Illegibility as a state effect

The limits of governing teacher identification in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Cyril Owen Ademola Brandt

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To Rodin,

big brother and interview partner number one back in 2005.

Table of contents

List of Tables, Figures, Maps, Textbox and Photo

iv

Glossary and acronyms

Throughout the thesis I use acronyms (partially based on Verhaghe (2009) and Andrianne (2008, 2016)). At the first time of use I write the full meaning followed by the acronym. Recurring key terms, some in French, are also explained below.

Accreditation	Process through which schools become officially registered at the Ministry of Education
Accreditation decree	Official document issued by the Minister of Education to accredit a school
ACB	Association Congolaise des Banques
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement* (French Development Agency)
Annuaire	Annual education yearbook
Bancarisation	Reform to pay all public employees via individual bank accounts.
BCC	*Banque Centrale du Congo* (Congolese Central Bank)
BEC	*Bureau de l'Enseignement Catholique* (Office of Catholic Education)
Budgetisé	Position in school or entire school on the government's payroll
Caritas	NGO affiliated with the Catholic Church
Comité de Suivi de la Paie	See *CSP*
Convention	Refers to a treaty signed in 1977 between the government and four faith-based organisations, stipulating the respective responsibilities in the provision of education. Faith-based schools are counted as public schools.
CSP	*Comité de Suivi de la Paie* (Payment Monitoring Committee) Committee that plans and monitors the bancarisation reform, headed by a director of the Congolese Central Bank
CTB	*Coopération Technique Belge* (Belgian Technical Cooperation)
DFID	United Kingdom's Department for International Development
Dossier	The school's accreditation decree, the school's letter of *mécanisation*, the document that identifies the teacher and the teacher's diploma
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
Educational administrator	State or FBO administrators of school networks (see *Convention*)
EP	*Ecole Primaire* (primary school)
ES	*Ecole Secondaire* (secondary school)
FBO	Faith-based organisation (see *Convention*)
FC	Francs Congolais (Congolese currency)
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
Gratuité	Proclaimed governmental policy on free primary schooling, but not completely implemented
IFOD S.A.	*Institution Financière pour les Œuvres de Développement, Société Anonyme* (Financial Institution for Development

	Projects, stock corporation). Microfinance institution, created in 2015 by the Congolese Episcopal Conference.
Inspection	Department of the Ministry of Education that is in charge of controlling schools in administrative, financial and pedagogic matters
Listing	SECOPE's pay sheets for schools and administrative offices
Mbudi	Part of Kinshasa after which a 2004 treaty between the government and public officials was named. The treaty stipulated teachers' minimum salary but has not been respected.
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
Mécanisé	The status after *mécanisation* (Registered school, office or teacher)
Mécanisé, payé	Registered school, office or teacher (on public payroll and paid)
Mécanisé, non-payé	Registered school, office or teacher (with SECOPE matriculation number but not paid); since the abbreviation "N.P." used to be included on school listings, these are sometimes simply referred to as *Non-Payé*
Mécanisation	Registration of school, office or teacher and assignment of SECOPE matriculation number, not necessarily paid
MEPSP	*Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel* (Ministry for Primary, Secondary and Vocational Education). I use the abbreviation *MoE* in this thesis
MEPS-INC	*Ministère de l'Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et l'Initiation de la Nouvelle Citoyenneté* (Ministry for Primary and Secondary Education and Initiation to New Citizenship), the *MEPSP's* name for a few months starting December 2014
MFI	Microfinance institution
MFP	*Ministère de la Fonction Publique* (Ministry of Civil Service)
MoE	Ministry of Education (see also *MEPSP*)
Motivation fee	*Prime de motivation*. Monthly fee paid by parents to teachers for each student. Synonym: top-up.
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
Non-mécanisé	School, office or teacher without SECOPE matriculation number and thus not on public payroll
Non-payé	see *Mécanisé non-payé*
Nouvelle Unité	New Unit. Teachers who have not been *mécanisé* by the government. Always non-paid.
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(Les) Omis	Teachers who were removed from payroll by accident or malevolence
PARSE	*Projet d'Appui au Redressement du Secteur de l'Education* (Education Sector Project). Project by the World Bank
PASS	*Assistant principal provincial du SECOPE* (Provincial principal assistant of SECOPE)
PER	Public Expenditure Review

PIE	*Plan Interimaire de l'Education* 2012-14 (Interim Education Sector Plan)
Promo-Scolaire	*Assises de la Promotion Scolaire*. Annual gathering of government and religious officials at the level of an educational division to discuss matters such as the opening of new schools. These meetings also take place at the level of an educational subdivision.
PROSEB	*Programme de Soutien à l'Education de Base* (Support to Basic Education Program). Program by GPE/World Bank
Proved	*Province Educationnelle* (educational division), the Ministry of Education's main geographical unit. In general, the Proved corresponds to provinces. "Proved" is also used as a synonym for the head of the Ministry's branch in that area.
Registration	See *accreditation* and *mécanisation*.
RESEN	*Rapport d'état du système éducatif* (education sector review)
RINS	*Résident Inspecteur*, Head of a SECOPE field office
SASS	*Assistant Provincial du SECOPE* ([National] Principal assistant of SECOPE)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SECOPE	*Service de Contrôle et de la Paie des Enseignants*. The Ministry of Education's department for the control of teacher payment
SERNIE	*Service national d'identification des élèves* (government's department for student identification)
Sous-Proved	*Sous-Province Educationnelle* (educational subdivision). See *Proved*
Territory	French: *territoire*. Administrative unit for rural areas. Usually the spatial equivalent of an educational subdivision
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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"Me – We" (Muhammad Ali)

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Thesis summary

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in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Introduction

Since Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001, the Congolese state has reengaged with the international community, showing willingness to reform and to build a state modelled after Western ideal types (De Villers 2009). This process included institutions such as a constitution as well as capacity-building measures in government ministries (Trefon 2011). An improved delivery of public services was designed to contribute to the legitimacy and stability of the war-torn Congolese state. Although these hopes were soon dashed (Englebert 2016b), reforms were nevertheless initiated and implemented.

Regarding the education sector, one of the overarching objectives was to offer free primary education (*gratuité*) to all children. However, at the beginning of sectoral reforms in 2007, two major impediments made this a difficult endeavour: First, the government's budget dedicated to education was insignificant. Parents funded approximately two-thirds of the entire education budget in the form of monthly teacher fees. These fees were shared with all administrative branches (Verhaghe 2007a). Second, about one-third of all teachers were not included in the government's database (Verhaghe 2009; World Bank 2008). I call these teachers *illegible*. Drawing on Scott (1998), legibility is understood in this thesis as *administrative knowledge about characteristics of teachers working in authorised positions*. Rendering teachers legible has figured prominently on donors' agendas since the early 2000s. Given this importance, the main research problem that this thesis engages with is the fact that significant numbers of teachers are still illegible despite the pursuit of legibility by the Congolese government and donors. Therefore, in this thesis I explore one main empirical research question: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?*

In order to address this question it is first of all necessary to understand who desires teacher legibility. Public school teachers desire legibility as it is a crucial step towards inclusion into the state system with all related benefits such as salaries. For the government, legibility is a necessary component to correctly remunerate all teachers, reduce school fees and comply with donor conditionalities around transparent payrolls and the non-accumulation of salary arrears. Finally, for donors the main reason is a reduction of fiduciary risk: an opaque and incorrect teacher database facilitates payroll fraud. Therefore, a full and

reliable database came to be seen as a "condition *sine qua non*" (World Bank 2008) for donor funding of teacher salaries. Furthermore, donors pursued legibility since it was a requirement for the non-accumulation of salary arrears of civil servants. These reasons underline that legibility can be a crucial state practice (see e.g. Aretxaga 2003; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). However, states might also pursue nonrecording practices (Kalir and van Schendel 2017). Since an incorrect database facilitates payroll fraud, certain administrators and politicians might not desire legibility. Hence, reform processes rooted in ideas about "good governance" faced a cumbersome organisational culture.

Merely seeing this as a neo-patrimonial or predatory regime is likely to inhibit a holistic understanding of processes that have led to illegibility. Therefore, I conceptualise the dynamics around legibility as a process of "permanent provocation" (Interview with M. Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 221f), "where each step forward invites responses from different sides, the only certainty being that the process will never come to rest" (Titeca, De Herdt, and Wagemakers 2013, 129). André and colleagues (2010, 158) argue that each measure and intervention should be considered as a provocation that incites reactions and adaptations. Permanent provocation allows an analysis of the impact of reforms over longer periods of time. Schematically speaking, the process of permanent provocation consists of three connected steps: first, some ideas about what government should contain are authorised whereas others are sidelined. Collaborations between certain groups of actors propose technical solutions for the tackling of what they consider to be problems. Second, resulting reforms and interventions are likely to face inevitable limits during the implementation process. Especially in a state with weak infrastructural power (Mann 1984), other groups of actors are likely to negotiate and adapt the impact of a reform (Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). Finally, an important aspect of the process of permanent provocation is reassembling, which means reacting to these limits in order to make interventions seem harmonious and ensure their persistence (Li 2007b).

Through a discourse analysis of relevant donor and government documents in Chapter 4 I reveal the emergence and evolution of the discourse around legibility from the 1970s onwards. Chapters 5 through 8 are then dedicated to the intricacies of governing teacher identification in the 2000s. Research for this study was carried out for nine months between 2015 and 2016 in two different research periods (January to May 2015; December 2015 to May 2016). Adopting a multi-sited approach, research took place in the national capital Kinshasa, six rural territories[1] in the province of Haut-Katanga and the provincial capital Lubumbashi. During my PhD research, a total of 246 semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted, of which 150 were conducted in two conflict-affected territories.[2] Interviews range from short personal conversations to long semi-structured interviews. Representatives of most key stakeholders were interviewed: teachers and

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[1] From French: *territoires*

[2] Another 106 interviews were conducted during my Master's research in *Province Orientale* and Kinshasa between August and December 2013. These interviews added to the understanding of issues explored in the PhD dissertation.

principals; government and religious officials at different levels; staff from private companies. In addition to these interviews I collected and analysed different kinds of quantitative data and relevant documentation in various administrative offices in the DRC as well as online.

Empirical analysis

Chapter 4: The rise and fall of the legibility-discourse (1908-2001)

In this chapter I analyse key texts of educational governance in the DRC in order to trace the emergence, evolution, and temporary demise of the discourse on legibility. My research begins by unveiling the roots of the "concessionary state" before 1977 (Poncelet et al. 2015; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). I first discuss the golden age of Catholic dominance in educational governance (1908-1946), then point to increasing state involvement (1946-1971) and highlight the notorious decade of Zairianisation (1971-1977). Although faith-based organisations remain utterly important in the everyday management of schools (Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2011), my findings suggest that their role at national-level policy-making has diminished since the end of the 1970s. I argue that international donors have become dominant in the realm of agenda-setting. This involvement has been enabled through massive funding and has gone hand-in-hand with the prioritisation and authorisation of new types of knowledge in policy-making. Second, I turn to a period of increasing international trusteeship and the emergence of the problematisation of teacher illegibility from 1977 onwards. Illegibility was problematised by donors because legibility was seen as an important objective in the fight against payroll fraud. Analysing payroll fraud in the Congolese administration from the 1970s onwards, I demonstrate how the legibility-discourse grew more salient in programs and practices in the 1980s. As a result, a department for teacher identification and payment was created in the Ministry of Education (*Service de Contrôle et de la Paie des Enseignants,* SECOPE). I consider the years between 1982 and 1992 as a *first wave of teacher legibility*. I then discuss the chaotic years between 1992 and 2001 and explain how the survival of the education sector in general, and of SECOPE in particular, went hand-in-hand with a deterioration of the administration. I end the chapter with a discussion of the demise of the legibility-discourse in the dire 1990s, which were characterised by political instability, economic collapse and transnational wars.

Chapter 5: State-building and administrative limits of legibility (2001-2013)

In this chapter, I begin by illustrating the encounters of a principal with the administration. This story from 2015 illustrates the persistently difficult nature of the teacher-state relationship. Then, I unpack the underlying mechanisms behind that relationship. I conduct an analysis of primary sources such as public expenditure reviews, education sector plans and audits in order to reveal the reappearance of the legibility-discourse in the 2000s. I summarise the theory of change behind the value that is attached to a higher level of

legibility, and I highlight the solutions proposed to solve the problem of teacher illegibility. My research revealed five types of interventions: (1) conducting a census; (2) administrative reforms; (3) suppressing school openings; (4) identifying teachers through a public-private partnership with commercial banks; (5) suppressing teacher transfers. These interventions form the basis for the rest of the analysis in this thesis.

In the rest of Chapter 5, I engage with the *second wave of teacher legibility* (2004-2013). I turn to projects that were implemented by a range of Western donors. Through various means, these projects sought to conduct a teacher census, improve the everyday functioning of SECOPE, and used teacher funding as a condition for further disbursements. None of these projects was fully successful, but that does not mean that they did not have an impact. I conclude that a significant number of teachers at the beginning of the 21st century remain at the edge of the state, in an opaque space at the frontier of legibility and illegibility. I claim that administrators are core to any government activity, but can also be among the strongest impediments to reform processes. Overall, I argue that the Congolese administration is characterised by a mixture of prebendal activities situated particularly within nodal points with discretionary power in the IT department, arbitrary errors, and administrative achievements.

Chapter 6: A problem for legibility: brokered educational expansion (2004-2013)

In Chapter 6, the analysis is concerned with the massive but unplanned expansion of the Congolese public primary and secondary education system. Opening new schools implies an expansion of the number of teachers. If this expansion takes place in an unplanned and intransparent manner, such an expansion goes against the pursuit of teacher legibility. Requesting a moratorium on school openings and teacher movements was supposed to prevent and subsequently regulate educational expansion. In order to unpack how school expansion is formally governed I analysed relevant government and donor documents. In 2007, a moratorium on school expansion was included in the World Bank's PARSE program (World Bank 2007c, 24). Seven years later, after several reiterations and modifications, the Minister complied with this condition and passed a moratorium in 2014. However, in the meantime, brokers had consistently circumvented the formal procedures and acquired accreditation decrees directly from the Minister. These brokers are government educational administrators at the deconcentrated territory level, national Members of Parliament and faith-based administrators. This analysis reveals that attempts of Western state-building – democratisation and decentralisation – can increase the number of brokers with an interest in accessing and distributing school accreditation decrees. The consequential intransparent expansion of the education system has been a major provocation for the will to render legible. The masses of new schools in fact reproduced the basis for the quest for legibility, adding innumerable numbers of teachers into the system. Moreover, it implied a deeper level of territorialisation, creating schools even in very remote villages. This spatial expansion posed particular challenges for the reform of teacher payments, as the following chapter illustrates.

Chapter 7: Circumventing administrative problems for teacher legibility: the bancarisation reform (2012-2016)

In this chapter, I explore a reform of teacher payment that was initiated in 2011, when the Congolese government sought to comply with a donor condition that was formulated in the government's first economic program in 2002: the non-accumulation of salary arrears of public servants. In a public-private partnership with commercial banks, the Ministry of Budget and the Congolese Central Bank sought to equip each civil servant, including teachers, with an individual bank account. This was designed to modernise salary payments and teacher identification, thus helping to constitute a comprehensive and up-to-date database of all teachers. However, the reform was ill-conceived in its theory of change and in its implementation. On the one hand, the government institutions in charge did not build on prior knowledge and disregarded wider problems around teacher legibility. On the other hand, the reform created a spatial gap between teachers and the organisations that were designated to pay them. Given the country's poor infrastructure and an absence of banks from rural areas, teachers had to travel large distances to withdraw their salaries. I will analyse how the reform persisted despite these infrastructural challenges. After a short interlude with banks' mobile counters and subcontracted phone companies, the system returned to a certain equilibrium: banks more or less successfully pay in urban areas and the Catholic NGO Caritas takes care of payments in most of the country's rural regions. However, Caritas functions according to the pre-bancarisation system and does not facilitate legibility.

Chapter 8: Maintaining legibility in an armed conflict (2015-2016)

In the final empirical chapter, I turn to legibility of internally displaced teachers. Teacher recruitment, retention and deployment pose particular challenges during and after armed conflicts (World Bank 2010). Therefore, armed conflict can be a limit to the practice of governing and continuously identifying teachers. I look at a long-enduring, recurrent low-intensity armed conflict in which many communities and teachers have been displaced and returned to their villages multiple times. The administration attempted to maintain a stable teaching workforce and reorganise education. During the conflict some teachers were directly attacked. Teachers' association with the state was an important reason for the attacks. These attacks, and the persistent insecurity, acted as reasons against returning home after internal displacement. Most teachers returned nonetheless and I claim that this requires an explanation. I argue that educational government in a context of low-intensity recurrent armed conflict functions according to similar principles that I discussed in previous chapters: the number of educational administrators and schools increased due to brokers and salaries arrive mainly through Caritas. Moreover, I show that the legibility-discourse influences administrators' actions during armed conflict. Building on insights from prior chapters, I argue that educational administrators make use of accreditation decrees and teacher salaries in order to maintain teacher legibility and make teachers return to their

villages once the government declares securitisation. All in all, in this chapter I not only show that armed conflict is a problem for teacher legibility, but demonstrate that the legibility-discourse has been crucial for maintaining stability of teacher deployment in this armed conflict.

Conclusion

Several authors argue that practices around statistics, numbers, and knowledge about the population are central to modern day state practices (Aretxaga 2003; Baitenmann 2005; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Lee and Zhang 2017; Trouillot 2001). Instead, my analysis suggests that states can also function while a significant number of its civil servants are illegible to the administration. Three main explanations for illegibility can be brought forward: Scott's (1998) analysis suggests that illegibility is the outcome of resistance by the population, some authors argue that nonrecording practices are deliberate (Kalir and van Schendel 2017; Vrăbiescu 2017) and an explanation pertaining to "good governance" attributes illegibility to state and reform failure.

Extending these debates, my research points to three interconnected reasons for teacher illegibility: First, systemic corruption in general, and in particular the existence of administrators at administrative nodal points who are reluctant to change; second, the accommodation by international donors of the government's transgression of agreements and the failed attempt by international donors to completely sideline existing institutions. The third reason why a significant number of teachers were still illegible to the state administration in 2016 is the unplanned expansion of public schools. Taking these aspects together, I advance my main theoretical argument that illegibility can be the emergent property of a process of permanent provocation. Since state practices and symbols occupy crucial positions within this process, I call this illegibility a state effect.

This perspective is a contribution to understanding structural violence that teachers are subjected to (Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, and Smith 2017; Sayed and Novelli 2016). In the DRC, processes around illegibility are related to teaching with inadequate or no payment, ill-designed top-down reforms with disastrous impacts for teachers' everyday lives, intransparent national decision-making processes leading to an inefficient allocation of resources, and the necessity of maintaining a stable teaching workforce within a recurrent armed conflict. While these aspects are a sign of a poor quality of public service delivery, I suggest exploring how they enhance state authority.

Three main mechanisms are at work: extraversion, mystification, and territorialisation. Extraversion, the "mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment" (Bayart and Ellis 2000, 218), has been a key source of resource mobilisation and acquisition of legitimacy. Tapping into global frameworks such as Education for All and Global Partnership of Education validates domestic policy-making despite poor performances. The constant accommodation of this poor performance is yet another process that reaffirms state authority. Mystification reveals that "consent to authority is generated as the attention of subordinates is focused on" local-

level interactions and negotiations (De Herdt and Titeca 2016, 8). I add to existing research by exploring national-level administrative dynamics that underlie these local-level negotiations. Finally, school expansion, bancarisation and returns after internal displacement enhance the territorial reach of state institutions. I end the thesis with a discussion of the practical implications of my findings. These mainly refer to the ongoing necessity to reform the school accreditation process and SECOPE and fields for further research. In sum, my analysis reveals that elements of Western state-building are not implemented in a linear fashion, and can have an impact well beyond formal intentions. State formation is what happens while state-builders are busy making other plans, and education sectors can play a crucial role in these processes.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In February 2001, the new Congolese president, Joseph Kabila Kabange, set out to visit major Western cities such as Paris, Brussels, Washington and New York. In New York, Kabila visited the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and "seduce[d] his interlocutors by his apparent readiness to change course" (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007, 278; De Villers 2009, 94). The troops of his father, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, invaded what was then Zaire over the course of eight months in 1996/97, easily defeating a dilapidated Zairian army. The invasion was orchestrated by Uganda and Rwanda and had the blessing of the United States. Laurent-Désiré Kabila changed the country's name back to Democratic Republic of Congo.[3]

In August 1998, he expelled his former allies who occupied key positions in the administration and military. They did not wait long to return, in the form of yet another invasion, with the involvement of several Congolese civil society actors (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007). Shortly after, Laurent-Désiré Kabila found himself in a full-fledged transnational war involving several African nations including Zimbabwe and Angola (De Villers, Omasombo, and Kennes 2001). In 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated, which brought his short reign to an end. On January 25th 2001, nine days after the assassination, his 29-year-old son Joseph Kabila was declared President of the DRC. He had served in his father's army, but had never held a political office. He decided early on to open his country to international investment and influence in order to secure two resources that his government greatly needed: funding and recognition by influential members of the international community. Since the beginning of his reign, Kabila has engaged in practices that Bayart and Ellis (2000, 218) describe as "extraversion", which means "mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment".

After a range of negotiations and treaties, civil and military parties settled for a transitional government in 2003 (DRC/Government and various armed or civil parties 2002; Johnson 2009; De Villers 2009). A power-sharing agreement installed a government presided over by Kabila and included four vice presidents from civil and former military parties. A constitution was ratified in 2005 and stipulated decentralisation in the form of the creation of new territorial units. The transitional government and its international partners organised democratic presidential and parliamentary elections, which took place in 2006. Five hundred representatives were voted into the national parliament, *Palais du Peuple.* These elections were the outcome of a sixteen-year-long, highly complex, violent struggle to transform the DRC from a one-party dictatorship into a multiparty presidential democracy.

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[3] The country's name between 1964 and 1971.

The elections were strongly supported by the European Union and were largely evaluated as free and fair (De Villers 2009).

This process in the DRC included elements that are typical of liberal post-conflict peace-building and state-building (Fukuyama 2015; Paris 2010; Trefon 2011). Democratisation, decentralisation, the rule of law, an accountable government, a market economy and the provision of public services such as security are among the most important constituents of this view on government and economy. They go hand in hand with the oversight and tutelage of international bilateral and multilateral donors. Reinvigorating public services, such as the education system, occupies an important role in processes of Western state-building, also in the case of the DRC (De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012).

On December 20th 2016, presidential elections were supposed to take place. They did not, and Joseph Kabila has clung to power since then. The initial hope that was kindled through the events of 2006 has evaporated. An increasingly authoritarian style of rule, political violence, ongoing and expanding conflicts in the east, and little social progress have marked Kabila's rule (Englebert 2016a, 2016b; Hoffman and Vlassenroot 2016).

On top of Kabila's disastrous rule, it has become increasingly clear that Congo's problems are much more profound than terms such as *post-conflict* imply: The country has been in a deep political, economic and financial crisis since at least the 1970s (Englebert and Tull 2008; De Herdt and Poncelet 2010b; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and Vlassenroot 2008). During the 32 years of dictatorship led by Mobutu Sese Seko (1965-1997) and strongly supported by Belgium, France and the United States, the country's socio-economic conditions deteriorated appallingly. For Congolese citizens, this was palpable through rapidly sinking standards of living, political decisions that favoured only small political circles, hyperinflation, and the use of the US Dollar as the main currency. Moreover, investments in public goods and services almost disappeared and civil servants' salaries eroded to close to nothing (Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Young and Turner 1985).

Whereas the education budget made up 25% of the national budget in 1982, it only accounted for 7% in 1987. Several researchers maintain that the structural adjustment programs under the tutelage of the World Bank and IMF were responsible for this sharp reduction (De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). At the end of the turbulent 1990s expenses for education had reached a mere 2-3% of the national budget. In terms of investment per student this meant a decrease from US $159 in 1982 to US $23 in 1987 to US $7 in 2006 (ibid.). Teacher salaries hit rock bottom in 2001/02 when the average official monthly income was about US $13, compared to US $68 in 1982 (ibid.). Many teachers remained unpaid for several consecutive months.

Despite the lack of public funding, the education system survived. Although it is difficult to make statements about the quality of education at the time, enrolment data point to a steady growth: 1.6 million students in 1960, 3.8 million in 1975, 4 million in 1987, 5.7 million in 1990/91, followed by a particularly remarkable catch-up growth of 10% per year between 2002 and 2006, ultimately reaching 8 million in 2006 (André et al. 2010;

Depaepe 1998; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). Also, in terms of some key educational indicators, the DRC did not perform poorly. For example, regarding the number of children who never went to school, the DRC in the post-war years ranked similarly to other sub-Saharan countries (André et al. 2010, 128). What was the magic formula that kept the education system going throughout dire years of depression, political turmoil and war?

Ever since colonial times, faith-based organisations (FBOs) have managed approximately 80% of public primary and secondary schools. After an unsuccessful nationalisation of schools in the 1970s President Mobutu signed the so-called *convention* with four main FBOs[4]. He thereby granted them the right to manage public schools and receive state subsidies such as teacher salaries, while the state remained in charge of issues such as the curriculum. While this hybrid governance was a key factor in the education sector's resilience throughout Mobutu's reign, another scheme was invented in response to state decay and vanishing government investment in public services in the 1990s.

In 1992, the Catholic Church and the National Association of Students' Parents called upon parents to temporarily pay teachers a so-called *prime de motivation* (motivation fee) in order to complement the meagre government salary (Mrsic-Garac 2009; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). This mirrored a more general trend of citizens contributing financially or in-kind for goods that were formerly provided by the state (Trefon 2004). Parents' contributions had all but disappeared when Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001. The first World Bank report in the 2000s estimated that parents funded 80% to 90% of the entire education budget (World Bank 2004). In 2008 this number was still estimated at 73% (World Bank 2008). The report from 2004 further stated that one-third of all Congolese teachers were not on the government's payroll and were exclusively funded by parents. As of 2016, these contributions have still not disappeared. In fact, it is quite the contrary. They have been institutionalised as administrative staff started to demand their piece of the cake: Since administrators were not in direct touch with parents, they requested a certain percentage of teachers' motivation fees (Verhaghe 2007a). Various attempts by international donors have been made to unbuild this system in order to achieve universal access to education.

Indeed, since Kabila's rapprochement in 2001, many major bilateral and multilateral donors[5] have invested in the country's education system. Working within the global framework of the Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All agenda, and envisaging the embracing of the DRC by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), two major problems were identified: lack of funding and the existence of various school fees. The major instruments used to reach these goals were investments in teacher salaries and

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[4] Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Kimbanguist. See Chapter 4 for more details.

[5] Among these, the following are the most crucial ones for this thesis due to their size of funding and the fact that they targeted teacher identification in their projects: the World Bank, the British Department for International Development (DFID), and the Belgian Development Cooperation (CTB, *Coopération Technique Belge*). These three are often referred to as "international donors" in this thesis.

schools' operational costs, the temporary funding of certain fees such as student insurance, the formal prohibition of school fees and capacity-building measures at the ministerial level.

However, the Congolese administration in general (Trefon 2010) and the educational administration in particular (Verhaghe 2007b) were in a calamitous state in the early 2000s. The educational administration survived the dire 1990s and early 2000s but its databases no longer reflected the realities at the school level (Verhaghe 2007b; World Bank 2004). Large numbers of teachers worked all over the country without being included in the administration's database. Therefore, identifying all teachers attained a top spot on donor agendas in the DRC. Donors sought what I call teacher legibility.

In what follows, I first outline the scope and relevance of legibility and illegibility in the DRC. Next, I embed the discussion of (il)legibility in a debate about the politics of development. Then, I outline a theoretical framework that facilitates a proper analysis of the processes that have led to persisting illegibility. In the next step, I highlight the novelty of the chosen approach, summarise my main argument, and show the relevance of this research for different academic and practical fields. Subsequently, I provide an overview of sub-research questions per empirical chapter. I finish with the inevitable limitations of this research endeavour.

1.1   Scope and relevance of teacher (il)legibility in the DRC

James Scott (1998) made legibility a central issue in his concern with state power. The Cambridge Dictionary (2017) defines legibility as "the quality of being clear enough to read". Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary (2017) defines it as "the degree to which writing or text can be read easily because the letters are clear, the text is printed well, etc.". Scott (1998) introduced the term legibility as a social scientific concept in his seminal book "Seeing Like a State. Why Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed". In the book, Scott attempts to show how centrally organised states gained increasing power over their subordinates. Scott put legibility at the centre of his concern with modern statecraft:

> "I began to see legibility as a central problem in statecraft. The premodern state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity. It lacked anything like a detailed 'map' of its terrain and its people." (Scott 1998, 2)

Building on Scott (1998), and the work of Foucault (2007, 2008), numerous authors have discussed the productive and restrictive role of gathering knowledge about populations and rendering people legible in processes of state formation (for example Aretxaga 2003; Trouillot 2001).

In this thesis, I understand teacher legibility as *administrative knowledge about characteristics of teachers working in authorised positions*. A teacher is legible when the state administration has full and up-to-date knowledge about the teacher's characteristics (age, education, position, school, etc.). Hence, the opposite are teachers who have not been registered by the state administration. I refer to these teachers as illegible. In the DRC, an

illegible teacher is called *non-mécanisé,* or *nouvelle unité* (new unit).[6] *Mécanisation* is the process through which a teacher receives an official matriculation number and becomes included in the database.[7]

It should not come as a surprise that it is challenging to provide an accurate number of illegible teachers. It is in the very nature of something that is illegible that it cannot easily be counted. The World Bank (2008, 76f) review of public expenditures in the DRC compared payrolls and school-level lists and estimated that up to 50% of the personnel represented on pay sheets were erroneous. Another way to estimate the number of illegible teachers is to compare payrolls and the annual education yearbook (*annuaire*). Annual education yearbooks are based on national-level surveys. Although such data must be treated with caution (Jerven 2013), they nonetheless reveal certain trends. Table 1.1 provides a comparison of these sources for the school year 2013/14:

Table 1.1 *Estimated number of (il)legible teachers in 2013/14*

Type of (il)legibility	Number of teachers
not in the administration's database (by definition, not on payroll) (*non-mécanisé, nouvelle unité*)	187,629
in the administration's database but not on payroll (*mécanisé non-payé* [not paid])	71,441
in the administration's database and on payroll (*mécanisé payé* [paid])	261,390

Sources: DRC/MoE/SECOPE (2014), DRC/MoE (2014)

By definition, payrolls do not include illegible teachers. These figures suggest that 49.8% of teachers were unpaid by the state in 2013/14 and 36% were *non-mécanisé,* i.e. illegible. As recently as 2016, Andrianne (2016) calculated that 100,000 teachers were misrepresented on payrolls, i.e. partially illegible. He states that this implies the necessity of revisiting 250,000 dossiers[8] and manually adding this information into the database. Given significant illegibility at an aggregated level, what does illegibility imply for individual teachers?

For teachers, illegibility impedes proper payment in two ways: First, all teachers who are not in the government's database are unable to receive a salary. The default option for

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[6] I try to minimise the number of French terms. *Mécanisation* and other words introduced in this paragraph are, however, so central and without a clear translation that I use them throughout the thesis.

[7] Importantly, *mécanisation* is not equivalent with inclusion on the payroll. The process of including a teacher on the payroll is called *budgétisation*, and a teacher who is on the payroll *payé*. The two processes were separated in the past.

[8] I use the term dossier to refer to the files that each teacher submits to the state administration: the school's accreditation decree, the letter of *mécanisation*, the document that identifies the teacher and the teacher's diploma (Kone Badara Dit Aly et al. 2011, 31).

teachers who are *nouvelle unité* is to wait for several months or even years before being added onto the payroll (Verhaghe 2009). Second, it can happen that teachers are in the database but their specific characteristics are unknown. A lack of knowledge about a teacher's age, date of diploma, family status, etc. is a form of illegibility and makes it administratively impossible to reward teachers correctly. This reduces the actual salary teachers receive.

A functioning educational administration requires legibility because legibility is a condition for the payment of salaries. Salaries occupy a major role in regard to the attractiveness and reputation of the teaching profession. Therefore, legibility facilitates central goals of educational governance such as efficient teacher recruitment and retention. Incomplete and unreliable knowledge about the number and characteristics of teachers make thorough educational planning and budgeting impossible.

For these reasons, illegibility directly interferes with Sustainable Development Goal number four which aims to "Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning" and specifically with target 4c: "By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers" (United Nations 2015). Since teachers are the most crucial actors in an education system, legibility is related to positive outcomes such as reading and writing skills, citizenship education, economic growth, labour market skills and transformative pedagogies. Clearly, a certain degree of illegibility does not mean that these objectives cannot be reached at all, but it means that they cannot be reached to the fullest degree and in an efficient and equitable manner. Therefore, illegibility also has negative implications for students.

Given these various aspects that underline the importance of legibility, international donors also pursue the objective of comprehensive teacher legibility. They seek to render teachers legible, for example through a census. The endeavour to establish comprehensive teacher legibility sits within a wider attempt to achieve a full, reliable and transparent teacher database and payroll. One of the more common phenomena in relation to opaque databases and payrolls is known as "ghost teacher" (World Bank 2010, 15) or "fictitious teacher" (Kapaji and Mukanga 1977, 249). These are imaginary teachers that only exist on payroll but not in reality. The spoils of their existence are shared by administrators and other conniving people.

Donors displayed reluctance to fund teacher salaries as long as there were signs of illicit practices. Expressed in more technical and politically neutral terms, donors faced "fiduciary risk" (Dolan et al. 2012, 11) and the establishment of a full and reliable overview of the educational workforce became a "condition *sine qua non*" for further financial support of teacher salaries and schools' operational costs (Verhaghe 2007b, 44; World Bank 2004). In other words, they were reluctant to invest in teacher salaries as long as their investments were likely to be partially embezzled. In the absence of a full and reliable database, the donor community can seek other solutions to maintain funding, such as shadow-aligned funding schemes or multi-donor trust funds (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, and Rigaud 2009). In the DRC, teacher legibility has been high on donor agendas and has been

accompanied by a range of projects and interventions. However, it is only one element within the broader objective to establish a complete and transparent teacher database. The relationship between illegibility and embezzlement will be investigated throughout the thesis.

In sum, what makes the existence of illegible teachers even more interesting and relevant to look at in the case of the DRC, is the fact that teacher legibility persists despite massive interventions by donors and the government. This is the core research problem that this thesis engages with. Consequently, this thesis explores the following research question: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?*

How can such persistent teacher illegibility be explained, although key actors seem to have an interest in teacher legibility? Is this a prototypical example of reform or state failure? Is the Congolese state too weak, corruption too high, and political will too low? How can I explain processes within the Congolese administration without falling prey to such simplistic explanations? It would be reductionist to merely claim that reforms have failed or that all reform efforts can be summarised as a "masquerade" (Trefon 2011). It seems more worthwhile to unpack what happens beyond schemes of state and capacity building, and rise above the discourse of state failure. One inevitable way forward is to leave idealised Western notions of the state behind and begin by asking fundamental questions: How can political processes, public authority, statehood and the politics of development in the DRC be understood? Section 1.2 provides an entry point into these questions.

1.2   Politics of development

The idea and very nature of development are heavily contested by academics, policy-makers, project implementers, civil society actors and so-called benefactors. Schematically, the distinction between ends and means can be helpful to flag two broad elements in this discussion: On the one hand, development as an end stands for multiple objectives. People and organisations advocate for economic growth and higher incomes, human rights, peace, access to quality education, human capabilities, participation in social life in an adequate manner, etc. (North 1992; Sen 1999; Tikly and Barrett 2013; United Nations 2015). On the other hand, the question of means arises: how to achieve a given objective, how to make development happen?

For example, Rostow's (1960) model of economic growth suggests linear stages of economic development. Despite increasing attention to local cultures and customs in project implementation, for instance, the economic gaze has never ceased to dominate development practice (Leftwich 2005). It was most radical in the 1980s through structural adjustment programs, which sought to cut public spending and increase the role of markets (Bonal 2002). Gradually, the pure focus on markets was complemented by the recognition that the "rules of the game" (North 1992, 4), i.e. institutions, are crucial aspects in any social and economic system. Given the apparent success of the capitalist democratic Western system over the collapsing Soviet communist system, state apparatuses in what was seen as

developing countries became objects of interest. Under the premise that good governance fosters development (World Bank 1991, 2017), administrative practices have become increasingly problematised and subject to external interventions. Technical and apolitical *capacity and state-building* has become a core aspect of development practices (Leftwich 2005).

Although there will be more said on practices around state-building, it is clear that well-performing institutions indeed facilitate social encounters. They allow humans to build expectations about another person's behaviour and reduce the number of possible outcomes of a given encounter. In the absence of strong, formal, applicable and enforceable institutions (rule of law, reliable court systems, well-organised bureaucracies, etc.), interactions are not guided by a high level of reliability but by a "regime of incertitude" (Englebert 2012, 170).

These insights can be applied to the Congolese education sector. Imagine a teacher who walks into the office of a bureaucrat working for the teacher payment department. The teacher seeks to address a problem that occurred in her monthly salary. At that moment, the bureaucrat is the visible and tangible face of the state and the most attainable interlocutor for the teacher. However, the bureaucrat might not fully disclose what s/he is able to achieve; procedures can be opaque; bribes can be demanded; multiple visits to the office might be necessary, etc. In the DRC in particular, low institutional security goes hand in hand with everyday negotiations (Englebert and Tull 2013; Titeca and De Herdt 2011; Trefon 2004).

Besides the immediate encounters, various authors have shown that the Congolese education system is in a constant process of institutional negotiations at different sub-provincial, provincial, national and international state and non-state actors (Poncelet et al. 2015; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2011; Titeca, De Herdt, and Wagemakers 2013). Given these reflections, it would be naive to assume that central decisions are implemented in a linear fashion throughout the territory. Instead, there are various local-level arrangements resulting from the constant negotiations (André et al. 2010; Leinweber 2013; Titeca and De Herdt 2011).

Increasingly, international donors have become part of these power struggles and negotiations (Cassimon, De Herdt, and Verbeke 2015; De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). In a similar logic, these and other authors consider the education system as an arena for power struggles rather than a disinterested field for the provision of public services (André et al. 2010; Gabudisa 1997, 45; De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2010; Leinweber 2013; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010, 25; Titeca, De Herdt, and Wagemakers 2013). This resembles Bierschenk's (1988, 146) portrayal of "development projects as arenas of negotiation for strategic groups".

These approaches resonate with the work of scholars in the field of comparative and international education (Bonal 2007; Dale and Robertson 2009; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008; Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2016; Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2012) and with socio-anthropological research on African education sectors (Bierschenk 2007; Charton 2014;

Fichtner 2010; Tama 2014). These authors turn away from an educationalist understanding of education systems towards an analysis of schools as embedded in and interacting with cultural, political, social and economic dynamics.

Given a predominant role of international donors and of the very idea of development in these dynamics, some authors speak of the "politics of development" (Abdulai and Hickey 2016; Hickey 2013; Leftwich 2005). Looking beyond reform failure or state failure, and related practices of state-building, scholars try, for instance, to unveil the unintended outcomes of democratisation or decentralisation (Boone 2003; Englebert 2012), processes of development brokerage (Bierschenk, Chauveau, and Olivier de Sardan 2002; Mosse and Lewis 2006), or elite bargains and political settlements (Abdulai and Hickey 2016; Khan 2010).

Socio-anthropological interest in the state and the intertwinement with international development is far ranging: It goes from concerns with the symbolic dimension of the state (Gupta 1995; Hansen and Stepputat 2001) to anthropological perspectives on state formation (Das and Poole 2004; Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005), relations between state and non-state actors (Jaffe 2013), ethnographic research of bureaucratic practices (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014b) and the lifeworlds of state agents (Blundo 2014).[9] Risking an over-simplification, I can summarise that these approaches recognise that statehood and/or public authority are constantly forming and might be considered an emergent property of negotiations, and that public authority is not nested solely within state institutions but within a broad range of state and non-state actors (Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Lund 2006; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). In the words of Lund (2006, 686), "if public authority — or 'stateness' — can wax and wane, it follows that state institutions are never definitively formed, but that a constant process of formation takes place".

On the one hand, constant negotiations lead to a situation where nothing ever seems to be concluded. On the other hand, there are temporary accords and tangible outcomes of negotiations. People and institutions accumulate symbolic, social and financial capital. So if everyday negotiations are open-ended, but are embedded in broader cultural, political and economic structures and have temporary empirical manifestations, how can I understand and conceptualise negotiations in a more systematic way and over longer periods of time? This question brings me to the process of "permanent provocation" (André et al. 2010, 158; Interview with M. Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 221f; see also De Herdt and Poncelet 2010b, 26; Li 2007c; Miller, Gordon, and Burchell 1991; Titeca, De Herdt, and Wagemakers 2013, 129). A more in-depth exploration of this concept follows in Chapter 2. At this stage, let me point out the essential implications of the term.

Writing on the Congolese education sector, André and colleagues (2010, 158) and Titeca and colleagues (2013, 129) summarise the implications of the process of permanent provocation in the sense that every top-down measure must be considered as a provocation

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[9] As well as somewhat misleading attempts to summarise such work (Sharma and Gupta 2006; see review by Bierschenk 2009)

that elicits reactions and adaptations. These approaches all share an explicit or implicit agreement that power can never be absolute (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Li 2007a, 2007c). In other words, agency – understood as a person's or organisation's "space for manoeuvre" (Lopes Cardozo and Shah 2016, 334) – is part and parcel of a power relationship, and of a process of permanent provocation. Rather than being limited to somewhat restrictive and dichotomous "dominocentric" and "resistocentrique" concepts (Olivier de Sardan 2008, 14), permanent provocation is all about interactions, dynamics, processes, adaptations, translations, movements, modifications, etc.

Rather than looking at reform failure or state failure, it opens up an analytical lens towards the interaction of new reforms and projects with existing structures and towards actual impacts of reforms and development practices (Li 2007b, 2007c). Regarding the topic of this thesis, a focus on the process of permanent provocation allows for an analysis that does not presume that states always seek legibility or that citizens always try to resist the state's gaze. Reality might be more nuanced. Therefore, I conceptualise the process that has led to persistent teacher (il)legibility in the DRC as a process of permanent provocation. This theoretical approach allows me to address knowledge gaps and make original contributions, as I point out in Section 1.3.

1.3   Novelty, main argument, and relevance

For Scott (1998), states seek to render citizens legible whereas citizens engage in resistance against state-imposed legibility. Similarly, Trouillot (2001, 126) considers the "legibility effect" as one among four state effects.[10] Alongside Scott and Trouillot, several other authors argue that practices around statistics, numbers, and knowledge about the population are central to modern day state practices (Aretxaga 2003; Baitenmann 2005; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Lee and Zhang 2017).

However, in reality, many states struggle to render their populations legible (Geschiere 2007). Jerven (2013) rekindled debates about the poor quality of statistical data in Africa. Bédécarrats and colleagues (2016, 9) argue that "governing with numbers" is simultaneously Africa's biggest potential and challenge. Taking this argument further and shedding light on the implications for the concerned populations, a group of authors around Kalir and van Schendel (2017, 1) recently focused more closely on "nonrecording states", by which they mean states that derecord or deliberately refrain from registering and identifying – rendering legible – certain people (Kalir 2017; Kalir and van Schendel 2017; Randall 2016). As they and others argue, comprehensive legibility is not always desired by state administrations and illegibility, nonrecording and looking away can have their own values (Gandhi 2017; Lan 2017; Vrăbiescu 2017). Furthermore, nonrecording can be a site of contestation between state and non-state actors (Rozakou 2017). These perspectives

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[10] The other three being an isolation effect, an identification effect and a spatialisation effect (Trouillot 2001, 126).

helped to underline that processes around illegibility can be highly dynamic rather than simply being an outcome of state absence and failure.

However, to the best of my knowledge, there are several issues that have so far not been addressed explicitly: First, how can illegibility persist despite the discursive valuing of legibility? Second, how does illegibility of a large group of state actors – teachers – influence their relationship with the state? Third, how does illegibility relate to the objective of cleaning up a payroll? Fourth, how do processes around (il)legibility influence state authority in a fragmented state such as the DRC? I build on the authors mentioned above and extend their thoughts in the following ways:

First, whereas Kalir and van Schendel (2017, 2) stress the "strategic and selective" nature of state recording practices, I instead point to the rather "systemic and pervasive" (ibid.) nature. I complement a focus on intentionality (Vrăbiescu 2017) and resistance with a focus on unintended outcomes and assemblages. Second, whereas Kalir and Van Schendel (2017, 6) claim that derecording or nonrecording practices are mainly targeted at "undeserving, undesired, and unproductive" categories of people, I unpack the tension between persisting illegibility despite the discursive construction of teacher legibility as desired and beneficial. Taking these points together brings me to the overarching original theoretical contribution of this thesis: I argue that (teacher) illegibility can be a state effect. I suggest understanding this state effect as the emergent property of a long enduring process of permanent provocation.

While these arguments relate to legibility, my main purpose is to contribute to two broader strands of research: First, I build on the work by Novelli, Smith and Lopes Cardozo (2017) on education and sustainable peace-building by showing that pervasive illegibility of state agents can be a form of structural violence. Second, I show how processes around illegibility contribute to an enhancement of state authority despite low state capacities. In discussions of structural violence and state authority, teacher (il)legibility has – to the best of my knowledge – not explicitly been touched upon.

Regarding the first argument, I draw on Gupta (2012) and reflect on the notion of bureaucratic structural violence and combine it with debates on teachers and social justice (Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, and Smith 2017; Sayed and Novelli 2016). In fact, teacher illegibility, and the challenge to govern teacher identification, must be seen within a much larger "global crisis in the teaching profession" (Lopes Cardozo 2011, 10; see also Bierschenk 2014a regarding teachers in Africa). This endeavour is itself part of a broader endeavour to understand the multiple links between education, conflict and peacebuilding (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, and Smith 2017; O'Malley 2007; A. Smith and Vaux 2003). Moreover, my elaboration of illegibility as a state effect contributes to attempts to better understand teachers' multifaceted identities and teachers' relationship with state administrations (Horner et al. 2015; Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2016; Vongalis-Macrow 2007; Wilson 2001). My main contribution to these debates is that structural violence in the education sector can be an enhancement of state authority. I develop this thought with the following line of argumentation.

With the second argument I critique a narrow understanding of international development as state-building. State-building as a development ideology is rooted in a construction of idealised Westerns states and defective Southern states. A common assumption in the state-building and good governance debates is that the transparent and fair delivery of public services produces positive results for citizens and thus leads to procedural and outcome-based legitimisation (Considine and Ali Afzal 2011). However, the impact of donor activities is less straightforward than this theory suggests. With the socio-anthropological approach in this thesis I look at the interaction between development projects and the social realities that they have an impact on.

Drawing on the case of teacher illegibility, I advance the argument that the DRC indeed tapped into various components of Western state-building, but did not use these resources as envisaged by international donors. I point to three mechanisms that reveal how state authority can be enhanced through elements associated with state-building, despite a lack of procedural or outcome-based legitimacy: extraversion, mystification, and territorialisation. First, I discuss how national governments might use the interactions with donors as a source of legitimacy and authority (Bayart and Ellis 2000; Bierschenk, Chauveau, and Olivier de Sardan 2002; Li 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Rossi 2006). Second, this thesis argues that it can be useful to understand how deregulated administrations can fuel state authority instead of diminishing it (De Herdt and Titeca 2016; Roy 2009; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). De Herdt and Titeca (2016, 8) consider that this mystification reveals that "consent to authority is generated as the attention of subordinates is focused on" local-level interactions and negotiations. Third, my research reveals that state institutions have expanded spatially, reaching formerly neglected areas. This spatial expansion is the outcome of a diverse set of practices around teacher legibility and reinforces the mystification process.

All of these dynamics do not stem from a top-down planning process but rather from the permanent interplay between new development projects and the multiple reactions and adaptations during implementation. In sum, while the World Development Report 2017 Governance and the Law (World Bank 2017) recognises the importance of looking not only at deviation from norms but the constant reshaping of norms, my research sheds a fundamental doubt on the theories of change behind prominent state-building practices. Furthermore, while Sustainable Development Goals certainly have merits, it is important to understand how the processes that unfold around them actually affect certain central groups of actors, such as teachers.

On top of these theoretical debates, the insights and arguments I advance in this thesis are first and foremost relevant for the Congolese education sector. In 2015, the country adopted a ten-year education sector strategy (2016-2025) that is already funded with hundreds of millions of US Dollars by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the British Department for International Development (DFID) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). My research points to potential caveats in reform

implementation that could be avoided through a more realistic assessment of wider political, economic and social aspects.

1.4   What to expect from this thesis: research questions and empirical chapters

As stated above, I explore one overarching research question in this thesis: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?* My introductory theoretical explanations suggest that rendering teachers legible is not a one-way street: It inadvertently causes reactions. There is not one actor who holds absolute power, nor are there others who are entirely powerless. There is rather a constant process of initiating reforms and actions, and responding to them, thus iteratively inciting new reactions. In each chapter, I offer a distinct perspective on these issues and research specific aspects of the overall process of permanent provocation around teacher legibility.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research design and methodology of this thesis. In general, all findings stem from fieldwork that took place in the DRC during a time span of nine months. The province of Haut-Katanga in South-Eastern DRC was home to this fieldwork. Two hundred and thirty[11] semi-structured or informal interviews were conducted by me and another 18 by colleagues. One hundred and fifty of these interviews were conducted in two conflict-affected territories. These interviews range from short conversations to long semi-structured interviews. In addition to these interviews, I collected different kinds of quantitative and qualitative documentation in various administrative offices in the DRC as well as online. These were analysed for different purposes, as I will further discuss in Chapter 3.

Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to an analysis of the emergence, evolution, demise and re-emergence of the legibility-discourse. I start by unpacking the historical roots of hybrid educational governance in the DRC between the state and FBOs. I demonstrate that the role of FBOs persists but their influence at national-level policy-making has vastly diminished. Since the 1970s, international donors have gained a crucial role in educational agenda-setting, as in Congolese politics more broadly. While legibility was not on the political agenda prior to the 1970s, it attained a prominent role in the wake of structural adjustment programs. Hence, I trace the emergence of the discourse of teacher legibility by analysing donor and government documents and following the questions: *Who has been influential in educational agenda-setting?* and *(At a particular moment in time) Why does teacher legibility receive political value?* Then I explore the concomitant question: *How is teacher legibility rendered technical?* I reveal that illegibility was problematised in government and donor documents and a technical solution was proposed: the creation of a new government department in charge of identifying all teachers and controlling teacher

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[11] Another 106 interviews were conducted during five months of my Master's research in the DRC. See Appendix 2 for a full list of interviews conducted during my PhD research.

payment. I analyse the early performance and subsequent demise of the new department and of the legibility-discourse more broadly.

In the remainder of Chapter 5, I begin by showing how a school principal sees the state administration in the year 2015. Starting with this empirical case study, I then investigate the dynamics and processes that have led to the kind of encounters and negotiations in which he regularly finds himself vis-à-vis bureaucrats. Therefore, I trace the re-emergence of the legibility-discourse and identify technical solutions to the problem of teacher illegibility in the post-2001 era of Western state-building. This sets the stage for the following analysis, as each subsequent chapter is concerned with one of these technical solutions. Still in Chapter 5, I turn to donors, who are the most important actors when it comes to technical solutions and external funding, and I engage with the question: *How have donors tried to reform the MoE's department of teacher identification and payment?* In line with my theoretical framework, I consider how donors react to the political and organisational culture in the DRC while carefully depoliticising major issues. Donors are far from possessing the authority and capacities to smoothly run all of their projects: Social reality is not a tabula rasa waiting to be reformed. The social reality under question here are mainly educational administrators and the organisations in which they work. These administrators can have interests and agendas that run contrary to formal policy goals. Therefore, it must be explored whether administrators can benefit from illegibility and how the administration performs nonetheless. Hence I ask: *How does the department of teacher identification and payment function and how have administrators reacted to reforms?* and *How has the MoE's department of teacher identification and payment performed throughout the years?*

Chapter 6 explores the dynamics behind the expansion of schools and the related increase of the number of teachers. It first asks: *How does educational expansion interfere with teacher legibility?* Then, looking at technical solutions to this problem I pursue the question: *How does the government try to govern educational expansion?* Finally, linking educational expansion to clientelism, I ask: *Which actors have an interest in educational expansion, and why?* The chapter therefore analyses the main drivers of the expansion of public education and links these dynamics to teacher illegibility.

In Chapter 7, I delve into a recent teacher payment reform which had teacher legibility as its main goal. Therefore, I ask: *How does the [so-called] bancarisation reform try to tackle teacher illegibility?* Since the early days of the reform's implementation it was clear that it was utterly unrealistic and ill-planned. Nevertheless, the reform survived. Again looking beyond reform failure, I therefore ask: *How did the bancarisation reform persist despite infrastructural, financial and organisational shortcomings?*

Finally, in Chapter 8, I propose to understand the impact of the government's attempt to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers in a recurrent armed conflict in two territories in the province of Haut-Katanga. The first relevant question to explore is: *How does armed conflict interfere with teacher legibility?* Since there is an obvious link between internally displaced teachers and teacher legibility, the second relevant question is

then again concerned with solutions: *How does the government try to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers?* Finally, I explore why the solutions might or might not work out in practice by addressing the question: *Which drivers act against the government's attempt to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers?*

Together, these research questions allow for an exploration of the main research question (see Table 1.2). In Chapter 2, I show how I derived these questions from theoretical arguments and empirical findings. These questions illuminate the process of permanent provocation around teacher legibility, or identification, in the DRC.

Table 1.2 *Research questions per empirical chapter*

Chapter	Sub research questions
4 The rise and fall of the legibility-discourse (1908-2001)	Who has been influential in educational agenda-setting?
	(At a particular moment in time) why does teacher legibility receive political value?
	How is teacher legibility rendered technical?
	How have donors tried to reform the MoE's department of teacher identification and payment?
5 State-building and administrative limits of legibility (2001-2013)	How does the department of teacher identification and payment function and how have administrators reacted to reforms?
	How has the MoE's department of teacher identification and payment performed throughout the years?
6 An ungoverned problem for legibility: brokered educational expansion	How does educational expansion interfere with teacher legibility?
	How does the government try to govern educational expansion?
	Which actors have an interest in educational expansion, and why?
7 Circumventing administrative problems for legibility: the bancarisation reform	How does the bancarisation reform try to tackle teacher illegibility?
	How did the bancarisation reform persist despite infrastructural, financial and organisational shortcomings?
8 Maintaining legibility during armed conflict	How does armed conflict interfere with teacher legibility?
	How does the government try to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers?
	Which drivers act against the government's attempt to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers?

1.5   Limitations of the research

This study naturally has some limitations. In-classroom research was not part of the research, and to some education researchers and specialists it might seem counter-intuitive or outright naive to discuss an education system without it. However, such a discussion would not have added benefit to the exploration of the specific research question explored in this thesis. Future research could include in-classroom research to understand the impact of legibility on classroom practices and to therefore further underline the importance of including questions of legibility in educational research. Furthermore, for similar reasons, neither parents' nor children's experiences and lifeworlds were extensively addressed. Drawing on the fact that parents still pay a large share of the education budget and demand the opening of new schools in the absence of sufficient government funding, I take parents'/students' demand and willingness to pay for education as given. Nevertheless, their point-of-view has hardly been taken into account in research on the politics of education in the DRC and certainly merits further attention.

