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Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel

Towards Peaceful Coexistence

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Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel

Towards Peaceful Coexistence



UNOWAS ISSUE PAPER
August 2018



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHEL

UNOWAS

BUREAU DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST ET LE SAHEL

Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel

Towards Peaceful Coexistence

UNOWAS ISSUE PAPER

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ABBREVIATIONS

APESS - *Association pour la promotion de l'Élevage au Sahel et en Savane*
CFA – West African Franc (XOF); (30/1/2018: US\$1 = CFA 529 / EUR1 = CFA 655)
CVD - *Conseil Villageois de Développement*
CILSS - Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
FAO – United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
FARS - *Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara*
FDR - *Front démocratique révolutionnaire*
FDS – *Forces de Défense et de Sécurité*
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GNAP - Federation of Cooperative Pastoral Associations in Mauritania
IDP – Internally Displaced Person
LGA – Local Government Area
MNLA – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MUJAO - The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
PRAPS - *Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel* (Regional Project to Support Pastoralism) - World Bank-funded, ECOWAS-WAEMU led project with CILSS coordination.
RECOPA - Communication Network on Pastoralism
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOWAS – United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

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FOREWORD

Recent years have witnessed an increase in violent conflicts involving pastoralists in parts of West Africa and the Sahel. They often take the form of clashes between herders and farmers, impacting human, national and regional security. As such, they are of increasing concern to ECOWAS and its Member States.

UNOWAS has been working closely with ECOWAS during the past year to examine the causes and possible solutions to pastoralism-related conflicts.

UNOWAS Issue Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel confirms that growing competition between herders and farmers over access to water and pasture is a primary driver of these conflicts. This tension is often aggravated by a weak enforcement of the rule of law, political manipulation, demographic pressure, climate change, and the prevalence of weapons in the region.


The Paper recognizes two main areas of response. First, urgent action is needed to resolve conflict in countries currently experiencing high levels of violence between herders and farmers. Secondly, sustained conflict prevention efforts are needed to stop violence from taking root elsewhere in region.

Some ECOWAS countries have developed strong pastoral codes and local mechanisms to resolve disputes through dialogue and mutual arrangements. There is therefore good practice to draw from in terms of conflict prevention and peaceful coexistence, and we must capitalize on these lessons.

The Paper emphasizes the importance of engaging affected communities, including women and youth, in finding sustainable solutions. It stresses the need to review, amend and implement national and regional laws relating to transhumance - and to support initiatives that promote peaceful co-existence among all populations: pastoralists and farmers and other groups throughout the region.

At the regional level, ECOWAS is an essential partner for this purpose. UNOWAS is committed, together with the UN system in the region, to support ECOWAS and national governments in these efforts.

Mohamed Ibn Chambas



UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel

UNOWAS MANDATE

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) works to enhance the contributions of the United Nations towards the achievement of peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, promoting an integrated regional approach to addressing issues that impact stability in the region.

METHODOLOGY AND UNIT OF ANALYSIS OF THE PAPER

UNOWAS Issue Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel is based on field research in six countries: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria. In each country, interviews were conducted with pastoralists, farmers, other members of communities, government and non-government officials, at both the local and national level.

The Paper focuses on pastoralism as the main unit of analysis, attempting to understand why conflicts involving pastoralists appear to have escalated in the region in recent years. What are the causes and drivers of these conflicts and how can they be resolved?

Executive Summary

UNOWAS Issue Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel

Violent conflicts involving pastoralists¹ have increased in West Africa and the Sahel, but not uniformly

1. Violent conflicts involving pastoralists have escalated in parts of West Africa and the Sahel in recent years, claiming thousands of lives across the region. These conflicts are primarily driven by a competition for land, water and forage, but there are also political and socio-economic factors involved. The main issue is about how these natural resources are managed and allocated. Pastoralists are both victims and actors in these conflicts. In addition, these conflicts can sometimes be between pastoralist groups themselves, or involve other actors such as fishermen and illegal miners. As pastoralists are mobile, these conflicts can be difficult to contain and spill across borders.

2. Although the general trend is of increasing violence, especially between pastoralists and farmers, this does not

apply to all ECOWAS countries. The scale and frequency of farmer-herder conflicts varies greatly between and within West African states. Violent conflicts often occur at known flash-points, in zones of insecurity (e.g. parts of Nigeria and Mali). However, in many other areas, farmers and pastoralists manage their relationship peacefully and mutually benefit from economic exchange and cooperation.

Addressing pastoralist-related conflicts from a prevention perspective

3. The main aim of UNOWAS Issue Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel is to assess the causes and drivers of conflicts involving pastoralists, and to recommend conflict prevention strategies.

¹ Pastoralism refers to extensive livestock breeding, which in West Africa means different breeds of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, depending on the ecological zone. Pastoralism generally requires some form of mobility of herders and their animals, often on a seasonal basis between dry and rainy seasons, and day-to-day between pastures and water points. The migration of pastoralists and their livestock between seasonal pastures is called transhumance. There is a diversity of pastoralists in West Africa; they are not homogeneous. Patterns of life among pastoralists range from nomadic and transhumant pastoralism to settled or semi-settled agro-pastoralism. Agro-pastoralism combines farming and livestock breeding and requires settlement to cultivate crops, but the mobility of livestock for transhumance is maintained.

A clear understanding of issues surrounding pastoralism and security at the national and regional level is needed to promote effective public policies and impartial media reporting.

Pastoralism and transhumance

4. Pastoralists rear livestock not only as a main economic activity but also as an intrinsic part of their culture.² In West Africa, the largest pastoralist group are the Fulani, a diverse population that is spread across the savanna and Sahel and increasingly the humid zone. The contribution of pastoralism to West African economies and to the agrarian sector is considerable. Pastoral lifestyles vary, from nomads who have no permanent abode and migrate with their families and herds, to settled agro-pastoralists who have houses and farms but move their herds between grazing areas to access patchy resources.

5. Transhumance - the movement of herders and their livestock from areas of scarcity to available pasture and water, usually on a seasonal basis - is particularly important for those with larger herds of livestock. In West Africa, cross-border transhumance is regulated by the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998). This Pro-

² They rear different breeds of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, depending on the ecological zone, and own much of the region's livestock.

ocol recognizes the importance of cross-border pastoral mobility and aims to reduce problems that can arise when livestock are on the move, including farmer-herder conflicts and the spread of animal diseases (epizootics). Encroachment into protected areas such as national parks, and possible poaching of wildlife, is another issue identified. In agro-pastoral areas – where pastoralism and farming co-exist - transhumance is meant to occur along routes or cattle tracks defined decades ago. However, maintenance of these traditional routes is now challenged by land use and population growth. Where transhumance routes are blocked, the movement of livestock is curtailed and encroachment onto farms often results, triggering conflict.

Causes and drivers of pastoralist-related conflicts

6. *Growing demographic and ecological pressures* are regional phenomena. The area of land under cultivation in West Africa and the Sahel has dramatically increased over time, while available grazing land has decreased. This is partly because pastoralists rarely own land on an individual or collective basis, but instead rely on access to pasture and water as common resources, in agreement with local communities. As demographic pressure increases, and without good management of these resources,

competition between herders and farmers over access to water and pasture has intensified. The ability of pastoralists to adapt to these challenges is also compromised by weak state engagement, insecurity, and often limited rights to access natural resources.

7. Climate change and acute variability and unpredictability in rainfall patterns also exerts pressure on pastoralists in West Africa and the Sahel. In most of the countries under review, pastoralists and farmers reported that climatic conditions have become more adverse. Typically, this equates with a longer dry season and a shorter rainy season. Even where the total volume of rainfall has not decreased, it fluctuates more year on year and can come in short bursts (which can cause flash floods) rather than steadily throughout the season. The fluctuation in rainfall, with greater annual variability over the past decade, is confirmed by scientific data on the Sahel. Pastoralists and farmers need support to maximize adaptation and resilience.

8. Increased use of firearms has intensified rural conflicts. This is particularly the case where farmer-herder conflicts occur on top of other conflicts, where they are compounded by the prevailing insecurity. This has happened in rural areas that have been destabilized by insurgency, war,

political or ethnic violence, or banditry. In such situations state authority is usually weak, dispute resolution mechanisms may have broken down, and weapons are readily available. Examples are central and northern Mali, where armed groups have gained access to Libyan weaponry after the overthrow of President Gaddafi in 2011, and in parts of central and northern Nigeria. The proliferation of small arms is a regional issue, which has made traditional conflicts deadlier, fueling cycles of revenge killings between communities.

9. Violent extremists and other armed groups operating in parts of the Sahel and West Africa have added to the disruption of traditional pastoralism. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes increasing and significant population displacement in the region caused by herder-farmer clashes, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).³ Boko Haram has been attacking and raiding pastoralists and farmers in the Lake Chad Basin, stealing livestock and crops, killing and displacing people. The relationship between pastoralists and terrorist groups in Mali and some bordering areas of Burkina Faso and Niger var-

³ According to information received from UNHCR's regional office based in Dakar (August 2018): it is estimated that 62,000 persons were internally displaced in Nigeria in 2017 as a result of farmer-herder conflicts, and 3000 persons in the northern part of Benin (country) in June/July 2018 for the same reasons.

ies depending on the group. There has been some recruitment among pastoralists into jihadi groups in Mali, allegedly for self-defense against other armed groups.

10. *Local and national politics* have a strong influence on the frequency and scale of conflicts involving pastoralists. Where the state tries to accommodate the interests and needs of both farmers and pastoralists, conflict is less likely to occur. If the state shows a strong bias towards one group and fails to be inclusive, or if it neglects all or one section of the rural population, conflicts are more likely to emerge. 'Land grabs' by powerful political or business elites often negatively impact both pastoralists and farmers. The introduction of national pastoral codes has helped address this challenge in some countries in the region (e.g. enshrining the rights and responsibilities of pastoralists in law).

11. Over the last years, *Nigeria* has had more fatalities in farmer-herder conflicts than the rest of the ECOWAS region combined. However, not all states are affected, and there are sharp contrasts even between neighboring states (eg. Sokoto and Zamfara, Gombe and Taraba). In the most affected areas, violence often extends beyond clashes between individual herders and crop farmers and engulfs whole settlements and

communities. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons have amplified the level of casualties. Their cumulative death toll currently runs into thousands each year in Nigeria, and curbing wide-spread impunity remains a challenge. Beyond heightened competition for rural resources and space, the situation is aggravated by local politics, frequently along ethno-religious lines. Increased southward movement of pastoralists from northern Nigeria to the southeast and southwest of the country has fueled new waves of clashes between predominantly Muslim pastoralists and Christian farmers.⁴

12. *In Mali*, insurgency and lawlessness have pushed more pastoralists south of the Niger River, and conflicts in northern Mali and the Inner Niger Delta have increased tensions between farmers and herders. Pastoralists are both affected by and implicated in armed groups, with poten-

4 In recent years, pastoralists in Nigeria have increasingly been migrating permanently or on seasonal transhumance southward from northern states in search of more favourable grazing conditions. This has increased pressure on farmers not only in the Middle Belt but also in places in southeast and southwest Nigeria, which previously had low populations of pastoralists. Deadly confrontations have ensued between herdsman and farmers when animals trespass on farmland. Tensions are further reinforced by differences in ethnicity, culture and religion: the Fulani herders are Muslim while the populations in the South and in the Middle Belt are majority Christian. States and judicial authorities have been slow in mediating and resolving disputes before they spiral out of control.

tial regional outreach. Cross-border attacks and banditry are common from the Gao region, northern Mali, into Tillabéri in Niger. In the Lake Chad Basin, farmer-herder conflicts have been aggravated by population displacements due the Boko Haram insurgency. There are also seasonal conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in different parts of the agro-pastoral zone in Niger and cases of disputes between pastoralist groups in dryland areas.

13. Conversely, in *Mauritania, Guinea and most of Burkina Faso*, violent conflicts between farmers and herders are less pronounced, but tensions do exist. In these countries, and also in Niger, there are local conflict management committees comprised of pastoralists and farmers, traditional leaders, and sometimes state authorities. Such committees do exist in parts of Nigeria but seem less frequent. Niger and Burkina Faso have also drawn up *local conventions*, which stipulate the rights and responsibilities of farmers and pastoralists and establish mutually-agreed enforcement procedures, that are sanctioned by local state authorities. All this is helping to promote conflict prevention, mediation and resolution, ensuring that farmland and pastureland are both protected.

Towards peaceful coexistence and conflict prevention

14. Conflicts between herders and farmers are of increasing concern to ECOWAS Member States. They have a devastating impact on human, national and regional security. They destroy the economic and social fabric of rural communities - and compromise traditional governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. Coupled with other phenomenon such as violent extremism, traditional ways of life are being threatened. The fate of farmers and herders who have fled violence as refugees or displaced people is also a cause for concern, including in the Lake Chad Basin and Mali among other places. Food insecurity on the heels of new droughts in the Sahel further aggravate the situation. In response to the latter, the UN System is scaling up its effort to cover food needs and build resilience for those most affected.⁵ Conflicts between pastoralists and farmers are thus closely intertwined with multiple other security, economic, environmental and political factors that impact both groups.

⁵ <https://www.devex.com/news/nexus-of-climate-and-conflict-exacerbates-sahel-food-security-crisis-93160>
<http://www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/en/c/1128039/>

15. Going forward, more attention is needed on issues relating to land rights and natural resource management. The 1998 ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance, along with existing national transhumance protocols, should be reviewed, updated and enforced. A regional communications strategy is needed to raise awareness about herder-farmer relations and ways to promote peaceful co-existence. Concrete actions to prevent human rights abuses and promote justice should be taken. The role and participation of women and youth as peacebuilders should be strengthened. Finally, longer-term strategies should be devised to address the effects of climate

change on pastoralists and farmers. Conflict resolution committees could be formalized and supported at local levels in all ECOWAS Member States. Lessons learned could be drawn from those countries, such as Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal, which already have such committees in place.

16. Above all, conflict prevention measures should be developed in close consultation with pastoralists and farmers and strive to protect the livelihoods of both. UN and non-UN partners have an important role to play to accompany ECOWAS and national governments in these efforts.




Figure 1: Transhumance Patterns in West Africa

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

INTRODUCTION

West Africa and the Sahel region is experiencing a surge in violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. These conflicts are primarily driven by competition for land, water, and forage, but there are also political and socio-economic factors involved, as the main issue is about how these essential natural resources are managed and allocated. Conflicts between pastoralists and farmers are often triggered by and contributing to communal tensions; they are often instrumentalized along ethnic and religious lines. Pastoralists are both victims and actors, which can be between pastoralist groups themselves or between pastoralists and farmers. Sometimes there are also conflicts with fishermen, illegal miners and others. As pastoralists are mobile, tensions can be difficult to contain and can spill across borders. In agro-pastoral areas this insecurity also negatively affects farmers and agricultural production. Banditry and cattle rustling are also part of the problem, especially in areas where the state is weak or where state officials are linked to armed groups. In conflict hotspots, there has been heavy loss of life and displacement among both farmers and pastoralists. Conversely, where there is peace and good natural resource management, there are mutual benefits to productivity and

trade in the region, as the two sectors reinforce and complement each other.

Although the general trend is of increased conflict, between pastoralists and farmers, this does not apply in all ECOWAS countries. The scale and frequency of farmer-herder conflicts varies greatly between and within West African states. Nigeria and Mali are currently the most severely affected, due to ongoing instability in both countries. However, in other countries (e.g. Guinea and Mauritania), farmer-pastoralist cooperation has been reinforced through the adoption of local pastoral codes, dispute resolution mechanisms and good management of natural resources.

The aim of this Paper is to examine the causes and drivers of pastoralist-related conflicts in six countries in West Africa and the Sahel: Mauritania, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. These countries were selected as they form an interconnected transhumance belt across the region. They were also chosen for comparative purposes. Pastoralism is important in each of these countries, but the scale and dynamics of conflict involving pastoralists vary. There are variations in state policies towards pastoralists across these cases, and in local conflict prevention practices.

One of the aims of the comparison is to identify examples of good practice and, conversely, to highlight factors that contribute to violent conflict.

While addressing the specific challenges relating to pastoralism in each country, the Paper underscores the need to prioritize responses that could lead to sustainable and inclu-

sive solutions for both farmers and herders and other groups in the region, from both national and regional perspectives.

UNOWAS is committed, together with the United Nations system in the region, to support ECOWAS and national governments in these efforts.

PASTORALISM AND TRANSHUMANCE

Pastoralism refers to extensive livestock breeding, which in West Africa and the Sahel means different breeds of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, depending on the ecological zone. Pastoralism generally requires some form of mobility of herders and their animals, often on a seasonal basis between dry and rainy seasons, and day-to-day between pastures and water points. Pastoralists have different herding practices and different types of migration.⁶ The migration of pastoralists and their livestock between seasonal pastures is called transhumance.

There is a diversity of pastoralists in West Africa; they are not a homogeneous group. Patterns of life among pastoralists range from nomadic and transhumant pastoralism to settled or semi-settled agro-pastoralism. Agro-pastoralism combines farming and livestock breeding and requires settlement to cultivate crops, but the mobility of livestock for transhumance is maintained. Transhumance is necessary, especially in the savannah and Sahel, because unless the herd size is very small or rainfall is plenty, no one

6 In some cases, when herders move their livestock on transhumance they are accompanied by their wives and children, while the aged and young children stay in a permanent settlement or camp. In other cases, the livestock are taken on transhumance by men and teenage boys only, without any women, girls or elderly people.

area of land can support the livestock all year, especially in the dry season, without heavy investment in infrastructure, water and animal feed.

The actual number of pastoralists, farmers and livestock in the six countries covered in this Paper, and more widely in the ECOWAS region, is not clear due to lack of available data. However, keeping these caveats in mind, FAO statistics for 2016 give approximations of 62 million cattle, 227 million small ruminants (sheep and goats), and 4.6 million camels in the six countries concerned. For the ECOWAS region, plus Mauritania, FAO statistics approximate a total of 73 million cattle, 4.6 million camels, 110 million sheep, 157 million goats (a total of 267 million small ruminants).⁷ The number of pastoralists is likely to be in the tens of millions.

There are different types of routes to facilitate the movement of cattle between pastures and water points.⁸ Pastoralism works best as a part of a regulated system, where space for

7 FAOSTAT, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. Data on Live Animals in Western Africa, 2016. Data accessed at <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QA>, 22 March 2018.

