemporary, ed. M. Solomon, (Sussex, 1979)
226. C. Boggs, (London, 1976), p.55
227. *ibid.*, p.56
228. A. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (Oxford, 1985), p.61



229. *ibid.*, p.61
230. *ibid.*, p.62
231. *ibid.*, p.62
232. *ibid.*, p.62
233. cf. D. McLellan, Engels, (Glasgow, 1977)
234. cf. A. Callinicos, (Oxford, 1985), p.62 ; and A. Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society, (New York, 1974), chapter 2.
235. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness ( London, 1971), p.xxi
236. Karl Marx, 'Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', [1859], in E.Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (New York, 1982), p.217
237. Lukacs, quoting Engels, The Ontology of Social Being: Marx's Basic Ontological Principles, ( London, 1978), pp.150-1
238. G. Lukacs, The Ontology of Social Being (London, 1978), pp.150-1
239. *ibid.*, pp.3-4
240. cf. D. McLellan, (Glasgow, 1977)
241. A. Callinicos, Althusser's Marxism, (London, 1976), chapter 1.
242. G. Lukacs, (London, 1971), p.24
243. P. Walton and A. Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, ( London, 1979), p.55
244. *ibid.*, p.71
245. D. McLellan, (London, 1979), pp.65-72
246. G. Lukacs, (London, 1978), pp.147-8
247. *ibid.*, pp.147-8
248. E. Mandel, 'The Role of the Individual in History: The Case of World War Two', in New Left Review, No.157, May/June (London, 1986)
249. G. Lukacs, (London, 1978), p.149
250. *ibid.*, p.149

251. Karl Marx, in E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York, 1982), p.218
252. G. Lukacs, (London, 1978), pp.159-61
253. *ibid.*, p.148
254. A. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy (Oxford, 1995), p.67
255. Walton and Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value (London, 1979), chapter 3. 'Engels and Scientific Marxism'
256. G. Lukacs, (London, 1978), p.149
257. See chapter 3 of this study.
258. Lukacs, Ontology, (London, 1978), pp.149-50
259. *ibid.*, p.152
260. M. Shaw, Marxism and Social Science, (London, 1975), p.153
261. Lukacs, Ontology, (London, 1978), p.153
262. ed. Istvan Eörsi, G. Lukacs Records of a Life, (London, 1983), p.173
263. *ibid.*, p.173
264. *ibid.*, p.173
264. *ibid.*, p.173
265. *ibid.*, p.173
266. *ibid.*, pp.173-4
267. For a debate concerning Novack's conflation of mechanistic and dialectical materialism, cf. E. Abrahamovici's essay in, Novack, (New York, 1978), pp.134-8
268. G. Novack, Humanism and Socialism, (New York, 1973), pp.39-41
269. *ibid.*, p.55
270. The neo-critical theorist Jürgen Habermas comes close to a reductionist concept of 'labour' in his neo-Kantian critique of Marx; cf. Walton and Gamble, (London, 1979), chapter 2.
271. E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, (London, 1960)
272. For a full discussion of this point see chapter 3.

273. A. Callinicos, (Oxford, 1985), p.67
274. *ibid.*, p.67
275. A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, (London, 1978) pp.210-211
276. J. Molyneux, Marxism and the Party, (London, 1978) p.31
277. F. Engels in *ibid.*, p.30
278. E. Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, (London, 1978) pp.178-9
279. cf., Engels' letter to P. Lafargue, 3rd April 1895, and to Richard Fischer protesting against the distortion of his views in , *ibid.*, pp.179-181
280. F. Engels, [1891] Preface to Marx's 'The Civil War in France', in Mandel, (London, 1978), pp.180-1
281. *ibid.*, p.181
282. 'Interviewer: If you were to search for the philosophical roots of Stalinism, where would you look primarily?  
Georg Lukacs: The most important distortion without which Stalinism would not have been possible, is in the way that Engels, and after him a number of Social Democrats, interpreted the idea of social determinism from a standpoint of logical necessity, as opposed to the actual social context of which Marx speaks.' cf. Lukacs, ed. I. Eörsi, Record of a Life, (London, 1983), p.105
283. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (London, 1977)
284. cf. R. Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom, (London, 1975), chapter 3
285. cf. K. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, (London, 1970). It was precisely the re-examination of the Marx-Hegel relationship which not only inspired Lukacs' polemic in History and Class Consciousness, (1923), against Bernstein's evolutionary position. Lukacs' 1923 work, despite the flaws he reappraised in the 1967 Preface, represents a landmark in the creative development of Marxian theory. In the period since its reissue it has become no mere documentation of a revolutionary past, but has come to be appreciated as relevant to the prefiguration of a new one to come. cf. Peter Binns, 'Marxism and Philosophy', in International Socialism Journal, (London, Autumn 1982)
286. H. Marcuse, (London, 1977), p.275

287. *ibid.*, p.258
288. H. Marcuse, Negations, (Boston, 1969). chapter 4.
289. *ibid.*, pp.134-5
290. *ibid.*, p.142
291. F. Engels, 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy', [1888], in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980), p.622
292. H. Marcuse, Negations, (1969). p.147
293. *ibid.*, pp.147-8
294. P.Goode, Korsch, (London, 1979)
295. M. Horkheimer, 'The Social Function of Philosophy', in Radical Philosophy Journal, (Winter 1972), p.12
296. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion. (London, 1980), p.126
297. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (London, 1973), p.53
298. M. Shaw, Marxism and Social Science, London, 1975)
299. cf. E. Mandel, (Amsterdam, 1986), chapter III. Mandel describes the origins of Marxism as a synthesis and transcendence of the revolutionary findings of the progressive bourgeois philosophy and social sciences.
300. cf. J. Ross and E. Mandel, 'The Need for a Revolutionary International', in International Marxist Review, (London, Spring 1982)
301. C.J.Arthur, 'Karl Marx: Theory and Practice', in International Journal, vol.8, Nos.1 and 2, (London, January-April 1983), p.27
302. F. Engels, in P.Goode, Karl Korsch: A Study in Western Marxism, (London, 1979), p.96
303. *ibid.*, p.96
304. *ibid.*, pp.183-5
305. *ibid.*, pp.185-7
306. *ibid.*, pp.185-7
307. F. Halliday, 'Introduction' in K. Korsch Marxism and Philosophy, (London, 1970)

308. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (London, 1971)
309. P. Goode, Korsch, (1979), pp.195-7
310. cf. R. Aronson, The Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983), pp.48-50  
Aronson writes: 'One can scarcely exaggerate the effect of this failed revolution on subsequent events.' p.50
311. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt eds., The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (New York, 1978), p.5
312. *ibid.*, p.6
313. *ibid.*, p.6
314. P. Connerton ed. , Introduction to Critical Sociology, (London, 1976), p.24
315. *ibid.*, p.25
316. T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, (London, 1979)
317. Martin Shaw's remarks, written in 1975 in a different era for the revolutionary Left in Europe, are still apposite today: 'Marxists in the social sciences can undoubtedly contribute as individuals outside any organisation to the development of revolutionary theory. But only indirectly: they will rely on others not only to apply any conclusions from political practice which may affect their theory. They will also tend, as individual 'marxists' (the idea itself is indeed self-contradictory) to adapt to existing definitions of reality. For if their 'marxism' is not related to a comprehensive revolutionary political practice, it will constantly tend towards the anchors which are provided for thought by the existing intellectual and institutional structures.' M. Shaw, (London, 1975), p.120
318. Arato and Gebhardt, The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (1978), p.5
319. *ibid.*, p.5
320. For the classic rebuttal of this position cf. Leon Trotsky, ( New York, 1980); and V. Serge, ( New York, 1980), and for a recent survey cf. Tariq Ali ed. The Stalinist Legacy, (London, 1984)  
R. Aronson, The Dialectic of Disaster, (1983), correctly observes the contradictory position of members of the Left Opposition between being members of a party that had come to substitute itself for the working class on the one hand and adherence to Marxist-democratic principles and defence of the Revolution against the bureaucratic dictatorship, on

the other; but forgets that the origins of the Left Opposition can be traced to Trotsky's The New Course (1923) which arguably receives insufficient consideration in his assessment of the relation between Bolshevism and Stalinism. Examination of The New Course would show that the Left Opposition argued for policies designed to restore Soviet democracy, industrialize at a humane pace, and solve the land question in a non-terroristic way. Hence, it can be argued that Aronson's account neglects specific factors which imply a greater break between Bolshevism and Stalinism than he allows for.

321. C. Boggs, (London, 1976)  
cf., also L. Maitan, in International Marxist Review,  
vol.2, No.3, (Summer 1987)
322. 'I consider the re-evaluation and determination of the  
subjective factor to be one of the most decisive  
necessities of the present situation...one of the chief  
tasks of materialism today, of revolutionary materialism.'  
H. Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Boston, 1970) p.74
323. F. Halliday, in K. Korsch, (London, 1970)
324. cf. W. Reich, Sex-Pol Essays 1929-1934, L. Baxandall ed.  
(New York, 1966), Introduction by B. Ollman;  
and Erich Fromm, 'The Method and Function of an Analytic  
Social Psychology', [1932], in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis:  
Essays on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology. (London,  
1978)
325. W. Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism. (London, 1975),  
pp.41-2  
It should be noted that the above is a translation  
substantially revised from the original which was written  
between 1930 and 1933. Later versions of the 1933 text are  
subject to the romantic naturalism of the later Reich after  
he abandoned Marxism. For an overview of Reich which  
indicates the romantic naturalism and mysticism of his  
later writings, cf. Reich, by C. Rycroft, (Glasgow, 1971).  
( Reich's "Marxist period" roughly spans 1927-1936. cf.  
Introduction to Sex-Pol Essays, 1929-1934, (1966) by B.  
Ollman)
326. ibid., Reich, (1975), pp.37-8
327. W. Reich, 'What is Class Conciousness', (1934). in L.  
Bandaxall ed. Sex-Pol Essays, (1966) ; and Reich, (1975).  
p.39 'In their political practice...the Marxists had  
failed to take into account the character structure of the  
masses and the social effect of mysticism.'
328. K. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, (1970, London), p.10

