Aristotle's Politics: Ethical politics or political realism?

Cohen de Lara, E.

Link to publication

Aristotle's Politics: Ethical Politics or Political Realism?

Emma Cohen de Lara

Abstract

Much of the scholarly literature provides significant support for the ethical foundation of Aristotelian political science. Still, it cannot be said that there is a smooth relationship between Aristotle's ethical thinking and his theory of politics in the *Politics*. This chapter takes the possible inconsistencies between the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* seriously and shows how these are accommodated when we understand Aristotle's political science in a comprehensive way, as a practical science that has both the good life *and* stability within the political community as its ends. The chapter shows how the thesis fits with several passages in the middle sections of the *Politics*, including Aristotle's controversial account of tyranny.

1. Introduction

Aristotle's practical philosophy has been receiving serious attention again over the last few decades among contemporary ethicists and political philosophers. Different scholars such as, on the European continent, Hannah Arendt and Franco Volpi have contributed to a reappreciation of Aristotle.[1] In the Anglo-American world Alisdair McIntyre, Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum have been instrumental in bringing about a renewed focus on Aristotle's ethical and political thought.[2] In particular, they were drawn to Aristotle for his understanding that political science is or should be based on an ethical understanding of human beings. Unlike the liberal paradigm of politics, which takes politics to be about the protection of individual rights and freedoms and which is arguably much more dominant in shaping politics today, Aristotle emphasized human flourishing as the genuine purpose of politics.[3] Human flourishing is the result of practicing the moral and intellectual virtues such as moderation, courage, liberality, and justice. Communal life finds its purpose in virtuous practices, and the laws of a community should encourage the development of virtuous dispositions as much as possible. Not only does the Aristotelian view of politics provide relief from the stark individualism of the liberal paradigm, it also appeals to everyday experiences in modern societies.

As already mentioned in the introduction to this volume, much of the scholarly literature provides significant support for the ethical foundation of Aristotelian political science.[4] In this way, the literature affirms a close relationship between the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. Still, as the introduction to this volume also showed, it cannot be said that there is a smooth relationship between Aristotle's ethical thinking and his theory of politics in the *Politics*. A closer analysis

is, thus, warranted in order to diagnose whether, and to what extent, Aristotle's political philosophy can be interpreted exclusively as a project of ethical politics.

In this chapter, I propose to take the possible inconsistencies between the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* seriously and show how these are accommodated when we understand Aristotle's political science in a comprehensive way, as a practical science that has both the good life *and* stability within the political community as its ends. A political scientist needs to understand virtue and the good life, but he also needs practical insight into the rules, mechanisms and processes that benefit the stability of the regime. As we will see, oftentimes the effort to maintain stability lacks a moral dimension and, on occasion, even involves an immoral dimension. I seek to show how the thesis fits with several passages in the middle sections of the *Politics*, including Aristotle's controversial account of tyranny (*Pol* 5.11 1313a34-5b10).

My argument starts out, in Sect. 2, from what one may call Aristotle's naturalism. For Aristotle, the political condition is natural to man: human beings belong in political community. As Aristotle concedes, there is a range of regimes where the good life is possible only to a limited degree. Still, outside of political community human life is barely possible at all. This awareness leads to a kind of realism about stability as a factor in maintaining political community constituting a necessary condition for human life although, obviously, it is not a sufficient condition for the good life. Next, in Sect. 3, I will discuss the possible causes of instability, taking a closer look at book 2 of the *Politics* where Aristotle argues that a polity is a plurality of people with distinct interests. Against Plato, Aristotle argues that this plurality cannot be erased through a moral education that loosens people's private attachments to material goods. At the same time, Aristotle is aware that the different interests in a polity tend to develop into factions. This observation, in effect, sets up the challenge for the middle books of the *Politics* – in particular books 5 and 6 – where Aristotle deals with the question how private interest and the distinct understandings of justice that result from these can be prevented from undermining the regime. Sects. 3, 4, 5 and 6 discuss the causes of instability, including the political judgment in oligarchy and democracy, and the remedies that Aristotle proposes for preventing instability, including in the tyrannical regime. In the final section, Sect. 7, I defend a practical understanding of Aristotle's political science, arguing against an understanding that reduces it to a project of ethical politics.

2. The Naturalness of Political Community

In book 1 of the *Politics*, Aristotle proposes that "a human being is by nature a political animal" (*Pol* 1.2 1253a3). Human beings, as a species, are a kind of animal that by nature belongs in a political community. Being political and belonging in a political community is what distinguishes human beings from other kinds of animals. Someone who is by nature without political community is either a "poor specimen" who cannot achieve the same kind of development as

other human beings who live in political community, or "superhuman" because he has no need for political community for his development. In both extreme cases, man is not really human; Aristotle also compares anyone who cannot form a community with others to a "beast" or a "god" (*Pol* 1.2 1253a30).

There are three reasons why a political community is the natural environment for human beings. First of all, unlike households or villages, the political community attains self-sufficiency (*Pol* 1.2 1252b30-3a1). This is why households and villages come into being; the city-state is the natural completion of the social order. Only in a city-state is the social order large enough so that, on account of a division of labour, it can provide for its own needs.

Second, man's capacity of "speech" (*logos*) is a sign of his political nature.[5] "Nature makes nothing pointlessly," so Aristotle argues, and there is no animal other than a human being that possesses speech (*Pol* 1.2 1253a9-10). Animals, of course, also have a way to communicate with one another, but it is only human beings, so argues Aristotle, who have developed speech so that they can communicate about complex issues that involve moral judgment: "Voice (*phōnē*) is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust. For it is peculiar to human beings, in comparison to the other animals, that they alone have perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust, and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city-state" (*Pol* 1.2 1253a13-18). Hence, a political community provides the environment where human being's specific and unique capacity for speech is developed. Outside of political community deliberations about good or bad, just or unjust matters do not and cannot take place. Human beings cannot develop their most distinctive capacity, namely, their capacity for articulating what is beneficial, good, just, and unjust when they grow up and live outside of a political community. The ability for developing speech is a clear indication, for Aristotle, of man's social and political nature.