8 These routes include: principal routes, including international routes; network of routes, which may link up to the international routes; daily herding routes that connect camps and villages to grazing areas; routes leading down from the daily herding routes or larger routes to rivers and streams.

livestock and pastoralists is demarcated and protected from encroachment (herding routes, grazing areas, access to water), while farmers' fields and crops are also protected from herders and their livestock, according to pastoral codes. Farmer-herder conflicts may be reduced if sufficient

infrastructure and regulations are put in place to assist farming and pastoralist communities, and if their rights and responsibilities are enshrined at the community level, according to agreed legislation or traditions, and implemented through local authorities.

CHAPTER 1: BURKINA FASO

Introduction

Despite challenges and frequent disputes in some areas, violent conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Burkina Faso⁹ are at a relatively low level¹⁰. There are however acute pressures on land, water, and livelihoods in rural areas. As a result, many pastoralists have left Burkina Faso for neighbouring countries further south, increasing pressures and tensions in other parts of West Africa.¹¹ The main challenge throughout Burkina Faso is natural resource access. Security in the northern part of the country – especially in Soum, Oudalan, and Séno provinces – is complicated by the conflict in Mali (with refugees and armed groups spilling over from Douentza and Gao) and the presence of Ansarul Islam, a militant organisation

9 Fieldwork in Burkina Faso was carried out in the following regions: Central-North, Sahel, and Hauts-Bassins, in addition to meetings in Ouagadougou which gave a national perspective.

10 Even if generally limited, the killing of livestock has become frequent in Guinée forestière (Beyla, Lola, Gueckédou). From 2014 to 2015 at least 2.533 cattle was reportedly killed in conflicts between farmers and herders. Sources: <http://afrique.ile360.ma/guinee/societe/2017/05/16/11852-guinee-au-sud-les-eleveurs-ne-sont-toujours-pas-les-bienvenus-11852>. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140218-guinee-conflit-chasseurs-eleveurs-lele-guekedou>.

11 There is no available data on the actual number of pastoralists who have left Burkina Faso for neighbouring countries, but it was widely acknowledged to be a significant trend.

tion linked to the Mali-based terrorist group Katiba Macina.

a. Pastoralism, Transhumance, and Migration

In Burkina Faso, pastoralism, agro-pastoralism and transhumance are not limited to one ethnic group. Pastoralism forms a significant part of the rural economy, and there are estimated to be 9.3 million cattle, 9.8 million sheep, 14.7 million goats, and some 19,000 camels.¹² The Fulani (Peul) are the dominant pastoralist group in the country, but the Mossi (the majority ethnic group in Burkina) and several other groups also rear livestock, often as agro-pastoralists. In Burkina Faso there is cross-border transhumance and internal transhumance between different regions and provinces. In the dry season pastoralists tend to move southwards from semi-arid northern areas of the Sahel into the savanna zone, or to more humid zones of neighbouring countries. They return northwards at the start of the rainy season, but it appears the length of the transhumance period is increasing in many cases, due to the scarcity of pasture and water in the Sahel. Transhumance in Burkina Faso is determined by the availability of pasture and water, but also by access to

12 According to FAOSTAT approximations for 2016. Data accessed at <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QA>, 22 March 2018.



Figure 2: Map of Burkina Faso. Source: United Nations.

it, which is a function of local politics, economics, and social relations connected to land tenure and land use, as much as local ecology.

In Burkina Faso there is private, communal, and state land. The state designated areas of land for specific activities, including agriculture, forestry, pastoralism, and wildlife conservation. This system was reported to have worked quite effectively during the administration of Thomas Sankara, but in the past three decades enforcement has been weak. Much land that was allocated for pastoralists has been cultivated or taken over by other developments, including

agriculture and plantations. Population growth combined with adverse environmental and climatic conditions have also reduced the area of usable land. There is a system of transhumance routes and access routes to water points such as rivers and dams, but many of these have been blocked or narrowed by crop fields. Pressures on pastoral livelihoods and on farmers have therefore increased.

These constraints in Burkina Faso are pushing many pastoralists southwards into neighbouring countries, particularly to Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin. Pastoralists in Burkina Faso confirmed this trend of

‘migratory drift’ from the drylands to (sub-)humid areas, resulting in permanent relocation.¹³ Most pastoralists with large herds were reported to have already left Burkina. Togo was cited as having formulated policies to benefit from this influx, with a quota of 50,000 animals per year permitted to enter from other West African countries, and a tax of 5,000 FCFA per head of cattle when pastoralists cross the border. Reportedly, local authorities in Togo and Benin also impose charges in the communes pastoralists pass through while on transhumance.¹⁴ Charges reportedly exist in Ghana as well, where chiefs sometimes demand payment in livestock for passing through or staying in their territory. Government officials in Ouagadougou emphasised that the permanent movement of so much livestock southwards out of the country is having negative reper-

13 The term ‘migratory drift’ was formulated by anthropologist Derrick Stenning in the 1950s: ‘Migratory drift may be said to have occurred when a stated range of seasonal grazing grounds has given way piecemeal to a completely new range. This may occur within the lifetime of a herdowner, or within two or more generations, depending upon the urgency of the environmental factors involved.’ (Stenning, 1957: 67-68). It can for example mean a lengthening or change in the direction of the dry season or wet season transhumance track, in a southerly or northerly direction, in response to political or environmental conditions. See ‘Stenning, D. J. (1957), ‘Transhumance, Migratory Drift, Migration: Patterns of Pastoral Fulani Nomadism’, *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 87 (1): 57-73.

14 Interview with the Directeur Provincial des Ressources Animales et Halieutiques du Seno, 14 April 2017.

cussions on Burkina Faso’s livestock industry, resulting in lost revenue for the state.¹⁵

As more pastoralists and their animals move permanently from the Sahel and savannah into sub-humid and humid areas towards the West African coast, it is also creating pressures on natural resources in those areas and therefore, a risk of conflict. Most of these southern fringes of West Africa were historically beyond the range of transhumant pastoralists.¹⁶ It is the combination of ecological/vegetation change due to deforestation in the humid zone and improvement in veterinary medicine, protecting *zebu* cattle against trypanosomiasis, that enables migration and/or transhumance that far south.

Many pastoralists in northern Burkina Faso have national and international ECOWAS certificates of transhumance and are aware of the regulations. They obtain the certificates by presenting livestock vaccination cards and proof of identity. They present their ECOWAS transhumance certificates at international borders and, when

15 Discussions at the Ministère des Ressources Animales et Halieutiques, Ouagadougou, 12 April 2017.

16 Tensions are already apparent in southern Nigeria, for example, as a new wave of pastoralists has moved in with their cattle into agricultural areas, destroying crops and disrupting the relationship between farmers and longer-established pastoral groups. The migration has occurred from northern Nigeria and across the border from Benin. Communication with Dr. Roger Blench, during his fieldwork in south-west Nigeria, November 2017.

on transhumance, forest guards and veterinarians often ask to see their documents.

b. Challenges facing pastoralists

Loss of pasture land and blockage of transhumance routes

Pastoral land in Burkina Faso is not protected: much has been cultivated by small-scale farmers, taken for plantation agriculture, acquired by elites, or built on. Transhumance routes and access routes to water are frequently blocked or narrowed by farms and settlements, constraining pastoral mobility and leading to the destruction of crops by cattle. The laws governing the rural space, including Burkina Faso's 2002 Pastoral Policy Act, are not widely enforced. Awareness of this legal framework, even among local authorities, is often lacking.

According to some farmers in Burkina Faso, the challenges facing pastoralists also affects them, for two main reasons. First, the blockage of transhumance routes and reduction in pastoral land increases the encroachment of livestock onto farmland. Second, some farmers in Burkina Faso buy livestock with the profits from their farming activities. This is the case among cotton farmers around Bobo Dioulasso, for example.¹⁷

¹⁷ Group interview with leaders and represen-

Political representation

In Burkina Faso, pastoralists' political representation is weak or non-existent. One of the aims of pastoralist associations in Burkina Faso is to give pastoralists a voice in civil society and politics, so they can influence decision-making on issues that affect them. This is also a stated aim of the World Bank-funded projects and other programmes.¹⁸

Climate change and adaptation

There is heavy pressure on water and pasture in Burkina Faso, especially during the dry season. The late dry season, around March to June, is the most difficult period for pastoralists, as water is scarce, especially in the Sahel Region. This necessitates transhumance and underlines the need to sustain dry season grazing areas and watering points for pastoralists (es-

tatives of the Cotton Producers Union of Burkina Faso, national headquarters, Bobo Dioulasso, 18 April 2017.

¹⁸ Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (*Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel*, PRAPS) (the World Bank-funded, ECOWAS-WAEMU led project with CILSS coordination). A regional pastoralist organisation headquartered in Ouagadougou and with a strong presence in northern Burkina Faso is APESS, *l'Association pour la promotion de l'Élevage au Sahel et en Savane*, founded in 1989. A pastoralist civil society network with good links in other areas of Burkina Faso is RECOPA, *le Réseau de Communication sur le Pastoralisme – Burkina Faso*. APESS and RECOPA partner with development agencies and are involved in implementing projects related to pastoralism. They are active but there is a need to support such organisations to implement projects and deepen their outreach among pastoralists.

pecially dams/ponds and bore holes). As rainfall patterns in the Sahel have become more unpredictable, adaptation to annual fluctuations in rainfall and therefore pasture is important.

In northern Burkina Faso, “Forage Christine” is frequently cited as being a vital dry season water resource (with bore holes and water points) This is a major hydraulic system in northern Oudalan Province that was opened in 1972 to provide pastoralists and their herds with water during the dry season. Pastoralists from a wide area, including Mali and Niger, congregate there during the dry season. Forage Christine therefore enables some of the pastoralists in northern Burkina and surroundings to stay in the Sahel Region throughout the year rather than migrating southwards.

Veterinary services

There are veterinary personnel and services in Burkina Faso, but they are under-resourced, often lacking the equipment and materials they need for work. Furthermore, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are not sufficiently trained or sensitized on the importance of animal sanitary care.

Education

Pastoralist youth in Burkina Faso, as elsewhere in the Sahel, tend to have low levels of school attendance. The main pastoralist associations view

this as a problem. There are few government policies with regard to nomadic and semi-nomadic culture. In addition, schools that used to be available for pastoralists, for example in Oudalan and Soum Provinces, have been closed.

c. Security challenges and the causes and drivers of conflict

Farmer-herder relations

There are farmers and pastoralists in most regions of Burkina Faso, and due to the multiple pressures they face, disputes frequently occur. The main cause of conflict is the destruction of crops by pastoralists’ livestock and the cultivation of transhumance routes or grazing areas by farmers. These are common problems across West Africa, but in Burkina Faso it is less common for such conflicts to lead to heavy loss of life. Violence does occur, but generally not on the large scale seen in neighbouring countries. For example, government records indicate that from 2005-2011 there were 12,071 conflicts in Burkina Faso involving pastoralists, with 55 deaths.¹⁹ Conflicts range from relatively minor cases to violent scenarios with fatalities. Eighteen of those killed in the recorded period were in

¹⁹ Government statistics viewed at the regional livestock department for North-Central Region, Kaya, 13 April 2017. This record was not disaggregated by age or gender.

Poni Province, South-West Region, in 2008. There is no indication of an increase in violence since 2011, and some respondents thought the level of violence between farmers and herders may have decreased.

Part of the reason for the lower level of violence compared to other West African countries is that pastoralism and agro-pastoralism are not activities of one ethnic group; even though the Fulani are the dominant pastoral group, the Mossi and others also rear livestock. Moreover, it is believed that many pastoralists with large herds of cattle have left Burkina Faso due to limited availability of pasture and water and the constraints on pastoral space and transhumance routes. This has possibly reduced some of the pressure on farmland. Another factor is that there are organised conflict management committees in place in most villages. Conflicts are usually addressed at the local level, before they become violent.

The more recent violent pastoralist-related conflicts reported in Burkina Faso were external and involved pastoralists who were caught up in violence after crossing borders into neighbouring countries. There was mass violence in March 2016 at Bouna, north-east Côte d'Ivoire, near the border with Burkina Faso. At least 33 people were killed, with more than 50 injured and more than 3000 displaced.²⁰ Many people were also

²⁰ 'Côte d'Ivoire: le conflit à Bouna fait 33 morts',

reported missing and it is unlikely all the victims were accounted for. Pastoralists in Bobo Dioulasso stated that more than 100 Fulani were killed in the Bouna violence, including men, women and children.²¹ Some were resident in Bouna, while others were there on seasonal transhumance. Tensions had built up over time and were reportedly linked to local chieftaincy politics between Lobi and Koulango communities, with the Lobi disputing the right of the Koulango to grant Fulani pastoralists access to land in Bouna.²² Accumulated grievances of Lobi farmers towards migrant Fulani herders were therefore entangled in local politics. This was likely a factor in pushing *dozo* hunters from the Lobi to launch attacks on Fulani communities. The Fulani in southern Burkina Faso indicated that smaller conflicts existed most months in border areas between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire.

Cattle rustling

Pastoralists in Burkina Faso frequently cite livestock theft (especially of cattle) as a security challenge, particu-

Le Figaro with AFP, 21 April 2016.

<http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/04/21/97001-20160421FILWWW00332-cote-d-ivoire-le-conflit-a-bouna-fait-33-morts.php>, accessed 27 November 2017.

²¹ Group interview with pastoralists from south-west Burkina Faso in Bobo Dioulasso, 17 April 2017.

²² 'Au Burkina Faso, avec les déplacés du conflit entre Peul et Lobi', *Le Monde Afrique*, 6 April 2016.

larly in the border areas when they go on transhumance. The border area between Burkina Faso and Ghana is known for cattle rustling. Most of the gangs are reported to be Burkinabé, operating on the Ghanaian side of the border, allegedly in complicity with local officials. Cattle theft is also a problem in parts of Burkina Faso itself, including in the Sahel Region where armed robbers operate. An official in Kaya in the Centre North region of Burkina Faso claimed that cattle rustling had considerably reduced in most parts of Burkina due to the mobilisation of local vigilante groups against the rustlers. These are self-defence committees such as “Kogl-Wééogo” (a Mossi name), which work against cattle theft and other crimes. However, cattle rustling continues to be a problem, including for pastoralists passing through Burkina Faso on transhumance.

The spread of terrorism to Burkina Faso

Throughout West Africa and the Sahel, terrorism represents an increasingly acute challenge for pastoralists, farmers and other groups. In Burkina Faso, the terrorist group Ansarul Islam emerged in 2016 in the Djibo area of Soum Province, Sahel Region of northern Burkina Faso. Established by a Mali-trained local preacher, Malam Ibrahim Dicko, Ansar Islam has close links to Katiba Macina, a terrorist group operating in central Mali, led by Hamadoun Kouffa,

d. Conflict prevention and resolution

There are formal and informal conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms at the local level in Burkina Faso. These help to minimise violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers and keep such conflicts at a low level. In the field, the *Conseil Villageois de Développement* (CVDs) were cited as playing the main role in conflict mediation and resolution and in addressing land tenure disputes. In the case of Firka village (Central-North Region), the CVD was said to consist of 12 representatives, including traditional leaders, local administration, a women’s leader, and representatives from traders, farmers and pastoralists.²³ Most farmer-herder disputes are resolved between the parties themselves, without going to the CVD, but if the dispute needs formal mediation they take it to the CVD. In Dori, in the Sahel Region of northern Burkina, more informal types of mediation are also used, involving religious authorities (the local imam) and other local leaders – mainly men; women are rarely involved.²⁴ The CVDs are linked to the 2004 Decentralization Code, the *Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales*, which

²³ Group interviews with farmers and pastoralists in Firka village, Pissila Commune, Sanmatenga Province, Central-North Region.

²⁴ Interviews in Dori, Séno Province, Sahel Region, 14 April 2017.

sought to give local bodies a larger role in land management.²⁵ There are also village-level representative committees responsible for land management (*Commissions Villageoises de Gestion des Terroirs*, CVGTs). However, these government and donor linked committees appear to be superseded by more customary forms of land management.²⁶ Nonetheless, the law in Burkina Faso stipulates that all untitled land is owned by the state. This is according to the 1984 law, *Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière*, amended in 1991 and 1996. There is also a national *Commission du Conciliation Foncier*, charged with regulating conflicts in pastoral zones.

The relative integration of pastoral and agricultural systems in Burkina Faso is a key reason for lower levels of violent conflict there. There seems to be more sharing of land and more accommodation between groups compared to countries where populations exercise more exclusive systems of territorial control.²⁷ In Burkina Faso, many farmers not only discuss their own challenges, but also the problems faced by pastoralists to find

mutually beneficial solutions.²⁸

Recommendations

- To sensitize populations regarding legal texts governing land, including pastoral land and transhumance;
- To encourage rotational systems of land use between farmers and pastoralists – rotating land between seasons or years – for the benefit of all;
- To increase investments in both the livestock and agricultural sectors in Burkina Faso, to assist the national economy and reduce the number of livestock being moved southwards into coastal West African States;
- To protect and preserve local vegetation and soil ecologies;²⁹
- To protect and maintain the existing pastoral areas;
- To invest in rural education, for all children, particularly targeting under-represented pastoralists, including in northern Burkina Faso. This would help pastoralists and farmers diversify their livelihoods and become more politically engaged;
- To promote community conflict resolution mechanisms and support the participation of women and youth.

25 Oliver Hughes, Catholic Relief Services Niger, *Literature Review of Land Tenure in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali: Context and Opportunities*. March 2014. Accessed online, 28 November 2017.

26 Ibid.

27 See Dafinger, Andreas, and Michaela Pelican (2006), 'Sharing or Dividing the Land? Land Rights and Farmer-Herder Relations in Burkina Faso and Northwest Cameroon', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 40 (1): 127-151.

28 Group Interview with Union of cotton farmers, national headquarters, Bobo Dioulasso, 19 April 2017

29 Interview with Modibo Oumarou, APESS, Dori (Séno Province, Sahel Region), 14 April 2017.

CHAPTER 2: THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

Introduction

Guinea has relatively low levels of violent conflict between farmers and pastoralists.³⁰ There is competition for increasingly scarce land and water and disputes occur in some places, such as in Beyla in the forest region or Boké/Boffa areas in the maritime region, but violent farmer-herder clashes that result in heavy loss of life are rare.³¹ However there is a growing concern about the impact of climate change and subsequent additional hydric stress³² on pastoralists-farmers

30 Guinea has however known recent cases of serious inter-ethnic violence in which hundreds were killed. See McGovern, Mike and Alexis Arieff. 2013. "History is stubborn": Talking about Truth, Justice, and National Reconciliation in the Republic of Guinea', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*: 50 (1): 198-225; Posthumus, Bram. 2016. *Guinea: Masks, Music and Minerals*. London: Hurst & Company.