Overall, I do not shed light on teacher unions although they play a crucial role for teachers' collective agency in other contexts (Lopes Cardozo 2009). In the DRC, however, Poncelet and colleagues (2010, 34) attest only a minor role to these unions, and my research did not point to any significant links between unions and legibility. It is also important to underline that I focused largely on legibility of teachers and not educational administrators. Future research might help to better understand the similarities and differences of both groups of state agents. Legibility is tightly linked to teacher payments. Although I consistently point to these links, I do not analyse dynamics around teacher payments as such, as this would go beyond the scope of this study. Finally, my knowledge on Congo's colonial education system was greatly informed by several authors and publications which find little explicit recognition in this thesis, as they deal particularly with pedagogy, textbooks, or focus exclusively on the colonial period with little reference to more recent epochs (Briffaerts 2011; Depaepe 2008; Depaepe, Debaere, and Van Rompaey 1991; Depaepe and Hulstaert 2015; Feltz 1980; Vinck et al. 2006; Yates 1971, 1976, 1980). Nevertheless, some of this research is referenced when I discuss historical foundations of Congolese educational governance in Chapters 4 and 5. The dissertation now proceeds as outlined above.

Chapter 2

Theoretical framework:
from state failure and resistance to permanent provocation

In this thesis, I engage with the persistence of illegibility among Congolese teachers in public schools. Despite massive attempts by the Congolese government and international donors since the 1970s to render all teachers legible, a significant number of teachers are currently still illegible or partially legible to the state administration. In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework in order to address this research problem. Arguably, I did not design the full framework before embarking on the research. It was developed in a dialog between theoretical reflections and empirical analysis. In the first part of this chapter, I discuss possible responses to the main research question in order to identify relevant conceptual approaches. The second part of this chapter brings these approaches together in a theoretical framework around processes of permanent provocation.

2.1   Possible explanations for illegibility

As I pointed out in the introduction, Scott (1998) argues that legibility is among the core instruments of modern states. Moreover, I showed that teacher legibility can have a value for teachers and international donors. For teachers it is a necessity before acquiring a salary; the government requires legible teachers so that it can pay all teachers and, in the case of the DRC, respond to donor conditions, and donors turn to legibility in order to reduce fiduciary risk. Furthermore, parents and students have an interest in legible teachers, because legible teachers are more likely to receive a government salary, which then leads to a reduction in parents' financial contributions to school fees. However, if I assume that legibility is so crucial for statecraft, and that everyone values legibility, it becomes difficult to explain the persistence of illegibility. What if reality is more ambivalent and not all of these actors value teacher legibility to the same degree? What if the type of state that requires a legible population is only one very particular type of state? Hence, the question that needs to be explored in a theoretical manner is the following: What are possible reasons for the existence of illegible public school teachers?

In order to reveal the dynamics behind illegibility, Kalir and Van Schendel (2017) suggest four analytical dimensions. First, recording is a two-directional process between those who record and those who are to be recorded (see also Lan 2017; Rozakou 2017). Second, the quest for legibility can be a "double-edged sword in the hands of states" (Kalir and van Schendel 2017, 2) as a legible population implies specific responsibilities. Third, discretionary power is crucial in defining what comes to be recorded or not. Fourth, state practices of recording, or a lack thereof, are embedded in international dynamics and include state and non-state actors (Kalir and van Schendel 2017; Rozakou 2017). Although

the focus of the work presented by the two authors – for example migrants in the Netherlands (Kalir 2017) – differs significantly from teachers in the DRC, their insights are valuable. Regarding this thesis, these aspects suggest important dynamics at the level of teachers, tensions between teachers and the state administration, and the need to pay attention to international donors. In the following sections I discuss how these aspects might be helpful in addressing the research question.

2.1.1   From state failure to multifarious administrative practices

In his work, Scott (1998, 2) points to the importance of legibility for the "classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion". In a similar vein, several authors consider legibility as a core component of modern Western states. Trouillot (2001, 126) defines legibility as "the production of both a language and a knowledge for governance and of theoretical and empirical tools that classify and regulate collectivities". Trouillot (2001, 126) further considers legibility a "state effect". Aretxaga (2003, 399) argues that "Foucault's studies of governmentality suggested the rise of a new kind of sovereign power from the eighteenth-century, one in which the power of the absolute sovereign was replaced by an array of practices and discourses aimed at the ordering and control of bodies and populations." According to her, key techniques include statistics, mapping and censuses which "were aimed at rendering populations and bodies legible, disciplined, and controlled" (ibid.). Possibly drawing on Trouillot, she claims that there is "a will to legibility as a state effect" (Aretxaga 2003, 404). Hansen and Stepputat (2001, 7) identify "the control of knowledge of the population – its size, occupations, production, and well-being" as a central language of governance which is "always underpinned by knowledge-generating techniques". Baitenmann (2005, 172f) states that "one of the most important and widespread state rituals is the effort of state agents to count and classify the population living within a state's territorial boundary". Important for this thesis, Baitenmann (2005, 173) argues that legibility is "a hallmark of modern statehood". Along similar lines Lee and Zhang (2017) stress the importance of legibility for state capacity. However, these findings might not apply to every kind of state, and a state that does pursue legibility is not necessarily a failed state.

As I indicated above, research by Kalir and Van Schendel (2017, 1) suggests that not all states are always interested in rendering their populations legible: "states are not simply in pursuit of enhanced 'legibility'; at times they also need to be able to 'look away.'" Vrăbiescu (2017) argues that nonrecording and derecording practices allow states to cover or defer their obligations towards their citizens. Gandhi (2017) portrays how administrators have discretionary power to looking and to look away, to permit and prohibit, to record and not record. Although Gandhi (2017) argues that illegibility must not only be linked to notions of state failure or corruption, it is nonetheless important to understand why bureaucrats might not desire legibility. The following paragraph exemplifies this link with regard to education sectors in states with intransparent administrative processes:

"Linked to deployment issues in fragile contexts is the question of transparency and 'ghost teachers' whose names remain on the payroll even though they are not actually working as teachers. In many countries, efforts to streamline the teaching cadre and remove 'ghost teachers' are stymied by vested interests and corruption." (World Bank 2010, 15)

'Ghost teachers' are an example of how state bureaucrats can benefit from intransparent and incomplete databases, by adding names to payrolls and acquiring their salaries. Establishing legibility goes hand-in-hand with the removal of such fictitious agents. Given that the state is not a monolithic entity but is constituted by myriads of actors, symbols and practices, it is possible that certain groups of state actors have vested interests against the establishment of higher levels of legibility (see also Donovan 2015b). The dominant corruption-discourse assigns a preeminent role to bureaucrats as individuals, and their "abuse of public office for private gains".[12] As I will argue throughout the thesis, corruption as a concept is not helpful in comprehensively describing or exploring administrative practices. At the same time, payroll fraud implies corruption. In order to unpack the protracted nature of corrupt practices in the context under study I turn to Max Weber.

Prebendal administrations

In his discussion of different types of *Herrschaft* (usually translated as authority or domination), Weber (1922, 151) discusses the concept of prebende (*Präbende* in German). By this, Weber refers to sinecures or benefices that are associated with certain administrative positions. According to Lemarchand (1988, 154) prebende "refers to the personal benefits drawn from the appropriation of public office – in the same way that in medieval Europe canons drew prebends from ecclesiastical lands". Prebende is a particular form of a patrimonial regime, where a leader distributes political offices according to loyalty and where there is no distinction between public and private funds. Contemporarily, in most countries such practices are prohibited by law but continue to exist in practice, which can be described as a "neo-patrimonial" system (Médard 1996). According to implicit rights each office-holder in a prebendal system is entitled to extract resources from activities that are associated with that position (Anders 2002; Blundo et al. 2006; Li 2007c; Young and Turner 1985). Regarding the DRC, Englebert and Kasongo (2016, 7) speak of a "generalised nature of the instrumentalisation of sovereignty by officeholders at all levels of the state".

A helpful way to further conceptualise and understand these dynamics is Poncelet and colleagues' (2010, 39; 2015, 91) description of the Congolese state as a "concessionary state", and the "concessionary modality of public action" that they describe. In this understanding of the administration, different groups of people have negotiated spaces of manoeuvre (*concessions*) in which they juggle the extent to which they extract resources from the population and contribute to the delivery of public services. The idea of

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[12] See Farrales & Diego for a debate of definitions of corruption (2005).

concessions can describe the work of international mining companies, faith-based organisations, or, as I stress in this thesis, it can also illustrate the functioning of significant parts of the administration.

However, corruption, prebende and concessionary resource extraction did not, of course, go unnoticed. What happens when a state administration does not perform according to formal procedures and objectives? A common way in international policy-making to respond to such a state administration is to depict it as deficient or deviant in order to intervene and build an idealised Western state. The images of the weak and failed state, and the concomitant idealised Western state, figure prominently in the agendas of international donors (Englebert and Tull 2008). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines state-building as follows:

> "Purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups" (OECD 2008, 14)

In this view, capacity development and institution building are depicted as central instruments in the state-building process. These instruments strongly build on the image of an idealised Western state (Englebert and Tull 2008). This state-building ideology is based on an implicit modernising and teleological way of framing statehood and political, social and economic development. Western state-building ideals get included in constitutions, economic strategies and development plans, are spelled out in more detail in sector-wide strategies, and are operationalised in government and donor-initiated projects and reforms. I speak of an idealised or imagined Western state, because state-builders seek to build and implement a type of state that hardly exists anywhere in the world. Pertinent buzzwords in this matter are good governance, accountability, rule of law and anti-corruption. The overarching image of an idealised liberal Western state can be unpacked by looking at underlying sets of values, paradigms and ideologies having to do with what I call the *4Ws*: Westphalian, Western, Weberian, and Welfare. These terms overlap and the following discussion is schematic. Nevertheless, it demarcates the most important characteristics of this imagined Western state.

Ideals of Western state-building

First of all, ever since the Westphalian treaties of 1648, the ideal Western state is sovereign. In this view, a state is recognised by other states and its sovereignty must not be infringed. Together, the mass of (nation-)states constitutes the international community. Therefore, a great deal of legitimacy can be attained through the recognition of the international community. Second, in the realm of state-building, the term Western usually points to a representative democracy, political checks and balances, the rule of law, the existence and respect of a constitution, a market economy, and the successful claim over the legitimate monopoly of using physical violence (Englebert and Tull 2008; Fukuyama 2015; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Weber 1922). Third, a

Weberian state often points to the existence of a legal-rational bureaucracy.[13] Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat is an indifferent one whose behaviour is built on clear and unambiguous guidelines. This bureaucrat is placed within a hierarchy and is subordinated to superiors, with a clear *Gehorsamspflicht* (duty to follow orders). Frequently, state- and capacity-building programs or civil service reforms seek to create such a Weberian bureaucracy. This notion of the bureaucrat was taken up in Fukuyama's description of the modern, impersonal state (2015, 10) – in a Weberian manner, he distinguishes it from a patrimonial, personalised state. This idealised Weberian bureaucracy also shines through in Rothstein's (2011) emphasis on impartiality, which he posits as the opposite of corruption, clientelism and similar modalities of public action. The term "good governance" became an umbrella concept for public sectors that are characterised by impartiality (Rothstein 2011; World Bank 1991, 2017). Fourth, the provision of public goods and services is often seen as a major source of state legitimacy and has therefore taken up a central role in donors' theories of change concerning state-building (Ndaruhutse et al. 2012; Pearson 2011). First and foremost of these is security, followed by other goods such as the rule of law, education, health, or drinking water (Hoffmann and Kirk 2013; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, and Smith 2017).

States which do not fulfil the norms, procedures and objectives that are related to the ideal and imagined Western state have come to be labelled "weak", "fragile" or "failed" (Englebert and Tull 2008; Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, and Nay 2014; Hameiri 2007). They are seen as deficient and are portrayed as breeding-grounds for terrorism or causing mass streams of refugees through the existence of armed groups and under-provision of public services (Aretxaga 2003). Consequently, improving the delivery of public services is seen as a post-conflict peace dividend that can help to legitimise a government. According to this logic, 'deviant' states need to be rectified and disciplined, and capacities need to be built from above. States that come out of an armed conflict in particular come under massive influence of the international community and might formally accept and embrace many of the elements of state-building and reconstruction agendas (Englebert and Tull 2008; De Herdt and Poncelet 2010b).

Criticism of the 'failed states'-debate and Western state-building

The biased framing of Southern states as failed and deviant has received much criticism in recent years (De Herdt and Poncelet 2010b). Hameiri (2007, 122) suggests that the problems are "failed paradigms" rather than "failed states". Along similar lines, Englebert and Tull (2008, 106) argue that such judgments are mainly based on "flawed ideas about failed states". Terms such as state-building and reconstruction are prone to neglecting existing structures or "inhabited institutions" (Binder 2007; Hallett and Ventresca 2006; De Herdt and Titeca 2016). De Herdt and colleagues (2012, 689) point out that in the case of the DRC "the social contract was broken well before" the outbreak of armed conflict

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[13] Weber (1922) describes the legal-rational bureaucracy as an ideal-type. However, he describes it as a system of *Herrschaft* (domination) and does not advocate it is as the optimal type of state.

(see also Englebert and Tull 2008; Milliken and Krause 2002; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and Vlassenroot 2008). Where state-builders see absences and a lack of state structures, Aretxaga (2003, 396) sees "not a deficit of state but an excess of statehood practices: Too many actors competing to perform as state."

When donors apply their particular state-building lens, they might be oblivious to existing institutions or administrative practices, paying "scant attention to the coexistence in Africa of informal political institutions with formal bureaucratic procedures" (Englebert and Tull 2008, 116). Vongalis-Macrow (2006) shows how international donors frame teacher policies in Iraq in the 2000s as if there had been no education system prior to the US-led invasion. The very contrary was the case, as Vongalis-Macrow argues. In a similar vein, De Herdt and Poncelet (2010b, 16) argue that "you don't reconstruct on nothing, but on diverse, complex and evolutionary arrangements." Research on donor involvement in education in the DRC yielded several examples of donors' misconceptions of the reality they are dealing with (Cassimon, De Herdt, and Verbeke 2015; De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012; Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst 2015; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010).

Along similar lines, "aidnographies" started to look into the internal functioning of the development industry (Gardner and Lewis 2015; Mosse 2004). Donors' practices frequently diverge from ideals such as those expressed in the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness from 2005. Although donors formally align their practices to host governments, their practices might reveal a disjuncture. Blundo (2014, 71) coined the term "two-speed bureaucracies" to describe different ways of working between state and donor administrations. Given the constant design of new codes of conduct, schemes, norms or organigrams pushed for by international donors, one could believe that African bureaucracies are void of formalisations. However, the contrary is true: Most African bureaucracies do not lack rules and norms, but face their abundance. It would be both wrong to completely dismiss these documents or to take them at face value. Their functioning should be subjected to critical analysis.

A major reason for the multiplicity of norms is what Bierschenk (2014b, 221) calls "sedimentation". He considers this as a process in which new sets of laws are adopted although the relationship to already existing norms is not clarified. This can lead to a myriad of official norms, some of which might be contradictory and cause normative double-binds. In such a context, the legal framework is not necessarily strictly enforced. Instead, people and institutions often turn to those norms which best suit their endeavour and objective. Although it is a common characteristic of any bureaucracies that actual everyday practices differ from codified norms, it is equally important to recognise the particular divergence between official and practiced norms in African bureaucracies (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014c; De Herdt and Olivier de Sardan 2015). What makes African bureaucracies such an interesting research object is the blending of formal and informal norms and practices (Therkildsen 2014). Olivier de Sardan (2008, 1) coined the term "practical norms" to explore the gap between official norms and actual practices.

Even when official state rules are circumvented, for instance through clientelist networks, state actors often seek to legitimise their practices by selectively referring to official norms and symbols (Anders 2002; Cleaver 2001; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). This can be understood as "false negatives", i.e. "where people's behaviour de facto deviates from legal norms but is nevertheless oriented towards it" (De Herdt 2015, 101f). Official norms are important objects of legitimisation. This brings the cycle to a close: Administrators who engage in corruption can seek to justify and rationalise their practices by referring to codified frameworks and norms (Anders 2002).

Another important factor that shapes the actual functioning of administrations can be found in severe material and financial shortcomings. These shortcomings hardly allow bureaucrats to carry out their missions as officially envisaged. Therefore, it is important to point to material reasons why an administration might not be able to perform according to set goals.

Infrastructure and technology

In order to govern a population over a given territory, an administration requires "territorial reach" (Hau 2012, 2). Michael Mann (1984, 189) proposes the concept "infrastructural power" as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm". In unpacking how state power is exercised, Schouten (2013, 7) builds on Latour (2005) and dedicates attention to the "mediation of interactions by symbolic and material entities". Srnicek (2010, 37) further argues that exercising power across space "presupposes that an entire network has been constructed through which it [power] can be exerted". Instead of seeking to understand the state abstractly, this allows for an analysis of state power in its diversity as manifested in localised practices (Krohn-Hansen 2015). In an analysis of biometric identification in South Africa, Donovan (2015b) highlights that infrastructural challenges are at the core of the implementation of many reforms. He further points to the "often overlooked social and technical construction of the infrastructure" (Donovan 2015a, 732). Rendering a population legible requires immense social and infrastructural capacities. Randall (2016) and Devarajan (2013) for example reveal that uncoordinated data collection processes and ill-conceived methodologies can be reasons for the persisting dearth of statistical knowledge on certain issues and groups in the population.

Infrastructural aspects are not detached from the issues discussed above: For instance, the infrastructural power of the Congolese state in terms of educational governance is tightly bound to the concessionary nature of the state. Since faith-based organisations are endowed with vast networks of priests and parishes, the state has acquired a much wider spatial outreach by tying them into the management of public education. Such "logistical techniques" (Mann 2012, 7f) allow decisions to spread over space, be mediated and changed, and reach – or not – their intended recipients. The imbrication of people with territories, infrastructure, IT equipment, and other material aspects play a crucial role in the way a reform takes shape (Li 2007c) (see Section 2.2.5).

In sum, regarding possible explanations for illegibility, I can retain the following: The fact that an idealised rational-legal state administration requires, or would benefit from, legibility does not mean that all administrators desire a legible population. Prebendal practices and concessions imply that administrators could be opposed to reforms and changes if these reforms target their concessions and discretionary power. At the same time, Western state-building and good governance agendas command donors to pursue legibility as a core component of statehood. However, my discussion shows that donors can be oblivious and biased towards existing multiple and overlapping authorities, norms and symbols. This underlines that it is important to include the possible tensions in the relationship between state administrations and donors in an analysis of the persisting existence of illegibility. Moreover, infrastructural shortcomings might hamper the implementation and unfolding of a reform or intervention regarding teacher identification.

2.1.2   From resistance to bottom-up dynamics

Randall (2016) identifies self-exclusion as a main reason for statistical invisibility in Africa. Similarly, Scott (1998, 24) argues that the state tries to render legible, whereas citizens or "local power-holders" resist and use local knowledge to design alternative strategies. As I pointed out above, Kalir and Van Schendel (2017) argue that processes of recording and nonrecording include those who record and those who are to be recorded. The process is to be "understood in terms of negotiation rather than imposition" (Kalir and van Schendel 2017, 4).

Since this thesis focuses on teachers, two questions arise: First, would teachers be able to resist the state's imposition of legibility? Second, would teachers have reasons to resist? Regarding the first question, education systems are usually among the largest state institutions and teachers occupy key positions in these systems (Horner et al. 2015; OECD 2005; Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2016). Therefore, teachers are key actors in modern states and carry a great amount of expectations on their shoulders (Davies 1993; Vongalis-Macrow 2007; Welmond 2002). Understanding their complex identities requires going beyond the portrayal of teachers as technical, neutral, or even benign implementers of education policies. Far beyond material factors only, teachers often stand in contested relationships to the state and non-state institutions, in processes that range from local to international levels and encompass cultural, political, social and economics dynamics (Charton 2014; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2012; Robertson et al. 2007; Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014; Verger, Altinyelken, and De Koning 2013). Despite enormous pressure and expectations, policy and reform processes are not linear but teachers have agency to accept, adapt, translate, modify or resist them (Bonal 2002; Fichtner 2010; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe 2006; Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2012). They can do so individually or collectively especially through unions (Gandhi Kingdon et al. 2014; Lopes Cardozo 2009).

However, to my knowledge, research thus far has not dealt with the question of the legibility of teachers in public schools, possibly because the issue was not as apparent in other contexts of study. In fact, teachers in public schools are likely very keen to be seen by the state, in the sense of being included in the state's database in order to receive a regular salary and benefit from teacher training. This discussion suggests that a focus on resistance and intentional self-exclusion is not helpful for the case under study. Nevertheless, there are other practices around teachers that might be important in order to fully understand processes around illegibility: first, teacher recruitment, transfers, and exits; second, the expansion of the education sector; and third, the relations between armed conflict, internal displacement and education. All of these issues need to be considered vis-à-vis the administrative dynamics that I discussed above.

Teacher recruitment, transfers and exits

Rendering legible usually implies that the object of legibility, the target population, needs to be attainable, stable and controllable. However, what happens when this target population is unsteady and not fixed? Teacher recruitment, transfers and exits can be extremely dynamic processes (Tama 2014; World Bank 2010). An administration needs to provide incentives and schemes to attain a desired level of stability. For instance, in all fields of teacher governance, monetary incentives play a crucial role, both in conflict-settings (World Bank 2010) and non-conflict-settings (Doctors, Ratteree, and Sayed 2015). These incentives can also take shape through possibilities for continuous professional development and the related chance to move up in the educational hierarchy (in-school or towards administrative positions). Furthermore, in an economically precarious context such as the Congolese one, teachers might seek transfers between schools in order to seek a better position or life condition, for example from a rural to an urban school, or from a non-accredited school to an accredited school. Finally, teachers can leave the profession for various reasons such as death, disciplinary exclusion or the choice of another job. If the administration that manages teacher recruitments, transfers and exits has weak capacities, these dynamics are potential reasons for teacher illegibility.

Expansion

Teacher recruitment can become particularly dynamic during phases of rapid expansion. Given the contemporary international urge towards Education for All, education systems that have not yet reached all children are still expanding. When this expansion collides with an administration that is recovering from years of war and instability, teacher identification might not hold the pace. Moreover, it is important to factor in the modalities of expansion. Corrales (2005, 18) argues that clientelism is among "the most intense political forces that push states to expand education". He defines clientelism as the "distribution of valued resources […] according to political criteria […] from a strong actor toward a weak actor" (Corrales 2005, 18).

De Herdt, Titeca and Wagemakers (2012) provided evidence for a link between clientelism and education in the DRC. Importantly, clientelism is not a static form of governance. Various authors suggest that democratisation and decentralisation reforms can strengthen patron-client relationships (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003; Boone 2003; Englebert and Kasongo 2014). Furthermore, there is one important deeply ingrained characteristic of Congolese educational governance: Faith-based organisations manage a large share of public schools in the DRC and the number of FBOs has grown since the early 2000s (Leinweber 2013; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). FBOs have an interest in opening new schools and therefore need to be taken into account in an analysis of the relationship between educational expansion and clientelism.

In Section 2.1.1, I pointed to lively administrative practices beyond solely predation, neo-patrimonialism or, for instance, clientelism. Bureaucrats represent the state on the ground and are "the main providers of goods and services on the state's behalf" (Olivier de Sardan 2014, 403). The state is at work through these bureaucrats and for many citizens these "interface bureaucrats are simply 'the' state" (Olivier de Sardan 2014, 404). Administrators are not mere indifferent implementers but brokers with multiple roles well beyond distortion and corruption. They have essential roles in the everyday workings of the state (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014c). Moreover, they enjoy a "space for manoeuvre" (Lopes Cardozo and Shah 2016, 334) to "construct their everyday relationships with service users" (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014c, 4) and to interpret and enact their own roles and responsibilities (Berenschot 2010). This discussion suggests that bureaucrats can have a role to play in processes of educational expansion.

Armed conflict and internal displacement

In addition to teacher recruitment, transfers and exits, and educational expansion, there is another reason why an administration might lose its overview: internally displaced teachers. This issue is highly relevant for this thesis as the DRC can by no means be considered to be a post-conflict state (De Herdt 2010, 10). In fact, in the province under study, there are various armed conflicts (Berghezan 2016; International Crisis Group 2006). These can be identified as "new wars" (Kalyvas 2001, 99), involving multiple belligerent parties and an on-and-off kind of low intensity conflict without a clear beginning or end.

In recent years it has become increasingly well understood why schools and teachers become targeted in armed conflicts. Some of these attacks are directly related to the school as a symbol of state presence, whereas others are motivated by the practical use of educational infrastructure since schools in rural areas can be among the few buildings constructed in durable materials (Pherali 2013; M. Smith, Koons, and Kapit 2014; van Wessel and van Hirtum 2013). Apart from physical facilities, teachers are key targets and can become trapped between different ideologies and belligerent parties (Lopes Cardozo and Shah 2016; Paulson and Rappleye 2007; Pherali 2013; M. Smith, Koons, and Kapit 2014; Wilson 2000). In several cases it has been noted that teachers become suspected of informing and spying (Pherali 2013, 58; M. Smith, Koons, and Kapit 2014; Wilson 2000, 10).

None of the research mentioned in the preceding paragraph, however, has established a direct link between armed conflict and teacher legibility. However, armed conflict can cause internal displacements, forcing teachers to abandon their schools and villages. In general, the everyday functioning of the educational administration during armed conflict has not received much attention in research. Therefore, it is not surprising that little knowledge is available on the question how an administration keeps up with the challenge of ensuring that all registered teachers remain legible, the topic that this thesis is dedicated to.

In sum, although resistance might be a valid reason for illegibility in some contexts, it does not seem very relevant for public school teachers. Teacher recruitment, transfers and exits, educational expansion and internal displacement are three categories that seem more relevant with regard to teacher illegibility. Combining this with the discussion on multifarious administrative practices, it should now be clear that there are a range of possible reasons for illegibility, far beyond state failure or resistance only. This amalgam of reasons suggests highly dynamic interactions, the analysis of which requires an adequate overarching theoretical framework. I return to the issues discussed thus far in Section 2.2.5 where I embed them in a larger framework.

2.2   Permanent provocation

The foregoing discussion points to a strong overlap between codified and non-codified norms, the interaction between state and non-state actors, the protracted interference of armed militias within a state's borders and restrictive infrastructural endowments that set certain limits to the exercise of public action. At the same time, my discussion suggests that the state does not necessarily disappear through these diverse dynamics; in fact, it even appears to expand in some instances.

One way to bring these divergent practices, actors and symbols together is Olivier de Sardan's (2008, 1) concept of "real governance". Explicitly directed against the "good governance" discourse, real governance points to the co-functioning of state and non-state actors "particularly at the level of the delivery of public or collective goods and services" (Olivier de Sardan 2008, 1). Similarly, Raeymaekers and colleagues (2008) point to the growing emergence of a "mediated form of statehood, in which governments rely on diverse strategies of negotiation with non-state sources of authority to provide certain functions of government" (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and Vlassenroot 2008, 17; see also Jaffe 2013 and Pouw and Baud 2013). Critical approaches towards education, globalisation and/or conflict adopt a similar stance concerning the multitudes of forces that shape contemporary education policies (Dale and Robertson 2009; Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2016; Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2012).

What these understandings of governance have in common is that governance does not solely take place according to codified norms (Blundo and Le Meur 2009; Corbridge et al. 2005; Hau 2012; Lund 2006; Torfing et al. 2012). Instead, "modes of governance are [...]

social constructs emerging from concrete (local and global) interactions specific to each situation" (Olivier De Sardan 2013, 281). Terms with similar implications are hybridity, hybrid governance or hybrid state (De Herdt 2015; Jaffe 2013; Meagher, De Herdt, and Titeca 2014; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). Increasingly popular terms to refer to the connections between state and non-state actors, as well human and non-human actors, are assemblage and network (Fenwick, Edwards, and Sawchuk 2015; Jaffe 2013; Li 2007b). Especially these later terms allow for an understanding of complexity, emergence and change while being compatible with an ethnographic analysis that seeks to uncover their various constitutive material and symbolic components (Delanda 2016; Latour 2005; Srnicek 2006).

Finally, a frequently appearing term is negotiation. Mosse and Lewis (2006, 10) argue that negotiation "is a poor descriptor of phenomena that may range from 'strategic stances' to 'unconscious dispositions' behind the compliance or compromise that either reproduces or erases social and institutional boundaries". Although I use the term negotiation at times in this thesis, as it can be helpful to describe certain social interactions, the term is indeed not helpful for uncovering long-standing and conflict-ridden societal processes. Analysing the relation between state and the Catholic Church in educational governance in the DRC, Titeca and colleagues (2013, 129) draw on Foucault and propose the potentially more dynamic term "permanent provocation":

> "Perhaps the process of state formation resembles much less a 'negotiation' and more what Foucault called a process of 'permanent provocation' (Miller, Gordon, and Burchell 1991), where each step forward invites responses from different sides, the only certainty being that the process will never come to rest. The state is permanently under construction."

Along similar lines, André and colleagues (2010, 158) argue that each measure and intervention from above should be considered as a provocation that incites reactions and results in adaptations. The concept of permanent provocation is based on Foucault's understanding of power:

> "The relationship between power and freedom's refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated. The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how could we seek to be slaves?). At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom , it would be better to speak of an "agonism – of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation." (Interview with M. Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 221f)

Thus, in Foucault's understanding, power leaves space for reactions. Reactions and space for manoeuvre are, in fact, seen as constituents of power itself (Interview with M. Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Li 2007a). Without the possibility for reactions,

power would be mere force. Although there is this space for reactions in Foucault's framing of power, Foucault himself never dealt with the question of how people react to power. He was far from conducting ethnographies. In his historical studies he rather looked at discourses, schemes, programs, and designs of how people have thought about influencing the action and behaviour of others (Foucault 2007, 2008). He gradually framed his ideas around the notion of governmentality. Focusing on the process of permanent provocation facilitates an analysis of the limits of governmentality during phases of implementation and the governmental reactions to these limits. In the next paragraph, I outline my understanding of this process, before discussing each aspect in more detail in the following sections.

Li (2007a, 275) defines the practice of government, or governmentality, as the "conduct of conduct" and adds that "government is the attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means".[14] Li discusses three elements in what she portrays as the practice of government: authorising knowledge, forging alignments and rendering technical. Another term that appears in Li's work and that I believe fits within the practice of government is problematisation. These four elements are the first four steps in my conceptualisation of the process of permanent provocation. However, the practice of government is only the design of policies. The impact of policies is a different matter altogether and requires ethnographic attention. Indeed, Li (2007a, 276) stresses that this practice of government, or governmentality, must not be mistaken as an absolute form of power and control over populations: It is first of all the discursive elaboration of how behaviour could be controlled and shaped. Therefore, Li (2007c, 27) proposes to explore "the intersection of governmental programs with the world they would transform". She argues that any plan or reform meets certain limits during the implementation process. These limits are the fifth step in my conceptual framework. Reacting to these limits is an inherent element of any project or reform. Therefore, "Reassembling to manage failure" is the final step in my theoretical framework. It illustrates the pursuit of compromises and the harmonisation of apparent incoherencies in order to ensure the continuity of a reform or project. Practices of reassembling can keep the process of permanent provocation in motion.

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[14] In this thesis, when I speak of "the government" I refer to the Congolese government. When I speak of "government" or "the practice of government" I make allusion to this wider concept of "conduct of conduct", which I understand as the attempt to change the behaviour of a specified target population towards a desired outcome without the use of force.

Figure 2.1 *The process of permanent provocation*

Source: *Adapted by author from Li's (2007b) portrayal of governmental assemblages*

Through its circular structure, Figure 2.1 alludes to the notion of permanent provocation. The upper right field constitutes the initial driver of the process of permanent provocation, illustrated by the black bar: Transforming problematisations into policies, if only discursively, is the first step of the practice of government. Surely, once in motion, all processes pertaining to the process of permanent provocation can overlap and interact. It is important to underline that this framework does not represent a top-down process of policy-making. It is not a static framework that takes place according to clearly delineated steps. Instead, it enables an analysis of top-down and bottom-up dynamics as well as dynamics of a more polycentric nature. In this thesis, I build on these ideas and propose to understand a range of activities around teacher legibility as a process of permanent provocation. In the remainder of the chapter, I further outline the six steps of the theoretical framework.

2.2.1   Problematising

One of the crucial questions for Scott (1998) is a question of value: Why does a state seek to render its citizens, and other phenomena, legible? From this perspective, legibility has a value for the state as it facilitates the achievement of core objectives such as taxation. I outline in Section 2.1 that legibility has a value for parents, teachers, the Congolese government and international donors. However, does this value always lead to an inclusion of legibility as a policy goal? Put differently, has illegibility always been considered a problem? The work by the following authors suggests that no policy or value is without a

beginning. Foucault investigated why and how certain issues (such as madness) have been framed as problems:

> "You could say that I do histories of problematisations. History in the way that things are problematic. How and why, and through which modality, was madness problematic in the modern world? And why has it become an important problem?" (Eskenazi & Caillat 2014, 4:31)

This resonates with educational researchers Dale and Robertson (2009, 1120) who ask "in pursuit of what manifest and latent social, economic, political and educational purposes […] are these things problematised, decided, administered, managed?". Selecting a certain object and making it relevant is linked to what Li (2007c, 7) calls "problematisations, that is, identifying deficiencies that need to be rectified". Li further argues the following:

> "The practice that tends to take centre stage is problematisation, as scholars examine how problems come to be defined as problems in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnoses of deficiency and promises of improvement." (Li 2007b, 274)

My discussion of state-building shows how a certain Western gaze consistently problematises Southern states. Yet, I also showed that this way of problematising has not been around forever, it has grown in dominance since the 1900s. In sum, this discussion suggests that a given issue does not have an essential or intrinsic value. Looking at the purpose, or, value, that is assigned to a certain aspect can help to unpack the historic emergence and construction of a discourse around that purpose. Furthermore, the way in which a topic is problematised can reveal power relations between involved actors. Continuously and repeatedly attaching value is a central driver of the process of permanent provocation and the authorisation of certain kinds of knowledges is paramount in taking certain issues into the policy arena.

2.2.2 Authorising knowledge

Only a certain number of problematisations enter the policy-making process. Authorising what is seen and accepted as a problem is a crucial step of the practice of government. Li (2007c, 265) describes the authorisation of knowledge as "specifying the requisite body of knowledge; confirming enabling assumptions; containing critiques". However, authorising knowledge is not necessarily an objective scientific process where the best solution is found for a given problem. In reality, the existing solutions might define the way in which a certain issue is conceived as a problem. Li (2007c, 7) argues that "their claim to expertise depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solutions that fall within their repertoire". For example, international donors have a certain portfolio of solutions that they can mobilise, such as capacity-building measures.

The question of knowledge authorisation goes hand-in-hand with the question of who can act as policymakers. It can be a paradox of states with weak infrastructural power that their governments can be relatively strong, or authoritarian, when it comes to agenda-

setting and the design of policies in certain sectors. Such a government can "shape the terms on which non-state practices can be integrated into governance arrangements" (Meagher, De Herdt, and Titeca 2014, 6). Michael Mann (1984, 188) coined the term "despotic power", defined as "the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups". This implies little transparency, accountability, or checks and balances, and that negotiations take place behind closed doors. Furthermore, a government can have "non-decision" power and exclude certain topics, people and knowledges (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 2005). Nonetheless, a government – or donor – might have to include other stakeholders in order to reach envisaged outcomes.

2.2.3 Forging alignments

For Li (2007c, 24), "forging alignments [is] the work of linking together the objectives of the various parties to an assemblage, both those who aspire to govern conduct and those whose conduct is to be conducted". This resonates with Kalir and Van Schendel's (2017) argument that (non)recording involves both those who record and those who are to be recorded. Harmonising objectives and "identifying common interests" (Li 2007c, 26) is a crucial step in convincing others to join the policy-making and implementation process. In a "hybrid state" actors that can claim to participate in such processes tend to be numerous and include state and non-state actors (Jaffe 2013, 734).

In the case under study, there are policymakers, bureaucrats, faith-based organisations, private companies, citizens and many more. A focus on forging alignments facilitates an analysis that recognises that governments, international donors or other initiators of public reforms need the cooperation of other actors. This can happen in the form of "private indirect government" (Mbembe 1999), public-private partnerships or other forms of indirect governance. The resulting government assemblages are ephemeral and new spontaneous ad-hoc alignments might be forged (see Section 2.2.6). Meanwhile, the state is likely to maintain its role as a "central frame of reference" (Titeca and De Herdt 2011, 12). The authorisation of knowledge and the forging of alignments stand in a direct relation to the subsequent processes of proposing solutions.

2.2.4 Rendering technical

I have noted that the relationship between problems and solutions is not as straightforward as, for example, logical frameworks might suggest. In reality, "it is the appearance of congruence between problems and interventions [...] that is really surprising and requires explanation" (Mosse and Lewis 2006, 14). International donors frequently achieve a fascinating step: They mingle with very internal affairs, such as state administrations, without being able to target some very sensitive issues. A certain degree of depoliticisation is inherent in the formulation of, for example, capacity-building measures. Problems need to be rendered technical, which means "extracting from the messiness of the social world, with all the processes that run through it, a set of relations that can be formulated as a diagram

in which problem (a) plus intervention (b) will produce (c), a beneficial result" (Li 2007b, 265). Li (2007c, 12) makes clear that every intervention is an assemblage of pre-existing resources. It draws upon

> "forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgement, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscriptions techniques and so forth."
> (Li 2007c, 12)

Such assemblages imply the active constitution of a particular policy out of different pre-existing and new elements, practices and actors: "Programs of intervention are pulled together from an existing repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion, and bricolage" (Li 2007c, 6). A project can be designed without adequate knowledge of context and local practices. Modalities often reflect the conditions in the capital city and are built on biased assumptions of the institutions, territory, and people that are to be reformed or take part in the reform. This biased knowledge management reflects a lack of representation of, for example, civil society and regional representatives. Here, the overlaps between processes of authorising knowledge, forging alignments and rendering problems technical become obvious.

So far, I have discussed four steps of the process of permanent provocation: Triggered by problematisations, a process of authorising knowledge, forging alignments and technical solutions is initiated. However, reforms and projects are never imposed but are severely limited by a range of factors and provoke reactions. Therefore, the following section discusses the limits of the practice of government.

2.2.5 Limits of government

Despite planners' desire to regulate, improve, intervene, govern, etc., they can hardly control everything. Reforms or capacity-building measures that seek to *build the state* are not implemented as neatly as described in policy documents (Boone 1998; Ferguson 1994; Long 2001; Mosse and Lewis 2006). The failure of top-down reforms has occupied a prominent place in the anthropology of development (Gardner and Lewis 2015; Mamdani 1972). Famously, Scott (1998) discussed several megalomaniac social engineering projects in this attempt to explain *how the state sees*, and what the state does not see.

Also regarding education policies, interventions are often biased, poorly informed and financed, and clash with material constraints and people's lived realities and their knowledge (Bartlett and Vavrus 2009; Berkovich 2011; Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2016; Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe 2006; Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2012; Welmond 2002). People have agency, they do not "passively receive knowledge or directions from the outside, but dynamically interact with it" (Gardner and Lewis 2015, 102). Hence, reforms do not simply fail or are resisted, but people actively negotiate the implementation and impacts of reforms (Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2011; Titeca, De Herdt, and Wagemakers 2013).

Offering a way to conceptualise this mediated impact of reforms, Li argues that the practice of government faces certain limits (Li 2007c). In line with her understanding of power (see introductory paragraphs in Section 2.2), one inherent limit of power is the use of force or coercion. She considers power as being defined by the absence of coercion (see Section 2.2). Second, she points to politics, which means the possibility for actors who were not included in the practice of government to challenge the diagnoses and prescriptions. Third, Li speaks of "processes and relations that cannot be reconfigured according to plan" (Li 2007c, 17). Li (2007c, 17) elaborates as follows:

> "One [limit of government] is the limit posed by the target of government: population. Men in their relations, their links, their imbrication are not easy to manage. [...] The relations and processes with which government is concerned present intrinsic limits to the capacity of experts to improve things. There is inevitably an excess. There are processes and relations that cannot be reconfigured according to plan."

This resonates with my discussion in Section 2.1.1 on the multitude of norms in the Congolese administration. Fourth, Li (2007a, 277) highlights "available forms of knowledge and technique". Legibility is a form of knowledge, and it can easily be imagined how a lack of legibility can become a limit of government. However, in this thesis, I am interested in the limits of achieving legibility. This brings me back to the discussion in Section 2.1, where I identify the likely reasons for illegibility. I consider these reasons as limits of government and they are reiterated in Table 2.1. As I stated above, they are not only theoretically derived but stem from a constant dialog between my theoretical thoughts and empirical findings:

Table 2.1 *Possible limits of governing teacher identification*

Limit of governing teacher identification	Chapters
1. Administrative practices and will	4, 5
2. Donor practices	4, 5 & 6
3. Infrastructure and technology	5, 8
4. Teacher entries, transfers and exits	5 & 6
5. A growing target population	6
6. Armed conflict	7

2.2.6 Reassembling to manage failure

The discussion above suggests that project implementation is likely to face several limits. Despite these limits, however, reforms are often made to survive. When a reform does not unfold as planned, there is an "open moment", which Lund (2016, 1202) considers as "particularly propitious moments for observing and analysing how authority is as much at stake and as much under construction as the very rights produced through its exercise". By referring to Lund, Titeca and colleagues (2013, 119) argue that an analysis of such open

moments allows to "gain insight into processes of authority and political control, and how they are questioned, challenged and possibly redefined".

In such a moment, new actors can join a certain process, mobilise their resources and adapt policies to their needs and often conflicting goals (Titeca and De Herdt 2011). Power configurations are challenged and can shift. These open spaces and resulting negotiations tend not to be characterised by enormous ruptures but by continuity and a temporal co-existence of new and older modalities of governance (De Herdt and Kasongo 2013, 234; De Herdt and Poncelet 2010b, 16). The re-arrangements of actor constellations in such open moments show that state formation is by no means a finished process in which the government is the pivotal actor.

Nevertheless, the parties that initiated a reform or project have can make them seem more successful than they really are. Interventions can become extended despite obvious shortcomings. In fact, managing reform failure is an inevitable aspect of reform management (Li 2005, 2007b). Whereas theories of change, results matrices and logical frameworks (log frames) are common tools in donors' project management and suggest a neat implementation process with foreseeable results, donors' actual practices are often the result of bricolage and constant adaptation. The coherence of a project is not a matter of design but of multiple acts of harmonisation (Latour 2005; Li 2007c; Mosse 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2006). Reforms do not set the parameters in which actors operate. Instead, reforms "become real through the work of generating and translating interests, creating context by tying in supporters and so sustaining interpretations" (Mosse and Lewis 2006, 13). These practices can be considered as the "reassembling" that Li defines as "grafting on new elements and reworking old ones; deploying existing discourses to new ends; transposing the meanings of key terms" (Li 2007b, 265). Schematically speaking, therefore, a project or reform is sustained by the same techniques of government that were used at its initiation: The authorisation of certain kinds of knowledge, the forging of alignments, and the discursive assurance that new technical solutions can be found.

Overall, this theoretical framework allows me to historicise the entanglement of everyday practices of a range of stakeholders. In Chapter 4 I trace the emergence of the political discourse around the value of teacher legibility in the DRC. Affiliated problematisations of illegibility and technical solutions provoke reactions and face limits. In reassembling processes, actors can make their practices seem more congruent and harmonious than they actually are in order to justify further interventions and actions. As long as a certain issue of interest retains its value, the process of permanent provocation is likely to continue. Concerning my main theoretical argument in this thesis, this analysis allows me to consider illegibility as a state effect that emerges from the process of permanent provocation around (il)legibility. Before I turn to the empirical analysis, I discuss my methodological approach in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

Research design and methodology

In this chapter, I outline my research design and methodology. Research for this study was carried out in different parts of the DRC for nine months from January to May 2015 and from December 2015 to May 2016. The way the chapters in this thesis are organised does not reflect the research process chronologically. My research started with ethnographic work. The ethnography was multi-sited and contains elements of a vertical case study and horizontal comparisons (see Section 3.3). During this phase, and the subsequent analysis of the gathered data, I addressed a helpful analytical question suggested by Christian Lund (2014): "Of what is this a case?" Pursuing this question helped me to link my empirical findings to the issue of teacher legibility.

Gradually, I realised that teacher legibility was a crucial issue with regard to educational expansion (Chapter 6), bancarisation reform (Chapter 7) and the administration of internally displaced teachers (Chapter 8). Therefore, I then turned to policy documents of different kinds and conducted an analysis of the legibility-discourse (see Section 3.1). Hence, schematically speaking, the research process went from ethnographic data towards a discourse analysis whereas the chapters in this thesis are ordered the other way around, beginning with the discourse analysis in order to set the stage for the subsequent chapters.

Discourse analysis is only one component of the research. In line with the interdisciplinary nature of international development studies, research methods for this study were not predetermined by affiliation to an academic discipline but were motivated through the research problem and the (sub) research questions. Therefore, this research uses a wide range of methods and data sources: semi-structured interviews; observations; documents and archival records; statistics and various databases (see Sections 3.2 and 3.4). After I discuss these issues, I provide a table to link sub research questions and research methods (see Section 3.5). In order to describe specificities of the different analytical steps, subsequent chapters begin with a brief reiteration of applied methods in the respective chapter. I end this current chapter with a reflection on positionality and ethical issues.

3.1   Discourse and document analysis

Discourse analysis is a term with various meanings and implications. The type of discourse analysis that I refer to in this thesis can be seen as "discursive institutionalism" that seeks to unpack a "coordinative discourse" (Schmidt 2008, 303) between different policymakers. More precisely, there is a specific reason why I apply discourse analysis. According to my theoretical framework, a permanent provocation begins with the assignment of value to a given object or issue, such as legibility. Consequently, the opposite of that issue becomes problematised. It was through this theoretical approach that I saw the necessity to trace the

emergence and evolution of the legibility-discourse. I came to realise that my initial empirical findings were situated within an attempt to control teacher identification and the actual dynamics that influenced teacher identification on the ground. Thus, I follow Nuijten and colleagues (2004, 122) who state that "to fully understand the process of policy intervention it is necessary to draw on newspapers, policy papers, official documents, government circulars and legislation next to more conventional ethnographic data." Similar to the rest of my research, this discourse analysis had a historicising component and thus resonates with Krohn-Hansen (2015, 335) who state that "today, it is common to see political anthropologists combine ethnographic work with history".

With the help of a discourse analysis I set out to explore the question: *(At a particular moment in time) Why does teacher legibility receive political value?* I identified, collected and analysed the following government and donor documents, which are particularly used in Chapter 5 but also in the other empirical chapters:

- Government education policies, strategies, plans and reviews (DRC/Government 1986; DRC/MoE 1999, 2010b, 2012b, 2014e, DRC/Various Ministries 2006, 2015; DRC/Various Ministries, Donors, and Civil society 2004)
- Government poverty reduction strategy papers (DRC/Government 2002, 2006, 2007; DRC/MinPlan 2011)
- Government documents related to bancarisation (DRC/MinBudget 2014; DRC/Secretariat technique du comité préparatoire de l'atelier sur la paie des agents et fonctionnaires de l'état 2011)
- Newspaper interviews regarding the bancarisation reform (IML 2012a, 2012c)
- DFID DRC country plan (DFID 2008)
- World Bank country analyses and reviews, Public Expenditure Reviews, project information documents and appraisals (World Bank, 1971, 1976, 1987, 1992, 1994, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008, 2013, 2015)
- Other donor documents in relation to education (GPE Secretariat 2012; UNESCO 1976, 2001; Various donors 2012)
- The government's first (2003-2005) and second (2010-12) economic program (DRC/MinBudget 2014; DRC/Secretariat technique du comité préparatoire de l'atelier sur la paie des agents et fonctionnaires de l'état 2011; IMF 2007; IML 2012a, 2012b)
- Secondary sources on the legibility-discourse (Kapaji and Mukanga 1977; Lewis 1979; Verhaghe 2009)

In these documents I looked for key terms that are associated with teacher legibility, such as:

- phantom teachers
- fictitious teachers (*enseignants fictifs*)
- fiduciary risk
- (non-)accumulation of salary arrears
- statistics

- educational planning
- included in database (*mécanisé*)
- new unit (*nouvelle unite*)
- *Service de Contrôle et de la Paie des Enseignants* (SECOPE) / government department for teacher payment
- matriculation number (*numéro de matriculation*)

I discuss the occurrence of these terms and put them into the perspective of who wrote them when, in which document and with which apparent purpose. In order to embed this analysis in a larger historical context and understand contemporary patterns in public authority I start by analysing the *longue durée* of the Congolese state, with particular attention paid to the role of faith-based organisations in the education sector. For that purpose I engage with a few primary sources (Jones 1922; De Jonghe et al. 1922) and with academic literature that discusses the early days of the Congolese state and education system.

I also conducted a document analysis in order to unpack how consultants and organisations propose to govern the government department in charge of identifying teachers. In order to explore the question: *How is the increasing political value of teacher legibility rendered technical?* I worked through the additional documents:

- Various reports by consultants and researchers commissioned by donors (Andrianne 2008, 2011, 2016; Devleeschouwer 2013; Marbeau Conseil 2014; Mazars Cameroun 2013, 2014, Verhaghe 2007a, 2007b)
- An analysis (French: *diagnostic*) of the *Service de Contrôle et de la Paie des Enseignants* (SECOPE) which was part of a World Bank program (Kone Badara Dit Aly et al. 2011)
- An audit of SECOPE by the national audit board (DRC/Cour des Comptes 2013)
- SECOPE datasets (e.g. DRC/MoE/SECOPE, 2015)
- A report by a long-term SECOPE inspector (Nioka Masongele 2013)
- Another report by Andrianne from 2016 for the DFID/USAID ACCELERE program
- DFID plans, project reviews and analysis (DFID 2011, 2012; DFID DRC Evidence Analysis and Coordination Programme 2016; Williams 2012)
- Two World Bank Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys / Reviews (Bah et al. 2014; World Bank 2008, 2015)
- Strategies, education sector plans etc. from the MoE (DRC/MoE 2012a, 2014b, World Bank 2013, 2014)
- Various legal documents (e.g. DRC/MoE 1983c, 2011d)
- World Bank reports, project appraisals, agreements and reports (DRC/Government and World Bank 2011; World Bank 1990, 2009, 2011, 2014)

I first analysed and summarised each of these documents with regards to technical solutions to achieve teacher legibility. In a next step, I ordered these solutions chronologically and per topic (see Chapter 5 for the full analysis).

Finally, in order to find further traces of legibility and technical solutions I looked through all publications of *Zaire-Afrique / Congo-Afrique* since 1964 (e.g. Obotela Rashidi 1988), editions of the journal *Cahiers économiques et sociaux* from the 1970s (see Kapaji and Mukanga 1977), the journal *Les Cahiers du Centre d'Etude et de Documentation Africaines (CEDAF)* from 1976 to 1992, two bibliographies on education in Zaire/Congo (CEDAF 1980; Malung'Mper Akpanabi 2006), monographs by Congolese researchers (Gabudisa 1997; Lay 1995; Lumeka-lua-Yansenga, Roller, and Nzenge 1985; Mokonzi Bambanota 2009) as well as other secondary sources that allowed me to historicise the Congolese administration (for example Gould 1977, 1979, 1980). Arguably, there are other sources which I did not analyse for reasons of time and accessibility, but comparison between different sources suggested a reasonable level of data saturation.

3.2   Ethnography and interviews

Li (2007c) establishes a link between a discourse analysis and ethnographic work. She encourages a type of research that does not stop at criticising discourses for what they propagate, or merely noticing implementation gaps, but to "examine governmentality ethnographically" (Li 2007a, 275). As I explain in Chapter 2, the power of governments and international donors can never be understood as absolute. Instead, "governmental power [...] has limits, and a focus on these limits, I argue, opens critical terrain for ethnographic analysis" (Li 2007a, 276). As Li (2007a, 277) further argues, friction that results from the regular interaction between the practice of government and the practice of politics can be usefully researched through ethnographic methods:

> "Questions such as these require us to combine study of governmental rationalities with the examination of concrete cases and particular struggles–conjunctures at which power can be examined empirically, in its diverse forms and complex multiplicity, its instability, and above all in its historical and spatial specificity."

Along similar lines, educational researchers Bartlett and Vavrus (2009, 9) who argue that a dominantly qualitative study "offer[s] the epistemological advantage of showing how systems, structures, or processes play out" in practice. For instance, in Chapter 6 I search for traces that uncover incoherences between what could be expected from a legal point of view and the empirical reality (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014a; Corbridge et al. 2005; Mosse and Lewis 2006; Olivier de Sardan 2008; Titeca and De Herdt 2011).

The conjunctures and spatial specificities that Li points to are mirrored in the multi-sited approach of my research (see Section 3.3). Finally, ethnographic work can also be helpful in order to explore how projects and discourses are sustained despite the inevitable instabilities and moments of failure and "the ways in which failure prepares the ground for new programming" (Li 2007a, 279). In the words of Mosse and Lewis (2006, 14):

"The ethnographic task is thus to show how, despite fragmentation and dissent, heterogeneous actors in development are constantly engaged in creating order through political acts of *composition* (Latour 2000)."

Finally, with regards to the main theoretical argument of this thesis, Jaffe (2013, 736) states that "our ethnographies should be attentive to capturing 'state effects' in a range of sites". A major method to conduct ethnographic research was the use of semi-structured interviews. In total I conducted 230 semi-structured and informal interviews, and another 18 were conducted by colleagues during a collective research phase in 2015 (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 1997).[15] Not each of the 248 interviews was of equal depth, length and importance. Some follow-up interviews were counted as an addition to the first interview. All interviews were conducted in French and all direct translations throughout the thesis are my own.

Following the multi-sited approach I described, interviews were conducted in the national capital Kinshasa, the provincial capital Lubumbashi and in the six listed rural educational subdivisions. Following the interest in different perspectives that is mirrored by the conceptual approach developed in Chapter 2, representatives of all key stakeholders were interviewed: teachers and principals; national Ministry of Education, government and faith-based officials at different/deconcentrated levels; staff from private companies, especially banks; international donors; NGOs (see Table 3.2 below for an overview).

In semi-structured interviews, I started with general questions about the respondents' situation.[16] Then I continued the semi-structured interview in the form of a focused personal narrative: I asked questions about a given event, actor or process and encouraged people to answer freely (Riessman 2001, 6). There is a constant tension in semi-structured interviews between "follow[ing] participants down their associative trails" (Riessman 2001, 2) and making sure to discuss all topics of interest. In some cases, I had only very few targeted questions in order to triangulate, for instance, certain numbers or dates. My analysis also contains elements of life histories (Hulme 2003), or organisational histories; I was especially interested in teachers' stories about the accreditation and registration processes, as these processes usually take several years.

So how did I find my interviewees? Early on there were a number of people I definitely wanted to talk to: educational administrators in two conflict-affected territories. As I decided to engage in a comparison between all six rural educational subdivisions I therefore also needed to interview the remaining four administrators. This is what Small (2009) calls targeted interviewing. Also, I engaged in what is commonly referred to as snowballing or sequential interviewing (Russell Bernard 2006; Small 2009). This means that I followed up on names or institutions that I heard about in interviews. This has two objectives: First, triangulating data so as to either check certain facts, or to create the space

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[15] Another 106 interviews were conducted during my Master's research in the DRC. See Appendix 2 for a full list of interviews conducted during my PhD research.
[16] For exemplary interview guides used in my research, see Appendix 4.

for varied interpretations of the same event. This is linked to what I introduce above as a pluralistic view of social reality.

Second, I strived for data saturation which means that one arrives at a level of data gathering where the new interview does not add any more insights; it confirms what is already known. However, sampling was also driven by feasibility. In the conflict-affected territories traveling was not easy and so I tried to visit all schools along two major roads. As a positive side effect this ensured institutional variety and can thus be seen as a multiple-case study approach (Bryman 2012, see Chapter 8). Importantly, the goal of such an approach is not representativity, but a rich understanding of reality through a multitude of perspectives and an exploration of common patterns in a variety of findings (Olivier de Sardan 2005).

In some cases I conducted multiple interviews with the same person. I repeatedly met key educational administrators at provincial and territory levels. They were key informants and I often reported my findings anonymously, in order to hear their opinion. Also, I talked to some teachers in the two conflict-affected territories in 2015 and 2016 in order to find out about their experience during and after displacement (see Chapter 8). Admittedly, many teachers were surprised to see me, especially in the remote and conflict-affected areas (Brandt 2016). However, the surprise usually turned into a welcoming and appreciative attitude.