Third, human beings belong in the political community because they need its laws and customs for living a genuinely human life. Human beings become fully human by moving towards their purpose (*telos*) that is the good life. For Aristotle, the good life consists of excelling at the activity that makes one specifically human, which means perfecting the exercise of man's specific function that is reasoning or deliberating. Man's capacity for speech is inherently connected to man's capacity for moral and intellectual reasoning. Still, man is born with the capacity for reasoning or deliberating but he needs to develop this capacity in order to become good at it; the capacity is almost worthless without training. Furthermore, the ability to reason successfully depends on the cultivation of character dispositions such as moderation. In other words, the ability to reason successfully depends on the development of the moral and intellectual virtues (cf. *NE* 1.7 1098a16–18). Human beings are not born with the virtues but become virtuous only on account of training and teaching. The political community, with its laws and customs, is the environment where such training and teaching takes place. Human beings need law, customs,

and the relationships with one another in order to practice the virtues. Aristotle writes that: "[A]s a human being is the best of animals when perfected, so when separated from law and justice he is worst of all … he is the most unrestrained and most savage of animals when he lacks virtue, as well as the worst where food and sex are concerned. But justice is a political matter; for justice is the organization of a political community, and justice decides what is just" (*Pol* 1.2 1253a35-8). It is clear, therefore, that for Aristotle man belongs in political community and can barely live and survive, let alone flourish, outside of political community.

3. Causes of Instability

However, to say that people in a political community share a life that is guided by deliberation about right and wrong, justice and injustice, does not mean that people necessarily deliberate correctly about these matters, nor does it mean that there is always enough freedom to do so. There are ways in which the common life guided by deliberative choices does not result in harmony in the political community. Aristotle recognizes that differences in private interest and the dominance of the passions such as greed and ambition oftentimes result in miscalculations or divergent understandings of justice, which constitute important causes of potential instability in a political community.

As Aristotle shows in book 2 of the *Politics*, the necessary division of labour in a city-state means that the city-state is necessarily a plurality (*Pol* 2.2 1261a18-19). A city-state, for Aristotle, is defined by a multitude, by which the "things from which a unity must come differ in kind" (*Pol* 2.2 1261a30–31). The city-state can only be self-sufficient if there is a multitude of people with different professions (*Pol* 2.2 1261b14-15). The multitude of the city-state also concerns differences in property and wealth. It would be "impracticable" for people to have property in common. Moreover, private attachments are in-born and people cultivate these attachments naturally: "To regard a thing as one's own makes an enormous difference to one's pleasure. For the love each person feels for himself is no accident, but it is something natural" (*Pol* 2.5 1263a41-b2). Not only are these private attachments natural, they are also beneficial: "What is held in common by the largest number of people receives the least care. For people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give" (*Pol* 2.3 1261b33-35). Aristotle yields to the down-to-earth observation that people are naturally attached to their own possessions and care more for what is theirs than for what is held in common. But property poses a potential problem, firstly, because differences in property create distinct interests in a political community and distinct interests are a source of faction and instability. Secondly, private property poses a moral problem, since it is human nature not to be satisfied with what one has: "Human greed is an insatiable thing … [men] go on always asking for more, until they go beyond all limit. For there is no natural limit to desires, and satisfying them is what the many spend their lives trying to do" (*Pol* 2.7 1267a41-b4). Aristotle adds that

whereas the nobler natures may be receptive to moral education and habituated not to desire more, most people have a baser nature and should simply be kept down although not ill-treated (*Pol* 2.7 1267a38-b7). Private property, hence, always requires institutional measures in order to prevent a threat to the political order.

To the complications that private property and greed bring to political life as such, Aristotle adds the insight that occupying positions of power poses a challenge to people, even to those people who have achieved a significant level of ethical excellence. Power tends to corrupt. The clearest indication of this is when Aristotle discusses the cycle of regimes (*Pol* 3.15 1286b9-22). His analysis is as follows: first there were kingships. Kings were men of great virtue, and there were not many of these, hence only a one or a few people would rule most cities. Over time, however, more people developed virtue and no longer endured the rule of one, causing monarchies to develop into polities. But – and here it is – the ruling classes in these polities, although they possessed virtue initially, could not withstand the temptation to abuse their power. In Aristotle's words, they "soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public treasury" (*Pol* 3.15 1286b14-15). As the powerful started to esteem wealth over virtue, the polities naturally developed into oligarchies. These passed into tyrannies, and tyrannies passed into democracies. These transitions are explained by the same mechanism: "Love of gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number, and so to strengthen the masses who in the end set upon their masters and established democracies" (*Pol* 3.15 1286b18-20). Aristotle's awareness of the corrupting influence of power is reiterated further on, when he argues that it is better to have the rule of law instead of the rule of men: "Passion perverts rulers even when they are the best of men" (*Pol* 3.16 1287a31-2).

The political passions that drive people into factious behaviour are numerous. As Aristotle's discussion of them shows, these passions are ingrained in people's character and, as we will see below, legislation is essential in order to prevent such passions from undermining the stability of the regime. We have already seen that greed and ambition are prevalent forces in human nature that come at the expense of political stability. People start a faction because they desire profit and honour and because they fear fines and dishonour (*Pol* 5.2 1302a33-34). They do so not simply to seek these goods but their jealousy gets the better of them when they see others either justly or unjustly getting more (*Pol* 5.2 1302a39-40). Arrogance plays a role as well, in particular when it comes to the rulers. Arrogance drives rulers to feel entitled. When they act upon this passion, they easily infringing on either private properties or public funds. This causes the people to start a faction in order to challenge the constitution that gave the rulers authority (*Pol* 5.3 1302b6-9).

Pride is a dangerous passion as well. People start a faction, according to Aristotle, when they are dishonoured and also when they see others being honoured (*Pol* 5.3 1302b11-12). This is the case both when honour and dishonour are bestowed unjustly, but also when the honour and

dishonour are bestowed justly. Fear causes people to start a faction when they have committed an injustice and are afraid of punishment or, alternatively, when they have not committed an injustice but are afraid of suffering one (*Pol* 5.3 1302b21-23). Contempt may also play a role in causing factions (*Pol* 5.3 1302b25). The many can hold the few in contempt when they are excluded from power and when they consider themselves the stronger party on account of being in a majority. The few, in turn, may hold the many in contempt in a democracy because they look down on the disorganization and anarchy caused by the rule of the many. In a monarchy, the generals may attack the ruler out of contempt for the danger involved in a rebellion (*Pol* 5.10 1312a11, cf. *Pol* 5.10 1313a12).