31 Fieldwork for this study was carried out in five of Guinea's eight administrative regions: Kindia, Mamou, Labé, Boké, and Conakry. No fieldwork was carried out in Faranah, Kankan, and Nzérékoré administrative regions. The focus was therefore on the western half of Guinea: the regions of Moyenne Guinée and Guinée Maritime. This is a major transhumance zone, but there are pastoral activities throughout the country. Information on transhumance and farmer-herder relations in Haute Guinée and Guinée Forestière was gathered from secondary sources and from veterinarians and other government officials in neighbouring regions and in Conakry.

32 Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat Focus Groups held in Tougué, Koubia, Dinguiraye, Siguiri, Mandiana, March-April 2018

conflicts which may increase in the coming years over access to water. When disputes arise, conflict management committees have played an important role by bringing community leaders together for dialogue alongside state officials. These committees include elders from the affected communities, religious leaders, and representatives from pastoralist and farmer associations. There are women's cooperatives among pastoralists in Guinea, but women are still unrepresented or under-represented in conflict management committees.

While the Government of Guinea has publicly sought to rebuild state institutions after years of neglect, the legacy of colonial and post-colonial state policies that fostered ethnic divisions can still be felt.³³ This is particularly the case between the two largest ethnic groups in the country: the Fulani and Maninké, which together make up two-thirds of the population. However, such ethnic divisions do not appear to have translated into conflicts between Fulani pastoralists and the Maninké, or farmers of other ethnic groups. In Guinea, most pastoralists are Fulani, and farmers (outside of *Moyenne Guinée*) are most likely to be of another ethnic group.

33 McGovern, Mike and Alexis Arieff. 2013. "History is stubborn", *op. cit.*

a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in Guinea

Pastoralism is the fourth largest sector in the economy of Guinea and is crucial for local livelihoods. Economic data on pastoralism is not comprehensive, partly because it contributes

National livestock estimates in 2012 included 5.5 million cattle.³⁴ These are projections and not based on a comprehensive recent survey. FAOSTAT, also using imputed figures, give approximations of 6.4 million cattle, 2.6 million sheep, and 2.8 million goats



Figure 3: Map of Guinea. Source: United Nations.

to what may be termed the ‘informal economy’ as well as to official GDP. According to the Ministry of Livestock’s 2012 figures, pastoralism accounted for 4.5% of Guinea’s GDP and 20.9% of agricultural production.

for 2016.³⁵

34 And 1.8 million sheep, 2.2 million goats, 105,000 pigs, and 24 million chickens.

35 FAOSTAT, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. Data on Live Animals in Guinea, 2016. Data accessed at <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QA>, 22 March 2018.

Pastoralism is spread across all four geographical regions of Guinea. There are different types of pastoralism and transhumance, and differences in the level of conflict between farmers and herders in the four regions. According to the Ministry of Livestock, Moyenne Guinée has the highest number of pastoralists and livestock, followed by Haute Guinée.³⁶ There is transhumance on a north-south basis between these regions and Guinée Maritime to the west and Guinée Forestière to the south. Not all transhumance in Guinea is on a north-south basis, as there is also transhumance on a highland-lowland basis and along rivers.

The main transhumance zone in Guinea in terms of the number of cattle moved during the dry season is from the highlands of the central Plateau (adjoining the Futa Jallon) to surrounding lowland areas. Transhumance occurs westwards from Middle Guinea to Guinea Maritime and eastwards from Middle Guinea to Upper Guinea. On the western side of the highlands there are two main transhumance zones: south-west down to Boké and Boffa, near the Atlantic coast, and north-west to Gaoual and Koundara, towards the borders with Senegal and Guinea Bissau. There is significant cross-border transhumance into Guinea-Bissau and to a lesser extent across the

36 Group interview with senior officials at the Ministère d'Élevage, Conakry, 28/2/2017.

northern border into Senegal. This transhumance occurs to and from the area around Téliimélé (in the central highlands, south-west Futa Jallon). Reportedly, due to pressure on dry season pastures around Boké and Boffa, fewer pastoralists now go on transhumance to the maritime areas and more go to Gaoual and Koundara or across the border into Guinea Bissau. However, fieldwork in Boké and Boffa confirmed there are still large numbers of pastoralists there with their trypano-tolerant N'Dama cattle.

Not all pastoralists in Guinea go on transhumance. In general, this is only necessary for those with larger herds. In the Futa Jallon, for example, which is predominantly Fulani, most of the population is sedentary and in the rural areas agro-pastoralism is the norm. A distinctive feature of their system is that the livestock are left to roam freely, without herders. As per Guinea's pastoral code, it is the responsibility of farmers to fence their fields (using natural fencing) so that cattle cannot enter and to survey their farms during the day to ensure livestock do not encroach. Similarly, it is the responsibility of herders to put their livestock in paddocks at night if they are near farms.³⁷ Land is allocated for farming and pastoralism and may be rotated from year to year. This is made easier because the Futa Jallon has a large Fulani majority and

37 LOI L/95/51/CTRN du 29 août 1995, portant Code Pastoral. Republic of Guinea.

such arrangements over land use may even take place within the same family. For pastoralists with larger herds who do need to retain their mobility, especially between the dry and rainy seasons, Guinea has both internal transhumance and external, cross-border transhumance. Internal transhumance can be for only 20-30 kilometres within one locality, or longer distances of 100 kilometres or more between regions. Cross-border transhumance occurs in both directions between Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, and Côte d'Ivoire. Both are critical for pastoral production and resilience, but in some parts of Guinea (e.g. along the border with Guinea-Bissau) cross-border transhumance is driven by land scarcity, with insufficient protection of grazing land.

b. Challenges facing pastoralists in Guinea

Blockage of transhumance routes

There are widespread complaints by pastoralists in Guinea of transhumance routes being blocked by farms. This happens most often because the routes are not properly demarcated. There are some initiatives to protect the routes, including donor projects to locate and demarcate them with beacons.³⁸ The more

³⁸ *Gestion de la Transhumance: une approche communautaire de gestion des parcours à bétail.*

routes are blocked, the greater the risk of cattle encroaching onto farms and destroying crops.

Cross-border transhumance into Guinea-Bissau is partly to avoid cotton farms in bordering lowland areas of the Republic of Guinea. Pastoralists report that the cotton farmers often cultivate their transhumance routes while they are in Guinea-Bissau, preventing them from returning before the harvest. In other areas, pastoralists claim they have trouble herding their livestock to streams and waterways during the dry season because the access routes have been cultivated with vegetables, by farmers doing irrigated farming. Reduced or loss of access to water points and riverine grazing areas due to cultivation by dry season farmers has become a common problem for pastoralists throughout West Africa.

Water shortages

There are acute water shortages in the dry season, both in grazing areas and along the routes. Villages, whether they are farming and/or rearing livestock, also face acute water shortages. Women sometimes walk miles to access clean pumped water, or more often communities drink untreated water from local sources. Water scarcity is also one of the main factors

2014/15. *Projet Régional de Gestion Durable du Bétail Ruminant Endémique en Afrique de l'Ouest PROGEBE-Guinée.* Conakry: Ministère d'Élevage et des Productions Animales.

encouraging transhumance during the dry season in Guinea. The cattle need water and herders have to rear the animals close to water sources, whether natural or man-made.

Cattle theft

Cattle theft is a problem in some parts of Guinea but it is relatively low intensity, with between 1-5 cows stolen at a time, not the large-scale organised rustling seen in other parts of West Africa, such as in Nigeria and parts of Niger and Mali. Cattle thieves are of different types - at times they are described as opportunists who steal cows that are unattended (as in the Futa Jallon during the dry season), while others are labelled as bandits, armed with guns, who shoot cattle along transhumance routes and then sell the meat. Guinea has a well-developed system of marking animals for security purposes, so that the owners can be easily traced.

Veterinary services in Guinea

There are qualified veterinary doctors working in many prefectures. However, a constraint expressed by them is the relatively limited support they receive from the state. In the sous-prefectures (sub-divisions), the *chefs des postes* and veterinarians working for the Ministry of Livestock – who are responsible for treatment and livestock production – are not usually supplied with vehicles, office equipment, or veterinary instruments and

drugs. The limited mobility makes it difficult for veterinarians to access pastoralists in dispersed rural areas.

Dairy production

N'Dama cattle produce a maximum of only about a litre of milk a day (compared to more than 20 litres in European dairy farms, where they use special breeds that are difficult to rear in the Tropics). Although the quantity of milk produced is low, a key problem faced is the lack of refrigeration and other production facilities for a functioning dairy industry. Dairy production in Guinea is mainly the preserve of women, some of whom have formed dairy cooperatives.

c. Security challenges and the causes and drivers of conflict

Farmer-herder relations

Violent conflicts involving pastoralists are less pronounced in Guinea compared to other countries in West Africa and the Sahel (such as Mali, Niger, and Nigeria). However, violent conflicts do sometimes occur, and non-violent disputes between farmers and pastoralists are relatively frequent. There are significant pressures on the livelihoods of pastoralists in most parts of the country, mainly due to shortages of water and pasture in the dry season and inadequate access to veterinary drugs and services in rural areas.

There are several flashpoints where farmer-herder conflicts have occurred. One is in the Forest region around Beyla, where Fulani herders move with their zebu cattle from Mali, often with the intention of permanent relocation. The farmers in the forest zone are of different ethnicities and view Fulani pastoralists as non-autochthonous without land rights. Where provisions for transhumance are absent or if routes are blocked, the destruction of crops by cattle can easily occur. The response of farmers in Beyla and in the forest zone has often been to shoot cattle that enter their fields, or to cut them with machetes. Pastoralists are reported to have retaliated by burning houses and with physical violence against farmers. This has led to some loss of life in the past and significant loss of assets on both sides, in terms of livestock killed and farms destroyed. It appears such conflicts around Beyla have reduced in recent years but the issue has not been fully resolved.

In general, it is in Guinée Forestière where farmer-herder conflicts appear to be most recurrent in Guinea, with clashes reported in 2016 and 2017 resulting in significant material damage and human casualties.³⁹ The disputes are not simply caused by transhumance; some of the problems arise due to cultural differences in resource management. The religious

39 United Nations Country Office, Conakry. June 2018.

and spiritual beliefs of forest peoples in relation to the natural environment may not always be known to or respected by pastoralists who are predominantly Muslim, for example. The role of the judiciary and local administration in managing farmer-herder relations may also be contentious in circumstances where community trust in the state is limited.

In the area between Boffa and Boké, near the Atlantic coast, there was communal violence around 2002 that led to loss of life in two districts: Mankountan and Diogoya.⁴⁰ These two communities are mainly Baga by ethnicity, belonging to different subgroups: *Baga Sitemu* and *Baga Monchon* respectively, who speak different dialects that local respondents said were hardly mutually intelligible. The Baga Sitemu in Mankountan are mainly Catholic, while the Baga Monchon are mainly Muslim. The two Baga communities came into conflict with each other over the issue of granting access rights to their land for Fulani pastoralists. It appears there was conflict between the Fulani and Baga at Mankountan. Subsequently, the Baga Sitemu stopped the Fulani herders from entering Mankountan, while the Baga Monchon in Diogoya allowed transhumance and cattle rearing to continue in their area. The people of Diogoya claim that in reaction they were attacked by the inhabitants of

40 Group interview with local leaders in Diogoya, 17 March 2017.

Mankountan, necessitating an intervention by the military. Nevertheless, local respondents deny religion was a factor in the conflict. To date, the Baga farmers in Mankountan refuse to allow any Fulani pastoralists into their district with livestock (but Fulani can go and stay there without cattle). It is claimed the Mankountan people are split over the issue; the other side argues that their farms have suffered, as the absence of cattle has led to grasses becoming overgrown, lack of manure, and an infestation of snakes and rats. For other farming communities in Boké and Boffa, organised systems are in place where farmers are paid by pastoralists for access to their land after the harvest.⁴¹ This includes compensation, so they can rebuild the ridges of rice paddies after the residues have been grazed by cattle.

d. Conflict prevention and resolution

Conflict management committees

Local conflict management committees exist in most prefectural, sub-prefectural, and village levels in areas of Guinea where pastoralists and farmers cohabit, and they are instrumental in preventing and resolving conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. These committees are generally made up of representatives from

⁴¹ This was reported by farmers and pastoralists to be 500 CFA per month, per cow.

the communities themselves, either local leaders and/or union members from pastoralist or farming associations. As the institution of chieftaincy does not formally exist in Guinea, having been abolished during the period of Sekou Touré, officials from the local administration preside over the conflict management committees. As well as farmers' and pastoralists' associations, religious leaders may be involved in arbitration – notably the local imam wherever the dispute occurs – to give an Islamic solution to the problem. Women appear to be under-represented.

Pastoralist and farming unions or groupings in Guinea are their official organisational structures. For example, in Mali prefecture (part of the Futa Jallon of Guinea), there are 58 pastoralist groupings covering different villages.⁴² Above the village level there are sub-prefectures and these have coordination committees that oversee the activities of groups in the villages. At the level of the prefecture there is a pastoralist union, and at the regional level there is a federation of pastoralists that brings together unions from different prefectures. At the national level there is a confederation intended to represent pastoralists' interests at the national level. Comparable structures exist for farmers, in different sectors.⁴³

⁴² Fieldwork in Mali prefecture, Futa Djallon, 7 March 2017.

⁴³ In Mali prefecture, for example, there were also

These groups form a line of communication between communities and state officials and are used as a basis for conflict management committees. In Koundara, meetings are convened between farmers and pastoralists through Conflict Management Committees 2-3 times a year, just before the planting season and just before the harvest, to coordinate their activities. Cattle are restricted to certain areas while farming activities take place and owners may be fined if they break these rules. Crops also have to be harvested by an agreed time, after which restrictions on the movement of livestock are lifted.⁴⁴ In general in Guinea, when cattle encroach onto farms and destroy crops, the owners can easily be traced because the livestock are marked.⁴⁵

- To strengthen the provision of essential services to farmers and pastoralists, with contributions from each group, and from partners;
- To provide continuous technical and financial support for women's income-generating activities such as dairy production cooperatives;
- To support and strengthen inclusive dialogue processes and conflict prevention and resolution structures in places where farmer-herder disputes are most frequent – including in Guinée Maritime and Guinée Forestière.

Recommendations

- To increase support to the Ministry of Livestock and the Ministry of Agriculture, to improve livestock production systems and protection of the ecosystem in which pastoralism takes place, including by marking transhumance routes;

said to be 23 village groupings for bee-keepers.

44 Fieldwork in Koundara, 13-14 March 2017.

45 If the owner is from within Guinea and not on international transhumance, the markings on the cattle indicate the village of origin and the specific owner. Otherwise, transhumance documents may be demanded, according to ECOWAS regulations.

CHAPTER 3: THE REPUBLIC OF MALI

Introduction

Continuous instability has afflicted Mali since the January 2012 secessionist rebellion in the northern part of the country. The number of terrorist attacks and armed groups has increased and the threat has spread from northern to central Mali and spilled over into bordering regions of Burkina Faso and Niger. Pastoralists are allegedly the main constituencies of the resurgence of terrorist activity in central Mali. The feeling of abandonment among the Fulani people, and more generally the population residing in the Mopti region⁴⁶, has contributed to this worrisome phenomenon.

a. Pastoralism and Transhumance

Pastoralism is a crucial economic sector in Mali. The 2015 Annual Report of the Ministry of Livestock Breeding and Fisheries estimated that pastoralism and the related livestock trade and products made up 15.2% of Mali's GDP – behind agriculture at 16.2%, but ahead of gold mining at 7.2%.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ The Mopti region was not involved in the peace talks in Algeria which led to the signing of the Peace Agreement in May and June 2015. *Exchange with JMAC/MINUSMA May 2018*.

⁴⁷ *Rapport Annuel 2015*. Direction Nationale des Productions et des Industries Animales, Ministère de l'Élevage et Pêche. Bamako, Republic of Mali. January 2016.

Government figures suggest Mali has among the largest livestock sectors in West Africa.⁴⁸ The figures do not consider the impact of war and continuing insecurity in Mali or the increased pressures on rural resources and livestock holdings.

The main areas of conflict in northern and central Mali are important pastoral zones with large numbers of livestock. The figures indicate that of Mali's nine regions, Mopti has by far the highest number of cattle, with 28% of the total. There are substantial numbers of cattle in all regions of Mali except Kidal, which due to its aridity has an estimated 52% of Mali's camels. Sheep and goats are present in all regions, but Gao was estimated to have the highest number, with over 20% of sheep and over 19% of goats, followed by Mopti with 18% and 19% respectively.⁴⁹ In the north, cattle are concentrated around the rivers, while camels and to some extent sheep and goats also survive from wells and bore holes in the arid interior. Cattle rustling, banditry, and resulting inter-communal tensions existed prior to 2012, and the collapse of state authority and the proliferation of armed groups since then have exacerbated these problems in

⁴⁸ The 2015 Annual Report estimated the number of livestock in Mali at 10.6 million heads of cattle, 15.1 million sheep, 21.1 million goats, 538,500 horses, 979,600 donkeys, 1.0 million camels, 82,425 pigs, and 38.6 million poultry.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.25.



Figure 4: Map of Mali. Source: United Nations.

many parts of central and northern Mali. During the Tuareg rebellion, there was a southwards displacement of pastoralists from the Tombouctou and Gao regions into the Mopti area and the Inner Delta of the River Niger. This has increased pressure on natural resources in central Mali and triggered conflict with agricultural communities.

Pastoralism and transhumance in Mali are strongly influenced by the country's topography and the distribution of rainfall across its different ecological zones. There are four main ecological zones, extending laterally

across the country⁵⁰:

- Saharan zone (desert) in the north, with mean annual rainfall of less than 200mm;
- Sahelian zone across the centre, with mean annual rainfall of 200mm - 600mm;
- Sudan or northern savanna zone, with mean annual rainfall of 600mm-1000mm;

⁵⁰ The eco-climatic zones and rainfall data are cited in *Programme d'Action National d'Adaptation au changement climatique (PANA)*, Ministère de l'Équipement et des transports – Direction Nationale de la Météorologie. Republic of Mali, July 2007.




Figure 5: Eco-climatic zones in Mali and area of the Inner Niger Delta. Source: Programme d'Action National d'Adaptation au changement climatique (PANA), 2007, p.7.

- Sudan-Guinea savanna in the south, with mean annual rainfall above 1000mm.