In general, I first contacted educational authorities who gave me permission to conduct fieldwork. In some cases, the educational administrators acted as my gatekeepers. Although there are certainly some caveats in this approach, I was able to conduct all interviews I desired and go to all places that I judged as relevant. Observations took place during field visits and I took pictures as well as careful notes on my reflections on administrative offices, road infrastructure, and the state of school buildings and equipment. In addition, observations convinced me of the poor state of school constructions and the unplanned nature of allocating school accreditation decrees, which is of relevance for Chapter 6 (Brandt 2017a, 2017b).

Coding

Most recorded interviews were transcribed and every informal interview was summarised and then entered into the qualitative data analysis software *atlas.ti*. Quotes used in the thesis were translated by me. My data analysis is based around focused and open coding. Regarding focused coding I followed the idea of "sensitizing concepts" (Bowen 2006) which means that the analysis and coding process was guided by theory. It is probably more correct to say that there was a constant interaction between concepts, topics and data. Next to this focused coding, I also kept an open eye and followed topics that were not covered by these concepts. I conducted five rounds of coding.

In the first round, I openly/inductively coded interviews 107-276[17] and created 358 different codes. After the second round, reducing misspellings and redundancies, I had 292 codes. The third round was extremely important. I took some codes apart and reattributed them to groups (Charmaz 2006). For instance, the code 'rumour' could be related to the topic of teacher payment or militias. In order to create groups, I labelled codes by the use of prefixes such as administration or teacher. After the fourth round of coding I had 305 codes. I then turned to interviews 277-308. Again, I cleaned up the codes by, for example, merging the codes "Conflict – Displaced school" and "Schools – in conflict" into "Schools in conflict". Also, sticking to my labelling technique, I for example changed all "NGO – xyz" into "Administration – NGO – xyz". After the fifth round of coding, including the remaining interviews, I had 368 codes (see Appendix 5 for the full list of codes). After grouping the codes, I had 23 groups of codes:

Table 3.1 *Codes (atlas.ti)*

Code numbers	Code group
1-2	Accessibility
3-101	Administration
102-166	Bancarisation
166-169	Budget
170-172	Concepts
173-201	Conflict
202	Corruption
203-221	Education
222-224	Students
225-249	Teachers
250-259	Identification
260-265	Individuals
266	Katanga disparities
267	Local solutions
268-284	Location
285	Mine
286	Mobility
287-291	Population
292-294	Research
295	RESEN
296-305	Salaries
306-366	Schools
367-368	Technology

Some groups have only one code (e.g. number 285) whereas others have dozens of codes (e.g. numbers 306-366). Coding served as a way to organise data, draw links between different topics, create groups and facilitate retrieval of data during writing. The number of

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[17] Continuous numbering after my Master's research, see Footnote 1.

codes per group mirrors the importance of the topic in my analysis. For example, administration has 99 codes, bancarisation has 64 codes and schools has 61 codes. Most importantly the coding process led me to a focus on legibility as the major issue that my research is concerned with. As can be seen from this list I did not once code with the word legibility. The group of codes that comes closest to an immediate focus on legibility is the group "Identification" which contains ten codes such as "Identification-Biometrical" or "Identification-*Mécanisation*". The coding and analysis led me to conclude the importance of legibility, which then led to a stronger theoretical engagement with the concept.

Data analysis

In interviews, people interpret and rationalise what they experience and hear (Hammersley 2003; Venkatesh 2013). Narratives do not represent objective facts about the social world (Hammersley 2003). People might also consciously or unconsciously perform a certain role and act according to perceived norms in front of the interviewer (Atkinson 2005; Riessman 2001). Furthermore, the respondent's societal position is crucial (Kelle 2005). I could not expect a teacher to tell me about internal administrative processes just as national-level administrators are unlikely to know about, or admit, the reality in rural schools. This challenged me as a researcher to consider people as experts on their own lives, but not as experts with regard to every societal process. Especially "cultural references" (Bonal 2012, 12) or "local semiotics" (Sissener 2001, 6), i.e. specific linguistic codes, can reveal a lot about people's experiences. This is illustrated by Venkatesh (2013, 6) who states that:

> "In my own work, I have found that subjects are not always conscious of (and able to articulate) unwritten rules and codes of conduct. […] The scholastic fallacy, as Bourdieu writes, would be to fail to understand that the subject's inability to state such rules of the game is not necessarily a measure of the nonexistence or lack of importance of such rules for the game being played."

These cultural references are crucial when it comes to understanding what I describe as "practical norms" (Olivier de Sardan 2008) in Chapter 2, especially in processes of school accreditation and teacher registration. Moreover, as a researcher I likely influenced what respondents said through my personality, my prior knowledge, my expectations and the way I intervened in the interview process through my questions (Sayer 2000, 17). I am aware that I was therefore a co-creator, sometimes passive and other times active, of the respondents' utterances (Burawoy 1998).

Despite these caveats I conducted a narrative analysis (Riessman 2001) in order to find out something about "individual and collective actions and meanings, as well as the social processes by which social life and human relationships are made and changed" (Laslett 1999, 392). My data analysis went hand-in-hand with my data collection. Thus, after having identified themes in my codes, I continued the triangulation that I used in the data collection process by comparing the different respondents' narratives about these themes

or specific events (Burawoy 1998, 15). In doing so, I was able, for instance, to explore administrators' strikingly different experiences vis-à-vis the school accreditation process (see Chapter 6).

3.3   Multi-sited research

Map 3.1 *Research sites in the DRC*

Source: Designed by the Education Development Trust, see Brandt (2017b)

What is now known as the province of Haut-Katanga (highlighted in orange on Map 3.1[18], and shown in more detail on Map 3.2) used to be the district of Haut-Katanga in the Katanga province. With the creation of new provinces in 2015, the new province of Haut-Katanga was born. Since decentralisation in the education sector preceded administrative decentralisation, the area under study functioned as the educational division of Katanga 1 for several years. With ongoing decentralisation, the educational division has changed names from Katanga 1 to Haut-Katanga. The educational division (French: *Division Educationnelle*) under study is made up of ten educational subdivisions (French: *Sous-Division Educationnelle*). The rural educational subdivisions are Kambove, Kasenga, Kipushi, Mitwaba, Pweto and Sakania. I visited all of them except for Kasenga. In Sakania I visited two cities but not the capital of the territory (see Map 3.2). In both cases, however, I spoke to key educational administrators either in person elsewhere, or on the phone. The four urban educational subdivisions (Lubumbashi 1-3 and Likasi) are not further discussed in this thesis as I explain below.

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[18] The red triangle depicts an area known as the "triangle of death", which is explored further in Chapter 8.

Map 3.2 *Research sites in Haut-Katanga*

Schematically speaking, there are vertical as well as horizontal elements in my study. On the one hand the idea of "studying up" (Foley 1977, 321) was a main driver of the multi-sited work I engaged in. In all chapters I try to combine empirical findings at local levels with

explanations stemming especially from the national level (De Herdt, Marivoet, and Muhigirwa 2015; De Herdt and Poncelet 2010b, 28). On the other hand, I increasingly turned to horizontal comparisons between educational subdivisions in order to point to specific differences. Overall, therefore, the study can also be seen as a multi-sited ethnography (Gupta 1995; Marcus 1995).

Chapters 4 and 5 are not immediately linked to the province of Haut-Katanga: Chapter 4 is not embedded in a regional context as it deals with the history of public authority in Congolese educational governance since colonial days, and with the emergence of the legibility-discourse since the 1970s. Chapter 5 draws on semi-structured interviews from Haut-Katanga to illustrate how principals and teachers interact with the educational administration in order to be included in the payroll. However, I decided not to engage in a fine-grained analysis of administrative everyday practices at the provincial level. Instead, I identified the main locus of (non-)action in the realm of teacher identification to be the national administration in Kinshasa.

The main reasons for the choice of Haut-Katanga as the province under study relate to Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Regarding Chapter 6 and my analysis of educational expansion, Haut-Katanga is relevant for four reasons: First, the province has experienced a steep expansion of the number of public schools since 2004. The four urban educational subdivisions have also experienced a stark increase in private schools. However, since private schools are subject to different accreditation procedures, the urban educational subdivisions were not deemed relevant for this thesis. Second, cross-regional differences in the numbers of schools between educational subdivisions point to some low-performers and some high-performers. These differences suggest either varying demand patterns or unequal access to accreditation decrees. Third, four of the six educational subdivisions have been created since 2008 which allows an exploration of the particular role of government educational administrators as brokers. Fourth, two educational subdivisions have been affected by conflict for many years. These educational subdivisions have historically been neglected in terms of school accreditations.

Chapter 7 of this thesis is concerned with the *bancarisation* reform. I encountered teachers in various rural and semi-urban locations telling me about the distances they have to travel in order to acquire their government salaries. Also, arrangements to deliver salaries shifted frequently in these rural areas, which makes them particularly pertinent for my analysis.

Finally, Chapter 8 deals with internally displaced teachers in a recurrent armed conflict. The fact that two educational subdivisions (Pweto and Mitwaba) in Haut-Katanga are conflict-affected makes it a relevant province to consider. The urban educational subdivisions have not been affected by armed conflict and are therefore not relevant for Chapter 8.

3.4   Quantitative data sources

Such a mixed-methods research framework can be met with scepticism due to the possible incommensurability of underlying epistemologies (Lincoln and Guba 2000). However, it is important to underline that there is a difference between a (post-)positivist research design and the use of quantitative empirical sources. My use of quantitative data do not imply that I follow a (post-)positivist research design. The quantitative data are largely analysed in a descriptive manner in order to complement and triangulate data from qualitative sources (see Section 3.2). Therefore, the different types of data appear highly commensurable.

Quantitative data in many African countries, also the DRC, are rarely completely reliable (Fichtner 2016; Jerven 2013; Marivoet and De Herdt 2014). Therefore, I tried to gradually get acquainted with and acquire relevant data sources concerning the topic of teacher identification. There are, in total, five types of quantitative data that I use in Chapters 5, 6 and 7: (1) accreditation decrees, (2) the government's Education Management and Information System (EMIS), (3) SECOPE's data, (4) reports from annual educational meetings, and (5) data from the government's department for student identification.

Accreditation decrees

In Chapter 6 I present an analysis based on 27 accreditation decrees (*Arrêtés d'agrément*) that I gathered during fieldwork (see Appendix 3 for the full list of decrees). These decrees cannot be found in nicely ordered shelves at the national or provincial level. Hence, I took pictures of the decrees in administrative offices and in schools. I elaborate on the nature and analytical value of these decrees in Chapter 6.

The government's EMIS

The Ministry publishes an annual education yearbook with quantitative indicators concerning the education sector. These *annuaires statistique de l'enseignement primaire, secondaire et professionnel* (statistical yearbooks for primary, secondary and vocational education) have, to a certain extent, been published since the 1970s. I was able to find the versions for the years 1971-73, 1976, 1981-1990 and 1996. Since then, there has been a yearbook for the year 1998/99 funded by UNICEF for those parts of the countries that officially were under Kinshasa's rule, and yearbook with very few quantitative data from 2001. Since Joseph Kabila's rise to power in 2001 the first comprehensive statistical yearbook was published for the school year 2006/07. Since then, it has been published continuously until 2013/14. Funding and technical support was provided by UNESCO and the World Bank. For the former province of Katanga there have been statistical yearbooks for the years 2010/11 until 2013/14, excluding a yearbook for 2012/13 which does not exist or was not available to me. The provincial yearbook makes similar differentiations as the national one.

So, what kind of data does the yearbook present in relation to the number of schools and teachers? First, it differentiates between pre-primary, primary and secondary schools.

Second, it includes public and private schools. Third, it distinguishes between educational administrative networks. Fourth, it differentiates between the old eleven provinces, and unfortunately not between the thirty educational divisions. The regional yearbooks do not differentiate between administrative entities but between politico-administrative entities. Thus, it presents numbers per territory and not per educational subdivision. Finally, it does not include out-of-school administrators but distinguishes between in-school teaching staff and in-school non-teaching staff.

SECOPE

A crucial source for data on teachers and schools is SECOPE. The history of this department merits more attention and is discussed in Chapter 6. The most accessible data source from SECOPE are monthly reports. It is important to understand that SECOPE's database only includes the so-called *écoles mécanisées*, which is precisely best understood as 'being included in SECOPE's database'. In contrast to the *annuaires*, it has the merit of differentiating between in-school staff and out-of-school administrators. Since SECOPE is concerned with paying state teachers, the department includes no data on private schools. Furthermore, SECOPE does not distinguish between educational administrative networks.

Reports from annual educational meetings (Promo-Scolaire)

Another government source on the number of schools are the annual reports per administrative network, educational subdivision and educational division (*rapport synthèse des travaux de la [sous-]commission de Promotion Scolaire*, used in Chapter 6). For most educational subdivisions and divisions, I obtained such reports. Regarding the numbers of schools and teachers these annual reports were helpful as they are the official state of the education sector at territory level.

SERNIE

Finally, the government's department for student identification SERNIE (*Service National de l'Identification des Elèves*) also produces its own reports. I collected and analysed several of these reports, the so-called *repertoires* that supposedly list all schools within a certain territory. To a limited degree these *repertoires* were helpful in estimating school numbers and triangulating data with the other reports.

All in all, data presented in these different sources are hardly in line with each other. In fact, there are massive differences between all data sources. Frequently, this had to do with the nature of the data presented, but also with shortcomings in the data collection. There are two major recent reports which analysed these data: the national education sector review (*Rapport d'état sur le système éducatif national*, RESEN) and the World Bank Public Expenditure Review from 2015. A comparison between these sources is provided in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

3.5   Methods per chapter and research question

Table 3.2 *Research questions and methods*

Chapter		Sub research questions	Methods
4	The rise and fall of the legibility-discourse (1908-2001)	Who has been influential in educational agenda-setting? (At a particular moment in time) why does teacher legibility receive political value? How is teacher legibility rendered technical? How have donors tried to reform the MoE's department of teacher identification and payment?	Analysis of online and field-based documentation; analysis of literature on Congolese bureaucracy from the 70s and 80s; interviews with key government and donor stakeholders, all used in order to trace the emergence of the legibility-discourse, the increasing problematisations of illegibility and the varied nature of technical solutions and projects to render legible, with a focus on the administration Analysis and comparison of different sets of databases regarding teacher numbers, particularly SECOPE's databases and the educational annual yearbooks
5	State-building and administrative limits of legibility (2001-2013)	How does the department of teacher identification and payment function and how have administrators reacted to reforms? How has the MoE's department of teacher identification and payment performed throughout the years?	
6	An ungoverned problem for legibility: brokered educational expansion (2004-2013)	How does educational expansion interfere with teacher legibility? How does the government try to govern educational expansion? Which actors have an interest in educational expansion, and why?	Analysis of interviews with administrators and teachers; analysis of collected accreditation decrees with regard to patterns between events of state-building (democratisation and decentralisation) and the number of accredited schools; analysis of donor and government documentation in relation to moratoriums on school openings/registration; observations of school constructions
7	Circumventing administrative problems for legibility: the bancarisation reform (2012-2016)	How does the bancarisation reform try to tackle teacher illegibility? How did the bancarisation reform persist despite infrastructural, financial and organisational shortcomings?	Analysis of documentation in relation to bancarisation; analysis of interviews with administrative staff, teachers, banking staff, mobile phone companies staff, Caritas staff, staff from the Central Bank and Ministry of Budget; preparation of database of distances from schools to payment points and establishment and analysis of maps
8	Maintaining legibility during armed conflict (2015-2016)	How does armed conflict interfere with teacher legibility? How does the government try to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers? Which drivers act against the government's attempt to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers?	Analysis of documentation in relation to the moratorium on teacher movements; analysis of interviews with administrators and teachers; longitudinal study

Table 3.2 summarises the main methods used per chapter and per sub research question. At the beginning of each chapter, I also introduce the particular methods.

3.6   Positionality and ethics

"Reflexivity - the placing of the anthropologist into his or her text and reflecting upon their authorial and subjective role in creating their knowledge - has become commonplace" (Gardner and Lewis 2015, 44)

Around the time I started my research in the DRC, I also worked as a trainer for anti-racism and critical whiteness workshops in Germany. Influenced by that work, I started out very cautious as to my role as a White male researcher. Unfortunately, critical post-colonial ideas in connection to Critical Race Theory are all too often sidelined in international development studies (Ziai 2012) and after the PhD I will continue to work at their mutual implications. I engaged with critical and indigenous methodologies (Denzin and Lincoln 2008) but was unable to draw helpful links to my research. Of course, my Whiteness played a role during the research. I was seen, noticed, and speculations started to emerge. The most striking rumour was during research in Mitwaba: While I did not notice anything, my driver was talking to people here and there while I was doing interviews. He revealed to me that someone had spread the rumour that we were bandits. During my research as such, however, I was rarely met with hostility. Whiteness seemed like a crucial signifier for people to ask for support. Whether abstract demands or concrete requests such as mobile phones, I was often asked to "Remember this primary school".

Introducing the research

Usually, as part of my introduction I stressed that I was not working for any donor or NGO and that I did not have access to funding. At the same time, I mentioned that I would disseminate my data and that it might have an influence on policy or projects in the future. This leads me to another reflection: At the beginning of each interview I clarified that I would guarantee anonymity and that everyone could decide for her-/himself whether or not to participate, and when to finish an interview. This was especially the case when I talked to teachers who had suffered direct acts of violence. In those cases, I was particularly careful about traumatising experiences and left the narrative in the hands of the interviewee without interfering too much.

In order to reach these teachers, I spent 42 hours traversing 440 km in a Land Cruiser towards the territory of Mitwaba, coming across unpaid and mutinying Congolese soldiers (Brandt 2016). Mitwaba had suffered from armed conflict for several years but at the time of my visit, the situation was rather calm. In general, I always made sure to travel in company of people with experience and/or authority in that region.

Consultancies

During my research I briefly worked as a researcher for a study commissioned by UNICEF and later I did a consultancy for the ACCELERE! project funded by DFID and USAID. On the one hand, these consultancies definitely facilitated access to certain resources and people. On the other hand, in a few cases the boundaries between me as an independent and me as a commissioned researcher might have been blurry for my interviewees. To the best of my capacities I tried to make that difference clear. Generally speaking, commissioned research and consultancy only took up a minor part of my time in the DRC. In the future, I am likely to become even more involved in what Nuijten et al. (2004, 119) call "researcher as participant in governance processes". This is true in a general sense, as all researchers co-construct realities through the way that they frame their findings (Latour 2005), but also in a more immediate way when it comes to engaging in interactions with donor agencies. In future consultancies I believe that I carry a responsibility to bring in the voices and perspectives of teachers on the ground into policy debates, thus reflecting a statement by Williams (2012, 494):

> "Academics can make an important contribution by [...] taking time to listen to the voices and perspectives of marginalised groups, and using this to question assumptions built in to policy and governance practices".

Aiming to influence the policy-making process can be a way to not only do "extractive" (Mosse and Lewis 2006, 3) research but to also give back and "do some good" (Goodhand 2000, 12).

Publishing and dissemination

Finally, there is a challenge when it comes to publishing: this thesis is written in English, whereas most of my interviewees and the audience in the DRC are francophone. Hence, at one point it will be important to also translate parts of my work into French. I did the same for my Master's thesis. The local dissemination process to the main research subjects turned out to be more challenging than I hoped, but I will seek to continue this process of knowledge co-production and sharing. With these thoughts of caution and reflection in mind, in the following chapter I set out to uncover the legibility-discourse and its roots in the Congolese hybrid education system.

Chapter 4

The rise and fall of the legibility-discourse (1908-2001)

In this chapter, I explore historical aspects of Congolese educational governance in order to unpack the roots, the first wave and the temporary demise of the legibility-discourse. The analysis reveals a shift of educational authority from state and faith-based organisations to state and international donors. This shifting authority went hand-in-hand with an increasing problematisation of teacher illegibility when international donors developed a tighter grip on the country's public expenditures. In the 1970s, teacher legibility became a condition for the rationalisation of the teaching workforce, which was the chosen path towards reducing the country's spending gap. One major instrument of this endeavour was the creation of a new department in the Ministry of Education (MoE) with the paramount purpose of identifying all teachers, removing fictitious ones and establishing a comprehensive teacher database. I further show how the new department lost its grip on teacher identification in the turbulent 1990s that were characterised by economic collapse, political turmoil and transnational wars. In order to explore these historical changes, I analyse official policy documents, poverty reduction strategy papers, reviews, evaluations, public speeches, and similar sources and further draw on findings from my field research (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2).

4.1   From faith-based organisations towards international donors (1908-1977)

I begin by discussing governance patterns in Congolese educational governance before the year 1977. 1977 is a crucial year for two reasons: First, in an article from 1977 I found the first evidence of a problematisation of teacher illegibility. Second, 1977 stands for the beginning of a gradual retreat of faith-based organisations (FBOs) from national level power games in the education sector and a simultaneous consolidation of international tutelage. In the pre-1977 period I distinguish among the following three epochs: First, the golden age of Catholic dominance (1908-1946), second, increasing state involvement (1946-1971), and third, Zairianisation (1971-77).

Golden age of Catholic dominance (1908-1946)

Through various associations[19] Belgian king Leopold II laid claim on the territory today known as the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the *Scramble for Africa* the Congo Free State was created in 1885 as one outcome of the so-called Congo or West Africa Conference in Berlin. The largest share of the territory was entrusted to Leopold II as private

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[19] International African Association / Committee for Studies of the Upper Congo (1876-1885). International Association of the Congo (1879-1885).

property. Leopold's reign became known for its ferocity, mass murders, forced labour, resource-exploitation and overall paternalistic way of treating inhabitants.

Major instruments of paternalism and discipline, but also of "collective emancipation" and the formation of staff for the army and administration, were educational facilities (Depaepe, Debaere, and Van Rompaey 1991; Depaepe and Hulstaert 2015, 21; Rideout Jr. 1970). A few years before 1885, Catholic and Protestant missionaries started their educational activities. Subsequently, they cooperated with the public administration and private enterprises to claim control over what would become Congolese territory and people. On August 3rd 1892 a decree concretised the state-church collaboration in the education sector, stipulating, for instance, the government's supervisory function (André and Poncelet 2013).

Twenty years after the Berlin conference, in 1906, Leopold signed a concordat with the Vatican, formalising relations between the Catholic Church and the Belgian crown. Belgian Catholic missionaries were prioritised over foreign and Protestant groups (MacGaffey 1982, 241; Young 1965, 13). They were granted land rights, received financial subsidies, and the right to use education as a tool for evangelisation was formally recognised (Gabudisa 1997, 44; Young 1965). This was the beginning of the golden age of Catholic dominance in education (André and Poncelet 2013, 2). Following a Belgian-style of ruling, a public-religious partnership became the heart of this indirect form of governance (Gabudisa 1997; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). This co-management of education has been challenged over time, but has essentially remains in place today.

When the Belgian state took over from Leopold in 1908, it quickly handed its few schools over to Catholic missionaries, creating official schools managed by congregations (André and Poncelet 2013; Gabudisa 1997, 81; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010, 131). Educational debates and planning commenced in the 1920s through two main events/reports: First, the US American Phelps-Stoke Fund and its president Thomas-Jesse Jones conducted an inquiry of the education system (Feltz 1980, 443; Jones 1922). Second, the educational "Franck Commission" (1922-24) initiated by the Belgian government wrote the "De Jonghe Conventions" (Briffaerts 2011; De Jonghe et al. 1922). These De Jonghe Conventions led to the educational reform "Project for the organisation of free education in the Belgian Congo with the support of National Missionary Societies"[20] published in 1925/29. The 1930s did not yield new educational reforms and World War II soon curbed any further planning efforts.

I now return to the two main issues that this chapter is concerned with: authority in education and the legibility-discourse. Regarding the issue of authority, I agree with Boyle (1995) that there was essentially no major disagreement between the dominant Catholic church and the state until after the World War II. With regards to legibility, there were no signs of any concern with exact knowledge about teacher characteristics. The dusk of the

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[20] French: Projet d'Organisation de l'Enseignement libre du Congo belge avec le concours des Sociétés des Missions Nationales.

golden age of Catholicism approached in the 1940s. It was followed by the 1950s which put an end to the harmonious relationship between church and state.

Increased state involvement (1946-1971)

The years before 1946 had seen a Catholic quasi-monopoly with a fierce focus on evangelisation and rudimentary primary education. In the years 1946 to 1948, Belgian Minister of Colonies Robert Godding initiated the first anticlerical attack (André and Poncelet 2013). On the one hand, the government expanded its reach by developing a tighter inspection and demanding stricter regulations for the reception of subsidies. On the other hand, it allowed subsidies for non-Belgian and Protestant schools, thus menacing established Catholic monopolies (André and Poncelet 2013; Boyle 1995, 456; Briffaerts 2011; Depaepe, Debaere, and Van Rompaey 1991; Gabudisa 1997, 88f). In 1952, these developments were formalised in a convention between churches and the state. After several decades of a co-beneficial public-private partnership between the church and the crown, this collaboration was jeopardised in what Boyle (1995, 460) calls "school wars".

Only two years later the school wars erupted again under the anticlerical Minister of Colonies Auguste Buisseret, again harming the church-state relationship (Depaepe, Debaere, and Van Rompaey 1991, 710). New government schools were opened and a government university followed in 1956 in today's Lubumbashi[21]. A new accord[22] between FBOs and the state was signed in 1956, further recognising and encouraging Protestant and government schools. As a reaction to these various provocations by the government, the Catholic Church created the powerful Office of Catholic Education (*Bureau de l'Enseignement Catholique*, BEC). The well-organised BEC proposed reforms and even disbursed subsidies and payments for Protestant schools (Kabongo-Mbaya 1992, 132), so that it was considered a second Ministry of Education (Rideout Jr. 1970).

At independence on June 30th 1960, the DRC inherited an education system almost completely limited to primary education. Having primary enrolment rates among the highest in Africa, only 2% of primary school students had moved to post primary level (Hull 1979, 141). The system created an enormous urge and necessity for expansion, especially at secondary level. At the time, about 97% of schools in the country were in the hands of FBOs, first and foremost the Catholic Church (Yates 1992, 245). Despite the preceding conflicts between church and state in the 1940s, the Catholic administration agreed to a common national program for education. In sum, independence made few alterations to the quantitative dominance of Catholic education. However, through political independence, the state was implicitly affirmed as the overall regulatory power in the education system, as in political matters more broadly.

The potential for educational development was counterbalanced by the turbulent first five years of the independent country. Within the first six months after independence

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[21] Then called Elisabethville.

[22] Called Buisseret-Moermans-Thompson accord.

there were political assassinations, seceding provinces with the assistance of foreign governments, a peacekeeping mission by the United Nations, mutiny in the military, and riots on the streets. In 1961, young Joseph Désiré Mobutu staged a coup, declared himself commander of the army, but he did not cling to power. It was not until 1965 when Mobutu regained political power through another military coup that the country reached a certain level of stability.

Hidden from political attention, the administration deteriorated immensely. Gould (1980, 61) argues that during the first five independent years the "public bureaucracy had been virtually dormant" and Depaepe (1998, 41) states that "against the background of the chaotic political developments of the First Republic, there was little time left for the development of a true educational policy". Meanwhile, the traditionally concessionary principles of educational governance were inscribed into the *Lualabourg constitution* from 1964 (André and Poncelet 2013). The education sector grew rapidly, especially in the secondary sector in order to make up for the lack of focus on secondary education under Belgian rule (Yates 1963). Reports frequently pointed to the overall low availability and quality of statistical data in Zaire, but this was not directly linked to teacher identification (Yates 1992). The focus of international assistance at the time was largely on agricultural education and manpower planning forecasts (World Bank 1971; Yates 1992).

In sum, fierce struggles over public authority and subsequent political and economic centralisation did not leave much space for concerns with teacher identification and legibility. In fact, the concessionary and fragmented nature of Congolese educational governance could be a crucial factor for teacher illegibility. In the subsequent 1970s, Mobutu's one-party state engaged in a set of reforms that led to a further decline of administrative quality, as I now discuss.

Zairianisation (1971-1977)

Mobutu presented himself to the world as a leading figure among critical third-world leaders, for example through his speech in 1972 at the United Nations General Assembly. Domestically, however, he turned Zaire into a highly centralised one-party state (Young and Turner 1985, 42). In 1967, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (*Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*, MPR) was founded and the party's program (*Manifesto de la N'Sele*) was passed, foreshadowing cultural, economic and political authoritarianism (Gould 1980, 99–100). Every Zairian was a member of the MPR by birth. Mobutu's system was built on patronage, clientelism, exploitation of domestic resources and the influx of foreign money (Young and Turner 1985). The party had captured the state, and Mobutu was the "supreme spiritual guide" of the party, nation and state (Yates 1992, 246).

In the 1970s, Mobutu initiated a notorious set of reforms called "Zairianisation", through which he claimed to purge the country from its Western influences.[23] Zairianisation

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[23] To name but three examples, the country's name was changed from Democratic Republic of Congo to Zaire, all cities gave up their colonial names and were re-baptised, and Western given

went hand-in-hand with economic restructuring and appropriations. Mobutu nationalised foreign businesses and granted control to members of his entourage. As a result, Zairians without technical or managerial experience became owners and managers of these businesses. Maintenance and investments were radically neglected. These measures were radicalised in January 1975 when certain foreign and domestic businesses were nationalised in the name of anti-capitalism and a "war on the bourgeoisie of our country", as Gould (1980, 56) reports from one of Mobutu's speeches in 1975. In November 1975, a limited retrocession of companies took place (Gould 1980, 58; Yates 1992, 247). Extracting resources became the *raison d'être* of an administrative and managerial post. In 1985, Young and Turner described the reforms as a complete disaster.

Zairianisation did not spare the education system. In 1971, the two faith-based universities[24] were nationalised and merged with the public university of Lubumbashi under the new banner of the University of Zaire. Subsequently, in 1974 Mobutu attempted to nationalise primary and secondary education. According to Hull (1979, 146), an education reform commission proposed six educational goals:

> "1) To achieve universal basic education of six years by 1980;
> 2) To increase the professional emphasis of secondary and higher education so that they
> 3) provide the nation with trained personnel necessary for development;
> 4) To act so that the school is no longer the sole means of advancement in society,
> 5) To establish government control over the entire education system, including schools run by religious authorities, replacing religious instruction with political and civic education; and
> 6) To introduce a year of obligatory national service before entrance to the university."

In reality, however, most of these goals had little influence. Hull (1979, 145) argues that "by the early 1970s, the formal system of education in Zaire had become so irrelevant to the country's needs". Consequentially, most of these educational goals were not pursued.[25] Only the fourth goal of the reform commission was targeted and led to the disenfranchising of FBOs. All primary and secondary schools were brought under state control. After the state-church "school wars" of the 1950s (Boyle 1995), I consider this nationalisation of schools as a *second school war*. Reacting to these immense provocations, the Zairian bishops refused the collaboration of their staff in January 1975 (Depaepe 1998; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). Yates (1992, 248) qualifies the intervention as a

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names were prohibited (see e.g. Ndaywel è Nziem 1998 for a great level of detail). The all-encompassing ideology became known as *Mobutisme* (Gould 1980, 63).

[24] The Catholic university of Lovanium near Kinshasa and the Protestant university in Kisangani.

[25] Honoré Vinck is among the few authors who shed more light on this period and argues in a different direction as e.g. MacGaffey (1982). Vinck (1995, 400) claims, for instance, that "Representatives of the Department of Education, strongly controlled the application of the propaganda rules".

"dismal failure" and further argues that "schools were looted of their furnishings, and buildings were allowed to deteriorate". Furthermore, she states that "teachers hired by the government were not only unqualified, but frequently came only to collect their pay checks" (Yates 1992, 248; see also Hull 1979).

As a result, merely two years later, in 1977, Mobutu had to renounce the idea of nationalising schools and handed them back to their former managers. On February 26th 1977, the Zairian government, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church and the Kimbanguist Church signed a convention concerning the management of schools[26], joined two years later by Muslim representatives. This convention assigned overall regulatory power to the state whereas FBOs regained the right to manage their schools. Some authors argue that FBOs departed successfully from this state-FBO conflict (Depaepe and Hulstaert 2015, 28). Albeit this is correct, I argue that the convention is among the last high-level political issues where FBOs had a say. Subsequently, international donors gained more authority in agenda-setting and legibility.

In 1976, UNESCO (1976) conducted the first encompassing education sector study. Underlining my argumentation that data on teachers did not have high political stakes at the time, Hull (1979, 148) argues that "the report was based on very scanty manpower data, a key missing ingredient in all education sector studies". Rideout Jr. (1970, 16) discusses UNESCO's work and points to salary payment arrears but makes no mention of anything related to illegibility. Overall, the report reveals nothing concrete about teacher legibility. Similarly, the World Bank's first two educational programs in the 1970s focused on popular issues at the time: educational planning with a focus on manpower needs and agricultural and technical training (Hull 1979; World Bank 1976). In sum, at the end of the 1970s FBOs had re-established their right to manage public schools while donors' structural adjustment programs loomed at the horizon.

4.2   The roots of the discourse of teacher legibility (1977-1982)

Whereas in 1965, Mobutu was celebrated as the nation's saviour, his reign at the end of the 1970s stood on shaky foundations. Due to decreasing copper prices on the world market and the devastating Zairianisation reforms, the economy had been in decline since the middle of the 1970s (Marysse 2005; World Bank 1987; Young and Turner 1985). The end of Zairianisation in the late 1970s can retrospectively be seen as an "open moment" (Lund 2016, 1202) for international donors, diplomats and businesses to strengthen their grip on Zaire's internal affairs. Although Zairianisation had created "distrust and hostility" between international donors and Mobutu's regime (Yates 1992, 247), donors shortly after re-engaged with the regime. At the end of the 1970s, Mobutu announced democratising and decentralising reforms (Gould 1980, 60) and comprehensive civil service reforms were planned subsequently (World Bank 1987, 31). Yates (1992) sheds light on the underlying

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[26] *Convention de Gestion des Écoles Nationales* [Agreement about the management of national schools] (DRC/Government and Various FBOs 1977)

power relations between Western governments and Mobutu's Zaire. She argues that Mobutu reluctantly accepted a five-year development plan (1986-1990) as a strategy to obtain international legitimacy (Yates 1992, 249).

Donors were concerned with the regime's stability in its role as an important anti-communist ally during the Cold War, the safety of international investments in the country, and the credits of the international banks and multinational corporations (Gould 1980, 93). Reforms were no longer requested, but imposed in exchange for military assistance, political legitimisation and economic support (Gould 1980). This imposition took shape, for instance, by integrating foreign experts in Mobutu's ministries to "monitor expenditures, reduce corruption, and strengthen economic and financial planning" (Yates 1992, 249; see also Gould 1980, 92).

Most famously, German economist and former director of the German central bank, Erwin Blumenthal, became de facto head of the Bank of Zaire in late 1978 and published a report that exposed the inner workings of Mobutu's administration (Blumenthal 1982). Callaghy (1984, vii) characterises Mobutu's regime as an "authoritarian state organised around a presidential monarch, who adopted the Belgian colonial state structure and patrimonialized it by creating an administrative monarchy, which was then used to recentralize power". Particularly through the Zairianisation measures, Mobutu and his entourage installed a system where people were parachuted into positions, not knowing how long they would remain, always subjected to brisk replacements. Thus, office-holders sought to extract resources as quickly as possible (Yates 1992, 246; Young and Turner 1985, 166). Some terms in line with this attitude are, for instance, the infamous Article 15 and *débrouillez-vous*[27], and Mobutu's reported encouragement to *yiba moke* ("steal carefully")[28] (Titeca, De Herdt, and Wagemakers 2013).

Prebendalism in the Zairian administration

The Zairian administration can be described by turning to Weber's (1922, 136) concept of prebende, which Lemarchand (1988, 153) defines as follows: "It refers to the personal benefits drawn from the appropriation of public office". According to uncodified rights and practical norms, each officer-holder in a prebendal system is entitled to extract resources from activities that are associated with that position (Young and Turner 1985, 165). Poncelet and colleagues' (2015; 2010) outline the concessionary nature of the Congolese state, where people or organisations are granted semi-autonomous spaces of decision-making and resource extraction. Drawing on their work, I suggest that one pictures the Congolese/Zairian bureaucracy as a network of prebendal concessions where each administrator enjoys constantly renegotiated rights to extract resources from the position

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[27] Meaning to fend-for-oneself. This refers to an invented article of the constitution of the separatist province of South-Kasai, dating back to the 1960s.

[28] Gould (1977, 95) refers to it as *yibana mayele* and cites Mobutu in a public meeting in 1976 as follows: "If you want to steal, steal a little carefully in a nice way. But if you steal too much to become rich overnight, you'll be caught".

s/he represents. In other words, Mobutu more or less directly granted thousands of concessions to his followers where they could pursue their personal objectives in the quickest manner possible. Given that the educational administration is part of the broader administrative state apparatus, it is not surprising that common administrative logics were also rampant in educational administration, as I now discuss.

Since the early 1970s Zaire slipped into what would become a "protracted economic crisis" (Gould 1980, 92). During this crisis the living conditions of lower rank civil servants significantly deteriorated (Gould 1980, 69). Official statutes were not respected, compensation was poor, so that "a permanent army of dissatisfied, low-status, poorly paid employees could only be desperate to find resources to feed their families and meet their other social needs beyond their meager salary" (Gould 1980, 70). These conditions expedited the spread of prebendal administrative practices, thus "reproducing in a very minor way, the much more complex and more self-enriching practices followed by top civil servants" (Gould 1980, 71). In fact, according to Gould (1980) central institutions such as the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank or the Civil Service Department were central for the development of forms of corruption regarding staff operations such as recruitment, transfers or adding someone to the payroll. Since payroll fraud can be a reliable and regular form of income (Gould 1980, 132), payrolls are among the most precious elements that one can seek to control in a prebendal system. I identify two types of payroll fraud that can be related to illegibility:

First, being included into the system requires *mécanisation* which means "getting put on the computerized payroll list" (Gould 1980, 132; see also Verhaghe 2009). *Mécanisation* starts with the insight that "it is a struggle to get appointed to an official position" (Gould 1980, 132). At different administrative checkpoints, bribes might be required or can speed up the process. If one wanted to be included in the payroll, someone had to include one's name in the database. One administrator reported the following to Gould: "If he were willing to make a trip to Kinshasa and 'reach an understanding' with the various officials in the informatics division, he could be put on the payroll in short order" (Gould 1980, 133). Yates also (1992, 246) states that the "education system has provided a substantial outlet for clientelism".

Second, "local officials can arrange with Kinshasa computer officials to have fictitious names included in the computer program" (Gould 1980, 133). Gould (1980, 71) went as far as to state that "perhaps the most significant fact about Zairian civil servants in their struggle to make a living is that so many of them are pure inventions of their colleagues". A related set of practices turns around the *reliquat* which is the "remainder of the payroll left in the hands of the regional or subregional accountant after all the salary claims have been more or less honoured" (Gould 1980, 133). Normally, this money would have to be returned to the source together with justifications of expenditures. However, a diverse set of practices has emerged over time to circumvent or defer these requirements. A frequently reported practice (Gould 1980, 133; Kapaji and Mukanga 1977; Verhaghe 2007b) is the use of that money for short-term investments with a rapid turnover. Money that is based on

fictitious agents is withheld at the level of the accountant and shared with conniving colleagues. Gould (1980, 134) argues that "there is a lively competition for this remainder between the regional accountant and his superiors at the regional level, and likewise, on a smaller scale, at the payment points further on down the territorial hierarchy".

Primary and secondary school teachers have always been high in number on the public payroll (Yates 1992, 246). The education budget took up 25% of the country's resources in 1982 (Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010, 24). Hence, there was money in the education system and payroll fraud was widespread. Yates (1992, 246) argues that fictitious teachers "appear only to pick up their pay checks and rarely, if ever, are seen in a classroom". They only exist on paper, invented by teams of administrators who share the very real spoils of their fictitious existence. These administrative phantasms had a very real and disastrous impact on the management of public funds. The problem of fictitious teachers was certainly real and I have now shown how administrators can benefit from the education system and from processes around illegibility.

I found the first notion of teacher illegibility in a text from 1977. Kapaji and Mukanga (1977, 249) point to a statement made by the state commissioner for finances on April 6th 1977 about problems with the budget's stability. This commissioner spoke about "fictitious teachers" as a sign of bad financial management. The second trace I found of attention paid to teacher legibility is from 1979. Gould (1980, 71) reported the following:

> "In the course of an August 1, 1979 meeting with professors at the National University of Kinshasa, First State Commissioner Bo-Boliko admitted that only one-third of all teachers receiving monthly salaries were real, the rest were 'phantoms', i.e, fictitious employees whose salaries were simply going to other people. Reliable estimates place the percentage of nonexistent civil servants between 60 and 75 percent. Thus, instead of the 385,000 civil servants, who, according to the Department of Finance figures existed as of mid-1978, including 208,000 Education Department employees, Zaire in reality had no more than 130,000 nonfictitious public employees at the time."[29]

These words were soon after reiterated by Mobutu during a press conference in Paris on March 21st 1979 (Gould 1980, 71; see also Young and Turner 1985, 246). The day after, Flora Lewis (1979) for the New York Times reported the following: President Mobutu said that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

> "had promised $150 million in immediate aid in return for his pledge to start a program that would cut public spending by two-thirds, improve the balance of payments and improve administrative efficiency. The spending cuts will come in administration and education, he said. Asked whether such a drastic reduction would cause social problems and hurt his country's future, the President said, 'Not at all. You

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[29] The exact numbers are not known. Gould himself uses different numbers – 300,000 at one point in Gould (1979, 96) and 400,000 in another publication (Gould 1980, 69).

don't know enough about Zaire. We're going to wipe out the imaginary schools and the fake teachers who exist only on paper.'"[30]

The discourse around the problematisation of teacher legibility had reached centre stage. Both excerpts above mention fictitious, imaginary or fake schools and teachers. These are, in fact, among the most important elements surrounding the issue of teacher illegibility. The increasing concern with public expenditures had led to a growing attention to transparency, payrolls and public expenditures. As I have shown, payroll fraud is a much bigger issue than teacher illegibility. In fact, fictitious teachers were only one manifestation of a much larger "corruption complex" (Olivier de Sardan 1999, 25) with massive opportunities for fraud and self-enrichment, which persisted by the grace of its Western international partners in the Cold War era. This echoes a concern expressed by Gran (1979, 301) when he reviewed World Bank reports between 1971 and 1979:

> "The cumulative impact of these documents has been not only to provide the entire aid community, the U.S. State Department, and many others with the most complete and comprehensive factual and statistical portrait of Zairian economic data that was 'available' but also to define what was valid and appropriate to consider in development analysis and how to reconceptualize these topics."

The focus on legibility was a particular kind of knowledge which was authorised and prioritised by international and domestic actors. Fictitious teachers had been identified as a problem that required rectification, and a problem has to be rendered technical in order to be solved (Li 2007c). Rendering something technical does not automatically mean that policymakers are building a façade, a masquerade, hidden agendas or that there is a clear distinction between front-stage and back-stage politics. With Li (2007c), I think it is important to acknowledge the potential veracity of policy-designers to reform and improve. In the following period, teacher illegibility was targeted intensively, and the country experienced its first wave of teacher legibility.

4.3   First wave of teacher legibility (1982-1992)

In 1977, the same year the educational convention between state and FBOs was signed, between March 3rd and March 8th the government created a commission in charge of physical controls of staff of the University of Zaire (Kapaji and Mukanga 1977, 250). Since the commission did not target teachers, its impact is not of interest for this dissertation. Nevertheless, it foreshadows the first wave of teacher legibility.

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[30] Mobutu's statement should not be overestimated in terms of his political will for change. Mobutu was known for publicly denouncing corrupt practices (Young and Turner 1985). These utterances were very rarely ever followed by sustainable and coherent practices (Hull 1979, 146f; Yates 1992, 249; Young and Turner 1985). As a case in point, his famous speech in N'Sele (Kinshasa) can be named. What was seemingly an opening up towards political pluralism turned out to be but a first step in a seven year-long diversion strategy.

One of the first attempts to curb payroll fraud more systematically and to respond to growing discontent by civil servants and teachers was the introduction of computerised payrolls (Gould 1979, 79). Administrative recentralisation under Mobutu since the late 1960s led to the establishment of computerised salary lists for all civil servants in Kinshasa (Gould 1979, 96; Young and Turner 1985, 246). Until 1979, the so-called *l'informatique* (informatics) in the Education Department was in charge of teachers, and subsequently the informatics division of the Ministry of Finance took over (Gould 1979; Interview with a former employee of the MoE, December 7th 2015). Whereas this could be interpreted as a sign of modernisation and more transparent administration, Gould (1979, 96–97) argues that

> "Even a superficial analysis of the institution of computers in the salary centralization process suggests that this modern management technique has actually facilitated greater consolidation of class interests, via centrally controlled corruption on a mass, computerized scale, than would otherwise have been possible."

Thus, computerisation did not impede prebendal practices. Quite the contrary: Thanks to computers, administrators were able to engage in large-scale corruption. In fact, before the 1980s the Congolese Ministry of Education faced a "social hieroglyph" (Scott 1998, 3), not having exact information about the numbers of schools and teachers under its responsibility. Each month, regional governors requested pay checks according to the estimations made by the regions' various educational administrators. This system unsurprisingly inflated monthly payments and "systematic embezzlement of funds for teachers' salaries" was revealed (MacGaffey 1982, 249; Interview with a former employee of the MoE, December 7 2015). MacGaffey (1982, 249) elaborates as follows:

> "In 1980, scandalous revelations of systematic embezzlement of funds for teachers' salaries forced the government to replace most of the high officials of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and to give the churches direct control of these funds."[31]

As a result of this prebendal administrative system, technical solutions to the problematisation of teacher illegibility took further shape in 1982. In an attempt to develop a tighter grip on teacher identification, and render them legible, Figure 4.1 illustrates the key events that took place between 1982 and 1992:

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[31] I did not find data sustaining the claim that churches were given direct control, but as always, the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.

Figure 4.1 *Teacher censuses (1982-1992)*

Sources: Andrianne (2008); Kone Badara Dit Aly et al. (2011); Nioka Masongele (2013)

In 1982, the government created the *Commission Général Likulia* that reportedly uncovered many irregular teachers and removed them from their positions (Nioka Masongele 2013, 7). Little written information is available on this commission and I did not consider it in my interviews, as I only became aware of it after my field research. Keen on getting an impression on its impact, I turned to a somewhat unconventional method. I asked a Congolese friend of mine, a student, to pose the following questions to some educational authorities: "What are your experiences with the Commission Général Likulia? Was it effective on the ground?" I chose questions that would not give away my expectations about practices around the prebendal administration. My friend sent me the following response:

> "Experiences with the *Commission Général Likulia* were entirely negative because that system allowed leaders to enrich themselves illegally and allowed educational authorities to destroy teachers through corruption and clientelism."

Judging by subsequent government activities it becomes clear that the Likulia commission did indeed not clarify the situation on the ground. Illegibility in the education sector was increasingly problematised and linked to structural adjustment programs. Reducing the teacher workforce became a condition for further assistance. Caulfield (2006, 16) argues that structural adjustment programs stand for a "radical shift in the opinion about third world bureaucracies as instruments of development to viewing them as impediments to development". In my opinion, a serious reconsideration of educational governance was not only ideological, but reflected that about 25% of the entire government budget went into education (Yates 1992, 248). Instead of simply reducing the budget, it was decided to gain more knowledge on the education sector in order to identify fictitious teachers and further dismiss staff. In order to reduce the teaching workforce, one first needed knowledge about the teaching workforce. However, a lack of organisational capacity made this a difficult task. Even unbuilding a state required infrastructural power.

In 1983, the Minister of Education issued two decrees to create a Pay Commission and a Commission for the Control of Teacher Payment (DRC/MoE 1983a, 1983b), in order to identify non-existing schools and teachers in Kinshasa. These commissions were part of a broader attempt in Zaire to conduct censuses, register citizens and issue identity cards (Obotela Rashidi 1988). In April 1983, the commissions went to the Congolese National Bank to pick up salaries and carried them to the schools in Kinshasa (Interview with a former employee of the MoE, December 7th 2015). As a result, it turned out that almost 40% (558 out of 1400) of all schools on paper did not exist in reality (Nioka Masongele 2013, 11) and 25% of all funds remained without destination (Interview with a former employee of the MoE, December 7th 2015).

After this successful enterprise, a similar team spent more time visiting all schools in Kinshasa and controlling their viability (Nioka Masongele 2013, 11; see also DRC/MoE 1983c). A collective accreditation decree for all schools in Kinshasa was issued as a result of this mass inspection (Nioka Masongele 2013, 11; see also DRC/MoE 1984).[32] The Minister followed up with the organisation of a meeting with all relevant educational stakeholders in order to extend the experiment from Kinshasa to the rest of country. The meeting was called workshop of Nganda (*Travaux de Nganda*), named after the Catholic center Nganda in Kinshasa's commune Ngaliema. The immediate goals of the workshop were twofold: First, to set up a list of all schools and teachers according to province and administrative network. Second, and of a much more contested nature, to fulfil the exigencies of the World Bank / IMF's structural adjustment program to cut expenditures in educational administration and reduce the number of teachers (Nioka Masongele 2013, 13; Interview with a former employee of the MoE, December 7th 2015).

For this purpose, a ministerial decree (DRC/MoE 1985) created the Department for the Control and Payment of Teachers in the Ministry of Education (*Service de Contrôle et de la Paie des Enseignants*, SECOPE). SECOPE's staff was originally composed of inspectors and was under the direct responsibility of the Minister of Education. SECOPE's initial tasks were to complete a full teacher census and to establish an overview of schools, conducting field visits and updating the database, preparing payments, publishing new accreditation decrees of existing schools (one lump decree per province)[33], and preparing lists with people eligible for pensions (Andrianne 2008). As a result of SECOPE's creation, the budget for teacher payments was transferred from the Ministry of Civil Servants to the Ministry of Education, under the auspices of SECOPE.

There are various versions about the scope of SECOPE's early activities, especially regarding the lay-off of teachers. Yates (1992, 248 and 251) stated that the number of government employees was at "some 400,000 in 1981, then was cut to 378,000 in 1984" and "under pressure from donor agencies and foreign creditors, in 1984 the government had dismissed 40,000 teachers, most of whom were 'phantoms.'" Titeca and De Herdt

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[32] 1984 is also the year of a comprehensive population census (Obotela Rashidi 1988).

[33] As of today, the provincial accreditation decree was only issued for the province of Kinshasa.

(2016) reiterate a claim by André and colleagues (2010) that SECOPE's creation went hand-in-hand with the dismissal of one third of all teachers, and cutting the salaries of the remaining teachers by two thirds. More specifically, Poncelet and colleagues (2010) draw on data from the Zairian Central Bank and suggest that the number of teachers in 1982 was at 285,900 and at 196,300 in 1987. I believe that the figure in 1982 is highly problematic, precisely because it is likely to include fictitious teachers and is therefore probably unreliable. The numbers do reveal actually disbursed salary payments but not the actual number of teachers. As a third alternative, van der Mark (1984, 62) states that in 1984 the government all at once dismissed 7,000 teachers.

To this day, I have not found evidence that unambiguously supports either of these numbers. Long-term SECOPE employee Nioka Masongele (2013) writes that one of the key objectives of the Nganda meeting was the reduction of teaching and administrative educational personnel to 180,000 people. This was confirmed in conversations I had with leading figures of SECOPE who stated that approximately 60,000 positions were removed (Interview with a former employee of the MoE, December 7th 2015). All non-teaching staff and non-essential teaching staff[34] outside of Kinshasa were eliminated, resulting in "irregular, illegal and arbitrary suspensions of posts" (Nioka Masongele 2013, 13). Out of these 60,000 people, only about 30,000 actually came to present themselves in order to discuss their future. Hence, as Andrianne argues, around 30,000 people existed fictitiously on the state's payrolls.

Initially, SECOPE was supported by the Belgian Development Cooperation, led by Belgians who had worked in the Congolese education sector for a significant amount of time and staffed largely with Congolese educational inspectors. Furthermore, SECOPE was assisted by the World Bank's Third Education Program (1985-1991) with "additional equipment and technical assistance" (World Bank 1992, 5). In line with structural adjustment programs, this program reveals a growing interest and interventionism in the state, thus replacing a narrower educationalist focus. The project was justified by stating that "one of the main activities [that SECOPE] dealt with [is] the rational management of expenditure" (World Bank 1992, 8). At the time, SECOPE was highly esteemed for its "efficiency in pursuing certain major objectives set initially for the Project" (World Bank 1992, 5) and context-specific knowledge (ibid., 8).

The project completion report emphasises the success of the project's efforts "to maintain teacher payroll procedures and the control of the opening and closing of schools" (World Bank 1992, iv–v). One year later, the 4th World Bank Program (1991-94) stated that SECOPE "has undertaken a comprehensive census of (real and fictitious) teachers" (World Bank 1990, 3). The program further stipulated that SECOPE would continue this effort. Although these statements cannot be taken at face value, administrative processes seem to have worked well. SECOPE became a respected and somewhat feared institution (Lay 1995; Interviews with several principals throughout the research). Hence, I slightly differ in my

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[34] Such as pedagogic counsellors, disciplinary directors or clerks (Nioka Masongele 2013, 13).

analysis from André and Poncelet (2013, 14) who argue that following 1985 there was an institutionalisation of negotiated concessionary modes. 1985 is, in my opinion, one of the few years in the country's history that represents an opposite trend, at least with regard to SECOPE. However, this trend came to an end when the political climate deteriorated.

Belgian development cooperation, and all official bilateral Belgian-Zairian diplomatic relations, were briskly stopped in 1990 following Mobutu's violent repression of protests at the University of Lubumbashi on May 10th and May 11th (Depaepe 1998). The World Bank stepped in to increase its already existing support of SECOPE. It followed up on its prior activities with a fourth education project in 1990. The project viewed SECOPE as an agent of change and the "elimination of fictitious staff" (World Bank 1990, 16) remained a core objective.

All in all, during the years of 1982 to 1992 the government made a lot of progress towards a continuous identification of teachers. After this first wave of legibility, the country's social, political and economic crises worsened to unprecedented levels. A SECOPE employee describes 1992 as the "Début de la descente aux enfers" (beginning of the downfall to hell) (Nioka Masongele 2013, 48). What happened in the 1990s, and how did this affect teacher legibility?

4.4   Demise of teacher legibility (1992-2001)

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Congolese economy was in a severe crisis. The government became increasingly unable to pay its bills, therefore printing large amounts of money and thereby fuelling hyperinflation (De Herdt 2002). For instance, according to my archival research, a secondary school principal earned approximately Ƶ 3,400[35] in 1986, Ƶ 14,000 in 1989, Ƶ 32,000 in 1990, Ƶ 256,000 in 1991 and finally, Ƶ 120 million in January 1992. In real terms, the salaries and the education budget decreased substantially in value throughout these years (De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012).

Overall, the 1990s were marked by events well beyond the scope of this thesis. Millions of Rwandese civilian refugees and former *génocidaires* fled to the country's eastern regions; orchestrated and supported by Uganda and Rwanda, Laurent-Désiré Kabila overthrew Mobutu in 1997; soon after Kabila expulsed his former allies; the former allies returned and launched the second Congo war; new political complexes emerged in the east; and finally Kabila ruled the country chaotically during four years and was assassinated in 2001 by one of his bodyguards (Johnson 2009; Marysse 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007; De Villers, Omasombo, and Kennes 2001; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004).

Thus, the early 1990s can be seen as a moment of rupture or an open moment that Lund (2016, 1202) defines as "particularly propitious moments for observing and analysing how authority is as much at stake and as much under construction as the very rights produced through its exercise". I identify four events or processes that took place in the 1990s which are of relevance for this thesis: First, the retreat of the state from funding;

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[35] Ƶ stands for Zaire, the country's currency until 1997.

