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The Conception Of Human Nature In Modern Political Thought:
with special reference to the work of Charles Taylor

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Frontispiece



Rene Magritte The Clairvoyant

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Abbreviations

Taylor's Works

SOTS Sources Of The Self
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)

EOA The Ethics of Authenticity
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991)

POR Multiculturalism And "The Politics Of Recognition"
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)

CHAPTER ONE

LOCATING TAYLOR: HUMAN NATURE IN THE MODERN PERIOD

Introduction

This thesis will analyse and advocate a 'contextualist' reading of human nature. By reference to the work of Charles Taylor it will be argued that Modern conceptions of human nature are (to echo Nietzsche) 'dead'. This is to attack the suggestion that a conception of human nature may be understood in an ahistorical, universalist, abstract or 'unencumbered' sense. A conception of human nature must, of necessity, it will be argued, be understood in a more dynamic and 'local' sense. It is the suggestion of this thesis that human nature must be understood in a sense akin to the existential notion of 'facticity', or as possessing a degree of 'determinacy'. While human nature is 'encumbered' by its 'situation' in time and geographical location it is not however wholly determined. An individual's existence is co-determined by individual choice, the individual's history, and by Nature. Human nature must be recognised to have a facticity, to exist at a certain point in history, in a certain country, to be encumbered by countless other emotional ties, friendships, and loyalties. This 'embedded' conception of human nature is delineated and explored through Taylor's conception of human nature as an 'interspatial epiphany', and is to be preferred to the unencumbered sense of interspatial epiphany that might be seen to be offered by some forms of existentialism. Such existentialist thought is not as astutely located or embedded as Taylor's thought, and suffers from what Taylor terms 'existential heroism', a focus on choice making rather than on the background of encumbrance.

While the notion of a universal conception of human nature must be abandoned, as the individual is now seen as 'located' temporally, and spatially, it is still possible to draw some (very) modest generalisations about the nature of individuals. This exploration proceeds by generating a 'thick description' of the self's particular, but ultimately contingent, connections and affiliations. (Such a located description is seen as superior by Taylor, to thin, mechanistic, scientific and neurological descriptions of human agency.)

This chapter will attempt to locate Charles Taylor's thought within contemporary political and philosophical debate by examining the author's own self definitions, and the epistemological, religious and political implications Taylor sees as flowing from his own thought, before considering other theorists perceptions of Taylor's place in contemporary debate.

Taylor's Self Location

In first trying to locate Taylor it is useful to turn to the thinker's own attempts at locating his thought. In the introduction to his two volumes of Philosophical Papers Taylor suggests his work is the concern of a 'momomaniac'¹. Taylor utilises a term coined by Berlin to identify himself more precisely as a 'hedgehog'. The target of Taylor's thought is 'atomism', and atomist theorising (which Taylor regards as inarticulate or 'blind'.) This initial characterisation of what Taylor wishes to oppose is clarified in his Philosophical Arguments² (a later work than Philosophical Papers.), and reformulated as an opposition to 'representational epistemology'. The major target of Taylor's thought might be identified more broadly as naturalism.

Atomism

In its early characterisation Taylor defines his atomist opponent as the family of theories that suggests that human beings should be studied by the categories or ‘canons’ of natural science. Taylor does not dismiss such natural scientific, naturalist and reductivist theorising out of hand; the discoveries of modern natural science are manifold and real, but it is disastrous to extend these ways of thinking, and operating, into the sphere of human social affairs and the study of human nature. In Philosophical Arguments Taylor characterises the reading of natural science’s methodologies into the sphere of the social sciences as the ‘ontologising’ of atomistic thinking, as a naturalising move and as a fateful error.

Atomism and Human Nature

One ontologising move of atomistic thinking is to apply this thinking to human nature, when applied to human nature atomist theories produce a peculiar, but historically significant conception of human nature as (variously) the ‘punctual’, abstract, or unencumbered self. Atomist theorising produces the extraordinary conception of humans as an abstract self, as the ‘ghost in the machine’. The human body is described in the ‘scientific’ terms of the natural science of the day contemporarily in a mechanistic way, while human conscious is ‘locked out’ of the body, and is ‘punctual’, in other words is literally extensionless, as akin to a theoretical geometric point. Contemporarily a punctual consciousness would be seen as a product of the neural connections and chemical content in and around the brain.

The punctual self is a conception of human nature Taylor identifies with Locke. Through Sources of the Self³ (hereafter SOTS) Taylor develops an analysis of successive, historical conceptions of human nature. An analysis that portrays Locke as the inheritor, and ultimate expression of a Cartesian inspired withdrawal from the intentional aspect of experience. The intentional aspect of experience is ‘retrieved’ for human experience by the concept of the embodied or encumbered individual; from the punctual self that is presumed in representational epistemology. Taylor sees his work as one of retrieval for lived human experience in all its contingent, and ‘messy’ embodiment.

Against atomist conceptions of human nature Taylor wishes to argue for a notion of (variously) engagement, embeddedness, or embodiment. That is to focus on the experience of human embodiment, the ‘anthropological’ or situated experience of being enveloped in a particular external reality. This is to focus both on human embodiment as a primordial facticity and on the experience of embeddedness or encumberment in a particular situation. This is to focus on the fact of certain human capabilities (for instance to hear within a certain auditory range) and the fact of Being (for instance a white, European male living at the beginning of the twenty first century.) The latter situated Being is the source (of SOTS) of the anthropological values of mediated human experience. The unashamedly encumbered notion of human nature in Taylor’s thought is termed ‘interspatial epiphany’. (This aspect of Taylor’s thought will be explored more fully in the third chapter.) Taylor suggests that his work is ‘expressivist’, which is its self a development of Romantic expressionist thought. In attempting to characterise human nature as an interspatial epiphany Taylor draws on aesthetic theory, and the concept of Romantic art as ‘epiphanic’. Taylor suggests that with Romantic art there is the genesis of a conception of art that breaks decisively with ancient conceptions of art as ‘mimesis’. It is through epiphanic Modernist art that

Taylor claims to discover a 'language of reflexivity' with which to describe interspatial epiphany.

Taylor suggests that Romantic art might be seen as 'epiphanic' because the Romantic artistic artefact is seen as intimately linked to its medium (its embodiment.) The choice to produce a written, or painted, or sculpted artefact is of immense importance, as the finished artefact will be crucially marked by its medium, as the human individual is marked by both temporal situation or location and primordial embodiment. Romantic aesthetics offer 'expressive epiphanies', the artistic artefact gestures beyond itself or represents some larger Truth. Romantic art is still largely representational, but a painting of a landscape for instance, is epiphanic as it is an expression of something greater, perhaps God's beneficence or power. Increasingly the Truth that Romantic epiphanic art expresses become plural, many truths might be seen as expressed in an artistic representational expressive epiphany. A landscape painting might now be regarded by some as gesturing to God, by some as gesturing to a bygone innocent era, or by some to an appreciation of the geographical processes at work in the environment.

However, it is in Modernist rather than Romantic notions of the artistic artefact as a framing or spatial epiphany that Taylor finds his metaphor for human nature. Taylor suggests that Modernists break any lingering tie to mimesis, while Romantic artefacts are representational, Modernist framing epiphanies are non-representational. This change calls for a reconceptualisation of the artistic artefact. This reconceptualisation revolutionises the place and status of the viewer, or audience, of an artefact. The artistic artefact in Modernist aesthetics is seen as the site of a 'juxtaposition' of colour, images, or words. The artefact is a 'frame' in which various 'forces' are captured. The site of juxtaposition, or of various forces is a vortex which comes to full expression, or is completed through being seen. In Modernist aesthetics it

is the viewer who 'earths', or completes the vortex, by having a response, or emotional reaction to the artefact.

This is the metaphor that Taylor wishes to develop for human nature. Atomistic, or naturalist or thin, or mechanistic conceptions of human nature should be abandoned in favour of a more 'dynamic' conception of the human individual as the location of various forces. There is a facticity of physical embodiment, and the individual's personal, though ultimately contingent, history or life story; the individual is partly *determinate* due to her spatial and temporal location, as the aesthetic artefact is partly determined by the medium it is represented in. The vortex of the individual is completed by the decisions the individual makes which co-determine (with facticity) the future; the individual expresses herself through the decisions she makes, and the form of life she seeks to pursue. This is the powerful and insightful conception of human nature that Taylor develops. Human Nature is a fallacy; the individual is always partly indeterminate. A conception of human Nature must fall with the decline in acceptance of a notion of human nature as an abstract, unencumbered self. The embodied self is an expression of its encumbered existence, but is an expression that can be modified by the operation of the human will. Having detailed Taylor's criticism of atomism, its disastrous consequences for conceptions of human nature (with the ontologising move) and Taylor's conception of the encumbered self as interspatial epiphany it is important to examine the epistemological issues Taylor identifies in his later Philosophical Arguments where the opponent is characterised as 'representational epistemology'.

Epistemology

In *Overcoming Epistemology*⁴ Taylor notes the decline in status of epistemology as the centre of philosophy relative to the hey day of logical positivism some fifty years

ago. Taylor comments that there is now a new orthodoxy, fuelled by the work of, among others, Richard Rorty, that the whole epistemological project from Descartes, through Locke and Kant and successive nineteenth and twentieth century movements has been a mistake. Taylor asks, if this project is to be repudiated what **exactly** is to be denied or overcome? Taylor suggests that there are two answers to this question, one answer with a narrow focus, one with a wider focus.

The narrower, short answer to the question of what exactly is to be overcome is the answer 'foundationalism'. The major theorist of this position is Quine. Quine undermines foundationalism by downgrading the logical positivist pretensions of epistemology, and seeing it as one science amongst many; as one possible way to explore external reality. Richard Rorty follows a similar line of argument in Irony, Contingency, and Solidarity⁵, and indeed is an admirer of Quine.

For Taylor overcoming epistemology means overturning the wider assumptions underlying representational epistemology. The assumption is that knowledge is to be seen as the correct representation of independent reality. Originally, in Descartes formulation, this is the notion of an inner representation of outer reality. It is this original formulation that Taylor also sees as inaugurating the drive to the punctual, abstract self. The course of the notion of (inner) representational epistemology progresses with an increasing mechanism of both external reality and human nature, an ontologising move as Taylor has identified it. The increasingly mechanistic world view of the modern period has seen Nature become 'disenchanted'. External reality is no longer seen as animated by a force, it is no longer organic and dynamic but a sterile machine. In regard to human nature representational epistemology has increasingly described human experience in a falsely passive, regular and mechanistic way.

For Taylor the unencumbered self is typically seen as receiving atoms of information passively from external reality, from which it constructs a picture of the

world. There is a focus on the clarity of inner representations of external reality, a move Taylor dubs 'inwardness' or an (inner) 'reflexive turn'. This reflexive turn is indissolubly linked to representational epistemology. Taylor wishes to overcome representational epistemology (in its wider focus), not just overcome a faith in foundationalism and such wishes to replace a thin conception of the punctual self with a thick description of the encumbered self as interspatial epiphany.

Taylor identifies four theorists who all help overcome the misguided grasp of representational epistemology in contemporary thought. Taylor isolates these four theorists as they use a similar form of argument to reclaim the 'conditions of intentionality' of human experience of the world which are ignored by representational epistemology. Taylor's four theorists of the 'conditions of intentionality' and 'disclosure' are Hegel, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein. The vital influence of Hegel on Taylor will be discussed below in relation to the charge against Taylor of moralism.

Taylor claims that all four theorists pursue their criticism of representational epistemology, and its assumption of 'punctuality', with an argument from 'transcendental conditions'. Heidegger's discussion of 'Lichtung' or 'the clearing' illustrates this most clearly. Representational epistemology is concerned with discovering the conditions that facilitate the correct inner representation of external reality. Kant takes this exploration to a high point with his consideration of the mind of the subject and the nature of experience. Kant sees the structure of the embodied human mind as of a primary importance and examines its capabilities and limitations. This examination gives a quasi-scientific assessment of human capacities; while humans see in three dimensions and in colour, their eyes are only sensitive to a limited range of lightwaves, and can only see for a certain distance.

Heidegger's examination of the nature and conditions of human experience goes deeper into this picture, or 'further back'. For Heidegger an understanding of the clearing is achieved not by focussing on the embodied mind, but by a focus on the fact that anything can 'appear' to the individual at all. Human experience is not like being immersed in a raging stream of sense data, colours, sounds, and shapes: a true Nietzschean chaotic flux, but is rather structured by a given consciousness or subject. The focus has now shifted to the knower-known complex, rather than an examination of embodied mind.

Heidegger's analysis can be said to go further back as the focus is not now on the mind structures experience (primordial embodiment), but an examination of the basis of embedded experience, a study of the conditions of intentionality (the dimension that Descartes' thought abstracts from.) There is a shift in focus to the 'background of experience'. Beyond primordial embodiment the individual colours or fleshes out this facticity with judgements of value and importance.

In the introduction to SOTS Taylor's suggests his methodology is one of 'post-Heideggerian hermeneutics⁶'. Taylor wishes to follow Heidegger in taking situated experience as of primary importance, to accept anthropological encumbered assessments of right and wrong as incorrigible. Taylor suggest individuals are capable of making 'strong evaluations' are able to make discriminations of right and wrong, better and worse drawing on the their encumbered embodiment. Taylor names his methodology the 'BA principle⁷', the best account principle whereby an individuals own self definitions of their beliefs and opinions must be taken as primary. In illustration of what this involves Taylor gives the example of an individual forming and checking the grammar of there speech drawing on the background of contemporary, located, practise. Taylor's four theorists of the conditions of intentionality undermine representational epistemology's anthropological beliefs in the disengaged subject, and

the punctual self and challenge the presumption of the value neutrality of physical reality. Taylor opposes projectivist ethics as he suggests they are blind to the reality of encumbrance, and value ladenness. (See discussion in relation to Weeks below.)

Taylor's theorists of intentionality undermine foundationalism as it is now impossible to keep digging below an agent's ordinary representations of reality to find more basic representations, at the base of such an excavation is a certain grasp of the world that the individual has as an agent in it. The individual's particular grasp is constituted by a contingent individual history. The unencumbered self is regarded as an impossibility, the 'thin' mechanistic notion of the punctual self is replaced by a 'thick' description of the individual in all their contingent detail (given the complexity of detailing all these aspects there is an acceptance that a complete and final description of the individual is impossible.) Taylor suggests this sort of argument reaches its ultimate expression in Merleau-Ponty's work where human agency is regarded as embodied, and where this lived body is the locus of direction of action and of desires that are never fully grasped or controlled by personal decision. In a strong echo of Heidegger's work the individual has no fixed nature and co-determines her future by an embodied operation of the mind which has been 'shaped' by its contingent personal history. This conception contrasts with representational epistemology's conception of the punctual self striving for reflexive clarity. It is obvious that Taylor's notion of interspatial epiphany is an embodied, encumbered conception of human nature that Taylor wishes to set within a denial of foundationalism and the metaphysical assumptions of representational epistemology.

“Instead of searching for an impossible foundational justification of knowledge or hoping to achieve total reflexive clarity about the bases of our beliefs, we would now conceive

this self-understanding as awareness about the limits and conditions of our knowing, an awareness that would help us to overcome the illusions of disengagement and atomic individuality that are constantly being generated by a civilisation founded on mobility and instrumental reason.”⁸

Towards the end of ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ Taylor sketches how this act of overcoming might impact on contemporary thought, the notion of human reason will be downgraded (relative to its logical positivist high point) into an ability to ‘articulate’ the background of individual lives in broad cultural strokes. The conception of human reason that Taylor appeals to is a more fragmented than the unitary logical positivist concept. In morality it will involve the rejection of projectivist ethics, and moralities based on instrumental reason, which tend to utilise a ‘thin’ description of the agent. In politics overcoming epistemology requires a hostility to contemporary conservatism and a rejection of radical doctrines of ‘unsituated freedom’. It is appropriate at this point to examine the notion of the fragmentation of human reason, and Taylor’s broader moral position. Alongside this it is vital to consider the charge of ‘moralism’, characterised as a foundationalist slide (by critics such as Waldron and Kymlicka⁹), before turning to consider the historical development of Taylor’s political thought. A lingering foundationalist urge is identified by critics with Taylor’s first person affirmation of Judeo-Christian theology at the end of SOTS.

The Place of Religion and ‘Taylor’s Moralism’

Taylor’s earliest work is devoted to Hegel, in the introduction to Hegel¹⁰ Taylor asks why it is that while Hegel’s thought has had a wide influence, it is rare for theorists

to champion Hegel's ontological thinking. It is Taylor's affinity for Hegelian teleological thinking that marks his work and opens him up to the criticism of moralism. Taylor and Hegel might be seen to have a common horror of atomism or fragmentation. Raymond Plant¹¹ suggests that Hegel's thought is marked by a preoccupation with fragmentation and division, and suggests three bifurcations of especial importance.

Plant suggests Hegel sees a division of man from God. In particular Western Judeo-Christian theology is marked by a misinterpretation of the lesson or message of Jesus' life which makes Christian practice in the increasingly individualistic and private. Hegel sees the Christians of his own day on a quest for personal salvation, rather than social and moral unity in the community; the real message of Jesus' life in Hegel's perception. The drive to solitariness begins with Abraham and the doctrine of salvation through the snapping of the ties of family, society and rootedness. Hegel is driven by this bifurcation from God and the second division, that of man from nature to address the third, the fragmentation of reason.

Plant suggests that through his analysis of the division of man from nature Hegel identifies what will come to be called, the disenchantment of external reality (or Nature). Through SOTS (in particular 'the voice of nature') Taylor traces this process of the disenchantment of Nature into the contemporary period. The argument is that ancient societies perceived Nature in an organic and substantive manner. The ancient deities were alive in Nature, and thus the experience of Nature is normative for the 'rational' individual. (In such a conception it is then, possible to 'attune' oneself to nature, that is to accord to the limits on behaviour that Nature indicates.) Taylor wishes to recapture something of this sense through his methodology of the BA principle, though Taylor's work has more epiphanic, and laudable cast to it.

This cohesive, substantive ideal has however passed, Nature has become disenchanted, it is no longer the garb of the deities but the site of regular, scientifically

discoverable laws. In SOTS Taylor most commonly identifies this disenchantment as the ‘fracturing of the moral horizon’. The disenchantment of Nature also shatters the horizon of communal social action. A unitary moral horizon is of immense importance to a community as a stimulus to communal acts, now society is seen to be colonised by plural moral horizons all adhered to by their community, incommensurable with any other colony, while no single horizon is capable of sustaining all the members of a nation state. It is just such a picture of contemporary society that Taylor regards as accurate

Ontology and Deontology

With the fracturing of the notion of a unitary moral horizon, and the associated loss of a stimulus for communal action it is necessary to reconceptualise the place of the individual. Taylor suggests that historically this reconceptualisation has given an enhanced status to the Being, individual organism, in SOTS Taylor will argue that the individual raises to the status of a creator God; a conceptualisation that needs its pretensions deflated by an embodied concept of human nature. This enhanced status for the individual has led to inarticulate moral theorising Taylor suggests, in particular to deontological theorising. Such deontological moral theory makes room for the new conception of the self that is now, variously ‘privatised’, ‘inward’, or more individualistic with a moral theory that suggests that when in conflict individual rights should trump the ‘good life’, or ‘social good’ of a community, or wider society.

Taylor’s thought is paradoxical, and uneven in relation to deontology. While Taylor champions the conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany, with a call to overcome epistemology in its wider aim of dismissing foundationalism and overturning the assumptions of representational epistemology by revealing the

background and the clearing of embodied experience, he seems to balk at accepting deontological conclusions. This is partly motivated by a more modest interpretation of the individual as limited by embodiment, as less than self clairvoyant, as driven by desires and contingent allegiances as well as reason and the desire to claim certain social rights, than the deontologists. However, while Taylor's thought would appear to be naturally at home within deontological moral theorising Taylor expresses an affiliation with ontological moral thought.

Taylor indebtedness to Hegel might be seen as central here, or it might be that Taylor finally slips into moralising and the ontological demand that when in conflict the social good should trump individual rights. The more astute analysis is that Taylor's work is more sensitive to embodiment and the values that encumberment 'implicates' the individual in. For instance an individual in the West an individual will necessarily be 'implicated' in Judeo-Christian values because these values animate vast swathes of social and political practise. Social and political practise is premised on broadly Christian understandings of right and wrong, a background in which individuals are embedded and may draw on to make strong evaluations. Beyond this Taylor's work is marked by his Canadian citizenship, and contemporary political debate within Canada over multiculturalism. Before moving on to consider Taylor's political thought it is necessary to examine the charge of moralism and the notion of a moral external reality in more depth.

In the introduction to SOTS Taylor is hostile to what are termed 'projectivist ethics', those ethics that suggest that physical reality is value neutral domain on which individuals project their values. Taylor's attack can be seen to be driven by his thick description of human nature. The encumbered self of interspatial epiphany is **not** the punctual self, the tight, extension less centre of control that projects value onto reality, presumed by inarticulate projectivist ethics. The embedded individual rather has a

contingent history of moral experience. From these individual moral experiences broad commonalities, or general themes, values and forms of life emerge.

Isaiah Berlin sees this process as generating ‘ultimate human values’, a status quo, a limited agreement over moral mores emerges within a form of life and a wider nation state. Ultimate human values are generated by communal interaction and are quite different to ‘Absolute human values’. Berlin would see the quest for Absolute human values as a foundationalist, and fruitless exercise. Taylor’s work would appear to be congenial to Berlinian ultimate human values, but his comments at the end of SOTS seem to suggest a foundational urge in Taylor “in spite of everything.¹²”

Waldron suggests that SOTS is a sandwich “400 pages of historical reflection between two thin slices of more abstract moral philosophy.¹³” Through the introduction to SOTS Taylor dismisses projectivist ethics and suggests that an important aspect of human Being is the capacity to make ‘strong evaluations’. Strong evaluation is the ability to make discriminations of right and wrong. Strong evaluation is of immense importance to a Taylor as it demonstrates how human values are generated with reference to a background, to a normative embeddedness. The status of embeddedness and strong evaluation is crucial here, one perception of the issue might see strong evaluation as identical to self reflexivity. In a Kantian interpretation self reflexivity could be viewed as the delineation of another capacity of the human brain. Following Heidegger the focus might be on the individual co-determining her future tempered by the insights of such reflection which is necessarily bounded by the various moral forms of life of the individuals embeddedness. While it is almost certain that Taylor accepts this latter interpretation the intemperate comments at the end of SOTS raise the spectre that Taylor has a more Absolute aim. This impression is given by Taylor’s comments upon Judeo-Christian theology, while suggesting that the in general stifles the spirit Taylor says

“If I may make one last unsupported assertion,... There is a large element of hope. It is a hope I see implicit in Judeo-Christian theism (however terrible the record of its adherents in history), and in its central promise of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever attain unaided.¹⁴”

It is astonishing that Taylor can make such a statement even expressed as a hope, how is this statement in tune with the notion of ultimate human values? Indeed is such a hope in tune with the notion of human nature as interspatial epiphany as delineated through SOTS? The desire for a ‘total’, ‘suprahuman’ affirmation, a teleological significance to existence would appear to be a strong foundationalist urge. Waldron suggests that Taylor offers a “first person reaffirmation of religion in spite of everything¹⁵”, and it is these very comments that may be cited to condemn Taylor for a slide back towards foundationalism. Such an accusation is overstated, and Taylor’s later work moves away from this ‘hope’.

The Charge of Moralism

It is immensely important to attain a sensitive understanding of the precursors to Taylor’s ‘spiritual’ pronouncement at the end of SOTS. It is important to re-emphasise the influence of Hegel on Taylor’s early thought. There is a close parallel between Taylor’s motives at the end of SOTS and Hegel’s religious thought. As cited above Plant identifies Hegel’s criticism of Western Christianity is that it misinterprets the life of Christ and provokes a solitary religion of personal salvation. In Taylor’s terms Plant is suggesting that Hegel accuses Western Christianity of championing disengagement.

Hegel argues that the intentional aspect of experience is relative ignored as individuals are educated, through religion, to become ‘..citizens of heaven who always look on high and this makes them strangers to human feeling.’¹⁶ Plant argues for a distinction between an early period in Hegel’s work where he argues for a reinterpretation of Christianity, before a later period in which he pursues such a reinterpretation for himself and Germany as a whole. Plant suggests that faced with a socially disastrous and solitary form of religion Hegel argues for a more ‘philosophical’, and we might add encumbered conception of Christianity that might restore a sense of unity, community, and social solidarity.

Theorists preceding Hegel such as Schiller and Herder had suggested that encumbered religion was practised by the ancient Greeks. While Hegel is sympathetic to such ideas he is astute enough to discern that there cannot be a simple return to ancient forms of religious life. An encumbered Christianity must be marked by or expressed through its current denizens. Most importantly to Hegel such a modern encumbered Christianity must take account of the rise of individualism, while Taylor would add terms such as the punctual self, the affirmation of ordinary life, the voice of nature, and the move of human reason from a substantive (ancient) to a procedural (modern) conception, to the list. Plant suggests that to mark this difference from preceding thought Hegel argues that a modern sense of community has to be ‘mediated’ (this contrasts with the ancient ‘unmediated’ sense of community) has to seek to integrate modern accounts of individualism has to be expressed in current vital terms. For Hegel, and for Taylor in his trail this means that modern religion must be transformed.

Plant advises

“It is important to notice, though, that at this stage [Hegel] is not writing as a philosopher, seeking to set Christianity into a wider interpretation of human existence as he was later to do; rather he is acting as a kind of cultural critic seeing what scope there might be for the transformation of Christianity.¹⁷”

Taylor’s comments at the end of SOTS must be seen in exactly the same terms, that is as the comments of a cultural critic who has a ‘hope’ that a transformed, encumbered Judeo-Christian theology can act as a mediated support to a sense of community. Taylor is arguing that representational epistemology offers an inaccurate and ‘thin’ description of human nature and makes a sense of social solidarity increasingly difficult (if not impossible) by blinding us to our value laden embodiment and embeddedness. Taylor’s criticism of naturalism in general is that it does not allow individuals to understand the sense in which values are not merely human projections onto a putatively inert universe. The concept of human nature as interspatial epiphany is an attempt to re focus attention on the every day experience of embodiment and encumberment with all its value ladenness, and to find a sense of social solidarity mediated through various conflicting forms of life. In this complex process Taylor offers his theism as a grounding for the objectivity of values, as a possible background, amongst others, from which to start to form a mediated sense of community (This aspect of Taylor’s thinking is fully explored in chapter four.) To conclude this chapter it is now necessary to consider the historical development of Taylor’s political thought.

From 'The Steady State' To 'Substantive Liberalism'

Taylor's earliest political prescription is contained in 'The politics of the steady state'¹⁸, where he argues for a strong centralised state that can co-ordinate and ameliorate the increasing crisis of dwindling resources **and** champion a preferred form of life for its citizens. Taylor's later political prescription contained in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (hereafter POR) and The Ethics of Authenticity (hereafter EOA), is for a 'politics of recognition' where a devolved liberal state can provide a more local, meaningful, and 'resonant surrounding' for encumbered individuals. Taylor's later liberalism argues for a corporatist element that maintains a link between government and various forms of life. Taylor is most commonly identified as a communitarian (see immediately below) and there is a constant concern in his political writings for the fostering of strong communal ties to support political action. Taylor's work is sympathetic to theorists such as Tocqueville who see liberal societies as threatened by 'soft despotism', that is as losing the ability to form associations free from state tutelage. Self-governing associations are vitally important for Taylor (and indeed Hegel) as they facilitate social and political engagement with wider society. Taylor's encumbered individual finds their most immediate and resonant experience in local associations, but the desire to engage politically in society is learnt and fostered in these local organisations. The place of Taylor's transformed Christianity can be seen to be vital to such a move from the local to the national.

Taylor suggests that to make the transition to a steady state society will require a strong common agreement to do so. In 'The politics of the steady state' Taylor suggests that a cohesive common agreement will flow from a 'Dunkirk spirit' fostered by the

stark realities of an impending resource crisis. For his later devolved, liberal political prescription Taylor suggests that an awareness of a common background or embeddedness will rally support behind liberal democratic plans for reform. The dramatic, jarring change foreseen by Taylor in the move to the steady state is replaced in his later political writings by a gradual democratic change achieved through forming democratic majorities around programmes for change. It is obvious that in his later political formulation Taylor can see a vital role for a transformed sense of Christianity. Taylor's Tocquevillian worries about contemporary liberal society is that it is based on a falsely punctual notion of the individual which carries with it a denial of ontological value, which Taylor by contrast sees as a common human experience of embeddedness; such blind or inarticulate theorising makes it increasingly difficult to maintain democratic majorities to sustain politics. Contemporary politics is practised and perceived by its citizens as a series of single issue actions rather than as an arena in which to foster communal ties and democratically protect plural forms of life. To bolster the communal action Taylor sees as vital to the practise of a politics of recognition a transcribed Christianity would be invaluable. Taylor's political thought is examined in greater depth in the final two chapters of this thesis, but in an attempt to offer an initial characterisation of his thought it is important to address Taylor's comments on civil society.

Modes Of Civil Society

In 'Modes of Civil Society'¹⁹ Taylor claims that notions of civil society are strangely in vogue again, not in the 'old' sense of synonymous with 'political society', but in Hegel's 'contrastive' sense. Hegel conceives of civil society as over and against the state. The perception of a need for civil society can be seen to stem from two

sources: firstly the demand is made within Western liberal democracies; secondly, it is a need recognised by those from eastern Europe emerging from the collapse of 'Communism'. Within totalitarian societies, civil society is seen as a prerequisite for, and a functioning reality of Western liberal democracies. (Eastern Europe sees the demand for civil society within Western democracies as paradoxical). Civil society is seen as an arena free from state tutelage; as the 'open spaces of freedom'. Taylor turns to consider the complexities of civil society, following the questions raised by eastern Europe, that is, that civil society exists in the West and the assertion that this is the culmination of a centuries old tradition. It might be added that the perceived need for, and establishing of a pre (or extra) political civil society is a symptom of, and reinforces the transcendental pretence.

Taylor suggests that civil society is present in Western societies, in the "web of autonomous associations, independent of the state, and have an effect on public policy."²⁰ However there is also a tendency for these bodies to become integrated into the political institutions they affect. There is a sneering perception of these bodies in a 'corporatist' association with the state. For some corporatism is unproblematic

"It makes sense for a democratic government to consult before deciding, not only to determine the most popular policy, but also to soften the edges of confrontation with the losers, who will at least have the sense that they have been listened to and will be listened to again."²¹

However, the corporatist style of government is roundly criticised by both the political left and right wings. Taylor asserts that beyond this criticism it is not clear that either left or right has come up with a viable alternative. The attack of the English 'new right' saw Mrs Thatcher attempting to destroy the power of the special interests inherent

in corporatism. But beyond that attack, there was a sense that the state and society should 'do their own thing', and keep out of each other's way. Taylor argues that this hope is utopian (or dystopian if one does not share the right wing's moral outlook).

Taylor argues that there is too much at stake to allow government and society to co-exist without co-ordination. Indeed the successful twentieth century economies are unashamedly corporatist. The idea that there is 'another path' is a nostalgic illusion of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Taylor then turns to consider the historical development of the concept of civil society.

Taylor suggests that medieval notions of society are important as a 'negative fact'. Medieval society was not defined by, nor seen as identical with its political organisation (For the Greeks and Romans society was defined by the 'politeia'). In the Middle Ages political authority was seen as one organ among many. This differentiation was extended by Latin Christendom, and the emergence of the Gelasian 'two swords' analysis. This was a formula for 'perpetual struggle' between two sources of authority, the church and the state. Thus Taylor argues, Western Christendom has always been 'bi-focal'. Taylor is quite correct to emphasise a need to remember this bi-focalism. Indeed the increased complexity of Modern existence reveals a perpetual struggle between a great many more than two sources of authority. The Modern error has been to opt for universalism (and a sense of 'home') over a remembrance of perpetual struggle ('homelessness'). Taylor's works brilliantly illustrates the complex and tension ridden nature of the contemporary period.

This recognition of the growing complexity of existence, of the call of many authorities on the individual, did not of its self ensure the 'trouble free' emergence of modern liberal democracies. Indeed the early Modern period perceived the 'wave of the future' as absolute monarchies. In the 1680's this absolutist model of political society drew influential justification from the concepts of Roman Law (which Sabine²² suggests

was driving towards concentration of powers in the Crown), and the work of theorists such as Bodin and Hobbes.

The medieval conception of society was superseded by an identification of society with its political organisation; in a form, Taylor claims, 'favourable to despotism'. The medieval conception of society is kept alive through the work of Grotius and Pufendorf with their 'social contract' doctrines. But even these theorists perceive a 'contract of subjugation' with an absolute power. Absolutist doctrines in Europe were finally defeated, Taylor asserts, by the emergence of the previously minor powers of England and the Low Countries and their more consensual political model. Around this alternative model a number of anti-absolutist doctrines crystallise; one of the most celebrated and influential is that of Locke. While Locke still uses civil society in the sense of 'political society' he lays the ground for the emergence of the Hegelian, more contrastive use of the term.

The contrastive sense of civil society emerges from the anti-absolutist position, but in two different, even antithetical ways; these Taylor terms the L and M streams, after the two (nominal) founders of the schools of thought: Locke and Montesquieu. The L stream of anti absolutism has an embryonic sense of humankind as a pre-political community: a realm under the protection, but not the direction, of political authority. The M stream is characterised by an assumption of an irremovable monarchical government. The important issue for this M stream is whether this government is unchecked (and veering towards despotism), or is limited by law. The limiting by law is only effective if there are independent bodies (which have a standing in that law) that can defend it. The M stream emphasises the rule of law and 'corps intermediaires', which stand and fall together. A 'free monarchy' is one in which there is an equilibrium between a central authority and an interlocking mass of agencies and associations.

Montesquieu's work itself articulates a 'third standard', Taylor asserts, a standard that will be taken up by Hegel. Montesquieu was an admirer of the ancient 'polis', which identified society with its political form, and of ancient freedom (which did not conceive of Cartesian dualism). Monarchy is antithetical to the republic, as the latter bases freedom on a sense of 'vertu' (a dedication to the public good); while the former bases freedom on a sense of one's own rights and privileges.

"Patriotic virtue was the motive force which kept the society free in the ancient republic, because it led people to defend the laws to the death against internal and external threats. The lively sense of one's own rights and status was what protected freedom in the modern monarchy, because it was what made the privileged resist royal encroachments and feel shame in obeying any order which derogated from their code."²³

The concept of 'civil society' can, then, be seen to be marked by two streams of thought, the L stream and M stream. The L stream elaborates a notion of society as an extra political reality. The 'flesh' is put on these Lockean bones by the emergence of two particular developments: the first of these is the emergence of the notion of society as an 'economy'. Society is perceived as the inter relation of acts of production, exchange and consumption. Such a view was popular among the Physiocrats of the eighteenth century, and achieves its paradigmatic statement with the work of Adam Smith. The emergence of an autonomous 'economic' sphere represents an intellectual revolution. Etymologically, 'economics' refers to household management; the 'nomos' of the term is imposed by the manager. More radically, however, this new distinct social realm is seen as capable of organising itself. The 'nomos' of economics now is etymologically closer to a term such as 'astronomy', suggesting an autonomous domain of causal laws. The

emergence of the 'economic' gave a new twist, and new force to the notion of an extra-political domain. Within the economic there is a debate up to the present period over how autonomous this domain should be.

The second development from the L stream of thought on civil society is expressed by the emergence of a 'public' with its own 'opinion'; and on the back of these developments emerges the idea of the 'nation'. The first conceptualisation of 'public opinion' saw it as the locus of what is of common concern. This common concern is not merely what is objectively of concern, or what an 'outsider' perceives as of concern. There is an increasing sense of territorial location (that Sabine has also detailed), and the 'nation state'. The concept of the nation is both a new force in history, and offers a new force to the public. The nation is novel in that it is developed in the public spaces outside of **any** authority, including even that second great focus of the West, the church.

"What was new was this opinion which presented itself as that of society, but which was elaborated through no official, established, hierarchical organs of definition."²⁴

The 'congeries' of ideas about the economy and public space constitutes one strand of thought on civil society, and reveals it as a 'public' and not 'private' matter. Civil society of the L stream is a return to medievalism, society and the public are a domain outside political structures. Taylor claims Hegel's position as superior, Sittlichkeit has three aspects family, civil society, and the state. Civil society is not identical with the state, the polis, or with the private. With the Modern progress of the transcendental pretence there does appear to be a 'privatisation' of civil society. Taylor's call for substantive liberalism is then perhaps an attempt to revive the domain of civil society.

L stream conceptions of civil society can then, lead to radical political hopes, like those of Thomas Paine, and foster the marginalisation of politics. The marginalisation of politics and an increased sense of self determination both individually, and at the level of the nation both emerge from the L stream bringing with them great dangers for society. A strong conception of self determination can see the state swallowed by a common will. The threat of the 'general will' as developed by Rousseau, and his followers in the twentieth century has led to a destruction of civil society. This is a transvaluation of values, in which an idea with its roots in the notion of pre political society is used to subject the individual's life to the enterprise of political transformation. (This characterisation is important, and will be returned to in the final chapter. Taylor's admiring assessment of Quebecker style substantive liberalism seems to threaten just this 'subjection').

The marginalisation of the political, stemming from the L stream, expresses itself in the anarchist urge to do without the state. Paradoxically it is also expressed in Modern 'new right' thought; the notion of the 'invisible hand, and the freeplay of blind economic forces, is seen to replace state intervention. Taylor comments that such a position can be seen as a sort of alienation, there is a flight from the public. This flight is most astutely observed by Tocqueville. Tocqueville is Montesquieu's greatest disciple; thus those discontented with the L variant of civil society can turn to Montesquieu. However, for Taylor, it is Hegel who truly captures the importance of Montesquieu.

In his dissatisfaction with the belief in the benign effects of the autonomous economic sphere, and the L variant of civil society thought, Hegel produces his own version of the civic humanist doctrine that sees the life of the citizen as valuable in itself. For Hegel, civil society is a separate sphere, but it is not self sufficient. A constituent of this sphere is economic process that must be regulated, and which in part

is regulated by civil society. However this sphere can only avoid destruction by being incorporated into the 'higher unity' of the state.

"Hegel combines both the L- and the M-stream in his concept of civil society. If the L-concept,..turns on the idea of a non political dimension to society, Montesquieu's contribution is the picture of a society which is defined by its political organisation, but where this is constitutionally diverse, distributing power among many independent sources."²⁵

Hegel stresses the importance of independent associations for non political purposes. The significance is not so much that they form the non political sphere, but that they form the basis to fragment and diversify power in the political system. The crucial aspect of independent associations is not their life outside of, but the way they are integrated into the political system.

"Hegel's 'corps intermediaires' are in fact 'amphibious' bodies. They have a life outside the political structure, and that is indeed their primary purpose, and the basis of their strength. But it is crucial to the health of the polity that they also play a role within it."²⁶

With this formulation Hegel felt it was possible to avoid the undifferentiated homogeneity of the 'general will state' (which inevitably leads to tyranny and terror) and the unregulated (and ultimately self destructive) play of blind economic forces.

Tocqueville also echoes this emphasis upon voluntary associations. The only defence from mild despotism is voluntary associations, which give the individual the taste and habit of 'self rule'. For voluntary associations to be the loci of self rule,

Tocqueville argues, they must be small, numerous and exist at many levels of the polity.

This polity should itself be decentralised. This, then, is also Taylor's position.

So the concept of civil society is complex, and makes it awkward to develop a simple response to the assertion that there is a functioning civil society in the West today. The situation is the more complex if an attempt is made to predict the future role of civil society.

"Thus one can argue that the distinction is essential to our conception of what it is to preserve freedom. But it has also been shouldered aside...by supposedly simpler and more arresting definitions of a free society, which turn on the idea of the general will, or a politics free sphere."²⁷

Taylor would advocate a 'third way' (presumably not merely as an Anglo-Saxon nostalgia) drawing on Tocqueville. "Tocqueville reformulates the ideals of republican freedom in a context of fragmented, decentralised power, whose formula derives from the M-stream."²⁸

Taylor's concern is that while the L stream has been discredited, the M stream of civil society will gain from this, and if it does then an important constituent of the Western political tradition will be sidetracked once again. It is important to balance both streams. These are very laudable comments (and prefigure Taylor's 'knocker and booster' debate explored in chapter Five). Now it is appropriate to end this chapter with an examination of how Taylor is located within contemporary debate by other theorists.

Locating Taylor

Waldron argues that Taylor may be characterised as a critic of Modernity;

"In political philosophy, Taylor is sometimes cited as a fellow-traveller of those gloomy critics of modernity (Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Michael Sandel, Robert Bellah, MacIntyre..) who lump all the vices of Western society together under the heading of 'liberalism' of 'individualism' and who call for a return to (variously) Periclean militarism, the Aristotelian polis, and Augustinian sense of original sin, the Florentine republics, New England town meetings, anywhere (it seems) but the modern exuberance of London, Paris and Los Angeles. (Taylor's earlier work on Hegel is supposed to have put him in this company and added Prussian Sittlichkeit to the list of nostalgic alternatives)."²⁹

While it is possible and accurate to capture Taylor in these terms it is also possible to see Taylor's work, as Waldron continues, as much more optimistic. Indeed Taylor is more insightful than his fellow-travellers in that he can perceive both the 'degeneracy' and the 'attraction' of the Modern period.

Taylor is also usually identified as a 'communitarian', as a theorist who suggests that the 'community is constitutive of the individual'. Richard Bernstein³⁰ warns that the term is very ambiguous as it 'lumps together' theorists as diverse as Taylor, Bellah, MacIntyre, Sandel, Unger, Horkheimer and Adorno, but encompasses thinkers who

span the political spectrum. Sandel, however, highlights how 'communitarianism' contrasts with instrumental and sentimental conceptions of community

It is also possible to characterise Taylor through the 'methodology' his thought which is profoundly influenced by phenomenology and the thought of Heidegger. Faced with the self-deceiving character of Modern thought Taylor proposes 'acts of retrieval' to revive the significance of contemporary practices. Taylor wishes to reveal the background of situated implication in value systems through an embodied conception of human nature. In terms of human nature Taylor suggests a 'phenomenology of moral experience'. Jane Bennett³¹ suggests that Taylor 'brings Hegel into the modern age'. Bennett claims that Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit offers a dialectic between two competing designs for 'homecoming'; a dialectic between 'Faith' and 'Enlightenment'. Taylor restates this dialectic in a modern vocabulary, in terms of a dialectic between 'expressivism' and 'naturalism', between embodiment and encumberment. It is through the BA principle that Taylor rediscovers value.

The Rediscovery Of Value

Jeffery Weeks agrees with Fekete (and indeed Taylor's) assertion that 'we live, breathe and excrete values, but the oceans and continents of value remain uncharted'. This sense underlies a crucial debate, which is the perception that with the increasing complexity of society, an increase in the number of tensions in society, there has been a torrent of value-laden arguments in the last decade. The 'fashionable madmen', as Auden called them, parade their fantasies of a final reconciliation between our desires and their will. However, 'we' actually live with a confusing plurality of values, some particularist, some universalist. There is a sense of moral confusion over moral certainty.

Weeks suggests that it is necessary to rethink values by exploring, and not rejecting, their plurality. Taylor seems to reach this standpoint in his later thought with the sense of 'la lotta continua'³² (the struggle continues). Weeks suggests a rejection of the notion of a 'unifying' vision (the step Taylor is accused of making by his critics), it is such visions that have led 'us' astray. McLellan has observed that while a group of theories may found a school; a group of values can found a civilisation. Values clarify what individuals believe to be right and wrong.

