

Draft

## Exploring Coalition Behaviour in the Allocation of Portuguese Local Government Portfolios

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### Abstract

The objective of this paper is to begin to explore coalition behaviour in Portuguese local government. Electoral rules exclude formal post-electoral coalition formation here. Given this, why study coalition behaviour in Portuguese local government? We argue that there is a coalition-like type of bargaining in the form of delegation, i.e., the distribution of portfolios to some but not all members of councils. This makes Portuguese local governments attractive sites for study. In the paper, we first describe the institutional structure and rules of the game at the local government level. Second, using descriptive evidence on recent local election data, we look at how parties behave post-electorally and discuss how this behaviour in light of the portfolio allocation and coalition bargaining literature.

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## Introduction

Government coalition formation is a well-established body of literature since the first studies came out in the early 1960s. Empirical studies on office- and policy-seeking behaviour, as well as portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies, are frequent at the national level. Results generally find in favor of the idea that parties are more policy-seeking than office-seeking. Not much is said in the literature about Portugal. One could argue that this is because Portugal is not a particularly good case to study since, with the exception of one descriptive account (Magone 2000), there were very few coalitions in central government, most of them in the early years following the restitution of the democratic regime. Perhaps, for this reason, there are no empirical coalition studies on Portuguese governments. The scenario at the local government level is quite another thing. Studies on coalition formation at the local level are just now starting to make a mark on the literature. Most parliamentary local government systems are open fields for research on coalition formation and portfolio allocation.

Here, we seek to explore Portuguese local government coalition behaviour. This case is interesting in two regards. First, it is relevant because it gets, or at least attempts to get, scholars theoretically and empirically interested in what goes on in Portugal with regard to coalition behaviour. Second, it is intriguing because there is no formal post-electoral coalition formation in Portugal at the local level. Despite this major institutional constraint, we argue that there is a coalition-*like* type of bargaining that takes the form delegation. Here, delegation refers to the distribution of portfolios among some, but not all, of the different parties comprising the executive councils.

We begin with a very brief reference to the literature on coalition formation and its application to the local government level. We then turn our attention to the description of the Portuguese context and its institutional constraints, namely, the institutional structure and the

rules of the game at the local government level. Finally, using descriptive evidence on the most recent local election data, December 2001, we explore how the parties behave post-electorally.

## **Brief General Overview of Coalition Bargaining and Portfolio Allocation**

Early explanations of coalition behaviour viewed parties as rational actors pursuing the goal of office. These office-seeking explanations resided in the idea that the best possible solution for parties competing for the spoils of government was to share as little power as possible. This resulted in minimal winning coalitions, that is, coalitions only as large as need be to secure winning and maximize cabinet durability, with partners as small as possible to minimize sharing spoils—minimum winning coalitions (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953; Riker 1962; Gamson 1961). Offices, irrespective of substance, would then be distributed proportionately according to the number of seats.

Empirical evidence, however, revealed that the pure-office seeking model of coalition formation did not adhere very well to reality (Browne and Franklin 1973; Budge and Keman 1990; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Bäck and Dumont 2004). Scholars argued in favor of policy preferences as the most important determinant of coalescence; they also argued that not all offices have the same bargaining value, so that it matters how the cake is cut. Empirical studies have shown that policy-based coalitions are in fact more applicable. This led to the relaxation of the pure office-seeking model—minimal connected winning coalition (Axelrod 1970),—where minimum winning coalitions would be more likely to form if they were connected policy-wise. It also led to the notion of compactness, where minimum winning coalitions would be more likely to form if they minimized ideological range (Leiserson 1966; de Swaan 1973).

More recent is the incorporation of institutional constraints in theories of coalition formation or “coalition avoidance”, as Kaare Strom and Jorn Leipart (1993: 870) would put it. Early coalition theories, both office- and policy-seeking, were devoid of institutional considerations, such as cabinet formation rules, electoral rule, and pre-electoral agreements.