A different kind of contempt, one that is more akin to carelessness, can play a role as well (*Pol* 5.3 1303a16). This passion is similar to political apathy. It means that the members of the city do not take responsibility for running the regime and allow people who are unfriendly to the regime to occupy the offices with supreme authority. And, finally, another political passion that is dangerous to regimes is anger and, in particular, hatred. Aristotle considers anger the cause of the overthrow of many regimes, in particular tyrannical regimes that treat the people in an arrogant fashion (*Pol* 5.10 1312b28-29). Angry people attack vehemently because they do not employ rational calculation. Hatred is an equally dangerous passion in a regime, and perhaps even more dangerous compared to anger. For anger involves pain, such as the pain at being treated in an arrogant fashion, but hatred is beyond pain and hence can employ rational calculation more easily to achieve its objectives (*Pol* 5.10 1312b31-3).

In fact, the material and psychological causes of instability are numerous, and Aristotle provides an elaborate analysis (*Pol* 5.1 1301a20-1307b25). It should be noted that many of the causes of instability involve human passions that Aristotle regards as a fixed part of the human psyche. The love of money, power, and honour, and pride and fear all drive people towards factional and, one may say, irrational behaviour that can be destructive of the regime. The point is that, as we will see below, Aristotle takes these passions as a given. They are analysed not in order to develop expertise about how to make the passions harmless or erasing them altogether, inoculating the regime against them. Rather, the passions are analysed in order to understand how they cause a threat to stability, and in order to understand how they can be controlled and channelled in such a way that they do not undermine the regime. Instead of subduing the passions Aristotle in the second half of book 5 and book 6 of the *Politics* provides an analysis of a large number of institutional, legal, or social mechanisms that control or channel factitious behaviour.

4. Political Judgment in Oligarchy and Democracy

In book 3 of the *Politics*, Aristotle offers the reader a classification of regimes (3.7 1279a23-b10). The classification distinguishes between regimes that are focused on the common good and regimes that are focused on the good of the ruling class. Aristotle calls the first group "correct

forms of government" and the second group "deviations" of the first group. The first group includes monarchy, aristocracy and polity. The second group includes tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.

Interestingly enough, in the middle books of the *Politics* Aristotle is largely concerned with democracy and oligarchy, which are two of the deviant regimes. Aristotle's justification for his preoccupation with democracy and oligarchy is that these are the most prevalent: "There are … said to be two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy" (*Pol* 4.3 1290a16-17). Of these, democracy is particularly prevalent. In *Politics* book 3, Aristotle explains that "now that city-states have become even larger, it is perhaps no longer easy for any other constitution to arise besides democracy" (3.15 1286b20-22). Given this practical observation, it becomes self-evident that a significant part of book 5 and 6 are predominantly concerned with these two regimes.

The two regimes of democracy and oligarchy are deviant on account of a lack of virtue and on account of errors in public deliberation about justice. Let us look at democracy first. Aristotle distinguishes democracy from polity. Different from a democracy, in a polity the many have developed as much virtue as possible and rule for the common benefit. Perfect virtue is beholden to the one or the few, but the masses *are* capable of military excellence, involving courage and self-discipline (*Pol* 3.7 1279b3). In a polity "the class of defensive soldiers, the ones who possess the weapons, has the most authority" (*Pol* 3.7 1279b4-5). By contrast, a democracy is described as the rule of the many who pursue their own interest. In a democracy, Aristotle characterises the many not by their military virtue but, instead, by their poverty. The real difference between democracy and oligarchy, so he argues, is poverty and wealth. It is an observable fact that "everywhere the rich are few, and the poor numerous" (*Pol* 3.8 1279b38-39). Hence, a democracy is a regime that indicates the rule of the many, that is, the poor. Democracy has in view the interest of the needy (*Pol* 3.7 1279b9).

The problem in a democracy is that the economic position of the poor defines their interest and colours their perspective on justice. Here, in particular, Aristotle's realistic view of human nature expresses itself. Ethically speaking, human beings are capable of developing virtue, including moderation, good judgment and justice. However, the assumption is that – in reality – people judge and act based on their own interest. Indeed, most people "judge badly about what concerns themselves" (*Pol* 3.9 1280a20). Justice can be understood numerically or proportionally (see *NE* 5.3 1131a10–24). Numerical justice means that things are considered according to arithmetical equality, for example, the principle of one man - one vote. Proportional justice means that a judgment is made about the proportionate worth of a thing or deed. For example, grades are distributed justly when the students receive a different grade in proportion to the merit of their work. What is just recognizes the proportion to which certain things are equal to one another. In a democracy, the many notoriously deny the definition of justice as proportional equality.[6] They refuse to acknowledge the proportionate worth of the few on account either of

the few's virtue or wealth. At the same time, in an oligarchy the wealthy few stubbornly deny the definition of justice as numerical equality and refuse to grant the many a say in power on account of their being equal as fellow-citizens. Both parties are speaking of a partial justice, which is not incorrect but rather incomplete and relative to their own point of few. They "think they are speaking about what is unqualifiedly just. For the one lot thinks that if they are unequal in one respect (wealth, say) they are wholly unequal, whereas the other lot thinks that if they are equal in one respect (freedom, say) they are wholly equal" (*Pol* 3.9 1280a23-26).

The relative misconceptions that the many and the few entertain about justice are an important cause of instability and tension. At the beginning of book 5, Aristotle reiterates that many constitutions come about because people treat their partial conception of justice as absolute. A democracy comes about because those who are equal numerically think that they are unqualifiedly equal and claim an equal share of everything. This constitution possesses justice "of a sort" (*Pol* 5.1 1301a36) but they are mistaken in understanding this justice as common justice. Practically speaking, they fail to recognize the claims of the wealthy and of the virtuous to rule. These claims are not based on numerical equality but, instead, on either the unequal contribution that the wealthy make to the polity in terms of financial resources, or on the unequal contribution that the virtuous make to the polity in terms of their superior ability to deliberate on matters of justice. Oligarchies come about because those who are superior in wealth claim superiority in all matters and appropriate a disproportionate share of political rule. In their partial conception of justice, they deny the legitimate claim to rule of the many, on account of their numbers (and a certain kind of knowledge, cf. *Pol* 3.11 1281b3-9) and they deny the legitimate claim to rule of the virtuous. This causes instability because it provides the many or the virtuous few with a persistent incentive to rebel: "When one or another of them [i.e. the many or the virtuous few] does not participate in the constitution in accordance with their assumption, they start a faction" (*Pol* 5.1 1301a37-39; cf. *Pol* 5.2 1302a22-32, *Pol* 5.3 1303b3-6).