Second, the emergence and increasing institutionalisation of various school fees and their upwards redistribution; Third, the overall degradation of SECOPE; and fourth, a change on accreditation decrees that favours the existence of *non-mécanisé* teachers.

September 1991 and January 1993 are renowned for lootings by the military. Upon not receiving their salaries, soldiers plundered cities and pushed the country over the edge of chaos. Metaphorically, the lootings stand for a move away from plundering the state to plundering citizens. This is exactly what happened in the education system. Government funding evaporated (De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012), and in 1992 teachers went on a long strike so that the country risked a year without education (André et al. 2010, 137). Encouraged by the Catholic Church, parents started to pay the infamous motivation fee in 1992 (Verhaghe 2007a).

Administrators started to give a new meaning to prebendal concessions: Personal enrichment and administrative survival was no longer (solely) based on illicit government revenues. Instead of extracting money from the government, administrators started to demand their share of the fees that parents paid to teachers (André and Poncelet 2013, 14; Bah et al. 2014; Depaepe 1998; De Herdt and Poncelet 2010a). In other words: Given the government's "empty pockets" (De Herdt and Titeca 2016), the system turned towards parents' pockets. Schools had largely turned into "tax units" (De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012, 689). In the words of De Herdt and colleagues (2012, 699): "The social contract between state and society has not disappeared; it has been adapted".

SECOPE was not spared from the catastrophes. SECOPE's performance seriously deteriorated around 1992 and it was no longer able to guarantee an up-to-date database (Verhaghe 2007b, 2009). André and colleagues (2010, 155) argue that after the end of international cooperation and assistance, SECOPE's isolation made it even more prone to corruption. Belgian had already withdrawn its support in 1990 and the World Bank's Fourth Education Project stopped credit disbursements in 1993 (World Bank 1994). From 1992 onwards, staff without experience in the inspection came to occupy important positions (Nioka Masongele 2013). Combined with the inaccessibility of large areas of the country during and following the Congolese wars (1996–2003), the administrative reshuffling resulted in large piles of requests by schools and teachers in provincial offices. Dossiers that included information on teachers were not directly treated or included into the national database, especially for provinces outside of Kinshasa (World Bank 2004, 25, 2008).

Another possible factor facilitating these practices was a change in school accreditation decrees. Whereas all decrees dated before 1992 in my possession state that "The staff of these schools will be paid by the government in the [following] budgetary year", in 1992 this has been changed and today reads as: "The staff of these schools will not be paid by the state as long as SECOPE has not controlled the conformity of the dossiers." (See Chapter 6 for more details). As a result of the lack of funding, a war-affected administration and this change of formulation, the now widespread problem of teachers who are *non-mécanisé* and *non-payé* emerged. These categories of schools and teachers had always existed, as *mécanisation* had always taken place after the teacher was already

working. However, the numbers and waiting periods steadily increased. Teachers sometimes waited several years for their *mécanisation*. *Mécanisation* and *budgétisation* were deferred towards an unknown future, in what Englebert (2012) characterises as a "regime of uncertainty". Educational personnel reacted by hesitating to signal changes at school level and as a result new teachers would receive their predecessor's salaries.

Between 1992 and 2001, teacher illegibility was not considered at high-level politics. Important educational reports of this time stem from the National Sovereign Conference[36], more particularly the General Estates for Education[37], but I was not able to find copies of them. In 1999, the government published suggestions for a new framework-law that did not address (il)legibility (DRC/MoE 1999).

4.5   Conclusion

In this chapter, I show that authority in educational governance shifted from the FBO-state relationship towards international trusteeship. André and Poncelet (2013) consider the Catholic Educational Coordination as a quasi-Ministry of Education until today. However, while I agree that FBOs remain important in the everyday management of schools, I further argue that their importance in national level policy-making has vastly diminished. As I have shown, international donors have gradually imposed their way of thinking and organising.

The tighter grip of donors went hand-in-hand with the emergence of a legibility-discourse in the 1970s. For donors, teacher legibility had a value because it was a way to reduce public spending. According to the theoretical framework that I outline in Section 2.2, attaching value to legibility is the first step, or rather a constantly renewed step, in the permanent provocation around teacher legibility. The problem of teacher illegibility was rendered technical especially through the creation of SECOPE. Whereas Li (2007c) treats technical solutions with caution and argues that they can never fully grasp social reality, I show that the solution of SECOPE worked rather successfully at the time. Given the prebendal concessionary nature of the Congolese administration at the time, this is even more remarkable. However, such performance could not be maintained throughout the turbulent 1990s.

In the bustling post-2001 period, donors re-engaged with the state administration, in particular with SECOPE. Through the discussion in this chapter, I demonstrate that they engage with an institution with a very particular history. In sum, this chapter provides the historical background that is necessary to further explore the main research question that this thesis is concerned with: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?*

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[36] *Conférence Nationale Souveraine*

[37] *Etats Généraux de l'Education*

Chapter 5

State-building and administrative limits of legibility (2001-2013)

The 1990s in the DRC were characterised by economic collapse, transnational wars and hostile government takeovers. With regard to the topic of teacher legibility, they were also characterised by the downfall of the administration in charge of teacher identification. Teacher legibility did not receive any particular discursive attention during the 1990s. Think of the river Danube that flows from Germany to the Black Sea: A few kilometres from its source, the Danube disappears and flows underground for quite a distance, only to re-emerge much stronger and bigger. The legibility-discourse re-emerged in the 2000s, having grown in complexity and scope. In order to explore how the legibility-discourse evolved, I conduct the following analytical steps:

First, I analyse how legibility was framed in government and donor documents after Joseph Kabila came to power in 2001. Second, I engage with administrative persistence and the reassembling of solutions, in what I call the *second wave of teacher legibility* (2001-2014). I turn to projects that were implemented by a range of Western donors. These projects sought to conduct a teacher census, improve the everyday functioning of SECOPE, and used teacher funding as a condition for further disbursements. None of these projects were fully successful, but that does not mean that they did not have an impact.

I conclude that the Congolese administration in the 2000s is characterised by agenda-setting by donors, prebendal activities that are related to illegibility and payroll fraud, arbitrary errors, and administrative achievements. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the 21st century, a significant number of teachers remained at the edge of the state, in an opaque space between legibility and illegibility. This chapter is inspired by findings at school level (see Section 5.1). Analytically, it is largely based on an analysis of government and donor documents (see Section 3.1 for more details).

5.1   How a principal sees the administration

> *"Administrative practices which should unfold automatically, so to speak, demand*
> *enormous personal investment in terms of time, money and social capital*
> *on the part of those involved."* (Bierschenk 2014a, 9)

During my research it struck me that teachers were struggling to be included in the payroll. Teachers can work while being not included in the government's database (*non-mécanisé*) and/or without receiving salaries (*non-payé*). As sustained by Bierschenk's comment on administrative practices in Africa more generally (epigraph above), simply submitting a dossier is unlikely to result in timely inclusion in the database and reception of a matriculation number (*mécanisation*). Teachers need to actively negotiate their

mécanisation and inclusion in the payroll. These negotiations take place vis-à-vis bureaucrats. Mirroring Scott's (1998) interest in how a state sees, Blundo (2014) inquires how state agents see the state. The following case study from the city of Lubumbashi in Haut-Katanga illustrates *how a school principal sees the state (administration)*:

> Together with a Belgian colleague of mine, I visited a nicely built school at the outskirts of a large city. We met with the principal who managed a school with sixteen teachers. In a long conversation he told us about the school's institutional history. In his words, the accreditation and registration process was "tough and long"[38]. Once they decided to become a public school, instead of a private school as initially planned, he contacted the former provincial director of the SECOPE. After SECOPE conducted a viability report (control of buildings, teachers, students, photos, etc.), the provincial director of SECOPE went to see the Minister of Education in Kinshasa. As reported, the principal contributed to the travel expenditures but did not pay anything on top. As a result, in 2010, "we obtained our accreditation number […]. After we wrote several letters and after we resubmitted our dossier/report repeatedly, our school was *mécanisé* in July 2012, but without being added to the payroll. This means that teachers did not receive any salaries, nor did the school obtain functioning costs. In order to be included in the state's payroll/budget (*budgétisé*), the principal stated "it was the same game/procedure" ("c'était le meme jeu"). Again, letters and reports had to be written until the school was *budgétisé* in July 2014. The principal said that "every two years we experience something positive" ("tous les deux ans il y a quelque chose de bon qui nous arrive"). From then onwards, eleven teachers have been paid, whereas five remained non-paid and the school still did not receive monthly functioning costs. Afterwards, the principal attempted anew to elevate ("faire monter") the non-paid teachers onto the payroll. In fact, SECOPE's listings indicated seven times *vacant* ("à pourvoir"), which clearly demonstrates the school's right to employ seven more people. The principal achieved *budgétisation* of the school four months later. The names still did not figure on the official payrolls, but SECOPE's documents show the SECOPE matriculation number followed by "Non-Payé" (non-paid).

Clearly, the principal in this case study had to actively pursue legibility of the teachers at his schools. The case study illustrates that standard administrative procedures are negotiated and intransparent. Variances of such negotiations are reiterated by other authors (De Herdt and Titeca 2016; Verhaghe 2007b, 45). In fact, teachers' negotiations around (il)legibility was a very salient issue in my interviews with teachers and principals throughout the years. Similarly, interviews made me familiar with teachers who were omitted (*les omis*) from payrolls after several years of service, and many others whose details (e.g. seniority) were incorrectly represented on the listings, and who consequently received a lower salary. With regard to the topic of this thesis, these findings indicate that there are three *de facto* categories of teachers in relation to illegibility: teachers who are *non-mécanisés*, teachers who were omitted from the database and teachers whose records

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[38] All quotes in this section refer to the principal.

are incorrect. Teachers have the desire to become legible to the administration. This desire is negotiated in encounters with bureaucrats. In my Master's thesis I focused on the local-level implications of these encounters (Brandt 2014). In Chapter 4, I begin to unpack the emergence and functioning of the administrative practices and norms that underlie these encounters, and I continue this endeavour in Chapter 5.

5.2   Dominant framings of illegibility

Whereas in the 1960s the Catholic educational office played the role of a "quasi-ministry" (Depaepe and Hulstaert 2015; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010), in the 2000s the influence of administrations of faith-based organisations (FBOs) at national level clearly diminished. FBOs in educational governance have not been replaced but have been superseded by other layers of authority, knowledge and resources. In this chapter I extend my argument that the old state-FBO dyad has been extended to a state-donor-FBO triad.

The beginning of Joseph Kabila's reign in 2001 marks an important change of government-donor relations and the framing of legibility. Similar to Mobutu in the 1980s, Kabila engaged in a strategy of extraversion (Bayart and Ellis 2000), which means that he turned to the international community in search of funding and recognition after he came to power in 2001. In fact, donor involvement reached an unprecedented level in the 2000s.

Investing in teacher salaries is a common strategy of international donors in contexts where the government is unable to do so (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, and Rigaud 2009). However, in 2005, the country had reverted to a situation where the state "lacked anything like a detailed 'map' of its terrain and its people" (Scott 1998, 2). Public finances in such contexts are usually intransparent and unreliable. A reform of public expenditures is often a core objective of donor activities, in order to leave a sustainable impact and to gradually move towards budget support. In the following analysis of educational reports, I unpack how the government and donors linked legibility and public expenditures. Table 5.1 provides an overview of how the main documents framed (il)legibility:

Table 5.1 *Influential documents in framing (il)legibility in the 2000s*

Documents	Framing of (il)legibility
Sun City Agreements Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2005 Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper 2006 Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper 2011	No attention to (il)legibility
First Economic Program of the Government 2003-2005 The national education sector review 2004 Meeting to reorganise the payment of state agents at Hotel Sultani in 2011 Second Economic Program of the Government 2010-2012	Legibility is important in order to achieve the non-accumulation of salary arrears
The national education sector review 2004 Verhaghe reports (World Bank, DFID) World Bank "Education Sector Project" 2007-2014 World Bank study: Reforming the public service wage system (2007) World Bank Public Expenditure Review 2008 DFID's country plan for DRC 2008 Strategy for primary, secondary and vocational education 2010/11-2015/16 Interim Education Sector Plan 2012-2014 Education program "Support to Basic Education" (2013-2016) funded by GPE World Bank Public Expenditure Review 2015	Legibility is important in order to reduce fiduciary risk

No attention to (il)legibility

First of all, the Sun City agreement dedicated two pages to education (DRC/Government and various armed or civil parties 2002, 51f) without mentioning (il)legibility. The education system was addressed more fully in the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP), which is tightly linked to IMF policies and conditionality (DRC/Government 2002). In its 101 pages, the IPRSP dedicates few words to education. It recognises the "deterioration of public sector education" (DRC/Government 2002, 11) and goes as far as claiming that the education system "produces functional illiterates". Furthermore, it points to dilapidated or non-existent educational infrastructure. Also, it highlights the persistent demand for education and the fact that parents "devote a large part of agricultural income to it" (DRC/Government 2002, 50). For instance, one of the recommendations is to "support and encourage private initiative in the sector" (DRC/Government 2002, 92). Of importance for this thesis is the fact that there is no mention of teacher legibility or related aspects in this document.

After the Interim PRSP, the first full Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP) followed in 2006 (DRC/Government 2006, 2007)[39]. Drawing on a prior World Bank

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[39] The publication from 2007 is the English version published by the IMF, which I use for direct quotes.

report (World Bank 2004), the paper points to "a cumbersome and outmoded system of school administration" (DRC/Government 2007) as one of four major problems. It further lists particular problems of the primary and secondary education sector: parents' (dis)satisfaction with the education system (DRC/Government 2007); the relationship between educational achievements and household income (DRC/Government 2007); and key indicators such as gross enrolment ratios (DRC/Government 2007). The strategy paper emphasises the objective to "establish, in the short term, a legal and regulatory framework conducive to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)" (DRC/Government 2007). It lists a range of steps to achieve this goal (DRC/Government 2007, 80) but makes no mention of salary arrears, ghost teachers or teacher salaries. Hence, legibility receives no attention in the PRGSP.

The second PRGSP from 2011 (DRC/MinPlan 2011) is similar to the first poverty reduction and growth strategy paper. It focuses on human capital (DRC/MinPlan 2011, 73ff), the relationship between educational achievements and standards of living, and return on education. Implicitly, it justifies investment on education through these aspects. In its list of 'four major constraints' the administration is not mentioned and legibility does not receive attention (DRC/MinPlan 2011, 76). There are two other documents in which legibility is addressed very differently, as I now show.

Legibility is important in order to achieve the non-accumulation of arrears

One of the most influential documents is the *First Economic Program of the Government* (*Programme Economique du Gouvernement 1*, PEG 1) for the years 2002-2005. It is linked to the IPRSP and responds to structural conditionality by the IMF (IMF 2007, 17). While I have been unable to obtain a copy, there is evidence as to why this document is crucial. As stipulated on the website of the Ministry of Budget (2014), the First Economic Program of the Government includes a condition on the non-accumulation of salary arrears. Non-accumulation of arrears refers to the outstanding debts towards public servants, for which a harmonisation of the payroll was seen as a precondition (DRC/MinBudget 2014). Similar statements were frequently uttered around the teacher payment reform (bancarisation, see Chapter 7) by Congolese politicians, for instance in a government-sponsored magazine that marketed the reform (IML 2012c). The government proposed a public-private partnership with commercial banks to pay teachers via individual bank accounts in order to facilitate continuous physical control of teachers. The education sector review also pointed to large accumulations of salary arrears (World Bank 2004, 59 and 71). Furthermore, the *Second Economic Program of the Government* repeated the objective of the non-accumulation of salary arrears (IML 2012a, 50)*.* These conditions were addressed at a government meeting at the Hotel Sultani in Kinshasa in 2011 (DRC/Secretariat technique du comité préparatoire de l'atelier sur la paie des agents et fonctionnaires de l'état 2011). Whereas the economic programs highlight non-accumulation of arrears, another set of documents stresses the importance of full legibility as a condition for the reduction of fiduciary risk.

Legibility is important in order to reduce fiduciary risk

The national education sector review (*Rapport d'état sur le secteur de l'éducation national*, RESEN) from 2004 was a large-scale review and analysis of the education sector and the first meaningful post-2000 analysis of education in the DRC (World Bank 2004).[40] The report devotes only a few words to the reason for its existence. It does so at the very beginning:

> "The education system in the DRC will play an important role in building the country's political institutions, in promoting economic growth and in redressing inequalities. […] The main purpose of this report is to assist the DRC to identify the priorities for education policy and present options in order to assist the government in developing an education strategy. This is necessary for preparing the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and a program of assistance for the education sector by external donors." (World Bank 2004, i)

Which, then, are the priorities for education policy? Or to frame the question more tightly in relation to the subject matter: *(How) Did the report problematise illegibility?* The report states very clearly that "The issue of teachers' salaries is one of the most pressing issues in reforming the education system in the DRC" (World Bank 2004, vii). The report builds on the PEG-1 and envisages the following overarching objective: "Settle payment of salary arrears and pensions" (World Bank 2004, 71). The report seeks to do so by reiterating a major objective of the 1980s: "(a) verifying the number of teachers, eliminating 'ghost teachers'" (World Bank 2004, 71). Moreover, it sets the goals of "(b) settling/writing off arrears in salary payments and (c) settlement of pension dues in order to retire teachers" (World Bank 2004, 71) Throughout the document, it becomes clear that "there exist large arrears of salary payments" (World Bank 2004, vii) but that the exact size is unknown.[41] Legibility therefore receives crucial importance through its link to funding and teacher salaries more broadly, which is highlighted as a major issue of the Congolese education system at the time. Finally, it is important to note that the report states that SECOPE is "considered fairly effective" (World Bank 2004, 16). Given documents published later on, this is a somewhat surprising assessment and seems to stand on shaky grounds.

Some of the most insightful sources on Congolese educational administration and payment procedures are the *Verhaghe reports:* Johan Verhaghe was affiliated with the World Bank and wrote up findings from empirical research in the form of several reports

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[40] In fact the first report in UNESCO's (2001) national education review, which is, however, not very revealing. The summary of the "Round Table on Education" did not include anything related to legibility (DRC/Various Ministries, Donors, and Civil society 2004).

[41] It is not easy to define who has a right to what kind of payment. For instance, the report makes clear that teachers who were *non-mécanisés* are indeed government employees but have no right to receive arrears (footnote 29 on page 25 of the report). This is a very tricky question and the solution allows for the exclusion of a great number of teachers from financial claims. In this sense, leaving teachers *non-mécanisés* can be seen as a strategy to minimise financial claims.

between 2007 and 2009 (Verhaghe 2007a, 2007b, 2009). It is in one of these reports that I found a major step towards technical solutions:

> "It is clear that in light of future (donor) support to teachers' salaries (e.g. salary rise) a total cleanup of payrolls is a condition *sine qua non* for transparency. [...]The situation on the ground being opaque, very little can be done prior to 'cleaning the house from attic to basement'. A reliable payroll is therefore a prerequisite for transparent payroll management." (Verhaghe 2007b, 44f)

At the time, Verhaghe was affiliated with the World Bank. It is therefore no coincidence that these words can also be found in the World Bank project that was developed hereafter.

The ultimate goal of the national education sector review RESEN was the preparation of a donor-funded education program. The World Bank's "Education Sector Project" (*Projet d'appui au redressement du secteur de l'éducation*, PARSE)[42] ran between 2008 and 2014 and went hand-in-hand with the RESEN and the PRGSP. The PARSE project information document is absolutely essential to understanding the value attached to teacher legibility (World Bank 2007b). Two of the World Bank's central objectives in its PARSE program were the "Reform of teacher career structure (training, deployment, salary, incentive structure)" and the provision of material and technical assistance to SECOPE (World Bank 2007b, 8 and 10). In the project appraisal document I found clear links between teacher salaries/legibility and MDGs: "Project support will apply to primary teachers only, in keeping with the focus on the MDGs" (World Bank 2007c, 64). A further, unique, relation is established between teacher salaries and social cohesion:

> "The risk of breakdown [of the IT system] is imminent. The consequences would be serious including possibilities of civil unrest if teachers were not paid because of the size of the teaching corps, the strength of the teachers' unions, and the influence of the religious organisations which are managing the majority of public schools." (World Bank 2007c, 65f)

Furthermore, next to MDG and social cohesion, PARSE treats legibility both as a goal and as a condition for future funding. The report explicitly states that

> "No withdrawal shall be made for payments for payments (sic) of primary school teachers' salaries and payments for primary school operating cost subsidies […] has been enacted freezing any transfer of personnel in primary school; and an *Arrêté inter-ministériel* (inter-ministerial bylaw) has been enacted freezing the opening or accreditation of new public primary schools until a comprehensive census of primary schools, students, classrooms and teachers has been completed." (World Bank 2007c, 24)

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[42] The two World Bank projects Emergency Multisector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project and Emergency Urban, and Social Rehabilitation Project (*Projet d'Urgence de Réhabilitation Urbaine et Sociale*, PURUS) also touched upon education but neither problematises teacher illegibility.

More conditions are mentioned, but for the sake of the argument I am making, this excerpt is sufficient. In sum, the program attached value to legibility through its impact on MDGs, social cohesion and future funding, and offers technical solutions in the form of a census.

In the same year, the World Bank published a report on salaries of public employees in the DRC (World Bank 2007a). It was thus published in close proximity to the PRGSP and the beginning of PARSE. It highlights that "due to uncertainty about the number of staff and management, and the control problem over the pay procedures, DRCs pay system is in critical condition" (World Bank 2007a, 24), thereby following suit to prior reports. It is one of the few official World Bank reports that goes a step further and politicises: This system leads to "confusion, inefficiency and double-dipping by enterprising people" (World Bank 2007a, 24). Hence, illegibility is linked to fiduciary risk, i.e. corruption. It thereby underlines the importance highlighted by the conditions as expressed in the PARSE program.

One year later the World Bank followed suit with a Public Expenditure Review (PER) (World Bank 2008). This PER is not exclusively focused on education but nevertheless dedicates one chapter to the topic. The report stresses two statements that prior reports had already made: First, similar to the report from 2007 (World Bank 2007a), it speaks of a "climate conducive to the misappropriation of funds" (World Bank 2008, 72). Second, it stipulates that "any increase in the amount of spending to be accomplished through this system is likely to generate more problems than solutions" (World Bank 2008, 72). Thus, fiduciary risk and the conditions for future support go hand-in-hand. Only if fiduciary risk is minimised would it be attractive for donors to invest in teacher salaries.

After these World Bank reports there was another crucial document, the *DRC country plan of United Kingdom Department for International Development* (DFID): In the country plan I found the clearest link between values and techniques to attain them (DFID 2008, 20). According to this country plan, a reduction of primary school fees and the concomitant increase in schooling rates are peace dividends. Given the DRC's unreliable public funding procedures, DFID invested money via a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The country plan stated that national financial management and teacher management systems needed to be improved. Furthermore, the plan suggested that key ways of doing so are a census, school mapping, and capacity building. At the point when all of these documents had been published, there had not been a coherent education sector strategy. This was changed in 2011 when the "Strategy for primary, secondary and vocational education 2010/11-2015/16" was published (DRC/MoE 2010b).

This strategy highlights the importance of a reliable database for the management of teacher movements and their payments. Drawing on the Verhaghe reports, it states that "one-third of teachers needs to be included in SECOPE's database" (DRC/MoE 2010b, 26). More explicitly, it links this endeavour to the issue "revalorization of the teaching profession"[43]. The report states that MoE is conducting a census that facilitates three

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[43] French: *Revalorisation de la fonction enseignante*

objectives: anticipating needs for new teachers; the required government budget to pay all teachers; and training needs for teachers and administrative staff (DRC/MoE 2010b, 45). Moreover, the census and the inclusion of teachers in SECOPE's database are seen as preconditions for the abolishment of monthly motivation fees paid by parents, which accounted for approximately 70-80% of all school fees at the time (DRC/MoE 2010b, 27 and 45). Hence, the most important official government document at the time dedicated enormous value to the issue of teacher legibility. Furthermore, it links legibility to the issue of new school openings and recruitment procedures, stating that there is very little available information on the issue of "natural expansion" (DRC/MoE 2010b, 26).

The strategy was followed by the more concrete Interim Education Sector Plan 2012-2014 (PIE, *Plan Intérimaire de l'Education*). The PIE was a condition for funding from the Washington-based Global Partnership for Education (GPE). International donors endorsed the PIE on June 20th 2012 (Various donors 2012) and welcomed the DRC into the GPE on June 25th of the same year (GPE Secretariat 2012). This adherence symbolises a huge leap for the DRC since the GPE is a major multilateral donor in the field of education, with a growing importance attached to conflict-affected and fragile states. The PIE encompasses a large number of objectives and is separated into the three main issues of access, quality and governance. Regarding activities in the realm of legibility, it stays very close to the statements and recommendations of the preceding Strategy for Primary, Secondary and Vocational Education 2010/11-2015/16". For instance, it reiterates the necessity to conduct a census (see e.g. DRC/MoE 2012b, 46). The overarching goal is stipulated as "SECOPE is reformed and endowed with modern equipment for an efficient management" (DRC/MoE 2012b, 77). People associated with the World Bank were heavily implied in the writing of the Interim Education Sector Plan (Interview with international consultant, January 22nd 2016), and there are obvious links between the World Bank's projects and the PIE.

As a consequence of DRC's acceptance into GPE, the DRC was granted US $100 million by GPE and the ensuing project "Support to Basic Education" (*Projet De Soutien A l'Education De Base*, PROSEB) was managed by the World Bank. The project included only a minor focus on SECOPE: "Restructuring of the administrative offices and further strengthening of SECOPE to progressively establish a foundation for further systems with a better accountability" (World Bank 2013, 20), as the PARSE project was still running and because the French Development Agency (*Agence Française du Développement*, AFD) was at the edge of engaging more strongly with SECOPE (Marbeau Conseil 2014; Mazars Cameroun 2013, 2014).

In 2015 the first education-specific Public Expenditure Review was published and repeats the main exigencies already made: "Adopt a clear strategy to onboard the schools and staff not on SECOPE payroll" (World Bank 2015, 105). It further argues that "database management and staff payroll are vital functions in the administration and management of the sector" (World Bank 2015, 35). These arguments are reiterated in the new sectoral education strategy 2016-2025. For the first time in history there is one comprehensive strategy for the entire education sector (DRC/Various Ministries 2015). The inclusion of

teachers into the database is mentioned and targeted. The strategy is much less critical than the Interim Education Sector Plan 2012-2014 and considers this inclusion a mere technical issue, stating that all actors are now well aware of the procedures of registration. The strategy envisages that all teachers will be paid by the government in 2025.

In sum, in the 2000s government and donor reports attached value to legibility by linking it to higher investment in education through more available money and more efficient spending, improved delivery of education, and socio-economic values such as social cohesion, confidence in the government (legitimacy), or economic development. This valuing of legibility lead to a discursive problematisation of illegibility. Illegibility was described as harmful because it causes, or implies, fiduciary risk and an accumulation of salary arrears. Consequently, more specific problems were outlined and linked to particular technical solutions: First, database management and administrative behaviour and norms were supposed to be cured through capacity building, a teacher census, and a public-private partnership with banks. Moreover, legibility became a condition for further funding of teacher salaries. Second, teacher transfers were seen as problematic. The remedy was a moratorium on teacher transfers. Third, the expansion of schools was hinted at in one document, and the proposed solution was the prevention of further openings. Figure 5.1 illustrates these relationships.

Figure 5.1 *Discursive problematisation of teacher illegibility in the 2000s*

Similar to the situation at the end of the 1970s, teacher legibility received meaningful values and therefore illegibility was problematised. As Figure 5.1 shows, the main technical solutions are treated in this and following chapters.[44] Capacity building and a census received the most attention by far, and Section 5.3 is dedicated to an analysis of how these interventions worked out.

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[44] Armed conflict and internal displacement, which I deal with in Chapter 8, were not problematised in official documents. This is why the topic is absent from Figure 5.1

5.3 Second wave of teacher legibility (2004-2013)

The preceding discussion reveals that donors and the government returned to SECOPE's initial objective in the 2000s: A "complete census"[45] and total clean-up of payrolls (World Bank 2004, 71) was reaffirmed a "condition *sine qua non*" (Verhaghe 2007b, 44) for donor engagement in funding teacher salaries (see also World Bank 2007c). Full legibility was thus reaffirmed as a major objective of interventions and as a condition for future funding.

However, institutions, such as Ministry departments, have grown historically and developed specific norms. In the case of the MoE in the DRC, such norms were strongly related to possibilities of appropriating resources from public funds. New reforms were inevitably mediated by "inhabited institutions" (Hallett and Ventresca 2006, 213). Administrators continued to assign value to illegibility and the related prebendal activities. From their perspective, reforms can be seen as attempts to squeeze the prebendal opportunities for very real people with very strong vested interests. In the meantime, alternative funding mechanisms such as Multi-Donor Trust Funds or shadow-aligned[46] funding streams were set up (Brannelly, Ndaruhutse, and Rigaud 2009).

For a range of reasons, full legibility was still not achieved in 2016.[47] Since donors nonetheless disbursed money on teacher salaries, it is interesting to look at the question of how conditions and interventions were negotiated and reassembled by the government and donors in the absence of full legibility. At the same time, SECOPE performed to a certain extent. Figure 5.2 shows the most important events from 2005 to 2016 with regards to technical solutions to render teachers legible. These events are discussed in-depth in the coming sections. As I state in the introduction of this chapter, I explore the reasons for the existence of three *de facto* categories of teachers: teachers who do not have a SECOPE matriculation number (*non-mécanisés*), teachers who were omitted from the database (*les omis*) and teachers whose records are incorrect. In other words, I try to understand the role of the administration in stories of teachers such as the one with which I started this chapter.

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[45] This census is dovetailed with "school mapping exercise exercises (sic) that have been planned for over two decades but have not yet taken place" (World Bank 2004, 95). For more information see Andrianne (2008) and World Bank (1992, 2014).

[46] Brannelly and colleagues (2009, 22) define it as follows: "Shadow alignment is where donors work in a way that is compatible with government systems and the longer-term transfer to using government systems, even if they are not working directly through government systems."

[47] I collected data until 2016.

Figure 5.2 *Rendering teachers legible (2005-2014)*

| 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |

Moratorium on teacher transfers (MoE)

Audit of SECOPE (World Bank, PARSE)

Organisational diagnostic of SECOPE

Audit by the national audit board

Dissemination of decrees, guidelines & brochures (PARSE)

Audit of SECOPE (DFID/ USAID)

Field studies on SECOPE's functioning (World Bank, Verhaghe Reports

Mecanisation of approx. 110.000 teachers (SECOPE)

Mecanisation of approx. 95.000 teachers (SECOPE)

Renewed Moratorium on teacher transfers (PARSE)

Teacher census / SECOPE 2.0 (failed) (DFID/CTB)

Sources: Andrianne (2008, 2011); DRC/Cour des Comptes (2013); DRC/MoE/SECOPE (2015a); DRC/MoE (2007d); Verhaghe (2007a, 2007b, 2009)

5.3.1 SECOPE's work and the second World Bank project (PARSE) (2007-2011)

The "Education Sector Project" (PARSE: *Projet d'appui au redressement du secteur de l'éducation*) was the first large-scale education program since the World Bank's Fourth Education Program was interrupted in 1992. Before I discuss the program in more depth, SECOPE's everyday administrative procedures merit more attention as they are at the core of problems that reoccur even today. Let me illuminate the main administrative procedures.

In general, four documents are needed to process teacher entries, transfer, or exits: the school's accreditation, the letter of *mécanisation*, the document that identifies the teacher and the teacher's diploma (Kone Badara Dit Aly et al. 2011, 31). Staff in SECOPE's field offices collect the respective dossiers and bring them to the provincial offices[48]. In practice, many network administrators take matters into their own hands and communicate directly with the provincial office. The provincial office, in the person of the PASS (Assistant principal provincial du SECOPE, Principal Provincial Assistant of SECOPE), would verify teachers' characteristics. After the provincial director confirmed the changes, these documents used to be physically transported to Kinshasa. At national level, the secretariat takes note of incoming dossiers, the SASS (*Assistant principal du SECOPE*, [National] Principal Assistant of SECOPE) registers the changes and then sends dossiers to the DATP (*Directeur Adjoint Technique et Paie*, Deputy Director in charge of technical and payment matters) who transmits them to the IT office. The IT office then adds these changes to the database (*encodage*). Next, the SASS verifies, double-checks and possibly suggests corrections to be made by the IT department. The final dossiers need to then be correctly archived. Finally, the payroll is produced and disaggregated according to province, bank, network administrator and school. This information is sent to the Ministry of Budget and each school is supposed to receive a listing of its particular pay scheme (Andrianne 2008; Kone Badara Dit Aly et al. 2011).

However, although SECOPE survived the difficult time between 1991 and 2005/6, this system stopped working properly. The first person to formulate a full-fledged criticism of SECOPE was Johan Verhaghe (2007b, 44). He observed that SECOPE's listings no longer reflected realities in schools. He named the following reasons for that situation:

> "- names of outgoing teachers are not removed from *listings*;
> - outgoing teachers are replaced by unidentified 'incognito' teachers;
> - names and salaries of transferred and promoted teachers are not transmitted to their new assignments;
> - *écoles mécanisées* employ non-registered teachers (*postes autorisés*) who work next to their *mécanisés* colleagues;
> - expanded *écoles mécanisées* hire new, non-registered teachers;
> - *écoles non-mécanisées* duly identified by SECOPE wait for regularization;
> - unidentified *écoles non-mécanisées* continue to grow outside the official system"

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[48] Created in 1986 through a decree (DRC/MoE 1986).

Verhaghe concluded "that in light of future (donor) support to teachers' salaries (e.g. salary rise) a total cleanup of payrolls is a condition *sine qua non* for transparency" (see also Andrianne 2008; Verhaghe 2007b, 44). These recommendations were taken up by the World Bank, for whom Verhaghe had conducted the study. The Bank's PARSE program started in 2007 and 45% of all of PARSE's expenditures were supposed to be allocated to schools' operational costs and teacher salaries (World Bank 2011). In line with Verhaghe's recommendations, the World Bank's program was the first one to declare full teacher legibility a core condition for future disbursements (Textbox 5.1):

Textbox 5.1 *World Bank Project Appraisal Document for the PARSE project (excerpt)*

World Bank Project Appraisal Document for the PARSE project

"Conditions for disbursement:
[...]
(i) No withdrawal shall be made:
(a) for payment of the **initial installment of the teachers' salaries** (Category 6 of the Grant) unless the Beneficiary has provided evidence that:
 i) an *Arrêté ministériel* (ministerial bylaw) has been enacted freezing any transfer of personnel in primary school; and an *Arrêté inter-ministériel* (inter-ministerial bylaw) has been enacted freezing the opening or accreditation of new public primary schools until a comprehensive census of primary schools, students, classrooms and teachers has been completed
 [...]
 iv) SECOPE has been granted exclusive authority to handle all payments of teachers' salaries."

Source: *World Bank* (2007c, 24)

Hence the PARSE project requested three conditions: a moratorium on primary school teacher movements, a moratorium on school openings (see Chapter 6) and a comprehensive census. The moratorium on teacher movements was passed in 2007 by ministerial letter (DRC/MoE 2007d). Subsequently, the first teacher census since the 1980s was launched by SECOPE through the same letter (World Bank 2008, 87; see also DRC/MoE 2007d). Indeed, from 2006 to 2008 the number of teachers in SECOPE's database grew from 248,201 to 305,037 (DRC/MoE/SECOPE 2015a). A large number of teachers were thus added to the database. Since I found no information on the procedures, it remains unknown whether SECOPE staff actually conducted field visits, or whether they dug into existing piles of dossiers which had remained untouched for several years.

Next to the census, safeguards within SECOPE needed to be reformed. PARSE sought to do so by engaging in the fields of human resources, database and resource management and support in IT software and skills (World Bank 2007b, 65f; see also World Bank 2008). Despite some achievements, such as the purchase of IT equipment, Andrianne (2008) detected a very slow reform process and persistent massive shortcomings. With regards to the fourth condition (see Textbox 5.1), provincial commissions in charge of teachers' salary payments were abolished by ministerial circular (DRC/MoE 2007a; see also World Bank 2011, 11). These commissions had intervened in payments and created disorder and

deductions (Verhaghe 2007b). Thus, SECOPE was strengthened internally and externally vis-à-vis other actors.

However, Andrianne's (2008) report unmistakably pointed to a dimension of SECOPE's functioning which remained untargeted: SECOPE's expansion. The national SECOPE office had 34 agents in 1997. In 2006, there were already 53 agents. Only two years later this number had grown to 99 agents. Positions within SECOPE are comparably well paid. A guard without any qualification earned three times as much (US $395) as a secondary school principal could possibly earn. On top of this, allocated functioning costs were likely to partially make their way into private pockets. SECOPE had become an "Eldorado" (Andrianne 2008). Consequentially, an amalgam of beneficiaries could be found on the payroll: family members of the minister's entourage, people sidelined in other departments, people left behind by former ministers. Furthermore, SECOPE's provincial offices grew from 11 to 30, and the number of authorised agents from 17 to 19 (DRC/MoE 2004, 2007c). This reflects the overall decentralisation process of the Congolese education sector that started in 2004.

Next to the national and provincial offices, the real expansive urge could be found in SECOPE's field offices (*antennes*). In 2008 a large number of field offices were created (DRC/MoE 2008). Each field office has the right to four employees (Andrianne 2008). Andrianne (2008) found that the transgression of these norms was particularly alarming in Kinshasa. In Kinshasa-East, there were 566 agents in 10 field offices, compared with, for example, 24 agents in 8 field offices in Bas-Congo. No correlation with administrative needs could be found and equipment was poor: Kone Badara Dit Aly and colleagues (2011) show a little later that field offices lacked technical equipment such as computers, printers or scanners. Through the upward flows of money which have become institutionalised in the Congo's education system (André et al. 2010; e.g. Bah et al. 2014, 99), staff in field offices could receive a little extra. Finally, bribes have always been a way to increase revenues (Andrianne 2008; De Herdt and Titeca 2016; Verhaghe 2007b; World Bank 2007a, 24). The question remains, however, how it was technically possible for all these people to appear on the payroll, given the official restriction of four people per office. This brings me to the IT system.

The calculation of the authorised number of staff (*calcul de l'effectif autorisé*) is an indispensable element in an educational management system (Devleeschouwer 2013, 9). It precedes any other calculations and, for instance, displays the number of available positions at a given school. As per its accreditation decree every school has a given structure. For instance, six teachers and a principal is the minimum for a Congolese primary school. Andrianne (2008) was the first one to remark in written form that most school structures were corrupted and did not represent reality. Their manipulation allowed administrators to introduce seemingly random numbers of staff per school / office and allocate salaries to them. This partially explains the overloaded SECOPE offices. In this case, clientelism and patronage require sophisticated tinkering with the IT system. All these people can be on the payroll because the entire IT system is corrupted. Devleeschouwer (2013) further remarks

that the absence of these functions is at the basis of a completely dysfunctional system which does not allow teachers' characteristics to be carefully treated (e.g. seniority) and does not respect concomitant monetary advantages. He goes as far as arguing that the reinstauration of these IT functions is a precondition for any further action that targets the validity and security of the data. In other words, it is key to reducing fiduciary risk.

These observations and analyses took place mainly at national level. At the beginning of this chapter I claim that the resulting issues are present in the entire country. In fact, since the problems stem from the national level there seem to be rather few regional differences (Andrianne 2016; Brandt 2014; DFID DRC Evidence Analysis and Coordination Programme 2016; De Herdt and Titeca 2016). Nevertheless, I can exemplarily sustain my claim by pointing to some very concrete examples from the province of Katanga: On a listing from a primary school, one out of ten teachers obtained his/her diploma on the date "00/00/0000" [date/month/year], which is obviously an administrative error. Such errors are common on SECOPE's listings that are in my possession.

This discussion shows that the government did not comply with the donor condition to establish a transparent, complete and reliable database. Nevertheless, PARSE continued to disburse funding. It did so by circumventing government structures through the use of a World Bank managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Next to initial commitments, the Fund committed to the payment of teacher salaries in November 2008 as a response to the global financial crisis (World Bank 2009). This scheme was used a second time for the months September 2009 and January 2010 (DRC/Government and World Bank 2011, 6). The disbursement of funding despite the government's compliance with conditions clearly shows that donors were able to accommodate reform failure.

Given these developments, the World Bank's PARSE program soon recognised that "the conditions, as set in the Financing Agreement [...] and the Project Appraisal Document [...] are challenging in the DRC's context" (World Bank 2011, 9). As a result of the project's eureka moment, the project was formally restructured after four years, leading to an adjustment of disbursement conditions "more in line with the reality of the sector and its development" (World Bank 2011, 4):

> "[This] will include both existing and new control mechanisms. Existing ones are e.g. availability of appointment letters ("commission d'affectation") at school and administration levels; new ones will consist of detailed record-keeping of personnel movement certified at school and administration levels (and based on teacher attendance records). A guide will provide reporting models." (World Bank 2011, 11)

This is a somewhat ironic and tautological statement: The Bank asks partners to comply with conditions because it believes that the status quo does not permit a proper implementation of the project. Logically, then, the context was not necessarily welcoming to these conditions. In fact, the World Bank PARSE Project Appraisal Document (World Bank 2007c, 2) had already included the observation that the DRC is "among the ten most corrupt countries in the world" according to the Corruption Perception Index. The restructuring of

the project was achieved by referring to knowledge about contextual factors that had already been known and mentioned when the project was initiated. As I discuss in Chapter 2, being able to decide which knowledge is authorised is a major step in the reassembling of projects. Reassembling here refers to the modification of conditions while sidelining the broader political environment.

It is possible that PARSE accepted the restructuring because the rest of the donor community had ongoing activities regarding the execution of a census. The ability to recognise failure and reassemble is therefore also dependent on other ongoing activities – this is, in a way, a kind of actually ongoing harmonisation between donors. Not meeting conditions does not only lead to their modification and reassembling, but to critical reviews of ongoing practices – of course coupled with suggestions for improvement (Andrianne 2008; DRC/MoE 2012b; Kone Badara Dit Aly et al. 2011; Verhaghe 2007b, 2009). Some of these suggestions and conditions framed SECOPE's reform period between 2011 and 2013. Before delving into the reform period, however, I shed light on a very specific attempt to render teachers legible. The next section shows how the British Department for International Development (DFID) turned to a project approach in order to fulfil the condition. This project approach came down to the decision to completely sideline existing state structures, that is, SECOPE.

5.3.2   Sidelining SECOPE: DFID/CTB's project-based census (2009-2011)

> *"One of the lessons learned is that it is illusionary to think that one can erase the past.*
> *One should rather capitalize."* (Andrianne 2011, 12)

In 2008 a plan for the next steps (*feuille de route*) was elaborated by all major donors involved in education in the DRC and approved by the government (Andrianne 2011). One of the stipulated objectives was to conduct a census. The catastrophic situation regarding teacher legibility was reiterated in the country's first ever comprehensive national education sector strategy (DRC/MoE 2010b). As a result, donors grew sceptic about SECOPE's role and certain people advocated the creation of a new service, "SECOPE 2" (Andrianne 2011, 9). In line with these policy priorities and considerations, a project funded by DFID was initiated in 2010. The main goal of this project was a census. The census was tightly linked to DFID's investment in the mentioned Multi-Donor Trust Fund (Boak and Smith 2009). Whereas PARSE invested in SECOPE's capacities, DFID chose to reduce fiduciary risk by completely doing without SECOPE. The project was called in full "Implement Teachers' Census and School Mapping to provide basis for planning and monitoring and evaluation" – Teacher Census and School Mapping in short – and was planned for the years 2010-2012 (DFID 2011). The national educational strategy claimed that the census would begin in October 2010 (DRC/MoE 2010b, 25), further stating that results were anticipated for 2011 (DRC/MoE 2010b, 85). The Belgian development agency (*Coopération Technique Belge*, CTB) was charged with carrying out the project and envisaged the execution of a census and mapping of all registered and unregistered schools (DFID 2008, 2011, 2012).

Surveys were prepared, maps for the entire country were established, cars bought and people hired (Andrianne 2011; Interview with former employee of the MoE, December 7th 2015). More precisely, 181 maps of territories had been prepared, and the project envisaged to hire 550 surveyors, 660 controllers and 146 reserve personnel (Andrianne 2011, 7). This staff was to be divided in 30 provincial units (ibid.). So, how did project evolve?

Sidelining SECOPE was not met with joy at the MoE. After only one year, the new project failed tremendously and did not yield any of the targeted outcomes (Andrianne 2011).[49] DFID's project completion review (2012) states that the financial commitment increased from £1.5 million to £14 million for this project. The Project Completion Review (DFID 2012) stated the following:

> "The shared governance arrangements between CTB, DFID and the government were insufficient for a project of this size and complexity. It proved not only high risk, but operationally too challenging to implement and this component of the project was closed early."

Consequentially, the project's components *teacher census* and *school mapping* were marked in the final report as "Not achieved as the component was terminated". Interestingly, the project completion report puts a lot of blame on the Congolese partner:

> "The political economy of the sector needs to be better understood. […] The project assumed too much will and capacity on the part of government. While high level political support existed vested interests within the administration stood to lose if the projects transformational objectives were to be achieved."

A report by a consultant instead highlighted the complete lack of inclusion of Congolese stakeholders in the project's design and inception. At the risk of being repetitive, I again cite Andrianne's (2011, 12) evaluation for its major empirical and conceptual importance: "One of the lessons learned is that it is illusionary to think that one can erase the past (*faire table rase du passé)*, one should rather capitalize". This strongly echoes Li's (2007a, 276) statement that "an explicit, calculated program of intervention is not invented *ab initio*". The term project failure loses meaning when projects are built on untenable assumptions. At the same time, Andrianne (2011) also points to a lack of activities and reform will on the ministerial side. Altogether, this project suggests that the non-execution of this census can neither exclusively be attributed to Congolese authorities nor to DFID. In the following period, donors decided to mingle more closely with SECOPE's internal affairs. A set of reforms was triggered between 2011 and 2013.

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[49] It would surely be interesting to discuss this project in more depth, but this is not necessary for the broader argument I am making (see in particular Andrianne 2011), especially regarding the often misunderstood difference between *geo-localisation* and *carte scolaire*.

5.3.3 Renewed reforms: SECOPE (2011-2013)

The new conditions of the PARSE project were formally complied with in the form of a new moratorium on teacher transfers and a simultaneous guide for principals and educational administrators on how to register such changes in the future (DRC/MoE 2011a, 2011d). What is interesting to notice is the fact that no internal SECOPE process was targeted.

More crucially, an audit published in 2011 triggered a new set of reforms in 2012, and a second set of reforms followed in 2013. Whereas PARSE conditions targeted principals and educational administrators, the new audit by Kone Badara Dit Aly and colleagues (2011, 65) identified very specific administrative positions, and thus people, as problematic nodal points. They argue that all power to add teachers and schools into the database (*mécanisation*) was in the hands of SASS (*Assistant principal du SECOPE*, [National] Principal assistant of SECOPE) and PASS (Provincial principal assistant of SECOPE). The consultants suggested redistributing power by drastically restructuring SECOPE in the form of a bureau made up of people who simultaneously act as auditors, reviewers, accountants and IT experts (*Bureau des Auditeurs Réviseurs Comptables Informaticiens*) and a Directorate for *mécanisation* (Kone Badara Dit Aly et al. 2011, 40f and 65f).

Maybe as an outcome of the devastating audit, a new director of SECOPE was named in 2012 (Nioka Masongele 2013). A reform project was immediately initiated and envisaged to take place from February to July 2012, funded on SECOPE's internal means (DRC/Cour des Comptes 2013). The objective was to achieve a consolidated final file of all schools and teachers, the transmission of that file to the Minister and the upload of the file to the Ministry's website (DRC/Cour des Comptes 2013). As stated in a World Bank document, "a rapid census of all ministry schools and staff was carried out in April/May 2012" by SECOPE (World Bank 2013, 10). This statement is sustained by a look at SECOPE's internal databases: From 2011 to 2012 over 100,000 teachers were added to SECOPE's database (DRC/MoE/SECOPE 2015a). However, the national audit board *Cour des Comptes* reiterated many well-known problems in an audit of SECOPE (DRC/Cour des Comptes 2013, 10).[50] More crucially, it requested a range of documents[51] from SECOPE, of which none were made available. In fact, most of the core problems identified by Kone Badara Dit Aly and colleagues (2011) were not addressed by SECOPE. Regarding the extent of discretionary power in the IT department, a report from the consultant Devleeschouwer (2013, 8) underlined Kone Badara Dit Aly and colleagues' (2011, 8) findings by pointing out the following:

> "The database is only accessible by the IT-department. No control, no consultation is possible. The team has its hand on everything. This is not acceptable because the IT-department is only a technical service of SECOPE. The responsibility for the encoded

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[50] Such as absence of certain dossiers, long delays in *mécanisation* processes, non-respect of formal procedures, differences between SECOPE's database and reality.

[51] Cleaned up payroll and database, Alphabetical list, Overview of schools with locations. In sum, all elements necessary for legibility.

data must return to the inspectors (SASS) [...] who have the competency to verify the data and their conformity with the MoE's rules."

Devleeschouwer found this situation to be similar at provincial level. Furthermore, Devleeschouwer's report made clear that SECOPE's internal system was utterly inefficient and unorganised. He pointed to an arbitrary division of tasks and to people carrying out tasks without having designated authorities:

"The surprise when seeing the IT-coordinator typing on his keyboard to incorporate staff, the same for a developer [...] to hear an IT-specialist say: 'when the authorized number of staff appears, I could indicate the additional number of teachers (*surnombres*) (who permits him to take up that role?)" (Devleeschouwer 2013, 6)

Furthermore, Devleeschouwer's (2013) report pointed to a striking incongruence of the database. For example, he detected matriculation numbers above 1,100,000 for about 350,000 registered employees. Adding 150,000 teachers in the folder of suspended teachers, he wondered where the 600,000 remaining matriculation numbers / agents went.

Despite these shortcomings, the Interim Education Sector Plan 2012-14 reaffirmed SECOPE's full authority in conducting the teacher census (DRC/MoE 2012b, 45). However, this authority went hand-in-hand with an envisaged restructuration of SECOPE (DRC/MinPlan 2011; DRC/MoE 2012b, 79), which was strongly informed by the previously mentioned audits (Devleeschouwer 2013; DRC/Cour des Comptes 2013). This restructuration started in October 2013 when a new round of reforms was initiated. Devleeschouwer's recommendations were copied one-to-one into a *Vade Mecum* for the continuous update of teacher payments (DRC/MoE 2013a). An order to make monthly listings to educational facilities available was disseminated in order to increase transparency (DRC/MoE 2013b), and an organigram of data flow from the schools to SECOPE's national office were also conceived and disseminated (DRC/MoE 2014c). All three documents were published together in 2014. It is important to repeat that these documents engaged much stronger with SECOPE's internal processes than any others before.

5.4   Impact and concluding thoughts

"Ball is in their court, it is their turn to play!" (Andrianne 2016, 19)

At the beginning of the new millennium, international donors had permeated domestic policy-making in the Congolese education sector. Official government documents (e.g. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) were tightly linked to donor conditionality. My discourse analysis revealed that donors valued teacher legibility mainly because it was a condition for the non-accumulation of salary arrears and because it supposedly reduces fiduciary risk. Subsequently, they tackled the problem of teacher illegibility in various ways: budget support, capacity building, governing political will by conditioning further funding, completely sidelining the state administration through a project approach and failing

harshly while doing so. Accepting that projects do not work out as planned and reassembling project components to find new *solutions* is in fact part and parcel of donor activities. Conditions were compromised and renegotiated, the context was depoliticised and funding was disbursed despite the fact that the government did not comply with conditions. This is what I call "reassembling to manage failure" in Section 2.2.6, drawing on Li's (2007b) work.

As I have shown in this chapter, the Congolese government initiated few, if any, major educational policies. My research suggests that one of the main reasons for the lack of domestic political embracement of legibility is that illegibility has not lost its value for crucial people in the state administration. Prebendal practices and payroll fraud have persisted since Mobutu's era (see Section 4.2). At the same time, the Congolese government managed to acquire resources from outside the country. If it is not a strong state, it is certainly a smart state.

What does this chapter add to my exploration of the main research question, which goes as follows: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?* It allows me to pinpoint a first set of reasons for persisting illegibility: administrative concessions and prebendal practices, the existence of administrative nodal points with little will to change, donors' unrealistic project approaches and donors' accommodation of government practices. Furthermore, it is necessary to address how SECOPE performed until the year 2015. In total, there have been three major surges in the number of teachers in SECOPE's database, as Table 5.2 displays:

Table 5.2 *Number of teachers and administrative staff in SECOPE's database (paid and non-paid)*

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total DRC	248201	280857	306037	375323	385214	418088	525318	546408	549394	544840
Katanga	22262	25459	26577	28826	39434	41120	51610	51820	51984	51169

Source: SECOPE (2015a)

The table shows that the province of Katanga has always made up roughly 10% of the teaching and administrative staff in the entire country.[52] From 2006 to 2007 approximately 13% were added to the national database. From 2008 to 2009 the total number increased by 18.5%. Finally, the largest push was from 2011 to 2012 when over 100,000 teachers, i.e. another 20.5%, were added to SECOPE's database.[53] The ratio of non-paid vs. paid teachers changed from 10% (22,478 out of 225,723) in 2006 to 37.4% (148,360 vs 396,480) in the same period. It is important to repeat that these numbers are based on

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[52] Unfortunately, the data were only available regarding former provinces and not educational divisions. Moreover, the data include administrative staff, which is due to the nature of the underlying database (see Section 3.4).

[53] It is equally interesting to look at how many teachers were added to payroll but I decided to sideline this important question in this thesis in order to remain focused on the issue of legibility.

SECOPE's database. In the following chapter, I discuss them vis-à-vis different data sources. In any case, SECOPE over-performed when comparing these data to the envisaged 22,500 annual *mécanisations* as stated in the Interim Education Sector Plan (DRC/MoE 2012a, 23).

One achievement that merits further recognition is the reintegration of *les omis* (the omitted). As of 2014, reintegrating omitted teachers had become a priority of SECOPE's ongoing reforms. It was inscribed into the *Vade Mecum* from 2013 and was to be solved before new non-paid teachers would be added to the payroll. According to Andrianne (2016) this was achieved for the province of Kinshasa (which he studied). Indeed, the *state was at work* (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014c) successfully and I think it is important to pay honest attention to its achievements. However, SECOPE's method did not seem to follow transparent procedures and the department did not make any data available, not even to the national audit board (DRC/Cour des Comptes 2013).

Finally, it is important to address the question whether all teachers who are in SECOPE's database are really legible. As recently as 2016, the problems identified by Devleeschouwer in 2013 were still rampant within SECOPE (Andrianne 2016). School structures in the database were still arbitrary and a high number of teachers were wrongly represented on the payroll: incorrect diploma dates, incorrect dates of recruitment, incorrect birthdays. These flaws made it impossible to correctly pay teachers and they meant that an elevated number of teachers in the database were at least partially illegible. Extrapolating from his field visits, Andrianne states that no fewer than 250,000 dossiers would need to be reviewed due to false or insufficient information. Over 100,000 paid teachers were not completely legible to the state administration, thus making it impossible to plan pensions or remunerate seniority. Andrianne (2016) also found people not working where they were noted as working on the list, foreshadowing the bancarisation problematic that I deal with in Chapter 7. "SECOPE's entire credibility is jeopardized", Andrianne (2016, 19) concludes.

In Chapter 7, I consider ongoing payroll problems as provocations that triggered yet another solution: The bancarisation reform through which all teachers were supposed to obtain their salaries via individual bank accounts. This reform met particular challenges due to the enormous spatial outreach of the education system. This spatial outreach is at least partially rooted in the recent expansion of the education system, with which I deal in the following chapter.