However, as these authors point out, institutions are relevant constraints on negotiations that can lead to the failure of coalescence (Strom and Leipart 1993; Strom, Budge, and Laver 1994; Lupia and Strom 2004).

Portfolio allocation is an important sub-theme within the literature on coalition formation (Laver and Schofield 1990; Budge and Keman 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996). The portfolio allocation model is concerned with coalition formation, specifically with what Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle (1996) call the equilibrium cabinet, i.e., one formed by parties that will not have the incentive to leave it. Most empirical studies here deal with the composition and duration of these cabinets (Warwick and Druckman 2001); very few studies are concerned with the actual allocation, in other words, with “how well rewarded each member-party [can] expect to be in terms of ministerial portfolios”(Warwick and Druckman 2001: 627).

## **Coalition Theories at the Local Government Level**

In the second half of the 1980s, coalition research was taken to another level, literally speaking. Some studies examined the potential of studying coalitions at the local level (Mellors and Pinjemberg 1989). Colin Mellors recognized the sub-national governments as “a new arena for the study of coalitions” (Mellors 1989, see also Laver and Schofield 1990). Despite these authoritative suggestions, the number of studies remains scarce, at least in comparison to the body of literature on the national governments.

One of the key weaknesses of the coalition theory at the national government level is the circularity problem in which the same data is used to develop the theory and test it too (Skjæveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen 2004). In other words, theory is usually no more than data description. In this sense, local government is seen as an obvious solution to this problem. Not only is the number of cases substantially larger, but they are substantively different. In sum, local governments provide both a larger and a more varying data set.

There is another advantage to studying local coalitions that also has to do with theory and research design of the empirical tests. On the theoretical side, it is by now well known that institutional constraints take on an important role in coalition formation. The earlier coalition theories treated parties as unconstrained actors that were more or less indiscriminate in their search for partners to form a minimum winning coalition (Strom, Budge, and Laver 1994). However, parties operate in specific institutional settings that reduce the coalition options available. On the research design side, it is possible to solve the problem due to institutional setting variation from country to country. Studies of local governments, therefore, are able to hold the institutional setting constant and control for its effect.

Conversely, one of the greatest difficulties of these studies is been that coalition theories are, in fact, formulated to address the specificities of national government in parliamentary democracies. This means that the theories may not hold at the local level. They have to be adapted to reflect the nature of local coalitions. For example, both the Denters (1985) and Steunenberg (1992) studies on the Netherlands were based on the assumption that the policy positions of local parties match those at the national level—a rather ‘heroic’ assumption (Skjæveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen 2004). More recent works have improved on this problem by obtaining data on local party policy positions. The work of Hanna Bäck (2003) focusing on Sweden is based on surveys sent to local councilors. Also, in a study on Denmark, Asbjørn Skjæveland, Søren Serritzlew, and Jens Blom-Hansen (2004) have measured policy positions through an expert survey also sent to local councilors. Although we may object on the grounds that some comparability problems may be present, this procedure is a clear improvement.

In addition, while the concept of coalition is clearly defined at national level, it is not without its problems at the local level. As Skjæveland, Serritzlew, and Blom-Hansen (2004: 9) put it:

“There are local functional equivalents to national government, but they depend on the specific local government system under study. In alderman systems, the local council forms an executive committee to which administrative authority is delegated. This is a close functional equivalent to a cabinet government and has been used as such in studies of local coalition formation in e. g. the Netherlands. In committee systems, executive authority rests with the local council’s standing committees. In these systems the committee chairmen have been used as the functional equivalents of national government.”