"They should also, in a complex and pluralistic world, help us to ensure that what we think is right is not necessarily what other people think is right, and to resolve differences in a democratic fashion."³³

This seems to be Taylor's position as well. Weeks suggests that it is wrong to seek the 'Truth' of values, ethics and morality in history, theory, science or some extra terrestrial source. Moralities are constantly being invented and reinvented as 'we' face the contingency of the present. Taylor seemed to accept this position through "Modes of Civil Society" where he describes anti absolutist political models as forming in relation to the specific circumstances of particular societies.

Weeks turns to discuss the notion of invention (of moralities) in more depth, with reference to the later thought of Foucault. (This is striking as Taylor also professes an admiration for this period of Foucault's thought). Weeks sees this period of Foucault's thought as exhibiting the move from deconstruction to reconstruction. Foucault suggests that the idea of the 'good' is both a human creation, and a collective (public) work that has many traditions. Weeks argues that deconstructionism is a part of the challenge to essentialism (or foundationalism) in the late modern period. Anti essentialists seek to demonstrate that all concepts of value are historical and contingent.

However, Weeks continues, anti essentialists do not solve the question of values, but pose it afresh. If there are no foundations is anything permitted? Some Post Modern thought Weeks claims, has surrendered to nihilism or 'consumerist amorality', but this is not necessarily the case. Many invented traditions can still guide life, the problem is not an absence of values but an inability to recognise that there are many ways of being human.

To explore fully the notion of 'invention' Weeks turns to the work of Walzer. Walzer explores the notion of inventing moralities by distinguishing it from the 'path of discovery', and the 'path of interpretation'. The 'path of discovery' assumes that moral principles are out there in heaven or Nature. Walzer suggest it is necessary to abstain from searching for the 'Truth' of morality, such a search dismisses the moral everyday world and advocates a detachment from it in the search for a universal standpoint. Taylor bitterly opposes such atomism, fragmentation and disengagement.

Walzer's 'path of interpretation' suggests an engagement, and 'embodiment' that Taylor would support.

"The task of the 'connected' moral critic is to evoke the shared moral values, by telling a 'plausible story about which values ought to be fundamental. These values may have been invented in the past, but are now embedded in thick communal traditions. "³⁴

This position also seems to characterise Taylor, and his methodology through EOR and POR

Weeks suggests there is a growing perception that a moral code, or value system, invented by others for 'our own good' should be avoided at all costs. However this asserts the need for a 'weak sense' of invention, to allow the individual to 'invent' (or

express, in Taylor) their own moral code. (Berlin's liberalism, with a sense of 'plumping' for ultimate values seems to approach this position). In Taylor this whole position is conceptualised with the notion of human nature as 'interspatial epiphany'. Walzer concedes that this weak sense of invention comes close to his own preferred 'path of interpretation'

Weeks suggests that while invented moralities are still tension filled domains, they do embody attempts to move beyond the nihilism and consumerist amorality of Post Modern thought. Weeks is quite correct to desire reconstruction, and Taylor's work is an important, and emblematic, attempt at such reconstruction. Weeks comments that the 'new movement' of 'life politics' constantly reinvents values, but also constantly stresses the notion that 'existential choice' only makes sense within a collective sense of belonging. There is individual connectedness or 'embodiment' that reveals the need for existential choice within determinacy, or situatedness. This sense of belonging can be felt at the family level, the local (community) level, at a national level, and increasingly at an international and then universal level. Embeddedness can reveal a commitment to universal solidarity with humanity, as a species. Taylor delineates embodiment at the individual level, and from this advocates an embeddedness in community

There is some cogency to Taylor's argument, but his perception of the issue is excessively pessimistic. This pessimism is driven by Taylor's (mis)perception of the absence of values in vast areas of Modern thought, for instance utilitarianism and existentialism. While the difficulty of attaining 'species solidarity' is great (and it must always be open to debate whether such an ideal is desirable), the situation is not as bleak as Taylor suspects; as Weeks argues the problem is not an absence of values but a plurality of values. This misperception, by Taylor, will also be seen to colour his political thought.

"Morality, as Michael Walzer has said, 'is something we have to argue about'. There is no final end, no final proof of what is right or wrong - only the possibility of continuing debate about it. But the position already contains a moral viewpoint and project: a commitment precisely to the values of open discussion and the freeplay of argument - what Bauman calls 'the art of civilised conversation' between and across cultural traditions."³⁵

Taylor mistakes Post Modern 'freeplay' for the denial of value, the denial of any 'horizon of significance'. This is misplaced. There is, in fact, unproblematic acceptance of value as invented. This thesis will utilise a comparison between Taylor's thought and existentialist thought at various points in an attempt to highlight Taylor's more astute position. Notions of existential heroism should indeed be superseded by a more encumbered conception of human nature as Taylor argues, but there is a greater plurality of moral sources than even Taylor's astute work can retrieve; outside the range of Taylor's thought lie some perceptive forms of both utilitarianism and existentialism.

The next two chapters will address Taylor's conception of human nature. Chapter Two will detail the historical heritage Taylor disinters for his conception of Expressivism; it will examine the 'historical archaeology' Taylor embarks upon for the concept of human nature. Chapter Three turns to examine Taylor's (re)construction of the concept of human nature as 'interspatial epiphany'. Chapter Four examines the charge of 'moralism' against Taylor and the vistas of value his thought excludes in utilitarianism and existentialism, while Chapter Five examines his political thought and prescriptions. The final chapter commences with a discussion of 'attunement', before urging a 'contextualist' reading of human nature influenced by Taylor but with an extension of possible sources.

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CHAPTER TWO

CHARLES TAYLOR: HUMAN NATURE AS EXPRESSIVISM

Introduction

This chapter will follow Taylor's exposition through SOTS in an attempt to detail the major facets of the modern notion of the self as Taylor identifies them. This chapter details the negative aspect of Taylor's thought through SOTS as he clears the ground to delineate his conception of human nature as an interspatial epiphany. The facets or aspects of human nature that Taylor identifies are inwardness, the affirmation of ordinary life and the voice of nature.

Inwardness

Through the section of SOTS entitled "Inwardness"¹ Taylor wishes to chart the fall of the 'enchanted universe' world view. This is the change in the conception of Nature historically as charted by theorists such as Frazer, Collingwood, Capra, and Connolly². The movement such theorists suggest is that the world view of the West has proceeded from an analogy to an intelligent organism, through a religious, 'divinely created' perspective, to the current notion of nature as a vast machine.

Alongside this development Taylor also wishes to trace the emergence of the notions of 'inner' and 'outer' in regard to human nature. Through the medieval period, Taylor argues, there emerges the notion of humans possessing an 'inner dimension'. With the turn inward, ancient conceptions of ontic logos fall and human reason moves from a

'substantive' to a 'procedural' conception. Reason in the Modern period becomes an activity of mind, rather than the perception of a physical, rational order. Taylor traces the emergence of 'inwardness' through the work of Plato, Saint Augustine, Descartes and Locke.

Plato

Taylor suggests that Plato does not establish 'inwardness', but rather 'centres' the self. (Indeed Taylor suggests that the ancients in fact had no notion of 'inner' and 'outer'. Taylor asserts that this is the import of Nietzsche's cryptic comment that the ancients were wise enough to stay on the surface of things). Against the prevailing ancient anti-rational warrior, and poetic ethics, Plato establishes the 'ethic of self mastery'. This position is typified by the image of the Platonic philosopher, literally a 'lover of wisdom'.

Plato's thought gives rise to a number of dichotomies, Taylor suggests. These divisions may be represented by the terms reason/desire, order/chaos, health/disease, and good/bad, in each case the former term is privileged by Plato's thought. Taylor insists that there is no conception of inner/outer, such a thorough going internalisation is instituted by Descartes. For Plato there is, rather, a dichotomy between the immaterial/material and the eternal/changing. The knowable in the theory of Forms is lodged in the immaterial and the eternal.

Reason is understood as substantive, as the apprehension of an objective, rational order ('ontic logos'). This order is apprehended by the human soul, the eternal, unchanging aspect of the human individual. It is this conception of reason that becomes increasingly complex and plural as, in Taylor's words, it moves from a substantive to a

procedural conception. That is as it moves from its ancient conception to a modern representational epistemological conception as an activity of mind.

Saint Augustine

Taylor suggests that Augustine Christianises Plato. The Platonic dichotomy between the material/immaterial is now cast in terms of a dichotomy between bodily/non bodily, flesh/spirit. Crucially Augustine introduces a notion of inner/outer. The path to God leads 'inwards' and 'upwards'.

To come to know God the individual should no longer proceed by a contemplation of physical reality - for Augustine the created order - where the ancients placed ontic logos. Rather the individual should follow an inner route. The 'Good' becomes displaced from a principle of order, to a knowing activity, a stress upon inner 'will'. Thus Augustine introduces the notion of 'inwardness'(an inner turn, or a burgeoning sense of reflexivity) to the Western tradition.

Both Plato and Augustine draw an analogy between the human soul and an eye. For Plato the eye of the soul is able to 'see' the 'shadow' of the Ideas in the cosmic order. For Augustine the eye of the soul has lost this power through 'the fall' (original sin) and this power must be restored by grace, the grace of God. To encounter God the individual must turn inward. With the Augustinian 'inward turn' there is a 'disengagement' from physical reality, discussed in the first chapter in terms of a withdrawal from the intentional aspect of experience. This disengagement will be completed by Descartes and Locke.

Taylor is identifying the start of a process that will profoundly mark the Western tradition. 'Inwardness' implies disengagement, while disengagement is a distancing of the

individual from lived experience. A conceptual gap is opening up. It is Taylor's contention that this move is disastrous for the West, as all its implications are played out. Such a move is chiefly problematic for Taylor as it distances the individual from lived experience (the raw, brute data of experience) and so from the existential values of the encumbered self.

Descartes

Taylor represents Descartes as a 'profoundly Augustinian' theorist, Descartes appropriates Anselm's Augustinian indebted ontology. Descartes extends 'inwardness' into the Modern period by linking it to certainty. Descartes' 'Cogito Argument' establishes 'inwardness' (increasingly approximating the notion of self reflexivity) as the foundation of all rational knowledge. Descartes advocates a disengagement from physical reality, a turn from the intentional aspect of experience, a rejection of embeddedness. The human body inhabits a physical reality that is increasingly identified with a conception of Nature as a vast mechanism.

The Cartesian notion of rationality is thoroughly procedural, as compared with the ancient substantive construal. For Taylor the Platonic 'moral source' of self mastery is expressed in terms of a move from the love of the (merely) sensible to a love of the ideas (understood as a move from the temporal and dynamic to the eternal and static). It is an 'intuneness' with the cosmic order. For Plato reason is substantive, the power to apprehend the order of the cosmos clearly. The Platonic notion of self mastery through an 'intuneness' with Nature becomes, through Descartes, a 'moral source' celebrating 'inwardness', a disengagement from Nature with a procedural conception of human reason. There is a dignity to be drawn from such a Cartesian 'disengagement'.

Descartes perceives rationality as the power to explain the cosmos (in essence a vast machine); as the ability to construct the order of the cosmos by the criteria of evidence. Procedural reason is to think according to certain canons. The Platonic notion of 'intuneness' is replaced by the dignity of disengagement. For Descartes rational mind dominates a disenchanted, mechanistic universe, Mind, driven on by this sense of dignity senses the superiority of the 'good life' and strives to attain it. Procedural rationality emerges as an activity of mind, quite at odds with ancient substantive rationality, which is passive, emerging as it does from the contemplation of rational order. Taylor is at some pains to stress this distinction as it illustrates the beginning of the shift from faith to unbelief.

Given Descartes' conception of Nature (external reality) as a vast machine, and his rejection of ontic logos, and teleology, it is bizarre that Taylor cites him as a profoundly 'Augustinian thinker'. Taylor feels at liberty to make such an identification by suggesting that Descartes modifies the Augustinian notion of ascending to God. While for Augustine the individual should turn inwards, and then upwards to find God and Truth, Descartes finds the basis of certainty inside the individual. While Augustine had a notion of the flawed individual, Descartes perceives a certainty of his own presence.

"The step from the imperfect self to a perfect God, so essentially Augustinian in its source, is in the process of mutating into something else....[It] is no longer a search for God within. It is no longer the way to an experience of everything in God. Rather what I now meet is myself..."³

The Augustinian tradition develops along new paths in the Modern period. Taylor sees this crucial curtailment as opening the door to Theism (initially through the work of

Locke) and Modern unbelief. (This theme is pursued in greater depth in 'the affirmation of ordinary life'). The force of Taylor's argument here is to begin the defence of one of his underlying theses. Modern theorising is 'inarticulate'. The theological place for Grace has disappeared; however Descartes still wishes to appeal to a notion of the superiority of the 'good life'. Descartes exhibits the growing problem of Modernism, his thought exists beyond its metaphysical underpinnings. It is 'inarticulate', it both appeals to, and denies a conception of the 'good life'. (Again this will be examined in the next section). What is emerging is that the role traditionally attributed to the Deity is now being assumed by the human individual. There is no Augustinian ascent, 'inwardness' leads to the self.

Taylor, in detailing the shifting sense of rationality, brilliantly illustrates the shifting sense of the 'cosmic location' of the individual from the ancient to the modern period. (As will be discussed at the beginning of the next chapter the individual no longer fears condemnation but meaninglessness).

While Taylor's insistence upon identifying these changes in terms of rival moral systems is disquieting, there is no doubting he has identified an important and profound change. The ancient notion of 'intuneness' is almost entirely lost to Moderns (though some are still sensitive to its call, i.e. environmentalists). It is Cartesian disengagement that characterises the modern sense of existence. The disengaged adventurer is the self image of the objective, rational, natural scientist; an archetype in the popular imagination of Modernity. A part of Taylor's project through SOTS is to rail against modern disengagement, and to advocate a return to a pre-modern sense of 'intuneness'. In recognition that this cannot simply be a call to a return to the ancient mind set (it is not a return to unmediated unity but to a mediated intuneness to Nature), Taylor calls for a sense of 'attunement' to be introduced into the Western tradition, thus SOTS is a work of 'retrieval'.

Locke

Locke raises Cartesian disengagement, 'inwardness', and procedural rationality to its apotheosis. Cartesian disengagement is extended until the 'punctual self' emerges. This is Locke's conception of the self as analogous to a geometric point; as extensionless. The withdrawal from the intentional aspect of experience that Descartes initiated, is pushed by Locke to the thoroughly disengaged notion of a 'view from nowhere'. Locke wishes to demolish the trustworthiness of any pre-reflexive activity. This demolition stops only at particulate ideas.

Lockean disengagement further entrenches the despirited mechanistic world view. It extends the metaphor of mechanistic process into the human individual. Locke holds an atomistic view of the human mind. The mind builds complex ideas from simple ones. Simple ideas 'impress' (a mechanical metaphor) upon the mind.

According to Taylor the Platonic and Cartesian ideal of self mastery, the wresting of human thought from the passions and custom, is continued in Locke. There is an exhortation for individuals to 'think things through' for themselves. The moral source Taylor identifies in Locke is that of 'self remaking'. Now, while this ideal is of immense importance to contemporary society it is disastrous from Taylor's perspective. 'Self remaking' stresses disengagement, the mind is freed from its 'embodiment', which for Taylor is an inescapably moral reality. For Taylor the true import of Locke's work is lost to Moderns. Locke's work is bounded by God. The pleasure or pain experienced through 'self remaking' is attendant upon the goals set by God.

There is a deep significance in Locke's work for Taylor. Locke is perhaps the pivotal theorist of SOTS. This is so because his work seems to offer the endless freedom

of 'self remaking', while being bounded by non-subjective values, or 'goods'. While it is open to the individual to choose a sinful path, this route will be attended by severe pains. Locke reaches this position by utilising a hedonistic theory as the basis of human motivation. This paradoxical position is one which Taylor wishes to capture through his own Expressivist conception of human nature.

Again it is possible to question Taylor's characterisation of a theorist. While his characterisation of Locke is reasonably sensitive, it is possible to see Taylor, in a Procrustean fashion, forcing the work of Locke into his own theological agenda. However, given this, Taylor has identified an important facet of the modern identity here. 'Self remaking' is an important aspect of the Modern notions of dignity, independence, and responsibility. (It is important to stress that this is true only of Western intellectual history, but Taylor would make no claims for his thought beyond these boundaries).

In summary then, Taylor has attempted to demonstrate through this section of SOTS, that

"..the whole (strange and ultimately questionable) picture of myself as objectified nature which this modern turn has made familiar to us only became available through that special kind of reflexive stance I am calling disengagement."⁴

So far Taylor has traced, through Plato, Augustine, Descartes, and Locke, one strand of internalisation, one that requires radical reflexivity and disengagement. Taylor now wishes to explore another strand of radical reflexivity, one that does not require disengagement. This strand of 'inwardness' is associated with Montaigne, and has as an ideal self exploration.

Montaigne: Inwardness And Embodiment

Montaigne begins his exploration of the self with the traditional belief that such an exploration should unearth a stable core. However Montaigne discovers no communion with being as 'every humane is ever between being born and dying'.

However the recognition of no 'stable core' in the nature of humans is not an abandonment of the aspiration to stability. But this sense of stability must recognise the very nature of humans as process, as one of perpetual change. Thus Montaigne wishes to explore the contours of the human condition, striving for a sense of equilibrium.

Montaigne does not find the universal (a stable core to humans), or the edifying. But Montaigne is not spurred by his discoveries into (an 'ethic' of) self mastery or self remaking, but to self knowledge and self acceptance. This is the ideal of being 'at home' within the ever changing contours of human nature. Nature shorn of its universalistic pretensions may guide the individual. Nature is no longer the omphalos, the connection to the Ideas, Rationality, or the ideal of moral perfection.

Montaigne perhaps truly performs the retrieval Taylor claims to be bringing about. Montaigne more fully revives the ancient injunction to 'know thy self'. Montaigne also revives the Platonic notion of a striving for balance. Plato famously compares the human individual to the tension in a rope tied between two pegs. It is this concept of identity that Montaigne can be seen to capture, and that Taylor himself attempts to recapture through his notion of Expressivism

For Montaigne individualism aims to identify the individual in all his or her unrepeatable difference, by a critique of first person self interpretations. This requires a deeper engagement. Montaigne still requires radical reflexivity, but this stream of

thought does not require disengagement, but rather a fuller understanding of the value ladenness of encumbrment.

Thus by the turn of the eighteenth century the modern notion of the self is forming, Taylor suggests. This notion holds together two notions of radical reflexivity, those espoused by Descartes and Montaigne. These two reflexive stances, self control, and self exploration, ground two different conceptions of individualism those of self responsible independence and recognised particularity, respectively.

If it possible to put to one side Taylor's insistence upon theology, and concentrate upon his other declared aim of showing conceptions of human nature as historical artefacts, then the first section of SOTS may be regarded as very persuasive. Conceding Taylor his identification of 'inwardness' then, (with the proviso of raising objections to his over emphasis upon theology, with its concomitant tendency to distort the thought of some of his chosen theorists) it is now possible to turn to the next section of SOTS which is on the 'Affirmation of Ordinary Life'.

The Affirmation Of Ordinary Life

In this section of SOTS Taylor attempts to establish three important theses. The first is that there has been a transvaluation of values in regard to what it is to live a 'good life'. In the terminology of the ancients the priority of the good life over life (or in Taylor's terminology 'ordinary life') has been reversed.

The second point Taylor wishes to pursue is that this transvaluation was achieved from an initial position of a broad societal belief in Judeo-Christian theology. Taylor wishes to delineate how 'unbelief' grew from belief. In pursuing this claim Taylor has some interesting things to say about how a culture dominated by 'unbelief' must view the

preceding culture of belief. Taylor's argument in this regard has points of contact with Hegel's view of history. It is vitally important to avoid anachronism; to avoid seeing the preceding culture as a catalogue of muddle headed errors. Following the preceding analysis of 'inwardness' it is possible to concede these points to Taylor, with some reservations.

These reservations also apply to Taylor's third thesis, which is implicit in Taylor's first two. It is the claim that there is a continuing reliance upon belief in Modern day conceptions of the 'good'. It is essential for the coherence of Taylor's position that this continuing dependence should be established, and Taylor attempts to do this both through this section and the next ('the voice of nature'). It will be argued that such a continuing dependence cannot be demonstrated, and must be rejected. The detailed dismissal of this assertion will occur at the beginning of chapter three. For now it is necessary to return to the three theses in more depth.

Transvaluation Of Values

In regard to Taylor's first point then, it is undeniable that there has been a transvaluation of values in respect of ordinary life. Taylor suggests that the ancients, and Aristotle in particular, drew a distinction between the good life and (ordinary) life. The good life is marked by the 'higher activities', theoretical contemplation, and participation as a citizen in the polity. Ordinary life is marked by (manual) work and re-production. For the ancients, not to live the good life is to be less than human. For the Modern the position is reversed. This reversal was driven by both religious and 'scientific' values.

Bacon

Taylor suggests that the Baconian revolution of the 'new science' emphasises a participatory, 'hands on', approach. Initially the 'revolutionary' implications of the 'new science' are felt solely in the realm of scientific investigation, but then increasingly throughout all human activity. Bacon attacks traditional science for 'pride'. For Bacon the cosmos cannot be grasped by passively contemplating it; the individual must investigate it actively. The burgeoning new science emphasises the utility of repeatable experimentation, the testing of theories. Both Descartes and Bacon urge the individual to think things through for themselves.

This transvaluation of values fuels a new sense of civility in the eighteenth century. The artisan emerges as an important figure. The life of commerce and acquisition comes to be seen in a positive light. Trade is regarded as a civilising influence, binding individuals together. Thus the ancient emphasis upon contemplation and public duty, is abandoned.

While Taylor does not phrase his discussion in such terms, it is possible to see his description of these changes as a battle between the public and the private. In such terms the ancients prioritise the public over the private. The Modern period prioritises the private, acquisitive life (ordinary life) over the public. Beyond a very few words, it is not proposed to discuss this interpretation of Taylor at this point. A fuller discussion of these points will occur in the final chapter of this thesis.

Belief From Unbelief

The 'Ethic' Of The Affirmation Of Ordinary Life

The religious implication of such a radical transvaluation of values is an attack upon mediation (the clergy) and the notion of the sacred. With the general attack upon the contemplative life, within the Catholic church there is a questioning of the role of the priesthood. Completing the transvaluation, the life of the priest (a medieval archetype) is seen as stunted, as a fall into the 'monkish error'. It is an error to turn one's back upon ordinary life and all of lived experience.

With the disappearance of mediation between the individual and God, there is also a rejection of the sacred. The formerly profane ordinary life is now sacrosanct. With the end of mediated salvation, in an unmediated, disengaged conception the quality of the individual's will becomes all Taylor suggests. It is not enough for Taylor simply to forge a metaphor for human nature it is important to show how this embodiment and encumberment 'inescapably' implicate the individual in certain theoretical positions

Increasingly, it seems that Taylor is horrified by the Modern turn, the turn that SOTS so insightfully traces. Taylor seems to dread the freedom that his Expressivist concept of human nature offers

The historical sweep of SOTS is excellent at showing how various Modern streams of thought draw, confusedly, from various Modern, and pre-Modern intellectual positions. Ultimately, Taylor appears to wish to limit this endless historical process; or rather to offer a limit to this free play, the boundary to this process is the encumberment of 'resonant surroundings'.

Taylor argues that the Expressive self requires 'resonant' surroundings to flourish. A large part of this resonant surrounding will for the Modern be found in the culture of the nation state. However for the Canadian Taylor, perhaps the force of this argument is now losing some of its appeal. It would be interesting to speculate how the contemporary secessionary debate in Canada influences Taylor's thought and impels him to look for a larger 'resonance' beyond the national and local. In fairness Taylor's own position is that the least interesting aspects of Modern thought offer an endless free play that dangerously undermines all possible allegiances. These issues will be explicitly returned to at the end of this chapter, and receive a fuller discussion in the final chapter.

Deism: The Path To Unbelief

The most important phase in the progress of the affirmation of ordinary life is, for Taylor, the fusion of its ethic (an attack upon mediation and the sacred) with the philosophy of disengaged reason, and freedom. This is a fusion between Protestant reformers (facilitated by the emerging Baconian 'new science') and the thought of Descartes. Taylor calls this fusion of Protestantism and Cartesianism, Deism. Early Deism (represented by the work of Locke) contains much traditional theology. Later Deism however, undergoes a 'naturalist mutation'. Taylor dates this mutation to the end of the eighteenth century, and the thinkers of the Radical Enlightenment. Through the affirmation of ordinary life Taylor traces Deism (specifically Lockean Deism) and its opposition (the 'moral sentiment' theories of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson). In the next section of SOTS, 'the voice of nature' Taylor traces the naturalist mutation of Deist thought.

As suggested above Locke is perhaps the pivotal theorist of SOTS. His importance as the theorist of the 'punctual self' has already been cited. Locke is also a crucial figure in the emergence of Deism. Locke's work is marked by Christian faith; specifically Locke is a theological voluntarist. However he also places a high estimation upon human reason. Locke's voluntarism means he sees 'moral law' as external to humans (much as Taylor espies an inescapable moral reality around the Modern individual). The 'moral law' is voluntaristic, rooted in God's commands. However the moral law is also susceptible to human reason. Thus the moral individual is able to use reason to attune him or herself to God's ends. This attunement is spurred on by Locke's hedonistic theory, where pleasure and pain accord to good and evil.

Such a Lockean construal is repugnant to many with a strong faith, Taylor suggests. There is an attack upon the normative nature of pleasure and pain. Bluntly, there is a suspicion of the supposed coincidence of pleasure, God's commands, and 'moral law'. Taylor forcefully argues that Locke's work does not slide into full scale sensualism (the pitfall of the late Modern period, through the Radical Enlightenment). Locke's work is saved by a sense of the awe and respect due to God; that is, by his piety. For Locke the individual cries out for God.

Locke's work stresses the notion of preservation, with two particular outcomes. The first is the sketching out of the affirmation of ordinary life. There is a stress on preserving the species. The preservation of 'His creatures' is given a central importance. Secondly, there is a stress upon preserving society, of working for the 'common good'. The validity of such work is presumably fuelled by the pleasure the individual feels

following God's calling to work hard and efficaciously. In this movement Taylor espies the genesis of the Protestant 'work ethic'.

Locke's work also stresses the transformatory power of reason. Locke uses the term 'reason' in two senses, which might be termed moral and intellectual reason. Moral reason allows the individual to apprehend the laws of nature. Intellectual reason is the capacity to reflect on this knowledge and be efficacious in production.

Locke's thought helps to define the notion, within eighteenth century Deist thought, of the 'providential order'. Reality is viewed as an interlocking order comprising mutually sub serving beings. These beings thrive within an environment designed by God. Within this order God is not reduced to a factor within human reason, as critics claim. God is instead exalted and human reason is elevated to participate in the divine.

Lockean Deism Opposed

For Taylor Lockean deism has three distinctive features. Firstly, Locke has a jaundiced view of the human individual. Secondly, Locke's work is characterised by theological voluntarism. Thirdly, Lockean Deism appeals to 'hyper Augustinianism', against which it partly revolts. 'Hyper Augustinianism' is a term Taylor uses to denote an increasingly radical interpretation of Augustine.

With Locke's rationalising of Christianity, large swathes of traditional theology have been swept away. For instance, the mystery of religion has, in Deism, been replaced with the notion that God's purposes are scrutable to human reason. Human moral reason discovers God's providence in the interlocking order of the cosmos. Such radical shifts of emphasis lead to major rethinking of many theological commonplaces.

Grace And Natural Good

In particular Taylor focuses upon the debate within Christianity over the nature of grace and natural good. A debate between Augustinian and Thomist schools. It is appropriate to offer a brief aside on this issue, as it affects Taylor's prognosis of the current malaise and division within late Modern society.

Briefly, Thomism suggests that grace calls the individual beyond natural good, to a higher level. Within orthodox belief this can be perceived as a call to the life of sanctity. The three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, are 'beyond' the natural virtues. If this Thomist thesis is radically interpreted (as increasingly it will be) grace may be seen to perfect nature. There is a sanctity to pursuing natural perfection.

Augustinianism suggests that the human will is so corrupt by original sin, 'the fall', that grace is required just to attain the natural virtues, and good. Radical interpretation of this thesis promotes a lively sense of human depravity and a rejection of the notion of natural perfection.

Taylor suggests that the early Modern period is dominated by battles between radical interpretations of Augustinianism and Thomism. With the birth of the Enlightenment such debates become perceived as parochial, hackneyed, and misplaced.

Taylor suggests that the Enlightenment, and the rise of Enlightenment Deism represents a victory over hyper Augustinian views. Reason triumphs over faith. However the naturalism that flourishes with the Enlightenment (and helps to shape the present) is itself committed to Thomist theories of grace.

It is ironic that the doctrines that trump Augustinianism, the defeat of faith by Enlightenment rationality, are committed to theological and Thomist metaphysical underpinnings. In particular such doctrines are committed to the Thomist notion of grace

and the possibility of natural perfection. Further, these doctrines also increasingly draw on the Lockean Deist notion of the providential order. The continuing dependence upon, and commitment to Thomism, of late Modern thought can be traced through the Erasmian tradition.

The Erasmian Tradition

The Erasmian tradition is opposed to Lockean Deism; it criticises Locke's position as a 'religion of external law'. The tradition proposes as an alternative a 'religion of love'. This opposes Lockean artificiality with notions of organicism; and Lockean mechanism with vitalism. (It is possible to see the inheritor of Erasmian thought as contemporary ecological and 'green' movements).

Taylor suggests that the Erasmian tradition flows through the Cambridge Platonists, into the work of Shaftesbury (Locke's pupil) and Hutcheson (the true founder of moral sentiment theories). Further, Taylor concurs with Cassirer that the Cambridge Platonists are the source of Romanticism. Taylor thus draws the battle lines of early Modern culture between Locke, Augustine, and Empiricism, opposed by the Cambridge Platonists, Thomism, and Romanticism. But all these positions have a theological heritage.

The Cambridge Platonists react against the voluntarism of Lockean Deism (with its notion of external law) with a notion of the 'good bent' of human nature. It is, they suggest, in the nature of humans (made in God's image) to tend towards the good. The Deism of Shaftesbury, opposed as it is to Locke's thought, might be identified as a development of the Erasmian tradition, transposed through Locke. This issues in a position where the autonomous human reasoner is given a central place, while

suppressing hyper Augustinian notions of grace. The genesis of ideas that will profoundly influence how many Moderns view themselves.

Shaftesbury: Stoic Deism

Shaftesbury's Deism is much influenced by Stoic thought, and in particular, by the Stoic notion of 'perfect tranquillity'. For Shaftesbury the individual (much like the ancient philosopher) takes joy in the contemplation of the cosmos. The cosmos is now understood as a divine, providential order, rather than a substantive rational order. Shaftesbury perceives God as the 'framer' of the cosmic order, rather than the theistic revelatory God of Abraham. Shaftesbury, influenced by Stoicism, places a central importance upon the quality of individual will (the Stoic's emphasise the importance of an ordered mind).

To 'short circuit' the voluntarism (religion of external law) of Locke, Shaftesbury proposes that there is a 'bent' in the nature of humans to the good. Shaftesbury opposes Locke and Hobbes in his claim that all actions are 'naturally indifferent', that is good and bad only in relation to local custom. Right and wrong are not fixed to standards in nature. There is an important shift of emphasis here (that Taylor is quick to point out). Lockean Deism appeals to (as a 'moral source' Taylor would argue) the dignity of the disengaged reasoner (the punctual self). Shaftesbury's appeal is to the 'bent' of our nature to love the whole. The whole (or cosmos) is divinely proscribed and thus tends to the good.

As Taylor recognises, it is possible to characterise Shaftesbury's work, and the Enlightenment, as a revival of paganism (as a return to the pre-Christian thought of the ancients). In Shaftesbury there is a return to Stoicism, and a return to the Platonic notion

of an ordered cosmos. The Platonic ideal, is though, almost totally unrecognisable. Shaftesbury's work embodies this new sensibility; the divinely ordered cosmos as a benevolent, or providential, order. Shaftesbury's notion of the providential order is itself radically altered into the late Modern period. It is disenchanted or de-spirited by the advances of the 'new science'.

Taylor argues that the Enlightenment cannot be fully understood as a simple return to paganism. It differs from preceding ancient thought in two fundamental ways. Firstly, Shaftesbury's thought is more Inward than the ancients. Secondly, the conception of cosmic order has altered radically. To recognise these contrasts, Taylor argues, it is important to recognise the burgeoning notion of 'natural affection'.

Natural Affection

For the ancients the cosmos represented a rational order. Thus for the ancients, with a substantive notion of rationality, it is objectively rational for the individual to love the order of the cosmos. As Taylor points out, to the Modern ear such an argument appears to lack a 'motivational postulate'. This motivational void is gradually filled by the notion of natural affection.

Natural Affection And Inwardness

In the middle ages, under the influence of Augustinian 'inwardness' there emerges the notion of two possible 'loves' or realms. These loves are inward, they emanate from the nature of the individual. By the time of Shaftesbury such a language of 'inwardness' is inescapable. For the early Modern the question 'Why should the individual love the

cosmos?' (as Shaftesbury himself urges) is answered by reference to the inclinations of the individual. The quality of will is scrutinised. There is a choice (a 'moral choice' for Taylor) open to the individual.

From the ancient position there has been an internalisation, mind and body have become separated (violating a notion of organicism). For Enlightenment thinkers the crucial issue, in relation to the notion of the good, is the nature of the subject. The individuals sentiments, or quality of will. Both ancient and Enlightenment thinkers appeal to 'nature' but in quite different senses. The ancient sense supposes a substantive rational order, while the modern sense appeals to inner sentiment. This important strand of thought is explored in the next section of SOTS 'the voice of nature'.

The Good

The growth of conceptions of 'inwardness' has decisively altered the ancient and Theological notions of the good. Modern theorists (whom Taylor characterises as 'moral projectivists') are anachronistic and blind to a conception of the good.

For the ancients the good is self manifesting, it is a brute fact of the substantive order. For the religious believer, the good is prescribed by God. With the growth of Deism God's purposes are increasingly scrutable to the human individual. The Modern, moral projectivist, blind theorist rejects ancient and Theological conceptions of the good. The human individual has grown in stature. The good is decided for the individual by the individual. (Increasingly the human individual is occupying the position previously reserved for the Deity, or ancient rationality).

Taylor's own Expressivist position would seem to approach that of Shaftesbury. The Expressivist individual occupies a cosmos in which the good is prescribed by God.

Taylor's God is not the mysterious, revelatory God Of Abraham, but has purposes that are scrutable by human reason. Taylor claims he wishes to strike a quasi-Lutheran position. This position Taylor has termed 'embodiment'. Embodiment for Taylor suggests a repudiation of the Lockean notion of the punctual self. The individual is incapable of the 'view from nowhere'. The good is not generated from within, but discovered in the 'bent' of human nature, and in the moral reality it inhabits.

As before, much of Taylor's argument is plausible, and may be conceded to him. The Lockean notion of the punctual self is an historical artefact, and should be rejected for a more 'organic' construal. Encumberment is a facet of human existence, in the terminology of the Existentialists there is a facticity to existence

Natural Affection, Cosmology, And Hutcheson

The second difference between Enlightenment and ancient thought that the notion of natural affection illuminates is that of the new view of the cosmos. The ancient conception of the cosmos as a substantive order is superseded by the conception of the cosmos as a divine creation (and a providential order).

In moral terms, Taylor suggests, there is a move from an 'ethic of order' to an 'ethic of benevolence'. Instead of order and reason there is benevolence and love. Love has become the highest virtue. Within an ethic of benevolence love is regarded as a 'natural' quality of inner will.

With the progression of the affirmation of ordinary life from its theistic origin, the Christian notion of charity ('agape') is integrated into the 'ethic of ordinary life'. There is an emphasis upon productive work to aid the general good. The Stoic notion of temperance is replaced by an inner commitment to benevolence. Shaftesbury as has been

seen is influenced by Stoicism, and is thus only part way along this movement. It is Hutcheson's 'moral sentiment' theory that more fully grasps inner commitment.

Hutcheson: Embodiment

Hutcheson concurs with Shaftesbury in his attack upon Lockean Deism and its voluntarism (its moral theory of external law). For Hutcheson extrinsic moral theory assumes that the individual is egoistic. The individual is moved by self love based on a subtle train of reasoning. The punctual self discerns the rational course of action, which happily coincides with the maximum amount of pleasure in God's providential order. Hutcheson, in contrast, claims that the individual is moved by goodness, and generous motives.

Hutcheson, drawing on Locke's mechanicism of simple ideas, sees the human moral sense as incorrigible. Human moral sense delivers brute data that powers underivable moral motives towards benevolence. Hutcheson's appeal to Lockean metaphysics is unfortunate, for Taylor, as it facilitates later projectivist theories of morality. (Such theories appeal back to Locke by assimilating moral propositions to secondary qualities).

The Lockean extrinsic theory of morality fails to notice human benevolence, for Hutcheson. This is important as the failure to exercise this bent to benevolence in human nature, allows the individual to become (literally) de-moralised. Human benevolence is damped down by not being exercised continually (it is akin to a muscle).

Lockean morality sees the interlocking order of the cosmos being apprehended by reason. Hutcheson sees the providential order being grasped by love (sentiment). Humans are doubly fortunate, there is a bent in our natures to benevolence, and

benevolence works best for human association (as is expressed in the mutually subserving providential order).

Hutcheson is, then, drawing a picture of the human individual embedded in a moral reality. The Lockean punctual self is a self responsible, rational, controlling subject. For Hutcheson the individual is engaged with inner moral sentiment. The individual is urged to express this natural moral sentiment of benevolence.

The struggle between notions of the disengaged subject and the embodied self continues into contemporary theorising. Taylor wishes to claim that notions of the disengaged punctual self should be rejected in favour of notions of the embodied self. For Taylor as for Hutcheson, the individual is embedded in an inescapably value laden reality.

Four Asides

Taylor then turns to look outside philosophy at some of the broad cultural movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Taylor's analysis shows how the new estimation of 'ordinary life' impacts upon wider cultural trends. As with Taylor's historical analysis in general, these comments are extremely acute. Taylor identifies four areas of particular interest.

Firstly Taylor examines the new valuation placed on commerce. This increasing emphasis on commerce Taylor sees as emerging out of the decline of 'honour ethics', which stressed citizen life, and the search for fame and renown. Against this there arises a new bourgeois ethic stressing production, and the ordered life. This new valuation of commerce is further illustrated by the emergence of the category of the 'economic'; the eighteenth century sees the birth of political economy. This isolation of the economic,

Taylor asserts, is not a scientific discovery that humanity stumbles across, but rather, reflects the higher value placed on the life of commerce, and this dimension of human life. This whole movement flows from the affirmation of ordinary life. Taylor finally observes that the new economic science is grounded in the notion of a self regulating system, a prime manifestation of the interlocking (providential) order.

Secondly, Taylor examines the rise of the modern novel. The novel, firstly, further entrenches the affirmation of ordinary life as it breaks with the classical tradition that portrayed tragedy and comedy in different styles. The tragic was associated with heroic figures, while comedy dealt with everyday reality. The novel Taylor suggests is associated with the Christian tradition of the gospels, dealing with the activities of humble people, but treating these activities very seriously, on a par with the activities of important individuals. Secondly, the novel departs from reworking tradition plots and portraying traditional archetypes. There is a movement, reflecting the demise of ontic logos, from the general and universal to the scrutiny of the particular to illicit the general. The novel rises as the universe no longer becomes perceived as the embodiment of archetypes.

Thirdly, the novel displays a new time consciousness, there is a break with the middle ages and its weak sense of anachronism (where biblical figures might appear in 'contemporary' dress). This again, is linked to the demise of ontic logos, where time is seen as the locus for the recurrent embodiment of archetypes (these archetypes being linked not historically, but symbolically). Taylor points to the rise of homogenous, empty, world time under the influence of the notion of the subject as a disengaged reasoner, objectifying the world. This change is very significant for Taylor, as this changing time consciousness reflected in the novel, flows back into the notion of the subject.

The notion of the human individual living his or her life as a story can emerge, this is the 'literary' approach to the self which Taylor wishes to champion. The notion of the self is changing from an archetypal form to a 'temporal form'. Thus the self is located in the happenings of world time; but also life emerges as a story to be told, it unfolds over time through events. Taylor points to the emergence of modern autobiography as an example of this change, with Rousseau and Goethe as early examples.

The fourth cultural trend Taylor examines is the change in the understanding of marriage and family. This change starts at the end of the seventeenth century with the wealthier classes increasingly idealising marriage; based on affection, mutual companionship, and devoted concern for children. Once again this change is an aspect of the affirmation of ordinary life. Marriage is increasingly seen as a matter of personal commitment, and thus something to be entered into voluntarily, therefore the family's role in such matters is precluded. This movement continues with the increasing withdrawal of the family from the control of wider society, and an increase in the valuation of privacy. Compassionate marriage and privacy, Taylor sees as emerging together, resulting in among other things the separation of childhood as a 'special' phase of the life cycle, and with the continual rise of capitalism, the family becoming perceived as a 'haven' in a heartless world.

This last aspect Taylor addresses as the rise of sentiment. This rise, which Taylor has traced philosophically, displaces the older notion of holding back or constraining one's emotions, with the new conception of the importance of giving full expression to one's feelings, and sentiments.

The Voice of Nature: The Growth Of Expressionism

Through this section of SOTS Taylor attempts to trace the rise of the Romantic notion of Expressionism. Expressionism is the precursor for Taylor's own notion of Expressivism. Expressivism is the term Taylor uses to denote his preferred mode of embodiment for the human individual. Expressivism is closer to Hutcheson than Romantic Expressionism; or at least less hostile to theology than some streams of Expressionism. Continuing his argument that Modern thought grows from Judeo-Christian theology Taylor characterises the Radical Enlightenment as a naturalist mutation of Deism. A species of Thomism.

This strand of Taylor's argument is under great stress here, as the era preceding the rise of Romanticism is traditionally characterised as a period of 'secularisation'. Taylor (perhaps unsurprisingly) complains that both major schools of thought on the subject are hopelessly anachronistic. Both the 'institutional' and 'scientific' schools redescribe the process of secularisation rather than explain it. Both see the fall of theology as inevitable. For the institutional school the growth of large scale institutions dissolves traditional allegiances, and theological belief therefore necessarily crumbles. For the scientific school the spread of education and science (issuing in the contemporary 'scientism' of society) necessarily undermines theology. Rather than 'secularisation' Taylor sees the 'fracturing of the moral horizon'.

The Fracturing Of The Moral Horizon

The pregnant phrase 'the fracturing of the moral horizon' is at the heart of Taylor's thought and SOTS. For Taylor this fracturing is driven by theological motives. The internal stresses that arise within belief with the new language of 'inwardness', and the new understanding of the cosmos drive the step to unbelief. While, previously, the step to theological language to characterise the individual has been 'inescapable', with the progress of the Enlightenment this overarching metaphysics is no more. With this fracturing two new frontiers of thought emerge. Taylor identifies these frontiers as 'the agents own powers', and 'a deepening sense of nature'. The effect of the shattering of the old metaphysics is to problematise all three positions, the original theological position and the two new frontiers (and indeed all subsequent positions).

It is at this point that it is possible to identify another aspect of Taylor's supposed moralism, his denial of 'homelessness'. Taylor's stress upon a hope implicit in Judeo-Christian theology is what Shklar⁵ terms, an attempt at 're-enchantment' (in Connolly's terms a denial of 'homelessness'). Taylor appears to want to re-erect a single, overarching metaphysics to repair the fractured theological horizon. This is perceived as critics as the force of Taylor's appeal to Judeo-Christian theology throughout SOTS.

Taylor sees the fracturing of the moral horizon, and the emergence of the two new frontiers of thought, as signalling the genesis of blind or inarticulate theorising. Contemporary thought, drawing heavily upon the two new frontiers, is inarticulate because it denies its theological base. (Contemporary thought glibly appeals to the notion of 'secularisation' to cover this inarticulacy). The two new frontiers wish to declare a radical break with all past thought.