Chapter 6

A problem for legibility:
brokered educational expansion (2004-2013)

Educational expansion is one of four dynamics that were problematised in reports from the Congolese government and donor reports (see Chapter 4).[54] What is the reasoning behind this problematisation? If an administration has problems governing a given number of teachers, it logically has more problems controlling a higher number of teachers. There are two solutions to this problem: First, reducing the teaching workforce, as was done in the 1980s (see Chapter 5). Second, preventing and subsequently regulating educational expansion. The latter was the preferred solution in the 2000s, in the form of a moratorium on school openings and registrations. However, as so often is true, this ideal world of government practices interacted with myriads of other actors, practices, reforms and symbols. In fact, educational expansion remained largely uninhibited until 2013. In order to explore the relationship between legibility and the actual expansion of the education system I proceed as follows below.

First, I identify and analyse relevant government and donor documents on school accreditations in order to describe the official procedures for school accreditations. Second, I show that democratisation and decentralisation have led to a multiplication of Members of Parliament (MPs) and educational administrators with an interest in facilitating school openings. Furthermore, I show that the fragmentation of faith-based networks in the 2000s had a similar effect. Third, I engage in an analysis of collected quantitative and qualitative material to explore the expansion process in the province of Haut-Katanga. To do this, I gathered 23 accreditation decrees for the period from 2003 to 2014 in schools and administrative offices.

This gathering process was a good example of data saturation: Increasingly, when I visited schools, I had already seen their kind of accreditation decree. Still, I do not claim to have collected all decrees. There is one decree from 2010 of which I only succeeded in obtaining the first page. It includes schools in two educational subdivisions (Kipushi and Pweto). However, through data triangulation I can indeed claim that I have gathered the larger part of all accreditation decrees between 2004 and 2013 (see Appendix 3 for a full overview). I systematically analysed accreditations per year and per network and compared these data to political and administrative events. I underline my quantitative data through qualitative findings. I conclude the chapter with a reflection on the impact of educational expansion on the objective to render teachers legible.

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[54] The insights and analysis of this chapter are published in a different form as Brandt, C. O. (2017). Ambivalent outcomes of statebuilding: Multiplication of brokers and educational expansion in the DR Congo (2004-2013). *Review of African Political Economy*. Online first

6.1   Governing expansion

The 2004 World Bank education report pointed to slow educational expansion and reflected on new ways of making education available to the population. However, several authors point to an immense uncontrolled increase in school accreditations in the 2000s (Andrianne 2008; Verhaghe 2009). Recently, moreover, Andrianne (2016) argued that there are many schools which were opened through fake accreditation decrees. In fact, historical sources point to unplanned and uncontrolled growth since the country's independence (Rideout Jr. 1970, 2; World Bank 1977, 1).

There are two legal aspects that are important in order to understand the uncontrolled increase of schools. First, there is the lack of precision concerning schools' locations. Second is a change on the decrees that took place in 1992. Starting with the first of these two points, it is important to highlight that accreditation decrees only list schools per territory or urban commune, and do not provide the exact location of the school (see Appendix 3). The exact location is only registered in SECOPE's database, as emphasised in an already mentioned ministerial letter (DRC/MoE 2007d). What does this mean for the accreditation of schools? An MP, or any other broker with contact to the Minister, can simply provide a list of school names and the according territory, and ask the Minister to sign the document. These lump-accreditations can then be used by the broker to hand out to his/her clientele in the provinces.

Second, each decree derives its legitimacy from references to documents such as the constitution or the educational framework-law. After these references, each decree contains three for four articles: Article 1 lists all public schools accredited through the decree, with their territory or urban commune, the educational network, the type of school (for example primary or secondary), the sections organised in secondary schools, and the number of classes per year. In all accreditation decrees in my possession issued on or before March 5th 1992, the second article reads as follows: "SECOPE has to control the school's viability"[55]. Article 3 makes clear that "The staff of these schools will be paid by the government in the budgetary year 1993". Finally, Article 4 prescribes that the Secretary General is in charge of having the decree applied and that it becomes valid at the date of its signature. My data suggest that a significant change occurred in 1992. In all decrees in my possession issued on or after March 21st 1992, Articles 2 and 3 were assembled as Article 2: "These schools will only be funded by the government after SECOPE's positive opinion following the viability control of the buildings, the equipment, didactic material, student numbers and teachers' qualifications". My data further suggest that this formulation was again modified between 2006 and 2008[56] and thenceforth read "The staff of these schools will not be paid by the state as long as SECOPE has not controlled the conformity of the dossiers" – a sentence that has remained on the decrees up to this day.

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[55] In my understanding "control" here refers to the ongoing control and not to the ex-ante control.

[56] The last decree with the old version I have is from 2006 (0519/2006) and the first one with the new wording is from 2008 (0275/2008) (see Appendix 3).

This modification unbinds the Ministry from declaring a clear moment when schools/teachers will be funded. The Minister can accredit schools without consulting the Ministries of Finance and Budget. This gives him a lot of legally backed discretionary power in signing and distributing decrees. Given the chaotic political and economic situation in 1992, the moment of change of this piece of legislation seems no coincidence, but rather as the intentional creation of elbow-room for the Minister. As a result, schools can be opened without guaranteed funding, without the necessary infrastructure and without proper planning. The change in formulation is thus crucial for the existence of parallel routes of how to obtain decrees. A World Bank (2008, 76) Public Expenditure Review recognises that "the Minister of Education can accredit schools en masse as he does not need the ex-ante affirmation of the Ministries of Finance and Budget". The statement that this approval takes place "even though this necessarily entails costs for the Treasury" (World Bank 2008, 76) is therefore not fully correct: In fact, the crux is that it does not automatically and not immediately entail costs.

As a response to these mass accreditations, Verhaghe (2007a) suggests to "impose moratorium on accreditation of new schools". This condition was taken up in the World Bank's PARSE program:

> "No withdrawal shall be made: (a) for payment of the initial installment of the teachers' salaries [...] unless the Beneficiary has provided evidence [...] an *Arrêté inter-ministériel* (inter-ministerial bylaw) has been enacted freezing the opening or accreditation of new public primary schools until a comprehensive census of primary schools, students, classrooms and teachers has been completed." (World Bank 2007c, 24)

This is the technical solution for the problem of educational expansion (see Chapter 4). The moratorium and the census were initially tightly linked to each other. However, in a ministerial letter from 2007 (DRC/MoE 2007d) that declares a moratorium on teacher movements (see Chapter 5), there is no mention of school openings. The moratorium was reiterated as a key outcome in DFID's DRC country plan: "System for registration and management of primary schools and teachers re-established, and all elements of the education sector properly registered." (DFID 2008, 20). Subsequently, with regards to the PARSE project, the moratorium condition was partially modified when PARSE was restructured in 2011:

> "The Government is in the process of establishing an inter-ministerial committee to oversee the application of the current policy, ensuring that accreditation is kept at the strict minimum and applies rigorous criteria. This will be added as a disbursement condition in place of the teachers' census." (World Bank 2011, 10)

This condition was reiterated two years later:

"The new system will function under the oversight of an interministerial committee made up of the ministries of education, budget, finance and the public service as well as trade unions and other key stakeholders." (World Bank 2013, 10)

In February 2014 the initial condition was complied with and the Minister of Education issued a letter to SECOPE:

"As part of reorganising the creation, *mécanisation* and *budgétisation* of schools, I am honoured to ask you to suspend the *mécanisation* of new schools for a period of three years, starting today." (DRC/MoE 2014d)

The policy only explicitly refers to SECOPE's task of *mécanisation* and does not make any allusion to the construction or accreditation of new schools. The moratorium was accompanied by a "Guide for the creation, *budgétisation* and *mécanisation* of public schools, teaching workforce and administrative staff of the EPSP" (DRC/MoE 2014b), published in July 2014 by SECOPE, which again reiterated the interministerial committee.[57] Interestingly, school registrations were simultaneously forbidden and then governed according to a new scheme. The guide does not add new legal norms but pretends to summarise the existing legal process. In Section 2.1.1, I argue that the state-building ideology is rooted in Weberian notions of impersonal and indifferent bureaucrats. This idealised scheme is a perfect way to illustrate how school accreditation functions in the official imagination (DRC/MoE 2014b).

Opening a school starts with requests by local communities. Currently, the country is divided in educational divisions which are again separated into educational subdivisions. Usually, an educational division corresponds to a province and an educational subdivision corresponds to a territory. Each division is presided over by a director (called *Proved*, as in *Directeur de la <u>Prov</u>ince <u>Ed</u>ucationnelle*) and each subdivision is presided over by a lower-ranking director (called *Sous-Proved,* as in *Directeur de la <u>Sous</u>-<u>Prov</u>ince <u>Ed</u>ucationnelle*). Requests are sent to the Sous-Proved, either directly or via one of the faith-based networks. The school first functions without any financial support from the state, being completely dependent on parents' contribution. The Sous-Proved then asks the technical staff, the inspection, to visit the school in order to conduct a viability check and produce a viability report, making sure that the school responds to official criteria such as the maximum number of students per class. This report is then sent to the provincial level where it is discussed at the annual meeting of all educational stakeholders taking place in May of each year (called *Travaux/Assises de Promotion Scolaire*, or Promo-Scolaire).

After deliberation, the Promo-Scolaire issues positive or negative advice for granting the decree. From there, the dossier is sent to Ministry of Education via the secretary

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[57] Also related, there is 300-page long document for architectural norms in school constructions (Consortium CRAterre - Urbaplan 2010).

general. The final decision whether or not to grant an accreditation decree to a school ought to take place in the previously mentioned national interministerial commission which then proposes the signing of the decree to the minister. After the minister's signature, the secretary general sends notifications and copies of the decree to the respective provincial ministers of education (representatives of the national minister with few responsibilities). Moreover, the notification and decree are sent to SECOPE. SECOPE's staff on the ground then verifies the school and teachers again and sends the dossier to the provincial office, which verifies the documents and sends them to the national office. Here, the schools are added to SECOPE's database (*mécanisation*) and receive a SECOPE matriculation number.[58] Finally, the school is added to the payroll and henceforth receives monthly functioning costs and its teachers obtain salaries (*budgétisation*). More precisely, the official guidelines state that the accreditation procedure "might result in public funding of teacher salaries and schools' functioning costs". Figure 6.1 summarises this imagined procedure of school accreditations. Whereas this scheme depicts an imagined accreditation process, my analysis shows that the official process is not stipulated unambiguously in legal documents (André et al. 2010; Verhaghe 2009, 4). I provide a more realistic scheme in Section 6.6.

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[58] For more details on this process, see Kone Badara Dit Aly and colleagues (2011).

Figure 6.1 *Imagined procedures for school accreditations*

Note: *This figure shows the accreditation process in the official imagination. Text in italics refers to acts, the rest are individual or collective actors. It is based on a government guide* (DRC/MoE 2014b, 9) *and translated and stylistically adapted by the author.*

6.2   Multiplication of brokers with leverage in expansion

With few doubts remaining, educational expansion in the DRC does not adhere to formal rules. What is less known, however, is the question how the local demand for accreditation is translated and pursued at the national level. Since very concrete intermediaries seem to play a crucial role in these processes, it could prove revealing to explore how the multiplication of political and administrative posts influences the school accreditation process. In this section I therefore turn to the multiplication of stakeholders, in the form of Members of Parliament, government educational administrators and religious educational administrators.

De Herdt and Titeca (2016, 13) argue that "by introducing more flexibility in recognising new public schools, the game is widened". I further show that by introducing more actors with an interest and leverage in recognising new schools, the game is similarly widened. More precisely, I identify three trajectories between 2004 and 2013 that facilitated the multiplication of stakeholders legitimately trying to obtain accreditation decrees: First, elections of national MPs according to newly introduced democratic guidelines; second, a proliferation of administrative units and personnel due to decentralisation measures; third, a fragmentation and growth of faith-based organisations (FBOs) following the deeply ingrained nature of the concessionary state. I consider these stakeholders as brokers.

As any other practice of government, state-building does not function exclusively according to formal guidelines and objectives. In fact, state-building is an amalgam of reforms, of which I am focusing on democratisation and decentralisation. These reforms interact with existing modes of decision-making, and ways of regulating access to resources and ways of distributing resources. Patron-client relationships are a frequently occurring mode of governance (Abdulai and Hickey 2016; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003; Boone 2003; Chabal 2009; Lemarchand 1972). As a reminder, Corrales (2005, 18) defines clientelism as the "distribution of valued resources […] according to political criteria […] from a strong actor toward a weak actor".

Drawing on a range of authors conducting research in different contexts I sustain that that the reproduction of existing structures and modes of governance is a potential consequence of state-building reforms. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006, 71) show that democratisation can go hand-in-hand with the persistence of clientelism. Boone (2003, 356) argues that "decentralisation has not necessarily empowered local citizens and can simply strengthen local power brokers or state agents." Along similar lines, Englebert and Kasongo (2016) show how decentralisation reforms in the DRC (re-)produce local systems of a predatory national state.

Corrales (2005, 18) suggests that clientelism is among "the most intense political forces that push states to expand education". Since democratisation and decentralisation might expand the potential number of clientelist relationships, the number of schools might therefore increase. Moreover, clientelism is opposite to impartial decision-making (Rothstein 2011) and implies autonomy, or concessions, for people to pursue their agendas.

As argued by Titeca and De Herdt (2011, 226), however, this autonomy "also creates a number of practical problems and a lack of coherence". In this chapter, I affirm both the reproduction of predatory elements and the lack of coherence, but I also shed light on more nuanced outcomes. With Abdulai and Hickey (2016, 45) I propose an analysis that addresses "the more complex workings of elite behaviour and elite–popular dynamics that underpin the interaction of political clientelism and democratic processes". I do so by looking at interactions between politicians and bureaucrats.

Bureaucrats take up an important role in these dynamics since they broker and mediate access to state resources (Berenschot 2010). Drawing on Mosse and Lewis (2006, 12), I understand brokers as a "specific group of social actors who specialise in the acquisition, control, and redistribution of development [in this chapter: state] revenue". *Broker* can furthermore highlight "the ways in which social actors operate as active agents building social, political, and economic roles rather than simply following normative scripts" (Mosse and Lewis 2006, 11). Building on theoretical thoughts elaborated in Chapter 2, the following section reveals how processes of democratisation, decentralisation and fragmentation in the DRC lead to a multiplication of brokers.

6.2.1 Multiplication through democratisation, or: emerging high-level brokers

The DRC/Zaire has a long history of (de-)centralisation and democratisation reforms. Famously, the country's independence was overshadowed by the division between Lumumba's vision of a strong federal state and the leaders of resource-rich provinces who preferred a decentralised polity. As shown in Chapter 5, Mobutu paid lip service to decentralisation in the 1970s but hardly followed up on promises. Similarly, in the 1990s, Mobutu's emotional promises of political pluralism declared during a speech in N'sele (Kinshasa) in April 1990 were a strategy of deferral and confusion. Following the formal end of the second Congo war (1998-2003) and the ensuing transitory government, the ideals of democracy and a decentralised state were inscribed into the constitution ratified in 2005.

Subsequently, the first and second democratic presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC took place in 2006 and 2011. They were the results of a sixteen-year long highly complex and violent struggle to transform the Congo from a one-party dictatorship into a multiparty presidential democracy. Nationwide, 500 MPs were elected. Each educational subdivision under study corresponds to one territory that has between one and three MPs representing it in the national assembly. Whereas Congo's political institutions perform poorly (Englebert 2016a), the emergence of elected politicians had consequences beyond formal stipulations. As pointed out in Chapter 2 and as explained above, I draw on, for instance, Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan's (2003, 146f) analysis of the Beninese context where they claim that the "democratisation process has reinforced the pre-existing, hybrid and composite form of local government". What counts for this chapter is the role of national MPs in obtaining accreditation decrees. Officially, MPs do not occupy any role in the accreditation process. In reality, they are the link between

provinces/territories/villages and the national level – frequently through interactions with educational administrators.

6.2.2 Multiplication through decentralisation, or: a proliferation of administrative units

The Congolese constitution from 2005 previews the establishment of 26 semi-autonomous provinces. The devolution of power includes the prerogative for the provinces to keep and use 40% of the revenues before sending the rest to Kinshasa. However, this has so far hardly been respected. Similar to other administrative sectors, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (DRC/Government 2006) that I introduce in Chapter 4 further foresaw decentralisation of educational governance.[59] In fact, the idea of "decentralised entities" for the regions already existed in the 1986 framework law, and educational administration had already been decentralised to a minor degree.[60]

Starting around 2004,[61] the educational administration preceded the general territorial decentralisation by several years. Thus, gradually, educational administration expanded. In Katanga, for instance, the number of educational divisions increased from one to three, and another one (Lualaba) was added a few years later (Interview with government educational administrator, March 31st 2016). This is a huge change, as the administration used to be extremely centralised and concentrated. For a long time, the Sous-Reged/Sous-Proved in Kipushi had been responsible for all schools in Katanga except for those in Lubumbashi and Likasi (Interviews with government educational administrator on March 31st 2016 and the head of the statistics department in the provincial administration in March and April 2016). The decentralisation at the level of educational divisions was also pursued at the level of educational subdivisions.

In 2007 there were 191 educational subdivisions in the country. In 2014 this number had increased to 258 educational subdivisions (DRC/MoE 2007a, 2015). In Haut-Katanga today, there are ten educational subdivisions, six of which have mainly rural character. Since 2008 four new educational subdivisions have been created. Pweto-Mitwaba was created in 2008 (separating from Kasenga), Mitwaba[62] (separating from Pweto) in 2010, and Kambove[63] (separating from Likasi) and Sakania[64] (separating from Kipushi) in 2011.

As of 2016 every territory in Haut-Katanga corresponds to one educational subdivision. Thinking back to Chapter 5 and the expansion of SECOPE's staff and field offices,

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[59] Decentralisation is furthermore understood as the increasing participation of parents and other local stakeholders in school governance (school-based management) (DRC/MoE 2010b, 2012b), but this is not of relevance for this chapter.

[60] The term "Sous-Reged" is still common in discussions with senior members of the administration (Instead of today's Sous-Proved, as provinces used to be regions) (Interview with head of statistics in the provincial educational office, March 3rd 2016).

[61] As seen on a ministerial decree from June 2004 (DRC/MoE 2004).

[62] The current administrator came into office on June 14th 2010 (DRC/MoE 2010a).

[63] Created on February 4th 2011 (DRC/MoE 2011b).

[64] The current administrator came into office on March 17th 2011 (DRC/MoE 2011c).

I can now point to a generalised expansion of educational administration. These observations resonate with Grossman and Lewis' (2014) statement regarding the proliferation of administrative units in Sub-Saharan Africa in general. Furthermore, article 204, section 13, of the Congolese constitution stipulates that primary and secondary education are exclusively provincial matters. Thus in 2007 a provincial ministry of education in Katanga was created. It responds to the provincial governor, who is in turn elected by members of the provincial parliament. The provincial ministry has not received much funding nor real competencies and is in a constant struggle, since the provincial educational director still responds directly to the Ministry of Education in Kinshasa. Accrediting private schools has been administered by the province for some time, whereas the granting of accreditation decrees for public schools remains a national prerogative.

The proliferation of administrative units goes hand-in-hand with a proliferation of administrators. As I argue in Section 2.1.1, administrators are not merely corrupt, as prominent depictions imply. Moreover, in the DRC, many bureaucrats have served throughout political turmoil and remained in office during changing government constellations. However, as suggested by, for example Abdulai and Hickey (2016, 65f), bureaucrats have little means of stopping politicians from acting according to their own agendas.

Due to the particularities of the Congolese education system, educational administrators have specific incentives for a school to exist and to be accredited: They receive money from each school that exists through their share of monthly fees paid by parents (Verhaghe 2007a). Also, many administrators used to be teachers themselves and might have an intrinsic interest to provide education. Furthermore, educational administrators in conflict-affected regions often see schools as a major tool to curb enrolment in armed groups. For these reasons, they are eager to seek direct relationships with MPs in order to obtain accreditation decrees. Although I can still acknowledge that "in practice, these offices are under-staffed and under-financed" (World Bank 2004, 14), the statement that administrative offices "are not able to play a significant role in educational management" (ibid.) must, however, be scrutinised in light of their actual achievements. Before further reflecting on the administrators' role in general, I consider the counterparts of the government administration: FBO networks.

6.2.3   Multiplication through concessions, or: fragmentation of church networks

As already explained in Chapters 1, 4 and 5, FBOs have always played a key role in the provision of education in the DRC. This "concessionary state" (Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010) was originally set in stone in a convention between the Congo Free State and the Vatican in 1906, which secured the Catholic Church's predominance until the 1940s (André and Poncelet 2013). Concessions, and recognition by the state, gradually extended towards Protestant denominations. After a failed attempt by President Mobutu to nationalise all schools, a convention was signed in 1977 and 1979, which ensured equal treatment for the Kimbanguist and Muslim faiths. They have all become fully recognised,

independent and publicly funded educational networks. Over the years, more religious networks have been included, as I now elaborate.[65]

With regard to FBOs in the province under study, three drivers underlying the multiplication of brokers need to be looked at: the Catholic network, the Protestant network and new religious networks.[66] First, traditionally, the Catholic Church has been the dominant provider of education. Due to internal conflicts, *the Salutist* (Salvation Army*)* and the *Fraternité* networks broke away from the Catholic administration and have become educational networks in their own right. Despite its vertical organisational structure in religious matters, the Catholic educational administration is not a top-down affair (Titeca and De Herdt 2011, 230). Titeca and De Herdt (2011, 230) take this analysis one step further:

> "The symbolic power that keeps a church together as a unified actor is also, necessarily, the result of a negotiation process bridging multiple legitimate practices. In other words, to the extent that (if at all) the Catholic Church can be called a unified actor, it is a negotiated actor."

It becomes unified by the myriads of decisions on school openings taken at the local level. The Catholic administration has not kept up with the government's decentralisation and expansion. For instance, the diocesan administrator in Likasi is responsible for the educational subdivisions of Kambove, Kasenga, Likasi, Lubudi (partially) and Mitwaba (partially) (Interview with two Catholic administrators, March 23rd 2016 and April 19th 2016). In fact, in the entire country there are 47 dioceses compared with about 320 educational subdivisions. Some of these were split up administratively, which was the case for Lubumbashi and Likasi.

Second, since the early 2000s, the Protestant network has overtaken the Catholic Church in terms of the number of schools it manages. Since the 1970s, Protestant communities in the DRC are organised under the banner of the Christ's Church in the Congo (*Eglise du Christ au Congo*, ECC) (Young and Turner 1985, 66). The ECC is a conglomerate of about 100 Protestant faiths and denominations (Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, etc.). In the 2000s, the *Seventh-Day Adventist Church* separated from the Protestant Church and was subsequently recognised as an autonomous educational network. The Protestant educational administration is organised in national and provincial offices that oversee the practices of the various communities. These communities have the real decision-making power when it comes to opening schools. Protestant provincial offices collect data from school openings but there is hardly any real supervision. Once a congregation opens a church in a new province or village, it always has the middle-term goal to also open a school.

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[65] Gradually more stakeholders were included through, for example, the privatisation of education in the 1980s. This is, however, irrelevant for this chapter as their accreditation process functions differently.

[66] Leinweber (2013) shows a strong expansion of the Muslim network. There were, however, close to no Muslim, or Kimbanguist, schools in the territories under study.

Thus, schools have not only been "one of the most important 'face' of the state" (De Herdt, Titeca, and Wagemakers 2012, 688) but also of FBOs. This heterogeneous bottom-up structure facilitates dynamic and unregulated growth.

Third, around 2006 to 2008 new religious networks[67] signed a management mandate with the government (*mandat de gestion*) allowing them to manage public schools (De Herdt and Poncelet 2010a, 4; Interview with national administrator of revivalist churches (*églises de reveil*), February 5 2016).

In sum, FBO networks are highly dynamic and not subject to coherent practices or top-down coordination. Democratisation, decentralisation and fragmentation have led to a multiplication of brokers who compete with each other while pursuing the same goal: For various reasons all of them try to obtain accreditation decrees for public schools from the national Ministry of Education. A major rule of the game is the fact that the Minister of Education is able to accredit schools without prior agreement of the Ministries of Budget and Finance. The following analysis consists of two parts: First, by drawing on quantitative data I present the outcomes of the brokered educational expansion in a particular educational division. Second, I use qualitative data to complement the insights yielded through the quantitative analysis in order to strengthen the understanding of brokers' roles in obtaining accreditation decrees.

6.3   Quantitative analysis of expansion

In the following analysis, four educational subdivisions (Lubumbashi 1, 2 and 3 and Likasi) from the province of Haut-Katanga are not included in the analysis because few public schools were opened in these urban subdivisions in the last decade. The analysis focuses on those territories that displayed the most friction and dynamics: Kambove, Kasenga, Kipushi, Mitwaba, Pweto, and Sakania. As a reference, Table 6.1[68] shows the national and provincial educational expansion over the last decades:

Table 6.1 *Numbers of public primary and secondary schools in DRC & Haut-Katanga (1986-2014, selected years)*

	1986/87	2002	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
DRC	14,864	24,108	37,893	41,609	45,714	46,744	49,490	53,875	57,848	61,789
Haut-Katanga	Not available	Not available	4,049	4,344	5,001	5,036	5,120	6,164	7,153	7,070

Sources: *Educational statistical yearbooks* (DRC/MoE 2007a, 2015) *and World Bank* (2004)

Table 6.1 shows a clear trend of educational expansion. The first post-war national annual educational yearbook funded by UNESCO was issued in the school year 2006/07. Unfortunately, these national yearbooks only disaggregate data between the eleven

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[67] Especially revivalist or awakening churches (*églises de réveil*), a very heterogeneous sub-group of the Pentecostal and charismatic stream in Protestantism.

[68] Due to armed conflicts and the occupation of one-third of the Congolese territory by belligerent groups, data for 2001/02 are probably not complete.

provinces. Thus, no intra-provincial data are available. This makes it impossible to establish an exact baseline of the numbers of schools in the educational subdivisions under study for the year 2004, and to compare their growth over time. However, other data sources I collected allow me to provide estimations. Drawing on unpublished annual reports established in every educational subdivision (*Rapport des travaux de la commission sous-provinciale de promotion scolaire*) and the provincial annual educational yearbook – which was first published in 2010 – Table 6.2 provides the following data:

Table 6.2 *Number of public primary and secondary schools per educational subdivision in Haut-Katanga (2002/3 - 2013/4)*

	2002-03	2007-08	2010-11	2013-14	2015-16
Sakania	not available (n.a.)	n.a.	48	51	n.a.
Kipushi	n.a.	n.a.	63	72	n.a.
Kasenga	96	n.a.	162	181	n.a.
Mitwaba	67	n.a.	121	116	175
Kambove	n.a.	71	73	136	n.a.
Pweto	141	n.a.	241	239	289

Sources: (DRC/MoE/Haut-Katanga 2012, 2015; DRC/MoE/Kasenga 2002; DRC/MoE/Likasi 2007; DRC/MoE/Mitwaba 2016; DRC/MoE/Pweto 2015)

Although these data might be somewhat incomplete, they allow several conclusions: First, the trend of educational expansion observed in Table 6.2 is sustained through these data. Haut-Katanga has experienced a growth in the numbers of public primary and secondary schools over the last years. Second, there seem to be some low-performers (for example Sakania) and some high-performers (for example Pweto). Third, the rapid increase of Kambove between 2010/11 and 2013/14 suggests that important events occurred in this timeframe that influenced the number of accredited schools. Finally, I added more recent data for Mitwaba and Pweto as both educational subdivisions have been affected by conflict. Schools in these educational subdivisions had difficulties responding to the surveys sent out for the educational yearbook in 2013/14.

These data allow me to confirm the occurrence of educational expansion at national, provincial and sub-provincial levels. By examining school accreditation decrees, the analysis now turns to the question of how this growth occurred.[69] Table 6.3 displays the annual

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[69] Some of the accreditation decrees are not destined for new schools but modify the structure of existing ones, for example by adding a new class. In general, the number of schools is only a proxy for the actually expansion because it does not take into account the number of classrooms. That analysis would have been more precise, but would not have substantially altered my claims. In some extreme cases the creation of new schools can also mean the transformation of private schools into public schools. For instance, the national coordination of the revivalist (*église de réveil*) network said that all of the schools in his network used to be private and were transformed in one stroke (Interview February 5th 2016). It is further important to add that the vast majority of all secondary

number of accreditation decrees (at the top) and the annual number of accredited public primary and secondary schools per educational subdivision between 2004 and 2013:

Table 6.3 *Annual accreditations per educational subdivision in Haut-Katanga (2004-13)*

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	∑
Total nr. of accreditation decrees	2	2	2	0	1	2	3	7	1	3	23
Accredited schools in …											
Sakania	0	1	0	0	4	0	7	9	0	0	21
Kipushi	0	0	2	0	6	1	13	12	0	15	49
Kasenga	25	2	4	0	15	23	0	8	1	38	116
Mitwaba	4	1	0	0	55	0	41	58	0	25	184
Kambove	0	5	12	0	14	22	2	39	0	94	188
Pweto	19	17	31	0	44	38	16	53	0	0	218
Total nr. of school accreditations	48	26	49	0	138	84	79	179	1	172	776

Source: *23 collected accreditation decrees (see Appendix 3)*

It is important to note that the number of school accreditations in Table 6.3 does not equal the growth of schools as presented in Table 6.2. A decree per se represents the potential of a new school, but not all decrees are used immediately. As the qualitative data below sustain, some administrators indeed have repertoires of unused accreditation decrees. Overall, from 2004 to 2013, at least 23 accreditation decrees for the territories under study were issued from the national Minister of Education. One accreditation decree can list schools for one or several territories. Together, these 23 decrees contain a total of 776 schools.

I now take a closer look at spatial and temporal differences that can be seen in Table 6.3. First, how do different educational subdivisions perform? There is a stark difference in the number of accreditations between educational subdivisions, which can be distinguished as low-performers (Sakania, Kipushi and Kasenga in the middle) and high-performers (Mitwaba, Kambove and Pweto). Second, what temporal differences or extraordinary trends exist? Upon the official end of the armed conflicts, 2004 is the year in which the accreditation decree-issuing machinery was turned on again. Accreditation decrees in the past (for example in 1986, 1992, and 1995) included only very few schools per territory. From 2004 onwards, accreditation decrees started to include a larger number of schools per territory. An even stronger increase can be observed from 2008 onwards. Finally, 2011 has

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schools are schools with only a pedagogic option (see for example DRC/MoE/Katanga 2012, 201). These are popular schools because they do not require any particular technical equipment but nevertheless lead to the desired national exam at the end of secondary school (*examen d'état*).

the highest number of school accreditations and accreditation decrees. It was a year of presidential and parliamentary elections in the DRC. Almost one-fourth of all 776 accreditations and almost one-third of all accreditation decrees were issued in 2011.

These patterns suggest that elections and thus MPs indeed play a decisive role in obtaining accreditation decrees. However, since for example 2008 and 2013 also display high numbers of accreditation although no elections took place, there must be other factors affecting how accreditation decrees are obtained. From the discussions above, these factors likely relate to administrative unit proliferation. In fact, since 2008, four new educational subdivisions have been created in the province under study. Whereas the older educational subdivision of Pweto has continuously received accreditations since 2004, Mitwaba began to expand in 2008, and the development of Kambove really took off only in 2011. Qualitative data explore this issue further. To allow for a better comparison between networks, Table 6.4 shows the number of accreditations per network:

Table 6.4 *Accreditations per educational network in Haut-Katanga (2004-13)*

Network	Govern ment	Catholic	Protestant (except 1st, 29th & 38th)	38th (Prot.)	1st (Prot.)	29th (Prot.)	other	Total
Number of accreditati ons (total)	184	271	107	101	50	44	19	776
Number of accreditati ons (%)	23.7	34.9	13.8	13	6.4	5.7	2.4	100

Source*: 23 collected accreditation decrees (see Appendix 3)*

The government network received 23.7% of all accreditations, the Catholic network 34.9% and the Protestant network alone received 38.9% of all school accreditations. All FBO networks combined obtained 76.3% of all accreditations. These shares reflect the nationwide pattern of school numbers per network and underline the increasing quantitative weight of the Protestant network compared to earlier decades (Titeca and De Herdt 2011; World Bank 2015). As mentioned above, the networks are not homogeneous entities. The Catholic network has provincial representatives but its daily operations are managed by diocesan administrators. Even more fragmented and with spatially overlapping administrations, the Protestant network consists of several different denominations.[70] In the educational division, there are 18 Protestant denominations that manage schools, as shown in Table 6.5:

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[70] Networks are either referred to by their abbreviation or their number (the 42nd for instance is called the *quarante-deuxième*).

Table 6.5 *Accreditations per Protestant network in Haut-Katanga (2004-2013)*

Denomination	Number of school accreditations
21st	2
54th	2
7th	2
Lutheran	2
Protestant (not specified)	2
ECJ/CEP	3
42nd	4
45th	4
30th	6
36th	7
ERSAC	8
2nd	13
59th	13
37th	17
8th	22
29th	44
AICC / 1st	50
38th	101
Total	**302**

Source*: 23 collected accreditation decrees (see Appendix 3)*

According to the data provided in Table 6.5, the minimum number of accreditations per Protestant denomination is two and the maximum is 101. Fifteen denominations obtained 22 school accreditations or fewer and the average number of school accreditations is 16.8 per denomination. Three denominations together (29th, 1st and 38th) received almost twice as many school accreditations (195) as the remaining fifteen denominations (107). One single Protestant denomination (38th) stands out as it acquired one-fourth of all accreditations. These numbers show the large discrepancies between different Protestant networks, the fragmentation of the Protestant administration and point to some crucial networks with extraordinary success in obtaining accreditation decrees: the 29th, the 38th and the 1st Protestant networks. As a final step in the quantitative analysis, in Table 6.6 I look at the accreditations per subdivision and network in order to complement the tables above:

Table 6.6 *Accreditations per educational subdivision and network in Haut-Katanga (2004-2013)*

	Govern ment	Catholic	Protestant (except 38th & 1st)	38th (Prot.)	1st (Prot.)	other	∑
Sakania	1	13	1	1	5	0	21
Kipushi	20	11	12	0	6	0	49
Kasenga	8	71	11	18	8	0	116
Mitwaba	62	74	11	20	12	5	184
Kambove	68	34	57	8	10	11	188
Pweto	25	68	59	54	9	3	218

Source*: 23 collected accreditation decrees (see Appendix 3)*

Table 6.6 reveals four aspects: First, government administrators were particularly effective in obtaining accreditation decrees in Mitwaba and Kambove. Second, the Catholic network obtained high numbers for Kasenga, Mitwaba and Pweto. Third, the table shows a high number of accreditations obtained by the 38th denomination for Pweto. Fourth, the 1st Protestant network received a similar number of accreditations for all educational subdivisions.

In sum, the quantitative data suggest three overarching insights: First, the data confirm prior perceptions that accreditation decrees have been issued in high numbers since 2004. Elections, especially in 2011, seem to have triggered a huge number of new school accreditations. There are a total of 22 networks/denominations that have obtained accreditations since 2004. This fragmentation is contrasted by a strong accumulation of accreditation decrees among several crucial networks. Second, different networks seem to specialise in specific educational subdivisions. Third, apparently not all school accreditations have been distributed, as some are kept as clientelistic capital instead. Taken together, these three points suggest a strong impact of democratisation, decentralisation, and fragmentation on school accreditations. In the following section, these impressions are corroborated by qualitative data. Drawing on qualitative data, I explain these trends by looking at the interactions between educational administrators and MPs. This allows me to explore how they construct their own roles and responsibilities. In other words, I shed light on everyday state formation and an underlying game of the rules in which all of them participate.

6.4   Qualitative analysis of expansion

The quantitative analysis makes very clear suggestions as to the nature of educational expansion. Through qualitative data I now complement and sustain these suggestions. Qualitative data here consist of interviews with involved brokers, educational bureaucrats and data stemming from official documents. Before I delve into the analysis of different territories, the following excerpt from my field notes underlines the marginal role of the provincial educational government office in the process of school accreditation:

> I am still searching a certain number of decrees. I call him to inquire whether he knows someone in Lubumbashi who was directly involved in getting decrees in Kinshasa. He says it's mainly the national MPs, who are hardly around. I ask him whether the educational division has all the decrees. He answers that he used to be responsible for collecting them, but never received any through the official channels: "The Minister somehow sent them to the schools directly." (Notes from a phone call with a provincial administrator, April 04th 2016)

6.4.1   Low-performers: Sakania, Kipushi and Kasenga

Three educational subdivisions can be seen as low-performers according to the number of school accreditations they obtained: Sakania, Kipushi and Kasenga with 21, 49 and 116 school accreditations respectively. In these three subdivisions, the contact between administrators and MPs is not very strong. One of the administrators complained that "they have never come to my office" (Interview, April 4th 2016). In fact, the last time his subdivision received an accreditation decree was before he even took office in 2011. "Since I started", he said, "there have not been any decrees for us" (ibid.). With regard to MPs, he and a teacher colleague were very eager to point out that some of them simply have no passion for education: "They are not concerned with schools and put their time and energy in other matters" (ibid.). It is important to add that Sakania has seen a large increase in the total number of schools, largely due to private schools in the border city of Kasumbalesa.

Outside of the urban areas, the territory is not densely populated. But the educational administrator nevertheless made clear that there is a need for further schools, and that he would be happy to be in the possession of accreditation decrees. This administrator uses a very passive way to describe his relationship to the MPs, as if he were waiting for them to come. He does not actively rewrite the rules of the game. This passivity might partially be due to his rather minimal experience (started in 2011), but similar cases show that this cannot be the only reason. Although the real reason behind his activity remain opaque, this section clearly shows the unequal access administrators have to the state's resources, depending on their relationship with national MPs. Furthermore, these utterances suggest that administrative unit proliferation – this educational subdivision was created in 2011 – does not automatically lead to new clientelistic bonds.

In another subdivision, I triangulated data and succeeded to identify some schools that are on a decree but did not exist at all. I compared schools on the decrees with reports from the *Service Nationale d'Identification des Elèves* (SERNIE) that I acquired. When I

approached the respective administrator with these schools that showed up on recently issued accreditation decrees, he told me: "They don't exist. Today it's the opposite: First the decree and then the construction" (Interview, March 31st 2016). He added that MPs visit villages and collect demands without always taking into account his advice. At other times, the MP calls the administrator who then recommends some villages that still need a school. Overall, in contrast to the administrator in Sakania, this senior administrator adopts a more active role. He is clearly aware of the circumvention of the official procedures to obtain accreditation decrees, and collaborates with MPs when possible. However, despite his authority, MPs might still open schools behind his back and without his authorisation.

Regarding the third low-performing subdivision, I encountered a similar situation. The administrator complained that "We are not very lucky with our MP. The MP of Pweto is very dynamic […]. But he [MP of Pweto] really abandoned us" (Interview, April 25th 2016). In the past, until 2008, Pweto and Kasenga formed one common educational subdivision. At that time, the "dynamic" MP of Pweto also "looked for decrees for Kasenga" (ibid.). However, as the administrator reported, he was soon told by "those people" [meaning other MPs] not to engage in that activity anymore (ibid.). Indeed, the last time Kasenga obtained decrees through the 10th Protestant denomination – to which the MP is affiliated – was shortly after the separation of the two subdivisions. The government administrator protested and said that prior to 2006 the Promo-Scolaire still functioned better. "We want this story with the MP to stop!" he stated (ibid.). Thus, decentralisation, in the form of administrative unit proliferation, and democratisation do not only carry a potential for the creation of new clientelistic ties, but might also jeopardise the existence of well-established ones.

Despite the fact that the government administrator complains, the subdivision obtained a high number (38) of accreditations in 2013 (see Table 6.3). The explanation for this is as easy as the impact is complex: The Catholic network managed to obtain one accreditation decree with authorisations for 27 primary schools and 11 secondary schools for Kasenga. However, the agency of one collective actor – the Catholic network – can stand in conflict with society's aggregated needs. An employee of SECOPE working in the subdivision told me that "there are those surprises that occur" (Interview, March 29th 2016). What he meant was that "the educational subdivision is large, many locations are difficult to access, and all of a sudden you find schools that were opened without our knowledge" (ibid.).

The SECOPE employee exemplified this with another re-occurring story: Two different educational networks opened a school at very close proximity. In a certain village, one Protestant school whose teachers were paid was able to take in all the children. Then, the Catholic network decided to open its own school, which created mischief and competition in the village. According to the SECOPE employee, these are "anarchic schools" and they only reinforce a situation where parents have to pay teachers as long as the new school is not funded by the government – which can take several years (ibid.). Moreover, he explained that parents support teachers in the beginning, with money, corn, etc., but at one

point they stop, tired of waiting for the government to take over. Teachers are then likely to leave the school and the decree might be in danger. The school might turn out to be non-viable and the decree could be re-attributed by either the FBO network or the government administrator. Finally, Kasenga reveals another interesting fact about the moratorium. In September 2014, that is seven months after the moratorium was passed, a Protestant network opened three new primary schools, two of which function without a ministerial decree. This does not mean that the moratorium has been breached. However, it points to the difficulty for the government of funding all those schools that were opened after the moratorium was passed.

6.4.2   High-performers: Mitwaba, Kambove and Pweto

On the other side of the performance spectrum I found educational networks that perform well in terms of obtaining accreditation decrees for schools. I first discuss the relationship between government administrators and MPs, then FBO administrators and MPs and finish with a focus on dynamics particularly related to FBOs. Whereas government administrators in Sakania and Kasenga seemed rather passive and complained about the lack of obtained accreditation decrees, the educational administrator in Kambove positioned himself very differently. Responding to my surprise about the recent expansion of public primary and secondary schools he affirmed: "That's me. When we got here, there were no schools" (Interview, April 23rd 2016).

Kambove was created in 2011 – before, it belonged to another subdivision – and the first administrator began his work. Before, there was reportedly little contact between the MP of Kambove and the responsible educational administrator based in another territory. The administrator's claims are substantiated by my quantitative data: 70% of all accreditations of Kambove were obtained after he arrived in 2011. What might be the reasons for his success? The administrator explains that he does not accept the straightjacket of a passive and waiting bureaucrat but actively constructs his roles and assumes responsibilities. He *sees the state* and at the same time he is *doing the state* (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014c; Blundo 2014). Furthermore, through a particular interpretation of the MP's role he has put himself much more closely side-by-side the MP:

> "It is part of their responsibilities. We have to exchange. As a technician, you can be like a counsellor in a specific area for the MP. An MP doesn't have knowledge in these areas. When a MP comes, he/she observes the bureaucratic services; that's the role of an MP. When the educational administrator doesn't know them, he needs to ask. It is about knowing the role of a MP at the national level. That's all." (ibid.)

Despite being aware of the actual procedures, he upholds that all dossiers are regularly introduced during the annual Promo-Scolaire. According to him, the MP then only takes care of the follow-up at national level. Interestingly, many of the decrees he obtained

were used for a collaborative project with the NGO International Rescue Committee (IRC). IRC built classrooms and the new schools then received a decree.

An educational administrator of Mitwaba strongly underlines the MP's central role. When I asked him, "Do you have the impression that the reports you write for Promo-Scolaire are read?" he answered: "Absolutely not. If it were not for our MP we would not receive anything" (Interview, April 22nd 2015). In fact, it was reported that no school in Mitwaba has been accredited via the official mechanism over the last couple of years. In Mitwaba, 45% of all decrees issued between 2004 and 2013 have been obtained since 2011, that is, since the creation of the subdivision. Reportedly, the educational administrator had already campaigned for the MP during the administrator's prior role as a school principal. Now, as administrator, he said that "When our MP obtains a decree and I can attribute it to a school, I tell them who to thank for the decree" (Interview, April 22nd 2015).

An occurrence in a village in Pweto further shows what these practical norms imply. Discussing a newly opened secondary school, I asked the principal about the school's name. He said, "For now we just call it after the village. The name will come with the decree." Admittedly, I did not immediately understand him. However, he knew that it is not up to him to choose the final name: At one point the educational administrator might have received a decree with a list of names, and would designate that name to his school. This practical norm of obtaining decrees via MPs is not a hidden practice. In the short historical section of the end-of-the-school year 2011/12 report from a secondary school in Pweto, I found the following sentence: "In 2006 this school obtained its decree thanks to the MP Ilunga-Kamany."

Besides this, the case of Mitwaba reveals another interesting finding: As briefly mentioned above, I came across different decrees that contained the same name of schools for the same territories. No one could tell me why this was the case, but it surely does not point to a well-organised management at national level. Maybe these were, after all, fictitious decrees mentioned by Andrianne (2016). Besides these potentially fictitious decrees, there are also *blank* decrees: All schools supposedly managed by the Protestant network AICC were not opened. Thus, AICC received *blank* decrees that it can use to open schools in the future. Furthermore, Mitwaba is a territory where many people and networks still aim to open their schools or to turn their schools' offspring (*succursale*) into formal schools.

A Protestant pastor told me: "We would like to open a primary school in the centre of Mitwaba. Even without decree, and then we'll try to snatch a decree. Waiting for the decree would mean a long delay. If you came from the government network, you only had to go see the educational administrator, and tomorrow you would obtain a decree" (Interview, April 11th 2016). In reality, the government administrator did not possess any more "blank decrees" but showed me a list he established that showed nine schools and their respective FBO network that have received a decree but have not been opened.

Some further cases from Mitwaba give a good impression of the local bargains and negotiations on how to obtain a decree. One principal told me: "The school was opened in

2008 and received a decree in 2011. Through the government educational administrator who takes care of that" (Interview April 12th 2016). At another school they weren't as lucky: "We try to find a decree, but the educational administrator ran out of them" (Interview, April 13th 2016). Schools can also change their FBO network out of necessity. A formerly Catholic school that existed as an offshoot since 1997 became independent in 2015/16 and now belongs to a Protestant network. A teacher told me that "as teachers we don't really know how these things are decided, but the people in the village demanded that we become liberated from being an offshoot" (Interview, April 12th 2016). Since teachers are subject to this "regime of incertitude" (Englebert 2012) and do not always have full knowledge about procedures and, moreover, have no other means of obtaining decrees, making them pay is not uncommon for educational administrators, inspectors or SECOPE employees. "We were asked to pay US $11" a principal told me (Interview, April 12th). But then, at least, they had their decree. This school time and again made clear that viability criteria are by no means respected.

I now turn towards the relationship between FBO administrators and MPs. During discussions it became clear that Pweto had one of the most active MPs. A former teacher himself, the national representative obtained numerous accreditations, especially for his former network (10th network, see Table 6.5). His network obtained the record number of 101 accreditations – about one-third of all Protestant accreditations (see Table 6.5). Curiously, the respective Protestant network administrator did not praise this intervention. He complained about the lack of inclusion and communication: "No MP ever comes here. I think it [the request] passes through Promo-Scolaire. If it is indeed thanks to the MP, we only see the results, the copies of decrees" (Interview, March 23rd 2016). This resonates with an observation made in the case of Kipushi: The network administrator is not necessarily strongly included.

Another government administrator even mentioned this exact MP without me raising the issue: "The MP could arrive in a village, pose questions, everywhere, to find out what the people need. He even short-cuts the network administrator, and directly sends the decrees to the schools" (Interview, March 29th 2016). His colleague from Pweto added that "I receive copies of decrees for schools where I never conducted a viability report. Once they arrive, I visit the schools to conduct the viability report. If I notice that the school does not respect the criteria, I file a report to my superiors" (Interview, March 19th 2015). In these cases, MPs become "street-level politicians" (Berenschot 2010, 888) who take note of the population's needs and desires in direct encounters.

Finally, FBOs display certain specific dynamics. The 11th Protestant network received school accreditations for 50 schools (see Table 4) but only one school has been opened (Interview, March 23rd 2016). One accreditation decree from 2011 contains school accreditations exclusively for the 11th Protestant network. Decrees with accreditations exclusively for one network are rare but not unheard of. What is more striking is that it is the only decree on which all territories are represented. It includes a total of 49 schools,

more or less equally distributed between the territories (five schools per territory at least, nine at most).

However, none of these schools had been opened in 2016, as the 11th Protestant network is currently managing exactly one school in the provincial capital. The 11th Protestant network does not even have an educational office or counsellor in the province. This underlines that accreditation decrees are not granted after a thorough evaluation of educational needs but suggests an important role of political ties. The government educational administrator of Kambove comments on the activities of the 11th Protestant network as follows: "There are some partners who first obtain decrees through other channels but who do not build. There are unused decrees lying around" (Interview, April 23rd 2016). If, however, he saw the need to use one of their school accreditations, he assumes that he could talk to someone in charge of the 11th Protestant network and attribute it to a new school. In general, the government educational administrator claims to have a tight grip on newly opened schools and that he is always aware when a school opens.

6.5   Impact and concluding thoughts: the real governance of expansion

Before I discuss the impact of these de facto accreditation procedures, let me summarise how accreditation happens in practice. For that purpose, I adapted the imagined and idealised diagram of accreditation procedures (DRC/MoE 2014b; see Figure 6.1 in Section 6.2), as is shown in Figure 6.2 below.

Members of Parliament or other brokers inquire locally how many schools are desired, or simply try to request a somewhat arbitrary number of decrees. Then, they turn to the Minister of Education or his entourage and seek a signature. Once the Minister signs, the Secretary General accompanies the decree with an official letter of announcement. One way or the other, decree and letter reach the local level. This can either happen through the MP or through other intermediaries. *Budgétisation*, the adding of new schools and teachers onto the government's payroll, is another procedure altogether and not an automatic follow-up.

The real governance of accreditation is at least as interesting as the donor's attempt to present an idealised version of the accreditation process. In Section 6.1, I argue that the official government document regulating school accreditation does not refer to any legal sources. The main reason is that accreditation procedures are not unambiguously stipulated in official documents. This representation of the official legal framework is a patchwork of texts and practices that have emerged over the years. It represents the state bureaucracy as an imagined ideal (Hansen and Stepputat 2001). I have now shown the reality behind this imagined ideal: Ambiguous and incomplete legal texts have rendered the accreditation process increasingly opaque, unreliable and subject to the Minister's discretionary power. Similar to my elaborations on SECOPE in Chapter 5, the state administration again functions through concessions, allowing people in nodal points to act largely ungoverned by official rules.

Figure 6.2 *De facto procedures for school accreditations*

The figure contains the following labels and text:

- Request
- Local community / Sous-Proved / FBO networks / Proved
- Local level
- *Inquire desired number of school openings*
- *Can try to use them as intermediaries*
- School
- Proved / Sous-Proved / FBO networks
- Sub-provincial level
- Brokers
- Brokers
- *Send decrees*
- Secretary General
- *Budgétisation*
- National level
- Creation / *Mécanisation* / *Budgétisation*
- *Seek signature*
- SECOPE
- Ministry of Education (MEPS-INC)
- Ministries of
  - Budget
  - Finance
  - Civil service

Note: *Text in italics refers to acts, the rest are individual or collective actors. Dotted lines refer to steps which are subject to incertitude.* Source: *Adapted by author from DRC/MoE* (2014b, 9) *(see also Figure 6.1 in Section 6.2).*

As I pointed out in Section 6.2, the first time that the school accreditation process was governed more tightly was through the moratorium issued in 2013. By and large, it seems that principals and administrators were aware of the moratorium. Most Sous-Proveds interpreted that the moratorium put a stop to new decrees (Interview with three representatives of the provincial Catholic administration, January 22nd 2015). A Catholic administrator evaluated the idea of the moratorium sceptically: "The moratorium was passed in order to better manage the numbers of the teaching workforce. However, it did not stop the demographic development and children will continue to be born and reach school age" (Interview of fellow researcher with diocesan Catholic administrator, March 2nd 2015). This statement echoes concerns by Andrianne (2016) (see Chapter 5). The creation of new schools and classrooms at local level can also not be prohibited by the moratorium.

Furthermore, I state in Section 6.2 that an interministerial commission to evaluate demands for school openings was announced in 2011 (World Bank 2011), in 2013 (World Bank 2013, 10) and in 2014 (DRC/MoE 2014b). As of 2015, the commission had not been created (Interview with national head of SECOPE, March 3rd 2015). This was reiterated several months later by an international consultant who stated that the commission "does not exist" (Interview with educational consultant on April 25th 2016). Therefore, no real progress has been made towards actual planning of the school accreditation process.

The second question that needs to be addressed is how this expansion interfered with the will to render teachers legible. What does the analysis in this chapter reveal about the main research question of this thesis? As a reminder, the research question is: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?* First of all, I take a look at the numbers. As I outline in Chapter 3, there are two main sources on the numbers of schools and teachers: SECOPE's database and national educational yearbooks. Furthermore, the national education sector review (RESEN) and the World Bank Public Expenditure Review (PER) from 2015 added estimations.

Table 5.2 in the preceding chapter provides data for the number of teachers and administrative staff from SECOPE (paid and non-paid) from 2006 to 2015. The number for the year 2013 was 546,408 and thus considerably higher than the number provided here (502,297). The reason is that the numbers in Table 5.2 include staff in educational administrative offices. Disaggregated data were only available to me from 2011 onwards. That said, all sources in Table 6.7 provide numbers of teachers and in-school administrative staff at the national level.[71] Data in the table do not concern exactly the same points in time, and it especially difficult to know which months the *annuaires* specify, which is why I provide data for the school years 2012/13 and 2013/14. By definition, SECOPE data never contain teachers who are *non-mécanisés*. SECOPE data are on teachers who are *mécanisés*, some of whom are paid and others who are non-paid. Comparing the other sources with SECOPE data gives an idea of the number of teachers who are *non-mécanisés*, as the other

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[71] No disaggregated data for the province of Haut-Katanga were available in all sources.

sources contain all types of teachers. The comparison ranges from 121,155 (RESEN 2012-13) to 287,767 (WB PER estimations for the year 2013).[72] Table 6.7 provides a comparison of these sources:

Table 6.7 *Number of teachers and in-school administrative staff in (2013)*

Source	SECOPE payroll October 2013	National education sector review (RESEN) 2012-13	World Bank PER 2012	World Bank PER 2013	Education statistical yearbook 2012-13	Education statistical yearbook 2013-14
Total nr. of in-school staff	502,297	623,452	738,803	790,064	655,648	713,708
Teachers *non-mécanisés*	*not applicable*	121,155	236,506	287,767	153,351	211,411

Sources: DRC/MoE/SECOPE (2013); DRC/MoE (2014a, 2014e, 2015); World Bank (2015)

Although all of these data need to be taken with a grain of salt, as they are not completely reliable, collectively they point to an immense scope of persisting illegibility. This is the outcome of an unplanned expansion that meets a cumbersome administration. Surely, there are other impacts of this expansion, such as increased access to education. However, in the analysis in this dissertation I limit myself to exploring my research questions around the issue of legibility. Most salient for this thesis is the enormous increase in teachers, particularly in difficult-to-reach areas. This is of high importance for the following two chapters, which investigate exactly the state's ability to govern at its geographical frontiers.

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[72] The numbers from the World Bank stem from a report published in 2015 but are calculated for the years 2012 and 2013.

Chapter 7

Circumventing administrative problems for teacher legibility: the bancarisation reform (2012-2016)

In Chapter 5, I show that donors and the educational administration undertook massive attempts to render teachers legible. I conclude that illegibility persisted because of administrative payroll fraud, failure of donor projects and donors' accommodation of the government's non-compliance with conditions. In Chapter 6, I explain how the Congolese public school system has expanded massively since 2004. This expansion led to a higher number of teachers who had to be administered by SECOPE. Moreover, the expansion led to a deeper territorialisation with many new schools in remote areas.

Next to these education-specific events, in the early 2000s another dynamic loomed on the horizon: IMF conditionalities requested the non-accumulation of salary arrears (see Section 4.4). This objective was inscribed into the government's economic programs from 2002 onwards. An important step towards this objective was a large-scale reform that envisaged paying all public servants via commercial bank accounts and thus ensuring their identification – the bancarisation reform that I analyse in this chapter. I explore how the reform tried to tackle teacher illegibility and how the reform has persisted despite infrastructural, financial and organisational shortcomings.