Another difficulty emerges with the characterization of either office-seeking or policy-seeking political actors or parties. When is it the case that local parties seek “to maximize their rewards from executive office” (Strom and Leipart 1993: 870) or that local “party leaders pursue policy objectives at least in part because of voter demands” (Strom and Leipart 1993: 872)? For example, according to the standard view at the national level of government, the formation of a oversized majority government is interpreted as a rejection of the office-seeking model of coalition formation, which is centered on notions related to the minimum winning concept. Laver, Rallings, and Thrasher (1998) refer that “there is no compelling reason why policy-seeking models of government formation (...) should not be applied at the local level” (1998: 335). This may well be true, but, as we shall see, the Portuguese case is one where these concepts are tricky to define in the local context.

Finally, local government coalition literature reveals a major imbalance. Most local government studies tend to focus specifically on coalition formation, bargaining, and “explaining and predicting coalition outcomes” (Bäck 2003: 441). Fewer studies look at the actual allocation of portfolios. One clear exception is the Laver, Rallings, and Thrasher (1998) study of British local councils. These authors argue that “the key assumption of the portfolio allocation model approach, applied at local level [is] that giving control of a particular council committee to one party rather than another implies different local policy outputs in the committee’s area of jurisdiction.” (1998: 336). Fewer still are studies that address portfolio salience, that is, “the importance or salience of the portfolios each party receives, as opposed to

just their quantity.” (Warwick and Druckman 2001: 627). As we will see in the next section, both the allocation of portfolios and their salience are determinant in explaining the functioning of Portuguese local party politics.

## **The Portuguese Local Cabinets**

In Portugal, the most important level of local government is the municipality.<sup>1</sup> The central government approves legislation on general guidelines concerning attributions of municipalities, competencies of local bodies, election form, as well as the local financing system. This means that all municipalities have the same general limits on their political and policy-making activity.

The form of government is defined by central government for all municipalities. There are two main bodies, an executive body and a legislative body, elected separately in a system of proportional representation of closed lists and the d’Hondt method. Political parties, pre-election coalitions of parties, and independent lists (groups of ordinary citizens) are allowed to run for these offices.

The legislative body (*assembleia municipal*) has typical powers, such as the control of the executive, budget approval, housing plan, loans, and approval of large projects. The executive body (*câmara municipal*) is the governing body that runs the municipality on a day-to-day basis. It is composed of 5, 7, 9, or 11 members<sup>2</sup> (one of these members is the president of the council) according to the population size of the municipality. Since the council is elected through the d’Hondt method, this body is multi-party. In this sense, the executive body may or may not have a majority of a single party in government. Since the decisions in weekly

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<sup>1</sup> There are 278 municipalities in the mainland, 19 in Azores Islands, and 11 in the Madeira Islands. Parishes constitute a lower level of government; there are about 4000 of these. Since 1976, the Portuguese constitution also refers to a regional level of government, the administrative region, but this level never actually existed.

<sup>2</sup> Because they are much larger municipalities, Lisbon and Porto have 17 and 15 members, respectively, in the executive body.

meetings are dichotomous (approval vs. non-approval), when a party has the majority, it can proceed on its own to implement its preferred policies.

The president of the council is the first name on the winning list running for the executive body. The president can roughly be seen as a “strong mayor” given his/her legal powers (Pereira 1991).<sup>3</sup> The president, among other things, implements, coordinates, and controls the decisions of the municipal bodies. In addition to his/her specific powers, the executive council can delegate many of its competencies on the president. In fact, this is the most frequent scenario (Pereira 1991). The weekly executive meetings usually serve one purpose—that of deciding on the most important issues, precisely those that cannot be delegated. The president can also delegate some of his/her functions to the other council members, whether they belong to his/her party or not. Upon delegation, council members become responsible for one or more functional areas of administration on a daily basis.

With regard to local party politics, there are some important issues to note. In the first place, there are five main parties represented in the national parliament and in local governments. Following the Left-Right ideological spectrum, from Left to Right, they are the following: BE (Radical Leftists);<sup>4</sup> PCP-CDU (Portuguese Communist Party); Center Left–PS (Socialist Party); Center Right–PSD (Social Democratic Party); Extreme Right–CDS (Democratic Social Center). The two middle parties are the largest, usually capturing about 80-85% of the votes and accounting for at least two thirds of the presidents of the municipality. Typically, though, two or three parties are represented in the executive body, meaning that political party competition at the local level can vary significantly.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Law nº 169/99 on the Attributions, Competencies, Functioning of Local Bodies.