While, with Taylor, it might be admitted that any such talk of a radical break is incorrect, it is unclear that Taylor's proposed solution to the impasse (to recover Judeo-Christian theology) is a better course of action. It is interesting to note that Taylor's work seems to generate a suspicion of any notion of 'a radical break'. After all this kind of anachronistic move is typically masked (or given a fig leaf of respectability) by specious appeals to an ill defined movement of thought (in this case 'secularisation'). These comments, and sentiments are perhaps particularly relevant now (in the late Modern period). An age when much contemporary thought (Post Modernism) is currently declaring just such a radical break with preceding (Modern) thought.

The New Frontiers

The two new frontiers of thought, along with theological belief, form a tripartite map of contemporary debate, within which, Taylor suggests, the modern identity is forged. This complex is not static, but dynamic, and the various streams continually feed off, and oppose the alternative streams. It is this complex, then, that should replace the notion of an atemporal, ahistorical human nature.

The frontier of an agent's own powers is dynamic in that it has, over time, been perceived in various ways. Taylor's work cites (at least) three interpretations. The agent's own powers may be perceived as those of rationality, ordering, and control. Such an interpretation accords with Cartesian thought, is at the base of contemporary scientism, and may be incorporated into theological thought as a 'divine gift'. A second interpretation, may perceive the agent's own inner power as the possession of a moral sentiment (after the work of Hutcheson). Yet another interpretation of the agent's own powers may be the Romantic notion of expression or Expressionism, the articulation of

each individuals unique capacities. This last interpretation is intimately linked to the second new frontier, that of a deepening sense of nature.

This second frontier is ambiguous between two senses of nature. With the growth of 'inwardness' there is a sense of nature both within and without the individual. Between unique human nature (each individual's unique capacities) and the nature of the cosmos (external reality). Within each domain a range of possibilities of interpretation is opening up. Within the realm of inner, or human nature Taylor traces a spectrum of interpretations from 'thin' Cartesianism to 'deep' Romanticism.

In the realm of external nature it is possible to perceive the cosmos in a continuum of possibilities from a thorough going de-spirited instrumentalism to out right pantheism. Both extremes of the spectrum may, however, possess a 'depth' (and, indeed, this is surely true for nature within, though Taylor seems, personally, to find Cartesian rationality 'thin'). A thorough going mechanistic view of the cosmos may then, give rise to a sense of depth. Such a position is held by contemporary natural scientists who maintain a Christian faith. The complexity of the world machine is perceived as requiring a designer. Complexity bespeaks the hand of God (the contemporary designed versus designoid debate).

It is Taylor's position that before a Romantic counter-attack was mounted, the progress of the Enlightenment de-spirited, and disenchanting external reality. Taylor suggests that such Radical Enlightenment theories dominate until this day, and form the basis of contemporary naturalistic, materialistic, de-spirited and scientific modes of thought. The historical forging of the current widespread scientism of contemporary thought is an example of 'blind theorising' for Taylor. Contemporarily such thought tends to a view of the human individual as a complex machine. This machine might possibly feature a soul, but a contemporary characterisation of the soul might, typically' tend

towards the Lockean punctual self (a chemical and biological picture), rather than a Romantic Expressionist, or theological conception.

This appeal to the punctual self is not arbitrary, the concept contributes to the self image of the archetypal Modern, the natural scientist. The archetype of the natural scientist (at its heyday with the Logical Positivists) is of the scientist objectively, 'discovering' various scientific truths by rational experimentation. The scientist's appeal to the ideal of the punctual self is characterised by Nagel, in the title of his book, The View From Nowhere. The scientific archetype stresses the nature of the individual as a reasoner, as possessing a centre capable of rational ordering. It lacks a strong sense of embodiment.

For Taylor such a position is disastrously analogous to MacIntyre's 'Disquieting Suggestion'. The scientific 'view from nowhere', appeals to a God like Archimedean point. A metaphysical niche formerly hollowed out, and hallowed for God is now occupied by the human individual possessing the inner capacity of reasoning. To add insult to injury, this all takes place within a metaphysics that, typically, denies theology.

Taylor attacks such blind theorising for its atomism. Such a conception lacks a notion of embodiment, and over emphasises one human capacity (rationality). Human capacities are compartmentalised and only one aspect of them is prioritised. Such theorising is guilty of 'changing the subject' (this aspect of Taylor's thought is explored at the beginning of the fourth chapter).

In opposing atomism Taylor wishes to proffer a more embodied conception of the individual. This notion of embodiment might be seen as more 'organic' than the 'rational actor', scientific conception. However Taylor's 'organicism' is not a simple return to ancient thought. To the ancients 'organicism' suggested a hierarchical ordering, Taylor wishes to be more egalitarian. Taylor appeals to a notion of Romantic Expressionism,

that in Taylor's brand of Expressivism 'inescapably' recovers encumberment and an implication in society mores. Taylor concludes 'the voice of nature' by tracing, and comparing, Radical Enlightenment and Romantic thought and the ways in which they appeal to the two new frontiers of thought. Taylor pursues this survey to demonstrate how Romantic thought is both more organic and exhibits a deeper sense of inner nature. This deeper sense of human nature is the Romantic understanding of the 'creative imagination'.

The Radical Enlightenment, The Two New Frontiers And Providentialism

Radical Enlightenment thought combines a lively sense of the agent's own powers with an instrumental reading of external reality. The agent's own powers for Radical Enlightenment thinkers are understood in terms of disengaged reason (terms that Taylor regards as 'thin'). Taylor cites Radical Enlightenment thinkers as materialist and Utilitarian thinkers such as Bentham, Holbach, Helvetius, and Condorcet. Combined with these interpretations of the two new frontiers, the Radical Enlightenment also levels a 'Panglossian attack' upon the notion of providentialism.

The Panglossian attack (which Taylor names after the character of Doctor Pangloss in Voltaire's Candide) finds providentialism incredulous in the face of natural disaster. With the experience of such calamities how can it be maintained that 'all is designed for the good'?

The Radical Enlightenment takes an instrumental stance towards external nature (and indeed towards conceptions of inner (human) nature). Thus it is possible, using the faculty of disengaged reason, to take control of nature and improve the lot of human kind in the face of natural disasters. (For Foucault this stance is mirrored in the sphere of

inner (human) nature with the rise of the disciplinary self, and by Taylor as the ethic of self remaking).

For Taylor Radical Enlightenment thought is blind. The self image of the movement is of a radical break with previous thought. One facet of this radical break is the Panglossian rejection of providentialism. Taylor suggests Radical Enlightenment theorists are blind or inarticulate because as they overtly reject providentialism the movement is more totally committed to the 'life goods' that providentialism underpinned.

These 'life goods'⁶ Taylor identifies as, firstly, the ideal of self responsible reason (only one possible position in the spectrum of 'inwardness' it will be remembered). Secondly, there is a commitment to the affirmation of ordinary life (perhaps in particular to the Baconian notion of hands on, improving, science). Lastly, Taylor identifies the ideal of universal and impartial benevolence (the interconnectedness of providentialism).

The Radical Enlightenment is inarticulate because it is (covertly) attached to the life goods of providentialism, while (overtly) doubting providentialism and offering an instrumental reading of nature. The mechanistic world view leaves little room for the notion of the divine, or providential coincidence of the interlocking cosmos. Without the providential framer this realm could be seen (and increasingly will be seen) as a realm of potential conflict.

Taylor's position would appear to be similar to that of MacIntyre's 'Disquieting Suggestion'. Radical thought is dressed in the rags of preceding theological thought. With the increasing rejection of Judeo-Christian theology the theoretical underpinning of providentialism is attacked. Radical Enlightenment thinkers are living beyond their metaphysical and ontological means. This attack is well made. Taylor's proposed method of setting things aright is to form a new mediated sense of human nature that will have room for strong evaluation and an assessment of the ends of life. In a sense Taylor does

wish to 're enchant' the cosmos, however this is not in the sense of a foundationalist slump as some of his critics suggest; Taylor wishes to re enchant the cosmos with by an acceptance of encumberment and the discriminations of right and wrong and better and worse this necessarily encompasses. The notion of human nature Taylor wishes to forward is not a return to a Christian conception of the individual, it is rather, a more dynamic, organic construal, drawing heavily upon Romantic Expressionism.

The Romantics, The Two New Frontiers, And Providentialism

Romantic thought perceives the agent's own powers in terms of the creative imagination, this notion itself draws heavily upon theories of aesthetics current within the Romantic movement. This general position is what Taylor labels Romantic Expressionism. This facet of Taylor's construal of the modern identity is explored in more detail in the next section of SOTS, on 'subtler languages'. The Romantic glorification of the creative imagination is combined with what Taylor terms a 'deep' sense of nature. This sense of depth is already a facet of inner (human) nature by the fact of the creative imagination. A sense of depth in external reality promotes varying degrees of Pantheism. At base a 'force' is thought to reside in external reality, be it divine, ecological (Gaia), or scientific (chemical, biological). Combined with these interpretations of the two new frontiers, the Romantics make an 'anti-levelling' attack upon the notion of providentialism.

The anti-levelling attack finds the providential coincidence of virtue and self interest incredulous. The Romantics are influenced in this protest by Rousseau and Kant. These theorists evoke a real sense of human depravity, of good and evil at war within the human breast.

Taylor continues to offer evidence for the suggestion that contemporary thought has a continuing dependence upon Judeo-Christian theology by highlighting some major theorists from both the Radical Enlightenment and Romantic movement.

The Radical Enlightenment

Holbach

Taylor suggests that Holbach offers the first statement of monistic materialism. With a 'cold' reading of human capacities (as disengaged reason) and a 'thin' reading of nature (external reality as a vast machine) Holbach offers a materialistic reading of the individual. The human spiritual dimension is merely a throw off of the physical. Such a statement offers the way for Physics to offer a reading of the human condition. This step further enhances the status of critical reason. Taylor is correct to identify the genesis of a process that sees the methodology of natural science grow to become paradigmatic for all (natural and social) science. The progress of such a belief has, indeed, had a disastrous effect upon the study of the human individual.

Bentham

For Taylor Utilitarianism is a strange intellectual doctrine. It is a prime example of a theory being inarticulate about (or even denying) its underlying ethics. Utilitarianism exhibits a reductive ontology which recognises only two 'sovereigns', pleasure and pain. The emphasis upon 'cold' rationality opposes the notion of a strong moral impetus (the passions). Utilitarianism appeals to the notion of universal benevolence, it makes a covert

appeal to providentialism. The utilitarians posit that increasing rationality necessarily releases a fund of altruism. Such an assertion, Taylor claims, is rooted in an understanding of Christian notions of 'agape'

Bentham solves this dilemma by fudging the issue. Bentham invokes, as many inarticulate theories do, a 'higher' good. Bentham invokes sensualism. Bentham claims that the main opponent of his principle of utility is the principle of asceticism. Bentham like many Radical Enlightenment thinkers increasingly exalts sensualism. For Taylor sensualism is the Christian notion of agape (charity) in Radical Enlightenment thought, having been transposed through the Deist affirmation of happiness and ordinary life.

Taylor suggests that the path of Utilitarianism need not suggest that all Enlightenment strains of naturalism must necessarily be inarticulate about their moral horizon. Diderot and Hume are examples of such articulate theorists.

Hume

Taylor regards Hume as closer in spirit to Hutcheson, rather than to the Radical Enlightenment with which he is more usually identified. Crucially Hume aspires to the individual finding a self acceptance. The task is to find significance without ontological warrant. In this, Hume is at odds with the Radical Enlightenment which is on the path Foucault defines as the rise of the disciplinary self. The Radical Enlightenment aspires to (rational) control, and the re-ordering of the self., self remaking.

For Taylor theorists such as Montaigne and Hume, who aspire to self acceptance, can seamlessly allow for the moral dimension. As Taylor sees humans as value generating beings, it is obvious (inescapable) to him that naturalism becomes articulate when it recognises the normative, encumbered aspect of human existence.

This chapter has then, detailed what might be termed the 'negative aspect' of Taylor's thought, examining the features of the Modern identity that Taylor wishes to criticise. Taylor's thought through SOTS now moves towards a more constructive phase, with his attempt to isolate the notion of human nature as an interspatial epiphany. It is to Taylor's positive aspect that the next chapter will turn.

¹Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp.111-211.

² see Frazer, J. The Golden Bough (Ware: Wordsworth, 1993), Collingwood, R.G. The Idea Of Nature, Capra, F. The Turning Point (London: Flamingo, 1983) and Connolly, W.E. Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) for discussions of the disenchantment of Nature.

³ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.157.

⁴ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.175.

⁵ Shklar, J. book review Sources of the Self in Political Theory Volume 20 February 1991.

⁶ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.93.

CHAPTER THREE

RE ENCHANTMENT: HUMAN NATURE AS AN INTERSPATIAL EPIPHANY

Introduction

This chapter will address the positive aspect of Taylor's Expressivism, which consists in his attempt to 're-enchant' reality and his concept of human nature understood as an 'interspatial epiphany'. Taylor draws heavily upon aesthetics to formulate this concept and appropriates the aesthetic terminology of a Modern work of art as an interspatial epiphanic artefact. It is vital therefore to examine the aesthetic precursor, or origin of interspatial epiphany in some detail. This investigation is made the more urgent for two reasons.

Firstly, Taylor initially attempts to illustrate his notion of human negatively. Taylor proceeds by a repudiation of Romantic epiphanies of being. Secondly, there is a subtle change in Taylor's thought in his later work. In POR Taylor talks of the dialogical nature of humans, which would appear to be a partial rejection of his originally aesthetic construal of human nature

Re-Enchantment

In the final section of SOTS, entitled 'Subtler Languages', Taylor attempts to flesh out his notion of Expressivism (delineating it from its Romantic precursor Expressionism). Taylor will argue that his Expressivism is marked by some crucial insights from Modernist aesthetics. Obviously these insights were unavailable to earlier

Romantic thought. Taylor argues that his Expressivism conceives of the human individual in terms of a Modernist 'interspatial epiphany'. The Modernist interspatial epiphany grows from the Romantic conception of epiphanic art. Romanticism offers epiphanies of Being, while Modernism offers interspatial epiphany. Taylor will attempt to argue that Modernist aesthetics is the successor doctrine to Romanticism. Through this argument Taylor accepts that there is a major discontinuity between Romanticism and Modernism (which Taylor terms 'personal indexing'). However, Taylor argues that beyond this there are major continuities between the two movements. The Victorian epoch is the era through which these continuities extend from Romanticism to Modernism. Through "Subtler Languages" Taylor outlines the continuities between the two movements through a discussion of the Victorian period, addresses the discontinuity of personal indexing, and expands upon the notion of interspatial epiphany, delineating its transformation from Romanticism. The final section of SOTS turns to a discussion of aesthetics.

At this juncture it is appropriate to ask why Taylor takes this turn to aesthetics. Every other section of SOTS is titled after a facet of the Modern identity that Taylor has identified: Inwardness, the Affirmation of Ordinary Life, and the Voice of Nature.

The Basis Of Taylor's Aestheticism

It is clear that Taylor turns to aesthetics as he perceives art rising to take the place of religion with the Romantics. (There is a theological story that Taylor wishes to tell). Once again there is a sense of theism clinging to Taylor's thought; Taylor turns to aesthetics as it was seen as the successor doctrine to Judeo-Christian theology.

The movement from religion to aesthetics that Taylor is tracing would seem to be emblematic of a Kuhnian paradigm shift. Why does Taylor not identify the movement as such? The first chapter suggested a number of schemes of paradigm shift for the movement of Western thought; for instance Collingwood's¹ organicism, to theism to mechanicism, or Frazer's² magic, to religion, to science. Taylor's thought would appear to offer both a more sensitive reading, and a retreat from these schemes. Taylor is more sensitive as his work recognises the contemporary situation as more complex than either theorist.

Taylor suggests that Frazer's tripartite division of the history of Western thought is more complex in its last (paradigm) shift. Emerging from the religious era, are both science and aesthetics. This increasing complexity is recognised by other late Modern theorists such as C.P. Snow and Isaiah Berlin. (Snow talks of 'two cultures', and Berlin of the fox and the hedgehog). While Taylor's work clearly recognises increasing complexity in Modern thought, it is not so aware as Frazer's of its contingency. Taylor's work would seem to show a marked hostility to Kuhn's thought.

It is probably more accurate to suggest that Taylor's thought is hostile to a 'hard' interpretation of Kuhn's thought. There is an ambiguity in Kuhn's thought about whether a paradigm shift utterly transfigures the vision of participants (the hard interpretation, or 'many maps' view) or merely changes the individual's viewpoint, or perspective (the soft interpretation, or 'one map' view). It is appropriate to say a few words on these two interpretations of Kuhn, as they will be of increasing importance in reference to Taylor's notion of 'personal indexing'.

The soft interpretation of Kuhn appeals to an analogy of a map; paradigms, or metaphysical systems of belief, map reality. A paradigm shift alters the individual's view of the map. For instance this alteration may be represented as a move from a position

directly above the map, to viewing it from lower down, and from one corner. The soft interpretation would appear to be indebted to the last gasp of Logical Positivism. Logical Positivism had a similar early (naive?) position of language mapping reality. However the soft interpretation does not have to be heavily indebted to positivism. Rather it wishes to deny, or at least downgrade the claims of radical incommensurability between paradigms.

The mention of the Logical Positivist legacy at this point is important. Logical Positivism is part of the complexity that Taylor identifies in late Modern thought. Out of the religious era Taylor identifies the emergence of two streams, the scientific and the aesthetic. Logical Positivism is the zenith of the scientific stream. The work of Wittgenstein is illustrative of the complexity of contemporary debate. Wittgenstein's early Positivism is overturned in his later work by its utter repudiation, in the Wittgensteinian linguistic turn. The aesthetic stream appropriates the linguistic turn in terms of a concern with the 'text'.

The hard interpretation of Kuhn emphasises the utter incommensurability of each paradigm. It emphasises how a shift between them is a 'leap of (blind) faith'. The thrust of the hard interpretation would seem to be to delimit the type of manoeuvre that Taylor will make with his artful suggestion that encumberment offers a background from which to locate oneself in new circumstances

Taylor is correct to suggest that conceptions of human nature capture notions of the good for humans. This is perhaps inescapable. So while the soft interpretation of Kuhn might need to be affirmed, this does not preclude a robust sense of possible incommensurability. Taylor's position is that Judeo-Christian theology might be helpful. He suggests that as conceptions of human nature are bound up with notions of the good a consideration of a transformed, mediated Judeo-Christian theology will be useful here.

It is now appropriate to turn to a discussion of the continuities and a discontinuity that Taylor identifies between Romantic and Modernist aesthetics.

The Continuity Of Romanticism And Modernism.

For Taylor the Romantic and Modernist are continuous. Through the Victorian period major strands of thought extend from the Romantic to the Modernist. There is in particular a similar high valuation of the aesthetic life. However there are also vast changes in emphasis, the most important of which Taylor details in the change from expressive to interspatial epiphany.

With the emergence of the notion of interspatial epiphany there arises the possibility to break from the ideal of the 'aesthetic life' to the ideal of the 'affirming life'. The affirming life draws on the notion of interspatial epiphany while rejecting any notion of an underlying dependence upon an ontological order. The work of Nietzsche is of crucial significance here. The affirming life is also supported by theorists within Modernism and by the Phenomenological, and Existential schools of thought.

The step to the affirming life is driven by the major discontinuity that exists between Romanticism and Modernism. This discontinuity Taylor identifies as 'personal indexing', the growing debate over the possibility of an unmediated cosmic order. Fully to capture Taylor's final Expressivist position it is necessary to explore Taylor's comments upon Victorian society, and the changing conception of the aesthetic life, before returning to an examination of the discontinuity between Romanticism and Modernism, and the step to the affirming life.

Victorian Society

For Taylor the culture of Victorian society is of vital importance. The theorists of that age saw themselves as engaged in a battle between religion and science. There is an increasing abandonment of religion in the face of the growth of science. The Victorians forge what Taylor terms an 'ethic of belief'. More accurately they forge a scientific 'ethic of unbelief'. The Victorians ascribe a certain 'manliness' to an abandonment of 'rosy' cosmic pictures. In the first chapter Connolly argued a similar point in favour of accepting 'homelessness'.

The Victorian solution to the fracturing of the theological horizon is not to embrace homelessness; instead the Victorians turn to the perceived 'wave of the future', positivistic natural science. There is a move towards an austere faith in propositions that can be rationally, or scientifically verified. In this complex a gamut of possible positions emerges. These include traditional religious belief, Romanticism, and unbelief. Taylor is interested in tracing a specific route that progresses to unbelief, but which at the same time is opposed to scientism (this for Taylor is the 'Victorian solution' and flaw).

Taylor is particularly interested in the Victorian age as he wishes to suggest that contemporary society is very close to our 'Victorian contemporaries'. This closeness is due to the societal turbulence, or burgeoning paradigm shift, that each epoch recognises in its own age. In the Victorian age this shift is between religion and science, in our own between Modernism and Post Modernism. Taylor suggests that contemporary society inherits four legacies from the Victorian period

The first of these continuities is the demand, bequeathed from the Enlightenment, to reduce the amount of suffering in society³. This demand is fuelled by a continuing high

value placed on ordinary life, and universal benevolence. The second legacy of the Victorian age is a continuing emphasis on the free self determining subject. With the fading of the notion of cosmic order (ontic logos) there is a stress upon the individual's own reflexive powers. The third continuity is an emphasis upon universal justice, while lastly, both epochs place a high valuation upon equality.

While the Modern individual can assent to the force of such sentiments in contemporary society, Taylor suggests there is a growing crisis of confidence in affirming such ideals. It will be Taylor's argument that while these ideals resonate through contemporary society, they are in fact relics of an earlier age. While the Modern wishes to affirm such ideals, much of the metaphysical underpinnings, that make sense of such ideals, has been rejected by Modern thought. Taylor's solution to this 'catch twenty-two' situation is to attempt to re-animate some of the ontological underpinnings of such laudable ideals by exploring an embedded experience of value. Taylor feels justified in this act of re-animation as it has a precursor in Victorian thought. In that epoch such laudable ideals were buttressed by notions of 'historical exceptionalism'.

Thus for Taylor the Victorian age and contemporary period are intellectually contemporaneous. Both eras appeal to the same basic moral and political standards. However the Modern period is increasingly blind and inarticulate in its theorising. This blindness is a fear of, or incapacity to articulate moral tenets that might underpin the high ideals (the inherited legacies) of contemporary society. In the late Modern period the eliding of such questions allows the step to Post Modern theorising, to the practice of an untrammelled affirming of life. During the Victorian age the full force of this intellectual impasse is assuaged by the rise of historical exceptionalism. (The importance of the affirming life will be addressed below and over the next two chapters.).

Before turning to examine historical exceptionalism it is necessary to challenge Taylor's assertion that contemporary and Victorian society are 'intellectually contemporaneous'. While it is possible to argue that there is a continuity between the two epochs, it is absurd to argue that the two eras appeal to the 'same basic moral and political standards'. The contemporary period can in no way be said to maintain Victorianism. In the political sphere the egalitarianism of contemporary practice is not mirrored in the Victorian period. Indeed the extent of dissimilarity is very pronounced. It is interesting to speculate that Taylor may give the two eras a falsely homogenous cast in an attempt to give his eventual Theism a spuriously stronger warrant in contemporary society.

Historical Exceptionalism

For Taylor historically exceptionalist 'self portraits' are, perhaps not unsurprisingly, inarticulately indebted to Judeo-Christian theology. The rise of historical exceptionalism is cast, by Taylor, in terms of traditional religious dogma. Taylor's position is that historical exceptionalism in the Victorian age represents the role of grace transposed outside of traditional theology.

Taylor's argument is that within the unitary horizon of theological belief, the true believer is spurred to religious faith by a sense of moral exceptionalism. The believer may define her positive duties in contrast to the heathen unbeliever. With the shattering of this horizon the entreaty to do good cannot be cast in entirely theological terms. In its place rises historical exceptionalism, that is the belief that each successive generation is more humane and rational. The grace of the believer becomes the historically exceptionalist

self portrait of the 'manly' Victorian scientist. Taylor suggests a succession of 'families' of historically exceptionalist self portraits animate the Victorian period.

The first family Taylor terms instrumental rationality. This family encompasses the Enlightenment notion of disengaged rationality, the Freudian conception of human 'good inclinations', and nineteenth century agnostic notions of the 'manliness of (un)belief. In the void left by the fall of conceptions of grace, there grows a perception that rigorous scientific honesty and detachment inclines towards fairness. There is a Stoic quality to this family.

The second family of self portraits centres around Rousseau. This family encompasses the Romantic notion of 'Nature as source', and extends through Schiller and Hölderlin to eventuate in the 1960's student revolts and 'flower generation'. This family builds upon eighteenth century notions of 'natural' animal sympathy (or sentiment). Within society such animal sympathy is transmuted into social conscience. It is this family of historical exceptionalism that is perhaps closest to Taylor's Expressivism. Taylor would perhaps suggest that there is a providential coincidence between natural sympathy and Judeo-Christian theology.

The third family of exceptionalist portraits centres about Kant. Here the source of exceptionalism is rational agency. Kant is not appealing to the 'thin' rationality of instrumentalism, but to agency and universality. Going beyond the work of Taylor for a moment, it might be argued that this last family of views is where many Moderns draw the motivational postulate to do good. Individuals draw on a sense of common humanity that obviates the need for a theological ontology. (This is the force of Kymlicka's attack upon Taylor in the next chapter). A sense of common humanity might be fostered from a quasi Darwinian evolutionary, 'organic' perspective. As suggested, such sentiments are beyond Taylor's work here. (However Taylor's later work does show signs of a more

direct engagement with Kantianism, this shift is examined in Chapter Five.). The route Taylor traces here inescapably identifies the spiritual in terms of theology. Having argued for the recognition of a continuity between Victorian and contemporary thought, Taylor turns to the discussion of aesthetics.

Changing Conceptions Of Epiphanic Art

It is Taylor's contention that with the fracturing of the theological horizon, art rises to the status of a religion. The rise of the 'new (Baconian) science' is largely responsible for the fracturing of the theological. Among the more astute theorists of the age the new science is immediately recognised as limited. The materialist and atomistic sweep of the new science is unable to capture (what might be termed) the spiritual (or existential) side of human experience. At the same time, the progress of science also undermines some of the traditional theological answers to spiritual questions. The biblical story of creation is exploded by advances in the scientific disciplines of physics and geology, it is no longer possible wholeheartedly to embrace theology.

Taylor suggests that with the crises of affirmation within theology, art rises to answer the spiritual questions traditionally answered by theology. The appeal of a move from religion to art, might be captured by saying, that with the growth of the aesthetic life beauty comes to be seen as independent of 'the good'. An appeal to beauty is seen as less problematic than an appeal to 'the good'. However the late Modern is able to perceive that an appeal to aesthetics is no less problematic than an appeal to theology. Early advocates of the aesthetic life, not unsurprisingly, have a naive reading of aesthetics.

For the early proponents of the aesthetic life it seemed possible to relinquish a discredited theological ontology and embrace an unproblematic aesthetics. Beauty is capable of being demonstrated, as the good once was. The particular notion of aesthetics that early proponents of the aesthetic life first adopt is termed by Taylor as epiphanic art (more particularly Expressionism). Epiphanic art itself undergoes tremendous reinterpretation through the nineteenth century. Taylor identifies two particularly important movements.

The Decentering Of The Self In Epiphanic Art

The first change Taylor identifies in epiphanic art through the nineteenth century is the shift from expressive to interspatial epiphany. As suggested in the previous chapter Romantic epiphanic art may be characterised by its proffering of expressive epiphanies, or epiphanies of Being. For the Romantics art rises to take the place of religion. The artistic artefact, in this scheme, gestures beyond itself, to perhaps God, or later to a notion of providentialism, or later still to Being. The aesthetic artefact is expressive of this. The art of expressive epiphany is representational, and (crucially) still just retains a truncated appeal to art as 'mimesis'. Thus a representational painting of a landscape might be offering a comment upon the power and beneficence of God. The beauty of the landscape, after the argument from design, bespeaks the hand of God. However there is an increasing complexity here. In later Romantic art the 'expressive epiphany' might be to the beauty of God, or to a naturally evolved landscape, or could be a representation of amoral nature.

An interspatial (or framing) epiphany in contrast, does not emphatically gesture beyond itself (Taylor's identification is tentative here, perhaps allowing himself an escape

hatch to say that personally he finds interspatial epiphany expressive of theology). It may gesture to the powers of an agent, but it usually delimits the step to a recognition of a deity. Crucially the artistic artefact, as interspatial epiphany, has broken free of any notion of 'mimesis'. The interspatial epiphanies of Modernism are, on the whole, non representational. Taylor uses a number of phrases to attempt to capture what he means by interspatial epiphany⁴. Interspatial or framing epiphanies offer the juxtaposition of several strands of thought, or visual imagery. Examples of interspatial epiphany in the visual arts would be a Mondrian or Pollock painting. A written interspatial epiphany might be Don Passos' USA, and various 'auto telic' or 'cut and paste' Surrealist novels.

The artistic artefact is seen as a frame, vortex, or a locus where various colours, strands of thought, or forces are captured or located. Crucially however an important aspect of the spatial epiphany is brought to the artistic artefact by the viewer, or reader. The juxtaposition of various forces at a particular locus is completed by the individual. The artefact arouses a particular sensation within the audience. The interpretations of the artefact are as varied as the audience.

Such works of art decisively break with notions of mimesis and, rather, gesture towards or highlight, the transfigurative powers of the individual. The artistic artefact is self manifesting. The individual's interpretation of the object completes it. The sensation aroused in the viewer was not in the artefact before the viewing. Such a conception of the artistic object allows the step to a notion of the affirming life.

It is then this conception of the artistic artefact that Taylor wishes to adopt for his metaphor of human nature. It is this brilliant insight that might be rescued from Taylor's wider thought. Interspatial epiphany emphasises the more active, or dynamic aspect of human existence. This is important as it captures the post Hegelian insight that human nature is an activity rather than a substance. This insight becomes increasingly

emphasised in Taylor's later work, especially in MPOR where he talks of the dialogical nature of humans.

Interspatial Epiphany Defined

Before moving onto to consider Taylor's remarks upon the subjectification within epiphanic art it is appropriate to make a few further comments upon Taylor's conception of interspatial epiphany. This aside is all the more urgent given the emphasis this thesis will place on the concept. As suggested above Taylor uses a number of terms in the attempt to capture the meaning of his position here. The new aesthetic concept might be termed a 'framing epiphany', an interspatial epiphany, or even an 'inter temporal epiphany'. Towards the end of SOTS Taylor suggests that epiphanies of being might be characterised by three features.

"..they (1) show some reality to be (2) an expression of something which is (3) an unambiguously good moral source."⁵

While Modernist theorists will make various attacks upon this Romantic dogma, as a general rule interspatial epiphany will negate the second proposition. The link to mimesis is decisively broken the emphasis now is upon the artistic artefact as a vortex, as a locus for forces, akin to electrical force.

The utility of Taylor's definition of epiphanies of being and through that, interspatial epiphany is that it allows him to locate various Modernist theorists. For instance the stream that leads through Schopenhauer and Nietzsche negates the third proposition. Expressionist painters Taylor suggests negate both proposition one and

three. While Taylor is willing to accept that the ways of Modernism are many, he asserts that with interspatial epiphany grows the insight that the human individual lives on a plurality of levels. Modern inwardness involves a movement within to a fragmentation of experience, echoing Harvey's definition of post modernism. These themes will be returned to below. But for the moment it is most significant to grasp and remember Taylor's claim⁶ here that the Modernist notion of interspatial epiphany has no exact precursor. The concept originated in the movement from Romantic to Modernist thought. At its core it retains the Romantic concept of originality and uniqueness. The interspatial epiphanic artistic artefact is a dynamic vortex completed by the viewer. In terms of human nature, the individual is a dynamic activity, a continual vortex, a constant juxtaposition of experience bounded only by death.

Taylor is quite correct to identify the concept of interspatial epiphany as original, and there are two further points to emphasise. Firstly, a similar claim for the originality of the Romantic period is made, famously, by Isaiah Berlin. It is this liberal sensibility that must be maintained against Taylor's theological communitarianism. Berlin suggests that not until the end of the eighteenth century is 'variety' viewed as a good thing. In preceding thought there is 'one good and many bad, one Truth and many errors'. But it is with the Romantics that there is a uniquely new emphasis upon variety and pluralism. For Berlin Romanticism is the single biggest shift in European consciousness after the Renaissance. It is with the Romantics that it becomes possible to believe that to one question there may be more than one answer. This enthrones toleration and communication between very different human beings.

"The notion that there are many values, that they are incompatible. The whole notion of plurality. The whole notion of inexhaustibility. The whole

notion of the, so to speak, in some sense, imperfection of all human answers and arrangements. The notion that no single answer which claims to be perfect and true, whether in art or life, can in principle be perfect or true; that I think we certainly owe to the Romantics."⁷.

Secondly, this insight seems to argue against the notion of a retrieval of 'spirit' in a theological sense. Rather it may be possible to argue for a retrieval of the original fruit of Romanticism. These issues will be more fully addressed in the next chapter in relation to Taylor's moralism and his abhorrence of personal indexing. For now it is necessary to return to the second change Taylor has identified in epiphanic art.

Subjectification Of Epiphanic Art

Taylor's second point is that through the nineteenth century the conception of Nature alters. Nature undergoes a 'subjectivist twist'⁸. Emerging from the eighteenth century the conception of Nature is bound up with Providentialism. Nature is perceived as tending to the good. With the rise of science this link to providentialism is severed. Within the scientific discipline of Biology the work of Darwin paints Nature as an aggressive, violent arena. It is a battleground with the survival of only the fittest.

In relation to conceptions of human nature, the changing perception of external Nature provokes a change in the conception of human embodiment. Early Romantic and Rousseauian notions of the innocence and purity of natural impulses fall. The idea that embodiment is the emanation of the impersonal force that courses through Nature becomes problematic. Such an impersonal force in Nature is no longer innocent, thus its human emanation might also be 'distasteful'⁹. Under these pressures there is a subjectivist

twist. The emphasis upon embodiment is now in terms of the self realisation of the subject. Human nature is perceived as an 'inner depth', a depth to be articulated or expressed. The realisation of this depth may (or may not) result in a moral subject, a subject not at one with the amoral struggle of external Nature. (Of course if external Nature is not amoral, but moral as Taylor claims, the purity of natural impulses may once again be asserted. This is why, at times, Taylor appears close to moral sentiment theorists).

The changing conception of Nature, and its subjectification issues in a split screen view of nature, Taylor suggests. There is the vast, amoral, universe, this is the utter 'Other' to the second view of Nature as human natural impulses. This split might be captured by two possible interpretations of Darwin. Evolution may be understood as either the 'red in tooth and claw' struggle for the survival of the fittest, or as the process of species' evolving into an environmental niche, an attenuated sense of providentialism now in terms of a designoid interlocking universe. This latter characterisation may become a sense of symbiosis, an interconnectedness without a divine architect.

The Split Screen Of Nature

With the establishment of this split screen view of Nature the problem arose of how to relate the two possible views of Nature. In other words how to relate natural human impulses with the vast world machine.

Taylor suggests that typically this problem of relation is solved by suppressing one side of the conception of Nature, or the other. For instance Naturalism suppresses the side of natural human impulses. This route has some 'obvious' benefits to its adherents. Nature (external reality) has been disenchanting, older ancient and theological

descriptions of Nature have fallen away. Nature does not exhibit the ancients' ontic logos, or the hallmark of the divine architect. As Taylor has argued through SOTS the ancient principle of order metamorphoses into God as 'chief engineer'; as the watchmaker, or creator of the world machine.

This change has been wrought for a number of reasons - but ultimately its progress has enhanced the status of the human. With the progress of the Affirmation of Ordinary Life, the formerly profane becomes sacred. In a transvaluation of values the fallen sinner becomes the Victorian scientist¹⁰. Humanity has 'matured', and as such perceives a suitable environment in Nature for its enhanced standing. (Increasingly each generation will see itself as epitomising 'mature' humanity. There are continual 'radical breaks' with preceding thought as each generation defines a historically exceptionalist self portrait for itself.). The progress of Naturalism involves a de-spiriting of Nature. With this change in the understanding of Nature there is a concomitant change in the understanding of human nature.

In terms of human nature the individual is a 'disengaged reasoner' in the Naturalist solution to the split screen of Nature. The progress of what Taylor has termed Inwardness produces the Naturalist 'punctual self' endowed with powerful analytic skills. (For Taylor there is a startling lack of humility in this position. There is no theological sense of 'the fall' or grace.). The individual understood as a disengaged reasoner is the archetype of Naturalism, and connects (as Taylor has suggested) with the Baconian scientific revolution. But such a position obviously suppresses any notion of human natural, or animal, impulses; or perhaps just limits human capacities to self reflexivity. The archetype of the disengaged reasoner is the apotheosis, and parody of Logical Positivist Behaviouralism, and the belief in the 'rational actor' model of academic enquiry.

Taylor suggests that this archetype has points of contact with the Platonic notion of 'self control'. Taylor wishes to reject the Naturalist position. He is quite right to do so.

Human nature as a disengaged reasoner is a particular historical artefact of the Western intellectual tradition. It is based upon a disenchanted view of Nature as a vast machine. This view of external reality is extended inwards, and can rob the human being of a 'spiritual dimension', however this suppression is hardly complete. In a more optimistic analysis than Taylor offers it is possible to assert that embodiment and embeddedness 'discover' the spiritual.

With the Logical Positivists the realm of natural human impulses is suppressed by being simply dismissed. Such discussion is displaced into the realm of non-science (nonsense) and seen as of interest to second order, social scientific disciplines. Such a view is still prevalent in the contemporary period. Taylor is quite right to identify and attack this position. Taylor is also correct to suggest that it is important to look to the other side of the split screen of Nature to find the vocabulary that can unmask and overturn the strange Modern archetype of human nature as a disengaged reasoner.

The Exaltation Of Natural Human Impulses

Drawing upon the progress of what Taylor has identified as Nature as source (the source of the title Sources Of The Self) it is possible to see a stream of thought that draws upon Romantic Expressionism. This solution to the split screen of Nature develops the Romantic conception of the 'creative imagination'. This is, however, also true of Naturalism. Though Logical Positivism is dismissive of human impulses or emotions, it is obviously the champion of one of them, viz the power of reason itself.

(That is why Nature is a split screen, naturalism is then another example of an inarticulate, or 'blind' theory.).

The Romantic solution differs from Naturalism by viewing inner nature as having a 'depth' (see immediately below, 'Personal Indexing'). Against the 'one dimensionality' of the Naturalist view of humans as reasoner, the Expressivist stream sees humans more holistically or 'Organically'. Humanity is animated by reason but also by lust, fear, hate, and a myriad of emotions or impulses. For some the 'Organic human' is as much animated by Platonic 'self control' as the Naturalist conception. For instance moral sentiment theorists such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. But these theorists' work may be seen to be tinged by the last vestiges of providentialism. Increasingly thought like that of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche comes to dominate. Increasingly Nature is seen as morally indifferent, as an impersonal 'wild' force. Nature moves from a substantive to a procedural construal. Nature is understood less as an order and more akin to a force. ('Force' is just as new a 'scientific' discovery as Nature as a vast machine.).

In terms of human nature there is a move from a conception of the human centre, or 'soul' understood as some sort of substance to it being perceived as an activity. There is a shift towards what is variously termed spirit, the immortal soul, reason, or self reflexivity. This movement reaches its worst excesses in the 1960's flower generation (expressing your inner depths), and various contemporary 'new age' beliefs. But it should be remembered the 1960's was a parody. On the whole Taylor is correct to suggest that the West requires a move back away from Naturalism and atomism.

To say a 'move back away from' is exactly the correct phrase. The archetype of a disengaged reasoner is a historically specific artefact, to move away from it requires an act of retrieval of embedded mediated experience.

Taylor increasingly casts the conflicts of Modernity as a battle between expressive theory, Expressionism, followed by Expressivism (characterised by the latter solution to the split screen view of nature), and the 'one dimensionality' (echoing Marcuse) of instrumental rationality. (This bi-polar characterisation of contemporary thought is taken up in Taylor's papers¹¹). It is clear that Taylor is not impartial within the battle lines he draws. He emphatically champions the cause of Expressive theory. However it is also clear that Taylor does not wholeheartedly embrace organicism, contextualism, and the indifference of the universe. Taylor's commitment to embeddedness prevents him from taking this final step. The lesson of the embodied exploration of the BA principle is for that Taylor that there is always some significance, some value ladenness. Taylor suggests that the individual must recognise the inescapably value laden character of the cosmos in which she is set¹².

Personal Indexing, The Discontinuity of Romanticism And Modernism

Taylor has, then, postulated a continuity between Romantic and Modernist aesthetics. While suggesting this unity Taylor has identified a major discontinuity between the two doctrines over the nature of the artistic artefact. Romantic expressive epiphanies become Modernist interspatial epiphanies (though even this characterisation is simplistic, many artists within the Modernist school would deny the validity of epiphanic art). Interspatial epiphany enthrones the idea that a publicly mediated order is impossible. The self manifesting thrust of spatial epiphany, the subjectivist twist in the idea of Nature, suggests that access to such an ontic order is now inescapably mediated through the individual imagination, and indeed individualism and the other facets of modern embeddedness that Taylor has identified. Human nature as an activity and not a

substance is the articulation of a personal vision, the self realisation of a personal depth, or index. This perception has overtaken the old conception of mediation, of 'ontic logos' and the contemplation of order. Individualism has trumped mediation through a public 'observable' order, or through beauty, or the grace of God. The progress of Inwardness and the 'Affirmation of Ordinary Life' is complete. With this progress there is the dawn of the possibility of the 'affirming life'.

The Affirming Life: The Fall Of Unmediated Public Orders

Taylor suggests that the possibility of self affirmation is no 'backwater debate'. It has a 'depth' in Western society indebted to the combined weight of Platonism and Christianity. The step to self affirmation may be further illustrated by contrasting the Greek and the Christian traditions.

For the Greeks, and Plato in particular, the goodness of nature is a feature of its own ordering. The goodness of reality may be grasped by contemplating its order. This strangely passive conception contrasts with the Christian tradition and the doctrine of creation. Within this Christian doctrine the goodness of Nature (the divinely created cosmos) is seen by God. 'He saw that it was good'. Thus the central idea of the affirming life is that the individual may use his or her own powers to transfigure his or her vision, and affirm the goodness of nature. Taylor is suggesting that contemporary, in the aftermath of Romanticism, in the aftermath of the work of Schopenhauer, with the concept of the self manifesting creative imagination (with its rejection of mimesis) it is possible to pursue the affirming life. It is possible for humans to take on powers formerly reserved for God. The self manifesting thrust of the notion of spatial epiphany finds its ultimate expression in the affirming life. The transfiguring of the individual's personal

vision, that sees nature as good, completes what it reveals. This is the brilliance of Taylor's identification of interspatial epiphany as the metaphor for human nature. Taylor attempts further to illustrate and flesh out the notion of the affirming life by reference to three nineteenth century thinkers who illustrate this stream of thought. Taylor appeals to the work of Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, and Nietzsche.

Kierkegaard

Through Either/Or Kierkegaard explores the affirming life. Kierkegaard at first lays out his ideal in terms of the aesthetic individual. However through the work the aesthetic individual is trumped by the ideal of the ethical individual, and the notion of 'choosing oneself'. Both individuals bring about a self transfiguration, but Kierkegaard, echoing Kant, sees the ethical individual as truly triumphing. (Kierkegaard's work is more Konigsbergian than that of Nietzsche, or Connolly).

The aesthetic individual in a sense makes no choices. The aesthetic person is carried from one finite thing to another, and is fully absorbed by these finite objects, in finite contexts. While the aesthetic individual is capable of transfiguration, she also lives in dread. This is the dread of being at the mercy of external finite objects and their vicissitudes. The aesthetic life is also an existence of despair. This is the despair of her own self, of sensing that she is 'meant for something higher'; to be more than the plaything of the finite. It is the ethical that lifts the individual from dread and despair.