329. E. Fromm, The Working Class in Weimar Germany (Leamington Spa, 1984)  
cf. also E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (London, 1960), p.41
330. W. Reich, Sex-Pol Essays, (1966), pp.105-7
331. Fromm's analysis in The Fear of Freedom, is superior to Reich's in this respect in particular.
332. H. Marcuse, in Brian Magee ed. (BEC, London, 1979), p.65
333. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (London, 1973)
334. B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, (London, 1982)
335. V. Geoghegan, Reason and Eros, (London, 1981), p.5
336. For a critical analysis of Karl Kautsky's attrition strategy cf. E. Mandel, (London, 1979), chapter 10. For the classic rebuttal of socialist reformism cf. Rosa Luxemburg's 'Reform or Revolution', in M.A. Waters, ed. (New York, 1977)
337. W. Reich, (1978), p.107
338. M. Horkheimer in P. Slater, The Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1977) p.77
339. H. Marcuse, 'The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State', in Negations, (Boston, 1969)
340. T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London, 1979)
341. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980)
342. cf. C. Sparks, 'Fascism and the Working Class. Part 1: The German Experience.' International Socialism Journal, (London, Autumn 1978)
343. B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, (London, 1982)
344. *ibid.*, p.12
345. H. Marcuse, (Boston, 1969), and cf. Otto Kirchheimer, 'Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise' [1941], in Arato and Gebhardt, (New York, 1978), p.49

346. cf. Erich Fromm's analysis of the socialist reformist acquiescence in Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980), pp.134-6
347. F. Pollock, 'State Capitalism; Its Possibilities and Limitations', [1941], in Arato and Gebhardt, (New York, 1978)
348. H. Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology [1941], in Arato and Gebhardt, (New York, 1978), pp.139-145
349. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (London, 1960), p.180
350. cf. *ibid.*, Appendix: 'The Character and the Social Process', pp.239-253
351. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974), pp.16-28
352. cf., E. Fromm, (London, 1980), pp.136-9
353. cf. A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith, (London, 1971)
354. H. Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, (London, 1979), pp.3-4
355. P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, (London, 1979),  
'Today the full experience of the past fifty years of imperialism remains a central and unavoidable sum still to be reckoned up by the workers' movement. Western Marxism has been an integral part of that history, and no new generation of revolutionary socialists in the imperialist countries can ignore it or bypass it. ' p.94
356. cf. Tariq Ali, Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties, (London, 1987), p.vii
357. P. Anderson, (London, 1979), p.94  
cf. also G. Lukacs, in Conversations with Lukacs, T.Pinkus ed. (Massachusetts, 1975), pp.61-2
358. cf. S.E. Bronner, Rosa Luxemburg, (New York, 1987), especially chapter 12.
359. cf. A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, (London, 1978), pp.210-11.
360. R. Aronson, The Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983), chapter II.
361. *ibid.*, pp.77-88



362. For a recent discussion cf. Chris Harman, 'Base and Superstructure', International Socialism Journal, (Summer 1986), p.4
363. G. Lukacs, (London, 1978), vol.2
364. E. Mandel, (London, 1978), p.178
365. C. Harman, in International Socialism Journal, (London, Summer, 1986), pp.4-5
366. E. Mandel, (London, 1978), p.190
367. *ibid.*, p.202
368. H. Marcuse, 'Philosophy and Critical Theory', in Negations, (Boston, 1969), p.148
369. *ibid.*, p.144
370. Harman, in International Socialism Journal, (London, Summer 1986), p.6 ; cf. also, R. Aronson, The Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983)
371. E. Fromm, (London, 1980), p.135
372. H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, (London, 1971), pp.80-1
373. R. Pippin, A. Feenberg, C.P. Webel, eds. Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, (London, 1988), p.xii
374. H. Marcuse, (Boston, 1969), p.158
375. D. Kellner, 'Herbert Marcuse's Reconstruction of Marxism', in , Pippin, Feenberg and Webel eds. (London, 1988).

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

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1. cf., G. Lukacs, 1967 Preface History and Class Consciousness, (London, 1971), p.xxi.  
Also, on the influence of positivism in the development of Marx's thought cf., C. Arthur, 'Karl Marx - Theory and Practice', in International, (January - April 1983) p.27
2. NB:David McLellan has written: 'Engels' gifts as a quick and lucid writer - a vulgarizer in the best sense of the word - admirably fitted him for the role of doctrinal mentor for the emergent Marxist movement'. D. McLellan, Engels, (Glasgow 1977) p.72
3. cf. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London,1980),p.18
4. W. Abendroth, A Short History of the European Working Class, (London, 1972), pp. 57-8
5. A. Callinicos, Althusser's Marxism, (1976),p. 16
6. ibid., p.17
7. 'The self-understanding of the proletariat is therefore simultaneously the objective understanding of the nature of society.' G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971),p.149
8. On the way in which alienation is experienced by the bourgeoisie and proletariat cf., G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971), p.149  
See also Lukacs' Lenin: A Study of the Unity of his Thought, (London, 1970, first published 1924)
9. The achievement of Lukacs and Korsch includes bringing into focus the significance of Marx's theory of alienation, a factor of decisive importance in the development of critical theory and the Marxist humanist critique of Stalinism.
10. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971), p.83
11. The tendency to reduce Marx's theory of alienation to the sociology of knowledge can be observed in Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality, (1976); critical discussions of this approach to 'alienation' and 'reification' can be found in Walton and Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, (London,1979), pp 34-9; Z.Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology, (1976), chapter 2; P.Sedgwick Psycho-Politics, (1982); R.Jacoby, Social Amnesia - A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing, (1975); and J. Grimshaw, Socialization and the Self. Radical Philosophy, No.25, (1980), T.W.Adorno 'The Sociology of Knowledge and its

- Consciousness', in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, Arato and Gebhardt ed.(New York 1978)
12. It is its social function in the historical process which alters the truth content and role of an ideology. cf.,M. Horkheimer 'The Social Function of Philosophy' [1940] in Radical Philosophy, (Winter 1972)
  13. F. Engels remarks that the proletariat became the practical force for the realization of the German Idealist tradition. cf., Ludwig Feuerbach and the Foundations of Classical German Philosophy in Marx and Engels, (London, 1980)
  14. See G. Lukacs, Ontology of Social Being, (1978) , and Walton and Gamble,From Alienation to Surplus Value, (1979). The dialectic of Labour, mankind as determined and determining , is the essence of Marx's conception of causality and teleology.
  15. In Marxism trade unions become elementary schools of the class-struggle.
  16. See G. Lukacs, 'Max Weber and German Sociology', Economy and Society, vol.1,(1972); and H.Marcuse, 'Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber', in Negations:Essays in Critical Theory, (Boston, 1969)
  17. See also H.Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', in Arato and Gebhardt ed.The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (NY, 1978)
  18. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971) p.88
  19. ibid., p.88
  20. ibid., p.88
  21. ibid., p.89
  22. ibid., p.89
  23. ibid., p.89
  24. ibid., p.90
  25. Fromm's The Fear of Freedom, first published in 1941 (as Escape from Freedom) is best understood as an application of the Marxist theory of alienation to the social psychology of advanced capitalist society. The political psychology of Fascism, analysed in Fromm's work, has been neglected in subsequent analyses of Fascism. For example, Fromm's book is not included in the bibliography of a recent restatement of the Marxist analysis of Fascism, cf.,C. Sparks, Never Again! The Hows and Whys of Stopping Fascism, (London, 1980)

26. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971), p.91
27. *ibid.*, p.91
28. It is often forgotten that the focus of Marcuse's critique of 'one dimensional society' was on 'tendencies' and their 'projection'. cf., One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974), p.15  
Fry provides a challenge to Marcuse's 'one dimensionality' thesis surveying the empirical literature in , J. Fry, Marcuse-Dilemma and Liberation, (Sussex, 1978)  
For an alternative view of the working class and its potential self-emancipation cf., E. Mandel and G. Novack, The Revolutionary Potential of the Working Class, (New York, 1980)
29. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971),p.93
30. *ibid.*, p.98
31. cf. M. Poster, Critical Theory of the Family, (London, 1978) chapter 2
32. cf. M. Barrett, Women's Oppression Today, (London, 1980)
33. G. Lukacs, (1971), p.99
34. See Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, [original American title Escape from Freedom, 1941],(London, 1960) and The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975)
35. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971),p.99
36. *ibid.*, p.100
37. *ibid.*, p.100
38. *ibid.*, pp.100-1
39. cf. Fromm's analysis of the bourgeois concept of love in The Art of Loving, (London, 1975)
40. G. Lukacs, Lukacs,(1971), p.109
41. *ibid.*, p.121
42. Cf. Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, (London,1974) chapter 18
43. G. Lukacs, (1971), p.59
44. Karl Marx cited in History and Class Consciousness, (1971)p.59
45. *ibid.*, p.63

46. P. M.Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, ( NY, 1970)
47. See D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London,1980); and M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (NY,1973)
48. M. Shaw, Marxism and Social Science, (London, 1975) p.108
49. F. Pollock, 'State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations', in Arato and Gebhardt ed. The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (1978)
50. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, ( Verso,1978) pp.415-20
51. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, ( London,1974)
52. D. Held Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1980)
53. E.P.Thompson, 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization', in New Left Review, No.121, (May/June 1980, London)
54. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, ( 1971), p.63
55. *ibid.*, p.65
56. *ibid.*, p.65
57. *ibid.*, p.66
58. *ibid.*, p.66
59. cf. E. Mandel, 'Socialism and Nuclear War', in New Left Review, No.141, (September/October 1983)
60. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.511
61. cf., Horkheimer and Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London, 1979)
62. It was Pollock's work, according to Marcuse, which suggested that there are 'no compelling reasons for the breakdown of capitalism'. Interview with Marcuse, Men of Ideas, B. Magee ed. (London, 1978)
63. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971) p.67
64. *ibid.*, p.68
65. cf. Fromm's Epilogue: 'On the Ambiguity of Hope', in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975), and Horkheimer and Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, (1979)

