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Use theories of meaning: between conventions and social norms

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Appendix A

List of named theses

In this appendix, a list of named theses is provided for reference purposes. For each thesis, all occurrences are listed with a page reference.

A1.   If x believes y, then x recognizes y. *Occurrences: p. 150.*

A1′.   If x expects y, then x recognizes y. *Occurrences: p. 150.*

A2. x expects y iff x has reason to believe y and x is rational to the (high enough) degree n. *Occurrences: p. 150.*

A3.   I reason rationally to a high enough degree. *Occurrences: p. 150.*

A4.   I expect that you expect that I am rational. *Occurrences: p. 151.*

A5.   I expect that you are rational. *Occurrences: p. 151.*

ALR1. The meaning of an expression in a natural language of a population is determined by the population's use of an abstract language corresponding to the natural language. *Occurrences: p. 157.*

ALR2. A population uses an abstract language $\mathcal{L}$ iff there are conventions of truthfulness and trust in $\mathcal{L}$ among the members of the population. *Occurrences: p. 158.*

ALR3. There are conventions of truthfulness and trust in an abstract language $\mathcal{L}$ among members of a population P iff speakers of P try to avoid uttering sentences not true in $\mathcal{L}$ (truthfulness) and hearers of P tend to believe that sentences uttered by speakers of P are true in $\mathcal{L}$ (trust). *Occurrences: p. 158.*

ALR-E. Expression e means m in $\mathcal{L}_\Gamma$ of P iff P uses Γ and Γ pairs e with m. *Occurrences: p. 162.*

ALR-E′. Expression e means m in $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{T}$ of P iff (i) P uses $\mathcal{L}$, (ii) $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_\mathcal{T}$, (iii) members of P process $\mathcal{L}$-utterances via an $\mathcal{L}$-determining translator $\mathcal{T}$, (iv) $\mathcal{T}$ generates $\mathcal{L}_\mathcal{T}$, and (v) $\mathcal{T}$ pairs e with m. *Occurrences: p. 170.*

ALR-S. Sentence s means m in $\mathcal{L}$ used by P iff P uses $\mathcal{L}$ and $\mathcal{L}(s) = m$. *Occurrences: p. 162.*

C.   For all expressions e, meanings m, coordinates $\mathcal{C}$: The conventional use of e at $\mathcal{C}$ determines that e means m at $\mathcal{C}$. *Occurrences: p. 6, 29, 32.*

C′.   For all expressions e, meanings m, coordinates $\mathcal{C}$: The stable use of e at $\mathcal{C}$ determines that e means m at $\mathcal{C}$. *Occurrences: p. 32, 171, 194.*

C″.   For all expressions e, meanings m, coordinates $\mathcal{C}$: The stable linguistic use of e at $\mathcal{C}$ determines that e means m at $\mathcal{C}$. *Occurrences: p. 172, 194, 293.*

C−N−. Meaning is neither conventional nor normative. *Occurrences: p. 6.*

C−N+. Meaning is not conventional but normative. *Occurrences: p. 6.*

C+N−. Meaning is conventional but not normative. *Occurrences: p. 6.*

C+N+. Meaning is both conventional and normative. *Occurrences: p. 6.*

C0.   A convention is *social*: there is a group G of agents. *Occurrences: p. 22.*

C1.   A convention *involves a pattern of activity*: (i) there is a pattern R of individual activities of members of G, (ii) R determines for a range of activities whether they are conforming or deviating, and (iii) at least on some occasions, members of G would behave in a way conforming to R. *Occurrences: p. 22.*

C2.   A convention *requires coordination*: Members of G have (together) an effective coordinative disposition to behave in a way conforming to R. *Occurrences: p. 22.*

C3.   A convention is *relatively robust*: in all near futures, it exists as well. *Occurrences: p. 22.*

C-M. If there is a conventional SCH-pattern for description δ indicating content+ μ with derivational complexity z among members of group g at time t in world w and δ's derivational complexity does not exceed z, then δ means μ among members of g at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 276.*

C-NC. Other things being equal, when a convention becomes entrenched among human members, it becomes a normative convention. *Occurrences: p. 248.*

CS. There is a normal situation in which a sender of a conventional signaling system produces ("utters") a signal in a way conforming to the signaling convention. *Occurrences: p. 147.*

CS′. There is a normal situation in which a sender of a conventional signaling system produces ("utters") a signal in a way conforming to the signaling convention iff

    a. There is a regularity R in situations which are two-sided signaling problems G among you and me, and R is a conventional signaling system $\langle \sigma, \rho \rangle$ among us.