It is worth noting, again, that the causes of factions are common. Guarding a regime implies careful attention to the interests of the many, the wealthy few, and the virtuous few, although – as Aristotle points out – the virtuous few are least likely to start a faction even though they would be most justified in doing so (*Pol* 5.1 1301a39-40). Maintaining a democracy, for example, is possible only if, in some way, the wealthy few are not treated too badly. We will see below some of the practical suggestions that Aristotle – surely based on his extensive knowledge of constitutions across the Greek world – makes to protect and maintain a balance even in simple constitutions such as a democracy. The same applies to oligarchy: a pure oligarchy, in which the wealthy few monopolize all power, is untenable if it does not somehow respect the interests of the many. A prudent lawgiver in an oligarchy anticipates this and designs the laws and institutions in such a way that an oligarchy is maintained while the claims of the many are accommodated. This is not easy, and may even seem counterintuitive; a democracy is maintained only if it

incorporates non-democratic elements, and an oligarchy is maintained only if it incorporates non-oligarchic elements. Below we will take a closer look at what this principle, the principle of opposites, implies in terms of concrete recommendations for laws, rules and procedures.

5. Dealing with Instability

Aristotle's response to the threat of political tension and instability caused by private interests, passions, and mistakes about justice, is mixed. On the one hand, he emphasizes that factional government – such as government by the many in their own interest, denying the claim to power of the wealthy and the virtuous – is not just and does not contribute to the essential goal or *telos* of the city-state. A city-state, so Aristotle posits, "exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only" (*Pol* 3.9 1280a32-3). An oligarchy, for example, which distributes power exclusively in proportion to wealth, makes the mistake of thinking that wealth is of primary importance to a city-state. But this would imply that the city-state indeed exists for survival and, following this line of reasoning, those people who possessed and contributed more wealth to the city-state would be entitled to more power because they ensured the material survival of the city-state. Rather, Aristotle's claim is that the good life and, hence, *virtue* or excellence is the goal of the city-state: "Excellence must be the care of a state which is truly so called" (*Pol* 3.9 1280b7). Good governance is inherently connected, not primarily to wealth or freedom but to excelling in good judgment and being wise, just, self-disciplined, courageous, magnanimous and so forth. Only when people unite in the practice of virtue does a city-state become a genuine community instead of a mere alliance of individuals (cf. *Pol* 3.9 1280b8-10, 1281a2-3). A good regime means that people unites on account of aggregations of people and families devoted to virtue and well-being, practicing virtue in relationship to one another and by common sacrifices and festivals that unify them in their pleasures and pains. Such a regime is made up of people who are unified by ties of civic friendship. They share in common practices and share their lives together.

On the other hand, in book 5 and 6 of the *Politics*, Aristotle is *not* concerned with introducing virtuous practices into regimes such as democracy or oligarchy. Rather, Aristotle offers a range of suggestions that are pragmatic instead of moral. The guiding principle of preserving constitutions is as follows: "Opposites are productive of opposite things" (*Pol* 5.8 1307b29). Throughout the recommendations for the different kinds of regimes in book 5, chapters 8–12, Aristotle shows how the principle of opposites works. Stability in a democracy is maintained if the legislator pays careful attention to including elements that are *non*-democratic, principally oligarchic, whereas a durable oligarchy protects its *non*-oligarchic, principally democratic elements. And so forth. The science of lawgiving and governing involves understanding which regime-specific elements preserve it and which destroy it: "Legislators and statesmen should not be ignorant about which democratic features preserve a democracy and

which destroy it, or which oligarchic features have these effects on an oligarchy" (*Pol* 5.9 1309b35-38, cf. *Pol* 5.8 1308b25-28, 1309a26-30, 1308a33-34, 6.1 1317a36-38). The principle of opposites ensures that a balance is maintained even in simple regimes such as democracy or oligarchy. It guarantees that all parts of the regime, even those excluded from the highest offices of authority, continue to wish for the existence of the regime (*Pol* 2.9 1270b20-22) because the regime in one way or other treats them well or meets their needs. As such, the principle of opposites has the effect of reducing, as much as possible, the interest of factions to destroy the regime. It is noteworthy that the principle of opposites does not state "lawgivers and statesmen should include as much virtue in any regime as possible" or, alternatively, "lawgivers and statesmen should move any single regime as closely as possible to the best regime". Rather, the focus is on preserving deviant regimes, such as democracy or oligarchy, *as deviant regimes*.

Let us look at a few of the concrete recommendations following the principle of opposites. First, Aristotle recommends that in oligarchies and aristocracies the governing class should treat well those who fall outside of the governing class. They should treat the many fairly and not deprive them of profit. They should also treat each other fairly and bring leading men into the governing class; those who love honour should not be deprived of it. The opposing element to the oligarchic or aristocratic is of course the democratic. Hence, a second recommendation, following the principle of opposites, is that in an oligarchy and aristocracy many *democratic* legislative measures are beneficial. For example, if the governing class is large, then democratic principles of short terms of offices and rotation can bring salvation (*Pol* 5.8 1308a14-15). This prevents an oligarchy from becoming *too* oligarchical whereby it destroys itself.

What is interesting to see here (and elsewhere when Aristotle argues from the principle of opposites) is that Aristotle's argument for the rotation of offices is not a moral argument. One could argue, following the approach of ethical politics, that more people are put in a position to develop their character by learning to deliberate about the public good and serve the public good. Aristotle's concern, however, is not to promote virtue but, rather, to prevent corruption. Without limitations to tenure, the ambitious and the wealthy will abuse their position and concentrate power into their own hands for their own benefit, causing oligarchies to become tyrannical (*Pol* 5.8 1308a20). It is especially the most powerful or the ones who hold the most important offices and hold them for a long time who develop tyrannical tendencies. Shortening their term in office – a democratic principle that allows as many people as possible from the ruling class to rule – means that ambitious rulers can do less harm (*Pol* 5.8 1308a18-19). This second recommendation for the short term of offices is thus based on a sense of realism about human nature. Regimes are preserved not by promoting virtuous practices but by designing mechanisms and, generally, by introducing non-indigenous elements that moderate the regime.

A third recommendation is that, in oligarchies as well as democracies, attention should be paid to property assessment. The wealth of the city needs to be assessed on a yearly basis or, following Aristotle's estimate, every 3 or 5 years in the case of large cities. With changes in the wealth of the city, property qualifications have to be reassessed in order for the same proportion between rulers and ruled to be maintained (*Pol* 5.8 1308b4-5). The reassessment is essential because without it an oligarchy would change into a dynasty where only a few powerful families rule when the total wealth decreases causing an increasing number of people to fall outside of the ruling class because they no longer meet the property qualification. Following the same line of reasoning, when the total wealth decreases in a democracy, an oligarchy results, and when there is a significant increase in the total wealth then oligarchies effectively become polities or democracies.