The ethical individual makes a true choice, by choosing herself in the light of infinity. This choice is not for the sake of any finite thing, but rather all finite objects get their value and significance from the choice of oneself. The ethical choice of oneself renounces all that is finite. The finite is recovered within the ethical, but now not as an

absolute, but as relative to our life project. This choice, for oneself is purely inward. The outward character of the individual's life is unchanged, but an inner transfiguration has been wrought. Through this choice the individual attains self-love, and self affirmation. There is then an emphasis upon the quality of inner will. It is this emphasis within the affirming life that Taylor will increasingly attempt to mutate into a re-engagement with theology. But to reiterate it is this movement that must be resisted. Within the terms of Taylor's own thought the theological horizon is shattered, there is an affirmation of ordinary life.

Kierkegaard's ethical self obviously appeals to a Kantian sense of dignity. Humans should live up to their ability to choose oneself and the infinite. However the ethical self has a vastly different shape to the Kantian self. The individual is not a rational agent who generates moral law from herself. Dignity is not located in submitting Nature to Law. The Kierkegaardian ethical self expresses her nature in transfiguring her life, by seeing and living it in a new dimension, that of infinite choice.

Taylor's commitment to theology is still prevalent. The Kierkegaardian ethical self is for Taylor, the Christian believer marked by grace. Taylor is critical of the Post Modern 'seduction' of infinite choice, and endless free play¹³. Taylor's concern is that such a mode of thought is politically dangerous. It is corrosive of civil society. It makes societal decision making and action difficult. (A social Zeitgeist will be required to achieve the high ideals of late Modern society, and it is therefore disastrous to allow Post Modernism to undermine it). Once again Taylor might be ceded much of his argument. All he says may indeed be true. But is his proposed solution to this impasse acceptable, or palatable? Taylor wishes to curtail the seduction of Post Modernism, to contain the scope for endless free play. Once again such a sentiment might be accepted, but is an appeal to Judeo-Christian theology really required to achieve this containment? Within

Taylor's own thought would it not be possible for the ethical self to exercise infinite choice, and also recognise the potential dangers of the affirming life, of choosing oneself?

Dostoyevsky

Dostoyevsky appeals much more self consciously to the Christian notion of grace, while also remaining true to his Romantic roots. Dostoyevsky is opposed to the notion that the individual affirms her dignity by separating herself from Nature. If the individual closes herself to Nature, and thus also to grace (which is a force circulating through Nature) she becomes locked into a vicious cycle of 'self loathing' and despair at the ugliness of reality. This position is paradoxical.

The individual most likely to close herself to grace (and thus Nature) is the most sensitive, and morally insightful individual. Such an individual finds reality morally repugnant, cannot bear its wild amoral character. This recognition provokes self loathing. Self loathing proceeds from the awareness that the individual herself is part of this reality. Thus violent acts towards Nature (an amoral reality) are justified.

Loathing of reality and self loathing provokes a polarisation between self and Nature. Evil is now projected onto reality. The evil inherent in Nature justifies, indeed calls for, acts of violence and destruction against Nature. The most noble individuals in the grip of self loathing wreak havoc only upon themselves, the most base destroy others. Taylor, quite correctly, suggests that Dostoyevsky offers a brilliant insight into the 'spiritual source' of Modern terrorism. Although Taylor does not say this, such individuals are 'baser self loathing moralists'.

What allows the individual to break free from the vicious circle of self loathing is a transfiguration of his or her stance. It is important to forge the ability to come to love

the world and oneself, in spite of its inherent evil. This acceptance of Nature 'warts and all' also requires an acceptance of the individual's part in it. It is an acceptance of responsibility, or at least complicity. For Dostoyevsky the escape from self loathing is aided by being loved by God. Taylor comments that Dostoyevsky's work combines two great streams of thought¹⁴. Firstly the Christian notion of the transformatory potential of God's love; and secondly, the Modern concept of the transfigurative powers of the subject. Today however the Dostoyevskian solution is unavailable. To repeat, society is dominated by unbelief. Taylor seems to grasp the wrong aspect of Dostoyevsky's work. It is perhaps less relevant to appeal to Dostoyevsky's notion of the love of God, and more interesting to consider how self loathing is fostered by a sense of complicity. Perhaps a sense of complicity might be a secular fuel for compassion.

Indeed it is possible to see an escape from self loathing to compassion in the work of another, nominally, communitarian theorist. Rorty's work emphasises 'Irony', in part derived from a sense of complicity. It might be suggested that for the political sphere it is a sense of irony, rather than of God's grace that is required to foster compassion in Modern, secular, plural societies.

Nietzsche

Nietzsche's work is the most modern of the three theorists illustrative of the affirming life. Nietzsche makes no appeal to the ethical, or to God, to buttress the individual's own transfigurative powers. Indeed it is Nietzsche's contention that a Christian sensibility is incapable of making the self affirmation he proposes. It is this Nietzschean insight that might be fruitfully contrasted with Taylor's work, and will be

pursued in subsequent chapters with a comparison to existential heroism and existential thought in general.

The individual understood as an inter-spatial epiphany must recognise the indifference of the universe, or homelessness. At the beginning of SOTS (as will be discussed in the next chapter) Taylor criticises theorists who 'change the subject'. Taylor suggests that many Modern theorists do not overtly recognise the 'inescapably' moral or value laden character of reality. Thus they are guilty of distorting the facts of human existence. But what can Taylor say to the Modern (like Nietzsche) who finds no moral framework to reality? To say 'You have missed, or you are inarticulate about the moral', seems to be a paradigmatic case of changing the subject.

Taylor's position on this is bizarre. The Modern individual is indeed, as Taylor argues, marked by the fracturing of the moral horizon, and the affirmation of ordinary life. Therefore how is it permissible for Taylor to 'change the subject' and claim the non believing individual is actually a part of a moral reality, without realising it? It would appear that the problem of false consciousness haunts even the Communitarian.

Taylor is incapable of finally taking the step to the affirming life, with a sense of cosmic indifference as he misses that values implicit in existential and utilitarian thought. It is possible that the inescapability of determinacy, and homelessness (and not the moral horizon) will generate the 'resonances' Taylor hopes to find within society and 'State' to motivate 'ethical' behaviour. But these resonances will be deeply personal and private. There will always be a debate about how far the individual can find private resonances reflected in society and the public. Taylor's conception is of a public marked by moralism (there is a rejection of homelessness), with a focus upon the 'quality of inner will'. This seems to draw a disciplinary stance towards the self. (Once again these points will be returned to in the next chapter.).

The Nietzschean 'übermensch' are able unreservedly to affirm the whole of reality; to say 'yes' to it all. Taylor suggests a Schopenhauerian influence early in Nietzsche's thought¹⁵. The wild amoral force of Schopenhauer's Nature is, in Nietzsche, 'will to power' (a pronounced sense of Modern inwardness). The individual is an intense objectification of this will.

To say 'yes' to the cosmos is achieved by a victory over the self, a self overcoming. It is striking the different outcomes self overcoming has in Nietzschean, and Eastern thought. For Nietzsche it is to an amoral force, the flux of experience, for the East it is to a stillness. This is paradoxical as there is surely a Western paradigm of stillness not marked by the Dionysian excess that Nietzsche so favours. The Platonic notion of 'balance' or a species of Stoicism might be cited as the outcome of self affirmation, of living life like an interspatial epiphany. But Taylor is too quick to follow Nietzsche in seeing self affirmation as inescapably leading to chaos.

For Nietzsche self overcoming is impossible for anyone caught within a Christian sensibility, or morality. The Christian can only bear the universe if it is regarded as the seat of God's plan or His rationality. The Christian mind set can only bear the cosmos if it is seen as progressing towards an ultimate salvation. Against this doctrine of salvation, Nietzsche counterpoises the notion of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche suggests there will be no salvation, no compensation for suffering. Only the übermensch can bear this vision of recurrence.

This is what separates the herd, the 'human-all-too-human' from the übermensch. In contrast to Kant and Dostoyevsky this self overcoming is achieved solely from within the individual. Nietzsche is championing the transfiguration of the affirming life solely in terms of the agent's own powers. What commands affirmation is the very power itself.

"Nietzsche wanted to put behind him the doctrine of aesthetic transfiguration which he drew from Schopenhauer, and which marks his early work. He wanted to go beyond 'justifying' the world through its manifestation in art and really affirm it."¹⁶

The Nietzschean *übermensch* might, then, be seen as the ultimate expression of the concept of human nature Taylor has tried to capture with the term 'spatial epiphany'. However this final position, which might quite properly be seen as the crowning achievement of SOTS, is quite obviously very far from the Expressivist position Taylor himself wishes to hold.

While Taylor's interpretation of Nietzsche is deeply flawed it is interesting to speculate whether the *übermensch* are quite the extreme self affirmers they are usually characterised as being. Taylor cites Nietzsche as a 'deeply Christian' thinker, or as offering Christianity with 'the value signs reversed'. Both characterisations are wide of the mark, however they do highlight how Nietzsche's work might be seen not fully to grasp homelessness. Nietzsche appears to be 'put out' by the fracturing of the moral horizon. The Dionysian cast of Nietzsche's thought might be seen as self loathing, as stimulated by a sense of betrayal in the face of homelessness. Nietzsche does talk of living one's life as a 'work of art', as seeing the artistic as offering salvation in a Godless universe. This position (as seen above) is no longer open to, or is more problematic for the late Modern individual. Perhaps self loathing is overcome, and homelessness accepted by a stance of balance and stillness. Perhaps Nietzsche's Dionysian excess is the mark of the 'human all too human' denied cosmic significance. (These themes will be returned to in the final chapter).

Epiphanic Aesthetics in Wider Society

Before moving on to consider the charge of moralism against Taylor it is appropriate to look at the more general comments Taylor makes upon the progress of epiphanic art up to the contemporary period. Taylor suggests that contemporary society is marked by forms of thought that might be termed 'Modernist' (and Taylor has argued that Modernist thought is the successor doctrine to Romanticism). However it is obvious that epiphanic art in the twentieth century is very different from its Romantic original.

The flow of Taylor's argument is at times paradoxical, the continuities he identifies between Romantic and Modernist aesthetics he later identifies as making twentieth century epiphanic art 'very different' from its Romantic original. At one juncture the subjectivism and simultaneous anti-subjectivist thrust of epiphanic art is portrayed as the continuity between Romanticism and Modernism through the Victorian period. Later these changes are responsible for the different character of contemporary epiphanic art. At one point the discontinuity between the two forms of aesthetics is singular (personal indexing), at others it is multiple. How are these two perspectives to be reconciled? It is obvious that within a deeper continuity Taylor is identifying a change in meaning of aesthetic terminology. Taylor identifies two great changes.

Firstly twentieth century epiphanic art is more subjective, it is marked by a greater sense of inwardness. This new emphasis is reflected in 'stream of consciousness' literature, and the hegemony of impressionistic artistic artefacts. Secondly, late modern epiphanic art is also anti-subjectivist. There is a decentring of the self, there is an emphasis upon artistic forms that displace the centre of interest onto language, or poetic transformation. Forms that dissolve the notion of a self. These two changes should be in

opposition to one another, 'a slide to subjectivism and an anti-subjectivist thrust'¹⁷, and they are indeed in tension. But, Taylor asserts, in their genesis they belong together.

Modernists and Romantics both oppose their worlds for similar reasons; both are critics of instrumental rationality. For the Romantics seeing the world, or Nature, as a mechanism, as a field for instrumental reason appears shallow. For the Romantics the counterweight to the world deformed by instrumental rationality is the 'real world' of Nature (for Taylor it is the 'real world' of morality). However this Romantic solution is not open to Modernists for two related reasons.

Firstly through the growth of industrialised society natural landscapes, like those Constable painted, have been obliterated. Secondly, the growth of the scientific, mechanistic world view has englobed even the life sciences removing the rationale for salvation through beauty. These two changes have been facilitated by the shift in the sense of 'Nature as source'. Nature is now understood in a more Schopenhauerian sense than Rousseauian or Romantic. Nature is a reservoir of amoral power and not spiritual, theological force. Taylor moves on to consider the subjectivism and anti subjectivism at the heart of late Modern thought.

Subjectivism

J S Mill

Taylor suggests J.S Mill as a pivotal figure here. This choice is apposite and interesting. It is here that Taylor comes closest to fully engaging with the public - private debate. Mill embodies the late Modern condition, his Utilitarian education left him in turmoil; a turmoil he assuaged by a love of Romantic poetry (a personal salvation

through beauty and art). Mill experienced first hand the conflict between austere disengaged reason and a desire for a richer sense of meaning. His work, Taylor suggests, combines 'scientific utilitarianism' with an Expressivist conception of human fulfilment.

"Whether this synthesis is consistent or not is another issue; what is important here is that it represents one form of a widespread attempt to integrate Romantic notions of personal fulfilment into the private lives of the denizens of a civilisation run more and more by the canons of instrumental reason."¹⁸

This comment is of vast significance. Mill's synthesis is indeed not consistent. Within a framework of a public - private distinction this might not be problematic. As long as Mill is willing to 'privatise' his love of Coleridge his public life may continue to abide by the norms of society. It would even be possible to criticise these excessively austere and utilitarian norms if he so wished. But there are two striking features here.

Firstly, it is possible for an individual to live an equitable existence with vast contradiction in his or her life. This is both heroic and absurd. These sentiments are captured by the spirit of 'vive la difference' within Post Modern thought

Secondly, it is possible to see how some private creeds are more deleterious to the public than others. While Mill's love of Coleridge is reasonably benign (though he may advocate, ad nauseam, a wider appreciation of his work), while the private creed imputed to Taylor is more insidious. Taylor's supposed moralism requires a scrutiny of individual inner will. Public existence within societal norms is not enough, the individual is required to accept certain beliefs in his or her private life as well. When Taylor is cast in a foundationalist light his thought seems to specify that the individual must accept

theology, must accept the inescapably moral character of reality. The accusation that Taylor's theism extends into moralism would make his work terroristic to the individual's private life.

Anti-Subjectivism

Taylor suggests that the anti subjectivism in Modern society is encapsulated by two related notions, the 'escape from the unitary self'¹⁹ and the 'recovery of lived experience'²⁰. Modernist anti subjectivism can be found in the thought of Pound, Eliot, Rilke, and Heidegger. This anti subjectivism can be expressed as a direct attack upon Romanticism, as a revival of 'classicism' (as in Eliot), or as anti Humanism (as in Heidegger). However given all its varied forms the roots of this protest are still Romantic. They originate in the Romantic belief in Nature and nature within. Naive, early Romanticism pursues what Taylor has termed 'Nature as source', with a Rousseauian belief in the innocence of Nature. "Self-articulation can thus be in harmony with, can further the revelation of, the spirit in things."²¹

Thus Hulme and Eliot can dismiss Romanticism as simple self expression. This is a calumny, Taylor declares. But what is true is that the grounds for providentialism have collapsed. There is no pre established harmony between 'self- and world-articulation'. (Though Taylor does not couch it in such terms there is a growing acceptance of the indifference of the universe.). Such a notion of harmony is no longer believable post Schopenhauer and the impact of scientific biology.

What remained for Modernists was the post Nietzschean notion of Nature as an immense amoral force with which 'we' must recover contact. This assertion is found in Fauvism, Stravinsky, and D.H. Lawrence. But this demand, except in the extreme case of

Surrealism, cannot be identified with the whole self, instinct and creative imagination together.

The Escape From The Unitary Self

So, Taylor argues, the Modern inward turn is not to a self to be articulated but to experience or subjectivity itself. Thus the Modern goes beyond the self to a fragmentation of experience. (Increasingly the notion of human nature as a substance falls away. Human nature is perceived as an activity.). What seemed to be required, for Modernist artists, was an escape from the unitary self. Only through this escape was it possible for the individual to truly retrieve lived experience.

Both the ideals of disengaged reason and Romantic fulfilment required a notion of the unitary self. For the former ideal, to dominate experience and construct orders of reason; for the latter ideal to align sensibility and reason into a harmonious whole. Now the emphasis is rather upon opening oneself to the 'flux of existence' that is beyond the scope of control or integration. As Lawrence has it "Our ready - made individuality, our identity, is no more than an accidental cohesion in the flux of time."²².

The need for an escape from the unitary self is an important recurring theme in the twentieth century, and is of course extremely pronounced in Post Modern thought. Taylor particularly highlights Foucault's attack upon the disciplinary or confessing self

"As a result of this, the epiphanic centre of gravity begins to be displaced from the self to the flow of experience, to new forms of unity, to language conceived in a variety of ways-eventually even as a 'structure'. An age starts of 'decentering' subjectivity, which reaches its culmination, or

perhaps its parody, in certain recently fashionable doctrines from Paris.

For all the genuine discoveries which we have made in this mode, the impetus to enter it is in large part the same as that which turned us inward. Decentering is not the alternative to inwardness; it is its complement."²³

The crucial emphasis here is on a continual search for a new unity. If this urge itself could be seen as fallacious, if homelessness might be accepted, the impetus to distort human experience in favour of unity might be avoided. (Again this important point will be returned to in the next chapter.)

The Recovery Of Lived Experience

Taylor, has then, attempted to illustrate how Modernist epiphanic art despite its apparent variety has at its centre a commitment to retrieve lived experience. In spite of various preferred routes to this recovery the basic impulse is the same, be it expressed by Pound, Lawrence, or Cezanne. Taylor now turns to examine exactly what is meant by a recovery of lived experience.

For some individuals this recovery simply meant throwing off the old forms of thought and achieving an unmediated contact with the fullness of life, or the flux of experience. Taylor identifies two seemingly opposed, but ultimately related, forms of this route.

Some Modernists embraced industrial civilisation, and made it an instrument of the transfiguring will. This is the path of Marinetti and the Italian Futurists. This route prioritises the agent's own powers, trumpets rationality that can subsume the world

under its will. In a less monolithic way Jonathan Raban (Soft City) and some contemporary post Modernists emphasise the 'plastic' nature of modern living. The second path Taylor highlights is that of the individual abandoning control of his or herself to the 'deep' unconscious forces within. This is the path of DADA and Surrealism. The ego merges with Nature. However this is not a return to the Romantic synthesis of instinct and creative imagination. The subjectivism of Modernist aesthetics assures a 'dizzying descent into ourselves'²⁴.

The Futurists and Surrealists seem politically antipodal to one another, but possess a deeper affinity. Both streams of thought strive for immediate unity, both take up the 'poetics of juxtaposition' (interspatial epiphany) polemically to shatter received forms of thought and break the hold of repressive traditions. The search for immediate unity in its two forms is subjectivist.

Against this trend the main figures of high Modernism are aware of an inescapable duality, and unbridgeable distance between the agent and the world. In other words some major Modernists argue that unmediated experience, the recovery of lived experience in this sense, is an impossibility. This sense of duality or distance was connected with the closing of an age of Empiricism' Taylor argues²⁵.

With the increasing perceived paucity of Empiricism there was a revival of Kantianism. This neo-Kantianism was however more aware of the historical and cultural variety of forms. (Again although Taylor does not put it in these terms, it is increasingly aware of the problem of pluralism. Taylor is perhaps loath to use this terminology as his own theism is also woefully blind to the pluralism of secular society.). This neo-Kantianism is now also coupled with a Nietzschean sense of the chaos of the flux of experience. Reality devoid of any conceptual framework would be perceived by the individual as a sensory 'brainstorm'.

"This general understanding of the indispensable mediating role of form underlay the most influential philosophies of science of the period. But it posed a special problem for those who sought the retrieval of experience, for this was generally conceived as a return to the concrete, to the immediate, to the fullness of lived reality, as against the abstract, the mediated, the merely conceptualised. If there was no unmediated experience, then wasn't this ambition quite illusory?"²⁶.

Taylor is quite correct, and insightful in this. The 'liberationary' philosophies of various schools aspire to an impossibility. They aspire to experience Nature in all its pre conceptual force', the attempt to capture Nature 'in the raw'. While this desire to 'see the world aright' might be perceived as liberating, or as a pre requisite to knowing one's self, it is illusory. There is a determinacy to existence that cannot be 'wished away'. An aspect of this determinacy will be certain forms, or frameworks of thought. All this might be assented to, and ceded to Taylor, and indeed is brilliantly astute. However, the content of such determinacy is harder to ascertain, but it is emphatically not encompassed by Taylor's notion of a moral framework.

Taylor is correct to admonish liberationary philosophies, but he is also correct to identify them as a major stream of contemporary thought. For many late Moderns the desire to recover lived experience is an important aspect of their self definition, to say to those individuals "You must accept the moral character of reality" is a calumny. It is at this point that this thesis would make recourse to the notion of a public-private distinction.

Taylor argues that faced with the impasse of wishing to recover lived experience, and perceiving the impossibility of this desire Modernism appealed to a distinction between forms²⁷. Taylor suggests that what was introduced was a distinction between forms that gave us experience deadened and etiolated and those that brought it back vivid and full! In other words the appeal to pre conceptual experience is in large part abandoned. The judgement of better and worse forms cannot be held up as pre conceptual, even though Taylor himself will make this attempt with his concept of 'strong evaluation'. Taylor identifies a number of attempts at this distinction. For instance Hulme makes such a distinction between deadening prose and vivid poetry. For Pound the distinction is between Western script and the Chinese ideogram.

This is an example of framing, or interspatial epiphany. The Chinese ideogram for red combines abbreviated pictures of rose, iron rust, cherry and flamingo. Built into the general term are fragments of the particulars from which it was abstracted. In Western script these fragments of the original terms are forgotten and as a consequence there is a deadening of language. Thus through the juxtaposition of images or words this vitality might be recovered. An interspatial epiphany is a frame that gestures beyond itself to something that we do not possess the words to capture. A something that we cannot simply grab onto while we let the fragments drop. There are two important nuances to grasp here.

Firstly there is a growing awareness amongst Modernist theorists that a full recovery of lived experience is impossible. Rather there is an increasing subtlety in their thought whereby aesthetics is no longer seen as the seat of redemption that supersedes religion. Indeed there is an acceptance that there is no final redemption, but only fragmentary hints of a fuller redemption²⁸. The second nuance adds full to the critics

charge of moralism when Taylor's first person affirmation of Judeo-Christian theology is seen in the light of a quest for a total, suprahuman affirmation of lived experience.

Adorno

Taylor suggests that Adorno is an important figure here. Adorno illustrates the shift from full to partial fulfilment. Adorno is influenced in this by Marx, Hegel, Schiller and crucially Schopenhauer. Adorno's original belief in the Romantic reconciliation of reason and sensibility is increasingly influenced by the Modernist sense that saw the breaking of old aesthetic forms as a liberation of concrete experience. As Adorno lived through the disappointment of Marxist hope he became increasingly convinced that a full recovery of concrete experience was impossible.

"The reconciliation eludes us, because universal concepts always suppress from sight something of the reality of the particular. The perfect, non-distorting, non-reductive appellation would be the 'name', a term drawn from the Cabbalist tradition. We have lost the power to truly name things."²⁹

In facing this dilemma, in coming to terms with fragmentary reconciliation, Adorno appropriates a term from Walter Benjamin. Unable to name things, and pace Wittgenstein, we can frame them in 'constellations', clusters of terms and images that create a space in which the particular can emerge

Its importance can be grasped in the late Modern concern with the particular versus the universal, the private versus the public, and the revival of interest in the work

of Isaiah Berlin. The achievement and tragedy of Taylor's thought is to the fore here. Having traced the growth of interspatial epiphany and set it in a historical archaeology of the concept of the self in the West, Taylor seems poised to grasp the kind of liberalism that Berlin has promulgated. Liberalism is tragic, it involves difficult choices without end. Beyond this Berlin argues that human capacities are limited, and this thesis would argue exhibit determinacy or facticity. The important emphasis in Berlin is upon something which, that other communitarian, Rorty, captures; the necessity to continue engaging with these problems with a proper sense of the worth of the human individual (in Rorty 'continuing the conversation of mankind'.) The worth of the individual can be captured by perceiving him or her as an interspatial epiphany.

As Waldron (the critic of Taylor) has it

"[Taylor] adopts, it seems, something like the pluralist humility of Isaiah Berlin:..That humility can be attractive, and Taylor deploys it to good effect, not only against liberals who identify Catholicism with the inquisition and communitarianism..but also against those like Bellah and ..MacIntyre who do nothing but lament the triviality and narcissism of modern life. But it is attractive only if it is unflinching."³⁰.

As Waldron also comments the nightmare Berlin highlights is the implementation of a religious ideology, a Utopia 'where everything fits and nothing costs'. This nightmare can be resisted through an embedded analysis of human nature and a lively civil society.

Having isolated, and illustrated, the concept of interspatial epiphany it is now possible to turn to an examination of the motivations for Taylor's imputed betrayal of the concept; and to set the concept (in Chapter Five) within Taylor's wider political thought.

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- ¹ Collingwood, R.G The Idea of Nature (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1960)
- ² Fraser, J. The Golden Bough (Ware: Wordsworth, 1993)
- ³ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1989) pp.394-395.
- ⁴ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1989) pp.465-466 and pp.475-477
- ⁵ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) p.479.
- ⁶ Taylor, C Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) p.468.
- ⁷ Berlin, I. Transcribed from Third Programme BBC Radio, broadcast 1966.
- ⁸ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) explored through Part IV pp.305-393 (especially pp389-390) and p.427.
- ⁹ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) pp.450-452 and again p.462.
- ¹⁰ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) pp. 400-401.
- ¹¹ See in particular Legitimation Crisis? Taylor, C. Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) Vol:2 Chap.10.
- ¹² As argued through Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) Part I in particular pp.3-25.
- ¹³ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) pp.489-490 and again pp503-505.
- ¹⁴ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) p.452.
- ¹⁵ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989) p.444.
- ¹⁶ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.454
- ¹⁷ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.456.
- ¹⁸ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p458.
- ¹⁹ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.462
- ²⁰ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p463.
- ²¹ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.461.
- ²² as quoted in Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.463.
- ²³ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.465.
- ²⁴ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.470.
- ²⁵ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.472.
- ²⁶ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.472.
- ²⁷ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.473.
- ²⁸ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp491-493.
- ²⁹ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.478.
- ³⁰ Waldron. J. How we learn to be good TLS March 23 1990 pp.325-6.

CHAPTER FOUR

PERSONAL INDEXING AND TAYLOR'S MORALISM

Introduction

This chapter will examine why Taylor is accused of a foundationalist slump and a retreat from his identification of human nature as an interspatial epiphany. As suggested in the first chapter critics of Taylor such as Waldron, Kymlicka and Shklar claim that Taylor undermines his concept of human nature by an apparent first person affirmation of Judeo-Christian theology. This positive affirmation of ontology signals to his critics that Taylor does **not** wish to set his concept of interspatial epiphany within a secular ethics. It will be the argument of this chapter that such a charge cannot be maintained.

Taylor is rather walking a more astute path that rejects foundationalism but which is sensitive to the claims that an embedded conception of the individual reveals that she is enveloped by plural value systems. Taylor wishes to maintain this retrieval in the face of representational epistemology that dismisses or suppresses discussion of value under the assumption that external reality is value neutral.

While the major charge of Taylor's critics might be dismissed it will be further argued that there is some cogency to the criticism that Taylor is blind to the value systems implicit in utilitarianism and existentialism; this will be explored in reference to the work of Dancy. Even this charge of a 'scotoma' (a small area of blindness) in Taylor's thought might be robbed of some of its force by the suggestion that perhaps Taylor simply sees such projectivist ethics as uninspiring, and as poor candidates to bolster social cohesion.

Taylor's argument through SOTS is that an individual's conception of herself is bound up with conceptions of 'the good'. In SOTS these conceptions are 'inescapably' approached through an 'embodied moral phenomenology' (in accordance with Taylor's BA principle.) However, it is only through EOA that Taylor's position becomes clear. With this increasing clarity it is possible, this thesis will argue, to hold a much more sympathetic view of Taylor's position than his critics would allow of.

In accordance with the preceding comments this chapter will briefly examine how Taylor might be characterised as betraying his conception of human nature, before moving on to a more thorough going examination of Taylor's case for 'moral realism' in the sense of an embodied moral phenomenology that respects the individuals own self definitions. This latter examination will draw upon the thought of Berlin. Critics of Taylor seize on his self characterisation as a hedgehog to suggest that Taylor conforms to Berlin's assessment of Tolstoy as a fox theorist who believes in being a hedgehog. It is to suggest that while as a theorist Taylor can accept a plurality of embedded values, for practical and political purposes he suggests that a unitary moral horizon is required.

The Putative Retreat From Interspatial Epiphany

As outlined in the first chapter Waldron suggests that SOTS is a 'sandwich'; four hundred pages of rich, vital, historical research between two pieces of moral philosophy. The beginning and end of SOTS are the "least satisfying", Waldron comments:

"..the weakest parts of this book are its confessional pages: the high minded rejection of emotivism at the beginning, and the first-person

affirmation of religion in spite of everything, at the end. Neither position is supported or implied by what we read in the middle of the book."¹.

For Waldron it is astounding that a mere sixty pages or so after Taylor has isolated and identified the concept of human nature as an interspatial epiphany he can comment that his task through SOTS

"...was one of retrieval, an attempt to uncover buried goods through rearticulation - and thereby to make these sources again empower, to bring the air back again into the half collapsed lungs of the spirit...It is a hope I see implicit in Judeo-Christian theism (however terrible the record of its adherents in history), and in its central promise of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever attain unaided."²

This final position, Taylor himself suggests, many will find 'overblown' and an 'overreaction' to a narrowness of the academy, in particular to representational epistemology. To his critics Taylor has repudiated atomistic, rationalistic, and purely scientific conceptions of human nature, he has, in large part, broken the hold of instrumental reason on contemporary conceptions of human nature, and revealed current received opinion as an historical artefact and then retreated to a theological position. There is some confusion here. Taylor's attack has widened the field for the role of 'spirit' to re-emerge, Taylor's sense of human nature is altogether more 'organic' and as part of this nature retrieves the ability to make strong evaluations. Taylor's critics see this

recovery of the spirit as followed by a call to a return to ancient and unmediated conceptions of theology. It will be argued, however, that Taylor's recovery of spirit, or the non physical, must be interpreted in a more sensitive fashion as a call for a reinterpretation of Judeo-Christian theology with a late Modern sensibility, this recovery is necessarily mediated through the changing facets of the Modern identity.

As suggested above Taylor sees his own work as characteristic of 'post-Heideggerian hermeneutics'. Taylor follows Heidegger's analysis that the Modern era suppresses the question of Being. The modern individual has fallen into Inauthenticity. Indeed the title of Taylor's The Ethics Of Authenticity expresses just how widespread Taylor feels this sentiment has spread.

It was argued in the previous chapter that Taylor at times walks a fine line on the edge of coherence when he argues for a unity, or continuity between disparate streams of thought within the aesthetics of epiphanic art. This problem is particularly acute with both the arguments for the continuity between contemporary society and 'our' 'Victorian contemporaries', and between the various streams of Modernist aesthetics. In the latter case Taylor argues for a distinction between Expressionism and the bulk of positivistic, mechanistic inspired Modernism, while Taylor sees his own Expressivism as the heir to Expressionism. While Taylor turns to the painted and written aesthetic artefact to illustrate his point, the focus of attention in this chapter will be architecture.

A differing sensibility to Taylor's might locate the seeds of Modernism in the trenches of the First World War. The literal architects of Modernism experienced the dirt, squalor, and decay of the trenches. This gave the Modernists a first metaphor. This is the metaphor of the operating theatre. Modern buildings are steel and glass, sterile towers. However this does not capture the full spectrum of Modernist thought. As Taylor has argued there is an initial flowering of Expressionism. In architecture such a

blooming is represented by a building such as the Einstein Tower in Berlin. It is interesting that these first explorations are made in Germany. Expressionism in architecture was by no means universally welcomed. An early critic of the Einstein Tower likened it to a 'flaccid jellyfish!' The metaphor of the Expressionists was to 'fevered hallucinations' and 'strange accidents'. The suggestion being that the Expressionists were more profoundly influenced by the destruction and mutilation of war, and a growing awareness of Inwardness.

It is interesting that it is possible to identify a pessimistic Modernism (of the Expressionists) alongside its more usual optimistic stream. It is interesting as Taylor identifies himself as someone drawn to the pessimistic view of history³. Taylor has a sympathy for the 'downward spiral' view of history. It would then, appear that Taylor has a Modern sense of history, one that views history as a decline (influenced in Taylor's case by Heidegger).

To return to the aesthetics of architecture, it is important not to over stress the pessimism and difference of Expressionism from the mainstream of Modernism. While Expressionism might not wholeheartedly recognise the central metaphor of Modernism (Nature as a machine), it is nonetheless influenced by the notion of a clean start after the destruction of war, and crucially by the Modernist emphasis upon light. Both the Modernists and the Expressionists are captivated by the vision of the world 'bathed in a crystal light'; hence the ubiquity of glass in Modernist architecture. In an attempt further to emphasise the subtle differences between 'pessimistic' and 'optimistic' Modernism it is appropriate to turn to a discussion of the work of Le Corbusier.

Le Corbusier is an instructive theorist for a number of reasons. Firstly, he was an early, and virulent critic of Expressionism in architecture. Secondly he epitomises the Modernist belief in light, embraces the Modernist metaphor of the operating theatre, and

wholeheartedly pursues the conception of the building as a machine for living in. Le Corbusier embodies the absolutism of optimistic Modernism. Continuing the medical metaphor Le Corbusier sees the urban slums of Paris as a cancer that must be cut out, to be replaced by severe glass tower blocks.

Le Corbusier epitomises what has been called 'architectural determinism'. He believed that architecture could change society. He is credited with saying that you would be 'a better man if you lived in a glass house', and that his age faced a choice between 'architecture or revolution'. Le Corbusier's comments are of immense significance, but their complex interrelations are hard to disentangle. Indeed such an investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. However it is important to make a few, brief comments.

Le Corbusier

Le Corbusier's belief in glass has an obvious parallel in early Liberal thought. Early Liberalism, influenced by philosophical radicalism, is epitomised by Bentham's Panopticon. The instrument of penal, and individual reform in the hands of Le Corbusier has a universal application. Increasingly the moral of optimistic, or mainstream Modernism seems to be an abhorrence of dirt and decay. This Modernist trend is most overt in German thought. In the hands of the National Socialists the emphasis upon individual hygiene metamorphoses into another Modern discovery, National or racial hygiene. With the National Socialists the human body becomes the site of a new 'religion'. The health and fitness element in the Hitler Youth movement is but one manifestation of this concern. (It is interesting to speculate how this Modern concern influences the thought of Foucault.). The human body, however, is not perceived in an

'organic' sense, rather the body is understood in a mechanistic sense. It is a machine for living in. This is the ultimate expression of an instrumental approach to the human organism, it represents a severe act of disengagement.

Le Corbusier epitomises this positivistic and scientific conception of the human body. Le Corbusier used a set of statistics, known as the 'body modular' to design certain aspects of his buildings, even his own home. In his house this resulted in a corridor approximately the width of a railway carriage corridor. Apparently several visitors to his house had trouble manoeuvring their 'non standard' bulk along this passageway. This characterises the absolutism of Le Corbusier's, Modernism's and ultimately Taylor's thought.

There is an obvious inhuman edge to Le Corbusier's thought. As an architect he has no interest in the foibles or interests of individuals. Rather he legislates, from the body modular, a totalitarian style for all. There is an obvious tyranny here, there is no consideration for individuals who wish to live 'messier' lives; for those who are not happy living on the surface of a Mondrian painting.

Once again Taylor is correct to see an overemphasis in Modernism upon atomism, disengagement, and instrumental rationality. Taylor is also correct to identify 'engagement', and interspatial epiphany derived from Expressionism and Romanticism as a solution to this historically specific state of affairs.

Nature Redefined

In initially considering why Taylor might be characterised as retreating from interspatial epiphany it is possible to draw a 'short answer' from the text of SOTS. It becomes increasingly clear through SOTS that Taylor sees an immense threat issuing

from unengaged Modernist thought. The existential heroist wing of Modernist thought suggests that the individual is free from all ties of community and family and that it is possible to have an unmediated contact with reality. The concept of personal indexing that Taylor outlines can be pursued into 'trivial' forms by theorists of this bent, the terminal point they envisage would be a chaos of self affirmers respecting no limits to the operation of their powers of radical choice making.

For Taylor then, influenced as he is by Hegel, it might be assumed that this final affirmation might be found in 'the state', or Prussian Sittlichkeit, which Waldron⁴ perceives as the outcome of Hegel's thought. However Taylor is a more subtle, much more sophisticated Modern than Hegel. The state as a monolithic entity is now a largely derided concept. For Taylor political institutions are to become increasingly decentralised, and thus increasingly 'resonant surroundings' (these political consequences will be explored in the next chapter). The terminal point for Taylor is in fact a Berlinian pluralist, humanist liberalism.

It is appropriate then to pause and consider in more depth Taylor's motivation for retrieving the spirit.

The Recovery Of Spirit

As has been suggested at a number of points, the motivation for Taylor's recovery of spirit and embedded values emanates from the most laudable of intentions. His final position is that an ontological background is required to assure that individuals are capable of respecting other humans. For Taylor, this is only achievable through an acceptance of anthropological, situated value. It is the fall of publicly mediated orders, and the rise of personal indexing that threatens democracy and humanitarianism. This is

one possible form of personal indexing, a heroic personal indexing, what is rather required is a more modest, more engaged personal indexing. The Communitarianism that Taylor advocates can only be supported by a communal horizon of significance. It is Taylor's 'hunch' that the content of this horizon could be bolstered by a reformulated, mediated conception of Judeo-Christian theology⁵. In terms of the quotation near the beginning of this chapter it is a *hope* that Taylor sees as *implicit* in theology. So communal significance is safeguarded by individuals who are sensitive to their embodiment and embedment in a particular society, but who nonetheless can make this embedment their own by mediating their experience through their own personal index. Personal indexing is **not** however the heroic or unconnected act envisaged by existentially heroic thought. This is the brilliance of Taylor's position. However Taylor is occasionally blinded by this brilliance into suggesting that almost all modern moral thinking is similarly unconnected.

Taylor appears to be misguided on two fronts. These fronts can be related to the public-private debate and the 'private language argument' (capturing Taylor's fetishisation of the quality of inner will). Taylor's dread at the collapse of public orders is well placed. The nightmare scenario Taylor envisages is a society of Post Modern self affirmers losing the will, after Tocqueville, to maintain democratic institutions. However this very collapse of a unitary horizon is one of the characteristic features of the progress of Modernity, and the freeing of humankind from 'superstition'. (It is possible to be both a Knocker and Booster of the 'progress' of Modern society).

The nightmare scenario Taylor envisages is perhaps somewhat overblown (indeed Taylor himself would accept this, see 'the issue over sources' below) but one that animates some contemporary forms of life. Taylor is postulating a severe form of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Disengaged self affirmers acknowledge no

allegiance and no parameters to their capacities. Therefore the scope for democratic politics is vastly reduced, both by 'narcissism', and a failure of the democratic will. Both Tocqueville and Nietzsche see Modern individuals as disengaging from politics as they become obsessed by 'pitiable comfort'.

The 'Tower of Babel' (a suitable metaphor for a society of self affirmers) in late Modern democratic society is corrosive, and threatens the individual. It is Taylor's contention that a conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany will engender a respect for other individuals. However this is only the case if self affirmers can be persuaded that heroic personal indexing is incoherent (after Wittgenstein's private language argument) and that the embeddedness of human experience offers a mediated experience of common values.

At the end of SOTS Taylor turns to focuses upon 'three issues' which are of particular interest to him (these three issues will be addressed immediately below). In respect of one of these issues, which Taylor labels 'the issue over sources', he comments

"We agree surprisingly well, across great differences of theological and metaphysical belief, about the demands of justice and benevolence, and their importance....So why worry that we disagree on the reasons, as long as we're united around the norms?...High standards need strong sources. This is because there is something morally corrupting, even dangerous in sustaining the demand simply on the feeling of undischarged obligation, on guilt, or its obverse, self-satisfaction."⁶

Taylor wishes to temper existential heroism and unmediated personal indexing by reference to lived experience and a situated moral phenomenology. The retrieval of spirit

is a laudable programme, and it is the Romantic fruit of that emphasis upon spirit that Taylor wishes to harvest. This is to maintain Berlin's appreciation of Romanticism while resisting the foundationalist slump (his critics accuse him of) and at the same time avoid unlocated existential heroism. That is, to maintain a real appreciation of the Romantic conception of the creative imagination, uniqueness and a sense of autonomy, to assert that the individual is the best judge of her own interests, even if this estimation is partial. Taylor accepts this need for autonomy (mediated personal indexing), and rejects attempts to usurp its primacy (with his BA principle). However it is Taylor's affirmation of both Judeo-Christian theology **and** his comments on Grace that lay him most exposed to his critics charge of moralism.

The Fetistishisation Of Inner Will: The Role Of Grace

Taylor's critic suggest that Taylor's appeal to Grace is captured by the tone of Ephesians (Chapter 2, Verses 8-9):

"For it is by Grace you have been saved, through faith - and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God - not by works, so that no-one can boast."

This then is the import of Taylor's emphasis upon Grace. It is the gift of God, and not attainable by humanity, by for example, increasing rationality. Indeed the opposite is true, it is attained through faith. There is an imputed fetishisation of the quality of will to critics such as Kymlicka, Taylor is seen as attempting to legislate the content of inner experience.

However what Taylor seems to be touching on is the need for humility or piety. Once again Taylor has touched upon a very important issue, but he sets this insight within a theological vocabulary that opens him to the charge of foundationalism. It could be suggested, with some accuracy, that much Modern thought could benefit from a dose of humility, that could curb the 'totalising' aspect of Modern thought.

In an attempt to defuse the criticism of theism it should be remembered that Taylor has detailed the fate of Grace in the Modern period, Taylor isolated 'historical exceptionalism' as the successor to Grace. Therefore it is unjust to characterise Taylor's comment on Grace as a call for a re-enchantment of Nature.

The issue for many Moderns is not what unitary horizon to appeal to or to celebrate but how to come to terms with the impossibility of ever having a unitary horizon again. For Taylor's critics it is Berlin's interpretation of Tolstoy that is of importance here. This is both because Berlin's estimation of Tolstoy might be applied to Taylor, and because at the centre of his analysis of Tolstoy Berlin sees a central concern for the dichotomy between the public and the private, the second front on which Taylor might be regarded as misguided.

Berlin On Tolstoy

In The Hedgehog and the Fox Berlin proposes a bifurcation in the mentality of 'human beings in general'. This is the division between the Fox ('who knows many things') and the Hedgehog ('who knows one big thing'). This then is a division between the pluralist and the monist (respectively). Berlin will admit that the dichotomy, 'if pressed', is artificial and absurd; but nonetheless he utilises it to divide prominent writers and thinkers. The list of Foxes includes Aristotle, Montaigne, Erasmus, Moliere, Goethe,

Pushkin, Shakespeare and Joyce. The list of Hedgehogs includes Plato, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Dante and Ibsen. However some theorists are more difficult to place, particularly Tolstoy. Taylor has no problem in locating himself within Berlin's divide. In the introduction to his Philosophical Papers Taylor identifies himself as a 'hedgehog'. The one thing that Taylor knows, in this sense, is the error of 'atomism'. Taylor is opposed to instrumental rationality.

Berlin suggests that while Tolstoy is difficult to locate, "The hypothesis I wish to offer is that Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog;..."⁷. This is the same belief that fosters Taylor's retreat from interspatial epiphany. In characterising Tolstoy, Berlin focuses upon his philosophy of history. Berlin suggests that the idea of history is of central importance to Tolstoy's thought. However Tolstoy is both enamoured of and repelled by the vista his philosophy of history reveals.