<sup>4</sup> Only recently have Radical leftists won representation and mandates at the national and local levels. But, contrary to what happens with the other four parties, none of the 308 municipalities is administered by this party.

<sup>5</sup> At the local level, we can only speculate that parties are distributed along a left-right dimension in the same way as parties at the national level (Mendes, Camões, and McDonald 2001; see Figure 2). We are in the course of collecting survey data and party manifesto data on party positions on a left-right dimension, as well as on several specific policy areas. Until then, we can only speculate about these positions.



## *Delegation as/or Coalition Formation? Defining the Concept of Coalition in Portuguese Local Government*

As said above, local executive council delegates functions to the president, who, in turn, usually delegates on the council members. Taking into consideration that citizens' votes constitute a delegation of power to representatives, a complete chain of delegation is defined. Figure 1 shows the complete chain of delegation at the local government level (Strom 2000: 269; Andeweg 2000).

[Figure 1 about here]

The president's delegation to council members takes on special meaning. We know from other contexts that delegation is very often selective and purposive (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). We said before that when a party has a majority, it can proceed on its own, implementing its preferred policies. But this may not occur; if there is no government majority of one party, two things may happen. First, the government may proceed and hope for occasional informal coalitions to form and approve decisions on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the winning party needs to gain support from minority parties; therefore, the probability of lengthier discussions and higher bargaining costs is much higher. The second alternative is the formation of stable informal coalition bargaining. How does this happen? Since the issue in local Portuguese government is not about whether or not cabinets will form (the classical problem on the conditions of government formation, see Laver 1998), bargaining can be seen through the delegation of functions selectively to some council members through the allocation of non-proportionately divided portfolios (Budge and Keman 2000; O'Leary Grofman and Elkit 2005).

## The 2001 Local Government Elections

Empirical studies on coalition formation in parliamentary democracies abound. However, except for José Magone (2000), who provides a descriptive account of six unstable coalitions in central government in the early years following the restitution of the democratic regime, there are no studies on Portuguese governments. One could argue that this is quite understandable given that the Portuguese parliamentary system is not prone to coalition formation. At the local government level, however, as discussed above, there is evidence of coalition-*like* bargaining behaviour. Thus, we argue that this makes Portuguese local governments attractive empirical study grounds.

One cannot speak of office-seeking behaviour in the Portuguese local government context in the traditional sense because offices are determined on election day and solely by election results. No single municipal council gets to rule on its own, unless it were to earn enough votes to secure all seats. This means that the winning party cannot bargain away seats to another party. The only bargaining chips available are the portfolios. In these majority councils, the winning party has the prerogative to keep all portfolios. It is important to recall that portfolios here are not the equivalent of holding office, as is the case with the central government level in Portugal and most other parliamentary systems. Portfolios are governmental parties' chance to actually govern. So, really, getting into the council is not the same thing as holding office, as it is in central government. Parties comprising the executive council *per se* have decision power only. They do not run the show on a daily basis.

Given this, the spoils of office reside in the chance to govern. The choice in parties allows us to check on office- and/or policy-seeking behaviour. Depending on which parties, second or third winning parties, we may possibly be able to say something about whether there is office- or policy-seeking behaviour in local government. In the face of non-majority councils, the

choice to allocate or not may reveal office-seeking behaviour and the choice of party getting the portfolios, as well as the nature of the portfolios distributed may reveal office- or policy-seeking behaviour. This logic is shown in Table 1; this table is a double-entry table with government majority/minority status information in the columns and portfolio distribution information in the lines. It tells us that majority councils that opt to distribute are oversized policy-seeking majorities. Minority governments that distribute portfolios can be minimal winning office-seekers or oversized coalition policy-seekers. When minority councils do not distribute portfolios, we can argue the case that they exhibit office-seeking-*like* behaviour. This is because governing power is not shared. Of course, this runs contrary to the standard office-seeking model; here, minority governments would not be considered office-seeking because this would jeopardize coalition duration. At the local level here, however, minority councils do not stand to lose office in not distributing.