These recommendations show that Aristotle is keen to maintain regimes as they are. In other words, his primary concern is to prevent regime change. This is assessment is a point of debate in modern scholarship. Adriel Trott has recently argued that Aristotle's understanding of the variety of regimes and the causes of revolutions in the middle sections of the *Politics* can be read as an attempt by Aristotle to increasingly bring the different regimes closer to his conception of a political community that aims to include all who have the capacity to deliberate in the constitution.[7] Her reading is also based on Aristotle's naturalism, specifically the assumptions that reason or speech (*logos*) is natural to human life in the sense that reasoned activity fulfils and perfects us as human beings and that, in a connected way, the city fulfils itself when it promotes political deliberation. Hence, according to Trott's reading, regimes are ameliorated when they become increasingly inclusive. Inclusivity is, indeed, the feature of the best regime, where all the citizens participate in the constitution (*Pol* 7.13 1332a34). If Trott's reading would hold then book 5 – or at least some of its sections would indeed be geared to bring different kinds of regimes closer to the best regime of books 7 and 8. But as we have seen, Aristotle does not use the principle of inclusivity in the recommendations that have just been listed but, rather, the principle of opposites. Indeed, on my reading Aristotle is keen to *maintain* the proportion of rulers and ruled, both in an oligarchy, when the ruling class is actually *small*, and in a democracy, when the ruling class is large but not all-encompassing since it excludes the few wealthy and few virtuous.

This is also apparent in Aristotle's third recommendation, which – as we have seen – stipulates that the differences in wealth between the rich and the poor in an oligarchy should be maintained and, therefore, that property qualifications should be adjusted on a regular basis. Levelling property in an oligarchy may promote inclusivity, but would cause the regime to be destroyed because the resulting regime would necessarily be of a different kind (*Pol* 5.9 1309b38-1310a1). Maintaining a regime means maintaining a specific proportion between wealthy and poor people. Aristotle compares an attempt to equalize wealth to straightening a nose. A straight

nose is beautiful, but a nose that is perfectly straight is no longer a nose; a nose needs both the quality that makes it beautiful (i.e. straightness) and a moderate amount of its opposite (i.e. crookedness) in order to retain due proportion and, in this way, be a real nose (*Pol* 5.9 1309b26-7). A regime is a regime by means of a similar kind of balance between the different parts. One is reminded of Aristotle's comment in book 2 that the nature of a city is a plurality (*Pol* 2.1 1261a17). By destroying the classes on account of levelling property, something Aristotle calls "extreme legislation", the constitution is also destroyed (*Pol* 5.9 1309b40-10a1). Such laws reject the principle of opposites because the principle cannot be maintained if there is perfect equality. Indeed, they cause a worsening of the constitution to a point where "it will not be a constitution at all" (*Pol* 5.9 1309b34-5). In short, a levelling of property is not to be desired, not even when it promotes inclusivity, because it undermines the constitution of a city and may even cause it not to be a constitution at all.

The most important thing in any regime, so Aristotle continues in a fourth recommendation, is that its laws are organized in such a way that it is impossible to make a profit from holding office (*Pol* 5.8 1308b33). This is important especially in oligarchies. The many, according to Aristotle, generally do not mind to be excluded from office; they are pleased to have the leisure to attend to their private affairs. But this is only true as long as the many believe that the wealthy officials are not enriching themselves further in office. The added benefit is that when there is no profit to be made from holding office, then the offices are more likely to be inhabited by notables who do not need the money (*Pol* 5.8 1309a3). The recommendation is based, once again, on the principle of opposites. An oligarchy is maintained by making it more likely that *non*-oligarchical, in this case aristocratic, element participates in the ruling class as well. In this way, stability is maintained since the many are at peace and can use their time increasing their wealth by working, and the few will not be ruled by just anyone.

Note that in this fourth recommendation, just like in the other recommendations, moral considerations are absent. Aristotle could have argued that absence of payment for public office would promote a sense of public spiritedness as it takes away the profit motive to rule. But even if there is no payment for office, which would attract the virtuous few, care should still be taken that those who inhabit the offices cannot enrich themselves in other ways. To prevent public funds from being stolen, so Aristotle argues, anyone inhabiting an office that is concerned with money should transfer the money to his successor in the presence of all citizens, and copies of the accounts should be deposited with each clan, administrative division, and tribe (*Pol* 5.8 1309a9-12). These laws seek to protect the city against the self-interested behaviour of the rulers. Aristotle offers a fifth recommendation that in a democracy, the wealthy are treated with restraint. Their property should not be redistributed and nor should their incomes. Nor should the wealthy be encouraged to take on expensive but frivolous public services, such as equipping choruses (*Pol* 5.8 1309a15-18). In an oligarchy, in turn, the poor should be well taken care of and should

be given some of the paid offices. Severe punishment should meet the wealthy person who treats the poor in an arrogant fashion. Moreover, in a sixth recommendation, Aristotle stipulates that each person cannot receive more than one inheritance so that the wealthy class does not grow unduly (*Pol* 5.8 1309a19-26).

The relationship between the classes also benefits from Aristotle's seventh recommendation that rulers take an oath to support the other class. In a democracy, the rulers should be regarded as spokesmen for the rich and should take oaths to this effect (*Pol* 5.9 1310a5-6). In oligarchic regimes, the opposite is good advice; the oligarchs need to be regarded as spokesmen for the people and should take oaths such as "I will not wrong the people" (*Pol* 5.9 1310a11). Aristotle points out that popular leaders in a democracy make the mistake of dividing the city into two and attacking the wealthy with their rhetoric, whereas the democratic regime is best maintained when democratic rulers support the wealthy in their rhetoric. Demagogues can be considered as tyrants in disguise; their rhetoric in support of the masses and against the elite is proof of their regime-undermining tendencies because a democracy cannot be maintained, when the wealthy or virtuous few are disrespected. Rather than maintaining a democratic regime, by attacking the few in their rhetoric, demagogues are actually preparing the way for regime change.