Tolstoy And History

Tolstoy's work is undeniably greatly influenced by the historicism of his day. Tolstoy grew up during the heyday of Hegelianism and philosophical historicism. It was Tolstoy's belief that only history was capable of 'breaking through' to first causes. Indeed this remains the hidden rationale behind historicist methodology up to the modern day. However Tolstoy's philosophy of history is also influenced by what Taylor has identified as the affirmation of ordinary life. This influence expresses itself in Tolstoy's hostility to the 'great man' view of history. Tolstoy is opposed to political histories, general histories, histories of culture, and liberal history that pre-suppose some metaphysical doctrine. These doctrines are expressed in terms such as the influence of significant individuals, or by talk of the exercise of 'power', or 'forces' (be they spiritual or of ideas) moving

through history. For Tolstoy any such talk is metaphysical claptrap, it obscures more than it reveals.

Tolstoy's philosophy of history, influenced by the transvaluation of values implicit in the affirmation of ordinary life, turns to the concrete experience of individuals. It progresses by the calculation of 'infinitesimals', 'the ordinary day-to-day succession of private data'.

History, as it is normally written, usually represents 'political' -public- events as the most important, while spiritual -'inner'- events are largely forgotten; yet prima facie it is they -the 'inner' events- that are the most real, the most immediate experience of human beings; they, and only they, are what life, in the last analysis, is made of; hence the routine political historians are talking shallow nonsense."⁸.

The similarity to Taylor's thought is striking here. The 'spirit' is ignored by political history. It is the inner and the spiritual that must be retrieved to truly grasp human history. In the final analysis it is individual's experience that is the 'foundation' of reality. Taylor wishes to argue that reality is inescapably moral from a moral phenomenology of human experience; that is, from the individual experience of being able to make strong evaluations, or draw qualitative distinctions (once again examined later in this chapter).

However Tolstoy's history as the calculation of infinitesimals has a paradoxical place in his own thought. While Tolstoy was influenced by historicism, he is also influenced by the realism and empirical temper of his age. This empiricism led Tolstoy instinctively to reject metaphysics. However it also led him to view the nature of history in scientifically rigorous terms. Tolstoy yearned for the concrete and verifiable over the

abstract and metaphysical. He exhibited a marked hostility to the Romantic. This led Tolstoy to hold a view of history similar to that of Collingwood (examined in the first chapter). Tolstoy saw clearly that history could not be a science in the Modern sense. Both history and metaphysical philosophy pretend to be something they are not, viz predictive sciences.

Sensitive history, that is history with a proper concern for evidence, analysis of documents and careful examination of concrete human experience, increasingly, and with increasing accuracy, locates an act in its context. However, this act of 'location' makes the actor seem increasingly less free, less responsible for his or her act. In principle it would be possible to achieve the position of ideal observer and plot every 'drop in the stream of history'. "The fact that we shall never identify all the causes, relate all human acts to the circumstances which condition them, does not imply that they are free, only that we shall never know how they are necessitated."⁹ The historical methodology Tolstoy advocates (from a sense of the primacy of inner human experience) paradoxically issues in historical determinism.

This then is the great paradox at the heart of Tolstoy's conception of history. Berlin suggests that Tolstoy's most insightful critic is Kareev. It is Kareev who portrays *War and Peace* as a 'historical poem on the philosophical theme of duality'. That is between the concrete data of everyday human experience, the reality of human experience with its perception of free will, and sense of responsibility; and the reality of inexorable historical determinism. The conflict is between two systems of value, the private and the public. Kareev sees Tolstoy as quite correct to institute 'greater realism' into historical studies, but suggests Tolstoy goes too far in declaring (not that history is not a natural science, but) that history is not a science at all. Against this Kareev suggests that individuals alongside their inner lives, have 'social purposes'.

"Kareev declares that it is men, doubtless, who make social forms, but these forms - the ways in which men live - in their turn affect those born into them; individual wills may not be all-powerful, but neither are they totally impotent,.."¹⁰

Kareev expresses the sense of determinacy that this thesis is attempting to develop.

Berlin comments that while Kareev's comments are reasonable; in a sense he misses the point.

The critic Eikhenbaum suggests that what oppresses Tolstoy is his lack of positive convictions. Intellectually, Tolstoy could explode all doctrines that claim to guarantee the unity of all things, the ideal of the 'seamless' whole. Nevertheless, privately, Tolstoy longed for a universal explanatory principle. This, in the final analysis, suggest Taylor's critics, in particular Shklar¹¹ is true of Taylor also; he is by nature a Fox who believes in being a Hedgehog, Taylor wishes to re-enchant nature and re-erect a unitary moral horizon.

"Tolstoy's...genius for this kind of lethal activity [the destruction of metaphysical, unifying doctrines] was very great and exceptional, and all his life he looked for some edifice strong enough to resist his engines of destruction and his mines and battering-rams; he wished to be stopped by an immovable obstacle, he wished his violent projectiles to be resisted by impregnable fortifications. The eminent reasonableness and tentative methods of Kareev, were altogether too unlike the final impenetrable, irreducible, solid bedrock of truth.."¹²

It is appropriate to quote Berlin at such length, and not merely for the power of his prose. It is just this desire for firm foundations that Taylor's critics accuse him of pursuing. However it is Kareev's position that is the more accurate characterisation of Taylor's.

It is the search for seamless unity itself that should be curbed. The search for unmediated unity that is a repetition of the Modern error of universalism. This search is traditionally pursued by Modernism through disengagement and the operation of instrumental rationality, but it can also be achieved by the calculation of infinitesimals, by engagement, a sense of embodiment. The remedy for the illusory search for seamless unity is an acceptance of homelessness. As Berlin comments

"Tolstoy's sense of reality was until the end too devastating to be compatible with any moral ideal which he was able to construct out of the fragments into which his intellect shivered the world, and he dedicated all of his vast strength of mind and will to the lifelong denial of this fact."¹³

It is now appropriate to turn to what Waldron cites as one of the weakest parts of Taylor's thought, his rejection of emotivism and to suggest that Taylor does miss the values implicit in utilitarianism and existentialism.

Inescapable Moral Horizons

At the beginning of SOTS Taylor attempts to engage in a phenomenology of moral experience; this discussion draws on and expands Taylor's own earlier thought, in

particular 'What is Human Agency'¹⁴. It will be remembered that in the introduction to his Philosophical Papers Taylor identifies himself as a Hedgehog, with a monomaniacal desire to refute 'atomism'. More broadly Taylor wishes to oppose instrumental rationality, and naturalism. To achieve this aim Taylor has developed the concept of human nature as an interspatial epiphany. This Expressivist concept attempts to deny the metaphor of instrumentalism, that of 'disengagement'. Taylor's laudable insistence upon a recognition of 'embeddedness' (facticity or determinacy) leads him, in the realm of ethics, to argue for 'moral realism' in the sense of an embedded acknowledgement of the 'thrownness' of an individual into a moral community. It is Taylor's argument that the progress of disengagement has had disastrous consequences for moral ontology.¹⁵

In commencing his phenomenology of moral experience Taylor launches into an attack upon three characteristics of 'emotivist' moral theories. Which Taylor variously identifies as emotivist or 'projectionist' ethics or as forms of moral subjectivism.

The Paucity Of Naturalism

The first naturalism Taylor identifies is the notion of moral sense. This is the attempt to assimilate moral reactions to visceral ones. Taylor associates this strand of thought with Rousseau, and with Mackie's 'error theory'. The motivations for the appeal to moral sense are, as has been seen, the loss of belief in a substantive ontology. Taylor focuses on two aspects of this movement in particular.

Firstly, there is a distrust of ontology. Historically ontology has been put to dubious uses, for example justifying the exclusion of 'heretics'. This distrust is strengthened, Taylor asserts, by a Rousseauian, primitivist sense that 'unspoiled human nature respects life'.

A second reason for the dismissal of ontology is the spectacular rise of Modern natural science. The scientism of contemporary culture puts all ontological accounts under 'a cloud'. There is a temptation to rest secure in the fact that humans have moral reactions and dismiss the underlying ontology as 'froth', as superstition and nonsense from a bygone age. For Taylor such a suppression of ontology is unacceptable.

It is unacceptable for two reasons. Firstly it is to distort lived experience. This is obviously unpalatable to Taylor as he pursuing a *phenomenology* of moral experience; that is an 'engaged' or embodied exploration. Secondly, the suppression of ontology unjustifiably extends the methodology of the natural sciences to the study of the human (and this is to embrace atomism). Taylor's concern is that ontology is rejected too lightly. An ontological account has the status of 'articulating' our moral instincts, it is a spelling out of human moral intuitions, and as such it is indispensable. It is clear then that to be articulate is to recognise ontology.

The second naturalism Taylor challenges is the attempt to eschew a conception of 'the good', in favour of many goods. Such a naturalist position is paradoxical; while overtly denying a sense of 'the good', it covertly appeals to such a sense in a commitment to pluralism. As Taylor will maintain with increasing rigidity, a conception of 'the good' is indispensable. Taylor argues that an individual who truly had no orientation to 'the good' would be regarded as less than human, a poor individual. The eschewal of 'the good' grows from the fracturing of the theological horizon.

The third naturalism Taylor identifies is a 'linguistic' strain. Such projectivist ethics argue that value terms have descriptive analogues that render recourse to evaluative terms superfluous. Taylor rejects such theories, and sees them as indebted to seventeenth century notions of 'secondary properties'.

"But as has been argued...these descriptive equivalents turn out to be unavailable for a whole host of our key value terms. With terms like 'courage' or 'brutality' or 'gratitude', we cannot grasp what could hold all their instances together as a class if we prescind from their evaluative point."¹⁶.

To grasp the evaluative point of a term, it is necessary to understand the kind of social interchange taking place, and a sense of the 'qualitative distinctions' being made. This final comment is of vast significance in relation to Taylor's later thought.

While in SOTS Taylor meets Berlin's assessment of Tolstoy, in his later work (especially EOA) Taylor increasingly stresses the dialogical character of human existence. This emphasis stems from Taylor's belief that humans achieve interspatial epiphany through the medium of language. With this increasing emphasis it will be argued that it is possible to have an increasing sympathy for Taylor's position.

The force of Taylor's denial of projectionist ethics and naturalism is to establish that 'qualitative distinctions' and 'strong evaluation' exist, but in a realm not adequately approached by natural science. Given the failure of naturalism to explain moral experience adequately Taylor expands upon his Heideggerian hermeneutics - his phenomenology of moral experience - as a more adequate alternative.

Jonathan Dancy has suggested that moral subjectivism in the Modern Anglo-American tradition is encapsulated by the work of Ayer and Hare. These theorists exhibit the common trait of being 'reductionist' about the nature of 'the good'; it is this trait that Taylor deplors. The backlash against moral subjectivism in the English speaking tradition, Dancy asserts, has issued in forms of 'intuitionism', which has come to be known as 'moral realism'. (Dancy also draws a contrast between American and English

moral realism that will be examined later in this chapter.) Through the opening section of SOTS Taylor puts forward a spirited defence of moral realism. This defence accepts the moral realist commonplace that in ethical matters there are 'facts of the matter': that is, moral facts that are independent of the individual's recognition of them. Taylor's conceptualisation of the nature and role of ontology is buttressed by his situated moral phenomenology.

It is Taylor's argument that the 'facts' of moral experience are either wilfully ignored (by reductionists), or overlooked by a society in the grip of the primacy of instrumental rationality. The primacy of instrumentalism issues in strange, cramped Modern moral theory, that is 'inarticulate' about 'the good'. The role of Taylor's conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany is becoming increasingly clear. One aspect of the term epiphany in Taylor's conception is to argue for a rejection of disengagement, and a call for re-engagement. The engagement Taylor foresees will also, however, have to recognise moral facts, or what Taylor terms 'inescapable moral horizons'. This insistence is apart of Taylor's assertion that identity (a conception of human nature or the self) is inextricably linked to a conception of 'the good'. Using the Modern metaphor of a 'veiled reality' the true moral nature of reality only emerges when the individual repudiates disengagement and undertakes a phenomenology of moral experience. What emerges from this phenomenology is what Taylor terms a recognition of 'strong evaluation', and his Best Account principle (or BA principle).

It will be the argument of this thesis that Taylor partially misinterprets Modern moral theorising, and that his commitment to moral realism (situated moral phenomenology) must be recast in less dogmatic terms.

Strong Evaluation

It is Taylor's argument (first developed in the paper *What is Human Agency*¹⁷) that the individual is capable of making 'strong evaluation' or drawing 'qualitative distinctions'. The individual finds it possible, and indeed inescapable to make estimations of 'higher' and 'lower', 'right' and 'wrong'. It will be remembered that Berlin suggested that Tolstoy spent much of his intellectual life looking for an 'immovable object'. Taylor's 'immovable object' is the ubiquitousness of 'strong evaluation'. Strong evaluation is the cornerstone of Taylor's phenomenology and the primordial experience of embodiment.

This is what naturalism misses in attempting to take a 'neutral stance' towards moral ontology. This type of Modern thought has led contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy to offer a cramped view of the nature and sources of moral value. Taylor's argument to defeat this type of thinking is to offer his own BA principle. To gain access to the moral realm, Taylor argues, we must approach it through 'our' deepest moral instincts. Such an exploration, rather than requiring disengagement, requires a more thorough going engagement with lived experience. The character of interspatial epiphany is captured in this engagement.

As a general approach opposed to that of natural science Taylor suggests the best account (or BA) principle. Taylor is suggesting that Platonism and natural science are allied in creating a false picture of the issue of strong evaluation, of excluding such evaluation from the realm of 'rational' discussion. This exclusion paves the way for the success of inarticulate projectionist ethics; in opposition to this Taylor asks a rhetorical question.

"What better measure of reality do we have in human affairs than those terms which on critical reflection and after correction of the errors we can

detect make the best sense of our lives? 'Making the best sense' here includes not only offering the best, most realistic orientation about the good but also allowing us best to understand and make sense of the actions and feelings of ourselves and others."¹⁸

It is unjustifiable to relegate the terms of everyday life to an existence in a realm of mere appearance, thus divorcing them from the serious project of 'explanatory purposes'. Taylor's moral realism is then, clear. Once again a lot of what Taylor says may be ceded to him. Taylor is correct to identify and challenge the reductionist thrust of contemporary instrumental rationality. The dualism that natural science and contemporary scientism foster between mind (or spirit) and body (echoing the value/fact distinction) should be challenged. Indeed Taylor's thought goes a long way to revealing this dualism as a particular historical artefact, and offering a more 'organic' alternative in interspatial epiphany.

Taylor demonstrates a particular application of interspatial epiphany, the nature of humans is expressed through a medium, this medium is language. Wittgenstein's attack upon the possibility of a 'private language' conceives of language as a social product. Humans express themselves through this 'social product', this medium contains moral terms, moral terms must not be suppressed, to do so is to stifle the expression of the human individual. For Taylor these moral terms originated from, and have a continuing dependence upon, theology. Humans cannot but help but to have recourse to these theistically derived terms to make sense of their lives. This account, the best account possible, should be respected, and these terms should not be dismissed as mere appearance, as projections.

"Theories like behaviourism or certain strands of contemporary computer struck cognitive psychology, which declare 'phenomenology' as irrelevant on principle, are based on a crucial mistake. They are 'changing the subject' in Donald Davidson's apt expression. What we need to explain is people living their lives; the terms in which they cannot avoid living their lives cannot be removed from the explanandum, unless we can propose other terms in which they could live them more clairvoyantly. We cannot just leap outside of these terms altogether, on the grounds that their logic doesn't fit some model of 'science' and that we know a priori that human beings must be explicable in this 'science'. This begs the question."¹⁹

Thus behaviourism and naturalist inspired theories adopt a "...basically non-realist position about strongly valued goods."²⁰

In attempting to defend his moral phenomenology Taylor sees himself as having forged a 'terse polemic' to support his position, an attack in two phases, with a third for good measure, or to add 'insult to injury'. Firstly "you cannot help having recourse to these strongly valued goods for the purposes of life:..."²¹. This phase of his attack might be ceded to Taylor; ceded but seen as 'uninteresting'. It is part of Taylor's misconception of some aspects of Modern moral philosophy that he sees it as 'blind' to moral ontology. Taylor asserts Modern Kantian and utilitarian moral thought is unable to accept strong evaluation (or qualitative distinctions) and thus moral ontology. But Taylor is mistaken. To paraphrase Taylor's characterisation of the effect of atomism on moral ontology: we must not allow Taylor's moral realism to 'frighten us away' from a more Modern characterisation of moral philosophy, (this will be examined, immediately below, through Kymlicka's thought).

Secondly no changing of the subject is admissible. It is apparent then that this is the role of Taylor's conception of human nature as 'interspatial epiphany'. Taylor's epiphanic, or 'organic', conception of human nature prevents the progress of instrumental rationality into the conceptualisation of the human individual, prevents the ontologising movement. The individual is expressed through a medium, in an exactly analogous fashion to the aesthetic and epiphanic conceptualisation of the artistic artefact. The individual is not expressed through paint or literature; human Being (in the Existential sense of the word) is expressed through language. Taylor is committed to the thought of the later Wittgenstein. Taylor would deny a naive, logical positivist account of language 'mapping' reality, and embrace Wittgenstein's later, more holistic, interpretation. The individual embedded in language expresses strong evaluation, uses language to describe qualitative distinctions. Thus the facticity or determinacy of human existence that Taylor identifies through the notion of human nature as interspatial epiphany, inescapably demonstrates recourse to the notion of moral ontology - to the notion, that is, of a normative ontology. Thus embodied experience of value or moral realism is an inescapable 'fact' of human Being. Taylor's argument is ingenious, but ironically he seems to deny emotivist theorists a rich sense of expression. (Again this will be returned to immediately below, in reference to Waldron).

The third phase of the polemic is to demonstrate that non-realist theories do not reject strong evaluation, but resort to it in a different realm. Thus non-realists often make their theory compatible with ordinary moral experience, while making this experience somehow irrelevant to it. Taylor cites as examples Mackie's 'error theory', and Blackburn's 'consequentialist theory'. Such positions are paradigm examples of inarticulate ethics. These theories covertly resort to strong evaluation and ordinary moral

experience, while overtly denying their importance. Taylor's aim is to 'trump' such theories by recourse to a moral phenomenology, an aim expressed in his BA principle.

Kymlicka And The Role Of Moral Philosophy

It is now appropriate to attempt to combat the charge of those critical of Taylor that he insists upon moral realism, in the sense of a foundationalist move. Kymlicka suggests that Taylor's work is benign enough if it is seen as one individual's spirited defence of the objectivity of moral sources from Naturalism. It is Taylor's claim that Modern moral philosophy offers a 'cramped' view of the nature and sources of moral value and this gives Modern thought a 'one - dimensional' cast. This 'blindness' to the 'spirit' has obscured the moral sources that empower people to live by such standards.

Kymlicka agrees with Dancy in seeing contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy as dominated by utilitarian and Kantian thought. These doctrines have three distinctive features. Kymlicka suggest that through an examination of these features it is possible to dismiss Taylor's foundationalist claim for moral realism, while leaving the conception of human nature as an interspatial epiphany unscathed.

The three features Kymlicka suggests are: Modern procedural rationality, the appeal to 'basic reasons', and deontology. Further Kymlicka suggests that Taylor's primary target is not the moral subjectivism he identifies, but rather the contrast between Classical and Modern moral thinking involved in the three features just identified. Kymlicka suggests that Taylor fails to appreciate the Modern importance of these features. This is an important charge as it is to claim that Taylor misses one possible source of mediated experience of value.

Kymlicka accepts Taylor's suggestion that Modern moral philosophy is characterised by procedural ethics. Indeed it is applied to ethical theory by its derivation from conceptions of reason (the progress of which Taylor himself has traced through SOTS). Secondly, Kymlicka accepts the suggestion that Modern moral theory has moved from a classical concern with qualitative distinctions, to an emphasis upon basic reasons. Utilitarianism, after all, is based about the maximisation of pleasure. Lastly, it is clear that Modern moral theory gives priority to the right over 'the good', and is thus deontological. Classical thought had a concern to describe the contours of a good life. Classical thought assessed the merits of the contemplative life over the life of action. It is also true that many Modern theorists mitigate this inattention to 'the good' by denying such a thing exists. This is, indeed, the tactic of much subjectivist thought, such as Mackie's 'error theory'.

Kymlicka suggests that Taylor's objection to such Modern ethics concerns the inescapability of strong evaluation. Taylor's claim is that strong evaluation is the discrimination of a sense of better and worse that is independent of the individual's own desires. Kymlicka would accept Taylor's argument against Mackie and moral subjectivism in general. Indeed Kymlicka suggests that similar anti- subjectivist sentiments might be found in the work of Rawls, Nozick, and Raz. But Taylor's primary target is not subjectivism but the atomism provoked by the three distinctions Kymlicka identifies.

Kymlicka argues that much utilitarian and Kantian thought is not inarticulate in maintaining subjectivism, while also maintaining a sense of right and wrong binding on all. Kymlicka proceeds by offering a different, less pessimistic, conception of the three new features of contemporary moral thought. Before moving on, it is important to say a few words on Taylor's conception of empowerment.

In identifying Modern Anglo-American moral thought as characterised by a moral realist backlash against subjectivism, Dancy also identifies a difference in approach between American and British moral theorists. The American tradition of realism exhibits a strong Humean influence. The moral facts that realism in general asserts exist are, in the American form, found not to motivate the individual. Moral facts are only of use to someone who has independently chosen to strive for the general good.

Kymlicka suggests that Taylor appears to want to 'hard wire in' a desire to strive for the general good by a first person appeal to theology. Kymlicka argues that this move is not required, and that Taylor only takes this step because he misunderstands Modern moral thought, because he is too Humean.

The British strain rejects the 'motivational paradox' of the American version. It rejects Hume, by asserting that beliefs alone can be enough to motivate "...which removes the temptation to see the moral facts as natural facts..."²² As Dancy comments 'I prefer my moral agents deHumeanised.' If Taylor's critics are correct then it is supremely ironical that Taylor's defence of moral realism appeals to theology from a Humean account of moral facts which itself entails an overly naturalistic interpretation of moral experience.

Kymlicka's Characterisation Of Modern Moral Theory

Kymlicka characterises both utilitarianism and Kantian moral theory as marked by a commitment to impartiality, an acceptance of the individual as an end in herself, and the suggestion that to act morally is to act in a way impartially justifiable to all. This conceptualisation has deep secular and religious roots in 'our' culture. The commitment to impartiality is the golden rule of Modern moral theory. In Kantian and utilitarian

theory there is a widespread commitment to the notion that an act is moral only if the actor could still endorse it if he or she were in the shoes of the individuals whom the act affects. Kymlicka suggests that this central concern is shown in Rawls' notion of the 'original position', Hare's 'impartial sympathiser', and Scanlon's 'contractualism'.

If impartiality is accepted, it provokes two questions: What are people's interests? And, What does it mean to show equal concern for those interests? The differences within Modern moral theory can be found in the differing answers to these two questions. Kymlicka suggests that within both utilitarianism and Kantianism there is an unanimous answer to the second question, but disagreement over the first question. Within utilitarianism, for instance, Kymlicka suggests that Bentham and Mill are separated by their answer to the first question: Bentham holds a hedonistic theory, the individual's interests being governed by the sovereign masters of pleasure and pain. For Mill the answer is found in the individual's expression of his or her own uniqueness. However both utilitarians believe that equal concern is shown for individuals through the notion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This is what gives continuity to utilitarianism from Bentham through Mill and Sidgwick to Hare and Griffin.

If this is a fair characterisation Kymlicka suggests that it is unwarranted for Taylor to talk of Modern, subjectivist, moral theory as 'leaving no conceptual room' for a notion of 'the good'. While Bentham may leave no room for a concept of 'the good' his work is not the whole of utilitarianism. Nothing in utilitarian or Kantian thought precludes a 'rich theory' of 'the good'. What is true is that few theorists attempt to list substantive goods of a valuable life. This is so for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Mill emphasised, the list of 'goods' will be different for different people. Thus little can be said at a general level. Secondly it is clear that even insightful and informed individuals can come to doubt their earlier judgements about 'the good'. Therefore what most Modern

moral theorists concentrate upon is, what might be termed, 'discovery procedures'. This requires abstracting a bit from particular ends. This is not however the total Lockean disengagement, to the punctual self, that Taylor mistakes it for, but a more modest reflexive act. Kymlicka suggests that just such an abstraction is what Rawls 'is about' with his unjustifiably maligned 'thin theory of the good'. Given this characterisation of Modern moral thought it is clear, Kymlicka claims, that Taylor's interpretations of the three contrasts between Classical and Modern moral theory are false or misleading.

The Three Characteristics Of Modern Moral Theory

Kymlicka argues that while Modern procedural ethics invokes procedures to ascertain right action, this does not compete with or preclude the idea that there are substantively correct ends that define a valuable life. The movement from substantive to procedural rationality is the opening up of the vista of rationality. It is the assertion of a new way of being rational. Kymlicka suggests that Taylor is misled in his characterisation of Modern morality by the fact that some moral philosophers do not define rationality as the correct apprehension of qualitative distinctions but rather as the adjusting of means to ends. This Modern position does not imply the refutation of qualitative distinctions, but just refers to them in different terms, as wisdom or insight. The failure to include the correct perception of qualitative distinctions within a definition of rationality would only be a problem if such theorists saw rationality as the only criterion to evaluate 'ways of life'. This they do not do.

In regard to the modern invocation of basic reasons over qualitative distinctions, Kymlicka suggests that Taylor's emphasis has at least two senses. At some points Taylor seems to suggest that qualitative distinctions underlie basic reasons. Qualitative

distinctions explain the point of basic reasons. Therefore Taylor sees the Modern focus upon the basic reason of impartiality as problematic as it neglects the underlying qualitative distinctions that explain why humans are worthy of impartial concern. What exercises Taylor is that there seems to be a lack of a motivational postulate, a lack of empowerment, which would drive the individual to recognise the concern and respect owed to others. Following Dancy, it might be asserted that Taylor needs to be less Humean. Kymlicka suggests a characterisation of Modern moral philosophy where its concern for basic reasons invites, rather than precludes (as Taylor argues), a debate about, and recognition of qualitative distinctions. Utilitarians and Kantians might disagree on the answers but they do not avoid the question.

In another sense Taylor seems to suggest that the commitment to basic reasons precludes qualitative distinctions. This is Taylor's claim that Modern moral theory has no place for the 'hypergood' (explored below). Taylor seems to be suggesting that utilitarianism is attempting to do away with any discrimination of right and wrong that is not rendered valid by our own desires. In other words Taylor is suggesting that utilitarianism does not recognise the discrimination of any values that are independent of the will. Kymlicka asserts that he simply finds this claim bizarre! While it is correct to say that utilitarians do not explain why benevolence is valued, it is quite different to say utilitarians do not accord benevolence a higher moral value than egoism or maliciousness. Kymlicka declares that the idea that utilitarians do not expressly endorse benevolence and impartiality as values is 'clearly false'. Even Bernard Williams, one of utilitarianism's fiercest critics, disagrees with Taylor. Williams suggests that utilitarians have always been frank about the priority of benevolence over desires. Kymlicka declares he cannot see Taylor's point here: why can't utilitarians recognise benevolence as a higher

good? Kymlicka suggests that Taylor unwarrantedly equate utilitarianism with Naturalism.

With regard to the Modern priority of the right over 'the good', Kymlicka finds no cause for concern in Modern deontology. Modern theorists are not attempting to give basic reasons a special status but draw on a more abstract notion of 'the good'. This abstraction is pursued in order to judge the social conditions that are required for people to be able to judge (and pursue) more particular conception of 'the good'. This position is only problematic, as it is for Taylor, if one has a different assessment of the task of moral philosophy than Kymlicka.

Kymlicka suggests that Taylor has much in common with the sentiments expressed by E.J.Bond in his work Reason and Value. Both Bond and Taylor are disappointed to find Modern moral philosophy discussing what is morally permissible and not what ends are most worthwhile. Contemporary moral philosophers do not view themselves as having this latter task, as they assume that individuals are interested in questions of 'the good'. This interest is seen as the natural object of 'practical reasoning'. Morality's role is to impress on people the importance of respecting other people's good! There is then a perceived division of labour between discovering the contours of 'the good life' (which is the object of each individual's practical reasoning) and morality that deals with obligation to others, which requires specifically moral reasoning. Taylor's moralism attempts to collapse this distinction.

Kymlicka's work has a more Modern interpretation of the role of the moral philosopher. Indeed it is possible to see Kymlicka's position as a more accurate phenomenology of moral experience than Taylor's. Kymlicka suggests that everyday language supports his interpretation. In Kymlicka's phenomenology there is a distinction between the immoral individual, who is insensitive to other's 'good', and the individual

living an unexamined, 'trivial', life. While the former individual requires moral education, the latter individual is not immoral, but rather requires 'inspiration'. An unimaginative society is not an immoral society, and it is not the role of moral philosophers to ensure a more imaginative use of collective experiences of 'the good'. It is exactly this assertion that Taylor's moralism would deny. Kymlicka will admit that his conception of moral philosophy is a more restricted conception, but this is not because Modern thought denies the validity of qualitative judgements about 'the good'.

"Unfortunately, while Taylor almost certainly opposes this restricted view of the task of moral philosophy, he never gets it sufficiently in focus to describe what exactly he dislikes about it...Hence his arguments focus on the relatively uncontroversial claim that it is important to make qualitative judgements about the good, while neglecting the real question - namely, is it moral philosophers who must make those judgements?"²³

It is now appropriate to examine Taylor's conception of 'hypergoods' and personal indexing, before concluding the critique of his moralism and commitment to a theological normative ontology.

Hypergoods

Waldron expresses a similar bewilderment to Kymlicka at Taylor's affirmation of theology at the end of SOTS 'in spite of everything'. To complete the quotation near the beginning of this chapter,

"..the weakest parts of this book [SOTS] are its confessional pages: the high-minded rejection of emotivism at the beginning, and the first-person re-affirmation of religion in spite of everything, at the end. Neither position is supported or implied by what we read in the middle of the book. *The optimism and interest of those intervening 400 pages are humanist through and through, whatever its author says.*"²⁴.

Judith Shklar is also similarly scathing. She identifies SOTS as an act of 're-enchantment', and as a piece of Catholic philosophy. In reference to Taylor's affirmation of theology from a 'discovery' of a normative ontology through the 'existential analytic', she comments

"I do not know about the Christians, but for a non believer, the statement [of strong evaluation] is both untrue and condescending. It is only a sign of Taylor's hope that classical philosophy and revealed religion are not only imperishable but are subconsciously lodged in all our minds, waiting to be rediscovered and expressed, and bound to tie us again to the cosmic order, which alone can give substance and meaning to our love of the good."²⁵

This is an apposite criticism. Shklar identifies the conflict between Taylor's Expressivist interspatial epiphany and his religious notion of the soul. The theistic conception of the soul would appear to be a paradigmatic act of disengagement. This is both a disengagement of 'spirit' from 'body', and from the affirmation of everyday life. The soul is pure disembodied spirit, with an interest in post-mortem rewards or sanctions. This

abstraction from the intentional aspect of reality that Taylor has identified in Descartes, is present in theism. It will be remembered that there was a similar distaste for the 'decay' of the bodily in the theorists of Modernist architecture. Theology implicitly seems to contain a similar distaste for the content of human embodiment (the amoral flow of 'bodily functions'.) Similar acts of disengagement Taylor dismisses as Naturalism.

However, Taylor's argument is that theology is somehow prior to all other positions. Taylor has attempted to trace the theological origins, or genesis of the plurality of Modern goods that emerge from the shattering of the theological horizon. Among such goods Taylor has identified the Platonic concept of 'self mastery', the affirmation of ordinary life, and a Victorian ethics of 'unbelief'.

Taylor recognises this plurality of ways 'to be good', but argues that in practice one good predominates, comes to act as a 'hypergood'. For Taylor a hypergood operates as a 'higher-order qualitative distinction'. The hypergood discriminates between other goods. As examples of the hypergood Taylor identifies expressive fulfilment, the love of God, and the search for justice. However in a further sense this hypergood is in some way independent of the individual's will. There is a continual concern in Taylor to discover a value system independent of the will, allied with a condemnation of personal indexing.

Taylor is suggesting that a 'will'-independent system of value or ontology is required to ensure that individuals are accorded the respect and dignity they deserve. Taylor is focusing upon ontology as a 'motivational postulate'. With reference to the Platonic concept of self mastery that Taylor suggests is characterised by the hegemony of reason over desire, in this conception reason is understood substantively.

"To be rational is to have a vision of rational order, and to love this order. So the difference of action or motivation has to be explained by reference to a cosmic reality, *the order of things*. This is good in a fuller sense..." (emphasis added).²⁶

This kind of reality Taylor terms a 'constitutive good'. The constitutive good is a moral source. It is these sources that Taylor has attempted to highlight through SOTS. A moral source "...is a something the love of which empowers us to do and be good."²⁷ Following Kymlicka and Dancy it is possible to suggest that a deHumeanised moral subjectivism is sufficient as a constitutive good. Indeed Waldron argues

"[A]ny religious account these days must be filtered through the inwardness and self-scrutiny of the modern self; that cannot be short-circuited."²⁸

As Waldron suggests, through SOTS Taylor offers a rich metaphor of human nature as Expressivism. This is an insightful and complex conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany; in other terms Being as an expression of uniqueness. However Taylor does not then seem willing to extend that complexity of expression to emotivist moral theorists.

"Suppose human attitudes are complex, subtle and multi-layered. Suppose that people have attitudes about attitudes, positive and negative feelings about the emotions they themselves experience..It is not obvious that a

complicated picture like this is incapable of characterising strong evaluation."²⁹

Taylor's moral phenomenology is, then, not insightful enough.

Kymlicka is similarly dismissive of Taylor's concept of moral source, and of his views of the relative merits of secular and theistic sources. Taylor appears to feel that appeals to moral source through sentience or reason are 'inherently contestable'.

Kymlicka asserts that there is no sense in which a theistic appeal to moral sources is less inherently contestable. But Kymlicka has surely mistaken Taylor's hope for a stronger deontological move.

Three Issues

Taylor suggests that SOTS throws light on the issue about sources, the issue about instrumentalism, and the issue about morality. With respect to the issue about sources, it is clear that Taylor's disquiet over the conflict of constitutive goods is overstated. There is a fetishisation of the quality of inner will as Taylor attempts to establish moral realism, with a stress upon ontology as a motivational postulate.

With respect to the issue about instrumentalism it seems clear that the contemporary emphasis upon disengaged reason is too 'light headed', and should be widened to acknowledge an Expressivist dimension.

It is the third issue, about morality, that is most paradoxical. Through a discussion of this issue Taylor seems to assert that it is important to recognise ontology so that we do not live beyond our 'moral means'. At some points it appears that Taylor feels that it is only normative ontology, accompanied by a Christian sense of grace, that

can provide such a strong moral source. If this ontology is rejected, Taylor claims, it may be necessary to downgrade our high standards. This gives a dangerously conservative edge to Taylor's theism. This is again a symptom of Taylor's quest for a spring of empowerment. Kymlicka suggests that this aspect of Taylor's thought must also be rejected. To downgrade standards, Kymlicka asserts, is to offer a cramped, extremely conservative view of morality. Taylor ultimately replaces what he considers a cramped sense of morality with a similarly cramped system. Kymlicka argues it is important to widen Taylor's emphasis upon empowerment. Kymlicka wishes to empower those who are able to act morally, and disempower those who are unable to act morally. In opposition to Taylor, Kymlicka asserts that it is sometimes important to take radical actions that are beyond the moral means or warrant of a society. In relation to the expansion of civil liberties he suggests:

"What high standards have historically required in order to be implemented is that some people are motivated by strong sources, some are subject to brute force, and some people are too lazy or indifferent to put up a struggle one way or the other.

This may mean that, as a society, we are living beyond our moral means. But why is this a problem?"³⁰

With the movement in Taylor's political thought from a steady state to a devolved liberal conception it is perhaps not unsurprising he wishes to curb the possibility of radical acts. It is through a discussion of Taylor's political thought that it is finally possible to rebuff his critics charge of foundationalism, it is to this discussion that the next chapter turns.

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- ¹Waldron, J. How we learn to be good TLS March 23-29 1990.
 - ² Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp.520-1.
 - ³ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.464.
 - ⁴ Waldron, J. How we learn to be good TLS March 23-29 1990 p.325.
 - ⁵ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp.520-521.
 - ⁶ Taylor, C. Sources Of The Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.515-6.
 - ⁷ Berlin, I. The Hedgehog and The Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981) p.5.
 - ⁸ Berlin, I. The Hedgehog and The Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981) p.22.
 - ⁹ Berlin, I. The Hedgehog and The Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981) p.38.
 - ¹⁰ Berlin, I. The Hedgehog and The Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981) P.49.
 - ¹¹ Shklar, J. book review Sources Of The Self Political Theory February 1991
 - ¹² Berlin, I. The Hedgehog and The Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981) p.54.
 - ¹³ Berlin, I. The Hedgehog and The Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1981) p.61.
 - ¹⁴ Taylor, C. What is Human Agency Philosophical Papers: (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985) Vol.1.
 - ¹⁵ Dancy, J. book review of Brink, D.O. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics TLS March 23-29 1990.
 - ¹⁶ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1989) p.54.
 - ¹⁷ Taylor, C. What is Human Agency Philosophical Papers: (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985) Vol.1.
 - ¹⁸ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.57.
 - ¹⁹ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.58.
 - ²⁰ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.59.
 - ²¹ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.59.
 - ²² Dancy, J. book review of Brink, D.O. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics TLS March 23-29, 1990.
 - ²³ Kymlicka, W. The Ethics of Inarticulacy Inquiry No 34 May 1991 pp155 - 182.
 - ²⁴ Waldron, J. How we learn to be good TLS March 23-29 1990 (emphasis added).
 - ²⁵ Shklar, J. book review Sources Of The Self Political Theory February 1991 p.108.
 - ²⁶ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.92.
 - ²⁷ Taylor, C. Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.93.
 - ²⁸ Waldron, J. How we learn to be good TLS March 23-29 1990.
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 - ³⁰ Kymlica, W The Ethics of Inarticulacy Inquiry No 34 May 1991.

CHAPTER FIVE

RETRIEVAL AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

Introduction

This chapter will explore the political implications of Taylor's conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany, set within a normative ontology. This is to address Taylor's call for 'substantive liberalism'. It will be suggested that there is a noticeable development in Taylor's political thought from the 'steady state' to 'substantive liberalism'. Before considering this movement the chapter will focus upon the EOA, taking this later work as a 'bridging text' between the concerns of SOTS and Taylor's political 'prescription'. With a similar bridging intent the beginning of this chapter will commence with a discussion on the grounds for asserting that existentialism can offer a background of significance from which to develop a sense of community that Taylor does not recognise.

Existential Ethics

As a beginning it is important to reiterate the distinction between 'normative ethics' and 'meta ethics'. Solomon¹ suggests a definition in that normative ethics is a set of concrete prescriptions and specific principles. Thus Taylor confesses a commitment to normative ethics through his situated moral phenomenology. In contrast meta ethics is a framework for talk about ethics. This definition is forged by Solomon through a consideration of the work of various existential thinkers. For instance, Sartre suggests that while his work is ethical he cannot provide a normative ethics, this is so as Sartre professes to have a meta ethical approach of nihilism. Such a meta ethic of nihilism is common to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Sartre's self proclaimed 'neglect' of ethics is a rejection of normative ethics. Solomon suggests that Heidegger's attack upon 'values' can be understood in the same way.

Solomon suggests an interesting contrast between Sartre and Heidegger, which is of use in assessing Taylor's position. Sartre recognises that within a meta ethics of nihilism it is possible to assert some 'existential values', which form an ethics of a sort. Sartre appropriates the phrase 'existential values' from Kierkegaard, which is of more than a passing interest; Kierkegaard felt he forged this notion against 'inauthentic' normative ethics, a paradigmatic example of which, for Kierkegaard, is Hegelian thought. Worse still is Sartre's assertion that Heidegger misses the possibility of existential value. In Being And Nothingness Sartre argues that Heidegger's description of authenticity and inauthenticity displays his anxiety to establish ontological foundations for a normative ethics, which he claims not to be concerned with. It is an attempt to reconcile his humanism with his religious sense of the transcendent. The blindness to 'value' that Kymlicka suggests in Taylor's interpretation of emotivism seems to mirror Heidegger's insensitivity to existential values. It will be the suggestion of this chapter that Taylor's flawed interpretation of authenticity is powered by a similar Heideggerian blind spot;. These comments connect to Taylor's adoption of a Berlinian derived Liberalism.

It will be the increasingly explicit argument of this chapter that Taylor is blind to existential value, this blindness is highlighted when Taylor's position is contrasted with that of Berlin and his notion of 'plumping' (Taylor makes an oblique reference to 'plumping' in EOA only to reject it). Berlin utilises an interesting example to stress the significance of 'plumping'. Berlin's example might be seen as a restatement of Sartre's famous 'moral dilemma' of an individual choosing to go to war or look after his ailing mother. In Berlin the example is of an individual standing on a bridge with their mother drowning on one side of the bridge, while their father drowns on the other. The issue is whom do you save? You cannot save both of them, so what do you do? Berlin's argument is that you 'plump' for one of them, and rescue them. Which ever choice the individual makes, it will be angst ridden, and promote feelings of guilt. There isn't a morally correct answer to this impasse. There are no 'moral facts' of the matter to appeal to; as Taylor argues for in his more lucid moments .

Solomon continues that while existential ethics is based on nihilism, freedom is the 'ontological' heart of existentialism. While no criterion of normative ethics can be

defended as correct, the principle of freedom is defended as correct on a meta ethical level. In other words the normative system one chooses is not open to judgement, but whether one chooses in freedom is open to judgement. The individual cannot make the wrong choice of values, but can make the choice wrongly. It is not what but how one chooses (that is 'morally' significant). Solomon argues that while existential ethics is such that it is impossible to criticise another's actions, it is possible to criticise the way of choosing. It will become apparent through the exposition of EOA that Taylor both accepts and utilises this distinction. Through EOA it becomes apparent that Taylor wishes both to reject the notion of an 'iron cage' while introducing his own 'cage' to restrict (Post Modern) 'free play'. It is not clear that Taylor can coherently 'square the circle' between Heidegger and Hegel, between authenticity and Sittlichkeit. As Solomon suggests the insistence upon freedom from authority is what sharply distinguishes the existentialist position from Kantian thought.

"Existentialism.. teaches that there is no standard of correctness for one's choices. If reason is argued to be the ultimate justification of morality, one is free to be 'irrational'. If God is posited as the ultimate source of all true values, one is free to be irreverent; if patriotism is taken as the ultimate duty, one is free to be treasonably undutiful; and if human nature is cited as support for a principle, one is free to act 'unnaturally'."².

This is not to suggest that there will not be consequences, or sanctions for one's choices.

Truly to capture the distinction Solomon suggests a contrast between the notion of a 'criminal' and a 'traitor'. The criminal accepts the value system against which she offends, and, to an extent, recognises the legitimacy of the sanctions taken against her as a result of her actions. The traitor on the other hand rejects the value system she betrays, and refuses to recognise the legitimacy of the sanctions taken against her. (Interestingly, Solomon contrasts the 1930's student radical as a criminal, with the 1960s traitorous student radical.) Some important aspects of this discussion can be brought out by an examination of Taylor's political thought (immediately below).