[Table 1 about here]

In this paper, we seek to assess what, if any bargaining occurred among local government party players. In order to do this, we look at the descriptive evidence from the most recent local government electoral contest in December 2001. These election results and related data refer to the 278 continental municipalities.<sup>6</sup> Data on seats are available online, however data on portfolio allocation were gathered through a survey conducted among municipalities.

Tables 2 through 5 present data on post-electoral schema agreed upon by the council parties. Table 2 lists the municipalities with minority councils, winning, and data on portfolio allocation. The first and foremost thing to notice is the fact that the vast majority of Portuguese local executive councils formed in the 2001 local election<sup>7</sup> are not on this list, meaning that

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<sup>6</sup> The municipalities of the Autonomous Regions, the Azore Islands and the Madeira Islands, were excluded due to too few survey responses.

<sup>7</sup> Generally speaking this is normal at the local level in Portugal.

they are majority councils. As expected, most of these majority councils did not allocate portfolios.

Only in 34 out of 278 municipal councils were there minority councils. In these municipalities, the winning party had to share office with one or two other parties. In about half of these cases, we find that there was no portfolio allocation—14 out 34 cases. In these anomalous cases, the winning party, given the option to distribute portfolios, chose not to do so; rather it preferred to govern alone and face opposing votes by the other parties in the council. This behaviour, we argue, could be viewed as “office-seeking”-like behaviour in light of the above discussion.

[Table 2 about here]

The next table, Table 3, provides us with more detailed information on the portfolios that were distributed and the parties getting the portfolios. These are a subset of 20 minority councils shown in the previous table that distributed portfolios, so there was some bargaining behaviour in these cases. What can we say about bargaining here? According to Table 1, these councils would be considered office-seekers if they are minimal winning or as policy-seekers if they form informal oversized majorities. Did they allocate portfolios to the smaller parties in the council? Do these parties share policy preferences? In 12 cases, we see that the winning party distributed portfolios to the smallest party in council, resulting in office-seeking-like agreements that were minimal winning.<sup>8</sup> In the remaining eight municipalities, policy-seeking oversized majorities formed, with four councils distributing portfolios to all council parties and the other four distributing portfolios only to the second winning party.

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<sup>8</sup> See footnote 5.

It is also interesting to note that of all portfolios allocated, most fall into two broad categories: 1) Social Housing and Sanitation Works and 2) Recreational Activities. The key portfolios, such as Finance, Urban Planning or Public Construction Works, are generally not among those allocated.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 4 points out a second type of anomaly. Here, we see 16 majority councils that did share portfolios with other council members. According to Table 1, this would indicate that these are oversized policy-seeking councils. This is because the winning party could have easily chosen to keep all portfolios, but instead chose to bargain with other council parties. What is also interesting about these councils is that if we examine the portfolios distributed and the rewarded parties, as we did in the previous table, we see that no key portfolios were allocated.

[Table 4 about here]

Table 5 simply highlights the pre-electoral formal coalitions formed between the PSD and the PP (with one exception, Coimbra). These are cases where winning parties are office-seekers from the start. The parties comprising the winning coalitions would not have coalesced when running for office had their purpose not been the goal of office. There are 19 such coalitions; 16 of these pre-electoral coalitions are majority councils. We see here that, in most cases (more than two thirds), these majorities opted to keep all portfolios. Only two coalition councils exhibited policy-seeking behaviour by having distributed portfolios.