    b. Let m be a message, t a state the world can be in, and a a response such that $m = \sigma(t)$ and $a = \rho(m)$.

    c. There is a situation t which is a two-sided signaling problem of type G where I am the sender and you are the receiver.

    d. I have observed that t holds.

    e. I signal m in conformity to our convention.

    f. The convention is "perfect," that is, there are no exceptions to it. *Occurrences: p. 149.*

C-SLU. If there is a conventional SCH-pattern for description δ indicating content+ μ with derivational complexity z among members of group g at time t in world w, then there is a stable linguistic use of δ indicating μ with derivational complexity z among members of g at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 277.*

DSN1. The enforcers have power over the addressees at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 246.*

DSN2. The enforcers tend to sanction the addressees' R-concerning behavior at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 246.*

DSN3. The addressees tend to behave according to R at least partly because of (DSN2) the enforcers' tendency to sanction their R-concerning behavior at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 246.*

FM1. *First meaning is systematic.* A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of others on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings of utterances. *Occurrences: p. 77.*

FM2. *First meanings are shared.* For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in FM1. *Occurrences: p. 77.*

FM3. *First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities.* The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character. *Occurrences: p. 77.*

G1.   We express normative attitudes with normative statements. *Occurrences: p. 237.*

G2.   Normative attitudes are a special type of conative mental states. *Occurrences: p. 237.*

G3.   Since normative attitudes are conative, normative statements do not have a descriptive but an "imperative" character. *Occurrences: p. 237.*

GS.   *A*-facts supervene globally on *B*-facts iff any world which is a minimal *B*-duplicate of our world is also an *A*-duplicate of our world. *Occurrences: p. 13.*

H.   For any language $\mathcal{L}$: The meaning of (almost) any expression of $\mathcal{L}$ depends on the meanings of (almost) all other expressions of $\mathcal{L}$; *i.e.* each difference between $\mathcal{L}$ and another language $\mathcal{L}'$ implies that the expressions in $\mathcal{L}$ have other meanings than the expressions in $\mathcal{L}'$. *Occurrences: p. 207.*

HD.   If it's the use of expressions in a community which determines their meanings, then in which way does this determination depend on the members and the circumstances? *Occurrences: p. 36, 288.*

I1.   According to conventionalist accounts, the literal meaning of an expression on a particular occasion of use is its *specific first meaning*. *Occurrences: p. 78.*

I2.   A necessary condition for successful linguistic communication is that the hearer understands the expression the speaker uttered in its generic first meaning. *Occurrences: p. 78.*

I3.   There are cases (occasions) of successful linguistic communication with malapropisms. *Occurrences: p. 80.*

I4.   According to conventionalist accounts, in case of successful linguistic communication with a malapropism, a hearer understands the malapropism the speaker uttered in its specific first meaning. *Occurrences: p. 80.*

I5. In cases of successful communication with malapropisms, the malapropism's generic first meaning is not identical to its contextually-relativized conventional meaning. *Occurrences: p. 81.*

I6. In cases of successful communication with malapropisms, if a hearer understands an expression a speaker uttered in its generic first meaning, then she doesn't understand it in its (contextually-relativized) conventional meaning (and *vice versa*). *Occurrences: p. 81.*

JSN3. Each enforcer could accept a system of norms of which N is a part at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 245.*

LSM1. I signal m with the intention that you do a. *Occurrences: p. 148.*

LSM2. I expect you to recognize my intention that you do a, when you observe that I signal m. *Occurrences: p. 148.*

LSM2′. I expect that (you expect that (I intend that you do a), when you observe that I signal m). *Occurrences: p. 150.*

LSM2′a. I expect that (you expect that t holds, when you observe that I signal m). *Occurrences: p. 151.*

LSM2′b. I expect that you expect that I desire that you do a, conditionally upon t. *Occurrences: p. 151.*

LSM2′c. I expect that you expect that (I desire that you do a, when you observe that I signal m). *Occurrences: p. 151.*

LSM2′d. I expect that you expect that I expect that (you do a, when you observe that I signal m). *Occurrences: p. 151.*

LSM3. I expect your recognition of my intention to be effective in bringing it about that you do a. I do not regard it as a foregone conclusion that my action will bring it about that you do a, whether or not you recognize my intention that you do a. *Occurrences: p. 148.*

LSN1. There is a stable linguistic use among the arbitrators at time t in world w whose pattern of activity is Θ. *Occurrences: p. 278.*

LSN2. There is a system of norms N according to which the addressees are N-required to conform to Θ and N-forbidden to deviate from Θ. *Occurrences: p. 279.*

LSN3. There is a rationalistic social norm to conform to Θ among the addressees enforced by the enforcers accepting N at time t in world w. *Occurrences: p. 279.*