There are many microclimates within each zone: rainfall patterns are not uniform across any one zone, and the level of rainfall varies from year to year. Local climate is affected by topography, such as by the many plateaux in Mali. The availability of water and pasture is also determined by other hydrological conditions – the presence of rivers and depth

of groundwater as well as rainfall. Geology is also key as this affects the hydrology and determines soil types, which in turn affects the distribution of grasses and therefore transhumance patterns. Pastoralists in Mali use and manage the natural resources of this varied and unstable ecological situation by being mobile and flexible.⁵¹

51 Van Dijk, Han. 1999. 'Ecological Insecurity and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend', in V. Azarya, A. Breedveld, M. de Bruijn, H. Van Dijk (Eds.) *Pastoralists under Pressure? Fulbe Societies Confronting Change in West Africa*, Leiden: Brill.

Rivers and streams support cattle and other livestock in northern Mali, but also agricultural activities. Access to pasture and water are determined not just by environmental conditions but also by political, social and demographic factors. The specific issues of access vary depending on the ecological pressure exerted by people and livestock, inter- and intra-community relations, social hierarchies and power, and whether it is an agro-pastoral zone or a purely pastoral zone. Competition for pasture is greatest along the River Niger and in the Inner Niger Delta. Central and southern Mali, corresponding with the Sahel and savanna zones, are the most densely populated parts of the country, with farming and pastoralism. The spread of violent conflict from northern to central Mali since January 2015 therefore has implications for pastoralism and agriculture and potentially affects a larger number of people than the more sparsely populated north.

There is variation in the distribution of pastoralist groups in Mali between regions and eco-climatic zones. Pastoralists in Timbuktu and Gao regions consist mainly of Tuareg, Bella, Arab, and Fulani (all of whom are internally variegated in different groups and lineages). Kidal region is predominantly Tuareg and Arab, while most pastoralists in Mopti region are Fulani. Even the areas claimed as Azawad by Tuareg separatists are ethnically diverse, with Songhai, Bella ('black' Tuaregs,

descended from former slaves), Fulani and others, while agro-pastoral zones in central Mali and along the Niger Bend include cultivators from different parts of the country. In Mopti region, Fulani pastoralism exists alongside a productive fishing economy and farming activities of Dogon, Bambara, Songhai, and Fulani farmers (and others); in Segou region, which is predominantly Bambara, farming is the dominant activity and pastoralism is more constrained but still an important part of the economy there.

Pastoral Transhumance

Mali borders seven different countries and there is international transhumance across all its borders, though in the vast desert areas bordering Mauritania, Algeria and north Niger transhumance is severely circumscribed. In the main pastoral zones of the Sahel and savanna there are strong cross-border links and two-way movements, in dry and rainy seasons, with pastoralists moving into Mali as well. Cross-border transhumance into northern regions of Mali has been interrupted by the prevailing insecurity, but in southern Mali it still occurs without much interruption – as research findings in Mauritania demonstrate. Internal transhumance within Mali is especially important and happens on a north-south axis between dry and rainy seasons, between highlands

and lowlands, and along the Niger Bend. The Inner Niger Delta is the key dry season transhumance zone in Mali, covering an area of some 50,000 km², from Ke Macina circle in Segou region to Mopti and the circles of Niafunké, Diré, and Goundam in Tombouktou region. The Delta is a regional resource, especially during the dry season, but transhumance there has been interrupted by conflict. The Delta is of vital importance for rice cultivation, pastoralism, and fishing.

Transhumance movements in the Inner Niger Delta have historically been determined by the advance and retreat of flood waters, with as many as 40% of Mali's cattle taken there each year on transhumance, as well as some cattle from neighbouring countries.⁵² Of particular importance are the *bourgoutières*, the alluvial flood plains of the Inner Delta on which a nutritious aquatic grass known as *burgu* (*Echinochloa stagnina*) grows. Large tracts of *burgu* emerge and become accessible to livestock as the River Niger's flood waters retreat at the end of the rainy season.

Historically, social contracts and political hierarchies determined pastoralists' access to the *burgu*. During the period of the Diina – the Islamic state also known as the Maasina Empire established during the nineteenth century (from around 1818) by Seeku

⁵² Fieldwork interviews in Mopti region, 3-4 April 2017.

Aamadu, with its capital at Hamdallaye - access to *burgu* was regulated by the Islamic authorities.⁵³ The Diina encompassed the Inner Delta and the adjacent drylands, which form part of the transhumance orbit of pastoralists when the river floods. Nineteenth century Fulani hegemony and 'arrangements with respect to resource tenure, livestock movements, and economic organisation'⁵⁴ was brought to an end by French colonial rule. It is still referred back to by some Fulani pastoralists as a model system which regulated the use of land and water between different user groups.⁵⁵

b. Challenges facing pastoralists

A weak state with institutional constraints

⁵³ See Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk (1995) *Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of Insecurity in Fulbe Society, Central Mali*, Amsterdam: Thela Publishers (online); pp. 52-63 are on the Diina of Seeku Aamadu. A classic text on the Diina is Bâ, Amadou Hampaté and Jean Daget (1984) *L'empire peul du Macina (1818-1853)*. Abidjan, les Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, (first edition 1962).

⁵⁴ Van Dijk, Han. 1999. 'Ecological Insecurity and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend', op. cit., p. 246.

⁵⁵ Hamadoun Kouffa – presumed leader of Ansar Dine Katibat Macina (see below) - referred back to the period of the Diina and Seeku Amadou as a model for Islamic government in central Mali. Some pastoralists are attracted to a message which says natural resource access (pasture and water) should be regulated according to Islamic rules. Where the Malian state has failed to secure pastoralists' livelihoods, local history can be called upon for alternative models of governance.

Investment in pastoralism and rural areas has generally been weak in Mali and further complicated by the conflict in the central and northern regions. Farming and pastoralist communities are affected, with the impacts of this insecurity cutting across gender lines. According to Mali's pastoral code, the authorities are meant to have a role in managing natural resources to prevent competition and conflict. Yet, efforts seem to have been lacking in this area. There is limited provision of basic infrastructure and services to rural areas, including the livestock sector, limited technical expertise available and few policy interventions promoted. Corruption is also perceived to be part of the problem with negative impacts on both farmers and pastoralists.

Reduced access to pasture and water

Many pastoralists report difficulties in accessing pasture and water in the regions of Mopti and Tombouctou, in addition to the blockage of transhumance routes by farmers. In the Tombouctou region, tensions often arise between farmers and pastoralists along the River Niger. The majority of farmers are Songhai and sedentary Tuareg, while the pastoralists are Tuareg, Arab and Fulani. The availability of grazing land along rivers has decreased as the area under cultivation has expanded, including for irrigated dry season farming.

It is perceived that since the 1984

drought, the number of livestock in the Tombouctou region has diminished, a situation worsened by the lack of education and professional training for nomads (whether men or women) and limited state support for pastoralism. Consequently, a large number of pastoralists has left the Tombouctou region (70% according to informal estimates).⁵⁶

In the Inner Niger Delta the system regulating access to *burgu* has broken down or traditional authorities restrict such access. There is currently acute competition between groups of pastoralists and between pastoralists, rice farmers and fishermen. As the conditions for pastoralism have deteriorated in surrounding regions (on the plateaux and in drylands of the Seeno, Gurma, and Mema) more pastoralists now move to the Inner Delta during the dry season than can support them.⁵⁷ As the demands on natural resources have increased, available pasture has decreased and conflicts over land and political authority have ensued.

The pastoral system in the Inner Delta depends on interconnections in the region as a whole – between areas of central Mali that surround the Delta and the wetlands of the Delta

⁵⁶ Interview with a pastoralist representative in Timbuktu, 5 April 2017.

⁵⁷ See Van Dijk, Han. 1999. 'Ecological Insecurity and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend', op. cit.

itself.⁵⁸ Access to pasture and water in all these areas is now constrained: due to a reduction in the land area that the river floods, increased rice cultivation, political and economic restrictions on pastoralists including privatisation of *bourgoutières*, and increased competition among pastoralists (the majority of whom are Fulani) for remaining pasture. Many pastoralists in central Mali are reported to have lost their herds, or at least some of their livestock, as a result of these adverse conditions. This has contributed to the spread of violent conflict into central Mali. Some have left pastoralism and others see no future in pastoralism.

c. Security challenges and the causes and drivers of conflict

Rebellion, terrorism

Pastoral livelihoods in Mali have become precarious and insecure for political, demographic, and ecological reasons. This applies to all the pastoralist groups (including Fulani, Tuareg and Arab), particularly in central and northern Mali which are the areas most affected by armed conflict. Socio-political and economic transformations in Tuareg society brought about by the two droughts of the

58 The most detailed study of pastoralism in this area is: de Bruijn, Mirjam, and van Dijk, Han. 1995. *Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of Insecurity in Fulbe Society, Central Mali*. Amsterdam: Thela Publishers (openly accessible online).

1970s and 1980s, underpinned Tuareg rebellions in Mali from 1990 and Niger from 1992.

The foundations for the rebellions of the 1990s and the renewed rebellions from 2012 were laid by the *teshumara*, a movement of unemployed intellectuals (*ishumar*) many of whom had been affected by drought and became urban migrants in the Maghreb.⁵⁹ They sought revolutionary alternatives (through an independent Tuareg nation state to be called Azawad) from the traditional pastoral life that had to a large extent collapsed. Especially among the small group of contemporaneous Western-educated Tuareg intellectuals, the droughts led to a rethinking of pastoral life. Many reached the conclusion that a pastoral existence had no future.⁶⁰

From 2012 up to the present there have been different groups and factions of rebels in northern Mali, affecting pastoralism and patterns of security in the region.⁶¹ Throughout the conflict, pastoralists themselves have had shifting alliances. Much of the revenue of terrorist groups and

59 One of the *ishumar* was Iyad Ag Ghali, who later became an Islamist and then leader of Ansar Dine.

60 Lecocq, Baz. 2004. 'Unemployed Intellectuals in the Sahara: The *Teshumara* Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg Society', *International Review of Social History*, 49: 87-109. p. 94.

61 An important overview of the different armed groups is given by Ibrahim Maiga (June 2016). *Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the Labels*. West Africa Report, Issue 17, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Dakar (Online).

of some of the armed groups comes from smuggling across the Sahara. These networks compete against each other to control smuggling routes, or otherwise have defined routes where they control the illicit traffic.⁶² In this context, pastoralists have formed alliances or cooperated with those groups controlling the areas they reside in or pass through on transhumance.

In parts of central Mali, Ansar Dine Katiba Macina (or Katibat Macina, the Macina Battalions), a group preaching violent jihad, has gained followers mainly among the Fulani from Mopti region and to a lesser extent Segou and Koulikoro regions. (The Katibat Macina was declared in a video in May 2016 as the Macina extension of Ansar Dine).⁶³ The reasons for joining the movement are diverse and have been well investigated.⁶⁴ Some Fulani had participated as combatants in The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), but

62 The smuggling draws on a longer history of Saharan trade networks. See Scheele, Judith (2012) *Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

63 Thiam, Adam (March 2017), *Centre du Mali: Enjeux Et Dangers D'Une Crise Négligée*, Bamako: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; ICG (July 2016), *Central Mali... op. cit.*

64 See Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne, and William Assanvo. 2016 (August). *Mali's Young Jihadists: Fuelled by Faith or Circumstance?* Policy Brief, Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Dakar; and Thiam, Adam (March 2017), *Centre du Mali: Enjeux Et Dangers... op. cit.*

then either demobilised or joined Ansar Dine or other armed groups. With the formation of Ansar Dine's Katibat Macina, some former MUJAO fighters joined (MUJAO had recruited among the Fulani). Many combatants joined for reasons of self-defence – in the case of MUJAO, against the Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), who were raiding Fulani cattle and looting from the local population in areas they captured in 2012. One of the motivations for pastoralists to join or cooperate with the Katibat Macina is to protect their cattle, due to threats from banditry and communal violence.⁶⁵ But this rebellion against the state goes beyond the immediate insecurity and includes a struggle, according to them, to change a situation where pastoralists feel they have been undermined by local power dynamics and state neglect.

Banditry, cattle rustling

Banditry and cattle rustling are a problem in parts of central and northern Mali. The terrorist groups, however, were rarely accused of stealing cattle or other livestock. In some cases, they actively pursued the bandits and recovered livestock for pastoralists.⁶⁶ Cattle rustlers in Mopti region

65 See Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne, and William Assanvo. 2016 (August). *Mali's Young Jihadists, op. cit.* p. 4 and p. 7 (footnote 13). This was also stated during our fieldwork in Mopti and Bamako, March-April 2017.

66 Interviews in Mopti, 4 April 2017.

are called Ntérééré; they are mainly Fulani and raid the cattle of other Fulani pastoralists. Some Ntérééré were recruited into armed groups and possibly terrorist groups in the region, but former Ntérééré have also had a role in protecting Fulani camps during communal violence with Dogon and Bambara militias (in the form of *dozos*, traditional hunting fraternities).⁶⁷ With armed conflict in central and northern Mali, rural banditry appeared to be more closely linked to the proliferation of different non-state armed groups than to terrorist groups specifically.

Communal violence and farmer-herder conflicts

Attacks by terrorist groups in central Mali, targeting state officials and religious and civilian opponents, has led to an increase in inter-communal violence. These deadly conflicts are relatively localised and run along ethnic lines, mainly between Fulani and Bambara and Fulani and Dogon. The general pattern is of Bambara and Dogon militias launching retaliatory attacks against Fulani pastoralist communities in response to the wave of attacks on local authorities by Katiba Macina followers, most of whom are Fulani. Terrorist attacks led to a retreat of state authority from parts of central Mali (Mopti region being the worst affected), notably from rural

67 International Crisis Group (July 2016), *Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?* Africa Report no. 238.

areas where the state was already weak.

In the past, however, Fulani, Bambara, and Dogon communities had a good relationship. Inter-ethnic violence between Fulani-Bambara and Fulani-Dogon was not on a large scale prior to the spread of the war to Douentza circle in 2012. Trust that previously existed between communities have been undermined. With the withdrawal of the state from many areas, communities set up self-defence militias, generally along ethnic lines. *Dozo* hunters have acted as a militia to protect the Bambara and Dogon against armed bandits and terrorists, but they also stand accused of attacking Fulani civilians. Inevitably this communal violence has also made farmer-herder relations more conflictual and difficult to manage. In many cases they are directly related to land issues and the management of rural resources. An important development, however, as reported by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, is the signing on 28 August 2018 of an intercommunal peace agreement between Fulani and Dogon communities from the area ('circle') of Koro in Sevare, in the region of Mopti. The accord was signed by 30 Dogon and Fulani village leaders from the municipalities of the area affected by the conflict.⁶⁸

68 <https://www.hdcentre.org/fr/updates/fulani-and-dogon-communities-from-koro-sign-a-peace-agreement-in-the-mopti-region-of-mali>

d. Conflict prevention and resolution

Given the magnitude of threats facing the Malian state, particularly in the central and northern regions, the Malian authorities are severely constrained in their ability to address growing pastoralism-related challenges. Yet, an essential part of restoring state authority on the Malian territory involves addressing the grievances of communities that have taken up arms. Local authorities need to rebuild their legitimacy and restore a social contract with alienated sections of the population if the multitude of conflicts are to be resolved. This will require dialogue and targeted development interventions, not least in pastoral and farming communities.

Recommendations

- To increase investments in both the agricultural and livestock sectors in Mali to support the livelihoods of local populations – and boost the national economy;
- To restore state authority and strengthen the provision of basic infrastructure and social services to rural areas, addressing long-term grievances of communities that have taken up arms;

- To address the root causes of the recruitment of pastoralists into insurgent groups, including cross-border dynamics of this phenomenon;
- To double efforts to support and preserve local conflict resolution mechanisms and promote dialogue between those groups most affected by conflict, including farmers and herders;
- The conflicts in Mali have gender-specific impacts, therefore gender-responsive policy interventions in the livestock and farming sectors are needed for conflict prevention and resolution processes to be effective and to preserve human rights;
- To undertake concrete actions to prevent and address human rights abuses and violations relating to conflicts between farmers and herders and other groups; to strengthen efforts to identify and hold accountable perpetrators of such crimes.

CHAPTER 4: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

Introduction

Pastoralism is a fundamental aspect of life and culture in Mauritania, both historically and in the present day. The rearing of domestic livestock on a sedentary basis or larger herds through transhumance is practised by a majority of the rural population. Agriculture accounts for about a quarter of the Mauritanian economy, and about 70% of this involves livestock rearing of one type or another.⁶⁹

Presently, Mauritania generally has low levels of violent conflict between farmers and herders and between pastoralists. At times tensions arise due to competition for pasture and water, blockage of transhumance routes, and the destruction of crops by livestock. There are problems with natural resource management and the allocation of space for pastoralists and farmers in the agro-pastoral zone. In areas too arid for agriculture, challenges involve how to manage rangeland and relationships between pastoralist groups.

While terrorism has not been a regular threat to them, some pastoralists,

⁶⁹ Fieldwork for this study was carried out both in northern and southern Mauritania, with more focus on the south, as that is where the majority of pastoralists and livestock are, including large herds of cattle, which cannot survive further north due to the greater aridity.

in their cross-border transhumance into Mali, are affected by banditry. Mauritania's pastoral code regulates pastoral activities and conflict prevention between farmers and pastoralists and between different groups of pastoralists.

a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in Mauritania

Pastoralism in Mauritania is determined by rainfall patterns and the distribution of water and pasture, which varies seasonally and between different regions of the country. The aridity increases moving northwards where, except in scattered oases, agriculture is impossible; the only livestock that survive in the desert are camels and, in some areas, a few domestic sheep and goats. The main pastoral zone in Mauritania, with the highest number of livestock, is in the south.⁷⁰ The riverine areas are especially important, but this is an agro-pastoral zone and that is where conflicts between farmers and pastoralists can arise. Mauritania's long southern border is also its most important transhumance zone, with nomadic groups moving their cattle, sheep, goats and camels be-

⁷⁰ FAOSTAT imputes that in 2016 there were 18.4 million cattle, 9.6 million sheep, 6.2 million goats, and 1.5 million camels in Mauritania. Data retrieved from <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL>, 22 March 2018.

tween Mauritania, Senegal and Mali, on a seasonal basis. The Mauritania-Senegal border is marked by the Senegal River (the right bank belongs to Mauritania, the left bank to Senegal). On the Mauritanian side, the Senegal River flows approximately 600 kilometres from Gouray (near Sélibabi, Guidimaka Region), to Rosso and beyond in Trarza Region, near the Atlantic coast (across the border from Saint Louis, Senegal).