[Table 5 about here]

## Conclusion

This objective of this paper is to explore Portuguese local government coalition behaviour. We review the specificities and constraints of the Portuguese case. The most restrictive of these is the fact that there is no formal post-electoral coalition formation in local government and that local government portfolios, although equivalents to national ministries, are not functional equivalents of office and are not distributed according to the traditional literature on coalition behaviour.

In a nutshell, we come to three preliminary conclusions. First, we find that most Portuguese parties at the local level are majority councils that did not allocate portfolios. Second, we find that, despite this, there is a type of bargaining behaviour. This occurs in the form of the portfolio allocation. In the few cases of majority councils that did distribute portfolios when they had no obligation to do so, we find evidence of policy-seeking behaviour. In minority councils, we mostly find what might be described as office-seeking-*like* behaviour. This is because most minority councils did distribute portfolios, but they did so to small council members, thus forming informal minimum winning agreements and exhibiting office-seeking-*like* behaviour. Finally, we find that the portfolio salience is an important issue in Portuguese local government, given that the vast majority of portfolios allocated are not politically relevant. All in all, the paper reveals that it is plausible to argue that there is coalition bargaining in Portuguese local government and that there appears to be a tendency toward the office-seeking behaviour.

Future studies on Portuguese local government coalition bargaining will take this exploratory study to another level and focus on explaining what factors determine Portuguese oversized coalition agreements (see Serritzlew, Skjæveland, and Blom-Hansen 2005) and the portfolio allocation process at the root of these agreements.


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**Figure 1 The Chain of Delegation in Portuguese Local Government System**




Delegation —————>

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Note: Inspired by Strom (2000: 269) and Andeweg (2000)

**Figure 2: Left-Right Alignment of Major Portuguese Parties According to the Experts**



**Table 1 Delegation of Portfolios in Majority and Minority Councils**

	<b>Distribution of Portfolios</b>	<b>No Distribution of Portfolios</b>
<b>Majority</b>	A – Oversized Majority <b>Policy-Seeking</b>	B – Simple Majority <b>Not applicable</b>
<b>Minority</b>	C – Type of agreement? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minimal winning– <b>Office-Seeking</b></li> <li>• Oversized – <b>Policy-Seeking</b></li> </ul>	D – Minority <b>Office-Seeking-like</b>

**Table 2 Non-Majority Winning Parties and Portfolio Allocation**

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Winning Party</b>	<b>Total Seats</b>	<b>Seats Won Winning Party</b>	<b>Portfolio Distribution</b>
Alvito	PS	5	2	No
Barreiro	PS	9	4	Yes
Beja	CDU	7	3	No
Bombarral	PSD	7	3	No
Celorico da Beira	MPT	5	2	No
Chamusca	CDU	5	2	Yes
Coruche	PS	7	3	Yes
Crato	PS	5	2	No
Entroncamento	PSD	7	3	Yes
Estremoz	CDU	7	3	Yes
Lamego	PS	7	3	No
Lisboa	PSD-PPM	17	8	Yes
Loures	PS	11	5	No
Marinha Grande	PS	7	3	Yes
Mirandela	PSD	7	3	Yes
Monforte	CDU	5	2	Yes
Moura	CDU	7	3	Yes
Nisa	CDU	5	2	Yes
Odivelas	PS	11	5	Yes
Peniche	PS	7	3	No
Portalegre	PSD	7	3	Yes
Porto	PSD-PP	13	6	Yes
Santarém	PS	9	4	No
Santiago do Cacém	CDU	7	3	Yes
Sátão	PSD	7	3	Yes
Sesimbra	PS	7	3	Yes
Sintra	PSD-PP	11	5	Yes
Terras de Bouro	PSD	5	2	No
Torres Vedras	PS	9	4	No
Vale de Cambra	PSD	7	3	No
Vila do Bispo	PSD	5	2	No
Vila Real Sto António	PS	7	3	No
Vila Viçosa	CDU	5	2	Yes