MD-ME. If meaning is normative, then this is because of the way it is constituted (determined). *Occurrences: p. 41.*

MI1. Expression types are reproductively established families of expression tokens. That is, expressions are individuated by the reproduction chain of patterns in which the expressions occur. *Occurrences: p. 198.*

MI2. Meaningful expressions don't have a meaning relative to a language. *Occurrences: p. 199.*

MI3. Expression e means semantic mapping function $\mathcal{M}$ iff (i) e has the stabilizing function ϕ and (ii) for all tokenings t of e: if t performs ϕ, then t maps onto world affairs according to $\mathcal{M}$. *Occurrences: p. 202.*

MI4. Expression e means semantic mapping function $\mathcal{M}$ iff e's use pattern is a coordination convention which proliferates because (i) e has the stabilizing function ϕ and (ii) for all tokenings t of e: if t performs ϕ, then t maps onto world affairs according to $\mathcal{M}$. *Occurrences: p. 205.*

N. For all expressions e, meanings m and coordinates $\mathcal{C}$: If e means m at $\mathcal{C}$, then utterances of "e means m at $\mathcal{C}$" can be used to express an *ought* with a demanding character. *Occurrences: p. 6, 17, 40, 65.*

N′. For all expressions e, meanings m and coordinates $\mathcal{C}$: If e means m at $\mathcal{C}$ in virtue of a social norm, then the enforcers of the social norm can demand that the addressees use e in accordance with its meaning m at $\mathcal{C}$ (by uttering "e means m at $\mathcal{C}$" which expresses an *ought* with a demanding character). *Occurrences: p. 65, 284, 293.*

N″. For all descriptions δ, meanings m and coordinates $\mathcal{C}$: If e means m at $\mathcal{C}$ in virtue of a social norm, then the enforcers of the social norm can demand that the addressees use δ in accordance with its meaning m at $\mathcal{C}$ (by uttering "δ means m at $\mathcal{C}$" which expresses an *ought* with a demanding character). *Occurrences: p. 284.*

N1. It's a practical *must*. The object of the *must* are actions. Sometimes, the object can also be a state, the possession of a property, or the attaining of something, on condition that it is one's own acting that gets oneself in such a state or in the possession of the properties. *Occurrences: p. 14.*

N2. A normative *must* does not rule out that one acts differently than how one must. A normative *must* is not a force that inevitably moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action. *Occurrences: p. 14.*

N3. Normative *musts* are tied to a pressure to act. It presses its addressee to do certain actions. *Occurrences: p. 15.*

N4. The normative *must* is always ontologically subjective. Its existence depends on thinking, feeling, and wanting of humans (or other living creatures). *Occurrences: p. 15.*

NA1. Normative attitudes are logically combinable. Example: Suppose I *N*-want to clean the kitchen on Sunday. I also *N*-want to write a letter on Tuesday. Then I *N*-want to do both. *Occurrences: p. 238.*

NA2. Normative attitudes are under consistency pressure. Example Suppose I *N*-want to clean the kitchen on Sunday and to go to the football match. But only one goal can be realized. Hence I *N*-want to give up one of my *N*-wants. *Occurrences: p. 239.*

NA3. Normative attitudes are generalizable. Example: Suppose *I N*-want you not to harm other people. Then I *N*-want *everyone* not to do harm to them. *Occurrences: p. 239.*

NA4. Normative attitudes are embedded in a hierarchy of higher-order normative attitudes. Example: Suppose I *N*-want to clean the kitchen on Sunday. Then I *N*-want to have this *N*-want. *Occurrences: p. 239.*

NDP. An agent in a decision problem under uncertainty ought to perform a subjectively rational strategy. *Occurrences: p. 97.*

NE. A strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium iff for all other strategy profiles s' which agree on what player 1 does in s, $u_2(s) \geq u_2(s')$, and for all other strategy profiles s'' which agree on what player 2 does in s, $u_1(s) \geq u_1(s'')$. *Occurrences: p. 98.*

PCE. A strategy profile s is a proper coordination equilibrium iff for all other strategy profiles s' which agree on what player 1 does in s, $u_2(s) > u_2(s')$ $\underline{\text{and}}$ $u_1(s) > u_1(s')$, and for all other strategy profiles s'' which agree on what player 2 does in s, $u_1(s) > u_1(s'')$ $\underline{\text{and}}$ $u_2(s) > u_2(s'')$. *Occurrences: p. 99.*

PF. A thing x has the proper function to ϕ iff x exists and is the way it is because the ancestors of x have performed ϕ sufficiently often. *Occurrences: p. 197.*