66. This point is forcefully made by C. Boggs in his discussion of Gramsci's Marxism, (London, 1978), and shall be returned to later.
67. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971) p.68
68. *ibid.*, p.68
69. R.Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism (London,1979)  
Also cf., T. Nairn, 'Anatomy of the Labour Party', in Revolution and Class Struggle , R. Blackburn, ed. (1977)
70. G. Lukacs, (1971) p.75
71. *ibid.*, p.76
72. *ibid.*, p.80
73. *ibid.*, p.80
74. A. Callinicos, Althusser's Marxism, (London, 1976) chapter 1, cf., also P. Binns, 'What are the Tasks of Marxism in Philosophy',in International Socialism, (Autumn 1982, London)
75. G. Lukacs, (1971),p.73
76. G. Lukacs, (1971), p.74 and cf., p.50
77. A. Callinicos, Althusser's Marxism,(London, 1978),p.22
78. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971), pp.50-51
79. *ibid.*, p.51
80. *ibid.*, p.51
81. *ibid.*, p.51
82. A.Callinicos, Althusser's Marxism, (1978), p.28
83. *ibid.*, p.27
84. *ibid.*, p.28 (my emphasis - CM)
85. cf.,P. Binns 'What are the Tasks of Marxism in Philosophy', in International Socialism, (Autumn 1982). p.107
86. G. Lukacs, 1967 Preface of History and Class Consciousness, (1971) p.xix
87. *ibid.*, p.xx and p.xvii
88. cf., R. Luxemburg, 'Organizational Question of Social Democracy', in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, ed. M.A Waters (NY,

- 1977) pp.118-9; cf. also D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1980), p.15
89. G. Lukacs, (1971), Preface
90. *ibid.*, Preface p.xvii
91. Lukacs, in Walton and Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, (1979), p.29
92. *ibid.*, p.30
93. *ibid.*, p.31
94. Lukacs, cited in Walton and Gamble, (1979), p.32
95. *ibid.*, p.33
96. *ibid.*, p.34
97. *ibid.*, p.34
98. *ibid.*, p.34
99. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London,1979)  
Marcuse, H. ,One Dimensional Man, (London 1974)  
Horkheimer and Adorno, Aspects of Sociology (London,1974), chapter IX  
E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975)
100. The relationship between critical theory, party and class, is analysed in the final chapter.
101. H. Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Beacon,1970),p.74,
102. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971), p.51
103. R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing, (1975), p.76
104. *ibid.*, p.76
105. *ibid.*, p.77
106. *ibid.*, p.74
107. *ibid.*, p.74/75
108. *ibid.*, p.80
109. *ibid.*, p.80

110. *ibid.*, p.82-3  
also, cf., V. Geoghegan, Reason and Eros, (1981) on Marcuse's underestimation of the ahistorical nature of Freud's instinct theory.
111. *ibid.*, Jacoby (1975), p.xxii
112. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, (1971), p.136
113. E.Fromm, 'The Human Implications of Instinctivistic Radicalism', in Voices of Dissent, (1958, USA), p.315
114. Arato and Gebhardt succinctly express the 'official line' of the Frankfurt School on Freud in contradistinction to the work of Erich Fromm. The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (1978), p.388
115. J. Fry, Marcuse Dilemma and Liberation, (1978), p.32
116. *ibid.*, p.32
117. See H. Marcuse, Epilogue to Eros and Civilization, (Beacon, 1974); and Jacoby, Social Amnesia (1975).  
It is instructive to note the influence of the Frankfurt School's interpretation of Freud in contemporary sociology. For example, for Bocock Freud has been neglected by the sociological tradition. But he goes further in his Marcusean interpretation of Freud. Marcuse, he argues, did not go far enough in emphasizing the 'archaic heritage', 'the sins of the fathers... still haunt contemporary man'. Bocock, Freud and Modern Society, (London, 1981), p.180  
Bocock also upholds the concept of the 'death instinct' against the detractors Reich and Fromm. Reverting to biological essentialism, Bocock argues that destructiveness derives 'from more basic instinctual sources than property relations.' p.186 Arguably, Bocock's argument offers up a conservative fatalism which obfuscates the real sociology of war and human destructiveness, and ultimately shifts responsibility off of the 'industrial-military complex' and onto its victims.  
cf., E. Mandel, 'Socialism and Nuclear War', in New Left Review, (Sept.-Oct. 1983),  
also, E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) for a refutation of Freud's instinct theory.
118. P.Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1980), quoting Fromm and Slater, p.112
119. See Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud, (London, 1980), and Marx's Concept of Man (1982)
120. P. Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (1980), p.113



121. See, for example, 'Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis', also, 'The Imposition of Sexual Morality', by Wilhelm Reich in Sex-Pol Essays 1929-1934, ed. L. Baxandall, Intro. B. Ollman, (NY, 1972)
122. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (Boston, 1974) p.60
123. According to Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (1973), Horkheimer and Adorno had reservations concerning Marcuse's more optimistic analysis of Freud and the 'pacification of human existence'.
124. E. Fromm, 'The Method and Function of an Analytical Social Psychology', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973), p.166
125. P. Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (1980), p.96
126. W. Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, (1978), p.49
127. *ibid.*, p.49
128. *ibid.*, p.49
129. *ibid.*, p.103
130. *ibid.*, p.50
131. *ibid.*, pp.60-61
132. Cf. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (NY, 1975), p.103
133. W. Reich, (1978), p.60
134. Cf. L. Way, Adler's Place in Psychology, (London, 1950), chapter 10.
135. Reich has been accurately described as a 'sexual anarchist'; E. Fromm's Greatness and Limitations of Freud, (London, 1980), p.135; Evidently, Reich had little understanding of the historical basis of Marxian social science.
136. Cf. N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (London, 1982), p.27
137. C. Rycroft, Reich, (Glasgow, 1976)
138. B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, (London, 1982), p.131
139. E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973)

140. B. Katz, (1982), p.146
141. V. Geogeghan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (London, 1981), p.44
142. Cf. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (London, 1986)

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

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1. Perhaps the most impartial account can be found in M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination (Boston, 1973)
2. cf. H. Marcuse, 'Critique of Neo-Freudian Revisionism', in Eros and Civilization, (Boston, 1966)
3. cf. D. Hausdorff, Erich Fromm, (Inc. USA, 1972)
4. cf. P. Slater, The Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1977)
5. cf. W.Reich, 'Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis', in Sex-Pol Essays, 1929-34, ed. L. Baxandall, Introduction by B. Ollman, (New York, 1972)
6. cf. E. Fromm, 'Freud's Model of Man and its Social Determinants', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1978) also cf. Adler's criticism of Freud's circular reasoning in H. L. Ansbacher and R. R. Ansbacher, The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: A Systematic Presentation from His Writings, (New York, 1964) p.61
7. cf. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) p.101
8. B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, (London, 1982) p.146
9. *ibid.*, p.149
10. *ibid.*, p.148
11. *ibid.*, p.146
12. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) p.101
13. B. Katz, (London, 1982) p.147
14. cf. E. Fromm, Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought, (London, 1980)
15. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) p.105 also cf. W. Bonss, 'Critical Theory and Empirical Social research: Some Observations', Introduction to E. Fromm , The Working Class in Weimar Germany, (Leamington Spa, 1984) p.2
16. M. Jay, (Boston, 1973) p.107
17. *ibid.*, p.107

18. Fromm argues that Marcuse neglects the clinical basis of psychoanalysis and thus fails to recognize that perversions are 'sick' under any circumstances. cf., E. Fromm The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/78) p.31
19. V. Geogeghan, Reason and Eros. The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (London, 1981) p.44
20. D. Hausdorff, Erich Fromm, (USA,1972)
21. For Britain cf. C. Leys, 'Politics in Britain', The Age of Affluence, (London, 1983) chapter 4
22. cf. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, with 1954 Supplementary Epilogue, (London, 1977)
23. D. Hausdorff, Erich Fromm, (USA, 1972) p.111
24. *ibid.*, p.111
25. *ibid.*, p.113
26. *ibid.*, p.115
27. *ibid.*, p.115
28. H. Marcuse, 'Critique of Neo-Freudian Revisionism', in Eros and Civilization, (New York, 1966) pp.263-4
29. E. Fromm, The Art of Loving, (1975) p.77-8
30. cf. P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, (London, 1979) p.34
31. cf. E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/8) p.33
32. The fact that Fromm did not have a medical background can not be viewed as a reason for his revision of psychoanalysis. Alfred Adler, Karen Horney and H.S. Sullivan were M.Ds but rejected Freudian instinct theory.
33. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) p.91
34. *ibid.*, p.91
35. D. Hausdorff, Erich Fromm, (1972) pp.22-3
36. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (1973) p.101
37. *ibid.*, p.101
38. *ibid.*, p.101 [my emphasis -CM]

39. cf. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1980) p.114
40. cf. Interview with H. Marcuse, in Men of Ideas with B. Magee, (BBC Publications, London, 1978) p.65  
NB. Marcuse makes the point that psychology was to be integrated into Marxism, not replace it.
41. cf. W. Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, (London, 1978)
42. cf. E. Fromm, 'The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology' [1932], in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/8)
43. *ibid.*, pp.175-6
44. *ibid.*, p.176
45. E. Fromm, 'Freud's Model of Man and its Social Determinants', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/8) p.47
46. cf., E. Fromm, Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought, (London, 1980)
47. cf. B. Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society, (London, 1929)  
and in Fromm's work, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975) chapter 8,
48. The influence of Marx's theory of alienation had a particularly profound effect on Fromm's work. cf. Fromm's essay Marx's concept of Man, (New York, 1982)  
and cf. N. O'Neill's comments in, Fascism and the Working Class, (London, 1982) p.21
49. Horkheimer wrote, 'Psychology without libido is in no way psychology...' cf. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) p.102
50. Erich Fromm, Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8) p.107
51. cf. J.A.C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians, [first published 1961], (London, 1977) for a useful summary of the perspectives of Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and H.S. Sullivan
52. Marcuse writes: 'The discussion will neglect the differences among the various revisionist groups and concentrate on the theoretical attitude common to all of them.' Eros and Civilization, (Boston, 1966) p.248
53. cf. R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing, (Sussex, 1975) p.10