Solomon, however, as his preceding comments indicate, argues that Sartre also has a close 'kinship' with Kant. Both thinkers argue that the only unqualified 'good' is a 'good will'. Taylor seems both to accept and reject this assertion. Perhaps it is more perceptive to say that Taylor both accepts and fears this assertion. It has been argued that Taylor fetishises the 'quality of inner will'. It is possible, then, that Taylor does so from the concern for a 'good will' that is common to both Kant and Sartre. Solomon suggests that like Kant

"Sartre is a very 'Protestant' moral philosopher: he cares very much for the conceptions of 'good' and 'bad' (and 'good' and 'evil'), but seeks only to continue Kant's shift in the locus of these values from 'moral facts' to acts of choice."³

Such a conception of morality accords well with the increasing conception of human nature as an activity and not a substance. Taylor's conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany captures this. However Taylor seemingly wishes to englobe the act of choice within a normative ontology. This is both perceptive and disquieting; in some hands this bespeaks an 'iron cage'. Taylor is correct to suggest that there is a 'givenness' to morality. This is the Hegelian conception of *Sittlichkeit* (of a morality of custom) that Taylor asserts through his situated moral phenomenology. There is however a different route, when explored by what Berlin terms an appreciation of 'ultimate human values'. (In the West these values may have a genesis in Christian thought). Berlin deliberately avoids using the terminology 'absolute' human values as he wishes to emphasize that these values can and do change over time, societies can choose to respect different values. Through EOA it will be possible to see the development of Taylor's 'harder' position through his criticism of the emphasis upon the act of choice. An emphasis upon choice is perhaps emblematic of a different 'metaphysical temper' to Taylor's *Sittlichkeit* and situated moral realism.

Existential Value And Emotivism

Solomon goes on to explore a common comparison made between existential ethics and the meta ethics of analytic philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare. Solomon observes, that for radically different reasons, Stevenson's 'emotivism', and Hare's 'prescriptivism' cannot represent any normative ethics as correct or true. Solomon comments that it is vital that such thinkers fully grasp the normative implications of this position; that it is impossible to proscribe, for example, genocide and rape. Existentialists, unlike Stevenson and Hare do fully accept this. Solomon suggests that this comparison helps point out a difference between the ethics of Sartre and the philosophies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (and, it may be added, Taylor). While Sartre accepts a degree of Cartesian dualism, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Taylor perceive dualism as at the seat of many contemporary 'malaises' (Taylor contrasts 'disengaged' individualism with 'engaged' Expressivism through the progress of SOTS). Heidegger's 'primitivism' and his analysis of the world as 'equipment' are attempts to overcome such dualism. In Merleau-Ponty there is a stress on the situation and a certain 'givenness' in (perhaps) bourgeois value systems.

"In a sense, Merleau-Ponty reintroduces Hegel's notion of 'Sittlichkeit' as a substitute for both the notions of [strongly, ontologically] 'given values' (Kant's 'moralitat') and Sartre's and Kierkegaard's exaggerated notion of existential choice."⁴

This is Taylor's aim as well, and it is laudable and would be whole heartedly echoed by this thesis.

With Merleau-Ponty and the stress on 'situation' the individual is seen as always making less than absolute choices within the limited perspective and prejudicial atmosphere of the 'situation'. Through EOA Taylor takes up this perception of 'situation' more explicitly than in SOTS. With regard to the 'student body' slide 'into' narcissistic' or

'deviant' forms of authenticity (in practice a soft relativism) Taylor wishes to reveal their 'situation', in a fashion akin to Merleau-Ponty. Taylor's act of retrieval is to reveal the exaggerated sense of existential choice amongst many in society. However, the fear is to Taylor's critics that there is a slump into 'moralitat'. However with Taylor's later work there is an explicit expression that he resists this 'slump'⁵. If there is then a spectrum between 'moralitat' and radical existential choice, it is perhaps to 'split hairs' to criticise Taylor's exact location in the spectrum. It is important though to be aware of a standing danger in Taylor's thought to slump into an expressive, 'seamless whole'.

To return to Solomon's analysis, he goes on to raise a more significant problem with existential thought that Taylor also addresses. Solomon observes that Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Camus, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty while all being 'ethical radicals' by their rejection of the Kantian foundation for morality, all also attempt to reject the content of Kant's 'bourgeois' morality. But if as these thinkers themselves argue you are limited to criticisms of the manner of choice, but not the content of choice, how can this radicalism be defended? This very problem seems to be the major issue Taylor has been trying to address, through the opening sections of both SOTS and EOA. In EOA he will argue a similar 'manner versus content' distinction. In Taylor's formulation the manner of choice is self referential, while the content is crucially not (there is no place for the traitor). Solomon suggests that the usual argument versus all forms of existential nihilism is that it 'opens the door' to all manner of horrors. 'Genocide and rape are placed on the same (a)moral plane as giving gifts and keeping promises'.

"But what must be evident here is that it is existentialism which places its highest confidence in humanity-that people will choose to be humane as well as human."⁶

Such a position accords more fully perhaps with Berlin than Taylor's thought. Such a position can power Berlin's assertion that the individual is the best judge of their own interests, something Taylor also argues. From the existential perspective, and perhaps

'humanism' more generally, traditional Christianity is clearly degrading to humanity, it portrays humanity as pathetically unable to resist 'evil'.

"Existentialism gives us perhaps the most optimistic view of man ever advanced in Western philosophy: man will, without being ordered, instructed, forced by man or nature, choose to be humane."⁷

This 'existential optimism' would appear to accord with Taylor's early political thought and its emphasis upon the 'steady state'. With a lucid understanding of the human condition the existentialist foresees a flowering of artistic sensitivity, or deeply felt religion, or Socratic ethics, or a new political and social conscience, the steady state similarly envisages a cultural 'flowering'.

Solomon argues, that existentialists do not 'give up' on morality and humane values, but rather put these attributes on what they suggest is surer ground. Existentialists wish to set aside invalid justifications for morality, a priori principles, the assumption of foundations, and become moral for the right reasons, from commitment. It is a move from the notion of moral facts to a focus on acts of choice, within a situation. Ultimately Taylor would appear to miss this, to miss existential values. In Chapter Four Kymlicka argued that Taylor mistakes Utilitarianism for naturalism; here Taylor mistakes the existential denial of normative ethics as a denial of any 'horizons of significance', and sees an emphasis upon choice as 'deviant'. Taylor is of course making a stand against unsituated choice making, the antithesis of his methodology of situated moral phenomenology.

For Solomon, existentialists reject the authority of 'morals' not to reject morality, but to make it the individual's own ethic. This can be achieved Solomon asserts without falling into seeing freedom as an end in itself. The focus, Solomon asserts, is on the object of choice, on commitment, an activity rather than a fact. Taylor's position is made more paradoxical by his denial of such an existentialist final position while so much of his thought is predicated on the acceptance of such existential tropes. Indeed his act of retrieval seems existential through and through. This unresolved paradox will become

clear through this chapter, alongside the assertion that (the later) Taylor modifies and to an extent ameliorates his position. In particular Taylor moves towards an acceptance of the fact that 'la lotta continua', something his 'hopeful' comments at the end of SOTS can be construed as denying. Before commencing this exploration of Taylor's political thought it is appropriate to examine some final comments by Solomon on the relative merits of individualism and community.

Existentialism And Community

Solomon concludes his discussion of existential ethics by turning to the paradox between the existential conception of the individual as 'alone', and the emphasis among existential theorists upon the particular 'value' of political and social community; this obviously touches on Taylor's Communitarian leanings. Solomon suggests that again and again there is a transition in existentialist thinkers from individual freedom to collective and political freedom, from individual choice to 'morality', from existentialism to humanism. In the case of Sartre this movement is characterised as a movement from existentialism to an eclectic Marxism. There is a similar, early, commitment to an eclectic Marxism in Taylor's political thought.

Solomon suggests an interesting interpretation of this hotly debated area in Sartre's thought, which emphasises 'situation'. Sartre's thought is portrayed as more individualistic in war time France, and more 'Communitarian' in relation to post-war French politics. With an emphasis upon situation, it is possible to simply characterise Sartre as making different choices at different times. Solomon asserts that such an interpretation is useful as it resists the temptation to see the choices an individual makes as akin to a 'natural fact'; as something that endures through the lifetime of the individual. Taylor would seem to accept this point, his call for a return to theology would seem to presuppose that current unbelievers may return to the theological fold. A lively sense of temporal location, and the possibility of radical change over time is another reason for Taylor's admiring adoption of Heidegger's thought.

Solomon continues that there is an often drawn distinction between French and British moralists that is of interest here. The French moralist is seen as concerned with cases of 'life and death' decisions, and angst-ridden choices. British moralists, in contrast, are concerned with the need to return their library books on time! Solomon suggests that this contrast is a natural consequence of the differing perspective on choice. That is, between a situation where nothing is settled, and a situation where everything is taken as settled. This difference in temper is sometimes related to a differing experience of the Second World War in Britain and France. French moralists stress 'existential heroism', while the British stress a more moderate concern for 'situatedness' in normative culture (something akin to Hegelian Sittlichkeit).

"Sartre's early philosophy takes too little heed of the role of everyday duties and distractions in our conceptions of morality and choice. The British moralists take far too little heed of the ever-present possibilities for grand existential choices-the rejection of a moral institution as well as a well-defined choice *within* that institution."⁸

What existentialist share (despite their supposed variety) is a confidence in the free individual in a free society (Berlin's position); what they want to reject is those restrictions on freedom individuals, themselves, have placed in their own path, Taylor would identify representational epistemology and the punctual self.

Solomon praises and criticises Philip Slater's characterisation of American society through The Pursuit Of Loneliness. It is possible to take Slater as emblematic of Taylor's Communitarian concerns. Slater sees the pursuit of individualism in American society as responsible for the 'degradation' of the individual. American individualism is seen as responsible for placing restrictions upon individual freedom. This sentiment is mirrored in Taylor (and through EOA). Taylor criticises the Modern emphasis upon individualism. This individualism is fostered by Cartesian dualism. The Cartesian distinction between the 'mind' and the 'body, characterises the mind or 'spirit' as instrumental reason. This is the (liberation) freedom of 'pure spirit' (that Solomon in another context calls the

'transcendental pretence'⁹). This sense of autonomy, that instrumental rationality propagates, fosters bodily disengagement and social atomism. This is also the perception of human nature as an 'activity' and not as a 'substance'. To overcome inauthentic conceptions of human nature as free spirit, which Taylor labels 'the ideal of authenticity', with its emphasis upon self responsible freedom, and the excesses of existential heroism, it is necessary to 'embody' the individual. Embodiment is the recognition of 'thrownness', facticity, or determinacy (sometimes with an ultimate acceptance of 'homelessness'). In Taylor there is a (Heideggerian) tension in relation to the dualism of mind and body, or spirit and the flesh. From the theological perspective there is something 'sinful', or at least 'messy' about human embodiment. To overcome social atomism, the embodied individual is placed within the 'dialogical' condition of society. In the political sphere this can suggest 'decentralisation' to make this social embodiment 'resonant'. To authentic (existentially heroic) individuals this will seem like the devolvement to the tyranny of opinion. Taylor argues that authenticity is a flawed ideal that does not recognise 'situatedness'. Taylor calls for substantive liberalism over procedural liberalism. However it is possible to follow a different path and argue that an embodied individual can choose a political form that ignores some aspects of embodiment for sound philosophical and political reasons (just such a route is explored by Walzer in the next chapter). However in opposition to this sense, both Slater and Taylor argue for a hope in an increased sense of community. Both advocate a movement from individualism to community.

Solomon urges a 'countereffort' (sic). What is required for Solomon, is philosophies that break from 'the crowd', or the 'universal community of the bourgeoisie'. Solomon observes that Sartre argues that it is 'inauthentic' American collectivism that provides the basis for self-destructive American individualism. This emphasis has two aspects. In one sense Taylor is correct, a sense of 'embeddedness' makes the option to live 'outside' of community (outside of one's facticity) a naive hope. In another sense the commitment to community is a choice. While Taylor is correct to urge an 'engagement', it does not help his argument, or the scope of democratic politics to represent this 'engagement' as 'inescapable'. Solomon's very pertinent point is that if Taylor wishes to revive communal action he is on surer footings if this can be argued for from the angle of

self responsible commitment. Indeed it will become apparent that Taylor misunderstands the (existential) liberal basis for commitment to community (this will become particularly apparent in an analysis offered by Michael Walzer in a reply in Taylor's POR).

Solomon concludes that he concurs with Slater (and Taylor) that a communal approach (rather than 'existential heroism') is required to make the necessary, and desirable changes to society, and political institutions. Solomon's caveat is that what is required is a rejection of the tendency to see our 'selves' from the 'outside', a tendency to deny responsibility. This is the 'requirement' Taylor argues through his conceptualisation of human nature as interspatial epiphany. For Solomon this priority of choice, bounded by 'situation' is what existentialism is all about. Indeed this is what human nature as interspatial epiphany is also 'about' a feature of Taylor's work that his critics are too slow to recognise.

The Ethics Of Authenticity: The Collision Of Heidegger And Hegel

At the beginning of EOA Taylor identifies three malaises in contemporary society. Each malaise is a 'centre of tension', as each is perceived in an ambivalent fashion, that is as not unambiguously 'bad'. The first malaise Taylor identifies is 'individualism', this is the growing sense of 'Inwardness' that Taylor has traced through SOTS. The ambivalence towards individualism is fostered by its possible perception as both a gain and a loss. On the positive side, Modern individualism has given the individual the unprecedented opportunity to determine the shape of their own lives. The sense of 'loss' that is aroused by the pursuit of individualism, is that it has precipitated a loss of 'meaning', there has been a breaking from moral and social 'horizons' of meaning and action. Such 'horizons', for instance the hierarchical schema of 'the great chain of being', undoubtedly restricted the individual but also gave her meaning in the 'archetypes', or 'niches' they identified. This is then the widely perceived 'disenchantment' of Nature. Taylor suggests that there are many ways to capture this sense of loss; he suggests Tocqueville's identification of the loss of the heroic, and Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's identification of a loss of 'passion' as examples.

The second malaise Taylor isolates is the worrying primacy of 'instrumental rationality'. This is the use of reason to (dryly) calculate maximum efficiency. Taylor suggests that this conception of reason has led Modern society to tend to eclipse independent aims by the demand to maximise efficiency, and output. There are two symptomatic developments from this application of 'instrumental rationality'. Firstly there is an enhanced status for, or a special aura around technology, and (often inappropriate) technological solutions. Secondly there is a perceived loss of 'resonance', 'depth' or 'richness' to human existence (in POR Taylor will talk of the 'flattening' of existence'.) Expressions of this sense of 'loss' are found in the work of Marx, Arendt and Borgman, who evocatively talked of the rise of the 'device paradigm'.

This second malaise can, however, recur in a more intense form. This issues in the suggestion that a movement towards the 'device paradigm' is not just a temptation, but is 'forced' upon the individual and society in general. The paradigmatic statement of this position is the work of Weber and his characterisation of Modern society as an 'iron cage' of bureaucracy. Taylor wishes to refute such strong interpretations, but not totally dismiss an element of determinacy; Weber is wrong to suggest an 'iron cage', the individual's 'degrees of freedom' are not zero. To combat this undoubted tendency (but not iron fate) will require, Taylor suggests, not just a battle for 'heart and minds' but concrete institutional change. However this institutional change should not proceed by a revolutionary and violent route.

The third malaise Taylor identifies is on the political level; it is the political implications of the emergence of the two (previous) malaises. This political level has two aspects. Firstly, the institutions and structures of 'industrial-technological society' might be seen to restrict the choices of the individual. Secondly, the individual may be perceived as becoming increasingly 'locked in their own heart'; in a sense the individual becomes 'lost' in the 'depths' they have discovered in their own existence. There is an undoubted rise in 'selfishness', or less pejoratively in a 'self obsession'. The danger of this obsession is in an increased non participation in 'self government'. The work of Tocqueville epitomises this view. The 'selfish' individual precipitates a 'soft despotism' of the 'state'. The self obsessed, socially disengaged (though perhaps 'individualistically

engaged' (see below)) individual is at the mercy of an 'immense tutelary power'. For Tocqueville the only defence against such 'soft despotism' is a vigorous political culture. But here lies the 'catch twenty-two', the atomism of society, fostered to free the 'self determining' individual, militates against the formation of such a vigorous culture! Taylor's solution to this impasse, it will be remembered from the first chapter, is Hegelian 'amphibious bodies'. It is the loss of these 'lateral associations' that fosters the individual's feelings of powerlessness, which in turn represents a threat to political liberty, and the dignity of the individual as a citizen.

Taylor recaptures his three malaises as a loss of meaning (from the fading of 'moral' horizons), an eclipse of human ends, and a loss of freedom, that is 'political liberty' and 'citizen dignity'. Taylor claims that his identification of these three malaises will be regarded as controversial; this is to be expected, it is a symptom of the ambiguity felt towards these developments. It is a symptom of the fact that society has both boosters and knockers, i.e. people differ about whether these three developments are a gain or a loss. Taylor's position is that it is vital to avoid being either a booster or knocker, since the polarisation of such a debate misses too much. This assertion of an intermediate position is admirable; it captures a Platonic sense of 'balance'. Perhaps balance is the appropriate stance for the embodied individual within ultimate 'homelessness'. However Taylor's work is also animated by a sense of salvation, which in Eastern thought expresses itself through a Buddhist notion of 'Nirvana' of 'stillness'. It is vital to maintain the dynamic stance of balance and avoid a 'slump' into 'stillness'. Taylor's act of retrieval is to avoid either 'extreme' position, and attempt to reveal the 'moral' basis of these developments; this is a historicism that can fall into stillness (and does so in Hegel's sense of a final reconciliation). Such a retrieval will 'empower' the individual to avoid either extreme position. Taylor claims that while this is his aim, EOA is too short adequately to achieve this aim, he thus proposes to perform the act of retrieval for the malaise of individualism, and then sketch answers to the other two malaises from this example.

The Malaise Of Individualism

In commencing his act of retrieval Taylor talks of his admiration for a recent work by Lionel Trilling entitled Sincerity and Authenticity. In this title, Taylor feels Trilling has accurately identified the predominate existential attitude of Modern society (particularly perhaps of the young, and the 'student body'). Trilling's work is insightful as it resists the common urge to regard Modern society as marked by loss, it resists the urge to be a knocker. Such sentiments of loss are expressed by Lasch in the criticism of what he identifies as 'narcissism', and in Bell's condemnation of 'hedonism'. However, it is rather to Bloom that Taylor prefers to turn.

In The Closing of the American Mind Bloom attempts to combat the 'facile relativism' that he sees as the climate of opinion of the student body. Bloom attempts to demonstrate that there is a strong moral idea at work in such widespread relativism (the moral ideal that Taylor wishes to call the 'ethic of authenticity'). Bloom suggests that contemporary society is 'deeply into' the culture of being 'true to oneself'. In its Modern conception this is the demand to be true to the 'voice within', as Taylor has traced this through SOTS, this is now no longer a commitment to a concept of 'moral sense', but to the 'depths' of human nature. Thus the 'soft relativism' of contemporary American society is an espousal of authenticity. Thus, Taylor's worry is that the ideal of authenticity sinks to an axiom. This axiomatic ideal isn't challenged, but more insidiously neither is it espoused, nor (to locate it more centrally within Taylor's concept of interspatial epiphany) is it articulated.

The political implication of this analysis (with its attendant 'blindness' to the moral ideal of authenticity) is the emergence of the 'liberalism of neutrality'. This is a species of Liberalism that professes to be neutral on the issue of what should define the content of 'the good life'. Taylor suggests that many writers in the school of the 'Liberalism of neutrality' overtly claim to be opposed to soft relativism. Among those Taylor identifies are Kymlicka and Dworkin. However their grounding in neutrality over 'the good life' results in them being 'inarticulate'. As Taylor puts it, "Its opponents slight it

[authenticity], and its friends can't speak of it."¹⁰ Taylor suggests that two further factors conspire to intensify this silence.

Firstly, there is the hold of moral subjectivism upon contemporary consciousness. This is the now familiar Taylorian criticism. Here, Taylor is explicit that his worry is that if such subjectivism is accepted, if it is ceded that moral realism is incorrect (that there is no grounding of morality in the nature of things, i.e. a commitment to the notion of a 'home') then it is impossible to argue with such individuals. Once again Taylor is quite correct to have such worries, but his proposed short-circuiting of Inwardness for the sake of Judeo-Christian theology is unacceptable. Secondly, the rise of Baconian science, the spectacular success of the explanatory power of the natural sciences, and of instrumental rationality in general, tends to undermine moral ideals. These two factors conspire to help 'thicken the darkness' around the moral ideal of authenticity. Taylor then asks the question 'Does this Matter?' He unequivocally says 'yes' it does. Soft relativism is a case in point.

As Bloom has shown, at the basis of the widespread soft relativism of contemporary society is a moral commitment. The assertion of soft relativism is a moral postulate not a theoretical insight. The practice of societal soft relativism, though, is a travesty of such moral insightfulness. The Bloomian insight cannot be used as a weapon to reject authenticity, but rather soft relativism should be rejected in the name of authenticity. Taylor wishes to turn the tables on the knockers of contemporary society, not by becoming a booster, but rather by retrieving the moral ideal he sees at the basis of authenticity.

The inarticulacy surrounding authenticity tends to affirm the power of choice, in and of itself. Again this is to miss the moral ideal of authenticity. Against this Taylor wishes to suggest (contra the boosters) that all in contemporary society is not as it should be, and then (in a partial agreement with the knockers on this first point, but then leaving to them behind) argue that authenticity as a moral ideal should be taken seriously.

Retrieval

Taylor suggests that to participate in his project of retrieval it is necessary to believe three things, all of them controversial. These Taylor lists as, firstly, the belief that the ideal of authenticity is a valid and worthwhile one (this first aspect will be assented to by this thesis, with a caveat over Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger). This Taylor restates as the need to oppose the criticism of the cult of authenticity. Secondly, is the belief that it is possible to argue in reason about ideals, and the conformity of practices to these ideals. This assertion will again be largely accepted, but with a 'metaphysical difference in accent', suggesting a fuller interpretation of the ideal of authenticity that argues against Taylor's moral realist quest for a 'home'. Taylor restates this belief as the rejection of subjectivism, it will be argued that while a rejection of existential heroism (the transcendental pretence) is required, this cannot be the slump to moral realism, this short-circuiting cannot be achieved. The third aspect Taylor identifies as the belief that such arguments over ideals can 'make a difference' (this belief will be ceded to Taylor). Taylor restates this belief as the need to reject the notion of an 'iron cage', be it found in 'the system' (or 'the state'), or in capitalism in general, in industrial-technological society, or in bureaucracy. Thus Taylor turns initially to the ideal of authenticity.

The Ideal of Authenticity

In common with his practice through SOTS Taylor will render authenticity as an inescapable 'moral source', a 'constitutive good' of Modern society. The ethics of authenticity Taylor suggests is relatively new and peculiar to Modern culture; it was 'born', he suggests, at the end of the eighteenth century and builds upon preceding conceptions of individualism, which in part it rejects. The earlier forms of individualism Taylor identifies as Descartes' 'individualism of disengaged rationality' and the political individualism of Locke. These are themes that Taylor has explored through SOTS, (examined in Chapter Two) and thus do not need to be expanded upon here. Authenticity

also partly refutes these earlier forms. It is a 'child' of the Romantic age and is thus opposed to instrumental rationality ('disengagement') and is opposed to an abstraction from social ties (atomism).

The real impetus for authenticity is then 'moral sense' theory with its suggestion that strong evaluation is intuitive. With 'moral sense' theory morality moves to become a 'voice within'. Morality has moved from a substantive order to an activity, a 'voice' of nature, and not a language within. Authenticity, Taylor asserts, develops out of the displacement of the moral accent on this idea. In its first incarnation authenticity is theistic or pantheistic, and it achieves its first paradigmatic statement with Rousseau. Rousseau is of interest as he also formulates a closely related idea, the notion of 'self determining freedom'. This is the notion that the individual is only free when she decides for herself; this is, then, the thin edge of the atomist wedge. However, authenticity gains its crucial importance through the work of Herder, and the notion of 'originality'. With Herder, each individual has a unique way of being human. It is then important to be true to oneself, and to avoid the pressures towards outward conformity. It is important to have contact with yourself and by the same token avoid taking an instrumental stance to human embodiment. Taylor's analysis here is interesting for three reasons.

Firstly, it seems paradoxical that Taylor can expound upon authenticity without explicit mention of an existentialist thinker (for example Heidegger, whose thought is often cited as a source for propagating a widespread acceptance, or engagement with authenticity). It is possible that Taylor is merely interested in the genesis of authenticity, and thus later existentialist thinkers, the undoubted heirs to authenticity, are for the moment of relatively little interest. A second interesting aspect of Taylor's analysis is how it echoes Berlin's assessment of the importance of the Romantic era. For Berlin the Romantic augurs an increasing rejection of ontology. However, for Taylor it represents the first slide into subjectivism and inarticulacy. Thirdly and lastly, Taylor characterises and then seems, to a certain extent, to overlook an awareness in the individual of the importance of resisting outward conformity. The resistance that authenticity instils can be seen as an important impetus towards the forging of lateral associations amongst like minded individuals. However Taylor's monomaniacal concern for atomism seems to

recast this awareness as a site of resistance to instrumentalism and disengagement. A measure of abstraction, or disengagement, is necessary to avoid the danger of outward conformity. For Berlin it is the 'metaphysicians' of the notion of a 'seamless universe' who are the most insidiously threatening to the freedom and dignity of the citizen. It would seem that Taylor feels that existentialism purports to offer such a seamless whole in its emphasis on radical choice making.

Inescapable Horizons: Subjectivism Opposed

Taylor then turns to his second controversial claim, which his second phrasing rendered as the rejection of subjectivism. The 'reality' of 'moral facts', it will be remembered, is discovered when one performs an act of engagement with one's moral sense, a phenomenology of moral experience. Kymlicka's work suggested that Taylor mistakes Utilitarianism for Naturalism, it will become apparent that Taylor makes this error in the realm of all subjectivist moral theories. In the particular setting of EOA this error is precipitated by a misunderstanding of existential value. It is, then, appropriate to turn to the flow of argument through EOA and examine Taylor's claim that it is possible to argue in reason to individuals about their ideals.

The Methodology Of Retrieval

Taylor sets his second controversial claim within the terms of how it is possible to argue with a booster (someone deeply implicated in the culture of soft relativism) about the animating ideal (i.e. authenticity) of contemporary culture. Taylor suggests that to argue or reason on a moral matter is always to argue with someone. The starting point is always the ideal in question. Of this ideal it is possible to ask two questions: What are the conditions of human life for fulfilling this ideal? And What does this ideal properly understood call for?

The General Features Of Human Life

In answer to the first question he has posed, what are the general features of human life that condition the fulfilment of any ideal Taylor has a short answer. The general feature of human life is its 'dialogical' character. We become human agents Taylor suggests by the acquisition of 'languages'. In defining the term 'languages' Taylor suggests he wants to take a very broad definition of its content, including the 'languages' of 'art, gesture and love'. In adopting this stance Taylor admits to being much influenced by the work of George Herbert Mead and the notion of 'significant others'. Taylor suggests that while some individuals can travel this far with him, they still wish to hold some sort of 'monological' ideal. A common complaint against Taylor's (and presumably Mead's) stance is that while we need relationships to fulfil us, we do not need them to define us. Taylor comments that all such positions underestimate the dialogical, and fall into existential heroism. Taylor then wishes to take this dialogical character of human existence on the one hand, and turn to his second question, what are the demands inherent in the ideal of authenticity itself. Taylor hopes to demonstrate that contemporary narcissistic modes of contemporary culture are 'manifestly inadequate'. In attempting to identify the demands of the ideal of authenticity, Taylor wishes to argue that two points must be recognised 'against the grain' of the usual, narcissistic, softly relativistic, interpretation of authenticity. These Taylor identifies as, firstly, the demands of the supra-human and, secondly, the demands of ties to others.

The Demands Of The Supra Human

Taylor suggests that in considering the 'originality' that the 'ethic of authenticity' assumes it is essential to recognise the presumption of a background of significance. The definition of oneself means finding what is significant in my difference from others. In an attempt to illustrate the difference that he is trying to capture here, Taylor contrasts two 'facts'. The first is that 'I may be the only person with 3,732 hairs on my head', while the

second is that 'I define myself by my ability to articulate important truths, or revive the tradition of my ancestors'. Taylor comments

"The difference is plain. We understand right away that the latter properties have human significance, or can easily be seen by people to have this, whereas the former do not - not, that is, without some special story."¹¹

(Taylor suggests that if the number 3,732 is sacred to a society then this number of hairs could be significant.)

By the soft relativist 'canon' things have significance not of themselves but because people deem them to have it. Taylor asserts that 'this is crazy', and asks 'what could someone mean who said this?' Well, they might be making a muddled attempt to say something about the ultimate relativity of value, an assertion of 'homelessness' akin to existential absurdity; a recognition of what might be termed 'paradigm. It will be remembered from the previous chapter that Taylor developed a notion of the 'hypergood', what if a differing sensibility holds the absurd to be their 'hypergood'? This would not incapacitate them from making assertions about 'the good life', or recognising 'objective value' (in a special sense), or Berlin's 'general values', but it would refute moral realism understood as a foundation. Taylor's argument is that the student body 'into' soft relativism denies all horizons of significance and this criticism is well placed.

So subjectivism is denied, it is impossible for things to have significance from the operation of individual will (the monological), when one recognises 'horizons of significance'. The attempt to suppress or deny horizons of significance slides into a subjectivist celebration of the act of choice itself. Such a celebration sees all options as equally worthy, it is the choosing that confers this worth. This accent on choice, that developed, Taylor suggests, from the notion of self determining freedom, assumes a background, or horizon of significance.

"I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find in myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters. Only if I exist in a world in which history..or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order *matters* crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial. Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands."¹²

Taylor suggests that his argument so far has not progressed very far. His concern seems to be that while he has shown that some self-transcending issues are indispensable (and thus it is possible to talk in reason to those enmired in trivialised modes of authenticity), "We have not shown that any particular *one* has to be taken seriously."¹³. It is this continual search for an overarching unity (which it is suspected will be theological) that is of a continual worry. It is now possible to turn to Taylor's argument that there is something self-defeating in modes of fulfilment that deny our ties to others.

The Demands Of The Ties To Others

The argument here can be seen to be of the most vital importance to Taylor, it is nothing less than a statement of his Communitarian beliefs. The importance of recognition of the dialogical and of community is of the utmost significance to Taylor. Taylor identifies the growth of deviant forms of authenticity in the increasing denial of non self-centred horizons of significance, fostering the emergence of 'the politics of recognition'. This complex relationship is explored in more depth, and greater cogency in Taylor's paper "The Politics Of Recognition" (contained in Multiculturalism and The Politics Of Recognition). It is then, proposed that a detailed exploration of this aspect of Taylor's thought will be left to the discussion of that paper towards the end of this Chapter. However as a foretaste, and to aid the exposition here, Taylor's

characteristically Communitarian arguments for the importance of the ties of others will be briefly surveyed.

The demand of the ties of others can be felt on two levels Taylor argues: the social, and the personal level. Deviant modes of authenticity are pernicious as on the societal level they undermine the notion of political citizenship, a sense of duty, and allegiance to society. On the personal level deviant authenticity centres on the individual, and the capacity for choice. Such a perspective illuminates the startling rise in divorce. Personal relationships are increasingly seen as the locus of self fulfilment, if this fulfilment ceases, the relationship is revocable. It will be remembered, that through SOTS, it was noted that Taylor had a central concern with the family, and condemned divorce. It was suggested that perhaps Taylor held a romantic view of family life. It becomes clear that Taylor sees divorce as a symptom of narcissistic modes of authenticity. These two facets of the demands of the ties of others reveals the emergence of an 'other dependence' with the emergence of the ideal of authenticity. It is this other dependence and the attendant rise of the politics of recognition that will be examined towards the end of this chapter. For now it is important to return to Taylor's assertion that contemporary narcissistic culture fails to live up to the ideal of authenticity. This is finally to retrieve authenticity. It is a discussion Taylor takes up with reference to aesthetics.

Aesthetics: The Refutation Of Nihilism

Taylor turns to discuss why the ideal of authenticity is prone to a deviation into trivial modes. Taylor suggests that with the rise of a culture of authenticity it is possible to see personal development as in conflict with the external demands of morality. However such conflicts have presumably always existed. Thus the issue is why, now, it is possible to dismiss these external demands. Taylor suggests that part of the answer is found in the atomism of the social sphere. Individuals no longer feel themselves condemned as 'wrongdoers' by a supra-human horizon of significance. The growth and entrenchment of 'market mechanisms' comes to appear as inevitable, and thus

increasingly tends to delegitimise the claims of society, history, tradition, nature or God. A radical anthropocentricism emerges. Therefore part of the explanation for the deviancy of authenticity is the fact that this 'cult' is being lived in an industrial-technological bureaucratic society.

Another important impetus for deviancy stems from reasons internal to the ideal of authenticity. Authenticity fosters a focus on self-fulfilment, and high culture and aesthetics move towards nihilism. That is the negation of all horizons of significance, in this interpretation it will be argued Taylor is incorrect. This nihilism is expressed in Nietzsche, Baudelaire and contemporary Post Modern theorists, such as Foucault and Derrida. Post Modernism is paradoxical as it takes deconstruction through even to the self. However Post Modernism, in particular the later work of Foucault, also points at a way out of nihilism. It points to the Expressive aspect of Modern individualism. This is the conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany with which we are now familiar. This is the self creation that emerges with the movement of aesthetics from mimesis to epiphanic art, or to what Taylor terms here, the art of 'poiesis' (or making).

Through the aesthetics of poiesis, beauty comes to be perceived as its own goal. Beauty is no longer perceived as an objective standard, but centres about the feelings that are aroused in the viewer. Through the work of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Kant beauty becomes perceived as having its own intrinsic fulfilment. In parallel to this, authenticity is its own goal. Self truth (or self wholeness) and aesthetics are ripe to be brought together Taylor suggests, and indeed they are through Schiller's Letters On The Aesthetic Education Of Man. This sense of beauty as a wholeness beyond the divisions between morality and desire inspires various attempts to champion the 'instinctual depths' against 'bourgeois' ethics of order. This project in aesthetics has, however, developed deviant forms; for instance Marinetti and the Futurists, Artaud and the 'theatre of cruelty', and the thought of Georges Bataille. In an analogous manner authenticity can develop in many branches, not all of which are equally legitimate. In effect its more narcissistic and subjectivist extremes should be rejected as deviant.

This, then, is the crucial importance Taylor placed upon aesthetics through SOTS. Through EOA its true nature is revealed, or there is a significant development in

Taylor's thought. The application of this later position allows him to define authenticity more clearly, and mount a persuasive argument as to why its more self centred modes may be isolated and rejected.

Legitimate Authenticity

Taylor suggests that authenticity: (A) involves (i) creation and construction, (ii) originality, and frequently (iii) opposition to the rules of society and morality. Moreover authenticity: (B) requires (i) an openness to horizons of significance (or the act of creation losses its significance), and (ii) self definition in dialogue. This exposition is an advance on that offered in SOTS. It appears to come to terms with Kymlicka's criticisms of a lack of focus and a need to live beyond the moral means of society (especially in A(iii)). There is a very real sense in which EOA might be seen as a final concluding chapter to SOTS.

Developing his analysis in terms of boosters and knockers, Taylor asserts that it is vital to avoid exalting (A) over (B) or vice versa. Deconstructionism on this schema recognises A(i) and A(ii) but ignores B(i) and B(ii). If one exalts (A) over (B) values come to be perceived as created and it is easy to 'tip over into' extreme forms of anthropocentrism. This is seen in the sense of self determining freedom that Rousseau forges. The sense of 'social contract' that Rousseau initiates and that is repeated through Marx and Lenin ties the individual to society, but promotes new heights of human centeredness (and aggression towards Nature). It has been the concern of this thesis that Taylor, in particular in SOTS, exalts (B) over (A), and represents Judeo-Christian theology as an 'iron cage'.

Taylor suggests that in the end authenticity shouldn't go all the way with self determining freedom. If authenticity does advance with self determining freedom it provokes a split screen between high tragedy and a 'flattening' of reality. There is the tragedy of the individual alone in a silent universe, without intrinsic meaning, and condemned to create value. This, at a later moment, yields a flattened world, a world where the horizons of meaning are fainter, where there aren't any very meaningful

choices. While this thesis would accept Taylor's broad point, it is possible to argue for a slightly longer journey with self determining freedom than Taylor himself sees as acceptable. The high tragedy of homelessness can recover horizons of significance with a renewed vigour and meaning. In existential thought under absolute absurdity there is still a vital and important role, to echo Berlin, for plumping

La Lotta Continua

Taylor suggests that he has reached the stage where he can confidently suggest that the culture of authenticity is actuated by an ideal of authenticity that condemns narcissistic variants. Thus the culture of authenticity suffers from a constitutive tension (this is then a restatement of Taylor's perception of an (at least) bi-focalism at the centre of Western thought). Taylor suggests that it is valuable to hold his view, partly because he things it is true, and partly because it leads to a quite different stance towards contemporary culture. Against the knockers (for instance Bloom, Bell, and Lasch) who condemn the egoism of self fulfilment, and the boosters, for whom everything is as it should be, there is Taylor's third position; where the argument is **over** authenticity, not **about** authenticity. (This third stance is predicated on an acceptance of his three controversial theses).

The efficacy of Taylor's position is that it is possible not to despair at self centred fulfilment gaining ground, or at the rising divorce rate, or the decline of citizen participation. From the Taylorian heights self centred practice can be seen as the site of ineradicable tension in the ideal of authenticity not fully being met. This tension, Taylor claims, can become a struggle, a battle can be joined, which can 'rage' back and forth. In a striking difference of tone from the end of SOTS Taylor adds "It will be bad news for anyone who hoped for a definitive solution. We can never return to the age before these self centred modes could tempt and solicit people."¹⁴ The Modern mediated position is superior, more astute, engaged and optimistic than radical existentialism or soft despotism.

Taylor's third position is then ambivalent, it is bad news for the hope of unity, however it is also good news. While the 'best' cannot be guaranteed, neither are the trivial or deviant forms of authenticity inevitable. The bars of the 'iron cage' have been prised apart. Having completed his act of retrieval in terms of the ideal of authenticity, in an attempt to combat the malaise of individualism, Taylor turns to apply a similar retrieval to the other two malaises he has identified.

The Malaise Of Instrumental Rationality: The Eclipse Of Ends

Taylor begins his discussion of this second malaise by addressing the 'cross alignment' of boosters and knockers between the malaises of individualism and instrumental rationality. In regard to individualism and authenticity Taylor has argued knockers offer a 'root and branch' condemnation of the ethic of self fulfilment, while boosters give a 'global endorsement' to all contemporary forms (even deviant ones) of authenticity. In regard to instrumental rationality the knockers of self fulfilment are boosters of instrumentalism and of technical development. Boosters of self fulfilment are knockers of technological society, and prefer pre-industrial society. The knockers of authenticity are on the right wing politically, while the knockers of instrumental rationality are on the left. Right wing American conservatives advocate traditional community and attack abortion, but in their economics they advocate an 'untamed capitalism' that has more than anything else helped to dissolve communities and is ready to 'close down a mining town at the drop of a balance sheet'.¹⁵ On the left those who advocate a reverential stance to nature, champion abortion on demand.

This leads, Taylor suggests, to two polarised debates. While the two are very different, Taylor suggests that there are more or less equally wrong¹⁶. Runaway instrumental rationality hardens atomism, and promotes an imperviousness to Nature. Knockers are correct in this, but it is impossible to dismiss technological society all together. Taylor suggests that what is required is retrieval. It is essential to overcome the unwitting conspiracy to silence that such a polarised debate promotes. Before

considering how this retrieval will advance, Taylor turns to look at the contemporary perception of instrumental rationality as an 'iron cage'.

The 'Iron Cage'

Taylor suggests that it is a common place to assume that there is something 'ineluctable' about the atomist-instrumentalist outlook in Western society: that such a position truly is the iron fate of technologically developed societies. Taylor suggests that there is probably a great deal of truth in the notion of the iron cage but that the degrees of freedom open to society are not zero. As an example of this limited freedom Taylor turns to the rise of 'green movements'. Against the general presumption of the fragmented public sphere at the mercy of instrumental reason it is possible to forge change.

"Human beings and their societies are more complex than any simple theory can account for... True, the philosophies of atomism and instrumentalism have a head start in our world. But it is still the case that there are many points of resistance, and that these are constantly being generated. We need only think of the whole movement since the Romantic era, which has been challenging the dominance of these categories, and of the offshoot of that movement today, which is challenging our ecological mismanagement."¹⁷.

It is illuminating to contrast these sentiments with Kareev's analysis of Tolstoy in the previous chapter.

This, then appears to be a return to the Hegelian concerns of "Modes of Civil Society" that Taylor expressed in Chapter One. Taylor will be concerned to argue for the place of 'amphibious bodies', or interest groups, against the popular view of a fragmented public at the mercy of an ineluctable fate pushing towards the dominance of instrumental reason. But even the 'fragment' of an interest group is insufficient at times, for Taylor.

"..it seems that in this each local community or group of concerned citizen stands over against the vast majority of the public, demanding a sacrifice in development, and hence GNP per head, for that public, in the name of their minority interest. So formulated, the case seems hopeless: it is politically a lost cause, and it doesn't even deserve to win. The mills of democratic politics ineluctably grind such small islands of resistance into powder."¹⁸

(The analysis of this impasse will be completed through POR). This predicament is transformed, Taylor argues, when a 'common consciousness', or a 'common understanding' is forged around an issue (as in the case of the environment). While this might be perceived as an argument for a free society, Taylor edged here towards a 'general will' (though he explicitly denies such an interpretation). Taylor claims he does not want to exaggerate 'our degrees of freedom' (assert existentialism heroism), but to claim that they are not zero. It has to be remembered that instrumental rationality has a strong ideological grip on the Western psyche. It is through such rationality that famine relief effort can be devised and put into operation, for instance:

"Instrumental reason has also grown along with a disengaged model of the human subject, which has a great hold on our imagination. It offers an ideal picture of a human thinking that has disengaged from its messy embedding in our bodily constitution, our dialogical situation, our emotions, and our traditional life forms in order to be pure, self-verifying rationality."¹⁹

So while there is this 'hold', it is also possible to struggle against it "by retrieving some of the richer moral background from which the modern stress on instrumental reason took its rise."²⁰ Taylor attempts the act of retrieval for instrumental rationality by stressing its importance to two 'moral contexts'. These are two facets of the Modern identity that

have been encountered previously; namely the 'moral sources' of self-responsible, self-controlling reasoning, and the affirmation of ordinary life in its Baconian 'efficacious mode'.

The route of 'rehabilitation' for instrumental rationality is the same as that for authenticity; there must be a consideration of (i) the circumstances of human life that condition the realisation of this ideal, and (ii) a consideration of what this realisation amounts to. To achieve this retrieval Taylor turns to a 'medical example'.²¹ The example proceeds by remembering that (i) instrumental rationality is an ideal, and not a picture of human agency (the stress on agency that formerly was upon strong evaluation, now focuses upon the dialogical). Therefore (ii) the individual must be respected in this embodied, dialogical, temporal nature. This retrieval can then, criticise the runaway extension of instrumental reason into medicine. In other words, the individual must be recognised as an organism, and not the locus of a technical problem, which is the instrumental analysis. This argues for an increased rapport between the cure-giver and patient.

The Third Malaise

Taylor begins his examination of the political consequences of the two previous malaises by arguing that it is not obligatory to see the iron fate of technological society as a slide towards the hegemony of instrumental reason. However the possibility of this very perception has animated the project of 'leaping out' of this instrumentalistic institution all together. Such revolutionary fervour is to be found in Marxism, Leninism and anarcho-individualism. Such hopes are illusory Taylor asserts, one element of facticity is the 'throwness' of the contemporary individual in a Western nation state (Taylor self consciously limits the relevance of his work to western politics). The collapse of Communist societies has revealed that market mechanisms in some form are necessary. For some in the West though, the collapse of Eastern European Communism is a sign that unrestricted market mechanisms must be adopted. Taylor asserts that this is

unrealistic. What should have died with Communism is the belief that Modern society can be run on a single principle, be it the 'general will' or the market.