RSN1. The enforcers have power over the addressees at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 232, 235.*

RSN1′. For all enforcers e and all addressees g: e has power over g at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 235.*

RSN1″. The enforcers could form a coalition that would together have power over any coalition the addressees could possibly form. *Occurrences: p. 235.*

RSN2. According to N, the addressees are N-required to conform to R and N-forbidden to deviate from R. *Occurrences: p. 232, 239.*

RSN3. Each enforcer accepts a system of norms of which N is a part at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 232, 240.*

RSN4. The enforcers tend to sanction the addressees' R-concerning behavior at least partly because of (RSN3) their accepting N at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 232, 240.*

RSN5. The addressees tend to behave according to R at least partly because of (RSN4) the enforcers' tendency to sanction their R-concerning behavior at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 232, 240.*

S0. A social norm is *social*: there are various not necessarily disjoint groups including (i) a group E of enforcers and (ii) a group G of addressees. *Occurrences: p. 26, 231.*

S1. A social norm *involves a pattern of activity*: (i) there is a pattern R of individual activities of the addressees, (ii) R determines for a range of activities whether they are conforming or deviating, and (iii) at least on some occasions, the addressees would behave in a way conforming to R. *Occurrences: p. 26, 231.*

S2. A social norm is *prescriptive*: A social norm is, in part, constituted by a norm N which determines for a range of activities whether they are prescribed, forbidden, or allowed. The norm N prescribes to conform to R. N is enforced by the enforcers who accept it and have power over the addressees. *Occurrences: p. 26, 231.*

S3. A social norm has a *demanding character*: The enforcers are in a position to demand conformity to R from the addressees. *Occurrences: p. 27, 231.*

S4. A social norm is *relatively robust*: in all near futures, the enforcers accept the same norm and at least on some occasions, the addressees behave in a way conforming to R. *Occurrences: p. 27, 232.*

SG1. A theoretically interesting part of natural languages can be explained by signaling systems. *Occurrences: p. 124.*

SG2. Important parts of a signaling system are: (i) signals, (ii) a population, (iii) a sender and receiver role, (iv) states of affairs observable by senders, (v) reactions of receivers, (vi) a pattern of activity prevailing in the population to use *signals* according to certain *contingency plans*. The contingency plans for the members of the population consist of two parts, one for the sender-role and one for the receiver-role.

   a. A sender's plan determines which signal to produce depending on what the sender has observed, her desires, and her beliefs.

   b. A receiver's plan determines how to react to an observed signal depending on her desires and beliefs. *Occurrences: p. 124.*

SG3. Signals in a signaling system have a meaning in virtue of the fact that there is a pattern of activity that is a convention in the population. Which meanings the signals have depends on the pattern which is the convention. *Occurrences: p. 124.*

SG-G. Normally, senders speaker-mean something (in *Grice*'s sense) when they utter a verbal expression conforming to a signaling convention they are party to. *Occurrences: p. 147.*

SLU-M. If there is a stable linguistic use of description δ indicating content+ μ with derivational complexity z among members of group g at time t in world w and δ's derivational complexity does not exceed z, then δ means μ among members of g at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 277.*

SNE. A strategy profile s is a strict Nash equilibrium iff for all other strategy profiles s' which agree on what player 1 does in s, $u_2(s) > u_2(s')$, and for all other strategy profiles s'' which agree on what player 2 does in s, $u_1(s) > u_1(s'')$. *Occurrences: p. 98.*

SN-M. If there is a linguistic social norm for description δ indicating content+ μ with derivational complexity z addressed to members of group g at time t in world w and δ's derivational complexity does not exceed z, then δ means μ among the members of g at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 280.*

SN-SLU. If there is a linguistic social norm for description δ indicating content+ μ with derivational complexity z addressed to members of group g at time t in world w, then there is a stable linguistic use of δ indicating μ with derivational complexity z among members of g at t in w. *Occurrences: p. 280.*

SP. Sub-sentential expressions have the meanings they do *because* sentences in which they occur mean what they do. *Occurrences: p. 185.*

SRB. An action a in a decision problem under uncertainty is *subjectively rational* for its agent iff a is among the actions with the maximal expected utility, that is, $a \in \{\, a' \mid \neg\exists a'' : EU(a'') > EU(a') \,\}$. *Occurrences: p. 97.*

U. For all expressions e, meanings m, coordinates $\mathcal{C}$: The use of e at $\mathcal{C}$ determines that e means m at $\mathcal{C}$. *Occurrences: p. 5.*

VA. Conventions are verbally performed agreements. *Occurrences: p. 145.*