54. Marcuse admits the mechanistic character of Freudian psychology in Negations, (1969) pp.257-8
55. E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/8) p.35
56. D. Hausdorff, Erich Fromm, (1972), p.26
57. E. Fromm reprinted in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8)
58. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (Boston, 1966) p.243
59. *ibid.*, Epilogue
60. R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia, (Sussex, 1975)
61. cf. P. Sedgwick's critical essays on Goffman and Laing in Psycho-Politics, (London, 1982)
62. For an alternative critique of conformist psychology cf., E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8)
63. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (London, 1979) p.193
64. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (Boston, 1966) p.266
65. E. Fromm, Man for Himself, (London, 1978) p.viii
66. *ibid.*, pp.vii-viii
67. Horney's work points to the effects of North American culture on neurosis, in particular cf. K. Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, (London, 1936)
68. Fromm also deals with the issue of psychoanalytic 'cure' or 'adjustment' of the psyche in Psychoanalysis and Religion, (New Haven/London, 1950) especially chapter IV
69. E. Fromm, Man for Himself, (1978)
70. cf. E. Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, (New Haven and London, 1950) ; and Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, (with D.T. Suzuki, and Richard De Martino), (New York, 1960; Harper and Colophon edition 1970)  
and for a recent non-reductionist discussion of Marxism and religion cf. M. Lowy, International Marxist Review, (Summer, 1987, Montreuil)
71. E. Fromm, 'The Theory of Mother Right and Its Relevance for Social Psychology' [1934], in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/8) p.137
72. cf. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975) p.109

73. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) p.101
74. *ibid.*, p.53
75. E. Fromm, The Art of Loving, (London, 1975) pp.78-9
76. E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (New York, 1982) p.11 (Fromm's emphasis)
77. E. Fromm, (New York, 1982) p.9
78. E. Fromm, 'Freud's Model of Man and It's Social Determinants', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/8) p.48
79. Thus Marcuse only mentions Fromm's book The Sane Society, (London, 1979) in passing (cf. Negations, (Boston, 1969) p.251) probably because it contradicts formidably the assertion that Fromm's 'revised' psychoanalysis is necessarily conformist.
80. For recent repetition of the Marcusean viewpoint cf. S. Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian Theory, (London, 1987)
81. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (London, 1977) p.9
82. *ibid.*, p.9
83. The affinities between Marx and Alfred Adler have been explored in 'Marxism and Psychology', by N. O'Neill in Marxist Sociology Revisited, M. Shaw ed. (London, 1984)
84. T. W. Adorno, quoted in P. Slater, The Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1977) p.114
85. E. Fromm, 'Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1973/8)
86. K. Marx quoted in, E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (New York, 1982) p.19
87. *ibid.*, p.22
88. N. Geras has shown that Marx's concept of human nature has been neglected or denied. However, Geras does not discuss, as Fromm does, Marx's more substantive concept, cf., N. Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend, (London, 1983)
89. E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (1982), p.24 (Fromm's emphasis)
90. *ibid.*, p.25 (ditto)
91. cf., E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (1979), chapter 3

92. E. Fromm, 'Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8) p.68
93. *ibid.*, p.68-9
94. *ibid.*, p.74
95. *ibid.*, p.74
96. *ibid.*, p.75
97. *ibid.*, p.76
98. cf. V.E. Frankl, The Unconscious God, (New York, 1935) p.20
99. E. Fromm, (1973/8) p.76
100. E. Fromm, The Art of Loving, (1975) p.37
101. Fromm discusses sexuality and its place in the development of psychoanalysis in his works. For example cf., The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975), Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought, (1980), To Have or to Be, (1978)
102. E. Fromm, (1973/8) p.47
103. *ibid.*, p.49
104. Fromm, The Art of Loving, (1975) p.36 (Fromm's emphasis)
105. *ibid.*, p.36
106. cf. E. Fromm, Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought, (London, 1980)
107. E. Fromm, To Have or to Be, (1978) p.70
108. *ibid.*, p.78
109. *ibid.*, p.79-80
110. *ibid.*, p.79-80
111. *ibid.*, p.81
112. cf., E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (London, 1977) p.21
113. E. Fromm, Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought, (1980) p.134 (my emphasis)
114. *ibid.*, p.134
115. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) p.109



116. cf. Appendix, 'Character and the Social Process' in E. Fromm The Fear of Freedom, (1977)
117. cf. R. Wollheim, Freud, (Glasgow, 1980)
118. cf. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977) p.7
119. E. Fromm, Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought, (1980) p.135
120. M. Solomon, Marxism and Art: Essays Classic and Contemporary. Edited with Historical and Critical Commentary, (Brighton, 1979) p.16
121. *ibid.*, p.25
122. E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (1980), p.16
123. E. Fromm, (1978) pp.69-50
124. cf. The discussion of teleology and causality in Lewis Way, Adler's Place in Psychology, (London, 1950) chapter 2
125. cf. E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (1980); H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (1977) E. Mandel and G. Novack, The Marxist Theory of Alienation, (New York, 1979); I. Mezaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London, 1978)
126. In Marcuse's social theory the notion of mediation tends to be compromised by Freud's mechanistic materialism.
127. K. Marx, 'Capital', quoted in M. Solomon, Marxism and Art, (1979), p.22
128. cf., E. Mandel, The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, (New York, 1971)
129. K. Marx and F. Engels, 'The German Ideology 1845/6', quoted in Marxism and Art, M. Solomon, (1979) p.36
130. Engels to Mehring, in M. Solomon, (1979) p.36
131. *ibid.*, p.36
132. cf. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975); and E. Fromm, (1980) p.59
133. cf., H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (1966)
134. cf. E. Fromm, 'Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man' in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8)

135. cf., E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (1980), chapter 9 esp. p.99
136. cf. Fromm's discussion in chapters 6 and 7 of *ibid.*,
137. cf. E. Fromm, The Art of Loving, (1975) esp. chapter 3. and cf., I.D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, (London, 1960)
138. cf. E. Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, (New York, 1950) p.61
139. cf., K. Marx, 'The Fetishism of Commodities', and 'The Power of Money'. in 'Paris Manuscripts of 1844' published as The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, (Moscow, 1977)
140. cf. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977)
141. cf., E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975)
142. I. Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London, 1975) (reprinted 1978) p.175 (Meszaros's emphasis)
143. cf., H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (1966)
144. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (1973) p.111
145. cf., G. Lukacs, The Ontology of Social Being, (London, 1978)
146. cf., K. Marx, quoted in E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (1982) p.16
147. cf. K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, Introduction by E. Mandel, Translation by B. Fowkes, (1976, London, reprinted 1986)
148. cf., E. Mandel and G. Novack, The Marxist Theory of Alienation, (New York, 1979)
149. cf. A. Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy, (London, 1985) p.93 especially chapter 3
150. *ibid.*,
151. cf. E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (1982) p.21
152. *ibid.*, p.43
153. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977) p.250
154. cf. K. Marx in M. Solomon, Marxism and Art, (1979) p.22
155. N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (1982) p.20
156. cf. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977) p.7

157. *ibid.*, p.8-9  
cf., also Fromm, (1973/8) p.41
158. cf. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1972; reprinted in 1974)
159. cf. B. Ollman, Social and Sexual Revolution: Essays On Marx and Reich, (London, 1979). Serge's comment on Kollontai's 'oversimplified theory of love' also applies to Ollman.  
cf. V. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, (London, 1984) p.205
160. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) p.103
161. cf., S. Freud, 'The Interpretation of Dreams' (1900) in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, edited by J. Strachey, (24 Vols.) Vols. 4-5
162. cf., E. Fromm's criticisms of Marx and Engels in The Sane Society, (London, 1963; reprinted 1979)
163. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) p.106-7
164. cf., E. Fromm (1978) p.46
165. Indeed. Mairet criticizes the Freudian view as over-deterministic: 'if past fantasies had anything like such potency we should all be mad, and society would be an impossibility.' P. Mairet, A B C Of Adler's Psychology, (London, 1928; second impression 1930) p.92
166. cf. E. Fromm, 'The Oedipus Complex: Comments on the Case of Little Hans', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8)
167. *ibid.*, p.23
168. *ibid.*, p.29
169. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (1966) p.60
170. *ibid.*, p.245
171. cf., E. Fromm, (1973/8) p.27  
and R. Wollheim who writes: 'To appreciate the work [Freud's CM] in its richness as it evolved, we must note how the clinical and theoretical sources flow together.' Freud, (Glasgow, 1980) p.21
172. E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8) p.29
173. *ibid.*, p.27
174. *ibid.*, p.27

175. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.20
176. cf., N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (London, 1982) chapter 1
177. E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis (1978) p.27
178. cf., P. Slater, Origins and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (1977)
179. Fromm draws from a range of social sciences and empirical data (crossing the barriers of disciplines) in his work. cf., for example, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975)
180. E. Fromm, (1978) p.48-9
181. E. Fromm, Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought, (1980) p.134; cf., also Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980) p.129
182. cf., R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia, (1975) p.1-2
183. cf., S. Freud, quoted in *ibid.*, p.3
184. NB: In chapter one, the weaknesses of Karl Korsch's concept of theory and practice were discussed in relation to this problem.
185. Fromm writes: '... the truth is historically conditioned' but 'it is dependent on the degree of rationality and the absence of contradictions within the society.' cf., E. Fromm (London, 1980), p.4
186. cf., R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia, (1975) p.2 .  
There is a dangerous tendency in Jacoby's book to make sweeping generalizations and arguments established by analogy rather than analysis.
187. E. Fromm, (1980) p.27
188. *ibid.*, p.28-9
189. *ibid.*, p.29
190. *ibid.*, p.29
191. F. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Introduction by E. Reed, [1884], (New York, 1972; sixth print 1983)
192. B. Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society, (London, 1929)

193. R. Briffault, The Mothers: A Study of the Origin of Sentiment and Institutions, Translation G. R. Taylor (London, 1927)
194. M. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (1982) p.22
195. cf., E. Fromm, (New York, 1975)
196. L. Way, Adler's Place in Psychology, (London, 1950) p.261
197. S. Freud, 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year Old Boy' (1909), in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. J. Stratechay (1955)  
cf., Fromm, (1973/8) p.98
198. E. Fromm, 'The Oedipus Complex: Comments on the Case of Little Hans', in Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (1973/8) p.98
199. *ibid.*, p.98
200. *ibid.*, p.99
201. *ibid.*, p.99
202. *ibid.*, p.100
203. *ibid.*, p.100
204. *ibid.*, p.100
205. *ibid.*, p.100-1
206. *ibid.*, p.101
207. *ibid.*, p.102
208. *ibid.*, p.102
209. *ibid.*, p.102
210. *ibid.*, p.102
211. *ibid.*, p.102-3
212. *ibid.*, p.103
213. *ibid.*, p.103
214. *ibid.*, p.104
215. *ibid.*, p.105
216. *ibid.*, p.110 . NB: also cf., Fromm, (1980) pp.16-21