The Senegal valley, including the Futa Toro, is the most fertile part of Mauritania and is a key water and agro-pastoral resource for both Mauritania and Senegal. Meanwhile the eastern half of Mauritania's southern frontier, bordering Mali and stretching across Assaba, Hodh El-Gharbi, and Hodh El-Chargui regions, has less water but fewer farms. This is a key pastoral zone, with a large number of livestock and predominantly Moor pas-




Figure 6: Map of Mauritania. Source: https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/af-rica/mauritania_rel95.jpg.

toralists. They have permanent settlements on the Mauritanian side of the border but the herders are highly mobile, moving on cross-border transhumance into the Kayes, Koulikoro, and Segou regions of Mali during the dry season and then returning northwards with the rains.

All the large towns in southern Mauritania are mixed in population. Smaller dispersed villages, hamlets and pastoralist camps are often more homogenous. The majority of pastoralists in Mauritania are Moor (white and black) and Haalpulaar (also referred to as Peul or Fulani/Fulbe).⁷¹ The Haalpulaaren are concentrated in the Futa Toro – where they tend to be sedentary or semi-sedentary; while the Mbororo or nomadic Fulbe are also present further east along the southern border with Mali.

Another major group in the Senegal valley is the Soninké, particularly around Sélibabi, and they are predominantly farmers. There are also Wolof farmers with their origins in Senegal. The Haalpulaar and Moors living near

71 Leservoisier (2012: 159) notes that Haalpulaaren is the self-ascribed name of the Fulbe in this region. It means “Pulaar-speakers”. See Leservoisier, Olivier (2012), ‘Ethnicity and Interdependence: Moors and Haalpulaaren in the Senegal Valley’, in James McDougall and Judith Scheele (eds.), *Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Pulaar exhibits marked dialectical differences to the Fulfulde spoken further east: they are essentially variants of the same language, with the same linguistic roots, but now they are hardly mutually intelligible.

the river are generally agro-pastoralists but moving northwards or east away from the agricultural areas they are only concentrated on pastoralism, often with large herds.

The rearing of camels and goats is important for people in Mauritania’s desert areas, but if disputes arise it is between pastoralists themselves, competing for available water or pasture. Central and northern Mauritania are well beyond the limit of agriculture, except in oases where irrigated farming in *palmeries* is a valuable economic activity. Some camels are owned by pastoralists, but the larger herds usually belong to elites living in town (usually white Moors). Herders are then employed to look after them. Their transhumance tracks can range from southern Mauritania all the way across long desert routes to Tiris Zemmour region, near the Algerian border in the north. Sometimes good pasture for camels is also found around Zouérat (near the border with Western Sahara, see map). The mobility of transhumant pastoralists only has the potential to trigger conflict in agro-pastoral zones where there are farming activities. Till now, no large-scale violent conflicts between farmers and herders were reported in Mauritania, but smaller disputes occur on a regular basis.

Pastoralism and the livestock trade between Mauritania, Mali and Senegal are vital economic activities, in

which mobility is fundamental. It was claimed that 400,000 sheep are sent annually from Kiffa to Senegal for the Tabaski festival (Eid el-Adha or ‘Festival of Sacrifice’).⁷² There is more transhumance of pastoralists from Mauritania to Senegal than the other way around.⁷³

b. Challenges facing pastoralists

Water scarcity

Access to water is a challenge for pastoralists throughout Mauritania, due to the country’s low rainfall. This can lead to competition around water points (wells or bore holes). Water points can be community run or privately owned and access usually has to be paid for. A general demand in Mauritania is for more wells and bore holes to be constructed in villages and along transhumance routes. The bore holes work well with solar panels, and some have already been built in this way, variously funded via DFID and World Bank programmes, for example. Water retention and storage could also be improved.

Shortages of pasture and animal feed in the dry season

Mauritania is a highly arid country where pasture does not tend to last

⁷² Interview with GNAP representative in Kiffa, 19 February 2017.

⁷³ Interview at the Ministry of Livestock, Kaédi, Gorgol Region, 14 February 2017.

throughout the dry season. And in areas where there is good pasture (from grasses and trees) there tends to be more pressure from large numbers of livestock. Shortage of pasture (or water) necessitates transhumance, but the conditions could be improved if animal feed distribution was better organised, especially in the late dry season.

Challenges relating to cross-border transhumance

Mauritania-Mali

There is a high level of pastoral mobility across Mauritania’s southern border with Mali. There is also trade across the border. The movement is two-way but cross-border transhumance of pastoralists based in Mauritania outpaces that of Malians moving north. As compared to Mauritania, pasture and water are more accessible further south in Mali. When the rains come in Mauritania, pastoralists spend the grazing period there; conversely, during the dry season, they walk with their livestock to Mali.

Until 2016, pastoralists from Mauritania could graze their animals freely in Mali; since then, some limits seem to have been placed on their movements. Today, Mauritanian pastoralists herd alongside Malian pastoralists (most of whom are Fulani, whereas a majority of the Mauriticians on the same transhumance route are

Moor, with some Fulani). They appear to have a reciprocal relationship: when Malian pastoralists go on transhumance to Mauritania at the end of the dry season, they migrate together with the Mauritians, who then look after them on the other side of the border. There is inter-marriage between Fulani communities on each side of the border.⁷⁴

There is no state support for security cooperation between pastoralists on the Malian and Mauritanian sides of the border, so pastoralists rely on their vigilante groups for surveillance and to prevent theft and other crimes around the livestock trade. Overall, the Malians and Mauritians seem to have a good relationship. Yet, pastoral mobility between Mauritania and Mali presents particular challenges for farmers in the Kayes and Koulikoro regions of Mali. Problems arise when pastoralists move their herds southwards in the dry season before the crops have been harvested. This can cause substantial damage to farmland and trigger local conflicts.⁷⁵

Pastoralists and forest guards in Mali

Mauritians in Hodh El-Gharbi (mainly Moor and Haalpulaar'en (Fulani) pastoralists) who cross into Mali have reported that Malian forest

⁷⁴ This was evident in the village of Goupou Modi, a Fulani village 9km from Sélibabi. 15 February 2017.

⁷⁵ Conversation with livestock specialists at the PRAPS office in Bamako, 23 March 2017.

guards impose heavy fines on them for using trees to feed their livestock. Some Mauritanian pastoralists reportedly cut down whole trees or uprooted them, triggering tensions with forest guards.

The relationship between forest guards and pastoralists seems to be difficult in other parts of Mali as well. Significantly, non-state armed groups (assumed to be linked to the Katibat Macina) operating in Mopti and Segou regions of central Mali have reportedly assassinated several forest guards, singling them out as targets along with the local administration and security agencies, such as the police and army. No such violent incidents have been recorded in Kayes and Koulikoro regions, which to date have been less affected by the insurgencies in central and northern Mali.⁷⁶ Incidents of cattle theft are also reportedly rare in Kayes and Koulikoro, unlike in Senegal where cattle theft is said to be more common. For pastoralists crossing Mauritania's southern border with Mali from Hodh El-Gharbi, they seem not to be affected by the conflict in northern Mali or Mopti and Segou in central Mali.

Mauritania-Senegal

Transhumance between Mauritania and Senegal occurs on a large scale

⁷⁶ The town of Nara, Koulikoro region, is an exception, as the Katibat Macina has attacked Malian security forces there (as in June 2016). However, the generalised insecurity in Mopti has not reached Koulikoro.

but is seasonal, Pastoralists need to obtain transhumance permits certifying that their livestock is vaccinated, pay customs duty on their livestock when they cross the border, and declare their length of stay in Senegal. Fulani pastoralists in Senegal tend to stay in villages at night, not with their livestock in the bush. Herders crossing from Mauritania are made to do the same, which is facilitated by social connections between families and communities of pastoralists from each side of the border and contact with the local administration in Senegal. They bring their livestock to fields near the villages to watch over them there. There is no reported blockage of transhumance routes between Mauritania and Senegal. Water scarcity is the main challenge, and sometimes herders are prevented from accessing privately owned bore holes (often owned by other pastoralists).

c. Security challenges and the causes and drivers of conflicts

Terrorism

With terrorist groups operating in Mali, there is concern that they could cross the border either to launch attacks or to use Mauritania as a rear base. The Mauritanian security forces are mobilised in strategic border areas to try and prevent this, and security along the roads is tight. Mobility

across the eastern border with the Tombouctou region of Mali is curtailed, but this hardly affects pastoralism as the main pastoral zone is to the south.

Mauritania's eastern border with Mali is mainly desert, with few pastoralists. It is a militarised zone and according to the former governor of Hodh El Charghi⁷⁷, pastoralists are forbidden from coming close to it. Large stretches of the border between Hodh El-Chargui and the Timbuktu region of Mali are not navigable by vehicle due to soft sand and rolling dunes, but there are entry points used by smugglers. As the border is not a large transhumance zone, its official closure has not seriously affected pastoralism in either Mauritania or Mali.

The long borders between Mauritania and Mali have received the most international concern, with fears that terrorist groups from Mali could penetrate into Mauritania. The main risk in southern Mauritania is from the area around the Wagadou forest in Mali and around Nampala, which are known militant hotspots bordering south-east Hodh El-Chargui region. The M'Bera refugee camp near Bassikounou, also south-east Mauritania, is close to volatile areas of Segou and Timbuktu regions in Mali. There are an estimated 50,000 refugees in the

⁷⁷ Who during fieldwork for this study in February 2017 was governor of AdrarRegion.

camp, mainly from Timbuktu region, assisted by UNHCR. The Malian refugees move in and out of the camp but it remains open, as conditions for the refugees in their places of origin are still insecure. Presently, disputes over water and grazing land are at a low level between the refugees and host communities.

Armed robbery

A main security concern appears to be the frequent armed robbery around the town of Nara, in the Koulikoro region of Mali.⁷⁸ Timbedra is 200 km from Nara, which is a major regional livestock market attracting traders from different ECOWAS countries (it is estimated a minimum of 10,000 cattle and 100,000 small ruminants are sold at Nara every week). The robbers are reportedly armed with Kalashnikovs and attack traders on the roads to or from Nara market, every 2-4 weeks. It is thought those involved are Moors, from both sides of the border. The economy of Timbedra and its estimated 80,000 inhabitants depend on pastoralism and the livestock trade.

Farmer-herder relations

The main area in Mauritania where tensions between farmers and herders arise is in the Senegal Valley. It was reported in Aleg, at the Ministry of Livestock in the Regional Delegation of Brakna, that conflicts between

78 This problem was discussed during research at Timbedra cattle market in Hodh El-Chargui.

herders and cultivators mainly occur in the rainy season. These conflicts can be violent and people are sometimes injured, but no fatalities were reported.⁷⁹ Disputes are generally settled by community leaders (generally older men); only for serious cases are local authorities and the gendarmerie brought in. According to the Ministry of Livestock in Brakna, pastoralists face serious pressures in the riverine areas. Access to water can be a problem because the river banks are heavily cultivated, blocking routes for livestock, and pasture land along the river is often not respected. That is a trigger for conflict, as it means cattle are more likely to encroach onto farms. The Haalpulaar (Peul/Fulani) were reportedly the majority in Brakna, followed by the Moors. Disputes can take an inter-ethnic dimension or be within the same group that is engaged in both farming and pastoralism.

Prominent pastoralists in Kaédi, capital of the Gorgol region, report that if there is drought or low rainfall in the north, large numbers of animals come down, and if the crops have not yet been harvested there can be damage to farms.⁸⁰ This is inter-regional transhumance and the southward movement can include camel herders from the Adrar region or Tagant, as well as cattle from adjoining regions. It can

79 Fieldwork interviews in Aleg, 14 February 2017.

80 Interview with Ba Alhassan Amadou and Bachir-Bellal Diallo, Kaédi, 14 February 2017.

be a source of conflict if such transhumance is not coordinated with farmers or local authorities, as the village authorities would be expected to determine a corridor for the livestock to use. In cases of conflict, traditional leaders and local authorities intervene.

According to officials at the Ministry of Livestock, pastoralists do not usually let their cattle or other livestock wander onto farms and violent conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are rare. One of the reasons given was the prevalence of agro-pastoralism, where much of the local population is involved in both activities (farming and rearing livestock). Farming communities in Gorgol include Wolof, Soninké, Moor, and Haalpulaar, while pastoralism is mainly practised by Moors and Haalpulaar. These are not homogenous groups – they are internally variegated by lineage, social background, and in some cases inter-marriage – but latent inter-ethnic tensions are also weakened by overlaps in economic activities. This is particularly the case with sedentarised Haalpulaar and Moor agro-pastoralists and potentially less so with Soninké and Wolof, who tend to farm more than herd. But Pulaar-speakers reportedly form a substantial majority in Gorgol and they tend to be agro-pastoralists.

d. Conflict prevention and resolution

Some of the reasons given for the peaceful resolution of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Mauritania include: i) agro-pastoralism, in which farmers and pastoralists do not necessarily pursue exclusive livelihoods – many people farm and have livestock, creating interconnections; ii) common religious affiliation, as most of the population is Muslim; iii) inter-marriage between groups. There were no reported problems of transhumance routes between Mauritania and Mali being blocked, as these are rangelands. Blockage of transhumance routes occurs primarily in agro-pastoral zones and this was reported to be a problem in the Senegal valley.

Outside the agro-pastoral zone, the competition is not between farmers and herders, but between pastoralists themselves. There is a great deal of cooperation and not always competition, but in some circumstances pressure on pasture and water creates tension between user groups over access rights. This is an issue in different pastoral zones – among Moor and Fulani cattle herders in southern Mauritania and Moor camel herders further north. However, there are established traditions and practises of natural resource management, many of which

have been enshrined in Mauritania's Pastoral Code.

The Pastoral Code (July 2000) in Mauritania is an important tool for conflict prevention and natural resource management. In agro-pastoral zones (notably the Senegal River valley) the challenge is to manage the relationship between mobile pastoralists and sedentary farmers. In parts of the country that are beyond the limit of agriculture (about 400mm isohyets for rain fed crops) the challenge is to effectively manage the rangeland environment and the use of available water and pasture among pastoralists themselves. The relationship between nomadic pastoralist groups themselves and between pastoralists and farmers is addressed in the Pastoral Code, prioritising local conflict prevention and management as the first stage, before involving state authorities or courts.⁸¹

timing of transhumance and, where necessary, an official identification of the transhumance routes – to prevent damage to farmers' crops and to address the needs of pastoralists;

- To construct more water points along transhumance routes, both in Mauritania and in Mali and northern Senegal. As well as providing water wherever possible in areas of scarcity, the sustainable consumption of water should also be encouraged;
- To establish or strengthen existing operations of customary courts and reinforce traditional and administrative mechanisms for non-violent dispute resolution;
- To enforce Mauritania's Pastoral Code and raise awareness within civil society, at the grassroots, and among farmers and herders on their rights and duties in relation to the pastoral code.

Recommendations

- To establish permanent cross border commissions between Mauritania and Senegal, and Mauritania and Mali, to help co-ordinate and facilitate cross-border transhumance. Interstate cooperation could focus on issues such as rights of passage, the

81 Wabnitz, Hans-Werner (2009) "Return to the Sources: Revival of Traditional Nomads' Rights to Common Property Resources in the Code Pastoral of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania", *Natural Resources Journal*, 49: 191-218.

CHAPTER 5: THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER

Introduction

Pastoralism forms an essential part of Niger's economy and is adapted to the different climatic and ecological conditions in the country, most of which falls within the Sahara and Sahel. Niger faces difficult environmental challenges that affect pastoralists. These challenges are in turn compounded by the civil insecurity that is preva-

lent in some parts of the country. Niger, while relatively politically stable, is surrounded by countries with ongoing insurgencies or other forms of insecurity (Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Benin). In analysing pastoralism and security in Niger, it is therefore necessary to look closely at the cross-border impacts of wider regional security challenges.



Figure 7: Map of Niger. Source: United Nations.

a. Pastoralism and Transhumance

Pastoral systems in Niger are determined by the country's climate and ecology, and by political factors, including patterns of insecurity. There are four broad eco-climatic zones in Niger that heavily influence the pattern of pastoral production (see Figure 8 below):⁸²

1. The largest and most sparsely populated is the Saharan zone, where pastoralism exists at oases and around wells, and is mostly limited to camels and some goats;
2. The second eco-climatic zone is Sahelo-Saharan, which is also arid but on average receives slightly more rainfall and can therefore support more pastoralists. Limited rainfall means this zone is largely above the limit of agriculture, except where there are ground water sources, such as around Lake Chad in the south-east.
3. Third is the Sahelian zone, much of which is agro-pastoral, with a presence of farmers and pastoralists. There are indications that in some areas farmers have moved northwards, to cultivate areas for rainfed agriculture that some years ago were the preserve of pastoralists.

82 Ministère de l'Élevage, Direction des Statistiques, SIM Bétail. *Atlas Sur L'élevage au Niger. Tome 1: L'Élevage au Niger, une richesse sans fin.* 2014.

4. In part of south-west of Niger, the ecology marks an intersection between Sahel and savanna environments and accommodates both farmers and pastoralists.

Pastoralists in Niger are mobile, moving their herds on a seasonal basis in search of available pasture and water. There is internal transhumance within Niger and cross-border transhumance into neighbouring countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali to the west, Nigeria to the south, and northern Cameroon and Chad to the east.

The main ethno-linguistic groups associated with pastoralism in Niger are the Fulani, Tuareg, Arab, Tubu (Teda), and Buduma (Yedina). There are clan differences within each group, and land tenure and access to pasture vary between them and can be locally specific, defined by family, lineage and history rather than ethnicity *per se*. There are differences in the distribution and specialisation of pastoral groups, as well as some overlaps. Fulani and Tuareg communities have the widest distribution in Niger; the Tubu are more limited to desert areas bordering Chad and Libya, while the Buduma are concentrated in the Lake Chad area. There is interaction between groups, and for example mixed Fulani and Tuareg villages in central Niger. Traditionally, Tuareg and Tubu are more specialised in camels and occupy more arid areas, while the




Figure 8: The main eco-climatic zones in Niger. Source: Ministère de l'Élevage, Niamey, 2014.

various Fulani clans own most of the cattle stock and are in more semi-arid areas. There is however considerable contact and they interact and sometimes compete and fight for common resources.

b. Challenges facing pastoralists

Pastoral livelihoods in Niger have become insecure due to adverse political, economic and ecological conditions, and due to physical insecurity caused by insurgency, inter-group conflict, and banditry. There are regionally specific forms of insecurity in

Niger and general problems affecting pastoral livelihoods in the country as a whole.

Loss of pasture and blockage of transhumance routes

One of the main difficulties pastoralists report in Niger is insufficient pasture, especially during the long dry season. This is possibly linked to diminishing rainfall – with reportedly shorter rainy seasons – and increased population pressure. The pressure on pasture comes from pastoralists themselves and from farmers. There has been some movement of pastoralists away from arid areas where

pasture is lacking, to parts of the Sahelian zone where at least some pasture is available. This has increased the burden on pastoralist communities in southern Niger, in what are already strained ecological conditions. Where there is land with high potential for farming, migrant farmers have also moved in and increased the area of land under cultivation, competing with pastoralists and agro-pastoralists.