Along the same lines, Aristotle writes how populist leaders aim to curry favour with the people by confiscating the property of the wealthy by means of the court. In this situation, Aristotle argues in an eighth recommendation, those who seek to maintain the democratic regime should pass a law that things confiscated from a convicted person cannot become common property but should become sacred property instead (*Pol* 6.5 1320a8-10). In other words, convicting the wealthy should not provide a material advantage to the many. It provides the crowd with less of an incentive to condemn the defendants since they will not gain from a conviction. A second proposition is to have a law in place that heavily fines people who bring frivolous public lawsuits (*Pol* 6.5 1320a12). The passage shows Aristotle's awareness that people's political judgment is often coloured by their private interest. Again, he proposes laws and rules not to educate or morally reform the people but, rather, to render harmless the effects of their passions on order and stability.

Furthermore, Aristotle recommends that in a situation when in a democracy people demand wages to attend the assembly, the assembly meetings should be kept to a minimum and courts with many jurors should be in session for a limited number of days (*Pol* 6.5 1320a21-24). By doing so, the strain on the budget is kept to a minimum, which relieves the wealthy since the revenue must come from taxes but may also come from confiscations of property (*Pol* 6.5 1320a20). Again, these rules are premised on the realist assumption that the many are prone to burden the few and even infringe on what is rightfully theirs. With these proposals, Aristotle seeks to limit the burden on the wealthy instead of urging for the need for the moral reform of

the many. He adds that the limitation of the days that courts are in session may also improve the quality of the decisions because it becomes easier for the rich to attend the sessions - the rich are unwilling to be away from their private affairs for many days, but are willing to be so for brief periods (*Pol* 6.5 1320a26-28). An apparently neutral law that limits the days in sessions for the courts due to budgetary constraints actually has the added benefit of providing – in a democracy – a stronger voice for the few wealthy.

The final recommendation that I want to discuss is Aristotle's proposal for maintaining the stability of any regime by means of the appropriate civic education (*Pol* 5.9 1310a14). Here, interestingly enough, the principle of opposites also applies. Civic education means nurturing those kinds of dispositions that are actually counterintuitive to the regime. Take, for example, citizens in a democracy. We may say and think that democratic citizens should be saturated with democratic values such as a belief in equality and freedom, the two core principles that define democracies up until today. But Aristotle proposes something different. Democratic citizens should be imbued with values that *oppose*(absolute) freedom. They should be persuaded that people cannot do whatever they like. Rather, so Aristotle argues, genuine freedom involves an opposite quality, namely, restraint. Thinking that freedom is genuinely being able to act according to one's fancy is bad (*Pol* 5.9 1310a32). Likewise, in an oligarchic city, Aristotle argues that its members have to be educated in values that are contrary to oligarchic values. Oligarchic rulers believe that they can live in luxury since they are wealthy while the poor toil away at their labour. But this results in a situation in which the poor become increasingly inclined to seek to change the regime (*Pol* 5.9 1310a23). Therefore, in order to maintain stability of the regime, the opposite dispositions and convictions need to take hold. The ruling class needs to develop restraint and moderation in spending their wealth; they actually need to act as if they were poor(er) than they really are.

Following Aristotle's discussion of education in *Politics* 5.9, one may argue that proponents of the ethical politics paradigm for Aristotle's political theory have a point that there is an ethical foundation to Aristotle's political science. Now, I do think that Aristotle's political science seeks to maintain stability not merely by means of the political, legal, and social organization of the city but *also* by means of education. The two approaches do not exclude each other and the passage above (*Pol* 5.9 1310a12-35) shows how Aristotle relies on both. Still, we should note, firstly, that in *Politics* 5.9 Aristotle regards the need for civic education as an important tool not for human flourishing per se but rather for the purpose of stability or, in his words, "to make a constitution last" (*Pol* 5.9 1310a12). This reaffirms the argument that stability is an end on its own for Aristotle's political science, even when it comes to civic education. Secondly, civic education is an important way to maintaining stability, but it is not the only one. It is listed at the tail end of a series of recommendations that are not ethical or educative but legal or institutional. Thirdly, even though Aristotle calls civic education important, the passage does

not offer an elaborate analysis of the specific civic virtues that are required by specific regimes. The description of the kind of temperance that is essential for democracies, for example, is short and lacks elaborate analysis. Aristotle's main point is that democratic citizens who believe in freedom and equality define freedom incorrectly; freedom in a democracy should be defined as including restraint (*Pol* 5.9 1310a27). But how this virtue is obtained, what kind of practices are conducive to it, and what this virtue looks like on the level of the soul, Aristotle does not tell us. For those who prefer to interpret the *Politics* from the perspective of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it may have been helpful if Aristotle had included a reference to the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the passage on education (*Pol* 5.9 1310a12-35) but this is not the case. Even if he would have, then there is the problem that the *Nicomachean Ethics*, although dealing with temperance (*NE* 3.10-3.12 1117b23-9b19), does not offer a discussion of this virtue in connection to the freedom experienced in a city. Instead, he limits the treatment of temperance in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the pleasures of touch in the case of food and drink and of sexual intercourse. The intemperate person is compared to a food-lover who wished that his neck would be as long as a crane's so that he would have the extended pleasure of feeling food sliding his throat (*NE* 3.10 1118a34-5). Moreover, Aristotle does not make an explicit connection between the passage on education in book 5 and books 7 and 8. In books 7 and 8, Aristotle elaborates on the education (*paideia*) of the citizen (*Pol*7.13 1332b9 ff.). Here, he refers to temperance in a few instances (*Pol* 7.15 1334a24, 1334a32). One could argue that the section on the musical education of the citizen is in some way conducive to temperance, even though Aristotle is not very explicit about this (*Pol* 8.5 1339a11 ff.). Still one is disappointed when one tries to find a detailed analysis of temperance as somehow involving opposite qualities, which is his approach in *Politics* 5.9. The sections in book 7 and 8 do not provide a clear and explicit discussion of temperance somehow involving education in the opposing values of a regime. This should not be surprising because the discussion in books 7 and 8 is not about the kind of temperance appropriate to either oligarchies or democracies but with the kind of education that is part of the *best* constitution (*Pol* 7.1 1323a14). This kind of education cannot simply be imposed on other kinds of regimes for Aristotle is adamant that civic education is regime-specific: Citizens are "to be educated in a way that suits their constitutions" (*Pol* 5.9 1310a13-14; cf. *Pol* 3.4 1276b16-7a13).