In order to conduct this analysis, I turn to quantitative and qualitative empirical sources. What stands out in this chapter are the quantitative databases and the maps that result from them. Since first encountering the bancarisation reform in the field, in Kisangani in 2013, I have desired to acquire quantitative data about the distances that teachers have to travel in order to reach the destinations where they are paid. From rumours, I heard that there were distances of up to 250 km. However, it was difficult to make solid statements on the ground of such anecdotal data. It was then with great excitement that I came into the possession of an enormous database on precisely these distances. I used a dataset that provides estimations about the distance between schools and locations where teachers are paid.[73] Distances are rather favourable and I will discuss this in the analysis. Due to the dearth of reliable datasets, I work with these estimates. Everything I discuss in Section 3.2.3 regarding the availability and quality of quantitative data applies to these databases. An immense amount of standardisation and harmonisation was necessary before I was able to use them.[74]

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[73] The dataset on SECOPE's website (see DRC/MoE/SECOPE 2014a) is incomplete and was completed through data acquired personally in Kinshasa.

[74] I established and worked on these datasets with the help of Tom de Herdt, Stylianos Moshonas and research assistant Justin Mann.

Initially, there were PDF files for each of the 162 educational subdivisions which were gradually compiled into one file. The total number of entries in the database were 30,059 of which 1,868 include no data on the distance. Map 7.1 in Section 7.4.1 builds on these data. A second quantitative dataset contains government data regarding the distribution of providers of teacher salary per territory and is displayed on Map 7.2 and Map 7.3 (see Section 7.4.7). These quantitative and spatial data provide information for the national and territory levels. Furthermore, I use excerpts from my interviews in order to underline or complement arguments made through the help of the quantitative data.

I proceed as follows: First, I discuss in more depth the technical solutions proposed as part of the bancarisation reform. Second, I investigate the reform's launch and reassembling. Through several case studies I present a nuanced analysis that takes into account context-specificities. Third, I point to the reform's impact on teacher legibility and end the chapter with concluding thoughts.

7.1   Bancarisation: A public-private partnership

Bancarisation was built on a particular framing of the problem of teacher illegibility, which led to a specific set of solutions. The main solution was the privatisation and individualisation of teacher payments through commercial banks. The reform was conceived as a public-private partnership between the Congolese government and commercial banks united under the umbrella of the *Association Congolaise des Banques* (ACB; Congolese Association of Banks). The main government actors were the Prime Minister, the Pay Directorate within the Ministry of Budget, the Ministry of Finance, the *Comité de Suivi de la Paie* (CSP, Payment Monitoring Committee) within the Congolese Central Bank, and the Ministry of Civil Service.

Teachers had reasons to be sceptical of the reform: Confidence in the banking sector was very low in the country, since, due to hyperinflation, banks were often confronted with liquidity shortages in the years 1991-1994 and their reputation suffered seriously. This situation changed however at the millennium turn. At the same time, banks were not very enthusiastic either. One employee summarised the banks' attitude as follows: "Teachers were not the most desired clients" due to their meagre salaries (Interview, December 18th 2015). This employee also explained that banks saw their participation in the bancarisation policy as a long-term investment and an opportunity to broaden their client base. Participation was voluntary and 15 out of 18 banks eventually participated. Banks' participation might also be interpreted as a bet on the gradual increase of teacher salaries. The reform was launched in a gradual manner, as shown in Figure 7.1:

Figure 7.1 *Key events around the bancarisation reform*

2011	2012	2013
MAY	**MAY JUL OCT NOV**	**FEB MAY**
Government meeting that kicked of the bancarisation reform	Prime Minister reaffirms bancarisation as a key objective in inaugural speech	Launch of reform in sub-provincial capitals
	Launch of reform in urban areas	Launch of reform in the remaining rural areas
	Launch of reform in provincial capitals	
	Memorandum of understanding concerning payment of state agents between the Congolese government and the ACB	

From May 18th to May 21st 2011, central government actors such as the office of the Prime Minister, the Pay Directorate, the Ministry of Finance, the Payment Monitoring Committee, and probably private actors, met for the first preparatory meeting in the Hotel Sultani in Kinshasa (DRC/Secretariat technique du comité préparatoire de l'atelier sur la paie des agents et fonctionnaires de l'état 2011). At that point, the government foresaw a gradual implementation, starting in urban areas. The bancarisation started with six banks in August 2011 when members of ministerial cabinets and secretary generals were paid via individual accounts. At his inaugural speech in May 2012, Prime Minister Matata Ponyo announced that the bancarisation of public workers would continue. In the first stage, the bancarisation was made operational in some large urban areas (July 2012). In the second stage, bancarisation was gradually extended to include provincial capitals (October 2012). The Memorandum of understanding (*Protocole d' accord*) between the government and the ACB was signed on December 1st 2012, several months after the reform had been launched (ACB and DRC/Government 2012). Third, district capitals and some urban areas (*chef-lieux des districts et certaines communes*) were included in February 2013. Finally, the Congolese territories were subdivided among the 15 participating private banks and the bancarisation was launched in rural areas in May 2013. This gradual approach appears like a well-planned implementation. However, there were several caveats that made implementation a difficult matter, as I discuss in the following section.

7.2 Initial caveats during implementation

Before I delve into the actual analysis of how the reform played out in the six rural territories of Haut-Katanga, I provide an overview of the major problems that were revealed during the reform's implementation process: first, poor physical infrastructure and organisational knowledge; second, the banks' influence of the territorial division; third, the role of phone companies; fourth, the sidelining of educational stakeholders.

First of all, the banks' interests prevented a well-planned distribution of territories. The territorial division was supervised by the ACB but "not according to objective criteria. Some banks received clients in areas where they had no branches, although other banks would have been present. Distribution of clients was about sharing the cake" (Interview with employee from the Congolese Central Bank, December 18th 2015). As a result, some

banks obtained clients in territories where they had no infrastructure, as the following point sustains.

Second, concerning the launch in rural areas, Radio Okapi (2013) cites Michel Losembe, President of the Congolese Association of Banks, as follows: "We were asked to double the number of public workers paid via banks, with the specificity that they are located outside of urban areas. This mainly concerns educational staff". However, the Congolese territory posed particular challenges to all service providers. Almost all rural territories were endowed with widely dispersed schools and a poorly developed road infrastructure. Especially during the rainy season, particular areas remained almost unattainable by car. This knowledge was widely available.

Already in 2008, a World Bank report signalled that "the disparity among local situations suggests that several solutions should coexist" (World Bank 2008, 95; see also Dolan et al. 2012). Moreover, the official summary of the meeting of several ministries in the Hotel Sultani in 2011 noted for instance the "insufficiency of commercial banks" and the "lack of transportation fees in order to transport money from provincial capitals to rural areas" (DRC/Secretariat technique du comité préparatoire de l'atelier sur la paie des agents et fonctionnaires de l'état 2011, 2). However, this existing knowledge was not properly taken into account. As a senior employee of the Congolese Central Bank specified: "We did not carry out studies" in order to prepare the reform (Interview, December 18th 2015). Moreover, as I explain in Chapter 5, several attempts to set up a comprehensive map and database in the past have failed. Consequentially, there existed only tacit knowledge about schools' locations: Whereas territory-level educational administrators knew the location of their schools, this knowledge was not made accessible to providers in a systematic way.

Third, the government did not compensate banks for the costs they incurred when facing the challenging infrastructural and organisational circumstances. In the beginning the government reimbursed banking fees of US $3.5 monthly. The same amount was paid for teachers in urban and rural areas. No further compensations were made. Therefore, in their attempt to reach rural areas while working profitably, banks subcontracted the mobile phone companies Tigo and Airtel.[75] Banks still opened accounts for teachers and received the normal monthly government payment of US $3.5 per client of which they transferred between US $1.2 – $2 to the phone companies for their operations. The latter saw the bancarisation as a huge opportunity to kick-off mobile money in the DRC. The mobile money phenomenon has been most successful in Kenya, whereas the penetration in the DRC was still very low. In theory, once teachers received their salary, the companies would send an SMS to teachers who could then move to a cash point to withdraw their salary. Teachers would only need their phones, a SIM card from the provider and a password when they wished to make a transaction or withdraw money. Inscription was said to be uncomplicated as it required only an identity card and an inscription document. In Sections 7.4.2, 7.4.4 and

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[75] This is a well-known practice in other countries (World Bank 2010, 20).

7.4.5 I discuss whether the involvement of mobile phone companies turned out as smoothly as envisaged.

Fourth, central educational stakeholders were sidelined from the preparation process. The experiences of national and provincial Ministries of Education, faith-based organisations, SECOPE and teacher unions were not taken into account (De Herdt, Marivoet, and Muhigirwa 2015). During a workshop to evaluate the reform in Kinshasa which I attended (*Premier Atelier d'évaluation de la mise en œuvre de la réforme sur la bancarisation de la paie des agents et fonctionnaires de l'état*, *Hôtel du Fleuve*, March 19th 2015), their representatives claimed that they were only invited to participate in the reform when implementation problems emerged in 2013. Furthermore, the reform did not include education sector-specific knowledge about the intricacies of identifying and paying teachers (see Chapter 5). Several pertinent issues such as SECOPE's internal problems were outside of the scope of bancarisation. Given the reform's limited scope, it was highly unlikely that bancarisation alone would fix all problems in the field of administering public servants (De Herdt, Marivoet, and Muhigirwa 2015). Nevertheless, the goal to bancarise[76] all teachers was promoted as equivalent with comprehensive legibility (IML 2012b, Interview with Daniel Mukoko Samba, former Minister of Budget). Given all these caveats, in the following section I explore how the reform turned out in practice.

7.3   Launching and reassembling the reform in rural areas

> *"The adopted procedure turns thousands of teachers into collateral damage of an operation that should have been implemented gradually. It should have taken into account the actual socio-economic, geographical and infrastructural context of the DRC."* (KongoTimes! 2013)

This section looks at the execution of the bancarisation reform, which I do not consider as a static implementation but as an evolving process. I look at six predominantly rural territories located in the province of Haut-Katanga, which all have insufficient or no banking infrastructure: Kambove, Kasenga, Kipushi, Mitwaba, Pweto, and Sakania. Overall, to my knowledge, only six urban areas in the entire province of Haut-Katanga had at least one bank (Kasumbalesa, Kilwa, Likasi, Lubumbashi, Pweto, Sakania), but all teachers were officially bancarised in May 2013. I base this analysis on the idea that reforms do not fail: They are reassembled. As a reminder, Li (2007b, 265) defines reassembling as "grafting on new elements and reworking old ones; deploying existing discourses to new ends; transposing the meanings of key terms." This is precisely what took place after the bancarisation reform was launched.

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[76] I use the verb "bancarise" (French: *bancariser*) several times in this thesis, to refer to the process of including teachers in the formal banking system.

7.3.1 The national picture

Map 7.1 compares distances among the territories for which data were available. These data underline the structural problem that was created through bancarisation: There are enormous distances between schools and payment locations.

Map 7.1 *Proposed distances from school to payment location (per territory, 2014)*

Source: *The underlying data come from DRC/MoE/SECOPE (2014)*

Bold black lines separate provinces from each other and small black lines separate territories. The province of Haut-Katanga sits at bottom right corner of the map and each rural territory is shown with an abbreviation (see legend on the right hand side next to the map). There are no data available for the territory of Kipushi. The five other rural territories have average distances between 5 km and 15 km and 50 km and 85 km. Remarkably, the territory of Pweto is among the five territories in the DRC with an average distance between 50 km and 85 km. Before discussing the implications of these distances in a qualitative analysis below, I point to two caveats that accompany this map: First, the map does not provide an objective assessment of distances. Instead, it is based on suggestions by SECOPE to reorganise payment points in order to reduce distances. Therefore, the map shows a rather optimistic view of the actual situation. Actual distances can be expected to be larger than this map and the underlying dataset suggest. Second, given very different types of

122

physical infrastructure (quality of roads, means of transportation, etc.), *distance* is not an objective measurement of the length and inconveniences of a journey, but it nevertheless provides a first entry point. This is now further explored through qualitative data to show that actors seek solutions to improve the system, within and outside the reform's logic.

7.3.2   Centralised decision to be urbanised (Kipushi)

Kipushi is a small mining town in South-Western Haut-Katanga, approximately 25 km west of Lubumbashi. It is also the capital of the territory of Kipushi. In Kipushi there is no banking infrastructure. Nevertheless, as for all urban agglomerations, bancarisation in Kipushi was launched in February 2013. All schools and teachers from the city of Kipushi were assigned to Ecobank in Lubumbashi. About a year earlier, when the first schools in Lubumbashi were bancarised (March 2012), Ecobank decided to start identifying teachers in Kipushi. The local SECOPE inspector reported to have organised meetings with school principals in order to prepare subsequent individual identifications with Ecobank staff (Interview, April 5th 2016). Teachers would need a copy of their identity card, which was usually their electoral card, and two pictures.

Ecobank's team arrived in Kipushi on a Saturday in December, three months before the start of payments, and identified all 276 teachers that were assigned to their bank. In the months that followed, how did Ecobank pay teachers in Kipushi, given that there was no banking infrastructure? Every month, for a couple of days, banking staff would come to the town to pay educational staff (Interview, April 5th 2016). Usually, they came with a team of three people. The distance of 25 km between Lubumbashi and Kipushi is rather short, roads are in impeccable condition and staff could easily arrive in the morning and return to Lubumbashi at night. Since only few people received debit cards, payments took place manually. Reportedly, payments worked smoothly without long waiting hours (Several interviews with banking staff, principals, and SECOPE inspector in April 2016).

Although these payment procedures seemingly worked well, Ecobank all of a sudden switched strategies. After about a year, around December 2013, the bank no longer sent their team to Kipushi, but made teachers travel from Kipushi to Lubumbashi. This trip back and forth costs about US $2 and usually takes 60 to 80 minutes in a bus. Whether this decision was taken by Ecobank staff in Lubumbashi or by the national headquarters in Kinshasa could not be verified. In any case, it likely had to do with Ecobank's wider approach of paying teachers in the rest of the territory of Kipushi. Centralising payments in Lubumbashi was arguably more profitable for Ecobank. However, this procedure strained teachers' resources and led to absences from schools.

Moreover, payment modalities in Lubumbashi were less than welcoming: In Lubumbashi, Ecobank did not pay teachers in the usual banks, but Ecobank set up *points de paie* (payment locations). The bank scheduled the payment days per bank in advance and communicated this to the schools. However, such schemes were hardly reliable and teachers repeatedly had to return to Lubumbashi, each time leaving their school classes behind. Reasons for these disruptions can either be attributed to banks' poor organisation,

or to teachers not respecting the schedules. Teachers wanted to withdraw their salaries as quickly as possible, due to financial necessity since many take on debts throughout the month and are in need of cash (Mignot 2011), but also because many did not trust the banking system. Moreover, the conditions under which payments took place were harsh: Payments took place manually without debit cards, in small rooms, in hot weather, surrounded by policemen and soldiers who likewise withdrew their salaries, and who were often prioritised.

Thus, especially in the first couple of months, teachers physically made up for insufficiencies in organisational and technological means. The lack of infrastructure, resources and organisation led to an even more challenging situation in rural areas. At the beginning of bancarisation, Ecobank subcontracted a mobile phone operator, Airtel, in order to pay teachers. Ecobank decided to reassign most of the teachers from Airtel to payments in the mentioned payment locations in Lubumbashi. However, to the surprise of the concerned teachers, Airtel remained in charge of a few schools. This is the case of teachers in Kafubu, a small agglomeration at about 20 km from Lubumbashi, renowned for its separately organised boys and girls secondary schools. On April 3rd 2014, 24 teachers from Kafubu sent a letter to the provincial director of the Congolese Central Bank, with 12 major stakeholders (Provincial Minister of Education and others) in copy. Whether or not the letter arrived at its destination is difficult to tell and I did not delve into that question. Nevertheless, an excerpt from the letter provides a very good overview of teachers' complaints and desires:

> "Since Airtel has taken care of our payments, severe delays have taken place and we regretfully observe these manoeuvers: belated payment of salaries, often two or three weeks after our colleagues from other places; payments during night hours, sometimes by the local SECOPE representative […], while the provider AIRTEL is absent […]. Given all the grievances that we enumerated above, we […] make some propositions to solve these difficulties. Mainly: Realising the bancarisation efforts […]. Otherwise, refer back to Caritas who used to pay us on time." (Teachers in Kafubu 2014)

At the time of my interviews in 2016, these teachers were still paid by Airtel. Most of their colleagues from the territory of Kipushi had been reassigned to urban banks, or were paid through the service provider *Groupe Service*. In other territories, however, the failure of phone companies and banks to reach distant schools led to the reinclusion of a familiar face in teacher payments: the Catholic NGO Caritas. In the letter, they explicitly demanded to be paid by Caritas, who had paid them before the initiation of bancarisation.

7.3.3 Beyond obvious logic (Sakania)

The territory of Sakania is at the very south of Haut-Katanga, called *la botte (the boot) de Sakania*. As of 2016, the majority of schools in urban areas were paid by banks (TMB and Rawbank in Kasumbalesa, and Rawbank in the city of Sakania), and most rural schools were

served by Caritas. Curiously, however, a few teachers from the town of Mokambo had to travel a rather long and uncomfortable road to Kasumbalesa (approximately 85 km) and Sakania (approximately 50 km) in order to withdraw their salaries at Rawbank. On June 20th 2015 the Catholic educational administrator wrote a letter to the president of the Payment Monitoring Committee within the Congolese Central Bank in Kinshasa. He asked for seven schools to be affiliated to Caritas instead of Rawbank and named the following reasons: the distance, the transportation costs drawn from the "petit salaire" (low salary), temporary abandonment of classrooms, and difficult means of communication. He ended the letter by stating that:

> "This is why, Mister President in charge of monitoring payments, […] we beg you with tears in the eyes for your long awaited assistance that would not only relieve us, but that would allow us to properly follow the national [educational] program in our classrooms." (Diocesan coordination Sakania-Kipushi 2015)

The demand was repeated on February 2nd 2016 (Diocesan coordination Sakania-Kipushi 2016). At that time, the person responsible for human resources at the Catholic educational administration wrote to the Caritas employee in charge of carrying out payments. Demanding his intervention at the bank, he listed the distances from eight concerned schools to Rawbank in the city of Sakania, Rawbank in Lubumbashi and TMB in Kasumbalesa respectively: five times 60 km, once 70 km, once 120 km and once 170 km. When I compared this with the data I used for Map 7.1, I found the following distances for these schools: Three schools were not in the database, four had a distance of 53 km, and one was listed with a distance of 39 km. The maximum distance in the dataset is 97 km. This strengthens my impression that Map 7.1, and the underlying dataset, provide a rather optimistic outlook. Similar to the case of Kipushi, these letters show that Caritas was indeed desired as a provider of teacher salaries. Although Caritas eventually paid most schools in the urban areas, several schools had to continue traveling to urban centres. Thus, Caritas' involvement in a given territory is not a guarantee of complete de-bancarisation of all rural schools.

7.3.4   Mobile phone companies (Kambove)

I already discussed the brief role played by mobile phone operator Airtel in Kipushi. In the territory of Kambove, Ecobank turned to Tigo. This seems, however, a curious decision. Hardly anyone appeared to actively use mobile money in this territory. In fact, Tigo had bad coverage in Kambove. Therefore, teachers had a hard time receiving notifications when money was transferred to their account. Moreover, it was very difficult for teachers to withdraw their money as they did not desire mobile money but wanted cash as soon as possible. They either had to go to some Tigo-affiliated businesses or wait for the Tigo team to arrive in the territory capital for a few days per month.

Moreover, Tigo paid slightly later than the banks, as the money first had to be transferred from the banks to Airtel. Furthermore, the phone companies assumed that

everyone possessed and knew how to use a phone; they did not have the time for a test period. Even if teachers had a phone, they required a SIM card from the respective provider. As reported in Jeune Afrique (2013), the Tigo employee responsible for these operations at the time complained that "mobile phone companies were tricked". As confirmed in an interview with this employee (December 15th 2015), Tigo was asked to participate in the reform last minute, and they could only accept the most rural areas, as banks had already distributed urban areas between themselves. Instead of starting with local analyses and capacities, contracts were made in Kinshasa. The desire to gain a piece of the bancarisation cake did not leave sufficient time to explore the actual circumstances. The Tigo employee in charge of mobile money soon decided to completely withdraw from paying public servants (Interview, December 15th 2015).

As a consequence of this chain of organisational, technological and financial shortcomings and poor performance, Airtel and Tigo largely dropped out of the market in Haut-Katanga. Ecobank quickly turned to the service provider *Groupe Service* who took over payments in Kambove. However, the case of the territory of Kasenga discussed next thoroughly displays that a poor performance does not always lead to one final replacement of providers: The process can be much more experimental.

7.3.5 Back and forth (Kasenga)

Teachers in the territory of Kasenga have been subject to changing payment modalities. From May to July 2013 Airtel was in charge of paying teachers in Kasenga. Many teachers did not obtain their salaries during those three months. As a SECOPE employee put it: "Few payments outside of urban centres took place" (Interview, March 29th 2016). In August, Ecobank replaced Airtel with Groupe Service (GS) who paid the outstanding salaries. This topic was taken up in online media (Radio Okapi, KongoTimes!, etc.) One website claimed that teachers in about 136 territories did not receive their salary for the months of May, June and July 2013 (KongoTimes! 2013). By September 2013, Caritas had already replaced Groupe Service. Caritas paid teachers for one year, until September 2014. Curiously, Groupe Service was then again asked to pay teachers in Kasenga. As one SECOPE employee said: "They [decision-makers in Kinshasa] did not respect our recommendations. The territory was returned to Ecobank/Groupe Service because everyone was supposed to be bancarised." SECOPE suggested, for instance, to only pay teachers once per trimester. This quote further underlines that SECOPE's suggestions as represented in Map 7.1 (Section 7.4.1) were not taken into account. A conversation with an Ecobank employee suggests that the decision to subcontract GS as well as the contract details were negotiated in Kinshasa without participation of the local branch (Interview, March 24th 2016).

The main difference between Caritas and Groupe Service is that Groupe Service needs to pay teachers individually, similar to banks and phone companies. However, many villages suffer from bad road access, especially during the rainy season. These teachers, as in the cases above, had to come to more populated centres and meet GS. There is, however, a difference between coming to a bank and trying to meet a GS staff member who will only be

on the ground for a few days. It was reported multiple times that teachers arrived when GS had already left. In some cases, teachers needed two days to arrive and two days to return on bike. Not even taking into account the physical stress that this implies for an overaged teaching workforce, this alone meant four days of absence from the classroom. Huge transaction costs occurred as teachers needed to pay for travel, food and sometimes shelter. Travel costs up to 50% of the monthly salary incurred. Although GS did not face the same technological problems as Tigo and Airtel, it faced its own set of challenges in paying teachers in rural areas. Another important disadvantage of these private parties is that they underlie no government supervision. Banks directly subcontracted them, without mediation or involvement of government agencies. SECOPE staff did not have any information about them, except what teachers reported and what they observed on pay days.

Finally, in December 2014 (or December 2015, not unambiguously stated in interviews) Caritas took over again. The SECOPE employee said he was "surprised when payments in his circumscription were reattributed to Caritas. We supposed that there was an intervention by the bishop, as he has a stake in this" (Interview, March 29th 2016). Hence, teachers in Kasenga went from Airtel to Groupe Service to Caritas to Groupe Service and back to Caritas. Before discussing in Section 7.4.7 what it means for teachers to be paid by Caritas, I approach one issue that is revealed by the case of Kasenga. In this chapter I am concerned with the question how the bancarisation reform persisted despite all the infrastructural, financial and organisational shortcomings. Regarding the financial perspective, I have so far shed light on the lack of funding for the actual delivery of salaries. As a result of this, all providers were not able to provide the proximity payment (*paie de proximité*) that would be beneficial for teachers.

There is yet another side to the funding problem: security and insurance. Arguably, many parts of the DRC are not fully secured. How did Caritas ensure that funds arrive at their destination? If there were a real danger of losing funds, one could imagine that Caritas would withdraw from the provision of salaries if these were not insured. So the question arises, how did Caritas insure its funds? A letter issued by the diocesan Caritas office of Kilwa-Kasenga suggests an answer. The letter is from March 2016, issued by Caritas' pay commission and written for the territories of Pweto and Kasenga. All principals who acted as mediators between Caritas and several schools of their networks were addressed. The pay commission argued that the Congolese government did not offer any insurance on the funds that Caritas managed and delivered. Pointing to mounting insecurity and reported robberies in the DRC, Caritas argued that it would not be able to cover any occurring losses. Therefore, Caritas suggested a collective liability, asking everyone responsible to sign the following clause:

> "We, teachers of […] accept that Caritas' payment commission continues to deliver our salaries up to our school. In case of losing salaries, due to robbery by armed bandits, we will accept the consequences and we will not seek legal means against the diocese of Kilwa-Kasenga." (Caritas Kilwa-Kasenga 2016)

Unless all teachers signed, Caritas stated (or threatened) that it would consider it necessary to return payment to the government. The relevant question for this chapter is not whether this was a fair arrangement. What is more interesting for the purpose of this chapter is how such a local arrangement adds to the persistence of the reform, and of Caritas' involvement therein. Kasenga's case underlines that bancarisation is a very attractive reform for many stakeholders. It is this very attraction that contributes to the reform's persistence, as it offers many advantages for those parties who deliver salaries.

Although staff on the ground face very difficult circumstances, national bank offices or diocesan bishops have their own reasons to be involved in the reform. Finally, it seems that the national government sometimes requested further bancarisation without proper knowledge of the situation on the ground. The final two cases are the territories of Pweto and Mitwaba. Due to their similar stories they are discussed together.

7.3.6 Between banks, Caritas and armed conflict (Pweto and Mitwaba)

The territories of Pweto and Mitwaba merit particular attention. They have been in a low-intensity armed conflict for about 15 years (Berghezan 2016), causing massive displacements of the population, including teachers. According to the reform's design to gradually proceed with bancarisation, BIC/FBN started paying teachers in the cities of Pweto and Kilwa during the first months of 2013. Although TMB had a bank in Kilwa, all teachers from Kilwa were paid in Pweto. Kilwa is located 132 km south of Pweto. Some months later, a decision was taken to integrate another 106 schools from Pweto to BIC/FBN. "This is when the waiting lines began" as one bank employee told me (Interview, February 18th 2015).

Most of these schools were located dozens of kilometres away from the city. As shown on Map 7.1, Pweto is among the worst performing territories in the entire country in terms of distances teachers have to travel. For instance, one agglomeration in the territory lies 70 km away from the bank it was assigned to, with roads in a very poor condition. Teachers cross this distance on bikes most of the time, and then often have to wait for several days in Pweto. The longest distance from a school to the bank was around 300 km according to the educational administrator. BIC/FBN decided explicitly not to offer the service of bringing salaries to the teachers. As reported by an employee of BIC/FBN: "There are obviously access problems for the teachers living far away from the city of Pweto, but there are no mobile counters. We have evaluated that this is too dangerous, especially surrounding this city" (Interview by a colleague, January 21st 2015). Furthermore, it still occurred that teachers who were newly added to the payroll were affiliated to the bank in the city where they did not live, although Pweto and Kilwa both have their own banks. Soon after, the 106 schools from Pweto were attributed to Caritas.

Teachers who were bancarised could make use of two alternatives to individual payments: Teachers could buy 20 checks for US $20 and someone else could withdraw money in their name. The second option was procuration. Before the bancarisation reform, banks only permitted one person to withdraw money for one other individual. Due to pressure from government services, the bank changed this parameter: One teacher could, in

theory, withdraw the money for the entire staff of his/her school. However, there was a huge downside to this: Procuration was usually treated at the end of the week, after all other client requests had been served. Therefore, few teachers used either of these possibilities.

In the case of Mitwaba, Rawbank was in charge of distributing salaries. However, for the first four months after the reform's launch, teachers remained unpaid. Subsequently, all teachers in Mitwaba were paid by Caritas. Certain areas that were particularly difficult to reach assigned one principal for several schools who travelled to the provincial capital in order to obtain the salaries. Usual inconveniences applied: Teachers of Mitwaba paid around FC 3,000 per school to Caritas. Caritas sometimes did not reimburse them fully for their travel. Taking a motorbike to and from the payment site could amount to 20% of a teacher's salary (Interview with SECOPE field staff on April 28th 2015). As of 2016, Caritas paid teachers in five out of six rural territories. In the following section I explore the broader reasons how Caritas came to pay five out six rural territories in Haut-Katanga.

7.3.7 Caritas' role in keeping the reform alive

According to the president of the Central Bank's Payment Monitoring Committee "the theory was that bancarisation encourages banks to open new branches. This took place in Kinshasa, especially concerning ATMs, but not really in the province" (Interview, December 18th 2015). After it became increasingly visible that banks and subcontractors did not deliver a decent service in rural areas, the national government turned to Caritas. Caritas was officially requested by the government to step in and pay teachers in remote areas, or as they are called *régions à accèss difficile* (regions with difficult access) from August 2013 onwards. How can this be explained?

I argue that Caritas was able to advance the right combination of resources at the right moment. First, Caritas could draw on a set of symbolic and legal resources: By referring to the convention signed by the Catholic Church in 1977, Caritas drew on the recognition of the Catholic Church as a school administrator. Caritas did not negotiate as an outsider, but as part of the Catholic Church (Bashimutu 2012, 43). Thus, it gave new meaning to its role in the "pastoral apostolate", the social service in the name of the Church for the good of the people (Interview with senior Caritas officials, December 18th 2016). In May 2011, a bill had been passed, modifying an existing one from 2004, allowing Caritas to act as payment operator (DRC/Various Ministries 2011). The next step towards Caritas' participation was a memorandum of understanding between the government and the *Conférence Episcopale Nationale Congolaise* (CENCO; National Congolese Episcopal Conference) from August 2011[77] (DRC/MoE and Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo 2011).

Having signed these documents, Caritas started to distribute teacher salaries before the bancarisation, at first for Catholic schools only and then also for schools belonging to other educational networks. For example, in 2012 Caritas managed a salary portfolio

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[77] Some sources (e.g. CENCO 2013) speak of April 2011 and I do not possess the original protocol.

amounting to 54.83% of the one it managed in 2015 (Caritas Congo 2012, 2016). In a public memo from May 3rd 2013, the month the bancarisation reform was launched in rural arears, CENCO's President addressed a memo to the Prime Minister (CENCO 2013) asking him to reinclude the Catholic Church into the payment chain. Next to these legal and symbolic arguments, Caritas could leverage on its enormous infrastructure. One senior Caritas official did not stop repeating: "Caritas is the Catholic Church" (Interview, December 18th 2016). Not only does every diocese have a Caritas office, every church, priest, car etc. affiliated with the Catholic Church can potentially be used by Caritas. What has been a major challenge for banks and phone companies is the biggest advantage for Caritas: the territories' infrastructure. In other words, the inability of banks to assure proper payments created an "open moment" for Caritas (Lund 1998, 2). Hence, Caritas started paying teachers in August 2013. Map 7.2 and 7.3 display the change of provider per territory between 2014 and 2015:

Comparing these two maps reveals that Caritas has come to be the dominant actor in rural areas. As a reminder, at the beginning of the bancarisation of rural areas, Caritas was not included at all. The overall composition of providers has changed drastically since the launch of bancarisation in 2011. Mobile phone companies have almost completely disappeared from rural areas, banks have serious problems reaching their clients outside of urban agglomerations, and Caritas came to the rescue. I now take this discussion to the provincial level. Since the reform was initiated, Caritas has paid teachers in five of the six rural territories in Haut-Katanga. Table 7.2 shows the number of schools and teachers paid in December 2015 in the six territories under study in Haut-Katanga.

Table 7.1 *Number of schools and teachers per provider of salaries in Haut-Katanga (2015)*

	Caritas	**Ecobank**	**TMB**	**FBN**	**Rawbank**	*SUM*
Nr. of schools	330	142	45	22	17	556
Nr. of teachers	2,427	1,149	434	194	175	4,379

Source: *SECOPE internal dataset from December 2015*

The table illustrates the enormous importance of Caritas in Haut-Katanga. About 59% of all schools and 55% of all teachers received their salaries through Caritas in 2015. How has Caritas' involvement affected payment modalities? The national director of Caritas claims to travel to the schools or at least to the nearest Catholic parish (Interview at Caritas headquarters, December 18th 2015). My field research shows, however, that this claim cannot be upheld (see for example Section 7.4.6). Caritas' biggest advantage, and the banks' and phone companies' biggest disadvantage, is the fact that Caritas is not required to pay individually. It has the freedom to pay according to the schools' lists instead of respecting the banks' lists. This mechanism allows teachers and principals to be more flexible when it comes to reallocating salaries among themselves at one school, for example when a new teacher receives the salary of a deceased one.

Map 7.2 *Territorial division between banks and Caritas (July 2014)*

Source: DRC/MinFinance/Ordonnateur Délégué et de L'Ordonnancement (2014)

Map 7.3 *Territorial division between banks and Caritas (December 2015)*

Source: SECOPE (2015)

Caritas has diocesan offices in Lubumbashi, Kilwa and Kipushi, plus another one in Likasi due to the population size. Sometimes priests also get involved. They meet Caritas staff at a certain road juncture, pick up the money and pay teachers themselves. At the time of the study, some zones were still considered insecure by Caritas, and teachers were required to come to the locations Caritas chose. Similar to BIC/FBN bank, teachers would have to travel for over 70 km. However, principals collect the money for several schools at the time. Despite possible deductions from their salaries, this system seems more beneficial to teachers as it exonerates them from long-distance travels (Interviews with various teachers in 2015 and 2016 in Pweto and Mitwaba). It is in this sense that the Caritas system replicates the pre-bancarisation system of human intermediaries. However, these advantages for teachers do not cohere with the government's proclaimed objective of a bancarisation rate of 100%. Teachers paid by Caritas, by now the majority of all teachers, are currently not bancarised. Caritas' involvement is likely to increase illegibility because educational administrators have few incentives to signal teacher entries, transfers and exists. Could I therefore come to the conclusion that the reform not only created immensely negative impacts, but is in fact a complete failure and can be put *ad acta*? Quite the contrary: In a persistent will to keep the reform going, a complementary project was designed.

If the prophet doesn't come to the mountain, the mountain comes to the prophet: In a similar sense, if teachers cannot be bancarised, non-banking organisations can turn into banks. Encouraged by the government, the National Congolese Episcopal Conference created the microfinance institution (MFI) *Institution Financière pour les Œuvres du Développement, Société Anonyme* (IFOD S.A.; Financial Institution for Development Projects). The MFI is open for investment from other parties (Interview with senior Caritas officials, December 18th 2016). This is a new legal entity that draws on the symbolic, material and social resources of Caritas and thus the Catholic Church. For the government, this would be a *deus ex machina*: Despite lacking banking infrastructure, hundreds of thousands of teachers would become bancarised and the bancarisation ratio would reach 100%. This, in fact, seems the only way for the government to reach 100%, as it is difficult to imagine that Caritas would soon leave the market. Caritas would turn over its clients to what would eventually become the country's biggest MFI. During conversations in December 2015, Caritas' senior employees explained that they envisaged a tightly-planned project implementation process and wanted to launch IFOD's activities by April 2016.

In order to comply with legal requirements of an MFI, and the government's objective of rendering the teaching workforce legible, IFOD would need to identify each individual teacher. Caritas did not stop there, but envisaged biometrical identification. Moreover, IFOD would need to individually pay every teacher every month. It remains to be seen whether IFOD is as easy a solution as Caritas suggests. Whereas Caritas saved the reform from drowning, IFOD's task is nothing less than saving the legibility quest.

7.4 Impact and concluding thoughts

In this chapter, I explore the *raison d'être,* the design, launch and persistence of the bancarisation reform. I illustrate that the bancarisation reform was an ill-conceived top-down reform. The designers of the reform were oblivious of earlier attempts to render teachers legible and gravely neglected technological and other infrastructural endowments. Nevertheless, the reform persisted, survived and strived through myriads of actions by all of the actors discussed in this chapter. Through multiple acts of reassembling, the reform was gradually adapted to the actual circumstances. Although the involvement of Caritas hampered the achievement of full bancarisation, it kept the reform alive. This sustains that a reform is not imposed from the top and resisted at the bottom. Especially in a polycentric governance system such as the Congolese one, non-state actors can complement the activities of the state, or of non-state actors'. They do so by reinterpreting symbolic frameworks and leveraging their infrastructural power. This underlines Hagmann and Péclard's (2010, 549) argument that "assets […] are crucial but […] symbolic resources and the ability to draw on social and cultural repertoires in order to give social meaning to one's actions, are just as important".

What does this mean for the legibility quest, and the main research question: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?* It is questionable whether the bancarisation reform is a great success for the identification of teachers. For example, teachers who leave the profession might remain on the payroll and continue to receive salaries. Another example is the replacement of aged teachers: Since they receive no pension they are sometimes replaced by younger colleagues who then receive the monthly motivation fees while the teacher in pension continues to receive the official salary. It is, however, true, that network administrators have stronger incentives to communicate new entries, transfers and exits. At the same time, it remains completely uncertain what happens to those teachers managed by Caritas. Whether or not IFOD will achieve biometrical identification remains to be seen.

Concerning teachers, it is obvious that the reform has had massively negative impacts. For several months, teachers in rural areas went unpaid, and were moved back and forth between banks, mobile phone companies, service providers and Caritas. Most severely, they had to travel for long distances in order to withdraw their salaries and thus missed out on significant numbers of school days. However, I stress that these teachers have not only been the most negatively affected, but also the ones who invest most in keeping the reform alive. Thus, the two questions on the reform's survival and its impact belong together.

In this chapter, I also discuss the situation in the two conflict-affected territories Pweto and Mitwaba. The following final empirical chapter investigates how educational administrators maintain teacher legibility within these two unstable territories.

Chapter 8

Maintaining legibility in an armed conflict (2015-2016)

Armed conflict is a major interruption of teaching and administrative practices. Teacher recruitment and deployment pose particular challenges during and after armed conflicts (World Bank 2010). Therefore, armed conflict can be a limit to the practice of continuously identifying teachers. In this final empirical chapter I look at the challenge of maintaining a stable teaching workforce in an armed conflict. I focus on a long-enduring, low-intensity armed conflict in Haut-Katanga in which teachers have been displaced and returned to their villages multiple times. Governing internally displaced teachers has rarely been discussed explicitly (Bengtsson and Naylor 2016; Ring and West 2015). I address this gap in this chapter through my analysis of internal displacement and teacher legibility.

In early 2015, I started my research in the territory of Pweto, where 87 interviews were conducted (see Map 8.1 for an overview of research locations). A few of these were conducted with Congolese researchers. After this first stage, research continued in the territory of Mitwaba where 33 interviews were conducted. In Mitwaba, I spoke to internally displaced teachers who sought temporary refuge in the towns of Mitwaba, Kasungeji and Mufunga-Sampwe. Upon returning in 2016, I discovered that all teachers I had met in 2015 had returned to their villages. For that reason, I embarked on research along three main roads: from Mitwaba (territory capital) to Mwema (approximately 60 km northwest), from Mitwaba (territory capital) to Kisele (approximately 105 km northwest), and from Mitwaba (territory capital) to Kyubo (approximately 120 km south) and conducted 30 follow-up interviews. My initial research in 2015 and follow-up research in 2016 gives this analysis a comparative dimension.

There is fairly little research and accessible data on this conflict. It was at times challenging to analyse a context that was hardly debated in the wider academic literature. Out of desperation, I started to search through a range of websites and found a surprising amount of information on websites such as Radio Okapi, IRIN News, ReliefWeb, KongoTimes! or Jeune Afrique I gathered 151 articles which amount to over 150 pages, from February 2003 to November 2015. Although I did not have the time to analyse them in all their depth, they helped me to better understand the conflict.

Map 8.1 *Research sites in Mitwaba and Pweto*

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows: First, I introduce the armed conflict to the extent necessary for this chapter. Second, I introduce the link between accreditation decrees, teacher salaries and the management of teacher deployment. Third, I provide empirical examples of how decrees and salaries were used to maintain stability and legibility during teachers' displacement. I demonstrate that educational government in this armed conflict is tightly related to aspects that I discuss in previous chapters: The Sous-Proved exists; SECOPE has its field offices; the number of schools expanded due to brokers; and teachers find ways of acquiring their salaries. Fourth, I explore the drivers that act against the government's attempt to maintain stability in the deployment of teachers. During the conflict some teachers were directly attacked.[78] These attacks, and persisting insecurity, can act as reasons against returning home after internal displacement. Most teachers return nonetheless. Therefore, finally, I analyse why teachers return after all. Doing so I explore how the will to render teachers legible, or maintain their legibility, has become a major rationale behind administrators' actions during armed conflict. I claim that the emphasis on teacher legibility has become an important driver for their returns. All in all, in this chapter I

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[78] I do not claim to conduct a full analysis of attacks on teachers. For example, psychological aspects such as post-traumatic stress disorders are not dealt with at all.

not only show that armed conflict is a problem for teacher legibility, but demonstrate clearly that legibility is crucial for maintaining stability of teacher deployment in this armed conflict.

8.1   Mayi Mayi militias in the *triangle de la mort*

Among the best known and studied conflicts are the ones in Eastern DRC (Hoffman and Vlassenroot 2016; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004) and in the north of the former province of Katanga (Autesserre 2007). My study turns to a conflict that has received considerably less attention: a conflict in a southern and central region in Haut-Katanga. More precisely I turn to a region that became commonly known as the *triangle de la mort* (triangle of death). This triangle depicts the area between the capitals of the three territories Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto, as seen on Map 3.1 in Section 3.2.2. Map 8.1 depicts research sites in the two conflict-affected territories Mitwaba and Pweto in the province of Haut-Katanga.

The conflict under study dates back at least to the beginning of the second Congolese war (1998-2003). In his defence against Rwandan and Ugandan troops, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila provided arms to local populations. These troops became known as *popular autodefense forces* and later some of them turned into Mayi Mayi (see Appendix 6 for a fuller account of this conflict). Since then, self-defence and self-enrichment have often gone hand-in-hand (De Villers, Omasombo, and Kennes 2001). The label Mayi Mayi has become a catchphrase for all militias made up of autochthone people (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001, 60). This is the first key information that is relevant for this chapter: The militia is made up of people from the area under study. The second important element is the following: There have been two main periods of attacks in the region under study. Major attacks in the *triangle of death* took place between 2001 and 2006 and especially since 2011. Attacks in the areas under study were most fierce between December 2012 and October 2014 (see all Interviews in Pweto and Mitwaba, in 2015 and 2016).

All in all, militias in the context under study play a role for teacher movements for two reasons: On the one hand, they are the driver of teachers' displacements. Each educational subdivision under study has about 200 public primary and secondary schools, of which at least 30 in each case were still displaced in 2015. Most of these reorganised education during their displacement. I argue that this reopening requires an explanation. On the other hand, they are the reason why teachers might be reluctant to return to their villages. It is then up to educational administrators to govern teacher movements and make them return. I now outlined a response to the sub research question: *How does armed conflict interfere with teacher legibility?* In the next section I proceed by exploring how educational administrators govern teacher movements during this armed conflict.

8.2   Governing teacher displacements and returns

If a school does not function at its designated location, "this facility will no longer be part of the accredited public schools and the salary of those working there will be immediately suspended" (Ministerial circular from 2007)

Besides teachers themselves, the most relevant actors for this chapter are bureaucrats that work in close proximity to teachers: government and FBO educational administrators of all types (Sous-Proved and SECOPE field staff) and priests. I argue and illustrate throughout the thesis that government and FBO administrators are anything but absent from teacher governance in the DRC. The existence of local-level bureaucrats is not understandable without an investigation of processes at national and provincial levels. Chapters 4 and 5 provide insights into these processes. Furthermore, in Chapter 6 I point to the enormous expansion of public schools especially in the two conflict-affected territories Pweto and Mitwaba. Without this expansion, and the brokering work of politicians and administrators, most of the schools that I refer to in this chapter would not even exist. Therefore, the preceding chapters provide a useful background to understand the dynamics I describe in this chapter. In other words, armed conflict does not imply that national structures have ceased to exist. Quite the contrary, as I argue.

Administrators

The two concerned Sous-Proveds have their offices in the centres of Pweto and Mitwaba respectively. As shown in Chapter 6, Pweto and Mitwaba used to belong to the educational subdivision of Kasenga. In 2008 the educational subdivision of Pweto-Mitwaba was created, with the Sous-Proved being located in Pweto. In 2011 Pweto and Mitwaba were divided. The Sous-Proveds are decisive actors for connections to the provincial and national levels, through their direct contacts with their superiors, donors and Members of Parliament. In Mitwaba, there are a total of approximately 175 public primary and secondary schools, whereas Pweto has about 289 public primary and secondary schools (see Section 6.4). As I show in Chapter 6, most of these schools were accredited rather recently, mainly through the involvement of the Sous-Proveds and MPs. The state expanded and achieved a deeper level of territorialisation. Without this, there would have been only very few schools and teachers to be targeted in the first place. Furthermore, there are several SECOPE inspectors in the two educational subdivisions. Finally, priests and church representatives also play a certain role in teacher governance. Conceptually speaking, educational administrators are what vom Hau (2008, 351) calls the state's "radiating institutions". Since bureaucrats do not make use of physical violence, they need different means of governing behaviour. My findings suggest that the previously mentioned moratoriums, accreditation decrees and salaries play an important role in this regard.

Accreditation decrees and salaries

In Chapter 6, I extensively discuss how schools are accredited in practice. The fact that formal procedures are regularly circumvented does, however, not mean that it is easy to obtain decrees. Accreditation decrees are very valuable. As a reminder, they contain the following information: territory, school name, educational network, branches, and structure. Thus, every decree binds a school to a certain territory, but not to a specific location. It is not until a field visit by SECOPE and the subsequent award of a SECOPE matriculation number that the school's location in a specific village is officially registered. Given a decree's immense value for teachers and the entire local educational community, they can also be used as a technique of government by educational administrators. As I show below, the threat to withdraw a decree from a school that is *non-mécanisé* and that does not maintain contact to the administration is common. In fact, I argue that this threat can be directly linked to the first moratorium on teacher and school movements from 2007 (DRC/MoE 2007d). I already referred to the letter that contains this moratorium in Chapter 5 when I looked at donor conditionalities. Now I turn to the first paragraph, which reads as follows:

> "Dear Director of the Educational Division,
> Anticipating the census and control of school and staff of the MoE by SECOPE and other departments, I hereby communicate the following directives [*me fais le devoir de vous faire part des considerations et directives ci-après*]: An educational facility that was registered [*recensé*] at a precise locality cannot henceforth be displaced (transferred) elsewhere for whichever reason. The only place where it is accredited is where SECOPE registered [*a recensé*] the school. If this happens nonetheless, this facility will no longer be part of the accredited public schools and the salary of those working there will be immediately suspended."

In order to guarantee stability, the Minister of Education declares that all schools that do not comply with the moratorium be removed from the public school system. This means the withdrawal of the accreditation decree. In addition to this specific moratorium, every notification letter for an accreditation decrees contains the stipulation that a change of location requires a new accreditation decree (see Appendix 3). Moreover, a direct link is drawn between the non-compliance with these guidelines and teacher salaries. Although it would be "an illusion to think that the national-level legal framework has a direct effect on local-level behavior" (Cassimon, De Herdt, and Verbeke 2015, 22), this does not mean that they cannot have unintended impacts. Since the early 2000s teacher salaries have increased significantly. Although they were still far from an agreement between the government and unions from 2005, they were high enough to provide an incentive for someone to remain in the teaching profession.

I argue throughout the thesis that the will to legibility has been an important driver of educational policies in the DRC in the 2000s. As such it has been reiterated and repeated, to the extent that I understand educational administrators as guardians of legibility: Any

displacement due to the conflict can only be temporary, and administrators threaten to withdraw decrees from those schools, and salaries from those teachers, that do not comply with orders to return. Again, it is useful to think back to Chapter 7 where I analyse the bancarisation reform: Although the reform is not without problems, salaries arrive even in the most remote areas. Without this undergirding infrastructure, the administrators could not make use of salaries to pressure teachers to return. My empirical findings now discuss and nuance these ideas.

8.3 Using accreditation decrees and salaries to maintain legibility during displacement

In order to provide empirical flesh to the discussion in the preceding section, I now discuss four related issues: First, I show how internally displaced teachers and principals communicate with the Sous-Proved and the SECOPE inspector. The Sous-Proved authorises the temporary reallocation of schools without having to communicate this to his superior in Lubumbashi. Second, as long as a school only has an accreditation decree and is not registered by SECOPE the Sous-Proved can withdraw the decree and allocate it to another school. This happens when the school in question has not been opened for an extended period, which often means that the principal has not been in touch with the Sous-Proved. The decree becomes an infrastructure of government. Third, I show that illegibility tends to reproduce itself. Fourth, a case of negotiation about the withdrawal of an accreditation decree sustains that the head of SECOPE steps in when a school does not return to the location where it was registered by SECOPE. Furthermore, it shows that national-level decrees regarding legibility can have an influence, albeit negotiated, at provincial and local levels.

Populations are either displaced for a rather short amount of time and subsequently return to their villages, or populations are displaced for a longer time and their schools accompany the IDPs, the school surviving as an institution and being temporarily reorganised in another area. People hide in surrounding forests, or migrate to neighbouring villages, to more populated centres or to neighbouring countries. Since this has been a perpetual crisis for over 15 years, many people have experienced such displacements multiple times – from the Rwandan invasion in 1998 until 2003, the first wave of militia insurgency from 2003 to 2006 and the second wave of attacks by the local militia occurring since 2011.[79] Strictly speaking, school displacements contradict the above-mentioned ministerial letter from 2007 that prohibits any displacement. However, given the fact that such a flight is not a voluntary decision, the Sous-Proved accepts schools' temporary displacements. Usually such decisions are taken without demanding authorisation from their superiors in Lubumbashi (Interview with provincial head of SECOPE, March 18th 2016).

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[79] I do not address the question of how schooling is facilitated during displacement. See Brandt (2017b) for relevant details on constructing schools in these conflict-affected territories.

Indeed, my findings suggest that all schools functioned during their displacement. At times principals wrote letters to the Sous-Proved to communicate their school's situation, documenting attacks and often demanding assistance. The following letter, written by a primary school principal on January 16th 2014 to the Sous-Proved in Pweto and to other educational offices gives an impression:

> "Monsieur le Chef,
> I inform you regretfully that on the 19/12/2013 the village of *x*, […], was burned down. Given the insecurity that is reigning in this area, we have taken the decision to open our school in *y* […]. All the classrooms, office were set on fire, except nine or ten houses in the village. We have almost lost everything."

This is a common depiction of events as documented in such letters. Through these letters, principals signal the ongoing functioning of the school to the Sous-Proved and the RINS. This brings me to the second issue discussed in this section: In case there is no such communication, the Sous-Proved might threaten to withdraw the school's accreditation decree and reallocate it to another school without such a decree. Since this decree only states the territory in which the school has to exist, and not the particular locality, the Sous-Proved has discretionary power in reallocating the decree. The following case illustrates this issue.

In a somewhat larger village 100 km north of Pweto a principal demanded the Sous-Proved's authorisation to open a new secondary school (Interview with school principals, February 18th 2015 and Sous-Proved on February 19th 2015). Although official national guidelines suspended the accreditation of new schools from 2014 until 2017, the Sous-Proved agreed to this opening as he recognised the urgent need for such a school in that area. Yet, the principal's demand has a history. This village was among the first ones in Pweto to be affected by the newly surging conflict in 2011. At the time, there were a primary school and a secondary school that functioned in that village. Following the attacks, the primary school's principal and his teachers moved to a village about 60 km away. The principal stayed in frequent contact with the Sous-Proved (Interview with principal, February 18th 2015). Hence, since the building had not been set on fire, the teachers returned in 2014/15 and opened its doors again in their village.

The case of the secondary school exhibits a very different development. The principal had not been in touch with the Sous-Proved and reportedly had not written any reports for two years (Interview with Sous-Proved, February 19th 2015). Importantly, the school was not *mécanisée*; it had only received an accreditation decree (Interview with provincial head of SECOPE, March 18th 2016). I was able to identify the school on an accreditation decree from 2009. Therefore, the Sous-Proved was able to withdraw the accreditation decree from the secondary school and attribute it to another secondary school in Pweto. He made clear that "The decree needs to be protected, especially regarding schools that have already received a matriculation number, as it is difficult to obtain these" (Interview with Sous-Proved, April 15th 2015). Hence this once-and-for-all relocation took

place according to the rules. As a reminder, a relocation is allowed within the territory as long as the school is not registered by SECOPE.

It is likely that there was a strong demand for a secondary school in Pweto at the time, and the Sous-Proved tried to allocate resources efficiently. Also, remembering findings from Chapter 6, Pweto has not received a great number of accreditation decrees in recent years. This scarcity is important to consider. When a Sous-Proved has a stock of decrees s/he might not have to withdraw decrees from one school and reallocate it to another. In this case, the secondary school will continue to function in Pweto and the new principal is trying to obtain a decree, and in the meantime is making ends meet through parents' financial contributions. This case suggests that the Sous-Proved's threat to withdraw a decree from a school that is not reopened is not an empty menace but one that can entail serious consequences. The decree thus becomes a meaningful "logistical technique" (Mann 2012, 7f) to incentivise teachers to follow orders.

Regarding the third point I mention at the beginning of this section, my data again suggest that *non-mécanisées* schools are less likely to remain in contact with the Sous-Proved. Let me cite a SECOPE field inspector (Interview, April 28th 2015):

> "Schools in Kyona-Ngoi were impossible to attain. In 2012 there was a census, the schools were displaced, there were no schools that were paid and that did not work. [...] The schools that were *non-mécanisées* were dispersed [...]. We suggested that they go where they can obtain their salaries and where we could provide the listings [...]. The non-paid schools could move around as they wanted, as they did not have to obtain their salaries. These are the reasons why they were unattainable."

This statement reveals several issues: First, the SECOPE field-inspector refers to the census from 2012 that I discussed in Chapter 5. Schools that were *non-mécanisées* at the time of the census were not registered because they were unattainable, and probably stopped functioning. He mentions six schools, which was confirmed by the Sous-Proved (Interview, April 28th 2015). Here, illegibility reproduces itself: *Non-mécanisées* schools do not have the same incentives to remain visible, and thereby disappear from the state's radar even during a census.

My fourth and final argument and empirical evidence is now that the provincial head of SECOPE might intervene when a school with a SECOPE matriculation number does not return to its original location. Yet, decisions simply might not be complied with, as the following case illustrates. Six letters were exchanged between different authorities: a principal, the Sous-Proved, the provincial head of SECOPE and a bishop. After the bishop contradicted the initial refusal of the provincial head of SECOPE to authorise the school's relocation, the provincial head of SECOPE directly confronted the bishop by writing that "the spirit (*l'esprit*) of your letter is contrary to mine". He further argues the following:

> "My letter is founded on the one hand on the unjustified declarations of the director of the subdivision of Mitwaba and on the other hand, on the Ministerial circular letter n°MINEPSP/CABMIN/028668/2007 from June 7th 2007. Therefore, in order not to

remove this school from the list of paid schools and not to suspend the salary of its personnel […], I ask you to reconsider your stance so that [the primary school] and its personnel return to [village of origin], the only place where it is accredited, for the school year 2015/16."

The provincial head of SECOPE made an unambiguous allusion to the circular letter from 2007 that I discuss above. He clearly reiterates the two threats (1) removing the schools from the lists of paid schools and (2) suspending the personnel's salaries. Finally, he echoes the words "the only place where it is accredited". Policies and official norms are not binding and do not have immediate effects on the provincial and eventually local level (Cassimon, De Herdt, and Verbeke 2015, 22), but they can have effects nevertheless. After I had collected the six most recent letters, I visited the school myself. The principal was very keen to discuss the issue and presented letters dating back as far as 2001, when problems had first occurred between the different communities. He was determined not to return: "We had to decide between salaries and our lives. […] Those who want to make this school return do not love human life" (Interview, April 16th 2016). This statement mirrors a statement made at a different moment by a priest belonging to the school's network: "We we're torn between salaries and lives" (Interview, April 11th 2016).