Another trend in the pastoral zone has been for farmers (men and women) to collect and store forage (including grasses), reducing what is available for resident and transhumant herders during the dry season. They may then sell such fodder to pastoralists, whereas previously pastoralists would graze their animals on it directly. Competition among pastoralists and between pastoralists and farmers around water sources is also an issue in some areas.

In Niger, pressure on pasture is a more serious concern than the blockage of transhumance routes. In some areas, the transhumance routes are reportedly kept open, but in other areas animal grazing areas and transhumant routes are reportedly blocked or narrowed by farms. This constitutes a source of farmer-herder conflicts in agro-pastoral areas. The other challenge is the timing of transhumance: if there is scarcity of pasture further north, pastoralists will sometimes move southwards into agricultural ar-

reas before the harvest. This can lead to the destruction of crops if transhumance routes and grazing land are inadequate.

Depletion of livestock

Some pastoralists in Tillaberi region and around Dakoro in Maradi region report that they have fewer cattle now than a decade ago because of insufficient pasture, caused by the expansion of agriculture, overgrazing, and shorter rainy seasons. In most of Niger there is no longer enough pasture to sustain the livestock, so during the dry season part of the herds must either be taken out of the country on transhumance or they must be given animal feed. Pastoralists often have to sell some of their livestock to buy animal feed, gradually depleting their wealth. There are concerns over whether pastoralism could be sustained for the next generation.

Insufficient animal feed in the dry season

As pasture land is not well protected and is affected by erratic rainfall, animal feed is necessary to sustain the pastoral economy, especially in the late dry season. There is, however, a large discrepancy between supply and demand. The shortage of animal feed also pushes the price up above the government subsidised rate. The market is taken over by middle men in many cases, who sell subsidised feed to pastoralists at a profit.

Access to education and health services

With ecological, political, and demographic constraints on pastoralists and the livestock sector in Niger, some of the younger generation seeking opportunities outside pastoralism. Yet one challenge in the rural areas of Niger is the lack of educational, health and other services. This is also a gender issue, as currently many women from pastoralist families in Niger migrate to towns and cities in other West African countries during the long dry season, to supplement household incomes. Elders in their communities complain that the women usually return with very few savings, even after six months away. Some can be seen begging in Niamey and other towns.

c. Security challenges and the causes and drivers of conflict

In some parts of Niger, the pressures on pastoral livelihoods outlined above are accentuated by various kinds of physical insecurity. The security situation for pastoralists is generally better in Niger than in neighbouring Nigeria, central/northern Mali, and even parts of Burkina Faso and Benin. There are however zones of insecurity and locally specific problems that have severely disrupted pastoral production and uprooted people. The dynamics of these particular conflicts and threats are outlined below.

Insurgency and cross-border attacks

In most regions of Niger violent conflict is at a low level, but since the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011 and the ensuing war and civil insecurity, the spill-over effects of the conflict in Libya, and of terrorism in Mali and Nigeria, are evident along Niger's borders.

Militant groups operating in border areas of Niger tend to emanate from neighbouring countries, but they draw on some local support. There are currently two main zones of insurgent violence affecting pastoralists in Niger. The first zone spans northern Tillaberi and parts of western Tahoua region in south-west Niger, where there have been periodic cross-border attacks and raids from Gao region in Mali. This zone includes part of the Liptako-Gourma area (broadly, where the borders of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso meet) and extends to areas of Mali and Niger to the east and north-east. The second zone affected by insurgency is the Lake Chad Basin, south-east Niger, where Boko Haram attacks and the military campaign to counter Boko Haram have had severe impacts on the Diffa region.

The Boko Haram insurgency has had destructive impacts on many of the pastoralist communities around Lake Chad and south-east Diffa. The lake is a vital resource for pastoralism, farming, and fishing, and the combination of insurgency and government measures to combat it have severely

compromised food security and the economy of the Lake Chad Basin.⁸³ There has been large-scale displacement within and into Diffa and a major humanitarian crisis that persists today. In both these zones of insecurity there has been a degree of local recruitment and collaboration with terrorist groups – out of necessity, opportunistically, or due to ideological commitment – and some opposition. The areas of Niger affected by cross-border attacks and insurgency have been put under a state of emergency. In Tillabéri region, the affected departments are Abala, Ouallam, Bankilaré, and Ayorou.⁸⁴ The Nigerian military is deployed in these areas and a curfew and restrictions on mobility have been imposed, including a ban on motorcycles.

The larger-scale violence since 2012 has been between Daoussahak (part of Tuareg society) and Fulani communities on both sides of the porous Mali-Niger border.⁸⁵ This conflict dates

83 Attacks by Boko Haram spread from Borno and Yobe States in north-east Nigeria – where the sect originates – across the border into Diffa in 2013, then escalated in 2014-16.

84 Interviews in the prefecture of Tillabéri, 26 April 2017, and Ouallam, 27 April 2017.

85 The Daoussahak, or Idaksahak (their self-ascribed name), are nomadic pastoralists living mainly in the administrative circles of Menaka and northern Ansongo, Gao region of Mali. Their language is called Tadaksahak, a Songhay language that has completely different origins to Tamasheq but which exhibits heavy lexical borrowings. The Daoussahak have distinct geographical and linguistic origins to the Kel Tamasheq, but they are regarded as a 'distinct ethnic group and a dependent social com-

to the mid-1970s, when drought depleted pastoralists' herds and pushed some to raid the cattle of their neighbours. Violent conflict between the Daoussahak and Fulani resurfaced with the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger from 1990, when many Daoussahak joined the rebellions and again started raiding Fulani cattle. This led the Fulani to form a self-defence militia in 1997 to protect themselves against Tuareg, and especially Daoussahak, raiders.⁸⁶ The attacks continued even after the Tuareg rebellions of the early to mid-1990s in Mali and Niger had ended. According to the International Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the fighters in "méharist" units ("nomadic brigades") of the Malian army deployed in the area, "often recruited from the ranks of former rebels integrated into the army following the peace accords, [and] have been accused of either ignoring the criminal activities plaguing the region, including cattle theft,

munity' within Tuareg society, specifically part of the Kel-Ataram ("people of the west"). They were herdsmen for the nobility of the Iwellemmeden Tuareg and performed religious duties as a Maraboutic tribe. The Daoussahak have participated in most of the Tuareg rebellions. See: Christiansen-Bolli, Regula (2010), *A grammar of Tadaksahak, a northern Songhay language of Mali*, doctoral thesis, Leiden University Centre for Linguistics (LUCL), Leiden University. Online.

86 Interview with Boubacar Diallo at GAJEL offices, Niamey, 25 April 2017. The formation of a Fulani self-defence militia in March 1997 is also noted in 'Liptako-Gourma: epicentre of the Sahel crisis?' *Institute for Security Studies. Peace and Security Council Report*, Dakar, 30 June 2017.

or colluding with the criminals.”⁸⁷ The Pastoralists’ Association of North Tillabéri has documented many attacks carried out by Tuareg (mainly Daoussahak) raiders on pastoral Fulani camps from 1990 to 2016, with their records indicating that cumulatively, for the period 1990-2007, the Tuareg and the Malian security forces killed 316 Fulani pastoralists and stole thousands of livestock.⁸⁸ The attacks occurred in Gao region of Mali and as cross-border raids into northern Tillabéri region of Niger.⁸⁹ A 2007 agreement reached to stop fighting lasted only three years, until April 2010.⁹⁰ It is in this zone that reports are made about the recruitment of pastoral Fulanis into terrorist groups.⁹¹

87 ‘Liptako-Gourma: epicentre of the Sahel crisis?’ *Institute for Security Studies*. Peace and Security Council Report, Dakar, 30 June 2017. Online.

88 ‘Bilan non-exhaustive des attaques Touaregs et des FDS maliens sur les éleveurs Peulhs nigériens de 1990 à 2007, du 21 avril 2010 au 10 aout 2016’, Conseil des Éleveurs Nord Tillabéri. List obtained from Boubacar Diallo at GAJEL offices, Niamey, 25 April 2017.

89 The reality of cross-border attacks by the Daoussahak Tuareg was confirmed by pastoralists who were directly affected. For example, Hauwa Aliou, a Bodejo (Wodaabe) woman interviewed in Niamey, was from Abala (north Tillabéri) and her family had been impoverished by Daoussahak raids in the 1990s. She was begging for alms in Niamey with her niece. Niamey, 29 April 2017.

90 Fulani representatives list the names of 13 people killed in a Tuareg attack on a Fulani camp in Innabaguel, Niger, on 21 April 2010. It is unclear what triggered this attack.

91 Cocks, Tim and David Lewis, ‘Why Niger and Mali’s cattle herders turned to jihad’, *Reuters*, 12 November 2017. Accessed online, 13 November 2017.

Boko Haram’s violence in south-east Diffa is on a larger scale to that being perpetrated by militant groups along the borders of Tillabéri and Tahoua. The violence in both regions has adversely affected pastoralists; it has also to some extent involved them. There is some level of recruitment of Fulani pastoralists in the Liptako-Gourma area and along the Niger-Mali border, whereas in the Lake Chad Basin the pastoral Fulani have not tended to join Boko Haram. In eastern Diffa region, certain Fulani clans have collaborated with the insurgents to gain access to pasture, after other Fulani (notably the Wodaabe) were forcibly displaced by Boko Haram. Raiding between pastoralists – reportedly Tubu raiding camels owned by the Fulani in eastern Diffa – is also occurring, as the Boko Haram insurgency has encouraged an illicit livestock trade.⁹²

Cattle rustling, banditry and conflicts between pastoralists

For pastoralists in Niger, banditry and livestock theft pose risks along sections of the borders with Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Chad. Moreover, Fulani pastoralists in Tamou – southern Tillabéri region – which is relatively peaceful, stated that banditry was a significant problem to them during their transhumance between Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin, more so

92 Interview with Abdou Nino, a leader of the National Federation of Agro-Pastoralism in Niger, Niamey, 29 April 2017.

than the narrowing of transhumance routes.⁹³ In other contexts, raiding occurs between pastoral groups (or between farmers and pastoralists) during armed conflicts over control of land and water, or over local or regional politics. As discussed above, the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali in the 1990s led to raids on Fulani cattle. Rebellions by groups of Tubu in eastern Niger also led to clashes with the Fulani, in Diffa region.⁹⁴ This conflict was partially resolved through a peace accord, but the Boko Haram insurgency precipitated renewed violence between the Tubu and Fulani. Armed groups of Tubu are reported to have been raiding Fulani cattle and even to have clashed with the Fulani in Kabelawa IDP camp (a UNHCR-run camp in south-east Niger, near the border with Chad).⁹⁵

93 The majority of Fulani in Tamou are agro-pastoralists, from different clans (*Ienyi*), the Baribe and Sonebe reportedly the largest. Most have cross-border kinship links into neighbouring countries (*Ienyol* such as Gao'obe and Jelgobe, with a strong presence in northern Mali and northern Burkina Faso respectively were also present). Interviews in Tamou, 29 April 2017.

94 Interview with a leader of the National Federation of Agro-Pastoralism in Niger, Niamey, 29 April 2017.

95 Discussions with a senior UN official who had been on mission in Diffa region during a major Boko Haram attack on Bosso on 3 June 2016. This displaced an estimated 50,000 people from Bosso to Diffa town. He also reported on the Tubu-Fulani conflict. Niamey, 21 April 2017. The information on the Tubu raids was confirmed by pastoralist associations.

Farmer-herder conflicts in Niger and during international transhumance

Violence between farmers and pastoralists in Niger is relatively common, with loss of life reported in many of the clashes. The level of farmer-herder violence is much lower than in neighbouring northern Nigeria, but it is still a major security concern in Niger.⁹⁶ The trigger for conflict is usually the destruction of crops by livestock, sometimes due to cattle and small ruminants moving southwards on transhumance into agro-pastoral areas before crops have been harvested or just after they have been planted. Most conflicts are seasonal in nature and therefore somewhat predictable. They usually stem from disputes over land rights and natural resource access. The most common herder-farmer conflicts in Niger are between Fulani pastoralists and farmers from different ethnic backgrounds, especially Zarma, Hausa, and Mawri. All of them are Muslim. Serious disputes sometimes occur within Fulani agro-pastoral communities in Niger as well, between farmers and herders. These rarely become violent but occasionally cases have to be taken to

96 Farmer-herder conflicts have been reported as a significant issue in Niger for at least three decades. See Gado, Boureima Alpha (2002), 'Arbitration & Resolving Tenure Conflict in Boboye, Niger', pp. 157-169, in Toulin, C., P. L. Delville, & S. Traouré (eds.), *The Dynamics of Resource Tenure in West Africa*. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED, London) in association with James Currey publishers, Oxford.

the local authorities for resolution.⁹⁷

d. Conflict prevention and resolution

Although periodic farmer-herder clashes exist – some of them very violent – most disputes of this type in Niger are resolved peacefully through mediation between the communities involved. There are also land commissions, which intervene where there are disputes to establish who owns a certain land and for natural resource management. These are meant to be community based, chaired by the mayor and with representatives from concerned parties – including farmers, pastoralists, and traditional leaders.⁹⁸ In cases of crop damage caused by livestock, the commission will ask the conflicting parties to provide evidence of the value of the crops that were destroyed. Disputes are usually settled with the payment of compensation by the herder.

Conflicts between pastoral groups can be particularly difficult to mediate, especially where these involve cross-border attacks and there is a need to identify leaders from each side who are representative of those involved in the fighting (for example, Fulani and Daoussahak). Third party

mediation is often required (e.g. pastoralist associations and/or the state authorities). Fair judicial processes and access to justice are other important elements.

Recommendations

- To secure the remaining pasture land and transhumance routes, and secure pastoralists' tenure rights;
- To review and support the committees that manage natural resource access for farmers and herders, with the aim to reduce conflict;
- To promote women's participation in conflict resolution;
- To produce and better distribute animal feed for pastoralists during the dry season, at an affordable rate;
- To construct more watering points (small dams, ponds or reservoirs) and wells and bore holes in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas, and address water storage problems;
- To formulate policies, with farmers, pastoralists and local communities, to combat banditry and cattle rustling.

⁹⁷ Interviews with Fulani agro-pastoralists in Tamou, Tillaberi region, 29 April 2017.

⁹⁸ Interview at the Mayor's office in Ouallam, northern Tillaberi region, 27 April 2017.

CHAPTER 6: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Note: *Field research for this Chapter was carried out at intervals between July and September 2017 in the following states: Plateau, Kaduna, Kebbi, Katsina, Zamfara, Kwara, Niger, Bauchi and Gombe. Additional field research was conducted in February 2018 in Taraba and Adamawa. Developments that took place in these and other states after February 2018 are not covered. The Chapter, however, makes some reference to federal and state initiatives that have been introduced since February 2018 to address conflicts between herders and farmers. These references draw on consultations with government and non-government officials in Nigeria, with ECOWAS, UN and non-UN partners in Nigeria. As with the overall Issue Paper, field research in Nigeria focused on pastoralism as the main unit of analysis, with the aim to understand why conflicts involving pastoralists have escalated in Nigeria in recent years.*

Introduction

The relationship between farmers and pastoralists has deteriorated in most of Nigeria. Farmer-herder conflicts are claiming more lives in Nigeria than in the rest of West Africa combined. The violence extends beyond clashes between individual

herders and crop farmers and engulfs whole settlements and communities. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons have rendered these conflicts deadlier in recent years⁹⁹. Their cumulative death toll currently runs into thousands each year in Nigeria, often with hundreds killed in single episodes of violence. At the root of these conflicts is increased competition for rural resources and space. Pressure on land has increased mainly due to exponential population growth in Nigeria. With demographic increase, there is less land available to people even as more land is being brought into cultivation throughout the country, including in the far North. The Government's presence is not felt in many rural areas and there is limited accountability in the management of rural space. Moreover, states have often failed to address the needs of the population in an inclusive way, and conflicts between herders and farmers are often mixed up with local politics, frequently along ethno-religious lines. Land grabs – of communal land, farmland and what had been grazing land – by elites and agro-business also cause problems for small farmers and pastoralists in some states. In central and northern Nigeria, pastoralists have lost access to much land they

⁹⁹ Presentation by the ECOWAS Commission at the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting on Herders-Farmers Conflicts in West Africa held in Abuja on 26 April 2018.

previously used for grazing. In addition, transhumance routes are frequently blocked by the expansion of farmland. But even with the general increase in farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria, the situation varies between states. In some areas the relationship is peaceful, usually due to local efforts to manage access to land and water, ecological and demographic conditions and the history of pastoralism in specific states. In recent years, pastoralists in Nigeria have increasingly been migrating permanently or on seasonal transhumance southward from northern states in search of more favourable grazing conditions. This has increased pressure on farmers not only in the Middle Belt but also in places in southeast and southwest Nigeria, which previously had low populations of pastoralists. Deadly confrontations have ensued between herdsmen and farmers when animals trespass on farmland. Tensions are further reinforced by differences in ethnicity, culture and religion: the Fulani herders are Muslim while the populations in the South and in the Middle Belt are majority Christian. States and judicial authorities have been slow in mediating and resolving disputes before they spiral out of control.

In this context, human rights advocates are increasingly emphasizing the right of indigenous people to land

and its resources.¹⁰⁰ Proponents of this standpoint argue that the alienation of indigenous land for open and unregulated grazing may constitute a violation of indigenous rights to property and culture, especially in areas where pastoralism is not a major traditional occupation. Responding to the position that freedom of movement under the Nigerian Constitution allows pastoralists access to all and everywhere, they posit that freedom of movement is not an absolute right but is moderated, as permitted by law¹⁰¹. These stakeholders also argue that the pressure to establish grazing reserves in non-cattle producing states is an attempt by pastoralists to secure the land. As is the case in many other ECOWAS countries, the debate around access to land and free movement is one of the most contentious issues in Nigeria.

Given that animal movement across states is a central feature of farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria, addressing these conflicts will require constructive responses and policies at both federal and state levels. In some states urgent conflict resolution measures

¹⁰⁰ Information provided to UNOWAS by the UNCT/Nigeria.