In book 5, there are references to Plato's *Republic*, and this is not unimportant. At the end of book 5, Aristotle mentions Plato's Socrates as agreeing with Euripides in defining democratic freedom as living according to one's fancy (*Pol* 5.9 1310a34). Aristotle is aware that Socrates had already understood excessive freedom, that is, freedom defined as being free to do what one likes (see *Republic* 555d, 563d-4d) to be the cause of destruction of democracies. However, Aristotle does not disagree with Socrates' argument that too much freedom is destructive, but with his argument that the lack of education in the right kind of freedom is the *sole* cause of destruction. In Aristotle's words, "[a]lthough there are many kinds of

oligarchies and democracies, Socrates discusses their changes as if there were only one of each" (*Pol* 5.12 1316b25-6). Thus, Aristotle criticises Socrates' simplification of things. As there are many different kinds of oligarchies and democracies, so – according to Aristotle's political science – is there a plurality of mechanisms that may ensure the stability of the different kinds. For Aristotle, political expertise means that one understands the different options and cultivate a kind of prudence to connect the right mechanism to a specific regime given the circumstances. The mechanisms involved are not merely moral but can also be institutional, legal or social. They are not always aimed at moral improvement of the citizens: oftentimes are simply aimed at preventing regime-change.

6. Tyranny

Even when it comes to tyranny, which is considered to be the worst regime, Aristotle is still more concerned with the maintenance of the regime than with any kind of moral improvement. Tyranny, he maintains, is preserved in two quite opposite ways. The traditional way is the most immoral. Aristotle lists a range of oppressive measures such as murdering outstanding men, prohibiting clubs and education or any gatherings connected with learning, using spies, impoverishing the people, and continuously engaging in war (*Pol* 5.11 1313a40-b41). The tyrant wants the ruled to think small and powerless to act (*Pol* 5.11 1314a16-24). He should prohibit anything that builds trust between the people and do whatever he can to ensure that people cannot communicate with one another. People should be forced to be in the public view as much as possible so that their activities cannot be kept a secret. Friends should be set up against each other and the people should be impoverished so that they cannot afford a militia and are forced to work (*Pol* 5.11 1313b2-21). Aristotle mentions the pyramids of Egypt as a good example of how the people can be put to work so that they have no time to plot against the tyrant. A tyrant also engages in constant war so that his subjects have no leisure and are perpetually in need of a leader (*Pol* 5.11 1313b27-8).

The second way to preserve tyranny is to make it more like kingship. Some, such as Adriel Trott in *Aristotle on the Nature of Community*, interpret this second way to preserve tyranny as Aristotle's attempt to bring even this regime just a little closer to the best regime by ennobling it and by redirecting the tyrant towards the common good.[8] Aristotle, it is true, writes that the tyrant should govern in a way that his character will at least be half-way disposed to virtue, meaning that he will only be half-depraved rather than vicious (*Pol* 5.11 1315b4-10). But it should also be noted that this second course of action implies that the tyrant keeps up the *appearance* of virtuous behaviour; he does not actually become virtuous. The tyrant should retain his power but, when he can afford it, act in a kingly manner or at least in a way that *it looks like* he is acting like a king rather than a tyrant. He should "*seem* to take care of public funds" (*Pol* 5.11 1314a40).[9] He should "*give the impression* of managing the city-state like the

head of a household rather than a tyrant" (*Pol* 5.11 1314b6-7). It "*should appear* that taxes and public services exist for the purposes of administration" (*Pol* 5.11 1314b14-15). He "should also *appear* not harsh but dignified" (*Pol* 5.11 1314b18). A tyrant "should always *be seen to be* very zealous about matters concerning the gods" (*Pol* 5.11 1314b38-39). This rule will be longer and more lasting and he will "not end up being hated and feared" (*Pol* 5.11 1315b5). It is this section in particular that Christopher Rowe appealed to when he mentioned "the problem of Aristotle's Machiavellian mood" in the middle sections of the *Politics*.[10] The point here is that, for Aristotle, political science includes understanding tyranny and providing the knowledge in a way that maintains tyranny. These proposals provide for stability with little or no concern to the moral reformation of the citizens or the tyrant.

7. Aristotle's Political Science

In this chapter, I aimed to show that, for Aristotle, stability is one of the ends of political science next to understanding the good life and how to promote it. Human beings need the city-state – whatever its constitution – to exist. A city-state may have a deviant regime, but outside of the city-state man can barely live as a human being at all. Insofar political science educates legislators, one of the most important area of study is thus the preservation of regimes: "That is why legislators should make use of our earlier studies of what causes the preservation and destruction of constitutions, *and from them try to institute stability*, carefully avoiding the causes of destruction while establishing the sort of laws, both written and unwritten, which best encompass the features that preserve constitutions" (*Pol* 6.5 1319b38-40).[11]

The goal of maintaining stability applies both to correct and to deviant constitutions. As a matter of fact, "the worst constitutions need the most guarding" (*Pol* 6.6 1320b39). Aristotle argues that just as one cannot afford mistakes with bodies that are in poor health or with ships that have loose timbers and worthless crews, so one can afford very few mistakes with deviant regimes such as tyranny, oligarchy and democracy (*Pol* 6.6 1320b35-9). Political science must include not just knowledge of justice and the common good but also knowledge about how to maintain stability in a regime. Moreover, even though virtue can be conducive to stability, stability is an end on its own. In Aristotle's political science, the student needs to understand how to maintain stability even in a regime where the practice of virtue is made impossible, such as in a tyranny. Any constitution, even tyranny, is better than none and the political scientist must be able to say "how a state may be constituted under any given conditions" (*Pol* 4.1 1288b29). Aristotle insists that understanding what is necessary and what is good for the inferior type of regime is part of the same, single science (*Pol* 4.2 1288b23). Understanding what is good for the inferior kind of regime means that political science is also about cultivating the insight into knowing which laws are suited even to perverted ones that do not include virtue in their

constitution. This is a kind of practical knowledge that the statesman should possess (see *Pol* 4.1 1289a13).

For Aristotle's political science stability has its own merits. Without virtue, there may not be a good regime, but without stability there is no regime at all. *Any* constitution presumes a certain level of order. This is why Aristotle can call tyranny a constitution, even though it is a perverted one. Vander Waerdt has proposed that Aristotle employs a "double teleology" when it comes to the end of the regime, whereby "the statesman's minimal aim is to preserve the regime, but his higher aim is to turn it toward the good life".[12] Kahn refers to the double teleology of Aristotle's political science as well.[13]I am proposing that the aim in politics is to preserve the regime, even if it is not actively turned towards the good life. The regimes in the middle sections of the *Politics* are better or worse in terms of stability. They are not better or worse in terms of being closer to the regime in book 7 and 8 of the *Politics* that is based on the practice of virtue, music and education. The regime in *Politics* 7 and 8 does not set the standard for the other regimes. This, again, tells us something about Aristotle's political science.