Thematically, this case is linked more strongly to inter-community accusations of witchcraft, and less directly to armed conflict. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this chapter it underlines that national-level policies regarding legibility can be influential at provincial and local levels. The analysis sustains the negotiated nature of public authority in the Congolese education system when it comes to everyday administrative decisions (Titeca and De Herdt 2011). Notwithstanding these negotiations, the reactions of the provincial head of SECOPE suggest that schools can be authorised to relocate temporarily, but their return to their villages is of utmost importance to the administration – under the threat of closing the school and stopping the paying of teacher salaries. Decrees and salaries are therefore important mediators of how state agents exercise power. By doing so, they can put teachers into the utterly uncomfortable situation where they need to decide whether to risk their lives to continue receiving salaries or the contrary.

8.4   Reasons against returning after internal displacement

"They came to look for the principal who's the state's antenna. They said 'we want the principal because he is the one who provides information to the police and the military'." (Interview with school principal, February 25th 2015)

Once the government, in the form of the territory administrator (*administrateur du territoire*) declares the end of hostilities, the success of the Congolese military or the retreat of Mayi Mayi, communities are encouraged to return to their villages. There are, however, a range of reasons why this return might not be welcomed by the communities.

Some of these reasons are of a general nature and have to do with the very nature of the conflict, while there are also reasons that concern teachers more specifically.

General reasons against returning after internal displacement

The existence and growth of Mayi Mayi militias is unthinkable without the underlying socio-economic conditions: The existence of Mayi Mayi falls on a fruitful ground, as the conflict-affected regions are inhabited by masses of young people without adequate possibilities to follow qualitative schooling and subsequently acquire meaningful employment. Their political, cultural and economic marginalisation is the core underlying feature of these armed insurgencies (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001). Enrolment in the militia is both rooted in economic poverty and the financial promises made by leaders, as well as by a sense of belonging and group identity which implies the "broad rejection of society as a whole" (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001, 59). Furthermore, Vlassenroot and Van Acker (2001) point out that enrolment in armed groups is not based on profound ideologies, but rather on the collective repugnance of foreign troops, ethnicities or, for example, the national military. The Mayi Mayi live outside of villages and people living in populated centres or villages are suspected of supporting the Congolese military. In general, Mayi Mayi groups can quickly disappear and reappear. They are very malleable. Hence, a declaration of pacification by the territory administrator does not, of course, mean that the underlying drivers of the conflict have disappeared. Moreover, former Mayi Mayi militias or allies are likely to have returned living in their former villages. There is therefore a generalised insecurity. Moreover, everyone faces difficult circumstances in terms of destroyed houses and schools, looted goods, shortage of food, and some time before agricultural production yields benefits anew. Besides these general reasons that speak against returning, teachers face a range of very particular challenges.

Teacher-specific reasons against returning after internal displacement

Teachers stand in an uneasy relationship with the militia. They can receive threats or be directly attacked. Such menaces and physical assaults are reasons why teachers might be uncomfortable with the idea of returning to their villages after having been displaced. Overall, my interviews conducted in Pweto and Mitwaba suggest that reasons for threats or attacks against teachers can be categorised around three topics: First, vigilante justice (*règlement de compte*) in general. This relates to the overall shift of Mayi Mayi practices from self-defence towards self-interested attacks. It offers a short-term possibility to take revenge against militaries or civilians, or then again, to use vigilante justice as a pretext for robbery and stealing; Second, vigilante justice in relation to the nature and activities of teachers. Here, teachers' former students or students' parents take revenge against teachers due to actions that are linked to the teaching profession. These actions include corporal punishment or the mandatory payments of various school fees that are collected by teachers. The third category encompasses attacks against all actors who are somehow related to the state (village chiefs, the police, the "intellectuals" [teachers], etc.). Among

these, teachers are quantitatively and spatially the most strongly dispersed actors. These attacks seem to be less motivated by individual characteristics and more by structural, symbolic, aspects. This category was the most salient one during interviews, and the rest of this section focuses on this issue.

More precisely, my data suggest that there are four interrelated practices and symbols that mediate teachers' role as state agents: First, generically, teachers themselves, embodying the state; Second, teachers as literate and suspected of writing letters to superiors. Third, some teachers in rural areas own cell phones which are interpreted as symbols for contacts with people from outside of the rural realm. Fourth, teachers have a certain degree of extra-rural mobility as they might leave their village to retrieve their salaries or buy certain goods.[80] According to my findings, Mayi Mayi interpret literacy, cell phones and movements as symbols of teachers' contact with other state agents.

The prevalence of these characteristics is not only important for explaining why teachers are harassed or physically attacked. These characteristics do not disappear once the Congolese military regain the upper hand and the government wants teachers to return to their villages. Instead, these symbolic aspects that expose teachers to attacks, combined with the persisting threat of resurging Mayi Mayi, make returning a dangerous matter. In fact, many teachers voiced their opinion and made clear to me that they did not want to return to their villages. That was in 2015. One year later, in 2016, most if not all teachers returned. Why?

8.5   Returning schools and teachers

This final section on returning schools and teachers draws on cases from six different locations. It sheds light on teachers' contestation of and compliance with the government's decisions. More precisely, the following analysis explores the role of legibility in making teachers return. Teachers have intrinsic motivations to return, but some of them have lived through horrific events. This makes returning a dangerous and potentially traumatic matter. Again, I am not delving into an in-depth investigation of what makes teachers return.[81] Overall, the Sous-Proved and SECOPE field staff seem to have strong authority:

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[80] Plenty of primary data are available to sustain these ideas. They are available upon request.

[81] Based on my data, the most important reasons for returns which were not related to legibility were the following: First, teachers frequently pointed to the symbolic value of schools' and teachers' return for the rest of the population. Second, in a similar vein, parents and village chiefs put pressure on teachers to return. Third, teachers saw the potential of education to prevent children from joining the militias. Fourth, costs of living during displacement were higher than in the villages where everyone has at least some agricultural returns. Fifth, these villages were in many cases the homes of teachers and they desired to return there.

Researcher:	Did you easily accept to return for this school year 2015/16?
Principal:	Yes, because it was a recommendation, and by the way, most of the parents returned, so we are condemned to return.
Researcher:	Whose recommendation was it?
Principal:	From our superiors.
Researcher:	Who exactly told you to return?
Principal:	Well, we worked in *[another village]*, and at the end of last school year we were told [by the Sous-Proved] that 'All schools have to be opened in their villages'. There's nothing to say against that, we were condemned to return. (Interview, April 14th 2016)

The principal started by affirming with a "yes" that he returned willingly, then framed it as a "recommendation" and finally talked about "condemnation". This excerpt suggests that the school was not a symbolic institution that signalled parents a calm return to their villages. Instead, returned families and the government's pressures made the teachers return, as a priest from the religious school network explained: "The principal did not want to return, but the population and the Sous-Proved requested it." It is important to add that this principal had personal conflicts with members of the militia. It was certainly not a voluntary return.

Let me now return to a case mentioned earlier in order to illustrate in more depth why a return is contested by teachers. The story of harassed teachers presented above already conveyed a sense of what some teachers went through. At the end of the school year 2014/15, this teacher told me about the attack on his village. Members of the militia arrived with a list of names, including his, accusing him of cooperating with the military. They tied him up and whipped him publicly. He almost lost his life. He told me the following:

Teacher:	When it comes to returning, I don't encourage it. Everything I have gone through, that is not an episode that allows me to return. If I were to be obliged to return, I would stop being a teacher.
Researcher:	Could you request a transfer?
Teacher:	I will request it, if I am forced, I stop. In order to stay in Mitwaba and wait for some time.

One year later, upon my arrival in Mitwaba, I visited all returned schools along two main roads. About 60 km north of the capital of Mitwaba, unattainable by cars and motorbikes due to an impassable bridge, a particular village I visited is usually described as a hotspot of the militia. Trying to find those teachers to whom I had spoken one year earlier, I was eager to hear their account. They had so openly talked about their experiences the year before that I thought I could easily continue our conversation. But they did not have much to tell me. If I interpret and paraphrase the few words they shared, they said: "We are here because we were left with no choice. The RINS and the Sous-Proved compelled us". After three displacements over the last ten years, all teachers of that school have returned, even

the one who seemed to have made up his mind on not returning. However, returns are strongly contested, as mirrored in the following excerpt:

Principal:	Even when the Sous-Proved told us to return, we did it reluctantly, as we have seen things around here.
Researcher:	You returned this year?
Principal:	Yes, reluctantly. Thinking about the issues that took place around here.
Researcher:	Would you have stayed in *Mitwaba* if you had had the chance?
Principal:	Yes.
Teacher:	Absolutely.
Principal:	Why does the Sous-Proved not come here? People from [an NGO] came. Why didn't he accompany them in their car? Is it not because he is afraid? He goes to [cities in the calmer South]. […] We would like the customary chiefs, the Sous-Proved and the RINS to come first. And we will follow them. They should see what has been going on over here.

"We have seen things around here" points to direct encounters of the principal with members of the militia and attacks on the school building. The principal and teacher had a very clear and frank way of criticising their superiors. Having been forced to return, they complain about the lack of support and name key actors whom they verbally hold accountable. The Sous-Proved had indeed told me about their complaints before, but honestly said that he was too afraid of going to the area they returned to.

When authority becomes contested, administrators have a certain leeway to put pressure on teachers. One teacher stated that "We returned because it was an order of the state, under the menace to block salaries and suspend the school" (Interview, April 14th 2016). Another teacher was warned by the Sous-Proved and a priest. He concluded that "If they find schools that have not been opened they will shut them down […]. We have agreed to return because these are the services. If you don't accept, they will remove you" [from the payroll] (Interview, April 12th 2016). These findings suggest that shutting down schools and suspending salaries are used by government administrators to make teachers return to their villages. Before I turn to the overall conclusion of this thesis, I follow the structure of prior chapters and end this chapter with come concluding thoughts and responses to sub research questions.

8.6   Concluding thoughts

Addressing the main research question – *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?* – I can start by concluding that the armed conflict in the territories under study is certainly not a major reason for the existence of a significant number of illegible Congolese public primary and secondary school teachers in 2016. However, this finding required explanation and this is what I do in this chapter. I argue that the legibility-discourse has an

impact on governing teachers in an armed conflict. Armed conflict is a problem for legibility, and legibility becomes the solution to this problem. This impact was not achieved through tightly-planned policies. Rather, it emerged as a long-term outcome of the teacher legibility-discourse.

Hence, stability is achieved through the administrators' focus on keeping teachers legible.[82] My data suggest that accreditation decrees and salaries become techniques to govern teacher legibility in this conflict. Of course I am not suddenly arguing that policies and decrees stemming from the national level are simply complied with: The empirical evidence I provide sustains that their impact is frequently negotiated. My analysis extends the idea of negotiations and investigates the long-term impact of the practice of government.

Since this thesis is interested in the question how government really functions in the DRC, this is in fact one of the most exciting findings: I argue that the long-enduring discourse of legibility has become so predominant in Congolese educational governance that it does, after all, have a very strong impact. It seems that teacher governance in the two conflict-affected territories is dominated by the discourse on legibility, to the detriment of a much more holistic and socially equitable policy- and decision-making. Despite the fact that educational facilities and communities have been affected by conflict for 20 years, the national government itself has only recently formally addressed the topic of education in emergencies and includes it in the new decennial education strategy (DRC/Various Ministries 2015). It seems as if the central government does not *see* the conflict. In the meantime, educational administrators turn to available instruments of government and make practical decisions about the fate of schools and teachers.

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[82] As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I leave out questions of, for example, psychological health. Also, I do not judge whether or not this stability is a good thing.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

In December 2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) passed a comprehensive education sector strategy (*Stratégie sectorielle de l'éducation et de la formation 2016-2025*) for the first time in its history. The strategy was elaborated by four ministries in dialogue with civil society actors and international donors. It encompasses all education branches from pre-primary education through vocational and non-formal education to higher education. The ten-year strategy is a milestone for Congolese educational planning and follows the Interim Education Sector Plan 2012-14. Strongly embedded within the logic of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) (DRC/Various Ministries 2015, 16), the strategy is built around the three strategic goals of access, quality and governance. The first phase of its implementation is sketched in an action plan for the years 2016 to 2020. This action plan serves as a guideline for the harmonisation and alignment of the activities of the government and donors. As a support for the strategy, GPE is providing US $100 million for an education sector program (*Projet d'Amélioration de la Qualité de l'Education,* PAQUE) (DRC/MoE/Cellule d'Appui Technique à l'Education 2015).

The acquisition of these funds sits within a broader strategy of extraversion (Bayart and Ellis 2000; De Villers 2009), that I alluded to at the beginning of this thesis: Joseph Kabila immediately turning to the international community when he came to power in 2001. In need of funding and legitimacy, his government formally accepted a set of reforms that fall under notions such as post-conflict reconstruction, liberal peace-building and state-building. In this thesis, I unpacked what this extraverted state-building meant for the objective of rendering all teachers legible to the state administration. This objective has existed since the 1970s and retains its importance in the new education sector strategy (DRC/Various Ministries 2015, 144). It is further linked to Sustainable Development Goal target 4c: "By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers" (United Nations 2015).

Congolese teachers desire to be legible to the state administration, and the objective of teacher legibility has been formally embraced by the government and international donors since the 1970s. However, a significant number of teachers were still illegible, or partially legible, to the state administration in 2016. Therefore, I set out to understand why this is the case. Has anything changed since legibility reappeared as one objective in a broader set of state-building reforms in 2003? Is the new education sector strategy a Potemkin village, written by skilful development brokers? Is it a mere "masquerade" (Trefon 2011) and do my findings therefore sustain an idea expressed by Raeymaekers (2007, 226): "If we want everything to remain as it is, everything must change."[83]?

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[83] "Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi." Young Tancredi Falconeri said to Prince Felipe Salina, in Tomasi di Lampedusa's (2002, 25) "Il Gattopardo" [The Leopard], published

The concluding chapter unfolds as follows: Responding to the main research question will allow me to discuss what remained the same and what changed in the realm of legibility in particular, and in Congolese educational governance in general, between the late 1970s and 2016. Building on these insights, I advance my main theoretical argument that illegibility can be considered a state effect rather than exclusively an outcome of resistance, state weakness and failure, or deliberate nonrecording (see Section 9.2.1). This argument leads to a discussion of structural violence that teachers are subjected to (see Section 9.2.2). While this structural violence is a striking sign of a poor quality of public service delivery, I suggest exploring how three underlying mechanisms enhance state authority: extraversion, mystification and territorialisation (see Section 9.2.3). I conclude that components of Western state-building can be mobilised for purposes well beyond formal state-building objectives. I end the thesis with a discussion of the practical implications of my findings and suggestions for further research.

9.1   Answering the main research question

In this thesis, I set out to explore the following research question: *Why have a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers in the DRC been illegible to the state administration since the 1970s?* In Chapter 4, I start the analysis by historicising the discourse of teacher legibility. I detected the first signs of a discourse of the value of legibility in the late 1970s, when international donors started to intervene more strongly in domestic finances. This insight was inseparable from an understanding of shifting patterns in educational authority. From the 1970s onwards, the important role of faith-based organisations in processes of agenda-setting at national level gradually tilted towards international donors.

After the dire 1990s – a decade that saw economic collapse, political instability and transnational wars – international donors returned even stronger in the 2000s, accompanied by Western state-building ideology. This ideology is rooted in diagnoses of failed states and remedies associated with good governance. In fact, in the case of the DRC, the discursive construction of legibility was tightly linked to good governance. It went hand-in-hand with the objectives to reduce fiduciary risk in the administration of teacher salaries and to reimburse salary arrears. An incomplete and unreliable teacher database implied payroll fraud and deterred donors from trusting the Congolese state administration. Consequently, the value of legibility was reframed from being a tool to unbuild a part of the state in the 1980s by setting off masses of educational personnel (see Section 4.3), to a facilitator of investments in teacher salaries in the 2000s (see Chapter 5). Achieving legibility has, however, not been a simple technical project. Through my analysis I unpack specific governmental limitations of teacher identification. An assessment of these limits leads to the following answer to the research question:

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originally in 1958. Raeymaekers uses this for politics in the DRC in the early 2000s. It seems like an irony of history that the ruler's animal under Mobutu was the leopard.

My analysis suggests that a significant number of public primary and secondary school teachers have been illegible to the state administration in the DRC since the 1970s through at least 2016 because of interconnected reasons that have to do with the Congolese administration, international donors and brokered educational expansion.

First, the Congolese Ministry of Education's department in charge of the identification of teachers (*Service de Contrôle et de la Paie des Enseignants,* SECOPE), occupies a crucial position in the legibility-assemblage. My analysis unveils that processes at the national-level office of SECOPE are key to understanding why teacher illegibility persists. SECOPE started off successfully in the 1980s but lost an overview of the situation on the ground in the devastating 1990s. Wars and political chaos caused the administration to deteriorate. The institutionalisation of parents' financial contributions to educational funding allowed the education system to persist. Meanwhile, they are also an important condition for the existence of illegible teachers since they fund teachers locally as long as they are not seen by the national state administration. Little has been written on the functioning of the educational administration in the 1990s, but my analysis of reports from the 2000s reveals that teacher illegibility skyrocketed in these years. My analysis further suggests that teacher illegibility needs to be understood vis-à-vis payroll fraud and technical shortcomings.

Except for its very beginnings, SECOPE has been characterised by a prebendal and concessionary organisational culture that fundamentally works in a way similar to the Congolese administration of the 1970s. The mass of money that flows through the Ministry of Education (MoE) makes it attractive for payroll fraud (see Sections 4.2, 5.3.1 and 5.3.3). For most of the 2000s, SECOPE's database and software were in a strikingly bad condition. For example, as per its accreditation decree, every school has a specific number of authorised classrooms and hence teaching positions (see Section 5.3.3). Educational management software usually prevents the number of paid staff from surpassing the number of authorised positions. However, SECOPE's database was so corrupted that this essential element of educational management was no longer reliable. SECOPE's staff was able to introduce real or fictitious people into schools and administrative offices. Throughout the 2000s, the education system has served as a major outlet for clientelism and payroll fraud.

Is it then correct to state that administrators benefit from illegibility, as I suggest in my theoretical discussion (see Section 2.1.1)? On the one hand, local- and national-level bureaucrats might indeed benefit from bribes paid by teachers who desire legibility. On the other hand, however, illegibility might rather be the aggregated outcome of systemic reluctance to change. Although a handful of administrators within SECOPE's IT department are responsible for adding people to the payroll, they are only one element in the wider Congolese "corruption complex" (Olivier de Sardan 1999, 25). Administrators who benefit from payroll fraud might not per se be against legible teachers; however, they might be opposed to broader sets of reforms that envisage transparent databases. Projects around teacher legibility, such as a census, are part of these reforms and might therefore not be

met with enthusiasm. Furthermore, payroll fraud in the form of clientelism can exacerbate illegibility since people without proper technical knowledge can occupy important positions in the administration and are unable to perform their duties. Therefore, the crucial link between payroll fraud and illegibility is not that administrators benefit from illegibility, but that illegibility is an unintended but tolerated outcome of embezzlement and clientelism.

When donors initiated capacity-building measures in the 2000s to make database and payroll management more transparent, they faced this prebendal and concessionary organisational culture. Prebendalism and state-building have existed side-by-side since the early 2000s (see Section 5.3). More precisely, they have been mutually constitutive, the one being a crucial reason for the other's existence.

This brings me to the second reason for persisting teacher illegibility: International donors have been unable, or unwilling, to ensure compliance with their conditions and have continuously accommodated the government's transgression of agreements. A constant process of reassembling and harmonisation has taken place so as to enable the continuation of the intervention process. This can be seen as an "improvement of improvement" (Li 2007c, 274), which means the optimistic pursuit of new solutions despite unsatisfactory project outcomes. The World Bank's restructuring of its PARSE program was exemplary, as it allowed continuous disbursements of funds despite the government's non-compliance (see Section 5.3.3). Another response to the government's poor performance record was an attempt by international donors to identify all teachers from scratch, while completely sidelining existing institutions. Refusing to consult with existing state structures, this project by the Belgian and British development agencies CTB and DFID was cancelled before it even reached implementation stage (see Section 5.3.2).

The third reason why a significant number of teachers were still illegible to the state administration in 2016 is the unplanned and brokered expansion of public schools. My analysis in Chapter 6 reveals that this expansion is rooted in existing modes of educational governance and was exacerbated by unintended impacts of state-building reforms: the fragmentation of faith-based administrations, administrative unit proliferation through decentralisation, and the election of members of parliament through democratisation increased the number of brokers with an interest in acquiring school accreditation decrees. This uncontrolled expansion led to a stark increase of the number of teachers and thereby counteracted the objective of teacher legibility. These teachers then faced the type of administration that I summarise above. Originally, in 2007, the suppression of school openings was a condition of future donor funding. However, again, donors reacted by reassembling conditions, as the Minister of Education obviously did not comply with this condition. Since 2013, a moratorium has been put in place and my findings suggest that it has been respected. However, institutions that were supposed to be created in order to facilitate educational planning, especially an interministerial commission, did not exist as of 2016.

Based on my analysis presented in this thesis, there are two other aspects that have a less straightforward impact on legibility. First, the impact of the bancarisation reform on

teacher legibility is ambiguous (see Chapter 7). Through this reform, the government attempted a new way to render teachers legible. Through a public-private partnership with banks, personal identification and individual payments were designed to ensure that only those teachers who work receive a salary. However, the infrastructural endowments of the Congolese territory coupled with the organisation of the reform prioritised urban areas and jeopardised the reform's functioning in rural territories. Banks, and the mobile phone companies they subcontracted, were largely unable to deliver salaries to rural areas.

The reform survived thanks to the involvement of the Catholic NGO Caritas and thanks to teachers who had to cope with frequent changes of payment providers, who had to travel long distances to withdraw their salaries, and who even had to exonerate Caritas from responsibility in case of theft. The legibility of teachers paid through Caritas has not increased, as Caritas pays teachers collectively per school and does not require individual identification. Whether the newly created microfinance institution will solve this problem and biometrically identify teachers remains to be seen.

Second, while it is easy to see how armed conflict could have been a potential major interruption of legibility, my data did not sustain this assumption (see Chapter 8). Recurrent armed conflicts led to repeated internal displacements of communities, including teachers. In line with the legibility-discourse, educational administrators ensured that teachers on the government's payroll continuously opened their schools during displacement, and returned to their villages upon declarations of pacification by the administrator of the territory. My analysis suggests that the threat to withdraw schools' accreditation decrees and remove teachers from the payroll was used to make teachers return. These findings reveal that the legibility-discourse has become a dominant element in the deployment of teachers in this armed conflict.

Linking all of these findings to Raeymaekers' reflection above, certainly not everything has remained the same. The state has been at work (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014c), and not only as a farce or a "masquerade" (Trefon 2011). Despite its consistently intransparent and prebendal organisational culture, SECOPE included massive numbers of teachers into its databases. It is important to acknowledge these changes while also nuancing the overall impact: Not all teachers who are included in SECOPE's databases are completely legible, some teachers (the omitted, *les omis*) were subject to derecording practices, many teachers were illegible in the past and large numbers still remain outside of the administration's gaze. What is the implication of these findings beyond the assessment of what has changed and what has remained the same? In other words, what do these processes around teacher legibility reveal about teacher-state relationships, and about the way the Congolese state, and states with nonrecording practices in general, function? The following sections provide some conclusive thoughts on these questions.

9.2 Theoretical implications

The long-enduring process of permanent provocation around teacher legibility has sustained the existence of illegibility and I argue that illegibility can be seen as a state effect. In the following section, I explain why the 'state' sits so prominently in my main theoretical argument and what I understand as a 'state effect'. Furthermore, I argue that these processes around illegibility can be understood as a form of structural violence and elaborate how these processes can enhance state authority.

9.2.1 Illegibility as a state effect

I point out in this thesis that most authors who write about legibility consider it as one of the most important characteristics, or instruments, of modern states (Aretxaga 2003; Baitenmann 2005; Scott 1998; Trouillot 2001) (see also Section 2.1). Legibility of practices and people can indeed constitute important ways for a state administration to exercise a whole range of functions. From standardising measurements or weights in order to facilitate economic exchanges, to tightly controlling people in an authoritarian way, legibility is the state's way of simplifying social reality so as to be able to intervene, regulate and extract resources. It is undeniable that legibility is often used for such purposes. However, legibility is not pursued by every kind of state, and it is not a necessary component of statehood.

States that deal with partially or fully illegible populations require a different kind of explanation. Are they mere deviances that will adjust themselves to a standard? In other words, how can the empirical findings from Section 9.1 be explained at a more theoretical level, thus allowing comparisons to other contexts and development of existing theoretical approaches? In Chapter 2, I identify three explanations for illegibility in existing literature: first, resistance by the people who are to be rendered legible; second, state failure or weak state capacities and corruption; and third, deliberate nonrecording. How do my findings speak to these explanations?

In Chapter 2, I lay out the reasons why illegibility in the case under study is not linked to resistance by teachers. In fact, the role of teachers in the legibility-assemblage is much more multifaceted than resistance suggests. Teachers seek inclusion into the state system with all related benefits. Teachers' entries, transfers and exits, as well as internally displaced teachers, are dynamic processes that require particular administrative attention (see Chapters 5 and 8). An expanding education sector massively increased the number of new entries, and teachers were crucial in maintaining the bancarisation reform.

Regarding the second argument, I show in this thesis that assumptions about state failure and weakness are analytically very poor as they stem from a highly normative background. Merely evaluating a state by its deviations from an unachieved ideal reveals little about the actual functioning of that state. From this perspective, the other side of state failure is Western state-building. Elements that are used in the process of state-building, such as democratisation or decentralisation, play a much more complex role in reality than is suggested by donor programs (see also Section 9.2.3).

A third explanation for illegibility can be found in work on nonrecording and derecording state practices (Gandhi 2017; Kalir 2017; Kalir and van Schendel 2017; Lan 2017; Rozakou 2017; Vrăbiescu 2017). By and large, this research on nonrecording practices has proven immensely helpful in exploring persisting illegibility and the relationship between states and legibility. My findings extend this work in two ways.

First, in contrast to their portrayal that derecording or nonrecording practices are mainly targeted at "undeserving, undesired, and unproductive" (Kalir and van Schendel 2017, 6; see also Kalir 2017, 73) categories of people, I illustrate the discursive construction of one group of state agents, teachers, as desired and productive. Second, whereas, for example, Vrăbiescu (2017) argues that nonrecording is deliberate and Gandhi (2017) claims that it falls within the discretionary power of individual bureaucrats, I show that no single actor forced everybody else to behave in a certain way or to embrace illegibility. In fact, some of the key actors seemed hardly concerned with legibility. It seems valid to doubt that politicians who act as brokers for accreditation decrees were trying to create illegible teachers. Similarly, the Minister of Education did not seem to sign accreditation decrees with the goal of enhancing the number of illegible teachers. Nonetheless, as a result of these actions, the number of illegible teachers vastly increased. Despite signs of some intentional derecording, my data do not permit me to conclude that derecording is a hidden core component of government in the DRC. It would be too quick a conclusion to categorise it as an "instrumentalization of disorder" (Chabal and Daloz 1999) or an outcome of intentional practices.

Since none of the three reasons – resistance, state failure or deliberate nonrecording or derecording – can explain illegibility on its own, I turn to the notion of an emergent property and a state effect. Let me explain why the term 'state' occupies such an important position in my argumentation, before I discuss the implications of my findings and of the term 'state effect'.

The Congolese state persists with meagre records in public service delivery. It can hardly build its authority on process- or outcome-based forms of legitimacy. Processes are intransparent and unfair and outcomes are poor. As I further develop in Section 9.2.2, the authority of the Congolese state is not so much based on its capacity to provide services than on its de facto central role in political and administrative processes. In fact, my research provides evidence for a very active kind of Congolese state. Far from admitting that "the Democratic Republic of Congo does not exist" (Herbst and Mills 2013, 79), I portray bustling state practices. The state occupies the central position in processes around legibility: It is the main interlocutor of international organisations and faith-based organisations; state-building has been an influential agenda in the 2000s; the state has a monopoly on issuing legitimate accreditation decrees; state representatives can initiate large-scale reforms, such as bancarisation; administrative bottlenecks with discretionary power within state structures are major impediments for reforms; even in conflict, educational administrators retain the power to govern teacher movements; last but not least, it is the institution that teachers seek to become part of. Teachers are the biggest

group of state actors and give a physical presence to the state even in the smallest village. In sum, these aspects justify my argument that illegibility is fundamentally connected to the state. What, then, justifies my framing of illegibility as a state 'effect'?

I argue that illegibility is an effect of a process of permanent provocation. All of the issues I reiterate in Section 9.1 have been part of that process: actions that either pursued the achievement of legibility (Chapters 4 and 5), actions that had negative consequences for legibility (Chapters 5 and 6) or consequences that are more difficult to assess (Chapters 7 and 8), or actions that were stimulated by the weight and salience of the legibility-discourse with the goal to maintain legibility (Chapter 8). Therefore, instead of linking illegibility to a single cause or to deliberate actions, my analysis shows how diverse and dispersed provocations interact, overlap and cause reactions and practices of reassembling. These provocations can stem from state and non-state actors at all levels – local, provincial and national. In fact, most provocations have a translocal component. For instance, brokers link the local to the national level and the entire *mécanisation* process is an administrative sequence from schools to the national SECOPE office. Furthermore, all practices are somehow linked to international agendas, interventions or funding.

These various practices are connected through the object they have in common: legibility. By exploring how people and organisations interact vis-à-vis the value they and others assign to legibility or illegibility, I turned away from a focus on a specific set of actors who always act rationally and according to strategic plans. Therefore, I understand the term 'effect' as an emergent property of this long-enduring process and not as an outcome of deliberate and intentional practices. Since the state plays a transversal role in my findings, as I explain above, I consider this effect a state effect. The term "state effect" is most commonly associated with the work of Mitchell (1991, 94) who defines it as a "metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist". So the question is not whether or not a state exists, and where it can be clearly delineated from society, but which effects are created through practices and symbols that are associated with the state.

The notion of an assemblage has been crucial in the analysis because it implies a concern with emergent properties and effects while being grounded in an empirical analysis that accounts for the various ways in which the elements of that assemblage are linked to each other (Delanda 2016; Latour 2005; Li 2007b). Moreover, an assemblage is open to an understanding of complex translocal processes, while it also permits me to identify certain nodal points within the assemblage. Furthermore, it helps to understand that the theoretical framework of the process of permanent provocation (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2) does not imply a neat procedure with a clear number of steps that occur one after the other. For example, the expansion of schools as illustrated in Chapter 6 has been a constant, and constantly overlooked, provocation for the legibility-agenda. It was not a one-off event that provoked responses but a long-enduring process.

Whereas the concept of assemblage is a way of understanding a wide variety of interactions over time and at different places, the term reassembling is more related to intentional practices. As Li points out, every project draws on existing and new components.

For example, SECOPE as top-down measure in the 1980s or banks and new technologies in the 2000s are elements that were newly introduced into the legibility-assemblage. I also show how projects do not follow a straightforward process from design to implementation and evaluation. Instead, in the case of the World Bank's PARSE program, school accreditation or the bancarisation reform, conditions and indicators of success were reassembled. One limitation of my research is that I did not look behind written texts of, for example, the PARSE program. The fact that conditions are reassembled in a text does not imply the absence of negotiations and fights behind the scenes. A more ethnographic approach to reassembling processes at the level of donor programs could be fruitful.

I differ from Li (2007c) in one crucial aspect. It is important to highlight the temporary success of SECOPE in the 1980s. Creating SECOPE was a highly top-down, modernist and centralised activity, of the sort that Scott (1998) describes, and that is usually strongly criticised by development anthropologists for its lack of sensitivity for local situations (Gardner and Lewis 2015; Li 2007c). SECOPE did not reach all of its initial objectives and could not maintain its performance in the turbulent 1990s. Nevertheless, despite the systemic corruption that it faced, the top-down intervention was, at the time, rather successful. This suggests that Li's argument that top-down reforms can never fully and adequately capture social dynamics in order to change them might benefit from more nuance. Although I agree with the idea, it risks to be all-encompassing in a way that it deters researchers from further unpacking successful or positive instances of change. I now elaborate my understanding of the relationship between illegibility as a state effect and structural violence.

9.2.2 Illegibility as structural violence

Teachers are subjected to numerous inequalities and disadvantages, both in terms of outcomes and processes. My findings suggest that teachers were neither excluded from a regime of state regulation, nor that their behaviour was constantly constrained by authoritarian control. Instead, this thesis I uncover that they were discursively valued, while practically speaking, progress has unfolded slowly. However, I also argue that there is not one single actor who can be held responsible. Although there are certain nodal points, such as the Minister of Education signing accreditation decrees or IT staff adding people to the payroll, I claim that teacher illegibility is an emergent property of a process of permanent provocation. In order to understand the inequalities and disadvantages that teachers are subjected to, it can be helpful to draw on Gupta (2012) who advances an analysis of bureaucratic practices as structural violence.

I begin by emphasising instances where Congolese teachers were subjected to inequalities and disadvantages due to processes associated with illegibility: meeting administrators in order to negotiate inclusion into the database and on the payroll (Chapter 5); teachers who receive no or an incorrect salary (Chapter 5); and the opening of schools as more of a bargain than a clearly delineated process (Chapter 6). As a result, there was insecurity as to whether schools would be put on payroll and whether they would remain

open; I show that teachers had to cope with the adverse impacts of the bancarisation reform and keep the reform alive through their journeys and other tactics (Chapter 7); teachers in two territories were subjected to insecurity, attacks and internal displacements for over fifteen years and nevertheless had to respect a state administration which ordered them to continuously open their schools (Chapter 8); finally, teachers had hardly any voice in deliberations about the question of legibility.[84]

Gupta's (2012) analysis can be helpful in understanding these instances as structural violence. He points to the arbitrariness within the Indian bureaucracy and the negative repercussions it has on Indian citizens. Drawing on Galtung (1969), he understands structural violence as occurring in "any situation in which some people are unable to achieve their capacities or capabilities to their full potential" (Gupta 2012, 20). The term 'structural violence' owes its name to the difficulty of unambiguously identifying an actor who committed a direct act of violence. This is in line with my understanding of illegibility as a state effect and the removal of intentionality from the centre of analysis. The permanent provocation around illegibility – within the broader Congolese political and economic system – produces inequitable outcomes and implies adverse processes, which can be understood as a form of structural violence against teachers.

Harris and Jeffrey (2013) criticise Gupta for depoliticising injustice and poverty. They further argue that Gupta's focus on the produced bureaucratic arbitrariness diverts his analysis from looking at the unequal distribution of state resources more broadly (see also Gandhi 2017). With Gupta (2013), however, I argue that removing intentionality from the centre, focusing on the aggregated outcomes of government practices, and criticising administrative idleness and resistance against reform do not imply depoliticisation. The idea of structural violence is itself an important step towards the acknowledgment of the type of conditions in which Congolese teachers have had to work in the last few decades. This understanding offers a radically different, and much more political, analysis than the ones dominantly promoted in donor analyses.

Furthermore, the insights of this thesis contribute to the work by Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith (2017). In a similar vein to Gupta (2012), they also draw on Galtung's (1969) conceptualisation of structural violence. They further build on Fraser's (1995) work in order to conceptualise the relationship between education and peace-building. I point out in the introduction that the various links between education and conflict, and peace, have received increasing attention since the early 2000s (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2005; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008; Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, and Smith 2017; Rose and Greeley 2006). Extending these analyses, Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith (2017) identify four highly entangled dimensions of social justice: recognition, representation, redistribution and reconciliation.

My case study serves as an example for the struggles around most of these dimensions. First, I talk about an essential act of the recognition of teachers in a public

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[84] My research did not reveal any significant role of teachers unions in this struggle.

school: recognition, i.e. registration, by the state administration. Second, legibility also has implications for redistributive practices as legibility is a condition for receiving salaries. Finally, teachers are only marginally represented in official policy-making. During my research, teachers unions seemed rather ineffective and without a strong base outside of urban areas. To my knowledge, the processes around teacher identification have so far not been discussed in analyses of education and conflict/peacebuilding. This might have to do with the intricacies of the Congolese contexts. Nonetheless, the theoretical implications can contribute to explorations of the multiple faces of education in relation to conflict and peace, and to analyses that link education systems to wider social, political, cultural and economic dynamics (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Paulson 2008; Shah and Lopes Cardozo 2014; Tebbe et al. 2010). Most importantly, I add to this debate by showing in the next section how inequitable practices in the education sector can enhance state authority.

9.2.3   Illegibility as an enhancement of state authority

Public authority in many African countries is rarely invested only in state institutions. Lund (2006, 686) describes public authority as the "amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of local institutions and the imposition of external institutions, conjugated with the idea of a state". Nevertheless, again, I provide a case where the state occupies a central role and is able to take or defer important decisions. Discussing the relationship between dons, bureaucrats and politicians in Jamaica, Jaffe (2013, 745) argues that the "contemporary assemblage of governmental actors is not necessarily a happy marriage" between these actors. In a similar vein, Moshonas (2013, 138) characterises the relationship between Congolese state actors and international donors as a "marriage of convenience". What are the main dynamics that keep such marriages together, and how can they enhance state authority? My analysis suggests three mechanisms: extraversion, mystification and territorialisation.

Extraversion

A crucial finding of this thesis is that the Congolese state has constantly drawn legitimacy from tapping into international frameworks, such as the Millennium Development Goals or the Global Partnership for Education. Hence, it engaged in practices of "extraversion" (Bayart and Ellis 2000, 218), meaning "mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment", as I have illustrated since the first pages of this thesis. These were not mere discursive acts but had significant implications for domestic agenda-setting. Certain kinds of knowledge and rationales were authorised and influenced the way that teacher legibility was perceived.

Ultimately, these practices led to an assignment of value to teacher legibility, largely due to the pressure of international actors. Teacher legibility was crucial for funding teacher salaries, which again was crucial for the removal of school fees. Facilitating free primary schooling was a key objective of educational policies in the 2000s. Therefore, teacher legibility was discursively constructed as a priority. Hence, I agree with Kalir and Van

Schendel (2017) on their statement that (non)recording practices must be seen within a wider international context. However, as said before, I slightly differ in my interpretation from Kalir and Van Schendel (2017, 6; see also Kalir 2017, 73) who claim that derecording or nonrecording practices mainly target "undeserving, undesired, and unproductive" categories of people. The main difference in my case is that teachers are not necessarily undesired by the state. Teachers assist the national government in responding to the population's desire for education. Moreover, in official documents, teacher legibility was advocated for and was assigned a positive value. Teachers experience the double bind between discursive value and practical neglect in a process that can be described as mystification.

Mystification

In order to understand how practices in the legibility-assemblage increase state authority it might be beneficial to leave the concept of legitimacy behind and turn towards the notion of mystification. As I argue in Section 9.2.2, illegibility is a form of structural violence with repercussions for teachers' everyday lives. Since the actual bottlenecks are beyond their scope and sit within the Ministry of Education in Kinshasa, teachers face an administrative "regime of incertitude" (Englebert 2012). Teachers' interactions with representatives of the state are fundamentally characterised by uncertain "practical norms" (Olivier de Sardan 2008, 1) rather than by reliable codified institutions.

Drawing on Burawoy (2012), De Herdt and Titeca (2016, 7) claim that this engagement leads to mystification, which means that "people's subordination to authority is generated instead from the inside and from the bottom up: people reproduce higher-level structures as a side effect of the local-level games they are involved in". They further argue that "mystification is to be distinguished from a deeply internalized consent to an authority that is regarded as legitimate or a situation in which authority has been naturalized and therefore considered inevitable" (De Herdt and Titeca 2016, 8). The practices of the Congolese state do not need to be considered legitimate as long as it occupies a central position within all these interactions, games and negotiations. In the words of Lund (2016, 1205), "the act of authorizing recursively authorizes the authorizer".

Territorialisation

One remarkable outcome of the myriad of administrative interactions has been a deeper level of state territorialisation. My analysis reveals four ways in which processes related to legibility enhanced the state's territorialisation: the number of SECOPE's field offices grew substantially (Chapter 5); the country experienced massive expansion of schools, particularly in historically neglected territories (Chapter 6); the bancarisation reconfigured the state's reach into rural areas (Chapter 7); finally, schools and teachers in a recurrent armed conflict functioned as shifting frontiers that re-established elements of statehood (Chapter 8). These processes have been accompanied by an extension of educational subdivisions. While faith-based organisations played a crucial role in setting up

and governing schools in rural areas since colonial times, they have not kept pace with the state's spatial extension.

The DRC is far from consolidating control over its designated territory. Since the early 2000s, militias have repeatedly taken control over significant parts of the territory in Haut-Katanga, not to mention the much more complex situations in Eastern DRC. Nevertheless, spatial reach remains a core aspect of state capacity (Hau 2012). Given Mann's definition of infrastructural power as "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (Mann 1984, 189), it seems correct to say that the education system has become, or remains, an important element of infrastructural power in the DRC. It is important to add that infrastructural power is a two-way street: For example, through education, students can become aware of their democratic rights and thus actively participate in the policy-making process. Furthermore, churches use the state's resources to extend their reach. For this thesis, however, infrastructural power is especially relevant in its capacity to territorialise the mystification process I explain above.

> ### How do the three mechanisms of extraversion, mystification and territorialisation interact and influence state authority?

Extraversion is an important driver of mystification. Tapping into external agendas, Western symbols of the state, funding and 'expertise' are crucial steps for the existence of the type of activities and negotiations that keep teachers busy. The main impetus for change comes through extraversion, and the main blockage against change is rooted in administrative nodal points with extended discretionary power. Furthermore, omnipresent non-codified practical norms that circumvent formal state structures can lead to an expansion of state structures and a deeper level of state territorialisation. In sum, the state might have insufficient capacities and does not necessarily have to be considered legitimate. The constant interactions, formal or informal, with its institutions and representatives all over the territory reproduce its authority. In other words, state authority can increase through the myriad practices at the blurred margin between illegibility and legibility. Arguably, the three processes of extraversion, mystification and territorialisation could merit more attention. Especially the difference between mystification and legitimisation, and the similarities between mystification, hegemony and Luke's (2005) third face of power could reveal more theoretical insights. However, this goes beyond the scope of this study and will be considered in future research.

9.3   Practical implications, future research and final reflections

The case I present in this thesis leads to some ambiguous insights. On the one hand, I proclaim that it is important to acknowledge actual achievements of the Congolese administration and international organisations, while on the other hand arguing that illegibility is a form of structural violence. This is, however, not a paradox. It merely points to

the multifaceted nature of the problem at hand. I engaged in a historicising analysis of the legibility-assemblage of teachers in the DRC and my analysis has led me through a wide range of donor practices: conditionalities and reassembling, the creation of institutions from scratch and the failure to do so, as well as multi-donor trust funds. Arguably, international organisations have been among the tightest allies of teachers in the DRC. Notwithstanding the actual drivers of agendas at higher policy-levels, their objectives regarding legibility were largely in line with teachers' desires. Also, for example, the World Bank and UNESCO have been among the most important providers of data on the Congolese education system. Taking a counterfactual perspective, it seems unlikely that the Congolese government would have dedicated similar attention to the topic of legibility had donors not been present.

At the same time, however, I argue above that the lax ways of accommodating reform failure and transgression of norms and contracts allowed the Ministry to be seen as a legitimate champion of teachers' and students' interests – of which I remain unconvinced. My analysis suggests that the unplanned nature of school expansion caused by the Minister will continue to be a strong impediment of equitable access to quality education in the DRC in the near future. While new schools are desired by the population, the overall outcome of unplanned expansion is an inefficient allocation of resources. Even though I sit somewhat uncomfortably making 'policy recommendations', the "will to improve" (Li 2007c) will persist and I cannot deny having formed my own thoughts on where change might be feasible and impactful. I share these reflections here and suggest fields for future research before closing the thesis.

Through myriads of signatures accrediting schools all over the country, the former Congolese Minister of Primary, Secondary and Vocational Education has violated conditionalities and created a situation that is less transparent than before. Between 2013 and 2016 the moratorium on school accreditations was respected, but a new Minister was appointed in 2016. If school accreditations continue to be used as clientelist capital there is little room for planning processes. Furthermore, ongoing deconcentration, decentralisation and fragmentation of FBOs will increase the number of potential brokers. More research on the "multiple accountabilities" (Blundo 2015) that such Ministers face, instead of assuming that they are neutral implementers of policies, could turn out to be rewarding.

I further need to mention that my theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 suggests that teacher transfers during the school year might be a reason for illegibility. In my research, I did not focus on this issue particularly and it would deserve further attention in the future.

Mismanagement of databases and payrolls is highly complex and technical (DFID DRC Evidence Analysis and Coordination Programme 2016). During the bancarisation reform, the Pay Directorate within the Ministry of Budget centralised all payments for public servants. Furthermore, the Ministry of Civil Service has always pronounced its desire to reintegrate the teacher payroll within its Ministry. Addressing the politics between these Ministries, and how they change the role of SECOPE, is of crucial interest for a better understanding of teacher legibility, and teacher payments. In general, the link between teacher legibility and teacher payments requires further attention.

Furthermore, I anticipate that the activities of the new Catholic-based microfinance institution IFOD will create new problems and dynamics, and thus maintain and expand the permanent provocation around fiscal stability and teacher legibility. In my assessment, it would be mesmerising if IFOD successfully managed to biometrically identify all teachers. The question that is likely to gain renewed importance is how the government accommodates IFOD's incapacity of doing so.

The academic interest in the topic of governing internally displaced teachers is still in its infancy. I argue that the creation of new administrative units has led to a deeper level of state territorialisation and control. This would suggest that the governing of teachers would not have been as tight for instance in 2005 as in 2016. This suggestion remains to be addressed by future research.

There are several historical dynamics that I hint at in this thesis. While I argue that the former state-FBO dyad was extended to a state-FBO-donor triad, it could be of further interest to better understand teacher management before 1982. For example, the implications of the concessionary state for teacher management, and legibility, could be researched in a comparative study with other colonial and postcolonial regimes.

Another key structure that merits more attention is the Global Partnership for Education. Given the extraverted nature of rule in the DRC, it will remain interesting to study how the state achieves the collection of the necessary data for GPE's purposes, and how such data are selectively mobilised to meet GPE's requirements. Furthermore, it should be critically discussed whether a country really needs to comply with GPE's performance conditions or whether it is sufficient for a country to remain within the boundaries set by global educational discourses and GPE, such as exemplified by the educational strategy 2016-2025 with which I began this chapter. The country's vision, according to the strategy, is as follows:

> "The vision of Congo's government for the education sector is the construction of an inclusive and quality education system that contributes effectively to national development, to peace building (*promotion à la paix*) and to an active democratic citizenry." (DRC/Various Ministries 2015, 9)

The educational strategy 2016-2025 will in all likelihood not revolutionise the education system but most probably trigger new projects and interventions, of which some may have positive repercussions for the concerned population. My research uncovered some caveats concerning the way that such internationally motivated frameworks can work. More precisely, I point to how components of Western state-building can influence state formation. I argue that Western state-building is anchored around what I called the *4Ws* (Westphalian, Western, Weberian, Welfare; see Section 2.1.1).

My research has now shown that these characteristics indeed play an important role in the functioning of the Congolese state but not quite as envisaged by international proponents of state-building (see Section 9.2.3): Extraversion taps into the idea of the Westphalian sovereign state; democratisation and decentralisation are central components

of a Western state but can have quite unexpected outcomes; the constant wish to build a Weberian impersonal bureaucracy has sustained and territorialised dynamics of mystification; and finally, a state can persist and acquire authority without major welfare-related benefits for its population.

Finally, whereas these state-building practices are intended to increase state capacities and improve the quality of public service delivery, they can in fact be mobilised by state actors for other purposes. Such practices are widely used in the DRC. Currently, democratic elections in the DRC are deferred because the database on the population eligible to vote is not established: the population is not legible to the state administration. The significance of the relationship between Western ideals of state-building and processes around (il)legibility is much wider than the education sector.

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Appendices

ONZICHTBAARHEID ALS STAATSEFFECT

De grenzen van beheer van leerkrachtidentificatie

in de Democratische Republiek Congo

Inleiding

Sinds Joseph Kabila aan de macht kwam in 2001 werkt de Congolese staat opnieuw samen met de internationale gemeenschap, en toont de staat bereidheid om te hervormen en een staat te bouwen gemodelleerd naar westerse ideale typen (De Villers 2009). Dit proces omvatte zowel instellingen zoals een grondwet alsook maatregelen voor capaciteitsopbouw bij ministeries (Trefon 2011). Een verbeterde levering van openbare diensten was bedoeld om bij te dragen aan de legitimiteit en stabiliteit van de door oorlog verscheurde Congolese staat. Hoewel deze hoop snel teniet werd gedaan (Englebert 2016b), werden er hervormingen geïnitieerd en geïmplementeerd.

Wat de onderwijssector betreft was één van de overkoepelende doelstellingen het aanbieden van gratis basisonderwijs voor alle kinderen. Aan het begin van de sectorale hervormingen in 2007 maakten twee belangrijke belemmeringen dit echter tot een moeizame onderneming. Ten eerste was de overheidsbegroting voor onderwijs onbeduidend. Ouders financierden ongeveer twee derde van het totale onderwijsbudget in de vorm van maandelijkse lerarenbijdragen. Deze kosten werden gedeeld met alle administratieve afdelingen (Verhaghe 2007a). Ten tweede was ongeveer een derde van alle leraren niet opgenomen in de database van de overheid (Verhaghe 2009; World Bank 2008). Ik noem deze leraren *onzichtbaar*. Op basis van het werk van Scott (1998) wordt zichtbaarheid in dit proefschrift omschreven als: *administratieve kennis over kenmerken van leraren die werkzaam zijn op geautoriseerde posities*. Het zichtbaar maken van leerkrachten heeft vanaf het begin van de jaren 2000 prominent op de agenda van donoren gestaan. Gezien dit belang is het belangrijkste onderzoeksprobleem waarmee dit proefschrift te maken heeft het feit dat een aanzienlijk aantal leraren nog steeds onzichtbaar is, ondanks het streven naar zichtbaarheid door de Congolese overheid en donoren. Daarom onderzoek ik in dit proefschrift één centrale empirische onderzoeksvraag: *Waarom is een groot aantal openbare leraren in het primair en voortgezet onderwijs in de DRC sinds de jaren zeventig onzichtbaar voor de overheidsadministratie?*

Om deze vraag te beantwoorden is het in de eerste plaats noodzakelijk om te begrijpen wie de zichtbaarheid van de leraar wenst. Leraren van openbare scholen willen zichtbaarheid, omdat het een cruciale stap is naar opname in het staatssysteem met alle gerelateerde voordelen zoals salarissen. Voor de overheid is zichtbaarheid een noodzakelijk

onderdeel om alle leerkrachten correct te belonen, het schoolgeld te verlagen en te voldoen aan de donorcondities rond transparante loonlijsten en het niet accumuleren van salarisachterstanden. Ten slotte is voor donoren de belangrijkste reden een vermindering van het fiduciaire risico: een ondoorzichtige en onjuiste database van leraren vergemakkelijkt loonfraude. Daarom werd een volledige en betrouwbare database als een "voorwaarde *sine qua non* " beschouwd (World Bank 2008) voor donorfinanciering van lerarensalarissen. Verder hebben donoren de zichtbaarheid nagestreefd, omdat het een vereiste was voor het niet-opbouwen van salarisachterstanden van ambtenaren. Deze redenen onderstrepen dat zichtbaarheid een cruciale staatspraktijk kan zijn (see e.g. Aretxaga 2003; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). Staten kunnen echter ook niet-opnamepraktijken nastreven (Kalir and van Schendel 2017). Aangezien een onjuiste database loonfraude vergemakkelijkt, kunnen bepaalde beheerders en politici misschien geen zichtbaarheid verlangen. Vandaar dat hervormingsprocessen die geworteld waren in ideeën over 'goed bestuur' zich moesten meten met een omslachtige organisatiecultuur.

Alleen al dit zien als een neo-patrimoniaal of roofzuchtig regime zal waarschijnlijk een holistisch begrip remmen van processen die hebben geleid tot onzichtbaarheid. Daarom conceptualiseer ik de dynamiek rond zichtbaarheid als een proces van "permanente provocatie" (interview met M. Foucault in Dreyfus en Rabinow 1983, 221f), "waarbij elke stap vooruit antwoorden van verschillende kanten uitnodigt, de enige zekerheid is dat het proces nooit tot rust zal komen " (Titeca, De Herdt, and Wagemakers 2013, 129). André en collega's (2010, 158) beargumenteren dat elke maatregel en interventie moet worden beschouwd als een provocatie die reacties en aanpassingen oproept. Permanente provocatie maakt een analyse van de impact van hervormingen over langere perioden mogelijk. Schematisch gezien bestaat het proces van permanente provocatie uit drie met elkaar verbonden stappen: ten eerste zijn enkele ideeën over wat de overheid zou moeten bevatten geautoriseerd, terwijl andere opzij worden geschoven. Samenwerkingsverbanden tussen bepaalde groepen actoren bieden technische oplossingen voor de aanpak van wat zij beschouwen als problemen. Ten tweede zullen de daaruit voortvloeiende hervormingen en interventies tijdens het implementatieproces waarschijnlijk tegen onvermijdelijke beperkingen aanlopen. Vooral in een staat met zwakke infrastructuurkracht (Mann 1984), zullen andere groepen actoren waarschijnlijk onderhandelen over de impact van een hervorming en deze aanpassen(Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). Ten slotte is een belangrijk aspect van het proces van permanente provocatie het opnieuw in elkaar zetten, wat betekent reageren op deze limieten om interventies harmonieus te laten lijken en hun persistentie te waarborgen (Li 2007b).

Via een discourse-analyse van relevante donor- en overheidsdocumenten in hoofdstuk 4 onthul ik de opkomst en evolutie van het publieke debat rond zichtbaarheid vanaf de jaren zeventig. Hoofdstukken 5 tot en met 8 worden vervolgens gewijd aan de fijne kneepjes van de identificatie van leerkrachten in de jaren 2000. Onderzoek voor deze studie werd uitgevoerd gedurende negen maanden tussen 2015 en 2016 in twee verschillende onderzoeksperiodes (januari tot mei 2015, december 2015 tot mei 2016). Met een

meervoudige aanpak vond onderzoek plaats in de nationale hoofdstad Kinshasa, zes plattelandsgebieden[85] in de provincie Haut-Katanga en de provinciale hoofdstad Lubumbashi. Tijdens mijn promotieonderzoek zijn in totaal 246 semi-gestructureerde kwalitatieve interviews afgenomen, waarvan 150 in twee door conflicten getroffen gebieden.[86] Interviews variëren van korte persoonlijke gesprekken tot lange semi-gestructureerde interviews. Vertegenwoordigers van de belangrijkste belanghebbenden werden geïnterviewd: leraren en opdrachtgevers; overheid en religieuze functionarissen op verschillende niveaus; personeel van particuliere bedrijven. Naast deze interviews verzamelde en analyseerde ik verschillende soorten kwantitatieve gegevens en relevante documentatie in verschillende administratieve kantoren in de DRC en online.