**Table 3 - Portfolios Allocated by Non-Majority Winning Parties**

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Total Seats</b>	<b>Winning Party (Seats)</b>	<b>Other Council Parties (Seats)</b>	<b>Council Party Getting Portfolios</b>	<b>Portfolios Allocated to Outside Party</b>
Barreiro	9	PS (4)	CDU (4) & PSD (1)	PSD	Sanitation & Public Works
Bombarral	7	PSD (3)	Ind. (2), PS (1) & PP(1)	PS	Urban Planning, Agriculture, Commerce, Education & Professional Improvement
Chamusca	5	CDU (2)	PS (2) & PSD-PP (1)	PS(2) & PSD-PP(1)	Regulation, Traffic, Economic Activities, Markets & Fairs, PDM, Social Housing, Health, Tourism, Supervising Commission & Jury for Public Works & Service Acquisition
Coruche	7	PS (3)	CDU (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Urban Affairs, Water & Sanitation, Environment, Parks
Entroncamento	7	PSD (3)	PS (2), BE (1) & CDU (1)	PS (2) & BE (1)	Commerce & Industry, Markets & Fairs, Cultural Activities
Estremoz	7	CDU (3)	PS (2) & PSD (2)	PS	Sports, Markets & Fairs, Cemeteries, Maintenance
Lisboa	17	PSD-PPM (8)	PS-CDU (8) & PP (1)	PP	Urban Maintenance, Solid Waste, Traffic, Mechanical Maintenance
Marinha Grande	7	PS (3)	CDU (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Social Affairs, Social Housing, Elderly Health Care
Mirandela	7	PSD (3)	PP (3) & PS (1)	PS	Sports, Tourism, Cultural Activities
Monforte	5	CDU (2)	PS (2) & PSD-PP (1)	PSD-PP	Sports, Recreational Activities
Moura	7	CDU (3)	PS (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Industry, Commerce, Agriculture, Consumer Information
Nisa	5	CDU (2)	PSD (2) & PS (1)	PSD (2) & PS (1)	Sanitation, Urban Maintenance, Parks, Rural Development, Riverfront Affairs, Sports, Markets & Fairs, Traffic; Health, Juvenile Affairs;
Odivelas	11	PS (5)	PSD (4) & CDU (2)	PSD (3) & CDU (2)	Health, Social Housing, Tourism, Veterinary Services, Environment, Economic Activities, Transportation and Garages, General Administration & Judicial Counciling
Portalegre	7	PSD (3)	PS (3) & CDU (1)	PS (1) & CDU (1)	Sports & Recreational Activities, Social Works, Social Housing, Markets & Fairs, Education, Science & Cultural Activities, Health, Consumer Information
Porto	13	PSD-PP (6)	PS (6) & CDU (1)	CDU	Environment, Administrative Reform
Sant. do Cacém	7	CDU (3)	PS (3) & PSD (1)	PSD	Health, Water & Sanitation, Environment, Urban Affairs, Municipal Infrastructures, Electrificações, Markets & Fairs, Traffic, Cemeteries
Sátão	7	PSD (3)	MPT (2) & PS (2)	MPT	Education & Cultural Activities, Arts & Crafts, School Transportation, School Transportation, Cafeteria & Dormitory Management, Cultural Affairs, Pre-School & Day Care, Schools, Tourism, Social Works
Sesimbra	7	PS (3)	CDU (2) & PSD-PP (2)	CDU	Social Works, Health, Education, Social Housing, Urban Planning
Sintra	11	PSD-PP (5)	PS (4) & CDU (2)	CDU	Environment, Local Intervention
Vila Viçosa	5	CDU (2)	PS (2) & PSD (1)	PS	Sports, Markets & Fairs, Traffic, Cemeteries