¹⁰¹ Information provided to UNOWAS by the UNCT/Nigeria: While Section 41 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of movement, Section 43 provides for a right to property, particularly land and its resources. The freedom of movement is limited by the requirement to respect private and/or communal property rights and the responsibility not to trespass.

are needed; in other states, initiatives to prevent the emergence of conflict are essential. Overall, robust efforts are needed to address the rampant impunity of herder-farmer conflicts in the country. Despite years of attacks and widespread carnage, few perpetrators have been arrested and brought to account. Moreover, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes increasing and significant population displacements caused by herder-farmer clashes, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It estimates that over 62,000 persons were internally displaced in Nigeria in 2017 as a result of such clashes.

a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in Nigeria

According to available data, Nigeria has the highest number of livestock in West Africa, with the number of cattle estimated at 20.5 million¹⁰². It is also likely that Nigeria has the highest number of pastoralists in West Africa, as colonial-era census data indicates¹⁰³. Most Nigerian pastoralists are

102 Accurate data on current livestock numbers in Nigeria does not exist. It has been decades since a comprehensive livestock survey was carried out in the country. FAOSTAT figures are imputed from old surveys. However, the approximation is that in 2016 there were 20.5 million cattle, 42 million sheep, 74 million goats, and 279,802 camels in Nigeria. <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL>, accessed 22 March 2018.

103 The Nigerian census no longer records data on


Fulani by ethnicity, but Fulani pastoralists are *not* a homogenous group. In Nigeria there are many different Fulani clans, sub-clans, local Fulani cultures and dialects, and variations in herding practices.

There is lack of documentation regarding nomadic pastoralism and transhumance in Nigeria. Consequently, there are no adequate records of nomadic pastoralists or of those involved in cross border transhumance. There is lack of information about the carrying capacities of their destination areas. As a result, it is difficult to recognize when the carrying capacities of these areas have been reached or overstretched.

Fulani and non-Fulani pastoralists

While the majority of pastoralists in Nigeria are Fulani, there are variations within the Fulani population. There are different herding practices, such as between family-based pastoralists and hired herders who rear other people's cattle. Pastoral mobility involving small family units centred on the rearing and reproduction of the family herd may be less conflict-prone, as relations are maintained

ethnicity or religion, but population censuses in 1951-3 recorded 3.6 million Fulani in Nigeria and British Cameroon. Not all these were pastoralists but they accounted for more than half the Fulani population in West Africa at that time. See Stenning, Derrick (1959), *Savannah Nomads: A Study of the Wodaabe Pastoral Fulani of Western Bornu Province, Northern Region, Nigeria*. International African Institute, London: Oxford University Press.



Map No. 4229 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS August 2014

Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

Figure 9: Map of Nigeria. Source: United Nations.

with local agricultural communities across family lines. In contrast, where young men are given control of livestock and they migrate without their families or supervision from elders, they are more prone to destroying crops without seeking redress. They often fail to negotiate access to pasture with agricultural communities or even with local Fulani populations. These are challenges that have dramatically increased in recent years¹⁰⁴.

It is not only the Fulani who rear animals on an extensive basis. In different parts of Nigeria there are non-104 Yet family-based pastoralism and transhumance still exist in Nigeria.

Fulani communities that keep cattle and other livestock. Some have their own traditions of livestock rearing, notably the diverse pastoralist group in Borno and Yobe States – while others acquired cattle through association with the pastoral Fulani usually by working as herdsmen of boys and getting paid in cattle. Most of the conflict is experienced with nomadic pastoralism not pastoralism as such.

Migratory trends

Nigeria's sizeable livestock economy can be explained by the country's large population - currently estimat-

ed at about 190 million (and expected to double by 2050)¹⁰⁵ - and its ecological conditions, as most of the country is suitable for livestock rearing. Historically, pastoralism was more concentrated in northern Nigeria, in the savannah zones, but there has been a growing 'migratory drift' of pastoralists southwards into sub-humid and humid zones of central and southern Nigeria. This process has been going on for decades, with pastoralists reaching tropical parts of the country along the Atlantic seaboard at least half a century ago¹⁰⁶. However, this trend has accelerated over the past decade, and with the southward extension of pastoralism, new pressures have emerged in the South. Consequently, pastoralism has become a national issue. It tends to be more recent Fulani migrants into the South collectively labelled Mbororo that are associated with the upsurge in conflict. Some observers note that the Udawa Fulani who have been steadily entering Nigeria from other West African countries were the first Fulani pastoralists to carry military grade weapons and also retain militia to guard them and fight against crop farmers. These observers note that

105 Census data in Nigeria has a high margin of error. Hence, population estimates and projections for Nigeria need to be treated with caution. UN World Population Prospects 2017, <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/>.

106 Blench, Roger (1994) 'The expansion and adaptation of Fulbe Pastoralism to subhumid and humid conditions in Nigeria'. *Cahiers d'Études africaines*, 133-135: 197-212.

the military used to eject the Udawa Fulani pastoralists from states of the North like Gombe from where they entered states of the Middle Belt¹⁰⁷.

Pastoral lifestyles

In Nigeria, as elsewhere in West Africa, pastoral lifestyles vary, from nomadic pastoralists to settled or semi-settled agro-pastoralists. Those with purely nomadic lifestyle are now a minority among pastoralists in Nigeria. Nomadic pastoralists typically have no permanent settlement and do not own land, although some are now starting to buy land. More common in Nigeria are semi-settled, transhumant pastoralists. They tend to have settlements or camps on the edge of villages or their own houses in villages, but they retain a level of mobility and move the livestock between pastures for daily grazing and on seasonal transhumance. Even for agro-pastoralists who combine farming and livestock rearing, part of the family remains in a permanent camp or village, while herdsman or boys take the cattle and sheep out for grazing. In general, pastoralism depends on good relations with farming communities, upon whom they rely for access to land and water. In Nigeria, however, this has become more difficult due to demographic pressures,

107 R. Blench, S. Longtau, U. Hassan and M. Walsh (2006) *The Role of Traditional Rulers in Conflict Prevention and Mediation in Nigeria*. (DFID Report).

more land being brought into cultivation and increased civil insecurity (communal violence, banditry, insurgency).

Transhumance patterns

Most of the transhumance occurs within Nigeria's borders, but there is also cross-border transhumance. Pastoralists tend to move southwards during the dry season and northwards during the rainy season, often within an orbit of about 100-200 kilometres. Most transhumance occurs within northern Nigeria - it is not necessarily between northern and southern Nigeria – but transhumance and permanent migration from the far North to the far South has increased in the past few years. There are exceptions to this north-south movement, notably when transhumance is towards rivers or other water points, which are dry season resources that attract pastoralists from different directions. The River Benue and River Niger and their various tributaries are key water sources, and, alongside the rivers, there is good pasture. The Hadejia-Nguru wetlands in Jigawa and Yobe States and Lake Chad in Borno State are also important water resources for farmers and pastoralists in northern Nigeria. The desiccation of Lake Chad over the past half-century has had an adverse effect on pastoral livelihoods in northeast Nigeria and for pastoralists in other countries bor-

dering the lake including Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

There is cross-border transhumance between Nigeria and neighbouring countries. In the ECOWAS region, there is significant pastoral mobility from the western axis of Nigeria into the Republic of Benin and to Togo, Ghana and beyond. In some cases, this is a permanent move due to pressures in Nigeria rather than seasonal transhumance, but there is reportedly migration into south-west Nigeria¹⁰⁸. There is pastoral mobility in both directions across the northern border between Nigeria and Niger, usually between dry and rainy seasons. However, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that at least some pastoralists in Niger are no longer crossing the border because of the widespread insecurity in Nigeria and the devaluation of the Naira. The latter has reduced the attractiveness of Nigerian livestock markets for pastoralists from the Republic of Niger seeking to sell livestock in Nigeria. Cross-border transhumance from Niger now appears to be more limited to certain states and routes, depending on security, and therefore avoiding the insurgency in Borno State and the rampant banditry in Zamfara State.

Some pastoralists do still move

¹⁰⁸ This movement was recorded during fieldwork for this study in Kwara and Kebbi States, for example.

southwards from Niger into northern Nigeria during the dry season. There is some coordination between specific states like Katsina and their counterparts in Niger regarding transhumance movements, which run in both directions. There is also transhumance between Nigeria and Cameroon, but patterns vary depending on the security situation (see below) and the section of the border, which runs all the way from the Atlantic seaboard to Lake Chad. Cameroon is part of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and therefore the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol does not govern this movement.

b. Challenges facing pastoralists

Note: *Field research for this Chapter on Nigeria does not cover the southern part of Nigeria and Benue State in the North Central/Middle Belt, which has witnessed significant violence in the first half of 2018; fieldwork was carried out at intervals between July and September 2017 in Plateau, Kaduna, Kebbi, Katsina, Zamfara, Kwara, Niger, Bauchi and Gombe states. Additional field research was conducted in February 2018 in Taraba and Adamawa.*

Blocked transhumance routes and loss of grazing reserves

There are many challenges facing pastoralists in Nigeria. Transhumance

routes are in practice not well protected and are often cultivated or blocked. This includes the cattle routes used by herders on a day-to-day basis when they are taking the animals for grazing in the morning and returning to the camp or village in the evening. In the South, the infrastructure to regulate the relationship between pastoralists and farmers does not exist.

The 1965 law establishing grazing reserves in the then Northern Region was ‘inherited’ by individual states in northern Nigeria after the regions were divided into states in 1967. The grazing reserves are therefore under the jurisdiction of northern states, not of the Federal Government. Most grazing reserves in northern Nigeria now only exist on paper¹⁰⁹. An example, which has regional implications for south-west Nigeria, is the loss of much of the Bobi Grazing Reserve in Niger State, which was a major grazing area¹¹⁰. The Bobi Grazing Reserve was equipped by the Federal Government with facilities for pastoralists, but most of it has been turned into farmland.¹¹¹ The UNCT/Nigeria, on

¹⁰⁹ *The Grazing Reserves Law, 1965*. Enacted by the Legislature of Northern Nigeria. The document is reproduced in *Journal of Nomadic Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Migrant Groups*, No. 4, 2001, pp. 85–91. National Commission for Nomadic Education, Kaduna, Nigeria.

¹¹⁰ Fieldwork was carried in Niger State, including in Bobi Grazing Reserve, for this study in August 2017.

¹¹¹ Fieldwork was carried in Niger State, including

the other hand, notes that the Bobi Grazing Reserve was abandoned by pastoralists due to deteriorating infrastructure; as a result some part of it were converted into farmland. The loss of grazing reserves and other pastoral land in northern Nigeria also explains why more pastoralists have moved to southern parts of the country, where grazing reserves never existed but where ecological changes now mean the South is more accessible than a generation ago.

Banditry and cattle rustling

Banditry is a serious form of insecurity in parts of central and northern Nigeria that has cost many lives. The modern history of banditry in northern Nigeria allegedly goes back to the early 1990s, as armed bandits from Chad entered the country across the north-eastern border¹¹². The first bandits and rustlers of cattle were the militia retained by the Udawa¹¹³. The Nigerian government played a vital role in controlling the flow of banditry from Chad, as Nigerian security agencies tightened security along the border in the mid- to late 1990s. After the Chadian banditry declined, some locals stepped into this space and took up banditry, cattle rustling

in Bobi Grazing Reserve, for this study in August 2017.

112 Interviews with a Fulani (Wodaabe) leader residing in Mubi, northern Adamawa State, and with a senior leader of the vigilante group Tabital Pulaaku, Adamawa State, September 2017.

113 Blench et.al (2006).

and robbery. The local bandits and victims were mainly Fulani, and in response Fulani pastoralists set up vigilante groups. These groups have been combatting rural banditry in Taraba and Adamawa States, often working with local authorities. They reduced the incidents of banditry in much of Taraba and Adamawa, but banditry persists in other parts of northern Nigeria. The North-West is now the worst affected zone, notably Zamfara and Kaduna States. In Katsina State, the government managed to contain the problem. The state government is also reported to have re-opened and secured some of the transhumance routes and grazing areas for pastoralists and to be seeking to increase nomadic education for boys and girls¹¹⁴. Consequently, violence is now relatively low in Katsina.

In contrast, there has been endemic, large-scale violence in Zamfara State that forced the pastoralist population to leave large areas of the state. Gangs of armed bandits have occupied swathes of southern Zamfara. The violence reached a high level in 2012-2013 and has persisted intermittently since then, with frequent large-scale attacks on villages. The number of fatalities in the Zamfara violence is likely to run into the thousands. The violence also spread to Kaduna State, with bandits occupying

114 In nomadic communities, parents are sometimes more reluctant to send their boys than girls to school, because boys of school age are expected to help rear the cattle and/or sheep.

part of bordering Birnin Gwari LGA. The bandits are organised and heavily armed; their criminal activities include the stealing of cattle, kidnaping for ransom, and armed robbery. Many of the bandits were identified as being Fulani while victims were Fulani and Hausa. Some of the political elites in Zamfara sponsored vigilante groups to confront the bandits but they mobilised these groups against the local Fulani population, creating generalised violence between Fulani pastoralists and Hausa farmers that has claimed many lives¹¹⁵. Fulani pastoralists claim they do not support the bandits, as they are also victims of such banditry, provoking their exodus from southern Zamfara to other parts of Nigeria, especially to central and northern states. The stirring up of inter-ethnic, farmer-herder violence in reaction to the banditry ended up scattering 'innocent' and 'criminal' elements from within the Fulani population; thus, the problem of banditry expanded beyond Zamfara. Subsequently, pastoralists who were displaced by the conflict and then returned to Zamfara discovered their grazing land being cultivated by farmers and their homes destroyed. This became a source of tension. Some pastoralists were accommodated as internally displaced persons

115 Presentation by Senator Saidu Mohammed Dansadau, who explained how he sponsored and mobilised the vigilantes. Conference on Rural Banditry organised by the Centre for Democratic Development and Training (CEDDERT), Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 14 September 2017.

around Gusau. The government of Zamfara State has directed that land belonging to pastoralists who fled be returned to them.

The Boko Haram insurgency and the Lake Chad Basin

Unlike armed groups in Mali, Boko Haram does not have a strong social base among pastoralists. Boko Haram is ethnically mixed, but the main social base of the sect is Kanuri, who are often rivals to the pastoralist Shuwa Arab and Fulani communities. However, there are Kanuri subgroups that are pastoralists, many of whom have been raided by Boko Haram. Borno State has the highest ethno-linguistic diversity among pastoralist groups in Nigeria, including Shuwa Arab, Fulani, Buduma (Yedina), Koyam (or Kwayam), Badawi, and Tubu. In Borno, the two largest of these, in terms of the human population and cattle ownership, are the Shuwa Arabs and pastoral Fulani: they speak different languages (Shuwa Arabic and Fulfulde) but have a close relationship, with intermarriage and mixed settlements in some areas¹¹⁶. In the waters and marshes around Lake Chad the Buduma (Yedina) are substantial in number and rear a type of cattle adapted to

116 Census data in Nigeria no longer captures ethnicity or religion, so the exact pastoralist population is difficult to estimate. In 1996 Braukämper estimated the Shuwa Arabs at half a million in Nigeria in an informative study of their history and mode of life: Braukämper, Ulrich "Strategies of Environmental Adaptation and Patterns of Transhumance of the Shuwa Arabs in the Nigerian Chad Basin", *Nomadic Peoples* 39 (1996): 53-68.

the lacustrine environment, the Kuri breed.

Northeast Nigeria, including the Lake Chad Basin, is an important agricultural and pastoral zone, and farmers and pastoralists have been badly affected by the violence. Fighting between Boko Haram and the Nigerian and regional armed forces rendered many farming and grazing areas unsafe. Boko Haram became predatory, raiding pastoralists for cattle and sheep and farmers for grains and other food supplies. Ethnic groups such as the Shuwa Arabs and some Fulani clans were in direct conflict with Boko Haram and sustained casualties while fighting the insurgents. Reportedly, several thousand pastoralists have been killed in the conflict, tens of thousands have been displaced, many losing their livestock and ending up destitute, often as IDPs or refugees. Those who were attacked by Boko Haram tended to lose their wealth, but others were able to move out of the conflict zone with their livestock into neighbouring countries, including Cameroon or nearby states in Nigeria such as Gombe, Adamawa, and Taraba, thus generating pressures on resources in those areas and elsewhere. While most pastoralists in the conflict zone were affected adversely by the Boko Haram insurgency, a minority did profit from it. Pastureland that became available as other pastoralists left was seized by groups willing to cooperate with Boko Haram, particularly in the Lake

Chad wetlands. Some pastoralists allegedly collaborated with Boko Haram for protection and unhindered access to pastures, while also paying for this access with livestock. While Boko Haram has been weakened in most areas of northeastern Nigeria, serious insecurity persists in rural areas of Borno State. Pastoralists and farmers have been returning to areas liberated from Boko Haram (notably in Adamawa and Yobe, and parts of southern Borno) but the displacement crisis continues as many rural areas of Borno are still too dangerous to return to.

Social problems

There are also social problems facing pastoralists in Nigeria. The behaviour of herdsmen has been noted as a problem in some areas, particularly where young men or children are given responsibility for rearing large herds of cattle that they cannot properly control. Reportedly, there are challenges with drug and alcohol abuse by some of the herders when they go into town, particularly in southern and central Nigeria. This often happens when the young men are migrating individually, without their families or community leaders. When the herdsmen are in town they may leave the livestock with young boys, often leading to the destruction of crops, as the animals are not properly tended and therefore encroach onto farms. Reports of rape by migratory herdsmen of female farmers in their

fields have also become common. In some cases, these young men are rearing their family herds, taking the livestock on long distance transhumance, while in other cases they are hired herdsmen.

c. Security challenges and causes and drivers of conflict

Most farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria are two-way: both pastoralists and farmers have been adversely affected. The large-scale violence that is now prevalent between the two communities is the result of a more complex dynamic with variations in each case. Understanding local histories and political and social contexts is vital if these conflicts are to be resolved. Farmer-herder conflicts in contemporary Nigeria often merge into inter-ethnic or ethno-religious violence, as in Adamawa, Benue, Kwara, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba, Zamfara, and other states. This generalises the violence between communities, taking it beyond clashes between cattle herders and crop farmers in the fields to wider ethnic or ethno-religious conflagrations. Severe pressure on traditional grazing lands in northern Nigeria and insecurity across large areas of the North have encouraged more pastoralists to move southwards¹¹⁷. There

117 The expansion of pastoralism from the savanna into humid zones towards the coast has occurred even in areas that were previously unfavourable to pastoralists due to the prevalence

are now acute tensions between pastoralists and farmers in southern Nigeria and low-level violence is widespread. This is generally caused by herdsmen driving their cattle onto farms and destroying crops, often deliberately. It seems to be migratory Fulani who are doing this, generally young men, not the Fulani pastoralists already resident in the South. At times the problem is caused by the blockage of national transhumance routes and lack of grazing land, but in non-traditional grazing areas where the population is agricultural, these may not exist. In such cases access to pasture has to be negotiated with local communities, who the new waves of pastoralists to the South have no prior connection or contact with. As already discussed, there are reportedly social problems among some of the herdsmen involved in these conflicts, including alcohol and drug consumption in town when they are supposed to be caring for the livestock.