Empirische analyse

Hoofdstuk 4: De opkomst en ondergang van het zichtbaarheidsdebat (1908-2001)

In dit hoofdstuk analyseer ik de belangrijkste teksten van onderwijsbestuur in de DRC om de opkomst, evolutie en tijdelijke ondergang van het debat over zichtbaarheid te traceren. Mijn onderzoek begint met het onthullen van de wortels van de "concessionaire staat" vóór 1977 (Poncelet et al. 2015; Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010). Ik bespreek eerst de gouden tijd van katholieke overheersing in educatief bestuur (1908-1946), wijs vervolgens op toenemende betrokkenheid van de staat (1946-1971) en benadruk het beruchte decennium van Zairianisatie (1971-1977). Hoewel op geloof gebaseerde organisaties nog steeds uiterst belangrijk zijn in het dagelijks beheer van scholen (Poncelet, André, and De Herdt 2010; Titeca and De Herdt 2011), suggereren mijn bevindingen dat hun rol bij de beleidsvorming op nationaal niveau is afgenomen sinds het einde van de jaren 1970. Ik beargumenteer dat internationale donoren dominant zijn geworden op het gebied van agendabepaling. Deze betrokkenheid werd mogelijk gemaakt door massale financiering en ging hand in hand met de prioritering en autorisatie van nieuwe soorten kennis in de beleidsvorming. Ten tweede kom ik op een periode van toenemend internationaal bestuur en de opkomst van de problematisering van de onzichtbaarheid van leraren vanaf 1977. Onzichtbaarheid werd door donoren als probleem gesteld omdat zichtbaarheid als een belangrijke doelstelling werd gezien in de strijd tegen loonfraude. Vanaf de jaren zeventig analyseer ik loonfraude in de Congolese administratie. Ik laat zien hoe het zichtbaarheidsdebat meer opviel in programma's en praktijken in de jaren tachtig. Dientengevolge werd een afdeling voor de identificatie en betaling van docenten gecreëerd in het ministerie van Onderwijs (*Service de Contrôle et de la Paie des Enseignants,* SECOPE). Ik beschouw de jaren tussen 1982 en 1992 als een *eerste golf van leerkrachtzichtbaarheid*. Vervolgens bespreek ik de chaotische jaren tussen 1992 en 2001 en leg ik uit hoe het voortbestaan van de onderwijssector in het

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[85] Uit het Frans: *territoires*

[86] Nog eens 106 interviews werden uitgevoerd tijdens mijn masteronderzoek in *Provincie Orientale* en Kinshasa tussen augustus en december 2013. Deze interviews hebben bijgedragen tot het begrip van de onderwerpen die in het proefschrift zijn onderzocht.

algemeen, en van SECOPE in het bijzonder, hand in hand ging met een verslechtering van de administratie. Ik beëindig het hoofdstuk met een bespreking van de ondergang van het zichtbaarheidsdebat in de verschrikkelijke jaren negentig, gekenmerkt door politieke instabiliteit, economische ineenstorting en transnationale oorlogen.

Hoofdstuk 5: Staatsopbouw en administratieve grenzen van zichtbaarheid (2001-2013)

In dit hoofdstuk begin ik met het illustreren van de ontmoetingen van een directeur met de administratie. Dit verhaal uit 2015 illustreert het aanhoudend moeilijke karakter van de relatie leraar-staat. Vervolgens pluis ik de onderliggende mechanismen achter die relatie uit. Ik voer een analyse uit van primaire bronnen zoals beoordelingen van overheidsuitgaven, plannen voor de onderwijssector en audits om te laten zien dat het zichtbaarheidsdebat in de jaren 2000 opnieuw verscheen. Ik vat de veranderingstheorie samen achter de waarde die gehecht wordt aan een hoger niveau van zichtbaarheid, en ik belicht de voorgestelde oplossingen om het probleem van de onzichtbaarheid van leraren op te lossen. Mijn onderzoek bracht vijf soorten interventies aan het licht: (1) een volkstelling houden; (2) bestuurlijke hervormingen; (3) schoolopeningen belemmeren; (4) het identificeren van leraren door middel van een publiek-privaat partnerschap met commerciële banken; (5) lerarenoverdrachten belemmeren. Deze interventies vormen de basis voor de rest van de analyse in dit proefschrift.

In de rest van hoofdstuk 5, behandel ik de *tweede golf van leerkrachtzichtbaarheid* (2004-2013). Ik wend me tot projecten die werden uitgevoerd door een aantal westerse donoren. Op verschillende manieren trachtten deze projecten een census voor leraren uit te voeren, het dagelijks functioneren van SECOPE te verbeteren en gebruikten ze de financiering van docenten als voorwaarde voor verdere uitbetalingen. Geen van deze projecten was volledig succesvol, maar dat betekent niet dat ze geen impact hadden. Ik concludeer dat een aanzienlijk aantal leraren aan het begin van de 21e eeuw aan de rand van de staat blijven, in een ondoorzichtige ruimte aan de grens van zichtbaarheid en onzichtbaarheid. Ik stel datadministratoren de kern zijn van elke overheidsactiviteit, maar ook één van de sterkste belemmeringen kunnen zijn voor hervormingsprocessen. Over het algemeen stel ik dat de Congolese administratie wordt gekenmerkt door een mix van prebendale activiteiten die zich vooral bevinden in knooppunten met discretionaire macht op de IT-afdeling, willekeurige fouten en administratieve prestaties.

Hoofdstuk 6: Een probleem voor de zichtbaarheid: bemiddelde onderwijsuitbreiding (2004-2013)

In hoofdstuk 6 gaat de analyse over de massale maar ongeplande expansie van het Congolese openbare primaire en secundaire onderwijsstelsel. Het openen van nieuwe scholen impliceert een uitbreiding van het aantal leraren. Als deze uitbreiding plaatsvindt op een ongeplande en ondoorzichtige manier, gaat zo'n uitbreiding in tegen het streven naar leerkrachtzichtbaarheid. Het aanvragen van een moratorium op openingen van scholen en

verplaatsingen van leerkrachten moest de uitbreiding van het onderwijs voorkomen en vervolgens reguleren. Om uiteen te zetten hoe schoolexpansie formeel wordt geregeld, heb ik relevante overheids- en donordocumenten geanalyseerd. In 2007 werd een moratorium op schooluitbreiding opgenomen in het PARSE-programma van de Wereldbank (World Bank 2007c, 24). Zeven jaar later, na verschillende herhalingen en wijzigingen, voldeed de minister aan deze voorwaarde en stelde in 2014 een moratorium in. In de tussentijd hadden bemiddelaars echter consequent de formele procedures omzeild en accreditatiebesluiten rechtstreeks van de minister verkregen. Deze bemiddelaars zijn onderwijsadministrateurs van de overheid op het gedeconcentreerde territoriumniveau, nationale parlementsleden en op geloof gebaseerde beheerders. Deze analyse laat zien dat pogingen van westerse staatsopbouw - democratisering en decentralisatie - het aantal bemiddelaars met een belang in de toegang tot en de verspreiding van decreten voor schoolaccreditatie kunnen vergroten. De daaruit voortvloeiende onoverzienbare uitbreiding van het onderwijssysteem was een belangrijke provocatie voor de wil om zichtbaarheid te vergroten. De massa's nieuwe scholen reproduceerden in feite de basis voor de zoektocht naar zichtbaarheid en voegden ontelbare aantallen leraren aan het systeem toe. Bovendien impliceerde dit een dieper niveau van territorialisering, waardoor zelfs in zeer afgelegen dorpen scholen werden gecreëerd. Deze ruimtelijke expansie vormde bijzondere uitdagingen voor de hervorming van lerarenbetalingen, zoals het volgende hoofdstuk illustreert.

Hoofdstuk 7: Administratieve problemen voor de leerkrachtzichtbaarheid omzeilen: de hervorming van de bancarisering (2012-2016)

In dit hoofdstuk onderzoek ik een hervorming van lerarenbetalingen die in 2011 werd geïnitieerd, toen de Congolese overheid probeerde te voldoen aan een donorvoorwaarde die was geformuleerd in het eerste economische programma van de regering in 2002: de niet-accumulatie van salarisachterstanden van ambtenaren . In een publiek-private samenwerking met commerciële banken trachtten het ministerie van Begroting en de Congolese Centrale Bank elke ambtenaar, inclusief leerkrachten, uit te rusten met een individuele bankrekening. Dit was bedoeld om salarisbetalingen en identificatie van leraren te moderniseren, en zo een uitgebreide en actuele database van alle docenten te vormen. De hervorming was echter slecht opgezet in haar theorie van verandering en in de uitvoering ervan. Aan de ene kant bouwden de verantwoordelijke overheidsinstellingen niet voort op voorkennis en ze gingen voorbij aan bredere problemen rond leerkrachtzichtbaarheid. Aan de andere kant creëerde de hervorming een ruimtelijke kloof tussen leraren en de organisaties die waren aangewezen om ze te betalen. Gezien de slechte infrastructuur van het land en de afwezigheid van banken in landelijke gebieden moesten leraren grote afstanden afleggen om hun salarissen op te nemen. Ik zal analyseren hoe de hervorming aanhield ondanks deze infrastructurele uitdagingen. Na een kort intermezzo met mobiele balies van banken en uitbestede telefoonbedrijven keerde het systeem terug naar een zeker evenwicht: banken betaalden min of meer met succes in stedelijke gebieden en de katholieke NGO Caritas zorgt voor betalingen in de meeste

plattelandsgebieden van het land. Caritas functioneert echter volgens het pre-bancarisatiesysteem en vergemakkelijkt de zichtbaarheid niet.

Hoofdstuk 8: De zichtbaarheid handhaven in een gewapend conflict (2015-2016)

In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk ga ik in op de zichtbaarheid van intern ontheemde leraren. Het werven, behouden en inzetten van docenten vormt een bijzondere uitdaging tijdens en na gewapende conflicten (World Bank 2010). Daarom kan gewapend conflict een limiet zijn voor de praktijk om leraren te besturen en voortdurend te identificeren. Ik kijk naar een langdurig, terugkerend gewapend conflict met lage intensiteit, waarbij veel gemeenschappen en leraren meerdere keren zijn ontheemd en naar hun dorpen zijn teruggekeerd. De administratie trachtte een stabiel personeelsbestand te behouden en het onderwijs te reorganiseren. Tijdens het conflict werden sommige leraren direct aangevallen. De omgang van leraren met de staat was een belangrijke reden voor de aanslagen. Deze aanvallen, en de aanhoudende onzekerheid, fungeerden als redenen om niet naar huis te gaan na interne ontheemding. De meeste leraren zijn echter teruggekeerd en ik stel dat dit een verklaring vereist. Ik beargumenteer dat de onderwijsoverheid in een context van terugkerende gewapende conflicten van lage intensiteit werkt volgens vergelijkbare principes die ik in vorige hoofdstukken heb besproken: het aantal educatieve beheerders en scholen is toegenomen als gevolg van bemiddelaars en salarissen komen voornamelijk aan via Caritas. Bovendien laat ik zien dat het zichtbaarheidsdebat de acties van bestuurders beïnvloedt tijdens gewapende conflicten. Voortbouwend op inzichten uit voorgaande hoofdstukken stel ik dat onderwijsbeheerders gebruik maken van accreditatiebesluiten en salarissen van leraren om leerkrachtzichtbaarheid te behouden en leraren terug te laten keren naar hun dorpen zodra de overheid securitisatie heeft verklaard. Al met al laat ik in dit hoofdstuk niet alleen zien dat gewapend conflict een probleem is voor leerkrachtzichtbaarheid, maar dat het zichtbaarheidsdebat cruciaal is geweest om de stabiliteit van de inzet van docenten in dit gewapende conflict te handhaven.

Conclusie

Verschillende auteurs beweren dat praktijken rond statistieken, cijfers en kennis over de bevolking centraal staan in hedendaagse staatspraktijken (Aretxaga 2003; Baitenmann 2005; Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Lee and Zhang 2017; Trouillot 2001). In plaats daarvan suggereert mijn analyse dat staten ook kunnen functioneren terwijl een aanzienlijk aantal van haar ambtenaren onzichtbaar zijn voor de administratie. Drie belangrijke verklaringen voor onzichtbaarheid kunnen naar voren worden gebracht: Scotts (1998) analyse suggereert dat onzichtbaarheid het resultaat is van verzet door de bevolking, sommige auteurs beweren dat niet-opnamepraktijken opzettelijk zijn (Kalir and van Schendel 2017; Vrăbiescu 2017) en een uitleg over 'goed bestuur' schrijft onzichtbaarheid toe aan falen van staten en hervormingen.

Als uitbreiding van deze debatten wijst mijn onderzoek op drie onderling verbonden redenen voor leerkrachtonzichtbaarheid: ten eerste, systemische corruptie in het algemeen,

en in het bijzonder het bestaan van beheerders op bestuurlijke knooppunten die niet geneigd zijn te veranderen; ten tweede, het accomoderen door internationale donoren dat de overheid overeenkomsten overtreedt en de mislukte poging van internationale donoren om bestaande instellingen volledig buiten de boot te houden. De derde reden waarom een aanzienlijk aantal leraren in 2016 nog steeds onzichtbaar was voor de overheid is de ongeplande uitbreiding van openbare scholen. Als ik deze aspecten bij elkaar neem, bespreek ik mijn belangrijkste theoretische argument dat onzichtbaarheid de opduikende eigenschap kan zijn van een proces van permanente provocatie. Aangezien handelingen en symbolen van de staat cruciale posities innemen binnen dit proces, noem ik deze onzichtbaarheid een effect van de staat.

Dit perspectief is een bijdrage aan het begrijpen van structureel geweld waaraan leerkrachten worden blootgesteld (Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, and Smith 2017; Sayed and Novelli 2016). In de DRC zijn processen rond onzichtbaarheid gerelateerd aan onderwijs met inadequate of geen betaling, slecht ontworpen top-downhervormingen met desastreuze gevolgen voor het dagelijks leven van leerkrachten, ondoorzichtige nationale besluitvormingsprocessen die leiden tot een inefficiënte toewijzing van middelen, en de noodzaak van het behoud van een stabiel lerarenteam bij een terugkerend gewapend conflict. Hoewel deze aspecten een teken zijn van een slechte kwaliteit van de openbare dienstverlening, stel ik voor te onderzoeken hoe zij het overheidsgezag versterken.

Er zijn drie hoofdmechanismen aan het werk: extraversie, mystificatie en territorialisering. Extraversie, de "mobiliserende middelen afgeleid van hun (mogelijk ongelijke) relatie met de externe omgeving" (Bayart and Ellis 2000, 218), is een sleutelbron geweest voor het mobiliseren van middelen en het verkrijgen van legitimiteit. Door gebruik te maken van mondiale kaders zoals Education for All en Global Partnership of Education wordt de binnenlandse beleidsvorming bevestigd, ondanks slechte prestaties. Het constante accomoderen van deze slechte prestaties is nog een ander proces dat het staatsbestuur opnieuw bevestigt. Mystificatie onthult dat "instemming met autoriteit wordt gegenereerd omdat de aandacht van ondergeschikten is gericht op" interacties op lokaal niveau en onderhandelingen (De Herdt and Titeca 2016, 8). Ik voeg aan bestaand onderzoek toe door de bestuurlijke dynamiek op nationaal niveau te onderzoeken die ten grondslag ligt aan deze onderhandelingen op lokaal niveau. Ten slotte vergroten schooluitbreiding, bancarisering en terugkeer na binnenlandse ontheemding het territoriale bereik van overheidsinstellingen. Ik eindig de scriptie met een bespreking van de praktische implicaties van mijn bevindingen. Deze hebben voornamelijk betrekking op de voortdurende noodzaak om het schoolaccreditatieproces en SECOPE te hervormen en op gebieden voor verder onderzoek. Kortom, mijn analyse laat zien dat elementen van westerse staatsopbouw niet lineair worden geïmplementeerd en een impact kunnen hebben die verder gaat dan formele intenties. Staatsvorming is wat er gebeurt terwijl staatsbeambten andere plannen maken en onderwijssectoren kunnen een cruciale rol spelen in deze processen.

Appendix 2: List of interviews

EP: *Ecole Primaire* / Primary school

ES: *Ecole Secondaire* / Secondary school

MoE: Congolese Ministry of Education

Date	Function
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
20.01.15	Caritas employee (Interview by colleagues)
20.01.15	Counsellor of provincial Minister of Education (Interview by colleagues)
21.01.15	Head of provincial educational inspection (Interview by colleagues)
21.01.15	Employee of a bank (Interview by colleagues)
21.01.15	Proved (Interview by colleagues)
21.01.15	Provincial head of SECOPE (Interview by colleagues)
22.01.15	Catholic diocesan network administrator & 3 assistants
22.01.15	Protestant provincial network administrator & 3 assistants (Interview by colleagues)
22.01.15	Kimbanguist provincial network, head of human resources and assistant (Interview by colleagues)
22.01.15	Senior staff of provincial MoE (Interview by colleagues)
22.01.15	Provincial chairman of Congolese NGO (Interview by colleagues)
22.01.15	Civil society representative (Interview by colleagues)
22.01.15	Two teachers (EP) (Interview by colleagues)
22.01.15	Headmaster (EP) (Interview by colleagues)
23.01.15	Provincial Minister of Education (Interview by colleagues)
04.02.15	Senior staff at provincial MoE
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Pweto	
15.02.15	Headmaster (EP) (Interview by colleague)
15.02.15	Headmaster (EP) (Interview by colleague)
16.02.15	Headmaster (EP) (Interview by colleague)

Date	Function
16.02.15	Headmaster (EP) (Interview by colleague)
16.02.15	Headmaster (EP) (Interview by colleague)
17.02.15	Civil society representative
18.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
18.02.15	Headmaster (ES)
19.02.15	Chairman of parental committee of a EP
18.02.15	Employees of a bank
18.02.15	Territory administrator
18.02.15	Employee of Congolese NGO
18.02.15	Employee of international NGO
19.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
19.02.15	Sous-Proved
19.02.15	SECOPE RINS (SECOPE)
20.02.15	Headmaster of accelerated learning EP
20.02.15	Provincial chairman of Congolese NGO
20.02.15	Teacher ES
20.02.15	Headmaster (ES)
21.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
21.02.15	Public forum on education
22.02.15	Itinerant educational inspector
23.02.15	Headmaster and teacher (EP)
23.02.15	Several parents in camp for IDPs
23.02.15	4 teacher (EP)s
23.02.15	Vice-chairman of parental committee (EP)
23.02.15	Teacher representative (EP)s
23.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
23.02.15	Village chief (*chef de localité*)
23.02.15	Secretary of a committee of IDPs
24.02.15	Headmaster (EP). 2 teachers (EP)
24.02.15	Teacher (EP)
24.02.15	Chairman and secretary of parental committee (EP)
24.02.15	Students' parents
24.02.15	Teacher in antenna (succursale) (EP)
24.02.15	IDPs and their chairman in a camp
25.02.15	Government administrator (*Chef du groupement*)
25.02.15	Headmaster (EP) and teacher (EP)
25.02.15	Chairman of parental committee of a EP
25.02.15	Headmistress (EP)

Date	Interviewee
25.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
25.02.15	Chairman of parental committee
25.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
25.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
25.02.15	Teacher (EP)
25.02.15	Chairman of parental committee
26.02.15	Administrator (*Chef du groupement*)
26.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
26.02.15	Lieutenant of Congolese military
26.02.15	Provincial chairman of Congolese NGO
27.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
27.02.15	Administrator (*Chef du localité*)
27.02.15	Secretary of parental committee (EP)
27.02.15	Itinerant educational inspector
27.02.15	Deputy headmaster (EP)
27.02.15	Member of parental committee at EP
27.02.15	Headmaster (EP)
27.02.15	Secretary of RINS (SECOPE)
28.02.15	RINS (SECOPE)
28.02.15	Civil society meeting
02.03.15	Headmaster & two teachers (EP)
02.03.15	Congolese state soldiers
02.03.15	Headmaster & teacher (EP)
02.03.15	Teacher (EP)
02.03.15	Administrator (*Chef de la chefferie*)
02.03.15	Diocesan educational administrator (also: head of Caritas' diocesan pay commission)
02.03.15	Diocesan Caritas' accountant
02.03.15	Civil society representative
03.03.15	Banking staff
03.03.15	Headmaster (EP)
03.03.15	Secretaries in educational office and NGO representative
03.03.15	Congolese state soldiers
03.03.15	Public prosecutor
03.03.15	Engineer
03.03.15	RINS (SECOPE)
Kinshasa	
09.-.13.03. 15	Civil society forum on education policies (*Forum National sur le financement et la politique de l'éducation*)

Date	Interviewee
18.03.15	UNICEF education specialist
18.03.15	International Rescue Committee education specialist
18.03.15	Senior MoE staff
19.03.15	Public deliberation on the banacarisation reform (*Premier Atelier d'évaluation de la mise en œuvre de la réforme sur la bancarisation de la paie des agents et fonctionnaires de l'état*)
19.03.15	Meeting of the local education group (Comcon)
24.03.15	Senior MoE staff
24.03.15	Senior MoE staff
25.03.15	Chief inspector
26.03.15	Senior staff of SECOPE
26.03.15	Senior staff of SECOPE
27.03.15	Infrastructural counsellor in MoE
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
30.03.15	Senior provincial agent in MoE
31.03.15	UNICEF education specialist
01.04.15	Provincial senior staff MoE
01.04.15	UNICEF education specialist
01.04.15	Educational inspector for ES
01.04.15	Provincial SECOPE staff in charge of territories
01.04.15	Provincial MoE staff in charge of private schools
02.04.15	Provincial head of SECOPE
02.04.15	Infrastructural counsellor in provincial MoE
02.04.15	UNICEF education specialist
06.04.15	MoE staff in charge of pensions
06.04.15	Proved
07.04.15	Head of SERNIE and
07.04.15	MoE staff in charge of pensions
08.04.15	Staff of International Rescue Committee
09.04.15	Provincial head of teacher union
09.04.15	Staff Congolese NGO
09.04.15	Civil society representative
10.04.15	Person in charge of textbooks, provincial MoE
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Pweto	
13.-17. 04.15	UNICEF workshop on education in emergencies
13.-17. 04.15	UNICEF education specialist

15.04.15	Sous-Proved
15.04.15	ES inspector
15.04.15 & 16.04.15	NGO worker
16.04.15	Employee at Territory educational administration
17.04.15	Territory inspector
17.04.15	Diocesan administrator
17.04.15	Diocesan Caritas' secretary
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
19.04.15	Investigative journalist
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Mitwaba	
20.04.15	NGO worker
22.04.15	Sous-Proved
23.04.15	Itinerant educational inspector
23.04.15	Two teachers (EP)
23.04.15	Administrator (*Chef de la Chefferie*)
23.04.15	Civil society representatives
25.04.15	Headmaster (ES)
25.04.15	Headmaster (ES)
25.04.15	Teacher (EP)
25.04.15	Deputy headmaster (EP)
25.04.15	NGO worker
25.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
25.04.15	Sous-Proved
25.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
25.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
25.04.15	Administrator (*Chef du groupement*)
25.04.15	Priest
26.04.15	Trader
26.04.15	Civil society representative (human rights)
26.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
26.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
27.04.15	Headmaster & teacher representative (EP)
27.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
27.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
27.04.15	Civil society representatives
28.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
28.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
28.04.15	Sous-Proved
28.04.15	RINS (SECOPE)
28.04.15	Headmaster (EP)
28.04.15	Teacher (EP)

28.04.15	Teacher (EP)
28.04.15	Teachers (EP)
Europe	
24.08.15	Donor education expert
Kinshasa	
7.12.15	Former employee of the MoE
11.12.15	Teacher unionist
11.12.15	SECOPE IT-department
14.12.15	Financial officer (national teacher health assurance)
14.12.15	Archival research in EP
14.12.15	SECOPE provincial office
15.12.15	Headmaster (EP)
15.12.15	Sous-Proved
15.12.15	Head of Tigo mobile money
18.12.15	Senior staff (Caritas)
18.12.15	Senior staff at the Congolese Central Bank
20.01.16	Staff at World Bank
21.01.16	Staff at Ministry of Civil Service
22.01.16	International consultant
05.02.16	Staff at national Protestant administration
05.02.16	National administrator of revivalist churches (*église de réveil*)
09.02.16	Staff at national Catholic administration
10.02.16	RINS (SECOPE)
11.02.16	Priest and social scientist
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
16.03.16	Proved
16.03.16	Provincial head of SERNIE
16.03.16	Head of statistics
16.03.16	Provincial head of SECOPE
18.03.16	Provincial head of SERNIE
18.03.16	Provincial head of SECOPE
18.03.16	Head of statistics
18.03.16	UNICEF education expert
22.03.16	Provincial head of SERNIE
22.03.16	EMIS staff
23.03.16	Provincial Protestant educational administration
23.03.16	Provincial Kimbanguist educational administration
23.03.16	Provincial Kimbanguist educational administration

23.03.16	Protestant sub-network administrator
24.03.16	Banking staff
24.03.16	TIGO staff
28.03.16	RINS (*phone*)
29.03.16	RINS (*phone*)
29.03.16	RINS (*phone*)
29.03.16	RINS (*phone*)
30.03.16	Sous-Proved
30.03.16	Sous-Proved and Territory inspector
31.03.16	Head of diocesan Caritas
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Kipushi	
31.03.16	Sous-Proved
01.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
04.04.16	Head of statistics (Protestant administration)
04.04.16	Protestant sub-network administrator and head of statistics
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Kipushi	
05.04.16	RINS (SECOPE)
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
05.04.16	Sous-Proved
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Sakania	
06.04.16	Sous-Proved
06.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
06.04.16	RINS (SECOPE)
07.04.16	RINS (SECOPE)
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
08.04.16	Sous-Proved (*phone*)
08.04.16	UNICEF education expert
08.04.16	Protestant sub-network administrator (*phone*)
08.04.16	Caritas staff
09.04.16	Banking staff
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Mitwaba	
11.04.16	Priest
11.04.16	Carpenter
11.04.16	Sous-Proved
12.04.16	4 Teachers (EP)
12.04.16	Headmaster (ES)
12.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
12.04.16	Administrator (*Chef du village*)
12.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
12.04.16	Teacher (EP antenna)

12.04.16	Teacher (EP antenna)
12.04.16	Headmaster (ES)
12.04.16	Teacher (EP)
12.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
13.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
13.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
13.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
13.04.16	Headmaster (ES)
13.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
14.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
14.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
14.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
14.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
14.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
15.04.16	Sous-Proved
16.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
16.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
16.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
16.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
16.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
17.04.16	Headmaster (EP)
16.04.16	Sous-Proved
Haut-Katanga: Likasi	
18.04.16	Government administrative staff
18.04.16	Itinerant educational inspector
18.04.16	Provincial head of SERNIE
19.04.16	Diocesan administrator and head of statistics
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Kambove	
19.04.16	Staff at Territory educational administration
Haut-Katanga: Lubumbashi	
20.04.16	Banking staff
23.04.16	Sous-Proved (*phone*)
25.04.16	Head of statistics (provincial administration)
25.04.16	Head of provincial SECOPE
25.04.16	Protestant sub-network administrator
25.04.16	Protestant sub-network administrator
25.04.16	Sous-Proved (*phone*)
25.04.16	Consultant
25.04.16	FBO representative (*phone*)
Haut-Katanga: Territory of Kipushi	
26.04.16	Staff of diocesan educational administration

Appendix 3: Accreditation decrees

Decrees from before 2004 (relevant for Section 6.2):

1. Arrêté ministériel NrMEPSP/CABMIN/001/00670/90 du 08/08 (1990 portant agrément des écoles publiques dans la région du Shaba [Ministerial decree accrediting public schools in the Shaba region]
2. Arrêté ministériel NrMEPSP/CABMIN/001/Route/02/92 du 05/03/1992 portant agrément des écoles publiques d'enseignement primaire, secondaire et professionnel dans la région du Shaba [Ministerial decree accrediting public primary, secondary and vocational schools in the Shaba region]
3. Arrêté ministériel NrMEPSP/CABMIN/001/00235/92 du 21/03/1992 portant agrément des écoles publiques d'enseignement primaire et secondaire dans la région du Shaba [Ministerial decree accrediting public primary, secondary and vocational schools in the Shaba region]
4. Arrêté ministériel NrMEPSP/CABMIN/001/01932/92 du 25/06/1992 portant agrément des écoles publiques dans la région du Shaba [Ministerial decree accrediting public primary and vocational schools in the Shaba region]
5. Arrêté ministériel NrMEPSP/CABMIN/001/655/95 du 15/03/95 portant création des écoles publiques d'enseignement secondaire et professionnel dans la région du Shaba [Ministerial decree accrediting public secondary and vocational schools in the Shaba region]
6. Arrêté ministériel NrMEPSP/CABMIN/001/677/95 du 16/03/95 portant création des écoles publiques d'enseignement primaire dans la région du Shaba [Ministerial decree accrediting public primary schools in the Shaba region]

Content of accreditation decrees:

Photo 1 (Appendix 3) *Excerpt of an exemplary accreditation decree*

Source: *Picture taken by author*

Text on Photo 1: Ministerial decree N◦ MINEPSP/CABMIN [*decree number*] accrediting public primary, secondary and professional schools in the province of Katanga / in the educational province of Katanga 1.

Text on each notification that accompanies accreditation decrees:

The attention of the education administration and inspection as well as that of network administrators, who receive a copy of this notification, is drawn to the fact that any modification with an effect on the school's organisation (fusion, structure, division, location, etc.) requires a new decree. [87]

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[87] Translated from original in French: « L'attention des Responsables de l'Administration et de l'Inspection Scolaires ainsi que des Gestionnaires concernés, qui me lisent en copie, est attiré sur le fait que tout changement devant intervenir ultérieurement dans l'organisation de ces écoles (fusion, structure, scission, dénomination, localisation, etc.) devra faire l'objet d'un nouvel Arrêté. »

Overview of school accreditations per network and Territory (2004-2013, Haut-Katanga)

Table created by author based on accreditation decrees collected during fieldwork.

Abbreviations:

Cath.   Catholic

Prot.   Protestant

Non-conv.   Non-conventionné (= government schools)

Adv.   Adventist

Kimb.   Kimbanguist

Other abbreviations designate different Protestant educational networks.

Nr of decree	Network	Type	Kambove	Kasenga	Kipushi	Likasi	Mitwaba	Pweto	Sakania	EP total	ES total	Total per decree
0450/2004 du 24/12/2004	Cath.	EP		14			2	7		23		
		ES		3				1			4	27
0452/2004 du 24/12/2004	Cath.	EP		4			1	3		8		
		ES		4			1	8			13	21
0922/2005 du 25/05/005	Cath.	EP						1				
		ES						1				2
01281/2005 du 17/11/2005	Prot. (38e)	EP	4	2			1	11		18		
		ES	1					4	1		6	24
0160/2006 du 18/07/2006	Prot. (8e)	EP	6	2	1			2		11		
		ES	6	2	1			2			11	22
0519/2006 du 11/12/2006	Prot. (29e)	EP						8		8		
		ES						4			4	
	Prot. (38e)	EP						4		4		
		ES						4			4	
	Prot. (30e)	EP						1		1		
		ES									0	

Dossier	Catégorie									Total	Total gén.
	non-conv.	EP						4		4		
		ES						2			2	27
0278/2008 du 04/09/2008	Cath.	EP	9	5		8	33	16	2	73		
		ES	4			5	6	5			20	
	Adv.	EP					2				2	
		ES									0	
	Prot. (2e)	EP									0	
		ES		1							1	
	Prot. (21e)	EP					2				2	
		ES									0	
	Prot. (29e)	EP							1	1		
		ES									0	
	Prot. (30e)	EP		1							1	
		ES									0	
	Prot. (38e)	EP		2			3	13		18		
		ES		2				1			3	
	Prot. (42e)	EP			2						2	
		ES									0	
	Prot. (45e)	EP									0	
		ES					1				1	
	Prot. (59e)	EP	1					2		3		
		ES					1				1	
	Prot. (*?*)	EP									0	
		ES						2			2	
	non-conv.	EP		3	4	2	6	4	1	20		
		ES		1		1	1	1			4	154
0053/2009 du 17/02/2009	Cath.	EP		2				2		4		
		ES						3			3	
	Adv.	EP									0	
		ES						1			1	
	Prot. (2e)	EP		3							3	
		ES									0	
	Prot. (29e)	EP						5		5		
		ES						2			2	

Ref	Denom.		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total	Grand
	Prot. (30e)	EP		1						1	
		ES		1						1	
	Prot. (38e)	EP		8				5		13	
		ES		4				6		10	
	non-conv.	EP		4	1			9		14	
		ES						5		5	62
0474/2009 du 19/11/2009	Cath.	EP	6							6	
		ES	5							5	
	Prot. (29e)	EP	6							6	
		ES	5							5	22
	Cath.	EP				1				1	
		ES								0	
0065/2010 du 16/02/2010	Orth.	EP				1				1	
		ES				1				1	
	ECJ/CEP	EP			1	1				2	
		ES	1		1	1				3	
	non-conv.	EP				7				7	
		ES	1			2				3	18
0109/2010 du 19/02/2010	Cath.	EP			4		2	6	1	13	
		ES			7		1	6	6	20	
	Prot. (38e)	EP					10	2		12	
		ES					5			5	
	Prot. (45e)	EP						1		1	
		ES								0	
	Prot. (59e)	EP						1		1	
		ES								0	
	non-conv.	EP					2			2	
		ES					4			4	58
0224/2010 not available	Cath.	EP								0	
		ES								0	
	Prot.	EP								0	
		ES								0	
	non-conv.	EP								0	
		ES								0	
	Cath.	EP					2			2	
		ES					2			2	

Réf.	Confession	Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Sous-total	Total
0439/2010 du 25/09/2010	Prot. (AICC)	EP					1			1	
		ES									0
	non-conv.	EP					10			10	
		ES					2			2	17
0312/2011 du 18/03/2011	Prot. (AICC)	EP	4	7	5	5	4	7	4	36	
		ES	1	1	1	4	1	2	1	11	47
0321/2011 du 18/03/2011	non-conv.	EP					1			1	
		ES					7			7	8
0399/2011 du 20/04/2011	Prot. (ERSAC)	EP	5							5	
		ES	3							3	8
0546/2011 du 11/06/2011	Cath.	EP						8		8	
		ES									0
	Prot. (2e)	EP						6		6	
		ES						3		3	
	Prot. (29e)	EP						6		6	
		ES						4		4	
	Prot. (38e)	EP						2		2	
		ES						2		2	
	Prot. (Luth.)	EP						1		1	
		ES						1		1	
	Adv.	EP						1		1	
		ES						1		1	35
0739/2011 du 23/08/2011	Cath.	EP	7				4			11	
		ES	3				4			7	
	Prot. (29e)	EP								0	
		ES	3							3	
	Prot. (59e)	EP					3			3	
		ES					2			2	
	Prot. (AICC)	EP	4				3			7	
		ES	1				1			2	
	Kimb.	EP								0	
		ES	1							1	

	non-conv.	EP	1							1	
		ES	4				2			6	43
1091/2011 du 18/10/2011	Cath.	EP				6	2		1	9	
		ES				1	2		1	4	
	Prot. (7e)	EP			1					1	
		ES			1					1	
	Prot. (29e)	EP								0	
		ES				1				1	
	Prot. (36e)	EP			4					4	
		ES								0	
	Prot. (AICC)	EP					2			2	
		ES								0	
	non-conv.	EP					2			2	
		ES					8			8	32
1349/2011 du 28/12/2011	Cath.	EP				6	2	1	1	10	
		ES					1		1	2	
	Prot. (36e)	EP						3		3	
		ES								0	
	Prot. (42e)	EP	1							1	
		ES	1							1	
	non-conv.	EP					2			2	
		ES					10			10	29
0509/2012 du 02/08/2012	Cath.	EP								0	
		ES		1						1	1
0093/2013 du 14/02/2013	Prot. (38e)	EP	1							1	
		ES	2							2	
	Prot. (59e)	EP	1							1	
		ES	1							1	5
0291/2013 du 03/06/2013	Prot. (37e)	EP	11							11	
		ES	6							6	17
0306/2013 du 24/06/2013	Cath.	EP		27			5			32	
		ES		11			4			15	
	Adv.	EP					1			1	
		ES					1			1	

Kimb.	EP	4							4		
	ES	6				1				7	
Prot. (30e)	EP					2			2		
	ES									0	
Prot. (38e)	EP					1			1		
	ES									0	
Prot. (45e)	EP					2			2		
	ES									0	
Prot. (54e)	EP					1			1		
	ES					1				1	
Prot. (59e)	EP					1			1		
	ES									0	
non-conv.	EP	47		11		3			61		
	ES	15		4		2				21	150
SUM		188	116	49	53	184	218	21	544	283	829

Appendix 4: Examples of interview guides

My interview guides varied depending on the type of interviewee. I consistently modified interview guides and adapted them to the interviewee; there is not one single guide with fully formulated questions. I mainly used bullet points and then formulated the questions during the conversation. In some cases, interview questions were very targeted and closed. For instance, I sat with one educational administrator with a list of schools that I identified on accreditation decrees and we went through the list, identifying schools that existed, that did not exist, that he did not request, etc. In other cases I asked one open question and the interviewee responded elaborately. For exemplary purposes, let me provide an example of a semi-structured interview guide with an educational administrator, during which I mainly focused on school accreditations, school construction costs, schools displacements and the administrations' reactions:

- Schools that did not return?
- Closed schools?
- Who demands/ manages/ distributes blank decrees?
- Growth of schools in last years (public or private?; network?; initiative?; what kind of construction?)
- Accreditation how?
- Last provisional authorisations [can I have them?] / accreditation / mécanisation?
- Who sends listings to schools ?
- Decrees without notification?
- Which colonial schools (years, denomination) still function?
    o History of secondary schools in this Territory
- School construction costs
- Case of EP x
    o Why did he demand his superior's authorisation?
    o Where is school now?
    o Maybe ask him which letters he has and ask him to bring others
    o Does EP x itself have the letters?
- PRRIS [government school construction program]
- World vision: construction of schools? (they announced constructions last year)
- EP y (just outside Mitwaba): since when?
- Regarding displaced schools: when does he send letters to the Proved, when does he take autonomous decisions?
- What is the role of FBO network administrators in finding temporary facilities for displaced schools?

In other cases, the list of questions was shorter but still led to a substantial conversation. For instance, when I conduced an interview with Caritas staff in Lubumbashi, I also addressed issues such as:

- Payments in Mitwaba
- History of payments in the different territories
- Payment modalities
- Operational costs (compared with the situation before 2013)
- Creation of the microfinance institution IFOD and implications
- Listings
- Schools' operational costs
- Contact with SECOPE field offices / principals
- Who is part of the team that actually disburses payments?

These interview guides formed the basis of the interviews and therefore of the primary data that I coded in the subsequent coding process. For a full list of codes, see the following appendix.

Appendix 5: List of codes (atlas.ti)

See Section 3.2 for an explanation of the coding process.

Codes 1-2 (accessibility)

Accessibility by road	Accessibility by road – Commerce

Codes 3-101 (Admin)

Admin – Donor	Admin - Donor – AFD	Admin - Donor – CDD	Admin - Donor – CERF	Admin - Donor - CTB	Admin - Donor - DFID
Admin - Donor - GTZ / GIZ	Admin - Donor - OSISA	Admin - Donor - PARSE	Admin - Donor - Per diem	Admin - Donor - Pooled Fund	Admin - Donor - PROSEB
Admin - Donor - Qatar foundation	Admin - Donor - Sub-cluster	Admin - Donor - UNICEF	Admin - Donor - World Bank	Admin – Provincial committee	Admin - Harmonisation
Admin - Customary	Admin - FBO	Admin - FBO - AICC	Admin - FBO - Catholic	Admin - FBO - Creation of offices	Admin - FBO - Priest
Admin - FBO - Kimbanguist	Admin - FBO - Missionaries	Admin - FBO - Protestant	Admin - FBO - Protestant - 29e	Admin - FBO - Protestant - 38e	Admin - FBO - Protestant - 54e
Admin - FBO - Protestant - 54e - Representative	Admin - FBO - Protestant - EPVO	Admin - FBO - Revivalist	Admin - gov't - ANR	Admin - gov't - AT	Admin - gov't - Comcon
Admin - gov't – Creation of Proveds	Admin - gov't - MPs	Admin - gov't - Decentralisation	Admin - gov't – Creation of new provinces	Admin - gov't – Pa Directorate	Admin - gov't – Infrastructural service
Admin - gov't - FARDC	Admin - gov't – Civil service	Admin - gov't - IFADEM	Admin - gov't - Inspection	Admin - gov't – Public persecutor	Admin - gov't - MEPSP
Admin - gov't - MESP	Admin - gov't - METP	Admin - gov't - MinBudget	Admin - gov't – Provincial Ministry of Ed.	Admin - gov't - Nganda	Admin - gov't - PIE
Admin - gov't - Politicians	Admin - gov't - Politics	Admin - gov't – Non-natif politics	Admin - gov't – Promises	Admin - gov't - Promo-Scolaire	Admin - gov't - Proved / Division
Admin - gov't - PRRIS	Admin - gov't - Reciprocity	Admin - gov't - schools	Admin - gov't - SECOPE	Admin - gov't - SECOPE - RINS	Admin - gov't - SERNIE

Admin - gov't - SIGE	Admin - gov't - SNEL	Admin - gov't - Sous-Proved / Sous-Division	Admin - gov't – Statistics	Admin - NGO - ACP	Admin - NGO - ACTED
Admin - NGO - AFPAK	Admin - NGO - AIDES	Admin - NGO – Children space	Admin - NGO - APEC	Admin - NGO - APED	Admin - NGO – Accelerated learning
Admin - NGO - CID	Admin - NGO - Concernes	Admin - NGO - Coopi	Admin - NGO - CRS	Admin - NGO – Space for children	Admin - NGO - Humcorps
Admin - NGO - IRC	Admin - NGO - MONUSCO	Admin - NGO - OCHA	Admin - NGO - OIM	Admin - NGO - Oxfam	Admin - NGO - PAM
Admin - NGO - Reconfort	Admin - NGO - SADRI	Admin - NGO - SOS Kinshasa	Admin - NGO - UNHCR	Admin - NGO - Vipatu	Admin - NGO - Vision Mondiale
Admin - Reform	Admin –Civil society	Admin – Teacher unions			

Codes 102-166 (Bancarisation)

Banc.	Banc. - BCC	Banc. - Accountability	Banc. - Anecdotes	Banc. - BCC – Name a	Banc. – Debit card
Banc. - Cheque	Banc. – Choice of bank	Banc. Provincial pay committee	Banc. - Credit	Banc. - CSP	Banc. – Banking culture
Banc. – Pay directorate	Banc. - Distance	Banc. - ATMs	Banc. – Collateral damage	Banc. - Teachers	Banc. – Banking fees
Banc. – Operational costs (providers)	Banc. – Operational costs (schools)	Banc. – Mobile counters	Banc. - Taxes	Banc. - Inconvenients	Banc. - Liquidation
Banc. - Listings	Banc. - Local propositions	Banc. - Location - Kambove	Banc. - Location - Kasenga	Banc. - Location - Kipushi	Banc. - Location - Likasi
Banc. - Location - Pweto	Banc. - Location - Sakania	Banc. - Distrust	Banc. - Payment procedure	Banc. - Pension	Banc. - Phone companies
Banc. – Payment point	Banc. - pre-banc.	Banc. - Headmaster	Banc. - Procuration	Banc. - Provider - ACB	Banc. - Provider - Airtel
Banc. - Provider - BIC	Banc. - Provider - BIC/FBN	Banc. - Provider - Caritas	Banc. - Provider - Ecobank	Banc. - Provider - Groupe Service	Banc. - Provider - Mobile banking

Banc. - Provider - Rawbank	Banc. - Provider - Security companies	Banc. - Provider – Sub-providers	Banc. - Provider - Tigo	Banc. - Provider - TMB	Banc. - Provider - VODACOM
Banc. - Rapport	Banc. - Remainders	Banc. - Retard	Banc. – Withdrawals	Banc. – Distribution of clients	Banc. - Rumours
Banc. – Customer service	Banc. - Security	Banc. – Full salaries	Banc. – Voice		

Codes 166-169 (Budget)

Budget	Budget - Execution	Budget - Ponction	Budget – Retrocession

Codes 170-172 (Concepts)

Concept - Polycentric	Concept - Practical norms	Concepts – Clientelism

Codes 173-201 (Conflict)

Conflict	Conflict – Early warning	Conflict – Attacks on chief	Conflict – National refugee commission	Conflict - Date	Conflict - FARDC
Conflict - IDP	Conflict – Name a	Conflict - Location	Conflict - May Mayi – in village	Conflict - Mayi Mayi	Conflict - Mayi Mayi - "our brothers Mayi Mayi"
Conflict - Mayi Mayi – from elsewhere	Conflict - Mayi Mayi - Education	Conflict - Mayi Mayi – Associated youth	Conflict - Mayi Mayi – Name b	Conflict - Mayi Mayi - Letters	Conflict - Mayi Mayi - Reasons - Jealousy
Conflict - Mayi Mayi - Reasons – Vigilante justice	Conflict – Name c	Conflict - Pacification	Conflict – Name d	Conflict - Petition	Conflict – Name e
Conflict – Return to village	Conflict - RRMP	Conflict - Rumour	Conflict – Triangle of death	Conflict – Zambia	

Codes 202 (Corruption)

Corruption

Codes 203-221 (Education)

Education - Access	Education - Alphabetisation	Education - peace	Education - urgency	Education - Exams - ENAFEP	Education - Exams - EXADETA
Education - Exams - TENAFEP	Education – Training of trainers	Education - Students	Education – Teacher training	Education - Trainings	Education - Initiation to new citizenship
Education - LOI	Education - Textbooks	Education – Pedagogic section	Education – Technical section	Education - PBEA	Education - Curriculum
Education – Sensibilisation					

Codes 222-224 (Students)

Students - EADE	Students - Number	Students – Vulnerable students

Codes 225-249 (Teachers)

Teachers - Contract	Teachers - Conflict - Attacks against teachers	Teachers - Conflict - Attacks against teachers - Former students	Teachers - Conflict - Connectors	Teachers - Conflict - God	Teachers - Conflict - Displaced
Teachers - Conflict - Displacement - Multiple	Teachers - Conflict - Mayi Mayi threat	Teachers - Conflict - not abandoned	Teachers - Conflict - Reputation	Teachers - Conflict - Return	Teachers - Conflict - Return - Intrinsic
Teachers - Conflict - Return - Reasons - Authorities	Teachers - Conflict - Return - Reasons - Chief	Teachers - Conflict - Return - Reasons - Internal	Teachers - Conflict - Return - Reasons - Population	Teachers - Conflict - Revisited (by me)	Teachers - Conflict - Stream of consciousness
Teachers - Deployment	Teachers - Deployment - Desertion	Teachers - Deployment - Moratorium	Teachers - Headmasters	Teachers - Accommodation	Teachers - Revalorisation of the teaching profession
Teachers – Particular statute					

Codes 250-259 (Identification)

Identification	Identification - Biometrical	Identification - Students	Identification - *Informatisée*	Identification - *Mécanisation*	Identification - Update
Identification - *Nouvelles Unités*	Identification - *Payer le dossier*	Identification - *Census*	Identification – Schools		

Codes 260-265 (Individuals)

Individual a	Individual b	Individual c	Individuals d	Individuals e	Individuals f

Code 266 (Katanga disparities)

Katanga disparities

Code 267 (Local solutions)

Local solutions

Codes 268-284 (Location)

Location - Kafubu	Location - Kambove	Location - Kasenga	Location - Kasumbalesa	Location - Kipushi	Location - Kipushia
Location - Likasi	Location - Lubumbashi	Location - Mitwaba	Location - Mitwaba - Mufunga	Location - Mitwaba - Mwema	Location - Mokambo
Location - Mombe	Location - Mufunga Sampwe	Location - Mwema	Location - Pweto	Location – Sakania	

Code 285 (Mining)

Mining

Code 286 (Mobility)

Mobility

Codes 287-291 (Population)

Population	Population - Conflict - Attacks against population	Population - Conflict - Displacement	Population - conflict - return	Population – Pygmies

Codes 292-294 (Research)

Research - Paper quote - CER16	Research - Reflexivity	Research - Reflexivity – Demands

Code 295 (RESEN)

RESEN [National Education Sector Review]

Codes 296-305 (Salaries)

Salaries	Salaries - Arrears	Salaries - *Budgétisation*	Salaries - Distribution	Salaries - Death	Salaries - Grade
Salaries – Schools' structure	Salaries - Taxes	Salaries - Prime	Salaries – Pension		

Codes 306-366 (Schools)

Schools - Accountability	Schools – Compulsory acquisition	Schools - administrative costs	Schools - Decree	Schools - Decree - Moratorium	Schools - Bulletins
Schools – School kitchen	Schools – School map	Schools – Chasing students	Schools - *Cinquantenaire*	Schools - Cohabitation	Schools - Competition
Schools - conflict	Schools - conflict - admin threat	Schools - conflict - destruction of schools	Schools - conflict - displacement	Schools - conflict – Urgency schools	Schools - conflict - not attacked
Schools - Conflict - Not re-opened	Schools - Conflict - Looting	Schools - conflict - return	Schools - Conflict - Return - NGO	Schools - Conflict - Use of schools	Schools – School construction
Schools - School construction – Year of creation	Schools - School construction - Incomplete	Schools – Parental committee	Schools - Dictation	Schools – School in progression	Schools - EP
Schools - EP - EP a	Schools - EP - EP b	Schools - EP - EP c	Schools - EP - EP d	Schools - ES	Schools - ES - Inst a
Schools - Ecoles *agréées non-mécanisées*	Schools – Number of students	Schools - Expansion	Schools – model schools	Schools – Enrolment fees	Schools – Operational costs
Schools – School fees	Schools – School financial mgt	Schools – *Gratuité* (free primary schooling)	Schools – School infrastructure	Schools - Katanga 1 schools	Schools – School kits
Schools - Latrines	Schools - Local conflicts	Schools - *non-agréées*	Schools - *non-mécanisées*	Schools – not viable	Schools - Numbers
Schools - Rapports	Schools – Teacher representative	Schools – Withdrawal of grade sheets	Schools - SBM	Schools - Guard	Schools - Student-Teacher-Ratio

Schools – Antennas					

Codes 367-368 (Technology)

Technology - Internet	Technology - Phones

Appendix 6: Background to the armed conflict in Northern Haut-Katanga

Appendix 6 provides background information to the armed conflict that was presented mainly in Chapter 8. The information is not essential to the comprehension of the main argument, but is provided here in order to allow for a more holistic understanding of the context.

The armed conflict in question has taken place in the so-called *triangle de la mort* (triangle of death), which schematically demarcates an area between the capitals of three territories (see Map 3.1 and Map 8.1). Pweto lies east, next to Lake Mwero and the Zambian border. Mitwaba is the southernmost of the three cities and the distance to the provincial capital of Lubumbashi is about 530 km. The next biggest city, Likasi, lies at approximately 400 km to the south and can be reached through a largely non-asphalted street. Manono is in the north, but not part of this study as it is located in a different educational division. In general, transport infrastructure in the area is very poor, all asphalted streets stopping well before the area. Over time, the triangle slowly turned into the so-called *polygon of death* (including the neighbouring territories of Kalemie, Malemba-Nkulu and Moba) as the militia's activities expanded.

The conflict under study is only one among several armed conflicts in the former province of Katanga (ASADHO, CDH, and CVDHO 2003; Berghezan 2016). In 2006 these conflicts were already called "The Congo's forgotten crisis" (International Crisis Group 2006, 1) and the current situation is seen as a "calm before the storm" (Berghezan 2016, 1). The conflict under study dates back at least to the beginning of the second Congolese war (1998-2003). In 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila (father of current President Joseph Kabila) had ousted President Mobutu with the help of Rwandan and Ugandan troops. One year later, after he decided to cut ties with his former allies, he faced these same troops invading the Congo. He rapidly turned to strategies of *popular autodefense forces* (De Villers, Omasombo, and Kennes 2001). Kabila provided arms to local populations to fight the aggressors independently of the regular army. Among these populations there had already been some self-defending groups, emerging since 1993-1994 (De Villers, Omasombo, and Kennes 2001). Especially in North and South Kivu, but also elsewhere in the country, these groups became known as *Mayi Mayi*. The name Mayi Mayi (Water Water in Swahili) refers to a ritual of "sprinkling young soldiers with 'magic water', the mayi, which is believed to protect warriors from bullets" (Jourdan 2011, 90). It can also refer to the Mayi Mayi belief that these bullets are transformed into water.

The story of the Mayi Mayi is very complex and dates back to the 1960s (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001, 67). Mayi Mayi have never been regular government troops; they have had their own agendas and used to be highly autonomous (De Villers, Omasombo, and Kennes 2001). Whereas in the beginning their main purpose was to defend their territories and civilians, there is an increasing "difficult distinction between self-defending Mayi Mayi and profit-seeking warlords" (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001, 67). Self-defence and self-enrichment have long gone hand-in-hand (De Villers, Omasombo, and Kennes 2001).

Vlassenroot and Van Acker (2001, 60) summarise that the label Mayi Mayi has become a catchphrase for all militias made up of autochthone people:

> "Today, the Mayi-Mayi are covering a variety of groups that includes both well-defined and structured groups with a clear political agenda and loose gangs of social bandits, only using the name of Mayi-Mayi to cover their violent behaviour and abuse of the population."

Autesserre (2009, 264) criticises that they are often represented through "'folkloric' aspects of the Mai Mai militias, such as reliance on supernatural powers and fighting naked". As Vlassenroot and van Acker (2001, 53) point out, it would be short-sighted to interpret these forms of violence as a new wave of "African Barbarism". In fact, these armed groups are embedded in economic, social and political networks that range from local relations to villagers and former neighbours to the global trade of minerals and resources and the role of Congolese and foreign political elites in upholding the conflict. Moreover, several high-ranking Mayi Mayi were integrated into the regular army; some eventually received political positions whereas others were not included in these political bargains (Autesserre 2009).

However, the goals and political leadership of the Mayi Mayi have become more obscure (International Crisis Group 2006). There have been two main periods of attacks in the region under study: major attacks in the *triangle of death* took place between 2001 and 2006 and especially since 2011, after the liberation of one their leaders Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga Wa Bafunkwa Kanonga from the Kasapa prison in Lubumbashi. Since 2011 the group adopted the name "Bakata Katanga"[88] and their corresponding official political objective is to fight for the independence of Katanga. They relate back to political claims for independence most prevalent in the 1960s (Independence of Katanga declared by Moïse Tshombe, supported by Belgian troops) and the 1970s (two Shaba/Katanga wars, again claims of independence by militias) (Kennes and Larmer 2016). For that reason, Kennes and Larmer (2016) qualify them as "neosecessionist movements". The Bakata Katanga have devastated many villages and attacked civilians which all lead to a humanitarian catastrophe. Attacks in the areas under study were most fierce between December 2012 and October 2014 (see all interviews in Pweto and Mitwaba, in 2015 and 2016). Spectacularly, a group of Mayi Mayi entered Lubumbashi on March 23rd 2013 and raised the flag of the independent Katanga from the 1960s (Kennes and Larmer 2016). Reliable sources point to the implication of high-ranking politicians and military men in this conflict (Berghezan 2016; Englebert 2016b). Former Congolese General John Numbi is among the most cited individuals (Berghezan 2016; Kennes and Larmer 2016). These sources are corroborated by my findings in the field. However, although the question of political leadership is crucial, it does not reveal the local-level intricacies of the conflict. It is important to underline that high-level political orchestration does not mean that individual

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[88] Meaning "cutting/separating [the province of] Katanga".

fighters do not have other reasons for joining the militia. The two dynamics can be complementary.

This thesis investigates the political economy and social dynamics surrounding administrative knowledge, focusing on public school teachers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). State administrations rely on knowledge about their employees in order to ensure transparent payroll management. Therefore, for decades, donors in the DRC have advocated for establishing a comprehensive teacher database. However, an administrative reform is not a mere technicality and the database has remained incomplete as of 2016. The success of such a reform depends on organisational, economic and infrastructural challenges that go well beyond the ambit of policy-makers. Exploring these challenges, this thesis is mainly interested in the persistence of the reform agenda and its effects. It concludes that the constant pursuit of improved administrative knowledge about teachers has strengthened state authority despite poor performance in public service delivery. Thereby, these insights contribute to a better understanding of the multiple relations between education systems, state authority and the international development industry.

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