217. NB: Fromm's work is notable amongst the critical theorists' for combining immanent critique with a comparative historical perspective. cf., D. Held, (1980) p.370
218. Fromm indicates the necessity of the sociological imagination for individual psychology, character analysis and psychotherapy. cf., Fromm, (1975) p. 360, and cf., Fromm (1973/8) p.161
219. For an account of this 'controversy' cf., R. Jacoby Social Amnesia, (1975); and R. Bocoock (1976; reprinted in 1981) and S. Frosh, (1987). These studies are marred by a Marcusean bias. For an alternative view of this debate cf., D. Hausdorff, (1972)
220. On the affinity between Marx and Weber on the concept of ideology, cf., A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, (London, 1971) chapter 14. Fromm makes the point that Weber's concept of social status lacks the dynamic concept of character. cf., Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977) Appendix
221. H. Orgler, Alfred Adler: The Man and His Work, (London, 1972) p.8
222. L. Way, (1950) chapter 11
223. cf. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977) p.8
224. N. O'Neill, 'Marxism and Psychology' in Marxist Sociology Revisited, ed. M. Shaw, (London, 1984) p.227
225. cf., R. Jacoby, (1975)
226. cf., K. Horney, (1966)
227. D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (London, 1984) p.162
228. J. Fry, Marcuse: Dilemma and Liberation, (Harvester, 1974)
229. D. Kellner, (1984) p.163
230. N. O'Neill, (1982) p.49
231. A. Adler, What Life Should Mean To You, (London, 1980) chapter 3
232. cf., E. Fromm, (1975)
233. L. Way, (1950) chapter 3
234. N. O'Neill, 'Marxism and Psychology' in M. Shaw ed. (1984) p.225

235. L. Way, (1950) p.306
236. *ibid.*, p.306
237. N. O'Neill, in M. Shaw ed. (1984) p.225
238. *ibid.*, p.225
239. P. Mairret, A B C Of Adler's Psychology, (1930), p.71
240. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (1963; reprinted 1979)
241. E. Fromm, (1975)
242. E. Fromm, (1963; reprinted 1979) chapter 5, section 2
243. E. Fromm, (1975) chapter 10
244. E. Fromm, (1977), p.154
245. E. Fromm, (1978), p.212
246. *ibid.*, p.213
247. E. Fromm, 'Freud's Theory of Aggressiveness and Destructiveness', in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) Appendix
248. E. Fromm, (1978) p.213
249. E. Fromm, (1977)
250. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) chapter 16
251. E. Fromm, (1975) p.381
252. *ibid.*, p.381
253. cf., H. Marcuse, 'Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Society', in Negations, (Boston, 1969)
254. E. Mandel, 'The Permanent Arms Economy', in Late Capitalism, (1978) chapter 9
255. E. Fromm, (1975), p.385
256. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1972; reprinted 1974)
257. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) p.385
258. *ibid.*, p.385
259. *ibid.*, p.385

260. *ibid.*, p.386
261. *ibid.*, p.388
262. *ibid.*, p.389
263. *ibid.*, p.482
264. *ibid.*, pp.482-3
265. E. Fromm. The Sane Society, (1963; reprinted 1979)
266. E. Fromm. (1975), p.485  
Also cf., Fromm's critical remarks on Marcuse's rather 'black or white' picture of love under late capitalism in The Art of Loving, (1975) 1980
267. E. Fromm. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) p.311
268. E. Fromm. The Fear of Freedom, (1977) pp.145-6
269. *ibid.*, p.141
270. cf., R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia, (1975).
271. cf., R. Boccock, Freud and Modern Society, (1976), and S. Frosh, The Politics of Psychoanalysis, (1987); cf., chapter 2 on the reactionary implications of neo-instinctivism
272. E. Fromm. (1973/8) p.212
273. cf., P. Slater, The Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (1977)
274. cf., I. Meszaros. (1970; later ed. 1978) p.177
275. E. Mandel. Late Capitalism, (1978) chapter 16
276. A. Maslow. Toward a Psychology of Being, (Wokingham, 1968. 2nd edition)
277. P. Leonard. Personality and Ideology: Towards a Materialist Understanding of the Individual, (London, 1984) chapter 9
278. E. Fromm. The Art of Loving, (1975) p.135
279. *ibid.*
280. Compare Fromm's concept of 'biophilia' with Adler's concept of 'social interest' (Gemeinschaftsgefühl)
281. H.L. Ansbacher and R.R. Ansbacher. The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: A Systematic Presentation in Selections from his Writings, (New York, 1964) p.16



282. E. Fromm, (1973/8) pp.34-5
283. cf., K. Horney, (1966) p.268
284. cf., E. Fromm, (1979)
285. C. Furtmüller, 'Introduction to Alfred Adler: A Biographical Essay', in H.L. Ansbacher and Ansbacher eds. Alfred Adler: Superiority and Social Interest, (London, 1964) pp.333-4
286. R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia, (1975)
287. L. Way, Adler's Place in Psychology, (1950) p.317
288. R. May notes that Adler's view of culture as a compensation for weakness 'is inconsistent with his general positive valuation of social experience'. cf., R. May, The Meaning of Anxiety, (New York, 1979) p.394
289. For a recent discussion of the individual in the social process, cf., 'The Role of the Individual in History: The Case of World War Two', E. Mandel in, New Left Review (May-June, 1986) pp.65-7
290. T.W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D.J. Levinson, R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, (New York, 1969)
291. 'Sozialpsychologische Teil: Der autoritärmasochistische Charakter', in M. Horkheimer ed. Studien über Autorität und Familie, (Paris, 1936)
292. cf., M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (1973); and D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (1980)
293. M. Jay, (1973) p.227
294. *ibid.*, p.116
295. E. Fromm, The Working Class in Weimar Germany: A Psychological and Sociological Study, (Leamington Spa, 1984) edited and with an introduction by W. Bonss.
296. M. Jay, (1973) p.117
297. *ibid.*, p.116
298. E. Fromm, The Working Class in Weimar Germany, (1984) p.228 (My emphasis - CM)
299. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977) p.183
300. For an informed account of Trotsky's analysis of Fascism cf., E. Mandel, Trotsky: A Study in the Dynamic of his Thought, (London, 1979) chapter 8

301. D. Hallas, The Comintern, (London, 1985)
302. E. Fromm The Working Class in Weimar Germany, (1980) pp.229-30
303. R. Levine-Meyer, Inside German Communism: Memoirs of Party Life in the Weimar Republic, (London, 1977) esp. chapter 20
304. D. Hallas, The Comintern, (1985)
305. E. Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, (London, 1978)
306. O. MacDonald, 'Poland and the Left in Europe', in International, Vol. 7, No.1 (London, January 1982)
307. Serge notes the ambiguity in the Left Opposition between the tendency to express the radical democratic ideals of the Russian Revolution, and the tendency to defend doctrinal orthodoxy which 'was authoritarian through and through'.  
V. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, (London, 1984) p.350
308. 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Socialist Democracy', in International Viewpoint, Resolutions of the Twelfth World Congress of the Fourth International of January 1985, (Montreuil,)
309. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) pp.102-10
310. R. Bocoock, (1981) esp. chapters 7 and 8, and P. Slater, (1980)
311. See chapter one of this study.
312. K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C.J. Arthur, (London, 1977) pp.94-5
313. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (London, 1979)
314. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) p.174
315. J.P. Sartre, Search for a Method, (Translation H. Barnes) (New York, 1963) p.62
316. E. Fromm, (1973/8)
317. A. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, second edition, (Wokingham, 1968)
318. V. Frankl, The Unconscious God, (1985) p.20
319. E. Fromm, (London, 1979) p.264
320. cf., chapter one.

321. cf., E.E. Cashmore and B. Troyna, Introduction to Race Relations, (London, 1983) p.39
322. N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (1982)
323. It is interesting to note the parallel between Fromm's concept of the social character and Weber's concept of 'elective affinities'. cf., A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, (London, 1978) p.211
324. E. Mandel, Trotsky: A Study in the Dynamic of his Thought, (London, 1979) p.89
325. *ibid.*, p.89
326. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (1977) p.179
327. *ibid.*, p.180
328. *ibid.*, p.180
329. *ibid.*, p.204
330. *ibid.*, p.205
331. *ibid.*, pp. 205-6
332. *ibid.*, p.252
333. For an overview of Gramsci's ideas cf., C. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism (London, 1979) p.18
334. cf., G. Novack, Humanism and Socialism, (New York, 1980)
335. E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (1982)
336. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (1955/1979) p.271
337. V. Serge, (1980) p.371
338. E. Fromm, (1955/1979) p.272
339. M. A. Waters, Feminism and the Marxist Movements, (New York, 1979)
340. G. Novack, 'The Problem of Alienation' in, The Marxist Theory of Alienation, E. Mandel and G. Novack, (New York, 1979) pp.74-6
341. cf., E. Fromm, To Have Or To Be (London, 1978)
342. cf., A. Swingewood, A Short History of Sociological Thought, (London, 1985) p.311.