Calling Aristotle's political science comprehensive is another way of saying that he recognizes human shortcomings and its consequences for politics. Reading books 5 and 6 of the *Politics*, we notice that there is little room for virtue in the most prevalent regimes, namely, oligarchy and democracy, and that institutional recommendations are more often than not made to prevent greed and ambition from affecting the stability of the regime. Aristotle's realism when it comes to politics may be easy to miss given the significance of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the temptation to interpret Aristotle's *Politics* from the perspective of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, Aristotle's political science is not exclusively focused on articulating regimes and changes to regimes that promote the practice of virtue. It is also, perhaps even predominantly, focused on the kind of rules, laws, institutions, and practices that are necessary for maintaining a regime, and hence maintaining stability. As Dorothea Frede recently proposed ethics and politics complement each other.[14] She argues that Aristotle "was not so naïve as to think that a good character is sufficient to guarantee that all citizens will do what is required of them without supervision and control".[15] For Aristotle, rules, laws and institutions on the one hand and ethics on the other hand reinforce one another.[16] Frede may well be correct here, but I would like to add that much of Aristotle's political science is exclusively concerned with rules, laws and institutions rather than with ethics (or, for that matter, a mixture of ethics and politics). For Aristotle, institutions and laws are essential for the protection of stability and as a basic condition for the possibility of virtue in politics. The goal of stability is prominent in the middle books of the *Politics* and, here, ethical concerns are barely present.

If we read the *Politics* in its entirety we may wonder whether there are *two* Aristotles, one ethical and the other political. Aristotle is obviously a thinker who excels in analysis, that is, in making distinctions and classifications. Perhaps this leads to a lack of synthesis, which in

the *Politics* would, among other things, translate into the absence of comments about how or whether the best regime in the final two books of the *Politics* relates to the middle books or, more general, how his ethics relate to his politics. Does this matter? Aristotle understands political science as generating political expertise, i.e. knowledge about what to do or how to act. This is where the real value of Aristotle's *Politics* lies. An approach that focuses on his ethical politics to the exclusion of his political realism may miss out on a range of interesting and important observations and recommendations that Aristotle makes about, in particular, oligarchy and democracy – systems of government that are prevalent in the world even today. Following this approach, we may gain a renewed appreciation of Aristotle as a philosopher who had a keen sense of the difficulties involved in lawgiving and, in particular, in the difficulties involved in maintaining stability in prevalent regimes such as oligarchy and democracy.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle subsumes ethics into politics. In the first book, he argues that "since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the human good" (1.2 1094b4-7). But we should note that Aristotle continues to argue that an inquiry into the good, either for a single man or for a city-state, is "*a sort of* political science (*politikē tis methodos*)" (1.2 1094b11-12).[17] In this way, Aristotle leaves room for a more comprehensive conception of political science, namely, one that studies both the good life *and* stability within the city-state. Modern thinking about politics has much to gain not only from Aristotle's understanding that human flourishing is the genuine goal of politics, but also from Aristotle's insightful knowledge about how to maintain stability in a regime.

References

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. *Philosophy* 33: 1–19.

Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Aristotle. 1932. *Politics*. Trans. H. Rackham. London: Heinemann.

———. 1998. *Politics*. Trans. C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett.

———. 2009. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. W. D. Ross and Lesley Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bodéüs, Richard. 1993. *The Political Dimension of Aristotle's Ethics*. Trans. Jan Garrett. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Cherry, Kevin. 2012. *Plato, Aristotle, and the Purpose of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frede, Dorothea. 2015. Aristotle on the Importance of Rules, Laws, and Institutions in *Ethics*. *Journal of Philosophical Research. Special Supplement*: 123–130.

Kahn, Charles H. 1987. The Normative Structure of Aristotle's "Politics". In *Aristoteles' "Politik"*, ed. Günther Patzig, 369–384. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

MacIntyre, Alisdair. 1981. *A Study in Moral Theory*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Nussbaum, Martha Craven. 1986. *The Fragility of Goodness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rowe, Christopher J. 1977. Aims and Methods in Aristotle's *Politics. The Classical Quarterly* 27: 159–172.

Rowe, Christopher J. 2008. Aristotelian Constitutions. In *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, ed. Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield, 366–389. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schofield, Malcolm. 2006. Aristotle's Political Ethics. In *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Richard Kraut, 305–322. Oxford: Blackwell.

Striker, Gisela. 2006. Aristotle's Ethics as Political Science. In *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics*, ed. Burkhard Reis, 127–141. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Trott, Adriel M. 2013. *Aristotle on the Nature of Community*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vander Waerdt, Paul A. 1991. The Plan and Intention of Aristotle's Ethical and Political Writings. *Illinois Classical Studies* 16: 231–153.

Volpi, Franco. 1999. The Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelianism. Trans. Eric Buzzetti. In *Action and Contemplation*, ed. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, 3–26. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Williams, Bernard. 1985. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. London: Fontana.

Endnotes

[1] Volpi 1999, Arendt 1958.

[2] Anscombe 1958, MacIntyre 1981, Williams 1985, Nussbaum 1986.

[3] Cf. Cherry 2012.

[4] For example, Bodéüs 1993, Striker 2006, Schofield 2006.

[5] *Logos* is used for reason or the faculty to deliberate; speech and reasoning capacity were considered to be inherently related.

[6] See Brouwer's chapter in this volume for an analysis of the connection between justice in the *Ethics* and the mixed regime in the *Politics*.

[7] Trott 2013, 172.

[8] Trott 2013, 187–190, cf. Kahn 1987, 383.

[9] As in the next five references, emphases are mine.

[10] Rowe 1977, 166, but see Rowe 2008, 384 for a more moderate interpretation. See also Kahn 1987, 384.

[11] Emphasis mine.

[12] Vander Waerdt 1991, 245, 249.

[13] Kahn 1987, 383.

[14] Frede 2015.

[15] Frede 2015, 129.

[16] Frede 2015, 130.

[17] The translation is my own. Ross' translation has "it is political science, *in one sense of that term*" (*NE* 1.2 1094b11-12).