The recent wave of Fulani herdsmen into southern Nigeria are collectively called 'Mbororo', but that is a general term for transhumant Fulani pastoral-

of trypanosomiasis, a disease carried by the tsetse fly that kills zebu cattle. The southward movement of pastoralists had also been constrained because tropical vegetation, particularly tropical forest, was largely unsuitable for cattle that were adapted to savanna environments. These conditions have changed because there is now easy access to veterinary drugs – nearly all pastoralists in Nigeria now self-medicate their cattle, including against trypanosomiasis – and large-scale deforestation has degraded the vegetation cover in much of southern Nigeria.

ists. They come from different clans in the North, but they generally migrate if pasture is limited in their areas of origin or if they are denied access due to insecurity or local politics. In the case of south-western Nigeria, the origins of the Mbororo tend to be in the North-West. Their movement into the South-West in significant numbers began only about a decade ago, but they were preceded by earlier waves of Fulani pastoralists, beginning in the mid-twentieth century, who successfully integrated with local communities. In southwest Nigeria (including Kwara State) the earlier groups of Fulani pastoralists are widely referred to as Borgu'en, and they are by now socially integrated and speak Yoruba and other local languages. There is therefore a need to recognise the diversity of pastoralists in Nigeria and identify different patterns of mobility. The level of herder-farmer violence in the South is still at a much lower level than in northern Nigeria. More field research is needed on the situation in the southern part of Nigeria and recent clashes recorded there between herders and farmers.

In the North-West, the highest levels of farmer-herder violence are in Zamfara and Kaduna States, areas that have been devastated by extremely vicious clashes between communities and by banditry, and ensuing loss of life. There are currently lower levels of violence in other parts of the North-West (e.g. Sokoto, Katsina, Ke-

bbi, Kano, Jigawa). Nonetheless, tensions are present, pastoral livelihoods are under pressure, and violence does occur. The difference is that local authorities may be more proactive in conflict prevention and less divided along sectional lines. The Katsina State government, for example, is attempting to regulate pastoralism by identifying grazing land and maintaining transhumance routes. It has also clamped down on banditry. In contrast, banditry, cattle rustling, and farmer-herder conflicts are still causing serious problems in neighbouring Zamfara.

In the North-East, the highest levels of violence between pastoralists and farmers are in Adamawa and Taraba States. There are lower levels of violence in Gombe, Bauchi, and Yobe, but pressures on pastoral livelihoods are still acute in these states. The situation in Borno is somewhat distinct; although there have been farmer-herder clashes in the past, the main problem is the destructive impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency, which has devastated herding and farming activities in Borno and the Lake Chad Basin. Parts of northern Adamawa and Yobe have also been affected by Boko Haram, with knock-on effects in other parts of the North-East as pastoralists and farmers are blocked from the conflict zone or displaced.

Government policies make a difference and clearly affect community

relations on the ground, as the cases of neighbouring Gombe and Taraba States suggest. In Gombe, the state government and local authorities are more inclined to dialogue with pastoralists and farmers. Traditional leaders attempt to coordinate farming and pastoralism, such as by announcing dates for when transhumance may begin and when crops have to be harvested by. Violence is at a low level in Gombe and traditional leaders and some state officials are actively involved in conflict prevention. This contrasts with the situation in Taraba State, where there is more polarisation along ethnic lines, with high levels of violence. There is an ethno-religious aspect to conflicts in southern Taraba, between Tiv, Jukun, Fulani, and Kuteb, with farmer-herder conflicts intertwined with local politics. In general, both farmers and pastoralists are severely affected by violent conflict. In conflict flashpoints, villages are vulnerable to attack by herdsmen during sustained periods of violence. At the same time, it is not uncommon for pastoralists to be killed by hostile farmers and their livestock either stolen or shot. Furthermore, where farmer-herder disputes escalate, pastoralist camps have been attacked by villagers resulting in heavy casualties. Sexual and gender-based violence has become frequent and more extreme on both sides, with a high death toll among women and children in some of the attacks on pastoralists and farmers alike.

There has already been serious devastating violence in Benue State since 2013. When the State Government passed legislation to regulate open grazing, pastoralists opposed to it threatened to attack Benue and in one case in January 2018 killed over 73 persons. There have also been clashes in other parts of Benue State, notably in Agatu between the Idoma and Fulani. Heavily armed militia associated with Fulani herdsmen attacked farming communities in Agatu in February 2016 and committed atrocities, killing over 300 and displacing whole villages some of which are now occupied by pastoralists.

In November and December 2017 there was also mass violence in villages near Numan, Adamawa State. It reportedly started with a homicide in which a Bachama farmer was murdered, allegedly during a dispute with a Fulani herdsman. The case was reportedly not resolved by the police or state authorities. Several Bachama villages then mobilised *en masse* against the resident Fulani population in the area, attacking camps and settlements and killing more than 70 Fulani people, most of them children¹¹⁸. Two weeks later the Fulani launched a reprisal attack on Bachama villages and killed scores of people.

In northcentral Nigeria, the highest

¹¹⁸ Documentary records and photographic evidence, November 2017.

levels of farmer-herder violence are in Plateau and Benue States, but high levels of violence have also been recorded in parts of Nassarawa, Niger, and Kwara States. In parts of central Nigeria mass violence has become endemic, leading to social dislocation and widespread instability. The areas worst affected by farmer-herder violence are among the most violent parts of Nigeria. However, even in zones of conflict there are examples of peaceful coexistence between farmers and pastoralists, due to proactive conflict prevention measures in specific communities. In other areas, efforts at conflict resolution have failed or not existed. Providing more effective and structured avenues for conflict prevention at the local level would be important, but fundamentally the livelihoods of farmers and pastoralists need to be supported in a more constructive and balanced way.

d. Conflict prevention and resolution

Urgent efforts are needed at the federal and state levels, in close coordination with local populations, to respond to heightened conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in Nigeria. Lessons from how similar conflicts have been prevented or resolved in other countries in the region, and across Africa, could inform Nigeria's response. This can also include lessons from how other coun-

tries have modernized, transformed and regulated their livestock sector and animal movement for the benefit of both pastoralist and farming communities (e.g. Brazil).

While a security approach is essential at first to stop the violence and restore rule of law, significant attention needs to be placed on understanding the political, historical, economic, human rights, ethnic, religious, and demographic drivers and dynamics of conflicts between herders and farmers.

Responses to herder-farmer conflicts at the federal and state levels

Federal responses

Over the years, the Federal Government of Nigeria has taken several measures to address the escalating situation between farmers and herders in the country. In 2014, the Government established an inter-ministerial committee to recommend measures for the restoration of grazing reserves. In 2015, a committee set up by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture to formulate a comprehensive livestock development plan recommended, among other things, the development of grazing reserves as a means of reducing the conflicts between herders and farmers. In 2016, the Government announced plans to appropriate land across

states for the grazing of cattle. However, these plans did not materialize due to fierce opposition from some interest groups. In May 2018, in addition to security-focused measures, the Federal Government announced a support package for reconstructing destroyed infrastructures and a ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan in 10 pilot states¹¹⁹.

Yet, the impact of the Government's efforts to address herder-farmer conflicts is yet to be felt. Moreover, impunity remains rampant: few of the perpetrators of these conflicts, and the massive killings recorded, have been prosecuted or punished. This general impunity has made both the farmers and pastoralists lose faith in the legal system and take the law into their own hands. Government committees set up to address the conflict, as well as independent researchers and experts, have put forward various recommendations. These recommendations focus on the re-establishment of security in the rural areas through more effective control of arms circulation; the establishment of pastures and/or grazing reserves; the banning of open grazing; and the enhancement of conflict resolution measures.

State responses

Since 2016, there have been legis-

119 According to the Federal Government, Naira 10 billion has been allocated for rehabilitation in states affected by the herders-farmers conflict, while about Naira 180 billion will be devoted to the ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan.

lative initiatives by some Nigerian states to enact laws preventing open grazing to address the farmer-herder conflicts and curb violence. Four Nigerian states – Benue, Edo, Ekiti and Taraba¹²⁰ – have so far enacted laws or are in the process of finalizing bills for this purpose. There is however disagreement between the Federal Government and the states concerned in terms of the implementation of such legislation.

In 2017, the Benue State parliament passed the Open Grazing Prohibition and Establishment of Ranching Bill, signed into law by the Governor on 22 May 2017¹²¹. A six-month grace period was given for further sensitization before the Law was operationalized on 1 November 2017. The Law was resisted by the Fulani-dominated Cattle Breeders Socio-Cultural Association *Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore*, which demanded its suspension. The Association claimed that the law required a change in culture and way of life practiced by Fulani populations for

120 Benue State: A Law to Prohibit Open Rearing and Grazing of Livestock and Provide for the Establishment of Ranches and Livestock Administration, Regulation and Control and for Other Matters Connected Therewith, 2017'; Edo State: A Bill for A Law to Establish the Edo State Control of Nomadic Cattle Rearing/Grazing Law and for Other Purposes; Ekiti State: The Prohibition of Cattle and Other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti 2016 Law; Taraba State: Anti-Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Bill 2017.

121 According to the Benue State Government, the law to prohibit open rearing and grazing of livestock also makes provision for the establishment of ranches and livestock administration.

centuries. Some civil society organizations also criticized some clauses of the Law that limited or compromised access to land for livestock purposes. The resistance to the Benue Law prompted violent attacks by herdsmen on farming communities along the Benue Valley on 1 January 2018, resulting in loss of lives and property. Continued clashes continued in Benue State throughout the months of January and February of 2018. According to the Governor of Benue State, the crisis has resulted in the displacement of about 200 000 individuals¹²². The implication of this and broader responses to the crisis are currently being assessed.

The Taraba State government announcement of its own anti-open grazing law was followed by mass violence on the Mambilla Plateau in June 2017, in south-east Taraba State, near the border with Cameroon. Ethnic Mambilla, Kaka, and Kambu farmers attacked Fulani settlements in an attempt to expel them from the area after more than a century of residence, killing hundreds of people and forcing many across the border into Cameroon as refugees. The violence was allegedly politically motivated, to seize land, and occurred along ethnic rather than religious lines (there were reportedly Muslims and Christians involved in the attacks on the predomi-

nantly Muslim Fulani).

As fieldwork for this Chapter on Nigeria was only carried out in one of the four states concerned with the anti-grazing laws (Taraba), more research and analysis are needed with regard to these laws. While some commentators argue that the enactment of regulations against open-grazing prevent violence, others underscore the opposite.

United Nations responses

In late February 2018, a UN inter-agency rapid assessment mission deployed to some of the affected areas in Benue and Nasarawa states. The mission found that the humanitarian response across all sites was inadequate. Beyond longer-term development concerns, it identified sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and food insecurity as serious issues. Women and children represent about 80% of the internally displaced (IDP) population, with many female-headed households devoid of any form of income-generating activity. Sexual violence, transactional sex, early marriages and physical violence were identified as some of the threats faced by displaced women and girls.

Drawing on the February 2018 mission, the UN Country Team in Nigeria (UNDP, UNHCR and FAO) has solicited funding to support the Government's efforts to design and implement measures that promote peace

¹²² Presentation to UNCT and International Partners by Governor Ortom of Benue in Abuja, February 2018.

and development in conflict affected communities in Benue and Nasarawa States, primarily in four areas: protection, monitoring and response; economic empowerment; peacebuilding; regional dimension.

Conflicts between herders and farmers in Nigeria raise questions about the applicability of national, regional and international instruments relating to human rights and the rule of law; about state versus federal powers; and about the extent to which certain national responses are consistent with regional instruments.

One recommendation of this Paper is for in-depth analysis to be conducted on the legal and constitutional issues linked to herder-farmer conflicts and the applicability in Nigeria of the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance, as well as other relevant instruments. There is great attention placed on these issues in Nigeria now, with increased pressure on the Federal Government to enforce the rule of law, stop violence and bring perpetrators to justice.

One question that has been tabled by the Nigerian Government is whether transhumance, in its current form, is sustainable in a country like Nigeria where the population is set to double by 2050 and where desert encroachment persists in the North¹²³. The Gov-

¹²³ There are concerns that pastoralism and transhumance drive desertification in the Sahelian

ernment has proposed ranching as a response to stop transhumance and thereby reduce violent clashes between herders and farmers.¹²⁴

Farmers and pastoralists alike suffer from the lack of enforcement of existing laws. Without clear directives regulating the management of land, water, and transhumance, disputes and violence between herders and farmers intensify.

Recommendations

All the recommendations listed should take into consideration gender issues and women's representation in terms of policy-making and practical interventions on herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria. Women and girls face related but also specific challenges within their communities; they can sometimes have influence over the youths who are the main protagonists of the conflicts.

Short to medium term

- To support efforts at the federal and state levels to stop the violence associated with herders-farmers clashes,

zone, hence measures are needed to explore ways to address this in northern Nigeria, thereby curbing the current southward movement of transhumance.

¹²⁴ Presentation by the Nigerian Government at the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting on Herders-Farmers Conflicts in West Africa held in Abuja on 26 April 2018.

by reinforcing security, community dialogue and accountability, while respecting national and international human rights obligations;

- To undertake further field-research on pastoralism-related security and human rights issues in affected states in the Middle Belt, South-East and South-West, documenting current challenges and proposing immediate and long-term options for addressing them;
- To establish capacity for early warning analysis and human rights risk assessment to better understand the trends and dynamics of conflict and to inform policy development and responses;
- To establish or reinforce conflict management committees in all Local Government Areas (LGAs) where tensions or disputes arise between pastoralists and farmers. These committees should include male and female representatives of farmers and pastoralists and be tasked with preventing, mediating, and resolving conflicts. Federal oversight, or some type of neutral arbitration, may be beneficial at the state level;
- To analyze the legal and constitutional issues linked to herders-farmers conflicts and the applicability to Nigeria of the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance, and other relevant instruments.

Long-term

- To study and propose different options for modernizing, transforming and regulating the livestock sector and animal production movement in Nigeria that are beneficial to both farmers and herders and other communities concerned; to assess what technical, financial and infrastructure needs and partnerships are required for each option, in the short, medium and long-term; to draw lessons from other countries that have experience in this area (e.g. Brazil). The study should also consider best practice from managing pastoralists-farmers relations in some Nigerian states (e.g. Gombe, Katsina) as well as in other ECOWAS Member States;
- To study the impact of conflicts between herders and farmers in Nigeria on (i) women and their economic empowerment, and (ii) on indigenous communities' rights to land and culture; to propose actions and options;
- To support the Nigerian authorities in organizing consultations with government and non-governmental stakeholders, and external actors as needed, to deliberate on the options emanating from the studies mentioned in the previous two recommendations.

OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Review, implement, and update as necessary, the 1998 ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance and the 2013 Nouakchott Declaration on Pastoralism (Member States that are signatories to it).
2. Sensitize populations to existing transhumance regulation in ECOWAS Member States for the purpose of national implementation.
3. Support ECOWAS in developing a regional communications strategy to raise awareness about herders-farmers relations and ways to promote peaceful co-existence, including training for journalists in ECOWAS Member States on fair reporting of these issues.
4. Review and/or adjust existing national and regional transhumance routes. Identify and demarcate transhumance routes with beacons and legally protect them, utilizing technology (such as GPS) and deploying rangers or security personnel to secure the routes, when feasible.
5. Promote cross-border cooperation among security services in countries in West Africa and the Sahel to promote synergy, intelligence-sharing and joint action.
6. Facilitate the coordination of pastoralist activities with those of crop farmers to mitigate conflicts by establishing or strengthening local community committees on conflict prevention and resolution as provided for in the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance; provide training and education for these committees on conflict resolution and natural resources governance.
7. Undertake concrete actions to prevent and address the human rights abuses and violations occurring within the context of herders-farmers conflict through the use of a human rights-based approach in all preventive and response efforts. Ensure systematic accountability for perpetrators of crimes and reparations to victims in line with national and international human rights standards.
8. Strengthen the role and participation of women and youth as peacebuilders for community-driven development; strengthen the roles of women in agricultural and pastoral production.
9. Strengthen national livestock movement governance, including identification and traceability mechanisms, and establish or re-

energize local and national networks or committees to manage, monitor and appraise transhumance.

10. Identify, develop and implement cross-border regional programs on transhumance infrastructure along identified transhumance corridors (e.g. bore holes and transhumance cluster parks to provide animal feed, water, resting points, veterinary and observatory services).

11. Explore partnerships with the international community and the private sector to drill more bore holes (solar powered) in strategic locations in West Africa and the Sahel, to improve the dry season resilience of pastoralists, thereby coordinating transhumance movements with the farming cycle to avoid damaging crops.

12. Devise a long-term strategy for addressing the effect of climate change - including water scarcity, deforestation and soil erosion - on the livelihoods and peaceful coexistence of pastoralists and farmers in West Africa and the Sahel; review existing studies on this topic and/or produce an updated assessment with recommended action.

13. Boost and extend the reach of the Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (*Projet Régional*

d'Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel, PRAPS, the World Bank-funded, ECOWAS-WAEMU-led project with CILSS coordination) and comparable pastoralism support projects to Nigeria, which has the largest pastoralist population and the highest number of farmer-herder conflicts in West Africa.

14. Encourage ECOWAS Member States to allocate 3% of the 10% agreement on agriculture budgeting of the Maputo Declaration to the livestock sector.

15. Within the framework of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, undertake an analysis of the impact of weapons circulation in the region on farmer-herder conflicts and recommendations for addressing this challenge.

16. Make available to and encourage UN Country Teams to translate the findings of UNOWAS' Paper into their programmatic work in support of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), relating to cross-border issues.

17. Facilitate, in collaboration with ECOWAS, Member States, civil society and concerned partners, experience-sharing exercises between ECOWAS countries with the aim to share good practice from one

country to another on the prevention of farmer-herder conflicts.

18. Raise awareness about the need for livelihood assistance for farmers and pastoralists affected by conflict, especially in areas of insurgency, including in central and northern Mali and the Lake Chad Basin.

19. Explore private sector development of ICT coverage in rural areas to facilitate distance learning (e.g. literacy, numeracy, general education) and for further inclusion of pastoralist communities in the overall regional economic framework.

20. In collaboration with ECOWAS, undertake an assessment and feasibility study of rural schools and nomadic education for both children and adults in the region (e.g. the creation of boarding schools and virtual educational courses via radio and mobile phones).

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