A chapter devoted to a discussion of social class is omitted in Aspects of Sociology, by The Frankfurt Institute For Social Research, prefaced by M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, (London, 1973/1974)

343. G. Novack, (1979) p.75
344. cf., E. Mandel, Revolutionary Marxism Today, J. Rothchild ed. (London, 1979)
345. cf., D. Bensaid, Revolutionary Strategy Today, (Amsterdam, 1987)
346. P. Walton and A. Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, (London, 1976; reprinted 1979) chapter 4
347. D. Bensaid, (Amsterdam, 1987) 'Consciousness is the way out of the vicious circle of proletarian alienation'. p.5

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

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1. See, ed. Arato and Gebhardt, The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (New York, 1978)
2. G. Lukacs, The Ontology of Social Being, Marx, (London, 1978) p.150
3. cf. E. Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, (London, 1978) pp.178-182
4. Lenin's later reading of Hegel's logic cast his attention towards a more dialectical appreciation of Marx's concept of materialism. cf. S. Sayers, 'Materialism, Realism and the Reflection Theory', Radical Philosophy, (Spring 1983)
5. N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (Southall, 1982), p.27 Here O'Neill draws uncritically from G. Therborn's rather sketchy essay, 'The Frankfurt School', in Western Marxism: A Critical Reader, (London 1983)
6. cf. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory (London, 1980), chapters 13 and 14
7. cf. P. Binns, 'What are the Tasks of Marxism in Philosophy?' in International Socialism (Autumn 1982) and A. Callinicos, 'Marxism and Philosophy: a reply to P. Binns, International Socialism, (Spring 1983)
8. Therborn, in Held, (London, 1980) p.354
9. Held, (London, 1980) p.356
10. Held devotes considerable discussion to Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse's respective epistemological positions on the question: "What is critical theory? How is it justified? What is its structure?" Held notes that in their answers to these questions 'each one of the Frankfurt theorists elaborated a different and original position.' (London, 1980) p.175
11. Held, (London, 1980) p.358
12. E.Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, (London, 1978)
13. cf. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (London, 1977)
14. cf. K. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, (London, 1970)
15. R. Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat, (London, 1982)
16. Binns, International Socialism, (Autumn 1982)

17. Held, (London, 1980) pp.194-5
18. *ibid.*, p.195
19. *ibid.*, p.386
20. *ibid.*, p.386
21. *ibid.*, p.50
22. M. Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, Trans. M.J. O'Donnell, et.al. (New York, 1972)
23. cf. M. Lowy's discussion of this idea in G. Lukacs. From Romanticism to Bolshevism, chapter 1, (London, 1979)
24. Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in Critical Theory (1972) p.215
25. Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Peking, 1975)
26. Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', (1972), p.216
27. *ibid.*, pp.221-2
28. Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Peking, 1975) p.45-6
29. Held, (London, 1980) p.50
30. *ibid.*, p.33
31. *ibid.*, p.195
32. *ibid.*, p.199
33. cf. T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (New York, 1973)
34. Held, (London, 1980) p.201
35. Held warns: 'Adorno's work has a style and character which marks it off from the rest of critical theory. His thought is much harder to expound than that of the others, to try to summarize its qualities is to take a considerable risk. Adorno's work is often elusive - and deliberately so.' (London, 1980) p.381
36. Held, (London, 1980) p.201
37. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (London, 1986), chapter 1

38. 'The strategic task of the next period...' Trotsky wrote. '...consist in overcoming the contradiction between ... (the confusion and disappointment of the older generation, the inexperience of the younger generation).' L. Trotsky, The Transitional Programme, (London, 1980) p.14
39. See the recent essay by M. Jay, 'Reflections on Marcuse's Theory of Remembrance' in Pippin, Feenberg, and Webel, eds. Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, (London, 1988)
40. H. Marcuse, Foreword to Negations, (Boston, 1969), p.xvi
41. Held, (London, 1980) p.201
42. This term is discussed in further detail later on in this chapter.
43. 'The final aim of the new social practice has been formulated: the abolition of Labor, the employment of the socialized means of production for the free development of all individuals. The rest is the task of man's own liberated activity.' H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (London, 1977) p.322
44. Adorno, in Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.66
45. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.68
46. M. Lowy, Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, chapter 1 (London, 1979)
47. see chapter one
48. M. Lowy, Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, (London, 1979)
49. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.68
50. *ibid.*, p.21
51. 'Remaining "fearlessly passive" in one's epistemology may be understandable as a defence against conceptual imperialism, but it is hardly a formula for political activism...Critical theory, he maintained, was a sign of resistance; even though it might one day be apparently forgotten or suppressed.' Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.78
52. M. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse (1980)
53. Horkheimer and Adorno, in Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness, (1980) p.350
54. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness, (1980) p.351

55. Held, (London, 1980) p.384
56. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (1973) p.256
57. P. Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1977)
58. Held, (London, 1980) p.205
59. cf. R. Aronson's moving and disturbing analysis of the character of hope, ('sometimes projects of hope, beginning with resistance, can themselves alter the facts.' p.211) in The Dialectics of Disaster: A Preface to Hope, (London, 1983) pp.208-215
60. 'In spite of the supplanting of Progress by Catastrophe I would suggest that the great and remarkable fact of history is the persistence of such struggles, the refusal to capitulate completely, the victories eked out of despair... Resistance may assume the slightest of forms according to the situation, such as arranging one's few remaining belongings in an Auschwitz bunkhouse, or it may assume the broadest and deepest, such as the Vietnamese Revolution. It seems as if it always seeks to fill the available space. In any case, if we may refer to world history and project a single struggle - in spite of our own limited goals and consciousness - then it is undeniable that in spite of everything the specific struggles continue and tend to form a single one.' Aronson. (London, 1983) pp.213-4
61. M.Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, (1972) p.213
62. *ibid.*, p.213
63. cf. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (London, 1977) p.322
64. A. Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society, (New York, 1974) pp.133-4
65. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) p.197
66. R. Aronson, Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983) cf., chapter 2 and 6 especially p.236
67. The common denominator is, as Aronson notes of Jewish socialists and humanists, the affirmation 'of universalist morality over narrow nationalism', p.252, cf. also p.222, R. Aronson. (London, 1983)
68. Adorno, quoted in, M. Jay, Adorno, (1984) pp.19-20
69. cf., E. Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War, (London, 1986)



70. Aronson, Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983) p.208
71. 'Hitler liberated us from the illusion that human rights would gradually extend to everyone as the world progressed, that we might place our hopes for security in the gradual growth of tolerance and decency....No country offered to receive Jewish victims of Nazism in the 1930s; no country tried to stop the exterminations in the early 1940s; and no country offered to receive the remnant after the war.' cf. Aronson, (London, 1983) p.236
72. Aronson, Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983) chapter 2
73. *ibid.*, pp.206-15
74. B. Bettelheim, The Informed Heart. A Study of the Psychological Consequences of Living under Extreme Fear and Terror, (London, 1986)
75. For a recent analysis of war and destructiveness in the twentieth century cf. Aronson, (London, 1983). Also cf. Mandel, (London, 1986)
76. Bettelheim, (London, 1986) pp.252-5
77. *ibid.*, p.253
78. *ibid.*, pp.252-3
79. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London, 1972) p.230 [Translation corrected]
80. Bettelheim, (London, 1986) p.253
81. cf. V.E. Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, (New York, 1985) chapter VIII
82. cf. Fromm's discussion of 'the ambiguity of hope' and 'rational faith' in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975) pp.482-5. Also, Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Boston, 1970) p.69
83. cf. for example, Marcuse's Soviet Marxism, (London, 1971) and Fromm's Marx's Concept of Man, (New York, 1966) cf. also E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980) pp.139-140
84. Horkheimer and Adorno's later position led them to vacillate uneasily between theoretical ultra-leftism and liberal reformism. cf. D. Held, (London, 1980)
85. The extent to which this condition of isolation of anti-Stalinist socialist and liberal humanists is changing in the Soviet Union is difficult to assess at this early stage of

- Garboachev's reforms. cf.' Perestroika Opens the Way for Independent Social Movements', A. Severyukhir in International Viewpoint, 129, (9 November 1987)
86. cf., Aronson, Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983) pp.208-9
  87. M. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) pp.85-6
  88. G. Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, (London, 1986) pp.43-4
  89. For a discussion of this term cf. Istvan Meszaros, The Work of Sartre, vol.1 , Search for Freedom, (Brighton, 1979)
  90. Bettelheim, The Informed Heart, (London, 1986)
  91. cf. G. Novack, Humanism and Socialism, (New York, 1973) for a clarification of Marxist and existentialist humanism in the twentieth century. Novack quotes T. Paine: 'Though the flame of liberty may sometimes cease to shine, the coal can never expire.' p.11
  92. Bettelheim, The Informed Heart, (London, 1986) p.243
  93. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975) p.384
  94. *ibid.*, p.385
  95. *ibid.*, p.385
  96. *ibid.*, p.386
  97. M. Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason, (New York, 1974)
  98. E. Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War, (London, 1986) p.93
  99. M. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.93
  100. L. Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed. What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going, (New York, 1980) p.254
  101. *ibid.*, pp.255-6
  102. E. Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War, (London, 1986) pp.91-2
  103. M. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.162
  104. *ibid.*, p.162

105. S. Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and The Frankfurt Institute, (New York, 1977) pp.189-90
106. cf. Aronson, Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983)
107. cf. 'M. Jay: Reflections on Marcuse's Theory of Remembrance' in Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, eds. Pippin, Feenberg, Webel, (London, 1988)
108. Aronson, Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983) p.204
109. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.162
110. E. Mandel writes that the revival of international socialism will mean 'a communism more self-critical, more sensitive to bureaucratic deviations and manipulation, more focused on self-organisation of the masses.' 'A New Stage of De-Stalinization in the USSR' International Viewpoint, 142, (13 June 1988)
111. cf. D. Bensaid, Revolutionary Strategy Today, (Amsterdam, 1987)
112. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundation of Critical Theory, (London, 1986) p.150
113. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Epilogue, (New York, 1975). For an expression of this attitude in the person of V. Serge cf. Memoirs of a Revolutionary, (London, 1984) chapter 10
114. Jay, Adorno, (London, 1984) p.162
115. *ibid.*, p.18
116. E. Fromm, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1979) p.31
117. Adorno, quoted in Jay, Adorno, (London 1984) p.176
118. P. Sedgwick, Psycho-Politics (London, 1982) p.54
119. H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, (London, 1971) pp.34-5
120. *ibid.*, pp.34-5
121. H. Marcuse, Negations, (Boston, 1969) pp.xix-xx
122. *ibid.*, p.xx
123. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) p.199
124. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973) chapter 3