**Table 4 - Majority Winning Parties with Portfolio Allocation**

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Total Seats</b>	<b>Electoral Winning Party (Seats)</b>	<b>Non-Electoral Winning Parties (Seats)</b>	<b>Non-Electoral Winning Parties with Portfolios</b>	<b>Portfolios Allocation</b>
Alter do Chão	5	PSD (3)	PS (2)	PS	Sports & Cultural Activities
Alvaiázere	5	PSD (4)	PS (1)	PS	Health
Amadora	11	PS (6)	PSD-PP (3) & CDU (2)	CDU	Economic Activities, Sanitation, Markets & Fairs, Job Placement, Tourism, Minor Protection
Aveiro	9	PS (5)	PSD (3) & PP (1)	PSD	Protecção Civil, Apoio ao Consumidor, Mercados e Feiras, Parque de Feiras e Exposições, Polícia Municipal e Saúde
Braga	11	PS (6)	PSD-PP-PPM (4) & CDU (1)	CDU	Social Works, Social Housing, Tourism
Coimbra	11	PSD-PP-PPM (6)	PS (4) & CDU (1)	CDU	Social Housing
Lousã	7	PS (6)	PSD (1)	PSD	Traffic & Health
Maia	9	PSD-PP (6)	PS (3)	PS	Sanitation & Water Works; Sanitation and Safety Inspection; Art Academy Management, Cultural Activities, Tourist Establishment Inspection, Food & Beverage Establishment Inspection, Gaming Establishment Inspection, Commerce, Markets & Fairs, Publicity
Mora	5	CDU (3)	PS (1) & PSD (1)	PSD	Markets & Fairs
Mourão	5	PS (4)	PSD (1)	PSD	Health
Oeiras	11	PSD (7)	PS (3) & CDU (1)	PS & CDU	Municipal Enterprises, Property Management, Job Placement & Professional Improvement, Sports
Oleiros	5	PSD (4)	PS (1)	PS	Environment, Traffic
Seia	7	PS (4)	PSD (2) & Ind. (1)	Ind.	Economic Development, European Funds
Seixal	11	CDU (6)	PS (3) & PSD (2)	PS & PSD	Health, Drug Abuse Prevention, Civil Protection, Consumer Protection;
Setúbal	9	CDU (6)	PS (2) & PSD-PP (1)	PS & PSD-PP	Consumer Protection; Cemeteries; Health
Tomar	7	PSD (5)	PS (2)	PS	Municipal Services, Civil Protection, Fire Prevention

**Table 5 Pre-Electoral Winning Coalitions with Portfolio Allocation**

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Winning Party</b>	<b>Total Seats</b>	<b>Seats Won by Winning Coalition</b>	<b>Portfolios Distributed</b>
Alfândega da Fé	PSD-PP	5	3	
Cascais	PSD-PP	11	7	
Coimbra	PSD-PP-PPM	11	6	Housing, Housing Project Management, Housing Infrastructure Restoration
Estarreja	PSD-PP	7	4	
Lisboa	PSD-PPM	17	8	Urban Maintenance, Solid Waste, Traffic, Mechanical Maintenance
Macedo de Cavaleiros	PSD-PP	7	4	
Maia	PSD-PP	9	6	Sanitation & Water Works; Sanitation and Safety Inspection; Art Academy Management, Cultural Activities, Tourist Establishment Inspection, Food & Beverage Establishment Inspection, Gaming Establishment Inspection, Commerce, Markets & Fairs, Publicity
Mangualde	PSD-PP	7	5	
Montemor-o-Velho	PSD-PP	7	4	
Penafiel	PSD-PP	9	5	
Porto	PSD-PP	13	6	Environment, Administrative Reform
Ribeira de Pena	PSD-PP	5	3	
Sabrosa	PSD-PP	5	3	
Sabugal	PSD-PP	7	4	
Sintra	PSD-PP	11	5	Environment, Local Intervention
Vila Nova de Famalicão	PSD-PP	11	6	
Vila Nova de Gaia	PSD-PP	11	8	
Vila Pouca de Aguiar	PSD-PP	7	4	