The reality now is that there is a need to combine a number of ways of 'operating', which jointly are necessary to a free and prosperous society, that nevertheless tend to impede one another. Taylor lists market allocation, state planning, collective provision for the needy, defence of individual rights and effective democratic initiative and control as amongst the ways of 'operating'. Taylor suggests that though it is impossible to abolish market mechanisms, it is impossible to exclusively organise society through its machinations. It is costly to restrict the market, but fatal not to restrict it.

"Governing a contemporary society is continually recreating a balance between requirements that tend to undercut each other, constantly finding creative new solutions as the old equilibria become stultifying. There can never be in the nature of the case a definitive solution."²²

Such laudable comments might be applauded, and seem to have a strong affiliation with the work of Berlin. Taylor continues that while there is no definitive victory there is gaining and losing ground. The movement to gaining ground occurs when a common understanding emerges. This 'rosy' picture is still perhaps somewhat disquieting to Taylor's critics, there seems to be a lack of what might be termed 'angst' in Taylor's analysis.

The need for a common understanding raises a problem Taylor asserts. This is the Tocquevillian fear that democratic initiative becomes paralysed by an 'immense tutelary power'. Taylor thus recasts Tocqueville's fear in terms of a fear of fragmentation. Given this phrasing there is a possible way of resisting fragmentation and atomism. Taylor's suggestion is a devolution to 'resonant surroundings'. Communal projects Taylor suggests are 'felt more' in particular groupings or communities. Thus there should be a devolution to the local community, and groupings around ethnicity, religion, ideology or other special interests. Fragmentation arises partly through the weakening of the bonds of sympathy, and partly through a failure of democratic initiative itself. The electorate as

a whole is seen as defenceless against the 'leviathan state' (while a well-organised partial grouping is seen as capable of making 'a dent'). A 'society wide' communal project seems utopian and naive. A lack of common action further weakens the bonds of sympathy, Taylor warns, and this **makes** the situation hopeless. A vicious circle is joined.

Now a society entering this vicious circle might however, still be highly democratic. For instance a common purpose that might remain while others atrophy is an emphasis upon a defence of rights. Taylor turns to an explicit examination of the American political scene.²³ A fragmented society still attempting to maintain a commitment to rights, like America, will be marked by two particular facets. Firstly an emphasis upon judicial battles, concern turns to judicial review. Secondly there will be an increase in 'interest', or 'advocacy' politics. While this is hardly despotism there is a resultant atrophying of a third facet; this is the formation of democratic majorities around meaningful programs. In this the American political scene is abysmal. There has been an increase in sound bytes and a reduction in voter participation. This style of politics makes issues harder to resolve, as judicial review results in the winner 'taking all'; there is a lack of the 'messy', embodied, and embedded compromise. Such a system reflects and entrenches fragmentation, and fosters the procedural liberalism of neutrality. To have lost the ability to build politically effective majorities is to 'lose your paddle in mid stream' and be swept downstream towards ever increasing atomism and fragmentation. Thus the politics of retrieval and resistance is the politics of democratic will formation and democratic empowerment.

In addressing how to fight fragmentation Taylor asserts that while it is not easy, there are no universal prescriptions for turning a vicious circle into a virtuous one, Tocqueville's thought is of interest. Tocqueville's solution was a measure of devolution, federalism, or subsidiarity. In this regard Taylor sees Canada as fortunate, as its provincial units correspond with regional societies. There is then a commitment to resonant, and local surroundings to 're-enframe' technological society.

What our situation seems to call for is a complex, multi-levelled struggle, intellectual, spiritual, and political, in which the debates in the public

arena interlink with those in a host of institutional settings, like hospitals and schools, where the issues of enframing technology are being lived through in concrete form; and where these disputes in turn both feed and are fed by the various attempts to define in theoretical terms the place of technology and the demands of authenticity, and beyond that, the shape of human life and its relation to the cosmos."²⁴

It is important to grasp the 'grandeur' and 'misere' of Modernity. Having thus completed the examination of the EOA it is appropriate to turn to Taylor's preceding political thought to see how his thinking develops.

The Politics Of The Steady State: Taylor's Early Political Prescription

"The Politics of the Steady State" (from Beyond Industrial Growth, edited by Abraham Rotstein) is of especial interest as it contains, what might be termed, Taylor's political prescription. It is interesting to note that this essay is not included in Taylor's two volume Philosophic Papers (first published in 1985). It is perhaps inappropriate to recourse to "The Politics of the Steady State" as it was published some nine years before Taylor's Philosophic Papers (and thus some thirteen years before Sources of the Self). However, only five years separate "Legitimation Crisis?" and "The Politics of the Steady State", and the two essays may be fruitfully read together. Indeed Philosophic Papers contains essays written between 1971 and 1984, thus both these papers are written within that period.

In "The Politics of the Steady State" Taylor asserts, under the influence of the 'Club of Rome' report, that it is undeniable that industrial growth cannot be maintained indefinitely. Consumer societies' current exponential growth, in population and industrial development, will eventually hit some sort of limit. Taylor claims the three most important limits are those of population, resources, and pollution; there are perhaps other limits, for instance Taylor suggests there may be a population concentration limit. Large cities create problems of overcrowding, and increase 'overhead costs'. While there may

be debates over the exact time scale until these limits are reached, there is general awareness that the age of exponential growth will have to come to an end. In this time of crisis it will be necessary to have an economic system that respects the three limits Taylor has identified. Such an economic system will have to respect a stable population, a severe rationing of non renewable resources, and a ban (or at least strict regulation) on the polluting side effects on production. A state that respected these three limits would be a 'steady state'. However Western society is grievously unprepared for such a movement to the 'steady state' as it would necessarily renounce exponential, quantitative growth. The steady state has not renounced growth all together; it rather emphasises qualitative growth. Such qualitative developments would be particularly urgent in respect of more economical resource use.

However contemporary society is obsessed with quantitative growth.

"Exponential growth is measured, conceived, worried about, and celebrated in our societies by the figure for GNP."²⁵

There is almost an idolatry of GNP in modern society. It is a very deep rooted obsession that touches on society's definitions of hope, the future, and the good life. Taylor identifies three ways in which society is addicted to exponential growth. The first source of addiction is to provide full employment. Capitalist societies depend upon growth to avoid widespread unemployment. Secondly, society depends upon growth to fund its income redistribution efforts. With the fall of ontological justifications for hierarchy, the notion of redistribution rises, and growth is utilised to furnish such adjustments. The third source of addiction to growth is its expectation.

"We can see it as defining the good life to include an ever-increasing command over goods and services, and an ever-increasing capacity to control nature for individual ends."²⁶

The roots of this addiction are to be found in the 'modern identity', in the sense of what it is to be a human, and especially in relation to the notion of autonomy. This modern productive identity also underpins a sense of common social purpose as efficacy. However if notions of the modern identity, and its attendant notion of common social purpose are 'slipping' in contemporary society (a society of growth) how are they to be maintained in the more inhospitable surroundings of the steady state? Thus the principal problem of the paper is how to stop societies 'flying apart' under conditions of qualitative growth. Society will in fact not so much 'fly apart' as become crushed by increasingly authoritarian regimes. Thus the central problem may be restated as, how is it possible to progress to the steady state while maintaining democratic institutions?

Of the three sources of addiction that Taylor has identified it is the second and third ones that are of crucial importance. The addiction to growth for full employment (the first source) is not decisive. A switch to the steady state would necessitate a return to labour intensive technologies, and in particular to recycling technologies. The second and third source are of such crucial importance as they partly define the good life. The fading of horizons of significance has a homogenising effect, for instance inequalities of income come to be seen as unjustifiable. There is an internal dynamic to society whereby certain groups continually push for increasing equality. The fact that these inequalities remain places a strain on social cohesion, a strain that is intensified by the loss of our self image as interdependent producers.

One phenomena of this growing crisis is the income scramble that fuels inflation. A more terrifying form of this scramble is the spectre of increased terrorist activity. While these two forms are very different things

"..it would be wrong to see the these two kinds of struggle, the utilitarian income scramble and the terroristic demand for rights, as necessarily two qualitatively different things, separated by water tight compartments. Who has not heard these days the demand for higher incomes and more equality framed in the rhetoric of rights and liberation?"²⁷

The move to the steady state may prompt extreme forms to dominate, or the crisis that precedes the switch to the steady state may produce a mutation. There may be a rediscovery of social solidarity and common purpose. There is the emergence of a kind of 'Dunkirk spirit' Taylor predicts. However the frightening scenario is more likely, with increasing bitterness and inter group struggle. A society terrorised would fly apart. In such a scenario increasingly authoritarian rule, or overt dictatorship, becomes the only solution. It is the only way of ensuring even a minimal amount of equitable distribution. Thus how is the authoritarian scenario to be avoided?

Taylor asserts that it is impossible adequately to judge what the solution would be. However it is possible to hint at some changes in institutions and publicly accepted goals that would form part of a more creative and civilised political response to the steady state. In making these deliberations, Taylor begins with some general considerations before focusing more specifically on the Canadian situation. Here, it will be enough to concentrate on Taylor's general observations, though selective reference will be made to his Canadian example, a more interesting Canadian case study is pursued through POR.

Firstly Taylor considers how the steady state will meet the demand of equality. The steady state partly by design, and partly by convergence will elaborate a normal pattern of consumption. A pattern of consumption that is accessible to the least affluent in society. The biggest challenge to the steady state is contemporary patterns of inequality. Such inequality is only held as provisionally tolerable by the prospect of its eventual eradication by rapid economic growth. Taylor asserts that there are different patterns of inequality that are not equally intolerable, for instance there is the difference between the mass of society and a few spectacularly rich individuals. In certain situations this could be perceived as absolutely intolerable, however apart from such circumstances such inequalities do not evoke mass resentment. For instance the small numbers of multi millionaires in America. What is, in fact, intolerable about contemporary industrial society is that it has developed a single norm of acceptable life, that is only accessible to two thirds, or three quarters of the population. Such a standard is intolerable in a way that the other forms of inequality are not. Such a unitary, and inaccessible norm creates a

major strain within society, which is temporarily eased by growth. But such a temporary 'salve' will be impossible in the steady state.

A society forced to give up exponential growth can respond by freezing existing patterns of distribution, or by rolling back all the positions proportionately, or a radical levelling. However all of these options are 'smouldering volcanoes' of resentment. Thus the future looks gloomy. However if the question of transition to the steady state is temporarily put to one side it is possible to "...focus on what new pattern of society could be potentially a free society.."28. The kind of society that could be sustained by the steady state, would have a consumption standard defining a normal decent life, available to the most disadvantaged. For the purposes of the paper Taylor assumes that there is a single consumption standard, though he admits that it might have regional fluctuations. Such a standard would be reasonably static, though it would grow 'slowly and irregularly'. The atomism of industrial-technological society is intensified in the move to the steady state by the loss of 'efficacious' self images; of pursuing quantitative growth. Nevertheless Taylor asserts that

"The aim of public policy would be to ensure by a mixture of rationing and subsidy that the goods and services of this common standard are available at prices which everyone can meet.."29

However, goods and services would be available beyond this standard, but at vastly superior cost. Taylor claims he can already hear the groans of some critics; that the steady state will be a Byzantine society with production and consumption held back by myriad controls, a society of dull uniformity. Taylor claims that he is not overjoyed at such a prospect either. But, firstly things are going to be bad whatever we do. Resource limits are going to be met and it will necessarily require a different method of allocation from that of the market. Secondly, Taylor asserts that things don't have to be that bad. A universal consumption standard does not have to stifle creativity. As Taylor puts it "Human happiness can survive the demise of the consumer society."30 However it is impossible to be too optimistic as a universal consumption standard does represent a

levelling down, relative to consumer society. How then is it possible to achieve such a change?

The Movement To, And The Maintenance Of The Steady State

To suggest that steady state resource redistribution is a 'levelling down' is a misleading way of characterising the issue. The reality of the movement to the steady state is of a quite different predicament, in two phases. A transitional period, marked by severe shortages, and the emergence of a new mould, the more permanent steady state. During the transitional period Taylor thinks that it is possible that a 'Dunkirk spirit' may prevail. The time of shortages will be analogous to a time of war. Thus individuals may be prepared to drop their standard of living, and 'level down' for the 'duration'. The second phase is the more problematic, and indeed the more interesting issue.

The question of how a steady state may be maintained, and prevented from slipping into authoritarianism, arises after the shock of the transitional phase, and with the assumption that democratic institutions have remained intact. What will be required to maintain the steady state is a mutation of societies' generally accepted self definitions. This is a first characterisation of Taylor's demand for substantive liberalism. Only a society with a strong sense of common purpose can accept the discipline of equal shares.

"Perhaps the health, maybe the fate, of free institutions in the steady state of the future depends on whether our societies respond to the end of growth either as a challenging common task which binds them or as a disaster in which each must scramble for safety on his own."³¹

Taylor asserts the end of growth must not be seen as a time heroically to attempt to salvage old forms of life, but as a communal enterprise to forge new modes of existence. This then will require new notions of identity. An important facet of this identity will have to be a strong sense of common purpose and solidarity, for only through this will radical equality be acceptable. In maintaining such strong common purpose in the

forthcoming crisis an advantage well lie with small societies, or those that can decentralise. The advantage of small size can be seen if we reflect on the conditions of maintaining free institutions.

Steady state societies will be more planned and regulated than society is today. Therefore there will be a recurrent danger of bureaucratic sclerosis, and of corruption and exploitation. In such a situation the drive towards Byzantinism may be unavoidable, but smaller societies will probably fair better. Thus it is important to meaningfully decentralise. This notion is of central importance. Taylor interprets this decentralising in Herderian terms. Taylor is suggesting not an arbitrary decentralism, but a breaking up of communities into smaller meaningful units. Areas bound by some deep common bond, in the Herderian formulation of geography or culture, or language. Such decentralisation and 'embeddness' are, as suggested before, in accord with Taylor's 'situated anthropology' of a post Heideggerian, hermeneutical moral phenomenology. In the political realm, it is an embedding in a community of 'deep resonance'.

A further suggestion Taylor has for the steady state is the more radical use of the mass media for consultation and decision making. Again such consultation is still better within a small community. Finally Taylor suggests that mobility, between professions, will also continue the solidarity of the steady state. In summary as we enter the steady state Taylor is concerned to see if it is possible to avoid authoritarian, or Byzantine societies, and whether it is possible to avoid the atrophy of civil rights and the institutions of self government, while avoiding the growth of irresponsible bureaucratic control. For Taylor the solution to the problem is to decentralise. The thrust of this argument is that smaller communities admit of a more deeply resonant surrounding. Conceptions of the self are embedded in institutions and practices of society, thus these should be local and accountable. It is important to have a strong sense of community, for it is only through this that it will be possible to support the demands of 'radical equality'. Such a notion of equality is represented in the steady state by its universal consumption standard; a standard that is going to be forced on society by the limits to industrial growth. While Taylor's thought here seems to retain a Marxist, economically determinist conceptualisation of reality (there is a determinist slant in the prediction of the 'inevitable

demise of quantitative growth), it is also possible to discern a first plea for what Taylor will come to call substantive liberalism; this is a hospitable form of the politics of 'equal dignity' that Taylor will isolate through POR. As emblematic of the 'transitional' phase of Taylor's thought it is of use to turn to the paper "Legitimation Crisis?". The paper is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, through its course Taylor explicitly argues for a movement away from 'economic determinism'. Secondly, the paper also contains early explorations of the issues of, the 'modern identity', and the conflictual nature of contemporary culture.

Legitimation Crisis?

"Legitimation Crisis?" concludes that Western consumer societies are indeed subject to a legitimation crisis. The title of the essay is in the form of a question, as Taylor asserts the problem is not so much of a single **crisis**, but of recurring legitimation **crises**. Taylor wishes to take up the issue of legitimation **crises**, while moving away from the traditional Marxist emphasis on purely economic factors. This difference in emphasis, with a move away from the 'purely' economic may illustrate a progression in Taylor's thought. However "The politics of the Steady State" is contained in a volume responding to the 'Club of Rome' report on the limits to industrial growth. Thus the economic emphasis in this essay may merely be a residual hangover of the forum for which it was written.

At the beginning of "Legitimation Crisis?" Taylor ponders whether we have the concepts to explore this issue fruitfully. While the belief that capitalism destroys itself is central to the Marxist tradition, this vision has been subsequently refined, modified, and even abandoned. Taylor suggests that James O'Connor offers an astute analysis of the issue. O'Connor suggests that capitalism generates 'external costs' that have to be assumed by the political system, which then threatens 'the states' 'legitimacy'. Such an approach is fruitful as it allows the identification of contradictions. However Taylor is convinced that headway can only be made on this issue if vulgar Marxist (economically determinist) views are dropped. The approach Taylor favours, is to focus on the question

of legitimacy. The way in which "...societies destroy themselves when they violate the conditions of legitimacy which they themselves tend to posit and inculcate."³² Taylor identifies, firstly the moral condemnations and defences of contemporary consumer society before, secondly, moving on to sketch the conflictual modern identity (given the detailed exploration of SOTS, little emphasis will be placed on this issue here). Thirdly, Taylor examines the features of modern society that entrench this identity. Lastly, Taylor examines the way in which that same society undermines its own legitimacy.

The Conflictual Grounds Of Consumer Society

Taylor identifies four streams of thought that condemn, and paradoxically justify contemporary society. This is then, the first emergence of Taylor's later conceptualisation of the booster and knocker debate. The first stream of protest is Platonic, an approach Taylor argues, that is taken up by Schumacher. This attack charges the economy with being driven by a frenzy of greed and envy. It sustains itself by the endless multiplication of desires. The modern member of society is like the figure of Calicles in Plato's Georgias. For Schumacher, and the Platonic tradition, ever increasing desire is a kind of blindness, or madness, or slavery. Such a condition is blind to the 'higher', the contemplation of nature (understood as the hierarchical order of ideas). The Calliclean life might be captured by a deviant form of the contemporary cult of authenticity. It is deviant as it is blind to 'higher contemplation'; in Taylor's terms it is 'insensitive' to moral realism.

The Platonic protest is related to the second stream of moral protest, which Taylor loosely terms 'Romantic'. The Romantic protest is associated with Rousseau. It remains Platonic in that it proposes a limitation of needs, or desires. It thus, also opposes Calliclean humanity. However, the Romantic protest is also profoundly un-Platonic. The protest is taken up in the name of Nature, but this is now understood as the spontaneous flow of life that 'courses' through humans and all things. This second stream of criticism is echoed in early Marx, but developed by the Frankfurt school, and in particular by Marcuse. It will be remembered that in SOTS, Taylor professes to be particularly drawn

to 'pessimistic' Marxist views, those with a downward spiral historical view. Marcuse argues a 'fall' into one dimensionality; Taylor argues a blindness to normative ontology.

The third stream of protest Taylor identifies is against the loss of community. Western society pushes towards 'bigness' and concentration, which necessarily destroys older, communal ties, and ways of living. Mobility and concentration are seen as essential conditions for rapid growth. The true Calliclean individual (narcissistic and authentic) will sacrifice community for the pleasures of acquisition. The criticism of concentration is essential to Taylor as the migration to cities breaks up communities, and thus destroys the 'resonant', 'local', community surroundings. But at a deeper level it is the liquidation of the past that is seen as terrible. The solution to this problem, is again post Heideggerian hermeneutics.

The fourth stream of criticism Taylor identifies is that against the irrationalities of Modern society.

"It is absurd, for instance, to endanger the ozone layer...and the eardrums of countless people, for the sake of saving a couple of hours off the time it takes to fly from London to New York; particularly when the snarl-ups that accompany fast transit on either end eat heavily into the gain anyway."³³

The notion of irrationality in contemporary society is a theme well explored by Marcuse, and Taylor suggests that this last criticism is separable from the preceding moral criticisms. Taylor finds it extraordinary that our societal bias towards more intense technology, our entrapment within the 'device paradigm', appears 'normal' most of the time.

This fourfold criticism of the 'growth-concentration-mobile society' strikes a chord in many people. However the Calliclean life may also be strongly defended. The autonomy and restless ambition of deviant authenticity can widen the horizons of society; help form a vital and creative place to live. Large cities partly drew new citizens due to this factor (which Raban identifies). Modern society may also be defended by claiming

that the Calliclean image does not fit. It may be pointed out that consumer society has brought increased affluence to a large proportion of society.

"..for those millions there is now the chance for a home, decently furnished, space, family life, the creative use of leisure, the building of a private space in which they can bring up a family, practise hobbies, see friends, as well as being plugged into a world-wide network of communications (admittedly only one way)."³⁴

From such a perspective, much of what is taken up by Platonism and Romanticism as critique, can now be seen to count **for** society. There is an emphasis upon instrumentalism to achieve a private space, that may become a resonant surrounding, the locus of family. There is a persistent emphasis upon family in Taylor's thought. It has become clear that, for Taylor, a high divorce rate is a function of instrumentalism and atomism, thus presumably, an emphasis upon family life will be symptomatic of non deviant forms of authenticity. Taylor is aware though, that such emphasis runs the risk of being labelled a 'merely' middle class concern.

However, it is clear that many individuals will feel the pull of both positions. Thus Taylor's aim is not to arbitrate between views but to examine what creates this ambivalence. The cause of this ambivalence is the inherently conflictual Modern identity. It is the Modern identity that can help to explain the legitimacy of Modern society and the threat to it

The Conflictual Modern Identity

In attempting to illustrate the central role for the Modern identity in the establishment, and delegitimisation of Modern society, Taylor turns to an early discussion of what will become the bulk of SOTS. Through "Legitimation Crisis?" Taylor identifies the bi-focal Modern perception of human nature in terms of two forms of 'living life according to nature', which he identifies as version one (V1) and version

two (V2); the debate that will become, through SOTS, Expressivism opposing instrumental rationality. Taylor utilises his distinction here to illuminate the means by which the traditional moral censure upon endless acquisition becomes lifted. 'How did we break the Platonic mould?' This question is framed in an odd way Taylor suggests. But it is so framed, as from a broader, historical perspective, it is Modern society that differs from the perennial norm.

Living life according to nature V1, is identified with, what will become disengaged instrumental rationality. V1 is anti hierarchical, and feeds into, what will become, the affirmation of ordinary life. Living life according to nature V2, is identified with 'moral sense', with Rousseau, Expressivism and, here, 'attunement' to nature. It is this emphasis upon the notion of 'attunement' that is of most interest, and will be taken up (obliquely) at the end of this chapter, and more explicitly at the beginning of the next.

In regard to the lifting of the moral censure of 'endless accumulation', the beginning of the process that Taylor has highlighted in "The Politics of the Steady State" as an addiction to technology, growth, and GNP, V1 justifies Modern consumer society, while V2 offers a platonic, and Romantic critique. V1 stresses control

"Modern man accumulates through productive labour. And this labour is the result of discipline and control, the discipline of an instrumental stance towards the world. In producing, we are not only meeting our needs, but we are also realising our status as autonomous rational agents. We are affirming ourselves spiritually,.."³⁵

V2 points a way to expressive fulfilment. "So living according to nature, version I, means exercising rationality and control to follow the demands of nature, which are themselves of no more than de facto worth. In version II, it is following the voice of nature, a source of pure, higher desire within us which induces us to act well. Sentiment thus comes into its own;.." ³⁶. V2, however, contains a transposed and stronger notion of 'attunement' with nature (it is the 'strength', or nature of this attunement that will become increasingly

problematic through Taylor's thought). The two modes of living life according to nature can then, turn 'critical' of one another; thus Modern society exhibits a constitutive tension

"Life according to nature underlies almost inescapably our conceptions of the good life just because it is so bound up with the modern identity. And this in two versions, with their family of variants. They are both operative in our civilisation, are interwoven in our ideals, and yet are also at odds."³⁷

The two versions of life according to nature are embedded in the structures, practises and institutions of society. Certain institutions and practices have been crucial in maintaining the modern identity. This however is lost from view as the modern identity continually stresses individual autonomy. But Taylor suggests, it is possible to single out four features of modern society that develop, and sustain, our sense of ourselves as a free agent.

The Entrenchment Of The Modern Identity

The first of these is equality. The individual is not a serf or a slave. A hierarchical society is justified on an old conception of cosmic logos. With the loss of this view, hierarchical society is swept away. Secondly the individual is a subject of rights, a bearer of equal rights. These two conditions might be said to express the basic minimum status of the modern subject in society. Another important faculty of the individual is her ability to effect her purposes, to be efficacious. Such efficacy is important both at the individual/private level, and also at the communal level. Thus alongside equality and rights is the notion of citizenship. A further dimension of efficacy pours over into the fourth facet Taylor identifies, that of being a producer. As producers we are aware of belonging to an interconnected society of labour and technology. In so far as the individual takes part in this production, she experiences the efficacy of this society. Our status as a producer is an important part of the self image of advanced industrial society.

The four dimensions Taylor has identified of the agent, the equal bearer of rights, who is producer and citizen are embodied in society and in its practices. The status of this four fold modern identity is sustained by the operation of a legal system, the political system of voting and elections, and through the practices of negotiation and collective bargaining. These practices embed a conception of the agent, and her relation to society, which reflects the modern identity and its related visions of the good. The growth of the modern identity can explain why these practices have developed in a particular way. Further this identity may also help to explain the growing malaise of advanced industrial society.

Consumer society satisfies the modern identity, in mode or version one, with a stress on autonomy. Consumer society also satisfies strands of version two, particularly those from the Romantic-expressive phase. Our contemporary private relations are predicated on expressive models. In a sense, Taylor suggests, we are all Romantics in our private lives. The economic, legal, and political structures in which we coexist are justified instrumentally. This compromise between the two versions of life according to nature seems very stable, but in fact it is wracked with inner tensions.

"We can see how closely interwoven both the affirmative and critical stances are to our contemporary society, how much they are from the same roots, and draw on the same sources. But perhaps we can also hope to gain some insight into the dialectic between the two, how the balance tips now one way, now another.... It is a moral crisis that is inescapably also a political one; because what is impugned is the definition of the good actually embedded in our practises."³⁸

Thus our society is always open to a certain moral critique. The danger is that society may be perceived as merely aiming at material enrichment. Taylor then turns to the features of modern society that undermine our confidence in it as Moderns.

The first feature Taylor identifies is work. For many their employment is dull and monotonous. Further in the sphere of work individuals are far from being equal

autonomous agents. In such a discussion we enter the terrain of Marx. Taylor wishes to amend Marx's work. The present formula of consumer society is a kind of historical compromise in which 'we' have, most of us, acquiesced. It is possible now to see Taylor as within the Western Marxist tradition. Unlike orthodox Marxists, the Western Marxists of the Frankfurt School argue that mass alienation has not come about through a supposedly economically determinist route. Society, on the contrary, has become a mass democracy, and improved the conditions and remuneration of workers. The current historical compromise appears to be a trade-off between a degree of alienation within the labour force, for consumer affluence. For Taylor this is a very grave problem as meaningful labour affirms an individual's spirituality.

The second feature Taylor identifies is the sense of common interest that underlies this compromise. This is the belief that the economic machine 'must run on'. This common intuition translates into the non imposition of priorities upon the capitalist machine. While a capitalist economy needs fiscal intervention, it has a basic principle that firms must be free to 'chase profits'.

"And so we get the culture that moral critics object to: the fixation on brute quantitative growth, unalloyed by judgements of priority. The justification of this has to be an image of the good life, in which the acquisition of more and more consumer goods- what the system is good at producing-is seen as a central purpose of life."³⁹

(The narcissistic and authentic lifestyle comes to dominate). Taylor suggests that the majority has acquiesced in this compromise from a mix of motives. The non imposition of priorities is a condition of the machine running at all. The resultant mode of life satisfies us as moderns. This collective silence on priorities is a condition of freedom, to be able to go one's 'own way'. Such 'disinvolvement' over priorities allows the building of private space for the individual to live her self contained life. This definition of the 'good life' as the continuing escalation of living standards appeals to the unregenerate in humans, as Plato well knew. But to say consumer society appeals to the lowest in us is a

half truth. It also appeals to notions of autonomy. What is not justified is endless increase.

Taylor finds it incredible that labour saving technology extends even into the realm of electric toothbrushes. There is a 'fetishisation', it is as though a faster car makes family life more intense and harmonious. Another reason why the machine 'run wild' appeals to moderns, is that it appeals to our sense of collective efficacy.

Thus meaningless work, disinvolvement over priorities, and fetishisation of commodities all challenges our image of ourselves as realised moderns. The challenge threatens us with a kind of anomie, where we cease to believe in the norms governing our society, but have no alternative but to live by them nonetheless. There is a crisis of allegiance. This underlies our present malaise, thus it is important to see why in recent years these features have begun to impress us. Thus Taylor identifies four areas where our society is a victim of its own success.

Delegitimation: Four 'Hypertrophies'

Firstly the prosperity of society cannot **but** produce doubts about the fetishisation of commodities. When society is struggling to make housing and basic consumer durables widespread, there is an obvious connection between effort and production. However in relatively affluent societies the effort goes into new models, and new features (there is a loss of resonance). For a substantial minority, who have not entered such affluence, production still makes sense. "But the continuation of the consumer boom does not seem to be very effective in helping those 'pockets of poverty'. The wealth does not 'trickle down' very adequately."⁴⁰

The second area Taylor identifies is the increasing doubt of the value of family. What makes such doubt the more terrible for Taylor, is that community has been sacrificed for the nuclear family, which is itself now under attack. The attack on the nuclear family comes from its association with a discredited consumer lifestyle, from the demands for autonomy within the Modern identity, and from feminist critiques.

The third area of consumer society success (or 'hypertrophy') is the way in which concentration and mobility start to have social consequences. As Hugh Stretton has pointed out, increasing concentration in large cities raises the overhead costs of social existence. Further the housing stock in villages deserted for the city has to be written off. Taylor suggests that increasing concentration virtually forces an expansion of the public sector. The enlargement of the public sector is a great source of malaise. Higher taxes are resisted by Modern autonomous individuals. (An example of this is the Californian tax revolt). Such revolt is further justified by the over bureaucratisation of the public sector. The public sector becomes over costly, and unresponsive. Thus these three hypertrophies of society intensify its malaise. The modern identity fragments community, a loss of faith in consumer society undermines notions of citizenship; unresponsive bureaucracies further make individuals cynical about citizenship, and even raise fears over individual rights. The net result is to undermine our notion of 'collective efficacy' (still an economic metaphor, it is interesting to note).

Collective efficacy is the fourth hypertrophy Taylor identifies. From the post war period, where there was a confidence in technological society, things have now gone sour. It is our sense of efficacy that has taken a serious blow. And thus our definitions of the 'good life' are attacked. All this builds up to a sense that society is due for a bout of social conflict, after the post war halcyon days. This sense grows partly from the increasing size of the public sector, and the burden it puts on the productive sector, and tax payers. It also comes from a more classless style of society. Workers and the less well educated have more 'muscle' than before, Taylor suggests, through trade union action (showing the date of this paper). There is a belief that the Government can 'do anything', that poverty and inequality can be eradicated. "Such a society will sooner or later make more and more insistent demands on government and the economy, which by their very nature and number will be incompatible."⁴¹. To face this society needs cohesion, self confidence, and effective self management. But paradoxically society confronts this period with lowered confidence, inner tensions, and a greater sense of alienation from institutions. The result is an income scramble in which the more powerful attempt to maintain their position. Taylor sees the experience of inflation as forcing a

return to consensus. This is because we are being forced to decide the issue of income distribution, something that was formerly just left to happen. An agreement on this issue is difficult at any time, but it is only possible with a sense of common purpose.

Thus Taylor has attempted to demonstrate how the Modern identity and its moral visions give the background to both the affirmative and critical stances to consumer society. The affirmative view does not just praise endless accumulation, but is also an affirmation of efficacy, and in turn autonomy.

We live in a society whose practices embody a certain notion of identity and human good. These must be 'ours' or we can feel no allegiance to that society. If something like the story Taylor has traced is true, then society will be prey to recurrent legitimization crises. Society is in contradiction, but the most lethal of these only comes into view when society is viewed in the light of the 'human good' it presupposes, that is by its picture of the Modern identity; by an exploration of conceptions of human nature. It is through POR that Taylor develops his affiliation to V2 and Expressivism with a discussion of the political and liberal form Taylor sees as capturing the most astute insight into the conflictual Modern identity. This is Taylor's argument for 'substantive' over 'procedural' liberalism.

The Politics Of Recognition

This paper is of vital interest as it 'fills out' the type of liberalism Taylor favours, and sees him grappling with the demands of plural, multicultural society. The publication of this paper follows closely on the heels of EOA, and indeed initially there is considerable overlap of content. Therefore after a brief introduction the focus of this exposition will be on Taylor's isolation and examination of two types of liberal politics: the politics of equal dignity and the politics of difference. Within this schema Taylor favours a politics of difference.

Taylor suggests that there are a number of strands in contemporary politics that turn on the need or demand for 'recognition'. The demand for 'recognition' is given an urgency by the supposed links between 'recognition' and 'identity'. Identity, Taylor

defines (after interspatial epiphany) as an individual's understanding of who he or she is. The underlying thesis of recognition is then that an individual's identity is partly shaped by the presence or absence of recognition, or by the misrecognition by others. So an individual, or cultural grouping, can suffer real damage if individuals or society 'mirror back' a demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition, or misrecognition can be a form of oppression, imprisoning the individual in a false and reduced mode of being. This complaint is common to feminism, ethnic minorities in European society and indigenous or colonised peoples in general. Due recognition, is then, not just a courtesy that is owed, but a vital human need.

As a first step it is necessary to abstract a bit from this 'discourse' and see how such a perception came to be. The demand for recognition would be incomprehensible to 'our' ancestors of two centuries ago. In beginning such an abstraction the work of Hegel immediately springs to mind Taylor suggests. However, it is necessary to go back further than this to two particular changes. The first change Taylor identifies is the collapse of social hierarchies (This change was encountered in Chapter One in "Modes of Civil Society" and as a constituent of V1). The second change is a new understanding of individual identity. This is the complex that Taylor has identified through SOTS, and has become familiar through EOA, as the rise of an 'individualised' identity, with an ideal of authenticity. The Herderian emphasis upon 'originality' completes the 'powerful moral ideal' that has come down to contemporary individuals. Herder applies this 'originality' to both the individual and the 'volk'. It is the seminal idea, Taylor suggests, of nationalism in both its benign and malignant forms. In Herder the demand for an 'original volk' expressed itself as a plea that Germans should not act as 'derivative Frenchmen'. In the contemporary situation it is expressed in the assertion that European colonialism should be 'rolled back' to allow developing nations the chance to truly 'be themselves'. Taylor's 'take' on originality appears at times to be closer to the Herderian original. Taylor is concerned that Liberalism in general should not be derivative of American Liberalism; in particular Canada should avoid such a derivation. Taylor asserts that dignity and authenticity are both partly offshoots of the collapse of hierarchical society.

(Authenticity, as has been seen, is an illusory call to the inward generation of identity; a call to the monological that violates the dialogical character of human existence).

The point of this brief historical analysis, Taylor claims, is not that other-dependence (or recognition) arose with the age of authenticity, it has always existed in a previously uncomplicated manner (i.e. within a social hierarchy), but that there has been the emergence of the conditions where the attempt to be recognised can fail. With the conception of 'original', inner identity there is no guarantee of a priori recognition. Recognition was formerly so unproblematic as to be unthematized. Early, seminal work on precisely this issue is found in the work of Rousseau and Hegel. Hegel's analysis isolates two aspects, the 'intimate' and the social. Taylor's concern through POR is to examine the social or public sphere, and to address the emergence of the 'politics of equal recognition', that is, to assess what equal recognition has meant and could mean.

In fact the politics of equal recognition has meant two things connected to the two changes Taylor has identified. Firstly, the collapse of social hierarchies has entailed a movement of interest, from 'honour' to dignity. A move to a politics of universalism, the assertion of equal dignity; the demand for an equalisation of rights and entitlements. For some this equalisation is understood only in terms of civil and voting rights; for others it has also included the socio-economic sphere. But its common theme is a principle of equal citizenship. This fosters a politics of 'equal dignity'.

Secondly, the changing perceptions leading up to the Modern identity have fostered a politics of difference, which itself has a universalistic basis. It is expressed as the demand that everyone is recognised for his or her unique identity. However recognition in this second sense means something different. In the politics of 'equal dignity', what is established is universally the same. It is an identical basket of rights and immunities. In 'the politics of difference', what is recognised is uniqueness, a distinctness from everyone else. This distinctness it is commonly argued has been ignored, or assimilated to a dominant or majority identity. Taylor quips, assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity. The politics of difference has a principle of universal equality that gives it a point of entry into the politics of equal dignity, but once it is

inside, its demands are hard to assimilate. Taylor suggests that the politics of difference grows organically out of the politics of universal dignity.

To proponents of the politics of equal dignity, the politics of difference can seem like a betrayal, it is a negation of their most cherished principle. The politics of difference demands a departure from the principle of 'difference-blindness'. Therefore arguments are forwarded to mitigate this perception. For instance a commitment to reverse or 'positive' discrimination is suggested as successful up to a point. Reverse discrimination is portrayed as a 'pump priming' exercise to mitigate a former shortcoming; after which there can be a return to difference-blindness.

"This argument seems cogent enough-. But it won't justify some of the measures now urged on the grounds of difference, the goal of which is not to bring us back to an eventual 'difference-blind' social space but, on the contrary, to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever."⁴²

The basis for the divergence of the two forms becomes clear when the underlying intuitions of value are examined. The politics of equal dignity suggests, after Kant, that all individuals are worthy of respect. This intuition has a metaphysical notion of why humans command respect, Taylor asserts, no matter how 'we' try to 'shy away' from this. In Kant dignity is defined in terms of rational agency, though this 'detailed definition' can and does change. It is the identification of a universal human potential (in Taylor's detailed definition strong evaluation plays the predominant role). In the politics of difference, the universal potential at its heart, is the potential for forming and defining one's identity as an individual and culture. In the intercultural context a stronger demand has arisen. This is the demand to accord respect to actually evolved cultures. It is expressed as a critique of European domination, in that Europe has suppressed and factually mistaken other cultures. Taylor argues that this attack has a moral dimension (but finally will reject this assertion after Wittgenstein).

As emblematic of the charge stemming from the politics of difference Taylor notes Saul Bellow's comment along the lines that 'when the Zulus produce a Tolstoy we'll read him'. Taylor suggests that the deficiency of Bellow's position, from the perspective of the politics of difference, is seen, not as a particular error, but as the denial of a fundamental principle. Taylor argues that to the extent that this stronger reproach (to having violated a (moral) fundamental principle) is in play, the demand for 'equal recognition' extends the equal value of all human potential to include the equal value of what 'they' in fact have made of this potential. The charge, in these terms, causes serious problems.

These two modes of liberal politics can, then, be seen to come into conflict. The politics of equal dignity (with its commitment to difference-blindness) accuses the politics of difference of violating non discrimination. The politics of difference (with its commitment to foster particularity) accuses the politics of equal respect of negating identity, by forcing all individuals into a homogenising mould. This is bad enough, but the politics of difference goes further to suggest that this homogenisation is not to a neutral mould, but in fact a highly discriminatory mould. The politics of equal respect is accused of being a particularism masquerading as a universalism. This is the cruellest cut of all as the theorists of the liberalism of equal dignity (for instance Rawls, Dworkin, and Habermas) are committed to the assertion that there are some difference-blind principles, even though these might not yet have been discovered. Having illustrated the conflict Taylor moves on to consider the stages of emergence for the two types of liberalism.

The Politics Of Equal Dignity

Taylor suggests that the politics of equal dignity emerges in two ways, through the thought of Rousseau, and through the thought of Kant. Rousseau contrast the condition of freedom in equality, with hierarchy and other dependence. Taylor asks why does Rousseau not see it as possible to have other dependence in conditions of equality? The answer is that Rousseau associates other dependence with the other's good opinion, understood within a framework of the traditional conception of honour. Therefore while

individuals are unequal in power, everyone is dependent on others, both slave to master and master to slave. In this Taylor suggests that Rousseau sounds like a Stoic (though he reaches very different conclusions).

Taylor argues that both the Stoics and Christianity in relation to 'pride' suggest an overcoming of the concern for the good opinion of others. However in Rousseau's prescription of a good society, that is a functioning (ancient) republic, glory and public recognition matter very much. If this is so, why is it that Rousseau sees Modern honour as a negative force? Rousseau offers a contrast between Modern theatre (in enclosed halls with an entry fee) with Republican public festivals (in the open air); in this latter situation the people are both spectator and show.

Rousseau is suggesting a 'balanced reciprocity' that he feels takes the sting out of the dependence on others, and makes it compatible with liberty. In such reciprocity the individual is obeying their self as a member of a common project, or 'general will'. In the conditions of hierarchy the unity of purpose is shattered. Rousseau is, then, the origin of a new discourse on honour and pride. Rousseau uses the denunciatory language of the Stoics and Christianity in regard to pride, but does not call for a complete renunciation of all concern with esteem. Thus, Taylor says, the age of dignity is born. This genesis leads (through Hegel) to the politics of equal dignity. While Rousseau inaugurates the new politics of equal dignity, his particular position is flawed. Rousseau argues a tight unity of purpose (upon which Taylor's argument through EOA seems to verge) which opposes differentiation. There is a Rousseauian trinity of (i) freedom, (ii) an absence of differentiated roles, and (iii) a tight common purpose. This position is the root of homogenising tyranny from its Jacobin starting point, to the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Taylor asserts that even if Rousseau's third aspect (iii) is put aside, his thought offers only a very small margin to recognise difference.

This provokes a more general question, is any politics of equal dignity bound to be equally homogenising? Is it true of the other models of equal dignity that Taylor suggested might be linked to Kant? Such a nominally Kantian model separates equal freedom from both (ii) and (iii). It is this very form of Liberalism that has come under attack by the more radical proponents of the politics of difference, for not being able to

give a due acknowledgement of distinctness. Are these critics correct? Taylor argues that it is indeed a fact that there are some proponents of this very model who see their own thought as giving a very restricted acknowledgement of distinct cultural identities. The issue, then is whether this restricted view of the Kantian inspired politics of equal dignity is the only possible interpretation. If it is so, then the accusation of homogenisation seems well placed. Taylor states he does see this restricted interpretation as the only perspective, and he hopes to show this is the case through an examination of the recent Canadian political scene.

The Canadian Example

Taylor's exploration of his preferred model of the politics of equal dignity centres around the recent secessionary debate in Canada. Taylor suggests that the issue stems from the 1982 adoption of the Canadian Charter Of Rights. With this adoption the question arose of how to relate the Charter to the claims for distinctness put forward by French Canadians (Quebeckers), and the aboriginal peoples. At stake in these deliberations is the desire for 'survival', and the consequent demands for autonomy in self-government to assure survival. For instance, Quebec has enacted a number of laws in defence of French Canadian survival. Amongst these, there is a law to determine who can send their children to English speaking schools (immigrants and francophones cannot), a law compelling business' with more than fifty workers to be run in French, and an 'outlawing' of non French commercial signage. The question arises, is this variation from the rights charter acceptable, or not?

The issue was brought to a head by the Meech (Lake) Amendment, and its proposal to recognise Quebec as a 'distinct society'. This recognition was perceived by the Quebeckers as the basis for judicial interpretation of the rest of the constitution, including the Charter. For many, such variation is unacceptable, examining this impasse illuminates the heart of the question of how rights based Liberalism is related to diversity.

The Canadian Charter Of Rights gives a basis for judicial review on two fronts. Firstly, it defines a set of individual rights. Secondly, it guarantees equal treatment, it

protects against discrimination on the grounds of sex, or race. For English Canadians a political society's espousal of collective goals is opposed to both these aspects of the Charter. Firstly, collective goals require restrictions on individual behaviour that violates rights. Secondly, espousing collective goals for a national group is inherently discriminatory as it involves treating 'insiders' and 'outsiders' differently (is akin to discrimination on the grounds of race or sex). In the Canadian example, the rest of Canada opposed the (Quebecker) Meech Lake Accord on these very grounds. They demanded the Charter be protected against the Meech clause. Taylor is correct to observe that there is a serious philosophical point at stake here.