125. Held, (London, 1980) p.71
126. *ibid.*, p.66
127. A. Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society, (New York) p.130
128. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (London, 1986) chapter two
129. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London, 1979) p.151
130. Held, (London, 1980) p.65
131. Held, (London, 1980) p.69 . Also cf. R. Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, (London, 1960)
132. Held, (London, 1980) p.69
133. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (London, 1986) p.33
134. *ibid.*, p.34
135. *ibid.*, p.34
136. *ibid.*, p.34
137. *ibid.*, p.34
138. *ibid.*, p.34
139. *ibid.*, p.35
140. *ibid.*, p.35
141. *ibid.*, p.36
142. *ibid.*, p.38
143. *ibid.*, p.39
144. *ibid.*, p.39
145. cf., M. Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason, (New York, 1974)
146. R. Roderick, (London, 1986) p.40
147. *ibid.*, p.39
148. H. Marcuse, 'Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber', in Negations, (Boston, 1969) p.201

149. *ibid.*, p.224
150. Roderick, (London, 1986) p.41
151. *ibid.*, p.41
152. E. Mandel, Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, (New York, 1983) p.57
153. Roderick, (London, 1986) p.41
154. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) pp.23-24
155. cf. H. Marcuse, in Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action, eds. A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn, (London, 1970)
156. H. Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Boston, 1970) p.74
157. P.Walton and A.Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, (London, 1976)
158. Held, (London, 1980) p.73
159. cf. H. Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', in Arato and Gebhardt, eds. The Frankfurt School Reader, (New York, 1978)
160. Held, (London, 1980) p.73
161. H. Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, (London, 1972) p.64
162. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) p.41
163. H. Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Boston, 1970) p.84
164. cf. E. Fromm, 'Freud's Model of Man and its Social Determinants', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1978)
165. M. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness, (1980) p.257
166. cf. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (London, 1979)
167. H. Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, (London, 1972) p.343
168. H. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (London, 1973) p.42
169. *ibid.*,
170. cf. B. Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation, (London 1982)
171. V. Geoghegan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (London, 1981)

172. *ibid.*, p.52
173. cf. Tariq Ali, 1968 and After: Inside the Revolution, (London, 1978)
174. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) p.200
175. Marcuse quoted in Geogeghan, (London, 1981) p.94
176. cf. M. Shaw, 'Student Movements of the 1960s: A View from the 1980s', Occasional Paper No.2 (University of Hull, 1986)
177. H. Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, (London, 1972) p.50
178. H. Marcuse, 'The Movement in a New Era of Repression', Berkeley Journal of Sociology, (1971)
179. cf. International Viewpoint, (17 September 1984) on the British Miners Strike.
180. H. Marcuse, Counter-Revolution and Revolt, (London, 1972)
181. cf. *ibid.*,
182. M. Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in Critical Theory, (New York, 1972)
183. cf. A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, ed.trans., Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, (London, 1982)
184. E. Fromm also became more involved. cf. Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980) chapter one.
185. cf. E. Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, (London, 1978) for a discussion of this problem.
186. Marcuse describes Horkheimer's later pronouncements as 'beneath criticism'. cf. P. Slater, Origins and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (1980) p.99
187. See chapter three.
188. cf. H. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (London, 1973)
189. cf. P. Lawson, 'Building a Marxist Movement in Britain', International New Series, No.1, (November/December 1985, London)  
cf. also A. Arblaster, 'Labour's Future and the Coalition Debate', New Left Review, No.157, (May/June 1986, London) p.58
190. E. Mandel, 'The Role of the Individual in History: The Case of World War Two', New Left Review, No.157, (May/June 1986) pp.65-7

191. cf. T. W. Adorno with E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, (New York, 1950)
192. E. Mandel, 'The Role of the Individual in History: The Case of World War Two', New Left Review, No.157, (May/June 1986) p.66
193. K. Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, (New York, 1966) p.97
194. E. Mandel, 'The Role of the Individual in History: The Case of World War Two', New Left Review, No.157, (May/June 1986) p.66
195. E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (London, 1960) Appendix
196. N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (Southall, 1982)
197. E. Mandel, 'The Role of the Individual in History: The Case of World War Two', New Left Review, No.157, (May/June 1986) p.65
198. cf. P. Slater, Origins and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1980)
199. cf. V. Geoghegan, Reason and Eros: The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (London, 1981) Conclusion
200. cf. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion. My Encounter with Marx and Freud, (London, 1980) p.10
201. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (London, 1979)
202. E. Fromm, 'Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1979)
203. cf. E. Fromm, Man for Himself: An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics, (London, 1978) and Psychoanalysis and Religion, (New York, 1950)
204. cf. Held, (London, 1980)
205. *ibid.*, p.363
206. *ibid.*, pp.360-1
207. cf. H. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (London, 1973)
208. C. Harman, The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After, (London, 1988)
209. Held, (London, 1980) p.361
210. R. Luxemburg in, J. Molyneux, Marxism and the Party, (London, 1978) pp.97-8
211. E. Mandel, 'On the Nature of the Soviet State', New Left Review, No.108, (March/April 1978)

212. E. Mandel, On Bureaucracy, (London, undated) p.27
213. cf. V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution, (Moscow, 1977)
214. L. Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?, (New York, 1980)
215. E. Mandel, On Bureaucracy, (London, undated) p.28
216. cf. M. Horkheimer, 'Tradition and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory, (New York, 1972)
217. cf. D. Hallas, The Comintern, (London, 1985)
218. R. Aronson, Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983) chapter 2
219. H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, (London, 1971) p.39
220. cf. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980) chapter 10
221. Held, (London, 1980) pp.47-8
222. R. Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution', in M.A. Waters ed., Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, (New York, 1977)
223. Held, (London, 1980) p.361
224. R. Luxemburg, 'The Russian Revolution', in M.A. Waters ed., Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, (New York, 1977) pp.368-9
225. Held, (London, 1980) p.361
226. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978); See also P. Mattick, Marx and Keynes, The Limits of the Mixed Economy, (London, 1974); P. A. Baran and P. M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capitalism: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, (London, 1968)
227. Held, (London, 1980) pp.362-3
228. *ibid.*, p.363
229. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980) chapter II
230. Held, (London, 1980) p.363
231. E. Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War, (London, 1986)
232. R. Aronson, The Dialectics of Disaster, (London, 1983) p.209



233. cf. A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, (London, 1971)  
As Swingewood writes: 'the human subject has disappeared within the framework of ...[Parson's] social theory.' A short History of Sociological Thought, (London, 1984) p.232 For critical reviews of Gouldner's attack on functionalist sociology cf. Swingewood (above), and M. Shaw, 'The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology' in Ideology in Social Science, ed. R. Blackburn, (Glasgow, 1972)
234. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) chapter 1
235. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.507
236. *ibid.*, p.500
237. *ibid.*, p.501
238. *ibid.*, p.502
239. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) chapter 10
240. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.502
241. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (London, 1979) chapter 4
242. cf. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London 1974). Although Marcuse makes this point in the above, it is not grounded in the forces and relations of capitalist production.
243. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.502
244. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974) p.70
245. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.502
246. *ibid.*, p.503
247. *ibid.*, p.503
248. *ibid.*, p.504
249. *ibid.*, p.504
250. *ibid.*, p.504
251. *ibid.*, p.505
252. *ibid.*, p.505
253. cf. E. Mandel, 'The Role of the Individual in History: The Case of World War Two', New Left Review, (May/June 1986) p.66

254. Mandel, (London, 1978) p.505
255. E. Fromm, 'Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, (London, 1978)
256. E. Mandel and G. Novack, The Marxist Theory of Alienation, (New York, 1979) pp.74-5
257. H. Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Boston, 1970)
258. Mandel, (London, 1978) pp.505-6
259. *ibid.*, p.506
260. *ibid.*, p.506
261. *ibid.*, p.502
262. cf. D. Hallas, The Comintern, (London, 1985). Also cf. E. Fromm, The Working Class in Weimar Germany, (Leamington Spa, 1984) and E. Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, (London, 1960). Also cf. Fromm's 1965 Foreword to the above in Escape from Freedom (American title), (New York, 1965)
263. M. Lowy, Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, (London, 1979) p.22
264. *ibid.*, p.22
265. *ibid.*, p.23
266. *ibid.*, p.24
267. *ibid.*, p.25
268. *ibid.*, p.25
269. *ibid.*, p.109
270. *ibid.*, p.109
271. *ibid.*, p.109
272. cf. Jay's discussion of this in, Adorno, (London, 1984)
273. Lowy, (London, 1979) pp.65-6
274. M. Weber, quoted in, Lowy, Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, (London, 1979) p.66
275. *ibid.*, p.67
276. 'The revolutionary thrust of the proletariat has long since become realistic action within the framework of society. In

the minds of men at least, the proletariat has been integrated into society.' M. Horkheimer, Critical Theory. Selected Essays, (New York, 1972) p.vi

277. G. Lukacs, Lenin: A Study in the Unity of his Thought, (London, 1977)
278. Lowy, (London, 1979) pp.191-2
279. 'It is of course a known fact that in the crucial debate about the possibility of building socialism in one country, Lukacs opted for Stalin's side of the argument as opposed to Trotsky's, and that he sided with Stalin on other issues in the 1920s. Despite this his later statements make rather curious reading today. After all, they furnish ideological justification for the most inhuman and, morally and politically, the most negative expressions of the Stalin era. When he attempts to distinguish the Stalin death camps from other death camps, he provides us with a fascinating illustration of the schizophrenia of the Communist intelligentsia.' I. Eörsi, 'The Right to the Last Word', in Georg Lukacs. Record of a Life, (London, 1983)
280. Lowy, (London, 1979) p.192
281. 'From 1924, after the death of Lenin, a process of bureaucratisation began in the USSR, in the course of which the Bolshevik Old Guard was gradually replaced by a conservative layer, of which the most competent representative and unchallenged leader was Joseph Stalin.' Lowy, (London, 1979) p.193
282. L. Trotsky, quoted in, Goode and Korsch, A Study in Western Marxism, (London, 1979) pp.183-5
283. E. Mandel, Introduction to Marxism, (London, 1982) chapter 12
284. H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, (London, 1955/1977) p.322
285. cf. G. Novack, 'The Uneven Development of the World Revolutionary Process', in , Understanding History, (New York, 1980)
286. 'Hostility to intellectuals, a powerful and readily manipulable bias in proletarian organizations, has not only been compatible with continued domination of such organizations by intellectuals, it has often served as a vital component of such domination. In the context of the Bolshevization of the Third International, this complex theme played a substantial role.' Thus: 'The assault on Lukacs as professor and philosopher was part of a broader movement against internal opposition as such.' Arato and Breines, The Young Lukacs and the Origins of Western Marxism, (London, 1979) p.137 see also pp.186-9

287. cf. R. Segal, The Tragedy of Leon Trotsky, (London, 1983)
288. D. A. Smart (ed. with Introduction), Pannekoek and Gorter's Marxism, (London, 1978)
289. Lowy, Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, (London, 1979) p.156
290. *ibid.*, p.156
291. *ibid.*, p.157
292. Held, (London, 1980) p.45
293. These possibilities were articulated by the International Left Opposition, see, P. Frank, The Fourth International (London, 1979)
294. L. Trotsky, 'Britain and Russia' in International Vol.5, No.1, (Autumn, 1979, London)
295. V.I. Lenin, 'Left-Wing Communism - An Infantile Disorder' in Selected Works, (Moscow, 1968)
296. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.507
297. *ibid.*, p.508
298. *ibid.*, p.509
299. *ibid.*, p.509
300. *ibid.*, p.509
301. cf. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974)
302. cf. *ibid.*, p.197
303. cf. H. Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Boston, 1970); and E. Fromm, The Art of Loving, (London, 1975)
304. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1979) p.508
305. *ibid.*, p.508
306. S. Engert, 'How Red Are the Greens?', in, International, New Series No.7, (November/December 1986, London)
307. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.511
308. *ibid.*, p.511-2
309. *ibid.*, p.512

310. *ibid.*, p.512
311. *ibid.*, p.512
312. M. Horkheimer, 'The Authoritarian State' (1940), in. Arato and Gebhardt eds., The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, (New York, 1978)
313. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (London, 1986)
314. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978); cf also R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (London, 1979); J. Westergaard and H. Resler, Class in a Capitalist Society, (London, 1978); and W. Abendroth, A Short History of the European Working Class, (London, 1972)
315. Mandel, (London, 1978) pp.511-2
316. Mandel, (London, 1978) chapter 9; cf. also Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, (London, 1968) chapter 12; H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capitalism, (London, 1974); and P. M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, (London, 1968)
317. J. G. Merquior, Western Marxism, (London, 1986) p.201
318. E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, (London, 1968); Late Capitalism, (London, 1978); cf. B. Rowthorn, 'Mandel's Late Capitalism' in, New Left Review No.98, (July/August 1976, London) for a critical review.
319. Mandel, (London, 1978)
320. *ibid.*, p.387  
For an example of this in British Further/Higher Education cf. A. Robinson and G. Long's article, 'Marketing Further Education: Products or People', in, NATEHE Journal vol.12, No.2, (March 1987).
321. Mandel, (London, 1978) p.388
322. *ibid.*, pp.392-4
323. M. Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason, (New York, 1974) p.26
324. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (London, 1974)
325. Mandel, (London, 1978) pp.395-6
326. H. Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston, 1972)

327. E. Mandel and G. Novack, The Revolutionary Potential of the Working Class, (New York, 1980)  
It is important to note that while Marcuse's thesis of the integration of the working class into capitalist society was couched in terms of the 'absolute impoverishment' thesis, he later modified his position under the influence of Marx's Grundrisse (1857/8).  
On this question of 'absolute' versus 'relative' impoverishment of the working class; cf. E. Mandel, Introduction to Marx's Capital, vol. I, (London, 1976) p.71
328. Mandel, (London, 1978) pp.507-8
329. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (London, 1986) p.39
330. Mandel, (London, 1978) p.507
331. For example, cf. H. Marcuse's 1954 Epilogue to Reason and Revolution, (London, 1955)
332. G. Novack, Understanding History, (New York, 1980)
333. P. Anderson, New Left Review 100, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', p.56
334. *ibid.*, p.56
335. *ibid.*, pp.58-9
336. cf. *ibid.*,
337. For an example of this tendency cf. R. Jacoby, Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing, (Sussex, 1975)
338. M. Shaw, 'Back to the Maginot Line: Harman's New Gramsci', International Socialism, Series 2, No.1, (July 1979) p.62
339. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (1975) chapter 12, ('The Connection Between Necrophilia and the Worship of Technique')
340. E. Mandel, Introduction to Marxist Economic Theory, (New York, 1983) chapter 3
341. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1979)
342. 'To reiterate the critique of the "fetishism of commodities" became as inappropriate as to adhere rigidly to the old analysis of the competitive market economy: both missed the new dimension of domination'.  
P. Connerton, ed. Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1976) p.24

343. P. Mattick, Marx and Keynes: The Limits of the Mixed Economy, (London, 1974)
344. The 'second generation' of critical theorists are contributing to a rectification of this problem in critical theory. See the work of C. Offe and J. Habermas and others in , Connerton ed., Introduction to Critical Sociology, (London, 1976)
345. E. Mandel, (London, 1978)
346. 'technology has become the great vehicle of reification - reification in its most mature and effective form.' H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London, 1974) p.138  
Also cf. H. Marcuse, 'The Obsolescence of Marxism', in, Marx and the Modern World, ed. N. Lobkowitz, (Indiana, 1967) pp.407-17. Here Marcuse writes a much neglected corrective to his One Dimensional Man.
347. E. Mandel, The Meaning of the Second World War, (London, 1986) p.171
348. For the alternative viewpoint which stresses the Marxist humanist position cf. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (London, 1979)
349. For a discussion of recent literature on the structure and role of the working class cf. P. Meiksins, 'The Sociology of Class Politics', in, New Left Review No.157, (May/June 1986, London); also, cf. E. Meiksins-Wood, The Retreat from Class, (London, 1986)
350. O. Kirchheimer is the exception to this argument, and to a lesser extent E. Fromm; cf. Held, (London, 1980) p.47-48
351. cf. D. Keller, 'Herbert Marcuse's Reconstruction of Marxism', in, eds. R. Pippin, A. Feenberg, C.P. Webel, Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, (London, 1988)

FOOTNOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

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1. S. E. Bronner, Rosa Luxemburg, A Revolutionary for Our Times, (New York, 1987) p.97
2. 'In the final analysis Auschwitz and Hiroshima were not products of technology but of relationships of social forces - in other words, they were the (provisional) terminus of the great historical defeats of the international proletariat after 1917.' cf. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism, (London, 1978) p.506
3. cf. H. Marcuse, 1954 Epilogue to Reason and Revolution, (London, 1955)
4. cf. chapter one
5. cf. P. Bellis, Marxism and the U.S.S.R., (London, 1979)
6. P. Slater, Origins and Significance of the Frankfurt School, (London, 1980)
7. M. Lowy, Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, (London, 1979)
8. R. Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (London, 1986) p.147
9. For a recent analysis of this concept cf. M. Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas, (Cambridge, 1984)
10. cf. Walton and Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, (London, 1976) chapter 4; N. O'Neill, Fascism and the Working Class, (Southall, 1982)
11. K. Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, (New York, 1966)
12. Marcuse, Epilogue to Eros and Civilization, (Boston, 1966)
13. H. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (London, 1972)
14. W.T. James, in. Ansbacher and Ansbacher, The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, (New York, 1964) p.17
15. *ibid.*, p.62
16. E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, (New York, 1975)
17. E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, Foreword II, (New York, 1965) p.xvi



18. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, (London, 1979) chapter 5
19. L. Way, Adler's Place in Psychology, (London, 1950) p.317
20. M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Boston, 1973)
21. D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, (London, 1980) p.389
22. M. Shaw, 'Harman's New Gramsci', International Socialism, New Series 1, (July, 1978)
23. R. Roderick, (1986), p.150
24. cf. C. Harman, The Lost Revolution, (London, 1982)  
H. Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, (London, 1971)
25. Roderick, (1986) p.147
26. E. Fromm, Man For Himself, (London, 1971)
27. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (London, 1980) pp.63-4
28. E. Fromm, 'Marx's Contribution to the Knowledge of Man', in The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, Fromm ed., (London, 1978)
29. Held, (1980) p.361
30. E. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, (1980)
31. Held, (1980) p.323
32. G. Novack, Understanding History: Marxist Essays, (New York, 1980); cf. E. Fromm, You Shall Be As Gods: A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and its Tradition, (New York, 1966) p.156. In this work Fromm expresses very clearly the Frankfurt School's fundamental misunderstanding of the crisis of imperialism as a single event in contrast to the more dialectical concept of it as a historical process subject to the conditions of combined and uneven development. cf. also E. Mandel, 'What is the Theory of Permanent Revolution?' in, International Marxist Review, Vol. 2, No.1, (Summer, 1986) for a recent analysis.
33. Fromm's concept of 'paradoxical hope' and his discussion of the role of socialist humanism tends to be overly pessimistic to the extent that it is based upon the notion that the hope embodied in the Russian Revolution 'had failed completely'. cf. E. Fromm, You Shall Be As Gods, (New York, 1966) pp.156-7. However, to the extent that Fromm's discussion acknowledges the disillusion experienced by many radical intellectuals following the bureaucratic degeneration of the Russian Revolution it is, arguably, justified.

Fromm, in his discussion of 'paradoxical hope' and his humanistic concept of 'faith' is correct to stress the attitude of engagement in the face of this disillusionment - cf. our previous discussion on 'Marxism and Tragedy'. He is wrong, however, to imply that faith in the certainty of the goal of socialist democracy is based only upon 'inner experience of the goal, even though it has not yet been reached, and no proof exists that it ever will be.' Fromm, (1966) p.157

Fromm was totally disillusioned by the bureaucratisation of the Russian Revolution and this led him to fall back upon a wholly ethical position in relation to the socialist goal. Fromm thereby neglects the contradictory role of the bureaucracy in Soviet Russia and thus tends to underestimate the historic gains made by the Russian working class which Stalinism could not eradicate. cf. E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, (London, 1968) chapter 15.

Also for a recent detailed discussion cf. P. Bellis, Marxism and the U.S.S.R., (London, 1979); and for a general discussion cf. D. Lane, Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R., Second Edition, (Oxford, 1978)

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