For some people, individual rights must always come first over collective goals. There is a commitment to 'deontology' that is powered by a perception, like that of Solomon's, of the priority of individual choice (the existentialist position is further characterised by a recognition of 'situation' after Merleau-Ponty). Such individuals are speaking from a Liberal perspective defended by Rawls and Dworkin. Dworkin in a paper entitled "Liberalism", identifies two sorts of 'moral' commitments. A commitment to the ends of life (which he terms 'substantive' (liberalism)) and a commitment to 'egalitarianism'. That is to the treatment of each other fairly and equally (which he terms procedural (liberalism)). Dworkin claims that the liberal society is one that adopts no particular substantive view but is united around a strong procedural commitment.

"The reason that the polity as such can espouse no substantive view,.. is that this would involve a violation of its procedural norm...In espousing this substantive outlook the society would not be treating the dissident minority with equal respect. It would be saying to them, in effect, "your view is not as valuable, in the eyes of this polity, as that of your more numerous compatriots." ⁴³

Profound philosophical assumptions underlie this view of liberalism, drawing largely from Kant. Human dignity is seen as consisting largely in autonomy (as Taylor would agree this sense of autonomy is often perceived with a shocking lack of 'humility', it is

shorn of a perception of determinacy or 'situation'). The popularity of the Kantian outlook explains why this model of Liberalism is so strong. Sandel has noted the strong hold, of what he terms, the 'procedural republic' on the political agenda of America. This 'hold' is responsible for the increasing emphasis upon judicial review at the expense of the ordinary political process of building majorities with a view to action (this is a repetition of the concerns Taylor expressed through EOA).

The Quebecker's notion of collective goals violates this model (but it must be asserted it works through this model to achieve its aims). One could argue that survival can, after all, be captured by a 'proceduralist liberal society'. One could consider the French language as a collective resource like clean air, or green spaces. Quebeckers object that their language is a good. Policies aimed at survival must ensure a future community that will avail itself of the French language. Survival policies must actively seek to create members of the community. Quebeckers opt for a different model of liberal society, organised around a definition of the 'good life'. Quebeckers see their model as not deprecating other individuals' goods. Their model respects the rights of minorities, but now these rights are understood as the fundamental rights that have been recognised from the beginning of the liberal tradition, to life, liberty, due process etc. One has to distinguish between the fundamental liberties and the privileges and immunities that are important, but which can be restricted for reasons of public policy. A point of criticism here might be to reject demands for survival in general. The British political attitude to the Welsh language is to treat it as a collective resource. To force individuals to take up the language is unacceptable, a greater proceduralist emphasis is required. This difference in temper will be taken up (immediately) below.

Taylor suggests that he has delved into this Canadian example in some depth as it illustrates the fundamental questions. Taylor wishes to argue that there is a form of the politics of equal respect as enshrined in the liberalism of rights that is 'inhospitable' to difference because (a) it insists on the uniform application of rules defining these rights without exception; and (b) is suspicious of collective goals. (This is Dworkinian procedural liberalism, the deontological liberalism of English Canada, which Walzer (below) will label 'Liberalism 1'). This model does not seek to abolish cultural difference,

but is inhospitable as it cannot accommodate what members of distinct societies aspire to, which is survival. Taylor suggests that this model is guilty as charged by the proponents of the politics of difference, it is homogenising.

However this is not the only model of liberal society, there are different models that take a different line on (a) and (b). These forms do call for the invariant defence of certain rights, but they distinguish these fundamental rights from the immunities and privileges. (This is Dworkinian substantive liberalism, the ontological liberalism of Quebeckers, which Walzer will label 'Liberalism 2'). Taylor claims he would 'obviously' endorse this kind of model. Indeed, "The 'rigidities' of procedural liberalism may rapidly become impractical in tomorrow's world."⁴⁴, that world being the world of multicultural society. The politics of equal respect in this more hospitable variety can be cleared of the charge of homogenising difference, Taylor asserts. Is this correct?

Walzer's comments below will raise some doubts. As a first comment, Taylor's call for substantive liberalism might be characterised in the same terms with which 'traditional philosophers' welcomed a notion of existential values; it seems to open the door to all kinds of 'horrors'. Perhaps this reflects a difference in temper between North Atlantic and European thought. Taylor's thought is obviously influenced by the Canadian cessionary, and ethnic debate; a debate largely furthered by arguments over the legitimacy of liberal institutions, and the possible use of these to further claims for survival. The European experience of substantive liberalism is more influenced by the former Yugoslavia; a 'debate' furthered by 'ethnic cleansing', and murder to further the claims of survival. Plainly criminal acts (that have become 'traitorous' to the 'ends of life', the 'good(s)' of other sections of the 'body politic').

Taylor then turns to consider a further charge against the more hospitable model of the politics of equal respect. This is a charge that is harder to rebut, but in the terms in which it is phrased perhaps it ought not to be rebutted. This charge is the claim made by difference-blind liberalism that it can offer a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can meet and co-exist. On this view it is necessary to make a distinction between public and private, and politics and religion. Therefore one can relegate the contentious issues to a sphere that does not impinge on the political. This view can be seen to be

wrong when one considers an issue such as the controversy over Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses. For Islam there is no separation of politics and religion. Taylor's argument is troubling here. Taylor argues that, Liberalism is not a meeting ground for all cultures, but the political expression of one range of cultures and not others.

Moreover, as many Muslims, are well aware. Western liberalism is not so much an expression of the secular, postreligious outlook that happens to be popular among liberal intellectuals as a more organic outgrowth of Christianity."⁴⁵

In a sense, there appears to be a need to 'retrieve' Islam for Taylor, by his methodology through EOA. Christian sensibilities (and those of moral realists) tend to get a bit agitated when others colonise their ground. If we 'embody' the followers of Islam in their 'messy' situation not all of these individuals acted in the same way to the controversy. Some young Muslims saw the controversy as primarily an issue over free speech, and not blasphemy. Waldron comments on Taylor, as 'moral philosopher' through SOTS

"Taylor concedes that "religion, our link with the highest, has been recurrently associated with sacrifice, even mutilation, as though something of us has to be torn away or immolated if we are to please the gods".

I [Waldron] would have thought the moral of this is that religious visions do not provide the best account of our humanitarian impulse. But for Taylor, the lesson is we must "avoid the error of declaring those goods invalid whose exclusive pursuit leads to contemptible or disastrous consequences". "⁴⁶

Waldron asserts a commitment to Liberalism 1. Taylor's point in the quotation above is repeated at the end of EOA, it is a position (midway between that of the knocker and

booster) that notes the grandeur and misery of Modernity. But, it is also tempting to argue that procedural liberalism is more substantive than it acknowledges. This is a point well made. The polarised debate between procedural liberalism versus substantive liberalism conspires to generate a silence over the substantive distinctions made at the basis of proceduralism (that it subsequently becomes blind too). The impetus to proceduralism flows from a positive assessment of the dignity of the human individual, an assessment that must have been made against a background of significance that subsequently is denied or ignored. Thus for Taylor a substantive politics of difference is not only preferable but more astute and more faithful to the human understood as an interspatial epiphany.

Taylor is suggesting the adoption of a hospitable form of the politics of equal dignity, in other words the substantive liberalism favoured by the Quebeckers. For Taylor, it is vital to adopt this position as it also characterises procedural liberalism; even if the practice of that liberalism is inarticulate, and overtly claims to be unconcerned with substantive distinctions (especially in respect of the 'good life'). Procedural liberalism claims a meta ethic of nihilism, that is, it overtly claims only to be concerned with the manner of choice. However, procedural liberalism is also necessarily attempting to create 'citizens', and therefore has conceptions of the contours of the 'good life' which it is trying to promulgate. This commitment will be perceived as relatively unproblematic, and therefore may periodically come under attack as being under-thematised. By Taylor's own argument, human identity is partly formed by an individual's own definition of his or her self; increasingly this self definition includes Waldron's correct worry at Taylor's argument for substantive liberalism. Increasingly the Modern individual is turning from a form of life that (Taylor admits) in its past practice has fostered 'immolation'. This very perception may drive individuals to Walzer's, more astute position (examined below).

Taylor asserts his argument is merely to claim that liberalism **can't and shouldn't** claim complete cultural neutrality. Against Taylor some might assert that it in fact liberalism does this, but finds this unproblematic. As has been seen Taylor misses the values of subjectivist moral theory, misses existential values, and misses the values inherent in a liberalism of neutrality. Perhaps he is not blind to them, but he does not take

them seriously, as seriously, that is, as existential thought and Berlin do. While Taylor is insensitive to the 'monological' and existential thought is too extreme in its notion of 'radical choice', there is a 'spiritual' attraction to a position that acknowledges 'situatedness' in an unproblematic manner. Walzer argues a similar point (below).

Taylor says his point is that liberalism is a fighting creed, he espouses a hospitable variant, versus its more rigid forms. Both liberalisms have to 'draw the line', substantive distinctions have to be made; they are inescapable in the political realm. In these circumstances a non-procedural liberalism can at least fully accept this. Taylor is asserting that it is necessary, 'inescapable', to draw substantive distinctions in the public sphere. Taylor does not see these distinctions as being based on the agglomeration of individual 'strong evaluations'; this is inauthentic, monological, disengagement. There is a normative ontology independent of the individual will. Thus procedural liberalism is fundamentally flawed, its popularity (that Taylor himself has noted), is derived from a widespread, inauthentic, commitment to a conception of human nature as autonomy. Thus a commitment to procedural liberalism bespeaks a 'blindness' to value, and substantive distinctions. The connection between Taylor's conception of human nature and his political thinking is clear.

Taylor's embodied' (authentic) perception of 'strong evaluation', is mirrored in the public and political by a commitment to the 'good life', substantive liberalism, and a recognition of 'substantive distinctions'. The individual is 'embodied' politically by a process of decentralisation, the devolution to 'resonant surroundings'; these surroundings are not solely geographical, but also capture the dialogical in the human condition (i.e. resonant surroundings are created by a sense of 'community', be it geographical, religious, or 'issue' based).

Against Taylor it needs to be maintained that embodied individuals, recognising 'strong evaluation' and 'substantive distinctions', may still choose a commitment to procedural liberalism. This is a commitment to a 'substantive goal', but this is now understood as an existential meta ethical framework, and not a normative ontology and ethics; though the choice of proceduralism recognises such 'values'. There is a

proceduralist commitment to a secular, formal public and political sphere. (This is substantially Walzer's argument (below)).

To sharpen up this 'countereffort' it is possible to (re)focus on the issue of multiculturalism. A member of a particular ethnic minority may favour procedural liberalism precisely because of their 'embodiment' (precisely because their 'centre is elsewhere' (see immediately below)). The member of an ethnic minority, living the 'good life' of reviving or maintaining the traditions of their ancestors, practising 'survival', may favour procedural liberalism as their ancestors have experienced the criminal (and traitorous) practise of substantive liberalism (again Walzer draws a similar point).

The controversy over multiculturalism, between procedural and substantive liberalism, that Taylor has highlighted is disturbing he asserts, as Western culture is becoming more multicultural and more porous. In practice this means that there is increased multicultural migration, there are more individuals living the life of the Diaspora, where their centre is 'elsewhere'. In these circumstances, with the marginalisation of segments of the population, there is something awkward in following the proceduralist liberal route. That is to deny a recognition of substantive distinctions, of having to defend a commitment to liberal political institutions with the assertion that 'this is how we do things round here'. The assertion, here, that procedural liberalism has to bluntly assert a form of life seems to deny such liberalism the rich expressive language that Taylor sees as the situation of the embodied individual. (Waldron made this very point in the previous chapter). Surely a procedural liberalism does not have to bluntly assert 'this is how we do things round here'? It could presumably perform an act of retrieval, like Taylor's, explaining how people came to the decision to practise procedural liberalism. That is to offer a 'historical narrative' to explain how it came about that the political and public sphere was seen as 'more secure', if conceptions of the 'good life' and 'religion were excluded from it. Such a narrative could also attempt to explain how this formulation is seen as dynamic, and not a 'final position', a sense of *la lotta continua* could invite individuals into procedural liberalism to help continue the struggle for autonomy within determinacy (a degree of givenness). This perception of procedural liberalism could revive the 'spirit' in terms akin to a moderate existential heroism.

Taylor focuses now upon the issue of multiculturalism as it is debated today, with its demand for recognition of equal value. In the Canadian example the demand was that we allow minority cultures to defend themselves within reasonable bounds. "But the further demand we are looking at here is that we all *recognise* the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their *worth*."⁴⁷ Demand for recognition becomes explicit, by the spread of the notion that the individual is formed by recognition. One of the key authors in this transition is Franz Fanon and his The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon suggests that colonisers impose a degrading image on the colonised, and advocates violent liberation, to meet the violence of the imposition of a degrading image. The main locus of such debate today is American University humanities' departments with the vociferous attack upon the Western Canon, 'of dead, white, males'.

The particular emphasis of this debate, that irks Taylor, is its non universalism. The attack on the Western Canon is not from the perspective that its alteration, or enlargement will be of benefit to all. It is not that all students miss something important by the narrowness of focus of the Canon, but that some individuals (non-white, non-male) are given a demeaning image by encountering the Canon. There is a non recognition in the Canon, that suggests that creativity is the 'birth right' of white males. But can't the criticism be captured in its universal prescription, can't the non-dead experience a lack of recognition! Isn't the 'universal conception' of the complaint implicit in the trinity it identifies: dead, white, males. This is to recommend a sense of *la lotta continua* in respect of the Western Canon. The continual enlargement of the Canon can be urged on the grounds that it is impossible to assert, a priori, that all the significant contributions to the Canon have already been made. It also permits artists from other cultures to be perceived as potential members of the Canon.

Further, liberalism captures this sense of 'vive la difference', a positive assessment of plurality. The traditional liberal freedoms (those freedoms that substantive liberalism identifies as 'fundamental' rights, rather than those restrictable privileges), such as the freedom of speech and that of association, seem to expect the outcome of these encounters to be the fostering of different, new sensibilities. These new sensibilities can

come to test the particular status quo of a society, but liberalism sees this challenge as positive. There is an 'arrogance' that something akin to procedural liberalism is essential to human happiness. The sense that the exact definition of the status quo can alter urges a perception of procedural liberalism as an achievement and not a 'given'.

Taylor suggests that the logic of the argument from 'critics of the Canon' (and indeed from neo-Nietzschean subjectivism (the coherence of which Taylor doubts)) is that we owe equal respect to all cultures as a 'right'. Taylor argues that while it may be possible to offer a presumption of equality, it is disquieting to have this demand made in the stronger terminology of a right.

"As a presumption, the claim is that all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings. I have worded it in this way to exclude partial cultural milieu within a society, as well as short phases of a major culture."⁴⁸

The demand for recognition as a right (the multiculturalist demand) emerges from the established principles of the politics of equal respect. Multiculturalists urge that the presumption of the equal worth of traditional societies is expanded to be seen as a right akin to that of equal civil rights, or equal voting rights. Taylor says that no matter how logical this 'extension' appears, it sits uncomfortably with 'difference blindness' (which is also at the heart of the politics of equal dignity). There is a stronger position even than that of 'right', however, that Taylor wishes to grasp.

This strong demand for recognition seems to require an *actual* judgement of equal worth. There is something 'very wrong' with the demand for recognition in this form. It makes no sense Taylor claims to demand as a matter of right that we come up with a final concluding judgement that the value of a traditional culture is great, or equal to others. The demand for actual real judgements of worth assumes a fused horizon of

standards. This is paradoxically, or tragically, homogenising. Strong multiculturalist demands homogenise as severely as procedural liberalism is perceived to do so.

"By implicitly invoking our standards to judge all civilisations and cultures, the politics of difference can end up making everyone the same."⁴⁹

In this form the demand for recognition is unacceptable, but the issue does not end there as the enemies of multiculturalism perceive this weakness and use it as an excuse to turn their backs on the problem. Such a tactic was evident in Bellow's comment, with its assumption that excellence takes a form familiar to us, and that a contribution from the Zulu nation is yet to be made. There is a Wittgensteinian element to the argument here. Wittgenstein suggested that if a lion spoke to 'us', 'we' would not understand him. This seems to be both the premise of Taylor's attack on Bellow, and elided by his sense of substantive liberalism. If Taylor's argument is that procedural liberalism has an (existentialist) meta ethical framework that it often fails to recognise or compromises by the use of substantive distinctions, then his argument is cogent enough; though it could be suggested that Taylor misperceives unproblematic acceptance of this determinacy, and a certain resultant quietism on the issue, for blindness. However Taylor's further position seems to be that as procedural liberalism is inarticulate about substantive distinctions, a more 'hospitable' substantive liberalism must be adopted (or indeed is already being practised in an inarticulate fashion by procedural liberalism).

However, Taylor argues

"There must be something midway between the inauthentic and homogenising demand for recognition of equal worth, on one hand, and the self-immurement within ethnocentric standards, on the other."⁵⁰

What there is, is Taylor's presumption of equal worth. How can this presumption, and its important place within a politics of multiculturalism be grounded? One ground Taylor

argues is religious and it is a ground he can't rule out. Herder expresses such a position with an assertion of divine providence that interprets cultural variety as not a mere accident, but a divine tactic to bring about 'greater harmony'. Taylor is then attempting to capture the liberal positive assessment of challenge to the status quo, by plural democratic routes.

"On the human level, one could argue that it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time-that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, the admirable-are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we have to abhor and reject."⁵¹

Taylor claims that it is 'arrogance', or a similar moral failing to dismiss such a supposition. However, Taylor argues that perhaps there is a moral issue at stake here, after all.

"We only need a sense of our limited part in the whole human story to accept this presumption [of equal worth]..What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many 'multiculturalists'- as well as their most bitter opponents-in its grip."⁵²

This latter suggestion is pursued by Walzer.

Before moving onto examine Walzer's argument it is enlightening to pause and consider the fact that there are some Canadians who are less enamoured of multiculturalism than Taylor. Neil Bissoondath⁵³ suggest that Canada's multicultural mosaic is flawed, and that the policy of multiculturalism has been 'disastrous' for Canada

“For the purposes of multiculturalism, the concept [of culture] has been reduced to the simplest theatre. Canadians, neatly divided into ‘ethnic’ and otherwise, encounter each other’s mosaic tiles mainly at festivals. There’s traditional music, traditional dancing, traditional food at distinctly untraditional prices, all of which is diverting as far as it goes – but such encounters remain at the level of a folkloric Disneyland.⁵⁴”

Bissoondath’s comments continue in a vein similar to Bellow, but demonstrate that Taylor may have severe problems in ‘selling’ a substantive liberalism even in Canada.

Walzer

Walzer takes up Taylor's two types of liberalism, (as suggested above) as Liberalism 1 (with the strongest possible commitment to individual rights and the neutral state) and Liberalism 2 (a state committed to the 'survival' of a particular nation, culture, or religion, as long as certain basic citizen rights are protected). Walzer notes that Taylor prefers Liberalism 2. Further Walzer wishes to suggest that Liberalism 2 is both permissive and 'optional', and one of the options is Liberalism 1. Walzer's question is when should we pick Liberalism 1 and when Liberalism 2?

In Taylor's Quebecker example, Walzer suggests Taylor would permit the 'exception', and allow a provincial government to choose Liberalism 2. Most liberal nation-states are, Walzer suggests, like Quebec rather than Canada. Their governments take an interest in the cultural survival of the majority nation, they don't claim to be neutral with reference to language, history, literature, or calendar. They accord public recognition to these with '**no visible anxiety**'. Their liberalism is 'vindicated' by tolerating and respecting ethnic and religious difference, allow minority groups to reproduce their ways of life in civil society and express their cultural values. There is however, undoubtedly tension and confusion inherent in Liberalism 2.

Liberalism 1 by contrast is the official doctrine of immigrant societies, for instance America (and increasingly Taylor argues all nations). This is entirely appropriate to its time and place; Liberalism 1 is appropriate to nations that see themselves as a 'social union of social unions' (in Rawls' terminology), or as a consonance of difference. The singular (Rawlsian) union distinguishes itself from all the plural unions. The plural unions are all free to do their best on their own, but they get no help from 'the state'. There is a hostility to demands for survival, forms of life are perceived as a collective resource. Within certain limits, all plural unions are equally at risk. Walzer admits that assertions of state neutrality are often hypocritical, and always incomplete. Public culture, for instance in America, is always more supportive of 'this way of life than of that'. Hence the emergence of the politics of multiculturalism. However such political practice is 'in principle' compatible with Liberalism 1.

In the stronger form of multicultural demand Taylor has identified, the state is called upon to take responsibility for everyone's (cultural) survival. This is Liberalism 2, except that the 'allowance' (the exception) has been turned into a requirement. Faced with such a requirement Walzer suggest that his own inclination (and he suspects that of Taylor) is to 'retreat' to Liberalism 1 *within* Liberalism 2.

"From within: that means that the choice is not governed by an absolute commitment to state neutrality and individual rights-nor by the deep dislike of particularist identities (short of citizenship) that is common among liberals of the first sort. It is governed instead by the social condition and the actual life choices of *these* men and women."⁵⁵

Indeed Walzer is influenced in this choice by his perception that this is what immigrants to such societies have in fact, themselves done. Such immigrants intend, and are prepared to take cultural risks, and leave the cultural certainties of their old way of life behind. In this way Liberalism 1 can support the multicultural demand for the study of 'otherness' in schools (can promote the enlarging of the Canon in a universalistic sense).

"Indeed, what other kind of liberalism, or antiliberalism, could possibly provide this support, encouraging people to study the culture of the other before the future of their own is guaranteed?"⁵⁶

While concurring with Walzer's analysis it is possible to suggest that Taylor gives ground to his critics by a somewhat opaque acceptance of this point.

Having detailed the character of Taylor's political thought it is possible, through the next chapter, to draw some conclusions on the calibre of Taylor's thought.

¹ Solomon, R. From Rationalism To Existentialism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985)

² Solomon, R. From Rationalism To Existentialism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985) p.315.

³ Solomon, R. From Rationalism To Existentialism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985) p.316.

⁴ Solomon, R. From Rationalism To Existentialism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985) p.317.

⁵ See especially through Taylor, C. Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton; Princeton University press, 1992).

⁶ Solomon, R. From Rationalism To Existentialism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985) p.318.

⁷ Solomon, R. From Rationalism To Existentialism (Lanham: University of America Press, 1985) p.318.

⁸ Solomon, R. From Rationalism To Existentialism (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985) p.322.

⁹ Solomon, R. C. Continental Philosophy Since 1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)

¹⁰ Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.18.

¹¹ Taylor, C. The Ethics Of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.36.

¹² Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1992) pp. 40-41.

¹³ Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.41.

¹⁴ Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.77.

¹⁵ Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.95.

¹⁶ Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.96.

¹⁷ Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.99.

¹⁸ Taylor, C The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.100.

¹⁹ Taylor, C The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) pp.101-102

²⁰ Taylor, C The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.103.

²¹ Taylor, C The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.106.

²² Taylor, C The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.111.

²³ Taylor, C The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.114.

²⁴ Taylor, C. The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) p.120.

²⁵ Taylor, C. in Rotstein, A (Ed.) Beyond Industrial Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) p.51.

²⁶ Taylor, C. in Rotstein, A (Ed.) Beyond Industrial Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) p.53.

²⁷ Taylor, C. in Rotstein, A (Ed.) Beyond Industrial Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) p.55.

²⁸ Taylor, C. in Rotstein, A (Ed.) Beyond Industrial Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) p.59.

²⁹ Taylor, C. in Rotstein, A (Ed.) Beyond Industrial Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) p.59-60.

³⁰ Taylor, C. in Rotstein, A (Ed.) Beyond Industrial Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) p.62.

³¹ Taylor, C. in Rotstein, A (Ed.) Beyond Industrial Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) p.63.

³² Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.248.

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- ³³ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.251.
- ³⁴ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.252.
- ³⁵ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.268.
- ³⁶ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.270.
- ³⁷ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.273.
- ³⁸ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.277.
- ³⁹ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.280.
- ⁴⁰ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.282.
- ⁴¹ Taylor, C. Legitimation Crisis? Philosophic Papers (Volume Two) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.286.
- ⁴² Taylor, C. Multiculturalism and "The Politics Of Recognition" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.40.
- ⁴³ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.56-57.
- ⁴⁴ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.61.
- ⁴⁵ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.62.
- ⁴⁶ Waldron J. How we learn to be good. TLS March 23-29 1990.
- ⁴⁷ Taylor, C. Multiculturalism and "The Politics Of Recognition" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.64.
- ⁴⁸ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.66.
- ⁴⁹ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.71.
- ⁵⁰ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.72.
- ⁵¹ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.72-73.
- ⁵² Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.73.
- ⁵³ Bissoondath, N. No place like home New Internationalist Number 305 September 1998 pp.20-22
- ⁵⁴ Bissoondath, N. No place like home New Internationalist Number 305 September 1998 p.20.
- ⁵⁵ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.102-103.
- ⁵⁶ Taylor, C. POR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p.103.

CHAPTER SIX

ATTUNEMENT AND HOMELESSNESS

Introduction

This chapter will firstly examine the cross connections between the forms of liberalism and politics identified in the preceding chapter before moving on to discuss the tension between substantive liberalism and civil society. Thirdly this chapter will examine the impact of Taylor's call for attunement and the demands of homelessness, before finally drawing some conclusions about Taylor's thought and his conceptualisation of human nature as interspatial epiphany. It will be argued that Taylor's conceptualisation of human nature is insightful and of vital interest to continuing research.

Cross Connections

As was seen in the previous chapter two pairs of opposing liberalisms were identified alongside an opposition of 'political position'. The first contrastive pair of liberalisms is that identified by Taylor as an opposition between procedural and substantive liberalism. It is perhaps more accurate to suggest that the two liberalisms delineate the two ends of a spectrum of liberal positions. Procedural liberalism is characterised by its focus on value-blind procedures for dealing with its citizens. Both Dworkin and Kymlicka argue that this form of liberalism is to be preferred as it assures equal treatment.

In contrast substantive liberalism is unashamedly willing to promote a specific liberal form of life; to engage in explicit comparisons of different forms of life and champion a particular, preferred liberal formation. Taylor favours a substantive conception of liberalism. For Taylor procedural liberalism is both inarticulate and potentially dangerous.

Taylor's accusation of inarticulacy is insightful. It has been Taylor's argument that procedural liberalism is inarticulate over value and conception of the good – Taylor finds procedural liberalism 'guilty as charged' by its multiculturalist critics, to be a particularism masquerading as a universalism. Taylor's point is that it is impossible for a truly procedural liberalism to exist as every political formation is marked by the values of those who framed it and sustain it. Procedural liberalism's emphasis upon value- and difference-blindness is underpinned by a complex web of particularist values. Procedural liberalism is a prime example of modern naturalism, it overtly denies any system of value while covertly appealing to a web of values.

Substantive liberalism in contrast is unafraid to appeal to its value system. For Taylor this position is superior as in a sense it is an improved form of procedural liberalism. Substantive liberalism can capture the benefits of procedural liberalism and offer a base from which to discuss and debate these values. Substantive liberalism does not have to become silent over, or 'run scared' from value. In a sense the two forms are identical but substantive liberalism is more clear sighted or articulate in regard to value; procedural liberalism is substantive but denies this heritage.

Having dealt with the charge of inarticulacy it is possible to examine Taylor's assertion that it is dangerous to maintain that liberalism is procedural. This criticism of procedural liberalism proceeds from Taylor's examination of multiculturalism. Taylor sees multiculturalism as a challenge to liberalism with its demands for the protection of cultural differences and values. It is Taylor's astute argument that in such circumstances procedural liberalism is lost before it even starts. Faced with a value laden political desire how can a form of liberalism that professes to be blind to all specific values mount a defence of its own position. It is only by becoming articulate about its sources of value that liberalism can hope to meet the challenge of multiculturalism.

The second spectrum of liberalism is that identified by the terms liberalism 1 and liberalism 2. Liberalism 1 is characterised by its concern with individual rights and state neutrality – once again a predominately procedural conception. Liberalism 2 is concerned to preserve the particular cultural values of its formation. Walzer's identification of liberalism 1 and 2 is superior to, or at least clearer than Taylor's construal. Indeed

Walzer's characterisation goes some way to answering Kymlicka's complaint that Taylor does not focus the issues at stake sharply enough. Walzer's overlaying analysis of the contemporary political landscape is superior as it allows him to champion the attractions of procedural liberalism in a clearer manner than Taylor.

It is Walzer's argument that liberalism 1 should be adopted within liberalism 2, a more procedural conception of liberal politics should be taken up within an overarching understanding of liberalism 2. It is to choose proceduralism from within substantivism. Walzer is arguing that a truly liberal polity chooses to act as though there are no prioritised positions. The attractions of this position seem to elude Taylor, who it has been seen misinterprets such chosen denials of privileged positions as a simple denial of all values, as species of naturalism. It is appropriate though to concur with Walzer that this in fact is the position Taylor adopts; though in Taylor's case it is not so clearly expressed.

In relation to the political positions identified in the previous chapter it is clear that Taylor champions a politics of difference over a politics of equal dignity. Again one of the positions might be termed as more naturalist and thinner. The politics of equal dignity focuses upon citizenship (a thin description of the individual) while a politics of difference attempts to recognise (and celebrate) different values. It is clear that a politics of difference will be the natural home of human individual understood as an interspatial epiphany. It has been Taylor's persistent argument that human nature should be recognised as situated, as both embodied and embedded. One aspect of this location has been pursued by Taylor through a situated moral phenomenology which reveals the value rich context of the individual's situation. What could be more natural then, than to take the results of this situated phenomenology into the political realm.

For Taylor a politics of difference can only be pursued within a substantive liberalism, a liberalism that is overt in an acceptance of its values. Taylor's challenge to procedural liberalism is acute and admirable; Taylor successfully shakes up the overtly naturalist and complacent procedural liberalism. A bruising encounter that can only serve to strengthen procedural liberalism, or make it more self reflective in preparation for the impending trials of multiculturalism and an increasing plurality of values. It is now

appropriate to turn to a discussion of the relationship between substantive liberalism and civil society.

Substantive Liberalism And Civil Society

Taylor professes to hold a Hegelian, or quasi-Tocquevillian conception of civil society. There is an emphasis on the role and place of extra political interest groups or truly 'amphibious bodies'. The important aspect of such bodies is how they enter into a 'corporatist' relationship with a territorial government, and fragment its powers. This fragmentation derives from their role as the loci for gaining the taste for self rule and as points of resistance against the 'leviathan', or overly bureaucratic 'state'. This emphasis is admirable, and of enduring importance for any democracy.

With reference to Taylor's positive assessment of his Canadian example, it would appear that the Quebecker interest group, or amphibious body has ceased to be engaged in a corporatist relationship with the state government and has achieved a position of dominance. This would seem to be a movement at the expense of civil society. Not only has an amphibious body been subsumed into the 'state', but its policies place curbs on extra political practice of other groupings; there seems to be the emergence of a notion of a 'general will', that Taylor apparently finds 'undisquieting'. Taylor is driven to an affirmation of the Quebecker cause by the logic of his own argument for a decentralisation of power to local 'resonant surroundings' (the appropriate setting for the Expressivist individual).

Taylor prioritises substantive liberalism over procedural liberalism partly due to the abysmal practice of American procedural politics, with its increasing focus on judicial reviews, and hence situations where the 'winner takes all'. This situation is, correctly, contrasted with the 'normal' political practice of forming democratic majorities around particular policies, after debate and possibly (it might be asserted essentially) compromise. However, how is it that the Quebecker case can be seen to be absolved of the accusation of attaining a similar paucity of outcome? The Quebecker case study seems to reveal an instance of the 'winner taking all'. Taylor's position, is perhaps, that

the Quebecker, substantive, outcome is superior as it recognises the value of the community, and answers the call for recognition and 'survival'. However it also, presumably, fosters resentment under the operation of a 'general will' (that some will want to reject) and an increasing polarity in debate. This is exactly the type of debate that Taylor wishes to overcome; as he has argued such 'polarity' tends to confusion rather than clarity, it is important to maintain a 'balance'. Perhaps the Canadian situation is truly fortunate, as Taylor suggests, and state and cultural 'boundaries' do coincide; but there has to be a suspicion that such 'overlap' can never be complete. Perhaps it is Taylor's position that any conclusion to a debate over 'survival' will be fractious, but a substantive outcome at least focuses attention upon fundamental values, and therefore promotes articulacy.

However it is possible to mount a more robust defence of procedural liberalism than Taylor apparently envisages. Such an argument would follow Walzer in advocating an increased emphasis upon the values implicit in procedural liberalism. The proceduralist approach would be to be suspicious of all calls for 'survival' from whatever quarter. The proceduralist emphasis would be upon the value of assuming, as a presumption, that all cultural values are of equal worth. Thus at the public level all such value systems should be treated as equally 'at risk'. There is a corporatist position for all value systems, for all calls for survival, but the emergence of one position to pre-eminence is, surely, threatening to social harmony.

In an attempt to 'sharpen up' the issues at stake here, it is appropriate to concentrate on a concrete example that Taylor himself highlights to criticise proceduralism liberalism, that of the Satanic Verses affair. Taylor's perspective on the affair is that it reveals how inarticulate and ineffectual procedural liberalism can be in the face of strongly held values. The Islamic challenge is both a call for 'survival' and a revelation of the suppressed Christian heritage of Western procedural liberalism. Procedural inarticulacy plays into the hands of such protests by only being able to offer a blunt assertion of this is 'how we do things round here'. Is it, then, Taylor's argument that Islam should mount a Quebecker style assault on government? It is difficult to disentangle Taylor's intentions, though it seems likely that he would not whole heartedly

embrace an Islamic state (perhaps on the grounds that it is not a 'resonant surrounding' for those in a Western liberal democracy). Taylor wishes liberalism to remember its heritage as a 'fighting creed', and self consciously assert values. But this is just what procedural liberalism perceives itself as doing by asserting the value of a secular, free public domain. A public non recognition of value, is a stance of non prescription. It is an essential value that Taylor, ironically, does not seem to recognise as a value at all.

However, one procedural approach to the affair might be to emphasise the value of equal political risk. In the British political situation this might be pursued, not by recognising the Islamic call for 'survival', but by de establishing the Church of England. Thus accusations of blasphemy, and calls for political intervention on behalf of religion or any value system in the public realm would be inadmissible from any quarter whatsoever; all faiths would emerge from this constitutional change as 'equally at risk'. Such a programme would perhaps be less deleterious to civil society than Taylor's Quebecker outcome (though it is likely to foster some resentment among British Christians). The important aspect of this procedural liberal course is that it emphasises the value of a society acting as though all value systems have a presumption of equality. Such a focus would seem to be always superior to substantive liberalism and be an overt promulgation of a value system.

Taylor's identification of calls for 'survival' is however interesting and raises some serious issues. However, a recognition of 'survival' as a positive act should be limited. The crucial aspect in this debate through Taylor's thought is the status of 'value'. To explore this it is necessary to turn to a discussion of Taylor's emphasis upon attunement, and the implication, of homelessness.

Attunement And Homelessness

Taylor's presumption of attunement and indeed his advocacy of substantive liberalism is a symptom of his situated moral phenomenology. Taylor's commitment to 'moral realism' is not a 'mere' sub rational hunch, but the outcome of the moral phenomenology of (Western) human experience that Taylor undertakes through the

opening sections of SOTS. Like Fekete, Taylor sees the human individual as 'living, breathing, and excreting' values. Taylor's perspective is that the 'discovery' of 'inescapable moral frameworks' is of the utmost importance, but that it is systematically ignored or suppressed by the Western intellectual tradition, especially modern atomist or naturalist thought. The playing out of the 'transcendental pretence' in terms of instrumental rationality drives intellectual enquiry towards a 'disengagement' from the 'spiritual' side of existence. In Taylor's thought this aspect of his thinking represents the Heideggerian influence.

Heidegger saw Modern dualism, instituted by the Cartesian 'cogito' argument, as intensifying the suppression of the question of Being. Heidegger would advocate an 'overcoming' or rejection of this fractious dualism. Taylor has identified Descartes' thought as promoting the 'disengagement' from the 'intentional' aspect of human experience that reaches its apotheosis in the thought of Locke and the conception of the individual as a 'punctual self'. Descartes, as the 'founder of Modern philosophy', can be seen to institute a differing conceptualisation of the human individual that has risen to 'canonical' proportions in the late Modern period. The retreat from the intentional, that is a disengagement from embodiment, and a flight to reason, or some other universalist and ahistorical human faculty can be seen as a characteristically Modern manoeuvre, and indeed flawed. Taylor's contextualist reading of human nature, and the development of his conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany (drawing on a Romantic, and Expressionist heritage) might be viewed as a much needed 'countereffort' to such Modernist thinking. Embodiment, and (re)engagement might be perceived as a laudable attempt to overcome (or mollify) dualism and regain a sense of an organic wholeness to the human individual. This humanist effort is undoubtedly a part of Taylor's thinking (identified by Waldron in particular), he ultimately has a scotoma in respect to homelessness.

Taylor's argument for attunement is spurred by his perception that the 'Natural order' of reality provides a normative framework to which the individual can align herself. The assertion of the Natural as a guide to human action has an ambiguity that it would appear Taylor wishes to exploit. On one level, Nature surely is a guide to human

practice, there is a resistance (to appropriate Nietzsche's term) in Nature to 'just any' human formulation of it. Those who wish to maintain that the earth is flat, or that the Universe is not heliocentric seem to be resisted by human observations and experience. Presumably Taylor would pay some heed to such perceptions as he champions the embodied phenomenology of experience. However, even this assertion of the Natural as a guide is not universally assented to. It is possible to raise doubts over the 'quality' of such contacts with Nature (they are, it is argued, 'dog legged' through measuring and photographic equipment). Nonetheless, it is possible to hold a broad 'physicalism'. That is resistant to such challenges, this is to echo Doctor Johnson's 'refutation' of Berkeley.

The particular emphasis that Taylor wishes to place on the notion of the Natural as a guide (which he perceives as a growing Romantic recognition of 'Nature as source') is how 'values' are 'extra human'. Taylor suggests that it is incoherent to act as though estimations of value are generated, *ex nihilo*, from the operation of individual human will. The assumption of the possibility of a monological generation of value is what marks deviant forms of authenticity. To act in such a manner is to lose 'significance' in a 'tragic homogenisation' of all values. Deviant forms of authenticity wish to deny the existence of 'horizons of significance' and the basic 'dialogical' character of human existence. It is possible, however, to cede Taylor his point while accusing him of question begging, and denying his conception of Nature.

While it is absurd to assert that all values are based in human will, is it not an equal absurdity to suggest that all value is guaranteed by a situated moral phenomenology? Taylor lays himself open to his critics by an overdetermined commitment to situated moral phenomenology. This weakness in Taylor's thought is most obvious in his inability to see any sense of value at work in emotivist moral theory, utilitarianism or existentialism. What Taylor seems to miss, or misperceive is homelessness.

A recognition of homelessness, an acceptance of the impossibility of absolute values the perspective from which Walzer can advocate the choice of liberalism 1 from within liberalism 2. This is not the attempt to generate values from the operation of human will or the naturalist prescription to see physical reality as value reality, rather it is

a value judgement to act as though there are no absolute values. It is this crucial aspect of contemporary thought that Taylor seems insensitive to. Taylor's criticism that such theories lack any conception of value, allied with his expression of a hope he sees in Judeo-Christian theology is what in large part provokes the criticism of his thought, and the accusation of moralism. While the charge of moralism is incorrect, it is clear that Taylor is blind to some forms of contemporary mediation.

Conclusions

Taylor himself, suggests that his work is characterised by being Expressivist and hostile to atomism and the widespread naturalism of Modern thought. The Expressivist element of Taylor's thought represents a 'mixed blessing'. On the positive side, Taylor seems to take up, and extend Berlin's assessment of the importance of the Romantic movement. Modernity can be perceived as repeating the mono theistic religious error of absolutism, or universalism. The primacy of faith becomes slowly transformed through the history of the Western intellectual tradition to a primacy of reason. As Berlin suggests both 'creeds' emphasise the singularity of Truth; while there is one Truth there are many potential errors. The Romantic movement, uniquely, promotes the notion that there are many 'truths'; it is the champion of heterogeneity over homogeneity. Thus Expressivist heterogeneity can be seen as superior, and as an astute challenge, to the Modern stress on instrumentality rationality.

On the negative side, the particular Expressivist heritage that Taylor takes up is aesthetic spiritualism and Germanic Idealism, with a Hegelian notion of heteronomy advancing towards an Absolute. In respect of human nature, and the appropriate political and social setting for the Expressivist individual there is thus a tension between notions of contract and equality (that respects many truths, and many ways of being human), and notions of a general will (that prioritises an ideal form of 'citizenship'). Taylor finally advocates procedural liberalism within substantive liberalism.

Taylor's thought is important as it recognises the importance of perceived 'values'. Taylor is adept at revealing the value ladenness of political formations that avow

neutrality. Taylor's general criticism that political structures should overtly promote their values is important and raises crucial issues for contemporary liberalism.

Taylor recognises that the Modern scientific outlook with its strict dualism between fact and value is too simple minded. The fact versus value distinction imposed onto (or into) human affairs (including the political realm) is disastrous. The supposedly eternal and irreducible facts of any matter, or situation are constantly at risk of being exploded (or Deconstructed) by a revelation of their value ladenness. The dualism between Facts and values is a Modern conceptual trope that has 'had its day', or is in the process of collapsing; this growing realisation has its genesis in Romantic thought. The extent to which this dualism is essential, useful, and capable of being maintained is an ongoing and hotly debated issue.

A further negative aspect of Taylor's affiliation for Expressivism is the sense of attunement it fosters in his thought. Expressivism emerges as the expression, or articulation of a normative 'bent' to reality. These sentiments seem to fatally undermine the Romantic conceptualisation of the heterogeneity of the truth, and reveal Taylor's strong Hegelian heritage. It would appear that for Taylor *Sittlichkeit* is heteronomy on the path to an ultimate unity (hopefully in Judeo-Christian theology.)

Taylor also suffers a limitation in his perception of the contemporary scope and variety of possible values. Taylor systematically professes to find much Modern thought devoid of values. Taylor is simply wrong in this perception. Taylor claims that subjectivist ethics and doctrines such as utilitarianism are devoid of values, or more accurately, cannot coherently appeal to values that they overtly espouse not to have recourse to. This is a misinterpretation.

On the political level the 'constitutive' tension in Taylor's thought drives him towards a positive estimation of substantive liberalism that potentially misses the values of procedural liberalism. However beyond this confusion much of the positive concern of Taylor's political thinking is insightful, and emblematic of the complexity of late Modern politics. Taylor's high estimation of Tocqueville's analysis of the spectre of 'soft despotism' is correct. Taylor's emphasis upon decentralisation and the local is admirable

However it is in the conceptualisation of human nature as interspatial epiphany itself that the enduring importance of Taylor's thought is to be found. The concept of human nature as self manifesting captures both Hegelian heteronomy and existential heroism. The concept provides a 'framework' within which it is possible to recognise both aspects of human 'nature'.

On the one hand, interspatial epiphany does justice to the 'situatedness' of the individual. There is a facticity or determinacy to the individual's constitution by token of both their biological characteristics, and their location in a specific place at a specific time. Taylor is indeed correct to assert that it is 'inescapable' to articulate this 'givenness', with the attendant requirement of attunement tempered by the possibility of choosing homelessness.

On the other hand, Taylor's thought makes it possible to identify the pretensions of existential heroism (unsituated conceptions of human nature) and to resist the scope for the 'perfection' of the individual (be it in terms of politics, or theology, or any other 'fashionable madness'.) This point of resistance is secured through Taylor's exploration of the determinacy (and embodiment) of the human condition. Human nature understood as an interspatial epiphany can restore a much needed sense of balance to a conception of human nature (a recovery of balance that is particularly required in the (late) Modern period). This is Taylor's great achievement. The conception of human nature as interspatial epiphany is a great humanist insight that will be of enduring importance.

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